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INTERNATIONAL LAW

International Law

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

INTERNATIONAL LAW

International Law

VOL. I.—PEACE
2nd Edition
8vo. 18s. net

VOL. I.—PEACE
2nd Edition
8vo. £18.00 net

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.
LONDON, NEW YORK, BOMBAY, AND CALCUTTA

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.
LONDON, NEW YORK, MUMBAI, AND KOLKATA

International Law A Guide VOL. 2. WAR AND NEUTRALITY 2ND EDITION BY L. Oppenheim, M.A., LL.D.

WHEWELL PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW HONORARY MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF JURISPRUDENCE AT MADRID

WHEWELL PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW HONORARY MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF JURISPRUDENCE IN MADRID

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.

LONGMANS, GREEN & CO.

39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON

39 Paternoster Row, London

NEW YORK, BOMBAY, AND CALCUTTA

NEW YORK, MUMBAI, AND KOLKATA

1912

1912

All rights reserved

All rights reserved.

INTRODUCTION TO THE 2ND EDITION

The course of events since 1906, when the second volume of this work first made its appearance, and the results of further research have necessitated, as in the case of the first volume, the thorough revision of the text, the rewriting of many portions, and the discussion of a number of new topics. The additions to this volume are even more numerous than those to the first, with the consequence that, in spite of the typographical devices explained in the preface to the second edition of the first volume, the text of this volume has been increased by one hundred pages. The increase is, in some measure, due to the fact that the thirteen Conventions of the Second Hague Peace Conference, and, further, the Declaration of London, are fully discussed and expounded. But the increase is also due to the fact that a number of other new topics have been discussed; I will only mention the questions whether enemy subjects have persona standi in judicio100a), and whether trading with enemy subjects is permitted (§ 101).

The events since 1906, when the second volume of this work was first published, along with the results of further research, have required a complete revision of the text, the rewriting of many sections, and the inclusion of several new topics, just like in the first volume. The additions in this volume are even more extensive than those in the first, resulting in an increase of one hundred pages in the text, despite the formatting methods explained in the preface of the second edition of the first volume. This growth is partly because the thirteen Conventions of the Second Hague Peace Conference, as well as the Declaration of London, are discussed in detail. However, the increase is also attributed to the exploration of several other new topics; I will just mention the questions of whether enemy subjects have persona standi in judicio100a) and whether trading with enemy subjects is allowed (§ 101).

The system of the work, with but occasional slight alterations in arrangement and the headings of the sections, remains the same. In those cases, however, in which a portion had to be entirely rewritten—as, for instance, that on Enemy Character, that on Commencement of War, and that on Unneutral Service—the arrangement of the topics differs from that in the first [Pg vi]edition, and the headings of the sections also differ. Apart from many new sections, a whole chapter treating of the proposed International Prize Court has been added at the end of the volume.

The structure of the work, with only a few minor changes in organization and section titles, remains unchanged. However, in cases where a section had to be completely rewritten—such as those on Enemy Character, Commencement of War, and Unneutral Service—the order of the topics is different from the first [Pg vi] edition, and the section titles have also changed. In addition to many new sections, a whole chapter discussing the proposed International Prize Court has been added at the end of the volume.

Since some of the Conventions produced by the Second Peace Conference, and, further, the Declaration of London, have not yet been ratified, the task of the writer of a comprehensive treatise on International Law is very difficult: he must certainly not treat the rules in these unratified documents as law, but, on the other hand, he must not ignore them. For this reason the right method seemed to be to give everywhere the law hitherto prevailing, and to give also the changes in the law which are proposed by these unratified documents. I venture to hope that this method will enable the reader to form a judgment of his own with regard to the merits of the Declaration of London. I have not concealed my conviction that the ratification of this Declaration would mark great progress in the development of International Law, since it offers a common agreement upon a number of subjects concerning which there has been hitherto much discord both in theory and practice. But I have endeavoured to put the matter impartially before the reader, and I have taken special care to draw attention to very numerous points which have not been settled by the Declaration of London.

Since some of the Conventions created by the Second Peace Conference, along with the Declaration of London, haven't been ratified yet, writing a comprehensive book on International Law is quite challenging. The author definitely shouldn't consider the rules in these unratified documents as law, but at the same time, they shouldn't be overlooked. Therefore, the best approach seemed to be to present the existing law and also outline the changes proposed by these unratified documents. I hope this method will allow the reader to form their own opinion about the merits of the Declaration of London. I believe that ratifying this Declaration would signify significant progress in the development of International Law, as it provides a common ground on several issues that have previously caused a lot of disagreement in both theory and practice. However, I've tried to present the matter fairly to the reader and have made a special effort to highlight many points that the Declaration of London does not address.

In revising and rewriting this volume I have remained true to the principle of impartiality, neither taking the part of any one nation, nor denouncing any other. The discredit which International Law concerning War and Neutrality suffers in the minds of certain sections of the public is largely due to the fact that many writers have not in the past approached the subject with that impartial and truly international spirit which is indispensable for its proper treatment.

In updating and rewriting this book, I’ve stayed committed to the principle of fairness, not siding with any one nation or criticizing another. The loss of credibility that International Law related to War and Neutrality has in the eyes of some people is mostly because many writers haven’t approached the topic with the unbiased and genuinely international mindset that’s essential for addressing it properly.

Many friends of the book have asked that the[Pg vii] second edition might, in the Appendix, offer an English translation of the French texts concerned. I was prepared to accede to their request, but had to abstain from doing so on account of the fact that the addition of a translation would have made the volume too bulky for convenience; the new Conventions of the Second Hague Peace Conference, the Declaration of London together with the Report of the Drafting Committee of the Naval Conference of London, the Naval Prize Bill of 1911, and the Geneva Convention Act of 1911, all of which necessarily had to be added, having increased the Appendix very considerably.

Many friends of the book have requested that the[Pg vii] second edition include an English translation of the relevant French texts in the Appendix. I was willing to fulfill their request, but I had to hold back because adding a translation would have made the volume too bulky for convenience. The new conventions from the Second Hague Peace Conference, the Declaration of London, along with the report from the Drafting Committee of the Naval Conference of London, the Naval Prize Bill of 1911, and the Geneva Convention Act of 1911—all of which needed to be included—have significantly increased the size of the Appendix.

It has been the aim of my assistants and myself to make the quotations in this and the preceding volume as correct as possible. However, considering that there are many thousands of citations, it would be a miracle if there were not numerous mistakes and misprints in them, in spite of the great care which has been bestowed upon the matter. I shall be most grateful, therefore, if readers will kindly draw my attention to any inaccuracy they may notice.

It’s been the goal of my assistants and me to make the quotes in this and the previous volume as accurate as possible. However, given that there are thousands of citations, it would be a miracle if there weren’t many mistakes and typos in them, despite the great care that has gone into this. I would greatly appreciate it if readers could point out any inaccuracies they notice.

My thanks are once more due to reviewers and readers who have drawn my attention to mistakes and misprints in the first edition; and I am again indebted to Miss B. M. Rutter and Mr. C. F. Pond for their valuable assistance in reading the proofs and in drawing up the Table of Cases and the alphabetical Index.

My thanks once again go to the reviewers and readers who pointed out mistakes and typos in the first edition; I'm also grateful to Miss B. M. Rutter and Mr. C. F. Pond for their valuable help in proofreading and creating the Table of Cases and the alphabetical Index.

L. OPPENHEIM.

L. Oppenheim.

Whewell House,
Cambridge,
    June 1, 1912.[Pg viii]

Whewell House,
Cambridge,
    June 1, 1912.[Pg viii]

ABBREVIATIONS OF TITLES OF BOOKS, ETC., QUOTED IN THE TEXT

The books referred to in the bibliography and notes are, as a rule, quoted with their full titles and the date of their publication. But certain books, periodicals, and Conventions which are very often referred to throughout this work are quoted in an abbreviated form, as follows:—

The books mentioned in the bibliography and notes are usually cited with their full titles and publication dates. However, some books, periodicals, and conventions that are frequently referenced in this work are cited in a shortened form, as follows:—

A.J. = The American Journal of International Law.

A.J. = The American Journal of International Law.

Annuaire = Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International.

Annuaire = Yearbook of the Institute of International Law.

Ariga = Ariga, La Guerre Russo-Japonaise (1908).

Ariga = Ariga, The Russo-Japanese War (1908).

Barboux = Barboux, Jurisprudence Du Conseil Des Prises Pendant La Guerre De 1870-71 (1871).

Barboux = Barboux, Jurisprudence of the Prize Court During the War of 1870-71 (1871).

Barclay, = Barclay, Problems of International Practice Problems and Diplomacy (1907).

Barclay, = Barclay, Problems of International Practice Problems and Diplomacy (1907).

Bernsten = Bernsten, Das Seekriegsrecht (1911).

Bernsten = Bernsten, The Law of Naval Warfare (1911).

Bluntschli = Bluntschli, Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staaten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt, 3rd ed. (1878).

Bluntschli = Bluntschli, The Modern Law of Nations of Civilized States Presented as a Legal Text, 3rd ed. (1878).

Boeck = Boeck, De La Propriété Privée Ennemie Sous Pavillon Ennemi (1882).

Boeck = Boeck, The Enemy of Private Property Under Enemy Flag (1882).

Boidin = Boidin, Les Lois De La Guerre et Les Deux Conférences De La Haye (1908).

Boidin = Boidin, The Laws of War and The Two Conferences of The Hague (1908).

Bonfils = Bonfils, Manuel De Droit International Public, 6th ed. by Fauchille (1912).

Bonfils = Bonfils, Manuel De Droit International Public, 6th ed. by Fauchille (1912).

Bordwell = Bordwell, The Law of War between Belligerents (1908).

Bordwell = Bordwell, The Law of War between Belligerents (1908).

Bulmerincq = Bulmerincq, Das Völkerrecht (1887).

Bulmerincq = Bulmerincq, International Law (1887).

Calvo = Calvo, Le Droit International, etc., 5th ed., 6 vols. (1896).

Calvo = Calvo, International Law, etc., 5th ed., 6 vols. (1896).

Convention I. = Hague Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes.

Convention I. = Hague Convention for the peaceful resolution of international disputes.

Convention II. = Hague Convention respecting the limitation of the employment of force for the recovery of contract debts.

Convention II. = Hague Convention on the limitation of the use of force for collecting contract debts.

Convention III. = Hague Convention relative to the commencement of hostilities.[Pg x]

Convention III. = Hague Convention regarding the start of conflicts.[Pg x]

Convention IV. = Hague Convention concerning the laws and customs of war on land.

Convention IV. = Hague Convention regarding the laws and customs of war on land.

Convention V. = Hague Convention respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in war on land.

Convention V. = Hague Convention regarding the rights and responsibilities of neutral powers and individuals during land conflicts.

Convention VI. = Hague Convention relative to the status of enemy merchantmen at the outbreak of hostilities.

Convention VI. = Hague Convention regarding the status of enemy merchant ships at the start of hostilities.

Convention VII. = Hague Convention relative to the conversion of merchantmen into men-of-war.

Convention VII. = Hague Convention regarding the conversion of merchant ships into warships.

Convention VIII. = Hague Convention concerning the laying of automatic submarine contact mines.

Convention VIII. = Hague Convention regarding the placement of automatic submarine contact mines.

Convention IX. = Hague Convention respecting bombardment by naval forces in time of war.

Convention IX. = Hague Convention regarding bombardment by naval forces during wartime.

Convention X. = Hague Convention for the adaptation of the principles of the Geneva Convention to maritime war.

Convention X. = Hague Convention for adapting the principles of the Geneva Convention to maritime warfare.

Convention XI. = Hague Convention concerning certain restrictions on the exercise of the right of capture in maritime war.

Convention XI. = Hague Convention about certain limitations on the right to capture during maritime warfare.

Convention XII. = Hague Convention concerning the establishment of an International Prize Court.

Convention XII. = Hague Convention regarding the establishment of an International Prize Court.

Convention XIII. = Hague Convention respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers in maritime war.

Convention XIII. = Hague Convention regarding the rights and responsibilities of neutral Powers in maritime warfare.

Despagnet = Despagnet, Cours De Droit International Public, 4th ed. by de Boeck (1910).

Despagnet = Despagnet, International Public Law Course, 4th ed. by de Boeck (1910).

Deuxième Conférence, = Deuxième Conférence Internationale De Actes La Paix, Actes et Documents, 3 vols. (1908-1909).

Deuxième Conférence, = Deuxième Conférence Internationale De Actes La Paix, Actes et Documents, 3 vols. (1908-1909).

Dupuis = Dupuis, Le Droit De La Guerre Maritime D'après Les Doctrines Anglaises Contemporaines (1899).

Dupuis = Dupuis, The Right of Maritime War According to Contemporary English Doctrines (1899).

Dupuis, Guerre = Dupuis, Le Droit De La Guerre Maritime D'après Les Conférences de la Haye et de Londres (1911).

Dupuis, War = Dupuis, The Law of Maritime Warfare Based on the Conferences of The Hague and London (1911).

Field = Field, Outlines of an International Code, 2 vols. (1872-1873).

Field = Field, Outlines of an International Code, 2 vols. (1872-1873).

Fiore = Fiore, Nouveau Droit International Public, deuxième édition, traduite de l'Italien et annotée par Antoine, 3 vols. (1885).[Pg xi]

Fiore = Fiore, New Public International Law, second edition, translated from Italian and annotated by Antoine, 3 vols. (1885).[Pg xi]

Fiore, Code = Fiore, Le Droit International Codifié, nouvelle édition, traduite de l'Italien par Antoine (1911).

Fiore, Code = Fiore, The Codified International Law, new edition, translated from Italian by Antoine (1911).

Gareis = Gareis, Institutionen des Völkerrechts, 2nd ed. (1901).

Gareis = Gareis, Institutions of International Law, 2nd ed. (1901).

Gessner = Gessner, Le Droit Des Neutres Sur Mer (1865).

Gessner = Gessner, The Rights of Neutrals at Sea (1865).

Grotius = Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625).

Grotius = Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace (1625).

Hague = Hague Regulations respecting the Laws Regulations and Customs of War on Land, adopted by the Hague Peace Conference of 1907.

Hague = Hague Regulations regarding the Laws and Customs of War on Land, adopted by the Hague Peace Conference of 1907.

Hall = Hall, A Treatise on International Law, 4th ed. (1895).

Hall = Hall, A Treatise on International Law, 4th ed. (1895).

Halleck = Halleck, International Law, 3rd English ed. by Sir Sherston Baker, 2 vols. (1893).

Halleck = Halleck, International Law, 3rd English ed. by Sir Sherston Baker, 2 vols. (1893).

Hartmann = Hartmann, Institutionen des praktischen Völkerrechts in Friedenszeiten (1874).

Hartmann = Hartmann, Institutions of Practical International Law in Times of Peace (1874).

Hautefeuille = Hautefeuille, Des Droits Et Des Devoirs Des Nations Neutres En Temps De Guerre Maritime, 3 vols. 2nd ed. (1858).

Hautefeuille = Hautefeuille, The Rights and Duties of Neutral Nations in Times of Maritime War, 3 vols. 2nd ed. (1858).

Heffter = Heffter, Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart, 8th ed. by Geffcken (1888).

Heffter = Heffter, The European Public International Law of Today, 8th ed. by Geffcken (1888).

Heilborn, Rechte = Heilborn, Rechte und Pflichten der Neutralen Staaten in Bezug auf die während des Krieges auf ihr Gebiet übertretenden Angehörigen einer Armee und das dorthin gebrachte Kriegsmaterial der Kriegführenden Parteien (1888).

Heilborn, Rights = Heilborn, Rights and Duties of Neutral States Regarding the Members of an Army Crossing Their Territory and the War Material Brought There by the Warring Parties (1888).

Heilborn, System = Heilborn, Das System des Völkerrechts entwickelt aus den völkerrechtlichen Begriffen (1896).

Heilborn, System = Heilborn, The System of International Law developed from the concepts of international law (1896).

Higgins = Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences (1909).

Higgins = Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences (1909).

Holland, Prize = Holland, A Manual of Naval Prize Law Law (1888).

Holland, Prize = Holland, A Manual of Naval Prize Law Law (1888).

Holland, Studies = Holland, Studies in International Law (1898).

Holland, Studies = Holland, Studies in International Law (1898).

Holland, Jurisprudence = Holland, The Elements of Jurisprudence, 6th ed. (1893).

Holland, Jurisprudence = Holland, The Elements of Jurisprudence, 6th ed. (1893).

Holland, War = Holland, The Laws of War on Land (1908).

Holland, War = Holland, The Laws of War on Land (1908).

Holtzendorff = Holtzendorff, Handbuch des Völkerrechts, 4 vols. (1885-1889).

Holtzendorff = Holtzendorff, Handbook of International Law, 4 vols. (1885-1889).

Kleen = Kleen, Lois et Usages De La Neutralité, 2 vols. (1900).[Pg xii]

Kleen = Kleen, Lois and Uses of Neutrality, 2 vols. (1900).[Pg xii]

Klüber = Klüber, Europäisches Völkerrecht, 2nd ed. by Morstadt (1851).

Klüber = Klüber, European Public Law, 2nd ed. by Morstadt (1851).

Kriegsbrauch = Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege (1902). (Heft 31 der kriegsgeschichtlichen Einzelschriften, herausgegeben vom Grossen Generalstabe, Kriegsgeschichtliche Abtheilung I.).

Kriegsbrauch = Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege (1902). (Issue 31 of the war history monographs, published by the Great General Staff, War History Department I.).

Land Warfare = Edmonds and Oppenheim, Land Warfare. An Exposition of the Laws and Usages of War on Land for the Guidance of Officers of His Majesty's Army (1912).

Land Warfare = Edmonds and Oppenheim, Land Warfare. An Explanation of the Laws and Practices of War on Land for the Guidance of Officers of His Majesty's Army (1912).

Lawrence = Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 4th ed. (1910).

Lawrence = Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 4th ed. (1910).

Lawrence, Essays = Lawrence, Essays on some Disputed Questions of Modern International Law (1884).

Lawrence, Essays = Lawrence, Essays on Some Disputed Questions of Modern International Law (1884).

Lawrence, War = Lawrence, War and Neutrality in the Far East, 2nd ed. (1904).

Lawrence, War = Lawrence, War and Neutrality in the Far East, 2nd ed. (1904).

Lémonon = Lémonon, La Seconde Conférence De La Paix (1908).

Lémonon = Lémonon, The Second Conference of Peace (1908).

Liszt = Liszt, Das Völkerrecht, 6th ed. (1910).

Liszt = Liszt, International Law, 6th ed. (1910).

Longuet = Longuet, Le Droit Actuel De La Guerre Terrestre (1901).

Longuet = Longuet, The Current Law of Land Warfare (1901).

Lorimer = Lorimer, The Institutes of International Law, 2 vols. (1883-1884).

Lorimer = Lorimer, The Institutes of International Law, 2 vols. (1883-1884).

Maine = Maine, International Law, 2nd ed. (1894).

Maine = Maine, International Law, 2nd ed. (1894).

Manning = Manning, Commentaries on the Law of Nations, new ed. by Sheldon Amos (1875).

Manning = Manning, Commentaries on the Law of Nations, new edition by Sheldon Amos (1875).

Martens = Martens, Völkerrecht, German translation of the Russian original, 2 vols. (1883).

Martens = Martens, International Law, German translation of the Russian original, 2 vols. (1883).

Martens, G. F. = G. F. Martens, Précis Du Droit Des Gens Moderne De l'Europe, nouvelle éd. by Vergé, 2 vols. (1858).

Martens, G. F. = G. F. Martens, A Summary of Modern International Law of Europe, new ed. by Vergé, 2 vols. (1858).

Martens, R.      }

Martens, R.

Martens, N.R.   }

Martens, N.R.

Martens, N.S.   }

Martens, N.S.

Martens, N.R.G. }

Martens, N.R.G.

Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. }

Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Series

Martens, Causes = Martens, Causes Célèbres du Droit des Célèbres Gens, 5 vols., 2nd ed. (1858-1861).[Pg xiii]

Martens, Famous Causes of Law, 5 vols., 2nd ed. (1858-1861).[Pg xiii]

Mérignhac = Mérignhac, Les Lois Et Coutumes De La Guerre Sur Terre (1903).

Mérignhac = Mérignhac, The Laws and Customs of War on Land (1903).

Meurer = Meurer, Die Haager Friedenskonferenz, 2 vols. (1905-1907).

Meurer = Meurer, The Hague Peace Conference, 2 vols. (1905-1907).

Moore = Moore, A Digest of International Law, 8 vols., Washington (1906).

Moore = Moore, A Digest of International Law, 8 vols., Washington (1906).

Moore, Arbitrations = Moore, History and Digest of the Arbitrations to which the United States have been a Party, 6 vols. (1898).

Moore, Arbitrations = Moore, History and Digest of the Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party, 6 vols. (1898).

Nippold = Nippold, Die Zweite Haager Friedenskonferenz, 2 vols. (1908-1911).

Nippold = Nippold, The Second Hague Peace Conference, 2 vols. (1908-1911).

Nys = Nys, Le Droit International, vol. i. (1904).

Nys = Nys, International Law, vol. i. (1904).

Ortolan = Ortolan, Règles Internationales et Diplomatie de la Mer, 2 vols., 3rd ed. (1856).

Ortolan = Ortolan, International Rules and Maritime Diplomacy, 2 vols., 3rd ed. (1856).

Perels = Perels, Das Internationale öffentliche Seerecht der Gegenwart, 2nd ed. (1903).

Perels = Perels, The International Public Maritime Law of the Present, 2nd ed. (1903).

Phillimore = Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, 4 vols., 3rd ed. (1879-1888).

Phillimore = Phillimore, Commentaries on International Law, 4 vols., 3rd ed. (1879-1888).

Piedelièvre = Piedelièvre, Précis De Droit International Public, 2 vols. (1894-1895).

Piedelièvre = Piedelièvre, Overview of Public International Law, 2 vols. (1894-1895).

Pillet = Pillet, Les Lois Actuelles De La Guerre (1901).

Pillet = Pillet, The Current Laws of War (1901).

Pistoye et Duverdy = Pistoye et Duverdy, Traité Des Prises Maritimes, 2 vols. (1854-1859).

Pistoye and Duverdy = Pistoye and Duverdy, Treatise on Maritime Captures, 2 volumes (1854-1859).

Pradier-Fodéré = Pradier-Fodéré, Traité De Droit International Public, 8 vols. (1885-1906).

Pradier-Fodéré = Pradier-Fodéré, Treatise on Public International Law, 8 vols. (1885-1906).

Pufendorf = Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium (1672).

Pufendorf = Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and Nations (1672).

R.G. = Revue Générale De Droit International Public.

R.G. = General Review of International Public Law.

R.I. = Revue De Droit International Et De Législation Comparée.

R.I. = International Law Review and Comparative Legislation.

Rivier = Rivier, Principes Du Droit Des Gens, 2 vols. (1896).

Rivier = Rivier, Principles of International Law, 2 vols. (1896).

Scott, Conferences = Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, vol. i. (1909).

Scott, Conferences = Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, vol. i. (1909).

Spaight = Spaight, War Rights on Land (1911).

Spaight = Spaight, War Rights on Land (1911).

Takahashi = Takahashi, International Law applied to the Russo-Japanese War (1908).

Takahashi = Takahashi, International Law Applied to the Russo-Japanese War (1908).

Taylor = Taylor, A Treatise on International Public Law (1901).[Pg xiv]

Taylor = Taylor, A Treatise on International Public Law (1901).[Pg xiv]

Testa = Testa, Le Droit Public International Maritime, traduction du Portugais par Boutiron (1886).

Testa = Testa, The International Public Maritime Law, translation from Portuguese by Boutiron (1886).

Twiss = Twiss, The Law of Nations, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (1884, 1875).

Twiss = Twiss, The Law of Nations, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (1884, 1875).

Ullmann = Ullmann, Völkerrecht, 2nd ed. (1908).

Ullmann = Ullmann, International Law, 2nd ed. (1908).

U.S. Naval War = The Laws and Usages of War at Sea, published Code on June 27, 1900, by the Navy Department, Washington, for the use of the U. S. Navy and for the information of all concerned.

U.S. Naval War = The Laws and Usages of War at Sea, published Code on June 27, 1900, by the Navy Department, Washington, for the use of the U.S. Navy and for the information of everyone involved.

Vattel = Vattel, Le Droit Des Gens, 4 books in 2 vols., nouvelle éd. (Neuchâtel, 1773).

Vattel = Vattel, The Law of Nations, 4 books in 2 vols., new ed. (Neuchâtel, 1773).

Walker = Walker, A Manual of Public International Law (1895).

Walker = Walker, A Manual of Public International Law (1895).

Walker, History = Walker, A History of the Law of Nations, vol. i. (1899).

Walker, A History of the Law of Nations, vol. i. (1899).

Walker, Science = Walker, The Science of International Law (1893).

Walker, Science = Walker, The Science of International Law (1893).

Wehberg, = Wehberg, Kommentar zu dem Haager Kommentar Abkommen betreffend die friedliche Erledigung internationaler Streitigkeiten (1911).

Wehberg, = Wehberg, Commentary on the Hague Commentary Convention concerning the peaceful resolution of international disputes (1911).

Westlake = Westlake, International Law, 2 vols. (1904-1907).

Westlake = Westlake, International Law, 2 vols. (1904-1907).

Westlake, = Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of Chapters International Law (1894).

Westlake, = Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law (1894).

Wharton = Wharton, A Digest of the International Law of the United States, 3 vols. (1886).

Wharton = Wharton, A Digest of the International Law of the United States, 3 vols. (1886).

Wheaton = Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 8th American ed. by Dana (1866).

Wheaton = Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 8th American edition by Dana (1866).

Zorn = Zorn, Das Kriegsrecht zu Lande in seiner neuesten Gestaltung (1906).

Zorn = Zorn, The Martial Law on Land in Its Latest Form (1906).

Z.V. = Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht und Bundesstaatsrecht.

Z.V. = Journal of International Law and Federal State Law.

CITED CASES

Acteon, the, § 194, p. 243 note 5; § 431, p. 547 note 2

Acteon, the, § 194, p. 243 note 5; § 431, p. 547 note 2

Adonis, the, § 386, p. 472 note 7; § 390, p. 477 note 3

Adonis, the, § 386, p. 472 note 7; § 390, p. 477 note 3

Africa, the, § 413, p. 531 note 1

Africa, the, § 413, p. 531 note 1

Alabama, the, § 335, p. 406

Alabama, the, § 335, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Alaska Boundary Dispute (1903), § 14, p. 18

Alaska Boundary Dispute (1903), § 14, p. 18

Alcinous v. Nygreu, § 101, p. 137 note 7

Alcinous v. Nygreu, § 101, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 7

Alexander, the, § 390, p. 477 note 3

Alexander, the, § 390, p. 477 note 3

Alexis, the, § 34, p. 40

Alexis, the, § 34, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Andersen v. Marten, § 435, p. 555 note 1

Andersen v. Marten, § 435, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 1

André, Major, § 160, p. 198

André, Major, § 160, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Ann Green, the, § 92, p. 120 note 2

Ann Green, the, § 92, p. 120 note 2

Anna, the, § 362, p. 443

Anna, the, § 362, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Anthon v. Fisher, § 195, p. 246 note 1

Anthon v. Fisher, § 195, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 1

Antoine v. Morshead, § 101, p. 137 note 3

Antoine v. Morshead, § 101, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 3

Apollo, the, § 427, p. 545 note 1

Apollo, the, § 427, p. 545 note 1

Aryol, the. See Orel

Aryol, the. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Asgill, Captain, § 249, p. 307

Asgill, Captain, § 249, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Askold, the, § 347 (3), p. 422

Askold, the, § 347 (3), p. 422

Astrolabe, the, § 186, p. 233

Astrolabe, the, § 186, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Atalanta, the, § 409, p. 522; § 412, p. 527 note 2

Atalanta, the, § 409, p. 522; § 412, p. 527 note 2

Aurora, the, § 347 (4), p. 423

Aurora, the, § 347 (4), p. 423

Awni-Illa, the, § 213, p. 269

Awni-Illa, the, § 213, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Baltica, the, § 88, p. 110 note 2; § 90, p. 116 note 1; § 91, p. 118 note 2

Baltica, the, § 88, p. 110 note 2; § 90, p. 116 note 1; § 91, p. 118 note 2

Bellona, the, § 271, p. 332

Bellona, the, § 271, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Benito Estenger, the, § 91, p. 118 note 2

Benito Estenger, the, § 91, p. 118 note 2

Bentzen v. Boyle, § 90, p. 116 note 4

Bentzen v. Boyle, § 90, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 4

Bermuda, the, § 385, p. 470; § 400, p. 499 note 1; § 400, p. 500 note 1

Bermuda, the, § 385, p. 470; § 400, p. 499 note 1; § 400, p. 500 note 1

Betsey, the, § 385, p. 469 note 1

Betsey, the, § 385, p. 469 note 1

Bolivia-Peruvian Boundary Dispute (1910), § 16, p. 19

Bolivia-Peruvian Boundary Dispute (1910), § 16, p. 19

Boudeuse, La. See La Boudeuse

Boudeuse, La. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Boussmaker, ex parte, § 100a, p. 134 note 4; § 101, p. 137 note 7

Boussmaker, ex parte, § 100a, p. 134 note 4; § 101, p. 137 note 7

Boussole, the, § 186, p. 233

Boussole, the, § 186, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Brandon v. Curling, § 101, p. 138 note 2

Brandon v. Curling, § 101, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 2

Bundesrath, the, § 400, p. 500; § 401, p. 501 note 1; § 402, p. 502; § 402, p. 503 note 2; § 433, p. 552

Bundesrat, the, § 400, p. 500; § 401, p. 501 note 1; § 402, p. 502; § 402, p. 503 note 2; § 433, p. 552

Calypso, the, § 384, p. 467 note 3

Calypso, the, § 384, p. 467 note 3

Camille, the, § 349, p. 426

Camille, the, § 349, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Captain W. Menzel, the, § 311, p. 376 note

Captain W. Menzel, the, § 311, p. 376 note

Carolina, the, § 408, p. 519

Carolina, § 408, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Caroline, the (1808), § 409, p. 522 note 1

Caroline, the (1808), § 409, p. 522 note 1

Caroline, the (1904), § 311, p. 376 note 1

Caroline, the (1904), § 311, p. 376 note 1

Carthage, the, § 403a, p. 506 note 1

Carthage, the, § 403a, p. 506 note 1

Cesarewitch, the, § 347 (4), p. 423

Cesarewitch, the, § 347 (4), p. 423

Ceylon, the, § 185, p. 231 note 2

Ceylon, the, § 185, p. 231 note 2

Charlotta, the (1810), § 386, p. 472 note 3

Charlotta, the (1810), § 386, p. 472 note 3

Charlotta, the (1814), § 101, p. 137 note 7

Charlotta, the (1814), § 101, p. 137 note 7

Circassian, the, § 380, p. 463 note 2

Circassian, the, § 380, p. 463 note 2

Columbia, the, § 382, p. 465 note 3; § 390, p. 477 note 3

Columbia, the, § 382, p. 465 note 3; § 390, p. 477 note 3

Commercen, the, § 401, p. 501 note 2

Commercen, the, § 401, p. 501 note 2

Cornu v. Blackburne, § 195, p. 246 note 1

Cornu v. Blackburne, § 195, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 1

Cumberland, the, § 186, p. 233 note 2

Cumberland, the, § 186, p. 233 note 2

Daifje, the, § 225, p. 283 note 4

Daifje, the, § 225, p. 283 note 4

Danous, the, § 88, p. 112 note 1; § 90, p. 115 note 1

Danous, the, § 88, p. 112 note 1; § 90, p. 115 note 1

De Fortuyn, the, § 181, p. 225 note 1

De Fortuyn, the, § 181, p. 225 note 1

De Jager v. Attorney-General, § 100, p. 132 note 3

De Jager v. Attorney-General, § 100, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 3

De Jarnett v. De Giversville, § 100a, p. 134 note 1

De Jarnett v. De Giversville, § 100a, p. 134 note 1

Dessaix, the, § 194, p. 244

Dessaix, the, § 194, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

De Wahl v. Browne, § 100a, p. 135 note 1

De Wahl v. Browne, § 100a, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 1

De Wütz v. Hendricks, § 352, p. 430 note 2

De Wütz v. Hendricks, § 352, p. 430 note 2

Diana, the (1799), § 189, p. 236

Diana, the (1799), § 189, p. 236

Diana, the (1904), § 347 (3), p. 422

Diana, the (1904), § 347 (3), p. 422

Discovery, the, § 186, p. 232

Discovery, § 186, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Doelwijk, the, § 403, p. 505; § 436, p. 556

Doelwijk, the, § 403, p. 505; § 436, p. 556

Dogger Bank, § 5, p. 7 note 2; § 11, p. 15 note 1 [Pg xvi]

Dogger Bank, § 5, p. 7 note 2; § 11, p. 15 note 1 [Pg xvi]

Dorsey v. Kyle, § 100a, p. 134 note 1

Dorsey v. Kyle, § 100a, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 1

Driefontein Consolidated Gold Mines Co. v. Janson, § 100a, p. 134 note 3

Driefontein Consolidated Gold Mines Co. v. Janson, § 100a, p. 134 note 3

Du Belloix v. Lord Waterpark, § 101, p. 137 note 9

Du Belloix v. Lord Waterpark, § 101, p. 137 note 9

Duclair, British coal vessels at, § 365, p. 448

Duclair, British coal ships at, § 365, p. 448

El Arish, Capitulation of, § 229, pp. 287-9

El Arish, Capitulation of, § 229, pp. 287-9

Elba, the, § 348 (2), p. 424

Elba, the, § 348 (2), p. 424

Elisabeth, the, § 189, p. 236

Elisabeth, the, § 189, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Eliza and Katy, the, § 428, p. 545 note 3

Eliza and Katy, the, § 428, p. 545 note 3

Elizabeth, the, § 386, p. 472 note 8

Elizabeth, the, § 386, p. 472 note 8

Elsebe, the, § 425, p. 543 note 2

Elsebe, the, § 425, p. 543 note 2

Emilia, § 88, p. 110 note 2

Emilia, § 88, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 2

Espiègle, L'. See L'Espiègle

L. Espiègle, See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Esposito v. Bowden, § 101, p. 137 notes 1, 7, and 8; p. 138 note 1

Esposito v. Bowden, § 101, p. 137 notes 1, 7, and 8; p. 138 note 1

Étoile, L'. See L'Étoile

L'Étoile. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Euridice, the, § 349, p. 426

Euridice, § 349, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Exchange, the, § 390, p. 477 note 3

Exchange, the, § 390, p. 477 note 3

Fanny, the, § 185, p. 232 note 2; § 424, p. 542 note 2

Fanny, the, § 185, p. 232 note 2; § 424, p. 542 note 2

Felicity, the, § 194, p. 243 note 5; § 431, p. 547 note 2

Felicity, the, § 194, p. 243 note 5; § 431, p. 547 note 2

Florida, the, § 362, p. 443

Florida, § 362, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Försigtigheten, the, § 349, p. 426

Försigtigheten, the, § 349, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Fortuna, the, § 386, p. 472 note 4

Fortuna, the, § 386, p. 472 note 4

Fox and others, the, § 434, p. 554 note 1

Fox and others, the, § 434, p. 554 note 1

Franciska, the, § 370, p. 452 note 2; § 380, p. 462 note 2; § 380, p. 464 note 1; § 381, p. 464 note 2; § 382, p. 465

Franciska, the, § 370, p. 452 note 2; § 380, p. 462 note 2; § 380, p. 464 note 1; § 381, p. 464 note 2; § 382, p. 465

Freden, the, § 360, p. 441 note 1

Freden, the, § 360, p. 441 note 1

Frederick Moltke, the, § 387, p. 473 note 3

Frederick Moltke, the, § 387, p. 473 note 3

Freundschaft, the, § 90, p. 116 note 5

Freundschaft, the, § 90, p. 116 note 5

Friendship, the, § 408, p. 518; § 412, p. 527 note 2

Friendship, the, § 408, p. 518; § 412, p. 527 note 2

Furtado v. Rodgers, § 101, p. 137 note 1; § 101, p. 138 note 2

Furtado v. Rodgers, § 101, p. 137 note 1; § 101, p. 138 note 2

Gamba v. Le Mesurier, § 101, p. 138 note 2

Gamba v. Le Mesurier, § 101, p. 138 note 2

Gelderland, the, § 354, p. 433

Gelderland, the, § 354, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

General, the, § 402, p. 502

General, the, § 402, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

General Armstrong, the, § 361, p. 442

General Armstrong, the, § 361, p. 442

General Hamilton, the, § 91, p. 118 note 3; § 389, p. 476 note 1

General Hamilton, the, § 91, p. 118 note 3; § 389, p. 476 note 1

Genoa, Capitulation of, § 226, p. 284 note 1

Genoa, Surrender of, § 226, p. 284 note 1

Georgina, the, § 185, p. 231 note 2

Georgina, the, § 185, p. 231 note 2

Gerasimo, the, § 371, p. 453 note 3

Gerasimo, the, § 371, p. 453 note 3

German contract for cutting trees in French forests, § 282, p. 342

German contract for cutting trees in French forests, § 282, p. 342

Gist v. Mason, § 101, p. 136 note 3

Gist v. Mason, § 101, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 3

Gloire, La. See La Gloire

Gloire, La. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Goodrich and De Forest v. Gordon, § 195, p. 246 note 1

Goodrich and De Forest v. Gordon, § 195, p. 246 note 1

Griswold v. Boddington, § 101, p. 137 note 8

Griswold v. Boddington, § 101, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 8

Grossovoi, the, § 347 (3), p. 422

Grossovoi, the, § 347 (3), p. 422

Haimun, the, § 210, p. 262 note 1; § 356, p. 437

Haimun, the, § 210, p. 262 note 1; § 356, p. 437

Hale, Captain Nathan, § 161, p. 199

Hale, Captain Nathan, § 161, p. 199

Hanger v. Abbot, § 100a, p. 135 note 1

Hanger v. Abbot, § 100a, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 1

Hardy, Le. See Le Hardy

Hardy, Le. Check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Harmony, the, § 88, p. 110 note 2

Harmony, the, § 88, p. 110 note 2

Henkle v. London Exchange Assurance Co., § 101, p. 136 note 3

Henkle v. London Exchange Assurance Co., § 101, p. 136 note 3

Henrik and Maria, the, § 375, p. 456 note 1

Henrik and Maria, the, § 375, p. 456 note 1

Herzog, the, § 402, p. 502; § 433, p. 552

Herzog, the, § 402, p. 502; § 433, p. 552

Hipsang, the, § 431, p. 548

Hipsang, the, § 431, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Hoare v. Allan, § 101, p. 137 note 10

Hoare v. Allan, § 101, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 10

Hobbs v. Henning, § 402, p. 503 note 4

Hobbs v. Henning, § 402, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 4

Hoffnung, the, § 384, p. 467 note 3

Hoffnung, the, § 384, p. 467 note 3

Hoop, the, § 100a, p. 133 note 2; § 101, p. 137 note 1; § 195, p. 246 note 1

Hoop, the, § 100a, p. 133 note 2; § 101, p. 137 note 1; § 195, p. 246 note 1

Hope, the, § 412, p. 527 note 3

Hope, the, § 412, p. 527 note 3

Hunter, the, § 427, p. 544 note 1

Hunter, the, § 427, p. 544 note 1

Hurtige Hanne, the, § 386, p. 472 note 5

Hurtige Hanne, the, § 386, p. 472 note 5

Hussar, the, § 211, p. 263

Hussar, the, § 211, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Icona, the, § 431, p. 548

Icona, the, § 431, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Iltis, the, § 348 (1), p. 424

Iltis, the, § 348 (1), p. 424

Imina, the, § 399, p. 498 note 1; § 402, p. 503

Imina, the, § 399, p. 498 note 1; § 402, p. 503

Indian Chief, the, § 90, p. 116 note 2

Indian Chief, the, § 90, p. 116 note 2

Industrie, the, § 410, p. 525 note 1

Industrie, the, § 410, p. 525 note 1

Inflexible, the, § 223, p. 282

Inflexible, the, § 223, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Investigator, the, § 186, p. 233 note 2

Investigator, the, § 186, p. 233 note 2

Invincible, the, § 223, p. 282

Invincible, § 223, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Italy v. Peru (Canevaro claim), § 24, p. 31 note 1

Italy v. Peru (Canevaro claim), § 24, p. 31 note 1

Jager. See De Jager

Jager. Check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Jakoga, Major, § 161, p. 199 note 1; § 255, p. 315

Jakoga, Major, § 161, p. 199 note 1; § 255, p. 315

James Cook, the, § 385, p. 469 note 3

James Cook, the, § 385, p. 469 note 3

Jameson Raid, § 56, p. 62

Jameson Raid, § 56, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Jan Frederick, the, § 91, p. 118 notes 4 and 6; § 92, p. 120 note 2

Jan Frederick, the, § 91, p. 118 notes 4 and 6; § 92, p. 120 note 2

Jarnett. See De Jarnett

Jarnett. Check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Jemchug, the, § 347 (4), p. 423

Jemchug, the, § 347 (4), p. 423

Jemmy, the, § 91, p. 118 note 5

Jemmy, the, § 91, p. 118 note 5

Joan, Le. See Le Joan

Joan, Le. Check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Johanna Emilie, the, § 88, p. 110 note 2

Johanna Emilie, the, § 88, p. 110 note 2

Jonge Klassina, the, § 90, p. 116 note 5[Pg xvii]

Jonge Klassina, the, § 90, p. 116 note 5[Pg xvii]

Jonge Margaretha, the, § 394, p. 486 note 3

Jonge Margaretha, the, § 394, p. 486 note 3

Jonge Pieter, the, § 101, p. 137 note 6

Jonge Pieter, the, § 101, p. 137 note 6

Juno, the, § 387, p. 473 note 4

Juno, the, § 387, p. 473 note 4

Kellner v. Le Mesurier, § 101, p. 138 note 2

Kellner v. Le Mesurier, § 101, p. 138 note 2

Knight Commander, the, § 431, p. 548

Knight Commander, the, § 431, p. 548

Korietz, the, § 320, p. 388; § 348 (2), p. 424; § 361, p. 442 note 3

Korietz, the, § 320, p. 388; § 348 (2), p. 424; § 361, p. 442 note 3

Kow-shing, the, § 89, p. 114 note 1; § 348, p. 424

Kow-shing, the, § 89, p. 114 note 1; § 348, p. 424

La Boudeuse, the, § 186, p. 232

La Boudeuse, the, § 186, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

La Gloire, the, § 225, p. 283 note 4

La Gloire, the, § 225, p. 283 note 4

La Paix, the, § 90, p. 117 note 1

La Paix, the, § 90, p. 117 note 1

La Rosina, the, § 225, p. 283 note 3

La Rosina, the, § 225, p. 283 note 3

La Santissima Trinidad, the, § 334, p. 405

La Santissima Trinidad, the, § 334, p. 405

Laura-Louise. See Le Laura-Louise

Laura-Louise. Check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Lavabre v. Wilson, § 101, p. 136 note 3

Lavabre v. Wilson, § 101, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 3

Le Hardy contre La Voltigeante, § 88, p. 111; § 90, p. 117 note 1

Le Hardy against The Acrobat, § 88, p. 111; § 90, p. 117 note 1

Le Joan, the, § 90, p. 117 note 1

Le Joan, the, § 90, p. 117 note 1

Le Laura-Louise, the, § 90, p. 117 note 1

Le Laura-Louise, the, § 90, p. 117 note 1

Lena, the, § 347 (3), p. 422

Lena, the, § 347 (3), p. 422

Le Nicolaüs, the, § 90, p. 117 note 1

Le Nicolaüs, the, § 90, p. 117 note 1

L'Espiègle, the, § 362, p. 443

L'Espiègle, the, § 362, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Le Thalia, the, § 90, p. 117 note 1

Le Thalia, the, § 90, p. 117 note 1

L'Étoile, the, § 186, p. 232

L'Étoile, the, § 186, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Leucade, the, § 194, p. 243 note 5; § 431, p. 547 note 2

Leucade, the, § 194, p. 243 note 5; § 431, p. 547 note 2

Lion, the, § 348, p. 424

Lion, the, § 348, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Lisette, the, § 399, p. 498 note 1

Lisette, the, § 399, p. 498 note 1

Ludwig, the, § 194, p. 244

Ludwig, the, § 194, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Luxor, the, § 404, p. 507; § 437, p. 558

Luxor, the, § 404, p. 507; § 437, p. 558

Madison, the, § 409, p. 522 note 2

Madison, the, § 409, p. 522 note 2

Madonna delle Gracie, § 101, p. 137 note 4

Madonna delle Gracie, § 101, p. 137 note 4

Malacca, the, § 84, p. 102

Malacca, the, § 84, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Manouba, the, § 413, p. 531 note 1

Manouba, the, § 413, p. 531 note 1

Margaret, the, § 404, p. 507 note 1

Margaret, the, § 404, p. 507 note 1

Maria, the (1799), § 422, p. 540 note 1; § 423, p. 541 note 1; § 425, p. 543 note 1; § 434, p. 554 note 1

Maria, the (1799), § 422, p. 540 note 1; § 423, p. 541 note 1; § 425, p. 543 note 1; § 434, p. 554 note 1

Maria, the (1805), § 390, p. 477 note 4

Maria, the (1805), § 390, p. 477 note 4

Maria v. Hall, § 100a, p. 134 note 2; § 101, p. 137 note 5

Maria v. Hall, § 100a, p. 134 note 2; § 101, p. 137 note 5

Mashona, the, § 101, p. 137 note 1

Mashona, the, § 101, p. 137 note 1

Mayer v. Reed, § 101, p. 137 note 9

Mayer v. Reed, § 101, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 9

Melville v. De Wold, § 101, p. 137 note 7

Melville v. De Wold, § 101, p. 137 note 7

Mentor, the, § 272, p. 333 note 1

Mentor, the, § 272, p. 333 note 1

Mercurius, the, § 390, p. 477 note 3

Mercurius, the, § 390, p. 477 note 3

Meteor, the, § 334, p. 405

Meteor, § 334, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Minerva, the, § 362, p. 443

Minerva, the, § 362, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Modeste, the, § 360, p. 441 note 1

Modeste, the, § 360, p. 441 note 1

Montara, the, § 89, p. 114 note 2

Montara, the, § 89, p. 114 note 2

Nancy, the (1800), § 404, p. 507 note 1

Nancy, the (1800), § 404, p. 507 note 1

Nancy, the (1809), § 380, p. 463 note 2

Nancy, the (1809), § 380, p. 463 note 2

Nancy Court of Appeal, § 172, p. 215

Nancy Court of Appeal, § 172, p. 215

Naniwa, the, § 89, p. 114 note 1; § 348, p. 423

Naniwa, the, § 89, p. 114 note 1; § 348, p. 423

Neptunus, the (1799), § 384, p. 467 note 3

Neptunus, the (1799), § 384, p. 467 note 3

Neptunus, the (1800), § 384, p. 467 note 3

Neptunus, the (1800), § 384, p. 467 note 3

Nereide, the, § 185, p. 232 note 2; § 424, p. 542, note 2

Nereide, the, § 185, p. 232 note 2; § 424, p. 542, note 2

Neutralitet, the, § 386, p. 472 note 9

Neutrality, the, § 386, p. 472 note 9

New York Life Insurance Co. v. Buck, § 101, p. 138 note 3

New York Life Insurance Co. v. Buck, § 101, p. 138 note 3

New York Life Insurance Co. v. Davis, § 101, p. 138 note 3

New York Life Insurance Co. v. Davis, § 101, p. 138 note 3

New York Life Insurance Co. v. Stathem, § 101, p. 138 note 3

New York Life Insurance Co. v. Stathem, § 101, p. 138 note 3

New York Life Insurance Co. v. Symes, § 101, p. 138 note 3

New York Life Insurance Co. v. Symes, § 101, p. 138 note 3

Niagara, the, § 382, p. 465

Niagara, the, § 382, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Nigretia, the, § 408, p. 519 note 2

Nigretia, the, § 408, p. 519 note 2

North-Eastern Boundary Dispute between Great Britain and the United States (1831), § 16, p. 19

North-Eastern Boundary Dispute between Great Britain and the United States (1831), § 16, p. 19

North German Confederation Volunteer Fleet scheme, § 84, p. 101

North German Confederation Volunteer Fleet plan, § 84, p. 101

Novara, the, § 186, p. 233

Novara, § 186, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Novik, the, § 347 (4), p. 423

Novik, the, § 347 (4), p. 423

Oki, Captain Teisuki, § 161, p. 199 note 1; § 255, p. 315

Oki, Captain Teisuki, § 161, p. 199 note 1; § 255, p. 315

Oldhamia, the, § 206, p. 256 note 1; § 431, p. 548

Oldhamia, the, § 206, p. 256 note 1; § 431, p. 548

Oleg, the, § 347 (4), p. 423

Oleg, the, § 347 (4), p. 423

Olinde Rodrigues, the, § 380, p. 463 note 2

Olinde Rodrigues, the, § 380, p. 463 note 2

Orel (or Aryol), the, § 206, p. 256 note 1

Orel (or Aryol), the, § 206, p. 256 note 1

Orinoco Steamship Co., § 16, p. 19

Orinoco Steamship Co., § 16, p. 19

Orozembo, the, § 408, p. 518; § 408, p. 519

Orozembo, the, § 408, p. 518; § 408, p. 519

Pacifico, Don, § 35, p. 41; § 44, p. 49

Pacifico, Don, § 35, p. 41; § 44, p. 49

Paix, La. See La Paix

Paix, La. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Palme, the, § 186, p. 233

Palme, the, § 186, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Panaghia Rhomba, the, § 390, p. 477 note 3

Panaghia Rhomba, the, § 390, p. 477 note 3

Paquette Habana, the, § 187, p. 234 note 1

Paquette Habana, § 187, p. 234 note 1

Pascal, the, § 348 (2), p. 424

Pascal, the, § 348 (2), p. 424

Peterburg, the, § 84, p. 102

Peterburg, the, § 84, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Peterhoff, the, § 373, p. 454; § 385, p. 470; § 400, p. 500 note 1; § 401, p. 501

Peterhoff, the, § 373, p. 454; § 385, p. 470; § 400, p. 500 note 1; § 401, p. 501

Phœnix, the, § 90, p. 116 note 4

Phœnix, the, § 90, p. 116 note 4

Planche v. Fletcher, § 101, p. 136 note 3[Pg xviii]

Planche v. Fletcher, § 101, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 3[Pg xviii]

Portland, the, § 90, p. 116 note 5

Portland, the, § 90, p. 116 note 5

Postilion, the, § 88, p. 112 note 1; § 90, p. 115 note 1

Postilion, the, § 88, p. 112 note 1; § 90, p. 115 note 1

Potts v. Bell, § 101, p. 137 note 1; § 101, p. 138 note 2

Potts v. Bell, § 101, p. 137 note 1; § 101, p. 138 note 2

Princesse Marie, the, § 431, p. 548

Princesse Marie, the, § 431, p. 548

Quang-nam, the, § 410, p. 525, note 1

Quang-nam, the, § 410, p. 525, note 1

Ramillies, § 211, p. 263

Ramillies, § 211, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Rapid, the, § 409, p. 522

Rapid, § 409, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Ras-el-Tin Fort, § 223, p. 282

Ras-el-Tin Fort, § 223, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Recovery, the, § 434, p. 554 note 1

Recovery, the, § 434, p. 554 note 1

Reshitelni, the, § 320, p. 389; § 361, p. 442 note 3

Reshitelni, the, § 320, p. 389; § 361, p. 442 note 3

Resolution, the, § 186, p. 232

Resolution, the, § 186, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Reuss, M. de, § 34, p. 40

Reuss, M. de, § 34, p. 40

Richmond, the, § 397, p. 494 note 1

Richmond, the, § 397, p. 494 note 1

Rolla, the, § 370, p. 452 note 2; § 375, p. 456 note 2

Rolla, the, § 370, p. 452 note 2; § 375, p. 456 note 2

Rose in Bloom, the, § 387, p. 474 note 2

Rose in Bloom, the, § 387, p. 474 note 2

Rosina, La. See La Rosina

Rosina, La. Check __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

St. Kilda, the, § 431, p. 548

St. Kilda, the, § 431, p. 548

St. Nicholas, the, § 428, p. 545 note 4

St. Nicholas, the, § 428, p. 545 note 4

Samuel, the, § 101, p. 137 note 6

Samuel, the, § 101, p. 137 note 6

Santissima Trinidad, La. See La Santissima Trinidad

Holy Trinity, La. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Sarah, the, § 428, p. 545 note 2

Sarah, the, § 428, p. 545 note 2

Sechs Geschwistern, the, § 91, p. 118 note 5

Sechs Geschwistern, the, § 91, p. 118 note 5

Seymour v. London and Provincial Marine Insurance Co., § 402, p. 504 note

Seymour v. London and Provincial Marine Insurance Co., § 402, p. 504 note

Shepeler v. Durand, § 100a, p. 133 note 4

Shepeler v. Durand, § 100a, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 4

Shepherdess, the, § 386, p. 472 note 6

Shepherdess, the, § 386, p. 472 note 6

Sicilian Sulphur Monopoly, § 34, p. 39

Sicilian Sulphur Monopoly, § 34, p. 39

Silesian Loan, § 37, p. 44; § 437, p. 557

Silesian Loan, § 37, p. 44; § 437, p. 557

Smolensk, the, § 84, p. 102

Smolensk, § 84, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of Newhaven, § 99, p. 130 note 1

Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of Newhaven, § 99, p. 130 note 1

Spes and Irene, the, § 386, p. 472 note 10

Spes and Irene, the, § 386, p. 472 note 10

Springbok, the, § 385, p. 470; § 390, p. 477; § 400, p. 500 note 1; § 401, p. 501

Springbok, the, § 385, p. 470; § 390, p. 477; § 400, p. 500 note 1; § 401, p. 501

Stackelberg, Baron de, § 37, p. 43

Stackelberg, Baron de, § 37, p. 43

Stephen Hart, the, § 385, p. 470; § 400, p. 499 note 1

Stephen Hart, the, § 385, p. 470; § 400, p. 499 note 1

Stert, the, § 388, p. 474 note 3

Stert, the, § 388, p. 474 note 3

Sutton v. Sutton, § 99, p. 130 note 1

Sutton v. Sutton, § 99, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 1

Swineherd, the, § 271, p. 332

Swineherd, the, § 271, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Sybille, the, § 211, p. 263

Sybille, the, § 211, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Talbot, the, § 348 (2), p. 424

Talbot, the, § 348 (2), p. 424

Temeraire, the, § 223, p. 282

Temeraire, the, § 223, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Tetardos, the, § 431, p. 548

Tetardos, the, § 431, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Teutonia, the, § 101, p. 138 note 1

Teutonia, the, § 101, p. 138 note 1

Thalia, Le. See Le Thalia.

Thalia, Le. Check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Thea, the, § 431, p. 548

Thea, the, § 431, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, § 90, p. 116 note 4

Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, § 90, p. 116 note 4

Trende Sostre, the, § 399, p. 498 note 1

Trende Sostre, the, § 399, p. 498 note 1

Trent, the, § 408, p. 519 note 3; § 431, p. 530

Trent, the, § 408, p. 519 note 3; § 431, p. 530

Twee Gebroeders, the, § 362, p. 443

Twee Gebroeders, the, § 362, p. 443

Variag, the, § 320, p. 388; § 348 (2), p. 424; § 361, p. 442 note 3

Variag, the, § 320, p. 388; § 348 (2), p. 424; § 361, p. 442 note 3

Vega, the, § 186, p. 233

Vega, the, § 186, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Venezuelan Boundary Dispute (1900), § 14, p. 18

Venezuelan Boundary Dispute (1900), § 14, p. 18

Venus, the (1803), § 225, p. 283 note 3

Venus, the (1803), § 225, p. 283 note 3

Venus, the (1814), § 88, p. 112 note 1; § 90, p. 116 note 3

Venus, the (1814), § 88, p. 112 note 1; § 90, p. 116 note 3

Victor, the, § 349, p. 427

Victor, the, § 349, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Vigilantia, the, § 91, p. 118 note 2

Vigilantia, the, § 91, p. 118 note 2

Vorwärts, the, § 194, p. 244

Forward, the, § 194, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Vrouw Judith, the, § 376, p. 458 note 1; § 384, p. 467 note 3; § 387, p. 474 note 1

Vrouw Judith, the, § 376, p. 458 note 1; § 384, p. 467 note 3; § 387, p. 474 note 1

Vrow Houwina, the, § 401, p. 501

Vrow Houwina, the, § 401, p. 501

Vrow Margaretha, the, § 91, p. 118 note 4

Vrow Margaretha, the, § 91, p. 118 note 4

Wachuset, the, § 362, p. 443

Wachuset, the, § 362, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Wahl. See De Wahl

Choice. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

War Onskan, the, § 432, p. 551 note 3

War Onskan, the, § 432, p. 551 note 3

Washburne, § 157, p. 194

Washburne, § 157, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Wells v. Williams, § 100a, p. 133 note 3

Wells v. Williams, § 100a, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 3

Welvaart van Pillaw, the, § 389 p. 476 note 1

Welvaart van Pillaw, the, § 389 p. 476 note 1

William, the, § 400, p. 499 note 1

William, the, § 400, p. 499 note 1

Willison v. Paterson, § 101, p. 137 note 2

Willison v. Paterson, § 101, p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ note 2

Yangtsze Insurance Association v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance Company, § 407, p. 516 note 1

Yangtsze Insurance Association v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance Company, § 407, p. 516 note 1

Young Jacob and Joanna, the, § 187, p. 234 note 2

Young Jacob and Joanna, the, § 187, p. 234 note 2

CONTENTS OF Volume Two

PART I

PART I

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER 1

AMICABLE SETTLEMENT OF STATE DIFFERENCES

Friendly resolution of state issues

I. State Differences and their Amicable Settlement in General

I. State Differences and their Amicable Settlement in General

SECT.     PAGE

SECTION     PAGE

1. Legal and political International Differences 3

1. Legal and Political International Differences 3

2. International Law not exclusively concerned with Legal Differences 4

2. International Law isn't only focused on legal differences 4

3. Amicable in contradistinction to compulsive settlement of Differences 4

3. Friendly as opposed to forced resolution of Disputes 4

II. Negotiation

II. Negotiation

4. In what Negotiation consists 6

4. What Negotiation Is __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

5. International Commissions of Inquiry 6

International Commissions of Inquiry __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

6. Effect of Negotiation 9

6. Impact of Negotiation __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

III. Good Offices and Mediation

III. Good Offices and Mediation

7. Occasions for Good Offices and Mediation 10

7. Opportunities for Assistance and Mediation 10

8. Right and Duty of offering, requesting, and rendering Good Offices and Mediation 10

8. Right and Duty of offering, requesting, and providing Good Offices and Mediation 10

9. Good Offices in contradistinction to Mediation 11

9. Good Offices compared to Mediation 11

10. Good Offices and Mediation according to the Hague Arbitration Convention 12

10. Good Offices and Mediation according to the Hague Arbitration Convention 12

11. Value of Good Offices and Mediation 14

11. Value of Good Offices and Mediation 14

IV. Arbitration

IV. Arbitration

12. Conception of Arbitration 16

12. Arbitration Concept __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

13. Treaty of Arbitration 16

13. Arbitration Agreement __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

14. Who is to Arbitrate? 17

14. Who will mediate? __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

15. On what principles Arbitrators proceed and decide 18

15. What principles do arbitrators use to make their decisions? 18

16. Binding force of Arbitral Verdict 18[Pg xx]

16. Binding force of Arbitral Verdict 18[Pg xx]

17. What differences can be decided by Arbitration 19

17. What differences can be settled by Arbitration 19

18. Value of Arbitration 22

18. Benefits of Arbitration __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

V. Arbitration according to the Hague Convention

V. Arbitration under the Hague Convention

19. Arbitral Justice in general 23

19. General Arbitral Justice __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

20. Arbitration Treaty and appointment of Arbitrators 26

20. Arbitration Agreement and Selection of Arbitrators 26

21. Procedure of and before the Arbitral Tribunal 27

21. Procedure of and before the Arbitral Tribunal 27

22. Arbitral Award 30

22. Arbitration Award __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

23. Binding force of Awards 30

23. Binding impact of Awards __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

24. Award binding upon Parties only 31

24. Award binding upon Parties only 31

25. Costs of Arbitration 32

25. Arbitration Costs __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

25a. Arbitration by Summary Procedure 32

25a. Arbitration by Summary Process __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER 2

COMPULSIVE SETTLEMENT OF STATE DIFFERENCES

Compulsive resolution of state issues

I. On Compulsive Means of Settlement of State Differences in General

I. On Compulsive Means of Resolving State Disputes in General

26. Conception and kinds of Compulsive Means of Settlement 34

26. Understanding and Types of Compulsive Settlement Methods 34

27. Compulsive Means in contradistinction to War 34

27. Compulsive Means in contrast to War 34

28. Compulsive Means in contradistinction to an Ultimatum and Demonstrations 35

28. Compulsive Methods Compared to an Ultimatum and Showings 35

II. Retorsion

II. Retorsion

29. Conception and Character of Retorsion 36

29. Conception and Character of Retorsion 36

30. Retorsion, when justified 37

30. Retorsion, when justified __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

31. Retorsion, how exercised 37

Retorsion, how it's used __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

32. Value of Retorsion 38

32. Value of Retorsion __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

III. Reprisals

III. Retaliation

33. Conception of Reprisals in contradistinction to Retorsion 38

33. Understanding Reprisals in contrast to Retorsion 38

34. Reprisals admissible for all International Delinquencies 39

34. Retaliation allowed for all International Offenses 39

35. Reprisals admissible for International Delinquencies only 40

35. Reprisals allowed only for international offenses 40

36. Reprisals, by whom performed 41

36. Reprisals, who carries them out 41

37. Objects of Reprisals 42

37. Objects of Reprisals __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

38. Positive and Negative Reprisals 44

38. Positive and Negative Reactions __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

39. Reprisals must be proportionate 44

39. Reprisals need to be proportionate 44

40. Embargo 44

40. Ban __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

41. Reprisals to be preceded by Negotiations and to be stopped when Reparation is made 46

41. Retaliation should come after negotiations and should stop once compensation is made. 46

42. Reprisals during Peace in contradistinction to Reprisals during War 46

42. Retaliation during Peace compared to Retaliation during War 46

43. Value of Reprisals 46

43. Worth of Retaliations __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

IV. Pacific Blockade

IV. Pacific Blockade

44. Development of practice of Pacific Blockade 48

44. Development of the practice of Pacific Blockade 48

45. Admissibility of Pacific Blockade 50

45. Validity of Pacific Blockade __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

46. Pacific Blockade and vessels of third States 51[Pg xxi]

46. Pacific Blockade and vessels of third States 51[Pg xxi]

47. Pacific Blockade and vessels of the blockaded State 52

47. Pacific Blockade and ships of the blockaded State 52

48. Manner of Pacific Blockade 52

48. How to Conduct a Pacific Blockade 52

49. Value of Pacific Blockade 53

49. Importance of Pacific Blockade __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

V. Intervention

V. Intervention

50. Intervention in contradistinction to Participation in a difference 54

50. Intervention compared to Participation in a difference 54

51. Mode of Intervention 55

51. Way of Intervention __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

52. Time of Intervention 55

52. Time to Intervene __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

PART II

Part II

WAR

WAR

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER 1

ON WAR IN GENERAL

ON WAR OVERALL

I. Characteristics of War

I. Features of War

53. War no illegality 59

War is not illegal __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

54. Conception of War 60

54. Concept of War __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

55. War a contention 61

55. War is a dispute __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

56. War a contention between States 62

56. War is a conflict between states 62

57. War a contention between States through armed forces 63

57. War is a conflict between nations involving military forces 63

58. War a contention between States for the purpose of overpowering each other 67

58. War is a struggle between states to overpower one another 67

59. Civil War 68

Civil War __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

60. Guerilla War 70

60. Guerrilla Warfare __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

II. Causes, Kinds, and Ends of War

II. Causes, Types, and Purposes of War

61. Rules of Warfare independent of Causes of War 72

61. Rules of Warfare independent of Causes of War 72

62. Causes of War 73

Causes of War __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

63. Just Causes of War 74

63. Just Causes of War __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

64. Causes in contradistinction to Pretexts for War 75

64. Real Reasons vs. Pretexts for War 75

65. Different kinds of War 76

65. Types of War __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

66. Ends of War 76

66. War Ends __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

III. The Laws of War

III. The Rules of War

67. Origin of the Laws of War 78

67. Origin of the Laws of War 78

68. The latest Development of the Laws of War 79

68. The most recent Updates on the Laws of War 79

69. Binding force of the Laws of War 83

69. Binding force of the Laws of War 83

IV. The Region of War

IV. The War Zone

70. Region of War in contradistinction to Theatre of War 85

70. Region of War compared to Theatre of War 85

71. Particular Region of every War 86[Pg xxii]

71. Specific Area of each War 86[Pg xxii]

72. Exclusion from Region of War through Neutralisation 88

72. Exclusion from War Zone through Neutralization 88

73. Asserted exclusion of the Baltic Sea from the Region of War 90

73. Claimed exclusion of the Baltic Sea from the War Zone 90

V. The Belligerents

V. The Opponents

74. Qualification to become a Belligerent (facultas bellandi) 90

74. Qualification to become a Belligerent (facultas bellandi) 90

75. Possibility in contradistinction to qualification to become a Belligerent 91

75. Possibility as opposed to qualification to become a Belligerent 91

76. Insurgents as a Belligerent Power 92

76. Insurgents as a Belligerent Power 92

77. Principal and accessory Belligerent Parties 93

77. Main and supporting warring parties 93

VI. The Armed Forces of the Belligerents

VI. The Armed Forces of the Belligerents

78. Regular Armies and Navies 94

78. Regular Armies and Navies __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

79. Non-combatant Members of Armed Forces 95

79. Non-combatant Members of Armed Forces 95

80. Irregular Forces 96

80. Unconventional Forces __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

81. Levies en masse 97

81. Levies in large numbers __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

82. Barbarous Forces 98

82. Savage Forces __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

83. Privateers 99

Privateers __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

84. Converted Merchantmen 100

Converted Cargo Ships __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

85. The Crews of Merchantmen 104

85. Merchant Ship Crews __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

86. Deserters and Traitors 106

86. Deserters and Traitors __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

VII. Enemy Character

VII. Antagonist Character

87. On Enemy Character in general 106

87. On Enemy Character in General 106

88. Enemy Character of Individuals 108

88. Enemy Character of Individuals __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

89. Enemy Character of Vessels 112

89. Enemy Character of Ships __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

90. Enemy Character of Goods 115

90. Enemy Item of Goods __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

91. Transfer of Enemy Vessels 117

Transfer of Enemy Ships __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

92. Transfer of Goods on Enemy Vessels 119

92. Transfer of Goods on Enemy Ships 119

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER 2

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

THE START OF WAR

I. Commencement of War

I. Start of War

93. Commencement of War in General 121

93. The Start of War in General 121

94. Declaration of War 123

94. Declaration of War __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

95. Ultimatum 125

95. Ultimatum __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

96. Initiative hostile Acts of War 126

96. Initiative hostile Acts of War 126

II. Effects of the Outbreak of War

II. Effects of the Outbreak of War

97. General Effects of the Outbreak of War 128

97. General Effects of the Outbreak of War 128

98. Rupture of Diplomatic Intercourse and Consular Activity 129

98. Break in Diplomatic Relations and Consular Activities 129

99. Cancellation of Treaties 129

99. Cancelling Treaties __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

100. Precarious position of Belligerents' subjects on Enemy Territory 131

100. Unstable situation for the subjects of belligerents in enemy territory 131

100a. Persona standi in judicio on Enemy Territory 133

100a. Legal standing in court on Enemy Territory 133

101. Intercourse, especially Trading, between Subjects of Belligerents 135[Pg xxiii]

101. Interaction, especially Trading, between People of Warring Parties 135[Pg xxiii]

102. Position of Belligerents' Property in the Enemy State 139

102. Position of Belligerents' Property in the Enemy State 139

102a. Effect of the Outbreak of War on Merchantmen 140

102a. Impact of War Outbreak on Merchant Ships 140

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER 3

WARFARE ON LAND

Land Warfare

I. On Land Warfare in General

I. On Ground Combat in General

103. Aims and Means of Land Warfare 144

103. Goals and Methods of Land Warfare 144

104. Lawful and Unlawful Practices of Land Warfare 144

104. Lawful and Unlawful Practices of Land Warfare 144

105. Objects of the Means of Warfare 145

105. Objects of the Means of Warfare 145

106. Land Warfare in contradistinction to Sea Warfare 145

106. Land Warfare in contrast to Sea Warfare 145

II. Violence against Enemy Persons

II. Violence Against Opposing Individuals

107. On Violence in general against Enemy Persons 146

107. On Violence in General Against Enemy Persons 146

108. Killing and Wounding of Combatants 146

108. Killing and Wounding of Combatants 146

109. Refusal of Quarter 147

109. No Mercy __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

110. Lawful and Unlawful Means of killing and wounding Combatants 148

110. Legal and Illegal Ways of Killing and Wounding Combatants 148

111. Explosive Bullets 149

111. Explosive Rounds __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

112. Expanding (Dum-Dum) Bullets 149

112. Expanding Bullets __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

113. Projectiles diffusing Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases 150

113. Projectiles releasing Asphyxiating or Harmful Gases 150

114. Violence directed from Air-Vessels 150

Aerial violence __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

115. Violence against non-combatant Members of Armed Forces 151

115. Violence against non-combatant Members of Armed Forces 151

116. Violence against Private Enemy Persons 151

116. Violence against Private Enemy Persons 151

117. Violence against the Head of the Enemy State and against Officials in Important Positions 153

117. Violence against the Leader of the Opposing State and against Officials in Key Positions 153

III. Treatment of Wounded, and Dead Bodies

III. Taking Care of the Injured and Handling Dead Bodies

118. Origin of Geneva Convention 154

Origin of Geneva Convention __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

119. The Wounded and the Sick 157

119. The Wounded and the Sick 157

120. Medical Units and Establishments, and Material 158

120. Medical Units and Establishments, and Materials 158

121. Personnel 159

121. Staff __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

122. Convoys of Evacuation 160

Evacuation Convoys __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

123. Distinctive Emblem 161

Unique Emblem __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

124. Treatment of the Dead 162

124. Handling the Deceased __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

124a. Application of the Geneva Convention, and Prevention of Abuses 163

124a. Application of the Geneva Convention, and Prevention of Abuses 163

124b. General provisions of the Geneva Convention 164

124b. General provisions of the Geneva Convention 164

IV. Captivity

IV. Imprisonment

125. Development of International Law regarding Captivity 165

125. Development of International Law regarding Captivity 165

126. Treatment of Prisoners of War 167

126. Treatment of Prisoners of War 167

127. Who may claim to be Prisoners of War 169

127. Who can claim to be Prisoners of War 169

128. Discipline 169

128. Discipline __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

129. Release on Parole 170

129. Parole Release __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

130. Bureau of Information 171[Pg xxiv]

130. Information Bureau __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__[Pg xxiv]

131. Relief Societies 171

131. Relief Societies __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

132. End of Captivity 172

132. End of Imprisonment __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

V. Appropriation and Utilisation of Public Enemy Property

V. Use and Management of Public Enemy Property

133. Appropriation of all the Enemy Property no longer admissible 174

133. Taking over all enemy property is no longer acceptable 174

134. Immoveable Public Property 174

134. Unmovable Public Property __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

135. Immoveable Property of Municipalities, and of Religious, Charitable, and the like Institutions 175

135. Property that Cannot Be Moved for Municipalities, and for Religious, Charitable, and Similar Institutions 175

136. Utilisation of Public Buildings 175

Use of Public Buildings __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

137. Moveable Public Property 176

137. Portable Public Property __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

138. Moveable Property of Municipalities, and of Religious, Charitable, and the like Institutions 177

138. Moveable Property of Municipalities, and of Religious, Charitable, and Similar Institutions 177

139. Booty on the Battlefield 177

Booty on the Battlefield __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

VI. Appropriation and Utilisation of Private Enemy Property

VI. Using and Managing Private Enemy Property

140. Immoveable Private Property 179

140. Permanent Private Property __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

141. Private War Material and Means of Transport 180

141. Private War Material and Means of Transport 180

142. Works of Art and Science, Historical Monuments 180

142. Works of Art and Science, Historical Monuments 180

143. Other Private Personal Property 180

143. Other Private Property __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

144. Booty on the Battlefield 181

Booty on the Battlefield __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

145. Private Enemy Property brought into a Belligerent's Territory 182

145. Private Enemy Property brought into a Belligerent's Territory 182

VII. Requisitions and Contributions

VII. Requests and Contributions

146. War must support War 183

War must support War __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

147. Requisitions in Kind, and Quartering 185

147. Requisitions in Kind, and Quartering 185

148. Contributions 186

Contributions __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

VIII. Destruction of Enemy Property

VIII. Enemy Property Destruction

149. Wanton destruction prohibited 187

No wanton destruction allowed __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

150. Destruction for the purpose of Offence and Defence 188

150. Destruction for the purpose of Offense and Defense 188

151. Destruction in marching, reconnoitring, and conducting Transport 188

151. Destruction while marching, scouting, and managing transport 188

152. Destruction of Arms, Ammunition, and Provisions 189

152. Destruction of Arms, Ammunition, and Provisions 189

153. Destruction of Historical Monuments, Works of Art, and the like 189

153. Destruction of Historical Monuments, Works of Art, and the like 189

154. General Devastation 190

154. Total Destruction __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

IX. Assault, Siege, and Bombardment

IX. Attack, Siege, and Bombing

155. Assault, Siege, and Bombardment, when lawful 191

155. Assault, Siege, and Bombardment, when lawful 191

156. Assault, how carried out 193

156. Assault, how it is done 193

157. Siege, how carried out 193

157. How to conduct a siege __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

158. Bombardment, how carried out 194

158. Bombardment methods __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

X. Espionage and Treason

X. Espionage and Betrayal

159. Twofold Character of Espionage and Treason 196

159. Twofold Character of Espionage and Treason 196

160. Espionage in contradistinction to Scouting and Despatch-bearing 197[Pg xxv]

160. Espionage, as opposed to Scouting and Dispatch-bearing 197[Pg xxv]

161. Punishment of Espionage 198

161. Punishment for Spying __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

162. Treason 199

Treason __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

XI. Ruses

XI. Tricks

163. Character of Ruses of War 200

163. Character of Ruses of War 200

164. Different kinds of Stratagems 201

164. Different types of strategies __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

165. Stratagems in contradistinction to Perfidy 202

165. Strategies in contrast to Deceit 202

XII. Occupation of Enemy Territory

XII. Occupying Enemy Territory

166. Occupation as an Aim of Warfare 204

166. Occupation as an Aim of Warfare 204

167. Occupation, when effected 206

167. Occupation, when established __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

168. Occupation, when ended 210

168. Occupation, when finished __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

169. Rights and Duties in General of the Occupant 210

169. Rights and Duties of the Occupant in General 210

170. Rights of the Occupant regarding the Inhabitants 211

170. Rights of the Occupant regarding the Inhabitants 211

171. Position of Government Officials and Municipal Functionaries during Occupation 213

171. Position of Government Officials and Municipal Functionaries during Occupation 213

172. Position of Courts of Justice during Occupation 214

172. Position of Courts of Justice during Occupation 214

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER 4

WARFARE ON SEA

Naval Warfare

I. On Sea Warfare in General

I. On Naval Warfare in General

173. Aims and Means of Sea Warfare 216

173. Goals and Methods of Naval Warfare 216

174. Lawful and Unlawful Practices of Sea Warfare 217

174. Legal and Illegal Practices of Sea Warfare 217

175. Objects of the Means of Sea Warfare 218

175. Objects of the Means of Sea Warfare 218

176. Development of International Law regarding Private Property on Sea 218

176. Development of International Law concerning Private Property on the Sea 218

177. Declaration of Paris 220

177. Paris Agreement __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

178. The Principle of Appropriation of Private Enemy Vessels and Enemy Goods thereon 221

178. The Principle of Claiming Private Enemy Ships and Their Goods 221

179. Impending Codification of Law of Sea Warfare 224

179. Upcoming Rules for Naval Warfare 224

II. Attack and Seizure of Enemy Vessels

II. Attacking and Taking Over Enemy Ships

180. Importance of Attack and Seizure of Enemy Vessels 225

180. Importance of Attack and Seizure of Enemy Vessels 225

181. Attack, when legitimate 225

Legitimate attack __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

182. Attack, how effected 226

182. Attack, how it happened __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

182a. Submarine Contact Mines 227

182a. Submarine Contact Mines __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

183. Duty of giving Quarter 231

183. Duty to provide Quarter __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

184. Seizure 231

Seizure __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

185. Effect of Seizure 231

185. Seizure Impact __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

186. Immunity of Vessels charged with Religious, Scientific, or Philanthropic Mission 232

186. Immunity of Vessels on Religious, Scientific, or Philanthropic Missions 232

187. Immunity of Fishing-boats and small boats employed in local Trade 234

187. Immunity of fishing boats and small boats used in local trade 234

188. Immunity of Merchantmen at the Outbreak of War on their Voyage to and from a Belligerent's Port 235

188. Immunity of Merchant Ships at the Start of War on their Journey to and from a Warring Nation's Port 235

189. Vessels in Distress 236[Pg xxvi]

189. Distressed Vessels __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__[Pg xxvi]

190. Immunity of Hospital and Cartel Ships 236

190. Immunity of Hospital and Cartel Ships 236

191. Immunity of Mail-boats and Mail-bags 236

191. Immunity of Mail-boats and Mail-bags 236

III. Appropriation, and Destruction of Enemy Merchantmen

III. Seizing and Destroying Enemy Merchant Ships

192. Prize Courts 238

192. Prize Courts __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

193. Conduct of Prize to Port of Prize Court 241

193. Conduct of Prize to Port of Prize Court 241

194. Destruction of Prize 242

194. Destruction of Prize __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

195. Ransom of Prize 245

Ransom of Prize __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

196. Loss of Prize, especially Recapture 246

196. Loss of Prize, especially Recapture 246

197. Fate of Prize 247

197. Prize Outcome __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

198. Vessels belonging to Subjects of Neutral States, but sailing under Enemy Flag 248

198. Ships owned by citizens of neutral countries, but operating under an enemy flag 248

199. Effect of Sale of Enemy Vessels during War 248

199. Effect of Sale of Enemy Vessels during War 248

200. Goods sold by and to Enemy Subjects during War 249

200. Goods sold by and to enemy subjects during war 249

IV. Violence against Enemy Persons

IV. Violence Against Enemy Combatants

201. Violence against Combatants 249

201. Violence against Combatants __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

202. Violence against Non-combatant Members of Naval Forces 250

202. Violence against Non-combatant Members of Naval Forces 250

203. Violence against Enemy Individuals not belonging to the Naval Forces 251

203. Violence against Enemy Individuals not belonging to the Naval Forces 251

V. Treatment of Wounded and Shipwrecked

V. Care for the Injured and Shipwrecked

204. Adaptation of Geneva Convention to Sea Warfare 252

204. Adaptation of Geneva Convention to Sea Warfare 252

205. The Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked 253

205. The Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked 253

205a. Treatment of the Dead 254

205a. Handling the Deceased __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

206. Hospital Ships 254

206. Hospital Ships __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

206a. Hospital Ships in Neutral Ports 256

206a. Hospital Ships in Neutral Ports 256

206b. Sick-Bays 257

206b. Sickbays __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

207. Distinctive Colour and Emblem of Hospital Ships 258

207. Distinctive Color and Emblem of Hospital Ships 258

208. Neutral Vessels assisting the Wounded, Sick, or Shipwrecked 259

208. Neutral Vessels helping the Wounded, Sick, or Shipwrecked 259

209. The Religious, Medical, and Hospital Staff 260

209. The Religious, Medical, and Hospital Staff 260

209a. Application of Convention X., and Prevention of Abuses 260

209a. Application of Convention X. and Prevention of Abuse 260

209b. General Provisions of Convention X. 261

209b. General Provisions of Convention X. 261

VI. Espionage, Treason, Ruses

VI. Spying, Betrayal, Tricks

210. Espionage and Treason 262

210. Spying and Betrayal __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

211. Ruses 262

211. Tricks __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

VII. Requisitions, Contributions, Bombardment

VII. Requests, Donations, Bombing

212. Requisitions and Contributions upon Coast Towns 264

212. Requisitions and Contributions from Coastal Towns 264

213. Bombardment of the Enemy Coast 266

213. Bombing the Enemy Coast __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

VIII. Interference with Submarine Telegraph Cables

VIII. Interference with Submarine Cables

214. Uncertainty of Rules concerning Interference with Submarine Telegraph Cables 271[Pg xxvii]

214. Uncertainty of Rules about Interference with Undersea Telegraph Cables 271[Pg xxvii]

CHAPTER V

Chapter 5

NON-HOSTILE RELATIONS OF BELLIGERENTS

Peaceful relations between opponents

I. On non-hostile Relations in General between Belligerents

I. On Non-Hostile Relations in General Between Warring Parties

215. Fides etiam hosti servanda 273

215. Faith must also be kept with the enemy __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

216. Different kinds of Non-hostile Relations 274

216. Different kinds of Non-hostile Relations 274

217. Licences to Trade 275

217. Trading Licenses __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

II. Passports, Safe-conducts, Safeguards

II. Passports, Transit Passes, Protections

218. Passports and Safe-conducts 276

Passports and Safe-passes __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

219. Safeguards 277

219. Safeguards __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

III. Flags of Truce

III. Peace Flags

220. Meaning of Flags of Truce 278

220. Meaning of Flags of Truce 278

221. Treatment of Unadmitted Flag-bearers 279

221. Treatment of Unregistered Flag-bearers __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

222. Treatment of Admitted Flag-bearers 279

222. Care for Admitted Flag-bearers __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

223. Abuse of Flag of Truce 281

223. Abuse of Flag of Truce 281

IV. Cartels

IV. Cartels

224. Definition and Purpose of Cartels 282

224. Definition and Purpose of Cartels 282

225. Cartel Ships 283

225. Cartel Ships __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

V. Capitulations

V. Agreements

226. Character and Purpose of Capitulations 284

226. Character and Purpose of Capitulations 284

227. Contents of Capitulations 285

227. Terms of Agreements __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

228. Form of Capitulations 286

228. Terms of Agreement __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

229. Competence to conclude Capitulations 287

Finalizing Agreements __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

230. Violation of Capitulations 289

230. Breach of Capitulations __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

VI. Armistices

VI. Ceasefires

231. Character and Kinds of Armistices 290

231. Character and Types of Ceasefires 290

232. Suspensions of Arms 291

232. Ceasefires __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

233. General Armistices 291

233. General Ceasefires __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

234. Partial Armistices 293

234. Partial Ceasefires __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

235. Competence to conclude Armistices 293

235. Authority to negotiate ceasefires __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

236. Form of Armistices 294

236. Armistice Forms __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

237. Contents of Armistices 294

237. Armistice Contents __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

238. Commencement of Armistices 296

238. Start of Armistices __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

239. Violation of Armistices 297

Violation of Ceasefires __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

240. End of Armistices 299

240. End of Ceasefires __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER 6

MEANS OF SECURING LEGITIMATE WARFARE

Ways to ensure just warfare

I. On Means in General of securing Legitimate Warfare

I. On Means in General of Securing Legitimate Warfare

241. Legitimate and Illegitimate Warfare 300

241. Legitimate and Illegitimate Warfare __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

242. How Legitimate Warfare is on the whole secured 301[Pg xxviii]

242. How Legitimate Warfare is on the whole secured 301[Pg xxviii]

II. Complaints, Good Offices and Mediation, Intervention

II. Complaints, Good Offices and Mediation, Intervention

243. Complaints lodged with the Enemy 302

243. Complaints filed with the Enemy 302

244. Complaints lodged with Neutrals 303

Complaints filed with neutrals __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

245. Good Offices and Mediation 303

245. Mediation and Good Offices __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

246. Intervention on the part of Neutrals 304

246. Neutral Intervention __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

III. Reprisals

III. Retaliation

247. Reprisals between Belligerents in contradistinction to Reprisals in time of Peace 305

247. Reprisals between Belligerents, as opposed to Reprisals in times of Peace 305

248. Reprisals admissible for every Illegitimate Act of Warfare 305

248. Retaliation allowed for every illegitimate act of warfare 305

249. Danger of Arbitrariness in Reprisals 306

249. Danger of Arbitrariness in Reprisals 306

250. Proposed Restriction of Reprisals 308

250. Proposed Restriction on Retaliation __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

IV. Punishment of War Crimes

IV. Prosecution of War Crimes

251. Conception of War Crimes 309

251. Definition of War Crimes __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

252. Different kinds of War Crimes 310

252. Different kinds of War Crimes 310

253. Violations of Rules regarding Warfare 310

253. Violations of Rules regarding Warfare 310

254. Hostilities in Arms by Private Individuals 312

254. Hostilities with Weapons by Private Individuals 312

255. Espionage and War Treason 313

255. Spyware and War Betrayal __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

256. Marauding 316

Marauding __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

257. Mode of Punishment of War Crimes 316

257. Mode of Punishment of War Crimes 316

V. Taking of Hostages

V. Hostage Situation

258. Former Practice of taking Hostages 317

258. Former Practice of taking Hostages 317

259. Modern Practice of taking Hostages 317

259. Modern Practice of Taking Hostages 317

VI. Compensation

VI. *Payment*

259a. How the Principle of Compensation for Violations of the Laws of War arose 319

259a. How the Principle of Compensation for Violations of the Laws of War Came About 319

259b. Compensation for Violations of the Hague Regulations 320

259b. Compensation for Violations of the Hague Regulations 320

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER 7

END OF WAR, AND POSTLIMINIUM

END OF WAR AND POSTLIMINIUM

I. On Termination of War in General

I. On Termination of War in General

260. War a Temporary Condition 322

260. War is a Temporary Situation 322

261. Three Modes of Termination of War 322

261. Three Ways to End a War 322

II. Simple Cessation of Hostilities

II. Simple End of Hostilities

262. Exceptional Occurrence of simple Cessation of Hostilities 323

262. Unusual Case of Simple Ceasefire 323

263. Effect of Termination of War through simple Cessation of Hostilities 324[Pg xxix]

263. Effect of Termination of War through Simple Cessation of Hostilities 324[Pg xxix]

III. Subjugation

III. Oppression

264. Subjugation in contradistinction to Conquest 325

264. Subjugation vs. Conquest __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

265. Subjugation a formal End of War 326

265. Subjugation as a Formal End to War 326

IV. Treaty of Peace

IV. Peace Treaty

266. Treaty of Peace the most frequent End of War 327

266. Treaty of Peace the most common End of War 327

267. Peace Negotiations 328

267. Peace Talks __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

268. Preliminaries of Peace 329

Peace Negotiations __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

269. Form and Parts of Peace Treaties 330

269. Form and Parts of Peace Treaties 330

270. Competence to conclude Peace 330

270. Ability to make Peace __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

271. Date of Peace 331

271. Peace Date __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

V. Effects of Treaty of Peace

V. Effects of Peace Treaty

272. Restoration of Condition of Peace 332

272. Restoration of Condition of Peace 332

273. Principle of Uti Possidetis 334

273. Principle of Uti Possidetis __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

274. Amnesty 334

274. Amnesty __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

275. Release of Prisoners of War 335

275. Release of Prisoners of War 335

276. Revival of Treaties 336

276. Treaty Revival __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

VI. Performance of Treaty of Peace

VI. Implementation of Peace Treaty

277. Treaty of Peace, how to be carried out 337

277. Treaty of Peace, how it should be carried out 337

278. Breach of Treaty of Peace 338

278. Breach of Treaty of Peace 338

VII. Postliminium

VII. Postliminium

279. Conception of Postliminium 339

279. Concept of Postliminium __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

280. Postliminium according to International Law, in contradistinction to Postliminium according to Municipal Law 340

280. Postliminium in International Law, as opposed to Postliminium in Municipal Law 340

281. Revival of the Former Condition of Things 341

281. Revival of the Former Condition of Things 341

282. Validity of Legitimate Acts 342

282. Validity of Legitimate Acts __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

283. Invalidity of Illegitimate Acts 343

283. Invalidity of Unlawful Acts __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

284. No Postliminium after Interregnum 343

284. No Postliminium after Interregnum __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

PART III

PART 3

NEUTRALITY

Neutrality

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER 1

ON NEUTRALITY IN GENERAL

ON NEUTRALITY OVERALL

I. Development of the Institution of Neutrality

I. Development of the Institution of Neutrality

285. Neutrality not practised in Ancient Times 347

285. Neutrality not practiced in Ancient Times 347

286. Neutrality during the Middle Ages 348[Pg xxx]

286. Neutrality during the Middle Ages 348[Pg xxx]

287. Neutrality during the Seventeenth Century 349

287. Neutrality during the Seventeenth Century 349

288. Progress of Neutrality during the Eighteenth Century 350

288. Progress of Neutrality during the Eighteenth Century 350

289. First Armed Neutrality 352

First Armed Neutrality __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

290. The French Revolution and the Second Armed Neutrality 354

290. The French Revolution and the Second Armed Neutrality 354

291. Neutrality during the Nineteenth Century 357

291. Neutrality during the Nineteenth Century 357

292. Neutrality in the Twentieth Century 359

292. Neutrality in the Twentieth Century 359

II. Characteristics of Neutrality

II. Features of Neutrality

293. Conception of Neutrality 361

293. Concept of Neutrality __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

294. Neutrality an Attitude of Impartiality 362

294. Neutrality: An Attitude of Impartiality 362

295. Neutrality an Attitude creating Rights and Duties 363

295. Neutrality is an Attitude that Creates Rights and Responsibilities 363

296. Neutrality an Attitude of States 363

296. Neutrality an Attitude of States 363

297. No Cessation of Intercourse during Neutrality between Neutrals and Belligerents 365

297. No Stopping of Communication during Neutrality between Neutrals and Warring Parties 365

298. Neutrality an Attitude during War (Neutrality in Civil War) 365

298. Neutrality an Attitude during War (Neutrality in Civil War) 365

299. Neutrality to be recognised by the Belligerents 367

299. Neutrality to be recognized by the Belligerents 367

III. Different Kinds of Neutrality

III. Types of Neutrality

300. Perpetual Neutrality 368

300. Forever Neutrality __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

301. General and Partial Neutrality 369

301. Full and Partial Neutrality __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

302. Voluntary and Conventional Neutrality 369

302. Voluntary and Conventional Neutrality __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

303. Armed Neutrality 369

303. Armed Neutrality __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

304. Benevolent Neutrality 370

304. Kind Indifference __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

305. Perfect and Qualified Neutrality 370

305. Ideal and Qualified Neutrality __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

306. Some Historical Examples of Qualified Neutrality 371

306. Some Historical Examples of Qualified Neutrality 371

IV. Commencement and End of Neutrality

IV. Start and End of Neutrality

307. Neutrality commences with Knowledge of the War 373

307. Neutrality starts with Understanding of the Conflict 373

308. Commencement of Neutrality in Civil War 374

308. Commencement of Neutrality in Civil War 374

309. Establishment of Neutrality by Declarations 374

309. Establishment of Neutrality by Declarations 374

310. Municipal Neutrality Laws 375

310. Municipal Neutrality Laws __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

311. British Foreign Enlistment Act 375

311. UK Foreign Enlistment Act __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

312. End of Neutrality 377

312. End of Neutrality __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER 2

RELATIONS BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRALS

Relations Between Combatants and Neutrals

I. Rights and Duties deriving from Neutrality

I. Neutrality: Rights and Responsibilities

313. Conduct in General of Neutrals and Belligerents  378

313. Conduct in General of Neutrals and Belligerents 378

314. What Rights and Duties of Neutrals and of Belligerents there are  378

314. What Rights and Duties of Neutrals and of Belligerents there are  378

315. Rights and Duties of Neutrals contested 379

315. Rights and Duties of Neutrals contested 379

316. Contents of Duty of Impartiality 381

316. Contents of Duty of Impartiality 381

317. Duty of Impartiality continuously growing more intense 382

317. The duty of impartiality is becoming increasingly important 382

317a. Neutrality Conventions of the Second Peace Conference 383

317a. Neutrality Conventions of the Second Peace Conference 383

318. Contents of Duty of Belligerents to treat Neutrals in accordance with their Impartiality 384[Pg xxxi]

318. Duty of Belligerents to Treat Neutrals Based on Their Impartiality 384[Pg xxxi]

319. Contents of Duty not to suppress Intercourse between Neutrals and the Enemy 385

319. Contents of Duty not to Suppress Interaction between Neutrals and the Enemy 385

II. Neutrals and Military Operations

II. Neutrals and Military Ops

320. Hostilities by and against Neutrals 386

320. Hostilities by and against Neutrals 386

321. Furnishing Troops and Men-of-War to Belligerents 389

321. Providing Troops and Warships to Warring Parties 389

322. Subjects of Neutrals fighting among Belligerent Forces 390

322. Subjects of Neutrals fighting among Belligerent Forces 390

323. Passage of Troops and War Material through Neutral Territory 391

323. Movement of Troops and Military Supplies through Neutral Areas 391

324. Passage of Wounded through Neutral Territory 392

324. Passage of Wounded through Neutral Territory 392

325. Passage of Men-of-War 393

325. Warship Passage __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

326. Occupation of Neutral Territory by Belligerents 394

326. Occupation of Neutral Territory by Belligerents 394

327. Prize Courts on Neutral Territory 395

327. Prize Courts on Neutral Territory 395

328. Belligerent's Prizes in Neutral Ports 395

328. Belligerent's Prizes in Neutral Ports 395

III. Neutrals and Military Preparations

III. Neutral Countries and Military Readiness

329. Depôts and Factories on Neutral Territory 397

329. Depots and Factories on Neutral Territory 397

330. Levy of Troops, and the like 398

330. Levy of Troops, and the like 398

331. Passage of Bodies of Men intending to Enlist 399

331. Passage of Groups of Men Planning to Enlist 399

332. Organisation of Hostile Expeditions 400

332. Organizing Hostile Expeditions __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

333. Use of Neutral Territory as Base of Naval Operations 400

333. Use of Neutral Territory as a Base for Naval Operations 400

334. Building and Fitting-out of Vessels intended for Naval Operations 405

334. Building and Fitting-out of Vessels Intended for Naval Operations 405

335. The Alabama Case and the Three Rules of Washington 406

335. The Alabama Case and the Three Rules of Washington 406

IV. Neutral Asylum to Land Forces and War Material

IV. Neutral Asylum for Ground Forces and Military Supplies

336. On Neutral Asylum in General 409

336. On Neutral Asylum in General 409

337. Neutral Territory and Prisoners of War 410

337. Neutral Territory and Prisoners of War 410

338. Fugitive Soldiers on Neutral Territory 413

338. Fugitive Soldiers on Neutral Territory 413

339. Neutral Territory and Fugitive Troops 413

339. Neutral Territory and Fugitive Troops 413

340. Neutral Territory and Non-combatant Members of Belligerent Forces 415

340. Neutral Territory and Non-combatant Members of Belligerent Forces 415

341. Neutral Territory and War Material of Belligerents 415

341. Neutral Territory and War Material of Belligerents 415

V. Neutral Asylum to Naval Forces

V. Neutral Asylum for Naval Forces

342. Asylum to Naval Forces in contradistinction to Asylum to Land Forces 417

342. Asylum for Naval Forces as opposed to Asylum for Land Forces 417

343. Neutral Asylum to Naval Forces Optional 417

343. Neutral Asylum for Naval Forces Optional 417

344. Asylum to Naval Forces in Distress 418

344. Asylum for Naval Forces in Distress 418

345. Exterritoriality of Men-of-War during Asylum 419

345. Exterritoriality of Warships during Asylum 419

346. Facilities to Men-of-War during Asylum 420

346. Facilities for Warships during Asylum 420

347. Abuse of Asylum to be prohibited 420

347. Abuse of Asylum is prohibited 420

348. Neutral Men-of-War as an Asylum 423

348. Neutral Men-of-War as an Asylum 423

348a. Neutral Territory and Shipwrecked Soldiers 424

348a. Neutral Territory and Shipwrecked Soldiers 424

VI. Supplies and Loans to Belligerents

VI. Supplies and Loans to Combatants

349. Supply on the part of Neutrals 426

349. Supply on the part of Neutrals 426

350. Supply on the part of Subjects of Neutrals 427[Pg xxxii]

350. Supply by the Subjects of Neutrals 427[Pg xxxii]

351. Loans and Subsidies on the part of Neutrals 430

351. Loans and Subsidies from Neutrals 430

352. Loans and Subsidies on the part of Subjects of Neutrals 430

352. Loans and Subsidies from Neutral Parties 430

VII. Services to Belligerents

VII. Support for Combatants

353. Pilotage 432

Pilotage __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

354. Transport on the part of Neutrals 433

354. Neutral Transport __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

355. Transport on the part of Neutral Merchantmen and by neutral rolling stock 434

355. Transport by neutral merchant ships and neutral vehicles 434

356. Information regarding Military and Naval Operations 434

356. Information about Military and Naval Operations 434

VIII. Violation of Neutrality

VIII. Breaking Neutrality

357. Violation of Neutrality in the narrower and in the wider sense of the Term 438

357. Violation of Neutrality in the narrower and in the wider sense of the Term 438

358. Violation in contradistinction to End of Neutrality 439

358. Violation in contrast to End of Neutrality 439

359. Consequences of Violations of Neutrality 439

359. Consequences of Violations of Neutrality 439

360. Neutrals not to acquiesce in Violations of Neutrality committed by a Belligerent 440

360. Neutrals should not agree to violations of neutrality committed by a warring party 440

361. Case of the General Armstrong 442

Case of the General Armstrong __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

362. Mode of exacting Reparation from Belligerents for Violations of Neutrality 442

362. How to Demand Compensation from Warring Parties for Breaking Neutrality 442

363. Negligence on the part of Neutrals 444

363. Negligence on the part of Neutrals 444

363a. Laying of Submarine Contact Mines by Neutrals 445

363a. The Placement of Underwater Contact Mines by Neutral Parties 445

IX. Right of Angary

IX. Right to Angary

364. The Obsolete Right of Angary 446

364. The Outdated Right of Angary 446

365. The Modern Right of Angary 447

365. The Modern Right of Angary 447

366. Right of Angary concerning Neutral Rolling Stock 448

366. Right of Angary concerning Neutral Rolling Stock 448

367. Right of Angary not deriving from Neutrality 449

367. Right of Angary not deriving from Neutrality 449

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER 3

BLOCKADE

Blockade

I. Conception of Blockade

I. Concept of Blockade

368. Definition of Blockade 450

368. Blockade Definition __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

369. Blockade, Strategic and Commercial 452

369. Blockade, Strategic and Commercial __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

370. Blockade to be Universal 452

370. Blockade to be Universal __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

371. Blockade, Outwards and Inwards 453

371. Blockade, Outbound and Inbound __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

372. What Places can be Blockaded 453

372. What Places Can Be Blockaded 453

373. Blockade of International Rivers 454

373. Blockade of International Rivers __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

374. Justification of Blockade 455

374. Justifying the Blockade __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

II. Establishment of Blockade

II. Setting Up the Blockade

375. Competence to establish Blockade 456

375. Authority to establish Blockade __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

376. Declaration and Notification of Blockade 456[Pg xxxiii]

376. Declaration and Notification of Blockade 456[Pg xxxiii]

377. Length of Time for Egress of Neutral Vessels 459

377. Length of Time for Neutral Vessels to Leave 459

378. End of Blockade 460

378. End of Blockade __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

III. Effectiveness of Blockade

III. Effectiveness of Blockade

379. Effective in contradistinction to Fictitious Blockade 461

379. Effective in contrast to Fictitious Blockade 461

380. Condition of Effectiveness of Blockade 461

380. Condition of Effectiveness of Blockade 461

381. Amount of Danger which creates Effectiveness 464

381. Amount of Danger that Creates Effectiveness 464

382. Cessation of Effectiveness 464

382. Termination of Effectiveness __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

IV. Breach of Blockade

IV. Blockade Violation

383. Definition of Breach of Blockade 466

383. Definition of Breach of Blockade 466

384. No Breach without Notice of Blockade 466

384. No Breach without Notice of Blockade 466

385. The former practice as to what constitutes an Attempt to break Blockade 468

385. The previous guidelines on what counts as an attempt to break a blockade 468

385a. What constitutes an Attempt to break Blockade according to the Declaration of London 470

385a. What counts as an Attempt to break Blockade according to the Declaration of London 470

386. When Ingress is not considered Breach of Blockade 472

386. When Ingress is not seen as a Breach of Blockade 472

387. When Egress is not considered Breach of Blockade 473

387. When leaving is not seen as a violation of the blockade 473

388. Passage through Unblockaded Canal no Breach of Blockade 474

388. Passage through Unblockaded Canal no Breach of Blockade 474

V. Consequences of Breach of Blockade

V. Consequences of Breaking a Blockade

389. Capture of Blockade-running Vessels 475

389. Seizure of Smuggling Ships __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

390. Penalty for Breach of Blockade 476

390. Penalty for Breach of Blockade 476

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER 4

CONTRABAND

Illegal goods

I. Conception of Contraband

I. Understanding Contraband

391. Definition of Contraband of War 480

391. Definition of Contraband of War 480

392. Absolute and conditional Contraband, and free Articles 481

392. Absolute and conditional contraband, and free articles 481

393. Articles absolutely Contraband 483

393. Absolutely Contraband Articles __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

394. Articles conditionally Contraband 485

394. Conditional Contraband Articles __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

395. Hostile Destination essential to Contraband 490

395. Hostile Destination essential to Contraband 490

396. Free Articles 492

396. Free Articles __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

396a. Articles destined for the use of the carrying Vessel, or to aid the Wounded 493

396a. Items meant for use on the carrying vessel, or to assist the wounded 493

397. Contraband Vessels 494

397. Smuggled Ships __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

II. Carriage of Contraband

II. Transporting Illegal Goods

398. Carriage of Contraband Penal by the Municipal Law of Belligerents 495

398. Carriage of Contraband Penal by the Municipal Law of Belligerents 495

399. Direct Carriage of Contraband 497

399. Smuggling Contraband __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

400. Circuitous Carriage of Contraband 499

400. Roundabout Transport of Illegal Goods __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

401. Indirect Carriage of Contraband (Doctrine of Continuous Transports) 500[Pg xxxiv]

401. Indirect Transportation of Contraband (Doctrine of Continuous Transports) 500[Pg xxxiv]

402. The Case of the Bundesrath 502

402. The Case of the Bundesrat __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

403. Continental support to the Doctrine of Continuous Transports 504

403. Continental support for the Doctrine of Continuous Transports 504

403a. Partial Recognition by the Declaration of London of the Doctrine of Continuous Voyages 505

403a. Partial Recognition by the Declaration of London of the Doctrine of Continuous Voyages 505

III. Consequences of Carriage of Contraband

III. Consequences of Carrying Contraband

404. Capture for Carriage of Contraband 506

404. Capture for Carriage of Contraband 506

405. Penalty for Carriage of Contraband according to the Practice hitherto prevailing 508

405. Penalty for Transporting Contraband According to Previous Practices 508

406. Penalty according to the Declaration of London for Carriage of Contraband 511

406. Penalty according to the Declaration of London for Carrying Contraband 511

406a. Seizure of Contraband without Seizure of the Vessel 513

406a. Seizure of Contraband without Seizure of the Vessel 513

CHAPTER V

CHAPTER 5

UNNEUTRAL SERVICE

UNBIASED SERVICE

I. The Different Kinds of Unneutral Service

I. The Different Kinds of Unneutral Service

407. Unneutral Service in general 515

407. Non-neutral Service in General __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

408. Carriage of Persons for the Enemy 517

408. Transporting People for the Enemy 517

409. Transmission of Intelligence to the Enemy 521

409. Transmission of Intelligence to the Enemy 521

410. Unneutral Service creating Enemy Character 524

410. Unneutral Service creating Enemy Character 524

II. Consequences of Unneutral Service

II. Consequences of Unbiased Service

411. Capture for Unneutral Service 526

411. Capture for Unbiased Service __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

412. Penalty for Unneutral Service 527

412. Penalty for Unfair Service __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

413. Seizure of Enemy Persons and Despatches without Seizure of Vessel 530

413. Seizure of Enemy Individuals and Documents without Seizing the Vessel 530

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER 6

VISITATION, CAPTURE, AND TRIAL OF NEUTRAL VESSELS

VISITATION, CAPTURE, AND TRIAL OF NEUTRAL VESSELS

I. Visitation

I. Visit

414. Conception of Right of Visitation 533

414. Conception of Right of Visitation 533

415. Right of Visitation, by whom, when, and where exercised 534

415. Right of Visitation, by whom, when, and where exercised 534

416. Only Private Vessels may be Visited 535

416. Only private vessels may be visited 535

417. Vessels under Convoy 535

417. Ships in Convoy __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

418. No Universal Rules regarding Mode of Visitation 537

418. No Universal Rules Regarding How to Visit 537

419. Stopping of Vessels for the Purpose of Visitation  538

419. Stopping of Vessels for the Purpose of Visitation 538

420. Visit 538

420. Visit __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

421. Search 539

421. Search __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

422. Consequences of Resistance to Visitation 540

422. Consequences of Resistance to Visitation 540

423. What constitutes Resistance 541

423. What is Resistance __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

424. Sailing under Enemy Convoy equivalent to Resistance 542[Pg xxxv]

424. Sailing under Enemy Convoy equivalent to Resistance 542[Pg xxxv]

425. Resistance by Neutral Convoy 543

425. Resistance by Neutral Convoy __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

426. Deficiency of Papers 543

426. Lack of Documents __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

427. Spoliation, Defacement, and Concealment of Papers 544

427. Spoliation, Defacement, and Concealment of Papers 544

428. Double and False Papers 545

Double and fake papers __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

II. Capture

II. Capture

429. Grounds and Mode of Capture 546

429. Grounds and Mode of Capture 546

430. Effect of Capture of Neutral Vessels, and their Conduct to Port 546

430. Impact of Seizing Neutral Vessels and their Treatment in Port 546

431. Destruction of Neutral Prizes 547

431. Destruction of Neutral Prizes __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

432. Ransom and Recapture of Neutral Prizes 551

432. Ransom and Recapture of Neutral Prizes 551

433. Release after Capture 551

433. Release after Capture __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

III. Trial of captured Neutral Vessels

III. Trial of seized Neutral Vessels

434. Trial of Captured Vessels a Municipal Matter 553

434. Trial of Captured Vessels a Municipal Matter 553

435. Result of Trial 555

435. Trial Result __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

436. Trial after Conclusion of Peace 555

436. Trial after Conclusion of Peace 555

437. Protests and Claims of Neutrals after Trial 557

437. Protests and Claims of Neutrals after Trial 557

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER 7

THE INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF PRIZE

I. Proposals for International Prize Courts

I. Suggestions for Global Prize Courts

438. Early Projects 559

438. Early Projects __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

439. German Project of 1907 561

439. German Project of 1907 __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

440. British Project of 1907 562

440. UK Project of 1907 __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

441. Convention XII. of the Second Peace Conference 563

441. Convention XII. of the Second Peace Conference 563

II. Constitution and Competence of the International Prize Court

II. Constitution and Competence of the International Prize Court

442. Personnel 565

442. Staff __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

443. Deciding Tribunal 566

443. Decision-making Tribunal __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

444. Administrative Council and International Bureau 569

444. Administrative Council and International Bureau 569

445. Agents, Counsel, Advocates, and Attorneys 569

445. Agents, Counsel, Advocates, and Attorneys 569

446. Competence 569

446. Skill __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

447. What Law to be applied 571

447. Which Law to Apply __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

III. Procedure in the International Prize Court

III. Procedure in the International Prize Court

448. Entering of Appeal 572

Appeal Submission __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

449. Pleadings and Discussion 574

449. Legal Documents and Discussion __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

450. Judgment 575

450. Judgment __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

451. Expenses and Costs 576

Expenses and Costs __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

IV. Action in Damages instead of Appeal

IV. Action in Damages instead of Appeal

452. Reason for Action in Damages instead of Appeal 577

452. Reason for Action in Damages instead of Appeal 577

453. Procedure if Action for Damages is brought 578[Pg xxxvi]

453. Procedure if Action for Damages is brought 578[Pg xxxvi]

APPENDICES

APPENDICES

I. Declaration of Paris of 1856 583

I. Declaration of Paris of 1856 583

II. Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 584

II. Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 584

III. Declaration concerning Expanding Bullets of 1899 585

III. Declaration about Expanding Bullets of 1899 585

IV. Declaration concerning the Diffusion of Asphyxiating Gases of 1899 586

IV. Declaration concerning the Diffusion of Asphyxiating Gases of 1899 586

V. Geneva Convention of 1906 587

V. Geneva Convention of 1906 __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

VI. Final Act of the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 591

VI. Final Act of the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 591

I. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes      592

I. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 592

II. Convention respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts      601

II. Agreement on Limiting the Use of Force to Collect Contract Debts 601

III. Convention relative to the Opening of Hostilities      602

III. Agreement on the Start of Conflicts 602

IV. Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land      603

IV. Convention regarding the Laws and Customs of War on Land 603

V. Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land      609

V. Convention regarding the Rights and Responsibilities of Neutral Powers and Individuals in Land Warfare      609

VI. Convention relative to the Status of Merchantmen at the Outbreak of Hostilities      612

VI. Convention regarding the Status of Merchant Ships at the Start of Hostilities 612

VII. Convention relative to the Conversion of Merchantmen into Men-of-War      613

VII. Agreement on the Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships      613

VIII. Convention relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines      614

VIII. Agreement on the Installation of Automatic Underwater Contact Mines 614

IX. Convention respecting Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War      616

IX. Agreement on Bombardment by Naval Forces During War      616

X. Convention for the Adaptation of the Principles of the Geneva Convention to Maritime Warfare      617

X. Convention for the Adaptation of the Principles of the Geneva Convention to Maritime Warfare      617

XI. Convention relative to certain Restrictions on the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Maritime War      621

XI. Agreement on Certain Limitations of the Right to Seize in Naval Warfare 621

XII. Convention concerning the Establishment of an International Prize Court      622

XII. Convention about Setting Up an International Prize Court      622

XIII. Convention concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Maritime War      629

XIII. Agreement on the Rights and Responsibilities of Neutral Countries in Maritime War 629

XIV. Declaration concerning the Prohibition of the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons      632

XIV. Declaration about the Ban on Releasing Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons 632

XV. Draft Convention concerning the Creation of a Judicial Arbitration Court      632

XV. Draft Convention concerning the Creation of a Judicial Arbitration Court 632

VII. Declaration of London of 1909 (including the Report of the Drafting Committee) 637

VII. Declaration of London of 1909 (including the Report of the Drafting Committee) 637

VIII. Additional Protocol, of 1910, to the Hague Convention concerning the Establishment of an International Prize Court 665

VIII. Additional Protocol of 1910 to the Hague Convention on Establishing an International Prize Court 665

IX. Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870 667

Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870 __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

X. The Naval Prize Act, 1864 674

X. The Naval Prize Act, 1864 674

XI. The Prize Courts Act, 1894 682

XI. The Prize Courts Act, 1894 682

XII. Naval Prize Bill of 1911 683

XII. Naval Prize Bill of 1911 683

XIII. Geneva Convention Act, 1911 690

XIII. Geneva Convention Act, 1911 __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

INDEX 691

INDEX __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

PART I Resolving state disputes

Chapter 1 Friendly resolution of state issues

I STATE DIFFERENCES AND THEIR FRIENDLY RESOLUTION IN GENERAL

Twiss, II. §§ 1-3—Ullmann, §§ 148-150—Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 5-12—Heffter, §§ 105-107—Rivier, II. § 57—Bonfils, No. 930—Despagnet, No. 469—Pradier-Fodéré, IV. Nos. 2580-2583—Calvo, III. §§ 1670-1671—Martens, II. §§ 101-102—Fiore, II. Nos. 1192-1198, and Code, No. 1246—Wagner, Zur Lehre von den Streiterledigungsmitteln des Völkerrechts (1900.)

Twiss, II. §§ 1-3—Ullmann, §§ 148-150—Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 5-12—Heffter, §§ 105-107—Rivier, II. § 57—Bonfils, No. 930—Despagnet, No. 469—Pradier-Fodéré, IV. Nos. 2580-2583—Calvo, III. §§ 1670-1671—Martens, II. §§ 101-102—Fiore, II. Nos. 1192-1198, and Code, No. 1246—Wagner, Zur Lehre von den Streiterledigungsmitteln des Völkerrechts (1900.)

Legal and political International Differences.

Legal and Political International Differences.

§ 1. International differences can arise from a variety of grounds. Between the extremes of a simple and comparatively unimportant act of discourtesy committed by one State against another, on the one hand, and, on the other, so gross an insult as must necessarily lead to war, there are many other grounds varying in nature and importance. State differences are correctly divided into legal and political. Legal differences arise from acts for which States have to bear responsibility, be it acts of their own or of their Parliaments, judicial and administrative officials, armed forces, or individuals living on their territory.[1] Political differences are the result of a conflict of political interests. But although this distinction is certainly theoretically correct and of practical importance, frequently in practice a sharp line cannot be drawn. For in many cases States either hide their political interests behind a claim for an alleged injury, or make a positive,[Pg 4] but comparatively insignificant, injury a pretext for the carrying out of political ends. Nations which have been for years facing each other armed to the teeth, waiting for a convenient moment to engage in hostilities, are only too ready to obliterate the boundary line between legal and political differences. Between such nations a condition of continuous friction prevails which makes it difficult, if not impossible, in every case which arises to distinguish the legal from the political character of the difference.

§ 1. International differences can come from various reasons. Between the extremes of a minor and relatively unimportant act of rudeness by one country towards another, on one hand, and, on the other, a blatant insult that would inevitably lead to war, there are many other reasons that vary in nature and importance. Differences between states are generally categorized as legal and political. Legal differences stem from actions for which countries must be held accountable, whether those actions are their own or those of their parliaments, judicial and administrative officials, armed forces, or individuals residing on their land.[1] Political differences arise from conflicting political interests. However, even though this distinction is certainly theoretically sound and practically relevant, it is often challenging to draw a clear line in reality. In many instances, countries either conceal their political goals behind claims of alleged harm or use a minor but real injury as an excuse to pursue political objectives. Nations that have spent years heavily armed and waiting for the right moment to initiate conflict are all too willing to blur the line between legal and political differences. A constant state of tension exists between such nations, which complicates, if not entirely prevents, the ability to differentiate the legal from the political nature of any arising issue.

International Law not exclusively concerned with Legal Differences.

International Law isn't just focused on legal differences.

§ 2. It is often maintained that the Law of Nations is concerned with legal differences only, political differences being a matter not of law but of politics. Now it is certainly true that only legal differences can be settled by a juristic decision of the underlying juristic question, whatever may be the way in which such decision is arrived at. But although political differences cannot be the objects of juristic decision, they can be settled short of war by amicable or compulsive means. And legal differences, although within the scope of juristic decision, can be of such kinds as to prevent the parties from submitting them to such decision, without being of a nature that they cannot be settled peaceably at all. Moreover, although the distinction between legal and political differences is certainly correct in theory and of importance in practice, nevertheless, in practice, a sharp line frequently cannot be drawn, as has just been pointed out. Therefore the Law of Nations is not exclusively concerned with legal differences, for in fact all amicable means of settling legal differences are likewise means of settling political differences, and so are two of the compulsive means of settling differences—namely, pacific blockade and intervention.

§ 2. It is often argued that the Law of Nations deals only with legal differences, while political differences relate not to law but to politics. It's certainly true that only legal differences can be resolved through a legal decision regarding the underlying legal question, regardless of how that decision is reached. However, while political differences cannot be resolved through a legal decision, they can be settled without going to war, either through friendly means or coercive measures. Additionally, legal differences, though they fall under the realm of legal decision-making, can be such that the parties cannot agree to submit them for a decision, without being impossible to resolve peacefully. Furthermore, although the distinction between legal and political differences is theoretically sound and practically significant, in reality, it is often difficult to make a clear distinction, as mentioned earlier. Therefore, the Law of Nations is not solely focused on legal differences, since all friendly methods of resolving legal differences also serve to address political differences, as do two types of coercive methods for resolving differences—namely, peaceful blockade and intervention.

Amicable in contradistinction to compulsive settlement of Differences.

Amicable as opposed to a forced resolution of conflicts.

§ 3. Political and legal differences can be settled either by amicable or by compulsive means. There[Pg 5] are four kinds of amicable means—namely, negotiation between the parties, good offices of third parties, mediation, and arbitration.[2] And there are also four kinds of compulsive means—namely, retorsion, reprisals (including embargo), blockade, and intervention of third States. No State is allowed to make use of compulsive means before negotiation has been tried, but there is no necessity for the good offices or mediation of third States, and eventually arbitration,[3] to be tried beforehand also. Frequently, however, States nowadays make use of the so-called Compromise Clause[4] in their treaties, stipulating thereby that any differences arising between the contracting parties with regard to matters regulated by, or to the interpretation of, the respective treaties shall be settled through the amicable means of arbitration to the exclusion of all compulsive means. And there are even a few examples of States which have concluded treaties stipulating that all differences, without exception, that might arise between them should be amicably settled by arbitration.[5] These exceptions, however, only confirm the rule that no international legal duty exists for States to settle their differences amicably through arbitration, or even to try to settle them in this way, before they make use of compulsive means.

§ 3. Political and legal differences can be resolved either through friendly means or through forceful measures. There[Pg 5] are four types of friendly means—specifically, negotiation between the parties, the good offices of third parties, mediation, and arbitration.[2] And there are also four types of forceful measures—namely, retorsion, reprisals (including embargo), blockade, and intervention by third states. No state is allowed to use forceful measures before attempting negotiation, but there is no requirement for the good offices or mediation of third states, or even arbitration,[3] to be tried beforehand as well. However, it is common for states today to include a Compromise Clause[4] in their treaties, stating that any disputes arising between the contracting parties regarding matters covered by the treaties, or concerning their interpretation, should be resolved through friendly means of arbitration, excluding all forceful measures. There are even a few examples of states that have made treaties requiring that all disputes, without exception, between them be amicably settled by arbitration.[5] These exceptions, however, only reinforce the rule that there is no international legal obligation for states to resolve their differences amicably through arbitration, or even to attempt to do so, before resorting to forceful measures.

[2] Some writers (see Hall, § 118, and Heilborn, System, p. 404) refuse to treat negotiation, good offices, and mediation as means of settling differences, because they cannot find that these means are of any legal value, it being in the choice of the parties whether or not they agree to make use of them. They forget, however, the enormous political value of these means, which alone well justifies their treatment; moreover, there are already some positive legal rules in existence concerning these means—see Hague Arbitration Treaty, articles 2-7 and 9-36—and others will in time, no doubt, be established.

[2] Some writers (see Hall, § 118, and Heilborn, System, p. 404) refuse to consider negotiation, good offices, and mediation as ways to resolve differences, since they believe these methods have no legal value and it's up to the parties to decide whether or not to use them. However, they overlook the significant political value these methods offer, which justifies their consideration. Furthermore, there are already some established legal rules regarding these methods—see Hague Arbitration Treaty, articles 2-7 and 9-36—and more will likely be developed in the future.

[5] See below, § 17.[Pg 6]

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.[Pg 6]

II Negotiation

Twiss, II. § 4—Lawrence, § 220—Moore, VII. § 1064—Taylor, §§ 359-360—Heffter, § 107—Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 13-17—Ullmann, § 151—Bonfils, Nos. 931-932—Despagnet, Nos. 470 and 477—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2584-2587—Rivier, II. § 57—Calvo, III. §§ 1672-1680—Martens, II. § 103—Nys, III. pp. 56-58.

Twiss, II. § 4—Lawrence, § 220—Moore, VII. § 1064—Taylor, §§ 359-360—Heffter, § 107—Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 13-17—Ullmann, § 151—Bonfils, Nos. 931-932—Despagnet, Nos. 470 and 477—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2584-2587—Rivier, II. § 57—Calvo, III. §§ 1672-1680—Martens, II. § 103—Nys, III. pp. 56-58.

In what Negotiation consists.

What negotiation is made of.

§ 4. The simplest means of settling State differences, and that to which States always resort before they make use of other means, is negotiation. It consists in such acts of intercourse between the parties as are initiated and directed for the purpose of effecting an understanding and thereby amicably settling the difference that has arisen between them.[6] Negotiation as a rule begins by a State complaining of a certain act, or lodging a certain claim with another State. The next step is a statement from the latter making out its case, which is handed over to the former. It may be that the parties come at once to an understanding through this simple exchange of statements. If not, other acts may follow according to the requirements of the special case. Thus, for instance, other statements may be exchanged, or a conference of diplomatic envoys, or even of the heads of the States at variance, may be arranged for the purpose of discussing the differences and preparing the basis for an understanding.

§ 4. The easiest way for States to resolve their differences, which they always turn to before considering other options, is negotiation. This involves interactions between the parties aimed at achieving mutual understanding and amicably resolving the disagreement that has occurred between them.[6] Negotiation typically starts when one State raises a complaint or presents a claim to another State. The next step involves the latter providing its response, explaining its position, which is then given to the former. It's possible that the parties reach an agreement right away through this straightforward exchange of information. If they don't, additional steps may be taken based on the specifics of the situation. For example, further statements could be exchanged, or a meeting could be organized with diplomatic representatives, or even with the leaders of the conflicting States, to discuss the issues and lay the groundwork for an agreement.

International Commissions of Inquiry.

International Inquiry Commissions.

§ 5. The contracting Powers of the Hague Convention for the peaceful settlement of international differences deem it expedient and desirable that, if the ordinary diplomatic negotiation has failed to settle such differences as do not involve either honour or [Pg 7]vital interests, the parties should, so far as circumstances allow, institute an International Commission of Inquiry[7] for the purpose of elucidating the facts underlying the difference by an impartial and conscientious investigation. The Convention of 1899 had only six articles (9-14) on the subject. The Second Conference of 1907, profiting by the experience gained by the Commission of Inquiry in the Dogger Bank[8] case, the first and as yet only occasion on which a Commission of Inquiry was instituted, remodelled the institution, and Convention I. treats of the subject in twenty-eight articles (9-36). The more important stipulations are the following:—

§ 5. The countries involved in the Hague Convention for peacefully resolving international disputes believe it is wise and preferable that if regular diplomatic negotiations fail to resolve differences that do not involve either honor or vital interests, the parties should, as much as possible, set up an International Commission of Inquiry[7] to clarify the facts behind the disagreement through an unbiased and thorough investigation. The 1899 Convention only had six articles (9-14) on this topic. The Second Conference in 1907, learning from the experiences of the Commission of Inquiry in the Dogger Bank[8] case, which was the first and only time a Commission of Inquiry was created, restructured the process, and Convention I now addresses the topic in twenty-eight articles (9-36). The most significant provisions are as follows:—

(1) The Commissions are to be constituted by a special treaty of the parties, which is to determine the facts to be examined, the manner and period within which the Commission is to be formed, the extent of the powers of the Commissioners, the place where the[Pg 8] Commission is to meet and whether it may remove to another place, the languages to be used by the Commission and parties, and the like (articles 9-10). If the treaty does not determine the place where the Commission is to sit, it shall sit at the Hague; if the treaty does not specify the languages to be used, the question shall be decided by the Commission; and if the treaty does not stipulate the manner in which the Commission is to be formed, it shall be formed in the manner determined by articles 45 and 57 of Convention I. (articles 11-12). The parties may appoint Assessors, Agents, and Counsel (articles 10, 13, 14).

(1) The Commissions will be established by a special treaty between the parties, which will define the facts to be examined, how and when the Commission will be formed, the powers of the Commissioners, where the[Pg 8] Commission will meet and if it can move to another location, the languages to be used by the Commission and the parties, and other similar details (articles 9-10). If the treaty does not specify the location of the Commission, it will meet in The Hague; if the treaty does not mention the languages to be used, the Commission will decide that; and if the treaty does not outline how the Commission should be formed, it will be formed according to articles 45 and 57 of Convention I. (articles 11-12). The parties may appoint Assessors, Agents, and Counsel (articles 10, 13, 14).

(2) The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration acts as Registry for the Commissions which sit at the Hague; but if they sit elsewhere, a Secretary-General is to be appointed whose office serves as Registry (articles 15-16).

(2) The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration serves as the Registry for the Commissions that meet in The Hague; however, if they meet in a different location, a Secretary-General will be appointed whose office will act as the Registry (articles 15-16).

(3) The parties may agree upon the rules of procedure to be followed by the Commission, but if they do not provide such rules themselves, the rules of procedure, comprised in articles 19-32 are applicable (article 17), and, in any case, the Commission is to settle such details of the procedure as are either not covered by the treaty of the parties or by articles 19-32, and is to arrange all the formalities required for dealing with the evidence (article 18).

(3) The parties can agree on the procedures the Commission should follow, but if they don’t set those rules themselves, the procedures outlined in articles 19-32 will apply (article 17). In any case, the Commission will determine any procedural details that aren’t addressed by the parties' treaty or by articles 19-32, and will handle all the formalities needed for handling the evidence (article 18).

(4) The Report of the Commission is to be signed by all its members; but if a member refuses to sign, the fact is to be mentioned, and the validity of the Report is not thereby affected (article 33). The Report of the Commission is read in open Court, the Agents and Counsel of the parties being present or duly summoned to attend; a copy of the Report is furnished to each party (article 34). This Report is absolutely limited to a statement of the facts, it has in no way the character[Pg 9] of an Arbitral Award, and it leaves to the parties entire freedom as to the effect to be given to the statement of the facts (article 35).

(4) The Commission's Report must be signed by all its members; if a member refuses to sign, that will be noted, but it doesn’t affect the Report's validity (article 33). The Report is read in open Court, with the Agents and Counsel of the parties present or properly summoned to attend; each party receives a copy of the Report (article 34). This Report strictly states the facts; it does not have the nature of an Arbitral Award, and it allows the parties complete freedom regarding the implications of the facts stated (article 35).

(5) Each party pays its own expenses and an equal share of the expenses of the Commission (article 36).

(5) Each party covers its own expenses and shares the Commission's expenses equally (article 36).

[7] See Herr, Die Untersuchungskommissionen der Haager Friedenskonferenzen (1911); Meurer, I. pp. 129-165; Higgins, pp. 167-170; Lémonon, pp. 77-91: Wehberg, Kommentar, pp. 21-46; Nippold, I. pp. 23-35; Scott, Conferences, pp. 265-273; Politis in R.G. XIX. (1912), pp. 149-188.

[7] See Herr, The Investigation Commissions of the Hague Peace Conferences (1911); Meurer, I. pp. 129-165; Higgins, pp. 167-170; Lémonon, pp. 77-91; Wehberg, Commentary, pp. 21-46; Nippold, I. pp. 23-35; Scott, Conferences, pp. 265-273; Politis in R.G. XIX. (1912), pp. 149-188.

[8] On October 24, 1904, during the Russo-Japanese war, the Russian Baltic fleet, which was on its way to the Far East, fired into the Hull fishing fleet off the Dogger Bank, in the North Sea, whereby two fishermen were killed and considerable damage was done to several trawlers. Great Britain demanded from Russia not only an apology and ample damages, but also severe punishment of the officer responsible for the outrage. As Russia maintained that the firing was caused by the approach of some Japanese torpedo-boats, and that she could therefore not punish the officer in command, the parties agreed upon the establishment of an International Commission of Inquiry, which, however, was charged not only to ascertain the facts of the incident but also to pronounce an opinion concerning the responsibility for the incident and the degree of blame attaching to the responsible persons. The Commission consisted of five naval officers of high rank—namely, one British, one Russian, one American, one French, and one Austrian, who sat at Paris in February 1905. The report of the Commission states that no torpedo-boats had been present, that the opening of fire on the part of the Baltic fleet was not justifiable, that Admiral Rojdestvensky, the commander of the Baltic fleet, was responsible for the incident, but that these facts were "not of a nature to cast any discredit upon the military qualities or the humanity of Admiral Rojdestvensky or of the personnel of his squadron." In consequence of the last part of this report Great Britain could not insist upon any punishment to be meted out to the responsible Russian Admiral, but Russia paid a sum of £65,000 to indemnify the victims of the incident and the families of the two dead fishermen. See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXXIII. (1906), pp. 641-716, And Mandelstam in R.G. XII. (1905), pp. 161 and 351.

[8] On October 24, 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian Baltic fleet, en route to the Far East, fired on the Hull fishing fleet off the Dogger Bank in the North Sea, killing two fishermen and causing significant damage to several trawlers. Great Britain demanded that Russia provide not only an apology and compensation, but also punishment for the officer responsible for the incident. Russia argued that the firing was provoked by the approach of some Japanese torpedo boats and therefore could not punish the commanding officer. The two parties agreed to establish an International Commission of Inquiry, which was tasked not only with determining the facts of the incident but also with assessing accountability and the degree of blame assigned to those responsible. The Commission was made up of five high-ranking naval officers—one each from Britain, Russia, the United States, France, and Austria—who convened in Paris in February 1905. The Commission's report stated that no torpedo boats were present, the Baltic fleet's decision to open fire was unjustifiable, and Admiral Rojdestvensky, the commander of the Baltic fleet, was responsible for the incident. However, it noted that these facts "do not reflect poorly on the military capabilities or humanity of Admiral Rojdestvensky or the personnel of his squadron." As a result of the report's conclusion, Great Britain could not demand any punishment for the Russian Admiral, but Russia agreed to pay £65,000 to compensate the victims and the families of the two deceased fishermen. See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXXIII. (1906), pp. 641-716, and Mandelstam in R.G. XII. (1905), pp. 161 and 351.

Effect of Negotiation.

Impact of Negotiation.

§ 6. The effect of negotiation can be to make it apparent that the parties cannot come to an amicable understanding at all. But frequently the effect is that one of the parties acknowledges the claim of the other party. Again, sometimes negotiation results in a party, although it does not acknowledge the opponent's alleged rights, waiving its own rights for the sake of peace and for the purpose of making friends with the opponent. And, lastly, the effect of negotiation can be a compromise between the parties. Frequently the parties, after having come to an understanding, conclude a treaty in which they embody the terms of the understanding arrived at through negotiation. The practice of everyday life shows clearly the great importance of negotiation as a means of settling international differences. The modern development of international traffic and transport, the fact that individuals are constantly travelling on foreign territories, the keen interest taken by all powerful States in colonial enterprise, and many other factors, make the daily rise of differences between States unavoidable. Yet the greater number of such differences are settled through negotiation of some kind or other.[Pg 10]

§ 6. The outcome of negotiation can sometimes make it clear that the parties won't reach a friendly agreement at all. However, often one party will acknowledge the claim made by the other. In some cases, negotiation leads to a party choosing to give up its own rights, not because it agrees with the other party's claims, but to maintain peace and foster goodwill. Lastly, negotiation can result in a compromise between the parties. Frequently, after reaching an understanding, the parties will formalize their agreement in a treaty that outlines the terms they negotiated. Everyday experience demonstrates how crucial negotiation is for resolving international disputes. The modern growth of international trade and travel, the constant movement of individuals across borders, the strong interest of powerful nations in colonial ventures, and many other factors make it inevitable that disputes between states will arise regularly. However, most of these disputes are resolved through some form of negotiation.[Pg 10]

III Peacekeeping and mediation

Maine, pp. 207-228—Phillimore, III. §§ 3-5—Twiss, II. § 7—Lawrence, § 220—Moore, VII. §§ 1065-1068—Taylor, §§ 359-360—Wheaton, § 73—Bluntschli, §§ 483-487—Heffter, §§ 107-108—Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 17-30—Ullmann, §§ 152-153—Bonfils, Nos. 9321-9431—Despagnet, Nos. 471-476—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2588-2593—Mérignhac, I. pp. 429-447—Rivier, II. § 58—Nys, III. pp. 59-61—Calvo, III. §§ 1682-1705—Fiore, III. Nos. 1199-1201, and Code, Nos. 1248-1293—Martens, II. § 103—Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague (1900), pp. 176-203—Zamfiresco, De la médiation (1911)—Politis in R.G. XVII. (1910), pp. 136-163.

Maine, pp. 207-228—Phillimore, III. §§ 3-5—Twiss, II. § 7—Lawrence, § 220—Moore, VII. §§ 1065-1068—Taylor, §§ 359-360—Wheaton, § 73—Bluntschli, §§ 483-487—Heffter, §§ 107-108—Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 17-30—Ullmann, §§ 152-153—Bonfils, Nos. 9321-9431—Despagnet, Nos. 471-476—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2588-2593—Mérignhac, I. pp. 429-447—Rivier, II. § 58—Nys, III. pp. 59-61—Calvo, III. §§ 1682-1705—Fiore, III. Nos. 1199-1201, and Code, Nos. 1248-1293—Martens, II. § 103—Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague (1900), pp. 176-203—Zamfiresco, De la médiation (1911)—Politis in R.G. XVII. (1910), pp. 136-163.

Occasions for Good Offices and Mediation.

Occasions for Good Offices and Mediation.

§ 7. When parties are not inclined to settle their differences by negotiation, or when they have negotiated without effecting an understanding, a third State can procure a settlement through its good offices or its mediation, whether only one or both parties have asked for the help of the third State or the latter has spontaneously offered it. There is also possible a collective mediation, several States acting at the same time as mediators. It is further possible for a mediatorial Conference or Congress to meet for the purpose of discussing the terms of an understanding between the conflicting parties. And it must be especially mentioned that good offices and mediation are not confined to the time before the differing parties have appealed to arms; they can also be offered and sought during hostilities for the purpose of bringing the war to an end. It is during war in particular that good offices and mediation are of great value, neither of the belligerents as a rule being inclined to open peace negotiations on his own account.

§ 7. When parties are unwilling to resolve their differences through negotiation, or when they have negotiated without reaching an agreement, a third State can help achieve a settlement through its good offices or mediation, regardless of whether only one or both parties have requested the third State's assistance or if the latter has offered it voluntarily. Collective mediation is also an option, with several States acting simultaneously as mediators. Additionally, a mediatorial conference or congress can be convened to discuss the terms of an agreement between the conflicting parties. It's important to note that good offices and mediation are not limited to before the parties have resorted to armed conflict; they can also be offered and sought during hostilities to help bring the war to a close. In fact, good offices and mediation are particularly valuable during war, since usually neither of the warring parties is inclined to initiate peace talks on their own.

Right and duty of offering, requesting, and rendering Good Offices and Mediation.

Right and responsibility of providing, asking for, and giving help and mediation.

§ 8. As a rule, no duty exists for a third State to offer its good offices or mediation, or to respond to a request of the conflicting States for such, nor is it, as a rule, the duty of the conflicting parties themselves[Pg 11] to ask or to accept a third State's good offices and mediation. But by special treaty such duty can be stipulated. Thus, for instance, by article 8 of the Peace Treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856, between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, it was stipulated that, in case in the future such difference as threatened peace should arise between Turkey and one or more of the signatory Powers, the parties should be obliged,[9] before resorting to arms, to ask for the mediation of the other signatory Powers. Thus, further, article 12 of the General Act of the Berlin Congo Conference of 1885 stipulates that, in case a serious difference should arise between some of the signatory Powers as regards the Congo territories, the parties should, before resorting to arms, be obliged to ask the other signatory Powers for their mediation. And lately the Hague Conventions for the peaceful settlement of international differences have laid down some stipulations respecting the right and duty of good offices and mediation, which will be found below in § 10.

§ 8. Generally, there is no obligation for a third State to offer its assistance or mediation, nor is there typically a duty for the conflicting parties to request or accept help from a third State. However, this duty can be established through a specific treaty. For example, Article 8 of the Peace Treaty of Paris, signed on March 30, 1856, between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, stated that if any disputes threatening peace arose between Turkey and one or more of the signatory Powers in the future, the parties would be required[Pg 11] to seek mediation from the other signatory Powers before resorting to military action. Additionally, Article 12 of the General Act of the Berlin Congo Conference of 1885 specifies that if a serious dispute arises between some of the signatory Powers concerning the Congo territories, the parties must request mediation from the other signatory Powers before taking up arms. Recently, the Hague Conventions for the peaceful resolution of international disputes have outlined some provisions regarding the right and duty of good offices and mediation, which are detailed below in § 10.

[9] But Italy did not comply with this stipulation before she declared war against Turkey in September 1911.

[9] But Italy didn’t follow this requirement before declaring war on Turkey in September 1911.

Good Offices in contradistinction to Mediation.

Good Offices in contrast to Mediation.

§ 9. Diplomatic practice frequently does not distinguish between good offices and mediation. But although good offices can easily develop into mediation, they must not be confounded with it. The difference between them is that, whereas good offices consist in various kinds of action tending to call negotiations between the conflicting States into existence, mediation consists in a direct conduct of negotiations between the differing parties on the basis of proposals made by the mediator. Good offices seek to induce the conflicting parties, who are either not at all inclined to negotiate with each other or who have negotiated without effecting an understanding, to enter or to[Pg 12] re-enter into such negotiations. Good offices can also consist in advice, in submitting a proposal of one of the parties to the other, and the like, but they never take part in the negotiations themselves. On the other hand, the mediator is the middleman who does take part in the negotiations. He makes certain propositions on the basis of which the States at variance may come to an understanding. He even conducts the negotiations himself, always anxious to reconcile the opposing claims and to appease the feeling of resentment between the parties. All the efforts of the mediator may often, of course, be useless, the differing parties being unable or unwilling to consent to an agreement. But if an understanding is arrived at, the position of the mediator as a party to the negotiation, although not a participator in the difference, frequently becomes clearly apparent either by the drafting of a special act of mediation which is signed by the States at variance and the mediator, or by the fact that in the convention between the conflicting States, which stipulates the terms of their understanding, the mediator is mentioned.

§ 9. Diplomatic practice often doesn’t differentiate between good offices and mediation. However, while good offices can easily lead to mediation, they shouldn’t be confused with it. The key difference is that good offices involve various actions aimed at initiating negotiations between conflicting States, whereas mediation involves directly conducting negotiations between the parties based on proposals from the mediator. Good offices aim to encourage the conflicting parties, who may either be unwilling to negotiate or have tried negotiating without success, to start or re-engage in negotiations. Good offices can also include offering advice or presenting one party's proposal to the other, but they don’t participate in the negotiations themselves. In contrast, the mediator acts as the intermediary who does get involved in the negotiations. The mediator puts forward specific proposals based on which the disputing States may reach an agreement. The mediator may even lead the negotiations, always aiming to balance the opposing claims and soothe the resentment between the parties. Of course, the mediator's efforts can sometimes be in vain, as the parties might be unable or unwilling to agree to a resolution. However, if an agreement is achieved, the mediator’s role as a negotiating party, though not involved in the dispute itself, often becomes clear, either through the creation of a special mediation document signed by the conflicting States and the mediator or by the mention of the mediator in the agreement detailing the terms of their understanding.

Good Offices and Mediation according to the Hague Arbitration Convention.

Good Offices and Mediation according to the Hague Arbitration Convention.

§ 10. The Hague Convention for the peaceful settlement of international differences[10] undertakes in articles 2-8 the task of making the signatory Powers have recourse more frequently than hitherto to good offices and mediation; it likewise recommends a new and particular form of mediation. Its rules are the following:—

§ 10. The Hague Convention for the peaceful settlement of international differences[10] aims in articles 2-8 to encourage the signatory countries to use good offices and mediation more often than before; it also suggests a new and specific type of mediation. The rules are as follows:—

[10] See Meurer, I. pp. 104-128; Higgins, p. 167; Barclay, Problems, pp. 191-197; Lémonon, pp. 69-73; Wehberg, Kommentar, pp. 10-21; Nippold, I. pp. 21-22; Scott, Conferences, pp. 256-265.

[10] See Meurer, I. pp. 104-128; Higgins, p. 167; Barclay, Problems, pp. 191-197; Lémonon, pp. 69-73; Wehberg, Kommentar, pp. 10-21; Nippold, I. pp. 21-22; Scott, Conferences, pp. 256-265.

(1) The contracting Powers agree to have recourse, before they appeal to arms, as far as circumstances allow, to good offices or mediation (article 2). And independently of this recourse, they consider it expedient and desirable that contracting Powers who are strangers[Pg 13] to the dispute should, on their own initiative, offer their good offices or mediation (article 3). A real legal duty to offer good offices or mediation is not thereby created; only the expediency and desirability of such offer are recognised. In regard to the legal duty of conflicting States to ask for good offices or mediation, it is obvious that, although literally such duty is agreed upon, the condition "as far as circumstances allow" makes it more or less illusory, as it is in the discretion of the parties to judge for themselves whether or not the circumstances of the special case allow their having recourse to good offices and mediation.

(1) The contracting powers agree to seek, before resorting to military action, good offices or mediation whenever possible (article 2). Additionally, they believe it is advisable and beneficial for contracting powers that are uninvolved in the dispute to voluntarily offer their good offices or mediation (article 3). This does not create a legal obligation to offer good offices or mediation; it simply acknowledges the usefulness and desirability of such offers. Regarding the legal obligation for conflicting states to request good offices or mediation, it is clear that, although such a duty is stated, the phrase "as far as circumstances allow" makes it quite unrealistic, as it is up to the parties to decide for themselves whether the specific circumstances justify seeking good offices or mediation.

(2) The contracting Powers agree that (article 3) a right to offer good offices or mediation exists for those of them who are strangers to a dispute, and that this right exists also after the conflicting parties have appealed to arms. Consequently, every contracting Power, when at variance with another, be it before or after the outbreak of hostilities, is in duty bound to receive an offer made for good offices or mediation, although it need not accept such offer. And it is especially stipulated that the exercise of the right to offer good offices or mediation may never be regarded by the conflicting States as an unfriendly act (article 3). It is, further, stipulated that the contracting Powers consider it their duty in a serious conflict to remind the parties of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and that the advice to have recourse to this Court may only be considered as an exercise of good offices (article 48, paragraphs 1 and 2). And, finally, in case of dispute between two Powers, one of them may always address to the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration a note containing a declaration that it would be ready to submit the dispute to arbitration, whereupon the Bureau must at once inform the other Power of this declaration (article 48, paragraphs 3 and 4).[Pg 14]

(2) The contracting Powers agree that (article 3) there is a right to offer good offices or mediation for those who are not involved in a dispute, and this right still exists even after the parties have taken up arms. Therefore, whenever a contracting Power is in conflict with another, whether before or after hostilities begin, it is required to consider any offer for good offices or mediation, although it does not have to accept it. It is specifically stated that exercising the right to offer good offices or mediation should never be viewed by the conflicting States as an act of hostility (article 3). Furthermore, the contracting Powers deem it their responsibility in serious conflicts to remind the parties of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and suggesting this Court should only be seen as exercising good offices (article 48, paragraphs 1 and 2). Lastly, in the event of a dispute between two Powers, one may always send a note to the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration declaring its willingness to submit the dispute to arbitration, and the Bureau must promptly inform the other Power of this declaration (article 48, paragraphs 3 and 4).[Pg 14]

(3) Mediation is defined (article 4) as reconciliation of the opposing claims and appeasement of the feelings of resentment between the conflicting States, and it is specially emphasised that good offices and mediation have exclusively the character of advice.

(3) Mediation is defined (article 4) as the process of resolving opposing claims and easing feelings of resentment between the conflicting States, and it is specifically noted that good offices and mediation are meant to be purely advisory in nature.

(4) The acceptance of mediation—and, of course, of good offices, which is not mentioned—does not (article 7) have the effect of interrupting, delaying, or hindering mobilisation or other preparatory measures for war, or of interrupting military operations when war has broken out before the acceptance of mediation, unless there should be an agreement to the contrary.

(4) Accepting mediation—and, of course, good offices, which isn't mentioned—does not (article 7) interrupt, delay, or prevent mobilization or other preparations for war, nor does it stop military operations if war has already started before mediation is accepted, unless there’s an agreement stating otherwise.

(5) The functions of the mediator are at an end (article 5) when once it is stated, either by one of the conflicting parties or by the mediator himself, that the means of reconciliation proposed by him are not accepted.

(5) The mediator's role is finished (article 5) when either one of the conflicting parties or the mediator himself states that the reconciliation methods he proposed are not accepted.

(6) A new and particular form of mediation is recommended by article 8. Before appealing to arms the conflicting States choose respectively a State as umpire, to whom each intrusts the mission of entering into direct communication with the umpire chosen by the other side for the purpose of preventing the rupture of pacific relations. The period of the mandate extends, unless otherwise stipulated, to thirty days, and during such period the conflicting States cease from all direct communication on the matter in dispute, which is regarded as referred exclusively to the mediating umpires, who must use their best efforts to settle the difference. Should such mediation not succeed in bringing the conflicting States to an understanding, and should, consequently, a definite rupture of pacific relations take place, the chosen umpires are jointly charged with the task of taking advantage of any opportunity to restore peace.

(6) Article 8 suggests a new and specific way of mediation. Before resorting to conflict, the opposing states each select a state as an umpire, to whom they delegate the responsibility of directly communicating with the umpire chosen by the other side to help prevent the breakdown of peaceful relations. This mandate lasts, unless stated otherwise, for thirty days. During this time, the conflicting states refrain from any direct communication regarding the issue in dispute, which is considered solely in the hands of the mediating umpires, who are expected to make their best efforts to resolve the differences. If mediation fails to lead the conflicting states to an agreement, and a total breakdown of peaceful relations occurs, the selected umpires are jointly responsible for seizing any chance to restore peace.

Value of Good Offices and Mediation.

Value of Good Offices and Mediation.

§ 11. The value of good offices and mediation for[Pg 15] the amicable settlement of international conflicts, be it before or after the parties have appealed to arms, cannot be over-estimated. Hostilities have been frequently prevented through the authority and the skill of mediators, and furiously raging wars have been brought to an end through good offices and mediation of third States.[11] Nowadays the importance of these means of settlement of international differences is even greater than in the past. The outbreak of war is under the circumstances and conditions of our times no longer a matter of indifference to all except the belligerent States, and no State which goes to war knows exactly how far such war may affect its very existence. If good offices and mediation are interposed at the right moment, they will in many cases not fail to effect a settlement of the conflict. The stipulations of the Hague Convention for the peaceful adjustment of differences have greatly enhanced the value of good offices and mediation by giving a legal right to Powers, strangers to the dispute, to offer their good offices and mediation before and during hostilities.

§ 11. The importance of good offices and mediation for[Pg 15] resolving international conflicts, whether before or after the parties have resorted to violence, cannot be overstated. Hostilities have often been prevented thanks to the authority and skill of mediators, and intense wars have been ended through the good offices and mediation of third-party states.[11] Today, the significance of these methods for settling international disputes is even greater than in the past. The onset of war under the current circumstances is no longer just a concern for the warring states; no country that enters into war can predict how it might impact its very existence. If good offices and mediation are offered at the right moment, they can often lead to a resolution of the conflict. The provisions of the Hague Convention for the peaceful resolution of disputes have significantly increased the value of good offices and mediation by granting a legal right to powers unrelated to the dispute to offer their good offices and mediation before and during hostilities.

[11] See the important cases of mediation discussed by Calvo, III. §§ 1684-1700, and Bonfils, Nos. 936-942. From our own days the case of the Dogger Bank incident of 1904 may be quoted as an example, for it was through the mediation of France that Great Britain and Russia agreed upon the establishment of an International Commission of Inquiry. (See p. 7, note 2.) And the good offices of the President of the United States of America were the means of inducing Russia and Japan, in August 1905, to open the negotiations which actually led to the conclusion of the Peace of Portsmouth on September 5, 1905.

[11] See the key mediation cases discussed by Calvo, III. §§ 1684-1700, and Bonfils, Nos. 936-942. An example from our time is the Dogger Bank incident of 1904, where France mediated and helped Great Britain and Russia agree on creating an International Commission of Inquiry. (See p. 7, note 2.) Additionally, the President of the United States played a crucial role in persuading Russia and Japan, in August 1905, to start negotiations that ultimately led to the signing of the Peace of Portsmouth on September 5, 1905.

IV DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Grotius, II. c. 23, § 8—Vattel, II. § 329—Hall, § 119—Westlake, I. pp. 332-356—Lawrence, § 221—Phillimore, III. §§ 3-5—Twiss, II. § 5—Taylor, §§ 357-358—Wharton, III. § 316—Moore, VII. §§ 1069-1080—Bluntschli, §§ 488-498—Heffter, § 109—Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 30-58—Ullmann, §§ 154-156—Bonfils, Nos. 944-969—Despagnet, Nos. 722-741—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2602-2630—Mérignhac, I. pp. 448-485—Rivier, II. § 59—Calvo, III. §§ 1706-1806—Fiore, II. Nos. 1202-1215, and Code, Nos. 1294-1380—Nys, III. pp. 65-80—Martens, II. § 104—Rouard de Card, L'arbitrage international (1876)—Mérignhac, Traité théorique et pratique de l'arbitrage (1895)—Moore, History and Digest of the Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party, 6 vols. (1898)—Darby, International Arbitration, 4th ed. (1904)—Dumas, Les sanctions de l'arbitrage international (1905), and in A.J. V. (1911), pp. 934-957—Nippold, Die Fortbildung des Verfahrens in völkerrechtlichen Streitigkeiten (1907)—Reinsch in A.J. V. (1911), pp. 604-614—Scott, Conferences, pp. 188-253—Lapradelle et Politis, Recueil des arbitrages internationaux, I. (1798-1855), (1905)—Fried, Handbuch der Friedensbewegung, 2nd ed. (1911), pp. 135-184—Morris, International Arbitration and Procedure (1911)—Balch, International Courts of Arbitration (4th ed., with an introduction and additional notes by Thomas Willing Balch, 1912).

Grotius, II. c. 23, § 8—Vattel, II. § 329—Hall, § 119—Westlake, I. pp. 332-356—Lawrence, § 221—Phillimore, III. §§ 3-5—Twiss, II. § 5—Taylor, §§ 357-358—Wharton, III. § 316—Moore, VII. §§ 1069-1080—Bluntschli, §§ 488-498—Heffter, § 109—Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 30-58—Ullmann, §§ 154-156—Bonfils, Nos. 944-969—Despagnet, Nos. 722-741—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2602-2630—Mérignhac, I. pp. 448-485—Rivier, II. § 59—Calvo, III. §§ 1706-1806—Fiore, II. Nos. 1202-1215, and Code, Nos. 1294-1380—Nys, III. pp. 65-80—Martens, II. § 104—Rouard de Card, L'arbitrage international (1876)—Mérignhac, Traité théorique et pratique de l'arbitrage (1895)—Moore, History and Digest of the Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party, 6 vols. (1898)—Darby, International Arbitration, 4th ed. (1904)—Dumas, Les sanctions de l'arbitrage international (1905), and in A.J. V. (1911), pp. 934-957—Nippold, Die Fortbildung des Verfahrens in völkerrechtlichen Streitigkeiten (1907)—Reinsch in A.J. V. (1911), pp. 604-614—Scott, Conferences, pp. 188-253—Lapradelle et Politis, Recueil des arbitrages internationaux, I. (1798-1855), (1905)—Fried, Handbuch der Friedensbewegung, 2nd ed. (1911), pp. 135-184—Morris, International Arbitration and Procedure (1911)—Balch, International Courts of Arbitration (4th ed., with an introduction and additional notes by Thomas Willing Balch, 1912).

Conception of Arbitration.

Arbitration Concept.

§ 12. Arbitration is the name for the determination of differences between States through the verdict of one or more umpires chosen by the parties. As there is no central political authority above the Sovereign States, and no such International Court as could exercise jurisdiction over them, State differences, unlike differences between private individuals, cannot as a rule be obligatorily settled in courts of justice. The only way in which a settlement of State differences through a verdict may be arrived at is by the conflicting States voluntarily consenting to submit themselves to a verdict of one or more umpires chosen by themselves for that purpose.

§ 12. Arbitration is the process for resolving disputes between countries by a decision from one or more judges selected by the involved parties. Since there is no central authority above sovereign nations and no international court with jurisdiction over them, disputes between states, unlike those between private individuals, generally cannot be compulsorily settled in courts. The only way to resolve state disputes through a decision is if the conflicting countries voluntarily agree to submit to a ruling from judges they choose for that purpose.

Treaty of Arbitration.

Arbitration Treaty.

§ 13. It is, therefore, necessary for such conflicting States as intend to have the conflict determined by arbitration to conclude a treaty by which they agree to this course. Such treaty of arbitration involves the obligation of both parties to submit in good faith to the decision of the arbitrators. Frequently[Pg 17] a treaty of arbitration will be concluded after the outbreak of a difference, but it also frequently happens that States concluding treaties stipulate therein by the so-called Compromise Clause,[12] that any difference arising between the parties respecting matters regulated by such treaty shall be determined by arbitration. Two or more States can also conclude a so-called general treaty of arbitration, or treaty of permanent arbitration, stipulating that all or certain kinds of differences in future arising between them shall be settled by this method. Thus article 7 of the Commercial Treaty between Holland and Portugal[13] of July 5, 1894, contains such a general treaty of arbitration, as it stipulates arbitration not only for differences respecting matters of commerce, but for all kinds of differences arising in the future between the parties, provided these differences do not concern their independence or autonomy. Until the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, however, general treaties of arbitration were not numerous. But public opinion everywhere was aroused in favour of general arbitration treaties through the success of this conference, with the result that from 1900 to the present day many general arbitration treaties have been concluded.[14]

§ 13. It is, therefore, necessary for conflicting states that want to resolve their disagreements through arbitration to enter into a treaty where they agree to this approach. Such an arbitration treaty requires both parties to genuinely comply with the arbitrators' decision. Often, a treaty for arbitration is made after a conflict starts, but it's also common for states to include a Compromise Clause in treaties that states any disputes over matters covered by that treaty will be resolved through arbitration. Additionally, two or more states can create a general arbitration treaty or a permanent arbitration treaty, which specifies that all or certain types of future disputes will be settled this way. For instance, Article 7 of the Commercial Treaty between Holland and Portugal from July 5, 1894, contains such a general arbitration agreement, stating that arbitration applies not just to commercial disputes but to all future disagreements, as long as they do not involve independence or autonomy issues. However, until the Hague Peace Conference in 1899, general arbitration treaties were not common. Following the success of this conference, public opinion grew in favor of general arbitration treaties, leading to many such treaties being signed from 1900 to the present day.

[12] See above, § 3.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[13] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXII. p. 590.

[13] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXII. p. 590.

[14] See below, § 17.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Who is to arbitrate?

Who will arbitrate?

§ 14. States which conclude an arbitration treaty have to agree upon the arbitrators. If they choose a third State as arbitrator, they have to conclude a treaty (receptum arbitri) with such State, by which they appoint the chosen State and by which such State accepts the appointment. The appointed State chooses on its own behalf those umpires who actually serve as arbitrators. It can happen that the conflicting States choose a head of a third State as arbitrator. But such head never himself investigates the[Pg 18] matter; he chooses one or more individuals, who make a report and propose a verdict, which he pronounces. And, further, the conflicting States may agree to entrust the arbitration to any other individual or to a body of individuals, a so-called Arbitration Committee or Commission. Thus the arbitration of 1900 in regard to the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute between Great Britain, Venezuela, and the United States was conducted by a Commission, sitting at Paris, consisting of American and English members and the Russian Professor von Martens as President. And the Alaska Boundary Dispute between Great Britain and the United States was settled in 1903, through the award of a Commission, sitting at London, consisting of American and Canadian members, with Lord Alverstone, Lord Chief Justice of England, as President.

§ 14. Countries that enter into an arbitration treaty must agree on the arbitrators. If they select a third country as the arbitrator, they need to create a treaty (receptum arbitri) with that country, which appoints the selected country and outlines its acceptance of the appointment. The appointed country independently selects the umpires who will actually serve as arbitrators. It's possible for the disputing countries to choose a leader of a third country as the arbitrator. However, that leader does not personally look into the case; instead, they appoint one or more individuals to gather information and propose a decision, which the leader then announces. Additionally, the disputing countries may decide to assign the arbitration to another individual or a group, known as an Arbitration Committee or Commission. For instance, the arbitration in 1900 regarding the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute between Great Britain, Venezuela, and the United States was carried out by a Commission that met in Paris, made up of American and English members, with Russian Professor von Martens as President. Similarly, the Alaska Boundary Dispute between Great Britain and the United States was resolved in 1903 through the decision of a Commission that convened in London, consisting of American and Canadian members, with Lord Alverstone, the Lord Chief Justice of England, as President.

On what principles Arbitrators proceed and decide.

On what principles Arbitrators operate and make decisions.

§ 15. The treaty of arbitration must stipulate the principles according to which the arbitrators have to give their verdict. These principles may be the general rules of International Law, but they may also be the rules of any Municipal Law chosen by the conflicting States, or rules of natural equity, or rules specially stipulated in the treaty of arbitration for the special case.[15] And it can also happen that the treaty of arbitration stipulates that the arbitrators shall compromise the conflicting claims of the parties without resorting to special rules of law. The treaty of arbitration, further, as a rule, stipulates the procedure to be followed by the arbitrators who are investigating and determining the difference. If a treaty of arbitration does not lay down rules of procedure, the arbitrators themselves have to work out such rules and to communicate them to the parties.

§ 15. The arbitration agreement must outline the principles that the arbitrators will use to make their decisions. These principles can include general rules of International Law, but they might also refer to any Municipal Law selected by the disagreeing States, or principles of natural fairness, or rules specifically set out in the arbitration agreement for the particular case.[15] Additionally, the arbitration agreement may state that the arbitrators should find a compromise between the conflicting claims of the parties without relying on specific legal rules. Furthermore, the arbitration agreement typically specifies the procedure that the arbitrators must follow when investigating and resolving the dispute. If the arbitration agreement does not establish rules of procedure, the arbitrators are responsible for creating such rules and sharing them with the parties.

[15] See below, § 335, concerning the "Three rules of Washington."

[15] See below, § 335, about the "Three rules of Washington."

Binding force of Arbitral Verdict.

Binding force of arbitration award.

§ 16. An arbitral verdict is final if the arbitration treaty does not stipulate the contrary, and the verdict[Pg 19] given by the arbitrators is binding upon the parties. As, however, no such central authority exists above the States as could execute the verdict against a State refusing to submit, it is in such a case the right of the other party to enforce the arbitral decision by compulsion. Yet it is obvious that an arbitral verdict is binding only under the condition[16] that the arbitrators have in every way fulfilled their duty as umpires and have been able to find their verdict in perfect independence. Should they have been bribed or not followed their instructions, should their verdict have been given under the influence of coercion of any kind, or should one of the parties have intentionally and maliciously led the arbitrators into an essential material error, the arbitral verdict would have no binding force whatever. Thus the award given in 1831 by the King of Holland in the North-Eastern Boundary Dispute between Great Britain and the United States of America was not considered binding by the parties because the arbitrator had transgressed his powers.[17] For the same reason, Bolivia refused in 1910 to submit to the award of the President of Argentina in her boundary dispute with Peru.[18] And in October 1910, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, deciding the case of the United States of America against the United States of Venezuela concerning the claims of the Orinoco Steamship Company, annulled,[19] with regard to certain points, a previous arbitration award given by Mr. Barge.

§ 16. An arbitral verdict is final unless the arbitration treaty states otherwise, and the decision made by the arbitrators is binding on the parties involved. However, since there is no higher authority above the States that can enforce the decision against a State that refuses to comply, it is the right of the other party to enforce the arbitral decision by force. Yet, it’s clear that an arbitral verdict is only binding if the arbitrators have fully carried out their duties as judges and reached their decision completely independently. If they were bribed, didn't follow their guidelines, issued their verdict under any kind of pressure, or if one of the parties deliberately misled the arbitrators into a significant error, then the arbitral verdict would have no binding power at all. For instance, the award given in 1831 by the King of Holland in the North-Eastern Boundary Dispute between Great Britain and the United States was not deemed binding by the parties because the arbitrator exceeded his authority.[17] For similar reasons, Bolivia refused in 1910 to accept the ruling of the President of Argentina in its boundary dispute with Peru.[18] Additionally, in October 1910, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, resolving the case of the United States against Venezuela regarding the claims of the Orinoco Steamship Company, annulled,[19] on certain points, a previous arbitration award given by Mr. Barge.

[16] See Donker Curtius and Nys in R.I. 2nd Ser. XII. (1910), pp. 5-34 and 595-641.

[16] See Donker Curtius and Nys in R.I. 2nd Ser. XII. (1910), pp. 5-34 and 595-641.

[17] See Moore, VII. § 1082, and Moore, Arbitrations, I. pp. 81-161.

[17] See Moore, VII. § 1082, and Moore, Arbitrations, I. pp. 81-161.

[18] See Fiore in R.G. XVII. (1910), pp. 225-256.

[18] See Fiore in R.G. XVII. (1910), pp. 225-256.

[19] See Martens, N.R.G. 3rd Ser. IV. (1911), p. 79.

[19] See Martens, N.R.G. 3rd Ser. IV. (1911), p. 79.

What differences can be decided by Arbitration.

What differences can be resolved by Arbitration.

§ 17. It is often maintained that every possible difference between States could not be determined by arbitration, and, consequently, efforts are made to[Pg 20] distinguish those groups of State differences which are determinable by arbitration from others. Now although all States may never consent to have all possible differences decided by arbitration, theoretically there is no reason for a distinction between differences decidable and undecidable through arbitration. For there can be no doubt that, the consent of the parties once given, every possible difference might be settled through arbitration, either by the verdict being based on rules of International Law, or rules of natural equity, or by opposing claims being compromised. But, differing from the theoretical question as to what differences are and are not determinable by arbitration, is the question as to what kind of State differences ought always to be settled in this manner. The latter question has been answered by article 38 (formerly 16) of the Hague Convention for the peaceful adjustment of international differences, the contracting Powers therein recognising arbitration as the most efficacious, and at the same time the most equitable, means of determining differences of a judicial character in general, and in especial differences regarding the interpretation or application of international treaties. But future experience must decide whether the signatory Powers will in practice always act according to this distinction.

§ 17. It's often argued that not every possible difference between States can be settled through arbitration, so efforts are made to[Pg 20] identify which types of State differences can actually be resolved by arbitration versus those that cannot. While it’s unlikely that all States will agree to have every possible difference decided by arbitration, there’s no theoretical reason to distinguish between differences that can and cannot be arbitrated. Clearly, once the parties agree, any difference could be resolved through arbitration, whether by applying rules of International Law, principles of natural equity, or through compromise of opposing claims. However, what differs from the theoretical question about which differences can or cannot be arbitrated is the practical question of which types of State differences should always be resolved this way. This latter question is addressed by article 38 (formerly 16) of the Hague Convention for the peaceful resolution of international disputes, where the contracting Powers recognize arbitration as the most effective and equitable method for determining judicial differences in general, particularly those related to the interpretation or application of international treaties. But we must see in the future whether the signatory Powers will actually follow this distinction in practice.

However this may be, when, in 1903, Great Britain and France, following the suggestion of this article 38 (formerly 16), concluded a treaty in which they agreed to settle by arbitration all such differences of a legal nature as do not affect their vital interests, their independence, or their honour, many other States followed the lead. Great Britain, in the same and the following years, entered into such arbitration treaties with Spain, Italy, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, Holland, Denmark, the United States of America, Colombia, and Brazil. All these[Pg 21] agreements were concluded for five years only, but those which have since expired have all been renewed for another period of five years.

However this may be, when, in 1903, Great Britain and France, following the suggestion of this article 38 (formerly 16), made a treaty agreeing to resolve all legal disputes that don’t impact their vital interests, independence, or honor through arbitration, many other countries followed suit. In the same and following years, Great Britain entered into such arbitration treaties with Spain, Italy, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, the Netherlands, Denmark, the United States, Colombia, and Brazil. All these agreements were made for just five years, but those that have expired have all been renewed for another five-year period.

Yet there is a flaw in all these treaties, because the decision as to whether a difference is of a legal nature or not, is left to the discretion of the parties. Cases have happened in which one of the parties has claimed to have a difference settled by arbitration on account of its legal nature, whereas the other party has denied the legal nature of the difference and, therefore, refused to go to arbitration. For this reason the arbitration treaties signed on August 3, 1911, between the United States of America and Great Britain and between the United States of America and France are epoch making, since article 3 provides that, in cases where the parties disagree as to whether or not a difference is subject to arbitration under the treaty concerned, the question shall be submitted to a joint High Commission of Inquiry; and that, if all, or all but one, of the members of such Commission decide the question in the affirmative, the case shall be settled by arbitration. Article 3 has, however, been struck out by the American Senate, with the consequence that these treaties have lost their intrinsic value, even should they be ratified.

Yet there is a flaw in all these treaties because the decision on whether a difference is legal or not is left to the discretion of the parties involved. There have been cases where one party has claimed a difference should be resolved through arbitration due to its legal nature, while the other party has denied that the difference is legal and has therefore refused to go to arbitration. This is why the arbitration treaties signed on August 3, 1911, between the United States and Great Britain and between the United States and France are groundbreaking. Article 3 states that if the parties disagree on whether a difference should be arbitrated under the treaty, the question will be submitted to a joint High Commission of Inquiry; if all but one of the members of this Commission decide in favor of arbitration, the case will be resolved through arbitration. However, the American Senate has removed Article 3, resulting in these treaties losing their practical value, even if they are ratified.

It should be mentioned that, whereas most arbitration treaties limit arbitration in one or more ways, exempting cases which concern the independence, the honour, or the vital interests of the parties, Argentina[20] and Chili in 1902, Denmark and Holland in 1903, Denmark and Holland in 1905, Denmark and Portugal in 1907, Argentina and Italy in 1907, the Central American Republics of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras,[Pg 22] Nicaragua, and San Salvador in 1907, Italy and Holland in 1907 entered into general arbitration treaties according to which all differences without any exception shall be settled by arbitration.[21]

It should be noted that, while most arbitration treaties restrict arbitration in various ways, exempting cases that involve the independence, honor, or vital interests of the parties, Argentina[20] and Chile in 1902, Denmark and the Netherlands in 1903, Denmark and the Netherlands in 1905, Denmark and Portugal in 1907, Argentina and Italy in 1907, and the Central American countries of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras,[Pg 22] Nicaragua, and El Salvador in 1907, as well as Italy and the Netherlands in 1907, established general arbitration treaties that state all disputes, without exception, should be resolved through arbitration.[21]

[20] Earlier than this, on July 23, 1898—see Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXIX. p. 137—Argentina and Italy, and on November 9, 1899—see Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXXII. (1905), p. 404—Argentina and Paraguay had concluded treaties according to which all differences without exception shall be settled by arbitration. See also above, § 3, concerning the Compromise Clause.

[20] Before this, on July 23, 1898—see Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXIX. p. 137—Argentina and Italy, and on November 9, 1899—see Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXXII. (1905), p. 404—Argentina and Paraguay had signed agreements stating that all disputes, without exception, would be resolved through arbitration. Also, see above, § 3, regarding the Compromise Clause.

[21] A list of all the arbitration treaties which have been entered into by the several States since the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899, is to be found in Fried, op. cit. p. 185.

[21] A list of all the arbitration treaties that have been signed by various States since the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899 can be found in Fried, op. cit. p. 185.

Value of Arbitration.

Value of Arbitration.

§ 18. There can be no doubt that arbitration is, and every day becomes more and more, of great importance. History proves that in antiquity and during the Middle Ages arbitration was occasionally[22] made use of as a peaceable means of settling international differences. But, although an International Law made its appearance in modern times, during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries very few cases of arbitration occurred. It was not until the end of the eighteenth century that arbitration was frequently made use of. There are 177 cases from 1794 to the end of 1900.[23] This number shows that the inclination of States to agree to arbitration has increased, and there can be no doubt that arbitration has a great future. States and the public opinion of the whole world become more and more convinced that there are a good many international differences which may well be determined by arbitration without any danger whatever to the national existence, independence, dignity, and prosperity of the States concerned. A net of so-called Peace Societies has spread over the whole world, and their members unceasingly work for the promotion of arbitration. The Parliaments of several countries have repeatedly given their vote in favour of arbitration; and the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 created a Permanent Court of Arbitration, a step by which a new epoch of the development[Pg 23] of International Law was inaugurated. It is certain that arbitration will gradually increase its range, although the time is by no means in sight when all international differences will find their settlement by arbitration.

§ 18. There's no doubt that arbitration is, and is becoming increasingly, important every day. History shows that in ancient times and during the Middle Ages, arbitration was sometimes used as a peaceful way to resolve international disputes. However, even though International Law emerged in modern times, there were very few arbitration cases during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. It wasn't until the late eighteenth century that arbitration started being used more frequently. There are 177 cases from 1794 to the end of 1900. This number indicates that states are more inclined to agree to arbitration, and it's clear that arbitration has a bright future. Both states and global public opinion are increasingly convinced that many international disagreements can be resolved through arbitration without threatening the national existence, independence, dignity, or prosperity of the states involved. A network of so-called Peace Societies has spread across the globe, and their members tirelessly advocate for the promotion of arbitration. The parliaments of several countries have repeatedly voted in favor of arbitration, and the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 established a Permanent Court of Arbitration, marking the beginning of a new era in the development of International Law. It's certain that arbitration will gradually expand its scope, though we're not close to a time when all international disputes will be settled through arbitration.

[22] See examples in Calvo, III. §§ 1707-1712, and in Nys, Les origines du droit international (1894), pp. 52-61.

[22] See examples in Calvo, III. §§ 1707-1712, and in Nys, Les origines du droit international (1894), pp. 52-61.

[23] See La Fontaine's Histoire sommaire et chronologique des arbitrages internationaux in R.I. 2nd Ser. IV. pp. 349, 558, 623. See also Scott, Conferences, pp. 188-252.

[23] See La Fontaine's Summary and Chronological History of International Arbitrations in R.I. 2nd Ser. IV. pp. 349, 558, 623. Also see Scott, Conferences, pp. 188-252.

The novel institution of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague stands at present in the cross-fire of impatient pacifists and cynical pessimists. Because a number of wars have been fought since the establishment of the Permanent Court, impatient pacifists are in despair and consider the institution of the Court of Arbitration a failure, whereas cynical pessimists triumphantly point to the fact that the millennium would seem to be as far distant as ever. The calm observer of the facts who possesses insight in the process of historical development, has no cause to despair, for, compared with some generations ago, arbitration is an established force which daily gains more power and influence. And when once a real International Court[24] of justice is established side by side with the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the chances of arbitration will be greatly increased.

The new institution of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague is currently caught in the middle of frustrated peace advocates and cynical skeptics. Because several wars have occurred since the Court was established, frustrated peace advocates are filled with despair and see the Arbitration Court as a failure, while cynical skeptics gleefully point out that a lasting peace seems as far away as ever. A calm observer who understands historical development has no reason to lose hope, because, compared to past generations, arbitration has become a recognized force that grows stronger and more influential every day. Once a real International Court[24] of justice is set up alongside the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the prospects for arbitration will be significantly improved.

V ARBITRATION UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION

Ullmann, §§ 155-156—Bonfils, Nos. 9531-9551—Despagnet, Nos. 742-746bis—Mérignhac, I. pp. 486-539—Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague (1900)—Martens, La conférence de la paix à la Haye (1900)—Mérignhac, La conférence internationale de la paix (1900)—Fried, Die zweite Haager Konferenz (1908)—Meurer, I. pp. 299-372—Scott, Conferences, pp. 286-385—Higgins, pp. 164-179—Lémonon, pp. 188-219—Nippold, I. pp. 36-231—Wehberg, Kommentar, pp. 46-164.

Ullmann, §§ 155-156—Bonfils, Nos. 9531-9551—Despagnet, Nos. 742-746bis—Mérignhac, I. pp. 486-539—Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague (1900)—Martens, La conférence de la paix à la Haye (1900)—Mérignhac, La conférence internationale de la paix (1900)—Fried, Die zweite Haager Konferenz (1908)—Meurer, I. pp. 299-372—Scott, Conferences, pp. 286-385—Higgins, pp. 164-179—Lémonon, pp. 188-219—Nippold, I. pp. 36-231—Wehberg, Kommentar, pp. 46-164.

Arbitral Justice in general.

Arbitration Justice overall.

§ 19. Of the 97 articles of the Hague Convention for the peaceful adjustment of international differences, no fewer than 44—namely, articles 37-90—deal with[Pg 24] arbitration in three chapters, headed "On Arbitral Justice," "On the Permanent Court of Arbitration," and "On Arbitral Procedure." The first chapter, articles 37-40, contains rules on arbitral justice in general, which, however, with one exception, are not of a legal but of a merely doctrinal character. Thus the definition in article 37, first paragraph, "International arbitration has for its object the determination of controversies between States by judges of their own choice and upon the basis of respect for law," is as doctrinal as the assertion of article 38: "In questions of a judicial character, and especially in questions regarding the interpretation or application of International Treaties or Conventions, arbitration is recognised by the contracting Powers as the most efficacious and at the same time the most equitable method of deciding controversies which have not been settled by diplomatic methods. Consequently it would be desirable that, in disputes regarding the above-mentioned questions, the contracting Powers should, if the case arise, have recourse to arbitration, in so far as circumstances permit." And the provision of article 39, that an agreement of arbitration may be made respecting disputes already in existence or arising in the future and may relate to every kind of controversy or solely to controversies of a particular character, is as doctrinal as the reservation of article 40, which runs: "Independently of existing general or special treaties imposing the obligation to have recourse to arbitration on the part of any of the contracting Powers, these Powers reserve to themselves the right to conclude, either before the ratification of the present Convention or afterwards, new general or special agreements with a view to extending obligatory arbitration to all cases which they consider possible to submit to it." The only rule of legal character is that of article 37 (second paragraph),[Pg 25] enacting the already existing customary rule of International Law, that "the agreement of arbitration implies the obligation to submit in good faith to the arbitral sentence."

§ 19. Out of the 97 articles in the Hague Convention for peacefully resolving international disputes, 44—specifically, articles 37-90—focus on[Pg 24] arbitration across three chapters titled "On Arbitral Justice," "On the Permanent Court of Arbitration," and "On Arbitral Procedure." The first chapter, articles 37-40, outlines rules about arbitral justice in general, which, with one exception, are more about doctrine than law. For instance, the definition in article 37, first paragraph, "International arbitration aims to resolve disputes between States through judges they choose, based on respect for law," is as doctrinal as the statement in article 38: "On judicial matters, especially concerning the interpretation or application of International Treaties or Conventions, arbitration is acknowledged by the contracting Powers as the most effective and fair method of settling disputes that haven’t been resolved through diplomatic means. Therefore, it would be ideal for the contracting Powers to resort to arbitration in disputes regarding these matters, as long as circumstances allow." Moreover, article 39 provides that an arbitration agreement can be made about existing disputes or those that may arise in the future and can pertain to any type of controversy or only to specific ones, which is just as doctrinal as the clause in article 40, stating: "Regardless of existing general or special treaties that require any contracting Powers to resort to arbitration, these Powers retain the right to establish, either before or after the ratification of this Convention, new general or special agreements to expand obligatory arbitration to all cases they deem appropriate for submission." The only legally binding rule is in article 37 (second paragraph),[Pg 25] which enforces the already established customary rule of International Law that "the agreement to arbitrate includes the obligation to submit in good faith to the arbitral decision."

On the signatory Powers no obligation whatever to submit any difference to arbitration is imposed. Even differences of a judicial character, and especially those regarding the interpretation or application of treaties, for the settlement of which the signatory Powers, in article 38, acknowledge arbitration as the most efficacious and at the same time the most equitable method, need not necessarily be submitted to arbitration.

On the signatory Powers, there is no obligation to submit any disputes to arbitration. Even disputes of a legal nature, particularly those concerning the interpretation or application of treaties, which the signatory Powers recognize in article 38 as the most effective and fair way to resolve, don't have to be submitted to arbitration.

Yet the principle of compulsory arbitration for a limited number of international differences was by no means negatived by the Hague Peace Conferences, especially not by the Second Conference.

Yet the idea of mandatory arbitration for a limited number of international disputes was not dismissed by the Hague Peace Conferences, especially not by the Second Conference.

The principle found, firstly, indirect recognition by the Convention respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts.[25] Since article I of this Convention stipulates that recourse to the employment of force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the Government of one country by the Government of another country as being due to its nationals is not allowed unless the debtor State refuses arbitration, compulsory arbitration has in this instance been victorious.

The principle established, first of all, is the indirect acknowledgment of the Convention on the Limitation of the Use of Force for Recovering Contract Debts.[25] Since Article I of this Convention states that using force to recover contract debts owed to a nation's citizens from another country’s government is not permitted unless the debtor state declines arbitration, compulsory arbitration has, in this case, prevailed.

Secondly, although it was not possible to agree upon some stipulation embodying compulsory arbitration for a number of differences in Convention I., the principle itself was fully recognised, and the Final Act of the Second Peace Conference includes, therefore, the Declaration that the Conference "is unanimous (1) in admitting the principle of compulsory arbitration;[Pg 26] (2) in declaring that certain disputes, in particular those relating to the interpretation and application of international agreements, may be submitted to compulsory arbitration without any restriction."

Secondly, while we couldn't agree on a specific rule for mandatory arbitration for several issues in Convention I, the principle itself was fully acknowledged. As a result, the Final Act of the Second Peace Conference includes the Declaration that the Conference "is unanimous (1) in accepting the principle of mandatory arbitration;[Pg 26] (2) in stating that certain disputes, especially those about interpreting and applying international agreements, can be submitted to mandatory arbitration without any limitations."

The above shows reasonable grounds for the hope and expectation that one of the future Peace Conferences will find a way out of the difficulty and come to an agreement stipulating compulsory arbitration for a limited number of international differences.[26]

The above indicates good reasons to be hopeful that one of the upcoming Peace Conferences will figure out a solution to the issue and reach an agreement that mandates arbitration for a limited number of international disputes.[26]

[26] See Scott, Conferences, pp. 319-385, where the proceedings of both the First and Second Peace Conferences concerning compulsory arbitration are sketched in a masterly and very lucid style.

[26] See Scott, Conferences, pp. 319-385, where the discussions from both the First and Second Peace Conferences about mandatory arbitration are presented in a skilled and very clear manner.

Arbitration Treaty and appointment of Arbitrators.

Arbitration Treaty and appointing Arbitrators.

Procedure of and before the Arbitral Tribunal.

Procedure of and before the Arbitral Tribunal.

§ 21. The parties may agree upon such rules of arbitral procedure as they like. If they fail to stipulate special rules of procedure, the following rules are valid, whether the parties have brought their case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration or have chosen other arbitrators (article 51):—

§ 21. The parties can decide on any rules of arbitration procedure they want. If they don't establish specific procedural rules, the following rules apply, regardless of whether the parties have presented their case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration or have selected different arbitrators (article 51):—

(1) The parties may appoint counsel or advocates for the defence of their rights before the tribunal. They may also appoint delegates or special agents to attend the tribunal for the purpose of serving as intermediaries between them and the tribunal. The members of the Permanent Court, however, may not act as agents, counsel, or advocates except on behalf of[Pg 28] the Power which has appointed them members of the Court (article 62).

(1) The parties can hire lawyers or advocates to defend their rights in front of the tribunal. They can also appoint representatives or special agents to attend the tribunal to act as intermediaries between them and the tribunal. However, the members of the Permanent Court cannot serve as agents, lawyers, or advocates except for the Power that appointed them as members of the Court (article 62).

(2) The tribunal selects the languages for its own use and for use before it, unless the Compromis has specified the languages to be employed (article 61).

(2) The tribunal chooses the languages for its own use and for proceedings before it, unless the Compromis has specified which languages to use (article 61).

(3) As a rule the arbitral procedure is divided into the two distinct phases of written pleadings and oral discussions. The written pleadings consist of the communication by the respective agents to the members of the tribunal and to the opposite party of cases, counter-cases, and, if necessary, replies; the parties must annex thereto all papers and documents relied on in the case. This communication is to be made either directly or through the intermediary of the International Bureau, in the order and within the time fixed by the Compromis (article 63). A duly certified copy of every document produced by one party must be communicated to the other party (article 64). Unless special circumstances arise, the tribunal does not meet until the pleadings are closed (article 65).

(3) Generally, the arbitration process is split into two clear phases: written submissions and oral discussions. The written submissions involve the parties' representatives communicating their cases, counter-cases, and any necessary replies to the tribunal members and the opposing party. Each party must attach all relevant papers and documents for the case. This communication can happen either directly or through the International Bureau, following the order and timelines set in the Compromis (article 63). A certified copy of every document presented by one party must be shared with the other party (article 64). Unless special circumstances arise, the tribunal does not convene until the submissions are complete (article 65).

(4) Upon the written pleadings follows the oral discussion in Court; it consists of the oral development of the pleas of the parties (article 63, last paragraph). The discussions are under the direction of the president of the tribunal, and are public only if it be so decided by the tribunal with the consent of the parties. Minutes with regard to the discussion are to be drawn up by secretaries appointed by the president, and only these official minutes, which are signed by the president and one of the secretaries, are authentic (article 66). During the discussion in Court the agents and counsel of the parties are authorised to present to the tribunal orally all the arguments they may think expedient in support of their case. They are likewise authorised to raise objections and to make incidental motions, but the decisions of the tribunal on these objections and motions[Pg 29] are final and cannot form the subject of any further discussion (articles 70, 71). Every member of the tribunal may put questions to the agents and counsel of the parties and demand explanations from them on doubtful points, but neither such questions nor other remarks made by members of the tribunal may be regarded as expressions of opinion by the tribunal in general or the respective member in particular (article 72). The tribunal may always require from the agents of the parties all necessary explanations and the production of all acts, and in case of refusal the tribunal takes note of it in the minutes (articles 69).

(4) After the written pleadings, there’s an oral discussion in Court; this involves the spoken presentation of each party's arguments (article 63, last paragraph). The discussions are led by the president of the tribunal and are public only if the tribunal decides this with the agreement of the parties. Minutes of the discussion are to be taken by secretaries appointed by the president, and only these official minutes, which are signed by the president and one of the secretaries, are considered authentic (article 66). During the court discussion, the agents and attorneys for each party can present any arguments they think are relevant to their case. They can also raise objections and make incidental motions, but the tribunal's decisions on these objections and motions[Pg 29] are final and cannot be further discussed (articles 70, 71). Every member of the tribunal has the right to ask questions of the agents and attorneys and seek clarifications on unclear points, but neither these questions nor any comments made by tribunal members can be taken as opinions from the tribunal as a whole or from any individual member (article 72). The tribunal can always demand that agents of the parties provide necessary explanations and submit all relevant documents, and if they refuse, the tribunal will note this in the minutes (articles 69).

When the competence of the tribunal is doubted on one or more points, the tribunal itself is authorised to decide whether it is or is not competent, by means of interpretation of the Compromis as well as the other papers and documents which may be adduced in the matter, and by means of the application of the principles of law (article 73).

When the tribunal's authority is questioned on one or more issues, the tribunal itself has the right to determine its own competence by interpreting the Compromis along with any other relevant papers and documents that may be presented, and by applying the principles of law (article 73).

During the discussion in Court—article 67 says, "After the close of the pleadings"—the tribunal is competent to refuse admittance to all such fresh acts and documents as one party may desire to submit to the tribunal without the consent of the other party (article 67). Consequently, the tribunal must admit fresh acts and documents when both parties agree to their submission. On the other hand, the tribunal is always competent to take into consideration fresh papers and documents to which its attention is drawn by the agents or counsel of the parties, and in such cases the tribunal may require production of the papers and documents, but it is at the same time obliged to make them known to the other party (article 68).

During the discussion in Court—article 67 states, "After the close of the pleadings"—the tribunal has the authority to deny the submission of any new documents or evidence that one party wants to present without the other party's agreement (article 67). Therefore, the tribunal must accept new documents and evidence when both parties agree to their submission. On the flip side, the tribunal can always consider new papers and documents that are brought to its attention by the agents or lawyers of the parties. In these situations, the tribunal may require those papers and documents to be produced, but it is also required to share them with the other party (article 68).

The parties must supply the tribunal, within the widest limits they may think practicable, with all the information required for deciding the dispute (article[Pg 30] 75). For the service of all notices by the tribunal in the territory of a third contracting Power, the tribunal applies direct to the Government of such Power. The same rule is valid in the case of steps being necessary in order to procure evidence on the spot. The requests for this purpose are to be executed by the Power concerned with the means at its disposal according to its Municipal Law; they may not be rejected unless the Power concerned considers them of such a nature as to impair its own sovereign rights or its safety. Instead, however, of making a direct application to a third Power, the tribunal is always entitled to have recourse to the intermediary of the Power on whose territory it sits (article 76).

The parties must provide the tribunal, as much as they think feasible, with all the information needed to decide the dispute (article[Pg 30] 75). For serving any notices by the tribunal in the territory of a third contracting Power, the tribunal directly contacts the Government of that Power. The same applies when actions are needed to collect evidence on-site. Requests for this must be fulfilled by the Power involved using the resources available under its own laws; they can only be denied if the Power believes they might harm its sovereign rights or safety. However, instead of making a direct request to a third Power, the tribunal can always rely on the intermediary of the Power where it is located (article 76).

As soon as the agents and counsel of the parties have submitted all explanations and evidence in support of their case, the president declares the discussion closed (article 77).

As soon as the agents and lawyers of the parties have submitted all explanations and evidence to support their case, the president announces that the discussion is closed (article 77).

Arbitral Award.

Arbitration Award.

§ 22. The arbitral award is given after a deliberation which has taken place behind closed doors, and the proceedings remain secret (article 78). The members of the tribunal vote, and the majority of the votes makes the decision of the tribunal. The decision, accompanied by a statement of the considerations upon which it is based, is to be drawn up in writing, to recite the names of the arbitrators, and to be signed by the president and the registrar or the secretary acting as the registrar (article 79). The verdict is read out at a public meeting of the tribunal, the agents and counsel of the parties being present or having been duly summoned to attend (article 80).

§ 22. The arbitral award is issued after a private deliberation, and the proceedings stay confidential (article 78). The tribunal members cast their votes, and the majority decision determines the outcome. The written decision must include a statement explaining the reasoning behind it, list the names of the arbitrators, and be signed by the president and the registrar or the secretary acting as the registrar (article 79). The verdict is announced at a public meeting of the tribunal, with the agents and counsel of the parties present or properly notified to attend (article 80).

Binding force of Awards.

Binding awards.

§ 23. The award, when duly pronounced and notified to the agents of the parties, decides the dispute finally and without appeal (article 81). Any dispute arising between the parties as to the interpretation or execution of the award must, in default of an agreement[Pg 31] to the contrary, be submitted to the tribunal which pronounced it (article 82). The parties may, however, beforehand stipulate in the Compromis the possibility of an appeal. In such case, and the Compromis failing to stipulate the contrary, the demand for a rehearing of the case must be addressed to the tribunal which pronounced the award. The demand for a rehearing of the case may only be made on the ground of the discovery of some new fact such as may exercise a decisive influence on the award, and which at the time when the discussion was closed was unknown to the tribunal as well as to the appealing party. Proceedings for a rehearing may only be opened after a decision of the tribunal expressly stating the existence of a new fact of the character described, and declaring the demand admissible on this ground. The treaty of arbitration must stipulate the period of time within which the demand for a rehearing must be made (article 83).—

§ 23. The award, once officially announced and communicated to the parties' representatives, resolves the dispute definitively and cannot be appealed (article 81). Any disagreements between the parties regarding the interpretation or implementation of the award must, unless agreed otherwise, be submitted to the tribunal that issued it (article 82). However, the parties may choose to include the option of an appeal in the Compromis. In that case, and unless the Compromis states otherwise, the request for a rehearing must be directed to the tribunal that issued the award. A request for a rehearing may only be made based on the discovery of a new fact that could significantly affect the award and that was unknown to both the tribunal and the appealing party when the discussion ended. Rehearings can only be initiated after the tribunal has explicitly acknowledged the existence of such a new fact and has declared the request permissible on that basis. The arbitration treaty must specify the timeframe within which the request for a rehearing must be submitted (article 83).—

The Hague Convention contains no stipulation whatever with regard to the question whether the award is binding under all circumstances and conditions, or whether it is only binding when the tribunal has in every way fulfilled its duty and has been able to find its verdict in perfect independence. But it is obvious that the award has no binding force whatever if the tribunal has been bribed or has not followed the parties' instructions given by the treaty of agreement; if the award was given under the influence of undue coercion; or, lastly, if one of the parties has intentionally and maliciously led the tribunal into an essential material error. (See above, § 16).

The Hague Convention doesn’t specify whether the award is always binding or only binding when the tribunal has completely fulfilled its responsibilities and reached its decision independently. However, it’s clear that the award has no binding power if the tribunal has been bribed or hasn’t followed the parties’ instructions set forth in the agreement; if the award was made under undue pressure; or if one party has deliberately and maliciously misled the tribunal into a significant factual error. (See above, § 16).

Award binding upon Parties only.

Award binding only upon Parties.

§ 24. The award[27] is binding only upon the parties to the proceedings. But when there is a question of[Pg 32] interpreting a convention to which other States than the States at variance are parties, the conflicting States have to inform all the contracting Powers of such convention in good time. Each of these States has a right to intervene in the case before the tribunal, and, if one or more avail themselves of this right, the interpretation contained in the award is as binding upon them as upon the conflicting parties (article 84).

§ 24. The award[27] is only binding on the parties involved in the proceedings. However, if there’s a question about interpreting a convention that involves other states besides the ones in conflict, the conflicting states must inform all the contracting powers about that convention in a timely manner. Each of these states has the right to intervene in the case before the tribunal, and if one or more take advantage of this right, the interpretation in the award is binding on them just as it is on the conflicting parties (article 84).

Costs of Arbitration.

Arbitration costs.

§ 25. Each party pays its own expenses and an equal share of those of the tribunal[28] (article 85).

§ 25. Each party covers its own costs and shares the tribunal's expenses equally[28] (article 85).

[28] See details in Wehberg, Kommentar, pp. 155-158.

[28] See details in Wehberg, Kommentar, pp. 155-158.

Arbitration by Summary Procedure.

Arbitration Summary Procedure.

§ 25a. With a view to facilitating the working of arbitration in disputes of minor importance admitting an abbreviated procedure, the contracting Powers propose the following rules for a summary procedure exclusively in writing:—

§ 25a. To make arbitration easier for small disputes that can use a shortened process, the contracting Powers suggest the following rules for a summary procedure that is entirely in writing:—

Each of the conflicting parties appoints an arbitrator, and these arbitrators need not necessarily be members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The two arbitrators thus appointed choose a third as umpire, who need not be a member of the Permanent Court either. But if they cannot agree upon an umpire, each of them proposes two candidates taken from the general list of the Permanent Court of Arbitration exclusive of such members as are either appointed by the conflicting States or are their nationals, and it is to be determined by lot which of the candidates shall be the umpire. This umpire presides over the tribunal which gives its decisions by a majority of votes (article 87). In the absence of an agreement concerning the matter, the tribunal settles the time within which the two parties must submit their respective cases to it (article 88). Each party is represented by an agent who serves as intermediary between the tribunal and his party (article 89). The proceedings are conducted exclusively in writing. Each party, however, is entitled[Pg 33] to ask that witnesses and experts should be called, and the tribunal has the right to demand oral explanations from the agents as well as from the experts and witnesses whose appearance in Court it may consider useful (article 90). Articles 52 to 85 of Convention I. apply so far as they are not inconsistent with the rules laid down in articles 87 to 90 (article 80).

Each side in the dispute appoints an arbitrator, and these arbitrators don’t have to be members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The two arbitrators they choose then select a third person as the umpire, who also doesn’t need to be part of the Permanent Court. If they can’t agree on an umpire, each arbitrator proposes two candidates from the general list of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, excluding members who have been appointed by the conflicting states or are their nationals, and it will be decided by lot which of the candidates will serve as umpire. This umpire leads the tribunal, which makes decisions based on a majority vote (article 87). If there is no agreement on this matter, the tribunal establishes the timeframe within which both parties must present their cases (article 88). Each party is represented by an agent who acts as a liaison between the tribunal and their party (article 89). The proceedings are conducted entirely in writing. However, each party has the right to request that witnesses and experts be summoned, and the tribunal can ask for oral explanations from the agents, as well as from the experts and witnesses whose presence in court it finds necessary (article 90). Articles 52 to 85 of Convention I apply as long as they don’t conflict with the rules set forth in articles 87 to 90 (article 80).

CHAPTER 2 FORCED RESOLUTION OF STATE DISPUTES

I ON COMPULSIVE METHODS FOR RESOLVING STATE DISPUTES IN GENERAL

Lawrence, § 136—Westlake, II. p. 6—Phillimore, III. § 7—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2632—Despagnet, No. 483—Fiore, II. No. 1225, and Code, Nos. 1381-1385—Taylor, § 431—Nys, III. pp. 83-94.

Lawrence, § 136—Westlake, II. p. 6—Phillimore, III. § 7—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2632—Despagnet, No. 483—Fiore, II. No. 1225, and Code, Nos. 1381-1385—Taylor, § 431—Nys, III. pp. 83-94.

Conception and kinds of Compulsive Means of Settlement.

Conception and types of Compulsive Means of Settlement.

§ 26. Compulsive means of settlement of differences are measures containing a certain amount of compulsion taken by a State for the purpose of making another State consent to such settlement of a difference as is required by the former. There are four different kinds of such means in use—namely, retorsion, reprisals (including embargo), pacific blockade, and intervention. But it must be mentioned that, whereas every amicable means of settling differences might find application in every kind of difference, not every compulsive means is applicable in every difference. For the application of retorsion is confined to political, and that of reprisals to legal differences.

§ 26. Compulsory Methods for Resolving Disputes are actions involving a degree of force taken by one country to persuade another country to agree to a resolution of a dispute as desired by the first. There are four main types of these methods—namely, retorsion, reprisals (including embargoes), pacific blockade, and intervention. However, it's important to note that while every friendly method of resolving disputes can be used for any type of difference, not all compulsory methods are suitable for every situation. Retorsion is limited to political disputes, while reprisals are specific to legal disagreements.

Compulsive Means in contradistinction to War.

Compulsive Means in contrast to War.

§ 27. War is very often enumerated among the compulsive means of settling international differences. This is in a sense correct, for a State might make war for no other purpose than that of compelling another State to settle a difference in the way required before war was declared. Nevertheless, the characteristics of compulsive means of settling international differences make it a necessity to draw a sharp line between these[Pg 35] means and war. It is, firstly, characteristic of compulsive means that, although they frequently consist of harmful measures, they are neither by the conflicting nor by other States considered as acts of war, and consequently all relations of peace, such as diplomatic and commercial intercourse, the execution of treaties, and the like, remain undisturbed. Compulsive means are in theory and practice considered peaceable, although not amicable, means of settling international differences. It is, further, characteristic of compulsive means that they are even at their worst confined to the application of certain harmful measures only, whereas belligerents in war may apply any amount and any kinds of force, with the exception only of those methods forbidden by International Law. And, thirdly, it is characteristic of compulsive means that their application must cease as soon as their purpose is realised by the compelled State declaring its readiness to settle the difference in the way requested by the compelling State; whereas, war once broken out, a belligerent is not obliged to lay down arms if and when the other belligerent is ready to comply with the request made before the war. As war is the ultima ratio between States, the victorious belligerent is not legally prevented from imposing upon the defeated any conditions he likes.

§ 27. War is often listed as a compelling way to resolve international disputes. This is somewhat true because a state might go to war just to force another state to resolve an issue in the way it demands before the war starts. However, the nature of compelling methods for settling international disputes requires a clear distinction between these[Pg 35] methods and war. Firstly, compelling methods may involve harmful actions, but they aren't considered acts of war by the conflicting states or others, so all peaceful relations—like diplomacy and trade or the enforcement of treaties—remain unaffected. Compelling methods are viewed as peaceful, though not friendly, ways to address international issues in theory and practice. Furthermore, compelling methods, even at their worst, only involve specific harmful actions, while warring parties can use any amount and type of force, except for methods explicitly banned by International Law. Thirdly, the use of compelling methods must stop as soon as the targeted state indicates its willingness to resolve the issue as requested by the state applying the pressure; in contrast, once a war starts, a belligerent is not required to cease fighting even if the opposing side is ready to agree to the initial demands. Since war is the ultima ratio between states, the victorious side cannot be legally stopped from imposing whatever conditions it wishes upon the defeated side.

Compulsive Means in contradistinction to an Ultimatum and Demonstrations.

Compulsive means in contrast to an ultimatum and demonstrations.

§ 28. The above-described characteristics of compulsive means for the settlement of international differences make it necessary to mention the distinction between such means and an ultimatum. The latter is the technical term for a written communication by one State to another which ends amicable negotiations respecting a difference, and formulates, for the last time and categorically, the demands to be fulfilled if other measures are to be averted. An ultimatum is, theoretically at least, not a compulsion, although it[Pg 36] can practically exercise the function of a compulsion, and although compulsive means, or even war, can be threatened through the same communication in the event of a refusal to comply with the demand made.[29] And the same is valid with regard to withdrawal of diplomatic agents, to military and naval demonstrations, and the like, which some publicists[30] enumerate among the compulsive means of settlement of international differences. Although these steps may contrive, indirectly, the settlement of differences, yet they do not contain in themselves any compulsion.

§ 28. The characteristics of the compulsive methods for resolving international disputes highlighted above require us to distinguish between these methods and an ultimatum. An ultimatum is a formal written communication from one state to another that concludes friendly negotiations regarding a dispute and clearly states, for the final time, the demands that must be met to avoid further actions. An ultimatum is, at least in theory, not considered coercive, although it can effectively function as a form of pressure, and coercive measures, or even war, can be implied through the same communication if the demands are rejected.[29] The same applies to the withdrawal of diplomatic representatives, military and naval displays, and similar actions that some commentators[30] list as coercive methods for resolving international conflicts. While these actions may indirectly lead to conflict resolution, they do not inherently involve coercion.

[29] See Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2649, and below, § 95.

[29] See Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2649, and below, § 95.

[30] See Taylor, §§ 431, 433, 441; Moore, VII. §§ 1089, 1091, 1099; Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2633.

[30] See Taylor, §§ 431, 433, 441; Moore, VII. §§ 1089, 1091, 1099; Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2633.

II RETORSION

Vattel, II. § 341—Hall, § 120—Westlake, II. p. 6—Phillimore, III. § 7—Twiss II. § 10—Taylor, § 435—Wharton, III. § 318—Moore, VII. § 1090—Wheaton, § 290—Bluntschli, § 505—Heffter, § 110—Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 59-71—Ullmann, § 159—Bonfils, Nos. 972-974—Despagnet, Nos. 484-486—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2634-2636—Rivier, II. § 60—Calvo, III. § 1807—Fiore, II. Nos. 1226-1227, and Code, Nos. 1386-1390—Martens, II § 105.

Vattel, II. § 341—Hall, § 120—Westlake, II. p. 6—Phillimore, III. § 7—Twiss II. § 10—Taylor, § 435—Wharton, III. § 318—Moore, VII. § 1090—Wheaton, § 290—Bluntschli, § 505—Heffter, § 110—Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 59-71—Ullmann, § 159—Bonfils, Nos. 972-974—Despagnet, Nos. 484-486—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2634-2636—Rivier, II. § 60—Calvo, III. § 1807—Fiore, II. Nos. 1226-1227, and Code, Nos. 1386-1390—Martens, II § 105.

Conception and Character of Retorsion.

Conception and Character of Retorsion.

§ 29. Retorsion is the technical term for the retaliation of discourteous or unkind or unfair and inequitable acts by acts of the same or a similar kind. Retorsion has nothing to do with international delinquencies, as it is not a means of compulsion in the case of legal differences, but only in the case of certain political differences. The act which calls for retaliation is not an illegal act; on the contrary, it is an act that is within the competence of the doer.[31] But a State can[Pg 37] commit many legislative, administrative, or judicial acts which, although they are not internationally illegal, contain a discourtesy or unfriendliness to another State or are unfair and inequitable. If the State against which such acts are directed considers itself wronged thereby, a political difference is created which might be settled by retorsion.

§ 29. Retorsion is the formal term for retaliating against discourteous, unkind, unfair, or inequitable actions with similar actions. Retorsion isn’t related to international offenses; it doesn’t involve coercion in legal disputes, but only in certain political disagreements. The action that prompts retaliation isn’t illegal; in fact, it’s something the doer is allowed to do.[31] However, a State can[Pg 37] engage in many legislative, administrative, or judicial actions that, while not internationally illegal, are discourteous or unfriendly to another State, or are unfair and inequitable. If the State affected by such actions feels wronged, it creates a political disagreement that could be resolved through retorsion.

[31] For this reason—see Heilborn, System, p. 352, and Wagner, Zur Lehre von den Streiterledigungsmitteln des Völkerrechts (1900), pp. 53-60—it is correctly maintained that retorsion, in contradistinction to reprisals, is not of legal, but only of political importance. Nevertheless, a system of the Law of Nations must not omit the matter of retorsion altogether, because retorsion is in practice an important means of settling political differences.

[31] For this reason—see Heilborn, System, p. 352, and Wagner, Zur Lehre von den Streiterledigungsmitteln des Völkerrechts (1900), pp. 53-60—it is accurately argued that retorsion, unlike reprisals, holds political significance rather than legal. However, a system of International Law should not completely overlook retorsion, as it is practically an important tool for resolving political disagreements.

Retorsion, when justified.

Retorsion, when justified.

§ 30. The question when retorsion is and when it is not justified is not one of law, and is difficult to answer. The difficulty arises from the fact that retorsion is a means of settling such differences as are created, not by internationally illegal, but by discourteous or unfriendly or unfair and inequitable acts of one State against another, and that naturally the conceptions of discourtesy, unfriendliness, and unfairness cannot be defined very precisely. It depends, therefore, largely upon the circumstances and conditions of the special cases whether a State will or will not consider itself justified in making use of retorsion. In practice States have frequently made use of retorsion in cases of unfair treatment of their citizens abroad through rigorous passport regulations, exclusion of foreigners from certain professions, the levy of exorbitant protectionist or fiscal duties; further, in cases of refusal of the usual mutual judicial assistance, refusal of admittance of foreign ships to harbours, and in similar cases.

§ 30. The question of when retorsion is justified and when it is not is not a legal issue and is hard to answer. The challenge comes from the fact that retorsion is a way to resolve conflicts that are caused not by internationally illegal actions, but by disrespectful, unfriendly, or unfair acts between States. Naturally, the ideas of disrespect, unfriendliness, and unfairness can't be defined with precision. Therefore, it largely depends on the specific circumstances and conditions of each case whether a State feels justified in using retorsion. In practice, States often resort to retorsion when their citizens face unfair treatment abroad, such as strict passport regulations, exclusion from certain professions, or the imposition of excessive protectionist or tax duties. This also applies to situations where there is a refusal of standard mutual legal assistance or denial of entry for foreign ships into ports, among other similar situations.

Retorsion, how exercised.

Retorsion, how it's applied.

§ 31. The essence of retorsion consists in retaliation for a noxious act by an act of the same kind. But a State in making use of retorsion is by no means confined to acts of the same kind as those complained of, acts of a similar kind being equally admissible. However, acts of retorsion are confined to acts which are not internationally illegal. And, further, as retorsion is made[Pg 38] use of only for the purpose of compelling a State to alter its discourteous, unfriendly, or unfair behaviour, all acts of retorsion ought at once to cease when such State changes its behaviour.

§ 31. The essence of retorsion is getting back at someone for a harmful action with a similar action. However, when a State uses retorsion, it doesn't have to be limited to actions of the exact same kind as the ones it is responding to; similar actions are also acceptable. Nevertheless, retorsion is limited to actions that are not illegal under international law. Moreover, since retorsion is only used to make a State change its rude, unfriendly, or unfair behavior, all acts of retorsion should stop as soon as that State changes its behavior.

Value of Retorsion.

Value of Retorsion.

§ 32. The value of retorsion as a means of settling certain international differences consists in its compulsory force, which has great power in regulating the intercourse of States. It is a commonplace of human nature, and by experience constantly confirmed, that evil-doers are checked by retaliation, and that those who are inclined to commit a wrong against others are often prevented by the fear of it. Through the high tide of Chauvinism, Protectionism, and unfriendly feelings against foreign nations, States are often tempted to legislative, administrative, and judicial acts against other States which, although not internationally illegal, nevertheless endanger friendly relations and intercourse within the Family of Nations. The certainty of retaliation is the only force which can make States resist the temptation.

§ 32. The value of retorsion as a way to resolve certain international disputes lies in its mandatory power, which is very effective in regulating the interactions between nations. It's a well-known aspect of human behavior, consistently confirmed by experience, that wrongdoers are deterred by retaliation, and that those who might consider harming others are often stopped by the fear of facing consequences. Amid the rising tide of nationalism, protectionism, and negative feelings toward foreign nations, countries are frequently tempted to engage in legislative, administrative, and judicial actions against others that, while not internationally illegal, still threaten friendly relations and cooperation within the community of nations. The certainty of retaliation is the only force that can encourage nations to resist such temptations.

III Retaliation

Grotius, III. c. 2—Vattel, II. §§ 342-354—Bynkershoek, Quaestiones jur. publ. I. c. 24—Hall, § 120—Lawrence, §§ 136-137—Westlake, II. pp. 7-11—Twiss, II. §§ 11-22—Moore, VII. §§ 1095, 1096-1098—Taylor, §§ 436-437—Wharton, III. §§ 318-320—Wheaton, §§ 291-293—Bluntschli, §§ 500-504—Heffter, §§ 111-112—Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 72-116—Ullmann, § 160—Bonfils, Nos. 975-985—Despagnet, Nos. 487-495—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2637-2647—Rivier, II. § 60—Nys, III. pp. 84-91—Calvo, III. §§ 1808-1831—Fiore, II. Nos. 1228-1230, and Code, Nos. 1391-1399—Martens, II. § 105—Lafargue, Les représailles en temps de paix (1899)—Ducrocq, Représailles en temps de paix (1901), pp. 5-57, 175-232—Westlake in The Law Quarterly Review, XXV. (1909), pp. 127-137.

Grotius, III. c. 2—Vattel, II. §§ 342-354—Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law I. c. 24—Hall, § 120—Lawrence, §§ 136-137—Westlake, II. pp. 7-11—Twiss, II. §§ 11-22—Moore, VII. §§ 1095, 1096-1098—Taylor, §§ 436-437—Wharton, III. §§ 318-320—Wheaton, §§ 291-293—Bluntschli, §§ 500-504—Heffter, §§ 111-112—Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 72-116—Ullmann, § 160—Bonfils, Nos. 975-985—Despagnet, Nos. 487-495—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2637-2647—Rivier, II. § 60—Nys, III. pp. 84-91—Calvo, III. §§ 1808-1831—Fiore, II. Nos. 1228-1230, and Code, Nos. 1391-1399—Martens, II. § 105—Lafargue, Retaliation in Times of Peace (1899)—Ducrocq, Retaliation in Times of Peace (1901), pp. 5-57, 175-232—Westlake in The Law Quarterly Review, XXV. (1909), pp. 127-137.

Conception of Reprisals in contradistinction to Retorsion.

Conception of Reprisals as opposed to Retorsion.

§ 33. Reprisals is the term applied to such injurious and otherwise internationally illegal acts of one State against another as are exceptionally permitted for the[Pg 39] purpose of compelling the latter to consent to a satisfactory settlement of a difference created by its own international delinquency. Whereas retorsion consists in retaliation of discourteous, unfriendly, unfair, and inequitable acts by acts of the same or a similar kind, and has nothing to do with international delinquencies, reprisals are acts, otherwise illegal, performed by a State for the purpose of obtaining justice for an international delinquency by taking the law into its own hands. It is, of course, possible that a State retaliates in consequence of an illegal act committed against itself by the performance of an act of a similar kind. Such retaliation would be a retorsion in the ordinary sense of the term, but it would not be retorsion in the technical meaning of the term as used by those writers on International Law who correctly distinguish between retorsion and reprisals.

§ 33. Reprisals is the term used for harmful and otherwise internationally illegal actions taken by one State against another that are exceptionally allowed for the[Pg 39] purpose of forcing the latter to agree to a satisfactory resolution of a dispute caused by its own international wrongdoing. While retorsion involves retaliating against rude, unfriendly, unfair, and inequitable acts with acts of a similar nature, and is unrelated to international misconduct, reprisals are illegal actions taken by a State to seek justice for an international offense by taking matters into its own hands. It is also possible for a State to retaliate against an illegal act committed against it by responding with a similar act. Such retaliation would be a retorsion in the common sense of the term, but it would not be retorsion in the technical sense as used by scholars of International Law who correctly differentiate between retorsion and reprisals.

Reprisals admissible for all International Delinquencies.

Reprisals are allowed for all international wrongdoings.

§ 34. Reprisals are admissible not only, as some writers[32] maintain, in case of denial or delay of justice, or of any other internationally interdicted ill-treatment of foreign citizens, but in every case of an international delinquency for which the injured State cannot get reparation through negotiation,[33] be it ill-treatment of its subjects abroad through denial or delay of justice or otherwise, or be it non-compliance with treaty obligations, violation of the dignity of a foreign State, violation of foreign territorial supremacy, or any other internationally illegal act.

§ 34. Reprisals are allowed not just, as some authors[32] suggest, in cases of denial or delay of justice, or any other form of internationally prohibited mistreatment of foreign citizens, but in any instance of international wrongdoing where the affected State cannot obtain compensation through negotiation,[33] whether it’s mistreatment of its citizens abroad due to denial or delay of justice or otherwise, or whether it involves failure to comply with treaty obligations, disrespect towards the dignity of a foreign State, violation of foreign territorial integrity, or any other act that is internationally illegal.

[32] See, for instance, Twiss, II. § 19.

[32] Check out Twiss, II. § 19, for example.

[33] As regards reprisals for the non-payment of contract-debts, see below, § 41.

[33] Regarding consequences for not paying contract debts, refer to § 41.

Thus, to give an example, Great Britain, in the case of the Sicilian Sulphur Monopoly, performed acts of reprisal against the Two Sicilies in 1840 for a violation of a treaty. By the treaty of commerce of 1816 between the Two Sicilies and Great Britain certain commercial advantages were secured to Great Britain. When, in[Pg 40] 1838, the Neapolitan Government granted a Sulphur Monopoly to a company of French and other foreign merchants, Great Britain protested against this violation of her treaty rights, demanded the revocation of the monopoly, and, after the Neapolitan Government had declined to comply with this demand, laid an embargo on Sicilian ships in the harbour of Malta and ordered her fleet in the Mediterranean to seize Sicilian ships by way of reprisal. A number of vessels were captured, but were restored after the Sicilies had, through the mediation of France, agreed to withdraw the grant of the Sulphur Monopoly.

So, for example, Great Britain took action against the Two Sicilies in 1840 over a violation of a treaty regarding the Sicilian Sulphur Monopoly. The 1816 trade agreement between the Two Sicilies and Great Britain secured certain commercial benefits for Great Britain. When, in [Pg 40] 1838, the Neapolitan Government granted a Sulphur Monopoly to a company of French and other foreign merchants, Great Britain protested this breach of its treaty rights and demanded that the monopoly be revoked. After the Neapolitan Government refused to comply, Great Britain imposed an embargo on Sicilian ships in the harbor of Malta and commanded its fleet in the Mediterranean to seize Sicilian vessels as a form of reprisal. Several ships were captured but were returned after the Sicilies agreed, with France's mediation, to revoke the Sulphur Monopoly grant.

Again, when in 1908 de Castro, the President of Venezuela, dismissed M. de Reuss, the Dutch Minister Resident at Caracas, Holland considered this step a violation of her dignity and sent cruisers into Venezuelan waters with the intention of resorting to reprisals. These cruisers captured the Venezuelan coast-guard ship Alexis outside Puerto Cabello, and another Venezuelan public vessel, both of which, however, were restored in 1909, when de Castro was deposed, and the new President opened negotiations with Holland and settled the conflict.

Again, when in 1908, de Castro, the President of Venezuela, fired M. de Reuss, the Dutch Minister Resident in Caracas, the Netherlands viewed this action as an affront to its dignity and deployed cruisers into Venezuelan waters with plans for reprisals. These cruisers seized the Venezuelan coast guard ship Alexis outside Puerto Cabello, along with another Venezuelan government vessel. However, both ships were returned in 1909 after de Castro was ousted, and the new President began talks with the Netherlands to resolve the issue.

Reprisals admissible for International Delinquencies only.

Reprisals allowed for International Offenses only.

§ 35. Reprisals are admissible in the case of international delinquencies only and exclusively. As internationally injurious acts on the part of administrative and judicial officials, armed forces, and private individuals are not ipso facto international delinquencies, no reprisals are admissible in the case of such acts if the responsible State complies with the requirements of its vicarious responsibility.[34] Should, however, a State refuse to comply with these requirements, its vicarious responsibility would turn into original responsibility, and thereby an international delinquency would be created for which reprisals are indeed admissible.

§ 35. Reprisals are allowed only in cases of international offenses. Since acts that cause international harm, carried out by government officials, armed forces, or private individuals, are not automatically considered international offenses, reprisals are not permitted for such actions if the responsible State meets its obligations for vicarious liability.[34] However, if a State refuses to meet these obligations, its vicarious liability would become original liability, and thus, an international offense would be established, making reprisals permissible.

The reprisals ordered by Great Britain in the case of Don Pacifico are an illustrative example of unjustified reprisals, because no international delinquency was committed. In 1847 a riotous mob, aided by Greek soldiers and gendarmes, broke into and plundered the house of Don Pacifico, a native of Gibraltar and an English subject living at Athens. Great Britain claimed damages from Greece without previous recourse by Don Pacifico to the Greek Courts. Greece refused to comply with the British claim, maintaining correctly that Don Pacifico ought to institute an action for damages against the rioters before the Greek Courts. Great Britain continued to press her claim, and finally in 1850 blockaded the Greek coast and ordered, by way of reprisal, the capture of Greek vessels. The conflict was eventually settled by Greece paying £150 to Don Pacifico. It is generally recognised that England had no right to act as she did in this case. She could have claimed damages directly from the Greek Government only after the Greek Courts had denied satisfaction to Don Pacifico.[35]

The reprisals ordered by Great Britain in the case of Don Pacifico are a clear example of unjustified actions, as no international wrongdoing had occurred. In 1847, a violent mob, supported by Greek soldiers and gendarmes, broke into and looted the house of Don Pacifico, a native of Gibraltar and an English citizen living in Athens. Great Britain demanded compensation from Greece without Don Pacifico first seeking justice in Greek courts. Greece rightly refused to comply with the British claim, stating that Don Pacifico should file a lawsuit for damages against the rioters in the Greek courts. Great Britain persisted in pushing her claim and eventually, in 1850, blockaded the Greek coast and ordered the seizure of Greek ships as a form of reprisal. The conflict was eventually resolved when Greece paid £150 to Don Pacifico. It is widely accepted that England had no right to act as she did in this situation. She could have sought damages directly from the Greek Government only after the Greek courts had failed to provide justice to Don Pacifico.[35]

Reprisals, by whom performed.

Reprisals, by whom done.

§ 36. Acts of reprisal may nowadays be performed only by State organs such as armed forces, or men-of-war, or administrative officials, in compliance with a special order of their State. But in former times private individuals used to perform acts of reprisal. Such private acts of reprisal seem to have been in vogue in antiquity, for there existed a law in Athens according to which the relatives of an Athenian murdered abroad had, in case the foreign State refused punishment or extradition of the murderer, the right to seize and to bring before the Athenian Courts three citizens of such foreign State (so-called ἀνδροληψία). During the Middle Ages, and even in modern times to[Pg 42] the end of the eighteenth century, States used to grant so-called "Letters of Marque" to such of their subjects as had been injured abroad either by a foreign State itself or its citizens without being able to get redress. These Letters of Marque authorised the bearer to acts of self-help against the State concerned, its citizens and their property, for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction for the wrong sustained. In later times, however, States themselves also performed acts of reprisal. Thereby acts of reprisal on the part of private individuals fell more and more into disuse, and finally disappeared totally with the end of the eighteenth century. The distinction between general and special reprisals, which used formerly to be drawn, is based on the fact that in former times a State could either authorise a single private individual to perform an act of reprisal (special reprisals), or command its armed forces to perform all kinds of such acts (general reprisals). The term "General Reprisals" is by Great Britain nowadays used for the authorisation of the British fleet to seize in time of war all enemy ships and goods. Phillimore (III. § 10) cites the following Order in Council of March 27, 1854: "Her Majesty having determined to afford active assistance to her ally, His Highness the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, for the protection of his dominions against the encroachments and unprovoked aggression of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, Her Majesty is therefore pleased, by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that general reprisals be granted against the ships, vessels, and goods of the Emperor of All the Russias, and of his subjects, or others inhabiting within any of his countries, territories or dominions, so that Her Majesty's fleets may lawfully seize all ships, vessels, and goods," &c.

§ 36. Nowadays, acts of reprisal can only be carried out by state bodies such as armed forces, warships, or administrative officials, following a specific order from their government. In the past, however, private individuals used to carry out acts of reprisal. Such private acts were common in ancient times; for example, there was a law in Athens that allowed the relatives of an Athenian who was murdered abroad to seize and present before Athenian courts three citizens of the foreign state if that state refused to punish or extradite the murderer (known as ἀνδροληψία). During the Middle Ages and even into modern times, until the end of the eighteenth century, states issued what were called "Letters of Marque" to their subjects who had been wronged abroad either by a foreign state or its citizens when they could not obtain justice. These Letters of Marque allowed the holder to take self-help measures against the respective state, its citizens, and their property to seek redress for the harm suffered. However, over time, states themselves began to carry out acts of reprisal. As a result, private acts of reprisal gradually became less common and eventually disappeared completely by the end of the eighteenth century. The distinction between general and special reprisals, which was previously made, arises from the fact that in the past, a state could either authorize a single individual to take an act of reprisal (special reprisals) or command its armed forces to perform various acts (general reprisals). The term "General Reprisals" is currently used by Great Britain to refer to the authorization of the British fleet to seize enemy ships and goods during wartime. Phillimore (III. § 10) cites the following Order in Council from March 27, 1854: "Her Majesty having determined to provide active support to her ally, His Highness the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, to protect his territories from the advances and unprovoked aggression of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, Her Majesty is thus pleased, with the advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that general reprisals be granted against the ships, vessels, and goods of the Emperor of All the Russias, and his subjects, or others living within any of his countries, territories, or dominions, so that Her Majesty's fleets may lawfully seize all ships, vessels, and goods," &c.

Objects of Reprisals.

Reprisal Targets.

§ 37. An act of reprisal may be performed against[Pg 43] anything and everything that belongs or is due to the delinquent State or its citizens. Ships sailing under its flag may be seized, treaties concluded with it may be suspended, a part of its territory may be militarily occupied, goods belonging to it or to its citizens may be seized, and the like. Thus in 1895 Great Britain ordered a fleet to land forces at Corinto and to occupy the custom-house and other Government buildings as an act of reprisal against Nicaragua; again, in 1901 France ordered a fleet to seize the island of Mitylene as an act of reprisal against Turkey; and in 1908 Holland ordered a squadron to seize two public Venezuelan vessels as an act of reprisal against Venezuela.[36] The persons of the officials and even of the private citizens of the delinquent State are not excluded from the possible objects of reprisals. Thus, when in 1740 the Empress Anne of Russia arrested without just cause the Baron de Stackelberg, a natural-born Russian subject, who had, however, become naturalised in Prussia by entering the latter's service, Frederick II. of Prussia seized by way of reprisal two Russian subjects and detained them until Stackelberg was liberated. But it must be emphasised that the only act of reprisal admissible with regard to foreign officials or citizens is arrest; they must not be treated like criminals, but like hostages, and under no condition or circumstance may they be executed or subjected to punishment of any kind.

§ 37. An act of reprisal can be carried out against[Pg 43] anything and everything that belongs to or is owed to the offending State or its citizens. Ships flying its flag can be seized, treaties with it can be suspended, a portion of its territory can be occupied by military force, goods belonging to it or its citizens can be confiscated, and similar actions can be taken. For instance, in 1895, Great Britain dispatched a fleet to land forces at Corinto and occupy the customs house and other government buildings as a reprisal against Nicaragua; similarly, in 1901, France ordered a fleet to take control of the island of Mitylene as a reprisal against Turkey; and in 1908, Holland sent a squadron to seize two Venezuelan ships as a reprisal against Venezuela.[36] Officials and even private citizens of the offending State can also be targets for reprisals. For example, when Empress Anne of Russia unjustly arrested Baron de Stackelberg in 1740, who was a natural-born Russian but had become a naturalized Prussian by serving in their military, Frederick II of Prussia seized two Russian citizens in reprisal and held them until Stackelberg was released. However, it is important to note that the only reprisal action that can be taken regarding foreign officials or citizens is arrest; they should not be treated like criminals but like hostages, and under no circumstances should they be executed or punished in any way.

[36] See above, § 34.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

The rule that anything and everything belonging to the delinquent State may be made the object of reprisals has, however, exceptions; for instance, individuals enjoying the privilege of exterritoriality while abroad, such as heads of States and diplomatic envoys, may not be made the object of reprisals, although this has occasionally been done in practice.[37] In regard[Pg 44] to another exception—namely, public debts of such State as intends performing reprisals—unanimity does not exist either in theory or in practice. When Frederick II. of Prussia in 1752, by way of negative reprisals for an alleged injustice of British Prize Courts against Prussian subjects, refused the payment of the Silesian loan due to English creditors, Great Britain, in addition to denying the question that there was at all a just cause for reprisals, maintained that public debts may not be made the object of reprisals. English jurists and others, as, for instance, Vattel (II. § 344), consent to this, but German writers dissent.[38]

The rule that anything and everything belonging to a delinquent State can be subject to reprisals does have exceptions. For example, individuals who have the privilege of extraterritoriality while abroad, like heads of states and diplomatic envoys, cannot be the target of reprisals, although this has happened occasionally in practice.[37] Regarding another exception—namely, public debts of the State intending to carry out reprisals—there's no consensus either in theory or practice. When Frederick II of Prussia, in 1752, enacted negative reprisals against British Prize Courts for an alleged injustice towards Prussian subjects by refusing to pay back the Silesian loan owed to English creditors, Great Britain not only denied that there was any valid reason for reprisals but also argued that public debts should not be subjected to reprisals. English jurists and others, like Vattel (II. § 344), agree with this viewpoint, but German writers disagree.[38]

[37] See the case reported in Martens, Causes Célèbres, I. p. 35.

[37] Check out the case discussed in Martens, Causes Célèbres, I. p. 35.

[38] See Phillimore, III. § 22, in contradistinction to Heffter, § 111, note 5. The case is reported with all its details in Martens, Causes Célèbres, II. pp. 97-168. The dispute was settled in 1756—see below, § 437—through Great Britain paying an indemnity of £20,000.

[38] See Phillimore, III. § 22, as opposed to Heffter, § 111, note 5. The case is detailed in Martens, Causes Célèbres, II. pp. 97-168. The issue was resolved in 1756—see below, § 437—with Great Britain paying a compensation of £20,000.

Positive and Negative Reprisals.

Positive and Negative Repercussions.

§ 38. Reprisals can be positive or negative. One speaks of positive reprisals when such acts are performed as would under ordinary circumstances involve an international delinquency. On the other hand, negative reprisals consist of refusals to perform such acts as are under ordinary circumstances obligatory; when, for instance, the fulfilment of a treaty obligation or the payment of a debt is refused.

§ 38. Reprisals can be either positive or negative. Positive reprisals refer to actions that, under normal circumstances, would be considered an international wrongdoing. In contrast, negative reprisals involve withholding actions that are typically obligatory; for example, refusing to fulfill a treaty obligation or to pay a debt.

Reprisals must be proportionate.

Reprisals must be proportional.

§ 39. Reprisals, be they positive or negative, must be in proportion to the wrong done and to the amount of compulsion necessary to get reparation. For instance, a State would not be justified in arresting by way of reprisal thousands of foreign subjects living on its territory whose home State had injured it through a denial of justice to one of its subjects living abroad. But it would in such case be justified in ordering its own Courts to deny justice to all subjects of such foreign State, or in ordering its fleet to seize several vessels sailing under the latter State's flag, or in suspending its commercial treaty with such State.

§ 39. Reprisals, whether positive or negative, must be proportionate to the wrong done and the amount of pressure needed to achieve compensation. For example, a state wouldn’t be justified in arresting thousands of foreign nationals living on its territory because their home state wronged it by denying justice to one of its citizens abroad. However, in that case, it would be justified in directing its own courts to deny justice to all citizens of that foreign state, or in commanding its navy to seize several ships flying the flag of that state, or in suspending its trade agreement with that state.

Embargo.

Trade ban.

§ 40. A kind of reprisal, which is called Embargo,[Pg 45] must be specially mentioned. This term of Spanish origin means detention, but in International Law it has the technical meaning of detention of ships in port. Now, as by way of reprisal all acts, otherwise illegal, may be performed, there is no doubt that ships of the delinquent State may be prevented from leaving the ports of the injured State for the purpose of compelling the delinquent State to make reparation for the wrong done.[39]

§ 40. A type of reprisal known as Embargo,[Pg 45] needs to be specifically mentioned. This term, which comes from Spanish, means detention, but in International Law, it has the specific meaning of detaining ships in port. Since reprisals can include all acts that would otherwise be illegal, it's clear that ships from the offending State can be kept from leaving the ports of the affected State to force the offending State to compensate for the wrong done.[39]

[39] Thus in 1840—see above, § 34—Great Britain laid an embargo on Sicilian ships.

[39] So in 1840—see above, § 34—Great Britain put a ban on Sicilian ships.

The matter would not need special mention were it not for the fact that embargo by way of reprisal is to be distinguished from detention of ships for other reasons. According to a now obsolete[40] rule of International Law, conflicting States could, when war was breaking out or impending, lay an embargo on, and appropriate each other's merchantmen. Another kind of embargo is the so-called arrêt de prince[41]—that is, a detention of foreign ships for the purpose of preventing them from spreading news of political importance. And there is, thirdly, an embargo arising out of the so-called jus angariæ—that is, the right of a belligerent State to seize and make use of neutral property in case of necessity, under the obligation to compensate the neutral owner of such property. States have in the past[42] made use of this kind of embargo when they had not enough ships for the necessary transport of troops, ammunition, and the like.

The issue wouldn’t be worth highlighting if it weren’t for the fact that an embargo as a form of retaliation is different from the detention of ships for other reasons. According to a now outdated[40] rule of International Law, conflicting states could, when war was about to break out or was imminent, impose an embargo on, and seize each other's merchant ships. Another type of embargo is known as arrêt de prince[41]—which involves detaining foreign ships to stop them from spreading politically significant news. Lastly, there’s an embargo based on the concept of jus angariæ—which is the right of a warring state to take and use neutral property when necessary, with the requirement to compensate the neutral owner for their property. In the past,[42] states have relied on this type of embargo when they didn’t have enough ships for the essential transport of troops, supplies, and similar needs.

[40] See, however, below, § 102a and article 1 of Convention VI., which only stipulates that it is desirable that enemy vessels in the port of a belligerent at the outbreak of war should be allowed to depart freely; see also article 2 of Convention VI.

[40] However, refer to § 102a and article 1 of Convention VI., which simply states that it is desirable for enemy ships in the port of a warring nation at the start of conflict to be allowed to leave without restrictions; also see article 2 of Convention VI.

[41] See Steck, Versuch über Handels-und Schiffahrts-Verträge (1782), p. 355; Caumont, Dictionnaire universel de droit maritime (1867), pp. 247-265; Calvo, III. § 1277; Pradier-Fodéré, V. p. 719; Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 98-104.

[41] See Steck, Essay on Trade and Shipping Contracts (1782), p. 355; Caumont, Universal Dictionary of Maritime Law (1867), pp. 247-265; Calvo, III. § 1277; Pradier-Fodéré, V. p. 719; Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 98-104.

[42] See below, § 364.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

These kinds of international embargo must not be confounded with the so-called civil embargo of English Municipal Law[43]—namely, the order of the[Pg 46] Sovereign to English ships not to leave English ports.

These types of international embargo should not be confused with the so-called civil embargo in English Municipal Law[43]—specifically, the order from the Sovereign directing English ships not to depart from English ports.

[43] See Phillimore, III. § 26.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Phillimore, III. § 26.

Reprisals to be preceded by Negotiations and to be stopped when Reparation is made.

Reprisals should come after Negotiations and should end once Reparation is made.

§ 41. Like all other compulsive means of settling international differences, reprisals are admissible only after negotiations have been conducted in vain for the purpose of obtaining reparation from the delinquent State. In former times, when States used to authorise private individuals to perform special reprisals, treaties of commerce and peace frequently stipulated for a certain period of time, for instance three or four months, to elapse after an application for redress before the grant of Letters of Marque by the injured State.[44] Although with the disappearance of special reprisals this is now antiquated, a reasonable time for the performance of a reparation must even nowadays be given. On the other hand, reprisals must at once cease when the delinquent State makes the necessary reparation. Individuals arrested must be set free, goods and ships seized must be handed back, occupied territory must be evacuated, suspended treaties must again be put into force, and the like.

§ 41. As with all other forceful ways of resolving international disputes, reprisals are only acceptable after attempts at negotiation have failed to obtain compensation from the offending State. In the past, when States allowed private individuals to carry out specific reprisals, trade and peace treaties often specified a waiting period—like three or four months—after a request for redress before the injured State would grant Letters of Marque.[44] While special reprisals are no longer recognized, a reasonable time for obtaining reparation must still be allowed today. On the other hand, reprisals must stop immediately when the offending State provides the necessary compensation. Individuals who have been detained must be released, seized goods and ships must be returned, occupied territories must be vacated, suspended treaties must be reinstated, and so on.

[44] See Phillimore, III. § 14.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Phillimore, III. § 14.

It must be specially mentioned that in the case of recovery of contract debts claimed from the Government of one country by the Government of another country as being due to its nationals, reprisals by means of armed forces can, according to article 1 of Convention II., only be resorted to in case the debtor State refuses to go to arbitration.

It should be noted that when recovering contract debts claimed from one country's government by another country's government on behalf of its nationals, military reprisals can only be used, according to Article 1 of Convention II, if the debtor state refuses to engage in arbitration.

Reprisals during Peace in contradistinction to Reprisals during War.

Reprisals during Peace in contrast to Reprisals during War.

§ 42. Reprisals in time of peace must not be confounded with reprisals between belligerents. Whereas the former are resorted to for the purpose of settling a conflict without going to war, the latter[45] are retaliations to force an enemy guilty of a certain act of illegitimate warfare to comply with the laws of war.

§ 42. Reprisals during peacetime should not be confused with reprisals between warring parties. The former are used to resolve a dispute without engaging in war, while the latter[45] are acts of retaliation aimed at compelling an enemy who has committed an illegal act of warfare to adhere to the laws of war.

[45] See below, § 247.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Value of Reprisals.

Value of Retaliation.

§ 43. The value of reprisals as a means of settling[Pg 47] international differences is analogous to the value of retorsion. States will have recourse to reprisals for such international delinquencies as they think insufficiently important for a declaration of war, but too important to be entirely overlooked. That reprisals are rather a rough means for the settlement of differences, and that the institution of reprisals can give and has in the past given occasion to abuse in case of a difference between a powerful and a weak State, cannot be denied. On the other hand, as there is no Court and no central authority above the Sovereign States which could compel a delinquent State to give reparation, the institution of reprisals can scarcely be abolished. The influence in the future of the existence of a Permanent Court of Arbitration remains to be seen. If all the States would become parties to the Hague Convention for the peaceful adjustment of international differences, and if they would have recourse to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague in all cases of an alleged international delinquency which affects neither their national honour nor their vital interests and independence, acts of reprisal would almost disappear.[Pg 48]

§ 43. The role of reprisals in resolving[Pg 47] international disputes is similar to that of retorsion. Countries will resort to reprisals for international wrongs they believe aren’t serious enough to warrant a declaration of war but still too significant to ignore. It's true that reprisals are a rather harsh way to resolve disputes, and the practice can lead to abuse, especially in conflicts between a powerful state and a weaker one. However, since there’s no court or central authority above sovereign states that can force a guilty state to provide compensation, reprisals are unlikely to be eliminated. The impact of having a Permanent Court of Arbitration in the future is still unknown. If all states were to join the Hague Convention for the peaceful resolution of international disputes and utilize the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague for cases involving alleged international wrongs that don’t threaten their national honor or vital interests, acts of reprisal would nearly vanish.[Pg 48]

IV PACIFIC BLOCKADE

Hall, § 121—Lawrence, § 138—Westlake, II. pp. 11-18—Taylor, § 444—Moore, VII. § 1097—Bluntschli, §§ 506-507—Heffter, § 112—Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 116-127—Ullmann, § 162—Bonfils, Nos. 986-994—Despagnet, Nos. 496-498—Pradier-Fodéré, V. Nos. 2483-2489, VI. No. 2648—Rivier, II. § 60—Nys, III. pp. 91-94—Calvo, III. §§ 1832-1859—Fiore, II. No. 1231, and Code, Nos. 1404-1414—Martens, II. 105—Holland, Studies, pp. 151-167—Deane, The Law of Blockade (1870), pp. 45-48—Fauchille, Du blocus maritime (1882), pp. 37-67—Falcke, Die Hauptperioden der sogenannten Friedensblockade (1891), and in the Zeitschrift für Internationales Recht, XIX. (1909), pp. 63-175—Barès, Le blocus pacifique (1898)—Ducrocq, Représailles en temps de paix (1901), pp. 58-174—Hogan, Pacific Blockade (1908)—Söderquist, Le Blocus Maritime (1908)—Staudacher, Die Friedensblockade (1909)—Westlake in The Law Quarterly Review, XXV. (1909), pp. 13-23.

Hall, § 121—Lawrence, § 138—Westlake, II. pp. 11-18—Taylor, § 444—Moore, VII. § 1097—Bluntschli, §§ 506-507—Heffter, § 112—Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 116-127—Ullmann, § 162—Bonfils, Nos. 986-994—Despagnet, Nos. 496-498—Pradier-Fodéré, V. Nos. 2483-2489, VI. No. 2648—Rivier, II. § 60—Nys, III. pp. 91-94—Calvo, III. §§ 1832-1859—Fiore, II. No. 1231, and Code, Nos. 1404-1414—Martens, II. 105—Holland, Studies, pp. 151-167—Deane, The Law of Blockade (1870), pp. 45-48—Fauchille, Du blocus maritime (1882), pp. 37-67—Falcke, Die Hauptperioden der sogenannten Friedensblockade (1891), and in the Zeitschrift für Internationales Recht, XIX. (1909), pp. 63-175—Barès, Le blocus pacifique (1898)—Ducrocq, Représailles en temps de paix (1901), pp. 58-174—Hogan, Pacific Blockade (1908)—Söderquist, Le Blocus Maritime (1908)—Staudacher, Die Friedensblockade (1909)—Westlake in The Law Quarterly Review, XXV. (1909), pp. 13-23.

Development of practice of Pacific Blockade.

Development of the practice of Pacific Blockade.

§ 44. Before the nineteenth century blockade was only known as a measure between belligerents in time of war. It was not until the second quarter of the nineteenth century that the first case occurred of a so-called pacific blockade—that is, a blockade during time of peace—as a compulsive means of settling international differences; and all such cases are either cases of intervention or of reprisals.[46] The first case, one of intervention, happened in 1827, when, during the Greek insurrection, Great Britain, France, and Russia intervened in the interest of the independence of Greece and blockaded those parts of the Greek coast which were occupied by Turkish troops. Although this blockade led to the battle of Navarino, in which the Turkish fleet was destroyed, the Powers[Pg 49] maintained, nevertheless, that they were not at war with Turkey. In 1831, France blockaded the Tagus as an act of reprisal for the purpose of exacting redress from Portugal for injuries sustained by French subjects. Great Britain and France, exercising intervention for the purpose of making Holland consent to the independence of revolting Belgium, blockaded in 1833 the coast of Holland. In 1838, France blockaded the ports of Mexico as an act of reprisal, but Mexico declared war against France in answer to this pacific blockade. Likewise as an act of reprisal, and in the same year, France blockaded the ports of Argentina; and in 1845, conjointly with Great Britain, France blockaded the ports of Argentina a second time. In 1850, in the course of her differences with Greece on account of the case of Don Pacifico,[47] Great Britain blockaded the Greek ports, but for Greek vessels only. Another case of intervention was the pacific blockade instituted in 1860 by Sardinia, in aid of an insurrection against the then Sicilian ports of Messina and Gaeta, but the following year saw the conversion of the pacific blockade into a war blockade. In 1862 Great Britain by way of reprisal for the plundering of a wrecked British merchantman, blockaded the Brazilian port of Rio de Janeiro. The blockade of the island of Formosa by France during her differences with China in 1884 and that of the port of Menam by France during her differences with Siam in 1893 are likewise cases of reprisals. On the other hand, cases of intervention are the blockade of the Greek coast in 1886 by Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy, and Russia, for the purpose of preventing Greece from making war against Turkey; and further, the blockade of the island of Crete in 1897 by the united Powers. The last case occurred in 1902, when Great Britain, Germany,[Pg 50] and Italy blockaded, by way of reprisal, the coast of Venezuela.[48]

§ 44. Before the nineteenth century, a blockade was only known as a strategy used by countries at war. It wasn't until the mid-nineteenth century that the first instance of a so-called peaceful blockade occurred—meaning a blockade during peacetime—as a forceful way to resolve international disputes; and all such cases are either interventions or reprisals.[46] The first instance of intervention happened in 1827 when, during the Greek insurrection, Great Britain, France, and Russia intervened to support Greece's independence and blockaded those areas of the Greek coast occupied by Turkish troops. Although this blockade led to the battle of Navarino, where the Turkish fleet was destroyed, the Powers[Pg 49] insisted that they were not at war with Turkey. In 1831, France blockaded the Tagus as a reprisal to demand compensation from Portugal for damages suffered by French citizens. Great Britain and France, intervening to make Holland agree to the independence of the rebellious Belgium, blockaded the coast of Holland in 1833. In 1838, France blockaded the ports of Mexico as a reprisal, but Mexico declared war on France in response to this peaceful blockade. Similarly, as an act of reprisal, France blockaded the ports of Argentina in the same year; and in 1845, together with Great Britain, France blockaded the ports of Argentina again. In 1850, during its disputes with Greece over the case of Don Pacifico,[47] Great Britain blockaded the Greek ports, but only for Greek vessels. Another case of intervention was the peaceful blockade established in 1860 by Sardinia to support an uprising against the Sicilian ports of Messina and Gaeta, but the next year, this peaceful blockade turned into a war blockade. In 1862, Great Britain, as a reprisal for the looting of a wrecked British merchant ship, blockaded the Brazilian port of Rio de Janeiro. The blockade of the island of Formosa by France during its disputes with China in 1884 and that of the port of Menam by France during its disputes with Siam in 1893 are also instances of reprisals. On the other hand, instances of intervention include the blockade of the Greek coast in 1886 by Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy, and Russia, to prevent Greece from waging war against Turkey; and additionally, the blockade of the island of Crete in 1897 by the united Powers. The last instance occurred in 1902 when Great Britain, Germany,[Pg 50] and Italy blockaded the coast of Venezuela as a reprisal.[48]

[46] A blockade instituted by a State against such portions of its own territory as are in revolt is not a blockade for the purpose of settling international differences. It has, therefore, in itself nothing to do with the Law of Nations, but is a matter of internal police. I cannot, therefore, agree with Holland, who, in his Studies in International Law, p. 138, treats it as a pacific blockade sensu generali. Of course, necessity of self-preservation only can justify a State that has blockaded one of its own ports in preventing the egress and ingress of foreign vessels. And the question might arise whether compensation ought not to be paid for losses sustained by foreign vessels so detained.

[46] A blockade enforced by a State against parts of its own territory that are in rebellion is not intended for resolving international disputes. Therefore, it does not relate to international law; it's an internal matter. I cannot agree with Holland, who, in his Studies in International Law, p. 138, considers it a peaceful blockade sensu generali. Naturally, only the need for self-preservation can justify a State blocking one of its own ports from allowing in and out foreign vessels. This raises the question of whether compensation should be given for the losses suffered by foreign vessels that are detained.

[47] See above, § 35.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[48] This blockade, although ostensibly a war blockade for the purpose of preventing the ingress of foreign vessels, was nevertheless essentially a pacific blockade. See Holland, in The Law Quarterly Review, XIX. (1903), p. 133; Parliamentary Papers, Venezuela, No. 1 (Venezuela), Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Venezuela.

[48] This blockade, while appearing to be a military blockade aimed at stopping foreign ships from entering, was really a peaceful blockade. See Holland, in The Law Quarterly Review, XIX. (1903), p. 133; Parliamentary Papers, Venezuela, No. 1 (Venezuela), Correspondence regarding the Affairs of Venezuela.

Admissibility of Pacific Blockade.

Admissibility of Pacific Blockade.

§ 45. No unanimity exists among international lawyers with regard to the question whether or not pacific blockades are admissible according to the principles of the Law of Nations. There is no doubt that the theory of the Law of Nations forbids the seizure and sequestration of vessels other than those of the blockaded State caught in an attempt to break a pacific blockade. For even those writers who maintain the admissibility of pacific blockade assert that vessels of third States cannot be seized. What is controverted is the question whether according to International Law the coast of a State may be blockaded at all in time of peace. From the first recorded instance to the last, several writers[49] of authority have negatived the question. On the other hand, many writers have answered the question in the affirmative, differing among themselves regarding the one point only whether or not vessels sailing under the flag of third States could be prevented from entering or leaving pacifically blockaded ports. The Institute of International Law in 1887 carefully studied, and at its meeting in Heidelberg discussed, the question, and finally voted a declaration[50] in favour of the admissibility of pacific blockades. Thus the most influential body of theorists has approved what had been established before by practice. There ought to be no doubt that the numerous cases of pacific blockade which have occurred during the nineteenth century have, through tacit consent of the members of the Family of Nations, established the[Pg 51] admissibility of pacific blockades for the settlement of political as well as of legal international differences.

§ 45. There isn’t a consensus among international lawyers about whether pacific blockades are permissible according to the principles of international law. It’s clear that the theory of international law prohibits the capture and confiscation of ships from states other than the blockaded one that are trying to break a pacific blockade. Even those scholars who argue that pacific blockades are allowed agree that ships from third states cannot be seized. The debate is whether a state's coast can be blockaded at all during peacetime. From the earliest instances to the most recent, several authoritative writers[49] have denied this possibility. Conversely, many others have answered in the affirmative, differing only on whether vessels flying the flag of third states can be prevented from entering or leaving pacifically blockaded ports. The Institute of International Law studied this issue in depth in 1887 and discussed it at their meeting in Heidelberg, ultimately voting for a declaration[50] supporting the admissibility of pacific blockades. Thus, the most influential group of theorists endorsed what had already been established through practice. There should be no doubt that the numerous cases of pacific blockade that occurred in the nineteenth century have, through the tacit agreement of the members of the Family of Nations, validated the[Pg 51] admissibility of pacific blockades for resolving both political and legal international disputes.

[49] The leader of these writers is Hautefeuille, Des Droits et des Devoirs des Nations Neutres (2nd ed. 1858, pp. 272-288).

[49] The main figure among these writers is Hautefeuille, Des Droits et des Devoirs des Nations Neutres (2nd ed. 1858, pp. 272-288).

[50] See Annuaire, IX. (1887), pp. 275-301.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Directory, IX. (1887), pp. 275-301.

Pacific Blockade and vessels of third States.

Pacific Blockade and vessels of third States.

§ 46. It has already been stated that those writers who admit the legality of pacific blockades are unanimous regarding the fact that no right exists for the blockading State to seize and sequestrate such ships of third States as try to break a pacific blockade. Apart from this, no unanimity exists with regard to the question of the relation between a pacific blockade and ships of third States. Some German writers[51] maintain that such ships have to respect the blockade, and that the blockading State has a right to stop such ships of third States as try to break a pacific blockade. The vast majority of writers, however, deny such right. There is, in fact, no rule of International Law which could establish such a right, as pacific in contradistinction to belligerent blockade is a mere matter between the conflicting parties. The declaration of the Institute of International Law in favour of pacific blockade contains, therefore, the condition: "Les navires de pavillons neutres peuvent entrer librement malgré le blocus."

§ 46. It has already been mentioned that the writers who recognize the legality of peaceful blockades all agree that the blockading State has no right to seize or confiscate ships from third States that attempt to break a peaceful blockade. Aside from this, there is no consensus on the relationship between a peaceful blockade and ships from third States. Some German writers[51] argue that these ships must respect the blockade, and that the blockading State has the right to stop ships from third States that try to breach a peaceful blockade. However, the vast majority of writers reject this right. In fact, there is no rule of International Law that could establish such a right, since a peaceful blockade, as opposed to a belligerent blockade, is simply a matter between the conflicting parties. The declaration by the Institute of International Law in support of peaceful blockade therefore includes the condition: "Les navires de pavillons neutres peuvent entrer librement malgré le blocus."

[51] See Heffter, § 112; Perels, § 30.

[51] See Heffter, § 112; Perels, § 30.

The practice of pacific blockade has varied with regard to ships of third States. Before 1850 ships of third States were expected to respect a pacific blockade, and such ships of these States as tried to break it were seized, but were restored at the termination of the blockade, yet without any compensation. When in 1850 Great Britain, and likewise when in 1886 Great Britain, Austria, Germany, Italy, and Russia blockaded the Greek ports, these ports were only closed for Greek ships, and others were allowed to pass through. And the same was the case during the blockade of Crete in 1897. On the other hand, in 1894, France, during a conflict with China, blockaded the[Pg 52] island of Formosa and tried to enforce the blockade against ships of third States. But Great Britain declared that a pacific blockade could not be enforced against ships of third States, whereupon France had to drop her intended establishment of a pacific blockade and had to consider herself at war with China. And when in 1902 Great Britain, Germany, and Italy instituted a blockade against Venezuela, they declared it a war blockade[52] because they intended to enforce it against vessels of third States.

The practice of peaceful blockade has changed regarding ships from third countries. Before 1850, ships from these countries were expected to respect a peaceful blockade, and any of their ships that attempted to break it were seized but returned once the blockade ended, without any compensation. In 1850, when Great Britain, and again in 1886 when Great Britain, Austria, Germany, Italy, and Russia blockaded the Greek ports, those ports were only closed to Greek ships, allowing others to pass through. The same situation occurred during the blockade of Crete in 1897. Conversely, in 1894, France blockaded the island of Formosa during a conflict with China and tried to enforce the blockade against ships from third countries. However, Great Britain stated that a peaceful blockade could not be enforced against these ships, which led France to abandon its plan for a peaceful blockade and consider itself at war with China. Similarly, when Great Britain, Germany, and Italy implemented a blockade against Venezuela in 1902, they declared it a war blockade because they intended to enforce it against vessels from third countries.

[52] That this blockade was essentially a pacific blockade I have already stated above, p. 50, note 1.

[52] I've already mentioned above that this blockade was essentially a peaceful blockade, p. 50, note 1.

Pacific Blockade and vessels of the blockaded State.

Pacific Blockade and vessels of the blockaded State.

§ 47. Theory and practice seem nowadays to agree upon the rule that the ships of a pacifically blockaded State trying to break the blockade may be seized and sequestrated. But they may not be condemned and confiscated, as they have to be restored at the termination of the blockade. Thus, although the Powers which had instituted a blockade against Venezuela in 1902 declared it a war blockade, all Venezuelan public and private ships seized were restored after the blockade was raised.

§ 47. Theory and practice seem to currently align on the rule that ships from a peacefully blockaded State attempting to break the blockade can be seized and detained. However, they cannot be condemned and confiscated, as they must be returned at the end of the blockade. Therefore, although the Powers that set up a blockade against Venezuela in 1902 labeled it a war blockade, all Venezuelan public and private ships that were seized were returned after the blockade was lifted.

Manner of Pacific Blockade.

Pacific Blockade Method.

§ 48. Pacific blockade is a measure of such enormous consequences that it can be justified only after the failure of preceding negotiations for the purpose of settling the questions in dispute. And further, as blockade, being a violation of the territorial supremacy of the blockaded State, is prima facie of a hostile character, it is necessary for such State as intends in time of peace to blockade another State to notify its intention to the latter and to fix the day and hour for the establishment of the blockade. And, thirdly, although the Declaration of Paris of 1856 enacting that a blockade to be binding must be effective concerns blockades in time of war only, there can be no doubt that pacific blockades ought to be likewise[Pg 53] effective. The declaration of the Institute of International Law in favour of pacific blockade contains, therefore, the condition: "Le blocus pacifique doit être déclaré et notifié officiellement, et maintenu par une force suffisante."

§ 48. A peaceful blockade is a measure with such significant consequences that it can only be justified after previous negotiations to settle the disputed issues have failed. Additionally, since a blockade violates the territorial authority of the blockaded State and is inherently hostile, any State intending to impose a blockade during peacetime must inform the other State of its intention and set a specific date and time for the blockade to take effect. Finally, while the Declaration of Paris of 1856 states that a blockade must be effective to be binding, this applies only to wartime blockades. However, it is clear that peaceful blockades should also be effective. Thus, the declaration from the Institute of International Law supporting peaceful blockade includes the condition: "Le blocus pacifique doit être déclaré et notifié officiellement, et maintenu par une force suffisante."

Value of Pacific Blockade.

Value of Pacific Blockade.

§ 49. As the establishment of a pacific blockade has in various instances not prevented the outbreak of hostilities, the value of a pacific blockade as a means of non-hostile settlement of international differences is doubted and considered uncertain by many writers. But others agree, and I think they are right, that the institution of pacific blockade is of great value, be it as an act of reprisal or of intervention. Every measure which is suitable and calculated to prevent the outbreak of war must be welcomed, and experience shows that pacific blockade is, although not universally successful, a measure of this kind. That it can give, and has in the past given, occasion for abuse in case of a difference between a strong and a weak Power is no argument against it, as the same is valid with regard to reprisals and intervention in general, and even to war. And although it is naturally a measure which will scarcely be made use of in case of a difference between two powerful naval States, it might nevertheless find application with success against a powerful naval State if exercised by the united navies of several Powers.[53]

§ 49. Since establishing a peaceful blockade hasn’t always stopped conflicts from breaking out, many writers question its effectiveness as a way to resolve international disputes without hostility. However, others, including myself, believe that peaceful blockades are quite valuable, whether used as a form of reprisal or intervention. Any action that is appropriate and aimed at preventing war should be welcomed, and experience shows that while peaceful blockades aren't always successful, they can serve that purpose. The fact that they might lead to abuse when there’s a disagreement between a powerful and a weaker nation doesn’t discredit them, as the same concern applies to reprisals, interventions, and even war. Although it's likely that peaceful blockades won’t be employed when powerful naval states are involved, they could still be effectively used against a strong naval state if executed by a coalition of several powers.[53]

[53] The following is the full text of the declaration of the Institute of International Law referred to above, § 45:

[53] Here is the complete text of the declaration from the Institute of International Law mentioned earlier, § 45:

"L'établissement d'un blocus en dehors de l'état de guerre ne doit être considéré comme permis par le droit de gens que sous les conditions suivantes:

"Laying a blockade outside of a state of war should only be considered permissible under international law under the following conditions:"

"1. Les navires de pavillon étranger peuvent entrer librement malgré le blocus.

"1. Foreign-flagged ships can enter freely despite the blockade."

"2. Le blocus pacifique doit être déclaré et notifié officiellement et maintenu par une force suffisante.

"2. The peaceful blockade must be officially declared and notified, and maintained by sufficient force."

"3. Les navires de la puissance bloquée qui ne respectent pas un pareil blocus, peuvent être séquestrés. Le blocus ayant cessé, ils doivent être restitués avec leurs cargaisons à leurs propriétaires, mais sans dédommagement à aucun titre."

"3. Ships from the blockaded power that do not comply with such a blockade may be seized. Once the blockade has ended, they must be returned along with their cargo to their owners, but without any compensation whatsoever."

V INTERVENTION

Intervention in contradistinction to Participation in a difference.

Intervention in contrast to Participation in a difference.

§ 50. Intervention as a means of settling international differences is only a special kind of intervention in general, which has already been discussed.[54] It consists in the dictatorial interference of a third State in a difference between two States for the purpose of settling the difference in the way demanded by the intervening State. This dictatorial interference takes place for the purpose of exercising a compulsion upon one or both of the parties in conflict, and must be distinguished from such attitude of a State as makes it a party to the very conflict. If two States are in conflict and a third State joins one of them out of friendship or from any other motive, such third State does not exercise an intervention as a means of settling international differences, but becomes a party to the conflict. If, for instance, an alliance exists between one of two States in conflict and a third, and if eventually, as war has broken out in consequence of the conflict, such third State comes to the help of its ally, no intervention in the technical sense of the term takes place. A State intervening in a dispute between two other States does not become a party to their dispute, but is the author of a new imbroglio, because such third State dictatorially requests those other States to settle their difference in a way to which both, or at any rate one of them, objects. An intervention, for instance, takes place when, although two States in conflict have made up their minds to fight it out in war, a third State dictatorially requests them to settle their dispute through arbitration.

§ 50. Intervention as a way of resolving international disputes is just a specific type of intervention in general, which has already been covered.[54] It involves the authoritative interference of a third State in a disagreement between two States, intended to resolve the issue in a manner dictated by the intervening State. This authoritative interference aims to compel one or both parties in the conflict and should be distinguished from a State's position that makes it a participant in the conflict itself. If two States are at odds, and a third State sides with one of them out of friendship or another reason, that third State is not intervening to resolve international disputes; rather, it becomes a participant in the conflict. For example, if there is an alliance between one of the two conflicting States and a third State, and war breaks out due to the dispute, when the third State comes to support its ally, that does not constitute intervention in the strict sense of the word. A State intervening in a dispute between two other States does not join their dispute but creates a new complication because that third State demands that the other States resolve their differences in a way that both, or at least one, opposes. An intervention occurs, for instance, when, despite two conflicting States being prepared to settle their issues through war, a third State insists that they resolve their dispute through arbitration.

Intervention, in the form of dictatorial interference, must, further, be distinguished from such efforts of a State as are directed to induce the States in conflict to settle their difference amicably by proffering its good offices or mediation, or by giving friendly advice. It is, therefore, incorrect when some jurists[55] speak of good offices and the like as an "amicable" in contradistinction to a "hostile" intervention.

Intervention, in the form of dictatorial interference, should also be distinguished from a State's efforts to encourage conflicting States to resolve their differences peacefully by offering its assistance or mediation, or by providing friendly advice. Therefore, it is incorrect when some legal experts[55] refer to good offices and similar actions as "amicable" in contrast to "hostile" intervention.

Mode of Intervention.

Intervention Method.

§ 51. Intervention in a difference between two States is exercised through a communication of the intervening State to one or both of the conflicting States with a dictatorial request for the settlement of the conflict in a certain way, for instance by arbitration or by the acceptance of certain terms. An intervention can take place either on the part of one State alone or of several States collectively. If the parties comply with the request of the intervening State or States, the intervention is terminated. If, however, one or both of the parties fail to comply with the request, the intervening State will either withdraw its intervention or proceed to the performance of acts more stringent than a mere request, such as pacific blockade, military occupation, and the like. Even war can be declared for the purpose of an intervention. Of special importance are the collective interventions exercised by several great Powers in the interest of the balance of power and of humanity.[56]

§ 51. Intervention in a disagreement between two States occurs when the intervening State communicates with one or both of the conflicting States, demanding that the conflict be settled in a specific manner, such as through arbitration or by accepting certain conditions. Intervention can happen either by one State acting alone or by several States acting together. If the involved parties agree to the request from the intervening State or States, the intervention ends. However, if one or both parties refuse to comply, the intervening State may withdraw its intervention or take more forceful actions than just making a request, like implementing a peaceful blockade, military occupation, and similar measures. War can even be declared for the sake of intervention. Collective interventions by multiple great Powers are particularly significant for maintaining the balance of power and addressing humanitarian issues.[56]

Time of Intervention.

Intervention Time.

§ 52. An intervention in a difference between two States can take place at any time from the moment a conflict arises till the moment it is settled, and even immediately after the settlement. In many cases interventions have taken place before the outbreak of war between two States for the purpose of preventing war; in other cases third States have intervened[Pg 56] during a war which had broken out in consequence of a conflict. Interventions have, further, taken place immediately after the peaceable settlement of a difference, or after the termination of war by a treaty of peace or by conquest, on the grounds that the conditions of the settlement or the treaty of peace were against the interests of the intervening State, or because the latter would not consent to the annexation of the conquered State by the victor.[57]

§ 52. An intervention in a disagreement between two States can happen anytime from when a conflict starts until it's resolved, and even right after it's settled. In many cases, interventions have occurred before a war broke out between two States to try to prevent it; in other instances, third States have intervened during a war that erupted due to a conflict. Additionally, interventions have happened right after a peaceful resolution of a disagreement or after a war ended through a peace treaty or conquest, based on the reason that the terms of the settlement or treaty were unfavorable to the intervening State, or because that State would not agree to the victor's annexation of the conquered territory.[Pg 56][57]

Part II CONFLICT

CHAPTER 1 ON WAR OVERALL

I WAR CHARACTERISTICS

Grotius, I. c. 1, § 2—Vattel, III. §§ 1-4, 69-72—Hall, §§ 15-18—Westlake, II. pp. 1-6—Lawrence, § 135—Lorimer, II. pp. 18-28—Manning, pp. 131-133—Phillimore, III. § 49—Twiss, II. §§ 22-29—Taylor, §§ 449-451—Wheaton, § 295—Bluntschli, §§ 510-514—Heffter, §§ 113-114—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 175-198—Klüber, §§ 235-237—G. F. Martens, II. § 263—Ullmann, § 165—Bonfils, Nos. 1000-1001—Despagnet, Nos. 499-505—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2650-2660—Rivier, II. § 61—Nys, III. pp. 95-117—Calvo, IV. §§ 1860-1864—Fiore, III. Nos. 1232-1268—Martens, II. § 106—Westlake, Chapters, pp. 258-264—Heilborn, System, pp. 321-332—Rettich, Zur Theorie und Geschichte des Rechts zum Kriege (1888), pp. 3-140—Wiesse, Le Droit international appliqué aux guerres civiles (1898)—Rougier, Les guerres civiles et le droit des gens (1903)—Higgins, War and the Private Citizen (1912), pp. 3-72.

Grotius, I. c. 1, § 2—Vattel, III. §§ 1-4, 69-72—Hall, §§ 15-18—Westlake, II. pp. 1-6—Lawrence, § 135—Lorimer, II. pp. 18-28—Manning, pp. 131-133—Phillimore, III. § 49—Twiss, II. §§ 22-29—Taylor, §§ 449-451—Wheaton, § 295—Bluntschli, §§ 510-514—Heffter, §§ 113-114—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 175-198—Klüber, §§ 235-237—G. F. Martens, II. § 263—Ullmann, § 165—Bonfils, Nos. 1000-1001—Despagnet, Nos. 499-505—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2650-2660—Rivier, II. § 61—Nys, III. pp. 95-117—Calvo, IV. §§ 1860-1864—Fiore, III. Nos. 1232-1268—Martens, II. § 106—Westlake, Chapters, pp. 258-264—Heilborn, System, pp. 321-332—Rettich, Zur Theorie und Geschichte des Rechts zum Kriege (1888), pp. 3-140—Wiesse, Le Droit international appliqué aux guerres civiles (1898)—Rougier, Les guerres civiles et le droit des gens (1903)—Higgins, War and the Private Citizen (1912), pp. 3-72.

War no illegality.

War is illegal.

§ 53. As within the boundaries of the modern State an armed contention between two or more citizens is illegal, public opinion has become convinced that armed contests between citizens are inconsistent with Municipal Law. Influenced by this fact, impatient pacifists, as well as those innumerable individuals who cannot grasp the idea of a law between Sovereign States, frequently consider war and law inconsistent. They quote the fact that wars are frequently waged by States as a proof against the very existence of an International Law. It is not difficult to show the absurdity of this opinion. As States are Sovereign, and as consequently no central authority can exist above them able to enforce compliance with its demands, war cannot, under the existing conditions and[Pg 60] circumstances of the Family of Nations, always be avoided. International Law recognises this fact, but at the same time provides regulations with which belligerents have to comply. Although with the outbreak of war peaceable relations between the belligerents cease, there remain certain mutual legal obligations and duties. Thus war is not inconsistent with, but a condition regulated by, International Law. The latter at present cannot and does not object to States which are in conflict waging war upon each other instead of peaceably settling their difference. But if they choose to go to war they have to comply with the rules laid down by International Law regarding the conduct of war and the relations between belligerents and neutral States. That International Law, if it could forbid war altogether, would be a more perfect law than it is at present there is no doubt. Yet eternal peace is an impossibility in the conditions and circumstances under which mankind at present live and will have to live for a long time to come, although eternal peace is certainly an ideal of civilisation which will slowly and gradually be realised.

§ 53. In today's modern State, armed conflicts between citizens are illegal, and public opinion generally holds that these armed struggles go against Municipal Law. Because of this, impatient pacifists and many others who struggle to understand the concept of laws among Sovereign States often view war and law as incompatible. They point out that wars are often initiated by States as evidence against the existence of International Law. It’s not hard to illustrate the foolishness of this view. Since States are Sovereign, no central authority exists above them to enforce compliance with its demands, making it impossible to always avoid war under the current conditions and circumstances of the Family of Nations. International Law recognizes this reality while also setting out rules that belligerents must follow. Even if peaceful relations between hostile parties end at the start of war, certain legal obligations and responsibilities still exist. Therefore, war is not at odds with International Law but is a situation governed by it. Currently, International Law does not prevent conflicting States from engaging in war rather than resolving their disputes peacefully. However, if they decide to go to war, they must adhere to the rules established by International Law concerning the conduct of warfare and the relationships between belligerents and neutral States. There is no doubt that if International Law could completely prohibit war, it would be a more perfect system than it is now. Nonetheless, lasting peace is impossible given the current conditions in which humanity lives and will likely continue to live for quite some time, although the ideal of eternal peace is certainly a goal of civilization that will be gradually achieved.

Conception of War.

War Concept.

§ 54. War is the contention between two or more States through their armed forces for the purpose of overpowering each other and imposing such conditions of peace as the victor pleases. War is a fact recognised, and with regard to many points regulated, but not established, by International Law. Those writers[58] who define war as the legal remedy of self-help to obtain satisfaction for a wrong sustained from another State, forget that wars have often been waged by both parties engaged for political reasons only; they confound a possible but not at all necessary cause of war with the conception of war. A State may be[Pg 61] driven into war because it cannot otherwise get reparation for an international delinquency, and such State may then maintain that it exercises by war nothing else than legally recognised self-help. But when States are driven into or deliberately wage war for political reasons, no legally recognised act of self-help is in such case performed by the war. And the same laws of war are valid, whether wars are waged on account of legal or of political differences.

§ 54. War is the conflict between two or more countries using their military forces to overpower one another and impose peace terms as the victor desires. War is a reality that is recognized and regulated by International Law in many aspects, but it is not defined by it. Those writers[58] who define war as a legal way to seek self-help for a wrong done by another country overlook that wars are often fought for political reasons by both sides; they mistake a potential cause of war for the idea of war itself. A country may enter war because it has no other way to get compensation for an international wrongdoing, and it may argue that it is simply exercising legally recognized self-help. However, when countries are forced into war or choose to fight for political reasons, this action doesn't constitute a legally recognized act of self-help. The laws of war apply equally, regardless of whether conflicts arise from legal or political disputes.

[58] See, for instance, Vattel, III. § 1; Phillimore, III. § 49; Twiss, II. § 26; Bluntschli, § 510; Bulmerincq, § 92.

[58] See, for example, Vattel, III. § 1; Phillimore, III. § 49; Twiss, II. § 26; Bluntschli, § 510; Bulmerincq, § 92.

War a contention.

War is a conflict.

§ 55. In any case, it is universally recognised that war is a contention, which means, a violent struggle through the application of armed force. For a war to be in existence, two or more States must actually have their armed forces fighting against each other, although the commencement of a war may date back to its declaration or some other unilateral initiative act. Unilateral acts of force performed by one State against another without a previous declaration of war may be a cause of the outbreak of war, but are not war in themselves, as long as they are not answered by similar hostile acts by the other side, or at least by a declaration of the other side that it considers the particular acts as acts of war. Thus it comes about that acts of force performed by one State against another by way of reprisal or during a pacific blockade in the case of an intervention are not necessarily initiative acts of war. And even acts of force illegally performed by one State against another, such, for instance, as occupation of a part of its territory, are not acts of war so long as they are not met with acts of force from the other side, or at least with a declaration from the latter that it considers the particular acts as acts of war. Thus, when Louis XIV. of France, after the Peace of Nimeguen, instituted the so-called Chambers of Reunion and in 1680 and 1681 seized the territory of the then Free Town of Strassburg and other parts of the German[Pg 62] Empire without the latter's offering armed resistance, these acts of force, although doubtless illegal, were not acts of war.

§ 55. In any case, it is widely accepted that war is a contention, which means, a violent struggle through the use of armed force. For a war to exist, two or more States must actually have their armed forces fighting against each other, although the start of a war can be traced back to its declaration or some other unilateral initiative. Unilateral acts of force carried out by one State against another without a prior declaration of war may lead to the outbreak of war, but they do not constitute war by themselves, as long as they are not met with similar hostile actions by the other side, or at least by a declaration from the other side that it views the specific actions as acts of war. Therefore, acts of force carried out by one State against another in retaliation or during a peaceful blockade in the event of an intervention are not necessarily acts of war. Even illegal acts of force by one State against another, such as the occupation of some of its territory, are not considered acts of war as long as there are no counteractions from the other side, or at least no declaration from that side stating that it considers the particular actions as acts of war. For example, when Louis XIV of France, after the Peace of Nimeguen, set up the so-called Chambers of Reunion and in 1680 and 1681 took control of the territory of the then Free City of Strassburg and other parts of the German[Pg 62] Empire without any armed resistance from that Empire, these actions, while certainly illegal, were not acts of war.

War a contention between States.

War is a conflict between states.

§ 56. To be considered war, the contention must be going on between States. In the Middle Ages wars were known between private individuals, so-called private wars, and wars between corporations, as the Hansa for instance, and between States. But such wars have totally disappeared in modern times. It may, of course, happen that a contention arises between the armed forces of a State and a body of armed individuals, but such contention[59] is not war. Thus the contention between the Raiders under Dr. Jameson and the former South African Republic in January 1896 was not war. Nor is a contention with insurgents or with pirates a war. And a so-called civil war[60] need not be from the beginning nor become at all a war in the technical sense of the term according to International Law. On the other hand, to an armed contention between a suzerain and its vassal[61] State the character of war ought not to be denied, for both parties are States, although the fact that the vassal makes war against the suzerain may, from the standpoint of Constitutional Law, be considered rebellion. And likewise an armed contention between a full Sovereign State and a State under the suzerainty of another State, as, for instance, the contention between Servia and Bulgaria[62] in 1885, is war. Again, an armed contention between one or more member-States of a Federal State and the latter ought to be considered as war in the technical sense of the term, according to International Law, although, according to the constitution of Federal[Pg 63] States, war between the member-States as well as between any member-State and the Federal State itself is illegal, and recourse to arms by a member-State may therefore correctly, from the standpoint of the constitution, be called rebellion. Thus the War of Secession within the United States between the Northern and the Southern member-States in 1861-1865 was real war.

§ 56. For it to be considered war, the conflict must be happening between States. In the Middle Ages, there were wars between private individuals, known as private wars, and between corporations, like the Hansa, as well as between States. However, such wars have completely disappeared in modern times. It is possible for a conflict to arise between the armed forces of a State and a group of armed individuals, but such a conflict[59] is not regarded as war. For example, the clash between the Raiders led by Dr. Jameson and the former South African Republic in January 1896 was not war. Similarly, a conflict with insurgents or pirates is not considered a war. Also, a so-called civil war[60] doesn’t necessarily have to start out as or become a war in the technical sense of the term according to International Law. On the other hand, an armed conflict between a suzerain and its vassal[61] State should not be denied the character of war, since both parties are States, although the fact that the vassal is waging war against the suzerain may, from a Constitutional Law perspective, be seen as rebellion. Likewise, an armed conflict between a fully Sovereign State and a State under the suzerainty of another State, such as the conflict between Servia and Bulgaria[62] in 1885, is considered war. Furthermore, an armed conflict between one or more member-States of a Federal State and the Federal State itself should be viewed as war in the technical sense according to International Law, even though the constitution of Federal States deems war between member-States or between a member-State and the Federal State illegal, making the use of force by a member-State properly described as rebellion from the constitutional standpoint. Thus, the War of Secession within the United States between the Northern and Southern member-States from 1861 to 1865 was indeed a real war.

[59] Some publicists maintain, however, that a contention between a State and the armed forces of a party fighting for public rights must be considered as war. See, for instance, Bluntschli, § 113, and Fiore, III. § 1265.

[59] Some publicists argue that a conflict between a State and the military forces of a group fighting for public rights should be regarded as war. See, for example, Bluntschli, § 113, and Fiore, III. § 1265.

[60] See below, § 59.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[61] See below, § 75.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[62] Bulgaria was at that time still a vassal State under Turkish suzerainty.

[62] At that time, Bulgaria was still a vassal state under Turkish control.

War a contention between States through armed forces.

War is a conflict between states fought using military force.

§ 57. It must be emphasised that war nowadays is a contention of States through their armed forces. Those private subjects of the belligerents who do not directly or indirectly belong to the armed forces do not take part in the armed contention: they do not attack and defend, and no attack is therefore made upon them. This fact is the result of an evolution of practices totally different from those in vogue in former times. During antiquity and the greater part of the Middle Ages war was a contention between the whole of the populations of the belligerent States. In time of war every subject of one belligerent, whether an armed and fighting individual or not, whether man or woman, adult or infant, could be killed or enslaved by the other belligerent at will. But gradually a milder and more discriminative practice grew up, and nowadays the life and liberty of such private subjects of belligerents as do not directly or indirectly belong to their armed forces are safe, as is also, with certain exceptions, their private property.

§ 57. It’s important to highlight that war today is a conflict between States through their armed forces. Individuals from the opposing sides who are not part of the armed forces, directly or indirectly, do not participate in the conflict: they do not attack or defend, and therefore, no aggression is directed at them. This situation has evolved significantly from past practices. In ancient times and much of the Middle Ages, war involved entire populations of the warring States. During wartime, any individual from one side, regardless of whether they were armed or not, whether male or female, adult or child, could be killed or enslaved by the opposing side at will. However, over time, a more humane and selective approach developed, and now the life and freedom of individuals who do not belong to the armed forces are generally protected, along with, with some exceptions, their personal property.

This is a generally admitted fact. But opinions disagree as to the general position of such private subjects in time of war. The majority of the European continental writers for the last three generations have propagated the doctrine that no relation of enmity exists between belligerents and such private subjects, or between the private subjects of the respective belligerents. This doctrine goes back to Rousseau, Contrat Social, I. c. 4. In 1801, on the occasion of the opening[Pg 64] of the French Prize Court, the famous lawyer and statesman Portalis adopted Rousseau's[63] doctrine by declaring that war is a relation between States and not between individuals, and that consequently the subjects of the belligerents are only enemies as soldiers, not as citizens. And although this new doctrine did not, as Hall (§ 18) shows, spread at once, it has since the second half of the nineteenth century been proclaimed on the European continent by the majority of writers. British and American-English writers, however, have never adopted this doctrine, but have always maintained that the relation of enmity between the belligerents extends also to their private citizens.

This is a generally accepted fact. However, opinions differ on the status of private individuals during wartime. For the past three generations, most European writers have advocated the idea that there is no hostility between warring parties and their private individuals or between the private individuals of the opposing sides. This idea traces back to Rousseau, Contrat Social, I. c. 4. In 1801, during the opening of the French Prize Court, the renowned lawyer and statesman Portalis supported Rousseau's doctrine by stating that war is a relationship between states, not individuals, meaning that the citizens of the warring parties are only enemies as soldiers, not as civilians. Although this new idea did not spread immediately, as Hall (§ 18) indicates, it has been championed by the majority of writers on the European continent since the latter half of the nineteenth century. In contrast, British and American writers have never embraced this idea and have consistently argued that the hostility between warring factions also applies to their private citizens.

[63] See Lassudrie-Duchêne, Jean Jacques Rousseau et le droit des gens (1906).

[63] See Lassudrie-Duchêne, Jean Jacques Rousseau and International Law (1906).

I think, if the facts of war are taken into consideration without prejudice, there ought to be no doubt that the British and American view is correct.[64] It is impossible to sever the citizens from their State, and the outbreak of war between two States cannot but make their citizens enemies. But the point is unworthy of dispute, because it is only one of terms without any material consequences.[65] For, apart from the terminology, the parties agree in substance upon the rules of the Law of Nations regarding such private subjects as do not directly or indirectly belong to the armed forces.[66] Nobody doubts that such private individuals are safe as regards their life and liberty, provided they behave peacefully and loyally; and that, with certain exceptions, their private property must not be touched. On the other hand, nobody doubts that, according to a generally recognised custom of modern warfare, the belligerent who has occupied a[Pg 65] part or the whole of his opponent's territory, and who treats such private individuals leniently according to the rules of International Law, may punish them for any hostile act, since they do not enjoy the privileges of members of armed forces. Although, on the one hand, International Law by no means forbids, and, as a law between States, is not competent to forbid, private individuals to take up arms against an enemy, it gives, on the other hand, the right to the enemy to treat hostilities committed by private[67] individuals as acts of illegitimate warfare. A belligerent is under a duty to respect the life and liberty of private enemy individuals, but he can carry out this duty under the condition only that these private individuals abstain from hostilities against himself. Through military occupation in war such private individuals fall under the authority[68] of the occupant, and he may therefore demand that they comply with his orders regarding the safety of his forces. The position of private enemy individuals is made known to them through the proclamations which the commander-in-chief of an army occupying the territory usually publishes. Thus General Sir Redvers Buller, when entering the territory of the South African Republic in 1900, published the following proclamation:

I believe that if we look at the facts of war fairly, there’s no question that the British and American perspective is right.[64] You can’t separate citizens from their State, and when two States go to war, their citizens become enemies. However, this point isn’t worth arguing about, since it’s just a matter of terminology without any real consequences.[65] In fact, aside from the language used, both sides agree on the rules of International Law regarding private individuals who aren’t directly or indirectly part of the armed forces.[66] There’s no doubt that such private individuals are safe regarding their life and freedom as long as they act peacefully and loyally; and, with a few exceptions, their private property shouldn’t be touched. On the flip side, it’s also widely accepted that in modern warfare, the belligerent who occupies part or all of their opponent’s territory and treats private individuals according to the rules of International Law can punish them for any hostile actions, since they don’t have the same privileges as armed forces members. Although International Law doesn’t forbid private individuals from taking up arms against an enemy, it does grant the enemy the right to treat hostile actions by private individuals as illegitimate warfare.[67] A belligerent must respect the life and liberty of private enemy individuals, but this duty only applies if those individuals refrain from hostilities against them. Through military occupation during war, these private individuals come under the authority[68] of the occupier, who can demand that they comply with orders for the safety of their forces. The situation of private enemy individuals is communicated to them through proclamations normally issued by the commander-in-chief of an army occupying the territory. For example, when General Sir Redvers Buller entered the South African Republic in 1900, he published the following proclamation:

"The troops of Queen Victoria are now passing through the Transvaal. Her Majesty does not make war on individuals, but is, on the contrary, anxious to spare them as far as may be possible the horrors of war. The quarrel England has is with the Government, not with the people, of the Transvaal. Provided they remain neutral, no attempt will be made[Pg 66] to interfere with persons living near the line of march; every possible protection will be given them, and any of their property that it may be necessary to take will be paid for. But, on the other hand, those who are thus allowed to remain near the line of march must respect and maintain their neutrality, and the residents of any locality will be held responsible, both in their persons and property, if any damage is done to railway or telegraph, or any violence done to any member of the British forces in the vicinity of their home."

"The troops of Queen Victoria are now moving through the Transvaal. Her Majesty doesn't wage war on individuals; instead, she is eager to protect them from the horrors of conflict as much as possible. England's issue is with the Government, not the people, of the Transvaal. As long as they stay neutral, there will be no interference with those living along the route; every effort will be made to ensure their safety, and any property that needs to be taken will be compensated for. However, those who are allowed to stay near the route must respect and uphold their neutrality. Residents in any area will be held accountable, both personally and for their property, if any damage occurs to the railway or telegraph, or if any harm comes to a member of the British forces nearby."

[64] See Boidin, pp. 32-44.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Boidin, pp. 32-44.

[65] But many continental writers constantly make use of Rousseau's dictum in order to defend untenable positions. See Oppenheim, Die Zukunft des Völkerrechts (1911), pp. 59-61.

[65] But many continental authors frequently reference Rousseau's dictum to justify weak arguments. See Oppenheim, Die Zukunft des Völkerrechts (1911), pp. 59-61.

[66] See Breton, Les non-belligérants: Leurs devoirs, leurs droits, et la question des otages (1904).

[66] See Breton, The Non-Belligerents: Their Duties, Their Rights, and the Issue of Hostages (1904).

[67] See below, § 254.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[68] The first edition of this work was wrong in stating that through military occupation private enemy individuals fall under the territorial supremacy of the occupant. Since military occupation by no means vests sovereignty in the occupant, but only actual authority, this authority may not be called territorial supremacy.

[68] The first edition of this work was incorrect in saying that through military occupation, private enemy individuals come under the territorial supremacy of the occupier. Since military occupation does not grant sovereignty to the occupier, but merely actual authority, this authority cannot be referred to as territorial supremacy.

It must be emphasised that this position of private individuals of the hostile States renders it inevitable that commanders of armies which have occupied hostile territory should consider and mark as criminals all such private individuals of the enemy as commit hostile acts, although such individuals may act from patriotic motives and may be highly praised for their acts by their compatriots. The high-sounding and well-meant words of Baron Lambermont, one of the Belgian delegates at the Conference of Brussels of 1874—"Il y a des choses qui se font à la guerre, qui se feront toujours, et que l'on doit bien accepter. Mais il s'agit ici de les convertir en lois, en prescriptions positives et internationales. Si les citoyens doivent être conduits au supplice pour avoir tenté de défendre leur pays au péril de leur vie, il ne faut pas qu'ils trouvent inscrits sur le poteau au pied duquel ils seront fusilés l'article d'un traité signé par leur propre gouvernement qui d'avance les condamnait à mort"—have no raison d'être in face of the fact that according to a generally recognised customary rule of International Law hostile acts on the part of private individuals are not acts of legitimate warfare, and the offenders may be treated and punished as war-criminals. Even those writers[69] who object to the term "criminals" do not[Pg 67] deny that such hostile acts by private individuals, in contradistinction to hostile acts by members of the armed forces, may be severely punished. The controversy whether or not such acts may be styled "crimes" is again only one of terminology; materially the rule is not at all controverted.[70]

It should be emphasized that the status of private individuals from enemy states makes it unavoidable for military commanders occupying hostile territory to view and label any such enemy individuals who engage in hostile actions as criminals, even if these individuals act out of patriotic motives and are celebrated by their fellow countrymen for what they do. The grand and well-intentioned words of Baron Lambermont, one of the Belgian delegates at the Brussels Conference of 1874—"There are things that happen in war, that will always happen, and that we must accept. But the issue here is to turn them into laws, into positive and international rules. If citizens are to be led to execution for trying to defend their country at the risk of their lives, they should not find inscribed on the stake at which they will be shot the article of a treaty signed by their own government that condemns them to death in advance"—have no reason to exist in light of the fact that, according to a widely recognized customary rule of International Law, hostile actions by private individuals are not recognized as legitimate acts of warfare, and these offenders can be treated and punished as war criminals. Even those writers[69] who oppose the term "criminals" do not[Pg 67] deny that such hostile acts by private individuals, as opposed to acts by members of the armed forces, can be punished severely. The debate over whether these acts can be termed "crimes" is merely a question of terminology; materially, the rule is not challenged at all.[70]

[69] See, for instance, Hall, § 18, p. 74, and Westlake, Chapters, p. 262.

[69] Check out Hall, § 18, p. 74, and Westlake, Chapters, p. 262.

[70] It is of value to quote articles 20-26 of the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, which the War Department of the United States published in 1863 during the War of Secession with the Southern member-States:

[70] It is important to reference articles 20-26 of the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, which the U.S. War Department published in 1863 during the Civil War with the Southern states:

(20) "Public war is a state of armed hostility between sovereign nations or governments. It is a law and requisite of civil existence that men live in political, continuous societies, forming organised units, called States or nations, whose constituents bear, enjoy, and suffer, advance and retrograde together, in peace and in war."

(20) "Public war is a situation of armed conflict between sovereign nations or governments. It is a law and a necessity of civil life that people exist in political, ongoing societies, creating organized units called States or nations, whose members share in the burdens, benefits, and challenges, both in peace and in war."

(21) "The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy as one of the constituents of the hostile State or nation, and as such is subjected to the hardships of war."

(21) "The citizen or native of a hostile country is considered an enemy because they are part of the hostile state or nation, and as a result, they face the difficulties of war."

(22) "Nevertheless, as civilisation has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honour as much as the exigencies of war will admit."

(22) "However, as civilization has progressed over the last few centuries, the distinction between private individuals from an enemy country and the enemy country itself, along with its armed forces, has also evolved, particularly in land warfare. It has increasingly been recognized that unarmed citizens should be protected in terms of their lives, property, and honor as much as the demands of war allow."

(23) "Private citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, or carried off to distant parts, and the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed in his private relations as the commander of the hostile troops can afford to grant in the overruling demands of a vigorous war."

(23) "Private citizens are no longer killed, enslaved, or taken away to far-off places, and ordinary people are not disturbed in their personal lives any more than the leader of the opposing forces can allow amidst the pressing needs of an active war."

(24) "The almost universal rule in remote times was ... that the private individual of the hostile country is destined to suffer every privation of liberty and protection and every disruption of family ties. Protection was ... the exception."

(24) "The nearly universal rule in ancient times was ... that the ordinary person from an enemy country was bound to experience a complete loss of freedom and safety, as well as a breakdown of family connections. Protection was ... the exception."

(25) "In modern regular wars ... protection of the inoffensive citizens of the hostile country is the rule; privation and disturbance of private relations are the exceptions."

(25) "In today's conventional wars ... protecting innocent civilians in the enemy country is the standard; hardship and disruption of personal relationships are the exceptions."

(26) "Commanding generals may cause the magistrates and civil officers of the hostile country to take the oath of temporary allegiance or an oath of fidelity to their own victorious Government or rulers, and they may expel every one who declines to do so. But, whether they do so or not, the people and their civil officers owe strict obedience to them as long as they hold sway over the district or country, at the peril of their lives."

(26) "Commanding generals can require the officials and civil leaders of the enemy country to swear a temporary loyalty oath or an oath of fidelity to their own victorious government or rulers, and they can remove anyone who refuses to comply. However, whether they enforce this or not, the people and their officials must obey them completely as long as they have control over the area or country, at the risk of their lives."

War a contention between States for the purpose of overpowering each other.

War is a conflict between states aimed at overpowering each other.

§ 58. The last, and not the least important, characteristic of war is its purpose. It is a contention between States for the purpose of overpowering each other. This purpose of war is not to be confounded with the ends[71] of war, for, whatever the ends of war may be, they can only be realised by one belligerent overpowering the other. Such a defeat as compels the vanquished to comply with any demand the victor[Pg 68] may choose to make is the purpose of war. Therefore war calls into existence the display of the greatest possible power and force on the part of the belligerents, rouses the passion of the nations in conflict to the highest possible degree, and endangers the welfare, the honour, and eventually the very existence of both belligerents. Nobody can predict with certainty the result of a war however insignificant one side may seem to be. Every war is a risk and a venture. Every State which goes to war knows beforehand what is at stake, and it would never go to war were it not for its firm, though very often illusory, conviction of its superiority in strength over its opponent. Victory is necessary in order to overpower the enemy; and it is this necessity which justifies all the indescribable horrors of war, the enormous sacrifice of human life and health, and the unavoidable destruction of property and devastation of territory. Apart from special restrictions imposed by the Law of Nations upon belligerents, all kinds and all degrees of force may be, and eventually must be, made use of in war in the interest and under the compulsion of its purpose, and in spite of their cruelty and the utter misery they entail. As war is a struggle for existence between States, no amount of individual suffering and misery can be regarded; the national existence and independence of the struggling State is a higher consideration than any individual well-being.

§ 58. The last, and definitely not the least important, characteristic of war is its purpose. It's a conflict between nations aimed at overpowering each other. This purpose of war should not be confused with the goals[71] of war, because no matter what those goals may be, they can only be achieved if one side defeats the other. Such a defeat forces the loser to comply with any demands the victor decides to make[Pg 68]. Therefore, war demands the maximum display of power and force from both sides, igniting the passions of the nations involved to the highest degree, and jeopardizing the welfare, honor, and even the very existence of both parties. No one can accurately predict the outcome of a war, no matter how weak one side may appear. Every war is a gamble and a risk. Every nation that engages in war is aware of what's at stake and would never go to war unless it firmly, although often mistakenly, believes in its strength over its opponent. Winning is essential to overpower the enemy; and this necessity justifies all the unimaginable horrors of war, the immense loss of human life and health, and the inevitable destruction of property and devastation of land. Aside from specific restrictions set by international law on combatants, all kinds and degrees of force may be used in war, driven by its purpose, regardless of the cruelty and immense suffering they cause. Since war is a fight for survival between nations, no amount of individual pain and suffering can be considered; the national existence and independence of the fighting state take precedence over any individual's well-being.

[71] See below, § 66.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Civil War.

Civil War.

§ 59. The characteristics of war as developed above must help to decide the question whether so-called civil wars are war in the technical meaning of the term. It has already been stated above (in § 56) that an armed contention between member-States of a Federal State and the latter and between a suzerain and its vassal ought to be considered as war because both parties are real States, although the Federal State as well as the[Pg 69] suzerain may correctly designate it as a rebellion. Such armed contentions may be called civil wars in a wider sense of the term. In the proper sense of the term a civil war exists when two opposing parties within a State have recourse to arms for the purpose of obtaining power in the State, or when a large portion of the population of a State rises in arms against the legitimate Government. As war is an armed contention between States, such a civil war need not be from the beginning, nor become at all, war in the technical sense of the term. But it may become war through the recognition of each of the contending parties or of the insurgents as the case may be, as a belligerent Power.[72] Through this recognition a body of individuals receives an international position in so far as it is for some parts and in some points treated as though it were a subject[73] of International Law. Such recognition may be granted by the very State within the boundaries of which the civil war broke out, and then other States will in most cases, although they need not, likewise recognise a state of war as existing and bear the duties of neutrality. But it may happen that other States recognise insurgents as a belligerent Power before the State on whose territory the insurrection broke out so recognises them. In such case the insurrection is war in the eyes of these other States, but not in the eyes of the legitimate Government.[74] Be that as it may, it must be specially observed that, although a civil war becomes war in the technical sense of the term by recognition, this recognition has a lasting effect only when the insurgents succeed in getting their independence established through the defeat of the legitimate Government and a consequent treaty of peace which recognises their independence. Nothing, however, prevents the State concerned,[Pg 70] after the defeat of the insurgents and reconquest of the territory which they had occupied, from treating them as rebels according to the Criminal Law of the land, for the character of a belligerent Power received through recognition is lost ipso facto by their defeat and the re-occupation by the legitimate Government of the territory occupied by them.

§ 59. The characteristics of war mentioned above should help determine whether so-called civil wars qualify as war in the technical sense. It has already been stated above (in § 56) that an armed conflict between member states of a federal state and the federal government, as well as between a suzerain and its vassal, should be viewed as war because both sides are real states, even if the federal state or the suzerain may accurately label it as a rebellion. These armed conflicts can be referred to as civil wars in a broader sense. In the strict sense, a civil war occurs when two opposing groups within a state resort to arms to gain control of the state or when a significant portion of the population rises against the legitimate government. Since war is defined as an armed conflict between states, this civil war does not need to start as, or be recognized as, war in the technical sense. However, it may attain that status when each contending party or the insurgents are recognized as a belligerent power.[72] This recognition grants a group of individuals an international status, as they are treated in some regards as subjects of [73] International Law. Such recognition can be issued by the very state where the civil war erupted, and then other states will typically, though not necessarily, acknowledge that a state of war exists and uphold their duties of neutrality. However, it’s possible for other states to recognize insurgents as a belligerent power before the state where the insurrection began offers that recognition. In this scenario, the insurrection is considered war by those other states, but not by the legitimate government.[74] Regardless, it is essential to note that while a civil war becomes war in the technical sense via recognition, this recognition only has a lasting effect if the insurgents manage to establish their independence by defeating the legitimate government and securing a peace treaty that acknowledges their sovereignty. Nevertheless, nothing stops the state in question, after defeating the insurgents and regaining the territory they occupied, from treating them as criminals under the country's laws, as the status of a belligerent power granted through recognition is automatically lost when they are defeated and the legitimate government reoccupies the territory.

[72] See below, §§ 76 and 298.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

[74] See below, § 298.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Guerilla War.

Guerrilla Warfare.

§ 60. The characteristics of war as developed above are also decisive for the answer to the question whether so-called guerilla war is real war in the technical sense of the term. Such guerilla war must not be confounded with guerilla tactics during a war. It happens during war that the commanders send small bodies of soldiers wearing their uniform to the rear of the enemy for the purpose of destroying bridges and railways, cutting off communications and supplies, attacking convoys, intercepting despatches, and the like. This is in every way legal, and the members of such bodies, when captured, enjoy the treatment due to enemy soldiers. It happens, further, that hitherto private individuals who did not take part in the armed contention take up arms and devote themselves mainly to similar tactics. According to the former rules of International Law such individuals, when captured, under no condition enjoyed the treatment due to enemy soldiers, but could be treated as criminals and punished with death. According to article 1 of the Regulations concerning war on land adopted by the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 such guerilla fighters enjoy the treatment of soldiers under the four conditions that they (1) do not act individually, but form a body commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, (2) have a fixed distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance, (3) carry arms openly, and (4) conduct their operations in accordance with the laws of war.[75]

§ 60. The characteristics of war outlined above are also crucial for answering the question of whether what is known as guerilla warfare is considered real war in the technical sense. Guerilla warfare should not be confused with guerilla tactics used during a war. During a war, commanders may send small groups of soldiers in uniform to the enemy's rear to destroy bridges and railways, disrupt communications and supplies, attack convoys, intercept messages, and similar actions. This practice is entirely legal, and the members of these groups, when captured, are treated as enemy soldiers. Additionally, there are instances where previously unarmed individuals who did not participate in the fighting take up arms and mainly engage in similar tactics. Under earlier International Law rules, such individuals, if captured, were not treated as enemy soldiers and could be treated as criminals, facing severe penalties, including death. However, according to Article 1 of the Regulations concerning land warfare adopted by the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, guerilla fighters are granted the same treatment as soldiers if they meet four conditions: (1) they do not act alone but form a group led by a person accountable for their subordinates, (2) they have a recognizable fixed emblem that can be seen from a distance, (3) they carry weapons openly, and (4) they operate according to the laws of war.[75]

[75] See also article 2 of the Hague Regulations.[Pg 71]

[75] Also check out article 2 of the Hague Regulations.[Pg 71]

On the other hand, one speaks of guerilla war or petty war when, after the defeat and the capture of the main part of the enemy forces, the occupation of the enemy territory, and the downfall of the enemy Government, the routed remnants of the defeated army carry on the contention by mere guerilla tactics. Although hopeless of success in the end, such petty war can go on for a long time thus preventing the establishment of a state of peace in spite of the fact that regular war is over and the task of the army of occupation is no longer regular warfare. Now the question whether such guerilla war is real war in the strict sense of the term in International Law must, I think, be answered in the negative, for two reasons. First, there are no longer the forces of two States in the field, because the defeated belligerent State has ceased to exist through the military occupation of its territory, the downfall of its established Government, the capture of the main part and the routing of the remnant of its forces. And, secondly, there is no longer in progress a contention between armed forces. For although the guerilla bands are still fighting when attacked, or when attacking small bodies of enemy soldiers, they try to avoid a pitched battle, and content themselves with the constant harassing of the victorious army, the destroying of bridges and railways, cutting off communications and supplies, attacking convoys, and the like, always in the hope that some event or events may occur which will induce the victorious army to withdraw from the conquered territory. But if guerilla war is not real war, it is obvious that in strict law the victor need no longer treat the guerilla bands as a belligerent Power and the captured members of those bands as soldiers. It is, however, not advisable that the victor should cease such treatment as long as those bands are under responsible commanders and observe[Pg 72] themselves the laws and usages of war. For I can see no advantage or reason why, although in strict law it could be done, those bands should be treated as criminals. Such treatment would only call for acts of revenge on their part, without in the least accelerating the pacification of the country. And it is, after all, to be taken into consideration that those bands act not out of criminal but patriotic motives. With patience and firmness the victor will succeed in pacifying these bands without recourse to methods of harshness.

On the other hand, we refer to guerilla warfare or petty warfare when, after the defeat and capture of most enemy forces, the occupation of their territory, and the fall of their government, the remaining defeated army continues the fight using guerilla tactics. Even though they have little hope of winning in the end, this petty warfare can persist for a long time, preventing peace from being established even though regular war is over and the occupying army is no longer engaged in traditional combat. Now, I believe we must answer the question of whether such guerilla warfare is considered real war in the strict sense under International Law negatively, for two reasons. First, there are no longer the armed forces of two states actively fighting, as the defeated state has effectively ceased to exist due to military occupation, the fall of its government, and the capture and routing of most of its forces. Second, there is no ongoing conflict between armed forces since, although guerilla groups still fight when attacked or when targeting small enemy units, they tend to avoid direct battles and focus on continually harassing the victorious army by destroying infrastructure, cutting communications and supplies, attacking convoys, and similar tactics, always hoping for events that might lead the winning army to withdraw from the conquered territory. If guerilla warfare is not real war, it follows that, under strict law, the victor no longer needs to treat guerilla groups as a belligerent power or captured members of those groups as soldiers. However, it’s not advisable for the victor to stop such treatment as long as those groups are led by responsible commanders and follow the laws and customs of war. I see no advantage or reason why, even if the law allows it, those groups should be treated as criminals. Such treatment would only provoke acts of revenge on their part and would not speed up the pacification of the area. It is essential to remember that those groups act not out of criminal intent but out of patriotism. With patience and firmness, the victor can pacify these groups without resorting to harsh methods.

II CAUSES, TYPES, AND OUTCOMES OF WAR

Grotius, I. c. 3; II. c. 1; III. c. 3—Pufendorf, VIII. c. 6, § 9—Vattel, III. §§ 2, 5, 24-50, 183-187—Lorimer, II. pp. 29-48—Phillimore, III. §§ 33-48—Twiss, II. §§ 26-30—Halleck, I. pp. 488-519—Taylor, §§ 452-454—Wheaton, §§ 295-296—Bluntschli, §§ 515-521—Heffter, § 113—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 221-236—Klüber, §§ 41, 235, 237—G. F. Martens, §§ 265-266—Ullmann, § 166—Bonfils, Nos. 1002-1005—Despagnet, No. 506—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2661-2670—Rivier, II. p. 219—Nys, III. pp. 106-114—Calvo, IV. §§ 1866-1896—Fichte, Ueber den Begriff des wahrhaften Krieges (1815)—Rettich, Zur Theorie und Geschichte des Rechts zum Kriege (1888), pp. 141-292—Peyronnard, Des causes de la guerre (1901).

Grotius, I. c. 3; II. c. 1; III. c. 3—Pufendorf, VIII. c. 6, § 9—Vattel, III. §§ 2, 5, 24-50, 183-187—Lorimer, II. pp. 29-48—Phillimore, III. §§ 33-48—Twiss, II. §§ 26-30—Halleck, I. pp. 488-519—Taylor, §§ 452-454—Wheaton, §§ 295-296—Bluntschli, §§ 515-521—Heffter, § 113—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 221-236—Klüber, §§ 41, 235, 237—G. F. Martens, §§ 265-266—Ullmann, § 166—Bonfils, Nos. 1002-1005—Despagnet, No. 506—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2661-2670—Rivier, II. p. 219—Nys, III. pp. 106-114—Calvo, IV. §§ 1866-1896—Fichte, Ueber den Begriff des wahrhaften Krieges (1815)—Rettich, Zur Theorie und Geschichte des Rechts zum Kriege (1888), pp. 141-292—Peyronnard, Des causes de la guerre (1901).

Rules of Warfare independent of Causes of War.

Rules of Warfare independent of Causes of War.

§ 61. Whatever may be the cause of a war that has broken out, and whether or no the cause be a so-called just cause, the same rules of International Law are valid as to what must not be done, may be done, and must be done by the belligerents themselves in making war against each other, and as between the belligerents and neutral States. This being the case, the question as to the causes of war is of minor importance for the Law of Nations, although not for international ethics. The matter need not be discussed at all in a treatise on International Law were it[Pg 73] not for the fact that many writers maintain that there are rules of International Law in existence which determine and define just causes of war. It must, however, be emphasised that this is by no means the case. All such rules laid down by writers on International Law as recognise certain causes as just and others as unjust are rules of writers, but not rules of International Law based on international custom or international treaties.

§ 61. No matter what the reason for a war that has started is, and whether or not that reason is considered a just cause, the same International Law rules apply to what cannot be done, what may be done, and what must be done by the warring parties against each other, as well as between the warring parties and neutral states. Because of this, the reasons for war are less significant for the Law of Nations, though they are still important for international ethics. This topic doesn’t really need to be covered in a discussion about International Law, except for the fact that many writers argue there are existing International Law rules that define just causes for war. It should be noted, however, that this is not the case at all. Any rules proposed by scholars that classify certain causes as just and others as unjust are merely the opinions of those writers, not rules of International Law grounded in international customs or treaties.

Causes of War.

Reasons for War.

§ 62. The causes of war are innumerable. They are involved in the fact that the development of mankind is indissolubly connected with the national development of States. The millions of individuals who as a body are called mankind do not face one another individually and severally, but in groups as races, nations, and States. With the welfare of the races, nations, and States to which they belong the welfare of individuals is more or less identified. And it is the development of races, nations, and States that carries with it the causes of war. A constant increase of population must in the end force upon a State the necessity of acquiring more territory, and if such territory cannot be acquired by peaceable means, acquisition by conquest alone remains. At certain periods of history the principle of nationality and the desire for national unity gain such a power over the hearts and minds of the individuals belonging to the same race or nation, but living within the boundaries of several different States, that wars break out for the cause of national unity and independence. And jealous rivalry between two or more States, the awakening of national ambition, the craving for rich colonies, the desire of a land-locked State for a sea coast, the endeavour of a hitherto minor State to become a world-Power, the ambition of dynasties or of great politicians to extend and enlarge their influence beyond the[Pg 74] boundaries of their own State, and innumerable other factors, have been at work ever since history was first recorded in creating causes of war, and these factors likewise play their part in our own times. Although one must hope that the time will come when war will entirely disappear, there is no possibility of seeing this hope realised in the near future. The first necessities of the disappearance of war are that the surface of the earth should be shared between States of the same standard of civilisation, and that the moral ideas of the governing classes in all the States of the world should undergo such an alteration and progressive development as would create the conviction that decisions of international courts of justice and awards of arbitrators are alone adequate means for the settlement of international disputes and international political aims. So long as these first necessities are not realised, war will as heretofore remain the ultima ratio of international politics.

§ 62. The reasons for war are countless. They stem from the fact that human development is closely tied to the national development of States. The millions of people who make up humanity do not interact with each other individually, but in groups as races, nations, and States. The well-being of the races, nations, and States to which they belong is closely linked to the well-being of individuals. It is the progress of races, nations, and States that brings about the causes of war. A consistent rise in population will eventually compel a State to seek more territory, and if that territory can't be obtained peacefully, conquest becomes the only option. At certain moments in history, the idea of nationality and the desire for national unity become so strong among individuals of the same race or nation living in different States that wars erupt for national unity and independence. Furthermore, rivalry between two or more States, the awakening of national ambition, the pursuit of wealthy colonies, a landlocked State's desire for a coastline, a previously minor State's aspiration to become a world power, and the ambitions of dynasties or influential politicians to expand their influence beyond their own State's borders—all these factors have historically contributed to the causes of war and continue to do so today. While we hope for a time when war will completely vanish, that hope is unlikely to be realized in the near future. The initial requirements for the elimination of war are that the Earth's surface should be divided among States with similar levels of civilization and that the moral attitudes of the ruling classes in all countries should undergo a transformation and progressive development to foster the belief that decisions made by international courts and arbitrators are the only suitable methods for resolving international disputes and political objectives. As long as these essential conditions are not met, war will remain, as it has been, the ultima ratio of international politics.

Just Causes of War.

Just War Theory.

§ 63. However this may be, it often depends largely upon the standpoint from which they are viewed whether or no causes of war are to be called just causes. A war may be just or unjust from the standpoint of both belligerents, or just from the standpoint of one and utterly unjust from the standpoint of the other. The assertion that whereas all wars waged for political causes are unjust, all wars waged for international delinquencies are just, if there be no other way of getting reparation and satisfaction, is certainly incorrect because too sweeping. The evils of war are so great that, even when caused by an international delinquency,[76] war cannot be justified if the delinquency be comparatively unimportant and trifling. And, on the other hand, under certain circumstances and conditions many political causes of war may correctly be[Pg 75] called just causes. Only such individuals as lack insight into history and human nature can, for instance, defend the opinion that a war is unjust which has been caused by the desire for national unity or by the desire to maintain the balance of power which under the present conditions and circumstances is the basis of all International Law. Necessity for a war implies its justification, whatever may be the cause. In the past many wars have undoubtedly been waged which were unjust from whatever standpoint they may be viewed. Yet the number of wars diminishes gradually every year, and the majority of the European wars since the downfall of Napoleon I. were wars that were, from the standpoint of at any rate one of the belligerents, necessary and therefore just wars.

§ 63. Regardless of how you look at it, whether or not we consider the reasons for war as just often depends on the perspective taken. A war can be deemed just or unjust by both sides, or it can be just from one side's viewpoint and completely unjust from the other’s. The claim that all wars fought for political reasons are unjust, while all wars fought to address international wrongs are just—if there’s no other way to seek compensation and satisfaction—is clearly too broad and misleading. The harms of war are so severe that even if sparked by an international wrongdoing, war cannot be justified if that wrongdoing is relatively minor and trivial. On the flip side, under certain conditions, many political reasons for war could indeed be considered just causes. Only those who lack understanding of history and human behavior would argue that a war is unjust if it’s motivated by a desire for national unity or to maintain the balance of power, which, under current conditions, is fundamental to all International Law. The necessity for a war suggests its justification, regardless of the reason. Historically, many wars have unquestionably been unjust from any perspective. However, the number of wars is gradually decreasing each year, and most of the European wars since Napoleon I's fall were necessary and therefore just, at least from the viewpoint of one of the belligerents.

Causes in contradistinction to Pretexts for War.

Causes as opposed to excuses for war.

§ 64. Be that as it may, causes of war must not be confounded with pretexts for war. A State which makes war against another will never confess that there is no just cause for war, and it will therefore, when it has made up its mind to make war for political reasons, always look out for a so-called just cause. Thus frequently the apparent reason of a war is only a pretext behind which the real cause is concealed. If two States are convinced that war between them is inevitable, and if consequently they face each other armed to the teeth, they will find at the suitable time many a so-called just cause plausible and calculated to serve as a pretext for the outbreak of the war which was planned and resolved upon long ago. The skill of politics and diplomacy are nowhere more needed than on the occasion of a State's conviction that it must go to war for one reason or another. Public opinion at home and abroad is often not ripe to appreciate the reason and not prepared for the scheme of the leading politicians, whose task it is to realise their plans with the aid of pretexts which appear as the cause of war,[Pg 76] whereas the real cause does not become apparent for some time.

§ 64. Regardless, the reasons for war should not be confused with excuses for war. A country that goes to war against another will never admit that there's no valid reason for it, so when it decides to wage war for political motives, it will always seek a so-called just cause. Often, the apparent reason for a war is merely a cover for the true cause. If two countries believe that conflict between them is unavoidable, and they're consequently armed to the teeth, they’ll find many so-called just causes that seem reasonable and can serve as a pretext for the war they’ve been planning for a long time. The skills of politics and diplomacy are crucial when a country is convinced it must go to war for one reason or another. Public opinion, both at home and abroad, often isn't ready to understand the actual reasons and isn't prepared for the plans of the top politicians, whose job it is to implement their strategies using excuses that look like the cause of war, while the real reasons remain hidden for a while.[Pg 76]

Different kinds of War.

Different types of War.

§ 65. Such writers on International Law as lay great stress upon the causes of war in general and upon the distinction between just causes and others, also lay great stress upon the distinction between different kinds of war. But as the rules of the Law of Nations are the same[77] for the different kinds of war that may be distinguished, this distinction is in most cases of no importance. Apart from that, there is no unanimity respecting the kinds of war, and it is apparent that, just as the causes of war are innumerable, so innumerable kinds of war can be distinguished. Thus one speaks of offensive and defensive, or religious, political, dynastic, national, civil wars; of wars of unity, independence, conquest, intervention, revenge, and of many other kinds. As the very name which each different kind of war bears always explains its character no further details are necessary respecting kinds of war.

§ 65. Writers on International Law who emphasize the reasons for war in general, as well as the difference between just causes and others, also highlight the distinction between various types of war. However, since the rules of International Law apply equally to the different kinds of war that can be identified, this distinction is generally not significant. Furthermore, there is no consensus on the types of war, and it's clear that, just as the reasons for war are countless, so too are the various types of war. For instance, people refer to offensive and defensive wars, or religious, political, dynastic, national, and civil wars; wars of unity, independence, conquest, intervention, revenge, and many others. Since the name of each type of war inherently describes its nature, no further details are needed regarding the types of war.

[77] See above, § 61.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Ends of War.

End of War.

§ 66. The cause or causes of a war determine at its inception the ends of such war. The ends of war must not be confounded with the purpose of war.[78] Whereas the purpose of war is always the same—namely, the overpowering and utter defeat of the opponent—the ends of war may be different in each case. Ends of war are those objects for the realisation of which a war is made.[79] In the beginning of the war its ends are determined by its cause or causes, as already said. But these ends may undergo alteration, or at least modification, with the progress and development of the war. No moral or legal duty exists for a belligerent[Pg 77] to stop the war when his opponent is ready to concede the object for which war was made. If war has once broken out the very national existence of the belligerents is more or less at stake. The risk the belligerents run, the exertion they make, the blood and wealth they sacrifice, the reputation they gain or lose through the changing fortune and chances of war—all these and many other factors work or may work together to influence the ends of a war so that eventually there is scarcely any longer a relation between them and the causes of the war. If war really were, as some writers maintain,[80] the legal remedy of self-help to obtain satisfaction for a wrong sustained from another State, no such alteration of the ends of war could take place without at once setting in the wrong such belligerent as changes the ends for which the war was initiated. But history shows that nothing of the kind is really the case, and the existing rules of International Law by no means forbid such alteration or modification of the ends of a war. This alteration or modification of the ends is the result of an alteration or modification of circumstances created during the progress of war through the factors previously mentioned; it could not be otherwise, and there is no moral, legal, or political reason why it should be otherwise. And the natural jealousy between the members of the Family of Nations, their conflicting interests in many points, and the necessity of a balance of power, are factors of sufficient strength to check the political dangers which such alteration of the ends of a war may eventually involve.

§ 66. The cause or causes of a war determine its objectives from the start. The goals of war should not be confused with the reasons for fighting. [78] While the purpose of war is always the same—specifically, to overpower and completely defeat the enemy—the objectives can vary in each situation. The objectives of war are the specific aims for which the conflict is undertaken. [79] Initially, the war's objectives are defined by its cause, as mentioned earlier. However, these objectives can change or be adjusted as the conflict progresses. There is no moral or legal obligation for a warring party to end the conflict when the opponent is willing to concede the objective for which the war was fought. Once war begins, the very survival of the parties involved is often at stake. The risks they take, the efforts they make, the lives and resources they sacrifice, along with the reputation they build or lose due to the unpredictable nature of war—all these factors can influence the war's objectives, leading to a situation where the connection between those objectives and the war's initial causes becomes tenuous. If war were, as some scholars suggest, merely a legal means of self-defense to seek recompense for a grievance from another state, then changing those objectives would immediately justify the wrong done by any belligerent altering them. However, history shows that this is not the case, and current International Law does not prohibit such changes to war objectives. This shift is a result of changing circumstances that arise during the conflict, influenced by the factors discussed earlier; it could not be otherwise, and there is no moral, legal, or political reason to suggest that it should be. The natural rivalry among nations, their conflicting interests, and the need for a balance of power are strong enough factors to mitigate the political risks that might accompany changes in a war's objectives.

[78] Ends of war must likewise not be confounded with aims of land and sea warfare; see below, §§ 103 and 173.

[78] The goals of war should not be confused with the objectives of land and sea combat; see below, §§ 103 and 173.

[79] See Bluntschli, § 536; Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 364; Rivier, II. p. 219.

[79] See Bluntschli, § 536; Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 364; Rivier, II. p. 219.

[80] See above, § 54.[Pg 78]

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.[Pg 78]

III The Laws of War

Hall, § 17—Westlake, Chapters, pp. 232-235—Maine, pp. 122-159—Phillimore, III. § 50—Taylor, § 470—Walker, History, I. §§ 106-108—Heffter, § 119—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 253-333—Ullmann, §§ 167 and 170—Bonfils, Nos. 1006-1013—Despagnet, Nos. 508-510—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3212-3213—Rivier, II. pp. 238-242—Nys, III. pp. 160-164—Calvo, IV. §§ 1897-1898—Fiore, III. Nos. 1244-1260—Martens, II. § 107—Longuet, p. 12—Bordwell, pp. 100-196—Spaight, pp. 1-19—Kriegsbrauch, p. 2—Land Warfare, §§ 1-7—Holland, Studies, pp. 40-96.

Hall, § 17—Westlake, Chapters, pp. 232-235—Maine, pp. 122-159—Phillimore, III. § 50—Taylor, § 470—Walker, History, I. §§ 106-108—Heffter, § 119—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 253-333—Ullmann, §§ 167 and 170—Bonfils, Nos. 1006-1013—Despagnet, Nos. 508-510—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3212-3213—Rivier, II. pp. 238-242—Nys, III. pp. 160-164—Calvo, IV. §§ 1897-1898—Fiore, III. Nos. 1244-1260—Martens, II. § 107—Longuet, p. 12—Bordwell, pp. 100-196—Spaight, pp. 1-19—Kriegsbrauch, p. 2—Land Warfare, §§ 1-7—Holland, Studies, pp. 40-96.

Origin of the Laws of War.

Origin of the Laws of War.

§ 67. Laws of War are the rules of the Law of Nations respecting warfare. The roots of the present Laws of War are to be traced back to practices of belligerents which arose and grew gradually during the latter part of the Middle Ages. The unsparing cruelty of the war practices during the greater part of the Middle Ages began gradually to be modified through the influence of Christianity and chivalry. And although these practices were cruel enough during the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, they were mild compared with those of still earlier times. Decided progress was made during the eighteenth, and again during the nineteenth century, after the close of the Napoleonic wars, especially in the years from 1850 to 1900. The laws of war evolved in this way: isolated milder practices became by-and-by usages, so-called usus in bello, manner of warfare, Kriegs-Manier, and these usages through custom and treaties turned into legal rules. And this evolution is constantly going on, for, besides the recognised Laws of War, there are usages in existence which have a tendency to become gradually legal rules of warfare. The whole growth of the laws and usages of war is determined by three principles. There is, first, the principle that a belligerent should be justified in applying any amount and any kind of force which is necessary[Pg 79] for the realisation of the purpose of war—namely, the overpowering of the opponent. There is, secondly, the principle of humanity at work, which says that all such kinds and degrees of violence as are not necessary for the overpowering of the opponent should not be permitted to a belligerent. And, thirdly and lastly, there is at work the principle of chivalry which arose in the Middle Ages and introduced a certain amount of fairness in offence and defence, and a certain mutual respect. And, in contradistinction to the savage cruelty of former times, belligerents have in modern times come to the conviction that the realisation of the purpose of war is in no way hampered by indulgence shown to the wounded, the prisoners, and the private individuals who do not take part in the fighting. Thus the influence of the principle of humanity has been and is still enormous upon the practice of warfare. And the methods of warfare, although by the nature of war to a certain degree cruel and unsparing, become less cruel and more humane every day. But it must be emphasised that the whole evolution of the laws and usages of war could not have taken place but for the institution of standing armies, which dates from the fifteenth century. The humanising of the practices of war would have been impossible without the discipline of standing armies; and the important distinction between members of armed forces and private individuals could not have arisen without the existence of standing armies.

§ 67. The Laws of War are the rules established by international law concerning warfare. The origins of today’s Laws of War can be traced back to practices adopted by warring parties that gradually developed during the later Middle Ages. The harsh brutality of warfare during much of the Middle Ages began to change over time due to the influences of Christianity and chivalry. Although war practices during the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries were still quite brutal, they were less severe compared to earlier eras. Significant progress was made during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, especially after the Napoleonic wars, particularly in the years between 1850 and 1900. The laws of war evolved in this way: isolated milder practices gradually became accepted norms, known as usus in bello, or methods of warfare, Kriegs-Manier, and these norms transformed into legal rules through custom and treaties. This evolution is ongoing, as besides the acknowledged Laws of War, there are current practices that are slowly becoming formal legal rules of warfare. The entire development of the laws and practices of war is guided by three principles. First, there’s the principle that a warring party is justified in using any amount and type of force necessary[Pg 79] to achieve the purpose of war—namely, defeating the opponent. Second, there is the principle of humanity, which states that any acts of violence not essential for defeating the opponent should not be allowed. Finally, there’s the principle of chivalry that emerged in the Middle Ages, promoting a sense of fairness in both offense and defense and mutual respect. In contrast to the brutal cruelty of earlier times, modern warring parties recognize that achieving the goals of war is not hindered by kindness shown to the wounded, prisoners, and civilians not involved in the fighting. Thus, the impact of the principle of humanity has been and continues to be substantial on how warfare is conducted. Although warfare is inherently cruel and fierce to some extent, the methods are becoming less brutal and more humane each day. However, it’s crucial to note that the entire evolution of the laws and practices of war would not have been possible without the establishment of standing armies, which began in the fifteenth century. The humane treatment of wartime practices would have been unachievable without the discipline that standing armies provide; and the key distinction between members of armed forces and civilians could not have emerged without the existence of standing armies.

The latest Development of the Laws of War.

The latest Development of the Laws of War.

§ 68. The latest and the most important development of the Laws of War was produced through general treaties concluded between the majority of States since the beginning of the second part of the nineteenth century. The following are the treaties concerned:—

§ 68. The most recent and significant advancement in the Laws of War came about through general treaties made between most countries since the start of the second half of the nineteenth century. The treaties in question are:—

(1) The Declaration of Paris of April 16, 1856, respecting warfare on sea. It abolishes privateering,[Pg 80] recognises the principles that the neutral flag covers enemy goods and that neutral goods under an enemy flag cannot be seized, and enacts the rule that a blockade in order to be binding must be effective. The Declaration is signed by seven States, but eighteen others acceded in course of time.

(1) The Declaration of Paris on April 16, 1856, regarding warfare at sea. It eliminates privateering,[Pg 80] acknowledges that neutral flags protect enemy goods and that neutral goods on an enemy ship can't be captured, and establishes the rule that a blockade must be effective to be enforceable. The Declaration is signed by seven countries, but eighteen others joined later.

(2) The Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864, for the amelioration of the condition of wounded soldiers in armies in the field, which originally was signed by only nine States, but to which in course of time all the civilised States—except Costa-Rica, Lichtenstein, and Monaco!—have acceded. A treaty containing a number of additional articles to the Convention was signed at Geneva on October 20, 1868, but was never ratified. A new Geneva Convention was signed on July 6, 1906, by thirty-five States, and several others have already acceded. There is no doubt that the whole civilised world will soon be a party to this new Geneva Convention. The principles of the Geneva Convention were adapted to maritime warfare by Conventions (see below, No. 8) of the First and Second Hague Peace Conferences.

(2) The Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864, aimed at improving the conditions for wounded soldiers in field armies, was initially signed by only nine countries, but over time, all civilized nations—except Costa Rica, Liechtenstein, and Monaco!—have joined. A treaty with additional articles related to the Convention was signed in Geneva on October 20, 1868, but it was never ratified. A new Geneva Convention was signed on July 6, 1906, by thirty-five countries, and several others have already joined. It's clear that soon the entire civilized world will be a part of this new Geneva Convention. The principles of the Geneva Convention were adapted for maritime warfare through Conventions (see below, No. 8) from the First and Second Hague Peace Conferences.

(3) The Declaration of St. Petersburg of December 11, 1868, respecting the prohibition of the use in war of projectiles under 400 grammes (14 ounces) which are either explosive or charged with inflammable substances. It is signed by seventeen States.

(3) The Declaration of St. Petersburg from December 11, 1868, regarding the ban on using projectiles in war that weigh less than 400 grams (14 ounces) and are either explosive or filled with flammable materials. It is signed by seventeen countries.

(4) The Convention enacting "Regulations respecting the Laws of War on Land," agreed upon at the First Peace Conference of 1899.

(4) The Convention establishing "Regulations regarding the Laws of War on Land," agreed upon at the First Peace Conference of 1899.

The history of this Convention may be traced back to the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field which the United States published on April 14, 1863, during the War of Secession. These instructions, which were drafted by Professor Francis Lieber, of the Columbia College of[Pg 81] New York, represent the first endeavour to codify the Laws of War, and they are even nowadays of great value and importance. In 1874 an International Conference, invited by the Emperor Alexander II. of Russia, met at Brussels for the purpose of discussing a draft code of the Laws of War on Land as prepared by Russia. The body of the articles agreed upon at this Conference, and known as the "Brussels Declarations," have, however, never become law, as ratification was never given by the Powers. But the Brussels Declarations were made the basis of deliberations on the part of the Institute of International Law, which at its meeting at Oxford in 1880 adopted a Manual[81] of the Laws of War consisting of a body of 86 rules under the title Les Lois de la Guerre sur Terre, and a copy of this draft code was sent to all the Governments of Europe and America. It was, however, not until the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 that the Powers reassembled to discuss again the codification of the Laws of War. At this Conference the Brussels Declarations were taken as the basis of the deliberations; but although the bulk of its articles was taken over, several important modifications were introduced in the Convention, which was finally agreed upon and ratified, only a few Powers abstaining from ratification.

The history of this Convention can be traced back to the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field that the United States published on April 14, 1863, during the Civil War. These instructions, drafted by Professor Francis Lieber from Columbia College in New York, represent the first attempt to codify the Laws of War, and they still hold significant value today. In 1874, an International Conference convened in Brussels, invited by Emperor Alexander II of Russia, to discuss a draft code of the Laws of War on Land prepared by Russia. However, the articles agreed upon at this Conference, known as the "Brussels Declarations," never became law as the Powers did not ratify them. Nevertheless, the Brussels Declarations formed the basis for discussions at the Institute of International Law, which, at its meeting in Oxford in 1880, adopted a Manual[81] of the Laws of War consisting of 86 rules under the title Les Lois de la Guerre sur Terre. A copy of this draft code was sent to all the governments of Europe and America. It wasn't until the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 that the Powers gathered again to discuss the codification of the Laws of War. During this Conference, the Brussels Declarations were used as the basis for discussions; however, while most articles were adopted, several key modifications were made in the Convention, which was ultimately agreed upon and ratified, with only a few Powers choosing not to ratify.

[81] See Annuaire, V. pp. 157-174.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Directory, V. pp. 157-174.

The Second Peace Conference of 1907 has revised this Convention, and its place is now taken by Convention IV. of the Second Peace Conference. The Convention,[82] as the preamble expressly states, does not[Pg 82] aim at giving a complete code of the Laws of War on Land, and cases beyond its scope still remain the subject of customary rules and usages. Further, it does not create universal International Law, as article 2 of the Convention expressly stipulates that the Regulations shall be binding upon the contracting Powers only in case of war between two or more of them, and shall cease to be binding in case a non-contracting Power takes part in the war. But, in spite of this express stipulation, there can be no doubt that in time the Regulations will become universal International Law. For all the Powers represented at the Second Peace Conference signed the Convention, except China, Spain, and Nicaragua, although some States made certain reservations. Nicaragua has since acceded, and it is certain that the outstanding States will in time also accede.

The Second Peace Conference of 1907 has updated this Convention, which is now referred to as Convention IV of the Second Peace Conference. The Convention,[82] as stated in the preamble, does not[Pg 82] aim to provide a complete set of Laws of War on Land, and issues outside its scope will still be governed by customary rules and practices. Additionally, it does not establish universal International Law, as article 2 of the Convention clearly states that the Regulations will only be binding on the contracting Powers in the event of war between two or more of them, and will no longer apply if a non-contracting Power joins the conflict. However, despite this clear stipulation, it’s likely that over time the Regulations will evolve into universal International Law. All the Powers represented at the Second Peace Conference signed the Convention, with the exceptions of China, Spain, and Nicaragua, although some States included specific reservations. Nicaragua has since joined, and it's expected that the remaining States will eventually follow suit.

[82] For brevity's sake the Hague Convention enacting Regulations regarding the laws and customs of war on land will be referred to in the following pages as the Hague Regulations. It is, however, of importance to observe that the Hague Regulations, although they are intended to be binding upon the belligerents, are only the basis upon which the signatory Powers have to frame instructions for their forces. Article 1 declares: "The high contracting parties shall issue instructions to their armed land forces, which shall be in conformity with the Regulations respecting the Laws of War on Land annexed to the present Convention." The British War Office, therefore, published in 1912, a guide, Land Warfare: an Exposition of the Laws and Usages of War on Land for the Guidance of Officers of His Majesty's Army, written by order of His Majesty's Secretary of War by Colonel Edmonds and Professor Oppenheim, in which the Hague Regulations are systematically set out; their full text is published in Appendix 6 of the guide. But it should be mentioned that the British War Office had already in 1903 published a manual, drafted with great precision and clearness by Professor Holland, for the information of the British forces, comprising "The Laws and Customs of War on Land, as defined by the Hague Convention of 1899." See also Holland, The Laws of War on Land (Written and Unwritten), Oxford, 1908.

[82] To keep things simple, the Hague Convention establishing Regulations about the laws and customs of war on land will be referred to as the Hague Regulations in the following pages. It's important to note that while the Hague Regulations are meant to be binding on the warring parties, they serve primarily as a foundation for the signatory Powers to create instructions for their armed forces. Article 1 states: "The high contracting parties shall issue instructions to their armed land forces, which shall be in conformity with the Regulations respecting the Laws of War on Land annexed to the present Convention." Consequently, the British War Office published a guide in 1912 titled Land Warfare: an Exposition of the Laws and Usages of War on Land for the Guidance of Officers of His Majesty's Army, commissioned by His Majesty's Secretary of War, authored by Colonel Edmonds and Professor Oppenheim, which systematically outlines the Hague Regulations; the full text is included in Appendix 6 of the guide. However, it's worth mentioning that the British War Office had already released a manual in 1903, carefully drafted by Professor Holland, for the British forces, detailing "The Laws and Customs of War on Land, as defined by the Hague Convention of 1899." See also Holland, The Laws of War on Land (Written and Unwritten), Oxford, 1908.

(5) The Declaration concerning expanding (dumdum) bullets; see below, § 112.

(5) The Declaration about expanding (dumdum) bullets; see below, § 112.

(6) The Declaration concerning projectiles and explosives launched from balloons; see below, § 114.

(6) The Declaration regarding projectiles and explosives launched from balloons; see below, § 114.

(7) The Declaration concerning projectiles diffusing asphyxiating or deleterious gases; see below, § 113.

(7) The Declaration regarding projectiles that release asphyxiating or harmful gases; see below, § 113.

(8) The Convention for the adaptation to sea warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention, produced by the First and revised by the Second Peace Conference.

(8) The Convention for adapting the principles of the Geneva Convention to naval warfare, created by the First Peace Conference and revised by the Second.

(9) The Convention of 1907 concerning the opening of hostilities (Second Peace Conference).

(9) The 1907 Convention about starting hostilities (Second Peace Conference).

(10) The Convention of 1907 concerning the status of enemy merchantmen at the outbreak of hostilities (Second Peace Conference).

(10) The 1907 Convention on the status of enemy merchant ships at the start of hostilities (Second Peace Conference).

(11) The Convention of 1907 concerning the conversion of merchantmen into men-of-war (Second Peace Conference).

(11) The 1907 Convention about turning merchant ships into warships (Second Peace Conference).

(12) The Convention of 1907 concerning the laying of automatic submarine contact mines (Second Peace Conference).

(12) The 1907 Convention about the installation of automatic submarine contact mines (Second Peace Conference).

(13) The Convention of 1907 concerning bombardment by naval forces in time of war (Second Peace Conference).

(13) The 1907 Convention on bombardment by naval forces during wartime (Second Peace Conference).

(14) The Convention of 1907 concerning certain restrictions on the exercise of the right of capture in maritime war (Second Peace Conference).

(14) The 1907 Convention regarding specific limitations on the use of the right to capture during naval warfare (Second Peace Conference).

(15) The two Conventions of 1907 concerning the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in land warfare and in sea warfare (Second Peace Conference).

(15) The two Conventions of 1907 about the rights and responsibilities of neutral Powers and individuals in land warfare and naval warfare (Second Peace Conference).

(16) The Declaration of London of February 26, 1909, concerning the Laws of Naval War, which was signed at the Conference of London by Great Britain, Germany, the United States of America, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Italy, Japan, Holland, and Russia, but is not yet ratified. This Declaration enacts rules concerning blockade, contraband, unneutral service, destruction of neutral prizes, transfer of vessels to a neutral flag, enemy character, convoy, and resistance to search.[83]

(16) The Declaration of London of February 26, 1909, about the Laws of Naval Warfare, was signed at the Conference of London by Great Britain, Germany, the United States, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Russia, but it hasn't been ratified yet. This Declaration establishes rules regarding blockade, contraband, unneutral service, destruction of neutral prizes, transferring vessels to a neutral flag, enemy status, convoy, and refusal to submit to search.[83]

Binding force of the Laws of War

Binding force of the Laws of War

§ 69. As soon as usages of warfare have by custom or treaty evolved into laws of war, they are binding upon belligerents under all circumstances and conditions,[Pg 84] except in the case of reprisals[84] as retaliation against a belligerent for illegitimate acts of warfare by the members of his armed forces or his other subjects. In accordance with the German proverb, Kriegsraeson geht vor Kriegsmanier (necessity in war overrules the manner of warfare), many German authors[85] and the Swiss-Belgian Rivier[86] maintain that the laws of war lose their binding force in case of extreme necessity. Such case of extreme necessity is said to have arisen when violation of the laws of war alone offers either a means of escape from extreme danger or the realisation of the purpose of war—namely, the overpowering of the opponent. This alleged exception to the binding force of the Laws of War, is, however, not at all generally accepted by German writers, for instance, Bluntschli does not mention it. English, American, French, and Italian writers do not, so far as I am aware, acknowledge it. The protest of Westlake,[87] therefore, against such an exception is the more justified, as a great danger would be involved by its admission.

§ 69. Once the practices of warfare have become laws of war through custom or treaty, they are binding on warring parties under all circumstances and conditions,[Pg 84] except in the case of reprisals[84] as retaliation against a warring party for illegitimate acts of warfare committed by their armed forces or other subjects. According to the German proverb, Kriegsraeson geht vor Kriegsmanier (necessity in war overrules the manner of warfare), many German authors[85] and the Swiss-Belgian Rivier[86] argue that the laws of war lose their binding nature in extreme situations. Such extreme necessity is claimed to arise when breaking the laws of war is the only way to escape severe danger or achieve the goals of war—namely, defeating the enemy. However, this supposed exception to the binding nature of the Laws of War is not widely accepted by German writers; for instance, Bluntschli does not mention it. As far as I know, English, American, French, and Italian writers also do not acknowledge it. Therefore, Westlake's[87] protest against this exception is more justified, as admitting it could lead to significant dangers.

[84] See below, § 248.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[85] See, for instance, Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 254-257; Ullmann, § 170; Meurer, II. pp. 7-15. Liszt, who in former editions agreed with these writers, deserts their ranks in the sixth edition (§ 24, IV. 3), and correctly takes the other side. See also Nys, III. p. 202, and Holland, War, § 2, where the older literature is quoted.

[85] For example, see Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 254-257; Ullmann, § 170; Meurer, II. pp. 7-15. Liszt, who agreed with these authors in previous editions, changes his stance in the sixth edition (§ 24, IV. 3) and correctly aligns with the opposite viewpoint. Also see Nys, III. p. 202, and Holland, War, § 2, where earlier literature is referenced.

[86] See Rivier, II. p. 242.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Rivier, II. p. 242.

[87] See Westlake, II. pp. 115-117, and Westlake, Chapters, p. 238.

[87] See Westlake, II. pp. 115-117, and Westlake, Chapters, p. 238.

The proverb dates very far back in the history of warfare. It originated and found recognition in those times when warfare was not regulated by laws of war—that is universally binding customs and international treaties, but only by usages (Manier, i.e. Brauch), and it says that necessity in war overrules usages of warfare. In our days, however, warfare is no longer regulated by usages only, but to a greater extent by laws, firm rules recognised either by international treaties or by universal custom.[88] These conventional and customary[Pg 85] rules cannot be overruled by necessity, unless they are framed in such a way as not to apply to a case of necessity in self-preservation. Thus, for instance, the rules that poisoned arms and poison are forbidden, and that it is not allowed treacherously to kill or wound individuals belonging to the hostile army, do not lose their binding force even if escape from extreme danger or the realisation of the purpose of war would result from an act of this kind. Article 22 of the Hague Rules stipulates distinctly that the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited, and this rule does not lose its binding force in a case of necessity. What may be ignored in case of military necessity are not the laws of war, but only the usages of war. Kriegsraeson geht vor Kriegsmanier, but not vor Kriegsrecht!

The saying goes way back in the history of warfare. It started and was recognized during a time when wars weren’t governed by laws but only by customs and practices. It suggests that necessity during war overrides these customs. Today, though, warfare is mostly regulated by laws, clear rules recognized through international treaties or customary practices. These conventional and customary rules can’t be overridden by necessity unless they are specifically crafted not to apply in cases of self-defense. For example, the rules prohibiting poisoned weapons and deceitful attacks on enemy troops remain enforceable even if breaking them would lead to escaping serious danger or achieving war objectives. Article 22 of the Hague Rules clearly states that belligerents' rights to harm the enemy are not limitless, and this rule remains in effect even in emergencies. What may be set aside in military necessity are not the laws of war but only the customs of war. Kriegsraeson geht vor Kriegsmanier, but not vor Kriegsrecht!

IV THE WAR ZONE

Taylor, §§ 471 and 498—Heffter, § 118—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 362-364—Klüber, § 242—Liszt, § 40, I.—Ullmann, § 174—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2733, and VIII. Nos. 3104-3106—Rivier, II. pp. 216-219—Boeck, Nos. 214-230—Longuet, §§ 18-25—Perels, § 33—Rettich, Zur Theorie und Geschichte des Rechts zum Kriege (1888), pp. 174-213.

Taylor, §§ 471 and 498—Heffter, § 118—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 362-364—Klüber, § 242—Liszt, § 40, I.—Ullmann, § 174—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2733, and VIII. Nos. 3104-3106—Rivier, II. pp. 216-219—Boeck, Nos. 214-230—Longuet, §§ 18-25—Perels, § 33—Rettich, Zur Theorie und Geschichte des Rechts zum Kriege (1888), pp. 174-213.

Region of War in contradistinction to Theatre of War.

Region of War in contrast to Theatre of War.

§ 70. Region of war is that part of the surface of the earth in which the belligerents may prepare and execute hostilities against each other. In this meaning region of war ought[89] to be distinguished from theatre of war. The latter is that part of a territory or the Open Sea on which hostilities actually take place. Legally no part of the earth which is not region of war may be made the theatre of war, but not every[Pg 86] section of the whole region of war is necessarily theatre of war. Thus, in the war between Great Britain and the two South African Republics the whole of the territory of the British Empire and the Open Sea, as well as the territory of the Republics, was the region of war, but the theatre of war was in South Africa only. On the other hand, in a war between Great Britain and another great naval Power it might well happen that the region of war is in many of its sections made the theatre of war.

§ 70. The region of war refers to the part of the earth's surface where the opposing parties can prepare for and carry out hostilities against each other. In this sense, the region of war should[89] be distinguished from the theatre of war. The theatre of war is the specific area or part of the Open Sea where actual hostilities occur. Legally, any part of the earth that is not a region of war cannot be designated as a theatre of war, but not every section of the entire region of war is necessarily a theatre of war. For instance, during the conflict between Great Britain and the two South African Republics, the entire territory of the British Empire and the Open Sea, along with the territory of the Republics, constituted the region of war, but the theatre of war was only in South Africa. Conversely, in a war between Great Britain and another major naval power, it is possible that many sections of the region of war may become the theatre of war.

[89] This distinction, although of considerable importance, does not appear to have been made by any other publicist.

[89] This distinction, while quite significant, doesn’t seem to have been recognized by any other publicist.

Particular Region of every War.

Specific Region of every War.

§ 71. The region of war depends upon the belligerents. For this reason every war has its particular region, so far at any rate as territorial region is concerned. For besides the Open Sea[90] and all such territories as are as yet not occupied by any State, which are always within the region of war, the particular region of every war is the whole of the territories and territorial waters of the belligerents. It must, however, be specially observed that any part of the globe which is permanently neutralised,[91] is always exempt from the region of war.

§ 71. The area of conflict is determined by the warring parties. Therefore, each war has its own specific region, at least in terms of territorial boundaries. In addition to the Open Sea[90] and any territories that are not currently claimed by any State, which are always considered part of the war zone, the specific area of each war encompasses all the lands and territorial waters of the involved parties. It's important to note, however, that any part of the world that is permanently neutralized,[91] is always excluded from the area of conflict.

[91] See below, § 72.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Since colonies are a part of the territory of the mother country, they fall within the region of war in the case of a war between the mother country and another State, whatever their position may be within the colonial empire they belong to. Thus in a war between Great Britain and France the whole of Australia, of Canada, of India, and so on, would be included with the British Islands as region of war. And, further, as States under the suzerainty of another State are internationally in several respects considered to be a portion of the latter's territory,[92] they fall within the region of war in case of war between the suzerain and another Power. Again, such parts of the territory of a State as are under the condominium or under the[Pg 87] administration of another State[93] fall within the region of war in case of war between one of the condomini and another Power and in case of war between the administrating State and another State. Thus, in a war between Great Britain and another Power, Cyprus would fall within the region of war; and the Soudan, which is in the condominium of England and Egypt, would likewise do so. On the other hand, Cyprus would not fall within the region of war in the case of war between Turkey and another Power, Great Britain excepted.

Since colonies are part of the mother country's territory, they are considered part of the war zone if a conflict arises between the mother country and another state, regardless of their status within the colonial empire. So, in a war between Great Britain and France, all of Australia, Canada, India, and so on would be included with the British Islands as a war zone. Moreover, as states that are under the control of another state are often regarded as part of that state’s territory, they also fall within the war zone in the event of a war between the controlling state and another power. Additionally, parts of a state's territory that are under a condominium or the administration of another state are included in the war zone in the case of conflict between one of the condominiums and another power, as well as during a war between the administering state and another state. For example, in a war between Great Britain and another power, Cyprus would be part of the war zone; similarly, the Sudan, which is under the condominium of England and Egypt, would be included. However, Cyprus would not be part of the war zone in the case of a war between Turkey and another power, except for Great Britain.

Although as a rule the territories of both belligerents, together with the Open Sea, fall within the region of war, and neutral territories do not, exceptions to the rule may occur:—

Although as a general rule the areas of both sides in the conflict, along with the Open Sea, are considered war zones, and neutral areas are not, there can be exceptions to this rule:—

(1) A belligerent can deliberately treat certain territories which legally fall within the region of war, as well as parts of the Open Sea, as though they were not parts of the region of war, provided that such territories on their part fulfil the duties incumbent upon neutrals. Thus during the Turco-Italian War in 1911 and 1912, Italy treated Crete and Egypt as though they were not parts of the region of war.[94]

(1) A warring party can intentionally regard specific areas that are legally considered part of the war zone, as well as sections of International Waters, as if they are outside the war zone, as long as those areas fulfill the responsibilities expected of neutral parties. For example, during the Turco-Italian War in 1911 and 1912, Italy treated Crete and Egypt as if they were not part of the war zone.[94]

(2) Cases are possible in which a part or the whole of the territory of a neutral State falls within the region of war. These cases arise in wars in which such neutral territories are the very objects of the war, as Korea, which was at that time an independent State, and the Chinese province of Manchuria[95] were in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and 1905. Such a case may also occur if an army of one of the belligerents crosses the frontier of a neutral State, but is not at[Pg 88] once disarmed and interned, and is, therefore, able at any moment to recross the frontier and attack the other belligerent.[96] Since necessity of self-preservation can compel the latter on his part also to cross the neutral frontier and pursue and attack the enemy on neutral territory, the part of such neutral territory concerned would for this reason become part of the region of war.

(2) There are situations where part or all of a neutral country's territory becomes a war zone. These instances happen in conflicts where those neutral areas are the very targets of the war, like Korea, which was an independent country at that time, and the Chinese region of Manchuria[95] during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and 1905. This can also happen if an army from one of the warring sides crosses into a neutral country without being immediately disarmed and detained, giving it the chance to re-enter and attack the opposing side. Since the need for self-preservation may force the other side to also cross into neutral territory to pursue and engage the enemy, that part of the neutral territory involved would then become a part of the war zone.

[94] There is no doubt that this attitude of Italy is explained by the fact that Egypt, although legally under Turkish suzerainty, is actually under British occupation, and that Crete is forcibly kept by the Powers under Turkish suzerainty.

[94] It's clear that Italy's attitude is shaped by the fact that Egypt, while officially under Turkish control, is really occupied by the British, and that Crete is being forcibly held by the Powers under Turkish rule.

[95] See below, § 320.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[96] See below, § 339.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Exclusion from region of war through neutralisation.

Exclusion from the area of conflict through neutralization.

§ 72. Although the Open Sea in its whole extent and the whole of the territories of the belligerents are as a rule within the region of war, certain parts can be excluded through neutralisation. Such neutralisation can take place permanently through a general treaty of the Powers or temporarily through a special treaty of the belligerents. At present no part of the Open Sea is neutralised, as the neutralisation of the Black Sea was abolished[97] in 1871. But the following are some important instances[98] of permanent neutralisation of parts of territories:—

§ 72. Even though the Open Sea and the lands of the warring parties are typically considered a war zone, certain areas can be designated as neutral. This neutral status can be established permanently through a general treaty among the powers or temporarily through a specific agreement between the warring parties. Currently, no part of the Open Sea is neutralized, since the neutralization of the Black Sea was lifted[97] in 1871. However, here are some notable examples[98] of permanent neutralization of specific territories:—

(1) The former Sardinian, but since 1860 French, provinces of Chablais and Faucigny[99] are permanently neutralised through article 92 of the Act of the Vienna Congress, 1815.

(1) The previously Sardinian, but since 1860 French, provinces of Chablais and Faucigny[99] are permanently neutralized by article 92 of the Vienna Congress Act, 1815.

(2) The Ionian Islands through article 2 of the Treaty of London of November 14, 1863, are permanently neutralised since they merged in the kingdom of Greece. But this neutralisation was restricted[100] to the islands of Corfu and Paxo only by article 2 of the treaty of London of March 24, 1864.

(2) The Ionian Islands were permanently neutralized by article 2 of the Treaty of London on November 14, 1863, as they became part of the Kingdom of Greece. However, this neutralization was limited[100] to the islands of Corfu and Paxo only, according to article 2 of the Treaty of London from March 24, 1864.

(3) The Suez Canal is permanently neutralised[101] since 1888.[Pg 89]

(3) The Suez Canal has been permanently neutralized[101] since 1888.[Pg 89]

(4) The Straits of Magellan[102] are permanently neutralised through article 5 of the boundary treaty of Buenos Ayres of July 23, 1881. But this treaty is not a general treaty of the Powers, since it is concluded between Argentina and Chili only.

(4) The Straits of Magellan[102] are permanently neutralized under article 5 of the boundary treaty of Buenos Ayres from July 23, 1881. However, this treaty is not a general treaty among the Powers, as it is only established between Argentina and Chile.

(5) The Panama[103] Canal is permanently neutralised through article 3 of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of November 18, 1901. But this treaty is not a general treaty of the Powers either, being concluded between only Great Britain and the United States.

(5) The Panama[103] Canal is permanently neutralized under Article 3 of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty from November 18, 1901. However, this treaty doesn't apply to all nations, as it was signed only between Great Britain and the United States.

(6) A piece of territory along the frontier between Sweden and Norway is neutralised by the Convention of Stockholm of October 26, 1905, which includes rules concerning a neutral zone.[104] But this is a neutralisation agreed upon between Sweden and Norway only, no third Power has anything to do with it, and even the contracting Powers stipulate—see article 1, last paragraph—that the neutralisation shall not be valid in the case of a war against a common enemy.

(6) A section of land along the border between Sweden and Norway is neutralized by the Convention of Stockholm on October 26, 1905, which includes rules about a neutral zone.[104] However, this neutralization is agreed upon only between Sweden and Norway; no third party is involved, and even the parties involved specify—see article 1, last paragraph—that the neutralization will not apply in the event of a war against a common enemy.

[98] The matter is thoroughly treated in Rettich, Zur Theorie und Geschichte des Rechtes zum Kriege (1888), pp. 174-213, where also the neutralisation of some so-called international rivers, especially the Danube, Congo, and Niger, is discussed.

[98] The topic is extensively covered in Rettich, Zur Theorie und Geschichte des Rechtes zum Kriege (1888), pp. 174-213, which also discusses the neutralization of certain so-called international rivers, particularly the Danube, Congo, and Niger.

[100] See Martens, N.R.G. XVIII. p. 63.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Martens, N.R.G. XVIII. p. 63.

[104] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXXIV. (1907), p. 703.

[104] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXXIV. (1907), p. 703.

As regards temporary neutralisation, it is possible for parts of the territories of belligerents and certain parts of the Open Sea to become neutralised through a treaty of the belligerents for the time of a particular war only. Thus, when in 1870 war broke out between France and Germany, the commander of the French man-of-war[105] Dupleix arranged with the commander of the German man-of-war Hertha—both stationed in the Japanese and Chinese waters—that they should, through their embassies in Yokohama, propose to their respective Governments the neutralisation of the Japanese and Chinese waters for the time of the war. Germany consented, but France refused the neutralisation. Again, at the commencement of the Turco-Italian[Pg 90] War in 1911, Turkey proposed the neutralisation of the Red Sea, but Italy refused to agree to it.

Regarding temporary neutralization, parts of the territories of warring countries and certain areas of the Open Sea can be neutralized through a treaty between the belligerents for the duration of a specific war. For example, when war broke out between France and Germany in 1870, the commander of the French warship Dupleix coordinated with the commander of the German warship Hertha—both located in Japanese and Chinese waters—to ask their respective governments through their embassies in Yokohama for the neutralization of those waters during the war. Germany agreed, but France declined the neutralization. Similarly, at the start of the Turco-Italian War in 1911, Turkey proposed the neutralization of the Red Sea, but Italy refused to accept it.

[105] See Perels, § 33, p. 160, note 2.

[105] See Perels, § 33, p. 160, note 2.

Asserted exclusion of the Baltic Sea from the Region of War.

Asserted exclusion of the Baltic Sea from the War Zone.

§ 73. That there is at present no part of the Open Sea neutralised is universally recognised, and this applies to the Baltic Sea, which is admittedly part of the Open Sea. Some writers,[106] however, maintain that the littoral States of the Baltic have a right to forbid all hostilities within the Baltic in case of a war between other States than themselves, and could thereby neutralise the Baltic without the consent and even against the will of the belligerents. This opinion is based on the fact that during the eighteenth century the littoral States of the Baltic claimed that right in several conventions, but it appears untenable, because it is opposed to the universally recognised principle of the freedom of the Open Sea. As no State has territorial supremacy over parts of the Open Sea, I cannot see how such a right of the littoral States of the Baltic could be justified.[107]

§ 73. It is widely accepted that there are currently no neutral parts of the Open Sea, and this includes the Baltic Sea, which is recognized as part of the Open Sea. Some writers,[106] however, argue that the coastal states of the Baltic have the right to prohibit any hostilities within the Baltic if a war occurs between states other than their own, thus allowing them to neutralize the Baltic without the consent or even against the wishes of the warring parties. This view is based on the claims made by the coastal states during the eighteenth century in several conventions, but it seems untenable because it contradicts the widely accepted principle of freedom of the Open Sea. Since no state has territorial control over parts of the Open Sea, I do not see how such a right for the Baltic coastal states could be justified.[107]

[106] See Perels, pp. 160-163, who discusses the question at some length and answers it in the affirmative.

[106] See Perels, pp. 160-163, where he talks about the question in detail and confirms it.

[107] See Rivier, II. p. 218; Bonfils, § 504; Nys, I. pp. 448-450.

[107] See Rivier, II. p. 218; Bonfils, § 504; Nys, I. pp. 448-450.

V THE COMBATANTS

Vattel, III. § 4—Phillimore, III. §§ 92-93—Taylor, §§ 458-460—Wheaton, § 294—Bluntschli, §§ 511-514—Heffter, §§ 114-117—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 237-248—Klüber, § 236—G. F. Martens, II. § 264—Gareis, § 83—Liszt, § 39, II.—Ullmann, §§ 168-169—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2656-2660—Rivier, II. pp. 207-216—Nys. III. pp. 114-118—Calvo, IV. §§ 2004-2038—Martens, II. § 108—Heilborn, System, pp. 333-335.

Vattel, III. § 4—Phillimore, III. §§ 92-93—Taylor, §§ 458-460—Wheaton, § 294—Bluntschli, §§ 511-514—Heffter, §§ 114-117—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 237-248—Klüber, § 236—G. F. Martens, II. § 264—Gareis, § 83—Liszt, § 39, II.—Ullmann, §§ 168-169—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2656-2660—Rivier, II. pp. 207-216—Nys. III. pp. 114-118—Calvo, IV. §§ 2004-2038—Martens, II. § 108—Heilborn, System, pp. 333-335.

Qualification to become a Belligerent (facultas bellandi).

Qualification to become a Belligerent (facultas bellandi).

§ 74. As the Law of Nations recognises the status of war and its effects as regards rights and duties between the two or more belligerents on the one hand, and, on the other, between the belligerents and neutral States, the question arises what kind of States are[Pg 91] legally qualified to make war and to become thereby belligerents. Publicists who discuss this question at all speak mostly of a right of States to make war, a jus belli. But if this so-called right is examined, it turns out to be no right at all, as there is no corresponding duty in those against whom the right is said to exist.[108] A State which makes war against another exercises one of its natural functions, and the only question is whether such State is or is not legally qualified to exercise such function. Now, according to the Law of Nations full-Sovereign States alone possess the legal qualification to become belligerents; half-and part-Sovereign States are not legally qualified to become belligerents. Since neutralised States, as Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg, are full-Sovereign States, they are legally qualified to become belligerents, although their neutralisation binds them not to make use of their qualification except for defence. If they become belligerents because they are attacked, they do not lose their character as neutralised States, but if they become belligerents for offensive purposes they ipso facto lose this character.

§ 74. As international law recognizes the status of war and its consequences concerning rights and responsibilities between the belligerents on one side, and between the belligerents and neutral states on the other, the question arises about which types of states are legally allowed to go to war and thereby become belligerents. Scholars who address this issue often refer to a state's "right" to wage war, known as a jus belli. However, upon closer examination, this so-called right appears to be nonexistent, as there is no corresponding obligation for those against whom this right is purported to apply. A state that engages in war against another is simply executing one of its natural functions, and the real question is whether that state is legally permitted to perform such a function. According to international law, only fully sovereign states have the legal authority to become belligerents; states that are partially or semi-sovereign do not have this legal qualification. Since neutral states like Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxembourg are fully sovereign, they can legally become belligerents, although their status as neutral states means they are obligated to use this qualification only for defense. If they become belligerents due to being attacked, they do not lose their status as neutral states; however, if they take on belligerent roles for offensive reasons, they automatically lose that status.

[108] See Heilborn, System, p. 333.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Heilborn, System, p. 333.

Possibility in contradistinction to qualification to become a Belligerent.

Possibility in contrast to qualification to become a Belligerent.

§ 75. Such States as do not possess the legal qualification to become belligerents are by law prohibited from offensive or defensive warfare. But the possession of armed forces makes it possible for them in fact to enter into war and to become belligerents. History records instances enough of such States having actually made war. Thus in 1876 Servia and Montenegro, although at that time vassal States under Turkish suzerainty, declared war against Turkey, and in March 1877, peace was concluded between Turkey and Servia.[109] And when in April 1877 war broke out between Russia and Turkey, the then Turkish vassal[Pg 92] State Roumania joined Russia, and Servia declared war anew against Turkey in December 1877. Further in November 1885 a war was waged between Servia, which had become a full-Sovereign State, and Bulgaria, which was at the time still a vassal State under Turkish suzerainty; the war lasted actually only a fortnight, but the formal treaty of peace was not signed until March 3, 1886, at Bukarest.[110] And although Turkey is a party to this treaty, Bulgaria appears as a party thereto independently and on its own behalf.

§ 75. States that lack the legal qualifications to become belligerents are legally prohibited from engaging in offensive or defensive warfare. However, the possession of armed forces allows them to technically participate in war and act as belligerents. History has recorded several instances of such States waging war. For example, in 1876, Servia and Montenegro, although at that time vassal States under Turkish control, declared war against Turkey, and peace was established between Turkey and Servia in March 1877.[109] When war broke out between Russia and Turkey in April 1877, the then Turkish vassal State of Roumania allied with Russia, and Servia again declared war on Turkey in December 1877. Additionally, in November 1885, a war took place between Servia, which had become a fully sovereign State, and Bulgaria, which was still a vassal State under Turkish control at that time; the conflict lasted only two weeks, but the formal peace treaty was not signed until March 3, 1886, in Bukarest.[110] Although Turkey is a party to this treaty, Bulgaria is recognized as an independent party acting on its own behalf.

[109] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. IV. pp. 12, 14, 172.

[109] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. IV. pp. 12, 14, 172.

[110] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. IV. p. 284.

[110] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. IV. p. 284.

Whenever a case arises in which a State lacking the legal qualification to make war nevertheless actually makes war, such State is a belligerent, the contention is real war and all the rules of International Law respecting warfare apply to it.[111] Therefore, an armed contention between the suzerain and the vassal, between a full-Sovereign State and a vassal State under the suzerainty of another State, and, lastly, between a Federal State and one or more of its members, is war[112] in the technical sense of the term according to the Law of Nations.

Whenever a situation arises where a State without the legal right to declare war actually goes to war, that State is considered a belligerent, the conflict is regarded as real war, and all the rules of International Law concerning warfare apply. Therefore, an armed conflict between a ruling State and a vassal, between a fully sovereign State and a vassal State under the control of another State, and finally, between a Federal State and one or more of its members, is considered war in the technical sense according to the Law of Nations.

[111] This is quite apparent through the fact that Bulgaria by accession became a party to the Geneva Convention at a time when she was still a vassal State under Turkish suzerainty.

[111] This is clearly shown by the fact that Bulgaria became part of the Geneva Convention upon its accession, even while it was still a vassal state under Turkish control.

[112] See above, § 56, and Baty, International Law in South Africa (1900), pp. 66-68.

[112] See above, § 56, and Baty, International Law in South Africa (1900), pp. 66-68.

Insurgents as a Belligerent Power.

Insurgents as a warring power.

§ 76. The distinction between legal qualification and actual power to make war explains the fact that insurgents may become a belligerent Power. It is a customary rule of the Law of Nations that any State may recognise insurgents as a belligerent Power, provided (1) they are in possession of a certain part of the territory of the legitimate Government; (2) they have set up a Government of their own; and (3) they conduct their armed contention with the legitimate Government according to the laws and usages of war.[113] Such[Pg 93] insurgents in fact, although not in law, form a State-like community, and practically they are making war, although their contention is by International Law not considered as war in the technical sense of the term as long as they have not received recognition as a belligerent Power.

§ 76. The difference between legal qualification and actual power to wage war explains why insurgents can be recognized as a belligerent Power. According to customary international law, any State can recognize insurgents as a belligerent Power, as long as (1) they control a certain area of the legitimate Government’s territory; (2) they have established their own Government; and (3) they conduct their armed conflict with the legitimate Government according to the laws and practices of war.[113]Such[Pg 93] insurgents do form a community similar to a State, although not legally recognized, and they are effectively waging war, even though their conflict isn't considered war under international law in the technical sense until they receive recognition as a belligerent Power.

[113] See above, § 59. See also Rougier, Les guerres civiles, &c. (1903), pp. 372-447, and Westlake, I. pp. 50-57. The Institute of International Law, at its meeting at Neuchatel in 1900, adopted a body of nine articles concerning the rights and duties of foreign States in case of an insurrection; articles 4-9 deal with the recognition of the belligerency of insurgents. See Annuaire, XVIII. p. 227.

[113] See above, § 59. See also Rougier, Les guerres civiles, &c. (1903), pp. 372-447, and Westlake, I. pp. 50-57. The Institute of International Law, at its meeting in Neuchatel in 1900, adopted a set of nine articles regarding the rights and responsibilities of foreign states in the event of an insurrection; articles 4-9 address the recognition of the belligerency of insurgents. See Annuaire, XVIII. p. 227.

Principal and accessory Belligerent Parties.

Principal and accessory Parties.

§ 77. War occurs usually between two States, one belligerent party being on each side. But there are cases in which there are on one or on both sides several parties, and in some of such cases principal and accessory belligerent parties are to be distinguished.

§ 77. War typically happens between two countries, with a fighting party on each side. However, there are situations where one or both sides have multiple parties, and in some of these cases, we need to distinguish between main and supporting fighting parties.

Principal belligerent parties are those parties to a war who wage it on the basis of a treaty of alliance, whether such treaty was concluded before or during the war. On the other hand, accessory belligerent parties are such States as provide help and succour only in a limited way to a principal belligerent party at war with another State; for instance, by paying subsidies, sending a certain number of troops or men-of-war to take part in the contention, granting a coaling station to the men-of-war of the principal party, allowing the latter's troops a passage through their territory, and the like. Such accessory party becomes a belligerent through rendering help.

Principal belligerent parties are the groups involved in a war based on a treaty of alliance, whether that treaty was made before or during the war. On the other hand, accessory belligerent parties are states that provide limited support to a principal belligerent party engaged in war with another state; for instance, by paying subsidies, sending a specific number of troops or warships to participate in the conflict, granting a coaling station to the principal party's warships, or allowing their troops to pass through their territory, and so on. An accessory party becomes a belligerent by offering assistance.

The matter need hardly be mentioned at all were it not for the fact that the question was formerly discussed by publicists whether or not it involved a violation of neutrality on the part of a neutral State in case it fulfilled in time of war a treaty concluded in time of peace, by the terms of which it had to grant a coaling station, the passage of troops through its territory, and the like, to one of the belligerents. This question is identical with the question, to be treated below in[Pg 94] § 305, whether a qualified neutrality, in contradistinction to a perfect neutrality, is admissible. Since the answer to this question is in the negative, such State as fulfils a treaty obligation of this kind in time of war may be considered by the other side an accessory belligerent party to the war, and all doubt in the matter ought now to be removed since article 2 of Convention V. of the Second Peace Conference[114] categorically enacts that "belligerents are forbidden to move across the territory of a neutral Power troops or convoys either of munitions of war or of supplies."

The issue hardly needs to be mentioned at all if it weren't for the fact that publicists previously discussed whether it constituted a violation of neutrality for a neutral State to fulfill a treaty made in peacetime during a war. This treaty might require the neutral State to provide a coaling station, allow the passage of troops through its territory, and similar provisions for one of the warring parties. This question is the same as the one that will be addressed below in[Pg 94] § 305, which considers whether a qualified neutrality, as opposed to a perfect neutrality, is acceptable. Since the answer to this question is negative, any State that fulfills such a treaty obligation during wartime may be regarded by the opposing side as an accessory belligerent party to the conflict. All doubts about this matter should now be cleared up, as Article 2 of Convention V of the Second Peace Conference[114] clearly states that "belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power."

[114] See also article 3 of Convention V.

[114] See also Article 3 of Convention V.

VI THE ARMED FORCES OF THE CONFLICTING PARTIES

Vattel, III. §§ 223-231—Hall, §§ 177-179, 181—Lawrence, §§ 148-150—Westlake, II. pp. 60-63—Manning, pp. 206-210—Phillimore, III. § 94—Twiss, II. § 45—Halleck, I. pp. 555-562—Taylor, §§ 471-476—Moore, VII. § 1109—Wheaton, §§ 356-358—Bluntschli, §§ 569-572—Heffter, §§ 124-124A—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 371-385—Klüber, 267—G. F. Martens, II. § 271—Gareis, § 83—Ullmann, § 175—Liszt, § 40, II.—Bonfils, Nos. 1088-1098—Despagnet, Nos. 520-523—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2721-2732, and VIII. Nos. 3091-3102—Nys, III. pp. 155-202—Rivier, II. pp. 242-259—Calvo, IV. §§ 2044-2065—Fiore, III. Nos. 1303-1316, and Code, Nos. 1455-1475—Martens, II. § 112—Longuet, §§ 26-36—Pillet, pp. 35-59—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 4-8—Perels, § 34—Boeck, Nos. 209-213—Dupuis, Nos. 74-91—Lawrence, War, pp. 195-218—Zorn, pp. 36-73—Bordwell, pp. 228-236—Land Warfare, § 17-38—Meurer, II. §§ 11-20—Spaight, pp. 34-72—Ariga, pp. 74-91—Takahashi, pp. 89-93.

Vattel, III. §§ 223-231—Hall, §§ 177-179, 181—Lawrence, §§ 148-150—Westlake, II. pp. 60-63—Manning, pp. 206-210—Phillimore, III. § 94—Twiss, II. § 45—Halleck, I. pp. 555-562—Taylor, §§ 471-476—Moore, VII. § 1109—Wheaton, §§ 356-358—Bluntschli, §§ 569-572—Heffter, §§ 124-124A—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 371-385—Klüber, 267—G. F. Martens, II. § 271—Gareis, § 83—Ullmann, § 175—Liszt, § 40, II.—Bonfils, Nos. 1088-1098—Despagnet, Nos. 520-523—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2721-2732, and VIII. Nos. 3091-3102—Nys, III. pp. 155-202—Rivier, II. pp. 242-259—Calvo, IV. §§ 2044-2065—Fiore, III. Nos. 1303-1316, and Code, Nos. 1455-1475—Martens, II. § 112—Longuet, §§ 26-36—Pillet, pp. 35-59—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 4-8—Perels, § 34—Boeck, Nos. 209-213—Dupuis, Nos. 74-91—Lawrence, War, pp. 195-218—Zorn, pp. 36-73—Bordwell, pp. 228-236—Land Warfare, § 17-38—Meurer, II. §§ 11-20—Spaight, pp. 34-72—Ariga, pp. 74-91—Takahashi, pp. 89-93.

Regular Armies and Navies.

Regular Forces

§ 78. The chief part of the armed forces of the belligerents are their regular armies and navies. What kinds of forces constitute a regular army and a regular navy is not for International Law to determine, but a matter of Municipal Law exclusively. Whether or not so-called Militia and Volunteer corps belong to armies rests entirely with the Municipal Law of the belligerents. There are several States whose armies[Pg 95] consist of Militia and Volunteer Corps exclusively, no standing army being provided for. The Hague Regulations expressly stipulate in article 1 that in countries where Militia or Volunteer Corps constitute the army or form part of it they are included under the denomination "Army." It is likewise irrelevant to consider the composition of a regular army, whether it is based on conscription or not, whether natives only or foreigners also are enrolled, and the like.

§ 78. The main components of the armed forces of the warring parties are their regular armies and navies. What qualifies as a regular army and a regular navy is not something that International Law can define; it's strictly a matter of Municipal Law. Whether so-called Militia and Volunteer corps are considered part of the armies depends entirely on the Municipal Law of the warring parties. There are several States whose armies[Pg 95] are made up solely of Militia and Volunteer Corps, without a standing army being established. The Hague Regulations clearly state in article 1 that in countries where Militia or Volunteer Corps make up the army or are part of it, they are classified under the term "Army." It's also irrelevant to examine the makeup of a regular army, whether it relies on conscription or not, whether it includes only locals or also foreigners, and so on.

Non-combatant Members of Armed Forces.

Support Staff of Armed Forces.

§ 79. In the main, armed forces consist of combatants, but no army in the field consists of combatants exclusively, as there are always several kinds of other individuals, such as couriers, aeronauts, doctors, farriers, veterinary surgeons, chaplains, nurses, official and voluntary ambulance men, contractors, canteen-caterers, newspaper correspondents,[115] civil servants, diplomatists, and foreign military attachés[116] in the suite of the Commander-in-Chief.

§ 79. Essentially, armed forces are made up of combatants, but no army in the field is made up of combatants alone, as there are always various other individuals present, such as couriers, balloonists, doctors, farriers, veterinarians, chaplains, nurses, both official and volunteer paramedics, contractors, canteen workers, journalists,[115] government employees, diplomats, and foreign military attachés[116] in the Commander-in-Chief's entourage.

[115] See Rey in R.G. XVII. (1910), pp. 73-102, and Higgins, War and the Private Citizen (1912), pp. 91-114.

[115] See Rey in R.G. XVII. (1910), pp. 73-102, and Higgins, War and the Private Citizen (1912), pp. 91-114.

[116] See Rey in R.G. XVII. (1910), pp. 63-73.

[116] See Rey in R.G. XVII. (1910), pp. 63-73.

Writers on the Law of Nations do not agree as regards the position of such individuals; they are not mere private individuals, but, on the other hand, are certainly not combatants, although they may—as, for instance, couriers, doctors, farriers, and veterinary surgeons—have the character of soldiers. They may correctly be said to belong indirectly to the armed forces. Article 3 of the Hague Regulations expressly stipulates that the armed forces of the belligerents may consist of combatants and non-combatants, and that both in case of capture must be treated as prisoners of war, provided[117] they produce a certificate of identification from the military authorities of the army they are accompanying. However, when one speaks of armed forces generally, combatants only are in consideration.

Writers on the Law of Nations have differing opinions on the status of these individuals; they are not just private individuals, but they also aren’t combatants. However, they can have the role of soldiers, like couriers, doctors, farriers, and veterinary surgeons. They can be said to belong indirectly to the armed forces. Article 3 of the Hague Regulations clearly states that the armed forces of the warring parties can include both combatants and non-combatants, and that in the event of capture, both must be treated as prisoners of war, as long as[117] they show a certificate of identification from the military authorities of the army they are with. However, when discussing armed forces in general, only combatants are considered.

[117] See below, § 127.[Pg 96]

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.[Pg 96]

Irregular Forces.

Irregular Forces.

§ 80. Very often the armed forces of belligerents consist throughout the war of their regular armies only, but, on the other hand, it happens frequently that irregular forces take part in the war. Of such irregular forces there are two different kinds to be distinguished—first, such as are authorised by the belligerents; and, secondly, such as are acting on their own initiative and their own account without special authorisation. Formerly it was a recognised rule of International Law that only the members of authorised irregular forces enjoyed the privileges due to the members of the armed forces of belligerents, whereas members of unauthorised irregular forces were considered to be war criminals and could be shot when captured. During the Franco-German war in 1870 the Germans acted throughout according to this rule with regard to the so-called "Franctireurs," requesting the production of a special authorisation from the French Government from every irregular combatant they captured, failing which he was shot. But according to article 1 of the Hague Regulations this rule is now obsolete, and its place is taken by the rule that irregulars enjoy the privileges due to members of the armed forces of the belligerents, although they do not act under authorisation, provided (1) that they are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, (2) that they have a fixed distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance,[118] (3) that they carry arms openly,[119] and [Pg 97](4) that they conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. It must, however, be emphasised that this rule applies only to irregulars fighting in bodies, however small. Such individuals as take up arms or commit hostile acts singly and severally are still liable to be treated as war criminals, and shot.[120]

§ 80. Often, the armed forces of warring parties are made up only of their regular armies throughout the conflict. However, it's also common for irregular forces to participate in the war. There are two types of such irregular forces to distinguish—first, those authorized by the warring parties; and second, those acting independently without specific authorization. Previously, it was an accepted rule of International Law that only members of authorized irregular forces received the privileges granted to members of the armed forces of warring parties, while members of unauthorized irregular forces were viewed as war criminals and could be executed upon capture. During the Franco-German War in 1870, the Germans adhered to this rule concerning the so-called "Franctireurs," insisting that every irregular combatant they captured produce a special authorization from the French Government, or they would face execution. However, according to Article 1 of the Hague Regulations, this rule is now outdated, replaced by the principle that irregulars are granted the same privileges as members of the armed forces of the warring parties, even if they do not act under authorization, provided that (1) they are commanded by someone responsible for their actions, (2) they have a fixed, recognizable emblem that can be seen from a distance,[118] (3) they carry their weapons openly,[119] and [Pg 97] (4) they conduct their operations according to the laws and customs of war. However, it is important to note that this rule only applies to irregulars fighting in groups, no matter how small. Individuals who take up arms or carry out hostile actions alone can still be treated as war criminals and executed.[120]

[118] The distance at which the emblem should be visible is undetermined. See Land Warfare, § 23, where it is pointed out that it is reasonable to expect that the silhouette of an irregular combatant in the position of standing against the skyline should be at once distinguishable from the outline of a peaceable inhabitant, and this by the naked eye of ordinary individuals, at a distance at which the form of an individual can be determined.—See Ariga, p. 87, concerning 120 irregulars who were treated as criminals and shot by the Japanese after the occupation of Vladimirowka on the island of Sakhaline.

[118] The distance at which the emblem should be visible is unclear. See Land Warfare, § 23, which states that it’s reasonable to expect that the silhouette of an irregular combatant standing against the skyline should be easily distinguishable from the outline of a peaceful resident, and this should be recognizable by the average person at a distance where the shape of an individual can be made out.—See Ariga, p. 87, regarding 120 irregulars who were treated as criminals and executed by the Japanese after the occupation of Vladimirowka on Sakhalin Island.

[119] See Land Warfare, § 26; individuals whose sole arm is a pistol, hand-grenade, a dagger concealed about the person, or a sword-stick, are not such as carry their arms openly.

[119] See Land Warfare, § 26; people who only have a pistol, hand grenade, a concealed dagger, or a sword cane are not ones who carry their weapons openly.

[120] See below, § 254.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Levies en masse.

Levies in bulk.

§ 81. It sometimes happens during war that on the approach of the enemy a belligerent calls the whole population of the country to arms and thus makes them a part, although a more or less irregular part, of his armed forces. Provided they receive some organisation and comply with the laws and usages of war, the combatants who take part in such a levy en masse organised by the State enjoy the privileges due to members of armed forces.

§ 81. Sometimes during war, when the enemy approaches, a fighting nation calls the entire population to arms and makes them part of its military forces, even if in a somewhat irregular way. As long as they receive some organization and follow the laws and customs of war, the fighters who participate in such a mobilization en masse organized by the State have the same rights as regular members of the armed forces.

It sometimes happens, further, during wars, that a levy en masse takes place spontaneously without organisation by a belligerent, and the question arises whether or not those who take part in such levies en masse belong to the armed forces of the belligerents, and therefore enjoy the privileges due to members of such forces. Article 2 of the Hague Regulations stipulates that the population of a territory not yet occupied who, on the enemy's approach, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading enemy, without having time to organise themselves under responsible commanders and to procure fixed distinctive emblems recognisable at a distance, shall nevertheless enjoy the privileges due to armed forces, provided that they carry arms openly and act otherwise in conformity with the laws and usages of war. But this case is totally different from a levy en masse of the population of a territory already invaded by the enemy, for the purpose of freeing the country from the invader. The[Pg 98] stipulation of the Hague Regulations quoted above does not cover this case, in which, therefore, the old customary rule of International Law is valid, that those taking part in such a levy en masse, if captured, are liable to be shot.[121]

It sometimes happens during wars that a spontaneous draft en masse occurs without the organization of a warring party, raising the question of whether those who join such drafts en masse are considered part of the armed forces of the warring parties and thus entitled to the privileges granted to members of those forces. Article 2 of the Hague Regulations states that the population of an unoccupied territory, who, upon the enemy's approach, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces without having time to organize themselves under accountable leaders or provide fixed distinguishing symbols that can be recognized from a distance, shall still enjoy the privileges associated with armed forces, as long as they carry their weapons openly and act in accordance with the laws and customs of war. However, this situation is entirely different from a draft en masse of the population of a territory already invaded by the enemy, aimed at driving out the invader. The stipulation of the Hague Regulations mentioned above does not apply here, meaning that the traditional rule of International Law is applicable: those participating in such a draft en masse, if captured, can be executed.[121]

[121] See below, § 254. Article 85 of the American Instructions for the Government of Armies in the Field of 1863 has enacted this rule as follows: "War rebels are persons within an occupied territory who rise in arms against the occupying or conquering army, or against the authorities established by the same. If captured, they may suffer death, whether they rise singly, in small or large bands, and whether called upon to do so by their own, but expelled Government or not...."

[121] See below, § 254. Article 85 of the American Instructions for the Government of Armies in the Field from 1863 states this rule as follows: "War rebels are individuals in an occupied territory who take up arms against the occupying or conquering army, or against the authorities established by them. If captured, they may face the death penalty, whether they act alone, in small groups, or in large ones, and regardless of whether they are called to do so by their own exiled government or not...."

It is of particular importance not to confound invasion with occupation in this matter. Article 2 distinctly speaks of the approach of the enemy, and thereby sanctions only such a levy en masse as takes place in territory not yet invaded by the enemy. Once the territory is invaded, although the invasion has not yet ripened into occupation,[122] a levy en masse is no longer legitimate. But, of course, the term territory, as used by article 2, is not intended to mean[123] the whole extent of the State of a belligerent, but refers only to such parts of it as are not yet invaded. For this reason, if a town is already invaded, but not a neighbouring town, the inhabitants of the latter may, on the approach of the enemy, legitimately rise en masse. And it matters not whether the individuals taking part in the levy en masse are acting in immediate combination with a regular army or separately from it.[124]

It is especially important not to confuse invasion with occupation in this situation. Article 2 clearly refers to the approach of the enemy and thus only allows for a levy en masse that occurs in areas not yet invaded by the enemy. Once the territory is invaded, even if the invasion hasn’t developed into occupation,[122] a levy en masse is no longer valid. However, the term territory in article 2 doesn’t mean[123] the entire state of a belligerent; it only refers to those parts that are not yet invaded. Therefore, if one town is already invaded but a neighboring town is not, the residents of the latter can legitimately rise en masse when the enemy approaches. It doesn’t matter if the individuals participating in the levy en masse are working directly with a regular army or acting independently.[124]

[122] Concerning the difference between invasion and occupation, see below, § 167.

[122] Regarding the difference between invasion and occupation, see below, § 167.

[123] See Land Warfare, §§ 31-32.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Land Warfare, §§ 31-32.

[124] See Land Warfare, § 34.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Land Warfare, § 34.

Barbarous Forces.

Brutal Forces.

§ 82. As International Law grew up amongst the States of Christendom, and as the circle of the members of the Family of Nations includes only civilised, although not necessarily Christian, States, all writers on International Law agree that in wars between themselves the members of the Family of Nations should not make use of barbarous forces—that is, troops consisting of[Pg 99] individuals belonging to savage tribes and barbarous races. But it can hardly be maintained that a rule of this kind has customarily grown up in practice, nor has it been stipulated by treaties, and the Hague Regulations overlook this point. This being the fact, it is difficult to say whether the members of such barbarous forces, if employed in a war between members of the Family of Nations, would enjoy the privileges due to members of armed forces generally. I see no reason why they should not, provided such barbarous forces would or could comply with the laws and usages of war prevalent according to International Law. But the very fact that they are barbarians makes it probable that they could or would not do so, and then it would be unreasonable to grant them the privileges generally due to members of armed forces, and it would be necessary to treat them according to discretion.[125] But it must be specially observed that the employment of barbarous forces must not be confounded with the enrolling of coloured individuals into the regular army and the employment of regiments consisting of disciplined coloured soldiers. There is no reason whatever why, for instance, the members of a regiment eventually formed by the United States of America out of negroes bred and educated in America, or why members of Indian regiments under English commanders, if employed in wars between members of the Family of Nations, should not enjoy the privileges due to the members of armed forces according to International Law.

§ 82. As International Law developed among the nations of Christendom, and as the group of the Family of Nations includes only civilized, though not necessarily Christian, countries, all authors on International Law agree that in conflicts among themselves, the members of the Family of Nations should not use barbaric forces—that is, troops made up of individuals from savage tribes and barbaric races. However, it’s hard to argue that a rule like this has been consistently upheld in practice, nor has it been established by treaties, and the Hague Regulations ignore this issue. Given this reality, it's difficult to determine whether members of such barbaric forces, if used in a war between members of the Family of Nations, would receive the same privileges as regular armed forces. I see no reason why they shouldn't, as long as these barbaric forces would or could follow the laws and customs of war as set out by International Law. But the very fact that they are considered barbarians makes it likely that they could or would not do so, and in that case, it would be unreasonable to grant them the same privileges typically given to armed forces, and they would need to be treated at the discretion of the commanders. But it must be emphasized that the use of barbaric forces should not be confused with the enlistment of individuals of color into the regular army or the deployment of units made up of disciplined soldiers of color. There is no reason at all why, for example, members of a regiment eventually formed by the United States of America from African Americans raised and educated in America, or members of Indian regiments under British commanders, if employed in conflicts between members of the Family of Nations, should not receive the privileges due to armed forces under International Law.

[125] As regards the limited use made of armed natives as scouts, and the like, on the part of the British commanders during the South-African War, see The Times' History of the War in South Africa, pp. 249-251. The Boers refused quarter to any such armed natives as fell into their hands.

[125] Regarding the limited use of armed local soldiers as scouts and similar roles by British commanders during the South African War, see The Times' History of the War in South Africa, pp. 249-251. The Boers offered no mercy to any armed locals they captured.

Privateers.

Privateers.

§ 83. Formerly privateers were a generally recognised part of the armed forces of the belligerents, private vessels being commissioned by the belligerents[Pg 100] through Letters of Marque to carry on hostilities at sea, and particularly to capture enemy merchantmen.[126] From the fifteenth century, when privateering began to grow up, down to the eighteenth century, belligerents used to grant such Letters of Marque to private ships owned by their subjects and by the subjects of neutral States. But during the eighteenth century the practice grew up that belligerents granted Letters of Marque to private ships of their own subjects only.[127] However, privateering was abolished by the Declaration of Paris in 1856 as between the signatory Powers and others who joined it later. And although privateering would still be legal as between other Powers, it will in future scarcely be made use of. In all the wars that occurred after 1856 between such Powers, no Letters of Marque were granted to private ships.[128]

§ 83. In the past, privateers were widely accepted as part of the armed forces of countries at war, with private vessels being authorized by the warring parties[Pg 100] through Letters of Marque to engage in combat at sea, particularly to seize enemy merchant ships.[126] From the fifteenth century, when privateering began to emerge, until the eighteenth century, warring nations granted these Letters of Marque to private ships owned by their citizens as well as those from neutral countries. However, during the eighteenth century, it became common for warring parties to issue Letters of Marque solely to private ships owned by their own citizens.[127] Nevertheless, privateering was abolished by the Declaration of Paris in 1856 among the signatory nations and those that later joined. Although privateering could still be legal between other nations, it will likely be rarely used in the future. In all the conflicts that took place after 1856 between these nations, no Letters of Marque were issued to private ships.[128]

[126] See Martens, Essai concernant les armateurs, les prises, et surtout les reprises (1795).

[126] See Martens, Essay on Shipowners, Captures, and Especially Recaptures (1795).

Converted Merchantmen.

Merchants.

§ 84. A case which happened in 1870, soon after the outbreak of the Franco-German war, gave occasion for the question whether converted merchantmen could be considered a part of the armed naval forces of a belligerent. As the North-German Confederation owned only a few men-of-war, the creation of a volunteer fleet was intended. The King of Prussia, as President of the Confederation, invited the owners of private German vessels to make them a part of the German[Pg 101] navy under the following conditions: Every ship should be assessed as to her value, and 10 per cent. of such value should at once be paid in cash to the owner as a price for the charter of the ship. The owner should engage the crew himself, but the latter should become for the time of the war members of the German navy, wear the German naval uniform, and the ship should sail under the German war flag and be armed and adapted for her purpose by the German naval authorities. Should the ship be captured or destroyed by the enemy, the assessed value should be paid to her owners in full; but should it be restored after the war undamaged, the owner should retain the 10 per cent. received as charter price. All such vessels should only try to capture or destroy French men-of-war, and if successful the owner should receive a sum between £1500 and £7500 as premium. The French Government considered this scheme a disguised evasion of the Declaration of Paris which abolished privateering, and requested the intervention of Great Britain. The British Government brought the case before the Law Officers of the Crown, who declared the German scheme to be substantially different from the revival of privateering, and consequently the British Government refused to object to it. The scheme, however, was never put into practice.[129]

§ 84. A case that occurred in 1870, shortly after the start of the Franco-German war, raised the question of whether converted merchant ships could be regarded as part of the military naval forces of a warring nation. Since the North-German Confederation had only a few warships, they aimed to create a volunteer fleet. The King of Prussia, as President of the Confederation, invited owners of private German vessels to incorporate them into the German[Pg 101] navy under these conditions: Each ship would be evaluated for its value, and 10 percent of that value would be paid immediately in cash to the owner as a rental price for the ship. The owner would hire the crew, but they would become members of the German navy for the duration of the war, wear the German naval uniform, and the ship would fly the German war flag, being armed and outfitted for its purpose by the German naval authorities. If the ship were captured or destroyed by the enemy, the full assessed value would be paid to its owners; however, if it were returned after the war unharmed, the owner would keep the 10 percent received as rental payment. All such vessels would only attempt to capture or destroy French warships, and if successful, the owner would receive a bonus ranging from £1500 to £7500. The French Government viewed this plan as a disguised way of sidestepping the Declaration of Paris, which prohibited privateering, and sought the intervention of Great Britain. The British Government presented the case to the Law Officers of the Crown, who determined that the German plan was fundamentally different from reviving privateering, leading the British Government to refrain from opposing it. However, the plan was never implemented.[129]

[129] See Perels, § 34; Hall, § 182; Boeck, No. 211; Dupuis, Nos. 81-84.

[129] See Perels, § 34; Hall, § 182; Boeck, No. 211; Dupuis, Nos. 81-84.

Now, in spite of the opinion of the British Law Officers, writers on International Law differ as to the legality of the above scheme; but, on the other hand, they are unanimous that not every scheme for a voluntary fleet is to be rejected. Russia,[130] in fact, since 1877, has possessed a voluntary fleet. France[131] has made arrangements with certain steamship companies according to which their mail-boats have to be[Pg 102] constructed on plans approved by the Government, have to be commanded by officers of the French navy, and have to be incorporated in the French navy at the outbreak of war. Great Britain from 1887 onwards has entered into agreements with several powerful British steamship companies for the purpose of securing their vessels at the outbreak of hostilities; and the United States of America in 1892 made similar arrangements with the American Line.[132]

Now, despite the views of the British Law Officers, experts in International Law have differing opinions on the legality of the scheme mentioned above; however, they all agree that not every plan for a voluntary fleet should be dismissed. Russia,[130] has actually had a voluntary fleet since 1877. France[131] has made agreements with certain steamship companies, requiring that their mail boats be[Pg 102] built according to Government-approved designs, commanded by officers from the French navy, and integrated into the French navy at the start of a war. Great Britain has been forming agreements with several major British steamship companies since 1887 to secure their ships at the onset of conflict; and the United States made similar deals with the American Line in 1892.[132]

[130] See Dupuis, No. 85.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Check Dupuis, No. 85.

[131] See Dupuis, No. 86.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Dupuis, No. 86.

[132] See Lawrence, § 201, and Dupuis, Nos. 87-88. On the whole question see Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3102-3103.

[132] Check out Lawrence, § 201, and Dupuis, Nos. 87-88. For a broader discussion, see Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3102-3103.

Matters were brought to a climax in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, through the cases of the Peterburg and the Smolensk.[133] On July 4 and 6 of that year, these vessels, which belonged to the Russian volunteer fleet in the Black Sea, were allowed to pass the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, which are closed[134] to men-of-war of all nations, because they were flying the Russian commercial flag. They likewise passed the Suez Canal under their commercial flag, but after leaving Suez they converted themselves into men-of-war by hoisting the Russian war flag, and began to exercise over neutral merchantmen all rights of supervision which belligerents can claim for their cruisers in time of war. On July 13 the Peterburg captured the British P. & O. steamer Malacca for alleged carriage of contraband, and put a prize-crew on board for the purpose of navigating her to Libau. But the British Government protested; the Malacca was released at Algiers on her way to Libau on July 27, and Russia agreed that the Peterburg and the Smolensk should no longer act as cruisers, and that all neutral vessels captured by them should be released.

Things came to a head in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War with the cases of the Peterburg and the Smolensk.[133] On July 4 and 6 of that year, these ships, which were part of the Russian volunteer fleet in the Black Sea, were permitted to pass through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, which are closed[134] to warships from all nations, because they were flying the Russian commercial flag. They also passed through the Suez Canal under their commercial flag, but after leaving Suez, they changed into warships by raising the Russian war flag and began to enforce all rights of oversight that belligerents can exercise over neutral merchant ships during wartime. On July 13, the Peterburg captured the British P. & O. steamer Malacca for allegedly carrying contraband and placed a prize crew on board to navigate her to Libau. However, the British Government protested; the Malacca was released in Algiers while en route to Libau on July 27, and Russia agreed that the Peterburg and the Smolensk would no longer operate as cruisers and that all neutral vessels they captured would be released.

[133] See the details of the career of these vessels in Lawrence, War, pp. 205 seq.

[133] See the details about the careers of these vessels in Lawrence, War, pp. 205 seq.

This case was the cause of the question of the conversion of merchantmen into men-of-war being[Pg 103] taken up by the Second Peace Conference in 1907, which produced Convention VII. on the matter.[135] This Convention, which is signed by all the States represented at the Conference except the United States of America, China, San Domingo, Nicaragua, and Uruguay—but Nicaragua acceded later—comprises twelve articles; its more important stipulations are the following: No converted vessel can have the status of a warship unless she is placed under the direct authority, immediate control, and responsibility of the Power whose flag she flies (article 1). Such a vessel must, therefore, bear the external marks which distinguish the warships of her nationality (article 2); the commander must be in the service of the State concerned, must be duly commissioned, and his name must figure on the list of the officers of the military fleet (article 3); and the crew must be subject to the rules of military discipline (article 4). A converted vessel must observe the laws and usages of war (article 5) and her conversion must as soon as possible be announced by the belligerent concerned in the list of the ships of his military fleet (article 6).

This case raised the issue of whether merchant ships can be turned into warships, which was addressed by the Second Peace Conference in 1907, resulting in Convention VII on the subject.[Pg 103] This Convention was signed by all the countries represented at the Conference except the United States, China, San Domingo, Nicaragua, and Uruguay—though Nicaragua joined later—and it consists of twelve articles. The key stipulations include: A converted vessel cannot be considered a warship unless it is under the direct authority, immediate control, and responsibility of the state whose flag it flies (article 1). Such a vessel must bear the external markings that identify the warships of its nationality (article 2); the commander must be a member of the state’s service, properly commissioned, and his name must be on the roster of military fleet officers (article 3); and the crew must follow military discipline rules (article 4). A converted vessel must comply with the laws and customs of war (article 5), and the belligerent must announce the conversion in the list of the ships of his military fleet as soon as possible (article 6).

[135] See Wilson in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 271-275; Lémonon, pp. 607-622; Higgins, pp. 312-321; Dupuis, Nos. 48-58; Nippold, II. pp. 73-84; Scott, Conferences, pp. 568-576; Higgins, War and the Private Citizen (1912), pp. 115-168.

[135] See Wilson in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 271-275; Lémonon, pp. 607-622; Higgins, pp. 312-321; Dupuis, Nos. 48-58; Nippold, II. pp. 73-84; Scott, Conferences, pp. 568-576; Higgins, War and the Private Citizen (1912), pp. 115-168.

The opinion, which largely prevails, that through this admittance of the conversion of merchantmen into men-of-war privateering has been revived, is absolutely unfounded, for the rules stipulated by Convention VII. in no way abrogate the rule of the Declaration of Paris that privateering is and remains abolished. But the Convention does not give satisfaction in so far as it does not settle the questions where the conversion of a vessel may be performed, and whether it is permitted to reconvert, before the termination of the war, into a merchantman a vessel[Pg 104] which during the war had been converted into a warship. The fact is, the Powers could not come to an agreement on these two points, the one party claiming that conversion could only be performed within a harbour of the converting Power, or an enemy harbour occupied by it, the other party defending the claim to convert likewise on the High Seas. One must look to the future for a compromise that will settle this vexed controversy. It is, however, important to notice the fact that the preamble of Convention VII. states expressly that the question of the place where a conversion may be performed remains open. Those Powers which claim that conversions[136] must not take place on the High Seas are not, therefore, prevented from refusing to acknowledge the public character of any vessel which had been converted on the High Seas, and from upholding their view that a converted vessel may not alternately claim the character and the privileges of a belligerent man-of-war and a merchantman.

The prevailing belief that allowing merchant ships to be turned into warships has revived privateering is completely unfounded. The rules set out by Convention VII do not override the Declaration of Paris, which states that privateering is abolished and remains so. However, the Convention falls short because it does not address where a vessel can be converted or whether it can switch back to a merchant ship before the war ends, after being converted into a warship during the conflict. The truth is, the Powers couldn't agree on these two issues. One side insists that conversions can only happen in a harbor of the converting Power or in an enemy harbor it occupies, while the other side argues that conversions can also take place on the High Seas. We must look ahead for a compromise to resolve this ongoing dispute. It's also important to note that the preamble of Convention VII clearly states that the question of where a conversion can occur is still open. The Powers that argue conversions must not happen on the High Seas are therefore not barred from refusing to recognize the public status of any vessel converted there and from maintaining their stance that a converted vessel cannot simultaneously claim the status and privileges of a warship and a merchant ship.

[136] Concerning the question whether an enemy merchantman, captured on the High Seas, may at once be converted into a warship, see below, p. 231, note 2.

[136] Regarding whether an enemy merchant ship captured on the High Seas can be immediately turned into a warship, see below, p. 231, note 2.

The Crews of Merchantmen.

Merchant ship crews.

§ 85. In a sense the crews of merchantmen owned by subjects of the belligerents belong to the latter's armed forces. For those vessels are liable to be seized by enemy men-of-war, and if attacked for that purpose they may defend themselves, may return the attack, and eventually seize the attacking men-of-war. The crews of merchantmen become in such cases combatants, and enjoy all the privileges of the members of armed forces. But unless attacked they must not commit hostilities, and if they do so they are liable to be treated as criminals just as are private individuals who commit hostilities in land warfare. Some writers[137] assert that, although merchantmen of the belligerents are not competent to exercise the right of visit, search,[Pg 105] and capture towards neutral vessels, they may attack enemy vessels—merchantmen as well as public vessels—not merely in self-defence but even without having been previously attacked, and that, consequently, the crews must in such case enjoy the privileges due to members of the armed forces. But this opinion is absolutely without foundation nowadays,[138] even in former times it was not generally recognised.[139]

§ 85. In a way, the crews of merchant ships owned by citizens of the warring nations are considered part of those nations' armed forces. These vessels can be seized by enemy warships, and if they are attacked for that reason, they have the right to defend themselves, return fire, and even seize the attacking warships. In these situations, the crews of merchant ships become combatants and have all the rights of armed forces members. However, unless they are attacked, they must not engage in hostilities, and if they do, they can be treated as criminals, just like individuals who commit acts of aggression in land warfare. Some writers[137] argue that although the merchant ships of warring nations cannot exercise the right of visit, search, [Pg 105] and capture against neutral vessels, they can attack enemy ships—both merchant and military—not just in self-defense but even without being attacked first, meaning their crews should have the same privileges as armed forces members. However, this view has no basis in today's world,[138] and even in the past, it was not widely accepted.[139]

[137] See Wheaton, § 357; Taylor, § 496; Walker, p. 135, and Science, p. 268.

[137] See Wheaton, § 357; Taylor, § 496; Walker, p. 135, and Science, p. 268.

[138] See below, § 181, and Hall, § 183.

[138] See below, § 181, and Hall, § 183.

[139] See Vattel, III. § 226, and G. F. Martens, II. § 289.

[139] See Vattel, III. § 226, and G. F. Martens, II. § 289.

It should be mentioned in regard to the fate of the crews of captured merchantmen that a distinction is to be made according as to whether or no a vessel has defended herself against a legitimate attack. In the first case the members of the crew become prisoners of war, for by legitimately taking part in the fighting they have become members of the armed forces of the enemy.[140] In the second case, articles 5 to 7 of Convention XI. of the Second Peace Conference enact the following rules:[141]

It should be noted regarding the fate of the crews of captured merchant ships that a distinction needs to be made based on whether a vessel defended itself against a legitimate attack. In the first scenario, the crew members become prisoners of war, as by legitimately participating in the fighting, they have effectively become part of the enemy's armed forces.[140] In the second scenario, articles 5 to 7 of Convention XI of the Second Peace Conference state the following rules:[141]

(1) Such members of the crew as are subjects of neutral States may not be made prisoners of war.

(1) Crew members who are from neutral countries cannot be taken as prisoners of war.

(2) The captain and the officers who are subjects of neutral States may only be made prisoners if they refuse to give a promise in writing not to serve on an enemy ship while the war lasts.

(2) The captain and officers from neutral States can only be taken as prisoners if they refuse to provide a written promise not to serve on an enemy ship for the duration of the war.

(3) The captain, officers, and such members of the crew who are enemy subjects may only be made prisoners if they refuse to give a written promise not to engage, while hostilities last, in any service connected with the operations of war.

(3) The captain, officers, and any crew members who are enemy subjects can only be taken prisoner if they refuse to provide a written promise not to participate, while hostilities are ongoing, in any activities related to military operations.

(4) The names of all the individuals retaining their liberty under parole must be notified by the captor to the enemy, and the latter is forbidden knowingly to employ the individuals concerned in any service prohibited by the parole.

(4) The names of all the people who are free under parole must be reported by the captor to the enemy, and the enemy is not allowed to knowingly use those individuals in any activities that are prohibited by the parole.

[140] This follows indirectly from article 8 of Convention XI.

[140] This is indirectly based on Article 8 of Convention XI.

[141] See below, § 201.[Pg 106]

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.[Pg 106]

Deserters and Traitors.

Deserters and traitors.

§ 86. The privileges of members of armed forces cannot be claimed by members of the armed forces of a belligerent who go over to the forces of the enemy and are afterwards captured by the former. They may be, and always are, treated as criminals. And the like is valid with regard to such treasonable subjects of a belligerent as, without having been members of his armed forces, are fighting in the armed forces of the enemy. Even if they appear under the protection of a flag of truce, deserters and traitors may be seized and punished.[142]

§ 86. Members of the armed forces cannot claim privileges if they switch sides to the enemy and are later captured by their former side. They can be, and always are, treated as criminals. The same applies to individuals engaging in treason against a belligerent, even if they were not part of that belligerent's armed forces but are fighting alongside the enemy. Even if they come under the protection of a truce flag, deserters and traitors can be captured and punished.[142]

[142] See below, § 222; Hall, § 190; Land Warfare, § 36.

[142] See below, § 222; Hall, § 190; Land Warfare, § 36.

VII RIVAL CHARACTER

Grotius, III. c. 4, §§ 6 and 7—Bynkershoek, Quaestiones juris publici, I. c. 3 in fine—Hall, §§ 167-175—Lawrence, §§ 151-159—Westlake, II. pp. 140-154—Phillimore, III. §§ 82-86—Twiss, II. §§ 152-162—Taylor, §§ 468 and 517—Walker, §§ 39-43—Wharton, III. §§ 352-353—Wheaton, §§ 324-341—Moore, VII. §§ 1185-1194—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 581-588—Ullmann, § 192—Nys, III. pp. 150-154—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3166-3175—Bonfils, Nos. 1343-13491—Despagnet, Nos. 650-653 quinto—Calvo, IV. §§ 1932-1952—Fiore, III. Nos. 1432-1436, and Code, Nos. 1701-1709—Boeck, Nos. 156-190—Dupuis, Nos. 92-129, and Guerre, Nos. 59-73—Lémonon, pp. 426-467—Higgins, p. 593—Nippold, II. pp. 40-54—Scott, Conferences, pp. 541-555—Frankenbach, Die Rechtsstellung von neutralen Staatsangehörigen in kriegführenden Staaten (1910)—Baty in The Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, New Series, IX. Part I. (1908), pp. 157-166, and Westlake, ibidem, Part II. (1909), pp. 265-268—Oppenheim in The Law Quarterly Review, XXV. (1909), pp. 372-383.

Grotius, III. c. 4, §§ 6 and 7—Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law, I. c. 3 at the end—Hall, §§ 167-175—Lawrence, §§ 151-159—Westlake, II. pp. 140-154—Phillimore, III. §§ 82-86—Twiss, II. §§ 152-162—Taylor, §§ 468 and 517—Walker, §§ 39-43—Wharton, III. §§ 352-353—Wheaton, §§ 324-341—Moore, VII. §§ 1185-1194—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 581-588—Ullmann, § 192—Nys, III. pp. 150-154—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3166-3175—Bonfils, Nos. 1343-13491—Despagnet, Nos. 650-653 fifth—Calvo, IV. §§ 1932-1952—Fiore, III. Nos. 1432-1436, and Code, Nos. 1701-1709—Boeck, Nos. 156-190—Dupuis, Nos. 92-129, and War, Nos. 59-73—Lémonon, pp. 426-467—Higgins, p. 593—Nippold, II. pp. 40-54—Scott, Conferences, pp. 541-555—Frankenbach, The Legal Status of Neutral Nationals in Warring States (1910)—Baty in The Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, New Series, IX. Part I. (1908), pp. 157-166, and Westlake, same source, Part II. (1909), pp. 265-268—Oppenheim in The Law Quarterly Review, XXV. (1909), pp. 372-383.

On Enemy Character in general.

On Antagonist Character in general.

§ 87. Since the belligerents, for the realisation of the purpose of war, are entitled to many kinds of measures against enemy persons and enemy property, the question must be settled as to what persons and what property are vested with enemy character. Now it is, generally speaking, correct to say that, whereas the subjects of the belligerents and the property of such subjects bear enemy character, the subjects of neutral States and the property of such subjects do[Pg 107] not bear enemy character. This rule has, however, important exceptions. For under certain circumstances and conditions enemy persons and property of enemy subjects may not bear, and, on the other hand, subjects of neutral States and their property may bear, enemy character. And it is even possible that a subject of a belligerent may for some parts bear enemy character as between himself and his home State.

§ 87. Since the fighters, to achieve the goals of war, are allowed to take various actions against enemy individuals and enemy property, we need to determine which individuals and properties are considered enemies. Generally speaking, it’s accurate to say that the citizens of the fighting states and their property are seen as enemies, while the citizens of neutral states and their property are not considered enemies. However, this rule has important exceptions. Under certain circumstances and conditions, enemy individuals and property belonging to enemy citizens may not be regarded as enemies, and on the flip side, individuals from neutral states and their property can be seen as enemies. It’s even possible that a citizen of a belligerent state may be considered an enemy in relation to their home state in some instances.

The matter of enemy character is, however, to a great extent in an unsettled condition, since on many points connected with it there are no universally recognised rules of International Law in existence. British and American Courts have worked out a body of precise and clear rules on the subject, but the practice of other countries, and especially of France, follows different lines. The Second Peace Conference of 1907 produced three articles on the matter—16, 17, and 18—in Convention V., accepted by all the signatory Powers, except Great Britain which, upon signing the Convention, entered a reservation against these three articles, and although these articles are only of minor importance, they have to be taken into consideration. On the other hand, the as yet unratified Declaration of London comprises a number of rules which, apart from two points, offer a common basis for the practice of all maritime States. At the first glance it would seem that only the four articles—57 to 60—of Chapter VI. headed "Enemy Character," treat of the subject under survey, but a closer examination shows that article 46, dealing with a certain kind of unneutral service, articles 55 and 56, dealing with transfer to a neutral flag, and, lastly, article 63, dealing with forcible resistance to the right of visitation, are also concerned with enemy character. In spite of these stipulations, which are accepted by all the Powers concerned, there remain two important points unsettled,[Pg 108] since neither the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 nor the Naval Conference of London of 1908-9 succeeded in agreeing upon a compromise concerning the old controversy as to whether nationality exclusively, or domicile also, should determine the neutral or enemy character of individuals and their goods, and further, whether or not neutral vessels acquire enemy character by embarking in time of war, with permission of the enemy, upon such trade with the latter as was closed to them in time of peace (Rule of 1756). According to article 7 of Convention XII. of the Second Hague Peace Conference, concerning the establishment of an International Prize Court, likewise not yet ratified, this Court would in time have to evolve a uniform practice of all the maritime States on these two points.

The issue of enemy character is still pretty unclear because there aren't universally accepted rules of International Law on many related points. British and American courts have established clear and specific rules on the topic, but the practices of other countries, especially France, vary. The Second Peace Conference of 1907 produced three articles on the subject—16, 17, and 18—in Convention V., which were accepted by all signatory Powers except Great Britain. Upon signing the Convention, Great Britain made a reservation against these three articles. Although these articles are not very significant, they still need to be considered. On the other hand, the unratified Declaration of London includes several rules that, aside from two issues, provide a common framework for the practices of all maritime States. At first glance, it seems that only the four articles—57 to 60—of Chapter VI, titled "Enemy Character," address this matter, but a closer look reveals that article 46, which deals with a certain type of unneutral service, articles 55 and 56, which concern the transfer to a neutral flag, and article 63, which addresses forceful resistance to the right of visitation, also relate to enemy character. Despite these stipulations, which are accepted by all the involved Powers, two important points remain unresolved, since neither the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 nor the Naval Conference of London of 1908-9 managed to find a compromise regarding the long-standing debate over whether nationality alone or domicile should determine the neutral or enemy status of individuals and their goods. Additionally, there is the question of whether neutral vessels take on enemy status by engaging in trade with the enemy during wartime, with the enemy's permission, for trade that was prohibited in peacetime (Rule of 1756). According to article 7 of Convention XII. from the Second Hague Peace Conference, which is also not yet ratified, this International Prize Court would eventually need to develop a consistent practice among all maritime States on these two issues.

For the consideration of enemy character in detail, it is convenient to distinguish between individuals, vessels, goods, the transfer of enemy vessels, and the transfer of enemy goods on enemy vessels.

For a detailed examination of enemy character, it's helpful to differentiate between individuals, ships, cargo, the transfer of enemy ships, and the transfer of enemy cargo on enemy ships.

Enemy Character of Individuals.

Adversary Character of Individuals.

§ 88. The general rule with regard to individuals is that subjects of the belligerents bear enemy character, whereas subjects of neutral States do not. In this sense article 16 of Convention V. stipulates: "The nationals of a State which is not taking part in the war are considered to be neutral." These neutral individuals can, however, lose their neutral and acquire enemy character in several cases, just as subjects of the belligerents can in other cases lose their enemy character:—

§ 88. The general rule regarding individuals is that the citizens of warring states are considered enemies, while the citizens of neutral states are not. In this context, article 16 of Convention V states: "The nationals of a State that is not participating in the war are regarded as neutral." However, these neutral individuals can lose their neutral status and be considered enemies in several situations, just as the citizens of warring states can, in certain cases, lose their enemy status:—

(1) Since relations of peace obtain between either of the belligerents and neutral States, the subjects of the latter can, by way of trade and otherwise, render many kinds of service to either belligerent without thereby losing their neutral character. On the other hand, if they enter the armed forces of a belligerent, or if they commit other acts in his favour, or commit hostile acts[Pg 109] against a belligerent, they acquire enemy character (article 17 of Convention V.). All measures that are allowed during war against enemy subjects are likewise allowed against such subjects of neutral Powers as have thus acquired enemy character. For instance, during the late South African War hundreds of subjects of neutral States, who were fighting in the ranks of the Boers, were captured by Great Britain and retained as prisoners until the end of the struggle. Such individuals must not, however, be more severely treated than enemy subjects, and, in especial, no punitive measures are allowed against them (article 17 of Convention V.). And article 18(a) of Convention V. stipulates expressly that subjects of neutral States not inhabiting the territory of the enemy or any territory militarily occupied by him do not acquire enemy character by furnishing supplies or making loans to the enemy, provided the supplies do not come from the enemy territory or any territory occupied by him.[143]

(1) Since peaceful relations exist between either of the fighting parties and neutral states, the citizens of the latter can, through trade and other means, provide various services to either side without losing their neutral status. However, if they join the armed forces of one of the belligerents, perform acts in favor of that side, or take hostile actions against a belligerent, they then take on the status of an enemy (article 17 of Convention V.). All actions permissible during wartime against enemy citizens are also applicable to citizens of neutral powers who have assumed enemy status. For example, during the recent South African War, hundreds of individuals from neutral states who were fighting alongside the Boers were captured by Great Britain and held as prisoners until the conflict ended. Nevertheless, these individuals must not be treated more harshly than enemy citizens, and especially, no punitive actions are permitted against them (article 17 of Convention V.). Article 18(a) of Convention V. clearly states that citizens of neutral states not residing in enemy territory or any area occupied by the enemy do not acquire enemy status by supplying or lending to the enemy, as long as the supplies do not originate from enemy territory or areas under its occupation.[143]

[143] Since Great Britain has entered a reservation against articles 16, 17, and 18 of Convention V. she is not bound by them. It is, however, of importance to state that articles 16, 17, and 18(a)—not 18(b)!—enact only such rules as were always customarily recognised, unless such an interpretation is to be put upon article 16 as prevents a belligerent from considering subjects of neutral States inhabiting the enemy country as bearing enemy character. The matter is different with regard to article 18(b), which creates an entirely new rule, for nobody has hitherto doubted that the members of the police force and the administrative officials of the enemy bear enemy character whether or no they are subjects of the enemy State.

[143] Since Great Britain has entered a reservation against articles 16, 17, and 18 of Convention V, she is not bound by them. However, it's important to note that articles 16, 17, and 18(a)—not 18(b)!—only establish rules that have always been customarily recognized, unless article 16 is interpreted in a way that prevents a belligerent from viewing the subjects of neutral states living in enemy territory as having enemy status. The situation is different regarding article 18(b), which introduces an entirely new rule, as it has never been disputed that members of the police force and administrative officials of the enemy are considered to have enemy status, regardless of whether they are subjects of the enemy state.

Article 18(b) of Convention V. stipulates that such subjects of neutral States as render services to the enemy in matters of police and administration, likewise do not acquire enemy character. This stipulation must, however, be read with caution. It can only mean that such individuals do not lose their neutral character to a greater degree than other subjects of neutral States resident on enemy territory; it cannot mean that they are in every way to be considered and[Pg 110] treated like subjects of neutral States not residing on enemy territory.

Article 18(b) of Convention V states that subjects of neutral States who provide services to the enemy in police and administration matters do not acquire enemy status. However, this stipulation must be interpreted carefully. It only means that these individuals do not lose their neutral status to a greater extent than other subjects of neutral States living in enemy territory; it does not mean that they should be regarded and[Pg 110] treated in the same way as subjects of neutral States not residing in enemy territory.

However that may be, it must be specially observed, that the acts by which subjects of neutral States lose their neutral and acquire enemy character need not necessarily be committed after the outbreak of war. Such individuals can, even before the outbreak of war, identify themselves to such a degree with a foreign State that, with the outbreak of war against that State, enemy character devolves upon them ipso facto unless they at once sever their connection with such State. This, for instance, is the case when a foreign subject in time of peace enlists in the armed forces of a State and continues to serve after the outbreak of war.

However that may be, it should be specifically noted that the actions by which individuals from neutral countries lose their neutral status and gain enemy status don’t have to happen after the war begins. These individuals can, even before the war starts, align themselves so closely with a foreign country that, once war breaks out against that country, they automatically become classified as enemies unless they immediately sever their ties with that country. For example, this occurs when a foreign national enlists in the military of a country during peacetime and continues to serve after the war begins.

(2) From the time when International Law made its appearance down to our own no difference has been made by a belligerent in the treatment accorded to subjects of the enemy and subjects of neutral States inhabiting the enemy country. Thus Grotius (III. c. 4, §§ 6 and 7) teaches that foreigners must share the fate of the population living on enemy territory, and Bynkershoek[144] distinctly teaches that foreigners residing in enemy country bear enemy character. English[145] and American practice assert, therefore, that foreigners, whether subjects of the belligerents or of neutral States, acquire enemy character by being domiciled (i.e. resident) in enemy country, because they have thereby identified themselves with the enemy population and contribute, by paying taxes and the like, to the support of the enemy Government. For this reason, all measures which may legitimately be taken against the civil population of the enemy territory, may likewise be taken against them, unless they withdraw from the country or are expelled therefrom. It must,[Pg 111] however, be remembered that they acquire enemy character in a sense and to a certain degree only, for their enemy character is not as intensive as that of enemy subjects resident on enemy territory. Such of them as are subjects of neutral States do not, therefore, lose the protection of their home State against arbitrary treatment inconsistent with the laws of war; and such of them as are subjects of the other belligerent are handed over to the protection of the Embassy of a neutral Power. However that may be, they are not exempt from requisitions and contributions; from the restrictions which an occupant imposes upon the population in the interest of the safety of his troops and his military operations; from punishments for hostile acts committed against the occupant; or from being taken into captivity, if exceptionally necessary.

(2) Since the introduction of International Law up until now, there hasn’t been any difference in how warring parties treat the subjects of enemy nations compared to those from neutral states living in enemy territory. Grotius (III. c. 4, §§ 6 and 7) explains that foreigners must accept the consequences that come with living on enemy land, and Bynkershoek[144] clearly states that foreigners living in an enemy country take on an enemy status. English[145] and American practices confirm that foreigners, whether from the warring nations or neutral states, gain enemy status by living in an enemy country, as they have aligned themselves with the enemy population and contribute, through taxes and similar means, to the support of the enemy government. Because of this, any actions that can legally be taken against the civilian population in enemy territory can also be taken against them, unless they leave the country or are forced to leave. It should, however, be noted that they acquire enemy status only to a limited extent and degree, as their enemy status isn’t as strong as that of enemy subjects living on enemy soil. Those who are subjects of neutral states thus do not lose the protection from their home state against arbitrary actions contrary to the laws of war, and those who are subjects of the opposing belligerent are afforded protection by the embassy of a neutral power. Regardless, they are not exempt from requisitions and contributions; from the restrictions that an occupying force imposes on the local population for the safety of its troops and military operations; from punishments for hostile actions against the occupying force; or from being taken captive if deemed necessary.

[144] Quaestiones juris publici, I. c. 3 in fine.

[144] Public Law Questions, I. c. 3 at the end.

[145] See the Harmony (1800), 2 C. Rob. 322; the Johanna Emilie, otherwise Emilia (1854), Spinks, 12; the Baltica (1857), 11 Moore, P.C. 141.

[145] See the Harmony (1800), 2 C. Rob. 322; the Johanna Emilie, also known as Emilia (1854), Spinks, 12; the Baltica (1857), 11 Moore, P.C. 141.

This treatment of foreigners resident on occupied enemy territory is generally recognised as legitimate by theory[146] and practice. The proposal of Germany, made at the Second Peace Conference, to agree upon rules which would have stipulated a more favourable treatment of subjects of neutral States resident on occupied enemy territory was, therefore, rejected. Not even France supported the German proposals, although according to the French conception foreigners residing in enemy country do not acquire enemy character, and therefore the German proposals were only a logical consequence of the French conception. This French conception of enemy character dates from the judgment of the Conseil des Prises in the case of Le Hardy contre La Voltigeante[147] (1802), which laid down the rule that neutral subjects residing in enemy country do not lose their neutral character, and enemy subjects residing in neutral countries do not lose their enemy character.[Pg 112] But it must be emphasised that this French conception of enemy character has been developed, not with regard to the treatment of foreigners whom an occupant finds resident on occupied enemy territory, but with regard to the exercise of the right of capture of enemy vessels and goods in warfare at sea. France did not make an attempt to draw the logical consequences from this conception and, therefore, to mete out to foreigners resident on occupied enemy territory a treatment different from that of enemy subjects resident there.

This approach to foreigners living in occupied enemy territory is usually seen as valid in both theory[146] and practice. Germany's proposal at the Second Peace Conference, which aimed to set rules for better treatment of individuals from neutral countries living in occupied enemy territories, was consequently turned down. Even France did not back the German proposals, despite the fact that according to the French view, foreigners in enemy territory do not take on enemy status, making the German proposals a logical extension of the French perspective. This French view on enemy status originates from the ruling of the Conseil des Prises in the case of Le Hardy contre La Voltigeante[147] (1802), which established that neutral individuals in enemy territory retain their neutral status, while enemy individuals in neutral countries still have enemy status.[Pg 112] However, it should be noted that this French view on enemy status was developed not in relation to how an occupier treats foreigners found in occupied enemy territory, but in terms of the right to capture enemy ships and goods in naval conflicts. France did not attempt to draw the logical conclusions from this view and therefore did not provide foreigners in occupied enemy territories with a different treatment than that given to enemy individuals living there.

[146] See Albrecht, Requisitionen von neutralem Privateigenthum, &c. (1912), pp. 13-15.

[146] See Albrecht, Requisition of Neutral Private Property, &c. (1912), pp. 13-15.

[147] 1 Pistoye et Duverdy (1859), 321.

[147] 1 Pistoye and Duverdy (1859), 321.

(3) Since enemy subjects who reside in neutral countries, or are allowed to remain resident on the territory of the other belligerent, have to a great extent identified themselves with the local population and are not under the territorial supremacy of the enemy, they lose their enemy character according to English and American practice,[148] but according to French practice they do not, a difference of practice which bears upon many points, especially upon the character of goods.[149]

(3) Since enemy nationals living in neutral countries, or those allowed to stay in the territory of the opposing side, have largely integrated with the local population and are not under the authority of the enemy, they lose their enemy status according to English and American practices,[148] but under French practice, they do not. This difference in practices has implications for many issues, particularly regarding the status of goods.[149]

[148] See the Postilion (1779), Hay & Marriot, 245; the Danous (1802), 4 C. Rob. 255, note; the Venus (1814), 8 Cranch, 253.

[148] See the Postilion (1779), Hay & Marriot, 245; the Danous (1802), 4 C. Rob. 255, note; the Venus (1814), 8 Cranch, 253.

[149] See below, § 90.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Enemy Character of Vessels.

Enemy Character of Vessels.

§ 89. The general rule with regard to vessels is that their character is determined by their flag. Whatever may be the nationality of the owner of a vessel—whether he be a subject of a neutral State, or of either belligerent—she bears enemy character, if she be sailing under the enemy flag. For this reason, the vessel of an enemy owner which sails under a neutral flag does as little bear enemy character as the vessel of the subject of a neutral State sailing under the flag of another neutral State. But the flag is the deciding factor only when the vessel is legitimately sailing under it. Should it be found that a vessel sailing under the flag of a certain neutral State has, according to the[Pg 113] Municipal Law of such State, no right to fly the flag she shows, the real character of the vessel must be determined in order to decide whether or no she bears enemy character. On the other hand, it makes no difference that the owner be the subject of a neutral non-littoral State without a maritime flag and that the vessel is, therefore, compelled to fly the flag of a maritime State: if the flag the vessel flies be the enemy flag, she bears enemy character.

§ 89. The basic rule regarding vessels is that their identity is determined by their flag. Regardless of the owner's nationality—whether they are from a neutral State or a belligerent—if a vessel is sailing under an enemy flag, it is considered to have enemy status. For this reason, a vessel owned by an enemy that sails under a neutral flag does not carry enemy status, just like a vessel owned by someone from a neutral State sailing under the flag of another neutral State. However, the flag is only decisive if the vessel is legitimately using it. If it turns out that a vessel flying the flag of a particular neutral State has no legal right to display that flag according to the[Pg 113] Municipal Law of that State, the true nature of the vessel needs to be established to determine whether it has enemy status. On the other hand, it doesn't matter if the owner is from a neutral non-coastal State without its own maritime flag and the vessel must therefore sail under the flag of a maritime State: if the flag being flown is the enemy flag, it is considered to have enemy status.

The general rule that the flag is the deciding factor has exceptions, and it is convenient to expound the matter according to the rules of the Declaration of London, although it is not yet ratified. The general rule is laid down by article 57 of the Declaration which enacts that, subject to the provisions respecting transfer to another flag, the character of a vessel is determined by the flag she is entitled to fly. Nevertheless, there are two exceptions to this rule:—

The general rule that the flag determines the decision has exceptions, and it's helpful to explain this according to the rules of the Declaration of London, even though it hasn't been ratified yet. The general rule is set out in article 57 of the Declaration, which states that, unless the provisions about transferring to another flag apply, a vessel's character is defined by the flag it is entitled to fly. However, there are two exceptions to this rule:—

(1) According to article 46 of the Declaration[150] a neutral merchantman acquires enemy character by taking a direct part in the hostilities, by being in the exclusive employment of the enemy government, and by being at the time exclusively intended either for the transport of troops or for the transmission of intelligence for the enemy. And it must be emphasised that the act by which a neutral merchantman acquires enemy character need not necessarily be committed after the outbreak of war, for she can, even before the outbreak of war, to such a degree identify herself with a foreign State that, with the outbreak of war against such State, enemy character devolves upon her ipso facto, unless she severs her connexion with the State concerned. This is, for instance, the case of a foreign merchantman which in time of peace has been hired by a State for the transport of troops or of war material,[Pg 114] and is carrying out her contract in spite of the outbreak of war.[151]

(1) According to article 46 of the Declaration[150] a neutral merchant ship takes on enemy status by actively participating in hostilities, being solely employed by the enemy government, and being exclusively intended at the time for transporting troops or relaying intelligence for the enemy. It should be highlighted that the action that gives a neutral merchant ship enemy status doesn’t have to happen after the war starts; she can, even before the war begins, align herself with a foreign State to such an extent that, once war breaks out against that State, she automatically acquires enemy status ipso facto, unless she cuts ties with the State involved. This is, for example, the situation of a foreign merchant ship that during peacetime has been contracted by a State to transport troops or military supplies,[Pg 114] and continues to fulfill her contract even after war has begun.[151]

(2) According to article 63 of the Declaration a neutral merchantman acquires enemy character ipso facto by forcibly resisting the legitimate exercise of the right of visitation and capture on the part of a belligerent cruiser (see details below, § 422).

(2) According to article 63 of the Declaration, a neutral merchant vessel automatically gains enemy status if it forcefully resists a belligerent cruiser’s legitimate right to visit and capture (see details below, § 422).

(3) According to British practice—adopted by America and Japan[152]—neutral merchantmen likewise acquire enemy character by violating the so-called rule of 1756,[153] in case they engage in time of war in a trade which the enemy prior to the war reserved exclusively for merchantmen sailing under his own flag. The Declaration of London has neither rejected nor accepted this rule of 1756, for article 57 stipulates expressly that the case where a neutral vessel is engaged in a trade which is closed in time of peace, remains unsettled. It would, therefore, according to article 7 of Convention XII. of the Second Peace Conference, be the task of the proposed International Prize Court to settle this point.

(3) According to British practice—adopted by America and Japan[152]—neutral merchant ships also take on enemy status by violating the so-called rule of 1756,[153] if they engage during wartime in trade that the enemy had previously reserved solely for ships flying their own flag. The Declaration of London has neither rejected nor accepted this rule of 1756, as article 57 clearly states that the situation where a neutral vessel is involved in trade that is closed during peacetime remains unresolved. Therefore, according to article 7 of Convention XII of the Second Peace Conference, it would be up to the proposed International Prize Court to address this issue.

Of whatever kind may be the case of the acquisition of enemy character on the part of a neutral vessel, the following four rules apply to all cases of such neutral[Pg 115] vessels as have acquired enemy character:—(a) all enemy goods on board may now be confiscated, although when they were first shipped the vessels concerned were neutral; (b) all goods on board will now be presumed to be enemy goods, and the owners of neutral goods will have to prove the neutral character of the latter; (c) the stipulations of articles 48 and 49 of the Declaration of London concerning the sinking of neutral prizes do not apply, because these vessels are now enemy vessels; (d) no appeal may be brought from the national prize courts to the International Prize Court, except with regard to the one question only, whether the vessel concerned has been justly considered to have acquired enemy character (see article 4 of Convention XII. of the Second Hague Peace Conference, concerning the establishment of an International Prize Court).

Regardless of how a neutral vessel may acquire enemy status, the following four rules apply to all such neutral vessels that have gained enemy character:—(a) all enemy goods on board may now be seized, even if the vessels were neutral at the time the goods were originally loaded; (b) all goods on board will now be assumed to be enemy goods, and the owners of neutral goods will need to prove that their goods are actually neutral; (c) the provisions of articles 48 and 49 of the Declaration of London regarding the sinking of neutral prizes do not apply, as these vessels are now considered enemy vessels; (d) no appeal can be made from national prize courts to the International Prize Court, except for the single question of whether the vessel in question has justly been deemed to have acquired enemy status (see article 4 of Convention XII. of the Second Hague Peace Conference, concerning the establishment of an International Prize Court).

[150] See below, § 410.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[151] The case of the Kow-shing ought here to be mentioned, although it has now lost its former importance:—

[151] The case of the Kow-shing should be mentioned here, even though it has now lost its previous significance:—

On July 14, 1894, the Kow-shing, a British ship, was hired at Shanghai by the Chinese Government to serve as a transport for eleven hundred Chinese soldiers and also for arms and ammunition from Tien-tsin to Korea. She was met on July 25 near the island of Phung-do, in Korean waters, by the Japanese fleet; she was signalled to stop, was visited by some prize officers, and, as it was apparent that she was a transport for Chinese soldiers, she was ordered to follow the Japanese cruiser, Naniwa. But although the British captain of the vessel was ready to comply with these orders, the Chinese on board would not allow it. Thereupon the Japanese opened fire and sank the vessel. As formerly hostilities could be commenced without a previous declaration of war the action of the Japanese was in accordance with the rules of International Law existing at the time. But in consequence of Convention III. of the Second Peace Conference which requires a declaration of war before the opening of hostilities, such action nowadays would not be justifiable. See Hall, § 168*; Takahashi, pp. 27-51; Holland, Studies, pp. 126-128.

On July 14, 1894, the Kow-shing, a British ship, was hired in Shanghai by the Chinese Government to transport eleven hundred Chinese soldiers along with arms and ammunition from Tien-tsin to Korea. On July 25, near the island of Phung-do, in Korean waters, the Japanese fleet encountered her; they signaled her to stop, and some prize officers boarded the ship. Seeing that she was transporting Chinese soldiers, she was ordered to follow the Japanese cruiser, Naniwa. However, even though the British captain was willing to follow these orders, the Chinese on board refused to allow it. As a result, the Japanese opened fire and sank the vessel. Back then, hostilities could begin without a declaration of war, so the Japanese action was in line with the International Law of that time. However, due to Convention III of the Second Peace Conference, which requires a declaration of war before starting hostilities, such an action would not be justified today. See Hall, § 168*; Takahashi, pp. 27-51; Holland, Studies, pp. 126-128.

[152] See the case of the Montara in Takahashi, p. 633.

[152] See the case of the Montara in Takahashi, p. 633.

[153] See below, § 289, and Higgins, War and the Private Citizen (1912), pp. 169-192.

[153] See below, § 289, and Higgins, War and the Private Citizen (1912), pp. 169-192.

Enemy Character of Goods.

Enemy Character of Goods.

§ 90. It is an old customary rule that all goods found on board an enemy merchantman are presumed to be enemy goods unless the contrary is proved by the neutral owners concerned. It is, further, generally recognised that the enemy character of goods depends upon the enemy character of their owners. As, however, no universally recognised rules exist as to the enemy character of individuals, there are likewise no universally recognised rules in existence as to the enemy character of goods.

§ 90. There's an old custom that says any goods found on an enemy merchant ship are assumed to belong to the enemy unless the neutral owners can prove otherwise. Additionally, it's widely accepted that whether goods are considered enemy property depends on whether their owners are enemies. However, since there are no universally accepted rules regarding whether individuals are enemies, there are also no universally recognized rules about the enemy status of goods.

(1) Since, according to British and American practice, domicile in enemy country makes an individual bear enemy character, all goods belonging to individuals domiciled in enemy country are enemy goods, and all goods belonging to individuals not resident in enemy country are not, as a rule, enemy goods. For this reason, goods belonging to enemy subjects residing in neutral countries[154] do not, but goods belonging[Pg 116] to subjects of neutral States residing in enemy country[155] do bear enemy character, although they may be the goods of a foreign consul appointed and residing in enemy country.[156] Further, the goods of such subjects of the belligerents as are domiciled on each other's territory and are allowed to remain there after the outbreak of war, acquire enemy character in the eyes of the belligerent whose subjects they are, but lose their enemy character in the eyes of the belligerent on whose territory they are allowed to remain.[157] Again, the produce of an estate on enemy territory belonging to a subject of a neutral State who resides abroad, does bear enemy character, for "Nothing[158] can be more decided and fixed than the principle ... that the possession of the soil does impress upon the owner the character of the country, as far as the produce of that plantation is concerned ... whatever the local residence of the owner may be." Lastly, all such property of a subject of a neutral State residing abroad but having a house of trade within the enemy country as is concerned in the commercial transactions of such house of trade,[159] likewise bears enemy character, because the owner of these goods has a "commercial domicile" in enemy country.

(1) In British and American law, if someone has their main home in an enemy country, they are considered to have an enemy status. This means that all goods owned by people living in an enemy country are classified as enemy goods, while goods owned by people who are not living in an enemy country are generally not considered enemy goods. As a result, goods owned by enemy individuals living in neutral countries do not count as enemy goods, but goods owned by individuals from neutral countries living in enemy territory are regarded as enemy goods, even if those goods belong to a foreign consul appointed and living in the enemy country. Additionally, the goods of individuals from opposing sides who are living in each other's territory and allowed to stay there after the war starts will be seen as enemy goods by the side they belong to, but lose their enemy status from the perspective of the side where they are allowed to remain. Furthermore, any produce from land in enemy territory owned by someone from a neutral country living abroad is also considered enemy property because, as stated, "Nothing can be more decided and fixed than the principle ... that the possession of the soil does impress upon the owner the character of the country, as far as the produce of that plantation is concerned ... whatever the local residence of the owner may be." Finally, any property owned by someone from a neutral country who is living abroad but has a business in the enemy country that relates to the commercial activities of that business is also considered enemy property, since the owner of those goods has a "commercial domicile" in enemy territory.

(2) On the other hand, according to French practice, the nationality of the owner of the goods is exclusively the deciding factor, and it does not matter where he resides. Hence only such goods on enemy merchantmen bear enemy character as belong to subjects of the enemy, whether those subjects are residing on enemy or neutral territory; and all such goods on enemy[Pg 117] merchantmen as belong to subjects of neutral States do not bear enemy character, whether those subjects reside on neutral or enemy country.[160]

(2) On the flip side, in French practice, the nationality of the goods' owner is the only thing that matters, regardless of where they live. Therefore, only the goods on enemy ships that belong to the enemy's nationals are considered to have enemy status, whether those nationals are living in enemy or neutral territory. Conversely, all goods on enemy ships that belong to nationals of neutral countries do not have enemy status, regardless of whether those nationals are in neutral or enemy territory.[Pg 117][160]

(3) The Declaration of London does not purport to decide the controversy, since the Powers represented at the Naval Conference of London could not agree. Whereas Holland, Spain, and Japan approved of the British and American practice, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Germany, and Russia sided with France. For this reason, the Declaration, by articles 58 and 59, only enacts that the enemy character of goods on enemy vessels is determined by the enemy character of their owner, and that all goods on enemy vessels are presumed to be enemy goods unless the contrary is proved. But the chief question, namely, what is the factor that decides the enemy character of an owner, is deliberately left unanswered. It would, therefore, according to article 7 of Convention XII., be for the proposed International Prize Court to settle it.

(3) The Declaration of London doesn't aim to resolve the disagreement since the countries represented at the Naval Conference of London couldn't come to an agreement. While Holland, Spain, and Japan supported the practices of Britain and the United States, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Germany, and Russia aligned with France. Because of this, the Declaration, through articles 58 and 59, only states that the enemy status of goods on enemy ships is determined by the enemy status of their owner, and that all goods on enemy ships are assumed to be enemy goods unless proven otherwise. However, the main question—what determines the enemy status of an owner—has been intentionally left unanswered. Thus, according to article 7 of Convention XII, it would be up to the proposed International Prize Court to resolve this issue.

[154] The Postilion (1779), Hay & Marriot, 245; the Danous (1802), 4 C. Rob. 255, note.

[154] The Postilion (1779), Hay & Marriot, 245; the Danous (1802), 4 C. Rob. 255, note.

[155] The Baltica (1857), 11 Moore, P.C. 141.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Baltica (1857), 11 Moore, P.C. 141.

[156] The Indian Chief (1801), 3 C. Rob. 12.

[156] The Indian Chief (1801), 3 C. Rob. 12.

[157] The Venus (1814), 8 Cranch, 253.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Venus (1814), 8 Cranch, 253.

[158] From the judgment of Sir William Scott in the case of the Phœnix (1803), 5 C. Rob. 41; see also Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle (Bentzen v. Boyle) (1815), 9 Cranch, 191.

[158] From the ruling of Sir William Scott in the case of the Phœnix (1803), 5 C. Rob. 41; see also Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle (Bentzen v. Boyle) (1815), 9 Cranch, 191.

[159] The Portland (1800), 3 C. Rob. 41; the Jonge Klassina (1803), 5 C. Rob. 297; the Freundschaft (1819), 4 Wheaton, 105.

[159] The Portland (1800), 3 C. Rob. 41; the Jonge Klassina (1803), 5 C. Rob. 297; the Freundschaft (1819), 4 Wheaton, 105.

[160] See the French cases of:—Le Hardy contre La Voltigeante (1802) and La Paix (1803), 1 Pistoye et Duverdy, pp. 321 and 486; Le Joan (1871), Le Nicolaüs (1871), Le Thalia (1871); Le Laura-Louise (1871), Barboux, pp. 101, 108, 116, 119.

[160] See the French cases of:—Le Hardy v. La Voltigeante (1802) and La Paix (1803), 1 Pistoye et Duverdy, pp. 321 and 486; Le Joan (1871), Le Nicolaüs (1871), Le Thalia (1871); Le Laura-Louise (1871), Barboux, pp. 101, 108, 116, 119.

Transfer of Enemy Vessels.

Transfer of Enemy Ships.

§ 91. The question of the transfer of enemy vessels to subjects of neutral States, either shortly before or during the war, must be regarded as forming part of the larger question of enemy character, for the point to be decided is whether such transfer[161] divests these vessels of their enemy character. It is obvious that, if this point is answered in the affirmative, the owners of enemy vessels can evade the danger of having their property seized and confiscated by selling their vessels to subjects of neutral States. Before the Declaration of London, which is, however, not yet ratified, the maritime Powers had not agreed upon common rules[Pg 118] concerning this subject. According to French[162] practice no transfer of enemy vessels to neutrals could be recognised, and a vessel thus transferred retained enemy character; but this concerned only transfer after the outbreak of war, any legitimate transfer anterior to the outbreak of war did give neutral character to a vessel. According to British and American practice, on the other hand, neutral vessels could well be transferred to a neutral flag before or after the outbreak of war and lose thereby their enemy character, provided that the transfer took place bona fide,[163] was not effected either in a blockaded port[164] or while the vessel was in transitu,[165] the vendor did not retain an interest in the vessel or did not stipulate a right to recover or repurchase the vessel after the conclusion of the war,[166] and the transfer was not made in transitu in contemplation of war.[167]

§ 91. The issue of transferring enemy ships to citizens of neutral countries, either just before or during the war, needs to be seen as part of the broader question of enemy status. The key question is whether such a transfer[161] divests these vessels of their enemy status. It's clear that if the answer is yes, then owners of enemy ships can avoid the risk of having their property seized and confiscated by selling their ships to citizens of neutral countries. Prior to the Declaration of London, which has not yet been ratified, maritime nations had not reached an agreement on common rules[Pg 118] regarding this issue. According to French[162] practice, no transfer of enemy ships to neutrals could be recognized, and a ship that was transferred retained its enemy status; however, this only applied to transfers after the war began, while any legitimate transfer before the war allowed a ship to obtain neutral status. In contrast, British and American practices allowed for neutral ships to be transferred to a neutral flag both before and after the war began, thus losing their enemy status, as long as the transfer was bona fide,[163] was not carried out in a blockaded port[164] or while the ship was in transitu,[165] the seller did not keep any interest in the ship and did not set a condition to recover or buy back the ship after the war,[166] and the transfer was not done in transitu in anticipation of the war.[167]

The Declaration of London offers clear and decisive rules concerning the transfer of enemy vessels, making a distinction between the transfer to a neutral flag before and after the outbreak of hostilities:

The Declaration of London provides clear and straightforward rules about transferring enemy ships, distinguishing between transfers to a neutral flag before and after hostilities begin:

(1) According to article 55 of the Declaration, the transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag, if effected before the outbreak of hostilities, is valid, unless the captor is able to prove that the transfer was made in order to avoid capture. However, if the bill of sale is not on board the transferred vessel, and if the transfer was effected less than sixty days before the outbreak of hostilities, the transfer is presumed to be void, unless the vessel can prove that such transfer was not effected[Pg 119] in order to avoid capture. To provide commerce with a guarantee that a transfer should not easily be treated as void on the ground that it was effected for the purpose of evading capture, it is stipulated that, in case the transfer was effected more than thirty days before the outbreak of hostilities, there is an absolute presumption of its validity, provided the transfer was unconditional, complete, and in conformity with the laws of the countries concerned, and further, provided that neither the control of, nor the profits arising from, the employment of the vessels remain in the same hands as before the transfer. But even in this case a vessel is suspect if the transfer took place less than sixty days before the outbreak of hostilities, and if her bill of sale is not on board. Hence she may be seized and brought into a port of a prize court for investigation, and she cannot claim damages for the capture, even if the Court releases her.

(1) According to article 55 of the Declaration, transferring an enemy vessel to a neutral flag before hostilities begin is valid unless the captor can prove that the transfer was made to avoid capture. However, if the bill of sale is not on board the transferred vessel and the transfer happened less than sixty days before hostilities started, the transfer is assumed to be void unless the vessel can prove it wasn't made to avoid capture. To ensure that commerce can trust such transfers won't easily be declared void for evading capture, it is specified that if the transfer took place more than thirty days before hostilities started, there is a definitive presumption of its validity, provided the transfer was unconditional, complete, and complied with the laws of the countries involved, and no control or profits from the vessel's use remain with the same parties as before the transfer. However, in this case, the vessel is still suspect if the transfer occurred less than sixty days before hostilities began and if the bill of sale is not on board. Therefore, it may be seized and taken to a prize court for investigation, and it cannot claim damages for the capture, even if the Court releases it.

(2) According to article 56 of the Declaration, the transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag, if effected after the outbreak of hostilities, is void unless the vessel can prove that the transfer was not made in order to avoid capture. And such proof is excluded, and an absolute presumption is established that the transfer is void, if the transfer has been made in a blockaded port or while the vessel was in transitu, further, if a right to repurchase or recover the vessel is reserved to the vendor, and lastly, if the requirements of the Municipal Law governing the right to fly the flag under which the vessel is sailing have not been fulfilled.

(2) According to article 56 of the Declaration, transferring an enemy ship to a neutral flag after hostilities have started is void unless the ship can prove that the transfer wasn't done to avoid capture. Such proof is not allowed, and there's a strong assumption that the transfer is void if it occurred in a blockaded port or while the ship was in transit. Additionally, if there's a right to buy back or recover the ship reserved by the seller, and if the rules of the local law governing the right to fly the flag the ship is using haven't been met.

[161] See Holland, Prize Law, § 19; Hall, § 171; Twiss, II. §§ 162-163; Phillimore, III. § 386; Boeck, Nos. 178-180; Bonfils, Nos. 1344-13491; Dupuis, Nos. 117-129, and Guerre, Nos. 62-66.

[161] See Holland, Prize Law, § 19; Hall, § 171; Twiss, II. §§ 162-163; Phillimore, III. § 386; Boeck, Nos. 178-180; Bonfils, Nos. 1344-13491; Dupuis, Nos. 117-129, and Guerre, Nos. 62-66.

[162] See Dupuis, No. 97.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ View Dupuis, No. 97.

[163] The Vigilantia (1798), 1 C. Rob. 1; the Baltica (1857), 11 Moore, P.C. 141; the Benito Estenger (1899), 176 United States, 568.

[163] The Vigilantia (1798), 1 C. Rob. 1; the Baltica (1857), 11 Moore, P.C. 141; the Benito Estenger (1899), 176 United States, 568.

[164] The General Hamilton (1805), 6 C. Rob. 61.

[164] The General Hamilton (1805), 6 C. Rob. 61.

[165] The moment a vessel transferred in transitu reaches a port where the new owner takes possession of her, the voyage of the vessel is considered to have terminated. The Vrow Margaretha (1799), 1 C. Rob. 336; the Jan Frederick (1804), 5 C. Rob. 128.

[165] As soon as a ship that's in transit arrives at a port where the new owner takes possession, the ship's journey is considered completed. The Vrow Margaretha (1799), 1 C. Rob. 336; the Jan Frederick (1804), 5 C. Rob. 128.

[166] The Sechs Geschwistern (1801), 4 C. Rob. 100; the Jemmy (1801), 4 C. Rob. 31.

[166] The Six Siblings (1801), 4 C. Rob. 100; the Jemmy (1801), 4 C. Rob. 31.

[167] The Jan Frederick (1804), 5 C. Rob. 128.

[167] The Jan Frederick (1804), 5 C. Rob. 128.

Transfer of Goods on Enemy Vessels.

Transfer of Goods on Enemy Vessels.

§ 92. The subject of the transfer of enemy goods on enemy vessels must likewise be considered as forming part of the larger subject of enemy character, for the question is here also whether such a transfer divests these goods of their enemy character. And concerning[Pg 120] this question[168] there was likewise no unanimous practice in existence among the maritime States before the agreement on the Declaration of London. British and American practice refused to recognise a sale in transitu under any circumstances or conditions, if the vessel concerned was captured before the neutral buyer had actually taken possession of the transferred goods.[169] On the other hand, French practice recognised such a sale in transitu, provided it could be proved that the transaction was made bona fide.[170]

§ 92. The issue of transferring enemy goods on enemy ships should also be viewed as part of the broader topic of enemy character, as it raises the question of whether such a transfer removes the enemy character from these goods. Regarding[Pg 120] this question[168] there was also no consistent practice among maritime nations prior to the agreement on the Declaration of London. British and American practices did not recognize a sale in transitu under any circumstances if the ship was captured before the neutral buyer took actual possession of the goods.[169] In contrast, French practices accepted such a sale in transitu, as long as it could be demonstrated that the transaction was made bona fide.[170]

The Declaration of London now stipulates, by article 60, that enemy goods on board an enemy vessel retain their enemy character until they reach their destination, notwithstanding any transfer effected after the outbreak of hostilities while the goods are in transitu. Hence if such enemy vessel is captured before having reached her destination, goods consigned to enemy subjects may be confiscated, although they have been sold in transitu to subjects of neutral States. A special rule is provided for the case of the enemy consignee of goods on board an enemy vessel becoming bankrupt while the goods are in transitu. In a number of countries[171] an unpaid vendor has, in the event of the bankruptcy of the buyer, a recognised legal right to recover such goods as have already become the property of the buyer, but have not yet reached him (right of stoppage in transitu). For this reason, article 60 of the Declaration stipulates in the second paragraph, that if, prior to the capture, the neutral consignor exercises, on the bankruptcy of the enemy consignee, his right of stoppage in transitu, the goods regain their neutral character and may not therefore be confiscated.

The Declaration of London now states, in article 60, that enemy goods on an enemy ship keep their enemy status until they arrive at their destination, even if they are sold after hostilities begin while the goods are in transitu. Therefore, if such an enemy ship is captured before reaching its destination, goods intended for enemy subjects can be seized, even if they were sold in transitu to individuals from neutral states. There is a special rule for cases where the enemy consignee of goods on an enemy vessel goes bankrupt while the goods are in transitu. In several countries[171], an unpaid seller has a legal right to reclaim goods that have already become the buyer's property but haven't yet reached them (right of stoppage in transitu) if the buyer goes bankrupt. For this reason, article 60 of the Declaration specifies in the second paragraph that if, before the capture, the neutral consignor exercises this right of stoppage in transitu due to the enemy consignee's bankruptcy, the goods regain their neutral status and cannot be seized.

[168] See Hall, § 172; Twiss, II. §§ 162 and 163; Phillimore, III. §§ 387 and 388; Dupuis, No. 1421, and Guerre, Nos. 68-73; Boeck, Nos. 182 and 183.

[168] See Hall, § 172; Twiss, II. §§ 162 and 163; Phillimore, III. §§ 387 and 388; Dupuis, No. 1421, and Guerre, Nos. 68-73; Boeck, Nos. 182 and 183.

[169] The Jan Frederick (1804), 5 C. Rob. 128; the Ann Green (1812), I Gallison, 274.

[169] The Jan Frederick (1804), 5 C. Rob. 128; the Ann Green (1812), I Gallison, 274.

[170] See Boeck, No. 162; Dupuis, No. 142.

[170] See Boeck, No. 162; Dupuis, No. 142.

[171] Great Britain is one of them, see Section 44 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71).

[171] Great Britain is one of those countries, see Section 44 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71).

CHAPTER 2 WAR BREAKS OUT

I START OF WAR

Grotius, c. 3, 5-14—Bynkershoek, Quaestiones juris publici, I. c. 2—Vattel, III. §§ 51-65—Hall, § 123—Westlake, II. pp. 18-26, and 267—Lawrence, § 140—Manning, pp. 161-163—Phillimore, III. §§ 51-56—Twiss, II. §§ 31-40—Halleck, I. pp. 521-526—Taylor, §§ 455-456—Moore, VII. §§ 1106-1108—Walker, § 37—Wharton, III. §§ 333-335—Wheaton, § 297—Bluntschli, §§ 521-528—Heffter, § 120—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 332-347—Gareis, § 80—Liszt, § 39, V.—Ullmann, § 171—Bonfils, Nos. 1027-10312—Despagnet, Nos. 513-516—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2671-2693—Nys, III. pp. 118-133—Rivier, II. pp. 220-228—Calvo, IV. §§ 1899-1911—Fiore, III. Nos. 1272-1276, and Code, 1422-1428—Martens, II. § 109—Longuet, §§ 1-7, 15-16—Mérignhac, pp. 29-41—Pillet, pp. 61-72—Lawrence, War, pp. 26-44—Barclay, pp. 53-58—Boidin, pp. 116-121—Bordwell, pp. 198-200—Higgins, pp. 202-205—Holland, War, § 16—Lémonon, pp. 309-406—Nippold, II. pp. 6-10—Scott, Conferences, pp. 516-522—Spaight, pp. 20-33—Ariga, §§ 11-12—Takahashi, pp. 1-25—Land Warfare, §§ 8-10—Holland, Studies, p. 115—Sainte-Croix, La Déclaration de guerre et ses effets immédiats (1892)—Bruyas, De la déclaration de guerre, etc. (1899)—Tambaro, L'inizio della guerra et la 3a convenzione dell' Aja del 1907 (1911)—Maurel, De la déclaration de guerre (1907)—Soughimoura, De la Déclaration de Guerre (1912)—Brocher in R.I. IV. (1872), p. 400; Férand-Giraud in R.I. XVII. (1885), p. 19; Nagaoka in R.I. 2nd Ser. VI. p. 475—Rolin in Annuaire, XX. (1904), pp. 64-70—Ebren and Martens in R.G. XI. (1904), pp. 133 and 148—Dupuis in R.G. XIII. (1906), pp. 725-735—Stowell in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 50-62.

Grotius, c. 3, 5-14—Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law, I. c. 2—Vattel, III. §§ 51-65—Hall, § 123—Westlake, II. pp. 18-26, and 267—Lawrence, § 140—Manning, pp. 161-163—Phillimore, III. §§ 51-56—Twiss, II. §§ 31-40—Halleck, I. pp. 521-526—Taylor, §§ 455-456—Moore, VII. §§ 1106-1108—Walker, § 37—Wharton, III. §§ 333-335—Wheaton, § 297—Bluntschli, §§ 521-528—Heffter, § 120—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 332-347—Gareis, § 80—Liszt, § 39, V.—Ullmann, § 171—Bonfils, Nos. 1027-10312—Despagnet, Nos. 513-516—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2671-2693—Nys, III. pp. 118-133—Rivier, II. pp. 220-228—Calvo, IV. §§ 1899-1911—Fiore, III. Nos. 1272-1276, and Code, 1422-1428—Martens, II. § 109—Longuet, §§ 1-7, 15-16—Mérignhac, pp. 29-41—Pillet, pp. 61-72—Lawrence, War, pp. 26-44—Barclay, pp. 53-58—Boidin, pp. 116-121—Bordwell, pp. 198-200—Higgins, pp. 202-205—Holland, War, § 16—Lémonon, pp. 309-406—Nippold, II. pp. 6-10—Scott, Conferences, pp. 516-522—Spaight, pp. 20-33—Ariga, §§ 11-12—Takahashi, pp. 1-25—Land Warfare, §§ 8-10—Holland, Studies, p. 115—Sainte-Croix, The Declaration of War and Its Immediate Effects (1892)—Bruyas, On the Declaration of War, etc. (1899)—Tambaro, The Beginning of War and the Third Hague Convention of 1907 (1911)—Maurel, On the Declaration of War (1907)—Soughimoura, On the Declaration of War (1912)—Brocher in R.I. IV. (1872), p. 400; Férand-Giraud in R.I. XVII. (1885), p. 19; Nagaoka in R.I. 2nd Ser. VI. p. 475—Rolin in Annuaire, XX. (1904), pp. 64-70—Ebren and Martens in R.G. XI. (1904), pp. 133 and 148—Dupuis in R.G. XIII. (1906), pp. 725-735—Stowell in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 50-62.

Commencement of War in General.

Start of War in General.

§ 93. According to the former practice of the States a condition of war could de facto arise either through a declaration of war; or through a proclamation and manifesto of a State that it considered itself at war with another State; or through the committal by one State of certain hostile acts of force against another State. History presents many instances of wars commenced in one of these three ways. Although Grotius[Pg 122] (III. c. 3, § 5) laid down the rule that a declaration of war is necessary for its commencement, the practice of the States shows that this rule was not accepted, and many wars have taken place between the time of Grotius and our own without a previous[172] declaration of war. Indeed many writers,[173] following the example of Grotius, have always asserted the existence of a rule that a declaration is necessary for the commencement of war, but it cannot be denied that until the Second Peace Conference of 1907 such a rule was neither sanctioned by custom nor by a general treaty of the Powers. Moreover many writers[174] distinctly approved of the practice of the Powers. This does not mean that in former times a State would have been justified in opening hostilities without any preceding conflict. There was, and can be, no greater violation of the Law of Nations than for a State to begin hostilities in time of peace without previous controversy and without having endeavoured to settle the conflict by negotiation.[175] But if negotiation had been tried without success, a State did not act treacherously in case it resorted to hostilities without a declaration of war, especially after diplomatic intercourse had been broken off. The rule, adopted by the First Peace Conference of 1899—see article 2 of the Conventions for the peaceful settlement of international differences of 1899 and 1907—which stipulates that, as far as circumstances allow, before the appeal to arms recourse must be had to the good offices or mediation of friendly Powers, did not essentially alter matters, for the formula as far as circumstances[Pg 123] allow leaves practically everything to the discretion of the Power bent on making war.

§ 93. According to past practices of the States, a state of war could de facto arise either through a declaration of war; or through a proclamation and manifesto from a State declaring it considered itself at war with another State; or through one State committing certain hostile acts of force against another State. History shows many instances of wars that began in one of these three ways. Although Grotius[Pg 122] (III. c. 3, § 5) established the rule that a declaration of war is needed to start a war, the practices of the States illustrate that this rule was not accepted, and many wars have occurred between Grotius's time and now without a prior[172] declaration of war. In fact, many writers,[173] following Grotius's example, have always insisted that a declaration is necessary to begin a war, but it cannot be denied that until the Second Peace Conference of 1907 such a rule was not recognized by custom or by a general treaty of the Powers. Moreover, many writers[174] clearly supported the practices of the Powers. This does not imply that in the past a State would have been justified in starting hostilities without any prior conflict. There was, and can be, no greater violation of the Law of Nations than for a State to initiate hostilities in a time of peace without any previous dispute and without having tried to resolve the conflict through negotiation.[175] However, if negotiation had been attempted without success, a State was not acting treacherously if it resorted to hostilities without a declaration of war, especially after diplomatic relations had been cut off. The rule, adopted by the First Peace Conference of 1899—see article 2 of the Conventions for the peaceful settlement of international differences of 1899 and 1907—which states that, as far as circumstances allow, before resorting to arms, one must seek the good offices or mediation of friendly Powers, did not fundamentally change the situation, since the phrase as far as circumstances[Pg 123] allow leaves nearly everything up to the discretion of the Power determined to go to war.

The outbreak of war between Russia and Japan in 1904 through Japanese torpedo boats attacking Russian men-of-war at Port Arthur before a formal declaration of war, caused a movement for the establishment of some written rules concerning the commencement of war. The Institute of International Law, at its meeting at Ghent in 1906, adopted three principles[176] according to which war should not be commenced without either a declaration of war or an ultimatum, and in either case a certain delay sufficient to ensure against treacherous surprise must be allowed before the belligerent can have recourse to actual hostilities. The Second Peace Conference at the Hague in 1907 took the matter up and produced the Convention (III.) relative to the commencement of hostilities which comprises four articles and has been signed by all the Powers represented at the Conference, except China and Nicaragua, both of which, however, acceded later.

The outbreak of war between Russia and Japan in 1904, triggered by Japanese torpedo boats attacking Russian warships at Port Arthur before a formal declaration of war, led to a movement to establish written rules regarding the start of war. The Institute of International Law, during its meeting in Ghent in 1906, adopted three principles[176] stating that war should not begin without either a declaration of war or an ultimatum, and in either case, there must be a sufficient delay to prevent any unexpected attacks before the parties can engage in actual hostilities. The Second Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907 took up this issue and created the Convention (III.) regarding the initiation of hostilities, which consists of four articles and has been signed by all the Powers represented at the Conference, except China and Nicaragua, both of which later joined.

[172] See Maurice, Hostilities without Declaration of War (1883).

[172] See Maurice, Hostilities without Declaration of War (1883).

[173] See, for instance, Vattel, III. § 51; Calvo, IV. § 1907; Bluntschli, § 571; Fiore, III. No. 1274; Heffter, § 120.

[173] For example, see Vattel, III. § 51; Calvo, IV. § 1907; Bluntschli, § 571; Fiore, III. No. 1274; Heffter, § 120.

[174] See, for instance, Bynkershoek, Quaestiones juris publici, I. c. 2; Klüber, § 238; G. F. Martens, § 267; Twiss, II. § 35: Phillimore, III. §§ 51-55; Hall, § 123; Ullmann (first edition), § 145; Gareis, § 80.

[174] See, for example, Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law, I. c. 2; Klüber, § 238; G. F. Martens, § 267; Twiss, II. § 35; Phillimore, III. §§ 51-55; Hall, § 123; Ullmann (first edition), § 145; Gareis, § 80.

[175] See above, § 3, where the rule is quoted that no State is allowed to make use of compulsive means of settling differences before negotiation has been tried.

[175] See above, § 3, where it states that no state is allowed to use coercive methods to resolve disputes before attempting negotiation.

[176] See Annuaire, XXI. (1906), p. 283.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Directory, XXI. (1906), p. 283.

Declaration of War.

Declaration of War.

§ 94. According to article 1 of Convention III. hostilities must not commence without a previous and unequivocal warning, and one of the forms which this warning may take is a declaration of war stating the reasons why the Power concerned has recourse to arms.

§ 94. According to article 1 of Convention III, hostilities must not start without a clear and prior warning, and one way to give this warning is through a declaration of war that outlines the reasons why the involved Power is resorting to military action.

A declaration of war is a communication of one State to another that the condition of peace between them has come to an end and a condition of war has taken its place. In former times declarations of war used to take place under greater or lesser solemnities, but during the last few centuries all these formalities have vanished, and a declaration of war nowadays may take place through a simple communication. The only two conditions with which, according to article 1, declarations of war must comply are, that they must be unmistakable,[Pg 124] and that they must state the reason for the resort to arms. No delay between the declaration and the actual commencement of hostilities is stipulated, and it is, therefore, possible for a Power to open hostilities immediately after the communication of the declaration of war to the enemy. All the more is it necessary to emphasise that there could be no greater violation of the Law of Nations than that which would be committed by a State which sent a declaration to another without previously having tried to settle the difference concerned by negotiation.

A declaration of war is a message from one State to another indicating that their peaceful relationship has ended and has been replaced by a state of war. In the past, declarations of war were announced with varying degrees of formality, but over the last few centuries, all these formalities have disappeared, and nowadays, a declaration of war can simply be conveyed through a straightforward communication. The only two requirements that, according to article 1, declarations of war must meet are that they must be clear, [Pg 124] and they must explain the reason for resorting to armed conflict. There's no required delay between the declaration and the start of hostilities, so a Power can launch an attack immediately after informing the enemy of the declaration of war. It is even more vital to stress that there is no greater breach of international law than when a State sends a declaration to another without first attempting to resolve their differences through negotiation.

However this may be, the question as to the way in which the communication of the declaration of war is to be made requires attention. Since there is nowhere a rule expressly formulated according to which the declaration must be communicated in writing, it might be asserted that communication by any means, be it by a written document, by telegraph or by telephone message, or by direct word of mouth, is admissible. I believe that such an assertion cannot be supported. The essential importance of the declaration of war and the fact that according to article 1 of Convention III. it must be unmistakable and must state the reason for the resort to arms, would seem to require a written document which is to be handed over to the other party by an envoy. Further, the fact that article 2 of Convention III. expressly enacts that the notification of the outbreak of war to neutrals may even be made by telegraph, points the same way, for the conclusion is justified that the declaration of war stipulated as necessary by article I may not be made by telegraph. And if a telegraph message is inadmissible, much more are telephone messages and communications by word of mouth. Moreover, the practice of the States throughout the last centuries has been to hand in a written declaration of war, when any declaration has been made.[Pg 125]

However this may be, the issue of how the declaration of war should be communicated needs attention. Since there isn't a specific rule stating that the declaration must be in writing, one might argue that any form of communication—be it a written document, a telegraph, a telephone call, or direct conversation—is acceptable. I don't think that argument holds up. The crucial significance of declaring war and the requirement in Article 1 of Convention III that it must be clear and explain the reasons for going to war suggest that a written document should be presented to the other party by a representative. Additionally, Article 2 of Convention III states that notifying neutrals about the outbreak of war may even be made by telegraph, which implies that the necessary declaration of war mentioned in Article 1 may not be made via telegraph. If a telegraph message isn't acceptable, then even less so are telephone calls or verbal communications. Furthermore, the practice of nations over the past centuries has usually been to submit a written declaration of war whenever such a declaration has been made.[Pg 125]

Particular attention must be paid to the fact that, in case of a declaration of war, the war, as between the belligerents, is considered to have commenced with the date of its declaration, although actual hostilities may not have been commenced until a much later date. On the other hand, as regards relations between the belligerents and neutrals, a war is not considered to have commenced until its outbreak has either been notified to the neutrals or has otherwise become unmistakably known to them. For this reason, article 2 of Convention III. enacts that the belligerents must at once after the outbreak of war notify[177] the neutrals, even if only by telegraph, and that the state of war shall not take effect with regard to neutrals until after they have received notification, unless it be established beyond doubt that they were in fact aware of the condition of war.

Particular attention must be given to the fact that if a war is declared, the war, between those involved, is considered to have started from the date of the declaration, even if actual fighting doesn't begin until much later. However, in terms of the relationship between the warring parties and neutral countries, a war isn't seen as having started until its outbreak has either been communicated to the neutrals or has become clearly known to them. For this reason, Article 2 of Convention III states that the warring parties must immediately notify the neutrals after the outbreak of war, even if it's just by telegram, and the state of war will not apply to neutral nations until they receive this notification, unless it is clearly established that they were already aware of the state of war.

[177] See below, § 307.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Ultimatum.

Final warning.

§ 95. The second form which the unequivocal warning, stipulated by article 1 of Convention III. as necessary before the commencement of hostilities, may take is an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.

§ 95. The second way in which the clear warning, required by article 1 of Convention III before starting hostilities, can be given is an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.

Ultimatum[178] is the technical term for a written communication of one State to another which ends amicable negotiations respecting a difference, and formulates, for the last time and categorically, the demands to be fulfilled if other measures are to be averted. An ultimatum may be simple or qualified. It is simple in case it does not include an indication of the measures contemplated by the Power sending it; such measures may be acts of retorsion or reprisals, or hostilities. It is qualified if it includes an indication of the measures contemplated by the Power sending it, for instance a pacific blockade, occupation of a certain territory, or war. Now the ultimatum stipulated by[Pg 126] article 1 of Convention III. must be a qualified one, for it must be so worded that the recipient can have no doubt about the commencement of war in case he does not comply with the demands of the ultimatum. For this reason, if a State has sent a simple ultimatum to another, or a qualified ultimatum threatening a measure other than war, it is not, in case of non-compliance, justified in at once commencing hostilities without a previous declaration of war. For this reason, Italy sent a declaration of war to Turkey in 1911, although an ultimatum threatening the occupation of Tripoli had preceded it.

Ultimatum[178] is a formal term for a written communication from one state to another that ends friendly negotiations over a disagreement and clearly states, for the last time, the demands that need to be met to avoid further actions. An ultimatum can be simple or qualified. It is simple if it doesn’t specify the actions the issuing power may take; these actions could include retaliatory measures or military action. It is qualified if it outlines the potential actions the issuing power may consider, such as a peaceful blockade, occupation of a specific territory, or war. According to[Pg 126] article 1 of Convention III, the ultimatum must be qualified, as it must be phrased in a way that leaves no doubt to the recipient about the start of war if the demands are not met. Therefore, if a state issues a simple ultimatum or a qualified ultimatum not threatening war, it cannot justify starting hostilities immediately without a formal declaration of war if the demands are ignored. This is why Italy declared war on Turkey in 1911, even though it had sent an ultimatum that only threatened the occupation of Tripoli beforehand.

Nothing is enacted by article 1 of Convention III. concerning the minimum length of time which an ultimatum must grant before the commencement of hostilities; this period may, therefore, be only very short, as, for instance, a number of hours. All the more is it necessary here likewise to emphasise that there could be no greater violation of the Law of Nations than that which would be committed by a State which sent an ultimatum without previously having tried to settle the difference concerned by negotiation.

Nothing is stated in Article 1 of Convention III about the minimum length of time that an ultimatum must allow before hostilities begin; this period can, therefore, be quite short, even just a few hours. It is essential to highlight that there is no greater violation of international law than when a state sends an ultimatum without first attempting to resolve the issue through negotiation.

It must be specially observed that the state of war following an ultimatum must likewise be notified to neutrals, for article 2 of Convention III. applies to this case also. And it must further be observed that, for the same reason as in the case of a declaration of war, an ultimatum containing a conditional declaration of war must be communicated to the other party by a written document.

It should be particularly noted that the state of war following an ultimatum must also be communicated to neutral parties, as article 2 of Convention III applies in this situation as well. Additionally, it should be emphasized that, just like with a declaration of war, an ultimatum that includes a conditional declaration of war must be communicated to the other party through a written document.

[178] See above, § 28.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Initiative hostile Acts of War.

Initiative hostile Acts of War.

§ 96. There is no doubt that, in consequence of Convention III. of the Second Peace Conference, the recourse to hostilities without a previous declaration of war or qualified ultimatum is forbidden. But the fact must not be overlooked that a war can nevertheless break out without these preliminaries. Thus a State[Pg 127] might deliberately order hostilities to be commenced without a previous declaration of war or qualified ultimatum. Further, the armed forces of two States having a grievance against one another might engage in hostilities without having been authorised thereto and without the respective Governments ordering them to desist from further hostilities. Again, acts of force by way of reprisals or during a pacific blockade or an intervention might be forcibly resisted by the other party, hostilities breaking out in this way.

§ 96. There’s no doubt that, because of Convention III of the Second Peace Conference, starting hostilities without a prior declaration of war or a formal ultimatum is prohibited. However, we shouldn’t overlook the fact that a war can still begin without these formalities. For instance, a State[Pg 127] could intentionally initiate hostilities without a prior declaration of war or formal ultimatum. Additionally, the armed forces of two States with grievances against each other might engage in hostilities without official authorization or orders from their respective Governments to stop. Moreover, acts of force taken in reprisal or during a peaceful blockade or intervention might be resisted by the other party, leading to hostilities breaking out in this manner.

It is certain that States which deliberately order the commencement of hostilities without a previous declaration of war or qualified ultimatum, commit an international delinquency, but they are nevertheless engaged in war. Further, it is certain that States which allow themselves to be dragged into a condition of war through unauthorised hostile acts of their armed forces, commit an international delinquency, but they are nevertheless engaged in war. Again, war is actually in existence if the other party forcibly resists acts of force undertaken by a State by way of reprisals, or during a pacific blockade or an intervention. Now in all these and similar cases, although war has broken out without a previous declaration or qualified ultimatum, all the laws of warfare must find application, for a war is still war in the eyes of International Law even though it has been illegally commenced, or has automatically arisen from acts of force which were not intended to be acts of war.

It is clear that countries that intentionally start conflicts without a prior declaration of war or a proper ultimatum are committing an international wrongdoing, but they are still engaged in war. Furthermore, it is clear that countries that are drawn into a state of war due to unauthorized hostile actions by their military also commit an international wrongdoing, yet they are still in a state of war. Additionally, war exists when the opposing party forcefully responds to acts of aggression carried out by a state as reprisals, or during a peaceful blockade or intervention. In all these situations, even if war has erupted without a prior declaration or proper ultimatum, all the laws of warfare still apply, because a war is a war in the eyes of International Law, even if it started illegally or arose automatically from acts of force that were not meant to be acts of war.

However that may be, article 2 of Convention III. also applies to wars which have broken out without a previous declaration or qualified ultimatum, and the belligerents must without delay send a notification to neutral Powers so that these may be compelled to fulfil the duties of neutrality. But, of course, neutral Powers must in this case likewise, even without notification,[Pg 128] fulfil the duties of neutrality if they are unmistakably aware of the outbreak of war.

However that may be, article 2 of Convention III also applies to wars that start without a prior declaration or qualified ultimatum. The warring parties must promptly notify neutral Powers so that these nations can fulfill their neutrality obligations. However, neutral Powers must also fulfill their neutrality duties, even without notification, if they are clearly aware of the outbreak of war.[Pg 128]

II IMPACT OF THE WAR OUTBREAK

Vattel, III. § 63—Hall, §§ 124-126—Westlake, II. pp. 29-32—Lawrence, §§ 143-146—Manning, pp. 163-165—Phillimore, III. §§ 67-91—Twiss, II. §§ 41-61—Halleck, I. pp. 526-552, and II. pp. 124-140—Taylor, §§ 461-468—Walker, §§ 44-50—Wharton, III. §§ 336-337A—Wheaton, §§ 298-319—Moore, V. § 779, and VII. §§ 1135-1142—Heffter, §§ 121-123—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 347-363—Gareis, § 81—Liszt, § 39, V.—Ullmann, § 173—Bonfils, Nos. 1044-1065—Despagnet, Nos. 517-519—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2694-2720—Nys, III. pp. 134-150—Rivier, II. pp. 228-237—Calvo, IV. §§ 1911-1931—Fiore, III. Nos. 1290-1301, and Code, Nos. 1439-1445—Martens, II. § 109—Longuet, §§ 8-15—Mérignhac, pp. 72-84—Pillet, pp. 42-59—Bordwell, pp. 200-211—Spaight, pp. 25-33—Ariga, §§ 13-15—Takahashi, pp. 26-88—Lawrence, War, pp. 45-55—Sainte-Croix, La Déclaration de guerre et ses effets immédiats (1892), pp. 166-207—Meyer, De l'interdiction du commerce entre les belligérants (1902)—Jaconnet, La guerre et les traités (1909)—Politis in Annuaire XXIII. (1910), pp. 251-282, and XXIV. (1911), pp. 200-223.

Vattel, III. § 63—Hall, §§ 124-126—Westlake, II. pp. 29-32—Lawrence, §§ 143-146—Manning, pp. 163-165—Phillimore, III. §§ 67-91—Twiss, II. §§ 41-61—Halleck, I. pp. 526-552, and II. pp. 124-140—Taylor, §§ 461-468—Walker, §§ 44-50—Wharton, III. §§ 336-337A—Wheaton, §§ 298-319—Moore, V. § 779, and VII. §§ 1135-1142—Heffter, §§ 121-123—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 347-363—Gareis, § 81—Liszt, § 39, V.—Ullmann, § 173—Bonfils, Nos. 1044-1065—Despagnet, Nos. 517-519—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2694-2720—Nys, III. pp. 134-150—Rivier, II. pp. 228-237—Calvo, IV. §§ 1911-1931—Fiore, III. Nos. 1290-1301, and Code, Nos. 1439-1445—Martens, II. § 109—Longuet, §§ 8-15—Mérignhac, pp. 72-84—Pillet, pp. 42-59—Bordwell, pp. 200-211—Spaight, pp. 25-33—Ariga, §§ 13-15—Takahashi, pp. 26-88—Lawrence, War, pp. 45-55—Sainte-Croix, La Déclaration de guerre et ses effets immédiats (1892), pp. 166-207—Meyer, De l'interdiction du commerce entre les belligérants (1902)—Jaconnet, La guerre et les traités (1909)—Politis in Annuaire XXIII. (1910), pp. 251-282, and XXIV. (1911), pp. 200-223.

General Effects of the Outbreak of War.

General Effects of the Outbreak of War.

§ 97. When war breaks out, even if it be limited to only two members of the Family of Nations, nevertheless the whole Family of Nations is thereby affected, since the rights and duties of neutrality devolve upon such States as are not parties to the war. And the subjects of neutral States may feel the consequences of the outbreak of war in many ways. War is not only a calamity to the commerce and industry of the whole world, but also involves the alteration of the legal position of neutral merchantmen on the Open Sea, and of the subjects of neutral States within the boundaries of the belligerents. For the belligerents have the right of visit, search, and eventually capture of neutral merchantmen on the Open Sea, and foreigners who remain within the boundaries of the belligerents, although subjects of neutral Powers, acquire in a degree[Pg 129] and to a certain extent enemy character.[179] However, the outbreak of war tells chiefly and directly upon the relations between the belligerents and their subjects. Yet it would not be correct to maintain that all legal relations between the parties thereto and between their subjects disappear with the outbreak of war. War is not a condition of anarchy, indifferent or hostile to law, but a condition recognised and ruled by International Law, although it involves a rupture of peaceful relations between the belligerents.

§ 97. When war starts, even if it’s just between two members of the Family of Nations, the entire Family of Nations is impacted. This is because the rights and responsibilities of neutrality fall on those states not involved in the conflict. Citizens of neutral states can experience the effects of the war in various ways. War not only disrupts global trade and industries, but it also changes the legal status of neutral merchant ships on the Open Sea and the individuals from neutral states within the territories of the warring parties. The warring nations have the right to visit, search, and potentially seize neutral merchant ships on the Open Sea, and foreigners who stay in the territories of the belligerents, even though they come from neutral countries, begin to take on some characteristics of an enemy.[Pg 129][179] However, the start of war mainly and directly impacts the relationships between the warring parties and their citizens. Still, it would be inaccurate to say that all legal relationships between the parties and their citizens vanish with the declaration of war. War is not a state of lawlessness that opposes or disregards law; rather, it is a situation recognized and governed by International Law, even though it marks a breakdown of peaceful relations between the warring parties.

[179] See above, § 88.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Rupture of Diplomatic Intercourse and Consular Activity.

Rupture of Diplomatic Relations and Consular Activities.

§ 98. The outbreak of war causes at once the rupture of diplomatic intercourse between the belligerents, if such rupture has not already taken place. The respective diplomatic envoys are recalled and ask for their passports, or receive them without any previous request, but they enjoy their privileges of inviolability and exterritoriality for the period of time requisite for leaving the country. Consular activity likewise comes to an end through the outbreak of war.[180]

§ 98. The start of war immediately ends diplomatic relations between the warring parties, unless that break has already occurred. The diplomatic representatives are recalled and request their passports, or they receive them without needing to ask, but they retain their rights to inviolability and exterritoriality for the time needed to leave the country. Consular activities also stop once war breaks out.[180]

Cancellation of Treaties.

Treaty Cancellations.

§ 99. The doctrine was formerly held, and a few writers[181] maintain it even now, that the outbreak of war ipso facto cancels all treaties previously concluded between the belligerents, such treaties only excepted as have been concluded especially for the case of war. The vast majority of modern writers on International Law have abandoned this standpoint,[182] and the opinion is pretty general that war by no means annuls every treaty. But unanimity as to what treaties are or are not cancelled by war does not exist. Neither does a uniform practice of the States exist, cases having occurred in which States have expressly declared[183] that[Pg 130] they considered all treaties annulled through war. Thus the whole question remains as yet unsettled. Nevertheless a majority of writers agree on the following points:—

§ 99. A doctrine used to be accepted, and a few writers[181] still hold it today, that the start of war ipso facto cancels all treaties previously made between the warring parties, except those specifically created for war situations. The vast majority of modern International Law writers have moved away from this view,[182] and it is widely agreed that war does not automatically invalidate every treaty. However, there is no consensus on which treaties are or aren't cancelled by war. Additionally, there is no consistent practice among states, as there have been instances where states have openly stated[183] that they consider all treaties void due to war. Thus, the entire issue remains unresolved. Nonetheless, most writers agree on the following points:—

(1) The outbreak of war cancels all political treaties between the belligerents which have not been concluded for the purpose of setting up a permanent condition of things, for instance, treaties of alliance.

(1) The start of war voids all political agreements between the warring parties that were not made to establish a lasting situation, such as treaties of alliance.

(2) On the other hand, it is obvious that such treaties as have been especially concluded for the case of war are not annulled, such as treaties in regard to the neutralisation of certain parts of the territories of the belligerents.

(2) On the other hand, it's clear that treaties specifically made for wartime situations aren't canceled, like agreements about the neutralization of certain areas in the territories of the warring parties.

(3) Such political and other treaties as have been concluded for the purpose of setting up a permanent[184] condition of things are not ipso facto annulled by the outbreak of war, but nothing prevents the victorious party from imposing upon the other party in the treaty of peace any alterations in, or even the dissolution of, such treaties.

(3) Political and other treaties that have been made to establish a permanent[184] situation are not ipso facto canceled just because war breaks out, but nothing stops the winning side from forcing the other side in the peace treaty to accept changes to, or even the cancellation of, those treaties.

(4) Such non-political treaties as do not intend to set up a permanent condition of things, as treaties of commerce for example, are not ipso facto annulled, but the parties may annul them or suspend them according to discretion.

(4) Non-political treaties that aren't meant to create a permanent situation, like trade agreements for instance, aren't ipso facto canceled, but the parties can choose to cancel or suspend them at their discretion.

(5) So-called law-making[185] treaties, as the Declaration of Paris for example, are not cancelled by the outbreak of war. The same is valid in regard to all treaties to which a multitude of States are parties, as the International Postal Union for example, but the belligerents may suspend them, as far as they themselves[Pg 131] are concerned, in case the necessities of war compel them to do so.[186]

(5) So-called law-making[185] treaties, like the Declaration of Paris for instance, aren't voided by the start of war. This also applies to all treaties involving multiple States, such as the International Postal Union, but the countries at war can suspend them regarding their own participation if war necessities require it.[186]

[181] See, for instance, Phillimore, III. § 530, and Twiss, I. § 252, in contradistinction to Hall, § 125.

[181] See, for example, Phillimore, III. § 530, and Twiss, I. § 252, in contrast to Hall, § 125.

[182] See Jaconnet, op. cit. pp. 113-128.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Jaconnet, *op. cit.* pp. 113-128.

[183] As, for instance, Spain in 1898, at the outbreak of the war with the United States of America, see Moore, V. pp. 375-380.

[183] For example, Spain in 1898, when the war with the United States started, see Moore, V. pp. 375-380.

[184] Thus American and English Courts—see the cases of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of Newhaven (1823), 8 Wheaton 464, and Sutton v. Sutton (1830), 1 Russel & Mylne, 663—have declared that article IX. of the treaty of Nov. 19, 1794, between Great Britain and the United States was not annulled by the outbreak of war in 1812. See Moore, V. § 779 and Westlake, II. p. 30; see also the foreign cases discussed by Jaconnet, op. cit. pp. 168-179.

[184] Therefore, American and English courts—refer to the cases of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of Newhaven (1823), 8 Wheaton 464, and Sutton v. Sutton (1830), 1 Russel & Mylne, 663—have stated that Article IX of the treaty dated November 19, 1794, between Great Britain and the United States was not canceled by the start of the war in 1812. See Moore, V. § 779 and Westlake, II. p. 30; also refer to the foreign cases discussed by Jaconnet, op. cit. pp. 168-179.

[186] The Institute of International Law is studying the whole question of the effect of war on treaties; see Politis, l.c., and especially Annuaire, XXIV. (1911), pp. 201-213, and 220-221.

[186] The Institute of International Law is looking into the entire issue of how war impacts treaties; see Politis, l.c., and especially Annuaire, XXIV. (1911), pp. 201-213, and 220-221.

Precarious position of Belligerents' subjects on Enemy Territory.

Precarious position of Belligerents' subjects on Enemy Territory.

§ 100. The outbreak of war affects likewise such subjects of the belligerents as are at the time within the enemy's territory. In former times they could at once be detained as prisoners of war, and many States, therefore, concluded in time of peace special treaties for the time of war expressly stipulating a specified period during which their subjects should be allowed to leave each other's territory unmolested.[187] Through the influence of such treaties, which became pretty general during the eighteenth century, it became an international practice that, as a rule, enemy subjects must be allowed to withdraw within a reasonable period, and no instance of the former rule has occurred during the nineteenth[188] century. Although some[189] writers even nowadays maintain that according to strict law the old rule is still in force, it may safely[190] be maintained that there is now a customary rule of International Law, according to which all such subjects of the enemy as have not according to the Municipal Law of their country to join the armed forces of the enemy must be allowed a reasonable period for withdrawal. On the other hand, such enemy subjects as are active or reserve officers, or reservists, and the like, may be prevented from leaving the[Pg 132] country and detained as prisoners of war, for the principle of self-preservation must justify belligerents in refusing to furnish each other with resources which increase their means of offence and defence.[191] However that may be, a belligerent need not allow[192] enemy subjects to remain on his territory, although this is frequently done. Thus, during the Crimean War Russian subjects in Great Britain and France were allowed to remain there, as were likewise Russians in Japan and Japanese in Russia during the Russo-Japanese War, and Turks in Italy during the Turco-Italian War. On the other hand, France expelled all Germans during the Franco-German war in 1870; the former South African Republics expelled most British subjects when war broke out in 1899; Russia, although during the Russo-Japanese War she allowed Japanese subjects to remain in other parts of her territory, expelled them from her provinces in the Far East; and in May 1912, eight months after the outbreak of the Turko-Italian War, Turkey decreed the expulsion of all Italians, certain classes excepted. In case a belligerent allows the residence of enemy subjects on his territory, he can, of course, give the permission under certain conditions only, such as an oath to abstain from all hostile acts or a promise not to leave a certain region, and the like. And it must be especially observed that an enemy subject who is allowed to stay in the country after the outbreak of war must not, in case the forces of his home State militarily occupy the part of the country inhabited by him, join these forces or assist them in any way. If, nevertheless, he does so, he is liable to be punished for treason[193] by the local Sovereign after the withdrawal of the enemy forces.

§ 100. The start of war also impacts the nationals of the warring parties who are in the enemy's territory at the time. In the past, they could be immediately detained as prisoners of war, which is why many countries created special treaties during peacetime that allowed their nationals to leave each other's territories without interference for a specific period during a war.[187] Thanks to such treaties, which became quite common during the eighteenth century, it became an international norm that enemy nationals should generally be allowed to leave within a reasonable time frame, and no instances of the previous rule have been recorded during the nineteenth[188] century. Although some[189] legal scholars today still argue that the old rule is technically still valid, it can be confidently asserted that there is now a customary rule of International Law dictating that all enemy nationals who are not required by the laws of their country to join the enemy's armed forces must be granted a reasonable time to withdraw. In contrast, enemy nationals who are active or reserve officers, or similar roles, may be restricted from leaving the[Pg 132] country and can be detained as prisoners of war, as the self-preservation principle justifies warring parties in denying resources that could bolster each other's offensive and defensive capabilities.[191] Regardless, a belligerent is not obliged to allow enemy nationals to stay in their territory, although this often happens. For instance, during the Crimean War, Russian nationals were permitted to remain in Great Britain and France, just as Russians in Japan and Japanese in Russia were allowed to stay during the Russo-Japanese War, and Turks in Italy during the Turco-Italian War. Conversely, France expelled all Germans during the Franco-German War in 1870; the former South African republics expelled most British nationals when war broke out in 1899; Russia, despite allowing Japanese nationals to stay in other areas, expelled them from her provinces in the Far East during the Russo-Japanese War; and in May 1912, eight months after the outbreak of the Turco-Italian War, Turkey ordered the expulsion of all Italians, with certain exceptions. If a belligerent does allow enemy nationals to reside on their territory, they can impose certain conditions for this permission, like an oath to refrain from all hostile actions or not to leave a specified area. Additionally, it's crucial to note that an enemy national permitted to remain in the country after the war starts must not join or assist the military forces of their home country if those forces occupy a part of the country they are living in. If they do so anyway, they can be punished for treason[193] by the local authority after the enemy forces withdraw.

[187] See a list of such treaties in Hall, § 126, p. 107, note 1.

[187] Check out a list of these treaties in Hall, § 126, p. 107, note 1.

[188] With regard to the 10,000 Englishmen who were arrested in France by Napoleon at the outbreak of war with England in 1803 and kept as prisoners of war for many years, it must be borne in mind that Napoleon did not claim a right to make such civilians prisoners of war as were at the outbreak of war on French soil. He justified his act as one of reprisals, considering it a violation of the Law of Nations on the part of England to begin hostilities by capturing two French merchantmen in the Bay of Audierne without a formal declaration of war. See Alison, History of Europe, V. p. 277, and Bonfils, No. 1052.

[188] Regarding the 10,000 Englishmen who were arrested in France by Napoleon at the start of the war with England in 1803 and held as prisoners of war for many years, it’s important to note that Napoleon did not assert any right to take civilian prisoners who happened to be on French territory when the war began. He defended his actions as reprisals, viewing England's seizure of two French merchant ships in the Bay of Audierne without a formal declaration of war as a breach of international law. See Alison, History of Europe, V. p. 277, and Bonfils, No. 1052.

[189] See Twiss, II. § 50; Rivier, II. p. 320; Liszt, § 39, V.; Holland, Letters upon War and Neutrality (1909), p. 39.

[189] See Twiss, II. § 50; Rivier, II. p. 320; Liszt, § 39, V.; Holland, Letters on War and Neutrality (1909), p. 39.

[190] See Land Warfare, § 12.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See *Land Warfare*, § 12.

[191] See Land Warfare, § 13.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Land Warfare, § 13.

Persona standi in judicio on Enemy Territory.

Persona standi in judicio on Enemy Territory.

§ 100a. Formerly the rule prevailed everywhere that an enemy subject has no persona standi in judicio and is, therefore, ipso facto by the outbreak of war, prevented from either taking or defending proceedings in the Courts. This rule dates from the time when war was considered such a condition between belligerents as justified the committing of hostilities on the part of all subjects of the one belligerent against all subjects of the other, and, further, the killing of all enemy subjects irrespective of sex and age, and, at any rate, the confiscation of all private enemy property. War in those times used to put enemy subjects entirely ex lege, and it was only a logical consequence from this principle that enemy subjects could not sustain persona standi in judicio. Since the rule that enemy subjects are entirely ex lege has everywhere vanished, the rule that they may not take or defend proceedings in the Courts has in many countries, such as Austria-Hungary, Germany, Holland, and Italy, likewise vanished. But in Great Britain and the United States of America[194] enemy subjects are still prevented from taking and defending legal proceedings,[195] although there are six exceptions to the general rule. Firstly, enemy subjects who do not bear enemy character because they are resident in neutral country or have a licence to trade or are allowed[196] to remain in the country of a belligerent, are therefore permitted to sue and be sued in British and American Courts. Secondly, if during time of peace a defendant obtains an opportunity to plead, and if subsequently war breaks out with the country of the plaintiff, the defendant may not plead that the plaintiff is prevented from suing.[197] Thirdly, if a contract was entered into and executed before the war,[Pg 134] and if an absent enemy subject has property within the boundaries of a belligerent, he may be sued.[198] Fourthly, a prisoner of war[199] may sue during war on a contract for wages. Fifthly, if the parties, being desirous to obtain a decision on the merits of the case, waive the objection, enemy subjects may sue and be sued.[200] Lastly, a petition on the part of a creditor who is an enemy subject, to prove a debt under a commission of bankruptcy must be admitted[201] although the dividend will not be paid till after the conclusion of peace.

§ 100a. In the past, there was a common rule that an enemy subject had no persona standi in judicio and was therefore ipso facto barred from taking or defending legal actions in the Courts once war broke out. This rule originated when war was thought to create a situation between warring parties that justified all subjects of one belligerent waging hostilities against all subjects of the other, and also allowed for the killing of all enemy subjects, regardless of age or gender, along with the seizure of all private enemy property. In those times, war would completely place enemy subjects ex lege, and it was a logical result of this principle that enemy subjects could not maintain persona standi in judicio. Since the idea that enemy subjects are entirely ex lege has disappeared in many places, the rule that they cannot take or defend proceedings in Courts has also faded in several countries, including Austria-Hungary, Germany, Holland, and Italy. However, in Great Britain and the United States of America[194], enemy subjects are still barred from taking and defending legal actions,[195] although there are six exceptions to this general rule. First, enemy subjects who do not have enemy status because they are residing in a neutral country, have a trading license, or are allowed[196] to stay in a belligerent's country can sue and be sued in British and American Courts. Second, if during peacetime a defendant has the chance to plead, and later a war breaks out with the plaintiff's country, the defendant cannot argue that the plaintiff is prevented from suing.[197] Third, if a contract was made and fulfilled before the war,[Pg 134] and if an absent enemy subject has property within the borders of a belligerent, he can be sued.[198] Fourth, a prisoner of war[199] may sue during wartime for unpaid wages. Fifth, if both parties want a decision based on the case's merits and choose to waive the objection, enemy subjects may sue and be sued.[200] Finally, a creditor who is an enemy subject must have their petition to prove a debt in a bankruptcy proceeding accepted[201], although the dividend will not be paid until after peace is restored.

[194] In strict law also in France.

[194] In strict legal terms, this also applies in France.

[195] The leading case is the Hoop (1799), 1 C. Rob. 196.

[195] The main case is the Hoop (1799), 1 C. Rob. 196.

[196] Wells v. Williams (1698), 1 Lord Raymond, 282.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Wells v. Williams (1698), 1 Lord Raymond, 282.

[197] Shepeler v. Durand (1854), 14 P.C. 582.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Shepeler v. Durand (1854), 14 P.C. 582.

[198] Dorsey v. Kyle (1869), 3 Maryland, 512. It would seem that the American Courts are inclined to drop the rule that an enemy subject cannot be sued; see De Jarnett v. De Giversville (1874), 56 Missouri, 440.

[198] Dorsey v. Kyle (1869), 3 Maryland, 512. It appears that American Courts are likely to abandon the rule that an enemy subject cannot be sued; see De Jarnett v. De Giversville (1874), 56 Missouri, 440.

[199] Maria v. Hall (1800), 2 B. & P. 236.

[199] Maria v. Hall (1800), 2 B. & P. 236.

[200] Driefontein Consolidated Gold Mines Co. v. Janson (1910), 2 Q.B. 419; App. Cas. (1902), 484.

[200] Driefontein Consolidated Gold Mines Co. v. Janson (1910), 2 Q.B. 419; App. Cas. (1902), 484.

[201] Ex parte Boussmaker (1806), 13 Vesey Jun. 71.

[201] Ex parte Boussmaker (1806), 13 Vesey Jun. 71.

It is asserted that, in consequence of article 23 (h) of the Hague Regulations concerning land warfare enacting the injunction "to declare extinguished, suspended, or unenforceable in a Court of Law the rights and rights of action of the nationals of the adverse party," Great Britain and the United States are compelled to abolish their rule that enemy subjects may not sue. But the interpretation of article 23 (h) is controversial, Great Britain and the United States of America—in contradistinction to Germany and France—maintaining that the article has nothing to do with their Municipal Law but concerns the conduct of armies in occupied enemy territory.[202]

It is claimed that, due to article 23 (h) of the Hague Regulations on land warfare, which states the requirement "to declare extinguished, suspended, or unenforceable in a Court of Law the rights and rights of action of the nationals of the opposing party," Great Britain and the United States must eliminate their rule that enemy subjects cannot sue. However, the interpretation of article 23 (h) is disputed, with Great Britain and the United States—unlike Germany and France—arguing that the article has no relevance to their domestic law and instead pertains to the behavior of armies in occupied enemy territory.[202]

However this may be, it must be especially observed that, according to British and American law, claims arising out of contracts concluded before the war do not become extinguished through the outbreak of war,[Pg 135] but are only suspended during war, and the Statute of Limitations does not, according to American[203] practice at any rate, run during war.

However this may be, it should be noted that, according to British and American law, claims stemming from contracts made before the war do not disappear due to the onset of war,[Pg 135] but are merely put on hold during the war, and the Statute of Limitations does not, according to American[203] practice, run during wartime.

[203] Hanger v. Abbot (1867), 6 Wallace, 532. The point is not settled in English law, for the obiter dictum in De Wahl v. Browne (1856), 25 L.J. (N.S.) Ex. 343, "It may be that the effect would ultimately be to bar the action by reason of the Statute of Limitations is no answer...", is not decisive, although Anson, Principles of the English Law of Contract (11th ed. 1906), p. 122, and other writers accept it as decisive.

[203] Hanger v. Abbot (1867), 6 Wallace, 532. This issue is not resolved in English law, as the obiter dictum in De Wahl v. Browne (1856), 25 L.J. (N.S.) Ex. 343, "It may be that the effect would ultimately be to bar the action by reason of the Statute of Limitations, is no answer...", is not conclusive, even though Anson, Principles of the English Law of Contract (11th ed. 1906), p. 122, and other authors view it as conclusive.

Intercourse, especially Trading, between Subjects of Belligerents.

Intercourse, especially trading, between subjects of conflicting parties.

§ 101. Following Bynkershoek,[204] all British and American writers and cases, and also some French[205] and German[206] writers assert the existence of a rule of International Law that all intercourse, and especially trading, is ipso facto by the outbreak of war prohibited between the subjects of the belligerents, unless it is permitted under the customs of war, as, for instance, ransom bills, or is allowed under special licences, and that all contracts concluded between the subjects of the belligerents before the outbreak of war become extinct or suspended. On the other hand, most German, French, and Italian writers deny the existence of such a rule, but assert the existence of another according to which belligerents are empowered to prohibit by special orders all trade between their own and enemy subjects.

§ 101. Following Bynkershoek,[204] all British and American writers and cases, as well as some French[205] and German[206] writers agree that there is a rule of International Law stating that all interactions, particularly trade, are ipso facto prohibited between the nationals of opposing parties once war breaks out, unless allowed under wartime customs, such as ransom bills, or under special permits. Additionally, any contracts made between the nationals of the opposing parties before the war start become void or on hold. Conversely, most German, French, and Italian writers reject the existence of such a rule, while claiming another rule exists that allows belligerents to specifically ban all trade between their nationals and those of the enemy.

[204] Quaestiones juris publici, I. c. 3: "quamvis autem nulla specialis sit commerciorum prohibitio ipsa tamen jure belli commercia sunt vetita."

[204] Public Law Questions, I. c. 3: "Even though there is no specific prohibition on trade, trade is still forbidden by the law of war."

[205] For instance, Pillet, p. 74, and Mérignhac, p. 57.

[205] For example, Pillet, p. 74, and Mérignhac, p. 57.

[206] For instance, Geffcken in his note 4 to Heffter, p. 265.

[206] For example, Geffcken in his note 4 to Heffter, p. 265.

These assertions are remnants of the time when the distinction[207] between International and Municipal Law was not, or not clearly, drawn. International Law, being a law for the conduct of States only and exclusively, has nothing to do directly with the conduct of private individuals, and both assertions are, therefore, nowadays untenable. Their place must be taken by the statement that, States being sovereign and the outbreak of war bringing the peaceful relations between belligerents to an end, it is within the competence[Pg 136] of every State to enact by its Municipal Law such rules as it pleases concerning intercourse, and especially trading, between its own and enemy subjects. And if we look at the Municipal Laws of the several countries, we find that they have to be divided into two groups. To the one group belong those States—such as Austria-Hungary, Germany, Holland, and Italy—whose Governments are empowered by their Municipal Laws to prohibit by special order all trading with enemy subjects at the outbreak of war. In these countries trade with enemy subjects is permitted to continue after the outbreak of war unless special prohibitive orders are issued. To the other group belong those States—such as Great Britain, the United States of America, and, unless desuetudo[208] has made an alteration, France—whose Municipal Laws declare trade and intercourse with enemy subjects ipso facto by the outbreak of war prohibited, but empowers the Governments to allow by special licences all or certain kinds of such trade.

These claims are leftovers from a time when the separation between International and Municipal Law wasn't clearly defined. International Law, which governs only the conduct of States, has nothing to do directly with individuals, making both claims outdated today. Instead, we must acknowledge that since States are sovereign and war disrupts peaceful relations between belligerents, each State has the authority to create its own Municipal Laws regarding interactions, particularly trade, between its citizens and enemy nationals. When we examine the Municipal Laws of different countries, we can categorize them into two groups. The first group consists of countries like Austria-Hungary, Germany, Holland, and Italy, whose Governments are allowed by their Municipal Laws to issue special orders prohibiting all trade with enemy nationals at the start of a war. In these countries, trade with enemy subjects can continue after the war begins unless specific prohibitions are put in place. The second group includes countries like Great Britain, the United States, and, unless traditions have changed, France, whose Municipal Laws automatically prohibit trade and exchanges with enemy nationals once a war breaks out, but grants Governments the power to permit certain types of trade through special licenses.

[208] See Meyer, op. cit. p. 91.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Meyer, *op. cit.* p. 91.

As regards the law of Great Britain[209] and the United States of America, it has been, since the end of the eighteenth century, an absolutely settled[210] rule of the Common Law that, certain cases excepted, all trading with alien enemies is ipso facto by the outbreak of war illegal unless it is allowed by special licences of the Crown. From the general principle asserted in the[Pg 137] leading cases,[211] the Courts have drawn the following more important consequences:—

As for the law in Great Britain[209] and the United States of America, it has been, since the late eighteenth century, an established[210] rule of Common Law that, with certain exceptions, all trade with enemy nations is ipso facto illegal upon the outbreak of war unless specifically permitted by special licenses from the Crown. From the general principles outlined in the[Pg 137] leading cases,[211] the Courts have drawn the following important consequences:—

(1) All contracts, entered into
during
a war,
with alien enemies without a special licence are illegal, invalid, and can never be enforced, unless the contract was one entered into in case of necessity,
or in order to supply
an invading English army or the English fleet, or by prisoners
of war concerning personal services and requirements. (2) Trading with the enemy does not become legal by the fact that goods coming from the enemy country to Great Britain, or going from Great Britain to the enemy country, are sent to their destination through a neutral country.
(3) As regards contracts entered into
before
the outbreak of war, a distinction must be drawn:—(
a
) Executory contracts are avoided, both parties being released from performance. (
b
) Contracts executed before the outbreak of war and not requiring to be acted upon during the war are suspended until after the conclusion of peace. (
c
) Executed contracts which require acting upon during the war are dissolved. (4) Partnerships
with alien enemies are dissolved. (5) No interest runs on debts
or mortgages.
(6) A contract of affreightment
must not be fulfilled; therefore English ships must not load or unload goods in an enemy port. (7) Contracts of insurance of enemy vessels and goods are so to be construed as to contain a proviso that the assurance shall not cover any loss occurring during a war between the country of the assurer and the country of the assured.
(8) A life insurance policy,
entered into before the outbreak of war conditioning the payment of yearly premiums on pain of forfeiture of the policy, is forfeited
ipso facto
by the outbreak of war because the payment of the premium is now prohibited. After the conclusion of peace, however, the insured may claim the equitable value of the policy arising, at the time of the outbreak of war, from the premiums actually paid.

[209] See besides the English and American text-books quoted above at the commencement of § 97, Pennant, Chadwick, and Gregory in The Law Quarterly Review, XVIII. (1902), pp. 289-296, XX. (1904), pp. 167-185, XXV. (1909), pp. 297-316; Bentwich, The Law of Private Property in War (1907), pp. 46-61; Phillipson, The Effect of War on Contracts (1909); Latifi, Effects of War on Property (1909), pp. 50-58.

[209] See besides the English and American textbooks mentioned above at the beginning of § 97, Pennant, Chadwick, and Gregory in The Law Quarterly Review, XVIII. (1902), pp. 289-296, XX. (1904), pp. 167-185, XXV. (1909), pp. 297-316; Bentwich, The Law of Private Property in War (1907), pp. 46-61; Phillipson, The Effect of War on Contracts (1909); Latifi, Effects of War on Property (1909), pp. 50-58.

[210] Whereas the Admiralty Court did at all times, the Common Law Courts did not during the eighteenth century hold trading with enemy subjects to be illegal, at any rate not in so far as insurance of enemy vessels and goods against capture on the part of English cruisers was concerned; see Henkle v. London Exchange Assurance Co. (1749), 1 Vesey Sen. 320; Planche v. Fletcher (1779), 1 Dougl. 251; Lavabre v. Wilson (1779), 1 Dougl. 284; Gist v. Mason (1786), 1 T.R. 84.

[210] While the Admiralty Court always saw it this way, the Common Law Courts in the eighteenth century did not consider trading with enemy subjects illegal, at least not when it came to insuring enemy vessels and goods against capture by English cruisers; see Henkle v. London Exchange Assurance Co. (1749), 1 Vesey Sen. 320; Planche v. Fletcher (1779), 1 Dougl. 251; Lavabre v. Wilson (1779), 1 Dougl. 284; Gist v. Mason (1786), 1 T.R. 84.

[211] Besides the Admiralty case of the Hoop (1799), 1 C. Rob. 196, the following are the leading cases:—Potts v. Bell (1800), 8 D. & E. 548; Furtado v. Rodgers (1802), 3 P. & B. 191; Esposito v. Bowden (1857), 7 E. & B. 763; the Mashona (1900), 10 Cape Times Law Reports, 170.

[211] In addition to the Admiralty case of the Hoop (1799), 1 C. Rob. 196, the key cases include: Potts v. Bell (1800), 8 D. & E. 548; Furtado v. Rodgers (1802), 3 P. & B. 191; Esposito v. Bowden (1857), 7 E. & B. 763; and the Mashona (1900), 10 Cape Times Law Reports, 170.

[212] Willison v. Paterson (1817), 7 Taunt, 439.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Willison v. Paterson (1817), 7 Taunt, 439.

[213] Antoine v. Morshead (1815), 6 Taunt, 237.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Antoine v. Morshead (1815), 6 Taunt, 237.

[214] The Madonna delle Gracie (1802), 4 C. Rob. 195.

[214] The Madonna delle Gracie (1802), 4 C. Rob. 195.

[215] Maria v. Hall (1800), 2 B. & P. 236.

[215] Maria v. Hall (1800), 2 B. & P. 236.

[216] The Jonge Pieter (1801), 4 C. Rob. 79. But if the goods have been bought by the subject of a neutral State bona fide by himself and are afterwards shipped through neutral country to the enemy, it is not a case of trading with the enemy; see the Samuel (1802), 4 C. Rob. 284, note.

[216] The Jonge Pieter (1801), 4 C. Rob. 79. However, if someone from a neutral country buys goods in good faith and then ships them through a neutral country to the enemy, it doesn't count as trading with the enemy; see the Samuel (1802), 4 C. Rob. 284, note.

[217] Melville v. De Wold (1855), 4 E. & B. 844; Esposito v. Bowden (1857), 7 E. & B. 763; Ex parte Boussmaker (1806), 13 Ves. Jun. 71; Alcinous v. Nygreu (1854), 4 E. & B. 217; the Charlotta (1814), 1 Dodson, 390.

[217] Melville v. De Wold (1855), 4 E. & B. 844; Esposito v. Bowden (1857), 7 E. & B. 763; Ex parte Boussmaker (1806), 13 Ves. Jun. 71; Alcinous v. Nygreu (1854), 4 E. & B. 217; the Charlotta (1814), 1 Dodson, 390.

[218] Griswold v. Boddington (1819), 16 Johnson, 438; Esposito v. Bowden (1857), 7 E. & B. 763.

[218] Griswold v. Boddington (1819), 16 Johnson, 438; Esposito v. Bowden (1857), 7 E. & B. 763.

[219] Du Belloix v. Lord Waterpark (1822), 1 Dowl. & R. 16; Mayer v. Reed (1867), 37 Gallison, 482.

[219] Du Belloix v. Lord Waterpark (1822), 1 Dowl. & R. 16; Mayer v. Reed (1867), 37 Gallison, 482.

[220] Hoare v. Allan (1789), 2 Dallas, 102.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Hoare v. Allan (1789), 2 Dallas, 102.

[221] Esposito v. Bowden (1857), 7 E. & B. 763. See also the Teutonia (1870), L. R. 4 Privy Council, 171.

[221] Esposito v. Bowden (1857), 7 E. & B. 763. See also the Teutonia (1870), L. R. 4 Privy Council, 171.

[222] Brandon v. Curling (1803), 4 East, 410; but see also Potts v. Bell (1800), 8 D. & E. 548; Furtado v. Rodgers (1802), 3 P. & B. 191; Kellner v. Le Mesurier (1803), 4 East, 396; Gamba v. Le Mesurier (1803), 4 East, 407.

[222] Brandon v. Curling (1803), 4 East, 410; but see also Potts v. Bell (1800), 8 D. & E. 548; Furtado v. Rodgers (1802), 3 P. & B. 191; Kellner v. Le Mesurier (1803), 4 East, 396; Gamba v. Le Mesurier (1803), 4 East, 407.

[223] New York Life Insurance Co. v. Stathem, v. Symes, and v. Buck (1876), 93 United States, 24; New York Life Insurance Co. v. Davis (1877), 95 United States, 425.

[223] New York Life Insurance Co. v. Stathem, v. Symes, and v. Buck (1876), 93 U.S. 24; New York Life Insurance Co. v. Davis (1877), 95 U.S. 425.

It must be specially observed that, if the continental interpretation of article 23 (h) of the Hague Regulations—see above, § 100a—were not contradicted by Great Britain and the United States of America, both countries would be compelled to alter their Municipal Laws in so far as these declare such contracts as have been entered into with alien enemies before the outbreak of war dissolved, void, or suspended. Article 23 (h) distinctly enacts that it is forbidden to declare extinguished or suspended the rights of the nationals of the adverse party. Since, however, as stated above in § 100a, Great Britain and the United States of America uphold a different interpretation, this article does not concern their Municipal Laws respecting trading with alien enemies.

It should be particularly noted that if the continental interpretation of article 23 (h) of the Hague Regulations—see above, § 100a—were not challenged by Great Britain and the United States, both countries would have to change their Municipal Laws regarding contracts made with foreign enemies before the war began, which they currently deem dissolved, void, or suspended. Article 23 (h) clearly states that it's not allowed to declare the rights of nationals from the opposing side as extinguished or suspended. However, as mentioned above in § 100a, Great Britain and the United States maintain a different interpretation, so this article does not apply to their Municipal Laws about trade with foreign enemies.

Position of Belligerents' Property in the Enemy State.

Position of Belligerents' Property in the Enemy State.

§ 102. In former times all private and public enemy property, immoveable or moveable, on each other's territory could be confiscated by the belligerents at the outbreak of war, as could also enemy debts; and the treaties[224] concluded between many States with regard to the withdrawal of each other's subjects at the outbreak of war stipulated likewise the unrestrained withdrawal of the private property of their subjects. Through the influence of such treaties as well as of Municipal Laws and Decrees enacting the same, an international usage and practice grew up that belligerents should neither confiscate private enemy property nor annul enemy debts on their territory. The last case of confiscation of private property is that of 1793 at the outbreak of war between France and Great Britain. No case of confiscation occurred during the nineteenth century, and although several writers maintain that according to strict law the old rule, in contradistinction to the usage which they do not deny, is still valid, it may safely be maintained that it is obsolete, and that there is now a customary rule of International Law in existence prohibiting the confiscation of private enemy property and the annulment of enemy debts on the territory of a belligerent. This rule, however, does not prevent a belligerent from seizing public enemy property on his territory, such as funds, ammunition, provisions, rolling stock of enemy state-railways, and other valuables; from preventing the withdrawal of private enemy property which may be made use of by the enemy[225] for military operations, such as arms and munitions; from seizing and making use of rolling stock belonging to private enemy railway[Pg 140] companies, other means of transport of persons or goods which are private enemy property, and, further, all appliances for the transmission of news, although they are private enemy property, provided all these articles are restored and indemnities are paid for them after the conclusion of peace;[226] and from suspending, as a measure of self preservation, the payment of large enemy debts till after the conclusion of peace in order to prevent the increase of resources of the enemy.

§ 102. In the past, all private and public enemy property, whether immovable or movable, could be confiscated by warring parties on each other's territory at the start of a war, including enemy debts. Additionally, treaties[224] made between various states about the withdrawal of each other's citizens at the beginning of war also allowed for the unrestricted withdrawal of their subjects' private property. Due to these treaties as well as municipal laws and decrees implementing the same, an international practice emerged that belligerents should not confiscate private enemy property nor cancel enemy debts on their territory. The last instance of private property confiscation occurred in 1793 at the onset of war between France and Great Britain. No confiscation incidents took place during the nineteenth century, and although some scholars argue that, by strict law, the old rule still applies—despite acknowledging the established usage—it can confidently be considered outdated. Now, there exists a customary rule of international law that prohibits the confiscation of private enemy property and the annulment of enemy debts on the territory of a belligerent. This rule, however, does not stop a belligerent from seizing public enemy property on their territory, such as funds, ammunition, supplies, rolling stock of enemy state railways, and other valuables; from preventing the withdrawal of private enemy property that could be used by the enemy[225] for military actions, like weapons and munitions; from seizing and using rolling stock belonging to private enemy railway[Pg 140] companies and other means of transport for people or goods that are private enemy property; and from taking all communication devices, even if they are private enemy property, as long as these items are returned and compensation is paid after peace is established;[226] and from delaying large enemy debt payments as a self-preservation measure until after peace is negotiated to stop the enemy's resources from increasing.

[224] See above, § 100; Moore, VII. § 1196; Scott, Conferences, pp. 559-563.

[224] See above, § 100; Moore, VII. § 1196; Scott, Conferences, pp. 559-563.

[225] The indulgence granted to enemy merchantmen in Russian and Japanese ports at the outbreak of the war in 1904, to leave those ports unmolested within a certain period of time, was conditional upon there being no contraband in the cargoes. See Lawrence, War, p. 52.

[225] At the start of the war in 1904, enemy merchant ships were allowed to leave Russian and Japanese ports without interference for a specific time, but this was only allowed if their cargoes did not contain any contraband. See Lawrence, War, p. 52.

[226] As the seizure of all these articles is, according to article 53 of the Hague Regulations, permissible in occupied enemy country, provided they are restored and indemnities paid after the conclusion of peace, seizure must likewise—under the same conditions—be permissible in case these articles are on the territory of a belligerent. As regards rolling stock belonging to private enemy railway companies, see Nowacki, Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege (1906), § 15.

[226] The confiscation of all these items is allowed under article 53 of the Hague Regulations in occupied enemy territory, as long as they are returned and compensation is paid after peace is established. Therefore, the confiscation should also be allowed under the same conditions if these items are located in a belligerent's territory. For information on rolling stock owned by private enemy railway companies, see Nowacki, Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege (1906), § 15.

Effect of the Outbreak of War on Merchantmen.

Effect of the Outbreak of War on Merchant Vessels.

§ 102a. In former times International Law empowered States at the outbreak of war to lay an embargo upon all enemy merchantmen in their harbours in order to confiscate them. And enemy merchantmen on the sea could at the outbreak of war be captured and confiscated although they did not even know of the outbreak of war. As regards enemy merchantmen in the harbours of the belligerents, it became, from the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, a usage, if not a custom, that no embargo[227] could be laid on them for the purpose of confiscating them, and that a reasonable time must be granted them to depart unmolested; but no rule was in existence until the Second Peace Conference of 1907 which prescribed immunity from confiscation for such enemy merchantmen at sea as did not know of the outbreak of war. This Conference took the matter into consideration, and produced a Convention (VI.) relative to the status of enemy merchantmen at the outbreak of hostilities[228] which is signed by all the Powers represented at the Conference, except[Pg 141] the United States of America,[229] China, and Nicaragua; but Nicaragua acceded later. In coming to an agreement on the subject, two facts had to be taken into consideration. There is, firstly, the fact that in all maritime countries numerous merchantmen are now built from special designs in order that they may quickly, at the outbreak of or during war, be converted into cruisers; it would therefore be folly on the part of a belligerent to grant any lenient treatment to such vessels. There is, secondly, the fact, that a belligerent fleet cannot nowadays remain effective for long without being accompanied by a train of colliers, transport vessels, and repairing vessels; it is, therefore, of the greatest importance for a belligerent to have as many merchantmen as possible at his disposal for the purpose of making use of them for such assistance to the fleet. For this reason, Convention VI. represents a compromise, and it distinguishes between vessels in the harbours of the belligerents and vessels on the sea. Its provisions are the following:—

§ 102a. In the past, International Law allowed States to impose an embargo on all enemy merchant ships in their harbors at the start of war to seize them. Enemy merchant ships at sea could also be captured and confiscated right when war broke out, even if they were unaware of it. Regarding enemy merchant ships in the harbors of the warring parties, starting with the Crimean War in 1854, it became customary, if not formal practice, not to impose an embargo for the purpose of confiscation. Instead, these ships were given a reasonable amount of time to leave peacefully. However, there weren’t any official rules until the Second Peace Conference of 1907, which established a guideline that enemy merchant ships at sea, ignorant of the war’s outbreak, would be protected from confiscation. This Conference addressed the issue and resulted in Convention (VI.) concerning the status of enemy merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities[228], which was signed by all the Powers present, except[Pg 141] the United States of America,[229] China, and Nicaragua; although Nicaragua later joined. In reaching an agreement on this matter, two factors had to be considered. First, many merchant ships in maritime nations are now designed in a way that allows them to be quickly converted into cruisers at the outset or during a war, making it imprudent for a warring party to treat these vessels leniently. Second, a warring fleet cannot operate effectively for long without a supply of colliers, transport vessels, and repair ships; thus, it’s crucial for a belligerent to have as many merchant vessels as possible available to support the fleet. For this reason, Convention VI. serves as a compromise, distinguishing between ships in the harbors of the belligerents and those at sea. Its provisions are as follows:—

[227] See above, § 40.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[228] See Lémonon, pp. 647-661; Higgins, pp. 300-307; Nippold, II. pp. 146-153; Scott, Conferences, pp. 556-568; Dupuis, Guerre, Nos. 74-81; Scott in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 260-269.

[228] See Lémonon, pp. 647-661; Higgins, pp. 300-307; Nippold, II. pp. 146-153; Scott, Conferences, pp. 556-568; Dupuis, Guerre, Nos. 74-81; Scott in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 260-269.

[229] The United States of America refused to sign the Convention because she considers its stipulations retrogressive as they are less liberal than the practice which has prevailed since 1854. But circumstances have changed since that time, and the two facts explained in the text would seem to have compelled the maritime Powers to adopt rules somewhat less liberal. This was the more necessary since no agreement could be arrived at concerning the question of the locality in which belligerents should be allowed to convert merchantmen into cruisers.

[229] The United States refused to sign the Convention because it finds its provisions outdated, as they are less progressive than the practices that have been in place since 1854. However, circumstances have changed since then, and the two facts discussed in the text seem to have forced the maritime Powers to adopt rules that are somewhat less progressive. This was especially necessary since no consensus could be reached regarding where belligerents should be allowed to convert merchant ships into cruisers.

(1) Article 1 of the Convention enacts that, in case an enemy merchantman is at the beginning of the war in the port of a belligerent, it is desirable that she should be allowed freely to depart, either immediately or after a sufficient term of grace, and, after being furnished with a passport, to proceed either direct to her port of destination or to such other port as may be determined. It is obvious that, since only the desirability of free departure of such vessels is stipulated, a belligerent is not compelled to grant free departure; nevertheless there must be grave reasons for not acting in accordance[Pg 142] with what is considered desirable by article 1. And it must be specially observed that a belligerent may make a distinction in the treatment of several enemy vessels in his harbours, and may grant free departure to one or more of them, and refuse it to others, according to his discretion.

(1) Article 1 of the Convention states that if an enemy merchant ship is in a belligerent's port at the start of the war, it is desirable for the ship to be allowed to leave freely, either immediately or after a reasonable period, and, once provided with a passport, to go directly to its intended port or to another designated port. It's clear that since only the desirability of free departure is mentioned, a belligerent is not required to permit it; however, there should be significant reasons for not acting in line with what article 1 considers desirable. It's also important to note that a belligerent can treat different enemy vessels in its harbors differently, granting free departure to some while denying it to others, based on its own judgment.

(2) The former usage that enemy merchantmen in the harbours of the belligerents at the outbreak of war may not be confiscated, has been made a binding rule by article 2 which enacts that such vessels as were not allowed to leave, or were by force majeure prevented from leaving during the term of grace, may not be confiscated, but may only be detained under the obligation that they shall be restored, without indemnity, after the conclusion of peace, or they may be requisitioned on condition of indemnities to be paid to the owners.

(2) The previous rule that enemy merchant ships in the ports of countries at war cannot be seized has been established as a binding rule by article 2. This article states that vessels that were not permitted to leave, or were prevented from leaving due to force majeure during the grace period, cannot be confiscated. Instead, they can only be held with the requirement that they are returned, without compensation, after peace is restored, or they can be requisitioned with the condition that compensation is paid to the owners.

(3) Enemy merchantmen which have left their last port of departure before the outbreak of war and which, while ignorant of the outbreak of war, are met at sea by cruisers of the belligerents, may, according to article 3, be captured, but they may not be confiscated, for they must be restored after the war is ended, although no indemnities need be paid. Indemnities are only to be paid in case the vessels have been requisitioned or destroyed, for a belligerent is empowered to requisition or destroy such vessels provided he takes care to preserve the ship papers and makes arrangements for the safety of the persons on board.

(3) Enemy merchant ships that left their last port before the war started and, while unaware of the war's outbreak, are encountered at sea by the opposing forces may, according to article 3, be captured, but they cannot be confiscated. They must be returned after the war ends, and no compensation is required. Compensation only needs to be paid if the vessels have been requisitioned or destroyed, as a belligerent is allowed to requisition or destroy such ships as long as they safeguard the ship's documents and ensure the safety of the people on board.

It is obvious that, in case such vessels are not ignorant of the outbreak of war—having, for instance, received the news by wireless telegraphy—they may not any longer claim the privileges stipulated by article 3. And this article stipulates expressly that after having touched a port of their own or of a neutral country, such vessels are no longer privileged.

It is clear that if these vessels are aware of the outbreak of war—such as if they received the news via wireless telegraphy—they can no longer claim the privileges outlined in article 3. This article specifically states that after they have docked at a port in their own country or in a neutral country, these vessels are no longer privileged.

(4) Enemy goods on board such enemy merchantmen[Pg 143] as are in the harbour of a belligerent at the outbreak of war or at sea and are in ignorance of the outbreak of war are, according to article 4, privileged to the same extent as the vessels concerned.

(4) Enemy goods on board those enemy merchant ships[Pg 143] that are in the harbor of a warring nation at the start of war or at sea and are unaware of the outbreak of war are, according to article 4, entitled to the same protections as the vessels involved.

(5) Enemy merchantmen whose construction indicates that they are intended to be converted into cruisers may be seized and confiscated in the harbours of the belligerents, as well as at sea, although ignorant of the outbreak of war, for article 5 stipulates expressly that Convention VI. does not affect such vessels.

(5) Enemy merchant ships that are built to be converted into cruisers can be seized and confiscated in the ports of the warring parties, as well as at sea, even if they are unaware of the war starting, because article 5 specifically states that Convention VI. does not apply to these vessels.

CHAPTER 3 Ground Warfare

I ON LAND WARFARE OVERALL

Vattel, III. §§ 136-138—Hall, §§ 184-185—Phillimore, III. § 94—Taylor, § 469—Wheaton, § 342—Bluntschli, §§ 534-535—Heffter, § 125—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 388-389—Gareis, § 84—Bonfils, Nos. 1066-1067—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2734-2741—Longuet, § 41—Mérignhac, p. 146—Pillet, pp. 85-89—Kriegsbrauch, p. 9—Land Warfare, § 39—Holland, War, Nos. 1-15.

Vattel, III. §§ 136-138—Hall, §§ 184-185—Phillimore, III. § 94—Taylor, § 469—Wheaton, § 342—Bluntschli, §§ 534-535—Heffter, § 125—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 388-389—Gareis, § 84—Bonfils, Nos. 1066-1067—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2734-2741—Longuet, § 41—Mérignhac, p. 146—Pillet, pp. 85-89—Kriegsbrauch, p. 9—Land Warfare, § 39—Holland, War, Nos. 1-15.

Aims and Means of Land Warfare.

Aims and Means of Land Warfare.

§ 103. The purpose of war, namely, the overpowering of the enemy, is served in land warfare through two aims[230]—firstly, defeat of the enemy armed forces on land, and, secondly, occupation and administration of the enemy territory. The chief means by which belligerents try to realise those aims, and which are always conclusively decisive, are the different sorts of force applied against enemy persons. But besides such violence against enemy persons there are other means which are not at all unimportant, although they play a secondary part only. Such means are: appropriation, utilisation, and destruction of enemy property; siege; bombardment; assault; espionage; utilisation of treason; ruses. All these means of warfare on land must be discussed in this chapter, as must also occupation of enemy territory.

§ 103. The purpose of war, which is to overpower the enemy, is achieved in land warfare through two main objectives[230]—first, defeating the enemy's armed forces on land, and second, occupying and governing the enemy's territory. The primary methods that warring parties use to accomplish these goals, which are always crucial, are the various types of force applied against enemy combatants. However, in addition to such violence against enemy personnel, there are other means that, while secondary, are still significant. These include: seizing, using, and destroying enemy property; laying siege; bombardment; assaults; espionage; exploiting treachery; and employing deception. All of these methods of land warfare will be examined in this chapter, along with the occupation of enemy territory.

[230] Aims of land warfare must not be confounded with ends of war; see above, § 66.

[230] The goals of land warfare should not be confused with the objectives of war; see above, § 66.

Lawful and Unlawful Practices of Land Warfare.

Lawful and Unlawful Practices of Land Warfare.

§ 104. But—to use the words of article 22 of the Hague Regulations—"the belligerents have not an[Pg 145] unlimited right as to the means they adopt for injuring the enemy." For not all possible practices of injuring the enemy in offence and defence are lawful, certain practices being prohibited under all circumstances and conditions, and other practices being allowed only under certain circumstances and conditions, or only with certain restrictions. The principles of chivalry and of humanity have been at work[231] for many hundreds of years to create these restrictions, and their work is not yet at an end. However, apart from these restrictions, all kinds and degrees of force and many other practices may be made use of in war.

§ 104. But—using the words from article 22 of the Hague Regulations—"the warring parties do not have an[Pg 145] unlimited right regarding the methods they choose to harm the enemy." Not every possible method of attacking or defending against the enemy is legal; some methods are banned in all circumstances, while others are only allowed under specific situations or with certain limitations. The principles of honor and humanity have been shaping these rules for many centuries, and their work continues. Nevertheless, aside from these rules, various types and levels of force and many other actions can be used in war.

[231] See above, § 67.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Objects of the Means of Warfare.

Objects of the Means of Warfare.

§ 105. In a sense all means of warfare are directed against one object only—namely, the enemy State, which is to be overpowered by all legitimate means. Apart from this, the means of land warfare are directed against several objects.[232] Such objects are chiefly the members of the armed forces of the enemy, but likewise, although in a lesser degree, other enemy persons; further, private and public property, fortresses, and roads. Indeed, apart from certain restrictions, everything may eventually be the object of a means of warfare, provided the means are legitimate in themselves and are capable of fostering the realisation of the purpose of war.

§ 105. In a way, all methods of warfare are focused on one main target—the enemy state, which is to be defeated by all legitimate means. Besides this, the methods used in land warfare target several objectives.[232] These objectives mainly include members of the enemy's armed forces, but to a lesser extent, also other individuals from the enemy; additionally, private and public property, fortifications, and roadways. In fact, with certain limitations, anything can eventually become a target of warfare, as long as the methods used are legitimate on their own and can help achieve the overall purpose of the war.

[232] See Oppenheim, Die Objekte des Verbrechens (1894), pp. 64-146, where the relation of human actions with their objects is fully discussed.

[232] See Oppenheim, The Objects of Crime (1894), pp. 64-146, where the connection between human actions and their objects is thoroughly discussed.

Land Warfare in contradistinction to Sea Warfare.

Land Warfare in contrast to Sea Warfare.

§ 106. Land warfare must be distinguished from sea warfare chiefly for two reasons. Firstly, their circumstances and conditions differ widely from each other, and, therefore, their means and practices also differ. Secondly, the law-making Conventions which deal with warfare rarely deal with land and sea warfare at the same time, but mostly treat them separately, for whereas some Conventions deal exclusively with warfare on sea, the Hague Regulations (Convention IV.) deal exclusively with warfare on land.[Pg 146]

§ 106. Land warfare is different from sea warfare for two main reasons. First, their circumstances and conditions are quite different, which leads to different means and practices. Second, the treaties that set the laws for warfare usually address land and sea warfare separately. Some treaties focus solely on sea warfare, while the Hague Regulations (Convention IV.) focus solely on land warfare.[Pg 146]

II VIOLENCE AGAINST ENEMY COMBATANTS

Grotius, III. c. 4—Vattel, III. §§ 139-159—Hall, §§ 128, 129, 185—Westlake, II. pp. 72-76—Lawrence, §§ 161, 163, 166-169—Maine, pp. 123-148—Manning, pp. 196-205—Phillimore, III. §§ 94-95—Halleck, II. pp. 14-18—Moore, VII. §§ 1111, 1119, 1122, 1124—Taylor, §§ 477-480—Walker, § 50—Wheaton, §§ 343-345—Bluntschli, §§ 557-563—Heffter, § 126—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 390-394—Gareis, § 85—Klüber, § 244—Liszt, § 40, III.—G. F. Martens, II. § 272—Ullmann, § 176—Bonfils, Nos. 1068-1071, 1099, 1141—Despagnet, Nos. 525-527—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2742-2758—Rivier, II. pp. 260-265—Nys, III. pp. 206-209—Calvo, IV. 2098-2105—Fiore, III. Nos. 1317-1320, 1342-1348, and Code, Nos. 1476-1483—Martens, II. § 110—Longuet, §§ 42-49—Mérignhac, pp. 146-165—Pillet, pp. 85-95—Holland, War, pp. 70-76—Zorn, pp. 127-161—Bordwell, pp. 278-283—Meurer, II. §§ 30-31—Spaight, pp. 73-156—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 9-11—Land Warfare, §§ 39-53.

Grotius, III. c. 4—Vattel, III. §§ 139-159—Hall, §§ 128, 129, 185—Westlake, II. pp. 72-76—Lawrence, §§ 161, 163, 166-169—Maine, pp. 123-148—Manning, pp. 196-205—Phillimore, III. §§ 94-95—Halleck, II. pp. 14-18—Moore, VII. §§ 1111, 1119, 1122, 1124—Taylor, §§ 477-480—Walker, § 50—Wheaton, §§ 343-345—Bluntschli, §§ 557-563—Heffter, § 126—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 390-394—Gareis, § 85—Klüber, § 244—Liszt, § 40, III.—G. F. Martens, II. § 272—Ullmann, § 176—Bonfils, Nos. 1068-1071, 1099, 1141—Despagnet, Nos. 525-527—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2742-2758—Rivier, II. pp. 260-265—Nys, III. pp. 206-209—Calvo, IV. 2098-2105—Fiore, III. Nos. 1317-1320, 1342-1348, and Code, Nos. 1476-1483—Martens, II. § 110—Longuet, §§ 42-49—Mérignhac, pp. 146-165—Pillet, pp. 85-95—Holland, War, pp. 70-76—Zorn, pp. 127-161—Bordwell, pp. 278-283—Meurer, II. §§ 30-31—Spaight, pp. 73-156—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 9-11—Land Warfare, §§ 39-53.

On Violence in general against Enemy Persons.

On Violence in general against Enemy Persons.

§ 107. As war is a contention between States for the purpose of overpowering each other, violence consisting of different sorts of force applied against enemy persons is the chief and decisive means of warfare. These different sorts of force are used against combatants as well as non-combatants, but with discrimination and differentiation. The purpose of the application of violence against combatants is their disablement so that they can no longer take part in the fighting. And this purpose may be realised through either killing or wounding them, or making them prisoners. As regards non-combatant members of armed forces, private enemy persons showing no hostile conduct, and officials in important positions, only minor means of force may as a rule be applied, since they do not take part in the armed contention of the belligerents.

§ 107. War is a struggle between nations aimed at overpowering one another, and violence, which includes various forms of force used against enemy individuals, is the main and crucial method of warfare. These different forms of force are directed at both combatants and non-combatants, but with careful consideration and distinction. The goal of using violence against combatants is to incapacitate them so they can no longer participate in the conflict. This goal can be achieved by either killing or wounding them, or by taking them as prisoners. When it comes to non-combatant members of armed forces, civilian enemy individuals who do not show hostility, and officials in critical roles, only limited levels of force should typically be applied, as they do not engage in the armed conflict of the warring parties.

Killing and Wounding of Combatants.

Killing and Wounding of Fighters.

§ 108. Every combatant may be killed or wounded, whether a private soldier or an officer, or even the monarch or a member of his family. Some publicists[233] assert that it is a usage of warfare not to aim at a[Pg 147] sovereign or a member of his family. Be that as it may, there is in strict law[234] no rule preventing the killing and wounding of such illustrious persons. But combatants may only be killed or wounded if they are able and willing to fight or to resist capture. Therefore, such combatants as are disabled by sickness or wounds may not be killed. Further, such combatants as lay down arms and surrender or do not resist being made prisoners may neither be killed nor wounded, but must be given quarter. These rules are universally recognised, and are now expressly enacted by article 23 (c) of the Hague Regulations, although the fury of battle frequently makes individual fighters[235] forget and neglect them.

§ 108. Any combatant can be killed or wounded, whether they're a private soldier, an officer, the monarch, or a member of their family. Some publicists[233] argue that it's customary in warfare not to target a[Pg 147] sovereign or their family. Regardless, there is no strict legal rule[234] that prevents the killing or wounding of such prominent individuals. However, combatants can only be killed or wounded if they are able and willing to fight or resist capture. Therefore, combatants who are incapacitated by illness or injury cannot be killed. Additionally, those who lay down their arms and surrender or do not resist being taken prisoner may not be killed or wounded and must be granted quarter. These rules are widely recognized and are explicitly stated in article 23 (c) of the Hague Regulations, although the chaos of battle often leads individual fighters[235] to forget and overlook them.

[233] See Klüber, § 245; G. F. Martens, II. § 278; Heffter, § 126.

[233] See Klüber, § 245; G. F. Martens, II. § 278; Heffter, § 126.

[234] Says Vattel, III. § 159: "Mais ce n'est point une loi de la guerre d'épargner en toute rencontre la personne du roi ennemi; et on n'y est obligé que quand on a la facilité de le faire prisonnier." The example of Charles XII. of Sweden (quoted by Vattel), who was intentionally fired at by the defenders of the fortress of Thorn, besieged by him, and who said that the defenders were within their right, ought to settle the point.

[234] Vattel says in Chapter III, § 159: "But it is not a law of war to spare the enemy king's life in every encounter; this obligation only applies when one has the opportunity to capture him." The example of Charles XII of Sweden (as mentioned by Vattel), who was deliberately targeted by the defenders of the fortress of Thorn, which he was besieging, and who stated that the defenders were justified in their actions, should clarify the matter.

[235] See Baty, International Law in South Africa (1900), pp. 84-85.

[235] See Baty, International Law in South Africa (1900), pp. 84-85.

Refusal of Quarter.

Quarter Refusal.

§ 109. However, the rule that quarter must be given has its exceptions. Although it has of late been a customary rule of International Law, and although the Hague Regulations now expressly stipulate by article 23 (d) that belligerents are prohibited from declaring that no quarter will be given, quarter may nevertheless be refused[236] by way of reprisal for violations of the rules of warfare committed by the other side; and, further, in case of imperative necessity, when the granting of quarter would so encumber a force with prisoners that its own security would thereby be vitally imperilled.[237] But it must be emphasised that the mere fact that numerous prisoners cannot safely be guarded and fed by the captors[238] does not[Pg 148] furnish an exceptional case to the rule, provided that no vital danger to the captors is therein involved. And it must likewise be emphasised that the former rule is now obsolete according to which quarter could be refused to the garrison of a fortress carried by assault, to the defenders of an unfortified place against an attack of artillery, and to the weak garrison who obstinately and uselessly persevered in defending a fortified place against overwhelming enemy forces.

§ 109. However, the rule that quarter must be given has exceptions. Even though it has recently become a customary rule of International Law, and even though the Hague Regulations now clearly state in article 23 (d) that belligerents cannot declare that no quarter will be given, quarter can still be denied as a reprisal for violations of warfare rules by the other side; furthermore, in situations of urgent necessity, when giving quarter would overwhelm a force with prisoners to the point that its own safety is critically endangered. But it’s important to emphasize that just because many prisoners cannot safely be guarded and fed by the captors does not create an exceptional case to the rule, as long as there is no significant danger to the captors involved. It should also be noted that the earlier rule—where quarter could be denied to the garrison of a fortress taken by assault, to defenders of an unfortified position under artillery attack, and to a weak garrison that stubbornly and needlessly continued to defend a fortified place against overwhelming enemy forces—is now outdated.

[236] See Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2800-2801, who opposes this principle but discusses the subject in a very detailed way.

[236] See Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2800-2801, who disagrees with this principle but explores the topic in great detail.

[237] See Payrat, Le Prisonnier de Guerre (1910), pp. 191-220, and Land Warfare, § 80.

[237] See Payrat, The Prisoner of War (1910), pp. 191-220, and Land Warfare, § 80.

[238] Accordingly, the Boers frequently during the South African War set free British soldiers whom they had captured.

[238] As a result, the Boers often released British soldiers they had taken prisoner during the South African War.

Lawful and Unlawful Means of killing and wounding Combatants.

Lawful and Unlawful Ways of Killing and Wounding Combatants.

§ 110. Apart from such means as are expressly prohibited by treaties or custom, all means of killing and wounding that exist or may be invented are lawful. And it matters not whether the means used are directed against single individuals, as swords and rifles, or against large bodies of individuals, as, for instance, shrapnel, Gatlings, and mines. On the other hand, all means are unlawful that render death inevitable or that needlessly aggravate the sufferings of wounded combatants. A customary rule of International Law, now expressly enacted by article 23 (e) of the Hague Regulations, prohibits, therefore, the employment of poison and of such arms, projectiles, and material as cause unnecessary injury. Accordingly: wells, pumps, rivers, and the like from which the enemy draws drinking water must not be poisoned; poisoned weapons must not be made use of; rifles must not be loaded with bits of glass, irregularly shaped iron, nails, and the like; cannons must not be loaded with chain shot, crossbar shot, red-hot balls, and the like. Another customary rule, now likewise enacted by article 23 (b) of the Hague Regulations, prohibits any treacherous way of killing and wounding combatants. Accordingly: no assassin must be hired and no assassination of combatants be committed; a price may not be put on the head of an enemy individual; proscription and outlawing are prohibited; no treacherous request for quarter must[Pg 149] be made; no treacherous simulation of sickness or wounds is permitted.

§ 110. Besides those methods that are specifically banned by treaties or customs, all means of killing and injuring that currently exist or can be invented are allowed. It doesn’t matter if the methods are aimed at individuals, like swords and rifles, or large groups of people, like shrapnel, Gatling guns, and mines. However, any means that guarantee death or unnecessarily worsen the suffering of wounded soldiers are not allowed. A customary rule of International Law, now explicitly stated in article 23 (e) of the Hague Regulations, prohibits the use of poison and any weapons, projectiles, or materials that cause unnecessary harm. Therefore: wells, pumps, rivers, and similar sources of drinking water must not be poisoned; poison weapons must not be used; rifles must not be loaded with pieces of glass, oddly shaped metal, nails, or the like; cannons must not be loaded with chain shot, crossbar shot, red-hot balls, and similar items. Another customary rule, which is also enacted in article 23 (b) of the Hague Regulations, forbids any deceptive methods of killing and wounding combatants. Therefore: no assassin may be hired and no assassination of combatants is allowed; a bounty may not be placed on the head of an enemy; proscription and outlawing are not permitted; no deceitful plea for mercy may be made; no deceptive feigning of illness or wounds is allowed.

Explosive Bullets.

Explosive bullets.

§ 111. In 1868 a conference met at St. Petersburg for the examination of a proposition made by Russia with regard to the use of explosive projectiles in war. The representatives of seventeen Powers—namely, Great Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Bavaria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Holland, Italy, Persia, Portugal, Prussia and the North German Confederation, Sweden-Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and Württemberg (Brazil acceded later) signed on December 11, 1868, the so-called Declaration of St. Petersburg,[239] which stipulates that the signatory Powers, and those who should accede later, renounce in case of war between themselves the employment, by their military and naval troops, of any projectile of a weight below 400 grammes (14 ounces) which is either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable substances. This engagement is obligatory only upon the contracting Powers, and it ceases to be obligatory in case a non-contracting Power takes part in a war between any of the contracting Powers.

§ 111. In 1868, a conference took place in St. Petersburg to discuss a proposal from Russia regarding the use of explosive projectiles in war. Representatives from seventeen nations—including Great Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Bavaria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Italy, Persia, Portugal, Prussia, the North German Confederation, Sweden-Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and Württemberg (Brazil joined later)—signed the Declaration of St. Petersburg on December 11, 1868,[239] which states that the signatory nations, as well as any that join later, agree to refrain from using any projectile weighing less than 400 grams (14 ounces) that is explosive or contains explosive or flammable substances in the event of war among themselves. This commitment is only binding for the countries that signed it and becomes non-binding if a non-signatory country participates in a war between any of the signatory nations.

Expanding (Dum-Dum) Bullets.

Expanding Dum-Dum Bullets.

§ 112. As Great Britain had introduced bullets manufactured at the Indian arsenal of Dum-Dum, near Calcutta, the hard jacket of which did not quite cover the core and which therefore easily expanded and flattened in the human body, the First Hague Peace Conference adopted a declaration signed on July 29, 1899, by fifteen Powers—namely, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Mexico, France, Greece, Montenegro, Holland, Persia, Roumania, Russia, Siam, Sweden-Norway, Turkey, and Bulgaria—stipulating that the contracting Powers should abstain, in case of war between two or more of them, from the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body,[Pg 150] such as bullets with hard envelopes which do not entirely cover the core or are pierced with incisions. Austria-Hungary, China, Germany, Italy, Nicaragua, Portugal, Japan, Luxemburg, Servia, Switzerland, and Great Britain acceded later.

§ 112. After Great Britain introduced bullets made at the Indian arsenal of Dum-Dum, near Calcutta, which had a hard jacket that didn’t fully cover the core and easily expanded and flattened in the human body, the First Hague Peace Conference adopted a declaration on July 29, 1899, signed by fifteen nations—Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Mexico, France, Greece, Montenegro, Holland, Persia, Romania, Russia, Siam, Sweden-Norway, Turkey, and Bulgaria—stating that the signatory nations should refrain from using bullets that expand or flatten easily in the human body during conflicts between them,[Pg 150] like bullets with hard shells that don’t completely cover the core or have incisions. Austria-Hungary, China, Germany, Italy, Nicaragua, Portugal, Japan, Luxembourg, Serbia, Switzerland, and Great Britain joined later.

Projectiles diffusing Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases.

Projectiles diffusing asphyxiating or harmful gases.

§ 113. The First Hague Peace Conference also adopted a Declaration, signed on July 29, 1899, by sixteen States—namely, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Mexico, France, Greece, Montenegro, Holland, Persia, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Siam, Sweden-Norway, Turkey and Bulgaria—stipulating that the signatory Powers should in a war between two or more of them abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. Austria-Hungary, China, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Nicaragua, Servia, Switzerland, and Great Britain acceded later.

§ 113. The First Hague Peace Conference also adopted a Declaration, signed on July 29, 1899, by sixteen States—namely, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Mexico, France, Greece, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Thailand, Sweden-Norway, Turkey, and Bulgaria—stating that the signatory Powers should, in the event of a war between two or more of them, refrain from using projectiles that are intended solely for the spread of asphyxiating or harmful gases. Austria-Hungary, China, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Nicaragua, Serbia, Switzerland, and Great Britain joined later.

Violence directed from Air-Vessels.

Violence from Air Vessels.

§ 114. The First Hague Peace Conference adopted likewise a Declaration, signed on July 29, 1899, prohibiting for a term of five years the launching of projectiles or explosives from balloons or other kinds of aerial vessels. The Second Peace Conference, on October 18, 1907, renewed this Declaration up to the close of the Third Peace Conference, but out of twenty-seven States which signed the Declaration only seven—namely, Great Britain, the United States of America, China, Holland, Bolivia, Salvador, Haiti (Nicaragua acceded later)—ratified it, and Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Russia—not to mention smaller Powers—did not even sign it. There is, therefore, no doubt that the Third Peace Conference will not renew the Declaration. Although it is very much to be regretted, the fact must be taken into consideration that in future violence directed from air-vessels will play a great part in war. For this reason, the question as to the conditions under which such violence is admissible, is of[Pg 151] importance,[240] but it is as yet impossible to give a satisfactory answer. The Institute of International Law, at its meeting at Madrid in 1911, adopted the principle[241] that aerial warfare must not comprise greater danger to the person and the property of the peaceful population than land or sea warfare. However this may be, there can be no doubt that the general principles laid down in the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868, in the two Declarations, adopted by the First Peace Conference, concerning expanding bullets and projectiles diffusing asphyxiating or deleterious gases, in the Hague rules concerning land warfare, and the like, must find application as regards violence directed from air vessels.

§ 114. The First Hague Peace Conference also adopted a Declaration, signed on July 29, 1899, that prohibited for a term of five years the use of projectiles or explosives from balloons or other types of aircraft. The Second Peace Conference, on October 18, 1907, extended this Declaration until the end of the Third Peace Conference, but out of the twenty-seven States that signed the Declaration, only seven—namely, Great Britain, the United States of America, China, the Netherlands, Bolivia, El Salvador, and Haiti (Nicaragua joined later)—ratified it. Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Russia, as well as several smaller states, didn't even sign it. Therefore, it is clear that the Third Peace Conference will not renew the Declaration. While it is very unfortunate, we must acknowledge that in the future, violence from aerial vehicles will play a significant role in warfare. For this reason, it is crucial to discuss the conditions under which such violence is acceptable, but it is currently impossible to provide a satisfactory answer. The Institute of International Law, during its meeting in Madrid in 1911, adopted the principle[241] that aerial warfare must not pose a greater danger to the lives and property of civilians than land or sea warfare. Regardless, it remains clear that the general principles outlined in the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868, as well as the two Declarations adopted by the First Peace Conference regarding expanding bullets and projectiles that release asphyxiating or harmful gases, and the Hague rules concerning land warfare, should also apply to violence from aircraft.

[241] See Annuaire, XXIV. (1911), p. 346.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Directory, XXIV. (1911), p. 346.

Violence against non-combatant Members of Armed Forces.

Violence against non-combatant members of armed forces.

§ 115. It will be remembered from above, § 79, that numerous individuals belong to armed forces without being combatants. Now, since and in so far as these non-combatant members of armed forces do not take part in the fighting, they may not directly be attacked and killed or wounded. However, they are exposed to all injuries indirectly resulting from the operations of warfare. And, with the exception of the personnel[242] engaged in the interest of the wounded, such as doctors, chaplains, persons employed in military hospitals, official ambulance men, who, according to articles 9 and 10 of the Geneva Convention, are specially privileged, such non-combatant members of armed forces may certainly be made prisoners, since the assistance they give to the fighting forces may be of great importance.

§ 115. As mentioned earlier, § 79, many people are part of armed forces without being combatants. Now, since these non-combatant members do not participate in the fighting, they should not be directly attacked, killed, or injured. However, they can still be affected by any harm that results indirectly from military operations. Except for personnel[242] involved in caring for the wounded, such as doctors, chaplains, and staff in military hospitals or official ambulance crews, who have special protections under articles 9 and 10 of the Geneva Convention, these non-combatant members can definitely be taken as prisoners, as the support they provide to military forces can be very significant.

[242] See below, § 121.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Violence against Private Enemy Persons.

Violence against private enemy individuals.

§ 116. Whereas in former[243] times private enemy persons of either sex could be killed or otherwise badly[Pg 152] treated according to discretion, and whereas in especial the inhabitants of fortified places taken by assault used to be abandoned to the mercy of the assailants, in the eighteenth century it became a universally recognised customary rule of the Law of Nations that private enemy individuals should not be killed or attacked. In so far as they do not take part in the fighting, they may not be directly attacked and killed or wounded. They are, however, like non-combatant members of the armed forces, exposed to all injuries indirectly resulting from the operations of warfare. Thus, for instance, when a town is bombarded and thousands of inhabitants are thereby killed, or when a train carrying private individuals as well as soldiers is wrecked by a mine, no violation of the rule prohibiting attack on private enemy persons has taken place.

§ 116. In the past[243] , private enemy individuals, regardless of gender, could be killed or seriously harmed at will. Particularly, the residents of fortified locations that were taken by assault were often left at the mercy of the attackers. However, in the eighteenth century, it became a widely accepted principle in international law that private enemy individuals should not be killed or harmed. As long as they are not participating in the fighting, they cannot be directly attacked, killed, or injured. They are, however, similar to non-combatant members of the armed forces, vulnerable to any harm that results indirectly from military operations. For example, when a town is bombarded and thousands of civilians are killed, or when a train carrying both civilians and soldiers is destroyed by a mine, no breach of the rule against attacking private enemy individuals has occurred.

[243] See Grotius, III. c. 4, §§ VI. and IX.

[243] See Grotius, III. c. 4, §§ VI. and IX.

As regards captivity, the rule is that private enemy persons may not be made prisoners of war. But this rule has exceptions conditioned by the carrying out of certain military operations, the safety of the armed forces, and the order and tranquillity of occupied enemy territory. Thus, for instance, influential enemy citizens who try to incite their fellow-citizens to take up arms may be arrested and deported into captivity. And even the whole population of a province may be imprisoned in case a levy en masse is threatening.[244]

Regarding captivity, the rule is that private enemy individuals cannot be taken as prisoners of war. However, there are exceptions based on carrying out certain military operations, ensuring the safety of the armed forces, and maintaining order and peace in occupied enemy territory. For example, influential enemy citizens who attempt to incite their fellow citizens to take up arms may be arrested and detained. Additionally, the entire population of a province may be imprisoned if there's a threat of a mass uprising.[244]

[244] Civilians who render assistance to the enemy as drivers, or as labourers to construct fortifications or siege works, or in a similar way, if captured while they are so engaged, may not be detained as prisoners of war, whether they render these services voluntarily or are requisitioned or hired. See Land Warfare, § 58 note (a).

[244] Civilians who help the enemy, whether as drivers, laborers building fortifications or siege works, or in any similar role, if captured while doing so, cannot be held as prisoners of war, regardless of whether they provide these services voluntarily or are forced or hired to do so. See Land Warfare, § 58 note (a).

Apart from captivity, restrictions of all sorts may be imposed upon, and means of force may be applied against, private enemy persons for many purposes. Such purposes are:—the keeping of order and tranquillity on occupied enemy territory; the prevention[Pg 153] of any hostile conduct, especially conspiracies; the prevention of intercourse with and assistance to the enemy forces; the securing of the fulfilment of commands and requests of the military authorities, such as those for the provision of drivers, hostages, farriers; the securing of compliance with requisitions and contributions, of the execution of public works necessary for military operations, such as the building of fortifications, roads, bridges, soldiers' quarters, and the like. What kind of violent means may be applied for these purposes is in the discretion of the respective military authorities, who on their part will act according to expediency and the rules of martial law established by the belligerents. But there is no doubt that, if necessary, capital punishment and imprisonment[245] are lawful means for these purposes. The essence of the position of private individuals in modern warfare with regard to violence against them finds expression in article 46 of the Hague Regulations, which lays down the rule that "family honours and rights, individual lives and private property, as well as religious convictions and liberty, must be respected."

Aside from captivity, various restrictions can be placed on private enemy individuals, and force can be used against them for many reasons. These reasons include: maintaining order and peace in occupied enemy territory; preventing any hostile actions, particularly conspiracies; stopping communication and support for enemy forces; ensuring compliance with commands and requests from military authorities, like providing drivers, hostages, and farriers; making sure requisitions and contributions are met; and executing necessary public works for military operations, such as building fortifications, roads, bridges, soldier accommodations, and similar structures. The types of force that may be used for these purposes are at the discretion of the respective military authorities, who will act according to what they deem appropriate and the rules of martial law set by the warring parties. However, it's clear that, if needed, capital punishment and imprisonment are lawful options for these purposes. The status of private individuals in modern warfare concerning violence against them is articulated in Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, which states that "family honors and rights, individual lives and private property, as well as religious beliefs and freedoms, must be respected."

[245] That in case of general devastation the peaceful population may be detained in so-called concentration camps, there is no doubt; see below, § 154. And there is likewise no doubt that hostages may be taken from the peaceful population; see below, § 170, p. 213, and § 259, p. 319, note 2.

[245] It's clear that during widespread destruction, innocent civilians can be held in what are known as concentration camps; refer to § 154 below. There’s also no doubt that hostages can be taken from the civilian population; see below, § 170, p. 213, and § 259, p. 319, note 2.

Violence against the Head of the Enemy State and against Officials in Important Positions.

Violence against the Leader of the Enemy State and against Officials in Key Positions.

§ 117. The head of the enemy State and officials in important posts, in case they do not belong to the armed forces, occupy, so far as their liability to direct attack, death, or wounds is concerned, a position similar to that of private enemy persons. But they are so important to the enemy State, and they may be so useful to the enemy and so dangerous to the invading forces, that they may certainly be made prisoners of war. If a belligerent succeeds in obtaining possession of the head of the enemy State or its Cabinet Ministers, he[Pg 154] will certainly remove them into captivity. And he may do the same with diplomatic agents and other officials of importance, because by weakening the enemy Government he may thereby influence the enemy to agree to terms of peace.

§ 117. The leader of the enemy State and officials in key positions, as long as they are not part of the armed forces, are treated similarly to private enemy individuals in terms of their risk of direct attack, death, or injury. However, they are so vital to the enemy State and could be extremely useful or pose a significant threat to the invading forces that they can definitely be taken as prisoners of war. If a belligerent manages to capture the head of the enemy State or its Cabinet Ministers, he[Pg 154] will likely take them into custody. The same applies to diplomatic agents and other important officials, as weakening the enemy Government may help persuade the enemy to consider peace terms.

III TREATMENT OF INJURED PERSONS AND CORPSES

Hall, § 130—Lawrence, § 165—Maine, pp. 156-159—Manning, p. 205—Phillimore, III. § 95—Halleck, II. pp. 36-39—Moore, VII. § 1134—Taylor, §§ 527-528—Bluntschli, §§ 586-592—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 289-319, 398-421—Liszt, § 40, V.—Ullmann, § 178 and in R.G. IV. (1897), pp. 437-447—Bonfils, Nos. 1108-11187—Despagnet, Nos. 551-553—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2794, VII. Nos. 2849-2881—Rivier, II. pp. 268-273—Nys, III. pp. 526-536—Calvo, IV. §§ 2161-2165—Fiore, III. Nos. 1363-1372, and Code, Nos. 1589-1604—Martens, II. § 114—Longuet, §§ 85-90—Mérignhac, pp. 114-142—Pillet, pp. 165-192—Kriegsbrauch, p. 26—Land Warfare, §§ 174-220—Zorn, p. 122—Bordwell, pp. 249-277—Spaight, pp. 419-460—Higgins, pp. 35-38—Holland, Studies, pp. 61-65—Holland, War, Nos. 41-69—Güret, Zur Geschichte der internationalen und freiwilligen Krankenpflege (1873)—Lueder, Die Genfer Convention (1876)—Moynier, La croix rouge, son passé et son avenir (1882); La revision de la Convention de Genève (1898); La fondation de la croix rouge (1903)—Buzzati, De l'emploi abusif ... de la croix rouge (1890)—Triepel, Die neuesten Fortschritte auf dem Gebiet des Kriegsrechts (1894), pp. 1-41—Müller, Entstehungsgeschichte des rothen Kreuzes und der Genfer Konvention (1897)—Münzel, Untersuchungen über die Genfer Konvention (1901)—Roszkoroski in R.I. 2nd Ser. IV. (1902), pp. 199, 299, 442—Gillot, La revision de la Convention de Genève, etc. (1902)—Meurer, Die Genfer Konvention und ihre Reform (1906)—Delpech in R.G. XIII. (1906), pp. 629-724—Macpherson in Z.V. V. (1911), pp. 253-277.

Hall, § 130—Lawrence, § 165—Maine, pp. 156-159—Manning, p. 205—Phillimore, III. § 95—Halleck, II. pp. 36-39—Moore, VII. § 1134—Taylor, §§ 527-528—Bluntschli, §§ 586-592—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 289-319, 398-421—Liszt, § 40, V.—Ullmann, § 178 and in R.G. IV. (1897), pp. 437-447—Bonfils, Nos. 1108-11187—Despagnet, Nos. 551-553—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2794, VII. Nos. 2849-2881—Rivier, II. pp. 268-273—Nys, III. pp. 526-536—Calvo, IV. §§ 2161-2165—Fiore, III. Nos. 1363-1372, and Code, Nos. 1589-1604—Martens, II. § 114—Longuet, §§ 85-90—Mérignhac, pp. 114-142—Pillet, pp. 165-192—Kriegsbrauch, p. 26—Land Warfare, §§ 174-220—Zorn, p. 122—Bordwell, pp. 249-277—Spaight, pp. 419-460—Higgins, pp. 35-38—Holland, Studies, pp. 61-65—Holland, War, Nos. 41-69—Güret, Zur Geschichte der internationalen und freiwilligen Krankenpflege (1873)—Lueder, Die Genfer Convention (1876)—Moynier, La croix rouge, son passé et son avenir (1882); La revision de la Convention de Genève (1898); La fondation de la croix rouge (1903)—Buzzati, De l'emploi abusif ... de la croix rouge (1890)—Triepel, Die neuesten Fortschritte auf dem Gebiet des Kriegsrechts (1894), pp. 1-41—Müller, Entstehungsgeschichte des rothen Kreuzes und der Genfer Konvention (1897)—Münzel, Untersuchungen über die Genfer Konvention (1901)—Roszkoroski in R.I. 2nd Ser. IV. (1902), pp. 199, 299, 442—Gillot, La revision de la Convention de Genève, etc. (1902)—Meurer, Die Genfer Konvention und ihre Reform (1906)—Delpech in R.G. XIII. (1906), pp. 629-724—Macpherson in Z.V. V. (1911), pp. 253-277.

Origin of Geneva Convention.

Origin of Geneva Convention.

§ 118. Although[246] since the seventeenth century several hundreds of special treaties have been concluded between different States regarding the tending of each other's wounded and the exemption of army surgeons from captivity, no general rule of the Law of Nations on these points was in existence until the second half of the nineteenth century other than one prohibiting the killing, mutilation, or ill-treatment of[Pg 155] the wounded. A change for the better was initiated by Jean Henry Dunant, a Swiss citizen from Geneva, who was an eye-witness of the battle of Solferino in 1859, where many thousands of wounded died who could, under more favourable circumstances, have been saved. When he published, in 1861 and 1863, his pamphlet, Un Souvenir de Solférino, the Geneva Société d'utilité publique, under the presidency of Gustave Moynier, created an agitation in favour of better arrangements for the tending of the wounded on the battlefield, and convoked an international congress at Geneva in 1863, where thirty-six representatives of nearly all the European States met and discussed the matter. In 1864 the Bundesrath, the Government of the Federal State of Switzerland, took the matter in hand officially, and invited all European and several American States to send official representatives to a Congress at Geneva for the purpose of discussing and concluding an international treaty regarding the wounded. This Congress met in 1864, and sixteen States were represented. Its result was the international "Convention[247] for the Amelioration of the Condition of Soldiers wounded in Armies in the Field," commonly called "Geneva Convention," signed on August 22, 1864. By-and-by States other than the original signatories joined the Convention, and finally the whole body of the civilised States of the world, with the exception of Costa Rica, Monaco, and Lichtenstein, became parties. That the rules of the Convention were in no wise perfect, and needed to be supplemented regarding many points, soon became apparent. A second International Congress met at the invitation of Switzerland in 1868 at Geneva, where additional articles[248] to the original Convention were discussed and[Pg 156] signed. These additional articles have, however, never been ratified. The First Hague Peace Conference in 1899 unanimously formulated the wish that Switzerland should shortly take steps for the assemblage of another international congress in order to revise the Geneva Convention. This Congress assembled in June 1906, thirty-five States having sent representatives, and on July 6, 1906, a new Geneva Convention[249] was signed by Great Britain, Germany, Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chili, China, Congo Free State, Korea, Denmark, Spain, the United States of America, Brazil, Mexico, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Montenegro, Norway, Holland, Peru, Persia, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Servia, Siam, Sweden, Switzerland, and Uruguay. Most of these States have already ratified, and Colombia, Costa-Rica, Cuba, Nicaragua, Salvador, Turkey, and Venezuela, which were not represented at the Congress, acceded later. There is no doubt that in time all the civilised Powers will become parties.

§ 118. Although[246] since the seventeenth century several hundred special treaties have been made between different states about caring for each other's wounded soldiers and keeping army surgeons from being captured, no general rule of international law on these matters existed until the second half of the nineteenth century, except for one rule that prohibited the killing, mutilation, or mistreatment of[Pg 155] the wounded. A positive change began with Jean Henry Dunant, a Swiss national from Geneva, who witnessed the battle of Solferino in 1859, where thousands of wounded individuals died who could have been saved under better circumstances. When he published his pamphlet, Un Souvenir de Solférino, in 1861 and 1863, the Geneva Société d'utilité publique, led by Gustave Moynier, started a movement for improved care of the wounded on the battlefield and organized an international congress in Geneva in 1863, where thirty-six representatives from nearly all European states gathered to discuss the issue. In 1864, the Bundesrath, the Swiss Federal Government, officially took charge of the matter and invited all European and several American states to send official representatives to a congress in Geneva to discuss and finalize an international treaty regarding the wounded. This congress took place in 1864, with sixteen states represented. It resulted in the international "Convention[247] for the Amelioration of the Condition of Soldiers wounded in Armies in the Field," commonly known as the "Geneva Convention," signed on August 22, 1864. Over time, other states beyond the original signatories joined the convention, and eventually, all civilized nations, except for Costa Rica, Monaco, and Liechtenstein, became parties to it. It soon became clear that the rules of the convention were not perfect and needed additional provisions in many areas. A second International Congress was convened at Switzerland's invitation in 1868 in Geneva, where additional articles[248] to the original convention were discussed and signed. However, these additional articles were never ratified. The First Hague Peace Conference in 1899 unanimously expressed the desire for Switzerland to soon take steps to hold another international congress to revise the Geneva Convention. This congress met in June 1906, with thirty-five states sending representatives, and on July 6, 1906, a new Geneva Convention[249] was signed by Great Britain, Germany, Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, China, the Congo Free State, Korea, Denmark, Spain, the United States of America, Brazil, Mexico, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Norway, the Netherlands, Peru, Persia, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Siam, Sweden, Switzerland, and Uruguay. Most of these states have already ratified it, and Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Turkey, and Venezuela, which were not represented at the congress, joined later. There is no doubt that over time, all civilized powers will become parties to it.

[246] See Macpherson, loc. cit. p. 254.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Macpherson, loc. cit. p. 254.

[248] See Martens, N.R.G. XVIII. p. 61.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Martens, N.R.G. XVIII. p. 61.

[249] See Martens, N.R.G. 3rd. Ser. II. (1910), p. 620, and Treaty Series, 1907, No. 15.

[249] See Martens, N.R.G. 3rd. Ser. II. (1910), p. 620, and Treaty Series, 1907, No. 15.

The new Convention consists of thirty-three articles instead of the ten articles of the old Convention, and provides rules for the treatment of the wounded and the dead; further rules concerning military hospitals and mobile medical units; the personnel engaged in the interest of the wounded including army chaplains; the material belonging to mobile medical units, military hospitals, and voluntary aid societies; the convoys of evacuation; the distinctive emblem; the carrying out of the Convention; and the prevention of abuses and infractions.

The new Convention has thirty-three articles instead of the ten articles in the old Convention and outlines guidelines for how to handle the wounded and the dead. It includes additional rules regarding military hospitals and mobile medical units, the personnel involved in caring for the wounded, including army chaplains, the equipment used by mobile medical units, military hospitals, and voluntary aid organizations, the evacuation convoys, the distinctive emblem, the implementation of the Convention, and measures to prevent abuses and violations.

In the final protocol the Conference expresses the desire that, in order to arrive at a unanimous interpretation of the Convention, the parties should, so far[Pg 157] as the cases and the circumstances permit, submit to Hague Court Arbitration any differences which in time of peace might arise between them concerning the interpretation of the Convention, but Great Britain and Japan refused to become parties to this.

In the final protocol, the Conference expresses the hope that, to achieve a unanimous interpretation of the Convention, the parties should, as much as possible given the cases and circumstances, submit any disputes regarding the interpretation of the Convention to Hague Court Arbitration that might arise between them during times of peace. However, Great Britain and Japan declined to participate in this.

The Wounded and the Sick.

The Injured and the Ill.

§ 119. According to articles 1-5 of the Geneva Convention,[250] the sick and wounded persons belonging, or officially attached, to armies must be respected and taken care of, without distinction of nationality, by the belligerent in whose power they may be. Should, however, a belligerent necessarily be compelled to abandon such sick and wounded persons to the enemy, he must, so far as military exigencies permit, leave behind with them a portion of his medical personnel to take care of them, and the necessary material. The sick and wounded who have fallen into the hands of the enemy are prisoners of war, but belligerents may exchange or release them, or even hand them over to a neutral State which has to intern them until after the conclusion of peace. After each engagement the commander in possession of the field must have search made for the wounded and must take measures to protect them against pillage and maltreatment. A nominal roll of all wounded and sick who have been collected must be sent as early as possible to the authorities of the country or army to which they belong, and the belligerents must keep each other mutually informed of any internments and changes as well as of admissions into hospital. It is specially stipulated by article 5 that, if a military authority finds it necessary to appeal to the charitable zeal of the inhabitants to collect and take care of, under his direction, the wounded[Pg 158] and sick of armies, he can grant to those who have responded to his appeal special protection and certain immunities.

§ 119. According to articles 1-5 of the Geneva Convention,[250] sick and injured individuals who are part of or officially connected to armies must be treated with respect and cared for, regardless of their nationality, by the warring party that has them in their control. However, if a warring party is forced to leave these sick and injured individuals to the enemy, they must, as far as military needs allow, leave behind some of their medical personnel to care for them, along with necessary supplies. Sick and injured individuals who fall into enemy hands are considered prisoners of war, but warring parties may exchange or release them, or even transfer them to a neutral country that must keep them until peace is established. After each battle, the commander in charge of the area must search for the wounded and take steps to protect them from theft and abuse. A list of all wounded and sick individuals who have been gathered must be sent as soon as possible to the authorities of their respective country or army, and the warring parties must keep each other updated on any internments, changes, and admissions to hospitals. Article 5 specifically states that if a military authority finds it necessary to seek help from local residents to collect and care for the wounded and sick, under their supervision, they can grant those who respond special protection and certain exemptions.

[250] The stipulations of the Geneva Convention are for the most part of a technical military character, and it is, therefore, impossible in a general treatise of International Law to enter into any details. Readers who take a deeper interest in the matter must be referred to the most valuable article by Macpherson in Z.V. V. (1911), pp. 253-277.

[250] The rules of the Geneva Convention are mostly technical military details, so it’s not possible to go into specifics in a general overview of International Law. Readers who want to learn more should check out the excellent article by Macpherson in Z.V. V. (1911), pages 253-277.

Medical Units and Establishments, and Material.

Medical Units and Establishments, and Material.

§ 120. In order that the wounded and sick may receive proper treatment, mobile medical units as well as the fixed establishments of the medical service must be respected and protected by the belligerents, but this protection ceases if these units and establishments are made use of to commit acts harmful to the enemy, for instance, to shelter combatants, to carry on espionage, to conceal arms and ammunition (articles 6 and 7). But article 8 expressly enacts that the units and establishments do not forego protection:—(a) in case the personnel is armed and use their arms for their own defence or for the defence of the wounded and sick under their charge; (b) in case, in default of armed orderlies, units or establishments are guarded by pickets or by sentinels furnished with authority in due form; (c) in case weapons and cartridges, taken from the wounded and not yet handed over to the proper department, are found in units or establishments.

§ 120. To ensure that the wounded and sick receive appropriate care, both mobile medical units and fixed medical service facilities must be respected and protected by warring parties. However, this protection ends if these units and facilities are used for harmful actions against the enemy, such as harboring combatants, conducting espionage, or hiding weapons and ammunition (articles 6 and 7). But article 8 clearly states that the units and facilities retain their protection:—(a) if the personnel are armed and use their weapons for self-defense or to protect the wounded and sick in their care; (b) if, in the absence of armed orderlies, units or facilities are guarded by properly authorized pickets or sentinels; (c) if weapons and ammunition taken from the wounded and not yet returned to the appropriate department are found in the units or facilities.

As regards the material, a distinction is drawn between the treatment of the material of mobile medical units, of fixed medical establishments, and of material belonging to Voluntary Aid Societies.

As for the material, a distinction is made between the treatment of the material used in mobile medical units, fixed medical facilities, and materials belonging to Voluntary Aid Societies.

(a) Mobile medical units which fall into the hands of the enemy must not be deprived of their material, including their teams, whatever may be the means of transport and whoever may be the drivers employed (article 14). The competent military authority is, however, permitted to make use of the material in captured medical units for the treatment of the wounded and the sick at hand, provided it is restored under the same conditions, and so far as possible at the same time, as laid down for the release of the medical personnel by article 12.[Pg 159]

(a) If mobile medical units are captured by the enemy, they should not be stripped of their equipment, including their teams, regardless of the transport means or who the drivers are (article 14). However, the appropriate military authority is allowed to use the equipment from captured medical units to treat the injured and sick present, as long as it is returned under the same conditions and, if possible, at the same time, as specified for the release of medical personnel in article 12.[Pg 159]

(b) The buildings and material of fixed medical establishments which, because the locality where they are is militarily occupied, fall into the hands of the enemy, remain, according to article 15, "subject to the laws of war," that means they remain entirely in the power of the captor, but they may not be diverted from their medical purpose so long as they are necessary for the proper treatment of the wounded and the sick. Should, however, urgent military necessity demand it, a commander may dispose of them, provided he makes previous arrangements for the welfare of the wounded and sick found in the fixed establishments.

(b) The buildings and materials of permanent medical facilities that, due to the area's military occupation, fall into enemy hands, remain, according to article 15, "subject to the laws of war." This means they remain fully under the control of the captor, but they cannot be repurposed as long as they are needed for the proper care of the wounded and sick. However, if urgent military necessity arises, a commander may take control of them, as long as he arranges beforehand for the care of the wounded and sick located in those facilities.

(c) The material of Voluntary Aid Societies, which are duly recognised, is, according to article 16, considered private property and must, therefore, be respected as such under all circumstances, although it may be requisitioned.

(c) The materials of Voluntary Aid Societies, which are officially recognized, are, according to article 16, regarded as private property and must therefore be respected as such in all situations, even if they can be requisitioned.

Personnel.

Staff.

§ 121. The personnel engaged exclusively in the collection, transport, and treatment of the wounded and sick, as well as in the administration of mobile medical units and establishments, the chaplains attached to armies, and, lastly, pickets and sentinels guarding medical units and establishments, must, according to article 9, under all circumstances be respected and protected. If they fall into the hands of the enemy they must not be treated as prisoners of war. According to article 12, however, they are not free to act or move without let or hindrance, for, if their assistance is indispensable, they may be called upon by the captor to carry on their duties to the wounded and the sick. But when their assistance is no longer indispensable, they must be sent back to their army or to their country at such time and by such route as may be compatible with military exigencies, and they must be allowed to take with them such effects, instruments, arms, and horses as are their[Pg 160] private property. So long as they are detained by the enemy he must, according to article 13, grant them the same allowances and the same pay as are due to the personnel holding the same rank in his own army.

§ 121. The personnel responsible solely for the collection, transport, and care of the wounded and sick, along with those managing mobile medical units and facilities, the chaplains attached to the military, and finally, the guards and sentinels protecting medical units and facilities, must, according to article 9, always be respected and protected. If they are captured by the enemy, they should not be treated as prisoners of war. According to article 12, however, they cannot operate or move freely, as they may be required by the captor to continue their duties for the wounded and the sick if their help is essential. When their assistance is no longer essential, they must be returned to their army or country at a time and by a route that aligns with military needs, and they must be permitted to take with them any personal belongings, tools, weapons, and horses that are theirs[Pg 160]. While they are held by the enemy, according to article 13, they must be provided the same allowances and pay as personnel of the same rank in the captor's army.

The personnel of Voluntary Aid Societies employed in the medical units and establishments is, according to article 10, privileged to the same extent as the official personnel, provided that the Voluntary Aid Society concerned is duly recognised and authorised by its Government and that the personnel of the Society is subject to military law and regulations. Each State must notify to the other, either in time of peace or at the commencement, or during the course, of hostilities, but in every case before actually employing them, the names of societies which it has authorised to render assistance to the regular medical service of its armies. A recognised Voluntary Aid Society of a neutral country cannot, according to article 11, afford the assistance of its personnel and units to a belligerent unless it has previously received the consent of its own Government and of the belligerent concerned. And a belligerent who accepts such assistance from a Voluntary Aid Society of a neutral country is bound, before making any use of it, to notify the fact to the enemy.

The staff of Voluntary Aid Societies working in medical units and establishments is, according to article 10, granted the same privileges as official personnel, as long as the Voluntary Aid Society in question is officially recognized and authorized by its Government and that its staff complies with military laws and regulations. Each State must inform the other, either during peacetime or at the start or during hostilities, but in all cases before actually using them, of the names of the societies it has authorized to support the regular medical services of its armies. A recognized Voluntary Aid Society from a neutral country cannot, according to article 11, provide support from its personnel and units to a belligerent unless it has received prior consent from its own Government and the relevant belligerent. Furthermore, a belligerent that accepts such assistance from a Voluntary Aid Society of a neutral country must notify the enemy of this fact before making use of it.

Convoys of Evacuation.

Evacuation Convoys.

§ 122. Convoys used for evacuating the wounded and sick must, as regards their personnel and material, be treated in the same way as mobile medical units, but subject to the following special provisions enacted by article 17:—

§ 122. Convoys used to evacuate the wounded and sick must, in terms of their personnel and equipment, be treated the same way as mobile medical units, but are subject to the following special provisions set forth in article 17:—

A belligerent intercepting a convoy may, if military exigencies demand, break it up, provided he takes charge of the sick and wounded who are in it. In this case, the obligation to send back the medical personnel, provided for in article 12, must be extended to the whole of the military personnel detailed for the transport[Pg 161] or the protection of the convoy and furnished with an authority in due form to that effect.

A hostile force that intercepts a convoy may, if military needs require, break it up, as long as they take responsibility for the sick and injured on board. In this situation, the requirement to send back the medical staff outlined in article 12 must also apply to all military personnel assigned to transport or protect the convoy, as long as they have the proper authorization for that task.[Pg 161]

The obligation to restore the medical material, provided for in article 14, must apply to railway trains and boats used in internal navigation, which are specially arranged for evacuation, as well as to the material belonging to the medical service for fitting up ordinary vehicles, trains, and boats. Military vehicles, other than those of the medical service, however, may be captured with their teams; and the civilian personnel and the various means of transport obtained by requisition, including railway material and boats used for convoys, are subject to the general rules of International Law concerning war.

The duty to return medical supplies, as stated in article 14, applies to trains and boats used for domestic transport that are specially set up for evacuation, as well as to supplies belonging to the medical service for equipping regular vehicles, trains, and boats. Military vehicles, except those belonging to the medical service, can be captured along with their crews; and the civilian staff and different transportation methods obtained through requisition, including railway assets and boats used for convoys, must follow the general rules of International Law regarding war.

Distinctive Emblem.

Unique Emblem.

§ 123. According to article 18 the Swiss heraldic device of the red cross on a white ground, formed by reversing the federal colours, is adopted as the emblem and distinctive sign of the medical service of armies, but there is no objection to the adoption of another emblem on the part of such non-Christian States as object to the cross on religious grounds. Thus Turkey has substituted a red crescent, and Persia a red sun for the cross.[251] The following are the rules concerning the use of this emblem:—

§ 123. According to Article 18, the Swiss heraldic symbol of the red cross on a white background, which is created by reversing the federal colors, is officially recognized as the emblem and distinctive sign of the medical services of the military. However, there is no issue with other emblems being adopted by non-Christian countries that object to the cross for religious reasons. For example, Turkey has replaced it with a red crescent, and Persia has chosen a red sun instead of the cross.[251] The following are the rules regarding the use of this emblem:—

(1) The emblem must be shown on the flags and the armlets (brassards) as well as on all the material belonging to the medical service, but the emblem cannot be recognised unless it is used with the permission of the competent military authority (article 19).

(1) The emblem must appear on the flags and armlets (brassards), as well as on all materials related to the medical service. However, the emblem cannot be recognized unless it is used with the permission of the appropriate military authority (article 19).

(2) Medical units and establishments must hoist the red cross flag accompanied by the national flag of the belligerent concerned (article 21), but medical units which have fallen into the hands of the enemy must not, so long as they are in that situation, fly any other flag than that of the red cross. The medical units[Pg 162] belonging to neutral countries which have, in accordance with article 11, been admitted to afford their services, must fly, along with the red cross flag, the national flag of the belligerent to whose army they are attached (article 22).

(2) Medical units and facilities must raise the red cross flag along with the national flag of the involved nation (article 21). However, medical units that have been captured by the enemy should only display the red cross flag for as long as they remain in that situation. The medical units[Pg 162] from neutral countries that have been accepted to provide their services, in line with article 11, must display both the red cross flag and the national flag of the belligerent army they are affiliated with (article 22).

(3) All the personnel must, according to article 20, wear, fixed to the left arm, an armlet (brassard) with a red cross on a white ground, delivered and stamped by the competent military authority and accompanied by a certificate of identity in the case of persons who are attached to the medical service and armies without wearing the military uniform.

(3) All personnel must, according to article 20, wear an armlet (brassard) with a red cross on a white background, fixed to the left arm. This armlet must be issued and stamped by the appropriate military authority and accompanied by an identity certificate for individuals attached to the medical service and military units who are not wearing a military uniform.

(4) The employment of the red cross on a white ground and the words "Red Cross" or "Geneva Cross" must not, according to article 23, be used, either in time of peace or in time of war, except to indicate the protected medical units, establishments, personnel, and material.

(4) The use of the red cross on a white background and the terms "Red Cross" or "Geneva Cross" must not, according to article 23, be used, whether in peace or war, except to represent the protected medical units, facilities, personnel, and equipment.

[251] See below, § 207.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Treatment of the Dead.

Care for the deceased.

§ 124. According to a customary rule of the Law of Nations belligerents have the right to demand from one another that dead soldiers shall not be disgracefully treated, especially not mutilated, and shall be, so far as possible, collected and buried[252] or cremated on the battlefield by the victor. The Geneva Convention does not stipulate any rule concerning the collection and burial or cremation of the dead, but article 3 enacts that after each engagement the commander in possession of the field must take measures to ensure protection of the dead against pillage and maltreatment, and that a careful examination of the bodies, in order to see that life is really extinct, must be made before the dead are buried or cremated. Each belligerent must send as soon as possible to the authorities of the country or army to which they belong the military[Pg 163] identification marks or tokens found on the dead (article 4). Pieces of equipment found upon the dead of the enemy are public enemy property and may, therefore, be appropriated as booty[253] by the victor. On the other hand, letters, money, jewellery, and such other articles of value found upon the dead on the battlefield, or on those who die in the medical units or fixed establishments, as are apparently private property, are not booty, but must, according to article 4 of the Geneva Convention and article 14 of the Hague rules concerning warfare on land, be collected and handed over to the Bureau of Information[254] concerning the prisoners of war, which has to transmit them to the persons interested through the channel of the authorities of their own country.

§ 124. According to a standard rule of international law, combatants have the right to demand that the bodies of fallen soldiers be treated respectfully, especially not mutilated, and should be, as much as possible, gathered and buried[252] or cremated on the battlefield by the victorious side. The Geneva Convention does not specify any rules regarding the collection and burial or cremation of the dead, but Article 3 states that after each conflict, the commander in control of the area must take steps to protect the dead from looting and mistreatment, and that a thorough examination of the bodies must be conducted to confirm that they are indeed deceased before they are buried or cremated. Each combatant must quickly send the military[Pg 163] identification marks or items found on the deceased to the authorities of their respective army (Article 4). Equipment discovered on enemy dead is considered public enemy property and may, therefore, be taken as spoils[253]. On the other hand, letters, money, jewelry, and other valuable personal items found on the dead on the battlefield, or those who die in medical units or fixed establishments, which are clearly private property, are not considered spoils but must be collected and turned over to the Bureau of Information[254] for prisoners of war, which is responsible for passing these items on to the relevant authorities in their home country.

[253] See below, § 139.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[254] See below, § 130.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Application of the Geneva Convention, and Prevention of Abuses.

Application of the Geneva Convention, and Prevention of Abuses.

§ 124a. The provisions of the Geneva Convention are only binding in the case of war between two or more of the contracting parties, they cease to be binding from the moment when one of the belligerent Powers is not a party (article 24). The commanders-in-chief of the belligerent armies must, in accordance with the instructions of their Governments and in conformity with the general principles of the Geneva Convention, arrange the details for carrying out the articles of the Geneva Convention, as well as for cases not provided for in these articles (article 25). The contracting parties must take the necessary measures to instruct their troops, especially the personnel protected by the Geneva Convention, in the provisions of the Convention, and to bring these provisions to the notice of the civil population (article 26). In countries whose legislation is not at the time of the signing of the Convention adequate for the purpose, the contracting parties must adopt such measures as may be necessary to prevent, at all times, the employment of[Pg 164] the emblem or the name of "Red Cross" or "Geneva Cross" by private individuals or by Societies other than those which are entitled to do so according to the Geneva Convention, and in particular for commercial purposes as a trade mark or trading mark (article 27). The contracting Governments must likewise adopt measures necessary for the repression in time of war of individual acts of pillage and maltreatment of the wounded and sick, as well as for the punishment of the improper use of the Red Cross flag and armlet (brassard) by officers and soldiers or private individuals not protected by the Geneva Convention. They must, at the latest within five years from the ratification of the Geneva Convention, communicate to one another through the Swiss Federal Council, the provisions concerning these measures of repression (article 28).[255]

§ 124a. The rules of the Geneva Convention are only applicable during a war between two or more of the countries that have signed it; they become void when one of the warring nations is not a signatory (article 24). The leaders of the fighting armies must, following their governments' directives and aligning with the core principles of the Geneva Convention, organize the specifics for implementing the articles of the Geneva Convention, as well as for situations not covered by these articles (article 25). The signatory countries are required to take necessary actions to educate their troops, particularly the personnel protected by the Geneva Convention, about its rules, and to communicate these provisions to the civilian population (article 26). In countries where the laws at the time of signing the Convention are insufficient for this purpose, the signatory countries must take measures to prevent, at all times, the use of the "Red Cross" or "Geneva Cross" emblems or names by individuals or organizations that are not authorized to do so under the Geneva Convention, especially for commercial purposes as a trademark or brand (article 27). The signatory governments must take necessary actions to address individual acts of looting and mistreatment of the wounded and sick during wartime, as well as to punish the improper use of the Red Cross flag and armlet (brassard) by military personnel or private individuals not protected by the Geneva Convention. They must, no later than five years after ratifying the Geneva Convention, inform each other through the Swiss Federal Council about the provisions related to these enforcement measures (article 28).[255]

[255] By reason of the uncertainties of parliamentary proceedings, Great Britain, in signing and ratifying the Geneva Convention, entered a reservation against articles 23, 27, and 28, but by the Geneva Convention Act, 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. V. ch. 20), Great Britain is now able to carry out the stipulations of these three articles.

[255] Due to the unpredictable nature of parliamentary processes, when Great Britain signed and ratified the Geneva Convention, it included a reservation regarding articles 23, 27, and 28. However, with the Geneva Convention Act of 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. V. ch. 20), Great Britain is now in a position to implement the requirements of these three articles.

General provisions of the Geneva Convention.

General provisions of the Geneva Convention.

§ 124b. The Geneva Convention comes into force for each contracting Power six months after the date of the deposit of its ratification (article 30). The new Geneva Convention replaces the old of 1864, but the old Geneva Convention remains in force between such of its contracting parties as do not become parties to the new Convention of 1906 (article 31). Such of the Powers as signed the old Convention of 1864, but did not sign the new Convention of December 31, 1906, are free to accede to it at any time later by means of a written notification to the Swiss Federal Council. Other Powers may likewise notify their accession at any time to the Swiss Federal Council, but their accession only takes effect in case, within a period of one year from such notification, no objection to the accession reaches the Swiss Federal Council from any of[Pg 165] the previous contracting Powers (article 32). Each of the contracting Powers is at liberty at any time to denounce the Geneva Convention by a written notification to the Swiss Federal Council, which must immediately indicate it to all the other contracting Powers (article 33). The denunciation, however, does not take effect until one year after it has come to the notice of the Swiss Federal Council, and a denunciation only affects such Power as has notified it.

§ 124b. The Geneva Convention becomes effective for each contracting Power six months after the date it deposits its ratification (article 30). The new Geneva Convention replaces the one from 1864, but the old Geneva Convention remains valid between those contracting parties that do not become part of the new Convention of 1906 (article 31). Powers that signed the old Convention of 1864 but did not sign the new Convention of December 31, 1906, can join it later by sending a written notification to the Swiss Federal Council. Other Powers can also notify their intention to join at any time to the Swiss Federal Council, but their accession will only take effect if, within one year from that notification, no objections to the accession are received by the Swiss Federal Council from any of the previous contracting Powers (article 32). Each contracting Power can withdraw from the Geneva Convention at any time by sending a written notification to the Swiss Federal Council, which must then inform all the other contracting Powers immediately (article 33). However, the withdrawal does not take effect until one year after the Swiss Federal Council is notified, and it only affects the Power that has submitted the notification.

IV IN CAPTIVITY

Grotius, III. c. 14—Bynkershoek, Quaest. jur. publ. I. c. 3—Vattel, III. §§ 148-154—Hall, §§ 131-134—Westlake, II. pp. 63-68—Lawrence, § 164—Maine, pp. 160-167—Manning, pp. 210-222—Phillimore, III. § 95—Twiss, II. § 177—Halleck, II. pp. 19-30—Taylor, §§ 519-524—Moore, VII. §§ 1127-1133—Wharton, III. §§ 348-348D—Wheaton, § 344—Bluntschli, §§ 593-626—Heffter, §§ 127-129—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 423-445—Ullmann, § 177—Bonfils, Nos. 1119-1140—Despagnet, Nos. 544-550—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2796-2842, and VIII. No. 3208—Rivier, II. pp. 273-279—Nys, III. pp. 537-553—Calvo, IV. §§ 2133-2157—Fiore, III. Nos. 1355-1362, and Code, Nos. 1567-1588—Martens, II. § 113—Longuet, §§ 77-83—Mérignhac, pp. 87-113—Pillet, pp. 145-164—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 11-18—Zorn, pp. 73-123—Bordwell, pp. 237-248—Land Warfare, §§ 54-116—Spaight, pp. 260-320—Holland, War, Nos. 24-40—Eichelmann, Über die Kriegsgefangenschaft (1878)—Romberg, Des belligérants et des prisonniers de guerre (1894)—Triepel, Die neuesten Fortschritte auf dem Gebiet des Kriegsrechts (1894), pp. 41-55—Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague (1900), pp. 145-151—Cros, Condition et traitement des prisonniers de guerre (1900)—Beinhauer, Die Kriegsgefangenschaft (1910)—Payrat, Le prisonnier de guerre dans la guerre continentale (1910).

Grotius, III. c. 14—Bynkershoek, Quaest. jur. publ. I. c. 3—Vattel, III. §§ 148-154—Hall, §§ 131-134—Westlake, II. pp. 63-68—Lawrence, § 164—Maine, pp. 160-167—Manning, pp. 210-222—Phillimore, III. § 95—Twiss, II. § 177—Halleck, II. pp. 19-30—Taylor, §§ 519-524—Moore, VII. §§ 1127-1133—Wharton, III. §§ 348-348D—Wheaton, § 344—Bluntschli, §§ 593-626—Heffter, §§ 127-129—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 423-445—Ullmann, § 177—Bonfils, Nos. 1119-1140—Despagnet, Nos. 544-550—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2796-2842, and VIII. No. 3208—Rivier, II. pp. 273-279—Nys, III. pp. 537-553—Calvo, IV. §§ 2133-2157—Fiore, III. Nos. 1355-1362, and Code, Nos. 1567-1588—Martens, II. § 113—Longuet, §§ 77-83—Mérignhac, pp. 87-113—Pillet, pp. 145-164—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 11-18—Zorn, pp. 73-123—Bordwell, pp. 237-248—Land Warfare, §§ 54-116—Spaight, pp. 260-320—Holland, War, Nos. 24-40—Eichelmann, Über die Kriegsgefangenschaft (1878)—Romberg, Des belligérants et des prisonniers de guerre (1894)—Triepel, Die neuesten Fortschritte auf dem Gebiet des Kriegsrechts (1894), pp. 41-55—Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague (1900), pp. 145-151—Cros, Condition et traitement des prisonniers de guerre (1900)—Beinhauer, Die Kriegsgefangenschaft (1910)—Payrat, Le prisonnier de guerre dans la guerre continentale (1910).

Development of International Law regarding Captivity.

Development of International Law regarding Captivity.

§ 125. During antiquity, prisoners of war could be killed, and they were very often at once actually butchered or offered as sacrifices to the gods. If they were spared, they were as a rule made slaves and only exceptionally liberated. But belligerents also exchanged their prisoners or liberated them for ransom. During the first part of the Middle Ages prisoners of[Pg 166] war could likewise be killed or made slaves. Under the influence of Christianity, however, their fate in time became mitigated. Although they were often most cruelly treated during the second part of the Middle Ages, they were not as a rule killed and, with the disappearance of slavery in Europe, they were no longer enslaved. By the time modern International Law gradually came into existence, killing and enslaving prisoners of war had disappeared, but they were still often treated as criminals and as objects of personal revenge. They were not considered in the power of the State by whose forces they were captured, but in the power of those very forces or of the individual soldiers that had made the capture. And it was considered lawful on the part of captors to make as much profit as possible out of their prisoners by way of ransom, provided no exchange of prisoners took place. So general was this practice that a more or less definite scale of ransom became usual. Thus, Grotius (III. c. 14, § 9) mentions that in his time the ransom of a private was the amount of his one month's pay. And since the pecuniary value of a prisoner as regards ransom rose in proportion with his fortune and his position in life and in the enemy army, it became usual for prisoners of rank and note not to belong to the capturing forces but to the Sovereign, who had, however, to recompense the captors. During the seventeenth century, the custom that prisoners were considered in the power of their captors died away. They were now considered to be in the power of the Sovereign by whose forces they were captured. But rules of the Law of Nations regarding their proper treatment were hardly in existence. The practice of liberating prisoners in exchange, or for ransom only, continued. Special cartels were often concluded at the outbreak of or during a war for the purpose of stipulating a scale[Pg 167] of ransom according to which either belligerent could redeem his soldiers and officers from captivity. The last[256] instance of such cartels is that between England and France in 1780, stipulating the ransom for members of the naval and military forces of both belligerents.

§ 125. In ancient times, prisoners of war could be killed, and they were often immediately butchered or sacrificed to the gods. If they were spared, they typically became slaves and were only rarely freed. However, opposing forces would also exchange their prisoners or release them for ransom. In the early Middle Ages, prisoners of war could also be killed or enslaved. But under the influence of Christianity, their situation gradually improved. Although they were frequently treated very cruelly in the later Middle Ages, they were usually not killed, and with the decline of slavery in Europe, they were no longer enslaved. By the time modern International Law began to develop, killing and enslaving prisoners of war had mostly ended, but they were still often treated like criminals or as targets for revenge. They were not seen as being under the authority of the State that captured them, but rather under the control of the very forces or individual soldiers who made the capture. It was deemed acceptable for captors to maximize their profit from prisoners through ransom, as long as there was no exchange of prisoners. This practice was so common that a fairly standard ransom scale emerged. For example, Grotius (III. c. 14, § 9) notes that during his time, the ransom for a private was equivalent to one month's pay. Since a prisoner’s ransom value increased with their wealth and status in life and within the enemy army, it became customary for prisoners of higher rank not to belong to the captors but to the Sovereign, who would need to compensate the captors. By the seventeenth century, the idea that prisoners were under the control of their captors faded away. They were now viewed as being under the authority of the Sovereign whose forces captured them. However, there were hardly any established rules under the Law of Nations regarding their treatment. The practice of freeing prisoners in exchange or solely for ransom persisted. Special agreements, or cartels, were often made at the start of or during a war to set a ransom scale for either side to redeem their soldiers and officers from captivity. The last instance of such cartels occurred between England and France in 1780, which established the ransom for members of the naval and military forces of both sides.

[256] See Hall, § 134, p. 428, note 1.

[256] See Hall, § 134, p. 428, note 1.

It was not until the eighteenth century, with its general tendencies to mitigate the cruel practices of warfare, that matters changed for the better. The conviction in time became general that captivity should only be the means of preventing prisoners from returning to their corps and taking up arms again, and should, as a matter of principle, be distinguished from imprisonment as a punishment for crimes. The Treaty of Friendship[257] concluded in 1785 between Prussia and the United States of America was probably the first to stipulate (article 24) the proper treatment of prisoners of war, prohibiting confinement in convict prisons and the use of irons, and insisting upon their confinement in a healthy place, where they may have exercise, and where they may be kept and fed as troops. During the nineteenth century the principle that prisoners of war should be treated by their captor in a manner analogous to that meted out to his own troops became generally recognised, and the Hague Regulations have now, by articles 4 to 20, enacted exhaustive rules regarding captivity.

It wasn't until the eighteenth century, with a general trend towards reducing the harsh practices of warfare, that things began to improve. Over time, it became widely accepted that captivity should only prevent prisoners from returning to their units and taking up arms again, and that it should, as a principle, be separate from imprisonment as a punishment for crimes. The Treaty of Friendship[257] signed in 1785 between Prussia and the United States was likely the first to specify (article 24) the proper treatment of prisoners of war, prohibiting their confinement in prison facilities and the use of shackles, while insisting they be held in a healthy environment where they could exercise and be housed and fed like soldiers. By the nineteenth century, the idea that prisoners of war should be treated by their captors similarly to their own troops became widely accepted, and the Hague Regulations have now laid out comprehensive rules regarding captivity in articles 4 to 20.

[257] See Martens, N.R. IV. p. 37.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Martens, N.R. IV. p. 37.

Treatment of Prisoners of War.

Treatment of POWs.

§ 126. According to articles 4-7 and 16-19 of the Hague Regulations prisoners of war are not in the power of the individuals or corps who capture them, but in the power of the Government of the captor. They must be humanely treated. All their personal belongings remain their property, with the exception of arms, horses, and military papers, which are booty;[258] and in practice[259] personal belongings are understood[Pg 168] to include military uniform, clothing, and kit required for personal use, although technically they are Government property. They may only be imprisoned as an unavoidable matter of safety, and only while the circumstances which necessitate the measure continue to exist. They may, therefore, be detained in a town, fortress, camp, or any other locality, and they may be bound not to go beyond a certain fixed boundary. But they may not be kept in convict prisons. Except in the case of officers, their labour may be utilised by the Government according to their rank and aptitude, but their tasks must not be excessive and must have nothing to do with military operations. Work done by them for the State must be paid for in accordance with tariffs in force for soldiers of the national army employed on similar tasks, or, in case there are no such tariffs in force, at rates proportional to the work executed. But prisoners of war may also be authorised to work for other branches of the public service or for private persons under conditions of employment to be settled by the military authorities, and they may likewise be authorised to work on their own account. All wages they receive go towards improving their position, and a balance must be paid to them at the time of their release, after deducting the cost of their maintenance. But whether they earn wages or not, the Government is bound under all circumstances to maintain them, and provide quarters, food, and clothing for them on the same footing as for its own troops. Officer prisoners must receive the same pay as officers of corresponding rank in the country where they are detained, the amount to be repaid by their Government after the conclusion of peace. All prisoners of war must enjoy every latitude in the exercise of their religion, including attendance at their own church service, provided only they comply with the regulations[Pg 169] for order issued by the military authorities. If a prisoner wants to make a will, it must be received by the authorities or drawn up on the same conditions as for soldiers of the national army. And the same rules are valid regarding death certificates and the burial of prisoners of war, and due regard must be paid to their grade and rank. Letters, money orders, valuables, and postal parcels destined for or despatched by prisoners of war must enjoy free postage, and gifts and relief in kind for prisoners of war must be admitted free from all custom and other duties as well as payments for carriage by Government railways (article 16).

§ 126. According to articles 4-7 and 16-19 of the Hague Regulations, prisoners of war are not controlled by the individuals or groups who capture them, but by the Government of the captor. They must be treated humanely. All their personal belongings remain their property, except for arms, horses, and military papers, which are considered war booty; [258] and generally speaking, [259] personal belongings are understood to include military uniforms, clothing, and gear needed for personal use, even though technically they are Government property. They may only be imprisoned for safety reasons and only for as long as necessary. They can be held in a town, fortress, camp, or any other location, and they may be restricted to a specific boundary. However, they cannot be kept in convict prisons. Except for officers, their labor may be utilized by the Government based on their rank and skills, but the tasks should not be excessive and must be unrelated to military operations. Work they do for the State must be compensated according to the pay scales for soldiers in the national army doing similar jobs, or, if no such scales exist, at rates proportionate to the work performed. Prisoners of war may also be permitted to work for other public service branches or for private individuals under employment conditions determined by military authorities, and they may also work independently. All wages they earn are meant to improve their situation, and a balance must be paid to them upon their release, after deducting their maintenance costs. Regardless of whether they earn wages, the Government is required to support them by providing shelter, food, and clothing on the same basis as its own troops. Officer prisoners must receive the same pay as officers of equal rank in the country where they are held, with the amount to be reimbursed by their Government after peace is achieved. All prisoners of war must have the freedom to practice their religion, including attending their own religious services, as long as they follow the order regulations issued by military authorities. If a prisoner wishes to create a will, it must be acknowledged by the authorities or prepared under the same conditions as for soldiers in the national army. The same regulations apply to death certificates and the burial of prisoners of war, paying respect to their rank and status. Letters, money orders, valuables, and packages sent to or from prisoners of war must be sent postage-free, and gifts or aid in kind for prisoners of war must be allowed entry without any customs or other duties, as well as free transportation on Government railways (article 16).

[258] See below, § 144.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[259] See Land Warfare, § 69.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Land Warfare, § 69.

Who may claim to be Prisoners of War.

Who can claim to be Prisoners of War.

§ 127. Every individual who is deprived of his liberty not for a crime but for military reasons has a claim to be treated as a prisoner of war. Article 13 of the Hague Regulations expressly enacts that non-combatant[260] members of armed forces, such as newspaper correspondents, reporters, sutlers, contractors, who are captured and detained, may claim to be treated as prisoners of war, provided they can produce a certificate from the military authorities of the army they were accompanying. But although the Hague Regulations do not contain anything regarding the treatment of private enemy individuals and enemy officials whom a belligerent thinks it necessary[261] to make prisoners of war, it is evident that they may claim all privileges of such prisoners. Such individuals are not convicts; they are taken into captivity for military reasons, and they are therefore prisoners of war.

§ 127. Anyone who is deprived of their freedom not for committing a crime but for military reasons has the right to be treated as a prisoner of war. Article 13 of the Hague Regulations clearly states that non-combatant[260] members of armed forces, like journalists, reporters, sutlers, and contractors, who are captured and held, can claim to be treated as prisoners of war, as long as they can provide a certificate from the military authorities of the army they were with. However, while the Hague Regulations do not specifically address the treatment of private enemy individuals and enemy officials whom a belligerent deems necessary[261] to make prisoners of war, it is clear that they can claim all the privileges of such prisoners. These individuals are not criminals; they are captured for military reasons, and therefore, they are prisoners of war.

[260] See above, § 79.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[261] See above, §§ 116 and 117.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Discipline.

Self-discipline.

§ 128. Articles 8 and 9 of the Hague Regulations lay down the discipline to be observed in the case of prisoners of war in the following way:—Every prisoner who, if questioned, does not declare his true name and rank is liable to a curtailment of the advantages[Pg 170] accorded to prisoners of his class. All prisoners are subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the army of the belligerent that keeps them in captivity. Any act of insubordination on the part of prisoners may be punished in accordance with these laws,[262] but apart from these laws, all kinds of severe measures are admissible to prevent a repetition of such acts. Escaped prisoners, who, after having rejoined their national army, are again taken prisoners, are not liable to any punishment for their flight. But if they are recaptured before they succeed in rejoining their army, or before they have quitted the territory occupied by the capturing forces, they are liable to disciplinary punishment.

§ 128. Articles 8 and 9 of the Hague Regulations outline the rules that must be followed regarding prisoners of war as follows: Every prisoner who, when questioned, does not provide his true name and rank may lose some of the benefits granted to prisoners in his category. All prisoners must adhere to the laws, regulations, and orders that are in effect in the army of the captors holding them. Any act of disobedience by prisoners may be punished according to these laws,[262] but beyond these laws, various strict measures may be taken to prevent such actions from happening again. Prisoners who escape, and later return to their national army but are captured again, will not face any punishment for their escape. However, if they are recaptured before they manage to rejoin their army or leave the area occupied by the capturing forces, they may face disciplinary punishment.

[262] Concerning the question whether after conclusion of peace such prisoners as are undergoing a term of imprisonment for offences against discipline may be detained, see below, § 275.

[262] Regarding whether prisoners who are serving time for disciplinary offenses can be kept in detention after peace is established, see below, § 275.

Release on Parole.

Parole Release.

§ 129. Articles 10 to 12 of the Hague Regulations deal with release on parole in the following manner:—No belligerent is obliged to assent to a prisoner's request to be released on parole, and no prisoner may be forced to accept such release. But if the laws of his country authorise him to do so, and if he acquiesces, any prisoner may be released on parole. In such case he is in honour bound scrupulously to fulfil the engagement he has contracted, both as regards his own Government and the Government that released him. And his own Government is formally bound neither to request, nor to accept, from him any service incompatible with the parole given. Any prisoner released on parole and recaptured bearing arms against the belligerent who released him, or against such belligerent's allies, forfeits the privilege to be treated as a prisoner of war, and may be tried by court-martial. The Hague Regulations do not lay down the punishment for such breach of parole, but according to a customary rule of International Law the punishment may be capital.[Pg 171]

§ 129. Articles 10 to 12 of the Hague Regulations deal with parole release as follows: No belligerent is required to agree to a prisoner's request for parole, and no prisoner can be forced to accept it. However, if the laws of his country allow it, and he agrees, any prisoner may be released on parole. In that case, he is honor-bound to strictly adhere to the commitment he has made, both to his own Government and to the Government that released him. His own Government is formally obligated not to request or accept from him any service that conflicts with the parole agreement. Any prisoner released on parole who is recaptured while fighting against the belligerent that released him, or against that belligerent's allies, loses the right to be treated as a prisoner of war and can be tried by court-martial. The Hague Regulations do not specify the punishment for breaking parole, but according to a customary rule of International Law, the punishment could be death.[Pg 171]

Bureau of Information.

Information Office.

§ 130. According to articles 14 and 16 of the Hague Regulations every belligerent[263] must institute on the commencement of war a Bureau of Information relative to his prisoners of war. This Bureau is intended to answer all inquiries about prisoners. It must be furnished by all the services concerned with all the necessary information to enable it to make out and keep up to date a separate return for each prisoner, and it must, therefore, be kept informed of internments and changes as well as of admissions into hospital, of deaths, releases on parole, exchanges, and escapes. It must state in its return for each prisoner the regimental number, surname and name, age, place of origin, rank, unit, wounds, date and place of capture, of internment, of the wounds received, date of death, and any observations of a special character. This separate return must, after conclusion of peace, be sent to the Government of the other belligerent.

§ 130. Under articles 14 and 16 of the Hague Regulations, every warring party[263] must set up a Bureau of Information at the start of war regarding their prisoners of war. This Bureau is meant to respond to all questions about prisoners. It must be provided by all relevant services with all the necessary information to create and maintain an updated list for each prisoner. Therefore, it must stay informed about internments and changes as well as hospital admissions, deaths, releases on parole, exchanges, and escapes. For each prisoner, the return must include the regimental number, last name and first name, age, place of origin, rank, unit, wounds, date and place of capture, date of internment, wounds received, date of death, and any noteworthy observations. After peace is established, this separate return must be sent to the government of the opposing party.

[263] And likewise such neutral States as receive and detain members of the armed forces of the belligerents; see article 14.

[263] Similarly, neutral countries that accept and hold members of the armed forces from the warring parties; see article 14.

The Bureau must likewise receive and collect all objects of personal use, valuables, letters, and the like, found on battlefields[264] or left by prisoners who have been released on parole, or exchanged, or who have escaped, or died in hospital or ambulances, and must transmit these articles to those interested. The Bureau must enjoy the privilege of free postage.

The Bureau must also gather and collect all personal items, valuables, letters, and similar objects found on battlefields[264] or left by prisoners who have been released on parole, exchanged, escaped, or who died in hospitals or ambulances, and must send these items to the relevant parties. The Bureau should have the privilege of free postage.

[264] See above, § 124.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Relief Societies.

Relief Societies.

§ 131. A new and valuable rule, taken from the Brussels Declaration, is that of article 15 of the Hague Regulations making it a duty of every belligerent to grant facilities to Relief Societies to serve as intermediaries for charity to prisoners of war. The condition of the admission of such societies and their agents is that the former are regularly constituted in accordance with the law of their country. Delegates of such[Pg 172] societies may be admitted to the places of internment for the distribution of relief, as also to the halting-places of repatriated prisoners, through a personal permit of the military authorities, provided they give an engagement in writing that they will comply with all regulations by the authorities for order and police.

§ 131. A new and important rule, taken from the Brussels Declaration, is that of article 15 of the Hague Regulations, which requires every warring party to allow Relief Societies to act as intermediaries for aiding prisoners of war. These societies and their representatives must be officially organized according to the laws of their country. Delegates from these[Pg 172] societies can be allowed access to internment camps to distribute aid, as well as to the locations where repatriated prisoners stop, through a personal permit from the military authorities, as long as they provide a written commitment to follow all regulations set by the authorities regarding order and security.

End of Captivity.

End of captivity.

§ 132. Captivity can come to an end through different modes. Apart from release on parole, which has already been mentioned, captivity comes to an end—(1) through simple release without parole; (2) through successful flight; (3) through liberation by the invading enemy to whose army the respective prisoners belong; (4) through exchange for prisoners taken by the enemy; (5) through prisoners[265] being brought into neutral territory by captors who take refuge there; and, lastly (6), through the war coming to an end. Release of prisoners for ransom is no longer practised, except in the case of the crew of a captured merchantman released on a ransom bill.[266] It ought, however, to be observed that the practice of ransoming prisoners might be revived if convenient, provided the ransom is to be paid not to the individual captor but to the belligerent whose forces made the capture.

§ 132. Captivity can end in various ways. Besides parole, which has already been mentioned, captivity ends—(1) through simple release without parole; (2) through successful escape; (3) through liberation by the invading enemy to whose army the respective prisoners belong; (4) through exchange for prisoners taken by the enemy; (5) through prisoners[265] being brought into neutral territory by captors who seek refuge there; and finally (6), through the end of the war. Ransom for the release of prisoners is no longer a common practice, except for the crew of a captured merchant ship, who may be released based on a ransom agreement.[266] However, it should be noted that the practice of ransoming prisoners could be revived if needed, as long as the ransom is paid not to the individual captor but to the military force responsible for the capture.

[265] See below, § 337.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[266] See below, § 195.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

As regards the end of captivity through the war coming to an end, a distinction must be made according to the different modes of ending war. If the war ends by peace being concluded, captivity comes to an end at once[267] with the conclusion of peace, and, as article 20 of the Hague Regulations expressly enacts, the repatriation of prisoners must be effected as speedily as possible. If, however, the war ends through conquest and annexation of the vanquished State, captivity[Pg 173] comes to an end as soon as peace is established. It ought to end with annexation, and it will in most cases do so. But as guerilla war may well go on after conquest and annexation, and thus prevent a condition of peace from being established, although real warfare is over, it is necessary not to confound annexation with peace.[268] The point is of interest regarding such prisoners only as are subjects of neutral States. For other prisoners become through annexation subjects of the State that keeps them in captivity, and such State is, therefore, as far as International Law is concerned, unrestricted in taking any measure it likes with regard to them. It can repatriate them, and it will in most cases do so. But if it thinks that they might endanger its hold over the conquered territory, it might likewise prevent their repatriation for any definite or indefinite period.[269]

Regarding the end of captivity when a war ends, we need to recognize the different ways a war can conclude. If the war ends with a peace agreement, captivity ends immediately with the signing of the peace. As stated in Article 20 of the Hague Regulations, prisoners must be repatriated as quickly as possible. However, if the war concludes through conquest and the annexation of the defeated State, captivity ends when peace is established. Ideally, it should end with annexation, and it usually does. However, since guerrilla warfare may continue after conquest and annexation, preventing a state of peace from being established even though real combat has ceased, we should not confuse annexation with peace. This distinction is particularly relevant for prisoners who are citizens of neutral States. For other prisoners, once annexation occurs, they become subjects of the State that holds them captive, which means that according to International Law, that State can take any actions it wants regarding them. It can repatriate them, which it often does. But if it believes they could threaten its control over the conquered territory, it might also delay their repatriation for a certain or indefinite period.

[267] That, nevertheless, the prisoners remain under the discipline of the captor until they have been handed over to the authorities of their home State, will be shown below, § 275.

[267] However, the prisoners still remain under the control of their captors until they are transferred to the authorities of their home country, as will be demonstrated below, § 275.

[268] See above, § 60.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[269] Thus, after the South African War, Great Britain refused to repatriate those prisoners of war who were not prepared to take the oath of allegiance.[Pg 174]

[269] So, after the South African War, Great Britain wouldn’t bring back the prisoners of war who weren’t willing to swear an oath of allegiance.[Pg 174]

V APPROPRIATION AND USE OF PUBLIC ENEMY PROPERTY

Grotius, III. c. 5—Vattel, III. §§ 73, 160-164—Hall, §§ 136-138—Westlake, II. pp. 102-107—Lawrence, § 171—Maine, pp. 192-206—Manning, pp. 179-183—Twiss, II. §§ 62-71—Halleck, II. pp. 58-68—Moore, VII. § 1148—Taylor, §§ 529-536—Wharton, III. § 340—Wheaton, §§ 346, 352-354—Bluntschli, §§ 644-651A—Heffter, §§ 130-136—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 488-500—G. F. Martens, II. §§ 279-280—Ullmann, § 183—Bonfils, Nos. 1176-1193—Despagnet, Nos. 592-596—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2989-3018—Rivier, II. pp. 306-314—Nys, III. pp. 296-308—Calvo, IV. §§ 2199-2214—Fiore, III. Nos. 1389, 1392, 1393, 1470, and Code, Nos. 1557-1560—Martens, II. § 120—Longuet, § 96—Mérignhac, pp. 299-316—Pillet, pp. 319-340—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 57-60—Holland, War, No. 113—Land Warfare, §§ 426-432—Meurer, II. §§ 65-69—Spaight, pp. 410-418—Zorn, pp. 243-270—Rouard de Card, La guerre continentale et la propriété (1877)—Bluntschli, Das Beuterecht im Krieg, und das Seebeuterecht insbesondere (1878)—Depambour, Des effets de l'occupation en temps de guerre sur la propriété et la jouissance des biens publics et particuliers (1900)—Wehberg, Das Beuterecht im Land und Seekrieg (1909; an English translation appeared in 1911 under the title Capture in War on Land and Sea)—Latifi, Effects of War on Property (1909).

Grotius, III. c. 5—Vattel, III. §§ 73, 160-164—Hall, §§ 136-138—Westlake, II. pp. 102-107—Lawrence, § 171—Maine, pp. 192-206—Manning, pp. 179-183—Twiss, II. §§ 62-71—Halleck, II. pp. 58-68—Moore, VII. § 1148—Taylor, §§ 529-536—Wharton, III. § 340—Wheaton, §§ 346, 352-354—Bluntschli, §§ 644-651A—Heffter, §§ 130-136—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 488-500—G. F. Martens, II. §§ 279-280—Ullmann, § 183—Bonfils, Nos. 1176-1193—Despagnet, Nos. 592-596—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2989-3018—Rivier, II. pp. 306-314—Nys, III. pp. 296-308—Calvo, IV. §§ 2199-2214—Fiore, III. Nos. 1389, 1392, 1393, 1470, and Code, Nos. 1557-1560—Martens, II. § 120—Longuet, § 96—Mérignhac, pp. 299-316—Pillet, pp. 319-340—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 57-60—Holland, War, No. 113—Land Warfare, §§ 426-432—Meurer, II. §§ 65-69—Spaight, pp. 410-418—Zorn, pp. 243-270—Rouard de Card, La guerre continentale et la propriété (1877)—Bluntschli, Das Beuterecht im Krieg, und das Seebeuterecht insbesondere (1878)—Depambour, Des effets de l'occupation en temps de guerre sur la propriété et la jouissance des biens publics et particuliers (1900)—Wehberg, Das Beuterecht im Land und Seekrieg (1909; an English translation appeared in 1911 under the title Capture in War on Land and Sea)—Latifi, Effects of War on Property (1909).

Appropriation of all the Enemy Property no longer admissible.

Appropriation of all the enemy property is no longer allowed.

§ 133. Under a former rule of International Law belligerents could appropriate all public and private[270] enemy property they found on enemy territory. This rule is now obsolete. Its place is taken by several rules, since distinctions are to be made between moveable and immoveable property, public and private property, and, further, between different kinds of private and public property. These rules must be discussed seriatim.

§ 133. In the past, a rule of International Law allowed belligerents to seize all public and private[270] enemy property they encountered in enemy territory. This rule is now outdated. It has been replaced by several new rules, as distinctions now need to be made between movable and immovable property, public and private property, and also among different types of private and public property. These rules need to be discussed seriatim.

[270] It is impossible for a treatise to go into historical details, and to show the gradual disappearance of the old rule. But it is of importance to state the fact, that even during the nineteenth century—see, for instance, G. F. Martens, II. § 280; Twiss, II. § 64; Hall, § 139—it was asserted that in strict law all private enemy moveable property was as much booty as public property, although the growth of a usage was recognised which under certain conditions exempted it from appropriation. In the face of articles 46 and 47 of the Hague Regulations these assertions have no longer any basis, and all the text-books of the nineteenth century are now antiquated with regard to this matter.

[270] It's impossible for a treatise to delve into historical details and show how the old rule gradually faded away. However, it's important to mention that even in the nineteenth century—see, for example, G. F. Martens, II. § 280; Twiss, II. § 64; Hall, § 139—it was claimed that under strict law, all private enemy movable property was considered as much booty as public property, though a growing practice was acknowledged that exempted it from appropriation under certain conditions. In light of articles 46 and 47 of the Hague Regulations, these claims are no longer valid, and all nineteenth-century textbooks on this topic are now outdated.

Immoveable Public Property.

Immovable Public Property.

§ 134. Appropriation of public immoveables is not lawful so long as the territory on which they are has[Pg 175] not become State property of the occupant through annexation. During mere military occupation of the enemy territory, a belligerent may not sell or otherwise alienate public enemy land and buildings, but only appropriate the produce of them. Article 55 of the Hague Regulations expressly enacts that a belligerent occupying enemy territory shall only be regarded as administrator and usufructuary of the public buildings, real property, forests, and agricultural works belonging to the hostile State and situated on the occupied territory; that he must protect the stock and plant, and that he must administer them according to the rules of usufruct. He may, therefore, sell the crop from public land, cut timber in the public forests and sell it, may let public land and buildings for the time of his occupation, and the like. He is, however, only usufructuary, and he is, therefore, prohibited from exercising his right in a wasteful or negligent way that would decrease the value of the stock and plant. Thus, for instance, he must not cut down a whole forest unless the necessities of war compel him.

§ 134. It's not legal to take public property as long as the land it’s on hasn't been claimed as state property by the occupier through annexation. During a simple military occupation of enemy territory, a fighting party cannot sell or otherwise dispose of public land and buildings of the enemy; they can only use the products from them. Article 55 of the Hague Regulations clearly states that a belligerent occupying enemy territory is seen only as an administrator and user of the public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural resources belonging to the hostile state that are located in the occupied area. They must protect the assets and manage them according to the rules of usage rights. Therefore, they can sell crops from public land, cut down timber from public forests and sell it, rent out public land and buildings during their occupation, and similar actions. However, they are only users, and are therefore prohibited from using this right in a wasteful or negligent manner that would reduce the value of the assets. For example, they should not cut down an entire forest unless the demands of war force them to do so.

Immoveable Property of Municipalities, and of Religious, Charitable, and the like Institutions.

Immovable Property of Municipalities, and of Religious, Charitable, and similar Institutions.

§ 135. It must, however, be observed that the produce of such public immoveables only as belong to the State itself may be appropriated, but not the produce of those belonging to municipalities or of those which, although they belong to the hostile State, are permanently set aside for religious purposes, for the maintenance of charitable and educational institutions, and for the benefit of art and science. Article 56 of the Hague Regulations expressly enacts that such property is to be treated as private property.

§ 135. However, it's important to note that only the revenue from public immovable property owned by the State can be appropriated. The revenue from property owned by municipalities or that, even though it's owned by a hostile State, is permanently designated for religious purposes, the support of charitable and educational institutions, and for the advancement of art and science cannot be appropriated. Article 56 of the Hague Regulations clearly states that such property should be treated as private property.

Utilisation of Public Buildings.

Use of Public Buildings.

§ 136. So far as the necessities of war demand, a belligerent may make use of public enemy buildings for all kinds of purposes. Troops must be housed, horses stabled, the sick and wounded nursed. Public buildings may in the first instance, therefore, be made[Pg 176] use of for such purposes, although they may thereby be considerably damaged. And it matters not whether the buildings belong to the enemy State or to municipalities, whether they are regularly destined for ordinary governmental and municipal purposes, or for religious, educational, scientific, and the like purposes. Thus, churches may be converted into hospitals, schools into barracks, buildings used for scientific research into stables. But it must be observed that such utilisation of public buildings as damages them is justified only if it is necessary. A belligerent who turned a picture gallery into stables without being compelled thereto would certainly commit a violation of the Law of Nations.

§ 136. As long as the needs of war require it, a warring party can use enemy public buildings for various purposes. Troops need to be housed, horses need stabling, and the sick and injured need care. Therefore, public buildings can initially be used for these purposes, even if they are significantly damaged in the process. It doesn’t matter if the buildings belong to the enemy government or local municipalities, or if they are meant for regular government, municipal, religious, educational, scientific, or similar purposes. For example, churches can be turned into hospitals, schools into barracks, and buildings meant for scientific research into stables. However, it should be noted that damaging public buildings is only justified if it's necessary. A warring party that converted an art gallery into stables without necessity would definitely be violating the Law of Nations.

Moveable Public Property.

Movable Public Property.

§ 137. Moveable public enemy property may certainly be appropriated by a belligerent provided that it can directly or indirectly be useful for military operations. Article 53 of the Hague Regulations unmistakably enacts that a belligerent occupying hostile territory may take possession of the cash, funds, realisable securities, depôts of arms, means of transport, stores, supplies, appliances on land or at sea or in the air adapted for the transmission of news or for the transport of persons or goods, and of all other moveable property of the hostile State which may be used for military operations. Thus, a belligerent is entitled to seize not only the money and funds of the hostile State on the one hand, and, on the other, munitions of war, depôts of arms, stores and supplies, but also the rolling-stock of public railways[271] and other means of transport and everything and anything he can directly or indirectly[Pg 177] make use of for military operations. He may, for instance, seize a quantity of cloth for the purpose of clothing his soldiers.

§ 137. Moveable property belonging to an enemy can definitely be taken by a belligerent as long as it can be used directly or indirectly for military operations. Article 53 of the Hague Regulations clearly states that a belligerent occupying enemy territory may take possession of cash, funds, securities that can be converted into cash, weapon depots, means of transport, supplies, and equipment on land, at sea, or in the air meant for transmitting news or transporting people or goods, along with any other moveable property from the enemy state that can be used for military purposes. Therefore, a belligerent has the right to seize not just money and funds from the enemy state but also military supplies, weapon depots, and various means of transport, including the rolling stock of public railways[271] and everything that can be used, directly or indirectly,[Pg 177] for military operations. For example, he may take a quantity of cloth to provide uniforms for his soldiers.

[271] See Nowacki, Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege (1906), §§ 15 and 19. Some writers—see, for instance, Bonfils, No. 1185, and Wehberg, op. cit. p. 22—maintain that such rolling stock may not be appropriated, but may only be made use of during war and must be restored after the conclusion of peace. The assertion that article 53, second paragraph, is to be interpreted in that sense, is unfounded, for restoration is there stipulated for such means of transport and the like as are private property.

[271] See Nowacki, Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege (1906), §§ 15 and 19. Some authors—like Bonfils, No. 1185, and Wehberg, op. cit. p. 22—argue that this type of rolling stock cannot be claimed, but can only be utilized during wartime and must be returned after peace is restored. The claim that article 53, second paragraph, should be understood this way is incorrect, as it specifies that restoration applies to means of transport and similar items that are private property.

Moveable Property of Municipalities, and of Religious, Charitable, and the like Institutions.

Moveable Property of Municipalities, and of Religious, Charitable, and Similar Institutions.

§ 138. But exceptions similar to those regarding the usufruct of public immoveables are valid in the case of the appropriation of public moveables. Article 56 of the Hague Regulations enumerates the property of municipalities, of religious, charitable, educational institutions, and of those of science and art. Thus the moveable property of churches, hospitals, schools, universities, museums, picture galleries, even when belonging to the hostile State, is exempt from appropriation by a belligerent. As regards archives, they are no doubt institutions for science, but a belligerent may nevertheless seize such State papers deposited therein as are of importance to him in connection with the war. The last instances of the former practice are presented by Napoleon I., who seized works of art during his numerous wars and had them taken to the galleries of Paris. But they had to be restored to their former owners in 1815.

§ 138. Exceptions similar to those regarding the use of public property also apply to the appropriation of public movable assets. Article 56 of the Hague Regulations lists the property belonging to municipalities, religious, charitable, educational institutions, and those related to science and art. Therefore, movable property from churches, hospitals, schools, universities, and museums, even when owned by an enemy state, is off-limits for appropriation by a warring party. Regarding archives, while they are certainly institutions for science, a warring party may still confiscate state documents housed there that are relevant to their war efforts. The last examples of the previous practice were during the time of Napoleon I, who took artworks during his various wars and brought them to the galleries in Paris. However, these items were required to be returned to their original owners in 1815.

Booty on the Battlefield.

Loot on the Battlefield.

§ 139. The case of moveable enemy property found by an invading belligerent on enemy territory is different from the case of moveable enemy property on the battlefield. According to a former rule of the Law of Nations all enemy property, public or private, which a belligerent could get hold of on the battlefield was booty and could be appropriated. Although some modern publicists[272] who wrote before the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 teach the validity of this rule, it is obvious from articles 4 and 14 of the Hague Regulations that it is now obsolete as regards private[273] enemy property except military papers, arms, horses, and the like. But as regards public enemy property[Pg 178] this customary rule is still valid. Thus weapons, munition, and valuable pieces of equipment which are found upon the dead, the wounded, and the prisoners, whether they are public or private property, may be seized, as may also the war-chest and State papers in possession of a captured commander, enemy horses, batteries, carts, and everything else that is of value. To whom the booty ultimately belongs is not for International but for Municipal Law[274] to determine, since International Law simply states that public enemy property on the battlefield can be appropriated by belligerents. And it must be specially observed that the restriction of article 53 of the Hague Regulations according to which only such moveable property may be appropriated as can be used for the operations of war, does not find application in the case of moveable property found on the battlefield, for article 53 speaks of "an army of occupation" only. Such property may be appropriated, whether it can be used for military operations or not; the mere fact that it was seized on the battlefield entitles a belligerent to appropriate it.

§ 139. The situation regarding movable enemy property discovered by an invading force on enemy land is different from movable enemy property found on the battlefield. According to an older principle of International Law, all enemy property, whether public or private, that a belligerent could capture on the battlefield was considered loot and could be claimed. Although some contemporary scholars[272] who wrote before the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 support this principle, it is clear from articles 4 and 14 of the Hague Regulations that it no longer applies to private[273] enemy property, except for military documents, weapons, horses, and similar items. However, regarding public enemy property[Pg 178], this customary rule is still in effect. Therefore, weapons, ammunition, and valuable equipment found on the dead, injured, and prisoners—regardless of being public or private property—may be seized, along with the war chest and state documents held by a captured commander, enemy horses, artillery, carts, and any other valuables. The determination of who ultimately owns the loot falls under Municipal Law[274], since International Law merely states that belligerents can claim public enemy property on the battlefield. It’s important to note that the limitation in article 53 of the Hague Regulations, which specifies that only movable property that can be used for military operations may be appropriated, does not apply to property found on the battlefield, as article 53 refers solely to "an occupying army." Such property can be claimed, regardless of whether it is useful for military purposes; the simple fact that it was taken on the battlefield grants a belligerent the right to appropriate it.

[272] See, for instance, Halleck, II. p. 73, and Heffter, § 135.

[272] Check out Halleck, II. p. 73, and Heffter, § 135, for example.

[273] See above, § 124, and below, § 144.

[273] See above, § 124, and below, § 144.

[274] According to British law all booty belongs to the Crown. See Twiss, II. §§ 64 and 71.

[274] Under British law, all spoils belong to the Crown. See Twiss, II. §§ 64 and 71.

VI APPROPRIATION AND USE OF PRIVATE ENEMY PROPERTY

Grotius, III. c. 5—Vattel, III. §§ 73, 160-164—Hall, §§ 139, 141-144—Lawrence, §§ 172-175—Maine, pp. 192-206—Manning, pp. 179-183—Twiss, II. §§ 62-71—Halleck, II. pp. 73-75—Moore, VII. §§ 1121, 1151, 1152, 1155—Taylor, §§ 529, 532, 537—Wharton, III. § 338—Wheaton, § 355—Bluntschli, §§ 652, 656-659—Heffter, §§ 130-136—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 488-500—G.F. Martens, II. §§ 279-280—Ullmann, § 183—Bonfils, Nos. 1194-1206—Despagnet, Nos. 597-604—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 3032-3047—Rivier, II. pp. 318-329—Nys, III. pp. 296-308—Calvo, IV. §§ 2220-2229—Fiore, III. Nos. 1391, 1392, 1472, and Code, Nos. 1530-1531—Martens, II. § 120—Longuet, §§ 97-98—Mérignhac, pp. 263-268—Pillet, pp. 319-340—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 53-56—Zorn, pp. 270-283—Meurer, II. § 64—Spaight, pp. 188-196—Holland, War, Nos. 106-107—Land Warfare, §§ 407-415—Bentwich, The Law of Private Property in War (1907)—See also the monographs of Rouard de Card, Bluntschli, Depambour, Wehberg, and Latifi, quoted above at the commencement of § 133.

Grotius, III. c. 5—Vattel, III. §§ 73, 160-164—Hall, §§ 139, 141-144—Lawrence, §§ 172-175—Maine, pp. 192-206—Manning, pp. 179-183—Twiss, II. §§ 62-71—Halleck, II. pp. 73-75—Moore, VII. §§ 1121, 1151, 1152, 1155—Taylor, §§ 529, 532, 537—Wharton, III. § 338—Wheaton, § 355—Bluntschli, §§ 652, 656-659—Heffter, §§ 130-136—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 488-500—G.F. Martens, II. §§ 279-280—Ullmann, § 183—Bonfils, Nos. 1194-1206—Despagnet, Nos. 597-604—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 3032-3047—Rivier, II. pp. 318-329—Nys, III. pp. 296-308—Calvo, IV. §§ 2220-2229—Fiore, III. Nos. 1391, 1392, 1472, and Code, Nos. 1530-1531—Martens, II. § 120—Longuet, §§ 97-98—Mérignhac, pp. 263-268—Pillet, pp. 319-340—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 53-56—Zorn, pp. 270-283—Meurer, II. § 64—Spaight, pp. 188-196—Holland, War, Nos. 106-107—Land Warfare, §§ 407-415—Bentwich, The Law of Private Property in War (1907)—See also the monographs of Rouard de Card, Bluntschli, Depambour, Wehberg, and Latifi, quoted above at the beginning of § 133.

Immoveable Private Property.

No Trespassing.

§ 140. Immoveable private enemy property may under no circumstances or conditions be appropriated by an invading belligerent. Should he confiscate and sell private land or buildings, the buyer would acquire no right[275] whatever to the property. Article 46 of the Hague Regulations expressly enacts that "private property may not be confiscated." But confiscation differs from the temporary use of private land and buildings for all kinds of purposes demanded by the necessities of war. What has been said above in § 136 with regard to utilisation of public buildings finds equal application[276] to private buildings. If necessary they may be converted into hospitals, barracks, and stables without indemnification of the proprietors, and they may also be converted into fortifications. A humane belligerent will not drive the wretched inhabitants into the street if he can help it. But under[Pg 180] the pressure of necessity he may be obliged to do this, and he is certainly not prohibited from doing it.

§ 140. Immovable private enemy property cannot be taken by an invading force under any circumstances. If they confiscate and sell private land or buildings, the buyer won't gain any rights[275] to the property. Article 46 of the Hague Regulations clearly states that "private property may not be confiscated." However, confiscation is different from the temporary use of private land and buildings for military needs. What was mentioned earlier in § 136 about using public buildings applies equally[276] to private buildings. If necessary, they may be used as hospitals, barracks, and stables without compensating the owners, and they can also be turned into fortifications. A humane combatant will not force the unfortunate inhabitants out onto the street if it can be avoided. But in times of necessity, they may have to do this, and they are certainly not forbidden from doing so.

[275] See below, § 283.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[276] The Hague Regulations do not mention this; they simply enact in article 46 that private property must be "respected," and may not be confiscated.

[276] The Hague Regulations don't cover this; they just state in article 46 that private property must be "respected" and cannot be confiscated.

Private War Material and Means of Transport.

Private War Material and Means of Transport.

§ 141. All kinds of private moveable property which can serve as war material, such as arms, ammunition, cloth for uniforms, leather for boots, saddles, and also all appliances, whether on land or at sea or in the air, which are adapted for the transmission of news or for the transportation of persons and goods, such as railway rolling-stock,[277] ships, telegraphs, telephones, carts, and horses, may be seized and made use of for military purposes by an invading belligerent, but they must be restored at the conclusion of peace, and indemnities must be paid for them. This is expressly enacted by article 53 of the Hague Regulations. It is evident that the seizure of such material must be duly acknowledged by receipt, although article 53 does not say so; for otherwise how could indemnities be paid after the conclusion of peace? As regards the question who is to pay the indemnities, Holland (War, No. 113) correctly maintains that "the Treaty of Peace must settle upon whom the burden of making compensation is ultimately to fall."

§ 141. All types of private movable property that can be used as war material, such as weapons, ammunition, fabric for uniforms, leather for boots, saddles, and also all equipment, whether on land, at sea, or in the air, that is suitable for transmitting messages or transporting people and goods, like railway rolling stock,[277] ships, telegraphs, telephones, carts, and horses, can be seized and used for military purposes by an invading force, but they must be returned at the end of peace, and compensations must be paid for them. This is specifically stated in article 53 of the Hague Regulations. It is clear that the seizure of such property must be officially recognized with a receipt, even though article 53 doesn’t mention it; otherwise, how could compensations be paid after peace is restored? Regarding who will pay the compensations, Holland (War, No. 113) rightly argues that "the Treaty of Peace must determine who ultimately bears the responsibility for compensation."

[277] See Nowacki, Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege (1906), § 15.

[277] See Nowacki, The Railroads in War (1906), § 15.

Works of Art and Science, Historical Monuments.

Works of Art and Science, Historical Monuments.

§ 142. On the other hand, works of art and science, and historical monuments may not under any circumstances or conditions be appropriated or made use of for military operations. Article 56 of the Hague Regulations enacts categorically that "all seizure" of such works and monuments is prohibited. Therefore, although the metal of which a statue is cast may be of the greatest value for cannons, it must not be touched.

§ 142. On the other hand, works of art and science, as well as historical monuments, must never be taken or used for military operations under any circumstances. Article 56 of the Hague Regulations explicitly states that "all seizure" of these works and monuments is not allowed. Therefore, even if the metal from which a statue is made is extremely valuable for making cannons, it must remain untouched.

Other Private Personal Property.

Other Private Personal Property.

§ 143. Private personal property which does not consist of war material or means of transport serviceable to military operations may not as a rule be seized.[278] Articles 46 and 47 of the Hague Regulations expressly[Pg 181] stipulate that "private property may not be confiscated," and "pillage is formally prohibited." But it must be emphasised that these rules have in a sense exceptions, demanded and justified by the necessities of war. Men and horses must be fed, men must protect themselves against the weather. If there is no time for ordinary requisitions[279] to provide food, forage, clothing, and fuel, or if the inhabitants of a locality have fled so that ordinary requisitions cannot be made, a belligerent must take these articles wherever he can get them, and he is justified[280] in so doing. And it must further be emphasised that quartering[281] of soldiers who, together with their horses, must be well fed by the inhabitants of the houses concerned, is likewise lawful, although it may be ruinous to the private individuals upon whom they are quartered.

§ 143. Private personal property that isn't war material or transportation useful for military operations generally cannot be seized.[278] Articles 46 and 47 of the Hague Regulations clearly state that "private property cannot be confiscated," and "pillage is strictly prohibited." However, it should be noted that there are exceptions to these rules, which are necessary and justified by the demands of war. Soldiers and their horses need food, and people must protect themselves from the elements. If there isn’t enough time for regular requisitions[279] to secure food, forage, clothing, and fuel, or if the locals have fled, leaving no one to requisition from, a fighting force must take these items wherever they can find them, and they are justified[280] in doing so. Additionally, it's important to point out that quartering[281] of soldiers, along with their horses, who must be well-fed by the residents of the houses they occupy, is also lawful, even if it may be financially devastating for those individuals.

[278] See above, § 133, note.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Check above, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[279] See below, § 147.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[280] The Hague Regulations do not mention this case.

[280] The Hague Regulations don’t address this case.

[281] See below, § 147.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Booty on the Battlefield.

Loot on the Battlefield.

§ 144. Private enemy property on the battlefield is no longer in every case an object of booty.[282] Arms, horses, and military papers may indeed be appropriated,[283] even if they are private property, as may also private means of transport, such as carts and other vehicles which an enemy has made use of. But letters, cash, jewellery, and other articles of value found upon the dead, wounded, and prisoners must, according to article 14 of the Hague Regulations and article 4 of the Geneva Convention, be handed over to the Bureau of Information regarding prisoners of war, which must transmit them to those interested. Through article 14 of the Hague Regulations and article 4 of the Geneva Convention it becomes apparent that nowadays private enemy property, except military papers, arms, horses,[Pg 182] and the like, is no longer booty, although, individual soldiers often take as much spoil as they can get. It is impossible for the commanders to bring the offender to justice in every case.[284]

§ 144. Private enemy property on the battlefield is not always considered loot. [282] Weapons, horses, and military documents can indeed be seized,[283] even if they belong to private individuals, as can personal vehicles like carts and other modes of transport used by the enemy. However, letters, cash, jewelry, and other valuables found on the dead, wounded, and prisoners must be handed over to the Bureau of Information for prisoners of war, which will forward them to their rightful owners, in accordance with article 14 of the Hague Regulations and article 4 of the Geneva Convention. These regulations make it clear that today, private enemy property—except for military documents, weapons, horses, [Pg 182] and similar items—is no longer considered booty, even though individual soldiers often take whatever they can find. It's difficult for commanders to hold every offender accountable. [284]

[282] See above, § 139.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[283] See above, § 139, and article 4 of the Hague Regulations. This article only mentions arms, horses, and military papers, but saddles, stirrups, and the like go with horses, as ammunition goes with arms, and these may for this reason likewise be appropriated; see Land Warfare, § 69, note (e).

[283] See above, § 139, and article 4 of the Hague Regulations. This article only talks about weapons, horses, and military documents, but items like saddles, stirrups, and similar accessories come with horses, just like ammunition is associated with weapons, and for this reason, these can also be taken; see Land Warfare, § 69, note (e).

[284] It is of interest to state the fact that, during the Russo-Japanese War, Japan carried out to the letter the stipulation of article 14 of the Hague Regulations. Through the intermediary of the French Embassies in Tokio and St. Petersburg, all valuables found on the Russian dead and seized by the Japanese were handed over to the Russian Government.

[284] It's worth noting that during the Russo-Japanese War, Japan fully adhered to the requirements of Article 14 of the Hague Regulations. With the help of the French Embassies in Tokyo and St. Petersburg, all valuables discovered on the Russian dead and taken by the Japanese were returned to the Russian Government.

Private Enemy Property brought into a Belligerent's Territory.

Private Enemy Property brought into a Belligerent's Territory.

§ 145. The case of private property found by a belligerent on enemy territory differs from the case of such property brought during time of war into the territory of a belligerent. That private enemy property on a belligerent's territory at the time of the outbreak of war may not be confiscated has already been stated above in § 102. Taking this fact into consideration, as well as the other fact that private property found on enemy territory is nowadays likewise as a rule exempt from confiscation, there can be no doubt that private enemy property brought into a belligerent's territory during time of war may not, as a rule, be confiscated.[285] On the other hand, a belligerent may prohibit the withdrawal of those articles of property which can be made use of by the enemy for military purposes, such as arms, ammunition, provisions, and the like. And in analogy with article 53 of the Hague Regulations there can be no doubt that a belligerent may seize such articles and make use of them for military purposes, provided that he restores them at the conclusion of peace and pays indemnities for them.

§ 145. The situation of private property found by a warring party on enemy land is different from that of property brought into the territory of a warring party during wartime. It has already been mentioned above in § 102 that private enemy property located in a belligerent's territory when war begins cannot be confiscated. Considering this fact, along with the additional fact that private property discovered on enemy territory is generally also exempt from confiscation nowadays, it is clear that private enemy property introduced into a belligerent's territory during wartime cannot, as a general rule, be confiscated.[285] On the other hand, a warring party may prohibit the removal of items that the enemy could use for military purposes, such as weapons, ammunition, food supplies, and similar items. Following article 53 of the Hague Regulations, there is no doubt that a warring party may confiscate such items and use them for military purposes, provided that they are returned at the end of the war and compensation is paid for them.

[285] The case of enemy merchantmen seized in a belligerent's territorial waters is, of course, an exception.[Pg 183]

[285] The situation with enemy merchant ships captured in a warring nation's territorial waters is, naturally, an exception.[Pg 183]

VII Requests and Donations

Vattel, III. § 165—Hall, § 140-140*—Lawrence, § 180—Westlake, II. pp. 96-102—Maine, p. 200—Twiss, II. § 64—Halleck, II. pp. 68-69—Taylor, §§ 538-539—Moore, VII. § 1146—Bluntschli, §§ 653-655—Heffter, § 131—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 500-510—Ullmann, § 183—Bonfils, Nos. 1207-1226—Despagnet, Nos. 587-590—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 3048-3064—Rivier, II. pp. 323-327—Nys, III. pp. 368-432—Calvo, IV. §§ 2231-2284—Fiore, III. Nos. 1394, 1473-1476—Martens, II. § 120—Longuet, §§ 110-114—Mérignhac, pp. 272-298—Pillet, pp. 215-235—Zorn, pp. 283-315—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 61-63—Holland, War, Nos. 111-112—Bordwell, pp. 314-324—Meurer, II. §§ 56-60—Spaight, pp. 381-408—Ariga, §§ 116-122—Land Warfare, §§ 416-425—Thomas, Des réquisitions militaires (1884)—Keller, Requisition und Kontribution (1898)—Pont, Les réquisitions militaires du temps de guerre (1905)—Albrecht, Requisitionen von neutralem Privateigentum, etc. (1912), pp. 1-24:—Risley in the Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, new series, vol. II. (1900), pp. 214-223.

Vattel, III. § 165—Hall, § 140-140*—Lawrence, § 180—Westlake, II. pp. 96-102—Maine, p. 200—Twiss, II. § 64—Halleck, II. pp. 68-69—Taylor, §§ 538-539—Moore, VII. § 1146—Bluntschli, §§ 653-655—Heffter, § 131—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 500-510—Ullmann, § 183—Bonfils, Nos. 1207-1226—Despagnet, Nos. 587-590—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 3048-3064—Rivier, II. pp. 323-327—Nys, III. pp. 368-432—Calvo, IV. §§ 2231-2284—Fiore, III. Nos. 1394, 1473-1476—Martens, II. § 120—Longuet, §§ 110-114—Mérignhac, pp. 272-298—Pillet, pp. 215-235—Zorn, pp. 283-315—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 61-63—Holland, War, Nos. 111-112—Bordwell, pp. 314-324—Meurer, II. §§ 56-60—Spaight, pp. 381-408—Ariga, §§ 116-122—Land Warfare, §§ 416-425—Thomas, Des réquisitions militaires (1884)—Keller, Requisition und Kontribution (1898)—Pont, Les réquisitions militaires du temps de guerre (1905)—Albrecht, Requisitionen von neutralem Privateigentum, etc. (1912), pp. 1-24:—Risley in the Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, new series, vol. II. (1900), pp. 214-223.

War must support War.

War must support War.

§ 146. Requisitions and contributions in war are the outcome of the eternal principle that war must support war.[286] This means that every belligerent may make his enemy pay as far as possible for the continuation of the war. But this principle, though it is as old as war and will only die with war itself, has not the same effect in modern times on the actions of belligerents as it formerly had. For thousands of years belligerents used to appropriate all private and public enemy property they could obtain, and, when modern International Law grew up, this practice found legal sanction. But after the end of the seventeenth century this practice grew milder under the influence of the experience that the provisioning of armies in enemy territory became more or less impossible when the inhabitants were treated according to the old principle. Although belligerents retained in strict law the right to appropriate all private besides all public property, it became usual to abstain from enforcing such right,[Pg 184] and in lieu thereof to impose contributions of cash and requisitions in kind upon the inhabitants of the invaded country.[287] And when this usage developed, no belligerent ever thought of paying in cash for requisitions, or giving a receipt for them. But in the nineteenth century another practice became usual. Commanders then often gave a receipt for contributions and requisitions, in order to avoid abuse and to prevent further demands for fresh contributions and requisitions by succeeding commanders without knowledge of the former impositions. And there are instances of cases during the nineteenth century on record in which belligerents actually paid in cash for all requisitions they made. The usual practice at the end of the nineteenth century was that commanders always gave a receipt for contributions, and that they either paid in cash for requisitions or acknowledged them by receipt, so that the respective inhabitants could be indemnified by their own Government after conclusion of peace. However, no restriction whatever was imposed upon commanders with regard to the amount of contributions and requisitions, and with regard to the proportion between the resources of a country and the burden imposed. The Hague Regulations have now settled the matter of contributions and requisitions in a progressive way by enacting rules which put the whole matter on a new basis. That war must support war remains a principle under these regulations also. But they are widely influenced by the demand that the enemy State as such, and not the private enemy individuals, should be made to support the war, and that only so far as the necessities of war demand it should contributions and requisitions be imposed. Although certain public moveable property[Pg 185] and the produce of public immoveables may be appropriated as heretofore, requisitions must be paid for in cash or, if this is impossible, acknowledged by receipt.

§ 146. Requisitions and contributions during war come from the long-standing principle that war must fund itself.[286] This means that each side in a conflict can make their enemy pay as much as possible to keep the war going. However, while this principle is as old as war itself and will likely endure as long as war exists, it doesn't have the same impact on how warring parties act today as it did in the past. For thousands of years, warring parties would seize all private and public property from their enemies that they could find, and when modern International Law emerged, this practice received legal approval. But after the late 1600s, this approach softened as it became clear that supplying armies in enemy territory was nearly impossible if the local population was treated according to the old principle. Although warring parties still technically had the right to seize all private and public property, it became common to avoid enforcing that right,[Pg 184] and instead impose cash contributions and requisition goods from the people of the occupied country.[287] When this practice started, no warring party thought to pay cash for requisitions or to provide a receipt for them. However, in the 19th century, a new approach became common. Commanders often provided receipts for contributions and requisitions to prevent abuse and stop new demands for further contributions and requisitions by incoming commanders who were unaware of previous impositions. There are records from the 19th century where warring parties paid cash for all requisitions they made. By the late 19th century, it had become standard for commanders to always give a receipt for contributions and to either pay cash for requisitions or acknowledge them with a receipt, so that the local inhabitants could be compensated by their own government after peace was achieved. Nonetheless, there were no limitations placed on commanders regarding how much they could demand in contributions and requisitions or how those demands related to the country's resources versus the burden imposed. The Hague Regulations have since addressed the issue of contributions and requisitions more progressively by establishing rules that reframe the entire situation. The principle that war must fund itself still applies under these regulations, but they are significantly influenced by the idea that it should be the enemy State as a whole—not individual private citizens—who bears the burden, with contributions and requisitions applied only as necessary for the war effort. While certain public movable properties and the output from public real estate may still be seized as before, requisitions must now be compensated in cash or acknowledged with a receipt if cash payment is not possible.

[286] Concerning the controversy as to the justification of Requisitions and Contributions, see Albrecht, op. cit. pp. 18-21.

[286] For the debate on the justification of Requisitions and Contributions, see Albrecht, op. cit. pp. 18-21.

[287] An excellent sketch of the historical development of the practice of requisitions and contributions is given by Keller, Requisition und Kontribution (1898), pp. 5-26.

[287] Keller provides a great overview of the historical evolution of the practice of requisitions and contributions in his book, Requisition und Kontribution (1898), pages 5-26.

Requisitions in Kind, and Quartering.

Requisitions in Kind and Quartering.

§ 147. Requisition is the name for the demand for the supply of all kinds of articles necessary for an army, such as provisions for men and horses, clothing, or means of transport. Requisition of certain services may also be made, but they will be treated below in § 170 together with occupation, requisitions in kind only being within the scope of this section. Now, what articles may be demanded by an army cannot once for all be laid down, as they depend upon the actual need of an army. According to article 52 of the Hague Regulations, requisitions may be made from municipalities as well as from inhabitants, but they may be made so far only as they are really necessary for the army. They may not be made by individual soldiers or officers, but only by the commander in the locality. All requisitions must be paid for in cash, and if this is impossible, they must be acknowledged by receipt, and the payment of the amount must be made as soon as possible. The principle that requisitions must be paid for by the enemy is thereby absolutely recognised, but, of course, commanders-in-chief may levy contributions—see below, § 148—in case they do not possess cash for the payment of requisitions. However this may be, by the rule that requisitions must always be paid for, it again becomes apparent and beyond all doubt that henceforth private enemy property is as a rule exempt from appropriation by an invading army.

§ 147. Requisition refers to the request for the supply of all types of items needed by an army, such as food for troops and horses, clothing, or transportation. Requests for certain services can also be made, but these will be discussed later in § 170, with requisitions for goods being the focus of this section. The specific items an army can demand cannot be predetermined, as they depend on the army's current needs. According to article 52 of the Hague Regulations, requisitions can be made from municipalities as well as from individuals, but only to the extent that they are genuinely necessary for the army. Requisitions cannot be made by individual soldiers or officers, but only by the commander present in the area. All requisitions must be paid for in cash, and if cash payment isn't possible, they must be documented with a receipt, and payment should be made as soon as possible. The principle that requisitions must be paid for by the enemy is clearly established, but commanders-in-chief may impose additional contributions—see below, § 148—if they do not have cash available for requisition payments. Regardless, the requirement for all requisitions to be paid for reinforces the principle that private enemy property is generally off-limits to an invading army.

A special kind of requisition is the quartering[288] of soldiers in the houses of private inhabitants of enemy territory, by which each inhabitant is required to supply lodging and food for a certain number of soldiers, and sometimes also stabling and forage for horses.[Pg 186] Although the Hague Regulations do not specially mention quartering, article 52 is nevertheless to be applied to it, since quartering is nothing else than a special kind of requisition. If cash cannot be paid at once for quartering, every inhabitant concerned must get a receipt for it, stating the number of soldiers quartered and the number of days they were catered for, and the payment of the amount must be made as soon as possible.

A specific type of requisition is the quartering[288] of soldiers in the homes of private citizens in enemy territory. This requires each resident to provide shelter and food for a specified number of soldiers, and sometimes stables and feed for horses.[Pg 186] Although the Hague Regulations do not specifically mention quartering, article 52 applies to it since quartering is essentially a special type of requisition. If immediate cash payment for quartering isn’t possible, each affected resident must obtain a receipt detailing the number of soldiers quartered and the number of days they were provided for, and the payment should be made as soon as possible.

[288] See above, § 143.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

But it must be specially observed, that neither in the case of ordinary requisitions nor in the case of quartering of troops is a commander compelled to pay the prices asked by the inhabitants concerned. On the contrary, he may fix the prices himself, although it is expected that the prices paid shall be fair.

But it's important to note that neither in the case of regular requests nor in the case of housing troops is a commander required to pay the prices demanded by the local residents. On the contrary, he can set the prices himself, although it's expected that the prices paid will be reasonable.

Contributions.

Donations.

§ 148. Contribution is a payment in ready money demanded either from municipalities or from inhabitants, whether enemy subjects or foreign residents. Whereas formerly no general rules concerning contributions existed, articles 49 and 51 of the Hague Regulations now enact that contributions may not be demanded extortionately, but exclusively[289] for the needs of the army, in order, for instance, to pay for requisitions or for the administration of the locality in question. They may be imposed by a written order of a commander-in-chief only, in contradistinction to requisitions which may be imposed by a mere commander in a locality. They may not be imposed indiscriminately on the inhabitants, but must so far as possible be assessed upon such inhabitants in compliance with the rules in force of the respective enemy Government regarding the assessment of taxes. And, finally, for every individual contribution a receipt must be given. It is apparent that these rules of the Hague Regulations try to exclude[Pg 187] all arbitrariness and despotism on the part of an invading enemy with regard to contributions, and that they try to secure to the individual contributors as well as to contributing municipalities the possibility of being indemnified afterwards by their own Government, thus shifting, so far as possible, the burden of supporting the war from private individuals and municipalities to the State proper.[290]

§ 148. Contribution is a cash payment required either from municipalities or from residents, whether they are enemy nationals or foreign residents. While there were no general rules about contributions in the past, articles 49 and 51 of the Hague Regulations now state that contributions cannot be demanded in an excessive manner but should solely be for the needs of the army, for example, to cover requisitions or for managing the local area. They must be ordered in writing by a commander-in-chief, unlike requisitions, which can be imposed by any local commander. Contributions shouldn’t be imposed randomly on residents; instead, they should be assessed as much as possible according to the rules set by the respective enemy government regarding tax assessments. Lastly, a receipt must be provided for each individual contribution. Clearly, these rules in the Hague Regulations aim to prevent any arbitrary or tyrannical actions by an invading enemy concerning contributions, and they strive to ensure that individual contributors as well as contributing municipalities have the opportunity to be reimbursed later by their own government, thus attempting to shift the financial burden of supporting the war from private individuals and municipalities to the state itself.[290]

[289] As regards contributions as a penalty, see article 50 of the Hague Regulations. See also Keller, op. cit. pp. 60-62.

[289] For information on contributions as a penalty, refer to article 50 of the Hague Regulations. Also, see Keller, op. cit. pp. 60-62.

[290] It is strange to observe that Kriegsbrauch, pp. 61-63, does not mention the Hague Regulations at all.

[290] It's odd to see that Kriegsbrauch, pp. 61-63, doesn't refer to the Hague Regulations at all.

VIII DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY ASSETS

Grotius, III. c. 5, §§ 1-3; c. 12—Vattel, III. §§ 166-168—Hall, § 186—Lawrence, § 206—Manning, p. 186—Twiss, II. §§ 65-69—Halleck, II. pp. 63, 64, 71, 74—Taylor, §§ 481-482—Wharton, III. § 349—Moore, VII. § 1113—Wheaton, §§ 347-351—Bluntschli, §§ 649, 651, 662, 663—Heffter, § 125—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 482-485—Klüber, § 262—G. F. Martens, II. § 280—Ullmann, § 176—Bonfils, Nos. 1078, 1178-1180—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2770-2774—Rivier, II. pp. 265-268—Nys, III. pp. 220-223—Calvo, IV. §§ 2215-2222—Fiore, III. Nos. 1383-1388, and Code, Nos. 1525-1529—Martens, II. § 110—Longuet, §§ 99, 100—Mérignhac, pp. 266-268—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 52-56—Holland, War, Nos. 3 and 76 (g)—Bordwell, p. 84—Spaight, pp. 129-140—Land Warfare, §§ 414, 422, 426, 427, 434.

Grotius, III. c. 5, §§ 1-3; c. 12—Vattel, III. §§ 166-168—Hall, § 186—Lawrence, § 206—Manning, p. 186—Twiss, II. §§ 65-69—Halleck, II. pp. 63, 64, 71, 74—Taylor, §§ 481-482—Wharton, III. § 349—Moore, VII. § 1113—Wheaton, §§ 347-351—Bluntschli, §§ 649, 651, 662, 663—Heffter, § 125—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 482-485—Klüber, § 262—G. F. Martens, II. § 280—Ullmann, § 176—Bonfils, Nos. 1078, 1178-1180—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2770-2774—Rivier, II. pp. 265-268—Nys, III. pp. 220-223—Calvo, IV. §§ 2215-2222—Fiore, III. Nos. 1383-1388, and Code, Nos. 1525-1529—Martens, II. § 110—Longuet, §§ 99, 100—Mérignhac, pp. 266-268—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 52-56—Holland, War, Nos. 3 and 76 (g)—Bordwell, p. 84—Spaight, pp. 129-140—Land Warfare, §§ 414, 422, 426, 427, 434.

Wanton destruction prohibited.

Unauthorized destruction prohibited.

§ 149. In former times invading armies frequently used to fire and destroy all enemy property they could not make use of or carry away. Afterwards, when the practice of warfare grew milder, belligerents in strict law retained the right to destroy enemy property according to discretion, although they did not, as a rule, any longer make use of such right. Nowadays, however, this right is obsolete. For in the nineteenth century it became a universally recognised rule of International Law that all useless and wanton destruction of enemy property, be it public or private, is absolutely prohibited. And this rule has now been[Pg 188] expressly enacted by article 23 (g) of the Hague Regulations, where it is categorically enacted that "to destroy ... enemy's property, unless such destruction ... be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war, is prohibited."

§ 149. In the past, invading armies often burned and destroyed all enemy property they couldn’t use or take with them. Later, as warfare became less brutal, combatants still legally retained the right to destroy enemy property at their discretion, though they generally stopped exercising that right. Nowadays, however, this right is outdated. In the nineteenth century, it became a universally accepted rule of International Law that any unnecessary and wanton destruction of enemy property, whether public or private, is strictly prohibited. This rule has now been[Pg 188] clearly established by article 23 (g) of the Hague Regulations, which states that "to destroy ... enemy's property, unless such destruction ... is imperatively demanded by the necessities of war, is prohibited."

Destruction for the purpose of Offence and Defence.

Destruction for the purpose of offense and defense.

§ 150. All destruction of and damage to enemy property for the purpose of offence and defence is necessary destruction and damage, and therefore lawful. It is not only permissible to destroy and damage all kinds of enemy property on the battlefield during battle, but also in preparation for battle or siege. To strengthen a defensive position a house may be destroyed or damaged. To cover the retreat of an army a village on the battlefield may be fired. The district around an enemy fortress held by a belligerent may be razed, and, therefore, all private and public buildings, all vegetation may be destroyed, and all bridges blown up within a certain area. If a farm, a village, or even a town is not to be abandoned but prepared for defence, it may be necessary to damage in many ways or entirely destroy private and public property. Further, if and where a bombardment is lawful, all destruction of property involved in it becomes likewise lawful. When a belligerent force obtains possession of an enemy factory for ammunition or provisions for the enemy troops, if it is not certain that they can hold it against an attack, they may at least destroy the plant, if not the buildings. Or if a force occupies an enemy fortress, they may raze the fortifications. Even a force intrenching themselves on a battlefield may be obliged to resort to the destruction of many kinds of property.

§ 150. All destruction of and damage to enemy property for offensive and defensive purposes is necessary destruction and damage, and therefore lawful. It's not only acceptable to destroy and damage all kinds of enemy property on the battlefield during combat, but also while preparing for battle or a siege. To strengthen a defensive position, a house may be destroyed or damaged. To cover an army's retreat, a village on the battlefield may be set on fire. The area around an enemy fortress held by a warring party may be leveled, meaning that all private and public buildings, as well as all vegetation, may be destroyed, and all bridges blown up within a certain radius. If a farm, village, or even a town is meant to be defended and not abandoned, it may be necessary to damage or totally destroy both private and public property in various ways. Furthermore, if and where bombardment is lawful, all destruction of property resulting from it also becomes lawful. When a warring force takes control of an enemy factory supplying ammunition or provisions for enemy troops, if it's uncertain they can keep it against an attack, they may at least destroy the equipment, if not the buildings themselves. Or if a force takes over an enemy fortress, they may demolish its fortifications. Even a force digging in on a battlefield might have to destroy various types of property.

Destruction in marching, reconnoitring, and conducting Transport.

Destruction in marching, scouting, and managing transport.

§ 151. Destruction of enemy property in marching troops, conducting military transport, and in reconnoitring, is likewise lawful if unavoidable. A reconnoitring party need not keep on the road if they can better serve their purpose by riding across the tilled[Pg 189] fields. And troops may be marched and transport may be conducted over crops when necessary. A humane commander will not unnecessarily allow his troops and transport to march and ride over tilled fields and crops. But if the purpose of war necessitates it he is justified in so doing.

§ 151. Destroying enemy property during troop movements, military transport, and reconnaissance is permissible if it's unavoidable. A reconnaissance team doesn't have to stick to the road if they can achieve their goals more effectively by crossing cultivated fields. Troops can be marched and transport can occur over crops when necessary. A compassionate commander will avoid letting his troops and transport march over cultivated fields and crops without a good reason. However, if the needs of war justify it, he is allowed to do so.

Destruction of Arms, Ammunition, and Provisions.

Destruction of Arms, Ammunition, and Supplies.

§ 152. Whatever enemy property a belligerent may appropriate he may likewise destroy. To prevent the enemy from making use of them a retreating force may destroy arms, ammunition, provisions, and the like, which they have taken from the enemy or requisitioned and cannot carry away. But it must be specially observed that they may not destroy provisions in the possession of private enemy inhabitants in order to prevent the enemy from making use of them in the future.[291]

§ 152. Any enemy property that a warring party may take over, they can also destroy. To stop the enemy from using them, a retreating force is allowed to destroy weapons, ammunition, supplies, and similar items that they have taken from the enemy or requisitioned and are unable to transport. However, it must be specifically noted that they cannot destroy supplies held by private enemy citizens to prevent the enemy from using them later.[291]

[291] Nor is a commander allowed to requisition such provisions in order to have them destroyed, for article 52 of the Hague Regulations expressly enacts that requisitions are only admissible for the necessities of the army.

[291] A commander cannot demand provisions just to destroy them, because article 52 of the Hague Regulations clearly states that requisitions are only acceptable for the army's needs.

Destruction of Historical Monuments, Works of Art, and the like.

Destruction of Historical Monuments, Artworks, and Similar Items.

§ 153. All destruction of and damage to historical monuments, works of art and science, buildings for charitable, educational, and religious[292] purposes are specially prohibited by article 56 of the Hague Regulations which enacts that the perpetrators of such acts must be prosecuted (poursuivie), that is court-martialed. But it must be emphasised that these objects enjoy this protection only during military occupation of enemy territory. Should a battle be waged around an historical monument on open ground, should a church, a school, or a museum be defended and attacked during military operations, these otherwise protected objects may be damaged or destroyed under the same conditions as other enemy property.

§ 153. All destruction of and damage to historical monuments, works of art and science, and buildings for charitable, educational, and religious purposes are specifically prohibited by Article 56 of the Hague Regulations, which states that those responsible for such acts must be prosecuted, meaning they can be court-martialed. However, it should be emphasized that these objects are only protected during military occupation of enemy territory. If a battle occurs around a historical monument in an open area, or if a church, school, or museum is defended and attacked during military operations, these otherwise protected objects may be damaged or destroyed under the same conditions as other enemy property.

[292] It is of importance to state the fact that, according to Grotius (III. c. 5, §§ 2 and 3), destruction of graves, tombstones, churches, and the like is not prohibited by the Law of Nations, although he strongly (III. c. 12, §§ 5-7) advises that they should be spared unless their preservation is dangerous to the interests of the invader.[Pg 190]

[292] It's important to note that, according to Grotius (III. c. 5, §§ 2 and 3), the destruction of graves, tombstones, churches, and similar structures is not forbidden by the Law of Nations, although he strongly advises (III. c. 12, §§ 5-7) that they should be protected unless keeping them intact threatens the interests of the invader.[Pg 190]

General Devastation.

General Destruction.

§ 154. The question must also be taken into consideration whether and under what conditions general devastation of a locality, be it a town or a larger part of enemy territory, is permitted. There cannot be the slightest doubt that such devastation is as a rule absolutely prohibited and only in exceptional cases permitted when, to use the words of article 23 (g) of the Hague Regulations, it is "imperatively demanded by the necessities of war." It is, however, impossible to define once for all the circumstances which make a general devastation necessary, since everything depends upon the merits of the special case. But the fact that a general devastation can be lawful must be admitted. And it is, for instance, lawful in case of a levy en masse on already occupied territory, when self-preservation obliges a belligerent to resort to the most severe measures. It is also lawful when, after the defeat of his main forces and occupation of his territory, an enemy disperses his remaining forces into small bands which carry on guerilla tactics and receive food and information, so that there is no hope of ending the war except by a general devastation which cuts off supplies of every kind from the guerilla bands. But it must be specially observed that general devastation is only justified by imperative necessity and by the fact that there is no better and less severe way open to a belligerent.[293]

§ 154. The question must also be considered regarding whether and under what conditions widespread destruction of a location, whether a town or a larger portion of enemy territory, is allowed. There is no doubt that such destruction is generally completely prohibited and only permitted in exceptional cases when, to quote article 23 (g) of the Hague Regulations, it is "imperatively demanded by the necessities of war." However, it’s impossible to define once and for all the circumstances that make widespread destruction necessary, as it depends on the specifics of each situation. Yet, it must be acknowledged that general destruction can be lawful. For example, it is lawful during a mass mobilization in already occupied territory when self-preservation forces a combatant to take extreme measures. It is also lawful when, after the defeat of his main forces and occupation of his territory, an enemy scatters his remaining troops into small groups that engage in guerrilla tactics and obtain food and information, making it impossible to end the war without a general destruction that cuts off all supplies to the guerrilla groups. However, it should be clearly noted that general destruction is only justified by an absolute necessity and the lack of a better and less severe option available to a combatant.[293]

[293] See Hall, § 186, who gives in nuce a good survey of the doctrine and practice of general devastation from Grotius down to the beginning of the nineteenth century. See also Spaight, pp. 125-139.

[293] See Hall, § 186, who provides a concise overview of the doctrine and practice of general devastation from Grotius to the early nineteenth century. Also, refer to Spaight, pp. 125-139.

Be that as it may, whenever a belligerent resorts to general devastation he ought, if possible, to make some provision for the unfortunate peaceful population of the devastated tract of territory. It would be more humane to take them away into captivity rather than let them perish on the spot. The practice, resorted to during the South African war, to house the victims of devastation in concentration camps, must be approved.[Pg 191] The purpose of war may even oblige a belligerent to confine a population forcibly[294] in concentration camps.

That said, whenever a combatant resorts to widespread destruction, they should, if possible, make some arrangements for the unfortunate civilian population in the affected area. It would be more humane to take them into captivity rather than let them die on the spot. The approach used during the South African war, which involved placing the victims of destruction in concentration camps, should be approved.[Pg 191] The nature of war may even require a combatant to forcibly confine a population[294] in concentration camps.

[294] See above, p. 153, note 1. As regards the devastation resorted to during the South African War, and as regards the concentration camps instituted in consequence of devastation during this war, see Beak, The Aftermath of War (1906), pp. 1-30, and The Times' History of the War in South Africa, vol. V. pp. 250-252.

[294] See above, p. 153, note 1. Regarding the destruction that took place during the South African War, as well as the concentration camps set up as a result of this destruction, refer to Beak, The Aftermath of War (1906), pp. 1-30, and The Times' History of the War in South Africa, vol. V, pp. 250-252.

IX Assault, siege, and bombardment

Vattel, III. §§ 168-170—Hall, § 186—Lawrence, § 204—Westlake, II. pp. 76-79—Moore, VII. § 1112—Halleck, II. pp. 59, 67, 185—Taylor, §§ 483-485—Bluntschli, §§ 552-554B—Heffter, § 125—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 448-457—G. F. Martens, II. § 286—Ullmann, § 181—Bonfils, Nos. 1079-1087—Despagnet, Nos. 528-535—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2779-2786—Rivier, II. pp. 284-288—Nys, III. pp. 210-219—Calvo, IV. §§ 2067-2095—Fiore, III. Nos. 1322-1330, and Code, Nos. 1519-1524—Longuet, §§ 58-59—Mérignhac, pp. 171-182—Pillet, pp. 101-112—Zorn, pp. 161-174—Holland, War, Nos. 80-83—Rolin-Jaequemyns in R.I. II. (1870), pp. 659 and 674, III. (1871), pp. 297-307—Bordwell, pp. 286-288—Meurer, §§ 32-34—Spaight, pp. 157-201—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 18-22—Land Warfare, §§ 117-138.

Vattel, III. §§ 168-170—Hall, § 186—Lawrence, § 204—Westlake, II. pp. 76-79—Moore, VII. § 1112—Halleck, II. pp. 59, 67, 185—Taylor, §§ 483-485—Bluntschli, §§ 552-554B—Heffter, § 125—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 448-457—G. F. Martens, II. § 286—Ullmann, § 181—Bonfils, Nos. 1079-1087—Despagnet, Nos. 528-535—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2779-2786—Rivier, II. pp. 284-288—Nys, III. pp. 210-219—Calvo, IV. §§ 2067-2095—Fiore, III. Nos. 1322-1330, and Code, Nos. 1519-1524—Longuet, §§ 58-59—Mérignhac, pp. 171-182—Pillet, pp. 101-112—Zorn, pp. 161-174—Holland, War, Nos. 80-83—Rolin-Jaequemyns in R.I. II. (1870), pp. 659 and 674, III. (1871), pp. 297-307—Bordwell, pp. 286-288—Meurer, §§ 32-34—Spaight, pp. 157-201—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 18-22—Land Warfare, §§ 117-138.

Assault, Siege, and Bombardment, when lawful.

Assault, Siege, and Bombardment, when lawful.

§ 155. Assault is the rush of an armed force upon enemy forces in the battlefield, or upon intrenchments, fortifications, habitations, villages, or towns, such rushing force committing every violence against opposing persons and destroying all impediments. Siege is the surrounding and investing of an enemy locality by an armed force, cutting off those inside from all communication for the purpose of starving them into surrender or for the purpose of attacking the invested locality and taking it by assault. Bombardment is the throwing by artillery of shot and shell upon persons and things. Siege can be accompanied by bombardment and assault, but this is not necessary, since a siege can be carried out by mere investment and starvation caused thereby. Assault, siege, and bombardment[Pg 192] are severally and jointly perfectly legitimate means of warfare.[295] Neither bombardment nor assault, if they take place on the battlefield, needs special discussion, as they are allowed under the same circumstances and conditions as force in general is allowed. The only question here is under what circumstances assault and bombardment are allowed outside the battlefield. The answer is indirectly given by article 25 of the Hague Regulations, where it is categorically enacted that "the attack or bombardment, by any means[296] whatever, of towns, villages, habitations, or buildings, which are not defended, is prohibited." Siege is not specially mentioned, because no belligerent would dream of besieging an undefended locality, and because siege of an undefended town would involve unjustifiable violence against enemy persons and would, therefore, be unlawful. Be this as it may, the fact that defended localities only may now be bombarded, involves a decided advance in the view taken by International Law. For it was formerly asserted by many writers[297] and military experts that, for certain reasons and purposes, undefended localities also might in exceptional cases be bombarded. But it must be specially observed that it matters not whether the defended locality be fortified or not, since an unfortified place can be defended.[298] And it must be mentioned that nothing prevents a belligerent who has taken possession of an undefended fortified place from destroying the fortifications by bombardment as well as by other means.

§ 155. Assault is the charge of an armed force against enemy troops on the battlefield, or against trenches, fortifications, homes, villages, or towns, with that attacking force committing acts of violence against opposing individuals and destroying all obstacles. A siege involves surrounding and isolating an enemy location by an armed force, cutting off those inside from all communication in order to starve them into surrender or to launch an attack on the besieged location and capture it by assault. Bombardment refers to the firing of artillery at people and structures. A siege can include bombardment and assault, but this isn’t necessary, as a siege can be conducted purely through encirclement and the resulting starvation. Assault, siege, and bombardment[Pg 192] are all completely legitimate methods of warfare.[295] Neither bombardment nor assault, when occurring on the battlefield, requires additional discussion, as they are permitted under the same circumstances and conditions as general use of force. The key question here is under what conditions assault and bombardment are permitted outside the battlefield. The answer is indirectly provided by Article 25 of the Hague Regulations, which explicitly states that "the attack or bombardment, by any means[296] whatsoever, of towns, villages, homes, or buildings that are not defended is prohibited." Siege is not specifically mentioned because no warring party would consider besieging an undefended location, and besieging an undefended town would entail unjustifiable violence against enemy individuals and would therefore be unlawful. Regardless, the fact that only defended locations may now be bombarded indicates a significant shift in the perspective of International Law. Previously, many writers[297] and military experts claimed that, for certain reasons and purposes, undefended locations could also be bombarded in exceptional cases. However, it is particularly important to note that it doesn’t matter whether the defended location is fortified or not, as an unfortified site can still be defended.[298] Furthermore, nothing prevents a belligerent who has taken control of an undefended fortified site from destroying the fortifications through bombardment or by other means.

[295] The assertion of some writers—see, for instance, Pillet, pp. 104-107, and Mérignhac, p. 173—that bombardment is lawful only after an unsuccessful attempt of the besiegers to starve the besieged into surrender is not based upon a recognised rule of the Law of Nations.

[295] The claim made by some authors—like Pillet, pp. 104-107, and Mérignhac, p. 173—that bombardment is only justified after the besiegers have made an unsuccessful attempt to force the besieged to surrender through starvation is not supported by an established rule of international law.

[296] The words by any means whatever were inserted by the Second Peace Conference in order to make it quite clear that the article is likewise to refer to bombardment from air-vessels.

[296] The phrase by any means whatever was added by the Second Peace Conference to clarify that the article also applies to bombing from aircraft.

[297] See, for instance, Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 451.

[297] For example, check out Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 451.

[298] See Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague (1900), p. 152.[Pg 193]

[298] See Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague (1900), p. 152.[Pg 193]

Assault, how carried out.

Assault, how it was done.

§ 156. No special rules of International Law exist with regard to the mode of carrying out an assault. Therefore, only the general rules respecting offence and defence find application. It is in especial not[299] necessary to give notice of an impending assault to the authorities of the respective locality, or to request them to surrender before an assault is made. That an assault may or may not be preceded or accompanied by a bombardment, need hardly be mentioned, nor that by article 28 of the Hague Regulations pillage of towns taken by assault is now expressly prohibited.

§ 156. There are no specific rules of International Law concerning how to carry out an assault. Therefore, only the general rules regarding offense and defense apply. It is especially not[299] necessary to notify the local authorities about an upcoming assault or to ask them to surrender before an assault happens. It’s also worth noting that an assault may or may not be preceded or accompanied by a bombardment, and according to article 28 of the Hague Regulations, looting of towns captured by assault is now explicitly prohibited.

[299] This becomes indirectly apparent from article 26 of the Hague Regulations.

[299] This is indirectly clear from article 26 of the Hague Regulations.

Siege, how carried out.

Siege tactics, how they were carried out.

§ 157. With regard to the mode of carrying out siege without bombardment no special rules of International Law exist, and here too only the general rules respecting offence and defence find application. Therefore, an armed force besieging a town may, for instance, cut off the river which supplies drinking water to the besieged, but must not poison[300] such river. And it must be specially observed that no rule of law exists which obliges a besieging force to allow all non-combatants, or only women, children, the aged, the sick and wounded, or subjects of neutral Powers, to leave the besieged locality unmolested. Although such permission[301] is sometimes granted, it is in most cases refused, because the fact that non-combatants are besieged together with the combatants, and that they have to endure the same hardships, may, and very often does, exercise pressure upon the authorities to surrender. Further, should the commander of a besieged place expel the non-combatants in order to lessen the number of those who consume his store of provisions, the besieging force[Pg 194] need not allow them to pass through its lines, but may drive them back.[302]

§ 157. There are no specific international laws regarding how to conduct a siege without bombardment, and only the general rules concerning offense and defense apply here. Therefore, an armed force besieging a town can, for example, cut off the river that supplies drinking water to those inside, but it must not poison[300] that river. It is also important to note that there is no legal requirement for a besieging force to allow all non-combatants, or only women, children, the elderly, the sick and wounded, or citizens of neutral countries, to leave the besieged area unharmed. While such permission[301] is sometimes granted, it is often denied because the presence of non-combatants alongside combatants, and their shared suffering, can pressure the authorities to surrender. Additionally, if the commander of a besieged location decides to expel non-combatants to reduce the number of people consuming his food supplies, the besieging force[Pg 194] does not have to let them pass through its lines and can send them back.[302]

[300] See above, § 110.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[301] Thus in 1870, during the Franco-German War, the German besiegers of Strassburg as well as of Belfort allowed the women, the children, and the sick to leave the besieged fortresses.

[301] So in 1870, during the Franco-German War, the German forces surrounding Strassburg and Belfort permitted the women, children, and sick to evacuate the besieged fortresses.

[302] See Land Warfare, § 129.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Land Warfare, § 129.

That diplomatic envoys of neutral Powers may not be prevented from leaving a besieged town is a consequence of their exterritoriality. However, if they voluntarily remain, may they claim uncontrolled[303] communication with their home State by correspondence and couriers? When Mr. Washburne, the American diplomatic envoy at Paris during the siege of that city in 1870 by the Germans, claimed the right of sending a messenger with despatches to London in a sealed bag through the German lines, Bismarck declared that he was ready to allow foreign diplomatists in Paris to send a courier to their home States once a week, but only under the condition that their despatches were open and did not contain any remarks concerning the war. Although the United States and other Powers protested, Bismarck did not alter his decision. The whole question must be treated as open.[304]

That diplomats from neutral countries can’t be stopped from leaving a besieged town is a result of their exterritorial rights. However, if they choose to stay, can they still claim unrestricted communication with their home country through letters and messengers? When Mr. Washburne, the American diplomat in Paris during the German siege in 1870, asserted his right to send a messenger with sealed dispatches to London through the German lines, Bismarck said he would allow foreign diplomats in Paris to send a courier to their home countries once a week, but only if their dispatches were open and didn’t include any comments about the war. Even though the United States and other countries protested, Bismarck didn’t change his stance. The whole matter should be considered as still unresolved.

[303] The matter is discussed by Rolin-Jaequemyns in R.I. III. (1871), pp. 371-377.

[303] This topic is covered by Rolin-Jaequemyns in R.I. III. (1871), pp. 371-377.

Bombardment, how carried out.

Bombardment, how it was done.

§ 158. Regarding bombardment, article 26 of the Hague Regulations enacts that the commander of the attacking forces shall do all he can to notify his intention to resort to bombardment. But it must be emphasised that a strict duty of notification for all cases of bombardment is not thereby imposed, since it is only enacted that a commander shall do all he can to send notification. He cannot do it when the circumstances of the case prevent him, or when the necessities of war demand an immediate bombardment. Be that as it may, the purpose of notification is to enable private individuals within the locality to be bombarded to seek shelter for their persons and for their valuable personal property.[Pg 195]

§ 158. Regarding bombardment, article 26 of the Hague Regulations states that the commander of the attacking forces should do everything possible to inform others of his intention to carry out bombardment. However, it’s important to highlight that there isn’t a strict obligation to notify in all cases of bombardment, as it only requires that a commander shall do all he can to send a notification. He cannot do this if circumstances prevent him, or if the demands of war require immediate bombardment. Nevertheless, the purpose of notification is to allow people in the area being bombarded to find shelter for themselves and for their valuable personal belongings.[Pg 195]

Article 27 of the Hague Regulations enacts the hitherto customary rule that all necessary steps must be taken to spare as far as possible all buildings devoted to religion, art, science, and charity; further, historic monuments, hospitals, and all other places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided these buildings, places, and monuments are not used at the same time for military purposes. To enable the attacking forces to spare these buildings and places, the latter must be indicated by some particular signs, which must be previously notified to the attacking forces and must be visible from the far distance from which the besieging artillery carries out the bombardment.[305]

Article 27 of the Hague Regulations establishes the ongoing customary rule that all necessary measures must be taken to protect as much as possible all buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, and charity; as well as historic monuments, hospitals, and any other places where the sick and wounded are gathered, as long as these buildings, places, and monuments are not being used for military purposes at the same time. To help the attacking forces avoid these buildings and places, they must be marked with specific signs, which need to be communicated to the attacking forces in advance and should be visible from a long distance from where the besieging artillery is carrying out the bombardment.[305]

[305] No siege takes place without the besieged accusing the besiegers of neglecting the rule that buildings devoted to religion, art, charity, the tending of the sick, and the like, must be spared during bombardments. The fact is that in case of a bombardment the destruction of such buildings cannot always be avoided, although the artillery of the besiegers do not intentionally aim at them. That the forces of civilised States intentionally destroy such buildings, I cannot believe.

[305] No siege happens without the people under siege claiming that the attackers are ignoring the rule that buildings dedicated to religion, art, charity, caring for the sick, and similar purposes should be protected during bombings. The reality is that during a bombing, it's not always possible to avoid destroying these buildings, even though the attackers don’t purposely target them. I can't believe that the military of civilized nations deliberately destroys such buildings.

It must be specially observed that no legal duty exists for the attacking forces to restrict bombardment to fortifications only. On the contrary, destruction of private and public buildings through bombardment has always been and is still considered lawful, as it is one of the means to impress upon the authorities the advisability of surrender. Some writers[306] assert either that bombardment of the town, in contradistinction to the fortifications, is never lawful, or that it is only lawful when bombardment of the fortifications has not resulted in inducing surrender. But this opinion does not represent the actual practice of belligerents, and the Hague Regulations do not adopt it.

It should be noted that there is no legal obligation for attacking forces to limit their bombardment to fortifications alone. In fact, the destruction of private and public buildings through bombardment has always been and continues to be considered lawful, as it serves as a means to encourage authorities to surrender. Some writers[306] argue that bombarding the town, as opposed to the fortifications, is never lawful, or that it is only lawful if the bombardment of the fortifications fails to lead to surrender. However, this viewpoint does not reflect actual practices of warring parties, and the Hague Regulations do not support it.

[306] See, for instance, Pillet, pp. 104-107; Bluntschli § 554A; Mérignhac, p. 180. Vattel (III. § 169) does not deny the right to bombard the town, although he does not recommend such bombardment.[Pg 196]

[306] See, for example, Pillet, pp. 104-107; Bluntschli § 554A; Mérignhac, p. 180. Vattel (III. § 169) acknowledges the right to bombard the town, although he doesn’t encourage such actions.[Pg 196]

X Espionage and betrayal

Vattel, III. §§ 179-182—Hall, § 188—Westlake, II. pp. 79 and 90—Lawrence, § 199—Phillimore, III. § 96—Halleck, I. pp. 571-575, and in A.J. V.(1911), pp. 590-603—Taylor, §§ 490 and 492—Wharton, III. § 347—Moore, VII. § 1132—Bluntschli, §§ 563-564, 628-640—Heffter, § 125—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 461-467—Ullmann, § 176—Bonfils, Nos. 1100-1104—Despagnet, Nos. 537-542—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2762-2768—Rivier, II. pp. 282-284—Nys, III. pp. 256-263—Calvo, IV. §§ 2111-2122—Fiore, III. Nos. 1341, 1374-1376, and Code, Nos. 1487-1490—Martens, II. § 116—Longuet, §§ 63-75—Mérignhac, pp. 183-209—Pillet, pp. 97-100—Zorn, pp. 174-195—Holland, War, Nos. 84-87—Bordwell, pp. 291-292—Meurer, §§ 35-38—Spaight, pp. 202-215, 333-335—Ariga, §§ 98-100—Takahashi, pp. 185-194—Friedemann, Die Lage der Kriegskundschafter und Spione (1892)—Violle, L'espionage militaire en temps de guerre (1904)—Adler, Die Spionage (1906)—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 30-31—Land Warfare, §§ 155-173—Bentwich in The Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, New Series, X. (1909), pp. 243-299.

Vattel, III. §§ 179-182—Hall, § 188—Westlake, II. pp. 79 and 90—Lawrence, § 199—Phillimore, III. § 96—Halleck, I. pp. 571-575, and in A.J. V.(1911), pp. 590-603—Taylor, §§ 490 and 492—Wharton, III. § 347—Moore, VII. § 1132—Bluntschli, §§ 563-564, 628-640—Heffter, § 125—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 461-467—Ullmann, § 176—Bonfils, Nos. 1100-1104—Despagnet, Nos. 537-542—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2762-2768—Rivier, II. pp. 282-284—Nys, III. pp. 256-263—Calvo, IV. §§ 2111-2122—Fiore, III. Nos. 1341, 1374-1376, and Code, Nos. 1487-1490—Martens, II. § 116—Longuet, §§ 63-75—Mérignhac, pp. 183-209—Pillet, pp. 97-100—Zorn, pp. 174-195—Holland, War, Nos. 84-87—Bordwell, pp. 291-292—Meurer, §§ 35-38—Spaight, pp. 202-215, 333-335—Ariga, §§ 98-100—Takahashi, pp. 185-194—Friedemann, Die Lage der Kriegskundschafter und Spione (1892)—Violle, L'espionage militaire en temps de guerre (1904)—Adler, Die Spionage (1906)—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 30-31—Land Warfare, §§ 155-173—Bentwich in The Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, New Series, X. (1909), pp. 243-299.

Twofold Character of Espionage and Treason.

Twofold Character of Espionage and Treason.

§ 159. War cannot be waged without all kinds of information about the forces and the intentions of the enemy and about the character of the country within the zone of military operations. To obtain the necessary information, it has always been considered lawful, on the one hand, to employ spies, and, on the other, to make use of the treason of enemy soldiers or private enemy subjects, whether they were bribed[307] or offered the information voluntarily and gratuitously. Article 24 of the Hague Regulations enacts the old customary rule that the employment of methods necessary to obtain information about the enemy and the country is considered allowable. The fact, however, that these methods are lawful on the part of the belligerent who employs them does not prevent the punishment of such individuals as are engaged in procuring information. Although a belligerent acts lawfully in employing spies and traitors,[Pg 197] the other belligerent, who punishes spies and traitors, likewise acts lawfully. Indeed, espionage and treason bear a twofold character. For persons committing acts of espionage or treason are—as will be shown below in § 255—considered war criminals and may be punished, but the employment of spies and traitors is considered lawful on the part of the belligerents.

§ 159. War cannot be fought without all kinds of information about the enemy’s forces, intentions, and the nature of the country within the military operations zone. To gather the necessary information, it has always been viewed as acceptable to use spies, as well as to exploit the betrayal of enemy soldiers or individual enemy citizens, whether they were bribed[307] or provided the information willingly and without payment. Article 24 of the Hague Regulations establishes the old customary rule that using methods to gather information about the enemy and the territory is considered permissible. However, the fact that these methods are lawful for the belligerent who uses them does not stop the punishment of individuals involved in gathering information. Although a belligerent acts legally in using spies and traitors,[Pg 197] the opposing belligerent, who punishes spies and traitors, also acts lawfully. In fact, espionage and treason have a dual nature. Individuals who commit acts of espionage or treason are—as will be shown below in § 255—considered war criminals and may face punishment, but employing spies and traitors is regarded as lawful by the belligerents.

[307] Some writers maintain, however, that it is not lawful to bribe enemy soldiers into espionage; see below, § 162.

[307] Some writers argue, however, that it's not acceptable to bribe enemy soldiers to gather intelligence; see below, § 162.

Espionage in contradistinction to Scouting and Despatch-bearing.

Espionage unlike Scouting and Delivering messages.

§ 160. Espionage must not be confounded, firstly, with scouting, or secondly, with despatch-bearing. According to article 29 of the Hague Regulations, espionage is the act of a soldier or other individual who clandestinely, or under false pretences, seeks to obtain information concerning one belligerent in the zone of belligerent operations with the intention of communicating it to the other belligerent.[308] Therefore, soldiers not in disguise, who penetrate into the zone of operations of the enemy, are not spies. They are scouts who enjoy all privileges of the members of armed forces, and they must, if captured, be treated as prisoners of war. Likewise, soldiers or civilians charged with the delivery of despatches for their own army or for that of the enemy and carrying out their mission openly are not spies. And it matters not whether despatch-bearers make use of balloons or of other means of communication. Thus, a soldier or civilian trying to carry despatches from a force besieged in a fortress to other forces of the same belligerent, whether making use of a balloon or riding or walking at night, may not be treated as a spy. On the other hand, spying can well be carried out by despatch-bearers or by persons in a balloon, whether they make use of the balloon of a despatch-bearer or rise in a balloon for the special purpose of spying.[309] The mere fact that a[Pg 198] balloon is visible does not protect the persons using it from being treated as spies; since spying can be carried out under false pretences quite as well as clandestinely. But special care must be taken really to prove the fact of espionage in such cases, for an individual carrying despatches is prima facie not a spy and must not be treated as a spy until proved to be such.

§ 160. Espionage should not be confused, first, with scouting, or second, with carrying messages. According to Article 29 of the Hague Regulations, espionage is when a soldier or someone else secretly, or under false pretenses, tries to gather information about one side in a conflict within the area of military operations, intending to share that information with the opposing side.[308] Therefore, soldiers who are not disguised and enter the enemy's operational area are not spies. They are scouts who have all the rights of armed forces members and must, if captured, be treated as prisoners of war. Likewise, soldiers or civilians who are tasked with delivering messages for their own army or the enemy and are carrying out their duties openly are not spies. It doesn’t matter if message carriers use balloons or other methods of communication. For example, a soldier or civilian attempting to bring messages from a besieged location to other forces of the same side, whether using a balloon or traveling by foot at night, should not be considered a spy. On the other hand, spying can certainly be done by message carriers or people in a balloon, whether they are using a balloon that someone is delivering a message with or ascending in a balloon specifically for the purpose of spying.[309] Just because a balloon is visible doesn’t mean the people using it are safe from being treated as spies; espionage can be conducted both under false pretenses and secretly. However, it is essential to provide strong evidence of espionage in such cases, as someone carrying messages is prima facie not a spy and should not be treated as one until proven otherwise.

[308] Assisting or favouring espionage or knowingly concealing a spy are, according to a customary rule of International Law, punishable as though they were themselves acts of espionage; see Land Warfare, § 172.

[308] Helping or supporting espionage or intentionally hiding a spy is, based on a standard rule of International Law, punishable as if it were actually an act of espionage; see Land Warfare, § 172.

[309] See below, § 356 (4), concerning wireless telegraphy.

[309] See below, § 356 (4), regarding wireless telegraphy.

A remarkable case of espionage is that of Major André,[310] which occurred in 1780 during the American War of Independence. The American General Arnold, who was commandant of West Point, on the North River, intended to desert the Americans and join the British forces. He opened negotiations with Sir Henry Clinton for the purpose of surrendering West Point, and Major André was commissioned by Sir Henry Clinton to make the final arrangements with Arnold. On the night of September 21, Arnold and André met outside the American and British lines, but André, after having changed his uniform for plain clothes, undertook to pass the American lines on his return, furnished with a passport under the name of John Anderson by General Arnold. He was caught, convicted as a spy, and hanged. As he was not seeking information,[311] and therefore was not a spy according to article 29 of the Hague Regulations, a conviction for espionage would not, if such a case occurred to-day, be justified. But it would be possible to convict for war treason, for André was no doubt negotiating treason. Be that as it may, George III. considered André a martyr, and honoured his memory by granting a pension to his mother and a baronetcy to his brother.[312]

A notable case of espionage is that of Major André,[310] which took place in 1780 during the American War of Independence. American General Arnold, who was in charge of West Point on the North River, planned to defect to the British forces. He started talks with Sir Henry Clinton about surrendering West Point, and Major André was sent by Sir Henry Clinton to finalize the details with Arnold. On the night of September 21, Arnold and André met just outside the American and British lines. After changing from his uniform into plain clothes, André tried to pass through the American lines on his way back, carrying a passport under the name John Anderson provided by General Arnold. He was captured, tried as a spy, and executed by hanging. Since he wasn't actively gathering information,[311] and therefore wouldn't qualify as a spy under article 29 of the Hague Regulations, a conviction for espionage wouldn’t be justified if this scenario happened today. However, it could lead to a conviction for treason in wartime, as André was undeniably engaged in treasonous negotiations. Regardless, George III viewed André as a martyr and honored his memory by granting a pension to his mother and a baronetcy to his brother.[312]

[310] See Halleck in A.J. V. (1911), p. 594.

[310] See Halleck in A.J. V. (1911), p. 594.

[311] Halleck, loc. cit., p. 598, asserts the contrary.

[311] Halleck, loc. cit., p. 598, claims the opposite.

[312] See Phillimore, III. § 106; Halleck, I. p. 575; Rivier, II. p. 284.

[312] See Phillimore, III. § 106; Halleck, I. p. 575; Rivier, II. p. 284.

Punishment of Espionage.

Espionage Punishment.

§ 161. The usual punishment for spying is hanging[Pg 199] or shooting, but less severe punishments are, of course, admissible and sometimes inflicted. However this may be, according to article 30 of the Hague Regulations a spy may not be punished without a trial before a court-martial. And according to article 31 of the Hague Regulations a spy who is not captured in the act but rejoins the army to which he belongs, and is subsequently captured by the enemy, may not be punished for his previous espionage and must be treated as a prisoner of war. But it must be specially observed that article 31 concerns only such spies as belong to the armed forces of the enemy; civilians who act as spies and are captured later may be punished. Be that as it may, no regard is paid to the status, rank, position, or motive of a spy. He may be a soldier or a civilian, an officer or a private. He may be following instructions of superiors or acting on his own initiative from patriotic motives. A case of espionage, remarkable on account of the position of the spy, is that of the American Captain Nathan Hale, which occurred in 1776. After the American forces had withdrawn from Long Island, Captain Hale recrossed under disguise and obtained valuable information about the English forces that had occupied the island. But he was caught before he could rejoin his army, and he was executed as a spy.[313]

§ 161. The typical punishment for spying is hanging[Pg 199] or shooting, but lighter punishments can be applied and are sometimes given. Regardless, according to article 30 of the Hague Regulations, a spy can’t be punished without a trial by a court-martial. Additionally, according to article 31 of the Hague Regulations, a spy who is not caught in the act but returns to their own army and is later captured by the enemy cannot be punished for their previous espionage and must be treated as a prisoner of war. However, it’s important to note that article 31 only applies to spies who are part of the enemy's armed forces; civilians acting as spies who are later captured can be punished. That said, no attention is paid to the status, rank, position, or motivations of a spy. They can be a soldier or a civilian, an officer or a private. They may be following orders from superiors or acting on their own initiative out of patriotic reasons. A notable case of espionage involving the position of the spy is that of American Captain Nathan Hale, which took place in 1776. After the American forces withdrew from Long Island, Captain Hale disguised himself and returned to gather valuable information about the British forces occupying the island. However, he was caught before he could rejoin his army, and he was executed as a spy.[313]

[313] The case of Major Jakoga and Captain Oki, which, though reported as a case of espionage, is really a case of treason, will be discussed below in § 255.

[313] The situation involving Major Jakoga and Captain Oki, which is described as espionage but is actually a case of treason, will be addressed further in § 255.

Treason.

Betrayal.

§ 162. Treason can be committed by a soldier or an ordinary subject of a belligerent, but it can also be committed by an inhabitant of an occupied enemy territory or even by the subject of a neutral State temporarily staying there, and it can take place after an arrangement with the favoured belligerent or without such an arrangement. In any case a belligerent making use of treason acts lawfully, although the Hague Regulations do not mention the matter at[Pg 200] all. But many acts of different sorts can be treasonable; the possible cases of treason and the punishment of treason will be discussed below in § 255.

§ 162. Treason can be committed by a soldier or a regular citizen of a warring party, but it can also be committed by someone living in occupied enemy territory or even by a citizen of a neutral country temporarily present there. This can happen with or without an agreement with the favored warring party. In any case, a warring party utilizing treason acts legally, even though the Hague Regulations don’t mention it at all. However, many different actions can be considered treasonous; the potential instances of treason and the penalties for treason will be discussed below in § 255.

Although it is generally recognised that a belligerent acts lawfully who makes use of the offer of a traitor, the question is controversial[314] whether a belligerent acts lawfully who bribes a commander of an enemy fortress into surrender, incites enemy soldiers to desertion, bribes enemy officers for the purpose of getting important information, incites enemy subjects to rise against the legitimate Government, and the like. If the rules of the Law of Nations are formulated, not from doctrines of book-writers, but from what is done by the belligerents in practice,[315] it must be asserted that such acts, detestable and immoral as they are, are not considered illegal according to the Law of Nations.

Although it is generally accepted that a fighting party acts lawfully when they take advantage of a traitor's offer, the debate arises over whether a fighting party acts lawfully when they bribe a commander of an enemy fortress to surrender, encourage enemy soldiers to desert, pay enemy officers for crucial information, or incite enemy civilians to rebel against their legitimate government, and similar actions. If the rules of International Law are based not on theoretical doctrines but on what belligerents actually do, it must be said that these actions, as detestable and immoral as they may be, are not deemed illegal under International Law.

[314] See Vattel, III. § 180; Heffter, § 125; Taylor, § 490; Martens, II. § 110 (8); Longuet, § 52; Mérignhac, p. 188, and others. See also below, § 164.

[314] See Vattel, III. § 180; Heffter, § 125; Taylor, § 490; Martens, II. § 110 (8); Longuet, § 52; Mérignhac, p. 188, and others. See also below, § 164.

[315] See Land Warfare, § 158.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See *Land Warfare*, § 158.

XI TRICKS

Grotius, III. c. 1, §§ 6-18—Bynkershoek, Quaest. jur. publ. I. c. 1—Vattel, III. §§ 177-178—Hall, § 187—Lawrence, § 207—Westlake, II. p. 73—Phillimore, III. § 94—Halleck, I. pp. 566-571—Taylor, § 488—Moore, VII. § 1115—Bluntschli, §§ 565-566—Heffter, § 125—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 457-461—Ullmann, § 176—Bonfils, Nos. 1073-1075—Despagnet, Nos. 526-527—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2759-2761—Rivier, II. p. 261—Nys, III. pp. 252-255—Calvo, IV. §§ 2106-2110—Fiore, III. Nos. 1334-1339—Longuet, §§ 53-56—Mérignhac, pp. 165-168—Pillet, pp. 93-97—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 23-24—Holland, War, Nos. 78-79—Bordwell, pp. 283-286—Meurer, II pp. 151-152—Spaight, pp. 152-156—Land Warfare, §§ 139-154—Brocher in R.I. V. (1873), pp. 325-329.

Grotius, III. c. 1, §§ 6-18—Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law I. c. 1—Vattel, III. §§ 177-178—Hall, § 187—Lawrence, § 207—Westlake, II. p. 73—Phillimore, III. § 94—Halleck, I. pp. 566-571—Taylor, § 488—Moore, VII. § 1115—Bluntschli, §§ 565-566—Heffter, § 125—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 457-461—Ullmann, § 176—Bonfils, Nos. 1073-1075—Despagnet, Nos. 526-527—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2759-2761—Rivier, II. p. 261—Nys, III. pp. 252-255—Calvo, IV. §§ 2106-2110—Fiore, III. Nos. 1334-1339—Longuet, §§ 53-56—Mérignhac, pp. 165-168—Pillet, pp. 93-97—Customs of War, pp. 23-24—Holland, War, Nos. 78-79—Bordwell, pp. 283-286—Meurer, II pp. 151-152—Spaight, pp. 152-156—Land Warfare, §§ 139-154—Brocher in R.I. V. (1873), pp. 325-329.

Character of Ruses of War.

Art of War.

§ 163. Ruses of war or stratagems are deceit employed during military operations for the purpose of misleading the enemy. Such deceit is of great[Pg 201] importance in war, and, just as belligerents are allowed to employ all methods of obtaining information, so they are, on the other hand, and article 24 of the Hague Regulations confirms this, allowed to employ all sorts of ruses for the purpose of deceiving the enemy. Very important objects can be attained through ruses of war, as, for instance, the surrender of a force or of a fortress, the evacuation of territory held by the enemy, the withdrawal from a siege, the abandonment of an intended attack, and the like. But ruses of war are also employed, and are very often the decisive factor, during battles.

§ 163. War tactics or tricks are deceptions used during military operations to mislead the enemy. This kind of deception is crucial in warfare, and just as combatants can use various methods to gather information, they are also permitted to use any kind of trickery to deceive the enemy, as confirmed by Article 24 of the Hague Regulations. Significant objectives can be achieved through war tactics, such as forcing a surrender of troops or a fortress, making the enemy evacuate occupied territory, withdrawing from a siege, or cancelling a planned attack, among others. However, war tactics are also used frequently and can often be a decisive factor during battles.

Different kinds of Stratagems.

Different types of strategies.

§ 164. Of ruses there are so many kinds that it is impossible to enumerate[316] and classify them. But in order to illustrate acts carried out as ruses some instances may be given. It is hardly necessary to mention the laying of ambushes and traps, the masking of military operations such as marches or the erection of batteries and the like, the feigning of attacks or flights or withdrawals, the carrying out of a surprise, and other stratagems employed every day in war. But it is important to know that, when useful, feigned signals and bugle-calls may be ordered, the watchword of the enemy may be used, deceitful intelligence may be disseminated,[317] the signals and the bugle-calls of the enemy may be mimicked[318] to mislead his forces. And even such detestable acts[319] as bribery of enemy commanders and officials in high position, and secret seduction of enemy soldiers to desertion, and of enemy subjects to insurrection, are frequently committed, although many writers protest. As regards the use of the national flag, the military ensigns, and the[Pg 202] uniforms of the enemy, theory and practice are unanimous in rejecting it during actual attack and defence, since the principle is considered inviolable that during actual fighting belligerent forces ought to be certain who is friend and who is foe. But many[320] publicists maintain that until the actual fighting begins belligerent forces may by way of stratagem make use of the national flag, military ensigns, and uniforms of the enemy. Article 23 (f) of the Hague Regulations does not prohibit any and every use of these symbols, but only their improper use, thus leaving the question open,[321] what uses are proper and what are not. Those who have hitherto taught the admissibility of the use of these symbols outside actual fighting can correctly maintain that the quoted article 23 (f) does not prohibit it.[322]

§ 164. There are so many types of ruses that it's impossible to list[316] and categorize them. However, to demonstrate actions taken as ruses, a few examples can be provided. It’s hardly necessary to mention setting ambushes and traps, disguising military movements like marches or the building of artillery positions, pretending to launch attacks or retreats, or conducting surprise actions—these strategies are used every day in warfare. It’s important to understand that, when it’s advantageous, false signals and bugle calls can be ordered, the enemy’s watchword can be utilized, deceptive information can be spread,[317] and the enemy's signals and bugle calls can be imitated[318] to mislead their forces. Even despicable acts[319] like bribing enemy commanders and high-ranking officials, secretly persuading enemy soldiers to desert, and inciting enemy civilians to revolt, are often carried out, despite protests from many writers. Regarding the use of national flags, military insignias, and the[Pg 202] uniforms of the enemy, both theory and practice agree that these should not be used during actual combat, as the principle is firmly upheld that, during fighting, military forces need to know who their allies are and who their opponents are. However, many[320] publicists argue that until actual combat starts, belligerent forces can use the national flag, military insignias, and enemy uniforms as a form of strategy. Article 23 (f) of the Hague Regulations does not forbid every use of these symbols, but only their improper use, leaving the question open,[321] as to which uses are acceptable and which are not. Those who have previously argued that the use of these symbols outside of actual combat is permissible can correctly assert that the cited article 23 (f) does not prohibit it.[322]

[316] See Land Warfare, § 144, where a great number of legitimate ruses are enumerated.

[316] See Land Warfare, § 144, which lists many legitimate tricks.

[317] See the examples quoted by Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2761.

[317] Check the examples mentioned by Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2761.

[318] See Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2760.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2760.

[319] The point has been discussed above in § 162.

[319] This point has been discussed earlier in § 162.

[320] See, for instance, Hall, § 187; Bluntschli, § 565; Taylor, § 488; Calvo, IV. No. 2106; Pillet, p. 95; Longuet, § 54. But, on the other hand, the number of publicists who consider it illegal to make use of the enemy flag, ensigns, and uniforms, even before an actual attack, is daily becoming larger; see, for instance, Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 458; Mérignhac, p. 166; Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2760; Bonfils, No. 1074; Kriegsbrauch, p. 24. As regards the use of the enemy flag on the part of men-of-war, see below, in § 211.

[320] For example, see Hall, § 187; Bluntschli, § 565; Taylor, § 488; Calvo, IV. No. 2106; Pillet, p. 95; Longuet, § 54. However, more and more publicists are considering it illegal to use the enemy's flag, insignia, and uniforms, even before an actual attack. For instance, see Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 458; Mérignhac, p. 166; Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2760; Bonfils, No. 1074; Kriegsbrauch, p. 24. Regarding the use of the enemy flag by warships, see below, in § 211.

[321] Some writers maintain that article 23 (f) of the Hague Regulations has settled the controversy, but they forget that this article speaks only of the improper use of the enemy ensigns and uniform. See Land Warfare, § 152.

[321] Some authors argue that article 23 (f) of the Hague Regulations has resolved the debate, but they overlook the fact that this article only addresses the improper use of enemy flags and uniforms. See Land Warfare, § 152.

[322] The use of the enemy uniform for the purpose of deceit is different from the case when members of armed forces who are deficient in clothes wear the uniforms of prisoners or of the enemy dead. If this is done—and it always will be done if necessary—such distinct alterations in the uniform ought to be made as will make it apparent to which side the soldiers concerned belong (see Land Warfare, § 154). Different again is the case where soldiers are, through lack of clothing, obliged to wear the apparel of civilians, such as greatcoats, hats, and the like. Care must then be taken that the soldiers concerned do nevertheless wear a fixed distinctive emblem which marks them as soldiers, since otherwise they lose the privileges of members of the armed forces of the belligerents (see article 1, No. 2, of the Hague Regulations). During the Russo-Japanese War both belligerents repeatedly accused each other of using Chinese clothing for members of their armed forces; the soldiers concerned apparently were obliged through lack of proper clothing temporarily to make use of Chinese garments. See, however, Takahashi, pp. 174-178.

[322] Using an enemy uniform to deceive is different from when soldiers, lacking proper clothing, wear uniforms of prisoners or fallen enemies. If this occurs—and it will if necessary—distinct changes to the uniform should be made to clearly indicate which side the soldiers belong to (see Land Warfare, § 154). It’s another situation when soldiers have to wear civilian clothing, like greatcoats and hats, due to lack of clothing. In this case, they must still wear a clear distinctive emblem that identifies them as soldiers; otherwise, they lose the privileges of armed forces members (see article 1, No. 2, of the Hague Regulations). During the Russo-Japanese War, both sides accused each other of using Chinese clothing for their soldiers; apparently, those soldiers had to rely on Chinese garments temporarily due to insufficient proper clothing. See, however, Takahashi, pp. 174-178.

Stratagems in contradistinction to Perfidy.

Strategies vs. Betrayal.

§ 165. Stratagems must be carefully distinguished from perfidy, since the former are allowed, whereas the latter is prohibited. Halleck (I. p. 566) correctly[Pg 203] formulates the distinction by laying down the principle that, whenever a belligerent has expressly or tacitly engaged and is therefore bound by a moral obligation to speak the truth to an enemy, it is perfidy to betray the latter's confidence, because it contains a breach of good faith.[323] Thus a flag of truce or the cross of the Geneva Convention must never be made use of for a stratagem, capitulations must be carried out to the letter, the feigning of surrender for the purpose of luring the enemy into a trap is a treacherous act, as is the assassination of enemy commanders or soldiers or heads of States. On the other hand, stratagem may be met by stratagem, and a belligerent cannot complain of the enemy who so deceives him. If, for instance, a spy of the enemy is bribed to give deceitful intelligence to his employer, or if an officer, who is approached by the enemy and offered a bribe, accepts it feigningly but deceives the briber and leads him to disaster, no perfidy is committed.

§ 165. Stratagems must be clearly distinguished from betrayal, since the former are permissible, while the latter is not. Halleck (I. p. 566) accurately formulates the distinction by stating that when a belligerent has explicitly or implicitly engaged and is therefore bound by a moral obligation to be truthful to an enemy, it is considered betrayal to break that trust, as it violates good faith.[Pg 203] Thus, a flag of truce or the cross of the Geneva Convention should never be used as a trick, capitulations must be honored completely, and pretending to surrender to lure the enemy into a trap is a deceitful act, just like the assassination of enemy commanders, soldiers, or heads of state. On the other hand, a stratagem can be countered with another stratagem, and a belligerent cannot complain about being deceived by the enemy. For example, if an enemy spy is bribed to provide false information to their employer, or if an officer approaches the enemy and pretends to accept a bribe but actually misleads the briber and causes them to fail, no betrayal has taken place.

[323] See Land Warfare, §§ 139-142, 146-150.[Pg 204]

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Land Warfare, §§ 139-142, 146-150.[Pg 204]

XII ENEMY TERRITORY OCCUPATION

Grotius, III. c. 6, § 4—Vattel, III. §§ 197-200—Hall, §§ 153-161—Westlake, II. pp. 83-106—Lawrence, §§ 176-179—Maine, pp. 176-183—Halleck, II. pp. 432-466—Taylor, §§ 568-579—Wharton, III. §§ 354-355—Moore, VII. §§ 1143-1155—Bluntschli, §§ 539-551—Heffter, §§ 131-132—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 510-524—Klüber, §§ 255-256—G. F. Martens, II. § 280—Ullmann, § 183—Bonfils, Nos. 1156-1175—Despagnet, Nos. 567-578—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2939-2988, 3019-3028—Nys, III. pp. 309-351—Rivier, II. pp. 299-306—Calvo, IV. §§ 2166-2198—Fiore, III. Nos. 1454-1481, and Code, Nos. 1535-1563—Martens, II. §§ 117-119—Longuet, §§ 115-133—Mérignhac, pp. 241-262—Pillet, pp. 237-259—Zorn, pp. 213-243—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 45-50—Holland, War, Nos. 102-106—Bordwell, pp. 312-330—Meurer, II. §§ 45-55—Spaight, pp. 320-380—Land Warfare, §§ 340-405—Waxel, L'armée d'invasion el la population (1874)—Litta, L'occupazione militare (1874)—Löning, Die Verwaltung des General-Gouvernements im Elsass (1874), and in R.I. IV. (1872), p. 622, V. (1873), p. 69—Bernier, De l'occupation militaire en temps de guerre (1884)—Corsi, L'occupazione militare in tempo di guerra e le relazione internazionale che ne derivano (2nd edit. 1886)—Bray, De l'occupation militaire en temps de guerre, etc. (1891)—Magoon, Law of Civil Government under Military Occupation (2nd edit. 1900)—Lorriot, De la nature de l'occupation de guerre (1903)—Deherpe, Essai sur le developpement de l'occupation en droit international (1903)—Sichel, Die kriegerische Besetzung feindlichen Staatsgebietes (1905)—Nowacki, Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege (1906), pp. 78-90—Rolin-Jaequemyns in R.I. II. (1870), p. 666, and III. (1871), p. 311.

Grotius, III. c. 6, § 4—Vattel, III. §§ 197-200—Hall, §§ 153-161—Westlake, II. pp. 83-106—Lawrence, §§ 176-179—Maine, pp. 176-183—Halleck, II. pp. 432-466—Taylor, §§ 568-579—Wharton, III. §§ 354-355—Moore, VII. §§ 1143-1155—Bluntschli, §§ 539-551—Heffter, §§ 131-132—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 510-524—Klüber, §§ 255-256—G. F. Martens, II. § 280—Ullmann, § 183—Bonfils, Nos. 1156-1175—Despagnet, Nos. 567-578—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2939-2988, 3019-3028—Nys, III. pp. 309-351—Rivier, II. pp. 299-306—Calvo, IV. §§ 2166-2198—Fiore, III. Nos. 1454-1481, and Code, Nos. 1535-1563—Martens, II. §§ 117-119—Longuet, §§ 115-133—Mérignhac, pp. 241-262—Pillet, pp. 237-259—Zorn, pp. 213-243—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 45-50—Holland, War, Nos. 102-106—Bordwell, pp. 312-330—Meurer, II. §§ 45-55—Spaight, pp. 320-380—Land Warfare, §§ 340-405—Waxel, L'armée d'invasion el la population (1874)—Litta, L'occupazione militare (1874)—Löning, Die Verwaltung des General-Gouvernements im Elsass (1874), and in R.I. IV. (1872), p. 622, V. (1873), p. 69—Bernier, De l'occupation militaire en temps de guerre (1884)—Corsi, L'occupazione militare in tempo di guerra e le relazione internazionale che ne derivano (2nd edit. 1886)—Bray, De l'occupation militaire en temps de guerre, etc. (1891)—Magoon, Law of Civil Government under Military Occupation (2nd edit. 1900)—Lorriot, De la nature de l'occupation de guerre (1903)—Deherpe, Essai sur le developpement de l'occupation en droit international (1903)—Sichel, Die kriegerische Besetzung feindlichen Staatsgebietes (1905)—Nowacki, Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege (1906), pp. 78-90—Rolin-Jaequemyns in R.I. II. (1870), p. 666, and III. (1871), p. 311.

Occupation as an Aim of Warfare.

Occupation as a Goal of Warfare.

§ 166. If a belligerent succeeds in occupying a part or even the whole of the enemy territory, he has realised a very important aim of warfare. He can now not only make use of the resources of the enemy country for military purposes, but can also keep it for the time being as a pledge of his military success, and thereby impress upon the enemy the necessity of submitting to terms of peace. And in regard to occupation, International Law respecting warfare has progressed more than in any other department. In former times enemy territory that was occupied by a belligerent was in every point considered his State property, with which and with the inhabitants therein he could do what he liked. He could devastate the country with fire and sword, appropriate all public and private property[Pg 205] therein, kill the inhabitants, or take them away into captivity, or make them take an oath of allegiance. He could, even before the war was decided and his occupation was definitive, dispose of the territory by ceding it to a third State, and an instance of this happened during the Northern War (1700-1718), when in 1715 Denmark sold the occupied Swedish territories of Bremen and Verden to Hanover. That an occupant could force the inhabitants of the occupied territory to serve in his own army and to fight against their legitimate sovereign, was indubitable. Thus, during the Seven Years' War, Frederick II. of Prussia repeatedly made forcible levies of thousands of recruits in Saxony, which he had occupied. But during the second half of the eighteenth century things gradually began to undergo a change. That the distinction between mere temporary military occupation of territory, on the one hand, and, on the other, real acquisition of territory through conquest and subjugation, became more and more apparent, is shown by the fact that Vattel (III. § 197) drew attention to it. However, it was not till long after the Napoleonic wars in the nineteenth century that the consequences of this distinction were carried to their full extent by the theory and practice of International Law. So late as 1808, after the Russian troops had militarily occupied Finland, which was at that time a part of Sweden, Alexander I. of Russia made the inhabitants take an oath of allegiance,[324] although it was only by article 4 of the Peace Treaty of Frederikshamm[325] of September 17, 1809, that Sweden ceded Finland to Russia. The first writer who drew all the consequences of the distinction between mere military occupation and real acquisition of territory was Heffter in his treatise Das Europaeische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart (§ 131), which made its appearance in 1844.[Pg 206] And it is certain that it took the whole of the nineteenth century to develop such rules regarding occupation as are now universally recognised and in many respects enacted by articles 42-56 of the Hague Regulations.

§ 166. If a warring party manages to occupy part or all of the enemy's territory, they achieve a significant objective of warfare. They can now utilize the resources of the enemy country for military needs, and keep it temporarily as leverage for their military success, thereby convincing the enemy of the need to accept peace terms. In terms of occupation, International Law related to warfare has advanced more than in any other area. In the past, any enemy territory occupied by a belligerent was seen entirely as their own State property, allowing them to do whatever they wanted with it and its inhabitants. They could ravage the land with violence, seize all public and private property, kill the inhabitants, enslave them, or force them to pledge allegiance. They could even, before the war was concluded and their control was confirmed, transfer the territory to a third State, as happened during the Northern War (1700-1718), when Denmark sold the occupied Swedish territories of Bremen and Verden to Hanover in 1715. It was undeniable that an occupier could compel the inhabitants of the occupied territory to serve in their army and fight against their legitimate government. For example, during the Seven Years' War, Frederick II of Prussia forcibly recruited thousands of soldiers from occupied Saxony. However, in the second half of the eighteenth century, changes began to emerge. The distinction between temporary military occupation and permanent acquisition of territory through conquest became increasingly evident, as highlighted by Vattel (III. § 197). Yet, it was not until long after the Napoleonic wars in the nineteenth century that the implications of this distinction were fully realized in the theory and practice of International Law. Even as late as 1808, after Russian troops had occupied Finland, which at the time was part of Sweden, Alexander I of Russia made the inhabitants swear allegiance, although it was only through Article 4 of the Peace Treaty of Frederikshamm on September 17, 1809, that Sweden officially ceded Finland to Russia. The first author to fully explore the implications of the difference between military occupation and actual acquisition of territory was Heffter in his treatise Das Europaeische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart (§ 131), published in 1844. It is clear that it took the entire nineteenth century to establish the rules regarding occupation that are now universally accepted and largely codified in Articles 42-56 of the Hague Regulations.[Pg 206]

[324] See Martens, N.R. I. p. 9.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Martens, N.R. I. p. 9.

[325] See Martens, N.R. I. p. 19.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Martens, N.R. I. p. 19.

In so far as these rules touch upon the special treatment of persons and property of the inhabitants of, and public property situated within, occupied territory, they have already been taken into consideration above in §§ 107-154. What concerns us here are the rights and duties of the occupying belligerent in relation to his political administration of the territory and to his political authority over its inhabitants.[326] The principle underlying these modern rules is that, although the occupant does in no wise acquire sovereignty over such territory through the mere fact of having occupied it, he actually exercises for the time being a military authority over it. As he thereby prevents the legitimate Sovereign from exercising his authority and claims obedience for himself from the inhabitants, he has to administer the country not only in the interest of his own military advantage, but also, so far as possible at any rate, for the public benefit of the inhabitants. Thus the present International Law not only gives certain rights to an occupant, but also imposes certain duties upon him.

As far as these rules address the special treatment of the people and property of the residents of, and public property located in, occupied territory, they have already been considered earlier in §§ 107-154. What we need to focus on here are the rights and responsibilities of the occupying force concerning their political management of the territory and their political authority over its residents.[326] The main idea behind these modern rules is that, although the occupier does not gain sovereignty over the territory just by occupying it, they do exercise military authority over it for the time being. Since they prevent the legitimate Sovereign from exercising authority and demand obedience from the residents, they must administer the country not only for their own military advantage but also, as much as possible, for the public good of the residents. Therefore, current International Law not only grants certain rights to an occupier but also imposes specific duties on them.

[326] The Hague Regulations (Section III. articles 42-56), and all the French writers, but also many others, treat under the heading "occupation" not only of the rights and duties of an occupant concerning the political administration of the country and the political authority over the inhabitants, but also of other matters, such as appropriation of public and private property, requisitions and contributions, and destruction of public and private property, violence against private enemy subjects and enemy officials. These matters have, however, nothing to do with occupation, but are better discussed in connection with the means of land warfare; see above, §§ 107-154.

[326] The Hague Regulations (Section III. articles 42-56), along with various French legal scholars and many others, address "occupation" not only in terms of the rights and responsibilities of an occupying force regarding the political management of a country and authority over its people, but also in relation to other issues such as seizing public and private property, requisitions and contributions, and the destruction of public and private properties, as well as violence against enemy civilians and officials. However, these issues are not directly related to occupation and are better discussed in the context of land warfare; see above, §§ 107-154.

Occupation, when effected.

Occupation, when enforced.

§ 167. Since an occupant, although his power is merely military, has certain rights and duties, the first question to deal with is, when and under what circumstances a territory must be considered occupied.

§ 167. Since an occupant, even with just military authority, has specific rights and responsibilities, the first question to address is when and under what circumstances a territory should be regarded as occupied.

Now it is certain that mere invasion is not occupation.[Pg 207] Invasion is the marching or riding of troops—or the flying of a military air vessel—into enemy country. Occupation is invasion plus taking possession of enemy country for the purpose of holding it, at any rate temporarily. The difference between mere invasion and occupation becomes apparent by the fact that an occupant sets up some kind of administration, whereas the mere invader does not. A small belligerent force can raid enemy territory without establishing any administration, but quickly rush on to some place in the interior for the purpose of reconnoitring, of destroying a bridge or depôt of munitions and provisions, and the like, and quickly withdraw after having realised its purpose.[327] Although it may correctly be asserted that, so long and in so far as such raiding force is in possession of a locality and sets up a temporary administration therein, it occupies this locality, yet it certainly does not occupy the whole territory, and even the occupation of such locality ceases the moment the force withdraws.

Now it’s clear that just invading doesn’t mean you’re occupying a place.[Pg 207] Invasion is when troops march or ride—or when a military aircraft flies—into enemy territory. Occupation is invasion plus taking control of enemy territory to hold it, at least for a while. The difference between just invading and actually occupying becomes clear when you realize that an occupant establishes some kind of administration, while a mere invader does not. A small fighting force can raid enemy land without setting up any administration, but will quickly move deeper into the territory to scout, destroy a bridge, or blow up a supply depot, and then quickly leave once its goal is achieved.[327] While it’s true that if such a raiding force controls a location and sets up a temporary administration, it occupies that location, it definitely doesn’t occupy the entire territory, and the occupation of that location ends the moment the force pulls out.

[327] See Land Warfare, § 343.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Land Warfare, § 343.

However this may be, as a rule occupation will be coincident with invasion. The troops march into a district, and the moment they get into a village or town—unless they are actually fighting their way—they take possession of the Municipal Offices, the Post Office, the Police Stations, and the like, and assert their authority there. From the military point of view such villages and towns are now "occupied." Article 42 of the Hague Regulations enacts that territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army, and that such occupation applies only to the territory where that authority is established and in a position to assert itself. This definition of occupation is not at all precise, but it is as precise as a legal definition of such kind of[Pg 208] fact as occupation can be. If, as some publicists[328] maintain, only such territory were actually occupied, in which every part is held by a sufficient number of soldiers to enforce immediately and on the very spot the authority of an occupant, an effective occupation of a large territory would be impossible, since then not only in every town, village, and railway station, but also in every isolated habitation and hut the presence of a sufficient number of soldiers would be necessary. Reasonably no other conditions ought to be laid down as necessary to constitute effective occupation in war than those under which in time of peace a Sovereign is able to assert his authority over a territory. What these conditions are is a question of fact which is to be answered according to the merits of the special case. When the legitimate Sovereign is prevented from exercising his powers and the occupant, being able to assert his authority, actually establishes an administration over a territory, it matters not with what means and in what ways his authority is exercised. For instance, when in the centre of a territory a large force is established from which flying columns are constantly sent round the territory, such territory is indeed effectively occupied, provided there are no enemy forces present, and, further, provided these columns can really keep the territory concerned under control.[329] Again, when an army is marching on through enemy territory, taking possession of the lines of communication and the open towns, surrounding the fortresses with besieging forces, and disarming the[Pg 209] inhabitants in open places of habitation, the whole territory left behind the army is effectively occupied, provided some kind of administration is established, and further provided that, as soon as it becomes necessary to assert the authority of the occupant, a sufficient force can within reasonable time be sent to the locality affected. The conditions vary with those of the country concerned. When a vast country is thinly populated, a smaller force is necessary to occupy it, and a smaller number of centres need be garrisoned than in the case of a thickly populated country. Thus, the occupation of the former Orange Free State and the former South African Republic became effective in 1901 some time after their annexation by Great Britain and the degeneration of ordinary war into guerilla war, although only about 250,000 British soldiers had to keep up the occupation of a territory of about 500,000 square miles. The fact that all the towns and all the lines of communication were in the hands and under the administration of the British army, that the inhabitants of smaller places were taken away into concentration camps, that the enemy forces were either in captivity or dispersed into comparatively small guerilla bands, and finally, that wherever such bands tried to make an attack, a sufficient British force could within reasonable time make its appearance, was quite sufficient to assert British authority[330] over[Pg 210] that vast territory, although it was more than a year before peace was finally established.

However this may be, as a rule, occupation coincides with invasion. The troops march into a region, and the moment they enter a village or town—unless they are actually fighting their way through—they take control of the Municipal Offices, the Post Office, the Police Stations, and similar places, asserting their authority there. From a military perspective, these villages and towns are now "occupied." Article 42 of the Hague Regulations states that territory is considered occupied when it is actually under the authority of the hostile army, and that such occupation only applies to the territory where that authority is established and capable of asserting itself. This definition of occupation isn’t very precise, but it’s as precise as a legal definition can be for something like occupation. If, as some scholars argue, only territory where every part is held by enough soldiers to immediately enforce the authority of an occupant is actually considered occupied, then effective occupation of a large territory would be impossible. In that case, there would need to be enough soldiers not just in every town, village, and railway station, but also in every individual home and hut. Logically, no other conditions should be required to establish effective occupation in war than those required for a Sovereign to assert authority over a territory in peacetime. What these conditions are depends on the specifics of each case. When the legitimate Sovereign is unable to exercise power and the occupant, capable of asserting authority, effectively establishes administration over the territory, it doesn't matter how their authority is exercised or by what means. For example, if a large force is based in the center of the territory and sends out mobile units across the area, the territory is effectively occupied, provided there are no enemy forces present and these units can indeed keep control over the area in question. Again, when an army moves through enemy territory, taking control of communication lines and open towns, surrounding fortresses with siege forces, and disarming the inhabitants in open areas, the entire territory left behind the army is effectively occupied, as long as some form of administration is established and provided a sufficient force can be sent to the affected area in a reasonable time when necessary to assert the authority of the occupant. The conditions change depending on the specific country. In a vast, sparsely populated country, a smaller force is needed to occupy it, and fewer centers need to be garrisoned compared to a densely populated country. For example, the occupation of the former Orange Free State and the former South African Republic became effective in 1901 some time after they were annexed by Great Britain and the conventional war turned into guerrilla warfare, although only about 250,000 British soldiers were maintaining the occupation of around 500,000 square miles. The fact that all the towns and communication lines were under British army control, that inhabitants of smaller areas were relocated to concentration camps, that enemy forces were either captured or split into smaller guerrilla units, and finally, that whenever such units attempted an attack, a sufficient British force could respond in a reasonable time, was enough to assert British authority over that vast territory, even though it took over a year to finally establish peace.

[328] See, for instance, Hall, § 161. This was also the standpoint of the delegates of the smaller States at the Brussels Conference of 1874 when the Declaration of Brussels was drafted.

[328] For example, see Hall, § 161. This was also the perspective of the delegates from the smaller states at the Brussels Conference of 1874 when the Declaration of Brussels was created.

[329] This is not identical with so-called constructive occupation, but is really effective occupation. An occupation is constructive only if an invader declares districts as occupied over which he actually does not exercise control—for instance, when he actually occupies only the capital of a large province, and proclaims that he has thereby occupied the whole of the province, although he does not take any steps to exercise control over it.

[329] This is not the same as so-called constructive occupation; rather, it is effective occupation. An occupation is only constructive if an invader claims areas as occupied despite not actually controlling them—for instance, when they only occupy the capital of a large province and proclaim that they have thus occupied the entire province, even though they do nothing to exert control over it.

[330] The annexation of the Orange Free State dates from May 24, 1900, and that of the South African Republic from September 1, 1900. It may well be doubted whether at these dates the occupation of the territories concerned was already so complete as to be called effective. The British Government ought not, therefore, to have proclaimed the annexation at such early dates. But there ought to be no doubt that the occupation became effective some time afterwards, in 1901. See, however, Sir Thomas Barclay in The Law Quarterly Review, XXI. (1905), p. 307, who asserts the contrary; see also, below, § 264, p. 326, note 2, and § 265, p. 327, note 1. The Times' History of the War in South Africa (vol. V. p. 251) estimates the number of Boer fighters in May 1901 to be about 13,000. These armed men were dispersed into a very large number of guerilla bands, and they were in a great many cases men who seemingly had submitted to the British authorities, but afterwards had taken up arms.

[330] The annexation of the Orange Free State started on May 24, 1900, and that of the South African Republic began on September 1, 1900. It’s questionable whether the occupation of these territories was truly complete enough at that time to be considered effective. The British Government should not have declared the annexation so early. However, it is clear that the occupation became effective sometime later, in 1901. See, however, Sir Thomas Barclay in The Law Quarterly Review, XXI. (1905), p. 307, who argues the opposite; see also, below, § 264, p. 326, note 2, and § 265, p. 327, note 1. The Times' History of the War in South Africa (vol. V. p. 251) estimates the number of Boer fighters in May 1901 to be around 13,000. These armed men were spread across numerous guerrilla groups, and many of them appeared to have submitted to British authority but later took up arms.

It must be emphasised that the rules regarding effective occupation must be formulated on the basis of actual practice quite as much as rules regarding other matters of International Law. Those rules are not authoritative which are laid down by theorists, but only those which are abstracted from the actual practice of warfare and are unopposed by the Powers.[331]

It’s important to stress that the rules about effective occupation should be based on real practices just like the rules for other aspects of International Law. The rules set by theorists aren’t authoritative; only those that come from actual wartime practices and aren’t challenged by the Powers are valid.[331]

[331] The question is so much controverted that it is impossible to enumerate the different opinions. Readers who want to study the question must be referred to the literature quoted above at the commencement of § 166.

[331] The question is so debated that it's impossible to list all the different opinions. Readers who want to explore the topic should refer to the literature mentioned earlier at the beginning of § 166.

Occupation, when ended.

Occupation ended.

§ 168. Occupation comes to an end when an occupant withdraws from a territory or is driven out of it. Thus, occupation remains only over a limited area of a territory if the forces in occupation are drawn into a fortress on that territory and are there besieged by the re-advancing enemy, or if the occupant concentrates his forces in a certain place of the territory, withdrawing before the re-advancing enemy. But occupation does not cease because the occupant, after having disarmed the inhabitants and having made arrangements for the administration of the country, is marching on to overtake the retreating enemy, leaving only comparatively few soldiers behind.

§ 168. Occupation ends when an occupant leaves a territory or is forced out. So, occupation only covers a limited area if the occupying forces have retreated to a fortress in that territory and are besieged by the returning enemy, or if the occupant has concentrated their forces in one place and is withdrawing from the advancing enemy. However, occupation does not stop just because the occupant has disarmed the local population and made plans for governing the country while pursuing the retreating enemy, leaving behind a relatively small number of soldiers.

Rights and Duties in General of the Occupant.

Rights and Duties in General of the Occupant.

§ 169. As the occupant actually exercises authority, and as the legitimate Government is prevented from exercising its authority, the occupant acquires a temporary right of administration over the respective territory and its inhabitants. And all steps he takes in the exercise of this right must be recognised by the legitimate Government after occupation has ceased. This administration is in no wise to be compared with ordinary administration, for it is distinctly and precisely military administration. In carrying it out the occupant is, on the one hand, totally independent of the[Pg 211] Constitution and the laws of the respective territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and since the maintenance and safety of his forces and the purpose of war stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all circumstances and conditions. But, although as regards the safety of his army and the purpose of war the occupant is vested with an almost absolute power, he is not the Sovereign of the territory, and therefore has no right to make changes in the laws or in the administration except those which are temporarily necessitated by his interest in the maintenance and safety of his army and the realisation of the purpose of war. On the contrary, he has the duty of administrating the country according to the existing laws and the existing rules of administration; he must insure public order and safety, must respect family honour and rights, individual lives, private property, religious convictions and liberty. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations enacts the following rule which is of fundamental importance: "The authority of the legitimate Power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to re-establish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."

§ 169. Since the occupant is actually exercising authority, and the legitimate Government is unable to do so, the occupant gains a temporary right to manage the respective territory and its people. All actions taken under this right must be acknowledged by the legitimate Government once the occupation ends. This administration is not to be confused with regular administration; it is clearly and specifically military administration. In executing this, the occupant is, on one hand, completely independent of the[Pg 211] Constitution and the laws of the territory in question, since occupation is a goal of warfare, and the safety and maintenance of his forces, as well as the purpose of war, are his primary concerns and must be prioritized under all circumstances. However, while the occupant has nearly absolute power regarding the safety of his army and the purpose of war, he is not the Sovereign of the territory and therefore cannot alter the laws or administration except for those changes that are temporarily required to maintain the safety of his army and achieve the goals of war. Instead, he has the responsibility to administer the country according to existing laws and rules; he must ensure public order and safety, respect family honor and rights, individual lives, private property, and religious beliefs and freedoms. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations states a fundamental rule: "The authority of the legitimate Power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to re-establish and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."

Rights of the Occupant regarding the Inhabitants.

Rights of the Occupant regarding the Inhabitants.

§ 170. An occupant having authority over the territory, the inhabitants are under his sway and have to render obedience to his commands. However, the power of the occupant over the inhabitants is not unrestricted, for articles 23, 44, and 45 of the Hague Regulations expressly enact, that he is prohibited from compelling the inhabitants to take part in military operations against the legitimate Government, to give information concerning the army of the other belligerent or concerning the latter's means of defence, or[Pg 212] to take an oath of allegiance. On the other hand, he may compel them to take an oath—sometimes called an "oath of neutrality"—to abstain from taking up a hostile attitude against the occupant and willingly to submit to his legitimate commands; and he may punish them severely for breaking this oath. He may make requisitions and demand contributions[332] from them, may compel them to render services as drivers, farriers, and the like.[333] He may compel them to render services for the repair or the erection of such roads, buildings, or other works as are necessary for military operations.[334] He may also collect the ordinary taxes, dues, and tolls imposed for the benefit of the State by the legitimate Government. But in such case he is, according to article 48 of the Hague Regulations, obliged to make the collection, as far as possible, in accordance with the rules in existence and the assessment in force, and he is, on the other hand, bound to defray the expenses of the administration of the occupied territory on the same scale as that by which the legitimate Government was bound.

§ 170. An occupant in charge of the territory has authority over the inhabitants, who must obey his commands. However, the occupant's power over the people is not unlimited. Articles 23, 44, and 45 of the Hague Regulations clearly state that he cannot force the inhabitants to participate in military operations against the legitimate Government, to provide information about the other side's army or defense, or to take an oath of loyalty. On the flip side, he can require them to take an oath—sometimes referred to as an "oath of neutrality"—to refrain from opposing him and to comply willingly with his legitimate commands. He can also punish them harshly for violating this oath. He can request supplies and demand contributions[332] from the population, and he can enforce service as drivers, farriers, and similar roles.[333] He can require them to help with the repair or construction of roads, buildings, or other works essential for military operations.[334] He can also collect regular taxes, fees, and tolls imposed for the benefit of the State by the legitimate Government. However, according to article 48 of the Hague Regulations, he must collect these, as much as possible, according to existing rules and assessments, and he is also required to cover the administration costs of the occupied territory at the same level that the legitimate Government would have.

[332] See above, §§ 147 and 148.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

[333] Formerly he could likewise compel them to render services as guides, but this is now prohibited by the wording which article 44 received from the Second Peace Conference. It should, however, be mentioned that Germany, Austria-Hungary, Japan, Montenegro, and Russia have signed Convention IV. with a reservation against article 44, and that in a war with these Powers the old rule is valid that inhabitants may be compelled to serve as guides.

[333] In the past, he could also force them to work as guides, but that's now against the rules set out in article 44 from the Second Peace Conference. However, it's important to note that Germany, Austria-Hungary, Japan, Montenegro, and Russia have signed Convention IV. with a reservation regarding article 44, and in a conflict involving these countries, the old rule still applies that locals can be compelled to work as guides.

[334] See article 52 of the Hague regulations, and Land Warfare, §§ 388-392.

[334] See article 52 of the Hague regulations, and Land Warfare, §§ 388-392.

Whoever does not comply with his commands, or commits a prohibited act, may be punished by him; but article 50 of the Hague Regulations expressly enacts the rule that no general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, may be inflicted on the population on account of the acts of individuals for which it cannot be regarded as collectively responsible. It must, however, be specially observed that this rule does not at all prevent[335] reprisals[Pg 213] on the part of belligerents occupying enemy territory. In case acts of illegitimate warfare are committed by enemy individuals not belonging to the armed forces, reprisals may be resorted to, although practically innocent individuals are thereby punished for illegal acts for which they are neither legally nor morally responsible—for instance, when a village is burned by way of reprisal for a treacherous attack committed there on enemy soldiers by some unknown individuals.[336] Nor does this new rule prevent an occupant from taking hostages[337] in the interest of the safety of the line of communication threatened by guerillas not belonging to the armed forces, or for other purposes,[338] although the hostage must suffer for acts or omissions of others for which he is neither legally nor morally responsible.

Whoever doesn’t follow his orders, or does something forbidden, can be punished by him; but article 50 of the Hague Regulations clearly states that no general punishment, monetary or otherwise, can be imposed on the population for actions of individuals that they cannot be seen as collectively responsible for. It should be especially noted that this rule does not prevent[335] reprisals[Pg 213] by belligerents occupying enemy territory. If acts of unlawful warfare are carried out by enemy individuals who are not part of the armed forces, reprisals may be taken, even though completely innocent individuals are punished for illegal acts they are neither legally nor morally responsible for—for example, when a village is burned in retaliation for a surprise attack on enemy soldiers committed there by some unknown individuals.[336] This new rule also doesn’t stop an occupying force from taking hostages[337] to protect the safety of communication lines threatened by guerrillas who are not part of the armed forces, or for other reasons,[338] even though the hostage suffers because of actions or omissions of others for which he is neither legally nor morally responsible.

[335] See Holland, War, No. 110, and Land Warfare, §§ 385-386. See also Zorn, pp. 239-243, where an important interpretation of article 50 is discussed.

[335] See Holland, War, No. 110, and Land Warfare, §§ 385-386. Also check out Zorn, pp. 239-243, which discusses an important interpretation of article 50.

[336] See below, § 248.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Refer below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[337] But this is a moot point; see below, § 259.

[337] But this is a pointless issue; see below, § 259.

[338] Belligerents sometimes take hostages for the purpose of securing compliance with demands for contributions, requisitions, and the like. As long as such hostages obtain the same treatment as prisoners of war, the practice does not seem to be illegal, although the Hague Regulations do not mention and many publicists condemn it; see above, § 116, p. 153, note 1, and below, § 259, p. 319, note 2.

[338] Combatants sometimes take hostages to ensure compliance with demands for resources, requisitions, and similar matters. As long as these hostages receive the same treatment as prisoners of war, the practice doesn't appear to be illegal, even though the Hague Regulations don't address it and many legal experts criticize it; see above, § 116, p. 153, note 1, and below, § 259, p. 319, note 2.

It must be particularly noted that in the treatment of the inhabitants of enemy territory the occupant need not make any difference between such as are subjects of the enemy and such as are subjects of neutral States.[339]

It’s important to point out that when dealing with the people in enemy territory, the occupying force doesn’t have to distinguish between those who are subjects of the enemy and those who are from neutral states.[339]

[339] See above,§ 88, and Frankenbach, Die Rechtsstellung von neutralen Staatsangehörigen in kriegführenden Staaten (1910), pp. 46-50.

[339] See above,§ 88, and Frankenbach, The Legal Status of Neutral Citizens in Warring States (1910), pp. 46-50.

And it must be further observed that, according to British and American views—see above, § 100a—article 23 (h) of the Hague Regulations prohibits an occupant of enemy territory from declaring extinguished, suspended, or unenforceable in a Court of Law the rights and the rights of action of the inhabitants.

And it should also be noted that, according to British and American perspectives—see above, § 100a—article 23 (h) of the Hague Regulations prohibits an occupant of enemy territory from declaring the rights and legal actions of the inhabitants to be extinguished, suspended, or unenforceable in a court of law.

Position of Government Officials and Municipal Functionaries during Occupation.

Position of Government Officials and Municipal Functionaries during Occupation.

§ 171. As through occupation authority over the territory actually passes into the hands of the occupant,[Pg 214] he may for the time of his occupation depose all Government officials and municipal functionaries that have not withdrawn with the retreating enemy. On the other hand, he must not compel them by force to carry on their functions during occupation, if they refuse to do so, except where a military necessity for the carrying on of a certain function arises. If they are willing to serve under him, he may make them take an oath of obedience, but not of allegiance, and he may not compel them to carry on their functions in his name, but he may prevent them from doing so in the name of the legitimate Government.[340] Since, according to article 43 of the Hague Regulations, he has to secure public order and safety, he must temporarily appoint other functionaries in case those of the legitimate Government refuse to serve under him, or in case he deposes them for the time of the occupation.

§ 171. Since the occupying authority effectively takes control of the territory,[Pg 214] they can remove all government officials and local authorities who haven’t left with the retreating enemy during their occupation. However, they cannot force these officials to continue their duties if they refuse, unless there is a military necessity for those duties to be fulfilled. If the officials agree to serve, the occupier can require them to take an oath of obedience, but not an oath of allegiance, and cannot force them to act in their name. However, they can stop them from acting in the name of the legitimate government.[340] According to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, since the occupier is responsible for maintaining public order and safety, they must temporarily appoint new officials if the legitimate government officials refuse to serve or if they are removed for the duration of the occupation.

[340] Many publicists assert that in case an occupant leaves officials of the legitimate Government in office, he "must" pay them their ordinary salaries. But I cannot see that there is a customary or conventional rule in existence concerning this point. But it is in an occupant's own interest to pay such salaries. and he will as a rule do this. Only in the case of article 48 of the Hague Regulations is he compelled to do it.

[340] Many publicists claim that if an occupant keeps the officials of the legitimate government in their positions, they "must" pay them their regular salaries. However, I don't see any standard or traditional rule regarding this matter. Still, it’s usually in the occupant's best interest to pay those salaries, and typically, they will do so. The only situation where they are required to do this is under Article 48 of the Hague Regulations.

Position of Courts of Justice during Occupation.

Position of Courts of Justice during Occupation.

§ 172. The particular position which Courts of Justice have nowadays in civilised countries, makes it necessary to discuss their position during occupation.[341] There is no doubt that an occupant may suspend the judges as well as other officials. However, if he does suspend them, he must temporarily appoint others in their place. If they are willing to serve under him, he must respect their independence according to the laws of the country. Where it is necessary, he may set up military Courts instead of the ordinary Courts. In case and in so far as he admits the administration of justice by the ordinary Courts, he may nevertheless, so far as it is necessary for military purposes or for the maintenance of public order and safety, temporarily[Pg 215] alter the laws, especially the Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is administered, as well as the laws regarding procedure. He has, however, no right to constrain the Courts to pronounce their verdicts in his name, although he need not allow them to pronounce verdicts in the name of the legitimate Government. A case that happened during the Franco-German War may serve as an illustration. In September 1870, after the fall of the Emperor Napoleon and the proclamation of the French Republic, the Court of Appeal at Nancy pronounced its verdicts under the formula "In the name of the French Government and People." Since Germany had not yet recognised the French Republic, the Germans ordered the Court to use the formula "In the name of the High German Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," but gave the Court to understand that, if the Court objected to this formula, they were disposed to admit another, and were even ready to admit the formula "In the name of the Emperor of the French," as the Emperor had not abdicated. The Court, however, refused to pronounce its verdict otherwise than "In the name of the French Government and People," and, consequently, suspended its sittings. There can be no doubt that the Germans had no right to order the formula, "In the name of the High German Powers, &c.," to be used, but they were certainly not obliged to admit the formula preferred by the Court; and the fact that they were disposed to admit another formula than that at first ordered ought to have made the Court accept a compromise. Bluntschli (§ 547) correctly maintains that the most natural solution of the difficulty would have been to use the neutral formula "In the name of the Law."

§ 172. The role that Courts of Justice have today in civilized countries makes it necessary to discuss their status during occupation.[341] There’s no doubt that an occupier can suspend judges and other officials. However, if they do suspend them, they must temporarily appoint others to take their place. If those appointed are willing to serve, the occupier must respect their independence according to the country’s laws. When needed, military Courts can be set up instead of the regular Courts. If the occupier allows the regular Courts to administer justice, they can still temporarily change the laws, especially Criminal Law, that are used for justice as well as the rules regarding procedures, as long as it’s necessary for military needs or to maintain public order and safety. However, they don’t have the right to force the Courts to deliver verdicts in their name, although they aren’t required to allow the Courts to issue verdicts in the name of the legitimate Government. A case during the Franco-German War illustrates this point. In September 1870, after Emperor Napoleon fell and the French Republic was proclaimed, the Court of Appeal in Nancy issued its verdicts stating, "In the name of the French Government and People." Since Germany hadn’t recognized the French Republic yet, they ordered the Court to use the formula "In the name of the High German Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," but indicated that if the Court opposed this, they would consider an alternative, even suggesting "In the name of the Emperor of the French," since the Emperor had not abdicated. However, the Court refused to issue its verdicts any way other than "In the name of the French Government and People," and as a result, suspended its hearings. There’s no question that the Germans had no right to mandate the formula "In the name of the High German Powers, etc.," but they were certainly not obligated to accept the formula the Court preferred; the fact that they were willing to consider another option should have encouraged the Court to accept a compromise. Bluntschli (§ 547) correctly argues that the easiest solution to the issue would have been to use the neutral phrase: "In the name of the Law."

[341] See Petit, L'Administration de la justice en territoire occupé (1900).

[341] See Petit, The Administration of Justice in Occupied Territory (1900).

CHAPTER 4 Naval warfare

I ON NAVAL WARFARE OVERVIEW

Hall, § 147—Lawrence, §§ 193-194—Westlake, II. pp. 120-132—Maine, pp. 117-122—Manning, pp. 183-184—Phillimore, III. § 347—Twiss, II. § 73—Halleck, II. pp. 80-82—Taylor, § 547—Wharton, III. §§ 342-345—Wheaton, § 355—Bluntschli, §§ 665-667—Heffter, § 139—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 547-548, 571-581—Ullmann, §§ 187-188—Bonfils, Nos. 1268, 1294-1338—Despagnet, Nos. 647-649—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3066-3090, 3107-3108—Nys, III. pp. 433-466—Rivier, II. pp. 329-335—Calvo, IV. §§ 2123, 2379-2410—Fiore, III. Nos. 1399-1413—Pillet, pp. 118-120—Perels, § 36—Testa, pp. 147-157—Boeck, Nos. 3-153—Lawrence, Essays, pp. 278-306—Westlake, Chapters, pp. 245-253—Ortolan, I. pp. 35-50—Hautefeuille, I. pp. 161-167—Gessner, Westlake, Lorimer, Rolin-Jaequemyns, Laveleye, Albéric Rolin, and Pierantoni in R.I. VII. (1875), pp. 256-272 and 558-656—Twiss, in R.I. XVI. (1884), pp. 113-137—See also the authors quoted below, § 178, p. 223, note 1.

Hall, § 147—Lawrence, §§ 193-194—Westlake, II. pp. 120-132—Maine, pp. 117-122—Manning, pp. 183-184—Phillimore, III. § 347—Twiss, II. § 73—Halleck, II. pp. 80-82—Taylor, § 547—Wharton, III. §§ 342-345—Wheaton, § 355—Bluntschli, §§ 665-667—Heffter, § 139—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 547-548, 571-581—Ullmann, §§ 187-188—Bonfils, Nos. 1268, 1294-1338—Despagnet, Nos. 647-649—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3066-3090, 3107-3108—Nys, III. pp. 433-466—Rivier, II. pp. 329-335—Calvo, IV. §§ 2123, 2379-2410—Fiore, III. Nos. 1399-1413—Pillet, pp. 118-120—Perels, § 36—Testa, pp. 147-157—Boeck, Nos. 3-153—Lawrence, Essays, pp. 278-306—Westlake, Chapters, pp. 245-253—Ortolan, I. pp. 35-50—Hautefeuille, I. pp. 161-167—Gessner, Westlake, Lorimer, Rolin-Jaequemyns, Laveleye, Albéric Rolin, and Pierantoni in R.I. VII. (1875), pp. 256-272 and 558-656—Twiss, in R.I. XVI. (1884), pp. 113-137—See also the authors quoted below, § 178, p. 223, note 1.

Aims and Means of Sea Warfare.

Aims and Means of Sea Warfare.

§ 173. The purpose of war is the same in the case of warfare on land or on sea—namely, the overpowering of the enemy. But sea warfare serves this purpose by attempting the accomplishment of aims different from those of land warfare. Whereas the aims of land warfare are defeat of the enemy army and occupation of the enemy territory, the aims[342] of sea warfare are: defeat of the enemy navy; annihilation of the enemy merchant fleet; destruction of enemy coast fortifications, and of maritime as well as military establishments on the enemy coast; cutting off intercourse with the enemy coast; prevention of carriage of contraband and of[Pg 217] rendering unneutral service to the enemy; all kinds of support to military operations on land, such as protection of a landing of troops on the enemy coast; and lastly, defence of the home coast and protection to the home merchant fleet.[343] The means by which belligerents in sea warfare endeavour to realise these aims are: attack on and seizure of enemy vessels, violence against enemy individuals, appropriation and destruction of enemy vessels and goods carried by them, requisitions and contributions, bombardment of the enemy coast, cutting of submarine cables, blockade, espionage, treason, ruses, capture of neutral vessels carrying contraband or rendering unneutral service.

§ 173. The purpose of war is the same whether it's on land or at sea—it's all about defeating the enemy. However, naval warfare aims to achieve different objectives compared to land warfare. While the goals of land warfare include defeating the enemy's army and taking control of their territory, the objectives[342] of naval warfare are: defeating the enemy's navy; destroying the enemy's merchant fleet; targeting enemy coastal fortifications and military bases; cutting off communication with the enemy coastline; stopping the transport of illegal goods and providing assistance to the enemy; supporting ground military operations, like protecting troop landings on enemy shores; and finally, defending the home coast and safeguarding the home merchant fleet.[343] The methods that warring parties use to achieve these goals in naval warfare include: attacking and capturing enemy ships, committing acts of violence against enemy personnel, seizing and destroying enemy vessels and their cargo, conducting requisitions and contributions, bombarding the enemy coastline, cutting submarine cables, implementing blockades, engaging in espionage, committing acts of treason, using tricks, and capturing neutral ships that are transporting illegal goods or providing assistance to the enemy.

[342] Aims of sea warfare must not be confounded with ends of war; see above, § 66.

[342] The goals of naval combat shouldn't be mixed up with the overall objectives of war; see above, § 66.

[343] Article 1 of the U.S. Naval War Code enumerates the following as aims of sea warfare:—The capture or destruction of the military and naval forces of the enemy, of his fortifications, arsenals, dry docks, and dockyards, of his various military and naval establishments, and of his maritime commerce; to prevent his procuring war material from neutral sources; to aid and assist military operations on land; to protect and defend the national territory, property, and sea-borne commerce.

[343] Article 1 of the U.S. Naval War Code outlines the goals of maritime warfare:—The capture or destruction of the enemy's military and naval forces, fortifications, arsenals, dry docks, and shipyards, as well as various military and naval facilities, and maritime trade; to stop them from acquiring war supplies from neutral sources; to support land military operations; and to protect and defend national territory, property, and sea-based commerce.

Lawful and Unlawful Practices of Sea Warfare.

Lawful and Unlawful Practices of Sea Warfare.

§ 174. As regards means of sea warfare, just as regards means of land warfare, it must be emphasised that not every practice capable of injuring the enemy in offence and defence is lawful. Although no regulations regarding the laws of war on sea have as yet been enacted by a general law-making treaty as a pendant to the Hague Regulations, there are treaties concerning special points—such as submarine mines, bombardment by naval forces, and others—and customary rules of International Law in existence which regulate the matter. Be that as it may, the rules concerning sea warfare are in many points identical with, but in many respects differ from, the rules in force regarding warfare on land. Therefore, the means of sea warfare must be discussed separately in the following sections. But blockade and capture of vessels carrying contraband and rendering unneutral service to the enemy, although they are means of[Pg 218] warfare against an enemy, are of such importance as regards neutral trade that they will be discussed below in Part III. §§ 368-413.

§ 174. When it comes to methods of naval warfare, just like with land warfare, it's important to highlight that not every action that can harm the enemy, whether in offense or defense, is considered lawful. Although a comprehensive treaty like the Hague Regulations hasn't yet been created to address the laws of war at sea, there are treaties that cover specific issues—such as submarine mines, naval bombardments, and more—and there are existing customary rules of International Law that govern these matters. Nevertheless, the rules for naval warfare are similar in many ways to, but also different from, the regulations that apply to land warfare. Therefore, the means of naval warfare will be examined separately in the sections that follow. However, the blockade and seizure of vessels carrying contraband and providing unneutral services to the enemy, while definitely actions against an adversary, are significant when it comes to neutral trade, so they will be discussed in Part III. §§ 368-413.

Objects of the Means of Sea Warfare.

Objects of the Means of Sea Warfare.

§ 175. Whereas the objects against which means of land warfare may be directed are innumerable, the number of the objects against which means of sea warfare are directed is very limited, comprising six objects only. The chief object is enemy vessels, whether public or private; the next, enemy individuals, with distinction between those taking part in fighting and others; the third, enemy goods on enemy vessels; the fourth, the enemy coast; the fifth and sixth, neutral vessels attempting to break blockade, carrying contraband, or rendering unneutral service to the enemy.

§ 175. While there are countless targets that land warfare can focus on, the targets for sea warfare are quite limited, consisting of only six. The main target is enemy vessels, both military and civilian; the next is enemy individuals, with a distinction between those who are actively fighting and those who are not; the third is enemy goods on enemy vessels; the fourth is the enemy coast; and the fifth and sixth are neutral vessels trying to break a blockade, carrying contraband, or providing support to the enemy.

Development of International Law regarding Private Property on Sea.

Development of International Law regarding Private Property at Sea.

§ 176. It is evident that in times when a belligerent could destroy all public and private enemy property he was able to seize, no special rule existed regarding private enemy ships and private enemy property carried by them on the sea. But the practice of sea warfare frequently went beyond the limits of even so wide a right, treating neutral goods on enemy ships as enemy goods, and treating neutral ships carrying enemy goods as enemy ships. It was not until the time of the Consolato del Mare in the fourteenth century that a set of clear and definite rules with regard to private enemy vessels and private enemy property on sea in contradistinction to neutral ships and neutral goods was adopted. According to this famous collection of maritime usages observed by the communities of the Mediterranean, there is no doubt that a belligerent may seize and appropriate all private enemy ships and goods. But a distinction is made in case of either ship or goods being neutral. Although an enemy ship may always be appropriated, neutral goods thereon have to be restored to the neutral owners. On the other hand, enemy goods on neutral ships may be appropriated, but[Pg 219] the neutral ships carrying such goods must be restored to their owners. However, these rules of the Consolato del Mare were not at all generally recognised, although they were adopted by several treaties between single States during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Neither the communities belonging to the Hanseatic League, nor the Netherlands and Spain during the War of Independence, nor England and Spain during their wars in the sixteenth century, adopted these rules. And France expressly enacted by Ordinances of 1543 (article 42) and 1583 (article 69) that neutral goods on enemy ships as well as neutral ships carrying enemy goods should be appropriated.[344] Although France adopted in 1650 the rules of the Consolato del Mare, Louis XIV. dropped them again by the Ordinance of 1681 and re-enacted that neutral goods on enemy ships and neutral ships carrying enemy goods should be appropriated. Spain enacted the same rules in 1718. The Netherlands, in contradistinction to the Consolato del Mare, endeavoured by a number of treaties to foster the principle that the flag covers the goods, so that enemy goods on neutral vessels were exempt from, whereas neutral goods on enemy vessels were subject to, appropriation. On the other hand, throughout the eighteenth and during the nineteenth century down to the beginning of the Crimean War in 1854, England adhered to the rules of the Consolato del Mare. Thus, no generally accepted rules of International Law regarding private property on sea were in existence.[345] Matters were made worse by privateering, which was generally recognised as lawful, and by the fact that belligerents frequently declared a coast blockaded without having a sufficient number of men-of-war on[Pg 220] the spot to make the blockade effective. It was not until the Declaration of Paris in 1856 that general rules of International Law regarding private property on sea came into existence.

§ 176. It's clear that when a warring party could destroy all enemy public and private property they could capture, there weren't specific rules about private enemy ships and the private enemy property they carried at sea. However, sea warfare often went beyond these broad rights, treating neutral goods on enemy ships as if they were enemy goods and neutral ships carrying enemy goods as enemy ships. It wasn't until the time of the Consolato del Mare in the fourteenth century that a clear set of rules about private enemy vessels and private enemy property at sea, distinguishing them from neutral ships and goods, was established. According to this well-known collection of maritime practices observed by Mediterranean communities, it's clear that a warring party may seize and take all private enemy ships and goods. But they must make a distinction when it comes to neutral ships or goods. While an enemy ship can always be taken, neutral goods on it must be returned to their neutral owners. On the other hand, enemy goods on neutral ships can be seized, but the neutral ships carrying those goods must be returned to their owners. However, the rules of the Consolato del Mare weren't widely recognized, although some treaties between individual states in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries adopted them. The communities of the Hanseatic League, as well as the Netherlands and Spain during the War of Independence, and England and Spain during their wars in the sixteenth century, did not accept these rules. France explicitly mandated through the Ordinances of 1543 (article 42) and 1583 (article 69) that neutral goods on enemy ships and neutral ships carrying enemy goods should be seized.[344] Even though France adopted the rules of the Consolato del Mare in 1650, Louis XIV. later repealed them with the Ordinance of 1681, reinstating the seizure of neutral goods on enemy ships and neutral ships carrying enemy goods. Spain implemented similar rules in 1718. The Netherlands, unlike the Consolato del Mare, sought through various treaties to support the principle that the flag covers the goods, meaning enemy goods on neutral vessels were exempt from seizure, while neutral goods on enemy vessels could be seized. In contrast, throughout the eighteenth and into the nineteenth century, up until the start of the Crimean War in 1854, England stuck to the rules of the Consolato del Mare. Therefore, there were no universally accepted rules of International Law regarding private property at sea.[345] The situation was worsened by privateering, generally seen as legal, and by the fact that warring parties often declared a blockade on a coast without having enough warships present to make that blockade effective. It wasn't until the Declaration of Paris in 1856 that general rules of International Law regarding private property at sea were established.

[344] Robe d'ennemy confisque celle d'amy. Confiscantur ex navibus res, ex rebus naves.

[344] Enemy's clothing is confiscated; that of the friend is taken too. Goods are seized from ships, ships are taken from goods.

[345] Boeck, Nos. 3-103, and Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 572-578, give excellent summaries of the facts.

[345] Boeck, Nos. 3-103, and Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 572-578, provide great summaries of the facts.

Declaration of Paris.

Paris Agreement.

§ 177. Things began to undergo a change with the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, when all the belligerents proclaimed that they would not issue Letters of Marque, and when, further, Great Britain declared that she would not seize enemy goods on neutral vessels, and when, thirdly, France declared that she would not appropriate neutral goods on enemy vessels. Although this alteration of attitude on the part of the belligerents was originally intended for the Crimean War only and exceptionally, it led after the conclusion of peace in 1856 to the famous and epoch-making Declaration of Paris,[346] which enacted the four rules—(1) that privateering is abolished, (2) that the neutral flag covers enemy goods[347] with the exception of contraband of war, (3) that neutral goods, contraband of war excepted, are not liable to capture under the enemy flag, (4) that blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, which means maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy. Since, with the exception of a few States such as the United States of America, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Uruguay, all members of the Family of Nations are now parties to the Declaration of Paris, it may well be maintained that the rules quoted are general International Law, the more so as the non-signatory Powers have hitherto[Pg 221] in practice always acted in accordance with those rules.[348]

§ 177. Things started to change with the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, when all the warring parties announced that they wouldn't issue Letters of Marque. Additionally, Great Britain declared that it would not seize enemy goods on neutral ships, and France stated that it would not take neutral goods on enemy vessels. Although this shift in the belligerents' stance was initially meant only for the Crimean War and was exceptional, it led to the significant Declaration of Paris in 1856 after peace was achieved. This declaration established four key rules: (1) privateering is abolished, (2) neutral flags protect enemy goods, except for contraband of war, (3) neutral goods, except for contraband of war, cannot be captured under an enemy flag, and (4) for a blockade to be legally binding, it must be effective, meaning it must be supported by sufficient force to genuinely prevent access to the enemy's coast. Since nearly all members of the Family of Nations, except a few like the United States, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Uruguay, are now parties to the Declaration of Paris, these rules can be considered general International Law, especially since those that have not signed have historically acted according to these principles.[348]

[347] It has been asserted—see, for instance, Rivier, II. p. 429—that the neutral flag covers only private, not public, enemy property, and therefore that such goods on neutral vessels as belong to the State of the enemy may be seized and appropriated. This opinion would seem, however, to be untenable in face of the fact that the Declaration of Paris speaks of marchandise neutre without any qualification, only excepting contraband goods, thus protecting the whole of the cargo under the neutral flag, contraband excepted. See below, § 319, p. 385, note 3.

[347] It has been claimed—see, for example, Rivier, II. p. 429—that the neutral flag only protects private enemy property, not public, and therefore goods on neutral ships that belong to an enemy State can be seized and taken. However, this argument seems to be weak considering that the Declaration of Paris refers to marchandise neutre without any restrictions, only excluding contraband goods, thus safeguarding all cargo under the neutral flag, except for contraband. See below, § 319, p. 385, note 3.

[348] That there is an agitation for the abolition of the Declaration of Paris has been mentioned above, § 83, p. 100, note 3.

[348] As mentioned earlier, there is a push to abolish the Declaration of Paris, § 83, p. 100, note 3.

The Principle of Appropriation of Private Enemy Vessels and Enemy Goods thereon.

The Principle of Appropriation of Private Enemy Vessels and Enemy Goods on Them.

§ 178. The Declaration of Paris did not touch upon the old rule that private enemy vessels and private enemy goods thereon may be seized and appropriated, and this rule is, therefore, as valid as ever, although there is much agitation for its abolition. In 1785 Prussia and the United States of America had already stipulated by article 23 of their Treaty of Friendship[349] that in case of war between the parties each other's merchantmen shall not be seized and appropriated. Again, in 1871 the United States and Italy, by article 12 of their Treaty of Commerce,[350] stipulated that in case of war between the parties each other's merchantmen, with the exception of those carrying contraband of war or attempting to break a blockade, shall not be seized and appropriated. In 1823 the United States had already made the proposal to Great Britain, France, and Russia[351] for a treaty abrogating the rule that enemy merchantmen and enemy goods thereon may be appropriated; but Russia alone accepted the proposal under the condition that all other naval Powers should consent. Again, in 1856,[352] on the occasion of the Declaration of Paris, the United States endeavoured to obtain the victory of the principle that enemy merchantmen shall not be appropriated, making it a condition of their accession to the Declaration of Paris that this principle should be recognised. But again the attempt failed, owing to the opposition of Great Britain.

§ 178. The Declaration of Paris didn’t address the longstanding rule that private enemy ships and the goods on them can be seized. This rule is still very much in effect, even though there’s a lot of push to get rid of it. Back in 1785, Prussia and the United States agreed in article 23 of their Treaty of Friendship[349] that if there was a war between them, their merchant ships wouldn’t be seized. Then in 1871, the United States and Italy stated in article 12 of their Treaty of Commerce,[350] that if there was a war, their merchant ships wouldn’t be seized, except for those carrying contraband or trying to break a blockade. In 1823, the United States had already proposed to Great Britain, France, and Russia[351] a treaty to eliminate the rule about appropriating enemy merchant ships and their goods; however, Russia was the only one that accepted, but only if all other naval powers agreed too. Again in 1856,[352] during the Declaration of Paris, the United States tried to push through the principle that enemy merchant ships shouldn’t be appropriated, making this principle a condition for joining the Declaration of Paris. Yet again, this attempt failed due to Great Britain’s opposition.

[349] See Martens, R. IV. p. 37. Perels (p. 198) maintains that this article has not been adopted by the Treaty of Commerce between Prussia and the United States of May 1, 1828; but this statement is incorrect, for article 12 of this treaty—see Martens, N.R. VII. p. 615—adopts it expressly.

[349] See Martens, R. IV. p. 37. Perels (p. 198) argues that this article hasn't been adopted by the Treaty of Commerce between Prussia and the United States dated May 1, 1828; however, this claim is wrong, because article 12 of this treaty—see Martens, N.R. VII. p. 615—explicitly adopts it.

[350] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. I. p. 57.

[350] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. I. p. 57.

[351] See Wharton, III. § 342, pp. 260-261, and Moore, VII. § 1198, p. 465.

[351] See Wharton, III. § 342, pp. 260-261, and Moore, VII. § 1198, p. 465.

[352] See Wharton, III. § 342, pp. 270-287, and Moore, VII. § 1198, p. 466.[Pg 222]

[352] See Wharton, III. § 342, pp. 270-287, and Moore, VII. § 1198, p. 466.[Pg 222]

At the outbreak of war in 1866, Prussia and Austria expressly declared that they would not seize and appropriate each other's merchantmen. At the outbreak of the Franco-German War in 1870, Germany declared French merchantmen exempt from capture, but she changed her attitude when France did not act upon the same lines. It should also be mentioned that already in 1865 Italy, by article 211 of her Marine Code, enacted that, in case of war with any other State, enemy merchantmen not carrying contraband of war or breaking a blockade shall not be seized and appropriated, provided reciprocity be granted. And it should further be mentioned that the United States of America made attempts[353] in vain to secure immunity from capture to enemy merchantmen and goods on sea at the First as well as at the Second Hague Peace Conference.

At the start of the war in 1866, Prussia and Austria clearly stated that they would not capture each other's merchant ships. When the Franco-German War began in 1870, Germany announced that French merchant ships would be safe from capture, but this changed when France didn't follow suit. It's also important to note that in 1865, Italy, through article 211 of her Marine Code, declared that if a war broke out with another state, enemy merchant ships not carrying contraband or violating a blockade would not be seized, as long as the same was granted in return. Additionally, the United States made unsuccessful attempts[353] to secure protection for enemy merchant ships and goods at sea during both the First and Second Hague Peace Conferences.

[353] See Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague, pp. 306-321, and Scott, Conferences, pp. 699-707.

[353] See Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague, pp. 306-321, and Scott, Conferences, pp. 699-707.

It cannot be denied that the constant agitation, since the middle of the eighteenth century, in favour of the abolition of the rule that private enemy vessels and goods may be captured on the High Seas, might, during the second half of the nineteenth century, have met with success but for the decided opposition of Great Britain. Public opinion in Great Britain was not, and is not, prepared to consent to the abolition of this rule. And there is no doubt that the abolition of the rule would involve a certain amount of danger to a country like Great Britain whose position and power depend chiefly upon her navy. The possibility of annihilating an enemy's commerce by annihilating his merchant fleet is a powerful weapon in the hands of a great naval Power. Moreover, if enemy merchantmen are not captured, they can be fitted out as cruisers, or at least be made use of for the transport of troops, munitions,[Pg 223] and provisions. Have not several maritime States made arrangements with their steamship companies to secure the building of their Transatlantic liners according to plans which make these merchantmen easily convertible into men-of-war?

It can't be denied that the ongoing push since the mid-eighteenth century to end the rule allowing private enemy ships and goods to be seized on the High Seas might have succeeded in the second half of the nineteenth century if not for the strong opposition from Great Britain. Public opinion in Great Britain wasn't, and isn't, ready to agree to the abolition of this rule. There's no doubt that getting rid of this rule would pose some risk to a country like Great Britain, whose status and power primarily depend on its navy. The ability to destroy an enemy's trade by eliminating their merchant fleet is a significant advantage for any major naval power. Additionally, if enemy merchant ships aren't captured, they can be repurposed as cruisers or at least used to transport troops, weapons,[Pg 223] and supplies. Haven't several maritime countries made deals with their shipping companies to ensure their Transatlantic liners are designed in a way that allows these merchant ships to be easily converted into warships?

The argument that it is unjust that private enemy citizens should suffer through having their property seized has no weight in face of the probability that fear of the annihilation of its merchant fleet in case of war may well deter a State intending to go to war from doing so. It is a matter for politicians, not for jurists, to decide whether Great Britain must in the interest of self-preservation oppose the abolition of the rule that sea-borne private enemy property may be confiscated.

The argument that it's unfair for private citizens of enemy states to have their property taken away doesn't hold up against the likelihood that the fear of losing their merchant fleet in a war might prevent a country from going to war in the first place. It's up to politicians, not lawyers, to determine whether Great Britain should, for the sake of self-preservation, fight against getting rid of the rule that allows the confiscation of sea-borne private enemy property.

However this may be, since the end of the nineteenth century it has not been the attitude of Great Britain alone which stands in the way of the abolition of the rule. Since the growth of navies among continental Powers, these Powers have learnt to appreciate the value of the rule in war, and the outcry against the capture of merchantmen has become less loud. To-day, it may perhaps be said that, even if Great Britain were to propose the abolition of the rule, it is probable that a greater number of the maritime States would refuse to accede. For it should be noted that at the Second Peace Conference, France, Russia, Japan, Spain, Portugal, Mexico, Colombia, and Panama, besides Great Britain, voted against the abolition of the rule. And there is noticeable a slow, but constant, increase in the number of continental publicists[354] who oppose[Pg 224] the abolition of the once so much objected to practice of capturing enemy merchantmen.

However this may be, since the end of the nineteenth century, it hasn’t just been Great Britain’s stance that has blocked the abolition of the rule. As navies grew among continental Powers, these countries learned to see the rule's value in warfare, and the outcry against capturing merchant ships has quieted down. Today, it could be said that even if Great Britain suggested abolishing the rule, a greater number of maritime States would likely refuse to go along with it. It’s important to note that at the Second Peace Conference, France, Russia, Japan, Spain, Portugal, Mexico, Colombia, and Panama, along with Great Britain, voted against abolishing the rule. There is also a noticeable, though gradual, increase in the number of continental publicists[354] who oppose[Pg 224] the once widely criticized practice of capturing enemy merchant ships.

[354] See, for instance, Perels, § 36, pp. 195-198; Röpcke, Das Seebeuterecht (1904), pp. 36-47; Dupuis, Nos. 29-31; Pillet, p. 119; Giordana, La proprieta privata nelle guerre maritime, etc. (1907); Niemeyer, Prinzipien des Seekriegsrechts (1909); Boidin, pp. 144-167. On the other hand, the Institute of International Law has several times voted in favour of the abolition of the rule; see Tableau Général de l'Institut de droit International (1893), pp. 190-193. The literature concerning the question of confiscation of private enemy property on sea is abundant. The following authors, besides those already quoted above at the commencement of § 173, may be mentioned:—Upton, The Law of Nations affecting Commerce during War (1863); Cauchy, Du respect de la propriété privée dans la guerre maritime (1866); Vidari, Del rispetto della proprietà privata fra gli stati in guerra (1867); Gessner, Zur Reform des Kriegsseerechts (1875); Klobukowski, Die Seebeute oder das feindliche Privateigenthum zur See (1877); Bluntschli, Das Beuterecht im Kriege und das Seebeuterecht insbesondere (1878); Boeck, De la propriété privée ennemie sous pavillon ennemi (1882); Dupuis, La guerre maritime et les doctrines anglaises (1899); Leroy, La guerre maritime (1900); Röpcke, Das Seebeuterecht (1904); Hirst, Commerce and Property in Naval Warfare: A Letter of the Lord Chancellor (1906); Hamman, Der Streit um das Seebeuterecht (1907); Wehberg, Das Beuterecht im Land und Seekrieg (1909); Cohen, The Immunity of Enemy's Property from Capture at Sea (1909); Macdonell, Some plain Reasons for Immunity from Capture of Private Property at Sea (1910). See also the literature quoted by Bonfils, No. 1281, Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3070-3090, and Boeck, Nos. 382-572, where the arguments of the authors against and in favour of the present practice are discussed.

[354] For example, see Perels, § 36, pp. 195-198; Röpcke, Das Seebeuterecht (1904), pp. 36-47; Dupuis, Nos. 29-31; Pillet, p. 119; Giordana, La proprieta privata nelle guerre maritime, etc. (1907); Niemeyer, Prinzipien des Seekriegsrechts (1909); Boidin, pp. 144-167. Conversely, the Institute of International Law has voted multiple times in favor of abolishing the rule; see Tableau Général de l'Institut de droit International (1893), pp. 190-193. There is a wealth of literature on the issue of confiscating private enemy property at sea. In addition to the authors mentioned at the beginning of § 173, the following can also be noted: Upton, The Law of Nations affecting Commerce during War (1863); Cauchy, Du respect de la propriété privée dans la guerre maritime (1866); Vidari, Del rispetto della proprietà privata fra gli stati in guerra (1867); Gessner, Zur Reform des Kriegsseerechts (1875); Klobukowski, Die Seebeute oder das feindliche Privateigenthum zur See (1877); Bluntschli, Das Beuterecht im Kriege und das Seebeuterecht insbesondere (1878); Boeck, De la propriété privée ennemie sous pavillon ennemi (1882); Dupuis, La guerre maritime et les doctrines anglaises (1899); Leroy, La guerre maritime (1900); Röpcke, Das Seebeuterecht (1904); Hirst, Commerce and Property in Naval Warfare: A Letter of the Lord Chancellor (1906); Hamman, Der Streit um das Seebeuterecht (1907); Wehberg, Das Beuterecht im Land und Seekrieg (1909); Cohen, The Immunity of Enemy's Property from Capture at Sea (1909); Macdonell, Some plain Reasons for Immunity from Capture of Private Property at Sea (1910). Also, see the literature cited by Bonfils, No. 1281, Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3070-3090, and Boeck, Nos. 382-572, where the arguments for and against the current practice are discussed.

Impending Codification of Law of Sea Warfare.

Impending Codification of Law of Sea Warfare.

§ 179. Be that as it may, the time is not very far distant when the Powers will perforce come to an agreement on this as on other points of sea warfare, in a code of regulations regarding sea warfare as a pendant to the Hague Regulations regarding warfare on land. An initiative step was taken by the United States of America by her Naval War Code[355] published in 1900, although she withdrew[356] the Code in 1904. Meanwhile, the Second Peace Conference has produced a number of Conventions dealing with some parts of Sea Warfare, namely: (1) the Convention (VI.) concerning the status of enemy merchantmen at the outbreak of hostilities; (2) the Convention (VII.) concerning the conversion of merchantmen into warships; (3) the Convention (VIII.) concerning the laying of automatic submarine contact mines; (4) the Convention (IX.) concerning the bombardment by naval forces; (5) the Convention (XI.) concerning restrictions on the exercise of the right of capture in maritime war.

§ 179. That being said, it's not long before the Powers will inevitably reach an agreement on this and other aspects of naval warfare, forming a set of rules to complement the Hague Regulations for land warfare. The United States took an initial step with its Naval War Code[355] published in 1900, although it withdrew[356] the Code in 1904. In the meantime, the Second Peace Conference has led to several Conventions addressing certain areas of naval warfare, specifically: (1) Convention (VI.) regarding the status of enemy merchant ships at the start of hostilities; (2) Convention (VII.) concerning the conversion of merchant vessels into warships; (3) Convention (VIII.) on the laying of automatic submarine contact mines; (4) Convention (IX.) about bombardment by naval forces; (5) Convention (XI.) on limitations to the right of capture in maritime conflict.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.[Pg 225]

II ATTACK AND CAPTURE OF ENEMY SHIPS

Hall, §§ 138 and 148—Lawrence, § 182—Westlake, II. pp. 133-140, 307-331—Phillimore, III. § 347—Twiss, II. § 73—Halleck, II. pp. 105-108—Taylor, §§ 545-546—Moore, VII. §§ 1175-1183, &c.,—Walker, § 50, p. 147—Wharton, III. § 345—Bluntschli, §§ 664-670—Heffter, §§ 137-139—Ullmann, § 188—Bonfils, Nos. 1269-1271, 1350-1354, 1398-1400—Despagnet, Nos. 650-659—Rivier, § 66—Nys, III. pp. 467-478—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3155-3165, 3176-3178—Calvo, IV. §§ 2368-2378—Fiore, III. Nos. 1414-1424, and Code, Nos. 1643-1649—Pillet, pp. 120-128—Perels, § 35—Testa, pp. 155-157—Lawrence, War, pp. 48-55, 93-111—Ortolan, II. pp. 31-34—Boeck, Nos. 190-208—Dupuis, Nos. 150-158, and Guerre, Nos. 74-112—U.S. Naval War Code, articles 13-16—Bernsten, §§ 7-8.

Hall, §§ 138 and 148—Lawrence, § 182—Westlake, II. pp. 133-140, 307-331—Phillimore, III. § 347—Twiss, II. § 73—Halleck, II. pp. 105-108—Taylor, §§ 545-546—Moore, VII. §§ 1175-1183, &c.—Walker, § 50, p. 147—Wharton, III. § 345—Bluntschli, §§ 664-670—Heffter, §§ 137-139—Ullmann, § 188—Bonfils, Nos. 1269-1271, 1350-1354, 1398-1400—Despagnet, Nos. 650-659—Rivier, § 66—Nys, III. pp. 467-478—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3155-3165, 3176-3178—Calvo, IV. §§ 2368-2378—Fiore, III. Nos. 1414-1424, and Code, Nos. 1643-1649—Pillet, pp. 120-128—Perels, § 35—Testa, pp. 155-157—Lawrence, War, pp. 48-55, 93-111—Ortolan, II. pp. 31-34—Boeck, Nos. 190-208—Dupuis, Nos. 150-158, and Guerre, Nos. 74-112—U.S. Naval War Code, articles 13-16—Bernsten, §§ 7-8.

Importance of Attack and Seizure of Enemy Vessels.

Importance of Attacking and Seizing Enemy Ships.

§ 180. Whereas in land warfare all sorts of violence against enemy individuals are the chief means, in sea warfare attack and seizure of enemy vessels are the most important means. For together with enemy vessels, a belligerent takes possession of the enemy individuals and enemy goods thereon, so that he can appropriate vessels and goods, as well as detain those enemy individuals who belong to the enemy armed forces as prisoners of war. For this reason, and compared with attack and seizure of enemy vessels, violence against enemy persons and the other means of sea warfare play only a secondary part, although such means are certainly not unimportant. For a weak naval Power can even restrict the operations of her fleet to mere coast defence, and thus totally refrain from directly attacking and seizing enemy vessels.

§ 180. In land warfare, various forms of violence against enemy individuals are the primary methods used, while in naval warfare, attacking and capturing enemy ships are the most significant strategies. By seizing enemy vessels, a combatant also gains control over the enemy personnel and goods on board, allowing them to appropriate ships and cargo, as well as detain enemy combatants as prisoners of war. Therefore, compared to the attack and seizure of enemy vessels, violence against enemy individuals and other tactics in naval warfare are considered secondary, even though they still hold some importance. A weaker naval power can limit its fleet's operations to just coastal defense, completely avoiding direct attacks and captures of enemy ships.

Attack when legitimate.

Attack when justified.

§ 181. All enemy men-of-war and other public vessels, which are met by a belligerent's men-of-war on the High Seas or within the territorial waters of either belligerent,[357] may at once be attacked, and the attacked vessel may, of course, defend herself by[Pg 226] a counter-attack. Enemy merchantmen may be attacked only if they refuse to submit to visit after having been duly signalled to do so. And no duty exists for an enemy merchantman to submit to visit; on the contrary, she may refuse it, and defend herself against an attack. But only a man-of-war is competent to attack men-of-war as well as merchantmen, provided the war takes place between parties to the Declaration of Paris, so that privateering is prohibited. Any merchantman of a belligerent attacking a public or private vessel of the enemy would be considered and treated as a pirate, and the members of the crew would be liable to be treated as war criminals[358] to the same extent as private individuals committing hostilities in land warfare. However, if attacked by an enemy vessel, a merchantman is competent to deliver a counter-attack and need not discontinue her attack because the vessel which opened hostilities takes to flight, but may pursue and seize her.

§ 181. All enemy warships and other public vessels that encounter a belligerent’s warships on the high seas or within the territorial waters of either side,[357] may be immediately attacked, and the attacked vessel can defend itself with a counter-attack. Enemy merchant ships can only be attacked if they refuse to comply with a visit after being properly signaled to do so. There is no obligation for an enemy merchant ship to comply with a visit; on the contrary, it can refuse and defend itself against an attack. However, only a warship has the authority to attack both warships and merchant ships, provided the conflict occurs between parties to the Declaration of Paris, which prohibits privateering. Any merchant ship of a belligerent attacking an enemy’s public or private vessel would be considered and treated as a pirate, and the crew members could be regarded as war criminals[358] to the same extent as private individuals engaging in hostilities in land warfare. However, if a merchant ship is attacked by an enemy vessel, it has the right to conduct a counter-attack and does not need to stop its attack if the vessel that initiated hostilities flees, but may pursue and capture it.

[357] But not, of course, in territorial waters of neutral States; see the De Fortuyn (1760), Burrell 175.

[357] But not, of course, in the territorial waters of neutral countries; see the De Fortuyn (1760), Burrell 175.

[358] See above, § 85, and below, § 254. Should a merchantman, legitimately—after having been herself attacked—or illegitimately, attack an enemy vessel, and succeed in capturing her, the prize, on condemnation, becomes droits of Admiralty and, therefore, the property of the British Government; see article 39 of the Naval Prize Act, 1864, and article 44 of the Naval Prize Bill introduced in 1911.

[358] See above, § 85, and below, § 254. If a merchant ship, legitimately—after being attacked—or illegitimately, attacks an enemy vessel and successfully captures it, the prize, upon condemnation, becomes droits of Admiralty and therefore the property of the British Government; see article 39 of the Naval Prize Act, 1864, and article 44 of the Naval Prize Bill introduced in 1911.

It must be specially mentioned that an attack upon enemy vessels on the sea may be made by forces on the shore. For instance, this is done when coast batteries fire upon an enemy man-of-war within reach of their guns. Enemy merchantmen, however, may not be attacked in this way, for they may only be attacked by men-of-war after having been signalled in vain to submit to visit.

It should be noted that forces on the shore can launch an attack on enemy vessels at sea. For example, this occurs when coastal batteries fire on an enemy warship within their range. However, enemy merchant ships cannot be attacked in this manner; they can only be engaged by warships after attempts to signal them for inspection have failed.

Attack how effected.

Attack how it affected.

§ 182. One mode of attack which was in use at the time of sailing ships, namely, boarding and fighting the crew, which can be described as a parallel to assault in land warfare, is no longer used, but if an instance occurred, it would be perfectly lawful. Attack is[Pg 227] nowadays effected by cannonade, torpedoes, and, if opportunity arises, by ramming; and nothing forbids an attack on enemy vessels by launching projectiles and explosives from air-vessels, provided the belligerents are not parties to the Declaration—see above, § 114—which prohibits such attacks. As a rule attacks on merchantmen will be made by cannonade only, as the attacking vessel aims at seizing her on account of her value. But, in case the attacked vessel not only takes to flight, but defends herself by a counter-attack, all modes of attack are lawful against her, just as she herself is justified in applying all modes of attack by way of defence.

§ 182. One way of fighting that was used during the era of sailing ships, specifically boarding and battling the crew—similar to assault in land warfare—is no longer practiced. However, if it did happen, it would still be completely legal. Nowadays, attacks are carried out using cannon fire, torpedoes, and, when the opportunity arises, by ramming. There's also nothing that prevents attacks on enemy vessels by launching projectiles and explosives from aircraft, as long as the warring parties are not signatories to the Declaration—see above, § 114—that bans such attacks. Generally, attacks on merchant ships will be carried out using cannon fire, since the attacking vessel aims to capture it due to its value. Yet, if the attacked vessel not only flees but also fights back with a counter-attack, all forms of attack are permitted against it, just as it is allowed to use any means of attack for its defense.

As regards attack by torpedoes, article 1 No. 3 of Convention VIII. of the Second Peace Conference enacts that it is forbidden to use torpedoes which do not become harmless if they miss their mark.

As for attacks using torpedoes, article 1 No. 3 of Convention VIII of the Second Peace Conference states that it's forbidden to use torpedoes that don’t become harmless if they miss their target.

Submarine Contact Mines.

Submarine contact mines.

§ 182a. A new mode of attack which requires special attention[359] is that by means of floating mechanical, in contradistinction to so-called electro-contact, mines. The latter need not specially be discussed, because they are connected with a battery on land, can naturally only be laid within territorial waters, and present no danger to neutral shipping except on the spot where they are laid. But floating mechanical mines can be dropped as well in the Open Sea as in territorial waters; they can, moreover, drift away to any distance from the spot where they were dropped and thus become a great danger to navigation in general. Mechanical mines were for the first time used, and by both parties, in the Russo-Japanese War during the blockade of Port Arthur in 1904, and the question of their admissibility[Pg 228] was at once raised in the press of all neutral countries, the danger to neutral shipping being obvious. The Second Peace Conference took the matter up and, in spite of the opposing views of the Powers, was able to produce the Convention (VIII.) concerning the laying of automatic submarine contact mines. This Convention comprises thirteen articles and was signed, although by some only with reservations, by all the Powers represented at the Conference, except China, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Portugal, Russia, Spain, and Sweden. Most of the signatory States have already ratified, and Nicaragua has since acceded. The more important stipulations of this Convention are the following:—

§ 182a. A new method of attack that requires special attention[359] is the use of floating mechanical mines, as opposed to what's called electro-contact mines. The latter don’t need much discussion because they are connected to a battery on land, can only be deployed within territorial waters, and pose no threat to neutral shipping except right at the location where they are set. However, floating mechanical mines can be deployed in both open seas and territorial waters; they can also drift far from where they were dropped, becoming a significant risk to navigation overall. Mechanical mines were first used by both sides during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, during the blockade of Port Arthur, and this raised the question of their acceptability[Pg 228] in the press of all neutral countries, as the danger to neutral shipping was evident. The Second Peace Conference addressed the issue, and despite differing opinions among the Powers, it managed to create the Convention (VIII.) regarding the laying of automatic submarine contact mines. This Convention includes thirteen articles and was signed, albeit with some reservations by a few, by all the Powers represented at the Conference, except for China, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Portugal, Russia, Spain, and Sweden. Most of the signatory States have already ratified it, and Nicaragua has since joined. The key stipulations of this Convention are as follows:—

(1) Belligerents[360] are forbidden to lay unanchored automatic contact mines, unless they be so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after those who laid them have lost control over them, and it is forbidden to lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings (article 1).

(1) Belligerents[360] are not allowed to set unanchored automatic contact mines unless they are designed to become harmless at most one hour after the ones who placed them have lost control over them. Additionally, it is prohibited to deploy anchored automatic contact mines that do not become harmless as soon as they become untethered from their moorings (article 1).

(2) It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coasts and ports of the enemy, with the sole object of intercepting commercial navigation (article 2).[361]

(2) It is not allowed to place automatic contact mines off the enemy's coasts and ports just to block commercial shipping (article 2).[361]

(3) When anchored automatic contact mines are employed, every possible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful navigation. The belligerents must provide, as far as possible, for these mines becoming harmless after a limited time has elapsed, and, where the mines cease to be under observation, to notify the danger zones as soon as military exigencies permit, by notice to mariners, which must also be communicated to the Governments through the diplomatic channel (article 3).[Pg 229]

(3) When using anchored automatic contact mines, every possible precaution must be taken to ensure safe navigation. The warring parties must, as much as possible, make sure these mines become harmless after a certain period of time, and, when the mines are no longer being monitored, they must alert about the danger zones as soon as military needs allow, through a notice to mariners, which must also be communicated to the Governments via diplomatic channels (article 3).[Pg 229]

(4) At the close of the war, each Power must remove the mines laid by it. As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by one of the belligerents off the coasts of the other, their position must be notified to the other party by the Power which laid them, and each Power must proceed with the least possible delay to remove the mines in its own waters (article 5).

(4) At the end of the war, each country must clear the mines it placed. For anchored automatic contact mines set by one of the fighting parties off the other’s coast, the country that set them must inform the other side of their location, and each country must then promptly remove the mines in its own waters (article 5).

(5) The Convention remains in force for seven years, but, unless denounced, it continues in force afterwards (article 11). According to article 12, however, the contracting Powers agree to reopen the question of the employment of automatic contact mines after six and a half years unless the Third Peace Conference has already taken up and settled the matter.

(5) The Convention is valid for seven years, but unless it's canceled, it stays in effect afterward (article 11). According to article 12, though, the contracting Powers agree to revisit the issue of using automatic contact mines after six and a half years unless the Third Peace Conference has already addressed and resolved the matter.

[359] See Lawrence, War, pp. 93-111; Wetzstein, Die Seeminenfrage im Völkerrecht (1909); Rocholl, Die Frage der Minen im Seekrieg (1910); Barclay, pp. 59 and 158; Lémonon, pp. 472-502; Higgins, pp. 328-345; Boidin, pp. 216-235; Dupuis, Guerre, Nos. 331-358; Scott, Conferences, pp. 576-587; Martitz in the Report of the 23rd Conference (1906) of the International Law Association, pp. 47-74; Stockton in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 276-284.

[359] See Lawrence, War, pp. 93-111; Wetzstein, The Mine Question in International Law (1909); Rocholl, The Question of Mines in Naval Warfare (1910); Barclay, pp. 59 and 158; Lémonon, pp. 472-502; Higgins, pp. 328-345; Boidin, pp. 216-235; Dupuis, War, Nos. 331-358; Scott, Conferences, pp. 576-587; Martitz in the Report of the 23rd Conference (1906) of the International Law Association, pp. 47-74; Stockton in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 276-284.

[360] As regards neutrals, see below, § 363a.

[360] For information about neutrals, refer to below, § 363a.

[361] France and Germany have signed with reservations against article 2.

[361] France and Germany have signed with objections to article 2.

There is no doubt that the stipulations of Convention VIII. are totally inadequate to secure the safety of neutral shipping, and it is for this reason that Great Britain added the following reservation in signing the Convention:—"In placing their signatures to this Convention the British plenipotentiaries declare that the mere fact that the said Convention does not prohibit a particular act or proceeding must not be held to debar His Britannic Majesty's Government from contesting its legitimacy." It is to be hoped that the Third Peace Conference will produce a more satisfactory settlement of the problem. The Institute of International Law studied the matter at its meetings at Paris in 1910 and at Madrid in 1911, and produced a Règlementation[362] internationale de l'usage des mines sous-marines et torpilles, comprising nine articles, of which the more important are the following:—

There’s no doubt that the rules in Convention VIII are completely insufficient to ensure the safety of neutral shipping. This is why Great Britain added the following reservation when signing the Convention:—"By signing this Convention, the British representatives declare that just because the Convention doesn’t specifically prohibit a certain act or action, it shouldn’t prevent His Britannic Majesty's Government from challenging its legitimacy." Hopefully, the Third Peace Conference will lead to a better resolution of the issue. The Institute of International Law examined this topic at its meetings in Paris in 1910 and in Madrid in 1911, producing an Règlementation[362] internationale de l'usage des mines sous-marines et torpilles, which includes nine articles, with the following being the most significant:—

(1) It is forbidden to place anchored or unanchored automatic mines in the Open Sea (the question of the laying of electric contact mines in the Open Sea being reserved for future consideration).[Pg 230]

(1) It's not allowed to put either anchored or unanchored automatic mines in the Open Sea (the issue of laying electric contact mines in the Open Sea will be looked at later).[Pg 230]

(2) Belligerents may lay mines in their own and in the enemy's territorial waters, but it is forbidden (a) to lay unanchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless one hour at most after those who laid them have lost control over them; (b) to lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings.

(2) Warring parties can place mines in their own and the enemy's territorial waters, but it is prohibited (a) to lay unanchored automatic contact mines that do not become harmless within one hour at most after the party that laid them has lost control; (b) to lay anchored automatic contact mines that do not become harmless as soon as they break free from their moorings.

(3) A belligerent is only allowed to lay mines off the coasts and ports of the enemy for naval and military purposes, he is not allowed to lay them there in order to establish or maintain a commercial blockade.

(3) A belligerent is only permitted to lay mines off the coasts and ports of the enemy for naval and military reasons; they cannot be laid there for the purpose of establishing or maintaining a commercial blockade.

(4) If mines are laid, all precautions must be taken for the safety of peaceful navigation, and belligerents must, in especial, provide that mines become harmless after a limited time has elapsed. In case mines cease to be under observation the belligerents must, as soon as military exigencies permit, notify the danger zones to mariners and also to the Governments through the diplomatic channel.

(4) If mines are used, all necessary precautions must be taken to ensure safe navigation, and warring parties must make sure that the mines become harmless after a set period of time. If mines are no longer being monitored, the warring parties must, as soon as military needs allow, inform sailors and also notify the governments through diplomatic channels about the danger zones.

(5) The question as to the laying of mines in straits is reserved for future consideration.

(5) The issue of placing mines in straits will be discussed later.

(6) At the end of the war each Power must remove the mines laid by it. As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by one of the belligerents off the coasts of the other, their position must be notified to the other party by the Power which laid them, and each Power must proceed with the least possible delay to remove the mines in its own waters. The Power whose duty it is to remove the mines after the war must make known the date at which the removal of the mines is complete.

(6) At the end of the war, each country must clear away the mines they set. For the anchored automatic contact mines placed by one side off the coast of the other, the country that laid them must inform the other party of their locations, and each country must remove the mines in their own waters as quickly as possible. The country responsible for clearing the mines after the war must announce the date when all the mines have been removed.

(7) A violation of these rules involves responsibility on the part of the guilty State. The State which has laid the mines is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved, and an action may be brought against[Pg 231] the guilty State, even by individuals who have suffered damage, before the competent International Tribunal.

(7) Breaking these rules means that the State at fault is responsible. The State that has placed the mines is considered guilty unless proven otherwise, and individuals who have suffered damage can take legal action against[Pg 231] the guilty State in front of the appropriate International Tribunal.

[362] See Annuaire, XXIV. (1911), p. 301.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Directory, XXIV. (1911), p. 301.

Duty of giving Quarter.

Quarterly Contributions.

§ 183. As soon as an attacked or counter-attacked vessel hauls down her flag and, therefore, signals that she is ready to surrender, she must be given quarter and seized without further firing. To continue an attack although she is ready to surrender, and to sink her and her crew, would constitute a violation of customary International Law, and would only as an exception be admissible in case of imperative necessity or of reprisals.

§ 183. As soon as a vessel that has been attacked or is counter-attacking lowers its flag, signaling that it is ready to surrender, it must be granted quarter and taken without any further firing. Continuing the attack despite the surrender signal and sinking the vessel and its crew would violate customary International Law, and would only be acceptable in exceptional cases of urgent necessity or retaliation.

Seizure.

Seizure.

§ 184. Seizure is effected by securing possession of the vessel through the captor sending an officer and some of his own crew on board the captured vessel. But if for any reason this is impracticable, the captor orders the captured vessel to lower her flag and to steer according to his orders.

§ 184. Seizure is done by taking control of the vessel through the captor sending an officer and some of his own crew onto the captured vessel. However, if this isn't possible for any reason, the captor instructs the captured vessel to lower its flag and to follow his orders.

Effect of Seizure.

Seizure Effects.

§ 185. The effect of seizure is different with regard to private enemy vessels, on the one hand, and, on the other, to public vessels.

§ 185. The impact of seizure varies between private enemy vessels and public vessels.

Seizure of private enemy vessels may be described as a parallel to occupation of enemy territory in land warfare. Since the vessel and the individuals and goods thereon are actually placed under the captor's authority, her officers and crew, and any private individuals on board, are for the time being submitted to the discipline of the captor, just as private individuals on occupied enemy territory are submitted to the authority of the occupant.[363] Seizure of private enemy vessels does not, however, vest the property finally in the hands of the belligerent[364] whose forces effected the capture. The prize has to be brought before a Prize[Pg 232] Court, and it is the latter's confirmation of the capture through adjudication of the prize which makes the appropriation by the capturing belligerent final.[365]

Seizing private enemy ships can be compared to occupying enemy land in warfare. Since the ship, its crew, and its cargo are under the control of the captor, the officers and crew, along with any private individuals aboard, must follow the rules set by the captor, similar to how private individuals in occupied enemy land must adhere to the occupant's authority.[363] However, taking private enemy vessels does not mean that the property automatically belongs to the capturing belligerent[364]. The captured prize must be brought before a Prize[Pg 232] Court, and it's the court's approval of the capture through the prize adjudication that makes the property transfer to the capturing belligerent final.[365]

[363] Concerning the ultimate fate of the crew, see above, § 85.

[363] For information about what happened to the crew, refer to § 85.

[364] It is asserted that a captured enemy merchantman may at once be converted by the captor into a man-of-war, but the cases of the Ceylon (1811) and the Georgina (1814), 1 Dodson 105 and 397, which are quoted in favour of such a practice, are not decisive. See Higgins, War and the Private Citizen (1912), pp. 138-142.

[364] It is claimed that a captured enemy merchant ship can immediately be turned by the captor into a warship, but the cases of the Ceylon (1811) and the Georgina (1814), 1 Dodson 105 and 397, cited to support this practice, are not conclusive. See Higgins, War and the Private Citizen (1912), pp. 138-142.

[365] See below, § 192.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

On the other hand, the effect of seizure of public enemy vessels is their immediate and final appropriation. They may be either taken into a port or at once destroyed. All individuals on board become prisoners of war, although, if perchance there should be on board a private enemy individual of no importance, he would probably not be kept for long in captivity, but liberated in due time.

On the other hand, when public enemy vessels are seized, they are immediately and completely taken over. They can either be brought into port or destroyed right away. Everyone on board becomes a prisoner of war, although if a private enemy individual of little significance happens to be on board, they would likely not be held for long and would be released in due time.

As regards goods on captured public enemy vessels, there is no doubt that the effect of seizure is the immediate appropriation of such goods on the vessels concerned as are enemy property, and these goods may therefore be destroyed at once, if desirable. Should, however, neutral goods be on board a captured enemy public vessel, it is a moot point whether or no they share the fate of the captured ship. According to British practice they do, but according to American practice they do not.[366]

As for goods on captured enemy vessels, it's clear that seizing them means those goods belong to the enemy and can be destroyed immediately if necessary. However, if there are neutral goods on a captured enemy public vessel, it's uncertain whether they also face the same consequences as the captured ship. British practice supports that they do, while American practice states they do not.[366]

[366] See, on the one hand, the Fanny (1814), 1 Dodson, 443, and, on the other, the Nereide (1815), 9 Cranch, 388. See also below, § 424, p. 542 note 2.

[366] Check out, on one side, the Fanny (1814), 1 Dodson, 443, and, on the other side, the Nereide (1815), 9 Cranch, 388. Also see below, § 424, p. 542 note 2.

Immunity of Vessels charged with Religious, Scientific, or Philanthropic Mission.

Immunity of Vessels on Religious, Scientific, or Charitable Missions.

§ 186. Enemy vessels engaged in scientific discovery and exploration were, according to a general international usage in existence before the Second Peace Conference of 1907, granted immunity from attack and seizure in so far and so long as they themselves abstained from hostilities. The usage grew up in the eighteenth century. In 1766, the French explorer Bougainville, who started from St. Malo with the vessels La Boudeuse and L'Étoile on a voyage round the world, was furnished by the British Government with safe-conducts. In 1776, Captain Cook's vessels Resolution and Discovery, sailing from Plymouth for the purpose of exploring the Pacific Ocean, were declared[Pg 233] exempt from attack and seizure on the part of French cruisers by the French Government. Again, the French Count Lapérouse, who started on a voyage of exploration in 1785 with the vessels Astrolabe and Boussole, was secured immunity from attack and seizure. During the nineteenth century this usage became quite general, and had almost ripened into a custom; examples are the Austrian cruiser Novara (1859) and the Swedish cruiser Vega (1878). No immunity, however, was granted to vessels charged with religious or philanthropic missions. A remarkable case occurred during the Franco-German war. In June, 1871, the Palme, a vessel belonging to the Missionary Society of Basle, was captured by a French man-of-war, and condemned by the Prize Court of Bordeaux. The owners appealed and the French Conseil d'État set the vessel free, not because the capture was not justified but because equity demanded that the fact that Swiss subjects owning sea-going vessels were obliged to have them sailing under the flag of another State, should be taken into consideration.[367]

§ 186. Enemy vessels involved in scientific research and exploration were, based on general international practice that existed before the Second Peace Conference of 1907, protected from attack and seizure as long as they refrained from hostilities. This practice originated in the eighteenth century. In 1766, the French explorer Bougainville, who set off from St. Malo with the ships La Boudeuse and L'Étoile for a voyage around the world, was issued safe-conducts by the British Government. In 1776, Captain Cook's ships Resolution and Discovery, departing from Plymouth to explore the Pacific Ocean, were declared[Pg 233] exempt from attack and seizure by the French Government. Likewise, the French Count Lapérouse, who embarked on an exploration voyage in 1785 with the ships Astrolabe and Boussole, was granted immunity from attack and seizure. Throughout the nineteenth century, this practice became quite common and nearly established as a custom; notable examples include the Austrian cruiser Novara (1859) and the Swedish cruiser Vega (1878). However, no immunity was provided for vessels engaged in religious or humanitarian missions. A significant case arose during the Franco-German war. In June 1871, the Palme, a ship owned by the Missionary Society of Basle, was seized by a French warship and condemned by the Prize Court of Bordeaux. The owners appealed, and the French Conseil d'État released the ship, not because the capture was unjustified but because it was deemed fair to consider that Swiss nationals owning ocean-going vessels were required to sail under the flag of another country.[367]

[367] See Rivier, II. pp. 343-344; Dupuis, No. 158; and Boeck, No. 199.

[367] See Rivier, II. pp. 343-344; Dupuis, No. 158; and Boeck, No. 199.

The Second Peace Conference embodied the previous usage concerning immunity of vessels of discovery and exploration in a written rule and extended the immunity to vessels with a religious or philanthropic mission, for article 4 of Convention XI. enacts that vessels charged with religious, scientific, or philanthropic missions are exempt from capture.

The Second Peace Conference captured the earlier practice regarding the immunity of ships involved in discovery and exploration in a formal rule and broadened that immunity to include ships on religious or charitable missions. Article 4 of Convention XI states that ships tasked with religious, scientific, or philanthropic missions are protected from being captured.

It must be specially observed that it matters not whether the vessel concerned is a private or a public vessel.[368]

It should be noted that it doesn't matter if the vessel in question is private or public.[368]

[368] See U.S. Naval War Code, article 13. The matter is discussed at some length by Kleen, II. § 210, pp. 503-505. Concerning the case of the English explorer Flinders, who sailed with the vessel Investigator from England, but exchanged her for the Cumberland, which was seized in 1803 by the French at Port Louis, in Mauritius, as she was not the vessel to which a safe-conduct was given, see Lawrence, § 185.[Pg 234]

[368] See U.S. Naval War Code, article 13. Kleen discusses this topic in detail, II. § 210, pp. 503-505. Regarding the case of the English explorer Flinders, who set sail from England on the ship Investigator but switched it for the Cumberland, which was captured by the French in 1803 at Port Louis, Mauritius, because it wasn't the ship that had been granted safe passage, see Lawrence, § 185.[Pg 234]

Immunity of Fishing-boats and small boats employed in local Trade.

Immunity of Fishing Boats and Small Boats Used in Local Trade.

§ 187. Coast fishing-boats, in contradistinction to boats engaged in deep-sea fisheries, were, according to a general, but not universal, custom in existence during the nineteenth century, granted immunity from attack and seizure so long and in so far as they were unarmed and were innocently employed in catching and bringing in fish.[369] As early as the sixteenth century treaties were concluded between single States stipulating such immunity to each other's fishing-boats for the time of war. But throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were instances of a contrary practice, and Lord Stowell refused[370] to recognise in strict law any such exemption, although he recognised a rule of comity to that extent. Great Britain has always taken the standpoint that any immunity granted by her to fishing-boats was a relaxation[371] of strict right in the interest of humanity, but revocable at any moment, and that her cruisers were justified in seizing enemy fishing-boats unless prevented therefrom by special instructions on the part of the Admiralty.[372] But at the Second Peace Conference she altered her attitude, and agreed to the immunity not only of fishing vessels, but also of small boats employed in local trade. Article 3 of Convention XI. enacts, therefore, that vessels employed exclusively in coast fisheries, and small boats employed in local trade, are, together with appliances, rigging, tackle, and cargo, exempt from capture.

§ 187. Coast fishing boats, unlike boats used in deep-sea fishing, were generally, though not universally, protected from attacks and seizures as long as they were unarmed and were simply used for catching and bringing in fish. [369] As early as the sixteenth century, treaties were made between individual states that guaranteed this protection for each other’s fishing boats during wartime. However, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there were instances where this practice was not followed, and Lord Stowell refused [370] to accept any such exemption in strict legal terms, although he acknowledged a rule of courtesy in this matter. Great Britain has always maintained that any immunity she granted to fishing boats was a leniency [371] from strict law in the interest of humanity, but it could be revoked at any time, and that her cruisers were justified in seizing enemy fishing boats unless specifically directed otherwise by the Admiralty. [372] However, at the Second Peace Conference, she changed her stance and agreed to protect not only fishing vessels but also small boats involved in local trade. Thus, Article 3 of Convention XI states that vessels exclusively engaged in coast fisheries, and small boats used for local trade, along with their equipment, rigging, tackle, and cargo, are exempt from capture.

[369] The Paquette Habana (1899), 175, United States, 677. See U.S. Naval War Code, article 14; Japanese Prize Law, article 3 (1).

[369] The Paquette Habana (1899), 175, United States, 677. See U.S. Naval War Code, article 14; Japanese Prize Law, article 3 (1).

[370] The Young Jacob and Joanna (1798), 1 C. Rob, 20.

[370] The Young Jacob and Joanna (1798), 1 C. Rob, 20.

[371] See Hall, § 148.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Hall, § 148.

[372] See Holland, Prize Law, § 36.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Holland, Prize Law, § 36.

It must be specially observed that boats engaged in deep-sea fisheries and large boats engaged in local trade do not enjoy the privilege of immunity from capture, and that the fishing vessels and small boats employed in local trade lose that privilege in case they take any part whatever in hostilities. And article 3[Pg 235] expressly stipulates that belligerents must not take advantage of the harmless character of the said boats in order to use them for military purposes while preserving their peaceful appearance.

It should be noted that boats used in deep-sea fishing and larger boats involved in local trade do not have the protection from capture, and that fishing vessels and small boats used in local trade lose this protection if they participate in any hostilities. Furthermore, article 3[Pg 235] clearly states that warring parties must not exploit the non-threatening nature of these boats to use them for military purposes while keeping up their peaceful appearance.

Immunity of Merchantmen at the Outbreak of War on their Voyage to and from a Belligerent's Port.

Immunity of Merchants at the Start of War on Their Journey to and from a Belligerent's Port.

§ 188. Several times at the outbreak of war during the nineteenth century belligerents decreed that such enemy merchantmen as were on their voyage to one of the former's ports at the outbreak of war, should not be attacked and seized during the period of their voyage to and from such port. Thus, at the outbreak of the Crimean War, Great Britain and France decreed such immunity for Russian vessels, Germany did the same with regard to French vessels in 1870,[373] Russia with regard to Turkish vessels in 1877, the United States with regard to Spanish vessels in 1898, Russia and Japan with regard to each other's vessels in 1904. But there is no rule of International Law which compels a belligerent to grant such days of grace, and it is probable that in future wars days of grace will not be granted. The reason is that the steamboats of many countries are now built, according to an arrangement with the Government of their home State, from special designs which make them easily convertible into cruisers, and that a belligerent fleet cannot nowadays remain effective for long without being accompanied by a train of transport-vessels, colliers, repairing-vessels, and the like.[374]

§ 188. Several times during the outbreak of war in the nineteenth century, countries at war declared that enemy merchant ships on their way to one of their ports at the start of the conflict should not be attacked or seized while traveling to and from that port. For example, at the start of the Crimean War, Great Britain and France granted such immunity to Russian vessels, and Germany did the same for French vessels in 1870,[373] while Russia did this for Turkish vessels in 1877, and the United States for Spanish vessels in 1898, as well as Russia and Japan regarding each other's vessels in 1904. However, there is no rule in International Law that requires a warring nation to grant such grace periods, and it's likely that future conflicts won't see these days of grace offered. The reason for this is that the steamboats of many countries are now designed, in cooperation with their home governments, in ways that allow them to be quickly converted into warships. As a result, a military fleet today cannot remain effective for long without support from a variety of transport ships, coal carriers, repair vessels, and others.[374]

[373] See, however, above, § 178, p. 222.

[373] See, however, above, § 178, p. 222.

[374] This point is ably argued by Lawrence, War, pp 54-55.

[374] This point is effectively explained by Lawrence, War, pp 54-55.

In case, however, merchantmen, other than those constructed on special lines in order to make them easily convertible into cruisers, are, at the outbreak of war, on their voyage to an enemy port and are ignorant of the outbreak of hostilities, article 3 of Convention VI.[375] of the Second Peace Conference must find application. They may not, therefore, be confiscated, but may[Pg 236] only be captured on condition that they shall be restored after the conclusion of peace, or that indemnities shall be paid for them if they have been requisitioned or destroyed.

If, however, merchant ships that weren’t specifically designed to be turned into cruisers are, at the start of a war, on their way to an enemy port and unaware of the outbreak of hostilities, Article 3 of Convention VI.[375] from the Second Peace Conference applies. They cannot be confiscated; instead, they may[Pg 236] only be captured under the condition that they will be returned after peace is established, or that compensation will be paid if they have been taken or destroyed.

[375] See above, § 102a, Nos. 3 and 4.

[375] See above, § 102a, Nos. 3 and 4.

Vessels in Distress.

Boats in Trouble.

§ 189. Instances have occurred when enemy vessels which were forced by stress of weather to seek refuge in a belligerent's harbour were granted exemption from seizure.[376] Thus, when in 1746, during war with Spain, the Elisabeth, a British man-of-war, was forced to take refuge in the port of Havanna, she was not seized, but was offered facility for repairing damages, and furnished with a safe-conduct as far as the Bermudas. Thus, further, when in 1799, during war with France, the Diana, a Prussian merchantman, was forced to take refuge in the port of Dunkirk and seized, she was restored by the French Prize Court. But these and other cases have not created any rule of International Law whereby immunity from attack and seizure is granted to vessels in distress, and no such rule is likely to grow up, especially not as regards men-of-war and such merchantmen as are easily convertible into cruisers.

§ 189. There have been instances where enemy ships that had to seek refuge in a belligerent's harbor due to severe weather were exempt from being seized.[376] For example, in 1746, during the war with Spain, the Elisabeth, a British warship, was forced to take shelter in the port of Havana. Instead of being seized, she was allowed to repair damages and was given safe passage to the Bermudas. Similarly, in 1799, during the war with France, the Diana, a Prussian merchant ship, sought refuge in Dunkirk and was initially seized, but she was later returned by the French Prize Court. However, these and other similar cases have not established a rule of International Law that provides immunity from attack and seizure for vessels in distress, and it’s unlikely that such a rule will develop, especially regarding warships and any merchant vessels that can be easily converted into cruisers.

[376] See Ortolan, II. pp. 286-291; Kleen, II. § 210, pp. 492-494.

[376] See Ortolan, II. pp. 286-291; Kleen, II. § 210, pp. 492-494.

Immunity of Hospital and Cartel Ships.

Immunity of Hospital and Cartel Ships.

§ 190. According to the Hague Convention, which adapted the principles of the Geneva Convention to warfare on sea, hospital ships are inviolable, and therefore may be neither attacked nor seized; see below in §§ 204-209. Concerning the immunity of cartel ships, see below in § 225.

§ 190. According to the Hague Convention, which updated the principles of the Geneva Convention for naval warfare, hospital ships are protected and cannot be attacked or seized; see below in §§ 204-209. For information on the immunity of cartel ships, see below in § 225.

Immunity of Mail-boats and of Mail-bags.

Immunity of Mail Boats and Mail Bags.

§ 191. No general rule of International Law exists granting enemy mail-boats immunity from attack and seizure, but the several States have frequently stipulated such immunity in the case of war by special treaties.[377] Thus, for instance, Great Britain and France by article 9 of the Postal Convention of August 30, 1860, and Great Britain and Holland by article 7 of the[Pg 237] Postal Convention of October 14, 1843, stipulated that all mail-boats navigating between the countries of the parties shall continue to navigate in time of war between these countries without impediment or molestation until special notice be given by either party that the service is to be discontinued.

§ 191. No general rule of International Law exists that gives enemy mailboats protection from attack and seizure, but various States have often agreed to such protection through specific treaties during wartime.[377] For example, Great Britain and France, through article 9 of the Postal Convention dated August 30, 1860, and Great Britain and Holland, through article 7 of the [Pg 237] Postal Convention dated October 14, 1843, agreed that all mailboats traveling between the countries of the parties would be allowed to operate during wartime without hindrance or harassment, unless one party gives special notice that the service is to be stopped.

[377] See Kleen, II. § 210, pp. 505-507.

[377] See Kleen, II. § 210, pp. 505-507.

Whereas there is no general rule granting immunity from capture to enemy mail-boats, enemy mail-bags do, according to article 1 of Convention XI., enjoy the privilege of such immunity, for it is there enacted that the postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, whether official or private in character, which may be found on board a neutral[378] or enemy ship at sea, is inviolable, and that, in case the ship is detained, the correspondence is to be forwarded by the captor with the least possible delay. There is only one exception to this rule of article 1, for correspondence destined to or proceeding from a blockaded port does not enjoy the privilege of immunity.

Whereas there isn't a general rule that protects enemy mail boats from being captured, enemy mail-bags do receive that protection according to Article 1 of Convention XI. It states that postal correspondence belonging to neutrals or belligerents, whether official or private, found on a neutral[378] or enemy ship at sea is inviolable. If the ship is detained, the captor must forward the correspondence with the least possible delay. The only exception to this rule in Article 1 is that correspondence going to or coming from a blockaded port does not have this immunity.

[378] See below, §§ 319 and 411.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

It must be specially observed that postal correspondence, and not parcels sent by parcel post, are immune from capture.[Pg 238]

It should be specifically noted that postal letters, and not packages sent by parcel post, are protected from being seized.[Pg 238]

III Confiscation and Destruction of Enemy Merchant Ships

Hall, §§ 149-152, 171, 269—Lawrence, §§ 183-191—Westlake, II. pp. 156-160—Phillimore, III. §§ 345-381—Twiss, II. §§ 72-97—Halleck, II. pp. 362-431, 510-526—Taylor, §§ 552-567—Wharton, III. § 345—Wheaton, §§ 355-394—Moore, VII. §§ 1206-1214—Bluntschli, §§ 672-673—Heffter, §§ 137-138—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 588-596—Ullmann, § 189—Bonfils, Nos. 1396-1440—Despagnet, Nos. 670-682—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3179-3207—Rivier, II. § 66—Calvo, IV. §§ 2294-2366, V. §§ 3004-3034—Fiore, III. Nos. 1426-1443, and Code, Nos. 1693-1706—Martens, II. §§ 125-126—Pillet, pp. 342-352—Perels, §§ 36, 55-58—Testa, pp. 147-160—Valin, Traité des prises, 2 vols. (1758-60), and Commentaire sur l'ordonnance de 1681, 2 vols. (1766)—Pistoye et Duverdy, Traité des prises maritimes, 2 vols. (1854-1859)—Upton, The Law of Nations affecting Commerce during War (1863)—Boeck, Nos. 156-209, 329-380—Dupuis, Nos. 96-149, 282-301—Bernsten, § 8—Marsden, Early Prize Jurisdiction and Prize Law in England in The English Historical Review, XXIV. (1909), p. 675; XXV. (1910), p. 243; XXVI. (1911) p. 34—Roscoe, The Growth of English Law (1911), pp. 92-140. See also the literature quoted by Bonfils at the commencement of No. 1396.

Hall, §§ 149-152, 171, 269—Lawrence, §§ 183-191—Westlake, II. pp. 156-160—Phillimore, III. §§ 345-381—Twiss, II. §§ 72-97—Halleck, II. pp. 362-431, 510-526—Taylor, §§ 552-567—Wharton, III. § 345—Wheaton, §§ 355-394—Moore, VII. §§ 1206-1214—Bluntschli, §§ 672-673—Heffter, §§ 137-138—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 588-596—Ullmann, § 189—Bonfils, Nos. 1396-1440—Despagnet, Nos. 670-682—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3179-3207—Rivier, II. § 66—Calvo, IV. §§ 2294-2366, V. §§ 3004-3034—Fiore, III. Nos. 1426-1443, and Code, Nos. 1693-1706—Martens, II. §§ 125-126—Pillet, pp. 342-352—Perels, §§ 36, 55-58—Testa, pp. 147-160—Valin, Traité des prises, 2 vols. (1758-60), and Commentaire sur l'ordonnance de 1681, 2 vols. (1766)—Pistoye et Duverdy, Traité des prises maritimes, 2 vols. (1854-1859)—Upton, The Law of Nations affecting Commerce during War (1863)—Boeck, Nos. 156-209, 329-380—Dupuis, Nos. 96-149, 282-301—Bernsten, § 8—Marsden, Early Prize Jurisdiction and Prize Law in England in The English Historical Review, XXIV. (1909), p. 675; XXV. (1910), p. 243; XXVI. (1911) p. 34—Roscoe, The Growth of English Law (1911), pp. 92-140. See also the literature quoted by Bonfils at the start of No. 1396.

Prize Courts.

Prize Courts.

§ 192. It has already been stated above, in § 185, that the capture of a private enemy vessel has to be confirmed by a Prize Court, and that it is only through the latter's adjudication that the vessel becomes finally appropriated. The origin[379] of Prize Courts is to be traced back to the end of the Middle Ages. During the Middle Ages, after the Roman Empire had broken up, a state of lawlessness established itself on the High Seas. Piratical vessels of the Danes covered the North Sea and the Baltic, and navigation of the Mediterranean Sea was threatened by Greek and Saracen pirates. Merchantmen, therefore, associated themselves for mutual protection and sailed as a merchant fleet under a specially elected chief, the[Pg 239] so-called Admiral. They also occasionally sent out a fleet of armed vessels for the purpose of sweeping pirates from certain parts of the High Seas. Piratical vessels and goods which were captured were divided among the captors according to a decision of their Admiral. During the thirteenth century the maritime States of Europe themselves endeavoured to keep order on the Open Sea. By-and-by armed vessels were obliged to be furnished with Letters Patent or Letters of Marque from the Sovereign of a maritime State and their captures submitted to the official control of such State as had furnished them with their Letters. A board, called the Admiralty, was instituted by maritime States, and officers of that Board of Admiralty exercised control over the armed vessels and their captures, inquiring in each case[380] into the legitimation of the captor and the nationality of the captured vessel and her goods. And after modern International Law had grown up, it was a recognised customary rule that in time of war the Admiralty of maritime belligerents should be obliged to institute a Court[381] or Courts whenever a prize was captured by public vessels or privateers in order to decide whether the capture was lawful or not. These Courts were called Prize Courts. This institution has come down to our times, and nowadays all maritime States either constitute permanent Prize Courts, or appoint them specially in each case of an outbreak of war. The whole institution is essentially one in the interest of neutrals, since belligerents want to be guarded by a decision of a Court against claims of neutral States regarding alleged unjustified capture of neutral vessels and goods. The[Pg 240] capture of any private vessel, whether prima facie belonging to an enemy or a neutral, must, therefore, be submitted to a Prize Court. Article 1 of Convention XII. (as yet unratified) of the Second Peace Conference now expressly enacts the old customary rule that "the validity of the capture of a merchantman or its cargo, when neutral or enemy property is involved, is decided before a Prize Court." It must, however, be emphasised that the ordinary Prize-Courts are not International Courts, but National Courts instituted by Municipal Law, and that the law they administer is Municipal Law,[382] based on custom, statutes, or special regulations of their State. Every State is, however, bound by International Law to enact only such statutes and regulations[383] for its Prize Courts as are in conformity with International Law. A State may, therefore, instead of making special regulations, directly order its Prize Courts to apply the rules of International Law, and it is understood that, when no statutes are enacted or regulations are given, Prize Courts have to apply International Law. Prize Courts may be instituted by belligerents in any part of their territory or the territories of allies, but not on neutral territory. It would nowadays constitute a breach of neutrality on the part of a neutral State to allow the institution on its territory of a Prize Court.[384]

§ 192. As mentioned earlier in § 185, the capture of a private enemy vessel must be approved by a Prize Court, and it is only through the court's ruling that the vessel can be finally claimed. The origin[379] of Prize Courts goes back to the end of the Middle Ages. During the Middle Ages, after the fall of the Roman Empire, the seas became lawless. Pirate ships from the Danes roamed the North Sea and the Baltic, while Greek and Saracen pirates threatened navigation in the Mediterranean Sea. To protect themselves, merchant ships banded together and sailed as a fleet under a specially elected leader, known as the[Pg 239] Admiral. They occasionally sent out armed ships to clear pirates from certain areas of the seas. The seized pirate ships and goods were distributed among the captors based on a decision made by their Admiral. In the 13th century, maritime states in Europe began trying to maintain order on the open sea. Over time, armed ships were required to have Letters Patent or Letters of Marque from the ruler of a maritime state, and their captures had to be submitted to the official oversight of that state. A board, called the Admiralty, was established by these states, and the officers of the Admiralty regulated the armed vessels and their captures, checking each case[380] for the legitimacy of the captor and the nationality of the seized vessel and its goods. Once modern International Law developed, it became a recognized customary rule that during wartime, the Admiralty of warring states had to establish a Court[381] whenever a prize was taken by public vessels or privateers to determine whether the capture was lawful. These courts were called Prize Courts. This system continues to the present day, and nowadays all maritime states either maintain permanent Prize Courts or appoint them specifically when a war breaks out. The entire institution primarily serves the interests of neutral parties because warring states want to be protected by a court's ruling against claims from neutral states regarding alleged unlawful captures of their vessels and goods. The[Pg 240] capture of any private vessel, whether clearly belonging to an enemy or a neutral, must therefore be submitted to a Prize Court. Article 1 of Convention XII. (still unratified) of the Second Peace Conference explicitly states the old customary rule that "the validity of capturing a merchant ship or its cargo when neutral or enemy property is involved is determined by a Prize Court." It should be noted, however, that ordinary Prize Courts are not International Courts, but National Courts established by Municipal Law, and the law they apply is Municipal Law,[382] based on customs, statutes, or specific regulations of their state. Every state is, however, obligated by International Law to enact only those statutes and regulations[383] for its Prize Courts that align with International Law. Therefore, a state may instruct its Prize Courts to apply the rules of International Law without creating special regulations, and it is understood that when no statutes or regulations are in place, Prize Courts must apply International Law. Prize Courts can be established by warring parties anywhere in their territory or in that of their allies, but not on neutral territory. Allowing the establishment of a Prize Court on neutral territory would now be considered a violation of neutrality by that neutral state.[384]

[379] I follow the excellent summary of the facts given by Twiss, II. §§ 74-75, but Marsden's articles in The English Historical Review, XXIV. (1909), p. 675, XXV. (1910), p. 243, XXVI. (1911), p. 34, must likewise be referred to.

[379] I refer to the excellent summary of the facts provided by Twiss, II. §§ 74-75, but Marsden's articles in The English Historical Review, XXIV. (1909), p. 675, XXV. (1910), p. 243, XXVI. (1911), p. 34, should also be noted.

[380] The first case that is mentioned as having led to judicial proceedings before the Admiral in England dates from 1357; see Marsden, loc. cit. XXIV. (1909), p. 680.

[380] The first case noted that resulted in legal action before the Admiral in England is from 1357; see Marsden, loc. cit. XXIV. (1909), p. 680.

[381] In England an Order in Council, dated July 20, 1589, first provided that all captures should be submitted to the High Court of Admiralty; see Marsden, loc. cit. XXIV. (1909), p. 690.

[381] In England, an Order in Council from July 20, 1589, first established that all captures must be presented to the High Court of Admiralty; see Marsden, loc. cit. XXIV. (1909), p. 690.

[382] See below, § 434.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[383] The constitution and procedure of Prize Courts in Great Britain are governed by the Naval Prize Act, 1864 (27 and 28 Vict. ch. 25), and the Prize Courts Act, 1894 (57 and 58 Vict. ch. 39). The Naval Prize Bill introduced by the British Government in 1911, although accepted by the House of Commons, was thrown out by the House of Lords.—It should be mentioned that the Institute of International Law has in various meetings occupied itself with the whole matter of capture, and adopted a body of rules in the Règlement international des Prises Maritimes, which represent a code of Prize Law; see Annuaire, IX. pp. 218-243, but also XVI. pp. 44 and 311.

[383] The structure and procedures of Prize Courts in Great Britain are governed by the Naval Prize Act of 1864 (27 and 28 Vict. ch. 25) and the Prize Courts Act of 1894 (57 and 58 Vict. ch. 39). The Naval Prize Bill introduced by the British Government in 1911 was accepted by the House of Commons but rejected by the House of Lords.—It should be noted that the Institute of International Law has discussed the entire issue of capture at various meetings and has adopted a set of rules in the Règlement international des Prises Maritimes, which serve as a code of Prize Law; see Annuaire, IX. pp. 218-243, as well as XVI. pp. 44 and 311.

[384] See below, § 327, and article 4 of Convention XIII. of the Second Peace Conference.

[384] See below, § 327, and article 4 of Convention XIII of the Second Peace Conference.

Whereas the ordinary Prize Courts are national courts, Convention XII.—as yet unratified—of the[Pg 241] Second Peace Conference, provides for the establishment of an International[385] Prize Court at the Hague, which, in certain matters, is to serve as a Court of Appeal in prize cases. In these cases jurisdiction in matters of prize is exercised, in the first instance, by the Prize Courts of belligerents (article 2), but, according to article 6, the national Prize Courts may not deal with any case in which there is a second appeal; since such cases necessarily come before the International Prize Court at the second appeal. This means that belligerents, besides Prize Courts of the first instance, may set up a Prize Court of Appeal, but they may not set up a second Court of Appeal above the first, except in cases in which the International Prize Court has no jurisdiction.

Whereas the regular Prize Courts are national courts, Convention XII—still not ratified—of the[Pg 241] Second Peace Conference establishes an International[385] Prize Court in The Hague, which is supposed to act as a Court of Appeal for certain prize cases. In these situations, the Prize Courts of the warring parties initially have jurisdiction (article 2), but according to article 6, the national Prize Courts cannot handle any case that allows for a second appeal; these cases must go to the International Prize Court for the second appeal. This means that warring parties can set up a Prize Court of Appeal in addition to the initial Prize Courts, but they cannot create a second Court of Appeal above the first, except for cases where the International Prize Court lacks jurisdiction.

It must be specially observed that the proposed International Prize Court—see articles 3 and 4—is, in the main, a Court to decide between belligerents and neutrals, and not between two belligerents.

It should be specifically noted that the proposed International Prize Court—see articles 3 and 4—is primarily a court to resolve disputes between belligerents and neutrals, rather than between two belligerents.

Conduct of Prize to port of Prize Court.

Conduct of Prize to port of Prize Court.

§ 193. As soon as a vessel is seized she must be conducted to a port where a Prize Court is sitting. As a rule the officer and the crew sent on board the prize by the captor will navigate the prize to the port. This officer can ask the master and crew of the vessel to assist him, but, if they refuse, they may not be compelled thereto. The captor need not accompany the prize to the port. In the exceptional case, however, where an officer and crew cannot be sent on board and the captured vessel is ordered to lower her flag and to steer according to orders, the captor must conduct the prize to the port. To which port a prize is to be taken is not for International Law to determine; the latter says only that the prize must be taken straight to a port of a Prize Court, and only in case of distress or necessity is delay allowed. If the neutral State concerned[Pg 242] gives permission,[386] the prize may, in case of distress or in case she is in such bad condition as prevents her from being taken to a port of a Prize Court, be taken to a near neutral port, and, if admitted, the capturing man-of-war as well as the prize enjoy there the privilege of exterritoriality. But as soon as circumstances allow, the prize must be conducted from the neutral port to that of the Prize Court, and only if the condition of the prize does not at all allow this, may the Prize Court give its verdict in the absence of the prize after the ship papers of the prize and witnesses have been produced before it.

§ 193. As soon as a vessel is seized, it must be taken to a port where a Prize Court is in session. Generally, the officer and crew assigned to the prize by the captor will steer the prize to the port. This officer may ask the master and crew of the seized vessel for assistance, but if they refuse, they cannot be forced to help. The captor does not need to accompany the prize to the port. In exceptional cases, when an officer and crew cannot be assigned to the prize, and the captured vessel is instructed to lower its flag and follow commands, the captor must take the prize to the port. The choice of which port to take a prize is not determined by International Law; it only states that the prize must go directly to a court's port, with delays allowed only in cases of distress or necessity. If the neutral state involved grants permission,[Pg 242][386] the prize may, if it is in distress or in such poor condition that it cannot reach a Prize Court port, be taken to a nearby neutral port. If admitted, both the capturing warship and the prize enjoy the privilege of extraterritoriality there. However, as soon as circumstances permit, the prize must be transported from the neutral port to the Prize Court port, and only if the prize is not in a condition to allow this can the Prize Court issue a ruling in the absence of the prize, after the ship's papers and witness statements have been presented.

[386] See below, § 328, and articles 21-23 of Convention XIII. of the Second Peace Conference.

[386] See below, § 328, and articles 21-23 of Convention XIII of the Second Peace Conference.

The whole of the crew of the prize are, as a rule, to be kept on board and to be brought before the Prize Court. But if this is impracticable, several important members of the crew, such as the master, mate, or supercargo, must be kept on board, whereas the others may be removed and forwarded to the port of the Prize Court by other means of transport. The whole of the cargo is, as a rule, also to remain on board the prize. But if the whole or part of the cargo is in a condition which prevents it from being sent to the port of the Prize Court, it may, according to the needs of the case, either be destroyed or sold in the nearest port, and in the latter case an account of the sale has to be sent to the Prize Court. All neutral goods amongst the cargo are also to be taken to the port of adjudication, although they have now, according to the Declaration of Paris, to be restored to their neutral owners. But if such neutral goods are not in a condition to be taken to the port of adjudication, they may likewise be sold or destroyed, as the case may require.

The entire crew of the captured ship must generally stay onboard and appear before the Prize Court. However, if that’s not possible, key crew members like the captain, mate, or supercargo must remain on the ship, while the others can be transferred to the port of the Prize Court by different means. Typically, all the cargo should also stay on the prize ship. But if some or all of the cargo can’t be sent to the Prize Court for any reason, it may be disposed of or sold at the nearest port, and in the case of a sale, a report needs to be sent to the Prize Court. All neutral goods in the cargo must also be taken to the adjudication port, but according to the Declaration of Paris, they need to be returned to their neutral owners. If those neutral goods aren’t in a state to be taken to the adjudication port, they may also be sold or destroyed, depending on the situation.

Destruction of Prize.

Prize Destruction.

§ 194. Since through adjudication by the Prize Courts the ownership of captured private enemy vessels[Pg 243] becomes finally transferred to the belligerent whose forces made the capture, it is evident that after transfer the captured vessel as well as her cargo may be destroyed. On the other hand, it is likewise evident that, since a verdict of a Prize Court is necessary before the appropriation of the prize becomes final, a captured merchantman must not as a rule be destroyed instead of being conducted to the port of a Prize Court. There are, however, exceptions to the rule, but no unanimity exists in theory or practice as regards those exceptions. Whereas some[387] consider the destruction of a prize allowable only in case of imperative necessity, others[388] allow it in nearly every case of convenience. Thus, the Government of the United States of America, on the outbreak of war with England in 1812, instructed the commanders of her vessels to destroy at once all captures, the very valuable excepted, because a single cruiser, however successful, could man a few prizes only, but by destroying each capture would be able to continue capturing, and thereby constantly diminish the enemy merchant fleet.[389] During the Civil War in America the cruisers of the Southern Confederated States destroyed all enemy prizes because there was no port open for them to bring prizes to. And during the Russo-Japanese War, Russian cruisers destroyed twenty-one captured Japanese merchantmen.[390] According to British practice,[391] the captor is allowed to destroy the prize in only two cases—namely, first, when the prize is in such a condition as prevents her from being sent to any port of adjudication; and, secondly, when the capturing vessel is unable to spare a prize crew to navigate[Pg 244] the prize into such a port. The Règlement international des prises maritimes of the Institute of International Law enumerates in § 50 five cases in which destruction of the capture is allowed—namely (1) when the condition of the vessel and the weather make it impossible to keep the prize afloat; (2) when the vessel navigates so slowly that she cannot follow the captor and is therefore exposed to an easy recapture by the enemy; (3) when the approach of a superior enemy force creates the fear that the prize might be recaptured by the enemy; (4) when the captor cannot spare a prize crew; (5) when the port of adjudication to which the prize might be taken is too far from the spot where the capture was made. Be that as it may,[392] in every case of destruction of the vessel the captor must remove crew, ship papers, and, if possible, the cargo, before the destruction of the prize, and must afterwards send crew, papers, and cargo to a port of a Prize Court for the purpose of satisfying the latter that both the capture and the destruction were lawful.

§ 194. Since the Prize Courts ultimately transfer ownership of captured enemy private vessels[Pg 243] to the belligerent forces that made the capture, it's clear that once the transfer happens, the captured vessel and its cargo can be destroyed. However, it's also clear that a decision from a Prize Court is necessary before the capture can be finalized, so generally, a captured merchant ship should not be destroyed but taken to a Prize Court port. There are exceptions to this rule, but there is no consensus in theory or practice regarding those exceptions. Some[387] believe destroying a prize is only acceptable in cases of urgent necessity, while others[388] allow it in nearly any situation of convenience. For example, when the War of 1812 broke out, the U.S. government instructed its commanders to destroy all captures immediately, except for the very valuable ones, because a single cruiser, no matter how successful, could only handle a few prizes, but by destroying each one, they could continue capturing and reduce the enemy's merchant fleet. [389] During the American Civil War, cruisers from the Southern Confederacy destroyed all enemy prizes because there were no ports available to bring them to. And in the Russo-Japanese War, Russian cruisers destroyed twenty-one captured Japanese merchant ships.[390] According to British practice,[391] a captor is allowed to destroy a prize only in two situations—first, when the prize is in such a condition that it cannot be sent to any adjudication port; and second, when the capturing vessel cannot spare a crew to navigate[Pg 244] the prize to such a port. The Règlement international des prises maritimes from the Institute of International Law outlines in § 50 five instances where destruction of a capture is permitted—namely (1) when the vessel's condition and weather make it impossible to keep the prize afloat; (2) when the vessel is moving so slowly that it cannot follow the captor and is thus easily recaptured by the enemy; (3) when a superior enemy force approaches, causing fear that the prize might be retaken; (4) when the captor cannot provide a prize crew; (5) when the adjudication port is too far from where the capture occurred. Regardless,[392] in every case of a vessel's destruction, the captor must remove the crew, ship documents, and, if possible, the cargo, before destroying the prize and must subsequently send the crew, documents, and cargo to a Prize Court port to prove that both the capture and destruction were lawful.

[387] See, for instance, Bluntschli, § 672.

[387] Check out Bluntschli, § 672, for example.

[388] See, for instance, Martens, § 126, who moreover makes no difference between the prize being an enemy or a neutral ship.

[388] For example, see Martens, § 126, who also doesn't differentiate between whether the prize is an enemy ship or a neutral one.

[389] U.S. Naval War Code (article 14) allows the destruction "in case of military or other necessity."

[389] The U.S. Naval War Code (article 14) permits destruction "in cases of military or other necessity."

[390] See Takahashi, pp. 284-310.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Takahashi, pp. 284-310.

[391] The Actaeon (1815), 2 Dod. 48; the Felicity (1819), 2 Dod. 381; the Leucade (1855), Spinks, 217. See also Holland, Prize Law, §§ 303-304.

[391] The Actaeon (1815), 2 Dod. 48; the Felicity (1819), 2 Dod. 381; the Leucade (1855), Spinks, 217. See also Holland, Prize Law, §§ 303-304.

[392] The whole matter is thoroughly discussed by Boeck, Nos. 268-285; Dupuis, Nos. 262-268; and Calvo, V. §§ 3028-3034. As regards destruction of a neutral prize, see below, § 431.

[392] The entire issue is extensively covered by Boeck, Nos. 268-285; Dupuis, Nos. 262-268; and Calvo, V. §§ 3028-3034. For information on the destruction of a neutral prize, see below, § 431.

But if destruction of a captured enemy merchantman can as an exception be lawful, the question as to indemnities to be paid to the neutral owners of goods carried by the destroyed vessel requires attention. It seems to be obvious that, if the destruction of the vessel herself was lawful, and if it was not possible to remove her cargo, no indemnities need be paid. An illustrative case happened during the Franco-German War. On October 21, 1870, the French cruiser Dessaix seized two German merchantmen, the Ludwig and the Vorwärts, but burned them because she could not spare a prize crew to navigate the prizes into a French port. The neutral owners of part of the cargo claimed indemnities, but the French Conseil d'État refused to[Pg 245] grant indemnities on the ground that the action of the captor was lawful.[393]

But if destroying a captured enemy merchant ship can be considered lawful in some cases, then we need to address the issue of compensation for the neutral owners of goods that were on the destroyed vessel. It seems clear that if destroying the ship itself was lawful and it wasn’t possible to remove its cargo, then no compensation is required. A related example occurred during the Franco-German War. On October 21, 1870, the French cruiser Dessaix captured two German merchant ships, the Ludwig and the Vorwärts, but set them on fire because she couldn’t spare a crew to take them to a French port. The neutral owners of some of the cargo demanded compensation, but the French Conseil d'État denied the claims on the grounds that the captor’s actions were lawful.[Pg 245][393]

[393] See Boeck, No. 146; Barboux, p. 153; Calvo, V. § 3033; Dupuis, No. 262; Hall, § 269. Should the International Prize Court at the Hague be established, article 3 of Convention XII. of the Second Peace Conference would enable the owners of neutral goods destroyed with the destroyed enemy merchantmen that carried them to bring the question as to whether they may claim damages before this Court.

[393] See Boeck, No. 146; Barboux, p. 153; Calvo, V. § 3033; Dupuis, No. 262; Hall, § 269. If the International Prize Court in The Hague is established, article 3 of Convention XII from the Second Peace Conference would allow the owners of neutral goods that were destroyed along with the enemy merchant ships carrying them to ask this Court whether they can claim damages.

Ransom of Prize.

Ransom of Prize.

§ 195. Although prizes have as a rule to be brought before a Prize Court, International Law nevertheless does not forbid the ransoming of the captured vessel either directly after the capture or after she has been conducted to the port of a Prize Court, but before the Court has given its verdict. However, the practice of accepting and paying ransom, which grew up in the seventeenth century, is in many countries now prohibited by Municipal Law. Thus, for instance, Great Britain by section 45 of the Naval Prize Act, 1864, prohibits ransoming except in such cases as may be specially provided for by an Order of the King in Council.[394] Where ransom is accepted, a contract of ransom is entered into by the captor and the master of the captured vessel; the latter gives a so-called ransom bill to the former, in which he promises the amount of the ransom. He is given a copy of the ransom bill for the purpose of a safe-conduct to protect[Pg 246] his vessel from again being captured, under the condition that he keeps the course to such port as is agreed upon in the ransom bill. To secure the payment of ransom, an officer of the captured vessel can be detained as hostage, otherwise the whole of the crew is to be liberated with the vessel, ransom being an equivalent for both the restoration of the prize and the release of her crew from captivity. So long as the ransom bill is not paid, the hostage can be kept in captivity. But it is exclusively a matter for the Municipal Law of the State concerned to determine whether or no the captor can sue upon the ransom bill, if the ransom is not voluntarily paid.[395] Should the capturing vessel, with the hostage or the ransom bill on board, be captured herself and thus become a prize of the enemy, the hostage is liberated, the ransom bill loses its effect, and need not be paid.[396]

§ 195. While prizes usually need to be presented to a Prize Court, International Law does allow for the ransoming of a captured vessel either right after the capture or after it's brought to the port of a Prize Court, as long as the Court hasn’t made its ruling yet. However, the practice of accepting and paying ransom, which began in the seventeenth century, is now illegal in many countries due to Municipal Law. For example, Great Britain, through section 45 of the Naval Prize Act, 1864, bans ransoming except in specific situations granted by an Order of the King in Council.[394] When ransom is accepted, a ransom contract is created between the captor and the master of the captured vessel; the latter issues a so-called ransom bill to the former, promising the ransom amount. He receives a copy of the ransom bill for safe conduct to protect[Pg 246] his vessel from being recaptured, provided he steers to the agreed-upon port mentioned in the ransom bill. To ensure the ransom payment, an officer from the captured vessel can be held as a hostage, or else the entire crew is to be released along with the vessel, with the ransom acting as compensation for both the return of the prize and the release of her crew. As long as the ransom bill remains unpaid, the hostage can be kept in captivity. However, it is solely up to the Municipal Law of the relevant State to decide whether the captor can take legal action on the ransom bill if it is not paid voluntarily.[395] If the capturing vessel, with the hostage or the ransom bill on board, is captured itself and becomes a prize of the enemy, the hostage is released, the ransom bill is rendered void, and does not need to be paid.[396]

[394] Article 40 of the Naval Prize Bill of 1911 runs as follows:—

[394] Article 40 of the Naval Prize Bill of 1911 states:—

(1) His Majesty in Council may, in relation to any war, make such orders as may seem expedient according to circumstances for prohibiting or allowing, wholly or in certain cases or subject to any conditions or regulations or otherwise as may from time to time seem meet, the ransoming or the entering into any contract or agreement for the ransoming of any ship or goods belonging to any of His Majesty's subjects, and taken as prize by any of His Majesty's enemies.

(1) The King in Council may, in connection with any war, issue orders that he finds necessary based on the situation to either prohibit or allow, fully or in certain cases, or under specific conditions or rules, the ransoming or entering into any contract or agreement for the ransoming of any ship or goods owned by His Majesty's subjects that have been seized as prizes by His Majesty's enemies.

(2) Any contract or agreement entered into, and any bill, bond, or other security given for ransom of any ship or goods, shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court as a Prize Court (subject to appeal to the Supreme Prize Court) and if entered into or given in contravention to any such Order in Council shall be deemed to have been entered into or given for an illegal consideration.

(2) Any contract or agreement made, and any bill, bond, or other security provided for the ransom of any ship or goods, will be solely under the authority of the High Court as a Prize Court (subject to appeal to the Supreme Prize Court). If such contracts or securities are made or given in violation of any Order in Council, they will be considered to have been made or provided for illegal reasons.

(3) If any person ransoms or enters into any contract or agreement for ransoming any ship or goods, in contravention of any such Order in Council, he shall for every such offence be liable to be proceeded against in the High Court at the suit of His Majesty in his office of Admiralty, and on conviction to be fined, in the discretion of the Court, any sum not exceeding five hundred pounds.

(3) If anyone pays a ransom or makes any contract or agreement to ransom any ship or goods, against any such Order in Council, they can be taken to the High Court by His Majesty in his office of Admiralty for each offence, and if found guilty, they may be fined, at the Court's discretion, up to five hundred pounds.

[395] See Hall, § 151, p. 479:—"The English Courts refuse to accept such arrangements (for ransom) from the effect of the rule that the character of an alien enemy carries with it a disability to sue, and compel payment of the debt indirectly through an action brought by the imprisoned hostage for the recovery of his freedom." The American Courts, in contradistinction to the British, recognise ransom bills. See on the one hand, the case of Cornu v. Blackburne (1781), 2 Douglas, 640, Anthon v. Fisher (1782), 2 Douglas, 649 note, the Hoop, 1 C. Rob. 201; and, on the other, Goodrich and De Forest v. Gordon (1818), 15 Johnson, 6.

[395] See Hall, § 151, p. 479:—"The English Courts refuse to accept such arrangements (for ransom) due to the rule that being an enemy alien prevents one from suing, and they cannot force payment of the debt indirectly through an action brought by the imprisoned hostage to regain his freedom." In contrast, American Courts recognize ransom bills. For example, consider the case of Cornu v. Blackburne (1781), 2 Douglas, 640, Anthon v. Fisher (1782), 2 Douglas, 649 note, The Hoop, 1 C. Rob. 201; and on the other hand, Goodrich and De Forest v. Gordon (1818), 15 Johnson, 6.

[396] The matter of ransom is treated with great lucidity by Twiss, II. §§ 180-183; Boeck, Nos. 257-267; Dupuis, Nos. 269-277.

[396] The topic of ransom is explained very clearly by Twiss, II. §§ 180-183; Boeck, Nos. 257-267; Dupuis, Nos. 269-277.

Loss of Prize, especially Recapture.

Loss of Prize, especially Recapture.

§ 196. A prize is lost—(1) when the captor intentionally abandons her, (2) when she escapes through being rescued by her own crew, or (3) when she is recaptured. Just as through capture the prize becomes, according to International Law, the property of the belligerent whose forces made the capture, provided a Prize Court confirms the capture, so such property is lost when the prize vessel becomes abandoned, or escapes, or is recaptured. And it seems to be obvious, and everywhere recognised by Municipal Law, that as soon as a captured enemy merchantman succeeds in escaping, the proprietorship of the former owners[Pg 247] revives ipso facto. But the case is different when a captured vessel, whose crew has been taken on board the capturing vessel, is abandoned and afterwards met and taken possession of by a neutral vessel or by a vessel of her home State. It is certainly not for International Law to determine whether or not the original proprietorship revives through abandonment. This is a matter for Municipal Law. The case of recapture is different from escape. Here too Municipal Law has to determine whether or no the former proprietorship revives, since International Law lays down the rule only that recapture takes the vessel out of the property of the enemy and brings her into the property of the belligerent whose forces made the recapture. Municipal Law of the individual States has settled the matter in different ways. Thus, Great Britain, by section 40 of the Naval Prize Act, 1864, enacted that the recaptured vessel, except when she has been used by the captor as a ship of war, shall be restored to her former owner on his paying one-eighth to one-fourth, as the Prize Court may award, of her value as prize salvage, no matter if the recapture was made before or after the enemy Prize Court had confirmed the capture.[397] Other States restore a recaptured vessel only when the recapture was made within twenty-four hours[398] after the capture occurred, or before the captured vessel was conducted into an enemy port, or before she was condemned by an enemy Prize Court.

§ 196. A prize is lost—(1) when the captor intentionally abandons it, (2) when it escapes by being rescued by its own crew, or (3) when it is recaptured. Just as through capture the prize becomes, under International Law, the property of the belligerent whose forces made the capture, provided a Prize Court confirms the capture, so this property is lost when the prize vessel is abandoned, escapes, or is recaptured. It seems obvious, and is universally acknowledged by Municipal Law, that as soon as a captured enemy merchant ship successfully escapes, the ownership of the original owners [Pg 247] is automatically restored ipso facto. However, the situation is different when a captured vessel, whose crew has been taken on board the capturing vessel, is abandoned and later encountered and taken over by a neutral vessel or by a vessel from her home State. It is clearly not for International Law to decide if the original ownership is restored through abandonment. This is a matter for Municipal Law. The situation of recapture is distinct from escape. Here too, Municipal Law must decide whether the previous ownership is restored, since International Law only states that recapture takes the vessel out of the enemy's property and transfers it to the property of the belligerent whose forces achieved the recapture. The Municipal Law of different States has addressed this in various ways. For example, Great Britain, through section 40 of the Naval Prize Act, 1864, stated that a recaptured vessel, unless it has been used by the captor as a warship, shall be returned to its original owner upon their payment of one-eighth to one-fourth, as determined by the Prize Court, of its value as prize salvage, regardless of whether the recapture occurred before or after the enemy Prize Court confirmed the capture.[397] Other States return a recaptured vessel only if the recapture occurred within twenty-four hours [398] of the capture, or before the captured vessel was taken into an enemy port, or before it was condemned by an enemy Prize Court.

[397] Article 30 of the Naval Prize Bill introduced in 1911 simply enacts that British merchantmen or goods captured by the enemy and recaptured by a British man-of-war shall be restored to the owner by a decree of the Prize Court.

[397] Article 30 of the Naval Prize Bill introduced in 1911 states that British merchant ships or goods taken by the enemy and then recaptured by a British warship will be returned to the owner by a ruling of the Prize Court.

[398] So, for instance, France; see Dupuis, Nos. 278-279.

[398] For example, France; see Dupuis, Nos. 278-279.

Fate of Prize.

Fate of Prize.

§ 197. Through being captured and afterwards condemned by a Prize Court, a captured enemy vessel and captured enemy goods become the property of the belligerent whose forces made the capture. What[Pg 248] becomes of the prize after the condemnation is not for International, but for Municipal Law to determine. A belligerent can hand the prize over to the officers and crew who made the capture, or can keep her altogether for himself, or can give a share to those who made the capture. As a rule, prizes are sold after they are condemned, and the whole or a part of the net proceeds is distributed among the officers and crew who made the capture. For Great Britain this distribution is regulated by the "Royal Proclamation as to Distribution of Prize Money" of August 3, 1886.[399] There is no doubt whatever that, if a neutral subject buys a captured ship after her condemnation, she may not be attacked and captured by the belligerent to whose subject she formerly belonged, although, if she is bought by an enemy subject and afterwards captured, she might be restored[400] to her former owner.

§ 197. When an enemy ship is captured and later condemned by a Prize Court, the ship and any captured enemy goods become the property of the belligerent forces that made the capture. What happens to the prize after the condemnation is determined by municipal law, not international law. A belligerent can give the prize to the officers and crew who made the capture, keep it for themselves, or share it with those who made the capture. Usually, prizes are sold after condemnation, and the total or a portion of the net proceeds is distributed among the officers and crew involved in the capture. In Great Britain, this distribution is governed by the "Royal Proclamation as to Distribution of Prize Money" from August 3, 1886.[399] There’s no question that if a neutral party buys a captured ship after it’s been condemned, it cannot be attacked and recaptured by the belligerent to which it originally belonged. However, if it is purchased by an enemy party and then recaptured, it may be returned[400] to its former owner.

[399] See Holland, Prize Law, pp. 142-150.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Holland, Prize Law, pp. 142-150.

[400] See above, § 196.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Vessels belonging to Subjects of Neutral States, but sailing under Enemy Flag.

Vessels owned by citizens of Neutral States but sailing under an Enemy Flag.

§ 198. It has been already stated above in § 89 that merchantmen owned by subjects of neutral States but sailing under enemy flag are vested with enemy character. It is, therefore, evident that they may be captured and condemned. As at present no non-littoral State has a maritime flag, vessels belonging to subjects of such States are forced to navigate under the flag of another State,[401] and they are, therefore, in case of war exposed to capture.

§ 198. It has been mentioned earlier in § 89 that merchant ships owned by citizens of neutral countries but sailing under an enemy flag are considered to have enemy status. Therefore, it is clear that they can be seized and condemned. Currently, since no non-coastal country has its own maritime flag, vessels owned by citizens of those countries must sail under the flag of another country,[401] which means they are at risk of being captured in the event of war.

Effect of Sale of Enemy Vessels during War.

Effect of Selling Enemy Ships During War.

§ 199. Since enemy vessels are liable to capture, the question must be taken into consideration whether the fact that an enemy vessel has been sold during the war to a subject of a neutral or to a subject of the belligerent State whose forces seized her, has the effect of excluding her appropriation. It is obvious that, if the question is answered in the affirmative, the owners of enemy vessels can evade the danger of having their[Pg 249] property captured by selling their vessels. The question of transfer of enemy vessels must, therefore, be regarded as forming part of the larger questions of enemy character and has consequently been treated in detail above, § 91.

§ 199. Since enemy ships can be captured, we need to consider whether the sale of an enemy ship during the war to a person from a neutral country or to someone from the warring State that seized it prevents the ship from being taken. It’s clear that if the answer is yes, the owners of enemy ships could avoid the risk of losing their property by selling their ships. Therefore, the issue of transferring enemy ships should be seen as part of the broader questions relating to enemy status and has been discussed in detail above, § 91.

Goods sold by and to Enemy Subjects during War.

Goods sold by and to Enemy Subjects during War.

§ 200. If a captured enemy vessel carries goods consigned by enemy subjects to subjects of neutral States, or to subjects of the belligerent whose forces captured the vessel, they may not be appropriated, provided the consignee can prove that he is the owner. As regards such goods found on captured enemy merchantmen as are consigned to enemy subjects but have been sold in transitu to subjects of neutral States, no unanimous practice of the different States is in existence. The subject of goods sold in transitu must—in the same way as the question of transfer of enemy vessels—be considered as forming part of the larger question of enemy character. It has, for this reason, been treated above, § 92.

§ 200. If a captured enemy ship has goods sent by enemy individuals to individuals from neutral countries, or to individuals from the warring side that captured the ship, those goods cannot be taken, as long as the consignee can prove ownership. Regarding goods found on captured enemy merchant ships that are sent to enemy individuals but have been sold in transitu to individuals from neutral countries, there is no uniform practice among different nations. The issue of goods sold in transitu must be considered, just like the question of transferring enemy ships, as part of the broader issue of enemy status. For this reason, it has been discussed above, § 92.

IV Violence Against Enemy Combatants

See the literature quoted above at the commencement of § 107. See also Bonfils, Nos. 1273-12733

See the literature quoted above at the beginning of § 107. See also Bonfils, Nos. 1273-12733

Violence against Combatants.

Violence against fighters.

§ 201. As regards killing and wounding combatants in sea warfare and the means used for the purpose, customary rules of International Law are in existence according to which only those combatants may be killed or wounded who are able and willing to fight or who resist capture. Men disabled by sickness or wounds, or such men as lay down arms and surrender or do not resist capture, must be given quarter, except in a case of imperative necessity or of reprisals. Poison, and such arms, projectiles, and materials as cause[Pg 250] unnecessary injury, are prohibited, as is also killing and wounding in a treacherous way.[402] The Declaration of St. Petersburg[403] and the Hague Declaration prohibiting the use of expanding (Dum-Dum)[404] bullets, apply to sea warfare as well as to land warfare, as also do the Hague Declarations concerning projectiles and explosives launched from balloons, and projectiles diffusing asphyxiating or deleterious gases.[405]

§ 201. When it comes to killing and injuring combatants in naval warfare and the methods used for this purpose, there are customary rules of International Law that state only those combatants who are able and willing to fight, or who resist capture, may be killed or wounded. Individuals who are disabled by illness or injuries, or those who lay down their arms and surrender or do not resist capture, must be spared, except in cases of urgent necessity or retaliation. The use of poison, as well as weapons, projectiles, and materials that inflict unnecessary harm, is forbidden, and killing or wounding in a deceitful manner is also prohibited.[402] The Declaration of St. Petersburg[403] and the Hague Declaration against the use of expanding (Dum-Dum)[404] bullets apply to naval warfare just as they do to land warfare, as do the Hague Declarations regarding projectiles and explosives launched from balloons, and projectiles that release asphyxiating or harmful gases.[405]

[402] See the corresponding rules for warfare on land, which are discussed above in §§ 108-110. See also U.S. Naval War Code, article 3.

[402] Check out the relevant rules for land warfare, which are discussed earlier in §§ 108-110. Also, refer to the U.S. Naval War Code, article 3.

[403] See above,§ 111.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[404] See above, § 112.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[405] See above, §§ 113 and 114.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

All combatants, and also all officers and members of the crews of captured merchantmen, could formerly[406] be made prisoners of war. According to articles 5 to 7 of Convention XI. of the Second Peace Conference—see above in § 85—such members of the crews as are subjects of neutral States may never be made prisoners of war; but the captain, officers, and members of the crews who are enemy subjects, and, further, the captain and officers who are subjects of neutral States may be made prisoners of war in case they refuse to be released on parole. As soon as such prisoners are landed, their treatment falls under articles 4-20 of the Hague Regulations; but as long as they are on board, the old customary rule of International Law, that prisoners must be treated humanely,[407] and not like convicts, must be complied with. The Hague Convention for the adaptation of the Geneva Convention to sea warfare enacts, however, some particular rules concerning the shipwrecked, the wounded, and the sick who, through falling into the hands of the enemy, become prisoners of war.[408]

All combatants, as well as all officers and crew members of captured merchant ships, could previously[406] be taken as prisoners of war. According to Articles 5 to 7 of Convention XI from the Second Peace Conference—see above in § 85—crew members who are from neutral countries can never be taken as prisoners of war; however, the captain, officers, and crew members who are enemy nationals, as well as the captain and officers who are from neutral countries, can be taken as prisoners of war if they refuse to be released on parole. Once these prisoners are on land, their treatment is governed by Articles 4-20 of the Hague Regulations; but while they remain on board, the traditional rule of International Law that requires prisoners to be treated humanely,[407] and not like criminals, must be observed. The Hague Convention for adapting the Geneva Convention to maritime warfare does include specific rules regarding shipwrecked, wounded, and sick individuals who become prisoners of war after falling into enemy hands.[408]

[406] This was almost generally recognised, but was refused recognition by Count Bismarck during the Franco-German War (see below, § 249) and by some German publicists, as, for instance, Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 479, note 6.

[406] This was mostly accepted, but Count Bismarck denied it during the Franco-German War (see below, § 249) as did some German writers, such as Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 479, note 6.

[407] See Holland, Prize Law, § 249, and U.S. Naval War Code, articles 10, 11.

[407] See Holland, Prize Law, § 249, and U.S. Naval War Code, articles 10, 11.

[408] See below, § 205.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Violence against Non-combatant Members of Naval Forces.

Violence against Non-combatant Members of Naval Forces.

§ 202. Just as military forces consist of combatants[Pg 251] and non-combatants, so do the naval forces of belligerents. Non-combatants, as, for instance, stokers, surgeons, chaplains, members of the hospital staff, and the like, who do not take part in the fighting, may not be attacked directly and killed or wounded.[409] But they are exposed to all injuries indirectly resulting from attacks on or by their vessels. And they may certainly be made prisoners of war, with the exception of members of the religious, medical, and hospital staff, who are inviolable according to article 10 of the Hague Convention for the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention.[410]

§ 202. Just like military forces have combatants[Pg 251] and non-combatants, so do the naval forces of warring parties. Non-combatants, like stokers, surgeons, chaplains, hospital staff, and others who don’t engage in fighting, should not be attacked directly or killed or injured.[409] However, they can be affected by any harm that results indirectly from attacks on or by their ships. They can certainly be taken as prisoners of war, except for members of the religious, medical, and hospital staff, who are protected under article 10 of the Hague Convention regarding the adaptation of the principles of the Geneva Convention to maritime warfare.[410]

[409] See U.S. Naval War Code, article 3.

[409] Check the U.S. Naval War Code, article 3.

[410] See below, § 209.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Violence against Enemy Individuals not belonging to the Naval Forces.

Violence against enemy individuals not part of the naval forces.

§ 203. Since and so far as enemy individuals on board an attacked or seized enemy vessel who do not belong to the naval forces do not take part in the fighting, they may not directly be attacked and killed or wounded, although they are exposed to all injury indirectly resulting from an attack on or by their vessel. If they are mere private individuals, they may as an exception only and under the same circumstances as private individuals on occupied territory be made prisoners of war.[411] But they are nevertheless, for the time they are on board the captured vessel, under the discipline of the captor. All restrictive measures against them which are necessary are therefore lawful, as are also punishments, in case they do not comply with lawful orders of the commanding officer. If they are enemy officials in important positions,[412] they may be made prisoners of war.

§ 203. As long as enemy individuals on a vessel that has been attacked or captured, who are not part of the military forces, do not engage in combat, they cannot be directly attacked, killed, or injured, even though they may suffer indirectly from any attack on or from their vessel. If they are just private individuals, they may only be made prisoners of war in exceptional circumstances and under the same conditions as private individuals in occupied territory.[411] However, while they are on board the captured vessel, they are subject to the authority of the captor. Therefore, any necessary restrictions against them are lawful, as are punishments if they fail to follow legitimate orders from the commanding officer. If they are enemy officials in key roles,[412] they can be taken as prisoners of war.

[411] See U.S. Naval War Code, article 11, and above, § 116.

[411] See U.S. Naval War Code, article 11, and above, § 116.

[412] See above, § 117.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

V Caring for the injured and shipwrecked

Perels, § 37—Pillet, pp. 188-191—Westlake, II. pp. 275-280—Moore, VII. § 1178—Bernsten, § 12—Bonfils, Nos. 1280-12809—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. No. 3209—U.S. Naval War Code, articles 21-29—Ferguson, The Red Cross Alliance at Sea (1871)—Houette, De l'extension des principes de la Convention de Genève aux victimes des guerres maritimes (1892)—Cauwès, L'extension des principes de la Convention de Genève aux guerres maritimes (1899)—Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague (1900), pp. 120-132—Boidin, pp. 248-262—Dupuis, Guerre, Nos. 82-105—Meurer, II. §§ 74-87—Higgins, pp. 382-394—Lémonon, pp. 526-554—Nippold, II. § 33—Scott, Conferences, pp. 599-614—Takahashi, pp. 375-385—Fauchille in R.G. VI. (1899), pp. 291-302—Bayer, in R.G. VIII. (1901), pp. 225-230—Renault in A.J. II. pp. 295-306—Higgins, War and the Private Citizen (1912), pp. 73-90, and in The Law Quarterly Review, XXVI (1910), pp. 408-414. See also the literature quoted above at the commencement of § 118.

Perels, § 37—Pillet, pp. 188-191—Westlake, II. pp. 275-280—Moore, VII. § 1178—Bernsten, § 12—Bonfils, Nos. 1280-12809—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. No. 3209—U.S. Naval War Code, articles 21-29—Ferguson, The Red Cross Alliance at Sea (1871)—Houette, De l'extension des principes de la Convention de Genève aux victimes des guerres maritimes (1892)—Cauwès, L'extension des principes de la Convention de Genève aux guerres maritimes (1899)—Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague (1900), pp. 120-132—Boidin, pp. 248-262—Dupuis, Guerre, Nos. 82-105—Meurer, II. §§ 74-87—Higgins, pp. 382-394—Lémonon, pp. 526-554—Nippold, II. § 33—Scott, Conferences, pp. 599-614—Takahashi, pp. 375-385—Fauchille in R.G. VI. (1899), pp. 291-302—Bayer, in R.G. VIII. (1901), pp. 225-230—Renault in A.J. II. pp. 295-306—Higgins, War and the Private Citizen (1912), pp. 73-90, and in The Law Quarterly Review, XXVI (1910), pp. 408-414. See also the literature mentioned above at the beginning of § 118.

Adaptation of Geneva Convention to Sea Warfare.

Adaptation of the Geneva Convention for Maritime Warfare.

§ 204. Soon after the ratification of the Geneva Convention the necessity of adapting its principles to naval warfare was generally recognised, and among the non-ratified Additional articles to the Geneva Convention of 1868 were nine which aimed at such an adaptation. But it was not until the Hague Peace Conference in 1899 that an adaptation came into legal existence. This adaptation was contained in the "Convention[413] for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864," which comprised fourteen articles. It has, however, been replaced by the "Convention (X.) for the Adaptation of the Principles of the Geneva Convention to Maritime War," of the Second Hague Peace Conference. This new convention comprises twenty-eight articles and was signed, although with some reservations, by all the Powers represented at the Conference, except Nicaragua which acceded later, and it has already been ratified by most of the signatory Powers. It provides rules concerning the wounded,[Pg 253] sick, shipwrecked, and dead; hospital ships; sickbays on men-of-war; the distinctive colour and emblem of hospital ships; neutral vessels taking on board belligerent wounded, sick, or shipwrecked; the religious, medical, and hospital staff of captured ships; the carrying out of the convention, and the prevention of abuses and infractions.

§ 204. Soon after the Geneva Convention was ratified, it was widely recognized that its principles needed to be adapted for naval warfare. Among the additional articles that were not ratified from the Geneva Convention of 1868, there were nine aimed at this adaptation. However, it wasn't until the Hague Peace Conference in 1899 that such an adaptation was legally established. This adaptation was included in the "Convention[413] for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864," which had fourteen articles. It has now been replaced by the "Convention (X.) for the Adaptation of the Principles of the Geneva Convention to Maritime War," from the Second Hague Peace Conference. This new convention includes twenty-eight articles and was signed—albeit with some reservations—by all the Powers represented at the Conference, except for Nicaragua, which joined later. Most of the signatory Powers have already ratified it. It provides rules regarding the wounded,[Pg 253] sick, shipwrecked, and dead; hospital ships; sickbays on warships; the identifying color and emblem of hospital ships; neutral vessels taking on board injured, ill, or shipwrecked belligerents; the religious, medical, and hospital staff of captured ships; the enforcement of the convention; and the prevention of abuses and violations.

[413] Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXVI. p. 979.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXVI. p. 979.

The Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked.

The Injured, Ill, and Shipwrecked.

§ 205. Soldiers, sailors, and other persons officially attached to fleets or armies, whatever their nationality, who are taken on board when sick or wounded, must be respected and tended by the captors (article 11). All enemy shipwrecked, sick, or wounded who fall into the power of a belligerent are prisoners of war. It is left to the captor to determine whether they are to be kept on board, or to be sent to a port of his own country, or a neutral port, or even a hostile port; and in the last case such repatriated prisoners must be prevented by their Government from again serving in the war (article 14). The shipwrecked, wounded, or sick, who are landed at a neutral port with the consent of the local authorities, must, unless there is an arrangement to the contrary between the neutral State concerned and the belligerent States, be guarded by the neutral State so as to prevent them from again taking part in the war;[414] the expenses of tending and interning them must be borne by the State to whom they belong (article 15). After each engagement, both belligerents must, so far as military interests permit, take measures to search for the shipwrecked, wounded, and sick, and to ensure them protection against pillage and maltreatment (article 16). Each belligerent must, as early as possible, send to the authorities of their country, navy, or army, a list of the names of the sick and wounded picked up by him; and the belligerents must keep each other informed as to internments and[Pg 254] transfers as well as to admissions into hospital and deaths which have occurred amongst the sick and wounded in their hands. And they must collect all objects of personal use, valuables, letters, &c., that are found in the captured ships in order to have them forwarded to the persons concerned by the authorities of their own country (article 17).

§ 205. Soldiers, sailors, and others officially attached to fleets or armies, regardless of their nationality, who are taken on board when sick or injured, must be treated with respect and cared for by their captors (article 11). All enemy individuals who have been shipwrecked, sick, or wounded and come under the control of a warring party are considered prisoners of war. It is up to the captor to decide whether they will be kept on board, sent to a port in their own country, a neutral port, or even a hostile port; in the latter case, those repatriated must be prevented by their government from rejoining the conflict (article 14). The shipwrecked, wounded, or sick individuals who are taken to a neutral port with the approval of the local authorities must, unless there’s an arrangement to the contrary between the neutral state involved and the warring parties, be protected by the neutral state to prevent them from re-engaging in the war; the costs of their care and detention must be covered by the state they belong to (article 15). After each battle, both sides must, as much as military operations allow, take steps to search for the shipwrecked, wounded, and sick people, and to protect them from looting and mistreatment (article 16). Each warring party must, as soon as possible, send a list of the names of the sick and injured they have rescued to the authorities of their country, navy, or army; they must also keep each other updated on internments and transfers, as well as hospital admissions and deaths among the sick and injured in their custody. Additionally, they must gather all personal items, valuables, letters, etc., found on captured ships to ensure they are sent to the appropriate individuals by their own government (article 17).

[414] See below, § 348a.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, §__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Treatment of the Dead.

Treatment of the Deceased.

§ 205a. After each engagement both belligerents must, so far as military interests permit, take measures to ensure the dead protection against pillage and maltreatment, and they must see that the burial, whether by land or sea, or cremation of the dead is preceded by a careful examination of the corpses in order to determine that life is really extinct (article 16). Each belligerent must, as early as possible, send to the authorities of their country, navy, or army, the military identification marks or tokens found on the dead; they must also collect all the objects of personal use, valuables, letters, &c., which have been left by the wounded and sick who die in hospital, in order that they may be forwarded to the persons concerned by the authorities of their own country (article 17).

§ 205a. After each encounter, both sides involved in the conflict must, as long as military needs allow, take steps to protect the dead from looting and mistreatment. They must ensure that the burial, whether on land or at sea, or the cremation of the deceased is preceded by a thorough examination of the bodies to confirm that life has truly ended (article 16). Each side must, as soon as possible, report to their respective authorities—be it the government, navy, or army—the military identification marks or tokens found on the deceased. They must also gather all personal belongings, valuables, letters, etc., left by the wounded and sick who pass away in the hospital, so that these can be sent to the relevant individuals by their country's authorities (article 17).

Hospital Ships.

Floating Hospitals.

§ 206. Three different kinds of hospital ships must be distinguished—namely, military hospital ships, hospital ships equipped by private individuals or relief societies of the belligerents, and hospital ships equipped by private neutral individuals and neutral relief societies.

§ 206. Three different types of hospital ships need to be recognized—military hospital ships, hospital ships set up by private individuals or aid organizations from the warring parties, and hospital ships operated by private neutral individuals and neutral aid organizations.

(1) Military hospital ships (article 1) are ships constructed or assigned by States specially and solely for the purpose of assisting the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked. Their names must be communicated to the belligerents at the commencement of or during hostilities, and in any case before they are employed. They must be respected by the belligerents, they may not be captured while hostilities last, and they are not on[Pg 255] the same footing as men-of-war during their stay in a neutral port.

(1) Military hospital ships (article 1) are ships built or designated by States specifically to help the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked. Their names must be shared with the opposing sides at the start of or during conflicts, and definitely before they start operating. They must be treated with respect by the opposing sides, cannot be seized while fighting is ongoing, and they do not have the same status as warships when they are in a neutral port.

(2) Hospital ships equipped wholly or in part at the cost of private individuals or officially recognised relief societies of the belligerents must be respected by either belligerent (article 2), and are exempt from capture, provided their home State has given them an official commission and has notified their names to the other belligerent at the commencement of or during hostilities, and in any case before they are employed. They must, further, be furnished with a certificate from the competent authorities declaring that they had been under the latter's control while fitting out and on final departure.

(2) Hospital ships that are equipped fully or partially at the expense of private individuals or officially recognized relief organizations of the warring parties must be respected by either side (article 2), and are protected from capture, as long as their home country has issued them an official commission and has informed the other side of their names at the start of or during hostilities, and in any case before they are put to use. Additionally, they must be provided with a certificate from the proper authorities stating that they were under their control while being outfitted and upon final departure.

(3) Hospital ships, equipped wholly or in part at the cost of private individuals or officially recognised relief societies of neutral States (article 3), must likewise be respected, and are exempt from capture, provided that they are placed under the control of one of the belligerents, with the previous consent of their own Government and with the authorisation of the belligerent himself, and that the latter has notified their names to his adversary at the commencement of, or during, hostilities, and in any case before they are employed.

(3) Hospital ships, funded entirely or partly by private individuals or officially recognized relief organizations from neutral countries (article 3), must also be respected and are exempt from capture, as long as they are under the control of one of the warring parties, with the prior consent of their own government and permission from the belligerent, and the belligerent has informed their opponents of their names at the start of, or during, hostilities, and in any case before they are used.

According to article 4 all military and other hospital ships must afford relief and assistance to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked of either belligerent. The respective Governments are prohibited from using these ships for any military purpose. The commanders of these vessels must not in any way hamper the movements of the combatants, and during and after an engagement they act at their own risk and peril. Both belligerents have a right to control and visit all military and other hospital ships, to refuse their assistance, to order them off, to make them take a certain course, to put a commissioner on board, and, lastly, to detain[Pg 256] them temporarily, if important circumstances require this. In case a hospital ship receives orders from a belligerent, these orders must, as far as possible, be inscribed in the ship papers.

According to article 4, all military and hospital ships must provide help and support to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked from either side. The governments involved are not allowed to use these ships for any military purposes. The commanders of these ships must not obstruct the movements of combatants, and during and after a conflict, they are responsible for their own safety. Both sides have the right to control and inspect all military and hospital ships, to deny their assistance, to order them to leave, to direct them on a specific route, to place an officer on board, and finally, to temporarily detain them if important circumstances demand it. If a hospital ship receives orders from one side, these orders should be recorded in the ship's documents as much as possible.[Pg 256]

The protection to which hospital ships are entitled ceases if they are made use of to commit acts harmful to the enemy[415] (article 8). But the fact of the staff being armed for the purpose of maintaining order and defending the wounded and sick, and the fact of the presence of wireless telegraphic apparatus on board, are not sufficient reasons for withdrawing protection.

The protection that hospital ships receive ends if they are used to carry out actions that harm the enemy[415] (article 8). However, the presence of armed staff for the purpose of maintaining order and defending the wounded and sick, as well as having wireless telegraphic equipment on board, are not enough reasons to withdraw that protection.

[415] An interesting case of this kind occurred during the Russo-Japanese war. The Aryol (also called the Orel), a hospital ship of the Russian Red Cross Society, was captured, and afterwards condemned by the Prize Court on the following grounds:—(a) For having communicated the orders of the commander-in-chief of the Russian squadron with which she was sailing to other Russian vessels; (b) for carrying, by order of the commander-in-chief of the squadron, in order to take them to Vladivostock, the master and some members of the crew of the British steamship Oldhamia, which had been captured by the Russians; (c) for having been instructed to purchase in Cape Town, or its neighbourhood, 11,000 ft. of conducting wire of good insulation; (d) for having navigated at the head of the squadron in the position usually occupied by reconnoitring vessels.—See Takahashi, pp. 620-625, and Higgins, op. cit. p. 74, and in The Law Quarterly Review, XXVI. (1910), p. 408.

[415] An interesting case of this type happened during the Russo-Japanese War. The Aryol (also known as the Orel), a hospital ship from the Russian Red Cross Society, was captured and later condemned by the Prize Court for the following reasons:—(a) For communicating the orders of the commander-in-chief of the Russian squadron it was accompanying to other Russian vessels; (b) for carrying, under the orders of the commander-in-chief of the squadron, the master and some crew members of the British steamship Oldhamia, which had been captured by the Russians, to Vladivostok; (c) for being instructed to purchase 11,000 feet of well-insulated conducting wire in Cape Town or its vicinity; (d) for leading the squadron in the position typically held by reconnaissance vessels.—See Takahashi, pp. 620-625, and Higgins, op. cit. p. 74, and in The Law Quarterly Review, XXVI. (1910), p. 408.

It must be specially observed that any man-of-war of either belligerent may, according to article 12, demand the surrender of the wounded, sick, or shipwrecked who are on board hospital ships of any kind. According to a reservation by Great Britain, article 12 is understood "to apply only to the case of combatants rescued during or after a naval engagement in which they have taken part."

It should be noted that any warship from either side can, according to article 12, request the surrender of the wounded, sick, or shipwrecked individuals aboard any type of hospital ship. As per a reservation made by Great Britain, article 12 is understood "to apply only to the case of combatants rescued during or after a naval engagement in which they have participated."

Hospital Ships in Neutral Ports.

Hospital Ships in Neutral Ports.

§ 206a. For the purpose of defining the status of hospital ships when entering neutral ports an International Conference met at the Hague in 1904, where Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, China, Korea, Denmark, Spain, the United States of America, France, Greece, Guatemala, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Mexico, Holland, Persia, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Servia, and Siam, were represented. Great Britain, however, did not[Pg 257] take part. The following is the text of the six articles of the Convention signed by all the representatives:—

§ 206a. To define the status of hospital ships entering neutral ports, an International Conference took place in The Hague in 1904, with representatives from Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, China, Korea, Denmark, Spain, the United States of America, France, Greece, Guatemala, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Holland, Persia, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, and Siam. However, Great Britain did not[Pg 257] participate. Below is the text of the six articles of the Convention signed by all the representatives:—

Article 1.—Hospital ships fulfilling the conditions prescribed in articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Convention concluded at the Hague on July 27, 1899, for the adaptation of the principles of the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864, to naval warfare shall in time of war be exempt in the ports of the contracting parties from all dues and taxes imposed on vessels for the benefit of the State.

Article 1.—Hospital ships that meet the requirements outlined in articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Convention established in The Hague on July 27, 1899, for adapting the principles of the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864, to naval warfare will, during wartime, be exempt from all fees and taxes levied on vessels for the benefit of the State in the ports of the contracting parties.

Article 2.—The provision contained in the preceding article shall not prevent the exercise of the right of search and other formalities demanded by the fiscal and other laws in force in the said ports.

Article 2.—The rule mentioned in the previous article does not stop the enforcement of the right to search and any other formalities required by the tax and other laws currently in effect at those ports.

Article 3.—The regulation laid down in article 1 is binding only upon the contracting Powers in case of war between two or more of themselves. The said rule shall cease to be obligatory as soon as in a war between any of the contracting Powers a non-contracting Power shall join one of the belligerents.

Article 3.—The rule established in article 1 applies only to the contracting Powers in the event of war between two or more of them. This rule will no longer be mandatory as soon as a non-contracting Power sides with one of the warring parties in a conflict involving any of the contracting Powers.

Article 4.—The present Convention, which bears date of this day and may be signed up to October 1, 1905, by any Power which shall have expressed a wish to do so, shall be ratified as speedily as possible. The ratifications shall be deposited at the Hague. On the deposit of the ratifications, a procès-verbal shall be drawn up, of which a certified copy shall be conveyed by diplomatic channels, after the deposit of each ratification, to all the contracting Powers.

Article 4.—This Convention, dated today and open for signing until October 1, 1905, by any country that wishes to do so, should be ratified as quickly as possible. The ratifications should be submitted in The Hague. After the ratifications are submitted, a procès-verbal will be prepared, and a certified copy will be sent through diplomatic channels to all the contracting countries after each ratification is submitted.

Article 5.—Non-signatory Powers will be allowed to adhere to the present convention after October 1, 1905. For that purpose they will have to make known the fact of their adhesion to the contracting Powers by means of a written notification addressed to the Government of the Netherlands, which will be communicated by that Government to all the other contracting Powers.

Article 5.—Non-signatory Powers will be allowed to join this convention after October 1, 1905. To do this, they must inform the contracting Powers of their decision to join through a written notification sent to the Government of the Netherlands, which will then communicate this information to all other contracting Powers.

Article 6.—In the event of any of the high contracting parties denouncing the present Convention, the denunciation shall only take effect after notification has been made in writing to the Government of the Netherlands and communicated by that Government at once to all the other contracting Powers. Such denunciation shall be effective only in respect of the Power which shall have given notice of it.

Article 6.—If any of the high contracting parties withdraws from this Convention, the withdrawal will only take effect after a written notification is sent to the Government of the Netherlands, and that Government immediately informs all the other contracting Powers. This withdrawal will only apply to the Power that has given notice of it.

Sick-Bays.

Sick bays.

§ 206b. According to article 7, in case of a fight on board a man-of-war, the sick-bays must, as far as[Pg 258] possible, be respected and spared. These sick-bays, and the material belonging to them, remain subject to the laws of war; they may not, however, be used for any purpose other than that for which they were originally intended so long as they are required for the wounded and sick. But should the military situation require it, a commander into whose power they have fallen may nevertheless apply them to other purposes, under the condition that he previously makes arrangements for proper accommodation for the wounded and sick on board. The protection to which sick-bays are entitled ceases if they are made use of to commit acts harmful to the enemy (article 8). But the fact that the staff of sick-bays is armed in order to defend the wounded and sick is not sufficient reason for withdrawing protection.

§ 206b. According to article 7, in the event of a fight on board a warship, the sick bays must be respected and preserved as much as possible. These sick bays and their materials remain under the laws of war; however, they cannot be used for anything other than their original purpose as long as they are needed for the injured and sick. If the military situation requires it, a commander who gains control of them may still repurpose them, provided that he arranges suitable accommodations for the injured and sick on board beforehand. The protection that sick bays receive ends if they are used to carry out actions that harm the enemy (article 8). However, the fact that the staff of the sick bays are armed to defend the injured and sick does not justify removing that protection.

Distinctive Colour and Emblem of Hospital Ships.

Distinctive Color and Emblem of Hospital Ships.

§ 207. All military hospital ships must be painted white outside with a horizontal band of green about one metre and a half in breadth. Other hospital ships must also be painted white outside, but with a horizontal band of red. The boats and small craft of hospital ships used for hospital work must likewise be painted white. And besides being painted in this distinguishing colour, all military and other hospital ships (article 5) must hoist, together with their national flag, the white flag with a red cross stipulated by the Geneva Convention. If they belong to a neutral State, they must also fly at the main mast the national flag of the belligerent under whose control they are placed. Hospital ships which, under the terms of article 4, are detained by the enemy, must haul down the national flag of the belligerent to whom they belong. All hospital ships which wish to ensure by night the freedom from interference to which they are entitled, must, subject to the assent of the belligerent they are accompanying, take the necessary measures to render[Pg 259] their special painting sufficiently plain. According to article 6 the distinguishing signs mentioned in article 5 may only be used, whether in time of peace or war, for protecting or indicating the ships therein mentioned.

§ 207. All military hospital ships must be painted white on the outside with a horizontal green band that is about one and a half meters wide. Other hospital ships must also be painted white on the outside, but with a horizontal red band. The boats and small craft of hospital ships used for medical purposes must also be painted white. In addition to being painted in these distinctive colors, all military and other hospital ships (article 5) must fly the white flag with a red cross as specified by the Geneva Convention, along with their national flag. If they belong to a neutral state, they must also display the national flag of the belligerent under whose control they are operating at the main mast. Hospital ships that are detained by the enemy, according to the terms of article 4, must lower the national flag of the belligerent to whom they belong. All hospital ships that want to ensure they are free from interference at night must, with the consent of the belligerent they are assisting, take necessary steps to make their special paint clearly visible. According to article 6, the distinguishing signs mentioned in article 5 may only be used, whether in peacetime or wartime, for the purpose of protecting or signaling the ships referred to.

Although in this connection the red cross is especially stipulated as the distinctive emblem, there is no objection to the use by non-Christian States, who object to the cross on religious grounds, of another emblem. Thus Turkey reserved the right to use a red crescent, and Persia to use a red sun.

Although the red cross is specifically designated as the official emblem, non-Christian countries that have objections to the cross for religious reasons can use a different emblem. For example, Turkey chose to use a red crescent, and Persia opted for a red sun.

Neutral Vessels assisting the Wounded, Sick, or Shipwrecked.

Neutral Vessels assisting the Wounded, Sick, or Shipwrecked.

§ 208. A distinction must be made between neutral men-of-war and private vessels assisting the sick, wounded, and shipwrecked.

§ 208. A distinction must be made between neutral warships and private vessels helping the sick, injured, and shipwrecked.

(1) If men-of-war take on board wounded, sick, or shipwrecked persons, precaution must be taken, so far as possible, that they do not again take part in the operations of war (article 13). Such individuals must not, however, be handed over to the adversary but must be detained till the end of the war.[416]

(1) If warships rescue injured, sick, or shipwrecked individuals, measures should be taken, as much as possible, to ensure they do not participate again in military actions (article 13). However, these individuals should not be handed over to the enemy and must be held until the war ends.[416]

(2) Neutral merchantmen,[417] yachts, or boats which have of their own accord rescued sick, wounded, or shipwrecked men, or who have taken such men on board at the appeal of the belligerent, must, according to article 9, enjoy special protection and certain immunities. In no case may they be captured for the sole reason of having such persons on board. But, subject to any undertaking that may have been given to them, they remain liable to capture for any violation of neutrality they may have committed.

(2) Neutral merchant ships,[417] yachts, or boats that voluntarily rescue sick, injured, or shipwrecked individuals, or have taken such individuals on board at the request of a warring party, must, according to article 9, receive special protection and certain privileges. They cannot be seized solely for having those individuals on board. However, depending on any commitments made to them, they can still be captured for any breaches of neutrality they may have committed.

[416] See below, § 348.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[417] See below, § 348a.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

It must be specially observed that, according to article 12, any man-of-war of either belligerent may demand from merchant ships, yachts, and boats, whatever the nationality of such vessels, the surrender of the wounded, sick, or shipwrecked who are on board.

It should be noted that, according to article 12, any military ship from either side can demand that merchant ships, yachts, and boats, regardless of their nationality, surrender any wounded, sick, or shipwrecked individuals on board.

According to the reservation of Great Britain,[Pg 260] mentioned above in § 206, article 12 is understood "to apply only to the case of combatants rescued during or after a naval engagement in which they have taken part."

According to Great Britain's reservation,[Pg 260] mentioned above in § 206, article 12 is interpreted "to apply only to the situation of combatants rescued during or after a naval battle in which they have participated."

The Religious, Medical, and Hospital Staff.

The Religious, Medical, and Hospital Staff.

§ 209. The religious, medical, and hospital staff of any captured vessel is inviolable, and the members may not be made prisoners of war, but they must continue to discharge their duties while necessary. If they do this, the belligerent into whose hands they have fallen has to give them the same allowances and the same pay as are granted to persons holding the same rank in his own navy. They may leave the ship, when the commander-in-chief considers it possible, and on leaving they are allowed to take with them all surgical articles and instruments which are their private property (article 10).

§ 209. The religious, medical, and hospital staff of any captured vessel is protected, and they cannot be taken as prisoners of war. Instead, they must continue to perform their duties as long as necessary. If they do this, the enemy who has taken them must provide the same support and pay as what is given to individuals of the same rank in their own navy. They are allowed to leave the ship when the commander-in-chief determines it is feasible, and upon leaving, they can take all surgical tools and instruments that belong to them personally (article 10).

Application of Convention X., and Prevention of Abuses.

Application of Convention X., and Prevention of Abuses.

§ 209a. The provisions of Convention X. are only binding in the case of war between contracting Powers, they cease to be binding the moment a non-contracting Power becomes one of the belligerents (article 18). In the case of operations of war between land and sea forces of belligerents, the provisions of Convention X. only apply to forces on board ship (article 22). The commanders-in-chief of the belligerent fleets must, in accordance with the instructions of their Governments and in conformity with the general principles of the Convention, arrange the details for carrying out the articles of Convention X., as well as for cases not provided for in these articles (article 19). The contracting parties must take the necessary measures to instruct their naval forces, especially the personnel protected by Convention X., in the provisions of the Convention, and to bring these provisions to the notice of the public (article 20). The contracting Powers must, in case their criminal laws are inadequate, enact measures necessary for checking, in time of war, individual acts[Pg 261] of pillage or maltreatment of the wounded and sick in the fleet, as well as for punishing, as unjustifiable adoption of military or naval marks, the unauthorised use of the distinctive signs mentioned in article 5 on the part of vessels not protected by the present Convention; they must communicate to each other, through the Dutch Government, the enactments for preventing such acts at the latest within five years of the ratification of Convention X.[418] (article 21).

§ 209a. The rules in Convention X. only apply in cases of war between countries that are part of the agreement; they stop being applicable as soon as a country that is not part of the agreement joins the conflict (article 18). When there are military operations involving both land and naval forces of the warring parties, the rules of Convention X. only apply to forces on ships (article 22). The commanders of the warring fleets must, following their governments' orders and adhering to the general principles of the Convention, organize the details for implementing the articles of Convention X., as well as handle situations not covered in these articles (article 19). The countries involved must take necessary steps to ensure their naval forces, especially the personnel protected by Convention X., understand the provisions of the Convention and make these provisions known to the public (article 20). The contracting countries must, if their criminal laws are not sufficient, create measures necessary to prevent, during wartime, individual acts of looting or mistreatment of the wounded and sick in the fleet, as well as punishing, as unjustifiable, the unauthorized use of military or naval symbols, the improper use of the distinctive signs mentioned in article 5 by vessels not covered by this Convention; they must inform each other, through the Dutch Government, of the laws established to prevent such acts within five years following the ratification of Convention X.[418] (article 21).

[418] Great Britain has entered a reservation against articles 6 and 21, but see above, § 124b, p. 164, note 1.

[418] Great Britain has made a reservation regarding articles 6 and 21, but refer to the earlier section, § 124b, p. 164, note 1.

General Provisions of Convention X.

General Provisions of Convention X.

§ 209b. Convention X. comes into force sixty days after ratification or accession on the part of each Power concerned (article 26). It replaces the Convention of 1899 for the adaptation to naval warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention, but this latter Convention remains in force between such of its contracting parties as do not become parties to Convention X. (article 25). Such non-signatory Powers of Convention X. as are parties to the Geneva Convention of 1906 are free to accede at any time, and a Power desiring to accede must notify its intention in writing to the Dutch Government which must communicate the accession to all the contracting Powers (article 24). Each of the contracting Powers is at any time at liberty to denounce Convention X. by a written notification to the Dutch Government which must immediately communicate the notification to all the other contracting Powers; the denunciation, however, does not take effect until one year after the notification has reached the Dutch Government, and a denunciation only affects the Power making the notification (article 27). A register kept by the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs must record the dates of the deposit of ratifications, as well as the dates of accessions or of denunciations; each contracting Power is[Pg 262] entitled to have access to this register and to be supplied with duly certified extracts from it (article 28).

§ 209b. Convention X comes into effect sixty days after ratification or accession by each relevant country (article 26). It replaces the 1899 Convention that adapted the principles of the Geneva Convention to naval warfare, but the original Geneva Convention still applies to those parties that do not join Convention X (article 25). Countries that have not signed Convention X but are part of the Geneva Convention of 1906 can join at any time. A country wishing to join must notify its intention in writing to the Dutch Government, which will inform all the contracting countries (article 24). Any contracting country can withdraw from Convention X at any time by sending written notification to the Dutch Government, which must promptly inform all other contracting countries; however, the withdrawal does not take effect until one year after the Dutch Government receives the notification, and the withdrawal only applies to the country making the notification (article 27). A register maintained by the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs must record the dates of ratifications, accessions, and withdrawals; each contracting country is[Pg 262] entitled to access this register and receive certified copies of its entries (article 28).

VI Espionage, betrayal, tricks

See, besides the literature quoted above at the commencement of §§ 159 and 163, Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. No. 3157, and Bentwich in The Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, New Series, X. (1909), pp. 243-249.

See, in addition to the literature mentioned at the beginning of §§ 159 and 163, Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. No. 3157, and Bentwich in The Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, New Series, X. (1909), pp. 243-249.

Espionage and Treason.

Espionage and treason.

§ 210. Espionage[419] and treason do not play as large a part in sea warfare as in land warfare;[420] still they may be made use of by belligerents. But it must be specially observed that, since the Hague Regulations deal only with land warfare, the legal necessity of trying a spy by court-martial according to article 30 of these Regulations does not exist for sea warfare, although such trial by court-martial is advisable.

§ 210. Espionage[419] and treason aren’t as significant in naval warfare as they are in ground combat; [420] however, they can still be utilized by warring parties. It's important to note that since the Hague Regulations only address land warfare, there isn’t a legal requirement to try a spy by court-martial under article 30 of these Regulations in naval warfare, though such a trial by court-martial is recommended.

[419] As regards the case of the Haimun, see below, § 356.

[419] For the case of the Haimun, see below, § 356.

[420] See above, §§ 159-162.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-162.

Ruses.

Tricks.

§ 211. Ruses are customarily allowed in sea warfare within the same limits as in land warfare, perfidy being excluded. As regards the use of a false flag, it is by most publicists considered perfectly lawful for a man-of-war to use a neutral's or the enemy's flag (1) when chasing an enemy vessel, (2) when trying to escape, and (3) for the purpose of drawing an enemy vessel into action.[421] On the other hand, it is universally agreed[Pg 263] that immediately before an attack a vessel must fly her national flag. Halleck (I. p. 568) relates the following instance: In 1783 the Sybille, a French frigate of thirty-eight guns, enticed the British man-of-war Hussar by displaying the British flag and intimating herself to be a distressed prize of a British captor. The Hussar approached to succour her, but the latter at once attacked the Hussar without showing the French flag. She was, however, overpowered and captured, and the commander of the Hussar publicly broke the sword of the commander of the Sybille, whom he justly accused of perfidy, although the French commander was acquitted when subsequently brought to trial by the French Government. Again, Halleck (I. p. 568) relates: In 1813 two merchants of New York carried out a plan for destroying the British man-of-war Ramillies in the following way. A schooner with some casks of flour on deck was expressly laden with several casks of gunpowder having trains leading from a species of gunlock, which, by the action of clockwork, went off at a given time after it had been set. To entice the Ramillies to seize her, the schooner came up, and the Ramillies then sent a boat with thirteen men and a lieutenant to cut her off. Subsequently the crew of the schooner abandoned her and she blew up with the lieutenant and his men on board.

§ 211. Ruses are typically permitted in naval warfare just like in land warfare, but deception is not allowed. When it comes to using a false flag, most legal experts consider it completely lawful for a warship to display a neutral or enemy flag (1) while chasing an enemy vessel, (2) while trying to escape, and (3) to lure an enemy vessel into combat.[421] However, it is universally agreed[Pg 263] that right before an attack, a vessel must show her national flag. Halleck (I. p. 568) recounts the following example: In 1783, the Sybille, a French frigate with thirty-eight guns, lured the British warship Hussar by flying the British flag and pretending to be a distressed prize of a British captor. The Hussar approached to help her, but the Sybille immediately attacked without showing the French flag. However, she was quickly overpowered and captured, and the commander of the Hussar publicly broke the sword of the Sybille’s commander, whom he rightly accused of deception, though the French commander was later acquitted when brought to trial by the French Government. Again, Halleck (I. p. 568) reports: In 1813, two merchants from New York executed a plan to destroy the British warship Ramillies in the following way. A schooner carrying some barrels of flour on deck was specifically loaded with several barrels of gunpowder that had fuses connected to a type of clock mechanism, which was set to explode at a predetermined time. To entice the Ramillies to capture her, the schooner approached, prompting the Ramillies to send a boat with thirteen men and a lieutenant to intercept her. Later, the crew of the schooner abandoned ship, and it exploded with the lieutenant and his men on board.

[421] The use of a false flag on the part of a belligerent man-of-war is analogous to the use of the enemy flag and the like in land warfare; see above, § 164. British practice—see Holland, Prize Law, § 200—permits the use of false colours. U.S. Naval War Code, article 7, forbids it altogether, whereas as late as 1898, during the war with Spain in consequence of the Cuban insurrection, two American men-of-war made use of the Spanish flag (see Perels, p. 183). And during the war between Turkey and Russia, in 1877, Russian men-of-war in the Black Sea made use of the Italian flag (see Martens, II. § 103, p. 566). The question of the permissibility of the use of a neutral or enemy flag is answered in the affirmative, among others, by Ortolan, II. p. 29; Fiore, III. No. 1340; Perels, § 35, p. 183; Pillet, p. 116; Bonfils, No. 1274; Calvo, IV. 2106; Hall, § 187. See also Pillet in R.G. V. (1898), pp. 444-451. But see the arguments against the use of a false flag in Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2760.

[421] Using a false flag by a wartime ship is similar to using the enemy's flag in land combat; see above, § 164. British practice—see Holland, Prize Law, § 200—allows the use of false colors. The U.S. Naval War Code, article 7, strictly prohibits it, yet as recently as 1898, during the conflict with Spain due to the Cuban insurrection, two American warships flew the Spanish flag (see Perels, p. 183). Additionally, during the war between Turkey and Russia in 1877, Russian warships in the Black Sea displayed the Italian flag (see Martens, II. § 103, p. 566). The question of whether it's permissible to use a neutral or enemy flag is affirmed by several sources, including Ortolan, II. p. 29; Fiore, III. No. 1340; Perels, § 35, p. 183; Pillet, p. 116; Bonfils, No. 1274; Calvo, IV. 2106; Hall, § 187. See also Pillet in R.G. V. (1898), pp. 444-451. However, there are counterarguments against using a false flag in Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2760.

Vattel (III. § 178) relates the following case of perfidy: In 1755, during war between Great Britain and France, a British man-of-war appeared off Calais, made signals of distress for the purpose of soliciting French vessels to approach to her succour, and seized a sloop and some sailors who came to bring her help. Vattel is himself not certain whether this case is a fact or fiction. But be that as it may, there is no doubt that, if the case be true, it is an example of perfidy, which is not allowed.[Pg 264]

Vattel (III. § 178) tells the following story of betrayal: In 1755, during the war between Great Britain and France, a British warship appeared off Calais, signaled for help to attract French vessels, and captured a sloop along with some sailors who came to assist. Vattel himself is unsure if this incident is a real event or made up. Regardless, if it is true, it certainly serves as an example of betrayal, which is unacceptable.[Pg 264]

VII Requests, Contributions, Bombardment

Hall, § 140*—Lawrence, § 204—Westlake, II. pp. 315-318—Moore, VII. §§ 1166-1174—Taylor, § 499—Bonfils, Nos. 1277-12771—Despagnet, Nos. 618-618 bis—Fiore, Code, Nos. 1633-1642—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3153-3154—Nys, III. pp. 430-432—Pillet, p. 117—Perels, § 35, p. 181—Holland, Studies, pp. 96-111—Dupuis, Nos. 67-73, and Guerre, Nos. 42-47—Barclay, Problems, p. 51—Higgins, pp. 352-357—Lémonon, pp. 503-525—Bernsten, § 7, III.—Boidin, pp. 201-215—Nippold, II. § 28—Scott, Conferences, pp. 587-598, and in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 285-294.

Hall, § 140*—Lawrence, § 204—Westlake, II. pp. 315-318—Moore, VII. §§ 1166-1174—Taylor, § 499—Bonfils, Nos. 1277-12771—Despagnet, Nos. 618-618 bis—Fiore, Code, Nos. 1633-1642—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3153-3154—Nys, III. pp. 430-432—Pillet, p. 117—Perels, § 35, p. 181—Holland, Studies, pp. 96-111—Dupuis, Nos. 67-73, and Guerre, Nos. 42-47—Barclay, Problems, p. 51—Higgins, pp. 352-357—Lémonon, pp. 503-525—Bernsten, § 7, III.—Boidin, pp. 201-215—Nippold, II. § 28—Scott, Conferences, pp. 587-598, and in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 285-294.

Requisitions and Contributions upon Coast Towns.

Requisitions and Contributions on Coast Towns.

§ 212. No case has to my knowledge occurred in Europe[422] of requisitions or contributions imposed by naval forces upon enemy coast towns. The question whether or not such requisitions and contributions would be lawful became of interest through an article on naval warfare of the future, published in 1882 by the French Admiral Aube in the Revue des Deux Mondes (vol. 50, p. 331). Aube pointed out that one of the tasks of the fleet in sea warfare of the future would be to attack and destroy by bombardment fortified and unfortified military and commercial enemy coast towns, or at least to compel them mercilessly to requisitions and contributions. As during the British naval manœuvres of 1888 and 1889 imaginary contributions were imposed upon several coast towns, Hall (§ 140*) took into consideration the question under what conditions requisitions and contributions would be lawful in sea warfare. He concluded, after careful consideration and starting from the principles regarding requisitions and contributions in land warfare, that such requisitions and contributions may be levied, provided a force is landed which actually takes possession of the respective coast town and establishes itself there, although only temporarily, until the imposed requisitions and contributions[Pg 265] have been complied with; that, however, no requisitions or contributions could be demanded by a single message sent on shore under threatened penalty of bombardment in case of refusal. There is no doubt that Hall's arguments are, logically, correct; but it was not at all certain that the naval Powers would adopt them, since neither the Institute of International Law nor the U.S. Naval War Code had done so.[423] The Second Hague Peace Conference has now settled the matter through the Convention (IX.) concerning bombardment by naval forces in time of war which amongst its thirteen articles includes two—3 and 4—dealing with requisitions and contributions. This Convention has been signed, although with some reservations, by all the Powers represented at the Conference except Spain, China, and Nicaragua, but China and Nicaragua acceded later. Many States have already ratified.

§ 212. To my knowledge, there hasn't been a case in Europe[422] of requisitions or contributions imposed by naval forces on enemy coastal towns. The question of whether such requisitions and contributions would be lawful became relevant due to an article on the future of naval warfare, published in 1882 by French Admiral Aube in the Revue des Deux Mondes (vol. 50, p. 331). Aube noted that one of the fleet’s tasks in future sea warfare would be to attack and destroy by bombardment fortified and unfortified military and commercial enemy coastal towns, or at least to force them into meeting demanding requisitions and contributions. During the British naval maneuvers in 1888 and 1889, hypothetical contributions were imposed on several coastal towns, leading Hall (§ 140*) to examine the conditions under which requisitions and contributions would be lawful in sea warfare. After careful analysis and drawing from the principles governing requisitions and contributions in land warfare, he concluded that such requisitions and contributions could be enforced, provided a force landed and took control of the respective coastal town, establishing a temporary presence there until the imposed requisitions and contributions were fulfilled; however, no requisitions or contributions could be demanded through a single message sent ashore with a threatened penalty of bombardment in case of refusal. There is no doubt that Hall's arguments are logically sound; however, it was not at all certain that the naval powers would accept them, as neither the Institute of International Law nor the U.S. Naval War Code had done so.[423] The Second Hague Peace Conference has now addressed this issue through the Convention (IX.) concerning bombardment by naval forces in times of war, which includes two articles—3 and 4—that deal with requisitions and contributions. This Convention has been signed by all the powers represented at the Conference, except Spain, China, and Nicaragua, although China and Nicaragua later joined. Many states have already ratified it.

[422] Holland, Studies, p. 101, mentions a case which occurred in South America in 1871.

[422] Holland, Studies, p. 101, talks about a case that happened in South America in 1871.

[423] The Institute of International Law has touched upon the question of requisitions and contributions in sea warfare in article 4, No. 1, of its rules regarding the bombardment of open towns by naval forces; see below, § 213, p. 267. U.S. Naval War Code, article 4, allows "reasonable" requisitions, but no contributions since "ransom" is not allowed.

[423] The Institute of International Law has addressed the issue of requisitions and contributions in naval warfare in article 4, No. 1, of its regulations on the bombardment of open towns by naval forces; see below, § 213, p. 267. The U.S. Naval War Code, article 4, permits "reasonable" requisitions, but does not allow contributions since "ransom" is prohibited.

According to article 3 undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or other buildings may be bombarded by a naval force, if the local authorities, on a formal summons being made to them, decline to comply with requisitions for provisions or supplies necessary for the immediate use of the naval force concerned. These requisitions must be proportional to the resources of the place; they can only be demanded by the commander of the naval force concerned; they must be paid for in cash, and, if this is not possible for want of sufficient ready money, their receipt must be acknowledged.

According to article 3, undefended ports, towns, villages, buildings, or other structures can be bombarded by a naval force if the local authorities, when formally asked, refuse to provide the necessary provisions or supplies for the immediate use of the naval force. These requests must be reasonable based on the local resources; they can only be made by the commander of the naval force involved; they must be paid for in cash, and if that isn't possible due to insufficient funds, a receipt must be acknowledged.

As regards contributions, Convention IX. does not directly forbid the demand for them, but article 4[Pg 266] expressly forbids bombardment of undefended places by a naval force on account of non-payment of money contributions; in practice, therefore, the demand for contributions will not occur in naval warfare.

As for contributions, Convention IX doesn’t directly prohibit asking for them, but Article 4[Pg 266] specifically prohibits bombarding undefended locations by a naval force due to unpaid contributions; in practice, this means that demands for contributions won’t happen in naval warfare.

Bombardment of the Enemy Coast.

Bombing the Enemy Coast.

§ 213. There is no doubt whatever that enemy coast towns which are defended may be bombarded by naval forces, acting either independently or in co-operation with a besieging army. But before the Second Peace Conference of 1907 the question was not settled as to whether or not open and undefended coast places might be bombarded by naval forces. The Institute of International Law in 1895, at its meeting at Cambridge, appointed a committee to investigate the matter. The report[424] of this committee, drafted by Professor Holland with the approval of the Dutch General Den Beer Portugael, and presented in 1896 at the meeting at Venice,[425] is of such interest that it is advisable to reproduce here a translation of the following chief parts:—

§ 213. There’s no doubt that enemy coastal towns that are defended can be bombarded by naval forces, either on their own or in coordination with a besieging army. However, before the Second Peace Conference of 1907, it was unclear whether or not open and undefended coastal areas could be bombarded by naval forces. The Institute of International Law, during its 1895 meeting in Cambridge, set up a committee to look into this issue. The report[424] from this committee, written by Professor Holland with the backing of Dutch General Den Beer Portugael, and presented in 1896 at the Venice meeting,[425] is so significant that it’s worth including here a translation of the key parts:—

When the Prince de Joinville recommended in 1844, in case of war, the devastation of the great commercial towns of England, the Duke of Wellington wrote:—"What but the inordinate desire of popularity could have induced a man in his station to write and publish such a production, an invitation and provocation to war, to be carried on in a manner such as has been disclaimed by the civilised portions of mankind?" (Raikes, Correspondence, p. 367). The opinion of the Prince de Joinville has been taken up by Admiral Aube in an article which appeared in the Revue des Deux Mondes in 1882. After having remarked that the ultimate object of war is to inflict the greatest possible damage to the enemy and that "La richesse est le nerf de la guerre," he goes on as follows:—"Tout ce qui frappe l'ennemi dans sa richesse devient non seulement légitime, mais s'impose comme obligatoire. Il faut donc s'attendre à voir les flottes cuirassées, maîtresses de la mer, tourner leur puissance d'attaque et déstruction, à défaut d'adversaires se dérobant à leurs coups, contre toutes les villes du littoral, fortifiées ou non,[Pg 267] pacifiques ou guerrières, les incendier, les ruiner, et tout au moins les rançonner sans merci. Cela s'est fait autrefois; cela ne se fait plus; cela se fera encore: Strasbourg et Péronne en sont garants...."

When the Prince de Joinville suggested in 1844 that, in the event of war, the major commercial cities of England should be destroyed, the Duke of Wellington responded:—"What but an excessive desire for popularity could have motivated a person in his position to write and publish such a piece, an invitation and provocation to war, conducted in a manner that has been rejected by the civilized parts of humanity?" (Raikes, Correspondence, p. 367). Admiral Aube picked up the Prince de Joinville's opinion in an article published in the Revue des Deux Mondes in 1882. After noting that the ultimate goal of war is to cause the greatest possible harm to the enemy and that "Wealth is the sinew of war," he continues:—"Anything that strikes the enemy in their wealth becomes not only legitimate but necessary. Therefore, one should expect to see armored fleets, masters of the sea, redirect their attack and destruction capabilities, in the absence of opponents evading their blows, against all coastal cities, whether fortified or not, peaceful or warlike, burning them, ruining them, and at the very least, extorting them mercilessly. This has happened before; it doesn’t happen anymore; it will happen again: Strasbourg and Péronne stand as proof...."

[424] See Annuaire, XV. (1896), pp. 148-150.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Directory, XV. (1896), pp. 148-150.

[425] See Annuaire, XV. (1896), p. 313.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Yearbook, XV. (1896), p. 313.

The discussion was opened again in 1888, on the occasion of manœuvres executed by the British Fleet, the enemy part of which feigned to hold to ransom, under the threat of bombardment, great commercial towns, such as Liverpool, and to cause unnecessary devastation to pleasure towns and bathing-places, such as Folkestone, through throwing bombs. One of your reporters observed in a series of letters addressed to the Times that such acts are contrary to the rules of International Law as well as to the practice of the present century. He maintained that bombardment of an open town ought to be allowed only for the purpose of obtaining requisitions in kind necessary for the enemy fleet and contributions instead of requisitions, further by the way of reprisal, and in case the town defends itself against occupation by enemy troops approaching on land.... Most of the admirals and naval officers of England who took part in the lively correspondence which arose in the Times and other journals during the months of August and September 1880 took up a contrary attitude....

The discussion was reopened in 1888, during maneuvers conducted by the British Fleet, part of which pretended to hold major commercial cities, like Liverpool, to ransom under the threat of bombardment, and to cause unnecessary destruction to leisure towns and beach resorts, like Folkestone, by dropping bombs. One of your reporters noted in a series of letters to the Times that such actions violate International Law and the norms of the current century. He argued that bombing an open town should only be permitted to obtain necessary provisions for the enemy fleet and contributions instead of provisions, as a form of retaliation, and only if the town is defending itself against invading enemy troops approaching from land.... Most of the admirals and naval officers from England who participated in the intense correspondence that emerged in the Times and other publications during August and September 1880 took an opposing stance....

On the basis of this report the Institute, at the same meeting, adopted a body of rules regarding the bombardment of open towns by naval forces, declaring that the rules of the law of war concerning bombardment are the same in the case of land warfare and sea warfare. Of special interest are articles 4 and 5 of these rules, which run as follows:—

On the basis of this report, the Institute, during the same meeting, approved a set of rules about the bombardment of open towns by naval forces, stating that the rules of war regarding bombardment are the same for both land and sea warfare. Of particular interest are articles 4 and 5 of these rules, which state as follows:—

Article 4. In virtue of the general principles above, the bombardment by a naval force of an open town, that is to say one which is not defended by fortifications or by other means of attack or of resistance for immediate defence, or by detached forts situated in proximity, for example of the maximum distance of from four to ten kilometres, is inadmissible except in the following cases:—

Article 4. According to the general principles mentioned above, a naval force is not allowed to bombard an open town—meaning one that isn’t protected by fortifications or other means of immediate defense, nor by nearby detached forts located within a distance of four to ten kilometers—except in the following cases:—

(1) For the purpose of obtaining by requisitions or contributions what is necessary for the fleet. These requisitions or contributions must in every case remain within the limits prescribed by articles 56 and 58 of the Manual of the Institute.

(1) To acquire what is needed for the fleet through requisitions or contributions. These requisitions or contributions must always stay within the limits set by articles 56 and 58 of the Manual of the Institute.

(2) For the purpose of destroying sheds, military erections,[Pg 268] depôts of war munitions, or of war vessels in a port. Further, an open town which defends itself against the entrance of troops or of disembarked marines can be bombarded for the purpose of protecting the disembarkation of the soldiers and of the marines, if the open town attempts to prevent it, and as an auxiliary measure of war to facilitate the result made by the troops and the disembarked marines, if the town defends itself. Bombardments of which the object is only to exact a ransom are specially forbidden, and, with the stronger reason, those which are intended only to bring about the submission of the country by the destruction, for which there is no other motive, of the peaceful inhabitants or of their property.

(2) To destroy sheds, military structures,[Pg 268] stores of war supplies, or warships in a port. Additionally, an open town that defends itself against the entry of troops or disembarked marines can be bombed to protect the landing of soldiers and marines if the town tries to stop it, and as a supporting measure of war to help achieve the objectives of the troops and the disembarked marines if the town fights back. Bombardments aimed solely at demanding a ransom are explicitly forbidden, and even more so those intended only to force the submission of the country by destroying peaceful inhabitants or their property, with no other purpose.

Article 5. An open town cannot be exposed to a bombardment for the only reasons:—

Article 5. An open town cannot be subjected to bombardment for the following reasons:—

(a) That it is the capital of the State or the seat of the Government (but naturally these circumstances do not guarantee it in any way against a bombardment).

(a) That it is the capital of the State or the seat of the Government (but of course, these factors do not assure it against a bombing in any way).

(b) That it is actually occupied by troops, or that it is ordinarily the garrison of troops of different arms intended to join the army in time of war.

(b) That it is actually occupied by soldiers, or that it is usually the base for troops of various branches meant to join the military during wartime.

The First Peace Conference did not settle the matter, but expressed the desire "that the proposal to settle the question of bombardment of ports, towns, and villages by a naval force may be referred to a subsequent Conference for consideration." The Second Peace Conference, however, by Convention IX.—see above, § 212, p. 265—has provided detailed rules concerning all the points in question, and the following is now the law concerning bombardment by naval forces:—

The First Peace Conference didn't resolve the issue but showed a wish "that the suggestion to address the bombardment of ports, towns, and villages by a naval force be discussed at a future Conference." The Second Peace Conference, however, through Convention IX.—see above, § 212, p. 265—has established detailed rules regarding all the relevant points, and the following is now the law about bombardment by naval forces:—

(1) The bombardment of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or other buildings is under all circumstances and conditions prohibited (article 1). To define the term "undefended," article 1 expressly enacts that "a place cannot be bombarded solely because automatic submarine contact mines are anchored off the harbour," but Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan entered a reservation against this, since they correctly consider such a place to be "defended."[Pg 269]

(1) Bombing undefended ports, towns, villages, homes, or other buildings is always prohibited (article 1). To clarify what is meant by "undefended," article 1 specifically states that "a place cannot be bombed just because automatic submarine contact mines are positioned offshore," but Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan made a reservation against this, as they rightly view such a place as "defended."[Pg 269]

(2) Although undefended places themselves are exempt, nevertheless military works, military or naval establishments, depôts of arms or war material, workshops or plant which could be utilised for the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and men-of-war in the harbour of undefended places may be bombarded. And no responsibility is incurred for any unavoidable damage caused thereby to the undefended place or its inhabitants. As a rule, however, the commander must, before resorting to bombardment of these works, ships, and the like, give warning to the local authorities so that they can destroy the works and vessels themselves. Only if, for military reasons, immediate action is necessary and no delay can be allowed to the enemy, may bombardment be resorted to without previous warning, the commander being compelled to take all due measures in order that the undefended place itself may suffer as little harm as possible (article 2).

(2) Even though undefended locations are protected, military structures, military or naval bases, arms or war material depots, facilities that could be used for the enemy’s fleet or army, and warships in the harbors of undefended places can still be bombarded. No responsibility is taken for any unavoidable damage caused to the undefended place or its residents. Generally, the commander must, before bombing these structures, ships, and such, warn the local authorities so they can destroy the facilities and vessels themselves. Bombardment without prior warning can only happen if immediate action is needed for military reasons, and there isn’t time for the enemy to react. The commander is required to take all necessary measures to ensure that the undefended place suffers as little damage as possible (article 2).

The first case in which naval forces acted according to these rules occurred during the Turco-Italian war. On February 25, 1912, Admiral Faravelli, the commander of an Italian squadron, surprised, at dawn, the Turkish gunboat Awni-Illa and a torpedo-boat in the port of Beirut. These vessels were called upon to surrender, they were given until nine o'clock a.m. to comply with the demand, and the demand was communicated to the Governor and the Consular authorities. At nine o'clock the Turkish vessels were again, by signal, summoned to surrender, and as no reply was received, they were fired at and destroyed, but not without first having vigorously answered the fire of the Italians. Shells missing the vessels and bursting on the quay killed and wounded a number of individuals and damaged several buildings. The Turkish Government protested against this procedure as a violation of Convention IX. of the Second Peace Conference, but,[Pg 270] provided the official report of Admiral Faravelli corresponds with the facts, the Turkish protest is unfounded.

The first instance where naval forces operated under these rules happened during the Turco-Italian War. On February 25, 1912, Admiral Faravelli, the leader of an Italian squadron, caught the Turkish gunboat Awni-Illa and a torpedo boat by surprise at dawn in the port of Beirut. These ships were ordered to surrender and were given until 9:00 a.m. to comply. This demand was also communicated to the Governor and the Consular authorities. At 9:00 a.m., the Turkish vessels were once again signaled to surrender, and when no response came, they were fired upon and destroyed, although they had initially returned fire against the Italians. Shells that missed the vessels exploded on the quay, resulting in casualties and damage to several buildings. The Turkish Government protested this action as a violation of Convention IX of the Second Peace Conference. However, [Pg 270] if Admiral Faravelli's official report aligns with the facts, the Turkish protest lacks merit.

(3) In case undefended places do not comply with legitimate requisitions, they likewise may be bombarded; see details above, § 212.

(3) If unprotected areas do not follow legitimate requests, they may also be bombarded; see details above, § 212.

(4) In case of bombardments, all necessary steps must be taken to spare buildings devoted to public worship, art, science, or charitable purposes; historical monuments; hospitals, and places where the sick or wounded are collected, provided they are not at the time used for military purposes. To enable the attacking force to carry out this injunction, the privileged buildings, monuments, and places must be indicated by visible signs, which shall consist of large stiff rectangular panels, divided diagonally into two coloured triangular portions, the upper portion black, the lower portion white (article 5). Unless military exigencies render it impossible the commander of an attacking naval force must, before commencing the bombardment, do all in his power to warn the authorities (article 6).

(4) During bombardments, all necessary measures must be taken to protect buildings meant for public worship, art, science, or charity; historical monuments; hospitals, and places where the sick or wounded are gathered, as long as they’re not being used for military purposes. To help the attacking force comply with this requirement, the protected buildings, monuments, and locations must be marked with visible signs, consisting of large, stiff rectangular panels divided diagonally into two colored triangular sections, with the upper section being black and the lower section white (article 5). Unless military needs make it impossible, the commander of an attacking naval force must do everything possible to warn the authorities before starting the bombardment (article 6).

(5) The giving over to pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is forbidden (article 7).[Pg 271]

(5) Looting a town or place, even if it was captured by force, is not allowed (article 7).[Pg 271]

VIII Interfering with submarine cables

Uncertainty of Rules concerning Interference with Submarine Telegraph Cables.

Uncertainty about the Rules Regarding Interference with Undersea Telegraph Cables.

§ 214. As the "International Convention[426] for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables" of 1884 expressly stipulates by article 15 that freedom of action is reserved to belligerents, the question is not settled how far belligerents are entitled to interfere with submarine telegraph cables. The only conventional rule concerning this question is article 54 of the Hague Regulations, inserted by the Second Peace Conference, which enacts that submarine cables connecting occupied enemy territory with a neutral territory shall not be seized or destroyed, and that, if a case of absolute necessity has compelled the occupant to seize or destroy such cable, it must be restored after the conclusion of peace and indemnities paid. There is no rule in existence which deals with other possible cases of seizure and destruction.

§ 214. The "International Convention[426] for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables" from 1884 clearly states in article 15 that belligerents have the freedom to act as they see fit, so it’s still unclear how much they can interfere with submarine telegraph cables. The only relevant rule is article 54 of the Hague Regulations, added by the Second Peace Conference, which states that submarine cables linking occupied enemy territory to neutral territory cannot be seized or destroyed. If an occupying force must seize or destroy such a cable due to absolute necessity, they must restore it after peace is restored and pay compensation. There are no existing rules regarding other potential cases of seizure and destruction.

The Institute of International Law has studied the matter and adopted,[427] at its meeting at Brussels in 1902, the following five rules:[Pg 272]

The Institute of International Law has looked into the issue and approved,[427] at its meeting in Brussels in 1902, the following five rules:[Pg 272]

(1) Le câble sousmarin reliant deux territoires neutres est inviolable.

(1) The undersea cable connecting two neutral territories is inviolable.

(2) Le câble reliant les territoires de deux belligérants ou deux parties du territoire d'un des belligérants peut être coupé partout, excepté dans la mer territoriale et dans les eaux neutralisées dépendant d'un territoire neutre.

(2) The cable connecting the territories of two opposing sides or two parts of the territory of one of the opposing sides can be cut anywhere, except in territorial waters and in neutral waters belonging to a neutral territory.

(3) Le câble reliant un territoire neutre au territoire d'un des belligérants ne peut en aucun cas être coupé dans la mer territoriale ou dans les eaux neutralisées dépendant d'un territoire neutre. En haute mer, ce câble ne peut être coupé que s'il y a blocus effectif et dans les limites de la ligne du blocus, sauf rétablissement du câble dans le plus bref délai possible. Le câble peut toujours être coupé sur le territoire et dans la mer territoriale dépendant d'un territoire ennemi jusqu'à d'une distance de trois milles marins de la laisse de basse-marée.

(3) The cable connecting a neutral territory to the territory of one of the belligerents cannot be cut in territorial waters or in neutral waters belonging to a neutral territory. On the high seas, this cable can only be cut if there is an effective blockade and within the limits of the blockade line, unless the cable is reestablished as soon as possible. The cable can always be cut in the territory and territorial waters of an enemy territory up to a distance of three nautical miles from the low water mark.

(4) Il est entendu que la liberté de l'État neutre de transmettre des dépêches n'implique pas la faculté d'en user ou d'en permettre l'usage manifestement pour prêter assistance à l'un des belligérants.

(4) It is understood that the freedom of a neutral state to send dispatches does not include the ability to use them or allow their use clearly to assist one of the belligerents.

(5) En ce qui concerne l'application des règles précédentes, il n'y a de différence à établir ni entre les câbles d'État et les câbles appartenant à des particuliers, ni entre les câbles de propriété ennemie et ceux qui sont de propriété neutre.

(5) Regarding the application of the previous rules, there is no distinction to be made between state cables and cables owned by individuals, nor between enemy-owned cables and those that are owned by neutral parties.

[427] See Annuaire, XIX. (1902), p. 331.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Yearbook, XIX. (1902), p. 331.

The U.S. Naval War Code, article 5, laid down the following rules:—

The U.S. Naval War Code, article 5, established the following rules:—

(1) Submarine telegraphic cables between points in the territory of an enemy, or between the territory of the United States and that of an enemy, are subject to such treatment as the necessities of war may require.

(1) Submarine telegraph cables linking locations in enemy territory, or between the United States and enemy territory, are subject to whatever actions are necessary due to the demands of war.

(2) Submarine telegraphic cables between the territory of an enemy and neutral territory may be interrupted within the territorial jurisdiction of the enemy.

(2) Submarine telegraphic cables between enemy territory and neutral territory can be interrupted within the enemy's territorial jurisdiction.

(3) Submarine telegraphic cables between two neutral territories shall be held inviolable and free from interruption.[428]

(3) Submarine telegraphic cables between two neutral areas shall be protected and free from disruption.[428]

[428] It is impossible for a treatise to discuss the details of the absolutely unsettled question as to how far belligerents may interfere with submarine telegraph cables. Readers who take a particular interest in it may be referred to the excellent monograph of Scholz, Krieg und Seekabel (1904), which discusses the matter thoroughly and ably.

[428] It's impossible for a document to cover the specifics of the completely unresolved issue regarding how much belligerents can interfere with submarine telegraph cables. Readers who are particularly interested in this topic may want to check out Scholz's excellent monograph, Krieg und Seekabel (1904), which thoroughly and skillfully discusses the subject.

CHAPTER 5 Non-hostile relations between combatants

I ON NON-HOSTILE RELATIONS IN GENERAL BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS

Grotius, III. c. 19—Pufendorf, VIII. c. 7, §§ 1-2—Bynkershoek, Quaest. jur. publ. I. c. 1—Vattel, III. §§ 174-175—Hall, § 189—Lawrence, § 210—Phillimore, III. § 97—Halleck, I. pp. 310-311—Taylor, § 508—Wheaton, § 399—Bluntschli, § 679—Heffter, § 141—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 525-527—Ullmann, § 185—Bonfils, Nos. 1237-1238—Despagnet, No. 555—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2882-2887—Rivier, II. p. 367—Calvo, IV. §§ 2411-2412—Fiore, III. No. 1482, and Code, Nos. 1721-1723—Martens, II. § 127—Longuet, §§ 134-135—Mérignhac, pp. 218-220—Pillet, pp. 355-356—Kriegsbrauch, p. 38—Land Warfare, §§ 221-223—Emanuel, Les conventions militaires dans la guerre continentale (1904).

Grotius, III. c. 19—Pufendorf, VIII. c. 7, §§ 1-2—Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law I. c. 1—Vattel, III. §§ 174-175—Hall, § 189—Lawrence, § 210—Phillimore, III. § 97—Halleck, I. pp. 310-311—Taylor, § 508—Wheaton, § 399—Bluntschli, § 679—Heffter, § 141—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 525-527—Ullmann, § 185—Bonfils, Nos. 1237-1238—Despagnet, No. 555—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2882-2887—Rivier, II. p. 367—Calvo, IV. §§ 2411-2412—Fiore, III. No. 1482, and Code, Nos. 1721-1723—Martens, II. § 127—Longuet, §§ 134-135—Mérignhac, pp. 218-220—Pillet, pp. 355-356—Rules of War, p. 38—Land Warfare, §§ 221-223—Emanuel, The Military Conventions in Continental Warfare (1904).

Fides etiam hosti servanda.

Keep faith even with enemies.

§ 215. Although the outbreak of war between States as a rule brings non-hostile intercourse to an end, necessity of circumstances, convenience, humanity, and other factors call, or may call, some kinds of non-hostile relations of belligerents into existence. And it is a universally recognised principle of International Law that, where such relations arise, belligerents must carry them out in good faith. Fides etiam hosti servanda is a rule which was adhered to in antiquity, when no International Law in the modern sense of the term existed. But it had then a religious and moral sanction only. Since in modern times war is not a condition of anarchy and lawlessness between belligerents, but a contention in many respects regulated, restricted, and modified by law, it is obvious that, where non-hostile relations between belligerents[Pg 274] occur, they are protected by law. Fides etiam hosti servanda is, therefore, a principle which nowadays enjoys as well a legal as a religious and moral sanction.

§ 215. While a war between states usually ends peaceful interactions, the needs of the situation, convenience, humanity, and other factors may create some forms of non-hostile relations between warring parties. It's a widely accepted principle of International Law that when such relations occur, the belligerents must engage in them in good faith. Fides etiam hosti servanda is a principle that was followed in ancient times when there wasn't International Law as we understand it today. Back then, it only had a religious and moral authority. However, in modern times, war is not a state of chaos and lawlessness between belligerents but is regulated, limited, and shaped by law. Thus, it's clear that when non-hostile relations between belligerents arise, they are protected by law. Fides etiam hosti servanda is, therefore, a principle that today holds both legal and religious as well as moral authority.

Different kinds of Non-hostile Relations.

Types of Friendly Relations.

§ 216. As through the outbreak of war all diplomatic intercourse and other non-hostile relations come to an end, it is obvious that non-hostile relations between belligerents must originate either from special rules of International Law or from special agreements between the belligerents.

§ 216. With the onset of war, all diplomatic communication and other non-hostile relations come to a halt, so it’s clear that non-hostile relations between those at war must arise either from specific rules of International Law or from special agreements between the warring parties.

No special rules of International Law which demanded non-hostile relations between belligerents existed in former times, but of late a few rules of this kind have arisen. Thus, for instance, release on parole[429] of prisoners of war creates an obligation on the part of the enemy not to re-admit the individuals concerned into the forces while the war lasts. And, to give another example, by article 4 of the Geneva Convention of 1906, and article 14 of the Hague Regulations—see also article 17 of Convention X. of the Second Peace Conference—it is the duty of either belligerent to return to the enemy, by his prisoner-of-war bureau, all objects of personal use, letters, jewellery, and the like found on the battlefield or left by those who died in hospital.[430] Non-hostile relations of this kind, however, need not be considered in this chapter, since they have already been discussed on several previous pages.

No special rules of International Law requiring non-hostile relations between warring parties existed in the past, but recently a few such rules have emerged. For example, the release on parole[429] of prisoners of war creates an obligation for the enemy not to reintegrate those individuals into their forces while the war continues. Another example can be found in Article 4 of the Geneva Convention of 1906 and Article 14 of the Hague Regulations—see also Article 17 of Convention X of the Second Peace Conference—where it is the responsibility of either warring party to return to the enemy, through their prisoner-of-war bureau, all personal items, letters, jewelry, and similar belongings found on the battlefield or left by those who died in the hospital.[430] However, these kinds of non-hostile relations will not be considered in this chapter, as they have already been addressed on several previous pages.

[429] See above, § 129.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[430] See above, § 144.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Non-hostile relations originating from special agreements of belligerents, so-called commercia belli, may either be concluded in time of peace for the purpose of creating certain non-hostile relations between the parties in case war breaks out, or they may be concluded during the actual time of war. Such non-hostile relations are created through passports, safe-conducts, safeguards, flags of truce, cartels, capitulations, and armistices. Non-hostile relations can[Pg 275] also be created by peace negotiations.[431] Each of these non-hostile relations must be discussed separately.

Non-hostile relations that come from special agreements between countries engaged in conflict, known as commercia belli, can be established during peacetime to prepare for non-hostile interactions if war breaks out, or they can be formed while war is ongoing. These non-hostile relations are established through passports, safe conducts, protections, flags of truce, negotiations for prisoner exchanges, surrender agreements, and ceasefires. Non-hostile relations can also arise from peace talks.[Pg 275] Each of these non-hostile relations should be examined individually.[431]

[431] See below, § 267.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Licences to Trade.

Licenses to Trade.

§ 217. Several writers[432] speak of non-hostile relations between belligerents created by licences to trade granted by a belligerent to enemy subjects either within certain limits or generally. It has been explained above, in § 101, that it is for Municipal Law to determine whether or not through the outbreak of war all trade and the like is prohibited between the subjects of belligerents. If the Municipal Law of one or both belligerents does contain such a prohibition, it is of course within the discretion of one or both of them to grant exceptional licences to trade to their own or the other belligerent's subjects, and such licences naturally include certain privileges. Thus, for instance, if a belligerent allows enemy subjects to trade with his own subjects, enemy merchantmen engaged in such trade are exempt from capture and appropriation by the grantor. Yet it is not International Law which creates this exemption, but the very licence to trade granted by the belligerent and revocable at any moment; and no non-hostile international relations between the belligerents themselves originate from such licences. The matter would be different if, either in time of peace for the time of war, or, during war, the belligerents agreed to allow certain trade between their subjects; but non-hostile relations originating from such an agreement would not be relations arising from a licence to trade, but from a cartel.[433]

§ 217. Several authors[432] discuss non-hostile relationships between warring parties established by trading licenses given by one side to the enemy’s subjects, either within specific limits or broadly. As explained earlier in § 101, it's up to municipal law to decide whether the outbreak of war prohibits all trade between the subjects of the belligerents. If the municipal law of one or both sides does impose such a prohibition, it is within their discretion to grant special trading licenses to their own or the opposing side's subjects, which naturally come with certain privileges. For example, if one side permits enemy subjects to trade with its own subjects, those enemy merchant ships involved in that trade are protected from capture and seizure by the one granting the license. However, this exemption isn't established by international law, but rather by the trading license issued by the belligerent, which can be revoked at any time, and no non-hostile international relations arise between the belligerents from such licenses. The situation would be different if, whether during peacetime or wartime, the belligerents mutually agreed to allow specific trade between their subjects; but non-hostile relations stemming from such an agreement would be based on a cartel, not a trade license.[433]

[432] See, for instance, Hall, § 196; Halleck, II. pp. 343-363; Lawrence, § 214; Manning, p. 168; Taylor, § 512; Wheaton, §§ 409-410; Fiore, III. No. 1500; Pradier-Fodéré, VII. No. 2938.

[432] For example, see Hall, § 196; Halleck, II. pp. 343-363; Lawrence, § 214; Manning, p. 168; Taylor, § 512; Wheaton, §§ 409-410; Fiore, III. No. 1500; Pradier-Fodéré, VII. No. 2938.

[433] See below, § 224.[Pg 276]

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.[Pg 276]

II Passports, safe conducts, safeguards

Grotius, III. c. 21, §§ 14-22—Vattel, III. §§ 265-277—Hall, §§ 191 and 195—Lawrence, § 213—Phillimore, III. §§ 98-102—Halleck, II. pp. 323-328—Taylor, § 511—Wheaton, § 408—Moore, VII. §§ 1158-1159—Bluntschli, §§ 675-678—Heffter, § 142—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 525-527—Ullmann, § 185—Bonfils, Nos. 1246-1247—Despagnet, Nos. 558-561—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2884, 2932-2938—Nys, III. pp. 504-505—Calvo, IV. §§ 2413-2418—Fiore, III. No. 1499, and Code, Nos. 1742-1749—Longuet, §§ 142-143—Mérignhac, pp. 239-240—Pillet, pp. 359-360—Kriegsbrauch, p. 41—Holland, War, No. 101—Land Warfare, §§ 326-337.

Grotius, III. c. 21, §§ 14-22—Vattel, III. §§ 265-277—Hall, §§ 191 and 195—Lawrence, § 213—Phillimore, III. §§ 98-102—Halleck, II. pp. 323-328—Taylor, § 511—Wheaton, § 408—Moore, VII. §§ 1158-1159—Bluntschli, §§ 675-678—Heffter, § 142—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 525-527—Ullmann, § 185—Bonfils, Nos. 1246-1247—Despagnet, Nos. 558-561—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2884, 2932-2938—Nys, III. pp. 504-505—Calvo, IV. §§ 2413-2418—Fiore, III. No. 1499, and Code, Nos. 1742-1749—Longuet, §§ 142-143—Mérignhac, pp. 239-240—Pillet, pp. 359-360—Kriegsbrauch, p. 41—Holland, War, No. 101—Land Warfare, §§ 326-337.

Passports and Safe-conducts.

Passports and travel permits.

§ 218. Belligerents on occasions arrange between themselves that passports and safe-conducts shall be given to certain of each other's subjects. Passports are written permissions given by a belligerent to enemy subjects, or others, allowing them to travel within that belligerent's territory or enemy territory occupied by him. Safe-conducts are written permissions given by a belligerent to enemy subjects, or others, allowing them to proceed to a particular place for a defined object, for instance, to a besieged town for conducting certain negotiations; but safe-conducts may also be given for goods, and they then comprise permission to carry such goods without molestation to a certain place. Passports as well as safe-conducts make the grantee inviolable so long and in so far as he complies with the conditions specially imposed upon him or made necessary by the circumstances of the special case. Passports and safe-conducts are not transferable, and they may be granted to enemy subjects for a limited or an unlimited period; in the former case their validity ceases with the expiration of the period. Both may be withdrawn, not only when the grantee abuses the protection, but also for military expediency. It must, however, be specially observed that passports[Pg 277] and safe-conducts are only a matter of International Law when the granting of them has been arranged between the belligerents or their responsible commanders, or between belligerents and neutral Powers. If they are granted without such an arrangement, unilaterally on the part of one of the belligerents, they fall outside the scope of International Law.[434]

§ 218. At times, belligerents agree to issue passports and safe-conducts for certain individuals from each other's countries. Passports are written permits granted by one side to individuals from the opposing side, allowing them to travel within that side's territory or within areas they occupy. Safe-conducts are written permits that allow individuals from the opposing side to travel to a specific location for a particular purpose, such as to a besieged town for negotiations; safe-conducts can also be issued for goods, permitting the transport of those goods without disturbance to a specified destination. Both passports and safe-conducts ensure that the person holding them is safe from harm, as long as they follow the specific conditions laid out or dictated by the situation. Passports and safe-conducts cannot be transferred and can be issued for a set period or indefinitely; in the case of a set duration, their validity ends when that period expires. Both can be revoked, not only if the holder misuses the protection but also for military reasons. It is important to note, however, that passports[Pg 277] and safe-conducts are only recognized by International Law when their issuance is agreed upon by the belligerents or their authorized commanders, or between belligerents and neutral nations. If issued unilaterally by one side without such an agreement, they do not fall under International Law.[434]

[434] The distinction between passports and the like arranged between the belligerents to be granted, on the one hand, and, on the other, such as are granted unilaterally, would seem to be necessary, although it is not generally made.

[434] The difference between passports and similar documents that are arranged between the warring parties to be issued, on one side, and those that are granted unilaterally, on the other side, seems to be important, even though it’s not usually acknowledged.

Safeguards.

Safety measures.

§ 219. Belligerents on occasions arrange between themselves that they shall grant protection to certain of each other's subjects or property against their own forces in the form of safeguards, of which there are two kinds. One consists in a written order given to an enemy subject or left with enemy property and addressed to the commander of armed forces of the grantor, in which the former is charged with the protection of the respective individual or property, and by which both become inviolable. The other kind of safeguard is given by detailing one or more soldiers to accompany enemy subjects or to guard the spot where certain enemy property is, for the purpose of protection. Soldiers on this duty are inviolable on the part of the other belligerent; they must neither be attacked nor made prisoners, and they must, on falling into the hands of the enemy, be fed, well kept, and eventually safely sent back to their corps. As in the case of passports and safe-conducts, it must be specially observed that safeguards are only a matter of International Law when the granting of them has been arranged by the belligerents, and not otherwise; except in the case of the safeguards mentioned by article 8, No. 2, of the Geneva Convention of 1906, who, according to articles 9 and 12 of that Convention, are inviolable.[Pg 278]

§ 219. Belligerents sometimes agree to protect certain subjects or property of each other from their own forces by establishing safeguards, which come in two forms. The first is a written order given to an enemy subject or left with enemy property, addressed to the commanding officer of the grantor's armed forces, instructing them to protect the designated individual or property, making both inviolable. The second type of safeguard involves assigning one or more soldiers to accompany enemy subjects or to guard specific enemy property for protection. Soldiers on this duty are considered inviolable by the opposing belligerent; they cannot be attacked or taken prisoner, and if captured, they must be fed, well cared for, and eventually returned safely to their unit. Similar to passports and safe-conducts, it's important to note that safeguards only hold significance in International Law when their provision has been mutually agreed upon by the belligerents, except for the safeguards mentioned in article 8, No. 2, of the Geneva Convention of 1906, which, according to articles 9 and 12 of that Convention, are inviolable.[Pg 278]

III Flags of truce

Hall, § 190—Lawrence, § 211—Westlake, II. p. 81—Moore, VII. § 1157—Phillimore, III. § 115—Halleck, II. pp. 333, 334—Taylor, § 510—Bluntschli, §§ 681-684—Heffter, § 126—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 421-423—Ullmann, § 180—Bonfils, Nos. 1239-1245—Despagnet, Nos. 556-557—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2927-2931—Rivier, II. pp. 279-280—Calvo, IV. §§ 2430-2432—Fiore, III. No. 1378, and Code, Nos. 1495-1500—Martens, II. § 127—Longuet, §§ 136-138—Mérignhac, pp. 220-225—Pillet, pp. 356-358—Zorn, pp. 195-199—Meurer, II. §§ 39-40—Bordwell, p. 293—Spaight, pp. 216-231—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 26-29—Holland, War, Nos. 88-91—Land Warfare, §§ 224-255.

Hall, § 190—Lawrence, § 211—Westlake, II. p. 81—Moore, VII. § 1157—Phillimore, III. § 115—Halleck, II. pp. 333, 334—Taylor, § 510—Bluntschli, §§ 681-684—Heffter, § 126—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 421-423—Ullmann, § 180—Bonfils, Nos. 1239-1245—Despagnet, Nos. 556-557—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2927-2931—Rivier, II. pp. 279-280—Calvo, IV. §§ 2430-2432—Fiore, III. No. 1378, and Code, Nos. 1495-1500—Martens, II. § 127—Longuet, §§ 136-138—Mérignhac, pp. 220-225—Pillet, pp. 356-358—Zorn, pp. 195-199—Meurer, II. §§ 39-40—Bordwell, p. 293—Spaight, pp. 216-231—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 26-29—Holland, War, Nos. 88-91—Land Warfare, §§ 224-255.

Meaning of Flags of Truce.

Meaning of Truce Flags.

§ 220. Although the outbreak of war brings all negotiations between belligerents to an end, and although no negotiations are as a rule conducted during war, certain circumstances and conditions make it necessary or convenient for the armed forces of belligerents to enter into negotiations with each other for various purposes. Since time immemorial a white flag has been used as a symbol by an armed force wishing to negotiate with the enemy, and always and everywhere it has been considered a duty of the enemy to respect this symbol. In land warfare the flag of truce is made use of in the following manner.[435] An individual—soldier or civilian—charged by his force with the task of negotiating with the enemy, approaches the latter either carrying the flag himself, or accompanied by a flag-bearer and, often, also by a drummer, a bugler, or a trumpeter, and an interpreter. In sea warfare the individual charged with the task of negotiating approaches the enemy in a boat flying the white flag. The Hague Regulations have now by articles 32 to 34 enacted most of the customary rules of International Law regarding flags of truce without adding any new rule. These rules are the same for land[Pg 279] warfare as for sea warfare, although their validity for land warfare is now grounded on the Hague Regulations, whereas their validity for sea warfare is still based on custom only.

§ 220. Even though the start of war ends all negotiations between the warring sides, and typically no negotiations happen during conflict, certain situations make it necessary or convenient for the armed forces of opposing sides to negotiate for various reasons. For centuries, a white flag has been used as a symbol by a military force wanting to negotiate with the enemy, and it has always been considered the enemy's duty to respect this symbol. In land warfare, the truce flag is used in the following way.[435] A designated individual—soldier or civilian—who is tasked by their force with negotiating with the enemy, approaches them either carrying the flag personally or accompanied by a flag-bearer, and often also by a drummer, bugler, or trumpeter, as well as an interpreter. In naval warfare, the person assigned to negotiate approaches the enemy in a boat displaying the white flag. The Hague Regulations have now codified most of the customary rules of International Law regarding flags of truce in articles 32 to 34 without adding any new rules. These rules apply equally to land warfare and naval warfare, although their authority for land warfare is now based on the Hague Regulations, while their authority for naval warfare is still based solely on custom.

[435] See Hague Regulations, article 32.

See Hague Regulations, art. 32.

Treatment of Unadmitted Flag-bearers.

Treatment of Unadmitted Flag Bearers.

§ 221. As a commander of an armed force is not, according to article 33 of the Hague Regulations, compelled to receive a bearer of a flag of truce, a flag-bearer who makes his appearance may at once be signalled to withdraw. Yet even then he is inviolable from the time he displays the flag to the end of the time necessary for withdrawal. During this time he may neither be intentionally attacked nor made prisoner. However, an armed force in battle is not obliged to stop its military operations on account of the approach of an enemy flag-bearer who has been signalled to withdraw. Although the latter may not be fired upon intentionally, should he be wounded or killed accidentally, during the battle, no responsibility or moral blame would rest upon the belligerent concerned. In former times the commander of an armed force could inform the enemy that, within a certain defined or indefinite period, he would under no circumstances or conditions receive a flag-bearer; if, in spite of such notice, a flag-bearer approached, he did not enjoy any privilege, and he could be attacked and made prisoner like any other member of the enemy forces. But this rule is now obsolete, and its place is taken by the rule that a commander must never, except in a case of reprisals, declare beforehand, even only for a specified period, that he will not receive a bearer of a flag of truce.[436]

§ 221. According to Article 33 of the Hague Regulations, a commander of an armed force is not required to accept a flag of truce. When a flag-bearer appears, they can be immediately signaled to leave. However, from the moment the flag is displayed until they leave, the flag-bearer is inviolable. During this time, they cannot be intentionally attacked or captured. An armed force engaged in battle is not obligated to halt military operations because an enemy flag-bearer has been told to withdraw. While they cannot be intentionally attacked, if the flag-bearer is accidentally wounded or killed during the battle, the opposing side bears no responsibility or moral blame. In the past, a commander could inform the enemy that for a specific or unspecified period, they wouldn't accept a flag-bearer; if a flag-bearer approached despite this notice, they had no privileges and could be attacked or captured like any other enemy combatant. However, this rule is now outdated, replaced by the rule that a commander must never declare in advance, even for a limited period, that they will not accept a flag of truce, except in cases of reprisals.[436]

[436] This becomes quite apparent from the discussion of the subject at the First Peace Conference; see Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXVI. p. 465; and Land Warfare, § 234.

[436] This is clearly shown in the discussions at the First Peace Conference; refer to Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXVI. p. 465; and Land Warfare, § 234.

Treatment of Admitted Flag-bearers.

Care for Admitted Flag-bearers.

§ 222. Bearers of flags of truce and their parties, when admitted by the other side, must be granted the privilege of inviolability. They may neither be attacked nor taken prisoners, and they must be allowed to[Pg 280] return safely in due time to their own lines. On the other hand, the forces admitting enemy flag-bearers need not allow them to acquire information about the receiving forces and to carry it back to their own corps. Flag-bearers and their parties may, therefore, be blindfolded by the receiving forces, or be conducted by roundabout ways, or be prevented from entering into communication with individuals other than those who confer officially with them, and they may even temporarily be prevented from returning till a certain military operation of which they have obtained information is carried out. Article 33 of the Hague Regulations specifically enacts that a commander to whom a flag of truce is sent "may take all steps necessary to prevent the envoy taking advantage of his mission to obtain information." Bearers of flags of truce are not, however, prevented from reporting to their corps any information they have gained by observation in passing through the enemy lines and in communicating with enemy individuals. But they are not allowed to sketch maps of defences and positions, to gather information secretly and surreptitiously, to provoke or to commit treacherous acts, and the like. If nevertheless they do any of these acts, they may be court-martialed. Articles 33 and 34 of the Hague Regulations specifically enact that a flag-bearer may temporarily be detained in case he abuses his mission for the purpose of obtaining information, and that he loses all privileges of inviolability "if it is proved beyond doubt that he has taken advantage of his privileged position to provoke or commit an act of treachery." Bearers of white flags and their party, who approach the enemy and are received, must carry[437] some authorisation with them to show that they are charged with the task of entering[Pg 281] into negotiations (article 32), otherwise they may be detained as prisoners, since it is his mission and not the white flag itself which protects the flag-bearer. This mission protects every one who is charged with it, notwithstanding his position in his corps and his status as a civilian or a soldier, but it does not protect a deserter. The latter may be detained, court-martialed, and punished, notice being given to his principal of the reason of punishment.[438]

§ 222. Bearers of flags of truce and their parties, when accepted by the other side, must be granted the privilege of inviolability. They cannot be attacked or taken prisoner, and they must be allowed to[Pg 280]return safely to their own lines in a timely manner. However, the forces that accept enemy flag-bearers are not required to allow them to gather information about the receiving forces to take back to their own units. Therefore, flag-bearers and their parties may be blindfolded by the receiving forces, taken through indirect routes, or prevented from communicating with anyone except those who are officially designated to talk to them, and they might even be temporarily held back from returning until a certain military operation, of which they have gathered information, is completed. Article 33 of the Hague Regulations specifically states that a commander who receives a flag of truce "may take all steps necessary to prevent the envoy from taking advantage of his mission to obtain information." However, flag-bearers are not prohibited from reporting back to their units any information they have observed while passing through enemy lines and communicating with enemy individuals. But they cannot sketch maps of defenses and positions, gather information secretly, provoke, or commit treacherous acts, and so on. If they do engage in any of these actions, they may face court-martial. Articles 33 and 34 of the Hague Regulations specifically state that a flag-bearer may be temporarily detained if he misuses his mission to obtain information, and he loses all privileges of inviolability "if it is proven beyond doubt that he has taken advantage of his privileged position to provoke or commit an act of treachery." Bearers of white flags and their party, who approach the enemy and are accepted, must carry[437] some authorization with them to show that they are tasked with entering into[Pg 281]negotiations (article 32); otherwise, they may be detained as prisoners, since it is their mission and not the white flag itself that protects the flag-bearer. This mission protects everyone assigned to it, regardless of their position in their unit or their status as a civilian or soldier, but it does not protect a deserter. The latter may be detained, court-martialed, and punished, with notice given to his superiors about the reason for the punishment.[438]

[437] Article 32 of the Hague Regulations confirms this customary rule by speaking of an individual who is "authorised" by one of the belligerents to enter into communication with the other.

[437] Article 32 of the Hague Regulations supports this customary rule by referring to a person who is "authorized" by one of the warring parties to communicate with the other.

[438] See Hall, § 190.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Hall, § 190.

Abuse of Flag of Truce.

Abusing a truce flag.

§ 223. Abuse of his mission by an authorised flag-bearer must be distinguished from an abuse of the flag of truce itself. Such abuse is possible in two different forms:—

§ 223. Abuse of his mission by an authorized flag-bearer must be distinguished from an abuse of the flag of truce itself. Such abuse can occur in two different forms:—

(1) The force which sends an authorised flag-bearer to the enemy has to take up a corresponding attitude; the ranks which the flag-bearer leaves being obliged to halt and to cease fire. Now it constitutes an abuse of the flag of truce if such attitude corresponding with the sending of a flag of truce is intentionally not taken up by the sending force. The case is even worse when a flag-bearer is intentionally sent on a feigned mission in order that military operations may be carried out by the sender under the protection due from the enemy to the flag-bearer and his party.

(1) The force that sends an authorized flag-bearer to the enemy must adopt a corresponding stance; the troops the flag-bearer leaves behind are required to stop and cease fire. It is a misuse of the flag of truce if the sending force deliberately fails to take the proper stance that should accompany the sending of a flag of truce. The situation is even more serious when a flag-bearer is intentionally sent on a false mission, allowing the sending force to carry out military operations while the enemy is expected to respect the flag-bearer and his group.

(2) The second form of a possible abuse appears in the case in which a white flag is made use of for the purpose of making the enemy believe that a flag of truce is about to be sent, although it is not sent, and of carrying out operations under the protection granted by the enemy to this pretended flag of truce.

(2) The second type of potential abuse occurs when a white flag is used to make the enemy think that a flag of truce is about to be sent, even though it isn’t, and to carry out operations under the protection that the enemy grants to this fake flag of truce.

It need hardly be specially mentioned that both forms of abuse are gross perfidy and may be met with reprisals, or with punishment of the offenders in case they fall into the hands of the enemy. The following case of abuse is related by Sir Sherston Baker in Halleck[Pg 282] (II. p. 315):—"On July 12, 1882, while the British fleet was lying off Alexandria, in support of the authority of the Khedive of Egypt, and the rebels under Arabi Pasha were being driven to great straits, a rebel boat, carrying a white flag of truce, was observed approaching H.M.S. Invincible from the harbour, whereupon H.M. ships Temeraire and Inflexible, which had just commenced firing, were ordered to suspend fire. So soon as the firing ceased, the boat, instead of going to the Invincible, returned to the harbour. A flag of truce was simultaneously hoisted by the rebels on the Ras-el-Tin fort. These deceits gave the rebels time to leave the works and to retire through the town, abandoning the forts, and withdrawing the whole of their garrison under the flag of truce."

It hardly needs to be mentioned that both forms of abuse are serious betrayal and can lead to reprisals or punishment for the offenders if they are captured by the enemy. The following case of abuse is noted by Sir Sherston Baker in Halleck[Pg 282] (II. p. 315):—"On July 12, 1882, while the British fleet was stationed off Alexandria to support the authority of the Khedive of Egypt, and the rebels led by Arabi Pasha were being pushed to their limits, a rebel boat flying a white flag of truce was seen approaching H.M.S. Invincible from the harbor. Consequently, H.M. ships Temeraire and Inflexible, which had just started firing, were ordered to stop. As soon as the firing ceased, instead of going to the Invincible, the boat returned to the harbor. At the same time, the rebels raised a flag of truce on the Ras-el-Tin fort. These deceptions allowed the rebels to leave their positions and retreat through the town, abandoning the forts and withdrawing their entire garrison under the flag of truce."

IV CARTELS

Grotius, III. c. 21, §§ 23-30—Vattel, III. §§ 278-286—Hall, § 193—Lawrence, § 212—Westlake, II. p. 139—Phillimore, III. §§ 111-112—Halleck, II. pp. 326-329—Taylor, § 599—Bluntschli, §§ 679-680—Heffter, § 142—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 525-529—Ullmann, § 185—Bonfils, Nos. 827 and 1280—Despagnet, No. 658—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2832-2837, 2888—Rivier, II. p. 360—Nys, III. pp. 521-525—Calvo, IV. §§ 2419-2429—Longuet, §§ 140, 141—Pillet, p. 359—Kriegsbrauch, p. 38—Holland, War, No. 100, and Prize Law, §§ 32-35—Land Warfare, §§ 338-339.

Grotius, III. c. 21, §§ 23-30—Vattel, III. §§ 278-286—Hall, § 193—Lawrence, § 212—Westlake, II. p. 139—Phillimore, III. §§ 111-112—Halleck, II. pp. 326-329—Taylor, § 599—Bluntschli, §§ 679-680—Heffter, § 142—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 525-529—Ullmann, § 185—Bonfils, Nos. 827 and 1280—Despagnet, No. 658—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2832-2837, 2888—Rivier, II. p. 360—Nys, III. pp. 521-525—Calvo, IV. §§ 2419-2429—Longuet, §§ 140, 141—Pillet, p. 359—Kriegsbrauch, p. 38—Holland, War, No. 100, and Prize Law, §§ 32-35—Land Warfare, §§ 338-339.

Definition and Purpose of Cartels.

Definition and Purpose of Cartels.

§ 224. Cartels are conventions between belligerents concluded for the purpose of permitting certain kinds of non-hostile intercourse between one another such as would otherwise be prevented by the condition of war. Cartels may be concluded during peace in anticipation of war, or during the time of war, and they may provide for numerous purposes. Thus, communication by post, telegraph, telephone, and railway, which would otherwise[Pg 283] not take place, can be arranged by cartels, as can also the exchange of prisoners, or a certain treatment of wounded, and the like. Thus, further, intercourse between each other's subjects through trade[439] can, either with or without limits, be agreed upon by belligerents. All rights and duties originating from cartels must be complied with in the same manner and good faith as rights and duties arising from other treaties.

§ 224. Cartels are agreements between warring parties established to allow certain types of non-hostile interactions that would typically be restricted during wartime. Cartels can be made during peacetime in preparation for conflict or while a war is ongoing, and they can serve a variety of purposes. For example, communication via mail, telegraph, telephone, and rail, which wouldn’t normally be possible, can be organized through cartels. They can also facilitate the exchange of prisoners or specific care for the injured, among other things. Additionally, trade between each other's citizens can be negotiated, with or without restrictions, by those in conflict. All rights and responsibilities that arise from these cartels must be honored with the same commitment and integrity as those stemming from other treaties.

[439] See above, § 217. But arrangements for granting passports, safe-conducts, and safeguards—see above, §§ 218 and 219—are not a matter of cartels.

[439] See above, § 217. However, the process of issuing passports, safe-conducts, and protections—see above, §§ 218 and 219—is not handled through cartels.

Cartel Ships.

Cartel Ships.

§ 225. Cartel ships[440] are vessels of belligerents which are commissioned for the carriage by sea of exchanged prisoners from the enemy country to their own country, or for the carriage of official communications to and from the enemy. Custom has sanctioned the following rules regarding these cartel ships for the purpose of securing protection for them on the one hand, and, on the other, their exclusive employment as a means for the exchange of prisoners: Cartel ships must not do any trade or carry any cargo or despatches;[441] they are especially not allowed to carry ammunition or instruments of war, except one gun for firing signals. They have to be furnished with a document from an official belonging to the home State of the prisoners and stationed in the country of the enemy declaring that they are commissioned as cartel ships. They are under the protection of both belligerents and may neither be seized nor appropriated. They enjoy this protection not only when actually carrying exchanged prisoners or official communications, but also on their way home after such carriage and on their way to fetch prisoners or official communications.[442] They lose the protection at once, and may consequently be seized and eventually[Pg 284] be appropriated, in case they do not comply, either with the general rules regarding cartel ships, or with the special conditions imposed upon them.

§ 225. Cartel ships[440] are vessels used by warring nations that are designated to transport exchanged prisoners from the enemy country back home, or to carry official communications to and from the enemy. Custom has established the following guidelines for these cartel ships to ensure their protection and restrict their use strictly for prisoner exchanges: Cartel ships are not allowed to engage in trade or carry any cargo or dispatches;[441] they are specifically prohibited from transporting ammunition or weapons, except for one gun used for signaling. They must have a document from an official of their home State, stationed in the enemy country, stating that they are appointed as cartel ships. They are protected by both warring parties and cannot be seized or taken over. This protection applies not only while they are transporting exchanged prisoners or official communications but also during their return journey after such transport and on their way to collect prisoners or official communications.[442] They lose this protection immediately and can be seized and potentially taken over if they do not follow either the general rules for cartel ships or the specific conditions set for them.

[440] See above, § 190.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[441] The La Rosina (1800), 2 C. Rob. 372; the Venus (1803), 4 C. Rob. 355.

[441] The La Rosina (1800), 2 C. Rob. 372; the Venus (1803), 4 C. Rob. 355.

[442] The Daifje (1800), 3 C. Rob. 139; the La Gloire (1804), 5 C. Rob. 192.

[442] The Daifje (1800), 3 C. Rob. 139; the La Gloire (1804), 5 C. Rob. 192.

V Surrender agreements

Grotius, III. c. 22, § 9—Vattel, III. §§ 261-264—Hall, § 194—Lawrence, § 215—Westlake, II. p. 81—Phillimore, III. §§ 122-127—Halleck, II. pp. 319-322—Taylor, §§ 514-516—Wheaton, § 405—Moore, VII. § 1160—Bluntschli, §§ 697-699—Heffter, § 142—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 527—Ullmann, § 185—Bonfils, Nos. 1259-1267—Despagnet, No. 562—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2917-2926—Rivier, II. pp. 361-362—Nys, III. pp. 514-517—Calvo, IV. §§ 2450-2452—Fiore, III. Nos. 1495-1497, and Code, Nos. 1733-1740—Martens, II. § 127—Longuet, §§ 151-154—Mérignhac, pp. 225-230—Pillet, pp. 361-364—Bordwell, p. 294—Meurer, II. §§ 41-42—Spaight, pp. 249-259—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 38-41—Holland, War, No. 92—Land Warfare, §§ 301-325.

Grotius, III. c. 22, § 9—Vattel, III. §§ 261-264—Hall, § 194—Lawrence, § 215—Westlake, II. p. 81—Phillimore, III. §§ 122-127—Halleck, II. pp. 319-322—Taylor, §§ 514-516—Wheaton, § 405—Moore, VII. § 1160—Bluntschli, §§ 697-699—Heffter, § 142—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 527—Ullmann, § 185—Bonfils, Nos. 1259-1267—Despagnet, No. 562—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2917-2926—Rivier, II. pp. 361-362—Nys, III. pp. 514-517—Calvo, IV. §§ 2450-2452—Fiore, III. Nos. 1495-1497, and Code, Nos. 1733-1740—Martens, II. § 127—Longuet, §§ 151-154—Mérignhac, pp. 225-230—Pillet, pp. 361-364—Bordwell, p. 294—Meurer, II. §§ 41-42—Spaight, pp. 249-259—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 38-41—Holland, War, No. 92—Land Warfare, §§ 301-325.

Character and Purpose of Capitulations.

Character and Purpose of Agreements.

§ 226. Capitulations are conventions between armed forces of belligerents stipulating the terms of surrender of fortresses and other defended places, or of men-of-war, or of troops. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish between a simple and a stipulated surrender. If one or more soldiers lay down their arms and surrender, or if a fortress or a man-of-war surrenders without making any terms whatever, there is no capitulation, for capitulation is a convention stipulating the terms of surrender.

§ 226. Capitulations are agreements between opposing armed forces that outline the conditions for surrendering fortresses, other defended locations, warships, or troops. Therefore, it’s important to differentiate between a simple surrender and a stipulated surrender. If one or more soldiers lay down their arms and surrender, or if a fortress or a warship surrenders without any specific terms, there is no capitulation, because capitulation is an agreement that outlines the terms of surrender.

Capitulations are military conventions only and exclusively; they must not, therefore, contain arrangements other than those of a local and military character concerning the surrendering forces, places, or ships. If they do contain such arrangements, the latter are not valid, unless they are ratified by the political authorities of both belligerents.[443] The surrender of a certain[Pg 285] place or force may, of course, be arranged by some convention containing other than military stipulations, but then such surrender would not originate from a capitulation. And just as is their character, so the purpose of capitulations is merely military—namely, the abandonment of a hopeless struggle and resistance which would only involve useless loss of life on the part of a hopelessly beset force. Therefore, whatever may be the indirect consequences of a certain capitulation, its direct consequences have nothing to do with the war at large, but are local only and concern the surrendering force exclusively.

Capitulations are strictly military agreements; therefore, they should only include arrangements that are local and military in nature regarding the surrendering forces, locations, or ships. If they include other types of arrangements, those are not valid unless approved by the political authorities of both sides involved in the conflict.[443] The surrender of a specific[Pg 285] place or force can be organized through an agreement that includes non-military terms, but that surrender would not be considered a capitulation. As such, the purpose of capitulations is purely military—specifically, to end a futile fight and resistance that would only result in unnecessary loss of life for a force in a desperate situation. Thus, regardless of any indirect effects of a particular capitulation, its direct implications are solely local and pertain exclusively to the surrendering force.

[443] See Phillimore, III. § 123, who discusses the promise of Lord William Bentinck to Genoa, in 1814, regarding its independence, which was disowned by the British Government. Phillimore himself disapproves of the attitude of Great Britain, and so do some foreign publicists, as, for instance, Despagnet (No. 562); but the rule that capitulations are military conventions, and that, therefore, such stipulations are not valid as are not of a local military character, is indubitable.

[443] See Phillimore, III. § 123, who talks about Lord William Bentinck’s promise to Genoa in 1814 concerning its independence, a promise that the British Government later rejected. Phillimore himself criticizes Great Britain's stance, as do some foreign publicists, such as Despagnet (No. 562); however, the principle that capitulations are military agreements and that therefore, such stipulations aren't valid unless they have a local military aspect is undeniable.

Contents of Capitulations.

Contents of Agreements.

§ 227. If special conditions are not agreed upon in a capitulation, it is concluded under the obvious condition that the surrendering force become prisoners of war, and that all war material and other public property in their possession or within the surrendering place or ship are surrendered in the condition they were at the time when the signature was given to the capitulation. Nothing prevents a force fearing surrender from destroying their provisions, munitions, their arms and other instruments of war which, when falling into the hands of the enemy, would be useful to him. Again, nothing prevents a commander, even after negotiations regarding surrender have begun, from destroying such articles. But when once a capitulation has been signed,[444] such destruction is no longer lawful, and, if carried out,[Pg 286] constitutes perfidy which may be punished by the other party as a war crime.

§ 227. If there are no special conditions agreed upon in a surrender agreement, it is understood that the surrendering force will become prisoners of war, and that all military equipment and other public property in their possession or within the location or ship being surrendered must be handed over in the condition they were in at the time the surrender agreement was signed. Nothing stops a force that fears surrender from destroying their supplies, weapons, and other military equipment that would be useful to the enemy if captured. Similarly, a commander can destroy such items even after surrender negotiations have started. However, once a surrender agreement has been signed,[444] such destruction is no longer allowed, and if it occurs,[Pg 286] it is considered treachery, which the other party can punish as a war crime.

[444] When, during the Russo-Japanese War, in January 1905, General Stoessel, the Commander of Port Arthur, had fortifications blown up and vessels sunk, during negotiations for surrender, but before the capitulation was signed, the Press undeservedly accused him of perfidy. U.S. Naval War Code, article 52, enacted the right principle, that "after agreeing upon or signing a capitulation, the capitulator must neither injure nor destroy the vessels, property, or stores in his possession that he is to deliver up, unless the right to do so is expressly reserved to him in the agreement or capitulation."

[444] In January 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War, General Stoessel, the Commander of Port Arthur, blew up fortifications and sank ships while negotiating his surrender, but before the capitulation was actually signed. The press unfairly accused him of betrayal. The U.S. Naval War Code, article 52, stated the right principle that "after agreeing upon or signing a capitulation, the capitulator must not harm or destroy the ships, property, or supplies in his possession that he is supposed to hand over, unless he has specifically reserved the right to do so in the agreement or capitulation."

But special conditions may be agreed upon between the forces concerned, and they must then be faithfully adhered to by both parties. The only rule which article 35 of the Hague Regulations enacts regarding capitulations is that the latter must be in accordance with the demands of military honour, and that, when once settled, they must be scrupulously observed. It is instructive to give some instances of possible conditions:—A condition of a capitulation may be the provision that the convention shall be valid only if within a certain period relief troops are not approaching. Provision may, further, be made that the surrendering forces shall not in every detail be treated like ordinary prisoners of war. Thus it may be stipulated that the officers or even the soldiers shall be released on parole, that officers remaining prisoners shall retain their swords. Whether or not a belligerent will grant or even offer such specially favourable conditions depends upon the importance of the force, place, or ship to be surrendered, and upon the bravery of the surrendering force. There are even instances of capitulations which stipulated that the surrendering forces should leave the place with full honours, carrying their arms and baggage away and joining their own army unmolested by the enemy through whose lines they had to march.[445]

But special conditions can be agreed upon between the involved parties, and they must be strictly followed by both sides. The only rule established by Article 35 of the Hague Regulations regarding capitulations is that these must align with the standards of military honor, and once established, they need to be carefully respected. It's helpful to provide some examples of possible conditions: A condition of a capitulation might be that the agreement is only valid if relief troops are not approaching within a certain time frame. Additionally, it may be specified that the surrendering forces are not treated like ordinary prisoners of war in every detail. For instance, it can be agreed that officers, or even soldiers, are released on parole, and that officers who remain prisoners retain their swords. Whether a belligerent will grant or even offer such favorable terms depends on the significance of the forces, location, or ship being surrendered, as well as the courage of the surrendering party. There are even cases where capitulations stipulated that the surrendering forces should leave the location with full honors, carrying their arms and belongings and rejoining their own army without interference from the enemy they had to march through.[445]

[445] During the Franco-German War the Germans granted these most favourable conditions to the French forces that surrendered Belfort on February 15, 1871.

[445] During the Franco-German War, the Germans offered the most favorable terms to the French forces that surrendered Belfort on February 15, 1871.

Form of Capitulations.

Form of agreements.

§ 228. No rule of International Law exists regarding the form of capitulations, which may, therefore, be concluded either orally or in writing. But they are usually concluded in writing. Negotiations for surrender, from whichever side they emanate, are usually sent under a flag of truce, but a force which is ready[Pg 287] to surrender without special conditions can indicate their intention by hoisting a white flag as a signal that they abandon all and every resistance. The question whether the enemy must at once cease firing and accept the surrender, is to be answered in the affirmative, provided he is certain that the white flag was hoisted by order or with the authority of the commander of the respective force. As, however, such hoisting may well have taken place without the authority of the commander and may, therefore, be disowned by the latter, no duty exists for the enemy to cease his attack until he is convinced that the white flag really indicates the intention of the commander to surrender.

§ 228. There’s no established rule in International Law about how capitulations should be made, so they can be agreed upon either verbally or in writing. However, they are typically formalized in writing. Negotiations for a surrender usually occur under a flag of truce, but a group ready to surrender without conditions can show their intention by raising a white flag, signaling that they are giving up all resistance. The question of whether the opposing force must immediately stop firing and accept the surrender is answered with a yes, as long as it's clear that the white flag was raised by order of the commander of the group in question. However, since the flag could be raised without the commander’s authority, and the commander may disown it, there’s no obligation for the enemy to halt their attack until they are certain that the white flag truly reflects the commander’s intention to surrender.

Competence to conclude Capitulations.

Competence to conclude agreements.

§ 229. The competence to conclude capitulations is vested in the commanders of the forces opposing each other. Capitulations entered into by unauthorised subordinate officers may, therefore, be disowned by the commander concerned without breach of faith. As regards special conditions of capitulations, it must be particularly noted that the competence of a commander to grant them is limited[446] to those the fulfilment of which depends entirely upon the forces under his command. If he grants conditions against his instructions, his superiors may disown such conditions. And the same is valid if he grants conditions the fulfilment of which depends upon forces other than his own and upon superior officers. The capitulation in El Arish[447] on January 24, 1800, arranged between the French General Kléber and the Turkish Grand Vizier, and approved by the British Admiral, Sir Sidney Smith, presents an illustrative example of this rule. As General Kléber, who was commanding the French army in Egypt, thought that he could not remain in Egypt, he proposed surrender under the condition that his army should be safely transported to France, carrying[Pg 288] away their arms and baggage. The Grand Vizier accepted these conditions. The British Admiral, Sir Sidney Smith, who approved of these conditions, was the local commander on the coast of Egypt, but was an officer inferior to Lord Keith, the commander of the British Mediterranean fleet. The latter had, on January 8, 1800, received secret orders, dated December 15, 1799, from the British Government instructing him not to agree to any capitulation which stipulated the free return of Kléber's army to France. Sir Sidney Smith did not, however, receive instructions based on these orders until February 22, 1800, and, therefore, when he approved of the capitulation of El Arish in January, was not aware that he acted against orders of the British Government.[448] Lord Keith, after having received the above orders on January 8, 1800, wrote at once to General Kléber, pointing out that he was not allowed to grant the return of the French army to France.[449] On the other hand, the British Government, after having been informed that Sir Sidney Smith had approved of the return of the French army, sent, on March 28, 1800, fresh orders[450] to Lord Keith, received by him at the end of April, advising him, although Sir Sidney Smith had exceeded his competence, to allow the capitulation to be carried out and the French army to be safely transported to France. Meanwhile, however, circumstances had entirely changed. When General Kléber had on March 17, 1800, received Lord Keith's letter of January 8, he addressed a proclamation,[451] in which Lord Keith's letter was embodied, to his troops asking them to prepare themselves for battle and actually began hostilities again on March 20. He was assassinated on June 14, and General Menou took over the command, and it was the latter who received,[Pg 289] on June 20, 1800, information of the changed attitude of the British Government regarding the capitulation of El Arish. Hostilities having been renewed as far back as March, General Menou refused,[452] on his part, to consent to the carrying out of the capitulation, and continued hostilities.

§ 229. The authority to negotiate surrender agreements lies with the commanders of the opposing forces. Surrenders made by unauthorized subordinate officers can be rejected by the relevant commander without any breach of trust. When it comes to specific conditions of surrender, it's essential to note that a commander's ability to grant these conditions is limited to those that can be fully fulfilled by the forces under their command. If a commander grants conditions that go against their orders, those in higher command may reject those conditions. This applies similarly if they grant conditions that depend on forces other than their own and on superior officers. The surrender at El Arish on January 24, 1800, negotiated between French General Kléber and the Turkish Grand Vizier and approved by British Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, exemplifies this rule. General Kléber, who led the French army in Egypt, believed he could not stay in Egypt, so he proposed surrendering on the condition that his army would be safely transported to France, along with their arms and baggage. The Grand Vizier accepted these terms. Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, who was the local commander on the Egyptian coast, approved these conditions but was lower in rank than Lord Keith, who commanded the British Mediterranean fleet. Lord Keith had received secret orders on January 8, 1800, dated December 15, 1799, from the British Government instructing him not to agree to any surrender that allowed Kléber's army to return freely to France. However, Sir Sidney Smith did not receive instructions based on these orders until February 22, 1800. Therefore, when he approved the surrender at El Arish in January, he was not aware that he was acting against the orders of the British Government. After receiving the orders on January 8, 1800, Lord Keith immediately wrote to General Kléber, informing him that he was not permitted to agree to the French army's return to France. On the other hand, after learning that Sir Sidney Smith had approved the return of the French army, the British Government sent new orders on March 28, 1800, to Lord Keith, which he received at the end of April, advising him to allow the surrender to go ahead and the French army to be safely transported to France, despite Sir Sidney Smith exceeding his authority. In the meantime, the situation had completely changed. When General Kléber received Lord Keith's letter from January 8 on March 17, 1800, he issued a proclamation that included Lord Keith's letter, instructing his troops to prepare for battle, and he actually resumed hostilities on March 20. He was assassinated on June 14, and General Menou took command. It was General Menou who received notice on June 20, 1800, about the British Government's changed stance regarding the surrender at El Arish. Since hostilities had resumed as far back as March, General Menou refused to carry out the surrender agreement and continued fighting.

[446] See U.S. Naval War Code, article 51.

[446] Refer to the U.S. Naval War Code, article 51.

[447] Martens, R. VII. p. 1.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Martens, R. VII. p. 1.

[448] Martens, R. VII. pp. 8 and 9.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Martens, R. VII. pp. 8-9.

[449] Martens, R. VII. p. 10.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Martens, R. VII. p. 10.

[450] Martens, R. VII. p. 11.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Martens, R. VII. p. 11.

[451] Martens, R. VII. p. 15.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Martens, R. VII, p. 15.

[452] Martens, R. VII. p. 16.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Martens, R. VII, p. 16.

It is obvious that Sir Sidney Smith, in approving the capitulation, granted a condition which did not depend entirely upon himself and the forces under him, but which depended upon Lord Keith and his fleet. Lord Keith as well as the British Government could have lawfully disowned this condition. That the British Government did not do so, but was ready to ratify Sir Sidney Smith's approval, was due to the fact that it did not want to disavow the promises of Sir Sidney Smith, who was not at the time aware of the orders of his Government to Lord Keith. On the other hand, the French Generals were not wrong in resuming hostilities after having received Lord Keith's first information, as thereby the capitulation fell to the ground.

It's clear that Sir Sidney Smith, by agreeing to the surrender, attached a condition that wasn't entirely in his control or that of his troops, but rather relied on Lord Keith and his fleet. Both Lord Keith and the British Government could have legally rejected this condition. The fact that the British Government chose not to disavow it and was willing to support Sir Sidney Smith's approval was because it didn't want to go back on the commitments made by Sir Sidney Smith, who was unaware of his Government's orders to Lord Keith at the time. On the other hand, the French Generals were justified in resuming hostilities after receiving Lord Keith's initial information, as that meant the surrender was no longer valid.

Violation of Capitulations.

Violation of Agreements.

§ 230. That capitulations must be scrupulously adhered to is an old customary rule, now enacted by article 35 of the Hague Regulations. Any act contrary to a capitulation would constitute an international delinquency if ordered by the belligerent Government concerned, and a war crime if committed without such order. Such violation may be met with reprisals or punishment of the offenders as war criminals.[Pg 290]

§ 230. It's an established rule that capitulations must be strictly followed, which is now codified in article 35 of the Hague Regulations. Any action against a capitulation would be considered an international offense if directed by the involved belligerent government, and a war crime if done without such orders. Violating this may lead to reprisals or the punishment of those responsible as war criminals.[Pg 290]

VI CEASEFIRES

Grotius, III. c. 21, §§ 1-13, c. 22, § 8—Pufendorf, VIII. c. 7, §§ 3-12—Vattel, III. §§ 233-260—Hall, § 192—Lawrence, § 216—Westlake, p. 82—Phillimore, III. §§ 116-121—Halleck, II. pp. 311-319—Moore, VII. § 1162—Taylor, §§ 513 and 516—Wheaton, §§ 400-404—Bluntschli, §§ 688-699—Heffter, § 142—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 531-544—Ullmann, § 186—Bonfils, Nos. 1248-1258—Despagnet, Nos. 563-566—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2889-2918—Rivier, II. pp. 362-368—Nys, III. pp. 518-520—Calvo, IV. §§ 2433-2449—Fiore, III. Nos. 1484-1494, and Code, Nos. 1750-1763—Martens, II. § 127—Longuet, §§ 145-149—Mérignhac, pp. 230-239—Pillet, pp. 364-370—Zorn. pp. 201-206—Bordwell, p. 291—Meurer, II. §§ 43-44—Spaight, pp. 232-248—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 41-44—Holland, War, Nos. 93-99—Land Warfare, §§ 256-300.

Grotius, III. c. 21, §§ 1-13, c. 22, § 8—Pufendorf, VIII. c. 7, §§ 3-12—Vattel, III. §§ 233-260—Hall, § 192—Lawrence, § 216—Westlake, p. 82—Phillimore, III. §§ 116-121—Halleck, II. pp. 311-319—Moore, VII. § 1162—Taylor, §§ 513 and 516—Wheaton, §§ 400-404—Bluntschli, §§ 688-699—Heffter, § 142—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 531-544—Ullmann, § 186—Bonfils, Nos. 1248-1258—Despagnet, Nos. 563-566—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2889-2918—Rivier, II. pp. 362-368—Nys, III. pp. 518-520—Calvo, IV. §§ 2433-2449—Fiore, III. Nos. 1484-1494, and Code, Nos. 1750-1763—Martens, II. § 127—Longuet, §§ 145-149—Mérignhac, pp. 230-239—Pillet, pp. 364-370—Zorn. pp. 201-206—Bordwell, p. 291—Meurer, II. §§ 43-44—Spaight, pp. 232-248—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 41-44—Holland, War, Nos. 93-99—Land Warfare, §§ 256-300.

Character and Kinds of Armistices.

Types of Armistices.

§ 231. Armistices or truces, in the wider sense of the term, are all agreements between belligerent forces for a temporary cessation of hostilities. They are in no wise to be compared with peace, and ought not to be called temporary peace, because the condition of war remains between the belligerents themselves, and between the belligerents and neutrals on all points beyond the mere cessation of hostilities. In spite of such cessation the right of visit and search over neutral merchantmen therefore remains intact, as does likewise the right to capture neutral vessels attempting to break a blockade, and the right to seize contraband of war. However, although all armistices are essentially alike in so far as they consist of cessation of hostilities, three different kinds must be distinguished—namely, (1) suspensions of arms, (2) general armistices, and (3) partial armistices.[453] It must be emphasised that the Hague Regulations deal with armistices in articles 36[Pg 291] to 41 very incompletely, so that the gaps need filling up from old customary rules.

§ 231. Armistices or truces, broadly speaking, are all agreements between warring parties for a temporary halt in fighting. They shouldn't be equated with peace and shouldn't be called temporary peace, because the state of war continues between the warring parties and between them and neutral parties on all matters beyond just stopping hostilities. Even with this halt, the right to visit and search neutral merchant ships remains unchanged, as does the right to capture neutral vessels trying to breach a blockade and the right to seize contraband. However, while all armistices are fundamentally the same in that they involve a cessation of hostilities, three different types must be noted—namely, (1) suspensions of arms, (2) general armistices, and (3) partial armistices.[453] It's important to highlight that the Hague Regulations only partially address armistices in articles 36[Pg 291] to 41, so the missing elements must be filled in with old customary rules.

[453] Although, as will be seen from the following sections, this distinction is absolutely necessary, it is not made by several publicists. Holland, War, No. 93, even says: "There is no difference of meaning, according to British usage at least, between a 'truce,' an 'armistice,' and a 'suspension of arms.'" Land Warfare, § 256—see in especial note (a)—accepts the distinction as indispensable.

[453] While this distinction is clearly essential, as will be shown in the following sections, many publicists overlook it. Holland, War, No. 93, even states: "According to British usage at least, there is no difference in meaning between a 'truce,' an 'armistice,' and a 'suspension of arms.'" Land Warfare, § 256—especially see note (a)—considers the distinction crucial.

Suspensions of Arms.

Ceasefire Agreements.

§ 232. Suspensions of arms, in contradistinction to armistices in the narrower sense of the term, are such cessations of hostilities as are agreed upon between large or small military or naval forces for a very short time and regarding momentary and local military purposes only. Such purposes may be—collection of the wounded; burial of the dead; negotiation regarding surrender or evacuation of a defended place, or regarding an armistice in the narrower sense of the term; but may also be the creation of a possibility for a commander to ask for and receive instructions from a superior authority,[454] and the like. Suspensions of arms have nothing to do with political purposes, or with the war generally, since they are of momentary and local importance only. They concern exclusively those forces and that spot which are the object of the suspension of arms. The Hague Regulations do not specially mention suspensions of arms, since article 37 speaks of local armistices only, apparently comprising suspensions of arms among local armistices.

§ 232. Suspensions of arms, as opposed to armistices in a stricter sense, are temporary halts in hostilities agreed upon by military or naval forces, whether large or small, for very brief periods and specific local military purposes. These purposes may include collecting the wounded, burying the dead, negotiating a surrender or evacuation of a defended location, or discussing an armistice in the stricter sense; they may also allow a commander to request and receive instructions from a higher authority,[454] among other things. Suspensions of arms are unrelated to political aims or the war in general, as they are only of immediate and local significance. They only affect the forces and the area involved in that specific suspension of arms. The Hague Regulations do not specifically mention suspensions of arms, since Article 37 refers to local armistices only, seemingly including suspensions of arms as part of local armistices.

[454] An instructive example of a suspension of arms for such purposes is furnished by the Convention between the German forces besieging Belfort and the French forces holding this fortress during the Franco-German War, signed on February 13, 1871; see Martens, N.R.G. XIX. p. 646.

[454] A good example of a ceasefire for such purposes can be seen in the agreement between the German troops besieging Belfort and the French troops defending this fortress during the Franco-German War, signed on February 13, 1871; see Martens, N.R.G. XIX. p. 646.

General Armistices.

General Ceasefires.

§ 233. A general armistice is such a cessation of hostilities as, in contradistinction to suspensions of arms with their momentary and local military purposes, is agreed upon between belligerents for the whole of their forces and the whole region of war. General armistices are always conventions of vital political importance affecting the whole of the war. They are as a rule, although not necessarily, concluded for a political purpose. It may be that negotiations of peace have ripened so far that the end of the war[Pg 292] is in sight and that, therefore, military operations appear superfluous; or that the forces of either belligerent are exhausted and need rest; or that the belligerents have to face domestic difficulties, the settlement of which is more pressing than the continuation of the war; or any other political purpose. Thus article 2 of the general armistice agreed upon at the end of the Franco-German War on January 28, 1871,[455] expressly declared the purpose of the armistice to be the creation of the possibility for the French Government to convoke a Parliamentary Assembly which could determine whether or not the war was to be continued or what conditions of peace should be accepted.

§ 233. A general armistice is a halt in fighting that, unlike temporary stops in hostilities with their specific military aims, is agreed upon by opposing forces for all their troops and the entire conflict area. General armistices are always agreements of significant political importance that impact the entire war. They are usually, but not always, established for political reasons. It might be the case that peace negotiations have progressed to the point where the end of the war is imminent, making military actions seem unnecessary; or that either side’s forces are worn out and in need of rest; or that the warring parties are dealing with internal issues that need to be resolved more urgently than continuing the war; or for any other political reason. For example, Article 2 of the general armistice agreed upon at the end of the Franco-German War on January 28, 1871,[455] specifically stated that the purpose of the armistice was to allow the French Government to gather a Parliamentary Assembly to decide whether the war should continue or what peace terms should be accepted.

[455] Martens, N.R.G. XIX. p. 626.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Martens, N.R.G. XIX. p. 626.

It is of importance to note that, for particular reasons, small parts of the belligerent forces and small parts of the theatre of war may be specially excluded without detracting from the general character of the armistice, provided the bulk of the forces and the greater part of the region of war are included. Thus, article 1 of the above-mentioned general armistice at the end of the Franco-German war specially excluded all military operations in the Départements du Doubs, du Jura, de la Côte d'Or, and likewise the siege of Belfort. It should also be mentioned that in the practice of belligerents the terms "suspension of arms" and "general armistice" are sometimes not sufficiently distinguished, but are interchangeable. Thus, for instance, the above-mentioned general armistice between France and Germany is entitled "Convention entre l'Allemagne et la France pour la suspension des hostilités, ..." whereas the different articles of the Convention always speak correctly of an armistice, and whereas, further, an annexe to the Convention signed on January 29 is entitled[456] "Annexe à la Convention d'armistice."

It’s important to note that, for specific reasons, some small parts of the fighting forces and some areas of the war zone may be specifically excluded without affecting the overall nature of the ceasefire, as long as the majority of the forces and most of the war region are included. For example, Article 1 of the referenced general ceasefire at the end of the Franco-German War specifically excluded all military actions in the Doubs, Jura, and Côte d'Or departments, as well as the siege of Belfort. It should also be noted that in the practice of combatants, the terms "suspension of arms" and "general ceasefire" are sometimes not clearly differentiated and are used interchangeably. For instance, the aforementioned general ceasefire between France and Germany is titled "Convention between Germany and France for the Suspension of Hostilities, ..." while the various articles of the Convention correctly refer to it as a ceasefire, and additionally, an annex to the Convention signed on January 29 is titled[456] "Annex to the Ceasefire Convention."

[456] Martens, N.R.G. XIX. p. 636.[Pg 293]

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Martens, N.R.G. XIX. p. 636.[Pg 293]

Partial Armistices.

Ceasefires.

§ 234. Partial armistices are agreements for cessations of hostilities which are not concluded by belligerents for their whole forces and the whole region of war, but do not merely serve, like suspensions of arms, momentary and local military purposes. They are armistices concluded by belligerents for a considerable part of their forces and front; they are always of political importance affecting the war in general; and they are very often, although they need not be, agreed upon for political purposes. Article 37 of the Hague Regulations apparently includes partial armistices together with suspensions of arms under the term "local" armistices. A partial armistice may be concluded for the military or the naval forces only; for cessation of hostilities in the colonies only; for cessation of hostilities between two of the belligerents in case more than two are parties to the war, and the like. But it is always a condition that a considerable part of the forces and region of war must be included, and that the purpose is not only a momentary one.

§ 234. Partial armistices are agreements to stop fighting that aren’t made by all the combatants for their entire forces or across the entire war zone, but are more than just temporary and localized military agreements like suspensions of arms. They are armistices made by combatants for a significant part of their forces and front lines; they always have political significance that impacts the overall war and are often, though not necessarily, established for political reasons. Article 37 of the Hague Regulations seemingly includes partial armistices along with suspensions of arms under the term "local" armistices. A partial armistice can be established for either military or naval forces only; for stopping hostilities in the colonies only; or for halting hostilities between two of the combatants if more than two are involved in the war, among other scenarios. However, it is always required that a substantial part of the forces and the war region must be included, and that the intent isn't solely for a temporary halt.

Competence to conclude Armistices.

Ability to end armistices.

§ 235. As regards the competence to conclude armistices, a distinction is necessary between suspensions of arms and general and partial armistices.

§ 235. When it comes to the ability to agree on armistices, we need to make a distinction between suspensions of arms and both general and partial armistices.

(1) Since the character and purpose of suspensions of arms are military, local, and momentary only, every commander is supposed to be competent to agree upon a suspension of arms, and no ratification on the part of superior officers or other authorities is required. Even commanders of the smallest opposing detachments may arrange a suspension of arms.

(1) Since the nature and purpose of ceasefires are military, local, and temporary, every commander is seen as capable of agreeing to a ceasefire, and there's no need for approval from higher-ranking officers or other authorities. Even commanders of the smallest opposing units can arrange a ceasefire.

(2) On the other hand, since general armistices are of vital political importance, only the belligerent Governments themselves or their commanders-in-chief are competent to conclude them, and ratification, whether specially stipulated or not, is necessary. Should a commander-in-chief conclude a general armistice which[Pg 294] would not find ratification, hostilities may at once be recommenced without breach of faith, it being a matter of common knowledge that a commander-in-chief is not authorised to agree upon exclusion of ratification, unless he received special powers thereto.

(2) On the flip side, since general armistices are hugely important politically, only the warring governments or their top commanders can finalize them, and ratification, whether specifically required or not, is necessary. If a commander-in-chief agrees to a general armistice that[Pg 294] isn't ratified, fighting can immediately resume without any breach of trust, as it's well known that a commander-in-chief cannot agree to exclude ratification unless they have been given special authority to do so.

(3) Partial armistices may be concluded by the commanders-in-chief of the respective forces, and ratification is not necessary, unless specially stipulated; the commanders being responsible to their own Governments in case they agree upon a partial armistice without being specially authorised thereto.

(3) Partial ceasefires can be agreed upon by the commanders-in-chief of the respective forces, and ratification isn't necessary unless specifically stated; the commanders are accountable to their own governments if they agree to a partial ceasefire without special authorization.

Form of Armistices.

Type of Armistices.

§ 236. No legal rule exists regarding the form of armistices, which may therefore be concluded either orally or in writing. However, the importance of general as well as partial armistices makes it advisable to conclude them by signing written documents containing all items which have been agreed upon. No instance is known of a general or partial armistice of modern times concluded otherwise than in writing. But suspensions of arms are often only orally concluded.

§ 236. There is no legal rule about how armistices should be formatted, so they can be made either verbally or in writing. However, because both general and partial armistices are important, it's a good idea to finalize them with signed written documents that outline everything agreed upon. There's no known case of a general or partial armistice in modern times that was made in any way other than in writing. However, suspensions of arms are often simply agreed upon verbally.

Contents of Armistices.

Contents of Ceasefires.

§ 237. That hostilities must cease is the obvious content of all kinds of armistices. Usually, although not at all necessarily, the parties embody special conditions in the agreement instituting an armistice. If and so far as this has not been done, the import of armistices is for some parts much controverted. Everybody agrees that belligerents during an armistice may, outside the line where the forces face each other, do everything and anything they like regarding defence and preparation of offence; for instance, they may manufacture and import munitions and guns, drill recruits, build fortresses, concentrate or withdraw troops. But no unanimity exists regarding such acts as must be left undone or may be done within the very line where the belligerent forces face each other. The[Pg 295] majority of writers, led by Vattel (III. § 245), maintain that in the absence of special stipulations it is essentially implied in an armistice that within such line no alteration of the status quo shall take place which the other party, were it not for the armistice, could by application of force, for instance by a cannonade or by some other means, prevent from taking place. These writers consider it a breach of faith for a belligerent to make such alterations under the protection of the armistice. On the other hand, a small minority of writers, but led by Grotius (III. c. 21, § 7) and Pufendorf (VIII. 7, § 7), assert that cessation of hostilities and of further advance only are essentially implied in an armistice; all other acts, such as strengthening of positions by concentration of more troops on the spot, erection and strengthening of defences, repairing of breaches of besieged fortresses, withdrawing of troops, making of fresh batteries on the part of besiegers without advancing, and the like, being allowed. As the Hague Regulations do not mention the matter, the controversy still remains unsettled. I believe the opinion of the minority to be correct, since an armistice does not mean anything else than a cessation of actual hostilities, and it is for the parties who agree upon an armistice to stipulate such special conditions as they think necessary or convenient. This applies particularly to the other controversial questions as to revictualling of besieged places and as to intercourse, commercial and otherwise, of the inhabitants of the region where actual fighting was going on before the armistice. As regards revictualling, it has been correctly maintained that, if it were not allowed, the position of the besieged forces would thereby be weakened by the action of the armistice. But I cannot see why this should be an argument to hold revictualling permissible. The principle vigilantibus jura sunt scripta applies to armistices[Pg 296] as well as to all other legal transactions. It is for the parties to prepare such arrangements as really suit their needs and wants. Thus, during the Franco-German War an armistice for twenty-five days proposed in November 1870 fell to the ground on the Germans refusing to grant the revictualling of Paris.[457] It seems to be the intention of the Hague Regulations that the parties should always stipulate those special conditions which they need. Article 39 pronounces this intention regarding intercourse, commercial and otherwise, during armistices, by the following words:—"It is for the contracting parties to settle in the terms of the armistice what communications may be held within the theatre of war with the population and with each other."

§ 237. It is clear that hostilities must stop in any type of armistice. Usually, though not always, the parties include specific conditions in the armistice agreement. If they don’t, the meaning of armistices can be debated in some areas. Everyone agrees that belligerents during an armistice can do anything they want regarding defense and offensive preparations outside the frontline where the forces are facing each other. For example, they can produce and import weapons and ammunition, train recruits, build fortifications, and move troops around. However, there is no consensus on the actions that need to be left undone or can be done right at the frontline where the belligerent forces face each other. The majority of scholars, led by Vattel (III. § 245), argue that unless there are specific agreements, it is implied in an armistice that no changes to the status quo shall occur within that area—changes that the other party could have prevented by using force if there were no armistice in place, such as by firing cannons or some other means. These scholars see it as a breach of trust for a belligerent to make such changes while under the protection of the armistice. Conversely, a small minority, led by Grotius (III. c. 21, § 7) and Pufendorf (VIII. 7, § 7), argue that only the cessation of hostilities and further advances is implied in an armistice; all other actions, like strengthening positions by bringing in more troops, building and reinforcing defenses, repairing breaches in besieged fortresses, withdrawing troops, and creating new batteries by besiegers without advancing, are allowed. Since the Hague Regulations do not address this issue, the debate remains unresolved. I believe the minority's view is correct because an armistice solely means the cessation of actual hostilities, and it's up to the parties that agree to the armistice to outline any special conditions they find necessary or convenient. This specifically applies to other controversial issues, such as resupplying besieged areas and the trade, both commercial and otherwise, of the inhabitants in the area where fighting was taking place before the armistice. Regarding resupplying, it has been correctly pointed out that if it were not allowed, the position of the besieged forces would be weakened by the armistice’s effects. However, I don’t understand why this would justify allowing resupply. The principle vigilantibus jura sunt scripta applies to armistices just like it does to all other legal matters. The parties must create arrangements that truly meet their needs. For instance, during the Franco-German War, a proposed twenty-five-day armistice in November 1870 fell through because the Germans refused to allow the resupply of Paris.[457] It seems to be the intention of the Hague Regulations that the parties should always stipulate any special conditions they require. Article 39 expresses this intention regarding communication, both commercial and otherwise, during armistices with the following words:—"It is for the contracting parties to settle in the terms of the armistice what communications may be held within the theatre of war with the population and with each other."

[457] See Pradier-Fodéré, VII. No. 2908, where the question of revictualling during an armistice is discussed at some length, and the opinions of many publicists from Grotius to our own days are quoted.

[457] See Pradier-Fodéré, VII. No. 2908, where the issue of supplying provisions during a ceasefire is discussed in detail, along with the views of numerous publicists from Grotius to the present.

It must be specially mentioned that for the purpose of preventing the outbreak of hostilities during an armistice it is usual to agree upon so-called lines of demarcation[458]—that is, a small neutral zone between the forces facing each other which must not be entered by members of either force. But such lines of demarcation do not exist, if they are not specially stipulated by the armistice concerned.

It should be noted that to prevent conflict during a ceasefire, it is common to establish what are called lines of demarcation[458]—a small neutral zone between opposing forces that neither side is allowed to enter. However, these lines of demarcation only exist if they are specifically outlined in the armistice.

[458] See Pradier-Fodéré, VII. No. 2901.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Pradier-Fodéré, VII. No. 2901.

Commencement of Armistices.

Start of Armistices.

§ 238. In case the contrary is not stipulated, an armistice commences the very moment the agreement upon it is complete. But often the parties stipulate in the agreement the time from which the armistice shall begin. If this is done in so detailed a manner that the very hour of the commencement is mentioned, no cause for controversy is given. But sometimes the parties fix only the date by stipulating that the armistice shall last from one certain day to another, e.g. from June 15 to July 15. In such case the actual commencement is controversial. Most publicists maintain[Pg 297] that in such case the armistice begins at 12 o'clock of the night between the 14th and the 15th of June, but Grotius (III. c. 21, § 4) maintains that it begins at 12 o'clock of the night between the 15th and the 16th of June.[459] Therefore, to avoid difficulties, agreements concerning armistices ought always to stipulate whether the first day is to be included in the armistice. Be that as it may, when the forces included in an armistice are dispersed over a very large area, the parties very often stipulate different dates of commencement for the different parts of the front, because it is not possible to announce the armistice at once to all the forces included. Thus, for instance, article 1 of the general armistice at the end of the Franco-German War[460] stipulated its immediate commencement for the forces in and around Paris, but that with regard to the other forces its commencement should be delayed three days. Article 38 of the Hague Regulations enacts that an armistice must be notified officially and in good time to the competent authorities and the troops, and that hostilities are suspended immediately after the ratification or at a fixed date, as the case may be.

§ 238. If nothing else is specified, an armistice starts as soon as the agreement is finalized. However, the parties often specify a starting time in the agreement. If they provide detailed information that includes the exact hour it begins, there’s no room for disagreement. Sometimes, though, they only set the date, stating that the armistice lasts from one particular day to another, e.g. from June 15 to July 15. In this case, the actual start time can be debated. Most legal experts argue[Pg 297] that the armistice starts at 12:00 AM on the night between June 14 and 15, but Grotius (III. c. 21, § 4) argues it starts at 12:00 AM on the night between June 15 and 16.[459] To avoid confusion, agreements about armistices should always specify if the first day counts as part of the armistice. Regardless, when forces involved in an armistice are spread across a wide area, the parties often set different start dates for different sections of the front, since it’s not feasible to inform all the forces simultaneously. For example, article 1 of the general armistice at the end of the Franco-German War[460] stated that it would start immediately for the forces in and around Paris, but for the other forces, it would begin three days later. Article 38 of the Hague Regulations requires that an armistice be officially announced in advance to the relevant authorities and troops, with hostilities suspended immediately after ratification or at a fixed date, depending on the situation.

[459] See Pradier-Fodéré, VII. No. 2897. The controversy occurs again with regard to the end of an armistice; see below, § 240.

[459] Refer to Pradier-Fodéré, VII. No. 2897. The debate comes up again concerning the conclusion of a ceasefire; see below, § 240.

[460] Martens, N.R.G. XIX. p. 626.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Martens, N.R.G. XIX. p. 626.

It sometimes happens that hostilities are carried on after the commencement of an armistice by forces which did not know of its commencement. In such cases the status quo at the date of the commencement of armistice has to be re-established so far as possible, prisoners made and enemy vessels seized being liberated, capitulations annulled, places occupied evacuated, and the like; but the parties may, of course, stipulate the contrary.

It sometimes happens that fighting continues after an armistice has started due to forces that were unaware it had begun. In these cases, the status quo at the time the armistice began needs to be restored as much as possible. This means releasing any prisoners taken and enemy ships captured, canceling any capitulations, evacuating occupied places, and similar actions; however, the parties can agree to do otherwise if they choose.

Violation of Armistices.

Violation of ceasefires.

§ 239. Any violation of armistices is prohibited, and, if ordered by the Governments concerned, constitutes an international delinquency. In case an[Pg 298] armistice is violated by members of the forces on their own account, the individuals concerned may be punished by the other party in case they fall into its hands. Be that as it may, the question must be answered, what general attitude is to be taken by one party, if the other violates the armistice? No unanimity regarding this point exists among the writers on International Law, many[461] asserting that in case of violation the other party may at once, without giving notice, re-open hostilities; others[462] maintaining that such party may not do this, but has only the right to denounce the armistice. The Hague Regulations endeavour to settle the controversy, article 40 enacting that any serious violation of an armistice by one of the parties gives the other the right to denounce it, and even, in case of urgency, to recommence hostilities at once. Three rules may be formulated from this—(1) violations which are not serious do not even give the right to denounce an armistice; (2) serious violations do as a rule empower the other party to denounce only the armistice, but not to recommence hostilities at once without notice; (3) only in case of urgency is a party justified in recommencing hostilities without notice, when the other party has broken an armistice. But since the terms "serious violation" and "urgency" lack precise definition, it is practically left to the discretion of the injured party.

§ 239. Any breaking of ceasefires is not allowed, and, if ordered by the involved Governments, counts as an international offense. If a ceasefire is broken by members of the forces acting independently, they can be punished by the other side if they are captured. That said, it’s important to address what response one side should have if the other breaks the ceasefire. There’s no agreement among experts in International Law on this matter; some assert that if a breach occurs, the other side may immediately resume fighting without notice, while others argue that the affected party should only have the right to formally end the ceasefire. The Hague Regulations attempt to clarify this issue, with article 40 stating that any serious breach of a ceasefire by one party gives the other party the right to end it and, in cases of urgency, to immediately resume hostilities. Three rules can be outlined from this: (1) breaches that aren’t serious do not grant the right to end a ceasefire; (2) serious breaches typically only allow the other party to end the ceasefire but not to resume fighting immediately without notice; (3) only in cases of urgency is a party justified in resuming hostilities without notice after the other party has violated a ceasefire. However, since the terms "serious violation" and "urgency" are not clearly defined, it ultimately depends on the judgment of the affected party.

It must be specially observed that violation of an armistice committed by private individuals acting on their own initiative is to be distinguished from violation by members of the armed forces. In the former case the injured party has, according to article 41 of[Pg 299] the Hague Regulations, only the right of demanding punishment of the offenders, and, if necessary, indemnity for losses sustained.

It should be noted that a violation of an armistice carried out by private individuals acting independently is different from a violation by armed forces members. In the first case, the harmed party has the right, according to Article 41 of [Pg 299] the Hague Regulations, to demand punishment for the offenders and, if needed, compensation for any losses incurred.

[461] See, for instance, Grotius, III. c. 21, § 11; Pufendorf, VIII. c. 7, § 11; Vattel, III. § 242; Phillimore, II. § 121; Bluntschli, § 695; Fiore, III. No. 1494.

[461] See, for example, Grotius, III. c. 21, § 11; Pufendorf, VIII. c. 7, § 11; Vattel, III. § 242; Phillimore, II. § 121; Bluntschli, § 695; Fiore, III. No. 1494.

[462] See, for instance, Calvo, IV. § 2436; Despagnet, No. 566; Pradier-Fodéré, VII. No. 2913.

[462] Check out Calvo, IV. § 2436; Despagnet, No. 566; Pradier-Fodéré, VII. No. 2913 for example.

End of Armistices.

End of Ceasefires.

§ 240. In case an armistice has been concluded for an indefinite period, the parties having made no stipulations regarding notice to recommence hostilities, notice may be given at any time, and hostilities recommenced at once after notification. In most cases, however, armistices are agreed upon for a definite period, and then they expire with such period without special notice, unless notification has been expressly stipulated. If, in case of an armistice for a definite period, the exact hour of the termination has not been agreed upon, but only the date, the armistice terminates at twelve o'clock midnight of such date. In case an armistice has been arranged to last from one certain day to another, e.g. from June 15 to July 15, it is again[463] controversial whether July 15 is excluded or included. An armistice may, lastly, be concluded under a resolutive condition, in which case the occurrence of the condition brings the armistice to an end.

§ 240. If an armistice has been agreed upon for an indefinite time and there are no stipulations about when to announce the start of hostilities again, notice can be given at any time, and hostilities will resume immediately after that notice. However, in most situations, armistices are set for a specific period, and they automatically end after that time without special notice unless a notification has been specifically agreed upon. If an armistice for a fixed term hasn’t specified an exact hour for its end but only the date, it will end at midnight on that date. If an armistice is scheduled to last from one specific day to another, e.g. from June 15 to July 15, it remains a point of debate whether July 15 is included or excluded. Finally, an armistice can also be made under a conditional agreement, in which case the armistice will end if that condition is met.

[463] See above, § 238.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

CHAPTER 6 Ways to ensure just warfare

I ON GENERAL MEANS OF ENSURING LEGITIMATE WARFARE

Bonfils, Nos. 1014-1017—Spaight, p. 460—Land Warfare, §§ 435-438.

Bonfils, Nos. 1014-1017—Spaight, p. 460—Land Warfare, §§ 435-438.

Legitimate and Illegitimate Warfare.

Legitimate vs. Illegitimate Warfare.

§ 241. Since war is not a condition of anarchy and lawlessness, International Law requires that belligerents shall comply with its rules in carrying on their military and naval operations. So long and in so far as belligerents do this, their warfare is legitimate; if they do not comply with the rules, their warfare is illegitimate. Now, illegitimate acts and omissions can be committed by belligerent Governments themselves, by the commanders or members of their forces, and by their subjects not belonging to the forces. Experience teaches that, on the whole, omissions and the committal of illegitimate acts on the part of individual soldiers are unavoidable during war, since the passions which are aroused by and during war will always carry away some individuals. But belligerents bear a vicarious responsibility for internationally illegal acts of their soldiers, which turns into original responsibility if they refuse to repair the wrong done by punishing the offenders and, if necessary, indemnifying the sufferers.[464] Cases in which belligerent Governments[Pg 301] themselves commit illegitimate acts, as well as cases in which they refuse to punish their soldiers for illegitimate acts constitute international delinquencies.[465] Now, if in time of peace an international delinquency is committed, the offended State can, if the worst comes to the worst, make war against the offender to compel adequate reparation.[466] But if an international delinquency is committed during warfare itself, no means whatever exist of compelling reparation.

§ 241. Since war isn’t just a state of chaos and lawlessness, International Law requires that combatants follow its rules while conducting their military and naval operations. As long as they do this, their warfare is legitimate; if they fail to comply with the rules, their warfare is illegitimate. Illegitimate acts and omissions can be carried out by the belligerent governments themselves, by the commanders or members of their forces, and by their civilians who aren’t part of the military. Experience shows that, generally, the omission of duties and the commission of illegitimate acts by individual soldiers are unavoidable during war, as the emotions stirred up by war will always influence some individuals. However, belligerents have vicarious responsibility for internationally illegal acts done by their soldiers, which becomes original responsibility if they refuse to address the wrongdoing by punishing the offenders and, if necessary, compensating the victims.[464] Instances where belligerent governments themselves commit illegitimate acts, as well as instances where they neglect to punish their soldiers for illegitimate acts, are considered international offenses.[465] Now, if an international offense occurs during peacetime, the harmed state can, as a last resort, go to war against the offender to secure proper compensation.[466] But if an international offense takes place during warfare, there are no means available to enforce reparation.

How Legitimate Warfare is on the whole secured.

How Legitimate Warfare is generally secured.

§ 242. Yet legitimate warfare is, on the whole at any rate, secured through several means recognised by International Law. These means of securing legitimate warfare may be divided into three classes. The first class comprises measures of self-help:—reprisals; punishment of war crimes committed by enemy soldiers and other enemy subjects; the taking of hostages. The second class comprises:—complaints lodged with the enemy; complaints lodged with neutral States; good offices, mediation, and intervention on the part of neutral States. And there is, thirdly, the fact that, according to article 3 of Convention IV. of the Second Peace Conference, belligerents are responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of their forces, and are liable to make compensation, if the case demands it, for any violation of the Hague Regulations. These means, as I have said, do on the whole secure the legitimacy of warfare, because it is to the interest of either belligerent to prevent the enemy from getting a justifiable opportunity of making use of them. On the other hand, isolated illegitimate acts of individual enemy soldiers will always occur; but they will in many cases meet with punishment either by one party to the war or the other. As regards hostile acts of private enemy individuals not belonging[Pg 302] to the armed forces, belligerents have a right[467] to consider and punish them severely as acts of illegitimate warfare.

§ 242. However, legitimate warfare is generally secured through several means recognized by International Law. These means of ensuring legitimate warfare can be categorized into three classes. The first class includes self-help measures: reprisals, punishing war crimes committed by enemy soldiers and other enemy subjects, and taking hostages. The second class consists of lodging complaints with the enemy, making complaints to neutral states, engaging in good offices, mediation, and intervention by neutral states. Lastly, there is the fact that, according to article 3 of Convention IV of the Second Peace Conference, belligerents are responsible for all actions taken by individuals in their forces and must compensate for any violations of the Hague Regulations if necessary. As I mentioned, these means generally secure the legitimacy of warfare, as it serves the interest of either side to prevent the enemy from having a valid reason to utilize them. That said, isolated illegitimate acts by individual enemy soldiers will always happen; however, they often result in punishment by one side or the other. Regarding hostile actions by private individuals not part of the armed forces, belligerents have the right to consider and punish them strictly as acts of illegitimate warfare.

[467] See below, § 254.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

II COMPLAINTS, ASSISTANCE, AND MEDIATION, INTERVENTION

Land Warfare, §§ 439-440.

Land Warfare, §§ 439-440.

Complaints lodged with the Enemy.

Complaints filed with the Enemy.

§ 243. Commanders of forces engaged in hostilities frequently lodge complaints with each other regarding single acts of illegitimate warfare committed by members of their forces, such as abuses of the flag of truce, violations of such flag or of the Geneva Convention, and the like. The complaint is sent to the enemy under the protection of a flag of truce, and the interest which every commander takes in the legitimate behaviour of his troops will always make him attend to complaints and punish the offenders, provided the complaints concerned are found to be justified. Very often, however, it is impossible to verify the statements in the complaint, and then certain assertions by one party, and their denial by the other, face each other without there being any way of solving the difficulty. It also often happens during war that the belligerent Governments lodge with each other mutual complaints of illegitimate acts and omissions. Since diplomatic intercourse is broken off during war, such complaints are either sent to the enemy under the protection of a flag of truce or through a neutral[468] State which lends its good offices. But here too indignant assertion and emphatic denial[Pg 303] frequently face each other without there being a way of solving the conflict.

§ 243. Commanders of forces involved in fighting often file complaints with each other about specific acts of unlawful warfare committed by their troops, such as misuse of the truce flag, violations of that flag or the Geneva Convention, and similar issues. The complaint is sent to the opposing side under the cover of a truce flag, and every commander is interested in ensuring their troops act appropriately, which motivates them to address complaints and punish those responsible, as long as the complaints are verified as valid. However, it is often difficult to confirm the details in the complaint, leading to conflicting statements from one side and denials from the other, with no clear way to resolve the issue. During wartime, it is also common for the warring Governments to exchange mutual complaints about unlawful actions and failures. Since diplomatic relations are severed during war, these complaints are either sent to the enemy under a truce flag or through a neutral[468] State that offers its assistance. But even then, angry claims and strong denials often confront each other with no means of resolving the dispute.

[468] Thus, in October 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, Japan sent a complaint concerning the alleged use of Chinese clothing on the part of Russian troops to the Russian Government, through the intermediary of the United States of America; see Takahashi, pp. 174-178.

[468] So, in October 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, Japan filed a complaint about the supposed use of Chinese clothing by Russian troops with the Russian Government, via the United States of America; see Takahashi, pp. 174-178.

Complaints lodged with Neutrals.

Complaints filed with Neutrals.

§ 244. If certain grave illegitimate acts or omissions of warfare occur, belligerents frequently lodge complaints with neutral States, either asking their good offices, mediation, or intervention to make the enemy comply with the laws of war, or simply drawing their attention to the facts. Thus, at the beginning of the Franco-German War, France lodged a complaint with Great Britain and asked her intervention on account of the intended creation of a volunteer fleet on the part of Germany, which France considered a violation of the Declaration of Paris.[469] Conversely, in January 1871, Germany, in a circular addressed to her diplomatic envoys abroad, and to be communicated to the respective neutral Governments, complained of twenty-one cases in which the French forces had, deliberately and intentionally it was alleged, fired on bearers of a flag of truce. Again, in November 1911, and in February 1912, during the Turco-Italian War, Turkey lodged a complaint with the Powers on account of the execution of Arabs in Tripoli as war criminals, and on account of the bombardment of Turkish war vessels in the harbour of Beirut.[470]

§ 244. When serious unlawful actions or omissions during warfare happen, combatants often file complaints with neutral states, either seeking their good services, mediation, or intervention to compel the enemy to follow the laws of war, or simply to inform them of the situation. For example, at the start of the Franco-German War, France complained to Great Britain and requested intervention regarding Germany's planned formation of a volunteer fleet, which France viewed as a breach of the Declaration of Paris.[469] In contrast, in January 1871, Germany sent a circular to its diplomats worldwide, to be shared with the relevant neutral governments, detailing twenty-one instances where the French forces allegedly deliberately fired upon those carrying a flag of truce. Additionally, in November 1911 and February 1912, during the Turco-Italian War, Turkey complained to the Powers regarding the execution of Arabs in Tripoli as war criminals and the bombardment of Turkish warships in the port of Beirut.[470]

[469] See above, § 84.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[470] See above, § 213.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Good Offices and Mediation.

Conflict Resolution and Mediation.

§ 245. Complaints lodged with neutral States may have the effect of one or more of the latter lending their offices or their mediation to the belligerents for the purpose of settling such conflict as arose out of the alleged illegitimate acts or omissions of warfare, thus preventing them from resorting to reprisals. Such good offices and mediation do not differ from those which settle a difference between States in time of peace and which have been discussed above in §§ 7-11; they are friendly acts in contradistinction to intervention, which is dictatorial interference for the purpose[Pg 304] of making the respective belligerents comply with the laws of war.

§ 245. Complaints made to neutral States may result in those States offering their services or mediation to the warring parties to help resolve the conflict that arose from the alleged wrongful acts or omissions during warfare, thereby preventing them from taking retaliatory actions. These good offices and mediation are similar to those that resolve disputes between States during peacetime, as discussed above in §§ 7-11; they are constructive efforts, unlike intervention, which is an authoritative interference aimed at forcing the warring parties to adhere to the laws of war.

Intervention on the part of Neutrals.

Neutral Intervention.

III Retaliation

Vattel, III. p. 142—Hall, § 135—Westlake, II. pp. 112-115, and Chapters, pp. 253-258—Taylor, §§ 487 and 507—Wharton, III. § 348B—Moore, VII. § 1114—Bluntschli, §§ 567, 580, 654, 685—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 392—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3214-3221—Bonfils, Nos. 1018-1026—Despagnet, No. 543—Rivier, II. pp. 298-299—Calvo, IV. §§ 2041-2043—Martens, II. § 121—Mérignhac, pp. 210-218—Holland, War, Nos. 119-120—Bordwell, p. 305—Spaight, pp. 462-465—Land Warfare, §§ 452-460—Halleck in A.J. VI. (1912), pp. 107-118.

Vattel, III. p. 142—Hall, § 135—Westlake, II. pp. 112-115, and Chapters, pp. 253-258—Taylor, §§ 487 and 507—Wharton, III. § 348B—Moore, VII. § 1114—Bluntschli, §§ 567, 580, 654, 685—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 392—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3214-3221—Bonfils, Nos. 1018-1026—Despagnet, No. 543—Rivier, II. pp. 298-299—Calvo, IV. §§ 2041-2043—Martens, II. § 121—Mérignhac, pp. 210-218—Holland, War, Nos. 119-120—Bordwell, p. 305—Spaight, pp. 462-465—Land Warfare, §§ 452-460—Halleck in A.J. VI. (1912), pp. 107-118.

Reprisals between Belligerents in contradistinction to Reprisals in time of Peace.

Reprisals between Belligerents in contrast to Reprisals in times of Peace.

§ 247. Whereas reprisals in time of peace are to be distinguished from retorsion and are injurious acts committed for the purpose of compelling a State to consent to a satisfactory settlement of a difference created through an international delinquency,[471] reprisals between belligerents are retaliation of an illegitimate act of warfare, whether constituting an international delinquency or not, for the purpose of making the enemy comply in future with the rules of legitimate warfare. Reprisals between belligerents are terrible means, because they are in most cases directed against innocent enemy individuals, who must suffer for real or alleged offences for which they are not responsible. But reprisals cannot be dispensed with, because without them illegitimate acts of warfare would be innumerable. As matters stand, every belligerent and every member of his forces knows for certain that reprisals are to be expected in case they violate the rules of legitimate warfare. And when nevertheless an illegal act occurs and is promptly met with reprisals as a retaliation, human nature would not be what it is if such retaliation did not act as a deterrent against a repetition of illegitimate acts.

§ 247. Whereas reprisals during peacetime are different from retorsion and are harmful actions taken to pressure a State into agreeing to a satisfactory resolution of a dispute caused by an international wrongdoing,[471] reprisals between warring parties are acts of retaliation against an unlawful act of war, whether it constitutes an international wrongdoing or not, aimed at ensuring the enemy follows the rules of legitimate warfare in the future. Reprisals between warring parties are severe measures, as they often target innocent individuals in the enemy camp, who suffer for real or alleged offenses they did not commit. However, reprisals are necessary; without them, unlawful acts of warfare would be countless. As it stands, every warring party and every member of their forces knows that reprisals will follow if they break the rules of legitimate warfare. And when an illegal act takes place and is quickly met with retaliation, human nature would not be what it is if that retaliation didn’t serve as a deterrent against further unlawful acts.

[471] See above, §§ 33 and 42.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Reprisals admissible for every Illegitimate Act of Warfare.

Reprisals allowed for every illegal act of warfare.

§ 248. Whereas reprisals in time of peace are admissible for international delinquencies only, reprisals[Pg 306] between belligerents are at once admissible for every and any act of illegitimate warfare, whether the act constitutes an international delinquency or not. It is for the consideration of the injured belligerent as to whether he will at once resort to reprisals, or, before doing so, will lodge complaints with the enemy or with neutral States. Practically, however, a belligerent will rarely resort at once to reprisals, provided the violation of the rules of legitimate warfare is not very grave and the safety of his troops does not require prompt and drastic measures. Thus, the Germans during the Franco-German War frequently by way of reprisal, bombarded and fired undefended open villages where their soldiers were treacherously killed by enemy individuals in ambush who did not belong to the armed forces. And Lord Roberts, during the South African War, ordered[472] by way of reprisal the destruction of houses and farms in the vicinity of the place where damage was done to the lines of communication.[473]

§ 248. While reprisals during peacetime are acceptable only for international wrongdoings, reprisals[Pg 306] between warring parties are permissible for any and all acts of unlawful warfare, regardless of whether the act qualifies as an international wrongdoing. It is up to the injured party to decide whether to immediately take reprisals or to first file complaints with the enemy or neutral countries. In practice, though, a belligerent will usually not resort to reprisals right away unless the violation of legitimate warfare rules is serious and the safety of their troops demands immediate and severe action. For instance, the Germans during the Franco-German War often retaliated by bombing and attacking undefended, open villages where their soldiers were ambushed and killed by enemy individuals who were not part of the armed forces. Similarly, Lord Roberts, during the South African War, ordered[472] to destroy houses and farms near the area where damage was inflicted on communication lines as a reprisal.[473]

[472] See section 4 of the Proclamation of June 19, 1900 (Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser., XXXII. p. 147), and Beak, The Aftermath of War (1906), p. 11.

[472] See section 4 of the Proclamation of June 19, 1900 (Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser., XXXII. p. 147), and Beak, The Aftermath of War (1906), p. 11.

[473] That prisoners of war may be made the objects of reprisals for acts of illegitimate warfare committed by the enemy, there is hardly any doubt; see Beinhauer, Die Kriegsgefangenschaft (1910), p. 74.

[473] It's pretty clear that prisoners of war can be used as a way to retaliate for illegal acts of warfare carried out by the enemy; see Beinhauer, Die Kriegsgefangenschaft (1910), p. 74.

Danger of Arbitrariness in Reprisals.

Risk of Arbitrary Reprisals.

§ 249. The right to exercise reprisals carries with it great danger of arbitrariness, for often the alleged facts which make belligerents resort to reprisals are not sufficiently verified, or the rules of war which they consider the enemy has violated are sometimes not generally recognised, or the act of reprisal performed is often excessive compared with the precedent act of illegitimate warfare. Three cases may illustrate this danger.

§ 249. The right to take retaliatory actions poses a significant risk of capricious actions, as the claims that lead combatants to resort to reprisals are often not thoroughly verified. Additionally, the wartime rules that they believe the enemy has violated are not always widely accepted, and the retaliatory acts carried out are frequently disproportionate to the preceding acts of unlawful warfare. Three examples can highlight this risk.

(1) In 1782 Joshua Huddy, a captain in the army of the American insurgents, was taken prisoner by loyalists and handed over to a Captain Lippencott for the ostensible purpose of being exchanged, but was[Pg 307] arbitrarily hanged. The commander of the British troops had Lippencott arrested, and ordered him to be tried for murder. Lippencott was, however, acquitted by the court-martial, as there was evidence to show that his command to execute Huddy was in accordance with orders of a Board which he was bound to obey. Thereupon some British officers who were prisoners of war in the hands of the Americans were directed to cast lots to determine who should be executed by way of reprisal for the execution of Huddy. The lot fell on Captain Asgill, a young officer only nineteen years old, and he would have been executed but for the mediation of the Queen of France, who saved his life.[474]

(1) In 1782, Joshua Huddy, a captain in the American rebel army, was captured by loyalists and handed over to Captain Lippencott supposedly for an exchange, but he was arbitrarily hanged. The commander of the British troops had Lippencott arrested and ordered him to stand trial for murder. However, Lippencott was acquitted by the court-martial because there was evidence showing that his order to execute Huddy was following commands from a Board he had to obey. Then, some British officers who were prisoners of war held by the Americans were told to draw lots to decide who would be executed in retaliation for Huddy's execution. The lot fell on Captain Asgill, a young officer only nineteen years old, and he would have been executed if not for the intervention of the Queen of France, who saved his life.[474]

(2) "The British Government, having sent to England, early in 1813, to be tried for treason, twenty-three Irishmen, naturalised in the United States, who had been captured on vessels of the United States, Congress authorised the President to retaliate. Under this act, General Dearborn placed in close confinement twenty-three prisoners taken at Fort George. General Prevost, under express directions of Lord Bathurst, ordered the close imprisonment of double the number of commissioned and non-commissioned United States' officers. This was followed by a threat of 'unmitigated severity against the American citizens and villages' in case the system of retaliation was pursued. Mr. Madison having retorted by putting in confinement a similar number of British officers taken by the United States, General Prevost immediately retorted by subjecting to the same discipline all his prisoners whatsoever.... A better temper, however, soon came over the British Government, by whom this system had been instituted. A party of United States' officers, who were prisoners of war in England, were released on[Pg 308] parole, with instructions to state to the President that the twenty-three prisoners who had been charged with treason in England had not been tried, but remained on the usual basis of prisoners of war. This led to the dismissal on parole of all the officers of both sides."[475]

(2) "The British Government, having sent to England, early in 1813, twenty-three Irishmen who were naturalized in the United States to be tried for treason, after capturing them on U.S. vessels, Congress authorized the President to retaliate. Under this act, General Dearborn closely confined twenty-three prisoners taken at Fort George. General Prevost, following specific instructions from Lord Bathurst, ordered the close imprisonment of twice as many commissioned and non-commissioned U.S. officers. This was followed by a threat of 'unmitigated severity against American citizens and villages' if retaliation continued. Mr. Madison responded by confining a similar number of British officers taken by the United States, prompting General Prevost to immediately impose the same treatment on all his prisoners. However, the British Government soon adopted a more conciliatory approach. A group of U.S. officers who were prisoners of war in England were released on parole, with instructions to inform the President that the twenty-three prisoners charged with treason in England had not been tried and remained classified as prisoners of war. This resulted in the dismissal on parole of all the officers from both sides."[Pg 308]

(3) During the Franco-German War the French had captured forty German merchantmen, and made their captains and crews prisoners of war. Count Bismarck, who considered it against International Law to detain these men as prisoners, demanded their liberation, and when the French refused this, ordered by way of reprisal forty French private individuals of local importance to be arrested and to be sent as prisoners of war to Bremen, where they were kept until the end of the war. Count Bismarck was decidedly wrong,[476] since France had, as the law then stood, in no way committed an illegal act by detaining the German crews as prisoners of war.[477]

(3) During the Franco-German War, the French captured forty German merchant ships and took their captains and crews as prisoners of war. Count Bismarck, who believed it was against International Law to hold these men as prisoners, demanded their release. When the French refused, he ordered the arrest of forty French private citizens of local significance and sent them as prisoners of war to Bremen, where they remained until the end of the conflict. Count Bismarck was clearly mistaken,[476] as France, according to the laws at the time, had not committed any illegal act by holding the German crews as prisoners of war.[477]

[474] See the case reported in Martens, Causes Célèbres, III, pp. 311-321. See also Phillimore, III. § 105.

[474] Check out the case discussed in Martens, Causes Célèbres, III, pp. 311-321. Also see Phillimore, III. § 105.

[475] See Wharton, III. § 348B.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Wharton, III. § 348B.

[476] That Bismarck's standpoint was wrong has been pointed out above in § 201. Some German writers, however, take his part; see, for instance, Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 479, note 6. As regards the present law on the subject, see above, §§ 85 and 201.

[476] It's been mentioned earlier in § 201 that Bismarck's viewpoint was incorrect. However, some German authors defend him; for example, see Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 479, note 6. Concerning the current law on this issue, refer to §§ 85 and 201.

[477] The case is one of reprisals, and has nothing to do with the taking of hostages; see below, § 258.

[477] This situation involves retaliation and is unrelated to the act of taking hostages; refer to § 258.

Proposed Restriction of Reprisals.

Proposed Limit on Reprisals.

§ 250. The Hague Regulations do not mention reprisals at all because the Brussels Conference of 1874, which accepted the unratified Brussels Declaration, had struck out several sections of the Russian draft code regarding reprisals. These original sections[478] (69-71) stipulated—(1) that reprisals should be admitted only in extreme cases of absolutely certain violations of the rules of legitimate warfare; (2) that the acts performed by way of reprisal must not be excessive, but in proportion to the respective violation; (3) that reprisals should be ordered by commanders-in-chief only. Articles 85 and 86 of the Manual of the Laws of War, adopted by the Institute of International Law,[479] propose the[Pg 309] following rules:—(1) Reprisals are to be prohibited in case reparation is given for the damage done by an illegal act; (2) in grave cases, in which reprisals are an imperative necessity, they must never exceed the degree of the violation committed by the enemy; (3) they may only be resorted to with the authorisation of the commander-in-chief; (4) they must in every case respect the laws of humanity and of morality. In face of the arbitrariness with which, according to the present state of International Law, reprisals may be exercised, it cannot be denied that an agreement upon some precise rules regarding reprisals is an imperative necessity.

§ 250. The Hague Regulations don’t mention reprisals at all because the Brussels Conference of 1874, which accepted the unratified Brussels Declaration, removed several sections from the Russian draft code related to reprisals. These original sections[478] (69-71) stated—(1) that reprisals should only be allowed in extreme cases of absolutely certain violations of the rules of legitimate warfare; (2) that the actions taken as reprisals must not be excessive but rather proportionate to the violation committed; (3) that only commanders-in-chief should authorize reprisals. Articles 85 and 86 of the Manual of the Laws of War, adopted by the Institute of International Law,[479] propose the[Pg 309] following rules:—(1) Reprisals are prohibited if compensation is provided for the damages caused by an illegal act; (2) in serious cases where reprisals are a necessity, they must not exceed the level of the violation carried out by the enemy; (3) they can only be used with the commander-in-chief's authorization; (4) in every case, they must adhere to the laws of humanity and morality. Given the unpredictability with which reprisals can be used under the current state of International Law, it is clear that there is an urgent need for a consensus on specific rules regarding reprisals.

[478] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. IV. pp. 14, 139, 207.

[478] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. IV. pp. 14, 139, 207.

[479] See Annuaire, V. p. 174.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See *Directory*, V. p. 174.

IV War crimes punishment

Hall, § 135—Bluntschli, §§ 627-643A—Spaight, p. 462—Holland, War, Nos. 117-118—Ariga, §§ 96-99—Takahashi, pp. 166-184—Landa in R.I. X. (1878), pp. 182-184—Land Warfare, §§ 441-451.

Hall, § 135—Bluntschli, §§ 627-643A—Spaight, p. 462—Holland, War, Nos. 117-118—Ariga, §§ 96-99—Takahashi, pp. 166-184—Landa in R.I. X. (1878), pp. 182-184—Land Warfare, §§ 441-451.

Conception of War Crimes.

Understanding War Crimes.

§ 251. In contradistinction to hostile acts of soldiers by which the latter do not lose their privilege of being treated as members of armed forces who have done no wrong, war crimes are such hostile or other acts of soldiers or other individuals as may be punished by the enemy on capture of the offenders. It must, however, be emphasised that the term war crime is used, not in the moral sense of the term crime, but only in a technical legal sense, on account of the fact that perpetrators of these acts may be punished by the enemy. For, although among the acts called war crimes are many which are crimes in the moral sense of the term, such, for instance, as the abuse of a flag of truce or assassination of enemy soldiers; there are others which may be highly praiseworthy and patriotic acts, such as[Pg 310] taking part in a levy en masse on territory occupied by the enemy. But because every belligerent may, and actually must, in the interest of his own safety punish these acts, they are termed war crimes, whatever may be the motive, the purpose, and the moral character of the respective act.[480]

§ 251. Unlike hostile actions by soldiers, which don't strip them of their rights as armed forces members who haven't wronged anyone, war crimes are defined as hostile or other actions by soldiers or individuals that can be punished by the enemy upon capturing the offenders. It's important to note that the term war crime is used here not in a moral sense but rather in a legal context, because those who commit these acts can be punished by the enemy. While many actions labeled as war crimes are indeed morally wrong, such as abusing a flag of truce or assassinating enemy soldiers, there are also acts that could be seen as honorable and patriotic, like participating in a mass uprising in enemy-occupied territory. Nonetheless, every warring party has the right, and indeed the obligation, to punish these actions for their own safety, which is why they're classified as war crimes, regardless of the intent, purpose, or moral implications of each act.[480]

[480] See above, § 57.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Different kinds of War Crimes.

Different types of war crimes.

§ 252. In spite of the uniform designation of these acts as war crimes, four different kinds of war crimes must be distinguished on account of the essentially different character of the acts. Violations of recognised rules regarding warfare committed by members of the armed forces belong to the first kind; all hostilities in arms committed by individuals who are not members of the enemy armed forces constitute the second kind; espionage and war treason belong to the third; and all marauding acts belong to the fourth kind.

§ 252. Even though all these actions are labeled as war crimes, we need to identify four different types of war crimes due to the distinct nature of the acts. The first type includes violations of accepted rules of warfare committed by armed forces members; the second type consists of hostilities carried out by individuals who are not part of the enemy armed forces; the third type involves espionage and treason during wartime; and the fourth type includes all acts of looting.

Violations of Rules regarding Warfare.

Warfare rule violations.

§ 253. Violations of rules regarding warfare are war crimes only when committed without an order of the belligerent Government concerned. If members of the armed forces commit violations by order of their Government, they are not war criminals and may not be punished by the enemy; the latter may, however, resort to reprisals. In case members of forces commit violations ordered by their commanders, the members may not be punished, for the commanders are alone responsible, and the latter may, therefore, be punished as war criminals on their capture by the enemy.

§ 253. Violating warfare rules counts as a war crime only when done without the order of the involved government. If armed forces commit violations by order of their government, they aren't considered war criminals and can't be punished by the enemy; however, the enemy can take reprisals. If members of the forces break rules under their commanders' orders, they can't be punished since only the commanders are responsible, and they can be punished as war criminals if captured by the enemy.

The following are the more important violations that may occur:

The following are the major violations that may happen:

(1) Making use of poisoned or otherwise forbidden arms and ammunition.

(1) Using poisoned or otherwise banned weapons and ammunition.

(2) Killing or wounding soldiers disabled by sickness or wounds, or who have laid down arms and surrendered.

(2) Killing or injuring soldiers who are disabled by illness or wounds, or who have laid down their weapons and surrendered.

(3) Assassination, and hiring of assassins.[Pg 311]

Assassination and hiring hitmen.

(4) Treacherous request for quarter, or treacherous feigning of sickness and wounds.

(4) Deceptive plea for mercy, or deceitful pretending of illness and injuries.

(5) Ill-treatment of prisoners of war, of the wounded and sick. Appropriation of such of their money and valuables as are not public property.

(5) Mistreatment of prisoners of war, and of the injured and sick. Taking their money and valuables that aren't public property.

(6) Killing or attacking harmless private enemy individuals. Unjustified appropriation and destruction of their private property, and especially pillaging. Compulsion of the population of occupied territory to furnish information about the army of the other belligerent or about his means of defence.

(6) Killing or attacking innocent private enemy individuals. Unjustly taking and destroying their private property, especially looting. Forcing the population of occupied areas to provide information about the other side's army or their means of defense.

(7) Disgraceful treatment of dead bodies on battlefields. Appropriation of such money and other valuables found upon dead bodies as are not public property, nor arms, ammunition, and the like.

(7) Unacceptable treatment of dead bodies on battlefields. Taking money and other valuables found on the deceased that aren't public property, along with weapons, ammunition, and similar items.

(8) Appropriation and destruction of property belonging to museums, hospitals, churches, schools, and the like.

(8) Taking and damaging property that belongs to museums, hospitals, churches, schools, and similar places.

(9) Assault, siege, and bombardment of undefended open towns and other habitations. Unjustified bombardment of undefended places on the part of naval forces.

(9) Attacking, laying siege to, and bombarding unprotected open towns and other settlements. Unwarranted bombarding of undefended locations by naval forces.

(10) Unnecessary bombardment of historical monuments, and of such hospitals and buildings devoted to religion, art, science, and charity, as are indicated by particular signs notified to the besiegers bombarding a defended town.

(10) Unnecessary shelling of historical monuments, and of hospitals and buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, and charity, as indicated by specific signs communicated to the attackers bombarding a defended town.

(11) Violations of the Geneva Convention.

(11) Violations of the Geneva Convention.

(12) Attack on or sinking of enemy vessels which have hauled down their flags as a sign of surrender. Attack on enemy merchantmen without previous request to submit to visit.

(12) Attack on or sinking of enemy ships that have lowered their flags to show they surrender. Attack on enemy merchant ships without a prior request to submit to inspection.

(13) Attack or seizure of hospital ships, and all other violations of the Hague Convention for the adaptation to naval warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention.[Pg 312]

(13) Attacking or capturing hospital ships, and any other breaches of the Hague Convention regarding the adaptation of the Geneva Convention principles to naval warfare.[Pg 312]

(14) Unjustified destruction of enemy prizes.[481]

(14) Unjustified destruction of enemy captives.[481]

(15) Use of enemy uniforms and the like during battle, use of the enemy flag during attack by a belligerent vessel.

(15) Using enemy uniforms and similar items during battle, or displaying the enemy flag while attacking from a belligerent vessel.

(16) Violation of enemy individuals furnished with passports or safe-conducts, violation of safeguards.

(16) Violating enemy individuals who have passports or safe-conducts, breaking safeguards.

(17) Violation of bearers of flags of truce.

(17) Violation of people carrying flags of truce.

(18) Abuse of the protection granted to flags of truce.

(18) Misuse of the protection given to flags of truce.

(19) Violation of cartels, capitulations, and armistices.

(19) Breaking cartel agreements, capitulations, and ceasefires.

(20) Breach of parole.

Parole violation.

[481] Unjustified destruction of neutral prizes—see below, § 431—is not a war crime, but is nevertheless an international delinquency, if ordered by the belligerent government.

[481] Unjustified destruction of neutral prizes—see below, § 431—is not classified as a war crime, but it is still an international wrongdoing if it is ordered by the warring government.

Hostilities in Arms by Private Individuals.

Hostilities in Arms by Private Individuals.

§ 254. Since International Law is a law between States only and exclusively, no rules of International Law can exist which prohibit private individuals from taking up arms and committing hostilities against the enemy. But private individuals committing such acts do not enjoy the privileges of members of armed forces, and the enemy has according to a customary rule of International Law the right to consider and punish such individuals as war criminals. Hostilities in arms committed by private individuals are not war crimes because they really are violations of recognised rules regarding warfare, but because the enemy has the right to consider and punish them as acts of illegitimate warfare. The conflict between praiseworthy patriotism on the part of such individuals and the safety of the enemy troops does not allow of any solution. It would be unreasonable for International Law to impose upon belligerents the duty to forbid the taking up of arms by their private subjects, because such action may occasionally be of the greatest value to a belligerent, especially for the purpose of freeing a country from the enemy who has militarily occupied it. Nevertheless[Pg 313] the safety of his troops compels the enemy to consider and punish such hostilities as acts of illegitimate warfare, and International Law gives him a right to do so.

§ 254. Since International Law is only a law between States, there are no rules in International Law that prevent private individuals from taking up arms and waging hostilities against the enemy. However, private individuals who engage in such actions do not have the same protections as members of armed forces, and the enemy has the right, according to established International Law customs, to treat and punish these individuals as war criminals. Hostilities carried out by private individuals aren't considered war crimes because they violate recognized warfare rules, but because the enemy can deem and treat them as acts of illegitimate warfare. The clash between these individuals' admirable patriotism and the safety of enemy troops doesn't permit a middle ground. It would be unreasonable for International Law to require belligerents to prevent their private citizens from taking up arms, as such actions can sometimes be incredibly valuable in efforts like liberating a country from military occupation by the enemy. Nonetheless[Pg 313], the safety of enemy troops forces the enemy to perceive and punish these acts as illegitimate warfare, and International Law grants them the right to do so.

It is usual to make a distinction between hostilities in arms on the part of private individuals against an invading or retiring enemy on the one hand, and, on the other, hostilities in arms committed on the part of the inhabitants against an enemy occupying a conquered territory. In the latter case one speaks of war rebellion, whether inhabitants take up arms singly or rise in a so-called levy en masse. Articles 1 and 2 of the Hague Regulations make the greatest possible concessions regarding hostilities committed by irregulars.[482] Beyond the limits of these concessions belligerents will never be able to go without the greatest danger to their troops.

It's common to differentiate between armed conflicts by private individuals against an invading or retreating enemy on one side, and on the other, armed conflicts by the local population against an enemy occupying seized territory. In the latter case, it's referred to as war rebellion, regardless of whether individuals take up arms alone or if they rise together in a so-called mass uprising. Articles 1 and 2 of the Hague Regulations allow for significant leniency regarding hostilities carried out by irregulars. Beyond these allowances, belligerents can never push the limits without risking serious danger to their forces.

[482] See above, §§ 80 and 81.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

It must be particularly noted that merchantmen of belligerents, which attack enemy vessels without previously having been attacked by them, commit a war crime,[483] and that the captains, officers, and members of the crews may, therefore, be punished as war criminals to the same extent as private individuals who commit hostilities in land warfare.

It’s important to highlight that merchant ships from warring nations that attack enemy vessels without being attacked first are committing a war crime,[483] and that captains, officers, and crew members can be treated as war criminals, just like individuals who engage in hostile acts on land.

[483] See above, §§ 85 and 181.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Espionage and War Treason.

Espionage and War Betrayal.

§ 255. Article 24 of the Hague Regulations now enacts the old customary rule that a belligerent has a right to employ all methods necessary to obtain information, and these methods include espionage and treason. But this right stands face to face with the right to consider and punish as war criminals enemy individuals, whether soldiers or not, committing acts of espionage or treason. There is an irreconcilable conflict between the necessity of obtaining information on the one hand, and self-preservation on the other; and accordingly espionage and treason, as has been explained above in § 159, bear a twofold character. On[Pg 314] the one hand, International Law gives a right to belligerents to make use of espionage and treason. On the other hand, the same law gives a right to belligerents to consider espionage and treason, committed by enemy soldiers or enemy private individuals within their lines, as acts of illegitimate warfare, and consequently punishable.

§ 255. Article 24 of the Hague Regulations now establishes the long-standing customary rule that a warring party has the right to use all necessary methods to gather information, which includes espionage and treason. However, this right is countered by the right to identify and punish war criminals among enemy individuals, whether they are soldiers or not, who engage in espionage or treason. There is an irreconcilable clash between the need for information on one hand and self-preservation on the other; thus, espionage and treason, as previously explained in § 159, have a dual nature. On[Pg 314] one side, International Law grants warring parties the right to utilize espionage and treason. On the other side, the same law allows warring parties to view espionage and treason, carried out by enemy soldiers or enemy civilians within their territories, as acts of illegitimate warfare, making them punishable.

Espionage has already been treated above in §§ 159-161. War treason may be committed in different ways. The following are the chief cases of war treason that may occur:—

Espionage has already been discussed above in §§ 159-161. War treason can happen in various ways. Here are the main types of war treason that can occur:—

(1) Information of any kind given to the enemy.

(1) Any kind of information shared with the enemy.

(2) Voluntary supply of money, provisions, ammunition, horses, clothing, and the like, to the enemy.

(2) Willingly providing money, food, ammunition, horses, clothing, and similar items to the enemy.

(3) Any voluntary assistance to military operations of the enemy, be it by serving as guide in the country, by opening the door of a defended habitation, by repairing a destroyed bridge, or otherwise.

(3) Any voluntary help to the enemy's military operations, whether by acting as a guide in the area, opening the door of a protected site, repairing a destroyed bridge, or in other ways.

(4) Attempt to induce soldiers to desert, to surrender, to serve as spies, and the like, and negotiating desertion, surrender, and espionage offered by soldiers.

(4) Try to convince soldiers to defect, give up, act as spies, and so on, and negotiate desertion, surrender, and espionage provided by soldiers.

(5) Attempt to bribe soldiers or officials in the interest of the enemy, and negotiating such bribe.

(5) Trying to bribe soldiers or officials for the benefit of the enemy, and discussing that bribe.

(6) Liberation of enemy prisoners of war.

(6) Release of captured enemy soldiers.

(7) Conspiracy against the armed forces or against individual officers and members of them.

(7) Conspiracy against the military or against individual officers and service members.

(8) Wrecking of military trains, destruction of the lines of communication or of the telegraphs or telephones in the interest of the enemy, and the destruction of any war material for the same purpose.

(8) Wrecking military trains, destroying communication lines, or damaging telegraphs or telephones for the enemy's benefit, and destroying any war supplies for the same reason.

(9) Circulation of enemy proclamations dangerous to the interests of the belligerent concerned.

(9) Spreading enemy messages is harmful to the interests of the warring party involved.

(10) Intentional false guidance of troops by a hired guide or by one who offered his services voluntarily.

(10) Deliberate misleading of troops by a hired guide or by someone who offered their services for free.

(11) Rendering courier or similar services to the enemy.[Pg 315]

(11) Providing courier or similar services to the enemy.[Pg 315]

It must be specially observed that enemy soldiers—in contradistinction to private enemy individuals—may only be punished for war treason when they have committed the act of treason during their stay within a belligerent's lines under disguise. If, for instance, two soldiers in uniform are sent into the rear of the enemy for the purpose of destroying a bridge, they may not, when caught by the enemy, be punished for war treason, because their act was one of legitimate warfare. But if they exchange their uniforms for plain clothes and thereby appear as members of the peaceful private population, they may be punished for war treason. A remarkable case of this kind occurred in the summer of 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War. Two Japanese disguised in Chinese clothes were caught in the attempt to destroy, with the aid of dynamite, a railway bridge in Manchuria, in the rear of the Russian forces. Brought before a court-martial, they confessed themselves to be Shozo Jakoga, forty-three years of age, a Major on the Japanese General Staff, and Teisuki Oki, thirty-one years of age, a Captain on the Japanese General Staff. They were convicted, and condemned to be hanged, but the mode of punishment was changed and they were shot. All the newspapers which mentioned this case reported it as a case of espionage, but it is in fact one of war treason. Although the two officers were in disguise, their conviction for espionage was impossible according to article 29 of the Hague Regulations, provided, of course, they were court-martialed for no other act than the attempt to destroy a bridge.

It should be specifically noted that enemy soldiers—in contrast to individual enemy civilians—can only be punished for war treason if they committed the act of treason while disguised and within the lines of a belligerent. For example, if two soldiers in uniform are sent behind enemy lines to destroy a bridge, they cannot be punished for war treason if they are caught, as their actions are considered a legitimate part of warfare. However, if they change out of their uniforms into plain clothes and then appear as part of the civilian population, they can be punished for war treason. A notable case of this occurred in the summer of 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War. Two Japanese men dressed in Chinese clothing were caught attempting to destroy a railway bridge in Manchuria with dynamite, behind Russian forces. When brought before a court-martial, they identified themselves as Shozo Jakoga, 43, a Major on the Japanese General Staff, and Teisuki Oki, 31, a Captain on the Japanese General Staff. They were convicted and initially sentenced to hang, but the method of execution was changed to shooting. All the newspapers that covered this case reported it as espionage, but it was actually a case of war treason. Even though the two officers were in disguise, their conviction for espionage was not feasible under article 29 of the Hague Regulations, assuming they were court-martialed solely for the attempt to destroy the bridge.

It must be particularly noted that there are many acts of inhabitants which a belligerent may forbid and punish in the interests of order and the safety of his army, although these acts do not fall under the category of war treason, and are not therefore punished as war crimes. To this class belong all acts which violate the[Pg 316] orders legitimately decreed by an occupant of enemy territory.[484]

It’s important to note that there are many actions by civilians that a warring party can prohibit and punish for the sake of maintaining order and ensuring the safety of their troops, even if these actions aren’t considered acts of treason and aren’t classified as war crimes. This includes any actions that go against the[Pg 316] legitimate orders issued by an occupying force in enemy territory.[484]

[484] See Land Warfare, § 446.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Land Warfare, § 446.

Marauding.

Raiding.

§ 256. Marauders are individuals roving either singly or collectively in bands over battlefields, or following advancing or retreating forces in quest of booty. They have nothing to do with warfare in the strict sense of the term, but they are an unavoidable accessory to warfare and frequently consist of soldiers who have left their corps. Their acts are considered acts of illegitimate warfare, and their punishment takes place in the interest of the safety of either belligerent.

§ 256. Marauders are people wandering alone or in groups across battlefields, or trailing behind advancing or retreating forces in search of loot. They aren't directly involved in warfare as it’s usually understood, but they are an inevitable part of it and often include soldiers who have deserted their units. Their actions are viewed as illegitimate acts of war, and punishing them is necessary for the safety of either side in the conflict.

Mode of Punishment of War Crimes.

Mode of Punishment for War Crimes.

§ 257. All war crimes may be punished with death, but belligerents may, of course, inflict a more lenient punishment, or commute a sentence of death into a more lenient penalty. If this be done and imprisonment take the place of capital punishment, the question arises whether such convicts must be released at the end of the war, although their term of imprisonment has not yet expired. Some publicists[485] answer this question in the affirmative, maintaining that it could never be lawful to inflict a penalty extending beyond the duration of the war. But I believe that the question has to be answered in the negative. If a belligerent has a right to pronounce a sentence of capital punishment, it is obvious that he may select a more lenient penalty and carry the latter out even beyond the duration of the war. And it would in no wise be in the interest of humanity to deny this right, for otherwise belligerents would have always to pronounce and carry out sentence of capital punishment in the interest of self-preservation.

§ 257. All war crimes can be punishable by death, but combatants can choose to impose a lighter punishment or convert a death sentence into a less severe one. If this happens and imprisonment replaces capital punishment, a question arises about whether these convicts must be released after the war, even if their prison term hasn’t ended. Some legal experts[485] answer this question affirmatively, arguing that it shouldn’t be lawful to impose a penalty that lasts beyond the war. However, I believe the answer is negative. If a combatant has the authority to impose a death sentence, it’s clear they can opt for a less severe punishment and enforce it even after the war is over. It would not be in humanity's best interest to deny this right, as it would mean that combatants would always have to impose and execute death sentences for the sake of self-preservation.

[485] See, for instance, Hall, § 135, p. 432.[Pg 317]

[485] Check out Hall, § 135, p. 432.[Pg 317]

V Hostage-taking

Hall, §§ 135 and 156—Taylor, § 525—Bluntschli, § 600—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 475-477—Klüber, §§ 156 and 247—G. F. Martens, II. 277—Ullmann, § 183—Bonfils, Nos. 1145 and 1151—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2843-2848—Rivier, II. p. 302—Calvo, IV. §§ 2158-2160—Fiore, III. Nos. 1363-1364—Martens, II. § 119—Longuet, § 84—Bordwell, p. 305—Spaight, pp. 465-470—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 49, 50—Land Warfare, §§ 461-464.

Hall, §§ 135 and 156—Taylor, § 525—Bluntschli, § 600—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 475-477—Klüber, §§ 156 and 247—G. F. Martens, II. 277—Ullmann, § 183—Bonfils, Nos. 1145 and 1151—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2843-2848—Rivier, II. p. 302—Calvo, IV. §§ 2158-2160—Fiore, III. Nos. 1363-1364—Martens, II. § 119—Longuet, § 84—Bordwell, p. 305—Spaight, pp. 465-470—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 49, 50—Land Warfare, §§ 461-464.

Former Practice of taking Hostages.

Former practice of taking hostages.

§ 258. The practice of taking hostages as a means of securing legitimate warfare prevailed in former times much more than nowadays. It was frequently resorted to in cases in which belligerent forces depended more or less upon each other's good faith, such as capitulations and armistices for instance. To make sure that no perfidy was intended, officers or prominent private individuals were taken as hostages and could be held responsible with their lives for any perfidy committed by the enemy. This practice has totally disappeared, and is hardly likely to be revived. But this former practice must not be confounded with the still existing practice of seizing enemy individuals for the purpose of making them the object of reprisals. Thus, when in 1870, during the Franco-German War, Count Bismarck ordered forty French notables to be seized and to be taken away into captivity as a retaliation upon the French for refusing to liberate the crews of forty captured merchantmen, these forty French notables were not taken as hostages, but were made the object of reprisals.[486]

§ 258. The practice of taking hostages as a way to ensure legitimate warfare was much more common in the past than it is today. It was often used in situations where opposing forces relied on each other's honesty, like during negotiations or ceasefires. To prevent any treachery, officers or prominent civilians were taken as hostages and could be held accountable with their lives for any deceit committed by the enemy. This practice has completely disappeared and is unlikely to come back. However, this old practice should not be confused with the current practice of capturing enemy individuals to use them for reprisals. For example, during the Franco-German War in 1870, when Count Bismarck ordered the seizure of forty notable French individuals as retaliation for France's refusal to release the crews of forty captured merchant ships, these individuals were not taken as hostages but were targeted for reprisals.[486]

[486] The case has been discussed above in § 249. All the French writers who comment upon this case make the mistake of referring to it as an instance of the taking of hostages.

[486] This case has been discussed above in § 249. All the French writers who talk about this case mistakenly refer to it as an example of taking hostages.

Modern Practice of taking Hostages.

Modern Hostage Taking Practices.

§ 259. A new practice of taking hostages was resorted to by the Germans in 1870 during the Franco-German War for the purpose of securing the safety of[Pg 318] forces against possible hostile acts on the part of private inhabitants of occupied enemy territory. Well-known men were seized and detained in the expectation that the population would refrain from hostile acts out of regard for the fate of the hostages. Thus, when unknown people frequently wrecked the trains transporting troops, the Germans seized prominent enemy citizens and put them on the engines of trains to prevent the latter from being wrecked, a means which always proved effective and soon put a stop to further train-wrecking. The same practice was resorted to, although for a short time only, by Lord Roberts[487] in 1900 during the South African War. This practice has been condemned by the majority of publicists. But, with all due deference to the authority of so many prominent men who oppose the practice, I cannot agree with their opinion. Matters would be different if hostages were seized and exposed to dangers for the purpose of preventing legitimate hostilities on the part of members of the armed forces of the enemy.[488] But no one can deny that train-wrecking on occupied enemy territory by private enemy individuals is an act which a belligerent is justified in considering and punishing as war treason.[489] It is for the purpose of guarding against an act of illegitimate warfare that these hostages are put on the engines. The danger they are exposed to comes from their fellow-citizens, who are informed of the fact that hostages are on the engines and who ought therefore to refrain from wrecking the trains. It cannot, and will not, be denied that the measure is a harsh one, and that it makes individuals liable to suffer for acts[Pg 319] for which they are not responsible. But the safety of his troops and lines of communication is at stake for the belligerent concerned, and I doubt, therefore, whether even the most humane commanders will be able to dispense with this measure, since it alone has proved effective. And it must further be taken into consideration that the amount of cruelty connected with it is no greater than in reprisals where also innocent individuals must suffer for illegitimate acts for which they are not responsible. And is it not more reasonable to prevent train-wrecking by putting hostages on the engines than to resort to reprisals for wreckage of trains? For there is no doubt that a belligerent is justified in resorting to reprisals[490] in each case of train-wrecking by private enemy individuals.[491]

§ 259. During the Franco-German War in 1870, the Germans adopted a new tactic of taking hostages to protect their forces from potential attacks by private citizens in occupied enemy territories. They detained well-known individuals, hoping that the local population would avoid hostile actions out of concern for the hostages' safety. For instance, when unknown individuals regularly sabotaged troop transport trains, the Germans captured prominent enemy citizens and placed them on the engines to deter further incidents, a strategy that was consistently effective and quickly ended the train wrecking. A similar approach was briefly used by Lord Roberts[487] in 1900 during the South African War. This practice has been criticized by many public figures. However, despite the respect I have for the opinions of these prominent individuals who oppose it, I do not share their view. The situation would be different if hostages were taken and put at risk to prevent legitimate military actions by enemy forces.[488] However, it's undeniable that saboteurs on enemy-occupied territory are engaged in acts that a combatant can justifiably classify as war treason and punish accordingly.[489] These hostages are placed on the engines to prevent acts of illegitimate warfare. The danger they face comes from their fellow citizens, who are aware that hostages are present and are thus expected to refrain from sabotage. It cannot be overlooked that this is a harsh measure, causing innocent individuals to suffer for actions they did not commit. However, the safety of the troops and their lines of communication is at stake for the combatant involved, and I doubt that even the most compassionate leaders can avoid using this method, as it has proven to be the only effective solution. Additionally, the level of cruelty involved is not greater than that seen in reprisals, where innocent people also suffer for wrongful actions they did not cause. Isn’t it more rational to prevent train wrecking by placing hostages on the engines than to conduct reprisals for train sabotage? Undoubtedly, a combatant is justified in resorting to reprisals for every instance of train wrecking by private enemy individuals.[490]

[487] See section 3 of the Proclamation of Lord Roberts, dated Pretoria, June 19, 1900, but this section was repealed by the Proclamation of July 29, 1900. See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXXII. (1905), pp. 147 and 149.

[487] See section 3 of Lord Roberts' Proclamation, dated Pretoria, June 19, 1900, but this section was later repealed by the Proclamation from July 29, 1900. See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXXII. (1905), pp. 147 and 149.

[488] Land Warfare, § 463, does not consider the practice commendable, because innocent citizens are thereby exposed to legitimate acts of train-wrecking on the part of raiding parties of armed forces of the enemy.

[488] Land Warfare, § 463, does not view the practice favorably, as it puts innocent civilians at risk of legitimate train-wrecking actions by raiding enemy forces.

[489] See above, § 255, No. 8.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, No. 8.

[490] See above, § 248.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[491] Belligerents sometimes take hostages to secure compliance with requisitions, contributions, ransom bills, and the like, but such cases have nothing to do with illegitimate warfare: see above, § 116, p. 153, note 1, and § 170, p. 213, note 3. The Hague Regulations do not mention the taking of hostages for any purpose.

[491] Warring parties sometimes take hostages to ensure cooperation with demands, contributions, ransom requests, and similar matters, but these situations are not related to unlawful warfare: see above, § 116, p. 153, note 1, and § 170, p. 213, note 3. The Hague Regulations do not address the taking of hostages for any reason.

VI PAYMENT

Bonfils, No. 10261—Despagnet, No. 510 bis—Lémonon, pp. 344-346—Higgins, pp. 260-261—Scott, Conferences, p. 528—Nippold, II. § 24—Boidin, pp. 83-84—Spaight, p. 462—Holland, War, No. 19—Land Warfare, § 436.

Bonfils, No. 10261—Despagnet, No. 510 bis—Lémonon, pp. 344-346—Higgins, pp. 260-261—Scott, Conferences, p. 528—Nippold, II. § 24—Boidin, pp. 83-84—Spaight, p. 462—Holland, War, No. 19—Land Warfare, § 436.

How the Principle of Compensation for Violations of the Laws of War arose.

How the Principle of Compensation for Violations of the Laws of War arose.

§ 259a. There is no doubt that, if a belligerent can be made to pay compensation for all damage done by him in violating the laws of war, this will be an indirect means of securing legitimate warfare. In former times no rule existed which stipulated such compensation, although, of course, violation of the laws of war was always an international delinquency. On the contrary, it was an established customary rule[492] that claims for[Pg 320] reparation of damages caused by violations of the rules of legitimate warfare could not be raised after the conclusion of peace, unless the contrary was expressly stipulated. It was not until the Second Hague Peace Conference that matters underwent a change. In revising the Convention concerning the laws and customs of war on land, besides other alterations, a new article (3) was adopted which enacts that a belligerent who violates the provisions of the Hague Regulations, shall, if the case demand, be liable to make compensation, and that he shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of his armed forces.

§ 259a. There’s no doubt that if a warring party can be made to pay for all the damage they cause by breaking the laws of war, this will be an indirect way to ensure legitimate warfare. In the past, there was no rule requiring such compensation, although violations of the laws of war were always considered an international wrongdoing. On the contrary, it was a well-established customary rule[492] that claims for[Pg 320] reparations for damages caused by breaches of the rules of legitimate warfare could not be pursued after peace was established, unless specifically stated otherwise. It wasn’t until the Second Hague Peace Conference that things changed. While revising the Convention regarding the laws and customs of war on land, a new article (3) was adopted, which states that a warring party who violates the Hague Regulations will be required to pay compensation if necessary, and will be held responsible for all actions taken by members of their armed forces.

[492] See below, § 274, p. 335.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, p. 335.

Attention should be drawn to the fact that Germany, on whose initiative this principle was adopted, proposed two articles concerning the matter, the one dealing with the payment of compensation for violations of the Hague Regulations with regard to subjects of neutral States,[493] and the other for violations of these Regulations with regard to enemy subjects. The conference, however, preferred to make no distinction between the different cases of violation but to adopt the general principle.

Attention should be drawn to the fact that Germany, which initiated the adoption of this principle, proposed two articles on the matter—one addressing compensation for violations of the Hague Regulations concerning citizens of neutral states,[493] and the other for violations of these Regulations related to enemy citizens. However, the conference chose not to differentiate between the various types of violations and instead opted to adopt the general principle.

[493] See below, § 357.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Compensation for Violations of the Hague Regulations.

Compensation for Violations of the Hague Regulations.

§ 259b. It is apparent that article 3 of Convention IV. enacts two different rules: firstly, that a belligerent who violates the Hague Regulations shall, if the case demand, pay compensation; and secondly, that a belligerent is responsible for all acts committed by any person forming part of his armed forces.

§ 259b. It’s clear that article 3 of Convention IV establishes two separate rules: first, that a warring party that breaks the Hague Regulations must pay compensation if necessary; and second, that a warring party is accountable for all actions taken by anyone in their armed forces.

On the other hand, the rule that compensation must be paid by belligerents for damage done through violations of the Hague Regulations, is a new rule, at any rate in so far as it is laid down in a general way. If interpreted according to the letter, article 3 of Convention IV. establishes the rule for payment of compensation for violations of the Hague Regulations only, and not for violations of other rules of International Law concerning land warfare or even concerning sea warfare. I have, however, no doubt that the Powers would recognise that the principle of article 3 must find application to any rule of the laws of war, if by the violation of such rule subjects of the enemy, or of neutral States, suffer damage. For instance, if the commander of a naval force, in contravention of Convention IX. of the Second Peace Conference, were to bombard an undefended place, compensation could be claimed for such subjects of the enemy and subjects of neutral States as suffered damage through the bombardment.

On the other hand, the rule that belligerents must pay compensation for damage caused by violations of the Hague Regulations is a new rule, at least in terms of its general application. If taken literally, Article 3 of Convention IV establishes the rule for compensation only for violations of the Hague Regulations, not for breaches of other rules of International Law related to land warfare or even sea warfare. However, I'm confident that the Powers would agree that the principle in Article 3 should apply to any rule of the laws of war if the violation causes damage to subjects of the enemy or neutral states. For example, if the commander of a naval force were to bombard an undefended area in violation of Convention IX from the Second Peace Conference, compensation could be claimed for those enemy subjects and neutral subjects who suffered damage due to the bombardment.

A point, however, to be kept in view is that article 3, although it establishes the obligation to pay compensation, does not stipulate anything concerning the time or the way in which claims for compensation are to be settled. This is clearly a case for arbitration, and it is to be hoped that the Third Peace Conference will make arbitration obligatory in cases of claims for compensation arising from violations, on the part of a belligerent, of the Hague Regulations as well as of other laws of war.

A key point to remember is that Article 3, while it sets the obligation to pay compensation, doesn’t specify when or how claims for compensation should be resolved. This is clearly a situation that calls for arbitration, and it’s hoped that the Third Peace Conference will make arbitration mandatory for compensation claims resulting from violations by a belligerent of the Hague Regulations and other laws of war.

CHAPTER 7 END OF WAR, AND POSTLIMINIUM

I ON THE ENDING OF WAR IN GENERAL

Hall, § 197—Lawrence, § 217—Phillimore, III. § 510—Taylor, § 580—Moore, VII. § 1163—Heffter, § 176—Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 791-792—Ullmann, § 198—Bonfils, No. 1692—Despagnet, No. 605—Calvo, V. § 3115—Fiore, III. No. 1693—Martens, II. § 128—Longuet, § 155.

Hall, § 197—Lawrence, § 217—Phillimore, III. § 510—Taylor, § 580—Moore, VII. § 1163—Heffter, § 176—Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 791-792—Ullmann, § 198—Bonfils, No. 1692—Despagnet, No. 605—Calvo, V. § 3115—Fiore, III. No. 1693—Martens, II. § 128—Longuet, § 155.

War a Temporary Condition.

War is a temporary condition.

§ 260. The normal condition between two States being peace, war can never be more than a temporary condition; whatever may have been the cause or causes of a war, the latter cannot possibly last for ever. For either the purpose of war will be realised and one belligerent will be overpowered by the other, or both will sooner or later be so exhausted by their exertions that they will desist from the struggle. Nevertheless wars may last for many years, although of late European wars have gradually become shorter. The shortening of European wars in recent times has resulted from several causes, the more important of which are:—conscription, the foundation of the armies of all the great European Powers, Great Britain excepted; the net of railways which extends over all European countries, and which enables a much quicker transport of troops on enemy territory; and lastly, the vast numbers of the opposing forces which usually hasten a decisive battle.

§ 260. The usual state between two countries is peace, so war can never be more than a temporary situation; no matter what caused the war, it can't last forever. Either the goals of the war will be achieved and one side will defeat the other, or both sides will eventually become so drained from fighting that they will stop the conflict. However, wars can go on for many years, although recent European wars have gradually become shorter. The decrease in the length of European wars lately is due to several factors, the most significant of which are: conscription, the establishment of the armies of all the major European Powers, except Great Britain; the extensive network of railways across European countries, which allows for much faster troop movement in enemy territory; and finally, the large numbers of opposing forces that typically push towards a decisive battle.

Three Modes of Termination of War.

Three Ways to End a War.

§ 261. Be that as it may, a war may be terminated in three different ways. Belligerents may, first, abstain[Pg 323]

§ 261. Regardless, a war can end in three different ways. Opposing sides can, first, choose to refrain from fighting[Pg 323]

from further acts of war and glide into peaceful relations without expressly making peace through a special treaty. Or, secondly, belligerents may formally establish the condition of peace through a special treaty of peace. Or, thirdly, a belligerent may end the war through subjugation of his adversary.[494]

from further acts of war and move into peaceful relations without officially making peace through a special treaty. Or, secondly, the warring parties may formally establish peace through a special treaty. Or, thirdly, one side may end the war by defeating the other.[494]

[494] That a civil war may come to an end through simple cessation of hostilities or through a treaty of peace need hardly be mentioned. But it is of importance to state the fact that there is a difference between civil war and other war concerning the third mode of ending war, namely subjugation. For to terminate a civil war, conquest and annexation, which together make subjugation, is unnecessary (see below, § 264), but conquest alone is sufficient.

[494] It's worth noting that a civil war can end either by simply stopping all fighting or through a peace treaty. However, it's important to highlight that there’s a key difference between civil wars and other kinds of wars regarding the third way to end a conflict, which is through subjugation. To end a civil war, both conquest and annexation—essentially making subjugation—aren't needed (see below, § 264), but just conquest is enough.

II Ceasefire

Hall, § 203—Phillimore, III. § 511—Halleck, II. p. 468—Taylor, § 584—Bluntschli, § 700—Heffter, § 177—Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 793—Ullmann, § 198—Bonfils, No. 1693—Despagnet, No. 605—Rivier, II. pp. 435-436—Calvo, V. § 3116—Fiore, III. No. 1693—Martens, II. § 128—Longuet, § 155—Mérignhac, p. 323—Pillet, p. 370.

Hall, § 203—Phillimore, III. § 511—Halleck, II. p. 468—Taylor, § 584—Bluntschli, § 700—Heffter, § 177—Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 793—Ullmann, § 198—Bonfils, No. 1693—Despagnet, No. 605—Rivier, II. pp. 435-436—Calvo, V. § 3116—Fiore, III. No. 1693—Martens, II. § 128—Longuet, § 155—Mérignhac, p. 323—Pillet, p. 370.

Exceptional Occurrence of simple Cessation of Hostilities.

Exceptional Occurrence of simple Cessation of Hostilities.

§ 262. The regular modes of termination of war are treaties of peace or subjugation, but cases have occurred in which simple cessation of all acts of war on the part of both belligerents has actually and informally brought the war to an end. Thus ended in 1716 the war between Sweden and Poland, in 1720 the war between Spain and France, in 1801 the war between Russia and Persia, in 1867 the war between France and Mexico. And it may also be mentioned that, whereas the war between Prussia and several German States in 1866 came to an end through subjugation of some States and through treaties of peace with others, Prussia has never concluded a treaty of peace with the Principality of Lichtenstein, which was also a party to the war. Although such termination of war through[Pg 324] simple cessation of hostilities is for many reasons inconvenient, and is, therefore, as a rule avoided, it may nevertheless in the future as in the past occasionally occur.

§ 262. The usual ways to end a war are through peace treaties or surrender, but there have been instances where simply stopping all acts of war by both sides has informally brought the conflict to an end. For example, this happened in 1716 with the war between Sweden and Poland, in 1720 with the war between Spain and France, in 1801 with the war between Russia and Persia, and in 1867 with the war between France and Mexico. It’s also worth noting that while the war between Prussia and several German states in 1866 ended with some states surrendering and peace treaties with others, Prussia has never signed a peace treaty with the Principality of Lichtenstein, which was also involved in the war. Although ending a war through a simple halt of hostilities can be impractical for many reasons and is typically avoided, it may still happen occasionally in the future as it has in the past.

Effect of Termination of War through simple Cessation of Hostilities.

Effect of Termination of War through simple Cessation of Hostilities.

§ 263. Since in the case of termination of war through simple cessation of hostilities no treaty of peace embodies the conditions of peace between the former belligerents, the question arises whether the status which existed between the parties before the outbreak of war, the status quo ante bellum, should be revived, or the status which exists between the parties at the time when they simply ceased hostilities, the status quo post bellum (the uti possidetis), can be upheld. The majority of publicists[495] correctly maintain that the status which exists at the time of cessation of hostilities becomes silently recognised through such cessation, and is, therefore, the basis of the future relations of the parties. This question is of the greatest importance regarding enemy territory militarily occupied by a belligerent at the time hostilities cease. According to the correct opinion such territory can be annexed by the occupier, the adversary through the cessation of hostilities having dropped all rights he possessed over such territory. On the other hand, this termination of war through cessation of hostilities contains no decision regarding such claims of the parties as have not been settled by the actual position of affairs at the termination of hostilities, and it remains for the parties to settle them by special agreement or to let them stand over.

§ 263. Since in the case of ending a war through a simple halt in fighting, no peace treaty outlines the terms between the former combatants, the question arises whether the status that existed between the parties before the war started, known as the status quo ante bellum, should be restored, or if the status that exists between the parties at the time they merely stop fighting, referred to as the status quo post bellum (the uti possidetis), can be maintained. Most legal experts[495] correctly argue that the status existing at the time hostilities cease is tacitly accepted through that cessation and thus forms the foundation for the future relations between the parties. This issue is critically important when considering enemy territory occupied by a belligerent at the time fighting stops. According to the prevailing view, such territory can be annexed by the occupying force, as the opposing party, through the end of hostilities, has relinquished all rights over that territory. On the other hand, this end to war through the cessation of hostilities does not resolve any claims of the parties that haven’t been addressed by the current state of affairs when the fighting stops, and it is up to the parties to either resolve these claims through a specific agreement or to leave them unresolved.

[495] See, however, Phillimore, III. § 511, who maintains that the status quo ante bellum has to be revived.[Pg 325]

[495] However, see Phillimore, III. § 511, who argues that the status quo ante bellum needs to be restored.[Pg 325]

III Oppression

Vattel, III. §§ 199-203—Hall, §§ 204-205—Lawrence, § 77—Phillimore, III. § 512—Halleck, I. pp. 467-498—Taylor, §§ 220, 585-588—Moore, I. § 87—Walker, § 11—Wheaton, § 165—Bluntschli, §§ 287-289, 701-702—Heffter, § 178—Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 792—Liszt, § 10—Ullmann, §§ 92, 97, and 197—Bonfils, Nos. 535 and 1694—Despagnet, Nos. 387-390, 605—Rivier, II. pp. 436-441—Calvo, V. §§ 3117-3118—Fiore, II. Nos. 863, III. No. 1693, and Code, Nos. 1078-1089—Martens. I. § 91, II. § 128—Longuet, § 155—Mérignhac, p. 324—Pillet, p. 371—Holtzendorff, Eroberung und Eroberungsrecht (1871)—Heimburger, Der Erwerb der Gebietshoheit (1888), pp. 121-132—Westlake, in The Law Quarterly Review, XVII. (1901), p. 392.

Vattel, III. §§ 199-203—Hall, §§ 204-205—Lawrence, § 77—Phillimore, III. § 512—Halleck, I. pp. 467-498—Taylor, §§ 220, 585-588—Moore, I. § 87—Walker, § 11—Wheaton, § 165—Bluntschli, §§ 287-289, 701-702—Heffter, § 178—Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 792—Liszt, § 10—Ullmann, §§ 92, 97, and 197—Bonfils, Nos. 535 and 1694—Despagnet, Nos. 387-390, 605—Rivier, II. pp. 436-441—Calvo, V. §§ 3117-3118—Fiore, II. Nos. 863, III. No. 1693, and Code, Nos. 1078-1089—Martens. I. § 91, II. § 128—Longuet, § 155—Mérignhac, p. 324—Pillet, p. 371—Holtzendorff, Eroberung und Eroberungsrecht (1871)—Heimburger, Der Erwerb der Gebietshoheit (1888), pp. 121-132—Westlake, in The Law Quarterly Review, XVII. (1901), p. 392.

Subjugation in contradistinction to Conquest.

Subjugation versus Conquest.

§ 264. Subjugation must not be confounded with conquest, although there can be no subjugation without conquest. Conquest is taking possession of enemy territory by military force. Conquest is completed as soon as the territory concerned is effectively[496] occupied. Now it is obvious that conquest of a part of enemy territory has nothing to do with subjugation, because the enemy may well reconquer it. But even the conquest of the whole of the enemy territory need not necessarily include subjugation. For, first, in a war between more than two belligerents the troops of one of them may evacuate their country and join the army of allies, so that the armed contention is continued, although the territory of one of the allies is completely conquered. Again, a belligerent, although he has annihilated the forces, conquered the whole of the territory of his adversary, and thereby actually brought the armed contention to an end,[497] may nevertheless not choose to exterminate the enemy State by annexing the conquered territory, but may conclude a treaty of[Pg 326] peace with the expelled or imprisoned head of the defeated State, re-establish the latter's Government, and hand the whole or a part of the conquered territory over to it. Subjugation takes place only when a belligerent, after having annihilated the forces and conquered the territory of his adversary, destroys his existence by annexing the conquered territory. Subjugation may, therefore, correctly be defined as extermination in war of one belligerent by another through annexation[498] of the former's territory after conquest, the enemy forces having been annihilated.[499]

§ 264. Subjugation must not be confused with conquest, even though you can't have subjugation without conquest. Conquest is when you take control of enemy territory using military force. Conquest is finished as soon as the area is effectively[496] occupied. It's clear that conquering part of enemy territory doesn't equate to subjugation because the enemy can reclaim it. However, even if you conquer all of the enemy's territory, it doesn't necessarily mean you've achieved subjugation. For example, in a war involving multiple sides, one group's troops might leave their country to join their allies, allowing the conflict to continue even if an ally's territory is fully conquered. Additionally, a belligerent may have defeated all opposing forces and taken complete control of their adversary's land, effectively ending the conflict,[497] but they might choose not to eliminate the enemy state by annexing the conquered land. Instead, they may sign a peace treaty with the defeated leader, restore that government, and give back all or part of the conquered land. Subjugation only happens when a belligerent, after destroying their enemy’s forces and conquering their land, eliminates their existence by annexing that territory. Therefore, subjugation can be accurately defined as the extermination in war of one belligerent by another through the annexation[498] of the defeated territory after conquest, with the enemy forces having been destroyed.[499]

[497] The continuation of guerilla war after the termination of a real war is discussed above in § 60.

[497] The ongoing guerilla warfare after the end of an actual war is covered earlier in § 60.

[498] That conquest alone is sufficient for the termination of civil wars has been pointed out above, § 261, p. 323, note 1.

[498] That victory alone is enough to end civil wars has been mentioned above, § 261, p. 323, note 1.

[499] It should be mentioned that a premature annexation can become valid through the occupation in question becoming soon afterwards effective. Thus, although the annexation of the South African Republic, on September 1, 1900, was premature, it became valid through the occupation becoming effective in 1901. See above, § 167, p. 209, note 1.

[499] It's worth noting that an early annexation can become valid if the occupation that follows is quickly put into action. So, while the annexation of the South African Republic on September 1, 1900, was premature, it became valid once the occupation was effectively established in 1901. See above, § 167, p. 209, note 1.

Subjugation a formal End of War.

Subjugation is a formal end to the conflict.

§ 265. Although complete conquest, together with annihilation of the enemy forces, brings the armed contention, and thereby the war, actually to an end, the formal end of the war is thereby not yet realised, as everything depends upon the resolution of the victor regarding the fate of the vanquished State. If he be willing to re-establish the captive or expelled head of the vanquished State, it is a treaty of peace concluded with the latter which terminates the war. But if he desires to acquire the whole of the conquered territory for himself, he annexes it, and thereby formally ends the war through subjugation. That the expelled head of the vanquished State protests and keeps up his claims, matters as little eventually as protests on the part of neutral States. These protests may be of political importance for the future, legally they are of no importance at all.

§ 265. While total victory and destruction of the enemy forces bring the fighting, and thus the war, to an actual close, the official end of the war isn't accomplished yet, as it all hinges on the victor's decision about the fate of the defeated State. If the victor is willing to restore the captured or exiled leader of the defeated State, it is a peace treaty with that leader that officially ends the war. However, if the victor wants to claim all of the conquered territory for themselves, they will annex it, which formally concludes the war through domination. The protests of the ousted leader of the defeated State and their ongoing claims are ultimately as inconsequential as protests from neutral States. While these protests may hold political significance for the future, they carry no legal weight at all.

History presents numerous instances of subjugation. Although no longer so frequent as in former times, subjugation is not at all of rare occurrence. Thus,[Pg 327] modern Italy came into existence through the subjugation by Sardinia in 1859 of the Two Sicilies, the Grand Dukedom of Tuscany, the Dukedoms of Parma and Modena, and in 1870 the Papal States. Thus, further, Prussia subjugated in 1866 the Kingdom of Hanover, the Dukedom of Nassau, the Electorate of Hesse-Cassel, and the Free Town of Frankfort-on-the-Main. And Great Britain annexed in 1900 the Orange Free State and the South African Republic.[500]

History shows many examples of oppression. While it's not as common as it used to be, oppression still happens regularly. For instance,[Pg 327] modern Italy was formed when Sardinia took control of the Two Sicilies, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the Duchies of Parma and Modena in 1859, and later the Papal States in 1870. Similarly, Prussia conquered the Kingdom of Hanover, the Duchy of Nassau, the Electorate of Hesse-Cassel, and the Free City of Frankfurt in 1866. Additionally, Great Britain annexed the Orange Free State and the South African Republic in 1900.[500]

[500] Since Great Britain annexed these territories in 1900, the agreement of 1902, regarding "Terms of Surrender of the Boer Forces in the Field"—see Parliamentary Papers, South Africa, 1902, Cd. 1096—is not a treaty of peace, and the South African War came formally to an end through subjugation, although—see above, § 167, p. 209, note 1—the proclamation of the annexation was somewhat premature. The agreement embodying the terms of surrender of the routed remnants of the Boer forces has, therefore, no internationally le gal basis (see also below, § 274, p. 334, note 2). The case would be different if the British Government had really—as Sir Thomas Barclay asserts in The Law Quarterly Review, XXI. (1905), pp. 303 and 307—recognised the existence of the Government of the South African Republic down to May 31, 1902.

[500] Since Great Britain took control of these territories in 1900, the 1902 agreement about the "Terms of Surrender of the Boer Forces in the Field"—see Parliamentary Papers, South Africa, 1902, Cd. 1096—is not a peace treaty, and the South African War officially ended through subjugation, even though—see above, § 167, p. 209, note 1—the announcement of the annexation was somewhat premature. The agreement outlining the terms of surrender of the defeated remnants of the Boer forces, therefore, lacks any international legal foundation (see also below, § 274, p. 334, note 2). The situation would be different if the British Government had genuinely—as Sir Thomas Barclay argues in The Law Quarterly Review, XXI. (1905), pp. 303 and 307—recognized the existence of the Government of the South African Republic up to May 31, 1902.

IV Peace Treaty

Grotius, III. c. 20—Vattel, IV. §§ 9-18—Phillimore, III. §§ 513-516—Halleck, I. pp. 306-324—Taylor, §§ 590-592—Moore, VII. § 1163—Wheaton, §§ 538-543—Bluntschli, §§ 703-707—Heffter, § 179—Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 794-804—Ullmann, § 198—Bonfils, Nos. 1696-1697, 1703-1705—Despagnet, Nos. 606-611—Rivier, II. pp. 443-453—Nys, III. pp. 719-734—Calvo, V. §§ 3119-3136—Fiore, III. Nos. 1694-1700, and Code, Nos. 1931-1941—Martens, II. § 128—Longuet, §§ 156-164—Mérignhac, pp. 324-329—Pillet, pp. 372-375.

Grotius, III. c. 20—Vattel, IV. §§ 9-18—Phillimore, III. §§ 513-516—Halleck, I. pp. 306-324—Taylor, §§ 590-592—Moore, VII. § 1163—Wheaton, §§ 538-543—Bluntschli, §§ 703-707—Heffter, § 179—Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 794-804—Ullmann, § 198—Bonfils, Nos. 1696-1697, 1703-1705—Despagnet, Nos. 606-611—Rivier, II. pp. 443-453—Nys, III. pp. 719-734—Calvo, V. §§ 3119-3136—Fiore, III. Nos. 1694-1700, and Code, Nos. 1931-1941—Martens, II. § 128—Longuet, §§ 156-164—Mérignhac, pp. 324-329—Pillet, pp. 372-375.

Treaty of Peace the most frequent End of War.

Treaty of Peace is the most common way to end a war.

§ 266. Although occasionally war ends through simple cessation of hostilities, and although subjugation is not at all rare or irregular, the most frequent end of war is a treaty of peace. Many publicists correctly call a treaty of peace the normal mode of terminating war. On the one hand, simple cessation of hostilities is certainly an irregular mode. Subjugation,[Pg 328] on the other hand, is in most cases either not within the scope of the intention of the victor or not realisable. And it is quite reasonable that a treaty of peace should be the normal end of war. States which are driven from disagreement to war will, sooner or later, when the fortune of war has given its decision, be convinced that the armed contention ought to be terminated. Thus a mutual understanding and agreement upon certain terms is the normal mode of ending the contention. And it is a treaty of peace which embodies such understanding.

§ 266. While sometimes wars end with a simple halt to fighting, and although domination isn't uncommon, the most common way wars conclude is through a peace treaty. Many experts correctly describe a peace treaty as the usual method for ending a war. On one hand, simply stopping hostilities is definitely an unusual way to end things. On the other hand, domination often isn't what the victor truly wants or isn’t achievable. It makes sense that a peace treaty is the standard resolution to a war. States that shift from disagreement to conflict will inevitably, after the outcome of the war has been decided, realize that the armed struggle needs to end. Therefore, finding common ground and reaching an agreement on specific terms is the typical way to resolve the conflict. A peace treaty represents that understanding.

Peace Negotiations.

Peace Talks.

§ 267. However, as the outbreak of war interrupts all regular non-hostile intercourse between belligerents, negotiations for peace are often difficult of initiation. Each party, although willing to negotiate, may have strong reasons for not opening negotiations. Good offices and mediation on the part of neutrals, therefore, always are of great importance, as thereby negotiations are called into existence which otherwise might have been long delayed. But it must be emphasised that neither formal nor informal peace negotiations do ipso facto bring hostilities to a standstill, although a partial or general armistice may be concluded for the purpose of such negotiations. The fact that peace negotiations are going on directly between belligerents does not create any non-hostile relations between them apart from those negotiations themselves. Such negotiations can take place by the exchange of letters between the belligerent Governments, or through special negotiators who may meet on neutral territory or on the territory of one of the belligerents. In case they meet on belligerent territory, the enemy negotiators are inviolable and must be treated on the same footing as bearers of flags of truce, if not as diplomatic envoys. For it can happen that a belligerent receives an enemy diplomatic envoy for the purpose of peace negotiations.[Pg 329] Be that as it may, negotiations, wherever taking place and by whomsoever conducted, may always be broken off before an agreement is arrived at.

§ 267. However, when war breaks out, it disrupts all ordinary non-hostile interactions between the fighting parties, making it hard to start peace talks. Each side, even if willing to negotiate, may have strong reasons to avoid initiating discussions. Neutral parties' good offices and mediation are therefore crucial, as they can spark negotiations that might otherwise take a long time to begin. It’s important to note that neither formal nor informal peace negotiations automatically stop hostilities, although a partial or general truce can be established for facilitating such talks. The fact that peace negotiations are happening directly between the warring parties doesn’t create any non-hostile relations between them outside of those specific negotiations. These discussions can occur through letter exchanges between the governments of the belligerents, or through special negotiators who may meet on neutral ground or on one side's territory. If they meet on a belligerent's territory, the enemy negotiators are protected and must be treated with the same respect as flag bearers of truce, if not as diplomatic agents. This is because a belligerent may receive an enemy diplomatic agent for peace negotiations.[Pg 329] Regardless, negotiations can always be halted before reaching an agreement, no matter where they take place or who is leading them.

Preliminaries of Peace.

Peace Basics.

§ 268. Although ready to terminate the war through a treaty of peace, belligerents are frequently not able to settle all the terms of peace at once. In such cases hostilities are usually brought to an end through so-called preliminaries of peace, the definite treaty, which has to take the place of the preliminaries, being concluded later on. Such preliminaries are a treaty in themselves, embodying an agreement of the parties regarding such terms of peace as are essential. Preliminaries are as binding as any other treaty, and therefore they need ratification. Very often, but not necessarily, the definitive treaty of peace is concluded at a place other than that at which the preliminaries were settled. Thus, the war between Austria, France, and Sardinia was ended by the Preliminaries of Villafranca of July 11, 1859, yet the definitive treaty of peace was concluded at Zurich on November 10, 1859. The war between Austria and Prussia was ended by the Preliminaries of Nickolsburg of July 26, 1866, yet the definitive treaty of peace was concluded at Prague on August 23. In the Franco-German War the Preliminaries of Versailles of February 26, 1871, were the precursor of the definitive treaty of peace concluded at Frankfort on May 10, 1871.[501]

§ 268. Even though they are willing to end the war through a peace treaty, the parties involved often can't agree on all the terms right away. In these situations, fighting usually stops with what's called preliminaries of peace, and the final treaty, which will replace the preliminaries, is finalized later. These preliminaries are effectively a treaty in their own right, representing an agreement on the essential terms of peace. Preliminaries are just as binding as any other treaty and therefore require ratification. Often, but not always, the final peace treaty is signed in a different location from where the preliminaries were agreed upon. For example, the war between Austria, France, and Sardinia ended with the Preliminaries of Villafranca on July 11, 1859, but the final peace treaty was signed in Zurich on November 10, 1859. The war between Austria and Prussia concluded with the Preliminaries of Nickolsburg on July 26, 1866, while the final peace treaty was signed in Prague on August 23. In the Franco-German War, the Preliminaries of Versailles on February 26, 1871, led to the final peace treaty, which was concluded in Frankfort on May 10, 1871.[501]

[501] No preliminaries of peace were agreed upon at the end of the Russo-Japanese war. After negotiations at Portsmouth (New Hampshire) had led to a final understanding on August 29, 1905, the treaty of peace was signed on September 5, and ratified on October 16.

[501] No peace terms were settled at the end of the Russo-Japanese War. After talks in Portsmouth (New Hampshire) reached a final agreement on August 29, 1905, the peace treaty was signed on September 5 and ratified on October 16.

The purpose for which preliminaries of peace are agreed upon makes it obvious that such essential terms of peace as are stipulated by the Preliminaries are the basis of the definitive treaty of peace. It may happen, however, that neutral States protest for the purpose of preventing this. Thus, when the war[Pg 330] between Russia and Turkey had been ended through the Preliminaries of San Stefano of March 3, 1878, Great Britain protested, a Congress met at Berlin, and Russia had to be content with less favourable terms of peace than those stipulated at San Stefano.

The purpose of agreeing on preliminary peace terms clearly shows that the essential peace conditions outlined in the Preliminaries form the foundation of the final peace treaty. However, it’s possible for neutral countries to object to prevent this from happening. For example, after the war[Pg 330] between Russia and Turkey concluded with the Preliminaries of San Stefano on March 3, 1878, Great Britain raised an objection, a Congress convened in Berlin, and Russia had to settle for less favorable peace conditions than those established at San Stefano.

Form and Parts of Peace Treaties.

Form and Parts of Peace Treaties.

§ 269. International Law does not contain any rules regarding the form of peace treaties; they may, therefore, be concluded verbally or in writing. But the importance of the matter makes the parties always conclude a treaty of peace in writing, and there is no instance of a verbally concluded treaty of peace.

§ 269. International Law doesn't have any rules about the format of peace treaties; they can be made either verbally or in writing. However, because of the significance of the issue, the parties usually create a written peace treaty, and there’s no example of a peace treaty made verbally.

According to the different points stipulated, it is usual to distinguish different parts within a peace treaty. Besides the preamble, there are general, special, and separate articles. General articles are those which stipulate such points as are to be agreed upon in every treaty of peace, as the date of termination of hostilities, the release of prisoners of war, and the like. Special articles are those which stipulate the special terms of the agreement of peace in question. Separate articles are those which stipulate points with regard to the execution of the general and special articles, or which contain reservations and other special remarks of the parties. Sometimes additional articles occur. Such are stipulations agreed upon in a special treaty following the treaty of peace and comprising stipulations regarding such points as have not been mentioned in the treaty of peace.

According to the different points outlined, it's common to identify various sections within a peace treaty. In addition to the preamble, there are general, special, and separate articles. General articles cover points that need to be agreed upon in every peace treaty, like the end date of hostilities, the release of prisoners of war, and similar matters. Special articles specify the unique terms of the particular peace agreement. Separate articles address points related to the implementation of the general and special articles or include reservations and additional remarks from the parties. Sometimes, additional articles appear. These are stipulations agreed upon in a special treaty that follows the peace treaty and include terms concerning issues not mentioned in the peace treaty.

Competence to conclude Peace.

Competence to achieve peace.

§ 270. As the treaty-making Power is according to the Law of Nations in the hands of the head[502] of the State, it is he who is competent to conclude peace. But just as constitutional restrictions imposed upon heads of States regarding their general power of concluding treaties[503] are of importance for International Law, so constitutional restrictions imposed upon heads[Pg 331] of States regarding their competence to make peace are of similar importance. And, therefore, such treaties of peace concluded by heads of States as violate constitutional restrictions are not binding upon the States concerned, because the heads have exceeded their powers. The Constitutions of the several States settle the matter differently, and it is not at all necessary that the power of declaring war and that of making peace should be vested by a Constitution in the same hands. In Great Britain the power of the Crown to declare war and to make peace is indeed unrestricted. But in the German Empire, for instance, it is different; for whereas the Emperor, the case of an attack on German territory excepted, may declare war only with the consent of the Bundesrath, his power of making peace is unrestricted.[504]

§ 270. Since the power to make treaties, according to international law, lies with the head[502] of the State, it is that person who is authorized to establish peace. However, just like constitutional limits placed on leaders regarding their overall ability to finalize treaties[503] are significant for international law, constitutional limitations on leaders concerning their authority to make peace are equally important. Therefore, any peace treaties signed by leaders that breach constitutional limits are not valid for the States involved, as the leaders have exceeded their powers. The constitutions of different States address this issue in various ways, and it's not necessary for the authority to declare war and the authority to make peace to be granted to the same entity by a constitution. In Great Britain, the Crown has unrestricted authority to declare war and make peace. However, in the German Empire, the situation is different; for instance, the Emperor can only declare war, except in the case of an attack on German territory, with the consent of the Bundesrath, but has unrestricted power to make peace.[504]

[504] See more examples in Rivier, II. p. 445.

[504] Check out more examples in Rivier, II. p. 445.

The controverted question as to whether the head of a State who is a prisoner of war is competent to make peace ought to be answered in the negative. The reason is that the head of a constitutional State, although he does not by becoming a prisoner of war lose his position, he nevertheless thereby loses the power of exercising the rights connected with his position.[505]

The debated question of whether a head of state who is a prisoner of war can make peace should be answered no. The reason is that while the leader of a constitutional state doesn’t lose their position by becoming a prisoner of war, they do lose the ability to exercise the rights associated with their role.[505]

[505] See Vattel, IV. § 13.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Vattel, IV. § 13.

Date of Peace.

Peace Day.

§ 271. Unless the treaty provides otherwise, peace commences with the signing of the peace treaty. Should the latter not be ratified, hostilities may be recommenced, and the unratified peace treaty is considered as an armistice. Sometimes, however, the peace treaty fixes a future date for the commencement of peace, stipulating that hostilities must cease on a certain future day. This is the case when war is waged in several or widely separated parts of the world, and when, therefore, it is impossible at once to inform the opposing forces of the conclusion of peace.[506] It may even[Pg 332] occur that different dates are stipulated for the termination of hostilities in different parts of the world.

§ 271. Unless the treaty states otherwise, peace begins with the signing of the peace treaty. If the treaty is not ratified, fighting may resume, and the unratified peace treaty is treated as a ceasefire. However, sometimes the peace treaty specifies a future date for peace to take effect, stating that hostilities must end on a particular day. This is usually the case when war is being fought in several or widely separated locations, making it impossible to immediately inform the opposing forces about the peace agreement.[506] It may even[Pg 332] happen that different dates are set for the end of hostilities in different regions.

[506] The ending of the Russo-Japanese war was quite peculiar. Although the treaty of peace was signed on September 5, 1905, the agreement concerning an armistice pending ratification of the peace treaty was not signed until September 14, and hostilities went on till September 16.

[506] The end of the Russo-Japanese War was unusual. Even though the peace treaty was signed on September 5, 1905, the agreement for a ceasefire while waiting for the peace treaty to be ratified wasn't signed until September 14, and fighting continued until September 16.

The question has arisen as to whether, in case a peace treaty provides a future date for the termination of hostilities in distant parts, and in case the forces in these parts hear of the conclusion of peace before such date, they must abstain at once from further hostilities. Most publicists correctly answer this question in the affirmative. But the French Prize Courts in 1801 condemned as a good prize the English vessel Swineherd which was captured by the French privateer Bellona in the Indian Seas within the period of five months fixed by the Peace of Amiens for the termination of hostilities in these seas.[507]

The question has come up about whether, if a peace treaty sets a future date for ending hostilities in far-off areas, and if the forces in those areas learn about the peace agreement before that date, they should immediately stop fighting. Most legal experts correctly respond that they should. However, the French Prize Courts in 1801 ruled in favor of the English ship Swineherd, which was seized by the French privateer Bellona in the Indian Seas during the five-month period established by the Peace of Amiens for stopping hostilities in those seas.[507]

[507] The details of this case are given by Hall, § 199; see also Phillimore, III. § 521.

[507] The specifics of this case are provided by Hall, § 199; see also Phillimore, III. § 521.

V EFFECTS OF PEACE TREATY

Grotius, III. c. 20—Vattel, IV. §§ 19-23—Hall, §§ 198-202—Lawrence, § 218—Phillimore, III. §§ 518-528—Halleck, I. pp. 312-324—Taylor, §§ 581-583—Wheaton, §§ 544-547—Bluntschli, §§ 708-723—Heffter, §§ 180-183, 184A—Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 804-817—Ullmann, § 199—Bonfils, Nos. 1698-1702—Despagnet, No. 607—Rivier, II. pp. 454-461—Calvo, V. §§ 3137-3163—Fiore, III. Nos. 1701-1703, and Code, Nos. 1942-1962—Martens, II. § 128—Longuet, §§ 156-164—Mérignhac, pp. 330-336—Pillet, pp. 375-377.

Grotius, III. c. 20—Vattel, IV. §§ 19-23—Hall, §§ 198-202—Lawrence, § 218—Phillimore, III. §§ 518-528—Halleck, I. pp. 312-324—Taylor, §§ 581-583—Wheaton, §§ 544-547—Bluntschli, §§ 708-723—Heffter, §§ 180-183, 184A—Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 804-817—Ullmann, § 199—Bonfils, Nos. 1698-1702—Despagnet, No. 607—Rivier, II. pp. 454-461—Calvo, V. §§ 3137-3163—Fiore, III. Nos. 1701-1703, and Code, Nos. 1942-1962—Martens, II. § 128—Longuet, §§ 156-164—Mérignhac, pp. 330-336—Pillet, pp. 375-377.

Restoration of Condition of Peace.

Restoration of Peace.

§ 272. The chief and general effect of a peace treaty is restoration of the condition of peace between the former belligerents. As soon as the treaty is ratified, all rights and duties which exist in time of peace between the members of the family of nations are ipso facto and at once revived between the former belligerents.[Pg 333]

§ 272. The main effect of a peace treaty is to restore peace between the parties that were previously in conflict. Once the treaty is ratified, all rights and responsibilities that exist during peacetime between nations are automatically and immediately brought back into effect between the former belligerents.[Pg 333]

On the one hand, all acts legitimate in warfare cease to be legitimate. Neither contributions and requisitions, nor attacks on members of the armed forces or on fortresses, nor capture of ships, nor occupation of territory are any longer lawful. If forces, ignorant of the conclusion of peace, commit such hostile acts, the condition of things at the time peace was concluded must as far as possible be restored.[508] Thus, ships captured must be set free, territory occupied must be evacuated, members of armed forces taken prisoners must be liberated, contributions imposed and paid must be repaid.

On one hand, all actions deemed acceptable in warfare become unacceptable. Contributions and requisitions, attacks on military personnel or fortifications, ship captures, and occupation of territory are no longer lawful. If forces, unaware of the peace agreement, carry out such hostile actions, the situation at the time the peace was established must be restored as much as possible.[508] Therefore, captured ships must be released, occupied territory must be vacated, prisoners of war must be freed, and any imposed and paid contributions must be reimbursed.

[508] The Mentor (1799), 1 C. Rob. 179. Matters are, of course, different in case a future date—see above, § 271—is stipulated for the termination of hostilities.

[508] The Mentor (1799), 1 C. Rob. 179. Things are obviously different if a future date—see above, § 271—is agreed upon for the end of hostilities.

On the other hand, all peaceful intercourse between the former belligerents as well as between their subjects is resumed as before the war. Thus diplomatic intercourse is restored, and consular officers recommence their duties.[509]

On the other hand, all peaceful interactions between the former enemies, as well as between their people, are resumed as they were before the war. This means diplomatic relations are restored, and consular officers start their duties again.[509]

[509] The assertion of many writers, that such contracts between subjects of belligerents as have been suspended by the outbreak of war revive ipso facto by the conclusion of peace is not the outcome of a rule of International Law. But just as Municipal Law may suspend such contracts ipso facto by the outbreak of war, so it may revive them ipso facto by the conclusion of peace. See above, § 101.

[509] The claim by many writers that contracts between subjects of warring parties that were put on hold when war broke out automatically revive when peace is established is not based on a principle of International Law. However, just like domestic law can automatically suspend such contracts due to the outbreak of war, it can also automatically restore them when peace is concluded. See above, § 101.

Attention must be drawn to the fact that the condition of peace created by a peace treaty is legally final in so far as the order of things set up and stipulated by the treaty of peace is the settled basis of future relations between the parties, however contentious the matters concerned may have been before the outbreak of war. In concluding peace the parties expressly or implicitly declare that they have come to an understanding regarding such settled matters. They may indeed make war against each other in future on other grounds, but they are legally bound not to go to war over such matters as have been settled by a previous treaty of peace. That the practice of States does[Pg 334] not always comply with this rule is a well-known fact which, although it discredits this rule, cannot shake its theoretical validity.

Attention must be drawn to the fact that the state of peace established by a peace treaty is legally final as long as the arrangements set forth by the treaty become the agreed foundation for future relations between the parties, no matter how contentious the issues may have been prior to the war. In making peace, the parties explicitly or implicitly agree that they have reached an understanding on these settled issues. They may indeed engage in war against each other in the future for different reasons, but they are legally obligated not to fight over matters that have been resolved by a previous peace treaty. It is a well-known fact that the practices of States do[Pg 334] not always adhere to this rule, which, while it undermines this principle, does not invalidate its theoretical basis.

Principle of Uti Possidetis.

Principle of Uti Possidetis.

§ 273. Unless the parties stipulate otherwise, the effect of a treaty of peace is that conditions remain as at the conclusion of peace. Thus, all moveable State property, as munitions, provisions, arms, money, horses, means of transport, and the like, seized by an invading belligerent remain his property, as likewise do the fruits of immoveable property seized by him. Thus further, if nothing is stipulated regarding conquered territory, it remains in the hands of the possessor, who may annex it. But it is nowadays usual, although not at all legally necessary, for the conqueror desirous of retaining conquered territory to stipulate cession of such territory in the treaty of peace.

§ 273. Unless the parties agree otherwise, the outcome of a peace treaty is that conditions stay the same as they were when peace was made. Therefore, any movable state property, like weapons, supplies, money, horses, transportation means, and similar items, that were taken by an invading force will remain their property, as will the benefits from any immovable property they seized. Additionally, if there are no specific agreements about conquered land, it stays with the possessor, who can annex it. However, these days, although it’s not legally required, it’s common for the conqueror who wants to keep the conquered territory to include a cession of that territory in the peace treaty.

Amnesty.

Amnesty.

§ 274. Since a treaty of peace is considered a final settlement of the war, one of the effects of every peace treaty is the so-called amnesty—that is, an immunity for all wrongful acts done by the belligerents themselves, the members of their forces, and their subjects during the war, and due to political motives.[510] It is usual, but not at all necessary, to insert an amnesty clause in a treaty of peace. So-called war crimes[511] which were not punished before the conclusion of peace[Pg 335] may no longer be punished after its conclusion. Individuals who have committed such war crimes and have been arrested for them must be liberated.[512] International delinquencies committed intentionally by belligerents through violation of the rules of legitimate warfare are considered condoned. Formerly even claims for reparation of damages caused by such acts could not be raised after the conclusion of peace, unless the contrary was expressly stipulated, but the matter is different now in accordance with article 3 of Convention IV. of the Second Peace Conference.[513] On the other hand, the amnesty has nothing to do with ordinary crimes or with debts incurred during war. A prisoner of war who commits murder during captivity may be tried and punished after the conclusion of peace, just as a prisoner who runs into debt during captivity may be sued after the conclusion of peace, or an action may be brought on ransom bills after peace has been restored.

§ 274. Since a peace treaty is seen as a final resolution of the war, one of the effects of every peace treaty is the so-called amnesty—that is, immunity for all wrongful acts committed by the belligerents, their forces, and their subjects during the war for political reasons.[510] It's common, but not required, to include an amnesty clause in a peace treaty. War crimes[511] that weren’t punished before the peace was established cannot be punished afterward. Individuals arrested for such war crimes must be released.[512] International offenses committed intentionally by the belligerents that violate legitimate warfare rules are considered forgiven. Previously, claims for damages caused by these acts could not be made after peace was concluded unless explicitly stated otherwise, but this has changed according to Article 3 of Convention IV of the Second Peace Conference.[513] On the other hand, the amnesty doesn’t apply to ordinary crimes or debts incurred during the war. A prisoner of war who commits murder while in captivity can be tried and punished after peace has been established, just like a prisoner who incurs debt while captive can be sued after peace is restored, or legal action can be taken on ransom bills once peace has been reestablished.

[510] Stress must be laid on the fact that this immunity is only effective in regard to the other party to the war. For instance, the occupant of enemy territory may not, after the conclusion of peace, punish war criminals. Nothing, however, prevents a belligerent from punishing members of his own forces or any of his own subjects who during war committed violations of the laws of war, e.g. killed wounded enemy soldiers and the like.

[510] It’s important to emphasize that this immunity only applies to the opposing party in the conflict. For example, the occupier of enemy territory cannot punish war criminals after peace is established. However, nothing stops a fighting party from punishing members of their own forces or their own citizens who committed violations of the laws of war during the conflict, e.g. killing wounded enemy soldiers and similar acts.

[511] See above, §§ 251-257. Clause 4 of the "Terms of Surrender of the Boer Forces in the Field"—see Parliamentary Papers, South Africa, 1902, Cd. 1096—seems to contradict this assertion, as it expressly excludes from the amnesty "certain acts, contrary to usages of war, which have been notified by the Commander-in-Chief to the Boer Generals, and which shall be tried by court-martial immediately after the close of hostilities." But it will be remembered—see above, § 265, p. 327, note 1—that the agreement embodying these terms of surrender does not bear the character of a treaty of peace, the Boer War having been terminated through subjugation.

[511] See above, §§ 251-257. Clause 4 of the "Terms of Surrender of the Boer Forces in the Field"—see Parliamentary Papers, South Africa, 1902, Cd. 1096—appears to contradict this statement, as it specifically excludes from the amnesty "certain acts, contrary to the rules of war, which have been communicated by the Commander-in-Chief to the Boer Generals, and which will be tried by court-martial right after the end of hostilities." However, it should be noted—see above, § 265, p. 327, note 1—that the agreement containing these terms of surrender does not have the status of a peace treaty, since the Boer War ended with subjugation.

[512] This applies to such individuals only as have not yet been convicted. Those who are undergoing a term of imprisonment need not be liberated at the conclusion of peace; see above, § 257.

[512] This only applies to individuals who haven't been convicted yet. Those who are currently serving time don't have to be released at the end of peace; see above, § 257.

[513] See above, § 259a.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Refer to above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

But it is important to remember here again that the amnesty grants immunity only for wrongful acts done by the subjects of one belligerent against the other. Such wrongful acts as have been committed by the subjects of a belligerent against their own Government are not covered by the amnesty. Therefore treason, desertion, and the like committed during the war by his own subjects may be punished by a belligerent after the conclusion of peace, unless the contrary has been expressly stipulated in the treaty of peace.[514]

But it’s important to remember that the amnesty only gives immunity for wrongful acts committed by the people of one side against the other. Wrongful acts committed by the people of a side against their own government are not included in the amnesty. Therefore, treason, desertion, and similar actions committed during the war by their own people can be punished by a side after peace is established, unless something different has been specifically stated in the peace treaty.[514]

[514] Thus Russia stipulated by article 17 of the Preliminaries of San Stefano, in 1878—see Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. III. p. 252—that Turkey must accord an amnesty to such of her own subjects as had compromised themselves during the war.

[514] Thus, Russia specified in Article 17 of the Preliminaries of San Stefano in 1878—see Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. III. p. 252—that Turkey must grant amnesty to its citizens who had gotten involved during the war.

Release of Prisoners of War.

Release of POWs.

§ 275. A very important effect of a treaty of peace is termination of the captivity of prisoners of war.[515] This, however, does not mean that with the conclusion[Pg 336] of peace all prisoners of war must at once be released. It only means—to use the words of article 20 of the Hague Regulations—that "After the conclusion of peace, the repatriation of prisoners of war shall take place as speedily as possible." The instant release of prisoners at the very place where they were detained, would be inconvenient not only for the State which kept them in captivity, but also for themselves, as in most cases they would not possess means to pay for their journey home. Therefore, although with the conclusion of peace they cease to be captives in the technical sense of the term, prisoners of war remain as a body under military discipline until they are brought to the frontier and handed over to their Government. That prisoners of war may be detained after the conclusion of peace until they have paid debts incurred during captivity seems to be an almost generally[516] recognised rule. But it is controversial whether such prisoners of war may be detained as are undergoing a term of imprisonment imposed upon them for offences against discipline. After the Franco-German War in 1871 Germany detained such prisoners,[517] whereas Japan after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 released them.

§ 275. A very important effect of a peace treaty is the end of the captivity of prisoners of war.[515] However, this doesn’t mean that all prisoners of war must be released immediately once peace is declared. It simply means—using the words from article 20 of the Hague Regulations—that "After the conclusion of peace, the repatriation of prisoners of war shall take place as quickly as possible." Releasing prisoners immediately at the location where they were held would be problematic not just for the State that held them but also for the prisoners themselves, as they generally wouldn’t have the resources to make it back home. Therefore, even though they stop being captives in the technical sense when peace is concluded, prisoners of war still remain under military discipline until they are taken to the border and handed over to their Government. The fact that prisoners of war can be held after peace is concluded until they pay off debts incurred during captivity appears to be a widely accepted rule. However, there is debate over whether prisoners of war can be held if they are serving out a sentence for discipline-related offenses. After the Franco-German War in 1871, Germany kept such prisoners,[517] while Japan released them after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905.

[515] See above, § 132.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[516] See, however, Pradier-Fodéré, VII. No. 2839, who objects to it.

[516] However, see Pradier-Fodéré, VII. No. 2839, who disagrees with it.

[517] See Pradier-Fodéré, VII. No. 2840; Beinhauer, Die Kriegsgefangenschaft (1910), p. 79; Payrat, Le prisonnier de Guerre (1910), pp. 364-370.

[517] See Pradier-Fodéré, VII. No. 2840; Beinhauer, Die Kriegsgefangenschaft (1910), p. 79; Payrat, Le prisonnier de Guerre (1910), pp. 364-370.

Revival of Treaties.

Reviving Treaties.

§ 276. The question how far a peace treaty has the effect of reviving treaties concluded between the parties before the outbreak of war is much controverted. The answer depends upon the other question, how far the outbreak of war cancels existing treaties between belligerents.[518] There can be no doubt that all such treaties as have been cancelled by the outbreak of war do not revive. On the other hand, there can likewise be no doubt that such treaties as have only[Pg 337] become suspended by the outbreak of war do revive. But no certainty or unanimity exists regarding such treaties as do not belong to the above two classes, and it must, therefore, be emphasised that no rule of International Law exists concerning these treaties. It is for the parties to make such special stipulations in the peace treaty as will settle the matter.

§ 276. The question of how much a peace treaty revives agreements made between the parties before the war started is highly debated. The answer depends on another question: how much the outbreak of war cancels existing treaties between the fighting parties.[518] There’s no doubt that all treaties canceled by the war's outbreak do not come back into effect. Likewise, there’s no doubt that treaties that were only suspended by the war do revive. However, there is no certainty or consensus regarding treaties that do not fit into these two categories, so it should be emphasized that there is no rule of International Law governing these treaties. It’s up to the parties to include specific terms in the peace treaty to resolve the issue.

[518] See the very detailed discussion of the question in Phillimore, III. §§ 529-538; see also above, § 99.

[518] Check out the in-depth discussion on this topic in Phillimore, III. §§ 529-538; also refer to the section above, § 99.

VI IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE TREATY

Grotius, III. c. 20—Vattel, IV. §§ 24-34—Phillimore, III. § 597—Halleck, I. pp. 322-324—Taylor, §§ 593-594—Wheaton, §§ 548-550—Bluntschli, §§ 724-726—Heffter, § 184—Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 817-822—Ullmann, § 199—Bonfils, Nos. 1706-1709—Despagnet, Nos. 612 and 613—Rivier, II. pp. 459-461—Calvo, V. §§ 3164-3168—Fiore, III. Nos. 1704-1705—Martens, II. § 128—Longuet, §§ 156-164—Mérignhac, pp. 336-337.

Grotius, III. c. 20—Vattel, IV. §§ 24-34—Phillimore, III. § 597—Halleck, I. pp. 322-324—Taylor, §§ 593-594—Wheaton, §§ 548-550—Bluntschli, §§ 724-726—Heffter, § 184—Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 817-822—Ullmann, § 199—Bonfils, Nos. 1706-1709—Despagnet, Nos. 612 and 613—Rivier, II. pp. 459-461—Calvo, V. §§ 3164-3168—Fiore, III. Nos. 1704-1705—Martens, II. § 128—Longuet, §§ 156-164—Mérignhac, pp. 336-337.

Treaty of Peace, how to be carried out.

Treaty of Peace, how to be carried out.

§ 277. The general rule, that treaties must be performed in good faith, applies to peace treaties as well as to others. The great importance, however, of a treaty of peace and its special circumstances and conditions make it necessary to draw attention to some points connected with the performance of treaties of peace. Occupied territory may have to be evacuated, a war indemnity to be paid in cash, boundary lines of ceded territory may have to be drawn, and many other tasks performed. These tasks often necessitate the conclusion of numerous treaties for the purpose of performing details of the peace treaty concerned, and the appointment of commissioners who meet in conference to inquire into details and prepare a compromise. Difficulties may arise in regard to the interpretation[519] of certain stipulations of the peace treaty which arbitration will settle if the parties cannot agree.

§ 277. The general rule that treaties must be honored in good faith applies to peace treaties just like any other. However, the significant importance of a peace treaty and its specific circumstances and conditions require us to highlight a few points related to the implementation of peace treaties. Occupied areas may need to be vacated, war reparations might have to be paid in cash, borders of ceded territories may need to be established, and various other tasks must be carried out. These tasks often require the creation of multiple treaties to address the details of the specific peace treaty, as well as the appointment of commissioners who convene to discuss details and work out compromises. Issues may arise regarding the interpretation of certain provisions of the peace treaty, which arbitration will resolve if the parties cannot come to an agreement.

Arrangements may have to be made for the case in which a part or the whole of the territory occupied during the war remains, according to the peace treaty, for some period under military occupation, such occupation to serve as a means of securing the performance of the peace treaty.[520] One can form an idea of the numerous points of importance to be dealt with during the performance of a treaty of peace if one takes into consideration the fact that, after the Franco-German War was terminated in 1871 by the Peace of Frankfort, more than a hundred Conventions were successively concluded between the parties for the purpose of carrying out this treaty of peace.

Arrangements might need to be made for situations where part or all of the territory occupied during the war stays under military occupation for some time, as specified in the peace treaty. This occupation would be intended to ensure the enforcement of the peace treaty.[520] You can get an idea of the many important points that need to be addressed during the implementation of a peace treaty by considering that, after the Franco-German War ended in 1871 with the Peace of Frankfort, over a hundred agreements were made between the parties to carry out this peace treaty.

Breach of Treaty of Peace.

Breach of Peace Treaty.

But a distinction must be made between violation during the period in which the conditions of the peace treaty have to be fulfilled, and violation after such period. In the first case, the other party may at once recommence hostilities, the war being considered not to have terminated through the violated peace treaty. The second case, which might happen soon or several years after the period for the fulfilment of the peace[Pg 339] conditions, is in no way different from violation of any treaty in general. And if a party cancels the peace treaty and wages war against the offender who violated it, this war is a new war, and in no way a continuation of the previous war which was terminated by the violated treaty of peace. It must, however, be specially observed that, just as in case of violation of a treaty in general, so in case of violation of a peace treaty, the offended party who wants to cancel the treaty on the ground of its violation must do this in reasonable time after the violation has taken place, otherwise the treaty remains valid, or at least the non-violated parts of it. A mere protest neither constitutes a cancellation nor reserves the right of cancellation.[521]

But a distinction must be made between violations that occur during the time when the terms of the peace treaty need to be fulfilled and violations that happen after that period. In the first case, the other party can immediately resume hostilities, as the war is considered to have not ended due to the breached peace treaty. The second case, which can arise soon after or even years later after the deadline for fulfilling the peace conditions, is no different from any other treaty violation. If a party nullifies the peace treaty and goes to war against the violator, this conflict is a new war and not a continuation of the previous war that ended with the violated peace treaty. It should be noted that, just like with any treaty violation, if the offended party wishes to cancel the peace treaty because of the breach, they must do so within a reasonable time after the violation occurs; otherwise, the treaty remains valid, or at least the parts that haven't been violated do. A mere protest does not constitute a cancellation nor reserve the right to cancel.

VII POSTLIMINIUM

Grotius, III. c. 9—Bynkershoek, Quaest. jur. publ. I. c. 15 and 16—Vattel, III. §§ 204-222—Hall, §§ 162-166—Manning, pp. 190-195—Phillimore, III. §§ 568-590—Halleck, II. pp. 500-526—Taylor, § 595—Wheaton, § 398—Bluntschli, §§ 727-741—Heffter, §§ 188-192—Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 822-836—Bonfils, No. 1710—Despagnet, No. 611—Nys, III. pp. 738-739—Rivier, II. pp. 314-316—Calvo, V. §§ 3169-3226—Fiore, III. Nos. 1706-1712—Martens, II. § 128—Pillet, p. 377.

Grotius, III. c. 9—Bynkershoek, Quaest. jur. publ. I. c. 15 and 16—Vattel, III. §§ 204-222—Hall, §§ 162-166—Manning, pp. 190-195—Phillimore, III. §§ 568-590—Halleck, II. pp. 500-526—Taylor, § 595—Wheaton, § 398—Bluntschli, §§ 727-741—Heffter, §§ 188-192—Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 822-836—Bonfils, No. 1710—Despagnet, No. 611—Nys, III. pp. 738-739—Rivier, II. pp. 314-316—Calvo, V. §§ 3169-3226—Fiore, III. Nos. 1706-1712—Martens, II. § 128—Pillet, p. 377.

Conception of Postliminium.

Conception of Postliminium.

§ 279. The term "postliminium" is originally one of Roman Law derived from post and limen (i.e. boundary). According to Roman Law the relations of Rome with a foreign State depended upon the fact whether or not a treaty of friendship[522] existed. If such a treaty was not in existence, Romans entering the foreign State concerned could be enslaved, and Roman goods taken there could be appropriated. Now, jus postliminii denoted the rule, firstly, that such[Pg 340] an enslaved Roman, should he ever return into the territory of the Roman Empire, became ipso facto a Roman citizen again with all the rights he possessed previous to his capture, and, secondly, that Roman property, appropriated after entry into the territory of a foreign State, should at once upon being taken back into the territory of the Roman Empire ipso facto revert to its former Roman owner. Modern International and Municipal Law have adopted the term for the purpose of indicating the fact that territory, individuals, and property, after having come in time of war under the sway of the enemy, return either during the war or with the end of the war under the sway of their original Sovereign. This can occur in different ways. An occupied territory can voluntarily be evacuated by the enemy and then at once be reoccupied by the owner. Or it can be reconquered by the legitimate Sovereign. Or it can be reconquered by a third party and restored to its legitimate owner. Conquered territory can also be freed through a successful levy en masse. Property seized by the enemy can be retaken, but it can also be abandoned by the enemy and subsequently revert to the belligerent from whom it was taken. And, further, conquered territory can in consequence of a treaty of peace be restored to its legitimate Sovereign. In all cases concerned, the question has to be answered what legal effects the postliminium has in regard to the territory, the individuals thereon, or the property concerned.

§ 279. The term "postliminium" comes from Roman Law, derived from post and limen (i.e., boundary). According to Roman Law, Rome's relations with a foreign State depended on whether a treaty of friendship[522] existed. If such a treaty was not in place, Romans who entered the foreign State could be enslaved, and Roman goods taken there could be seized. Now, jus postliminii referred to the rule that, firstly, a Roman who was enslaved but later returned to the territory of the Roman Empire automatically regained his citizenship with all the rights he had before his capture, and, secondly, that Roman property taken after entering a foreign State would automatically revert to its original Roman owner once it was brought back to the territory of the Roman Empire. Modern International and Municipal Law has adopted the term to indicate that territories, individuals, and property that come under enemy control during wartime return either during the war or at the end of it to their original Sovereign. This can happen in various ways. An occupied territory can be voluntarily evacuated by the enemy and then immediately reoccupied by its owner. It can be retaken by the legitimate Sovereign. It can also be reclaimed by a third party and restored to its rightful owner. Conquered territory can be freed through a successful mass mobilization. Property seized by the enemy can be regained, or it can be abandoned by the enemy and subsequently revert to the original belligerent. Furthermore, conquered territory can be returned to its legitimate Sovereign as a result of a peace treaty. In all these cases, the question arises regarding the legal effects of postliminium concerning the territory, the individuals on it, or the property involved.

Postliminium according to International Law, in contradistinction to Postliminium according to Municipal Law.

Postliminium in International Law, as opposed to Postliminium in Municipal Law.

§ 280. Most writers confound the effects of postliminium according to Municipal Law with those according to International Law. For instance: whether a private ship which is recaptured reverts ipso facto to its former owner;[523] whether the former laws of a reconquered State revive ipso facto by the reconquest;[Pg 341] whether sentences passed on criminals during the time of an occupation by the enemy should be annulled—these and many similar questions treated in books on International Law have nothing at all to do with International Law, but have to be answered exclusively by the Municipal Law of the respective States. International Law can deal only with such effects of postliminium as are international. These international effects of postliminium may be grouped under the following heads: revival of the former condition of things, validity of legitimate acts, invalidity of illegitimate acts.

§ 280. Most writers mix up the effects of postliminium under Municipal Law with those under International Law. For example: does a private ship that is recaptured automatically revert to its former owner? Whether the previous laws of a reconquered State come back automatically after reconquest? Should sentences passed on criminals during enemy occupation be annulled? These and many similar questions discussed in International Law books have nothing to do with International Law, but should be addressed solely by the Municipal Law of the respective States. International Law can only address the international effects of postliminium. These international effects of postliminium can be categorized under the following headings: restoration of the previous state of affairs, validity of legitimate acts, invalidity of illegitimate acts.

[523] See above, § 196.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Revival of the Former Condition of Things.

Revival of the Past State of Affairs.

§ 281. Although a territory and the individuals thereon come through military occupation in war under the actual sway of the enemy, neither such territory nor such individuals, according to the rules of International Law of our times, fall under the sovereignty of the invader. They rather remain, if not acquired by the conqueror through subjugation, under the sovereignty of the other belligerent, although the latter is in fact prevented from exercising his supremacy over them. Now, the moment the invader voluntarily evacuates such territory, or is driven away by a levy en masse, or by troops of the other belligerent or of his ally, the former condition of things ipso facto revives; the territory and individuals concerned being at once, so far as International Law is concerned, considered to be again under the sway of their legitimate Sovereign. For all events of international importance taking place on such territory the legitimate Sovereign is again responsible towards third States, whereas during the time of occupation the occupant was responsible for such events.

§ 281. Even though a territory and the people living there come under the control of the enemy through military occupation during war, neither the territory nor the people, according to today's International Law, fall under the sovereignty of the invader. They remain, unless conquered through subjugation, under the sovereignty of the opposing party, even though that party cannot actually exercise control over them. The moment the invader voluntarily leaves the territory, or is forced out by a mass uprising, or by troops from the other side or their ally, the previous state of affairs automatically comes back; the territory and the people involved are immediately considered, under International Law, to be back under the control of their legitimate Sovereign. For any international events happening on that territory, the legitimate Sovereign is once again accountable to third states, while the occupying power was responsible during the occupation.

But it must be specially observed that the case in which the occupant of a territory is driven out of it by the forces of a third State not allied with the legitimate[Pg 342] Sovereign of such territory is not a case of postliminium, and that consequently the former state of things does not revive, unless the new occupant hands the territory over to the legitimate Sovereign. If this is not done, the military occupation of the new occupant takes the place of that of the previous occupant.

But it should be noted that when the occupant of a territory is forced out by the military of a third state that is not allied with the legitimate[Pg 342] sovereign of that territory, this situation does not qualify as postliminium. As a result, the previous state of affairs doesn’t return unless the new occupant returns the territory to the legitimate sovereign. If that doesn’t happen, the military occupation by the new occupant replaces that of the previous occupant.

Validity of Legitimate Acts.

Legitimacy of Valid Acts.

§ 282. Postliminium has no effect upon such acts of the former military occupant connected with the occupied territory and the individuals and property thereon as were legitimate acts of warfare. On the contrary, the State into whose possession such territory has reverted must recognise all such legitimate acts of the former occupant, and the latter has by International Law a right to demand such recognition. Therefore, if the occupant has collected the ordinary taxes, has sold the ordinary fruits of immoveable property, has disposed of such moveable state property as he was competent to appropriate, or has performed other acts in conformity with the laws of war, this may not be ignored by the legitimate Sovereign after he has again taken possession of the territory.

§ 282. Postliminium has no effect on actions taken by the former military occupant related to the occupied territory and the individuals and property there, as long as those actions were legitimate acts of warfare. Instead, the State that has regained control over that territory must acknowledge all such legitimate actions of the former occupant, who, under International Law, has the right to demand that recognition. Therefore, if the occupant has collected regular taxes, has sold the usual yields of immovable property, has dealt with movable state property that they were allowed to appropriate, or has carried out other actions in line with the laws of war, the legitimate Sovereign cannot ignore these after resuming control of the territory.

However, only those consequences of such acts must be recognised which have occurred during the occupation. A case which illustrates this happened after the Franco-German War. In October 1870, during occupation by German troops of the Départements de la Meuse and de la Meurthe, a Berlin firm entered into a contract with the German Government to fell 15,000 oak trees in the State forests of these départements, paying in advance £2250. The Berlin firm sold the contract rights to others, who felled 9000 trees and sold, in March 1871, their right to fell the remaining 6000 trees to a third party. The last-named felled a part of these trees during the German occupation, but, when the French Government again took possession of the territory concerned, the contractors were without[Pg 343] indemnity prevented from further felling of trees.[524] The question whether the Germans had a right at all to enter into the contract is doubtful. But even if they had such right, it covered the felling of trees during their occupation only, and not afterwards.

However, only the consequences of such acts that happened during the occupation need to be recognized. A case that illustrates this occurred after the Franco-German War. In October 1870, while German troops occupied the Départements de la Meuse and de la Meurthe, a Berlin company signed a contract with the German Government to chop down 15,000 oak trees in the state forests of these départements, paying £2,250 in advance. The Berlin firm sold the rights of the contract to others, who cut down 9,000 trees and in March 1871 sold their rights to cut the remaining 6,000 trees to a third party. The last group cut down some of these trees during the German occupation, but when the French Government took back control of the territory, the contractors were left without any compensation and could not continue cutting trees.[Pg 343][524] The question of whether the Germans had any right to enter into the contract is uncertain. But even if they did have that right, it only applied to the tree-cutting done during their occupation, not afterward.

[524] The Protocol of Signature added to the Additional Convention to the Peace Treaty of Frankfort, signed on December 11, 1871—see Martens, N.R.G. XX. p. 868—comprises a declaration stating the fact that the French Government does not recognise any liability to pay indemnities to the contractors concerned.

[524] The Protocol of Signature added to the Additional Convention to the Peace Treaty of Frankfort, signed on December 11, 1871—see Martens, N.R.G. XX. p. 868—includes a declaration that the French Government does not acknowledge any obligation to pay compensation to the involved contractors.

Invalidity of Illegitimate Acts.

Invalidity of Unauthorized Actions.

§ 283. If the occupant has performed acts which are not legitimate acts of warfare, postliminium makes their invalidity apparent. Therefore, if the occupant has sold immoveable State property, such property may afterwards be claimed from the acquirer, whoever he is, without any indemnity. If he has given office to individuals, they may afterwards be dismissed. If he has appropriated and sold such private or public property as may not legitimately be appropriated by a military occupant, it may afterwards be claimed from the acquirer without payment of damages.

§ 283. If the occupant has carried out actions that aren't legitimate acts of warfare, postliminium makes their invalidity clear. Therefore, if the occupant has sold immovable State property, that property can later be reclaimed from the buyer, no matter who they are, without any compensation. If they have given positions to individuals, those individuals can be dismissed later. If they have taken and sold private or public property that can't be legitimately taken by a military occupant, it can also be reclaimed from the buyer without any payment for damages.

No Postliminium after Interregnum.

No Postliminium after Interregnum.

§ 284. Cases of postliminium occur only when a conquered territory comes either during or at the end of the war again into the possession of the legitimate Sovereign. No case of postliminium arises when a territory, ceded to the enemy by the treaty of peace or conquered and annexed without cession at the end of a war which was terminated through simple cessation of hostilities,[525] later on reverts to its former owner State, or when the whole of the territory of a State which was conquered and subjugated regains its liberty and becomes again the territory of an independent State. Such territory has actually been under the sovereignty of the conqueror; the period between the conquest and the revival of the previous condition of things was not one of mere military occupation during war, but one of interregnum during time of peace, and therefore the[Pg 344] revival of the former condition of things is not a case of postliminium. An illustrative instance of this is furnished by the case of the domains of the Electorate of Hesse-Cassel.[526] This hitherto independent State was subjugated in 1806 by Napoleon and became in 1807 part of the Kingdom of Westphalia constituted by Napoleon for his brother Jerome, who governed it up to the end of 1813, when, with the downfall of Napoleon, the Kingdom of Westphalia fell to pieces and the former Elector of Hesse-Cassel was reinstated. Jerome had during his reign sold many of the domains of Hesse-Cassel. The Elector, however, on his return, did not recognise these contracts, but deprived the owners of their property without indemnification, maintaining that a case of postliminium had arisen, and that Jerome had no right to sell the domains. The Courts of the Electorate pronounced against the Elector, denying that a case of postliminium had arisen, since Jerome, although a usurper, had been King of Westphalia during an interregnum, and since the sale of the domains was therefore no wrongful act. But the Elector, who was absolute in the Electorate, did not comply with the verdict of his own courts, and the Vienna Congress, which was approached in the matter by the unfortunate proprietors of the domains, refused its intervention, although Prussia strongly took their part. It is generally recognised by all writers on International Law that this case was not one of postliminium, and the attitude of the Elector cannot therefore be defended by appeal to International Law.

§ 284. Cases of postliminium happen only when a conquered territory comes back into the control of the legitimate Sovereign, either during or at the end of the war. No postliminium case arises when a territory has been ceded to the enemy by a peace treaty or conquered and annexed without cession after a war that ended with just a halt in hostilities,[525] and later returns to its former owner state, or when the entire territory of a state that was conquered and subjugated regains its freedom and once again becomes an independent state. Such a territory was actually under the conqueror's sovereignty; the time between the conquest and the return to the previous state wasn’t just a period of military occupation during war, but a time of interregnum during peace, and therefore the[Pg 344] return to the old situation doesn’t count as postliminium. An example of this can be seen in the case of the territories of the Electorate of Hesse-Cassel.[526] This previously independent state was conquered in 1806 by Napoleon and became part of the Kingdom of Westphalia, which Napoleon created for his brother Jerome, who ruled until the end of 1813, when the fall of Napoleon led to the disintegration of the Kingdom of Westphalia and the former Elector of Hesse-Cassel was reinstated. During his reign, Jerome sold many of the territories of Hesse-Cassel. However, upon his return, the Elector did not recognize these contracts and took the property from the owners without compensation, arguing that a case of postliminium had occurred, and that Jerome had no right to sell the territories. The Courts of the Electorate ruled against the Elector, stating that no case of postliminium had arisen since Jerome, even though a usurper, had been King of Westphalia during an interregnum, making the sale of the territories not a wrongful act. However, the Elector, who had absolute power in the Electorate, did not comply with his own courts’ ruling, and the Vienna Congress, which the unfortunate owners of the territories approached, refused to intervene, even though Prussia strongly supported their case. It is widely accepted by all writers on International Law that this case did not involve postliminium, and the Elector’s actions cannot therefore be justified by reference to International Law.

[525] See above, § 263.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[526] See Phillimore, III. §§ 568-574, and the literature there quoted.

[526] See Phillimore, III. §§ 568-574, and the literature there quoted.

PART III NEUTRALITY

CHAPTER 1 ON NEUTRALITY IN GENERAL

I DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEUTRALITY INSTITUTION

Hall, §§ 208-214—Lawrence, § 223—Westlake, II. pp. 169-177—Phillimore, III. §§ 161-226—Twiss, II. §§ 208-212—Taylor, §§ 596-613—Walker, History, pp. 195-203, and Science, pp. 374-385—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 614-634—Ullmann, § 190—Bonfils, Nos. 1494-1521—Despagnet, No. 687—Rivier, II. pp. 370-375—Nys, III. pp. 558-567—Calvo, IV. §§ 2494-2591—Fiore, III. Nos. 1503-1535—Martens, II. § 130—Dupuis, Nos. 302-307—Mérignhac, pp. 339-342—Boeck, Nos. 8-153—Kleen, I. pp. 1-70—Cauchy, Le droit maritime international (1862), vol. II. pp. 325-430—Gessner, pp. 1-69—Bergbohm, Die bewaffnete Neutralität 1780-1783 (1884)—Fauchille, La diplomatie française et la ligue des neutres 1780 (1893)—Schweizer, Geschichte der schweizerischen Neutralitaet (1895), I. pp. 10-72.

Hall, §§ 208-214—Lawrence, § 223—Westlake, II. pp. 169-177—Phillimore, III. §§ 161-226—Twiss, II. §§ 208-212—Taylor, §§ 596-613—Walker, History, pp. 195-203, and Science, pp. 374-385—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 614-634—Ullmann, § 190—Bonfils, Nos. 1494-1521—Despagnet, No. 687—Rivier, II. pp. 370-375—Nys, III. pp. 558-567—Calvo, IV. §§ 2494-2591—Fiore, III. Nos. 1503-1535—Martens, II. § 130—Dupuis, Nos. 302-307—Mérignhac, pp. 339-342—Boeck, Nos. 8-153—Kleen, I. pp. 1-70—Cauchy, Le droit maritime international (1862), vol. II. pp. 325-430—Gessner, pp. 1-69—Bergbohm, Die bewaffnete Neutralität 1780-1783 (1884)—Fauchille, La diplomatie française et la ligue des neutres 1780 (1893)—Schweizer, Geschichte der schweizerischen Neutralitaet (1895), I. pp. 10-72.

Neutrality not practised in Ancient Times.

Neutrality not practiced in Ancient Times.

§ 285. Since in antiquity there was no notion of an International Law,[527] it is not to be expected that neutrality as a legal institution should have existed among the nations of old. Neutrality did not exist even in practice, for belligerents never recognised an attitude of impartiality on the part of other States. If war broke out between two nations, third parties had to choose between the belligerents and become allies or enemies of one or other. This does not mean that third parties had actually to take part in the fighting. Nothing of the kind was the case. But they had, if necessary, to render assistance; for example, to allow the passage of belligerent forces through their country, to supply provisions and the like to the party[Pg 348] they favoured, and to deny all such assistance to the enemy. Several instances are known of efforts[528] on the part of third parties to take up an attitude of impartiality, but belligerents never recognised such impartiality.

§ 285. Since there was no concept of International Law in ancient times,[527] it wasn't expected that neutrality as a legal principle would exist among ancient nations. Neutrality didn't even exist in practice, as those involved in conflict never acknowledged any impartial stance from other states. When war broke out between two nations, third parties had to choose sides and become allies or enemies of one of the parties. This doesn’t mean that third parties had to participate in the fighting. Rather, they had to be prepared to provide support; for instance, they might allow the passage of warring forces through their territory, supply provisions to the side they supported, and deny similar assistance to the opposing side[Pg 348]. There are several known instances of attempts[528] by third parties to maintain neutrality, but these efforts were never recognized by those engaged in combat.

[528] See Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 614-615.

[528] See Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 614-615.

Neutrality during the Middle Ages.

Neutrality in the Middle Ages.

§ 286. During the Middle Ages matters changed in so far only as, in the latter part of this period, belligerents did not exactly force third parties to a choice; but legal duties and rights connected with neutrality did not exist. A State could maintain that it was no party to a war, although it furnished one of the belligerents with money, troops, and other kinds of assistance. To prevent such assistance, which was in no way considered illegal, treaties were frequently concluded, during the latter part of the Middle Ages, for the purpose of specially stipulating that the parties were not to assist each other's enemies in any way during time of war, and were to prevent their subjects from rendering such assistance. Through the influence of such treaties the difference between a really and feigned impartial attitude of third States during war became recognised, and neutrality, as an institution of International Law, gradually developed during the sixteenth century.

§ 286. During the Middle Ages, things only changed in that, in the later part of this period, warring parties didn't exactly force third parties to make a choice; however, there weren't any legal duties or rights connected to neutrality. A State could claim it was not involved in a war, even if it provided one of the belligerents with money, troops, and other types of support. To prevent such support, which was not seen as illegal, treaties were often made during the later part of the Middle Ages specifically stating that the parties would not assist each other's enemies in any way during wartime and would prevent their subjects from offering such support. Thanks to these treaties, the distinction between genuinely neutral and merely pretending to be neutral third States during war was recognized, and neutrality as an institution of International Law gradually developed during the sixteenth century.

Of great importance was the fact that the Swiss Confederation, in contradistinction to her policy during former times, made it a matter of policy from the end of the sixteenth century always to remain neutral during wars between other States. Although this former neutrality of the Swiss can in no way be compared with modern neutrality, since Swiss mercenaries for centuries afterwards fought in all European wars, the Swiss Government itself succeeded in each instance in taking up and preserving such an attitude of impartiality as complied with the current rules of neutrality.[Pg 349]

It was really important that the Swiss Confederation, unlike its past policy, decided from the end of the sixteenth century to always stay neutral during wars between other nations. While this earlier form of neutrality in Switzerland can't really be compared to modern neutrality—since Swiss mercenaries fought in all European wars for centuries afterward—the Swiss Government managed to maintain an attitude of impartiality that aligned with the current standards of neutrality.[Pg 349]

It should be mentioned that the collection of rules and customs regarding Maritime Law which goes under the name of Consolato del Mare made its appearance about the middle of the fourteenth century. One of the rules there laid down, that in time of war enemy goods on neutral vessels may be confiscated, but that, on the other hand, neutral goods on enemy vessels must be restored, became of great importance, since Great Britain acted accordingly from the beginning of the eighteenth century until the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854.[529]

It should be noted that the collection of rules and customs related to Maritime Law known as Consolato del Mare emerged around the mid-fourteenth century. One of the established rules states that during wartime, enemy goods on neutral ships can be seized, while neutral goods on enemy ships must be returned. This rule became significant as Great Britain adhered to it from the early eighteenth century until the start of the Crimean War in 1854.[529]

[529] See above, § 176.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Neutrality during the Seventeenth Century.

Neutrality in the 1600s.

§ 287. At the time of Grotius, neutrality was recognised as an institution of International Law, although such institution was in its infancy only and needed a long time to reach its present range. Grotius did not know, or at any rate did not make use of, the term neutrality.[530] He treats neutrality in the very short seventeenth chapter of the Third Book on the Law of War and Peace, under the head De his, qui in bello medii sunt, and establishes in § 3 two doubtful rules only. The first is that neutrals shall do nothing which may strengthen a belligerent whose cause is unjust, or which may hinder the movements of a belligerent whose cause is just. The second rule is that in a war in which it is doubtful whose cause is just, neutrals shall treat both belligerents alike, in permitting the passage of troops, in supplying provisions for the troops, and in not rendering assistance to persons besieged.

§ 287. At the time of Grotius, neutrality was recognized as a concept in International Law, although it was still new and needed a long time to develop into what it is today. Grotius either did not know or did not use the term neutrality.[530] He discusses neutrality briefly in the seventeenth chapter of the Third Book on the Law of War and Peace, under the topic De his, qui in bello medii sunt, and sets out two uncertain rules in § 3. The first is that neutrals should do nothing that could help a belligerent with an unjust cause or hinder a belligerent with a just cause. The second rule is that in a war where it's unclear which side is just, neutrals should treat both belligerents the same in allowing troop movements, supplying provisions for the troops, and not providing assistance to besieged individuals.

[530] That the term was known at the time of Grotius may be inferred from the fact that Neumayr de Ramsla in 1620 published his work Von der Neutralität und Assistenz ... in Kriegszeiten; see Nys in R.I. XVII. (1885), p. 78.

[530] The fact that the term was recognized during Grotius' time can be inferred from Neumayr de Ramsla's publication in 1620 titled Von der Neutralität und Assistenz ... in Kriegszeiten; see Nys in R.I. XVII. (1885), p. 78.

The treatment of neutrality by Grotius shows, on the one hand, that apart from the recognition of the fact that third parties could remain neutral, not many rules regarding the duties of neutrals existed, and, on the other hand, that the granting of passage to troops[Pg 350] of belligerents and the supply of provisions to them was not considered illegal. And the practice of the seventeenth century furnishes numerous instances of the fact that neutrality was not really an attitude of impartiality, and that belligerents did not respect the territories of neutral States. Thus, although Charles I. remained neutral, the Marquis of Hamilton and six thousand British soldiers were fighting in 1631 under Gustavus Adolphus. "In 1626 the English captured a French ship in Dutch waters. In 1631 the Spaniards attacked the Dutch in a Danish port; in 1639 the Dutch were in turn the aggressors, and attacked the Spanish Fleet in English waters; again, in 1666 they captured English vessels in the Elbe...; in 1665 an English fleet endeavoured to seize the Dutch East India Squadron in the harbour of Bergen, but were beaten off with the help of the forts; finally, in 1693, the French attempted to cut some Dutch ships out of Lisbon, and on being prevented by the guns of the place from carrying them off, burnt them in the river."[531]

The way Grotius handled neutrality shows that, while he recognized that third parties could stay neutral, there weren't many rules about what neutrals were supposed to do. Also, allowing troops from warring sides to pass through and supplying them with provisions was seen as acceptable. The seventeenth century provides many examples that neutrality wasn't truly an impartial stance, and belligerents often disregarded the territories of neutral states. For instance, even though Charles I stayed neutral, the Marquis of Hamilton led six thousand British soldiers to fight alongside Gustavus Adolphus in 1631. In 1626, the English captured a French ship in Dutch waters. In 1631, Spaniards attacked the Dutch in a Danish port; in 1639, the Dutch launched an attack on the Spanish fleet in English waters. Again in 1666, they captured English ships in the Elbe. In 1665, an English fleet tried to seize the Dutch East India Squadron in the Bergen harbor but was repelled with the help of the forts. Finally, in 1693, the French attempted to steal some Dutch ships from Lisbon but, when thwarted by the fort's cannons, burned them in the river.[531]

[531] See Hall, § 209, p. 604.

[531] See Hall, § 209, p. 604.

Progress of Neutrality during the Eighteenth Century.

Progress of Neutrality during the 18th Century.

§ 288. It was not until the eighteenth century that theory and practice agreed upon the duty of neutrals to remain impartial, and the duty of belligerents to respect the territories of neutrals. Bynkershoek and Vattel formulated adequate conceptions of neutrality. Bynkershoek[532] does not use the term "neutrality," but calls neutrals non hostes, and he describes them as those who are of neither party—qui neutrarum partium sunt—in a war, and who do not, in accordance with a treaty, give assistance to either party. Vattel (III. § 103), on the other hand, makes use of the term "neutrality," and gives the following definition:—"Neutral nations, during a war, are those who take no one's part, remaining friends common to[Pg 351] both parties, and not favouring the armies of one of them to the prejudice of the other." But although Vattel's book appeared in 1758, twenty-one years after that of Bynkershoek, his doctrines are in some ways less advanced than those of Bynkershoek. The latter, in contradistinction to Grotius, maintained that neutrals had nothing to do with the question as to which party to a war had a just cause; that neutrals, being friends to both parties, have not to sit as judges between these parties, and, consequently, must not give or deny to one or other party more or less in accordance with their conviction as to the justice or injustice of the cause of each. Vattel, however, teaches (III. § 135) that a neutral, although he may generally allow the passage of troops of the belligerents through his territory, may refuse this passage to such belligerent as is making war for an unjust cause.

§ 288. It wasn’t until the eighteenth century that theory and practice agreed on the obligation of neutral parties to stay impartial and the obligation of warring parties to respect the territories of neutrals. Bynkershoek and Vattel provided clear ideas about neutrality. Bynkershoek[532] doesn’t use the term "neutrality," instead referring to neutrals as non hostes, describing them as those who are not involved with either side—qui neutrarum partium sunt—in a war and who do not, according to a treaty, provide support to either side. Vattel (III. § 103), however, uses the term "neutrality" and defines it as follows: "Neutral nations, during a war, are those who take no one’s side, remaining friends common to both parties, and not favoring the armies of one over the other." Although Vattel’s book came out in 1758, twenty-one years after Bynkershoek’s, his ideas are in some ways less progressive than Bynkershoek’s. The latter, in contrast to Grotius, argued that neutrals should not involve themselves in deciding which side in a war has a just cause; since neutrals are friends to both sides, they should not act as judges between them and, therefore, should not grant or withhold assistance to either side based on their beliefs about the justice or injustice of each cause. However, Vattel teaches (III. § 135) that a neutral, while generally allowing the passage of troops from the warring parties through their territory, can deny this passage to the party waging war for an unjust cause.

[532] Quaest. jur. publ. I. c. 9.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Public Law Questions I. c. 9.

Although the theory and practice of the eighteenth century agreed upon the duty of neutrals to remain impartial, the impartiality demanded was not at all a strict one. For, firstly, throughout the greater part of the century a State was considered not to violate neutrality in case it furnished one of the belligerents with such limited assistance as it had previously promised by treaty.[533] In this way troops could be supplied by a neutral to a belligerent, and passage through neutral territory could be granted to his forces. And, secondly, the possibility existed for either belligerent to make use of the resources of neutrals. It was not considered a breach of neutrality on the part of a State to allow one or both belligerents to levy troops on its territory, or to grant Letters of Marque to vessels belonging to its commercial fleet. During the second half of the eighteenth century, theory and practice became aware of the fact that neutrality[Pg 352] was not consistent with these and other indulgences. But this only led to the distinction between neutrality in the strict sense of the term and an imperfect neutrality.

Although the theory and practice of the eighteenth century agreed that neutrals should stay impartial, the kind of impartiality expected wasn’t very strict. For one, for most of the century, a state wasn’t considered to be violating neutrality if it provided one of the belligerents with limited assistance that it had previously committed to in a treaty.[533] This meant that a neutral could supply troops to a belligerent and allow his forces to pass through neutral territory. Additionally, either belligerent could utilize the resources of neutrals. It was not viewed as a violation of neutrality for a state to let one or both belligerents recruit troops on its land or to issue Letters of Marque to ships in its commercial fleet. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, both theory and practice recognized that neutrality was incompatible with these allowances and others. This realization only led to a distinction between strict neutrality and imperfect neutrality.[Pg 352]

[533] See examples in Hall, § 211.

[533] See examples in Hall, § 211.

As regards the duty of belligerents to respect neutral territory, progress was also made in the eighteenth century. Whenever neutral territory was violated, reparation was asked and made. But it was considered lawful for the victor to pursue the vanquished army into neutral territory, and, likewise, for a fleet to pursue[534] the defeated enemy fleet into neutral territorial waters.

As for the obligation of warring parties to honor neutral territory, there were advancements in the eighteenth century. Whenever neutral territory was breached, compensation was requested and provided. However, it was seen as acceptable for the winning side to chase the defeated army into neutral territory, and similarly, for a naval fleet to follow the defeated enemy fleet into neutral waters.

[534] See below, §§ 320 and 347 (4).

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

First Armed Neutrality.

First Armed Neutrality.

§ 289. Whereas, on the whole, the duty of neutrals to remain impartial and the duty of belligerents to respect neutral territory became generally recognised during the eighteenth century, the members of the Family of Nations did not come to an agreement during this period regarding the treatment of neutral vessels trading with belligerents. It is true that the right of visit and search for contraband of war and the right to seize the latter was generally recognised, but in other respects no general theory and practice was agreed upon. France and Spain upheld the rule that neutral goods on enemy ships as well as neutral ships carrying enemy goods could be seized by belligerents. Although England granted from time to time, by special treaties with special States, the rule "Free ship, free goods," her general practice throughout the eighteenth century followed the rule of the Consolato del Mare, according to which enemy goods on neutral vessels may be confiscated, whereas neutral goods on enemy vessels must be restored. England, further, upheld the principle that the commerce of neutrals should in time of war be restricted to the same limits as in time of peace, since most States in time of peace reserved cabotage and trade with their colonies to vessels of their own merchant marine. It was in 1756 that this principle first came[Pg 353] into question. In this year, during war with England, France found that on account of the naval superiority of England she was unable to carry on her colonial trade by her own merchant marine, and she, therefore, threw open this trade to vessels of the Netherlands, which had remained neutral. England, however, ordered her fleet to seize all such vessels with their cargoes on the ground that they had become incorporated with the French merchant marine, and had thereby acquired enemy character. From this time the above principle is commonly called the "rule[535] of 1756." England, thirdly, followed other Powers in the practice of declaring enemy coasts to be blockaded and condemning captured neutral vessels for breach of blockade, although the blockades were by no means always effective.

§ 289. Overall, the duty of neutral parties to stay impartial and the obligation of warring sides to respect neutral territory became widely recognized during the eighteenth century. However, the countries in the Family of Nations did not reach a consensus during this time regarding how to treat neutral ships trading with warring nations. It's true that the right to inspect for contraband of war and to seize such items was generally accepted, but there was no common theory or practice agreed upon in other respects. France and Spain maintained the rule that neutral goods on enemy ships, as well as neutral ships carrying enemy goods, could be seized by belligerents. Although England occasionally allowed the principle "Free ship, free goods" through specific treaties with certain states, its general practice throughout the eighteenth century adhered to the rule of the Consolato del Mare, which stated that enemy goods on neutral vessels could be confiscated, while neutral goods on enemy vessels should be returned. Furthermore, England upheld the idea that neutral trade during wartime should be limited to the same extent as during peacetime, since most countries during peacetime restricted cabotage and trade with their colonies to their own merchant vessels. This principle first came into question in 1756. That year, during its war with England, France found itself unable to conduct its colonial trade due to England's naval superiority, so it opened that trade to vessels from the Netherlands, which had remained neutral. In response, England ordered its fleet to seize all such vessels and their cargoes, claiming they had essentially become part of the French merchant marine and thus had taken on enemy status. From that point on, this principle became known as the "rule of 1756." Additionally, England followed other nations in declaring enemy coastlines as blockaded and condemning neutral vessels captured for violating blockades, even though these blockades were not always effective.

[535] See Phillimore, III. §§ 212-222; Hall, § 234; Manning, pp. 260-267; Westlake, II. p. 254; Moore, VII. § 1180; Boeck, No. 52: Dupuis, Nos. 131-133. Stress must be laid on the fact that the original meaning of the rule of 1756 is different from the meaning it received by its extension in 1793. From that year onwards England not only considered those neutral vessels which embarked upon the French coasting and colonial trade thrown open to them during the war with England, as having acquired enemy character, but likewise those neutral vessels which carried neutral goods from neutral ports to ports of a French colony. This extension of the rule of 1756 was clearly unjustified, and it is not possible to believe that it will ever be revived.

[535] See Phillimore, III. §§ 212-222; Hall, § 234; Manning, pp. 260-267; Westlake, II. p. 254; Moore, VII. § 1180; Boeck, No. 52: Dupuis, Nos. 131-133. It's important to emphasize that the original meaning of the rule from 1756 is different from its interpretation after it was expanded in 1793. Starting that year, England not only viewed neutral ships involved in French coastal and colonial trade during the war as having taken on an enemy status, but also those neutral ships transporting neutral goods from neutral ports to French colonial ports. This broadened interpretation of the rule from 1756 was clearly unjustified, and it’s hard to believe it will ever be brought back.

As privateering was legitimate and in general use, neutral commerce was considerably disturbed during every war between naval States. Now in 1780, during war between Great Britain, her American colonies, France, and Spain, Russia sent a circular[536] to England, France, and Spain, in which she proclaimed the following five principles: (1) That neutral vessels should be allowed to navigate from port to port of belligerents and along their coasts; (2) that enemy goods on neutral vessels, contraband excepted, should not be seized by belligerents; (3) that, with regard to contraband, articles 10 and 11 of the treaty of 1766[Pg 354] between Russia and Great Britain should be applied in all cases; (4) that a port should only be considered blockaded if the blockading belligerent had stationed vessels there, so as to create an obvious danger for neutral vessels entering the port; (5) that these principles should be applied in the proceedings and judgments on the legality of prizes. In July and August 1780, Russia[537] entered into a treaty, first with Denmark and then with Sweden, for the purpose of enforcing those principles by equipping a number of men-of-war. Thus the "Armed Neutrality" made its appearance. In 1781, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Austria, in 1782 Portugal, and in 1783 the Two Sicilies joined the league. France, Spain, and the United States of America accepted the principles of the league without formally joining. The war between England, the United States, France, and Spain was terminated in 1783, and the war between England and the Netherlands in 1784, but in the treaties of peace the principles of the "Armed Neutrality" were not mentioned. This league had no direct practical consequences, since England retained her former standpoint. Moreover, some of the States that had joined the league acted contrary to some of its principles when they themselves went to war—as did Sweden during her war with Russia 1788-1790, and France and Russia in 1793—and some of them concluded treaties in which were stipulations at variance with those principles. Nevertheless, the First Armed Neutrality has proved of great importance, because its principles have furnished the basis of the Declaration of Paris of 1856.

As privateering was accepted and commonly practiced, neutral trade was significantly disrupted during wartime between naval powers. In 1780, amidst the conflict involving Great Britain, her American colonies, France, and Spain, Russia sent a circular[536] to England, France, and Spain, laying out the following five principles: (1) Neutral vessels should be allowed to travel between the ports of warring nations and along their coastlines; (2) enemy goods on neutral vessels, except for contraband, shouldn’t be seized by warring powers; (3) concerning contraband, Articles 10 and 11 of the 1766 treaty[Pg 354] between Russia and Great Britain should apply in all situations; (4) a port should only be considered blockaded if the blocking power has stationed ships there, making it clear that entering the port poses a risk for neutral vessels; (5) these principles should guide the processes and judgments regarding the legality of captured goods. In July and August 1780, Russia[537] formed agreements first with Denmark and then Sweden to enforce these principles by providing several warships. This initiated the "Armed Neutrality." In 1781, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Austria joined, followed by Portugal in 1782 and the Two Sicilies in 1783. France, Spain, and the United States accepted the league's principles without formally joining. The war involving England, the United States, France, and Spain ended in 1783, while the conflict between England and the Netherlands concluded in 1784, but the peace treaties did not acknowledge the principles of "Armed Neutrality." Ultimately, the league had no immediate practical effects, as England maintained its previous stance. Furthermore, some countries that joined the league acted against its principles during their own conflicts, such as Sweden in its war with Russia (1788-1790) and France and Russia in 1793, and some made treaties that contradicted those principles. Nevertheless, the First Armed Neutrality was significant, as its principles became the foundation for the Declaration of Paris in 1856.

[536] Martens, R. III. p. 158.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Martens, R. III. p. 158.

[537] Martens, R. III. pp. 189 and 198.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Martens, R. III. pp. 189 and 198.

The French Revolution and the Second Armed Neutrality.

The French Revolution and the Second Armed Neutrality.

§ 290. The wars of the French Revolution showed that the time was not yet ripe for the progress aimed at by the First Armed Neutrality. Russia, the very same Power which had initiated the Armed Neutrality[Pg 355] in 1780 under the Empress Catharine II. (1762-1796), joined Great Britain in 1793 in order to interdict all neutral navigation into ports of France, with the intention of subduing France by famine. Russia and England justified their attitude by the exceptional character of their war against France, which country had proved to be the enemy of the security of all other nations. The French Convention answered with an order to the French fleet to capture all neutral ships carrying provisions to enemy ports or carrying enemy goods.

§ 290. The wars of the French Revolution demonstrated that the moment wasn't right for the progress sought by the First Armed Neutrality. Russia, the very same power that had initiated the Armed Neutrality[Pg 355] in 1780 under Empress Catherine II (1762-1796), allied with Great Britain in 1793 to block all neutral shipping to French ports, intending to weaken France through starvation. Russia and England defended their position by citing the unique nature of their war against France, which had proven to be a threat to the security of all other nations. In response, the French Convention ordered the French fleet to seize all neutral ships transporting supplies to enemy ports or carrying enemy goods.

But although Russia herself had acted in defiance of the principles of the First Armed Neutrality, she called a second into existence in 1800, during the reign of the Emperor Paul. The Second Armed Neutrality was caused by the refusal of England to concede immunity from visit and search to neutral merchantmen under convoy.[538] Sweden was the first to claim in 1653, during war between Holland and Great Britain, that the belligerents should not visit and search Swedish merchantmen under convoy of Swedish men-of-war, provided a declaration was made by the men-of-war that the merchantmen had no contraband on board. Other States later raised the same claim, and many treaties were concluded which stipulated the immunity from visit and search of neutral merchantmen under convoy. But Great Britain refused to recognise the principle, and when, in July 1800, a British squadron captured a Danish man-of-war and her convoy of several merchantmen for having resisted visit and search, Russia invited Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia to renew the "Armed Neutrality," and to add to its principles the further one, that belligerents should not have a right of visit and search in case the commanding officer of the man-of-war, under whose convoy[Pg 356] neutral merchantmen were sailing, should declare that the convoyed vessels did not carry contraband of war. In December 1800 Russia concluded treaties with Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia consecutively, by which the "Second Armed Neutrality" became a fact.[539] But it lasted only a year on account of the assassination of the Emperor Paul of Russia on March 23, and the defeat of the Danish fleet by Nelson on April 2, 1801, in the battle of Copenhagen. Nevertheless, the Second Armed Neutrality likewise proved of importance, for it led to a compromise in the "Maritime Convention" concluded by England and Russia under the Emperor Alexander I. on June 17, 1801, at St. Petersburg.[540] By article 3 of this treaty, England recognised, as far as Russia was concerned, the rules that neutral vessels might navigate from port to port and on the coasts of belligerents, and that blockades must be effective. But in the same article England enforced recognition by Russia of the rule that enemy goods on neutral vessels may be seized, and she did not recognise the immunity of neutral vessels under convoy from visit and search, although, by article 4, she conceded that the right of visit and search should be exercised only by men-of-war, and not by privateers, in case the neutral vessels concerned sailed under convoy.

But despite Russia acting against the principles of the First Armed Neutrality, she established a second one in 1800, during Emperor Paul's reign. The Second Armed Neutrality arose because England refused to grant immunity from visit and search to neutral merchant ships under convoy.[538] Sweden was the first to assert this in 1653, during the war between Holland and Great Britain, claiming that belligerents shouldn't visit and search Swedish merchant ships under the protection of Swedish warships, as long as the warships declared that the merchant ships carried no contraband. Other countries later made the same claim, resulting in many treaties that guaranteed the immunity of neutral merchant ships under convoy from visit and search. However, Great Britain would not accept this principle. In July 1800, after a British squadron captured a Danish warship and its convoy of merchant ships for resisting visit and search, Russia invited Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia to renew the "Armed Neutrality" and add a new principle: that belligerents should not have the right to visit and search if the commanding officer of the warship protecting the neutral merchant ships declared they carried no contraband. In December 1800, Russia signed treaties with Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia, officially making the "Second Armed Neutrality" a reality.[539] However, it only lasted a year due to the assassination of Emperor Paul of Russia on March 23, and the defeat of the Danish fleet by Nelson on April 2, 1801, during the battle of Copenhagen. Still, the Second Armed Neutrality was significant, as it led to a compromise in the "Maritime Convention" agreed upon by England and Russia under Emperor Alexander I on June 17, 1801, in St. Petersburg.[540] Article 3 of this treaty saw England acknowledging, as far as Russia was concerned, the rules that allowed neutral vessels to navigate from port to port and along the coasts of belligerents and that blockades must be effective. However, in the same article, England insisted that Russia recognize the rule allowing the seizure of enemy goods on neutral vessels, and she did not acknowledge the immunity of neutral vessels under convoy from visit and search, although, in article 4, she conceded that the right of visit and search should only be exercised by warships, not privateers, when the neutral vessels were under convoy.

[538] See below, § 417.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[539] Martens, R. VII. pp. 127-171. See also Martens, Causes Célèbres, IV. pp. 218-302.

[539] Martens, R. VII. pp. 127-171. See also Martens, Causes Célèbres, IV. pp. 218-302.

[540] Martens, R. VII. p. 260.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Martens, R. VII. p. 260.

But this compromise did not last long. When in November 1807 war broke out between Russia and England, the former in her declaration of war[541] annulled the Maritime Convention of 1801, proclaimed again the principles of the First Armed Neutrality, and asserted that she would never again drop these principles. Great Britain proclaimed in her counter-declaration[542] her return to those principles against which the First and the Second Armed Neutrality were directed, and[Pg 357] she was able to point out that no Power had applied these principles more severely than Russia under the Empress Catharine II. after the latter had initiated the First Armed Neutrality.

But this compromise didn't last long. When war broke out between Russia and England in November 1807, Russia declared war[541] and canceled the Maritime Convention of 1801, restated the principles of the First Armed Neutrality, and claimed that it would never abandon these principles again. Great Britain responded in her counter-declaration[542] by reaffirming those principles that the First and Second Armed Neutrality were aimed against, and[Pg 357] she was able to highlight that no country had enforced these principles more strictly than Russia during the reign of Empress Catherine II, after she had established the First Armed Neutrality.

[541] Martens, R. VIII. p. 706.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Martens, R. VIII. p. 706.

[542] Martens, R. VIII. p. 710.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Martens, R. VIII. p. 710.

Thus all progress made by the Maritime Convention of 1801 fell to the ground. Times were not favourable to any progress. After Napoleon's Berlin decrees in 1806 ordering the boycott of all English goods, England declared all French ports and all the ports of the allies of France blockaded, and ordered her fleet to capture all ships destined to these ports. And Russia, which had in her declaration of war against England in 1807 solemnly asserted that she would never again drop the principles of the First Armed Neutrality, by article 2 of the Ukase[543] published on August 1, 1809, violated one of the most important of these principles by ordering that neutral vessels carrying enemy (English) goods were to be stopped, the enemy goods seized, and the vessels themselves seized if more than the half of their cargoes consisted of enemy goods.

Thus, all the progress made by the Maritime Convention of 1801 was lost. The times were not favorable for any advancement. After Napoleon's Berlin decrees in 1806, which called for a boycott of all English goods, England declared all French ports and those of France's allies to be blockaded and ordered her fleet to capture all ships heading to these ports. And Russia, which had declared war against England in 1807 and solemnly promised to uphold the principles of the First Armed Neutrality, in article 2 of the Ukase[543] published on August 1, 1809, violated one of the most important of these principles by ordering that neutral vessels carrying enemy (English) goods be stopped, that the enemy goods be seized, and that the vessels themselves be seized if more than half of their cargoes consisted of enemy goods.

[543] Martens, N.R. I. p. 484.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Martens, N.R. I. p. 484.

Neutrality during the Nineteenth Century.

Neutrality in the 1800s.

§ 291. The development of the rules of neutrality during the nineteenth century was due to four factors.

§ 291. The evolution of neutrality rules during the nineteenth century was driven by four factors.

(1) The most prominent and influential factor is the attitude of the United States of America towards neutrality from 1793 to 1818. When in 1793 England joined the war which had broken out in 1792 between the so-called First Coalition and France, Genêt, the French diplomatic envoy accredited to the United States, granted Letters of Marque to American merchantmen manned by American citizens in American ports. These privateers were destined to cruise against English vessels, and French Prize Courts were set up by the French Minister in connection with French consulates in American ports. On the complaint of Great Britain, the Government of the United States ordered[Pg 358] these privateers to be disarmed and the French Prize Courts to be disorganised.[544] As the trial of Gideon Henfield,[545] who was acquitted, proved that the Municipal Law of the United States did not prohibit the enlistment of American citizens in the service of a foreign belligerent, Congress in 1794 passed an Act temporarily forbidding American citizens to accept Letters of Marque from a foreign belligerent and to enlist in the army or navy of a foreign State, and forbidding the fitting out and arming of vessels intended as privateers for foreign belligerents. Other Acts were passed from time to time. Finally, on April 20, 1818, Congress passed the Foreign Enlistment Act, which deals definitely with the matter, and is still in force,[546] and which afforded the basis of the British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819. The example of the United States initiated the present practice, according to which it is the duty of neutrals to prevent the fitting out and arming on their territory of cruisers for belligerents, to prevent enlistment on their territory for belligerents, and the like.

(1) The most important and influential factor is the attitude of the United States towards neutrality from 1793 to 1818. In 1793, when England entered the war that had started in 1792 between the First Coalition and France, Genêt, the French diplomatic envoy to the United States, issued Letters of Marque to American merchant ships crewed by American citizens in American ports. These privateers were meant to operate against English vessels, and French Prize Courts were established by the French Minister in cooperation with French consulates in American ports. In response to complaints from Great Britain, the United States Government ordered these privateers to disarm and disband the French Prize Courts.[Pg 358] The trial of Gideon Henfield,[544] who was acquitted, showed that U.S. law did not prohibit American citizens from joining the service of a foreign belligerent. Therefore, in 1794, Congress passed a law temporarily prohibiting American citizens from accepting Letters of Marque from foreign belligerents and from enlisting in the army or navy of a foreign state, as well as forbidding the preparation and arming of vessels intended as privateers for foreign belligerents. Additional laws were passed over time. Finally, on April 20, 1818, Congress enacted the Foreign Enlistment Act, which specifically addresses this issue and is still in effect,[546] and which formed the basis for the British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819. The example set by the United States initiated the current practice, which obligates neutrals to prevent the outfitting and armament of cruisers for belligerents on their territory, to prevent enlistment for belligerents on their territory, and similar actions.

[544] See Wharton, III. §§ 395-396.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Wharton, III. §§ 395-396.

[545] Concerning this trial, see Taylor, § 609.

[545] For more details about this trial, see Taylor, § 609.

[546] See Wheaton, §§ 434-437; Taylor, § 610; Lawrence, § 223.

[546] See Wheaton, §§ 434-437; Taylor, § 610; Lawrence, § 223.

(2) Of great importance for the development of neutrality during the nineteenth century became the permanent neutralisation of Switzerland and Belgium. These States naturally adopted and retained throughout every war an exemplary attitude of impartiality towards the belligerents. And each time war broke out in their vicinity they took effectual military measures for the purpose of preventing belligerents from making use of their neutral territory and resources.

(2) A key factor in the growth of neutrality during the nineteenth century was the permanent neutralization of Switzerland and Belgium. These countries consistently maintained a commendable position of impartiality during every war. Whenever conflict erupted nearby, they took effective military actions to prevent warring parties from using their neutral lands and resources.

(3) The third factor is the Declaration of Paris of 1856, which incorporated into International Law the rule "Free ship, free goods," the rule that neutral[Pg 359] goods on enemy ships cannot be appropriated, and the rule that blockade must be effective.

(3) The third factor is the Declaration of Paris from 1856, which added to International Law the rule "Free ship, free goods," stating that neutral[Pg 359] goods on enemy ships can't be taken, and that blockades must be effective.

(4) The fourth and last factor is the general development of the military and naval resources of all members of the Family of Nations. As all the larger States were, during the second half of the nineteenth century, obliged to keep their armies and navies at every moment ready for war, it followed as a consequence that, whenever war broke out, each belligerent was anxious not to injure neutral States in order to avoid their taking the part of the enemy. On the other hand, neutral States were always anxious to fulfil the duties of neutrality for fear of being drawn into the war. Thus the general rule, that the development of International Law has been fostered by the interests of the members of the Family of Nations, applies also to the special case of neutrality. But for the fact that it is to the interest of belligerents to remain during war on good terms with neutrals, and that it is to the interest of neutrals not to be drawn into war, the institution of neutrality would never have developed so favourably as it actually did during the nineteenth century.

(4) The fourth and final factor is the overall growth of military and naval resources among all members of the Family of Nations. Since most larger states had to keep their armies and navies ready for war at all times during the second half of the nineteenth century, it followed that whenever war broke out, each side was careful not to harm neutral states to avoid pushing them to support the enemy. At the same time, neutral states were always eager to uphold their neutrality to avoid getting dragged into the conflict. Therefore, the general principle that the development of International Law has been encouraged by the interests of the members of the Family of Nations also applies to the specific case of neutrality. If it weren't in the interest of warring parties to maintain good relations with neutrals during war, and in the interest of neutrals to stay out of conflict, the institution of neutrality wouldn't have developed as positively as it did in the nineteenth century.

Neutrality in the Twentieth Century.

Neutrality in the 20th Century.

§ 292. And this development has continued during the first decade of the twentieth century. The South African and Russo-Japanese wars produced several incidents which gave occasion for the Second Peace Conference of 1907 to take the matter of neutrality within the range of its deliberations and to agree upon the Convention (V.) concerning the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in war on land, as well as upon the Convention (XIII.) concerning the rights and duties of neutral Powers in maritime war. And some of the other Conventions agreed upon at this Conference, although they do not directly concern neutral Powers, are indirectly of great importance to them. Thus the[Pg 360] Convention (VII.) respecting the conversion of merchantmen into men-of-war indirectly concerns neutral trade as well as the Convention (VIII.) respecting the laying of submarine mines, and the Convention (XI.) concerning restrictions on the exercise of the right of capture. Of the greatest importance, however, is the fact that by the as yet unratified Convention XII. the Conference agreed upon the establishment of an International Prize Court to serve as a Court of Appeal in such prize cases decided by the Prize Courts of either belligerent as concern the interests of neutral Powers or their subjects. To enable this proposed Court to find its verdicts on the basis of a generally accepted prize law the Naval Conference of London met in 1908 and produced, in 1909, the Declaration of London concerning the laws of naval war, which represents a code comprising the rules respecting blockade, contraband, unneutral service, destruction of neutral prizes, transfer to neutral flag, enemy character, convoy, resistance to search, and compensation. Although the Declaration of London has been signed by only ten Powers, none of which has as yet ratified,[547] there is no doubt that sooner or later, perhaps with some slight modifications, it will either be expressly ratified, or become customary law by the fact that maritime Powers which go to war will carry out its rules.[548] Be that as it may, the Declaration of London is a document of epoch-making character and the future historian of International Law will reckon its development from the Declaration of Paris (1856) to the Declaration of London[549] (1909).

§ 292. This development has continued throughout the first decade of the twentieth century. The South African and Russo-Japanese wars led to several events that prompted the Second Peace Conference of 1907 to address the issue of neutrality during its discussions and to agree on Convention (V.) regarding the rights and duties of neutral Powers and individuals in land warfare, as well as Convention (XIII.) covering the rights and duties of neutral Powers in maritime conflict. Additionally, some of the other Conventions established at this Conference, while not directly focused on neutral Powers, are still very important to them. For example, Convention (VII.) concerning the conversion of merchant ships into warships affects neutral trade, as do Convention (VIII.) regarding the laying of submarine mines, and Convention (XI.) which imposes restrictions on the exercise of the right of capture. However, the most significant aspect is that through the still-unratified Convention XII, the Conference agreed to establish an International Prize Court to act as a Court of Appeal in prize cases decided by either belligerent’s Prize Courts that involve the interests of neutral Powers or their citizens. To allow this proposed Court to make its decisions based on widely accepted prize law, the Naval Conference of London convened in 1908 and produced the Declaration of London in 1909, which outlines a code containing the rules regarding blockade, contraband, unneutral service, destruction of neutral prizes, transfer to a neutral flag, enemy character, convoy, resistance to search, and compensation. Although only ten Powers have signed the Declaration of London, none have ratified it yet, there’s little doubt that it will eventually be ratified, perhaps with some minor changes, or become customary law since maritime Powers that enter into war will likely adhere to its rules. Regardless, the Declaration of London is a groundbreaking document, and future historians of International Law will trace its evolution from the Declaration of Paris (1856) to the Declaration of London (1909).

[547] See Smith, International Law, 4th ed. by Wylie (1911), pp. 353-371, where the chief points against ratification, and the answers made thereto, are impartially set forth.

[547] See Smith, International Law, 4th ed. by Wylie (1911), pp. 353-371, where the main arguments against ratification and the responses to them are presented fairly.

[548] Thus both Italy and Turkey, although the latter is not even a signatory Power, during the Turco-Italian War, complied with the rules of the Declaration of London.

[548] So both Italy and Turkey, even though Turkey isn't a signatory nation, followed the rules of the Declaration of London during the Turco-Italian War.

II NEUTRALITY CHARACTERISTICS

Grotius, III. c. 17, § 3—Bynkershoek, Quaest. jur. publ. I. c. 9—Vattel, III. §§ 103-104—Hall, §§ 19-20—Lawrence, § 222—Westlake, II. pp. 161-169—Phillimore, III. §§ 136-137—Halleck, II. p. 141—Taylor, § 614—Moore, VII. §§ 1287-1291—Walker, § 54—Wheaton, § 412—Bluntschli, §§ 742-744—Heffter, § 144—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 605-606—Gareis, § 87—Liszt, § 42—Ullmann, § 190—Bonfils, Nos. 1441 and 1443—Despagnet, No. 686—Rivier, II. pp. 368-370—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3222-3224, 3232-3233—Nys, III. pp. 570-581—Calvo, IV. §§ 2491-2493—Fiore, III. Nos. 1536-1541, and Code, Nos. 1768-1775—Martens, II. § 129—Dupuis, No. 316—Mérignhac, pp. 349-351—Pillet, pp. 272-274—Heilborn, System, pp. 336-351—Perels, § 38—Testa, pp. 167-172—Kleen, I. §§ 1-4—Hautefeuille, I. pp. 195-200—Gessner, pp. 22-23—Schopfer, Le principe juridique de la neutralité et son évolution dans l'histoire de la guerre (1894).

Grotius, III. c. 17, § 3—Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law I. c. 9—Vattel, III. §§ 103-104—Hall, §§ 19-20—Lawrence, § 222—Westlake, II. pp. 161-169—Phillimore, III. §§ 136-137—Halleck, II. p. 141—Taylor, § 614—Moore, VII. §§ 1287-1291—Walker, § 54—Wheaton, § 412—Bluntschli, §§ 742-744—Heffter, § 144—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 605-606—Gareis, § 87—Liszt, § 42—Ullmann, § 190—Bonfils, Nos. 1441 and 1443—Despagnet, No. 686—Rivier, II. pp. 368-370—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3222-3224, 3232-3233—Nys, III. pp. 570-581—Calvo, IV. §§ 2491-2493—Fiore, III. Nos. 1536-1541, and Code, Nos. 1768-1775—Martens, II. § 129—Dupuis, No. 316—Mérignhac, pp. 349-351—Pillet, pp. 272-274—Heilborn, System, pp. 336-351—Perels, § 38—Testa, pp. 167-172—Kleen, I. §§ 1-4—Hautefeuille, I. pp. 195-200—Gessner, pp. 22-23—Schopfer, The Legal Principle of Neutrality and Its Evolution in the History of War (1894).

Conception of Neutrality.

Neutrality Concept.

§ 293. Such States as do not take part in a war between other States are neutrals.[550] The term "neutrality" is derived from the Latin neuter. Neutrality may be defined as the attitude of impartiality adopted by third States towards belligerents and recognised by belligerents, such attitude creating rights and duties between the impartial States and the belligerents. Whether or not a third State will adopt and preserve an attitude of impartiality during war is not a matter for International Law but for International Politics. Therefore, unless a previous treaty stipulates it expressly, no duty exists for a State, according to International Law, to remain neutral in war. On the other hand, it ought not to be maintained, although this is done by some writers,[551] that every State has by the Law of Nations a right not to remain neutral. The fact is that every Sovereign State, as an independent member of the Family of Nations, is master of its own resolutions, and[Pg 362] that the question of remaining neutral or not is, in absence of a treaty stipulating otherwise, one of policy and not of law. However, all States which do not expressly declare the contrary by word or action, are supposed to be neutral, and the rights and duties arising from neutrality come into and remain in existence through the mere fact that a State takes up and preserves an attitude of impartiality and is not drawn into the war by the belligerents themselves. A special assertion of intention to remain neutral is not therefore legally necessary on the part of neutral States, although they often expressly and formally proclaim[552] their neutrality.

§ 293. States that do not participate in a conflict between other States are considered neutral.[550] The word "neutrality" comes from the Latin neuter. Neutrality can be defined as the impartial stance taken by third States toward belligerents, which is acknowledged by those belligerents, establishing rights and responsibilities between the neutral States and the belligerents. Whether a third State chooses to maintain an impartial stance during a war is influenced more by International Politics than by International Law. As such, unless a prior treaty explicitly requires it, International Law does not obligate a State to stay neutral in war. Additionally, it shouldn’t be asserted—though some writers do—that every State has a right under the Law of Nations not to remain neutral. The reality is that each Sovereign State, as an independent member of the international community, has control over its own decisions, and[Pg 362] the decision to stay neutral or not is, in the absence of a treaty stating otherwise, a matter of policy rather than law. However, all States that do not explicitly declare otherwise are presumed to be neutral, and the rights and responsibilities that come with neutrality arise and continue simply by virtue of a State adopting and maintaining an impartial position, without being dragged into the conflict by the belligerents. Therefore, a specific declaration of intent to remain neutral is not legally required from neutral States, although they often formally announce[552] their neutrality.

[550] Grotius (III. c. 17) calls them medii in bello; Bynkershoek (I. c. 9) non hostes qui neutrarum partium sunt.

[550] Grotius (III. c. 17) refers to them as medii in bello; Bynkershoek (I. c. 9) calls them non hostes qui neutrarum partium sunt.

[551] See, for instance, Vattel, III. § 106, and Bonfils, No. 1443.

[551] For example, see Vattel, III. § 106, and Bonfils, No. 1443.

[552] See below, § 309.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Neutrality an Attitude of Impartiality.

Neutrality is an impartial attitude.

§ 294. Since neutrality is an attitude of impartiality, it excludes such assistance and succour to one of the belligerents as is detrimental to the other, and, further, such injuries to the one as benefit the other. But it requires, on the other hand, active measures from neutral States. For neutrals must prevent belligerents from making use of their neutral territories and of their resources for military and naval purposes during the war. This concerns not only actual fighting on neutral territories, but also transport of troops, war materials, and provisions for the troops, the fitting out of men-of-war and privateers, the activity of Prize Courts, and the like.

§ 294. Neutrality means being impartial, which means not giving help to one side in a conflict if it harms the other side, or causing damage to one side that benefits the other. However, it also requires neutral states to take proactive steps. Neutrals must stop warring parties from using their territory and resources for military purposes during the conflict. This includes not only actual fighting on neutral land but also the movement of soldiers, military supplies, and food for the troops, equipping warships and privateers, managing Prize Courts, and similar activities.

But it is important to remember that the necessary attitude of impartiality is not incompatible with sympathy with one and antipathy against the other belligerent, so long as such sympathy and antipathy are not realised in actions violating impartiality. Thus, not only public opinion and the Press of a neutral State, but also the Government,[553] may show their sympathy[Pg 363] to one party or another without thereby violating neutrality. And it must likewise be specially observed that acts of humanity on the part of neutrals and their subjects, such as the sending of doctors, medicine, provisions, dressing material, and the like, to military hospitals, and the sending of clothes and money to prisoners of war, can never be construed as acts of partiality, although these comforts are provided for the wounded and the prisoners of one of the belligerents only.

But it's important to remember that the necessary attitude of impartiality doesn’t rule out feeling sympathy for one side and dislike for the other in a conflict, as long as those feelings don’t turn into actions that violate impartiality. Therefore, not only can public opinion and the media of a neutral state express their support for one side or the other, but so can the government,[553] without breaching neutrality. It should also be noted that acts of kindness from neutral parties, like sending doctors, medicine, supplies, dressing materials, and other help to military hospitals, as well as sending clothes and money to prisoners of war, should never be viewed as acts of bias, even if those comforts are provided only for the wounded and prisoners of one side in the conflict.

[553] See, however, Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 656, and Frankenbach, Die Rechtsstellung von neutralen Staatsangehörigen in kriegführenden Staaten (1910), p. 53, who assert the contrary.

[553] However, check Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 656, and Frankenbach, The Legal Status of Neutral Nationals in Warring States (1910), p. 53, who argue the opposite.

Neutrality an Attitude creating Rights and Duties.

Neutrality is an attitude that creates rights and responsibilities.

§ 295. Since neutrality is an attitude during the condition of war only, this attitude calls into existence special rights and duties which do not generally obtain. They come into existence by the fact that the outbreak of war has been notified or has otherwise[554] unmistakably become known to third States who take up an attitude of impartiality, and they expire ipso facto by the termination of the war.

§ 295. Since neutrality is a stance that exists only during wartime, this stance creates specific rights and responsibilities that typically don’t apply. These rights and duties emerge once the start of the war is communicated or has otherwise[554] been clearly recognized by third States that adopt a neutral position, and they end ipso facto with the conclusion of the war.

[554] See article 2 of Convention III. of the Second Peace Conference.

[554] See article 2 of Convention III of the Second Peace Conference.

Rights and duties deriving from neutrality do not exist before the outbreak of war, although such outbreak may be expected every moment. Even so-called neutralised States, as Switzerland and Belgium, have during time of peace no duties connected with neutrality, although as neutralised States they have even in time of peace certain duties. These duties are not duties connected with neutrality, but duties imposed upon the neutralised States as a condition of their neutralisation. They include restrictions for the purpose of safeguarding the neutralised States from being drawn into war.[555]

Rights and responsibilities that come from being neutral don't exist before a war breaks out, even if one could happen at any moment. Even so-called neutralized countries, like Switzerland and Belgium, don't have any obligations related to neutrality during peacetime, although as neutralized countries, they do have certain responsibilities. These responsibilities aren't tied to neutrality; rather, they are required of the neutralized countries as part of their neutral status. They involve restrictions meant to protect the neutralized countries from getting involved in conflicts.[555]

Neutrality an Attitude of States.

Neutrality: An Attitude of States.

§ 296. As International Law is a law between States only and exclusively, neutrality is an attitude of impartiality on the part of States, and not on the part of individuals.[556] Individuals derive neither rights[Pg 364] nor duties, according to International Law, from the neutrality of those States whose subjects they are. Neutral States are indeed obliged by International Law to prevent their subjects from committing certain acts, but the duty of these subjects to comply with such injunctions of their Sovereigns is a duty imposed upon them by Municipal, not by International Law. Belligerents, on the other hand, are indeed permitted by International Law to punish subjects of neutrals for breach of blockade, for carriage of contraband and for rendering unneutral service to the enemy; but the duty of subjects of neutrals to comply with these injunctions of belligerents is a duty imposed upon them by these very injunctions of the belligerents, and not by International Law. Although as a rule a State has no jurisdiction over foreign subjects on the Open Sea,[557] either belligerent has, exceptionally, by International Law, the right to punish foreign subjects by confiscation of cargo, and eventually of the vessel itself, in case their vessels break blockade, carry contraband, or render unneutral service to the enemy; but punishment is threatened and executed by the belligerents, not by International Law. Therefore, if neutral merchantmen commit such acts, they neither violate neutrality nor do they act against International Law, but they simply violate injunctions of the belligerents concerned. If they choose to run the risk of punishment in the form of losing their property, this is their own concern, and their neutral home State need not prevent them from doing so. But to the right of belligerents to punish subjects of neutrals for the acts specified corresponds the duty of neutral States to[Pg 365] acquiesce on their part in the exercise of this right by either belligerent.

§ 296. International Law is a set of rules between States only, so neutrality is about impartiality from States, not individuals.[556] Individuals don’t gain rights[Pg 364] or responsibilities under International Law just because their States are neutral. Neutral States must prevent their citizens from engaging in certain actions, but the obligation for these citizens to follow their government’s rules comes from Domestic Law, not International Law. On the flip side, belligerents have the right under International Law to punish neutral subjects for violating blockades, transporting contraband, or providing unneutral service to the enemy; the obligation for those subjects to follow the commands of the belligerents arises from those commands themselves, not from International Law. Generally, a State doesn’t have authority over foreign individuals on the Open Sea,[557] but belligerents have the exceptional right under International Law to confiscate cargo and even the ship itself if those ships break a blockade, carry contraband, or provide unneutral service to the enemy; however, punishment is enacted by the belligerents, not by International Law. So, if neutral merchant ships engage in such actions, they aren’t violating neutrality or International Law; they are simply ignoring the commands of the involved belligerents. If they decide to risk losing their property, that's their choice, and their neutral home State doesn’t have to stop them. However, the belligerents’ right to punish neutral subjects for these acts comes with the expectation that neutral States will accept this right being exercised by either side.

[556] It should be specially observed that it is an inaccuracy of language to speak (as is commonly done in certain cases) of individuals as being neutral. Thus, article 16 of Convention V. of the Second Peace Conference designates the nationals of a State which is not taking part in a war as "neutrals." Thus, further, belligerents occupying enemy territory frequently make enemy individuals who are not members of the armed forces of the enemy take a so-called oath of neutrality.

[556] It's important to note that it’s inaccurate to refer to individuals as neutral, as is often done in some situations. For example, Article 16 of Convention V of the Second Peace Conference refers to the citizens of a country that is not involved in a war as "neutrals." Additionally, warring parties that occupy enemy territory often require enemy civilians who are not part of the enemy's armed forces to take a so-called oath of neutrality.

Moreover, apart from carriage of contraband, breach of blockade, and unneutral service to the enemy, which a belligerent may punish by capturing and confiscating the vessels or goods concerned, subjects of neutrals are perfectly unhindered in their movements, and neutral States have in especial no duty to prevent their subjects from selling arms, munitions, and provisions to a belligerent, from enlisting in his forces, and the like.

Moreover, aside from carrying contraband, breaking blockades, and providing unneutral support to the enemy, which a warring party can punish by seizing and confiscating the involved vessels or goods, subjects of neutral countries can move freely. Neutral States have no specific obligation to stop their citizens from selling weapons, munitions, and supplies to a warring party, from joining their forces, and similar activities.

No Cessation of Intercourse during Neutrality between Neutrals and Belligerents.

No Stopping of Interaction during Neutrality between Neutrals and Belligerents.

§ 297. Neutrality as an attitude of impartiality involves the duty of abstaining from assisting either belligerent either actively or passively, but it does not include the duty of breaking off all intercourse with the belligerents. Apart from certain restrictions necessitated by impartiality, all intercourse between belligerents and neutrals takes place as before, a condition of peace prevailing between them in spite of the war between the belligerents. This applies particularly to the working of treaties, to diplomatic intercourse, and to trade. But indirectly, of course, the condition of war between belligerents may have a disturbing influence upon intercourse between belligerents and neutrals. Thus the treaty-rights of a neutral State may be interfered with through occupation of enemy territory by a belligerent; its subjects living on such territory bear in a sense enemy character; its subjects trading with the belligerents are hampered by the right of visit and search, and the right of the belligerents to capture blockade-runners and contraband of war.

§ 297. Neutrality as an attitude of impartiality involves the responsibility to not actively or passively assist either side in a conflict, but it doesn’t require cutting off all contact with the warring parties. Besides certain limitations needed for impartiality, all interactions between warring parties and neutrals continue as usual, maintaining a state of peace between them despite the war. This is particularly true for the implementation of treaties, diplomatic relations, and trade. However, the ongoing conflict between the warring parties can indirectly disrupt interactions with neutrals. For instance, a neutral state's treaty rights could be affected by a belligerent occupying enemy territory; its citizens in that area might be considered enemy subjects to some extent; and those trading with the warring parties could face challenges due to the right of search and seizure, as well as the rights of belligerents to capture blockade runners and contraband.

Neutrality an Attitude during War (Neutrality in Civil War).

Neutrality: An Attitude During War (Neutrality in Civil War).

§ 298. Since neutrality is an attitude during war, the question arises as to the necessary attitude of foreign States during civil war. As civil war becomes real war through recognition[558] of the insurgents as a[Pg 366] belligerent Power, a distinction must be made as to whether recognition has taken place or not. There is no doubt that a foreign State commits an international delinquency by assisting insurgents in spite of its being at peace with the legitimate Government. But matters are different after recognition. The insurgents are now a belligerent Power, and the civil war is now real war. Foreign States can either become a party to the war or remain neutral, and in the latter case all duties and rights of neutrality devolve upon them. Since, however, recognition may be granted by foreign States independently of the attitude of the legitimate Government, and since recognition granted by the latter is not at all binding upon foreign Governments, it may happen that insurgents are granted recognition on the part of the legitimate Government, whereas foreign States refuse it, and vice versa.[559] In the first case, the rights and duties of neutrality devolve upon foreign States as far as the legitimate Government is concerned. Men-of-war of the latter may visit and search merchantmen of foreign States for contraband; a blockade declared by the legitimate Government is binding upon foreign States, and the like. But no rights and duties of neutrality devolve upon foreign States as regards the insurgents. A blockade declared by them is not binding, their men-of-war may not visit and search merchantmen for contraband. On the other hand, if insurgents are recognised by a foreign State but not by the legitimate Government, such foreign State has all rights and duties of neutrality so far as the insurgents are concerned, but not so far as the legitimate Government is concerned.[560] In[Pg 367] practice, however, recognition of insurgents on the part of foreign States will, if really justified, always have the effect of causing the legitimate Government to grant its recognition also.

§ 298. Since neutrality is a stance during war, the question comes up about how foreign states should act during a civil war. When a civil war becomes a real war due to the recognition[558] of the insurgents as a[Pg 366] belligerent Power, it’s necessary to distinguish whether that recognition has occurred or not. There’s no doubt that a foreign state engages in international wrongdoing by supporting insurgents even while being at peace with the legitimate Government. However, the situation changes after recognition. The insurgents are now a belligerent Power, and the civil war has turned into a real war. Foreign states can either join the war or remain neutral; if they choose neutrality, all responsibilities and rights of neutrality fall upon them. Since recognition can be given by foreign states regardless of the position of the legitimate Government, and since recognition from the legitimate Government doesn’t bind foreign Governments, it’s possible for insurgents to be recognized by the legitimate Government while foreign states refuse that recognition, and vice versa.[559] In the first scenario, the rights and responsibilities of neutrality apply to foreign states concerning the legitimate Government. The warships of the legitimate Government can visit and inspect merchant vessels of foreign states for contraband; a blockade declared by the legitimate Government is enforceable against foreign states, and so on. However, no rights or responsibilities of neutrality apply to foreign states regarding the insurgents. A blockade they declare is not enforceable, and their warships cannot inspect merchant vessels for contraband. Conversely, if a foreign state recognizes the insurgents but the legitimate Government does not, that foreign state carries all rights and duties of neutrality concerning the insurgents, but not towards the legitimate Government.[560] In[Pg 367] practice, though, if foreign states recognize the insurgents when justified, it typically causes the legitimate Government to also extend its recognition.

[558] See above, §§ 59 and 76, and Rougier, Les guerres civiles et le droit des gens (1903), pp. 414-447.

[558] See above, §§ 59 and 76, and Rougier, Les guerres civiles et le droit des gens (1903), pp. 414-447.

[559] See above, § 59.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[560] See the body of nine rules regarding the position of foreign States in case of an insurrection, adopted by the Institute of International Law at its meeting at Neuchâtel in 1900 (Annuaire, XVIII. p. 227). The question as to whether, in case foreign States refuse recognition to insurgents, although the legitimate Government has granted it, the legitimate Government has a right of visit and search for contraband is controversial; see Annuaire, XVIII. pp. 213-216.

[560] Refer to the nine rules about the status of foreign states during an insurrection, which were adopted by the Institute of International Law at its meeting in Neuchâtel in 1900 (Annuaire, XVIII. p. 227). The issue of whether the legitimate government has the right to visit and search for contraband when foreign states refuse to recognize insurgents, despite the legitimate government’s recognition, is debated; see Annuaire, XVIII. pp. 213-216.

Neutrality to be recognised by the Belligerents.

Neutrality to be acknowledged by the warring parties.

§ 299. Just as third States have no duty to remain neutral in a war, so they have no right[561] to demand that they be allowed to remain neutral. History reports many cases in which States, although they intended to remain neutral, were obliged by one or both belligerents to make up their minds and choose the belligerent with whom they would throw in their lot. For neutrality to come into existence it is, therefore, not sufficient for a third State at the outbreak of war to take up an attitude of impartiality, but it is also necessary that the belligerents recognise this attitude by acquiescing in it and by not treating such third State as a party to the war. This does not mean, as has been maintained,[562] that neutrality is based on a contract concluded either expressis verbis or by unmistakable actions between the belligerents and third States, and that, consequently, a third State might at the outbreak of war take up the position of one which is neither neutral nor a party to the war, reserving thereby for itself freedom in its future resolutions and actions. Since the normal relation between members of the Family of Nations is peace, the outbreak of war between some of the members causes the others to become neutrals ipso facto by their taking up an attitude of impartiality and by their not being treated by the belligerents as parties to the war. Thus, it is not a contract that calls neutrality into existence, but this condition is rather a legal consequence of a certain[Pg 368] attitude on the part of third States at the outbreak of war, on the one hand, and, on the other, on the part of the belligerents themselves.

§ 299. Just as third States are not required to stay neutral in a war, they also don't have the right[561] to insist on remaining neutral. History has shown many cases where States, despite their intention to remain neutral, were forced by one or both sides in conflict to choose a side and align with one of the belligerents. For neutrality to be recognized, it’s not enough for a third State to adopt an impartial stance at the start of a war; the belligerents must also acknowledge this attitude by accepting it and not treating the third State as a party to the conflict. This doesn’t imply, as has been argued,[562] that neutrality is based on a contract made either expressis verbis or through clear actions between the belligerents and third States, allowing a third State to position itself as neither neutral nor part of the war, thereby keeping its options open for future decisions and actions. Since the typical relationship among members of the Family of Nations is peace, a war between some members automatically turns the others into neutrals ipso facto by adopting an impartial stance and not being treated by the belligerents as participants in the war. Therefore, neutrality arises not from a contract but is instead a legal outcome of a specific[Pg 368] attitude by third States at the start of the conflict, along with the response of the belligerents themselves.

[561] But many writers assert the existence of such a right; see, for instance, Vattel, III. § 106; Wheaton, § 414; Kleen, I. § 2; Bonfils, No. 1443.

[561] But many writers argue that such a right exists; see, for example, Vattel, III. § 106; Wheaton, § 414; Kleen, I. § 2; Bonfils, No. 1443.

[562] See Heilborn, System, pp. 347 and 350.

[562] See Heilborn, System, pp. 347 and 350.

III TYPES OF NEUTRALITY

Vattel, III. §§ 101, 105, 107, 110—Phillimore, III. §§ 138-139—Halleck, II. p. 142—Taylor, § 618—Wheaton, §§ 413-425—Bluntschli, §§ 745-748—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 634-636—Ullmann, § 190—Despagnet, No. 685—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3225-3231—Rivier, II. pp. 370-379—Calvo, IV. §§ 2592-2642—Fiore, III. Nos. 1542-1545—Mérignhac, pp. 347-349—Pillet, pp. 277-284—Kleen, I. §§ 6-22.

Vattel, III. §§ 101, 105, 107, 110—Phillimore, III. §§ 138-139—Halleck, II. p. 142—Taylor, § 618—Wheaton, §§ 413-425—Bluntschli, §§ 745-748—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 634-636—Ullmann, § 190—Despagnet, No. 685—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3225-3231—Rivier, II. pp. 370-379—Calvo, IV. §§ 2592-2642—Fiore, III. Nos. 1542-1545—Mérignhac, pp. 347-349—Pillet, pp. 277-284—Kleen, I. §§ 6-22.

Perpetual Neutrality.

Everlasting Neutrality.

§ 300. The very first distinction to be made between different kinds of neutrality is that between perpetual or other neutrality. Perpetual or permanent is the neutrality of States which are neutralised by special treaties of the members of the Family of Nations, as at the present time that of Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg. Apart from duties arising from the fact of their neutralisation which are to be performed in time of peace as well as in time of war, the duties and rights of neutrality are the same for neutralised as for other States. It must be specially observed that this concerns not only the obligation not to assist either belligerent, but likewise the obligation to prevent them from making use of the neutral territory for their military purposes. Thus, Switzerland in 1870 and 1871, during the Franco-German War, properly prevented the transport of troops, recruits, and war material of either belligerent over her territory, disarmed the French army which had saved itself by crossing the Swiss frontier, and detained the members of this army until the conclusion of peace.[563]

§ 300. The first distinction to be made between different types of neutrality is between perpetual and other forms of neutrality. Perpetual or permanent neutrality refers to the status of States that are neutralized by specific treaties among the members of the Family of Nations, such as Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxembourg today. Aside from obligations that come with their neutralization that must be upheld in both times of peace and war, the duties and rights of neutrality are the same for neutralized States as for others. It is important to note that this includes not only the obligation not to help either side but also the duty to prevent both from using neutral territory for military purposes. For example, during the Franco-German War in 1870 and 1871, Switzerland properly prevented the transport of troops, recruits, and military supplies of either side across its territory, disarmed the French army that crossed into Switzerland, and held its members until peace was achieved.[563]

[563] See below, § 339.[Pg 369]

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.[Pg 369]

General and Partial Neutrality.

General and Partial Neutrality.

§ 301. The distinction between general and partial neutrality derives from the fact that a part of the territory of a State may be neutralised,[564] as are, for instance, the Ionian Islands of Corfu and Paxo, which are now a part of the territory of the Kingdom of Greece. Such State has the duty to remain always partially neutral—namely, as far as its neutralised part is concerned. In contradistinction to such partial neutrality, general neutrality is the neutrality of States no part of whose territory is neutralised by treaty.

§ 301. The difference between general and partial neutrality comes from the fact that a portion of a country's territory can be neutralized,[564] like the Ionian Islands of Corfu and Paxo, which now belong to the Kingdom of Greece. This country has the obligation to stay partially neutral—specifically regarding its neutralized territory. In contrast to partial neutrality, general neutrality means that no part of a country's territory is neutralized by treaty.

[564] See above, § 72.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Voluntary and Conventional Neutrality.

Voluntary and Conventional Neutrality.

§ 302. A third distinction is that between voluntary and conventional neutrality. Voluntary (or simple or natural) is the neutrality of such State as is not bound by a general or special treaty to remain neutral in a certain war. Neutrality is in most cases voluntary, and States whose neutrality is voluntary may at any time during the war give up their attitude of impartiality and take the part of either belligerent. On the other hand, the neutrality of such State as is by treaty bound to remain neutral in a war is conventional. Of course, the neutrality of neutralised States is in every case conventional. Yet not-neutralised States can likewise by treaty be obliged to remain neutral in a certain war, just as in other cases they can by treaty of alliance be compelled not to remain neutral, but to take the part of one of the belligerents.

§ 302. A third distinction is between voluntary and conventional neutrality. Voluntary (or simple or natural) neutrality applies to a state that isn't obligated by a general or specific treaty to stay neutral in a particular war. In most cases, neutrality is voluntary, and states that are neutral voluntarily can choose at any time during the war to abandon their impartial stance and support either side. In contrast, the neutrality of a state that is bound by treaty to stay neutral in a war is considered conventional. Naturally, the neutrality of neutralized states is always conventional. However, non-neutralized states can also be required by treaty to remain neutral in a certain war, just as they can be compelled by alliance treaties not to remain neutral and to side with one of the belligerents.

Armed Neutrality.

Armed neutrality.

§ 303. One speaks of an armed neutrality when a neutral State takes military measures for the purpose of defending its neutrality against possible or probable attempts of either belligerent to make use of the neutral territory. Thus, the neutrality of Switzerland during the Franco-German War was an armed neutrality. In another sense of the term, one speaks of an armed neutrality when neutral States take military measures for the purpose of defending the real or pretended[Pg 370] rights of neutrals against threatening infringements on the part of either belligerent. The First and Second Armed Neutrality[565] of 1780 and 1800 were armed neutralities in the latter sense of the term.

§ 303. Armed neutrality refers to a situation where a neutral state takes military action to protect its neutrality from possible or likely attempts by either side in a conflict to use its territory. For example, Switzerland's neutrality during the Franco-German War was considered armed neutrality. In another context, armed neutrality occurs when neutral states take military measures to defend their actual or claimed rights against threats from either side in a conflict. The First and Second Armed Neutrality of 1780 and 1800 are examples of armed neutrality in this latter sense.

[565] Se above, §§ 289 and 290.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Benevolent Neutrality.

Kind Neutrality.

§ 304. Treaties stipulating neutrality often stipulate a "benevolent" neutrality of the parties regarding a certain war. The term is likewise frequently used during diplomatic negotiations. However, at present there is no distinction between benevolent neutrality and neutrality pure and simple. The idea dates from earlier times, when the obligations imposed by neutrality were not so stringent, and neutral States could favour one of the belligerents in many ways without thereby violating their neutral attitude. If a State remained neutral in the then lax sense of the term, but otherwise favoured a belligerent, its neutrality was called benevolent.

§ 304. Treaties that establish neutrality often include a "benevolent" neutrality of the parties concerning a specific war. This term is also commonly used during diplomatic talks. However, currently, there's no real difference between benevolent neutrality and simple neutrality. This concept comes from earlier times when the obligations associated with neutrality weren’t so strict, allowing neutral states to support one of the warring parties in various ways without violating their neutral stance. If a state maintained neutrality in the more relaxed sense at that time but still favored one of the belligerents, its neutrality was referred to as benevolent.

Perfect and Qualified Neutrality.

Perfect and Qualified Neutrality.

§ 305. A distinction of great practical importance was in former times that between perfect, or absolute, and qualified, or imperfect, neutrality. The neutrality of a State was qualified if it remained neutral on the whole, but actively or passively, directly or indirectly, gave some kind of assistance to one of the belligerents in consequence of an obligation entered into by a treaty previous to the war, and not for the special war exclusively. On the other hand, a neutrality was termed perfect if a neutral State neither actively nor passively, and neither directly nor indirectly, favoured either belligerent. There is no doubt that in the eighteenth century, when it was recognised that a State could be considered neutral, although it was by a previous treaty bound to render more or less limited assistance to one of the belligerents, this distinction between neutrality perfect and qualified was justified. But during the second half of the nineteenth century it[Pg 371] became controversial whether a so-called qualified neutrality was neutrality at all, and whether a State, which, in fulfilment of a treaty obligation, rendered some assistance to one of the belligerents, violated its neutrality. The majority of modern writers[566] maintained, correctly I think, that a State was either neutral or not, and that a State violated its neutrality in case it rendered any assistance whatever to one of the belligerents from any motive whatever. For this reason, a State which had entered into such obligations as those just mentioned would in time of war frequently be in a conflict of duties. For, in fulfilling its treaty obligations, it would frequently be obliged to violate its duty of neutrality, and vice versa. Several writers,[567] however, maintained that such fulfilment of treaty obligations would not contain a violation of neutrality. All doubt in the matter ought now to be removed, since article 2 of Convention V. of the Second Peace Conference categorically enacts that "belligerents are forbidden to move across the territory of a neutral Power troops or convoys either of munitions of war or of supplies." The principle at the back of this enactment no doubt is that a qualified neutrality has no longer any raison d'être, and that neutrality must in every case be perfect.[568]

§ 305. A distinction of great practical importance was once made between perfect, or absolute, neutrality and qualified, or imperfect, neutrality. A State’s neutrality was qualified if it remained neutral overall but actively or passively, directly or indirectly, provided some type of assistance to one of the belligerents due to a treaty obligation made before the war and not specifically for that conflict. In contrast, neutrality was considered perfect if a neutral State neither actively nor passively, directly nor indirectly, favored either of the belligerents. There’s no doubt that in the eighteenth century, it was acknowledged that a State could be neutral even if it was bound by a prior treaty to offer limited assistance to one of the belligerents; this distinction between perfect and qualified neutrality was justified. However, during the second half of the nineteenth century, it became controversial whether what was known as qualified neutrality was actually neutrality at all and whether a State that provided assistance to one of the belligerents to fulfill a treaty obligation violated its neutrality. Most modern writers[566] correctly argue that a State is either neutral or not, and that a State violates its neutrality if it offers any assistance to one of the belligerents for any reason. Consequently, a State that has entered into such obligations would often face conflicting duties during wartime. By fulfilling its treaty obligations, it might be compelled to break its duty of neutrality, and vice versa. Some writers,[567] however, argued that fulfilling treaty obligations wouldn’t constitute a violation of neutrality. All doubt on this matter should now be removed, since article 2 of Convention V. from the Second Peace Conference clearly states that "belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either war munitions or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power." The principle behind this rule is undoubtedly that qualified neutrality no longer has any raison d'être, and that neutrality must be perfect in every case.[568]

[566] See, for instance, Ullmann, § 190; Despagnet, No. 685; Rivier, II. p. 378; Calvo, IV. § 2594; Taylor, § 618; Fiore, III. No. 1541; Kleen, I. § 21; Hall, § 215 (see also Hall, § 219, concerning passage of troops). Phillimore, III. § 138, goes with the majority of publicists, but in § 139 he thinks that it would be too rigid to consider acts of "minor" partiality which are the result of conventions previous to the war as violations of neutrality.

[566] See, for example, Ullmann, § 190; Despagnet, No. 685; Rivier, II. p. 378; Calvo, IV. § 2594; Taylor, § 618; Fiore, III. No. 1541; Kleen, I. § 21; Hall, § 215 (also see Hall, § 219, regarding troop movements). Phillimore, III. § 138, aligns with most publicists, but in § 139 he believes it's overly strict to view acts of "minor" partiality stemming from agreements made before the war as breaches of neutrality.

[567] See, for instance, Heffter, § 144; Manning, p. 225; Wheaton, §§ 425-426; Bluntschli, § 746; Halleck, II. p. 142.

[567] For example, check out Heffter, § 144; Manning, p. 225; Wheaton, §§ 425-426; Bluntschli, § 746; Halleck, II. p. 142.

[568] See above, § 77, where it has been pointed out that a neutral who takes up an attitude of qualified neutrality may nowadays be considered as an accessory belligerent party to the war.

[568] See above, § 77, where it has been pointed out that a neutral who adopts a stance of qualified neutrality may now be seen as an accessory belligerent party in the war.

Some Historical Examples of Qualified Neutrality.

Some Historical Examples of Qualified Neutrality.

§ 306. For the purpose of illustration the following instances of qualified neutrality may be mentioned:—

§ 306. For illustration, the following examples of qualified neutrality can be noted:—

(1) By a treaty of amity and commerce concluded in 1778 between the United States of America and[Pg 372] France, the former granted for the time of war to French privateers and their prizes the right of admission to American ports, and entered into the obligation not to admit the privateers of the enemies of France. When subsequently, in 1793, war was waged between England and France, and England complained of the admission of French privateers to American ports, the United States met the complaint by advancing their treaty obligations.[569]

(1) In a treaty of friendship and trade signed in 1778 between the United States and [Pg 372] France, the U.S. allowed French privateers and their captured ships to enter American ports during wartime, and agreed not to let in privateers from France's enemies. Later, in 1793, when war broke out between England and France and England complained about French privateers being allowed into American ports, the United States responded by citing their treaty obligations.[569]

(2) Denmark had by several treaties, especially by one of 1781, undertaken the obligation to furnish Russia with a certain number of men-of-war and troops. When, in 1788, during war between Russia and Sweden, Denmark fulfilled her obligations towards Russia, she nevertheless declared herself neutral. And although Sweden protested against the possibility of such qualified neutrality, she acquiesced in the fact and did not consider herself to be at war with Denmark.[570]

(2) Denmark, through several treaties, particularly one from 1781, committed to providing Russia with a specified number of warships and soldiers. When, in 1788, during the conflict between Russia and Sweden, Denmark met its obligations to Russia, it still declared itself neutral. Even though Sweden objected to the idea of such a partial neutrality, it accepted the situation and did not view itself as being at war with Denmark.[570]

(3) In 1848, during war between Germany and Denmark, Great Britain, fulfilling a treaty obligation towards Denmark, prohibited the exportation of arms to Germany, whereas such exportation to Denmark remained undisturbed.[571]

(3) In 1848, during the war between Germany and Denmark, Great Britain, honoring a treaty obligation to Denmark, banned the export of arms to Germany, while allowing exports to Denmark to continue without interruption.[571]

(4) In 1900, during the South African War, Portugal, for the purpose of complying with a treaty obligation[572] towards Great Britain regarding the passage of British troops through Portuguese territory in South Africa, allowed such passage to an English force which had landed at Beira[573] and was destined for Rhodesia.

(4) In 1900, during the South African War, Portugal, to fulfill a treaty obligation[572] to Great Britain concerning the movement of British troops through Portuguese territory in South Africa, permitted an English force that had landed at Beira[573] to pass through on its way to Rhodesia.

[569] See Wheaton, § 425, and Phillimore, III. § 139.

[569] See Wheaton, § 425, and Phillimore, III. § 139.

[570] See Phillimore, III. § 140.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Phillimore, III. § 140.

[571] See Geffcken in Holtzendorff, VI. p. 610, and Rivier, II. p. 379.

[571] See Geffcken in Holtzendorff, VI. p. 610, and Rivier, II. p. 379.

[572] Article 11 of the treaty between Great Britain and Portugal concerning the delimitation of spheres of influence in Africa. (Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XVIII. p. 185.)

[572] Article 11 of the treaty between Great Britain and Portugal about defining areas of influence in Africa. (Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XVIII. p. 185.)

[573] See below, § 323; Baty, International Law in South Africa (1900), p. 75; and The Times' History of the War in South Africa, vol. IV. p. 366.[Pg 373]

[573] See below, § 323; Baty, International Law in South Africa (1900), p. 75; and The Times' History of the War in South Africa, vol. IV. p. 366.[Pg 373]

IV Beginning and End of Neutrality

Hall, § 207—Phillimore, I. §§ 392-392A, III. §§ 146-149—Taylor, §§ 610-611—Wheaton, §§ 437-439, and Dana's note 215—Heffter, § 145—Bonfils, Nos. 1445-1446—Despagnet, No. 689—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3234-3237—Rivier, II. pp. 379-381—Martens, II. § 138—Kleen, I. §§ 5, 36-42.

Hall, § 207—Phillimore, I. §§ 392-392A, III. §§ 146-149—Taylor, §§ 610-611—Wheaton, §§ 437-439, and Dana's note 215—Heffter, § 145—Bonfils, Nos. 1445-1446—Despagnet, No. 689—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3234-3237—Rivier, II. pp. 379-381—Martens, II. § 138—Kleen, I. §§ 5, 36-42.

Neutrality commences with Knowledge of the War.

Neutrality starts with understanding the War.

§ 307. Since neutrality is an attitude of impartiality deliberately taken up by a State not implicated in a war, neutrality cannot begin before the outbreak of war becomes known. It is only then that third States can make up their minds whether or not they intend to remain neutral. They are supposed to remain neutral, and the duties deriving from neutrality are incumbent upon them so long as they do not expressis verbis or by unmistakable acts declare that they will be parties to the war. It had long been the usual practice on the part of belligerents to notify the outbreak of war to third States for the purpose of enabling them to take up the necessary attitude of impartiality, but such notification was not formerly in strict law necessary. The mere fact of the knowledge of the outbreak of war which had been obtained in any way gave a third State an opportunity of making up its mind regarding the attitude which it intended to take up, and, if it remained neutral, its neutrality was to be dated from the time of its knowledge of the outbreak of war. But it is apparent that an immediate notification of the war on the part of belligerents is of great importance, as thereby all doubt and controversy regarding the knowledge of the outbreak of war are excluded. For the fact must always be remembered that a neutral State may in no way be made responsible for acts of its own or of its subjects which have been performed before it knew of the war, although the outbreak of war might be[Pg 374] expected. For this reason article 2 of Convention III. of the Second Peace Conference enacts that belligerents must without delay send a notification of the outbreak of war, which may even be made by telegraph, to neutral Powers, and that the condition of war shall not take effect in regard to neutral Powers until after receipt of a notification, unless it be established beyond doubt that they were in fact aware of the outbreak of war.[574]

§ 307. Since neutrality is a stance of impartiality intentionally adopted by a State not involved in a war, neutrality cannot officially begin until the war's outbreak is known. Only then can third States decide whether they intend to remain neutral. They are expected to stay neutral, and the obligations that come with neutrality apply to them as long as they do not explicitly state or take clear actions to indicate that they will join the war. It has traditionally been the practice for warring parties to inform third States of the war's outbreak to allow them to adopt a stance of impartiality, but such notifications were not legally required in the past. Simply knowing about the war's outbreak through any means allowed a third State to decide on its stance, and if it chose neutrality, that neutrality would date from the moment it became aware of the war's outbreak. However, it's clear that prompt notification of the war by the warring parties is crucial, as it eliminates any uncertainty or disputes regarding the knowledge of the war's start. It's important to remember that a neutral State cannot be held responsible for any actions taken by itself or its citizens before it was aware of the war, even if the war's outbreak was anticipated. For this reason, Article 2 of Convention III from the Second Peace Conference states that warring parties must promptly notify neutral Powers of the war's outbreak, which can even be done by telegraph, and that the state of war will not apply to neutral Powers until they receive this notification, unless it can be proven beyond doubt that they were already aware of the war's outbreak.[574]

[574] See above, §§ 94 and 95.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Commencement of Neutrality in Civil War.

Commencement of Neutrality in Civil War.

§ 308. As civil war becomes real war through recognition of the insurgents as a belligerent Power, neutrality during a civil war begins for every foreign State from the moment recognition is granted. That recognition might be granted or refused by foreign States independently of the attitude of the legitimate Government has been stated above in § 298, where also an explanation is given of the consequences of recognition granted either by foreign States alone or by the legitimate Government alone.

§ 308. When a civil war is recognized as an actual war through the acknowledgment of the insurgents as a belligerent Power, neutrality during a civil war starts for any foreign State from the moment recognition is given. This recognition can be granted or denied by foreign States regardless of the stance of the legitimate Government, as noted above in § 298, which also explains the consequences of recognition granted either by foreign States alone or by the legitimate Government alone.

Establishment of Neutrality by Declarations.

Establishing Neutrality through Declarations.

§ 309. Neutrality being an attitude of States creating rights and duties, active measures on the part of a neutral state are required for the purpose of preventing its officials and subjects from committing acts incompatible with its duty of impartiality. Now, the manifesto by which a neutral State orders its organs and subjects to comply with the attitude of impartiality adopted by itself is called a declaration of neutrality in the special sense of the term. Such declaration of neutrality must not, however, be confounded, on the one hand, with manifestoes of the belligerents proclaiming to neutrals the rights and duties devolving upon them through neutrality, or, on the other hand, with the assertions made by neutrals to belligerents or urbi et orbi that they will remain neutral, although these manifestoes and assertions are often also called declarations of neutrality.[575]

§ 309. Neutrality is an attitude of states that creates rights and responsibilities, so a neutral state needs to take active steps to prevent its officials and citizens from doing anything that contradicts its duty to remain impartial. The official statement in which a neutral state instructs its organizations and citizens to adhere to its chosen stance of impartiality is known as a declaration of neutrality. However, this declaration should not be confused, on one hand, with statements made by belligerents informing neutrals about the rights and responsibilities that come with being neutral, or, on the other hand, with claims made by neutrals to belligerents or urbi et orbi that they will stay neutral, even though these statements and claims are often also referred to as declarations of neutrality.[575]

[575] See above, § 293.[Pg 375]

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.[Pg 375]

Municipal Neutrality Laws.

City Neutrality Laws.

§ 310. International Law leaves the provision of necessary measures for the establishment of neutrality to the discretion of each State. Since in constitutional States the powers of Governments are frequently so limited by Municipal Law that they may not take adequate measures without the consent of their Parliaments, and since it is, so far as International Law is concerned, no excuse for a Government if it is by its Municipal Law prevented from taking adequate measures, several States have once for all enacted so-called Neutrality Laws, which prescribe the attitude to be taken up by their officials and subjects in case the States concerned remain neutral in a war. These Neutrality Laws are latent in time of peace, but their provisions become operative ipso facto by the respective States making a declaration of neutrality to their officials and subjects.

§ 310. International Law allows each State to decide how to implement necessary measures for maintaining neutrality. In constitutional States, the powers of Governments are often restricted by Domestic Law, meaning they may not be able to take effective action without Parliament's approval. Moreover, from the perspective of International Law, a Government cannot use Domestic Law as an excuse for inaction. Therefore, several States have established Neutrality Laws that outline the expected behavior of their officials and citizens if they decide to remain neutral during a war. These Neutrality Laws stay dormant during peacetime, but their rules automatically come into effect when the respective States declare neutrality to their officials and citizens.

British Foreign Enlistment Act.

British Foreign Enlistment Act.

§ 311. After the United States of America had on April 20, 1818, enacted[576] a Neutrality Law, Great Britain followed the example in 1819 with her Foreign Enlistment Act,[577] which was in force till 1870. As this Act did not give adequate powers to the Government, Parliament passed on August 9, 1870, a new Foreign Enlistment Act,[578] which is still in force. This Act, in the event of British neutrality, prohibits—(1) The enlistment by a British subject in the military or naval service of either belligerent, and similar acts (sections 4-7); (2) the building, equipping,[579] and[Pg 376] despatching[580] of vessels for employment in the military or naval service of either belligerent (sections 8-9); (3) the increase, on the part of any individual living on British territory, of the armament of a man-of-war of either belligerent being at the time in a British port (section 10); (4) the preparing or fitting out of a naval or military expedition against a friendly State (section 11).

§ 311. After the United States enacted a Neutrality Law on April 20, 1818, Great Britain followed suit in 1819 with its Foreign Enlistment Act, which remained in effect until 1870. Since this Act did not provide sufficient authority to the Government, Parliament passed a new Foreign Enlistment Act on August 9, 1870, which is still in effect today. This Act, in case of British neutrality, prohibits—(1) the enlistment of a British subject in the military or naval service of either side, and similar actions (sections 4-7); (2) the construction, equipping, and sending out of vessels for use in the military or naval service of either side (sections 8-9); (3) the increasing, by anyone residing in British territory, of the armament of a warship from either side that is currently in a British port (section 10); (4) the preparation or outfitting of a naval or military expedition against a friendly State (section 11).

[576] Printed in Phillimore, I. pp. 667-672.

[576] Published in Phillimore, I. pp. 667-672.

[577] 59 Geo. III. c. 69.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 59 Geo. III. c. 69.

[578] 33 and 34 Vict. c. 90. See Sibley in the Law Magazine and Review, XXIX. (1904), pp. 453-464, and XXX. (1905), pp. 37-53.

[578] 33 and 34 Vict. c. 90. See Sibley in the Law Magazine and Review, XXIX. (1904), pp. 453-464, and XXX. (1905), pp. 37-53.

[579] According to section 30, the Interpretation Clause of the Act, "equipping" includes "the furnishing of a ship with any tackle, apparel, furniture, provisions, arms, munitions, or stores, or any other thing which is used in or about a ship for the purpose of fitting or adapting her for the sea or for naval service." It is, therefore, not lawful for British ships, in case Great Britain is neutral, to supply a belligerent fleet direct with coal, a point which became of interest during the Russo-Japanese War. German steamers laden with coal followed the Russian fleet on her journey to the Far East, and British shipowners were prevented from doing the same by the Foreign Enlistment Act. And it was in application of this Act that the British Government ordered, in 1904, the detention of the German steamer Captain W. Menzel, which took in Welsh coal at Cardiff for the purpose of carrying it to the Russian fleet en route to the Far East. See below, § 350.

[579] According to section 30 of the Interpretation Clause of the Act, "equipping" includes "furnishing a ship with any tackle, apparel, furniture, provisions, arms, munitions, or stores, or any other items used in or around a ship to prepare or adapt her for the sea or naval service." Therefore, it's not legal for British ships, if Great Britain is neutral, to supply a hostile fleet directly with coal, which became relevant during the Russo-Japanese War. German steamers loaded with coal followed the Russian fleet on its way to the Far East, while British shipowners were prohibited from doing the same by the Foreign Enlistment Act. It was under this Act that the British Government ordered the detention of the German steamer Captain W. Menzel in 1904, as it took on Welsh coal at Cardiff to deliver it to the Russian fleet en route to the Far East. See below, § 350.

[580] An interesting case which ought here to be mentioned occurred in October 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War. Messrs. Yarrow & Co., the shipbuilders, possessed a partly completed vessel, the Caroline, which could be finally fitted up either as a yacht or as a torpedo-boat. In September 1904, a Mr. Sinnet and the Hon. James Burke Roche called at the shipbuilding yard of Messrs. Yarrow, bought the Caroline, and ordered her to be fitted up as a high-speed yacht. The required additions were finished on October 3. On October 6 the vessel left Messrs. Yarrow's yard and was navigated by a Captain Ryder, via Hamburg, to the Russian port of Libau, there to be altered into a torpedo-boat. That section 8 of the Foreign Enlistment Act applies to this case there is no doubt. But there is no doubt either that it is this Act, and not the rules of International Law, which required the prosecution of Messrs. Sinnet and Roche on the part of the British Government. For, if viewed from the basis of International Law, the case is merely one of contraband. See below, §§ 321, 334, and 397.

[580] An interesting case that should be mentioned happened in October 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War. Messrs. Yarrow & Co., the shipbuilders, had a partially completed vessel, the Caroline, that could be finished either as a yacht or as a torpedo boat. In September 1904, Mr. Sinnet and the Hon. James Burke Roche visited Yarrow's shipyard, bought the Caroline, and requested it to be equipped as a high-speed yacht. The necessary modifications were completed on October 3. On October 6, the vessel left Yarrow's yard and was steered by Captain Ryder, via Hamburg, to the Russian port of Libau, where it was to be converted into a torpedo boat. There is no doubt that section 8 of the Foreign Enlistment Act applies to this case. However, it is also clear that it is this Act, and not the rules of International Law, that prompted the British Government to prosecute Messrs. Sinnet and Roche. From the perspective of International Law, this case is simply one of contraband. See below, §§ 321, 334, and 397.

It must be specially observed that the British Foreign Enlistment Act goes beyond the requirements of International Law in so far as it tries to prohibit and penalises a number of acts which, according to the present rules of International Law, a neutral State is not required to prohibit and penalise. Thus, for instance, a neutral State need not prohibit its private subjects from enlisting in the service of a belligerent; from supplying coal, provisions, arms, and ammunition direct to a belligerent fleet, provided such fleet is not within or just outside the territorial waters of the neutral concerned; from selling ships to a belligerent although it is known that they will be converted into cruisers or used as transport ships. For article 7 of Convention VII. as well as of Convention XIII. of the Second Peace[Pg 377] Conference categorically enacts that "a neutral Power is not bound to prevent the export or transit, on behalf of either belligerent, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which could be of use to an army or fleet."

It should be noted that the British Foreign Enlistment Act goes further than what International Law requires by attempting to prohibit and punish several actions that a neutral State is not obligated to restrict or penalize under current International Law. For example, a neutral State is not required to stop its private citizens from joining the military of a warring party; from supplying coal, food, weapons, and ammunition directly to a warring fleet, as long as that fleet is not in or just outside the neutral State's territorial waters; or from selling ships to a warring party, even if it is known they will be turned into warships or used for transport. Article 7 of Convention VII and Convention XIII of the Second Peace Conference clearly states that "a neutral Power is not obliged to prevent the export or transit, on behalf of either party involved in the conflict, of arms, war munitions, or anything else that could be useful to an army or navy."

End of Neutrality.

End of Neutrality.

§ 312. Neutrality ends with the war, or through the commencement of war by a hitherto neutral State against one of the belligerents, or through one of the belligerents commencing war against a hitherto neutral State. Since, apart from a treaty obligation, no State has by International Law the duty to remain neutral in a war between other States,[581] or, if it is a belligerent, to allow a hitherto neutral State to remain neutral,[582] it does not constitute a violation of neutrality on the part of a hitherto neutral to declare war against one of the belligerents, and on the part of a belligerent to declare war against a neutral. Duties of neutrality exist so long only as a State remains neutral. They come to an end ipso facto by a hitherto neutral State throwing up its neutrality, or by a belligerent beginning war against a hitherto neutral State. But the ending of neutrality must not be confounded with violation of neutrality. Such violation does not ipso facto bring neutrality to an end, as will be shown below in § 358.

§ 312. Neutrality ends when a war starts, or if a previously neutral State declares war on one of the belligerents, or if one of the belligerents declares war on a previously neutral State. Since, except for treaty obligations, no State is legally required to remain neutral in a conflict between other States,[581] or, if it is a belligerent, to permit a previously neutral State to stay neutral,[582] it does not breach neutrality if a previously neutral State declares war against one of the belligerents, nor does it violate neutrality for a belligerent to declare war on a neutral State. The obligations of neutrality exist only as long as a State remains neutral. They automatically end ipso facto when a previously neutral State abandons its neutrality, or when a belligerent initiates war against a previously neutral State. However, the end of neutrality should not be confused with a violation of neutrality. Such a violation does not ipso facto terminate neutrality, as will be explained further in § 358.

[581] See above, § 293.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[582] See above, § 299.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

CHAPTER 2 Relations Between Combatants and Outsiders

I RIGHTS AND DUTIES ARISING FROM NEUTRALITY

Vattel, III. § 104—Hall, § 214—Phillimore, III. §§ 136-138—Twiss, II. § 216—Heffter, § 146—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 656-657—Gareis, § 88—Liszt, § 42—Ullmann, § 191—Bonfils, Nos. 1441-1444—Despagnet, Nos. 684 and 690—Rivier, II. pp. 381-385—Nys, III. pp. 582-639—Calvo, IV. §§ 2491-2493—Fiore, III. Nos. 1501, 1536-1540, and Code, Nos. 1776-1778, 1784—Martens, II. § 131—Kleen, I. §§ 45-46—Mérignhac, pp. 339-342—Pillet, pp. 273-275.

Vattel, III. § 104—Hall, § 214—Phillimore, III. §§ 136-138—Twiss, II. § 216—Heffter, § 146—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 656-657—Gareis, § 88—Liszt, § 42—Ullmann, § 191—Bonfils, Nos. 1441-1444—Despagnet, Nos. 684 and 690—Rivier, II. pp. 381-385—Nys, III. pp. 582-639—Calvo, IV. §§ 2491-2493—Fiore, III. Nos. 1501, 1536-1540, and Code, Nos. 1776-1778, 1784—Martens, II. § 131—Kleen, I. §§ 45-46—Mérignhac, pp. 339-342—Pillet, pp. 273-275.

Conduct in General of Neutrals and Belligerents.

Conduct in General of Neutrals and Belligerents.

§ 313. Neutrality can be carried out only if neutrals as well as belligerents follow a certain line of conduct in their relations with one another. It is for this reason that from neutrality derive rights and duties, as well for belligerents as for neutrals, and that, consequently, neutrality can be violated as well by belligerents as by neutrals. These rights and duties are correspondent: the duties of neutrals correspond to the rights of either belligerent, and the duties of either belligerent correspond to the rights of the neutrals.

§ 313. Neutrality can only be maintained if both neutral parties and those engaged in conflict adhere to certain behaviors in their interactions. This is why neutrality involves both rights and responsibilities for both belligerents and neutrals, and as a result, it can be breached by either side. These rights and responsibilities are interconnected: the duties of neutrals align with the rights of each belligerent, and the responsibilities of each belligerent align with the rights of neutral parties.

What Rights and Duties of Neutrals and of Belligerents there are.

What rights and responsibilities do neutrals and belligerents have?

§ 314. There are two rights and two duties deriving from neutrality for neutrals, and likewise two for belligerents.

§ 314. There are two rights and two duties that come from neutrality for neutrals, and similarly two for those engaged in conflict.

Duties of neutrals are, firstly, to act toward belligerents in accordance with their attitude of impartiality; and, secondly, to acquiesce in the exercise of either belligerent's right to punish neutral merchantmen for breach of blockade, carriage of contraband, and rendering unneutral service to the enemy,[Pg 379] and, accordingly, to visit, search, and eventually capture them.

The responsibilities of neutral parties are, first, to act towards warring parties with impartiality; and, second, to accept the enforcement of either side's right to penalize neutral merchant ships for violating blockades, carrying forbidden goods, and providing assistance to the enemy. This includes visiting, searching, and possibly seizing those ships.[Pg 379]

The duties of either belligerent are, firstly, to act towards neutrals in accordance with their attitude of impartiality; and, secondly, not to suppress their intercourse, and in especial their commerce, with the enemy.[583]

The responsibilities of either side in a conflict are, first, to treat neutral parties based on their stance of impartiality; and, second, not to hinder their interactions, especially their trade, with the opposing side.[583]

[583] All writers on International Law resolve the duty of impartiality incumbent upon neutrals into many several duties, and they do the same as regards the duty of belligerents—namely, to act toward neutrals in accordance with the latter's impartiality. In this way quite a large catalogue of duties and corresponding rights are produced, and the whole matter is unnecessarily complicated.

[583] All writers on International Law break down the obligation of neutrality into various duties, and they do the same for the obligations of belligerents—meaning that belligerents must interact with neutrals based on the neutrals' impartiality. This results in a lengthy list of responsibilities and corresponding rights, making the whole issue unnecessarily complicated.

Either belligerent has a right to demand impartiality from neutrals, whereas, on the other hand, neutrals have a right to demand such behaviour from either belligerent as is in accordance with their attitude of impartiality. Neutrals have a right to demand that their intercourse, and in especial their commerce, with the enemy shall not be suppressed; whereas, on the other hand, either belligerent has the right to punish subjects of neutrals for breach of blockade, carriage of contraband, and unneutral service, and, accordingly, to visit, search, and capture neutral merchantmen.

Either side in a conflict has the right to expect neutrality from those not involved, while neutrals have the right to insist that both sides act in a way that aligns with their neutral stance. Neutrals can demand that their interactions, especially trade, with the enemy are not restricted; however, each side has the right to penalize neutral citizens for violating blockades, transporting prohibited goods, or engaging in actions that support the enemy, and therefore can inspect, seize, or capture neutral merchant ships.

Rights and Duties of Neutrals contested.

Rights and Duties of Neutrals debated.

§ 315. Some writers[584] maintain that no rights derive from neutrality for neutrals, and, consequently, no duties for belligerents, because everything which must be left undone by a belligerent regarding his relations with a neutral must likewise be left undone in time of peace. But this opinion has no foundation. Indeed, it is true that the majority of the acts which belligerents must leave undone in consequence of their duty to respect neutrality must likewise be left undone in time of peace in consequence of the territorial supremacy of every State. However, there are several acts which do not belong to this class—for instance, the non-appropriation of enemy goods on neutral vessels.[Pg 380] And those acts which do belong to this class fall nevertheless at the same time under another category. Thus, a violation of neutral territory on the part of a belligerent for military and naval purposes of the war is indeed an act prohibited in time of peace, because every State has to respect the territorial supremacy of other States; but it is at the same time a violation of neutrality, and therefore totally different from other violations of foreign territorial supremacy. This becomes quite apparent when the true inwardness of such acts is regarded. For every State has a right to demand reparation for an ordinary violation of its territorial supremacy, but it need not take any notice of it, and it has no duty to demand reparation. Yet in case a violation of its territorial supremacy constitutes at the same time a violation of its neutrality, the neutral State has not only a right to demand reparation, but has a duty[585] to do so. For, if it did not, this would contain a violation of its duty of impartiality, because it would be favouring one belligerent to the detriment of the other.[586]

§ 315. Some writers[584] argue that neutrals have no rights from being neutral, and therefore, belligerents have no obligations toward them. They claim that anything a belligerent must refrain from doing regarding their relationship with a neutral must also be avoided during peacetime. However, this view is unfounded. It is true that most actions belligerents must avoid to respect neutrality are also actions they must avoid during peacetime due to the territorial authority of every state. Still, there are several actions that do not fall into this category—for example, not taking enemy goods from neutral ships.[Pg 380] Moreover, those actions that do fall into this category also belong to another one. For instance, a belligerent violating neutral territory for military and naval purposes during war is indeed prohibited in times of peace, as every state must respect the territorial authority of others; however, this is also a breach of neutrality and differs significantly from other violations of foreign territorial authority. This becomes clear when we examine the true nature of such actions. Every state has the right to seek reparation for a typical violation of its territorial authority, but it doesn't have to respond to it, nor is it obligated to seek reparation. However, if a breach of its territorial authority also constitutes a breach of its neutrality, the neutral state is not only entitled to demand reparation, but it is also obliged[585] to do so. If it fails to act, it would be breaching its duty of impartiality by favoring one belligerent over the other.[586]

[584] Heffter, § 149; Gareis, § 88; Heilborn, System, p. 341.

[584] Heffter, § 149; Gareis, § 88; Heilborn, System, p. 341.

[585] See, for instance, article 3 of Convention XIII. of the Second Peace Conference, which enacts:—"When a ship has been captured in the territorial waters of a neutral Power, such Power must, if the prize is still within its jurisdiction, employ the means at its disposal to release the prize with its officers and crew, and to intern the prize crew. If the prize is not within the jurisdiction of the neutral Power, the captor Government, on the demand of that Power, must liberate the prize with its officers and crew."

[585] For example, see Article 3 of Convention XIII of the Second Peace Conference, which states: "When a ship is captured in the territorial waters of a neutral country, that country must, if the prize is still under its authority, use the means available to release the prize along with its officers and crew, and to detain the prize crew. If the prize is not under the authority of the neutral country, the capturing government must release the prize along with its officers and crew upon the request of that country."

[586] See below, § 360.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

On the other hand, it has been asserted[587] that, apart from conventional neutrality, from which treaty obligations arise, it is incorrect to speak of duties deriving from neutrality, since at any moment during the war neutrals could throw up neutrality and become parties to the war. I cannot agree with this opinion either. That a hitherto neutral can at any moment throw up neutrality and take part in the war, is just as true as that a belligerent can at any moment during[Pg 381] the war declare war against a hitherto neutral State. Yet this only proves that there is no duty to remain neutral, and no duty for a belligerent to abstain from declaring war against a hitherto neutral State. This is a truism which ought not to be doubted, and is totally different from the question as to what duties derive from neutrality so long as a certain State remains neutral at all. The assertion that such duties derive from neutrality is in no way inconsistent with the fact that neutrality itself can at any moment during the war come to an end through the beginning of war by either a neutral or a belligerent. This assertion only states the fact that, so long as neutrals intend neutrality and so long as belligerents intend to recognise such neutrality of third States, duties derive from neutrality for both belligerents and neutrals.

On the other hand, it has been stated[587] that, apart from standard neutrality that creates treaty obligations, it's not accurate to say there are duties coming from neutrality, since at any point during the war, neutrals could abandon their neutrality and join the conflict. I can't agree with that perspective either. The fact that a previously neutral party can at any moment abandon neutrality and participate in the war is just as valid as the fact that a belligerent can at any moment during[Pg 381] the war declare war on a previously neutral state. However, this only demonstrates that there is no obligation to remain neutral, nor any obligation for a belligerent to refrain from declaring war on a previously neutral state. This is a self-evident point that should not be questioned, and it's completely different from the issue of what duties arise from neutrality as long as a certain state remains neutral. The claim that such duties arise from neutrality does not conflict with the reality that neutrality can be ended at any moment during the war by either a neutral or a belligerent. This claim simply acknowledges that as long as neutrals intend to stay neutral and belligerents intend to respect the neutrality of third states, duties emerge from neutrality for both belligerents and neutrals.

[587] See Gareis, § 88.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Gareis, § 88.

Contents of Duty of Impartiality.

Contents of Duty of Fairness.

§ 316. It has already been stated above, in § 294, that impartiality excludes such assistance and succour to one of the belligerents as is detrimental to the other, and, further, such injuries to one of the belligerents as benefit the other, and that it includes active measures on the part of neutrals for the purpose of preventing belligerents from making use of neutral territories and neutral resources for their military and naval purposes. But all this does not exhaust the contents of the duty of impartiality.

§ 316. It has already been mentioned above, in § 294, that impartiality excludes providing help and support to one of the warring parties if it harms the other, and also any actions that cause harm to one party while benefiting the other. Additionally, it includes proactive steps taken by neutral parties to stop warring parties from using neutral lands and resources for their military and naval activities. However, all of this does not fully cover the responsibilities of impartiality.

It must, on the one hand, be added that according to the present strict conception of neutrality the duty of impartiality of a neutral excludes all facilities whatever for military and naval operations of the belligerents, even if granted to both belligerents alike. In former times assistance was not considered a violation of neutrality, provided it was given to both belligerents in the same way, and States were considered neutral although they allowed an equal number of their troops to fight on the side of each belligerent. To-day this[Pg 382] could no longer happen. From Conventions V. and XIII. of the Second Peace Conference, which deal with neutrality in land and sea warfare respectively, it becomes quite apparent that any facility whatever directly concerning military or naval operations, even if it consists only in granting passage over neutral territory to belligerent forces, is illegal, although granted to both belligerents alike. The duty of impartiality to-day comprises abstention from any active or passive co-operation with belligerents.

It must be added that, according to today's strict understanding of neutrality, the duty of a neutral party excludes any support for military and naval operations of the warring parties, even if it's offered to both sides equally. In the past, providing assistance wasn't seen as a breach of neutrality as long as it was given to both belligerents in the same manner, and countries were considered neutral even if they allowed the same number of their troops to fight for each side. Today, this[Pg 382] would no longer be acceptable. From Conventions V. and XIII. of the Second Peace Conference, which address neutrality in land and sea warfare respectively, it’s clear that any support concerning military or naval operations, even if it’s just allowing passage through neutral territory to warring forces, is illegal, even if offered to both sides equally. The duty of impartiality today means refraining from any active or passive cooperation with the warring parties.

On the other hand, it must be added that the duty of impartiality includes the equal treatment of both belligerents regarding such facilities as do not directly concern military or naval operations, and which may, therefore, be granted or not to belligerents, according to the discretion of a neutral. If a neutral grants such facilities to one belligerent, he must grant them to the other in the same degree. If he refuses them to the one, he must likewise refuse them to the other.[588] Thus, since it does not, according to the International Law of the present day, constitute a violation of neutrality if a neutral allows his subjects to supply either belligerent with arms and ammunition in the ordinary way of trade, it would constitute a violation of neutrality to prohibit the export of arms destined for one of the belligerents only. Thus, further, if a neutral allows men-of-war of one of the belligerents to bring their prizes into neutral ports, he must grant the same facility to the other belligerent.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the duty of impartiality includes treating both sides equally when it comes to facilities that don't directly involve military or naval operations. These can be provided or withheld to belligerents at the neutral's discretion. If a neutral grants such facilities to one side, they must extend the same to the other. If they deny them to one, they must deny them to the other as well.[588] Therefore, according to today's International Law, it isn't a breach of neutrality for a neutral to let their citizens sell arms and ammunition to either side as part of regular trade, but it would be a violation of neutrality to ban the export of arms intended for only one of the belligerents. Furthermore, if a neutral allows warships from one side to bring their captured goods into neutral ports, they must provide the same allowance to the other side.

[588] See articles 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, of Convention V., and articles 7, 9, 11, 17, 19, 21, 23 of Convention XIII. of the Second Peace Conference.

[588] See articles 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14 of Convention V, and articles 7, 9, 11, 17, 19, 21, 23 of Convention XIII of the Second Peace Conference.

Duty of Impartiality continuously growing more intense.

Duty of Impartiality is becoming increasingly important.

§ 317. Although neutrality has already for centuries been recognised as an attitude of impartiality, it has taken two hundred years for the duty of impartiality to attain its present range and intensity. Now this continuous development has by no means ceased. It[Pg 383] is slowly and gradually going on, and there is no doubt that during the twentieth century the duty of impartiality will become much more intense than it is at present. The fact that the intensity of this duty is the result of gradual development bears upon many practical questions regarding the conduct of neutrals. It is therefore necessary to discuss separately the relations between neutrals and belligerents in order to ascertain what line of conduct must be followed by neutrals.

§ 317. Although neutrality has been recognized for centuries as an impartial stance, it has taken two hundred years for the duty of impartiality to reach its current extent and importance. This ongoing development is far from over. It[Pg 383] is continuing slowly and steadily, and there's little doubt that during the twentieth century, the duty of impartiality will become much more intense than it is now. The fact that the intensity of this duty comes from gradual development affects many practical issues concerning the behavior of neutrals. Therefore, it's essential to separately discuss the relationships between neutrals and belligerents to determine the appropriate course of action for neutrals.

Neutrality Conventions of the Second Peace Conference.

Neutrality Conventions of the Second Peace Conference.

§ 317a. The Second Peace Conference has produced two Conventions concerning neutrality:—

§ 317a. The Second Peace Conference has produced two agreements regarding neutrality:—

(1) The Convention (V.) respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in war on land,[589] which comprises twenty-five articles and has been signed by all the Powers represented at the Conference, except China and Nicaragua; both, however, acceded later. Many Powers have already ratified. Great Britain entered a reservation[590] against articles 16-18, and Argentina against article 18.

(1) The Convention (V.) regarding the rights and responsibilities of neutral Powers and individuals during land warfare,[589] which includes twenty-five articles and has been signed by all the Powers present at the Conference, except for China and Nicaragua; both of which joined later. Many Powers have already ratified it. Great Britain made a reservation[590] regarding articles 16-18, while Argentina objected to article 18.

[589] See Lémonon, pp. 407-425; Higgins, pp. 290-294; Boidin, pp. 121-134; Nippold, § 25; Scott, Conferences, pp. 541-555; Bustamente in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 95-120.

[589] See Lémonon, pp. 407-425; Higgins, pp. 290-294; Boidin, pp. 121-134; Nippold, § 25; Scott, Conferences, pp. 541-555; Bustamente in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 95-120.

[590] See above, § 88.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

(2) The Convention (XIII.) respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers in maritime war,[591] which comprises thirty-three articles and has been signed by all the Powers represented at the Conference, except the United States of America, China, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Spain; but America, China, and Nicaragua acceded later. Many Powers have already ratified, but there are a number of reservations; they will be dealt with in due course when the points concerned are being discussed.

(2) The Convention (XIII) regarding the rights and responsibilities of neutral countries in maritime warfare,[591] includes thirty-three articles and has been signed by all the countries represented at the Conference, except for the United States, China, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Spain; however, the U.S., China, and Nicaragua joined later. Many countries have already ratified it, but there are several reservations; these will be addressed later when the relevant points are discussed.

[591] See Lémonon, pp. 555-606; Higgins, pp. 459-483; Bernsten, § 13; Boidin, pp. 236-247; Dupuis, Guerre, Nos. 277-330; Nippold, § 34; Scott, Conferences, pp. 620-648; Hyde in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 507-527.

[591] See Lémonon, pp. 555-606; Higgins, pp. 459-483; Bernsten, § 13; Boidin, pp. 236-247; Dupuis, Guerre, Nos. 277-330; Nippold, § 34; Scott, Conferences, pp. 620-648; Hyde in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 507-527.

Both Conventions deal comprehensively with the rights and duties of neutrals, but it is not convenient[Pg 384] in a treatise on International Law either to treat separately of the duties of neutrals in war on land and on sea, or to dispense with any distinction in the treatment of the several points concerned. The arrangement of topics in the sections of this chapter will, therefore, be independent of the arrangement of topics in the two Conventions, and will be as follows:—Neutrals and Military Operations (§§ 320-328); Neutrals and Military Preparations (§§ 329-335); Neutral Asylum to Soldiers and War Materials (§§ 336-341); Neutral Asylum to Naval Forces (§§ 342-348); Supplies and Loans to Belligerents (§§ 349-352); Services to Belligerents (§§ 353-356).

Both Conventions cover the rights and responsibilities of neutrals thoroughly, but it's not practical[Pg 384] in a discussion on International Law to address the duties of neutrals in land and sea warfare separately, or to ignore any distinctions in the various related issues. The arrangement of topics in this chapter will thus be independent of how the topics are organized in the two Conventions, and will be as follows:—Neutrals and Military Operations (§§ 320-328); Neutrals and Military Preparations (§§ 329-335); Neutral Asylum to Soldiers and War Materials (§§ 336-341); Neutral Asylum to Naval Forces (§§ 342-348); Supplies and Loans to Belligerents (§§ 349-352); Services to Belligerents (§§ 353-356).

Contents of Duty of Belligerents to treat Neutrals in accordance with their Impartiality.

Contents of Duty of Belligerents to Treat Neutrals According to Their Impartiality.

§ 318. Whereas the relations between neutrals and belligerents require detailed discussion with regard to the duty of impartiality incumbent upon neutrals, the contents of the duty of belligerents to treat neutrals in accordance with their impartiality are so manifest that elaborate treatment is unnecessary. Such duty excludes, firstly, any violation of neutral territory for military or naval purposes of the war;[592] and, secondly, the appropriation of neutral goods, contraband excepted, on enemy vessels.[593] On the other hand, such duty includes, firstly, due treatment of neutral diplomatic envoys accredited to the enemy and found on occupied enemy territory; and, secondly, due treatment of neutral subjects and neutral property on enemy territory. A belligerent who conquers enemy territory must at least grant to neutral envoys accredited to the enemy the right to quit the occupied territory unmolested.[594] And such belligerent must likewise[Pg 385] abstain from treating neutral subjects and property established on enemy territory more harshly than the laws of war allow; for, although neutral subjects and property have, by being established on enemy territory, acquired enemy character, they have nevertheless not lost the protection of their neutral home State.[595] And such belligerent must, lastly, pay full damages in case he makes use of his right of angary[596] against neutral property in course of transit through enemy territory.

§ 318. While the relationships between neutral parties and those engaged in conflict need detailed discussion concerning the obligation of neutrality that rests on neutral parties, the obligation of those in conflict to respect neutrals’ impartiality is so obvious that extensive explanation isn’t needed. This duty excludes, first, any breach of neutral territory for military or naval purposes during the war;[592] and, second, the seizure of neutral goods, except for contraband, on enemy ships.[593] On the flip side, this duty includes, first, proper treatment of neutral diplomats accredited to the enemy who are found in occupied enemy territory; and, second, proper treatment of neutral individuals and neutral property in enemy territory. A party engaged in conflict that captures enemy territory must at least allow neutral diplomats accredited to the enemy the right to leave the occupied area without interference.[594] Additionally, this party must also[Pg 385] refrain from treating neutral individuals and property located in enemy territory more harshly than what wartime laws permit; for, although neutral individuals and property, by being in enemy territory, have taken on enemy status, they still retain the protection of their neutral home State.[595] Lastly, this party must fully compensate for any damage if it exercises its right of angary[596] against neutral property in transit through enemy territory.

[592] See articles 1-4 of Convention V., and articles 1-5 of Convention XIII. of the Second Peace Conference.

[592] See articles 1-4 of Convention V., and articles 1-5 of Convention XIII. of the Second Peace Conference.

[593] This is stipulated by the Declaration of Paris of 1856.

[593] This is outlined in the Declaration of Paris of 1856.

[595] See above, § 88.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Refer above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[596] See below, §§ 364-367.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-367.

Contents of Duty not to suppress Intercourse between Neutrals and the Enemy.

Contents of Duty not to Prevent Communication between Neutrals and the Enemy.

§ 319. The duty of either belligerent not to suppress intercourse of neutrals with the enemy requires no detailed discussion either. It is a duty which is in accordance with the development of the institution of neutrality. It is of special importance with regard to commerce of subjects of neutrals with belligerents, since formerly attempts were frequently made to intercept all neutral trade with the enemy. A consequence of the now recognised freedom of neutral commerce with either belligerent is, firstly, the rule, enacted by the Declaration of Paris of 1856, that enemy goods, with the exception of contraband, on neutral vessels on the Open Sea or in enemy territorial waters may not be appropriated by a belligerent,[597] and, secondly, the rule, enacted by article 1 of Convention XI. of the Second Peace Conference, that the postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, except correspondence destined for or proceeding from a blockaded port, which may be found on a neutral or enemy vessel, is inviolable.[598] But the recognised freedom of neutral commerce necessitates, on the other hand, certain measures on the part of belligerents. It would be unreasonable to impose on a belligerent a duty not to prevent the[Pg 386] subjects of neutrals from breaking a blockade, from carrying contraband, and, lastly, from rendering unneutral service to the enemy. International Law gives, therefore, a right to either belligerent to forbid all such acts to neutral merchantmen, and, accordingly, to visit, search, capture, and punish them.[599]

§ 319. The responsibility of either side in a conflict not to block interactions between neutrals and the enemy doesn't require extensive explanation. This duty aligns with the evolution of the concept of neutrality. It's particularly significant regarding the trade of neutral subjects with warring parties, as there were previously many attempts to disrupt all neutral trade with the enemy. One result of the now acknowledged freedom of neutral trade with either side is, first, the rule established by the Declaration of Paris in 1856, which states that enemy goods, except for contraband, on neutral ships in international waters or enemy territorial waters cannot be seized by a belligerent,[597] and, second, the rule set forth in Article 1 of Convention XI of the Second Peace Conference, which declares that the postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, except for mail sent to or coming from a blockaded port, is inviolable when found on a neutral or enemy vessel.[598] However, the recognized freedom of neutral trade also requires certain measures from the belligerents. It would be unreasonable to expect a belligerent not to stop neutral subjects from breaking a blockade, carrying contraband, or providing unauthorized assistance to the enemy. Therefore, International Law grants each belligerent the right to prohibit such actions by neutral merchant vessels and, consequently, to inspect, search, seize, and sanction them.[599]

[597] That not only goods owned by enemy individuals but also goods owned by the enemy State are exempt from appropriation when on neutral vessels, has been pointed out above, § 177, p. 220, note 2.

[597] It has been mentioned above, § 177, p. 220, note 2, that both property owned by enemy individuals and property owned by the enemy State are exempt from seizure when on neutral ships.

[598] See above, § 191, and below, § 411.

[598] See above, § 191, and below, § 411.

[599] That a subject of a neutral State who tries to break a blockade, or carries contraband to the enemy, or renders the enemy unneutral service, violates injunctions of the belligerents, but not International Law, has been shown above in § 296; see also below, §§ 383 and 398.

[599] It has been demonstrated in § 296 that a citizen of a neutral country who attempts to break a blockade, transports illegal goods to the enemy, or provides services to the enemy is violating the commands of the warring parties, but not International Law. For further details, see below, §§ 383 and 398.

II Neutrals and Military Actions

Vattel, III. §§ 105, 118-135—Hall, §§ 215, 219, 220, 226—Westlake, II. pp. 179-183—Lawrence, §§ 229, 234-240—Manning, pp. 225-227, 245-250—Twiss, II. §§ 217, 218, 228—Halleck, II. pp. 146, 165, 172—Taylor, §§ 618, 620, 632, 635—Walker, §§ 55, 57, 59-61—Wharton, III. §§ 397-400—Moore, VII. §§ 1293-1303—Wheaton, §§ 426-429—Bluntschli, §§ 758, 759, 763, 765, 769-773—Heffter, §§ 146-150—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 657-676—Ullmann, § 191—Bonfils, Nos. 1449-1457, 1460, 1469, 1470—Despagnet, Nos. 690-692—Rivier, II. pp. 395-408—Calvo, IV. §§ 2644-2664, 2683—Fiore, III. Nos. 1546-1550, 1574-1575, 1582-1584—Martens, II. §§ 131-134—Kleen, I. §§ 70-75, 116-122—Mérignhac, pp. 352-380—Pillet, pp. 284-289—Perels, § 39—Testa, pp. 173-180—Heilborn, Rechte, pp. 4-12—Dupuis, Nos. 308-310, 315-317, and Guerre, Nos. 277-294—Land Warfare, §§ 465-471.

Vattel, III. §§ 105, 118-135—Hall, §§ 215, 219, 220, 226—Westlake, II. pp. 179-183—Lawrence, §§ 229, 234-240—Manning, pp. 225-227, 245-250—Twiss, II. §§ 217, 218, 228—Halleck, II. pp. 146, 165, 172—Taylor, §§ 618, 620, 632, 635—Walker, §§ 55, 57, 59-61—Wharton, III. §§ 397-400—Moore, VII. §§ 1293-1303—Wheaton, §§ 426-429—Bluntschli, §§ 758, 759, 763, 765, 769-773—Heffter, §§ 146-150—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 657-676—Ullmann, § 191—Bonfils, Nos. 1449-1457, 1460, 1469, 1470—Despagnet, Nos. 690-692—Rivier, II. pp. 395-408—Calvo, IV. §§ 2644-2664, 2683—Fiore, III. Nos. 1546-1550, 1574-1575, 1582-1584—Martens, II. §§ 131-134—Kleen, I. §§ 70-75, 116-122—Mérignhac, pp. 352-380—Pillet, pp. 284-289—Perels, § 39—Testa, pp. 173-180—Heilborn, Rechte, pp. 4-12—Dupuis, Nos. 308-310, 315-317, and Guerre, Nos. 277-294—Land Warfare, §§ 465-471.

Hostilities by and against Neutrals.

Hostilities between Neutrals.

§ 320. The duty of impartiality incumbent upon a neutral must obviously prevent him from committing hostilities against either belligerent. This would need no mention were it not for the purpose of distinction between hostilities on the one hand, and, on the other, military or naval acts of force by a neutral for the purpose of repulsing violations of his neutrality committed by either belligerent. Hostilities of a neutral are acts of force performed for the purpose of attacking a belligerent. They are acts of war, and they create a condition of war between such neutral and the belligerent[Pg 387] concerned. If, however, a neutral does not attack a belligerent, but only repulses him by force when he violates or attempts to violate the neutrality of the neutral, such repulse does not comprise hostilities. Thus, if men-of-war of a belligerent attack an enemy vessel in a neutral port and are repulsed by neutral men-of-war, or if belligerent forces try to make their way through neutral territory and are forcibly prevented by neutral troops, no hostilities have been committed by the neutral, who has done nothing else than fulfil his duty of impartiality. Article 10 of Convention V. enacts categorically that "the fact of a neutral Power repelling, even by force, attacks on its neutrality, cannot be considered as a hostile act." And stress must be laid on the fact that it is no longer legitimate for a belligerent to pursue[600] military or naval forces who take refuge on neutral territory; should, nevertheless, a belligerent do this, he must, if possible, be repulsed by the neutral.

§ 320. The duty of impartiality that a neutral must uphold clearly prevents them from engaging in hostilities against either side. This distinction is important for understanding the difference between hostilities and military or naval actions taken by a neutral to defend their neutrality against violations by either side. Hostilities by a neutral are acts of force aimed at attacking a belligerent. They are acts of war and create a state of war between the neutral and the belligerent involved.[Pg 387] However, if a neutral does not attack a belligerent but merely defends against them with force when the belligerent violates or tries to violate the neutral's territory, such defense does not count as hostilities. Therefore, if warships from a belligerent attack another vessel in a neutral port and are met with resistance from neutral warships, or if belligerent forces attempt to cross neutral territory and are forcibly stopped by neutral troops, no hostilities have occurred on the part of the neutral, who is simply fulfilling their duty of impartiality. Article 10 of Convention V clearly states that "the act of a neutral Power repelling attacks on its neutrality, even by force, cannot be seen as a hostile act." It is important to emphasize that it is no longer acceptable for a belligerent to chase military or naval forces that seek refuge in neutral territory; if a belligerent does attempt this, they must be repelled by the neutral if possible.

[600] See above, § 288, p. 352, and below, § 347 (4), p. 422.

[600] See above, § 288, p. 352, and below, § 347 (4), p. 422.

It is, on the other hand, likewise obvious that hostilities against a neutral on the part of either belligerent are acts of war, and not mere violations of neutrality. If, however, belligerent forces attack enemy forces which have taken refuge on neutral territory or which are there for other purposes, such acts are not hostilities against the neutral, but mere violations of neutrality which must be repulsed or for which reparation must be made, as the case may be.

It is also clear that attacks against a neutral by either side in a conflict are acts of war, rather than just breaches of neutrality. However, if a warring party attacks enemy forces that have sought refuge on neutral land or are there for other reasons, such actions are not considered hostilities against the neutral party, but simply violations of neutrality that need to be addressed or compensated for, depending on the situation.

Quite a peculiar condition arose at the outbreak of and during the Russo-Japanese War. The ends for which Japan went to war were the expulsion of the Russian forces from the Chinese Province of Manchuria and the liberation of Korea, which was at the time an independent State, from the influence of Russia. Manchuria and Korea became therefore the[Pg 388] theatre of war, although both were neutral territories and although neither China nor Korea became parties to the war. The hostilities which occurred on these neutral territories were in no wise directed against the neutrals concerned. This anomalous condition of matters arose out of the inability of both China and Korea to free themselves from Russian occupation and influence. And Japan considered her action, which must be classified as an intervention, justified on account of her vital interests. The Powers recognised this anomalous condition by influencing China not to take part in the war, and by influencing the belligerents not to extend military operations beyond the borders of Manchuria. Manchuria and Korea having become the theatre of war,[601] the hostilities committed there by the belligerents against one another cannot be classified as a violation of neutrality. The case of the Variag and the Korietz on the one hand, and, on the other, the case of the Reshitelni, may illustrate the peculiar condition of affairs:—

A strange situation arose at the start and during the Russo-Japanese War. Japan went to war to drive Russian forces out of Manchuria, a Chinese province, and to free Korea, which was then an independent state, from Russian influence. As a result, Manchuria and Korea became the battlefield, even though both were neutral territories and neither China nor Korea took part in the war. The fighting that occurred on these neutral lands was not directed against the neutral parties involved. This unusual situation emerged from both China and Korea's inability to liberate themselves from Russian control. Japan felt that its actions, which can be seen as an intervention, were justified due to its crucial interests. The major powers acknowledged this unusual situation by persuading China not to participate in the war and by urging the warring sides not to extend military actions beyond Manchuria's borders. Since Manchuria and Korea became the battlefield, the clashes that took place there between the warring parties cannot be seen as violations of neutrality. The cases of the Variag and the Korietz on one side, and the case of the Reshitelni on the other, illustrate this peculiar situation:—

(1) On February 8, 1904, a Japanese squadron under Admiral Uriu entered the Korean harbour of Chemulpo and disembarked Japanese troops. The next morning Admiral Uriu requested the commanders of two Russian ships in the harbour of Chemulpo, the Variag and the Korietz, to leave the harbour and engage him in battle outside, threatening attack inside the harbour in case they would not comply with his request. But the Russian ships did comply, and the battle took place outside the harbour, but within Korean territorial waters.[602] The complaint made by Russia, that in this case the Japanese violated Korean neutrality, would seem to be unjustified, since Korea fell within the region and the theatre of war.[Pg 389]

(1) On February 8, 1904, a Japanese fleet led by Admiral Uriu arrived at the Korean port of Chemulpo and unloaded Japanese troops. The following morning, Admiral Uriu asked the commanders of two Russian ships in Chemulpo harbor, the Variag and the Korietz, to leave the harbor and fight him outside, threatening to attack if they didn’t comply. The Russian ships did agree to his request, and the battle occurred outside the harbor but still within Korean territorial waters.[602] Russia's complaint that the Japanese violated Korean neutrality seems unwarranted since Korea was part of the region and the theater of war.[Pg 389]

(2) The Russian destroyer Reshitelni, one of the vessels that escaped from Port Arthur on August 10, 1904, took refuge in the Chinese harbour of Chifu. On August 12, two Japanese destroyers entered the harbour, captured the Reshitelni, and towed her away.[603] There ought to be no doubt that this act of the Japanese comprises a violation of neutrality,[604] since Chifu does not belong to the part of China which fell within the region of war.

(2) The Russian destroyer Reshitelni, one of the ships that got away from Port Arthur on August 10, 1904, found shelter in the Chinese harbor of Chifu. On August 12, two Japanese destroyers came into the harbor, captured the Reshitelni, and towed her away.[603] There's no doubt that this action by the Japanese is a breach of neutrality,[604] since Chifu is not part of the area in China that was involved in the war.

[601] See above, § 71, p. 87; Lawrence, War, pp. 268-294; Ariga, §§ 16-22.

[601] See above, § 71, p. 87; Lawrence, War, pp. 268-294; Ariga, §§ 16-22.

[602] See Lawrence, War, pp. 279-289, and Takahashi, pp. 462-466.

[602] See Lawrence, War, pp. 279-289, and Takahashi, pp. 462-466.

[603] See Lawrence, War, pp. 291-294, and Takahashi, pp. 437-444.

[603] See Lawrence, War, pp. 291-294, and Takahashi, pp. 437-444.

[604] See below, § 361, where the case of the General Armstrong is discussed.

[604] See below, § 361, where the case of the General Armstrong is discussed.

Furnishing Troops and Men-of-War to Belligerents.

Furnishing Troops and Warships to Combatants.

§ 321. If a State remains neutral, it violates its impartiality by furnishing a belligerent with troops or men-of-war. And it matters not whether a neutral renders such assistance to one of the belligerents or to both alike. Whereas Convention V. does not mention the furnishing of troops to belligerents on the part of neutrals, article 6 of Convention XIII. enacts that "the supply, in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral Power to a belligerent Power, of warships, ammunition, or war material of any kind whatever, is forbidden."

§ 321. If a state stays neutral, it loses its impartiality by providing a belligerent with troops or warships. It doesn’t matter if the neutral support goes to one of the belligerents or both. While Convention V. doesn’t address the provision of troops by neutrals to belligerents, article 6 of Convention XIII. states that "the supply, in any way, directly or indirectly, by a neutral Power to a belligerent Power, of warships, ammunition, or any type of war material, is prohibited."

However, the question is controversial as to whether a neutral State, which in time of peace concluded a treaty with one of the belligerents to furnish him in case of war with a limited number of troops, would violate its neutrality by fulfilling its treaty obligation. Several writers[605] have answered the question in the negative, and there is no doubt that during the eighteenth century such cases happened. But no case happened during the nineteenth century, and there ought to be no doubt that nowadays the answer must be in the affirmative, since a qualified neutrality[606] is no longer admissible.

However, the question is debatable regarding whether a neutral state, which in peacetime signed a treaty with one of the warring parties to provide a limited number of troops in case of war, would breach its neutrality by honoring its treaty obligation. Several writers[605] have answered this question negatively, and there's no doubt that such instances occurred during the eighteenth century. However, no such cases arose during the nineteenth century, and there should be no doubt that nowadays the answer must be yes, as qualified neutrality[606] is no longer acceptable.

[605] See, for instance, Bluntschli, § 759, and Heffter, § 144. See above, § 306 (2), where the case is quoted of Denmark furnishing troops to Russia in 1788 during a Russo-Swedish war.

[605] For example, see Bluntschli, § 759, and Heffter, § 144. See above, § 306 (2), where it mentions the case of Denmark providing troops to Russia in 1788 during a Russo-Swedish war.

[606] See above, § 305.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

As regards furnishing men-of-war to belligerents,[Pg 390] the question arose during the Russo-Japanese War as to whether a neutral violates his duty of impartiality by not preventing his national steamship companies from selling to a belligerent such of their liners as are destined in case of war to be incorporated as cruisers in the national navy. The question was discussed on account of the sale to Russia of the Augusta Victoria and the Kaiserin Maria Theresia by the North German Lloyd, and the Fürst Bismarck and the Columbia by the Hamburg-American Line, vessels which were at once enrolled in the Russian Navy as second-class cruisers, re-named as the Kuban, Ural, Don, and Terek. Had these vessels, according to an arrangement with the German Government, really been auxiliary cruisers to the German Navy, and had the German Government given its consent to the transaction, a violation of neutrality would have been committed by Germany. But the German Press maintained that these vessels had not been auxiliary cruisers to the Navy, and Japan did not lodge a protest with Germany on account of the sale. If these liners were not auxiliary cruisers to the German Navy, their sale to Russia was a legitimate sale of articles of contraband.[607]

As for providing warships to warring parties,[Pg 390] the issue came up during the Russo-Japanese War about whether a neutral country breaks its obligation of impartiality by not stopping its national shipping companies from selling to a belligerent those liners that, in the event of war, would be turned into cruisers for the national navy. This question was raised because of the sale to Russia of the Augusta Victoria and the Kaiserin Maria Theresia by North German Lloyd, and the Fürst Bismarck and the Columbia by the Hamburg-American Line, all of which were immediately registered in the Russian Navy as second-class cruisers, renamed the Kuban, Ural, Don, and Terek. If these vessels had, under an agreement with the German Government, actually been auxiliary cruisers for the German Navy, and if the German Government had approved the sale, it would have been a violation of neutrality by Germany. However, the German Press argued that these vessels were not auxiliary cruisers of the Navy, and Japan did not file a protest with Germany regarding the sale. If these liners were not auxiliary cruisers of the German Navy, then their sale to Russia was a valid transaction involving contraband goods.[607]

[607] See below, § 397.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Subjects of Neutrals fighting among Belligerent Forces.

Subjects of neutrals engaged in conflict amid belligerent forces.

§ 322. Although several States, as Great Britain[608] and the United States of America, by their Municipal Law prohibit their subjects from enlisting in the military or naval service of belligerents, the duty of impartiality incumbent upon neutrals does not at present include any necessity for such prohibition, provided the individuals concerned cross the frontier singly[609] and not in a body. But a neutral must recall his military and naval officers who may have been serving in the army or navy of either belligerent before the outbreak of war. A neutral must, further, retain military and[Pg 391] naval officers who want to resign their commissions for the obvious purpose of enlisting in the service of either belligerent. Therefore, when in 1877, during war between Turkey and Servia, Russian officers left the Russian and entered the Servian Army as volunteers with permission of the Russian Government, there was a violation of the duty of impartiality on the part of neutral Russia.

§ 322. Although several countries, like Great Britain[608] and the United States of America, through their laws prohibit their citizens from joining the military or naval forces of warring nations, the requirement for neutrality does not currently necessitate such a prohibition, as long as individuals cross the border one at a time[609] and not as a group. However, a neutral country must recall its military and naval officers who may have served in the armed forces of either side before the war started. Additionally, a neutral must keep military and naval officers who wish to resign their positions for the clear purpose of enlisting with either warring side. Thus, when in 1877, during the conflict between Turkey and Servia, Russian officers volunteered to leave the Russian Army and join the Servian Army with the approval of the Russian Government, it represented a breach of the duty of impartiality by neutral Russia.

[608] See Section 4 of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870.

[608] See Section 4 of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870.

[609] See article 6 of Convention V.

[609] See article 6 of Convention V.

On the other hand, there is no violation of neutrality in a neutral allowing surgeons and such other non-combatant members of his army as are vested with a character of inviolability according to the Geneva Convention to enlist or to remain in the service of either belligerent.

On the other hand, there's no breach of neutrality if a neutral party allows surgeons and other non-combatant members of their army, who have inviolable status according to the Geneva Convention, to enlist or continue serving either side in the conflict.

Passage of Troops and War Material through Neutral Territory.

Passage of Troops and Military Supplies through Neutral Land.

§ 323. In contradistinction to the practice of the eighteenth century,[610] it is now generally recognised that a violation of the duty of impartiality is involved when a neutral allows a belligerent the passage of troops or the transport of war material over his territory.[611] And it matters not whether a neutral gives such permission to one of the belligerents only, or to both alike. The practice of the eighteenth century was a necessity, since many German States consisted of parts distant one from another, so that their troops had to pass through other Sovereigns' territories for the purpose of reaching outlying parts. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the passing of belligerent troops through neutral territory still occurred. Prussia, although she at first repeatedly refused it, at last entered in 1805 into a secret convention with Russia granting Russian troops passage through Silesia during war with France. On the other hand, even before Russia had made use of this permission, Napoleon ordered Bernadotte to march French troops through the then Prussian territory[Pg 392] of Anspach without even asking the consent of Prussia. In spite of the protest of the Swiss Government, Austrian troops passed through Swiss territory in 1813, and when in 1815 war broke out again through the escape of Napoleon from the Island of Elba and his return to France, Switzerland granted to the allied troops passage through her territory.[612] But since that time it has become universally recognised that all passage of belligerent troops through neutral territory must be prohibited, and the Powers declared expressis verbis in the Act of November 20, 1815, which neutralised Switzerland, and was signed at Paris,[613] that "no inference unfavourable to the neutrality and inviolability of Switzerland can and must be drawn from the facts which have caused the passage of the allied troops through a part of the territory of the Swiss Confederation." The few instances[614] in which during the nineteenth century States pretended to remain neutral, but nevertheless allowed the troops of one of the belligerents passage through their territory, led to war between the neutral and the other belligerent.

§ 323. Unlike the practice of the eighteenth century,[610] it is now widely accepted that allowing a warring party to move troops or transport war supplies through a neutral country is a breach of the duty of impartiality.[611] It doesn’t matter if the neutral allows this to just one side or both. The practices of the eighteenth century were necessary since many German States were geographically separated, requiring their troops to travel through the territories of other sovereigns to reach distant areas. At the start of the nineteenth century, belligerent troops still crossed neutral territory. Prussia, despite initially refusing, eventually entered into a secret agreement with Russia in 1805 allowing Russian troops passage through Silesia during the war with France. Meanwhile, before Russia even used this permission, Napoleon instructed Bernadotte to move French troops through the then Prussian territory of Anspach without Prussia’s consent. Despite protests from the Swiss Government, Austrian troops moved through Swiss land in 1813, and when war erupted again in 1815 due to Napoleon escaping from Elba and returning to France, Switzerland allowed allied troops to pass through its territory.[612] Since then, it has been universally acknowledged that the passage of belligerent troops through neutral territory must be prohibited. In the Act of November 20, 1815, which neutralised Switzerland and was signed in Paris,[613] the Powers declared expressis verbis that "no unfavorable inferences about the neutrality and inviolability of Switzerland can and must be drawn from the facts that caused the passage of the allied troops through part of the territory of the Swiss Confederation." The few instances[614] in the nineteenth century where countries claimed to be neutral but still allowed one side’s troops to pass through led to conflicts between the neutral state and the other warring party.

[610] See Vattel, III. §§ 119-132.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Vattel, III. §§ 119-132.

[611] See Dumas in R.G. XVI. (1909), pp. 289-316.

[611] See Dumas in R.G. XVI. (1909), pp. 289-316.

[612] See Wheaton, §§ 418-420.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Wheaton, §§ 418-420.

[613] See Martens, N.R. II. p. 741.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Martens, N.R. II. p. 741.

[614] See Heilborn, Rechte, pp. 8-9.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Heilborn, Rights, pp. 8-9.

Passage of Wounded through Neutral Territory.

Passage of Wounded through Neutral Territory.

However, just as in the case of furnishing troops so in the case of passage, it is a moot point whether passage of troops can be granted without thereby violating the duty of impartiality incumbent upon a neutral, in case a neutral is required to grant it in consequence of an existing State-servitude or of a treaty previous to the war. There ought to be no doubt that, since nowadays a qualified neutrality is no longer admissible, the question must be answered in the negative.[615]

However, just like with supplying troops, it's debatable whether allowing the movement of troops can happen without violating the neutral duty of impartiality, especially if a neutral party is obligated to allow it due to an existing state agreement or a treaty made before the war. There's no question that since qualified neutrality isn't acceptable anymore, this issue should be answered with a no.[615]

§ 324. The passage of wounded soldiers is different from that of troops. If a neutral allows the passage of[Pg 393] wounded soldiers, he certainly does not render direct assistance to the belligerent concerned. But it may well be that indirectly it is of assistance on account of the fact that a belligerent, thereby relieved from transport of his wounded, can now use the lines of communication for the transport of troops, war material, and provisions. Thus, when in 1870 after the battles of Sedan and Metz, Germany applied to Belgium and Luxemburg to allow her wounded to be sent through their territories, France protested on the ground that the relief thereby created to the lines of communication in the hands of the Germans would be an assistance to the military operations of the German Army. Belgium, on the advice of Great Britain, did not grant the request made by Germany, but Luxemburg granted it.[616]

§ 324. The movement of wounded soldiers is different from that of troops. If a neutral party allows the passage of wounded soldiers, they are not directly assisting the belligerent involved. However, it may indirectly help because a belligerent freed from transporting their wounded can then use their lines of communication for moving troops, war supplies, and provisions. For example, in 1870, after the battles of Sedan and Metz, Germany asked Belgium and Luxembourg to let their wounded be transported through their territories. France objected, arguing that this would ease the lines of communication for the Germans and assist their military operations. Belgium, following Great Britain's advice, denied Germany's request, while Luxembourg approved it.[616]

[616] See Hall, § 219, and Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 664.

[616] See Hall, § 219, and Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 664.

According to article 14 of Convention V. a neutral Power may grant the passage of wounded or sick to a belligerent. If he does grant it, the trains bringing them must carry neither combatants nor war material, and those of the wounded and sick who belong to the army of the other belligerent must remain on the neutral territory concerned, must there be guarded by the neutral Government, and must, after having recovered, be prevented from returning to their home State and rejoining their corps. By the stipulation of article 14 it is left to the consideration of a neutral whether or no he will allow the passage of wounded and sick to a belligerent; he will, therefore, have to investigate every case and come to a conclusion according to its merits. It should be stated that, according to article 15 of Convention V., the "Geneva Convention applies to the sick and wounded interned in neutral territory."

According to Article 14 of Convention V, a neutral Power may allow the passage of wounded or sick individuals to a belligerent. If this is granted, the trains transporting them must not carry any combatants or military supplies. Additionally, those wounded or sick individuals who belong to the army of the opposing belligerent must stay on the neutral territory in question, be protected by the neutral Government, and after they recover, must be prevented from returning to their home country and rejoining their units. Article 14 leaves it up to the neutral party to decide whether or not to permit the passage of wounded and sick individuals to a belligerent; therefore, they will need to assess each situation and reach a decision based on its individual circumstances. It should also be noted that, according to Article 15 of Convention V, the "Geneva Convention applies to the sick and wounded interned in neutral territory."

Passage of Men-of-War.

Naval Ships Passage.

[617] See below, § 333.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Occupation of Neutral Territory by Belligerents.

Occupation of Neutral Territory by Belligerents.

§ 326. In contradistinction to the practice of the eighteenth century,[618] the duty of impartiality must nowadays prevent a neutral from permitting belligerents to occupy a neutral fortress or any other part of neutral territory. If a treaty previously entered into stipulates such occupation, it cannot be granted without violation of neutrality.[619] On the contrary, the neutral must even use force to prevent belligerents from occupying any part of his neutral territory. The question as to whether such occupation on the part of a belligerent[Pg 395] would be excusable in case of extreme necessity on account of the neutral's inability to prevent the other belligerent from making use of the neutral territory as a base for his military operations must, I think, be answered in the affirmative, since an extreme case of necessity in the interest of self-preservation must be considered as an excuse.[620]

§ 326. Unlike the practices of the eighteenth century,[618] the duty of impartiality today requires that a neutral country does not allow warring parties to use a neutral fortress or any other part of neutral territory. If a pre-existing treaty allows for such occupation, it cannot be approved without compromising neutrality.[619] Instead, the neutral must even resort to force to stop warring parties from occupying any part of its neutral territory. The issue of whether a warring party's occupation might be justified in cases of extreme necessity—due to the neutral's inability to stop the other party from using neutral territory as a base for military actions—should be answered positively, as extreme cases for self-preservation must be seen as a valid justification.[620]

[618] See Kleen, I. § 116.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Kleen, I. § 116.

[619] See Klüber, § 281, who asserts the contrary.

[619] See Klüber, § 281, who claims the opposite.

[620] See Vattel, III. § 122; Bluntschli, § 782; Calvo, IV. § 2642. Kleen, I. § 116, seems not to recognise an extreme necessity of the kind mentioned above as an excuse.—There is a difference between this case and the case which arose at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, when both belligerents invaded Korea, for, as was explained above in § 320, Korea and Manchuria fell within the region and the theatre of war.

[620] See Vattel, III. § 122; Bluntschli, § 782; Calvo, IV. § 2642. Kleen, I. § 116, doesn’t seem to acknowledge an extreme necessity like the one mentioned above as a valid excuse.—There's a distinction between this situation and the one that arose at the start of the Russo-Japanese War, when both sides invaded Korea, because, as previously explained in § 320, Korea and Manchuria were part of the war zone.

Prize Courts on Neutral Territory.

Prize Courts in Neutral Territory.

§ 327. It has long been universally recognised that the duty of impartiality must prevent a neutral from permitting a belligerent to set up Prize Courts on neutral territory. The intention of a belligerent in setting up a court on neutral territory can only be to facilitate the plundering by his men-of-war of the commerce of the enemy. A neutral tolerating such Prize Courts would, therefore, indirectly assist the belligerent in his naval operations. During the eighteenth century it was not considered illegitimate on the part of neutrals to allow the setting up of Prize Courts on their territory. The Règlement du Roi de France concernant les prises qui seront conduites dans les ports étrangers, et des formalités que doivent remplir les Consuls de S.M. qui y sont établis of 1779, furnishes a striking proof of it. But since in 1793 the United States of America disorganised the French Prize Courts set up by the French envoy Genêt on her territory,[621] it became recognised that such Prize Courts are inconsistent with the duty of impartiality incumbent upon a neutral, and article 4 of Convention XIII. enacts this formerly customary rule.

§ 327. It has been widely accepted for a long time that a neutral party must not allow a belligerent to establish Prize Courts on neutral territory. The belligerent's aim in setting up a court in a neutral place is solely to help their warships loot the commerce of the enemy. A neutral that allows such Prize Courts would, therefore, be indirectly aiding the belligerent in their naval efforts. During the eighteenth century, it wasn't seen as wrong for neutrals to permit the establishment of Prize Courts on their land. The Règlement du Roi de France concernant les prises qui seront conduites dans les ports étrangers, et des formalités que doivent remplir les Consuls de S.M. qui y sont établis from 1779 serves as a clear example of this. However, after 1793, when the United States put a stop to the French Prize Courts established by the French envoy Genêt on its territory,[621] it became accepted that these Prize Courts contradict the neutral's duty of impartiality, and article 4 of Convention XIII codifies this previously customary rule.

[621] See above, § 291 (1.)

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ (1.)

Belligerent's Prizes in Neutral Ports.

Bellinger's Prizes in Neutral Ports.

§ 328. It would, no doubt, be an indirect assistance to the naval operations of a belligerent if a neutral[Pg 396] allowed him to organise on neutral territory the safekeeping of prizes or their sale.

§ 328. It would certainly help the naval operations of a fighting country if a neutral[Pg 396] let them set up the storage or sale of captured ships on neutral land.

But the case of a temporary stay of a belligerent man-of-war with her prize in a neutral port is different. Neutral Powers may—although most maritime States no longer do it—allow prizes to be brought temporarily into their ports. Articles 21 and 22 of Convention XIII. lay down the following rules in the matter: A prize may only be brought into a neutral port on account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want of fuel or provisions; it must leave as soon as the circumstances which justified its entry are at an end, and if it does not, the neutral Power must order it to leave at once and must, in case of disobedience, employ the means at disposal to release the prize with its officers and crew, and to intern the prize-crew; a prize brought into a neutral port for reasons other than unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want of fuel or provisions, must forthwith be released by the respective neutral Power.

But the situation with a temporary stop of a fighting ship with its captured vessel in a neutral port is different. Neutral countries may—although most maritime nations don’t do this anymore—allow prize ships to be temporarily brought into their ports. Articles 21 and 22 of Convention XIII lay down the following rules on this matter: A prize can only enter a neutral port due to being unseaworthy, bad weather, or lack of fuel or supplies; it must depart as soon as the reasons for its entry are no longer valid, and if it doesn’t, the neutral country must order it to leave immediately and, in case of noncompliance, use available means to release the prize along with its officers and crew, and to detain the prize crew; a prize brought into a neutral port for reasons other than unseaworthiness, bad weather, or lack of fuel or supplies must be released immediately by the respective neutral country.

The question requires attention as to whether a prize whose unseaworthiness is so great that it cannot be repaired, may be allowed to remain in the neutral port and be there sold[622] after the competent Prize Court has condemned it. Since article 21 enacts that an admitted prize must leave the neutral port as soon as the circumstances which justified its entry are at an end, there is no doubt that it may remain if it cannot by repair be made seaworthy. And there ought, consequently, to be no objection to its sale in the neutral port, provided it has previously been condemned by the proper Prize Court.

The question needs to be addressed regarding whether a prize that is so unseaworthy it can't be repaired can stay in a neutral port and be sold there after it's been condemned by the appropriate Prize Court. Since article 21 states that an accepted prize must leave the neutral port as soon as the reasons for its entry are no longer valid, it’s clear that it can remain if it can't be made seaworthy through repairs. Therefore, there should be no issue with it being sold in the neutral port, as long as it has been condemned by the proper Prize Court.

[622] See Kleen, vol. I. § 115.

[622] See Kleen, vol. I. § 115.

While the stipulation of article 21 cannot meet with any objection, the stipulation of article 23 of Convention XIII. is of a very doubtful character. This article enacts that a neutral Power may allow prizes to enter[Pg 397] its ports, whether under convoy or not, when they are brought there to be sequestrated pending the decision of a Prize Court. And it is of importance to state the fact that the restriction of article 21 does not apply to prizes brought into a neutral port under the rule of article 23. This rule actually enables a belligerent to safeguard all his prizes against recapture, and a neutral Power which allows belligerent prizes access to its ports under the rule of article 23 would indirectly render assistance to the naval operations of the belligerent concerned. For this reason, Great Britain as well as Japan and Siam entered a reservation against article 23. Be that as it may, those Powers which have accepted article 23 will not, I believe, object to the sale in the neutral port concerned of such sequestrated prizes, provided they have previously been condemned by the proper Prize Court.

While the provision in article 21 is completely acceptable, the provision in article 23 of Convention XIII raises serious doubts. This article states that a neutral country can allow captured ships to enter[Pg 397] its ports, whether they are being escorted or not, when they are brought there to be held until a Prize Court makes a decision. It's important to note that the restriction in article 21 doesn't apply to ships brought into a neutral port under the rule of article 23. This rule actually allows a warring party to protect all its captured ships from being recaptured, and a neutral country that allows these captured ships to access its ports under article 23 would indirectly support the military operations of the involved warring party. For this reason, Great Britain, as well as Japan and Siam, expressed reservations about article 23. Nevertheless, the countries that have accepted article 23 will likely not object to the sale of such held ships in the neutral port, as long as they have been previously condemned by the appropriate Prize Court.

III Neutrals and Military Readiness

Hall, §§ 217-218, 221-225—Lawrence, §§ 234-240—Westlake, II. pp. 181-198—Manning, pp. 227-244—Phillimore, III. §§ 142-151B—Twiss, II. §§ 223-225—Halleck, II. pp. 152-163—Taylor, §§ 616, 619, 626-628—Walker, §§ 62-66—Wharton, III. §§ 392, 395-396—Wheaton, §§ 436-439—Moore, VII. §§ 1293-1305—Heffter, §§ 148-150—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 658-660, 676-684—Ullmann, § 191—Bonfils, Nos. 1458-1459, 1464-1466—Despagnet, Nos. 692-693—Rivier, II. pp. 395-408—Calvo, IV. §§ 2619-2627—Fiore, III. Nos. 1551-1570—Kleen, I. §§ 76-89, 114—Mérignhac, pp. 358-360—Pillet, pp. 288-290—Dupuis, Nos. 322-331, and Guerre, Nos. 290-294—Land Warfare, §§ 472-476.

Hall, §§ 217-218, 221-225—Lawrence, §§ 234-240—Westlake, II. pp. 181-198—Manning, pp. 227-244—Phillimore, III. §§ 142-151B—Twiss, II. §§ 223-225—Halleck, II. pp. 152-163—Taylor, §§ 616, 619, 626-628—Walker, §§ 62-66—Wharton, III. §§ 392, 395-396—Wheaton, §§ 436-439—Moore, VII. §§ 1293-1305—Heffter, §§ 148-150—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 658-660, 676-684—Ullmann, § 191—Bonfils, Nos. 1458-1459, 1464-1466—Despagnet, Nos. 692-693—Rivier, II. pp. 395-408—Calvo, IV. §§ 2619-2627—Fiore, III. Nos. 1551-1570—Kleen, I. §§ 76-89, 114—Mérignhac, pp. 358-360—Pillet, pp. 288-290—Dupuis, Nos. 322-331, and Guerre, Nos. 290-294—Land Warfare, §§ 472-476.

Depôts and Factories on Neutral Territory.

Depots and Factories on Neutral Territory.

§ 329. Although according to the present intense conception of the duty of impartiality neutrals need not[623] prohibit their subjects from supplying belligerents with arms and the like in the ordinary way of trade, a[Pg 398] neutral must[624] prohibit belligerents from erecting and maintaining on his territory depôts and factories of arms, ammunition, and military provisions. However, belligerents can easily evade this by not keeping depôts and factories, but contracting with subjects of the neutral concerned in the ordinary way of trade for any amount of arms, ammunition, and provisions.[625]

§ 329. Although under the current strong belief in the duty of impartiality, neutrals don't have to[623] stop their citizens from selling arms and similar items to warring parties as part of regular trade, a[Pg 398] neutral must[624] prevent warring parties from setting up and maintaining storage facilities and factories for arms, ammunition, and military supplies on their land. However, warring parties can easily get around this by not having their own storage and factories, but instead making arrangements with citizens of the neutral country in the usual way of trade for any quantity of arms, ammunition, and supplies.[625]

[623] See below, § 350.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[624] See Bluntschli, § 777, and Kleen, I. § 114.

[624] See Bluntschli, § 777, and Kleen, I. § 114.

[625] The distinction made by some writers between an occasional supply on the one hand, and, on the other, an organised supply in large proportions by subjects of neutrals, and the assertion that the latter must be prohibited by the neutral concerned, is not justified. See below, § 350.

[625] The difference some writers make between a one-time supply and a structured supply in large amounts by neutral parties, and the claim that the latter must be banned by the neutral involved, is not justified. See below, § 350.

Levy of Troops, and the like.

Levy of Troops, and similar matters.

§ 330. In former centuries neutrals were not required to prevent belligerents from levying troops on their neutral territories, and a neutral often used to levy troops himself on his territory for belligerents without thereby violating his duty of impartiality as understood in those times. In this way the Swiss Confederation frequently used to furnish belligerents, and often both parties, with thousands of recruits, although she herself always remained neutral. But at the end of the eighteenth century a movement was started which tended to change this practice. In 1793 the United States of America interdicted the levy of troops on her territory for belligerents, and by-and-by many other States followed the example. During the nineteenth century the majority of writers maintained that the duty of impartiality must prevent a neutral from allowing the levy of troops. The few[626] writers who differed made it a condition that a neutral, if he allowed such levy at all, must allow it to both belligerents alike. The controversy is now finally settled, for articles 4 and 5 of Convention V. lay down the rules that corps of combatants may not be formed, nor recruiting offices opened, on the territory of a neutral Power, and that neutral Powers must not allow these acts.

§ 330. In past centuries, neutral countries weren’t required to stop warring nations from recruiting troops on their land, and a neutral often recruited troops for warring sides without violating their duty of impartiality as understood at the time. The Swiss Confederation frequently provided thousands of recruits to warring parties, often both sides, while remaining neutral itself. However, by the late eighteenth century, a movement began to change this practice. In 1793, the United States of America banned the recruitment of troops on its territory for warring nations, and gradually many other states followed suit. During the nineteenth century, most writers argued that the duty of impartiality must prevent neutrals from allowing troop recruitment. A few[626] writers who disagreed argued that if a neutral allowed recruitment at all, they must permit it for both sides equally. The debate has now been settled, as articles 4 and 5 of Convention V establish that combat groups cannot be formed, nor recruitment offices opened, on the territory of a neutral Power, and that neutral Powers must not permit these actions.

[626] See, for instance, Twiss, II. § 225, and Bluntschli, § 762.

[626] See, for example, Twiss, II. § 225, and Bluntschli, § 762.

The duty of impartiality must likewise prevent[Pg 399] a neutral from allowing a belligerent man-of-war reduced in her crew to enrol sailors in his ports, with the exception of such few men as are absolutely necessary to navigate the vessel to the nearest home port.[627]

The obligation of neutrality should also stop a neutral country from letting a military ship, short on crew, recruit sailors at its ports, except for the few individuals needed to safely navigate the ship back to its nearest home port.[Pg 399][627]

[627] See article 18 of Convention XIII. and below, § 333 (3), and § 346.

[627] Refer to article 18 of Convention XIII. and below, § 333 (3), and § 346.

A pendant to the levy of troops on neutral territory was the granting of Letters of Marque to vessels belonging to the merchant marine of neutrals. Since privateering has practically disappeared, the question as to whether neutrals must prohibit their subjects from accepting Letters of Marque from a belligerent,[628] need not be discussed.

A counterpart to sending troops onto neutral ground was giving Letters of Marque to ships from neutral countries. Since privateering has mostly become a thing of the past, the issue of whether neutrals must stop their citizens from accepting Letters of Marque from a warring party,[628] is not necessary to address.

Passage of Bodies of Men intending to Enlist.

Passage of groups of men planning to enlist.

§ 331. A neutral is not obliged by his duty of impartiality to interdict passage through his territory to men either singly or in numbers who intend to enlist. Thus in 1870 Switzerland did not object to Frenchmen travelling through Geneva for the purpose of reaching French corps or to Germans travelling through Basle for the purpose of reaching German corps, under the condition, however, that these men travelled without arms and uniform. On the other hand, when France during the Franco-German War organised an office[629] in Basle for the purpose of sending bodies of Alsatian volunteers through Switzerland to the South of France, Switzerland correctly prohibited this on account of the fact that this official organisation of the passage of whole bodies of volunteers through her neutral territory was more or less equal to a passage of troops.

§ 331. A neutral country doesn’t have to stop people, whether individually or in groups, from passing through its territory if they plan to enlist. For example, in 1870, Switzerland allowed French individuals to travel through Geneva to join French troops and Germans to travel through Basle to join German troops, as long as they were unarmed and not in uniform. However, when France set up an office[629] in Basle during the Franco-German War to send groups of Alsatian volunteers through Switzerland to southern France, Switzerland rightly banned this because the official organization of large groups of volunteers passing through its neutral territory was essentially similar to allowing troops to pass.

[629] See Bluntschli, § 770.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Bluntschli, § 770.

The Second Peace Conference has sanctioned this distinction, for article 6 of Convention V. enacts that "the responsibility of a neutral Power is not involved by the mere fact that persons cross the frontier individually (isolément) in order to offer their services to[Pg 400] one of the belligerents." An argumentum e contrario justifies the conclusion that the responsibility of a neutral is involved in case it does allow men to cross the frontier in a body in order to enlist in the forces of a belligerent.

The Second Peace Conference has approved this distinction, as Article 6 of Convention V states that "the responsibility of a neutral Power is not triggered merely by individuals crossing the border (isolément) to offer their services to[Pg 400] one of the warring parties." A reverse argument justifies the conclusion that a neutral's responsibility is indeed engaged if it permits groups of people to cross the border to join the forces of a warring party.

Organisation of Hostile Expeditions.

Planning Hostile Missions.

§ 332. If the levy and passage of troops, and the forming of corps of combatants, must be prevented by a neutral, he is all the more required to prevent the organisation of a hostile expedition from his territory against either belligerent. Such organisation takes place when a band of men combine under a commander for the purpose of starting from the neutral territory and joining the belligerent forces. The case, however, is different, if a number of individuals, not organised into a body under a commander, start in company from a neutral State for the purpose of enlisting with one of the belligerents. Thus in 1870, during the Franco-German War, 1200 Frenchmen started from New York in two French steamers for the purpose of joining the French Army. Although the vessels carried also 96,000 rifles and 11,000,000 cartridges, the United States did not interfere, since the men were not organised in a body, and since, on the other hand, the arms and ammunition were carried in the way of ordinary commerce.[630]

§ 332. If a neutral country needs to stop the movement and deployment of troops and the formation of military groups, it is even more important for them to prevent the organization of a hostile mission from their territory against either side in conflict. This organization occurs when a group of people comes together under a leader with the aim of leaving the neutral territory to join the forces of one of the belligerents. However, the situation changes if several individuals, not organized as a group under a leader, leave together from a neutral state to enlist with one of the belligerents. For example, in 1870, during the Franco-German War, 1,200 Frenchmen departed from New York on two French steamers to join the French Army. Even though the ships also carried 96,000 rifles and 11,000,000 cartridges, the United States did not intervene since the men were not organized as a unit, and because the arms and ammunition were transported in a manner typical of regular trade.[630]

[630] See Hall, § 222.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Hall, § 222.

Use of Neutral Territory as Base of Naval Operations.

Use of Neutral Territory as a Base for Naval Operations.

§ 333. Although a neutral is not required by his duty of impartiality to prohibit[631] the passage of belligerent men of-war through his maritime belt, or the temporary stay of such vessels in his ports, it is universally recognised that he must not allow admitted vessels to make the neutral maritime belt and neutral ports the base of their naval operations against the enemy. And article 5 of Convention XIII. enacts that "belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports and[Pg 401] waters as a base of naval operations against their adversaries." The following rules may be formulated as emanating from the principle:—

§ 333. While a neutral country doesn’t have to bar the passage of belligerent warships through its waters or their temporary stay in its ports, it is widely accepted that it must not let admitted vessels use its waters and ports as a base for naval operations against opposing forces. Article 5 of Convention XIII. states that "belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports and[Pg 401] waters as a base of naval operations against their adversaries." The following rules can be derived from this principle:—

(1) A neutral must, so far as is in his power, prevent belligerent men-of-war from cruising within his portion of the maritime belt for the purpose of capturing enemy vessels as soon as they leave this belt. It must, however, be specially observed that a neutral is not required to prevent this beyond his power. It is absolutely impossible to prevent such cruising under all circumstances and conditions, especially in the case of neutrals who own possessions in distant parts of the globe. How many thousands of vessels would be necessary, if Great Britain, for instance, were unconditionally obliged to prevent such cruising in every portion of the maritime belt of all her numerous possessions scattered over all parts of the globe?

(1) A neutral must, as much as possible, stop warring ships from patrolling their part of the sea to catch enemy vessels as soon as they leave this area. However, it should be noted that a neutral isn’t required to prevent this beyond their capabilities. It’s completely impossible to stop such patrols under all circumstances, especially for neutrals who have territories in far-off parts of the world. How many thousands of ships would be needed if Great Britain, for example, was unconditionally obligated to prevent such patrols in every part of the sea around all her many territories scattered across the globe?

(2) A neutral must prevent a belligerent man-of-war from leaving a neutral port at the same time as an enemy man-of-war or an enemy merchantman, or must make other arrangements which prevent an attack so soon as both reach the Open Sea.[632] Article 16 of Convention XIII. enacts that there must be an interval of at least twenty-four hours between the departure of a belligerent warship and a ship of the other belligerent.

(2) A neutral country must stop a warship from leaving its port at the same time as an enemy warship or an enemy merchant ship, or must arrange for other measures to prevent an attack as soon as both reach the open sea.[632] Article 16 of Convention XIII states that there must be at least a twenty-four-hour interval between the departure of a belligerent warship and a ship from the opposing belligerent.

(3) A neutral must prevent a belligerent man-of-war, whose crew is reduced from any cause whatever, from enrolling sailors in his neutral ports, with the exception of such few hands as are necessary for the purpose of safely navigating the vessel to the nearest port of her home State.[633]

(3) A neutral must stop a warring warship, whose crew is diminished for any reason, from signing up sailors in their neutral ports, except for the few needed to safely navigate the vessel to the closest port of its home state.[633]

(4) A neutral must prevent belligerent men-of-war admitted to his ports or maritime belt from taking in such a quantity of provisions and coal as would[Pg 402] enable them to continue their naval operations, for otherwise he would make it possible for them to cruise on the Open Sea near his maritime belt for the purpose of attacking enemy vessels.

(4) A neutral country must stop warships that enter its ports or maritime zone from taking on so much food and coal that they can keep conducting military operations, because otherwise, it would allow them to patrol the Open Sea near its waters to attack enemy ships.

There is, however, no unanimity of the Powers concerning the quantity of provisions and coal which belligerent men-of-war may be allowed to take in. Articles 19 and 20 of Convention XIII. of the Second Peace Conference enact the following:—

There is, however, no agreement among the Powers regarding the amount of supplies and coal that warring naval ships can bring in. Articles 19 and 20 of Convention XIII. from the Second Peace Conference state the following:—

Article 19: "Belligerent war-ships may only revictual in neutral ports or roadsteads to bring up their supplies to the peace standard. Similarly these vessels may only ship sufficient fuel to enable them to reach the nearest port in their own country. They may, on the other hand, fill up their bunkers built to carry fuel, when in neutral countries which have adopted this method of determining the amount of fuel to be supplied. If in accordance with the law of the neutral Power, the ships are not supplied with coal within twenty-four hours of their arrival, the duration of their permitted stay is extended by twenty-four hours."

Article 19: "Warring ships can only resupply in neutral ports or anchorages to stock up on supplies up to peace standards. These ships are also only allowed to load enough fuel to get them to the nearest port in their own country. However, they can fill their fuel tanks in neutral countries that have established rules for how much fuel can be provided. If, according to the laws of the neutral country, the ships do not receive coal within twenty-four hours of arriving, their allowed stay is extended by another twenty-four hours."

Article 20: "Belligerent war-ships which have shipped fuel in a port belonging to a neutral Power may not within the succeeding three months replenish their supply in a port of the same Power."

Article 20: "Belligerent warships that have taken on fuel in a port belonging to a neutral country cannot replenish their supply in a port of the same country for the next three months."

Great Britain, Japan, and Siam, while they have accepted article 20,[634] have entered a reservation against article 19. Great Britain upholds her rule that belligerent warships shall not be allowed to take in more provisions and fuel in neutral ports than is necessary to bring them safely to the nearest port of their own country.

Great Britain, Japan, and Siam have accepted article 20,[634] but have made a reservation against article 19. Great Britain maintains its rule that warring warships cannot stock up on more supplies and fuel in neutral ports than what is required to safely reach the nearest port of their own country.

While, therefore, the matter is not settled, it is agreed that it makes no difference whether the man-of-war concerned intends to buy provisions and coal on land[Pg 403] or to take them in from transport vessels which accompany or meet her in neutral waters.

While the issue isn't fully resolved, it's agreed that it doesn't matter whether the warship plans to purchase supplies and coal on land[Pg 403] or to receive them from transport ships that accompany or meet her in neutral waters.

(5) A neutral must prevent belligerent men-of-war admitted into his ports or maritime belt from replenishing with ammunition and armaments, and from adding to their armaments, as otherwise he would indirectly assist them in preparing for hostilities (article 18 of Convention XIII.). And it makes no difference whether the ammunition and armaments are to come from the shore or are to be taken in from transport vessels.

(5) A neutral must stop warring ships allowed into his ports or coastal waters from restocking their ammunition and weapons, and from increasing their armaments, as otherwise he would be indirectly helping them get ready for conflict (article 18 of Convention XIII.). It doesn't matter if the ammunition and weapons come from the land or if they're taken from transport ships.

Similarly a neutral must prevent belligerent men-of-war in his ports and roadsteads from carrying out such repairs as would add in any manner whatever to their fighting force. The local authorities of the neutral Power must decide what repairs are absolutely necessary to make these vessels seaworthy, and such repairs are allowed, but they must be carried out with the least possible delay (article 17 of Convention XIII.).

Similarly, a neutral country must stop warring ships in its ports and waterways from making any repairs that would enhance their combat capabilities in any way. The local authorities of the neutral country must determine which repairs are absolutely necessary to make these ships seaworthy, and those repairs are permitted, but they must be done as quickly as possible (article 17 of Convention XIII.).

(6) A neutral must prevent belligerent men-of-war admitted into his ports from remaining there longer than is necessary for ordinary and legitimate purposes.[635] It cannot be said that the rule adopted in 1862 by Great Britain, and followed by some other maritime States, not to allow a longer stay than twenty-four hours, is a rule of International Law. It is left to the consideration of neutrals to adopt by their Municipal Law any rule they think fit so long as the admitted men-of-war do not prolong their stay for any other than ordinary and legitimate purposes. Article 12 of Convention XIII. prescribes the twenty-four hours rule only for those neutral countries which have not special provisions to the contrary in their Municipal Laws.[636] But it is agreed—and article 14 of Convention XIII.[Pg 404] enacts it—that belligerent men-of-war, except those exclusively for the time devoted to religious, scientific, or philanthropic purposes, must not prolong their stay in neutral ports and waters beyond the time permitted, except on account of damage or stress of weather. A neutral would certainly violate his duty of impartiality if he were to allow belligerent men-of-war to winter in his ports or to stay there for the purpose of waiting for other vessels of the fleet or transports.

(6) A neutral country must ensure that warships from fighting nations that are allowed into its ports do not stay longer than necessary for normal and legitimate reasons.[635] It's not accurate to say that the rule established in 1862 by Great Britain, and followed by some other maritime nations, which limits stays to twenty-four hours, is an official rule of International Law. Neutrals have the discretion under their own laws to establish any rule they see fit, as long as the warships that are admitted do not extend their stay for purposes other than normal and legitimate ones. Article 12 of Convention XIII specifies the twenty-four-hour rule only for those neutral countries that do not have specific provisions stating otherwise in their national laws.[636] However, it is generally agreed—and Article 14 of Convention XIII.[Pg 404] lays it down—that belligerent warships, except those solely for religious, scientific, or charitable purposes, must not remain in neutral ports and waters longer than allowed, unless due to damage or bad weather. A neutral would clearly breach their duty of impartiality if they allowed belligerent warships to stay in their ports over the winter or to remain there waiting for other ships from their fleet or transport vessels.

The rule that a neutral must prevent belligerent men-of-war from staying too long in his ports or waters, became of considerable importance during the Russo-Japanese War, when the Russian Baltic Fleet was on its way to the Far East. Admiral Rojdestvensky is said to have stayed in the French territorial waters of Madagascar from December 1904 till March 1905, for the purpose of awaiting there a part of the Baltic Fleet that had set out at a later date. The Press likewise reported a prolonged stay by parts of the Baltic Fleet during April 1905 at Kamranh Bay and Hon-kohe Bay in French Indo-China. Provided the reported facts be true, France would seem to have violated her duty of impartiality by not preventing such an abuse of her neutral ports.

The rule that a neutral country must prevent belligerent warships from staying too long in its ports or waters became quite significant during the Russo-Japanese War, when the Russian Baltic Fleet was heading to the Far East. Admiral Rojdestvensky reportedly stayed in French territorial waters off Madagascar from December 1904 to March 1905 to wait for a part of the Baltic Fleet that had left later. The press also reported that parts of the Baltic Fleet had a lengthy stay in April 1905 at Kamranh Bay and Hon-kohe Bay in French Indo-China. If these reports are accurate, it appears that France failed to uphold its duty of neutrality by allowing such misuse of its neutral ports.

(7) A neutral must prevent more than three men-of-war belonging to the same belligerent from being simultaneously in one of his ports or roadsteads unless his Municipal Law provides the contrary (article 15 of Convention XIII.).

(7) A neutral must stop more than three warships from the same fighting side from being in one of his ports or anchorages at the same time unless his local law says otherwise (article 15 of Convention XIII.).

(8) At the outbreak of war a neutral must warn all belligerent men-of-war which were in his ports or roadsteads or in his territorial waters before the outbreak of war, to depart within twenty-four hours or within such time as the local law prescribes (article 13[637] of Convention XIII.).

(8) When a war breaks out, a neutral party must notify all military ships from the warring nations that were in their ports, anchorages, or territorial waters before the war started, to leave within twenty-four hours or within the time specified by local law (article 13[637] of Convention XIII.).

[631] See Curtius, Des navires de guerre dans les eaux neutres (1907).

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Curtius, Warships in Neutral Waters (1907).

[632] See below, § 347 (1).

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[633] See article 18 of Convention XIII. and above, § 330.

[633] Refer to article 18 of Convention XIII. and above, § 330.

[634] But Germany has entered a reservation against article 20.

[634] But Germany has made a reservation regarding Article 20.

[635] See below, § 347.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[636] Germany, Domingo, Siam, and Persia have entered a reservation against article 12.

[636] Germany, Domingo, Siam, and Persia have submitted a reservation regarding article 12.

[637] Germany has entered a reservation against article 13.[Pg 405]

[637] Germany has made a reservation regarding article 13.[Pg 405]

Building and Fitting-out of Vessels intended for Naval Operations.

Building and Outfitting of Vessels for Naval Operations.

§ 334. Whereas a neutral is in no[638] wise obliged by his duty of impartiality to prevent his subjects from selling armed vessels to the belligerents, such armed vessels being merely contraband of war, a neutral is bound to employ the means at his disposal to prevent his subjects from building, fitting out, or arming, to the order of either belligerent, vessels intended to be used as men-of-war, and to prevent the departure from his jurisdiction of any vessel which, by order of either belligerent, has been adapted to warlike use.[639] The difference between selling armed vessels to belligerents, on the one hand, and building them to order, on the other hand, is usually defined in the following way:—

§ 334. While a neutral party isn't required to stop their citizens from selling armed ships to the warring sides, since those ships are just considered contraband of war, a neutral must take steps to prevent their citizens from constructing, outfitting, or arming ships specifically for either side. They also need to stop any ships that have been modified for military use from leaving their territory on the orders of either side. [639] The distinction between selling armed ships to belligerents and constructing them upon request is typically explained as follows:—

An armed ship, being contraband of war, is in no wise different from other kinds of contraband, provided she is not manned in a neutral port so that she can commit hostilities at once after having reached the Open Sea. A subject of a neutral who builds an armed ship or arms a merchantman, not to order of a belligerent but intending to sell her to a belligerent, does not differ from a manufacturer of arms who intends to sell them to a belligerent. There is nothing to prevent a neutral from allowing his subjects to sell armed vessels, and to deliver them to belligerents, either in a neutral port or in a port of the belligerent. In the case of the La Santissima Trinidad[640] (1822), as in that of the Meteor[641] (1866), American courts have recognised this.[642]

An armed ship, which is considered contraband of war, is no different from other types of contraband, as long as it’s not crewed in a neutral port so that it can engage in hostilities immediately upon reaching the open sea. A neutral party who builds an armed ship or equips a merchant vessel—not at the request of a belligerent but with the intention of selling it to one—doesn’t differ from a manufacturer of weapons who plans to sell them to a belligerent. There’s nothing stopping a neutral from allowing their citizens to sell armed vessels and deliver them to belligerents, whether in a neutral port or in a belligerent's port. In the case of the La Santissima Trinidad[640] (1822), as well as in the case of the Meteor[641] (1866), American courts have recognized this.[642]

[638] See below, §§ 350 and 397.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

[639] See article 8 of Convention XIII.

[639] See Article 8 of Convention XIII.

[640] 7 Wheaton, § 340.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 7 Wheaton, § 340.

[641] See Wharton, III. § 396, p. 561.

[641] See Wharton, III. § 396, p. 561.

[642] See Phillimore, III. § 151B, and Hall, § 224.

[642] See Phillimore, III. § 151B, and Hall, § 224.

On the other hand, if a subject of a neutral builds armed ships to order of a belligerent, he prepares the means of naval operations, since the ships on sailing outside the territorial waters of the neutral and taking in a crew and ammunition can at once commit hostilities. Thus, through carrying out the order of the belligerent, the neutral territory concerned[Pg 406] has been made the base of naval operations. And as the duty of impartiality includes the obligation of the neutral to prevent either belligerent from making neutral territory the base of military or naval operations, a neutral violates his neutrality by not preventing his subjects from carrying out an order of a belligerent for the building and fitting out of men-of-war.

On the other hand, if a neutral party has its citizens build armed ships for one of the warring sides, they are setting up the means for naval operations. Since these ships can leave the neutral territory and take on a crew and ammunition, they could quickly engage in hostilities. By fulfilling the warring side's order, the neutral territory involved[Pg 406] becomes a base for naval operations. The obligation of impartiality requires the neutral party to stop either side from using neutral territory as a base for military or naval operations, so a neutral fails to maintain their neutrality if they don't prevent their citizens from following a warring side's order to build and outfit warships.

This distinction, although of course logically correct, is hair-splitting. It only shows that neutral States ought[643] to be required to prevent their subjects from supplying arms, ammunition, and the like, to belligerents. But so long as this progress is not made, the above distinction will probably continue to be drawn, in spite of its hair-splitting character.

This distinction, while logically correct, is nitpicking. It just demonstrates that neutral States should be required to stop their citizens from providing arms, ammunition, and similar supplies to warring parties. However, as long as this progress isn't made, this distinction will likely keep being made, despite its nitpicking nature.

[643] See below, § 350.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

The Alabama Case and the Three Rules of Washington.

The Alabama Case and the Three Rules of Washington.

§ 335. The movement for recognition of the fact that the duty of impartiality requires a neutral to prevent his subjects from building and fitting out to order of belligerents vessels intended for naval operations, began with the famous case of the Alabama. It is not necessary to go into all the details[644] of this case. It suffices to say that in 1862, during the American Civil War, the attention of the British Government was drawn by the Government of the United States to the fact that a vessel for warlike purposes was built in England to order of the insurgents. This vessel, afterwards called the Alabama, left Liverpool in July 1862 unarmed, but was met at the Azores by three other vessels, also coming from England, which supplied her with guns and ammunition, so that she could at once begin to prey upon the merchantmen of the United States. On the conclusion of the Civil War, the United States claimed damages from Great Britain for the losses sustained by[Pg 407] her merchant marine through the operations of the Alabama and other vessels likewise built in England. Negotiations went on for several years, and finally the parties entered, on May 8, 1871, into the Treaty of Washington[645] for the purpose of having their difference settled by arbitration, five arbitrators to be nominated—Great Britain, the United States, Brazil, Italy, and Switzerland, each choosing one. The treaty contained three rules, since then known as "The Three Rules of Washington," to be binding upon the arbitrators, namely:[646]

§ 335. The movement to recognize that the duty of impartiality requires a neutral party to stop its subjects from building and outfitting vessels for belligerents intended for naval operations, started with the famous case of the Alabama. It isn’t necessary to go into all the details[644] of this case. It’s enough to say that in 1862, during the American Civil War, the British Government was alerted by the United States Government about a vessel being built in England for military purposes on behalf of the insurgents. This vessel, later known as the Alabama, left Liverpool in July 1862 unarmed, but was met at the Azores by three other vessels also coming from England, which provided her with guns and ammunition, enabling her to immediately start attacking United States merchant ships. After the Civil War ended, the United States claimed damages from Great Britain for the losses suffered by[Pg 407] her merchant marine due to the actions of the Alabama and other vessels similarly built in England. Negotiations continued for several years, and finally, on May 8, 1871, the parties signed the Treaty of Washington[645] to have their dispute resolved through arbitration, with five arbitrators to be chosen—Great Britain, the United States, Brazil, Italy, and Switzerland, each selecting one. The treaty included three rules, known as "The Three Rules of Washington," which would be binding on the arbitrators, namely:[646]

"A neutral Government is bound—

"A neutral government is required—"

"Firstly. To use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or carry on war against a Power with which it is at peace, and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction, to warlike use.

"Firstly. To apply due diligence to stop the outfitting, arming, or equipping within its jurisdiction of any vessel that it has reasonable grounds to believe is meant to cruise or wage war against a nation with which it is at peace, and also to use the same diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended for such activities, provided that the vessel has been specifically modified in whole or in part within that jurisdiction for military use."

"Secondly. Not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men.

"Secondly. Neither side is allowed to use its ports or waters as a base for naval operations against the other, or to renew or increase military supplies or weapons, or to recruit soldiers."

"Thirdly. To exercise due diligence in its waters, and as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violations of the foregoing obligations and duties."

"Thirdly. To practice due diligence in its waters, and regarding all individuals within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violations of the above obligations and duties."

[644] See Mountague Bernard, Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War (1870), pp. 338-496; Geffcken, Die Alabama Frage (1872); Pradier-Fodéré, La Question de l'Alabama (1872); Caleb Cushing, Le Traité de Washington (1874); Bluntschli in R.I. II. (1870), pp. 452-485; Balch, L'Évolution de l'arbitrage international (1908), pp. 43-70.

[644] See Montague Bernard, The Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War (1870), pp. 338-496; Geffcken, The Alabama Question (1872); Pradier-Fodéré, The Alabama Question (1872); Caleb Cushing, The Washington Treaty (1874); Bluntschli in R.I. II. (1870), pp. 452-485; Balch, The Evolution of International Arbitration (1908), pp. 43-70.

[645] Martens, N.R.G. XX. p. 698.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Martens, N.R.G. Vol. XX, p. 698.

[646] See Moore, VII. § 1330.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Moore, VII. § 1330.

In consenting that these rules should be binding upon the arbitrators, Great Britain expressly declared that, in spite of her consent, she maintained that these rules were not recognised rules of International Law at the time when the case of the Alabama occurred,[Pg 408] and the treaty contains also the stipulation that the parties—

In agreeing that these rules should be binding for the arbitrators, Great Britain clearly stated that, despite her agreement, she believed these rules were not recognized as International Law when the case of the Alabama happened,[Pg 408] and the treaty also includes the requirement that the parties—

"Agree to observe these rules as between themselves in future, and to bring them to the knowledge of other Maritime Powers, and to invite them to accede to them."

"Agree to follow these rules among themselves going forward, share them with other Maritime Powers, and invite them to join in."

The appointed arbitrators[647] met at Geneva in 1871, held thirty-two conferences there, and gave decision[648] on September 14, 1872, according to which England had to pay 15,500,000 dollars damages to the United States.

The appointed arbitrators[647] met in Geneva in 1871, held thirty-two meetings there, and made their ruling[648] on September 14, 1872, stating that England had to pay 15,500,000 dollars in damages to the United States.

[647] See Moore, Arbitrations, I. pp. 495-682.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Moore, Arbitrations, I. pp. 495-682.

[648] The award is printed in full in Moore, Arbitrations, I. pp. 653-659, and in Phillimore, III. § 151.

[648] The award is fully printed in Moore, Arbitrations, I. pp. 653-659, and in Phillimore, III. § 151.

The arbitrators put a construction upon the term due diligence[649] and asserted other opinions in their decision which are very much contested and to which Great Britain never consented. Thus, Great Britain and the United States, although they agreed upon the three rules, did not at all agree upon the interpretation thereof, and they could, therefore, likewise not agree upon the contents of the communication to other maritime States stipulated by the Treaty of Washington. It ought not, therefore, to be said that the Three Rules of Washington[650] have literally become universal rules of International Law. Nevertheless, they were the starting-point of the movement for the universal recognition of the fact that the duty of impartiality obliges neutrals to prevent their subjects from building and fitting out, to order of belligerents, vessels intended for warlike purposes, and to prevent the departure from their jurisdiction of any vessel, which, by order of a belligerent, has been adapted to warlike use. Particular attention must be paid to the fact that, although article 8 of Convention XIII. in other respects[Pg 409] copies almost verbally the first of the Three Rules of Washington, it differs from it in so far as it replaces the words "to use due diligence" by "to employ the means at its disposal." For this reason the construction put by the Geneva arbitrators upon the term due diligence cannot find application to the rule of article 8, the employment of the means at the disposal of a neutral to prevent the acts concerned being a mere question of fact.

The arbitrators interpreted the term due diligence[649] and expressed other views in their decision that are heavily disputed and which Great Britain never agreed to. So, while Great Britain and the United States reached a consensus on the three rules, they fundamentally disagreed on their interpretation. Consequently, they also couldn't agree on the details of the communication to other maritime States as stated in the Treaty of Washington. It shouldn't be claimed that the Three Rules of Washington[650] have officially become universal rules of International Law. Still, they were the starting point for the movement toward the global acceptance of the idea that the obligation of impartiality requires neutral parties to stop their citizens from building and outfitting vessels for belligerents that are meant for military purposes, and to prevent any vessel adapted for military use by a belligerent from leaving their jurisdiction. Special attention must be given to the fact that, while Article 8 of Convention XIII mostly copies the first of the Three Rules of Washington almost word-for-word, it differs by replacing "to use due diligence" with "to employ the means at its disposal." Therefore, the interpretation made by the Geneva arbitrators regarding the term due diligence does not apply to the rule in Article 8, as using the means available to a neutral to prevent the relevant actions is simply a matter of fact.

[649] See below, § 363.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[650] As regards the seven rules adopted by the Institute of International Law, at its meeting at the Hague in 1875, as emanating from the Three Rules of Washington, see Annuaire, I. (1877), p. 139.

[650] Regarding the seven rules adopted by the Institute of International Law at its meeting in The Hague in 1875, which are derived from the Three Rules of Washington, see Annuaire, I. (1877), p. 139.

IV Neutral Asylum for Ground Troops and Military Supplies

Vattel, III. §§ 132-133—Hall, §§ 226 and 230—Halleck, II. p. 150—Taylor, § 621—Wharton, III. § 394—Moore, VII. §§ 1314-1318—Bluntschli, §§ 774, 776-776A, 785—Heffter, § 149—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 662-665—Ullmann, § 191—Bonfils, Nos. 1461-1462—Rivier, II. pp. 395-398—Calvo, IV. §§ 2668-2669—Fiore, III. Nos. 1576, 1582, 1583—Martens, II. § 133—Mérignhac, pp. 370-376—Pillet, pp. 286-287—Kleen, II. §§ 151-157—Holland, War, Nos. 131-133—Zorn, pp. 316-352—Heilborn, Rechte und Pflichten der neutralen Staaten in Bezug auf die während des Krieges auf ihr Gebiet übertretenden Angehörigen einer Armee und das dorthingebrachte Kriegsmaterial der kriegführenden Parteien (1888), pp. 12-83—Rolin-Jaequemyns in R.I. III. (1871), pp. 352-366—Land Warfare, §§ 485-501.

Vattel, III. §§ 132-133—Hall, §§ 226 and 230—Halleck, II. p. 150—Taylor, § 621—Wharton, III. § 394—Moore, VII. §§ 1314-1318—Bluntschli, §§ 774, 776-776A, 785—Heffter, § 149—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 662-665—Ullmann, § 191—Bonfils, Nos. 1461-1462—Rivier, II. pp. 395-398—Calvo, IV. §§ 2668-2669—Fiore, III. Nos. 1576, 1582, 1583—Martens, II. § 133—Mérignhac, pp. 370-376—Pillet, pp. 286-287—Kleen, II. §§ 151-157—Holland, War, Nos. 131-133—Zorn, pp. 316-352—Heilborn, Rights and Duties of Neutral States Regarding the Army Members and War Materials Crossing Their Territories During War (1888), pp. 12-83—Rolin-Jaequemyns in R.I. III. (1871), pp. 352-366—Land Warfare, §§ 485-501.

On Neutral Asylum in general.

On Neutral Asylum overall.

§ 336. Neutral territory, being outside the region of war,[651] offers an asylum to members of belligerent forces, to the subjects of the belligerents and their property, and to war material of the belligerents. Since, according to the present rules of International Law, the duty of either belligerent to treat neutrals according to their impartiality must—the case of extreme necessity for self-preservation excepted—prevent them from violating the territorial supremacy of neutrals, enemy persons as well as enemy goods are perfectly safe on neutral territory. It is true that[Pg 410] neither belligerent has a right to demand from a neutral[652] such asylum for his subjects, their property, and his State property. But neither has he, on the other hand, any right to demand that a neutral refuse such asylum to the enemy. The territorial supremacy of the neutral enables him to use his discretion, and either to grant or to refuse asylum. However, the duty of impartiality incumbent upon him must induce a neutral granting asylum to take all such measures as are necessary to prevent his territory from being used as a base of hostile operations.

§ 336. Neutral territory, being outside the area of conflict,[651] provides refuge for members of warring forces, the nationals of the belligerents and their property, as well as the war supplies of the belligerents. According to current International Law, each belligerent is obligated to treat neutrals based on their neutrality, which generally prevents them from infringing on the territorial rights of neutrals—except in cases of extreme necessity for self-defense. Enemy personnel and property are safe in neutral territories. While no belligerent can demand that a neutral country offer asylum for their nationals, their property, and state assets, neither can they insist that a neutral deny asylum to the enemy. The neutral's territorial authority gives them the discretion to either grant or deny asylum. However, their duty of impartiality means that a neutral granting asylum must take all necessary steps to ensure their territory is not used as a base for hostile actions.

[651] See above, §§ 70 and 71.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

[652] The generally recognised usage for a neutral to grant temporary hospitality in his ports to vessels in distress of either belligerent is an exception to be discussed below in § 344.

[652] The commonly accepted practice for a neutral nation to offer temporary shelter to ships in distress, regardless of which side they belong to, is an exception that will be addressed later in § 344.

Now, neutral territory may be an asylum, first, for private enemy property; secondly, for public enemy property, especially war material, cash, and provisions; thirdly, for private subjects of the enemy; fourthly, for enemy land forces; and, fifthly, for enemy naval forces. Details, however, need only be given with regard to asylum to land forces, war material, and naval forces. For with regard to private property and private subjects it need only be mentioned that private war material brought into neutral territory stands on the same footing as public war material of a belligerent brought there, and, further, that private enemy subjects are safe on neutral territory even if they are claimed by a belligerent for the committal of war crimes.

Now, neutral territory can be a safe haven, first, for private enemy property; second, for public enemy property, especially military equipment, cash, and supplies; third, for private individuals from the enemy; fourth, for enemy ground forces; and fifth, for enemy naval forces. However, details only need to be provided regarding protection for land forces, military equipment, and naval forces. As for private property and private individuals, it's sufficient to state that private military equipment brought into neutral territory is treated the same as public military equipment of a warring party brought there, and also that private individuals from the enemy are protected on neutral territory, even if they are sought by a warring party for alleged war crimes.

Only asylum to land forces and war material will be discussed here in §§ 337-341, asylum to naval forces being reserved for separate discussion in §§ 342-348. As regards asylum to land forces, a distinction must be made between (1) prisoners of war, (2) single fugitive soldiers, and (3) troops or whole armies pursued by the enemy and thereby induced to take refuge on neutral territory.

Only asylum for land forces and war materials will be discussed here in §§ 337-341, with asylum for naval forces being set aside for separate discussion in §§ 342-348. When it comes to asylum for land forces, we need to distinguish between (1) prisoners of war, (2) individual fleeing soldiers, and (3) troops or entire armies being chased by the enemy and therefore seeking refuge on neutral territory.

Neutral Territory and Prisoners of War.

Neutral Territory and Prisoners of War.

§ 337. Neutral territory is an asylum to prisoners[Pg 411] of war of either belligerent in so far as they become free ipso facto by their coming into neutral territory. And it matters not in which way they come there, whether they escape from a place of detention and take refuge on neutral territory, or whether they are brought as prisoners into such territory by enemy troops who themselves take refuge there.[653]

§ 337. Neutral territory is a safe haven for prisoners of war from either side, as they become free automatically upon entering that neutral area. It doesn't matter how they get there, whether they escape from a detention facility and find refuge in neutral territory, or if they are taken as prisoners into that territory by enemy forces seeking refuge themselves.[653]

[653] The case of prisoners on board a belligerent man-of-war which enters a neutral port is different; see below, § 345.

[653] The situation with prisoners on a warship that docks in a neutral port is different; see below, § 345.

The principle that prisoners of war regain their liberty by coming into neutral territory has been generally recognised for centuries. An illustration occurred in 1558, when several Turkish and Barbary captives escaped from one of the galleys of the Spanish Armada which was wrecked near Calais, and, although the Spanish Ambassador claimed them, France considered them to be freed by the fact of their coming on her territory, and sent them to Constantinople.[654] But has the neutral on whose territory a prisoner has taken refuge the duty to retain such fugitives and thereby prevent them from rejoining the enemy army? Formerly this question was not settled. In 1870, during the Franco-German War, Belgium answered the question in the affirmative, and detained a French non-commissioned officer who had been a prisoner in Germany and had escaped into Belgian territory with the intention of rejoining at once the French forces. Whereas this case was controversial,[655] all writers agreed that the case was different if escaped prisoners wanted to remain on the neutral territory. As such refugees might at any subsequent time wish to rejoin their forces, the neutral was by his duty of impartiality considered to be obliged to take adequate measures to prevent their so doing. There was likewise no unanimity regarding prisoners brought into neutral territory by enemy[Pg 412] forces taking refuge there. It was agreed that such prisoners became free by being brought into neutral territory; but whereas some writers[656] maintained that they could not be detained in case they intended at once to leave the neutral territory, others asserted that they must always be detained and that they must comply with such measures as the neutral considers necessary to prevent them from rejoining their forces.

The idea that prisoners of war can regain their freedom by entering neutral territory has been widely accepted for centuries. A notable example occurred in 1558 when several Turkish and Barbary captives escaped from one of the Spanish Armada's galleys, which had wrecked near Calais. Although the Spanish Ambassador claimed them, France believed they were freed by simply being on its territory and sent them to Constantinople.[654] But does the neutral country where a prisoner seeks refuge have the responsibility to hold onto these fugitives and stop them from rejoining the enemy army? This question was not clearly answered in the past. In 1870, during the Franco-German War, Belgium answered affirmatively and detained a French non-commissioned officer who had escaped from Germany and entered Belgium, intending to return to the French forces. While this case was controversial,[655] most writers agreed that the situation would be different if escaped prisoners wanted to stay on neutral ground. Since these refugees might later wish to rejoin their forces, the neutral was seen as having a duty of impartiality to take necessary steps to prevent that from happening. There was also no consensus about prisoners who were brought into neutral territory by enemy forces seeking refuge there. It was generally agreed that such prisoners became free upon entering neutral territory; however, some writers[656] argued they could not be detained if they intended to leave immediately, while others insisted they must always be held and comply with whatever measures the neutral deems necessary to prevent them from rejoining their forces.

[654] See Hall, § 226, p. 641, note 1.

[654] See Hall, § 226, p. 641, note 1.

[655] See Rolin-Jaequemyns in R.I. III. (1871), p. 556; Bluntschli, § 776; Heilborn, Rechte, pp. 32-34.

[655] See Rolin-Jaequemyns in R.I. III. (1871), p. 556; Bluntschli, § 776; Heilborn, Rechte, pp. 32-34.

[656] For instance, Heilborn, Rechte, pp. 51-52.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ For example, Heilborn, Rights, pp. 51-52.

Article 13 of Convention V. settles the controversy by enacting that a neutral who receives prisoners of war who have escaped or who are brought there by troops of the enemy taking refuge on neutral territory, shall leave them at liberty, but that, if he allows them to remain on his territory, he may—he need not!—assign them a place of residence so as to prevent them from rejoining their forces. Since, therefore, everything is left to the discretion of the neutral, he will have to take into account the merits and needs of every case and to take such steps as he thinks adequate. But so much is certain that a belligerent may not in every case categorically demand from a neutral who receives escaped prisoners, or such as have been brought there by troops who take refuge, that he should detain them.

Article 13 of Convention V addresses the issue by stating that a neutral who receives prisoners of war who have escaped or who are brought there by enemy troops taking refuge on neutral ground must let them go free. However, if the neutral allows them to stay on their territory, they may—but are not required to—assign them a residence to prevent them from joining their forces again. Therefore, everything is left to the neutral's discretion, and they need to consider the specifics and requirements of each case and take appropriate actions as they see fit. It is clear that a belligerent cannot always insist that a neutral who receives escaped prisoners, or those brought by seeking enemy troops, must detain them.

The case of prisoners who, with the consent of the neutral, are transported through neutral territory is different. Such prisoners do not become free on entering the neutral territory, but there is no doubt that a neutral, by consenting to the transport, violates his duty of impartiality, because such transport is equal to passage of troops through neutral territory (article 2 of Convention V.).

The situation with prisoners who are transported through neutral territory with the neutral party's consent is different. These prisoners don’t automatically gain their freedom when they enter the neutral territory, but it’s clear that the neutral party, by allowing the transport, is violating their duty to remain impartial because this transport is similar to allowing troops to pass through neutral territory (article 2 of Convention V.).

Attention must, lastly, be drawn to the case where enemy soldiers are amongst the wounded whom a belligerent is allowed by a neutral to transport through neutral territory. Such wounded prisoners become[Pg 413] free, but they must, according to article 14 of Convention V., be guarded by the neutral so as to insure their not again taking part in military operations.[657]

Lastly, we need to pay attention to the situation where enemy soldiers are among the wounded that a belligerent is allowed to transport through neutral territory. These wounded prisoners become[Pg 413] free, but according to Article 14 of Convention V., they must be guarded by the neutral to ensure they don’t take part in military operations again.[657]

[657] See also article 15 of Convention X. and below, § 348a.

[657] See also Article 15 of Convention X and below, § 348a.

Fugitive Soldiers on Neutral Territory.

Fugitive Soldiers in Neutral Territory.

§ 338. A neutral may grant asylum to single soldiers of belligerents who take refuge on his territory, although he need not do so, and may at once send them back to the place they came from. If he grants such asylum, his duty of impartiality obliges him to disarm the fugitives and to take such measures as are necessary to prevent them from rejoining their forces. But it must be emphasised that it is practically impossible for a neutral to be so watchful as to detect every single fugitive who enters his territory. It will always happen that such fugitives steal into neutral territory and leave it again later on to rejoin their forces without the neutral being responsible. And, before he can incur responsibility for not doing so, a neutral must actually be in a position to detain such fugitives. Thus Luxemburg, during the Franco-German War, could not prevent hundreds of French soldiers, who, after the capitulation of Metz, fled into her territory, from rejoining the French forces; because, according to the condition[658] of her neutralisation, she is not allowed to keep an army, and therefore, in contradistinction to Switzerland and Belgium, was unable to mobilise troops for the purpose of fulfilling her duty of impartiality.

§ 338. A neutral country can grant asylum to individual soldiers from warring parties who seek refuge on its territory, but it’s not obligated to do so and can immediately send them back to where they came from. If it grants asylum, it must disarm these soldiers and take necessary steps to prevent them from rejoining their forces. However, it’s important to note that it's nearly impossible for a neutral country to be vigilant enough to catch every single soldier who enters its territory. There will always be cases where these soldiers slip into neutral territory and then leave again to return to their forces without the neutral country being held accountable. A neutral country can only be responsible for not acting if it is actually able to detain such soldiers. For instance, during the Franco-German War, Luxemburg was unable to stop hundreds of French soldiers from leaving its territory to rejoin the French forces after the surrender of Metz because, due to its status as a neutral country, it is not permitted to maintain an army, and unlike Switzerland and Belgium, it could not mobilize troops to fulfill its duty of impartiality.

Neutral Territory and Fugitive Troops.

Neutral Zone and Escaped Soldiers.

§ 339. On occasions during war large bodies of troops, or even a whole army, are obliged to cross the neutral frontier for the purpose of escaping captivity. A neutral need not permit this, and may repulse them on the spot, but he may also grant asylum. It is, however, obvious that the presence of such troops on neutral territory is a danger for the other party. The duty of impartiality incumbent upon a neutral[Pg 414] obliges him, therefore, to disarm such troops at once, and to guard them so as to insure their not again performing military acts against the enemy during the war. Convention V. enacts the following rules:—

§ 339. Sometimes during war, large groups of troops, or even an entire army, have to cross into neutral territory to avoid capture. A neutral country doesn't have to allow this and can reject them immediately, but it can also offer asylum. However, it's clear that having these troops on neutral land poses a risk to the opposing side. The duty of neutrality requires the neutral side[Pg 414] to disarm these troops right away and keep them under control to prevent them from carrying out military actions against the enemy during the war. Convention V. establishes the following rules:—

Article 11: "A neutral Power which receives in its territory troops belonging to the belligerent armies shall detain them, if possible, at some distance from the theatre of war. It may keep them in camps, and even confine them in fortresses or localities assigned for the purpose. It shall decide whether officers are to be left at liberty on giving their parole that they will not leave the neutral territory without authorisation."

Article 11: "A neutral country that allows troops from warring armies into its territory should keep them, if possible, at a distance from the area of conflict. It may hold them in camps and even confine them in fortresses or designated locations. It will decide whether officers can be released on the condition that they promise not to leave the neutral territory without permission."

Article 12: "In the absence of a special Convention, the neutral Power shall supply the interned with the food, clothing, and relief which the dictates of humanity prescribe. At the conclusion of peace, the expenses caused by internment shall be made good."

Article 12: "If there isn’t a specific agreement, the neutral country will provide the people who have been interned with food, clothing, and assistance as required by human compassion. Once peace is restored, the costs associated with internment will be reimbursed."

It is usual for troops who are not actually pursued by the enemy—for if pursued they have no time for it—to enter through their commander into a convention with the representative of the neutral concerned, stipulating the conditions upon which they cross the frontier and give themselves into the custody of the neutral. Such conventions are valid without needing ratification, provided they contain only such stipulations as do not disagree with International Law and as concern only the requirements of the case.

It’s common for troops who aren’t actually being chased by the enemy—because if they were, they wouldn’t have time for this—to work out an agreement through their commander with a representative of the neutral party involved. This agreement outlines the conditions for crossing the border and handing themselves over to the neutral authority. These agreements are valid without needing to be approved, as long as they include only terms that align with International Law and address the specific situation.

The most remarkable instance known in history is the asylum granted by Switzerland during the Franco-German War to a French army of 85,000 men with 10,000 horses which crossed the frontier on February 1, 1871.[659] France had, after the conclusion of the war, to pay about eleven million francs for the maintenance of this army in Switzerland during the rest of the war.

The most notable event recorded in history is the refuge provided by Switzerland during the Franco-German War to a French army of 85,000 soldiers and 10,000 horses, which crossed the border on February 1, 1871.[659] After the war ended, France had to pay around eleven million francs for the care of this army in Switzerland for the remainder of the conflict.

[659] See the Convention regarding this asylum between the Swiss General Herzog and the French General Clinchant in Martens, N.R.G. XIX. p. 639.

[659] See the agreement about this asylum between Swiss General Herzog and French General Clinchant in Martens, N.R.G. XIX. p. 639.

Neutral Territory and Non-combatant Members of Belligerent Forces.

Neutral Territory and Non-combatant Members of Warring Forces.

§ 340. The duty of impartiality incumbent upon a neutral obliges him to detain in the same way as soldiers such non-combatant[660] members of belligerent forces as cross his frontier. He may not, however, detain army surgeons and other non-combatants who are privileged according to article 2 of the Geneva Convention.

§ 340. The obligation of neutrality requires a neutral party to treat non-combatant members of warring forces crossing their border in the same manner as soldiers. However, they cannot detain army surgeons and other non-combatants who are granted privileges under article 2 of the Geneva Convention.

[660] See Heilborn, Rechte, pp. 43-46. Convention V. does not mention any rule concerning this matter.

[660] See Heilborn, Rights, pp. 43-46. Convention V. does not mention any rules regarding this issue.

Neutral Territory and War Material of Belligerents.

Neutral Territory and War Materials of Warring Parties.

§ 341. It can happen during war that war material belonging to one of the belligerents is brought into neutral territory for the purpose of saving it from capture by the enemy. Such war material can be brought by troops crossing the neutral frontier for the purpose of evading captivity, or it can be purposely sent there by order of a commander. Now, a neutral is by no means obliged to admit such material, just as he is not obliged to admit soldiers of belligerents. But if he admits it, his duty of impartiality obliges him to seize and retain it till after the conclusion of peace. War material includes, besides arms, ammunition, provisions, horses, means of military transport such as carts and the like, and everything else that belongs to the[Pg 416] equipment of troops. But means of military transport belong to war material only so far as they are the property of a belligerent. If they are hired or requisitioned from private individuals, they may not be detained by the neutral.

§ 341. During war, it’s possible for military supplies owned by one of the fighting parties to be brought into neutral territory to protect them from being captured by the enemy. These supplies might be taken by troops crossing the neutral border to avoid capture, or they could be intentionally sent there under orders from a commander. A neutral country is not obligated to accept such supplies, just as it isn’t required to permit soldiers from the warring parties. However, if it does allow them in, the neutral’s duty of impartiality requires it to seize and hold these materials until after peace is established. War supplies include, in addition to weapons, ammunition, food, horses, military transport methods like carts, and anything else that is part of the[Pg 416] troops' equipment. Military transport methods are considered war supplies only if they belong to a warring party. If they are rented or taken from private individuals, the neutral country cannot keep them.

It can likewise happen during war that war material, originally the property of one of the belligerents but seized and appropriated by the enemy, is brought by the latter into neutral territory. Does such material, through coming into neutral territory, become free, and must it be restored to its original owner, or must it be retained by the neutral and after the war be restored to the belligerent who brought it into the neutral territory? In analogy with prisoners of war who become free through being brought into neutral territory, it is maintained[661] that such war material becomes free and must be restored to its original owner. To this however, I cannot agree.[662] Since war material becomes through seizure by the enemy his property and remains his property unless the other party re-seizes and thereby re-appropriates it, there is no reason for its reverting to its original owner upon transportation into neutral territory.[663]

It can also happen during war that military supplies, originally owned by one of the opposing sides but taken and claimed by the enemy, are brought into neutral territory by the latter. Does this material become free simply because it has entered neutral territory, and does it need to be returned to its original owner, or should it be kept by the neutral party and returned to the belligerent who brought it into the neutral territory after the war? By analogy with prisoners of war who become free when brought into neutral territory, it is argued[661] that such military supplies become free and should be returned to their original owner. However, I cannot agree with this.[662] Since military supplies become the property of the enemy upon seizure and remain their property unless the other side reclaims and re-appropriates them, there is no reason for them to revert to their original owner simply because they were transported into neutral territory.[663]

[661] See Hall, § 226.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Hall, § 226.

[662] See Heilborn, Rechte, p. 60, and Land Warfare, § 492. The Dutch Government at the Second Peace Conference proposed a rule according to which captured war material brought by the captor into neutral territory should be restored, after the war, to its original owner, but—see Deuxième Conférence, Actes, vol. i. p. 145—this proposal was not accepted.

[662] See Heilborn, Rights, p. 60, and Land Warfare, § 492. The Dutch Government at the Second Peace Conference suggested a rule stating that captured war materials taken by the captor into neutral territory should be returned to their original owner after the war, but—see Second Conference, Proceedings, vol. i. p. 145—this proposal was not accepted.

[663] See Heilborn, Rechte, pp. 61-65, where the question is discussed as to whether a neutral may claim a lien on war material brought into his territory for expenses incurred for the maintenance of detained troops belonging to the owner of the war material.[Pg 417]

[663] See Heilborn, Rechte, pp. 61-65, where the discussion revolves around whether a neutral party can assert a lien on war materials that have been brought into their territory to cover expenses related to the upkeep of detained troops belonging to the owner of the war materials.[Pg 417]

V Neutral Refuge for Naval Forces

Vattel, III. § 132—Hall, § 231—Twiss, II. § 222—Halleck, II. p. 151—Taylor, §§ 635, 636, 640—Wharton, III. § 394—Wheaton, § 434—Moore, VII. §§ 1314-1318—Bluntschli, §§ 775-776B—Heffter, § 149—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 665-667, 674—Ullmann, § 191—Bonfils, No. 1463—Despagnet, No. 692 ter—Rivier, II. p. 405—Calvo, IV. §§ 2669-2684—Fiore, III. Nos. 1576-1581, 1584, and Code, Nos. 1788-1792—Martens, II. § 133—Kleen, II. § 155—Pillet, pp. 305-307—Perels, § 39, p. 231—Testa, pp. 173-187—Dupuis, Nos. 308-314, and Guerre, Nos. 304-328—Ortolan, II. pp. 247-291—Hautefeuille, I. pp. 344-405—Takahashi, pp. 418-484—Bajer in R.I. 2nd Ser. II. (1900), pp. 242-244—Lapradelle in R.G. XI. (1904), p. 531.

Vattel, III. § 132—Hall, § 231—Twiss, II. § 222—Halleck, II. p. 151—Taylor, §§ 635, 636, 640—Wharton, III. § 394—Wheaton, § 434—Moore, VII. §§ 1314-1318—Bluntschli, §§ 775-776B—Heffter, § 149—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 665-667, 674—Ullmann, § 191—Bonfils, No. 1463—Despagnet, No. 692 ter—Rivier, II. p. 405—Calvo, IV. §§ 2669-2684—Fiore, III. Nos. 1576-1581, 1584, and Code, Nos. 1788-1792—Martens, II. § 133—Kleen, II. § 155—Pillet, pp. 305-307—Perels, § 39, p. 231—Testa, pp. 173-187—Dupuis, Nos. 308-314, and Guerre, Nos. 304-328—Ortolan, II. pp. 247-291—Hautefeuille, I. pp. 344-405—Takahashi, pp. 418-484—Bajer in R.I. 2nd Ser. II. (1900), pp. 242-244—Lapradelle in R.G. XI. (1904), p. 531.

Asylum to Naval Forces in contradistinction to Asylum to Land Forces.

Asylum for Naval Forces as opposed to Asylum for Land Forces.

§ 342. Whereas asylum granted by a neutral to land forces and single members of them is conditioned by the obligation of the neutral to disarm such forces and to detain them for the purpose of preventing them from joining in further military operations, a neutral may grant temporary asylum to men-of-war of belligerents without being obliged to disarm and detain them.[664] The reason is that the sea is considered an international highway, that the ports of all nations serve more or less the interests of international traffic on the sea, and that the conditions of navigation make a certain hospitality of ports to vessels of all nations a necessity. Thus the rules of International Law regarding asylum of neutral ports to men-of-war of belligerents have developed on somewhat different lines from the rules regarding asylum to land forces. But the rule, that the duty of impartiality incumbent upon a neutral must prevent him from allowing belligerents to use his territory as a base of operations of war, is nevertheless valid regarding asylum granted to their men-of-war.

§ 342. While a neutral country must disarm and detain land forces when granting asylum to them, it can offer temporary asylum to warships from warring parties without needing to disarm or detain them.[664] This is because the sea is regarded as an international highway, and the ports of all nations facilitate international shipping. The nature of maritime navigation necessitates a level of hospitality from ports to vessels from all countries. As a result, the rules of International Law governing asylum in neutral ports for warships differ from those for land forces. However, the principle that a neutral country must maintain impartiality and prevent belligerents from using its territory as a base for military operations still applies to warships.

[664] See, however, below, § 347, concerning the abuse of asylum, which must be prohibited.

[664] See below, § 347, regarding the misuse of asylum, which needs to be banned.

Neutral Asylum to Naval Forces optional.

Neutral Asylum for Naval Forces is optional.

§ 343. Although a neutral may grant asylum to belligerent men-of-war in his ports, he has no duty to[Pg 418] do so. He may prohibit all belligerent men-of-war from entering any of his ports, whether these vessels are pursued by the enemy or desire to enter for other reasons. However, his duty of impartiality must prevent him from denying to the one party what he grants to the other, and he may not, therefore, allow entry to men-of-war of one belligerent without giving the same permission to men-of-war of the other belligerent (article 9 of Convention XIII.). Neutrals as a rule admit men-of-war of both parties, but they frequently exclude all men-of-war of both parties from entering certain ports. Thus Austria prohibited during the Crimean War all belligerent men-of-war from entering the port of Cattaro. Thus, further, Great Britain prohibited during the American Civil War the access of all belligerent men-of-war to the ports of the Bahama Islands, the case of stress of weather excepted.

§ 343. While a neutral can allow warships from warring nations to dock in their ports, they aren't required to[Pg 418] do so. They can also ban all warships from entering their ports, regardless of whether those ships are being chased by an enemy or have other reasons for coming. However, they must remain impartial and can't allow entry for one side's warships without doing the same for the other side (article 9 of Convention XIII.). Typically, neutral nations allow warships from both sides, but they often ban all warships from entering certain ports. For example, during the Crimean War, Austria prohibited all warring warships from accessing the port of Cattaro. Additionally, Great Britain denied all warring warships access to the ports of the Bahama Islands during the American Civil War, except in cases of severe weather.

Be that as it may, since a neutral must prevent belligerents from making his territory the base of military operations, he must not allow an unlimited number of men-of-war belonging to one of the belligerents to stay simultaneously in one of his ports. Article 15 of Convention XIII. limits the number of such men-of-war to three, unless there are special provisions to the contrary in the Municipal Law of the neutral concerned.

Be that as it may, since a neutral must stop warring parties from using his territory as a base for military operations, he shouldn't allow an unlimited number of warships belonging to one of the warring sides to be in one of his ports at the same time. Article 15 of Convention XIII. limits the number of such warships to three, unless there are specific provisions to the contrary in the Municipal Law of the neutral involved.

Asylum to Naval Forces in Distress.

Asylum for Naval Forces in Distress.

§ 344. To the rule that a neutral need not admit men-of-war of the belligerents to neutral ports there is no exception in strict law. However, there is an international usage that belligerent men-of-war in distress should never be prevented from making for the nearest port. In accordance with this usage vessels in distress have always been allowed entry even to such neutral ports as were totally closed to belligerent men-of-war. There are even instances known of belligerent men-of-war in distress having asked for[Pg 419] and been granted asylum by the enemy in an enemy port.[665]

§ 344. According to the rule, a neutral country doesn't have to allow warships from fighting nations into its ports, and there's no strict legal exception to this. However, in practice, when a warship is in distress, it should always be allowed to go to the nearest port. Following this practice, ships in distress have consistently been permitted to enter even neutral ports that were completely closed to enemy warships. There are even known cases where distressed enemy warships have requested and been granted asylum in enemy ports.[665]

[665] See above, § 189.

See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Exterritoriality of Men-of-War during Asylum.

Exterritoriality of Warships during Asylum.

§ 345. The exterritoriality, which according to a universally recognised rule of International Law men-of-war must enjoy[666] in foreign ports, obtains even in time of war during their stay in neutral ports. Therefore, prisoners of war on board do not become free by coming into the neutral port[667] so long as they are not brought on shore, nor do prizes[668] brought into neutral ports by belligerents. On the other hand, belligerent men-of-war are expected to comply with all orders which the neutral makes for the purpose of preventing them from making his ports the base of their operations of war, as, for instance, with the order not to leave the ports at the same time as vessels of the other belligerent. And, if they do not comply voluntarily, they may be made to do so through application of force, for a neutral has the duty to prevent by all means at hand the abuse of the asylum granted.

§ 345. Warships, under a universally recognized rule of International Law, must be granted exterritoriality in foreign ports, even during wartime while they are in neutral ports. As a result, prisoners of war on board do not gain their freedom simply by entering a neutral port unless they are brought ashore, nor do captured ships brought into neutral ports by warring parties gain such status. Conversely, warring ships are required to follow all orders from neutral authorities aimed at preventing them from using those ports as bases for military operations, such as not leaving the port simultaneously with vessels from the opposing side. If they do not comply voluntarily, force may be used to ensure compliance, as neutrals are obligated to prevent any misuse of the asylum that is provided.

[667] See above, § 337.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[668] See articles 21-23 of Convention XIII.

[668] Check out articles 21-23 of Convention XIII.

Special provision is made by article 24 of Convention XIII. for the case of a belligerent man-of-war which refuses to leave a neutral port. This article enacts:—"If, notwithstanding the notification of the neutral Power, a belligerent ship of war does not leave a port where it is not entitled to remain, the neutral Power is entitled to take such measures as it considers necessary to render the ship incapable of putting to sea so long as the war lasts, and the commanding officer of the ship must facilitate the execution of such measures. When a belligerent ship is detained by a neutral Power, the officers and crew are likewise detained. The officers and crew so detained may be left in the ship or kept either on another vessel or on land, and may be subjected to such measures of restriction as it may appear[Pg 420] necessary to impose upon them. A sufficient number of men must, however, be always left on board for looking after the vessel. The officers may be left at liberty on giving their word not to quit neutral territory without permission."

Special provisions are made by Article 24 of Convention XIII for situations involving a hostile warship that refuses to leave a neutral port. This article states: "If, despite the notification from the neutral Power, a hostile warship does not depart from a port where it should not remain, the neutral Power is entitled to take whatever measures it deems necessary to make the ship unable to leave as long as the war continues, and the ship's commanding officer must assist in implementing these measures. When a hostile ship is held by a neutral Power, its officers and crew are also held. The detained officers and crew may remain on the ship or be kept on another vessel or on land and may face restrictions as deemed necessary. However, a sufficient number of crew must always remain on board to take care of the vessel. The officers may be allowed to stay free if they promise not to leave neutral territory without permission."

If a vessel is granted asylum for the whole time of the war—see below, § 347 (3 and 4)—and is, therefore, dismantled, she loses the character of a man-of-war, no longer enjoys the privilege of exterritoriality due to men-of-war in foreign waters, and prisoners on board become free, although they must be detained by the neutral concerned.

If a ship is given asylum for the entire duration of the war—see below, § 347 (3 and 4)—and is therefore decommissioned, it loses its status as a warship, no longer has the privilege of extraterritoriality that applies to warships in foreign waters, and prisoners on board are set free, although they still have to be held by the neutral country involved.

Facilities to Men-of-War during Asylum.

Facilities for Soldiers during Asylum.

§ 346. A belligerent man-of-war, to which asylum is granted in a neutral port, is not only not disarmed and detained, but facilities may even be rendered to her as regards slight repairs, and the supply of provisions and coal. However, a neutral may only allow small repairs of the vessel herself and not of her armaments;[669] for he would render assistance to one of the belligerents, to the detriment of the other, if he were to allow the damaged armaments of a belligerent man-of-war to be repaired in a neutral port. And, further, a neutral may only allow a limited amount of provisions and coal to be taken in by a belligerent man-of-war in neutral ports;[670] for, if he did otherwise, he would allow the belligerent to use the neutral ports as a base for operations of war. And, lastly, a neutral may allow a belligerent man-of-war in his ports to enrol only such a small number of sailors as is necessary to navigate her safely to the nearest port of her home State.[671]

§ 346. A warship granted refuge in a neutral port is not only allowed to remain unarmed and not detained, but it may also receive help for minor repairs, as well as supplies of food and coal. However, a neutral country can only permit small repairs to the ship itself and not to its weapons;[669] since allowing repairs to the armaments of a warship would provide one side in the conflict an advantage over the other. Furthermore, a neutral country may only permit a limited amount of food and coal to be supplied to a warship in its ports;[670] as providing more would enable the warship to use the neutral port as a base for military operations. Finally, a neutral country may only allow a warship in its ports to take on a small number of crew members necessary to navigate safely to the nearest port of its home country.[671]

[669] See above, § 333 (5), and below, § 347 (3).

[669] See above, § 333 (5), and below, § 347 (3).

[670] See above, § 333 (4).

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § 333 (4).

[671] See above, §§ 330 and 333 (3).

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and 333 (3).

Abuse of Asylum to be prohibited.

Asylum abuse is prohibited.

§ 347. It would be easy for belligerent men-of-war to which asylum is granted in neutral ports to abuse such asylum if neutrals were not required to prohibit such abuse.[Pg 421]

§ 347. It would be simple for aggressive warships that are granted refuge in neutral ports to misuse that refuge if neutral parties were not required to prevent such misuse.[Pg 421]

(1) A belligerent man-of-war can abuse asylum, firstly, by ascertaining whether and what kind of enemy vessels are in the same neutral port, accompanying them when they leave, and attacking them immediately they reach the Open Sea. To prevent such abuse, in the eighteenth century several neutral States arranged that, if belligerent men-of-war or privateers met enemy vessels in a neutral port, they were not to be allowed to leave together, but an interval of at least twenty-four hours was to elapse between the sailing of the vessels. During the nineteenth century this so-called twenty-four hours rule was enforced by the majority of States, and the Second Peace Conference, by article 16 of Convention XIII., has made it a general rule[672] by enacting:—"When war-ships belonging to both belligerents are present simultaneously in a neutral port or roadstead, a period of not less than twenty-four hours must elapse between the departure of the ship belonging to one belligerent and the departure of the ship belonging to the other. The order of departure is determined by the order of arrival, unless the ship which arrived first is so circumstanced that an extension of its stay is permissible. A belligerent war-ship may not leave a neutral port or roadstead until twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant ship flying the flag of its adversary."

(1) A hostile warship can misuse asylum by first checking if there are any enemy vessels in the same neutral port. Then, it can follow them when they leave and attack them as soon as they reach open water. To prevent such misuse, several neutral countries in the eighteenth century decided that if hostile warships or privateers encountered enemy vessels in a neutral port, they should not be allowed to depart at the same time. Instead, there should be at least a twenty-four hour gap between the sailing of the vessels. Throughout the nineteenth century, most countries enforced this twenty-four hours rule, and the Second Peace Conference established it as a general rule in article 16 of Convention XIII by declaring:—"When warships from both belligerents are present at the same time in a neutral port or roadstead, at least twenty-four hours must pass between the departure of one belligerent's ship and the departure of the other. The order of departure is based on the order of arrival unless the first-arriving ship is in a situation that allows for an extension of its stay. A belligerent warship cannot leave a neutral port or roadstead until twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant ship flying its adversary's flag."

(2) Asylum can, secondly, be abused by wintering in a port in order to wait for other vessels of the same fleet, or by similar intentional delay. There is no doubt that neutrals must prohibit this abuse by ordering such belligerent men-of-war to leave the neutral ports. Following the example set by Great Britain in 1862,[673] several maritime States have adopted the rule of not allowing a belligerent man-of-war to stay in their[Pg 422] neutral ports for more than twenty-four hours, except on account of damage or stress of weather. Other States, such as France, do not, however, object to a more prolonged stay in their ports. Article 12 of Convention XIII. prescribes the twenty-four hours rule only for those neutral countries which have not special provisions to the contrary in their Municipal Laws.[674]

(2) Asylum can also be misused by staying in a port over the winter to wait for other ships from the same fleet, or by similar deliberate delays. It’s clear that neutral countries need to stop this misuse by requiring those warships to leave their ports. Following Great Britain's example in 1862,[673] several maritime nations have enacted a rule that prohibits warships from being in their[Pg 422] neutral ports for more than twenty-four hours, unless there’s damage or bad weather. However, other nations like France don’t mind if a ship stays longer in their ports. Article 12 of Convention XIII states the twenty-four hours rule only applies to neutral countries that don’t have specific laws saying otherwise.[674]

(3) Asylum can, thirdly, be abused by repairing a belligerent man-of-war which has become unseaworthy. Although small repairs are allowed,[675] a neutral would violate his duty of impartiality by allowing such repairs as would make good the unseaworthiness of a belligerent man-of-war. During the Russo-Japanese War this was generally recognised, and the Russian men-of-war Askold and Grossovoi in Shanghai, the Diana in Saigon, and the Lena in San Francisco had therefore to be disarmed and detained. The crews of these vessels had likewise to be detained for the time of the war.

(3) Asylum can, thirdly, be misused by repairing a damaged warship that is not seaworthy. While minor repairs are allowed, [675] a neutral party would be violating their obligation to remain impartial by making repairs that would restore the seaworthiness of a warship involved in conflict. This was generally recognized during the Russo-Japanese War, leading to the disarming and detention of the Russian warships Askold and Grossovoi in Shanghai, the Diana in Saigon, and the Lena in San Francisco. The crews of these vessels were also required to be detained for the duration of the war.

(4) Asylum can, lastly, be abused by remaining in a neutral port an undue length of time in order to escape attack and capture by the other belligerent. Neutral territorial waters are in fact an asylum for men-of-war which are pursued by the enemy, but, since nowadays a right of pursuit into neutral waters, as asserted by Bynkershoek,[676] is no longer recognised, it would be an abuse of asylum if the escaped vessel were allowed to make a prolonged stay in the neutral waters. A neutral who allowed such abuse of asylum would violate his duty of impartiality, for he would assist one of the belligerents to the disadvantage of the other.[677] Therefore,[Pg 423] when after the battle off Port Arthur in August 1904 the Russian battleship Cesarewitch, the cruiser Novik, and three destroyers escaped, and took refuge in the German port of Tsing-Tau in Kiao-Chau, the Novik, which was uninjured, had to leave the port after a few hours,[678] whereas the other vessels, which were too damaged to leave the port, were disarmed and, together with their crews, detained till the conclusion of peace. And when, at the end of May 1905, after the battle of Tsu Shima, three injured Russian men-of-war, the Aurora, Oleg, and Jemchug, escaped into the harbour of Manila, the United States of America ordered them to be disarmed and, together with their crews, to be detained during the war.

(4) Finally, asylum can be misused by staying in a neutral port for too long to avoid being attacked and captured by the other side. Neutral waters actually provide refuge for warships that are being chased by the enemy, but since a right to chase into neutral waters, as claimed by Bynkershoek,[676] is no longer recognized, it would be an abuse of asylum if the fleeing ship was allowed to linger in neutral waters. A neutral party that permitted such abuse would violate their obligation to remain impartial, as they would be favoring one side to the detriment of the other.[677] Therefore,[Pg 423] when after the battle off Port Arthur in August 1904 the Russian battleship Cesarewitch, the cruiser Novik, and three destroyers escaped and took refuge in the German port of Tsing-Tau in Kiao-Chau, the Novik, which was unharmed, had to leave the port after a few hours,[678] while the other ships, which were too damaged to depart, were disarmed and held with their crews until peace was restored. And when, at the end of May 1905, after the battle of Tsushima, three damaged Russian warships, the Aurora, Oleg, and Jemchug, took refuge in the harbor of Manila, the United States ordered them to be disarmed and detained with their crews for the duration of the war.

[672] See above, § 333 (2), and Hall, § 231, p. 651.

[672] See above, § 333 (2), and Hall, § 231, p. 651.

[673] See Hall, § 231, p. 653.

[673] See Hall, § 231, p. 653.

[674] See above, § 333 (6)—Germany, Domingo, Siam, and Persia have entered a reservation against article 12.

[674] See above, § 333 (6)—Germany, Domingo, Siam, and Persia have made a reservation regarding article 12.

[675] See above, § 333 (5) and § 346.

[675] See above, § 333 (5) and § 346.

[676] Quaest. jur. publ. I. c. 8. See also above, § 288, p. 352, and § 320, p. 387.

[676] Public Law Questions I. ch. 8. Also, refer to § 288, p. 352, and § 320, p. 387.

[677] It was only during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 that this became generally recognised, and article 24 of Convention XIII. places it beyond all doubt. Until the Russo-Japanese War it was still a controverted question whether a neutral is obliged either to dismiss or to disarm and detain such men-of war as had fled into his ports for the purpose of escaping attack and capture. See Hall, § 231, p. 651, and Perels, § 39, p. 213, in contradistinction to Fiore, III. No. 1578. The "Règlement sur le régime légal des navires et de leurs équipages dans les ports étrangers," adopted by the Institute of International Law in 1898 at its meeting at the Hague—see Annuaire, XVII. (1898), p. 273—answers (article 42) the question in the affirmative.

[677] It was only during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 that this became widely accepted, and article 24 of Convention XIII clarifies it without doubt. Before the Russo-Japanese War, it was still a debated issue whether a neutral country is required to either dismiss or disarm and detain warships that had taken refuge in its ports to avoid attack and capture. See Hall, § 231, p. 651, and Perels, § 39, p. 213, in contrast to Fiore, III. No. 1578. The "Règlement sur le régime légal des navires et de leurs équipages dans les ports étrangers," adopted by the Institute of International Law in 1898 at its meeting in The Hague—see Annuaire, XVII. (1898), p. 273—answers (article 42) the question affirmatively.

[678] This case marks the difference between the duties of neutrals as regards asylum to land and naval forces. Whereas land forces crossing neutral frontiers must either be at once repulsed or detained, men-of-war may be granted the right to stay for some limited time within neutral harbours and to leave afterwards unhindered; see above, § 342. The supply of a small quantity of coal to the Novik in Tsing-Tau was criticised by writers in the Press, but unjustly. For—see above, § 346—a neutral may allow a belligerent man-of-war in his port to take in so much coal as is necessary to navigate her to her nearest home port.

[678] This case highlights the difference in how neutral parties handle asylum for land versus naval forces. While land forces that cross neutral borders must either be immediately repelled or detained, warships may be allowed to stay in neutral ports for a limited time and leave afterward without obstruction; see above, § 342. The provision of a small amount of coal to the Novik in Tsing-Tau faced criticism from journalists, which was unwarranted. For—see above, § 346—a neutral country may permit a belligerent warship in its port to take on just enough coal to reach its nearest home port.

Neutral Men-of-War as an Asylum.

Neutral Warships as a Refuge.

§ 348. It can happen during war that neutral men-of-war pick up and save from drowning soldiers and sailors of belligerent men-of-war sunk by the enemy, or that they take belligerent marines on board for other reasons. Such neutral men-of-war being an asylum for the rescued marines, the question has arisen whether such rescued marines must be given up to the enemy, or must be detained during the war, or may be brought to their home country. Two cases are on record which illustrate this matter.

§ 348. During a war, it can occur that neutral warships rescue and save from drowning soldiers and sailors from enemy warships that have been sunk, or that they take enemy marines on board for other reasons. Since these neutral warships provide a safe haven for the rescued marines, the issue has come up about whether these rescued marines must be returned to the enemy, can be held throughout the war, or may be transported back to their home country. Two recorded cases illustrate this situation.

(1) At the beginning of the Chino-Japanese War, on July 25, 1894, after the Japanese cruiser Naniwa[Pg 424] had sunk the British ship Kow-shing, which served as transport carrying Chinese troops,[679] forty-five Chinese soldiers who clung to the mast of the sinking ship were rescued by the French gunboat Lion and brought to the Korean harbour of Chemulpo. Hundreds of others saved themselves on some islands near the spot where the incident occurred, and 120 of these were taken on board the German man-of-war Iltis and brought back to the Chinese port of Tientsin.[680]

(1) At the start of the Chino-Japanese War, on July 25, 1894, after the Japanese cruiser Naniwa[Pg 424] sank the British ship Kow-shing, which was transporting Chinese troops,[679] forty-five Chinese soldiers who clung to the mast of the sinking ship were rescued by the French gunboat Lion and taken to the Korean harbor of Chemulpo. Hundreds of others found safety on some nearby islands, and 120 of these were picked up by the German warship Iltis and returned to the Chinese port of Tientsin.[680]

(2) At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, on February 9, 1904, after the Russian cruisers Variag and Korietz had accepted the challenge[681] of a Japanese fleet, fought a battle outside the harbour of Chemulpo, and returned, crowded with wounded, to Chemulpo, the British cruiser Talbot, the French Pascal, and the Italian Elba received large numbers of the crews of the disabled Russian cruisers. The Japanese demanded that the neutral ships should give up the rescued men as prisoners of war, but the neutral commanders demurred, and an arrangement was made according to which the rescued men were handed over to the Russians under the condition that they should not take part in hostilities during the war.[682]

(2) At the start of the Russo-Japanese War on February 9, 1904, after the Russian cruisers Variag and Korietz faced off against a Japanese fleet and fought a battle outside the harbor of Chemulpo, they returned filled with wounded to Chemulpo. The British cruiser Talbot, the French Pascal, and the Italian Elba took on many of the crews from the damaged Russian cruisers. The Japanese insisted that the neutral ships hand over the rescued men as prisoners of war, but the neutral commanders hesitated. Eventually, they reached an agreement where the rescued men were returned to the Russians on the condition that they would not participate in fighting for the duration of the war.

[679] See above, § 89, p. 114, note 1.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[680] See Takahashi, Cases on International Law during the Chino-Japanese War (1899), pp. 36 and 51.

[680] See Takahashi, Cases on International Law during the Chino-Japanese War (1899), pp. 36 and 51.

[681] See above, § 320 (1).

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ (1).

[682] See Lawrence, War, pp. 63-75, and Takahashi, pp. 462-466.

[682] See Lawrence, War, pp. 63-75, and Takahashi, pp. 462-466.

The Second Peace Conference has settled the question, for article 13 of Convention X. enacts:—"If wounded, sick, or shipwrecked are taken on board a neutral man-of-war, precaution must be taken, so far as possible, that they do not again take part in the operations of the war."

The Second Peace Conference has resolved the issue, as article 13 of Convention X states:—"If wounded, sick, or shipwrecked individuals are taken aboard a neutral warship, precautions must be taken, as much as possible, to ensure they do not participate again in the war operations."

Neutral Territory and Shipwrecked Soldiers.

Neutral Zone and Shipwrecked Soldiers.

§ 348a. Just as in war on land members of the belligerent forces may find themselves on neutral territory, so in war on sea shipwrecked or wounded or sick belligerent soldiers can be brought into neutral[Pg 425] territory. Two cases of this kind must be distinguished:—

§ 348a. Just like in land warfare, where soldiers from fighting forces may end up in neutral areas, in naval warfare, shipwrecked, injured, or ill soldiers from the warring sides can also be brought into neutral[Pg 425] territory. Two cases of this situation need to be differentiated:—

(1) According to article 14 of Convention X. it is left to the belligerent man-of-war who captures shipwrecked, wounded, or sick enemy soldiers to send them to a neutral port. The neutral Power concerned need not receive them, but, on the other hand, may grant them asylum. If asylum is granted, the neutral Power is, according to article 15 of Convention X., obliged—unless there is an arrangement to the contrary between the neutral Power and both belligerents—to guard them so as to prevent them from again taking part in the war,[683] the expenses for tending and interning them to be paid by the belligerent to whom they belong.

(1) According to Article 14 of Convention X, it's up to the capturing naval ship to take shipwrecked, injured, or sick enemy soldiers to a neutral port. The neutral country doesn't have to accept them but can choose to grant them asylum. If asylum is granted, the neutral country must, according to Article 15 of Convention X, ensure that these soldiers do not participate in the war again, unless there’s a different agreement between the neutral country and both warring parties. The costs for caring for and detaining them should be covered by the belligerent to whom they belong.[683]

(2) Neutral merchantmen[684] can either of their own accord have rescued wounded, sick, or shipwrecked men, or they can have taken them on board on appeal by belligerent men-of-war. The surrender of these men may, according to article 12 of Convention X., be demanded at any time by any belligerent man-of-war. But if such demand be not made and the men be brought into a neutral port, they need not be detained by the neutral concerned.

(2) Neutral merchant ships[684] can voluntarily rescue injured, sick, or shipwrecked individuals, or they can take them on board if requested by warring military ships. According to Article 12 of Convention X., any military ship can demand the surrender of these individuals at any time. However, if no demand is made and the individuals are brought into a neutral port, the neutral party does not have to keep them there.

[683] See above, § 205.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[684] See above, § 208 (2).[Pg 426]

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.[Pg 426]

VI SUPPLIES AND LOANS TO CONFLICTING PARTIES

Vattel, III. § 110—Hall, §§ 216-217—Lawrence, § 235—Westlake, II. pp. 217-219—Phillimore, III. § 151—Twiss, II. § 227—Halleck, II. p. 163—Taylor, §§ 622-625—Walker, § 67—Wharton, III. §§ 390-391—Moore, VII. §§ 1307-1312—Bluntschli, §§ 765-768—Heffter, § 148—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 687-700—Ullmann, §§ 191-192—Bonfils, Nos. 1471-1474—Despagnet, Nos. 693-694—Rivier, II. pp. 385-411—Calvo, IV. §§ 2624-2630—Fiore, III. Nos. 1559-1563—Martens, II. § 134—Kleen, I. §§ 66-69, 96-97—Mérignhac, pp. 360-364—Pillet, pp. 289-293—Dupuis, Nos. 317-319—Land Warfare, §§ 477-480.

Vattel, III. § 110—Hall, §§ 216-217—Lawrence, § 235—Westlake, II. pp. 217-219—Phillimore, III. § 151—Twiss, II. § 227—Halleck, II. p. 163—Taylor, §§ 622-625—Walker, § 67—Wharton, III. §§ 390-391—Moore, VII. §§ 1307-1312—Bluntschli, §§ 765-768—Heffter, § 148—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 687-700—Ullmann, §§ 191-192—Bonfils, Nos. 1471-1474—Despagnet, Nos. 693-694—Rivier, II. pp. 385-411—Calvo, IV. §§ 2624-2630—Fiore, III. Nos. 1559-1563—Martens, II. § 134—Kleen, I. §§ 66-69, 96-97—Mérignhac, pp. 360-364—Pillet, pp. 289-293—Dupuis, Nos. 317-319—Land Warfare, §§ 477-480.

Supply on the part of Neutrals.

Supply on the part of Neutrals.

§ 349. The duty of impartiality must prevent a neutral from supplying belligerents with arms, ammunition, vessels, and military provisions.[685] And it matters not whether such supply takes place for money or gratuitously. A neutral who sold arms and ammunition to a belligerent at a profit would violate his duty of impartiality as also would one who transferred such arms and ammunition to a belligerent as a present. This is a settled rule so far as direct transactions regarding such supply between belligerents and neutrals are concerned. The case is different where a neutral does not directly and knowingly deal with a belligerent, although he may, or ought to, be aware that he is indirectly supplying a belligerent. Different States have during neutrality taken up different attitudes regarding such cases. Thus in 1825, during the War of Independence which the Spanish South American Colonies waged against their mother country, the Swedish Government sold three old men-of-war, the Försigtigheten, Euridice, and Camille to two merchants, who on their part sold them to English merchants, representatives of the Government of the Mexican insurgents. When Spain complained, Sweden rescinded[Pg 427] the contract.[686] Further, the British Government in 1863, during the American Civil War, after selling an old gunboat, the Victor, to a private purchaser and subsequently finding that the agents of the Confederate States had obtained possession of her, gave the order that during the war no more Government ships should be sold.[687] On the other hand, the Government of the United States of America, in pursuance of an Act passed by Congress in 1868 for the sale of arms which the end of the Civil War had rendered superfluous, sold in 1870, notwithstanding the Franco-German War, thousands of arms and other war material which were shipped to France.[688] This attitude of the United States is now generally condemned, and article 6 of Convention XIII. may be quoted against a repetition of such a practice on the part of a neutral State. This article prohibits the supply in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral to a belligerent, of warships, ammunition, or war material of any kind whatever.

§ 349. The duty of impartiality requires that a neutral must not provide belligerents with weapons, ammunition, ships, or military supplies.[685] It doesn’t matter if such supplies are given for money or for free. A neutral who sells weapons and ammunition to a belligerent for profit would be breaking their duty of impartiality, just like someone who gives those weapons and ammunition to a belligerent as a gift. This is a well-established rule regarding direct transactions between belligerents and neutrals. The situation is different when a neutral does not directly and knowingly engage with a belligerent, even if they may, or should, be aware that they are indirectly supplying one. Different countries have adopted various stances on such cases during times of neutrality. For example, in 1825, during the War of Independence that the Spanish South American Colonies fought against Spain, the Swedish Government sold three old warships, the Försigtigheten, Euridice, and Camille, to two merchants, who then sold them to English merchants acting on behalf of the Mexican insurgents. When Spain complained, Sweden canceled the contract.[Pg 427] [686] Furthermore, during the American Civil War in 1863, the British Government sold an old gunboat, the Victor, to a private buyer. When they later discovered that Confederate agents had gained possession of it, they ordered that no more government ships should be sold during the war. [687] Conversely, the United States, following an Act passed by Congress in 1868 allowing the sale of surplus arms after the Civil War, sold thousands of weapons and other military materials to France in 1870, despite the ongoing Franco-German War. [688] This approach by the United States is now widely criticized, and Article 6 of Convention XIII may be cited against a neutral state engaging in such practices again. This article prohibits any supply, directly or indirectly, from a neutral to a belligerent of warships, ammunition, or any type of military material.

[685] See article 6 of Convention XIII.

[685] See article 6 of Convention XIII.

[686] See Martens, Causes Célèbres, V. pp. 229-254.

[686] See Martens, Famous Cases, V. pp. 229-254.

[687] See Lawrence, § 235.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Lawrence, § 235.

[688] See Wharton, III. § 391, and Moore, VII. § 1309.

[688] See Wharton, III. § 391, and Moore, VII. § 1309.

Supply on the part of Subjects of Neutrals.

Supply from Neutral Sources.

§ 350. In contradistinction to supply to belligerents by neutrals, such supply by subjects of neutrals is lawful, and neutrals are not, therefore, obliged according to their duty of impartiality to prevent such supply. Article 7 of Convention V. and article 7 of Convention XIII. concur in enacting the old customary rule that "A neutral Power is not bound to prevent the export or transit, on behalf of one or other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which can be of use to an army or fleet." And article 18[689] of Convention V. recognises the fact that the furnishing of supplies to a belligerent by such subjects of neutrals as do not live on the territory of the other party, or on[Pg 428] the territory occupied by that party, does not invest these individuals with enemy character. When in August 1870, during the Franco-German War, Germany lodged complaints with the British Government for not prohibiting its subjects from supplying arms and ammunition to the French Government, Great Britain correctly replied that she was not by International Law under the obligation to prevent her subjects from committing such acts. Of course, such neutral as is anxious to avoid all controversy and friction can by his Municipal Law order his subjects to abstain from such acts, as for instance Switzerland and Belgium did during the Franco-German War. But such injunctions arise from political prudence, and not from any obligation imposed by International Law.

§ 350. Unlike supplies to warring parties by neutral countries, supplying such materials by citizens of neutral countries is legal, and neutrals are not obligated by their duty of impartiality to stop such supplies. Article 7 of Convention V and Article 7 of Convention XIII affirm the traditional rule that "A neutral Power is not required to prevent the export or transit, on behalf of either of the warring parties, of arms, munitions of war, or anything else that could be useful to an army or fleet." Furthermore, Article 18[689] of Convention V acknowledges that supplying a belligerent by citizens of neutrals who do not reside in the territory of the other party or in the territory occupied by that party does not make these individuals enemies. In August 1870, during the Franco-German War, Germany complained to the British Government for not stopping its citizens from supplying arms and ammunition to the French Government. Great Britain correctly responded that, under International Law, it was not obliged to prevent its citizens from taking such actions. Of course, a neutral country wishing to avoid any disputes and tensions can, through its domestic laws, instruct its citizens to refrain from such activities, as Switzerland and Belgium did during the Franco-German War. However, such prohibitions are based on political caution, not on any obligation set by International Law.

[689] That Great Britain has entered a reservation against article 18, and the portent of this reservation, has been pointed out above, in § 88, p. 109, note 1.

[689] Great Britain has made a reservation regarding article 18, and the significance of this reservation has been discussed earlier in § 88, p. 109, note 1.

The endeavour to make a distinction between supply in single cases and on a small scale on the one hand, and, on the other, supply on a large scale, and to consider only the former lawful,[690] has neither in theory nor in practice found recognition. As International Law stands, belligerents may make use of visit, search, and seizure to protect themselves against conveyance of contraband by sea to the enemy by subjects of neutrals. But so far as their neutral home State is concerned, such subjects may, at the risk of having their property seized during such conveyance, supply either belligerent with any amount of arms, ammunition, coal, provisions, and even with armed ships,[691] provided always that they deal with the belligerents in the ordinary way of commerce.

The effort to differentiate between supplying in individual cases and on a small scale versus supplying on a large scale, and to only consider the former as lawful, has not gained recognition either theoretically or practically. As it stands in International Law, warring parties can utilize visit, search, and seizure to defend against the transport of contraband by sea to their enemy by neutral subjects. However, regarding their neutral home State, these subjects can supply either side with any quantity of arms, ammunition, coal, provisions, and even armed ships, provided they conduct their dealings with the belligerents in the usual manner of commerce.

[690] See Bluntschli, § 766.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Bluntschli, § 766.

[691] See above, § 334, and below, § 397.

[691] See above, § 334, and below, § 397.

The case is different when there is no ordinary commerce with a belligerent Government and when subjects of neutrals directly supply a belligerent army or navy, or parts of them. If, for instance, a belligerent fleet[Pg 429] is cruising outside the maritime belt of a neutral, the latter must prevent vessels of his subjects from bringing coal, arms, ammunition, and provisions to that fleet, for otherwise he would allow the belligerent to make use of neutral resources for naval operations.[692] But he need not prevent vessels of his subjects from bringing coal, arms, ammunition, and provisions to belligerent ports, although the supply is destined for the navy and the army of the belligerent. He need not prevent belligerent merchantmen from coming into his ports and carrying arms and the like, bought from his subjects, over to the ports of their home State. And he need not prevent vessels of his subjects from following a belligerent fleet and supplying it en route[693] with coal, ammunition, provisions, and the like, provided such supply does not take place in the neutral maritime belt.

The situation is different when there is no regular trade with a warring government and when the citizens of neutral countries directly supply a warring army or navy, or parts of them. For example, if a warring fleet[Pg 429] is patrolling outside the maritime zone of a neutral country, that neutral country must stop its vessels from delivering coal, weapons, ammunition, and supplies to that fleet, otherwise it would allow the warring side to use neutral resources for military operations.[692] However, it doesn’t have to stop its vessels from bringing coal, weapons, ammunition, and supplies to warring ports, even if those supplies are intended for the navy and army of the warring side. It also doesn’t have to prevent warring merchant ships from entering its ports and taking weapons and similar goods bought from its citizens back to the ports of their home country. And it doesn’t have to stop its vessels from following a warring fleet and supplying it en route[693] with coal, ammunition, provisions, and so on, as long as this supply doesn’t happen in the neutral maritime zone.

[692] See above, § 333 (4).

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § 333 (4).

[693] See above, § 311, p. 375, note 4.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

There is no doubt that, as the law stands at present, neutrals need not prevent their subjects from supplying belligerents with arms and ammunition. Yet, on the other hand, there is no doubt either that such supply is apt to prolong a war which otherwise would come to an end at an earlier date. But it will be a long time, if ever it happens, before it is made a duty of neutrals to prevent such supply as far as is in their power, and to punish such of their subjects as engage in it. The profit derived from such supply being enormous, the members of the Family of Nations are not inclined to cripple the trade of their subjects by preventing it. And belligerents want to have the opportunity of replenishing with arms and ammunition if they run short of them during war. The question is merely one of the standard of public morality.[694] If this standard rises, and it becomes the conviction of the world at large that supply[Pg 430] of arms and ammunition by subjects of neutrals is apt to lengthen wars, the rule will appear that neutrals must prevent such supply.

There’s no doubt that, under current law, neutral countries don’t have to stop their citizens from supplying weapons and ammunition to countries at war. However, it’s also clear that such supplies can extend a conflict that might otherwise end sooner. It’ll likely be a long time, if it ever happens, before neutrals are required to prevent these supplies as much as they can and to punish their citizens who do engage in it. The financial benefits of these supplies are huge, so countries don’t want to hurt their own trade by banning it. Additionally, warring nations need the option to restock weapons and ammunition if they run low during a conflict. The issue really comes down to what the standard of public morality is. If this standard improves, and it becomes a widely accepted belief that supplying arms and ammunition from neutral countries tends to prolong wars, then it will seem obvious that neutrals should block such supplies.

Loans and Subsidies on the part of Neutrals.

Loans and Subsidies from Neutral Parties.

§ 351. His duty of impartiality must prevent a neutral from granting a loan to either belligerent. Vattel's (III. § 110) distinction between such loans as are granted on interest and such as are not so granted, and his assertion that loans on the part of neutrals are lawful if they are granted on interest with the pure intention of making money, have not found favour with other writers. Nor do I know any instance of such loan on interest having occurred during the nineteenth century.

§ 351. A neutral's obligation to remain impartial should stop them from lending money to either side in a conflict. Vattel's (III. § 110) distinction between loans made with interest and those without, along with his claim that neutral loans are lawful if they are made with the genuine intention of earning a profit, haven't been well accepted by other authors. I am also unaware of any instances of such interest-bearing loans taking place during the nineteenth century.

What is valid regarding a loan is all the more valid regarding subsidies in money granted to a belligerent on the part of a neutral. Through the granting of subsidies a neutral becomes as much the ally of the belligerent as he would by furnishing him with a number of troops.[695]

What applies to a loan is even more applicable to monetary subsidies given to a warring party by a neutral. By providing subsidies, a neutral party becomes as much an ally of the warring party as if they were supplying troops. [695]

[695] See above, §§ 305, 306, 321.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Loans and Subsidies on the part of Subjects of Neutrals.

Loans and subsidies from the subjects of neutral countries.

§ 352. It was formerly a moot point in the theory of International Law whether a neutral is obliged by his duty of impartiality to prevent his subjects from granting subsidies and loans to belligerents for the purpose of enabling them to continue the war. Several writers[696] maintained either that a neutral was obliged to prevent such loans and subsidies altogether, or at least that he must prohibit a public subscription on neutral territory for such loans and subsidies. On the other hand, a number of writers asserted that, since money is just as much an article of commerce as goods,[Pg 431] a neutral was in no wise obliged to prevent on his territory public subscription by his subjects to loans for the belligerents. In contradistinction to the theory of International Law, the practice of the States has beyond doubt established the fact that neutrals need not prevent on their territory subscription to loans for belligerents. Thus in 1854, during the Crimean War, France protested in vain against a Russian loan being raised in Amsterdam, Berlin, and Hamburg. In 1870, during the Franco-German War, a French loan was raised in London. In 1877, during the Russo-Turkish War, no neutral prevented his subjects from subscribing to the Russian loan. Again, in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese loans were raised in London and Berlin, and Russian loans in Paris and Berlin. The Second Peace Conference, by enacting in article 7 of Convention V. that a neutral is not bound to prevent the export ... of anything which can be of use to an army or fleet, has indirectly recognised that a neutral need not prevent the subscription on his territory to loans for belligerents.

§ 352. It used to be a debated issue in International Law whether a neutral country is obligated by its duty of impartiality to stop its citizens from providing subsidies and loans to countries at war to help them continue fighting. Some scholars[696] argued that a neutral must prevent such loans and subsidies entirely, or at least prohibit public fundraising for them on neutral ground. Conversely, other scholars claimed that since money is just as much a commodity as goods,[Pg 431] a neutral is not required to stop its citizens from publicly funding loans for belligerent nations. In contrast to the theory of International Law, the actual practices of states have clearly established that neutrals do not need to prevent the raising of loans for belligerents on their territory. For instance, in 1854, during the Crimean War, France unsuccessfully protested against a Russian loan being raised in Amsterdam, Berlin, and Hamburg. In 1870, during the Franco-German War, a French loan was secured in London. In 1877, during the Russo-Turkish War, no neutral country stopped its citizens from subscribing to a Russian loan. Again, in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese loans were raised in London and Berlin, while Russian loans were obtained in Paris and Berlin. The Second Peace Conference, by stating in article 7 of Convention V that a neutral is not obligated to prevent the export ... of anything that could be useful to an army or fleet, has indirectly acknowledged that a neutral does not need to stop the raising of loans for belligerents on its territory.

[696] See Phillimore, III. § 151; Bluntschli, § 768; Heffter, § 148; Kleen, I. § 68. The case of De Wütz v. Hendricks (9 Moore, 586) quoted by Phillimore in support of his assertion that neutrals must prevent their subjects from subscribing to a loan for belligerents, is not decisive, for Lord Chief Justice Best declared only "that it was contrary to the Law of Nations for persons residing in this country to enter into any agreements to raise money by way of a loan for the purpose of supporting subjects of a foreign State in arms against a Government in alliance with our own."

[696] See Phillimore, III. § 151; Bluntschli, § 768; Heffter, § 148; Kleen, I. § 68. The case of De Wütz v. Hendricks (9 Moore, 586), which Phillimore cites to support his claim that neutral states must stop their citizens from taking loans for warring nations, isn’t conclusive. Lord Chief Justice Best only stated that "it was against the Law of Nations for people living in this country to make any agreements to raise money through a loan to support subjects of a foreign State in arms against a Government allied with our own."

But matters differ somewhat in regard to subsidies to belligerents by subjects of neutrals. A neutral is not indeed obliged to prevent individual subjects from granting subsidies to belligerents, just as he is not obliged to prevent them from enlisting with either belligerent. But if he were to allow on his territory a public appeal for subscriptions to such subsidy, he would certainly violate his duty of impartiality; for loans are a matter of commerce, subsidies are not. It must, however, be emphasised that public appeals for subscriptions of money for charitable purposes in favour of the wounded, the prisoners, and the like, need not be prevented, even if they are only made in favour of one of the belligerents.

But the situation is a bit different when it comes to subsidies provided to belligerents by subjects of neutral states. A neutral isn't required to stop individual subjects from giving subsidies to belligerents, just like they're not required to stop them from joining either side. However, if they permit a public appeal for funds to support such subsidies on their territory, they would definitely be violating their duty of impartiality; loans are considered commerce, while subsidies are not. It should be noted that public appeals for fundraising for charitable causes, like helping the wounded or prisoners, don’t need to be restricted, even if they are directed only at one of the belligerents.

The distinction between loans and subsidies is[Pg 432] certainly correct as the law stands at present. But there is no doubt that the fact of belligerents having the opportunity of getting loans from subjects of neutrals is apt to lengthen wars. The Russo-Japanese War, for instance, would have come to an end much sooner if either belligerent could have been prevented from borrowing money from subjects of neutrals. Therefore, what has been said above in § 350 with regard to the supply of arms and ammunition on the part of subjects of neutrals applies likewise to loans: they will no longer be considered lawful when the standard of public morality rises.

The difference between loans and subsidies is[Pg 432] definitely true according to current law. However, it’s clear that the ability of warring parties to secure loans from neutral citizens tends to prolong conflicts. For example, the Russo-Japanese War would likely have ended much sooner if either side had been unable to borrow money from neutral subjects. So, what was stated earlier in § 350 about the supply of arms and ammunition from neutral parties also applies to loans: they will no longer be seen as acceptable when public morality improves.

VII SERVICES FOR COMBATANTS

Westlake, II. pp. 219-220—Despagnet, No. 696 bis—Bonfils, No. 1475[1]—Ullmann, § 192—Rivier, II. pp. 388-391—Calvo, IV. §§ 2640-2641—Martens, II. § 134—Perels, § 43—Kleen, I. §§ 103-108—Lawrence, War, pp. 83-92, 218-220—Scholz, Drahtlose Telegraphie und Neutralität (1905), passim, and Krieg und Seekabel (1904), pp. 122-133—Land Warfare, §§ 481-484—Kebedgy, in R.I. 2nd Ser. IV. (1904), pp. 445-451.

Westlake, II. pp. 219-220—Despagnet, No. 696 bis—Bonfils, No. 1475[1]—Ullmann, § 192—Rivier, II. pp. 388-391—Calvo, IV. §§ 2640-2641—Martens, II. § 134—Perels, § 43—Kleen, I. §§ 103-108—Lawrence, War, pp. 83-92, 218-220—Scholz, Drahtlose Telegraphie und Neutralität (1905), passim, and Krieg und Seekabel (1904), pp. 122-133—Land Warfare, §§ 481-484—Kebedgy, in R.I. 2nd Ser. IV. (1904), pp. 445-451.

Pilotage.

Navigation.

§ 353. Since pilots are in the service of littoral States the question as to whether neutrals may permit their pilots to render services to belligerent men-of-war and transport vessels, is of importance. Article 11[697] of Convention XIII. enacts that "a neutral Power may allow belligerent war-ships to employ its licensed pilots." Since, therefore, everything is left to the discretion of neutrals, they will have to take the merits and needs of every case into account. There would certainly be no objection to a neutral allowing belligerent vessels to which asylum is legitimately granted, to be piloted into his ports, and likewise such vessels to be[Pg 433] piloted through his maritime belt if their passage is not prohibited. But a belligerent might justly object to the men-of-war of his adversary being piloted on the Open Sea by pilots of a neutral Power, except in a case of distress.

§ 353. Since pilots serve coastal States, it's important to consider whether neutral parties can allow their pilots to assist belligerent warships and transport vessels. Article 11[697] of Convention XIII states that "a neutral Power may allow belligerent warships to use its licensed pilots." Therefore, since neutrals have discretion, they need to consider the specifics of each situation. There would certainly be no issue with a neutral allowing belligerent vessels, to which asylum is properly granted, to be guided into their ports, and likewise for those vessels to be[Pg 433] navigated through their maritime area if their passage isn't restricted. However, a belligerent could rightfully object to the enemy's warships being piloted on the Open Sea by pilots from a neutral Power, except in cases of distress.

[697] Germany has entered a reservation against article 11.

[697] Germany has made a reservation regarding article 11.

It is worth mentioning that Great Britain during the Franco-German War in 1870, prohibited her pilots from conducting German and French men-of-war which were outside the maritime belt, except when in distress.

It’s worth noting that Great Britain during the Franco-German War in 1870, prohibited her pilots from operating German and French warships that were outside the maritime zone, except when they were in distress.

Transport on the part of Neutrals.

Transport on the part of Neutrals.

§ 354. It is generally recognised that the duty of impartiality incumbent upon a neutral obliges him to prevent his men-of-war and other public vessels from rendering transport services to either belligerent. Therefore, such vessels must neither carry soldiers nor sailors belonging to belligerent forces, nor their prisoners of war, nor ammunition, military or naval provisions, nor despatches. The question as to how far such vessels are prevented from carrying enemy subjects other than members of the forces depends upon the question whether by carrying those individuals they render such service to one of the belligerents as is detrimental to the other. Thus, when the Dutch Government in 1901, during the South African War, intended to send a man-of-war, the Gelderland, to President Kruger for the purpose of conveying him to Europe, they made sure in advance that Great Britain did not object.

§ 354. It's widely accepted that the responsibility of neutrality requires a neutral state to stop its warships and other public vessels from providing transport services to either side in a conflict. Therefore, these vessels must not carry soldiers or sailors from either side, nor their prisoners of war, nor ammunition, military supplies, or messages. The issue of whether these vessels can transport civilians from the enemy (who aren't part of the armed forces) depends on whether transporting those individuals would give one side an advantage over the other. For example, when the Dutch Government in 1901, during the South African War, planned to send the warship Gelderland to President Kruger to take him to Europe, they made sure beforehand that Great Britain had no objections.

The question has been raised[698] as to whether a neutral whose rolling stock runs on the railway lines of a belligerent, may continue to leave such rolling stock there although it is being used for the transport of troops, war material, and the like. The answer, I believe, ought to be in the negative, for there is no doubt that, if the rolling stock remains on the railway lines of a belligerent, the neutral concerned is indirectly rendering transport services to the belligerent. It is for[Pg 434] this reason that article 19 of Convention V. enacts that railway material coming from the territory of neutrals shall not be requisitioned or used by a belligerent except in the case and to the extent required by absolute necessity.[699]

The question has been raised[698] about whether a neutral party whose rolling stock operates on the railway lines of a belligerent can continue to leave that rolling stock there, even if it's being used to transport troops, war materials, and similar items. I believe the answer should be no, because it’s clear that if the rolling stock stays on a belligerent's railway, the neutral party is indirectly providing transport services to that belligerent. This is why article 19 of Convention V states that railway materials coming from neutral territory cannot be requisitioned or used by a belligerent except in cases and to the extent required by absolute necessity.[699]

[698] See Nowacki, Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege (1906), p. 126.

[698] See Nowacki, The Railroads in War (1906), p. 126.

[699] See below, § 365.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Transport on the part of Neutral Merchantmen and by neutral rolling stock.

Transport by neutral merchant ships and neutral transportation vehicles.

§ 355. Just as a neutral is not obliged to prevent his merchantmen from carrying contraband, so he is not obliged to prevent them from rendering services to belligerents by carrying in the way of trade enemy troops, and the like, and enemy despatches. Neutral merchantmen rendering such services to belligerents do so at their own risk, for these are unneutral services for which the merchantmen may be punished[700] by the belligerents, but for which the neutral State under whose flag such merchantmen sail bears no responsibility whatever.

§ 355. Just as a neutral country isn't required to stop its merchant ships from carrying contraband, it also isn't required to prevent them from helping belligerents by transporting enemy troops, enemy messages, and so on. Neutral merchant ships providing these kinds of services do so at their own risk, as these are considered unneutral activities for which the merchant ships could face punishment[700] by the belligerents. However, the neutral country whose flag these merchant ships sail under has no responsibility for these actions.

[700] See below, §§ 407-413.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-413.

And the same is valid with regard to rolling stock belonging to private railway companies of a neutral State. That such rolling stock may not, without the consent of the companies owning it, be made use of by a belligerent for the transport of troops, war material, and the like, except in the case of and to the extent required by absolute necessity, follows from article 19 of Convention V. But, if a private railway company gives its consent, and if its rolling stock is made use of for warlike purposes, it acquires enemy character, article 19 of Convention V. does not apply, and the other belligerent may seize and appropriate it as though it were the property of the enemy State.[701]

And the same applies to the rolling stock owned by private railway companies of a neutral state. This means that such rolling stock cannot be used by a warring party for transporting troops, war materials, and similar items without the consent of the owning companies, except in cases of absolute necessity, as stated in Article 19 of Convention V. However, if a private railway company consents to its use and its rolling stock is used for military purposes, it is considered to have enemy status, Article 19 of Convention V. does not apply, and the opposing belligerent may seize and take it as if it were the property of the enemy state.[701]

[701] See Nowacki, Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege (1906), p. 128.

[701] See Nowacki, The Railways in War (1906), p. 128.

Information regarding Military and Naval Operations.

Information regarding Military and Naval Operations.

§ 356. Information regarding military and naval operations may be given and obtained in so many various ways that several cases must be distinguished:—

§ 356. Information about military and naval operations can be shared and gathered in many different ways, so several situations need to be differentiated:—

(1) It is obvious that the duty of impartiality incumbent upon a neutral obliges him to prevent his men-of-war[Pg 435] from giving any information to a belligerent concerning naval operations of the other party. But a neutral bears no responsibility whatever for private vessels sailing under his flag which give such information. Such vessels run, however, the risk of being punished for rendering unneutral service.[702]

(1) It's clear that a neutral party has a responsibility to ensure that their warships[Pg 435] do not share any information with one side in a conflict about the naval activities of the other side. However, a neutral has no liability for private ships flying their flag that do share such information. These private vessels do face the risk of being penalized for providing unneutral service.[702]

[702] See below, §§ 409 and 410, and articles 45, Nos. 1 and 2, and 46, No. 4, of the Declaration of London.

[702] See below, §§ 409 and 410, along with articles 45, numbers 1 and 2, and 46, number 4, of the Declaration of London.

[703] See Calvo, § 2640.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Calvo, § 2640.

(3) According to article 8 of Convention V. "a neutral Power is not bound to forbid or restrict the employment, on behalf of belligerents, of telegraph or telephone cables, or of wireless telegraphy apparatus whether belonging to it, or to companies, or to private individuals." Since, therefore, everything is left to the discretion of the neutral concerned, he will have to take the merits and needs of every case into consideration, and act accordingly. But so much is certain that a belligerent may not categorically request neutrals to forbid or restrict such employment of their telegraph wires and the like on the part of his adversary.[Pg 436]

(3) According to Article 8 of Convention V, "a neutral power isn't required to prohibit or limit the use of telegraph or telephone cables, or wireless telegraphy equipment, whether they belong to it, to companies, or to private individuals, on behalf of belligerents." Therefore, since everything is left to the discretion of the neutral party, they must consider the specifics and needs of each situation and act accordingly. However, it is clear that a belligerent cannot outright demand that neutrals prohibit or restrict the use of their telegraph lines and similar resources by their opponent.[Pg 436]

The case is different when a belligerent intends to arrange the transmitting of messages through a submarine cable purposely laid over neutral territory or through telegraph and telephone wires purposely erected on neutral territory. This would seem to be an abuse of neutral territory, and the neutral must prevent it. Accordingly, when in 1870, during the Franco-German War, France intended to lay a telegraph cable from Dunkirk to the North of France, the cable to go across the Channel to England and from there back to France, Great Britain refused her consent on account of her neutrality. And again in 1898, during war between Spain and the United States of America, when the latter intended to land at Hong Kong a cable proposed to be laid from Manila, Great Britain refused her consent.[704]

The situation changes when a warring party plans to send messages through a submarine cable intentionally laid over neutral territory or through telegraph and telephone lines set up on neutral land. This appears to be an exploitation of neutral territory, and the neutral country must stop it. For instance, in 1870, during the Franco-German War, France aimed to lay a telegraph cable from Dunkirk to Northern France, which would cross the Channel to England and then return to France. Great Britain denied approval due to its neutrality. Similarly, in 1898, during the war between Spain and the United States, when the U.S. intended to land a cable at Hong Kong originating from Manila, Great Britain again denied consent.[704]

[704] See Lawrence, War, p. 219.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Lawrence, War, p. 219.

The case is likewise different when a belligerent intends to erect in a neutral country, or in a neutral port or neutral waters, a wireless telegraphy station or any apparatus intended as a means of communication with belligerent forces on land or sea, or to make use of any installation of this kind established by him before the outbreak of war for purely military purposes, and not previously opened for the service of the public generally. According to articles 3 and 5 of Convention V. and article 5 of Convention XIII., a neutral is bound to prohibit this. The case which occurred in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War and the siege of Port Arthur, when the Russians installed an apparatus for wireless telegraphy in Chifu and communicated thereby with the besieged, constituted a violation of neutrality.

The situation is different when a belligerent wants to set up a wireless telegraph station or any communication device in a neutral country, neutral port, or neutral waters to connect with their forces on land or sea. This includes using any installations they had established before the war for military purposes, which were not previously available for public use. According to Articles 3 and 5 of Convention V and Article 5 of Convention XIII, a neutral country must prohibit this. An example of this occurred in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War and the siege of Port Arthur, when the Russians set up a wireless telegraph station in Chifu to communicate with the besieged, which violated neutrality.

(4) It is obvious that his duty of impartiality must prevent a neutral from allowing belligerents to establish intelligence bureaux on his territory. On the other hand, a neutral is not obliged to prevent his subjects[Pg 437] from giving information to belligerents, be it by letter, telegram, telephone, or wireless telegraphy. In especial a neutral is not obliged to prevent his subjects from giving information to belligerents by wireless telegraphy apparatus installed on a neutral merchantman. Such individuals run, however, the risk of being punished as spies, provided they act clandestinely or under false pretences, and the vessel concerned is subject to the risk of being captured and confiscated for rendering unneutral service.

(4) It's clear that a neutral party must not allow warring sides to set up intelligence offices on their land. However, a neutral isn't required to stop their citizens from sharing information with these warring sides, whether it’s through letters, telegrams, phone calls, or radio. Specifically, a neutral doesn’t have to stop their citizens from providing information to warring sides using wireless telegraphy equipment on a neutral merchant ship. Those individuals could face punishment as spies if they act secretly or under false pretenses, and the ship itself could be in danger of being seized and taken for providing unneutral assistance.

Stress must be laid on the fact that newspaper correspondents making use of wireless telegraphy from on board neutral merchantmen for the purpose of sending news to their papers,[705] may not be treated as spies, and the merchantmen concerned may not be confiscated, although belligerents need by no means allow the presence of such vessels at the seat of war. Thus, during the Russo-Japanese War, the Haimun, a vessel fitted with a wireless telegraphy apparatus for the service of the Times, was ordered away by the Japanese. But, of course, an individual can at the same time be a correspondent for a neutral newspaper and a spy, and he may then be punished for espionage.

It’s important to emphasize that newspaper correspondents using wireless telegraphy from aboard neutral merchant ships to send news to their papers,[705] should not be considered spies, and the merchant ships in question cannot be confiscated, even though warring parties are not obligated to allow such vessels near the conflict zones. For example, during the Russo-Japanese War, the Haimun, which was equipped with a wireless telegraphy system for the Times, was ordered to leave by the Japanese. However, an individual can be both a correspondent for a neutral newspaper and a spy simultaneously, and in that case, they could face punishment for espionage.

[705] See Lawrence, War, pp. 84-88. On newspaper correspondents generally in naval warfare, see Higgins, War and the Private Citizen (1912), pp. 91-114, and in Z.V. VI. (1912), pp. 19-28, and the literature and cases there cited.

[705] See Lawrence, War, pp. 84-88. For an overview of newspaper correspondents in naval warfare, check out Higgins, War and the Private Citizen (1912), pp. 91-114, and in Z.V. VI. (1912), pp. 19-28, along with the sources and cases mentioned there.

VIII BREACH OF NEUTRALITY

Hall, §§ 227-229—Lawrence, §§ 233, 238, 239—Phillimore, III. §§ 151A-151B—Taylor, §§ 630 and 642—Wharton, III. §§ 402, 402A—Wheaton, §§ 429-433—Moore, VII. §§ 1319-1328, 1334-1335—Bluntschli, §§ 778-782—Heffter, § 146—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 667-676, 700-709—Ullmann, § 191—Bonfils, No. 1476—Despagnet, No. 697—Pradier-Fodéré, No. 3235—Rivier, II. pp. 394-395—Calvo, IV. §§ 2654-2666—Fiore, III. Nos. 1567-1570—Martens, II. § 138—Kleen, I. § 25—Dupuis, Nos. 332-337.

Hall, §§ 227-229—Lawrence, §§ 233, 238, 239—Phillimore, III. §§ 151A-151B—Taylor, §§ 630 and 642—Wharton, III. §§ 402, 402A—Wheaton, §§ 429-433—Moore, VII. §§ 1319-1328, 1334-1335—Bluntschli, §§ 778-782—Heffter, § 146—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 667-676, 700-709—Ullmann, § 191—Bonfils, No. 1476—Despagnet, No. 697—Pradier-Fodéré, No. 3235—Rivier, II. pp. 394-395—Calvo, IV. §§ 2654-2666—Fiore, III. Nos. 1567-1570—Martens, II. § 138—Kleen, I. § 25—Dupuis, Nos. 332-337.

Violation of Neutrality in the narrower and in the wider sense of the Term.

Violation of Neutrality in the narrower and in the wider sense of the term.

§ 357. Many writers who speak of violation of neutrality treat under this head only of violations of the duty of impartiality incumbent upon neutrals. And indeed such violations only are meant, if one speaks of violation of neutrality in the narrower sense of the term. However, it is necessary for obvious reasons to discuss not only violations of the duty of impartiality of neutrals, but violations of all duties deriving from neutrality, whether they are incumbent upon neutrals or upon belligerents. In the wider sense of the term violation of neutrality comprises, therefore, every performance or omission of an act contrary to the duty of a neutral towards either belligerent as well as contrary to the duty of either belligerent towards a neutral. Everywhere in this treatise the term is used in its wider sense.

§ 357. Many writers discussing violations of neutrality focus only on breaches of the impartiality duty required of neutrals. Indeed, these breaches are what is meant when referring to violations of neutrality in a narrower sense. However, it's important for obvious reasons to consider not just breaches of the impartiality duty by neutrals, but also violations of all duties tied to neutrality, whether they fall on neutrals or on belligerents. In a broader context, a violation of neutrality includes any action or failure to act that goes against the obligations of a neutral toward either belligerent, as well as actions contrary to the duties of either belligerent toward a neutral. Throughout this text, the term is used in this broader sense.

It is important to remember that violations of neutrality on the part of belligerents must not be confounded with violations of the laws of war by which subjects of neutral States suffer damage. If, for instance, an occupant levies excessive contributions from subjects of neutral States domiciled in enemy country in contravention of article 49 of the Hague Regulations, this is a violation of the Laws of War, for which, according to article 3 of Convention IV., the belligerent concerned[Pg 439] must pay compensation, but it is not a violation of neutrality.

It’s important to remember that violations of neutrality by warring parties should not be confused with violations of the laws of war that harm citizens of neutral countries. For example, if an occupying force demands excessive payments from citizens of neutral states living in enemy territory, which goes against Article 49 of the Hague Regulations, this is a violation of the laws of war. According to Article 3 of Convention IV, the responsible belligerent must provide compensation, but this does not count as a violation of neutrality.

Violation in contradistinction to End of Neutrality.

Violation in contrast to End of Neutrality.

§ 358. Violation of neutrality must not be confounded with the ending of neutrality,[706] for neither a violation on the part of a neutral[707] nor a violation on the part of a belligerent brings ipso facto neutrality to an end. If correctly viewed, the condition of neutrality continues to exist between a neutral and a belligerent in spite of a violation of neutrality. It must be emphasised that a violation of neutrality contains nothing more than a breach of a duty deriving from the condition of neutrality. This applies not only to violations of neutrality by negligence, but also to those by intention. Even in an extreme case in which the violation of neutrality is so great that the offended party considers war the only adequate measure in answer to it, it is not the violation which brings neutrality to an end, but the determination of the offended party. For there is no violation of neutrality so great as to oblige the offended party to make war in answer to it, such party having always the choice whether it will keep up the condition of neutrality or not.

§ 358. Violating neutrality should not be confused with ending neutrality,[706] because neither a violation by a neutral[707] nor a violation by a belligerent automatically ends neutrality. If viewed correctly, the status of neutrality remains between a neutral and a belligerent despite any violations. It's important to emphasize that a violation of neutrality is simply a failure to uphold the duties that come with being neutral. This applies to both unintentional and intentional violations. Even in an extreme case where the violation is so severe that the offended party feels war is the only suitable response, it is not the violation itself that ends neutrality, but rather the offended party's decision. There is no violation severe enough to force the offended party into war, as that party always has the choice to maintain neutrality or not.

[706] See above, § 312.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[707] But this is almost everywhere asserted, as the distinction between the violation of the duty of impartiality incumbent upon neutrals on the one hand, and on the other, the ending of neutrality, is usually not made.

[707] But this is claimed almost everywhere, as people often don't differentiate between the breach of the obligation of impartiality required of neutrals and the termination of neutrality itself.

But this applies only to mere violations of neutrality, and not to hostilities. The latter are acts of war and bring neutrality to an end; they have been characterised in contradistinction to mere violations above in § 320.

But this only applies to simple violations of neutrality, not to hostilities. The latter are considered acts of war and end neutrality; they have been distinguished from mere violations mentioned above in § 320.

Consequences of Violations of Neutrality.

Consequences of Violating Neutrality.

§ 359. Violations of neutrality, whether committed by a neutral against a belligerent or by a belligerent against a neutral, are international delinquencies.[708] They may at once be repulsed, the offended party may require the offender to make reparation, and, if this is refused, it may take such measures as it thinks[Pg 440] adequate to exact the necessary reparation.[709] If the violation is only slight and unimportant, the offended State will often merely complain. If, on the other hand, the violation is very substantial and grave, the offended State will perhaps at once declare that it considers itself at war with the offender. In such case it is not the violation of neutrality which brings neutrality to an end, but the declaration of the offended State that it considers the violation of so grave a character as to oblige it to regard itself at war with the offender.

§ 359. Violations of neutrality, whether committed by a neutral against a belligerent or by a belligerent against a neutral, are international offenses.[708] They can be immediately rejected, and the affected party may demand that the wrongdoer provide compensation. If this demand is ignored, the affected party can take whatever actions it deems necessary to obtain the required compensation.[Pg 440][709] If the violation is minor and insignificant, the affected State will often just express its dissatisfaction. However, if the violation is serious and significant, the affected State may quickly announce that it considers itself at war with the offender. In this situation, it is not the violation of neutrality that ends neutrality, but the announcement from the affected State that it views the violation as so serious that it must consider itself at war with the offender.

That a violation of neutrality can only, like any other international delinquency, be committed by malice or culpable negligence,[710] and that it can be committed through a State's refusing to comply with the consequences of its "vicarious" responsibility for acts of its agents or subjects,[711] is a matter of course. Thus, if a belligerent fleet attacks enemy vessels in neutral territorial waters without an order from its Government, the latter bears "vicarious" responsibility for this violation of neutral territory on the part of its fleet. If the Government concerned refuses to disown the act of its fleet and to make the necessary reparation, this "vicarious" responsibility turns into "original" responsibility, for a case of violation of neutrality and an international delinquency has then arisen. And the same is valid if an agent of a neutral State without an order of his Government commits such an act as would constitute a violation of neutrality in case it were ordered by the Government; for instance, if the head of a province of a neutral, without thereto being authorised by his Government, allows forces of a belligerent to march through this neutral territory.

That a breach of neutrality can only, like any other international offense, happen through intent or serious neglect,[710] and that it can occur if a State refuses to accept the consequences of its "vicarious" responsibility for the actions of its agents or subjects,[711] is obvious. So, if a belligerent fleet attacks enemy ships in neutral waters without orders from its Government, that Government is "vicariously" responsible for this breach of neutral territory by its fleet. If the Government refuses to disown the actions of its fleet and to provide the necessary reparations, this "vicarious" responsibility becomes "original" responsibility because a breach of neutrality and an international offense has then occurred. The same applies if an agent of a neutral State, without orders from his Government, performs an act that would violate neutrality if it were ordered by the Government; for example, if the leader of a province in a neutral State, without authorization from his Government, allows forces of a belligerent to march through that neutral territory.

Neutrals not to acquiesce in Violations of Neutrality committed by a Belligerent.

Neutrals should not agree to violations of neutrality committed by a warring party.

§ 360. It is entirely within the discretion of a belligerent whether he will acquiesce in a violation of[Pg 441] neutrality committed by a neutral in favour of the other belligerent. On the other hand, a neutral may not exercise the same discretion regarding a violation of neutrality committed by one belligerent and detrimental to the other. His duty of impartiality rather obliges him in the first instance to prevent, with the means at his disposal, the belligerent concerned from committing such violation; for instance, to repulse an attack of men-of-war of a belligerent on enemy vessels in neutral ports. Thus article 3 of Convention XIII. enacts:—"When a ship has been captured in the territorial waters of a neutral Power, such Power must, if the prize is still within its jurisdiction, employ the means at its disposal to release the prize with its officers and crew, and to intern the prize crew." And in case he could not prevent and repulse a violation of his neutrality, the same duty obliges him to exact due reparation from the offender,[712] for otherwise he would favour the one party to the detriment of the other. If a neutral neglects this obligation, he is thereby committing a violation of neutrality on his part for which he may be made responsible by such belligerent as has suffered through the violation of neutrality committed by the other belligerent and acquiesced in by the neutral. For instance, if belligerent men-of-war seize enemy vessels in ports of a neutral, and if the neutral, who could not or did not prevent this, exacts no reparation from the belligerent concerned, the other[Pg 442] party may make the neutral responsible for the losses sustained.

§ 360. It is completely up to a belligerent whether they will accept a violation of[Pg 441] neutrality committed by a neutral in favor of the other belligerent. However, a neutral cannot have the same flexibility when it comes to a violation of neutrality by one belligerent that harms the other. Their duty to remain impartial requires them, first and foremost, to use all available means to stop the offending belligerent from committing such a violation; for example, to prevent an attack by the warships of one side on enemy vessels in neutral ports. Thus, Article 3 of Convention XIII states:—"When a ship has been captured in the territorial waters of a neutral Power, that Power must, if the prize is still under its jurisdiction, take the necessary actions to release the prize along with its officers and crew and to intern the prize crew." If they are unable to prevent and stop a violation of their neutrality, they are still obliged to demand appropriate compensation from the offender,[712] as failing to do so would be in favor of one party to the detriment of the other. If a neutral ignores this obligation, they are, in fact, violating neutrality themselves and could be held accountable by the belligerent that has been harmed by the violation committed by the other belligerent with the neutral's consent. For example, if warships from one belligerent seize enemy vessels in the ports of a neutral, and if the neutral, who could not or did not prevent this, demands no restitution from the offending belligerent, the other[Pg 442] party may hold the neutral accountable for the losses incurred.

[712] See articles 25 and 26 of Convention XIII. This duty is nowadays universally recognised, but before the nineteenth century it did not exist, although the rule that belligerents must not commit hostilities on neutral territory, and in especial in neutral ports and waters, was well recognised. That in spite of its recognition this rule was in the eighteenth century frequently infringed by commanders of belligerent fleets, may be illustrated by many cases. Thus, for instance, in 1793, the French frigate Modeste was captured in the harbour of Genoa by two British men-of-war (see Hall, § 220). And in 1801, during war against Sweden, a British frigate captured the Freden and three other Swedish vessels in the Norwegian harbour of Oster-Risoer (see Ortolan, II. pp. 413-418).

[712] See articles 25 and 26 of Convention XIII. This obligation is now widely recognized, but before the 19th century it didn’t exist, even though the rule that fighting parties should not engage in hostilities on neutral territory, particularly in neutral ports and waters, was well established. However, despite its acknowledgment, this rule was often violated by commanders of warring fleets in the 18th century, as illustrated by multiple instances. For example, in 1793, the French frigate Modeste was seized in the harbor of Genoa by two British warships (see Hall, § 220). And in 1801, during the war against Sweden, a British frigate captured the Freden and three other Swedish vessels in the Norwegian harbor of Oster-Risoer (see Ortolan, II. pp. 413-418).

Case of the General Armstrong.

Case of the General Armstrong.

§ 361. Some writers[713] maintain that a neutral is freed from responsibility for a violation of neutrality through a belligerent attacking enemy forces in neutral territory, in case the attacked forces, instead of trusting for protection or redress to the neutral, defend themselves against the attack. This rule is adopted from the arbitral award in the case of the General Armstrong. In 1814, during war between Great Britain and the United States of America, the American privateer General Armstrong, lying in the harbour of Fayal, an island belonging to the Portuguese Azores, defended herself against an attack of an English squadron, but was nevertheless captured. The United States claimed damages from Portugal because the privateer was captured in a neutral Portuguese port. Negotiations went on for many years, and the parties finally agreed in 1851 upon arbitration to be given by Louis Napoleon, then President of the French Republic. In 1852 Napoleon gave his award in favour of Portugal, maintaining that, although the attack on the privateer in neutral waters comprised a violation of neutrality, Portugal could not be made responsible, on account of the fact that the attacked privateer chose to defend herself instead of demanding protection from the Portuguese authorities.[714] It is, however, not at all certain that the rule laid down in this award will find general recognition in theory and practice.[715]

§ 361. Some writers[713] argue that a neutral party is not held responsible for a breach of neutrality when a belligerent attacks enemy forces in neutral territory, especially if those forces choose to defend themselves rather than seek protection or compensation from the neutral party. This principle comes from the arbitral ruling in the case of the General Armstrong. In 1814, during the conflict between Great Britain and the United States, the American privateer General Armstrong, docked in the harbour of Fayal, a Portuguese Azores island, defended itself against an assault from an English squadron but was ultimately captured. The United States sought damages from Portugal because the privateer was taken in a neutral Portuguese port. Negotiations continued for many years, and in 1851, both parties agreed to arbitration by Louis Napoleon, who was then the President of the French Republic. In 1852, Napoleon issued his ruling in favor of Portugal, stating that while the attack on the privateer in neutral waters was indeed a breach of neutrality, Portugal could not be held accountable since the privateer opted to fight back instead of requesting protection from the Portuguese authorities.[714] However, it remains uncertain whether the rule established in this ruling will be widely accepted in both theory and practice.[715]

[713] See, for instance, Hall, § 228, and Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 701.

[713] See, for example, Hall, § 228, and Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 701.

[714] See Moore, Arbitrations, II. pp. 1071-1132; Calvo, IV. § 2662; and Dana's note 208 in Wheaton, § 429.

[714] See Moore, Arbitrations, II. pp. 1071-1132; Calvo, IV. § 2662; and Dana's note 208 in Wheaton, § 429.

[715] The case of the Reshitelni, which occurred in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, and is somewhat similar to that of the General Armstrong, is discussed above in § 320 (2). That no violation of neutrality took place in the case of the Variag and Korietz, is shown above in § 320 (1).

[715] The case of the Reshitelni, which happened in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War, is somewhat similar to that of the General Armstrong and is discussed above in § 320 (2). It is shown above in § 320 (1) that there was no violation of neutrality in the case of the Variag and Korietz.

Mode of exacting Reparation from Belligerents for Violations of Neutrality.

Mode of obtaining compensation from warring parties for breaches of neutrality.

§ 362. It is obvious that the duty of a neutral not to acquiesce in violations of neutrality committed by[Pg 443] one belligerent to the detriment of the other obliges him to repair, so far as he can, the result of such wrongful acts. Thus, he must liberate[716] a prize taken in his neutral waters, or prisoners made on his territory, and the like. In so far, however, as he cannot, or not sufficiently, undo the wrong done, he must exact reparation from the offender. Now, no general rule can be laid down regarding the mode of exacting such reparation, since everything depends upon the merits of the individual case. Only as regards capture of enemy vessels in neutral waters has a practice grown up, which must be considered binding, and according to which the neutral must claim the prize, and eventually damages, from the belligerent concerned, and must restore her to the other party. Thus in 1800, during war between Great Britain and the Netherlands, Prussia claimed before the British Prize Court the Twee Gebroeders,[717] a Dutch vessel captured by the British cruiser L'Espiègle in the neutral maritime belt of Prussia. Sir William Scott ordered restoration of the vessel, yet he refused costs and damages, because the captor had not violated Prussian neutrality intentionally but only by mistake and misapprehension. Thus again, in 1805, during war between Great Britain and Spain, the United States claimed before the British Prize Court the Anna,[718] a Spanish vessel captured by the English privateer Minerva within their neutral maritime belt. Thus, further, in 1864, during the American Civil War, when the Confederate cruiser Florida was captured by the Federal cruiser Wachuset in the neutral Brazilian port of Bahia, Brazil claimed the prize. As the latter had sunk while at anchor in Hampton Roads, she could not be restored, but the United States expiated the violation of neutrality[Pg 444] committed by her cruiser by court-martialing the commander; further, by dismissing her Consul at Bahia for having advised the capture; and, finally, by sending a man-of-war to the spot where the violation of neutrality had taken place for the special purpose of delivering a solemn salute to the Brazilian flag.[719]

§ 362. It is clear that a neutral party's obligation not to tolerate breaches of neutrality by one side that harm the other requires them to remedy, as much as possible, the consequences of such wrongful actions. So, they must release a prize taken in their neutral waters, or prisoners captured on their territory, and similar cases. However, to the extent that they cannot fully undo the harm caused, they must seek compensation from the wrongdoer. There isn't a universal rule for how to seek such compensation, as everything depends on the specifics of each case. Only regarding the capture of enemy ships in neutral waters has a practice developed that is considered binding, under which the neutral party must claim the prize and potential damages from the involved belligerent and must return the vessel to the other party. For example, in 1800, during the war between Great Britain and the Netherlands, Prussia brought a claim before the British Prize Court for the Twee Gebroeders,[717] a Dutch ship captured by the British cruiser L'Espiègle in Prussia's neutral maritime zone. Sir William Scott ordered the ship's return but denied costs and damages because the capture was not a deliberate violation of Prussian neutrality, but an unintentional mistake. Likewise, in 1805, during the war between Great Britain and Spain, the United States claimed before the British Prize Court the Anna,[718] a Spanish vessel captured by the British privateer Minerva within their neutral maritime zone. Furthermore, in 1864, during the American Civil War, when the Confederate cruiser Florida was captured by the Federal cruiser Wachuset in the neutral Brazilian port of Bahia, Brazil made a claim for the prize. Since the Florida sank while anchored in Hampton Roads, she couldn't be returned, but the United States addressed the breach of neutrality by court-martialing the commander, dismissing the Consul at Bahia for advising the capture, and sending a warship to the location of the neutrality violation to deliver a formal salute to the Brazilian flag.[719]

[716] See article 3 of Convention XIII.

[716] Check out article 3 of Convention XIII.

[717] 3 C. Rob. 162.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 3 C. Rob. 162.

[719] See Moore, VII. § 1334, p. 1090.

[719] See Moore, VII. § 1334, p. 1090.

Negligence on the part of Neutrals.

Negligence on the part of Neutrals.

§ 363. Apart from intentional violations of neutrality, a neutral can be made responsible only for such acts favouring or damaging a belligerent as he could by due diligence have prevented, and which by culpable negligence he failed to prevent. It is by no means obligatory for a neutral to prevent such acts under all circumstances and conditions. This is in fact impossible, and it becomes more obviously so the larger a neutral State, and the longer its boundary lines. So long as a neutral exercises due diligence for the purpose of preventing such acts, he is not responsible in case they are nevertheless performed. However, the term due diligence has become controversial through the definition proffered by the United States of America in interpreting the Three Rules of Washington, and through the Geneva Court of Arbitration adopting such interpretation.[720] According to this interpretation the due diligence of a neutral must be in proportion to the risks to which either belligerent may be exposed from failure to fulfil the obligations of neutrality on his part. Had this interpretation been generally accepted, the most oppressive obligations would have become incumbent upon neutrals. But no such general acceptance has taken place. The fact is that due diligence in International Law can have no other meaning than it has in Municipal Law. It means such diligence as can reasonably be expected when all the circumstances and conditions of the case are taken into consideration.

§ 363. Apart from intentional breaches of neutrality, a neutral party can only be held responsible for actions that either help or hurt a belligerent if they could have reasonably prevented those actions and failed to do so due to negligence. It is not mandatory for a neutral to stop such actions in every situation or condition. This is actually impossible, especially for a larger neutral state with extensive borders. As long as a neutral party exercises reasonable care to prevent such actions, they are not liable if those actions still occur. However, the term due diligence has sparked debate due to the interpretation provided by the United States in the Three Rules of Washington and the Geneva Court of Arbitration's adoption of that interpretation.[720] According to this interpretation, a neutral's due diligence must match the risks that either belligerent could face due to their failure to uphold neutrality. Had this interpretation been widely accepted, neutrals would have faced extremely burdensome obligations. But there hasn’t been such widespread agreement. The reality is that due diligence in International Law means the same as it does in Municipal Law. It refers to the level of care that can reasonably be expected when all circumstances and conditions of the case are taken into account.

[720] See above, § 335.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Be that as it may, the Second Peace Conference has[Pg 445] taken a step which certainly excludes for the future the continuation of the controversy regarding the interpretation of due diligence, for articles 8 and 25 of Convention XIII., instead of stipulating due diligence on the part of neutrals, stipulate the employment of the means at their disposal.

Be that as it may, the Second Peace Conference has[Pg 445] taken a step that certainly rules out any future debate about the meaning of due diligence, because articles 8 and 25 of Convention XIII. don't require neutrals to show due diligence but rather specify the use of the means available to them.

Laying of Submarine Contact Mines by Neutrals.

Laying Submarine Contact Mines by Neutral Parties.

§ 363a. In order to defend themselves against possible violations of their neutral territory, neutrals may lay automatic contact mines off their coasts. If they do this, they must, according to article 4 of Convention VIII., observe the same rules and take the same precautions as are imposed upon belligerents, and as have been expounded above, § 182a. Moreover they must, according to paragraph 2 of article 4 of Convention VIII., give notice in advance to mariners of the place where automatic contact mines have been laid, and this notice must be communicated at once to the Governments through the diplomatic channels.

§ 363a. To protect their neutral territory from potential violations, neutral states may set up automatic contact mines off their coasts. If they do this, they must, according to article 4 of Convention VIII, follow the same rules and take the same precautions that are required of belligerents, as explained above in § 182a. Additionally, they must, as stated in paragraph 2 of article 4 of Convention VIII, notify mariners in advance about where automatic contact mines have been placed, and this notice must be communicated promptly to the Governments through diplomatic channels.

Convention VIII. is quite as unsatisfactory in its rules concerning mines laid by neutrals as in its rules concerning mines laid by belligerents, and the danger to neutral shipping created by mines laid by neutrals is very great, all the more as the laying of mines by neutrals is not restricted to their maritime belt. For article 4 of Convention VIII. speaks of the laying of contact mines on the part of neutral Powers off their coasts, without limiting the laying within the three-mile wide maritime belt as was proposed at the Second Peace Conference, and as article 6[721] of the Règlementation internationale de l'Usage des Mines sous-marines et torpilles of the Institute of International Law likewise proposes.

Convention VIII is just as inadequate in its rules about mines laid by neutrals as it is with those laid by belligerents, and the threat to neutral shipping posed by mines from neutrals is very significant, especially since the placement of mines by neutrals isn't limited to their coastal waters. Article 4 of Convention VIII refers to the laying of contact mines by neutral Powers off their coasts, without restricting this to the three-mile maritime zone as suggested at the Second Peace Conference, and as Article 6[721] of the Règlementation internationale de l'Usage des Mines sous-marines et torpilles of the Institute of International Law also proposes.

[721] See Annuaire, XXIV. (1911), p. 302.[Pg 446]

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See *Annuaire*, XXIV (1911), p. 302.[Pg 446]

IX Right of Angary

Hall, § 278—Lawrence, § 233—Westlake, II. p. 119—Phillimore, III. § 29—Halleck, I. p. 485—Taylor, § 641—Walker, § 69—Bluntschli, § 795A—Heffter, § 150—Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 98-103—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 771-773—Ullmann, § 192—Bonfils, No. 1440—Despagnet, No. 494—Rivier, II. pp. 327-329—Kleen, II. §§ 165 and 230—Perels, § 40—Hautefeuille, III. pp. 416-426—Holland, War, Nos. 139-140—Land Warfare, §§ 507-510—Albrecht, Requisitionen von neutralem Privateigenthum, insbesondere von Schiffen (1912), pp. 24-66.

Hall, § 278—Lawrence, § 233—Westlake, II. p. 119—Phillimore, III. § 29—Halleck, I. p. 485—Taylor, § 641—Walker, § 69—Bluntschli, § 795A—Heffter, § 150—Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 98-103—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 771-773—Ullmann, § 192—Bonfils, No. 1440—Despagnet, No. 494—Rivier, II. pp. 327-329—Kleen, II. §§ 165 and 230—Perels, § 40—Hautefeuille, III. pp. 416-426—Holland, War, Nos. 139-140—Land Warfare, §§ 507-510—Albrecht, Requisitionen von neutralem Privateigenthum, insbesondere von Schiffen (1912), pp. 24-66.

The Obsolete Right of Angary.

The Obsolete Right of Angary.

§ 364. Under the term jus angariae[722] many writers on International Law place the right, often claimed and practised in former times, of a belligerent deficient in vessels to lay an embargo on and seize neutral merchantmen in his harbours, and to compel them and their crews to transport troops, ammunition, and provisions to certain places on payment of freight in advance.[723] This practice arose in the Middle Ages,[724] and was made much use of by Louis XIV. of France. To save the vessels of their subjects from seizure under the right of angary, States began in the seventeenth century to conclude treaties by which they renounced such right with regard to each other's vessels. Thereby the right came into disuse during the eighteenth century. Many writers[725] assert, nevertheless, that it is not obsolete, and might be exercised even to-day. But I doubt whether the Powers would concede to one another the exercise of such a right. The facts that no case happened in the nineteenth century and that International Law with regard to rights and duties of neutrals has become much more developed during the eighteenth[Pg 447] and nineteenth centuries, would seem to justify the opinion that such angary is now probably obsolete,[726] although some writers[727] deny this.

§ 364. Under the term jus angariae[722] many scholars of International Law refer to the right, which was often claimed and practiced in the past, of a warring party lacking ships to impose an embargo and seize neutral merchant vessels in their ports, forcing them and their crews to transport troops, ammunition, and supplies to specific locations in exchange for upfront payment of freight.[723] This practice began in the Middle Ages,[724] and was frequently utilized by Louis XIV of France. To protect their subjects' vessels from being seized under the right of angary, states started in the seventeenth century to sign treaties renouncing this right concerning each other's ships. This led to the right falling out of use during the eighteenth century. Many writers[725] argue, however, that it is still not obsolete and could be exercised today. But I doubt that nations would allow each other to use such a right. The fact that there was no occurrence of this in the nineteenth century and the significant advancements in International Law pertaining to the rights and duties of neutrals during the eighteenth[Pg 447] and nineteenth centuries suggest that such angary is likely obsolete now,[726] although some writers[727] dispute this.

[722] The term angaria, which in medieval Latin means post station, is a derivation from the Greek term ἄγγαρος for messenger. Jus angariae would therefore literally mean a right of transport.

[722] The term angaria, which in medieval Latin means post station, comes from the Greek word ἄγγαρος, meaning messenger. So, Jus angariae would literally mean a right to transport.

[723] See above, § 40.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[724] On the origin and development of the jus angariae, see Albrecht, op. cit. pp. 24-37.

[724] For information on the origin and development of the jus angariae, refer to Albrecht, op. cit. pp. 24-37.

[725] See, for instance, Phillimore, III. § 29; Calvo, III. § 1277; Heffter, § 150; Perels, § 40.

[725] See, for example, Phillimore, III. § 29; Calvo, III. § 1277; Heffter, § 150; Perels, § 40.

[726] See Article 39 of the "Règlement sur le régime légal des navires ... dans les ports étrangers" adopted by the Institute of International Law (Annuaire, XVII. 1898, p. 272): "Le droit d'angarie est supprimé, soit en temps de paix, soit en temps de guerre, quant aux navires neutres."

[726] See Article 39 of the "Regulations on the Legal Regime of Ships ... in Foreign Ports" adopted by the Institute of International Law (Yearbook, XVII. 1898, p. 272): "The right of angary is abolished, both in times of peace and in times of war, concerning neutral ships."

[727] See Albrecht, op. cit. pp. 34-37.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Albrecht, op. cit. pp. 34-37.

The Modern Right of Angary.

The Modern Right to Angary.

§ 365. In contradistinction to this probably obsolete right to compel neutral ships and their crews to render certain services, the modern right of angary consists in the right of belligerents to make use of, or destroy in case of necessity, for the purpose of offence and defence, neutral property on their own or on enemy territory or on the Open Sea. In case property of subjects of neutral States is vested with enemy character,[728] it is not neutral property in the strict sense of the term neutral, and all rules respecting appropriation, utilisation, and destruction of enemy property obviously apply to it. The object of the right of angary is such property of subjects of neutral States as retains its neutral character from its temporary position on belligerent territory and which therefore is not vested with enemy character. All sorts of neutral property, whether it consists of vessels or other[729] means of transport, or arms, ammunition, provisions, or other personal property, may be the object of the right of angary, provided the articles concerned are serviceable to military ends and wants. The conditions under which the right may be exercised are the same as those under which private enemy property may be utilised or destroyed, but in every case the neutral owner must be fully indemnified.[730]

§ 365. Unlike the likely outdated right to force neutral ships and their crews to provide certain services, the modern right of angary allows belligerents to use or destroy, when necessary, for offense and defense, neutral property located on their territory, enemy territory, or in international waters. If property belonging to subjects of neutral States is seen as having enemy status,[728] it is not considered truly neutral property, and all rules regarding the appropriation, use, and destruction of enemy property clearly apply. The purpose of the right of angary is to act on property belonging to subjects of neutral States that maintains its neutral status due to its temporary location on belligerent territory and is therefore not considered enemy property. Various forms of neutral property, whether ships or other[729] means of transport, arms, ammunition, supplies, or personal items, can fall under the right of angary, as long as the items can be used for military purposes and needs. The conditions for exercising this right are the same as those for utilizing or destroying private enemy property, but in all cases, the neutral owner must receive full compensation.[730]

[728] See above, § 90.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[729] Thus in 1870, during the Franco-German War, the Germans seized hundreds of Swiss and Austrian railway carriages in France and made use of them for military purposes.

[729] So in 1870, during the Franco-German War, the Germans took hundreds of Swiss and Austrian train cars in France and used them for military purposes.

[730] See article 6 of U.S. Naval War Code:—"If military necessity should require it, neutral vessels found within the limits of belligerent authority may be seized and destroyed, or otherwise used for military purposes, but in such cases the owners of the neutral vessels must be fully recompensed. The amount of the indemnity should, if practicable, be agreed upon in advance with the owner or master of the vessel; due regard must be had for treaty stipulations upon these matters." See also Holland, War, No. 140.[Pg 448]

[730] See article 6 of the U.S. Naval War Code:—"If military necessity requires it, neutral ships found within the limits of hostile territory may be seized and destroyed, or otherwise used for military purposes, but in such cases, the owners of the neutral ships must be fully compensated. The amount of compensation should, if possible, be agreed upon beforehand with the owner or captain of the ship; due consideration must be given to treaty agreements regarding these matters." See also Holland, War, No. 140.[Pg 448]

A remarkable case[731] happened in 1871 during the Franco-German War. The Germans seized some British coal-vessels lying in the river Seine at Duclair, and sank them for the purpose of preventing French gunboats from running up the river. On the intervention of the British Government, Count Bismarck refused to recognise the duty of Germany to indemnify the owners of the vessels sunk, although he agreed to pay indemnities.

A notable event[731] occurred in 1871 during the Franco-German War. The Germans took some British coal ships that were anchored in the Seine River at Duclair and sank them to stop French gunboats from advancing up the river. When the British Government intervened, Count Bismarck denied Germany's responsibility to compensate the owners of the sunken vessels, although he did agree to pay for damages.

[731] See Albrecht, op. cit. pp. 45-48.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Albrecht, op. cit. pp. 45-48.

However, it may safely be maintained that a duty to pay indemnities for any damage done by exercising the right of angary must nowadays be recognised. Article 53 of the Hague Regulations stipulates the payment of indemnities for the seizure and utilisation of all appliances adapted to the transport of persons or goods which are the private property of inhabitants of occupied enemy territory, and article 52 of the Hague Regulations stipulates payment for requisitions; if, thus, the immunity from confiscation of private property of inhabitants is recognised, all the more must that of private neutral property temporarily on occupied enemy territory be recognised also.

However, it can be confidently stated that there is a responsibility to pay compensation for any damage caused by exercising the right of angary that should be acknowledged today. Article 53 of the Hague Regulations requires compensation for the seizure and use of all equipment meant for the transport of people or goods that are privately owned by residents of occupied enemy territory. Similarly, Article 52 of the Hague Regulations mandates payment for requisitions. Therefore, if we recognize that private property of residents is immune from confiscation, we must also recognize the immunity of private neutral property that is temporarily in occupied enemy territory.

Right of Angary concerning Neutral Rolling Stock.

Right of Angary concerning Neutral Rolling Stock.

§ 366. A special case of the right of angary has found recognition by article 19 of Convention V. of the Second Peace Conference enacting that railway material coming from the territory of a neutral Power, whether belonging to the neutral State or to companies or private persons, shall not be requisitioned or utilised by a belligerent, except in the case of and to the extent required by absolute necessity, that it shall as soon as possible be sent back to the country of origin, and that compensation shall be paid for its use.[732] But it must be mentioned that article 19 gives a right to a neutral[Pg 449] Power, whose railway material has been requisitioned by a belligerent, to retain and make use of, to a corresponding extent, railway material coming from the territory of the belligerent concerned.

§ 366. A special case of the right of angary has been acknowledged by Article 19 of Convention V of the Second Peace Conference, stating that railway materials coming from the territory of a neutral power, whether owned by the neutral state or by companies or private individuals, cannot be requisitioned or used by a belligerent, except in cases of absolute necessity, and must be returned to the country of origin as soon as possible, with compensation provided for their use.[732] However, it should be noted that Article 19 grants a neutral power, whose railway materials have been requisitioned by a belligerent, the right to retain and use, to an equivalent extent, railway materials coming from the territory of the concerned belligerent.[Pg 449]

[732] See Nowacki, Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege (1906), pp. 115-126, and Albrecht, op. cit. pp. 22-24.

[732] See Nowacki, Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege (1906), pp. 115-126, and Albrecht, op. cit. pp. 22-24.

Right of Angary not deriving from Neutrality.

Right of Angary not deriving from Neutrality.

§ 367. Whatever the extent of the right of angary may be, it does not derive from the law of neutrality. The correlative duty of a belligerent to indemnify the neutral owner of property appropriated or destroyed by the exercise of the right of angary does indeed derive from the law of neutrality. But the right of angary itself is rather a right deriving from the law of war. As a rule this law gives, under certain circumstances and conditions, the right to a belligerent to seize, make use of, or destroy private property of inhabitants only of occupied enemy territory, but under other circumstances and conditions, and very exceptionally, it likewise gives a belligerent the right to seize, use, or destroy such neutral property as is temporarily on occupied enemy territory.

§ 367. No matter how extensive the right of angary may be, it doesn’t come from the law of neutrality. The obligation for a belligerent to compensate a neutral owner for property taken or destroyed by exercising the right of angary does come from the law of neutrality. However, the right of angary itself originates from the law of war. Typically, this law allows a belligerent, under certain circumstances and conditions, to seize, use, or destroy private property of residents only from occupied enemy territory. In rare cases and under different circumstances, it also grants a belligerent the right to seize, use, or destroy neutral property that is temporarily located in occupied enemy territory.

CHAPTER 3 Blockade

I Blockade Concept

Grotius, III. c. 1, § 5—Bynkershoek, Quaest. jur. publ. I. c. 2-15—Vattel, III. § 117—Hall, §§ 233, 237-266—Lawrence, §§ 246-252—Westlake, II. pp. 228-239—Maine, pp. 107-109—Manning, pp. 400-412—Phillimore, III. §§ 285-321—Twiss, II. §§ 98-120—Halleck, II. pp. 182-213—Taylor, §§ 674-684—Walker, §§ 76-82—Wharton, III. §§ 359-365—Moore, VII. §§ 1266-1286—Wheaton, §§ 509-523—Bluntschli, §§ 827-840—Heffter, §§ 154-157—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 738-771—Ullmann, § 182—Bonfils, Nos. 1608-1659—Despagnet, Nos. 620-640—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2676-2679, and VIII. Nos. 3109-3152—Nys, III. pp. 224-244, 693-694—Rivier, II. pp. 288-298—Calvo, V. §§ 2827-2908—Fiore, III. Nos. 1606-1629—Martens, II. § 124—Pillet, pp. 129-144—Kleen, I. §§ 124-139—Ortolan, II. pp. 292-336—Hautefeuille, II. pp. 189-288—Gessner, pp. 145-227—Perels, §§ 48-51—Testa, pp. 221-229—Dupuis, Nos. 159-198, and Guerre, Nos. 113-136—Boeck, Nos. 670-726—Holland, Prize Law, §§ 106-140—U.S. Naval War Code, articles 37-43—Bernsten, § 10—Nippold, II. § 32—Bargrave Deane, The Law of Blockade (1870)—Fauchille, Du blocus maritime (1882)—Carnazza-Amari, Del blocco maritimo (1897)—Frémont, De la saisie des navires en cas de blocus (1899)—Guynot-Boissière, Du blocus maritime (1899)—§§ 35-44 of the "Règlement international des prises maritimes" (Annuaire, IX. 1887, p. 218), adopted by the Institute of International Law—Atherley-Jones, Commerce in War (1906) pp. 92-252—Söderquist, Le Blocus Maritime (1908)—Hansemann, Die Lehre von der einheitlichen Reise im Rechte der Blockade und Kriegskonterbande (1910)—Güldenagel, Verfolgung und Rechtsfolgen des Blockadebruches (1911)—Hirschmann, Das internationale Prisenrecht (1912) §§ 17-23—Kennedy in The Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, New Series, IX. (1908), pp. 239-251—Myers in A.J. IV. pp. 571-595—General Report presented to the Naval Conference of London by its Drafting Committee, articles 1-21.

Grotius, III. c. 1, § 5—Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law I. c. 2-15—Vattel, III. § 117—Hall, §§ 233, 237-266—Lawrence, §§ 246-252—Westlake, II. pp. 228-239—Maine, pp. 107-109—Manning, pp. 400-412—Phillimore, III. §§ 285-321—Twiss, II. §§ 98-120—Halleck, II. pp. 182-213—Taylor, §§ 674-684—Walker, §§ 76-82—Wharton, III. §§ 359-365—Moore, VII. §§ 1266-1286—Wheaton, §§ 509-523—Bluntschli, §§ 827-840—Heffter, §§ 154-157—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 738-771—Ullmann, § 182—Bonfils, Nos. 1608-1659—Despagnet, Nos. 620-640—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2676-2679, and VIII. Nos. 3109-3152—Nys, III. pp. 224-244, 693-694—Rivier, II. pp. 288-298—Calvo, V. §§ 2827-2908—Fiore, III. Nos. 1606-1629—Martens, II. § 124—Pillet, pp. 129-144—Kleen, I. §§ 124-139—Ortolan, II. pp. 292-336—Hautefeuille, II. pp. 189-288—Gessner, pp. 145-227—Perels, §§ 48-51—Testa, pp. 221-229—Dupuis, Nos. 159-198, and War, Nos. 113-136—Boeck, Nos. 670-726—Holland, Prize Law, §§ 106-140—U.S. Naval War Code, articles 37-43—Bernsten, § 10—Nippold, II. § 32—Bargrave Deane, The Law of Blockade (1870)—Fauchille, On Maritime Blockade (1882)—Carnazza-Amari, On Maritime Blockade (1897)—Frémont, On the Seizure of Vessels in Case of Blockade (1899)—Guynot-Boissière, On Maritime Blockade (1899)—§§ 35-44 of the "International Regulation of Maritime Prize" (Yearbook, IX. 1887, p. 218), adopted by the Institute of International Law—Atherley-Jones, Commerce in War (1906) pp. 92-252—Söderquist, Maritime Blockade (1908)—Hansemann, The Doctrine of the Unified Journey in the Law of Blockade and War Contraband (1910)—Güldenagel, Pursuit and Legal Consequences of Breaking Blockade (1911)—Hirschmann, The International Prize Law (1912) §§ 17-23—Kennedy in The Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, New Series, IX. (1908), pp. 239-251—Myers in A.J. IV. pp. 571-595—General Report presented to the Naval Conference of London by its Drafting Committee, articles 1-21.

Definition of Blockade.

Definition of Blockade.

§ 368. Blockade is the blocking by men-of-war[733] of the approach to the enemy coast or a part of it for the purpose of preventing ingress and egress of vessels[Pg 451] of all nations. Blockade must not be confounded with siege, although it may take place concurrently with siege. Whereas siege aims at the capture of the besieged place, blockade endeavours merely to intercept all intercourse, and especially commercial intercourse, by sea between the coast and the world at large. Although blockade is, as shown above in §§ 173 and 174, a means of warfare against the enemy, it concerns neutrals as well, because the ingress and egress of neutral vessels are thereby interdicted and may be punished.

§ 368. Blockade is when warships[733] block access to the enemy's coast or a part of it to prevent ships from entering or leaving[Pg 451] from any nation. Blockade should not be confused with a siege, even though they can happen at the same time. A siege aims to capture the location under siege, while a blockade focuses on cutting off all communication, especially trade, by sea between the coast and the rest of the world. Although blockade is, as explained above in §§ 173 and 174, a method of warfare against the enemy, it also affects neutral parties because it restricts their ships' ability to enter or leave, which can lead to penalties.

[733] When in 1861, during the American Civil War, the Federal Government blocked the harbour of Charleston by sinking ships laden with stone, the question arose whether a so-called stone-blockade is lawful. There ought to be no doubt—see below, § 380—that such a stone-blockade is not a blockade in the ordinary sense of the term, and that neutral ships may not be seized and confiscated for having attempted egress or ingress. But, on the other hand, there ought to be no doubt either that this mode of obstructing an enemy port is as lawful as any other means of sea warfare, provided the blocking of the harbour is made known so that neutral vessels can avoid the danger of being wrecked. See Wharton, III. § 361A; Fauchille, Blocus, pp. 143-145; Perels, § 35, p. 187.

[733] In 1861, during the American Civil War, the Federal Government blocked the harbor of Charleston by sinking ships filled with stone. This raised the question of whether such a stone blockade is legal. There should be no doubt—see below, § 380—that a stone blockade is not a blockade in the usual sense and that neutral ships cannot be seized or confiscated for trying to enter or exit. However, it should also be clear that this method of blocking an enemy port is as legal as any other form of naval warfare, as long as the fact that the harbor is blocked is communicated so neutral vessels can avoid the risk of being wrecked. See Wharton, III. § 361A; Fauchille, Blocus, pp. 143-145; Perels, § 35, p. 187.

Blockade in the modern sense of the term is an institution which could not develop until neutrality was in some form a recognised institution of the Law of Nations, and until the freedom of neutral commerce was in some form guaranteed. The institution of blockade dates from the sixteenth century,[734] but it has taken several hundred years for the institution to reach its present condition, since, until the beginning of the nineteenth century, belligerents frequently made use of so-called paper blockades, which are no longer valid, a blockade now being binding only if effective.

Blockade, in today's sense, is a system that couldn't develop until neutrality was recognized as a legitimate part of international law and until the freedom of neutral trade was somewhat guaranteed. The concept of blockade originated in the sixteenth century,[734] but it took several hundred years for it to evolve into its current form. Until the early nineteenth century, warring parties often relied on what were called paper blockades, which are no longer recognized as valid; a blockade is now considered legitimate only if it is effective.

[734] See Fauchille, Blocus, pp. 2-6.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Fauchille, Blockade, pp. 2-6.

It is on account of the practical importance of blockade for the interests of neutrals that the matter is more conveniently treated with neutrality than with war. And it must be noted that blockade as a means of warfare must not be confounded with so-called pacific blockade, which is a means of compulsive settlement of State differences.

It’s because of the practical importance of blockades for the interests of neutral parties that the issue is better addressed with neutrality than with war. It’s also important to note that a blockade as a method of warfare should not be confused with what is called a pacific blockade, which is a way to force a resolution of state disagreements.

Apart from the stipulation of the Declaration of[Pg 452] Paris that a blockade to be binding must be effective, no conventional rules concerning blockade were in existence until the Declaration of London, nor was the practice of the States governed by common rules covering all the points concerned. But articles 1-21 of the Declaration of London now offer a code of the law of blockade and will, should this Declaration be ratified, in time produce a common practice of all maritime States.

Aside from the requirement in the Declaration of[Pg 452] Paris that for a blockade to be considered valid, it must be effective, there were no established conventional rules regarding blockades until the Declaration of London. Furthermore, states did not follow a common set of rules encompassing all relevant aspects. However, articles 1-21 of the Declaration of London now provide a legal framework for blockades and, if this Declaration is approved, will eventually lead to a unified practice among all maritime states.

Blockade, Strategic and Commercial.

Blockade, Strategic and Business.

§ 369. A blockade is termed strategic if it forms part of other military operations directed against the coast which is blockaded, or if it be declared in order to cut off supply to enemy forces on shore. In contradistinction to blockade strategic, one speaks of a commercial blockade, when a blockade is declared simply in order to cut off the coast from intercourse with the outside world, although no military operations take place on shore. That blockades commercial are, according to the present rules of International Law, as legitimate as blockades strategic, is not generally denied. But several writers[735] maintain that blockades purely commercial ought to be abolished as not in accordance with the guaranteed freedom of neutral commerce during war.

§ 369. A blockade is called strategic if it is part of other military operations targeting the coast being blockaded, or if it is declared to cut off supplies to enemy forces on land. In contrast to a strategic blockade, a commercial blockade is when a blockade is established simply to prevent the coast from interacting with the outside world, even if no military actions are occurring on land. The current rules of International Law generally accept that commercial blockades are as legitimate as strategic ones. However, several writers[735] argue that purely commercial blockades should be abolished since they do not align with the guaranteed freedom of neutral trade during wartime.

[735] See Hall, § 233.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Hall, § 233.

Blockade to be Universal.

Blockade to be Global.

§ 370. A blockade is really in being when vessels of all nations are interdicted and prevented from ingress or egress. Blockade as a means of warfare is admissible only in the form of a universal blockade, that is—as article 5 of the Declaration of London stipulates—it "must be applied impartially to the vessels of all nations." If the blockading belligerent were to allow the ingress or egress of vessels of one nation, no blockade would exist.[736]

§ 370. A blockade is really in effect when vessels from all nations are prohibited from entering or leaving. A blockade as a method of warfare is only acceptable if it's a universal blockade; that is—as article 5 of the Declaration of London states—it "must be applied impartially to the vessels of all nations." If the blockading country allowed vessels from one nation to pass, then no blockade would be in place.[736]

[736] The Rolla (1807), 6 C. Rob. 364; the Franciska (1855), Spinks, 287. See also below, § 382.

[736] The Rolla (1807), 6 C. Rob. 364; the Franciska (1855), Spinks, 287. See also below, § 382.

On the other hand, provided a blockade is universal,[Pg 453] a special licence of ingress or egress may be given to a special vessel and for a particular purpose,[737] and men-of-war of all neutral nations may be allowed to pass to and fro unhindered.[738] Thus, when during the American Civil War the Federal Government blockaded the coast of the Confederate States, neutral men-of-war were not prevented from ingress and egress. But it must be specially observed that a belligerent has a right to prevent neutral men-of-war from passing through the line of blockade, and it is entirely within his discretion whether or not he will admit or exclude them; nor is he compelled to admit them all, even though he has admitted one or more of them.

On the other hand, if a blockade is comprehensive,[Pg 453] a special permit for entry or exit may be granted to a specific vessel for a certain purpose,[737] and naval ships from all neutral countries may be allowed to move freely. [738] For example, during the American Civil War, when the Federal Government blockaded the coast of the Confederate States, neutral naval vessels were not stopped from entering or leaving. However, it's important to note that a belligerent has the right to stop neutral naval ships from passing through the blockade line, and it’s entirely up to him whether he allows or denies them access; he is not required to let all neutral ships through, even if he has permitted one or more.

[737] This exception to the general rule is not mentioned by the Declaration of London, but I have no doubt that the International Prize Court would recognise it.

[737] This exception to the general rule isn't mentioned in the Declaration of London, but I'm sure the International Prize Court would acknowledge it.

[738] Recognised by article 6 of the Declaration of London.

[738] Acknowledged in article 6 of the Declaration of London.

Blockade, Outwards and Inwards.

Blockade, Outward and Inward.

§ 371. As a rule a blockade is declared for the purpose of preventing ingress as well as egress. But sometimes only ingress or only egress is prevented. In such cases one speaks of "Blockade inwards" and of "Blockade outwards" respectively. Thus the blockade of the mouth of the Danube declared by the Allies in 1854 during the Crimean War was a "blockade inwards," since the only purpose was to prevent supply reaching the Russian Army from the sea.[739]

§ 371. Generally, a blockade is set up to stop both entry and exit. However, sometimes it only restricts entry or exit. In those cases, it's referred to as "blockade inwards" or "blockade outwards." For example, the blockade at the mouth of the Danube declared by the Allies in 1854 during the Crimean War was a "blockade inwards," as its sole purpose was to prevent supplies from reaching the Russian Army via the sea.[739]

[739] The Gerasimo (1857), 11 Moore, P.C. 88.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Gerasimo (1857), 11 Moore, P.C. 88.

What Places can be Blockaded.

Places That Can Be Blockaded.

§ 372. In former times it was sometimes asserted that only ports, or even only fortified[740] ports, could be blockaded, but the practice of the States has always shown that single ports and portions of an enemy coast as well as the whole of the enemy coast may be blockaded. Thus during the American Civil War the whole of the coast of the Confederate States to the extent of about 2500 nautical miles was blockaded. And attention must be drawn to the fact, that such ports of a belligerent[Pg 454] as are in the hands of the enemy may be the object of a blockade. Thus during the Franco-German War the French blockaded[741] their own ports of Rouen, Dieppe, and Fécamp, which were occupied by the Germans. Article 1 of the Declaration of London indirectly sanctions the practice of the States by enacting that "a blockade must not extend beyond the ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy."

§ 372. In the past, it was sometimes claimed that only ports, or even only fortified ports, could be blockaded. However, the actions of states have consistently demonstrated that individual ports and sections of an enemy's coastline, as well as the entire enemy coastline, can be blockaded. For instance, during the American Civil War, the entire coast of the Confederate States, spanning about 2500 nautical miles, was blockaded. It's important to note that ports controlled by the enemy can also be the target of a blockade. During the Franco-German War, for example, the French blockaded their own ports of Rouen, Dieppe, and Fécamp, which had been occupied by the Germans. Article 1 of the Declaration of London indirectly supports this practice by stating that "a blockade must not extend beyond the ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy."

[740] Napoleon I. maintained in his Berlin Decrees: "Le droit de blocus, d'après la raison et l'usage de tous les peuples policés, n'est applicable qu'aux places fortes."

[740] Napoleon I. stated in his Berlin Decrees: "The right of blockade, according to reason and the customs of all civilized nations, only applies to fortified places."

[741] See Fauchille, Blocus, p. 161.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Fauchille, Blocus, p. 161.

Blockade of International Rivers.

Blockade of Global Rivers.

§ 373. It is a moot question whether the mouth of a so-called international river may be the object of a blockade, in case the riparian States are not all belligerents. Thus, when in 1854, during the Crimean War, the allied fleets of Great Britain and France blockaded the mouth of the Danube, Bavaria and Württemberg, which remained neutral, protested. When in 1870 the French blockaded the whole of the German coast of the North Sea, they exempted the mouth of the river Ems, because it runs partly through Holland. And when in 1863, during the blockade of the coast of the Confederate States, the Federal cruiser Vanderbilt captured the British vessel Peterhoff[742] destined for Matamaros, on the Mexican shore of the Rio Grande, the American Courts released the vessel on the ground that trade with Mexico, which was neutral, could not be prohibited.

§ 373. It's a debated issue whether the mouth of a so-called international river can be blockaded if not all the neighboring countries are at war. For instance, in 1854, during the Crimean War, the allied fleets of Great Britain and France blockaded the mouth of the Danube, prompting protests from Bavaria and Württemberg, which remained neutral. In 1870, when the French blockaded the entire German coast of the North Sea, they made an exception for the mouth of the river Ems because it flows partly through Holland. Additionally, during the blockade of the Confederate States in 1863, the Federal cruiser Vanderbilt captured the British vessel Peterhoff[742] heading for Matamoros on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande, but American Courts released the vessel, arguing that trade with neutral Mexico could not be prohibited.

[742] 5 Wallace, 49. See Fauchille, Blocus, pp. 171-183; Phillimore, III. § 293A; Hall, § 266; Rivier, II. p. 291.

[742] 5 Wallace, 49. See Fauchille, Blockade, pp. 171-183; Phillimore, III. § 293A; Hall, § 266; Rivier, II. p. 291.

The Declaration of London would seem to settle the controversy only as regards one point. By enacting that "the blockading forces must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts," article 18 certainly prohibits the blockade of the whole mouth of a boundary river between a neutral and a belligerent State, as, for instance, the River Rio Grande in case of war with the United States of America, provided Mexico remained neutral. But no provision is made for the case of the[Pg 455] blockade of the mouths of rivers, such as the Danube or the Rhine, for example, which pass through several States between their sources and their mouths at the sea coast, if one or more upper riparian States remain neutral.

The Declaration of London seems to address the controversy only on one point. By stating that "the blockading forces must not prevent access to neutral ports or coasts," article 18 clearly prohibits blockading the entire mouth of a border river between a neutral and a belligerent State, such as the Rio Grande in the event of a war with the United States, as long as Mexico stays neutral. However, there is no provision regarding the blockade of river mouths like the Danube or the Rhine, which pass through several States between their sources and their mouths at the coastline, if one or more upstream States remain neutral.

Justification of Blockade.

Blockade Justification.

§ 374. The question has been raised in what way blockade, which vests a belligerent with a certain jurisdiction over neutral vessels and which has detrimental consequences for neutral trade, could be justified.[743] Several writers, following Hautefeuille,[744] maintain that the establishment of a blockade by a belligerent stationing a number of men-of-war so as to block the approach to the coast includes conquest of that part of the sea, and that such conquest justifies a belligerent in prohibiting ingress and egress of vessels of all nations. In contradistinction to this artificial construction of a conquest of a part of the sea, some writers[745] try to justify blockade by the necessity of war. I think, however, no special justification of blockade is necessary at all. The fact is that the detrimental consequences of blockade to neutrals stand in the same category as the many other detrimental consequences of war to neutrals. Neither the one nor the other need be specially justified. A blockade interferes indeed with the recognised principle of the freedom of the sea, and, further, with the recognised freedom of neutral commerce. But all three have developed together, and when the freedom of the sea in time of peace and war, and, further, when the freedom of neutral commerce became generally recognised, the exceptional restrictions of blockade became at the same time recognised as legitimate.

§ 374. The question has been raised about how a blockade, which gives a belligerent certain authority over neutral vessels and negatively impacts neutral trade, can be justified.[743] Several authors, following Hautefeuille,[744] argue that when a belligerent establishes a blockade by positioning a number of warships to obstruct access to the coast, it effectively takes control over that part of the sea, and such control justifies the belligerent in banning the entry and exit of vessels from all nations. In contrast to this constructed notion of sea conquest, some writers[745] seek to justify blockade through the necessity of war. However, I believe no specific justification for blockade is needed at all. The reality is that the negative effects of a blockade on neutrals fall into the same category as the many other adverse effects of war on neutrals. Neither situation requires special justification. A blockade does indeed interfere with the established principle of the freedom of the seas and, additionally, with the recognized freedom of neutral commerce. But all three have evolved together, and as the freedom of the seas in times of peace and war, along with the freedom of neutral commerce, became widely accepted, the exceptional restrictions of blockade were simultaneously recognized as legitimate.

[743] The matter is thoroughly treated by Fauchille, Blocus, pp. 13-36, and Güldenagel, op. cit. pp. 39-86.

[743] The topic is extensively covered by Fauchille, Blocus, pp. 13-36, and Güldenagel, op. cit. pp. 39-86.

[744] See Hautefeuille, II. pp. 190-191.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Hautefeuille, vol. II, pp. 190-191.

[745] See Gessner, p. 151; Bluntschli, § 827; Martens, II. § 124.[Pg 456]

[745] See Gessner, p. 151; Bluntschli, § 827; Martens, II. § 124.[Pg 456]

II BLOCKADE ESTABLISHED

See the literature quoted above at the commencement of § 368.

See the literature mentioned earlier at the beginning of § 368.

Competence to establish Blockade.

Competence to establish blockade.

§ 375. A declaration of blockade being "a high[746] act of sovereignty" and having far-reaching consequences upon neutral trade, it is generally recognised not to be in the discretion of a commander of a naval force to establish blockade without the authority of his Government. Article 9 of the Declaration of London precisely enacts that "a Declaration of blockade is made by the blockading Power or by the naval authorities acting in its name." The authority of his Government to establish a blockade can be granted to a commander of a naval force purposely for a particular blockade, the Government ordering the commander of a squadron to blockade a certain port or coast. Or a Government can expressly delegate its power to blockade to a commander for use at his discretion. And if operations of war take place at great distance[747] from the seat of Government and a commander finds it necessary to establish a blockade, the latter can become valid through his Government giving its immediate consent after being informed of the act of the commander. And, further, the powers vested in the hands of the supreme commander of a fleet are supposed to include the authority to establish a blockade in case he finds it necessary, provided that his Government acquiesces as soon as it is informed of the establishment of the blockade.[748]

§ 375. A declaration of blockade is considered "a significant act of sovereignty" and has major impacts on neutral trade. It is generally accepted that a naval commander cannot establish a blockade without their Government's approval. Article 9 of the Declaration of London states that "a Declaration of blockade is made by the blockading Power or by the naval authorities acting on its behalf." The Government can grant authority for a specific blockade to a naval commander, instructing them to blockade a certain port or coastline. Alternatively, a Government can also explicitly delegate its blockade power to a commander for them to use at their discretion. If military operations are occurring far from the Government's location and a commander deems it necessary to establish a blockade, that blockade can become valid once the Government gives immediate approval after being informed of the commander's actions. Additionally, the powers held by the supreme commander of a fleet are assumed to include the authority to set up a blockade if deemed necessary, provided their Government agrees as soon as they are informed of the blockade's establishment.

[746] The Henrik and Maria (1799), 1 C. Rob. 146.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Henrik and Maria (1799), 1 C. Rob. 146.

[747] The Rolla (1807), 6 C. Rob. 364.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Rolla (1807), 6 C. Rob. 364.

[748] As regards the whole matter, see Fauchille, Blocus, pp. 68-73.

[748] For the complete discussion, refer to Fauchille, Blocus, pp. 68-73.

Declaration and Notification of Blockade.

Blockade Declaration and Notification.

§ 376. A blockade is not in being ipso facto by the outbreak of war. And even the actual blocking of the approach to an enemy coast by belligerent men-of-war[Pg 457] need not by itself mean that the ingress and egress of neutral vessels are to be prohibited, since it can take place for the purpose of preventing the egress and ingress of enemy vessels only. Continental writers, therefore, have always considered notification to be essential for the establishment of a blockade. English, American, and Japanese writers, however, have not hitherto held notification to be essential, although they considered knowledge on the part of a neutral vessel of an existing blockade to be necessary for her condemnation for breach of blockade.[749]

§ 376. A blockade doesn't automatically exist just because war has broken out. Even if enemy warships are actively blocking access to an enemy coast[Pg 457], it doesn't necessarily mean that neutral ships must be banned from entering or leaving. This action can be aimed solely at preventing enemy vessels from coming and going. Therefore, European scholars have always believed that a notification is crucial for establishing a blockade. In contrast, English, American, and Japanese scholars have not considered notification to be essential so far, although they do think that a neutral ship's awareness of an existing blockade is necessary for it to be held liable for breaching that blockade.[749]

[749] See below, § 384.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

But although Continental writers have always held notification to be essential for the establishment of blockade, they differed with regard to the kind of notification that is necessary. Some writers[750] maintained that three different notifications must take place—namely, first, a local notification to the authorities of the blockaded ports or coast; secondly, a diplomatic or general notification to all maritime neutral States by the blockading belligerent; and, thirdly, a special notification to every approaching neutral vessel. Other writers[751] considered only diplomatic and special notification essential. Others again[752] maintained that special notification to every approaching neutral vessel is alone required, although they recommended diplomatic notification as a matter of courtesy.

But while Continental writers have always believed that notification is crucial for establishing a blockade, they disagreed on the type of notification needed. Some writers[750] argued that three different notifications are necessary: first, a local notification to the authorities of the blockaded ports or coast; second, a diplomatic or general notification to all maritime neutral states from the blockading belligerent; and third, a specific notification to every approaching neutral vessel. Other writers[751] only considered diplomatic and specific notifications essential. Yet others[752] argued that only specific notification to every approaching neutral vessel is required, although they suggested that diplomatic notification should be done out of courtesy.

[750] See, for instance, Kleen, I. § 131.

[750] For example, see Kleen, I. § 131.

[751] See, for instance, Bluntschli, 831-832; Martens, II. § 124, Gessner, p. 181.

[751] See, for example, Bluntschli, 831-832; Martens, II. § 124, Gessner, p. 181.

[752] See, for instance, Hautefeuille, II. pp. 224 and 226; Calvo, V. § 2846; Fauchille, pp. 219-221.

[752] Check out, for example, Hautefeuille, II. pp. 224 and 226; Calvo, V. § 2846; Fauchille, pp. 219-221.

As regards the practice of States, it has always been usual for the commander who established a blockade to send a notification of the blockade to the authorities of the blockaded ports or coast and the foreign consuls there. It has, further, always been usual for the blockading Government to notify the fact diplomatically[Pg 458] to all neutral maritime States. And some States, as France and Italy, have always ordered their blockading men-of-war to board every approaching neutral vessel and notify her of the establishment of the blockade. But Great Britain, the United States of America, and Japan did not formerly consider notification to be essential for the institution of a blockade. They held the simple fact that the approach was blocked, and egress and ingress of neutral vessels actually prevented, to be sufficient to make the existence of a blockade known, and when no diplomatic notification had taken place, they did not seize a vessel for breach of blockade whose master had no actual notice of the existence of the blockade. English,[753] American,[754] and Japanese[755] practice, accordingly, made a distinction between a so-called de facto blockade on the one hand, and, on the other, a notified blockade.

In terms of state practices, it has always been standard for the commander who set up a blockade to inform the authorities of the affected ports or coasts and the foreign consuls there. Additionally, it has always been customary for the blockading government to diplomatically notify all neutral maritime states about the blockade[Pg 458]. Some countries, like France and Italy, have consistently instructed their blockading ships to stop every approaching neutral vessel and inform them of the blockade. However, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan previously did not see notification as necessary for creating a blockade. They believed that simply blocking the approach and stopping neutral ships from entering or leaving was enough to indicate the existence of a blockade. If no diplomatic notification had been issued, they would not seize a vessel for violating the blockade if its captain had no actual knowledge of it. Thus, the practices of Britain, the U.S., and Japan made a clear distinction between a so-called de facto blockade and a formally notified blockade.

[753] The Vrouw Judith (1799), 1 C. Rob. 150.

[753] The Vrouw Judith (1799), 1 C. Rob. 150.

[754] See U.S. Naval War Code, articles 39-40.

[754] See U.S. Naval War Code, articles 39-40.

[755] See Japanese Prize Law, article 30.

[755] See Japanese Prize Law, article 30.

The Declaration of London, when ratified, will create a common practice, for articles 8 to 12 represent an agreement of the Powers on the following points:—

The Declaration of London, once ratified, will establish a common practice, as articles 8 to 12 reflect an agreement among the Powers on the following points:—

(1) There must be a declaration as well as a notification in order to make a blockade binding (article 8). If there is either no proper declaration or no proper notification, the blockade is not binding.

(1) There must be a declaration as well as a notification to make a blockade valid (article 8). If there is either no proper declaration or no proper notification, the blockade is not valid.

(2) A declaration of blockade is made either by the blockading Power or by the naval authorities acting in its name. The declaration of blockade must specify (a) the date when the blockade begins; (b) the geographical limits of the coastline under blockade; and (c) the period within which neutral vessels may come out (article 9). If the commencement of the blockade or its geographical limits are given inaccurately in the[Pg 459] declaration, or if no mention is made of the period within which neutral vessels may come out, or if this period is given inaccurately, the declaration is void, and a new declaration is necessary in order to make the blockade binding (article 10).

(2) A declaration of blockade is issued either by the blockading Power or by its naval authorities. The blockade declaration must include (a) the start date of the blockade; (b) the geographical boundaries of the coastline under blockade; and (c) the timeframe in which neutral vessels can exit (article 9). If the start of the blockade or its geographical boundaries are inaccurately stated in the[Pg 459] declaration, or if there is no indication of the timeframe for neutral vessels to exit, or if this timeframe is inaccurately provided, the declaration is invalid, and a new declaration is required to make the blockade enforceable (article 10).

(3) Notification of the declaration of blockade must at once be made. Two notifications are necessary (article 11):—

(3) Notification of the blockade declaration must be made immediately. Two notifications are required (article 11):—

The first notification must be made by the Government of the blockading fleet to all neutral Governments either through the diplomatic channel, or otherwise, for instance by telegraph. The purpose of this notification is to enable neutral Governments to inform merchantmen sailing under their flag of the establishment of a blockade.

The first notification must be made by the Government of the blockading fleet to all neutral Governments either through diplomatic channels or otherwise, for example by telegraph. The purpose of this notification is to allow neutral Governments to inform merchant ships sailing under their flag about the establishment of a blockade.

The second notification must be made to the local authorities by the officer commanding the blockading force; these authorities have on their part to notify, as soon as possible, the foreign consuls at the blockaded port or coastline. The purpose of this notification is to enable neutral merchantmen in the blockaded port or ports to receive knowledge of the establishment of the blockade and to prepare themselves to leave the port within the period specified in the declaration of blockade.

The second notification must be made to the local authorities by the officer in charge of the blockading force; these authorities must, in turn, notify the foreign consuls at the blockaded port or coastline as soon as possible. The purpose of this notification is to inform neutral merchant ships in the blockaded port or ports about the blockade so they can prepare to leave the port within the timeframe specified in the blockade declaration.

(4) The rules as to declaration and notification of blockade apply to cases where the limits of a blockade have been extended, or where a blockade is re-established after having been raised (article 12).

(4) The rules for declaring and notifying a blockade apply to situations where the boundaries of a blockade have been expanded, or where a blockade is re-established after being lifted (article 12).

Length of Time for Egress of Neutral Vessels.

Length of Time for Neutral Vessels to Leave.

§ 377. As regards ingress, a blockade becomes valid the moment it is established; even vessels in ballast have no right of ingress. As regards egress, it has always been usual for the blockading commander to grant a certain length of time within which neutral vessels might leave the blockaded ports unhindered, but no rule existed respecting the length of such time,[Pg 460] although fifteen days were frequently granted.[756] This usage of granting to neutral vessels a period within which they may leave the blockaded port, has been made a binding rule by the Declaration of London. For, since article 9 enacts that a declaration of blockade must specify the period within which neutral vessels may come out, it implicitly enacts that the granting of such a period is compulsory, although it may only be long enough to enable neutral vessels to make their way out as quickly as possible.

§ 377. Regarding ingress, a blockade is valid as soon as it's established; even vessels carrying only ballast have no right to enter. For egress, it has generally been the case that the blockading commander allows a certain amount of time for neutral vessels to leave the blockaded ports without interference, but there was no set rule about how long this period should be,[Pg 460] although fifteen days was often given.[756] This practice of granting neutral vessels a timeframe to exit the blockaded port has been formalized by the Declaration of London. Since article 9 stipulates that a blockade declaration must state the timeframe for neutral vessels to leave, it implicitly establishes that allowing such a period is mandatory, even if it is just long enough for neutral vessels to exit as quickly as possible.

[756] According to U.S. Naval War Code, article 43, thirty days are allowed "unless otherwise specially ordered."

[756] According to the U.S. Naval War Code, article 43, thirty days are permitted "unless otherwise specifically ordered."

End of Blockade.

End of Blockade.

§ 378. Apart from the conclusion of peace, a blockade can come to an end in three different ways.

§ 378. Besides the peace treaty, a blockade can end in three different ways.

It may, firstly, be raised, or restricted in its limits, by the blockading Power for any reason it likes. In such a case it has always been usual to notify the end of blockade to all neutral maritime States, and article 13 of the Declaration of London turns this usage into a binding rule by enacting that the voluntary raising of a blockade, as also any restrictions in its limits, must, in the same way as the declaration of a blockade, be notified to all neutral Governments by the blockading Power, as well as to the local authorities by the officer commanding the blockading fleet.

It can, first of all, be lifted or its limits can be restricted by the blockading Power for any reason it chooses. In such cases, it has always been customary to inform all neutral maritime States about the end of the blockade, and article 13 of the Declaration of London makes this practice a mandatory rule by stating that the voluntary lifting of a blockade, as well as any limits imposed on it, must be communicated to all neutral Governments by the blockading Power, just like the declaration of a blockade, and to the local authorities by the officer in charge of the blockading fleet.

A blockade can, secondly, come to an end through an enemy force driving off the blockading squadron or fleet. In such case the blockade ends ipso facto by the blockading squadron being driven away, whatever their intention as to returning may be. Should the squadron return and resume the blockade, it must be considered as new, and not simply the continuation of the former blockade, and another declaration and notification are necessary (article 12 of the Declaration of London).

A blockade can, secondly, end when an enemy force drives away the blockading squadron or fleet. In this case, the blockade ends ipso facto when the blockading squadron is forced to leave, regardless of their plans to return. If the squadron comes back and resumes the blockade, it must be treated as a new blockade, not just a continuation of the previous one, and a new declaration and notification are required (article 12 of the Declaration of London).

The third ground for the ending of a blockade is its[Pg 461] failure to be effective, a point which will be treated below in § 382.

The third reason for ending a blockade is its[Pg 461] ineffectiveness, a topic that will be discussed further in § 382.

III BLOCKADE EFFECTIVENESS

See the literature quoted above at the commencement of § 368.

See the literature mentioned above at the beginning of § 368.

Effective in contradistinction to Fictitious Blockade.

Effective in contrast to Fictitious Blockade.

§ 379. The necessity for effectiveness in a blockade by means of the presence of a blockading squadron of sufficient strength to prevent egress and ingress of vessels became gradually recognised during the first half of the nineteenth century; it became formally enacted as a principle of the Law of Nations through the Declaration of Paris in 1856, and the Declaration of London enacts it by article 2. Effective blockade is the contrast to so-called fictitious or paper blockade, which was frequently practised during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and at the beginning of the nineteenth century.[757] Fictitious blockade consists in the declaration and notification that a port or a coast is blockaded without, however, posting a sufficient number of men-of-war on the spot to be really able to prevent egress and ingress of every vessel. It was one of the principles of the First and of the Second Armed Neutrality that a blockade should always be effective, but it was not till after the Napoleonic wars that this principle gradually found universal recognition. During the second half of the nineteenth century even those States which had not acceded to the Declaration of Paris did not dissent regarding the necessity for effectiveness of blockade.

§ 379. The need for an effective blockade through the presence of a strong blockading squadron to prevent ships from entering or leaving gradually became recognized during the first half of the nineteenth century; it was officially established as a principle of the Law of Nations through the Declaration of Paris in 1856, and the Declaration of London reinforces it in Article 2. An effective blockade is the opposite of what is termed a fictitious or paper blockade, which was often practiced during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries.[757] A fictitious blockade involves declaring and notifying that a port or coast is blockaded without actually deploying enough warships on-site to genuinely prevent the entry or exit of vessels. It was one of the principles of both the First and Second Armed Neutrality that a blockade should always be effective, but it wasn't until after the Napoleonic wars that this principle gradually gained universal acceptance. During the second half of the nineteenth century, even those states that had not signed the Declaration of Paris agreed on the necessity for an effective blockade.

[757] See Fauchille, Blocus, pp. 74-109.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Fauchille, *Blocus*, pp. 74-109.

Condition of Effectiveness of Blockade.

Effectiveness of Blockade Condition.

§ 380. The condition of effectiveness of blockade, as defined by the Declaration of Paris, is its maintenance[Pg 462] by such a force as is sufficient really to prevent access to the coast. But no unanimity exists respecting what is required to constitute an effective blockade according to this definition. Apart from differences of opinion regarding points of minor interest, it may be stated that in the main there are two conflicting opinions.

§ 380. The requirement for a blockade to be considered effective, as outlined in the Declaration of Paris, is its enforcement[Pg 462] by a force that is truly capable of preventing access to the coast. However, there is no agreement on what exactly constitutes an effective blockade under this definition. Aside from differing views on less significant details, it can be said that there are primarily two opposing opinions.

According to one opinion, the definition of an effective blockade pronounced by the First Armed Neutrality of 1780 is valid, and a blockade is effective only when the approach to the coast is barred by a chain of men-of-war anchored on the spot and so near to one another that the line cannot be passed without obvious danger to the passing vessel.[758] This corresponds to the practice hitherto followed by France.

According to one view, the definition of an effective blockade established by the First Armed Neutrality of 1780 still holds true, and a blockade is considered effective only when access to the coast is blocked by a line of warships anchored nearby and so close together that vessels cannot pass without significant risk. This aligns with the approach that France has followed until now.[758]

[758] See Hautefeuille, II. p. 194; Gessner, p. 179; Kleen, I. § 129; Boeck, Nos. 676-681; Dupuis, Nos. 173-174; Fauchille, Blocus, pp. 110-142. Phillimore, III. § 293, takes up the same standpoint in so far as a blockade de facto is concerned:—"A blockade de facto should be effected by stationing a number of ships, and forming as it were an arch of circumvallation round the mouth of the prohibited port, where, if the arch fails in any one part, the blockade itself fails altogether."

[758] See Hautefeuille, II. p. 194; Gessner, p. 179; Kleen, I. § 129; Boeck, Nos. 676-681; Dupuis, Nos. 173-174; Fauchille, Blocus, pp. 110-142. Phillimore, III. § 293, shares the same view regarding a blockade de facto:—"A blockade de facto should be established by positioning several ships to create an effective barrier around the entrance of the restricted port, where, if any part of the barrier is compromised, the entire blockade fails."

According to another opinion, a blockade is effective when the approach is watched—to use the words of Dr. Lushington[759]—"by a force sufficient to render the egress and ingress dangerous, or, in other words, save under peculiar circumstances, as fogs, violent winds, and some necessary absences, sufficient to render the capture of vessels attempting to go in or come out most probable." According to this opinion there need be no chain of anchored men-of-war to expose any vessels attempting to break the blockade to a cross fire, but a real danger of capture suffices, whether the danger is caused by cruising or anchored men-of-war. This is the standpoint of theory and practice of Great Britain and the United States, and it seems likewise to be that of Germany and several[Pg 463] German writers.[760] The blockade during the American War of the whole coast of the Confederate States to the extent of 2500 nautical miles by four hundred Federal cruisers could, of course, only be maintained by cruising vessels; and the fact that all neutral maritime States recognised it as effective shows that the opinion of dissenting writers has more theoretical than practical importance.

According to another view, a blockade is effective when the approach is monitored—using Dr. Lushington's words, "by a force strong enough to make entering and leaving dangerous, or, in other words, except under special circumstances like fogs, strong winds, and some necessary absences, enough to make it highly likely for vessels trying to enter or exit to be captured." This perspective suggests that there doesn't have to be a chain of anchored warships to expose any vessels attempting to break the blockade to crossfire; rather, a real risk of capture is enough, whether that danger comes from warships that are cruising or anchored. This is the theoretical and practical viewpoint of Great Britain and the United States, and it also appears to be the stance of Germany and several German writers. The blockade throughout the American War over the entire coastline of the Confederate States, covering 2500 nautical miles by four hundred Federal cruisers, could obviously only be sustained by cruising vessels; and the fact that all neutral maritime states recognized it as effective demonstrates that the dissenting opinions have more theoretical than practical significance.

[759] In his judgment in the case of the Franciska (1855), Spinks, 287.

[759] In his ruling in the case of the Franciska (1855), Spinks, 287.

[760] See Perels, § 49; Bluntschli, § 829; Liszt, § 41, III.

[760] See Perels, § 49; Bluntschli, § 829; Liszt, § 41, III.

The Declaration of London has settled the controversy in so far as article 3 enacts that "the question whether a blockade is effective, is a question of fact." Each case must, therefore, be judged according to its merits, and the before mentioned decision of Dr. Lushington would seem to have found implied recognition by article 3.

The Declaration of London has resolved the debate because article 3 states that "the question of whether a blockade is effective is a matter of fact." Each case must, therefore, be assessed based on its own specifics, and the earlier decision by Dr. Lushington appears to have received implicit acknowledgment in article 3.

The question of effectiveness being one of fact, and the real danger to passing vessels being the characteristic of effectiveness of blockade, it must be recognised that in certain cases and in the absence of a sufficient number of men-of-war a blockade may be made effective through planting land batteries within range of any vessel attempting to pass,[761] provided there be at least one man-of-war on the spot. But a stone blockade,[762] so called because vessels laden with stones are sunk in the channel to block the approach, is not an effective blockade.

The question of effectiveness is a factual matter, and the real threat to passing ships lies in how effective the blockade is. It's important to acknowledge that in some situations, and when there aren’t enough warships available, a blockade can still be enforced by installing land batteries within range of any ships trying to pass,[761] as long as there’s at least one warship present. However, a stone blockade,[762] which involves sinking ships loaded with stones in the channel to prevent access, is not an effective blockade.

[761] The Nancy (1809), 1 Acton, 63; the Circassian (1864), 2 Wallace, 135; the Olinde Rodrigues (1898), 174, United States, 510. See also Bluntschli, § 829; Perels, § 49; Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 750; Walker, Manual, § 78.

[761] The Nancy (1809), 1 Acton, 63; the Circassian (1864), 2 Wallace, 135; the Olinde Rodrigues (1898), 174, United States, 510. See also Bluntschli, § 829; Perels, § 49; Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 750; Walker, Manual, § 78.

[762] See above, § 368, p. 450, note 1. It ought to be mentioned here also that according to article 2 of Convention VIII. "it is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the ports and coasts of the enemy, with the sole object of intercepting commercial navigation."

[762] See above, § 368, p. 450, note 1. It should also be noted that under article 2 of Convention VIII, "it's prohibited to place automatic contact mines off the enemy's ports and coasts solely to intercept commercial shipping."

And it must, lastly, be mentioned that the distance of the blockading men-of war from the blockaded port or coast is immaterial so long as the circumstances and conditions of the special case justify such distance.[Pg 464] Thus during the Crimean War the port of Riga was blockaded by a man-of-war stationed at a distance of 120 miles from the town, in the Lyser Ort, a channel three miles wide forming the only approach to the gulf.[763]

And it should finally be noted that the distance of the blockading warships from the blockaded port or coastline doesn't matter as long as the specific circumstances and conditions justify that distance.[Pg 464] For example, during the Crimean War, the port of Riga was blockaded by a warship located 120 miles away from the town, in the Lyser Ort, a three-mile-wide channel that was the only way into the gulf.[763]

[763] The Franciska (1855), Spinks, 287. See Hall, § 260, and Holland, Studies, pp. 166-167.

[763] The Franciska (1855), Spinks, 287. See Hall, § 260, and Holland, Studies, pp. 166-167.

Amount of Danger which creates Effectiveness.

Amount of Danger That Creates Effectiveness.

§ 381. It is impossible to state exactly what degree of danger to a vessel attempting to pass is necessary to prove an effective blockade. It is recognised that a blockade does not cease to be effective in case now and then a vessel succeeds in passing the line unhindered, provided there was so much danger as to make her capture probable. Dr. Lushington strikingly dealt with the matter in the following words:[764]—"The maintenance of a blockade must always be a question of degree—of the degree of danger attending ships going into or leaving a port. Nothing is further from my intention, nor indeed more opposed to my notions, than any relaxation of the rule that a blockade must be sufficiently maintained; but it is perfectly obvious that no force could bar the entrance to absolute certainty; that vessels may get in and get out during the night, or fogs, or violent winds, or occasional absence; that it is most difficult to judge from numbers alone. Hence, I believe that in every case the inquiry has been, whether the force was competent and present, and, if so, the performance of the duty was presumed; and I think I may safely assert that in no case was a blockade held to be void when the blockading force was on the spot or near thereto on the ground of vessels entering into or escaping from the port, where such ingress or egress did not take place with the consent of the blockading squadron."

§ 381. It’s impossible to define exactly what level of danger to a vessel trying to pass is needed to prove a blockade is effective. It’s understood that a blockade remains effective even if an occasional vessel manages to slip through unhindered, as long as there was enough danger to make capture likely. Dr. Lushington addressed this issue effectively with the following words:[764]—"The enforcement of a blockade must always be a matter of degree—specifically, the degree of danger faced by ships entering or leaving a port. It’s not my intention, nor does it align with my views, to relax the rule that a blockade must be properly enforced; however, it’s clear that no force can guarantee absolute certainty against entry. Vessels may get in and out during the night, in fog, in strong winds, or when defenders are temporarily absent. It’s also very difficult to gauge solely by the numbers. Therefore, I believe that in every case, the question has been whether the blocking force was capable and present, and if so, the duty was assumed to be fulfilled. I think I can confidently state that in no situation was a blockade deemed invalid if the blockading force was present or nearby, based on vessels entering or leaving the port, unless such movements occurred with the permission of the blockading squadron."

[764] In his judgment in the case of the Franciska (1855), Spinks, 287.

[764] In his ruling regarding the Franciska (1855), Spinks, 287.

Cessation of Effectiveness.

End of Effectiveness.

§ 382. A blockade is effective so long as the danger lasts which makes probable the capture of such vessels[Pg 465] as attempt to pass the approach. A blockade, therefore, ceases ipso facto by the absence of such danger, whether the blockading men-of-war are driven away, or are sent away for the fulfilment of some task which has nothing to do with the blockade, or voluntarily withdraw, or allow the passage of vessels in other cases than those which are exceptionally admissible. Thus, when in 1861, during the American Civil War, the Federal cruiser Niagara, which blockaded Charleston, was sent away and her place was taken after five days by the Minnesota, the blockade ceased to be effective, although the Federal Government refused to recognise this.[765] Thus, further, when during the Crimean War Great Britain allowed Russian vessels to export goods from blockaded ports, and accordingly the egress of such vessels from the blockaded port of Riga was permitted, the blockade of Riga ceased to be effective, because it tried to interfere with neutral commerce only; therefore, the capture of the Danish vessel Franciska[766] for attempting to break the blockade was not upheld.

§ 382. A blockade is effective as long as the threat that makes it likely for ships to be captured exists[Pg 465]. Therefore, a blockade ends automatically when that danger is gone, whether the ships enforcing the blockade are driven away, sent off to carry out another task unrelated to the blockade, voluntarily leave, or allow the passage of vessels in cases that are not exceptionally permitted. For example, when in 1861, during the American Civil War, the Federal cruiser Niagara, which was blockading Charleston, was sent away and was replaced after five days by the Minnesota, the blockade was no longer effective, even though the Federal Government refused to acknowledge this.[765] Similarly, during the Crimean War, when Great Britain allowed Russian ships to export goods from blockaded ports, and thus permitted the exit of such ships from the blockaded port of Riga, the blockade of Riga stopped being effective because it only tried to disrupt neutral trade; therefore, the seizure of the Danish vessel Franciska[766] for trying to break the blockade was not upheld.

[765] See Mountague Bernard, Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War (1870), pp. 237-239.

[765] See Montague Bernard, Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War (1870), pp. 237-239.

[766] Spinks, 287. See above, § 370.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Spinks, 287. See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

On the other hand, practice[767] and the majority of writers have always recognised the fact that a blockade does not cease to be effective in case the blockading force is driven away for a short time through stress of weather, and article 4 of the Declaration of London precisely enacts that "a blockade is not regarded as raised if the blockading force is temporarily withdrawn on account of stress of weather." English[768] writers, further, have hitherto denied that a blockade loses effectiveness through a blockading man-of-war being absent for a short time for the purpose of chasing a[Pg 466] vessel which succeeded in passing the approach unhindered,[769] but the Declaration of London does not recognise this.[770]

On the other hand, practice[767] and most writers have always acknowledged that a blockade remains effective even if the blockading force is temporarily driven away due to bad weather. Article 4 of the Declaration of London clearly states that "a blockade is not considered lifted if the blockading force is temporarily withdrawn because of bad weather." English[768] writers have also previously argued that a blockade doesn't lose its effectiveness if a warship is absent for a brief period to chase after a vessel that managed to get through unimpeded,[Pg 466] [769] but the Declaration of London does not support this view.[770]

[767] The Columbia (1799), 1 C. Rob. 154.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The *Columbia* (1799), 1 C. Rob. 154.

[768] See Twiss, II. § 103, p. 201, and Phillimore, III. § 294.

[768] See Twiss, II. § 103, p. 201, and Phillimore, III. § 294.

[769] See article 37 of U.S. Naval War Code.

[769] See article 37 of the U.S. Naval War Code.

[770] See the Report of the Drafting Committee on article 4 of the Declaration of London.

[770] Check out the Report of the Drafting Committee on article 4 of the Declaration of London.

IV Blockade Breach

See the literature quoted above at the commencement of § 368.

See the literature mentioned above at the beginning of § 368.

Definition of Breach of Blockade.

Definition of Blockade Breach.

§ 383. Breach or violation of blockade is the unallowed ingress or egress of a vessel in spite of the blockade. The attempted breach is, so far as punishment is concerned, treated in the same way as the consummated breach, but the practice of States has hitherto differed with regard to the question at what time and by what act an attempt to break a blockade commences.

§ 383. Breaking or violating a blockade is the unauthorized entry or exit of a vessel despite the blockade. An attempted violation is punished the same way as a successful violation, but different countries have varied practices regarding when and how an attempt to break a blockade begins.

It must be specially observed that the blockade-runner violates International Law as little as the contraband carrier. Both (see below, § 398) violate injunctions of the belligerent concerned.

It should be noted that the blockade-runner breaks International Law just as minimally as the contraband carrier. Both (see below, § 398) defy the orders of the involved belligerent.

No Breach without Notice of Blockade.

No breach without notice of blockade.

§ 384. Since breach of blockade is, from the standpoint of the blockading belligerent, a criminal act, knowledge on the part of a vessel of the existence of a blockade is essential for making her egress or ingress a breach of blockade.

§ 384. Since breaking a blockade is considered a criminal act by the blockading party, it is crucial for a vessel to be aware of the blockade's existence for its entry or exit to be classified as a breach of blockade.

It is for this reason that Continental theory and practice have never considered a blockade established without local and diplomatic notification, so that every vessel might have, or might be supposed to have, notice of the existence of a blockade. And for the same reason some States, as France and Italy, have never considered a vessel to have committed a breach of blockade unless a special warning was given her before her attempted[Pg 467] ingress by one of the blockading cruisers stopping her and recording the warning upon her log-book.[771]

It’s for this reason that Continental theory and practice have never recognized a blockade that was set up without local and diplomatic notification, ensuring that every vessel had, or was expected to have, knowledge of the blockade's existence. Similarly, some countries, like France and Italy, have never deemed a vessel to have violated a blockade unless a specific warning was given to it before it tried to enter, with one of the blockading cruisers stopping the vessel and recording the warning in its logbook.[Pg 467][771]

[771] See above, § 376.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

British, American, and Japanese practice regarding the necessary knowledge of the existence of a blockade on the part of a vessel has always made a distinction between actual and constructive notice, no breach of blockade having been held to exist without either the one or the other.[772] Actual notice has been considered knowledge acquired by a direct warning from one of the blockading men-of-war or knowledge acquired from any other public or private source of information. Constructive knowledge has been presumed knowledge of the blockade on the part of a vessel on the ground either of notoriety or of diplomatic notification. The existence of a blockade has always been presumed to be notorious to vessels within the blockaded ports, but it has been a question of fact whether it was notorious to other vessels. And knowledge of the existence of a blockade has always been presumed on the part of a vessel in case sufficient time had elapsed after the home State of the vessel had received diplomatic notification of the blockade, so that it could inform thereof all vessels sailing under its flag, whether or no they had actually received, or taken notice of, the information.[773]

British, American, and Japanese practices regarding the necessary awareness of a blockade by a vessel have always differentiated between actual and constructive notice, with no breach of blockade being recognized without either one. Actual notice is understood as knowledge gained through a direct warning from a blockading warship or information from any other public or private source. Constructive notice is presumed knowledge of the blockade based on either general awareness or diplomatic notification. It has always been assumed that vessels within blockaded ports are aware of the blockade, but it has been debated whether this awareness extends to other vessels. Additionally, a vessel is presumed to be aware of the existence of a blockade if enough time has passed after its home State received diplomatic notification of the blockade, allowing it to inform all vessels flying its flag, regardless of whether they have directly received or acknowledged that information.

[772] See Holland, Prize Law, §§ 107, 114-127; U.S. Naval War Code, article 39; Japanese Prize Law, article 30.

[772] See Holland, Prize Law, §§ 107, 114-127; U.S. Naval War Code, article 39; Japanese Prize Law, article 30.

[773] The Vrouw Judith (1799), 1 C. Rob. 150; the Neptunus (1799), 2 C. Rob. 110; the Calypso (1799), 2 C. Rob. 298; the Neptunus (1800), 3 C. Rob. 173; the Hoffnung (1805), 6 C. Rob. 112.

[773] The Vrouw Judith (1799), 1 C. Rob. 150; the Neptunus (1799), 2 C. Rob. 110; the Calypso (1799), 2 C. Rob. 298; the Neptunus (1800), 3 C. Rob. 173; the Hoffnung (1805), 6 C. Rob. 112.

The Declaration of London follows, to a certain extent, British, American, and Japanese practice, but differs chiefly in the presumption that knowledge of a blockade is never absolute, but may in every case be rebutted. Article 14 enacts that "the liability of a neutral vessel to capture for breach of blockade is contingent on her knowledge, actual or presumptive, of the blockade." Knowledge of the blockade is presumed,[Pg 468] failing proof to the contrary, in case the vessel has left a neutral port subsequent to the notification of the blockade to the Power to which such port belongs, and provided that the notification was made in sufficient time (article 15). But in case a neutral vessel approaching a blockaded port has neither actual nor presumptive knowledge of the blockade, she is not considered in delicto, and notification must be made to her by recording a warning on her log-book, stating the day and hour and the geographical position of the vessel at the time (article 16, first paragraph). Further, if a neutral vessel is coming out of a blockaded port, she must be allowed to pass free, in case, through the negligence of the officer commanding the blockading fleet, no declaration of blockade was notified to the local authorities, or in case, in the declaration as notified, no period was mentioned within which neutral vessels might come out (article 16, second paragraph).

The Declaration of London somewhat follows British, American, and Japanese practices but mainly differs in that the assumption is that knowledge of a blockade is never certain and can be challenged in each case. Article 14 states that "a neutral vessel's liability to capture for violating a blockade depends on her knowledge, whether actual or assumed, of the blockade." Knowledge of the blockade is assumed, [Pg 468] unless proven otherwise, if the vessel has left a neutral port after being informed of the blockade by the power governing that port, and assuming the notification was made in time (Article 15). However, if a neutral vessel approaching a blockaded port has no actual or assumed knowledge of the blockade, she is not deemed in delicto, and notification must be provided by recording a warning in her logbook, noting the date, time, and geographic position of the vessel at that moment (Article 16, first paragraph). Additionally, if a neutral vessel is coming out of a blockaded port, she must be allowed to pass freely if, due to the negligence of the officer in charge of the blockading fleet, no blockade declaration was communicated to the local authorities, or if the declaration didn't specify a timeframe in which neutral vessels could exit (Article 16, second paragraph).

The former practice as to what constitutes an Attempt to break Blockade.

The previous practice regarding what counts as an attempt to break a blockade.

§ 385. The practice of States as well as the opinions of writers have hitherto differed much regarding such acts of a vessel as constitute an attempt to break blockade.

§ 385. The actions of states and the views of authors have varied significantly up to now regarding the actions of a vessel that qualify as an attempt to break a blockade.

(1) The Second Armed Neutrality of 1800 intended to restrict an attempt to break blockade to the employment of force or ruse by a vessel on the line of blockade for the purpose of passing through. This was, on the whole, the practice of France, which moreover, as stated before, required that the vessel should previous to the attempt have received special warning from one of the blockading men-of-war. Many writers[774] took the same standpoint.

(1) The Second Armed Neutrality of 1800 aimed to limit efforts to break a blockade to the use of force or trickery by a ship within the blockade line trying to pass through. This was generally the approach taken by France, which also required that the ship had to receive specific warning from one of the blockading warships before attempting to break through. Many writers[774] shared this perspective.

(2) The practice of other States, as Japan, approved by many writers,[775] went beyond this and considered it[Pg 469] an attempt to break blockade when a vessel, with or without force or ruse, endeavoured to pass the line of blockade. This practice frequently saw an attempt complete in the fact that a vessel destined for a blockaded place was found anchoring or cruising near the line of blockade.

(2) The actions of other countries, like Japan, have been supported by many writers,[775] who went further and viewed it as[Pg 469] an effort to break a blockade when a ship, using force or trickery, tried to cross the blockade line. This practice often resulted in a situation where a ship meant for a blockaded area was seen anchoring or cruising close to the blockade line.

(3) The practice of Great Britain and the United States of America went furthest, since it considered it an attempted breach of blockade when a vessel, not destined according to her ship papers for a blockaded port, was found near it and steering for it; and, further, when a vessel destined for a port, the blockade of which was diplomatically notified, started on her journey knowing that the blockade had not been raised, except when the port from which the vessel sailed was so distant from the scene of war as to justify her master in starting for a destination known to be blockaded, on the chance of finding that the blockade had been removed, and with an intention of changing her destination should that not prove to be the case.[776] This practice, further, applied the doctrine of continuous voyages[777] to blockade, for it considered an attempt of breach of blockade to have been committed by such vessel as, although ostensibly destined for a neutral or an unblockaded port, is in reality intended, after touching there, to go on to a blockaded port.[778]

(3) The practices of Great Britain and the United States went the furthest, considering it a breach of blockade when a ship, not bound for a blockaded port according to its shipping documents, was found nearby and headed for it; and, additionally, when a ship bound for a diplomatically notified blockaded port began its journey knowing that the blockade was still in effect, unless the port it departed from was far enough away from the conflict that the captain could reasonably start for a known blockaded destination, hoping the blockade would be lifted, and with the intention of changing direction if that turned out not to be the case.[776] This practice also applied the doctrine of continuous voyages[777] to blockades, as it viewed any attempt to breach a blockade as having been committed by a vessel that, although claiming to be headed for a neutral or unblockaded port, actually intended to proceed to a blockaded port after stopping there.[778]

(4) During the Civil War the American Prize Courts carried the practice further by condemning such vessels for breach of blockade as knowingly carried to a neutral port cargo ultimately destined for a blockaded port, and by condemning for breach of blockade such cargo, but not the vessel, as was ultimately destined for a blockaded port, when the carrying vessel was ignorant[Pg 470] of this ulterior destination of the cargo. Thus the Bermuda,[779] a British vessel with a cargo, part of which was, in the opinion of the American Courts, ultimately destined for the blockaded ports of the Confederate States, was seized on her voyage to the neutral British port of Nassau, in the Bahama Islands, and condemned for breach of blockade by the American Courts. The same happened to the British vessel Stephen Hart,[780] which was seized on her voyage to the neutral port of Cardenas, in Cuba. And in the famous case of the Springbok,[781] a British vessel also destined for Nassau, in the Bahama Islands, which was seized on her voyage to this neutral British port, the cargo alone was finally condemned for breach of blockade, since, in the opinion of the Court, the vessel was not cognisant that the cargo was intended to reach a blockaded port. The same happened to the cargo of the British vessel Peterhoff[782] destined for the neutral port of Matamaros, in Mexico. The British Government declined to intervene in favour of the British owners of the respective vessels and cargoes.[783]

(4) During the Civil War, the American Prize Courts took things further by condemning ships that knowingly carried cargo intended for a blockaded port to a neutral port, and by condemning such cargo for breach of blockade—even if the carrying ship was unaware of the cargo's final destination. For example, the Bermuda,[779] a British ship with cargo that the American Courts believed was ultimately headed for the blockaded ports of the Confederate States, was seized on its way to the neutral British port of Nassau in the Bahamas and condemned for breaching the blockade. The same fate befell the British ship Stephen Hart,[780] which was seized while heading to the neutral port of Cardenas in Cuba. In the well-known case of the Springbok,[781] a British vessel also bound for Nassau in the Bahamas, only the cargo was ultimately condemned for breach of blockade, since the Court determined that the ship was not aware that the cargo was meant for a blockaded port. The same result occurred for the cargo of the British ship Peterhoff[782] destined for the neutral port of Matamoros in Mexico. The British Government chose not to intervene on behalf of the British owners of the respective ships and cargoes.[783]

[774] See Hautefeuille, II. p. 134; Kleen, I. § 137; Gessner, p. 202; Dupuis, No. 185; Fauchille, Blocus, p. 322.

[774] See Hautefeuille, II. p. 134; Kleen, I. § 137; Gessner, p. 202; Dupuis, No. 185; Fauchille, Blocus, p. 322.

[775] See Bluntschli, § 835; Perels, § 51; Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 763; Rivier, II. p. 431. See also § 25 of the Prussian Regulations (1864) concerning Naval Prizes, and article 31 of the Japanese Naval Prize Law.

[775] See Bluntschli, § 835; Perels, § 51; Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 763; Rivier, II. p. 431. See also § 25 of the Prussian Regulations (1864) about Naval Prizes, and article 31 of the Japanese Naval Prize Law.

[776] See Holland, Prize Law, § 133, and U.S. Naval War Code, article 42; the Betsey (1799), 1 C. Rob. 332.

[776] See Holland, Prize Law, § 133, and U.S. Naval War Code, article 42; the Betsey (1799), 1 C. Rob. 332.

[777] On this doctrine, see below, § 400, p. 499, note 1.

[777] For more on this principle, refer to § 400, p. 499, note 1 below.

[778] See Holland, Prize Law, § 134, and the case of the James Cook (1810), Edwards, 261.

[778] See Holland, Prize Law, § 134, and the case of the James Cook (1810), Edwards, 261.

[779] 3 Wallace, § 14.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 3 Wallace, § 14.

[780] 3 Wallace, 559.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 3 Wallace, 559.

[781] 5 Wallace, 1.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 5 Wallace, 1.

[782] 5 Wallace, 28.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 5 Wallace, 28.

[783] See Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous, N. 1 (1900), "Correspondence regarding the Seizure of the British Vessels Springbok and Peterhoff by the United States Cruisers in 1863."

[783] See Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous, N. 1 (1900), "Correspondence about the Seizure of the British Vessels Springbok and Peterhoff by the United States Cruisers in 1863."

It is true that the majority of authorities[784] assert the illegality of these judgments of the American Prize Courts, but it is a fact that Great Britain at the time recognised as correct the principles which are the basis of these judgments.

It is true that most authorities[784] claim that these rulings from the American Prize Courts are illegal, but the fact remains that Great Britain at that time accepted the principles underlying these decisions as valid.

[784] See, for instance, Holland, Prize Law, p. 38, note 2; Phillimore, III. § 298; Twiss, Belligerent Right on the High Seas (1884), p. 19; Hall, § 263; Gessner, Kriegführende und neutrale Mächte (1877), pp. 95-100; Bluntschli, § 835; Perels, § 51; Fauchille, pp. 333-344; Martens, II. § 124. See also Wharton, III. § 362, p. 401, and Moore, VII. § 1276.

[784] Check out Holland, Prize Law, p. 38, note 2; Phillimore, III. § 298; Twiss, Belligerent Right on the High Seas (1884), p. 19; Hall, § 263; Gessner, Kriegführende und neutrale Mächte (1877), pp. 95-100; Bluntschli, § 835; Perels, § 51; Fauchille, pp. 333-344; Martens, II. § 124. Also look at Wharton, III. § 362, p. 401, and Moore, VII. § 1276.

What constitutes an Attempt to break Blockade according to the Declaration of London.

What counts as an Attempt to break Blockade according to the Declaration of London.

§ 385a. The Declaration of London proposes a settlement of this controversial matter by enacting in article 17 that "neutral vessels may not be captured for breach of blockade except within the area of operations[Pg 471] of the men-of-war detailed to render the blockade effective," and in article 19 that "whatever may be the ulterior destination of a vessel or of her cargo, she may not be captured for breach of blockade, if, at the moment, she is on the way to a non-blockaded port."

§ 385a. The Declaration of London suggests a resolution to this contentious issue by stating in article 17 that "neutral ships cannot be seized for violating a blockade unless they are within the operational area[Pg 471] of the warships assigned to enforce the blockade," and in article 19 that "regardless of the intended destination of a ship or its cargo, it cannot be seized for breaching a blockade if it is currently headed to a port that is not blockaded."

Accordingly, a neutral vessel, to be guilty of an attempt to break blockade, must actually have entered the area of operations (rayon d'action) of the blockading fleet. This area of operations is a question of fact in each case of a blockade. "When a Government decides to undertake blockading operations against some part of the enemy coast it details a certain number of men-of-war to take part in the blockade, and entrusts the command to an officer whose duty it is to use them for the purpose of making the blockade effective. The commander of the naval force thus formed posts the vessels at his disposal according to the line of the coast and the geographical position of the blockaded places, and instructs each vessel as to the part which she has to play, and especially as to the zone which she is to watch. All the zones watched taken together and so organised as to make the blockade effective, form the area of operations of the blockading force."[785]

Accordingly, a neutral vessel can only be guilty of attempting to break a blockade if it has actually entered the area of operations (rayon d'action) of the blockading fleet. This area of operations is determined on a case-by-case basis for each blockade. "When a government decides to carry out blockading operations against a part of the enemy coast, it assigns a certain number of warships to participate in the blockade and gives command to an officer responsible for making the blockade effective. The commander of the naval force organizes the vessels based on the coastline and the geographical locations of the blockaded areas, instructing each vessel on its role and the specific zone it needs to monitor. All the monitored zones together, organized to ensure the effectiveness of the blockade, constitute the area of operations of the blockading force."[785]

[785] Report of the Drafting Committee on article 17.

[785] Report of the Drafting Committee on article 17.

But the fact alone that a neutral vessel has entered the area of operations is not sufficient to justify her capture, she must also be destined and be on her way to the blockaded port. If she passes through the area of operations without being destined and on her way to the blockaded port, she is not attempting to break the blockade. Even should the ulterior destination of a vessel or her cargo be the blockaded port, she is not considered to attempt to break the blockade, if, at the moment of the visitation, she is really on her way to a non-blockaded port (article 19). However, she must really, and not only apparently, be on her way to a[Pg 472] non-blockaded port; if it can be proved that in reality her immediate destination is the blockaded port and that she only feigns to be destined for a non-blockaded port, she may be captured, for she is actually attempting to break the blockade.[786]

But just the fact that a neutral vessel has entered the operational area isn't enough to justify capturing it; it also has to be headed to the blockaded port. If it goes through the area without being on its way to the blockaded port, it isn't trying to break the blockade. Even if the final destination of a ship or its cargo is the blockaded port, it isn't considered attempting to break the blockade if, at the time of inspection, it's actually headed for a non-blockaded port (article 19). However, it must truly, and not just appear to, be headed to a non-blockaded port; if it's proven that its real destination is the blockaded port and it's just pretending to be going to a non-blockaded port, it can be captured, as it's actually trying to break the blockade.[Pg 472][786]

[786] See the Report of the Drafting Committee on article 19.

[786] Check out the Report of the Drafting Committee on article 19.

From these stipulations of the Declaration of London it becomes quite apparent that the application to blockade of the doctrine of continuous voyage in any form is not admissible.

From these rules in the Declaration of London, it's clear that the application of the continuous voyage doctrine to blockades in any form is not allowed.

When Ingress is not considered Breach of Blockade.

When ingress is not seen as a breach of blockade.

§ 386. Although blockade inwards interdicts ingress to all vessels, if not especially licensed,[787] necessity makes exceptions to the rule.

§ 386. Even though an inward blockade prevents entry for all vessels without special permission,[787] necessity creates exceptions to this rule.

[787] See above, § 370.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

According to the practice which has hitherto been quite general, whenever a vessel either by need of repairs,[788] stress of weather,[789] want of water[790] or provisions, or upon any other ground was absolutely obliged to enter a blockaded port, such ingress did not constitute a breach of blockade. On the other hand, according to the British practice at any rate, ingress did not cease to be breach of blockade if caused by intoxication of the master,[791] ignorance[792] of the coast, loss of compass,[793] endeavour to get a pilot,[794] and the like, or an attempt to ascertain[795] whether the blockade was raised.[796]

According to the common practice that has been in place, whenever a ship had to enter a blockaded port due to repairs,[788] bad weather,[789] lack of water[790] or supplies, or for any other reason, this entry did not count as a breach of the blockade. However, under British practice, entering still counted as a breach of blockade if it was caused by the captain being drunk,[791] not knowing the coast, a lost compass,[793] trying to find a pilot,[794] and similar situations, or attempting to figure out[795] whether the blockade had been lifted.[796]

[788] The Charlotta (1810), Edwards, 252.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Charlotta (1810), Edwards, 252.

[789] The Fortuna (1803), 5 C. Rob. 27.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Fortuna (1803), 5 C. Rob. 27.

[790] The Hurtige Hanne (1799), 2 C. Rob. 124.

[790] The Hurtige Hanne (1799), 2 C. Rob. 124.

[791] The Shepherdess (1804), 5 C. Rob. 262.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Shepherdess (1804), 5 C. Rob. 262.

[792] The Adonis (1804), 5 C. Rob. 256.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Adonis (1804), 5 C. Rob. 256.

[793] The Elizabeth (1810), Edwards, 198.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Elizabeth (1810), Edwards, 198.

[794] The Neutralitet (1805), 6 C. Rob. 30.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Neutrality (1805), 6 C. Rob. 30.

[795] The Spes and Irene (1804), 5 C. Rob. 76.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The *Spes* and *Irene* (1804), 5 C. Rob. 76.

[796] See Holland, Prize Law, §§ 135-136.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Holland, Prize Law, §§ 135-136.

The Declaration of London recognises that necessity makes exceptions to the rule that vessels may not enter a blockaded port. Article 7 enacts that "in circumstances of distress, acknowledged by an officer of the blockading force, a neutral vessel may enter a place under blockade, and subsequently leave it, provided that she has neither discharged nor shipped any cargo there."[Pg 473] It has, however, to be kept in view that article 7, firstly, does not define the term circumstances of distress, and, secondly, makes it a condition that the circumstances concerned must be acknowledged by an officer of the blockading force. Everything is, therefore, prima facie at any rate, left to the consideration of the respective officer. A vessel in distress will have to signal to the man-of-war of the blockading force which she meets within the area of operations that she intends to enter the blockaded port, and the commander of the man-of-war will have to convince himself that circumstances of distress really exist, and that no fraud is intended. The commander may deny the condition of distress, and then the vessel may not proceed, although the State whose flag she flies may ask for indemnities in case there really was distress and the vessel was lost or damaged by not being allowed to enter the blockaded port. On the other hand, when once the commander of the man-of-war has acknowledged that the respective vessel is in a condition of distress, it is not in his discretion, but he is in duty bound,[797] to allow her to enter the blockaded port.

The Declaration of London acknowledges that necessity creates exceptions to the rule that ships cannot enter a blockaded port. Article 7 states that "in situations of distress, recognized by an officer of the blockading force, a neutral ship may enter a blockaded area and leave, as long as it hasn't unloaded or loaded any cargo there."[Pg 473] However, it's important to note that article 7 does not define the term circumstances of distress, and requires that these circumstances must be recognized by an officer of the blockading force. Therefore, everything is generally left to the judgment of the respective officer. A ship in distress will have to signal to the warship of the blockading force that it encounters within the operational area that it plans to enter the blockaded port. The commander of the warship must verify that real circumstances of distress exist and that there is no intention to commit fraud. The commander can deny the condition of distress, and in that case, the ship cannot proceed, although the country whose flag it flies may seek compensation if there was indeed distress and the ship was lost or damaged by being denied entry to the blockaded port. On the other hand, once the commander of the warship has acknowledged that the ship is in distress, it is not at his discretion; he is obligated[797] to allow her to enter the blockaded port.

[797] See Report of the Drafting Committee on article 7.

[797] See the Drafting Committee's report on article 7.

When Egress is not considered Breach of Blockade.

When leaving does not count as breaking the blockade.

§ 387. There are a few cases of egress which, according to the hitherto prevailing practice of Great Britain and most other States, were not considered breaches of blockade outwards.[798] Thus, a vessel that was in a blockaded port before the commencement of the blockade[799] was allowed to sail from this port in ballast, as was also a vessel that had entered during a blockade either in ignorance of it or with the permission of the blockading squadron.[800] Thus, further, a vessel the cargo of which was put on board before the commencement[Pg 474] of the blockade was allowed to leave the port afterwards unhindered.[801] Thus, again, a vessel obliged by absolute necessity to enter a blockaded port was afterwards allowed to leave it unhindered. And a vessel employed by the diplomatic envoy of a neutral State for the exclusive purpose of sending home from a blockaded port distressed seamen of his nationality was also allowed to pass unhindered.[802]

§ 387. There are a few cases of leaving a blockaded port that, according to the previously accepted practices in Great Britain and most other countries, were not seen as violations of the blockade. [798] For example, a ship that was in a blockaded port before the blockade started [799] was allowed to leave the port empty, just like a ship that entered during the blockade either without knowing it or with permission from the blockading squadron. [800] Similarly, a ship whose cargo was loaded before the blockade began was allowed to leave the port later without any restrictions. [Pg 474] A ship that was forced by absolute necessity to enter a blockaded port was also permitted to leave it without interference. Additionally, a vessel used by a diplomatic envoy from a neutral country specifically to send distressed seamen of their nationality home from a blockaded port was allowed to pass without obstruction. [802]

[798] See Holland, Prize Law, § 130; Twiss, II. § 113; Phillimore, III. § 313.

[798] See Holland, Prize Law, § 130; Twiss, II. § 113; Phillimore, III. § 313.

[799] The Frederick Moltke (1798), 1 C. Rob. 86.

[799] The Frederick Moltke (1798), 1 C. Rob. 86.

[800] The Juno (1799), 2 C. Rob. 116.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Juno (1799), 2 C. Rob. 116.

[801] The Vrouw Judith (1799), 1 C. Rob. 150.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Judith (1799), 1 C. Rob. 150.

[802] The Rose in Bloom (1811), 1 Dodson, 55.

[802] The Rose in Bloom (1811), 1 Dodson, 55.

The Declaration of London recognises by article 7—see above, § 386—that a vessel which, on account of distress, entered a blockaded port, must be allowed to leave it afterwards, provided she has neither discharged nor shipped cargo there. And article 16, second paragraph—see above, § 384—enacts that a vessel coming out of a blockaded port must be allowed to pass free, if, through the negligence of the commander of the blockading fleet, no declaration of blockade has been notified to the local authorities, or if, in the declaration as notified, no period has been mentioned within which neutral vessels might come out. But beyond these the Declaration of London does not specify any cases in which egress is not considered breach of blockade. The International Prize Court will, if established, have to develop a more detailed practice concerning the matter.

The Declaration of London acknowledges in article 7—see above, § 386—that a ship that enters a blockaded port due to distress must be allowed to leave afterwards, as long as it hasn't unloaded or loaded any cargo there. Additionally, article 16, second paragraph—see above, § 384—states that a ship leaving a blockaded port must be allowed to pass freely if the commander of the blockading fleet failed to notify local authorities of the blockade or if the notification did not specify a time frame during which neutral vessels could depart. However, the Declaration of London does not outline other situations where leaving would not be considered a breach of the blockade. The International Prize Court, if established, will need to create more detailed guidelines regarding this issue.

Passage through Unblockaded Canal no Breach of Blockade.

Passage through Unblockaded Canal no Breach of Blockade.

§ 388. A breach of blockade can only be committed by passing through the blockaded approach. Therefore, if the maritime approach to a port is blockaded whilst an inland canal leads to another unblockaded port of the enemy or to a neutral port, no breach of blockade is committed by the egress or the ingress of a vessel passing such canal for the purpose of reaching the blockaded port.[803]

§ 388. A breach of blockade can only happen by going through the blockaded area. So, if the sea route to a port is blocked while an inland canal leads to another port of the enemy that isn't blocked or a neutral port, there is no breach of blockade if a vessel enters or exits that canal to reach the blockaded port.[803]

[803] The Stert (1801), 4 C. Rob. 65. See Phillimore, III. § 314.[Pg 475]

[803] The Stert (1801), 4 C. Rob. 65. See Phillimore, III. § 314.[Pg 475]

Although the Declaration of London does not mention this point, the International Prize Court would surely decide it as stated, since this decision is based on common sense.

Although the Declaration of London doesn't mention this point, the International Prize Court would definitely decide it as stated, since this decision is based on common sense.

V BLOCKADE BREACH CONSEQUENCES

See the literature quoted above at the commencement of § 368.

See the literature mentioned above at the beginning of § 368.

Capture of Blockade-running Vessels.

Seizure of blockade-running vessels.

§ 389. It is universally recognised that a vessel may be captured for a breach of blockade in delicto only, that means, during the time of an attempt to break it, or of the breach itself. But here again practice as well as theory hitherto have differed much, since there has been no unanimity with regard to the extent of time during which an attempt of breach and the breach itself could be said to be actually continuing.

§ 389. It is widely accepted that a vessel can be seized for violating a blockade in delicto only, which means during the act of trying to break it or the breach itself. However, there has been considerable divergence between practice and theory on this issue, as there has been no agreement on how long the attempt to breach and the breach itself can be considered ongoing.

It has already been stated above in § 385 that it has been a moot point from what moment a breach of blockade could be said to have been attempted, and that according to the practice of Great Britain and the United States an attempt was to be found in the fact that a vessel destined for a blockaded port was starting on her voyage. It is obvious that the controversy bore upon the question from what point of time a blockade-running vessel must be considered in delicto.

It has already been mentioned above in § 385 that it’s been a debated issue from what moment a breach of blockade can be considered attempted, and that according to the practices of Great Britain and the United States, an attempt is indicated by the fact that a ship headed for a blockaded port was beginning its journey. It's clear that the controversy revolved around the question of when a blockade-running vessel must be regarded as in delicto.

But it has been likewise a moot point as to when the period of time during which a blockade-running vessel might be said to be in delicto came to an end. According to Continental theory and practice, such vessel was considered to be in delicto only so long as she was actually on the line of blockade, or, having fled from there, so long as she was pursued by one of the blockading cruisers. On the other hand, according to the[Pg 476] practice of Great Britain[804] and the United States,[805] a blockade-running vessel was held to be in delicto so long as she had not completed her voyage from the blockaded port to the port of her destination and back to the port from which she started originally, the voyage out and home being considered one voyage. But a vessel was held to be in delicto so long only as the blockade continued, capture being no longer admissible in case the blockade had been raised or had otherwise come to an end.

But it has also been a debated question about when the period during which a blockade-running ship could be considered in delicto came to an end. According to Continental theory and practice, a ship was considered in delicto only while it was actually on the blockade line or, if it had escaped from there, as long as it was being pursued by one of the blockading cruisers. On the other hand, under the practice of Great Britain[804] and the United States,[805] a blockade-running ship was regarded as in delicto as long as it had not completed its journey from the blockaded port to its destination and back to its original port, treating the outbound and return trip as one voyage. However, a ship was considered in delicto only while the blockade was ongoing, with capture no longer being appropriate if the blockade had been lifted or had otherwise ended.

[804] The Welvaart van Pillaw (1799), 2 C. Rob. 128; General Hamilton (1805), 6 C. Rob. 61.

[804] The Welvaart van Pillaw (1799), 2 C. Rob. 128; General Hamilton (1805), 6 C. Rob. 61.

[805] See U.S. Naval War Code, article 44.

[805] See U.S. Naval War Code, article 44.

The Declaration of London, when ratified, will settle the controversy, for, according to article 20, a vessel is in delicto so long only as she is pursued by a man-of-war of the blockading force, and she may no longer be captured if the pursuit is abandoned or if the blockade is raised. Stress must be laid on two points. Firstly, the pursuit must be carried out by a man-of-war belonging to the blockading force, and not by any other cruiser. Secondly, a blockade-breaking vessel is liable to capture so long as the pursuit lasts, whether or no she is still within the area of operations; even if for a while she has taken refuge in a neutral port, she may, on coming out, be captured, provided the captor is one of the men-of-war of the blockading force which pursued her and waited for her outside the port of refuge.[806]

The Declaration of London, once ratified, will resolve the dispute, because, according to article 20, a vessel is in delicto only while being pursued by a warship from the blockading force, and it can no longer be captured if the pursuit stops or if the blockade is lifted. There are two important points to emphasize. First, the pursuit must be conducted by a warship that is part of the blockading force, not by any other cruiser. Second, a vessel that breaks the blockade is subject to capture as long as the pursuit continues, regardless of whether it is still within the operational area; even if it temporarily seeks shelter in a neutral port, it can be captured when it comes out, as long as the captor is one of the warships from the blockading force that pursued it and waited for it outside the port of refuge.[806]

[806] See the Report of the Drafting Committee on article 20.

[806] Check out the Report of the Drafting Committee on article 20.

Penalty for Breach of Blockade.

Blockade Breach Penalty.

§ 390. Capture being effected, the blockade-runner must be sent to a port to be brought before a Prize Court. For this purpose the crew may be temporarily detained, as they will have to serve as witnesses. In former times the crew could be imprisoned, and it is said that even capital[807] punishment could have been pronounced against them. But since the eighteenth[Pg 477] century this practice of imprisoning the crew has been abandoned, and nowadays the crew may not even be made prisoners of war, but must be released as soon as the Prize Court has pronounced its verdict.[808] The only penalty which may be pronounced is confiscation of the vessel and the cargo. But the practice[809] of the several States has hitherto differed much concerning the penalty for breach of blockade. According to British and American practice, confiscation of both vessel and cargo used to take place in case the owners of the vessel were identical with those of the cargo. In case vessel and cargo had not the same owners, confiscation of both took place only when the cargo consisted of contraband of war or the owners knew of the blockade at the time the cargo was shipped for the blockaded port.[810] And it mattered not whether the captured vessel which carried the cargo had herself actually passed through the blockaded line, or the breach of blockade was effected through a combined action of lighters and the vessel, the lighters passing the line and discharging the cargo into the vessel near the line, or vice versa.[811] The cargo alone was confiscated according to the judgments of the American Prize Courts during the Civil War in the case of the Springbok and in similar cases[812] when goods ultimately destined for a blockaded port were sent to a neutral port on a vessel whose owners were ignorant of this ulterior destination of the goods.

§ 390. Once captured, the blockade-runner must be sent to a port to be presented before a Prize Court. For this reason, the crew can be temporarily detained, as they will need to testify. In the past, the crew could be imprisoned, and it’s said that they could even face the death penalty. However, since the eighteenth century, this practice of imprisoning the crew has been discontinued, and now the crew cannot even be treated as prisoners of war; they must be released as soon as the Prize Court delivers its verdict. The only penalty that can be imposed is the confiscation of the vessel and its cargo. However, the approach of different States has varied greatly regarding penalties for breaching a blockade. According to British and American practices, confiscation of both the vessel and cargo used to happen if the owners of both were the same. If the vessel and the cargo had different owners, confiscation of both occurred only if the cargo was contraband or if the owners were aware of the blockade at the time the cargo was shipped to the blockaded port. It didn’t matter whether the captured vessel that carried the cargo had actually crossed the blockaded line or if the breach was accomplished through a combination of lighters and the vessel, with the lighters crossing the line and unloading the cargo into the vessel near the line, or vice versa. The cargo alone was confiscated according to the decisions of American Prize Courts during the Civil War in the case of the *Springbok* and similar cases when goods ultimately meant for a blockaded port were sent to a neutral port on a vessel whose owners were unaware of this intended destination for the goods.

[807] See Bynkershoek, Quaest. jur. publ. I. c. 11.

[807] See Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law I. c. 11.

[808] See Calvo, V. §§ 2897-2898. U.S. Naval War Code, article 45.

[808] See Calvo, V. §§ 2897-2898. U.S. Naval War Code, article 45.

[809] See Fauchille, Blocus, pp. 357-394: Gessner, pp. 210-214; Perels, § 51, pp. 276-278.

[809] See Fauchille, Blocus, pp. 357-394: Gessner, pp. 210-214; Perels, § 51, pp. 276-278.

[810] The Mercurius (1798), 1 C. Rob. 80; the Columbia (1799), 1 C. Rob. 154; the Alexander (1801), 4 C. Rob. 93; the Adonis (1804), 5 C. Rob. 256; the Exchange (1808), Edwards, 39; the Panaghia Rhomba (1858), 12 Moore, P.C. 168—See Phillimore, III. §§ 318-319.

[810] The Mercurius (1798), 1 C. Rob. 80; the Columbia (1799), 1 C. Rob. 154; the Alexander (1801), 4 C. Rob. 93; the Adonis (1804), 5 C. Rob. 256; the Exchange (1808), Edwards, 39; the Panaghia Rhomba (1858), 12 Moore, P.C. 168—See Phillimore, III. §§ 318-319.

[811] The Maria (1805), 6 C Rob. 201.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Maria (1805), 6 C Rob. 201.

[812] See above, § 385 (4).

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

The Declaration of London settles the matter by a very simple rule, for according to article 21 the penalty[Pg 478] for blockade-breaking is condemnation of the vessel in all cases, and condemnation of the cargo also, unless the owner proves that at the time of the shipment of the goods the shipper neither knew nor could have known of the intention of the vessel to break the blockade. The case in which the whole or part of the cargo consists of contraband, is not mentioned by article 21, but its condemnation is a matter of course.

The Declaration of London addresses the issue with a straightforward rule. According to article 21, the penalty[Pg 478] for violating a blockade is the seizure of the ship in all cases, as well as the cargo, unless the owner can prove that at the time the goods were shipped, the shipper neither knew nor could have known about the ship’s intention to break the blockade. Article 21 doesn’t mention the situation where all or part of the cargo is contraband, but its confiscation is considered standard procedure.

CHAPTER 4 Illegal goods

I Understanding of contraband

Grotius, III. c. 1, § 5—Bynkershoek, Quaest. jur. publ. I. cc, IX-XII—Vattel, III. §§ 111-113—Hall, §§ 236-247—Lawrence, §§ 253-259—Westlake, II. pp. 240-265—Maine, pp. 96-122—Manning, pp. 352-399—Phillimore, III. §§ 226-284—Twiss, II. §§ 121-151—Halleck, II. pp. 214-238—Taylor, §§ 653-666—Walker, §§ 73-75—Wharton, III. §§ 368-375—Moore, VII. §§ 1249—1263—Wheaton, §§ 476-508—Bluntschli, §§ 801-814—Heffter, §§ 158-161—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 713-731—Gareis, § 89—Liszt, § 42—Ullmann, §§ 193-194—Bonfils, No. 1537-158815—Despagnet, Nos. 705-715 ter—Rivier, II pp. 416-423—Calvo, V. §§ 2708-2795—Fiore, III. Nos. 1591-1601, and Code, Nos. 1827-1835—Martens, II. § 136—Kleen, I. §§ 70-102—Boeck, Nos. 606-659—Pillet, pp. 315-330—Gessner, pp. 70-144—Perels, §§ 44-46—Testa, pp. 201-220—Lawrence, War, pp. 140-174—Ortolan, II. pp. 165-213—Hautefeuille, II. pp. 69-172—Dupuis, Nos. 199-230, and Guerre, Nos. 137-171—Bernsten, § 9—Nippold, II. § 35—Takahashi, pp. 490-526—Holland, Prize Law, §§ 57-87—U.S. Naval War Code, articles 34-36—Heineccius, De navibus ob vecturam vetitarum mercium commissis dissertatio (1740)—Huebner, De la saisie des bâtiments neutres, 2 vols. (1759)—Valin, Traité des prises, 2 vols. (1763)—Martens, Essai sur les armateurs, les prises, et surtout les reprises (1795)—Lampredi, Del commercio dei populi neutrali in tempo di guerra (1801)—Tetens, Considérations sur les droits réciproques des puissances belligérantes et des puissances neutres sur mer (1805)—Pistoye et Duverdy, Traité des prises maritimes, 2 vols. (1855)—Pratt, The Law of Contraband of War (1856)—Moseley, What is Contraband and what is not? (1861)—Upton, The Law of Nations affecting Commerce during War (1863)—Lehmann, Die Zufuhr von Kriegskonterbandewaren, etc. (1877)—Kleen, De contrebande de guerre et des transports interdits aux neutres (1893)—Vossen, Die Konterbande des Krieges (1896)—Manceaux, De la contrebande de guerre (1899)—Brochet, De la contrebande de guerre (1900)—Hirsch, Kriegskonterbande und verbotene Transporte in Kriegszeiten (1901)—Pincitore, Il contrabbando di guerra (1902)—Remy, Théorie de la continuauté du voyage en matière de blocus et de contrebande de guerre (1902)—Knight, Des états neutres au point de vue de la contrebande de guerre (1903)—Wiegner, Die Kriegskonterbande (1904)—Atherley-Jones, Commerce in War (1906), pp. 1-91 and 253-283—Hold, Die Kriegskonterbande (1907)—Hansemann, Die Lehre von der einheitlichen Reise im Rechte der Blockade und Kriegskonterbande (1910)—Hirschmann, Das internationale Prisenrecht[Pg 480] (1912), §§ 24-30—Westlake in R.I. II. (1870), pp. 614-655—Kleen in R.I. XXV. (1893), pp. 7, 124, 209, 389, and XXVI. pp. 214-217 (1894)—Bar in R.I. XXVI. (1894), pp. 401-414—Brocher de la Fléchère, in R.I. 2nd Ser. I. (1899), pp. 337-353—Fauchille in R.G. IV. (1897), pp. 297-323—Kleen in R.G. XI. (1904), pp. 353-362—Gover in The Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, new series, II. (1900), pp. 118-130—Kennedy and Randall in The Law Quarterly Review, XXIV (1908), pp. 59-75, 316-327, and 449-464—General Report presented to the Naval Conference of London by its Drafting Committee, articles 22-44.

Grotius, III. c. 1, § 5—Bynkershoek, Public Law Questions I. cc, IX-XII—Vattel, III. §§ 111-113—Hall, §§ 236-247—Lawrence, §§ 253-259—Westlake, II. pp. 240-265—Maine, pp. 96-122—Manning, pp. 352-399—Phillimore, III. §§ 226-284—Twiss, II. §§ 121-151—Halleck, II. pp. 214-238—Taylor, §§ 653-666—Walker, §§ 73-75—Wharton, III. §§ 368-375—Moore, VII. §§ 1249-1263—Wheaton, §§ 476-508—Bluntschli, §§ 801-814—Heffter, §§ 158-161—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 713-731—Gareis, § 89—Liszt, § 42—Ullmann, §§ 193-194—Bonfils, No. 1537-158815—Despagnet, Nos. 705-715 in the context of—Rivier, II pp. 416-423—Calvo, V. §§ 2708-2795—Fiore, III. Nos. 1591-1601, and Code, Nos. 1827-1835—Martens, II. § 136—Kleen, I. §§ 70-102—Boeck, Nos. 606-659—Pillet, pp. 315-330—Gessner, pp. 70-144—Perels, §§ 44-46—Testa, pp. 201-220—Lawrence, War, pp. 140-174—Ortolan, II. pp. 165-213—Hautefeuille, II. pp. 69-172—Dupuis, Nos. 199-230, and War, Nos. 137-171—Bernsten, § 9—Nippold, II. § 35—Takahashi, pp. 490-526—Holland, Prize Law, §§ 57-87—U.S. Naval War Code, articles 34-36—Heineccius, On Ships Transporting Prohibited Goods (1740)—Huebner, On the Seizure of Neutral Ships, 2 vols. (1759)—Valin, Treatise on Seizures, 2 vols. (1763)—Martens, Essay on Shipowners, Seizures, and Especially Recaptures (1795)—Lampredi, The Commerce of Neutral Nations in Time of War (1801)—Tetens, Considerations on the Reciprocal Rights of Warring and Neutral Powers at Sea (1805)—Pistoye and Duverdy, Treatise on Maritime Seizures, 2 vols. (1855)—Pratt, The Law of War Contraband (1856)—Moseley, What is Contraband and what isn't? (1861)—Upton, The Law of Nations Affecting Trade During War (1863)—Lehmann, The Supply of War Contraband Goods, etc. (1877)—Kleen, On War Contraband and Prohibited Transport for Neutrals (1893)—Vossen, The War Contraband (1896)—Manceaux, On War Contraband (1899)—Brochet, On War Contraband (1900)—Hirsch, War Contraband and Prohibited Transport During Wartime (1901)—Pincitore, War Contraband (1902)—Remy, Theory of Journey Continuity in Matters of Blockade and War Contraband (1902)—Knight, Neutral States from the Perspective of War Contraband (1903)—Wiegner, The War Contraband (1904)—Atherley-Jones, Commerce in War (1906), pp. 1-91 and 253-283—Hold, The War Contraband (1907)—Hansemann, The Theory of Unified Travel in the Law of Blockade and War Contraband (1910)—Hirschmann, The International Prize Law[Pg 480] (1912), §§ 24-30—Westlake in R.I. II. (1870), pp. 614-655—Kleen in R.I. XXV. (1893), pp. 7, 124, 209, 389, and XXVI. pp. 214-217 (1894)—Bar in R.I. XXVI. (1894), pp. 401-414—Brocher de la Fléchère, in R.I. 2nd Ser. I. (1899), pp. 337-353—Fauchille in R.G. IV. (1897), pp. 297-323—Kleen in R.G. XI. (1904), pp. 353-362—Gover in The Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, new series, II. (1900), pp. 118-130—Kennedy and Randall in The Law Quarterly Review, XXIV (1908), pp. 59-75, 316-327, and 449-464—General Report presented to the Naval Conference of London by its Drafting Committee, articles 22-44.

Definition of Contraband of War.

Definition of War Contraband.

§ 391. The term contraband is derived from the Italian "contrabbando," which, itself deriving from the Latin "contra" and "bannum" or "bandum," means "in defiance of an injunction." Contraband of war[813] is the designation of such goods as by either belligerent are forbidden to be carried to the enemy on the ground that they enable the latter to carry on the war with greater vigour. But this definition is only a formal one, as it does not state what kinds of goods belong to the class of contraband. This point was much controverted before the Declaration of London. Throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries the matter stood as Grotius had explained it. Although he does not employ the term contraband, he treats of the matter. He[814] distinguishes three different kinds of articles. Firstly, those which, as arms for instance, can only be made use of in war, and which are, therefore, always contraband. Secondly, those, as for example articles of luxury, which can never be made use of in war and which, therefore, are never contraband. Thirdly, those which, as money, provisions, ships, and articles of naval equipment, can be made use of in war as well as in peace, and which are on account of their[Pg 481] ancipitous use contraband or not according to the circumstances of the case. In spite of Bynkershoek's decided opposition[815] to this distinction by Grotius, the practice of most belligerents until the beginning of the twentieth century has been in conformity with it. A great many treaties have from the beginning of the sixteenth century been concluded between many States for the purpose of fixing what articles belonging to the class of ancipitous use should, and what should not, be regarded between the parties as contraband, but these treaties disagree with one another. And, so far as they were not bound by a treaty, belligerents formerly exercised their discretion in every war according to the special circumstances and conditions in regarding or not regarding certain articles of ancipitous use as contraband. The endeavour of the First and the Second Armed Neutrality of 1780 and 1800 to restrict the number and kinds of articles that could be regarded as contraband failed, and the Declaration of Paris of 1856 uses the term contraband without any attempt to define it.

§ 391. The term contraband comes from the Italian "contrabbando," which is derived from the Latin "contra" and "bannum" or "bandum," meaning "in defiance of an injunction." Contraband of war[813] refers to goods that either side in a conflict is prohibited from sending to the enemy because they help the enemy continue the war more effectively. However, this definition is just a formal one, as it doesn’t specify which types of goods fall into the contraband category. This issue was widely debated before the Declaration of London. Throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, the situation was described by Grotius. Although he doesn’t use the term contraband, he discusses the topic. He[814] identifies three different types of items. First, there are items like weapons that can only be used in war and are, therefore, always considered contraband. Second, there are items like luxury goods that can never be used in war and are never considered contraband. Third, there are items such as money, food, ships, and naval equipment that can be used both in war and in peace, and their classification as contraband or not depends on the specific circumstances. Despite Bynkershoek’s strong opposition[815] to Grotius's distinction, most belligerents' practices until the early twentieth century aligned with it. Many treaties have been signed since the early sixteenth century between various states to determine which items of ambiguous use should be considered contraband, but these treaties often conflict with one another. As long as belligerents were not bound by a treaty, they exercised their judgment in each war according to the specific circumstances regarding whether certain items of ambiguous use should be treated as contraband. The efforts of the First and Second Armed Neutrality of 1780 and 1800 to limit the types and amounts of goods classified as contraband were unsuccessful, and the Declaration of Paris in 1856 mentions contraband without attempting to define it.

[813] Although—see above, §§ 173-174—prevention of carriage of contraband is a means of sea warfare against the enemy, it chiefly concerns neutral commerce and is, therefore, more conveniently treated with neutrality.

[813] Although—see above, §§ 173-174—preventing the transport of contraband is a method of naval warfare against the enemy, it primarily relates to neutral trade and is, therefore, better addressed within the context of neutrality.

[814] See Grotius, III. c. I, § 5:—"Sunt res quae in bello tantum usum habent, ut arma: sunt quae in bello nullum habent usum, ut quae voluptati inserviunt: sunt quae et in bello et extra bellum usum habent, ut pecuniae, commeatus, naves, et quae navibus adsunt.... In tertio illo genere usus ancipitis, distinguendus erit belli status...."

[814] See Grotius, III. c. I, § 5:—"There are things that are useful only in war, like weapons; there are things that have no use in war, like those that serve pleasure; there are things that are useful both in war and out of war, like money, supplies, ships, and those associated with ships.... In that third category of dual-purpose items, the status of war must be distinguished...."

[815] See Bynkershoek, Quaest. jur. publici. I. c. X.

[815] See Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law. I. c. X.

It is by the Declaration of London that the Powers have, for the first time in history, come to an agreement concerning what articles are contraband. The distinction which Grotius made between three classes of goods, while still recognised, has been merged by the Declaration of London into the distinction between articles of absolute contraband, articles of conditional contraband, and such articles as may under no circumstances or conditions be considered contraband. This Declaration, moreover, has put the whole matter of contraband upon a new basis, since the Powers have by articles 22 to 44 agreed upon a common code of rules concerning contraband.

It is through the Declaration of London that the Powers have, for the first time in history, reached an agreement on what items are considered contraband. The distinction that Grotius made between three categories of goods is still acknowledged but has been combined by the Declaration of London into the categories of absolute contraband, conditional contraband, and items that can never be deemed contraband under any circumstances. Furthermore, this Declaration has established a new framework for the entire issue of contraband, as the Powers have agreed on a common set of rules regarding contraband in Articles 22 to 44.

Absolute and conditional Contraband, and free Articles.

Absolute and conditional contraband, and free items.

§ 392. Apart from the distinction between articles which can be made use of only in war and those of[Pg 482] ancipitous use, two different classes of contraband must be distinguished.

§ 392. Besides the difference between items that can only be used in warfare and those of[Pg 482] ambiguous use, we need to identify two different categories of contraband.

There are, firstly, articles which by their very character are destined to be made use of in war. In this class are to be reckoned not only arms and ammunition, but also such articles of ancipitous use as military stores, naval stores, and the like. They are termed absolute contraband.

There are, first of all, items that are specifically meant for use in war. This category includes not only weapons and ammunition but also items that can serve dual purposes, like military supplies, naval supplies, and similar goods. These are called absolute contraband.

There are, secondly, articles which by their very character are not destined to be made use of in war, but which under certain circumstances and conditions can be of the greatest use to a belligerent for the continuation of the war. To this class belong, for instance, provisions, coal, gold, and silver. These articles are termed conditional or relative contraband.

There are, secondly, items that aren’t meant to be used in war but can still be extremely helpful to a combatant under certain circumstances and conditions. This group includes things like food supplies, coal, gold, and silver. These items are called conditional or relative contraband.

Although hitherto not all the States have made this distinction, nevertheless they did make a distinction in so far as they varied the list of articles which they declared contraband in their different wars; certain articles, as arms and ammunition, have always been on the list, whilst other articles were only considered contraband when the circumstances of a particular war made it necessary. The majority of writers have always approved of the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, although several insisted that arms and ammunition only and exclusively could be recognised as contraband, and that conditional contraband did not exist.[816] The distinction would seem to have been important not only regarding the question whether or no an article was contraband, but also regarding the consequences of carrying contraband.[817]

While not all States have made this distinction until now, they have differed in the list of items they labeled as contraband in their various wars. Some items, like arms and ammunition, have always been included on that list, while others were deemed contraband only when the specific situation of a war required it. Most writers have generally supported the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, although some insisted that only arms and ammunition could be defined as contraband, arguing that conditional contraband does not exist. The distinction seems to be significant not just in determining whether an item is contraband, but also in understanding the consequences of transporting contraband.

[816] See, for instance, Hautefeuille, II. p. 157, and Kleen, I. § 90.

[816] See, for example, Hautefeuille, II. p. 157, and Kleen, I. § 90.

[817] See below, § 405, p. 510.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, p. 510.

The Declaration of London has adopted (articles 22 and 24) the distinction between absolute and conditional[Pg 483] contraband, but it distinguishes, besides these two classes of articles, a third class (article 27). To this class belong all articles which are either not susceptible of use in war, or the possibility of the use of which in war is so remote as practically to make them not susceptible of use in war. These articles are termed free articles.[818]

The Declaration of London has established (articles 22 and 24) the difference between absolute and conditional[Pg 483] contraband, but it also identifies a third category (article 27). This category includes all items that either cannot be used in war or have such a slim chance of being used in war that they are essentially considered unusable in that context. These items are referred to as free articles.[818]

[818] But there are a number of other free articles, although they do not belong to the articles characterised above; see below, § 396a.

[818] But there are several other free articles, even though they aren't part of the articles described above; see below, § 396a.

Articles absolutely Contraband.

Contraband articles.

§ 393. That absolute contraband cannot and need not be restricted to arms and ammunition only and exclusively becomes obvious, if the fact is taken into consideration that other articles, although of ancipitous use, can be as valuable and essential to a belligerent for the continuance of the war as arms and ammunition. The necessary machinery and material for the manufacture of arms and ammunition are almost as valuable as the latter themselves, and warfare on sea can as little be waged without vessels and articles of naval equipment as without arms and ammunition. But formerly no unanimity existed with regard to such articles of ancipitous use as had to be considered as absolute contraband, and States, when they went to war, increased or restricted, according to the circumstances of the particular war, the list of articles they considered absolute contraband.

§ 393. It's clear that absolute contraband doesn't have to be limited to just arms and ammunition. Other items, even if they can have different uses, can be just as important and necessary for a warring party to continue fighting as arms and ammunition. The equipment and materials needed to make arms and ammunition are nearly as valuable as the arms themselves, and naval warfare cannot be conducted without ships and naval gear any more than it can without arms and ammunition. However, in the past, there was no agreement about which dual-use items should be classified as absolute contraband, and countries would adjust their lists of what they considered absolute contraband based on the specific situation of each war.

According to the British practice[819] which has hitherto prevailed—subject, however, to the prerogative of the Crown to order alterations of the list during a war—the following articles were considered absolute contraband:—

According to the British practice[819] that has been in place until now—though the Crown has the authority to change the list during wartime—the following items were seen as complete contraband:—

Arms of all kinds, and machinery for manufacturing arms; ammunition, and materials for ammunition, including lead, sulphate of potash, muriate of potash (chloride of potassium), chlorate of potash, and nitrate of soda; gunpowder and its materials, saltpetre and brimstone, also guncotton; military[Pg 484] equipments and clothing; military stores; naval stores, such as masts, spars, rudders, ship timbers, hemp and cordage, sail-cloth, pitch and tar, copper for sheathing vessels, marine engines and the component parts thereof (including screw propellers, paddle-wheels, cylinders, cranks, shafts, boilers, tubes for boilers, boiler-plates and fire bars), maritime cement and the materials used for its manufacture (as blue lias and Portland cement), iron in any of the following forms: anchors, rivet-iron, angle-iron, round bars of from 3/4 to 5/8 of an inch diameter, rivets, strips of iron, sheet plate-iron exceeding 1/4 of an inch, and Low Moor and Bowling plates.

Arms of all types, and machines for making arms; ammunition, and substances for ammunition, including lead, potash sulfate, potash chloride (potassium chloride), potash chlorate, and sodium nitrate; gunpowder and its components, saltpeter and sulfur, as well as guncotton; military[Pg 484] gear and clothing; military supplies; naval supplies, such as masts, spars, rudders, ship timber, hemp and rope, sail fabric, pitch and tar, copper for sheathing ships, marine engines and their parts (including screw propellers, paddle wheels, cylinders, cranks, shafts, boilers, boiler tubes, boiler plates, and fire bars), marine cement and the materials used to make it (like blue lias and Portland cement), and iron in any of the following forms: anchors, rivet iron, angle iron, round bars ranging from 3/4 to 5/8 inch in diameter, rivets, iron strips, sheet iron over 1/4 inch thick, and Low Moor and Bowling plates.

[819] See Holland, Prize Law, § 62.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Holland, Prize Law, § 62.

By articles 22 and 23 of the Declaration of London an agreement has been reached according to which two classes of absolute contraband must be distinguished. Article 22 enumerates eleven groups of articles which may always, without special declaration and notice, be treated as absolute contraband. These constitute the first class. The second—see article 23—consists of such articles exclusively used for war as are not enumerated[820] amongst the eleven groups of the first class; these may be treated as absolute contraband also, but only after special declaration and notification. Such declaration may be published during time of peace, and notification thereof must then be addressed to all other Powers; but if the declaration is published after the outbreak of hostilities, a notification need only be addressed to the neutral Powers. Should a Power—see article 26—waive, so far as itself is concerned, the right to treat as absolute contraband an article comprised in the first class, notification thereof must be made to the other Powers. The following are the groups of articles comprised in the first class:[Pg 485]

By Articles 22 and 23 of the Declaration of London, an agreement has been reached that distinguishes two classes of absolute contraband. Article 22 lists eleven categories of items that can always be treated as absolute contraband without special declaration or notice. These make up the first class. The second class—see Article 23—includes items that are exclusively used for war but are not included in the eleven categories of the first class; these can also be treated as absolute contraband, but only after a special declaration and notification. Such a declaration can be published during peacetime, and notification must then be sent to all other powers. However, if the declaration is published after hostilities begin, notification only needs to be sent to neutral powers. If a power—see Article 26—decides to waive its right to treat an article from the first class as absolute contraband for itself, notification must be sent to the other powers. The following are the categories of items included in the first class: [Pg 485]

(1) Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their distinctive component parts.

(1) All types of weapons, including those for sports, and their unique parts.

(2) Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds, and their distinctive component parts.

(2) Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of every type, along with their unique components.

(3) Powder and explosives specially prepared for use in war.

(3) Powder and explosives specifically made for use in warfare.

(4) Gun-mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military waggons, field forges, and their distinctive component parts.

(4) Gun mounts, limber boxes, limbers, military wagons, field forges, and their unique component parts.

(5) Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character.

(5) Clothing and gear that are clearly military in nature.

(6) All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character.

(6) All types of gear with a distinctly military style.

(7) Saddle, draught, and pack animals suitable for use in war.

(7) Saddle, draft, and pack animals suitable for use in war.

(8) Articles of camp equipment, and their distinctive component parts.

(8) Camp equipment articles and their unique parts.

(9) Armour plates.

Armor plates.

(10) Warships, including boats, and their distinctive component parts of such a nature that they can only be used on a vessel of war.

(10) Warships, including boats, and their unique parts that can only be used on a military ship.

(11) Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of munitions of war, for the manufacture or repair of arms, or war material for use on land or sea.

(11) Tools and equipment designed specifically for making weapons of war, for the production or repair of arms, or military supplies for use on land or at sea.

[820] The Report of the Drafting Committee on article 23 recognises that at present it would be difficult to mention any articles which could under article 23 be declared absolute contraband, but since future contingencies cannot be foreseen, it was considered necessary to stipulate the possibility of increasing the list of absolute contraband. That only such additional articles could be declared absolute contraband as by their very character are destined to be made use of in war, is a matter of course.

[820] The Report of the Drafting Committee on article 23 acknowledges that currently it would be challenging to identify any items that could be definitively classified as absolute contraband under article 23. However, since future circumstances are unpredictable, it was deemed necessary to allow for the possibility of expanding the list of absolute contraband. Naturally, the only additional items that could be classified as absolute contraband would be those that, by their very nature, are intended for use in warfare.

It is apparent that this list embodies a compromise, for it includes several articles—such as saddle, draught, and pack animals suitable for use in war—which Great Britain and other Powers formerly only considered as conditional contraband.

It’s clear that this list reflects a compromise, as it includes several items—like saddle, draft, and pack animals suitable for use in war—that Great Britain and other countries previously only viewed as conditional contraband.

Articles conditionally Contraband.

Articles conditionally Contraband.

§ 394. There are many articles which are not by their character destined to be made use of in war, but which are nevertheless of great value to belligerents for the continuance of war. Such articles are conditionally contraband, which means that they are contraband when it is clearly apparent—see below, § 395—that they are intended to be made use of for military or naval purposes. This intention becomes apparent on considering either the destination of the vessel carrying the articles concerned, or the consignee of the articles.

§ 394. There are many items that aren't specifically meant for use in war, but which are still very valuable to fighting parties for the duration of the conflict. These items are considered conditionally contraband, meaning they are deemed contraband when it's clearly obvious—see below, § 395—that they are intended for military or naval use. This intention becomes clear when we look at either the destination of the ship carrying these items or the person receiving them.

Before the Declaration of London neither the practice of States nor the opinion of writers agreed upon[Pg 486] the matter, and it was in especial controversial[821] whether or no foodstuffs, horses and other beasts of burden, coal and other fuel, money and the like, and cotton could conditionally be declared contraband.

Before the Declaration of London, neither the practices of States nor the views of scholars were in agreement on the issue, and it was especially controversial whether food, horses and other pack animals, coal and other fuel, money, and similar items, as well as cotton, could be declared contraband under certain conditions.

(1) That foodstuffs should not under ordinary circumstances be declared contraband there ought to be no doubt. There are even several[822] writers who emphatically deny that foodstuffs could ever be conditional contraband. But the majority of writers has always admitted that foodstuffs destined for the use of the enemy army or navy might be declared contraband. This has been the practice of Great Britain,[823] the United States of America, and Japan. But in 1885, during her hostilities against China, France declared rice in general as contraband, on the ground of the importance of this article to the Chinese population. And Russia in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese war, declared rice and provisions in general as contraband; on the protest of Great Britain and the United States of America, however, she altered her decision and declared these articles conditional contraband only.

(1) There should be no doubt that foodstuffs should not normally be considered contraband. Some[822] writers strongly argue that foodstuffs can never be deemed conditional contraband. However, most writers have always acknowledged that foodstuffs meant for the enemy's army or navy can be classified as contraband. This has been the practice of Great Britain,[823] the United States, and Japan. In 1885, during its conflict with China, France declared rice in general as contraband due to its importance to the Chinese population. Similarly, in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, Russia declared rice and provisions as contraband; however, following protests from Great Britain and the United States, it changed its stance to classify these items as conditional contraband only.

(2) The importance of horses and other beasts of burden for cavalry, artillery, and military transport explains their frequently being declared as contraband by belligerents. No argument against their character as conditional contraband can have any basis. But they were frequently declared absolute contraband, as, for instance, by article 36 of the United States Naval War Code of 1900. Russia, which during the Russo-Japanese War altered the standpoint taken up at first by her, and recognised the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, nevertheless maintained[Pg 487] her declaration of horses and beasts of burden as absolute contraband. The Declaration of London, by article 22, No. 7, declares them as absolute contraband.

(2) The significance of horses and other pack animals for cavalry, artillery, and military transport explains why they are often labeled as contraband by warring parties. There’s no argument against their classification as conditional contraband. However, they were often classified as absolute contraband, as stated in article 36 of the United States Naval War Code of 1900. Russia, which during the Russo-Japanese War initially took a different position, acknowledged the difference between absolute and conditional contraband but still upheld her designation of horses and pack animals as absolute contraband. The Declaration of London, in article 22, No. 7, also identifies them as absolute contraband.

(3) Since men-of-war are nowadays propelled by steam power, the importance of coal, and eventually other fuel for waging war at sea is obvious. For this reason, Great Britain has ever since 1854 maintained that coal, if destined for belligerent men-of-war or belligerent naval ports, is contraband. But in 1859 France and Italy did not take up the same standpoint. Russia, although in 1885 she declared that she would never consent to coal being regarded as contraband, in 1904 declared coal, naphtha, alcohol, and every other kind of fuel, absolute contraband. And she adhered to this standpoint, although she was made to recognise the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband.

(3) Since warships are now powered by steam, the importance of coal, and eventually other fuels for fighting at sea is clear. For this reason, Great Britain has maintained since 1854 that coal meant for military ships or belligerent naval ports is contraband. However, in 1859, France and Italy didn't share the same view. Russia, while stating in 1885 that she would never agree to coal being considered contraband, declared in 1904 that coal, naphtha, alcohol, and all other types of fuel were absolutely contraband. She stuck to this position, even though she was made to understand the difference between absolute and conditional contraband.

(4) As regards money, unwrought precious metals which may be coined into money, bonds and the like, the mere fact that a neutral is prohibited by his duty of impartiality from granting a loan to a belligerent ought to bring conviction that these articles are contraband if destined for the enemy State or its forces. However, the case seldom happens that these articles are brought by neutral vessels to belligerent ports, since under the modern conditions of trade belligerents can be supplied in other ways with the necessary funds.

(4) When it comes to money, unprocessed precious metals that can be turned into money, bonds, and similar items, the simple fact that a neutral party can't give a loan to a party in conflict due to their duty to remain neutral should make it clear that these items are considered contraband if they're intended for the enemy state or its forces. However, it's rare for these items to be transported by neutral ships to ports of countries at war, as modern trade conditions allow belligerents to obtain the necessary funds through other means.

(5) As regards raw cotton, it is asserted[824] that in 1861, during the Civil War, the United States declared it absolute contraband under quite peculiar circumstances, since it took the place of money sent abroad for the purpose of paying for vessels, arms, and ammunition. But this assertion is erroneous.[825] Be that as it[Pg 488] may, raw cotton should not, under ordinary circumstances, be able to be considered absolute contraband. For this reason Great Britain protested when Russia, in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War, declared cotton in general as contraband; Russia altered her standpoint and declared cotton conditional contraband only.[826]

(5) Regarding raw cotton, it is claimed[824] that in 1861, during the Civil War, the United States declared it absolute contraband under quite unusual circumstances, as it replaced the money sent overseas to pay for ships, weapons, and ammunition. However, this claim is incorrect.[825] Regardless, raw cotton should not generally be considered absolute contraband. For this reason, Great Britain objected when Russia, during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, classified cotton as contraband; Russia then changed its position and classified cotton as conditional contraband only.[826]

[821] See Perels, § 45, and Hall, §§ 242-246, who give bird's-eye views of the controversy.

[821] See Perels, § 45, and Hall, §§ 242-246, which provide overviews of the controversy.

[822] See, for instance, Bluntschli, § 807.

[822] See, for example, Bluntschli, § 807.

[823] The Jonge Margaretha (1799), 1 C. Rob. 189.

[823] The Jonge Margaretha (1799), 1 C. Rob. 189.

[824] See Hall, § 246, p. 690, note 2; Taylor, § 662; Wharton, III. § 373.

[824] See Hall, § 246, p. 690, note 2; Taylor, § 662; Wharton, III. § 373.

[825] See Moore, VII. § 1254, and Holland, Letters to the "Times" upon War and Neutrality (1909) pp. 108-112.

[825] See Moore, VII. § 1254, and Holland, Letters to the "Times" on War and Neutrality (1909) pp. 108-112.

[826] According to the British practice which has hitherto prevailed—see Holland, Prize Law, § 64—the list of conditional contraband comprises:—Provisions and liquors for the consumption of army and navy; money, telegraphic materials, such as wire, porous cups, platina, sulphuric acid, and zinc; materials for the construction of a railway, as iron bars, sleepers, and the like; coal, hay, horses, rosin, tallow, timber. But it always was in the prerogative of the Crown to extend or reduce this list during a war according to the requirements of the circumstances.

[826] According to the British practice that has been followed so far—see Holland, Prize Law, § 64—the list of conditional contraband includes: provisions and drinks for the army and navy; money; telegraphic materials, such as wire; porous cups; platinum; sulfuric acid; and zinc; materials for building a railway, like iron bars, sleepers, and similar items; coal; hay; horses; rosin; tallow; and timber. However, it has always been within the Crown's authority to add to or remove items from this list during a war based on the needs of the situation.

By articles 24 to 28 of the Declaration of London an agreement has been reached by the Powers according to which two classes of conditional contraband must be distinguished. Article 24 enumerates fourteen groups of articles which may always, without special declaration and notice, be treated as conditional contraband; these constitute the first class. The second—see article 25—consists of articles which are not enumerated either amongst the eleven groups of absolute contraband contained in article 22 or amongst the fourteen groups of conditional contraband contained in article 24, but which are nevertheless susceptible of use in war as well as for purposes of peace; these may be treated as conditional contraband also, but only after special declaration and notification. Such declaration may be published during time of peace, and notification thereof must then be addressed to all other Powers; but if the declaration is published after the outbreak of hostilities a notification need be addressed to the neutral Powers only. Should a Power—see article 26—waive, so far as itself is concerned, the right to treat as conditional contraband an article comprised in the first class, notification thereof must be made to the other Powers. But it is of course obvious, although[Pg 489] not specially stated in article 26, that a Power may treat as conditional contraband any article belonging either to the first or second class of absolute contraband; in such a case, however, special declaration and notification would seem to be necessary. The following are the groups of articles comprised in the first class of conditional contraband:—

By articles 24 to 28 of the Declaration of London, the Powers have come to an agreement that distinguishes between two classes of conditional contraband. Article 24 lists fourteen groups of items that can be treated as conditional contraband at all times, without needing a special declaration or notice; these make up the first class. The second class—outlined in article 25—includes items that are not listed among the eleven groups of absolute contraband in article 22 or the fourteen groups of conditional contraband in article 24, but can still be used for both war and peaceful purposes; these can also be treated as conditional contraband, but only after a special declaration and notification. This declaration can be made during peacetime, and the notification must be sent to all other Powers; however, if the declaration is made after hostilities begin, notification only needs to be sent to neutral Powers. If a Power—according to article 26—decides to forgo the right to treat an item in the first class as conditional contraband for itself, it must notify the other Powers. It's also clear, although not explicitly stated in article 26, that a Power can treat any item in either class of absolute contraband as conditional contraband; in that case, special declaration and notification would be required. The following are the groups of items included in the first class of conditional contraband:—

(1) Foodstuffs.

Groceries.

(2) Forage and grain, suitable for feeding animals.

(2) Feed and grains that are appropriate for animal nourishment.

(3) Clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes, suitable for use in war.

(3) Clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes that are suitable for use in war.

(4) Gold and silver in coin or bullion; paper money.

(4) Gold and silver in coins or bars; cash.

(5) Vehicles of all kinds available for use in war, and their component parts.

(5) All types of vehicles available for use in war, along with their parts.

(6) Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds; floating docks, parts of docks and their component parts.

(6) Boats, ships, and all types of watercraft; floating docks, dock parts, and their components.

(7) Railway material, both fixed and rolling-stock, and material for telegraphs, wireless telegraphs, and telephones.

(7) Railway materials, including both fixed installations and rolling stock, as well as equipment for telegraphs, wireless telegraphs, and telephones.

(8) Balloons and flying machines and their distinctive component parts, together with accessories and articles recognisable as intended for use in connection with balloons and flying machines.

(8) Balloons and flying machines and their unique parts, along with accessories and items clearly meant for use with balloons and flying machines.

(9) Fuel; lubricants.

(9) Fuel; oils.

(10) Powder and explosives not specially prepared for use in war.

(10) Powder and explosives that haven't been specifically prepared for use in war.

(11) Barbed wire and implements for fixing and cutting the same.

(11) Barbed wire and tools for installing and cutting it.

(12) Horseshoes and shoeing materials.

Horseshoes and hoof care supplies.

(13) Harness and saddlery.

Harness and tack.

(14) Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of nautical instruments.

(14) Binoculars, telescopes, stopwatches, and all sorts of nautical tools.

This list represents a compromise, just as does the list of absolute contraband of article 22. Those opponents of the Declaration of London who object to foodstuffs being on the list of conditional contraband forget that several times in the past—see above, p. 486 (1)—belligerents have declared foodstuffs absolute contraband.[Pg 490]

This list is a compromise, just like the list of absolute contraband in Article 22. Those who oppose the Declaration of London and argue against food being included in the list of conditional contraband forget that in the past—see above, p. 486 (1)—belligerents have declared food to be absolute contraband.[Pg 490]

Hostile Destination essential to Contraband.

Hostile Destination essential to Smuggling.

§ 395. Whatever may be the nature of articles, they are never contraband unless they are destined for the use of a belligerent in war. Arms and ammunition destined for a neutral are as little contraband as other goods with the same destination. As this hostile destination is essential even for articles which are obviously used in war, such hostile destination is all the more important for such articles of ancipitous use as are only conditionally contraband. Thus, for instance, provisions and coal are perfectly innocent and not at all contraband if they are not purposely destined for enemy troops and naval forces, but are destined for use by a neutral. However, the destination of the articles must not be confounded with the destination of the vessel which carries them. For, on the one hand, certain articles with a hostile destination are considered contraband although the carrying vessel is destined for a neutral port, and, on the other hand, certain articles, although they are without a hostile destination, are considered contraband because the carrying vessel is to touch at an intermediate enemy port and is, therefore, destined for such port, although her ultimate destination is a neutral port.

§ 395. No matter what the nature of the items is, they are never considered contraband unless they are meant for the use of a belligerent in war. Weapons and ammunition intended for a neutral party are just as non-contraband as any other goods having the same purpose. Since the hostile destination is crucial even for items that are clearly used in warfare, it becomes even more significant for items of ambiguous use that are only conditionally contraband. For example, food and coal are completely harmless and not considered contraband if they are not intentionally intended for enemy troops or naval forces, but rather for a neutral party. However, the intended purpose of the items should not be confused with the destination of the ship that carries them. On one hand, certain items with a hostile intent are seen as contraband even if the vessel is heading to a neutral port. On the other hand, some items, despite having no hostile intent, are deemed contraband because the vessel is scheduled to stop at an enemy port beforehand and is therefore bound for that location, even though its final destination is a neutral port.

The Declaration of London, by articles 30 to 36, enacts very detailed rules with regard to hostile destination, distinguishing clearly between the characteristics of hostile destination of absolute contraband and those of hostile destination of conditional contraband.

The Declaration of London, by articles 30 to 36, lays out very specific rules regarding hostile destination, clearly distinguishing between the characteristics of hostile destination for absolute contraband and those for hostile destination of conditional contraband.

(1) The destination of articles of absolute contraband is, according to article 30, to be considered hostile if it be shown that they are being sent either to enemy territory, or to territory occupied by the enemy, or, further, to the armed forces of the enemy. And, according to article 31, hostile destination of absolute contraband is considered to be completely proved, firstly, when the goods are consigned to an enemy port[Pg 491] or to the armed forces of the enemy, and, secondly, when the vessel is to call either at enemy ports only, or when she is to touch at an enemy port or meet the armed forces of the enemy before reaching the neutral port to which the cargo concerned is consigned.

(1) The destination of items considered absolute contraband is deemed hostile, per article 30, if it can be shown that they are being sent either to enemy territory, to territory occupied by the enemy, or to the enemy's armed forces. Additionally, according to article 31, the hostile destination of absolute contraband is completely established in two scenarios: first, when the goods are sent to an enemy port[Pg 491] or to the enemy's armed forces, and second, when the vessel is set to stop only at enemy ports or will touch at an enemy port or encounter the enemy's armed forces before arriving at the neutral port designated for the cargo.

(2) The destination of articles of conditional contraband, on the other hand, is, according to article 33, considered to be hostile if they are intended for the use of the armed forces or of a government department of the enemy State, unless in this latter case the circumstances show that the articles concerned cannot in fact be used for warlike purposes. Gold and silver in coin or bullion and paper money, however, are in every case considered to have a hostile destination if intended for a government department of the enemy State. And, according to article 34, hostile destination of articles of conditional contraband is, if the contrary be not proved, presumed when the articles are consigned, firstly, to enemy authorities or to an enemy contractor[827] established in the enemy country, who as a matter of common knowledge supplies articles of this kind to the enemy, or, secondly, to a fortified place of the enemy or to another place serving as a base[828]—whether of operations or supply—for the armed forces of the enemy. On the other hand, if the articles are not so consigned and if the contrary be not proved, their destination is presumed to be non-hostile. And in the case of a merchantman[Pg 492] which can herself be conditional contraband if bound to a fortified place of the enemy or to another place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy, there is no presumption of a hostile destination, but a direct proof is necessary that she is destined for the use of the armed forces or of a government department of the enemy State.

(2) The destination of items considered as conditional contraband is seen as hostile, according to article 33, if they are meant for the use of the enemy's armed forces or a government agency, unless it's clear that these items can't actually be used for warfare. However, gold and silver in coins or bullion, as well as paper money, are always viewed as having a hostile destination if intended for a government department of the enemy state. Moreover, according to article 34, items of conditional contraband are presumed to have a hostile destination unless proven otherwise, when they are sent, first, to enemy authorities or to an enemy contractor[827] based in the enemy country who is known to supply such items to the enemy, or, second, to a fortified location of the enemy or to another site functioning as a base[828]—whether for operations or supply—for the enemy's armed forces. Conversely, if the items are not sent this way and there's no evidence to the contrary, their destination is assumed to be non-hostile. In the case of a merchant ship[Pg 492] that could also be considered conditional contraband if heading to a fortified location of the enemy or to another base for the enemy's armed forces, there is no presumption of a hostile destination; instead, clear proof is required that it is intended for the use of the enemy's armed forces or a government department.

[827] The French text of article 34 contains the words à un commerçant établi en pays ennemi et lorsqu'il est notoire que ce commerçant fournit à l'ennemi des objets et materiaux de cette nature. The translation to an enemy contractor has been objected to by opponents of the Declaration of London, but it is absolutely correct because it meets the meaning of the French text.

[827] The French text of article 34 contains the words to a merchant established in enemy territory and when it is well known that this merchant supplies the enemy with such items and materials. The translation to an enemy contractor has been challenged by critics of the Declaration of London, but it is entirely accurate because it reflects the meaning of the French text.

[828] The Report of the Drafting Committee on article 34 states that the base concerned may be one of operations or supply. Opponents of the Declaration of London object to article 34 on account of the alleged ambiguity of the words place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy, and assert that all seaports of Great Britain might be treated as bases of supply for the armed forces because railways connect them with other places which actually serve as bases of supply or operations. This is surely erroneous, because the doctrine of continuous voyages is not—see article 35 in contradistinction to article 30, and below, § 403a—to be applied to conditional contraband.

[828] The Report of the Drafting Committee on Article 34 states that the relevant base may involve operations or supply. Critics of the Declaration of London argue against Article 34 due to the supposed ambiguity of the phrase place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy, claiming that all seaports in Great Britain could be considered supply bases for the armed forces since railways link them to other locations that actually function as supply or operational bases. This is clearly incorrect, as the doctrine of continuous voyages does not apply to conditional contraband—see Article 35 in contrast to Article 30, and below, § 403a.

Free Articles.

Free Articles.

§ 396. It is obvious that such articles as are not susceptible of use in war may never be declared contraband, whether their destination be hostile or not.

§ 396. It's clear that items that can’t be used in war can never be labeled as contraband, regardless of whether they're headed to a hostile destination or not.

The Declaration of London, by article 27, expressly recognises this and, in article 28—the so-called free list—enumerates seventeen groups of articles which may never be declared contraband in spite of their hostile destination, namely:—

The Declaration of London, in article 27, clearly acknowledges this and, in article 28—the so-called free list—lists seventeen categories of items that can never be labeled as contraband regardless of their intended use, specifically:—

(1) Raw cotton, wool, silk, jute, flax, hemp, and other raw materials of the textile industries, and yarns of the same.

(1) Raw cotton, wool, silk, jute, flax, hemp, and other raw materials used in the textile industry, as well as their yarns.

(2) Oil seeds and nuts; copra.

(2) Oil seeds and nuts; copra.

(3) Rubber, resins, gums, and lacs; hops.

(3) Rubber, resins, gums, and lacquers; hops.

(4) Raw hides and horns, bones, and ivory.

(4) Raw hides, horns, bones, and ivory.

(5) Natural and artificial manures, including nitrates and phosphates for agricultural purposes.

(5) Natural and synthetic fertilizers, including nitrates and phosphates for farming purposes.

(6) Metallic ores.

Metal ores.

(7) Earths, clays, lime, chalk, stone, including marble, bricks, slates, and tiles.

(7) Earth, clay, lime, chalk, stone, including marble, bricks, slates, and tiles.

(8) Chinaware and glass.

(8) China and glassware.

(9) Paper and paper-making materials.

Paper and paper-making supplies.

(10) Soap, paint and colours, including articles exclusively used in their manufacture, and varnish.

(10) Soap, paint, and colors, including items used only in their production, and varnish.

(11) Bleaching powder, soda, ash, caustic soda, salt cake, ammonia, sulphate of ammonia, and sulphate of copper.

(11) Bleaching powder, soda, ash, caustic soda, salt cake, ammonia, ammonium sulfate, and copper sulfate.

(12) Agricultural, mining, textile, and printing machinery.

(12) Farm, mining, textile, and printing equipment.

(13) Precious and semi-precious stones, pearls, mother-of-pearl, and coral.

(13) Precious and semi-precious stones, pearls, mother-of-pearl, and coral.

(14) Clocks and watches, other than chronometers.

(14) Clocks and watches, excluding chronometers.

(15) Fashion and fancy goods.

Fashion and luxury items.

(16) Feathers of all kinds, hairs, and bristles.

(16) Feathers of all types, hairs, and bristles.

(17) Articles of household furniture and decoration, office furniture and requisites.

(17) Items of home furniture and decor, office furniture, and supplies.

This free list is of great importance to neutral trade, more particularly as it not only comprises such articles as are not susceptible of use in war, but likewise a number of articles, the possibility of the use of which in war is so remote as practically to make them not susceptible of use in war. The list guarantees to a number of industries and trades of neutral States freedom from interference on the part of belligerents, and it is to be expected that in time the list will be increased.

This free list is really important for neutral trade, especially since it includes items that can't be used in war, as well as several items whose use in war is so unlikely that they basically won't be used for that purpose. The list ensures that various industries and trades in neutral countries won't be disrupted by the fighting nations, and we can expect that over time, the list will grow.

Articles destined for the use of the carrying Vessel, or to aid the Wounded.

Articles intended for use by the carrying vessel or to assist the wounded.

§ 396a. Besides the seventeen groups of articles contained in the free list, there are two other groups of free articles.

§ 396a. In addition to the seventeen groups of articles in the free list, there are two more groups of free articles.

Firstly, those articles which serve exclusively to aid the sick and wounded. They, according to article 29, No. 1, of the Declaration of London, may never be treated as contraband even if their destination is hostile. They may, however, in case of urgent military necessity and, subject to the payment of compensation, be requisitioned if they are destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy or to the armed forces of the enemy.

Firstly, the items that are solely meant to help the sick and injured. According to Article 29, No. 1, of the Declaration of London, they can never be considered contraband, even if they're headed for enemy territory. However, in situations of urgent military need, and with compensation provided, they can be taken if they are meant for land owned or controlled by the enemy or for the enemy's armed forces.

Secondly, articles intended for the use of the vessel in which they are found or for the use of her crew and passengers during the voyage. Hostile destination being essential before any kinds of articles may be considered contraband, those articles which are carried by a vessel evidently for her own use or for the use of her crew and passengers can never be contraband, as is now specially stipulated by article 29, No. 2, of the Declaration of London. Merchantmen frequently carry a gun and a certain amount of ammunition for the purpose of signalling, and, if they navigate in parts of the sea where there is danger of piracy, they frequently carry a certain amount of arms and ammunition for defence against an attack by pirates. It will not[Pg 494] be difficult either for the searching belligerent man-of-war or for the Prize Court to ascertain whether or no such arms and ammunition are carried bona fide.

Secondly, items meant for the use of the vessel they are on or for the crew and passengers during the journey. A hostile destination is essential for any items to be considered contraband, so items carried by a vessel clearly for her own use or for the use of her crew and passengers can never be contraband, as specifically stated in article 29, No. 2, of the Declaration of London. Merchant ships often carry a gun and some ammunition for signaling purposes, and if they sail in areas where there is a risk of piracy, they frequently carry some weapons and ammunition for defense against pirate attacks. It won’t be hard for the inspecting belligerent warship or the Prize Court to determine whether such weapons and ammunition are being carried bona fide.

Contraband Vessels.

Smuggled goods Ships.

§ 397. A neutral vessel, whether carrying contraband or not, can herself be contraband. Such is the case when she has been built or fitted out for use in war and is on her way to the enemy. Although it is the duty of neutrals—see article 8 of Convention XIII., and above §§ 334 and 350—to employ the means at their disposal to prevent the fitting out, arming, or the departure of any vessel within their jurisdiction, which they have reason to believe is intended to cruise or to engage in hostile operations against a belligerent, their duty of impartiality does not compel them to prevent their subjects from supplying a belligerent with vessels fit for use in war except where the vessel concerned has been built or fitted out by order of a belligerent. Subjects of neutrals may therefore—unless prevented from so doing by Municipal Law, as, for instance, subjects of the British Crown by §§ 8 and 9 of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870—by way of trade supply belligerents with vessels of any kind, provided these vessels have not been built or fitted out by order of the belligerent concerned. According to the practice which has hitherto prevailed, such vessels, being equivalent to arms, used to be considered as absolute contraband.[829] And it made no difference whether or no they were fit for use as men-of-war, it sufficed that they were fit to be used for the transport of troops and the like.

§ 397. A neutral vessel, whether carrying contraband or not, can itself be considered contraband. This happens when it has been built or outfitted for war and is heading to the enemy. While it is the responsibility of neutral parties—see article 8 of Convention XIII, and above §§ 334 and 350—to take steps to prevent the outfitting, arming, or departure of any vessel in their jurisdiction that they believe is meant to engage in hostile actions against a belligerent, their duty of impartiality does not require them to stop their citizens from supplying vessels capable of use in war to a belligerent unless the vessel has been built or outfitted by order of that belligerent. Therefore, neutral citizens may—unless limited by local laws, such as those imposed on British citizens by §§ 8 and 9 of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870—provide belligerents with any type of vessels through trade, as long as those vessels have not been built or outfitted by the belligerent in question. According to the practice up to now, such vessels, being equal to arms, have typically been regarded as absolute contraband.[829] It did not matter whether or not they were suitable for use as warships; it was sufficient that they were capable of transporting troops and similar uses.

[829] The Richmond (1804), 5 C. Rob. 325. See also Twiss, II. § 148, and Holland, Prize Law, § 86.

[829] The Richmond (1804), 5 C. Rob. 325. See also Twiss, II. § 148, and Holland, Prize Law, § 86.

According to article 22, No. 10, article 24, No. 6, and article 34 of the Declaration of London the law concerning contraband vessels will be the following:—A distinction is made between warships on the one hand, and, on the other, vessels and the like generally.[Pg 495] According to article 22, No. 10, warships, including their boats and their distinctive component parts of such a nature that they can only be used on a vessel of war, may be treated as absolute contraband without notice. On the other hand, according to article 24, No. 6, vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds, and, further, floating docks, parts of docks and their component parts may only be treated as conditional contraband, but may be so treated without notice. And it must be specially observed that whereas with regard to articles of conditional contraband generally, there is a legal presumption established as to their hostile destination in case they are consigned to enemy authorities or to a contractor established in the enemy country, who, as a matter of common knowledge, supplies articles of this kind to the enemy, article 34 expressly exempts merchant vessels from this presumption in case it is sought to prove that they themselves are contraband.

According to Article 22, No. 10, Article 24, No. 6, and Article 34 of the Declaration of London, the law regarding contraband vessels is as follows: a distinction is made between warships and all other types of vessels. [Pg 495] According to Article 22, No. 10, warships, including their boats and parts that are specifically designed for use on a war vessel, can be considered absolute contraband without prior notice. In contrast, Article 24, No. 6 states that vessels, crafts, and boats of any kind, as well as floating docks, parts of docks, and their components, can only be considered conditional contraband, but again, without prior notice. It's important to note that while there is a legal assumption about the hostile destination of articles deemed conditional contraband when they are sent to enemy authorities or to a contractor in the enemy country who is known to supply such articles to the enemy, Article 34 specifically exempts merchant vessels from this assumption if it's being argued that they are contraband themselves.

II SMUGGLING

See the literature quoted above at the commencement of § 391.

See the literature mentioned earlier at the beginning of § 391.

Carriage of Contraband Penal by the Municipal Law of Belligerents.

Carriage of Contraband Penal by the Municipal Law of Belligerents.

§ 398. The guaranteed freedom of commerce making the sale of articles of all kinds to belligerents by subjects of neutrals legitimate, articles of conditional as well as absolute contraband may be supplied by sale to either belligerent by these individuals. And the carriage of such articles by neutral merchantmen on the Open Sea is, as far as International Law is concerned, quite as legitimate as their sale. The carrier of contraband by no means violates an injunction of the Law of Nations. But belligerents have by the Law of Nations the right to[Pg 496] prohibit and punish the carriage of contraband by neutral merchantmen, and the carrier of contraband violates, for this reason, an injunction of the belligerent concerned. It is not International Law, but the Municipal Law of the belligerents, which makes carriage of contraband illegitimate and penal.[830] The question why the carriage of contraband articles may nevertheless be prohibited and punished by the belligerents, although it is quite legitimate so far as International Law is concerned, can only be answered by a reference to the historical development of the Law of Nations. In contradistinction to former practice, which interdicted all trade between neutrals and the enemy, the principle of freedom of commerce between subjects of neutrals and either belligerent has gradually become universally recognised; but this recognition included from the beginning the right of either belligerent to punish carriage of contraband on the sea. And the reason obviously is the necessity for belligerents in the interest of self-preservation to prevent the import of such articles as may strengthen the enemy, and to confiscate the contraband cargo, and eventually the vessel also, as a deterrent to other vessels.

§ 398. The guaranteed freedom of commerce makes it legitimate for neutral parties to sell various items to warring nations, allowing both conditional and absolute contraband to be sold to either belligerent by these individuals. Additionally, transporting such items on the Open Sea by neutral merchant ships is, under International Law, just as legitimate as selling them. A carrier of contraband does not break any laws of Nations. However, belligerents are entitled under International Law to prohibit and penalize the transport of contraband by neutral merchant ships, which means that carriers of contraband are violating the laws set by the specific belligerent. It is not International Law that renders the transport of contraband illegitimate and punishable, but rather the Municipal Law of the belligerents. [Pg 496] The question of why the transport of contraband items can still be prohibited and penalized by belligerents, even if it's considered legitimate under International Law, can only be answered by looking at the historical evolution of the Law of Nations. Unlike past practices that banned all trade between neutrals and the enemy, the principle of free commerce between neutral parties and either belligerent has gradually gained universal acceptance; however, this recognition has always included the right for either belligerent to punish the transport of contraband at sea. The rationale behind this is clearly linked to the need for belligerents, in the interest of their own survival, to stop the import of goods that could aid the enemy and to confiscate the contraband cargo, and potentially the entire vessel, as a warning to other ships.

[830] See above, § 296.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

The present condition of the matter of carriage of contraband[831] is therefore a compromise. In the interest of the generally recognised principle of freedom of commerce between belligerents and subjects of neutrals, International Law does not require neutrals to prevent their subjects from carrying contraband; on the other hand, International Law empowers either belligerent to prohibit and punish carriage of contraband just as it—see above, § 383—empowers either belligerent to prohibit and punish breach of blockade.

The current situation regarding the transportation of contraband[831] is therefore a compromise. In line with the widely accepted principle of free trade between warring parties and neutral nations, International Law does not require neutrals to stop their citizens from carrying contraband. However, International Law gives either side the authority to forbid and penalize the transportation of contraband, just as it—see above, § 383—gives either side the authority to forbid and penalize violations of a blockade.

[831] The same applies to blockade-running and rendering unneutral service.

[831] The same goes for trying to run blockades and providing unneutral assistance.

The Declaration of London has in no way altered[Pg 497] the existing condition of the matter. The fact that articles 22 and 24 give a list of articles which, without special declaration and notice, may always be treated as absolute and conditional contraband respectively, does not involve the forbidding by International Law of the carriage of the articles. Articles 22 and 24 are certainly part of International Law, yet they merely embody an agreement as to what goods may—but they need not—be treated as contraband.

The Declaration of London has not changed[Pg 497] the current situation. The fact that articles 22 and 24 provide a list of items that can be considered absolute and conditional contraband, respectively, without specific declaration and notice, does not mean that International Law prohibits the transport of these items. Articles 22 and 24 are indeed part of International Law, but they only represent an agreement on what goods may be treated as contraband, not that they must be.

Direct Carriage of Contraband.

Transporting Contraband.

§ 399. Carriage of contraband commonly occurs where a vessel is engaged in carrying to an enemy port such goods as are contraband when they have a hostile destination. In such cases it makes no difference whether the fact that the vessel is destined for an enemy port becomes apparent from her papers, she being bound to such port, or whether she is found at sea sailing on a course for an enemy port, although her papers show her to be bound to a neutral port. And, further, it makes no difference, according to the hitherto prevailing practice of Great Britain and the United States of America at any rate, that she is bound to a neutral port and that the articles concerned are, according to her papers, destined for a neutral port, if only she is to call at an intermediate enemy port or is to meet enemy naval forces at sea in the course of her voyage to the neutral port of destination;[832] for otherwise the door would be open to deceit, and it would always be pretended that goods which a vessel is engaged in carrying to such intermediate enemy places were intended for the neutral port of ultimate destination. For the same reason a vessel carrying such articles as are contraband when they have a hostile destination is considered to be carrying contraband if her papers show that her destination is dependent upon contingencies under which she may have[Pg 498] to call at an enemy port, unless she proves that she has abandoned the intention of eventually calling there.[833]

§ 399. Carrying contraband usually happens when a ship is transporting goods to an enemy port that are considered contraband due to their hostile destination. In these situations, it doesn't matter whether it's clear from the ship's documents that she's headed to an enemy port or if she's seen at sea heading toward an enemy port, even if her papers indicate she's going to a neutral port. Additionally, according to the current practices of Great Britain and the United States, it doesn't matter if she's supposed to go to a neutral port and her documents say the goods are meant for a neutral destination, as long as she plans to stop at an enemy port or meet enemy forces at sea on her way to that neutral port; otherwise, it would allow for deceit, and it would always be claimed that goods being taken to these intermediate enemy locations were meant for the neutral port at the end of her journey. For the same reason, a ship transporting goods that are contraband when they have a hostile destination is still considered to be carrying contraband if her documents suggest that her destination could change based on circumstances that would require her to stop at an enemy port, unless she can prove that she has given up the intention of ultimately stopping there.[832] for otherwise the door would be open to deceit, and it would always be pretended that goods which a vessel is engaged in carrying to such intermediate enemy places were intended for the neutral port of ultimate destination. For the same reason a vessel carrying such articles as are contraband when they have a hostile destination is considered to be carrying contraband if her papers show that her destination is dependent upon contingencies under which she may have[Pg 498] to call at an enemy port, unless she proves that she has abandoned the intention of eventually calling there.[833]

[832] See Holland, Prize Law, § 69.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Holland, Prize Law, § 69.

[833] The Imina (1800), 3 C. Rob. 167; and the Trende Sostre (1800), cited in the Lisette (1806), 6 C. Rob. 391, note. See also Holland, Prize Law, § 70.

[833] The Imina (1800), 3 C. Rob. 167; and the Trende Sostre (1800), referenced in the Lisette (1806), 6 C. Rob. 391, note. See also Holland, Prize Law, § 70.

The Declaration of London distinguishes between carriage of absolute and conditional contraband:—

The Declaration of London differentiates between the transport of absolute and conditional contraband:—

As regards absolute contraband, a vessel is, according to article 32, considered to be carrying contraband whether the fact that she is destined for an enemy port becomes evident from her papers, she being bound for such port, or whether she is found at sea sailing for an enemy port, although her papers show her to be bound for a neutral port. And, according to article 31, No. 2, it makes no difference that the vessel is bound for a neutral port and that the articles concerned are, according to her papers, destined for a neutral port, if only she is to touch at an intermediate enemy port or is to meet armed forces of the enemy before reaching the neutral port for which the goods in question are consigned.

Regarding absolute contraband, a vessel is deemed to be carrying contraband under article 32 if it is clear from her documents that she is headed for an enemy port, whether she is directly bound for that port or found at sea sailing toward it, even if her papers indicate she is going to a neutral port. Furthermore, according to article 31, No. 2, it doesn’t matter if the vessel is en route to a neutral port and the items listed in her documents are designated for a neutral port; it is sufficient if she will stop at a hostile port or encounter enemy armed forces before reaching the neutral port for which the goods are intended.

As regards conditional contraband, a vessel is, according to article 35, considered to be carrying contraband whether her papers show her to be destined to an enemy port, or, being clearly found out of the course to a neutral port indicated by her papers, she is unable to give adequate reasons to justify such deviation.

As for conditional contraband, a vessel is, under article 35, seen as carrying contraband if her documents indicate she's heading to an enemy port, or if she is clearly found to be off course to a neutral port specified in her papers and cannot provide sufficient reasons for that deviation.

Article 32 as well as article 35 stipulates that ship papers are conclusive proof as to the destination of the vessel and of the cargo, unless the vessel is clearly found out of the course indicated by her papers, but the Report of the Drafting Committee of the Naval Conference of London emphasises the fact that the rule of the conclusiveness of ship papers must not be interpreted too literally, since otherwise fraud would be made easy. Ship papers are conclusive proof—says the Report—unless facts show their evidence to be false.

Article 32 and Article 35 state that ship documents are definitive proof of the vessel's destination and the cargo, unless the vessel is clearly found off the course indicated by those documents. However, the Report of the Drafting Committee of the Naval Conference of London highlights that the rule about the conclusiveness of ship documents shouldn't be taken too literally, as this could make it easy to commit fraud. Ship documents are definitive proof—says the Report—unless evidence shows they are false.

Circuitous Carriage of Contraband.

Roundabout Transport of Illegal Goods.

§ 400. On occasions a neutral vessel carrying such articles as are contraband if they have a hostile destination is, according to her papers, ostensibly bound for a neutral port, but is intended, after having called and eventually having delivered her cargo there, to carry the same cargo from there to an enemy port. There is, of course, no doubt that such vessels are carrying contraband whilst engaged in carrying the articles concerned from the neutral to the enemy port. But during the American Civil War the question arose whether they may already be considered to be carrying contraband when on their way from the port of starting to the neutral port from which they are afterwards to carry the cargo to an enemy port, since they are really intended to carry the cargo from the port of starting to an enemy port, although not directly, but circuitously, by a roundabout way. The American Prize Courts answered the question in the affirmative by applying to the carriage of contraband the principle of dolus non purgatur circuitu and the so-called doctrine of continuous voyages.[834] This attitude of the American Prize[Pg 500] Courts has called forth protests from many authorities,[835] British as well as foreign, but Great Britain has not protested, and from the attitude of the British Government in the case of the Bundesrath and other vessels in 1900 during the South African War it could safely, although indirectly only, be concluded that Great Britain considered the practice of the American Prize Courts correct and just, and that, when a belligerent, she intended to apply the same principles. This could also be inferred from § 71 of Holland's Manual of Naval Prize Law, which established the rule: "The ostensible destination of a vessel is sometimes a neutral port, while she is in reality intended, after touching, and even landing and colourably delivering over her cargo there, to proceed with the same cargo to an enemy port. In such a case the voyage is held to be 'continuous,' and the destination is held to be hostile throughout." And provided that the intention of the vessel is really to carry the cargo circuitously, by a roundabout way, to an enemy port, and further provided, that a mere suspicion is not held for a proof of such intention, I cannot see why this application of the doctrine of continuous voyages should not be considered reasonable, just, and adequate.

§ 400. Sometimes a neutral ship carrying goods that are considered contraband if heading to an enemy destination appears, based on its documentation, to be going to a neutral port. However, the true intention is to drop off the cargo at the neutral port and then take the same cargo on to an enemy port. It's clear that these vessels are transporting contraband when they move the items from the neutral port to the enemy port. During the American Civil War, a debate emerged about whether these ships could already be seen as carrying contraband while traveling from their departure port to the neutral port, since their ultimate goal is to move the cargo to an enemy port, albeit indirectly and through a longer route. The American Prize Courts affirmed this, applying the principle of dolus non purgatur circuitu and the doctrine of continuous voyages.[834] This stance of the American Prize Courts drew criticism from numerous authorities, both British and foreign, but Great Britain did not raise any objections. Based on the British Government's approach to the Bundesrath and other vessels in 1900 during the South African War, it can be reasonably concluded, even if indirectly, that Great Britain viewed the American Prize Courts' practice as valid and fair, and that when engaged in conflict, it would apply the same principles. This is also suggested by § 71 of Holland's Manual of Naval Prize Law, which states: "The apparent destination of a vessel is sometimes a neutral port, while it is actually intended, after stopping, and even landing and seemingly delivering its cargo there, to head with the same cargo to an enemy port. In this scenario, the voyage is regarded as 'continuous,' and the destination is considered hostile throughout." As long as the ship's intention is genuinely to take the cargo indirectly to an enemy port, and a mere suspicion is not treated as proof of such intention, I see no reason why the use of the doctrine of continuous voyages should not be viewed as reasonable, fair, and sufficient.

[834] The so-called doctrine of continuous voyages dates from the time of the Anglo-French wars at the end of the eighteenth century, and is connected with the application of the so-called rule of 1756. (See above, § 289.) Neutral vessels engaged in French and Spanish colonial trade, thrown open to them during the war, sought to evade seizure by British cruisers and condemnation by British Prize Courts, according to the rule of 1756, by taking their cargo to a neutral port, landing it and paying import duties there, and then re-lading it and carrying it to the mother country of the respective colony. Thus in the case of the William (1806), 5 C. Rob. 385, it was proved that this neutral vessel took a cargo from the Spanish port La Guira to the port of Marblehead in Massachusetts—the United States being neutral—landed the cargo, paid import duties there, then took in the chief part of this cargo besides other goods, and sailed after a week for the Spanish port of Bilbao. In all such cases the British Prize Courts considered the voyages from the colonial port to the neutral port and from there to the enemy port as one continuous voyage and confirmed the seizure of the ships concerned. See Remy, Théorie de la continuauté du voyage en matière de blocus et de contrebande (1902); Hansemann, Die Lehre von der einheitlichen Reise im Rechte der Blockade und Kriegskonterbande (1910), and Fauchille in R.G. IV. (1897), pp. 297-323. The American Courts have applied the doctrine of continuous voyages not only to carriage of contraband but also to blockade; see above, § 385 (4), where the cases of the Bermuda and the Stephen Hart are quoted.

[834] The so-called doctrine of continuous voyages dates back to the Anglo-French wars at the end of the 18th century and is linked to the enforcement of the rule of 1756. (See above, § 289.) Neutral ships involved in French and Spanish colonial trade, which was opened to them during the war, tried to escape seizure by British cruisers and condemnation by British Prize Courts under the rule of 1756 by taking their cargo to a neutral port, unloading it and paying import duties there, and then reloading it to transport it to the mother country of the respective colony. In the case of the William (1806), 5 C. Rob. 385, it was shown that this neutral vessel carried a cargo from the Spanish port of La Guira to Marblehead in Massachusetts—the United States being neutral—unloaded the cargo, paid import duties, then took on the majority of this cargo along with other goods, and set sail after a week for the Spanish port of Bilbao. In all such situations, the British Prize Courts viewed the trips from the colonial port to the neutral port and then to the enemy port as one continuous voyage and upheld the seizure of the involved ships. See Remy, Théorie de la continuité du voyage en matière de blocus et de contrebande (1902); Hansemann, Die Lehre von der einheitlichen Reise im Rechte der Blockade und Kriegskonterbande (1910), and Fauchille in R.G. IV. (1897), pp. 297-323. The American Courts have applied the doctrine of continuous voyages not just to contraband transport but also to blockade; see above, § 385 (4), where the cases of the Bermuda and the Stephen Hart are referenced.

[835] See, for instance, Hall, § 247. But Phillimore, III. § 227, p. 391, says of the judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of the Bermuda and the Peterhoff, that they "contain very valuable and sound expositions of the law, professedly, and for the most part really, in harmony with the earlier decisions of English Prize Courts." On the other hand, Phillimore, III. § 298, p. 490, disagrees with the American Courts regarding the application of the doctrine of continuous voyages to breach of blockade, and reprobates the decision in the case of the Springbok.

[835] For example, see Hall, § 247. However, Phillimore, III. § 227, p. 391, comments on the judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of the Bermuda and the Peterhoff, noting that they "provide very valuable and sound interpretations of the law, both in principle and largely in line with the earlier decisions of English Prize Courts." On the flip side, Phillimore, III. § 298, p. 490, disagrees with the American Courts on the application of the continuous voyages doctrine in cases of breach of blockade and criticizes the ruling in the case of the Springbok.

Indirect Carriage of Contraband (Doctrine of Continuous Transports).

Indirect Carriage of Contraband (Doctrine of Continuous Transports).

§ 401. It also happens in war that neutral vessels carry to neutral ports such articles as are contraband if bound for a hostile destination, the vessel being cognisant or not of the fact that arrangements have been made for the articles to be afterwards brought by land or sea into the hands of the enemy. And[Pg 501] the question has arisen whether such vessels on their voyage to the neutral port may be considered to be carrying contraband of war.[836] As early as 1855, during the Crimean War, the French Conseil-Général des Prises, in condemning the cargo of saltpetre of the Hanoverian neutral vessel Vrow Houwina, answered the question in the affirmative;[837] but it was not until the American Civil War that the question was decided on principle. Since from the British port of Nassau, in the Bahamas, and from other neutral ports near the coast of the Confederate States, goods, first brought to these nearer neutral ports by vessels coming from more distant neutral ports were carried to the blockaded coast of the Southern States, Federal cruisers seized several vessels destined and actually on their voyage to Nassau and other neutral ports because all or parts of their cargoes were ultimately destined for the enemy. And the American Courts considered those vessels to be carrying contraband, although they were sailing from one neutral port to another, on clear proof that the goods concerned were destined to be transported by land or sea from the neutral port of landing into the enemy territory. The leading cases are those of the Springbok and Peterhoff, which have been mentioned above in § 385 (4), for the Courts found the seizure of these and[Pg 502] other vessels justified on the ground of carriage of contraband as well as on the ground of breach of blockade. Thus, another application of the doctrine of continuous voyages came into existence, since vessels whilst sailing between two neutral ports could only be considered to be carrying contraband when the transport first from one neutral port to another and afterwards from the latter to the enemy territory had been regarded as one continuous voyage. This application of the doctrine of continuous voyages is fitly termed "doctrine of continuous transports."

§ 401. In war, it's possible for neutral ships to carry items that are considered contraband if they're headed for an enemy destination, whether or not the ship knows that plans have been made for those items to later be taken by land or sea to the enemy. And[Pg 501] the question has come up whether these ships, while traveling to a neutral port, can be seen as carrying contraband of war.[836] As early as 1855, during the Crimean War, the French Conseil-Général des Prises answered this question in the affirmative when they condemned the cargo of saltpetre on the Hanoverian neutral ship Vrow Houwina;[837] but it wasn't until the American Civil War that the principle was firmly established. Ships coming from the British port of Nassau in the Bahamas and other nearby neutral ports were bringing goods, first transported by vessels arriving from more distant neutral ports, to the blockaded coast of the Confederate States. Federal cruisers seized several vessels that were bound for and actually sailing to Nassau and other neutral ports because all or parts of their cargoes were ultimately meant for the enemy. The American Courts deemed those vessels to be carrying contraband, even though they were traveling from one neutral port to another, based on clear evidence that the goods were intended to be transported by land or sea from the neutral landing port into enemy territory. The key cases are the Springbok and Peterhoff, as previously mentioned in § 385 (4), where the Courts found the seizures of these and other vessels to be justified on the grounds of carrying contraband as well as violating the blockade. This led to another application of the doctrine of continuous voyages, as vessels traveling between two neutral ports could only be considered to be carrying contraband if the journey from one neutral port to another and then from there to enemy territory was treated as a single continuous voyage. This application of the doctrine of continuous voyages is aptly called "doctrine of continuous transports."

[836] The question is treated with special regard to the case of the Bundesrath, in two able articles in The Law Quarterly Review, XVII. (1901), under the titles "The Seizure of the Bundesrath" (Mr. I. Dundas White) and "Contraband Goods and Neutral Ports" (Mr. E. L. de Hart). See also Baty, International Law in South Africa (1900), pp. 1-44.

[836] The issue is discussed with particular attention to the situation involving the Bundesrath, in two insightful articles in The Law Quarterly Review, XVII. (1901), titled "The Seizure of the Bundesrath" (Mr. I. Dundas White) and "Contraband Goods and Neutral Ports" (Mr. E. L. de Hart). Also refer to Baty, International Law in South Africa (1900), pp. 1-44.

[837] See Calvo, V. § 2767, p. 52. The case of the Swedish neutral vessel Commercen, which occurred in 1814, and which is frequently quoted with that of the Vrow Houwina (1 Wheaton, 382), is not a case of indirect carriage of contraband. The Commercen was on her way to Bilbao, in Spain, carrying a cargo of provisions for the English army in Spain, and she was captured by a privateer commissioned by the United States of America, which was then at war with England. When the case, in 1816, came before Mr. Justice Story, he reprobated the argument that the seizure was not justified because a vessel could not be considered to be carrying contraband when on her way to a neutral port, and he asserted that the hostile destination of goods was sufficient to justify the seizure of the vessel.

[837] See Calvo, V. § 2767, p. 52. The case of the Swedish neutral vessel Commercen, which took place in 1814 and is often cited alongside the Vrow Houwina (1 Wheaton, 382), is not an example of indirectly transporting contraband. The Commercen was en route to Bilbao, Spain, carrying supplies for the British army in Spain when it was seized by a privateer authorized by the United States, which was then at war with England. When the case was presented in 1816 before Mr. Justice Story, he rejected the argument that the seizure was unjustified simply because a ship could not be seen as carrying contraband while heading to a neutral port. He stated that the hostile destination of the goods was enough to warrant the vessel's seizure.

The Case of the Bundesrath.

The Case of the Bundesrat.

§ 402. This application of the doctrine of continuous voyages under the new form of continuous transports has likewise been condemned by many British and foreign authorities; but Great Britain did not protest in this case either—on the contrary, as was mentioned above in § 385 (4), she declined to interfere in favour of the British owners of the vessels and cargoes concerned. And that she really considered the practice of the American Courts just and sound became clearly apparent by her attitude during the South African War. When, in 1900, the Bundesrath, Herzog, and General, German vessels sailing from German neutral ports to the Portuguese neutral port of Lorenzo Marques in Delagoa Bay, were seized by British cruisers under the suspicion of carrying contraband, Germany demanded their release, maintaining that no carriage of contraband could be said to take place by vessels sailing from one neutral port to another. But Great Britain refused to admit this principle, maintaining that articles ultimately destined for the enemy were contraband, although the vessels carrying them were bound for a neutral port.[838]

§ 402. This use of the continuous voyages doctrine under the new concept of continuous transports has also been criticized by many British and foreign authorities; however, Great Britain did not protest in this instance either—on the contrary, as mentioned earlier in § 385 (4), it chose not to intervene in favor of the British owners of the vessels and cargoes involved. It was clear that Great Britain considered the practices of the American Courts to be fair and sound, especially evident from its stance during the South African War. In 1900, when the Bundesrath, Herzog, and General, German ships leaving German neutral ports for the Portuguese neutral port of Lorenzo Marques in Delagoa Bay, were seized by British cruisers on suspicion of carrying contraband, Germany demanded their release, arguing that no contraband could be transported by ships moving from one neutral port to another. However, Great Britain rejected this principle, insisting that items ultimately meant for the enemy were considered contraband, even if the ships carrying them were headed for a neutral port.[838]

[838] See Parliamentary Papers, Africa, No. 1 (1900); Correspondence respecting the action of H.M.'s naval authorities with regard to certain foreign vessels.

[838] See Parliamentary Papers, Africa, No. 1 (1900); Correspondence about the actions of H.M.'s naval authorities concerning certain foreign vessels.

There is no doubt that this attitude of the British[Pg 503] Government was contrary to the opinion of the prominent English[839] writers on International Law. Even the Manual of Naval Prize Law, edited by Professor Holland[840] in 1888, and "issued by authority of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty," reprobated the American practice, for in § 72 it lays down the following rule: "... If the destination of the vessel be neutral, then the destination of the goods on board should be considered neutral, notwithstanding it may appear from the papers or otherwise that the goods themselves have an ulterior destination by transhipment, overland conveyance, or otherwise." And the practice of British Prize Courts in the past would seem to have been in accordance with this rule. In 1798, during war between England and the Netherlands, the neutral ship Imina,[841] which had left the neutral port of Dantzig for Amsterdam carrying ship's timber, but on hearing of the blockade of Amsterdam by the British had changed her course for the neutral port of Emden, was seized on her voyage to Emden by a British cruiser; she was, however, released by Sir William Scott because she had no intention of breaking blockade, and because a vessel could only be considered as carrying contraband whilst on a voyage to an enemy port. "The rule respecting contraband, as I have always understood it, is that the articles must be taken in delicto, in the actual prosecution of the voyage to an enemy port," said Sir William Scott.[842]

There’s no doubt that this stance of the British[Pg 503] Government went against the views of leading English[839] writers on International Law. Even the Manual of Naval Prize Law, edited by Professor Holland[840] in 1888, and officially published by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, criticized the American practice. In § 72, it states the following rule: "... If the destination of the vessel is neutral, then the destination of the goods on board should be viewed as neutral, even if it seems from the documents or otherwise that the goods themselves have a different destination through transshipment, overland transport, or otherwise." The past actions of British Prize Courts seem to have aligned with this rule. In 1798, during the war between England and the Netherlands, the neutral ship Imina,[841] which had left the neutral port of Dantzig for Amsterdam carrying timber, changed its course for the neutral port of Emden upon hearing about the blockade of Amsterdam by the British. A British cruiser seized her on her way to Emden; however, she was released by Sir William Scott because she intended no breach of the blockade, and a vessel could only be considered to be carrying contraband if it was on a voyage to an enemy port. "The rule regarding contraband, as I have always understood it, is that the articles must be taken in delicto, in the actual pursuit of the voyage to an enemy port," said Sir William Scott.[842]

[839] See, for instance, Hall, § 247, and Twiss in The Law Magazine and Review, XII. (1877), pp. 130-158.

[839] Check out Hall, § 247, and Twiss in The Law Magazine and Review, XII. (1877), pp. 130-158.

[840] In a letter to the Times of January 3, 1900, Professor Holland points out that circumstances had so altered since 1888 that the attitude of the British Government in the case of the Bundesrath was quite justified; see Holland, Letters to the "Times" upon War and Neutrality (1909), pp. 114-119.

[840] In a letter to the Times on January 3, 1900, Professor Holland highlights that things had changed so much since 1888 that the British Government's stance on the Bundesrath was completely justified; see Holland, Letters to the "Times" about War and Neutrality (1909), pp. 114-119.

[841] 3 C. Rob. 167.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 3 C. Rob. 167.

[842] It is frequently maintained—see Phillimore, III. § 227, pp. 397-403—that in 1864, in the case of Hobbs v. Henning, Lord Chief Justice Erle repudiated the doctrine of continuous transports, but Westlake shows that this is not the case. See Westlake's Introduction in Takahashi, International Law during the Chino-Japanese War (1899), pp. xx-xxiii, and in The Law Quarterly Review, XV. (1899), pp. 23-30. See also Hart, ibidem, XXIII. (1907), p. 199, who discusses the case of Seymour v. London and Provincial Marine Insurance Co. (41 L.J.C.P. 193) in which the Court recognised the doctrine of continuous transports.[Pg 504]

[842] It's often claimed—see Phillimore, III. § 227, pp. 397-403—that in 1864, in the case of Hobbs v. Henning, Lord Chief Justice Erle rejected the idea of continuous transports, but Westlake demonstrates that this isn't accurate. See Westlake's Introduction in Takahashi, International Law during the Chino-Japanese War (1899), pp. xx-xxiii, and in The Law Quarterly Review, XV. (1899), pp. 23-30. Also refer to Hart, ibidem, XXIII. (1907), p. 199, who discusses the case of Seymour v. London and Provincial Marine Insurance Co. (41 L.J.C.P. 193) where the Court acknowledged the concept of continuous transports.[Pg 504]

Continental support to the Doctrine of Continuous Transports.

Continental support for the Doctrine of Continuous Transports.

§ 403. Although the majority of Continental writers condemn the doctrine of continuous transports, several eminent Continental authorities support it. Thus, Gessner (p. 119) emphatically asserts that the destination of the carrying vessel is of no importance compared with the destination of the carried goods themselves. Bluntschli, although he condemns in § 835 the American practice regarding breach of blockade committed by a vessel sailing from one neutral port to another, expressly approves in § 813 of the American practice regarding carriage of contraband by a vessel sailing between two neutral ports, yet carrying goods with a hostile destination. Kleen (I. § 95, p. 388) condemns the rule that the neutral destination of the vessel makes the goods appear likewise neutral, and defends seizure in the case of a hostile destination of the goods on a vessel sailing between two neutral ports; he expressly states that such goods are contraband from the moment the carrying vessel leaves the port of loading. Fiore (III. No. 1649) reprobates the theory of continuous voyages as applied by British and American Courts, but he asserts nevertheless that the hostile destination of certain goods carried by a vessel sailing to a neutral port justifies the vessel being regarded as carrying contraband, and the seizure thereof. Bonfils (No. 1569) takes up the same standpoint as Bluntschli, admitting the application of the theory of continuous voyages to carriage of contraband, but reprobating its application to breach of blockade. And the Institute of International Law adopted the rule:[843] "La destination pour l'ennemi est présumée lorsque le transport va à l'un de ses ports, ou bien à un port neutre qui, d'après[Pg 505] des preuves évidentes et de fait incontestable, n'est qu'une étape pour l'ennemi, comme but final de la même opération commerciale." Thus this representative body of authorities of all nations has fully adopted the American application of the doctrine of continuous voyages to contraband, and thereby recognised the possibility of circuitous as well as indirect carriage of contraband.

§ 403. Although most Continental writers criticize the doctrine of continuous transports, several notable Continental authorities support it. For instance, Gessner (p. 119) strongly argues that the destination of the carrying vessel is not important compared to the destination of the goods being transported. Bluntschli, while denouncing in § 835 the American practice regarding breaches of blockade by a vessel traveling from one neutral port to another, explicitly approves in § 813 of the American practice related to the carriage of contraband by a vessel moving between two neutral ports that is carrying goods headed for a hostile destination. Kleen (I. § 95, p. 388) argues against the principle that the neutral destination of the vessel makes the goods themselves seem neutral, and he defends the seizure of goods if they have a hostile destination on a vessel sailing between two neutral ports; he clearly states that such goods are considered contraband from the moment the carrying vessel departs from the loading port. Fiore (III. No. 1649) criticizes the theory of continuous voyages as applied by British and American courts, but he still asserts that if certain goods carried by a vessel heading to a neutral port have a hostile destination, it justifies treating the vessel as carrying contraband, leading to their seizure. Bonfils (No. 1569) shares the same view as Bluntschli, accepting the application of the theory of continuous voyages to the carriage of contraband while criticizing its application to breaches of blockade. The Institute of International Law adopted the rule:[843] "La destination pour l'ennemi est présumée lorsque le transport va à l'un de ses ports, ou bien à un port neutre qui, d'après[Pg 505] des preuves évidentes et de fait incontestable, n'est qu'une étape pour l'ennemi, comme but final de la même opération commerciale." Thus, this representative body of authorities from all nations has fully adopted the American application of the doctrine of continuous voyages to contraband and recognized the potential for both circuitous and indirect carriage of contraband.

[843] See § 1 of the Règlementation internationale de la contrebande de guerre, Annuaire, XV. (1896), p. 230.

[843] See § 1 of the International Regulations on War Smuggling, Yearbook, XV. (1896), p. 230.

And it must be mentioned that the attitude of several Continental States has hitherto been in favour of the American practice. Thus, according to §§ 4 and 6 of the Prussian Regulations of 1864 regarding Naval Prizes, it was the hostile destination of the goods or the destination of the vessel to an enemy port which made a vessel appear as carrying contraband and which justified her seizure. In Sweden the same was valid.[844] Thus, further, an Italian Prize Court during the war with Abyssinia in 1896 justified the seizure in the Red Sea of the Dutch vessel Doelwijk,[845] which sailed for the neutral French port of Djibouti, carrying a cargo of arms and ammunition destined for the Abyssinian army and to be transported to Abyssinia after having been landed at Djibouti.

And it's important to note that the stance of several European countries has previously supported the American approach. According to §§ 4 and 6 of the Prussian Regulations of 1864 regarding Naval Prizes, it was the hostile intent of the goods or the ship's route to an enemy port that made a vessel appear to be carrying contraband and justified its seizure. The same applied in Sweden.[844] Furthermore, an Italian Prize Court during the war with Abyssinia in 1896 upheld the seizure of the Dutch vessel Doelwijk,[845] which was headed for the neutral French port of Djibouti, carrying a cargo of arms and ammunition intended for the Abyssinian army to be shipped to Abyssinia after being unloaded at Djibouti.

[844] See Kleen, I. p. 389, note 2.

[844] See Kleen, I. p. 389, note 2.

[845] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXVIII. p. 66. See also below, § 436.

[845] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXVIII. p. 66. See also below, § 436.

Partial Recognition by the Declaration of London of the Doctrine of Continuous Voyages.

Partial Recognition by the Declaration of London of the Doctrine of Continuous Voyages.

§ 403a. The Declaration of London offers a compromise in order to settle the controversy respecting the application of the doctrine of continuous voyages to the carriage of contraband, whether circuitous or indirect carriage be concerned.

§ 403a. The Declaration of London presents a compromise to resolve the debate about applying the doctrine of continuous voyages to the transportation of contraband, whether it involves indirect or circuitous shipping.

(1) On the one hand, article 30 recognises with regard to absolute contraband the application of the doctrine of continuous voyages—both to circuitous and indirect carriage of contraband—by enacting that: "absolute contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy or to the armed forces of the enemy. It is[Pg 506] immaterial whether the carriage of the goods is direct or entails transhipment or a subsequent transport by land."

(1) On one hand, article 30 acknowledges that for absolute contraband, the continuous voyages doctrine applies—this includes both roundabout and indirect transportation of contraband—by stating that: "absolute contraband can be captured if it is proven to be intended for territory owned by or occupied by the enemy or for the enemy's armed forces. It doesn't matter if the goods are transported directly or require transshipment or later transport by land.[Pg 506]

(2) On the other hand, article 35 categorically rejects the doctrine of continuous voyages with regard to conditional contraband by enacting that "conditional contraband is not liable to capture except when found on board a vessel bound for territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces of the enemy,[846] and when it is not to be discharged in an intervening neutral port."

(2) On the other hand, article 35 clearly rejects the idea of continuous voyages concerning conditional contraband by stating that "conditional contraband is not subject to capture unless found on a vessel headed for territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or for the enemy's armed forces,[846] and when it is not intended to be offloaded in a neutral port in between."

(3) However, in cases where the enemy country has no seaboard, article 36—in contradistinction to the provisions of article 35—expressly recognises the doctrine of continuous voyages for conditional contraband also by enacting that "notwithstanding the provisions of article 35, conditional contraband, if shown to have the destination referred to in article 33, is liable to capture in cases where the enemy country has no seaboard."

(3) However, when the enemy country has no coastline, article 36—unlike the rules in article 35—clearly acknowledges the principle of continuous voyages for conditional contraband by stating that "despite the provisions of article 35, conditional contraband, if it can be shown to have the destination mentioned in article 33, is subject to capture in situations where the enemy country has no coastline."

[846] The rule of article 35 came into question for the first time during the Turco-Italian war. In January 1912, the Carthage, a French mail-steamer plying between Marseilles and Tunis, was captured for carriage of contraband by an Italian torpedo-boat and taken to Cagliari, because she had an aeroplane destined for Tunis on board. As the destination of the vessel was neutral, and as, according to article 24, No. 8, of the Declaration of London aeroplanes are conditional contraband, France protested against the capture of the vessel, Italy agreed to release her, and the parties arranged to have the question as to whether the capture of the vessel was justified settled by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague.

[846] The rule in article 35 was questioned for the first time during the Turco-Italian war. In January 1912, the Carthage, a French mail steamer operating between Marseilles and Tunis, was seized by an Italian torpedo boat for carrying contraband and taken to Cagliari because it had an airplane meant for Tunis on board. Since the vessel was headed to a neutral destination, and according to article 24, No. 8, of the Declaration of London airplanes are considered conditional contraband, France protested the seizure. Italy agreed to release the vessel, and both parties decided to have the matter of whether the capture was justified resolved by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.

III CONSEQUENCES OF CARRYING CONTRABAND

See the literature quoted above at the commencement of § 391.

See the literature mentioned above at the beginning of § 391.

Capture for Carriage of Contraband.

Capture for Smuggling.

§ 404. It has always been universally recognised by theory and practice that a vessel carrying contraband may be seized by the cruisers of the belligerent concerned. But seizure is allowed only so long as a vessel[Pg 507] is in delicto, which commences when she leaves the port of starting and ends when she has deposited the contraband goods, whether with the enemy or otherwise. The rule is generally recognised, therefore, that a vessel which has deposited her contraband may not be seized on her return voyage. British and American practice, however, has hitherto admitted one exception to this rule—namely, in the case in which a vessel has carried contraband on her outward voyage with simulated and false papers.[847] But no exception has been admitted by the practice of other countries. Thus, when in 1879, during war between Peru and Chili, the German vessel Luxor, after having carried a cargo of arms and ammunition from Monte Video to Valparaiso, was seized in the harbour of Callao, in Peru, and condemned by the Peruvian Prize Courts for carrying contraband, Germany interfered and succeeded in getting the vessel released.

§ 404. It's always been universally recognized by both theory and practice that a ship carrying contraband can be seized by the cruisers of the involved belligerent. However, a seizure is only permitted as long as a vessel is in delicto, which starts when it leaves the port of origin and ends when it has offloaded the contraband goods, whether with the enemy or otherwise. Therefore, the general rule is that a vessel that has unloaded its contraband cannot be seized on its return trip. Nonetheless, British and American practices have previously allowed one exception to this rule—specifically, when a vessel carried contraband on its outward journey using fake and fraudulent documents.[847] However, other countries have not recognized this exception. For instance, during the war between Peru and Chile in 1879, the German ship Luxor, after transporting arms and ammunition from Monte Video to Valparaiso, was seized in the harbor of Callao, Peru, and condemned by the Peruvian Prize Courts for carrying contraband. Germany intervened and managed to have the ship released.

[847] The Nancy (1800), 3 C. Rob. 122; the Margaret (1810), 1 Acton, 333. See Holland, Prize Law, § 80. Wheaton, I. § 506, note 2, condemns this practice; Hall, § 247, p. 696, calls it "undoubtedly severe"; Halleck, II. p. 220, defends it. See also Calvo, V. §§ 2756-2758.

[847] The Nancy (1800), 3 C. Rob. 122; the Margaret (1810), 1 Acton, 333. See Holland, Prize Law, § 80. Wheaton, I. § 506, note 2, criticizes this practice; Hall, § 247, p. 696, considers it "undoubtedly severe"; Halleck, II. p. 220, supports it. See also Calvo, V. §§ 2756-2758.

It must be specially observed that seizure for carriage of contraband is only admissible on the Open Sea and in the maritime territorial belts of the belligerents. Seizure within the maritime belt of neutrals would be a violation of neutrality.

It should be noted that seizing contraband is only allowed on the Open Sea and in the territorial waters of the warring parties. Seizing within the territorial waters of neutral parties would violate their neutrality.

The Declaration of London entirely confirms these old customary rules, but does not recognise the above-mentioned British exception. Article 37 enacts that a vessel carrying goods liable to capture as absolute or conditional contraband may be captured on the high seas or in the territorial waters of the belligerents throughout the whole of her voyage even if she is to touch at a port of call before reaching the hostile destination. Article 38 enacts that a vessel may not be captured on the ground that she has carried contraband[Pg 508] on a previous occasion if such carriage is in point of fact at an end.

The Declaration of London fully supports these traditional rules but does not acknowledge the British exception mentioned earlier. Article 37 states that a ship carrying goods that are considered absolute or conditional contraband can be seized on the open seas or within the territorial waters of the warring nations throughout its entire journey, even if it will stop at a port before arriving at the enemy's destination. Article 38 specifies that a ship cannot be seized simply because it has carried contraband on a previous trip, as long as that carriage is no longer ongoing.[Pg 508]

Penalty for Carriage of Contraband according to the Practice hitherto prevailing.

Penalty for Transporting Illegal Goods according to the Current Practice.

§ 405. In former times neither in theory nor in practice have similar rules been recognised with regard to the penalty of carriage of contraband. The penalty was frequently confiscation not only of the contraband cargo itself, but also of all other parts of the cargo, together with the vessel. Only France made an exception, since according to an ordonnance of 1584 she did not even confiscate the contraband goods themselves, but only seized them against payment of their value, and it was not until 1681 that an ordonnance proclaimed confiscation of contraband, but with exclusion of the vessel and the innocent part of the cargo.[848] During the seventeenth century this distinction between contraband on the one hand, and, on the other, the innocent goods and the vessel was clearly recognised by Zouche and Bynkershoek, and confiscation of the contraband only became more and more the rule, certain cases excepted. During the eighteenth century the right to confiscate contraband was frequently contested, and it is remarkable as regards the change of attitude of some States that by article 13 of the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce[849] concluded in 1785 between Prussia and the United States of America all confiscation was abolished. This article provided that the belligerent should have the right to stop vessels carrying contraband and to detain them for such length of time as might be necessary to prevent possible damage by them, but such detained vessels should be paid compensation for the arrest imposed upon them. It further provided that the belligerent could seize all contraband against[Pg 509] payment of its full value, and that, if the captain of a vessel stopped for carrying contraband should deliver up all contraband, the vessel should at once be set free. I doubt whether any other treaty of the same kind was entered into by either Prussia or the United States.[850] And it is certain that, if any rule regarding penalty for carriage of contraband was generally recognised at all, it was the rule that contraband goods could be confiscated. But there always remained the difficulty that it was controversial what articles were contraband, and that the practice of States varied much regarding the question as to whether the vessel herself and innocent cargo carried by her could be confiscated. For beyond the rule that absolute contraband could be confiscated, there was no unanimity regarding the fate of the vessel and the innocent part of the cargo. Great Britain and the United States of America hitherto confiscated the vessel when the owner of the contraband was also the owner of the vessel; they also confiscated such part of the innocent cargo as belonged to the owner of the contraband goods; they, lastly, confiscated the vessel, although her owner was not the owner of the contraband, provided he knew of the fact that his vessel was carrying contraband, or provided the vessel sailed with false or simulated papers for the purpose of carrying contraband.[851] Some States allowed such vessel carrying contraband as was not herself liable to confiscation to proceed with her voyage on delivery of her contraband[Pg 510] goods to the seizing cruiser,[852] but Great Britain[853] and other States insisted upon the vessel being brought before a Prize Court in every case.

§ 405. In the past, there were no similar rules recognized, either in theory or practice, regarding the penalty for carrying contraband. The penalty often involved the confiscation not just of the contraband cargo itself, but also of all other cargo and the ship itself. France was the notable exception; based on an ordonnance from 1584, it did not confiscate contraband goods but only seized them for payment of their value. It wasn't until 1681 that an ordonnance mandated confiscation of contraband, but with the exception of the vessel and the innocent portion of the cargo.[848] During the seventeenth century, this distinction between contraband and the innocent goods and vessel was clearly acknowledged by Zouche and Bynkershoek, and confiscation of contraband gradually became the norm, with some exceptions. In the eighteenth century, the right to confiscate contraband faced frequent challenges, and it is noteworthy regarding the changing stance of some States that by Article 13 of the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce[849] signed in 1785 between Prussia and the United States, all confiscation was abolished. This article stated that a belligerent could stop vessels carrying contraband and detain them for as long as necessary to prevent potential damage, but those detained vessels would be compensated for their arrest. It further clarified that the belligerent could seize all contraband against[Pg 509] payment of its full value, and if the captain of a vessel stopped for carrying contraband surrendered all contraband, the vessel would be set free immediately. I'm not sure if any other treaty of this kind was made by either Prussia or the United States.[850] It's clear that if any rule about penalties for carrying contraband was recognized, it was that contraband goods could be confiscated. However, there remained the ongoing issue of what items were considered contraband, and the practices of States varied widely regarding whether the vessel itself and any innocent cargo onboard could also be confiscated. Beyond the agreement that absolute contraband could be confiscated, there was no consensus about the fate of the vessel and the innocent part of the cargo. Great Britain and the United States typically confiscated the vessel when the owner of the contraband was also the vessel's owner; they also confiscated any innocent cargo belonging to the owner of the contraband goods. Finally, they would confiscate the vessel even if the owner wasn't the contraband owner, as long as they knew their vessel was carrying contraband or if the vessel sailed with false or falsified papers to carry contraband.[851] Some States allowed vessels carrying contraband that were not themselves subject to confiscation to continue their journey after handing over their contraband goods to the capturing cruiser,[852] but Great Britain[853] and other States insisted that the vessel be brought before a Prize Court in every instance.

[848] See Wheaton, Histoire des Progrès du Droit des gens en Europe (1841), p. 82.

[848] See Wheaton, History of the Progress of International Law in Europe (1841), p. 82.

[849] Martens, R. IV. p. 42. The stipulation was renewed by article 12 of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded between the two States in 1828; Martens, N.R. VII. p. 619.

[849] Martens, R. IV. p. 42. The agreement was refreshed by article 12 of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed between the two countries in 1828; Martens, N.R. VII. p. 619.

[850] Article 12 of the Treaty of Commerce, between the United States of America and Italy, signed at Florence on February 26, 1871—see Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. I. p. 57—stipulates immunity from seizure of such private property only as does not consist of contraband: "The high contracting parties agree that in the unfortunate event of war between them, the private property of their respective citizens and subjects, with the exception of contraband of war, shall be exempt from capture, or seizure, on the high seas or elsewhere, by the armed vessels or by the military forces of either party; it being understood that this exemption shall not extend to vessels and their cargoes which may attempt to enter a port blockaded by the naval forces of either party." See above, § 178.

[850] Article 12 of the Treaty of Commerce between the United States of America and Italy, signed in Florence on February 26, 1871—see Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. I. p. 57—states that private property is immune from seizure, as long as it does not include contraband: "The high contracting parties agree that in the unfortunate event of war between them, the private property of their respective citizens and subjects, except for contraband of war, shall be exempt from capture or seizure on the high seas or elsewhere by the armed vessels or military forces of either party; it being understood that this exemption does not apply to vessels and their cargoes that attempt to enter a port blockaded by the naval forces of either party." See above, § 178.

[851] See Holland, Prize Law, §§ 82-87.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Holland, Prize Law, §§ 82-87.

[852] See Calvo, V. § 2779.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Calvo, V. § 2779.

[853] See Holland, Prize Law, § 81.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Holland, Prize Law, § 81.

As regards conditional contraband, those States which made any distinction at all between absolute and conditional contraband, as a rule confiscated neither the conditional contraband nor the carrying vessel, but seized the former and paid for it. According to British practice[854] hitherto prevailing, freight was paid to the vessel, and the usual compensation for the conditional contraband was the cost price plus 10 per cent. profit. States acting in this way asserted a right to confiscate conditional contraband, but exercised pre-emption in mitigation of such a right. Those Continental writers who refused to recognise the existence of conditional contraband, denied, consequently, that there was a right to confiscate articles not absolutely contraband, but they maintained that every belligerent had, according to the so-called right of angary,[855] a right to stop all such neutral vessels as carried provisions and other goods with a hostile destination of which he might have made use and to seize such goods against payment of their full value.

Regarding conditional contraband, states that made any distinction between absolute and conditional contraband typically did not confiscate either the conditional contraband or the carrying vessel. Instead, they seized the former and compensated for it. According to the British practice[854], freight was paid to the vessel, and the usual compensation for the conditional contraband was the cost price plus a 10 percent profit. States operating this way claimed a right to confiscate conditional contraband but chose to mitigate that right by preemptively compensating. Continental writers who refused to acknowledge the existence of conditional contraband denied that there was a right to confiscate items that were not absolutely contraband. However, they argued that every belligerent had the so-called right of angary,[855] allowing them to stop neutral vessels carrying provisions and other goods with a hostile destination, which they might use, and to seize such goods while paying their full value.

[854] See Holland, Prize Law, § 84. Great Britain likewise exercised pre-emption instead of confiscation with regard to such absolute contraband as was in an unmanufactured condition and was at the same time the produce of the country exporting it.

[854] See Holland, Prize Law, § 84. Great Britain also chose to preempt rather than confiscate absolute contraband that was in its raw form and was also produced by the country exporting it.

[855] See above, § 365.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

The Institute of International Law, whose rules regarding contraband, adopted at its meeting at Venice in 1896, restrict contraband to arms, ammunition, articles of military equipment, vessels fitted for naval operations, and instruments for the immediate fabrication of ammunition, proposed a compromise regarding articles of ancipitous use. Although the rules state that those articles may not be considered contraband, they nevertheless give the choice to a belligerent of[Pg 511] either exercising pre-emption or seizing and temporarily retaining such articles against payment of indemnities.[856]

The Institute of International Law, whose rules about contraband were adopted at its meeting in Venice in 1896, limits contraband to arms, ammunition, military equipment, ships prepared for naval operations, and tools for making ammunition on the spot. They proposed a compromise regarding items that could be used for multiple purposes. While the rules indicate that those items can't be classified as contraband, they still allow a warring party to choose between either acting preemptively or seizing and temporarily holding those items while providing compensation. [Pg 511][856]

[856] It is of value to print here the Règlementation internationale de la contrebande de guerre adopted by the Institute of International Law (Annuaire, XV. [1896] p. 230):—

[856] It's important to include the International Regulations on War Smuggling adopted by the Institute of International Law (Yearbook, XV. [1896] p. 230):—

§ 1. Sont articles de contrebande de guerre: (1) les armes de toute nature; (2) les munitions de guerre et les explosifs; (3) le matériel militaire (objets d'équipement, affûts, uniformes, etc.); (4) les vaisseaux équipés pour la guerre; (5) les instruments spécialement faits pour la fabrication immédiate des munitions de guerre; lorsque ces divers objets sont transportés par mer pour le compte ou à la destination d'un belligérant.

§ 1. The following items are considered contraband of war: (1) all types of weapons; (2) war ammunition and explosives; (3) military equipment (including gear, weapon mounts, uniforms, etc.); (4) vessels outfitted for warfare; (5) tools specifically designed for the immediate production of war ammunition; when these various items are transported by sea for the account of or destined for a belligerent.

La destination pour l'ennemi est présumée lorsque le transport va à l'un de ses ports, ou bien à un port neutre qui, d'après des preuves évidentes et de fait incontestable, n'est qu'une étape pour l'ennemi, comme but final de la même opération commerciale.

La destination pour l'ennemi est présumée lorsque le transport va à l'un de ses ports, ou bien à un port neutre qui, d'après des preuves évidentes et de fait incontestable, n'est qu'une étape pour l'ennemi, comme but final de la même opération commerciale.

§ 2. Sous la dénomination de munitions de guerre doivent être compris les objets qui, pour servir immédiatement à la guerre, n'exigent qu'une simple réunion ou juxtaposition.

§ 2. Under the term munitions de guerre, we must include items that, to be used directly for war, require only a simple assembly or arrangement.

§ 3. Un objet ne saurait être qualifié de contrebande à raison de la seule intention de l'employer à aider ou favoriser un ennemi, ni par cela seul qu'il pourrait être, dans un but militaire, utile à un ennemi ou utilisé par lui, ou qu'il est destiné à son usage.

§ 3. An object cannot be classified as contraband solely based on the intention to use it to assist or benefit an enemy, nor simply because it could be useful to an enemy for military purposes, or that it is intended for their use.

§ 4. Sont et demeurent abolies les prétendues contrebandes désignées sous les noms soit de contrebande relative, concernant des articles (usus ancipitis) susceptibles d'être utilisés par un belligérant dans un but militaire, mais dont l'usage est essentiellement pacifique, soit de contrebande accidentelle, quand lesdits articles ne servent spécialement aux buts militaires que dans une circonstance particulière.

§ 4. The so-called contraband designated as either relative contraband, regarding items that can be used by a belligerent for military purposes but are primarily for peaceful use, or as incidental contraband, when those items are only used for military purposes in specific circumstances, are abolished and will remain abolished.

§ 5. Néanmoins le belligérant a, à son choix et à charge d'une équitable indemnité, le droit de séquestre ou de préemption quant aux objets qui, en chemin vers un port de son adversaire, peuvent également servir à l'usage de la guerre et à des usages pacifiques.

§ 5. However, the belligerent has the right, at their discretion and with the obligation to provide fair compensation, to seize or preempt objects that, while heading to a port of their opponent, may also be used for war and peaceful purposes.


§ 9. En cas de saisies ou répressions non justifiées pour cause de contrebande ou de transport, l'État du capteur sera tenu aux dommages-intérêts et à la restitution des objets.

§ 9. In cases of unjustified seizures or penalties due to smuggling or transportation, the state of the seizing party will be liable for damages and the return of the objects.

§ 10. Un transport parti avant la déclaration de la guerre et sans connaissance obligée de son imminence n'est pas punissable.

§ 10. A shipment that left before the declaration of war and without necessary knowledge of its imminence is not punishable.

Penalty according to the Declaration of London for Carriage of Contraband.

Penalty according to the Declaration of London for the Transportation of Contraband.

§ 406. The Declaration of London offers by articles 39 to 44 a settlement of the controversy respecting the penalty for carriage of contraband which represents a fair compromise.

§ 406. The Declaration of London provides a resolution for the dispute regarding the penalty for carrying contraband in Articles 39 to 44, which serves as a reasonable compromise.

The chief rule is (article 39) that contraband goods, whether absolute or conditional contraband, may be confiscated. The carrying vessel may (article 40) likewise be confiscated if the contraband reckoned either by value, weight, volume, or freight, forms more than half the cargo. If the latter be not the case, and if the carrying vessel be therefore released, she may (article 41) be condemned to pay the costs and expenses[Pg 512] incurred by the captor in respect of the proceedings in the national Prize Court and the custody of the ship and cargo during the proceedings. But whatever be the proportion between contraband and innocent goods on a vessel, innocent goods (article 42) which belong to the owner of the contraband and are on board the same carrying vessel, may be confiscated.

The main rule is (article 39) that illegal goods, whether completely or conditionally illegal, can be seized. The ship carrying these goods may (article 40) also be taken if the contraband, measured by value, weight, volume, or freight, makes up more than half of the cargo. If it doesn't meet that threshold and the ship is released, it may (article 41) still be ordered to pay the costs and expenses[Pg 512] incurred by the seizing party related to the case in the national Prize Court and for the care of the ship and cargo during the case. However, regardless of the ratio between illegal and legal goods on a ship, legal goods (article 42) that belong to the owner of the illegal goods and are on board the same ship can be confiscated.

If a vessel carrying contraband sails before the outbreak of war (article 43), or is unaware of a declaration of contraband which applies to her cargo, or has no opportunity of discharging her cargo after receiving such knowledge, the contraband may only be confiscated on payment of compensation, and the vessel herself and her innocent cargo may not be confiscated nor may the vessel be condemned to pay any costs and expenses incurred by the captor.[857] But there is a presumption which is not rebuttable with regard to the mens rea of the vessel. For according to the second paragraph of article 43 a vessel is considered to have knowledge of the outbreak of war or of a declaration of contraband if she leaves an enemy port after the outbreak of hostilities, or if she leaves a neutral port subsequent to the notification of the outbreak of hostilities or of the declaration of contraband to the Power to which such port belongs, provided such notification was made in sufficient time.

If a ship carrying illegal goods sets sail before the war starts (article 43), or is unaware of a declaration of contraband affecting its cargo, or doesn’t have a chance to unload after realizing this, the illegal goods can only be seized with compensation given, and the ship itself and its innocent cargo cannot be taken, nor can the ship be forced to cover any costs and expenses incurred by the captor.[857] However, there is an unchallengeable assumption regarding the mens rea of the ship. According to the second paragraph of article 43, a ship is deemed to be aware of the war starting or a contraband declaration if it departs from an enemy port after hostilities begin, or leaves a neutral port after being notified of the outbreak of hostilities or the contraband declaration to the authority to which that port belongs, as long as the notification was delivered in a timely manner.

[857] It is obvious that the vessel must be brought into a port and before a Prize Court if the captor desires to seize the contraband against compensation. The question as to whether article 44 applies to such a case, and whether, therefore, the neutral vessel may be allowed to continue her voyage if the master is willing to hand over the contraband to the captor, must be answered in the affirmative, provided that the contraband, reckoned either by value, weight, volume, or freight, forms less than half the cargo. For article 44 precisely treats of a case in which the vessel herself is not liable to condemnation on account of the proportion of the contraband on board (see article 40).

[857] It’s clear that the ship needs to be taken to a port and presented in front of a Prize Court if the captor wants to seize the contraband and receive compensation. The issue of whether article 44 applies to this situation, and if the neutral vessel can continue its journey if the captain is willing to surrender the contraband to the captor, can be answered with a yes, as long as the contraband, measured by value, weight, volume, or freight, makes up less than half of the cargo. This is because article 44 specifically addresses a scenario where the vessel itself cannot be condemned due to the proportion of the contraband on board (see article 40).

The question of pre-emption of conditional contraband is not mentioned by the Declaration of London. There is, however, nothing to prevent the several maritime[Pg 513] Powers from exercising pre-emption in mitigation of their right of confiscation; the future must show whether or no they will be inclined to do this.

The Declaration of London doesn't mention the issue of pre-emption for conditional contraband. However, there's nothing stopping the various maritime Powers from exercising pre-emption to lessen their right to confiscate. We'll have to wait and see if they choose to do this in the future.

Seizure of Contraband without Seizure of the Vessel.

Seizing Contraband without Taking the Vessel.

§ 406a. Hitherto the practice of the several States has differed—see above, § 405—with regard to the question as to whether a vessel which was not herself liable to condemnation might be allowed to proceed on her voyage on condition that she handed over the contraband carried by her to the captor. Great Britain and some other States answered it in the negative, but several States in the affirmative. The Declaration of London, although it upholds the general rule that, whatever may be the ultimate fate of the vessel, she must be taken into a port of a Prize Court, admits two exceptions to the rule:—

§ 406a. Until now, different states have had varying practices—see above, § 405—regarding whether a ship that isn’t itself subject to seizure can continue its voyage if it surrenders the contraband it’s carrying to the captor. Great Britain and some other states answered this question negatively, while several states responded positively. The Declaration of London, although it maintains the general principle that regardless of the ship's ultimate fate, it must be taken to a Prize Court port, acknowledges two exceptions to this rule:—

(1) According to article 44, a vessel which has been stopped for carrying contraband and which is not herself liable to be confiscated on account of the proportion of contraband on board, may—not must—when the circumstances permit it, be allowed to continue her voyage in case she hands over the contraband cargo to the captor. In such a case the captor is at liberty to destroy the contraband handed over to him. But the matter must in any case be brought before a Prize Court. The captor must therefore enter the delivery of the contraband on the log-book of the vessel so stopped, and the master of the latter must give duly certified copies of all relevant papers to the captor.

(1) According to article 44, a ship that has been stopped for carrying illegal goods and is not subject to confiscation due to the amount of contraband on board may—not must—be allowed to continue its journey if the circumstances allow, provided it hands over the contraband cargo to the captor. In this case, the captor is free to destroy the contraband that has been handed over. However, the situation must still be presented to a Prize Court. Therefore, the captor must record the delivery of the contraband in the logbook of the stopped vessel, and the captain of that vessel must provide properly certified copies of all relevant documents to the captor.

(2) According to article 54, the captor may—see below, § 431—exceptionally, in case of necessity, demand the handing over, or may proceed himself to the destruction, of any absolute or conditional contraband goods found on a vessel which is not herself liable to condemnation, if the taking of the vessel into the port of a Prize Court would involve danger to the safety of the capturing cruiser or to the success of the operations in[Pg 514] which she is engaged at the time. But the captor must, nevertheless, bring the case before a Prize Court. He must, therefore, enter the captured goods on the log-book of the stopped vessel, and must obtain duly certified copies of all relevant papers. If the captor cannot establish the fact before the Prize Court that he was really compelled to abandon the intention of bringing in the carrying vessel, he must be condemned (see article 51) to pay the value of the goods to their owners if the goods were contraband or if they were not. And the same is valid in case (article 52) the seizure or destruction of the goods is held by the Prize Court to have been justifiable, but not the capture itself of the carrying vessel.

(2) According to article 54, the captor may—see below, § 431—in exceptional circumstances, if necessary, demand the surrender or may personally destroy any absolute or conditional contraband goods found on a vessel that is not subject to condemnation. This is allowed if taking the vessel to the port of a Prize Court would put the safety of the capturing cruiser or the success of the operations she is involved in at risk. However, the captor must still present the case to a Prize Court. Therefore, he must record the captured goods in the logbook of the stopped vessel and obtain properly certified copies of all relevant documents. If the captor cannot prove to the Prize Court that he was truly forced to give up on bringing in the carrying vessel, he must be required (see article 51) to compensate the owners for the value of the goods, regardless of whether they were contraband or not. The same applies in case (article 52) the seizure or destruction of the goods is deemed justifiable by the Prize Court, even if the capture of the carrying vessel itself is not justified.

CHAPTER 5 UNBIASED SERVICE

I THE VARIOUS TYPES OF UNNEUTRAL SERVICE

Hall, §§ 248-253—Lawrence, §§ 260-262—Westlake, II. pp. 261-265—Phillimore, III. §§ 271-274—Halleck, II. pp. 289-301—Taylor, §§ 667-673—Walker, § 72—Wharton, III. § 374—Wheaton, §§ 502-504 and Dana's note No. 228—Moore, VII. §§ 1264-1265—Bluntschli, §§ 815-818—Heffter, § 161A—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 731-738—Ullmann, § 192—Bonfils, Nos. 1584-1588—Despagnet, Nos. 716-716 bis—Rivier, II. pp. 388-391—Nys, III. pp. 675-681—Calvo, V. §§ 2796-2820—Fiore, III. Nos. 1602-1605, and Code, Nos. 1836-1840—Martens, II. § 136—Kleen, I. §§ 103-106—Boeck, Nos. 660-669—Pillet, p. 330—Gessner, pp. 99-111—Perels, § 47—Testa, p. 212—Dupuis, Nos. 231-238, and Guerre, Nos. 172-188—Bernsten, § 9—Nippold, II. § 35—Holland, Prize Law, §§ 88-105—U.S. Naval War Code, articles 16 and 20—Hautefeuille, II. pp. 173-188—Ortolan, II. pp. 209-213—Mountague Bernard, Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War (1870), pp. 187-205—Marquardsen, Der Trent-Fall (1862), pp. 58-71—Hirsch, Kriegskonterbande und verbotene Transporte in Kriegszeiten (1897), pp. 42-55—Takahashi, International Law during the Chino-Japanese War (1899), pp. 52-72—Vetzel, De la contrebande par analogie en droit maritime internationale (1901)—Atherley-Jones, Commerce in War (1906), pp. 304-315—Hirschmann, Das internationale Prisenrecht (1912), §§ 31-32—See also the monographs quoted above at the commencement of § 391, and the General Report presented to the Naval Conference of London on behalf of the Drafting Committee, articles 45-47.

Hall, §§ 248-253—Lawrence, §§ 260-262—Westlake, II. pp. 261-265—Phillimore, III. §§ 271-274—Halleck, II. pp. 289-301—Taylor, §§ 667-673—Walker, § 72—Wharton, III. § 374—Wheaton, §§ 502-504 and Dana's note No. 228—Moore, VII. §§ 1264-1265—Bluntschli, §§ 815-818—Heffter, § 161A—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 731-738—Ullmann, § 192—Bonfils, Nos. 1584-1588—Despagnet, Nos. 716-716 bis—Rivier, II. pp. 388-391—Nys, III. pp. 675-681—Calvo, V. §§ 2796-2820—Fiore, III. Nos. 1602-1605, and Code, Nos. 1836-1840—Martens, II. § 136—Kleen, I. §§ 103-106—Boeck, Nos. 660-669—Pillet, p. 330—Gessner, pp. 99-111—Perels, § 47—Testa, p. 212—Dupuis, Nos. 231-238, and Guerre, Nos. 172-188—Bernsten, § 9—Nippold, II. § 35—Holland, Prize Law, §§ 88-105—U.S. Naval War Code, articles 16 and 20—Hautefeuille, II. pp. 173-188—Ortolan, II. pp. 209-213—Mountague Bernard, Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War (1870), pp. 187-205—Marquardsen, Der Trent-Fall (1862), pp. 58-71—Hirsch, Kriegskonterbande und verbotene Transporte in Kriegszeiten (1897), pp. 42-55—Takahashi, International Law during the Chino-Japanese War (1899), pp. 52-72—Vetzel, De la controversande par analogie en droit maritime internationale (1901)—Atherley-Jones, Commerce in War (1906), pp. 304-315—Hirschmann, Das internationale Prisenrecht (1912), §§ 31-32—See also the monographs quoted above at the beginning of § 391, and the General Report presented to the Naval Conference of London on behalf of the Drafting Committee, articles 45-47.

Unneutral service in general.

Unbiased service in general.

§ 407. Before the Declaration of London the term unneutral service was used by several writers with reference to the carriage of certain persons and despatches for the enemy on the part of neutral vessels. The term has been introduced in order to distinguish the carriage of persons and despatches for the enemy from the carriage of contraband, as these were often confounded with each other. Since contraband consists[Pg 516] of certain goods only and never of persons or despatches, a vessel carrying persons and despatches for the enemy is not thereby actually carrying contraband.[858] And there is another important difference between the two. Carriage of contraband need not necessarily, and in most cases actually does not, take place in the direct service of the enemy. On the other hand, carriage of persons and despatches for the enemy always takes place in the direct service of the enemy, and, consequently, represents a much more intensive assistance of, and a much more intimate connection with, the enemy than carriage of contraband. For these reasons a distinct treatment of carriage of contraband, on the one hand, and carriage of persons and despatches, on the other, was certainly considered desirable by many publicists. Those writers who did not adopt the term unneutral service, on account of its somewhat misleading character, preferred[859] the expression analogous of contraband, because in practice maritime transport for the enemy was always treated in analogy with, although not as, carriage of contraband.

§ 407. Before the Declaration of London, the term unneutral service was used by various writers to describe neutral vessels transporting certain individuals and messages for the enemy. This term was created to differentiate the transportation of individuals and messages for the enemy from the transportation of contraband, as these two concepts were often confused. Since contraband only includes specific goods and never involves people or messages, a vessel transporting individuals and messages for the enemy is not technically carrying contraband.[858] Additionally, there is another significant distinction between the two. Transporting contraband does not necessarily occur as part of the enemy's direct service, and in most cases, it actually does not. Conversely, transporting individuals and messages for the enemy always happens in direct service to the enemy, which implies a much greater level of assistance and a closer connection with the enemy than transporting contraband. For these reasons, many publicists believed it was important to treat the transportation of contraband separately from the transportation of individuals and messages. Those writers who chose not to use the term unneutral service due to its somewhat misleading nature preferred the term analogous of contraband, because in practice, maritime transport for the enemy was always viewed similarly to, though not as, the transportation of contraband.

[858] This was recognised in the case of the Yangtsze Insurance Association v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance Company, L.R. (1908), 1 K.B. 910 and 2 K.B. 504.

[858] This was acknowledged in the case of the Yangtsze Insurance Association v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance Company, L.R. (1908), 1 K.B. 910 and 2 K.B. 504.

[859] It was also preferred in the first edition of this work. But it was necessary to abandon further resistance on account of the fact that after the official adoption, in the translation of the Declaration of London, of the term unneutral service it was useless to oppose it.

[859] It was also favored in the first edition of this work. However, it became essential to give up any further opposition because, after the official acceptance of the term unneutral service in the translation of the Declaration of London, it was pointless to resist it.

The Declaration of London puts the whole matter upon a new and very much enlarged basis, for Chapter III. treats in articles 45 to 47, under the heading De l'assistance hostile—the official English translation of which is unneutral service—not only of the carriage of persons for the enemy on the part of a neutral vessel, but also of the transmission of intelligence in the interest of the enemy, the taking of a direct part in the hostilities, and a number of other acts on the part of a neutral vessel. Accordingly the Declaration of London[Pg 517] makes a distinction between two kinds of unneutral service, meting out for the one a treatment analogous in a general way to contraband, and for the other a treatment analogous to that of enemy merchant vessels. Carriage of individual members of the armed forces of the enemy and a certain case of transmission of intelligence in the interest of the enemy constitute the first kind, and four groups of acts creating enemy character for the vessel concerned constitute the second kind.[860]

The Declaration of London establishes a completely new and expanded framework because Chapter III discusses in articles 45 to 47, under the heading De l'assistance hostile—which translates to unneutral service—not only the transportation of enemy personnel by a neutral vessel but also the sharing of information that benefits the enemy, actively participating in hostilities, and various other actions by a neutral vessel. As a result, the Declaration of London[Pg 517] distinguishes between two types of unneutral service, treating one similarly to contraband and the other as if it were enemy merchant ships. Transporting individual enemy armed forces and certain types of information exchange that assist the enemy fall under the first type, while four categories of actions that give the vessel an enemy status belong to the second type.[860]

[860] Although—see above, §§ 173 and 174—prevention of unneutral service to the enemy is a means of sea warfare, it chiefly concerns neutral commerce, and is, therefore, more conveniently treated with neutrality.

[860] Although—see above, §§ 173 and 174—preventing unneutral service to the enemy is a method of naval warfare, it mainly affects neutral trade, so it's more effectively addressed within the context of neutrality.

Carriage of Persons for the Enemy.

Transporting Enemies.

§ 408. Either belligerent may punish neutral vessels for carrying, in the service of the enemy, certain persons.

§ 408. Either side in conflict may penalize neutral ships for transporting certain individuals on behalf of the enemy.

Such persons included, according to the customary rules of International Law hitherto prevailing, not only members of the armed forces of the enemy, but also individuals who were not yet members of the armed forces but who would have become so as soon as they reached their place of destination, and, thirdly, non-military individuals in the service of the enemy either in such a prominent position that they could be made prisoners of war, or who were going abroad as agents for the purpose of fostering the cause of the enemy. Thus, for instance, if the head of the enemy State or one of his cabinet ministers fled the country to avoid captivity, the neutral vessel that carried him could have been punished, as could also the vessel carrying an agent of the enemy sent abroad to negotiate a loan and the like. However, the mere fact that enemy persons were on board a neutral vessel did not in itself prove that these persons were carried by the vessel for the enemy and in his service. This was the case only when either the vessel knew of the character of the persons and nevertheless carried them, thereby acting in the service of the enemy, or when the vessel[Pg 518] was directly hired by the enemy for the purpose of transport of the individuals concerned. Thus, for instance, if able-bodied men booked their passages on a neutral vessel to an enemy port with the secret intention of enlisting in the forces of the enemy, the vessel could not be considered as carrying persons for the enemy; but she could be so considered if an agent of the enemy openly booked their passages. Thus, further, if the fugitive head of the enemy State booked his passage under a false name, and concealed his identity from the vessel, she could not be considered as carrying a person for the enemy; but she could be so considered if she knew whom she was carrying, because she was then aware that she was acting in the service of the enemy. As regards a vessel directly hired by the enemy, there could be no doubt that she was acting in the service of the enemy. Thus the American vessel Orozembo[861] was in 1807, during war between England and the Netherlands, captured and condemned, because, although chartered by a merchant in Lisbon ostensibly to sail in ballast to Macao and to take from there a cargo to America, she received by order of the charterer three Dutch officers and two Dutch civil servants, and sailed, not to Macao, but to Batavia. And the American vessel Friendship[862] was likewise in 1807, during war between England and France, captured and condemned, because she was hired by the French Government to carry ninety shipwrecked officers and sailors home to a French port.

People included, according to the prevailing rules of International Law at the time, were not only members of the enemy's armed forces, but also individuals who weren't part of the armed forces yet but would have joined as soon as they reached their destination. Additionally, there were non-military individuals working for the enemy in such a significant role that they could be taken as prisoners of war or who were sent abroad as agents to promote the enemy's interests. For example, if the leader of the enemy State or one of their cabinet ministers fled the country to avoid capture, the neutral vessel that transported them could be punished, just like the vessel carrying an enemy agent sent to negotiate a loan, and so on. However, the simple fact that enemy individuals were on board a neutral vessel did not automatically mean they were being transported for the enemy's benefit. This was only the case if the vessel was aware of who the individuals were and still decided to carry them, thereby acting in the enemy's service, or if the vessel was directly rented by the enemy for transporting those individuals. For instance, if able-bodied men bought tickets on a neutral ship to an enemy port with the secret intent to join the enemy's forces, the vessel couldn't be seen as carrying individuals for the enemy; but it could be viewed that way if an enemy agent openly arranged their bookings. Furthermore, if the fleeing leader of the enemy State booked travel under a false name and hid their identity from the vessel, it couldn’t be considered as carrying a person for the enemy; but it could be if the vessel was aware of who they were carrying, since then it would know it was assisting the enemy. In the case of a vessel directly hired by the enemy, there was no doubt it was operating in the enemy's service. For instance, the American vessel Orozembo[861] was captured and condemned in 1807 during the war between England and the Netherlands because, although it was chartered by a merchant in Lisbon to supposedly sail empty to Macao and return with a cargo to America, it took three Dutch officers and two Dutch civil servants at the charterer's order and sailed not to Macao, but to Batavia. Similarly, the American vessel Friendship[862] was also captured and condemned in 1807 during the war between England and France because it was hired by the French Government to take ninety shipwrecked officers and sailors home to a French port.

[861] 6 C. Rob. 430.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 6 C. Rob. 430.

[862] 6 C. Rob. 420.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 6 C. Rob. 420.

According to British practice hitherto prevailing, a neutral vessel was considered as carrying persons in the service of the enemy even if she were, through the application of force, constrained by the enemy to carry the persons, or if she were in bona-fide ignorance of the status of her passengers. Thus, in 1802, during war[Pg 519] between Great Britain and France, the Swedish vessel Carolina[863] was condemned by Sir William Scott for having carried French troops from Egypt to Italy, although the master endeavoured to prove that the vessel was obliged by force to render the transport service. And the above-mentioned vessel Orozembo was condemned[864] by Sir William Scott, although her master was ignorant of the service for the enemy on which he was engaged: "... In cases of bona-fide ignorance there may be no actual delinquency; but if the service is injurious, that will be sufficient to give the belligerent a right to prevent the thing from being done or at least repeated," said Sir William Scott.[865]

According to the British practice that has been followed so far, a neutral ship was viewed as carrying individuals in the service of the enemy, even if it was forced to carry those individuals by the enemy, or if it was genuinely unaware of the status of its passengers. For example, in 1802, during the war between Great Britain and France, the Swedish ship Carolina[863] was condemned by Sir William Scott for transporting French troops from Egypt to Italy, even though the captain tried to show that the ship was forced to provide this transport service. Likewise, the previously mentioned ship Orozembo[864] was condemned by Sir William Scott, despite the captain's ignorance of the fact that he was assisting the enemy: "... In cases of bona-fide ignorance there may be no actual wrongdoing; but if the service is harmful, that will be enough to give the belligerent the right to stop the action from taking place or at least to prevent it from happening again," stated Sir William Scott.[865]

[863] 4 C. Rob. 256.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 4 C. Rob. 256.

[864] See Phillimore, III. § 274, and Holland, Prize Law, §§ 90-91. Hall, § 249, p. 700, note 2, reprobates the British practice. During the Russo-Japanese War only one case of condemnation of a neutral vessel for carrying persons for the enemy is recorded, that of the Nigretia, a vessel which endeavoured to carry into Vladivostock the escaped captain and lieutenant of the Russian destroyer Ratzoporni; see Takahashi, pp. 639-641.

[864] See Phillimore, III. § 274, and Holland, Prize Law, §§ 90-91. Hall, § 249, p. 700, note 2, criticizes the British practice. During the Russo-Japanese War, only one instance of a neutral vessel being condemned for transporting personnel for the enemy is recorded, that of the Nigretia, a ship that attempted to bring into Vladivostok the escaped captain and lieutenant of the Russian destroyer Ratzoporni; see Takahashi, pp. 639-641.

[865] It should be mentioned that, according to the customary law hitherto prevailing, the case of diplomatic agents sent by the enemy to neutral States was an exception to the rule that neutral vessels may be punished for carrying agents sent by the enemy. The importance of this exception became apparent in the case of the Trent which occurred during the American War. On November 8, 1861, the Federal cruiser San Jacinto stopped the British mail steamer Trent on her voyage from Havana to the British port of Nassau, in the Bahamas, forcibly took off Messrs. Mason and Slidell, together with their secretaries, political agents sent by the Confederate States to Great Britain and France, and then let the vessel continue her voyage. Great Britain demanded their immediate release, and the United States at once granted this, although the ground on which release was granted was not identical with the ground on which release was demanded. The Government of the United States maintained that the removal of these men from the vessel without bringing her before a Prize Court for trial was irregular, and, therefore, not justified, whereas release was demanded on the ground that a neutral vessel could not be prevented from carrying diplomatic agents sent by the enemy to neutrals. Now diplomatic agents in the proper sense of the term these gentlemen were not, because although they were sent by the Confederate States, the latter were not recognised as such, but only as a belligerent Power. Yet these gentlemen were political agents of a quasi-diplomatic character, and the standpoint of Great Britain was for this reason perhaps correct. The fact that the Governments of France, Austria, and Prussia protested through their diplomatic envoys in Washington shows at least that neutral vessels may carry unhindered diplomatic agents sent by the enemy to neutrals, however doubtful it may be whether the same is valid regarding agents with a quasi-diplomatic character. See Parliamentary Papers, 1862, North America, N. 5; Marquardsen, Der Trent Fall (1862); Wharton, § 374; Moore, VII. § 1265; Phillimore, II. §§ 130-130A; Mountague Bernard, Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War (1870), pp. 187-205; Harris, The Trent Affair (1896).[Pg 520]

[865] It's important to note that, under the customary law that was in place at the time, the situation involving diplomatic agents sent by enemy states to neutral countries was an exception to the rule that neutral vessels could be penalized for carrying such agents. The significance of this exception became clear in the case of the Trent, which occurred during the American Civil War. On November 8, 1861, the Federal cruiser San Jacinto stopped the British mail steamer Trent on her journey from Havana to Nassau, in the Bahamas, and forcibly removed Messrs. Mason and Slidell, along with their secretaries. These individuals were political agents sent by the Confederate States to Great Britain and France, and then the vessel was allowed to continue its voyage. Great Britain demanded their immediate release, and the United States complied quickly, though the reasoning behind the release was not the same as the grounds on which it was requested. The United States Government argued that taking these men off the ship without bringing it before a Prize Court for trial was irregular and therefore unjustifiable, whereas the release was requested on the basis that a neutral vessel shouldn't be stopped from carrying diplomatic agents sent by an enemy. Technically, these gentlemen were not legitimate diplomatic agents since, while sent by the Confederate States, the latter weren't recognized as such, just as a belligerent Power. Still, these individuals acted as political agents of a quasi-diplomatic nature, and Britain's perspective may have had merit for this reason. The fact that the governments of France, Austria, and Prussia protested through their diplomatic representatives in Washington indicates that neutral vessels should be able to carry unhindered diplomatic agents sent by an enemy, although it's unclear if this also applies to agents with a quasi-diplomatic status. See Parliamentary Papers, 1862, North America, N. 5; Marquardsen, Der Trent Fall (1862); Wharton, § 374; Moore, VII. § 1265; Phillimore, II. §§ 130-130A; Mountague Bernard, Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War (1870), pp. 187-205; Harris, The Trent Affair (1896).[Pg 520]

According to the Declaration of London neutral merchantmen may, apart from the case of the carriage of persons who in the course of the voyage directly assist the operations of the enemy, only be considered to render unneutral service by carrying such enemy persons as are actually already members of the armed forces of the enemy. Article 45 makes it quite apparent, through using the words "embodied in the armed forces," that reservists and the like who are on their way to the enemy country for the purpose of there joining the armed forces, do not belong to such enemy persons as a neutral vessel may not carry without exposing herself to punishment for rendering unneutral service to the enemy. And four different cases of carrying enemy persons must be distinguished according to the Declaration of London, namely: that of a neutral vessel exclusively engaged in the transport of enemy troops; that of a vessel transporting a military detachment of the enemy; that of a vessel transporting one or more persons who in the course of the voyage directly assist the operations of the enemy; that of a vessel transporting, on a voyage specially undertaken, individual members of the armed forces of the enemy.

According to the Declaration of London, neutral merchant ships can only be considered to be providing unneutral service by carrying enemy personnel who are already members of the enemy's armed forces, except in cases where they are transporting individuals who directly assist the enemy's operations during the voyage. Article 45 clearly states, using the term "embodied in the armed forces," that reservists and similar individuals traveling to the enemy country to join the armed forces do not fall under the category of enemy persons that a neutral vessel is prohibited from carrying without risking punishment for unneutral service. The Declaration of London distinguishes four different scenarios involving the transport of enemy personnel: a neutral vessel exclusively transporting enemy troops; a vessel transporting a military unit of the enemy; a vessel transporting one or more individuals who directly assist the enemy's operations during the voyage; and a vessel making a special trip to transport specific members of the enemy's armed forces.

(1) According to article 46, No. 4, a neutral vessel exclusively intended at the time for the transport of enemy troops acquires thereby enemy character. This case will be considered with others of the same kind below in § 410.

(1) According to article 46, No. 4, a neutral ship that is specifically meant for transporting enemy soldiers takes on enemy status. This situation will be analyzed along with other similar cases below in § 410.

(2) In case a vessel, although she is not exclusively therefor destined, and although she is not on a voyage specially undertaken for that purpose, transports, to the knowledge of either the owner or the charterer or the master, a military detachment of the enemy, she is, according to article 45, No. 2, considered to render unneutral service for which she may be punished. Accordingly, if to the knowledge of either the owner[Pg 521] or the charterer or the master, a neutral vessel in the ordinary course of her voyage carries a military detachment of the enemy, she is liable to be seized for unneutral service.

(2) If a ship, even though not specifically meant for that purpose and not on a journey explicitly undertaken for it, carries a military group of the enemy, and either the owner, charterer, or captain knows about it, she is, according to article 45, No. 2, deemed to be providing unneutral service and may face punishment. Therefore, if a neutral vessel, in the ordinary course of her journey, transports a military group of the enemy, and either the owner, charterer, or captain is aware of it, she can be seized for unneutral service.

(3) In case a neutral vessel, to the knowledge of either the owner or the charterer or the master, carries one or more persons—subjects of one of the belligerents or of a neutral Power—who in the course of the voyage directly assist the operations of the enemy in any way, for instance by signalling or sending message by wireless telegraphy, she is, according to article 45, No. 2, likewise liable to seizure for rendering unneutral service.

(3) If a neutral vessel, known to the owner, charterer, or captain, carries one or more individuals—subjects of one of the warring parties or a neutral nation—who directly help the enemy during the voyage in any way, such as by signaling or sending messages via wireless telegraphy, it is, under article 45, No. 2, also subject to seizure for providing unneutral service.

(4) In case a neutral vessel carries individual members of the armed forces of the enemy, she is, according to article 45, No. 1, then only liable to seizure if she is on a voyage specially undertaken for such transport, that means, if she has been turned from her ordinary course and has touched at a port outside her ordinary course for the purpose of embarking, or is going to touch at a port outside her ordinary course for the purpose of disembarking, the enemy persons concerned. A liner, therefore, carrying individual members of the armed forces of the enemy in the ordinary course of her voyage may not be considered to be rendering unneutral service and may not be seized. However, according to article 47, a neutral vessel carrying members of the armed forces of the enemy while pursuing her ordinary course, may be stopped for the purpose of taking off such enemy persons and making them prisoners of war (see below, § 413).

(4) If a neutral ship is carrying individual members of the enemy's armed forces, according to article 45, No. 1, it can only be seized if it is on a journey specifically made for that purpose. This means that if the ship has diverted from its usual route and has stopped at a port outside its normal course to pick up those individuals, or is heading to a port outside its normal route to drop them off, it can be taken. Therefore, a liner that is transporting individual enemy soldiers as part of its regular journey cannot be seen as providing unneutral service and cannot be seized. However, according to article 47, a neutral ship carrying enemy armed forces while following its regular route may be stopped to remove those enemy individuals and take them as prisoners of war (see below, § 413).

Transmission of Intelligence to the Enemy.

Transmission of Intelligence to the Enemy.

§ 409. Either belligerent may punish neutral merchantmen for transmission of intelligence to the enemy.

§ 409. Either side in the conflict can punish neutral merchants for giving information to the enemy.

According to customary rules hitherto in force, either belligerent might punish neutral vessels for the carriage of political despatches from or to the enemy, and especially for such despatches as were in relation to[Pg 522] the war. But to this rule there were two exceptions. Firstly, on the ground that neutrals have a right to demand that their intercourse with either belligerent be not suppressed: a neutral vessel might not, therefore, be punished for carrying despatches from the enemy to neutral Governments, and vice versa,[866] and, further, despatches from the enemy Government to its diplomatic agents and consuls abroad in neutral States, and vice versa.[867] Secondly, on account of article 1 of Convention XI., by which postal correspondence is inviolable, except in the case of violation of blockade, the correspondence destined for, or proceeding from, the blockaded port. However, the mere fact that a neutral vessel had political despatches to or from the enemy on board did not by itself prove that she was carrying them for and in the service of the enemy. Just as in the case of certain enemy persons on board, so in the case of despatches, the vessel was only considered to be carrying them in the service of the enemy if either she knew of their character and had nevertheless taken them on board, or if she was directly hired for the purpose of carrying them. Thus, the American vessel Rapid,[868] which was captured in 1810 during the war between Great Britain and the Netherlands, on her voyage from New York to Tonningen, for having on board a despatch for a Cabinet Minister of the Netherlands hidden under a cover addressed to a merchant at Tonningen, was released by the Prize Court. On the other hand, the Atalanta,[869] which carried despatches in a tea chest hidden in the trunk of a supercargo, was condemned.[870]

According to the customary rules that were in place until now, either side in a conflict could penalize neutral ships for carrying political messages to or from the enemy, especially those related to the war. However, there were two exceptions to this rule. First, neutrals have the right to ensure that their interactions with either side are not hindered: therefore, a neutral ship could not be punished for carrying messages from the enemy to neutral governments, and vice versa, as well as messages from the enemy government to its diplomatic agents and consuls in neutral countries, and vice versa. Second, based on Article 1 of Convention XI., which states that postal correspondence is protected unless there is a blockade violation involving correspondence to or from a blockaded port. However, simply having political messages going to or from the enemy on board a neutral vessel did not automatically imply that the ship was transporting them for the enemy's benefit. Similar to certain enemy individuals being on board, concerning messages, a vessel was only seen as carrying them for the enemy if it either knew what they contained and decided to take them on anyway, or if it was specifically hired for that purpose. For example, the American ship Rapid, which was seized in 1810 during the war between Great Britain and the Netherlands while traveling from New York to Tonningen with a message for a Cabinet Minister of the Netherlands concealed under an address to a merchant in Tonningen, was released by the Prize Court. In contrast, the Atalanta, which carried messages hidden in a tea chest in the trunk of a supercargo, was condemned.

[866] The Caroline (1808), 6 C. Rob. 461.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Caroline (1808), 6 C. Rob. 461.

[867] The Madison (1810), Edwards, 224.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The *Madison* (1810), Edwards, 224.

[868] Edwards, 228.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Edwards, 228.

[869] 6 C. Rob. 440.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 6 C. Rob. 440.

[870] British practice seems unsettled on the question as to whether the vessel must know of the character of the despatch which she is carrying. In spite of the case of the Rapid, quoted above, Holland, Prize Law, § 100, maintains that ignorance of the master of the vessel is no excuse, and Phillimore, III. § 272, seems to be of the same opinion.

[870] British practice appears unclear about whether the vessel needs to be aware of the nature of the cargo it is transporting. Despite the case of the Rapid mentioned earlier, Holland, Prize Law, § 100, argues that the master's ignorance is not a valid excuse, and Phillimore, III. § 272, seems to share this view.

According to the Declaration of London the carriage[Pg 523] of despatches for the enemy may only be punished in case it falls under the category of transmitting intelligence to the enemy on the part of a neutral vessel. Two kinds of such transmission of intelligence must be distinguished:—

According to the Declaration of London, transporting[Pg 523] messages for the enemy can only be penalized if it qualifies as neutral vessels sharing information with the enemy. There are two types of such information transmission that need to be differentiated:—

Firstly, according to article 46, No. 4, a neutral vessel exclusively intended for the transmission of intelligence to the enemy acquires thereby enemy character; this will be considered with other cases of the same kind below in § 410.

Firstly, according to article 46, No. 4, a neutral vessel specifically meant for sending intelligence to the enemy is considered to have enemy status; this will be addressed along with other similar cases below in § 410.

Secondly, according to article 45, No. 1, a neutral vessel may be seized for transmitting intelligence to the enemy if she is on a voyage specially undertaken for such transmission, that is to say, if she has been turned from her ordinary course and has touched or is going to touch at a port outside her ordinary course for the purpose of transmitting intelligence to the enemy. A liner, therefore, transmitting intelligence to the enemy in the ordinary course of her voyage may not be considered to be rendering unneutral service and may not be punished. However, self-preservation would in a case of necessity justify a belligerent in temporarily detaining such a liner for the purpose of preventing the intelligence from reaching the enemy.[871]

Secondly, according to article 45, No. 1, a neutral ship can be seized for sending information to the enemy if it is on a journey specifically made for that purpose. This means if it has changed its regular route and has stopped or is going to stop at a port outside its usual path to send information to the enemy. Therefore, a liner that sends information to the enemy during its regular voyage cannot be deemed to be providing unneutral service and cannot be punished. However, self-preservation would allow a belligerent to temporarily detain such a liner if necessary to prevent the information from reaching the enemy.[871]

[871] See below, § 413.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See below, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

The conception "transmission of intelligence" is not defined by the Declaration of London. It certainly means not only oral transmission of intelligence, but also the transmission of despatches containing intelligence. The transmission of any political intelligence of value to the enemy, whether or no the intelligence is in relation to the war, must be considered unneutral service, the case excepted in which intelligence is transmitted from the enemy to neutral Governments, and vice versa, and, further, from the enemy Government to its diplomatic agents and consuls abroad in neutral[Pg 524] States. And it must be emphasised that, although a vessel may be seized and punished for unneutral service, according to article 1 of Convention XI. of the Second Hague Peace Conference the postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, whatever its character, found on board is inviolable.

The term "transmission of intelligence" isn't defined in the Declaration of London. It clearly refers not just to sharing information verbally but also to sending messages that contain intelligence. The transmission of any political intelligence that could benefit the enemy, whether or not it's related to the war, should be viewed as unneutral service, except in cases where intelligence is sent from the enemy to neutral governments and vice versa, as well as from the enemy government to its diplomatic agents and consuls abroad in neutral States. Moreover, it's important to note that while a vessel can be seized and penalized for unneutral service, according to Article 1 of Convention XI of the Second Hague Peace Conference, the postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, regardless of its nature, found on board is protected.

Unneutral Service creating Enemy Character.

Unbiased Service creating Opponent Character.

§ 410. In contradistinction to cases of unneutral service which are similar to carriage of contraband, the Declaration of London enumerates in article 46 four cases of such kinds of unneutral service as vest neutral vessels with enemy character.[872]

§ 410. In contrast to cases of unneutral service similar to the transport of contraband, the Declaration of London lists four types of unneutral service in article 46 that give neutral vessels an enemy status.[872]

(1) There is, firstly, the case of a neutral merchantman taking a direct part in the hostilities. This may occur in several ways, but such vessel in every case loses her neutral and acquires enemy character, just as a subject of a neutral Power who enlists in the ranks of the enemy armed forces. But a distinction must be made between taking a direct part in the hostilities, for instance rendering assistance to the enemy fleet during battle, on the one hand, and, on the other, acts of a piratical character. If a neutral merchantman—see above, §§ 85, 181, and 254—without Letters of Marque during war and from hatred of one of the belligerents, were to attack and sink merchantmen of such belligerent, she would have to be considered, and could therefore be treated as, a pirate.

(1) First, there’s the situation of a neutral merchant ship directly getting involved in the conflict. This can happen in various ways, but in every instance, that vessel loses its neutral status and takes on an enemy identity, just like a citizen of a neutral country who joins the enemy's armed forces. However, it’s important to differentiate between directly participating in the hostilities, like assisting the enemy fleet during a battle, and acts that are deemed piratical. If a neutral merchant ship—see above, §§ 85, 181, and 254—attacks and sinks merchant ships of one of the warring parties out of hostility and without Letters of Marque during wartime, it would be regarded as a pirate and could be treated accordingly.

(2) There is, secondly, the case of a neutral vessel which sails under the orders or the control of an agent placed on board by the enemy Government. The presence of such agent, and the fact that the vessel sails under his orders or control shows clearly that she is really for all practical purposes part and parcel of the enemy forces.

(2) Secondly, there's the situation of a neutral ship that operates under the orders or control of an agent assigned by the enemy government. The presence of this agent and the fact that the ship follows his orders or control clearly indicate that it is, for all practical purposes, an integral part of the enemy forces.

(3) There is, thirdly, the case of a neutral vessel in the exclusive employment of the enemy. This may[Pg 525] occur in two different ways: either the vessel may be rendering a specific service in the exclusive employment of the enemy, as, for instance, did those German merchantmen during the Russo-Japanese War which acted as colliers for the Russian fleet en route for the Far East; or the vessel may be chartered by the enemy so that she is entirely at his disposal for any purpose he may choose, whether such purpose is or is not connected with the war.[873]

(3) Third, there's the situation of a neutral ship being exclusively used by the enemy. This can happen in two ways: either the ship is providing a specific service solely for the enemy, like those German merchant ships during the Russo-Japanese War that supplied coal to the Russian fleet on its way to the Far East; or the ship is chartered by the enemy, making it completely available for any purpose they choose, whether that purpose is related to the war or not.[873]

(4) There is, fourthly and lastly, the case of a neutral merchantman exclusively intended at the time either for the transport of enemy troops or for the transmission of intelligence for the enemy. This case is different from the case—provided for by article 45, No. 1—of a vessel on a voyage specially undertaken with a view to the carriage of individual members of the armed forces of the enemy. Whereas the latter is a case of unneutral service rendered by a vessel which turns from her course for the purpose of rendering specific service, the former is a case in which the vessel is exclusively and for the time being permanently intended and devoted to the rendering of unneutral service. For the time being she is, therefore, actually part and parcel of the enemy marine. For this reason she is considered to be rendering unneutral service, and to have lost her neutral character, even if, at the moment an enemy cruiser searches her, she is engaged neither in the transport of troops nor in the transmission of intelligence. The fact is decisive that she is for the time being exclusively intended for such unneutral service, whether or no she is at every moment really[Pg 526] engaged in rendering such service. And it makes no difference, whether the vessel is engaged by the enemy and paid for the transport of troops or the transmission of intelligence, or whether she renders the service[874] gratuitously.

(4) Lastly, there's the situation of a neutral merchant ship that is intended solely for transporting enemy troops or sending intelligence to the enemy. This is different from the case outlined in article 45, No. 1, which involves a vessel specifically taking a voyage to carry individual members of the enemy's armed forces. In the latter case, the vessel is providing unneutral service by altering its course to deliver specific assistance, while in the former, the vessel is entirely and currently dedicated to providing unneutral service. For that time, it is indeed part of the enemy's naval force. Therefore, it is viewed as providing unneutral service and having lost its neutral status, even if it isn't actively transporting troops or sending intelligence at the moment it is inspected by an enemy cruiser. What matters is that the vessel is currently exclusively designated for such unneutral service, regardless of whether it's actively engaged in it at every moment. It doesn't matter if the vessel is hired and paid by the enemy for the transport of troops or intelligence, or if it is providing the service for free.

[872] See above, § 89 (1), p. 113.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ (1), p. 113.

[873] Two cases of interest occurred in 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War. The Industrie, a German vessel, and the Quang-nam, a French vessel, were captured and condemned by the Japanese for being in the employ of Russia as reconnoitring vessels, although the former pretended to collect news in the service of the Chefoo Daily News, and the latter pretended to be a cargo vessel plying between neutral ports. See Takahashi, pp. 732 and 735.

[873] Two notable incidents happened in 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War. The Industrie, a German ship, and the Quang-nam, a French ship, were seized and condemned by the Japanese for working with Russia as scouting vessels, even though the former claimed to be gathering news for the Chefoo Daily News, while the latter posed as a cargo ship operating between neutral ports. See Takahashi, pp. 732 and 735.

[874] As regards the meaning of the term transmission of intelligence, see above, § 409.

[874] For the meaning of the term transmission of intelligence, refer to the section above, § 409.

II UNNEUTRAL SERVICE CONSEQUENCES

See the literature quoted above at the commencement of § 407.

See the literature mentioned above at the beginning of § 407.

Capture for Unneutral Service.

Capture for Unbiased Service.

§ 411. According to customary rules hitherto prevailing, as well as according to the Declaration of London, a neutral vessel may be captured if visit or search establish the fact, or grave suspicion of the fact, that she is rendering unneutral service to the enemy. And such capture may take place anywhere throughout the range of the Open Sea and the territorial maritime belt of either belligerent.

§ 411. According to the customary rules that have been in effect until now, as well as the Declaration of London, a neutral ship can be captured if a visit or search proves, or raises serious suspicion, that it is providing unneutral service to the enemy. This capture can happen anywhere in the Open Sea and the territorial waters of either side involved in the conflict.

Stress must be laid on the fact that mail steamers are on principle not exempt from capture for unneutral service. Although, according to article 1 of Convention XI., the postal correspondence of belligerents as well as of neutrals, whatever its official or private character, found on board a vessel on the sea is inviolable,[875] and a vessel may never, therefore, be considered to be rendering unneutral service by carrying amongst her postal correspondence despatches containing intelligence for the enemy, a mail steamer is nevertheless—see article 2 of Convention XI.—not exempt from the laws and customs of naval war respecting neutral merchantmen. A mail boat is, therefore, quite as much as any other[Pg 527] merchantman, exposed to capture for rendering unneutral service.

It’s important to emphasize that mail steamers are generally not protected from being captured for engaging in unneutral service. Even though, according to Article 1 of Convention XI, the postal correspondence of both belligerents and neutrals, regardless of whether it’s official or personal, found on a vessel at sea is inviolable,[875] and therefore a vessel cannot be deemed to be providing unneutral service just by carrying dispatches containing information for the enemy among its postal correspondence, a mail steamer is still—see Article 2 of Convention XI—not exempt from the laws and customs of naval warfare concerning neutral merchant ships. Hence, a mail boat, just like any other[Pg 527] merchant vessel, is vulnerable to capture for engaging in unneutral service.

[875] See above, §§ 191 and 319.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, §§ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

However this may be, capture is allowed only so long as the vessel is in delicto, that is during the time in which she is rendering the unneutral service concerned or immediately afterwards while she is being chased for having rendered unneutral service. A neutral vessel may not, therefore, be captured after the completion of a voyage specially undertaken for the purpose of transporting members of the armed forces of the enemy, or of transmitting intelligence for the enemy, or after having disembarked the military detachment of the enemy and the persons directly assisting the operations of the enemy in the course of the voyage whom she was transporting. And it must be specially emphasised that even such neutral vessel as had acquired—see article 46 of the Declaration of London—enemy character by rendering unneutral service, ceases to be in delicto after her unneutral service has come to an end. Thus, for instance, a neutral vessel which took a direct part in hostilities[876] may not afterwards be captured, nor may a vessel which has disembarked the agent of the enemy Government under whose orders or control she was navigating.

However this may be, capture is allowed only as long as the vessel is in delicto, meaning during the time she is providing the unneutral service in question or immediately afterwards while she is being pursued for having rendered unneutral service. A neutral vessel cannot, therefore, be captured after completing a voyage specifically undertaken to transport members of the enemy's armed forces, transmit intelligence for the enemy, or after having disembarked the military contingent of the enemy and those directly aiding the enemy's operations during the voyage. It's important to emphasize that even a neutral vessel that has gained—see article 46 of the Declaration of London—enemy status by rendering unneutral service stops being in delicto once that unneutral service has ended. For example, a neutral vessel that actively participated in hostilities[876] may not be captured afterward, nor may a vessel that has disembarked an agent of the enemy government under whose orders or control she was operating.

[876] Provided she did not—see above, § 410 (1)—commit acts of a piratical character; for such acts she may always be punished.

[876] As long as she didn't—see above, § 410 (1)—engage in any pirate-like behavior; because for those actions, she can always be held accountable.

Penalty for Unneutral Service.

Penalty for Unbiased Service.

§ 412. According to the practice hitherto prevailing, a neutral vessel captured for carriage of persons or despatches in the service of the enemy could be confiscated. Moreover, according to British[877] practice, such part of the cargo as belonged to the owner of the vessel was likewise confiscated.[878] And if the vessel was not found guilty of carrying persons or despatches in the service of the enemy, and was not therefore condemned,[Pg 528] the Government of the captor could nevertheless detain the persons as prisoners of war and confiscate the despatches, provided the persons and despatches concerned were in any way of such a character as to make a vessel, which was cognisant of this character, liable to punishment for transporting them for the enemy.

§ 412. According to the practices that have been in place until now, a neutral ship captured for carrying people or messages serving the enemy could be seized. Additionally, according to British[877] practices, any part of the cargo that belonged to the ship's owner could also be confiscated.[878] If the vessel was found not guilty of carrying people or messages for the enemy and was therefore not condemned,[Pg 528] the capturing government's forces could still hold the individuals as prisoners of war and seize the messages, as long as those individuals and messages were of a nature that would make the vessel, aware of this nature, liable for transporting them for the enemy.

[877] The Friendship (1807), 6 C. Rob. 420; the Atalanta (1808), 6 C. Rob. 440. See Holland, Prize Law, §§ 95 and 105.

[877] The Friendship (1807), 6 C. Rob. 420; the Atalanta (1808), 6 C. Rob. 440. See Holland, Prize Law, §§ 95 and 105.

[878] See, however, the Hope (1808), 6 C. Rob. 463, note.

[878] See, however, the Hope (1808), 6 C. Rob. 463, note.

The Declaration of London recognises these three rules. Articles 45 and 46 declare any vessel rendering any kind of unneutral service to the enemy liable to confiscation, and likewise declare such part of the cargo as belongs to the owner of the confiscated vessel liable to confiscation. And article 47 enacts that, although a neutral vessel may not be condemned because there are no grounds for her capture, the capturing State may nevertheless detain as prisoners of war any members of the armed forces of the enemy who were found on board the vessel. The case of despatches found on board is not mentioned by article 47, but there ought to be no doubt—see below, § 413—that the old customary rule that, although the vessel may not be condemned because there is no ground for capture, any despatches for the enemy found on board may, in analogy with article 47, be confiscated, provided such despatches are not part of the postal correspondence carried on board.

The Declaration of London acknowledges these three rules. Articles 45 and 46 state that any vessel providing any type of unneutral service to the enemy can be confiscated, and similarly, any part of the cargo that belongs to the owner of the confiscated vessel is also subject to confiscation. Article 47 specifies that even though a neutral vessel cannot be condemned if there are no valid grounds for seizing it, the capturing State can still detain any members of the enemy's armed forces found on the vessel as prisoners of war. Article 47 does not mention the situation of despatches found on board, but there should be no doubt—see below, § 413—that the established customary rule indicates that, even if the vessel cannot be condemned due to a lack of grounds for capture, any despatches for the enemy found on board may be confiscated, in accordance with article 47, as long as those despatches are not part of the postal correspondence being transported.

It must be emphasised that the mere fact that a neutral vessel is rendering unneutral service, is not sufficient for her condemnation; for in addition mens rea is required. Now as regards the four kinds of unneutral service which create enemy character, mens rea is obviously always in existence, and therefore always presumed to be present. For this reason article 46, in contradistinction to article 45, does not mention anything concerning the knowledge by the vessel of the outbreak of hostilities. But as regards the other cases of unneutral service, article 45 provides that the vessel may not be confiscated if the vessel is encountered at[Pg 529] sea while unaware of the outbreak of hostilities, or if the master, after becoming aware of the outbreak of hostilities, has had no opportunity of disembarking the passengers concerned. On the other hand, a vessel is deemed, according to article 45, to be aware of the existence of a state of war if she left an enemy port subsequent to the outbreak of hostilities, or a neutral port subsequent to the notification of the outbreak of hostilities to the Power to which such port belongs, provided that such notification was made in sufficient time.

It must be emphasized that just because a neutral vessel is providing unneutral service, it doesn't automatically mean it should be condemned; mens rea is also necessary. Regarding the four types of unneutral service that create enemy status, mens rea is clearly always present and therefore always assumed. For this reason, article 46, unlike article 45, does not mention anything about the vessel's knowledge of the outbreak of hostilities. However, for other cases of unneutral service, article 45 states that a vessel cannot be confiscated if it is found at[Pg 529] sea without being aware of the outbreak of hostilities, or if the captain, after learning about the outbreak, had no chance to disembark the affected passengers. On the other hand, according to article 45, a vessel is considered to be aware of a state of war if it leaves an enemy port after the outbreak of hostilities, or a neutral port after being notified of the outbreak by the Power to which that port belongs, as long as the notification was made in time.

Although the Declaration of London metes out the same punishment for the several kinds of unneutral service which it enumerates, it nevertheless makes a distinction, apart from the penalty, with regard to the treatment of the vessels captured for rendering unneutral service.

Although the Declaration of London assigns the same punishment for the different types of unneutral service it lists, it still distinguishes, aside from the penalty, how vessels captured for providing unneutral service are treated.

Article 45 provides for a neutral vessel captured for having rendered either of the two kinds of unneutral service mentioned in this article a treatment which is, in a general way, the same as that for a neutral vessel captured for the carriage of contraband. This means that the vessel does not lose her neutral character, and must under all circumstances and conditions be taken before a Prize Court, unless—see article 49 of the Declaration of London—the taking of her into a port of the capturing State would involve danger to the safety of the capturing vessel or to the success of the military operations in which she is engaged at the time. And an appeal from the national Prize Courts may be brought to the International Prize Court.

Article 45 states that a neutral vessel captured for providing either of the two types of unneutral service mentioned in this article will be treated similarly to a neutral vessel captured for carrying contraband. This means that the vessel retains its neutral status and must be taken to a Prize Court in all circumstances, unless—see article 49 of the Declaration of London—bringing it into the port of the capturing State would pose a risk to the safety of the capturing vessel or to the success of the military operations it is currently involved in. Additionally, an appeal from the national Prize Courts can be made to the International Prize Court.

Article 46, on the other hand, provides, apart from the penalty, a treatment for a vessel captured for having rendered any of the four kinds of unneutral service enumerated in this article which, in a general way, is the same as that for a captured enemy merchantman.[Pg 530] This means that such vessel acquires enemy character. Accordingly (see above, § 89) all enemy goods on the vessel may be seized, all goods on board will be presumed to be enemy goods, and the owners of neutral goods on board will have to prove the neutral character of their goods. Further, the rules of articles 48 and 49 of the Declaration of London concerning the destruction of neutral vessels do not apply. Again, no appeal may be brought from the national Prize Courts to the International Prize Court by the owner of the ship except concerning the one question only, namely, whether the act of which she is accused has the character of unneutral service.[879]

Article 46, on the other hand, outlines a treatment for a vessel captured for providing any of the four types of unneutral service mentioned in this article, which, in general, is similar to that for a captured enemy merchant ship.[Pg 530] This means that such a vessel is considered an enemy. Therefore (see above, § 89), all enemy goods on the vessel can be seized, everything on board will be assumed to be enemy goods, and owners of neutral goods on board will need to prove that their goods are neutral. Furthermore, the rules in articles 48 and 49 of the Declaration of London regarding the destruction of neutral vessels do not apply. Also, the owner of the ship cannot appeal from the national Prize Courts to the International Prize Court, except on one question only: whether the act she is accused of constitutes unneutral service.[879]

[879] The question as to whether, if the vessel has been destroyed by the captor, the innocent owners of the neutral goods on board may claim compensation, has to be decided in the same way as the question as to whether the owners of neutral goods on a destroyed enemy merchantman have a claim to compensation; see above, § 194.

[879] The question of whether innocent owners of neutral goods on a ship destroyed by the captor can claim compensation should be decided the same way as whether the owners of neutral goods on a destroyed enemy merchant ship can claim compensation; see above, § 194.

Seizure of Enemy Persons and Despatches without Seizure of Vessel.

Seizure of Enemy Individuals and Dispatches without Seizing the Vessel.

§ 413. According to the British[880] and American practice, as well as that of some other States, which has hitherto prevailed, whenever a neutral vessel was stopped for carrying persons or despatches for the enemy, these could not be seized unless the vessel were seized at the same time. The release, in 1861, during the American Civil War, of Messrs. Mason[881] and Slidell, who had been forcibly taken off the Trent, while the ship herself was allowed to continue her voyage, was based, by the United States, on the fact that the seizure of these men without the seizure of the vessel was illegal. Since, according to the Declaration of London, a neutral vessel rendering unneutral service of any kind is liable to be confiscated, it is evident that in such a case the enemy persons and despatches concerned may not be taken off the vessel unless the vessel herself is seized and brought into a port of a Prize Court. However, article 47 provides that any member of the armed forces of the enemy found on board a neutral[Pg 531] merchant vessel may be taken off and made a prisoner of war, although there may be no ground for the capture of the vessel. Therefore, if a vessel carries individual members of the armed forces of the enemy in the ordinary course of her voyage,[882] or if she transports a military detachment of the enemy and the like without being aware of the outbreak of hostilities, the members of the armed forces of the enemy on board may be seized, although the vessel herself may not be seized, as she is not rendering unneutral service.

§ 413. According to British[880] and American practices, as well as those of some other countries, it has been a standard that when a neutral ship is stopped for carrying individuals or messages for the enemy, those can’t be taken unless the ship is also seized at the same time. The release in 1861, during the American Civil War, of Messrs. Mason[881] and Slidell, who were forcibly removed from the Trent, while the ship itself was allowed to continue on its journey, was justified by the United States on the grounds that taking these men without seizing the vessel was illegal. Since the Declaration of London states that a neutral ship providing any unneutral service can be confiscated, it’s clear that in such a situation, any enemy individuals or messages involved cannot be removed from the ship unless the ship itself is seized and brought into a Prize Court port. However, Article 47 states that any member of the enemy’s armed forces found aboard a neutral merchant ship can be taken off and made a prisoner of war, even if there’s no justification for capturing the vessel. Therefore, if a ship is carrying individual members of the enemy's armed forces in the normal course of her voyage,[882] or if it transports a military unit of the enemy without being aware of the start of hostilities, those members of the armed forces can be seized, even if the ship itself isn’t seized, as it isn’t providing unneutral service.

[880] See Holland, Prize Law, § 104.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Holland, Prize Law, § 104.

[881] See above, § 408, p. 519, note 3.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[882] Accordingly, in January 1912, during the Turco-Italian War, the Italian gunboat Volturno, after having overhauled, in the Red Sea, the British steamer Africa going from Hodeida to Aden, took off and made prisoners of war Colonel Riza Bey and eleven other Turkish officers. Although the Declaration of London is not yet ratified by Great Britain, she did not protest. The case of the Manouba ought likewise to be mentioned here. This French steamer, which plies between Marseilles and Tunis, was stopped on January 16, 1912, by an Italian cruiser in the Mediterranean, and twenty-nine Turkish passengers, who were supposed to be Turkish officers on their way to the theatre of war, were forcibly taken off and made prisoners. On the protest of France, the captives were handed over to her in order to ascertain whether they were members of the Turkish forces, and it was agreed between the parties that the case should be settled by an arbitral award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, Italy asserting that she had only acted in accordance with article 47 of the Declaration of London.

[882] In January 1912, during the Turco-Italian War, the Italian gunboat Volturno intercepted the British steamer Africa in the Red Sea while it was traveling from Hodeida to Aden. They captured Colonel Riza Bey and eleven other Turkish officers as prisoners of war. Even though Great Britain hadn't ratified the Declaration of London yet, they did not raise any objections. Another case to mention is that of the Manouba. This French steamer, which runs between Marseilles and Tunis, was stopped by an Italian cruiser in the Mediterranean on January 16, 1912. Twenty-nine Turkish passengers, believed to be Turkish officers heading to the front lines, were forcibly removed and taken prisoner. After France protested, the captives were returned to her to determine if they were part of the Turkish forces. It was agreed that the matter would be resolved by an arbitral award from the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, with Italy claiming that they were acting in line with Article 47 of the Declaration of London.

The Declaration of London does not mention the case of enemy despatches embodying intelligence found on board such a neutral vessel as may not herself be captured for such carriage. For instance, in the case of a mail steamer pursuing her ordinary course and carrying a despatch of the enemy not in her mail bags but separately, the vessel may not, according to article 45, be seized. In this, and similar cases, may despatches be seized without the seizure of the vessel? It has been pointed out above, § 409, that, in a case of necessity, self-preservation would justify a belligerent in temporarily detaining such a liner for the purpose of preventing the intelligence from reaching the enemy. This certainly fits the case of a vessel transmitting oral intelligence. But if a vessel carried despatches, the necessity of detaining her ceases through seizure of the[Pg 532] despatches themselves. The question—see above, § 412—as to whether in such cases the despatches may be seized without seizure of the vessel ought, therefore, in analogy with article 47 of the Declaration of London, to be answered in the affirmative.

The Declaration of London doesn’t address the situation of enemy messages found on a neutral ship that wouldn’t be captured for carrying them. For example, if a mail steamer is following its usual route and is carrying an enemy message separately, rather than in its mail bags, the ship shouldn’t be seized, according to Article 45. In such cases, can the messages be confiscated without taking the ship? It’s been mentioned earlier, § 409, that in an urgent situation, a warring party could temporarily hold such a liner to stop the information from reaching the enemy. This clearly applies to a ship transmitting spoken information. However, if a ship is carrying messages, the need to detain it disappears once the messages are seized[Pg 532]. The question—see above, § 412—about whether the messages can be taken without capturing the ship should therefore be answered positively, similar to Article 47 of the Declaration of London.

Quite different from the case of seizure of such enemy persons and despatches as a vessel cannot carry without exposing herself to punishment, is the case[883] where a vessel has such enemy persons and despatches on board as she is allowed to carry, but whom a belligerent believes it to be necessary in the interest of self-preservation to seize. Since necessity in the interest of self-preservation is, according to International Law, an excuse[884] for an illegal act, a belligerent may seize such persons and despatches, provided that such seizure is not merely desirable, but absolutely necessary[885] in the interest of self-preservation, as, for instance, in the case where an Ambassador of the enemy on board a neutral vessel is on the way to submit to a neutral a draft treaty of alliance injurious to the other belligerent.

Quite different from the situation where a ship cannot carry enemy personnel and documents without risking punishment is the case where a ship has enemy personnel and documents on board that it is allowed to carry, but a belligerent believes it's necessary for its own survival to seize them. Since the necessity for self-preservation is, according to International Law, a justification for an illegal act, a belligerent may seize such individuals and documents, as long as that seizure is not just preferable but absolutely essential for self-preservation—like when an enemy ambassador on a neutral vessel is on route to present a damaging draft treaty of alliance to a neutral party that would harm the other belligerent.

[883] See Hall, § 253; Rivier, II. p. 390.

[883] See Hall, § 253; Rivier, II. p. 390.

CHAPTER 6 VISITATION, SEIZURE, AND TRIAL OF NEUTRAL VESSELS

I VISIT

Bynkershoek, Quaest. jur. pub. I. c. 14—Vattel, III. § 114—Hall, §§ 270-276—Manning, pp. 433-460—Phillimore, III. §§ 322-344—Twiss, II. §§ 91-97—Halleck, II. pp. 255-271—Taylor, §§ 685-689—Wharton, III. §§ 325 and 346—Wheaton, §§ 524-537—Moore, VII. §§ 1199-1205—Bluntschli, §§ 819-826—Heffter, §§ 167-171—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 773-781—Klüber, §§ 293-294—G. F. Martens, II. §§ 317 and 321—Ullmann, § 196—Bonfils, Nos. 1674-1691—Despagnet, Nos. 717-721—Rivier, II. pp. 423-426—Nys, III. pp. 682-692—Calvo, V. §§ 2939-2991—Fiore, III. Nos. 1630-1641, and Code, Nos. 1853-1877—Martens, II. § 137—Kleen, II. §§ 185-199, 209—Gessner, pp. 278-332—Boeck, Nos. 767-769—Dupuis, Nos. 239-252, and Guerre, Nos. 189-204—Bernsten, § 11—Nippold, II. § 35—Perels, §§ 52-55—Testa, pp. 230-242—Ortolan, II. pp. 214-245—Hautefeuille, III. pp. 1-299—Holland, Prize Law, §§ 1-17, 155-230—U.S. Naval War Code, articles 30-33—Schlegel, Sur la visite des vaisseaux neutres sous convoi (1800)—Mirbach, Die völkerrechtlichen Grundsätze des Durchsuchungsrechts zur See (1903)—Loewenthal, Das Untersuchungsrecht des internationalen Seerechts im Krieg und Frieden (1905)—Atherley-Jones, Commerce in War (1906), pp. 299-360—Hirschmann, Das internationale Prisenrecht (1912), §§ 33-34—Duboc in R.G. IV. (1897), pp 382-403—See also the monographs quoted above at the commencement of § 391, Bulmerincq's articles on Le droit des prises maritimes in R.I. X-XIII. (1878-1881), and the General Report presented to the Naval Conference of London on behalf of the Drafting Committee, article 63.

Bynkershoek, Quaest. jur. pub. I. c. 14—Vattel, III. § 114—Hall, §§ 270-276—Manning, pp. 433-460—Phillimore, III. §§ 322-344—Twiss, II. §§ 91-97—Halleck, II. pp. 255-271—Taylor, §§ 685-689—Wharton, III. §§ 325 and 346—Wheaton, §§ 524-537—Moore, VII. §§ 1199-1205—Bluntschli, §§ 819-826—Heffter, §§ 167-171—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 773-781—Klüber, §§ 293-294—G. F. Martens, II. §§ 317 and 321—Ullmann, § 196—Bonfils, Nos. 1674-1691—Despagnet, Nos. 717-721—Rivier, II. pp. 423-426—Nys, III. pp. 682-692—Calvo, V. §§ 2939-2991—Fiore, III. Nos. 1630-1641, and Code, Nos. 1853-1877—Martens, II. § 137—Kleen, II. §§ 185-199, 209—Gessner, pp. 278-332—Boeck, Nos. 767-769—Dupuis, Nos. 239-252, and Guerre, Nos. 189-204—Bernsten, § 11—Nippold, II. § 35—Perels, §§ 52-55—Testa, pp. 230-242—Ortolan, II. pp. 214-245—Hautefeuille, III. pp. 1-299—Holland, Prize Law, §§ 1-17, 155-230—U.S. Naval War Code, articles 30-33—Schlegel, Sur la visite des vaisseaux neutres sous convoi (1800)—Mirbach, Die völkerrechtlichen Grundsätze des Durchsuchungsrechts zur See (1903)—Loewenthal, Das Untersuchungsrecht des internationalen Seerechts im Krieg und Frieden (1905)—Atherley-Jones, Commerce in War (1906), pp. 299-360—Hirschmann, Das internationale Prisenrecht (1912), §§ 33-34—Duboc in R.G. IV. (1897), pp 382-403—See also the monographs quoted above at the start of § 391, Bulmerincq's articles on Le droit des prises maritimes in R.I. X-XIII. (1878-1881), and the General Report presented to the Naval Conference of London on behalf of the Drafting Committee, article 63.

Conception of Right of Visitation.

Visitation Rights Concept.

§ 414. Right of visitation[886] is the right of belligerents to visit and eventually search neutral merchantmen for the purpose of ascertaining whether these vessels really belong to the merchant marine of neutrals, and,[Pg 534] if this is found to be the case, whether they are attempting to break a blockade, or carry contraband, or render unneutral service to the enemy. The right of visit and search was already mentioned in the Consolato del Mare, and although it has often[887] been contested, its raison d'être is so obvious that it has long been universally recognised in practice. It is indeed the only means by which belligerents are able to ascertain whether neutral merchantmen intend to bring assistance to the enemy and to render him unneutral services.[888]

§ 414. Right of visitation[886] is the right of warring parties to visit and possibly search neutral merchant ships to determine if these vessels genuinely belong to neutral merchant fleets and,[Pg 534] if so, whether they are trying to break a blockade, transport contraband, or provide unauthorized support to the enemy. The right to visit and search was already highlighted in the Consolato del Mare, and although it has often[887] been challenged, its raison d'être is so clear that it has long been universally acknowledged in practice. It is indeed the only way for warring parties to verify if neutral merchant ships plan to assist the enemy and provide him with unauthorized services.[888]

[886] It must be borne in mind that this right of visitation is not an independent right but is involved in the right of either belligerent—see above, § 314—to punish neutral vessels breaking blockade, carrying contraband, and rendering unneutral service.

[886] It’s important to remember that this right of inspection isn't an independent right; it’s tied to the right of either side in conflict—see above, § 314—to penalize neutral ships that violate blockade, carry illegal goods, or provide unauthorized assistance.

[887] See, for instance, Hübner, De la saisie des bâtiments neutres (1759), I. p. 227.

[887] See, for example, Hübner, On the Seizure of Neutral Vessels (1759), I. p. 227.

[888] Attention should be drawn to the Règlement international des prises maritimes, adopted at Heidelberg in 1887 by the Institute of International Law; §§ 1-29 regulate visit and search. See Annuaire, IX. (1888), p. 202.

[888] It’s important to note the International Regulations on Maritime Seizures, which were adopted in Heidelberg in 1887 by the Institute of International Law; Sections 1-29 cover the rules for visit and search. See Yearbook, IX. (1888), p. 202.

Right of Visitation, by whom, when, and where exercised.

Right of Visitation: who can exercise it, when, and where.

[889] It should be mentioned that privateers could also exercise the right of visit and search. But since even such States as have not acceded to the Declaration of Paris in practice no longer issue Letters of Marque, such a case will no longer occur.

[889] It's worth noting that privateers could also claim the right to inspect and search vessels. However, since even countries that haven't agreed to the Declaration of Paris no longer actually issue Letters of Marque, this situation is unlikely to happen again.

[890] But this is not universally recognised. Thus, Hautefeuille, III. p. 91, maintains that during a general armistice the right of visitation may not be exercised, and § 5 of the Règlement international des prises maritimes of the Institute of International Law takes up the same attitude. It ought, likewise, to be mentioned that in strict law the right of visit and search may be exercised even after the conclusion of peace before the treaty of peace is ratified. But the above-mentioned § 5 of the Règlement international des prises maritimes declares this right to cease "avec les préliminaires de la paix." See below, § 436.

[890] However, this is not universally acknowledged. For instance, Hautefeuille, III. p. 91, argues that during a general cease-fire, the right to inspect ships should not be exercised, and § 5 of the International Regulations on Maritime Prize from the Institute of International Law shares the same view. It should also be noted that legally, the right to visit and search can still be exercised even after peace is declared, before the peace treaty is ratified. Yet, the aforementioned § 5 of the International Regulations on Maritime Prize states that this right ceases "with the preliminaries of peace." See below, § 436.

Only Private Vessels may be Visited.

Only private vessels can be visited.

§ 416. During the nineteenth century it became universally recognised that neutral men-of-war are not objects of the right of visit and search of belligerents.[891] And the same is valid regarding public neutral vessels which sail in the service of armed forces, such as transport vessels, for instance. Doubt exists as to the position of public neutral vessels which do not sail in the service of armed forces, but sail for other purposes, as, for instance, mail-boats belonging to a neutral State. It is asserted[892] that, if commanded by an officer of the Navy, they must be treated in the same way as men-of-war, but that it is desirable to ask the commanders to give their word of honour assuring the absence of contraband and unneutral service.

§ 416. During the nineteenth century, it became widely accepted that neutral warships are not subject to the right of visit and search by warring parties.[891] The same applies to public neutral vessels operating in support of armed forces, like transport ships, for example. There is uncertainty about the status of public neutral vessels that do not serve armed forces but operate for other reasons, such as mail boats belonging to a neutral country. It is argued[892] that if these vessels are commanded by a Navy officer, they should be treated like warships, but it would be preferable to ask the commanders to provide their word of honor confirming the absence of contraband and unneutral activities.

[891] In former times Great Britain tried to extend visitation to neutral men-of-war. See Manning, p. 455.

[891] In the past, Great Britain attempted to allow visits to neutral warships. See Manning, p. 455.

[892] See, for instance, Gessner, p. 297, and Perels, § 52, IV.

[892] See, for example, Gessner, p. 297, and Perels, § 52, IV.

Vessels under Convoy.

Ships under convoy.

§ 417. Sweden in 1653, during war between Great Britain and the Netherlands, claimed that the belligerents ought to waive their right of visitation over Swedish merchantmen if the latter sailed under the convoy of a Swedish man-of-war whose commander asserted the absence of contraband on board the convoyed vessels. The Peace of Westminster in 1654 brought this war to an end, and in 1756 the Netherlands, then neutral, claimed the right of convoy. But it was[Pg 536] not until the last quarter of the eighteenth century that the right of convoy was more and more insisted upon by Continental neutrals. During the American War of Independence in 1780, the Netherlands again claimed that right, and when they themselves in 1781 waged war against Great Britain, they ordered their men-of-war and privateers to respect the right of convoy. Between 1780 and 1800 treaties were concluded, in which Russia, Austria, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, France, the United States of America, and other States recognised that right. But Great Britain always refused to recognise it, and in July 1800 the action of a British squadron in capturing a Danish man-of-war and her convoy of six merchantmen for resistance to visitation called the Second Armed Neutrality into existence. Yet Great Britain still resisted, and by article 4 of the "Maritime Convention" of St. Petersburg of June 17, 1801, she conceded to Russia only that vessels under convoy should not be visited by privateers. During the nineteenth century more and more treaties stipulating the right of convoy were concluded, but this right was not mentioned in the Declaration of Paris of 1856, and Great Britain refused to recognise it throughout the century. However, Great Britain abandoned her opposition at the Naval Conference of London of 1908-9, and the Declaration of London proposes to settle the matter by articles 61 and 62 in the following way:—

§ 417. In 1653, during the war between Great Britain and the Netherlands, Sweden argued that the warring parties should give up their right to inspect Swedish merchant ships if they were under the protection of a Swedish warship whose captain confirmed there was no illegal cargo on board the escorted vessels. The Peace of Westminster in 1654 ended this war, and in 1756, the Netherlands, being neutral, asserted the right of convoy. However, it wasn’t until the last quarter of the eighteenth century that Continental neutrals increasingly demanded this right. During the American War of Independence in 1780, the Netherlands again asserted this right, and when they went to war against Great Britain in 1781, they ordered their warships and privateers to honor the right of convoy. Between 1780 and 1800, treaties were made in which Russia, Austria, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, France, the United States of America, and other states acknowledged this right. But Great Britain consistently refused to recognize it, and in July 1800, when a British squadron captured a Danish warship and her convoy of six merchant ships for resisting inspection, it led to the establishment of the Second Armed Neutrality. Yet Great Britain continued to resist, and by article 4 of the "Maritime Convention" of St. Petersburg on June 17, 1801, she conceded to Russia only that vessels under convoy should not be inspected by privateers. Throughout the nineteenth century, more treaties affirming the right of convoy were signed, but this right was not included in the Declaration of Paris of 1856, and Great Britain maintained her refusal to acknowledge it during that century. However, Great Britain changed her stance at the Naval Conference of London in 1908-9, and the Declaration of London seeks to address the matter through articles 61 and 62 in the following way:—

Neutral vessels under the convoy of a man-of-war flying the same flag are exempt from search and may not be visited if the commander of the convoy, at the request of the commander of the belligerent cruiser which desires to visit, gives, in writing, all information as to the character of the convoyed vessels and their cargoes which could be obtained by search. Should the commander of the belligerent man-of-war have[Pg 537] reason to suspect that the confidence of the commander of the convoy has been abused, he may not himself resort to visit and search, but must communicate with the commander of the convoy. The latter must investigate the matter, and must record the result of his investigation in a report, a copy of which must be given to the commander of the belligerent cruiser. Should, in the opinion of the commander of the convoy, the facts stated in the report justify the capture of one or more of the convoyed vessels, he must withdraw protection from the offending vessels, and the belligerent cruiser may then capture them.

Neutral ships under the escort of a warship flying the same flag are exempt from being searched and cannot be boarded if the convoy commander, at the request of the commander of the hostile cruiser wanting to board, provides in writing all the information about the nature of the escorted ships and their cargoes that could be obtained by searching. If the commander of the enemy warship has[Pg 537]reason to suspect that the convoy commander's trust has been violated, he cannot himself board and search but must reach out to the convoy commander. The convoy commander must look into the matter and record the findings in a report, providing a copy to the commander of the enemy cruiser. If, in the convoy commander's opinion, the facts in the report warrant the seizure of one or more of the escorted ships, he must withdraw protection from the offending vessels, allowing the hostile cruiser to capture them.

In case a difference of opinion arises between the commander of the convoy and the commander of the belligerent cruiser—for instance, with regard to the question as to whether certain goods are absolute or conditional contraband or as to whether the port of destination of a convoyed vessel is an ordinary commercial port or a port which serves as a base of supply for the armed forces of the enemy and the like—the commander of the belligerent cruiser has no power of overruling the decision of the commander of the convoy. He can only protest and report the case to his Government, which will settle the matter by means of diplomacy.

If there's a disagreement between the convoy commander and the commander of the enemy cruiser—like whether specific goods are classified as absolute or conditional contraband or if the destination port of a convoy ship is just a regular commercial port or one that supports the enemy's armed forces—the commander of the enemy cruiser cannot override the convoy commander's decision. He can only file a protest and report the situation to his government, which will resolve the issue through diplomatic means.

No Universal Rules regarding Mode of Visitation.

No universal rules about how to visit.

§ 418. There are no rules of International Law which lay down all the details of the formalities of the mode of visitation. A great many treaties regulate them as between the parties, and all maritime nations have given instructions to their men-of-war regarding these formalities. Thereby uniform formalities are practised with regard to many points, but regarding others the practice of the several States differs. Article 17 of the Peace Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659 has served as a model of many of the above-mentioned treaties regulating the formalities of visitation: "Les[Pg 538] navires d'Espagne, pour éviter tout désordre, n'approcheront pas de plus près les Français que la portée du canon, et pourront envoyer leur petite barque ou chaloupe à bord des navires français et faire entrer dedans deux ou trois hommes seulement, à qui seront montrés les passeports par le maître du navire français, par lesquels il puisse apparoir, non seulement de la charge, mais aussi du lieu de sa demeure et résidence, et du nom tant du maître ou patron que du navire même, afin que, par ces deux moyens, on puisse connaître, s'il porte des marchandises de contrebande; et qu'il apparaisse suffisamment tant de la qualité du dit navire que de son maître ou patron; auxquelles passeports on devra donner entière foi et créance."

§ 418. There are no international law rules that outline all the specifics of the visitation process. Many treaties govern these details between the parties involved, and all maritime nations have provided instructions to their warships regarding these formalities. This results in consistent practices for several aspects, but the procedures can vary among different states. Article 17 of the Peace Treaty of the Pyrenees from 1659 has served as a model for many of these treaties regulating visitation procedures: "Spanish ships, to avoid any disorder, shall not approach the French any closer than cannon range, and may send their small boat or skiff to board French ships with only two or three men, who will be shown the passports by the French ship's master. These passports must indicate not only the cargo but also the place of residence, as well as the names of both the captain and the ship itself, so that it can be determined whether they are carrying contraband; and the nature of the said ship and its master or captain must be sufficiently identifiable; these passports are to be given full trust and credence."

Stopping of Vessels for the Purpose of Visitation.

Stopping of Vessels for the Purpose of Inspection.

§ 419. A man-of-war which wishes to visit a neutral vessel must stop her or make her bring to. Although the chasing of vessels may take place under false colours, the right colours must be shown when vessels are stopped.[893] The order for stopping can be given[894] by hailing or by firing one or two blank cartridges from the so-called affirming gun, and, if necessary, by firing a shot across the bows of the vessel. If nevertheless the vessel does not bring to, the man-of-war is justified in using force to compel her to bring to. Once the vessel has been brought to, the man-of-war also brings to, keeping a reasonable distance. With regard to this distance, treaties very often stipulate either the range of a cannon shot or half such width or even a range beyond a cannon shot; but all this is totally impracticable.[895] The distance must vary according to the requirements of the case, and according to wind and weather.

§ 419. A warship that wants to visit a neutral vessel must stop it or make it come to a halt. While ships might chase under false flags, the correct flags must be displayed when stopping vessels.[893] The order to stop can be given[894] by calling out or by firing one or two blank shots from the so-called affirming gun, and, if necessary, by firing a shot across the bow of the vessel. If the vessel still doesn’t stop, the warship is justified in using force to make it comply. Once the vessel has been stopped, the warship also stops, maintaining a reasonable distance. Regarding this distance, treaties often specify either the range of a cannon shot or half that length or even further than a cannon shot; however, all of this is completely impractical.[895] The distance must vary based on the situation and the conditions of wind and weather.

[893] See above, § 211.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, section __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[895] See Ortolan, II. p. 220, and Perels, § 53, pp. 284, 285.

[895] See Ortolan, II. p. 220, and Perels, § 53, pp. 284, 285.

Visit.

Check it out.

§ 420. The vessel, having been stopped or brought to, is visited[896] by one or two officers sent in a boat[Pg 539] from the man-of-war. These officers examine the papers of the vessel to ascertain her nationality, the character of her cargo and passengers, and, lastly, the ports from and to which she is sailing. Instead of visiting the merchantman and inspecting her papers on board, the practice is followed, by the men-of-war of some States, of summoning the master of the merchantman with his papers on board the former and examining the papers there.

§ 420. The vessel, once stopped or brought to a halt, is approached by one or two officers who arrive in a boat from the man-of-war.[896] These officers check the vessel's papers to verify her nationality, the nature of her cargo and passengers, and finally, the ports she is coming from and heading to. Instead of boarding the merchant ship to inspect the papers, some naval forces have adopted the practice of calling the merchant ship's captain to the man-of-war with his documents to review them there.

If everything is found in order and there is no suspicion of fraud, the vessel is allowed to continue her course, a memorandum of the visit having been entered in her log-book. On the other hand, if the inspection of the papers shows that the vessel is carrying contraband or rendering unneutral service, or that she is for another reason liable to capture, she is at once seized. But it may be that, although ostensibly everything is in order, there is nevertheless grave suspicion of fraud against the vessel. In such case she may be searched.

If everything checks out and there's no suspicion of fraud, the ship can continue on its way, with a record of the visit noted in her logbook. However, if the inspection of the documents reveals that the ship is carrying illegal goods or providing unneutral service, or if there's any other reason she could be captured, she will be seized immediately. But it might also happen that, even if everything appears to be in order, there are serious suspicions of fraud against the ship. In that case, she may be searched.

Search.

Search.

§ 421. Search is effected[897] by one or two officers, and eventually a few men, in presence of the master of the vessel. Care must be taken not to damage the vessel or the cargo, and no force whatever must be applied. No lock must be forcibly broken open by the search party, but the master is to be required to unlock it. If he fails to comply with the demand he is not to be forced thereto, since the master's refusal to assist the search in general, or that of a locked part of the vessel or of a locked box in particular, is at once sufficient cause for seizing the vessel. Search being completed, everything removed has to be replaced with care. If the search has satisfied the searching officers and dispelled all suspicion, a memorandum is entered in the log-book of the vessel, and she is allowed to[Pg 540] continue her voyage. On the other hand, if search brought contraband or another cause for capture to light, the vessel is seized. But since search can never take place so thoroughly on the sea as in a harbour, it may be that, although search has disclosed no proof to bear out the suspicion, grave suspicion still remains. In such case she may be seized and brought into a port for the purpose of being searched there as thoroughly as possible. But the commander of a man-of-war seizing a vessel in such case must bear in mind that full indemnities must be paid to the vessel for loss of time and other losses sustained if finally she is found innocent. Therefore, after a search at sea has brought nothing to light against the vessel, seizure should take place only in case of grave suspicion.

§ 421. A search is conducted[897] by one or two officers, along with a few men, in the presence of the ship's captain. Care must be taken not to damage the ship or its cargo, and no force should be used. No lock should be forcibly broken by the search party; instead, the captain is required to unlock it. If he fails to comply with this request, he cannot be forced to do so, as the captain’s refusal to assist with the search in general, or with a locked part of the ship or a locked box specifically, is enough reason to seize the vessel. Once the search is complete, everything that was removed must be carefully put back. If the search satisfies the officers and eliminates any suspicion, a note is made in the ship's log, and it is allowed to[Pg 540] continue its journey. On the other hand, if the search uncovers contraband or another reason for capture, the ship is seized. However, since a search at sea can never be as thorough as one in a harbor, it’s possible that, despite finding no evidence to support the suspicion, serious doubts may still exist. In that case, the ship may be seized and brought into port for a more thorough search. The commander of a warship seizing a vessel must remember that full compensation must be paid to the ship for lost time and other losses if it is ultimately found to be innocent. Therefore, a seizure at sea should only happen if there is serious suspicion after the search has not revealed anything against the vessel.

Consequences of Resistance to Visitation.

Consequences of Refusing Visits.

§ 422. If a neutral merchantman resists visit or search, she is at once captured, and may be confiscated. The question as to whether the vessel only, or also her cargo, could be confiscated for resistance has hitherto been controversial. According to British[898] and American theory and practice, the cargo as well as the vessel was liable to confiscation. But Continental[899] writers emphatically argued against this and maintained that the vessel only was liable to confiscation.

§ 422. If a neutral merchant ship resists being boarded or searched, it will be immediately captured and can be seized. There has been ongoing debate about whether just the ship or its cargo could also be seized for such resistance. According to British[898] and American legal perspectives, both the cargo and the vessel could be confiscated. However, Continental[899] writers strongly disagreed and argued that only the vessel was subject to confiscation.

[898] The Maria (1799), 1 C. Rob. 340.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Maria (1799), 1 C. Rob. 340.

[899] See Gessner, pp. 318-321.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Gessner, pp. 318-321.

According to article 63 of the Declaration of London, resistance to the legitimate exercise of the right of visit, search, and capture involves in all cases the confiscation of the vessel, which by her forcible resistance has acquired enemy character (see above, § 89). For this reason such goods on board as belong to the master or owner of the vessel are treated as enemy goods and may be confiscated. Enemy goods on board may now likewise be confiscated, although when they were first shipped the vessel bore neutral character. Further, all goods on board are now presumed to be enemy goods,[Pg 541] and the owners of neutral goods on board will have to prove the neutral character of their goods. Lastly, no appeal may be brought from the National Prize Courts to the International Prize Court by the owner of the ship except concerning the one question only, namely, as to whether there was justification for capturing her on the grounds of forcible resistance.

According to Article 63 of the Declaration of London, resistance to the legitimate exercise of the right of visit, search, and capture will always lead to the confiscation of the vessel that has shown forceful resistance and is now considered an enemy (see above, § 89). Because of this, any goods on board that belong to the master or owner of the vessel are treated as enemy goods and can be confiscated. Goods identified as enemy goods on board can now also be confiscated, even if the vessel was considered neutral when they were first loaded. Additionally, all goods on board are now presumed to be enemy goods,[Pg 541] and the owners of neutral goods on board will need to prove that their goods are indeed neutral. Finally, no appeal can be made from the National Prize Courts to the International Prize Court by the owner of the ship except on the single issue of whether there was justification for capturing the vessel based on forceful resistance.

It must be emphasised that visit and search do not take place after a vessel has been captured for resistance, for the mere fact of resisting has imposed enemy character upon her, and the question is now irrelevant whether visit and search would show her to be guilty or innocent.

It’s important to note that a visit and search do not happen after a ship has been captured for resisting, because the act of resistance has already branded it as an enemy. At this point, it doesn’t matter whether a visit and search would prove it to be guilty or innocent.

What constitutes Resistance.

What is Resistance?

§ 423. According to the practice hitherto prevailing,[900] and also according to the Declaration of London, a mere attempt on the part of a neutral merchantman to escape visitation does not in itself constitute resistance. Such vessel may be chased and compelled by force to bring to, and she cannot complain if, in the endeavour forcibly to compel her to bring to, she is damaged or accidentally sunk. If, after the vessel has been compelled to bring to, visit and search show her to be innocent, she must be allowed to proceed on her course.

§ 423. Based on the existing practice, [900] and in line with the Declaration of London, just making an attempt to evade inspection doesn’t count as resistance for a neutral merchant ship. That ship can be pursued and forced to stop, and it can’t complain if it gets damaged or accidentally sunk while being compelled to stop. If, after being forced to stop, a visit and search prove the ship is innocent, it must be allowed to continue on its way.

[900] The Maria (1799), 1 C. Rob. 340.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Maria (1799), 1 C. Rob. 340.

Resistance to be penal must be forcible resistance. It constitutes resistance, therefore, if a vessel applies force in resisting any legitimate action by the belligerent cruiser which requires her to stop and to be visited and searched. The term forcible resistance is not defined in detail by article 63 of the Declaration of London. It is, consequently, not certain whether the actual application of force only, or also the refusal, on the part of the master, to show the ship papers or to open locked parts of the vessel or locked boxes, and similar acts, constitutes forcible resistance. The International[Pg 542] Prize Court, if established, would have to develop a practice which would decide these points.

Resistance to being penalized must be forcible resistance. It qualifies as resistance if a vessel uses force to resist any legitimate action by a belligerent cruiser that requires it to stop and be visited and searched. The term forcible resistance isn't clearly defined in article 63 of the Declaration of London. Therefore, it's uncertain whether it refers only to the actual use of force or also includes the refusal by the master to show the ship’s papers, open locked areas of the vessel, or unlock boxes, along with similar actions. The International[Pg 542] Prize Court, if it is established, would need to develop a practice to clarify these issues.

Sailing under Enemy Convoy equivalent to Resistance.

Sailing under Enemy Convoy is like being in Resistance.

§ 424. Wheaton excepted, all writers would seem to agree that the fact of neutral merchantmen sailing under a convoy of enemy men-of-war is equivalent to forcible resistance on their part, whether they themselves intend to resist by force or not. But the Government of the United States of America in 1810 contested this principle. In that year, during war between Great Britain and Denmark, many American vessels sailing from Russia used to seek protection under the convoy of British men-of-war, whereupon Denmark declared all such American vessels to be good and lawful prizes. Several were captured without making any resistance whatever, and were condemned by Danish Prize Courts. The United States protested, and claimed indemnities from Denmark, and in 1830 a treaty between the parties was signed at Copenhagen,[901] according to which Denmark had to pay 650,000 dollars as indemnity. But in article 5 of this treaty the parties "expressly declare that the present convention is only applicable to the cases therein mentioned, and, having no other object, may never hereafter be invoked by one party or the other as a precedent or a rule for the future."[902]

§ 424. Except for Wheaton, all writers seem to agree that when neutral merchant ships sail under the protection of enemy warships, it's seen as active resistance on their part, regardless of whether they actually intend to fight back. However, the United States government challenged this principle in 1810. That year, during the war between Great Britain and Denmark, many American ships leaving Russia sought protection under British warship convoys. In response, Denmark declared all such American ships to be legitimate prizes. Several were captured without any resistance and were condemned by Danish Prize Courts. The United States protested and demanded compensation from Denmark, and in 1830, a treaty was signed in Copenhagen,[901] which stipulated that Denmark would pay $650,000 as compensation. However, in article 5 of this treaty, both parties "expressly declare that the present convention is only applicable to the cases therein mentioned, and, having no other object, may never hereafter be invoked by one party or the other as a precedent or a rule for the future."[902]

[901] Martens, N.R. VIII. p. 350.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Martens, N.R. VIII. p. 350.

[902] See Wheaton, §§ 530-537, and Taylor, § 693, p. 790. Wheaton was the negotiator of this treaty on the part of the United States.—With the case of neutral merchantmen sailing under enemy convoy, the other case—see above, § 185—in which neutral goods are placed on board an armed enemy vessel is frequently confused. In the case of the Fanny (1814), 1 Dodson, 443, Sir William Scott condemned neutral Portuguese property on the ground that placing neutral property on board an armed vessel was equal to resistance against visitation. But the Supreme Court of the United States of America, in the of the Nereide (1815), 9 Cranch, 388, held the contrary view. The Court was composed of four judges, of whom Story was one, and the latter dissented from the majority and considered the British practice correct. See Phillimore, III. § 341, and Wheaton, § 529.

[902] See Wheaton, §§ 530-537, and Taylor, § 693, p. 790. Wheaton was the negotiator of this treaty on behalf of the United States. When it comes to neutral merchant ships sailing under enemy protection, it's often confused with the other case—see above, § 185—where neutral goods are loaded onto an armed enemy ship. In the case of the Fanny (1814), 1 Dodson, 443, Sir William Scott ruled against neutral Portuguese property because placing neutral goods on an armed vessel was seen as defying inspections. However, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of the Nereide (1815), 9 Cranch, 388, took a different stance. The Court had four judges, including Story, who disagreed with the majority and believed the British practice was correct. See Phillimore, III. § 341, and Wheaton, § 529.

Article 63 of the Declaration of London does not—as was pointed out above in § 423—define the term forcible resistance, but it is to be expected that the[Pg 543] practice of the International Prize Court would consider the sailing under enemy convoy equivalent to forcible resistance.

Article 63 of the Declaration of London does not—as mentioned above in § 423—define the term forcible resistance, but it's expected that the[Pg 543] practice of the International Prize Court would view sailing under enemy convoy as equivalent to forcible resistance.

Resistance by Neutral Convoy.

Resistance by Neutral Shipment.

§ 425. Since Great Britain did not, before agreeing to the Declaration of London, recognise the right of convoy and had always insisted upon the right of visitation to be exercised over neutral merchantmen sailing under the convoy of neutral men-of-war, the question has arisen as to whether such merchantmen are considered resisting visitation in case the convoying men-of-war only, and not the convoyed vessels themselves, offer resistance. British practice has answered the question in the affirmative. The rule was laid down in 1799[903] and in 1804[904] by Sir William Scott in the cases of Swedish vessels captured while sailing under the convoy of a Swedish man-of-war.

§ 425. Since Great Britain did not recognize the right of convoy before agreeing to the Declaration of London and always insisted on the right of visitation over neutral merchant ships sailing under the protection of neutral warships, a question has come up about whether these merchant ships are seen as resisting visitation if only the escorting warships, and not the merchant vessels themselves, are putting up resistance. British practice has answered this question in the affirmative. The rule was established in 1799[903] and in 1804[904] by Sir William Scott in the cases of Swedish vessels captured while sailing under the protection of a Swedish warship.

[903] The Maria, 1 C. Rob. 340.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Maria, 1 C. Rob. 340.

[904] The Elsebe, 5 C Rob. 173.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The *Elsebe*, 5 C Rob. 173.

Since Great Britain—see above, § 417—has abandoned her opposition to the right of convoy and has agreed to articles 61 and 62 of the Declaration of London which lay down rules concerning the matter, the resistance by a neutral convoy to visitation may not, under ordinary circumstances, be considered to be resistance on the part of the convoyed neutral merchantman. If, however, the commander of a convoy, after having refused to give the written information mentioned in article 61 or to allow the investigation mentioned in article 62, forcibly resists visitation of the convoyed merchantmen by a belligerent cruiser, the question as to whether resistance by a convoy is equivalent to resistance by a convoyed vessel, may even under the Declaration of London arise.

Since Great Britain—see above, § 417—has dropped her opposition to the right of convoy and has agreed to articles 61 and 62 of the Declaration of London, which outline the rules regarding this issue, the resistance of a neutral convoy to inspection usually should not be viewed as resistance from the neutral merchant vessels being convoyed. However, if the commander of a convoy, after refusing to provide the written information mentioned in article 61 or to allow the inspection referred to in article 62, forcefully resists the inspection of the convoyed merchant vessels by a belligerent cruiser, the question of whether resistance by a convoy is equivalent to resistance by a convoyed vessel may arise, even under the Declaration of London.

Deficiency of Papers.

Missing Documents.

The Declaration of London does not mention the point, and the International Prize Court would, therefore, have to evolve a system of rules to be applied in cases concerned.

The Declaration of London doesn't address this issue, so the International Prize Court would need to create a set of rules to apply in the relevant cases.

Spoliation, Defacement, and Concealment of Papers.

Spoliation, Defacement, and Hiding of Documents.

§ 427. Mere deficiency of papers does not arouse the same suspicion which a vessel incurs if she destroys[905] or throws overboard any of her papers, defaces them or conceals them, and in especial in case the spoliation of papers takes place at the time when the visiting vessel comes in sight. Whatever her cargo may be, a vessel may at once be seized without further search so soon as it becomes apparent that spoliation, defacement, or concealment of papers has taken place. The practice of the several States has hitherto differed with regard to other consequences of spoliation, and[Pg 545] the like, of papers, but confiscation is certainly admissible in case other circumstances increase the suspicion.[906]

§ 427. Simply lacking documents doesn't raise the same suspicion as when a vessel destroys[905] or throws any of her papers overboard, alters them, or hides them, especially if this happens when the inspecting vessel comes into view. No matter what her cargo is, a vessel can be immediately seized without further investigation as soon as it's clear that documents have been destroyed, altered, or hidden. Different states have had varying practices regarding the consequences of document destruction and similar actions, but confiscation is definitely allowed if other factors increase suspicion.[906]

[905] The Hunter (1815), 1 Dodson, 480.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Hunter (1815), 1 Dodson, 480.

[906] See the case of the Apollo in Calvo, V. § 2989.

[906] Refer to the case of the Apollo in Calvo, V. § 2989.

The Declaration of London does not mention the case of spoliation of papers, and it would therefore be the task of the International Prize Court to evolve a uniform practice concerning the subject.

The Declaration of London doesn't address the issue of damaged documents, so it will be up to the International Prize Court to develop a consistent approach to this matter.

Double and False Papers.

Fake Documents.

§ 428. The highest suspicion is aroused through the fact that a visited vessel carries double papers, or false[907] papers, and such vessel may certainly be seized. But the practice of the several States has hitherto differed with regard to the question whether confiscation is admissible for the mere fact of carrying double or false papers. Whereas the practice of some States, as Russia and Spain, answered the question in the affirmative, British[908] and American[909] practice took a more lenient view, and condemned such vessels only on a clear inference that the false or double papers were carried for the purpose of deceiving the belligerent by whom the capture was made, but not in other cases.[910]

§ 428. The highest suspicion arises when a visited vessel has double papers or false[907] papers, and such a vessel can definitely be seized. However, the practices of different States have varied regarding whether confiscation is justified solely for having double or false papers. Some States, like Russia and Spain, answered this question in the affirmative, while British[908] and American[909] practices have been more lenient, only condemning such vessels when it’s clear that the false or double papers were meant to deceive the belligerent who captured the vessel, but not in other situations.[910]

[907] The Sarah (1801), 3 C. Rob. 330.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Sarah (1801), 3 C. Rob. 330.

[908] The Eliza and Katy (1805), 6 C. Rob. 192.

[908] The Eliza and Katy (1805), 6 C. Rob. 192.

[909] The St. Nicholas (1816), 1 Wheaton, 417.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The St. Nicholas (1816), 1 Wheaton, 417.

[910] See Halleck, II. p. 271; Hall, § 276; Taylor, § 690.

[910] See Halleck, II. p. 271; Hall, § 276; Taylor, § 690.

Since the Declaration of London does not mention the case of double or false papers, it would likewise be the task of the International Prize Court to evolve a uniform practice.[Pg 546]

Since the Declaration of London doesn’t address the issue of double or false papers, it will also be the responsibility of the International Prize Court to develop a consistent practice.[Pg 546]

II Capture

Hall, § 277—Lawrence, § 191—Phillimore, III. §§ 361-364—Twiss, II. §§ 166-184—Halleck, II. pp. 362-391—Taylor, § 691—Moore, VII. §§ 1206-1214—Bluntschli, § 860—Heffter, §§ 171, 191, 192—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 777-780—Ullmann, § 196—Rivier, II. pp. 426-428—Nys, III. pp. 697-709—Calvo, V. §§ 3004-3034—Fiore, III. Nos. 1644-1657, and Code, Nos. 1878-1889—Martens, II. §§ 126-137—Kleen, II. §§ 203-218—Gessner, pp. 333-356—Boeck, Nos. 770-777—Dupuis, Nos. 253-281, and Guerre, Nos. 205-217—Bernsten, § 11—Nippold, II. § 35—Perels, § 55—Testa, pp. 243-244—Hautefeuille, III. pp. 214-299—Holland, Prize Law, §§ 231-314—U.S. Naval War Code, articles 46-50—Atherley-Jones, Commerce in War (1906), pp. 361-646—Hirschmann, Das internationale Prisenrecht (1912), §§ 35-37—See also the monographs quoted above at the commencement of § 391, Bulmerincq's articles on Le droit des prises maritimes in R.I. X-XIII. (1878-1881), and the General Report presented to the Naval Conference of London on behalf of its Drafting Committee, articles 48-54.

Hall, § 277—Lawrence, § 191—Phillimore, III. §§ 361-364—Twiss, II. §§ 166-184—Halleck, II. pp. 362-391—Taylor, § 691—Moore, VII. §§ 1206-1214—Bluntschli, § 860—Heffter, §§ 171, 191, 192—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 777-780—Ullmann, § 196—Rivier, II. pp. 426-428—Nys, III. pp. 697-709—Calvo, V. §§ 3004-3034—Fiore, III. Nos. 1644-1657, and Code, Nos. 1878-1889—Martens, II. §§ 126-137—Kleen, II. §§ 203-218—Gessner, pp. 333-356—Boeck, Nos. 770-777—Dupuis, Nos. 253-281, and Guerre, Nos. 205-217—Bernsten, § 11—Nippold, II. § 35—Perels, § 55—Testa, pp. 243-244—Hautefeuille, III. pp. 214-299—Holland, Prize Law, §§ 231-314—U.S. Naval War Code, articles 46-50—Atherley-Jones, Commerce in War (1906), pp. 361-646—Hirschmann, Das internationale Prisenrecht (1912), §§ 35-37—See also the monographs quoted above at the start of § 391, Bulmerincq's articles on Le droit des prises maritimes in R.I. X-XIII. (1878-1881), and the General Report presented to the Naval Conference of London on behalf of its Drafting Committee, articles 48-54.

Grounds and Mode of Capture.

Capture Methods and Areas.

§ 429. From the statements given above in §§ 368-428 regarding blockade, contraband, unneutral service, and visitation, it is obvious that capture may take place either because the vessel, or the cargo, or both, are liable to confiscation, or because grave suspicion demands a further inquiry which can be carried out in a port only. Both cases are alike so far as all details of capture are concerned, and in the latter case Prize Courts may pronounce capture to be justified, although no ground for confiscation of either vessel or cargo, or both, has been detected.

§ 429. From the statements mentioned above in §§ 368-428 about blockade, contraband, unneutral service, and inspection, it’s clear that a capture can occur either because the vessel, the cargo, or both are subject to confiscation, or because serious suspicion warrants further investigation that can only be carried out in a port. Both situations are similar regarding all aspects of the capture, and in the second case, Prize Courts may determine the capture to be justified, even if no reasons for confiscating either the vessel or the cargo, or both, have been found.

The mode of capture is the same as described above in § 184 regarding capture of enemy vessels.[911]

The method of capturing is the same as mentioned earlier in § 184 about capturing enemy ships.[911]

[911] The Règlement international des prises maritimes, adopted by the Institute of International Law at its meeting at Heidelberg in 1887, regulates capture in §§ 45-62; see Annuaire, IX. (1888), p. 204.

[911] The International Regulations for Maritime Captures, adopted by the Institute of International Law at its meeting in Heidelberg in 1887, governs capture in §§ 45-62; see Yearbook, IX. (1888), p. 204.

Effect of Capture of Neutral Vessels, and their Conduct to Port.

Effect of Seizing Neutral Ships and Bringing Them to Port.

§ 430. The effect of capture of neutral vessels is in every way different from the effect of capture of enemy vessels,[912] since the purpose of capture differs in these two cases. Capture of enemy vessels is made for the[Pg 547] purpose of appropriating them in the exercise of the right of belligerents to appropriate all enemy property found on the Open Sea or in the maritime territorial belt of either belligerent. On the other hand, neutral merchantmen are captured for the purpose of confiscation of vessel or cargo, or both, as punishment for certain special acts, the punishment to be pronounced by a Prize Court after a thorough investigation into all the circumstances of the special case. Therefore, although the effect of capture of neutral vessels is that the vessels, the individuals, and the goods thereon are placed under the captor's authority, her officers and crew never become prisoners of war. They are indeed to be detained as witnesses for the trial of the vessel and cargo, but nothing stands in the way of releasing such of them as are not wanted for that purpose. As regards passengers, if any, they have to be released as soon as possible, with the exception of those enemy persons who may be made prisoners of war.

§ 430. The impact of capturing neutral vessels is completely different from capturing enemy vessels,[912] because the reason for the capture varies in these situations. Enemy vessels are captured to take possession of them, exercising the right of belligerents to seize all enemy property found on the Open Sea or in the maritime territorial waters of either party involved. In contrast, neutral merchant ships are captured to confiscate the vessel or cargo, or both, as punishment for specific actions, with the penalty decided by a Prize Court after a detailed investigation into the specific circumstances of the case. Therefore, while the consequence of capturing neutral vessels is that the vessels, the individuals, and the goods on board come under the captor's control, the officers and crew do not become prisoners of war. They should be held as witnesses for the trial of the vessel and cargo, but there’s nothing preventing the release of those who are not needed for that purpose. Regarding any passengers, they should be released as soon as possible, except for those enemy individuals who may be captured as prisoners of war.

[912] See above, § 185.

See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Regarding the conduct of captured neutral vessels to a port of a Prize Court, the same is valid as regards conduct of captured enemy vessels[913] to such port.

Regarding the handling of captured neutral vessels to a Prize Court port, the same rules apply to captured enemy vessels[913] to that port.

[913] See above, § 193.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Destruction of Neutral Prizes.

Destruction of Neutral Awards.

§ 431. That as a rule captured neutral vessels may not be sunk, burned, or otherwise destroyed has always been universally recognised just as that captured enemy merchantmen may not as a rule be destroyed. But up to the time of the agreement on the Declaration of London it was a moot question whether the destruction of captured neutral vessels was likewise exceptionally allowed instead of bringing them before a Prize Court. British[914] practice did not, as regards the neutral owner of the vessel, hold the captor justified in destroying a vessel, however exceptional the case may[Pg 548] have been, and however meritorious the destruction of the vessel may have been from the point of view of the Government of the captor. For this reason, should a captor, for any motive whatever, have destroyed a neutral prize, full indemnities had to be paid to the owner, although, if brought into a port of a Prize Court, condemnation of vessel and cargo would have been pronounced beyond doubt. The rule was, that a neutral prize must be abandoned in case it could not, for any reason whatever, be brought to a port of a Prize Court. But the practice of other States did not recognise this British rule. The question became of great importance in 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War, when Russian cruisers sank the British vessels Knight Commander, Oldhamia, Icona, St. Kilda, and Hipsang, the German vessels Thea, and Tetardos, and the Danish vessel Princesse Marie. Russia paid damages to the owners of the vessels Icona, St. Kilda, Thea, Tetardos, and Princesse Marie, because her Prize Courts declared that the capture of these vessels was not justified, but she refused to pay damages to the owners of the other vessels destroyed, because her Prize Courts considered them to have been justly captured.

§ 431. It has always been universally acknowledged that captured neutral vessels cannot be sunk, burned, or otherwise destroyed, just as captured enemy merchant ships cannot usually be destroyed. However, until the agreement on the Declaration of London, it was debated whether the destruction of captured neutral vessels could be exceptioned instead of being taken before a Prize Court. British[914] practices did not view the captor as justified in destroying a vessel, regardless of how exceptional the situation was and how commendable the destruction might have appeared from the captor government's perspective. Therefore, if a captor destroyed a neutral prize for any reason, full compensation had to be paid to the owner, even though the vessel and cargo would have clearly been condemned if they had been taken to a Prize Court. The rule was that a neutral prize had to be abandoned if it could not be brought to a Prize Court for any reason. However, the practices of other nations did not recognize this British rule. The issue became very significant in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War when Russian cruisers sank the British vessels Knight Commander, Oldhamia, Icona, St. Kilda, and Hipsang, the German vessels Thea and Tetardos, and the Danish vessel Princesse Marie. Russia compensated the owners of the vessels Icona, St. Kilda, Thea, Tetardos, and Princesse Marie because her Prize Courts ruled that the capture of these vessels was not justified, but she refused to compensate the owners of the other destroyed vessels, as her Prize Courts determined that their capture was justified.

[914] The Actaeon (1815), 2 Dodson, 48; the Felicity (1819), 2 Dodson, 381; the Leucade (1855), Spinks, 217. See Phillimore, III. § 333; Twiss, II. § 166; Hall, § 77; Holland, Letters to the "Times" upon War and Neutrality (1909), pp. 140-150.

[914] The Actaeon (1815), 2 Dodson, 48; the Felicity (1819), 2 Dodson, 381; the Leucade (1855), Spinks, 217. See Phillimore, III. § 333; Twiss, II. § 166; Hall, § 77; Holland, Letters to the "Times" on War and Neutrality (1909), pp. 140-150.

The Declaration of London proposes to settle the matter by a compromise. Recognising that neutral prizes may not as a rule be destroyed, and admitting only one exception to the rule, it empowers the captor under certain circumstances and conditions to demand the handing over, or to proceed himself to the destruction, of contraband carried by a neutral prize which he is compelled to abandon.

The Declaration of London aims to resolve the issue through a compromise. It acknowledges that, generally, neutral prizes shouldn't be destroyed, allowing for only one exception to this rule. It gives the captor, under specific circumstances and conditions, the right to request the handover, or to destroy, contraband carried by a neutral prize that he has to abandon.

The very first rule of Chapter IV. of the Declaration of London, headed "Destruction of Neutral Prizes," is that of article 48, according to which, as a matter of principle, captured neutral vessels may not be destroyed, but must be taken into a port of a Prize Court.[Pg 549] However, article 49 permits, as an exception to the rule, the destruction of such a captured neutral vessel as would herself be liable to condemnation, if the taking of the vessel into a port of a Prize Court would involve danger to the safety of the capturing cruiser, or to the success of the operations in which she is at the time of capture engaged.

The very first rule of Chapter IV of the Declaration of London, titled "Destruction of Neutral Prizes," is outlined in article 48, which states that, as a general principle, captured neutral ships cannot be destroyed but must be brought to a port of a Prize Court.[Pg 549] However, article 49 allows for an exception to this rule, permitting the destruction of a captured neutral ship if it would be subject to condemnation itself and taking it to a port of a Prize Court would pose a threat to the safety of the capturing cruiser or hinder the success of the operations that the cruiser is involved in at the time of capture.

There is, therefore, no doubt that a neutral prize may no longer be destroyed because the captor cannot spare a prize crew or because a port of a Prize Court is too far distant, or the like. The only justification for destruction of a neutral prize is danger to the captor or his operations at the time of capture. As regards the degree of danger required, it cannot be denied that the wording of article 49 does not provide any clue for a restrictive interpretation. But considering that article 51 speaks of an "exceptional necessity," it is hoped and to be expected that the International Prize Court would give such an interpretation to article 49 as would permit a resort to the sinking of neutral prizes in cases of absolute necessity only. Be that as it may, according to article 49 only such neutral prizes may be sunk as would be liable to confiscation if brought before a Prize Court. Sinking of captured neutral vessels—apart from neutral vessels which have acquired enemy character and may for this reason be sunk under the same conditions as enemy vessels—is, therefore, chiefly admitted in three[915] cases, namely: (1) When—see article 40 of the Declaration of London—the vessel[Pg 550] carries contraband the value of which forms more than half the value of the cargo; (2) when a vessel has been captured for rendering those kinds of unneutral service which are enumerated by article 45 of the Declaration of London; (3) when—see article 21 of the Declaration of London—a vessel has been captured for breach of blockade. In no case, however, in which she is not liable to confiscation, may a neutral vessel under any circumstances and conditions be destroyed; she must always be abandoned if the capturing cruiser cannot take her into a port of a Prize Court.

There is no doubt that a neutral prize can no longer be destroyed simply because the captor can't spare a prize crew or because a Prize Court is too far away, or similar reasons. The only reason to destroy a neutral prize is if it poses a danger to the captor or their operations at the time of capture. Regarding the level of danger required, it's clear that the wording of article 49 does not hint at a restrictive interpretation. However, considering that article 51 mentions an "exceptional necessity," it is hoped that the International Prize Court will interpret article 49 in a way that allows for the sinking of neutral prizes only in cases of absolute necessity. Regardless, according to article 49, only those neutral prizes that would be subject to confiscation if presented to a Prize Court may be sunk. The sinking of captured neutral vessels—except for neutral vessels that have taken on enemy characteristics and can thus be sunk under the same conditions as enemy vessels—is mainly allowed in three cases: (1) When—see article 40 of the Declaration of London—the vessel carries contraband worth more than half the cargo's value; (2) when a vessel has been captured for providing those types of unneutral services listed in article 45 of the Declaration of London; (3) when—see article 21 of the Declaration of London—a vessel has been captured for breaking a blockade. In any case where the vessel is not subject to confiscation, a neutral vessel cannot be destroyed under any circumstances; it must always be abandoned if the capturing cruiser cannot take it to a Prize Court.

[915] Only such cases of possible confiscation of a neutral vessel are mentioned in the text as are in accordance with the Declaration of London. The practice of some States has hitherto admitted confiscation in other cases also, for instance, in case of deficiency, spoliation, or defacement of ship papers, and in case of double and false papers; see above, §§ 426-428. It will be the task of the International Prize Court to evolve a uniform practice with regard to such cases. Likewise the text does not enumerate the cases in which the sinking of a neutral vessel is permissible because she previously acquired enemy character; concerning this, see above, § 89.

[915] The text only mentions cases of potential confiscation of a neutral vessel that align with the Declaration of London. Some States have allowed confiscation in other situations too, such as when there’s a deficiency, spoliation, or alteration of ship papers, and in instances of duplicate or fake papers; refer to §§ 426-428 for more details. The International Prize Court will be responsible for developing a consistent practice regarding these cases. Additionally, the text doesn’t list the scenarios where sinking a neutral vessel is allowed due to her previously taking on an enemy character; for more on this, see above, § 89.

However this may be, when the captor feels compelled to resort to the destruction of a neutral prize, he must place in safety all persons found on the captured vessel, and he must take on board all the captured ship's papers which are relevant for the purpose of deciding the validity of the capture (article 50). And (article 51) if the captor fails to establish the fact before the Prize Court that he destroyed the prize in the face of an exceptional necessity, the owners of the vessel and cargo must receive full compensation without any examination of, and any regard to, the question as to whether or no the capture itself was justifiable. Compensation must likewise be paid in case the capture is held by the Prize Court to be invalid, although the act of destruction has been held to be justifiable (article 52). And in any case, the owners of neutral goods not liable to condemnation which have been destroyed with the vessel, may always and under all circumstances and conditions claim damages (article 53).

However this may be, when the captor feels the need to destroy a neutral prize, he must ensure the safety of all individuals on the captured vessel, and he must take aboard all relevant ship papers that are necessary to determine the validity of the capture (article 50). And (article 51) if the captor fails to prove to the Prize Court that he destroyed the prize out of exceptional necessity, the owners of the vessel and cargo must receive full compensation without any examination or consideration of whether the capture itself was justified. Compensation must also be paid if the Prize Court determines that the capture was invalid, even if the destruction was deemed justifiable (article 52). Additionally, the owners of neutral goods that are not subject to condemnation and have been destroyed along with the vessel can always claim damages under any circumstances (article 53).

Thus many safeguards have been established against arbitrariness in resorting to the destruction of neutral prizes. On the other hand, it would seem to be going too far to insist on the captor letting the prize go with her contraband on board, if he be compelled to abandon the prize. For this reason article 54 empowers the[Pg 551] captor of a neutral vessel herself not liable to confiscation, to demand the handing over, or to proceed himself to the destruction, of any goods liable to confiscation found on board, if the taking of the vessel into a port of a Prize Court would involve danger to the captor or to the success of the operations in which he is at the time of capture engaged. Details concerning such destruction have been given above in § 406a (2).

Thus, many protections have been put in place to prevent arbitrary actions related to the destruction of neutral prizes. However, it seems excessive to require the captor to allow the prize to carry her contraband if he must abandon it. For this reason, Article 54 allows the[Pg 551] captor of a neutral vessel, which is not subject to confiscation, to demand the surrender of or to proceed with the destruction of any goods that could be confiscated found on board if taking the vessel to a Prize Court poses a risk to the captor or to the success of the operations he is involved in at the time of the capture. Further details about such destruction have been provided above in § 406a (2).

Ransom and Recapture of Neutral Prizes.

Ransom and Recovery of Neutral Prizes.

§ 432. Regarding ransom of captured neutral vessels, the same is valid as regards ransom of captured enemy vessels.[916]

§ 432. Concerning the ransom of captured neutral vessels, the same applies to the ransom of captured enemy vessels.[916]

[916] See above, § 195.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

As regards recapture of neutral prizes,[917] the rule ought to be that ipso facto by recapture the vessel becomes free without payment of any salvage. Although captured, she was still the property of her neutral owners, and if condemnation had taken place at all, it would have been a punishment, and the recapturing belligerent has no interest whatever in the punishment of a neutral vessel by the enemy.

As for getting back neutral prizes,[917] the rule should be that ipso facto by recapture the vessel is released without any salvage payment. Even though it was captured, it still belonged to its neutral owners, and if it had been condemned at all, that would have been a penalty, and the recapturing belligerent has no interest in punishing a neutral vessel by the enemy.

[917] See Hautefeuille, III. pp. 366-406; Gessner, pp. 344-356; Kleen, II. § 217; Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 778-780; Calvo, V. §§ 3210-3216.

[917] See Hautefeuille, III. pp. 366-406; Gessner, pp. 344-356; Kleen, II. § 217; Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 778-780; Calvo, V. §§ 3210-3216.

But the matter of recapture of neutral prizes is not settled, no rule of International Law and no uniform practice of the several States being formulated regarding it. Very few treaties touch upon it, and the municipal regulations of the different States regarding prizes seldom mention it. According to British practice,[918] the recaptor of a neutral prize is entitled to salvage, in case the recaptured vessel would have been liable to condemnation if brought into an enemy port.

But the issue of reclaiming neutral prizes is still unresolved, as there is no established rule in International Law and no consistent practice among different States on this matter. Very few treaties address it, and the local laws of various States regarding prizes rarely mention it. According to British practice,[918] the person who reclaims a neutral prize is entitled to salvage if the recovered vessel would have faced condemnation if it had been taken to an enemy port.

[918] The War Onskan (1799), 2 C. Rob. 299. See Holland, Prize Law, § 270.

[918] The War Onskan (1799), 2 C. Rob. 299. See Holland, Prize Law, § 270.

Release after Capture.

Release after Capture.

§ 433. Besides the case in which captured vessels must be abandoned, because they cannot for some reason or another be brought into a port, there are[Pg 552] cases in which they are released without a trial. The rule is that a captured neutral vessel is to be tried by a Prize Court in case the captor asserts her to be suspicious or guilty. But it may happen that all suspicion is dispelled even before the trial, and then the vessel is to be released at once. For this reason article 246 of Holland's Prize Law lays down the rule: "If, after the detention of the vessel, there should come to the knowledge of the commander any further acts tending to show that the vessel has been improperly detained, he should immediately release her...." Even after she has been brought into the port of a Prize Court, release can take place without a trial. Thus the German vessels Bundesrath and Herzog, which were captured in 1900 during the South African War and taken to Durban, were, after search had dispelled all suspicion, released without trial.

§ 433. Besides the situations where captured ships must be abandoned because they can’t be brought into port for some reason, there are cases where they are released without a trial. The rule is that a captured neutral ship must be tried by a Prize Court if the captor claims it is suspicious or guilty. However, there may be instances where all suspicion is cleared even before the trial, and in that case, the ship should be released immediately. For this reason, article 246 of Holland's Prize Law states: "If, after the ship is detained, the commander becomes aware of any further actions indicating that the ship was improperly detained, he should immediately release her...." Even after the ship has been brought into a Prize Court's port, it can be released without a trial. Thus, the German ships Bundesrath and Herzog, which were captured in 1900 during the South African War and taken to Durban, were released without a trial after investigation cleared all suspicion.

That the released vessel may claim damages is a matter of course, and article 64 of the Declaration of London precisely enacts it. But it should be mentioned that, since Convention XII. stipulates only appeals against judgments of National Prize Courts, the International Prize Court would not have jurisdiction in a case of the release of a vessel without trial, and that the question of compensation could, therefore, be settled through the diplomatic channel only.[Pg 553]

That a released vessel can claim damages is expected, and Article 64 of the Declaration of London clearly states this. However, it’s important to note that since Convention XII only covers appeals against decisions made by National Prize Courts, the International Prize Court wouldn’t have jurisdiction in cases where a vessel is released without trial. Therefore, the issue of compensation would need to be resolved through diplomatic channels only.[Pg 553]

III TRIAL OF CAPTURED NEUTRAL SHIPS

Lawrence, §§ 188-190—Maine, p. 96—Manning, pp. 472-483—Phillimore, III. §§ 433-508—Twiss, II. §§ 169-170—Halleck, II. pp. 393-429—Taylor, §§ 563-567—Wharton, III. §§ 328-330—Moore, VII. §§ 1222-1248—Wheaton, §§ 389-397—Bluntschli, §§ 841-862—Heffter, §§ 172-173—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 781-788—Ullmann, § 196—Bonfils, Nos. 1676-1691—Despagnet, Nos. 677-682 bis—Rivier, II. pp. 353-356—Nys, III. pp. 710-718—Calvo, V. §§ 3035-3087—Fiore, III. Nos. 1681-1691, and Code, Nos. 1890-1929—Martens, II. §§ 125-126—Kleen, II. §§ 219-234—Gessner, pp. 357-427—Boeck, Nos. 740-800—Dupuis, Nos. 282-301, and Guerre, Nos. 218-223—Nippold, II. § 35—Perels, §§ 56-57—Testa, pp. 244-247—Hautefeuille, III. pp. 299-365—Atherley-Jones, Commerce in War (1906), pp. 361-594—Hirschmann, Das internationale Prisenrecht (1912), § 38—See also the monographs quoted above at the commencement of § 391, and Bulmerincq's articles on Le droit des prises maritimes in R.I. X.-XIII. (1878-1881).

Lawrence, §§ 188-190—Maine, p. 96—Manning, pp. 472-483—Phillimore, III. §§ 433-508—Twiss, II. §§ 169-170—Halleck, II. pp. 393-429—Taylor, §§ 563-567—Wharton, III. §§ 328-330—Moore, VII. §§ 1222-1248—Wheaton, §§ 389-397—Bluntschli, §§ 841-862—Heffter, §§ 172-173—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 781-788—Ullmann, § 196—Bonfils, Nos. 1676-1691—Despagnet, Nos. 677-682 bis—Rivier, II. pp. 353-356—Nys, III. pp. 710-718—Calvo, V. §§ 3035-3087—Fiore, III. Nos. 1681-1691, and Code, Nos. 1890-1929—Martens, II. §§ 125-126—Kleen, II. §§ 219-234—Gessner, pp. 357-427—Boeck, Nos. 740-800—Dupuis, Nos. 282-301, and Guerre, Nos. 218-223—Nippold, II. § 35—Perels, §§ 56-57—Testa, pp. 244-247—Hautefeuille, III. pp. 299-365—Atherley-Jones, Commerce in War (1906), pp. 361-594—Hirschmann, Das internationale Prisenrecht (1912), § 38—See also the monographs quoted above at the beginning of § 391, and Bulmerincq's articles on Le droit des prises maritimes in R.I. X.-XIII. (1878-1881).

Trial of Captured Vessels a Municipal Matter.

Trial of Captured Vessels is a Local Issue.

§ 434. Although belligerents have, under certain circumstances, according to International Law, the right to capture neutral vessels, and although they have the duty to bring these vessels for trial before a Prize Court, such trials are in no way an international matter. Just as Prize Courts—apart from the proposed International Prize Court—are municipal[919] institutions, so trials of captured neutral vessels by these Prize Courts are municipal matters. The neutral home States of the vessels are not represented and, directly at any rate, not concerned in the trial. Nor is, as commonly maintained, the law administered by Prize Courts International Law. These Courts apply the law of their country. The best proof of this is the fact that the practice of the Prize Courts of the several countries has hitherto differed in many points. Thus, for instance,[Pg 554] the question what is and what is not contraband, and, further, the question when an attempt to break blockade begins and when it ends, have hitherto been differently answered by the practice of different States.

§ 434. Although warring parties have, under certain circumstances, the right to seize neutral vessels according to International Law, and although they are required to bring these vessels before a Prize Court for trial, these trials are not handled as international matters. Just like Prize Courts—except for the proposed International Prize Court—are local institutions, the trials of seized neutral vessels by these Prize Courts are also local issues. The neutral home States of the vessels are not represented and, at least directly, are not involved in the trial. Moreover, contrary to popular belief, the law enforced by Prize Courts is not International Law. These Courts apply their own country's laws. The best evidence of this is that the practices of Prize Courts in different countries have varied significantly. For example, the definitions of what constitutes contraband and the timing of when an attempt to break a blockade starts and ends have been answered differently by the practices of different States.

[919] See above, § 192. The matter is regulated so far as Great Britain is concerned by the Naval Prize Act, 1864 (27 and 28 Vict. ch. 25) and the Prize Courts Act, 1894 (57 and 58 Vict. ch. 39). The Règlement international des prises maritimes, adopted in 1887 at Heidelberg by the Institute of International Law, provides in §§ 63-118 detailed rules concerning the organisation of Prize Courts and the procedure before them; see Annuaire, IX. (1888), p. 208.

[919] See above, § 192. The issue is governed in the UK by the Naval Prize Act, 1864 (27 and 28 Vict. ch. 25) and the Prize Courts Act, 1894 (57 and 58 Vict. ch. 39). The International Regulations on Maritime Prizes, adopted in 1887 in Heidelberg by the Institute of International Law, provides in §§ 63-118 detailed guidelines for the organization of Prize Courts and the procedures they follow; see Annuaire, IX. (1888), p. 208.

[920] The Maria (1799), 1 C. Rob. 340; the Recovery (1807), 6 C. Rob. 341; the Fox and others (1811), Edwards, 311.

[920] The Maria (1799), 1 C. Rob. 340; the Recovery (1807), 6 C. Rob. 341; the Fox and others (1811), Edwards, 311.

[921] See, for instance, Halleck, II. p. 411; Maine, p. 96; Manning, p. 472; Phillimore, III. §§ 433-436; Hall, § 277. On the other hand, Holland, Studies, p. 199; Westlake, II. p. 289; and Scott, Conferences, p. 467, distinctly agree with me.

[921] For example, see Halleck, II. p. 411; Maine, p. 96; Manning, p. 472; Phillimore, III. §§ 433-436; Hall, § 277. On the other hand, Holland, Studies, p. 199; Westlake, II. p. 289; and Scott, Conferences, p. 467, clearly agree with me.

And matters will remain as they are even after the establishment of the International Prize Court and ratification of the Declaration of London. The law of this Declaration is certainly International Law, but it will be binding only upon the States, and they, on their part, must embody it in their Municipal Law so that their Prize Courts are obliged to administer such a law in prize cases as is in conformity with the Declaration of London. It will be the task of the International Prize Court[922] to control the National Prize Courts in that direction. A State which is a party to the Declaration and would nevertheless order its Prize Courts to apply a law which is in opposition to the Declaration of London, would commit an international[Pg 555] delinquency, but its Prize Courts would be obliged to apply such law.

And things will stay the same even after the International Prize Court is established and the Declaration of London is ratified. The law outlined in this Declaration is definitely International Law, but it will only be binding on the States. They must incorporate it into their national laws so that their Prize Courts are required to apply a law in prize cases that aligns with the Declaration of London. It will be the responsibility of the International Prize Court[922] to supervise the National Prize Courts in this regard. A State that is a party to the Declaration but still directs its Prize Courts to apply a law that contradicts the Declaration of London would be committing an international offense, but its Prize Courts would still have to enforce that law.

[922] Trial before this Court is, of course, an international matter.

[922] The trial in this Court is, of course, an international issue.

Result of Trial.

Trial Outcome.

§ 435. The trial of a captured neutral ship can have one or more of five results:—vessel and cargo can be condemned,[923] or the vessel alone, or the cargo alone; and the vessel and cargo can be released either with or without costs and damages. Costs and damages must be allowed when capture was not justified, and, after the ratification of the Declaration of London and the establishment of the International Prize Court, an appeal may, according to article 64 of the Declaration of London and article 4 of Convention XII., be brought before the International Prize Court if costs and damages are refused or inadequately allowed by a Prize Court. But it must be emphasised that capture might be justified, as, for instance, in the case of spoliation of papers, although the Prize Court did not condemn the vessel, and, further, that costs and damages are never allowed in case a part only of the cargo is condemned, although the vessel herself and the greater part of the cargo are released. That, in case the captor is unable to pay the costs and damages allowed to a released neutral vessel, his Government has to indemnify the vessel, there ought to be no doubt, for a State bears "vicarious" responsibility[924] for internationally injurious acts of its naval forces.

§ 435. The trial of a captured neutral ship can lead to one or more of five outcomes: the vessel and cargo can be condemned,[923] or just the vessel, or just the cargo; and both the vessel and cargo can be released either with or without costs and damages. Costs and damages must be provided when the capture was not justified, and after the ratification of the Declaration of London and the establishment of the International Prize Court, an appeal may, as stated in article 64 of the Declaration of London and article 4 of Convention XII., be taken to the International Prize Court if costs and damages are denied or insufficiently provided by a Prize Court. However, it should be noted that the capture might be justified, for instance, in cases of document spoliation, even if the Prize Court did not condemn the vessel. Additionally, costs and damages are never awarded when only a portion of the cargo is condemned, while the vessel itself and the majority of the cargo are released. In cases where the captor cannot pay the costs and damages awarded to a released neutral vessel, there should be no doubt that their Government must compensate the vessel, as a State has "vicarious" responsibility[924] for internationally wrongful acts of its naval forces.

[923] It would seem to be obvious that condemnation of the vessel involves the loss of the vessel at the date of capture; see Andersen v. Marten, L.R. (1907) 2 K.B. 248.

[923] It seems clear that condemning the vessel means losing it on the date it was seized; see Andersen v. Marten, L.R. (1907) 2 K.B. 248.

Trial after Conclusion of Peace.

Trial after Peace Agreement.

§ 436. It is a moot question whether neutral vessels captured before conclusion of peace may be tried after the conclusion of peace.[925] I think that the answer[Pg 556] must be in the affirmative, even if a special clause is contained in the Treaty of Peace, which stipulates that captured but not yet condemned vessels of the belligerents shall be released. A trial of neutral prizes is in any case necessary for the purpose of deciding the question whether capture was justified or not, and whether, should condemnation not be justified, the neutral vessels may claim costs and indemnities. Thus, after the conclusion of the Abyssinian War, in December 1896, the Italian Prize Commission, in the case of the Doelwijk,[926] claimed the right to try the vessel in spite of the fact that peace had been concluded between the time of capture and trial, declared the capture of the vessel and cargo to have been justified, but pronounced that, peace having been concluded, confiscation of vessel and cargo would no longer be lawful.

§ 436. It's an open question whether neutral vessels seized before peace is finalized can be tried after peace has been established.[925] I believe the answer should be yes, even if there's a specific clause in the Treaty of Peace stating that captured vessels that haven't been condemned yet should be released. In any case, a trial of neutral prizes is essential to determine whether the capture was justified and whether, if it turns out the condemnation was unjustified, the neutral vessels can claim costs and damages. For example, after the Abyssinian War in December 1896, the Italian Prize Commission, regarding the case of the Doelwijk,[926] asserted its right to try the vessel despite the fact that peace had been established between the capture and the trial, ruled that the capture of the vessel and cargo was justified, but stated that, since peace had been concluded, confiscation of the vessel and cargo would no longer be permissible.

[925] See Perels, § 57, p. 309, in contradistinction to Bluntschli, § 862. But there is, of course, no doubt that a belligerent can exercise an act of grace and release such prizes. Thus, in November 1905, at the end of the Russo-Japanese War, the Mikado proclaimed the unconditional release of all neutral prizes captured after the signing but before the ratification of the Peace of Portsmouth. Thereby, three German vessels, two English, and one Norwegian escaped confiscation, which in strict law—see above, p. 534, note 4—would have been justified.

[925] See Perels, § 57, p. 309, compared to Bluntschli, § 862. However, there's no doubt that a belligerent can choose to show mercy and release such prizes. For example, in November 1905, at the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, the Emperor announced the unconditional release of all neutral prizes captured after the signing but before the ratification of the Peace of Portsmouth. As a result, three German ships, two English, and one Norwegian avoided confiscation, which, according to strict law—see above, p. 534, note 4—would have been warranted.

[926] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXVIII. pp. 66-90.

[926] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXVIII. pp. 66-90.

Different from the question whether neutral prizes may be tried after the conclusion of peace is the other question whether they may be condemned to be confiscated. In the above-mentioned case of the Doelwijk the question was answered in the negative, but I believe it ought to have been answered in the affirmative. Confiscation of vessel and cargo having the character of a punishment, it would seem that the punishment may be inflicted after the conclusion of peace provided the criminal act concerned was consummated before peace was concluded. But nothing, of course, stands in the way of a belligerent taking a more lenient view and ordering his Prize Courts not to pronounce confiscation of neutral vessels after the conclusion of peace.

Different from the question of whether neutral prizes can be tried after peace is established, there’s the other question of whether they can be condemned for confiscation. In the previously mentioned case of the Doelwijk, the question was answered negatively, but I believe it should have been answered positively. Since the confiscation of a vessel and cargo serves as a punishment, it seems that this punishment can be imposed after peace is concluded, as long as the criminal act took place before peace was established. However, of course, nothing prevents a belligerent from adopting a more lenient approach and instructing their Prize Courts not to impose confiscation on neutral vessels after peace has been reached.

The Declaration of London does not settle either the former or the latter question, and it would therefore[Pg 557] be the task of the International Prize Court to evolve a uniform practice in the cases concerned.

The Declaration of London doesn’t resolve either the former or the latter question, so it would be up to the International Prize Court to develop a consistent approach in these cases.

Protests and Claims of Neutrals after Trial.

Protests and Claims of Neutrals after the Trial.

§ 437. Hitherto, if a trial led to condemnation, and if the latter was confirmed by the Court of Appeal, the matter as between the captor and the owner of the captured vessel and cargo was finally settled. But the right of protection,[927] which a State exercises over its subjects and their property abroad, may nevertheless have been the cause of diplomatic protests and claims on the part of the neutral home State of a condemned vessel or cargo, in case the verdict of the Prize Courts was considered to be not in accordance with International Law or formally or materially unjust. It is through such protests and claims that the matter, which was hitherto a mere municipal one, became of international importance. And history records many instances of cases of interposition of neutral States after trials of vessels which had sailed under their flags. Thus, for instance, in the famous case of the Silesian Loan,[928] it was the fact that Frederick II. of Prussia considered the procedure of British Prize Courts regarding a number of Prussian merchantmen captured during war between Great Britain and France in 1747 and 1748 as unjust, which made him in 1752 resort to reprisal and cease the payment of the interest of the Silesian Loan. The matter was settled[929] in 1756, through the payment of £20,000 as indemnity by Great Britain. Thus, further, after the American Civil War, articles 12-17 of the Treaty of Washington[930] provided the appointment of three Commissioners for the purpose, amongst others, of deciding all claims against verdicts of the American Prize Courts. And when in 1879, during war between Peru and Chili, the[Pg 558] German vessel Luxor was condemned by the Peruvian Courts, Germany interposed and the vessel was released.[931]

§ 437. Until now, if a trial resulted in a guilty verdict, and if that verdict was upheld by the Court of Appeal, the issue between the captor and the owner of the seized vessel and cargo was considered settled. However, the right to protection,[927] which a State has over its citizens and their property abroad, could still lead to diplomatic protests and claims from the neutral home State of a condemned vessel or cargo, especially if the decision of the Prize Courts was seen as inconsistent with International Law or formally or materially unfair. It is through such protests and claims that the issue, previously regarded as a local matter, gained international significance. History records many instances where neutral States intervened after trials involving vessels flying their flags. For example, in the well-known case of the Silesian Loan,[928] Frederick II of Prussia deemed the actions of British Prize Courts regarding several Prussian merchant ships seized during the war between Great Britain and France in 1747 and 1748 to be unjust, which prompted him in 1752 to take retaliatory action and stop paying interest on the Silesian Loan. The issue was resolved[929] in 1756, when Great Britain paid £20,000 in compensation. Similarly, after the American Civil War, articles 12-17 of the Treaty of Washington[930] called for the appointment of three Commissioners to decide all claims against American Prize Court verdicts. And when in 1879, during the war between Peru and Chile, the[Pg 558] German vessel Luxor was condemned by Peruvian Courts, Germany intervened and the vessel was released.[931]

[928] See above, § 37.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[929] See Martens, Causes Célèbres, II. p. 167.

[929] See Martens, Causes Célèbres, II. p. 167.

[930] See Martens, N.R.G. XX. p. 698.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Martens, N.R.G. XX. p. 698.

[931] See above, § 404.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See above, § __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

The ratification of the Declaration of London and the establishment of the International Prize Court would finally do away with such grave international disputes.

The approval of the Declaration of London and the creation of the International Prize Court would finally eliminate such serious international conflicts.

CHAPTER 7 THE INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT

I Proposals for Global Prize Courts

Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 785-788—Boeck, Nos. 743-764—Dupuis, No. 289, and Guerre, Nos. 224-231—Higgins, pp. 432-435—Lémonon, pp. 280-293—Nippold, I. § 15—Trendelenburg, Lücken im Völkerrecht (1870), pp. 49-53—Gessner, Kriegführende und neutrale Mächte (1877), pp. 52-58—Bulmerincq and Gessner in R.I. XI. (1879), pp. 173-191, and XIII. (1881), pp. 260-267.

Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 785-788—Boeck, Nos. 743-764—Dupuis, No. 289, and Guerre, Nos. 224-231—Higgins, pp. 432-435—Lémonon, pp. 280-293—Nippold, I. § 15—Trendelenburg, Lücken im Völkerrecht (1870), pp. 49-53—Gessner, Kriegführende und neutrale Mächte (1877), pp. 52-58—Bulmerincq and Gessner in R.I. XI. (1879), pp. 173-191, and XIII. (1881), pp. 260-267.

Early Projects.

Early Projects.

§ 438. Numerous inconveniences must naturally result from a condition of International Law which has hitherto prevailed and according to which the Courts of the belligerent whose forces had captured neutral vessels exercised jurisdiction without any control by neutrals. Although, as shown above in § 437, neutrals frequently interfered after a trial and succeeded in obtaining recognition for their claims in face of the verdicts of Prize Courts, great dissatisfaction has long been felt at the condition of matters hitherto obtaining, and proposals have been made for so-called mixed Prize Courts.

§ 438. Many problems naturally arise from the current state of International Law, where the courts of the belligerent country that captured neutral vessels have exercised jurisdiction without any oversight from neutral parties. Although, as shown above in § 437, neutrals often intervened after a trial and managed to get their claims recognized despite the Prize Courts' verdicts, there has been long-standing dissatisfaction with the existing situation. As a result, proposals have been made for so-called mixed Prize Courts.

The first proposal of this kind was made in 1759 by Hübner,[932] who suggested a Prize Court composed of judges nominated by the belligerent and of consuls or councillors nominated by the home State of the captured neutral merchantmen.

The first proposal of this kind was made in 1759 by Hübner,[932] who suggested a Prize Court made up of judges appointed by the warring parties and consuls or councillors appointed by the home country of the captured neutral merchant ships.

[932] De la saisie des bâtiments neutres (1759), vol. II. p. 21.[Pg 560]

[932] On the Seizure of Neutral Buildings (1759), vol. II. p. 21.[Pg 560]

A somewhat similar proposal was made by Tetens[933] in 1805.

A similar proposal was made by Tetens[933] in 1805.

[933] Considérations sur les droits réciproques des puissances belligérantes et des puissances neutres sur mer, avec les principes du droit de guerre en général (1805), p. 163.

[933] Considerations on the Reciprocal Rights of Warring Powers and Neutral Powers at Sea, along with the Principles of the Law of War in General (1805), p. 163.

Other proposals followed until the Institute of International Law took up the matter in 1875, appointing, on the suggestion of Westlake, at its meeting at the Hague, a Commission for the purpose of drafting a Projet d'organisation d'un tribunal international des prises maritimes. In the course of time there were mainly two proposals before the Institute, Westlake's and Bulmerincq's.

Other proposals came up until the Institute of International Law addressed the issue in 1875, appointing, based on Westlake's suggestion, a Commission at its meeting in The Hague to draft a Projet d'organisation d'un tribunal international des prises maritimes. Over time, there were mainly two proposals presented to the Institute: Westlake's and Bulmerincq's.

Westlake proposed[934] that Courts of Appeal should be instituted in each case of war, and each Court should consist of three judges—one to be nominated by the belligerent concerned, another by the home State of the neutral prizes concerned, and the third by a neutral Power not interested in the case. According to Westlake's proposal there would therefore have to be instituted in every war as many Courts of Appeal as neutrals concerned.

Westlake proposed[934] that Courts of Appeal should be set up for each war, with each Court made up of three judges—one appointed by the involved belligerent, another by the home State of the neutral parties, and the third by a neutral Power that isn’t involved in the case. According to Westlake's suggestion, this means that every war would require as many Courts of Appeal as there are neutrals involved.

[934] See Annuaire, II. (1878), p. 114.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See *Yearbook*, II. (1878), p. 114.

Bulmerincq proposed[935] that two Courts should be instituted in each war for all prize cases, the one to act as Prize Court of the First Instance, the other to act as Prize Court of Appeal; each Court to consist of three judges, one judge to be appointed by each belligerent, the third judge to be appointed in common by all neutral maritime Powers.

Bulmerincq suggested[935] that two courts should be set up during each war to handle all prize cases: one would serve as the Prize Court of First Instance, and the other would function as the Prize Court of Appeal. Each court would have three judges, with one appointed by each warring party, and the third judge selected jointly by all neutral maritime powers.

[935] See R.I. XI. (1879), pp. 191-194.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See R.I. XI. (1879), pp. 191-194.

Finally, the Institute agreed, at its meeting at Heidelberg in 1887, upon the following proposal, which is embodied in §§ 100-109 of the Règlement international des prises maritimes:[936]—At the beginning of a war each belligerent institutes a Court of Appeal consisting of five judges, the president and one of the[Pg 561] other judges to be appointed by the belligerent, the three remaining to be nominated by three neutral Powers, and this Court to be competent for all prize cases.

Finally, the Institute decided, during its meeting in Heidelberg in 1887, on the following proposal, which is detailed in §§ 100-109 of the Règlement international des prises maritimes:[936]—At the start of a war, each side establishes a Court of Appeal made up of five judges. The president and one of the[Pg 561] other judges will be appointed by the warring side, while three remaining judges will be nominated by three neutral countries, and this Court will handle all prize cases.

[936] Annuaire, IX. (1887), p. 239.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Directory, IX. (1887), p. 239.

No further step was taken in the matter during the nineteenth century. But, during the South African War, the conviction became general that the exclusive jurisdiction of belligerents over captured neutral vessels is incompatible with the modern condition of the oversea commerce of neutrals. At the Second Peace Conference of 1907, therefore, Germany, as well as Great Britain, brought forward a project for real International Prize Courts.

No further action was taken on the issue during the nineteenth century. However, during the South African War, it became widely accepted that the exclusive control of warring nations over captured neutral ships does not align with the current state of overseas trade for neutral countries. At the Second Peace Conference in 1907, both Germany and Great Britain presented a proposal for genuine International Prize Courts.

German Project of 1907.

German Project of 1907.

§ 439. The German project[937] was embodied in a draft of thirty-one articles dealing in three chapters with "Competence in Prize Cases," "Organisation of the International Prize Court," and "Procedure before the International Prize Court," and made the following proposals:—National Prize Courts should only be competent in the first instance, every appeal to go to the International Prize Court, and the latter to be competent not only in case of capture of neutral vessels, but in every case of capture of merchantmen. At the beginning of every war an International Prize Court should be established, but, in case there were more than two parties to a war, as many International Prize Courts should be established as there were couples of States fighting against each other. Each Court every time it sat should consist of five judges, three of whom should be members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, and two should be admirals. The admirals should belong to the navies of the belligerents, but the three members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration should be chosen by neutral Powers, each belligerent authorising one neutral Power to select one member, and these two neutrals to appoint a third[Pg 562] neutral Power which would select the third member. The Court should sit at the Hague, have its first meeting when the first appeal case arose, and be dissolved after the conclusion of peace. The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration should serve as the Registry of every International Prize Court. Each belligerent and the owners of the captured vessels or cargoes should have the right to bring an appeal before the International Prize Court.

§ 439. The German project[937] was outlined in a draft consisting of thirty-one articles organized into three chapters: "Jurisdiction in Prize Cases," "Structure of the International Prize Court," and "Process before the International Prize Court." It proposed that national Prize Courts would only have initial jurisdiction, with all appeals going to the International Prize Court, which would be competent not only in cases of neutral vessels being captured but in all cases of merchant ship captures. An International Prize Court should be established at the start of every war, and if there were more than two parties involved, as many International Prize Courts should be set up as there were pairs of states in conflict. Each Court should consist of five judges, three of whom would be from the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague and two would be admirals. The admirals would come from the navies of the warring states, while the three members of the Permanent Court would be selected by neutral Powers, with each belligerent choosing one neutral Power to appoint a member, and those two neutrals appointing a third neutral Power to select the third member. The Court would convene in The Hague, hold its first meeting upon the first appeal case, and be dissolved after peace was established. The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration would act as the Registry for each International Prize Court. Both the belligerents and the owners of the captured vessels or cargoes would have the right to appeal to the International Prize Court.

[937] Deuxième Conférence, Actes, II. p. 1071.

[937] Second Conference, Proceedings, II. p. 1071.

British Project of 1907.

British Project of 1907.

§ 440. The British project[938] was embodied in a draft of sixteen articles, and made the following proposals:—The International Prize Court should be competent in such cases only as directly concerned a neutral Power or its subjects, an appeal to be brought before the International Court only after the case had been decided by the highest National Prize Court of the belligerent concerned. Neutral Powers only, and not their subjects, should have the right to enter an appeal, and each neutral Power should represent its subjects concerned in a prize case. In contradistinction to the German project, the British draft proposed the establishment once for all of a Permanent International Prize Court, each Power whose mercantile marine at the date of the signature of the proposed convention exceeded a total of 800,000 tons, should, within three months from the date of ratification, nominate a prominent jurist as a member of the Court, and another as his deputy. The President of the Court should be nominated by the signatory Powers in their alphabetical order, should remain in office one year only, and should have a casting vote. If a legal question were to be decided which had already been provided for in a convention between the parties in dispute, the Court should base its decision on such convention. In the absence of such a convention, and if all civilised nations were agreed on a[Pg 563] point of legal interest, the Court should base its decision thereon, otherwise the Court should decide according to the principles of International Law.

§ 440. The British project[938] was outlined in a draft of sixteen articles, making the following proposals: The International Prize Court should only handle cases directly involving a neutral Power or its subjects, with an appeal going to the International Court only after the case was decided by the highest National Prize Court of the relevant belligerent. Only neutral Powers, not their subjects, should have the right to appeal, and each neutral Power should represent its concerned subjects in a prize case. Unlike the German project, the British draft proposed establishing a Permanent International Prize Court that would be set up once and for all. Each Power with a mercantile marine exceeding 800,000 tons at the date of the proposed convention's signature should nominate a leading jurist as a member of the Court, along with another as his deputy, within three months of ratification. The President of the Court would be appointed by the signatory Powers in alphabetical order, serving only one year and having a casting vote. If a legal question needed resolution and it had already been addressed in a convention between the disputing parties, the Court would base its decision on that convention. If there was no such convention, and if all civilized nations agreed on a relevant legal point, the Court would base its decision on that agreement; otherwise, it would decide according to the principles of International Law.

[938] Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, Actes, II. p. 1076.

[938] Second Peace Conference, Proceedings, II. p. 1076.

Convention XII. of the Second Peace Conference.

Convention XII. of the Second Peace Conference.

§ 441. The Second Peace Conference, after having studied and discussed the German and the British projects, produced the "Convention (XII.) respecting the establishment of an International Prize Court" which, on the whole, follows more closely the lines of the British project, but includes several features of the German, and others which originate neither with the British nor the German project. It comprises fifty-seven articles and is divided into four parts headed respectively "General Provisions" (articles 1-9), "Constitution of the International Prize Court" (articles 10-27), "Procedure in the International Prize Court" (articles 28-50), and "Final Provisions" (articles 51-57). The Convention was signed by all the Powers represented at the Conference, except Brazil, China, Domingo, Greece, Luxemburg, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Roumania, Russia, Servia, and Venezuela. Ten States—namely, Chili, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Persia, Salvador, Siam, Turkey, and Uruguay—entered a reservation against article 15 of the Convention because they did not agree with the principle of the composition of the Court embodied in this article.

§ 441. The Second Peace Conference, after reviewing and discussing the German and British proposals, created the "Convention (XII.) regarding the establishment of an International Prize Court," which mainly aligns with the British proposal but also incorporates several elements from the German one, along with some features that originate independently of both. It consists of fifty-seven articles and is organized into four sections titled "General Provisions" (articles 1-9), "Constitution of the International Prize Court" (articles 10-27), "Procedure in the International Prize Court" (articles 28-50), and "Final Provisions" (articles 51-57). The Convention was signed by all the Powers present at the Conference, except for Brazil, China, Domingo, Greece, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Romania, Russia, Serbia, and Venezuela. Ten States—namely, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Persia, El Salvador, Siam, Turkey, and Uruguay—made a reservation against article 15 of the Convention because they disagreed with the principle of the Court's composition outlined in this article.

As eleven States did not sign the Convention and ten of the signatory States refused to accept the composition of the Court as regulated by article 15, it cannot be said that the Convention is based on universal agreement. Yet the fact that, with the exception of Russia, all the Great Powers and a great number of the minor Powers have signed it without a reservation, offers sufficient guarantee for the success of the Court when once established. Nothing prevents a future Peace Conference from making such alterations in the Convention as would meet the wishes of the Powers[Pg 564] which at present refuse to sign the Convention or to accept article 15.

As eleven states didn't sign the Convention and ten of the signatory states rejected the Court's structure as outlined in Article 15, it's not accurate to say the Convention has universal support. However, the fact that all the Great Powers, except for Russia, and many smaller powers have signed it without reservations provides a solid foundation for the Court's future success once it’s established. There's nothing stopping a future Peace Conference from making changes to the Convention that would address the concerns of the powers that currently refuse to sign or accept Article 15.[Pg 564]

It should be mentioned that, according to article 55, the Convention remains in force for twelve years from the date it comes into force, and is to be tacitly renewed for six years, unless denounced one year at least before the expiry of the period for which it is in force. And article 57 stipulates that two years before the expiration of the period for which it is in force, any contracting Power may demand a modification of the provisions concerning its own participation in the composition of the Court. The demand must be addressed to the Administrative Council which, on its part, must examine it and submit proposals as to the measures to be adopted to all the contracting Powers. These Powers must, with the least possible delay, inform the Administrative Council of their decision. The result is at once, or at any rate one year and thirty days before the expiry of the period of two years, to be communicated to the Power which made the demand for a modification of the provisions concerning its participation in the composition of the Court.[Pg 565]

It should be noted that, according to article 55, the Convention stays in effect for twelve years from the date it comes into force and will be automatically renewed for six years, unless it's canceled at least one year before the end of the current period. Article 57 states that two years before the end of the period, any contracting Power can request a change in the provisions regarding its participation in the Court's composition. This request must be sent to the Administrative Council, which must review it and propose measures to all the contracting Powers. These Powers must promptly inform the Administrative Council of their decision. The outcome is to be communicated immediately, or at least one year and thirty days before the expiration of the two-year period, to the Power that requested the modification regarding its participation in the Court.[Pg 565]

II CONSTITUTION AND AUTHORITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT

Westlake, II. pp. 288-297—Lawrence, § 192—Ullmann, § 196—Bonfils, Nos. 14401-14403—Despagnet, Nos. 683-683 bis—Fiore, Code, Nos. 1897-1901—Dupuis, Guerre, Nos. 232-276—Bernsten, § 14—Lémonon, pp. 293-335—Higgins, pp. 435-444—Barclay, Problems, pp. 105-108—Scott, Conferences, pp. 466-511—Nippold, I. §§ 16-19—Fried, Die zweite Haager Konferenz (1908), pp. 121-130—Lawrence, International Problems (1908), pp. 132-159—Hirschmann, Das internationale Prisenrecht (1912), §§ 39-41—Gregory, White, and Scott in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 458-475, and 490-506, and V. (1911), pp. 302-324—Donker Curtius in R.I. 2nd Ser. XI. (1909), pp. 5-36.

Westlake, II. pp. 288-297—Lawrence, § 192—Ullmann, § 196—Bonfils, Nos. 14401-14403—Despagnet, Nos. 683-683 bis—Fiore, Code, Nos. 1897-1901—Dupuis, Guerre, Nos. 232-276—Bernsten, § 14—Lémonon, pp. 293-335—Higgins, pp. 435-444—Barclay, Problems, pp. 105-108—Scott, Conferences, pp. 466-511—Nippold, I. §§ 16-19—Fried, Die zweite Haager Konferenz (1908), pp. 121-130—Lawrence, International Problems (1908), pp. 132-159—Hirschmann, Das internationale Prisenrecht (1912), §§ 39-41—Gregory, White, and Scott in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 458-475, and 490-506, and V. (1911), pp. 302-324—Donker Curtius in R.I. 2nd Ser. XI. (1909), pp. 5-36.

Personnel.

Staff.

§ 442. The International Prize Court consists of judges and deputy judges, a judge who is absent or prevented from sitting being replaced by a deputy (article 14). The judges and the deputies are appointed by the contracting Powers from among jurists of known proficiency in maritime International Law, and of the highest moral reputation, each Power appointing one judge and one deputy for a period of six years (articles 10 and 11). The judges are all of equal rank and have precedence according to the date of the notification of their appointment to the Administrative Council of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, but, if they sit by rota in conformity with article 15, paragraph 2, they have precedence according to the date on which they entered upon their duties, and, when the date is the same, the senior takes precedence; deputies rank after the judges (article 12). The judges—and the deputies when taking the places of judges—must, when outside their own country, be granted diplomatic privileges and immunities in the performance of their duties; they must, before taking their seats, take an oath, or make a solemn affirmation, before the Administrative Council, that they will discharge[Pg 566] their duties impartially and conscientiously (article 13). No judge or deputy judge may, during the tenure of his office, appear as agent or advocate before the International Prize Court, nor act for one of the parties in any capacity whatever (article 17).

§ 442. The International Prize Court is made up of judges and deputy judges, with a judge who is not available being replaced by a deputy (article 14). The judges and deputies are chosen by the contracting Powers from among recognized experts in maritime International Law, who also have a strong moral reputation, with each Power appointing one judge and one deputy for a six-year term (articles 10 and 11). All judges hold equal rank and their order of precedence is determined by the date they were notified of their appointment to the Administrative Council of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. However, if they sit by rotation according to article 15, paragraph 2, their order of precedence is based on when they started their duties, and if they started on the same date, the one who has been there longer takes precedence; deputies follow the judges in rank (article 12). Judges—and deputies when filling in for judges—must receive diplomatic privileges and immunities while carrying out their duties outside their own country; they must also take an oath or make a solemn affirmation before the Administrative Council before they can assume their roles, committing to perform their duties impartially and conscientiously (article 13). No judge or deputy judge is allowed to act as an agent or advocate before the International Prize Court, or represent one of the parties in any capacity while they are in office (article 17).

Attention should be drawn to the fact that the Court, if once established, will be permanent, and the judges, if once appointed, will always be at hand, although in time of peace they will not sit.

Attention should be drawn to the fact that the Court, once established, will be permanent, and the judges, once appointed, will always be available, although they will not sit during peacetime.

Deciding Tribunal.

Decision Tribunal.

§ 443. The judges appointed by the contracting Powers do not, as a body, decide the appeal cases brought before the Court. From among the great number of judges appointed, a deciding tribunal is formed which is composed of fifteen judges, nine of whom constitute a quorum; and a judge who is absent or prevented from sitting is replaced by a deputy (article 14). The judges appointed by Great Britain, Germany, the United States of America, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Japan, and Russia are always summoned to sit, but the judges appointed by the remaining contracting Powers are only in rotation summoned to sit, and their duties may successively be performed by the same person, since the same individual may be appointed as judge by several of these Powers (article 15). If a belligerent Power has, according to the rota, no judge sitting in the deciding tribunal, it has a right to demand that the judge appointed by it shall take part in the settlement of all cases arising from the war, and lots shall then be drawn to decide which of the judges entitled to sit by rota shall withdraw, but the judge of the other belligerent party does not take part in the drawing of lots (article 16). No judge may sit who has been a party, in any way whatever, to the sentence pronounced by the National Prize Court against which the appeal has been made, or who has taken part in the case as counsel or advocate for one[Pg 567] of the parties (article 17). The summoning by rota of the judges appointed by the minor Powers takes place according to the following list:—

§ 443. The judges chosen by the contracting Powers do not collectively decide the appeal cases presented to the Court. Instead, a deciding tribunal is formed from the large number of appointed judges, consisting of fifteen judges, with nine needed for a quorum. If a judge is absent or cannot participate, a deputy will take their place (article 14). Judges appointed by Great Britain, Germany, the United States, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Japan, and Russia are always called to sit, while judges from the other contracting Powers are summoned in rotation. Their duties can be carried out successively by the same person, as an individual may be appointed as a judge by several of these Powers (article 15). If a belligerent Power does not have a judge present in the deciding tribunal according to the rota, it can request that its appointed judge participate in resolving all cases stemming from the war. Lots will then be drawn to determine which of the judges qualified to sit by rota will withdraw, but the judge from the opposing belligerent party does not participate in the drawing (article 16). No judge may sit if they have been involved in any way with the ruling made by the National Prize Court that the appeal is against, or if they have served as counsel or advocate for one of the parties (article 17). The summoning of judges appointed by the minor Powers is done according to the following list:—

Judges Deputy Judges
First Year
1. Argentina Paraguay
2. Colombia Bolivia
3. Spain Spain
4. Greece Roumania
5. Norway Sweden
6. Holland Belgium
7. Turkey Persia
Second Year
1. Argentina Panama
2. Spain Spain
3. Greece Roumania
4. Norway Sweden
5. Holland Belgium
6. Turkey Luxemburg
7. Uruguay Costa Rica
Third Year
1. Brazil Domingo
2. China Turkey
3. Spain Portugal
4. Holland Greece
5. Roumania Belgium
6. Sweden Denmark
7. Venezuela Haiti
Fourth Year
1. Brazil Guatemala
2. China Turkey
3. Spain Portugal
4. Peru Honduras
5. Roumania Greece
6. Sweden Denmark
7. Switzerland Holland
Fifth Year
1. Belgium Holland
2. Bulgaria Montenegro
3. Chili Nicaragua
4. Denmark Norway
5. Mexico Cuba
6. Persia China
7. Portugal Spain
Sixth Year
1. Belgium Holland
2. Chili Salvador
3. Denmark Norway
4. Mexico Ecuador
5. Portugal Spain
6. Servia Bulgaria
7. Siam China

The deciding tribunal elects its President and Vice-President by an absolute majority of the votes cast, but after two ballots the election is made by a bare majority, and, in case the votes are equal, by lot (article 19).

The deciding tribunal selects its President and Vice-President by an absolute majority of the votes cast, but after two rounds of voting, the election is decided by a simple majority. If there's a tie, the winner is determined by drawing lots (article 19).

The judges—as well as the deputies when they sit—receive, while carrying out their duties, a salary of one hundred Netherland florins (about £8, 4s.) per diem, besides travelling expenses. The salaries and travelling[Pg 568] expenses are to be paid by the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and the judges must not receive any other remuneration either from their own Government or from any other Power (article 20).

The judges, along with the deputies when they’re sitting, receive a daily salary of one hundred Netherland florins (around £8, 4s.) per diem, in addition to travel expenses. The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration will cover the salaries and travel expenses [Pg 568], and the judges are prohibited from receiving any other pay from their own government or any other authority (article 20).

The belligerent captor, as well as a neutral Power which is herself, or whose national is, a party, may appoint a naval officer of high rank to sit as Assessor, but he has no voice in the decision. If more than one neutral Power is concerned in a case, they must agree among themselves, if necessary by lot, on the naval officer to be appointed as Assessor (article 18).

The aggressive captor, as well as a neutral country that is a party to the matter, can appoint a senior naval officer to act as an Assessor, but this officer does not have a say in the final decision. If multiple neutral countries are involved in a case, they need to come to an agreement among themselves, even if that means drawing lots, on which naval officer will be appointed as Assessor (article 18).

The seat[939] of the deciding tribunal is at the Hague, and it may not, except in the case of force majeure, be transferred elsewhere without the consent of both belligerents (article 21). When the Court is not sitting, the duties conferred on it by certain articles of Convention XII. are discharged by a delegation of three judges appointed by the Court; this delegation comes to a decision by a majority of votes, and its members must, of course, reside at the Hague while they fulfil their duties (article 48).

The location[939] of the deciding tribunal is in The Hague, and it cannot be moved to another location without the agreement of both parties involved, unless there's a case of force majeure (article 21). When the Court is not in session, its responsibilities as outlined in certain articles of Convention XII are handled by a delegation of three judges selected by the Court; this delegation makes decisions based on a majority vote, and its members must, of course, live in The Hague while performing their duties (article 48).

[939] The working-order (ordre intérieur) of the International Prize Court is to be drawn up by the Court itself; see details in article 49.

[939] The operational rules of the International Prize Court will be established by the Court itself; see details in article 49.

The deciding tribunal determines what language it will itself use and what languages may be used before it, but in all cases the official language of the National Courts which have had cognisance of the case may be used before it (article 24).

The deciding tribunal decides what language it will use and which languages can be used in front of it, but in all cases, the official language of the National Courts that have dealt with the case can be used before it (article 24).

For all notices to be served, in particular on the parties, witnesses, or experts, the deciding tribunal may apply direct to the Government of the State on whose territory the service is to be carried out. The same rule applies in the case of steps to be taken to procure evidence. The Court is equally entitled to act through the Power on whose territory it holds its[Pg 569] sitting. Notices to be given to parties in the place where the Court sits may be served through the International Bureau (article 27).

For all notices that need to be served, especially to the parties, witnesses, or experts, the deciding tribunal can directly contact the Government of the State where the service is to take place. The same guideline applies when it comes to gathering evidence. The Court also has the right to operate through the Power in the territory where it is holding its[Pg 569] session. Notices meant for parties in the location where the Court is sitting can be served through the International Bureau (article 27).

Administrative Council and International Bureau.

Admin Council and Int'l Bureau.

§ 444. The Administrative Council of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague serves at the same time as the Administrative Council of the International Prize Court, but only representatives of the Powers who are parties to Convention XII. shall be members of it (article 22).

§ 444. The Administrative Council of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague also acts as the Administrative Council of the International Prize Court, but only representatives from the countries that are parties to Convention XII will be members of it (article 22).

The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration acts as Registry of the International Prize Court and must place its offices and staff at the disposal of the Court. This Bureau has the custody of the archives and carries out the administrative work, and its General Secretary acts as Registrar of the International Prize Court. The secretaries necessary to assist the Registrar, translators, and shorthand writers are appointed by the International Prize Court (article 23).

The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration serves as the Registry for the International Prize Court and must provide its offices and staff for the Court's use. This Bureau is responsible for keeping the archives and handling administrative tasks, with its General Secretary serving as the Registrar of the International Prize Court. The secretaries needed to support the Registrar, along with translators and shorthand writers, are appointed by the International Prize Court (article 23).

Agents, Counsel, Advocates, and Attorneys.

Agents, Counselors, Advocates, and Lawyers.

§ 445. Belligerent as well as neutral Powers concerned in a case may appoint special Agents to act as intermediaries between themselves and the International Prize Court, and they may also engage Counsel or Advocates to defend their rights and interests (article 25).

§ 445. Both belligerent and neutral Powers involved in a case can appoint special Agents to serve as intermediaries between them and the International Prize Court. They can also hire Counsel or Advocates to defend their rights and interests (article 25).

Private individuals concerned in a case are compelled to be represented before the Court by an Attorney, who must either be an Advocate qualified to plead before a Court of Appeal or a High Court of one of the contracting States, or a lawyer practising before a similar Court, or, lastly, a Professor of Law at one of the higher teaching centres of those countries (article 26).

Private individuals involved in a case must be represented in court by an attorney. This attorney must either be an advocate qualified to plead before a Court of Appeal or a High Court in one of the contracting states, a lawyer practicing before a similar court, or, finally, a law professor at one of the higher education institutions in those countries (article 26).

Competence.

Skill.

§ 446. The general principle underlying the rules of Convention XII. concerning the competence of the International Prize Court is that on the whole, although not exclusively, the Court is competent in cases where neutrals are directly or indirectly concerned. The[Pg 570] International Prize Court is, as a rule, a Court of Appeal, all prize cases must, in the first instance, be decided by a National Prize Court of the captor, although the Municipal Law of the country concerned may provide that a first appeal must likewise be decided by a National Prize Court. The second appeal may never by decided by a National, but must always be decided by the International Prize Court. However, should the National Court of the First Instance or the National Court of Appeal fail to give final judgment within two years from the date of capture, the case may be carried direct to the International Prize Court (articles 2 and 6).

§ 446. The main idea behind the rules of Convention XII regarding the authority of the International Prize Court is that generally, though not exclusively, the Court has jurisdiction in cases where neutral parties are involved, either directly or indirectly. The[Pg 570] International Prize Court typically acts as a Court of Appeal; all prize cases must initially be handled by the National Prize Court of the captor, although the local laws of the relevant country may stipulate that a first appeal also needs to be reviewed by a National Prize Court. The second appeal cannot be decided by a National Court and must always be adjudicated by the International Prize Court. However, if the National Court of the First Instance or the National Court of Appeal does not reach a final judgment within two years from the capture date, the case can be brought directly to the International Prize Court (articles 2 and 6).

An appeal against the judgments of National Prize Courts may be brought before the International Court: (1) when the judgment concerns the property of a neutral Power or a neutral individual;[940] (2) when the judgment concerns enemy property and relates to (a) cargo on board a neutral vessel, (b) an enemy vessel captured in the territorial waters of a neutral Power, provided such Power has not made the capture the subject of diplomatic claim, and (c) a claim based upon the allegation that the seizure has been effected in violation, either of the provisions of a convention in force between the belligerent Powers, or of an enactment issued by the belligerent captor. In any case, the appeal may be based on the ground that the judgment was wrong either in fact or in law (article 3).

An appeal against the judgments of National Prize Courts can be taken to the International Court when: (1) the judgment involves the property of a neutral Power or a neutral individual; [940] (2) the judgment involves enemy property and relates to (a) cargo on a neutral vessel, (b) an enemy vessel taken in the territorial waters of a neutral Power, as long as that Power has not claimed the capture diplomatically, and (c) a claim based on the assertion that the seizure was carried out in violation of either a convention in effect between the warring Powers or a law issued by the capturing belligerent. In any case, the appeal may be based on the argument that the judgment was incorrect, either factually or legally (article 3).

[940] Since the question of enemy or neutral character of individuals—see above, § 88—is for some parts controversial, the International Prize Court would have to decide the controversy.

[940] Since whether individuals are enemies or neutral—see above, § 88—is controversial in some areas, the International Prize Court would need to resolve the dispute.

The following Powers and individuals are entitled[941] to bring an appeal before the International Prize Court:—

The following powers and individuals are allowed[941] to submit an appeal to the International Prize Court:—

(1) Neutral Powers, if the judgment injuriously affects their property or the property of their subjects,[Pg 571] or if the capture is alleged to have taken place in the territorial waters of such Powers (article 4, No. 1).

(1) Neutral Powers, if the ruling negatively impacts their property or the property of their citizens,[Pg 571] or if the seizure is claimed to have occurred in the territorial waters of those Powers (article 4, No. 1).

(2) Neutral individuals,[942] if the judgment injuriously affects their property. But the home State of such an individual may intervene and either forbid him to bring the appeal before the International Prize Court, or itself undertake the proceedings in his place (article 4, No. 2).

(2) Neutral individuals,[942] if the judgment negatively impacts their property. However, the home state of that individual may step in and either prohibit them from bringing the appeal before the International Prize Court or take over the proceedings on their behalf (article 4, No. 2).

(3) Subjects of the enemy, if the judgment injuriously affects their cargoes on neutral vessels, or if it injuriously affects their property in case the seizure is alleged to have been effected in violation, either of the provisions of a convention in force between the belligerent Powers, or of an enactment issued by the belligerent captor (article 4, No. 3).

(3) Enemy subjects, if the ruling negatively impacts their goods on neutral ships, or if it harms their property when the seizure is claimed to have occurred in violation of either the terms of an agreement currently in effect between the warring Powers or a regulation issued by the capturing belligerent (article 4, No. 3).

(4) Subjects of neutral Powers or of the enemy deriving rights from the rights of such individuals as are themselves qualified to bring an appeal before the International Prize Court, provided they have intervened in the proceedings of the National Court or Courts concerned. Individuals so entitled may appeal separately to the extent of their interests (article 5, first paragraph).

(4) Citizens of neutral countries or the enemy who receive rights from individuals qualified to appeal to the International Prize Court, as long as they have participated in the proceedings of the relevant National Court or Courts. Those individuals with such rights may appeal separately according to their interests (article 5, first paragraph).

(5) Subjects of neutral Powers or of the enemy deriving rights from the rights of a neutral Power whose property was the subject of the judgment. Individuals so entitled may likewise appeal separately to the extent of their interest, provided they have intervened in the proceedings of the National Court or Courts concerned (article 5, second paragraph).

(5) People from neutral countries or the enemy who have rights based on the rights of a neutral country whose property was involved in the judgment. Individuals with such rights can also appeal separately based on their interest, as long as they have participated in the proceedings of the relevant National Court or Courts (article 5, second paragraph).

[941] But note article 51 of Convention XII.

[941] But check out article 51 of Convention XII.

What Law to be applied.

What law applies?

§ 447. As regards the law to be applied by the International Prize Court, article 7 of Convention XII. contains the following provisions and distinctions:—

§ 447. Regarding the law that the International Prize Court should apply, article 7 of Convention XII states the following provisions and distinctions:—

(1) If a question of law to be decided be covered by a treaty in force between the belligerent captor and a[Pg 572] Power which is itself, or whose subject is, a party to the proceedings, the Court must apply the provisions of such treaty.

(1) If a legal question is addressed by a treaty that is currently in effect between the capturing belligerent and a[Pg 572] Power that is also a party to the proceedings, the Court must follow the terms of that treaty.

(2) In absence of such provisions, the Court must apply the rules of International Law.

(2) Without such provisions, the Court has to apply the rules of International Law.

(3) If there be no generally recognised rules of International Law which could be applied, the Court must base its decision on the general principles of justice and equity.

(3) If there are no widely accepted rules of International Law that can be applied, the Court must make its decision based on the general principles of justice and fairness.

(4) If—see article 3, No. 2 (c) of Convention XII.—the ground of appeal be the violation of an enactment issued by the belligerent captor, the Court must apply such enactment.

(4) If—see article 3, No. 2 (c) of Convention XII.—the reason for the appeal is the violation of a rule issued by the belligerent captor, the Court must follow that rule.

(5) The Court is empowered to disregard failure, on the part of an appellant, to comply with the procedure laid down by the Municipal Law of the belligerent captor, if it is of opinion that the consequences of such Municipal Law are unjust or inequitable.

(5) The Court can choose to overlook an appellant's failure to follow the procedures set out by the Municipal Law of the warring captor if it believes that the results of that Municipal Law are unfair or unequal.

The very wide powers of the International Prize Court with regard to the law to be applied by it, have been considerably narrowed down by the fact that the Declaration of London provides a code of Prize Law, which in time will be universally accepted, but those powers are still very wide.

The broad powers of the International Prize Court regarding the applicable law have been significantly limited by the Declaration of London, which establishes a code of Prize Law that will eventually gain universal acceptance. Nevertheless, those powers remain extensive.

III PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT

See the literature quoted above at the commencement of § 442.

See the literature mentioned above at the beginning of § 442.

Entering of Appeal.

Entering Appeal.

§ 448. As a rule there are two ways of entering an appeal against the judgment of a National Prize Court, namely, either by a written declaration made in the National Court against whose judgment the appeal[Pg 573] is directed, or by a written or telegraphic declaration addressed to the International Bureau. In either case the appeal must be entered within one hundred and twenty days from the day the judgment was delivered or notified (article 28). But the appeal must be addressed to the International Bureau only, if a party intends to carry a case direct to the International Prize Court on account of the National Courts having failed to give final judgment within two years from the date of capture, and in such case the appeal must be entered within thirty days from the expiry of the period of two years (article 30).

§ 448. Generally, there are two ways to file an appeal against a judgment made by a National Prize Court. You can either submit a written declaration to the National Court whose judgment you are appealing[Pg 573], or send a written or telegraphic declaration to the International Bureau. In either case, the appeal must be filed within one hundred and twenty days from the date the judgment was issued or communicated (article 28). However, the appeal must be directed solely to the International Bureau if a party wants to take a case directly to the International Prize Court because the National Courts have not provided a final judgment within two years from the date of capture. In that situation, the appeal must be made within thirty days from the end of the two-year period (article 30).

If the appeal has been entered in the National Court, this Court must, without considering the question as to whether the appeal was entered in time, transmit within seven days the record of the case to the International Bureau. On the other hand, if the declaration of appeal has been sent to the International Bureau, this Bureau must immediately, if possible by telegraph, send information to the National Court concerned which must within seven days transmit the record of the case to the Bureau. And should the appeal be entered by a neutral individual, the International Bureau must immediately by telegraph inform the Government of the respective individual in order to enable such Government to come to a decision as to whether it will—see article 4, No. 2—prevent the individual from going on with the appeal, or will undertake proceedings in his stead (article 29).

If the appeal has been submitted to the National Court, this Court must, without considering whether the appeal was submitted on time, send the case record to the International Bureau within seven days. On the other hand, if the appeal declaration has been sent to the International Bureau, this Bureau must immediately, preferably by telegraph, inform the National Court involved, which must send the case record to the Bureau within seven days. If the appeal is submitted by a neutral individual, the International Bureau must promptly inform the respective individual's government by telegraph so that the government can decide whether to stop the individual from proceeding with the appeal or to take action on their behalf (see article 4, No. 2 and article 29).

If the appeal has not been entered in time, the Court must reject it without discussion of the merits of the case. But the Court may grant relief from the effect of this rule and admit the appeal, if the appellant is able to show that he was prevented by force majeure from entering the appeal in time, and that he has entered the appeal within sixty days after the circumstances[Pg 574] which prevented him from entering it earlier ceased to operate (article 31).

If the appeal wasn't filed on time, the Court has to reject it without considering the case's merits. However, the Court can provide an exception to this rule and accept the appeal if the appellant can demonstrate that they were prevented by force majeure from filing on time and that they submitted the appeal within sixty days after the circumstances[Pg 574] that hindered them from doing so no longer applied (article 31).

If the appeal has been entered in time, a certified copy of the notice of appeal must officially be transmitted to the respondent by the Court; if the Court is not sitting, its delegation of three judges must act for it (articles 32 and 48). If in addition to the parties who are before the Court through an appeal having been entered, there are other parties concerned who are entitled to appeal, or if in the case referred to in article 29, third paragraph, the Government which has received notice of an appeal has not announced its decision, the Court may not deal with the case until either the period of one hundred and twenty days from the day the judgment of the National Prize Court has been delivered or notified, or the period of thirty days from the expiry of two years from the date of capture has expired (article 31).

If the appeal was submitted on time, a certified copy of the notice of appeal must be officially sent to the respondent by the Court; if the Court is not in session, a delegation of three judges must act on its behalf (articles 32 and 48). If there are additional parties involved who are eligible to appeal, or if in the situation mentioned in article 29, third paragraph, the Government that received notice of an appeal has not stated its decision, the Court cannot proceed with the case until either 120 days have passed from the date the National Prize Court's judgment was issued or notified, or 30 days have passed since the two-year period from the date of capture has expired (article 31).

Pleadings and Discussion.

Pleadings and Discussion.

§ 449. The procedure, which follows the entry of an appeal and the preliminary steps in consequence thereof, comprises two distinct phases, namely, written pleadings and oral discussion.

§ 449. The process that occurs after an appeal is filed and the initial steps taken as a result includes two separate phases: written submissions and oral discussions.

(1) The written pleadings consist of the deposit and exchange of cases, counter-cases, and, if necessary, of replies, the order of which, as also the periods within which they must be delivered, must be fixed by the Court or its delegation of three judges (article 48), and to which all papers and documents the parties intend to make use of must be annexed. The Court must communicate a certified copy of every document produced by one party to the other party (article 34).

(1) The written pleadings include the deposit and exchange of cases, counter-cases, and, if needed, replies. The order in which these must be submitted, along with the deadlines for delivery, must be determined by the Court or its group of three judges (article 48). All papers and documents that the parties plan to use must be attached. The Court is required to provide a certified copy of every document submitted by one party to the other party (article 34).

(2) After the close of the pleadings the Court must fix a day for a public sitting on which the discussion is to take place (article 35). The discussion is under the direction of the President or Vice-President, or, in case both of these are absent or cannot act, of the[Pg 575] senior judge present; but the judge appointed by a belligerent party may never preside (article 38). The discussion takes place with open doors, but a Government which is a party may demand that the discussion take place with closed doors. In any case minutes must be taken and must be signed by the President and Registrar, and these minutes alone have an authentic character (article 39). During the discussion the parties state their views of the case both as to the law and as to the facts, but the Court may at any stage suspend the speeches of counsel in order that supplementary evidence may be obtained (article 35). The Court may order the supplementary evidence to be taken, either in the manner provided for by article 27, or before itself, or before one or more members of the Court provided it can be done without compulsion or intimidation; if steps are taken by members of the Court outside the territory where it is sitting, the consent of the foreign Government must be obtained (article 36). The parties must be summoned to take part in all stages of the taking of supplementary evidence, and they must receive certified copies of the minutes (article 37). If a party does not appear in spite of having been duly summoned, or if a party fails to comply with some step within the period fixed by the Court, the case proceeds without that party and the Court makes its decision on the basis of the material at its disposal, but the Court must officially notify to the parties all decisions or orders made in their absence (article 40).

(2) After the pleadings are finished, the Court must set a date for a public meeting where the discussion will occur (article 35). The discussion is led by the President or Vice-President, or if both are absent or unable to act, by the[Pg 575] senior judge present; however, a judge appointed by a belligerent party can never preside (article 38). The discussion is conducted openly, but a government that is a party may request that the discussion be held in private. In any case, minutes must be taken and signed by the President and Registrar, and these minutes are the only ones with official status (article 39). During the discussion, the parties present their perspectives on both the legal and factual aspects of the case, but the Court can suspend the lawyers' speeches at any point to gather additional evidence (article 35). The Court may decide how to gather this supplementary evidence, either in the way described in article 27, in front of itself, or before one or more judges, provided it can be done without coercion or intimidation; if judges take action outside the territory where the Court is situated, they must get consent from the foreign government (article 36). The parties must be called to participate at every stage of collecting supplementary evidence, and they must receive certified copies of the minutes (article 37). If a party fails to appear despite being properly summoned, or if they do not follow through on a required action within the time frame set by the Court, the case will proceed without that party, and the Court will make its decision based on the available information, but the Court must officially inform all parties of any decisions or orders made in their absence (article 40).

Judgment.

Judgment.

§ 450. After the discussion follows the judgment of the Court.

§ 450. After the discussion, the Court delivers its judgment.

The deliberation of the Court in order to agree upon the judgment takes place in private and must remain secret. The Court must take into consideration all the documents, evidence, and oral statements. All[Pg 576] questions are decided by a majority of the judges present; if the number of the judges is even and is equally divided, the vote of the junior judge in the order of precedence is not counted (articles 42 and 43). The judgment must be taken down in writing, state the reasons upon which it is based, give the names of the judges taking part in it and of the assessors, if any, and must be signed by the President and Registrar.

The Court's discussions to reach a decision happen in private and must stay confidential. The Court needs to consider all the documents, evidence, and oral statements. All[Pg 576] decisions are made by a majority of the judges present; if the number of judges is even and split, the vote of the junior judge in order of precedence does not count (articles 42 and 43). The judgment must be written down, state the reasons behind it, include the names of the judges involved and any assessors, and must be signed by the President and Registrar.

The pronouncement of the judgment of the Court takes place in public, the parties being present or having been duly summoned to attend. The judgment must be officially communicated to the parties. After this communication has been made, the Court must transmit to the National Prize Court concerned the record of the case, together with copies of the various decisions arrived at and of the minutes of the proceedings (article 45).

The court announces its judgment publicly, with the involved parties present or properly notified to attend. The judgment must be officially shared with the parties. Once this communication is done, the court needs to send the case record to the relevant National Prize Court, along with copies of all the decisions made and the minutes of the proceedings (article 45).

If the Court pronounces the capture of a vessel or cargo to be valid, they may be disposed of in accordance with the Municipal Law of the belligerent captor. If the Court pronounces the capture to be invalid, restitution of the vessel or cargo must be ordered, and the amount of damages, if any, must be fixed, especially in case the vessel or cargo has been sold or destroyed. If the National Prize Court has already declared the capture to be invalid, the International Prize Court must decide on an appeal concerning the damages due to the owner of the captured vessel or cargo (article 8).

If the Court rules that the capture of a ship or cargo is legitimate, it can be dealt with according to the local laws of the country that captured it. If the Court finds the capture to be illegitimate, it must order the return of the ship or cargo and determine any damages, especially if the ship or cargo has been sold or destroyed. If the National Prize Court has already ruled the capture invalid, the International Prize Court must handle an appeal regarding the damages owed to the owner of the captured ship or cargo (article 8).

Expenses and Costs.

Expenses and Costs.

§ 451. The general expenses of the International Prize Court are borne by the contracting Powers in proportion to their share in the composition of the Court as laid down in article 15 of Convention XII.; the appointment of deputy judges does not involve any contribution (article 47).

§ 451. The general expenses of the International Prize Court are covered by the contracting Powers according to their representation in the Court as specified in article 15 of Convention XII.; appointing deputy judges does not require any financial contribution (article 47).

As regards costs, each party pays its own, but the party against whom the Court has given its decision,[Pg 577] must bear the costs of the trial and, in addition, must pay one per cent. of the value of the subject matter of the case as a contribution to the general expenses of the International Prize Court. The amount of the payments must be fixed in the judgment of the Court (article 46, first and second paragraphs). If the appeal is brought by an individual, he must, after having entered the appeal, furnish the International Bureau with security to an amount fixed by the Court or—see article 48—by its delegation (article 46, third paragraph).

As for costs, each party covers its own expenses, but the party that the Court rules against,[Pg 577] must pay for the trial costs and also contribute one percent of the case's value to the overall expenses of the International Prize Court. The Court will set the amount of these payments in its judgment (article 46, first and second paragraphs). If an individual files the appeal, they must, after submitting the appeal, provide the International Bureau with a security amount determined by the Court or—see article 48—by its delegation (article 46, third paragraph).

IV ACTION FOR DAMAGES RATHER THAN APPEAL

Scott in A.J. V. (1911), pp. 302-324.

Scott in A.J. V. (1911), pp. 302-324.

Reason for Action in Damages instead of Appeal.

Reason for Taking Legal Action for Damages instead of Appealing.

§ 452. According to the Constitution of the United States of America, and probably that of some other States, no appeal may be brought against a judgment of their Highest Courts. These States could not, therefore, ratify Convention XII. and take part in the establishment of the International Prize Court without previously having altered their Constitution. As such alteration would be a very complicated and precarious matter, the Naval Conference of London of 1908-9 included in the Final Protocol of the Conference the following vœu:—"The Delegates of the Powers represented at the Naval Conference and which have signed or have expressed their intention to sign the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, concerning the establishment of an International Prize Court, considering the constitutional difficulties which, in certain States, stand in the way of the ratification of that Convention in its actual form, agree to call the attention of their Governments to the advantage of concluding an[Pg 578] arrangement according to which the said States would, in depositing their ratifications, have the power to add thereto a reservation to the effect that the right of recourse to the International Prize Court in connection with decisions of their National Courts, shall take the form of a direct action for damages, provided, however, that the effect of this reservation shall not be such as to impair the rights guaranteed by the said Convention to private individuals as well as to Governments, and that the terms of the reservation shall form the subject of a subsequent understanding between the signatory Powers of the same Convention."

§ 452. According to the Constitution of the United States of America, and likely that of some other states, no appeal can be made against a judgment of their highest courts. Therefore, these states could not ratify Convention XII and participate in setting up the International Prize Court without first changing their Constitution. Since making such a change would be very complicated and risky, the Naval Conference of London in 1908-9 included the following wish in the Final Protocol of the Conference:—"The Delegates of the Powers represented at the Naval Conference who have signed or expressed their intention to sign the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, regarding the establishment of an International Prize Court, recognize the constitutional challenges that some states face in ratifying that Convention in its current form, and agree to urge their Governments to consider the benefit of reaching an[Pg 578] arrangement that would allow those states, when depositing their ratifications, to add a reservation stating that the right to appeal to the International Prize Court regarding decisions made by their National Courts shall take the form of a direct action for damages, provided that this reservation does not undermine the rights guaranteed by the Convention to private individuals and governments, and that the terms of the reservation will be the subject of a future understanding among the signatory Powers of the same Convention."

To carry out this recommendation, Great Britain, Germany, the United States of America, Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Chili, Denmark, Spain, France, Japan, Norway, Holland, and Sweden signed on September 19, 1910, at the Hague the "Additional Protocol to the Convention relative to the establishment of an International Prize Court" which comprises nine articles, is (article 8) considered to be an integral part of that Convention, and which will be ratified at the same time as the Convention, accession to the Convention being subordinated (article 9) to accession to the Protocol.[943]

To implement this recommendation, Great Britain, Germany, the United States, Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Chile, Denmark, Spain, France, Japan, Norway, Holland, and Sweden signed the "Additional Protocol to the Convention on the establishment of an International Prize Court" on September 19, 1910, in The Hague. This document consists of nine articles, and (article 8) is considered an integral part of that Convention. It will be ratified at the same time as the Convention, with accession to the Convention being dependent (article 9) on accession to the Protocol.[943]

[943] There is no doubt that, should the International Prize Court be established, all the contracting Powers of Convention XII. would accede to this additional protocol.

[943] There's no doubt that if the International Prize Court is set up, all the countries involved in Convention XII will agree to this additional protocol.

Procedure if Action for Damages is brought.

Procedure if Action for Damages is brought.

§ 453. According to article 1 of the Protocol, those signatory or acceding Powers of Convention XII. which are prevented by difficulties of a constitutional nature from accepting the Convention in its unaltered form, have, in ratifying the Convention or acceding to it, the right to declare that in prize cases over which their National Courts have jurisdiction, recourse to the International Prize Court may only be had in the form of an action in damages for the injury caused by the capture. In consequence thereof the procedure in the[Pg 579] International Prize Court, as described above, §§ 448-451, takes place with the following modifications:—

§ 453. According to Article 1 of the Protocol, any signatory or joining Powers of Convention XII that face constitutional challenges preventing them from accepting the Convention exactly as it is can, when ratifying or joining the Convention, state that in prize cases under the jurisdiction of their National Courts, the only way to approach the International Prize Court is through a claim for damages due to the loss caused by the capture. As a result, the process in the [Pg 579] International Prize Court, as outlined above, §§ 448-451, will proceed with the following changes:—

(1) The action for damages may only be brought before the International Prize Court by means of a written or telegraphic declaration addressed to the International Bureau (article 5). This Bureau must directly notify, if possible by telegraph, the Government of the belligerent captor, which, without considering whether the prescribed periods of time have been observed, must within seven days of the receipt of the notification, transmit to the International Bureau the case and a certified copy of the decision, if any, rendered by the National Prize Court (article 6).

(1) You can only file a damage claim with the International Prize Court through a written or telegraphic declaration sent to the International Bureau (article 5). The Bureau must notify the Government of the capturing party as quickly as possible, ideally by telegraph. Regardless of whether the timeframes have been followed, the government must send the case and a certified copy of any decision made by the National Prize Court to the International Bureau within seven days of receiving the notification (article 6).

(2) The International Prize Court does not, as in Appeal Cases, pronounce upon the validity or nullity of the capture concerned, nor confirm or reverse the judgment of the National Prize Court, but simply fixes the amount of damages to be allowed, if any, to the plaintiff, if the capture is considered to be illegal (article 3).

(2) The International Prize Court doesn't, like in Appeal Cases, decide on the validity or invalidity of the capture in question, nor does it confirm or overturn the judgment of the National Prize Court. It only determines the amount of damages to be awarded, if any, to the plaintiff, if the capture is deemed illegal (article 3).

(3) After having delivered judgment, the International Prize Court does not transmit the record of the case, the various decisions arrived at, and the minutes, to the National Prize Court, but directly to the Government of the belligerent captor (article 7).

(3) After delivering its judgment, the International Prize Court does not send the case record, the various decisions made, and the minutes to the National Prize Court, but directly to the government of the warring captor (article 7).

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I 1856 Paris Declaration

Les Plénipotentiaires qui ont signé le Traité de Paris du trente mars, mil huit cent cinquante-six, réunis en Conférence,—

Les Plénipotentiaires qui ont signé le Traité de Paris du 30 mars 1856, réunis en Conférence,—

Considérant:

Considering:

Que le droit maritime, en temps de guerre, a été pendant longtemps l'objet de contestations regrettables;

Que le droit maritime, en temps de guerre, a été pendant longtemps l'objet de contestations regrettables;

Que l'incertitude du droit et des devoirs en pareille matière, donne lieu, entre les neutres et les belligérants, à des divergences d'opinion qui peuvent faire naître des difficultés sérieuses et même des conflits;

Que l'incertitude du droit et des devoirs en pareille matière, donne lieu, entre les neutres et les belligérants, à des divergences d'opinion qui peuvent faire naître des difficultés sérieuses et même des conflits;

Qu'il y a avantage, par conséquent, à établir une doctrine uniforme sur un point aussi important;

Qu'il y a avantage, par conséquent, à établir une doctrine uniforme sur un point aussi important;

Que les Plénipotentiaires assemblés au Congrès de Paris ne sauraient mieux répondre aux intentions, dont leurs Gouvernements sont animés, qu'en cherchant à introduire dans les rapports internationaux des principes fixes à cet égard;

Que les Plénipotentiaires assemblés au Congrès de Paris ne sauraient mieux répondre aux intentions, dont leurs Gouvernements sont animés, qu'en cherchant à introduire dans les rapports internationaux des principes fixes à cet égard;

Dûment autorisés, les susdits Plénipotentiaires sont convenus de se concerter sur les moyens d'atteindre ce but; et étant tombés d'accord ont arrêté la Déclaration solennelle ci-après:—

Duly authorized, the aforementioned Plenipotentiaries agreed to consult on the means to achieve this goal; and having reached an agreement, they established the following solemn Declaration:—

1. La course est et demeure abolie;

1. The race is and remains abolished;

2. Le pavillon neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, à l'exception de la contrebande de guerre;

2. The neutral flag covers enemy goods, except for contraband of war;

3. La marchandise neutre, à l'exception de la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavillon ennemi;

3. Neutral goods, except for contraband of war, cannot be seized under an enemy flag;

4. Les blocus, pour être obligatoires, doivent être effectifs, c'est-à-dire, maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire réellement l'accès du littoral de l'ennemi.

4. Blockades, to be mandatory, must be effective, meaning they have to be maintained by a sufficient force to truly restrict access to the enemy's coastline.

Les Gouvernements des Plénipotentiaires soussignés s'engagent à porter cette Déclaration à la connaissance des États, qui n'ont pas été appelés à participer au Congrès de Paris, et à les inviter à y accéder.

Les Gouvernements des Plénipotentiaires soussignés s'engagent à porter cette Déclaration à la connaissance des États, qui n'ont pas été appelés à participer au Congrès de Paris, et à les inviter à y accéder.

Convaincus qui les maximes qu'ils viennent de proclamer ne sauraient être accueillies qu'avec gratitude par le monde entier, les Plénipotentiaires soussignés ne doutent pas, que les efforts de leurs Gouvernements pour en généraliser l'adoption ne soient couronnés d'un plein succès.

Convincing everyone that the principles they have just declared will be welcomed with gratitude by the entire world, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have no doubt that their Governments' efforts to promote their adoption will be fully successful.

La présente Déclaration n'est et ne sera obligatoire qu'entre les Puissances, qui y ont, ou qui y auront accédé.

La présente Déclaration n'est et ne sera obligatoire qu'entre les Puissances, qui y ont, ou qui y auront accédé.

Fait à Paris, le seize avril, mil huit cent cinquante-six.[Pg 584]

Fait à Paris, le seize avril, 1856.[Pg 584]

APPENDIX II DECLARATION OF ST. PETERSBURG OF 1868

Sur la proposition du Cabinet Impérial de Russie, une Commission Militaire Internationale ayant été réunie à Saint-Pétersbourg, afin d'examiner la convenance d'interdire l'usage de certains projectiles en temps de guerre entre les nations civilisées, et cette Commission ayant fixé d'un commun accord les limites techniques où les nécessités de la guerre doivent s'arrêter devant les exigences de l'humanité, les Soussignés sont autorisés par les ordres de leurs Gouvernements à déclarer ce qui suit:

Sur la proposition du Cabinet Impérial de Russie, une Commission Militaire Internationale a été réunie à Saint-Pétersbourg pour examiner la possibilité d'interdire l'usage de certains projectiles en temps de guerre entre les nations civilisées. Cette Commission a convenu, d'un commun accord, des limites techniques où les nécessités de la guerre doivent s'arrêter face aux exigences de l'humanité. Les Soussignés sont autorisés par les ordres de leurs Gouvernements à déclarer ce qui suit:

Considérant que les progrès de la civilisation doivent avoir pour effet d'atténuer autant que possible les calamités de la guerre;

Considérant que les avancées de la civilisation doivent viser à réduire autant que possible les horreurs de la guerre;

Que le seul but légitime que les États doivent se proposer durant la guerre est l'affaiblissement des forces militaires de l'ennemi;

Que le seul but légitime que les États doivent se proposer durant la guerre est l'affaiblissement des forces militaires de l'ennemi;

Qu'à cet effet, il suffit de mettre hors de combat le plus grand nombre d'hommes possible;

Qu'à cet effet, il suffit de mettre hors de combat le plus grand nombre d'hommes possible;

Que ce but serait dépassé par l'emploi d'armes qui aggraveraient inutilement les souffrances des hommes mis hors de combat, ou rendraient leur mort inévitable;

Que ce but serait dépassé par l'emploi d'armes qui aggraveraient inutilement les souffrances des hommes mis hors de combat, ou rendraient leur mort inévitable;

Que l'emploi de pareilles armes serait dès lors contraire aux lois de l'humanité;

Que l'utilisation de telles armes serait donc contraire aux lois de l'humanité;

Les Parties Contractantes s'engagent à renoncer mutuellement, en cas de guerre entre elles, à l'emploi par leurs troupes de terre ou de mer, de tout projectile d'un poids inférieur à 400 grammes, qui serait ou explosible ou chargé de matières fulminantes ou inflammables.

Les Parties Contractantes s'engagent à renoncer mutuellement, en cas de guerre entre elles, à l'emploi par leurs troupes de terre ou de mer, de tout projectile d'un poids inférieur à 400 grammes, qui serait ou explosible ou chargé de matières fulminantes ou inflammables.

Elles inviteront tous les États, qui n'ont pas participé par l'envoi de Délégués aux délibérations de la Commission Militaire Internationale réunie à Saint-Pétersbourg, à accéder au présent engagement.

Elles inviteront tous les États qui n'ont pas envoyé de délégués aux discussions de la Commission Militaire Internationale à Saint-Pétersbourg à joindre cet engagement.

Cet engagement n'est obligatoire que pour les Parties Contractantes ou Accédantes en cas de guerre entre deux ou plusieurs d'entre elles: il n'est pas applicable vis-à-vis de Parties non-Contractantes ou qui n'auraient pas accédé.

Cet engagement n'est obligatoire que pour les Parties Contractantes ou Accédantes en cas de guerre entre deux ou plusieurs d'entre elles: il n'est pas applicable vis-à-vis de Parties non-Contractantes ou qui n'auraient pas accédé.

Il cesserait également d'être obligatoire du moment où, dans une guerre entre Parties Contractantes ou Accédantes, une partie non-Contractante, ou qui n'aurait pas accédé, se joindrait à l'un des belligérants.

Il cesserait également d'être obligatoire du moment où, dans une guerre entre Parties Contractantes ou Accédantes, une partie non-Contractante, ou qui n'aurait pas accédé, se joindrait à l'un des belligérants.

Les Parties Contractantes ou Accédantes se réservent de s'entendre ultérieurement toutes les fois qu'une proposition précise serait formulée en vue des perfectionnements à venir que la science pourrait apporter dans l'armement des troupes, afin de maintenir les principes, qu'elles ont posés et de concilier les nécessités de la guerre avec les lois de l'humanité.

Les Parties Contractantes ou Accédantes se réservent de s'entendre ultérieurement toutes les fois qu'une proposition précise serait formulée en vue des perfectionnements à venir que la science pourrait apporter dans l'armement des troupes, afin de maintenir les principes qu'elles ont posés et de concilier les nécessités de la guerre avec les lois de l'humanité.

Fait à Saint-Pétersbourg, le vingt-neuf novembre onze décembre, mil huit cent soixante-huit.[Pg 585]

Fait à Saint-Pétersbourg, le vingt-neuf novembre onze décembre, mil huit cent soixante-huit.[Pg 585]

APPENDIX 3 DECLARATION ABOUT EXPANDING (DUM-DUM) BULLETS Signed in The Hague, July 29, 1899

Les Soussignés, Plénipotentiaires des Puissances représentées à la Conférence Internationale de la Paix à La Haye, dûment autorisés à cet effet par leurs Gouvernements, s'inspirant des sentiments qui ont trouvé leur expression dans la Déclaration de Saint-Pétersbourg du 29 novembre (11 décembre) 1868,

Les Soussignés, Plénipotentiaires des Puissances représentées à la Conférence Internationale de la Paix à La Haye, dûment autorisés à cet effet par leurs Gouvernements, s'inspirant des sentiments qui ont trouvé leur expression dans la Déclaration de Saint-Pétersbourg du 29 novembre (11 décembre) 1868,

Déclarent:

Declare:

Les Puissances Contractantes s'interdisent l'emploi de balles qui s'épanouissent ou s'aplatissent facilement dans le corps humain, telles que les balles à enveloppe dure dont l'enveloppe ne couvrirait pas entièrement le noyau ou serait pourvue d'incisions.

Les Puissances Contractantes interdisent l'utilisation de balles qui se déforment ou s'aplatissent facilement dans le corps humain, comme les balles à enveloppe dure dont l'enveloppe ne couvre pas complètement le noyau ou qui ont des incisions.

La présente Déclaration n'est obligatoire que pour les Puissances Contractantes, en cas de guerre entre deux ou plusieurs d'entre elles.

La présente Déclaration n'est obligatoire que pour les Puissances Contractantes, en cas de guerre entre deux ou plusieurs d'entre elles.

Elle cessera d'être obligatoire du moment où dans une guerre entre des Puissances Contractantes, une Puissance non-Contractante se joindrait à l'un des belligérants.

Elle cessera d'être obligatoire dès qu'une Puissance non-Contractante se joindra à l'un des belligérants dans une guerre entre des Puissances Contractantes.

La présente Déclaration sera ratifiée dans le plus bref délai possible.

La présente Déclaration sera ratifiée dès que possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

The ratifications will be submitted to The Hague.

Il sera dressé du dépôt de chaque ratification un procès-verbal, dont une copie, certifiée conforme, sera remise par la voie diplomatique à toutes les Puissances Contractantes.

Il sera fait un procès-verbal de chaque ratification, et une copie certifiée conforme sera envoyée par voie diplomatique à toutes les Puissances Contractantes.

Les Puissances non-Signataires pourront adhérer à la présente Déclaration. Elles auront, à cet effet, à faire connaître leur adhésion aux Puissances Contractantes, au moyen d'une notification écrite, adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et communiquée par celui-ci à toutes les autres Puissances Contractantes.

Les Puissances non-Signataires pourront adhérer à la présente Déclaration. Elles devront, pour ce faire, informer les Puissances Contractantes de leur adhésion par une notification écrite, envoyée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, qui la communiquera à toutes les autres Puissances Contractantes.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes dénonçât la présente Déclaration, cette dénonciation ne produirait ses effets qu'un an après la notification faite par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et communiquée immédiatement par celui-ci à toutes les autres Puissances Contractantes.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes dénonçât la présente Déclaration, cette dénonciation ne produirait ses effets qu'un an après la notification faite par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et communiquée immédiatement par celui-ci à toutes les autres Puissances Contractantes.

Cette dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée.

Cette dénonciation n’aura des effets que vis-à-vis de la Puissance qui l’aura notifiée.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires ont signé la présente Déclaration et l'ont revêtue de leurs cachets.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires ont signé la présente Déclaration et l'ont revêtue de leurs cachets.

Fait à La Haye, le 29 juillet 1899, en un seul exemplaire, qui restera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et dont des copies, certifiées conformes, seront remises par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances Contractantes.[Pg 586]

Fait à La Haye, le 29 juillet 1899, en un seul exemplaire, qui restera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et dont des copies, certifiées conformes, seront remises par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances Contractantes.[Pg 586]

APPENDIX 4 DECLARATION ABOUT THE SPREAD OF ASPHYXIATING GASES Signed in The Hague, July 29, 1899

Les Soussignés, Plénipotentiaires des Puissances représentées à la Conférence Internationale de la Paix à La Haye, dûment autorisés à cet effet par leurs Gouvernements, s'inspirant des sentiments qui ont trouvé leur expression dans la Déclaration de Saint-Pétersbourg du 29 novembre (11 décembre) 1868,

Les Soussignés, Plénipotentiaires des Puissances représentées à la Conférence Internationale de la Paix à La Haye, dûment autorisés à cet effet par leurs Gouvernements, s'inspirant des sentiments qui ont trouvé leur expression dans la Déclaration de Saint-Pétersbourg du 29 novembre (11 décembre) 1868,

Déclarent:

Declare:

Les Puissances Contractantes s'interdisent l'emploi de projectiles qui ont pour but unique de répandre des gaz asphyxiants ou délétères.

Les Puissances Contractantes s'interdisent l'emploi de projectiles qui ont pour but unique de répandre des gaz asphyxiants ou délétères.

La présente Déclaration n'est obligatoire que pour les Puissances Contractantes, en cas de guerre entre deux ou plusieurs d'entre elles.

La présente Déclaration n'est obligatoire que pour les Puissances Contractantes, en cas de guerre entre deux ou plusieurs d'entre elles.

Elle cessera d'être obligatoire du moment où dans une guerre entre des Puissances Contractantes une Puissance non-Contractante se joindrait à l'un des belligérants.

Elle ne sera plus obligatoire dès qu'une Puissance non-Contractante se joindra à l'un des belligérants dans une guerre entre des Puissances Contractantes.

La présente Déclaration sera ratifiée dans le plus bref délai possible.

La présente Déclaration sera ratifiée dès que possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Il sera dressé du dépôt de chaque ratification un procès-verbal, dont une copie, certifiée conforme, sera remise par la voie diplomatique à toutes les Puissances Contractantes.

Il sera fait un compte rendu du dépôt de chaque ratification, dont une copie certifiée conforme sera envoyée par voie diplomatique à toutes les Puissances Contractantes.

Les Puissances non-Signataires pourront adhérer à la présente Déclaration. Elles auront, à cet effet, à faire connaître leur adhésion aux Puissances Contractantes, au moyen d'une notification écrite, adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et communiquée par celui-ci à toutes les autres Puissances Contractantes.

Les Puissances non-Signataires pourront adhérer à la présente Déclaration. Elles auront, à cet effet, à faire connaître leur adhésion aux Puissances Contractantes, au moyen d'une notification écrite, adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et communiquée par celui-ci à toutes les autres Puissances Contractantes.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes dénonçât la présente Déclaration, cette dénonciation ne produirait ses effets qu'un an après la notification faite par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et communiquée immédiatement par celui-ci à toutes les autres Puissances Contractantes.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes dénonçât la présente Déclaration, cette dénonciation ne produirait ses effets qu'un an après la notification faite par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et communiquée immédiatement par celui-ci à toutes les autres Puissances Contractantes.

Cette dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée.

Cette dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires ont signé la présente Déclaration et l'ont revêtue de leurs cachets.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires ont signé la présente Déclaration et l'ont revêtue de leurs cachets.

Fait à La Haye, le 29 juillet 1899, en un seul exemplaire, qui restera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et dont des copies, certifiées conformes, seront remises par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances Contractantes.[Pg 587]

Fait à La Haye, le 29 juillet 1899, en un seul exemplaire, qui restera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et dont des copies, certifiées conformes, seront remises par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances Contractantes.[Pg 587]

APPENDIX V Geneva Convention 1906

Chapitre Premier.Des Blessés et Malades.

Chapter One.Injured and Sick.

Article premier.

First article.

Les militaires et les autres personnes officiellement attachées aux armées, qui seront blessés ou malades, devront être respectés et soignés, sans distinction de nationalité, par le belligérant qui les aura en son pouvoir.

Les militaires et les autres personnes officiellement rattachées aux armées, qui seront blessés ou malades, devront être respectés et soignés, sans distinction de nationalité, par le belligérant qui les aura en son pouvoir.

Toutefois, le belligérant, obligé d'abandonner des malades ou des blessés à son adversaire, laissera avec eux, autant que les circonstances militaires le permettront, une partie de son personnel et de son matériel sanitaires pour contribuer à les soigner.

Toutefois, le belligérant, obligé d'abandonner des malades ou des blessés à son adversaire, laissera avec eux, autant que les circonstances militaires le permettront, une partie de son personnel et de son matériel sanitaires pour contribuer à les soigner.

Article 2.

Article 2.

Sous réserve des soins à leur fournir en vertu de l'article précédent, les blessés ou malades d'une armée tombés au pouvoir de l'autre belligérant sont prisonniers de guerre et les règles générales du droit des gens concernant les prisonniers leur sont applicables.

Sous réserve des soins à leur fournir en vertu de l'article précédent, les blessés ou malades d'une armée tombés au pouvoir de l'autre belligérant sont prisonniers de guerre et les règles générales du droit des gens concernant les prisonniers leur sont applicables.

Cependant, les belligérants restent libres de stipuler entre eux, à l'égard des prisonniers blessés ou malades, telles clauses d'exception ou de faveur qu'ils jugeront utiles; ils auront, notamment, la faculté de convenir:

Cependant, les belligérants restent libres de stipuler entre eux, à l'égard des prisonniers blessés ou malades, telles clauses d'exception ou de faveur qu'ils jugeront utiles; ils auront, notamment, la faculté de convenir:

De se remettre réciproquement, après un combat, les blessés laissés sur le champ de bataille;

De se remettre réciproquement, après un combat, les blessés laissés sur le champ de bataille;

De renvoyer dans leur pays, après les avoir mis en état d'être transportés ou après guérison, les blessés ou malades qu'ils ne voudront pas garder prisonniers;

De renvoyer dans leur pays, après les avoir mis en état d'être transportés ou après guérison, les blessés ou malades qu'ils ne voudront pas garder prisonniers;

De remettre à un État neutre, du consentement de celui-ci, des blessés ou malades de la partie adverse, à la charge par l'État neutre de les interner jusqu'à la fin des hostilités.

De remettre à un État neutre, du consentement de celui-ci, des blessés ou malades de la partie adverse, à la charge par l'État neutre de les interner jusqu'à la fin des hostilités.

Article 3.

Article 3.

Après chaque combat, l'occupant du champ de bataille prendra des mesures pour rechercher les blessés et pour les faire protéger, ainsi que les morts, contre le pillage et les mauvais traitements.

Après chaque combat, l'occupant du champ de bataille prendra des mesures pour rechercher les blessés et les protéger, ainsi que les morts, contre le pillage et les mauvais traitements.

Il veillera à ce que l'inhumation ou l'incinération des morts soit précédée d'un examen attentif de leurs cadavres.

Il veillera à ce que l'inhumation ou l'incinération des morts soit précédée d'un examen attentif de leurs cadavres.

Article 4.

Article 4.

Chaque belligérant enverra, dès qu'il sera possible, aux autorités de leur pays ou de leur armée les marques ou pièces militaires d'identité trouvées sur les morts et l'état nominatif des blessés ou malades recueillis par lui.

Chaque belligérant enverra, dès qu'il sera possible, aux autorités de leur pays ou de leur armée les marques ou pièces militaires d'identité trouvées sur les morts et l'état nominatif des blessés ou malades recueillis par lui.

Les belligérants se tiendront réciproquement au courant des internements et des mutations, ainsi que des entrées dans les hôpitaux et des décès survenus parmi les blessés et malades en leur pouvoir. Ils recueilleront tous les objets d'un usage personnel, valeurs, lettres, etc., qui seront trouvés sur les champs de bataille ou délaissés par les blessés ou malades décédés dans les établissements et formations sanitaires, pour les faire transmettre aux intéressés par les autorités de leur pays.

Les belligérants s'informeront mutuellement des internements et des transferts, ainsi que des admissions à l'hôpital et des décès parmi les blessés et malades sous leur garde. Ils récupéreront tous les effets personnels, les objets de valeur, les lettres, etc., qui seront trouvés sur les champs de bataille ou abandonnés par les blessés ou malades décédés dans les établissements et formations médicales, afin de les faire transmettre aux personnes concernées par les autorités de leur pays.

Article 5.

Article 5.

L'autorité militaire pourra faire appel au zèle charitable des habitants pour recueillir et soigner, sous son contrôle, des blessés ou malades des armées, en accordant aux personnes ayant répondu à cet appel une protection spéciale et certaines immunités.

L'autorité militaire peut faire appel à la générosité des habitants pour recueillir et soigner, sous son contrôle, les blessés ou malades des armées, en accordant aux personnes qui répondent à cet appel une protection spéciale et certaines immunités.

Chapitre II.Des Formations et Établissements Sanitaires.

Chapter 2.On Health Organizations and Institutions.

Article 6.

Article 6.

Les formations sanitaires mobiles (c'est-à-dire celles qui sont destinées à accompagner les armées en campagne) et les établissements fixes du service de santé seront respectés et protégés par les belligérants.

Les formations sanitaires mobiles (c'est-à-dire celles qui sont destinées à accompagner les armées en campagne) et les établissements fixes du service de santé seront respectés et protégés par les belligérants.

Article 7.

Article 7.

La protection due aux formations et établissements sanitaires cesse si l'on en use pour commettre des actes nuisibles à l'ennemi.[Pg 588]

La protection accordée aux formations et établissements sanitaires prend fin si ceux-ci sont utilisés pour commettre des actes nuisibles à l'ennemi.[Pg 588]

Article 8.

Article 8.

Ne sont pas considérés comme étant de nature à priver une formation ou un établissement sanitaire de la protection assurée par l'article 6:

Ne sont pas considérés comme étant de nature à priver une formation ou un établissement sanitaire de la protection assurée par l'article 6:

1o. Le fait que le personnel de la formation ou de l'établissement est armé et qu'il use de ses armes pour sa propre défense ou celle de ses malades et blessés;

1o. The fact that the staff of the training or establishment is armed and that they use their weapons for their own defense or that of their patients and injured individuals;

2o. Le fait qu'à défaut d'infirmiers armés, la formation ou l'établissement est gardé par un piquet ou des sentinelles munis d'un mandat régulier;

2o. The fact that in the absence of armed nurses, the training or establishment is secured by a guard or sentries with a proper mandate;

3o. Le fait qu'il est trouvé dans la formation ou l'établissement des armes et cartouches retirées aux blessés et n'ayant pas encore été versées au service compétent.

3o. The fact that it is found in the formation or establishment of weapons and cartridges removed from the injured and not yet submitted to the appropriate service.

Chapitre III.Du Personnel.

Chapter III.The Staff.

Article 9.

Article 9.

Le personnel exclusivement affecté à l'enlèvement, au transport et au traitement des blessés et des malades, ainsi qu'à l'administration des formations et établissements sanitaires, les aumôniers attachés aux armées, seront respectés et protégés en toute circonstance; s'ils tombent entre les mains de l'ennemi, ils ne seront pas traités comme prisonniers de guerre.

Le personnel exclusivement affecté à l'enlèvement, au transport et au traitement des blessés et des malades, ainsi qu'à l'administration des formations et établissements sanitaires, les aumôniers attachés aux armées, seront respectés et protégés en toute circonstance; s'ils tombent entre les mains de l'ennemi, ils ne seront pas traités comme prisonniers de guerre.

Ces dispositions s'appliquent au personnel de garde des formations et établissements sanitaires dans le cas prévu à l'article 8, no 2.

Ces dispositions s'appliquent au personnel de garde des formations et établissements sanitaires dans le cas prévu à l'article 8, n° 2.

Article 10.

Article 10.

Est assimilé au personnel visé à l'article précédent le personnel des Sociétés de secours volontaires dûment reconnues et autorisées par leur Gouvernement, qui sera employé dans les formations et établissements sanitaires des armées, sous la réserve que ledit personnel sera soumis aux lois et règlements militaires.

Est assimilé au personnel visé à l'article précédent le personnel des Sociétés de secours volontaires dûment reconnues et autorisées par leur Gouvernement, qui sera employé dans les formations et établissements sanitaires des armées, sous la réserve que ledit personnel sera soumis aux lois et règlements militaires.

Chaque État doit notifier à l'autre soit dès le temps de paix, soit à l'ouverture ou au cours des hostilités, en tout cas avant tout emploi effectif, les noms des Sociétés qu'il a autorisées à prêter leur concours, sous sa responsabilité, au service sanitaire officiel de ses armées.

Chaque État doit informer l'autre, que ce soit en temps de paix, au début ou durant les hostilités, et dans tous les cas avant toute intervention réelle, des noms des Sociétés qu'il a autorisées à apporter leur aide, sous sa responsabilité, au service sanitaire officiel de ses armées.

Article 11.

Article 11.

Une Société reconnue d'un pays neutre ne peut prêter le concours de ses personnels et formations sanitaires à un belligérant qu'avec l'assentiment préalable de son propre Gouvernement et l'autorisation du belligérant lui-même.

Une Société reconnue d'un pays neutre ne peut prêter le concours de ses personnels et formations sanitaires à un belligérant qu'avec l'assentiment préalable de son propre Gouvernement et l'autorisation du belligérant lui-même.

Le belligérant qui a accepté le secours est tenu, avant tout emploi, d'en faire la notification à son ennemi.

Le belligérant qui a accepté l'aide doit, avant de l'utiliser, en informer son ennemi.

Article 12.

Article 12.

Les personnes désignées dans les articles 9, 10 et 11 continueront, après qu'elles seront tombées au pouvoir de l'ennemi, à remplir leurs fonctions sous sa direction.

Les personnes désignées dans les articles 9, 10 et 11 continueront, après qu'elles seront tombées au pouvoir de l'ennemi, à remplir leurs fonctions sous sa direction.

Lorsque leur concours ne sera plus indispensable, elles seront renvoyées à leur armée ou à leur pays dans les délais et suivant l'itinéraire compatibles avec les nécessités militaires.

Lorsque leur concours ne sera plus indispensable, elles seront renvoyées à leur armée ou à leur pays dans les délais et suivant l'itinéraire compatibles avec les nécessités militaires.

Elles emporteront, alors, les effets, les instruments, les armes et les chevaux qui sont leur propriété particulière.

Elles emporteront donc les effets, les instruments, les armes et les chevaux qui leur appartiennent.

Article 13.

Article 13.

L'ennemi assurera au personnel visé par l'article 9, pendant qu'il sera en son pouvoir, les mêmes allocations et la même solde qu'au personnel des mêmes grades de son armée.

L'ennemi garantira au personnel mentionné dans l'article 9, tant qu'il en aura les moyens, les mêmes allocations et le même salaire que celui des personnels de même grade dans son armée.

Chapitre IV.Du Matériel.

Chapter IV.Equipment.

Article 14.

Article 14.

Les formations sanitaires mobiles conserveront, si elles tombent au pouvoir de l'ennemi, leur matériel, y compris les attelages, quels que soient les moyens de transport et le personnel conducteur.

Les formations sanitaires mobiles conserveront, si elles tombent au pouvoir de l'ennemi, leur matériel, y compris les attelages, quels que soient les moyens de transport et le personnel conducteur.

Toutefois, l'autorité militaire compétente aura la faculté de s'en servir pour les soins des blessés et malades; la restitution du matériel aura lieu dans les conditions prévues pour le personnel sanitaire, et, autant que possible, en même temps.

Toutefois, l'autorité militaire compétente aura la possibilité de l'utiliser pour soigner les blessés et malades ; la restitution du matériel se fera dans les conditions prévues pour le personnel sanitaire, et autant que possible, en même temps.

Article 15.

Article 15.

Les bâtiments et le matériel des établissements fixes demeurent soumis aux lois de la guerre, mais ne pourront être détournés de leur emploi, tant qu'ils seront nécessaires aux blessés et aux malades.

Les bâtiments et le matériel des établissements fixes restent soumis aux lois de la guerre, mais ne pourront pas être utilisés à d'autres fins tant qu'ils seront nécessaires aux blessés et aux malades.

Toutefois, les commandants des troupes d'opérations pourront en disposer, en cas de nécessités militaires importantes, en assurant au préalable le sort des blessés et malades qui s'y trouvent.

Toutefois, les commandants des troupes d'opérations pourront en disposer, en cas de nécessités militaires importantes, en assurant au préalable le sort des blessés et malades qui s'y trouvent.

Article 16.

Article 16.

Le matériel des Sociétés de secours, admises au bénéfice de la Convention conformément aux conditions déterminées par celle-ci, est considéré comme propriété privée et, comme tel, respecté en toute circonstance, sauf le droit de réquisition reconnu aux belligérants selon les lois et usages de la guerre.[Pg 589]

The property of relief societies, authorized to benefit from the Convention under the defined conditions, is treated as private property and, as such, is respected in all circumstances, except for the right of requisition acknowledged to combatants in accordance with the laws and customs of war.[Pg 589]

Chapitre V.Des Convois d'Évacuation.

Chapter V.Evacuation Convoys.

Article 17.

Article 17.

Les convois d'évacuation seront traités comme les formations sanitaires mobiles, sauf les dispositions spéciales suivantes:

Les convois d'évacuation seront traités comme les unités de santé mobiles, sauf les dispositions spéciales suivantes :

1o. Le belligérant interceptant un convoi pourra, si les nécessités militaires l'exigent, le disloquer en se chargeant des malades et blessés qu'il contient.

1o. The warring party intercepting a convoy can, if military needs demand, break it apart by taking on the sick and injured it contains.

2o. Dans ce cas, l'obligation de renvoyer le personnel sanitaire, prévue à l'article 12, sera étendue à tout le personnel militaire préposé au transport ou à la garde du convoi et muni à cet effet d'un mandat régulier.

2o. In this case, the obligation to send back the healthcare staff, as stated in article 12, will be extended to all military personnel responsible for transporting or guarding the convoy and equipped with a proper mandate for this purpose.

L'obligation de rendre le matériel sanitaire, prévue à l'article 14, s'appliquera aux trains de chemins de fer et bateaux de la navigation intérieure spécialement organisés pour les évacuations, ainsi qu'au matériel d'aménagement des voitures, trains et bateaux ordinaires appartenant au service de santé.

L'obligation de rendre le matériel sanitaire, prévue à l'article 14, s'appliquera aux trains de chemins de fer et bateaux de la navigation intérieure spécialement organisés pour les évacuations, ainsi qu'au matériel d'aménagement des voitures, trains et bateaux ordinaires appartenant au service de santé.

Les voitures militaires, autres que celles du service de santé, pourront être capturées avec leurs attelages.

Les voitures militaires, autres que celles du service de santé, pourront être capturées avec leurs attelages.

Le personnel civil et les divers moyens de transport provenant de la réquisition, y compris matériel de chemin de fer et les bateaux utilisés pour les convois, seront soumis aux règles générales du droit des gens.

Le personnel civil et les différents moyens de transport issus de la réquisition, y compris le matériel ferroviaire et les bateaux utilisés pour les convois, seront soumis aux règles générales du droit international.

Chapitre VI.Du Signe Distinctif.

Chapter VI.The Distinctive Sign.

Article 18.

Article 18.

Par hommage pour la Suisse, le signe héraldique de la croix rouge sur fond blanc, formé par interversion des couleurs fédérales, est maintenu comme emblème et signe distinctif du service sanitaire des armées.

Par hommage pour la Suisse, le symbole de la croix rouge sur fond blanc, issu de l'inversion des couleurs nationales, reste l'emblème et le signe distinctif du service de santé des armées.

Article 19.

Article 19.

Cet emblème figure sur les drapeaux, les brassards, ainsi que sur tout le matériel se rattachant au service sanitaire, avec la permission de l'autorité militaire compétente.

Cet emblème apparaît sur les drapeaux, les brassards, ainsi que sur tout le matériel lié au service de santé, avec l'autorisation de l'autorité militaire compétente.

Article 20.

Article 20.

Le personnel protégé en vertu des articles 9, alinéa 1er, 10 et 11 porte, fixé au bras gauche, un brassard avec croix rouge sur fond blanc, délivré et timbré, par l'autorité militaire compétente, accompagné d'un certificat d'identité pour les personnes rattachées au service de santé des armées et qui n'auraient pas d'uniforme militaire.

Le personnel protégé en vertu des articles 9, alinéa 1er, 10 et 11 porte, fixé au bras gauche, un brassard avec une croix rouge sur fond blanc, délivré et timbré par l'autorité militaire compétente, accompagné d'un certificat d'identité pour les personnes rattachées au service de santé des armées et qui n'ont pas d'uniforme militaire.

Article 21.

Article 21.

Le drapeau distinctif de la Convention ne peut être arboré que sur les formations et établissements sanitaires qu'elle ordonne de respecter et avec le consentement de l'autorité militaire. Il devra être accompagné du drapeau national du belligérant dont relève la formation ou l'établissement.

Le drapeau distinctif de la Convention ne peut être affiché que sur les formations et établissements de santé qu'elle exige de respecter et avec l'accord de l'autorité militaire. Il doit être accompagné du drapeau national du pays belligérant auquel la formation ou l'établissement appartient.

Toutefois, les formations sanitaires tombées au pouvoir de l'ennemi n'arboreront pas d'autre drapeau que celui de la Croix-Rouge, aussi longtemps qu'elles se trouveront dans cette situation.

Toutefois, les formations sanitaires tombées au pouvoir de l'ennemi n'arboreront pas d'autre drapeau que celui de la Croix-Rouge, aussi longtemps qu'elles se trouveront dans cette situation.

Article 22.

Article 22.

Les formations sanitaires des pays neutres qui, dans les conditions prévues par l'article 11, auraient été autorisées à fournir leurs services, doivent arborer, avec le drapeau de la Convention, le drapeau national du belligérant dont elles relèvent.

Les établissements de santé des pays neutres qui, selon les conditions stipulées dans l'article 11, auraient été autorisés à offrir leurs services, doivent afficher, en plus du drapeau de la Convention, le drapeau national du pays belligérant auquel ils sont associés.

Les dispositions du deuxième alinéa de l'article précédent leur sont applicables.

Les dispositions du deuxième alinéa de l'article précédent leur sont applicables.

Article 23.

Article 23.

L'emblème de la Croix-Rouge sur fond blanc et les mots Croix-Rouge ou Croix de Genève ne pourront être employés, soit en temps de paix, soit en temps de guerre, que pour protéger ou désigner les formations et établissements sanitaires, le personnel et le matériel protégés par la Convention.

L'emblème de la Croix-Rouge sur fond blanc et les mots Croix-Rouge ou Croix de Genève ne pourront être employés, soit en temps de paix, soit en temps de guerre, que pour protéger ou désigner les formations et établissements sanitaires, le personnel et le matériel protégés par la Convention.

Chapitre VII.De l'Application et de l'Exécution de la Convention.

Chapter 7.On the Application and Execution of the Agreement.

Article 24.

Article 24.

Les dispositions de la présente Convention ne sont obligatoires que pour les Puissances contractantes, en cas de guerre entre deux ou plusieurs d'entre elles. Ces dispositions cesseront d'être obligatoires du moment où l'une des Puissances belligérantes ne serait pas signataire de la Convention.

Les dispositions de la présente Convention ne sont obligatoires que pour les Puissances contractantes, en cas de guerre entre deux ou plusieurs d'entre elles. Ces dispositions cesseront d'être obligatoires du moment où l'une des Puissances belligérantes ne serait pas signataire de la Convention.

Article 25.

Article 25.

Les commandants en chef des armées belligérantes auront à pourvoir aux détails d'exécution des articles précédents, ainsi qu'aux cas non prévus, d'après les instructions de leurs Gouvernements respectifs et conformément aux principes généraux de la présente Convention.

Les commandants en chef des armées belligérantes devront s'occuper des détails d'exécution des articles précédents, ainsi que des situations non prévues, selon les instructions de leurs gouvernements respectifs et en accord avec les principes généraux de la présente convention.

Article 26.

Article 26.

Les Gouvernements signataires prendront les mesures nécessaires pour instruire leurs troupes, et spécialement le[Pg 590] personnel protégé, des dispositions de la présente Convention et pour les porter à la connaissance des populations.

Les gouvernements signataires prendront les mesures nécessaires pour former leurs troupes, en particulier le[Pg 590] personnel protégé, sur les dispositions de cette convention et pour les informer auprès des populations.

Chapitre VII.De la Répression des Abus et des Infractions.

Chapter 7.On the Repression of Abuses and Offenses.

Article 27.

Article 27.

Les Gouvernements signataires, dont la législation ne serait pas dès à présent suffisante, s'engagent à prendre ou à proposer à leurs législatures les mesures nécessaires pour empêcher en tout temps l'emploi, par des particuliers ou par des sociétés autres que celles y ayant droit en vertu de la présente Convention, de l'emblème ou de la dénomination de Croix-Rouge ou Croix de Genève, notamment, dans un but commercial, par le moyen de marques de fabrique ou de commerce.

The signatory governments, whose legislation is not currently adequate, commit to taking or proposing the necessary measures to their legislatures to ensure that at all times, individuals or companies that do not have the right under this Convention are prohibited from using the emblem or the name of Croix-Rouge or Croix de Genève, especially for commercial purposes, through trademarks or business marks.

L'interdiction de l'emploi de l'emblème ou de la dénomination dont il s'agit produira son effet à partir de l'époque déterminée par chaque législation et, au plus tard, cinq ans après la mise en vigueur de la présente Convention. Dès cette mise en vigueur, il ne sera plus licite de prendre une marque de fabrique ou de commerce contraire à l'interdiction.

L'interdiction de l'emploi de l'emblème ou de la dénomination en question prendra effet à partir de la date fixée par chaque législation et, au plus tard, cinq ans après l'entrée en vigueur de la présente Convention. Dès que celle-ci entre en vigueur, il ne sera plus permis d'utiliser une marque qui contredise cette interdiction.

Article 28.

Article 28.

Les Gouvernements signataires s'engagent également à prendre ou à proposer à leurs législatures, en cas d'insuffisance de leurs lois pénales militaires, les mesures nécessaires pour réprimer, en temps de guerre, les actes individuels de pillage et de mauvais traitements envers des blessés et malades des armées, ainsi que pour punir, comme usurpation d'insignes militaires, l'usage abusif du drapeau et du brassard de la Croix-Rouge par des militaires ou des particuliers non protégés par la présente Convention.

Les gouvernements signataires s'engagent aussi à prendre ou à proposer à leurs législatures, en cas d'insuffisance de leurs lois pénales militaires, les mesures nécessaires pour punir, en temps de guerre, les actes individuels de pillage et de mauvais traitements envers les blessés et malades des armées, ainsi que pour sanctionner, comme usurpation d'insignes militaires, l'usage abusif du drapeau et du brassard de la Croix-Rouge par des militaires ou des personnes non protégées par la présente Convention.

Ils se communiqueront, par l'intermédiaire du Conseil fédéral suisse, les dispositions relatives à cette répression, au plus tard dans les cinq ans de la ratification de la présente Convention.

Ils se communiqueront, par l'intermédiaire du Conseil fédéral suisse, les dispositions relatives à cette répression, au plus tard dans les cinq ans de la ratification de la présente Convention.

Dispositions Générales.

General Provisions.

Article 29.

Article 29.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée aussitôt que possible.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée dès que possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à Berne.

Les ratifications seront déposées à Berne.

Il sera dressé du dépôt de chaque ratification un procès-verbal dont une copie, certifiée conforme, sera remise par la voie diplomatique à toutes les Puissances contractantes.

Il sera fait un compte rendu du dépôt de chaque ratification, dont une copie certifiée conforme sera envoyée par voie diplomatique à toutes les puissances contractantes.

Article 30.

Article 30.

La présente Convention entrera en vigueur pour chaque Puissance six mois après la date du dépôt de sa ratification.

The present Convention will take effect for each Power six months after the date of the deposit of its ratification.

Article 31.

Article 31.

La présente Convention, dûment ratifiée, remplacera la Convention du 22 août 1864 dans les rapports entre les États contractants.

La présente Convention, dûment ratifiée, remplacera la Convention du 22 août 1864 dans les rapports entre les États contractants.

La Convention de 1864 reste en vigueur dans les rapports entre les Parties qui l'ont signée et qui ne ratifieraient pas également la présente Convention.

La Convention de 1864 reste en vigueur dans les relations entre les Parties qui l'ont signée et qui ne ratifieraient pas également la présente Convention.

Article 32.

Article 32.

La présente Convention pourra, jusqu'au 31 décembre prochain, être signée par les Puissances représentées à la Conférence qui s'est ouverte à Genève le 11 juin 1906, ainsi que par les Puissances non représentées à cette Conférence qui ont signé la Convention de 1864.

La présente Convention pourra, jusqu'au 31 décembre prochain, être signée par les Puissances représentées à la Conférence qui s'est ouverte à Genève le 11 juin 1906, ainsi que par les Puissances non représentées à cette Conférence qui ont signé la Convention de 1864.

Celles de ces Puissances qui, au 31 décembre 1906, n'auront pas signé la présente Convention, resteront libres d'y adhérer par la suite. Elles auront à faire connaître leur adhésion au moyen d'une notification écrite adressée au Conseil fédéral suisse et communiquée par celui-ci à toutes les Puissances contractantes.

Celles de ces Puissances qui, au 31 décembre 1906, n'auront pas signé la présente Convention, resteront libres d'y adhérer par la suite. Elles auront à faire connaître leur adhésion au moyen d'une notification écrite adressée au Conseil fédéral suisse et communiquée par celui-ci à toutes les Puissances contractantes.

Les autres Puissances pourront demander à adhérer dans la même forme, mais leur demande ne produira effet que si, dans le délai d'un an à partir de la notification au Conseil fédéral, celui-ci n'a reçu d'opposition de la part d'aucune des Puissances contractantes.

Les autres Puissances pourront demander à adhérer de la même manière, mais leur demande ne sera valide que si, dans un délai d'un an à partir de la notification au Conseil fédéral, celui-ci n'a reçu d'opposition de la part d'aucune des Puissances contractantes.

Article 33.

Article 33.

Chacune des Parties contractantes aura la faculté de dénoncer la présente Convention. Cette dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'un an après la notification faite par écrit au Conseil fédéral suisse; celui-ci communiquera immédiatement la notification à toutes les autres Parties contractantes.

Chacune des Parties contractantes a le droit de mettre fin à la présente Convention. Cette résiliation ne sera effective qu'un an après l'envoi d'une notification écrite au Conseil fédéral suisse; celui-ci transmettra immédiatement la notification à toutes les autres Parties contractantes.

Cette dénonciation ne vaudra qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée.

Cette dénonciation ne sera valable que pour la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires ont signé la présente Convention et l'ont revêtue de leurs cachets.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires ont signé la présente Convention et l'ont revêtue de leurs cachets.

Fait à Genève, le six juillet mil neuf cent six, en un seul exemplaire, qui restera déposé dans les archives de la Confédération suisse, et dont des copies, certifiées conformes, seront remises par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances contractantes.[Pg 591]

Fait à Genève, le six juillet 1906, en un seul exemplaire, qui restera déposé dans les archives de la Confédération suisse, et dont des copies, certifiées conformes, seront remises par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances contractantes.[Pg 591]

APPENDIX 6 FINAL ACT OF THE SECOND PEACE CONFERENCE Signed in The Hague, October 18, 1907

La Deuxième Conférence Internationale de la Paix, proposée d'abord par Monsieur le Président des États-Unis d'Amérique, ayant été, sur l'invitation de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, convoquée par Sa Majesté la Reine des Pays-Bas, s'est réunie le 15 juin 1907 à La Haye, dans la Salle des Chevaliers, avec la mission de donner un développement nouveau au principes humanitaires qui ont servi de base à l'œuvre de la Première Conférence de 1899.

La Deuxième Conférence Internationale de la Paix, initially proposed by the President of the United States, was convened at the invitation of His Majesty the Emperor of All Russia, by Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, and took place on June 15, 1907, in The Hague, in the Knights' Hall, with the goal of advancing the humanitarian principles that served as the foundation for the First Conference in 1899.

Les Puissances, dont l'énumeration suit, ont pris part à la Conférence, pour laquelle Elles avaient désigné les Délégués nommés ci-après:

Les Puissances, dont l'énumération suit, ont participé à la Conférence, pour laquelle elles avaient désigné les délégués nommés ci-après:

[Here follow names.]

[Here follow names.]

Dans une série de réunions, tenues du 15 juin au 18 octobre 1907, où les Délégués précités ont été constamment animés du désir de réaliser, dans la plus large mesure possible, les vues généreuses de l'Auguste Initiateur de la Conférence et les intentions de leurs Gouvernements, la Conférence a arrêté, pour être soumis à la signature des Plénipotentiaires, le texte des Conventions et de la Déclaration énumérées ci-après et annexées au présent Acte:

Dans une série de réunions, organisées du 15 juin au 18 octobre 1907, où les Délégués mentionnés ont constamment souhaité réaliser, dans la mesure du possible, les objectifs généreux de l'Auguste Initiateur de la Conférence et les intentions de leurs Gouvernements, la Conférence a décidé, pour être soumis à la signature des Plénipotentiaires, le texte des Conventions et de la Déclaration énumérées ci-après et annexées au présent Acte:

I. Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.

I. Convention for the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.

II. Convention concernant la limitation de l'emploi de la force pour le recouvrement de dettes contractuelles.

II. Agreement on the limitation of the use of force for the recovery of contractual debts.

III. Convention relative à l'ouverture des hostilités.

III. Convention regarding the initiation of hostilities.

IV. Convention concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre.

IV. Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land.

V. Convention concernant les droits et les devoirs des Puissances et des personnes neutres en cas de guerre sur terre.

V. Convention regarding the rights and duties of Powers and neutral individuals in the event of war on land.

VI. Convention relative au régime des navires de commerce ennemis au début des hostilités.

VI. Convention regarding the status of enemy commercial vessels at the start of hostilities.

VII. Convention relative à la transformation des navires de commerce en bâtiments de guerre.

VII. Convention regarding the conversion of commercial ships into warships.

VIII. Convention relative à la pose de mines sous-marines automatiques de contact.

VIII. Convention on the installation of automatic contact mines.

IX. Convention concernant le bombardement par des forces navales en temps de guerre.

IX. Convention regarding naval bombardment in wartime.

X. Convention pour l'adaptation à la guerre maritime des principes de la Convention de Genève.

X. Convention for the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention.

XI. Convention relative à certaines restrictions à l'exercice du droit de capture dans la guerre maritime.

XI. Convention regarding certain restrictions on the exercise of the right of capture in maritime warfare.

XII. Convention relative à l'établissement d'une Cour internationale des prises.

XII. Convention related to the establishment of an International Prize Court.

XIII. Convention concernant les droits et les devoirs des Puissances neutres en cas de guerre maritime.

XIII. Convention regarding the rights and duties of neutral Powers in the event of maritime war.

XIV. Déclaration relative à l'interdiction de lancer des projectiles et des explosifs du haut de ballons.

XIV. Declaration on the Prohibition of Releasing Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons.

Ces Conventions et cette Déclaration formeront autant d'actes séparés. Ces actes porteront la date de ce jour et pourront être signés jusqu'au 30 juin 1908 à La Haye par les Plénipotentiaires des Puissances représentées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix.

Ces Conventions et cette Déclaration formeront autant d'actes séparés. Ces actes porteront la date de ce jour et pourront être signés jusqu'au 30 juin 1908 à La Haye par les Plénipotentiaires des Puissances représentées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix.

La Conférence, se conformant à l'esprit d'entente et de concessions réciproques qui est l'esprit même de ses délibérations, a arrêté la déclaration suivante qui, tout en réservant à chacune des Puissances représentées le bénéfice de ses votes, leur permet à toutes d'affirmer les principes qu'Elles considèrent comme unanimement reconnus:

La Conférence, adhering to the spirit of understanding and mutual concessions that embodies its discussions, has established the following declaration which, while reserving to each of the Powers represented the benefit of their votes, allows all of them to affirm the principles they see as universally acknowledged:

Elle est unanime,

She is unanimous,

1o. A reconnaître le principe de l'arbitrage obligatoire;

1o. To acknowledge the principle of mandatory arbitration;

2o. A déclarer que certains différends, et notamment ceux relatifs à l'interprétation et à l'application des stipulations conventionnelles internationales, sont susceptibles d'être soumis à l'arbitrage obligatoire sans aucune restriction.

2o. It should be stated that certain disputes, particularly those related to the interpretation and application of international treaty provisions, can be submitted to mandatory arbitration without any restrictions.

Elle est unanime enfin à proclamer que, s'il n'a pas été donné de conclure dès maintenant une Convention en ce sens, les divergences d'opinion qui se sont manifestées n'ont pas dépassé les limites d'une controverse juridique, et qu'en travaillant ici ensemble pendant quatre mois, toutes les Puissances du[Pg 592] monde, non seulement ont appris à se comprendre et à se rapprocher davantage, mais ont su dégager, au cours de cette longue collaboration, un sentiment très élevé du bien commun de l'humanité.

Elle est unanime enfin à proclamer que, s'il n'a pas été possible de conclure dès maintenant une convention à ce sujet, les divergences d'opinion qui se sont manifestées n'ont pas dépassé le cadre d'une simple controverse juridique. En travaillant ensemble ici pendant quatre mois, toutes les puissances du[Pg 592] monde ont non seulement appris à se comprendre et à se rapprocher, mais elles ont aussi réussi à dégager, au cours de cette longue collaboration, un sentiment très fort du bien commun de l'humanité.

En outre, la Conférence a adopté à l'unanimité la Résolution suivante:

En plus, la Conférence a adopté à l'unanimité la Résolution suivante :

La Deuxième Conférence de la Paix confirme la Résolution adoptée par la Conférence de 1899 à l'égard de la limitation des charges militaires; et, vu que les charges militaires se sont considérablement accrues dans presque tous les pays depuis ladite année, la Conférence déclare qu'il est hautement désirable de voir les Gouvernements reprendre l'étude sérieuse de cette question.

La Deuxième Conférence de la Paix confirme la Résolution adoptée par la Conférence de 1899 concernant la limitation des charges militaires; et, étant donné que les charges militaires ont considérablement augmenté dans presque tous les pays depuis cette année-là, la Conférence déclare qu'il est très souhaitable que les Gouvernements reprennent l'étude sérieuse de cette question.

Elle a, de plus, émis les Vœux suivants:

Elle a également exprimé les vœux suivants:

1o. La Conférence recommande aux Puissances signataires l'adoption du projet ci-annexé de Convention pour l'établissement d'une Cour de Justice arbitrale, et sa mise en vigueur dès qu'un accord sera intervenu sur le choix des juges et la constitution de la Cour.

1o. The Conference recommends to the signing Powers the adoption of the attached draft Convention for the establishment of an Arbitration Court, and its implementation as soon as an agreement has been reached on the selection of judges and the constitution of the Court.

2o. La Conférence émet le vœu qu'en cas de guerre, les autorités compétentes, civiles et militaires, se fassent un devoir tout spécial d'assurer et de protéger le maintien des rapports pacifiques et notamment des relations commerciales et industrielles entre les populations des États belligérants et les pays neutres.

2o. The Conference expresses the wish that in the event of war, the relevant civil and military authorities make it a priority to ensure and protect the maintenance of peaceful relations, especially commercial and industrial ties, between the populations of belligerent states and neutral countries.

3o. La Conférence émet le vœu que les Puissances règlent, par des Conventions particulières, la situation, au point de vue des charges militaires, des étrangers établis sur leurs territoires.

3o. The Conference wishes that the Powers regulate, through specific agreements, the situation regarding the military obligations of foreigners residing in their territories.

4o. La Conférence émet le vœu que l'élaboration d'un règlement relatif aux lois et coutumes de la guerre maritime figure au programme de la prochaine Conférence et que, dans tous les cas, les Puissances appliquent, autant que possible, à la guerre sur mer, les principes de la Convention relative aux lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre.

4o. The Conference expresses the wish that the development of regulations regarding the laws and customs of maritime warfare be included in the agenda of the next Conference, and that, in all cases, the Powers apply, as much as possible, to naval warfare the principles of the Convention concerning the laws and customs of land warfare.

Enfin, la Conférence recommande aux Puissances la réunion d'une troisième Conférence de la Paix qui pourrait avoir lieu, dans une période analogue à celle qui s'est écoulée depuis la précédente Conférence, à une date à fixer d'un commun accord entre les Puissances, et elle appelle leur attention sur la nécessité de préparer les travaux de cette troisième Conférence assez longtemps à l'avance pour que ses délibérations se poursuivent avec l'autorité et la rapidité indispensables.

Enfin, la Conférence recommande aux Puissances de tenir une troisième Conférence de la Paix, qui pourrait se dérouler dans une période similaire à celle qui a suivi la précédente Conférence, à une date à convenir d'un commun accord entre les Puissances. Elle attire leur attention sur la nécessité de préparer les travaux de cette troisième Conférence assez en amont pour que ses délibérations avancent avec l'autorité et la rapidité requises.

Pour atteindre à ce but, la Conférence estime qu'il serait très désirable que environ deux ans avant l'époque probable de la réunion, un Comité préparatoire fût chargé par les Gouvernements de recueillir les diverses propositions à soumettre à la Conférence, de rechercher les matières susceptibles d'un prochain règlement international et de préparer un programme que les Gouvernements arrêteraient assez tôt pour qu'il pût être sérieusement étudié dans chaque pays. Ce Comité serait, en outre, chargé, de proposer un mode d'organisation et de procédure pour la Conférence elle-même.

To achieve this goal, the Conference believes it would be very desirable for about two years before the expected date of the meeting, a Preparatory Committee be appointed by the Governments to gather various proposals to be submitted to the Conference, to identify issues that could be addressed with an upcoming international agreement, and to prepare an agenda that the Governments would finalize early enough for it to be seriously examined in each country. This Committee would also be responsible for suggesting an organizational structure and process for the Conference itself.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires ont signé le présent acte et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiaries have signed this document and affixed their seals.

Fait à La Haye, le dix-huit octobre mil neuf cent sept, en un seul exemplaire qui sera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et dont les copies, certifiées conformes, seront délivrées à toutes les Puissances représentées à la Conférence.

Fait à La Haye, le dix-huit octobre mil neuf cent sept, en un seul exemplaire qui sera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et dont les copies, certifiées conformes, seront délivrées à toutes les Puissances représentées à la Conférence.

CONVENTION I. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

[944] Only the texts of this and the other Conventions of the Second Peace Conference are here printed; the preambles, reservations, and special declarations made in signing the Conventions are omitted.

[944] Only the texts of this and the other Conventions from the Second Peace Conference are printed here; the preambles, reservations, and special declarations made when signing the Conventions are not included.

Titre I.—Du maintien de la paix générale.

Title I.—On Keeping the Peace.

Article premier.

Article one.

En vue de prévenir autant que possible le recours à la force dans les rapports entre les États, les Puissances contractantes conviennent d'employer tous leurs efforts pour assurer le règlement pacifique des différends internationaux.

En vue de prévenir autant que possible le recours à la force dans les relations entre les pays, les États signataires s'engagent à utiliser tous leurs efforts pour garantir la résolution pacifique des conflits internationaux.

Titre II.—Des bons offices et de la médiation.

Title II.—On Good Offices and Mediation.

Article 2.

Article 2.

En cas de dissentiment grave ou de conflit, avant d'en appeler aux armes, les Puissances contractantes conviennent d'avoir recours, en tant que les circonstances le permettront, aux bons offices ou à la médiation d'une ou de plusieurs Puissances amies.

En cas de désaccord sérieux ou de conflit, avant de passer aux hostilités, les États signataires conviennent d'utiliser, dans la mesure du possible, les bons offices ou la médiation d'un ou plusieurs pays amis.

Article 3.

Article 3.

Indépendamment de ce recours, les Puissances contractantes jugent utile et désirable qu'une ou plusieurs Puissances étrangères au conflit offrent de leur propre initiative, en tant que les circonstances s'y prêtent, leurs bons offices ou leur médiation aux Etats en conflit.

Independently of this appeal, the contracting Powers consider it useful and desirable that one or more foreign Powers, as circumstances allow, offer their good offices or mediation to the States in conflict on their own initiative.

Le droit d'offrir les bons offices ou la médiation appartient aux Puissances étrangères au conflit, même pendant le cours des hostilités.

Le droit d'offrir des bons offices ou de la médiation appartient aux puissances étrangères au conflit, même pendant les hostilités.

L'exercice de ce droit ne peut jamais être considéré par l'une ou l'autre des Parties en litige comme un acte peu amical.

L'exercice de ce droit ne peut jamais être considéré par l'une ou l'autre des Parties en litige comme un acte peu amical.

Article 4.

Article 4.

Le rôle du médiateur consiste à concilier les prétentions opposées et à apaiser les ressentiments qui peuvent s'être produits entre les États en conflit.

Le rôle du médiateur est de réconcilier les demandes opposées et de calmer les ressentiments qui peuvent avoir émergé entre les États en conflit.

Article 5.

Article 5.

Les fonctions du médiateur cessent du moment où il est constaté, soit par l'une des Parties en litige, soit par le médiateur lui-même, que les moyens de conciliation proposés par lui ne sont pas acceptés.

Les fonctions du médiateur cessent dès qu'il est constaté, que ce soit par l'une des Parties en litige ou par le médiateur lui-même, que les moyens de conciliation proposés par lui ne sont pas acceptés.

Article 6.

Article 6.

Les bons offices et la médiation, soit sur le recours des Parties en conflit, soit sur l'initiative des Puissances étrangères au conflit, ont exclusivement le caractère de conseil et n'ont jamais force obligatoire.

Les bons offices et la médiation, que ce soit à la demande des Parties en conflit ou sur l'initiative des Puissances étrangères au conflit, ont uniquement un caractère de conseil et n'ont jamais de force obligatoire.

Article 7.

Article 7.

L'acceptation de la médiation ne peut avoir pour effet, sauf convention contraire, d'interrompre, de retarder ou d'entraver la mobilisation et autres mesures préparatoires à la guerre.

L'acceptation de la médiation ne peut avoir pour effet, sauf convention contraire, d'interrompre, de retarder ou d'entraver la mobilisation et autres mesures préparatoires à la guerre.

Si elle intervient après l'ouverture des hostilités, elle n'interrompt pas, sauf convention contraire, les opérations militaires en cours.

Si elle intervient après l'ouverture des hostilités, elle n'interrompt pas, sauf accord contraire, les opérations militaires en cours.

Article 8.

Article 8.

Les Puissances contractantes sont d'accord pour recommander l'application, dans les circonstances qui le permettent, d'une médiation spéciale sous la forme suivante.

Les parties contractantes conviennent de recommander l'application, dans les circonstances appropriées, d'une médiation spéciale sous la forme suivante.

En cas de différend grave compromettant la paix, les États en conflit choisissent respectivement une Puissance à laquelle ils confient la mission d'entrer en rapport direct avec la Puissance choisie d'autre part, à l'effet de prévenir la rupture des relations pacifiques.

In the event of a serious dispute threatening peace, the conflicting states each select a power to which they assign the task of directly engaging with the other chosen power, in order to prevent the breakdown of peaceful relations.

Pendant la durée de ce mandat dont le terme, sauf stipulation contraire, ne peut excéder trente jours, les États en litige cessent tout rapport direct au sujet du conflit, lequel est considéré comme déféré exclusivement aux Puissances médiatrices. Celles-ci doivent appliquer tous leurs efforts à régler le différend.

Pendant la durée de ce mandat dont le terme, sauf stipulation contraire, ne peut excéder trente jours, les États en litige cessent tout rapport direct au sujet du conflit, lequel est considéré comme déféré exclusivement aux Puissances médiatrices. Celles-ci doivent appliquer tous leurs efforts à régler le différend.

En cas de rupture effective des relations pacifiques, ces Puissances demeurent chargées de la mission commune de profiter de toute occasion pour rétablir la paix.

En cas de rupture des relations pacifiques, ces puissances ont toujours la responsabilité de saisir chaque occasion pour restaurer la paix.

Titre III.—Des Commissions internationales d'enquête.

Title III.—International Inquiry Commissions.

Article 9.

Article 9.

Dans les litiges d'ordre international n'engageant ni l'honneur ni des intérêts essentiels et provenant d'une divergence d'appréciation sur des points de fait, les Puissances contractantes jugent utile et désirable que les Parties qui n'auraient pu se mettre d'accord par les voies diplomatiques instituent, en tant que les circonstances le permettront, une Commission internationale d'enquête chargée de faciliter la solution de ces litiges en éclaircissant, par un examen impartial et consciencieux, les questions de fait.

In international disputes that don't involve honor or essential interests and arise from differing views on factual points, the contracting powers find it useful and desirable that the parties, unable to reach an agreement through diplomatic means, establish, as circumstances allow, an international commission of inquiry tasked with helping to resolve these disputes by clarifying factual issues through an impartial and thorough examination.

Article 10.

Article 10.

Les Commissions internationales d'enquête sont constituées par convention spéciale entre les Parties en litige.

Les commissions internationales d'enquête sont créées par un accord spécial entre les parties en conflit.

La convention d'enquête précise les faits à examiner; elle détermine le mode et le délai de formation de la Commission et l'étendue des pouvoirs des commissaires.

La convention d'enquête précise les faits à examiner; elle détermine le mode et le délai de formation de la Commission et l'étendue des pouvoirs des commissaires.

Elle détermine également, s'il y a lieu, le siège de la Commission et la faculté de se déplacer, la langue dont la Commission fera usage et celles dont l'emploi sera autorisé devant elle, ainsi que la date à laquelle chaque Partie devra déposer son exposé des faits, et généralement toutes les conditions dont les Parties sont convenues.

Elle détermine également, s'il y a lieu, le siège de la Commission et la faculté de se déplacer, la langue dont la Commission fera usage et celles dont l'emploi sera autorisé devant elle, ainsi que la date à laquelle chaque Partie devra déposer son exposé des faits, et généralement toutes les conditions dont les Parties sont convenues.

Si les Parties jugent nécessaire de nommer des assesseurs, la convention d'enquête détermine le mode de leur désignation et l'étendue de leurs pouvoirs.

Si les Parties estiment nécessaire de nommer des assesseurs, la convention d'enquête définit la manière dont ils sont désignés et l'étendue de leurs pouvoirs.

Article 11.

Article 11.

Si la convention d'enquête n'a pas désigné le siège de la Commission, celle-ci siégera à La Haye.

Si la convention d'enquête n'a pas désigné le siège de la Commission, celle-ci siégera à La Haye.

Le siège une fois fixé ne peut être changé par la Commission qu'avec l'assentiment des Parties.

Le siège, une fois établi, ne peut être changé par la Commission qu'avec l'accord des Parties.

Si la convention d'enquête n'a pas déterminé les langues à employer, il en est décidé par la Commission.

Si la convention d'enquête n'a pas déterminé les langues à employer, il en est décidé par la Commission.

Article 12.

Article 12.

Sauf stipulation contraire, les Commissions d'enquête sont formées de la manière déterminée par les articles 45 et 57 de la présente Convention.

Sauf stipulation contraire, les Commissions d'enquête sont formées de la manière déterminée par les articles 45 et 57 de la présente Convention.

Article 13.

Article 13.

En cas de décès, de démission ou d'empêchement, pour quelque cause[Pg 594] que ce soit, de l'un des commissaires, ou éventuellement de l'un des assesseurs, il est pourvu à son remplacement selon le mode fixé pour sa nomination.

En cas de décès, de démission ou d'empêchement, pour quelque cause[Pg 594] que ce soit, de l'un des commissaires, ou éventuellement de l'un des assesseurs, il est pourvu à son remplacement selon le mode fixé pour sa nomination.

Article 14.

Article 14.

Les Parties ont le droit de nommer auprès de la Commission d'enquête des agents spéciaux avec la mission de Les représenter et de servir d'intermédiaires entre Elles et la Commission.

Les Parties ont le droit de nommer auprès de la Commission d'enquête des agents spéciaux chargés de les représenter et de faire le lien entre elles et la Commission.

Elles sont, en outre, autorisées à charger des conseils ou avocats nommés par elles, d'exposer et de soutenir leurs intérêts devant la Commission.

Elles sont, en outre, autorisées à charger des conseils ou avocats nommés par elles, d'exposer et de soutenir leurs intérêts devant la Commission.

Article 15.

Article 15.

Le Bureau International de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage sert de greffe aux Commissions qui siègent à La Haye, et mettra ses locaux et son organisation à la disposition des Puissances contractantes pour le fonctionnement de la Commission d'enquête.

Le Bureau International de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage sert de secrétariat aux Commissions qui se réunissent à La Haye, et mettra ses locaux et son organisation à la disposition des Puissances contractantes pour le fonctionnement de la Commission d'enquête.

Article 16.

Article 16.

Si la Commission siège ailleurs qu'à La Haye, elle nomme un Secrétaire Général dont le bureau lui sert de greffe.

Si la Commission siège ailleurs qu'à La Haye, elle nomme un Secrétaire Général dont le bureau lui sert de greffe.

Le greffe est chargé, sous l'autorité du Président, de l'organisation matérielle des séances de la Commission, de la rédaction des procès-verbaux et, pendant le temps de l'enquête, de la garde des archives qui seront ensuite versées au Bureau International de La Haye.

Le greffe est responsable, sous l'autorité du Président, de l'organisation matérielle des séances de la Commission, de la rédaction des procès-verbaux et, pendant la durée de l'enquête, de la gestion des archives qui seront ensuite transmises au Bureau International de La Haye.

Article 17.

Article 17.

En vue de faciliter l'institution et le fonctionnement des Commissions d'enquête, les Puissances contractantes recommandent les règles suivantes qui seront applicables à la procédure d'enquête en tant que les Parties n'adopteront pas d'autres règles.

En vue de faciliter la création et le fonctionnement des Commissions d'enquête, les Puissances signataires recommandent les règles suivantes qui seront applicables à la procédure d'enquête à moins que les Parties n'adoptent d'autres règles.

Article 18.

Article 18.

La Commission réglera les détails de la procédure non prévus dans la convention spéciale d'enquête ou dans la présente Convention, et procédera à toutes les formalités que comporte l'administration des preuves.

La Commission réglera les détails de la procédure non prévus dans la convention spéciale d'enquête ou dans la présente Convention, et procédera à toutes les formalités que comporte l'administration des preuves.

Article 19.

Article 19.

L'enquête a lieu contradictoirement.

The investigation is adversarial.

Aux dates prévues, chaque Partie communique à la Commission et à l'autre Partie les exposés des faits, s'il y a lieu, et, dans tous les cas, les actes, pièces et documents qu'Elle juge utiles à la découverte de la vérité, ainsi que la liste des témoins et des experts qu'elle désire faire entendre.

At the scheduled dates, each Party will share with the Commission and the other Party the statements of facts, if applicable, and in all cases, the actions, reports, and documents they consider useful for uncovering the truth, as well as the list of witnesses and experts they wish to hear.

Article 20.

Article 20.

La Commission a la faculté, avec l'assentiment des Parties, de se transporter momentanément sur les lieux où elle juge utile de recourir à ce moyen d'information ou d'y déléguer un ou plusieurs de ses membres. L'autorisation de l'État sur le territoire duquel il doit être procédé à cette information devra être obtenue.

La Commission a le droit, avec l'accord des Parties, de se rendre temporairement sur les lieux où elle estime nécessaire d'utiliser ce moyen d'information, ou d'y déléguer un ou plusieurs de ses membres. L'autorisation de l'État sur le territoire duquel cette information doit être recueillie devra être obtenue.

Article 21.

Article 21.

Toutes constatations matérielles, et toutes visites des lieux doivent être faites en présence des agents et conseils des Parties ou eux dûment appelés.

Toutes constatations matérielles, et toutes visites des lieux doivent être faites en présence des agents et conseils des Parties ou eux dûment appelés.

Article 22.

Article 22.

La Commission a le droit de solliciter de l'une ou l'autre Partie telles explications ou informations qu'elle juge utiles.

La Commission a le droit de demander à l'une ou l'autre Partie les explications ou informations qu'elle considère utiles.

Article 23.

Article 23.

Les Parties s'engagent à fournir à la Commission d'enquête, dans la plus large mesure qu'Elles jugeront possible, tous les moyens et toutes les facilités nécessaires pour la connaissance complète et l'appréciation exacte des faits en question.

Les Parties s'engagent à fournir à la Commission d'enquête, dans la mesure du possible, tous les moyens et toutes les facilités nécessaires pour une compréhension complète et une évaluation précise des faits en question.

Elles s'engagent à user des moyens dont Elles disposent d'après leur législation intérieure, pour assurer la comparution des témoins ou des experts se trouvant sur leur territoire et cités devant la Commission.

Elles s'engagent à utiliser les ressources dont elles disposent selon leur législation nationale pour garantir la présence des témoins ou des experts se trouvant sur leur territoire et convoqués devant la Commission.

Si ceux-ci ne peuvent comparaître devant la Commission, Elles feront procéder à leur audition devant leurs autorités compétentes.

Si ceux-ci ne peuvent se présenter devant la Commission, elles feront organiser leur audition devant les autorités compétentes.

Article 24.

Article 24.

Pour toutes les notifications que la Commission aurait à faire sur le territoire d'une tierce Puissance contractante, la Commission s'adressera directement au Gouvernement de cette Puissance. Il en sera de même s'il s'agit de faire procéder sur place à l'établissement de tous moyens de preuve.

Pour toutes les notifications que la Commission doit faire sur le territoire d'un autre pays contractant, la Commission s'adressera directement au gouvernement de ce pays. Il en sera de même si cela concerne la mise en place de tous moyens de preuve sur place.

Les requêtes adressées à cet effet seront exécutées suivant les moyens dont la Puissance requise dispose d'après Sa législation intérieure. Elles ne peuvent être refusées que si cette Puissance les juge de nature à porter atteinte à Sa souveraineté ou à Sa sécurité.

Les demandes faites à cet égard seront traitées selon les ressources dont la Puissance requise dispose selon sa législation interne. Elles ne peuvent être refusées que si cette Puissance estime qu'elles pourraient menacer sa souveraineté ou sa sécurité.

La Commission aura aussi toujours la faculté de recourir à l'intermédiaire de la Puissance sur le territoire de laquelle elle a son siège.

La Commission pourra toujours faire appel à l'intermédiaire de la Puissance sur le territoire de laquelle elle a son siège.

Article 25.

Article 25.

Les témoins et les experts sont appelés à la requête des Parties ou[Pg 595] d'office par la Commission, et, dans tous les cas, par l'intermédiaire du Gouvernement de l'État sur le territoire duquel ils se trouvent.

Les témoins et les experts sont contactés à la demande des Parties ou[Pg 595] automatiquement par la Commission, et, dans tous les cas, par l'intermédiaire du Gouvernement de l'État sur le territoire duquel ils se trouvent.

Les témoins sont entendus, successivement et séparément, en présence des agents et des conseils et dans un ordre à fixer par la Commission.

Les témoins sont entendus, un par un, en présence des agents et des avocats, dans un ordre déterminé par la Commission.

Article 26.

Article 26.

L'interrogatoire des témoins est conduit par le Président.

L'interrogatoire des témoins est conduit par le Président.

Les membres de la Commission peuvent néanmoins poser à chaque témoin les questions qu'ils croient convenables pour éclaircir ou compléter sa déposition, ou pour se renseigner sur tout ce qui concerne le témoin dans les limites nécessaires à la manifestation de la vérité.

Les membres de la Commission peuvent toutefois poser aux témoins toutes les questions qu'ils jugent pertinentes pour clarifier ou compléter leur déposition, ou pour obtenir des informations sur tout ce qui concerne le témoin, dans les limites nécessaires à l'établissement de la vérité.

Les agents et les conseils des Parties ne peuvent interrompre le témoin dans sa déposition, ni lui faire aucune interpellation directe, mais peuvent demander au Président de poser au témoin telles questions complémentaires qu'ils jugent utiles.

Les agents et les conseils des Parties ne peuvent pas interrompre le témoin pendant sa déposition, ni lui faire de remarques directes, mais peuvent demander au Président de poser au témoin les questions supplémentaires qu'ils considèrent utiles.

Article 27.

Article 27.

Le témoin doit déposer sans qu'il lui soit permis de lire aucun projet écrit. Toutefois, il peut être autorisé par le Président à s'aider de notes ou documents si la nature des faits rapportés en nécessite l'emploi.

Le témoin doit témoigner sans pouvoir lire aucun document écrit. Toutefois, il peut être autorisé par le Président à utiliser des notes ou des documents si la nature des faits rapportés le nécessite.

Article 28.

Article 28.

Procès-verbal de la déposition du témoin est dressé séance tenante et lecture en est donnée au témoin. Le témoin peut y faire tels changements et additions que bon lui semble et qui seront consignés à la suite de sa déposition.

Procès-verbal de la déposition du témoin est dressé séance tenante et lecture en est donnée au témoin. Le témoin peut y faire tels changements et additions que bon lui semble et qui seront consignés à la suite de sa déposition.

Lecture faite au témoin de l'ensemble de sa déposition, le témoin est requis de signer.

Lecture given to the witness of the entire statement, the witness is asked to sign.

Article 29.

Article 29.

Les agents sont autorisés, au cours ou à la fin de l'enquête, à présenter par écrit à la Commission et à l'autre Partie tels dires, réquisitions ou résumés de fait, qu'ils jugent utiles à la découverte de la vérité.

Les agents sont autorisés, pendant ou à la fin de l'enquête, à soumettre par écrit à la Commission et à l'autre Partie des déclarations, des demandes ou des résumés des faits qu'ils estiment utiles pour découvrir la vérité.

Article 30.

Article 30.

Les délibérations de la Commission ont lieu à huis clos et restent secrètes.

Les délibérations de la Commission se tiennent à huis clos et restent confidentielles.

Toute décision est prise à la majorité des membres de la Commission.

Toutes les décisions sont prises à la majorité des membres de la Commission.

Le refus d'un membre de prendre part au vote doit être constaté dans le procès-verbal.

Le refus d'un membre de participer au vote doit être noté dans le procès-verbal.

Article 31.

Article 31.

Les séances de la Commission ne sont publiques et les procès-verbaux et documents de l'enquête ne sont rendus publics qu'en vertu d'une décision de la Commission, prise avec l'assentiment des Parties.

Les réunions de la Commission ne sont pas publiques et les comptes-rendus et documents de l'enquête ne sont publiés que sur décision de la Commission, avec l'accord des Parties.

Article 32.

Article 32.

Les Parties ayant présenté tous les éclaircissements et preuves, tous les témoins ayant été entendus, le Président prononce la clôture de l'enquête et la Commission s'ajourne pour délibérer et rédiger son rapport.

Les Parties ayant présenté tous les éclaircissements et preuves, tous les témoins ayant été entendus, le Président prononce la clôture de l'enquête et la Commission s'ajourne pour délibérer et rédiger son rapport.

Article 33.

Article 33.

Le rapport est signé par tous les membres de la Commission.

Le rapport est signé par tous les membres de la Commission.

Si un des membres refuse de signer, mention en est faite; le rapport reste néanmoins valable.

Si un des membres refuse de signer, cela est noté ; le rapport reste néanmoins valable.

Article 34.

Article 34.

Le rapport de la Commission est lu en séance publique, les agents et les conseils des Parties présents ou dûment appelés.

Le rapport de la Commission est présenté en séance publique, avec la présence ou la convocation appropriée des agents et des conseils des Parties.

Un exemplaire du rapport est remis à chaque Partie.

A copy of the report is provided to each Party.

Article 35.

Article 35.

Le rapport de la Commission, limité à la constatation des faits, n'a nullement le caractère d'une sentence arbitrale. Il laisse aux Parties une entière liberté pour la suite à donner à cette constatation.

Le rapport de la Commission, limité à la constatation des faits, n'a absolument pas le caractère d'une sentence arbitrale. Il laisse aux Parties une entière liberté pour la suite à donner à cette constatation.

Article 36.

Article 36.

Chaque Partie supporte ses propres frais et une part égale des frais de la Commission.

Chaque Partie couvre ses propres frais ainsi qu'une part égale des frais de la Commission.

Titre IV.—De l'arbitrage international.

Title IV—International Arbitration.

Chapitre I.De la Justice arbitrale.

Chapter I.On Arbitration Justice.

Article 37.

Article 37.

L'arbitrage international a pour objet le règlement de litiges entre les États par des juges de leur choix et sur la base du respect du droit.

L'arbitrage international vise à résoudre des conflits entre les pays par des juges choisis par eux et en se basant sur le respect du droit.

Le recours à l'arbitrage implique l'engagement de se soumettre de bonne foi à la sentence.

Le recours à l'arbitrage implique l'engagement de se soumettre de bonne foi à la sentence.

Article 38.

Article 38.

Dans les questions d'ordre juridique, et en premier lieu, dans les questions d'interprétation ou d'application des Conventions internationales, l'arbitrage est reconnu par les Puissances contractantes comme le moyen le plus efficace et en même temps le plus équitable de régler les litiges qui n'ont pas été résolus par les voies diplomatiques.[Pg 596]

In legal matters, particularly regarding the interpretation or application of international treaties, arbitration is acknowledged by the contracting powers as the most effective and fair way to resolve disputes that have not been settled through diplomatic means.[Pg 596]

En conséquence, il serait désirable que, dans les litiges sur les questions susmentionnées, les Puissances contractantes eussent, le cas échéant, recours à l'arbitrage, en tant que les circonstances le permettraient.

En conséquence, il serait souhaitable que, dans les litiges sur les questions mentionnées ci-dessus, les puissances contractantes aient, si nécessaire, recours à l'arbitrage, dans la mesure où les circonstances le permettent.

Article 39.

Article 39.

La Convention d'arbitrage est conclue pour des contestations déjà nées ou pour des contestations éventuelles.

La convention d'arbitrage est conclue pour des différends déjà existants ou pour des différends potentiels.

Elle peut concerner tout litige ou seulement les litiges d'une catégorie déterminée.

Elle peut concerner tout conflit ou seulement les conflits d'une catégorie spécifique.

Article 40.

Article 40.

Indépendamment des Traités généraux ou particuliers qui stipulent actuellement l'obligation du recours à l'arbitrage pour les Puissances contractantes, ces Puissances se réservent de conclure des accords nouveaux, généraux ou particuliers, en vue d'étendre l'arbitrage obligatoire à tous les cas qu'Elles jugeront possible de lui soumettre.

Independently of the general or specific treaties that currently require the parties to resort to arbitration, these parties reserve the right to enter into new agreements, whether general or specific, in order to extend mandatory arbitration to all cases that they deem suitable for submission.

Chapitre II.De la Cour permanente d'arbitrage.

Chapter 2.The Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Article 41.

Article 41.

Dans le but de faciliter le recours immédiat à l'arbitrage pour les différends internationaux qui n'ont pu être réglés par la voie diplomatique, les Puissances contractantes s'engagent à maintenir, telle qu'elle a été établie par la Première Conférence de la Paix, la Cour permanente d'arbitrage, accessible en tout temps et fonctionnant, sauf stipulation contraire des Parties, conformément aux règles de procédure insérées dans la présente Convention.

In order to make it easier to access arbitration immediately for international disputes that could not be resolved diplomatically, the contracting powers agree to maintain, as established by the First Peace Conference, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which will be accessible at all times and will operate, unless otherwise specified by the Parties, according to the procedural rules outlined in this Convention.

Article 42.

Article 42.

La Cour permanente est compétente pour tous les cas d'arbitrage, à moins qu'il n'y ait entente entre les Parties pour l'établissement d'une juridiction spéciale.

La Cour permanente a compétence pour tous les cas d'arbitrage, à moins qu'il n'y ait un accord entre les Parties pour établir une juridiction spéciale.

Article 43.

Article 43.

La cour permanente a son siège à La Haye.

La cour permanente a son siège à La Haye.

Un Bureau International sert de greffe à la Cour; il est l'intermédiaire des communications relatives aux réunions de celle-ci; il a la garde des archives et la gestion de toutes les affaires administratives.

Un Bureau International agit comme un secrétariat pour la Cour; il est le lien pour les communications concernant ses réunions; il conserve les archives et gère toutes les affaires administratives.

Les Puissances contractantes s'engagent à communiquer au Bureau, aussitôt que possible, une copie certifiée conforme de toute stipulation d'arbitrage intervenue entre Elles et de toute sentence arbitrale Les concernant et rendue par des juridictions spéciales.

Les Puissances contractantes s'engagent à communiquer au Bureau, aussitôt que possible, une copie certifiée conforme de toute stipulation d'arbitrage intervenue entre Elles et de toute sentence arbitrale Les concernant et rendue par des juridictions spéciales.

Elles s'engagent à communiquer de même au Bureau les lois, règlements et documents constatant éventuellement l'exécution des sentences rendues par la Cour.

Elles s'engagent à communiquer également au Bureau les lois, règlements et documents constatant éventuellement l'exécution des sentences rendues par la Cour.

Article 44.

Article 44.

Chaque Puissance contractante désigne quatre personnes au plus, d'une compétence reconnue dans les questions de droit international, jouissant de la plus haute considération morale et disposées à accepter les fonctions d'arbitre.

Chaque Puissance contractante désigne quatre personnes au plus, ayant une expertise reconnue en droit international, ayant une grande intégrité morale et prêtes à accepter les fonctions d'arbitre.

Les personnes ainsi désignées sont inscrites, au titre de Membres de la Cour, sur une liste qui sera notifiée à toutes les Puissances contractantes par les soins du Bureau.

Les personnes ainsi désignées sont inscrites, au titre de Membres de la Cour, sur une liste qui sera notifiée à toutes les Puissances contractantes par les soins du Bureau.

Toute modification à la liste des arbitres est portée, par les soins du Bureau, à la connaissance des Puissances contractantes.

Toute modification à la liste des arbitres est communiquée, par les soins du Bureau, aux Puissances contractantes.

Deux ou plusieurs Puissances peuvent s'entendre pour la désignation en commun d'un ou de plusieurs Membres.

Deux ou plusieurs puissances peuvent se mettre d'accord pour choisir ensemble un ou plusieurs membres.

La même personne peut être désignée par des Puissances différentes.

La même personne peut être désignée par des pouvoirs différents.

Les Membres de la Cour sont nommés pour un terme de six ans. Leur mandat peut être renouvelé.

Les Membres de la Cour sont nommés pour un terme de six ans. Leur mandat peut être renouvelé.

En cas de décès ou de retraite d'un Membre de la Cour, il est pourvu à son remplacement selon le mode fixé pour sa nomination, et pour une nouvelle période de six ans.

En cas de décès ou de retraite d'un membre de la Cour, il est procédé à son remplacement selon la méthode établie pour sa nomination, et pour une nouvelle période de six ans.

Article 45.

Article 45.

Lorsque les Puissances contractantes veulent s'adresser à la Cour permanente pour le règlement d'un différend survenu entre Elles, le choix des arbitres appelés à former le Tribunal compétent pour statuer sur ce différend, doit être fait dans la liste générale des Membres de la Cour.

Lorsque les Puissances contractantes veulent s'adresser à la Cour permanente pour régler un différend survenu entre elles, le choix des arbitres qui formeront le Tribunal compétent pour statuer sur ce différend doit être fait dans la liste générale des Membres de la Cour.

A défaut de constitution du Tribunal arbitral par l'accord des Parties, il est procédé de la manière suivante:

A défaut de constitution du Tribunal arbitral par l'accord des Parties, il est procédé de la manière suivante:

Chaque Partie nomme deux arbitres, dont un seulement peut être son national ou choisi parmi ceux qui ont été désignés par Elle comme Membres de la Cour permanente. Ces arbitres choisissent ensemble un surarbitre.

Chaque Partie nomme deux arbitres, dont un seul peut être de sa nationalité ou choisi parmi ceux qui ont été désignés par elle comme membres de la Cour permanente. Ces arbitres choisissent ensemble un surarbitre.

En cas de partage des voix, le choix du surarbitre est confié à une Puissance tierce, désignée de commun accord par les Parties.

En cas de partage des voix, le choix du surarbitre est confié à une puissance tierce, désignée d'un commun accord par les parties.

Si l'accord ne s'établit pas à ce sujet, chaque Partie désigne une Puissance différente et le choix du surarbitre est fait de concert par les Puissances ainsi désignées.

Si l'accord ne se fait pas à ce sujet, chaque Partie désigne une Puissance différente et le choix du surarbitre est fait ensemble par les Puissances ainsi désignées.

Si, dans un délai de deux mois, ces deux Puissances n'ont pu tomber d'accord, chacune d'Elles présente deux candidats pris sur la liste des Membres de la Cour permanente, en dehors des Membres désignés par les[Pg 597] Parties et n'étant les nationaux d'aucune d'Elles. Le sort détermine lequel des candidats ainsi présentés sera le surarbitre.

Si, dans un délai de deux mois, ces deux puissances n'ont pas pu s'accorder, chacune d'elles propose deux candidats tirés de la liste des membres de la Cour permanente, en dehors des membres désignés par les [Pg 597] parties et qui ne sont pas des ressortissants de l'une ou l'autre. Un tirage au sort détermine lequel des candidats présentés sera le surarbitre.

Article 46.

Article 46.

Dès que le Tribunal est composé, les Parties notifient au Bureau leur décision de s'adresser à la Cour, le texte de leur compromis, et les noms des arbitres.

Dès que le Tribunal est composé, les Parties notifient au Bureau leur décision de s'adresser à la Cour, le texte de leur compromis, et les noms des arbitres.

Le Bureau communique sans délai à chaque arbitre le compromis et les noms des autres Membres du Tribunal.

Le Bureau communique immédiatement à chaque arbitre le compromis et les noms des autres Membres du Tribunal.

Le Tribunal se réunit à la date fixée par les Parties. Le Bureau pourvoit à son installation.

Le tribunal se réunit à la date convenue par les parties. Le bureau s'occupe de son installation.

Les Membres du Tribunal, dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions et en dehors de leur pays, jouissent des privilèges et immunités diplomatiques.

Les membres du tribunal, dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions et en dehors de leur pays, bénéficient des privilèges et des immunités diplomatiques.

Article 47.

Article 47.

Le Bureau est autorisé à mettre ses locaux et son organisation à la disposition des Puissances contractantes pour le fonctionnement de toute juridiction spéciale d'arbitrage.

Le Bureau est autorisé à mettre ses locaux et son organisation à la disposition des puissances contractantes pour le fonctionnement de toute juridiction spéciale d'arbitrage.

La juridiction de la Cour permanente peut être étendue, dans les conditions prescrites par les règlements, aux litiges existant entre des Puissances non contractantes ou entre des Puissances contractantes et des Puissances non contractantes, si les Parties sont convenues de recourir à cette juridiction.

La juridiction de la Cour permanente peut être étendue, dans les conditions prescrites par les règlements, aux litiges existant entre des Puissances non contractantes ou entre des Puissances contractantes et des Puissances non contractantes, si les Parties sont convenues de recourir à cette juridiction.

Article 48.

Article 48.

Les Puissances contractantes considèrent comme un devoir, dans le cas où un conflit aigu menacerait d'éclater entre deux ou plusieurs d'entre Elles, de rappeler à celles-ci que la Cour permanente leur est ouverte.

Les puissances contractantes voient comme un devoir, si un conflit sérieux menace d'éclater entre deux ou plusieurs d'entre elles, de rappeler à ces dernières que la Cour permanente est à leur disposition.

En conséquence, Elles déclarent que le fait de rappeler aux Parties en conflit les dispositions de la présente Convention, et le conseil donné, dans l'intérêt supérieur de la paix, de s'adresser à la Cour permanente, ne peuvent être considérés que comme actes de bons offices.

En conséquence, elles déclarent que le fait de rappeler aux parties en conflit les dispositions de la présente convention, et le conseil donné, dans l'intérêt supérieur de la paix, de s'adresser à la Cour permanente, ne peuvent être considérés que comme des actes de bons offices.

En cas de conflit entre deux Puissances, l'une d'Elles pourra toujours adresser au Bureau International une note contenant sa déclaration qu'Elle serait disposée à soumettre le différend à un arbitrage.

In the event of a conflict between two Powers, one of them can always send a note to the International Bureau stating that it is willing to submit the dispute to arbitration.

Le Bureau devra porter aussitôt la déclaration à la connaissance de l'autre Puissance.

Le Bureau devra immédiatement informer l'autre Puissance de la déclaration.

Article 49.

Article 49.

Le Conseil administratif permanent, composé des Représentants diplomatiques des Puissances contractantes accrédités à La Haye et du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas, qui remplit les fonctions de Président, a la direction et le contrôle du Bureau International.

Le Conseil administratif permanent, composé des Représentants diplomatiques des Puissances contractantes accrédités à La Haye et du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas, qui remplit les fonctions de Président, a la direction et le contrôle du Bureau International.

Le Conseil arrête son règlement d'ordre ainsi que tous autres règlements nécessaires.

Le Conseil établit son règlement interne ainsi que tous les autres règlements nécessaires.

Il décide toutes les questions administratives qui pourraient surgir touchant le fonctionnement de la Cour.

Il décide de toutes les questions administratives qui pourraient survenir concernant le fonctionnement de la Cour.

Il a tout pouvoir quant à la nomination, la suspension ou la révocation des fonctionnaires et employés du Bureau.

Il a tous les pouvoirs concernant la nomination, la suspension ou la révocation des fonctionnaires et employés du Bureau.

Il fixe les traitements et salaires, et contrôle la dépense générale.

Il détermine les salaires et les traitements, et surveille les dépenses générales.

La présence de neuf membres dans les réunions dûment convoquées suffit pour permettre au Conseil de délibérer valablement. Les décisions sont prises à la majorité des voix.

La présence de neuf membres dans les réunions dûment convoquées suffit pour permettre au Conseil de délibérer valablement. Les décisions sont prises à la majorité des voix.

Le Conseil communique sans délai aux Puissances contractantes les règlements adoptés par lui. Il Leur présente chaque année un rapport sur les travaux de la Cour, sur le fonctionnement des services administratifs et sur les dépenses. Le rapport contient également un résumé du contenu essentiel des documents communiqués au Bureau par les Puissances en vertu de l'article 43 alinéas 3 et 4.

Le Conseil informe immédiatement les Puissances contractantes des règlements qu'il a adoptés. Chaque année, il leur présente un rapport sur les activités de la Cour, le fonctionnement des services administratifs et les dépenses. Le rapport inclut également un résumé des points essentiels des documents soumis au Bureau par les Puissances conformément à l'article 43, alinéas 3 et 4.

Article 50.

Article 50.

Les frais du Bureau seront supportés par les Puissances contractantes dans la proportion établie pour le Bureau international de l'Union postale universelle.

Les frais du Bureau seront couverts par les pays signataires selon la même proportion que celle établie pour le Bureau international de l'Union postale universelle.

Les frais à la charge des Puissances adhérentes seront comptés à partir du jour où leur adhésion produit ses effets.

Les frais à la charge des Puissances adhérentes commenceront à être comptés à partir du jour où leur adhésion prend effet.

Chapitre III.De la procédure arbitrale.

Chapter III.On Arbitration Procedure.

Article 51.

Article 51.

En vue de favoriser le développement de l'arbitrage, les Puissances contractantes ont arrêté les règles suivantes qui sont applicables à la procédure arbitrale, en tant que les Parties ne sont pas convenues d'autres règles.

En vue de favoriser le développement de l'arbitrage, les Puissances contractantes ont établi les règles suivantes qui s'appliquent à la procédure arbitrale, à moins que les Parties ne soient d'accord sur d'autres règles.

Article 52.

Article 52.

Les Puissances qui recourent à l'arbitrage signent un compromis dans lequel sont déterminés l'objet du litige, le délai de nomination des arbitres, la forme, l'ordre et les délais dans lesquels la communication visée par l'article 63 devra être faite, et le montant de la somme que chaque Partie aura à déposer à titre d'avance pour les frais.

Les puissances qui choisissent l'arbitrage signent un accord qui définit l'objet du litige, le délai pour nommer les arbitres, la forme, l'ordre et les délais dans lesquels la communication mentionnée à l'article 63 devra être faite, ainsi que le montant que chaque partie devra verser en avance pour les frais.

Le compromis détermine également, s'il y a lieu, le mode de nomination des arbitres, tous pouvoirs spéciaux éventuels du Tribunal, son siège, la langue dont il fera usage et celles dont l'emploi[Pg 598] sera autorisé devant lui, et généralement toutes les conditions dont les Parties sont convenues.

Le compromis détermine également, s'il y a lieu, le mode de nomination des arbitres, tous pouvoirs spéciaux éventuels du Tribunal, son siège, la langue dont il fera usage et celles dont l'emploi[Pg 598] sera autorisé devant lui, et généralement toutes les conditions dont les Parties sont convenues.

Article 53.

Article 53.

La Cour permanente est compétente pour l'établissement du compromis, si les Parties sont d'accord pour s'en remettre à elle.

La Cour permanente est compétente pour établir le compromis, si les Parties acceptent de lui faire confiance.

Elle est également compétente, même si la demande est faite seulement par l'une des Parties, après qu'un accord par la voie diplomatique a été vainement essayé, quand il s'agit:

Elle est aussi compétente, même si la demande est faite seulement par l'une des Parties, après qu'un accord par la voie diplomatique a été vainement essayé, quand il s'agit:

1o. d'un différend rentrant dans un Traité d'arbitrage général conclu ou renouvelé après la mise en vigueur de cette Convention et qui prévoit pour chaque différend un compromis et n'exclut pour l'établissement de ce dernier ni explicitement ni implicitement la compétence de la Cour. Toutefois, le recours à la Cour n'a pas lieu si l'autre Partie déclare qu'à son avis le différend n'appartient pas à la catégorie des différends à soumettre à un arbitrage obligatoire, à moins que le Traité d'arbitrage ne confère au Tribunal arbitral le pouvoir de décider cette question préalable;

1o. In the case of a dispute covered by a general arbitration treaty that was agreed upon or renewed after this Convention came into effect, which provides for a compromise for each dispute and does not exclude the Court's jurisdiction explicitly or implicitly for this purpose. However, recourse to the Court will not occur if the other Party states that in their opinion the dispute does not fall into the category of disputes subject to mandatory arbitration, unless the arbitration treaty grants the arbitral tribunal the authority to decide this preliminary question;

2o. d'un différend provenant de dettes contractuelles réclamées à une Puissance par une autre Puissance comme dues à ses nationaux, et pour la solution duquel l'offre d'arbitrage a été acceptée. Cette disposition n'est pas applicable si l'acceptation a été subordonnée à la condition que le compromis soit établi selon un autre mode.

2o. In a dispute arising from contractual debts claimed by one Power against another Power as owed to its nationals, and for which the offer of arbitration has been accepted. This provision does not apply if the acceptance was conditional on the agreement being established in a different manner.

Article 54.

Article 54.

Dans les cas prévus par l'article précédent, le compromis sera établi par une commission composée de cinq membres désignés de la manière prévue à l'article 45 alinéas 3 à 6.

Dans les cas prévus par l'article précédent, le compromis sera établi par une commission composée de cinq membres désignés de la manière prévue à l'article 45 alinéas 3 à 6.

Le cinquième membre est de droit Président de la commission.

Le cinquième membre est de droit Président de la commission.

Article 55.

Article 55.

Les fonctions arbitrales peuvent être conférées à un arbitre unique ou à plusieurs arbitres désignés par les Parties à leur gré, ou choisis par Elles parmi les Membres de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage établie par la présente Convention.

Les fonctions d'arbitrage peuvent être confiées à un arbitre unique ou à plusieurs arbitres choisis par les parties selon leur préférence, ou sélectionnés parmi les membres de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage établie par la présente convention.

A défaut de constitution du Tribunal par l'accord des Parties, il est procédé de la manière indiquée à l'article 45 alinéas 3 à 6.

A lack of agreement between the Parties on the establishment of the Tribunal will follow the procedure outlined in Article 45, paragraphs 3 to 6.

Article 56.

Article 56.

Lorsqu'un Souverain ou un Chef d'Etat est choisi pour arbitre, la procédure arbitrale est réglée par Lui.

Lorsqu'un souverain ou un chef d'État est choisi comme arbitre, il établit les règles de la procédure arbitrale.

Article 57.

Article 57.

Le surarbitre est de droit Président du Tribunal.

Le surarbitre est de droit Président du Tribunal.

Lorsque le Tribunal ne comprend pas de surarbitre, il nomme lui-même son Président.

Lorsque le Tribunal n'a pas de surarbitre, il désigne lui-même son Président.

Article 58.

Article 58.

En cas d'établissement du compromis par une commission, telle qu'elle est visée à l'article 54, et sauf stipulation contraire, la commission elle-même formera le Tribunal d'arbitrage.

En cas d'établissement du compromis par une commission, telle qu'elle est mentionnée à l'article 54, et sauf accord différent, la commission elle-même constituera le Tribunal d'arbitrage.

Article 59.

Article 59.

En cas de décès, de démission ou d'empêchement, pour quelque cause que ce soit, de l'un des arbitres, il est pourvu à son remplacement selon le mode fixé pour sa nomination.

En cas de décès, de démission ou d'empêchement, pour quelque cause que ce soit, de l'un des arbitres, il est pourvu à son remplacement selon le mode fixé pour sa nomination.

Article 60.

Article 60.

A défaut de désignation par les Parties, le Tribunal siège à La Haye.

A défaut de désignation par les Parties, le Tribunal siège à La Haye.

Le Tribunal ne peut siéger sur le territoire d'une tierce Puissance qu'avec l'assentiment de celle-ci.

Le Tribunal ne peut siéger sur le territoire d'une tierce puissance qu'avec son accord.

Le siège une fois fixé ne peut être changé par le Tribunal qu'avec l'assentiment des Parties.

Le siège, une fois établi, ne peut être changé par le Tribunal qu'avec l'accord des Parties.

Article 61.

Article 61.

Si le compromis n'a pas déterminé les langues à employer, il en est décidé par le Tribunal.

Si le compromis n'a pas déterminé les langues à utiliser, cela sera décidé par le Tribunal.

Article 62.

Article 62.

Les Parties ont le droit de nommer auprès du Tribunal des agents spéciaux, avec la mission de servir d'intermédiaires entre Elles et le Tribunal.

Les Parties ont le droit de nommer auprès du Tribunal des agents spéciaux, pour servir d'intermédiaires entre Elles et le Tribunal.

Elles sont en outre autorisées à charger de la défense de leurs droits et intérêts devant le Tribunal, des conseils ou avocats nommés par Elles à cet effet.

Elles sont en outre autorisées à charger de la défense de leurs droits et intérêts devant le Tribunal, des conseils ou avocats nommés par Elles à cet effet.

Les Membres de la Cour permanente ne peuvent exercer les fonctions d'agents, conseils ou avocats, qu'en faveur de la Puissance qui les a nommés Membres de la Cour.

Les Membres de la Cour permanente ne peuvent exercer les fonctions d'agents, conseils ou avocats, qu'en faveur de la Puissance qui les a nommés Membres de la Cour.

Article 63.

Article 63.

La procédure arbitrale comprend en règle générale deux phases distinctes: l'instruction écrite et les débats.

La procédure d'arbitrage se compose généralement de deux phases distinctes : la phase écrite et les débats.

L'instruction écrite consiste dans la communication faite par les agents respectifs, aux membres du Tribunal et à la Partie adverse, des mémoires, des contre-mémoires et, au besoin, des répliques; les Parties y joignent toutes pièces et documents invoqués dans la cause. Cette communication aura lieu, directement ou par l'intermédiaire du Bureau International, dans l'ordre et dans les délais déterminés par le compromis.[Pg 599]

L'écrit consiste à ce que les agents respectifs communiquent aux membres du tribunal et à la partie adverse tous les mémoires, contre-mémoires et, si nécessaire, répliques ; les parties y joignent toutes les pièces et documents cités dans l'affaire. Cette communication se fera, directement ou via le Bureau International, selon l'ordre et les délais établis par le compromis.[Pg 599]

Les délais fixés par le compromis pourront être prolongés de commun accord par les Parties, ou par le Tribunal quand il le juge nécessaire pour arriver à une décision juste.

Les délais établis par le compromis peuvent être prolongés d'un commun accord entre les Parties, ou par le Tribunal lorsqu'il le juge nécessaire pour parvenir à une décision équitable.

Les débats consistent dans le développement oral des moyens des Parties devant le Tribunal.

Les débats se concentrent sur le développement oral des arguments des Parties devant le Tribunal.

Article 64.

Article 64.

Toute pièce produite par l'une des Parties doit être communiquée, en copie certifiée conforme, à l'autre Partie.

Chaque document produit par l'une des Parties doit être transmis, en copie certifiée conforme, à l'autre Partie.

Article 65.

Article 65.

A moins de circonstances spéciales, le Tribunal ne se réunit qu'après la clôture de l'instruction.

A moins de circonstances spéciales, le Tribunal ne se réunit qu'après la clôture de l'instruction.

Article 66.

Article 66.

Les débats sont dirigés par le Président.

Les débats sont animés par le Président.

Ils ne sont publics qu'en vertu d'une décision du Tribunal, prise avec l'assentiment des Parties.

Ils ne sont publics qu'en vertu d'une décision du Tribunal, prise avec l'accord des Parties.

Ils sont consignés dans des procès-verbaux rédigés par des secrétaires que nomme le Président. Ces procès-verbaux sont signés par le Président et par un des secrétaires; ils ont seuls caractère authentique.

Ils sont consignés dans des procès-verbaux rédigés par des secrétaires nommés par le Président. Ces procès-verbaux sont signés par le Président et par un des secrétaires; ils ont seul caractère authentique.

Article 67.

Article 67.

L'instruction étant close, le Tribunal a le droit d'écarter du débat tous actes ou documents nouveaux qu'une des Parties voudrait lui soumettre sans le consentement de l'autre.

L'instruction étant close, le Tribunal a le droit d'écarter du débat tous actes ou documents nouveaux qu'une des Parties voudrait lui soumettre sans le consentement de l'autre.

Article 68.

Article 68.

Le Tribunal demeure libre de prendre en considération les actes ou documents nouveaux sur lesquels les agents ou conseils des Parties appelleraient son attention.

Le Tribunal peut choisir de prendre en compte des actes ou des documents nouveaux que les agents ou les avocats des Parties lui signaleraient.

En ce cas, le Tribunal a le droit de requérir la production de ces actes ou documents, sauf l'obligation d'en donner connaissance à la Partie adverse.

En ce cas, le Tribunal a le droit de demander la production de ces actes ou documents, sauf l'obligation de les communiquer à la Partie adverse.

Article 69.

Article 69.

Le Tribunal peut, en outre, requérir des agents des Parties la production de tous actes et demander toutes explications nécessaires. En cas de refus, le Tribunal en prend acte.

Le Tribunal peut également demander aux représentants des Parties de fournir tous les documents et d'apporter toutes les explications nécessaires. En cas de refus, le Tribunal en prendra note.

Article 70.

Article 70.

Les agents et les conseils des Parties sont autorisés à présenter oralement au Tribunal tous les moyens qu'ils jugent utiles à la défense de leur cause.

Les agents et les conseillers des Parties sont autorisés à soumettre oralement au Tribunal tous les arguments qu'ils estiment utiles pour défendre leur position.

Article 71.

Article 71.

Ils ont le droit de soulever des exceptions et des incidents. Les décisions du Tribunal sur ces points sont définitives et ne peuvent donner lieu à aucune discussion ultérieure.

Ils ont le droit de soulever des exceptions et des incidents. Les décisions du Tribunal sur ces points sont définitives et ne peuvent donner lieu à aucune discussion ultérieure.

Article 72.

Article 72.

Les membres du Tribunal ont le droit de poser des questions aux agents et aux conseils des Parties et de leur demander des éclaircissements sur les points douteux.

Les membres du Tribunal ont le droit de poser des questions aux agents et aux avocats des Parties et de leur demander des clarifications sur les points flous.

Ni les questions posées, ni les observations faites par les membres du Tribunal pendant le cours des débats ne peuvent être regardées comme l'expression des opinions du Tribunal en général ou de ses membres en particulier.

Ni les questions posées, ni les observations faites par les membres du Tribunal pendant le cours des débats ne peuvent être regardées comme l'expression des opinions du Tribunal en général ou de ses membres en particulier.

Article 73.

Article 73.

Le Tribunal est autorisé à déterminer sa compétence en interprétant le compromis ainsi que les autres Traités qui peuvent être invoqués dans la matière, et en appliquant les principes du droit.

Le Tribunal a le droit de déterminer sa compétence en interprétant le compromis ainsi que les autres traités qui peuvent être mentionnés dans le contexte, et en appliquant les principes du droit.

Article 74.

Article 74.

Le Tribunal a le droit de rendre des ordonnances de procédure pour la direction du procès, de déterminer les formes, l'ordre et les délais dans lesquels chaque Partie devra prendre ses conclusions finales, et de procéder à toutes les formalités que comporte l'administration des preuves.

Le Tribunal a le droit de rendre des ordonnances de procédure pour la direction du procès, de déterminer les formes, l'ordre et les délais dans lesquels chaque Partie devra prendre ses conclusions finales, et de procéder à toutes les formalités que comporte l'administration des preuves.

Article 75.

Article 75.

Les Parties s'engagent à fournir au Tribunal, dans la plus large mesure qu'Elles jugeront possible, tous les moyens nécessaires pour la décision du litige.

Les Parties s'engagent à fournir au Tribunal, dans la plus large mesure qu'Elles jugeront possible, tous les moyens nécessaires pour la décision du litige.

Article 76.

Article 76.

Pour toutes les notifications que le Tribunal aurait à faire sur le territoire d'une tierce Puissance contractante, le Tribunal s'adressera directement au Gouvernement de cette Puissance. Il en sera de même s'il s'agit de faire procéder sur place à l'établissement de tous moyens de preuve.

Pour toutes les notifications que le Tribunal doit faire sur le territoire d'un autre État contractant, le Tribunal s'adressera directement au Gouvernement de cet État. Il en sera de même s'il faut procéder sur place à l'établissement de tous les moyens de preuve.

Les requêtes adressées à cet effet seront exécutées suivant les moyens dont la Puissance requise dispose d'après sa législation intérieure. Elles ne peuvent être refusées que si cette Puissance les juge de nature à porter atteinte à sa souveraineté ou à sa sécurité.

Les demandes faites à cet effet seront traitées selon les moyens dont l'État concerné dispose selon sa législation. Elles ne pourront être refusées que si cet État les considère comme susceptibles de menacer sa souveraineté ou sa sécurité.

Le Tribunal aura aussi toujours la faculté de recourir à l'intermédiaire de la Puissance sur le territoire de laquelle il a son siège.

Le Tribunal aura aussi toujours la possibilité de passer par l'intermédiaire de la puissance sur le territoire de laquelle il est basé.

Article 77.

Article 77.

Les agents et les conseils des Parties ayant présenté tous les éclaircissements et preuves à l'appui de leur cause, le[Pg 600] Président prononce la clôture des débats.

Les agents et les conseillers des Parties ayant fourni tous les éclaircissements et les preuves pour soutenir leur cause, le[Pg 600] Président déclare la clôture des débats.

Article 78.

Article 78.

Les délibérations du Tribunal ont lieu à huis clos et restent secrètes.

Les délibérations du Tribunal se tiennent à huit clos et restent confidentielles.

Toute décision est prise à la majorité de ses membres.

Toute décision est prise à la majorité de ses membres.

Article 79.

Article 79.

La sentence arbitrale est motivée. Elle mentionne les noms des arbitres; elle est signée par le Président et par le greffier ou le secrétaire faisant fonctions de greffier.

La sentence arbitrale est motivée. Elle mentionne les noms des arbitres; elle est signée par le Président et par le greffier ou le secrétaire faisant fonctions de greffier.

Article 80.

Article 80.

La sentence est lue en séance publique, les agents et les conseils des Parties présents ou dûment appelés.

La sentence est lue en séance publique, les agents et les conseils des Parties présents ou dûment appelés.

Article 81.

Article 81.

La sentence, dûment prononcée et notifiée aux agents des Parties, décide définitivement et sans appel la contestation.

La décision, officiellement prononcée et communiquée aux représentants des Parties, règle définitivement et sans possibilité d'appel le litige.

Article 82.

Article 82.

Tout différend qui pourrait surgir entre les Parties, concernant l'interprétation et l'exécution de la sentence, sera, sauf stipulation contraire, soumis au jugement du Tribunal qui l'a rendue.

Tout différend qui pourrait surgir entre les Parties, concernant l'interprétation et l'exécution de la sentence, sera, sauf stipulation contraire, soumis au jugement du Tribunal qui l'a rendue.

Article 83.

Article 83.

Les Parties peuvent se réserver dans le compromis de demander la révision de la sentence arbitrale.

Les Parties peuvent se réserver dans le compromis de demander la révision de la sentence arbitrale.

Dans ce cas, et sauf stipulation contraire, la demande doit être adressée au Tribunal qui a rendu la sentence. Elle ne peut être motivée que par la découverte d'un fait nouveau qui eût été de nature à exercer une influence décisive sur la sentence et qui, lors de la clôture des débats, était inconnu du Tribunal lui-même et de la Partie qui a demandé la révision.

Dans ce cas, et sauf indication contraire, la demande doit être envoyée au tribunal qui a rendu la décision. Elle ne peut être fondée que sur la découverte d'un fait nouveau qui aurait pu avoir une influence décisive sur la décision et qui, lors de la clôture des débats, était inconnu du tribunal lui-même et de la partie demandant la révision.

La procédure de révision ne peut être ouverte que par une décision du Tribunal constatant expressément l'existence du fait nouveau, lui reconnaissant les caractères prévus par le paragraphe précédent et déclarant à ce titre la demande recevable.

La procédure de révision ne peut être ouverte que par une décision du Tribunal constatant expressément l'existence du fait nouveau, lui reconnaissant les caractères prévus par le paragraphe précédent et déclarant à ce titre la demande recevable.

Le compromis détermine le délai dans lequel la demande de révision doit être formée.

Le compromis fixe le délai dans lequel la demande de révision doit être faite.

Article 84.

Article 84.

La sentence arbitrale n'est obligatoire que pour les Parties en litige.

La sentence arbitrale est obligatoire seulement pour les parties en conflit.

Lorsqu'il s'agit de l'interprétation d'une convention à laquelle ont participé d'autres Puissances que les Parties en litige, celles-ci avertissent en temps utile toutes les Puissances signataires. Chacune de ces Puissances a le droit d'intervenir au procès. Si une ou plusieurs d'entre Elles ont profité de cette faculté, l'interprétation contenue dans la sentence est également obligatoire à leur égard.

Lorsqu'il s'agit d'interpréter une convention à laquelle d'autres puissances ont pris part en plus des parties en litige, celles-ci informent en temps voulu toutes les puissances signataires. Chacune de ces puissances a le droit d'intervenir dans le procès. Si une ou plusieurs d'entre elles exercent ce droit, l'interprétation contenue dans la décision est également obligatoire pour elles.

Article 85.

Article 85.

Chaque Partie supporte ses propres frais et une part égale des frais du Tribunal.

Chaque partie couvre ses propres frais et une portion égale des frais du tribunal.

Chapitre IV.De la procédure sommaire d'arbitrage.

Chapter 4.On the Summary Arbitration Procedure.

Article 86.

Article 86.

En vue de faciliter le fonctionnement de la justice arbitrale, lorsqu'il s'agit de litiges de nature à comporter une procédure sommaire, les Puissances contractantes arrêtent les règles ci-après qui seront suivies en l'absence de stipulations différentes, et sous réserve, le cas échéant, de l'application des dispositions du chapitre III. qui ne seraient pas contraires.

En vue de faciliter le fonctionnement de la justice arbitrale, lorsqu'il s'agit de litiges pouvant nécessiter une procédure rapide, les puissances contractantes établissent les règles suivantes qui seront appliquées en l'absence de stipulations différentes, et sous réserve, le cas échéant, de l'application des dispositions du chapitre III qui ne seraient pas contraires.

Article 87.

Article 87.

Chacune des Parties en litige nomme un arbitre. Les deux arbitres ainsi désignés choisissent un surarbitre. S'ils ne tombent pas d'accord à ce sujet, chacun présente deux candidats pris sur la liste générale des Membres de la Cour permanente, en dehors des Membres indiqués par chacune des Parties Elles-mêmes et n'étant les nationaux d'aucune d'Elles; le sort détermine lequel des candidats ainsi présentés sera le surarbitre.

Chacune des Parties en litige désigne un arbitre. Les deux arbitres choisis sélectionnent un surarbitre. S'ils ne s'accordent pas, chacun propose deux candidats de la liste générale des Membres de la Cour permanente, à l'exclusion des Membres choisis par chaque Partie et qui ne sont pas des ressortissants d'aucune d'elles; un tirage au sort décide qui parmi les candidats présentés sera le surarbitre.

Le surarbitre préside le Tribunal, qui rend ses décisions à la majorité des voix.

Le surarbitre dirige le Tribunal, qui prend ses décisions à la majorité des voix.

Article 88.

Article 88.

A défaut d'accord préalable, le Tribunal fixe, dès qu'il est constitué, le délai dans lequel les deux Parties devront lui soumettre leurs mémoires respectifs.

A défaut d'accord préalable, le Tribunal fixe, dès qu'il est constitué, le délai dans lequel les deux Parties devront lui soumettre leurs mémoires respectifs.

Article 89.

Article 89.

Chaque Partie est représentée devant le Tribunal par un agent qui sert d'intermédiaire entre le Tribunal et le Gouvernement qui l'a désigné.

Chaque Partie est représentée devant le Tribunal par un agent qui fait office d'intermédiaire entre le Tribunal et le Gouvernement qui l'a désigné.

Article 90.

Article 90.

La procédure a lieu exclusivement par écrit. Toutefois, chaque Partie a le droit demander la comparution de témoins et d'experts. Le Tribunal a, de son côté, la faculté de demander des explications orales aux agents des deux Parties, ainsi qu'aux experts et aux témoins dont il juge la comparution utile.[Pg 601]

La procédure se déroule uniquement par écrit. Cependant, chaque Partie a le droit de demander la présence de témoins et d'experts. De son côté, le Tribunal peut demander des explications orales aux représentants des deux Parties, ainsi qu'aux experts et aux témoins qu'il considère utiles.[Pg 601]

Titre V.—Dispositions finales.

Title V.—Final provisions.

Article 91.

Article 91.

La présente Convention dûment ratifiée remplacera, dans les rapports entre les Puissances contractantes, la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux du 29 juillet 1899.

La présente Convention dûment ratifiée remplacera, dans les rapports entre les Puissances contractantes, la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux du 29 juillet 1899.

Article 92.

Article 92.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée aussitôt que possible.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée dès que possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères des Pays-Bas.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera enregistré par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances participant et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une notification écrite, adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront par une notification écrite, envoyée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise, par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement Leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise, par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement Leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 93.

Article 93.

Les Puissances non signataires qui ont été conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix pourront adhérer à la présente Convention.

Les puissances qui ne sont pas signataires et qui ont été invitées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix pourront rejoindre cette Convention.

La Puissance qui désire adhérer notifie par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera déposé dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

La Puissance qui souhaite adhérer informe par écrit le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas de son intention en lui envoyant l'acte d'adhésion, qui sera enregistré dans les archives de ce Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix une copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 94.

Article 94.

Les conditions auxquelles les Puissances qui n'ont pas été conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, pourront adhérer à la présente Convention formeront l'objet d'une entente ultérieure entre les Puissances contractantes.

Les conditions selon lesquelles les puissances qui n'ont pas été invitées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix pourront rejoindre cette Convention feront l'objet d'un accord ultérieur entre les puissances signataires.

Article 95.

Article 95.

La présente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La présente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 96.

Article 96.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 97.

Article 97.

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt de ratifications effectué en vertu de l'article 92 alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle auront été reçues les notifications d'adhésion (article 93 alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 96 alinéa 1).

Un registre maintenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date de dépôt des ratifications effectuées selon l'article 92, paragraphes 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle les notifications d'adhésion (article 93, paragraphe 2) ou de retrait (article 96, paragraphe 1) auront été reçues.

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise à prendre connaissance de ce registre et à en demander des extraits certifiés conformes.

Chaque Puissance contractante a le droit de consulter ce registre et de demander des copies certifiées conformes.

CONVENTION 2. Agreement on the Restriction of Using Force to Collect Contract Debts.

Article premier.

First article.

Les Puissances contractantes sont convenues de ne pas avoir recours à la force armée pour le recouvrement de dettes contractuelles réclamées au Gouvernement d'un pays par le Gouvernement d'un autre pays comme dues à ses nationaux.

Les Puissances contractantes ont convenu de ne pas utiliser la force armée pour récupérer des dettes contractuelles dues au Gouvernement d'un pays par le Gouvernement d'un autre pays, au nom de ses citoyens.

Toutefois, cette stipulation ne pourra être appliquée quand l'État débiteur refuse ou laisse sans réponse une offre d'arbitrage, ou, en cas d'acceptation, rend impossible l'établissement du compromis, ou, après l'arbitrage, manque de se conformer à la sentence rendue.[Pg 602]

Cependant, cette clause ne pourra pas être appliquée si l'État débiteur refuse ou ignore une proposition d'arbitrage, ou, en cas d'acceptation, rend impossible l'établissement de l'accord, ou, après l'arbitrage, ne se conforme pas à la décision rendue.[Pg 602]

Article 2.

Article 2.

Il est de plus convenu que l'arbitrage, mentionné dans l'alinéa 2 de l'article précédent, sera soumis à la procédure prévue par le titre IV chapitre 3 de la Convention de La Haye pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux. Le jugement arbitral détermine, sauf les arrangements particuliers des Parties, le bien-fondé de la réclamation, le montant de la dette, le temps et le mode de paiement.

Il est également convenu que l'arbitrage, mentionné dans le paragraphe 2 de l'article précédent, sera soumis à la procédure prévue par le titre IV chapitre 3 de la Convention de La Haye sur le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux. Le jugement arbitral détermine, sauf arrangements spécifiques entre les Parties, la validité de la réclamation, le montant de la dette, ainsi que le délai et le mode de paiement.

Article 3.

Article 3.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée aussitôt que possible.

The present Convention will be ratified as soon as possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une notification écrite, adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront par une notification écrite, envoyée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise, par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique, aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise, par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique, aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 4.

Article 4.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises à adhérer à la présente Convention.

Les puissances non signataires peuvent rejoindre cette convention.

La Puissance qui désire adhérer notifie par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera déposé dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

La puissance qui souhaite adhérer informe par écrit son intention au gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera déposé dans les archives de ce gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances invitées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix une copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 5.

Article 5.

La présente Convention produira effet pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La présente Convention prendra effet pour les États qui ont participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt. Pour les États qui ratifieront par la suite ou qui adhéreront, cela prendra effet soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 6.

Article 6.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'en ce qui concerne la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 7.

Article 7.

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt de ratifications effectué en vertu de l'article 3 alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle auront été reçues les notifications d'adhésion (article 4 alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 6 alinéa 1).

Un registre maintenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date de dépôt des ratifications effectuées conformément à l'article 3 paragraphes 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle les notifications d'adhésion (article 4 paragraphe 2) ou de dénonciation (article 6 paragraphe 1) auront été reçues.

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise à prendre connaissance de ce registre et à en demander des extraits certifiés conformes.

Chaque Puissance contractante peut consulter ce registre et demander des copies certifiées conformes.

CONVENTION 3. Convention on the Beginning of Hostilities.

Article premier.

First article.

Les Puissances contractantes reconnaissent que les hostilités entre elles ne doivent pas commencer sans un avertissement préalable et non équivoque, qui aura, soit la forme d'une déclaration de guerre motivée, soit celle d'un ultimatum avec déclaration de guerre conditionnelle.

Les Puissances contractantes reconnaissent que les hostilités entre elles ne doivent pas commencer sans un avertissement préalable et non équivoque, qui aura, soit la forme d'une déclaration de guerre motivée, soit celle d'un ultimatum avec déclaration de guerre conditionnelle.

Article 2.

Article 2.

L'état de guerre devra être notifié sans retard aux Puissances neutres et ne produira effet à leur égard qu'après réception d'une notification qui pourra être faite même par voie télégraphique. Toutefois les Puissances neutres ne pourraient invoquer l'absence de notification, s'il était établi d'une manière non douteuse qu'en fait elles connaissaient l'état de guerre.

L'état de guerre doit être informé immédiatement aux puissances neutres et ne prendra effet pour elles qu'après réception d'une notification, qui peut même être faite par télégramme. Cependant, les puissances neutres ne peuvent pas se prévaloir de l'absence de notification si il est clairement établi qu'elles savaient pertinemment qu'un état de guerre existait.

Article 3.

Article 3.

L'article 1 de la présente Convention produira effet en cas de guerre entre[Pg 603] deux ou plusieurs des Puissances contractantes.

L'article 1 de la présente Convention produira effet en cas de guerre entre[Pg 603] deux ou plusieurs des Puissances contractantes.

L'article 2 est obligatoire dans les rapports entre un belligérant contractant et les Puissances neutres également contractantes.

L'article 2 est obligatoire dans les rapports entre un belligérant contractant et les Puissances neutres également contractantes.

Article 4.

Article 4.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée aussitôt que possible.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée dès que possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des puissances participantes et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une notification écrite adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une notification écrite adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 5.

Article 5.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises à adhérer à la présente Convention.

Les puissances non signataires peuvent rejoindre cette convention.

La Puissance qui désire adhérer notifie par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera déposé dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

La Puissance qui souhaite adhérer informe par écrit le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas de son intention en lui envoyant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera conservé dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances une copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 6.

Article 6.

La présente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt, et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La présente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt, et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 7.

Article 7.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Hautes Parties contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Hautes Parties contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 8.

Article 8.

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt de ratifications effectué en vertu de l'article 4 alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle auront été reçues les notifications d'adhésion (article 5 alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 7 alinéa 1).

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt des ratifications effectuées en vertu de l'article 4, alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle auront été reçues les notifications d'adhésion (article 5, alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 7, alinéa 1).

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise à prendre connaissance de ce registre et à en demander des extraits certifiés conformes.

Chaque puissance contractante peut consulter ce registre et demander des extraits certifiés conformes.

CONVENTION 4. Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land.

Article premier.

First article.

Les Puissances contractantes donneront à leurs forces armées de terre des instructions qui seront conformes au Règlement concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre, annexé à la présente Convention.

Les Puissances contractantes donneront à leurs forces armées de terre des instructions qui seront conformes au Règlement concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre, annexé à la présente Convention.

Article 2.

Article 2.

Les dispositions contenues dans le Règlement visé à l'article 1er ainsi que dans la présente Convention, ne sont applicables qu'entre les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligérants sont tous parties à la Convention.

Les dispositions du règlement mentionné à l'article 1er ainsi que dans cette Convention ne s'appliquent qu'entre les puissances signataires et uniquement si tous les belligérants sont parties à la Convention.

Article 3.

Article 3.

La Partie belligérante qui violerait les dispositions dudit Règlement sera tenue à indemnité, s'il y a lieu. Elle sera responsable de tous actes commis par les personnes faisant partie de sa force armée.

La Partie belligérante qui enfreindra les dispositions de ce Règlement devra payer des dommages-intérêts, le cas échéant. Elle sera responsable de tous les actes commis par les membres de sa force armée.

Article 4.

Article 4.

La présente Convention dûment ratifiée remplacera, dans les rapports entre les Puissances contractantes, la Convention du 29 juillet 1899 concernant[Pg 604] les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre.

La présente Convention dûment ratifiée remplacera, dans les rapports entre les Puissances contractantes, la Convention du 29 juillet 1899 concernant[Pg 604] les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre.

La Convention de 1899 reste en vigueur dans les rapports entre les Puissances qui l'ont signée et qui ne ratifieraient pas également la présente Convention.

La Convention de 1899 reste en vigueur dans les relations entre les puissances qui l'ont signée et qui ne ratifieraient pas aussi la présente Convention.

Article 5.

Article 5.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée aussitôt que possible.

The present Convention will be ratified as soon as possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une notification écrite adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront par une notification écrite envoyée au gouvernement des Pays-Bas, accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 6.

Article 6.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises à adhérer à la présente Convention.

Les pays qui ne sont pas signataires peuvent rejoindre cette Convention.

La Puissance qui désire adhérer notifie par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera déposé dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

La Puissance qui souhaite adhérer informe par écrit le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas de son intention en lui envoyant l'acte d'adhésion, qui sera conservé dans les archives de ce Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances une copie authentique de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en précisant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 7.

Article 7.

La présente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La présente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 8.

Article 8.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 9.

Article 9.

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt de ratifications effectué en vertu de l'article 5 alinéas 3 et 4 ainsi que la date à laquelle auront été reçues les notifications d'adhésion (article 6 alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 8 alinéa 1).

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt des ratifications effectuées en vertu de l'article 5, paragraphes 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle auront été reçues les notifications d'adhésion (article 6, paragraphe 2) ou de dénonciation (article 8, paragraphe 1).

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise à prendre connaissance de ce registre et à en demander des extraits certifiés conformes.

Chaque puissance contractante peut consulter ce registre et demander des copies certifiées conformes.

Annexe à la Convention.

Appendix to the Agreement.

Règlement concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre.

Regulations concerning the laws and customs of war on land.

SECTION I.—DES BELLIGÉRANTS.

SECTION I.—BELLIGERENTS.

Chapitre I.De la qualité de belligérant.

Chapter 1.On the quality of being a belligerent.

Article premier.

Prime article.

Les lois, les droits et les devoirs de la guerre ne s'appliquent pas seulement à l'armée, mais encore aux milices et aux corps de volontaires réunissant les conditions suivantes:

Les lois, les droits et les devoirs de la guerre ne s'appliquent pas seulement à l'armée, mais aussi aux milices et aux groupes de volontaires qui remplissent les conditions suivantes:

1o. d'avoir à leur tête une personne responsable pour ses subordonnés;

1o. to have at their head a person responsible for their subordinates;

2o. d'avoir un signe distinctif fixe et reconnaissable à distance;

2o. to have a clear and recognizable distinctive sign from a distance;

3o. de porter les armes ouvertement et

3o. to carry arms openly and

4o. de se conformer dans leurs opérations aux lois et coutumes de la guerre.

4o. to comply in their operations with the laws and customs of war.

Dans les pays où les milices ou des corps de volontaires constituent l'armée ou en font partie, ils sont compris sous la dénomination d'armée.

Dans les pays où les milices ou des corps de volontaires forment l'armée ou en font partie, ils sont appelés armée.

Article 2.

Article 2.

La population d'un territoire non occupé qui, à l'approche de l'ennemi, prend spontanément les armes pour combattre les troupes d'invasion sans avoir eu le temps de s'organiser conformément à l'article premier, sera considérée comme belligérante si elle[Pg 605] porte les armes ouvertement et si elle respecte les lois et coutumes de la guerre.

La population d'un territoire non occupé qui, à l'approche de l'ennemi, prend spontanément les armes pour combattre les troupes d'invasion sans avoir eu le temps de s'organiser conformément à l'article premier, sera considérée comme belligérante si elle[Pg 605] porte les armes ouvertement et si elle respecte les lois et coutumes de la guerre.

Article 3.

Article 3.

Les forces armées des parties belligérantes peuvent se composer de combattants et de non-combattants. En cas de capture par l'ennemi, les uns et les autres ont droit au traitement des prisonniers de guerre.

Les forces armées des parties belligérantes peuvent se composer de combattants et de non-combattants. En cas de capture par l'ennemi, les uns et les autres ont droit au traitement des prisonniers de guerre.

Chapitre II.Des prisonniers de guerre.

Chapter II.War prisoners.

Article 4.

Article 4.

Les prisonniers de guerre sont au pouvoir du Gouvernement ennemi, mais non des individus ou des corps qui les ont capturés.

Les prisonniers de guerre sont sous le contrôle du gouvernement ennemi, mais pas des individus ou des groupes qui les ont capturés.

Ils doivent être traités avec humanité.

Ils doivent être traités avec humanité.

Tout ce qui leur appartient personnellement, excepté les armes, les chevaux et les papiers militaires, reste leur propriété.

Tout ce qui leur appartient personnellement, sauf les armes, les chevaux et les documents militaires, reste leur propriété.

Article 5.

Article 5.

Les prisonniers de guerre peuvent être assujettis à l'internement dans une ville, forteresse, camp ou localité quelconque, avec obligation de ne pas s'en éloigner au delà de certaines limites déterminées; mais ils ne peuvent être enfermés que par mesure de sûreté indispensable, et seulement pendant la durée des circonstances qui nécessitent cette mesure.

Les prisonniers de guerre peuvent être retenus dans une ville, une forteresse, un camp ou tout autre endroit, avec l'obligation de ne pas s'en écarter au-delà de certaines limites spécifiques ; cependant, ils ne peuvent être enfermés que pour des raisons de sécurité essentielles, et uniquement pendant la durée des circonstances qui rendent cette mesure nécessaire.

Article 6.

Article 6.

L'État peut employer, comme travailleurs, les prisonniers de guerre, selon leur grade et leurs aptitudes, à l'exception des officiers. Ces travaux ne seront pas excessifs et n'auront aucun rapport avec les opérations de la guerre.

L'État peut employer, en tant que travailleurs, les prisonniers de guerre, selon leur grade et leurs compétences, sauf pour les officiers. Ces travaux ne seront pas excessifs et n’auront aucun rapport avec les opérations de guerre.

Les prisonniers peuvent être autorisés à travailler pour le compte d'administrations publiques ou de particuliers, ou pour leur propre compte.

Les prisonniers peuvent être autorisés à travailler pour des administrations publiques, des particuliers, ou pour leur propre compte.

Les travaux faits pour l'État sont payés d'après les tarifs en vigueur pour les militaires de l'armée nationale exécutant les mêmes travaux, ou, s'il n'en existe pas, d'après un tarif en rapport avec les travaux exécutés.

Les travaux réalisés pour l'État sont rémunérés selon les tarifs en vigueur pour les militaires de l'armée nationale effectuant les mêmes tâches, ou, si aucun tarif n'existe, selon un tarif correspondant aux travaux effectués.

Lorsque les travaux ont lieu pour le compte d'autres administrations publiques ou pour des particuliers, les conditions en sont réglées d'accord avec l'autorité militaire.

Lorsque les travaux sont effectués pour d'autres administrations publiques ou pour des particuliers, les conditions sont établies en accord avec l'autorité militaire.

Le salaire des prisonniers contribuera à adoucir leur position, et le surplus leur sera compté au moment de leur libération, sauf défalcation des frais d'entretien.

Le salaire des prisonniers aidera à améliorer leur situation, et le surplus leur sera compté au moment de leur libération, sauf déduction des frais d'entretien.

Article 7.

Article 7.

Le Gouvernement au pouvoir duquel se trouvent les prisonniers de guerre est chargé de leur entretien.

Le gouvernement qui détient les prisonniers de guerre est responsable de leur prise en charge.

A défaut d'une entente spéciale entre les belligérants, les prisonniers de guerre seront traités pour la nourriture, le couchage et l'habillement, sur le même pied que les troupes du Gouvernement qui les aura capturés.

A défaut d'une entente spéciale entre les belligérants, les prisonniers de guerre seront traités pour la nourriture, le couchage et l'habillement, sur le même pied que les troupes du Gouvernement qui les aura capturés.

Article 8.

Article 8.

Les prisonniers de guerre seront soumis aux lois, règlements et ordres en vigueur dans l'armée de l'État au pouvoir duquel ils se trouvent. Tout acte d'insubordination autorise, à leur égard, les mesures de rigueur nécessaires.

Les prisonniers de guerre seront soumis aux lois, règlements et ordres en vigueur dans l'armée de l'État au pouvoir duquel ils se trouvent. Tout acte d'insubordination autorise, à leur égard, les mesures de rigueur nécessaires.

Les prisonniers évadés, qui seraient repris avant d'avoir pu rejoindre leur armée ou avant de quitter le territoire occupé par l'armée qui les aura capturés, sont passibles de peines disciplinaires.

Les prisonniers évadés, qui seraient repris avant d'avoir pu rejoindre leur armée ou avant de quitter le territoire occupé par l'armée qui les aura capturés, sont passibles de peines disciplinaires.

Les prisonniers qui, après avoir réussi à s'évader, sont de nouveau faits prisonniers, ne sont passibles d'aucune peine pour la fuite antérieure.

Les prisonniers qui, après avoir réussi à s'évader, sont de nouveau capturés, ne sont passibles d'aucune peine pour la fuite précédente.

Article 9.

Article 9.

Chaque prisonnier de guerre est tenu de déclarer, s'il est interrogé à ce sujet, ses véritables noms et grade et, dans le cas où il enfreindrait cette règle, il s'exposerait à une restriction des avantages accordés aux prisonniers de guerre de sa catégorie.

Chaque prisonnier de guerre doit déclarer, s'il est interrogé à ce sujet, son vrai nom et son grade. S'il ne respecte pas cette règle, il risque de perdre certains des avantages accordés aux prisonniers de guerre de sa catégorie.

Article 10.

Article 10.

Les prisonniers de guerre peuvent être mis en liberté sur parole, si les lois de leur pays les y autorisent, et, en pareil cas, ils sont obligés, sous la garantie de leur honneur personnel, de remplir scrupuleusement, tant vis-à-vis de leur propre Gouvernement que vis-à-vis de celui qui les a faits prisonniers, les engagements qu'ils auraient contractés.

Les prisonniers de guerre peuvent être libérés sous caution, si les lois de leur pays le permettent. Dans ce cas, ils sont tenus, sous l'honneur, de respecter soigneusement les engagements qu'ils ont pris, tant envers leur propre gouvernement que celui qui les a capturés.

Dans le même cas, leur propre Gouvernement est tenu de n'exiger ni accepter d'eux aucun service contraire à la parole donnée.

Dans le même cas, leur propre gouvernement ne peut exiger ni accepter d'eux aucun service qui soit en désaccord avec leur promesse.

Article 11.

Article 11.

Un prisonnier de guerre ne peut être contraint d'accepter sa liberté sur parole; de même le Gouvernement ennemi n'est pas obligé d'accéder à la demande du prisonnier réclamant sa mise en liberté sur parole.

Un prisonnier de guerre ne peut pas être forcé d'accepter sa libération sous condition; de même, le gouvernement ennemi n'est pas obligé d'accepter la demande du prisonnier qui demande à être libéré sous condition.

Article 12.

Article 12.

Tout prisonnier de guerre, libéré sur parole et repris portant les armes contre le Gouvernement envers lequel il s'était engagé d'honneur, ou contre les alliés de celui-ci, perd le droit au[Pg 606] traitement des prisonniers de guerre et peut être traduit devant les tribunaux.

Tout prisonnier de guerre, libéré sur parole et repris portant les armes contre le Gouvernement envers lequel il s'était engagé d'honneur, ou contre les alliés de celui-ci, perd le droit au[Pg 606] traitement des prisonniers de guerre et peut être traduit devant les tribunaux.

Article 13.

Article 13.

Les individus qui suivent une armée sans en faire directement partie, tels que les correspondants et les reporters de journaux, les vivandiers, les fournisseurs, qui tombent au pouvoir de l'ennemi et que celui-ci juge utile de détenir, ont droit au traitement des prisonniers de guerre, à condition qu'ils soient munis d'une légitimation de l'autorité militaire de l'armée qu'ils accompagnaient.

Les personnes qui suivent une armée sans en faire directement partie, comme les journalistes et reporters, les fournisseurs de nourriture, qui tombent entre les mains de l'ennemi et que celui-ci décide de retenir, ont droit au traitement des prisonniers de guerre, à condition qu'elles aient une preuve d'identité de l'autorité militaire de l'armée qu'elles accompagnaient.

Article 14.

Article 14.

Il est constitué, dès le début des hostilités, dans chacun des États belligérants, et, le cas échéant, dans les pays neutres qui auront recueilli des belligérants sur leur territoire, un bureau de renseignements sur les prisonniers de guerre. Ce bureau, chargé de répondre à toutes les demandes qui les concernent, reçoit des divers services compétents toutes les indications relatives aux internements et aux mutations, aux mises en liberté sur parole, aux échanges, aux évasions, aux entrées dans les hôpitaux, aux décès, ainsi que les autres renseignements nécessaires pour établir et tenir à jour une fiche individuelle pour chaque prisonnier de guerre. Le bureau devra porter sur cette fiche le numéro matricule, les nom et prénom, l'âge, le lieu d'origine, le grade, le corps de troupe, les blessures, la date et le lieu de la capture, de l'internement, des blessures et de la mort, ainsi que toutes les observations particulières. La fiche individuelle sera remise au Gouvernement de l'autre belligérant après la conclusion de la paix.

It will be set up, from the very start of hostilities, in each of the warring states, and if applicable, in neutral countries that have taken in combatants on their territory, an office for information about prisoners of war. This office, responsible for responding to all requests concerning them, receives all relevant information from the appropriate services regarding internments and transfers, releases on parole, exchanges, escapes, admissions to hospitals, deaths, as well as other necessary details to create and maintain an individual file for each prisoner of war. The office must include on this file the registration number, last name and first name, age, place of origin, rank, military unit, injuries, date and place of capture, internment, injuries, and death, as well as any special remarks. The individual file will be handed over to the government of the other warring party after the peace agreement is concluded.

Le bureau de renseignements est également chargé de recueillir et de centraliser tous les objets d'un usage personnel, valeurs, lettres, etc., qui seront trouvés sur les champs de bataille ou délaissés par des prisonniers libérés sur parole, échangés, évadés ou décédés dans les hôpitaux et ambulances, et de les transmettre aux intéressés.

Le bureau d'information est aussi responsable de rassembler et de centraliser tous les objets personnels, comme les effets personnels, les valeurs, les lettres, etc., qui seront trouvés sur les champs de bataille ou abandonnés par des prisonniers libérés sous condition, échangés, évadés ou décédés dans les hôpitaux et ambulances, puis de les transmettre aux personnes concernées.

Article 15.

Article 15.

Les sociétés de secours pour les prisonniers de guerre, régulièrement constituées selon la loi de leur pays et ayant pour objet d'être les intermédiaires de l'action charitable, recevront, de la part des belligérants, pour elles et pour leurs agents dûment accrédités, toute facilité, dans les limites tracées par les nécessités militaires et les règles administratives, pour accomplir efficacement leur tâche d'humanité. Les délégués de ces sociétés pourront être admis à distribuer des secours dans les dépôts d'internement, ainsi qu'aux lieux d'étape des prisonniers rapatriés, moyennant une permission personnelle délivrée par l'autorité militaire, et en prenant l'engagement par écrit de se soumettre à toutes les mesures d'ordre et de police que celle-ci prescrirait.

Les organisations d'aide pour les prisonniers de guerre, établies conformément à la législation de leur pays et ayant pour but d'agir en tant qu'intermédiaires pour l'action humanitaire, recevront, de la part des belligérants, toutes les facilités nécessaires pour elles et pour leurs agents dûment accrédités, dans les limites définies par les exigences militaires et les règles administratives, afin d'accomplir efficacement leur mission humanitaire. Les délégués de ces organisations pourront être autorisés à distribuer de l'aide dans les centres d'internement, ainsi qu'aux endroits où les prisonniers sont rapatriés, à condition d’obtenir une autorisation personnelle de l'autorité militaire, et de s'engager par écrit à respecter toutes les mesures de sécurité et de police que celle-ci imposera.

Article 16.

Article 16.

Les bureaux de renseignements jouissent de la franchise de port. Les lettres, mandats et articles d'argent, ainsi que les colis postaux destinés aux prisonniers de guerre ou expédiés par eux, seront affranchis de toutes les taxes postales, aussi bien dans les pays d'origine et de destination que dans les pays intermédiaires.

Les bureaux d'information bénéficient de la franchise de port. Les lettres, mandats et articles d'argent, ainsi que les colis postaux destinés aux prisonniers de guerre ou envoyés par eux, seront exempts de toutes les taxes postales, tant dans les pays d'origine que de destination et dans les pays intermédiaires.

Les dons et secours en nature destinés aux prisonniers de guerre seront admis en franchise de tous droits d'entrée et autres, ainsi que des taxes de transport sur les chemins de fer exploités par l'État.

Les dons et soutiens en nature destinés aux prisonniers de guerre seront acceptés sans frais d'entrée et autres, ainsi que sans taxes de transport sur les chemins de fer gérés par l'État.

Article 17.

Article 17.

Les officiers prisonniers recevront la solde à laquelle ont droit les officiers de même grade du pays où ils sont retenus, à charge de remboursement par leur Gouvernement.

Les officiers prisonniers recevront le salaire auquel ont droit les officiers de même grade dans le pays où ils sont retenus, avec l'obligation de remboursement par leur gouvernement.

Article 18.

Article 18.

Toute latitude est laissée aux prisonniers de guerre pour l'exercice de leur religion, y compris l'assistance aux offices de leur culte, à la seule condition de se conformer aux mesures d'ordre et de police prescrites par l'autorité militaire.

Toute latitude est laissée aux prisonniers de guerre pour l'exercice de leur religion, y compris l'assistance aux offices de leur culte, à la seule condition de se conformer aux mesures d'ordre et de police prescrites par l'autorité militaire.

Article 19.

Article 19.

Les testaments des prisonniers de guerre sont reçus ou dressés dans les mêmes conditions que pour les militaires de l'armée nationale.

Les testaments des prisonniers de guerre sont reçus ou rédigés dans les mêmes conditions que pour les membres de l'armée nationale.

On suivra également les mêmes règles en ce qui concerne les pièces relatives à la constatation des décès, ainsi que pour l'inhumation des prisonniers de guerre, en tenant compte de leur grade et de leur rang.

On follow the same rules regarding the documents related to the confirmation of deaths, as well as for the burial of prisoners of war, taking into account their rank and status.

Article 20.

Article 20.

Après la conclusion de la paix, le rapatriement des prisonniers de guerre s'effectuera dans le plus bref délai possible.

Après la fin de la guerre, le rapatriement des prisonniers de guerre se fera le plus rapidement possible.

Chapitre III.Des malades et des blessés.

Chapter 3.The Sick and the Injured.

Article 21.

Article 21.

Les obligations des belligérants concernant le service des malades et des blessés sont régies par la Convention de Genève.[Pg 607]

The obligations of warring parties regarding the care of the sick and wounded are governed by the Geneva Convention.[Pg 607]

SECTION II.—DES HOSTILITÉS.

SECTION II.—ABOUT HOSTILITIES.

Chapitre I.Des moyens de nuire à l'ennemi, des sièges et des bombardements.

Chapter 1.On ways to harm the enemy, sieges, and bombings.

Article 22.

Article 22.

Les belligérants n'ont pas un droit illimité quant au choix des moyens de nuire à l'ennemi.

Les belligérants n'ont pas un droit illimité quant au choix des moyens de nuire à l'ennemi.

Article 23.

Article 23.

Outre les prohibitions établies par des conventions spéciales, il est notamment interdit:

Outre les prohibitions établies par des conventions spéciales, il est notamment interdit:

(a) d'employer du poison ou des armes empoisonnées;

(a) to use poison or poisoned weapons;

(b) de tuer ou de blesser par trahison des individus appartenant à la nation ou à l'armée ennemie;

(b) to kill or injure through betrayal individuals belonging to the enemy nation or army;

(c) de tuer ou de blesser un ennemi qui, ayant mis bas les armes ou n'ayant plus les moyens de se défendre, s'est rendu à discrétion;

(c) to kill or injure an enemy who, having laid down their arms or no longer being able to defend themselves, has surrendered unconditionally;

(d) de déclarer qu'il ne sera pas fait de quartier;

(d) to declare that no quarter will be given;

(e) d'employer des armes, des projectiles ou des matières propres à causer des maux superflus;

(e) to use weapons, projectiles, or materials that can cause unnecessary harm;

(f) d'user indûment du pavillon parlementaire, du pavillon national ou des insignes militaires et de l'uniforme de l'ennemi, ainsi que des signes distinctifs de la Convention de Genève;

(f) wrongfully using the parliamentary flag, the national flag, or the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive signs of the Geneva Convention;

(g) de détruire ou de saisir des propriétés ennemies, sauf les cas où ces destructions ou ces saisies seraient impérieusement commandées par les nécessités de la guerre;

(g) to destroy or seize enemy property, except in cases where such destruction or seizure is absolutely required by the necessities of war;

(h) de déclarer éteints, suspendus ou non recevables en justice, les droits et actions des nationaux de la Partie adverse.

(h) to declare extinguished, suspended, or inadmissible in court the rights and actions of the nationals of the opposing Party.

Il est également interdit à un belligérant de forcer les nationaux de la Partie adverse à prendre part aux opérations de guerre dirigées contre leur pays, même dans le cas où ils auraient été à son service avant le commencement de la guerre.

Il est également interdit à un belligérant de forcer les nationaux de la Partie adverse à prendre part aux opérations de guerre dirigées contre leur pays, même dans le cas où ils auraient été à son service avant le commencement de la guerre.

Article 24.

Article 24.

Les ruses de guerre et l'emploi des moyens nécessaires pour se procurer des renseignements sur l'ennemi et sur le terrain sont considérés comme licites.

Les ruses de guerre et l’utilisation des moyens nécessaires pour obtenir des informations sur l’ennemi et sur le terrain sont considérées comme légitimes.

Article 25.

Article 25.

Il est interdit d'attaquer ou de bombarder, par quelque moyen que ce soit des villes, villages, habitations ou bâtiments qui ne sont pas défendus.

Il est interdit d'attaquer ou de bombarder, par quelque moyen que ce soit des villes, villages, habitations ou bâtiments qui ne sont pas défendus.

Article 26.

Article 26.

Le commandant des troupes assaillantes, avant d'entreprendre le bombardement, et sauf le cas d'attaque de vive force, devra faire tout ce qui dépend de lui pour en avertir les autorités.

Le commandant des troupes assaillantes, avant de commencer le bombardement, et sauf en cas d'attaque imminente, devra faire tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour en informer les autorités.

Article 27.

Article 27.

Dans les sièges et bombardements, toutes les mesures nécessaires doivent être prises pour épargner, autant que possible, les édifices consacrés aux cultes, aux arts, aux sciences et à la bienfaisance, les monuments historiques, les hôpitaux et les lieux de rassemblement de malades et de blessés, à condition qu'ils ne soient pas employés en même temps à un but militaire.

In the midst of sieges and bombings, all necessary measures should be taken to protect, as much as possible, the buildings dedicated to worship, the arts, sciences, and charity, historical monuments, hospitals, and places where sick and injured people gather, provided that they are not simultaneously used for military purposes.

Le devoir des assiégés est de désigner ces édifices ou lieux de rassemblement par des signes visibles spéciaux qui seront notifiés d'avance à l'assiégeant.

Le devoir des assiégés est de désigner ces bâtiments ou lieux de rassemblement par des signes visibles spéciaux qui seront notifiés d'avance à l'assiégeant.

Article 28.

Article 28.

Il est interdit de livrer au pillage une ville ou localité même prise d'assaut.

Il est interdit de piller une ville ou un endroit, même s'il a été conquis.

Chapitre II.Des espions.

Chapter II.About spies.

Article 29.

Article 29.

Ne peut être considéré comme espion que l'individu qui, agissant clandestinement ou sous de faux prétextes, recueille ou cherche à recueillir des informations dans la zone d'opérations d'un belligérant, avec l'intention de les communiquer à la partie adverse.

Ne peut être considéré comme espion que l'individu qui, agissant clandestinement ou sous de faux prétextes, recueille ou cherche à recueillir des informations dans la zone d'opérations d'un belligérant, avec l'intention de les communiquer à la partie adverse.

Ainsi les militaires non déguisés qui ont pénétré dans la zone d'opérations de l'armée ennemie, à l'effet de recueillir des informations, ne sont pas considérés comme espions. De même, ne sont pas considérés comme espions: les militaires et les non militaires, accomplissant ouvertement leur mission, chargés de transmettre des dépêches destinées, soit à leur propre armée, soit à l'armée ennemie. A cette catégorie appartiennent également les individus envoyés en ballon pour transmettre les dépêches, et, en général, pour entretenir les communications entre les diverses parties d'une armée ou d'un territoire.

Ainsi les militaires non déguisés qui ont pénétré dans la zone d'opérations de l'armée ennemie, à l'effet de recueillir des informations, ne sont pas considérés comme espions. De même, ne sont pas considérés comme espions : les militaires et les non militaires, accomplissant ouvertement leur mission, chargés de transmettre des dépêches destinées, soit à leur propre armée, soit à l'armée ennemie. A cette catégorie appartiennent également les individus envoyés en ballon pour transmettre les dépêches, et, en général, pour entretenir les communications entre les diverses parties d'une armée ou d'un territoire.

Article 30.

Article 30.

L'espion pris sur le fait ne pourra être puni sans jugement préalable.

L'espion surpris sur le fait ne pourra pas être puni sans un jugement préalable.

Article 31.

Article 31.

L'espion qui, ayant rejoint l'armée à laquelle il appartient, est capturé plus tard par l'ennemi, est traité comme prisonnier de guerre et n'encourt aucune responsabilité pour ses actes d'espionnage antérieurs.[Pg 608]

The spy who, upon joining the army he belongs to, is later captured by the enemy, is treated as a prisoner of war and is not held accountable for his previous acts of espionage.[Pg 608]

Chapitre III.Des parlementaires.

Chapter III.On the Parliamentarians.

Article 32.

Article 32.

Est considéré comme parlementaire l'individu autorisé par l'un des belligérants à entrer en pourparlers avec l'autre et se présentant avec le drapeau blanc. Il a droit à l'inviolabilité ainsi que le trompette, clairon ou tambour, le porte-drapeau et l'interprète qui l'accompagneraient.

Est considéré comme parlementaire l'individu autorisé par l'un des belligérants à entrer en pourparlers avec l'autre et se présentant avec le drapeau blanc. Il a droit à l'inviolabilité ainsi que le trompette, clairon ou tambour, le porte-drapeau et l'interprète qui l'accompagneraient.

Article 33.

Article 33.

Le chef auquel un parlementaire est expédié n'est pas obligé de le recevoir en toutes circonstances.

Le chef auquel un parlementaire est envoyé n'est pas obligé de le recevoir en toutes circonstances.

Il peut prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires afin d'empêcher le parlementaire de profiter de sa mission pour se renseigner.

Il peut prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour empêcher le parlementaire de profiter de sa mission pour se renseigner.

Il a le droit, en cas d'abus, de retenir temporairement le parlementaire.

Il a le droit, en cas d'abus, de retenir temporairement le parlementaire.

Article 34.

Article 34.

Le parlementaire perd ses droits d'inviolabilité, s'il est prouvé, d'une manière positive et irrécusable, qu'il a profité de sa position privilégiée pour provoquer ou commettre un acte de trahison.

Le parlementaire perd ses droits d'inviolabilité s'il est prouvé, de manière positive et irrécusable, qu'il a profité de sa position privilégiée pour provoquer ou commettre un acte de trahison.

Chapitre IV.Des capitulations.

Chapter IV.On Surrenders.

Article 35.

Article 35.

Les capitulations arrêtées entre les parties contractantes doivent tenir compte des règles de l'honneur militaire.

Les accords conclus entre les parties doivent respecter les règles de l'honneur militaire.

Une fois fixées, elles doivent être scrupuleusement observées par les deux parties.

Une fois établies, elles doivent être strictement respectées par les deux parties.

Chapitre V.De l'armistice.

Chapter V.About the Armistice.

Article 36.

Article 36.

L'armistice suspend les opérations de guerre par un accord mutuel des parties belligérantes. Si la durée n'en est pas déterminée, les parties belligérantes peuvent reprendre en tout temps les opérations, pourvu toutefois que l'ennemi soit averti en temps convenu, conformément aux conditions de l'armistice.

L'armistice pauses the fighting through a mutual agreement between the warring parties. If the duration isn't specified, the parties can restart their operations at any time, as long as the enemy is notified within the agreed timeframe, according to the terms of the armistice.

Article 37.

Article 37.

L'armistice peut être général ou local. Le premier suspend partout les opérations de guerre des États belligérants; le second, seulement entre certaines fractions des armées belligérantes et dans un rayon déterminé.

L'armistice peut être général ou local. Le premier suspend partout les opérations de guerre des États belligérants; le second, seulement entre certaines fractions des armées belligérantes et dans un rayon déterminé.

Article 38.

Article 38.

L'armistice doit être notifié officiellement et en temps utile aux autorités compétentes et aux troupes. Les hostilités sont suspendues immédiatement après la notification ou au terme fixé.

L'armistice doit être notifié officiellement et en temps utile aux autorités compétentes et aux troupes. Les hostilités sont suspendues immédiatement après la notification ou au terme fixé.

Article 39.

Article 39.

Il dépend des parties contractantes de fixer, dans les clauses de l'armistice, les rapports qui pourraient avoir lieu, sur le théâtre de la guerre, avec les populations et entre elles.

Il revient aux parties contractantes de déterminer, dans les clauses de l'armistice, les relations qui pourraient exister, sur le terrain de la guerre, avec les populations et entre elles.

Article 40.

Article 40.

Toute violation grave de l'armistice, par l'une des parties, donne à l'autre le droit de le dénoncer et même, en cas d'urgence, de reprendre immédiatement les hostilités.

Any serious violation of the armistice by either party gives the other the right to denounce it and, in case of emergency, to immediately resume hostilities.

Article 41.

Article 41.

La violation des clauses de l'armistice, par des particuliers agissant de leur propre initiative, donne droit seulement à réclamer la punition des coupables et, s'il y a lieu, une indemnité pour les pertes éprouvées.

La violation des clauses de l'armistice, par des particuliers agissant de leur propre initiative, donne droit seulement à réclamer la punition des coupables et, s'il y a lieu, une indemnité pour les pertes éprouvées.

SECTION III.—DE L'AUTORITÉ MILITAIRE SUR LE TERRITOIRE DE L'ÉTAT ENNEMI.

SECTION III.—ON MILITARY AUTHORITY OVER ENEMY TERRITORY.

Article 42.

Article 42.

Un territoire est considéré comme occupé lorsqu'il se trouve placé de fait sous l'autorité de l'armée ennemie.

Un territoire est considéré comme occupé lorsqu'il est de facto sous le contrôle de l'armée ennemie.

L'occupation ne s'étend qu'aux territoires où cette autorité est établie et en mesure de s'exercer.

L'occupation ne s'étend qu'aux territoires où cette autorité est en place et capable de s'exercer.

Article 43.

Article 43.

L'autorité du pouvoir légal ayant passé de fait entre les mains de l'occupant, celui-ci prendra toutes les mesures qui dépendent de lui en vue de rétablir et d'assurer, autant qu'il est possible, l'ordre et la vie publics en respectant, sauf empêchement absolu, les lois en vigueur dans le pays.

L'autorité du pouvoir légal ayant passé de fait entre les mains de l'occupant, celui-ci prendra toutes les mesures qui dépendent de lui en vue de rétablir et d'assurer, autant qu'il est possible, l'ordre et la vie publics en respectant, sauf empêchement absolu, les lois en vigueur dans le pays.

Article 44.

Article 44.

Il est interdit à un belligérant de forcer la population d'un territoire occupé à donner des renseignements sur l'armée de l'autre belligérant ou sur ses moyens de défense.

Il est interdit à un belligérant de forcer la population d'un territoire occupé à donner des renseignements sur l'armée de l'autre belligérant ou sur ses moyens de défense.

Article 45.

Article 45.

Il est interdit de contraindre la population d'un territoire occupé à prêter serment à la Puissance ennemie.

Il est interdit de forcer la population d'un territoire occupé à prêter allégeance à la puissance ennemie.

Article 46.

Article 46.

L'honneur et les droits de la famille, la vie des individus et la propriété privée, ainsi que les convictions religieuses et l'exercice des cultes, doivent être respectés.

L'honneur et les droits de la famille, la vie des individus et la propriété privée, ainsi que les convictions religieuses et l'exercice des cultes, doivent être respectés.

La propriété privée ne peut pas être confisquée.

La propriété privée ne peut pas être confisquée.

Article 47.

Article 47.

Le pillage est formellement interdit.[Pg 609]

Looting is strictly prohibited.[Pg 609]

Article 48.

Article 48.

Si l'occupant prélève, dans le territoire occupé, les impôts, droits et péages établis au profit de l'État, il le fera, autant que possible, d'après les règles de l'assiette et de la répartition en vigueur, et il en résultera pour lui l'obligation de pourvoir aux frais de l'administration du territoire occupé dans la mesure où le Gouvernement légal y était tenu.

Si l'occupant perçoit, dans le territoire occupé, les impôts, droits et péages établis pour le bénéfice de l'État, il le fera, autant que possible, selon les règles de l'assiette et de la répartition en vigueur, et il en résultera pour lui l'obligation de couvrir les frais de l'administration du territoire occupé dans la mesure où le Gouvernement légal y était tenu.

Article 49.

Article 49.

Si, en dehors des impôts visés à l'article précédent, l'occupant prélève d'autres contributions en argent dans le territoire occupé, ce ne pourra être que pour les besoins de l'armée ou de l'administration de ce territoire.

Si, en dehors des impôts visés à l'article précédent, l'occupant prélève d'autres contributions en argent dans le territoire occupé, ce ne pourra être que pour les besoins de l'armée ou de l'administration de ce territoire.

Article 50.

Article 50.

Aucune peine collective, pécuniaire ou autre, ne pourra être édictée contre les populations à raison de faits individuels dont elles ne pourraient être considérées comme solidairement responsables.

Aucune peine collective, pécuniaire ou autre, ne pourra être édictée contre les populations à raison de faits individuels dont elles ne pourraient être considérées comme solidairement responsables.

Article 51.

Article 51.

Aucune contribution ne sera perçue qu'en vertu d'un ordre écrit et sous la responsabilité d'un général en chef.

Aucune contribution ne sera perçue qu'en vertu d'un ordre écrit et sous la responsabilité d'un général en chef.

Il ne sera procédé, autant que possible, à cette perception que d'après les règles de l'assiette et de la répartition des impôts en vigueur.

Il ne sera procédé, autant que possible, à cette perception que d'après les règles de l'assiette et de la répartition des impôts en vigueur.

Pour toute contribution, un reçu sera délivré aux contribuables.

Pour chaque contribution, un reçu sera remis aux contribuables.

Article 52.

Article 52.

Des réquisitions en nature et des services ne pourront être réclamés des communes ou des habitants, que pour les besoins de l'armée d'occupation. Ils seront en rapport avec les ressources du pays et de telle nature qu'ils n'impliquent pas pour les populations l'obligation de prendre part aux opérations de la guerre contre leur patrie.

Des réquisitions en nature et des services ne pourront être demandés aux communes ou aux habitants, que pour les besoins de l'armée d'occupation. Ils seront en lien avec les ressources du pays et de telle manière qu'ils n'impliquent pas pour les populations l'obligation de participer aux opérations de guerre contre leur pays.

Ces réquisitions et ces services ne seront réclamés qu'avec l'autorisation du commandant dans la localité occupée.

Ces réquisitions et ces services ne seront demandés qu'avec l'autorisation du commandant dans la zone occupée.

Les prestations en nature seront, autant que possible, payées au comptant; sinon, elles seront constatées par des reçus, et le paiement des sommes dues sera effectué le plus tôt possible.

Les services en nature seront, autant que possible, payés en espèces ; sinon, ils seront documentés par des reçus, et le paiement des montants dus sera fait dès que possible.

Article 53.

Article 53.

L'armée qui occupe un territoire ne pourra saisir que le numéraire, les fonds et les valeurs exigibles appartenant en propre à l'État, les dépôts d'armes, moyens de transport, magasins et approvisionnements et, en général, toute propriété mobilière de l'État de nature à servir aux opérations de la guerre.

L'armée qui occupe un territoire ne pourra saisir que l'argent liquide, les fonds et les biens exigibles appartenant directement à l'État, les dépôts d'armes, les moyens de transport, les magasins et les approvisionnements et, en général, toute propriété mobilière de l'État qui peut servir aux opérations militaires.

Tous les moyens affectés sur terre, sur mer et dans les airs à la transmission des nouvelles, au transport des personnes ou des choses, en dehors des cas régis par le droit maritime, les dépôts d'armes et, en général, toute espèce de munitions de guerre, peuvent être saisis, même s'ils appartiennent à des personnes privées, mais devront être restitués et les indemnités seront réglées à la paix.

Tous les moyens affectés sur terre, sur mer et dans les airs à la transmission des nouvelles, au transport des personnes ou des choses, en dehors des cas régis par le droit maritime, les dépôts d'armes et, en général, toute espèce de munitions de guerre, peuvent être saisis, même s'ils appartiennent à des personnes privées, mais devront être restitués et les indemnités seront réglées à la paix.

Article 54.

Article 54.

Les câbles sous-marins reliant un territoire occupé à un territoire neutre ne seront saisis ou détruits que dans le cas d'une nécessité absolue. Ils devront également être restitués et les indemnités seront réglées à la paix.

Les câbles sous-marins reliant un territoire occupé à un territoire neutre ne seront saisis ou détruits que dans le cas d'une nécessité absolue. Ils devront également être restitués et les indemnités seront réglées à la paix.

Article 55.

Article 55.

L'État occupant ne se considérera que comme administrateur et usufruitier des édifices publics, immeubles, forêts et exploitations agricoles appartenant à l'État ennemi et se trouvant dans le pays occupé. Il devra sauvegarder le fonds de ces propriétés et les administrer conformément aux règles de l'usufruit.

L'État occupant ne se considérera que comme gestionnaire et bénéficiaire des bâtiments publics, des biens immobiliers, des forêts et des exploitations agricoles appartenant à l'État ennemi et présents dans le pays occupé. Il devra préserver le capital de ces propriétés et les gérer selon les règles de l'usufruit.

Article 56.

Article 56.

Les biens des communes, ceux des établissements consacrés aux cultes, à la charité et à l'instruction, aux arts et aux sciences, même appartenant à l'État seront traités comme la propriété privée.

Les biens des communes, ceux des établissements consacrés aux cultes, à la charité et à l'instruction, aux arts et aux sciences, même appartenant à l'État, seront traités comme la propriété privée.

Toute saisie, destruction ou dégradation intentionnelle de semblables établissements, de monuments historiques, d'œuvres d'art et de science, est interdite et doit être poursuivie.

Toute saisie, destruction ou dégradation intentionnelle de semblables établissements, de monuments historiques, d'œuvres d'art et de science, est interdite et doit être poursuivie.

CONVENTION 5. Convention on the Rights and Responsibilities of Neutral Powers and Individuals in Land Warfare.

Chapitre I.Des Droits et des Devoirs des Puissances neutres.

Chapter 1.The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers.

Article premier.

First article.

Le territoire des Puissances neutres est inviolable.

Le territoire des Puissances neutres est inviolable.

Article 2.

Article 2.

Il est interdit aux belligérants de faire passer à travers le territoire d'une Puissance neutre des troupes ou des convois, soit de munitions, soit d'approvisionnements.[Pg 610]

Il est interdit aux belligérants de faire passer à travers le territoire d'une Puissance neutre des troupes ou des convois, soit de munitions, soit d'approvisionnements.[Pg 610]

Article 3.

Article 3.

Il est également interdit aux belligérants:

Il est également interdit aux belligérants:

(a) d'installer sur le territoire d'une Puissance neutre une station radiotélégraphique ou tout appareil destiné à servir comme moyen de communication avec des forces belligérantes sur terre ou sur mer;

(a) to set up on the territory of a neutral Power a radio telegraph station or any device intended to serve as a means of communication with warring forces on land or at sea;

(b) d'utiliser toute installation de ce genre établie par eux avant la guerre sur le territoire de la Puissance neutre dans un but exclusivement militaire, et qui n'a pas été ouverte au service de la correspondance publique.

(b) to use any installation of this kind set up by them before the war on the territory of the neutral Power for exclusively military purposes, and which has not been opened for public correspondence.

Article 4.

Article 4.

Des corps de combattants ne peuvent être formés, ni des bureaux d'enrôlement ouverts, sur le territoire d'une Puissance neutre au profit des belligérants.

Des corps de combattants ne peuvent être formés, ni des bureaux d'enrôlement ouverts, sur le territoire d'une Puissance neutre au profit des belligérants.

Article 5.

Article 5.

Une Puissance neutre ne doit tolérer sur son territoire aucun des actes visés par les articles 2 à 4.

Une puissance neutre ne doit tolérer sur son territoire aucun des actes visés par les articles 2 à 4.

Elle n'est tenue de punir des actes contraires à la neutralité que si ces actes ont été commis sur son propre territoire.

Elle n'est obligée de punir des actes contraires à la neutralité que si ces actes ont été commis sur son propre territoire.

Article 6.

Article 6.

La responsabilité d'une Puissance neutre n'est pas engagée par le fait que des individus passent isolément la frontière pour se mettre au service de l'un des belligérants.

La responsabilité d'une puissance neutre n'est pas engagée par le fait que des individus passent isolément la frontière pour se mettre au service de l'un des belligérants.

Article 7.

Article 7.

Une Puissance neutre n'est pas tenue d'empêcher l'exportation ou le transit, pour le compte de l'un ou de l'autre des belligérants, d'armes, de munitions, et, en général, de tout ce qui peut être utile à une armée ou à une flotte.

Une Puissance neutre n'est pas tenue d'empêcher l'exportation ou le transit, pour le compte de l'un ou de l'autre des belligérants, d'armes, de munitions, et, en général, de tout ce qui peut être utile à une armée ou à une flotte.

Article 8.

Article 8.

Une Puissance neutre n'est pas tenue d'interdire ou de restreindre l'usage, pour les belligérants, des câbles télégraphiques ou téléphoniques, ainsi que des appareils de télégraphie sans fil, qui sont, soit sa propriété, soit celle de compagnies ou de particuliers.

Une Puissance neutre n'est pas tenue d'interdire ou de restreindre l'usage, pour les belligérants, des câbles télégraphiques ou téléphoniques, ainsi que des appareils de télégraphie sans fil, qui sont, soit sa propriété, soit celle de compagnies ou de particuliers.

Article 9.

Article 9.

Toutes mesures restrictives ou prohibitives prises par une Puissance neutre à l'égard des matières visées par les articles 7 et 8 devront être uniformément appliquées par elle aux belligérants.

Toutes mesures restrictives ou prohibitives prises par une Puissance neutre à l'égard des matières visées par les articles 7 et 8 devront être uniformément appliquées par elle aux belligérants.

La Puissance neutre veillera au respect de la même obligation par les compagnies ou particuliers propriétaires de câbles télégraphiques ou téléphoniques ou d'appareils de télégraphie sans fil.

La Puissance neutre s'assurera que les entreprises ou les particuliers qui possèdent des câbles télégraphiques ou téléphoniques, ou des appareils de télégraphie sans fil, respectent la même obligation.

Article 10.

Article 10.

Ne peut être considéré comme un acte hostile le fait, par une Puissance neutre, de repousser, même par la force, les atteintes à sa neutralité.

Ne peut être considéré comme un acte hostile le fait, par une Puissance neutre, de repousser, même par la force, les atteintes à sa neutralité.

Chapitre II.Des belligérants internés et des blessés soignés chez les neutres.

Chapter 2.About the interned belligerents and the wounded cared for by the neutrals.

Article 11.

Article 11.

La Puissance neutre qui reçoit sur son territoire des troupes appartenant aux armées belligérantes, les internera, autant que possible, loin du théâtre de la guerre.

La puissance neutral qui accueille des troupes des armées belligérantes sur son territoire, les internera, autant que possible, loin du champ de bataille.

Elle pourra les garder dans des camps, et même les enfermer dans des forteresses ou dans des lieux appropriés à cet effet.

Elle pourra les garder dans des camps, et même les enfermer dans des forteresses ou dans des lieux adaptés à cet effet.

Elle décidera si les officiers peuvent être laissés libres en prenant l'engagement sur parole de ne pas quitter le territoire neutre sans autorisation.

Elle décidera si les officiers peuvent être relâchés en prenant un engagement verbal de ne pas quitter le territoire neutre sans autorisation.

Article 12.

Article 12.

A défaut de convention spéciale, la Puissance neutre fournira aux internés les vivres, les habillements et les secours commandés par l'humanité.

A lack of special agreement, the neutral power will provide the interned with food, clothing, and assistance as required by humanity.

Bonification sera faite, à la paix, des frais occasionnés par l'internement.

Bonification will be provided, upon peace, for the costs incurred during internment.

Article 13.

Article 13.

La Puissance neutre qui reçoit des prisonniers de guerre évadés les laissera en liberté. Si elle tolère leur séjour sur son territoire, elle peut leur assigner une résidence.

La Puissance neutre qui reçoit des prisonniers de guerre évadés les laissera en liberté. Si elle tolère leur séjour sur son territoire, elle peut leur assigner une résidence.

La même disposition est applicable aux prisonniers de guerre amenés par des troupes se réfugiant sur le territoire de la Puissance neutre.

La même règle s'applique aux prisonniers de guerre amenés par des troupes qui se réfugient sur le territoire de la puissance neutre.

Article 14.

Article 14.

Une Puissance neutre pourra autoriser le passage sur son territoire des blessés ou malades appartenant aux armées belligérantes, sous la réserve que les trains qui les amèneront ne transporteront ni personnel, ni matériel de guerre. En pareil cas, la Puissance neutre est tenue de prendre les mesures de sûreté et de contrôle nécessaires à cet effet.

Une puissance neutre peut permettre le passage sur son territoire des blessés ou malades des armées en conflit, à condition que les trains qui les transportent ne transportent ni personnel ni matériel de guerre. Dans ce cas, la puissance neutre doit prendre les mesures de sécurité et de contrôle nécessaires à cet effet.

Les blessés ou malades amenés dans ces conditions sur le territoire neutre par un des belligérants, et qui appartiendraient à la partie adverse, devront être gardés par la Puissance neutre de manière qu'ils ne puissent de nouveau prendre part aux opérations de la guerre. Cette Puissance aura les mêmes devoirs quant aux blessés ou malades de l'autre armée qui lui seraient confiés.[Pg 611]

Les blessés ou malades amenés dans ces conditions sur le territoire neutre par un des belligérants, et qui appartiendraient à la partie adverse, devront être gardés par la Puissance neutre de manière qu'ils ne puissent de nouveau prendre part aux opérations de la guerre. Cette Puissance aura les mêmes devoirs quant aux blessés ou malades de l'autre armée qui lui seraient confiés.[Pg 611]

Article 15.

Article 15.

La Convention de Genève s'applique aux malades et aux blessés internés sur territoire neutre.

La Convention de Genève s'applique aux malades et aux blessés qui sont internés sur un territoire neutre.

Chapitre III.Des personnes neutres.

Chapter III.Neutral Parties.

Article 16.

Article 16.

Sont considérés comme neutres les nationaux d'un État qui ne prend pas part à la guerre.

S nationals of a state that is not involved in the war are considered neutral.

Article 17.

Article 17.

Un neutre ne peut pas se prévaloir de sa neutralité:

Un neutre ne peut pas se prévaloir de sa neutralité:

(a) s'il commet des actes hostiles contre un belligérant;

(a) if he commits hostile acts against a belligerent;

(b) s'il commet des actes en faveur d'un belligérant, notamment s'il prend volontairement du service dans les rangs de la force armée de l'une des Parties.

(b) if he commits acts in favor of a belligerent, particularly if he voluntarily joins the armed forces of one of the Parties.

En pareil cas, le neutre ne sera pas traité plus rigoureusement par le belligérant contre lequel il s'est départi de la neutralité que ne pourrait l'être, à raison du même fait, un national de l'autre État belligérant.

En pareil cas, le neutre ne sera pas traité plus sévèrement par le belligérant contre lequel il a violé la neutralité que ne le serait, en raison du même acte, un citoyen de l'autre État belligérant.

Article 18.

Article 18.

Ne seront pas considérés comme actes commis en faveur d'un des belligérants, dans le sens de l'article 17, lettre b:

Ne seront pas considérés comme actes commis en faveur d'un des belligérants, dans le sens de l'article 17, lettre b:

(a) les fournitures faites ou les emprunts consentis à l'un des belligérants, pourvu que le fournisseur ou le prêteur n'habite ni le territoire de l'autre Partie, ni le territoire occupé par elle, et que les fournitures ne proviennent pas de ses territoires;

(a) supplies made or loans granted to one of the belligerents, as long as the supplier or lender does not live in the territory of the other Party or in the territory occupied by it, and that the supplies do not come from its territories;

(b) les services rendus en matière de police ou d'administration civile.

(b) services provided in terms of police or civil administration.

Chapitre IV.Du matériel des chemins de fer.

Chapter 4.On the materials of railways.

Article 19.

Article 19.

Le matériel des chemins de fer provenant du territoire de Puissances neutres, qu'il appartienne à ces Puissances ou à des sociétés ou personnes privées, et reconnaisable comme tel, ne pourra être réquisitionné et utilisé par un belligérant que dans le cas et la mesure où l'exige une impérieuse nécessité. Il sera renvoyé aussitôt que possible dans le pays d'origine.

Le matériel des chemins de fer provenant du territoire de Puissances neutres, qu'il appartienne à ces Puissances ou à des sociétés ou personnes privées, et reconnaissable comme tel, ne pourra être réquisitionné et utilisé par un belligérant que dans le cas et la mesure où l'exige une impérieuse nécessité. Il sera renvoyé aussitôt que possible dans le pays d'origine.

La Puissance neutre pourra de même, en cas de nécessité, retenir et utiliser, jusqu'à due concurrence, le matériel provenant du territoire de la Puissance belligérante.

La Puissance neutre pourra également, en cas de nécessité, retenir et utiliser, jusqu'à concurrence appropriée, le matériel provenant du territoire de la Puissance belligérante.

Une indemnité sera payée de part et d'autre, en proportion du matériel utilisé et de la durée de l'utilisation.

A payment will be made by both parties, based on the equipment used and the duration of its use.

Chapitre V.Dispositions finales.

Chapter V.Final Provisions.

Article 20.

Article 20.

Les dispositions de la présente Convention ne sont applicables qu'entre les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligérants sont tous parties à la Convention.

Les dispositions de la présente Convention ne sont applicables qu'entre les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligérants sont tous parties à la Convention.

Article 21.

Article 21.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée aussitôt que possible.

The present Convention will be ratified as soon as possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une notification écrite, adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront par une notification écrite, envoyée au gouvernement néerlandais et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratification sera immédiatement remise par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratification sera immédiatement remise par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 22.

Article 22.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises à adhérer à la présente Convention.

Les puissances non signataires peuvent rejoindre cette convention.

La Puissance qui désire adhérer notifie par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera déposé dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

La Puissance qui souhaite adhérer informe par écrit le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas de son intention en lui envoyant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera enregistré dans les archives du Gouvernement concerné.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances une copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 23.

Article 23.

La présente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur[Pg 612] ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La présente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur[Pg 612] ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 24.

Article 24.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances, en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

Si l'une des Puissances contractantes souhaitait se retirer de la présente Convention, elle devra notifier cette décision par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, qui transmettra immédiatement une copie certifiée de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances, en leur indiquant la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 25.

Article 25.

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt des ratifications effectué en vertu de l'article 21 alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle auront été reçues les notifications d'adhésion (article 22 alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 24 alinéa 1).

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt des ratifications effectué en vertu de l'article 21 alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle auront été reçues les notifications d'adhésion (article 22 alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 24 alinéa 1).

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise à prendre connaissance de ce registre et à en demander des extraits certifiés conformes.

Chaque puissance contractante a le droit de consulter ce registre et de demander des extraits certifiés conformes.

CONVENTION 6. Convention Regarding the Status of Merchant Ships at the Start of Hostilities.

Article premier.

First article.

Lorsqu'un navire de commerce relevant d'une des Puissances belligérantes se trouve, au début des hostilités, dans un port ennemi, il est désirable qu'il lui soit permis de sortir librement, immédiatement ou après un délai de faveur suffisant, et de gagner directement, après avoir été muni d'un laissez-passer, son port de destination ou tel autre port qui lui sera désigné.

When a commercial ship belonging to one of the warring Powers is in an enemy port at the start of hostilities, it is desirable that it be allowed to leave freely, either immediately or after a sufficient grace period, and to head directly, once it has been issued a pass, to its destination port or any other port designated for it.

Il en est de même du navire ayant quitté son dernier port de départ avant le commencement de la guerre et entrant dans un port ennemi sans connaître les hostilités.

Il en est de même du navire ayant quitté son dernier port de départ avant le commencement de la guerre et entrant dans un port ennemi sans connaître les hostilités.

Article 2.

Article 2.

Le navire de commerce qui, par suite de circonstances de force majeure n'aurait pu quitter le port ennemi pendant le délai visé à l'article précédent, ou auquel la sortie n'aurait pas été accordée, ne peut être confisqué.

Le navire de commerce qui, en raison de circonstances imprévues, n'a pas pu quitter le port ennemi dans le délai mentionné à l'article précédent, ou auquel la sortie n'a pas été autorisée, ne peut pas être confisqué.

Le belligérant peut seulement le saisir moyennant l'obligation de le restituer après la guerre sans indemnité, ou le réquisitionner moyennant indemnité.

Le belligérant ne peut le saisir que s'il s'engage à le rendre après la guerre sans compensation, ou le réquisitionner avec compensation.

Article 3.

Article 3.

Les navires de commerce ennemis, qui ont quitté leur dernier port de départ, avant le commencement de la guerre et qui sont rencontrés en mer ignorants des hostilités, ne peuvent être confisqués. Ils sont seulement sujets à être saisis, moyennant l'obligation de les restituer après la guerre sans indemnité, ou à être réquisitionnés, ou même à être détruits, à charge d'indemnité et sous l'obligation de pourvoir à la sécurité des personnes ainsi qu'à la conservation des papiers de bord.

Les navires de commerce ennemis, qui ont quitté leur dernier port avant le début de la guerre et qui sont trouvés en mer sans être au courant du conflit, ne peuvent pas être pris. Ils peuvent seulement être saisis, avec l'obligation de les restituer après la guerre sans compensation, ou être réquisitionnés, ou même détruits, à condition de verser une indemnité et de garantir la sécurité des personnes ainsi que la conservation des documents de bord.

Après avoir touché à un port de leur pays ou à un port neutre, ces navires sont soumis aux lois et coutumes de la guerre maritime.

Après avoir atteint un port de leur pays ou un port neutre, ces navires sont soumis aux lois et coutumes de la guerre maritime.

Article 4.

Article 4.

Les marchandises ennemies se trouvant à bord des navires visés aux articles 1 et 2 sont également sujettes à être saisies et restituées après la guerre sans indemnité, ou à être réquisitionnées moyennant indemnité, conjointement avec le navire ou séparément.

Les marchandises ennemies à bord des navires mentionnés dans les articles 1 et 2 peuvent aussi être saisies et restituées après la guerre sans compensation, ou requises avec compensation, ensemble avec le navire ou séparément.

Il en est de même des marchandises se trouvant à bord des navires visés à l'article 3.

Il en est de même des marchandises se trouvant à bord des navires visés à l'article 3.

Article 5.

Article 5.

La présente Convention ne vise pas les navires de commerce dont la construction indique qu'ils sont destinés à être transformés en bâtiments de guerre.

La présente Convention ne vise pas les navires de commerce dont la construction indique qu'ils sont destinés à être transformés en bâtiments de guerre.

Article 6.

Article 6.

Les dispositions de la présente Convention ne sont applicables qu'entre les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligérants sont tous parties à la Convention.

Les dispositions de la présente Convention ne s'appliquent qu'entre les Puissances contractantes et seulement si tous les belligérants sont parties à la Convention.

Article 7.

Article 7.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée aussitôt que possible.

The current agreement will be ratified as soon as possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une notification écrite, adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront par une notification écrite, envoyée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratifications, sera immédiatement[Pg 613] remise par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratifications, sera immédiatement[Pg 613] remise par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 8.

Article 8.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises à adhérer à la présente Convention.

Les puissances qui n'ont pas signé peuvent rejoindre cette convention.

La Puissance qui désire adhérer notifie par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera déposé dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

La Puissance qui souhaite adhérer informe par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui envoyant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera déposé dans les archives de ce Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances une copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 9.

Article 9.

La présente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La présente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 10.

Article 10.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 11.

Article 11.

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt de ratifications effectué en vertu de l'article 7 alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle auront été reçues les notifications d'adhésion (article 8 alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 10 alinéa 1).

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt des ratifications effectuées en vertu de l'article 7, alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle les notifications d'adhésion (article 8, alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 10, alinéa 1) auront été reçues.

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise à prendre connaissance de ce registre et à en demander des extraits certifiés conformes.

Chaque Puissance contractante peut consulter ce registre et demander des copies certifiées conformes.

CONVENTION 7. Agreement on Converting Merchant Ships into Warships.

Article premier.

First article.

Aucun navire de commerce transformé en bâtiment de guerre ne peut avoir les droits et les obligations attachés à cette qualité, s'il n'est placé sous l'autorité directe, le contrôle immédiat et la responsabilité de la Puissance dont il porte le pavillon.

A commercial ship converted into a war vessel cannot have the rights and responsibilities associated with that status unless it is under the direct authority, immediate control, and responsibility of the Power whose flag it flies.

Article 2.

Article 2.

Les navires de commerce transformés en bâtiments de guerre doivent porter les signes extérieurs distinctifs des bâtiments de guerre de leur nationalité.

Les navires de commerce convertis en navires de guerre doivent afficher les signes distinctifs des navires de guerre de leur pays.

Article 3.

Article 3.

Le commandant doit être au service de l'État et dûment commissionné par les autorités compétentes. Son nom doit figurer sur la liste des officiers de la flotte militaire.

Le commandant doit être au service de l'État et dûment commissionné par les autorités compétentes. Son nom doit figurer sur la liste des officiers de la flotte militaire.

Article 4.

Article 4.

L'équipage doit être soumis aux règles de la discipline militaire.

L'équipage doit suivre les règles de la discipline militaire.

Article 5.

Article 5.

Tout navire de commerce transformé en bâtiment de guerre est tenu d'observer dans ses opérations, les lois et coutumes de la guerre.

Tout navire de commerce transformé en bâtiment de guerre doit respecter, dans ses opérations, les lois et coutumes de la guerre.

Article 6.

Article 6.

Le belligérant, qui transforme un navire de commerce en bâtiment de guerre, doit, le plus tôt possible, mentionner cette transformation sur la liste des bâtiments de sa flotte militaire.

Le belligérant, qui transforme un navire de commerce en bâtiment de guerre, doit, le plus tôt possible, mentionner cette transformation sur la liste des bâtiments de sa flotte militaire.

Article 7.

Article 7.

Les dispositions de la présente Convention ne sont applicables qu'entre les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligérants sont tous parties à la Convention.

Les dispositions de la présente Convention ne sont applicables qu'entre les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligérants sont tous parties à la Convention.

Article 8.

Article 8.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée aussitôt que possible.

The current Agreement will be ratified as soon as possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal[Pg 614] signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal[Pg 614] signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une notification écrite, adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront par une notification écrite, envoyée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise, par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, et par la voie diplomatique, aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise, par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, et par la voie diplomatique, aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 9.

Article 9.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises à adhérer à la présente Convention.

Les puissances non signataires peuvent rejoindre cette convention.

La Puissance qui désire adhérer notifie par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera déposé dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

La Puissance qui souhaite adhérer informe par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui envoyant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera conservé dans les archives de ce Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances une copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 10.

Article 10.

La présente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au première dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt, et pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La présente Convention prendra effet pour les pays qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt, et pour les pays qui ratifieront plus tard ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que leur ratification ou adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 11.

Article 11.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La dénonciation n'aura d'effets que pour la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 12.

Article 12.

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt de ratifications effectué en vertu de l'article 8 alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle auront été reçues les notifications d'adhésion (article 9 alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 11 alinéa 1).

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt des ratifications effectuées en vertu de l'article 8, alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle les notifications d'adhésion (article 9, alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 11, alinéa 1) auront été reçues.

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise à prendre connaissance de ce registre et à en demander des extraits certifiés conformes.

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise à consulter ce registre et à demander des copies certifiées conformes.

CONVENTION 8. Agreement on the Installation of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines.

Article premier.

Article one.

Il est interdit:

It's prohibited:

1o. de placer des mines automatiques de contact non amarrées, à moins qu'elles ne soient construites de manière à devenir inoffensives une heure au maximum après que celui qui les a placées en aura perdu le contrôle;

1o. To lay unanchored contact mines unless they are designed to become harmless no later than one hour after the person who placed them has lost control.

2o. de placer des mines automatiques de contact amarrées, qui ne deviennent pas inoffensives dès qu'elles auront rompu leurs amarres;

2o. to place anchored contact mines that do not become harmless once they have broken free;

3o. d'employer des torpilles, qui ne deviennent pas inoffensives lorsqu'elles auront manqué leur but.

3o. using torpedoes that don't become harmless when they miss their target.

Article 2.

Article 2.

Il est interdit de placer des mines automatiques de contact devant les côtes et les ports de l'adversaire, dans le seul but d'intercepter la navigation de commerce.

Il est interdit de placer des mines automatiques de contact devant les côtes et les ports de l'adversaire, dans le seul but d'intercepter la navigation de commerce.

Article 3.

Article 3.

Lorsque les mines automatiques de contact amarrées sont employées, toutes les précautions possibles doivent être prises pour la sécurité de la navigation pacifique.

Lorsque les mines automatiques de contact amarrées sont utilisées, toutes les précautions possibles doivent être prises pour sécuriser la navigation pacifique.

Les belligérants s'engagent à pourvoir, dans la mesure du possible, à ce que ces mines deviennent inoffensives après un laps de temps limité, et, dans le cas où elles cesseraient d'être surveillées, à signaler les régions dangereuses, aussitôt que les exigences militaires le permettront, par un avis à la navigation, qui devra être aussi communiqué aux Gouvernements par la voie diplomatique.

Les belligérants s'engagent à faire en sorte, dans la mesure du possible, que ces mines deviennent inoffensives après un délai limité. Si elles ne sont plus surveillées, ils s'engagent à signaler les zones dangereuses dès que les conditions militaires le permettent, par un avis à la navigation, qui doit également être transmis aux gouvernements par voie diplomatique.

Article 4.

Article 4.

Toute Puissance neutre qui place des mines automatiques de contact devant ses côtes, doit observer les mêmes règles et prendre les mêmes précautions que celles qui sont imposées aux belligérants.[Pg 615]

Toute puissance neutre qui place des mines automatiques de contact devant ses côtes doit respecter les mêmes règles et prendre les mêmes précautions que celles qui sont imposées aux belligérants.[Pg 615]

La Puissance neutre doit faire connaître à la navigation, par un avis préalable, les régions où seront mouillées des mines automatiques de contact. Cet avis devra être communiqué d'urgence aux Gouvernements par voie diplomatique.

La Puissance neutre doit informer la navigation, par un avis préalable, des zones où seront ancrées des mines automatiques de contact. Cet avis devra être communiqué d'urgence aux Gouvernements par voie diplomatique.

Article 5.

Article 5.

A la fin de la guerre, les Puissances contractantes s'engagent à faire tout ce qui dépend d'elles pour enlever, chacune de son côté, les mines qu'elles ont placées.

À la fin de la guerre, les puissances signataires s'engagent à faire tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour retirer, chacune de leur côté, les mines qu'elles ont posées.

Quant aux mines automatiques de contact amarrées, que l'un des belligérants aurait posées le long des côtes de l'autre, l'emplacement en sera notifié à l'autre partie par la Puissance qui les a posées et chaque Puissance devra procéder dans le plus bref délai à l'enlèvement des mines qui se trouvent dans ses eaux.

Quant aux mines automatiques de contact amarrées, que l'un des belligérants aurait posées le long des côtes de l'autre, l'emplacement en sera notifié à l'autre partie par la Puissance qui les a posées et chaque Puissance devra procéder dans le plus bref délai à l'enlèvement des mines qui se trouvent dans ses eaux.

Article 6.

Article 6.

Les Puissances contractantes, qui ne disposent pas encore de mines perfectionnées telles qu'elles sont prévues dans la présente Convention, et qui, par conséquent, ne sauraient actuellement se conformer aux règles établies dans les articles 1 et 3, s'engagent à transformer, aussitôt que possible, leur matériel de mines, afin qu'il réponde aux prescriptions susmentionnées.

Les parties contractantes, qui n'ont pas encore de mines perfectionnées comme celles prévues dans cette Convention, et qui, par conséquent, ne peuvent actuellement se conformer aux règles établies dans les articles 1 et 3, s'engagent à modifier, dès que possible, leur matériel de mines pour qu'il soit conforme aux exigences mentionnées ci-dessus.

Article 7.

Article 7.

Les dispositions de la présente Convention ne sont applicables qu'entre les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligérants sont tous parties à la Convention.

Les dispositions de la présente Convention ne s'appliquent qu'entre les Puissances contractantes et seulement si tous les belligérants sont parties à la Convention.

Article 8.

Article 8.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée aussitôt que possible.

The present Agreement will be ratified as soon as possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une notification écrite, adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront par une notification écrite, envoyée au gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise, par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique, aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise, par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique, aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 9.

Article 9.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises à adhérer à la présente Convention.

Les puissances qui ne sont pas signataires peuvent rejoindre cette convention.

La Puissance qui désire adhérer notifie par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera déposé dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

La Puissance qui souhaite adhérer informe par écrit le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas de son intention en envoyant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera déposé dans les archives de ce même Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances une copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 10.

Article 10.

La présente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt, et pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La présente Convention prendra effet pour les pays qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt, et pour les pays qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas aura reçu la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion.

Article 11.

Article 11.

La présente Convention aura une durée de sept ans à partir du soixantième jour après la date du premier dépôt de ratifications.

La présente Convention aura une durée de sept ans à partir du soixantième jour après la date du premier dépôt de ratifications.

Sauf dénonciation, elle continuera d'être en vigueur après l'expiration de ce délai.

Sauf dénonciation, elle continuera d'être en vigueur après l'expiration de ce délai.

La dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les Puissances, en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

La dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les Puissances, en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et six mois après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et six mois après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 12.

Article 12.

Les Puissances contractantes s'engagent à reprendre la question de l'emploi des mines automatiques de contact six mois avant l'expiration du terme prévu par l'alinéa premier de l'article précédent, au cas où elle n'aurait pas été reprise et résolue à une date antérieure par la troisième Conférence de la Paix.[Pg 616]

Les Puissances contractantes s'engagent à revoir la question de l'utilisation des mines automatiques de contact six mois avant la fin de la période prévue par le premier alinéa de l'article précédent, si celle-ci n’a pas été abordée et résolue à une date antérieure par la troisième Conférence de la Paix.[Pg 616]

Si les Puissances contractantes concluent une nouvelle Convention relative à l'emploi des mines, dès son entrée en vigueur, la présente Convention cessera d'être applicable.

Si les Puissances contractantes établissent une nouvelle Convention sur l'utilisation des mines, dès qu'elle entre en vigueur, la présente Convention ne sera plus en vigueur.

Article 13.

Article 13.

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt de ratifications effectué en vertu de l'article 8 alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle auront été reçues les notifications d'adhésion (article 9 alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 11 alinéa 3).

Un registre maintenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date de dépôt des ratifications effectuées conformément à l'article 8 alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle les notifications d'adhésion (article 9 alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 11 alinéa 3) auront été reçues.

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise à prendre connaissance de ce registre et à en demander des extraits certifiés conformes.

Chaque Puissance contractante a le droit de consulter ce registre et de demander des copies certifiées conformes.

CONVENTION 9. Convention on Bombardment by Naval Forces During War.

Chapitre Ier.—Du bombardement des ports, villes, villages, habitations ou bâtiments non défendus.

Chapter 11.—On the bombing of ports, cities, villages, homes, or undefended buildings.

Article premier.

First article.

Il est interdit de bombarder, par des forces navales, des ports, villes, villages, habitations ou bâtiments, qui ne sont pas défendus.

Il est interdit de bombarder, par des forces navales, des ports, villes, villages, habitations ou bâtiments, qui ne sont pas défendus.

Une localité ne peut pas être bombardée à raison du seul fait que, devant son port, se trouvent mouillées des mines sous-marines automatiques de contact.

Une localité ne peut pas être bombardée à raison du seul fait que, devant son port, se trouvent mouillées des mines sous-marines automatiques de contact.

Article 2.

Article 2.

Toutefois, ne sont pas compris dans cette interdiction les ouvrages militaires, établissements militaires ou navals, dépôts d'armes ou de matériel de guerre, ateliers et installations propres à être utilisés pour les besoins de la flotte ou de l'armée ennemie, et les navires de guerre se trouvant dans le port. Le commandant d'une force navale pourra, après sommation avec délai raisonnable, les détruire par le canon, si tout autre moyen est impossible et lorsque les autorités locales n'auront pas procédé à cette destruction dans le délai fixé.

Toutefois, les ouvrages militaires, les établissements militaires ou navals, les dépôts d'armes ou de matériel de guerre, ainsi que les ateliers et installations destinés aux besoins de la flotte ou de l'armée ennemie, et les navires de guerre présents dans le port ne sont pas inclus dans cette interdiction. Le commandant d'une force navale peut, après avoir donné un préavis raisonnable, les détruire par canon si aucun autre moyen n'est possible et si les autorités locales n'ont pas effectué cette destruction dans le délai imparti.

Il n'encourt aucune responsabilité dans ce cas pour les dommages involontaires, qui pourraient être occasionnés par le bombardement.

Il n'est pas responsable dans ce cas des dommages accidentels qui pourraient être causés par le bombardement.

Si des nécessités militaires, exigeant une action immédiate, ne permettaient pas d'accorder de délai, il reste entendu que l'interdiction de bombarder la ville non défendue subsiste comme dans le cas énoncé dans l'alinéa 1er et que le commandant prendra toutes les dispositions voulues pour qu'il en résulte pour cette ville le moins d'inconvénients possible.

Si des nécessités militaires exigeant une action immédiate ne permettent pas d'accorder de délai, il est entendu que l'interdiction de bombarder la ville non défendue reste comme dans le cas énoncé dans l'alinéa 1er, et que le commandant prendra toutes les mesures nécessaires pour minimiser les désagréments pour cette ville.

Article 3.

Article 3.

Il peut, après notification expresse, être procédé au bombardement des ports, villes, villages, habitations ou bâtiments non défendus, si les autorités locales, mises en demeure par une sommation formelle, refusent d'obtempérer à des réquisitions de vivres ou d'approvisionnements nécessaires au besoin présent de la force navale qui se trouve devant la localité.

Il peut, après notification claire, être procédé au bombardement des ports, villes, villages, habitations ou bâtiments non défendus, si les autorités locales, mises en demeure par une demande formelle, refusent de répondre à des réquisitions de nourriture ou d'approvisionnements nécessaires au besoin immédiat de la force navale qui se trouve devant la localité.

Ces réquisitions seront en rapport avec les ressources de la localité. Elles ne seront réclamées qu'avec l'autorisation du commandant de ladite force navale et elles seront, autant que possible, payées au comptant; sinon elles seront constatées par des reçus.

These requisitions will be in line with the resources of the local area. They will only be requested with the permission of the commander of the naval force in question and will be paid for in cash whenever possible; if not, they will be documented with receipts.

Article 4.

Article 4.

Est interdit le bombardement, pour le non paiement des contributions en argent, des ports, villes, villages, habitations ou bâtiments, non défendus.

Est interdit le bombardement, pour le non paiement des contributions en argent, des ports, villes, villages, habitations ou bâtiments, non défendus.

Chapitre II.Dispositions générales.

Chapter II.General Provisions.

Article 5.

Article 5.

Dans le bombardement par des forces navales, toutes les mesures nécessaires doivent être prises par le commandant pour épargner, autant que possible, les édifices consacrés aux cultes, aux arts, aux sciences et à la bienfaisance, les monuments historiques, les hôpitaux et les lieux de rassemblement de malades ou de blessés, à condition qu'ils ne soient pas employés en même temps à un but militaire.

Dans le bombardement par des forces navales, toutes les mesures nécessaires doivent être prises par le commandant pour épargner, autant que possible, les bâtiments destinés aux cultes, aux arts, aux sciences et à la charité, les monuments historiques, les hôpitaux et les lieux de rassemblement de malades ou de blessés, à condition qu'ils ne soient pas utilisés en même temps à des fins militaires.

Le devoir des habitants est de désigner ces monuments, ces édifices ou lieux de rassemblement, par des signes visibles, qui consisteront en grands panneaux rectangulaires rigides, partagés, suivant une des diagonales, en deux triangles de couleur, noire en haut et blanche en bas.

Le devoir des habitants est de désigner ces monuments, ces édifices ou lieux de rassemblement, par des signes visibles, qui consisteront en grands panneaux rectangulaires rigides, partagés, suivant une des diagonales, en deux triangles de couleur, noire en haut et blanche en bas.

Article 6.

Article 6.

Sauf le cas où les exigences militaires ne le permettraient pas, le commandant de la force navale assaillante doit, avant d'entreprendre le bombardement, faire tout ce qui dépend de lui pour avertir les autorités.

Sauf le cas où les exigences militaires ne le permettraient pas, le commandant de la force navale assaillante doit, avant d'entreprendre le bombardement, faire tout ce qui dépend de lui pour avertir les autorités.

Article 7.

Article 7.

Il est interdit de livrer au pillage une ville ou localité même prise d'assaut.[Pg 617]

Il est interdit de piller une ville ou un endroit, même s'il a été pris d'assaut.[Pg 617]

Chapitre III.Dispositions finales.

Chapter III.Final Provisions.

Article 8.

Article 8.

Les dispositions de la présente Convention ne sont applicables qu'entre les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligérants sont tous parties à la Convention.

Les dispositions de la présente Convention ne s'appliquent qu'entre les Puissances contractantes et seulement si tous les belligérants sont parties à la Convention.

Article 9.

Article 9.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée aussitôt que possible.

The present agreement will be ratified as soon as possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

The ratifications will be submitted in The Hague.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y participent et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une notification écrite, adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront par une notification écrite, envoyée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications, mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise, par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique, aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relativement au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées dans le paragraphe précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratification, seront immédiatement remises, par le biais du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par voie diplomatique, aux puissances invitées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas mentionnés dans le paragraphe précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera savoir en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 10.

Article 10.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises à adhérer à la présente Convention.

Les puissances non signataires peuvent rejoindre cette convention.

La Puissance qui désire adhérer notifie par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera déposé dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

La Puissance qui souhaite adhérer informe par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui envoyant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera conservé dans les archives de ce Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances une copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 11.

Article 11.

La présente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La présente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 12.

Article 12.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances Contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

If one of the Contracting Powers wants to withdraw from this Agreement, the withdrawal must be notified in writing to the Government of the Netherlands, which will immediately send a certified copy of the notification to all the other Powers, informing them of the date it was received.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 13.

Article 13.

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt de ratifications effectué en vertu de l'article 9 alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle auront été reçues les notifications d'adhésion (article 10 alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 12 alinéa 1).

Un registre maintenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date à laquelle les ratifications ont été déposées en vertu de l'article 9, alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle les notifications d'adhésion (article 10, alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 12, alinéa 1) auront été reçues.

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise à prendre connaissance de ce registre et à en demander des extraits certifiés conformes.

Chaque puissance contractante est autorisée à consulter ce registre et à demander des copies certifiées conformes.

CONVENTION X. Convention for Adapting the Principles of the Geneva Convention to Maritime Warfare.

Article premier.

First article.

Les bâtiments-hôpitaux militaires, c'est-à-dire les bâtiments construits ou aménagés par les États spécialement et uniquement en vue de porter secours aux blessés, malades et naufragés, et dont les noms auront été communiqués, à l'ouverture ou au cours des hostilités, en tout cas avant toute mise en usage, aux Puissances belligérantes, sont respectés et ne peuvent être capturés pendant la durée des hostilités.

Les hôpitaux militaires, c'est-à-dire les bâtiments construits ou rénovés par les États spécialement et uniquement pour aider les blessés, malades et naufragés, et dont les noms auront été transmis, à l'ouverture ou pendant les conflits, en tout cas avant leur utilisation, aux puissances en guerre, doivent être respectés et ne peuvent pas être pris pendant la durée des hostilités.

Ces bâtiments ne sont pas non plus assimilés aux navires de guerre au point de vue de leur séjour dans un port neutre.

Ces bâtiments ne sont pas non plus assimilés aux navires de guerre en ce qui concerne leur séjour dans un port neutre.

Article 2.

Article 2.

Les bâtiments hospitaliers, équipés en totalité ou en partie aux frais des particuliers ou des sociétés de secours officiellement reconnues, sont également respectés et exempts de capture, si la Puissance belligérante dont ils dépendent, leur a donné une commission officielle et en a notifié les noms à la Puissance adverse à l'ouverture ou[Pg 618] au cours des hostilités, en tout cas avant toute mise en usage.

Les hôpitaux, que ce soit en partie ou en entier financés par des particuliers ou des organismes de secours reconnus, sont aussi protégés et ne peuvent pas être pris, à condition que la puissance belligérante à laquelle ils appartiennent leur ait donné une autorisation officielle et ait informé la puissance adverse de leurs noms au début ou pendant les hostilités, en tout cas avant qu'ils ne soient utilisés.

Ces navires doivent être porteurs d'un document de l'autorité compétente déclarant qu'ils ont été soumis à son contrôle pendant leur armement et à leur départ final.

Ces navires doivent avoir un document de l'autorité compétente indiquant qu'ils ont été soumis à son contrôle pendant leur préparation et à leur départ final.

Article 3.

Article 3.

Les bâtiments hospitaliers, équipés en totalité ou en partie aux frais des particuliers ou des sociétés officiellement reconnues de pays neutres, sont respectés et exempts de capture, à condition qu'ils se soient mis sous la direction de l'un des belligérants, avec l'assentiment préalable de leur propre Gouvernement et avec l'autorisation du belligérant lui-même et que ce dernier en ait notifié le nom à son adversaire dès l'ouverture ou dans le cours des hostilités, en tout cas, avant tout emploi.

Les bâtiments hospitaliers, entièrement ou partiellement financés par des particuliers ou des organisations officiellement reconnues de pays neutres, sont protégés et ne peuvent pas être saisis, à condition qu'ils soient sous la supervision d'un des belligérants, avec le consentement préalable de leur propre gouvernement et avec l'autorisation du belligérant lui-même. Ce dernier doit également notifier le nom aux adversaires dès le début ou pendant les hostilités, en tout cas avant toute utilisation.

Article 4.

Article 4.

Les bâtiments qui sont mentionnés dans les articles 1, 2 et 3, porteront secours et assistance aux blessés, malades et naufragés des belligérants sans distinction de nationalité.

Les bâtiments mentionnés dans les articles 1, 2, et 3 fourniront secours et assistance aux blessés, malades et naufragés des belligérants, sans distinction de nationalité.

Les Gouvernements s'engagent à n'utiliser ces bâtiments pour aucun but militaire.

Les gouvernements s'engagent à ne pas utiliser ces bâtiments à des fins militaires.

Ces bâtiments ne devront gêner en aucune manière les mouvements des combattants.

Ces bâtiments ne doivent en aucun cas gêner les déplacements des combattants.

Pendant et après le combat, ils agiront à leurs risques et périls.

Pendant et après le combat, ils agiront à leurs propres risques.

Les belligérants auront sur eux le droit de contrôle et de visite; ils pourront refuser leur concours, leur enjoindre de s'éloigner, leur imposer une direction déterminée et mettre à bord un commissaire, même les détenir, si la gravité des circonstances l'exigeait.

Les belligérants auront le droit de contrôle et de visite sur eux ; ils pourront refuser leur aide, leur demander de s'éloigner, leur imposer un itinéraire précis et embarquer un commissaire, et même les détenir si la situation l'exigeait.

Autant que possible, les belligérants inscriront sur le journal de bord des bâtiments hospitaliers les ordres qu'ils leur donneront.

Autant que possible, les belligérants inscrire sur le journal de bord des bâtiments hospitaliers les ordres qu'ils leur donneront.

Article 5.

Article 5.

Les bâtiments-hôpitaux militaires seront distingués par une peinture extérieure blanche avec une bande horizontale verte d'un mètre et demi de largeur environ.

Les hôpitaux militaires seront reconnaissables par une peinture extérieure blanche avec une bande horizontale verte d'environ un mètre et demi de large.

Les bâtiments qui sont mentionnés dans les articles 2 et 3, seront distingués par une peinture extérieure blanche avec une bande horizontale rouge d'un mètre et demi de largeur environ.

Les bâtiments mentionnés dans les articles 2 et 3 seront peints en blanc à l'extérieur, avec une bande horizontale rouge d'environ un mètre et demi de large.

Les embarcations des bâtiments qui viennent d'être mentionnés, comme les petits bâtiments qui pourront être affectés au service hospitalier, se distingueront par une peinture analogue.

Les embarcations des navires mentionnés récemment, ainsi que les petits bateaux qui pourront être utilisés pour le service hospitalier, seront reconnaissables grâce à une peinture similaire.

Tous les bâtiments hospitaliers se feront reconnaître en hissant, avec leur pavillon national, le pavillon blanc à croix-rouge prévu par la Convention de Genève et, en outre, s'ils ressortissent à un État neutre, en arborant au grand mât le pavillon national du belligérant sous la direction duquel ils se sont placés.

Tous les bâtiments hospitaliers se feront reconnaître en hissant, avec leur pavillon national, le pavillon blanc à croix-rouge prévu par la Convention de Genève et, en outre, s'ils ressortissent à un État neutre, en arborant au grand mât le pavillon national du belligérant sous la direction duquel ils se sont placés.

Les bâtiments hospitaliers qui, dans les termes de l'article 4, sont détenus par l'ennemi, auront à rentrer le pavillon national du belligérant dont ils relèvent.

Les bâtiments hospitaliers qui, selon l'article 4, sont détenus par l'ennemi, devront afficher le pavillon national du belligérant auquel ils appartiennent.

Les bâtiments et embarcations ci-dessus mentionnés, qui veulent s'assurer la nuit le respect auquel ils ont droit, ont, avec l'assentiment du belligérant qu'ils accompagnent, à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour que la peinture qui les caractérise soit suffisamment apparente.

Les bâtiments et embarcations mentionnés ci-dessus, qui veulent s'assurer pendant la nuit du respect qu'ils méritent, doivent, avec l'accord du belligérant qu'ils accompagnent, prendre les mesures nécessaires pour que leur peinture distinctive soit suffisamment visible.

Article 6.

Article 6.

Les signes distinctifs prévus à article 5 ne pourront être employés, soit en temps de paix, soit en temps de guerre, que pour protéger ou désigner les bâtiments qui y sont mentionnés.

Les signes distinctifs prévus à l'article 5 ne pourront être utilisés, que ce soit en temps de paix ou en temps de guerre, uniquement pour protéger ou désigner les bâtiments mentionnés.

Article 7.

Article 7.

Dans le cas d'un combat à bord d'un vaisseau de guerre, les infirmeries seront respectées et ménagées autant que faire se pourra.

Dans le cas d'un combat à bord d'un vaisseau de guerre, les infirmeries seront respectées et préservées autant que possible.

Ces infirmeries et leur matériel demeurent soumis aux lois de la guerre, mais ne pourront être détournés de leur emploi, tant qu'ils seront nécessaires aux blessés et malades.

Ces infirmeries et leur matériel sont toujours soumis aux lois de la guerre, mais ne peuvent pas être détournés de leur utilisation tant qu'ils sont nécessaires aux blessés et aux malades.

Toutefois le commandant, qui les a en son pouvoir, a la faculté d'en disposer, en cas de nécessité militaire importante, en assurant au préalable le sort des blessés et malades qui s'y trouvent.

Toutefois, le commandant, qui les a en son pouvoir, a la possibilité de les utiliser en cas de nécessité militaire importante, en s'assurant au préalable du sort des blessés et malades qui s'y trouvent.

Article 8.

Article 8.

La protection due aux bâtiments hospitaliers et aux infirmeries des vaisseaux cesse si l'on en use pour commettre des actes nuisibles à l'ennemi.

La protection accordée aux hôpitaux et aux infirmeries des navires cesse si on les utilise pour commettre des actes nuisibles à l'ennemi.

N'est pas considéré comme étant de nature à justifier le retrait de la protection le fait que le personnel de ces bâtiments et infirmeries est armé pour le maintien de l'ordre et pour la défense des blessés ou malades, ainsi que le fait de la présence à bord d'une installation radio-télégraphique.

N'est pas considéré comme étant de nature à justifier le retrait de la protection le fait que le personnel de ces bâtiments et infirmeries est armé pour le maintien de l'ordre et pour la défense des blessés ou malades, ainsi que le fait de la présence à bord d'une installation radio-télégraphique.

Article 9.

Article 9.

Les belligérants pourront faire appel au zèle charitable des commandants de bâtiments de commerce, yachts ou embarcations neutres, pour prendre à bord et soigner des blessés ou des malades.

Les belligérants pourront faire appel au zèle charitable des commandants de navires marchands, yachts ou embarcations neutres, pour prendre à bord et soigner des blessés ou des malades.

Les bâtiments qui auront répondu à[Pg 619] cet appel ainsi que ceux qui spontanément auront recueilli des blessés, des malades ou des naufragés, jouiront d'une protection spéciale et de certaines immunités. En aucun cas, ils ne pourront être capturés pour le fait d'un tel transport; mais, sauf les promesses qui leur auraient été faites, ils restent exposés à la capture pour les violations de neutralité qu'ils pourraient avoir commises.

Les bâtiments qui répondront à[Pg 619] cet appel ainsi que ceux qui, de leur propre initiative, accueilleront des blessés, des malades ou des naufragés bénéficieront d'une protection spéciale et de certaines immunités. En aucun cas, ils ne pourront être capturés pour ce type de transport; cependant, sauf pour les promesses qui leur auraient été faites, ils restent vulnérables à la capture en cas de violations de neutralité qu'ils pourraient avoir commises.

Article 10.

Article 10.

Le personnel religieux, médical et hospitalier de tout bâtiment capturé est inviolable et ne peut être fait prisonnier de guerre. Il emporte, en quittant le navire, les objets et les instruments de chirurgie qui sont sa propriété particulière.

Le personnel religieux, médical et hospitalier de tout bâtiment capturé est inviolable et ne peut être fait prisonnier de guerre. Il emporte, en quittant le navire, les objets et les instruments de chirurgie qui sont sa propriété particulière.

Ce personnel continuera à remplir ses fonctions tant que cela sera nécessaire et il pourra ensuite se retirer, lorsque le commandant en chef le jugera possible.

Ce personnel continuera à remplir ses fonctions tant que cela sera nécessaire et il pourra ensuite se retirer, lorsque le commandant en chef le jugera possible.

Les belligérants doivent assurer à ce personnel tombé entre leurs mains, les mêmes allocations et la même solde qu'au personnel des mêmes grades de leur propre marine.

Les belligérants doivent garantir à ce personnel capturé les mêmes compensations et le même salaire que ceux des membres des mêmes grades de leur propre marine.

Article 11.

Article 11.

Les marins et les militaires embarqués, et les autres personnes officiellement attachées aux marines ou aux armées, blessés ou malades, à quelque nation qu'ils appartiennent, seront respectés et soignés par les capteurs.

Les marins et les militaires à bord, ainsi que les autres personnes officiellement rattachées aux marines ou aux armées, blessés ou malades, peu importe leur nationalité, seront respectés et soignés par les capteurs.

Article 12.

Article 12.

Tout vaisseau de guerre d'une partie belligérante peut réclamer la remise des blessés, malades ou naufragés, qui sont à bord de bâtiments-hôpitaux militaires, de bâtiments hospitaliers de société de secours ou de particuliers, de navires de commerce, yachts et embarcations, quelle que soit la nationalité de ces bâtiments.

Tout vaisseau de guerre d'une partie belligérante peut réclamer la remise des blessés, malades ou naufragés, qui sont à bord de bâtiments-hôpitaux militaires, de bâtiments hospitaliers de société de secours ou de particuliers, de navires de commerce, yachts et embarcations, quelle que soit la nationalité de ces bâtiments.

Article 13.

Article 13.

Si des blessés, malades ou naufragés sont recueillis à bord d'un vaisseau de guerre neutre, il devra être pourvu, dans la mesure du possible, à ce qu'ils ne puissent pas de nouveau prendre part aux opérations de la guerre.

Si des blessés, malades ou naufragés sont recueillis à bord d'un vaisseau de guerre neutre, il devra être pourvu, dans la mesure du possible, à ce qu'ils ne puissent pas de nouveau prendre part aux opérations de la guerre.

Article 14.

Article 14.

Sont prisonniers de guerre les naufragés, blessés ou malades d'un belligérant, qui tombent au pouvoir de l'autre. Il appartient à celui-ci de décider, suivant les circonstances, s'il convient de les garder, de les diriger sur un port de sa nation, sur un port neutre ou même sur un port de l'adversaire. Dans ce dernier cas, les prisonniers ainsi rendus à leur pays ne pourront servir pendant la durée de la guerre.

Sailors shipwrecked in battle, injured or ill, who fall into the hands of the opposing side are considered prisoners of war. It is up to the captors to decide, based on the circumstances, whether to keep them, send them to a port in their own nation, a neutral port, or even a port of the enemy. In the latter case, the prisoners returned to their country cannot serve during the war.

Article 15.

Article 15.

Les naufragés, blessés ou malades, qui sont débarqués dans un port neutre, du consentement de l'autorité locale, devront, à moins d'un arrangement contraire de l'État neutre avec les États belligérants, être gardés par l'État neutre de manière qu'ils ne puissent pas de nouveau prendre part aux opérations de la guerre.

Les naufragés, blessés ou malades, qui sont arrivés dans un port neutre avec l'accord des autorités locales, devront, sauf si un accord différent est établi entre l'État neutre et les pays en guerre, être gardés par l'État neutre de manière à ce qu'ils ne puissent pas reprendre part aux opérations de la guerre.

Les frais d'hospitalisation et d'internement seront supportés par l'État dont relèvent les naufragés, blessés ou malades.

Les frais d'hospitalisation et d'internement seront couverts par l'État dont dépendent les naufragés, blessés ou malades.

Article 16.

Article 16.

Après chaque combat, les deux Parties belligérantes, en tant que les intérêts militaires le comportent, prendront des mesures pour rechercher les naufragés, les blessés et les malades et pour les faire protéger, ainsi que les morts, contre le pillage et les mauvais traitements.

Après chaque combat, les deux parties en conflit, selon leurs intérêts militaires, prendront des mesures pour rechercher les naufragés, les blessés et les malades, et pour les protéger, ainsi que les morts, contre le pillage et les mauvais traitements.

Elles veilleront à ce que l'inhumation, l'immersion ou l'incinération des morts soit précédée d'un examen attentif de leurs cadavres.

Elles s'assureront que l'inhumation, l'immersion ou l'incinération des morts soit précédée d'un examen attentif de leurs cadavres.

Article 17.

Article 17.

Chaque belligérant enverra, dès qu'il sera possible, aux autorités de leur pays, de leur marine ou de leur armée, les marques ou pièces militaires d'identité trouvées sur les morts et l'état nominatif des blessés ou malades recueillis par lui.

Chaque belligérant enverra, dès qu'il sera possible, aux autorités de leur pays, de leur marine ou de leur armée, les marques ou pièces militaires d'identité trouvées sur les morts et l'état nominatif des blessés ou malades recueillis par lui.

Les belligérants se tiendront réciproquement au courant des internements et des mutations, ainsi que des entrées dans les hôpitaux et des décès survenus parmi les blessés et malades en leur pouvoir. Ils recueilleront tous les objets d'un usage personnel, valeurs, lettres, etc. qui seront trouvés dans les vaisseaux capturés, ou délaissés par les blessés ou malades décédés dans les hôpitaux, pour les faire transmettre aux intéressés par les autorités de leur pays.

Les belligérants tiendront chacun informé des internements et des transferts, ainsi que des admissions dans les hôpitaux et des décès survenus parmi les blessés et malades sous leur garde. Ils recueilleront tous les objets personnels, les valeurs, les lettres, etc. qui seront trouvés dans les navires capturés, ou laissés par les blessés ou malades décédés dans les hôpitaux, afin de les faire transmettre aux personnes concernées par les autorités de leur pays.

Article 18.

Article 18.

Les dispositions de la présente Convention ne sont applicables qu'entre les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligérants sont tous parties à la Convention.

Les dispositions de la présente Convention ne s'appliquent qu'entre les Puissances contractantes et uniquement si tous les belligérants sont partis à la Convention.

Article 19.

Article 19.

Les commandants en chef des flottes des belligérants auront à pourvoir aux détails d'exécution des articles précédents, ainsi qu'aux cas non prévus, d'après les instructions de leurs Gouvernements[Pg 620] respectifs et conformément aux principes généraux de la présente Convention.

Les chefs des flottes des pays en guerre devront s'occuper des détails d'application des articles précédents, ainsi que des cas non prévus, en suivant les instructions de leurs gouvernements respectifs et selon les principes généraux de cette Convention.[Pg 620]

Article 20.

Article 20.

Les Puissances signataires prendront les mesures nécessaires pour instruire leurs marines, et spécialement le personnel protégé, des dispositions de la présente Convention et pour les porter à la connaissance des populations.

Les puissances signataires prendront les mesures nécessaires pour informer leurs marines, et en particulier le personnel protégé, des dispositions de la présente convention et pour les communiquer aux populations.

Article 21.

Article 21.

Les Puissances signataires s'engagent également à prendre ou à proposer à leurs législatures, en cas d'insuffisance de leurs lois pénales, les mesures nécessaires pour réprimer en temps de guerre, les actes individuels de pillage et de mauvais traitements envers des blessés et malades des marines, ainsi que pour punir, comme usurpation d'insignes militaires, l'usage abusif des signes distinctifs désignés à l'article 5 par des bâtiments non protégés par la présente Convention.

Les puissances signataires s'engagent également à prendre ou à proposer à leurs législatures, en cas d'insuffisance de leurs lois pénales, les mesures nécessaires pour réprimer en temps de guerre, les actes individuels de pillage et de mauvais traitements envers des blessés et malades des marines, ainsi que pour punir, comme usurpation d'insignes militaires, l'usage abusif des signes distinctifs désignés à l'article 5 par des bâtiments non protégés par la présente Convention.

Ils se communiqueront, par l'intermédiaire du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, les dispositions relatives à cette répression, au plus tard dans les cinq ans de la ratification de la présente convention.

Ils se communiqueront, par l'intermédiaire du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, les dispositions relatives à cette répression, au plus tard dans les cinq ans de la ratification de la présente convention.

Article 22.

Article 22.

En cas d'opérations de guerre entre les forces de terre et de mer des belligérants, les dispositions de la présente Convention ne seront applicables qu'aux forces embarquées.

En cas de combats entre les forces terrestres et navales des parties en conflit, les règles de cette Convention ne s'appliqueront qu'aux forces en mer.

Article 23.

Article 23.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée aussitôt que possible.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée dès que possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une notification écrite, adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront par une notification écrite, envoyée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 24.

Article 24.

Les Puissances non signataires qui auront accepté la Convention de Genève du 6 juillet 1906, sont admises à adhérer à la présente Convention.

Les puissances qui n'ont pas signé mais qui auront accepté la Convention de Genève du 6 juillet 1906, sont autorisées à rejoindre la présente Convention.

La Puissance qui désire adhérer, notifie par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera déposé dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

La Puissance qui souhaite adhérer, notifie par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera déposé dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances une copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 25.

Article 25.

La présente Convention, dûment ratifiée, remplacera dans les rapports entre les Puissances contractantes, la Convention du 29 juillet 1899 pour l'adaptation à la guerre maritime des principes de la Convention de Genève.

La présente Convention, dûment ratifiée, remplacera dans les rapports entre les Puissances contractantes, la Convention du 29 juillet 1899 pour l'adaptation à la guerre maritime des principes de la Convention de Genève.

La Convention de 1899 reste en vigueur dans les rapports entre les Puissances qui l'ont signée et qui ne ratifieraient pas également la présente Convention.

La Convention de 1899 est toujours en vigueur dans les relations entre les puissances qui l'ont signée et qui ne ratifient pas également la présente Convention.

Article 26.

Article 26.

La présente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt, et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La présente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt, et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 27.

Article 27.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 28.

Article 28.

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt des ratifications[Pg 621] effectué en vertu de l'article 23 alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle auront été reçues les notifications d'adhésion (article 24 alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 27 alinéa 1).

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt des ratifications[Pg 621] effectué en vertu de l'article 23 alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle auront été reçues les notifications d'adhésion (article 24 alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 27 alinéa 1).

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise à prendre connaissance de ce registre et à en demander des extraits certifiés conformes.

Chaque puissance contractante a le droit de consulter ce registre et de demander des extraits certifiés conformes.

Convention 11. Agreement on Specific Limitations Regarding the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Maritime Warfare.

Chapitre I.De la Correspondance postale.

Chapter I.On Postal Correspondence.

Article premier.

First article.

La correspondance postale des neutres ou des belligérants, quel que soit son caractère officiel ou privé, trouvée en mer sur un navire neutre ou ennemi, est inviolable. S'il y a saisie du navire, elle est expédiée avec le moins de retard possible par le capteur.

The postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, whether official or private, found at sea on a neutral or enemy ship, is inviolable. If the ship is seized, it must be sent without unnecessary delay by the capturing party.

Les dispositions de l'alinéa précédent ne s'appliquent pas, en cas de violation de blocus, à la correspondance qui est à destination ou en provenance du port bloqué.

Les dispositions du paragraphe précédent ne s'appliquent pas, en cas de violation de blocus, aux communications qui sont à destination ou en provenance du port bloqué.

Article 2.

Article 2.

L'inviolabilité de la correspondance postale ne soustrait pas les paquebots-poste neutres aux lois et coutumes de la guerre sur mer concernant les navires de commerce neutres en général. Toutefois, la visite n'en doit être effectuée qu'en cas de nécessité, avec tous les ménagements et toute la célérité possibles.

L'inviolabilité de la correspondance postale ne soustrait pas les paquebots-poste neutres aux lois et coutumes de la guerre sur mer concernant les navires de commerce neutres en général. Toutefois, la visite ne doit être effectuée qu'en cas de nécessité, avec tous les ménagements et toute la célérité possibles.

Chapitre II.De l'exemption de capture pour certains bateaux.

Chapter 2.On the exemption from capture for certain boats.

Article 3.

Article 3.

Les bateaux exclusivement affectés à la pêche côtière ou à des services de petite navigation locale sont exempts de capture, ainsi que leurs engins, agrès, apparaux et chargement.

Les bateaux utilisés uniquement pour la pêche côtière ou pour des services de petite navigation locale sont exemptés de capture, de même que leurs équipements, instruments, matériels et chargement.

Cette exemption cesse de leur être applicable dès qu'ils participent d'une façon quelconque aux hostilités.

Cette exemption n'est plus valable pour eux dès qu'ils participent d'une manière ou d'une autre aux combats.

Les Puissances contractantes s'interdisent de profiter du caractère inoffensif desdits bateaux pour les employer dans un but militaire en leur conservant leur apparence pacifique.

Les puissances signataires s'interdisent de tirer parti du fait que ces bateaux sont inoffensifs pour les utiliser à des fins militaires tout en gardant une apparence pacifique.

Article 4.

Article 4.

Sont également exempts de capture les navires chargés de missions religieuses, scientifiques ou philanthropiques.

Sont également exemptes de capture les navires chargés de missions religieuses, scientifiques ou philanthropiques.

Chapitre III.Du régime des équipages des navires de commerce ennemis capturés par un belligérant.

Chapter 3.On the Management of Crews of Enemy Merchant Ships Captured by a Belligerent.

Article 5.

Article 5.

Lorsqu'un navire de commerce ennemi est capturé par un belligérant, les hommes de son équipage, nationaux d'un État neutre, ne sont pas faits prisonniers de guerre.

Lorsqu'un navire de commerce ennemi est capturé par un belligérant, les membres de son équipage, citoyens d'un État neutre, ne sont pas considérés comme des prisonniers de guerre.

Il en est de même du capitaine et des officiers, également nationaux d'un État neutre, s'ils promettent formellement par écrit de ne pas servir sur un navire ennemi pendant la durée de la guerre.

Il en est de même du capitaine et des officiers, également nationaux d'un État neutre, s'ils promettent formellement par écrit de ne pas servir sur un navire ennemi pendant la durée de la guerre.

Article 6.

Article 6.

Le capitaine, les officiers et les membres de l'équipage, nationaux de l'État ennemi, ne sont pas faits prisonniers de guerre, à condition qu'ils s'engagent, sous la foi d'une promesse formelle écrite, à ne prendre, pendant la durée des hostilités, aucun service ayant rapport avec les opérations de la guerre.

Le capitaine, les officiers et les membres de l'équipage, qui sont citoyens de l'État ennemi, ne seront pas considérés comme des prisonniers de guerre, à condition qu'ils s'engagent, avec une promesse écrite formelle, à ne pas accepter de service lié aux opérations de guerre pendant toute la durée des hostilités.

Article 7.

Article 7.

Les noms des individus laissés libres dans les conditions visées à l'article 5 alinéa 2 et à l'article 6, sont notifiés par le belligérant capteur à l'autre belligérant. Il est interdit à ce dernier d'employer sciemment lesdits individus.

Les noms des individus laissés libres dans les conditions décrites à l'article 5 alinéa 2 et à l'article 6, sont notifiés par le belligérant qui a capturé à l'autre belligérant. Il est interdit à ce dernier d'utiliser sciemment ces individus.

Article 8.

Article 8.

Les dispositions des trois articles précédents ne s'appliquent pas aux navires qui prennent part aux hostilités.

Les dispositions des trois articles précédents ne s'appliquent pas aux navires qui participent aux hostilités.

Chapitre IV.Dispositions finales.

Chapter IV.Final Provisions.

Article 9.

Article 9.

Les dispositions de la présente Convention ne sont applicables qu'entre les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligérants sont tous Parties à la Convention.

Les règles de cette Convention s'appliquent uniquement entre les puissances signataires et seulement si tous les belligérants sont parties à la Convention.

Article 10.

Article 10.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée aussitôt que possible.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée dès que possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.[Pg 622]

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y participent et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.[Pg 622]

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une notification écrite adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront par une notification écrite envoyée au gouvernement des Pays-Bas, accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 11.

Article 11.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises à adhérer à la présente Convention.

Les pays qui n'ont pas signé peuvent rejoindre cette Convention.

La Puissance qui désire adhérer notifie par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera déposé dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

La Puissance qui veut adhérer informe par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui envoyant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera déposé dans les archives de ce Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances une copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 12.

Article 12.

La présente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La présente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 13.

Article 13.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La dénonciation n’aura d'effets que pour la puissance qui l’aura notifiée, et ce un an après que la notification aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 14.

Article 14.

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt des ratifications effectué en vertu de l'article 10 alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle auront été reçues les notifications d'adhésion (article 11 alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 13 alinéa 1).

Un registre maintenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date de dépôt des ratifications effectuées conformément à l'article 10, alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle les notifications d'adhésion (article 11, alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 13, alinéa 1) auront été reçues.

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise à prendre connaissance de ce registre et à en demander des extraits certifiés conformes.

Chaque Puissance contractante peut consulter ce registre et demander des copies certifiées conformes.

CONVENTION 12. Convention on the Creation of an International Prize Court.

Titre I.Dispositions générales.

Title I.General Provisions.

Article premier.

First article.

La validité de la capture d'un navire de commerce ou de sa cargaison est, s'il s'agit de propriétés neutres ou ennemies, établie devant une juridiction des prises conformément à la présente Convention.

La validité de la saisie d'un navire de commerce ou de sa cargaison est, s'il s'agit de biens neutres ou ennemis, établie devant une juridiction des prises selon la présente Convention.

Article 2.

Article 2.

La juridiction des prises est exercée d'abord par les tribunaux de prises du belligérant capteur.

La juridiction des prises est exercée d'abord par les tribunaux de prises du belligérant capteur.

Les décisions de ces tribunaux sont prononcées en séance publique ou notifiées d'office aux parties neutres ou ennemies.

Les décisions de ces tribunaux sont prononcées en public ou communiquées automatiquement aux parties neutres ou adverses.

Article 3.

Article 3.

Les décisions des tribunaux de prises nationaux peuvent être l'objet d'un recours devant la Cour internationale des prises:

Les décisions des tribunaux de prises nationaux peuvent faire l'objet d'un recours devant la Cour internationale des prises :

1o. lorsque la décision des tribunaux nationaux concerne les propriétés d'une Puissance ou d'un particulier neutres;

1o. when the decision of national courts concerns the properties of a neutral Power or an individual;

2o. lorsque ladite décision concerne des propriétés ennemies et qu'il s'agit:

2o. when the said decision concerns enemy properties and it involves:

(a) de marchandises chargées sur un navire neutre,

(a) of goods loaded onto a neutral ship,

(b) d'un navire ennemi, qui aurait été capturé dans les eaux territoriales d'une Puissance neutre, dans le cas où cette Puissance n'aurait pas fait de cette capture l'objet d'une réclamation diplomatique,

(b) of an enemy ship that would have been captured in the territorial waters of a neutral power, in the event that this power did not make this capture the subject of a diplomatic claim,

(c) d'une réclamation fondée sur l'allégation que la capture aurait été effectuée en violation, soit d'une disposition conventionnelle en vigueur entre les Puissances belligérantes, soit d'une disposition légale édictée par le belligérant capteur.

(c) of a complaint based on the claim that the capture was made in violation of either a treaty provision in effect between the warring Powers or a legal provision established by the capturing belligerent.

Le recours contre la décision des tribunaux nationaux peut être fondé sur ce que cette décision ne serait pas justifiée, soit en fait, soit en droit.[Pg 623]

Le recours contre la décision des tribunaux nationaux peut être basé sur le fait que cette décision ne serait pas justifiée, que ce soit en fait ou en droit.[Pg 623]

Article 4.

Article 4.

Le recours peut être exercé:

The appeal can be made:

1o. par une Puissance neutre, si la décision des tribunaux nationaux a porté atteinte à ses propriétés ou à celles de ses ressortissants (article 3—1o) ou s'il est allégué que la capture d'un navire ennemi a eu lieu dans les eaux territoriales de cette Puissance (article 3—2o b);

1o. by a neutral Power, if the decision of national courts has infringed upon its properties or those of its nationals (article 3—1o) or if it is claimed that the capture of an enemy vessel occurred in the territorial waters of that Power (article 3—2o b);

2o. par un particulier neutre, si la décision des tribunaux nationaux a porté atteinte à ses propriétés (article 3—1o), sous réserve toutefois du droit de la Puissance dont il relève, de lui interdire l'accès de la Cour ou d'y agir elle-même en ses lieu et place;

2o. By a neutral individual, if the decision of the national courts has affected their property (article 3—1o), subject to the right of the Power to which they belong, to deny them access to the Court or to act on their behalf;

3o. par un particulier relevant de la Puissance ennemie, si la décision des tribunaux nationaux a porté atteinte à ses propriétés dans les conditions visées à l'article 3—2o, à l'exception du cas prévu par l'alinéa b.

3o. by a private individual subject to the enemy Power, if the decision of the national courts has affected his properties under the conditions outlined in article 3—2o, except in the case provided for in paragraph b.

Article 5.

Article 5.

Le recours peut aussi être exercé, dans les mêmes conditions qu'à l'article précédent, par les ayants-droit, neutres ou ennemis, du particulier auquel le recours est accordé, et qui sont intervenus devant la juridiction nationale. Ces ayants-droit peuvent exercer individuellement le recours dans la mesure de leur intérêt.

Le recours peut aussi être exercé, dans les mêmes conditions qu'à l'article précédent, par les ayants-droit, neutres ou ennemis, du particulier auquel le recours est accordé, et qui sont intervenus devant la juridiction nationale. Ces ayants-droit peuvent exercer individuellement le recours dans la mesure de leur intérêt.

Il en est de même des ayants-droit, neutres ou ennemis, de la Puissance neutre dont la propriété est en cause.

Il en est de même des ayants-droit, neutres ou ennemis, de la Puissance neutre dont la propriété est en cause.

Article 6.

Article 6.

Lorsque, conformément à l'article 3 ci-dessus, la Cour internationale est compétente, le droit de juridiction des tribunaux nationaux ne peut être exercé à plus de deux degrés. Il appartient à la législation du belligérant capteur de décider si le recours est ouvert après la décision rendue en premier ressort ou seulement après la décision rendue en appel ou en cassation.

Lorsque, conformément à l'article 3 ci-dessus, la Cour internationale est compétente, le droit de juridiction des tribunaux nationaux ne peut être exercé à plus de deux niveaux. Il revient à la législation de la partie en conflit de décider si un recours est possible après la décision de première instance ou seulement après la décision en appel ou en cassation.

Faute par les tribunaux nationaux d'avoir rendu une décision définitive dans les deux ans à compter du jour de la capture, la Cour peut être saisie directement.

Faute par les tribunaux nationaux d'avoir rendu une décision définitive dans les deux ans à compter du jour de la capture, la Cour peut être saisie directement.

Article 7.

Article 7.

Si la question de droit à résoudre est prévue par une Convention en vigueur entre le belligérant capteur et la Puissance qui est elle-même partie au litige ou dont le ressortissant est partie au litige, la Cour se conforme aux stipulations de ladite Convention.

Si la question de droit à résoudre est prévue par une Convention en vigueur entre le belligérant capteur et la Puissance qui est elle-même partie au litige ou dont le ressortissant est partie au litige, la Cour se conforme aux stipulations de ladite Convention.

A défaut de telles stipulations, la Cour applique les règles du droit international. Si des règles généralement reconnues n'existent pas, la Cour statue d'après les principes généraux de la justice et de l'équité.

A lack of such stipulations means that the Court applies the rules of international law. If generally recognized rules do not exist, the Court decides based on the general principles of justice and fairness.

Les dispositions ci-dessus sont également applicables en ce qui concerne l'ordre des preuves ainsi que les moyens qui peuvent être employés.

Les dispositions ci-dessus s'appliquent aussi à l'ordre des preuves et aux moyens qui peuvent être utilisés.

Si, conformément à l'article 3—2o c, le recours est fondé sur la violation d'une disposition légale édictée par le belligérant capteur, la Cour applique cette disposition.

Si, conformément à l'article 3—2o c, le recours est fondé sur la violation d'une disposition légale édictée par le belligérant capteur, la Cour applique cette disposition.

La Cour peut ne pas tenir compte des déchéances de procédure édictées par la législation du belligérant capteur, dans les cas où elle estime que les conséquences en sont contraires à la justice et à l'équité.

La Cour peut ne pas prendre en compte les abandons de procédure établis par la législation de l'État belligérant qui saisit, dans les cas où elle juge que les résultats en sont contraires à la justice et à l'équité.

Article 8.

Article 8.

Si la Cour prononce la validité de la capture du navire ou de la cargaison, il en sera disposé conformément aux lois du belligérant capteur.

Si le tribunal déclare la capture du navire ou de la cargaison valide, cela sera traité selon les lois du belligérant qui a effectué la capture.

Si la nullité de la capture est prononcée, la Cour ordonne la restitution du navire ou de la cargaison et fixe, s'il y a lieu, le montant des dommages-intérêts. Si le navire ou la cargaison ont été vendus ou détruits, la Cour détermine l'indemnité à accorder de ce chef au propriétaire.

Si la nullité de la capture est prononcée, la Cour ordonne la restitution du navire ou de la cargaison et fixe, s'il y a lieu, le montant des dommages-intérêts. Si le navire ou la cargaison ont été vendus ou détruits, la Cour détermine l'indemnité à accorder de ce chef au propriétaire.

Si la nullité de la capture avait été prononcée par la juridiction nationale, la Cour n'est appelée à statuer que sur les dommages et intérêts.

Si la nullité de la capture avait été prononcée par la juridiction nationale, la Cour n'est appelée à statuer que sur les dommages et intérêts.

Article 9.

Article 9.

Les Puissances contractantes s'engagent à se soumettre de bonne foi aux décisions de la Cour internationale des prises et à les exécuter dans le plus bref délai possible.

Les Puissances contractantes s'engagent à se soumettre de bonne foi aux décisions de la Cour internationale des prises et à les exécuter dans les plus brefs délais.

Titre II.Organisation de la Cour internationale des prises.

Title II.Organization of the International Prize Court.

Article 10.

Article 10.

La Cour internationale des prises se compose de juges et de juges suppléants nommés par les Puissances contractantes et qui tous devront être des jurisconsultes d'une compétence reconnue dans les questions de droit international maritime et jouissant de la plus haute considération morale.

La Cour internationale des prises se compose de juges et de juges suppléants nommés par les Puissances contractantes qui doivent tous être des experts reconnus en droit international maritime et bénéficier de la plus haute considération morale.

La nomination de ces juges et juges suppléants sera faite dans les six mois qui suivront la ratification de la présente Convention.

La nomination de ces juges et juges suppléants sera faite dans les six mois qui suivront la ratification de la présente Convention.

Article 11.

Article 11.

Les juges et juges suppléants sont nommés pour une période de six ans, à compter de la date où la notification de leur nomination aura été reçue par le Conseil administratif institué par la[Pg 624] Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux du 29 juillet 1899. Leur mandat peut être renouvelé.

The judges and substitute judges are appointed for a period of six years, starting from the date the notification of their appointment is received by the Administrative Council established by the[Pg 624] Convention for the Peaceful Resolution of International Conflicts of July 29, 1899. Their term can be renewed.

En cas de décès ou de démission d'un juge ou d'un juge suppléant, il est pourvu à son remplacement selon le mode fixé pour sa nomination. Dans ce cas, la nomination est faite pour une nouvelle période de six ans.

En cas de décès ou de démission d'un juge ou d'un juge suppléant, son remplacement est effectué selon la méthode établie pour sa nomination. Dans ce cas, la nomination se fait pour une nouvelle période de six ans.

Article 12.

Article 12.

Les juges de la Cour internationale des prises sont égaux entre eux et prennent rang d'après la date où la notification de leur nomination aura été reçue (article 11 alinéa 1), et, s'ils siègent à tour de rôle (article 15 alinéa 2), d'après la date de leur entrée en fonctions. La préséance appartient au plus âgé, au cas où la date est la même.

Les juges de la Cour internationale des prises sont tous égaux et sont classés selon la date à laquelle leur nomination a été notifiée (article 11 alinéa 1). S'ils siègent à tour de rôle (article 15 alinéa 2), ils sont classés selon la date de leur entrée en fonction. En cas de date identique, la préséance revient au juge le plus âgé.

Les juges suppléants sont, dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, assimilés aux juges titulaires. Toutefois ils prennent rang après ceux-ci.

Les juges suppléants sont, dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, considérés comme des juges titulaires. Cependant, ils sont classés après ceux-ci.

Article 13.

Article 13.

Les juges jouissent des privilèges et immunités diplomatiques dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions et en dehors de leur pays.

Les juges bénéficient de privilèges et d'immunités diplomatiques dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, ainsi qu’en dehors de leur pays.

Avant de prendre possession de leur siège, les juges doivent, devant le Conseil administratif, prêter serment ou faire une affirmation solennelle d'exercer leurs fonctions avec impartialité et en toute conscience.

Avant de prendre possession de leur siège, les juges doivent, devant le Conseil administratif, prêter serment ou faire une affirmation solennelle d'exercer leurs fonctions avec impartialité et en toute conscience.

Article 14.

Article 14.

La Cour fonctionne au nombre de quinze juges; neuf juges constituent le quorum nécessaire.

La Cour fonctionne avec quinze juges; neuf juges forment le quorum nécessaire.

Le juge absent ou empêché est remplacé par le suppléant.

Le juge absent ou empêché est remplacé par le suppléant.

Article 15.

Article 15.

Les juges nommés par les Puissances contractantes dont les noms suivent: l'Allemagne, les États-Unis d'Amérique, l'Autriche-Hongrie, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, l'Italie, le Japon et la Russie sont toujours appelés à siéger.

Les juges nommés par les puissances contractantes dont les noms suivent : l'Allemagne, les États-Unis, l'Autriche-Hongrie, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, l'Italie, le Japon et la Russie sont toujours appelés à siéger.

Les juges et les juges suppléants nommés par les autres Puissances contractantes siègent à tour de rôle d'après le tableau annexé à la présente Convention; leurs fonctions peuvent être exercées successivement par la même personne. Le même juge peut être nommé par plusieurs desdites Puissances.

Les juges et les juges suppléants nommés par les autres Puissances contractantes siègent à tour de rôle d'après le tableau annexé à la présente Convention; leurs fonctions peuvent être exercées successivement par la même personne. Le même juge peut être nommé par plusieurs desdites Puissances.

Article 16.

Article 16.

Si une Puissance belligérante n'a pas, d'après le tour de rôle, un juge siégeant dans la Cour, elle peut demander que le juge nommé par elle prenne part au jugement de toutes les affaires provenant de la guerre. Dans ce cas, le sort détermine lequel des juges siégeant en vertu du tour de rôle doit s'abstenir. Cette exclusion ne saurait s'appliquer au juge nommé par l'autre belligérant.

Si une puissance belligérante n'a pas, selon le tour de rôle, un juge siégeant dans la Cour, elle peut demander que le juge qu'elle a nommé participe au jugement de toutes les affaires découlant de la guerre. Dans ce cas, un tirage au sort détermine lequel des juges en fonction du tour de rôle doit s'abstenir. Cette exclusion ne s'applique pas au juge nommé par l'autre belligérant.

Article 17.

Article 17.

Ne peut siéger le juge qui, à un titre quelconque, aura concouru à la décision des tribunaux nationaux ou aura figuré dans l'instance comme conseil ou avocat d'une partie.

Ne peut siéger le juge qui, à un titre quelconque, aura concouru à la décision des tribunaux nationaux ou aura figuré dans l'instance comme conseil ou avocat d'une partie.

Aucun juge, titulaire ou suppléant, ne peut intervenir comme agent ou comme avocat devant la Cour internationale des prises ni y agir pour une partie en quelque qualité que ce soit, pendant toute la durée de ses fonctions.

Aucune juge, titulaire ou suppléant, ne peut intervenir comme agent ou comme avocat devant la Cour internationale des prises ni y agir pour une partie en quelque qualité que ce soit, pendant toute la durée de ses fonctions.

Article 18.

Article 18.

Le belligérant capteur a le droit de désigner un officier de marine d'un grade élevé qui siégera en qualité d'assesseur avec voix consultative. La même faculté appartient à la Puissance neutre, qui est elle-même partie au litige, ou à la Puissance dont le ressortissant est partie au litige; s'il y a, par application de cette dernière disposition, plusieurs Puissances intéressées, elles doivent se concerter, au besoin par le sort, sur l'officier à désigner.

Le belligérant capturant a le droit de désigner un officier de marine de haut rang qui siégera en tant qu'assesseur avec un droit de parole consultatif. Ce même droit appartient à la puissance neutre qui est aussi impliquée dans le litige, ou à la puissance dont le ressortissant est parti au litige ; s'il y a, en vertu de cette dernière disposition, plusieurs puissances intéressées, elles doivent se concerter, si nécessaire par tirage au sort, sur l'officier à désigner.

Article 19.

Article 19.

La Cour élit son Président et son Vice-Président à la majorité absolue des suffrages exprimés. Après deux tours de scrutin, l'élection se fait à la majorité relative et, en cas de partage des voix, le sort décide.

La Cour choisit son Président et son Vice-Président à la majorité absolue des votes exprimés. Après deux tours de vote, l'élection se fait à la majorité relative et, en cas d'égalité des voix, un tirage au sort détermine le résultat.

Article 20.

Article 20.

Les juges de la Cour internationale des prises touchent une indemnité de voyage fixée d'après les règlements de leur pays et reçoivent, en outre, pendant la session ou pendant l'exercice de fonctions conférées par la Cour, une somme de cent florins néerlandais par jour.

Les juges de la Cour internationale des prises reçoivent une indemnité de voyage déterminée selon les règlements de leur pays et, en plus, pendant la session ou lorsqu'ils exercent des fonctions accordées par la Cour, ils perçoivent une somme de cent florins néerlandais par jour.

Ces allocations, comprises dans les frais généraux de la Cour prévus par l'article 47, sont versées par l'entremise du Bureau international institué par la Convention du 29 juillet 1899.

Ces allocations, comprises dans les frais généraux de la Cour prévus par l'article 47, sont versées par l'entremise du Bureau international institué par la Convention du 29 juillet 1899.

Les juges ne peuvent recevoir de leur propre Gouvernement ou de celui d'une autre Puissance aucune rémunération comme membres de la Cour.

Les juges ne peuvent recevoir de leur propre gouvernement ou de celui d'un autre pays aucune rémunération en tant que membres de la Cour.

Article 21.

Article 21.

La Cour internationale des prises a son siège à La Haye et ne peut, sauf le cas de force majeure, le transporter ailleurs qu'avec l'assentiment des parties belligérantes.[Pg 625]

La Cour internationale des prises a son siège à La Haye et ne peut, sauf le cas de force majeure, le transporter ailleurs qu'avec l'assentiment des parties belligérantes.[Pg 625]

Article 22.

Article 22.

Le Conseil administratif, dans lequel ne figurent que les représentants des Puissances contractantes, remplit, à l'égard de la Cour internationale des prises, les fonctions qu'il remplit à l'égard de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage.

Le Conseil administratif, composé uniquement des représentants des Puissances contractantes, exerce, par rapport à la Cour internationale des prises, les mêmes fonctions qu'il exerce envers la Cour permanente d'arbitrage.

Article 23.

Article 23.

Le Bureau international sert de greffe à la Cour internationale des prises et doit mettre ses locaux et son organisation à la disposition de la Cour. Il a la garde des archives et la gestion des affaires administratives.

Le Bureau international sert de greffe à la Cour internationale des prises et doit mettre ses locaux et son organisation à la disposition de la Cour. Il a la garde des archives et la gestion des affaires administratives.

Le secrétaire général du Bureau international remplit les fonctions de greffier.

Le secrétaire général du Bureau international agit comme greffier.

Les secrétaires adjoints au greffier, les traducteurs et les sténographes nécessaires sont désignés et assermentés par la Cour.

Les assistants du greffier, les traducteurs et les sténographes requis sont désignés et assermentés par le tribunal.

Article 24.

Article 24.

La Cour décide du choix de la langue dont elle fera usage et des langues dont l'emploi sera autorisé devant elle.

La Cour décide quelle langue elle utilisera et quelles langues seront autorisées devant elle.

Dans tous les cas, la langue officielle des tribunaux nationaux, qui ont connu de l'affaire, peut être employée devant la Cour.

Dans tous les cas, la langue officielle des tribunaux nationaux qui ont traité l'affaire peut être utilisée devant la Cour.

Article 25.

Article 25.

Les Puissances intéressées ont le droit de nommer des agents spéciaux ayant mission de servir d'intermédiaires entre Elles et la Cour. Elles sont, en outre, autorisées à charger des conseils ou avocats de la défense de leurs droits et intérêts.

Les Puissances intéressées ont le droit de nommer des agents spéciaux pour agir comme intermédiaires entre elles et la Cour. Elles peuvent également engager des conseillers ou avocats pour défendre leurs droits et intérêts.

Article 26.

Article 26.

Le particulier intéressé sera représenté devant la Cour par un mandataire qui doit être soit un avocat autorisé à plaider devant une Cour d'appel ou une Cour suprême de l'un des Pays contractants, soit un avoué exerçant sa profession auprès d'une telle Cour, soit enfin un professeur de droit à une école d'enseignement supérieur d'un de ces pays.

Le particulier intéressé sera représenté devant la Cour par un mandataire qui doit être soit un avocat autorisé à plaider devant une Cour d'appel ou une Cour suprême de l'un des Pays contractants, soit un avoué exerçant sa profession auprès d'une telle Cour, soit enfin un professeur de droit à une école d'enseignement supérieur d'un de

Article 27.

Article 27.

Pour toutes les notifications à faire, notamment aux parties, aux témoins et aux experts, la Cour peut s'adresser directement au Gouvernement de la Puissance sur le territoire de laquelle la notification doit être effectuée. Il en est de même s'il s'agit de faire procéder à l'établissement de tout moyen de preuve.

Pour toutes les notifications à faire, notamment aux parties, aux témoins et aux experts, la Cour peut s'adresser directement au Gouvernement de la Puissance sur le territoire de laquelle la notification doit être effectuée. Il en est de même s'il s'agit de faire procéder à l'établissement de tout moyen de preuve.

Les requêtes adressées à cet effet seront exécutées suivant les moyens dont la Puissance requise dispose d'après sa législation intérieure. Elles ne peuvent être refusées que si cette Puissance les juge de nature à porter atteinte à sa souveraineté ou à sa sécurité. S'il est donné suite à la requête, les frais ne comprennent que les dépenses d'exécution réellement effectuées.

Les demandes faites à cet égard seront traitées selon les moyens dont l'État concerné dispose selon sa législation interne. Elles ne peuvent être refusées que si cet État les considère comme susceptibles de menacer sa souveraineté ou sa sécurité. Si la demande est acceptée, les frais ne comprennent que les dépenses d'exécution réellement engagées.

La Cour a également la faculté de recourir à l'intermédiaire de la Puissance sur le territoire de laquelle elle a son siège.

La Cour peut aussi choisir d'utiliser l'intermédiaire de la puissance sur le territoire où elle est située.

Les notifications à faire aux parties dans le lieu où siège la Cour peuvent être exécutées par le Bureau international.

Les notifications à faire aux parties dans le lieu où siège la Cour peuvent être exécutées par le Bureau international.

Titre III.Procédure devant la Cour internationale des prises.

Title III.Procedure before the International Prize Court.

Article 28.

Article 28.

Le recours devant la Cour internationale des prises est formé au moyen d'une déclaration écrite, faite devant le tribunal national qui a statué, ou adressée au Bureau international; celui-ci peut être saisi même par télégramme.

Le recours devant la Cour internationale des prises se fait par une déclaration écrite, faite devant le tribunal national qui a rendu sa décision, ou envoyée au Bureau international; celui-ci peut être contacté même par télégramme.

Le délai du recours est fixé à cent vingt jours à dater du jour où la décision a été prononcée ou notifiée (article 2 alinéa 2).

Le délai pour faire appel est de cent vingt jours à partir du jour où la décision a été prise ou communiquée (article 2 alinéa 2).

Article 29.

Article 29.

Si la déclaration de recours est faite devant le tribunal national, celui-ci, sans examiner si le délai a été observé, fait, dans les sept jours qui suivent, expédier le dossier de l'affaire au Bureau international.

Si la déclaration de recours est faite devant le tribunal national, celui-ci, sans vérifier si le délai a été respecté, envoie le dossier de l'affaire au Bureau international dans les sept jours qui suivent.

Si la déclaration de recours est adressée au Bureau international, celui-ci en prévient directement le tribunal national, par télégramme s'il est possible. Le tribunal transmettra le dossier comme il est dit à l'alinéa précédent.

Si la déclaration de recours est envoyée au Bureau international, celui-ci en informera directement le tribunal national, idéalement par télégramme. Le tribunal transmettra le dossier comme mentionné dans le paragraphe précédent.

Lorsque le recours est formé par un particulier neutre, le Bureau international en avise immédiatement par télégramme la Puissance dont relève le particulier, pour permettre à cette Puissance de faire valoir le droit que lui reconnaît l'article 4—2o.

Lorsque le recours est formé par une personne neutre, le Bureau international en informe immédiatement par télégramme le pays dont dépend la personne, afin de permettre à ce pays d'exercer le droit que lui accorde l'article 4—2o.

Article 30.

Article 30.

Dans le cas prévu à l'article 6 alinéa 2, le recours ne peut être adressé qu'au Bureau international. Il doit être introduit dans les trente jours qui suivent l'expiration du délai de deux ans.

Dans le cas prévu à l'article 6 alinéa 2, le recours ne peut être adressé qu'au Bureau international. Il doit être introduit dans les trente jours qui suivent l'expiration du délai de deux ans.

Article 31.

Article 31.

Faute d'avoir formé son recours dans le délai fixé à l'article 28 ou à l'article 30, la partie sera, sans débats, déclarée non recevable.

Faute d'avoir formé son recours dans le délai fixé à l'article 28 ou à l'article 30, la partie sera, sans débats, déclarée non recevable.

Toutefois, si elle justifie d'un empêchement de force majeure et si elle[Pg 626] a formé son recours dans les soixante jours qui ont suivi la cessation de cet empêchement, elle peut être relevée de la déchéance encourue, la partie adverse ayant été dûment entendue.

Toutefois, si elle prouve qu'elle a un empêchement de force majeure et si elle[Pg 626] a déposé son recours dans les soixante jours suivant la fin de cet empêchement, elle peut être excusée de la perte de ses droits, la partie adverse ayant été correctement entendue.

Article 32.

Article 32.

Si le recours a été formé en temps utile, la Cour notifie d'office et sans délai à la partie adverse une copie certifiée conforme de la déclaration.

Si le recours a été fait à temps, la Cour envoie automatiquement et sans délai à l'autre partie une copie certifiée conforme de la déclaration.

Article 33.

Article 33.

Si, en dehors des parties qui se sont pourvues devant la Cour, il y a d'autres intéressés ayant le droit d'exercer le recours, ou si, dans le cas prévu à l'article 29 alinéa 3, la Puissance qui a été avisée, n'a pas fait connaître sa résolution, la Cour attend, pour se saisir de l'affaire, que les délais prévus à l'article 28 ou à l'article 30 soient expirés.

Si, en dehors des parties qui se sont pourvues devant la Cour, il y a d'autres intéressés ayant le droit d'exercer le recours, ou si, dans le cas prévu à l'article 29 alinéa 3, la Puissance qui a été avisée n'a pas fait connaître sa résolution, la Cour attend, pour se saisir de l'affaire, que les délais prévus à l'article 28 ou à l'article 30 soient expirés.

Article 34.

Article 34.

La procédure devant la Cour internationale comprend deux phases distinctes: l'instruction écrite et les débats oraux.

La procédure devant la Cour internationale comprend deux phases distinctes : l’instruction écrite et les débats oraux.

L'instruction écrite consiste dans le dépôt et l'échange d'exposés, de contre-exposés et, au besoin, de répliques dont l'ordre et les délais sont fixés par la Cour. Les parties y joignent toutes pièces et documents dont elles comptent se servir.

L'échange écrit implique la soumission et l'échange d'exposés, de contre-exposés et, si nécessaire, de répliques, dont l'ordre et les délais sont établis par la Cour. Les parties y ajoutent toutes les pièces et documents qu'elles prévoient d'utiliser.

Toute pièce, produite par une partie, doit être communiquée en copie certifiée conforme à l'autre partie par l'intermédiaire de la Cour.

Toute pièce, produite par une partie, doit être communiquée en copie certifiée conforme à l'autre partie par l'intermédiaire de la Cour.

Article 35.

Article 35.

L'instruction écrite étant terminée, il y a lieu à une audience publique, dont le jour est fixé par la Cour.

L'instruction écrite étant terminée, il y a lieu à une audience publique, dont le jour est fixé par la Cour.

Dans cette audience, les parties exposent l'état de l'affaire en fait et en droit.

Dans cette audience, les parties présentent l'état de l'affaire en fait et en droit.

La Cour peut, en tout état de cause, suspendre les plaidoiries, soit à la demande d'une des parties, soit d'office, pour procéder à une information complémentaire.

La Cour peut, en tout état de cause, suspendre les plaidoiries, soit à la demande d'une des parties, soit d'office, pour procéder à une information complémentaire.

Article 36.

Article 36.

La Cour internationale peut ordonner que l'information complémentaire aura lieu, soit conformément aux dispositions de l'article 27, soit directement devant elle ou devant un ou plusieurs de ses membres en tant que cela peut se faire sans moyen coercitif ou comminatoire.

La Cour internationale peut décider que des informations supplémentaires seront données, soit selon les règles de l'article 27, soit directement devant elle ou devant un ou plusieurs de ses membres, tant que cela se fait sans recours à la force ou à des menaces.

Si des mesures d'information doivent être prises par des membres de la Cour en dehors du territoire où elle a son siège, l'assentiment du Gouvernement étranger doit être obtenu.

Si des mesures d'information doivent être prises par des membres de la Cour en dehors du territoire où elle a son siège, l'accord du Gouvernement étranger doit être obtenu.

Article 37.

Article 37.

Les parties sont appelées à assister à toutes mesures d'instruction. Elles reçoivent une copie certifiée conforme des procès-verbaux.

Les parties sont invitées à participer à toutes les mesures d'instruction. Elles reçoivent une copie certifiée conforme des procès-verbaux.

Article 38.

Article 38.

Les débats sont dirigés par le Président ou le Vice-Président et, en cas d'absence ou d'empêchement de l'un et de l'autre, par le plus ancien des juges présents.

Les débats sont dirigés par le Président ou le Vice-Président et, en cas d'absence ou d'empêchement de l'un et de l'autre, par le plus ancien des juges présents.

Le juge nommé par une partie belligérante ne peut siéger comme Président.

Le juge choisi par une des parties en conflit ne peut pas être Président.

Article 39.

Article 39.

Les débats sont publics sauf le droit pour une Puissance en litige de demander qu'il y soit procédé à huis clos.

Les débats sont publics, sauf si une Puissance en litige demande qu'ils se tiennent à huis clos.

Ils sont consignés dans des procès-verbaux, que signent le Président et le greffier et qui seuls ont caractère authentique.

Ils sont enregistrés dans des procès-verbaux, que signe le Président et le greffier, et qui ont seul caractère authentique.

Article 40.

Article 40.

En cas de non comparution d'une des parties, bien que régulièrement citée, ou faute par elle d'agir dans les délais fixés par la Cour, il est procédé sans elle et la Cour décide d'après les éléments d'appréciation qu'elle a à sa disposition.

En cas de non comparution d'une des parties, bien que régulièrement citée, ou faute par elle d'agir dans les délais fixés par la Cour, il est procédé sans elle et la Cour décide d'après les éléments d'appréciation qu'elle a à sa disposition.

Article 41.

Article 41.

La Cour notifie d'office aux parties toutes décisions ou ordonnances prises en leur absence.

La Cour informe automatiquement les parties de toutes les décisions ou ordonnances prises en leur absence.

Article 42.

Article 42.

La Cour apprécie librement l'ensemble des actes, preuves et déclarations orales.

La Cour évalue librement tous les actes, preuves et témoignages.

Article 43.

Article 43.

Les délibérations de la Cour ont lieu à huis clos et restent secrètes.

Les délibérations de la Cour se déroulent en privé et restent confidentielles.

Toute décision est prise à la majorité des juges présents. Si la Cour siège en nombre pair et qu'il y ait partage des voix, la voix du dernier des juges dans l'ordre de préséance établi d'après l'article 12 alinéa 1 n'est pas comptée.

Toute décision est prise à la majorité des juges présents. Si la Cour siège en nombre pair et qu'il y ait partage des voix, la voix du dernier des juges dans l'ordre de préséance établi d'après l'article 12 alinéa 1 n'est pas comptée.

Article 44.

Article 44.

L'arrêt de la Cour doit être motivé. Il mentionne les noms des juges qui y ont participé, ainsi que les noms des assesseurs, s'il y a lieu; il est signé par le Président et par le greffier.

L'arrêt de la Cour doit être motivé. Il mentionne les noms des juges qui y ont participé, ainsi que les noms des assesseurs, s'il y a lieu; il est signé par le Président et par le greffier.

Article 45.

Article 45.

L'arrêt est prononcé en séance publique, les parties présentes ou dûment appelées; il est notifié d'office aux parties.

L'arrêt is announced in a public session, with the parties present or properly summoned; it is notified automatically to the parties.

Cette notification une fois faite,[Pg 627] la Cour fait parvenir au tribunal national des prises le dossier de l'affaire en y joignant une expédition des diverses décisions intervenues ainsi qu'une copie des procès-verbaux de l'instruction.

Cette notification une fois faite,[Pg 627] la Cour envoie au tribunal national des saisies le dossier de l'affaire en y joignant une copie des différentes décisions prises ainsi qu'une copie des procès-verbaux de l'instruction.

Article 46.

Article 46.

Chaque partie supporte les frais occasionnés par sa propre défense.

Chaque partie couvre les coûts liés à sa propre défense.

La partie qui succombe supporte, en outre, les frais causés par la procédure. Elle doit, de plus, verser un centième de la valeur de l'objet litigieux à titre de contribution aux frais généraux de la Cour internationale. Le montant de ces versements est déterminé par l'arrêt de la Cour.

La partie qui perd doit aussi payer les frais engendrés par la procédure. De plus, elle doit verser un centième de la valeur de l'objet en question pour contribuer aux frais généraux de la Cour internationale. Le montant de ces paiements est fixé par l'arrêt de la Cour.

Si le recours est exercé par un particulier, celui-ci fournit au Bureau international un cautionnement dont le montant est fixé par la Cour et qui est destiné à garantir l'exécution éventuelle des deux obligations mentionnées dans l'alinéa précédent. La Cour peut subordonner l'ouverture de la procédure au versement du cautionnement.

Si le recours est exercé par un particulier, celui-ci fournit au Bureau international un cautionnement dont le montant est fixé par la Cour et qui est destiné à garantir l'exécution éventuelle des deux obligations mentionnées dans l'alinéa précédent. La Cour peut subordonner l'ouverture de la procédure au versement du cautionnement.

Article 47.

Article 47.

Les frais généraux de la Cour internationale des prises sont supportés par les Puissances contractantes dans la proportion de leur participation au fonctionnement de la Cour telle qu'elle est prévue par l'article 15 et par le tableau y annexé. La désignation des juges suppléants ne donne pas lieu à contribution.

Les frais généraux de la Cour internationale des prises sont couverts par les États contractants en fonction de leur participation au fonctionnement de la Cour, comme l'indique l'article 15 et le tableau qui y est annexé. La nomination des juges suppléants ne nécessite pas de contribution.

Le Conseil administratif s'adresse aux Puissances pour obtenir les fonds nécessaires au fonctionnement de la Cour.

Le Conseil administratif s'adresse aux Puissances pour obtenir les fonds nécessaires au fonctionnement de la Cour.

Article 48.

Article 48.

Quand la Cour n'est pas en session, les fonctions qui lui sont conférées par l'article 32, l'article 34 alinéas 2 et 3, l'article 35 alinéa 1 et l'article 46 alinéa 3, sont exercées par une Délégation de trois juges désignés par la Cour. Cette Délégation décide à la majorité des voix.

Quand la Cour n'est pas en session, les fonctions qui lui sont conférées par l'article 32, l'article 34 alinéas 2 et 3, l'article 35 alinéa 1 et l'article 46 alinéa 3, sont exercées par une Délégation de trois juges désignés par la Cour. Cette Délégation décide à la majorité des voix.

Article 49.

Article 49.

La Cour fait elle-même son règlement d'ordre intérieur qui doit être communiqué aux Puissances contractantes.

La Cour établit elle-même son règlement intérieur, qui doit être communiqué aux pays signataires.

Dans l'année de la ratification de la présente Convention, elle se réunira pour élaborer ce règlement.

In the year the present Convention is ratified, it will convene to develop this regulation.

Article 50.

Article 50.

La Cour peut proposer des modifications à apporter aux dispositions de la présente Convention qui concernent la procédure. Ces propositions sont communiquées, par l'intermédiaire du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, aux Puissances contractantes qui se concerteront sur la suite à y donner.

La Cour peut suggérer des changements à apporter aux dispositions de la présente Convention concernant la procédure. Ces suggestions sont transmises, via le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, aux Puissances contractantes qui discuteront sur la suite à y donner.

Titre IV.Dispositions finales.

Title IV.Final Provisions.

Article 51.

Article 51.

La présente Convention ne s'applique de plein droit que si les Puissances belligérantes sont toutes parties à la Convention.

La présente Convention ne s'applique automatiquement que si toutes les Puissances belligérantes sont parties à la Convention.

Il est entendu, en outre, que le recours devant la Cour internationale des prises ne peut être exercé que par une Puissance contractante ou le ressortissant d'une Puissance contractante.

Il est entendu, en outre, que le recours devant la Cour internationale des prises ne peut être exercé que par une Puissance contractante ou le ressortissant d'une Puissance contractante.

Dans les cas de l'article 5, le recours n'est admis que si le propriétaire et l'ayant-droit sont également des Puissances contractantes ou des ressortissants de Puissances contractantes.

Dans les cas de l'article 5, le recours n'est admis que si le propriétaire et l'ayant-droit sont également des Puissances contractantes ou des ressortissants de Puissances contractantes.

Article 52.

Article 52.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée et les ratifications en seront déposées à La Haye dès que toutes les Puissances désignées à l'article 15 et dans son annexe seront en mesure de le faire.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée et les ratifications en seront déposées à La Haye dès que toutes les Puissances désignées à l'article 15 et dans son annexe seront en mesure de le faire.

Le dépôt des ratifications aura lieu en tout cas, le 30 juin 1909, si les Puissances prêtes à ratifier peuvent fournir à la Cour neuf juges et neuf juges suppléants, aptes à siéger effectivement. Dans le cas contraire, le dépôt sera ajourné jusqu'au moment où cette condition sera remplie.

Le dépôt des ratifications aura lieu en tout cas, le 30 juin 1909, si les Puissances prêtes à ratifier peuvent fournir à la Cour neuf juges et neuf juges suppléants, aptes à siéger effectivement. Dans le cas contraire, le dépôt sera ajourné jusqu'au moment où cette condition sera remplie.

Il sera dressé du dépôt des ratifications un procès-verbal dont une copie, certifiée conforme, sera remise par la voie diplomatique à chacune des Puissances désignées à l'alinéa premier.

Il sera établi un procès-verbal sur le dépôt des ratifications dont une copie, certifiée conforme, sera envoyée par voie diplomatique à chacune des Puissances mentionnées au premier alinéa.

Article 53.

Article 53.

Les Puissances désignées à l'article 15 et dans son annexe sont admises à signer la présente Convention jusqu'au dépôt des ratifications prévu par l'alinéa 2 de l'article précédent.

Les Puissances désignées à l'article 15 et dans son annexe peuvent signer cette Convention jusqu'à ce que les ratifications soient déposées comme prévu au paragraphe 2 de l'article précédent.

Après ce dépôt, elles seront toujours admises à y adhérer, purement et simplement. La Puissance qui désire adhérer notifie par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant, en même temps, l'acte d'adhésion qui sera déposé dans les archives dudit Gouvernement. Celui-ci enverra, par la voie diplomatique, une copie certifiée conforme de la notification et de l'acte d'adhésion à toutes les Puissances désignées à l'alinéa précédent, en leur faisant savoir la date où il a reçu la notification.

Après ce dépôt, elles pourront toujours y adhérer, sans conditions. La Puissance qui souhaite adhérer doit notifier par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui envoyant, en même temps, l'acte d'adhésion, qui sera enregistré dans les archives de ce Gouvernement. Celui-ci enverra, par voie diplomatique, une copie certifiée conforme de la notification et de l'acte d'adhésion à toutes les Puissances mentionnées au paragraphe précédent, en leur indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 54.

Article 54.

La présente Convention entrera en vigueur six mois à partir du dépôt des[Pg 628] ratifications prévu par l'article 52 alinéas 1 et 2.

La présente Convention entrera en vigueur six mois après le dépôt des[Pg 628] ratifications prévu par l'article 52 alinéas 1 et 2.

Les adhésions produiront effet soixante jours après que la notification en aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et, au plus tôt, à l'expiration du délai prévu par l'alinéa précédent.

Les adhésions prendront effet soixante jours après que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas aura reçu la notification et, au plus tôt, à l'expiration du délai prévu par l'alinéa précédent.

Toutefois, la Cour internationale aura qualité pour juger les affaires de prises décidées par la juridiction nationale à partir du dépôt des ratifications ou de la réception de la notification des adhésions. Pour ces décisions, le délai fixé à l'article 28 alinéa 2, ne sera compté que de la date de la mise en vigueur de la Convention pour les Puissances ayant ratifié ou adhéré.

Toutefois, la Cour internationale sera capable de juger les affaires de saisies décidées par le système judiciaire national à partir du moment où les ratifications sont déposées ou que la notification des adhésions est reçue. Pour ces décisions, le délai fixé à l'article 28 alinéa 2 ne sera compté qu'à partir de la date de mise en vigueur de la Convention pour les puissances ayant ratifié ou adhéré.

Article 55.

Article 55.

La présente Convention aura une durée de douze ans à partir de sa mise en vigueur, telle qu'elle est déterminée par l'article 54 alinéa 1, même pour les Puissances ayant adhéré postérieurement.

La présente Convention aura une durée de douze ans à partir de sa mise en vigueur, telle qu'elle est déterminée par l'article 54 alinéa 1, même pour les Puissances ayant adhéré postérieurement.

Elle sera renouvelée tacitement de six ans en six ans sauf dénonciation.

Elle sera renouvelée automatiquement tous les six ans, sauf si elle est annulée.

La dénonciation devra être, au moins un an avant l'expiration de chacune des périodes prévues par les deux alinéas précédents, notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui en donnera connaissance à toutes les autres Parties contractantes.

La dénonciation devra être, au moins un an avant l'expiration de chacune des périodes prévues par les deux alinéas précédents, notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui en donnera connaissance à toutes les autres Parties contractantes.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée. La Convention subsistera pour les autres Puissances contractantes, pourvu que leur participation à la désignation des juges soit suffisante pour permettre le fonctionnement de la Cour avec neuf juges et neuf juges suppléants.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée. La Convention subsistera pour les autres Puissances contractantes, pourvu que leur participation à la désignation des juges soit suffisante pour permettre le fonctionnement de la Cour avec neuf juges et neuf juges suppléants.

Article 56.

Article 56.

Dans le cas où la présente Convention n'est pas en vigueur pour toutes les Puissances désignées dans l'article 15 et le tableau qui s'y rattache, le Conseil administratif dresse, conformément aux dispositions de cet article et de ce tableau, la liste des juges et des juges suppléants pour lesquels les Puissances contractantes participent au fonctionnement de la Cour. Les juges appelés à siéger à tour de rôle seront, pour le temps qui leur est attribué par le tableau susmentionné, répartis entre les différentes années de la période de six ans, de manière que, dans la mesure du possible, la Cour fonctionne chaque année en nombre égal. Si le nombre des juges suppléants dépasse celui des juges, le nombre de ces derniers pourra être complété par des juges suppléants désignés par le sort parmi celles des Puissances qui ne nomment pas de juge titulaire.

If this Agreement is not in effect for all the Powers listed in Article 15 and the related table, the Administrative Council will create, in accordance with the provisions of this article and table, the list of judges and substitute judges for which the contracting Powers participate in the Court's operation. The judges scheduled to serve in rotation will, for the time assigned to them by the aforementioned table, be distributed across the different years of the six-year period, so that, as much as possible, the Court operates each year with an equal number. If the number of substitute judges exceeds that of the judges, the number of judges can be supplemented by substitute judges chosen randomly from those Powers that do not appoint a regular judge.

La liste ainsi dressée par le Conseil administratif sera notifiée aux Puissances contractantes. Elle sera révisée quand le nombre de celles-ci sera modifié par suite d'adhésions ou de dénonciations.

La liste établie par le Conseil administratif sera avisée aux puissances contractantes. Elle sera mise à jour lorsque le nombre de celles-ci changera en raison d'adhésions ou de résiliations.

Le changement à opérer par suite d'une adhésion ne se produira qu'à partir du 1er janvier qui suit la date à laquelle l'adhésion a son effet, à moins que la Puissance adhérente ne soit une Puissance belligérante, cas auquel elle peut demander d'être aussitôt représentée dans la Cour, la disposition de l'article 16 étant du reste applicable, s'il y a lieu.

Le changement résultant d'une adhésion ne prendra effet qu'à partir du 1er janvier suivant la date à laquelle l'adhésion devient effective, sauf si la puissance adhérente est une puissance belligérante, dans ce cas elle peut demander à être immédiatement représentée devant la Cour, la disposition de l'article 16 étant également applicable, le cas échéant.

Quand le nombre total des juges est inférieur à onze, sept juges constituent le quorum nécessaire.

Quand le nombre total des juges est inférieur à onze, sept juges forment le quorum nécessaire.

Article 57.

Article 57.

Deux ans avant l'expiration de chaque période visée par les alinéas 1 et 2 de l'article 55, chaque Puissance contractante pourra demander une modification des dispositions de l'article 15 et du tableau y annexé, relativement à sa participation au fonctionnement de la Cour. La demande sera adressée au Conseil administratif qui l'examinera et soumettra à toutes les Puissances des propositions sur la suite à y donner. Les Puissances feront, dans le plus bref délai possible, connaître leur résolution au Conseil administratif. Le résultat sera immédiatement, et au moins un an et trente jours avant l'expiration dudit délai de deux ans, communiqué à la Puissance qui a fait la demande.

Deux ans avant la fin de chaque période mentionnée dans les paragraphes 1 et 2 de l'article 55, chaque puissance contractante pourra demander un changement des dispositions de l'article 15 et du tableau qui y est annexé concernant sa participation au fonctionnement de la Cour. La demande sera adressée au Conseil administratif, qui l'examinera et soumettra des propositions à toutes les puissances sur la suite à donner. Les puissances informeront le Conseil administratif de leur décision dès que possible. Le résultat sera communiqué immédiatement, et au moins un an et trente jours avant la fin de ces deux ans, à la puissance qui a formulé la demande.

Le cas échéant, les modifications adoptées par les Puissances entreront en vigueur dès le commencement de la nouvelle période.

Le cas échéant, les modifications adoptées par les Puissances entreront en vigueur dès le commencement de la nouvelle période.

Annexe de l'article 15.

Annex to Article 15.

Distribution des Juges et Juges Suppléants par Pays pour chaque année de la période de six ans.

Distribution of Judges and Alternate Judges by Country for each year over the six-year period.

Judges. Deputy Judges.
Première Année.
1 Argentine Paraguay
2 Colombie Bolivie
3 Espagne Espagne
4 Grèce Roumanie
5 Norvège Suède
6 Pays-Bas Belgique
7 Turquie Perse
Deuxième Année.
1 Argentine Panama
2 Espagne Espagne
3 Grèce Roumanie
4 Norvège Suède
5 Pays-Bas Belgique
6 Turquie Luxembourg
7 [Pg 629]7 Uruguay Costa Rica
Troisième Année.
1 Brésil Dominicaine
2 Chine Turquie
3 Espagne Portugal
4 Pays-Bas Suisse
5 Roumanie Grèce
6 Suède Danemark
7 Vénézuéla Haïti
Quatrième Année.
1 Brésil Guatémala
2 Chine Turquie
3 Espagne Portugal
4 Pérou Honduras
5 Roumanie Grèce
6 Suède Danemark
7 Suisse Pays-Bas
Cinquième Année.
1 Belgique Pays-Bas
2 Bulgarie Monténégro
3 Chili Nicaragua
4 Danemark Norvège
5 Mexique Cuba
6 Perse Chine
7 Portugal Espagne
Sixième Année.
1 Belgique Pays-Bas
2 Chili Salvador
3 Danemark Norvège
4 Mexique Equateur
5 Portugal Espagne
6 Serbie Bulgarie
7 Siam Chine

CONVENTION 13. Agreement on the Rights and Responsibilities of Neutral Powers in Maritime Warfare.

Article premier.

Article one.

Les belligérants sont tenus de respecter les droits souverains des Puissances neutres et de s'abstenir, dans le territoire ou les eaux neutres, de tous actes qui constitueraient de la part des Puissances qui les toléreraient un manquement à leur neutralité.

Les belligérants doivent respecter les droits souverains des pays neutres et s'abstenir, dans les territoires ou les eaux neutres, de tout acte qui constituerait, de la part des pays qui les accepteraient, un manquement à leur neutralité.

Article 2.

Article 2.

Tous actes d'hostilité, y compris la capture et l'exercice du droit de visite, commis par des vaisseaux de guerre belligérants dans les eaux territoriales d'une Puissance neutre, constituent une violation de la neutralité et sont strictement interdits.

Tous actes d'hostilité, y compris la capture et l'exercice du droit de visite, commis par des vaisseaux de guerre belligérants dans les eaux territoriales d'une Puissance neutre, constituent une violation de la neutralité et sont strictement interdits.

Article 3.

Article 3.

Quand un navire a été capturé dans les eaux territoriales d'une Puissance neutre, cette Puissance doit, si la prise est encore dans sa juridiction, user des moyens dont elle dispose pour que la prise soit relâchée avec ses officiers et son équipage, et pour que l'équipage mis à bord par le capteur soit interné.

Quand un navire est capturé dans les eaux territoriales d'une puissance neutre, cette puissance doit, si la prise est encore sous sa juridiction, utiliser les moyens à sa disposition pour que la prise soit libérée avec ses officiers et son équipe, et pour que l'équipage mis à bord par le capturant soit interné.

Si la prise est hors de la juridiction de la Puissance neutre, le Gouvernement capteur, sur la demande de celle-ci, doit relâcher la prise avec ses officiers et son équipage.

Si la saisie est en dehors de la juridiction de la Puissance neutre, le gouvernement qui a capturé le navire doit, à la demande de cette Puissance, libérer le navire ainsi que ses officiers et son équipage.

Article 4.

Article 4.

Aucun tribunal des prises ne peut être constitué par un belligérant sur un territoire neutre ou sur un navire dans des eaux neutres.

Aucune cour de prises ne peut être formée par un belligérant sur un territoire neutre ou sur un navire dans des eaux neutres.

Article 5.

Article 5.

Il est interdit aux belligérants de faire des ports et des eaux neutres la base d'opérations navales contre leurs adversaires, notamment d'y installer des stations radio-télégraphiques ou tout appareil destiné à servir comme moyen de communication avec des forces belligérantes sur terre ou sur mer.

Il est interdit aux belligérants d'utiliser des ports et des eaux neutres comme base pour des opérations navales contre leurs adversaires, notamment d'y installer des stations radio-télégraphiques ou tout équipement destiné à servir de moyen de communication avec des forces belligérantes sur terre ou sur mer.

Article 6.

Article 6.

La remise à quelque titre que ce soit, faite directement ou indirectement par une Puissance neutre à une Puissance belligérante, de vaisseaux de guerre, de munitions, ou d'un matériel de guerre quelconque, est interdite.

La remise, quelle qu'en soit la raison, faite directement ou indirectement par une puissance neutre à une puissance belligérante, de navires de guerre, de munitions ou de tout matériel militaire, est interdite.

Article 7.

Article 7.

Une Puissance neutre n'est pas tenue d'empêcher l'exportation ou le transit, pour le compte de l'un ou de l'autre des belligérants, d'armes, de munitions, et, en général, de tout ce qui peut être utile à une armée ou à une flotte.

Une Puissance neutre n'est pas obligée d'empêcher l'exportation ou le transit, au profit de l'un ou de l'autre des belligérants, d'armes, de munitions, et, en général, de tout ce qui peut être utile à une armée ou à une flotte.

Article 8.

Article 8.

Un Gouvernement neutre est tenu d'user des moyens dont il dispose pour empêcher dans sa juridiction l'équipement ou l'armement de tout navire, qu'il a des motifs raisonnables de croire destiné à croiser ou à concourir à des opérations hostiles contre une Puissance avec laquelle il est en paix. Il est aussi tenu d'user de la même surveillance pour empêcher le départ hors de sa juridiction de tout navire destiné à croiser ou à concourir à des opérations hostiles, et qui aurait été, dans ladite juridiction, adapté en tout ou en partie à des usages de guerre.

Un gouvernement neutre doit utiliser les moyens à sa disposition pour empêcher, dans sa juridiction, l'équipement ou l'armement de tout navire qu'il a des raisons de croire destiné à mener ou à participer à des opérations hostiles contre une puissance avec laquelle il est en paix. Il doit également exercer la même surveillance pour empêcher le départ, hors de sa juridiction, de tout navire prévu pour croiser ou participer à des opérations hostiles, et qui aurait été, dans cette juridiction, adapté en tout ou en partie à des fins militaires.

Article 9.

Article 9.

Une Puissance neutre doit appliquer également aux deux belligérants les conditions, restrictions ou interdictions, édictées par elle pour ce qui concerne l'admission dans ses ports, rades ou[Pg 630] eaux territoriales, des navires de guerre belligérants ou de leurs prises.

Une Puissance neutre doit appliquer également aux deux belligérants les conditions, restrictions ou interdictions, édictées par elle pour ce qui concerne l'admission dans ses ports, rades ou[Pg 630] eaux territoriales, des navires de guerre belligérants ou de leurs prises.

Toutefois, une Puissance neutre peut interdire l'accès de ses ports et de ses rades au navire belligérant qui aurait négligé de se conformer aux ordres et prescriptions édictés par elle ou qui aurait violé la neutralité.

Cependant, une puissance neutre peut interdire l'accès de ses ports et de ses havres au navire belligérant qui n'aurait pas respecté les ordres et les règles établis par elle ou qui aurait violé la neutralité.

Article 10.

Article 10.

La neutralité d'une Puissance n'est pas compromise par le simple passage dans ses eaux territoriales de navires de guerre et des prises des belligérants.

La neutralité d'une Puissance n'est pas compromise par le simple passage dans ses eaux territoriales de navires de guerre et des prises des belligérants.

Article 11.

Article 11.

Une Puissance neutre peut laisser les navires de guerre des belligérants se servir de ses pilotes brevetés.

Une puissance neutre peut permettre aux navires de guerre des belligérants d'utiliser ses pilotes certifiés.

Article 12.

Article 12.

A défaut d'autres dispositions spéciales de la législation de la Puissance neutre, il est interdit aux navires de guerre des belligérants de demeurer dans les ports et rades ou dans les eaux territoriales de ladite Puissance, pendant plus de 24 heures, sauf dans les cas prévus par la présente Convention.

A lack of other specific provisions in the legislation of the neutral Power, warships of the belligerents are prohibited from staying in the ports, harbors, or territorial waters of that Power for more than 24 hours, except in the cases provided for in this Convention.

Article 13.

Article 13.

Si une Puissance avisée de l'ouverture des hostilités apprend qu'un navire de guerre d'un belligérant se trouve dans un de ses ports et rades ou dans ses eaux territoriales, elle doit notifier audit navire qu'il devra partir dans les 24 heures ou dans le délai prescrit par la loi locale.

Si une puissance sage apprend l'ouverture des hostilités et qu'un navire de guerre d'un des belligérants se trouve dans un de ses ports, baies, ou eaux territoriales, elle doit informer ce navire qu'il devra quitter dans les 24 heures ou dans le délai prévu par la loi locale.

Article 14.

Article 14.

Un navire de guerre belligérant ne peut prolonger son séjour dans un port neutre au delà de la durée légale que pour cause d'avaries ou à raison de l'état de la mer. Il devra partir dès que la cause du retard aura cessé.

Un navire de guerre en conflit ne peut rester dans un port neutre plus longtemps que la durée légale, sauf en cas de dommages ou en raison de l'état de la mer. Il devra partir dès que la raison du retard aura disparu.

Les règles sur la limitation du séjour dans les ports, rades et eaux neutres, ne s'appliquent pas aux navires de guerre exclusivement affectés à une mission religieuse, scientifique ou philanthropique.

Les règles sur la limitation du séjour dans les ports, rades et eaux neutres, ne s'appliquent pas aux navires de guerre exclusivement affectés à une mission religieuse, scientifique ou philanthropique.

Article 15.

Article 15.

A défaut d'autres dispositions spéciales de la législation de la Puissance neutre, le nombre maximum des navires de guerre d'un belligérant qui pourront se trouver en même temps dans un de ses ports ou rades, sera de trois.

A lack of other special provisions in the legislation of the neutral power, the maximum number of warships from a belligerent that can be present at the same time in one of its ports or roadsteads will be three.

Article 16.

Article 16.

Lorsque des navires de guerre des deux parties belligérantes se trouvent simultanément dans un port ou une rade neutres, il doit s'écouler au moins 24 heures entre le départ du navire d'un belligérant et le départ du navire de l'autre.

Lorsque des navires de guerre des deux belligérants se trouvent simultanément dans un port ou une rade neutre, il doit s'écouler au moins 24 heures entre le départ du navire d'un belligérant et le départ du navire de l'autre.

L'ordre des départs est déterminé par l'ordre des arrivées, à moins que le navire arrivé le premier ne soit dans le cas où la prolongation de la durée légale du séjour est admise.

L'ordre des départs est déterminé par l'ordre des arrivées, à moins que le navire arrivé en premier ne soit dans le cas où la prolongation de la durée légale du séjour est admise.

Un navire de guerre belligérant ne peut quitter un port ou une rade neutres moins de 24 heures après le départ d'un navire de commerce portant le pavillon de son adversaire.

Un navire de guerre en conflit ne peut quitter un port ou une zone neutre moins de 24 heures après le départ d'un navire de commerce affichant le drapeau de son ennemi.

Article 17.

Article 17.

Dans les ports et rades neutres, les navires de guerre belligérants ne peuvent réparer leurs avaries que dans la mesure indispensable à la sécurité de leur navigation et non pas accroître, d'une manière quelconque, leur force militaire. L'autorité neutre constatera la nature des réparations à effectuer qui devront être exécutées le plus rapidement possible.

In neutral ports and anchorages, warships of warring nations can only repair their damages to the extent necessary for the safety of their navigation and cannot increase their military strength in any way. The neutral authority will assess the nature of the repairs needed, which must be carried out as quickly as possible.

Article 18.

Article 18.

Les navires de guerre belligérants ne peuvent pas se servir des ports, rades et eaux territoriales neutres, pour renouveler ou augmenter leurs approvisionnements militaires ou leur armement ainsi que pour compléter leurs équipages.

Les navires de guerre belligérants ne peuvent pas utiliser les ports, rades et eaux territoriales neutres pour renouveler ou augmenter leurs approvisionnements militaires ou leur armement, ainsi que pour compléter leurs équipages.

Article 19.

Article 19.

Les navires de guerre belligérants ne peuvent se ravitailler dans les ports et rades neutres que pour compléter leur approvisionnement normal du temps de paix.

Les navires de guerre en conflit ne peuvent se ravitailler dans les ports et rades neutres que pour compléter leur approvisionnement normal en temps de paix.

Ces navires ne peuvent, de même, prendre du combustible que pour gagner le port le plus proche de leur propre pays. Ils peuvent, d'ailleurs, prendre le combustible nécessaire pour compléter le plein de leurs soutes proprement dites, quand ils se trouvent dans les pays neutres qui ont adopté ce mode de détermination du combustible à fournir.

Ces navires ne peuvent, de même, prendre du combustible que pour gagner le port le plus proche de leur propre pays. Ils peuvent, d'ailleurs, prendre le combustible nécessaire pour compléter le plein de leurs soutes proprement dites, quand ils se trouvent dans les pays neutres qui ont adopté ce mode de détermination du combustible à fournir.

Si, d'après la loi de la Puissance neutre, les navires ne reçoivent du charbon que 24 heures après leur arrivée, la durée légale de leur séjour est prolongée de 24 heures.

Si, selon la loi de la Puissance neutre, les navires ne reçoivent du charbon que 24 heures après leur arrivée, la durée légale de leur séjour est prolongée de 24 heures.

Article 20.

Article 20.

Les navires de guerre belligérants, qui ont pris du combustible dans le port d'une Puissance neutre, ne peuvent renouveler leur approvisionnement qu'après trois mois dans un port de la même Puissance.

Les navires de guerre belligérants, qui ont fait le plein de carburant dans le port d'une puissance neutre, ne peuvent recharger leur approvisionnement qu'après trois mois dans un port de la même puissance.

Article 21.

Article 21.

Une prise ne peut être amenée dans un port neutre que pour cause d'innavigabilité,[Pg 631] de mauvais état de la mer, de manque de combustible ou de provisions.

Une prise ne peut être amenée dans un port neutre que pour cause d'innavigabilité,[Pg 631] de mauvais état de la mer, de manque de carburant ou de provisions.

Elle doit repartir aussitôt que la cause qui en a justifié l'entrée a cessé. Si elle ne le fait pas, la Puissance neutre doit lui notifier l'ordre de partir immédiatement; au cas où elle ne s'y conformerait pas, la Puissance neutre doit user des moyens dont elle dispose pour la relâcher avec ses officiers et son équipage et interner l'équipage mis à bord par le capteur.

Elle doit repartir dès que la raison qui a justifié son arrivée a pris fin. Si elle ne le fait pas, la puissance neutre doit lui donner l'ordre de partir immédiatement ; si elle ne s'y conforme pas, la puissance neutre doit utiliser les moyens dont elle dispose pour la libérer avec ses officiers et son équipage et interner l'équipage embarqué par le capteur.

Article 22.

Article 22.

La Puissance neutre doit, de même, relâcher la prise qui aurait été amenée en dehors des conditions prévues par l'article 21.

La Puissance neutre doit également relâcher le contrôle qui aurait été exercé en dehors des conditions prévues par l'article 21.

Article 23.

Article 23.

Une Puissance neutre peut permettre l'accès de ses ports et rades aux prises escortées ou non, lorsqu'elles y sont amenées pour être laissées sous séquestre en attendant la décision du tribunal des prises. Elle peut faire conduire la prise dans un autre de ses ports.

Une puissance neutre peut permettre l'accès de ses ports et rades aux prises escortées ou non, lorsqu'elles y sont amenées pour être laissées sous séquestre en attendant la décision du tribunal des prises. Elle peut faire conduire la prise dans un autre de ses ports.

Si la prise est escortée par un navire de guerre, les officiers et les hommes mis à bord par le capteur sont autorisés à passer sur le navire d'escorte.

Si la prise est escortée par un navire de guerre, les officiers et les hommes mis à bord par le capteur sont autorisés à passer sur le navire d'escorte.

Si la prise voyage seule, le personnel placé à son bord par le capteur est laissé en liberté.

Si la prise voyage seule, le personnel placé à son bord par le capteur est laissé en liberté.

Article 24.

Article 24.

Si, malgré la notification de l'autorité neutre, un navire de guerre belligérant ne quitte pas un port dans lequel il n'a pas le droit de rester, la Puissance neutre a le droit de prendre les mesures qu'elle pourra juger nécessaires pour rendre le navire incapable de prendre la mer pendant la durée de la guerre et le commandant du navire doit faciliter l'exécution de ces mesures.

Si, malgré la notification de l'autorité neutre, un navire de guerre d'un belligérant ne quitte pas un port où il n'est pas autorisé à rester, la puissance neutre a le droit de prendre les mesures qu'elle juge nécessaires pour rendre le navire incapable de sortir en mer pendant la durée de la guerre, et le commandant du navire doit faciliter l'exécution de ces mesures.

Lorsqu'un navire belligérant est retenu par une Puissance neutre, les officiers et l'équipage sont également retenus.

Lorsqu'un navire en guerre est retenu par un pays neutre, les officiers et l'équipage sont aussi retenus.

Les officiers et l'équipage ainsi retenus peuvent être laissés dans le navire ou logés, soit sur un autre navire, soit à terre, et ils peuvent être assujettis aux mesures restrictives qu'il paraîtrait nécessaire de leur imposer. Toutefois, on devra toujours laisser sur le navire les hommes nécessaires à son entretien.

Les officiers et l'équipage ainsi retenus peuvent être laissés sur le navire ou logés sur un autre navire ou à terre, et ils peuvent être soumis aux mesures restrictives qu'il semblerait nécessaire de leur imposer. Cependant, on devra toujours laisser sur le navire les hommes nécessaires à son entretien.

Les officiers peuvent être laissés libres en prenant l'engagement sur parole de ne pas quitter le territoire neutre sans autorisation.

Les officiers peuvent être laissés libres en promettant sur l'honneur de ne pas quitter le territoire neutre sans autorisation.

Article 25.

Article 25.

Une Puissance neutre est tenue d'exercer la surveillance, que comportent les moyens dont elle dispose, pour empêcher dans ses ports ou rades et dans ses eaux toute violation des dispositions qui précèdent.

Une Puissance neutre doit surveiller, avec les moyens à sa disposition, pour empêcher dans ses ports ou rades et dans ses eaux toute violation des dispositions précédentes.

Article 26.

Article 26.

L'exercice par une Puissance neutre des droits définis par la présente Convention ne peut jamais être considéré comme un acte peu amical par l'un ou par l'autre belligérant qui a accepté les articles qui s'y réfèrent.

L'exercice par une Puissance neutre des droits définis par la présente Convention ne peut jamais être considéré comme un acte peu amical par l'un ou par l'autre belligérant qui a accepté les articles qui s'y réfèrent.

Article 27.

Article 27.

Les Puissances contractantes se communiqueront réciproquement, en temps utile, toutes les lois, ordonnances et autres dispositions réglant chez elles le régime des navires de guerre belligérants dans leurs ports et leurs eaux, au moyen d'une notification adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et transmise immédiatement par celui-ci aux autres Puissances contractantes.

Les Puissances contractantes s'informeront mutuellement, en temps voulu, de toutes les lois, ordonnances et autres règles régissant le traitement des navires de guerre belligérants dans leurs ports et eaux, par le biais d'une notification envoyée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, qui la transmettra immédiatement aux autres Puissances contractantes.

Article 28.

Article 28.

Les dispositions de la présente Convention ne sont applicables qu'entre les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligérants sont tous parties à la Convention.

Les dispositions de la présente Convention ne s'appliquent qu'entre les Puissances contractantes et seulement si tous les belligérants sont parties à la Convention.

Article 29.

Article 29.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée aussitôt que possible.

The present Convention will be ratified as soon as possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

The ratifications will be submitted in The Hague.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les représentants des puissances qui y participent et par le ministre des Affaires étrangères des Pays-Bas.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une notification écrite, adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront par une notification écrite, envoyée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 30.

Article 30.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises à adhérer à la présente Convention.

Les puissances qui ne sont pas signataires peuvent rejoindre cette Convention.

La Puissance qui désire adhérer[Pg 632] notifie par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera déposé dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

La Puissance qui souhaite adhérer[Pg 632] informe par écrit le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas de son intention en lui envoyant l'acte d'adhésion qui sera conservé dans les archives de ce Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances une copie certifiée conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Article 31.

Article 31.

La présente Convention produira effet pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt des ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par la Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La présente Convention produira effet pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt des ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 32.

Article 32.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulût dénoncer la présente Convention, la dénonciation sera notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immédiatement copie certifiée conforme de la notification à toutes les autres Puissances en leur faisant savoir la date à laquelle il l'a reçue.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

La dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée et un an après que la notification en sera parvenue au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 33.

Article 33.

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt de ratifications effectué en vertu de l'article 29 alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle auront été reçues les notifications d'adhésion (article 30 alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 32 alinéa 1).

Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date à laquelle les ratifications ont été déposées conformément à l'article 29, paragraphes 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle les notifications d'adhésion (article 30, paragraphe 2) ou de retrait (article 32, paragraphe 1) auront été reçues.

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise à prendre connaissance de ce registre et à en demander des extraits certifiés conformes.

Each contracting party is allowed to access this registry and request certified copies.

XIV.—STATEMENT regarding the Ban on Releasing Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons.

Les soussignés, Plénipotentiaires des Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence Internationale de la Paix à La Haye, dûment autorisés à cet effet par leurs Gouvernements,

Les soussignés, Plénipotentiaires des Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence Internationale de la Paix à La Haye, dûment autorisés à cet effet par leurs Gouvernements,

s'inspirant des sentiments qui ont trouvé leur expression dans la Déclaration de St. Pétersbourg du 29 novembre/11 décembre 1868, et désirant renouveler la déclaration de La Haye du 29 juillet 1899, arrivée à expiration,

s'inspirant des sentiments qui ont trouvé leur expression dans la Déclaration de St. Pétersbourg du 29 novembre/11 décembre 1868, et désirant renouveler la déclaration de La Haye du 29 juillet 1899, arrivée à expiration,

Déclarent:

Declare:

Les Puissances contractantes consentent, pour une période allant jusqu'à la fin de la troisième Conférence de la Paix, à l'interdiction de lancer des projectiles et des explosifs du haut de ballons ou par d'autres modes analogues nouveaux.

Les Puissances contractantes consentent, pour une période allant jusqu'à la fin de la troisième Conférence de la Paix, à l'interdiction de lancer des projectiles et des explosifs du haut de ballons ou par d'autres modes analogues nouveaux.

La présente Déclaration n'est obligatoire que pour les Puissances contractantes, en cas de guerre entre deux ou plusieurs d'entre elles.

La présente Déclaration n'est obligatoire que pour les Puissances contractantes, en cas de guerre entre deux ou plusieurs d'entre elles.

Elle cessera d'être obligatoire du moment où, dans une guerre entre des Puissances contractantes, une Puissance non contractante se joindrait à l'un des belligérants.

Elle cessera d'être obligatoire dès qu'une Puissance non contractante se joindra à l'un des belligérants dans une guerre entre des Puissances contractantes.

La présente Déclaration sera ratifiée dans le plus bref délai possible.

La présente Déclaration sera ratifiée dès que possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Il sera dressé du dépôt des ratifications un procès-verbal, dont une copie, certifiée conforme, sera remise par la voie diplomatique à toutes les Puissances contractantes.

Il y aura un procès-verbal qui sera établi à partir du dépôt des ratifications, dont une copie certifiée conforme sera envoyée par voie diplomatique à toutes les Puissances contractantes.

Les Puissances non signataires pourront adhérer à la présente Déclaration. Elles auront, à cet effet, à faire connaître leur adhésion aux Puissances contractantes, au moyen d'une notification écrite, adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et communiquée par celui-ci à toutes les autres Puissances contractantes.

Les Puissances non signataires pourront adhérer à la présente Déclaration. Elles devront, à cet effet, informer leur adhésion aux Puissances contractantes, par le biais d'une notification écrite, envoyée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et transmise par celui-ci à toutes les autres Puissances contractantes.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes dénonçât la présente Déclaration, cette dénonciation ne produirait ses effets qu'un an après la notification faite par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et communiquée immédiatement par celui-ci à toutes les autres Puissances contractantes.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes dénonçât la présente Déclaration, cette dénonciation ne produirait ses effets qu'un an après la notification faite par écrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et communiquée immédiatement par celui-ci à toutes les autres Puissances contractantes.

Cette dénonciation ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée.

Cette dénonciation n'aura des effets que pour la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée.

Annex to the First Resolution of the Second Peace Conference XV.—DRAFT CONVENTION ON ESTABLISHING A JUDICIAL ARBITRATION COURT.

Titre I.Organisation de la Cour de justice arbitrale.

Title I.Organization of the Arbitration Court.

Article premier.

First article.

Dans le but de faire progresser la cause de l'arbitrage, les Puissances contractantes conviennent d'organiser, sans[Pg 633] porter atteinte à la Cour permanente d'arbitrage, une Cour de justice arbitrale, d'un accès libre et facile, basée sur l'égalité juridique des États, réunissant des juges représentant les divers systèmes juridiques du monde, et capable d'assurer la continuité de la jurisprudence arbitrale.

In order to advance the cause of arbitration, the contracting powers agree to establish, without undermining the Permanent Court of Arbitration, an accessible and easy-to-reach arbitration court based on the legal equality of states, bringing together judges who represent various legal systems from around the world, and capable of ensuring the continuity of arbitral jurisprudence.

Article 2.

Article 2.

La Cour de justice arbitrale se compose de juges et de juges suppléants choisis parmi les personnes jouissant de la plus haute considération morale et qui tous devront remplir les conditions requises, dans leurs pays respectifs, pour l'admission dans la haute magistrature ou être des jurisconsultes d'une compétence notoire en matière de droit international.

La Cour de justice arbitrale est composée de juges et de juges suppléants choisis parmi des personnes ayant une très grande réputation morale et qui doivent tous respecter les conditions requises dans leurs pays respectifs pour être admis dans la haute magistrature ou être des experts reconnus en droit international.

Les juges et les juges suppléants de la Cour sont choisis, autant que possible, parmi les membres de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage. Le choix sera fait dans les six mois qui suivront la ratification de la présente Convention.

Les juges et les juges suppléants de la Cour sont choisis, autant que possible, parmi les membres de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage. Le choix sera fait dans les six mois qui suivront la ratification de la présente Convention.

Article 3.

Article 3.

Les juges et les juges suppléants sont nommés pour une période de douze ans à compter de la date où la nomination aura été notifiée au Conseil administratif institué par la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux. Leur mandat peut être renouvelé.

Les juges et les juges suppléants sont nommés pour une période de douze ans à partir de la date à laquelle la nomination a été notifiée au Conseil administratif mis en place par la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux. Leur mandat peut être renouvelé.

En cas de décès ou de démission d'un juge ou d'un juge suppléant, il est pourvu à son remplacement selon le mode fixé pour sa nomination. Dans ce cas, la nomination est faite pour une nouvelle période de douze ans.

En cas de décès ou de démission d'un juge ou d'un juge suppléant, il est remplacé selon le processus établi pour sa nomination. Dans ce cas, la nomination se fait pour une nouvelle période de douze ans.

Article 4.

Article 4.

Les juges de la Cour de justice arbitrale sont égaux entre eux et prennent rang d'après la date de la notification de leur nomination. La préséance appartient au plus âgé, au cas où la date est la même.

Les juges de la Cour de justice arbitrale sont tous égaux et sont classés selon la date de leur nomination. La priorité est donnée au plus âgé, en cas de date identique.

Les juges suppléants sont, dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, assimilés aux juges titulaires. Toutefois, ils prennent rang après ceux-ci.

Les juges suppléants sont, dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, considérés comme les juges titulaires. Cependant, ils ont un rang inférieur à ceux-ci.

Article 5.

Article 5.

Les juges jouissent des privilèges et immunités diplomatiques dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions et en dehors de leurs pays.

Les juges bénéficient de privilèges et d'immunités diplomatiques dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, même en dehors de leurs pays.

Avant de prendre possession de leur siège, les juges et les juges suppléants doivent, devant le Conseil administratif, prêter serment ou faire une affirmation solennelle d'exercer leurs fonctions avec impartialité et en toute conscience.

Avant de prendre possession de leur siège, les juges et les juges suppléants doivent, devant le Conseil administratif, prêter serment ou faire une affirmation solennelle d'exercer leurs fonctions avec impartialité et en toute conscience.

Article 6.

Article 6.

La Cour désigne annuellement trois juges qui forment une Délégation spéciale et trois autres destinés à les remplacer en cas d'empêchement. Ils peuvent être réélus. L'élection se fait au scrutin de liste. Sont considérés comme élus ceux qui réunissent le plus grand nombre de voix. La Délégation élit elle-même son Président, qui, à défaut d'une majorité, est désigné par le sort.

La Cour désigne chaque année trois juges qui forment une Délégation spéciale et trois autres pour les remplacer en cas d'empêchement. Ils peuvent être réélus. L'élection se fait par scrutin de liste. Sont considérés comme élus ceux qui obtiennent le plus grand nombre de voix. La Délégation choisit elle-même son Président, qui, en l'absence d'une majorité, est désigné par tirage au sort.

Un membre de la Délégation ne peut exercer ses fonctions quand la Puissance qui l'a nommé, ou dont il est le national, est une des Parties.

Un membre de la Délégation ne peut pas exercer ses fonctions quand la Puissance qui l'a nommé, ou dont il est le national, est une des Parties.

Les membres de la Délégation terminent les affaires qui leur ont été soumises, même au cas où la période pour laquelle ils ont été nommés juges serait expirée.

Les membres de la Délégation terminent les affaires qui leur ont été soumises, même si la période pour laquelle ils ont été nommés juges a expiré.

Article 7.

Article 7.

L'exercice des fonctions judiciaires est interdit au juge dans les affaires au sujet desquelles il aura, à un titre quelconque, concouru à la décision d'un Tribunal national, d'un Tribunal d'arbitrage ou d'une Commission d'enquête, ou figuré dans l'instance comme conseil ou avocat d'une Partie.

L'exercice des fonctions judiciaires est interdit au juge dans les affaires au sujet desquelles il aura, à un titre quelconque, concouru à la décision d'un Tribunal national, d'un Tribunal d'arbitrage ou d'une Commission d'enquête, ou figuré dans l'instance comme conseil ou avocat d'une Partie.

Aucun juge ne peut intervenir comme agent ou comme avocat devant la Cour de justice arbitrale ou la Cour permanente d'arbitrage, devant un Tribunal spécial d'arbitrage ou une Commission d'enquête, ni y agir pour une Partie en quelque qualité que ce soit, pendant toute la durée de son mandat.

Aucun juge ne peut intervenir comme agent ou comme avocat devant la Cour de justice arbitrale ou la Cour permanente d'arbitrage, devant un Tribunal spécial d'arbitrage ou une Commission d'enquête, ni y agir pour une Partie en quelque qualité que ce soit, pendant toute la durée de son mandat.

Article 8.

Article 8.

La Cour élit son Président et son Vice-Président à la majorité absolue des suffrages exprimés. Après deux tours de scrutin, l'élection se fait à la majorité relative et, en cas de partage des voix, le sort décide.

La Cour élit son Président et son Vice-Président à la majorité absolue des suffrages exprimés. Après deux tours de vote, l'élection se fait à la majorité relative et, en cas d'égalité des voix, un tirage au sort décide.

Article 9.

Article 9.

Les juges de la Cour de justice arbitrale reçoivent une indemnité annuelle de six mille florins néerlandais. Cette indemnité est payée à l'expiration de chaque semestre à dater du jour de la première réunion de la Cour.

Les juges de la Cour de justice arbitrale reçoivent une indemnité annuelle de six mille florins néerlandais. Cette indemnité est payée à la fin de chaque semestre à partir du jour de la première réunion de la Cour.

Pendant l'exercice de leurs fonctions au cours des sessions ou dans les cas spéciaux prévus par la présente Convention, ils touchent une somme de cent florins par jour. Il leur est alloué, en outre, une indemnité de voyage fixée d'après les règlements de leur pays. Les dispositions du présent alinéa s'appliquent aussi aux juges suppléants remplaçant les juges.

Pendant l'exercice de leurs fonctions au cours des sessions ou dans les cas spéciaux prévus par la présente Convention, ils touchent une somme de cent florins par jour. Il leur est alloué, en outre, une indemnité de voyage fixée d'après les règlements de leur pays. Les dispositions du présent alinéa s'appliquent aussi aux juges suppléants remplaçant les juges.

Ces allocations, comprises dans les frais généraux de la Cour, prévus par[Pg 634] l'article 33, sont versées par l'entremise du Bureau international institué par la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.

Ces allocations, comprises dans les frais généraux de la Cour, prévus par[Pg 634] l'article 33, sont versées par l'entremise du Bureau international institué par la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.

Article 10.

Article 10.

Les juges ne peuvent recevoir de leur propre Gouvernement ou de celui d'une autre Puissance aucune rémunération pour des services rentrant dans leurs devoirs comme membres de la Cour.

Les juges ne peuvent recevoir de leur propre gouvernement ou de celui d'une autre puissance aucune rémunération pour des services faisant partie de leurs devoirs en tant que membres de la Cour.

Article 11.

Article 11.

La Cour de justice arbitrale a son siège à La Haye et ne peut, sauf le cas de force majeure, le transporter ailleurs.

La Cour de justice arbitrale est située à La Haye et ne peut être déplacée ailleurs, sauf en cas de force majeure.

La Délégation peut, avec l'assentiment des Parties, choisir un autre lieu pour ses réunions si des circonstances particulières l'exigent.

La Délégation peut, avec l'accord des Parties, choisir un autre endroit pour ses réunions si des circonstances particulières l'exigent.

Article 12.

Article 12.

Le Conseil administratif remplit à l'égard de la Cour de justice arbitrale les fonctions qu'il remplit à l'égard de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage.

Le Conseil administratif exerce les mêmes fonctions vis-à-vis de la Cour de justice arbitrale que celles qu'il remplit pour la Cour permanente d'arbitrage.

Article 13.

Article 13.

Le Bureau international sert de greffe à la Cour de justice arbitrale et doit mettre ses locaux et son organisation à la disposition de la Cour. Il a la garde des archives et la gestion des affaires administratives.

Le Bureau international sert de greffe à la Cour de justice arbitrale et doit mettre ses locaux et son organisation à la disposition de la Cour. Il a la garde des archives et la gestion des affaires administratives.

Le Secrétaire Général du Bureau remplit les fonctions de greffier.

Le Secrétaire Général du Bureau remplit les fonctions de greffier.

Les secrétaires adjoints au greffier, les traducteurs et les sténographes nécessaires sont désignés et assermentés par la Cour.

Les secrétaires adjoints au greffier, les traducteurs et les sténographes nécessaires sont choisis et assermentés par la Cour.

Article 14.

Article 14.

La Cour se réunit en session une fois par an. La session commence le troisième mercredi de juin et dure tant que l'ordre du jour n'aura pas été épuisé.

La Cour se réunit en session une fois par an. La session commence le troisième mercredi de juin et dure jusqu'à ce que l'ordre du jour soit épuisé.

La Cour ne se réunit pas en session, si la Délégation estime que cette réunion n'est pas nécessaire. Toutefois, si une Puissance est partie à un litige actuellement pendant devant la Cour et dont l'instruction est terminée ou va être terminée, elle a le droit d'exiger que la session ait lieu.

La Cour ne se réunit pas en session si la Délégation estime que cette réunion n'est pas nécessaire. Toutefois, si un État est impliqué dans un litige actuellement en cours devant la Cour et dont l'instruction est terminée ou va bientôt l'être, il a le droit d'exiger que la session ait lieu.

En cas de nécessité, la Délégation peut convoquer la Cour en session extraordinaire.

En cas de besoin, la Délégation peut convoquer la Cour en session extraordinaire.

Article 15.

Article 15.

Un compte-rendu des travaux de la Cour sera dressé chaque année par la Délégation. Ce compte-rendu sera transmis aux Puissances contractantes par l'intermédiaire du Bureau international. Il sera communiqué aussi à tous les juges et juges suppléants de la Cour.

Un rapport sur le travail de la Cour sera rédigé chaque année par la Délégation. Ce rapport sera envoyé aux États contractants via le Bureau international. Il sera également communiqué à tous les juges et juges suppléants de la Cour.

Article 16.

Article 16.

Les juges et les juges suppléants, membres de la Cour de justice arbitrale, peuvent aussi être nommés aux fonctions de juge et de juge suppléant dans la Cour internationale des prises.

Les juges et les juges suppléants, membres de la Cour de justice arbitrale, peuvent aussi être nommés aux fonctions de juge et de juge suppléant dans la Cour internationale des prises.

Titre II.Compétence et procédure.

Title II.Competence and Procedure.

Article 17.

Article 17.

La Cour de justice arbitrale est compétente pour tous les cas qui sont portés devant elle, en vertu d'une stipulation générale d'arbitrage ou d'un accord spécial.

La Cour de justice arbitrale est compétente pour tous les cas qui sont portés devant elle, en vertu d'une stipulation générale d'arbitrage ou d'un accord spécial.

Article 18.

Article 18.

La Délégation est compétente:

The Delegation is competent:

1. pour juger les cas d'arbitrage visés à l'article précédent, si les Parties sont d'accord pour réclamer l'application de la procédure sommaire, réglée au Titre IV Chapitre 4 de la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux;

1. To judge the arbitration cases mentioned in the previous article, if the Parties agree to request the use of the expedited procedure, as outlined in Title IV Chapter 4 of the Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes;

2. pour procéder à une enquête en vertu et en conformité du Titre III de ladite Convention en tant que la Délégation en est chargée par les Parties agissant d'un commun accord. Avec l'assentiment des Parties et par dérogation à l'article 7 alinéa 1, les membres de la Délégation ayant pris part à l'enquête peuvent siéger comme juges, si le litige est soumis à l'arbitrage de la Cour ou de la Délégation elle-même.

2. to conduct an investigation under and in accordance with Title III of the said Convention as the Delegation is tasked by the Parties acting in mutual agreement. With the consent of the Parties and by exception to article 7 paragraph 1, the members of the Delegation who took part in the investigation may serve as judges if the dispute is submitted to the arbitration of the Court or the Delegation itself.

Article 19.

Article 19.

La Délégation est, en outre, compétente pour l'établissement du compromis visé par l'article 52 de la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux, si les Parties sont d'accord pour s'en remettre à la Cour.

La Délégation est, en outre, compétente pour l'établissement du compromis visé par l'article 52 de la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux, si les Parties sont d'accord pour s'en remettre à la Cour.

Elle est également compétente, même si la demande est faite seulement par l'une des Parties, après qu'un accord par la voie diplomatique a été vainement essayé, quand il s'agit:

Elle est également compétente, même si la demande est faite seulement par l'une des Parties, après qu'un accord par la voie diplomatique a été vainement essayé, quand il s'agit:

1o. d'un différend rentrant dans un traité d'arbitrage général conclu ou renouvelé après la mise en vigueur de cette Convention et qui prévoit pour chaque différend un compromis, et n'exclut pour l'établissement de ce dernier ni explicitement ni implicitement la compétence de la Délégation. Toutefois, le recours à la Cour n'a pas lieu si l'autre Partie déclare qu'à son avis le différend n'appartient pas à la catégorie des questions à soumettre à un arbitrage [Pg 635]obligatoire, à moins que le traité d'arbitrage ne confère au tribunal arbitral le pouvoir de décider cette question préalable.

1o. In the case of a dispute covered by a general arbitration treaty concluded or renewed after this Convention comes into effect, which provides for a compromise for each dispute and does not explicitly or implicitly exclude the Delegate's authority for establishing this compromise. However, resorting to the Court does not occur if the other Party states that, in its opinion, the dispute does not fall within the category of issues to be submitted to mandatory arbitration [Pg 635] unless the arbitration treaty grants the arbitral tribunal the power to decide this preliminary question.

2o. d'un différend provenant de dettes contractuelles réclamées à une Puissance par une autre Puissance comme dues à ses nationaux, et pour la solution duquel l'offre d'arbitrage a été acceptée. Cette disposition n'est pas applicable si l'acceptation a été subordonnée à la condition que le compromis soit établi selon un autre mode.

2o. of a dispute arising from contractual debts claimed by one Power against another as owed to its nationals, and for the resolution of which the offer of arbitration has been accepted. This provision does not apply if the acceptance was conditional upon the compromise being established in a different manner.

Article 20.

Article 20.

Chacune des Parties a le droit de désigner un juge de la Cour pour prendre part, avec voix délibérative, à l'examen de l'affaire soumise à la Délégation.

Chacune des Parties a le droit de désigner un juge de la Cour pour prendre part, avec voix délibérative, à l'examen de l'affaire soumise à la Délégation.

Si la Délégation fonctionne en qualité de Commission d'enquête, ce mandat peut être confié à des personnes prises en dehors des juges de la Cour. Les frais de déplacement et la rétribution à allouer auxdites personnes sont fixés et supportés par les Puissances qui les ont nommées.

Si la Délégation fonctionne comme Commission d'enquête, ce mandat peut être confié à des personnes choisies en dehors des juges de la Cour. Les frais de déplacement et la rémunération à attribuer à ces personnes sont déterminés et pris en charge par les Puissances qui les ont nommées.

Article 21.

Article 21.

L'accès de la Cour de justice arbitrale, instituée par la présente Convention, n'est ouvert qu'aux Puissances contractantes.

L'accès à la Cour de justice arbitrale, établie par cette Convention, n'est ouvert qu'aux Puissances contractantes.

Article 22.

Article 22.

La Cour de justice arbitrale suit les règles de procédure édictées par la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux, sauf ce qui est prescrit par la présente Convention.

La Cour de justice arbitrale suit les règles de procédure établies par la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux, sauf pour ce qui est prescrit par la présente Convention.

Article 23.

Article 23.

La Cour décide du choix de la langue dont elle fera usage, et des langues dont l'emploi sera autorisé devant elle.

La Cour décide quelle langue elle va utiliser et quelles langues seront autorisées devant elle.

Article 24.

Article 24.

Le Bureau international sert d'intermédiaire pour toutes les communications à faire aux juges au cours de l'instruction prévue à l'article 63 alinéa 2 de la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.

Le Bureau international sert d'intermédiaire pour toutes les communications à faire aux juges pendant l'instruction mentionnée à l'article 63 alinéa 2 de la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.

Article 25.

Article 25.

Pour toutes les notifications à faire, notamment aux Parties, aux témoins et aux experts, la Cour peut s'adresser directement au Gouvernement de la Puissance sur le territoire de laquelle la notification doit être effectuée. Il en est de même s'il s'agit de faire procéder à l'établissement de tout moyen de preuve.

Pour toutes les notifications à faire, notamment aux Parties, aux témoins et aux experts, la Cour peut s'adresser directement au Gouvernement de la Puissance sur le territoire de laquelle la notification doit être effectuée. Il en est de même s'il s'agit de faire procéder à l'établissement de tout moyen de preuve.

Les requêtes adressées à cet effet ne peuvent être refusées que si la Puissance requise le juge de nature à porter atteinte à sa souveraineté ou à sa sécurité. S'il est donné suite à la requête, les frais ne comprennent que les dépenses d'exécution réellement effectuées.

Les demandes faites à cet effet ne peuvent être refusées que si l'État concerné estime que cela menace sa souveraineté ou sa sécurité. Si la demande est acceptée, les coûts ne comprennent que les dépenses réellement engagées pour l'exécution.

La Cour a également la faculté de recourir à l'intermédiaire de la Puissance sur la territoire de laquelle elle a son siège.

La Cour peut aussi faire appel à l'intermédiaire de la puissance sur le territoire où elle est située.

Les notifications à faire aux Parties dans le lieu où siège la Cour peuvent être exécutées par le Bureau international.

Les notifications à faire aux Parties dans le lieu où se trouve la Cour peuvent être réalisées par le Bureau international.

Article 26.

Article 26.

Les débats sont dirigés par le Président ou le Vice-Président et, en cas d'absence ou d'empêchement de l'un et de l'autre, par le plus ancien des juges présents.

Les débats sont dirigés par le Président ou le Vice-Président et, en cas d'absence ou d'empêchement de l'un ou de l'autre, par le juge le plus âgé présent.

Le juge nommé par une des Parties ne peut siéger comme Président.

Le juge désigné par l'une des parties ne peut pas agir en tant que Président.

Article 27.

Article 27.

Les délibérations de la Cour ont lieu à huis clos et restent secrètes.

Les délibérations de la Cour se tiennent à huis clos et restent confidentielles.

Toute décision est prise à la majorité des juges présents. Si la Cour siège en nombre pair et qu'il y ait partage des voix, la voix du dernier des juges, dans l'ordre de préséance établi d'après l'article 4 alinéa 1, ne sera pas comptée.

Toute décision est prise à la majorité des juges présents. Si la Cour siège en nombre pair et qu'il y ait partage des voix, la voix du dernier des juges, dans l'ordre de préséance établi d'après l'article 4 alinéa 1, ne sera pas comptée.

Article 28.

Article 28.

Les arrêts de la Cour doivent être motivés. Ils mentionnent les noms des juges qui y ont participé; ils sont signés par le Président et par le greffier.

Les décisions de la Cour doivent être expliquées. Elles indiquent les noms des juges qui ont participé ; elles sont signées par le Président et par le greffier.

Article 29.

Article 29.

Chaque Partie supporte ses propres frais et une part égale des frais spéciaux de l'instance.

Chaque partie couvre ses propres frais et une part égale des frais spéciaux de la procédure.

Article 30.

Article 30.

Les dispositions des articles 21 à 29 sont appliquées par analogie dans la procédure devant la Délégation.

Les dispositions des articles 21 à 29 sont appliquées par analogie dans la procédure devant la Délégation.

Lorsque le droit d'adjoindre un membre à la Délégation n'a été exercé que par une seule Partie, la voix du membre adjoint n'est pas comptée, s'il y a partage de voix.

Lorsque le droit d'ajouter un membre à la Délégation a été exercé seulement par une seule Partie, la voix du membre adjoint ne compte pas s'il y a une égalité des voix.

Article 31.

Article 31.

Les frais généraux de la Cour sont supportés par les Puissances contractantes.[Pg 636]

Les frais généraux de la Cour sont couverts par les puissances contractantes.[Pg 636]

Le Conseil administratif s'adresse aux Puissances pour obtenir les fonds nécessaires au fonctionnement de la Cour.

Le Conseil administratif s'adresse aux États pour obtenir les fonds nécessaires au fonctionnement de la Cour.

Article 32.

Article 32.

La Cour fait elle-même son règlement d'ordre intérieur qui doit être communiqué aux Puissances contractantes.

La Cour élabore elle-même son règlement intérieur, qui doit être communiqué aux puissances contractantes.

Après la ratification de la présente Convention, la Cour se réunira aussitôt que possible, pour élaborer ce règlement, pour élire le Président et le Vice-Président ainsi que pour désigner les membres de la Délégation.

Après la ratification de la présente Convention, la Cour se réunira dès que possible pour élaborer ce règlement, élire le Président et le Vice-Président, ainsi que désigner les membres de la Délégation.

Article 33.

Article 33.

La Cour peut proposer des modifications à apporter aux dispositions de la présente Convention qui concernent la procédure. Ces propositions sont communiquées par l'intermédiaire du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas aux Puissances contractantes qui se concerteront sur la suite à y donner.

La Cour peut suggérer des changements aux règles de cette Convention concernant la procédure. Ces suggestions sont envoyées par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas aux États contractants, qui discuteront des prochaines étapes à suivre.

Titre III.Dispositions finales.

Title III.Final provisions.

Article 34.

Article 34.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée dans le plus bref délai possible.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée dès que possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Il sera dressé du dépôt de chaque ratification un procès-verbal, dont une copie, certifiée conforme, sera remise par la voie diplomatique à toutes les Puissances signataires.

Il sera fait un compte-rendu du dépôt de chaque ratification, dont une copie certifiée conforme sera envoyée par voie diplomatique à toutes les puissances signataires.

Article 35.

Article 35.

La Convention entrera en vigueur six mois après sa ratification.

La Convention commencera à être appliquée six mois après sa ratification.

Elle aura une durée de douze ans, et sera renouvelée tacitement de douze ans en douze ans, sauf dénonciation.

Elle durera douze ans et sera renouvelée automatiquement tous les douze ans, sauf si elle est annulée.

La dénonciation devra être notifiée, au moins deux ans avant l'expiration de chaque période, au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui en donnera connaissance aux autres Puissances.

La dénonciation devra être notifiée, au moins deux ans avant l'expiration de chaque période, au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui en donnera connaissance aux autres Puissances.

La dénonciation ne produira effet qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée. La Convention restera exécutoire dans les rapports entre les autres Puissances.[Pg 637]

The denunciation will only take effect with respect to the Power that notified it. The Convention will remain enforceable in relations between the other Powers.[Pg 637]

APPENDIX 7 DECLARATION OF LONDON OF 1909
(Not yet approved)
With the Report from the Drafting Committee on each Article

[945] The several articles of the Declaration of London are printed in italics, whereas the Report of the Drafting Committee on each article is printed in roman type.

[945] The various articles of the Declaration of London are printed in italics, while the Report of the Drafting Committee on each article is printed in regular type.

Disposition Préliminaire.

Preliminary Disposition.

Les Puissances Signataires sont d'accord pour constater que les règles contenues dans les Chapitres suivants répondent, en substance, aux principes généralement reconnus du droit international.

The Signatory Powers agree to acknowledge that the rules contained in the following Chapters essentially align with the generally recognized principles of international law.

Cette disposition domine toutes les règles qui suivent. L'esprit en a été indiqué dans les considérations générales placées en tête de ce Rapport. La Conférence a eu surtout en vue de constater, de préciser, de compléter au besoin, ce qui pouvait être considéré comme un droit coutumier.

Cette disposition domine toutes les règles qui suivent. L'esprit en a été indiqué dans les considérations générales placées en tête de ce Rapport. La Conférence a surtout eu en vue de constater, de préciser, de compléter au besoin, ce qui pouvait être considéré comme un droit coutumier.

Chapitre Premier.Du blocus en temps de guerre.

Chapter One.The wartime blockade.

Le blocus est envisagé ici uniquement comme opération de guerre, et l'on n'a entendu en rien toucher à ce qu'on appelle le blocus pacifique.

Le blocus est considéré ici uniquement comme une opération de guerre, et il n'a pas été question de toucher à ce qu'on appelle le blocus pacifique.

Article 1.

Article 1.

Le blocus doit être limité aux ports et aux côtes de l'ennemi ou occupés par lui.

The blockade must be limited to the enemy's ports and coasts or those occupied by them.

Le blocus, opération de guerre, ne peut être dirigé par un belligérant que contre son adversaire. C'est la règle très simple qui est posée tout d'abord. Elle n'a toute sa portée que si on la rapproche de l'article 18.

Le blocus, une opération de guerre, ne peut être dirigé par un belligérant que contre son adversaire. C'est une règle très simple qui est posée tout d'abord. Elle n'a toute sa portée que si on la rapproche de l'article 18.

Article 2.

Article 2.

Conformément à la Déclaration de Paris de 1856, le blocus, pour être obligatoire, doit être effectif, c'est-à-dire maintenu par une force suffisante pour interdire réellement l'accès du littoral ennemi.

According to the Paris Declaration of 1856, for a blockade to be mandatory, it must be effective, meaning it must be maintained by a sufficient force to genuinely prohibit access to the enemy's coastline.

La première condition pour qu'un blocus soit obligatoire est qu'il soit effectif. Il y a longtemps que tout le monde est d'accord à ce sujet. Quant à la définition du blocus effectif, nous avons pensé que nous n'avions qu'à nous approprier celle qui se trouve dans la Déclaration de Paris du 16 avril 1856, qui lie conventionnellement un grand nombre d'États et qui est acceptée de fait par les autres.

La première condition pour qu'un blocus soit obligatoire est qu'il soit effectif. Cela fait longtemps que tout le monde est d'accord sur ce point. En ce qui concerne la définition d'un blocus effectif, nous avons pensé que nous n'avions qu'à adopter celle qui figure dans la Déclaration de Paris du 16 avril 1856, qui engage de nombreux États par convention et qui est acceptée en pratique par les autres.

Article 3.

Article 3.

La question de savoir si le blocus est effectif est une question de fait.

The question of whether the blockade is effective is a matter of fact.

On comprend que souvent des difficultés s'élèvent sur le point de savoir si un blocus est ou non effectif; il y a en jeu des intérêts opposés. Le belligérant bloquant veut limiter son effort, et les neutres désirent que leur commerce soit le moins gêné possible. Des protestations diplomatiques ont été parfois formulées à ce sujet. L'appréciation peut être délicate, parce qu'il n'y a pas de règle absolue à poser sur le nombre et la situation des navires de blocus. Tout dépend des circonstances de fait, des conditions géographiques. Suivant les cas, un navire suffira pour bloquer un port aussi efficacement que possible, alors qu'une flotte pourra être insuffisante pour empêcher réellement l'accès d'un ou de plusieurs ports déclarés bloqués. C'est donc essentiellement une question de fait, à trancher dans chaque espèce, et non d'après une formule arrêtée à l'avance. Qui la tranchera? L'autorité judiciaire. Ce sera d'abord le tribunal national appelé à statuer sur la validité de la prise, et auquel le navire capturé pour violation de blocus pourra demander de déclarer la nullité de la prise, parce que le blocus, n'ayant pas été effectif, n'était pas obligatoire. Ce recours a toujours existé; il pouvait ne pas donner une satisfaction suffisante aux Puissances intéressées, parce qu'elles pouvaient estimer que le tribunal national était assez naturellement porté à considérer comme effectif le blocus déclaré tel par son Gouvernement. Mais, quand la Convention sur la Cour Internationale des Prises entrera en vigueur,[Pg 638] il y aura une juridiction absolument impartiale à laquelle les neutres pourront s'adresser et qui décidera si, dans tel cas, le blocus était effectif ou non. La possibilité de ce recours, outre qu'elle permettra de réparer certaines injustices, aura vraisemblablement un effet préventif, en ce qu'un Gouvernement se préoccupera d'établir ses blocus de telle façon que l'effet ne puisse pas en être annulé par des décisions qui lui causeraient un grand préjudice. L'article 3 a donc toute sa portée, si on l'entend en ce sens que la question prévue doit être tranchée judiciairement. C'est pour écarter toute équivoque que l'explication précédente est insérée dans le Rapport à la demande de la Commission.

On understands that difficulties often arise over whether a blockade is effective or not; there are opposing interests at play. The blockading belligerent wants to limit their effort, while neutral parties want their trade to be as unrestricted as possible. Diplomatic protests have sometimes been made regarding this issue. Assessing the situation can be tricky because there’s no absolute rule concerning the number and positioning of blockade vessels. It all depends on the specific circumstances and the geographical conditions. In some cases, a single ship may effectively block a port, while a fleet may not be enough to genuinely prevent access to one or more declared blockaded ports. Thus, it's fundamentally a question of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis, rather than according to a preset formula. Who will decide? The judicial authority. Initially, this will be the national court tasked with ruling on the legality of the seizure, which the captured ship can request to declare null and void, as the blockade, having not been effective, was not mandatory. This recourse has always existed; it might not have satisfied the interested Powers because they could believe that the national court would naturally regard the blockade declared by its Government as effective. However, when the Convention on the International Prize Court comes into effect,[Pg 638] there will be an entirely impartial jurisdiction to which neutrals can turn, and that will decide whether, in a given case, the blockade was effective or not. The possibility of this recourse, in addition to potentially addressing certain injustices, will likely have a preventive effect, as a Government will be concerned with establishing its blockades in such a way that their impact can't be nullified by decisions that could cause significant harm. Article 3 thus holds great significance if understood in the sense that the intended question must be resolved judicially. It is to eliminate any ambiguity that the previous explanation is included in the Report at the request of the Commission.

Article 4.

Article 4.

Le blocus n'est pas considéré comme levé si, par suite du mauvais temps, les forces bloquantes se sont momentanément éloignées.

The blockade is not considered lifted if, due to bad weather, the blocking forces have temporarily moved away.

Il ne suffit pas que le blocus soit établi; il faut qu'il soit maintenu. S'il vient à être levé, il pourra être repris, mais alors il exigera les mêmes formalités que s'il était établi pour la première fois. Traditionnellement, on ne considère pas le blocus comme levé, lorsque c'est par suite du mauvais temps que les forces bloquantes se sont momentanément éloignées. C'est ce que dit l'article 4. Il doit être tenu pour limitatif en ce sens que le mauvais temps est le seul cas de force majeure qui puisse être allégué. Si les forces bloquantes s'éloignaient pour toute autre cause, le blocus serait considéré comme levé, et, au cas où il viendrait à être repris, les articles 12 in fine et 13 seraient applicables.

Il ne suffit pas que le blocus soit établi ; il faut qu'il soit maintenu. S'il est levé, il pourra être rétabli, mais il nécessitera alors les mêmes formalités que s'il était établi pour la première fois. Traditionnellement, on ne considère pas le blocus comme levé lorsque c'est à cause du mauvais temps que les forces de blocage se sont temporairement éloignées. C'est ce que dit l'article 4. Il doit être considéré comme limitatif en ce sens que le mauvais temps est le seul cas de force majeure qui puisse être invoqué. Si les forces de blocage s'éloignent pour une autre raison, le blocus serait considéré comme levé, et si jamais il était rétabli, les articles 12 in fine et 13 seraient applicables.

Article 5.

Article 5.

Le blocus doit être impartialement appliqué aux divers pavillons.

The blockade must be applied fairly to all flags.

Le blocus, opération de guerre légitime, doit être respecté par les neutres en tant qu'il reste vraiment une opération de guerre ayant pour but d'interrompre toutes les relations commerciales du port bloqué. Ce ne peut être un moyen pour un belligérant de favoriser certains pavillons en les laissant passer. C'est ce qu'indique l'article 5.

Le blocus, une opération de guerre légitime, doit être respecté par les neutres tant qu'il reste vraiment une opération de guerre visant à interrompre toutes les relations commerciales du port bloqué. Ce ne peut être un moyen pour un belligérant de favoriser certains pavillons en les laissant passer. C'est ce qu'indique l'article 5.

Article 6.

Article 6.

Le commandant de la force bloquante peut accorder à des navires de guerre la permission d'entrer dans le port bloqué et d'en sortir ultérieurement.

The commander of the blocking force can grant warships permission to enter and later leave the blocked port.

L'interdiction qui s'applique à tous les navires de commerce, s'applique-t-elle aussi aux navires de guerre? Il n'y a pas de réponse absolue à faire. Le commandant des forces de blocus peut estimer qu'il a avantage à intercepter toute communication de la place bloquée, et refuser l'accès aux navires de guerre neutres; rien ne lui est imposé. S'il accorde l'entrée, c'est affaire de courtoisie. Si on a consacré une règle pour dire simplement cela, c'est pour qu'on ne puisse pas prétendre que le blocus a cessé d'être effectif par suite de la permission accordée à tels et tels navires de guerre neutres.

L'interdiction qui s'applique à tous les navires de commerce s'applique-t-elle aussi aux navires de guerre ? Il n'y a pas de réponse claire à cela. Le commandant des forces de blocus peut décider qu'il est dans son intérêt d'intercepter toute communication de la zone bloquée et de refuser l'accès aux navires de guerre neutres ; rien ne l'y oblige. S'il permet l'entrée, c'est une question de courtoisie. Si une règle a été établie pour clarifier cela, c'est pour éviter que l'on prétende que le blocus a cessé d'être effectif en raison de la permission accordée à certains navires de guerre neutres.

Le commandant du blocus doit agir impartialement, comme il est dit dans l'article 5. Toutefois, par cela seul qu'il a laissé entrer un navire de guerre, il ne peut être obligé de laisser passer tous les navires de guerre neutres qui se présenteront. C'est une question d'appréciation. La présence d'un navire de guerre neutre dans un port bloqué peut ne pas avoir les mêmes conséquences à toutes les phases du blocus, et le commandant doit être laissé maître de juger s'il peut être courtois sans rien sacrifier de ses intérêts militaires.

Le commandant du blocus doit agir de manière impartiale, comme indiqué dans l'article 5. Cependant, le fait qu'il ait laissé entrer un navire de guerre ne l'oblige pas à laisser passer tous les navires de guerre neutres qui se présentent. C'est une question d'évaluation. La présence d'un navire de guerre neutre dans un port bloqué peut avoir des conséquences différentes à chaque étape du blocus, et le commandant doit être libre de juger s'il peut être courtois sans compromettre ses intérêts militaires.

Article 7.

Article 7.

Un navire neutre, en cas de détresse constatée par une autorité des forces bloquantes, peut pénétrer dans la localité bloquée et en sortir ultérieurement à la condition de n'y avoir laissé ni pris aucun chargement.

A neutral ship, in the event of distress recognized by a blocking force authority, may enter the blocked area and leave later as long as it hasn’t left or taken any cargo.

La détresse peut expliquer l'entrée d'un navire neutre dans la localité bloquée. C'est, par exemple, un navire qui manque de vivres ou d'eau, qui a besoin d'une réparation immédiate. Sa détresse une fois constatée par une autorité de la force bloquante, il peut franchir la ligne de blocus; ce n'est pas une faveur qu'il ait à solliciter de l'humanité ou de la courtoisie de l'autorité bloquante. Celle-ci peut contester l'état de détresse, mais, l'état une fois vérifié, la conséquence suit d'elle-même. Le navire qui aura ainsi pénétré dans le port bloqué ne sera pas obligé d'y rester tout le temps que durera le blocus; il pourra en sortir quand il sera en état de le faire, quand il se sera procuré les vivres ou l'eau qui lui sont nécessaires, quand il aura été réparé. Mais la permission qui lui a été accordée n'a pu servir de prétexte à des opérations commerciales; c'est pour cela qu'on exige qu'il n'ait laissé ou pris aucun chargement.

Distress can explain a neutral ship entering a blocked area. For example, this could be a ship that is running low on supplies or water, or that needs immediate repairs. Once its distress is confirmed by an authority from the blockading force, it can cross the blockade line; it’s not a favor it has to ask for from the humanity or courtesy of the blockading authority. The authority can challenge the state of distress, but once it is verified, the consequence follows automatically. A ship that has entered a blocked port this way won’t be required to stay there for the duration of the blockade; it can leave once it’s able to do so, once it has secured the necessary supplies or water, or once it has been repaired. However, the permission granted cannot be used as an excuse for commercial operations; that’s why it’s required that the ship has not left or taken any cargo.

Il va sans dire que l'escadre de blocus, qui voudrait absolument empêcher de passer, pourrait le faire, si elle mettait à la disposition du navire en détresse les secours dont il a besoin.

Il va sans dire que l'escadre de blocus, qui voudrait absolument empêcher de passer, pourrait le faire, si elle mettait à la disposition du navire en détresse les secours dont il a besoin.

Article 8.

Article 8.

Le blocus, pour être obligatoire, doit être déclaré conformément à l'article 9 et notifié conformément aux articles 11 et 16.

The blockade, to be mandatory, must be declared in accordance with article 9 and notified in accordance with articles 11 and 16.

Indépendamment de la condition d'effectivité formulée par la Déclaration[Pg 639] de Paris, un blocus, pour être obligatoire, doit être déclaré et notifié. L'article 8 se borne à poser le principe qui est appliqué par les articles suivants.

Indépendamment de la condition d'effectivité formulée par la Déclaration[Pg 639] de Paris, un blocus, pour être obligatoire, doit être déclaré et notifié. L'article 8 se borne à poser le principe qui est appliqué par les articles suivants.

Il suffit, pour éviter toute équivoque, d'indiquer nettement le sens des deux expressions qui vont être fréquemment employées. La déclaration de blocus est l'acte de l'autorité compétente (Gouvernement ou chef d'escadre), constatant qu'un blocus est établi ou va l'être dans des conditions qui doivent être précisées (article 9). La notification est le fait de porter à la connaissance des Puissances neutres ou de certaines autorités la déclaration de blocus (article 11).

Il suffit, pour éviter toute ambiguïté, d'indiquer clairement le sens des deux expressions qui vont être souvent utilisées. La déclaration de blocus est l'acte de l'autorité compétente (Gouvernement ou chef d'escadre), qui constate qu'un blocus est établi ou va l'être dans des conditions qui doivent être précisées (article 9). La notification consiste à informer les Puissances neutres ou certaines autorités de la déclaration de blocus (article 11).

Le plus souvent, ces deux choses—la déclaration et la notification—auront lieu préalablement à l'application des règles du blocus, c'est-à-dire, à l'interdiction réelle du passage. Toutefois, comme on le verra plus loin, il est parfois possible que le passage soit interdit à raison du fait même du blocus qui est porté à la connaissance d'un navire approchant d'un port bloqué, au moyen d'une notification qui est spéciale, tandis que la notification qui vient d'être définie, et dont il est parlé à l'article 11, a un caractère général.

Le plus souvent, ces deux choses—la déclaration et la notification—auront lieu avant l'application des règles du blocus, c'est-à-dire, avant l'interdiction réelle du passage. Toutefois, comme on le verra plus loin, il est parfois possible que le passage soit interdit en raison du blocus lui-même, qui est signalé à un navire approchant d'un port bloqué, au moyen d'une notification qui est spéciale, tandis que la notification récemment définie, mentionnée à l'article 11, a un caractère général.

Article 9.

Article 9.

La déclaration de blocus est faite, soit par la Puissance bloquante, soit par les autorités navales agissant en son nom.

The declaration of a blockade is made either by the blockading power or by naval authorities acting on its behalf.

Elle précise:

She specifies:

1o La date du commencement du blocus;

1o The date the blockade started;

2o Les limites géographiques du littoral bloqué;

2o The geographical boundaries of the blocked coastline;

3o Le délai de sortie à accorder aux navires neutres.

3o The time allowed for neutral ships to depart.

La déclaration de blocus émane le plus souvent du Gouvernement belligérant lui-même. Le Gouvernement peut avoir laissé au commandant de ses forces navales la faculté de déclarer lui-même un blocus selon les circonstances. Cette latitude aura peut-être lieu de s'appliquer moins souvent qu'autrefois à raison de la facilité et de la rapidité des communications. Cela importe peu: il y a là une question d'ordre intérieur.

La déclaration de blocus vient généralement du gouvernement belligérant lui-même. Le gouvernement peut avoir donné au commandant de ses forces navales le pouvoir de déclarer un blocus selon les circonstances. Cette liberté sera peut-être utilisée moins souvent qu'auparavant en raison de la facilité et de la rapidité des communications. Cela n'a que peu d'importance : c'est une question d'ordre intérieur.

La déclaration de blocus doit préciser certains points que les neutres ont intérêt à connaître pour se rendre compte de l'étendue de leurs obligations. Il faut que l'on sache exactement quand commence l'interdiction de communiquer avec la localité bloquée. Il importe, pour l'obligation du bloquant comme pour l'obligation des neutres, qu'il n'y ait pas d'incertitude sur les points réellement bloqués. Enfin, depuis longtemps, s'est établi l'usage de laisser sortir les navires neutres qui sont dans le port bloqué. On confirme ici cet usage en ce sens que le bloquant doit accorder un délai de sortie; on ne fixe pas la durée de ce délai, parce que cette durée est évidemment subordonnée aux circonstances très variables. Il a été seulement entendu qu'il y aurait un délai raisonnable.

La déclaration de blocus doit préciser certains points que les pays neutres ont besoin de connaître pour comprendre l'étendue de leurs obligations. Il est essentiel de savoir exactement quand commence l'interdiction de communiquer avec la zone bloquée. Il est important, tant pour l'obligation du bloqueur que pour celle des neutres, qu'il n'y ait pas d'incertitude sur les zones réellement bloquées. Enfin, il est d'usage depuis longtemps de laisser sortir les navires neutres qui se trouvent dans le port bloqué. On confirme ici cette pratique en précisant que le bloqueur doit accorder un délai de sortie; on ne fixe pas la durée de ce délai, car elle dépend évidemment de circonstances très variables. Il a seulement été convenu qu'il y aurait un délai raisonnable.

Article 10.

Article 10.

Si la Puissance bloquante ou les autorités navales agissant en son nom ne se conforment pas aux mentions qu'en exécution de l'article 9—1o et 2o, elles ont dû inscrire dans la déclaration de blocus, cette déclaration est nulle, et une nouvelle déclaration est nécessaire pour que le blocus produise ses effets.

If the blockading power or the naval authorities acting on its behalf do not adhere to the stipulations that, in accordance with Article 9—1o and 2o, they were required to include in the blockade declaration, that declaration is void, and a new declaration is necessary for the blockade to take effect.

Cet article a pour but d'assurer l'observation de l'article 9. La déclaration de blocus contient des mentions qui ne correspondent pas à la réalité des faits; elle indique que le blocus a commencé ou commencera tel jour, et, en fait, il n'a commencé que plusieurs jours après. Les limites géographiques sont exactement tracées; elles sont plus étendues que celles dans lesquelles opèrent les forces de blocus. Quelle sera la sanction? La nullité de la déclaration de blocus, ce qui fait que cette déclaration ne produira aucun effet. Si, donc, en pareil cas, un navire neutre est saisi pour violation de blocus, il pourra opposer la nullité de la saisie en se fondant sur la nullité de la déclaration de blocus; si son moyen est repoussé par le tribunal national, il pourra se pourvoir devant la Cour Internationale.

This article aims to ensure compliance with Article 9. The blockade declaration contains references that do not match the actual facts; it states that the blockade started or will start on a certain day, but in reality, it didn't begin until several days later. The geographic boundaries are clearly defined; they cover a larger area than where the blockade forces operate. What will the penalty be? The invalidation of the blockade declaration, which means that this declaration will have no effect. Therefore, if a neutral ship is seized for violating the blockade, it can challenge the seizure based on the invalidity of the blockade declaration; if its argument is rejected by the national court, it can appeal to the International Court.

Il faut remarquer la portée de la disposition pour qu'il n'y ait pas de surprise. La déclaration porte que le blocus commence le 1er février; en fait, il n'a commencé que le 8. Il va sans dire que la déclaration n'a produit aucun effet du 1er au 8, puisqu'à ce moment-là, il n'y avait pas de blocus du tout; la déclaration constate un fait, mais n'en tient pas lieu. La règle va plus loin: la déclaration ne produira pas même effet à partir du 8; elle est nulle définitivement, et il faut en faire une autre.

Il faut noter l'importance de la déclaration pour éviter toute surprise. Elle indique que le blocus commence le 1er février ; en réalité, il a débuté seulement le 8. Il va sans dire que la déclaration n'a eu aucun effet du 1er au 8, puisqu'à ce moment-là, il n'y avait pas de blocus du tout ; la déclaration établit un fait, mais ne compte pas pour cela. La règle va plus loin : la déclaration ne produira même pas d'effet à partir du 8 ; elle est définitivement nulle, et il faut en rédiger une nouvelle.

Il n'est pas parlé ici du cas où l'article 9 aurait été méconnu, en ce qu'aucun délai de sortie n'aurait été accordé aux navires neutres se trouvant dans le port bloqué. La sanction ne saurait être la même. Il n'y a pas de raison d'annuler la déclaration en ce qui touche les bâtiments neutres voulant pénétrer dans le porte bloqué. Il faut une sanction spéciale, qui est indiquée dans l'article 16, alinéa 2.

Il n'est pas question ici du cas où l'article 9 aurait été violé, puisque aucun délai de sortie n'aurait été accordé aux navires neutres dans le port bloqué. La sanction ne peut pas être la même. Il n'y a pas de raison d'annuler la déclaration concernant les bâtiments neutres souhaitant entrer dans le port bloqué. Il faut une sanction spécifique, qui est indiquée dans l'article 16, alinéa 2.

Article 11.

Article 11.

La déclaration de blocus est notifiée:

The blockade is announced.

1o Aux Puissances neutres, par la Puissance bloquante, au moyen[Pg 640] d'une communication adressée aux Gouvernements eux-mêmes ou à leurs représentants accrédités auprès d'elle;

1o To the neutral powers, through the blocking power, by means of a communication addressed to the Governments themselves or their accredited representatives;

2o Aux autorités locales, par le commandant de la force bloquante. Ces autorités, de leur côté, en informeront, aussitôt que possible, les consuls étrangers qui exercent leurs fonctions dans le port ou sur le littoral bloqués.

2o To the local authorities, by the commander of the blocking force. These authorities will, in turn, inform the foreign consuls operating in the port or along the blocked coast as soon as possible.

La déclaration de blocus ne vaut que si elle est notifiée. On ne peut exiger l'observation d'une règle que de ceux qui ont été en mesure de la connaître.

La déclaration de blocus n'est valable que si elle est notifiée. On ne peut exiger le respect d'une règle que de ceux qui ont pu en prendre connaissance.

Il y a deux notifications à faire:

Il y a deux notifications à faire :

1. La première est adressée aux Puissances neutres par la Puissance belligérante, qui la communique aux Gouvernements eux-mêmes ou à leurs représentants accrédités auprès d'elle. La communication aux Gouvernements se fera le plus souvent au moyen des agents diplomatiques: il pourrait arriver qu'un belligérant ne fût pas en rapports diplomatiques avec un pays neutre; il s'adressera directement au Gouvernement de ce pays, ordinairement par la voie télégraphique. C'est aux Gouvernements neutres avisés de la déclaration de blocus à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour en faire parvenir la nouvelle sur les divers points de leur territoire, spécialement dans leurs ports.

1. The first is addressed to neutral Powers by the belligerent Power, which communicates it to the Governments themselves or to their accredited representatives. The communication to the Governments will most often be done through diplomatic agents; it could happen that a belligerent is not in diplomatic relations with a neutral country; in that case, they will contact the Government of that country directly, usually via telegraph. It is the responsibility of informed neutral Governments regarding the declaration of blockade to take the necessary measures to ensure that the news reaches various points of their territory, especially in their ports.

2. La seconde notification est faite par le commandant de la force bloquante aux autorités locales. Celles-ci doivent informer, aussitôt que possible, les consuls étrangers qui résident dans la place ou sur le littoral bloqués. Ces autorités engageraient leur responsabilité en ne s'acquittant pas de cette obligation. Les neutres pourraient éprouver un préjudice du fait de n'avoir pas été prévenus du blocus en temps utile.

2. The second notification is made by the commander of the blockading force to the local authorities. They must inform, as soon as possible, the foreign consuls residing in the blockaded area or along the coast. These authorities would be held responsible for not fulfilling this obligation. Neutral parties could suffer harm due to not being warned about the blockade in a timely manner.

Article 12.

Article 12.

Les règles relatives à la déclaration et à la notification de blocus sont applicables dans le cas où le blocus serait étendu ou viendrait à être repris après avoir été levé.

The rules regarding the declaration and notification of a blockade apply in cases where the blockade is extended or is resumed after having been lifted.

Un blocus est étendu au-delà de ses limites primitives; c'est, pour la partie nouvelle, un blocus nouveau et, par suite, les règles de la déclaration et de la notification doivent s'y appliquer. Il en est de même dans le cas où, après avoir été levé, un blocus est repris; il n'y a pas à tenir compte du fait qu'un blocus a déjà existé pour la même localité.

Un blocus s'étend au-delà de ses limites initiales; pour la nouvelle zone, c'est un nouveau blocus, et donc, les règles de déclaration et de notification doivent s'appliquer. Il en va de même si, après avoir été levé, un blocus est rétabli; il n'est pas nécessaire de tenir compte du fait qu'un blocus a déjà existé pour la même localité.

Article 13.

Article 13.

La levée volontaire du blocus, ainsi que toute restriction qui y serait apportée, doit être notifiée dans la forme prescrite par l'article 11.

The voluntary lifting of the blockade, as well as any restrictions that may be applied to it, must be notified in the manner prescribed by Article 11.

S'il est indispensable de connaître l'établissement d'un blocus, il serait utile que le public fût renseigné sur la levée du blocus, puisqu'elle fait cesser l'entrave apportée aux relations des neutres avec le port bloqué. Aussi a-t-on jugé à propos de demander à la Puissance qui lève un blocus de le faire savoir dans la forme où elle a notifié l'établissement du blocus (article 11). Seulement, il y a lieu de remarquer que la sanction ne saurait être la même dans les deux cas. Pour la notification de la déclaration de blocus, il y a une sanction directe, adéquate: le blocus non notifié n'est pas obligatoire. Pour la levée, il ne saurait y avoir rien d'analogue. Le public profitera, en fait, de cette levée, quand même on ne la lui aurait pas fait connaître officiellement. La Puissance bloquante qui n'aurait pas notifié la levée s'exposerait à des réclamations diplomatiques motivées par l'inaccomplissement d'un devoir international. Cet inaccomplissement aura des conséquences plus ou moins graves suivant les circonstances. Parfois, la levée du blocus aura été, en fait, immédiatement connue, et la notification officielle n'ajouterait rien à cette publicité effective.

If it's essential to understand the establishment of a blockade, it would be helpful for the public to be informed about the lifting of the blockade, as it ends the restrictions on neutral parties' dealings with the blocked port. Therefore, it has been deemed appropriate to request that the power lifting the blockade announce it in the same manner it notified the establishment of the blockade (Article 11). However, it should be noted that the consequences cannot be the same in both situations. For the notification of the declaration of a blockade, there is a direct, adequate consequence: an unnotified blockade is not obligatory. Conversely, there can be nothing comparable for the lifting of the blockade. The public will benefit from this lifting even if it is not officially communicated to them. The blockading power that fails to notify the lifting would expose itself to diplomatic claims based on its failure to fulfill an international duty. This failure will have more or less serious consequences depending on the circumstances. At times, the lifting of the blockade may already be known, and the official notification would not add anything to this effective publicity.

Il va sans dire qu'il ne s'agit que de la levée volontaire du blocus; si le bloquant a été chassé par l'arrivée de forces ennemies, il ne peut être tenu de faire connaître sa défaite, que son adversaire se chargera d'annoncer sans retard. Au lieu de lever un blocus, un belligérant peut se contenter de le restreindre; il ne bloque plus qu'un port au lieu de deux. Pour le port qui cesse d'être compris dans le blocus, c'est comme s'il y avait levée volontaire; en conséquence, la même règle s'applique.

It goes without saying that this only refers to the voluntary lifting of the blockade; if the blockading force has been driven away by the arrival of enemy troops, they cannot be required to announce their defeat, which their opponent will quickly take care of. Instead of lifting a blockade, a belligerent can simply choose to restrict it; they may block only one port instead of two. For the port that is no longer under blockade, it’s as if there has been a voluntary lifting; as a result, the same rule applies.

Article 14.

Article 14.

La saisissabilité d'un navire neutre pour violation de blocus est subordonnée à la connaissance réelle ou présumée du blocus.

The ability to seize a neutral ship for violating a blockade depends on actual or presumed knowledge of the blockade.

Pour qu'un navire soit saisissable pour violation de blocus, la première condition est qu'il ait eu connaissance du blocus, parce qu'il n'est pas juste de punir quelqu'un pour inobservation d'une règle qu'il aurait ignorée. Toutefois, il est des circonstances où, même en l'absence d'une connaissance réelle prouvée, on peut présumer cette connaissance, sauf à réserver à l'intéressé la faculté de démentir la présomption (article 15).

Pour qu'un navire puisse être saisi pour violation de blocus, la première condition est qu'il ait connaissance du blocus, car il n'est pas juste de punir quelqu'un pour ne pas respecter une règle qu'il ignorait. Cependant, il existe des situations où, même sans preuve d'une connaissance réelle, on peut supposer cette connaissance, sauf à donner à la personne concernée la possibilité de contester cette présomption (article 15).

Article 15.

Article 15.

La connaissance du blocus est, sauf preuve contraire, présumée, lorsque le navire a quitté un port neutre postérieurement à la notification, en temps utile, du blocus à la Puissance dont relève ce port.[Pg 641]

Knowledge of the blockade is, unless proven otherwise, presumed when the ship has left a neutral port after timely notification of the blockade to the Power responsible for that port.[Pg 641]

Un navire a quitté un port neutre postérieurement à la notification du blocus faite à la Puissance dont relève le port. Cette notification avait-elle été faite en temps utile, c'est-à-dire de manière à parvenir dans le port même où elle a dû être divulguée par les autorités du port? C'est une question de fait à examiner. Si elle est résolue affirmativement, il est naturel de supposer que le navire avait eu, lors de son départ, connaissance du blocus. Cette présomption n'est pourtant pas absolue et la preuve contraire est réservée. Ce sera au navire inculpé à la fournir, en justifiant de l'existence de circonstances qui expliquent son ignorance.

Un navire a quitté un port neutre après que le blocus ait été notifié à la Puissance du port. Cette notification a-t-elle été faite à temps, c'est-à-dire d'une manière à atteindre le port où elle aurait dû être annoncée par les autorités locales ? C'est une question de fait à examiner. Si la réponse est oui, on peut supposer que le navire était au courant du blocus au moment de son départ. Cependant, cette présomption n'est pas définitive et la preuve du contraire peut être apportée. C'est au navire accusé de le prouver, en démontrant qu'il existe des circonstances qui expliquent son ignorance.

Article 16.

Article 16.

Si le navire qui approche du port bloqué n'a pas connu ou ne peut être présumé avoir connu l'existence du blocus, la notification doit être faite au navire même par un officier de l'un des bâtiments de la force bloquante. Cette notification doit être portée sur le livre de bord avec indication de la date et de l'heure, ainsi que de la position géographique du navire à ce moment.

If the ship approaching the blocked port is not aware of the blockade or cannot be presumed to be aware of it, the notification must be given to the ship by an officer from one of the blockading vessels. This notification must be recorded in the ship's logbook, including the date and time, as well as the geographical position of the ship at that moment.

Le navire neutre qui sort du port bloqué, alors que, par la négligence du commandant de la force bloquante, aucune déclaration de blocus n'a été notifiée aux autorités locales ou qu'un délai n'a pas été indiqué dans la déclaration notifiée, doit être laissé libre de passer.

The neutral ship leaving the blocked port, while, due to the negligence of the commanding officer of the blockading force, no blockade declaration has been notified to the local authorities or a time limit has not been indicated in the notified declaration, must be allowed to pass freely.

On suppose un navire approchant du port bloqué sans qu'on puisse dire qu'il connaît ou qu'il est présumé connaître l'existence du blocus; il n'a été touché par aucune notification dans le sens de l'article 11. Dans ce cas, une notification spéciale est nécessaire pour faire connaître régulièrement le fait du blocus au navire. Cette notification est faite au navire même par un officier de l'un des bâtiments de la force bloquante et portée sur le livre de bord; elle peut être faite aux navires d'une flotte convoyée par un vaisseau de guerre neutre, grâce à l'intermédiaire du commandant du convoi qui en donne reçu et qui prend les mesures nécessaires pour l'inscription de la notification sur le livre de bord de chaque navire. Elle mentionne les circonstances de temps et de lieu dans lesquelles elle est faite, ainsi que les lieux bloqués. Le navire est empêché de passer, ce qui fait que le blocus est obligatoire pour lui, bien que n'ayant pas été préalablement notifié; c'est pour cela que cet adverbe a été omis dans l'article 8. Il n'est pas admissible qu'un navire de commerce ait la prétention de ne pas tenir compte d'un blocus réel et de forcer le blocus, par cette seule raison qu'il n'en avait pas personnellement connaissance. Seulement, s'il peut être empêché de passer il ne peut être saisi que lorsqu'il essaie de forcer le blocus après avoir reçu la notification. Comme on le voit, cette notification spéciale joue un rôle très restreint, et ne doit pas être confondue avec la notification spéciale exigée d'une manière absolue dans la pratique de certaines marines.

On assumes a ship is approaching a port that is blockaded without any indication that it knows or is assumed to know about the blockade; it hasn’t received any notifications according to Article 11. In this case, a specific notification is required to inform the ship about the blockade. This notification is delivered to the ship itself by an officer from one of the blockading vessels and recorded in the ship's log; it can also be given to ships in a convoy protected by a neutral warship, through the convoy commander who acknowledgesthe receipt and takes necessary steps to have the notification recorded in each ship's log. The notification states the time and place it was made, as well as the locations that are blockaded. The ship is prevented from passing, making the blockade mandatory for it, even if it wasn't previously notified; that’s why this adverb has been omitted in Article 8. A commercial ship cannot claim to disregard a real blockade and attempt to breach it simply because it was not personally aware of it. However, if it is obstructed from passing, it can only be seized when it tries to breach the blockade after receiving the notification. As seen, this specific notification has a very limited role and should not be confused with the special notification that is absolutely required in the practices of certain navies.

Ce qui vient d'être dit se réfère au navire venant du large. Il faut aussi s'occuper du navire sortant du port bloqué. Si une notification régulière du blocus a été faite aux autorités locales (article 11—2o), la situation est simple: le navire connaît, ou est présumé connaître, le blocus, et s'expose donc à la saisie dans le cas où il n'a pas observé le délai donné par le bloquant. Mais il peut arriver qu'aucune déclaration de blocus n'ait été notifiée aux autorités locales ou que cette déclaration ait été muette au sujet du délai de sortie, malgré la prescription de l'article 9—3o. La sanction de la faute du bloquant est que le navire doit être laissé libre de passer. C'est une sanction énergique qui correspond exactement à la nature de la faute commise, et sera le meilleur moyen d'empêcher de la commettre.

What has been said refers to the ship coming from the sea. We also need to address the ship leaving the port that is blocked. If regular notification of the blockade has been made to the local authorities (article 11—2o), the situation is straightforward: the ship knows, or is assumed to know, about the blockade and is therefore at risk of being seized if it has not adhered to the deadline set by the blockader. However, there may be cases where no declaration of the blockade has been notified to the local authorities or where this declaration was unclear about the exit deadline, despite the requirements of article 9—3o. The penalty for the blockader's mistake is that the ship must be allowed to pass freely. This is a strong penalty that precisely matches the nature of the wrongdoing and will be the best way to prevent it from happening again.

Il va sans dire que cette disposition ne concerne que les navires auxquels le délai de sortie avait dû profiter—c'est-à-dire, les navires neutres qui étaient dans le port au moment de l'établissement du blocus; elle est absolument étrangère aux navires qui seraient dans le port après avoir forcé le blocus.

Il va sans dire que cette disposition ne concerne que les navires auxquels le délai de sortie avait dû profiter—c'est-à-dire, les navires neutres qui étaient dans le port au moment de l'établissement du blocus; elle est absolument étrangère aux navires qui seraient dans le port après avoir forcé le blocus.

Le commandant de l'escadre de blocus est toujours à même de réparer son omission ou son erreur, de faire une notification du blocus aux autorités locales ou de compléter celle qu'il aurait déjà faite.

Le commandant de l'escadre de blocus peut toujours corriger son omission ou son erreur, informer les autorités locales du blocus ou compléter l'avis qu'il aurait déjà donné.

Comme on le voit par ces explications, on suppose le cas le plus ordinaire, celui où l'absence de notification implique une négligence du commandant des forces de blocus. La situation se trouve évidemment tout à fait changée, si le commandant a fait tout ce qui dépendait de lui pour faire la notification et s'il en a été empêché par le mauvais vouloir des autorités locales qui ont intercepté toute communication avec le dehors. Dans ce cas, il ne peut être forcé de laisser passer les navires qui veulent sortir et qui, en l'absence de la notification exigée et de la connaissance présumée du blocus, sont dans une situation analogue à celle qui est prévue par l'article 16, alinéa 1er.

As we can see from these explanations, we assume the most common scenario, where the lack of notification indicates negligence on the part of the commander of the blockade forces. The situation clearly changes if the commander has done everything possible to provide the notification and has been prevented from doing so by the ill will of local authorities who have intercepted all communication with the outside world. In that case, he cannot be forced to allow ships to leave that are attempting to do so, and which, in the absence of the required notification and presumed knowledge of the blockade, are in a situation similar to what is outlined in article 16, paragraph 1er.

Article 17.

Article 17.

La saisie des navires neutres pour violation de blocus ne peut être effectuée que dans le rayon d'action des bâtiments de[Pg 642] guerre chargés d'assurer l'effectivité du blocus.

The seizure of neutral ships for violating a blockade can only be carried out within the operational range of the warships tasked with enforcing the blockade.

L'autre condition de la saisissabilité du navire est que celui-ci se trouve dans le rayon d'action des bâtiments de guerre chargés d'assurer l'effectivité du blocus: il ne suffit pas qu'il soit en route pour le port bloqué.

L'autre condition de la saisissabilité du navire est que celui-ci se trouve dans le rayon d'action des bâtiments de guerre chargés d'assurer l'effectivité du blocus: il ne suffit pas qu'il soit en route pour le port bloqué.

Quant à ce qui constitue le rayon d'action, il a été fourni une explication qui a été universellement acceptée, et qui est reproduite ici comme le meilleur commentaire de la règle de l'article 17:

Quant à ce qui constitue le rayon d'action, il a été donné une explication qui a été largement acceptée, et qui est reproduite ici comme le meilleur commentaire de la règle de l'article 17:

"Lorsqu'un Gouvernement décide d'entreprendre une opération de blocus contre une partie quelconque de côte ennemie, il désigne un certain nombre de navires de guerre qui devront participer au blocus, et il en confie le commandement à un officier qui aura pour mission d'assurer par leur moyen l'effectivité du blocus. Le commandant de la force navale ainsi constituée repartit les navires mis à sa disposition suivant la configuration de la côte et la situation géographique des points bloqués, et donne à chacun d'eux des instructions sur le rôle qu'il aura à remplir, et en particulier sur la zone confiée à sa surveillance. C'est l'ensemble de ces zones de surveillance, organisées de telle manière que le blocus soit effectif, qui forme le rayon d'action de la force navale bloquante.

"When a government decides to carry out a blockade against any part of enemy coastline, it designates a number of warships that will participate in the blockade and appoints an officer to command them. The officer's mission is to ensure the effectiveness of the blockade through their use. The commander of the naval force organizes the ships at their disposal based on the coastline's layout and the geographical situation of the blocked points, providing each ship with instructions on the role they will play, particularly regarding the area they are responsible for monitoring. The collection of these monitoring areas, organized in such a way that the blockade is effective, constitutes the operational radius of the blocking naval force."

"Le rayon d'action ainsi compris est étroitement lié à l'effectivité du blocus et aussi au nombre des bâtiments qui y sont affectés.

"Le rayon d'action ainsi compris est étroitement lié à l'effectivité du blocus et aussi au nombre des bâtiments qui y sont affectés."

"Il peut se présenter des cas où un seul navire suffira pour maintenir un blocus effectif—par exemple, à l'entrée d'un port ou à l'embouchure d'un fleuve dont l'estuaire est peu étendu—à la condition que les circonstances permettent au bloqueur de se tenir suffisamment rapproché de l'entrée. Dans ce cas, le rayon d'action est lui-même rapproché de la côte. Mais, si les circonstances le forcent, au contraire, à se tenir éloigné, il pourra se faire que le navire soit insuffisant pour assurer l'effectivité, et il deviendra alors nécessaire de lui adjoindre d'autres navires pour la maintenir. De ce fait le rayon d'action devient plus étendu et plus éloigné de la côte. Il pourra donc varier suivant les circonstances et suivant le nombre des navires bloqueurs, mais sera toujours limité par la condition que l'effectivité soit assurée.

"Sometimes, just one ship is enough to maintain an effective blockade—like at the entrance of a port or at the mouth of a river with a narrow estuary—provided that the conditions allow the blockading ship to stay close to the entrance. In this case, the operational range is itself close to the shore. However, if conditions force the ship to stay further away, it may turn out that one ship isn’t sufficient to ensure effectiveness, and it will then be necessary to add more ships to maintain it. As a result, the operational range becomes wider and further from the shore. Therefore, it can vary depending on the circumstances and the number of blockading ships, but will always be limited by the condition that effectiveness is ensured."

"Il ne semble pas possible d'assigner au rayon d'action des limites en chiffres fixes et invariables, pas plus qu'il n'est possible de fixer à l'avance et invariablement le nombre des bâtiments nécessaires pour assurer l'effectivité de tout blocus. Ces éléments doivent être déterminés, suivant les circonstances, pour chaque cas particulier de blocus; peut-être pourrait-on le faire au moment de la déclaration.

"Il ne semble pas possible d'assigner au rayon d'action des limites en chiffres fixes et invariables, pas plus qu'il n'est possible de fixer à l'avance et invariablement le nombre des bâtiments nécessaires pour assurer l'effectivité de tout blocus. Ces éléments doivent être déterminés, suivant les circonstances, pour chaque cas particulier de blocus; peut-être pourrait-on le faire au moment de la déclaration."

"Il est évident qu'un blocus ne sera pas établi de la même façon pour une côte sans défense et pour une côte possédant tous les moyens modernes de défense. Il ne saurait être question dans ce dernier cas d'appliquer une règle telle que celle qui exigeait autrefois des vaisseaux arrêtés et suffisamment proches des points bloqués; la situation serait trop dangereuse pour les navires de la force bloquante qui, par ailleurs, possèdent aujourd'hui des moyens plus puissants leur permettant de surveiller d'une façon effective une zone beaucoup plus étendue que jadis.

"Clearly, a blockade will not be set up the same way for an undefended coast as for a coast equipped with all modern defense capabilities. In the latter case, it's out of the question to apply a rule like the one that used to require ships to be stopped and close to the blocked points; the situation would be too dangerous for the blockading ships, which today have more powerful tools that allow them to monitor a much larger area than before."

"Le rayon d'action d'une force navale bloquante pourra s'étendre assez loin, mais, comme il dépend du nombre des bâtiments concourant à l'effectivité du blocus, et comme il reste toujours limité par la condition d'effectivité, il n'atteindra jamais des mers éloignées sur lesquelles naviguent des navires de commerce, peut-être destinés aux ports bloqués, mais dont la destination est subordonnée aux modifications que les circonstances sont susceptibles d'apporter au blocus au cours du voyage. En résumé, l'idée de rayon d'action liée à celle d'effectivité telle que nous avons essayé de la définir, c'est-à-dire, comprenant la zone d'opérations des forces bloquantes, permet au belligérant d'exercer d'une manière efficace le droit de blocus qui lui est reconnu, et, d'un autre côté, elle évite aux neutres d'être exposés à grande distance aux inconvénients du blocus, tout en leur laissant courir les dangers auxquels ils s'exposent sciemment en s'approchant des points dont l'accès est interdit par le belligérant."

" The range of a blocking naval force can stretch quite far, but since it relies on the number of vessels involved in the effectiveness of the blockade, and since it is always limited by the condition of effectiveness, it will never reach distant waters where commercial ships sail, potentially headed for the blocked ports. However, their destination is subject to changes that circumstances may bring to the blockade during the journey. In summary, the concept of range linked to that of effectiveness, as we have tried to define it, meaning the area of operations of the blocking forces, allows the belligerent to effectively exercise the right of blockade that is recognized to them, while also protecting neutrals from being exposed at great distances to the disadvantages of the blockade, while still allowing them to face the dangers they consciously take on by approaching points that are off-limits due to the belligerent's actions."

Article 18.

Article 18.

Les forces bloquantes ne doivent pas barrer l'accès aux ports et aux côtes neutres.

The blocking forces should not block access to neutral ports and coasts.

Cette règle a été jugée nécessaire pour mieux sauvegarder les intérêts commerciaux des pays neutres; elle complète l'article 1er, d'après lequel un blocus doit être limité aux ports et côtes de l'ennemi, ce qui implique que, puisque c'est une opération de guerre, il ne saurait être dirigé contre un port neutre, malgré l'intérêt que pourrait y avoir un belligérant à raison du rôle de ce port neutre pour le ravitaillement de son adversaire.[Pg 643]

Cette règle a été jugée nécessaire pour mieux protéger les intérêts commerciaux des pays neutres ; elle complète l'article 1er, selon lequel un blocus doit être limité aux ports et côtes de l'ennemi, ce qui implique que, comme c'est une opération de guerre, il ne peut pas être dirigé contre un port neutre, même si un belligérant aurait un intérêt en raison du rôle de ce port neutre pour le ravitaillement de son adversaire.[Pg 643]

Article 19.

Article 19.

La violation du blocus est insuffisamment caractérisée pour autoriser la saisie du navire, lorsque celui-ci est actuellement dirigé vers un port non bloqué, quelle que soit la destination ultérieure du navire ou de son chargement.

The breach of the blockade is not clearly defined enough to allow for the seizure of the ship when it is currently headed for an unblocked port, regardless of the ship's or its cargo's later destination.

C'est la destination réelle du navire qui doit être envisagée, quand il s'agit de violation de blocus, et non la destination ultérieure de la cargaison. Cette destination prouvée ou présumée ne peut donc suffire à autoriser la saisie, pour violation de blocus, d'un navire actuellement destiné à un port non bloqué. Mais le croiseur pourrait toujours établir que cette destination à un port non bloqué est apparente et qu'en réalité, la destination immédiate du navire est bien le port bloqué.

C'est la destination réelle du navire qui doit être envisagée, quand il s'agit de violation de blocus, et non la destination ultérieure de la cargaison. Cette destination prouvée ou présumée ne peut donc suffire à autoriser la saisie, pour violation de blocus, d'un navire actuellement destiné à un port non bloqué. Mais le croiseur pourrait toujours établir que cette destination à un port non bloqué est apparente et qu'en réalité, la destination immédiate du navire est bien le port bloqué.

Article 20.

Article 20.

Le navire qui, en violation du blocus, est sorti du port bloqué ou a tenté d'y entrer, reste saisissable tant qu'il est poursuivi par un bâtiment de la force bloquante. Si la chasse en est abandonnée ou si le blocus est levé, la saisie n'en peut plus être pratiquée.

The ship that, in violation of the blockade, has left the blocked port or attempted to enter it remains subject to seizure as long as it is pursued by a vessel of the blockading force. If the pursuit is abandoned or the blockade is lifted, the seizure can no longer be carried out.

Un navire est sorti du port bloqué ou a tenté d'y entrer. Sera-t-il indéfiniment saisissable? L'affirmative absolue serait excessive. Ce navire doit rester saisissable tant qu'il est poursuivi par un bâtiment de la force bloquante; il ne suffirait pas qu'il fût rencontré par un croiseur de l'ennemi bloquant qui ne ferait pas partie de l'escadre de blocus. La question de savoir si la chasse est ou non abandonnée est une question de fait; il ne suffit pas que le navire se soit réfugié dans un port neutre. Le navire qui le poursuit peut attendre sa sortie, de telle sorte que la chasse est forcément suspendue, mais non abandonnée. La saisie n'est plus possible quand le blocus a été levé.

Un navire est sorti du port bloqué ou a essayé d'y entrer. Sera-t-il toujours saisissable ? Dire que oui serait exagéré. Ce navire doit rester saisissable tant qu'il est poursuivi par un bâtiment de la force de blocus ; il ne suffit pas qu'il soit rencontré par un croiseur de l'ennemi bloquant qui ne fait pas partie de l'escadre de blocus. La question de savoir si la chasse est abandonnée ou non est une question de fait ; il ne suffit pas que le navire se soit réfugié dans un port neutre. Le navire qui le poursuit peut attendre sa sortie, de sorte que la chasse est forcément suspendue, mais pas abandonnée. La saisie n'est plus possible quand le blocus a été levé.

Article 21.

Article 21.

Le navire reconnu coupable de violation de blocus est confisqué. Le chargement est également confisqué, à moins qu'il soit prouvé qu'au moment où la marchandise a été embarquée, le chargeur n'a ni connu ni pu connaître l'intention de violer le blocus.

The ship found guilty of breaking the blockade is seized. The cargo is also confiscated unless it can be proven that at the time the goods were loaded, the shipper neither knew nor could have known of the intention to break the blockade.

Le navire est confisqué dans tous les cas. Le chargement est aussi confisqué en principe, mais on laisse à l'intéressé la possibilité d'exciper de sa bonne foi, c'est-à-dire, de prouver que, lors de l'embarquement de la marchandise, le chargeur ne connaissait pas et ne pouvait connaître l'intention de violer le blocus.

Le navire est confisqué dans tous les cas. Le chargement est aussi confisqué en principe, mais on laisse à l'intéressé la possibilité de prouver sa bonne foi, c'est-à-dire, de démontrer qu'au moment de l'embarquement de la marchandise, le chargeur ne connaissait pas et ne pouvait pas connaître l'intention de violer le blocus.

Chapitre II.De la contrebande de guerre.

Chapter 2.On War Contraband.

Ce chapitre est l'un des plus importants, sinon le plus important, de la Déclaration. Il traite d'une matière qui a parfois provoqué de graves conflits entre les belligérants et les neutres. Aussi a-t-on souvent réclamé d'une manière pressante un règlement qui établirait d'une manière précise les droits et devoirs de chacun. Le commerce pacifique pourra être reconnaissant de la précision qui, pour la première fois, est apportée à ce sujet, qui l'intéresse au plus haut point.

Ce chapitre est l'un des plus importants, sinon le plus crucial, de la Déclaration. Il aborde un sujet qui a parfois causé de graves conflits entre les parties en guerre et les neutres. Par conséquent, il y a souvent eu des demandes urgentes pour un règlement qui définirait clairement les droits et les devoirs de chacun. Le commerce pacifique peut être reconnaissant pour la clarté qui, pour la première fois, est apportée à ce sujet qui l'intéresse particulièrement.

La notion de contrebande de guerre comporte deux éléments: il s'agit d'objets d'une certaine espèce et d'une certaine destination. Des canons, par exemple, sont transportés sur un navire neutre. Sont-ils de la contrebande? Cela dépend: non, s'ils sont destinés à un Gouvernement neutre; oui, s'ils sont destinés à un Gouvernement ennemi. Le commerce de certains objets n'est nullement interdit d'une manière générale pendant la guerre; c'est le commerce de ces objets avec l'ennemi qui est illicite et contre lequel le belligérant, au détriment duquel il se fait, peut se protéger par les mesures qu'admet le droit des gens.

La notion de contrebande de guerre comprend deux éléments : il s'agit d'objets d'un certain type et d'une certaine destination. Des canons, par exemple, sont transportés sur un navire neutre. Sont-ils considérés comme de la contrebande ? Cela dépend : non, s'ils sont destinés à un Gouvernement neutre ; oui, s'ils sont destinés à un Gouvernement ennemi. Le commerce de certains objets n'est pas du tout interdit de manière générale pendant la guerre ; c'est le commerce de ces objets avec l'ennemi qui est illégal et contre lequel le belligérant, qui en souffre, peut se protéger par les mesures acceptées par le droit international.

Les articles 22 et 24 énumèrent les objets et matériaux qui sont susceptibles de constituer de la contrebande de guerre et qui en constituent effectivement, quand ils ont une certaine destination, qui est déterminée par les articles 30 et 33. La distinction traditionnelle de la contrebande absolue et de la contrebande conditionnelle est maintenue: à la première se réfèrent les articles 22 et 30, à la seconde les articles 24 et 33.

Les articles 22 et 24 énumèrent les objets et matériaux susceptibles de constituer de la contrebande de guerre, et qui le font effectivement, selon une certaine destination définie par les articles 30 et 33. La distinction classique entre la contrebande absolue et la contrebande conditionnelle est préservée : les articles 22 et 30 se réfèrent à la première, tandis que les articles 24 et 33 se rapportent à la seconde.

Article 22.

Article 22.

Sont de plein droit considérés comme contrebande de guerre les objets et matériaux suivants, compris sous le nom de contrebande absolue, savoir:

Are automatically considered war contraband the items and materials listed below, known as absolute contraband, namely:

1o Les armes de toute nature, y compris les armes de chasse, et les pièces détachées caractérisées.

1o Weapons of all kinds, including hunting weapons, and the specified spare parts.

2o Les projectiles, gargousses, et cartouches de toute nature, et les pièces détachées caractérisées.

2o Projectiles, shells, and cartridges of all kinds, as well as specific spare parts.

3o Les poudres et les explosifs spécialement affectés à la guerre.

3o The powders and explosives specifically designated for war.

4o Les affûts, caissons, avant-trains, fourgons, forges de campagne, et les pièces détachées caractérisées.

4o Hides, gunners' boxes, trucks, wagons, field forges, and the specific spare parts.

5o Les effets d'habillement et d'équipement militaires caractérisés.

5o The effects of military clothing and equipment defined.

6o Les harnachements militaires caractérisés de toute nature.

6o All types of military harnesses.

7o Les animaux de selle, de trait et de bât, utilisables pour la guerre.

7o Horses for riding, pulling, and carrying, usable for war.

8o Le matériel de campement et les pièces détachées caractérisées.

8o Camping gear and the specific spare parts.

9o Les plaques de blindage.

9o Armor plates.

10o Les bâtiments et embarcations de guerre et les pièces détachées spécialement caractérisées comme ne pouvant être utilisées que sur un navire de guerre.

10o Warships and military vessels and the parts specifically designed to be used only on a warship.

11o Les instruments et appareils exclusivement faits pour la fabrication des munitions de guerre, pour la fabrication et la réparation des armes et du matériel militaire, terrestre ou naval.

11o The instruments and devices specifically made for the production of war munitions, for the manufacturing and repair of weapons and military equipment, whether land or naval.

Cette liste est celle qui avait été arrêtée à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix par le Comité chargé d'étudier spécialement la question de la contrebande. Elle était le résultat de concessions mutuelles, et il n'a pas paru sage de rouvrir les discussions à ce sujet, soit pour retrancher, soit pour ajouter des articles.

Cette liste est celle qui avait été arrêtée à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix par le Comité chargé d'étudier spécialement la question de la contrebande. Elle était le résultat de concessions mutuelles, et il n'a pas paru sage de rouvrir les discussions à ce sujet, soit pour retrancher, soit pour ajouter des articles.

Les mots sont de plein droit veulent dire que la disposition produit son effet, par le fait même de la guerre, et qu'aucune déclaration des belligérants n'est nécessaire. Le commerce est averti dès le temps de paix.

Les mots sont de plein droit signifient que la disposition a effet automatiquement à cause de la guerre, et qu'aucune déclaration des parties en conflit n'est nécessaire. Le commerce est prévenu dès la période de paix.

Article 23.

Article 23.

Les objets et matériaux qui sont exclusivement employés à la guerre peuvent être ajoutés à la liste de contrebande absolue au moyen d'une déclaration notifiée.

The items and materials that are used solely for war can be added to the absolute contraband list through a notified declaration.

La notification est adressée aux Gouvernements des autres Puissances ou à leurs représentants accrédités auprès de la Puissance qui fait la déclaration. La notification faite après l'ouverture des hostilités n'est adressée qu'aux Puissances neutres.

The notification is sent to the governments of other powers or their accredited representatives with the power making the declaration. The notification given after hostilities have begun is only sent to neutral powers.

Certaines découvertes ou inventions pourraient rendre insuffisante la liste de l'article 22. Une addition pourra y être faite à condition qu'il s'agisse d'objets et matériaux qui sont exclusivement employés à la guerre. Cette addition doit être notifiée aux autres Puissances, qui prendront les mesures nécessaires pour la faire connaître à leurs nationaux. Théoriquement, la notification peut se faire en temps de paix ou en temps de guerre. Sans doute, le premier cas se présentera rarement, parce qu'un État faisant une pareille notification pourrait être soupçonné de songer à une guerre; cela aurait néanmoins l'avantage de renseigner le commerce à l'avance. Il n'y avait pas de raison d'en exclure la possibilité.

Certain discoveries or inventions might make the list in Article 22 insufficient. An addition can be made as long as it includes objects and materials that are exclusively used for war. This addition must be communicated to the other Powers, who will take the necessary steps to inform their nationals. In theory, the notification can happen in times of peace or war. However, the first case is unlikely to occur often, because a state making such a notification might be suspected of planning for war; nevertheless, it would provide the advantage of informing commerce in advance. There was no reason to exclude this possibility.

On a trouvé excessive la faculté accordée à une Puissance de faire une addition à la liste en vertu de sa simple déclaration. Il est à remarquer que cette faculté ne présente pas les dangers qu'on lui suppose. D'abord, bien entendu, la déclaration ne produit d'effet que pour celui qui la fait, en ce sens que l'article ajouté ne sera de la contrebande que pour lui, en tant que belligérant; les autres États pourront d'ailleurs faire une déclaration analogue. L'addition ne peut concerner que des objets exclusivement employés à la guerre; actuellement il serait difficile d'indiquer de tels objets ne rentrant pas dans la liste. L'avenir est réservé. Si une Puissance avait la prétention d'ajouter à la liste de contrebande absolue des articles non exclusivement employés à la guerre, elle pourrait s'attirer des réclamations diplomatiques, puisqu'elle méconnaîtrait une règle acceptée. De plus, il y aurait un recours éventuel devant la Cour Internationale des Prises. On peut supposer que la Cour estime que l'objet mentionné dans la déclaration de contrebande absolue y figure à tort, parce qu'il n'est pas exclusivement employé à la guerre, mais qu'il aurait pu rentrer dans une déclaration de contrebande conditionnelle. La confiscation pourra se justifier si la saisie a été faite dans les conditions prévues pour cette espèce de contrebande (articles 33 à 35), qui diffèrent de celles qu'on applique à la contrebande absolue (article 30).

On found the power granted to a state to add items to the list simply by its declaration to be excessive. It should be noted that this power does not present the dangers that are often assumed. First of all, the declaration only affects the state making it, in the sense that the added items will only be considered contraband for that state as a belligerent; other states can make similar declarations. The addition can only concern items exclusively used for war; currently, it would be difficult to identify such items that are not on the list. The future is uncertain. If a state were to claim the right to add items to the absolute contraband list that are not exclusively used for war, it could face diplomatic claims, as it would be disregarding an accepted rule. Additionally, there could be a potential appeal to the International Prize Court. It can be assumed that the Court would consider that the item mentioned in the absolute contraband declaration is included erroneously because it is not exclusively used for war, but could have been included in a conditional contraband declaration. Confiscation may be justified if the seizure was made under the conditions specified for this type of contraband (articles 33 to 35), which are different from those applied to absolute contraband (article 30).

Il avait été suggéré que, dans l'intérêt du commerce neutre, un délai devrait s'écouler entre la notification et son application. Mais cela aurait été très préjudiciable au belligérant qui veut précisément se protéger, puisque, pendant le délai, le commerce des articles jugés par lui dangereux aurait été libre, et que l'effet de sa mesure aurait été manqué. Il a été tenu compte, sous une autre forme, des considérations d'équité qui avaient été invoquées (voir article 43).

Il avait été suggéré que, dans l'intérêt du commerce neutre, un délai devrait s'écouler entre la notification et son application. Mais cela aurait été très préjudiciable au belligérant qui veut précisément se protéger, puisque, pendant le délai, le commerce des articles jugés par lui dangereux aurait été libre, et que l'effet de sa mesure aurait été manqué. Il a été tenu compte, sous une autre forme, des considérations d'équité qui avaient été invoquées (voir article 43).

Article 24.

Article 24.

Sont de plein droit considérés comme contrebande de guerre les objets et matériaux susceptibles de servir aux usages de la guerre comme à des usages pacifiques, et compris sous le nom de contrebande conditionnelle, savoir:

Are automatically considered wartime contraband the items and materials that can be used for both war purposes and peaceful uses, and are classified as conditional contraband, namely:

1o Les vivres.

1o Supplies.

2o Les fourrages et les graines propres à la nourriture des animaux.

2o The fodder and seeds suitable for animal feed.

3o Les vêtements et les tissus d'habillement, les chaussures, propres à des usages militaires.

3o Clothing and fabrics for apparel, shoes, suitable for military use.

4o L'or et l'argent monnayés et en lingots, les papiers représentatifs de la monnaie.

4o The gold and silver that is minted and in bars, the paper currency representatives.

5o Les véhicules de toute nature pouvant servir à la guerre, ainsi que les pièces détachées.

5o Vehicles of all kinds that can be used for war, along with spare parts.

6o Les navires, bateaux et embarcations de tout genre, les docks flottants, parties de bassins, ainsi que les pièces détachées.

6o Ships, boats, and vessels of all kinds, floating docks, sections of basins, as well as spare parts.

7o Le matériel fixe ou roulant des chemins de fer, le matériel des télégraphes, radiotélégraphes et téléphones.

7o The fixed or mobile equipment of railways, the equipment for telegraphs, radio telegraphs, and telephones.

8o Les aérostats et les appareils d'aviation, les pièces détachées caractérisées ainsi que les accessoires, objets[Pg 645] et matériaux caractérisés comme devant servir à l'aérostation ou à l'aviation.

8o Balloons and aircraft, spare parts defined as well as accessories, items[Pg 645] and materials identified as intended for ballooning or aviation.

9o Les combustibles; les matières lubrifiantes.

9o Fuels; lubricating materials.

10o Les poudres et les explosifs qui ne sont pas spécialement affectés à la guerre.

10o The powders and explosives that are not specifically intended for warfare.

11o Les fils de fer barbelés, ainsi que les instruments servant à les fixer ou à les couper.

11o Barbed wire, along with the tools used to secure or cut it.

12o Les fers à cheval et le matériel de maréchalerie.

12o Horseshoes and Blacksmith Tools.

13o Les objets de harnachement et de sellerie.

13o Horse gear.

14o Les jumelles, les télescopes, les chronomètres et les divers instruments nautiques.

14o The binoculars, telescopes, chronometers, and various nautical instruments.

Sur l'expression sont de plein droit, il faut faire la même observation qu'à propos de l'article 22. Les objets énumérés ne constituent de la contrebande conditionnelle que s'ils ont la destination prévue par l'article 33.

Sur l'expression sont de plein droit, il faut faire la même observation qu'à propos de l'article 22. Les objets énumérés ne constituent de la contrebande conditionnelle que s'ils ont la destination prévue par l'article 33.

Les vivres comprennent les produits nécessaires ou utiles à l'alimentation de l'homme, solides ou liquides.

Les vivres incluent les produits nécessaires ou utiles à l'alimentation humaine, qu'ils soient solides ou liquides.

Les papiers représentatifs de la monnaie ne comprennent que le papier-monnaie, les billets de banque ayant ou non cours légal. Les lettres de change et les chèques n'y rentrent pas.

Les papiers représentatifs de la monnaie ne comprennent que le papier-monnaie, les billets de banque ayant ou non cours légal. Les lettres de change et les chèques n'y rentrent pas.

Les machines et chaudières rentrent dans l'énumération du 6o.

Les machines et chaudières sont incluses dans l'énumération du 6o.

Le matériel des chemins de fer comprend le matériel fixe, comme les rails, les traverses, les plaques tournantes, les pièces destinées à la construction des ponts, et le matériel roulant, comme les locomotives, les wagons.

Le matériel des chemins de fer comprend le matériel fixe, comme les rails, les traverses, les plaques tournantes, les pièces destinées à la construction des ponts, et le matériel roulant, comme les locomotives, les wagons.

Article 25.

Article 25.

Les objets et matériaux susceptibles de servir aux usages de la guerre comme à des usages pacifiques, et autres que ceux visés aux articles 22 et 24, peuvent être ajoutés à la liste de contrebande conditionnelle au moyen d'une déclaration qui sera notifiée de la manière prévue à l'article 23, deuxième alinéa.

Objects and materials that could be used for both warfare and peaceful purposes, and those not mentioned in Articles 22 and 24, can be added to the list of conditional contraband through a declaration that will be communicated as specified in the second paragraph of Article 23.

Cette disposition correspond, pour la contrebande conditionnelle, à la disposition de l'article 23 pour la contrebande absolue.

Cette disposition correspond, pour la contrebande conditionnelle, à la disposition de l'article 23 pour la contrebande absolue.

Article 26.

Article 26.

Si une Puissance renonce, en ce qui la concerne, à considérer comme contrebande de guerre des objets et matériaux qui rentrent dans une des catégories énumérées aux articles 22 et 24, elle fera connaître son intention par une déclaration notifiée de la manière prévue à l'article 23, deuxième alinéa.

If a Power decides not to regard items and materials that fall into one of the categories listed in Articles 22 and 24 as contraband of war for its purposes, it will announce its intention through a declaration notified in the manner specified in the second paragraph of Article 23.

Un belligérant peut vouloir ne pas user du droit de considérer comme contrebande de guerre les articles rentrant dans les listes ci-dessus. Il peut lui convenir ou de faire rentrer dans la contrebande conditionnelle un article compris dans la contrebande absolue ou de déclarer libre, en ce qui le concerne, le commerce de tel article rentrant dans l'une ou dans l'autre catégorie. Il est à désirer qu'il fasse connaître son intention à ce sujet, et il est probable qu'il le fera pour avoir le mérite de la mesure. S'il ne le fait pas, et s'il se contente de donner des instructions à ses croiseurs, les navires visités seront agréablement surpris si le visiteur ne leur reproche pas de transporter ce qu'eux-mêmes considéraient comme de contrebande. Rien n'empêche une Puissance de faire une pareille déclaration en temps de paix. Voir ce qui est dit à propos de l'article 23.

Un belligérant peut choisir de ne pas déclarer comme contrebande de guerre les articles mentionnés dans les listes ci-dessus. Il peut décider d'inclure un article de la contrebande absolue dans la contrebande conditionnelle, ou de déclarer le commerce d'un article d'une catégorie ou de l'autre comme libre, en ce qui le concerne. Il serait souhaitable qu'il fasse connaître son intention à ce sujet, et il est probable qu'il le fera pour bénéficier du mérite de cette décision. S'il ne le fait pas et se contente de donner des instructions à ses croiseurs, les navires visités seront agréablement surpris si le visiteur ne leur reproche pas de transporter ce qu'ils considéraient eux-mêmes comme de la contrebande. Rien n’empêche une Puissance de faire une telle déclaration en temps de paix. Voir ce qui est dit à propos de l'article 23.

Article 27.

Article 27.

Les objets et matériaux qui ne sont pas susceptibles de servir aux usages de la guerre, ne peuvent pas être déclarés contrebande de guerre.

Objects and materials that cannot be used for military purposes cannot be declared as contraband of war.

L'existence d'une liste dite libre (article 28) rend utile cette affirmation que les objets qui ne sont pas susceptibles de servir aux usages de la guerre ne peuvent être déclarés contrebande de guerre. On aurait pu croire que les objets ne rentrant pas dans cette liste peuvent être déclarés au moins de contrebande conditionnelle.

L'existence d'une liste dite libre (article 28) rend utile cette affirmation que les objets qui ne peuvent pas être utilisés à des fins militaires ne peuvent pas être considérés comme de la contrebande de guerre. On aurait pu penser que les objets qui ne figurent pas sur cette liste peuvent au moins être déclarés comme de la contrebande conditionnelle.

Article 28.

Article 28.

Ne peuvent pas être déclarés contrebande de guerre les articles suivants, savoir:

The following items cannot be declared contraband of war, namely:

1o Le coton brut, les laines, soies, jutes, lins, chanvres bruts, et les autres matières premières des industries textiles, ainsi que leurs filés.

1o Raw cotton, wools, silks, jute, linen, raw hemp, and other raw materials for the textile industries, along with their threads.

2o Les noix et graines oléagineuses; le coprah.

2o Nuts and seeds; copra.

3o Les caoutchoucs, résines, gommes et laques; le houblon.

3o Rubbers, resins, gums and lacquers; hops.

4o Les peaux brutes, les cornes, os et ivoires.

4o Raw hides, horns, bones, and ivories.

5o Les engrais naturels et artificiels, y compris les nitrates et phosphates pouvant servir à l'agriculture.

5o Natural and artificial fertilizers, including nitrates and phosphates that can be used in agriculture.

6o Les minerais.

6o Minerals.

7o Les terres, les argiles, la chaux, la craie, les pierres y compris les marbres, les briques, ardoises et tuiles.

7o The lands, the clays, the lime, the chalk, the stones including marbles, the bricks, slates, and tiles.

8o Les porcelaines et verreries.

8o Porcelain and glassware.

9o Le papier et les matières préparées pour sa fabrication.

9o Paper and the materials prepared for its production.

10o Les savons, couleurs, y compris les matières exclusivement destinées à les produire, et les vernis.

10o Soaps, colors, including the materials specifically intended to produce them, and varnishes.

11o L'hypochlorite de chaux, les cendres de soude, la soude caustique, le sulfate de soude en pains, l'ammoniaque, le sulfate d'ammoniaque et le sulfate de cuivre.

11o Calcium hypochlorite, soda ash, caustic soda, sodium sulfate in solid form, ammonia, ammonium sulfate, and copper sulfate.

12o Les machines servant à l'agriculture, aux mines, aux industries textiles et à l'imprimerie.[Pg 646]

12o The machines used in agriculture, mining, textile industries, and printing.[Pg 646]

13o Les pierres précieuses, les pierres fines, les perles, la nacre et les coraux.

13o Jewels, gemstones, pearls, mother-of-pearl, and corals.

14o Les horloges, pendules, et montres autres que les chronomètres.

14oClocks, watches, and timepieces other than chronometers.

15o Les articles de mode et les objets de fantaisie.

15o Clothing and fun products.

16o Les plumes de tout genre, les crins et soies.

16o Feathers of all kinds, manes, and silks.

17o Les objets d'ameublement ou d'ornement; les meubles et accessoires de bureau.

17o Furniture or decorative items; office furniture and accessories.

C'est pour diminuer les inconvénients de la guerre pour le commerce qu'il a été jugé utile de dresser cette liste dite libre, ce qui ne veut pas dire, comme il a été expliqué plus haut, que tous les objets restés en dehors pourraient être déclarés contrebande de guerre.

C'est pour diminuer les inconvénients de la guerre pour le commerce qu'il a été jugé utile de dresser cette liste dite libre, ce qui ne veut pas dire, comme il a été expliqué plus haut, que tous les objets restés en dehors pourraient être déclarés contrebande de guerre.

Les minerais sont les produits des mines servant à obtenir des métaux (metallic ores).

Les minerais sont les produits des mines utilisés pour obtenir des métaux (metallic ores).

On avait demandé de faire rentrer dans le 10o les produits tinctoriaux; cela a paru trop général; il y a des matières d'où on tire des couleurs, comme le charbon, mais qui servent aussi à d'autres usages. Les produits qui ne sont utilisés que pour obtenir des couleurs bénéficient de l'exemption.

On avait demandé de faire entrer dans le 10o les produits tinctoriaux; cela semblait trop général ; il existe des matières dont on extrait des couleurs, comme le charbon, mais qui sont également utilisées à d'autres fins. Les produits qui ne sont utilisés que pour obtenir des couleurs bénéficient de l'exemption.

Les "articles de Paris" dont tout le monde comprend la signification rentrent dans le 15o.

Les "articles de Paris" dont tout le monde comprend la signification rentrent dans le 15o.

Dans le 16o, il s'agit des soies de certains animaux comme les porcs et les sangliers.

Dans le 16o, il s'agit des poils de certains animaux comme les cochons et les sangliers.

Les tapis et les nattes rentrent dans les objets d'ameublement et d'ornement (17o).

Les tapis et les nattes sont des objets de mobilier et de décoration (17o).

Article 29.

Article 29.

Ne peuvent non plus être considérés comme contrebande de guerre:

They also cannot be considered as war contraband:

1o Les objets et matériaux servant exclusivement à soigner les malades et les blessés. Toutefois, ils peuvent, en cas de nécessité militaire importante, être réquisitionnés, moyennant une indemnité, lorsqu'ils ont la destination prévue à l'article 30.

1o The objects and materials used solely to treat the sick and injured. However, they can, in cases of significant military necessity, be requisitioned, with compensation, when they have the intended purpose stated in Article 30.

2o Les objets et matériaux destinés à l'usage du navire où ils sont trouvés, ainsi qu'à l'usage de l'équipage et des passagers de ce navire pendant la traversée.

2o The items and materials intended for use on the ship where they are found, as well as for the use of the crew and passengers of that ship during the voyage.

Si les objets énumérés dans l'article 29 ne sont pas non plus considérés comme contrebande de guerre, c'est pour des motifs autres que ceux qui ont fait admettre la liste de l'article 28.

Si les objets énumérés dans l'article 29 ne sont pas non plus considérés comme contrebande de guerre, c'est pour des motifs autres que ceux qui ont fait admettre la liste de l'article 28.

Des raisons d'humanité ont fait écarter les objets et matériaux servant exclusivement à soigner les malades et les blessés, ce qui comprend naturellement les drogues et les divers médicaments. Il ne s'agit pas des bateaux hospitaliers, pour lesquels une immunité spéciale est assurée par la Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907, mais de navires de commerce ordinaires dont le chargement comprendrait des objets de la nature indiquée. Le croiseur a toutefois le droit, en cas de nécessité importante, de réquisitionner ces objets pour les besoins de son équipage ou de sa flotte; cette réquisition ne peut être faite que moyennant indemnité. Mais il faut remarquer que ce droit de réquisition ne peut s'exercer dans tous les cas. Les objets dont il s'agit doivent avoir la destination prévue à l'article 30, c'est-à-dire, la destination ennemie. Autrement le droit commun reprend son empire: un belligérant ne saurait avoir le droit de réquisition à l'égard des navires neutres en pleine mer.

Humanitarian reasons have led to the exclusion of items and materials used solely for the treatment of the sick and injured, which naturally includes drugs and various medications. This does not apply to hospital ships, for which special immunity is guaranteed by the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, but rather to ordinary commercial vessels whose cargo might include such items. However, a cruiser has the right, in cases of significant necessity, to requisition these items for the needs of its crew or fleet; this requisition can only be made with compensation. It's important to note that this right of requisition cannot be exercised in every case. The items in question must have the destination outlined in Article 30, that is, the enemy destination. Otherwise, general law prevails: a belligerent cannot have the right to requisition from neutral ships on the high seas.

On ne peut non plus considérer comme contrebande les objets et matériaux destinés à l'usage du navire et qui pourraient, en eux-mêmes et par leur nature, constituer de la contrebande de guerre, par exemple les armes destinées à défendre le navire contre les pirates ou à faire des signaux. Il en est de même de ce qui est destiné à l'usage de l'équipage et des passagers pendant la traversée; l'équipage comprend ici tout le personnel du navire en général.

On also can't consider the items and materials meant for the ship's use as contraband, even if they could technically be classified as war contraband due to their nature, like weapons intended to defend the ship against pirates or to signal. The same applies to goods meant for the crew and passengers during the voyage; the crew here includes all personnel on the ship in general.

De la destination de la contrebande.—Comme il a été dit, le deuxième élément de la notion de contrebande est la destination. De grandes difficultés se sont produites à ce sujet et se symbolisent dans la théorie du voyage continu, souvent combattue ou invoquée sans que l'on se rende bien compte de son exacte signification. Il faut envisager simplement les situations en elles-mêmes et voir comment elles doivent être réglées de manière à ne pas tracasser inutilement les neutres et à ne pas sacrifier les droits légitimes des belligérants.

On the destination of smuggling.—As mentioned, the second element of the concept of smuggling is the destination. There have been significant challenges related to this, often symbolized in the theory of continuous voyage, which is frequently debated or referenced without a clear understanding of its precise meaning. We need to look at the situations themselves and determine how they should be addressed to avoid unnecessarily troubling neutral parties and not infringe on the legitimate rights of belligerents.

Pour amener un rapprochement entre des théories et des pratiques contraires, on a séparé, à ce point de vue, la contrebande absolue de la contrebande conditionnelle.

Pour rapprocher des théories et des pratiques opposées, on a séparé, à ce sujet, la contrebande absolue de la contrebande conditionnelle.

A la contrebande absolue se rapportent les articles 30 à 32, à la contrebande conditionnelle les articles 33 à 36.

A la contrebande absolue se rapportent les articles 30 à 32, à la contrebande conditionnelle les articles 33 à 36.

Article 30.

Article 30.

Les articles de contrebande absolue sont saisissables, s'il est établi qu'ils sont destinés au territoire de l'ennemi ou à un territoire occupé par lui ou à ses forces armées. Peu importe que le transport de ces objets se fasse directement ou exige, soit un transbordement, soit un trajet par terre.

Absolute contraband items can be seized if it's proven they're intended for enemy territory or any area occupied by the enemy or its armed forces. It doesn't matter whether these items are transported directly or require a transfer or a land journey.

Les objets compris dans la liste de l'article 22 constituent de la contrebande absolue, quand ils sont destinés à un territoire de l'ennemi ou à un territoire occupé par lui ou à ses forces armées de terre ou de mer. Ces objets sont saisissables, du moment qu'une[Pg 647] pareille destination finale peut être établie par le capteur. Ce n'est donc pas la destination du navire qui est décisive, c'est la destination de la marchandise. Celle-ci a beau être à bord d'un navire qui doit la débarquer dans un port neutre; du moment que le capteur est à même d'établir que cette marchandise doit, de là, être transportée en pays ennemi par voie maritime ou terrestre, cela suffit pour justifier la saisie et ensuite la confiscation de la cargaison. C'est le principe même du voyage continu qui est ainsi consacré, pour la contrebande absolue, par l'article 30. On regarde comme ne faisant qu'un tout le trajet suivi par la marchandise.

The items listed in Article 22 are considered absolute contraband when they are intended for enemy territory, occupied territory, or for enemy land or naval forces. These items can be seized as long as the final destination can be established by the seizing party. Therefore, it is not the destination of the ship that matters, but the destination of the goods. Even if the goods are on a ship headed for a neutral port, if the seizing party can prove that these goods are to be transported from there to enemy territory by sea or land, that is enough to justify the seizure and subsequent confiscation of the cargo. This establishes the very principle of continuous voyage for absolute contraband as enshrined in Article 30, treating the entire journey of the goods as a single entity.

Article 31.

Article 31.

La destination prévue à l'article 30 est définitivement prouvée dans les cas suivants:

The intended destination as outlined in Article 30 is conclusively established in the following cases:

1o Lorsque la marchandise est documentée pour être débarquée dans un port de l'ennemi ou pour être livrée à ses forces armées.

1o When the goods are documented to be unloaded in an enemy port or to be delivered to its armed forces.

2o Lorsque le navire ne doit aborder qu'à des ports ennemis, ou lorsqu'il doit toucher à un port de l'ennemi ou rejoindre ses forces armées, avant d'arriver au port neutre pour lequel la marchandise est documentée.

2o When the ship is only supposed to dock at enemy ports, or when it needs to dock at an enemy port or join its armed forces, before reaching the neutral port for which the cargo is documented.

Comme il a été dit, c'est au capteur qu'incombe l'obligation de prouver que la marchandise de contrebande a bien la destination prévue par l'article 30. Dans certains cas prévus par l'article 31, cette destination est définitivement prouvée, c'est-à-dire que la preuve contraire n'est pas admise.

Comme il a été dit, c'est au capteur qu'incombe l'obligation de prouver que la marchandise de contrebande a bien la destination prévue par l'article 30. Dans certains cas prévus par l'article 31, cette destination est définitivement prouvée, c'est-à-dire que la preuve contraire n'est pas admise.

Premier Cas.—La marchandise est documentée pour être débarquée dans un port ennemi, c'est-à-dire que, d'après les papiers de bord qui se réfèrent à cette marchandise, elle doit bien y être débarquée. Il y a alors un véritable aveu, de la part des intéressés eux-mêmes, de la destination ennemie.

Premier Cas.—The goods are documented to be unloaded at an enemy port, meaning that, according to the shipping papers related to these goods, they are indeed supposed to be unloaded there. This serves as a clear acknowledgment from those involved of the enemy destination.

Deuxième Cas.—Le navire ne doit aborder qu'à des ports ennemis ou bien il doit toucher à un port ennemi avant d'arriver au port neutre pour lequel la marchandise est documentée. Ainsi cette marchandise doit bien, d'après les papiers qui la concernent, être débarquée dans un port neutre, mais le navire qui la porte doit, avant d'arriver à ce port, toucher à un port ennemi. Elle sera saisissable et on ne réserve pas la possibilité de prouver que la destination neutre est réelle et conforme aux intentions des intéressés. La circonstance que, avant de parvenir à cette destination, le navire touchera à un port ennemi, ferait naître un trop grand risque pour le belligérant dont le croiseur visite le navire. Sans supposer même une fraude préméditée, il pourrait y avoir, pour le capitaine du navire de commerce, une forte tentation de débarquer la contrebande dont il trouverait un prix avantageux, et, pour l'autorité locale, la tentation de réquisitionner cette marchandise.

Second Case.—The ship must only dock at enemy ports or it must stop at an enemy port before arriving at the neutral port for which the cargo is documented. Therefore, this cargo must, according to the relevant papers, be unloaded at a neutral port, but the ship carrying it must, before reaching that port, stop at an enemy port. It will be subject to seizure and there’s no allowance for proving that the neutral destination is real and aligned with the intentions of those involved. The fact that, before reaching this destination, the ship will stop at an enemy port creates too great a risk for the belligerent whose cruiser inspects the ship. Without even assuming a premeditated fraud, there could be a strong temptation for the captain of the commercial vessel to offload the contraband for which he finds a good price, and for the local authority, the temptation to requisition this cargo.

Le cas où le navire, avant d'arriver au port neutre, doit rejoindre les forces armées de l'ennemi, est identique.

Le cas où le navire, avant d'arriver au port neutre, doit rejoindre les forces armées de l'ennemi, est identique.

Pour simplifier, la disposition ne parle que d'un port ennemi; il va de soi qu'il faut lui assimiler le port occupé par l'ennemi, comme cela résulte de la règle générale de l'article 30.

Pour simplifier, la disposition ne parle que d'un port ennemi; il va de soi qu'il faut lui assimiler le port occupé par l'ennemi, comme cela résulte de la règle générale de l'article 30.

Article 32.

Article 32.

Les papiers de bord font preuve complète de l'itinéraire du navire transportant de la contrebande absolue, à moins que le navire soit rencontré ayant manifestement dévié de la route qu'il devrait suivre d'après ses papiers de bord et sans pouvoir justifier d'une cause suffisante de cette déviation.

The shipping documents thoroughly demonstrate the route of the ship carrying absolute contraband, unless the ship is encountered clearly deviating from the course it should be taking according to its shipping documents and cannot provide sufficient justification for that deviation.

Les papiers de bord font donc preuve complète de l'itinéraire du navire, à moins que ce navire soit rencontré dans des circonstances qui montrent que l'on ne peut se fier à leurs allégations. Voir, d'ailleurs, les explications données à propos de l'article 35.

Les papiers de bord montrent donc clairement l'itinéraire du navire, à moins que ce navire ne soit rencontré dans des circonstances qui montrent qu'on ne peut pas faire confiance à ses affirmations. Voir, d'ailleurs, les explications données à propos de l'article 35.

Article 33.

Article 33.

Les articles de contrebande conditionnelle sont saisissables, s'il est établi qu'ils sont destinés à l'usage des forces armées ou des administrations de l'État ennemi, à moins, dans ce dernier cas, que les circonstances établissent qu'en fait ces articles ne peuvent être utilisés pour la guerre en cours; cette dernière réserve ne s'applique pas aux envois visés par l'article 24—4o.

Conditional contraband articles can be seized if it’s established that they are intended for use by the armed forces or the enemy's state administrations, unless in the latter case, the circumstances show that these items cannot actually be used for the ongoing war; this last exception does not apply to shipments covered by article 24—4o.

Les règles qui concernent la contrebande conditionnelle diffèrent de celles qui ont été posées pour la contrebande absolue, à un double point de vue: 1o il ne s'agit pas d'une destination à l'ennemi en général, mais d'une destination à l'usage de ses forces armées ou de ses administrations; 2o la doctrine du voyage continu est écartée. A la première idée correspondent les articles 33 et 34; à la seconde correspond l'article 35.

Les règles sur la contrebande conditionnelle diffèrent de celles établies pour la contrebande absolue, à deux égards : 1o il ne s'agit pas d'une destination vers l'ennemi en général, mais vers l'utilisation de ses forces armées ou de ses administrations ; 2o la doctrine du voyage continu est écartée. La première idée correspond aux articles 33 et 34 ; la seconde correspond à l'article 35.

Les objets compris dans la liste de la contrebande conditionnelle peuvent servir à des usages pacifiques comme à des emplois hostiles. Si, d'après les circonstances, l'emploi pacifique est certain, la saisie ne se justifie pas; il en est autrement si l'emploi hostile doit se supposer, ce qui arrive, par exemple, s'il s'agit de vivres destinés à une armée ou à une flotte de l'ennemi, de charbon destiné à une flotte ennemie. En cas pareil, il n'y a évidemment pas de doute. Mais que faut-il décider quand[Pg 648] c'est à l'usage des administrations civiles d'État ennemi que les objets sont destinés? C'est de l'argent qui est envoyé à une administration civile et qui doit être employé au paiement du salaire de ses agents, des rails de chemin de fer qui sont expédiés à une administration des travaux publics. Il y aura, dans ces cas, destination ennemie rendant la marchandise saisissable d'abord et confiscable ensuite. Cela s'explique pour des raisons à la fois juridiques et pratiques. L'État est un, quoique les fonctions nécessaires à son action soient confiées à diverses administrations. Si une administration civile peut recevoir librement des vivres ou de l'argent, cela ne profite pas à elle seule, mais à l'État tout entier, y compris l'administration militaire, puisque les ressources générales de l'État augmentent ainsi. Il y a plus: ce que reçoit une administration civile peut être jugé plus nécessaire à l'administration militaire et attribué directement à celle-ci. L'argent ou les vivres réellement destinés à une administration civile peuvent se trouver ainsi directement employés aux besoins de l'armée. Cette possibilité, qui existe toujours, explique pourquoi la destination aux administrations de l'État ennemi est assimilée à la destination aux forces armées.

Les objets listés dans la contrebande conditionnelle peuvent être utilisés à la fois pour des fins pacifiques et hostiles. Si, selon les circonstances, l'utilisation pacifique est évidente, la saisie n'est pas justifiée ; en revanche, cela change si l’on suppose une utilisation hostile, comme dans le cas de provisions destinées à une armée ou à une flotte ennemie, ou de charbon destiné à une flotte ennemie. Dans ces situations, il n'y a clairement pas de doute. Mais que doit-on décider lorsque les objets sont destinés à des administrations civiles de l'État ennemi ? Cela concerne l'argent envoyé à une administration civile pour payer ses agents, ou encore des rails de chemin de fer expédiés à une administration des travaux publics. Dans ces cas, il y a une destination ennemie, rendant la marchandise saisissable d'abord et confiscable ensuite. Cela se justifie pour des raisons tant juridiques que pratiques. L'État est unique, même si les fonctions nécessaires à son action sont réparties entre diverses administrations. Si une administration civile peut recevoir librement des vivres ou de l'argent, cela ne bénéficie pas uniquement à elle, mais à l'État entier, y compris à l'administration militaire, puisque les ressources globales de l'État augmentent ainsi. De plus, ce qu'une administration civile reçoit peut être jugé plus nécessaire pour l'administration militaire et directement attribué à celle-ci. L'argent ou les provisions réellement destinés à une administration civile peuvent ainsi être utilisés pour les besoins de l'armée. Cette possibilité, qui existe toujours, explique pourquoi la destination vers des administrations de l'État ennemi est considérée comme équivalente à la destination vers des forces armées.

Il s'agit des administrations de l'État, qui sont des dépendances du pouvoir central, et non de toutes les administrations qui peuvent exister dans l'État ennemi; les administrations locales, municipales, par exemple, n'y rentrent pas, et ce qui serait destiné à leur usage ne constituerait pas de la contrebande.

Il s'agit des administrations de l'État, qui sont des dépendances du pouvoir central, et non de toutes les administrations qui peuvent exister dans l'État ennemi; les administrations locales, municipales, par exemple, n'y rentrent pas, et ce qui serait destiné à leur usage ne constituerait pas de la contrebande.

La guerre peut se poursuivre dans des circonstances telles que la destination à l'usage d'une administration civile ne puisse être suspectée et ne puisse, par conséquent, donner à la marchandise le caractère de contrebande. Par exemple, une guerre existe en Europe et les colonies des pays belligérants ne sont pas, en fait, atteintes par la guerre. Les vivres ou autres objets de la liste de contrebande conditionnelle qui seraient destinés à l'usage d'une administration civile coloniale ne seraient pas réputés contrebande de guerre, parce que les considérations invoquées plus haut ne s'appliquent pas dans l'espèce; il ne peut y avoir emprunt pour les besoins de la guerre des ressources de l'administration civile. Exception est faite pour l'or et l'argent ou les papiers représentatifs de la monnaie, parce qu'une somme d'argent peut facilement se transmettre d'un bout du monde à l'autre.

La guerre peut continuer dans des situations où l'utilisation par une administration civile ne peut pas être mise en doute et ne peut donc pas qualifier la marchandise de contrebande. Par exemple, une guerre se déroule en Europe, mais les colonies des pays en guerre ne sont pas réellement touchées par celle-ci. Les denrées alimentaires ou d'autres articles de la liste de contrebande conditionnelle destinés à l'usage d'une administration civile coloniale ne seraient pas considérés comme de la contrebande de guerre, car les raisons évoquées précédemment ne s'appliquent pas ici ; il ne peut pas y avoir de détournement des ressources de l'administration civile pour les besoins de la guerre. Une exception est faite pour l'or, l'argent ou les papiers représentant de la monnaie, car une somme d'argent peut facilement être transférée d'un bout à l'autre du monde.

Article 34.

Article 34.

Il y a présomption de la destination prévue à l'article 33, si l'envoi est adressé aux autorités ennemies, ou à un commerçant établi en pays ennemi et lorsqu'il est notoire que ce commerçant fournit à l'ennemi des objets et matériaux de cette nature. Il en est de même si l'envoi est à destination d'une place fortifiée ennemie, ou d'une autre place servant de base aux forces armées ennemies; toutefois, cette présomption ne s'applique point au navire de commerce lui-même faisant route vers une de ces places et dont on entend établir le caractère de contrebande.

There is a presumption of the intended purpose described in Article 33 if the shipment is sent to enemy authorities or to a merchant based in enemy territory, and it is well-known that this merchant supplies the enemy with items and materials of that kind. The same applies if the shipment is intended for an enemy stronghold or another location used as a base for enemy armed forces; however, this presumption does not apply to the merchant ship itself heading towards one of these locations, which is intended to be characterized as contraband.

A défaut des présomptions ci-dessus, la destination est présumée innocente.

If none of the above presumptions apply, the destination is presumed innocent.

Les présomptions établies dans le présent article admettent la preuve contraire.

The presumptions established in this article allow for contrary evidence.

Ordinairement les articles de contrebande ne seront pas expressément adressés aux autorités militaires ou aux administrations de l'État ennemi. On dissimulera plus ou moins la destination véritable; c'est au capteur à l'établir pour justifier la saisie. Mais on a cru raisonnable d'établir des présomptions, soit à raison de la qualité du destinataire, soit à raison du caractère de la place à laquelle sont destinés les objets. C'est une autorité ennemie ou un commerçant établi en pays ennemi, qui est le fournisseur notoire du Gouvernement ennemi pour les articles dont il s'agit. C'est une place fortifiée ennemie ou une place servant de base aux forces armées ennemies, que ce soit une base d'opérations ou une base de ravitaillement.

Ordinarily, smuggled goods aren’t explicitly addressed to military authorities or enemy state administrations. The true destination will be somewhat concealed; it’s up to the seizer to establish it to justify the confiscation. However, it was deemed reasonable to establish presumptions, either based on the identity of the recipient or the nature of the location for which the goods are intended. This could be an enemy authority or a trader established in enemy territory, who is a well-known supplier for the enemy government for the goods in question. It could also be a fortified enemy location or a place serving as a base for enemy armed forces, whether it's an operations base or a supply base.

Cette présomption générale ne saurait s'appliquer au navire de commerce lui-même qui se dirigerait vers une place fortifiée et qui peut bien, par lui-même, constituer de la contrebande relative, mais à la condition que sa destination à l'usage des forces armées ou des administrations de l'État ennemi soit directement prouvée.

Cette présomption générale ne saurait s'appliquer au navire de commerce lui-même qui se dirigerait vers une place fortifiée et qui peut bien, par lui-même, constituer de la contrebande relative, mais à la condition que sa destination à l'usage des forces armées ou des administrations de l'État ennemi soit directement prouvée.

A défaut des présomptions précédentes, la destination est présumée innocente. C'est le droit commun, d'après lequel le capteur doit prouver le caractère illicite de la marchandise qu'il prétend saisir.

A défaut des présomptions précédentes, la destination est présumée innocente. C'est le droit commun, d'après lequel le capteur doit prouver le caractère illicite de la marchandise qu'il prétend saisir.

Enfin, toutes les présomptions ainsi établies dans l'intérêt du capteur ou contre lui admettent la preuve contraire. Les tribunaux nationaux d'abord, la Cour Internationale ensuite, apprécieront.

Enfin, toutes les présomptions établies dans l'intérêt du capteur ou contre lui acceptent la preuve contraire. Les tribunaux nationaux d'abord, la Cour Internationale ensuite, évalueront.

Article 35.

Article 35.

Les articles de contrebande conditionnelle ne sont saisissables que sur le navire qui fait route vers le territoire de l'ennemi ou vers un territoire occupé par lui ou vers ses forces armées et que ne doit pas les décharger dans un port intermédiaire neutre.

Conditional contraband items can only be seized on the ship headed toward enemy territory or a territory occupied by them or their armed forces and that should not unload them at a neutral intermediate port.

Les papiers de bord font preuve complète de l'itinéraire du navire ainsi que du lieu de déchargement des marchandises, à moins que ce navire soit rencontré ayant manifestement dévié de la route[Pg 649] qu'il devrait suivre d'après ses papiers de bord et sans pouvoir justifier d'une cause suffisante de cette déviation.

The shipping papers fully document the ship's route and the location for unloading the goods, unless the ship is encountered clearly deviating from the course[Pg 649] it should follow according to its shipping papers and without being able to justify a valid reason for this deviation.

Comme il a été dit plus haut, la doctrine du voyage continu a été écartée pour la contrebande conditionnelle. Celle-ci n'est donc saisissable que si elle doit être débarquée dans un port ennemi. Du moment que la marchandise est documentée pour être débarquée dans un port neutre, elle ne peut constituer de la contrebande, et il n'y a pas à rechercher si, de ce port neutre, elle doit être expédiée à l'ennemi par mer ou par terre. C'est la différence essentielle avec la contrebande absolue.

Comme mentionné précédemment, la doctrine du voyage continu a été rejetée au profit de la contrebande conditionnelle. Celle-ci ne peut donc être saisie que si elle est destinée à être déchargée dans un port ennemi. Tant que la marchandise est documentée pour être déchargée dans un port neutre, elle ne peut pas être considérée comme de la contrebande, et il n'est pas nécessaire d'examiner si, de ce port neutre, elle doit être envoyée à l'ennemi par mer ou par terre. C'est la différence essentielle avec la contrebande absolue.

Les papiers de bord font preuve complète de l'itinéraire du navire et du lieu de déchargement de la cargaison; il en serait autrement si le navire était rencontré ayant manifestement dévié de la route qu'il devrait suivre d'après ses papiers et sans pouvoir justifier d'une cause suffisante de cette déviation.

Les papiers de bord montrent clairement l'itinéraire du navire et l'endroit où la cargaison doit être déchargée ; ce serait différent si le navire était rencontré évidement en dehors de son itinéraire prévu selon ses papiers et sans être en mesure de justifier une raison valable pour cette déviation.

Cette règle sur la preuve fournie par les papiers de bord a pour but d'écarter des prétentions élevées à la légère par un croiseur et amenant des saisies injustifiées. Elle ne doit pas être entendue d'une manière trop absolue qui faciliterait toutes les fraudes. Ainsi elle n'est pas maintenue quand le navire est rencontré en mer ayant manifestement dévié de la route qu'il aurait dû suivre et sans pouvoir justifier de cette déviation. Les papiers de bord sont alors contredits par la réalité des faits et perdent toute force probante; le croiseur se décidera librement suivant les cas. De même, la visite du navire peut permettre de constater des faits qui prouvent d'une manière irréfutable que la destination du navire ou le lieu de déchargement de la marchandise sont faussement indiqués dans les papiers de bord. Le croiseur apprécie alors librement les circonstances et saisit ou non le navire suivant cette appréciation. En résumé, les papiers de bord font preuve, à moins que la fausseté de leurs indications ne soit démontrée par les faits. Cette restriction de la force probante des papiers de bord a paru aller de soi et ne pas avoir besoin d'être expressément mentionnée. On n'a pas voulu avoir l'air de diminuer la force de la règle générale, qui est une garantie pour le commerce neutre.

This rule regarding evidence provided by ship's papers aims to prevent inflated claims made lightly by a cruiser, which can lead to unjust seizures. It shouldn't be interpreted too strictly, as that could facilitate fraud. Therefore, it isn't upheld when a ship is encountered at sea that has clearly deviated from the route it should have followed and cannot justify that deviation. In such cases, the ship's papers are contradicted by the reality of the situation and lose all evidential force; the cruiser will decide freely based on the circumstances. Likewise, inspecting the ship may reveal facts that conclusively prove that the destination of the ship or the unloading location of the cargo is falsely stated in the ship's papers. The cruiser then assesses the situation freely and decides whether or not to seize the ship based on that evaluation. In summary, ship's papers are proof unless the falsity of their statements is demonstrated by the facts. This limitation on the evidential force of ship's papers seems obvious and didn't need to be explicitly mentioned. There was a reluctance to appear to diminish the strength of the general rule, which is a guarantee for neutral trade.

De ce qu'une indication est reconnue fausse, il ne résulte pas que la force probante des papiers de bord soit infirmée dans son ensemble. Les indications pour lesquelles aucune allégation de fausseté ne peut être vérifiée conservent leur valeur.

De ce qu'une indication est reconnue fausse, il ne résulte pas que la force probante des papiers de bord soit infirmée dans son ensemble. Les indications pour lesquelles aucune allégation de fausseté ne peut être vérifiée conservent leur valeur.

Article 36.

Article 36.

Par dérogation à l'article 35, si le territoire de l'ennemi n'a pas de frontière maritime, les articles de contrebande conditionnelle sont saisissables, lorsqu'il est établi qu'ils ont la destination prévue à l'article 33.

Notwithstanding article 35, if the enemy's territory does not have a maritime border, conditional contraband articles can be seized when it is established that they are intended for the destination outlined in article 33.

Le cas prévu est assurément rare, mais cependant il s'est présenté dans des guerres récentes. Pour la contrebande absolue, il n'y a pas de difficulté, puisque la destination à l'ennemi peut toujours être prouvée, quel que soit l'itinéraire à suivre par la marchandise (article 30). Il en est autrement pour la contrebande conditionnelle, et une dérogation doit être apportée à la règle générale de l'article 35, alinéa 1er, de manière à permettre au capteur d'établir que la marchandise suspecte a bien la destination spéciale prévue à l'article 33, sans qu'on puisse objecter le fait du déchargement dans un port neutre.

Le cas prévu est assurément rare, mais cependant il s'est présenté dans des guerres récentes. Pour la contrebande absolue, il n'y a pas de difficulté, puisque la destination à l'ennemi peut toujours être prouvée, quel que soit l'itinéraire à suivre par la marchandise (article 30). Il en est autrement pour la contrebande conditionnelle, et une dérogation doit être apportée à la règle générale de l'article 35, alinéa 1er, de manière à permettre au capteur d'établir que la marchandise suspecte a bien la destination spéciale prévue à l'article 33, sans qu'on puisse objecter le fait du déchargement dans un port neutre.

Article 37.

Article 37.

Le navire transportant des articles, qui sont saisissables comme contrebande absolue ou conditionnelle, peut être saisi, en haute mer ou dans les eaux des belligérants, pendant tout le cours de son voyage, même s'il a l'intention de toucher à un port d'escale avant d'atteindre la destination ennemie.

The ship carrying items that can be seized as absolute or conditional contraband can be confiscated, in international waters or in the enemy's waters, at any point during its journey, even if it intends to stop at a port before reaching the enemy destination.

Le navire peut être saisi pour cause de contrebande pendant tout le cours de son voyage, pourvu qu'il soit dans des eaux où un acte de guerre est licite. Le fait qu'il aurait l'intention de toucher à un port d'escale avant d'atteindre la destination ennemie n'empêche pas la saisie, du moment que, dans l'espèce, la destination ennemie est établie conformément aux règles établies par les articles 30 à 32 pour la contrebande absolue, par les articles 33 à 35 pour la contrebande conditionnelle, et sous la réserve de l'exception de l'article 36.

Le navire peut être saisi pour des raisons de contrebande pendant tout le voyage, tant qu'il se trouve dans des eaux où un acte de guerre est autorisé. Le fait qu'il ait l'intention de s'arrêter dans un port avant d'atteindre sa destination ennemie ne l'empêche pas d'être saisi, à condition que, dans ce cas, la destination ennemie soit conforme aux règles établies par les articles 30 à 32 pour la contrebande absolue, par les articles 33 à 35 pour la contrebande conditionnelle, et sous la réserve de l'exception de l'article 36.

Article 38.

Article 38.

Une saisie ne peut être pratiquée en raison d'un transport de contrebande antérieurement effectué et actuellement achevé.

A seizure cannot be carried out due to a smuggling transport that was previously conducted and is now completed.

Un navire est saisissable quand il transporte de la contrebande, mais non pour en avoir transporté.

Un navire peut être saisi s'il transporte de la contrebande, mais pas pour l'avoir transportée par le passé.

Article 39.

Article 39.

Les articles de contrebande sont sujets à confiscation.

Smuggled items are subject to confiscation.

Cela ne présente aucune difficulté.

That poses no difficulty.

Article 40.

Article 40.

La confiscation du navire transportant de la contrebande est permise, si cette contrebande forme, soit par sa valeur, soit par son poids, soit par son volume, soit par son fret, plus de la moitié de la cargaison.[Pg 650]

The confiscation of the ship carrying contraband is allowed if the contraband, either by its value, weight, volume, or freight, makes up more than half of the cargo.[Pg 650]

Tout le monde admettait bien que, dans certains cas, la confiscation de la contrebande ne suffit pas et que la confiscation doit atteindre le navire lui-même, mais les opinions différaient sur la détermination de ces cas. On s'est arrêté à une certaine proportion à établir entre la contrebande et l'ensemble de la cargaison. Mais la question se subdivise: 1o Quelle sera cette proportion? La solution adoptée tient le milieu entre les solutions proposées, qui allaient du quart aux trois quarts. 2o Comment sera calculée cette proportion? La contrebande devra-t-elle former plus de la moitié de la cargaison en volume, en poids, en valeur, en fret? L'adoption d'un critérium déterminé prête à des objections théoriques et facilite aussi des pratiques destinées à éviter la confiscation du navire malgré l'importance de la cargaison. Si on prend le volume ou le poids, le capitaine prendra des marchandises licites assez volumineuses ou pesantes pour que le volume ou le poids de la contrebande soit inférieur. Une observation analogue peut être faite en ce qui concerne la valeur ou le fret. La conséquence est qu'il suffit, pour justifier la confiscation, que la contrebande forme plus de la moitié de la cargaison à l'un quelconque des points de vue indiqués. Cela peut paraître sévère; mais, d'une part, en procédant autrement, on faciliterait des calculs frauduleux, et d'autre part, il est permis de dire que la confiscation du navire est justifiée, lorsque le transport de la contrebande était une partie notable de son trafic, ce qui est vrai pour chacun des cas prévus.

Everyone agreed that, in some cases, seizing the contraband alone isn't enough and that the seizure should include the ship itself, but opinions varied on how to determine those cases. A certain ratio was established between the contraband and the overall cargo. But the question breaks down further: 1o What should this ratio be? The solution adopted falls somewhere between the proposed solutions, which ranged from one-quarter to three-quarters. 2o How will this ratio be calculated? Should the contraband make up more than half of the cargo in volume, weight, value, or freight? Adopting a specific criterion raises theoretical objections and also makes it easier for practices to be devised to avoid the ship's seizure despite the significance of the cargo. If volume or weight is considered, the captain will choose legitimate goods that are sizable or heavy enough so that the volume or weight of the contraband will be less. A similar observation can be made regarding value or freight. The consequence is that to justify a seizure, it only needs to be shown that the contraband constitutes more than half of the cargo from any of the perspectives indicated. This might seem harsh; however, on one hand, doing otherwise would facilitate fraudulent calculations, and on the other hand, it can be said that the seizure of the ship is justified when the transport of contraband was a significant part of its traffic, which is true for each of the considered cases.

Article 41.

Article 41.

Si le navire transportant de la contrebande est relâché, les frais occasionnés au capteur par la procédure devant la juridiction nationale des prises ainsi que par la conservation du navire et de sa cargaison pendant l'instruction sont à la charge du navire.

If the ship carrying the smuggled goods is released, the costs incurred by the catcher due to the procedures before the national prize jurisdiction as well as for the maintenance of the ship and its cargo during the investigation are to be borne by the ship.

Il n'est pas juste que, d'une part, le transport de contrebande au-delà d'une certaine proportion entraîne la confiscation du navire, tandis qu'au-dessous de cette proportion, il n'y a que la confiscation de la contrebande, ce qui souvent n'est pas une perte pour le capitaine, le fret de cette contrebande ayant été payé à l'avance. N'y a-t-il pas là un encouragement à la contrebande, et ne conviendrait-il pas de faire subir une certaine peine pour le transport inférieur à la proportion requise pour la confiscation? On avait proposé une espèce d'amende qui aurait pu être en rapport avec la valeur des articles de contrebande. Des objections d'ordre divers ont été formulées contre cette proposition, bien que le principe d'une perte pécuniaire infligée à raison du transport de la contrebande eût paru justifié. On est arrivé au même but d'une autre façon en disposant que les frais occasionnés au capteur par la procédure devant la juridiction nationale des prises, comme par la conservation du navire et de sa cargaison pendant l'instruction, sont à la charge du navire; les frais de conservation du navire comprennent, le cas échéant, les frais d'entretien du personnel du navire capturé. Il convient d'ajouter que le dommage causé au navire par sa conduite et son séjour dans un port de prise est de nature à produire l'effet préventif le plus sérieux en ce qui concerne le transport de la contrebande.

It’s not fair that, on one hand, smuggling beyond a certain amount leads to the confiscation of the ship, while below that amount, only the smuggled goods are confiscated, which often isn’t a loss for the captain since the freight for those goods has already been paid. Isn’t this encouraging smuggling, and wouldn’t it make sense to impose some sort of penalty for transporting below the required amount for confiscation? They had proposed a kind of fine that would relate to the value of the smuggled items. Various objections were raised against this proposal, although the principle of a financial loss for smuggling appeared justified. The same objective was achieved in a different way by stating that the costs incurred by the captor through the national prize jurisdiction procedure, such as the preservation of the ship and its cargo during the investigation, are the responsibility of the ship; the preservation costs include, if necessary, the maintenance expenses for the crew of the captured ship. It should be added that the damage caused to the ship by its handling and its stay in a prize port can have a seriously preventive effect regarding smuggling activities.

Article 42.

Article 42.

Les marchandises qui appartiennent au propriétaire de la contrebande et qui se trouvent à bord du même navire sont sujettes à confiscation.

The goods that belong to the owner of the smuggling operation and are on the same ship are subject to confiscation.

Le propriétaire de la contrebande est puni d'abord par la confiscation de sa propriété illicite; il l'est ensuite par la confiscation des marchandises, même licites, qu'il peut avoir sur le même navire.

Le propriétaire de la contrebande est puni d'abord par la confiscation de sa propriété illicite; il l'est ensuite par la confiscation des marchandises, même licites, qu'il peut avoir sur le même navire.

Article 43.

Article 43.

Si un navire est rencontré en mer naviguant dans l'ignorance des hostilités ou de la déclaration de contrebande applicable à son chargement, les articles de contrebande ne peuvent être confisqués que moyennant indemnité; le navire et le surplus de la cargaison sont exempts de la confiscation et des frais prévus par l'article 41. Il en est de même si le capitaine, après avoir eu connaissance de l'ouverture des hostilités ou de la déclaration de contrebande, n'a pu encore décharger les articles de contrebande.

If a ship is encountered at sea unaware of the hostilities or the declaration of contraband applicable to its cargo, the contraband items can only be confiscated with compensation; the ship and the remaining cargo are exempt from confiscation and the fees outlined in Article 41. The same applies if the captain, after becoming aware of the outbreak of hostilities or the declaration of contraband, has not yet been able to unload the contraband items.

Le navire est réputé connaître l'état de guerre ou la déclaration de contrebande, lorsqu'il a quitté un port neutre, après que la notification de l'ouverture des hostilités ou de la déclaration de contrebande a été faite, en temps utile, à la Puissance dont relève ce port. L'état de guerre est, en outre, réputé connu par le navire lorsqu'il a quitté un port ennemi après l'ouverture des hostilités.

The ship is considered to be aware of the state of war or the declaration of contraband when it leaves a neutral port after timely notification of the start of hostilities or the declaration of contraband has been given to the Power responsible for that port. Additionally, the state of war is deemed known to the ship when it has departed from an enemy port after hostilities have begun.

La disposition a pour but de ménager les neutres qui, en fait, transporteraient de la contrebande, mais auxquels on ne pourrait rien reprocher, ce qui peut se présenter dans deux cas. Le premier est celui où ils ne connaissent pas l'ouverture des hostilités; le second est celui où, tout en connaissant cette ouverture, ils ignorent la déclaration de contrebande qu'a faite un belligérant conformément aux articles 23 et 25, et qui est précisément applicable à tout ou partie du chargement. Il serait injuste de saisir le navire et de[Pg 651] confisquer la contrebande; d'autre part, le croiseur ne peut être obligé de laisser aller à l'ennemi des produits propres à la guerre et dont celui-ci peut avoir grand besoin. Les intérêts en présence sont conciliés en ce sens qu'alors la confiscation ne peut avoir lieu que moyennant indemnité (voir, dans un ordre d'idées analogue, la Convention du 18 octobre 1907, sur le régime des navires de commerce ennemis au début des hostilités).

La disposition vise à protéger les neutres qui, en réalité, pourraient transporter de la contrebande, mais à qui on ne pourrait rien reprocher, ce qui peut se produire dans deux situations. La première est lorsque ces neutres ne sont pas au courant du début des hostilités ; la seconde est lorsque, bien qu'ils soient informés du début des hostilités, ils ignorent la déclaration de contrebande faite par un belligérant selon les articles 23 et 25, qui s'applique précisément à tout ou partie de leur chargement. Il serait injuste de saisir le navire et de[Pg 651]confisquer la contrebande ; d'un autre côté, le croiseur ne peut pas être obligé de laisser passer vers l'ennemi des produits destinés à la guerre dont ce dernier peut avoir grand besoin. Les intérêts en jeu sont équilibrés de manière à ce que la confiscation ne puisse avoir lieu qu'avec indemnité (voir, dans un sens similaire, la Convention du 18 octobre 1907 sur le régime des navires de commerce ennemis au début des hostilités).

Article 44.

Article 44.

Le navire arrêté pour cause de contrebande et non susceptible de confiscation à raison de la proportion de la contrebande peut être autorisé, suivant les circonstances, à continuer sa route, si le capitaine est prêt à livrer la contrebande au bâtiment belligérant.

The ship stopped for smuggling and not subject to confiscation due to the amount of contraband may be allowed to continue its journey, depending on the circumstances, if the captain is willing to surrender the contraband to the belligerent ship.

La remise de la contrebande est mentionnée par le capteur sur le livre de bord du navire arrêté, et le capitaine de ce navire doit remettre au capteur copie certifiée conforme de tous papiers utiles.

The handover of the smuggled goods is noted by the inspector in the ship's log of the stopped vessel, and the captain of that ship must provide the inspector with a certified copy of all relevant documents.

Le capteur a la faculté de détruire la contrebande qui lui est ainsi livrée.

The sensor has the ability to destroy the smuggling that is delivered to it.

Un navire neutre est arrêté pour cause de contrebande. Il n'est pas susceptible de confiscation, parce que la contrebande n'atteint pas la proportion prévue par l'article 40. Il peut néanmoins être conduit dans un port de prise pour qu'il y ait un jugement relatif à la contrebande. Ce droit du capteur paraît excessif dans certains cas, si on compare le peu d'importance que peut avoir la contrebande (une caisse de fusils ou de revolvers, par exemple) et le grave préjudice qu'entraînent pour le navire ce détournement de sa route et sa retenue pendant le temps de l'instruction. Aussi s'est-on demandé s'il n'était pas possible de reconnaître au navire neutre le droit de continuer sa route moyennant la remise des objets de contrebande au capteur qui, de son côté, n'aurait pu les refuser que pour des motifs suffisants, par exemple, le mauvais état de la mer, qui rend le transbordement impossible ou difficile, des soupçons fondés au sujet de la quantité véritable de contrebande que porte le navire de commerce, la difficulté de loger les objets à bord du navire de guerre, etc. Cette proposition n'a pas réuni les suffrages suffisants. On a prétendu qu'il était impossible d'imposer une pareille obligation au croiseur pour lequel cette remise présenterait presque toujours des inconvénients. Si, par hasard, il n'y en a pas, le croiseur ne la refusera pas, parce qu'il aura lui-même avantage à ne pas être détourné de sa route par la nécessité de conduire le navire dans un port. Le système de l'obligation étant ainsi écarté, on a décidé de réglementer la remise facultative qui, espère-t-on, sera pratiquée toutes les fois que ce sera possible, au grand avantage des deux parties. Les formalités prévues sont très simples et n'exigent pas d'explication.

A neutral ship is stopped for smuggling. It can't be confiscated because the smuggling doesn't reach the level specified in Article 40. However, it can be taken to a capture port for a ruling regarding the smuggling. This right of the captor seems excessive in some cases, especially when you consider how little impact the smuggling may have (like a box of rifles or revolvers, for instance) compared to the serious harm caused to the ship by the diversion from its route and the time spent detained during the investigation. Therefore, there has been a discussion about whether it’s possible to allow the neutral ship to continue its journey, provided it surrenders the smuggled items to the captor, who could only refuse under reasonable grounds—such as bad sea conditions that make transfer impossible or difficult, justified suspicions about the actual amount of contraband the merchant ship is carrying, the difficulty of stowing the items aboard the warship, etc. This proposal didn’t gain enough support. It was argued that it would be impossible to place such an obligation on the cruiser, as this surrender would almost always present disadvantages. If by chance there are no disadvantages, the cruiser won't refuse it because it would also benefit from not being diverted from its route by the need to take the ship to port. With the obligation system thus dismissed, it was decided to regulate optional surrender, which is hoped will be practiced whenever possible, greatly benefiting both parties. The required formalities are very simple and don’t require explanation.

Un jugement du tribunal des prises devra intervenir au sujet de la marchandise ainsi remise. C'est pour cela que le capteur doit se munir des papiers nécessaires. On pourrait concevoir qu'il y eût doute sur le caractère de certains objets que le croiseur prétend être de contrebande; le capitaine du navire de commerce conteste, mais il préfère les livrer pour avoir la faculté de continuer sa route. Il n'y a là qu'une saisie devant être confirmée par la juridiction des prises.

Un jugement du tribunal des prises devra intervenir au sujet de la marchandise ainsi remise. C'est pour cela que le capteur doit se munir des papiers nécessaires. On pourrait concevoir qu'il y ait doute sur le caractère de certains objets que le croiseur prétend être de contrebande ; le capitaine du navire de commerce conteste, mais il préfère les livrer pour avoir la faculté de continuer sa route. Il n'y a là qu'une saisie devant être confirmée par la juridiction des prises.

La contrebande livrée par le navire de commerce peut embarrasser le croiseur qui doit être laissé libre de la détruire au moment même de la remise ou postérieurement.

La contrebande livrée par le navire de commerce peut poser problème pour le croiseur qui doit être libre de la détruire au moment de la remise ou ultérieurement.

Chapitre III.De l'assistance hostile.

Chapter III.On hostile assistance.

D'une manière générale, on peut dire que le navire de commerce qui manque à la neutralité, soit en transportant de la contrebande de guerre, soit en violant un blocus, fournit une assistance à l'ennemi, et c'est à ce titre que le belligérant au préjudice duquel il agit peut lui faire subir certaines pertes. Mais il y a des cas où cette assistance hostile est particulièrement caractérisée et qu'on a jugé nécessaire de prévoir spécialement. On en a fait deux catégories d'après la gravité du fait reproché au navire neutre.

D'une manière générale, on peut dire que le navire de commerce qui manque à la neutralité, soit en transportant de la contrebande de guerre, soit en violant un blocus, fournit une assistance à l'ennemi, et c'est à ce titre que le belligérant au préjudice duquel il agit peut lui faire subir certaines pertes. Mais il y a des cas où cette assistance hostile est particulièrement caractérisée et qu'on a jugé nécessaire de prévoir spécialement. On en a fait deux catégories d'après la gravité du fait reproché au navire neutre.

Dans les cas qui rentrent dans la première catégorie (article 45), le navire est confisqué, et on lui applique le traitement du navire sujet à confiscation pour transport de contrebande. Cela signifie que le navire ne perd pas sa qualité de neutre et a droit aux garanties admises pour les navires neutres; par exemple, il ne pourrait être détruit par le capteur que dans les conditions établies pour les navires neutres (articles 48 et suivants); la règle le pavillon couvre la marchandise s'applique en ce qui concerne la marchandise qui se trouve à bord.

In cases that fall into the first category (Article 45), the ship is confiscated, and it is treated as a ship subject to confiscation for transporting contraband. This means that the ship does not lose its neutral status and is entitled to the protections granted to neutral ships; for example, it could only be destroyed by the capturing party under the conditions established for neutral ships (Articles 48 and onward); the rule the flag covers the cargo applies regarding the cargo on board.

Dans les cas plus graves qui appartiennent à la seconde catégorie (article 46), le navire est encore confisqué; de plus, il n'est pas traité seulement comme un navire confiscable comme porteur de contrebande, mais comme un navire de commerce ennemi, ce qui entraîne certaines conséquences. Le règlement sur la destruction des prises neutres ne s'applique pas au navire, et, celui-ci devenant navire ennemi, ce n'est plus la seconde, mais c'est la troisième règle de la Déclaration de[Pg 652] Paris qui est applicable. La marchandise qui sera à bord sera présumée ennemie; les neutres auront le droit de réclamer leur propriété en justifiant de leur neutralité (article 59). Il ne faut cependant pas exagérer jusqu'à penser que le caractère neutre originaire du navire est complètement effacé, de telle sorte qu'il doive être traité comme s'il avait toujours été ennemi. Le navire peut soutenir que la prétention élevée contre lui n'est pas fondée, que l'acte qui lui est reproché n'a pas le caractère d'une assistance hostile. Il a donc le droit de recourir à la juridiction internationale en vertu des dispositions qui protègent les propriétés neutres.

In more serious cases that belong to the second category (article 46), the ship is still confiscated; moreover, it is not only treated as a confiscatable ship carrying contraband, but as an enemy commercial vessel, which leads to certain consequences. The regulations on the destruction of neutral prizes do not apply to the ship, and, since it becomes an enemy ship, it is no longer the second rule but the third rule of the Declaration of[Pg 652] Paris that is applicable. The cargo on board will be presumed enemy; neutrals will have the right to claim their property by proving their neutrality (article 59). However, it should not be exaggerated to think that the original neutral character of the ship is completely erased, so that it must be treated as if it had always been an enemy. The ship can argue that the claim made against it is unfounded, that the act it is accused of does not constitute hostile assistance. Therefore, it has the right to seek international jurisdiction under the provisions that protect neutral properties.

Article 45.

Article 45.

Un navire neutre est confisqué et, d'une manière générale, passible du traitement que subirait un navire neutre sujet à confiscation pour contrebande de guerre:

A neutral ship is seized and, in general, is subject to the same treatment as a neutral ship that would be confiscated for war contraband:

1o Lorsqu'il voyage spécialement en vue du transport de passagers individuels incorporés dans la force armée de l'ennemi, ou en vue de la transmission de nouvelles dans l'intérêt de l'ennemi.

1o When traveling specifically to transport individual passengers who are part of the enemy's armed forces, or to relay information in the interest of the enemy.

2o Lorsqu'à la connaissance soit du propriétaire, soit de celui qui a affrété le navire en totalité, soit du capitaine, il transporte un détachement militaire de l'ennemi ou une ou plusieurs personnes qui, pendant le voyage, prêtent une assistance directe aux opérations de l'ennemi.

2o When either the owner, the person who has fully chartered the ship, or the captain is aware that they are transporting a military detachment of the enemy or one or more individuals who, during the journey, provide direct assistance to the enemy's operations.

Dans les cas visés aux numéros précédents, les marchandises appartenant au propriétaire du navire sont également sujettes à confiscation.

In the cases mentioned in the previous numbers, the goods belonging to the shipowner are also subject to seizure.

Les dispositions du présent article ne s'appliquent pas si, lorsque le navire est rencontré en mer, il ignore les hostilités, ou si le capitaine, après avoir appris l'ouverture des hostilités, n'a pu encore débarquer les personnes transportées. Le navire est réputé connaître l'état de guerre lorsqu'il a quitté un port ennemi après l'ouverture des hostilités ou un port neutre postérieurement à la notification en temps utile de l'ouverture des hostilités à la Puissance dont relève ce port.

The provisions of this article do not apply if, when the ship is encountered at sea, it is unaware of hostilities, or if the captain, after learning about the start of hostilities, has not yet been able to disembark the people on board. The ship is considered to be aware of the state of war when it has left an enemy port after hostilities began or a neutral port after receiving timely notification of the beginning of hostilities to the Power that governs that port.

Le premier cas suppose des passagers voyageant individuellement; le cas d'un détachement militaire est visé ci-après. Il s'agit d'individus incorporés dans la force armée de terre ou de mer de l'ennemi. Il y a eu quelque hésitation sur le sens de l'incorporation qui est prévue. Comprend-elle seulement les individus qui, appelés à servir en vertu de la loi de leur pays, ont effectivement rejoint le corps dont ils doivent faire partie? ou comprend-elle même ces individus dès qu'ils sont appelés et avant qu'ils aient rejoint leur corps? La question a une grande importance pratique. Que l'on suppose des individus originaires d'un pays de l'Europe continentale et établis en Amérique; ces individus sont tenus à des obligations militaires envers leur pays d'origine; ils doivent, par exemple, faire partie de la réserve de l'armée active de ce pays. Leur patrie étant en guerre, ils s'embarquent pour aller faire leur service. Seront-ils considérés comme incorporés pour l'application de la disposition dont nous nous occupons? Si on s'attachait à la législation intérieure de certains pays, l'affirmation pourrait être soutenue. Mais, indépendamment des raisons purement juridiques, l'opinion contraire a paru plus conforme aux nécessités pratiques et, dans un esprit de conciliation, elle a été acceptée par tous. Il serait difficile, ou peut-être même impossible, de distinguer, sans des mesures vexatoires que les Gouvernements neutres n'accepteraient pas, entre les passagers d'un navire, ceux qui sont tenus d'un service militaire, et qui voyagent pour y satisfaire.

Le premier cas concerne des passagers voyageant individuellement; le cas d'un détachement militaire sera abordé plus tard. Il s'agit d'individus incorporés dans les forces armées terrestres ou maritimes de l'ennemi. Il y a eu un certain flou sur le sens de l'incorporation indiquée. Cela comprend-il seulement les personnes qui, appelées à servir selon la loi de leur pays, ont effectivement rejoint l'unité à laquelle elles doivent appartenir ? Ou cela inclut-il ces personnes dès qu'elles sont appelées et avant d'avoir intégré leur unité ? La question a une grande importance pratique. Supposons qu'il s'agisse d'individus originaires d'un pays d'Europe continentale et vivant en Amérique ; ces personnes ont des obligations militaires envers leur pays d'origine ; elles doivent, par exemple, faire partie de la réserve de l'armée active de ce pays. Leur patrie étant en guerre, elles s'embarquent pour faire leur service. Seront-elles considérées comme incorporées au sens de la disposition dont nous parlons ? Si l'on se basait sur la législation intérieure de certains pays, cette affirmation pourrait être soutenue. Mais, au-delà des raisons purement juridiques, l'opinion contraire semble plus adaptée aux nécessités pratiques et, dans un souci de conciliation, elle a été acceptée par tous. Il serait difficile, voire impossible, de faire la distinction, sans des mesures vexatoires que les gouvernements neutres ne voudraient pas accepter, entre les passagers d'un navire, ceux qui sont tenus à un service militaire, et qui voyagent pour s'y soumettre.

La transmission de nouvelles dans l'intérêt de l'ennemi est assimilée au transport de passagers incorporés dans sa force armée. On parle du navire qui voyage spécialement pour indiquer qu'il ne s'agit pas du service normal du navire. Il s'est détourné de sa route; il a relâché dans un port où il ne s'arrête pas ordinairement, pour effectuer le transport en question. Il n'est pas nécessaire qu'il soit exclusivement affecté au service de l'ennemi; ce dernier cas rentrerait dans la seconde catégorie, article 56, 4o.

The transmission of information in the enemy's interest is considered similar to transporting passengers who are part of their armed force. We talk about the ship that is traveling specifically to indicate that it's not part of the ship's regular service. It has deviated from its course; it has stopped at a port where it doesn't usually go to carry out that transport. It doesn't need to be exclusively assigned to the enemy's service; that would fall into the second category, article 56, 4o.

Dans les deux hypothèses dont il vient d'être parlé, il s'agit d'une opération isolée faite par le navire; il a été chargé d'effectuer tel transport ou de transmettre telles nouvelles; il n'est pas attaché d'une manière continue au service de l'ennemi. Il en résulte qu'il peut bien être saisi pendant le voyage où il se livre à l'opération qui lui est confiée; ce voyage terminé, tout est fini en ce sens qu'il ne pourrait être saisi pour avoir fait l'opération prévue; c'est analogue à ce qui est admis en matière de contrebande (article 38).

Dans les deux scénarios mentionnés, il s'agit d'une action unique effectuée par le navire ; il a été chargé de transporter quelque chose ou de transmettre des informations. Il n'est pas constamment au service de l'ennemi. Par conséquent, il peut être saisi pendant le voyage où il réalise la tâche qui lui a été confiée ; une fois ce voyage terminé, tout est réglé en ce sens qu'il ne pourrait pas être saisi pour avoir réalisé l'opération prévue. C'est similaire à ce qui est accepté en matière de contrebande (article 38).

Le deuxième cas se subdivise également.

Le deuxième cas se subdivise également.

Transport d'un détachement militaire de l'ennemi ou transport d'une ou de plusieurs personnes qui, pendant le voyage, prêtent une assistance directe aux opérations de l'ennemi, par exemple en faisant des signaux. S'il s'agit de militaires ou de marins en uniforme, il n'y a pas de difficulté: le navire est évidemment confiscable. S'il s'agit de militaires ou de marins en costume civil pouvant être pris pour des passagers ordinaires, on exige la[Pg 653] connaissance du capitaine ou du propriétaire, celui qui a affrété le navire en totalité étant assimilé au propriétaire. La règle est la même pour l'hypothèse des personnes prêtant une assistance directe à l'ennemi pendant le voyage.

Transport of a military detachment of the enemy or transport of one or more individuals who, during the journey, provide direct assistance to the enemy's operations, for example by signaling. If they are military personnel or sailors in uniform, there’s no issue: the ship is clearly subject to confiscation. If they are military personnel or sailors in civilian clothing who could be mistaken for ordinary passengers, the knowledge of the captain or the owner is required, with the individual who has fully chartered the ship being treated as the owner. The same rule applies to cases of individuals providing direct assistance to the enemy during the journey.

Dans ces cas, si le navire est confisqué à raison de son assistance hostile, l'on doit confisquer également les marchandises appartenant au propriétaire du navire.

Dans ces cas, si le navire est saisi à cause de son assistance hostile, il faut aussi saisir les marchandises appartenant au propriétaire du navire.

Ces dispositions supposent que l'état de guerre était connu du navire qui se livre aux opérations prévues; cette connaissance motive et justifie la confiscation. La situation est tout autre lorsque le navire ignore l'ouverture des hostilités, de telle sorte qu'il s'est chargé de l'opération en temps normal. Il a pu apprendre en mer l'ouverture des hostilités, mais sans pouvoir débarquer les personnes transportées. La confiscation serait alors injuste, et la règle équitable qui a été adoptée est d'accord avec les dispositions déjà acceptées dans d'autres matières. Si le navire a quitté un port ennemi après l'ouverture des hostilités, ou un port neutre après que l'ouverture des hostilités avait été notifiée à la Puissance d'où relève ce port, la connaissance de l'état de guerre sera présumée.

These provisions assume that the state of war was known to the ship carrying out the planned operations; this knowledge motivates and justifies the confiscation. The situation is completely different when the ship is unaware of the outbreak of hostilities, so it undertook the operation under normal circumstances. It may have learned at sea about the onset of hostilities, but without being able to disembark the transported individuals. Confiscation would then be unfair, and the equitable rule that has been adopted aligns with the provisions already accepted in other matters. If the ship left an enemy port after the outbreak of hostilities, or a neutral port after the outbreak of hostilities had been reported to the Power to which that port belongs, knowledge of the state of war will be presumed.

Il n'est question ici que d'empêcher la confiscation du navire. Les personnes trouvées à bord et qui font partie des forces armées de l'ennemi pourront être prises par le croiseur comme prisonniers de guerre.

Il s'agit uniquement d'empêcher la saisie du navire. Les personnes trouvées à bord et qui font partie des forces armées ennemies pourront être capturées par le croiseur en tant que prisonniers de guerre.

Article 46.

Article 46.

Un navire neutre est confisqué et, d'une manière générale, passible du traitement qu'il subirait s'il était un navire de commerce ennemi:

A neutral ship is seized and, in general, subject to the treatment it would face if it were an enemy merchant vessel:

1o Lorsqu'il prend une part directe aux hostilités.

1o When he takes a direct part in hostilities.

2o Lorsqu'il se trouve sous les ordres ou sous le contrôle d'un agent placé à bord par le Gouvernement ennemi.

2o When he is under the orders or control of an agent placed on board by the enemy government.

3o Lorsqu'il est affrété en totalité par le Gouvernement ennemi.

3o When it is fully chartered by the enemy Government.

4o Lorsqu'il est actuellement et exclusivement affecté, soit au transport de troupes ennemies, soit à la transmission de nouvelles dans l'intérêt de l'ennemi.

4o When it is currently and exclusively assigned, either to the transportation of enemy troops or to the transmission of news in the interest of the enemy.

Dans les cas visés par le présent article, les marchandises appartenant au propriétaire du navire sont également sujettes à confiscation.

In the cases covered by this article, the goods belonging to the shipowner are also subject to confiscation.

Les cas prévus ici sont plus graves que ceux de l'article 45, ce qui justifie le traitement plus sévère infligé au navire, ainsi qu'il a été expliqué plus haut.

Les cas mentionnés ici sont plus sérieux que ceux de l'article 45, ce qui explique le traitement plus strict imposé au navire, comme indiqué précédemment.

Premier cas.—Le navire prend une part directe aux hostilités. Cela peut se présenter sous diverses formes. Il va sans dire que, s'il y a lutte armée, le navire est exposé à tous les risques d'une pareille lutte. On suppose qu'il est tombé au pouvoir de l'ennemi qu'il combattait, et qui est autorisé à le traiter comme un navire de commerce ennemi.

First case.—The ship takes a direct part in the hostilities. This can occur in various forms. It goes without saying that if there is armed conflict, the ship is exposed to all the risks of such a struggle. It is assumed that it has fallen into the hands of the enemy it was fighting, and who is allowed to treat it as an enemy commercial vessel.

Deuxième cas.—Le navire est sous les ordres ou sous le contrôle d'un agent placé à bord par le Gouvernement ennemi. Cette présence caractérise le lien qui existe entre l'ennemi et le navire. Dans d'autres circonstances, le navire peut bien avoir un lien avec l'ennemi; mais pour être sujet à la confiscation, il faudrait alors qu'il rentrât dans le troisième cas.

Second case.—The ship is under the orders or control of an agent placed on board by the enemy government. This presence defines the connection between the enemy and the ship. In other circumstances, the ship might have a connection with the enemy; however, to be subject to confiscation, it would then need to fall under the third case.

Troisième cas.—Le navire est affrété en totalité par le Gouvernement ennemi. Il est donc complètement à la disposition de ce Gouvernement, qui peut s'en servir pour des buts divers se rattachant plus ou moins directement à la guerre, notamment pour effectuer des transports; c'est la situation de navires charbonniers qui accompagnent une flotte belligérante. Souvent il y aura une charte-partie entre le Gouvernement belligérant et le propriétaire ou le capitaine du navire; mais il n'y a là qu'une question de preuve. Le fait de l'affrètement en totalité suffit, de quelque façon qu'il soit établi.

Third case.—The ship is fully chartered by the enemy Government. It is therefore completely at the disposal of this Government, which can use it for various purposes related more or less directly to the war, notably for transporting goods; this is the situation of coal ships that accompany a warring fleet. Often there will be a charter party between the warring Government and the owner or captain of the ship; however, this is merely a matter of proof. The fact that it is fully chartered is sufficient, no matter how it is established.

Quatrième cas.—Le navire est actuellement et exclusivement affecté, soit au transport de troupes ennemies, soit à la transmission de nouvelles dans l'intérêt de l'ennemi. A la différence des cas visés dans l'article 45, il s'agit ici d'un service permanent auquel est affecté le navire. Aussi faut-il décider que, tant que l'affectation dure, le navire est saisissable, encore qu'au moment où un croiseur ennemi visite le navire, celui-ci ne transporte pas de troupes ou ne serve pas à la transmission de nouvelles.

Case Four.—The ship is currently and exclusively used for either transporting enemy troops or relaying information in the interest of the enemy. Unlike the cases mentioned in Article 45, this involves a permanent assignment for the ship. Therefore, it must be determined that as long as this assignment continues, the ship is subject to seizure, even if at the moment an enemy cruiser inspects the ship, it is not transporting troops or serving to relay information.

Comme pour les cas de l'article 45, et par les mêmes raisons, les marchandises appartenant au propriétaire du navire, et qui pourraient se trouver à bord, sont également sujettes à confiscation.

Comme pour les cas de l'article 45, et pour les mêmes raisons, les marchandises appartenant au propriétaire du navire et qui pourraient se trouver à bord sont également sujettes à confiscation.

On avait proposé de considérer comme navire de commerce ennemi le navire neutre faisant actuellement et avec l'autorisation du Gouvernement ennemi un trajet auquel il n'a été autorisé qu'après l'ouverture des hostilités ou dans les deux mois qui l'ont précédée. Cela se serait appliqué notamment aux navires de commerce neutres qui seraient admis par un belligérant à une navigation réservée en temps de paix à la marine nationale de ce belligérant—par exemple, au cabotage. Plusieurs Délégations ont repoussé[Pg 654] formellement cette proposition, de sorte que la question ainsi soulevée est restée entière.

On proposed to consider a neutral ship currently traveling, with the permission of the enemy government, as an enemy commercial vessel if it was granted authorization only after the start of hostilities or in the two months preceding them. This would particularly apply to neutral commercial ships that were allowed by one of the belligerents to engage in navigation that was reserved during peacetime for that belligerent's navy—for example, coastal shipping. Several delegations formally rejected[Pg 654] this proposal, leaving the issue raised unresolved.

Article 47.

Article 47.

Tout individu incorporé dans la force armée de l'ennemi et qui sera trouvé à bord d'un navire de commerce neutre, pourra être fait prisonnier de guerre, quand même il n'y aurait pas lieu de saisir ce navire.

Any individual incorporated into the enemy's armed forces who is found on board a neutral merchant ship can be taken prisoner of war, even if there is no reason to seize that ship.

Des individus incorporés dans les forces armées de terre ou de mer d'un belligérant peuvent se trouver à bord d'un navire de commerce neutre visité. Si le navire est sujet à confiscation, le croiseur le saisira et le conduira dans un de ses ports avec les personnes qui se trouvent à bord. Évidemment les militaires ou marins de l'État ennemi ne seront pas laissés libres, mais seront considérés comme prisonniers de guerre. Il peut arriver que l'on ne soit pas dans le cas de saisir le navire—par exemple, parce que le capitaine ne connaissait pas la qualité d'un individu qui s'était présenté comme un simple passager. Faut-il alors laisser libre le ou les militaires qui sont sur le navire? Cela n'a pas paru admissible. Le croiseur belligérant ne peut être contraint de laisser libres des ennemis actifs qui sont matériellement en son pouvoir et qui sont plus dangereux que tels et tels articles de contrebande; naturellement il doit agir avec une grande discrétion, et c'est sous sa responsabilité qu'il exige la remise de ces individus, mais son droit existe; aussi a-t-il été jugé nécessaire de s'expliquer sur ce point.

Des individus intégrés dans les forces armées terrestres ou maritimes d'un belligérant peuvent se retrouver à bord d'un navire de commerce neutre lors d'une visite. Si le navire risque d'être confisqué, le croiseur le saisira et l'amènera dans l'un de ses ports avec les personnes présentes à bord. Évidemment, les militaires ou marins de l'État ennemi ne seront pas laissés libres, mais seront considérés comme des prisonniers de guerre. Il peut arriver qu'il ne soit pas possible de saisir le navire—par exemple, si le capitaine ignorait le statut d'un individu qui s'était présenté comme un simple passager. Faut-il alors laisser libre le ou les militaires qui sont sur le navire? Cela n'a pas semblé acceptable. Le croiseur belligérant ne peut pas être contraint de libérer des ennemis actifs qui sont matériellement sous son contrôle et qui sont plus dangereux que certains articles de contrebande; naturellement, il doit agir avec une grande prudence, et c'est sous sa responsabilité qu'il exige la remise de ces individus, mais son droit existe; ainsi, il a été jugé nécessaire de clarifier ce point.

Chapitre IV.De la destruction des prises neutres.

Chapter 4.On the destruction of neutral captures.

La destruction des prises neutres était à l'ordre du jour de la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix et n'a pu y être réglée. Elle se retrouve à l'ordre du jour de la présente Conférence et, cette fois, un accord a été possible. Il y a lieu de s'applaudir d'un pareil résultat qui témoigne d'un sincère désir d'entente de la part de tous. On a constaté ici, une fois de plus, que des formules tranchantes et opposées ne répondent pas toujours à la réalité et que, si on veut descendre dans le détail et arriver aux applications précises, on aura souvent à peu près la même manière de faire, quoiqu'on ait paru se réclamer d'opinions tout à fait contraires. Pour s'accorder, il faut d'abord se bien comprendre, ce qui n'est pas toujours le cas. Ainsi, on a constaté que ceux qui proclamaient le droit de détruire les prises neutres, ne prétendaient pas user de ce droit capricieusement et à tout propos, mais seulement d'une manière exceptionnelle, et qu'à l'inverse, ceux qui affirmaient le principe de l'interdiction de la destruction, admettaient que ce principe devait céder dans des cas exceptionnels. Il s'agissait donc de s'entendre sur ces cas exceptionnels auxquels, dans les deux opinions, devait se borner le droit de destruction. Ce n'était pas tout: il fallait aussi une garantie contre les abus dans l'exercice de ce droit; l'arbitraire dans l'appréciation des cas exceptionnels devait être diminué au moyen d'une responsabilité effective imposée au capteur. C'est ici qu'est intervenu, dans le règlement de l'affaire, un élément nouveau, grâce auquel l'accord a pu se faire. L'intervention possible de la justice fera réfléchir le capteur en même temps qu'elle assurera une réparation dans le cas d'une destruction sans motif.

La destruction des prises neutres était à l'ordre du jour de la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix et n'a pas pu y être résolue. Elle est de nouveau à l'ordre du jour de la présente Conférence et, cette fois, un accord a été atteint. Il faut se féliciter d'un tel résultat qui témoigne d'un véritable désir d'entente de la part de tous. On a remarqué ici, une fois de plus, que des formules tranchantes et opposées ne correspondent pas toujours à la réalité et que, si l'on veut entrer dans le détail et arriver à des applications concrètes, on aura souvent à peu près la même approche, même si on s'est paru se réclamer d'opinions complètement opposées. Pour s'entendre, il faut d'abord bien se comprendre, ce qui n'est pas toujours le cas. Ainsi, on a constaté que ceux qui proclamaient le droit de détruire les prises neutres ne souhaitaient pas exercer ce droit de manière capricieuse et à tout moment, mais seulement d'une manière exceptionnelle. En revanche, ceux qui affirmaient le principe de l'interdiction de la destruction admettaient que ce principe devait être assoupli dans des cas exceptionnels. Il s'agissait donc de se mettre d'accord sur ces cas exceptionnels où, selon les deux opinions, le droit de destruction devait être limité. Ce n'était pas tout : il fallait aussi garantir contre les abus dans l'exercice de ce droit ; l'arbitraire dans l'évaluation des cas exceptionnels devait être réduit par une responsabilité réelle imposée au capteur. C'est ici qu'est intervenu, dans le règlement de l'affaire, un élément nouveau, grâce auquel l'accord a pu se réaliser. L'intervention possible de la justice fera réfléchir le capteur tout en assurant une réparation en cas de destruction sans motif.

Tel est l'esprit général des dispositions de ce chapitre.

Tel est l'esprit général des dispositions de ce chapitre.

Article 48.

Article 48.

Un navire neutre saisi ne peut être détruit par le capteur, mais il doit être conduit dans tel port qu'il appartiendra pour y être statué ce que de droit sur la validité de la capture.

A neutral ship that is seized cannot be destroyed by the captor, but it must be taken to a port that belongs to them so that a decision can be made regarding the validity of the capture.

Le principe général est très simple. Un navire neutre saisi ne peut être détruit par le capteur; cela peut être admis par tout le monde, quelle que soit la manière dont on envisage l'effet de la saisie. Le navire doit être conduit dans un port pour y être statué sur la validité de la prise. Il sera ou non amariné suivant les cas.

Le principe général est très simple. Un navire neutre saisi ne peut pas être détruit par le capteur; cela peut être accepté par tout le monde, quelle que soit la façon dont on considère l'effet de la saisie. Le navire doit être amené dans un port pour qu'il soit décidé si la saisie est valide. Il sera ou non amariné selon les cas.

Article 49.

Article 49.

Par exception, un navire neutre, saisi par un bâtiment belligérant et qui serait sujet à confiscation, peut être détruit, si l'observation de l'article 48 peut compromettre la sécurité du bâtiment de guerre ou le succès des opérations dans lesquelles celui-ci est actuellement engagé.

As an exception, a neutral ship captured by a warring vessel and subject to confiscation can be destroyed if adhering to Article 48 could jeopardize the safety of the warship or the success of the operations it is currently involved in.

La première condition pour que le navire saisi puisse être détruit est qu'il soit susceptible de confiscation d'après les circonstances. Si le capteur ne peut pas même songer à obtenir la confiscation du navire, comment pourrait-il avoir la prétention de le détruire?

La première condition pour que le navire saisi puisse être détruit est qu'il soit susceptible de confiscation d'après les circonstances. Si le capteur ne peut pas même songer à obtenir la confiscation du navire, comment pourrait-il avoir la prétention de le détruire?

La seconde est que l'observation du principe général soit de nature à compromettre la sécurité du bâtiment de guerre ou le succès des opérations dans lesquelles il est actuellement engagé. C'est la formule à laquelle on s'est arrêté après quelques tâtonnements. Il a été entendu que compromettre la sécurité était synonyme de mettre en danger la navire, et pourrait être traduit en anglais par involve danger. C'est naturellement au moment où a lieu la destruction qu'il faut se placer[Pg 655] pour voir si les conditions sont ou non remplies. Le danger qui n'existait pas au moment même de la saisie peut s'être manifesté quelque temps après.

La seconde est que l'observation du principe général pourrait compromettre la sécurité du navire de guerre ou le succès des opérations dans lesquelles il est actuellement engagé. C'est la formule à laquelle on s'est arrêté après quelques tâtonnements. Il a été entendu que compromettre la sécurité signifiait mettre en danger le navire, et pourrait être traduit en anglais par involve danger. C'est naturellement au moment de la destruction qu'il faut se placer[Pg 655] pour voir si les conditions sont ou non remplies. Le danger qui n'existait pas au moment même de la saisie pourrait s'être manifesté quelque temps après.

Article 50.

Article 50.

Avant la destruction, les personnes qui se trouvent à bord devront être mises en sûreté, et tous les papiers de bord et autres pièces, que les intéressés estimeront utiles pour le jugement sur la validité de la capture, devront être transbordés sur le bâtiment de guerre.

Before the destruction, the individuals on board must be secured, and all the ship’s papers and any other documents that those involved deem necessary for assessing the validity of the capture must be transferred to the warship.

La disposition prévoit des précautions à prendre dans l'intérêt des personnes et dans celui de l'administration de la justice.

La disposition prévoit des mesures à prendre dans l'intérêt des individus et dans celui de l'administration de la justice.

Article 51.

Article 51.

Le capteur qui a détruit un navire neutre doit, préalablement à tout jugement sur la validité de la capture, justifier en fait n'avoir agi qu'en présence d'une nécessité exceptionnelle, comme elle est prévue à l'article 49. Faute par lui de ce faire, il est tenu à indemnité vis-à-vis des intéressés, sans qu'il y ait à rechercher si la capture était valable ou non.

The sensor that destroyed a neutral ship must, before any judgment about the validity of the capture, prove that it acted only in the presence of exceptional necessity, as outlined in Article 49. If it fails to do this, it is liable to compensate the parties involved, regardless of whether the capture was valid or not.

Ce texte donne une garantie contre la destruction arbitraire des prises par l'établissement d'une responsabilité effective du capteur qui a opéré la destruction. Ce capteur doit, en effet, avant tout jugement sur la validité de la prise, justifier en fait qu'il était bien dans un des cas exceptionnels qui sont prévus. La justification sera faite contradictoirement avec le neutre qui, s'il n'est pas content de la décision du tribunal national des prises, pourra se pourvoir devant la juridiction internationale. Cette justification est donc une condition préalable à remplir par le capteur. S'il ne le fait pas, il doit indemniser les intéressés au navire et au chargement, sans qu'il y ait à rechercher si la prise était valable ou nulle. Il y a donc là une sanction sérieuse de l'obligation de ne détruire la prise que dans des cas déterminés, c'est une peine pécuniaire qui frappe le capteur. Si, au contraire, la justification est faite, le procès de prise se suit comme à l'ordinaire; lorsque la prise est déclarée valable, aucune indemnité n'est due; quand elle est déclarée nulle, les intéressés ont droit à être indemnisés. Le recours devant la Cour Internationale ne peut être formé que quand la décision du tribunal des prises est intervenue sur le fond et non pas aussitôt après que la question préalable a été jugée.

This text provides a guarantee against the arbitrary destruction of captures by establishing a clear responsibility for the captor who carried out the destruction. The captor must, in fact, justify that they were in one of the exceptional cases provided for before any judgment is made on the validity of the capture. The justification will be made with the neutral party, who, if they are not satisfied with the decision of the national capture court, can appeal to the international jurisdiction. Therefore, this justification is a prerequisite that the captor must meet. If they fail to do so, they must compensate those concerned with the ship and cargo, regardless of whether the capture was valid or null. This imposes a serious sanction on the obligation to destroy a capture only in specified cases, which results in a financial penalty for the captor. Conversely, if the justification is provided, the capture case continues as usual; when the capture is declared valid, no compensation is owed; when it is declared null, those concerned are entitled to compensation. An appeal to the International Court can only be made after the capture court's decision has been finalized on the merits and not immediately after the preliminary question has been judged.

Article 52.

Article 52.

Si la capture d'un navire neutre, dont la destruction a été justifiée, est ensuite déclarée nulle, le capteur doit indemniser les intéressés en remplacement de la restitution à laquelle ils auraient droit.

If the capture of a neutral ship, whose destruction has been justified, is later declared void, the captor must compensate the interested parties instead of returning the ship to them.

Article 53.

Article 53.

Si des marchandises neutres qui n'étaient pas susceptibles de confiscation ont été détruites avec le navire, le propriétaire de ces marchandises a droit à une indemnité.

If neutral goods that were not subject to seizure were destroyed with the ship, the owner of those goods is entitled to compensation.

Le navire détruit contenait des marchandises neutres non susceptibles de confiscation; le propriétaire de ces marchandises a, en tout cas, droit à une indemnité, c'est-à-dire sans qu'il y ait à distinguer suivant que la destruction était ou non justifiée. C'est équitable et c'est une garantie de plus contre une destruction arbitraire.

Le navire détruit transportait des marchandises neutres qui ne pouvaient pas être confisquées ; le propriétaire de ces marchandises a, en tout cas, droit à une compensation, sans qu'il soit nécessaire de déterminer si la destruction était justifiée ou non. C'est juste et c'est une protection supplémentaire contre une destruction arbitraire.

Article 54.

Article 54.

Le capteur a la faculté d'exiger la remise ou de procéder à la destruction des marchandises confiscables trouvées à bord d'un navire qui lui-même n'est pas sujet à confiscation, lorsque les circonstances sont telles que, d'après l'article 49, elles justifieraient la destruction d'un navire passible de confiscation. Il mentionne les objets livrés ou détruits sur le livre de bord du navire arrêté et se fait remettre par le capitaine copie certifiée conforme de tous papiers utiles. Lorsque la remise ou la destruction a été effectuée et que les formalités ont été remplies, le capitaine doit être autorisé à continuer sa route.

The inspector has the authority to demand the surrender or to proceed with the destruction of items that can be confiscated found on a ship that itself is not subject to confiscation, when the circumstances are such that, according to Article 49, they would justify the destruction of a ship liable for confiscation. He notes the items delivered or destroyed in the ship's logbook and obtains from the captain a certified copy of all relevant documents. Once the surrender or destruction has taken place and all formalities have been completed, the captain must be allowed to continue on his way.

Les dispositions des articles 51 et 52 concernant la responsabilité du capteur qui a détruit un navire neutre sont applicables.

The provisions of articles 51 and 52 regarding the liability of the captor who destroyed a neutral vessel are applicable.

Un croiseur rencontre un navire de commerce neutre portant de la contrebande dans une proportion inférieure à celle qui est prévue par l'article 40. Il peut amariner le navire et le conduire dans un port pour y être jugé. Il peut, conformément à ce qui est réglé par l'article 44, accepter la remise de la contrebande qui lui est offerte par le navire arrêté. Mais, qu'arrivera-t-il si aucune de ces solutions n'intervient? Le navire arrêté n'offre pas de remettre la contrebande et le croiseur n'est pas en situation de conduire le navire dans un de ses ports. Le croiseur est-il obligé de laisser aller un navire neutre avec la contrebande qu'il porte? Cela a paru excessif, au moins dans certaines circonstances exceptionnelles. Ce sont celles-là mêmes qui justifieraient la destruction du navire, s'il était susceptible de confiscation. En pareil cas, le croiseur pourra exiger la remise ou procéder à la destruction des marchandises confiscables. Les raisons qui ont fait admettre la destruction du navire pourront justifier la destruction des marchandises de contrebande, d'autant plus que les considérations d'humanité qui peuvent être invoquées en cas de destruction du navire sont écartées ici. Contre une exigence arbitraire du croiseur,[Pg 656] il y a les mêmes garanties qui ont permis de reconnaître la faculté de détruire le navire. Le croiseur doit préalablement justifier qu'il se trouvait bien dans les circonstances exceptionnelles prévues; sinon, il est condamné à la valeur des marchandises livrées ou détruites, sans qu'il y ait à rechercher si elles constituaient ou non de la contrebande de guerre.

Un croiseur rencontre un navire de commerce neutre transportant de la contrebande dans une quantité inférieure à celle prévue par l'article 40. Il peut intercepter le navire et le conduire dans un port pour y être jugé. Il peut, conformément à ce qui est stipulé par l'article 44, accepter la remise de la contrebande que le navire arrêté lui propose. Mais que se passe-t-il si aucune de ces solutions ne se concrétise ? Le navire arrêté ne propose pas de remettre la contrebande et le croiseur n'est pas en mesure de conduire le navire dans un de ses ports. Le croiseur doit-il laisser partir un navire neutre avec la contrebande qu'il transporte ? Cela a semblé excessif, du moins dans certaines circonstances exceptionnelles. Ce sont précisément ces circonstances qui justifieraient la destruction du navire, s'il était susceptible de confiscation. Dans ce cas, le croiseur pourra exiger la remise ou procéder à la destruction des marchandises confiscables. Les raisons qui justifient la destruction du navire peuvent également justifier la destruction des marchandises de contrebande, d'autant plus que les considérations humanitaires qui peuvent être évoquées lors de la destruction du navire sont écartées ici. Face à une demande arbitraire du croiseur,[Pg 656] il y a les mêmes garanties qui ont permis de reconnaître la possibilité de détruire le navire. Le croiseur doit d'abord prouver qu'il se trouvait bien dans les circonstances exceptionnelles prévues ; sinon, il sera condamné à rembourser la valeur des marchandises livrées ou détruites, sans qu'il soit nécessaire de déterminer si elles constituaient ou non de la contrebande de guerre.

La disposition prescrit des formalités qui sont nécessaires pour constater le fait même et pour mettre la juridiction des prises à même de statuer.

La disposition impose des formalités nécessaires pour établir le fait lui-même et pour permettre à la juridiction des prises de statuer.

Naturellement, une fois que la remise a été effectuée ou que la destruction a été opérée et que les formalités ont été remplies, le navire arrêté doit être laissé libre de continuer sa route.

Naturellement, une fois que la remise a été effectuée ou que la destruction a été opérée et que les formalités ont été remplies, le navire arrêté doit être laissé libre de continuer son chemin.

Chapitre V.Du transfert de pavillon.

Chapter V.On the transfer of flags.

Un navire de commerce ennemi est sujet à capture, tandis qu'un navire de commerce neutre est respecté. On comprend, dès lors, qu'un croiseur belligérant, rencontrant un navire de commerce qui se réclame d'une nationalité neutre, ait à rechercher si cette nationalité a été légitimement acquise ou si elle n'a pas eu pour but de soustraire le navire aux risques auxquels il aurait été exposé s'il avait gardé son ancienne nationalité. La question se présente naturellement quand le transfert est de date relativement récente, au moment où a lieu la visite, que ce transfert soit, du reste, antérieur ou postérieur à l'ouverture des hostilités. Elle est résolue différemment suivant qu'on se place plutôt au point de vue de l'intérêt du commerce ou plutôt au point de vue de l'intérêt des belligérants. Il est heureux que l'on se soit entendu sur un règlement qui concilie les deux intérêts dans la mesure du possible et qui renseigne les belligérants et le commerce neutre.

A merchant ship belonging to an enemy can be captured, while a neutral merchant ship is respected. Thus, it’s clear that a warring cruiser, encountering a merchant ship claiming a neutral nationality, must investigate whether that nationality was legitimately obtained or if it was simply a way to avoid the risks the ship would face if it retained its original nationality. This question naturally arises when the transfer is relatively recent, at the time of inspection, whether that transfer occurred before or after hostilities began. The resolution varies depending on whether one prioritizes commercial interests or the interests of the warring parties. Fortunately, a agreement has been reached that attempts to balance both interests as much as possible, providing guidance for both the warring parties and neutral commerce.

Article 55.

Article 55.

La transfert sous pavillon neutre d'un navire ennemi, effectué avant l'ouverture des hostilités, est valable à moins qu'il soit établi que ce transfert a été effectué en vue d'éluder les conséquences qu'entraîne le caractère de navire ennemi. Il y a néanmoins présomption de nullité si l'acte de transfert ne se trouve pas à bord, alors que le navire a perdu la nationalité belligérante moins de soixante jours avant l'ouverture des hostilités; la preuve contraire est admise.

The transfer under a neutral flag of an enemy ship, done before hostilities begin, is valid unless it's proven that the transfer was made to evade the consequences of being considered an enemy ship. However, there is a presumption of nullity if the transfer document is not on board, especially if the ship lost its belligerent nationality less than sixty days before hostilities started; contrary evidence is allowed.

Il y a présomption absolue de validité d'un transfert effectué plus de trente jours avant l'ouverture des hostilités, s'il est absolu, complet, conforme à la législation des pays intéressés, et s'il a cet effet que le contrôle du navire et le bénéfice de son emploi ne restent pas entre les mêmes mains qu'avant le transfert. Toutefois, si le navire a perdu la nationalité belligérante moins de soixante jours avant l'ouverture des hostilités et si l'acte de transfert ne se trouve pas à bord, la saisie du navire ne pourra donner lieu à des dommages et intérêts.

There is a complete presumption of validity for a transfer made more than thirty days before the start of hostilities, as long as it is absolute, complete, compliant with the laws of the countries involved, and results in the control and benefit of the ship not remaining with the same parties as before the transfer. However, if the ship lost its belligerent nationality less than sixty days before the start of hostilities and the transfer document is not on board, the seizure of the ship will not result in damages or compensation.

La règle générale, posée par l'alinéa 1er, est que le transfert sous pavillon neutre d'un navire ennemi est valable, en supposant, bien entendu, que les conditions juridiques ordinaires de validité ont été remplies. C'est au capteur, s'il veut faire annuler ce transfert, à établir que le transfert a eu pour but d'éluder les conséquences de la guerre que l'on prévoyait. Il y a un cas considéré comme suspect, celui dans lequel l'acte de transfert ne se trouve pas à bord, alors que le navire a changé de nationalité moins de soixante jours avant l'ouverture des hostilités. La présomption de validité établie au profit du navire par l'alinéa 1er est renversée au profit du capteur. Il y a présomption de nullité du transfert, mais la preuve contraire est admise. Il peut être prouvé, pour l'écarter, que le transfert n'a pas été opéré en vue d'éluder les conséquences de la guerre; il va sans dire que les conditions juridiques ordinaires de validité doivent avoir été remplies.

The general rule stated in paragraph 1 is that the transfer of an enemy ship under a neutral flag is valid, provided, of course, that the usual legal conditions for validity have been met. It is up to the seizer, if they want to annul this transfer, to prove that the transfer was intended to evade the consequences of the anticipated war. There is one case considered suspicious: when the transfer document is not onboard the ship, yet the ship changed nationality less than sixty days before the hostilities began. The presumption of validity established in favor of the ship by paragraph 1 is overturned in favor of the seizer. There is a presumption of invalidity of the transfer, but counter-evidence is allowed. It can be proven, to dismiss the presumption, that the transfer was not made to avoid the consequences of the war; it goes without saying that the usual legal conditions for validity must have been met.

On a voulu donner au commerce cette garantie que le droit de faire considérer un transfert comme nul pour ce motif qu'il aurait eu pour but d'éluder les conséquences de la guerre ne s'étendrait pas trop loin et ne comprendrait pas une période trop étendue. En conséquence, si le transfert a été effectué plus de trente jours avant l'ouverture des hostilités, il ne peut être attaqué pour cette seule cause, et il est considéré comme absolument valable, s'il a été fait dans des conditions qui en démontrent le caractère sérieux et définitif et qui sont les suivantes: le transfert doit être absolu, complet, et conforme à la législation des pays intéressés et il a pour effet de mettre le contrôle et les bénéfices du navire entre d'autres mains. Ces conditions établies, le capteur n'est pas admis à prétendre que le vendeur prévoyait la guerre dans laquelle son pays allait être engagé et voulait, par la vente, se soustraire aux risques qu'elle lui aurait fait courir pour les navires dont il opérait le transfert. Si, même dans cette hypothèse, le navire est rencontré par un croiseur et qu'il n'ait pas l'acte de transfert à bord, il pourra être saisi lorsque le changement de nationalité a eu lieu moins de soixante jours avant l'ouverture des hostilités; cette circonstance le rend suspect. Mais si,[Pg 657] devant la juridiction des prises, il fait les justifications prévues par l'alinéa 2, il doit être relâché; seulement il ne pourra obtenir des dommages et intérêts, attendu qu'il y avait eu motif suffisant pour saisir le navire.

On wanted to give commerce the assurance that the right to deem a transfer as null for the reason that it aimed to evade the consequences of war wouldn't be too broad or cover too long a period. Therefore, if the transfer was made more than thirty days before the start of hostilities, it cannot be challenged solely on that basis, and it is considered completely valid if it was made under conditions that demonstrate its serious and definitive nature, which are as follows: the transfer must be absolute, complete, and in accordance with the laws of the relevant countries, and it must effectively transfer the control and benefits of the ship to another party. Once these conditions are established, the purchaser cannot claim that the seller anticipated the war in which their country would be involved and sought to escape the risks it would pose for the ships being transferred. If, even under this assumption, the ship is intercepted by a cruiser and does not have the transfer documents on board, it may be seized if the change of nationality occurred less than sixty days before the start of hostilities; this circumstance makes it suspect. However, if, before the prize court, it provides the justifications outlined in paragraph 2, it must be released; though it will not be able to claim damages since there was sufficient reason to seize the vessel.

Article 56.

Article 56.

Le transfert sous pavillon neutre d'un navire ennemi, effectué après l'ouverture des hostilités, est nul, à moins qu'il soit établi que ce transfert n'a pas été effectué en vue d'éluder les conséquences qu'entraîne le caractère de navire ennemi.

The transfer under a neutral flag of an enemy vessel, made after hostilities have begun, is invalid unless it is proven that the transfer was not made to evade the consequences of being considered an enemy ship.

Toutefois, il y a présomption absolue de nullité:

However, there is an absolute presumption of nullity:

1o Si le transfert a été effectué pendant que le navire est en voyage ou dans un port bloqué.

1o If the transfer was made while the ship is on a journey or in a blocked port.

2o S'il y a faculté de réméré ou de retour.

2o If there is a right of redemption or return.

3o Si les conditions, auxquelles est soumis le droit de pavillon d'après la législation du pavillon arboré, n'ont pas été observées.

3o If the conditions under which the right of the flag is regulated by the flag state legislation have not been observed.

Pour le transfert postérieur à l'ouverture des hostilités, la règle est plus simple: le transfert n'est valable que s'il est établi qu'il n'a pas eu pour but d'éluder les conséquences qu'entraîne le caractère de navire ennemi. C'est la solution inverse de celle qui est admise pour le transfert antérieur à l'ouverture des hostilités; présomption de validité dans ce dernier, présomption de nullité dans celui dont il s'agit maintenant, sauf la possibilité de faire la preuve contraire. Il pourrait être établi, par exemple, que le transfert est la suite d'une transmission héréditaire.

Pour le transfert après le début des hostilités, la règle est plus simple : le transfert n'est valable que s'il est prouvé qu'il n'avait pas pour but d'éluder les conséquences liées au statut de navire ennemi. C'est l'approche opposée à celle acceptée pour le transfert avant le début des hostilités ; présomption de validité dans ce dernier cas, présomption de nullité dans celui dont il est question maintenant, sauf si une preuve contraire peut être apportée. Par exemple, il pourrait être démontré que le transfert est le résultat d'une transmission héréditaire.

L'article 56 indique des cas dans lesquels la présomption de nullité est absolue pour des motifs qui se comprennent aisément: dans le premier, le lien entre le transfert et le risque de guerre couru par le navire apparaît clairement; dans le second, l'acquéreur se présente comme un prête-nom devant être considéré comme propriétaire du navire pendant une période dangereuse, après laquelle le vendeur reprendra son navire; enfin, le troisième cas aurait pu à la rigueur être sous-entendu, le navire qui se réclame d'une nationalité neutre devant naturellement justifier qu'il a droit à cette nationalité.

L'article 56 mentionne des situations où la présomption de nullité est totale pour des raisons compréhensibles : tout d'abord, le lien entre le transfert et le risque de guerre auquel le navire est exposé est clair ; ensuite, l'acheteur agit comme un prête-nom qui doit être considéré comme le propriétaire du navire durant une période dangereuse, après quoi le vendeur reprendra le navire ; enfin, le troisième cas aurait pu être sous-entendu : un navire revendiquant une nationalité neutre doit naturellement prouver qu'il a le droit à cette nationalité.

On avait d'abord prévu le cas où le navire est, après le transfert, maintenu dans le service auquel il était affecté auparavant. Il y a là une circonstance suspecte au plus haut point; le transfert paraît fictif, puisque rien n'est changé dans le service du navire. Cela s'applique, par exemple, au cas d'une même ligne de navigation desservie par le navire après et avant le transfert. On a objecté que, parfois, la présomption absolue serait trop rigoureuse, que certains navires, comme les navires pétroliers, ne pouvaient, à raison de leur construction, être affectés qu'à un service déterminé. Pour tenir compte de cette observation, le mot trajet avait été ajouté, de sorte qu'il aurait fallu que le navire eût été maintenu dans les mêmes service et trajet; il semblait que l'on donnait, de cette façon, une satisfaction suffisante à la réclamation. Néanmoins, sur une insistance en vue de la suppression du cas dans l'énumération, cette suppression a été admise. Il en résulte que le transfert rentre alors dans l'application de la règle générale; il est bien présumé nul, mais la preuve contraire est admise.

Initially, we planned for the scenario where the ship is kept in the same service it was assigned to before the transfer. This raises a highly suspicious circumstance; the transfer seems to be fictitious since nothing has changed in the ship’s service. This applies, for example, to a situation where the same shipping line is served by the ship before and after the transfer. It has been argued that sometimes, an absolute presumption would be too strict since certain ships, like tankers, due to their construction, can only be assigned to specific services. To address this point, the word trip was added, so it would need to be that the ship was kept in the same service and trip; this seemed to adequately satisfy the claim. However, upon insistence to remove the case from the enumeration, this removal was accepted. As a result, the transfer then falls under the application of the general rule; it is presumed null, but contrary evidence is allowed.

Chapitre VI.Du caractère ennemi.

Chapter VI.About the enemy character.

La règle inscrite dans la Déclaration de Paris, "le pavillon neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, à l'exception de la contrebande de guerre," répond trop au progrès des mœurs, a trop pénétré l'opinion publique pour qu'en présence d'une application si générale, on n'y voie pas un principe de droit commun, qu'il n'est plus même question de discuter. Aussi le caractère neutre ou ennemi des navires de commerce n'a-t-il pas seulement pour conséquence de décider de la validité de leur capture, mais encore du sort des marchandises, autres que la contrebande, qui sont trouvées à leur bord. Une remarque générale analogue peut être faite au sujet du caractère neutre ou ennemi de la marchandise. Personne ne songe à contester aujourd'hui le principe d'après lequel, "la marchandise neutre, à l'exception de la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavillon ennemi." Ce n'est donc que dans le cas où elle est trouvée à bord d'un navire ennemi, que se pose la question de savoir si une marchandise est neutre ou ennemie.

La règle inscrite dans la Déclaration de Paris, "le pavillon neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, à l'exception de la contrebande de guerre," correspond trop au progrès des mœurs, a trop pénétré l'opinion publique pour qu'en présence d'une application si générale, on n'y voie pas un principe de droit commun, qu'il n'est plus même question de discuter. Aussi le caractère neutre ou ennemi des navires de commerce n'a-t-il pas seulement pour conséquence de décider de la validité de leur capture, mais encore du sort des marchandises, autres que la contrebande, qui sont trouvées à leur bord. Une remarque générale analogue peut être faite au sujet du caractère neutre ou ennemi de la marchandise. Personne ne songe à contester aujourd'hui le principe d'après lequel, "la marchandise neutre, à l'exception de la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavillon ennemi." Ce n'est donc que dans le cas où elle est trouvée à bord d'un navire ennemi, que se pose la question de savoir si une marchandise est neutre ou ennemie.

La détermination du caractère neutre ou ennemi apparaît ainsi comme le développement des deux principes consacrés en 1856, ou mieux comme le moyen d'en assurer la juste application pratique.

La détermination du caractère neutre ou ennemi apparaît ainsi comme le développement des deux principes consacrés en 1856, ou mieux comme le moyen d'en assurer la juste application pratique.

L'utilité de dégager, à cet égard, des pratiques des différents pays des règles claires et simples n'a, pour ainsi dire, pas besoin d'être démontrée. Pour le commerce, l'incertitude des risques de capture, si elle n'est pas une cause d'arrêt total, est tout au moins la pire des entraves. Le commerçant doit savoir les risques qu'il court en chargeant sur tel ou tel navire; l'assureur, s'il ignore la gravité de ces risques, est forcé d'exiger des primes de guerre souvent exorbitantes ou insuffisantes.

L'utilité de dégager, à cet égard, des pratiques des différents pays des règles claires et simples n'a, pour ainsi dire, pas besoin d'être démontrée. Pour le commerce, l'incertitude des risques de capture, si elle n'est pas une cause d'arrêt total, est tout au moins la pire des entraves. Le commerçant doit savoir les risques qu'il court en chargeant sur tel ou tel navire; l'assureur, s'il ignore la gravité de ces risques, est forcé d'exiger des primes de guerre souvent exorbitantes ou insuffisantes.

Les règles qui forment ce chapitre ne sont malheureusement pas complètes;[Pg 658] quelques points importants ont dû être laissés de côté, comme on l'a déjà vu par ce qui a été dit dans les explications préliminaires et comme cela sera précisé plus loin.

Les règles qui forment ce chapitre ne sont malheureusement pas complètes;[Pg 658] certains points importants ont dû être omis, comme nous l'avons déjà mentionné dans les explications préliminaires et comme cela sera précisé plus tard.

Article 57.

Article 57.

Sous réserve des dispositions relatives au transfert de pavillon, le caractère neutre ou ennemi du navire est déterminé par le pavillon qu'il a le droit de porter.

Subject to the provisions regarding the transfer of flags, the neutral or enemy status of the ship is determined by the flag it is entitled to fly.

Le cas où le navire neutre se livre à une navigation réservée en temps de paix reste hors de cause et n'est nullement visé par cette règle.

The case where a neutral vessel engages in restricted navigation during peacetime remains unaffected and is not addressed by this rule.

Le principe est donc que le caractère neutre ou ennemi du navire est déterminé par le pavillon qu'il a le droit de porter. C'est une règle simple qui paraît bien répondre à la situation spéciale des navires, si on les compare aux autres biens meubles et notamment aux marchandises. A plus d'un point de vue, ils ont une sorte d'individualité; notamment ils ont une nationalité, un caractère national. Cette nationalité est manifestée par le droit de pavillon; elle place les navires sous la protection et le contrôle de l'État dont ils relèvent; elle les soumet à la souveraineté et aux lois de cet État et, le cas échéant, à ses réquisitions. C'est là le critérium le plus sûr que le navire est bien un des éléments de la force maritime marchande d'un pays et, par conséquent, le meilleur critérium pour déterminer s'il est neutre ou ennemi. Aussi convient-il de s'y attacher exclusivement et d'écarter ce qui se rattache à la personnalité du propriétaire.

The principle is that the neutral or enemy status of a ship is determined by the flag it has the right to fly. It's a straightforward rule that seems to fit well with the unique situation of ships when compared to other movable properties, especially goods. In many ways, they have a kind of individuality; in particular, they have a nationality, a certain character. This nationality is shown through the right to fly a flag; it places ships under the protection and control of the state they belong to; it subjects them to the sovereignty and laws of that state and, when necessary, to its requisitions. This is the most reliable criterion that the ship is indeed part of the merchant maritime power of a country and, therefore, the best criterion for determining whether it is neutral or enemy. Thus, it is important to focus solely on this and disregard anything related to the personality of the owner.

Le texte dit: le pavillon que le navire a le droit de porter; cela s'entend naturellement du pavillon que le navire est, s'il ne l'a fait, en droit d'arborer, conformément aux lois qui régissent le port de ce pavillon.

Le texte dit : le pavillon que le navire a le droit de porter; cela s'entend naturellement du pavillon que le navire est, s'il ne l'a fait, en droit d'arborer, conformément aux lois qui régissent le port de ce pavillon.

L'article 57 réserve les dispositions relatives au transfert de pavillon pour lesquelles il suffit de renvoyer aux articles 55 et 56; il pourra se faire qu'un navire ait bien le droit de porter un pavillon neutre, au point de vue de la législation du pays dont il se réclame, mais soit considéré comme ennemi par un belligérant, parce que le transfert à la suite duquel il a porté le pavillon neutre tombe sous le coup de l'article 55 ou de l'article 56.

L'article 57 concerne les règles sur le transfert de pavillon, pour lesquelles il suffit de se référer aux articles 55 et 56. Il peut arriver qu'un navire ait le droit de porter un pavillon neutre selon la législation du pays dont il se réclame, mais soit considéré comme ennemi par un belligérant, parce que le transfert qui a conduit à ce pavillon neutre est régi par l'article 55 ou l'article 56.

Enfin, la question de savoir si un navire perd son caractère neutre, lorsqu'il effectue une navigation que l'ennemi réservait avant la guerre aux seuls navires nationaux a été soulevée. Une entente n'a pu avoir lieu, comme cela a été expliqué plus haut à propos du chapitre sur l'Assistance hostile, et la question est restée absolument entière, comme l'alinéa 2 de l'article 57 prend soin de le dire.

Enfin, la question de savoir si un navire perd son caractère neutre lorsqu'il effectue une navigation que l'ennemi réservait avant la guerre aux seuls navires nationaux a été soulevée. Une entente n'a pu avoir lieu, comme cela a été expliqué plus haut à propos du chapitre sur l'Assistance hostile, et la question est restée absolument entière, comme l'alinéa 2 de l'article 57 prend soin de le dire.

Article 58.

Article 58.

Le caractère neutre ou ennemi des marchandises trouvées à bord d'un navire ennemi est déterminé par le caractère neutre ou ennemi de leur propriétaire.

The neutral or enemy status of goods found on an enemy ship is determined by the neutral or enemy status of their owner.

A la différence des navires, les marchandises n'ont pas une individualité propre; on fait dépendre leur caractère neutre ou ennemi de la personnalité de leur propriétaire. C'est ce qui a prévalu après un examen approfondi de diverses opinions tendant à s'attacher à l'origine des marchandises, à la personne du porteur de risques, du réclamateur ou de l'expéditeur. Le critérium adopté par l'article 58 paraît, d'ailleurs, conforme aux termes de la Déclaration de Paris comme à ceux de la Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907, sur l'établissement d'une Cour Internationale des prises, où il est parlé des propriétés neutres ou ennemies (articles 1, 3, 4 et 8).

Unlike ships, goods don’t have an individual identity; their neutral or enemy status is determined by the identity of their owner. This principle prevailed after a thorough examination of various viewpoints focusing on the origin of the goods and the identity of the risk bearer, claimant, or shipper. The criterion adopted by Article 58 also seems to align with the terms of the Declaration of Paris as well as the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, on the establishment of an International Prize Court, which discusses neutral or enemy properties (Articles 1, 3, 4, and 8).

Mais il ne faut pas se dissimuler que l'article 58 ne résout qu'une partie du problème, la plus simple; c'est le caractère neutre ou ennemi du propriétaire qui détermine le caractère des marchandises, mais à quoi s'attachera-t-on pour déterminer le caractère neutre ou ennemi du propriétaire? On ne le dit pas, parce qu'il a été impossible d'arriver à une entente sur ce point. Les opinions ont été partagées entre le domicile et la nationalité; il est inutile de reproduire ici les arguments invoqués dans les deux sens. On avait pensé à une sorte de transaction ainsi formulée:

Mais il ne faut pas se cacher que l'article 58 ne résout qu'une partie du problème, la plus simple; c'est le caractère neutre ou ennemi du propriétaire qui détermine le caractère des marchandises, mais sur quoi se basera-t-on pour définir le caractère neutre ou ennemi du propriétaire ? On ne le dit pas, car il a été impossible d'arriver à un accord sur ce point. Les opinions étaient partagées entre le domicile et la nationalité; il est inutile de reproduire ici les arguments avancés dans les deux sens. On avait pensé à une sorte de transaction ainsi formulée:

"Le caractère neutre ou ennemi des marchandises trouvées à bord d'un navire ennemi est déterminé par la nationalité neutre ou ennemie de leur propriétaire et, en cas d'absence de nationalité ou en cas de double nationalité neutre et ennemie de leur propriétaire, par le domicile de celui-ci en pays neutre ou ennemi."

"Whether goods found on a vessel are neutral or enemy is determined by the neutral or enemy nationality of their owner, and if there is no nationality or if the owner has both neutral and enemy nationalities, it's determined by where the owner resides in neutral or enemy territory."

"Toutefois, les marchandises appartenant à une société anonyme ou par actions sont considérées comme neutres ou ennemies selon que la société a son siège social en pays neutre ou ennemi."

"Toutefois, les marchandises appartenant à une société anonyme ou par actions sont considérées comme neutres ou ennemies selon que la société a son siège social en pays neutre ou ennemi."

L'unanimité n'a pu être obtenue.

Unanimity could not be reached.

Article 59.

Article 59.

Si le caractère neutre de la marchandise trouvée à bord d'un navire ennemi n'est pas établi, la marchandise est présumée ennemie.

If the neutral character of the goods found on board an enemy ship is not established, the goods are presumed to be enemy property.

L'article 59 formule la règle traditionnelle d'après laquelle la marchandise trouvée à bord d'un navire ennemi est présumée ennemie sauf la preuve contraire;[Pg 659] ce n'est qu'une présomption simple laissant au revendiquant le droit, mais la charge de prouver ses droits.

L'article 59 établit la règle classique selon laquelle la marchandise trouvée à bord d'un navire ennemi est considérée comme ennemie, sauf preuve du contraire;[Pg 659] c'est simplement une présomption qui permet au revendiquant de faire valoir ses droits, mais il doit prouver ceux-ci.

Article 60.

Article 60.

Le caractère ennemi de la marchandise chargée à bord d'un navire ennemi subsiste jusqu'à l'arrivée à destination, nonobstant un transfert intervenu pendant le cours de l'expédition, après l'ouverture des hostilités.

The enemy character of the goods loaded on an enemy ship remains until they reach their destination, regardless of any transfer that occurred during the voyage after hostilities began.

Toutefois, si, antérieurement à la capture, un précédent propriétaire neutre exerce, en cas de faillite du propriétaire ennemi actuel, un droit de revendication légale sur la marchandise, celle-ci reprend le caractère neutre.

However, if, prior to the capture, a previous neutral owner asserts a legal claim on the merchandise in the event of the current enemy owner's bankruptcy, it regains its neutral status.

Cette disposition envisage le cas où une marchandise, étant propriété ennemie au moment de son départ, a été l'objet d'une vente ou d'un transfert pendant le cours du voyage. La facilité qu'il y aurait à garantir, au moyen d'une vente, la marchandise ennemie contre l'exercice du droit de capture, sauf à s'en faire rétrocéder la propriété à l'arrivée, a toujours conduit à ne pas tenir compte de ces transferts; le caractère ennemi subsiste.

Cette disposition envisage le cas où une marchandise, appartenant à un ennemi au moment de son départ, a été vendue ou transférée pendant le voyage. La facilité d'assurer, par une vente, la marchandise ennemie contre le droit de saisie, sauf à récupérer la propriété à l'arrivée, a toujours conduit à ignorer ces transferts ; le caractère ennemi demeure.

Au point de vue du moment à partir duquel une marchandise doit être considérée comme devant prendre et conserver le caractère ennemi de son propriétaire, le texte est inspiré du même esprit d'équité qui a présidé à la Convention de La Haye sur le régime des bâtiments de commerce au début des hostilités, et du même désir de garantir les opérations entreprises dans la confiance du temps de paix. C'est seulement lorsque le transfert a lieu après l'ouverture des hostilités qu'il est, jusqu'à l'arrivée, inopérant au point de vue de la perte du caractère ennemi. Ce qu'on considère ici, c'est la date du transfert, et non la date du départ du navire. Car, bien que le navire parti avant la guerre, et resté peut-être dans l'ignorance de l'ouverture des hostilités, jouisse de ce chef d'une certaine exemption, la marchandise peut cependant avoir le caractère ennemi; le propriétaire ennemi de cette marchandise est à même de connaître la guerre, et c'est précisément pour cela qu'il cherchera à échapper à ses conséquences.

From the moment a good must be considered as taking on and maintaining the enemy status of its owner, the text is inspired by the same spirit of fairness that guided the Hague Convention on the status of merchant vessels at the start of hostilities, and by the desire to protect operations carried out in the trust of peacetime. It is only when the transfer occurs after the hostilities have begun that it becomes, until arrival, ineffective in terms of losing the enemy character. What is being considered here is the date of the transfer, not the departure date of the vessel. Because, even though the ship left before the war and may have remained unaware of the outbreak of hostilities, it does benefit from that aspect of exemption, the goods can still have the enemy status; the enemy owner of those goods is aware of the war, and this is precisely why they will try to evade its consequences.

On a cru, toutefois, devoir ajouter sinon une restriction, du moins un complément jugé nécessaire. Dans un grand nombre de pays, le vendeur non payé a, en cas de faillite de l'acheteur, un droit de revendication légale (stoppage in transitu) sur les marchandises déjà devenues la propriété de l'acheteur, mais non encore parvenues jusqu'à lui. En pareil cas la vente est résolue, et, par l'effet de sa revendication, le vendeur reprend sa marchandise, sans être réputé avoir jamais cessé d'être propriétaire. Il y a là pour le commerce neutre, en cas de faillite non simulée, une garantie trop précieuse pour être sacrifiée, et le deuxième alinéa de l'article 60 a pour but de la sauvegarder.

On a related note, however, we need to add, if not a restriction, at least a necessary addition. In many countries, a seller who hasn’t been paid has, in the event of the buyer's bankruptcy, a legal right to reclaim (stoppage in transitu) goods that have already become the buyer's property but haven’t yet reached them. In such cases, the sale is canceled, and, due to their claim, the seller takes back their goods without being considered to have ever ceased to be the owner. This provides neutral commerce, in cases of genuine bankruptcy, with a protection that is too valuable to be sacrificed, and the second paragraph of Article 60 aims to preserve it.

Chapitre VII.Du convoi.

Chapter VII.The convoy.

La pratique du convoi a, dans le passé, soulevé parfois de graves difficultés et même des conflits. Aussi peut-on constater avec satisfaction l'accord intervenu pour la régler.

La pratique du convoi a, dans le passé, soulevé parfois de graves difficultés et même des conflits. Aussi peut-on constater avec satisfaction l'accord intervenu pour la régler.

Article 61.

Article 61.

Les navires neutres sous convoi de leur pavillon sont exempts de visite. Le commandant du convoi donne par écrit, à la demande du commandant d'un bâtiment de guerre belligérant, sur le caractère des navires et sur leur chargement, toutes informations que la visite servirait à obtenir.

Neutral ships under the protection of their flag are exempt from inspection. The commander of the convoy provides, in writing, at the request of the commander of a belligerent warship, all information that an inspection would reveal regarding the ships and their cargo.

Le principe posé est simple: un navire neutre convoyé par un navire de guerre de sa nation est exempt de visite. Le motif en est que le croiseur belligérant doit trouver dans les affirmations du commandant du convoi la garantie que lui procurerait l'exercice même du droit de visite; il ne peut, en effet, révoquer en doute ces affirmations, données par l'agent officiel d'un Gouvernement neutre, sans manquer à la courtoisie internationale. Si les Gouvernements neutres laissent les belligérants visiter les navires portant leur pavillon, c'est qu'ils ne veulent pas prendre la charge de la surveillance de ces navires, et qu'alors ils permettent aux belligérants de se protéger eux-mêmes. La situation change quand un Gouvernement neutre entend prendre cette charge; le droit de visite n'a plus la même raison d'être.

Le principe est simple : un navire neutre escorté par un navire de guerre de son pays est exempt de visite. La raison en est que le croiseur belligérant doit se fier aux déclarations du commandant du convoi, qui fournissent la garantie que lui donnerait l’exercice du droit de visite ; il ne peut, en effet, remettre en question ces déclarations, faites par l’agent officiel d’un gouvernement neutre, sans manquer à la courtoisie internationale. Si les gouvernements neutres permettent aux belligérants de visiter les navires affichant leur pavillon, c’est qu’ils ne veulent pas assumer la responsabilité de surveiller ces navires, et ils laissent donc aux belligérants le soin de se protéger eux-mêmes. La situation change quand un gouvernement neutre décide de prendre cette responsabilité ; le droit de visite n’a plus la même justification.

Mais il résulte de l'explication de la règle donnée pour le convoi que le Gouvernement neutre s'engage à donner aux belligérants toute garantie que les navires convoyés ne profitent pas de la protection qui leur est assurée pour agir contrairement à la neutralité—par exemple, pour transporter de la contrebande de guerre, pour fournir à un belligérant une assistance hostile, pour tenter de violer un blocus. Il faudra donc une surveillance sérieuse exercée au départ sur les navires devant être convoyés, et cette surveillance devra se poursuivre au cours du voyage. Le Gouvernement devra procéder avec vigilance pour empêcher tout abus du convoi, et il donnera en ce sens des instructions précises à l'officier chargé de commander un convoi.

Mais il résulte de l'explication de la règle donnée pour le convoi que le Gouvernement neutre s'engage à donner aux belligérants toute garantie que les navires convoyés ne profitent pas de la protection qui leur est assurée pour agir contrairement à la neutralité—par exemple, pour transporter de la contrebande de guerre, pour fournir à un belligérant une assistance hostile, pour tenter de violer un blocus. Il faudra donc une surveillance sérieuse exercée au départ sur les navires devant être convoyés, et cette surveillance devra se poursuivre au cours du voyage. Le Gouvernement devra procéder avec vigilance pour empêcher tout abus du convoi, et il donnera en ce sens des instructions précises à l'officier chargé de commander un convoi.

Un croiseur belligérant rencontre un convoi: il s'adresse au commandant de[Pg 660] ce convoi, qui doit, sur sa demande, lui donner par écrit toutes les informations utiles sur les navires qui sont sous sa protection. On exige une déclaration écrite, parce qu'elle empêche les équivoques et les malentendus, qu'elle engage plus la responsabilité du commandant. Cette déclaration a pour but de rendre la visite inutile par le fait même qu'elle procure au croiseur les renseignements que la visite elle-même lui aurait fournis.

Un croiseur de guerre croise un convoi : il s'adresse au commandant de[Pg 660] ce convoi, qui doit, à sa demande, lui fournir par écrit toutes les informations utiles sur les navires sous sa protection. Une déclaration écrite est exigée, car elle empêche les ambiguïtés et les malentendus, et elle engage davantage la responsabilité du commandant. Cette déclaration vise à rendre la visite superflue en fournissant au croiseur les informations que la visite elle-même aurait pu apporter.

Article 62.

Article 62.

Si le commandant du bâtiment de guerre belligérant a lieu de soupçonner que la religion du commandant du convoi a été surprise, il lui communique ses soupçons. C'est au commandant du convoi seul qu'il appartient en ce cas de procéder à une vérification. Il doit constater le résultat de cette vérification par un procès-verbal dont une copie est remise à l'officier du bâtiment de guerre. Si des faits ainsi constatés justifient, dans l'opinion du commandant du convoi, la saisie d'un ou de plusieurs navires, la protection du convoi doit leur être retirée.

If the commander of the warring warship suspects that the commander of the convoy has been compromised, he communicates his suspicions to him. It is solely the responsibility of the convoy commander to carry out a verification. He must confirm the results of this verification with a report, of which a copy is provided to the warship officer. If the verified facts justify, in the opinion of the convoy commander, the seizure of one or more ships, the protection of the convoy must be withdrawn from them.

Le plus souvent le croiseur s'en tiendra à la déclaration que lui aura donnée le commandant du convoi, mais il peut avoir de sérieuses raisons de croire que la religion de ce commandant a été surprise, qu'un navire convoyé dont les papiers paraissent en règle, et ne présentent rien de suspect, transporte, en fait, de la contrebande adroitement dissimulée. Le croiseur peut communiquer ses soupçons au commandant du convoi. Une vérification peut être jugée nécessaire. Elle est faite par le commandant du convoi; c'est lui seul qui exerce l'autorité sur les navires placés sous sa protection. Il a paru toutefois que l'on éviterait souvent bien des difficultés, s'il était permis au belligérant d'assister à cette vérification; autrement il lui serait toujours possible de suspecter, sinon la bonne foi, du moins la vigilance ou la perspicacité du visiteur. Mais on n'a pas cru devoir imposer au commandant du convoi l'obligation de laisser l'officier du croiseur assister à la vérification. Il agira comme il le jugera bon: s'il accepte l'assistance d'un officier du croiseur, ce sera un acte de courtoisie ou de bonne politique. Il devra, dans tous les cas, dresser un procès-verbal de la vérification et en donner une copie à l'officier du croiseur.

Le croiseur se fiera généralement à la déclaration faite par le commandant du convoi, mais il peut avoir de bonnes raisons de croire que ce commandant a été trompé, qu'un navire qui semble en règle et qui ne présente rien de suspect transporte en réalité de la contrebande habilement cachée. Le croiseur peut faire part de ses soupçons au commandant du convoi. Une vérification pourrait être nécessaire. Celle-ci est effectuée par le commandant du convoi; c'est lui qui a l'autorité sur les navires qu'il protège. Cependant, il semble qu'il serait souvent utile d'éviter beaucoup de problèmes si le belligérant pouvait assister à cette vérification; sinon, il pourrait toujours douter, sinon de la bonne foi, du moins de la vigilance ou du discernement du vérificateur. Toutefois, on n'a pas jugé nécessaire d'imposer au commandant du convoi l'obligation de permettre à l'officier du croiseur d'assister à la vérification. Il agira comme il le souhaite : s'il accepte l'assistance d'un officier du croiseur, ce sera un acte de courtoisie ou de bonne politique. Dans tous les cas, il devra rédiger un procès-verbal de la vérification et en donner une copie à l'officier du croiseur.

Des divergences peuvent s'élever entre les deux officiers, spécialement à propos de la contrebande conditionnelle. Le caractère du port auquel sont destinés des blés peut être contesté; est-ce un port de commerce ordinaire? est-ce un port qui sert de base de ravitaillement pour les forces armées? La situation de fait produite par le convoi doit être, en ce cas, maintenue. Il pourra seulement y avoir une protestation de la part de l'officier du croiseur, et la difficulté sera réglée par la voie diplomatique.

Des divergences peuvent s'élever entre les deux officiers, spécialement à propos de la contrebande conditionnelle. Le caractère du port auquel sont destinés des blés peut être contesté; est-ce un port de commerce ordinaire? est-ce un port qui sert de base de ravitaillement pour les forces armées? La situation de fait produite par le convoi doit être, en ce cas, maintenue. Il pourra seulement y avoir une protestation de la part de l'officier du croiseur, et la difficulté sera réglée par la voie diplomatique.

La situation est tout autre si un navire convoyé est trouvé porteur de contrebande sans qu'une contestation puisse s'élever. Le navire n'a plus droit à la protection, parce que la condition à laquelle cette protection était subordonnée n'a pas été remplie. Il a trompé son propre Gouvernement d'abord et essayé de tromper un belligérant. Il doit alors être traité comme un navire de commerce neutre qui, dans les circonstances ordinaires, rencontre un croiseur belligérant et est visité par lui. Il ne peut se plaindre d'être ainsi traité rigoureusement, parce qu'il y a dans son cas une aggravation de la faute commise par un transporteur de contrebande.

The situation is completely different if a convoyed ship is found carrying contraband without any dispute arising. The ship no longer has the right to protection because the condition for that protection has not been met. It has deceived its own government first and attempted to deceive a belligerent. It should then be treated like a neutral merchant ship that, under normal circumstances, encounters a belligerent cruiser and is inspected by it. It cannot complain about being treated harshly because there is an aggravation of the offense committed by a carrier of contraband in its case.

Chapitre VIII.De la résistance à la visite.

Chapter VIII.On declining the visit.

Le sujet traité dans ce chapitre n'est pas mentionné dans le programme soumis en février 1908 par le Gouvernement Britannique; il se rattache étroitement à plusieurs des questions de ce programme, aussi s'est-il naturellement présenté à l'esprit au cours des discussions, et il a paru nécessaire de poser une règle sur laquelle on s'est facilement accordé.

Le sujet traité dans ce chapitre n'est pas mentionné dans le programme soumis en février 1908 par le Gouvernement Britannique; il se rattache étroitement à plusieurs des questions de ce programme, aussi s'est-il naturellement présenté à l'esprit au cours des discussions, et il a paru nécessaire de poser une règle sur laquelle on s'est facilement accordé.

Un croiseur belligérant rencontre un navire de commerce et le somme de s'arrêter pour qu'il soit procédé à la visite. Le navire sommé ne s'arrête pas et essaie de se soustraire à la visite par la fuite. Le croiseur peut employer la force pour l'arrêter, et le navire de commerce, s'il est avarié ou coulé, n'a pas le droit de se plaindre, puisqu'il a contrevenu à une obligation imposée par le droit des gens. S'il est arrêté et s'il est établi que c'est seulement pour éviter les ennuis de la visite qu'il avait recouru à la fuite, qu'il n'avait d'ailleurs commis aucun acte contraire à la neutralité, il ne sera pas puni pour sa tentative. S'il est constaté, au contraire, que le navire a de la contrebande à bord ou qu'il a, d'une façon quelconque, violé ses devoirs de neutre, il subira les conséquences de son infraction à la neutralité, mais il ne subira non plus aucune peine pour avoir tenté la fuite. Certains pensaient, au contraire, que le navire devrait être puni pour une tentative de fuite caractérisée comme pour une résistance violente. La possibilité de[Pg 661] la confiscation engagerait, disait-on, le croiseur à ménager, dans la mesure du possible, le navire en fuite. Mais cette idée n'a pas prévalu.

Un croiseur de guerre croise un navire marchand et lui ordonne de s'arrêter pour inspection. Le navire ordonné ne s'arrête pas et tente d'échapper à l'inspection en fuyant. Le croiseur peut utiliser la force pour l'arrêter, et si le navire marchand est endommagé ou coulé, il n’a pas le droit de se plaindre, car il a violé une obligation imposée par le droit international. S'il est arrêté et qu'il s'avère qu'il a seulement fui pour éviter des problèmes liés à l'inspection, sans avoir commis d'autre acte qui contreviendrait à sa neutralité, il ne sera pas puni pour sa tentative. En revanche, s'il est prouvé que le navire avait de la contrebande à bord ou qu'il a violé ses obligations de neutre d'une manière quelconque, il subira les conséquences pour son infraction à la neutralité, mais il ne sera pas puni pour avoir tenté de fuir. Certains pensaient, par contre, que le navire devrait être puni pour une tentative de fuite considérée comme une résistance violente. On disait que la possibilité de [Pg 661] confiscation inciterait le croiseur à épargner, autant que possible, le navire en fuite. Mais cette idée n'a pas prévalu.

Article 63.

Article 63.

La résistance opposée par la force à l'exercice légitime du droit d'arrêt, de visite et de saisie, entraîne, dans tous les cas, la confiscation du navire. Le chargement est passible du même traitement que subirait le chargement d'un navire ennemi; les marchandises appartenant au capitaine ou au propriétaire du navire sont considérées comme marchandises ennemies.

The resistance from the force against the legitimate exercise of the right to stop, inspect, and seize leads to the confiscation of the vessel in all cases. The cargo is subject to the same treatment as that of an enemy ship's cargo; goods owned by the captain or the ship's owner are treated as enemy goods.

La situation est différente s'il y a résistance violente à l'action légitime du croiseur. Le navire commet un acte d'hostilité et doit, dès lors, être traité en ennemi; il sera donc soumis à confiscation, quand même la visite ne révélerait aucun fait contraire à la neutralité, et cela semble ne pouvoir soulever aucune difficulté.

La situation est différente s'il y a résistance violente à l'action légitime du croiseur. Le navire commet un acte d'hostilité et doit donc être traité comme un ennemi ; il sera donc soumis à confiscation, même si la visite ne révèle aucun fait contraire à la neutralité, et cela semble ne pouvoir soulever aucune difficulté.

Que faut-il décider du chargement? La formule qui a semblé la meilleure est celle d'après laquelle ce chargement sera traité comme celui qui serait à bord d'un navire ennemi. Cette assimilation entraîne les conséquences suivantes: le navire neutre qui a résisté devenant navire ennemi, la marchandise se trouvant à bord est présumée ennemie. Les neutres intéressés pourront réclamer leur propriété, conformément à la 3e règle de la Déclaration de Paris, mais la marchandise ennemie sera confisquée parce que la règle le pavillon couvre la marchandise ne peut plus être invoquée, le navire saisi sur lequel elle se trouve étant considéré comme ennemi. On remarquera que le droit de réclamer la marchandise est reconnu à tous les neutres, même à ceux qui ont la nationalité du navire saisi; il paraîtrait excessif de les faire souffrir de l'acte du capitaine. Il y a toutefois une exception à l'égard des marchandises appartenant au propriétaire du navire. Il semble naturel qu'il supporte les conséquences des actes de son agent. Sa propriété à bord du navire sera donc traitée en marchandise ennemie. A plus forte raison, en est-il de même de la marchandise appartenant au capitaine.

Que faut-il décider du chargement? La formule qui a semblé la meilleure est celle d'après laquelle ce chargement sera traité comme celui qui serait à bord d'un navire ennemi. Cette assimilation entraîne les conséquences suivantes : le navire neutre qui a résisté devenant navire ennemi, la marchandise se trouvant à bord est présumée ennemie. Les neutres intéressés pourront réclamer leur propriété, conformément à la 3e règle de la Déclaration de Paris, mais la marchandise ennemie sera confisquée parce que la règle le pavillon couvre la marchandise ne peut plus être invoquée, le navire saisi sur lequel elle se trouve étant considéré comme ennemi. On remarquera que le droit de réclamer la marchandise est reconnu à tous les neutres, même à ceux qui ont la nationalité du navire saisi ; il paraîtrait excessif de les faire souffrir de l'acte du capitaine. Il y a toutefois une exception à l'égard des marchandises appartenant au propriétaire du navire. Il semble naturel qu'il supporte les conséquences des actes de son agent. Sa propriété à bord du navire sera donc traitée en marchandise ennemie. A plus forte raison, en est-il de même de la marchandise appartenant au capitaine.

Chapitre IX.Des dommages et intérêts.

Chapter IX.Damages and compensation.

Ce chapitre a une portée très générale, puisque la disposition qu'il contient trouve son application dans les cas nombreux où un croiseur peut saisir un navire ou des marchandises.

Ce chapitre a une portée très générale, puisque la disposition qu'il contient trouve son application dans les cas nombreux où un croiseur peut saisir un navire ou des marchandises.

Article 64.

Article 64.

Si la saisie du navire ou des marchandises n'est pas validée par la juridiction des prises ou si, sans qu'il y ait eu de mise en jugement, la saisie n'est pas maintenue, les intéressés ont droit à des dommages et intérêts, à moins qu'il y ait eu des motifs suffisants de saisir le navire ou les marchandises.

If the seizure of the ship or goods is not validated by the prize jurisdiction, or if, without a judgment being made, the seizure is not upheld, the interested parties have the right to compensation, unless there were sufficient grounds to seize the ship or goods.

Un croiseur a saisi un navire neutre, par exemple, pour transport de contrebande ou violation de blocus. Le tribunal des prises relâche le navire en annulant la saisie. Cela ne suffit évidemment pas à dédommager les intéressés de la perte éprouvée par suite de la saisie, et cette perte a pu être considérable, puisque le navire a été, pendant un temps souvent très long, empêché de se livrer à son trafic ordinaire. Peuvent-ils demander à être indemnisés de ce préjudice? Rationnellement il faut admettre l'affirmative, si ce préjudice est immérité, c'est-à-dire si la saisie n'a pas été amenée par leur faute. Il peut arriver, en effet, que la saisie ait été motivée, parce que le capitaine du navire visité n'a pas produit des justifications qui devaient se trouver normalement à sa disposition et qui ont été fournies plus tard. Dans ce cas, il serait injuste que des dommages et intérêts fussent accordés. A l'inverse, s'il y a eu vraiment faute du croiseur, s'il a saisi dans un cas où il n'y avait pas de motifs suffisants de le faire, il est juste que des dommages et intérêts soient alloués.

A cruiser has seized a neutral ship, for example, for smuggling or breaching a blockade. The prize court releases the ship by canceling the seizure. However, this obviously does not compensate the interested parties for the losses incurred due to the seizure, and this loss can be significant, as the ship has often been prevented from carrying out its normal trade for a very long time. Can they claim compensation for this harm? Rationally, the answer should be yes, if this harm is unwarranted, meaning if the seizure was not caused by their fault. It can happen, in fact, that the seizure was justified because the captain of the inspected ship did not provide the necessary documentation that should have normally been at their disposal and that was submitted later. In this case, it would be unfair to award damages. Conversely, if the cruiser was indeed at fault, if it made a seizure in a situation where there were not sufficient grounds to do so, it is fair for damages to be awarded.

Il peut arriver aussi qu'un navire saisi et conduit dans un port ait été relaxé par voie administrative sans intervention d'un tribunal de prises. En pareil cas, la pratique varie: dans certains pays, la juridiction des prises n'intervient que dans le cas d'une capture et ne pourrait statuer sur une demande de dommages-intérêts fondée sur ce que la saisie aurait été injustifiée; dans d'autres, la juridiction des prises serait compétente pour une demande de ce genre. Il y a là une inégalité peu équitable et il convient d'établir une règle qui produise le même effet dans tous les pays. Il est raisonnable que toute saisie pratiquée sans motifs suffisants donne droit à des dommages-intérêts au profit des intéressés, sans qu'il y ait à distinguer suivant que la saisie a été ou non suivie d'une décision du tribunal des prises, et d'autant plus que c'est quand la saisie aura été le moins justifiée, que le navire pourra être relaxé par voie administrative. On a donc employé une formule générale pouvant comprendre tous les cas de saisie.

Il peut arriver aussi qu'un navire saisi et conduit dans un port ait été relaxé par voie administrative sans intervention d'un tribunal de prises. En pareil cas, la pratique varie : dans certains pays, la juridiction des prises n'intervient que dans le cas d'une capture et ne pourrait statuer sur une demande de dommages-intérêts fondée sur ce que la saisie aurait été injustifiée ; dans d'autres, la juridiction des prises serait compétente pour une demande de ce genre. Il y a là une inégalité peu équitable et il convient d'établir une règle qui produise le même effet dans tous les pays. Il est raisonnable que toute saisie pratiquée sans motifs suffisants donne droit à des dommages-intérêts au profit des intéressés, sans qu'il y ait à distinguer suivant que la saisie a été ou non suivie d'une décision du tribunal des prises, et d'autant plus que c'est quand la saisie aura été le moins justifiée, que le navire pourra être relaxé par voie administrative. On a donc employé une formule générale pouvant comprendre tous les cas de saisie.

Il convient de remarquer que la question de savoir si les tribunaux[Pg 662] nationaux de prises sont compétents pour statuer sur les dommages-intérêts n'est pas visée dans le texte. En tant qu'il y a un procès sur les propriétés saisies, aucun doute n'est possible. Dans la procédure engagée sur la validité de la capture, les intéressés auront l'occasion de faire valoir leur droit à une indemnité, et, si la décision du tribunal national ne leur donne pas satisfaction, ils pourront se pourvoir devant la Cour Internationale des prises. Si, au contraire, l'action du belligérant s'est bornée à une saisie, la législation du belligérant capteur décide si des tribunaux sont compétents pour connaître d'une demande en indemnité et, en cas d'affirmative, quels tribunaux sont compétents dans l'espèce; la Cour Internationale n'a, dans ce cas, aucune compétence d'après la Convention de La Haye. Au point de vue international, la voie diplomatique est la seule ouverte pour faire valoir la réclamation, qu'il s'agisse de se plaindre d'une décision effectivement rendue ou de suppléer à l'absence de juridiction.

It should be noted that the question of whether national prize courts[Pg 662] are competent to rule on damages is not addressed in the text. As long as there is a trial concerning the seized properties, there is no doubt. In the procedure initiated regarding the validity of the capture, the interested parties will have the opportunity to assert their right to compensation, and if the national court's decision does not satisfy them, they can appeal to the International Prize Court. On the other hand, if the belligerent's action was limited to a seizure, the legislation of the capturing belligerent determines whether courts are competent to hear a compensation request and, if so, which courts have jurisdiction in the case; the International Court does not have jurisdiction in this instance according to the Hague Convention. From an international perspective, diplomatic channels are the only means available to make a claim, whether it concerns complaining about a decision that has actually been made or compensating for the lack of jurisdiction.

On a posé la question de savoir s'il y avait lieu de distinguer les dommages directs et les dommages indirects subis par le navire ou la marchandise. Il a semblé qu'il valait mieux laisser la juridiction des prises libre d'apprécier le dédommagement dû, qui variera suivant les circonstances et dont le montant ne peut être déterminé à l'avance par des règles trop minutieuses.

On asked whether there should be a distinction between direct and indirect damages suffered by the ship or the cargo. It seemed better to let the prize jurisdiction freely assess the compensation owed, which will vary depending on the circumstances and whose amount cannot be predetermined by overly detailed rules.

Il n'a été parlé que du navire pour simplifier; mais ce qui a été dit s'applique naturellement à la cargaison saisie, puis relâchée. Ainsi la marchandise innocente, se trouvant à bord du navire saisi, subit tous les inconvénients de la saisie du navire. S'il y a eu des motifs suffisants de saisir le navire, que cette saisie soit maintenue ou non, les propriétaires de la cargaison n'ont aucun droit à des dommages et intérêts.

Il a seulement été question du navire pour simplifier les choses; mais ce qui a été dit s'applique aussi à la cargaison qui a été saisie puis relâchée. Donc, la marchandise innocente, trouvée à bord du navire saisi, subit tous les désagréments liés à la saisie du navire. S'il y a eu des raisons suffisantes pour saisir le navire, que cette saisie soit maintenue ou non, les propriétaires de la cargaison n'ont aucun droit à des dommages et intérêts.

Il peut être utile d'indiquer certains cas dans lesquels la saisie du navire serait justifiée, quelle que pût être la décision du tribunal des prises. C'est notamment celui de jet, de suppression ou de destruction volontaire de tout ou partie des papiers de bord, provenant du fait du capitaine, de quelqu'un de l'équipage ou des passagers. Il y a là quelque chose qui justifie tous les soupçons et qui explique que le navire soit saisi, sauf au capitaine à rendre compte de sa conduite devant le tribunal des prises. Même si ce tribunal acceptait les explications données et ne trouvait pas de causes suffisantes de confiscation, les intéressés ne pourraient songer à réclamer des dommages-intérêts.

Il peut être utile d'indiquer certains cas dans lesquels la saisie du navire serait justifiée, quelle que soit la décision du tribunal des prises. C'est notamment le cas du jet, de la suppression ou de la destruction volontaire de tout ou partie des papiers de bord, par le capitaine, un membre de l'équipage ou un passager. Cela soulève des soupçons et explique la saisie du navire, à moins que le capitaine ne puisse justifier sa conduite devant le tribunal des prises. Même si ce tribunal accepte les explications fournies et ne trouve pas de raisons suffisantes pour la confiscation, les parties concernées ne pourraient pas envisager de réclamer des dommages-intérêts.

Un cas analogue serait celui où l'on trouverait à bord des papiers doubles, faux, ou falsifiés, alors que cette irrégularité se rattache à des circonstances de nature à influer sur la saisie du navire.

Un cas similaire serait celui où l'on trouverait à bord des documents doubles, faux ou falsifiés, quand cette irrégularité est liée à des circonstances susceptibles d'influencer la saisie du navire.

Il a semblé suffisant que ces cas où la saisie s'expliquerait raisonnablement fussent mentionnés dans le Rapport sans faire l'objet d'une disposition expresse, et cela parce que l'indication de deux cas particuliers aurait pu faire croire que c'étaient les seuls dans lesquels la saisie se justifierait.

Il a semblé suffisant que ces cas où la saisie pouvait être raisonnablement expliquée soient mentionnés dans le rapport sans nécessiter une disposition explicite, car l'indication de deux cas particuliers aurait pu laisser penser que ce sont les seuls où la saisie serait justifiée.

Tels sont les principes de droit international que la Conférence Navale s'est efforcée de reconnaître comme propres à régir pratiquement les rapports des peuples dans d'importantes matières pour lesquelles des règles précises faisaient jusqu'à présent défaut. Elle a continué ainsi l'œuvre de codification commencée par la Déclaration de Paris de 1856. Elle a travaillé dans le même esprit que la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix et, profitant des travaux faits à La Haye, elle a pu résoudre un certain nombre de problèmes que, faute de temps, cette Conférence avait dû laisser sans solution. Souhaitons que l'on puisse dire que ceux qui ont élaboré la Déclaration de Londres de 1909 n'ont pas été trop indignes de leurs prédécesseurs de 1856 et de 1907.

These are the principles of international law that the Naval Conference has tried to acknowledge as relevant to governing the relationships between nations on important issues where clear rules have previously been lacking. It has continued the work of codification that started with the Declaration of Paris in 1856. It has worked in the same spirit as the Second Peace Conference and, building on the work done in The Hague, it has been able to resolve several issues that, due to a lack of time, that Conference had to leave unresolved. Let us hope we can say that those who crafted the London Declaration of 1909 lived up to the standards set by their predecessors from 1856 and 1907.

Dispositions Finales.

Final Arrangements.

Ces dispositions ont trait à diverses questions qui touchent à l'effet de la Déclaration, à sa ratification, à sa mise en vigueur, à sa dénonciation, à l'adhésion des Puissances non représentées.

Ces dispositions concernent différentes questions liées à l'impact de la Déclaration, à sa ratification, à son entrée en vigueur, à sa dénonciation, et à l'adhésion des Puissances non représentées.

Article 65.

Article 65.

Les dispositions de la présente Déclaration forment un ensemble indivisible.

The provisions of this Declaration constitute an indivisible whole.

Cet article est très important et conforme à ce qui avait été admis pour la Déclaration de Paris.

Cet article est très important et conforme à ce qui avait été admis pour la Déclaration de Paris.

Les règles contenues dans la présente Déclaration touchent à des points très importants et très différents. Elles n'ont pas toutes été acceptées avec le même empressement par toutes les Délégations; des concessions ont été faites sur un point en vue de concessions obtenues sur un autre. L'ensemble a été, tout balancé, reconnu satisfaisant. Une attente légitime serait trompée, si une Puissance pouvait faire des réserves à propos d'une règle à laquelle une autre Puissance attache une importance particulière.[Pg 663]

Les règles dans cette Déclaration concernent des sujets très importants et variés. Elles n'ont pas toutes été accueillies avec le même enthousiasme par toutes les Délégations ; des compromis ont été faits sur un point pour en obtenir sur un autre. Dans l'ensemble, le résultat a été jugé satisfaisant. Une attente légitime serait déçue si une Puissance pouvait émettre des réserves sur une règle à laquelle une autre Puissance accorde une importance particulière.[Pg 663]

Article 66.

Article 66.

Les Puissances Signataires s'engagent à s'assurer, dans le cas d'une guerre où les belligérants seraient tous parties à la présente Déclaration, l'observation réciproque des règles contenues dans cette Déclaration. Elles donneront, en conséquence, à leurs autorités et à leurs forces armées les instructions nécessaires et prendront les mesures qu'il conviendra pour en garantir l'application par leurs tribunaux, spécialement par leurs tribunaux de prises.

The Signatory Powers commit to ensuring that in the event of a war where all parties involved are signatories to this Declaration, they will observe the mutual rules contained in this Declaration. Consequently, they will give their authorities and armed forces the necessary instructions and take appropriate measures to guarantee its application by their courts, especially by their prize courts.

D'après l'engagement qui résulte de cet article, la Déclaration s'applique dans les rapports entre les Puissances Signataires, quand les belligérants sont également parties à la Déclaration.

D'après l'engagement qui résulte de cet article, la Déclaration s'applique dans les rapports entre les Puissances Signataires, quand les belligérants sont également parties à la Déclaration.

Ce sera à chaque Puissance à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour assurer l'observation de la Déclaration. Ces mesures pourront varier suivant les pays, exiger ou non l'intervention du pouvoir législatif. C'est une affaire d'ordre intérieur.

It will be up to each Power to take the necessary steps to ensure compliance with the Declaration. These measures may vary from country to country and may or may not require intervention from the legislative authority. This is a matter of internal affairs.

Il faut remarquer que les Puissances neutres peuvent être aussi dans le cas de donner des instructions à leurs autorités, spécialement aux commandants des convois, comme on l'a vu plus haut.

Il faut remarquer que les Puissances neutres peuvent aussi donner des instructions à leurs autorités, notamment aux commandants des convois, comme on l'a vu plus haut.

Article 67.

Article 67.

La présente Déclaration sera ratifiée aussitôt que possible.

This Declaration will be ratified as soon as possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à Londres.

The ratifications will be submitted in London.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les Représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part, et par le Principal Secrétaire d'État de Sa Majesté Britannique au Département des Affaires Étrangères.

The first deposit of ratifications will be recorded in a report signed by the Representatives of the participating Powers and by the Principal Secretary of State for Her Britannic Majesty at the Foreign Affairs Department.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une notification écrite adressée au Gouvernement Britannique et accompagnée de l'instrument de ratification.

Future deposits of ratifications will be made through a written notification sent to the British Government along with the instrument of ratification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratification qui les accompagnent, sera immédiatement, par les soins du Gouvernement Britannique et par la voie diplomatique, remise aux Puissances Signataires. Dans les cas visés par l'alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

A certified copy of the minutes related to the first deposit of ratifications, the notifications mentioned in the previous paragraph, as well as the instruments of ratification that accompany them, will be promptly delivered to the Signatory Powers by the British Government through diplomatic channels. In the cases referred to in the previous paragraph, the Government will also inform them of the date on which it received the notification.

Cette disposition toute de protocole n'a pas besoin d'explication. On a emprunté la formule admise à La Haye par la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix.

Cette disposition toute de protocole n'a pas besoin d'explication. On a emprunté la formule admise à La Haye par la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix.

Article 68.

Article 68.

La présente Déclaration produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification aura été reçue par le Gouvernement Britannique.

This Declaration will take effect for the Powers that participated in the first deposit of ratifications sixty days after the date of the record of that deposit and, for the Powers that ratify later, sixty days after their ratification notification is received by the British Government.

Article 69.

Article 69.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances Signataires voulût dénoncer la présente Déclaration, elle ne pourra le faire que pour la fin d'une période de douze ans commençant à courir soixante jours après le premier dépôt de ratifications et, ensuite, pour la fin de périodes successives de six ans, dont la première commencera à l'expiration de la période de douze ans.

If one of the signatory Powers wanted to terminate this Declaration, they could only do so at the end of a twelve-year period, starting sixty days after the initial deposit of ratifications, and then for the end of successive six-year periods, the first of which would begin at the end of the twelve-year period.

La dénonciation devra être, au moins un an à l'avance, notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement Britannique, qui en donnera connaissance à toutes les autres Puissances. Elle ne produira ses effets qu'à l'égard de la Puissance qui l'aura notifiée.

The notice must be given, at least one year in advance, in writing to the British Government, which will inform all the other Powers. It will only take effect concerning the Power that has given the notice.

Il résulte implicitement de l'article 69 que la Déclaration à une durée indéfinie. Les périodes après lesquelles la dénonciation peut se faire ont été fixées par analogie de ce qui est admis dans la Convention pour l'établissement d'une Cour Internationale des prises.

Il résulte implicitement de l'article 69 que la Déclaration a une durée indéfinie. Les périodes après lesquelles la dénonciation peut se faire ont été fixées par analogie de ce qui est admis dans la Convention pour l'établissement d'une Cour Internationale des prises.

Article 70.

Article 70.

Les Puissances représentées à la Conférence Navale de Londres, attachant un prix particulier à la reconnaissance générale des règles adoptées par elles, expriment l'espoir que les Puissances qui n'y étaient pas représentées adhéreront à la présente Déclaration. Elles prient le Gouvernement Britannique de vouloir bien les inviter à le faire.

The Powers represented at the London Naval Conference, placing particular value on the general recognition of the rules adopted by them, express the hope that the Powers not represented will adhere to this Declaration. They request the British Government to kindly invite them to do so.

La Puissance qui désire adhérer notifie par écrit son intention au Gouvernement Britannique en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhésion, qui sera déposé dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

The Power that wishes to join notifies the British Government in writing of its intention by sending the act of accession, which will be deposited in the archives of said Government.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances copie certifiée conforme de la notification, ainsi que de l'acte d'adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification. L'adhésion produira effet soixante jours après cette date.

This Government will immediately send a certified copy of the notification and the act of accession to all the other Powers, noting the date on which it received the notification. The accession will take effect sixty days after that date.

La situation des Puissances adhérentes sera, en tout ce qui concerne cette Déclaration, assimilée à la situation des Puissances Signataires.

The situation of the adhering Powers will, in all matters concerning this Declaration, be treated the same as the situation of the Signatory Powers.

La Déclaration de Paris contenait déjà une invitation adressée aux Puissances non représentées, à l'effet d'adhérer à la Déclaration. L'invitation officielle, au lieu d'être faite individuellement par chacune des Puissances représentées à la Conférence, sera plus[Pg 664] aisément faite par la Grande-Bretagne agissant au nom de toutes.

La Déclaration de Paris contenait déjà une invitation aux puissances non représentées pour qu'elles adhèrent à la Déclaration. Au lieu que chaque puissance représentée à la conférence fasse une invitation individuelle, celle-ci sera plus facilement faite par la Grande-Bretagne agissant au nom de toutes.

Les formes de l'adhésion sont très simples. L'assimilation des Puissances adhérentes aux Puissances Signataires entraîne naturellement pour les premières l'observation de l'article 65; on ne peut adhérer à une partie de la Déclaration, mais seulement à l'ensemble.

Les formes de l'adhésion sont très simples. L'assimilation des Puissances adhérentes aux Puissances Signataires entraîne naturellement pour les premières l'observation de l'article 65; on ne peut adhérer à une partie de la Déclaration, mais seulement à l'ensemble.

Article 71.

Article 71.

La présente Déclaration, qui portera la date du 26 février 1909, pourra être signée à Londres, jusqu'au 30 juin 1909, par les Plénipotentiaires des Puissances représentées à la Conférence Navale.

This Declaration, dated February 26, 1909, may be signed in London until June 30, 1909, by the Plenipotentiaries of the Powers represented at the Naval Conference.

Comme à La Haye, on a tenu compte des convenances de certaines Puissances dont les Représentants peuvent ne pas être en situation de signer dès à présent la Déclaration et qui cependant veulent être considérées comme des Puissances Signataires, non comme des Puissances adhérentes.

Comme à La Haye, on a tenu compte des convenances de certaines Puissances dont les Représentants peuvent ne pas être en situation de signer dès à présent la Déclaration et qui cependant veulent être considérées comme des Puissances Signataires, non comme des Puissances adhérentes.

Il va sans dire que les Plénipotentiaires des Puissances dont il est parlé à l'article 71 ne sont pas nécessairement ceux qui avaient été délégués comme tels à la Conférence Navale.

Il va sans dire que les Plénipotentiaires des Puissances mentionnés dans l'article 71 ne sont pas forcément ceux qui avaient été désignés comme tels à la Conférence Navale.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires ont revêtu la présente Déclaration de leurs signatures et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiaries have signed this Declaration and affixed their seals.

Fait à Londres, le vingt-six février mil neuf cent neuf, en un seul exemplaire, qui restera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement Britannique et dont des copies, certifiées conformes, seront remises par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances représentées à la Conférence Navale.[Pg 665]

Made in London, on February 26, 1909, in a single copy, which will be kept in the archives of the British Government and certified copies will be sent through diplomatic channels to the Powers represented at the Naval Conference.[Pg 665]

APPENDIX 8 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION ON CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT Signed in The Hague, September 19, 1910

Article premier.

Article one.

Les puissances signataires de la convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907, relative à l'établissement d'une Cour Internationale des prises ou y adhérant, pour lesquelles des difficultés d'ordre constitutionnel s'opposent à l'acceptation, sous sa forme actuelle, de ladite convention, ont la faculté de déclarer, dans l'acte de ratification ou d'adhésion, que, dans les affaires de prises rentrant dans la compétence de leurs tribunaux nationaux, le recours devant la Cour Internationale des prises ne pourra être exercé contre elles que sous la forme d'une action en indemnité du préjudice causé par la capture.

Les puissances signataires de la convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907, concernant l'établissement d'une Cour Internationale des prises ou qui y adhèrent, et pour lesquelles des problèmes constitutionnels empêchent l'acceptation de cette convention dans sa forme actuelle, peuvent déclarer, dans l'acte de ratification ou d'adhésion, que dans les affaires de saisies relevant de la compétence de leurs tribunaux nationaux, le recours devant la Cour Internationale des prises ne pourra être exercé contre elles que sous la forme d'une action en indemnité pour le préjudice causé par la capture.

Article 2.

Article 2.

Dans le cas de recours exercé devant la Cour Internationale des prises sous la forme d'une action en indemnité, l'article 8 de la convention est sans application; la Cour n'a pas à prononcer la validité ou la nullité de la capture, non plus qu'à infirmer ou confirmer la décision des tribunaux nationaux.

Dans le cas d'un recours devant la Cour Internationale des prises sous la forme d'une action en indemnité, l'article 8 de la convention ne s'applique pas; la Cour n'a pas à déclarer la validité ou la nullité de la capture, ni à confirmer ou infirmer la décision des tribunaux nationaux.

Article 3.

Article 3.

Les conditions auxquelles est subordonné par la convention l'exercice du recours devant la Cour Internationale des prises sont applicables à l'exercice de l'action en indemnité.

Les conditions auxquelles est subordonné par la convention l'exercice du recours devant la Cour Internationale des prises sont applicables à l'exercice de l'action en indemnité.

Article 4.

Article 4.

Sous réserve des dispositions ci-après, les règles de procédure établies par la convention pour le recours devant la Cour Internationale des prises seront observées pour l'action en indemnité.

Sous réserve des dispositions ci-après, les règles de procédure établies par la convention pour le recours devant la Cour Internationale des prises seront observées pour l'action en indemnité.

Article 5.

Article 5.

Par dérogation à l'article 28, § 1, de la convention, l'instance en indemnité ne peut être introduite devant la Cour Internationale des prises qu'au moyen d'une déclaration écrite, adressée au Bureau International de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage. Le Bureau peut être saisi même par télégramme.

Par dérogation à l'article 28, § 1, de la convention, l'instance en indemnité ne peut être introduite devant la Cour Internationale des prises qu'au moyen d'une déclaration écrite, adressée au Bureau International de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage. Le Bureau peut être saisi même par télégramme.

Article 6.

Article 6.

Par dérogation à l'article 29 de la convention, le Bureau International notifie directement et par télégramme, s'il est possible, au Gouvernement du belligérant capteur la déclaration d'instance dont il est saisi. Le Gouvernement du belligérant capteur, sans examiner si les délais prescrits ont été observés, fait, dans les sept jours de la réception de la notification, transmettre au Bureau International le dossier de l'affaire en y joignant, le cas échéant, une copie certifiée conforme de la décision rendue par le tribunal national.

Par dérogation à l'article 29 de la convention, le Bureau International notifie directement et par télégramme, si possible, au Gouvernement du belligérant capturé la déclaration d'instance dont il est saisi. Le Gouvernement du belligérant capturé, sans vérifier si les délais prescrits ont été respectés, doit, dans les sept jours suivant la réception de la notification, transmettre au Bureau International le dossier de l'affaire en y joignant, si nécessaire, une copie certifiée conforme de la décision rendue par le tribunal national.

Article 7.

Article 7.

Par dérogation à l'article 45, § 2, de la convention, la Cour, après le prononcé et la notification de son arrêt aux parties en cause, fait parvenir directement au Gouvernement du belligérant capteur le dossier de l'affaire qui lui a été soumise, en y joignant l'expédition des diverses décisions intervenues ainsi que la copie des procès-verbaux de l'instruction.

Par dérogation à l'article 45, § 2, de la convention, la Cour, après le prononcé et la notification de son arrêt aux parties en cause, fait parvenir directement au Gouvernement du belligérant capteur le dossier de l'affaire qui lui a été soumise, en y joignant l'expédition des diverses décisions intervenues ainsi que la copie des procès-verbaux de l'instruction.

Article 8.

Article 8.

Le présent protocole additionnel sera considéré comme faisant partie intégrante de la convention et sera ratifié en même temps que celle-ci. Si la déclaration prévue à l'article 1 ci-dessus est faite dans l'acte de ratification, une copie certifiée conforme en sera insérée dans le procès-verbal de dépôt des ratifications visé à l'article 52, § 3, de la convention.[Pg 666]

Le présent protocole additionnel sera considéré comme faisant partie intégrante de la convention et sera ratifié en même temps que celle-ci. Si la déclaration prévue à l'article 1 ci-dessus est faite dans l'acte de ratification, une copie certifiée conforme en sera insérée dans le procès-verbal de dépôt des ratifications visé à l'article 52, § 3, de la convention.[Pg 666]

Article 9.

Article 9.

L'adhésion à la convention est subordonnée à l'adhésion au présent protocole additionnel.

L'adhésion à la convention dépend de l'adhésion à ce protocole additionnel.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires ont signé le présent protocole additionnel.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires ont signé le présent protocole additionnel.

Fait à La Haye le 19 septembre 1910, en un seul exemplaire qui sera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et dont des copies, certifiées conformes, seront remises, par la voie diplomatique, aux Puissances désignées dans l'article 15 de la convention relative à l'établissement d'une Cour Internationale des prises du 18 octobre 1907 et dans son Annexe.[Pg 667]

Fait à La Haye le 19 septembre 1910, en un seul exemplaire qui sera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et dont des copies, certifiées conformes, seront remises, par la voie diplomatique, aux Puissances désignées dans l'article 15 de la convention relative à l'établissement d'une Cour Internationale des prises du 18 octobre 1907 et dans son Annexe.[Pg 667]

APPENDIX 9 Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 33 & 34 VICT., CHAPTER 90

An Act to regulate the conduct of Her Majesty's Subjects during the existence of hostilities between foreign states with which Her Majesty is at peace.
[9 August 1870.]

An Act to manage the behavior of Her Majesty's Subjects while there are hostilities between foreign states that are at peace with Her Majesty.
[9 August 1870.]


Whereas it is expedient to make provision for the regulation of the conduct of Her Majesty's subjects during the existence of hostilities between foreign states with which Her Majesty is at peace:

Whereas it is necessary to establish rules for the behavior of Her Majesty's subjects during times of conflict with foreign nations that are at peace with Her Majesty:

Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

Be it enacted by Her Majesty the Queen, with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and the Commons assembled in this Parliament, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

Preliminary.

Preliminary.

Short Title of Act.

Short Title of Act.

1. This Act may be cited for all purposes as "The Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870."

1. This Act can be referred to for all purposes as "The Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870."

Application of Act

Application of the Act

2. This Act shall extend to all the dominions of Her Majesty, including the adjacent territorial waters.

2. This Act will apply to all territories under Her Majesty's rule, including the nearby territorial waters.

Commencement of Act.

Start of Act.

3. This Act shall come into operation in the United Kingdom immediately on the passing thereof, and shall be proclaimed in every British possession by the governor thereof as soon as may be after he receives notice of this Act, and shall come into operation in that British possession on the day of such proclamation, and the time at which this Act comes into operation in any place is, as respects such place, in this Act referred to as the commencement of this Act.

3. This Act will take effect in the United Kingdom immediately upon its passage, and the governor of each British territory will announce it as soon as they receive notice of this Act. It will take effect in that territory on the day it is announced, and the point in time when this Act takes effect in any location is referred to in this Act as the commencement of this Act.

Illegal Enlistment.

Unauthorized Recruitment.

Penalty on enlistment in service of foreign state.

Penalty for enlisting in the service of a foreign state.

4. If any person, without the license of Her Majesty, being a British subject, within or without Her Majesty's dominions, accepts or agrees to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any foreign state at peace with Her Majesty, and in this Act referred to as a friendly state, or whether a British subject or not within Her Majesty's dominions, induces any other person to accept or agree to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any such foreign state as aforesaid,—

4. If anyone, without the permission of Her Majesty, being a British citizen, inside or outside Her Majesty's territories, accepts or agrees to accept any commission or position in the military or naval service of any foreign country at war with a foreign country that is at peace with Her Majesty, referred to in this Act as a friendly state, or whether a British citizen or not within Her Majesty's territories, convinces anyone else to accept or agree to accept any commission or position in the military or naval service of any such foreign country as mentioned above,—

He shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.

He will be guilty of an offense against this Act, and will be subject to a fine and imprisonment, or either punishment at the discretion of the court where the offender is convicted; and if imprisonment is given, it may be with or without hard labor.

Penalty on leaving Her Majesty's Dominions with intent to serve a Foreign State.

Penalty on leaving Her Majesty's Dominions with the intention to serve a foreign state.

5. If any person, without the license of Her Majesty, being a British subject, quits or goes on board any ship with a view of quitting Her Majesty's dominions, with intent to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with a friendly state, or, whether a British subject or not, within Her Majesty's dominions, induces any other person to quit or to go on board any ship with a view of quitting Her Majesty's dominions with the like intent,—

5. If anyone, without permission from Her Majesty, being a British subject, leaves or boards any ship intending to leave Her Majesty's territories and plans to accept any role or duty in the military or naval service of a foreign country that's at war with a friendly nation, or, whether they are a British subject or not, within Her Majesty's territories, persuades someone else to leave or board any ship intending to exit Her Majesty's territories with the same purpose,—

He shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.

He will be guilty of an offense against this Act and may face a fine and imprisonment, or one of those punishments, depending on the discretion of the court where the offender is convicted; and if imprisonment is given, it could be with or without hard labor.

Penalty on embarking Persons under False Representations as to Service.

Penalty on embarking Persons under False Representations as to Service.

6. If any person induces any other person to quit Her Majesty's dominions or to embark on any ship within Her Majesty's dominions under a misrepresentation or false representation of the service in which such person is to be engaged, with the intent or in order that such person may accept or agree to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with a friendly state,—

6. If anyone convinces someone else to leave the Queen's territory or to board any ship within the Queen's territory through misrepresentation or false claims about the work they will be doing, with the intent that the person will accept or agree to accept any commission or enlistment in the military or naval service of any foreign country that is at war with a friendly nation,—

He shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.

He will be guilty of an offense against this Act and will face fines and imprisonment, or one of those penalties, at the court's discretion where the offender is convicted. If imprisonment is imposed, it may be with or without hard labor.

Penalty on taking illegally enlisted Persons on board Ship.

Penalty for taking illegally enlisted persons on board a ship.

7. If the master or owner of any ship, without the license of Her Majesty, knowingly either takes on board, or engages to take on board, or has on board such ship within Her Majesty's dominions any of the following persons, in this Act referred to as illegally enlisted persons; that is to say,—

7. If the captain or owner of any ship, without the permission of Her Majesty, knowingly takes on board, agrees to take on board, or has on board that ship within Her Majesty's territories any of the following people, referred to in this Act as illegally enlisted persons; that is to say,—

(1) Any person who, being a British subject within or without the dominions of Her Majesty, has, without the license of Her Majesty, accepted or agreed to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state:

(1) Anyone who is a British subject, whether inside or outside the territories of Her Majesty, and has accepted or agreed to accept a commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign country that is at war with a friendly state, without Her Majesty's permission:

(2) Any person, being a British subject, who, without the license of Her Majesty, is about to quit Her Majesty's dominions with the intent to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with a friendly state:

(2) Any person who is a British subject and is about to leave the UK without Her Majesty's permission, intending to accept any commission or job in the military or naval service of a foreign country at war with a friendly state:

(3) Any person who has been induced to embark under a misrepresentation or false representation of the service in which such person is to be engaged, with the intent or in order that such person may accept or agree to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with a friendly state:

(3) Anyone who has been persuaded to join based on a lie or misleading information about the service they are supposed to join, with the intention of getting that person to accept or agree to accept any commission or position in the military or naval service of a foreign country at war with a friendly nation:

Such master or owner shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and the following consequences shall ensue; that is to say,—

Such master or owner will be guilty of an offense against this Act, and the following consequences will follow; that is to say,—

(1) The offender shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour: and

(1) The offender will be subject to a fine and imprisonment, or either of these penalties, at the discretion of the court that convicts the offender; and if imprisonment is given, it may be with or without hard labor: and

(2) Such ship shall be detained until the trial and conviction or acquittal of the master or owner, and until all penalties inflicted on the master or owner have been paid, or the master or owner has given security for the payment of such penalties to the satisfaction of two justices of the peace, or other magistrate or magistrates having the authority of two justices of the peace: and

(2) That ship will be held until the trial and conviction or acquittal of the captain or owner, and until all penalties imposed on the captain or owner have been paid, or the captain or owner has provided security for the payment of those penalties that is satisfactory to two justices of the peace, or other magistrate or magistrates with the authority of two justices of the peace: and

(3) All illegally enlisted persons shall immediately on the discovery of the offence be taken on shore, and shall not be allowed to return to the ship.

(3) Anyone who is illegally enlisted must be taken ashore immediately upon the discovery of the offense and will not be allowed to return to the ship.

Illegal Shipbuilding and Illegal Expeditions.

Unauthorized Shipbuilding and Illegal Expeditions.

Penalty on illegal Shipbuilding and illegal Expeditions.

Penalty for illegal shipbuilding and illegal expeditions.

8. If any person within Her Majesty's dominions, without the license of Her Majesty, does any of the following acts; that is to say,—

8. If anyone within Her Majesty's territories, without Her Majesty's permission, does any of the following actions; that is to say,—

(1) Builds or agrees to build, or causes to be built any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe that the same shall or will be employed in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state: or

(1) Constructs or agrees to construct, or causes to be constructed any ship with the intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe that it will be used in the military or naval service of any foreign nation at war with any friendly nation: or

(2) Issues or delivers any commission for any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe that the same shall or will be employed in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state: or

(2) Issues or delivers any commission for any ship with the intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe that it will be used in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state: or

(3) Equips any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe that the same shall or will be employed in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state: or

(3) Equips any ship with the intention or knowledge, or having good reason to believe that it will be used in the military or naval service of any foreign country engaged in conflict with any friendly nation: or

(4) Despatches, or causes or allows to be despatched, any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe that the same shall or will be employed in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state:

(4) Sends, or causes or allows to be sent, any ship with the intention or knowledge, or having a good reason to believe that it will be used in the military or naval service of any foreign country at war with any friendly country:

Such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence against this Act, and the following consequences shall ensue:

Such a person will be considered to have committed an offense against this Act, and the following consequences will follow:

(1) The offender shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.

(1) The offender will be subject to a fine and imprisonment, or either punishment, at the discretion of the court that convicts the offender; and imprisonment, if imposed, may be with or without hard labor.

(2) The ship in respect of which any such offence is committed, and her equipment, shall be forfeited to Her Majesty:

(2) The ship involved in any such offense, along with its equipment, will be seized by Her Majesty:

Provided that a person building, causing to be built, or equipping a ship in any of the cases aforesaid, in pursuance of a contract made before the commencement of such war as aforesaid, shall not be liable to any of the penalties imposed by this section in respect of such building or equipping if he satisfies the conditions following; (that is to say,)

Provided that a person who is building, having a ship built, or equipping a ship under the situations mentioned earlier, following a contract made before the start of the war referred to, will not face any of the penalties outlined in this section regarding that building or equipping if they meet the following conditions; (that is to say,)

(1) If forthwith upon a proclamation of neutrality being issued by Her Majesty he gives notice to the Secretary of State that he is so building, causing to be built, or equipping such ship, and furnishes such particulars of the contract and of any matters relating to, or done, or to be done under the contract as may be required by the Secretary of State:

(1) If immediately after a declaration of neutrality is announced by Her Majesty, he informs the Secretary of State that he is building, having built, or equipping such a ship, and provides the details of the contract and any related matters as required by the Secretary of State:

(2) If he gives such security, and takes and permits to be taken such other measures, if any, as the Secretary of State may prescribe for ensuring that such ship shall not be despatched, delivered, or removed [Pg 669]without the license of Her Majesty until the termination of such war as aforesaid.

(2) If he provides this security and follows any additional measures that the Secretary of State may require to make sure that the ship is not dispatched, delivered, or removed [Pg 669] without the permission of Her Majesty until the war mentioned earlier is over.

Presumption as to Evidence in case of Illegal Ship.

Presumption regarding Evidence in the event of an Illegal Ship.

9. Where any ship is built by order of or on behalf of any foreign state when at war with a friendly state, or is delivered to or to the order of such foreign state, or any person who to the knowledge of the person building is an agent of such foreign state, or is paid for by such foreign state or such agent, and is employed in the military or naval service of such foreign state, such ship shall, until the contrary is proved, be deemed to have been built with a view to being so employed, and the burden shall lie on the builder of such ship of proving that he did not know that the ship was intended to be so employed in the military or naval service of such foreign state.

9. If a ship is built by order of or on behalf of a foreign state that is at war with a friendly state, or if it is delivered to that foreign state, or to someone known to the builder as an agent of that foreign state, or if it is paid for by that foreign state or its agent, and is used in the military or naval service of that foreign state, then that ship will be presumed to have been built for that purpose unless proven otherwise. The burden is on the builder of the ship to show that they did not know the ship was intended for military or naval service for that foreign state.

Penalty on aiding the Warlike Equipment of Foreign ships.

Penalty for aiding the military equipment of foreign ships.

10. If any person within the dominions of Her Majesty, and without the license of Her Majesty,—

10. If anyone within the realm of Her Majesty, and without Her Majesty's permission,—

By adding to the number of guns, or by changing those on board for other guns, or by the addition of any equipment for war, increases or augments, or procures to be increased or augmented, or is knowingly concerned in increasing or augmenting the warlike force of any ship which at the time of her being within the dominions of Her Majesty was a ship in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state,—

By increasing the number of guns, changing the guns on board for different ones, or adding any war equipment, you are increasing or boosting, or arranging to increase or boost, or are knowingly involved in increasing or boosting the military power of any ship that was part of the military or naval service of a foreign state at war with a friendly state while it was within Her Majesty's dominions,—

Such person shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.

Such a person will be guilty of breaking this Act and may face a fine and imprisonment, or either of those penalties, based on the court's decision where the offender is convicted; and if imprisonment is given, it can be with or without hard labor.

Penalty on fitting out Naval or Military Expeditions without License.

Penalty for fitting out Naval or Military Expeditions without a License.

11. If any person within the limits of Her Majesty's dominions, and without the license of Her Majesty,—

11. If anyone within the bounds of Her Majesty's territory, and without Her Majesty's permission,—

Prepares or fits out any naval or military expedition to proceed against the dominions of any friendly state, the following consequences shall ensue:

Prepares or equips any naval or military mission to go against the territories of any friendly state, the following consequences shall follow:

(1) Every person engaged in such preparation or fitting out, or assisting therein, or employed in any capacity in such expedition, shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.

(1) Anyone involved in the preparation or setup, helping with it, or working in any role for such an expedition will be committing an offense under this Act and can be punished by a fine, imprisonment, or both, depending on the court's decision after conviction; and if imprisonment is given, it may include hard labor or not.

(2) All ships, and their equipments, and all arms and munitions of war, used in or forming part of such expedition, shall be forfeited to Her Majesty.

(2) All ships, their equipment, and all weapons and military supplies used in or part of this expedition shall be forfeited to Her Majesty.

Punishment of Accessories.

Punishment for Accessories.

12. Any person who aids, abets, counsels, or procures the commission of any offence against this Act shall be liable to be tried and punished as a principal offender.

12. Anyone who helps, encourages, advises, or arranges for the commission of any offense under this Act will be subject to trial and punishment as if they were the main offender.

Limitation of Term of Imprisonment.

Limit on Prison Sentence.

13. The term of imprisonment to be awarded in respect of any offence against this Act shall not exceed two years.

13. The maximum prison sentence for any offense under this Act shall not be more than two years.

Illegal Prize.

Unauthorized Prize.

Illegal Prize brought into British Ports restored.

Illegal Prize brought into British Ports restored.

14. If during the continuance of any war in which Her Majesty may be neutral, any ship, goods, or merchandize captured as prize of war within the territorial jurisdiction of Her Majesty, in violation of the neutrality of this realm, or captured by any ship which may have been built, equipped, commissioned, or despatched, or the force of which may have been augmented, contrary to the provisions of this Act are brought within the limits of Her Majesty's dominions by the captor, or any agent of the captor, or by any person having come into possession thereof with the knowledge that the same was prize of war so captured as aforesaid, it shall be lawful for the original owner of such prize, or his agent, or for any person authorised in that behalf by the Government of the foreign state to which such owner belongs, to make application to the Court of Admiralty for seizure and detention of such prize, and the court shall, on due proof of the facts, order such prize to be restored.

14. If during any war where Her Majesty is neutral, any ship, goods, or merchandise captured as a prize of war within Her Majesty's territorial jurisdiction, in violation of this realm's neutrality, or captured by any ship that was built, equipped, commissioned, or sent out, or whose force was increased, against the rules of this Act, is brought into Her Majesty's domains by the captor, their agent, or by anyone who has come into possession of it knowing it was captured as a prize of war, the original owner of that prize, or their agent, or anyone authorized by the government of the foreign state to which the owner belongs, may apply to the Court of Admiralty for the seizure and detention of such a prize. The court shall, upon proper evidence of the facts, order the restoration of the prize.

Every such order shall be executed and carried into effect in the same manner, and subject to the same right of appeal as in the case of any order made in the exercise of the ordinary jurisdiction of such court; and in the meantime and until a final order has been made on such application the court shall have power to make all such provisional and other orders as to the care or custody of such captured ship, goods, or merchandize, and (if the same be of perishable nature, or incurring risk of deterioration) for the sale thereof, and with respect to the deposit or investment of the proceeds of any such sale, as may be made by such court in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction.

Every such order will be carried out and enforced in the same way, and with the same right of appeal as any order issued under the usual authority of the court. Meanwhile, until a final order is made regarding the application, the court has the power to issue all necessary temporary and other orders related to the care or custody of the captured ship, goods, or merchandise. If any of these items are perishable or at risk of deterioration, the court can also order their sale, as well as handle the deposit or investment of the proceeds from that sale, similar to what it does under its usual jurisdiction.

General Provision.

General Provision.

License by Her Majesty, how granted.

License by Her Majesty, how granted.

15. For the purpose of this Act, a license by Her Majesty shall be under the sign manual of Her Majesty, or be signified by Order in Council or by proclamation of Her Majesty.

15. For the purpose of this Act, a license from Her Majesty shall be under Her Majesty's signature, or indicated by an Order in Council or by proclamation of Her Majesty.

Legal Procedure.

Legal Process.

Jurisdiction in respect of Offences by Persons against Act.

Jurisdiction regarding offenses committed by individuals under the Act.

16. Any offence against this Act shall, for all purposes of and incidental to the trial and punishment of any person guilty of any such offence, be[Pg 670] deemed to have been committed either in the place in which the offence was wholly or partly committed, or in any place within Her Majesty's dominions in which the person who committed such offence may be.

16. Any offense against this Act will, for all purposes related to the trial and punishment of anyone guilty of such an offense, be[Pg 670] considered to have been committed either in the location where the offense was fully or partially committed, or in any location within Her Majesty's territories where the person who committed the offense may be.

Venue in respect of Offences by Persons. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97.

Venue in respect of Offences by Persons. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97.

17. Any offence against this Act may be described in any indictment or other document relating to such offence, in cases where the mode of trial requires such a description, as having been committed at the place where it was wholly or partly committed, or it may be averred generally to have been committed within Her Majesty's dominions, and the venue or local description in the margin may be that of the county, city, or place in which the trial is held.

17. Any offense against this Act can be described in any indictment or other document related to that offense, in cases where the way of trial requires such a description, as having been committed at the location where it was fully or partially committed, or it can generally be stated to have been committed within Her Majesty's territories, and the venue or local description in the margin can be that of the county, city, or place where the trial takes place.

Power to remove Offenders for Trial.

Power to remove Offenders for Trial.

18. The following authorities, that is to say, in the United Kingdom any judge of a superior court, in any other place within the jurisdiction of any British court of justice, such court, or, if there are more courts than one, the court having the highest criminal jurisdiction in that place, may, by warrant or instrument in the nature of a warrant in this section included in the term "warrant," direct that any offender charged with an offence against this Act shall be removed to some other place in Her Majesty's dominions for trial in cases where it appears to the authority granting the warrant that the removal of such offender would be conducive to the interests of justice, and any prisoner so removed shall be triable at the place to which he is removed, in the same manner as if his offence had been committed at such place.

18. The following authorities, meaning in the United Kingdom any judge of a superior court, and in any other location under the jurisdiction of any British court of justice, such court, or if there are multiple courts, the one with the highest criminal jurisdiction in that location, can, by warrant or an instrument similar to a warrant included in the term "warrant," order that any offender charged with an offense against this Act be transferred to another location in Her Majesty's dominions for trial. This is applicable in cases where the authority issuing the warrant believes that the transfer of the offender would serve the interests of justice. Any prisoner moved in this way will be tried at the location to which they are taken, as if their offense had occurred there.

Any warrant for the purposes of this section may be addressed to the master of any ship or to any other person or persons, and the person or persons to whom such warrant is addressed shall have power to convey the prisoner therein named to any place or places named in such warrant, and to deliver him, when arrived at such place or places, into the custody of any authority designated by such warrant.

Any warrant for this section can be addressed to the captain of any ship or to any other individuals, and the individuals to whom the warrant is addressed will have the authority to transport the prisoner named in the warrant to any locations specified in it, and to hand him over, upon arrival at those locations, to the custody of any authority indicated by the warrant.

Every prisoner shall, during the time of his removal under any such warrant as aforesaid, be deemed to be in the legal custody of the person or persons empowered to remove him.

Every prisoner will, during their transport under any such warrant mentioned above, be considered to be in the legal custody of the person or persons authorized to carry out the removal.

Jurisdiction in respect of Forfeiture of Ships for Offences against Act.

Jurisdiction regarding the forfeiture of ships for violations of the Act.

19. All proceedings for the condemnation and forfeiture of a ship, or ship and equipment, or arms and munitions of war, in pursuance of this Act shall require the sanction of the Secretary of State or such chief executive authority as is in this Act mentioned, and shall be had in the Court of Admiralty, and not in any other court; and the Court of Admiralty shall, in addition to any power given to the court by this Act, have in respect of any ship or other matter brought before it in pursuance of this Act all powers which it has in the case of a ship or matter brought before it in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction.

19. All proceedings to condemn and forfeit a ship, or ship and equipment, or arms and ammunition under this Act must have the approval of the Secretary of State or the chief executive authority mentioned in this Act, and shall take place in the Court of Admiralty, not in any other court; the Court of Admiralty shall, in addition to any powers provided by this Act, have all the powers it normally has regarding any ship or matter brought before it under this Act.

Regulations as to Proceedings against the Offender and the Ship.

Regulations regarding legal actions against the offender and the ship.

20. Where any offence against this Act has been committed by any person by reason whereof a ship, or ship and equipment, or arms and munitions of war, has or have become liable to forfeiture, proceedings may be instituted contemporaneously or not, as may be thought fit, against the offender in any court having jurisdiction of the offence, and against the ship, or ship and equipment, or arms and munitions of war, for the forfeiture in the Court of Admiralty; but it shall not be necessary to take proceedings against the offender because proceedings are instituted for the forfeiture, or to take proceedings for the forfeiture because proceedings are taken against the offender.

20. If someone commits an offense under this Act that causes a ship, its equipment, or arms and munitions of war to be subject to forfeiture, legal action can be taken at the same time or separately against the person responsible in any court that has jurisdiction over the offense, and also against the ship, its equipment, or the arms and munitions of war for forfeiture in the Court of Admiralty. However, it's not necessary to take action against the offender just because forfeiture proceedings have started, or to initiate forfeiture proceedings just because action has been taken against the offender.

Officer authorised to seize offending Ships.

Officer authorized to seize offending ships.

21. The following officers, that is to say,—

21. The following officers, that is to say,—

(1) Any officer of customs in the United Kingdom, subject nevertheless to any special or general instructions from the Commissioners of Customs or any officer of the Board of Trade, subject nevertheless to any special or general instructions from the Board of Trade;

(1) Any customs officer in the United Kingdom, still following any specific or general instructions from the Commissioners of Customs or any officer of the Board of Trade, still following any specific or general instructions from the Board of Trade;

(2) Any officer of customs or public officer in any British possession, subject nevertheless to any special or general instructions from the governor of such possession;

(2) Any customs officer or public officer in any British territory, still subject to any specific or general instructions from the governor of that territory;

(3) Any commissioned officer on full pay in the military service of the Crown, subject nevertheless to any special or general instructions from his commanding officer;

(3) Any commissioned officer receiving full pay in the military service of the Crown, still subject to any specific or general instructions from their commanding officer;

(4) Any commissioned officer on full pay in the naval service of the Crown, subject nevertheless to any special or general instructions from the Admiralty or his superior officer,

(4) Any commissioned officer on full pay in the naval service of the Crown, still subject to any specific or general instructions from the Admiralty or their superior officer,

may seize or detain any ship liable to be seized or detained in pursuance of this Act, and such officers are in this Act referred to as the "local authority"; but nothing in this Act contained shall derogate from the power of the Court of Admiralty to direct any ship to be seized or detained by any officer by whom such court may have power under its ordinary jurisdiction to direct a ship to be seized or detained.

may seize or hold any ship that can be seized or held under this Act, and these officers are referred to in this Act as the "local authority"; however, nothing in this Act takes away from the power of the Court of Admiralty to order any ship to be seized or held by any officer that the court has the authority to direct under its normal jurisdiction.

Powers of Officers authorised to seize Ships.

Powers of Officers Authorized to Seize Ships.

22. Any officer authorised to seize or detain any ship in respect of any offence against this Act may, for the purpose of enforcing such seizure or detention, call to his aid any constable or officers of police, or any officers of Her Majesty's army or navy or marines, or any excise officer or officers of customs, or any harbour-master or dock-master, or any[Pg 671] officers having authority by law to make seizures of ships, and may put on board any ship so seized or detained any one or more of such officers to take charge of the same, and to enforce the provisions of this Act, and any officer seizing or detaining any ship under this Act may use force, if necessary, for the purpose of enforcing seizure or detention, and if any person is killed or maimed by reason of his resisting such officer in the execution of his duties, or any person acting under his orders, such officer so seizing or detaining the ship, or other person, shall be freely and fully indemnified as well against the Queen's Majesty, Her heirs and successors, as against all persons so killed, maimed, or hurt.

22. Any officer authorized to seize or detain a ship for any violation of this Act may, to enforce that seizure or detention, request assistance from any constable or police officer, or any officers from Her Majesty's army, navy, or marines, or any excise officer, customs officer, or any harbor master or dock master, or any officers legally empowered to seize ships. They may also place any of these officers aboard the seized or detained ship to take charge and enforce the provisions of this Act. An officer seizing or detaining a ship under this Act may use force if necessary to carry out the seizure or detention, and if anyone is killed or injured while resisting that officer in performing their duties, or anyone acting under their orders, that officer or the other person shall be fully indemnified against the Queen's Majesty, her heirs, and successors, as well as against all persons who were killed, injured, or harmed.

Special Power of Secretary of State or Chief Executive Authority to detain Ship.

Special Power of Secretary of State or Chief Executive Authority to detain Ship.

23. If the Secretary of State or the chief executive authority is satisfied that there is a reasonable and probable cause for believing that a ship within Her Majesty's dominions has been or is being built, commissioned, or equipped contrary to this Act, and is about to be taken beyond the limits of such dominions, or that a ship is about to be despatched contrary to this Act, such Secretary of State or chief executive authority shall have power to issue a warrant stating that there is reasonable and probable cause for believing as aforesaid, and upon such warrant the local authority shall have power to seize and search such ship, and to detain the same until it has been either condemned or released by process of law, or in manner herein-after mentioned.

23. If the Secretary of State or the chief executive authority believes there is a reasonable cause to think that a ship within Her Majesty's territories has been or is being built, commissioned, or equipped against this Act, and is about to be taken outside those territories, or that a ship is about to be sent off in violation of this Act, the Secretary of State or chief executive authority has the power to issue a warrant stating there is reasonable cause for such belief. With that warrant, the local authority can seize and search the ship, and hold it until it has been either condemned or released by legal means, or as described later.

The owner of the ship so detained, or his agent, may apply to the Court of Admiralty for its release, and the court shall as soon as possible put the matter of such seizure and detention in course of trial between the applicant and the Crown.

The owner of the detained ship, or their agent, can apply to the Court of Admiralty for its release. The court will, as soon as possible, begin the trial regarding the seizure and detention between the applicant and the Crown.

If the applicant establish to the satisfaction of the court that the ship was not and is not being built, commissioned, or equipped or intended to be despatched contrary to this Act, the ship shall be released and restored.

If the applicant proves to the satisfaction of the court that the ship was not and is not being built, commissioned, equipped, or intended to be sent out in violation of this Act, the ship will be released and restored.

If the applicant fail to establish to the satisfaction of the court that the ship was not and is not being built, commissioned, or equipped, or intended to be despatched contrary to this Act, then the ship shall be detained till released by order of the Secretary of State or chief executive authority.

If the applicant fails to prove to the court's satisfaction that the ship was not, is not, being built, commissioned, or equipped, or intended to be dispatched in violation of this Act, then the ship will be held until released by order of the Secretary of State or the chief executive authority.

The court may in cases where no proceedings are pending for its condemnation release any ship detained under this section on the owner giving security to the satisfaction of the court that the ship shall not be employed contrary to this Act, notwithstanding that the applicant may have failed to establish to the satisfaction of the court that the ship was not and is not being built, commissioned, or intended to be despatched contrary to this Act. The Secretary of State or the chief executive authority may likewise release any ship detained under this section on the owner giving security to the satisfaction of such Secretary of State or chief executive authority that the ship shall not be employed contrary to this Act, or may release the ship without such security if the Secretary of State or chief executive authority think fit so to release the same.

The court may, in situations where no legal action is pending for its condemnation, release any ship that has been detained under this section if the owner provides security that satisfies the court, ensuring that the ship won’t be used in violation of this Act. This is true even if the applicant fails to convince the court that the ship was not and is not being built, commissioned, or intended for dispatch in violation of this Act. The Secretary of State or the chief executive authority can also release any ship detained under this section if the owner provides security that satisfies the Secretary of State or chief executive authority, ensuring the ship won’t be used in violation of this Act. They may also release the ship without any security if they believe it is appropriate to do so.

If the court be of opinion that there was not reasonable and probable cause for the detention, and if no such cause appear in the course of the proceedings, the court shall have power to declare that the owner is to be indemnified by the payment of costs and damages in respect of the detention, the amount thereof to be assessed by the court, and any amount so assessed shall be payable by the Commissioners of the Treasury out of any moneys legally applicable for that purpose. The Court of Admiralty shall also have power to make a like order for the indemnity of the owner, on the application of such owner to the court, in a summary way, in cases where the ship is released by the order of the Secretary of State or the chief executive authority, before any application is made by the owner or his agent to the court for such release.

If the court believes that there wasn't reasonable and probable cause for the detention, and if no such cause appears during the proceedings, the court has the authority to declare that the owner is to be compensated for the costs and damages related to the detention, with the amount to be determined by the court. Any assessed amount shall be payable by the Commissioners of the Treasury from any funds legally available for that purpose. The Court of Admiralty also has the power to issue a similar order for the owner’s compensation, at the request of the owner to the court, in a summary manner, in cases where the ship is released by the order of the Secretary of State or the chief executive authority, before any request is made by the owner or their agent to the court for such a release.

Nothing in this section contained shall affect any proceedings instituted or to be instituted for the condemnation of any ship detained under this section where such ship is liable to forfeiture subject to this provision, that if such ship is restored in pursuance of this section all proceedings for such condemnation shall be stayed; and where the court declares that the owner is to be indemnified by the payment of costs and damages for the detainer, all costs, charges, and expenses incurred by such owner in or about any proceedings for the condemnation of such ship shall be added to the costs and damages payable to him in respect of the detention of the ship.

Nothing in this section will affect any proceedings that have been or will be started for the seizure of any ship held under this section, as long as that ship is subject to forfeiture according to this provision. If the ship is returned as outlined in this section, all proceedings for its seizure will be paused. If the court decides that the owner should be compensated for costs and damages due to the seizure, all costs, charges, and expenses incurred by the owner regarding any proceedings for the seizure of that ship will be included in the costs and damages owed to them for the ship's detention.

Nothing in this section contained shall apply to any foreign non-commissioned ship despatched from any part of Her Majesty's dominions after having come within them under stress of weather or in the course of a peaceful voyage, and upon which ship no fitting out or equipping of a warlike character has taken place in this country.

Nothing in this section applies to any foreign non-commissioned ship sent from any part of Her Majesty's territories after having entered them due to bad weather or during a peaceful voyage, as long as no military outfitting or equipping has occurred in this country on that ship.

Special Power of Local Authority to detain Ship.

Special Power of Local Authority to Detain Ship.

24. Where it is represented to any local authority, as defined by this Act, and such local authority believes the representation, that there is a reasonable[Pg 672] and probable cause for believing that a ship within Her Majesty's dominions has been or is being built, commissioned, or equipped contrary to this Act, and is about to be taken beyond the limits of such dominions, or that a ship is about to be despatched contrary to this Act, it shall be the duty of such local authority to detain such ship, and forthwith to communicate the fact of such detention to the Secretary of State or chief executive authority.

24. If any local authority, as defined by this Act, receives a representation and believes it to be true, indicating that there is reasonable and probable cause to think that a ship within Her Majesty's territories has been or is being built, commissioned, or equipped in violation of this Act, and is about to be taken outside those territories, or that a ship is about to be sent off in violation of this Act, then it is the local authority's responsibility to detain that ship and immediately inform the Secretary of State or the chief executive authority about the detention.

Upon the receipt of such communication the Secretary of State or chief executive authority may order the ship to be released if he thinks there is no cause for detaining her, but if satisfied that there is reasonable and probable cause for believing that such ship was built, commissioned, or equipped or intended to be despatched in contravention of this Act, he shall issue his warrant stating that there is reasonable and probable cause for believing as aforesaid, and upon such warrant being issued further proceedings shall be had as in cases where the seizure or detention has taken place on a warrant issued by the Secretary of State without any communication from the local authority.

Upon receiving this communication, the Secretary of State or chief executive authority may order the ship to be released if they believe there’s no reason to keep it detained. However, if they are convinced there is reasonable and probable cause to believe that the ship was built, commissioned, or equipped, or is intended to be sent out in violation of this Act, they will issue a warrant stating that there is reasonable and probable cause for such beliefs. Once this warrant is issued, further actions will proceed just like in cases where the seizure or detention occurred based on a warrant issued by the Secretary of State without any communication from the local authority.

Where the Secretary of State or chief executive authority orders the ship to be released on the receipt of a communication from the local authority without issuing his warrant, the owner of the ship shall be indemnified by the payment of costs and damages in respect of the detention upon application to the Court of Admiralty in a summary way in like manner as he is entitled to be indemnified where the Secretary of State having issued his warrant under this Act releases the ship before any application is made by the owner or his agent to the court for such release.

If the Secretary of State or the chief executive authority orders the ship to be released based on a communication from the local authority without issuing a warrant, the ship's owner will be compensated for costs and damages due to the detention. This can be done by applying to the Court of Admiralty in a straightforward manner, similar to how they would be compensated if the Secretary of State, after issuing a warrant under this Act, releases the ship before the owner or their agent has made an application to the court for that release.

Power of Secretary of State or Executive Authority to grant Search Warrant.

Power of Secretary of State or Executive Authority to grant Search Warrant.

25. The Secretary of State or the chief executive authority may, by warrant, empower any person to enter any dockyard or other place within Her Majesty's dominions and inquire as to the destination of any ship which may appear to him to be intended to be employed in the naval or military service of any foreign state at war with a friendly state, and to search such ship.

25. The Secretary of State or the top executive authority may, through a warrant, authorize any person to enter any dockyard or other location within Her Majesty's territories and investigate the destination of any ship that seems to be intended for use in the naval or military service of any foreign nation at war with a friendly nation, and to inspect that ship.

Exercise of Powers of Secretary of State or Chief Executive Authority.

Exercise of Powers of Secretary of State or Chief Executive Authority.

26. Any powers or jurisdiction by this Act given to the Secretary of State may be exercised by him throughout the dominions of Her Majesty, and such powers and jurisdiction may also be exercised by any of the following officers, in this Act referred to as the chief executive authority, within their respective jurisdictions; that is to say,

26. Any powers or authority granted by this Act to the Secretary of State can be exercised by him across all of Her Majesty’s territories, and these powers and authority can also be exercised by any of the following officers, referred to in this Act as the chief executive authority, within their specific areas of responsibility; namely,

(1) In Ireland by the Lord Lieutenant or other the chief governor or governors of Ireland for the time being, or the chief secretary to the Lord Lieutenant:

(1) In Ireland, by the Lord Lieutenant or whichever chief governor or governors are in charge of Ireland at the time, or the chief secretary to the Lord Lieutenant:

(2) In Jersey by the Lieutenant Governor:

(2) In Jersey by the Lieutenant Governor:

(3) In Guernsey, Alderney, and Sark, and the dependent islands by the Lieutenant Governor:

(3) In Guernsey, Alderney, and Sark, along with the nearby islands governed by the Lieutenant Governor:

(4) In the Isle of Man by the Lieutenant Governor:

(4) In the Isle of Man by the Lieutenant Governor:

(5) In any British possession by the Governor:

(5) In any British territory by the Governor:

A copy of any warrant issued by a Secretary of State or by any officer authorised in pursuance of this Act to issue such warrant in Ireland, the Channel Islands, or the Isle of Man shall be laid before Parliament.

A copy of any warrant issued by a Secretary of State or any authorized officer under this Act will be presented to Parliament for review in Ireland, the Channel Islands, or the Isle of Man.

Appeal from Court of Admiralty.

Appeal from Admiralty Court.

27. An appeal may be had from any decision of a Court of Admiralty under this Act to the same tribunal and in the same manner to and in which an appeal may be had in cases within the ordinary jurisdiction of the court as a Court of Admiralty.

27. You can appeal any decision made by a Court of Admiralty under this Act to the same tribunal and in the same way as you would for an appeal in cases that fall within the court's ordinary jurisdiction as a Court of Admiralty.

Indemnity to Officers.

Indemnity for Officers.

28. Subject to the provisions of this Act providing for the award of damages in certain cases in respect of the seizure or detention of a ship by the Court of Admiralty no damages shall be payable, and no officer or local authority shall be responsible, either civilly or criminally, in respect of the seizure or detention of any ship in pursuance of this Act.

28. According to this Act's rules for awarding damages in specific situations regarding the seizure or detention of a ship by the Court of Admiralty, no damages will be paid, and no officer or local authority will be held liable, either civilly or criminally, for the seizure or detention of any ship carried out under this Act.

Indemnity to Secretary of State or Chief Executive Authority.

Indemnity to the Secretary of State or Chief Executive Authority.

29. The Secretary of State shall not, nor shall the chief executive authority, be responsible in any action or other legal proceedings whatsoever for any warrant issued by him in pursuance of this Act, or be examinable as a witness, except at his own request, in any court of justice in respect of the circumstances which led to the issue of the warrant.

29. The Secretary of State and the chief executive authority won’t be held responsible in any legal actions for any warrants issued under this Act, nor will they be required to testify as witnesses in any court about the events that led to the issuance of the warrant, unless they request to do so.

Interpretation Clause.

Interpretation Clause.

Interpretation of Terms.

Terms Interpretation.

30. In this Act, if not inconsistent with the context, the following terms have the meanings herein-after respectively assigned to them; that is to say,

30. In this Act, unless the context requires otherwise, the following terms have the meanings assigned to them below; that is to say,

"Foreign State:"

"Foreign State:"

"Foreign state" includes any foreign prince, colony, province, or part of any province or people, or any person or persons exercising or assuming to exercise the powers of government in or over any foreign country, colony, province, or part of any province or people:

"Foreign state" refers to any foreign ruler, colony, province, or part of a province or people, or any individual or group of individuals who are exercising or claiming to exercise government authority in or over any foreign country, colony, province, or part of any province or people:

"Military Service:"

"Military Service:"

"Military service" shall include military telegraphy and any other employment whatever, in or in connection with any military operation:

"Military service" includes military telegraphy and any other work related to or associated with any military operation:

"Naval Service:"

"Naval Service:"

"Naval service" shall, as respects a person, include service as a marine, employment as a pilot in piloting or directing the course of a ship of war or other ship when such ship of war or other ship is being used in any [Pg 673]military or naval operation, and any employment whatever on board a ship of war, transport, store ship, privateer or ship under letters of marque; and as respects a ship, include any user of a ship as a transport, store ship, privateer or ship under letters of marque:

"Naval service" refers to a person’s service as a marine, working as a pilot to navigate or direct a warship or other vessel when that vessel is involved in any [Pg 673] military or naval operation, as well as any job on board a warship, transport, supply ship, privateer, or a ship authorized by letters of marque; and for a ship, it includes its use as a transport, supply ship, privateer, or a ship under letters of marque:

"United Kingdom:"

"UK:"

"United Kingdom" includes the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands, and other adjacent islands:

"United Kingdom" includes the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands, and other nearby islands:

"British Possessions:"

"British Territories:"

"British possession" means any territory, colony, or place being part of Her Majesty's dominions, and not part of the United Kingdom, as defined by this Act:

"British possession" refers to any territory, colony, or area that is part of Her Majesty's dominions but is not part of the United Kingdom, as defined by this Act:

"The Secretary of State:"

"The Secretary of State:"

"The Secretary of State" shall mean any one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State:

"The Secretary of State" means any one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State:

"Governor:"

"Governor:"

"The Governor" shall as respects India mean the Governor General or the Governor of any presidency, and where a British possession consists of several constituent colonies, mean the Governor General of the whole possession or the Governor of any of the constituent colonies, and as respects any other British possession it shall mean the officer for the time being administering the government of such possession; also any person acting for or in the capacity of a governor shall be included under the term "Governor":

"The Governor" in relation to India refers to the Governor General or the Governor of any presidency, and in cases where a British possession includes several colonies, it means the Governor General of the entire possession or the Governor of any of the individual colonies. For any other British possession, it will refer to the person currently administering the government of that possession; additionally, anyone acting for or as a governor will also be included under the term "Governor":

"Court of Admiralty:"

"Admiralty Court:"

"Court of Admiralty" shall mean the High Court of Admiralty of England or Ireland, the Court of Session of Scotland, or any Vice-Admiralty Court within Her Majesty's dominions:

"Court of Admiralty" refers to the High Court of Admiralty of England or Ireland, the Court of Session of Scotland, or any Vice-Admiralty Court within Her Majesty's territories:

"Ship:"

"Vessel:"

"Ship" shall include any description of boat, vessel, floating battery, or floating craft; also any description of boat, vessel, or other craft or battery, made to move either on the surface of or under water, or sometimes on the surface of and sometimes under water:

"Ship" refers to any type of boat, vessel, floating battery, or floating craft; it also includes any kind of boat, vessel, or other craft or battery designed to move either on the surface of water, under water, or occasionally on the surface and occasionally under water:

"Building:"

"Construction:"

"Building" in relation to a ship shall include the doing any act towards or incidental to the construction of a ship, and all words having relation to building shall be construed accordingly:

"Building" in relation to a ship shall include doing any act towards or related to the construction of a ship, and all terms relating to building shall be interpreted accordingly:

"Equipping:"

"Gear up:"

"Equipping" in relation to a ship shall include the furnishing a ship with any tackle, apparel, furniture, provisions, arms, munitions, or stores, or any other thing which is used in or about a ship for the purpose of fitting or adapting her for the sea or for naval service, and all words relating to equipping shall be construed accordingly:

"Equipping" a ship means providing it with any gear, clothing, furniture, supplies, weapons, ammunition, or other items that are used on or around the ship to prepare it for sailing or for naval operations. All terms related to equipping should be understood in this way:

"Ship and Equipment:"

"Vessel and Equipment:"

"Ship and equipment" shall include a ship and everything in or belonging to a ship:

"Ship and equipment" means a ship and everything inside it or that belongs to it:

"Master:"

"Boss:"

"Master" shall include any person having the charge or command of a ship.

"Master" refers to anyone in charge of or commanding a ship.

Repeal of Acts, and Saving Clauses.

Repeal of Acts, and Saving Clauses.

Repeal of Foreign Enlistment Act. 59 G. 3, c. 69.

Repeal of Foreign Enlistment Act. 59 G. 3, c. 69.

31. From and after the commencement of this Act, an Act passed in the fifty-ninth year of the reign of His late Majesty King George the Third, chapter sixty-nine, intituled "An Act to prevent the enlisting or engagement of His Majesty's subjects to serve in foreign service, and the fitting out or equipping, in His Majesty's dominions, vessels for warlike purposes, without His Majesty's license," shall be repealed: Provided that such repeal shall not affect any penalty, forfeiture, or other punishment incurred or to be incurred in respect of any offence committed before this Act comes into operation, nor the institution of any investigation or legal proceeding, or any other remedy for enforcing any such penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid.

31. Starting from the date this Act goes into effect, an Act passed during the fifty-ninth year of King George the Third’s reign, chapter sixty-nine, titled "An Act to prevent the enlisting or engagement of His Majesty's subjects to serve in foreign service, and the fitting out or equipping, in His Majesty's dominions, vessels for warlike purposes, without His Majesty's license," will be repealed. However, this repeal will not affect any penalty, forfeiture, or other punishment that has been incurred or will be incurred for any offense committed before this Act takes effect, nor will it impact the initiation of any investigations, legal proceedings, or any other remedies for enforcing such penalties, forfeitures, or punishments as mentioned above.

Saving as to Commissioned Foreign Ships.

Saving as to Commissioned Foreign Ships.

32. Nothing in this Act contained shall subject to forfeiture any commissioned ship of any foreign state, or give to any British court over or in respect of any ship entitled to recognition as a commissioned ship of any foreign state any jurisdiction which it would not have had if this Act had not passed.

32. Nothing in this Act will cause any commissioned ship of a foreign state to be forfeited, nor will it give any British court jurisdiction over any ship recognized as a commissioned ship of a foreign state that it wouldn't have had if this Act hadn't been enacted.

Penalties not to extend to Persons entering into Military Service in Asia. 59 G. 3, c. 69, s. 12.

Penalties not to extend to persons entering into military service in Asia. 59 G. 3, c. 69, s. 12.

33. Nothing in this Act contained shall extend or be construed to extend to subject to any penalty any person who enters into the military service of any prince, state, or potentate in Asia, with such leave or license as is for the time being required by law in the case of subjects of Her Majesty entering into the military services of princes, states, or potentates of Asia.[Pg 674]

33. Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted to mean that any person who joins the military service of any prince, state, or ruler in Asia, with the necessary permission or license as required by law for subjects of Her Majesty joining the military services of princes, states, or rulers in Asia, will face any penalties.[Pg 674]

APPENDIX X THE NAVAL PRIZE ACT, 1864 27 & 28 VICT., CHAPTER 25

An Act for regulating Naval Prize of War.
[23rd June 1864.]

An Act for regulating Naval Prize of War.
[June 23, 1864.]


Whereas it is expedient to enact permanently, with Amendments, such Provisions concerning Naval Prize, and Matters connected therewith, as have heretofore been usually passed at the Beginning of a War:

Whereas it is practical to permanently establish, with amendments, provisions regarding naval prizes and related matters that have typically been enacted at the start of a war:

Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

Preliminary.

Initial.

Short Title.

Short Title.

1. This Act may be cited as the Naval Prize Act, 1864.

1. This Act can be referred to as the Naval Prize Act of 1864.

2. In this Act—

2. In this law—

Interpretation of Terms.

Terms Interpretation.

The Term "the Lords of the Admiralty" means the Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom, or the Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral:

The term "the Lords of the Admiralty" means the Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom or the Commissioners responsible for carrying out the duties of the Lord High Admiral:

The Term "the High Court of Admiralty" means the High Court of Admiralty of England:

The term "the High Court of Admiralty" means the High Court of Admiralty of England:

The Term "any of Her Majesty's Ships of War" includes any of Her Majesty's Vessels of War, and any hired armed Ship or Vessel in Her Majesty's Service:

The term "any of Her Majesty's Ships of War" includes any of Her Majesty's War Vessels, and any hired armed Ship or Vessel in Her Majesty's Service:

The Term "Officers and Crew" includes Flag Officers, Commanders, and other Officers, Engineers, Seamen, Marines, Soldiers, and others on board any of Her Majesty's Ships of War:

The term "Officers and Crew" includes Flag Officers, Commanders, and other Officers, Engineers, Seamen, Marines, Soldiers, and others on board any of Her Majesty's Warships:

The Term "Ship" includes Vessel and Boat, with the Tackle, Furniture, and Apparel of the Ship, Vessel, or Boat:

The term "Ship" includes vessel and boat, along with the equipment, furnishings, and gear of the ship, vessel, or boat:

The Term "Ship Papers" includes all Books, Passes, Sea Briefs, Charter Parties, Bills of Lading, Cockets, Letters, and other Documents and Writings delivered up or found on board a captured Ship:

The term "Ship Papers" includes all books, passes, sea briefs, charter parties, bills of lading, cockets, letters, and other documents and writings delivered up or found on board a captured ship:

The Term "Goods" includes all such Things as are by the Course of Admiralty and Law of Nations the Subject of Adjudication as Prize (other than Ships).

The term "Goods" includes all items that are subject to adjudication as prize under the rules of Admiralty and the Law of Nations (excluding ships).

I.—Prize Courts.

I.—Prize Courts.

High Court of Admiralty and other Courts to be Prize Courts for Purposes of Act.

High Court of Admiralty and other Courts to act as Prize Courts for the purposes of the Act.

3. The High Court of Admiralty, and every Court of Admiralty or of Vice-Admiralty, or other Court exercising Admiralty Jurisdiction in Her Majesty's Dominions, for the Time being authorised to take cognizance of and judicially proceed in Matters of Prize, shall be a Prize Court within the Meaning of this Act.

3. The High Court of Admiralty and every Court of Admiralty or Vice-Admiralty, or any other Court that has the authority to handle Admiralty Jurisdiction in Her Majesty's Dominions, authorized at the time to deal with and make legal decisions in Prize matters, shall be considered a Prize Court under this Act.

Every such Court, other than the High Court of Admiralty, is comprised in the Term "Vice-Admiralty Prize Court," when hereafter used in this Act.

Every court, except for the High Court of Admiralty, is included in the term "Vice-Admiralty Prize Court" when mentioned later in this Act.

High Court of Admiralty.

Admiralty High Court.

Jurisdiction of High Court of Admiralty.

Jurisdiction of High Court of Admiralty.

4. The High Court of Admiralty shall have Jurisdiction throughout Her Majesty's Dominions as a Prize Court.

4. The High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction throughout Her Majesty's Dominions as a Prize Court.

The High Court of Admiralty as a Prize Court shall have Power to enforce any Order or Decree of a Vice-Admiralty Prize Court, and any Order or Decree of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in a Prize Appeal.

The High Court of Admiralty, acting as a Prize Court, has the authority to enforce any order or decree issued by a Vice-Admiralty Prize Court, as well as any order or decree from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council regarding a Prize Appeal.

Appeal; Judicial Committee.

Appeal; Court Committee.

Appeal to Queen in Council, in what Cases.

Appeal to the Queen in Council, in what cases.

5. An Appeal shall lie to Her Majesty in Council from any Order or Decree of a Prize Court, as of Right in case of a Final Decree, and in other Cases with the Leave of the Court making the Order or Decree.

5. An Appeal can be made to Her Majesty in Council from any Order or Decree of a Prize Court, as a matter of right in the case of a Final Decree, and in other cases with the permission of the Court that issued the Order or Decree.

Every Appeal shall be made in such Manner and Form and subject to such Regulations (including Regulations as to Fees, Costs, Charges, and Expenses) as may for the Time being be directed by Order in Council, and in the Absence of any such Order, or so far as any such Order does not extend, then in such Manner and Form and subject to such Regulations as are for the Time being prescribed or in force respecting Maritime Causes of Appeal.[Pg 675]

Every appeal must be made in the manner and form specified and according to the regulations (including those regarding fees, costs, charges, and expenses) that are currently directed by Order in Council. In the absence of such an order, or where the order does not apply, the appeal shall be made in the manner and form and according to the regulations currently prescribed or in effect for maritime causes of appeal.[Pg 675]

Jurisdiction of Judicial Committee in Prize Appeals.

Jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee in Prize Appeals.

6. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council shall have Jurisdiction to hear and report on any such Appeal, and may therein exercise all such Powers as for the Time being appertain to them in respect of Appeals from any Court of Admiralty Jurisdiction, and all such Powers as are under this Act vested in the High Court of Admiralty, and all such Powers as were wont to be exercised by the Commissioners of Appeal in Prize Causes.

6. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has the authority to hear and report on any such appeal, and may exercise all the powers that currently belong to them regarding appeals from any Court of Admiralty Jurisdiction, as well as all the powers granted to the High Court of Admiralty under this Act, and all the powers that were typically exercised by the Commissioners of Appeal in Prize Causes.

Custody of Processes, Papers, &c.

Custody of processes, papers, etc.

7. All Processes and Documents required for the Purposes of any such Appeal shall be transmitted to and shall remain in the Custody of the Registrar of Her Majesty in Prize Appeals.

7. All processes and documents needed for any such appeal must be sent to and will stay with the Registrar of Her Majesty in Prize Appeals.

Limit of Time for Appeal.

Appeal Deadline.

8. In every such Appeal the usual Inhibition shall be extracted from the Registry of Her Majesty in Prize Appeals within Three Months after the Date of the Order or Decree appealed from if the Appeal be from the High Court of Admiralty, and within Six Months after that Date if it be from a Vice-Admiralty Prize Court.

8. In every such Appeal, the usual Inhibition shall be taken from the Registry of Her Majesty in Prize Appeals within three months after the date of the Order or Decree being appealed, if the Appeal is from the High Court of Admiralty, and within six months after that date if it is from a Vice-Admiralty Prize Court.

The Judicial Committee may, nevertheless, on sufficient Cause shown, allow the Inhibition to be extracted and the Appeal to be prosecuted after the Expiration of the respective Periods aforesaid.

The Judicial Committee may, however, if there is enough reason provided, permit the Inhibition to be removed and the Appeal to be pursued after the expiration of the previously mentioned periods.

Vice-Admiralty Prize Courts.

Vice-Admiralty Prize Courts.

Enforcement of Orders of High Court, &c.

Enforcement of Orders of High Court, &c.

9. Every Vice-Admiralty Prize Court shall enforce within its Jurisdiction all Orders and Decrees of the Judicial Committee in Prize Appeals and of the High Court of Admiralty in Prize Causes.

9. Every Vice-Admiralty Prize Court shall enforce within its jurisdiction all orders and decrees of the Judicial Committee in prize appeals and of the High Court of Admiralty in prize cases.

Salaries of Judges of Vice-Admiralty Prize Courts.

Salaries of Judges of Vice-Admiralty Prize Courts.

10. Her Majesty in Council may grant to the Judge of any Vice-Admiralty Prize Court a Salary not exceeding Five Hundred Pounds a Year, payable out of Money provided by Parliament, subject to such Regulations as seem meet.

10. The Queen in Council may grant the Judge of any Vice-Admiralty Prize Court a salary of up to five hundred pounds a year, paid from funds provided by Parliament, subject to any regulations that seem appropriate.

A Judge to whom a Salary is so granted shall not be entitled to any further Emolument, arising from Fees or otherwise, in respect of Prize Business transacted in his Court.

A Judge who receives a Salary like this will not be entitled to any additional Compensation, from Fees or otherwise, regarding Prize Business handled in their Court.

An Account of all such Fees shall be kept by the Registrar of the Court, and the Amount thereof shall be carried to and form Part of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.

An account of all these fees will be maintained by the court registrar, and the total will be added to and become part of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.

Retiring Pensions of Judges, as in 22 & 23 Vict. c. 26.

Retiring Pensions of Judges, as in 22 & 23 Vict. c. 26.

11. In accordance, as far as Circumstances admit, with the Principles and Regulations laid down in the Superannuation Act, 1859, Her Majesty in Council may grant to the Judge of any Vice-Admiralty Prize Court an annual or other Allowance, to take effect on the Termination of his Service, and to be payable out of Money provided by Parliament.

11. Accordingly, as far as circumstances allow, and in line with the principles and regulations established in the Superannuation Act of 1859, Her Majesty in Council may grant an annual or other allowance to the Judge of any Vice-Admiralty Prize Court, which will begin once their service ends, and will be paid out of funds provided by Parliament.

Returns from Vice-Admiralty Prize Courts.

Returns from Vice-Admiralty Prize Courts.

12. The Registrar of every Vice-Admiralty Prize Court shall, on the First Day of January and First Day of July in every year, make out a Return (in such Form as the Lords of the Admiralty from Time to Time direct) of all cases adjudged in the Court since the last half-yearly Return, and shall with all convenient Speed send the same to the Registrar of the High Court of Admiralty, who shall keep the same in the Registry of that Court, and who shall, as soon as conveniently may be, send a Copy of the Returns of each Half Year to the Lords of the Admiralty, who shall lay the same before both Houses of Parliament.

12. The Registrar of every Vice-Admiralty Prize Court must, on the first day of January and the first day of July each year, create a report (in the format directed by the Lords of the Admiralty from time to time) of all cases decided in the Court since the last half-yearly report, and must promptly send it to the Registrar of the High Court of Admiralty, who will keep it on record in that Court's registry. The Registrar shall, as soon as possible, send a copy of the half-yearly reports to the Lords of the Admiralty, who will present them to both Houses of Parliament.

General.

General.

General Orders for Prize Courts.

General Prize Court Orders.

13. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, with the Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, may from Time to Time frame General Orders for regulating (subject to the Provisions of this Act) the Procedure and Practice of Prize Courts, and the Duties and Conduct of the Officers thereof and of the Practitioners therein, and for regulating the Fees to be taken by the Officers of the Courts, and the Costs, Charges, and Expenses to be allowed to the Practitioners therein.

13. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, along with the Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, can occasionally establish General Orders to manage (in accordance with the provisions of this Act) the procedures and practices of Prize Courts, as well as the duties and conduct of their officers and practitioners. They will also set regulations for the fees charged by the Court's officers and the costs, charges, and expenses that will be granted to the practitioners involved.

Any such General Orders shall have full Effect, if and when approved by Her Majesty in Council, but not sooner or otherwise.

Any such General Orders will take full effect only when approved by Her Majesty in Council, and not before or in any other way.

Every Order in Council made under this Section shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament.

Every Order in Council made under this Section must be presented to both Houses of Parliament.

Every such Order in Council shall be kept exhibited in a conspicuous Place in each Court to which it relates.

Every Order in Council must be displayed in a visible location in each relevant Court.

Prohibition of Officer of Prize Court acting as Proctor, &c.

Prohibition of Officer of Prize Court acting as Proctor, &c.

14. It shall not be lawful for any Registrar, Marshal, or other Officer of any Prize Court, or for the Registrar of Her Majesty in Prize Appeals, directly or indirectly to act or be in any manner concerned as Advocate, Proctor, Solicitor, or Agent, or otherwise, in any Prize Cause or Appeal, on pain of Dismissal or Suspension from Office, by Order of the Court or of the Judicial Committee (as the Case may require).

14. It’s not allowed for any Registrar, Marshal, or other Officer of any Prize Court, or for the Registrar of Her Majesty in Prize Appeals, to act or be involved in any way as an Advocate, Proctor, Solicitor, or Agent, or otherwise, in any Prize Cause or Appeal, under the threat of Dismissal or Suspension from Office, as ordered by the Court or the Judicial Committee (depending on the situation).

Prohibition of Proctors being concerned for adverse Parties in a Cause.

Prohibition of Proctors being involved with opposing parties in a case.

15. It shall not be lawful for any Proctor or Solicitor, or Person practising as a Proctor or Solicitor, being employed by a Party in a Prize Cause or Appeal, to be employed or concerned, by himself or his Partner, or by any other Person, directly or indirectly by or on behalf of any adverse Party in that Cause or Appeal, on pain of Exclusion or Suspension from Practice in Prize Matters, by Order of the Court or of the Judicial Committee (as the Case may require).[Pg 676]

15. It is not allowed for any Proctor or Solicitor, or anyone acting as a Proctor or Solicitor, who is hired by a Party in a Prize Cause or Appeal, to also be hired or involved, either by themselves, their Partner, or anyone else, directly or indirectly, by or on behalf of any opposing Party in that Cause or Appeal. Violating this will result in Exclusion or Suspension from practicing in Prize Matters, as ordered by the Court or the Judicial Committee, depending on the situation.[Pg 676]

II.—Procedure in Prize Causes.

II.—Procedure in Prize Cases.

Proceedings by Captors.

Court case by captors.

Custody of Prize Ship.

Custody of Prize Ship.

16. Every Ship taken as Prize, and brought into Port within the Jurisdiction of a Prize Court, shall forthwith and without Bulk broken, be delivered up to the Marshal of the Court.

16. Every ship that is captured as a prize and brought into port within the jurisdiction of a prize court shall immediately and without any bulk being broken, be handed over to the Marshal of the Court.

If there is no such Marshal, then the Ship shall be in like Manner delivered up to the Principal Officer of Customs at the Port.

If there isn’t a Marshal, then the Ship will be handed over to the Chief Officer of Customs at the Port in the same way.

The Ship shall remain in the Custody of the Marshal, or of such Officer, subject to the Orders of the Court.

The Ship will stay in the custody of the Marshal or another Officer, following the Court's orders.

Bringing in of Ship Papers.

Submitting Ship Papers.

17. The Captors shall, with all practicable Speed after the Ship is brought into Port, bring the Ship Papers into the Registry of the Court.

17. The Captors must, as quickly as possible after the Ship arrives in Port, submit the Ship Papers to the Court Registry.

The Officer in Command, or One of the Chief Officers of the Capturing Ship, or some other Person who was present at the Capture, and saw the Ship Papers delivered up or found on board, shall make Oath that they are brought in as they were taken, without Fraud, Addition, Subduction, or Alteration, or else shall account on Oath to the Satisfaction of the Court for the Absence or altered Condition of the Ship Papers or any of them.

The Officer in Charge, or one of the senior officers of the capturing ship, or someone else who was there during the capture and witnessed the ship’s papers being surrendered or found on board, must swear an oath that the documents are presented exactly as they were taken, without any fraud, additions, omissions, or alterations. If not, they will need to explain under oath to the court’s satisfaction why the ship’s papers are missing or in a changed condition.

Where no Ship Papers are delivered up or found on board the captured Ship, the Officer in Command, or One of the Chief Officers of the capturing Ship, or some other Person who was present at the Capture, shall make Oath to that Effect.

Where no Ship Papers are handed over or found on board the captured Ship, the Officer in Charge, or one of the Chief Officers of the capturing Ship, or another person who was present at the Capture, shall take an Oath to that effect.

Issue of Monition.

Monition issue.

18. As soon as the Affidavit as to Ship Papers is filed, a Monition shall issue, returnable within Twenty Days from the Service thereof, citing all Persons in general to show Cause why the captured Ship should not be condemned.

18. Once the Affidavit regarding the Ship Papers is filed, a Monition will be issued, returnable within Twenty Days of its Service, calling on all Persons in general to explain why the captured Ship should not be condemned.

Examinations on Standing Interrogatories.

Exams on Standing Questions.

19. The Captors shall, with all practicable Speed after the captured Ship is brought into Port, bring Three or Four of the Principal Persons belonging to the captured Ship before the Judge of the Court or some Person authorised in this behalf, by whom they shall be examined on Oath on the Standing Interrogatories.

19. The Captors will, as quickly as possible after the captured Ship arrives in Port, bring Three or Four of the Main Individuals from the captured Ship before the Judge of the Court or someone authorized for this purpose, where they will be examined under Oath on the Standard Interrogatories.

The Preparatory Examinations on the Standing Interrogatories shall, if possible, be concluded within Five Days from the Commencement thereof.

The Preparatory Examinations on the Standing Interrogatories should, if possible, be finished within five days from the start.

Adjudication by Court.

Court Decision

20. After the Return of the Monition, the Court shall, on Production of the Preparatory Examinations and Ship Papers, proceed with all convenient Speed either to condemn or to release the captured Ship.

20. After the Return of the Monition, the Court shall, upon presentation of the Preparatory Examinations and Ship Papers, move as quickly as possible to either condemn or release the captured Ship.

Further Proof.

Further Evidence.

21. Where, on Production of the Preparatory Examinations and Ship Papers, it appears to the Court doubtful whether the captured Ship is good Prize or not, the Court may direct further Proof to be adduced, either by Affidavit or by Examination of Witnesses, with or without Pleadings, or by Production of further Documents; and on such further Proof being adduced the Court shall with all convenient Speed proceed to Adjudication.

21. If, upon reviewing the Preparatory Examinations and Ship Papers, the Court is uncertain whether the captured Ship is a valid Prize, it can require additional evidence to be presented, either through Affidavit or by questioning Witnesses, with or without Pleadings, or by presenting more Documents; and after this additional evidence is provided, the Court will proceed to make a decision as quickly as possible.

Custody, &c. of Ships of War.

Custody of Warships.

22. The foregoing Provisions, as far as they relate to the Custody of the Ship, and to Examination on the Standing Interrogatories, shall not apply to Ships of War taken as Prize.

22. The previous provisions, to the extent they relate to the custody of the ship and the examination on the standing interrogatories, do not apply to warships captured as a prize.

Claim.

Claim.

Entry of Claim; Security for Costs.

Entry of Claim; Security for Costs.

23. At any Time before Final Decree made in the Cause, any Person claiming an Interest in the Ship may enter in the Registry of the Court a Claim, verified on Oath.

23. At any time before the final decree is made in the case, anyone claiming an interest in the ship may file a claim in the court's registry, verified under oath.

Within Five Days after entering the Claim, the Claimant shall give Security for Costs in the Sum of Sixty Pounds; but the Court shall have Power to enlarge the Time for giving Security, or to direct Security to be given in a larger Sum, if the Circumstances appear to require it.

Within five days of entering the claim, the claimant must provide security for costs in the amount of sixty pounds; however, the court has the authority to extend the time for providing security or to require security in a larger amount if the circumstances seem to warrant it.

Appraisement.

Valuation.

Power to Court to direct Appraisement.

Power to Court to direct Appraisement.

24. The Court may, if it thinks fit, at any Time direct that the captured Ship be appraised.

24. The Court may, if it sees fit, at any time order that the captured ship be evaluated.

Every Appraisement shall be made by competent Persons sworn to make the same according to the best of their Skill and Knowledge.

Every appraisal must be done by qualified individuals who are sworn to provide their service to the best of their skill and knowledge.

Delivery on Bail.

Delivery on Bail.

Power to Court to direct Delivery to Claimant on Bail.

Power to Court to direct Delivery to Claimant on Bail.

25. After Appraisement, the Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that the captured Ship be delivered up to the Claimant, on his giving Security to the Satisfaction of the Court to pay to the Captors the appraised Value thereof in case of Condemnation.

25. After appraisal, the court may, if it deems appropriate, order that the captured ship be handed over to the claimant, provided that they give security satisfactory to the court to pay the captors the appraised value in the event of condemnation.

Sale.

Sale.

Power to Court to order Sale.

Power to Court to order Sale.

26. The Court may at any Time, if it thinks fit, on account of the Condition of the captured Ship, or on the Application of a Claimant, order that the captured Ship be appraised as aforesaid (if not already appraised), and be sold.

26. The Court can, at any time it sees fit, due to the condition of the captured ship or at the request of a claimant, order that the captured ship be appraised as mentioned earlier (if it hasn't already been appraised) and be sold.

Sale on Condemnation.

Condemnation Sale.

27. On or after Condemnation the Court may, if it thinks fit, order that the Ship be appraised as aforesaid (if not already appraised), and be sold.

27. On or after Condemnation, the Court may, if it sees fit, order that the Ship be appraised as mentioned above (if it hasn't already been appraised) and be sold.

How Sales to be made.

How Sales Are Made.

28. Every Sale shall be made by or under the Superintendence of the Marshal of the Court or of the Officer having the Custody of the captured Ship.

28. Every sale will be conducted by or under the supervision of the Court Marshal or the Officer in charge of the captured ship.

Payment of Proceeds to Paymaster General or Official Accountant.

Payment of proceeds to Paymaster General or Official Accountant.

29. The Proceeds of any Sale, made either before or after Condemnation, and after Condemnation the appraised Value of the captured Ship, in case she has been delivered up to a Claimant on[Pg 677] Bail, shall be paid under an Order of the Court either into the Bank of England to the Credit of Her Majesty's Paymaster General, or into the Hands of an Official Accountant (belonging to the Commissariat or some other Department) appointed for this Purpose by the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury or by the Lords of the Admiralty, subject in either case to such Regulations as may from Time to Time be made, by order in Council, as to the Custody and Disposal of Money so paid.

29. The proceeds from any sale, whether made before or after condemnation, and after condemnation, the appraised value of the captured ship, in cases where it has been returned to a claimant on[Pg 677] bail, shall be paid under a court order either into the Bank of England for the credit of Her Majesty's Paymaster General, or into the hands of an official accountant (from the Commissariat or another department) appointed for this purpose by the commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury or by the Lords of the Admiralty, subject in either case to any regulations that may be established over time by order in council regarding the custody and disposal of the funds so paid.

Small armed Ships.

Small armed vessels.

One Adjudication as to several small Ships.

One Adjudication as to several small Ships.

30. The Captors may include in One Adjudication any Number, not exceeding Six, of armed Ships not exceeding One hundred Tons each, taken within Three Months next before Institution of Proceedings.

30. The captors may include in one adjudication any number, up to six, of armed ships each not exceeding one hundred tons, taken within three months before the start of the proceedings.

Goods.

Products.

Application of foregoing Provisions to Prize Goods.

Application of the above Provisions to Prize Goods.

31. The foregoing Provisions relating to Ships shall extend and apply, mutatis mutandis, to goods taken as Prize on board Ship; and the Court may direct such goods to be unladen, inventoried, and warehoused.

31. The previous rules about Ships will also apply, with necessary changes, to goods taken as Prize on board a Ship; and the Court may order those goods to be unloaded, inventoried, and stored.

Monition to Captors to proceed.

Warning to captors to proceed.

Power to Court to call on Captors to proceed to Adjudication.

Power to Court to call on Captors to proceed to Adjudication.

32. If the Captors fail to institute or to prosecute with Effect Proceedings for Adjudication, a Monition shall, on the Application of a Claimant, issue against the Captors, returnable within Six Days from the Service thereof, citing them to appear and proceed to Adjudication; and on the Return thereof the Court shall either forthwith proceed to Adjudication or direct further Proof to be adduced as aforesaid and then proceed to Adjudication.

32. If the Captors don't start or effectively pursue legal proceedings for a decision, a notice will be issued against them at the request of a Claimant, which must be returned within six days of being served, requiring them to show up and move forward with the adjudication; and upon this return, the Court will either immediately proceed to adjudication or request further evidence to be presented and then proceed to adjudication.

Claim on Appeal.

Appeal Claim.

Person intervening on Appeal to enter Claim.

Person intervening on Appeal to enter Claim.

33. Where any Person, not an original Party in the Cause, intervenes on Appeal, he shall enter a Claim, verified on Oath, and shall give Security for Costs.

33. If anyone who wasn't an original party in the case wants to intervene in an appeal, they must file a claim, verified under oath, and provide security for costs.

III.—Special Cases of Capture.

III.—Special Cases of Capture.

Land Expeditions.

Land Adventures.

Jurisdiction of Prize Court in case of Capture in Land Expedition.

Jurisdiction of Prize Court in case of Capture in Land Expedition.

34. Where, in an Expedition of any of Her Majesty's Naval or Naval and Military Forces against a Fortress or Possession on Land, Goods belonging to the State of the Enemy or to a Public Trading Company of the Enemy exercising Powers of Government are taken in the Fortress or Possession, or a Ship is taken in Waters defended by or belonging to the Fortress or Possession, a Prize Court shall have Jurisdiction as to the Goods or Ship so taken, and any Goods taken on board the Ship as in case of Prize.

34. In an operation by any of Her Majesty's Naval or Naval and Military Forces against a fortress or location on land, if goods owned by the enemy state or a public trading company of the enemy with government authority are seized in the fortress or location, or if a ship is captured in waters defended by or associated with the fortress or location, a Prize Court will have jurisdiction over the goods or ship taken, along with any goods found on board the ship, as is customary in cases of prize.

Conjunct Capture with Ally.

Join Forces with Ally.

Jurisdiction of Prize Court in case of Expedition with Ally.

Jurisdiction of Prize Court in case of Expedition with Ally.

35. Where any Ship or Goods is or are taken by any of Her Majesty's Naval or Naval and Military Forces while acting in conjunction with any Forces of any of Her Majesty's Allies, a Prize Court shall have Jurisdiction as to the same as in the case of Prize, and shall have Power, after Condemnation, to apportion the due share of the Proceeds to Her Majesty's Ally, the proportionate Amount and the Disposition of which Share shall be such as may from Time to Time be agreed between Her Majesty and Her Majesty's Ally.

35. If any ship or goods are taken by any of Her Majesty's naval or military forces while working together with the forces of any of Her Majesty's allies, a prize court will have jurisdiction over the matter just like in cases of prize. After a condemnation, the court will have the authority to distribute the appropriate share of the proceeds to Her Majesty's ally, with the proportion and allocation of that share determined by agreements made from time to time between Her Majesty and Her Majesty's ally.

Joint Capture.

Joint Capture.

Restriction on Petitions by asserted joint Captors.

Restriction on Petitions by claimed joint Captors.

36. Before Condemnation, a Petition on behalf of asserted joint Captors shall not (except by special Leave of the Court) be admitted, unless and until they give Security to the Satisfaction of the Court to contribute to the actual Captors a just Proportion of any Costs, Charges, and Expenses or Damages that may be incurred by or awarded against the actual Captors on account of the Capture and Detention of the Prize.

36. Before a Condemnation, a Petition on behalf of claimed joint Captors won’t be accepted (except with special permission from the Court) unless they provide Security that satisfies the Court to contribute to the actual Captors a fair share of any Costs, Charges, Expenses, or Damages that may be incurred by or awarded against the actual Captors due to the Capture and Detention of the Prize.

After Condemnation, such a Petition shall not (except by special Leave of the Court) be admitted unless and until the asserted joint Captors pay to the actual Captors a just Proportion of the Costs, Charges, and Expenses incurred by the actual Captors in the Case, and give such Security as aforesaid, and show sufficient Cause to the Court why their Petition was not presented before Condemnation.

After Condemnation, a Petition won't be accepted (unless the Court gives special permission) until the claimed joint Captors pay the actual Captors a fair share of the Costs, Charges, and Expenses that the actual Captors incurred in the Case, provide the Security mentioned earlier, and demonstrate to the Court sufficient reasons for not submitting their Petition before Condemnation.

Provided, that nothing in the present Section shall extend to the asserted Interest of a Flag Officer claiming to share by virtue of his Flag.

Provided that nothing in this Section will extend to the claimed Interest of a Flag Officer who asserts a right to share because of their Flag.

Offences against Law of Prize.

Violations of Prize Law.

In case of Offence by Captors, Prize to be reserved for Crown.

In case of Offense by Captors, Prize to be kept for the Crown.

37. A Prize Court, on Proof of any Offence against the Law of Nations, or against this Act, or any Act relating to Naval Discipline, or against any Order in Council or Royal Proclamation, or of any Breach of Her Majesty's Instructions relating to Prize, or of any Act of Disobedience to the Orders of the Lords of the Admiralty, or to the Command of a Superior Officer, committed by the Captors in relation to any Ship or Goods taken as Prize, or in relation to any Person on Board any such Ship, may, on Condemnation, reserve the Prize to Her Majesty's Disposal, notwithstanding any Grant that may have been made by Her Majesty in favour of Captors.[Pg 678]

37. A Prize Court, upon proving any offense against international law, this Act, or any laws about Naval Discipline, or against any Orders in Council or Royal Proclamations, or any violation of Her Majesty's Instructions regarding Prize, or any act of disobedience to the Orders of the Lords of the Admiralty, or to the Command of a Superior Officer, committed by the Captors related to any Ship or Goods taken as Prize, or concerning any Person on Board such a Ship, may, upon condemnation, reserve the Prize for Her Majesty’s disposal, regardless of any Grant that may have been made by Her Majesty in favor of the Captors.[Pg 678]

Pre-emption.

Prevention.

Purchase by Admiralty for Public Service of Stores on board Foreign Ships.

Purchase by Admiralty for Public Service of Supplies on board Foreign Ships.

38. Where a Ship of a Foreign Nation passing the Seas laden with Naval or Victualling Stores intended to be carried to a Port of any Enemy of Her Majesty is taken and brought into a Port of the United Kingdom, and the Purchase for the Service of Her Majesty of the Stores on board the Ship appears to the Lords of the Admiralty expedient without the Condemnation thereof in a Prize Court, in that Case the Lords of the Admiralty may purchase, on the Account or for the Service of Her Majesty, all or any of the Stores on board the Ship; and the Commissioners of Customs may permit the Stores purchased to be entered and landed within any Port.

38. If a ship from a foreign country, carrying naval or supply goods intended for an enemy port of Her Majesty, is captured and brought into a port in the United Kingdom, and the Lords of the Admiralty find it necessary to buy the supplies on board for Her Majesty's service without a trial in a Prize Court, then the Lords of the Admiralty can purchase all or any of the supplies on the ship for Her Majesty's use; and the Commissioners of Customs can allow the purchased supplies to be brought in and unloaded at any port.

Capture by Ship other than a Ship of War.

Capture by a Ship other than a Warship.

Prizes taken by Ships other than Ships of War to be Droits of Admiralty.

Prizes captured by ships that are not warships will be considered Admiralty rights.

39. Any Ship or Goods taken as Prize by any of the Officers and Crew of a Ship other than a Ship of War of Her Majesty shall, on Condemnation, belong to Her Majesty in Her Office of Admiralty.

39. Any ship or goods seized as a prize by any of the officers and crew of a ship that is not Her Majesty's warship shall, upon condemnation, belong to Her Majesty in her Admiralty office.

IV.—Prize Salvage.

IV.—Prize Recovery.

Salvage to Re-captors of British Ship or Goods from Enemy.

Salvage for Recapturers of British Ships or Goods from Enemies.

40. Where any Ship or Goods belonging to any of Her Majesty's Subjects, after being taken as Prize by the Enemy, is or are retaken from the Enemy by any of Her Majesty's Ships of War, the same shall be restored by Decree of a Prize Court to the Owner, on his paying as Prize Salvage One Eighth Part of the Value of the Prize to be decreed and ascertained by the Court, or such Sum not exceeding One Eighth Part of the estimated Value of the Prize as may be agreed on between the Owner and the Re-captors, and approved by Order of the Court; Provided, that where the Re-capture is made under circumstances of Special Difficulty or Danger, the Prize Court may, if it thinks fit, award to the Re-captors as Prize Salvage a larger Part than One Eighth Part, but not exceeding in any Case One Fourth Part, of the Value of the Prize.

40. If any ship or goods owned by one of Her Majesty's subjects are captured as a prize by the enemy and are later recaptured from them by one of Her Majesty's warships, they will be returned to the owner by a Prize Court ruling, provided the owner pays a prize salvage fee of one-eighth of the prize's value, as determined by the court. Alternatively, the owner and the recaptors can agree on a sum not more than one-eighth of the estimated value of the prize, which must also be approved by a court order. However, if the recapture occurs under special circumstances of significant difficulty or danger, the Prize Court may decide to award the recaptors a larger salvage fee, not exceeding one-fourth of the prize's value.

Provided also, that where a Ship after being so taken is set forth or used by any of Her Majesty's Enemies as a Ship of War, this Provision for Restitution shall not apply, and the Ship shall be adjudicated on as in other Cases of Prize.

Provided also, that if a Ship, after being seized, is used by any of Her Majesty's Enemies as a War Ship, this rule for Restitution will not apply, and the Ship will be judged like any other cases of Prize.

Permission to re-captured Ship to proceed on Voyage.

Permission to recapture the ship to proceed on its voyage.

41. Where a Ship belonging to any of Her Majesty's Subjects, after being taken as Prize by the Enemy, is retaken from the Enemy by any of Her Majesty's Ships of War, she may, with the Consent of the Re-captors, prosecute her Voyage, and it shall not be necessary for the Re-captors to proceed to Adjudication till her Return to a Port of the United Kingdom.

41. If a ship owned by any of Her Majesty's subjects is captured as a prize by the enemy and is then recaptured from the enemy by one of Her Majesty’s warships, it may continue its journey with the consent of the recapturers, and they won’t need to go through adjudication until it returns to a port in the United Kingdom.

The Master or Owner, or his Agent, may, with the Consent of the Re-captors, unload and dispose of the Goods on board the Ship before Adjudication.

The Master or Owner, or their Agent, may, with the Consent of the Re-captors, unload and sell the Goods on board the Ship before a decision is made.

In case the Ship does not, within Six Months, return to a Port of the United Kingdom, the Re-captors may nevertheless institute Proceedings against the Ship or Goods in the High Court of Admiralty, and the Court may thereupon award Prize Salvage as aforesaid to the Re-captors, and may enforce Payment thereof, either by Warrant of Arrest against the Ship or Goods, or by Monition and Attachment against the Owner.

In the event that the Ship does not return to a port in the United Kingdom within six months, the Re-captors can still file a case against the Ship or its Goods in the High Court of Admiralty. The Court may then award Prize Salvage as mentioned earlier to the Re-captors and can enforce payment either by issuing a Warrant of Arrest against the Ship or Goods or by Monition and Attachment against the Owner.

V.—Prize Bounty.

V.—Prize Bounty.

Prize Bounty to Officers and Crew present at Engagement with an Enemy.

Prize Bounty to Officers and Crew present during Engagement with an Enemy.

42. If, in relation to any War, Her Majesty is pleased to declare, by Proclamation or Order in Council, Her Intention to grant Prize Bounty to the Officers and Crews of Her Ships of War, then such of the Officers and Crew of any of Her Majesty's Ships of War as are actually present at the taking or destroying of any armed Ship of any of Her Majesty's Enemies shall be entitled to have distributed among them as Prize Bounty a Sum calculated at the Rate of Five Pounds for each Person on board the Enemy's Ship at the Beginning of the Engagement.

42. If, during any War, Her Majesty decides, through a Proclamation or Order in Council, to grant Prize Bounty to the Officers and Crews of Her Warships, then the Officers and Crew of any of Her Majesty's Warships who are actually present during the capture or destruction of any armed Ship belonging to Her Majesty's Enemies will be entitled to receive a Prize Bounty calculated at the rate of Five Pounds for each person on board the Enemy's Ship at the start of the Engagement.

Ascertainment of Amount of Prize Bounty by Decree of Prize Court.

Ascertainment of Amount of Prize Bounty by Decree of Prize Court.

43. The Number of the Persons so on board the Enemy's Ship shall be proved in a Prize Court, either by the Examinations on Oath of the Survivors of them, or of any Three or more of the Survivors, or if there is no Survivor by the Papers of the Enemy's Ship, or by the Examinations on Oath of Three or more of the Officers and Crew of Her Majesty's Ship, or by such other Evidence as may seem to the Court sufficient in the Circumstances.

43. The number of people on board the enemy's ship will be determined in a Prize Court, either by the sworn testimonies of the survivors, or by the testimony of any three or more survivors, or if there are no survivors, by the documents from the enemy's ship, or by the sworn testimonies of three or more officers and crew members of Her Majesty's ship, or by any other evidence that the court finds sufficient given the circumstances.

The Court shall make a Decree declaring the Title of the Officers and Crew of Her Majesty's Ship to the Prize Bounty, and stating the Amount thereof.

The Court will issue a decree declaring the title of the officers and crew of Her Majesty's ship to the prize bounty and stating the amount of it.

The Decree shall be subject to Appeal as other Decrees of the Court.

The Decree can be appealed like any other Court Decree.

Payment of Prize Bounty awarded.

Prize bounty payment awarded.

44. On Production of an official Copy of the Decree the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury shall, out of Money provided by Parliament, pay the Amount of Prize Bounty decreed, in such Manner as any Order in Council may from Time to Time direct.[Pg 679]

44. Upon receiving an official copy of the decree, the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury will use funds provided by Parliament to pay out the amount of the prize bounty as specified, in accordance with any directives issued by an Order in Council from time to time.[Pg 679]

VI.—Miscellaneous Provisions.

VI.—Miscellaneous Provisions.

Ransom.

Ransom.

Power for regulating Ransom by Order in Council.

Power for regulating Ransom by Order in Council.

45. Her Majesty in Council may from Time to Time, in relation to any War, make such Orders as may seem expedient, according to Circumstances, for prohibiting or allowing, wholly or in certain Cases, or subject to any Conditions or Regulations or otherwise, as may from Time to Time seem meet, the ransoming or the entering into any contract or Agreement for the ransoming of any Ship or Goods belonging to any of Her Majesty's Subjects, and taken as Prize by any of Her Majesty's Enemies.

45. The Queen in Council may, from time to time, in connection with any war, issue orders that seem appropriate based on circumstances. This includes deciding whether to prohibit or allow, either completely or in specific cases, or under certain conditions or regulations, the ransoming or entering into any contract or agreement for the ransoming of any ship or goods belonging to any of the Queen's subjects that have been captured as prizes by any of her enemies.

Any Contract or Agreement entered into, and any Bill, Bond, or other Security given for Ransom of any Ship or Goods, shall be under the exclusive Jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty as a Prize Court (subject to Appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council), and if entered into or given in contravention of any such Order in Council shall be deemed to have been entered into or given for an illegal Consideration.

Any contract or agreement made, and any bill, bond, or other security provided for the ransom of any ship or goods, will be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty as a Prize Court (subject to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council). If made or provided in violation of any such Order in Council, it will be considered to have been made or provided for an illegal purpose.

If any Person ransoms or enters into any Contract or Agreement for Ransoming any Ship or Goods, in contravention of any such Order in Council, he shall for every such Offence be liable to be proceeded against in the High Court of Admiralty at the Suit of Her Majesty in Her Office of Admiralty, and on Conviction to be fined, in the Discretion of the Court, any Sum not exceeding Five hundred Pounds.

If someone ransoms or makes a contract or agreement to ransom any ship or goods against any such Order in Council, they can be prosecuted in the High Court of Admiralty at the request of Her Majesty in Her Office of Admiralty for each offense, and if convicted, they will be fined up to five hundred pounds at the court's discretion.

Convoy.

Supply convoy.

Punishment of Masters of Merchant Vessels under Convoy disobeying Orders or deserting Convoy.

Punishment of Masters of Merchant Vessels under Convoy disobeying Orders or abandoning Convoy.

46. If the Master or other Person having the Command of any Ship of any of Her Majesty's Subjects, under the Convoy of any of Her Majesty's Ships of War, wilfully disobeys any lawful Signal, Instruction, or Command of the Commander of the Convoy, or without Leave deserts the Convoy, he shall be liable to be proceeded against in the High Court of Admiralty at the Suit of Her Majesty in Her Office of Admiralty, and upon Conviction to be fined, in the Discretion of the Court, any Sum not exceeding Five hundred Pounds, and to suffer Imprisonment for such Time, not exceeding One Year, as the Court may adjudge.

46. If the captain or any person in charge of a ship belonging to any of Her Majesty's Subjects, under the protection of any of Her Majesty's warships, deliberately ignores any lawful signal, instruction, or command from the commander of the convoy, or leaves the convoy without permission, they may face legal action in the High Court of Admiralty at the request of Her Majesty's Admiralty Office. If convicted, they could be fined up to five hundred pounds and sentenced to imprisonment for up to one year, depending on the court's judgment.

Customs Duties and Regulations.

Customs Fees and Rules.

Prize Ships and Goods liable to Duties and Forfeiture.

Prize Ships and Goods liable to Duties and Forfeiture.

47. All Ships and Goods taken as Prize and brought into a Port of the United Kingdom shall be liable to and be charged with the same Rates and Charges and Duties of Customs as under any Act relating to the Customs may be chargeable on other Ships and Goods of the like Description; and

47. All ships and goods taken as prizes and brought into a port in the United Kingdom will be subject to the same rates, charges, and customs duties as any other ships and goods of a similar type may be charged under any customs-related act; and

All Goods brought in as Prize which would on the voluntary Importation thereof be liable to Forfeiture or subject to any Restriction under the Laws relating to the Customs, shall be deemed to be so liable and subject, unless the Commissioners of Customs see fit to authorise the Sale or Delivery thereof for Home Use or Exportation, unconditionally or subject to such Conditions and Regulations as they may direct.

All goods brought in as a prize that would be subject to forfeiture or any restrictions under customs laws upon voluntary importation will be considered liable and subject to those rules, unless the Commissioners of Customs decide to authorize the sale or delivery for domestic use or export, either without conditions or under the specific conditions and regulations they set.

Regulations of Customs to be observed as to Prize Ships and Goods.

Regulations of Customs to be followed regarding Prize Ships and Goods.

48. Where any Ship or Goods taken as Prize is or are brought into a Port of the United Kingdom, the Master or other Person in charge or command of the Ship which has been taken or in which the Goods are brought shall, on Arrival at such Port, bring to at the proper Place of Discharge, and shall, when required by any Officer of Customs, deliver an Account in Writing under his Hand concerning such Ship and Goods, giving such Particulars relating thereto as may be in his Power, and shall truly answer all Questions concerning such Ship or Goods asked by any such Officer, and in default shall forfeit a Sum not exceeding One hundred Pounds, such Forfeiture to be enforced as Forfeitures for Offences against the Laws relating to the Customs are enforced, and every such Ship shall be liable to such Searches as other Ships are liable to, and the Officers of the Customs may freely go on board such Ship and bring to the Queen's Warehouse any Goods on board the same, subject, nevertheless, to such Regulations in respect of Ships of War belonging to Her Majesty as shall from Time to Time be issued by the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury.

48. When any ship or goods taken as a prize are brought into a port in the United Kingdom, the captain or other person in charge of the ship must, upon arrival at that port, deliver them to the appropriate place for unloading. They must also provide a written account, signed by them, regarding the ship and goods if requested by any customs officer, including any details they have. They are required to answer all questions from such officers about the ship or goods accurately. If they fail to do so, they may face a fine of up to one hundred pounds, and this fine will be enforced like other customs law violations. Every such ship will be subject to the same searches as other ships, and customs officers may board the ship and take any goods to the Queen's Warehouse, subject to regulations that will be issued from time to time by the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury for Her Majesty's warships.

Power for Treasury to remit Customs Duties in certain cases.

Power for Treasury to remit Customs Duties in certain cases.

49. Goods taken as Prize may be sold either for Home Consumption or for Exportation; and if in the former Case the Proceeds thereof, after payment of Duties of Customs, are insufficient to satisfy the just and reasonable claims thereon, the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury may remit the whole or such Part of the said Duties as they see fit.

49. Goods seized as a prize can be sold either for domestic use or for export. If they are sold for domestic use and the proceeds, after paying customs duties, aren't enough to cover the legitimate and fair claims against them, the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury can waive all or part of those duties as they choose.

Perjury.

Lying under oath.

Punishment of Persons guilty of Perjury.

Punishment of people guilty of lying under oath.

50. If any Person wilfully and corruptly swears, declares, or affirms falsely in any Prize Cause or Appeal, or in any Proceeding under this Act, or in respect of any Matter required by this Act to be verified on Oath, or suborns any other Person to do so, he shall be deemed guilty of Perjury, or of Subornation of Perjury (as the Case may be), and shall be liable to be punished accordingly.[Pg 680]

50. If anyone intentionally and corruptly swears, claims, or affirms falsely in any Prize Cause or Appeal, or in any proceedings under this Act, or regarding any matter that must be verified under oath according to this Act, or convinces someone else to do so, they will be considered guilty of Perjury or Subornation of Perjury (whichever applies), and will face appropriate punishment.[Pg 680]

Limitation of Actions, &c.

Statute of Limitations, etc.

Actions against Persons executing Act not to be brought without Notice, &c.

Actions against persons executing the Act cannot be initiated without notice, etc.

51. Any Action or Proceeding shall not lie in any Part of Her Majesty's Dominions against any Person acting under the Authority or in the Execution or intended Execution or in pursuance of this Act for any alleged Irregularity or Trespass, or other Act or Thing done or omitted by him under this Act, unless Notice in Writing (specifying the Cause of the Action or Proceeding) is given by the intending Plaintiff or Prosecutor to the intended Defendant One Month at least before the Commencement of the Action or Proceeding, nor unless the Action or Proceeding is commenced within Six Months next after the Act or Thing complained of is done or omitted, or, in case of a Continuation of Damage, within Six Months next after the doing of such Damage has ceased.

51. No legal action or proceeding can be taken in any part of Her Majesty's territories against anyone acting under the authority or in the execution or intended execution of this Act for any claimed irregularity or trespass, or any other act or omission related to this Act, unless the intending plaintiff or prosecutor gives written notice (outlining the reason for the action or proceeding) to the intended defendant at least one month before starting the action or proceeding. Additionally, the action or proceeding must be initiated within six months after the act or omission being complained about has occurred, or, in the case of ongoing damage, within six months after the damage has stopped.

In any such action the Defendant may plead generally that the Act or Thing complained of was done or omitted by him when acting under the authority or in the Execution or intended Execution or in pursuance of this Act, and may give all special Matter in Evidence; and the Plaintiff shall not succeed if Tender of sufficient Amends is made by the Defendant before the Commencement of the Action; and in case no Tender has been made, the Defendant may, by Leave of the Court in which the Action is brought, at any Time pay into Court such Sum of Money as he thinks fit, whereupon such Proceeding and Order shall be had and made in and by the Court as may be had and made on the Payment of Money into Court in an ordinary Action; and if the Plaintiff does not succeed in the Action, the Defendant shall receive such full and reasonable Indemnity as to all Costs, Charges, and Expenses incurred in and about the Action as may be taxed and allowed by the proper Officer, subject to Review; and though a Verdict is given for the Plaintiff in the Action he shall not have Costs against the Defendant, unless the Judge before whom the Trial is had certifies his Approval of the Action.

In any such case, the Defendant can generally claim that the action or issue being complained about was done or left undone while acting under the authority or in the execution or intended execution of this Act, and may present all relevant evidence. The Plaintiff will not win if the Defendant offers sufficient compensation before the Action begins; and if no offer has been made, the Defendant may, with the Court's permission where the Action is filed, pay any amount of money into Court at any time. Following that, procedures and orders will be handled in the Court just like in regular Actions involving money payments. If the Plaintiff does not win the Action, the Defendant will receive full and reasonable compensation for all costs, charges, and expenses incurred in the Action, as may be calculated and approved by the appropriate Officer, subject to review. Even if a Verdict is given for the Plaintiff, he will not be awarded costs against the Defendant unless the Judge overseeing the Trial certifies approval of the Action.

Any such Action or Proceeding against any Person in Her Majesty's Naval Service, or in the Employment of the Lords of the Admiralty, shall not be brought or instituted elsewhere than in the United Kingdom.

Any such action or proceeding against any person in Her Majesty's Naval Service, or employed by the Lords of the Admiralty, must be brought or initiated only within the United Kingdom.

Petitions of Right.

Petitions for Rights.

Jurisdiction of High Court of Admiralty on Petitions of Right in certain Cases, as in 23 & 24 Vict. c. 34.

Jurisdiction of High Court of Admiralty on Petitions of Right in certain Cases, as in 23 & 24 Vict. c. 34.

52. A Petition of Right, under The Petitions of Right Act, 1860, may, if the Suppliant thinks fit, be intituled in the High Court of Admiralty, in case the Subject Matter of the Petition or any material part thereof arises out of the Exercise of any Belligerent Right on behalf of the Crown, or would be cognizable in a Prize Court within Her Majesty's Dominions if the same were a Matter in dispute between private Persons.

52. A Petition of Right, under The Petitions of Right Act, 1860, may, if the applicant thinks it's appropriate, be titled in the High Court of Admiralty, in case the subject matter of the petition or any significant part of it arises from the exercise of any belligerent right on behalf of the Crown, or would be considered in a Prize Court within Her Majesty's Dominions if it were a matter in dispute between private individuals.

Any Petition of Right under the last-mentioned Act, whether intituled in the High Court of Admiralty or not, may be prosecuted in that Court, if the Lord Chancellor thinks fit so to direct.

Any Petition of Right under the last-mentioned Act, whether titled in the High Court of Admiralty or not, may be pursued in that Court if the Lord Chancellor decides to allow it.

The Provisions of this Act relative to Appeal, and to the framing and Approval of General Orders for regulating the Procedure and Practice of the High Court of Admiralty, shall extend to the Case of any such Petition of Right intituled or directed to be prosecuted in that Court; and, subject thereto, all the Provisions of The Petitions of Right Act, 1860, shall apply, mutatis mutandis, in the Case of any such Petition of Right; and for the Purposes of the present Section the Terms "Court" and "Judge" in that Act shall respectively be understood to include and to mean the High Court of Admiralty and the Judge thereof, and other Terms shall have the respective Meanings given to them in that Act.

The rules in this Act regarding appeals and the creation and approval of general orders for regulating the procedures and practices of the High Court of Admiralty will apply to any petition of right intended to be filed in that court. Additionally, all the provisions of The Petitions of Right Act, 1860, will apply, with necessary changes, to any such petition of right. For the purposes of this section, the terms "Court" and "Judge" in that Act should be understood to refer to the High Court of Admiralty and its Judge, and other terms will have the meanings assigned to them in that Act.

Orders in Council.

Orders in Council.

Power to make Orders in Council.

Power to make Orders in Council.

53. Her Majesty in Council may from Time to Time make such Orders in Council as seem meet for the better Execution of this Act.

53. Her Majesty in Council may, from time to time, issue any Orders in Council that seem appropriate for the better execution of this Act.

Order in Council to be gazetted, &c.

Order in Council to be published in the official journal, etc.

54. Every Order in Council under this Act shall be published in the London Gazette, and shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament within Thirty Days after the making thereof, if Parliament is then sitting, and, if not, then within Thirty Days after the next Meeting of Parliament.

54. Every Order in Council under this Act will be published in the London Gazette and will be presented to both Houses of Parliament within thirty days after it is made, if Parliament is currently in session. If Parliament is not in session, it will be presented within thirty days after their next meeting.

Savings.

Save money.

Not to affect Rights of Crown; Effect of Treaties, &c.

Not to affect Rights of Crown; Effect of Treaties, &c.

55. Nothing in this Act shall—

55. Nothing in this Act shall—

(1) give to the Officers and Crew of any of Her Majesty's Ships of War any Right or Claim in or to any Ship or Goods taken as Prize or the Proceeds thereof, it being the intent of this Act that such Officers and Crews shall continue to take only such Interest (if any) in the Proceeds of Prizes as may be from Time to Time granted to them by the Crown; or

(1) give to the Officers and Crew of any of Her Majesty's Ships of War any Right or Claim in or to any Ship or Goods taken as Prize or the Proceeds thereof, it being the intent of this Act that such Officers and Crews shall continue to take only such Interest (if any) in the Proceeds of Prizes as may be granted to them by the Crown from time to time; or

(2) affect the Operation of any existing Treaty or Convention with any Foreign Power; or

(2) affect the operation of any existing treaty or convention with any foreign power; or

(3) take away or abridge the Power of the Crown to enter into any Treaty or Convention with any Foreign Power containing any Stipulation that may seem meet concerning[Pg 681] any Matter to which this Act relates; or

(3) take away or shorten the Power of the Crown to enter into any Treaty or Agreement with any Foreign Power that includes any Terms that may seem appropriate concerning[Pg 681] any Matter related to this Act; or

(4) take away, abridge, or control, further or otherwise than as expressly provided by this Act, any Right, Power, or Prerogative of Her Majesty the Queen in right of Her Crown, or in right of Her Office of Admiralty, or any Right or Power of the Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom, or of the Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral; or

(4) take away, shorten, or control, beyond what is explicitly stated in this Act, any Right, Authority, or Privilege of Her Majesty the Queen in her capacity as Sovereign, or in her role as the Head of the Admiralty, or any Right or Authority of the Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom, or of the Commissioners responsible for carrying out the duties of the Lord High Admiral; or

(5) take away, abridge, or control, further or otherwise than as expressly provided by this Act, the Jurisdiction or Authority of a Prize Court to take cognizance of and judicially proceed upon any Capture, Seizure, Prize, or Reprisal of any Ship or Goods, or to hear and determine the same, and, according to the Course of Admiralty and the Law of Nations, to adjudge and condemn any Ship or Goods, or any other Jurisdiction or Authority of or exerciseable by a Prize Court.

(5) take away, reduce, or manage, beyond what is specifically stated in this Act, the power or authority of a Prize Court to recognize and legally act on any capture, seizure, prize, or reprisal of any ship or goods, to hear and decide on the issue, and, following the principles of Admiralty and international law, to judge and condemn any ship or goods, or any other powers or authorities that a Prize Court may have.

Commencement.

Graduation.

Commencement of Act.

Start of Act.

56. This Act shall commence on the Commencement of The Naval Agency and Distribution Act, 1864.[Pg 682]

56. This Act shall begin on the start date of The Naval Agency and Distribution Act, 1864.[Pg 682]

APPENDIX 11 THE PRIZE COURTS ACTS, 1894 57 & 58 VICT., CHAPTER 39

An Act to make further provision for the establishment of Prize Courts, and for other purposes connected therewith.
[17th August 1894.]

An Act to provide additional measures for the establishment of Prize Courts and for other related purposes.
[17th August 1894.]


Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this current Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

Short Title.

Short Title.

1. This Act may be cited as the Prize Courts Act, 1894.

1. This Act can be referred to as the Prize Courts Act, 1894.

Constitution of Prize Courts in British Possessions.

Constitution of Prize Courts in British Territories.

2.—(1) Any commission, warrant, or instructions from Her Majesty the Queen or the Admiralty for the purpose of commissioning or regulating the procedure of a prize court at any place in a British possession may, notwithstanding the existence of peace, be issued at any time, with a direction that the court shall act only upon such proclamation as herein-after mentioned being made in the possession.

2.—(1) Any commission, warrant, or instructions from Her Majesty the Queen or the Admiralty for the purpose of setting up or managing the operations of a prize court in any British territory may, even during peacetime, be issued at any time, with a directive that the court will only operate once the proclamation mentioned later has been made in that territory.

(2) Where any such commission, warrant, or instructions have been issued, then, subject to instructions from Her Majesty, the Vice-Admiral of such possession may, when satisfied, by information from a Secretary of State or otherwise, that war has broken out between Her Majesty and any foreign State, proclaim that war has so broken out, and thereupon the said commission, warrant, and instructions shall take effect as if the same had been issued after the breaking out of such war and such foreign State were named therein.

(2) If any commission, warrant, or instructions have been issued, then, following directions from Her Majesty, the Vice-Admiral of that territory may, when convinced by information from a Secretary of State or other sources that war has started between Her Majesty and a foreign State, announce that war has indeed begun. As a result, the commission, warrant, and instructions will take effect as if they had been issued after the war began and naming the foreign State involved.

53 & 54 Vict. c. 27.

53 & 54 Vict. c. 27.

(3) The said commission and warrant may authorise either a Vice-Admiralty Court or a Colonial Court of Admiralty, within the meaning of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, to act as a prize court, and may establish a Vice-Admiralty Court for that purpose.

(3) The mentioned commission and warrant may allow either a Vice-Admiralty Court or a Colonial Court of Admiralty, as defined by the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, to serve as a prize court, and may set up a Vice-Admiralty Court for that purpose.

(4) Any such commission, warrant, or instructions may be revoked or altered from time to time.

(4) Any such commission, warrant, or instructions can be revoked or changed at any time.

(5) A court duly authorised to act as a prize court during any war shall after the conclusion of the war continue so to act in relation to, and finally dispose of, all matters and things which arose during the war, including all penalties and forfeitures incurred during the war.

(5) A court that is properly authorized to function as a prize court during any war shall, after the war ends, continue to operate in relation to, and finally resolve, all matters and issues that arose during the war, including all penalties and forfeitures that were incurred during the war.

Rules of Court for and Fees in Prize Courts. 27 & 28 Vict. c. 25.

Rules of Court for and Fees in Prize Courts. 27 & 28 Vict. c. 25.

3.—(1) Her Majesty the Queen in Council may make rules of court for regulating, subject to the provisions of the Naval Prize Act, 1864, and this Act, the procedure and practice of prize courts within the meaning of that Act, and the duties and conduct of the officers thereof, and of the practitioners therein, and for regulating the fees to be taken by the officers of the courts, and the costs, charges, and expenses to be allowed to the practitioners therein.

3.—(1) The Queen in Council can create court rules to manage, in accordance with the provisions of the Naval Prize Act of 1864 and this Act, the procedures and practices of prize courts as defined by that Act, along with the responsibilities and behavior of the officers and practitioners involved, and to set the fees that the court officers can collect, as well as the costs and expenses that practitioners can be compensated for.

(2) Every rule so made shall, whenever made, take effect at the time therein mentioned, and shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament, and shall be kept exhibited in a conspicuous place in each court to which it relates.

(2) Every rule created will take effect at the time specified and will be presented to both Houses of Parliament. It will also be displayed in a visible location in each relevant court.

27 & 28 Vict. c. 25.

27 & 28 Vict. c. 25.

(3) This section shall be substituted for section thirteen of the Naval Prize Act, 1864, which section is hereby repealed.

(3) This section will replace section thirteen of the Naval Prize Act, 1864, which is hereby repealed.

53 & 54 Vict c. 27.

53 & 54 Vict c. 27.

(4) If any Colonial Court of Admiralty within the meaning of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, is authorised under this Act or otherwise to act as a prize court, all fees arising in respect of prize business transacted in the court shall be fixed, collected, and applied in like manner as the fees arising in respect of the Admiralty business of the court under the said Act.

(4) If any Colonial Court of Admiralty, as defined by the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act of 1890, is authorized under this Act or otherwise to function as a prize court, all fees related to prize business handled in that court shall be determined, collected, and used in the same way as the fees related to the Admiralty business of the court under the mentioned Act.

As to Vice-Admiralty Courts.

Regarding Vice-Admiralty Courts.

4. Her Majesty the Queen in Council may make rules of court for regulating the procedure and practice, including fees and costs, in a Vice-Admiralty Court, whether under this Act or otherwise.

4. Her Majesty the Queen in Council may create court rules to manage the procedures and practices, including fees and costs, in a Vice-Admiralty Court, whether under this Act or not.

Repeal of 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 79, s. 25.

Repeal of 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 79, s. 25.

5. Section twenty-five of the Government of India Act, 1800, is hereby repealed.[Pg 683]

5. Section twenty-five of the Government of India Act, 1800, is now repealed.[Pg 683]

APPENDIX 12 Naval Prize Bill of 1911 Approved by the House of Commons, but rejected by the House of Lords

A Bill to Consolidate, with Amendments, the Enactments relating to Naval Prize of War.

A Bill to Combine, with Changes, the Laws related to Naval Prize of War.


Whereas at the Second Peace Conference held at The Hague in the year nineteen hundred and seven a Convention, the English translation whereof is set forth in the First Schedule to this Act, was drawn up, but it is desirable that the same should not be ratified by His Majesty until such amendments have been made in the law relating to naval prize of war as will enable effect to be given to the Convention:

Whereas at the Second Peace Conference held in The Hague in 1907, a Convention, the English translation of which is included in the First Schedule of this Act, was created, but it is preferable that it should not be ratified by His Majesty until amendments have been made to the laws regarding naval prize of war that will allow the Convention to be put into effect:

And whereas for the purpose aforesaid it is expedient to consolidate the law relating to naval prize of war with such amendments as aforesaid and with certain other minor amendments:

And since it's necessary for the purpose mentioned above, it's important to bring together the laws concerning naval prizes of war along with the previously mentioned amendments and a few other minor changes:

Be it therefore enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—

Be it therefore enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, assembled in this current Parliament, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—

Part I.—Courts and Officers.

Part I.—Courts and Officers.

The Prize Court in England.

The Prize Court in England.

The High Court. [54 & 55 Vict. c. 53, s. 4.]

The High Court. [54 & 55 Vict. c. 53, s. 4.]

1.—(1) The High Court shall, without special warrant, be a prize court, and shall, on the high seas, and throughout His Majesty's Dominions, and in every place where His Majesty has jurisdiction, have all such jurisdiction as the High Court of Admiralty possessed when acting as a prize court, and generally have jurisdiction to determine all questions as to the validity of the capture of a ship or goods, the legality of the destruction of a captured ship or goods, and as to the payment of compensation in respect of such a capture or destruction.

1.—(1) The High Court will, without a special warrant, act as a prize court, and will, on the high seas, across all of His Majesty's Dominions, and in every place where His Majesty has authority, have all the powers that the High Court of Admiralty had when functioning as a prize court. It will also generally have the authority to decide all issues regarding the validity of a ship or goods being captured, the legality of destroying a captured ship or goods, and the payment of compensation for such capture or destruction.

For the purposes of this Act the expression "capture" shall include seizure for the purpose of the detention, requisition, or destruction of any ship or goods which, but for any convention, would be liable to condemnation, and the expressions "captured" and "taken as prize" shall be construed accordingly, and where any ship or goods have been so seized the court may make an order for the detention, requisition, or destruction of the ship or goods and for the payment of compensation in respect thereof.

For this Act, the term "capture" means taking possession for the purpose of detaining, requisitioning, or destroying any ship or goods that would be subject to condemnation if not for any convention. The terms "captured" and "taken as prize" will be understood in the same way. If a ship or goods have been seized, the court may issue an order for their detention, requisition, or destruction and for compensation to be paid in relation to them.

(2) Subject to rules of court, all causes and matters within the jurisdiction of the High Court as a prize court shall be assigned to the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the Court.

(2) Following court rules, all cases and issues within the High Court's jurisdiction as a prize court will be assigned to the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the Court.

Power of High Court to enforce decrees of other courts. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25. s. 4.]

Power of High Court to enforce decrees of other courts. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25. s. 4.]

2. The High Court as a prize court shall have power to enforce any order or decree of a prize court in a British possession, and any order of the Supreme Prize Court constituted under this Act in a prize appeal.

2. The High Court as a prize court shall have the authority to enforce any order or decree from a prize court in a British territory, and any order from the Supreme Prize Court established under this Act in a prize appeal.

Prize Courts in British Possessions.

Prize Courts in British Territories.

Prize courts in British possessions. [57 & 58 Vict. c. 39. s. 2 (1) and (3). 53 & 54 Vict. c. 27, s. 2 (3) and s. 9.] 53 & 54 Vict. c. 27.

Prize courts in British possessions. [57 & 58 Vict. c. 39. s. 2 (1) and (3). 53 & 54 Vict. c. 27, s. 2 (3) and s. 9.] 53 & 54 Vict. c. 27.

3. His Majesty may, by commission addressed to the Admiralty, empower the Admiralty to authorise, and the Admiralty may thereupon by warrant authorise, either a Vice-Admiralty court or a Colonial Court of Admiralty, within the meaning of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, to act as a prize court in a British possession, or may in like manner establish a Vice-Admiralty court for the purpose of so acting; and any court so authorised shall, subject to the terms of the warrant from the Admiralty, have all such jurisdiction as is by this Act conferred on the High Court as a prize court.

3. The King may, through a commission sent to the Admiralty, give the Admiralty the power to authorize, and the Admiralty can then issue a warrant to authorize either a Vice-Admiralty court or a Colonial Court of Admiralty, as defined by the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, to function as a prize court in a British territory, or may similarly establish a Vice-Admiralty court for that purpose; and any court that is authorized in this way shall, according to the terms of the warrant from the Admiralty, have all the jurisdiction granted to the High Court as a prize court by this Act.

Commissions. [57 & 58 Vict. c. 39, s. 2 (1), (2).]

Commissions. [57 & 58 Vict. c. 39, s. 2 (1), (2).]

4.—(1) Any commission, warrant, or instructions from His Majesty the King or the Admiralty for the purpose of commissioning a prize court at any place in a British possession may, notwithstanding[Pg 684] the existence of peace, be issued at any time, with a direction that the court shall act only upon such proclamation as herein-after mentioned being made in the possession.

4.—(1) Any commission, warrant, or instructions from His Majesty the King or the Admiralty to set up a prize court in any British territory may, even during a time of peace, be issued at any time, with a directive that the court will only operate after the specific proclamation mentioned later is made in that territory.

(2) Where any such commission, warrant, or instructions have been issued, then, subject to instructions from His Majesty the Vice-Admiral of such possession may, when satisfied by information from a Secretary of State or otherwise that war has broken out between His Majesty and any foreign State, proclaim that war has so broken out, and thereupon the said commission, warrant, and instructions shall take effect as if the same had been issued after the breaking out of such war and such foreign State were named therein.

(2) If any commission, warrant, or instructions have been issued, then, following guidance from His Majesty, the Vice-Admiral of that territory may, upon receiving information from a Secretary of State or otherwise confirming that war has started between His Majesty and any foreign State, announce that war has indeed begun. Consequently, the mentioned commission, warrant, and instructions will become effective as if they had been issued after the war had started, with that foreign State named in them.

(3) Any such commission, warrant, or instructions may be revoked or altered from time to time.

(3) Any commission, warrant, or instructions like these can be revoked or changed as needed.

Enforcement of orders.

Order enforcement.

5. Every prize court in a British possession shall enforce within its jurisdiction all orders and decrees of the High Court and of any other prize court in a British possession in prize causes, and all orders of the Supreme Prize Court constituted under this Act in prize appeals.

5. Every prize court in a British territory must enforce all orders and decisions of the High Court and any other prize court in a British territory regarding prize cases, as well as all orders of the Supreme Prize Court established under this Act in prize appeals.

Remuneration of certain judges of prize courts in a British possession. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, ss. 10, 11.] 53 & 54 Vict. c. 27.

Remuneration of certain judges of prize courts in a British territory. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, ss. 10, 11.] 53 & 54 Vict. c. 27.

6.—(1) His Majesty in Council may, with the concurrence of the Treasury, grant to the judge of any prize court in a British possession, other than a Colonial Court of Admiralty within the meaning of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, remuneration, at a rate not exceeding five hundred pounds a year, payable out of money provided by Parliament, subject to such regulations as seem meet.

6.—(1) The King in Council may, with the agreement of the Treasury, provide a salary to the judge of any prize court in a British territory, other than a Colonial Court of Admiralty as defined by the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, at a rate not exceeding five hundred pounds a year, paid from funds allocated by Parliament, following any regulations that are deemed appropriate.

(2) A judge to whom remuneration is so granted shall not be entitled to any further emolument, arising from fees or otherwise, in respect of prize business transacted in his court.

(2) A judge who receives payment in this way will not be entitled to any additional income, from fees or any other sources, related to prize cases handled in his court.

(3) An account of all such fees shall be kept by the registrar of the court, and the amount thereof shall be carried to and form part of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.

(3) The registrar of the court shall keep a record of all such fees, and the total amount will be added to and become part of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.

Returns from prize courts in British possessions. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 12.]

Returns from prize courts in British territories. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 12.]

7. The registrar of every prize court in a British possession shall, on the first day of January and first day of July in every year, make out a return (in such form as the Admiralty from time to time direct) of all cases adjudged in the court since the last half-yearly return, and shall with all convenient speed send the same to the Admiralty registrar of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the High Court, who shall keep the same in the Admiralty registry of that Division, and who shall as soon as conveniently may be, send a copy of the returns of each half year to the Admiralty, and the Admiralty shall lay the same before both houses of Parliament.

7. The registrar of every prize court in a British territory must, on January 1st and July 1st each year, prepare a report (in the format specified by the Admiralty from time to time) of all cases decided in the court since the last six-month report, and must promptly send it to the Admiralty registrar of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the High Court. This registrar will keep the report in the Admiralty registry of that Division and will, as soon as possible, send a copy of the reports from each half-year to the Admiralty, which will present them to both houses of Parliament.

Fees. [57 & 58 Vict. c. 39 s. 3 (4).] 53 & 54 Vict. c. 27.

Fees. [57 & 58 Vict. c. 39 s. 3 (4).] 53 & 54 Vict. c. 27.

8. If any Colonial Court of Admiralty within the meaning of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, is authorised under this Act or otherwise to act as a prize court, all fees arising in respect of prize business transacted in the court shall be fixed, collected, and applied in like manner as the fees arising in respect of the Admiralty business of the court under the first-mentioned Act.

8. If any Colonial Court of Admiralty, as defined by the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, is allowed under this Act or any other to function as a prize court, all fees related to prize business handled in that court will be set, collected, and used in the same way as the fees related to Admiralty business of the court under the previously mentioned Act.

Appeals.

Appeals.

Appeals to Supreme Prize Court. [54 & 55 Vict. c. 53, s. 4 (3).]

Appeals to Supreme Prize Court. [54 & 55 Vict. c. 53, s. 4 (3).]

9.—(1) Any appeal from the High Court when acting as a prize court, or from a prize court in a British possession, shall lie only to a court (to be called the Supreme Prize Court) consisting of such members for the time being of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as may be nominated by His Majesty for that purpose.

9.—(1) Any appeal from the High Court when serving as a prize court, or from a prize court in a British territory, shall only be directed to a court (called the Supreme Prize Court) made up of members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as appointed by His Majesty for that purpose.

(2) The Supreme Prize Court shall be a court of record with power to take evidence on oath, and the seal of the court shall be such as the Lord Chancellor may from time to time direct.

(2) The Supreme Prize Court will be a court of record with the authority to take sworn evidence, and the court's seal will be as determined by the Lord Chancellor from time to time.

(3) Every appeal to the Supreme Prize Court shall be heard before not less than three members of the court sitting together.

(3) Every appeal to the Supreme Prize Court will be heard by at least three members of the court sitting together.

(4) The registrar and other officers for the time being of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council shall be registrar and officers of the Supreme Prize Court.

(4) The registrar and other current officers of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council will also serve as the registrar and officers of the Supreme Prize Court.

Procedure on, and conditions of, appeals. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 5.]

Procedure on, and conditions of, appeals. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 5.]

10.—(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Prize Court from any order or decree of a prize court, as of right in case of a final decree, and in other cases with the leave of the court making the order or decree or of the Supreme Prize Court.

10.—(1) You can appeal to the Supreme Prize Court from any order or decision made by a prize court. You have the right to appeal in the case of a final decision, and in other cases, you need permission from the court that made the order or from the Supreme Prize Court.

(2) Every appeal shall be made in such manner and form and subject to such conditions and regulations (including regulations as to fees, costs, charges, and expenses) as may for the time being be directed by order in Council.

(2) Every appeal must be made in the manner and format specified and must comply with the conditions and regulations (including those regarding fees, costs, charges, and expenses) that are currently directed by order in Council.

Jurisdiction of the Supreme Prize Court in prize appeals. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 6; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 53, s. 4 (3).]

Jurisdiction of the Supreme Prize Court in prize appeals. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 6; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 53, s. 4 (3).]

11. The Supreme Prize Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any such appeal, and may therein exercise all such powers as are under this Act vested in the High Court, and all such powers as were wont to be exercised by the Commissioners of Appeal or by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in prize causes.

11. The Supreme Prize Court will have the authority to hear and decide on any such appeal, and may exercise all the powers granted to the High Court under this Act, along with all the powers that were typically exercised by the Commissioners of Appeal or the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in prize cases.

Rules of Court.

Court Rules.

Rules of court. [57 & 58 Vict c. 39, s. 3.]

Rules of court. [57 & 58 Vict c. 39, s. 3.]

12. His Majesty in Council may make rules of court for regulating, subject to the provisions of this Act, the procedure and practice of the Supreme Prize Court and of the Prize[Pg 685] Courts within the meaning of this Act, and the duties and conduct of the officers thereof, and of the practitioners therein, and for regulating the fees to be taken by the officers of the courts, and the costs, charges, and expenses to be allowed to the practitioners therein.

12. The King in Council may create court rules to manage, in line with this Act's provisions, the procedures and practices of the Supreme Prize Court and the Prize[Pg 685] Courts as defined by this Act, as well as the responsibilities and behavior of their officers and practitioners. He may also set the fees charged by the court officers, along with the costs, charges, and expenses allowed for the practitioners.

Officers of Prize Courts.

Prize Court Officers.

Prohibition of officer of prize court acting as advocate, &c. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, ss. 14, 15.]

Prohibition of an officer of the prize court acting as an advocate, etc. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, ss. 14, 15.]

13. It shall not be lawful for any registrar, marshal, or other officer of the Supreme Prize Court or of any other prize court, directly or indirectly to act or be in any manner concerned as advocate, proctor, solicitor, or agent, or otherwise, in any prize appeal or cause.

13. No registrar, marshal, or any other officer of the Supreme Prize Court or any other prize court is allowed to act or be involved in any way as an advocate, proctor, solicitor, or agent, or in any other capacity, in any prize appeal or case.

Protection of persons acting in execution of Act. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 51.]

Protection of individuals acting in accordance with the Act. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 51.]

14. The Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, shall apply to any action, prosecution, or other proceeding against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act whether commenced in the United Kingdom or elsewhere within His Majesty's dominions.

14. The Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, will apply to any action, prosecution, or other legal proceeding against anyone for acts done in following or carrying out this Act or concerning any claimed neglect or failure to execute this Act, whether started in the United Kingdom or anywhere else within His Majesty's territories.

Continuance of Proceedings.

Ongoing Legal Proceedings.

Continuance of proceedings after conclusion of war. [57 & 58 Vict. c. 39, s. 2 (5).]

Continuance of proceedings after the end of the war. [57 & 58 Vict. c. 39, s. 2 (5).]

15. A court duly authorised to act as a prize court during any war shall after the conclusion of the war continue so to act in relation to, and finally dispose of, all matters and things which arose during the war, including all penalties, liabilities and forfeitures incurred during the war.

15. A court officially allowed to operate as a prize court during any war will continue to do so after the war ends, dealing with and resolving all issues and matters that came up during the war, including all penalties, liabilities, and forfeitures that were incurred during that time.

Part II.—Procedure in Prize Causes.

Part II.—Procedure in Prize Cases.

Custody of ships taken as prize. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 16.]

Custody of ships taken as a prize. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 16.]

16. Where a ship (not being a ship of war) is taken as prize, and is or is brought within the jurisdiction of a prize court, she shall forthwith be delivered up to the marshal of the court, or, if there is no such marshal, to the principal officer of customs at the port, and shall remain in his custody, subject to the orders of the court.

16. When a ship (not a warship) is captured as a prize and comes under the jurisdiction of a prize court, it must immediately be handed over to the court's marshal, or if there is no marshal, to the chief customs officer at the port, and will stay in their custody, following the court's orders.

Bringing in of ship papers. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 17.]

Bringing in of ship papers. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 17.]

17.—(1) The captors shall in all cases, with all practicable speed, bring the ship papers into the registry of the court.

17.—(1) The captors must, in every situation, bring the ship's documents to the court registry as quickly as possible.

(2) The officer in command, or one of the chief officers of the capturing ship, or some other person who was present at the capture and saw the ship papers delivered up or found on board, shall make oath that they are brought in as they were taken, without fraud, addition, subduction, or alteration, or else shall account on oath to the satisfaction of the court for the absence or altered condition of the ship papers or any of them.

(2) The officer in charge, or a senior officer of the ship that made the capture, or someone else who was there during the capture and saw the ship's documents handed over or found on board, must swear that the documents are being presented exactly as they were taken, without any fraud, additions, omissions, or changes. Otherwise, they must provide an explanation under oath that satisfies the court for the missing or changed condition of any of the ship's documents.

(3) Where no ship papers are delivered up or found on board the captured ship, the officer in command, or one of the chief officers of the capturing ship, or some other person who was present at the capture, shall make oath to that effect.

(3) If no ship papers are handed over or found on the captured ship, the officer in charge, one of the senior officers of the capturing ship, or another person who was there during the capture, must swear an oath to that effect.

Examination of persons from captured ship. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 19.]

Examination of individuals from captured ships. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 19.]

18. The captors shall also, unless the court otherwise directs, with all practicable speed after the captured ship is brought into port, bring a convenient number of the principal persons belonging to the captured ship before the judge of the court or some person authorised in this behalf, by whom they shall be examined on oath.

18. The captors must also, unless the court decides otherwise, quickly bring a reasonable number of the main individuals from the captured ship before the judge or someone authorized for this purpose, where they will be examined under oath.

Delivery of ship on bail. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 25.]

Delivery of ship on bail. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 25.]

19. The court may, if it thinks fit, at any time after a captured ship has been appraised direct that the ship be delivered up to the claimant on his giving security to the satisfaction of the court to pay to the captors the appraised value thereof in case of condemnation.

19. The court may, if it deems appropriate, at any time after a captured ship has been assessed, order that the ship be handed over to the claimant provided they give security that is satisfactory to the court to pay the captors the assessed value if the ship is condemned.

Power to order sale. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, ss. 26 & 27.]

Power to order sale. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, ss. 26 & 27.]

20. The court may at any time, if it thinks fit, on account of the condition of the captured ship, or on the application of a claimant, or on or after condemnation, order that the captured ship be appraised (if not already appraised), and be sold.

20. The court can decide at any time, if it sees fit, based on the condition of the captured ship, or at the request of a claimant, or after condemnation, to order that the captured ship be appraised (if it hasn't been appraised already) and sold.

Power to award compensation notwithstanding release of ship.

Power to award compensation regardless of the ship's release.

21. Where a ship has been taken as prize, a prize court may award compensation in respect of the capture notwithstanding that the ship has been released, whether before or after the institution of any proceedings in the court in relation to the ship.

21. When a ship has been seized as a prize, a prize court can grant compensation for the capture regardless of whether the ship has been released, whether that happened before or after any legal proceedings related to the ship were initiated in the court.

Application and effect of Part II. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 31.]

Application and effect of Part II. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 31.]

22.—(1) The provisions of this Part of this Act relating to ships shall extend and apply, with the necessary adaptations, to goods taken as prize.

22.—(1) The rules in this section of this Act regarding ships will also apply, with the necessary adjustments, to goods taken as prize.

(2) The provisions of this Part of this Act shall have effect subject to any rules of court dealing with the subject-matter thereof.

(2) The rules in this part of this Act will apply as long as they don't conflict with any court rules related to the topic.

Part III.—International Prize Court.

Part III.—International Prize Court.

Appointment of British judge and deputy judge of International Court. [See 39 & 40 Vict. c. 59, s. 6.]

Appointment of British judge and deputy judge of International Court. [See 39 & 40 Vict. c. 59, s. 6.]

23.—(1) In the event of an International Prize Court being constituted in accordance with the said Convention or with any Convention entered into for the purpose of enabling any power to become a party to the said Convention or for the purpose of amending the said Convention in matters subsidiary or incidental thereto (hereinafter referred to as the International Prize Court), it shall be lawful for His Majesty from time to time to appoint a judge and deputy judge of the court.

23.—(1) If an International Prize Court is set up according to the mentioned Convention or any Convention created to allow a power to join the mentioned Convention or to revise it on related or incidental matters (hereinafter called the International Prize Court), it will be permissible for His Majesty to appoint a judge and a deputy judge of the court from time to time.

(2) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed by His Majesty a judge or deputy judge of the court unless he has been, at or before the time of his appointment, the holder,[Pg 686] for a period of not less than two years, of some one or more of the offices described as high judicial offices by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, as amended by any subsequent enactment.

(2) A person is not qualified to be appointed by His Majesty as a judge or deputy judge of the court unless, at or before the time of their appointment, they have held one or more of the positions defined as high judicial offices by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, as modified by any later law, for at least two years.[Pg 686]

Payment of contribution towards expenses of International Prize Court.

Payment of contribution towards the expenses of the International Prize Court.

24. Any sums required for the payment of any contribution towards the general expenses of the International Prize Court payable by His Majesty under the said Convention shall be charged on and paid out of the Consolidated Fund and the growing proceeds thereof.

24. Any amounts needed for the payment of contributions to the general expenses of the International Prize Court that His Majesty owes under the Convention will be taken from and paid out of the Consolidated Fund and its growing proceeds.

Appeals to International Prize Court.

Appeals to International Prize Court.

25. In cases to which this Part of this Act applies an appeal from the Supreme Prize Court shall lie to the International Prize Court.

25. In cases covered by this Part of this Act, an appeal from the Supreme Prize Court can be made to the International Prize Court.

Transfer of cases to the International Prize Court.

Transfer of cases to the International Prize Court.

26. If in any case to which this Part of this Act applies final judgment is not given by the prize court, or on appeal by the Supreme Prize Court, within two years from the date of the capture, the case may be transferred to the International Prize Court.

26. If in any case that this Part of this Act applies to, a final judgment is not made by the prize court, or on appeal by the Supreme Prize Court, within two years from the date of the capture, the case may be sent to the International Prize Court.

Rules as to appeals and transfers to International Prize Court.

Rules regarding appeals and transfers to the International Prize Court.

27. His Majesty in Council may make rules regulating the manner in which appeals and transfers under this Part of this Act may be made and with respect to all such matters (including fees, costs, charges, and expenses) as appear to His Majesty to be necessary for the purpose of such appeals and transfers, or to be incidental thereto or consequential thereon.

27. The King in Council can establish rules that govern how appeals and transfers under this section of the Act can be made, as well as any related matters (including fees, costs, charges, and expenses) that the King deems necessary for these appeals and transfers, or that are related to or arise from them.

Enforcement of orders of International Prize Court.

Enforcement of orders from the International Prize Court.

28. The High Court and every prize court in a British possession shall enforce within its jurisdiction all orders and decrees of the International Prize Court in appeals and cases transferred to the Court under this Part of this Act.

28. The High Court and every prize court in a British territory will enforce all orders and decisions of the International Prize Court in appeals and cases that are transferred to the Court under this Part of this Act.

Application of Part III.

Application of Section III.

29. This part of this Act shall apply only to such cases and during such period as may for the time being be directed by Order in Council, and His Majesty may by the same or any other Order in Council apply this Part of this Act subject to such conditions, exceptions and qualifications as may be deemed expedient.

29. This part of this Act applies only to the cases and time periods specified by an Order in Council, and the King can, through the same or any other Order in Council, apply this Part of the Act with any conditions, exceptions, and qualifications that are considered necessary.

Part IV.—Prize Salvage and Prize Bounty.

Part IV. — Prize Salvage and Prize Bounty.

Prize Salvage.

Prize Recovery.

Salvage to re-captors of British ship or goods from enemy.

Salvage to re-capture British ships or goods from the enemy.

30. Where any ship or goods belonging to any of His Majesty's subjects, after being taken as prize by the enemy, is or are retaken from the enemy by any of His Majesty's ships of war, the same shall be restored by decree of a prize court to the owner.

30. If any ship or goods owned by any of His Majesty's subjects are captured by the enemy and are then recovered from the enemy by any of His Majesty's warships, they shall be returned to the owner by order of a prize court.

Permission to recaptured ship to proceed on voyage and postponement of proceedings. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 41.]

Permission for the recaptured ship to continue its voyage and the delay of proceedings. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 41.]

31.—(1) Where a ship belonging to any of his Majesty's subjects, after being taken as prize by the enemy, is retaken from the enemy by any of His Majesty's ships of war, she may, with the consent of the re-captors, prosecute her voyage, and it shall not be necessary for the re-captors to proceed to adjudication till her return to a port of His Majesty's dominions.

31.—(1) If a ship owned by any of the King's subjects is captured by the enemy and then recaptured by one of the King's warships, it can continue its voyage with the re-captors' permission, and there's no need for the re-captors to go through legal proceedings until it returns to a port in the King's territories.

(2) The master or owner, or his agent, may, with the consent of the re-captors, unload and dispose of the goods on board the ship before adjudication.

(2) The owner or master, or their agent, can, with the agreement of the recaptors, unload and sell the goods on the ship before a decision is made.

(3) If the ship does not, within six months, return to a port of His Majesty's dominions, the re-captors may nevertheless institute proceedings against the ship or goods in the High Court, or in any prize court in a British possession, and the court may thereupon award prize salvage as aforesaid to the re-captors, and may enforce payment thereof, either by warrant of arrest against the ship or goods, or in the same manner as a judgment of the court in which the proceedings are instituted may be enforced.

(3) If the ship doesn't return to a port under His Majesty's control within six months, the reclaimers can still take action against the ship or its goods in the High Court or any prize court in a British territory. The court can then award prize salvage to the reclaimers and can enforce payment either by issuing a warrant to seize the ship or goods or in the same way that a judgment from the court where the action was filed can be enforced.

Prize Bounty.

Prize Rewards.

Prize bounty to officers and crew present in case of capture or destruction of enemy's ship. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 42.]

Prize bounty to officers and crew present in case of capture or destruction of the enemy's ship. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 42.]

32. If, in relation to any war, His Majesty is pleased to declare, by proclamation or Order in Council, his intention to grant prize bounty to the officers and crews of his ships of war, then such of the officers and crew of any of His Majesty's ships of war as are actually present at the taking or destroying of any armed ship of any of His Majesty's enemies shall be entitled to have distributed among them as prize bounty a sum calculated at such rates and in such manner as may be specified in the proclamation or Order in Council.

32. If, in connection with any war, His Majesty decides, through proclamation or Order in Council, to offer prize bounty to the officers and crews of his warships, then the officers and crew of any of His Majesty's warships who are actually present when capturing or destroying any armed ship of His Majesty's enemies will be entitled to receive a distribution of prize bounty amounting to a sum calculated at the rates and in the manner specified in the proclamation or Order in Council.

Ascertainment of amount of prize bounty. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 43.]

Ascertainment of the amount of prize bounty. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 43.]

33.—(1) A prize court shall make a decree declaring the title of the officers and crew of His Majesty's ship to the prize bounty, and stating the amount thereof.

33.—(1) A prize court will issue a decree confirming the claim of the officers and crew of His Majesty's ship to the prize bounty and specifying the amount of that bounty.

(2) The decree shall be subject to appeal as other decrees of the court.

(2) The decree can be appealed like other court decrees.

Part V.—Special Cases of Jurisdiction.

Part V.—Special Cases of Jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction in case of capture in land expedition. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 34.]

Jurisdiction in case of capture in land expedition. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 34.]

34. Where, in an expedition of any of His Majesty's naval or naval and military forces against a fortress or possession on land goods belonging to the state of the enemy, or to a public trading company of the enemy exercising powers of government, are taken in the fortress or possession, or a ship is taken in waters defended by or belonging to the fortress or possession, a prize court shall have jurisdiction as to the goods or ships so taken, and any goods[Pg 687] taken on board the ship, as in case of prize.

34. When any of His Majesty's naval or military forces are on an expedition against an enemy fortress or territory, and goods belonging to the enemy state or a public trading company with government powers are seized in that fortress or territory, or if a ship is captured in waters protected by or belonging to that fortress or territory, a prize court will have authority over the goods or ships that were seized, as well as any goods taken aboard the captured ship, just like in the case of a prize.

Jurisdiction in case of prize taken in expedition with ally. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 35.]

Jurisdiction in case of prize taken in expedition with ally. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 35.]

35. Where any ship or goods is or are taken by any of His Majesty's naval or naval and military forces while acting in conjunction with any forces of any of His Majesty's allies, a prize court shall have jurisdiction as to the same as in case of prize, and shall have power, after condemnation, to apportion the due share of the proceeds to His Majesty's ally, the proportionate amount and the disposition of which share shall be such as may from time to time be agreed between His Majesty and His Majesty's ally.

35. If any ship or goods are taken by any of His Majesty's naval or military forces working together with any of His Majesty's allies, a prize court will have jurisdiction over them the same way it does in the case of prizes. It will also have the authority, after a condemnation, to distribute the appropriate share of the proceeds to His Majesty's ally. The exact amount and distribution of that share will be determined by agreements made from time to time between His Majesty and His Majesty's ally.

Jurisdiction of High Court on petitions of right as under 23 & 24 Vict. c. 34. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 52.]

Jurisdiction of High Court on petitions of right as under 23 & 24 Vict. c. 34. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 52.]

36.—(1) In any case where a petition of right under the Petitions of Right Act, 1860, is presented and the subject-matter of the petition or any material part thereof arises out of the exercise of any belligerent right on behalf of the Crown, or would be cognizable in a prize court within His Majesty's dominions if the same were a matter in dispute between private persons, the petition may, if the subject thinks fit, be intituled in the High Court as a prize court.

36.—(1) In any situation where a petition of right is filed under the Petitions of Right Act, 1860, and the main issue of the petition or any significant part of it stems from the use of a military right on behalf of the Crown, or would be recognized in a prize court within His Majesty's territories if it were a dispute between private individuals, the petition may, if the petitioner chooses, be titled in the High Court as a prize court.

(2) Any petition of right under the last-mentioned Act, whether intituled in the High Court or not, may be prosecuted in that court if the Lord Chancellor thinks fit so to direct.

(2) Any petition of right under the last-mentioned Act, whether entitled in the High Court or not, may be pursued in that court if the Lord Chancellor considers it appropriate to do so.

(3) The provisions of this Act relative to appeal, and to the making of orders for regulating the procedure and practice of the High Court as a prize court, shall extend to the case of any such petition of right intituled or directed to be prosecuted in that court; and, subject thereto, all the provisions of the Petitions of Right Act, 1860, shall apply with such adaptations as may be necessary in the case of any such petition of right; and for the purposes of this section the terms "court" and "judge" in that Act shall respectively be understood to include the High Court as a prize court and the judges thereof, and other terms shall have the respective meanings given to them in that Act.

(3) The rules of this Act regarding appeals and the procedures for managing the High Court as a prize court will also apply to any petition of right filed in that court. Additionally, all the specifications of the Petitions of Right Act, 1860, will apply with any necessary adjustments for those petitions. For the purposes of this section, the terms "court" and "judge" in that Act will be understood to include the High Court as a prize court and its judges, and other terms will have the meanings assigned to them in that Act.

Part VI.—Offences.

Part VI.—Crimes.

Offences by captors. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 37.]

Offenses by captors. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 37.]

37. A prize court, on proof of any offence against the law of nations, or against this Act, or any Act relating to naval discipline, or against any Order in Council or royal proclamation, or of any breach of His Majesty's instructions relating to prize, or of any act of disobedience to the orders of the Admiralty, or to the command of a superior officer, committed by the captors in relation to any ship or goods taken as prize, or in relation to any person on board any such ship, may, on condemnation, reserve the prize to His Majesty's disposal, notwithstanding any grant that may have been made by His Majesty in favour of captors.

37. A prize court, upon proving any violation of international law, this Act, or any Act concerning naval discipline, or any Order in Council or royal proclamation, or any breach of the King's instructions regarding prizes, or any act of disobedience to Admiralty orders, or to the commands of a superior officer, committed by the captors concerning any ship or goods seized as a prize, or in relation to any person on board such a ship, may, upon condemnation, reserve the prize for the King's disposal, regardless of any grant that may have been made by the King in favor of the captors.

Perjury. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 50.]

Perjury. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 50.]

38. If any person wilfully and corruptly swears, declares, or affirms falsely in any prize cause or appeal, or in any proceeding under this Act, or in respect of any matter required by this Act to be verified on oath, or suborns any other person to do so, he shall be deemed guilty of perjury, or of subornation of perjury (as the case may be), and shall be liable to be punished accordingly.

38. If anyone intentionally and dishonestly swears, declares, or affirms falsely in any prize case or appeal, or in any process under this Act, or regarding any matter that this Act requires to be confirmed under oath, or persuades someone else to do so, they will be considered guilty of perjury or subornation of perjury (depending on the situation) and will be subject to appropriate punishment.

Disobedience to, or desertion of, convoy. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 46.]

Disobedience to or desertion of the convoy. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 46.]

39. If the master or other person having the command of any British ship under the convoy of any of His Majesty's ships of war, wilfully disobeys any lawful signal, instruction, or command of the commander of the convoy, or without leave deserts the convoy, he shall be liable to be proceeded against in the High Court at the suit of His Majesty in His Office of Admiralty, and upon conviction to be fined, in the discretion of the Court, any sum not exceeding five hundred pounds, and to suffer imprisonment for such time, not exceeding one year, as the Court may adjudge.

39. If the captain or anyone in charge of a British ship under the protection of any of His Majesty's warships deliberately ignores any lawful signal, instruction, or command from the commander of the convoy, or leaves the convoy without permission, they can be taken to the High Court at the request of His Majesty in His Office of Admiralty. If convicted, they may be fined up to five hundred pounds at the Court's discretion and could face imprisonment for up to one year, as determined by the Court.

Part VII.—Miscellaneous Provisions.

Part VII.—Miscellaneous Provisions.

Ransom.

Ransom payment.

Power for regulating ransom by Order in Council. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 45.]

Power for regulating ransom by Order in Council. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 45.]

40.—(1) His Majesty in Council may, in relation to any war, make such orders as may seem expedient according to circumstances for prohibiting or allowing, wholly or in certain cases or subject to any conditions or regulations or otherwise as may from time to time seem meet, the ransoming or the entering into any contract or agreement for the ransoming of any ship or goods belonging to any of His Majesty's subjects, and taken as prize by any of His Majesty's enemies.

40.—(1) The King in Council may, in relation to any war, issue orders that seem appropriate based on the situation for prohibiting or permitting, either completely or in specific cases or subject to any conditions or regulations, or as deemed necessary from time to time, the ransoming or entering into any contract or agreement for the ransoming of any ship or goods owned by any of the King’s subjects and captured as a prize by any of the King’s enemies.

(2) Any contract or agreement entered into, and any bill, bond, or other security given for ransom of any ship or goods, shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court as a prize court (subject to appeal to the Supreme Prize Court), and if entered into or given in contravention of any such Order in Council shall be deemed to have been entered into or given for an illegal consideration.

(2) Any contract or agreement made, along with any bill, bond, or other security provided for the ransom of any ship or goods, will be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court as a prize court (subject to appeal to the Supreme Prize Court). If made or provided in violation of any such Order in Council, it will be considered to have been made or given for an illegal consideration.

(3) If any person ransoms or enters into any contract or agreement for ransoming any ship or goods, in contravention of any such Order in Council, he shall for every such offence be[Pg 688] liable to be proceeded against in the High Court at the suit of His Majesty in His Office of Admiralty, and on conviction to be fined, in the discretion of the Court, any sum not exceeding five hundred pounds.

(3) If anyone ransoms or makes any contract or agreement to ransom any ship or goods, against any such Order in Council, they will be[Pg 688] subject to legal action in the High Court at the request of His Majesty in His Office of Admiralty, and if convicted, they can be fined—at the Court's discretion—an amount not exceeding five hundred pounds.

Customs Duties and Regulations.

Import Taxes and Rules.

Prize ships and goods liable to customs duties and forfeiture. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 47.]

Prize ships and goods subject to customs duties and forfeiture. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 47.]

41.—(1) All ships and goods taken as prize and brought into a port of His Majesty's dominions shall be liable to and be charged with the same rates and charges and duties of customs as under any Act relating to the customs in force at the port may be chargeable on other ships and goods of the like description.

41.—(1) All ships and goods captured as prizes and brought into a port within His Majesty's territories will be subject to the same rates, charges, and customs duties that apply to other ships and goods of the same type under any customs law currently in effect at that port.

(2) All goods brought in as prize which would on the voluntary importation thereof be liable to forfeiture, or subject to any restriction, under the laws relating to the customs, shall be deemed to be so liable and subject, unless the Customs authority see fit to authorise the sale or delivery thereof for home use or exportation, unconditionally or subject to such conditions and regulations as they may direct.

(2) All goods brought in as prizes that would be subject to forfeiture or any restrictions under customs laws if voluntarily imported are considered to be liable and subject to those rules, unless the Customs authority decides to allow their sale or delivery for domestic use or export, either without conditions or with the conditions and regulations they specify.

Regulations of customs as to prize ships and goods. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 48.]

Regulations of customs regarding prize ships and goods. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 48.]

42. Where any ship or goods taken as prize is or are brought into a port of His Majesty's dominions, the master or other person in charge or command of the ship which has been taken or in which the goods are brought shall, on arrival at such port, bring to at the proper place of discharge, and shall, when required by any officer of customs, deliver an account in writing under his hand concerning such ship and goods, giving such particulars relating thereto as may be in his power, and shall truly answer all questions concerning such ship or goods asked by any such officer, and in default shall forfeit a sum not exceeding one hundred pounds, such forfeiture to be enforced as forfeitures for offences against the laws relating to the customs in force at the port are enforced, and every such ship shall be liable to such searches as other ships are liable to, and the officers of the customs may freely go on board such ship and bring to the King's or other warehouse any goods on board the same, subject, nevertheless, to such regulations in respect of ships of war belonging to His Majesty as shall from time to time be issued by His Majesty.

42. When any ship or goods taken as a prize are brought into a port of His Majesty's territories, the captain or person in charge of the seized ship or the ship carrying the goods must, upon arrival at that port, go to the designated unloading area and must, when requested by a customs officer, provide a written account concerning the ship and goods, including all relevant details that he can offer. He must also truthfully answer any questions about the ship or goods asked by any customs officer. Failure to comply may result in a fine of up to one hundred pounds, which will be enforced like fines for violations of customs laws at that port. Every such ship is subject to the same searches as other ships, and customs officers are allowed to board the ship and take any goods to the King's or another warehouse, while still adhering to any regulations regarding His Majesty's warships that may be issued from time to time.

Sale of prize goods and power to remit customs duties. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 49.]

Sale of prize goods and authority to waive customs duties. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 49.]

43. Goods taken as prize may be sold either for home consumption or for exportation; and if in the former case the proceeds thereof, after payment of duties of customs, are insufficient to satisfy the just and reasonable claims thereon, the Customs authority may remit the whole or such part of the said duties as they see fit.

43. Goods taken as a prize can be sold either for local use or for export. If, in the first case, the money made from the sale, after paying customs duties, isn’t enough to cover the fair and reasonable claims against it, the Customs authority can waive all or part of those duties as they see appropriate.

Capture by Ship other than a Ship of War.

Capture by a Vessel Other than a Warship.

Prizes taken by Ships other than ships of war to be droits of Admiralty. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 39.]

Prizes captured by ships other than warships will be considered droits of Admiralty. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 39.]

44. Any ship or goods taken as prize by any of the officers and crew of a ship other than a ship of war of His Majesty shall, on condemnation, belong to His Majesty in His office of Admiralty.

44. Any ship or goods seized as a prize by any of the officers and crew of a ship that isn’t a warship of His Majesty shall, upon condemnation, belong to His Majesty in His office of Admiralty.

Supplemental.

Supplemental.

Saving for rights of Crown; effect of treaties, &c. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 55.]

Saving for rights of Crown; effect of treaties, etc. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 55.]

45. Nothing in this Act shall—

45. Nothing in this Act shall—

(1) give to the officers and crew of any of His Majesty's ships of war any right or claim in or to any ship or goods taken as prize or the proceeds thereof, it being the intent of this Act that such officers and crews shall continue to take only such interest (if any) in the proceeds of prizes as may be from time to time granted to them by the Crown; or

(1) give to the officers and crew of any of His Majesty's warships any right or claim to any ship or goods taken as a prize or the money from it, as this Act intends for such officers and crews to continue to have only the interest (if any) in the proceeds of prizes that may be granted to them by the Crown from time to time; or

(2) affect the operation of any existing treaty or convention with any foreign power; or

(2) impact the functioning of any current treaty or agreement with any foreign country; or

(3) take away or abridge the power of the Crown to enter into any treaty or convention with any foreign power containing any stipulation that may seem meet concerning any matter to which this Act relates; or

(3) remove or limit the power of the Crown to enter into any treaty or agreement with any foreign power that includes any terms that may be appropriate regarding any matter related to this Act; or

(4) take away, abridge, or control, further or otherwise than as expressly provided by this Act, any right, power, or prerogative of His Majesty the King in right of His Crown, or in right of His office of Admiralty, or any right or power of the Admiralty; or

(4) take away, shorten, or control, further or otherwise than as clearly stated in this Act, any right, power, or privilege of His Majesty the King in his capacity as the Crown, or in his role within the Admiralty, or any right or power of the Admiralty; or

(5) take away, abridge, or control, further or otherwise than as expressly provided by this Act, the jurisdiction or authority of a prize court to take cognizance of and judicially proceed upon any capture, seizure, prize, or reprisal of any ship or goods, and to hear and determine the same, and, according to the course of Admiralty and the law of nations, to adjudge and condemn any ship or goods, or any other jurisdiction or authority of or exerciseable by a prize court.

(5) take away, shorten, or control, further or differently than what’s clearly stated in this Act, the authority of a prize court to recognize and legally act on any capture, seizure, prize, or reprisal of any ship or goods, and to hear and decide on those matters, and, following Admiralty law and international law, to rule against and condemn any ship or goods, or any other authority or powers that a prize court may exercise.

Power to make Orders in Council. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, ss. 53, 54.]

Power to make Orders in Council. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, ss. 53, 54.]

46.—(1) His Majesty in Council may from time to time make such Orders in Council as seem meet for the better execution of this Act.

46.—(1) The King in Council may occasionally issue Orders in Council that are appropriate for the better execution of this Act.

(2) Every Order in Council under this Act and all rules made in pursuance of this Act shall be notified in the London Gazette, and shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament within thirty days after the making thereof, if Parliament is then sitting, and, if not, then within thirty days after the next meeting of Parliament, and shall have effect as if enacted in this Act.[Pg 689]

(2) Every Order in Council under this Act and all rules made in accordance with this Act must be published in the London Gazette, and must be presented to both Houses of Parliament within thirty days after they are made, if Parliament is in session, and if not, then within thirty days after the next meeting of Parliament, and will have the same effect as if they were part of this Act.[Pg 689]

Definitions. 27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 2.

Definitions. 27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 2.

47. In this Act unless the context otherwise requires—

47. In this Act, unless the context indicates otherwise—

The expression "the High Court" means the High Court of Justice in England:

The term "the High Court" refers to the High Court of Justice in England:

The expression "any of His Majesty's ships of war" includes any of His Majesty's vessels of war, and any hired armed ship or vessel in His Majesty's service:

The phrase "any of His Majesty's ships of war" refers to any of His Majesty's war vessels, as well as any hired armed ship or vessel serving under His Majesty:

The expression "officers and crew" includes flag officers, commanders, and other officers, engineers, seamen, marines, soldiers, and others on board any of His Majesty's ships of war:

The term "officers and crew" includes flag officers, commanders, and other officers, engineers, sailors, marines, soldiers, and others on board any of His Majesty's warships:

The expression "ship" includes vessel and boat, with the tackle, furniture, and apparel of the ship, vessel, or boat:

The term "ship" refers to a vessel or boat, along with the equipment, furnishings, and gear associated with the ship, vessel, or boat:

The expression "ship papers" includes all books, papers, and other documents and writings delivered up or found on board a captured ship, and, where certified copies only of any papers are delivered to the captors, includes such copies:

The term "ship papers" refers to all books, papers, and other documents found on a captured ship or handed over, and it also includes certified copies of any papers that are provided to the captors:

The expression "goods" includes all such things as are by the course of Admiralty and law of nations the subject of adjudication as prize (other than ships):

The term "goods" refers to all items that, under Admiralty law and international law, can be the subject of legal decisions regarding prizes (excluding ships):

The expression "Customs authority" means the Commissioners or other authority having control of the administration of the law relating to customs.

The term "Customs authority" refers to the Commissioners or any other body responsible for managing the enforcement of customs laws.

Short title and repeal.

Short title and repeal.

48.—(1) This Act may be cited as the Naval Prize Act, 1911.

48.—(1) This Act may be referred to as the Naval Prize Act, 1911.

(2) The enactments mentioned in the second Schedule to this Act are hereby repealed to the extent specified in the third column of that Schedule.[Pg 690]

(2) The laws listed in the second Schedule to this Act are hereby repealed to the extent specified in the third column of that Schedule.[Pg 690]

APPENDIX 13 GENEVA CONVENTION ACT, 1911 1 & 2 GEO. 5, CHAPTER 20

An Act to make such amendments in the Law as are necessary to enable certain reserved provisions of the Second Geneva Convention to be carried into effect.
[18th August 1911.]

An Act to make the necessary changes to the Law to allow certain reserved provisions of the Second Geneva Convention to be implemented.
[18th August 1911.]


Whereas His Majesty has ratified, with certain reservations, the Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick of armies in the field, drawn up in Geneva in the year one thousand nine hundred and six, and it is desirable, in order that those reservations may be withdrawn, that such amendments should be made in the law as are in this Act contained:

Whereas His Majesty has approved, with some reservations, the Convention for improving the treatment of wounded and sick soldiers in the field, established in Geneva in 1906, and it is important that those reservations be lifted by making the amendments included in this Act:

Be it therefore enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—

Be it therefore enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—

Prohibition of use of emblem of red cross on white ground, &c.

Prohibition of the use of the red cross emblem on a white background, etc.

1.—(1) As from the commencement of this Act it shall not be lawful for any person to use for the purposes of his trade or business, or for any other purpose whatsoever, without the authority of the Army Council, the heraldic emblem of the red cross on a white ground formed by reversing the Federal colours of Switzerland, or the words "Red Cross" or "Geneva Cross," and, if any person acts in contravention of this provision, he shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding ten pounds, and to forfeit any goods upon or in connection with which the emblem or words were used.

1.—(1) Starting from the beginning of this Act, it is illegal for anyone to use the heraldic emblem of a red cross on a white background—created by reversing the Federal colors of Switzerland—or the terms "Red Cross" or "Geneva Cross," for their trade or business or any other purpose, without permission from the Army Council. Anyone who violates this rule will be committing an offense under this Act and could face a fine of up to ten pounds, as well as the loss of any goods associated with the use of the emblem or words.

(2) Where a company or society is guilty of any such contravention, without prejudice to the liability of the company or society, every director, manager, secretary, and other officer of the company or society who is knowingly a party to the contravention shall be guilty of an offence against this Act and liable to the like penalty.

(2) If a company or organization violates this, without affecting the company's or organization's responsibility, every director, manager, secretary, and other officer who is aware of and involved in the violation will be committing an offense under this Act and will face similar penalties.

(3) Nothing in this section shall affect the right (if any) of the proprietor of a trade mark registered before the passing of this Act, and containing any such emblem or words, to continue to use such trade mark for a period of four years from the passing of this Act, and, if the period of the registration or of the renewal of registration of any such trade mark expires during those four years, the registration thereof may be renewed until the expiration of those four years, but without payment of any fee.

(3) Nothing in this section will impact the rights (if any) of the owner of a trademark that was registered before this Act was enacted, and has any such emblem or words, to keep using that trademark for four years after this Act is passed. If the registration period or the renewal period for that trademark runs out during those four years, the registration can be renewed until the end of those four years, but without having to pay any fee.

(4) Proceedings under this Act shall not in England or Ireland be instituted without the consent of the Attorney-General.

(4) Legal actions under this Act in England or Ireland cannot be started without the Attorney-General's consent.

(5) This Act shall extend to His Majesty's possessions outside the United Kingdom, subject to such necessary adaptations as may be made by Order in Council.

(5) This Act will apply to His Majesty's possessions outside the United Kingdom, subject to any necessary adjustments that may be made by Order in Council.

Short title.

Short title.

2. This Act may be cited as the Geneva Convention Act, 1911.

2. This Act can be referred to as the Geneva Convention Act, 1911.

INDEX

This Index does not refer to Conventions, &c., printed in the Appendices.

This Index does not refer to Conventions, etc., printed in the Appendices.

A

A

Abuse of flag of truce, 281

Abuse of the flag of truce, 281

of neutral asylum, 419, 420-423

of neutral asylum, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-423

Abyssinian War, referred to on:

Abyssinian War, mentioned in:

hostile destination of goods, 505

hostile destination for goods, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

trial of neutral vessels after conclusion of peace, 556

trial of neutral vessels after conclusion of peace, 556

Acts of force initiative of war, 126-128

Acts of force start war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-128

Admiralty, origin of Board of, 239

Board of Admiralty, origin of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Aerial warfare. See Air-vessels

Air combat. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Aeroplanes, conditional contraband, 506

Planes, conditional contraband, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Africa, case of the, 531

Africa, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Air-vessels:

Air vessels:

invasion by, 207

invasion by __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

violence directed from, 150, 192, 227

violence from, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Alabama, case of the, 406-409

Alabama case, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-409

Alaska Boundary dispute (1903), 18

Alaska boundary dispute (1903), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Alexander I. of Russia exacts oath of allegiance in Finland, 205

Alexander I of Russia requires an oath of loyalty in Finland, 205

Alexander II. of Russia, and laws of war, 81

Alexander II of Russia and laws of war, 81

Alexis, case of the, 40

Alexis, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Allegiance, oath of, 173, 205, 212

Oath of allegiance, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Alverstone, Lord, 18

Alverstone, Lord, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Ambulances, See Convoys of Evacuation

Ambulances, See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

American Civil War, referred to on:

American Civil War, referred to on:

blockade, 453, 454, 463, 465, 469

blockade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__

ingress and egress of neutral warships during, 453

ingress and egress of neutral warships during, 453

contraband, 487, 499, 501

contraband, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

neutral asylum during, 418, 443

neutral asylum during, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

political agents on neutral vessel, 519, 530

political agents on neutral ship, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

real war, 63

real war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

sale of vessels during, 427

sale of ships during, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

stone-blockade, 450

stone-blockade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

treatment of prizes in, 243, 557

treatment of prizes in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

American-English War (1812), referred to on:

American-English War (1812), referred to on:

capture in neutral port, 442

capture in neutral port, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

destruction of neutral prizes, 243

destruction of neutral prizes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

reprisals, 307

reprisals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

American War of Independence, referred to on:

American War of Independence, referred to on:

convoy, vessels under, 536

convoy, vessels under, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

espionage, 198

espionage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

reprisals, 306

reprisals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

treatment of prizes during, 243

prize treatment during __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Amicable settlement of State differences. See State differences

Friendly resolution of State differences. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Amiens, Peace of (1802), 332

Amiens, Treaty of (1802), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Amnesty, 334

Amnesty, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Analogous of contraband. See Unneutral service

Similar to contraband. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Andersen v. Marten, case of, 555

Andersen v. Marten, case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

André, Major, case of, 198

André, Major, case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Angary:

Anger

derivation of right of, 449

derivation of right of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

exercise of right of, 385, 510

exercise of right of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

modern right of, 447

modern right of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

obsolete right of, 446

outdated right of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

pre-emption of neutral goods under right of, 449

pre-emption of neutral goods under right of, 449

Anna, case of the, 443

Anna, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Anne, Empress of Russia, 43

Anne, Empress of Russia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Anspach, troops marched through, 392

Anspach, troops marched through, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Arbitration:

Dispute resolution:

a means of settling State differences, 5

a way to resolve State differences, 5

appointment of arbitrator, 17, 26

arbitrator appointment, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

award, 18, 19, 30

award, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

appeal against, 31

appeal against, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

binding force of, 18, 25, 30

binding force of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

competence of tribunal of, 29

jurisdiction of the tribunal, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

compulsory, 25

mandatory, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

conception of, 16

concept of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

costs of, 32

costs of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

early use of, 22

early use of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

efficacy of, 25

effectiveness of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Hague Convention, stipulations concerning, 24

Hague Convention, regulations about, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

language to be used during, 26, 28

language to use during, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

minutes concerning, 28

minutes about, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Permanent International Court of, 22, 23, 26, 27-31, 561

Permanent International Court of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__-31, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__

preliminary proceedings in, 27

initial proceedings in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

procedure of tribunal in, 27

tribunal procedure in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

rules governing, 27

governing rules, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

[Pg 692]scope of, 20-21

scope of, 20-21

summary procedure in, 32

summary procedure in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

treaties of, 16, 18, 20, 26

treaties of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

obligations under, 16, 25

obligations under __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

stipulations of, 18

terms of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

tribunal of Court of, 27

court tribunal, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

value of, 22, 25

value of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Arbitration Treaties, 16, 20, 21, 26

Arbitration Agreements, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

Area of operations during blockade, 471

Area of operations during the blockade, 471

Argentina, blockades of (1838) and (1845), 49

Argentina, blockades of (1838) and (1845), 49

Armed Neutrality. See Neutrality

Armed Neutrality. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Armistices:

Ceasefires:

character of, 290

character of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

commencement of, 296

start of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

competence to conclude, 293

competence to conclude, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

contents of, 294-296

contents of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-296

end of, 299

end of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

form of, 294

form of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

general, 291, 293

general, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

hostilities, cessation of, during, 290, 295

ceasefire during __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

kinds of, 290, 291

types of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

lines of demarcation during, 296

lines of demarcation during, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

partial, 293

partial, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

permissible acts during, 294-296

permissible actions during, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-296

purpose of, 291

purpose of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

re-victualling during, 295

re-supplying during, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

suspension of arms during, 291

suspension of arms during, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

violation of, 297

violation of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

by private individual, 298

by a private individual, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

visitation of neutral vessels during, 290, 534

visitation of neutral vessels during __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Arnold, General, at West Point, 198

Arnold, General, at West Point, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Arrêt de prince, 45

Royal decree, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Aryol (or Orel), case of the, 256

Aryol (or Orel), case of the, 256

Asgill, Captain, case of, 307

Asgill, Captain, case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Askold, case of the, 422

Askold, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Assault, 191-193

Assault, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-193

Asylum. See Neutral Asylum

Asylum. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Atalanta, case of the, 522

Atalanta, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Athens, ancient law of, concerning reprisals, 41

Athens, ancient law of, concerning reprisals, 41

Attack on enemy vessels, 225-237. See also Enemy vessels

Attack on enemy ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-237. See also __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Aube, Admiral, on naval warfare, 264, 266

Aube, Admiral, on naval combat, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Augusta Victoria, case of the, 390

Augusta Victoria, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Aurora, case of the, 423

Aurora, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Awni Illa, case of the, 269

Awni Illa, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

B

B

Bahama Islands, access refused to belligerent warships at, 418

Bahama Islands, entry denied to hostile warships at, 418

Baker, Sir Sherston, 281

Baker, Sir Sherston, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Baltic Sea, asserted neutralisation of, 90

Baltic Sea, claimed to be neutralized, 90

Baltica, case of the, 110, 116

Baltica, the case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Barbarous forces, 98

Brutal forces, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Barge, arbitration award of Mr., 19

Barge, Mr.'s arbitration award, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Basle, office for volunteers at, 399

Basel, volunteer office at, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Bathurst, Lord, reprisal by, 307

Bathurst, Lord, retaliation by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Beasts of burden as contraband, 486

Beasts of burden as smuggling, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Belfort:

Belfort:

capitulation of, 286

surrender of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

siege of, 193, 292

siege of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

suspension of arms during siege of, 291

suspension of arms during the siege of, 291

Belgium, neutralisation of, 91, 358, 363, 368, 393, 411, 413, 428

Belgium, neutralization of, 91, 358, 363, 368, 393, 411, 413, 428

Belligerents:

Belligerents:

accessory, 93

accessory, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

angary, right of, exercised by, 446-449

angary, right to exercise by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-449

appropriation of property by, 174-187

property appropriation by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-187

armed forces of, 94-106

military of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-106

asylum granted to, 409-425

asylum granted to, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-425

barbarous forces as, 98

barbaric forces as, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

capture of neutral vessels by, 546-552

capture of neutral ships by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-552

complaints of illegitimate warfare by, 302

complaints of illegal warfare by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

conduct in general of, 378

conduct in general of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

deserters, treatment of, by, 105, 335

deserters, treatment of, by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

duties of, 378-386

duties of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-386

impartiality of neutrals towards, 362, 381-383

impartiality of neutrals toward __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-383

insurgents as, 62, 92

insurgents like, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

intercourse between subjects of, 135-138, 275, 333

interactions between subjects of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-138, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

and neutrals, 117, 365, 385, 428

and neutrals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

irregular forces of, 96

irregular forces of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

levies en masse of, 97, 152, 190, 313

levies in bulk of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

loans to, by neutrals, 430

loans from neutral parties, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

merchantmen of. See Merchantmen

merchant ships. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

military operations by and against, neutrals, 386-397

military operations by and against neutrals, 386-397

military preparations by and against 397-409

military preparations for and against __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-409

navies of, 94, 99-105

navies of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-105

neutralised States as, 91

neutralized States as, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

neutrality to be recognised by, 367

neutrality to be acknowledged by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

non-combatants with armed forces of, 95, 151, 169, 250

non-combatants with armed forces of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

non-hostile relations of, 273-299

peaceful relations of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-299

occupation of neutral territory by, 394

occupation of neutral territory by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

principal, 93

principal, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

prisoners of, treatment, 167-171

prisoners of treatment, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-171

private enemy property, 139. See also Private enemy property

private enemy property, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. See also __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

privateers of, 99, 103, 357, 372, 534

privateers of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__

Prize Courts of, 395. See also Prize Courts

Prize Courts of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. See also __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

property in enemy State of subjects of, 139, 182

property in enemy State of subjects of, 139, 182

qualification to become, 62, 90

qualification to become, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

regular armies of, 94

regular armies of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

[Pg 693] representation at International Prize Court, 569

[Pg 693] representation at the International Prize Court, 569

rights of, 378-386

rights of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-386

services to, 153, 181, 212, 432-437

services to, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__-437

subjects of, on enemy territory, 131-135

subjects of, on enemy territory, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-135

supplies to, by neutrals, 375, 405-409, 426-430

supplies by neutrals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-409, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__-430

trade between subjects of, 135-138, 275, 333

trade among subjects of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-138, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

traitors. See War criminals

traitors. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

vassal States as, 91

vassal States as __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

violation of neutrality by, 426, 438-445

violation of neutrality by __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-445

visitation of neutral vessels by, 428, 533-545

visitation of neutral vessels by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-545

volunteer fleets of, 100-104

volunteer fleets of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-104

war rebels, treatment of, by, 98

war rebels, treatment by __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Bellona, case of the, 332

Bellona, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Bentinck, promise of, to Genoa, 284

Bentinck's promise to Genoa, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Berlin:

Berlin:

Congo Conference of (1885), 11

Congo Conference of 1885, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Decrees of (1806), 357, 453

Decrees of 1806, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Treaty of (1878), 330

Treaty of 1878, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Bermuda, case of the, 470, 500

Bermuda, the case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Bernadotte, 391

Bernadotte, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Bismarck:

Bismarck:

act of reprisal by, 317

act of retaliation by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

on diplomatic envoys in besieged town, 194

on diplomatic envoys in besieged town, 194

on crews of captured merchantmen, prisoners of war, 250, 308, 317

on crews of captured merchant ships, prisoners of war, 250, 308, 317

on right of angary, 448

on the right of angary, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Black Sea, neutralisation of, 88

Black Sea, neutralization of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Blockade:

Blockade:

area of operations in, 471

area of operations in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

breach of:

breach of:

attempt at, 468-472

try for, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-472

canals, unblockaded and, 474

canals, unblocked and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

capture on account of, 475

capture on account of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

consequences of, 475-478

consequences of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-478

definition of, 466

definition of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

during armistice, 290

during ceasefire, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

egress and, 473

leave and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

ingress and, 472

ingress and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

penalty for, 476

penalty for __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

practice of nations regarding, 386, 468-475

nations' practices on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-475

what constitutes a, 468-475

what constitutes a, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-475

commercial, 452

ads, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

competence to establish, 456

ability to establish, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

conception of, 450-455

concept of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-455

continuous voyage and, 469, 472

ongoing journey and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

contraband, seizure of, during, 290

contraband seizure during __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

declaration of, 456, 458

declaration of, 456, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

definition of, 450

definition of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

effectiveness of: 356, 461-466

effectiveness of: __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-466

cessation of, 464

stop of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

condition of, 461

condition of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

danger necessary to create, 464

essential risk to create, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

distinguished from fictitious, 461

distinguished from fictional, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

end of, 460

end of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

establishment of, 456-461

establishing __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-461

existence of, 466

existence of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

fictitious, 461

faux, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

international rivers and, 454

international rivers and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

inward, 453

inward, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

justification for, 455

justification for __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

knowledge of, necessary for breach, 466

knowledge of, necessary for breach, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

neutral vessels, time for egress of, 459

neutral vessels, time to go, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

notification of, 456, 459, 466

notification of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

former practice of nations regarding, 457

previous practices of nations about, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

outward, 453

outward, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

pacific. See Pacific blockade

pacific. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

places liable to, 453

risky locations, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

postal correspondence during, 237, 385

mail during, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

stone, 450, 463

stone, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

strategic, 452

strategic, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

universality of, 452

universality of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Bluntschli:

Bluntschli:

on continuous voyage, 504

on a continuous journey, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

on courts of justice during occupation, 215

on courts of justice during occupation, 215

Bolivia-Peruvian Boundary Dispute (1910), 19

Bolivia-Peru Boundary Dispute (1910), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Bombardment:

Shelling:

by land forces, 191, 194

by ground troops, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

by naval forces, 266-270

by naval forces, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-270

Bonfils, on carriage of contraband, 504

Bonfils, on smuggling illegal goods, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Booty on battlefield, 163, 177, 181

Booty on the battlefield, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Bosphorus and Dardanelles, 102

Bosphorus and Dardanelles, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Bougainville, safe-conduct granted to, 232

Bougainville, safe passage granted to, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Boundary disputes:

Border conflicts:

between Bolivia and Peru, 19

between Bolivia and Peru, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

between Great Britain and U.S.A., 18, 19

between Great Britain and the U.S.A., 18, 19

between Great Britain and Venezuela, 18

between the UK and Venezuela, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Boundary treaty of Buenos Ayres (1881) between Argentina and Chili, 89

Boundary treaty of Buenos Aires (1881) between Argentina and Chile, 89

Bowles, Mr. Gibson, on withdrawal from Declaration of Paris, 100

Bowles, Mr. Gibson, on withdrawing from the Declaration of Paris, 100

Bribery, 196, 201

Bribery, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

British Foreign Enlistment Act, 358, 375, 494

British Foreign Enlistment Act, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Brussels:

Brussels:

Conference of (1874), 208, 308

Conference of 1874, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Declaration of (1874), 81, 171

Declaration of 1874, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Buenos Ayres, Boundary treaty of (1881), between Argentina and Chili, 89

Buenos Aires, Boundary treaty of (1881), between Argentina and Chile, 89

Bukarest, treaty of (1886), 92

Bucharest, treaty of (1886), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Bulgaria as a belligerent while under Turkish suzerainty, 62, 92

Bulgaria as a warring nation while still under Turkish control, 62, 92

Buller, Sir Redvers, proclamation by during the South African War, 65

Buller, Sir Redvers, proclamation by during the South African War, 65

[Pg 694] Bullets, expanding and explosive, 149, 250

Bullets, expanding and explosive, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Bulmerincq, proposal regarding Prize Courts, 560

Bulmerincq, proposal on Prize Courts, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Bundesrath, case of the, 500, 502, 552

Bundesrath case, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Bureau of Information in war, 163, 171, 181

Bureau of Information during war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Bynkershoek:

Bynkershoek:

on contraband, 481, 508

on contraband, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

on intercourse during war, 135

on sex during war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

on neutrality, 350, 361, 422

on neutrality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

C

C

Cabinet Ministers, capture of, 153

Cabinet Ministers, capture of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Camille, case of the, 426

Camille, case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Cancellation of treaties on account of:

Treaties canceled because of:

violation by one party, 338

violation by one party, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

war, 129

war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Capitulations:

Surrenders:

character and purpose of, 284

character and purpose of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

competence to conclude, 287

competence to finalize, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

contents of, 285

contents of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

flag of truce and, 286

flag of truce and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

form of, 286

form of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

violation of, 289

violation of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Captain W. Menzel, case of the, 376

Captain W. Menzel, case of the, 376

Captivity:

Captivity:

detention in, after peace, 170, 336

detention after peace, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

discipline in, 169-170

discipline in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-170

effect of treaty of peace on, 335

effect of treaty of peace on, 335

end of, 172, 335

end of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

law regarding, development of, 165-167

law on development of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-167

parole, release on, 170

parole, release on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

relief societies assisting those in, 171

relief societies helping those in need, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

treatment of prisoners of war in, 167, 306

treatment of prisoners of war in, 167, 306

who may be taken into, 151, 152, 153, 169, 250, 308

who may be taken into, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__

Capture of neutral vessels:

Seizing neutral ships:

abandonment after, 551

abandonment after, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

conduct to port after, 547

head to port after, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

destruction after, 547-551

destruction after, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-551

effect of, 546

impact of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

grounds of, 546

grounds of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

mode of, 546

mode of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

ransom after, 551

ransom afterward, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

recapture after, 551

recapture after, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

release after, 551

release after, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

trial after, 240, 553-558

trial after, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-558

after conclusion of peace, 555

after peace is established, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

by International Prize Court, 572-579

by International Prize Court, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-579

claims after, 557

claims after, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

municipal matter, a, 553

city issue, a, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

protests after, 557

protests afterward, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

result of, 555

result of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Carolina, case of the, 519

Carolina, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Caroline, case of the, 376

Caroline, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Carriage of contraband. See Contraband of war

Transporting contraband. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Cartel ships:

Cartel boats:

rules regarding, 283

rules about, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

seizure of, 236

seizure of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Cartels:

Cartels:

definition and purpose of, 275, 282

definition and purpose of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

ransom of soldiers arranged by, 166

soldiers' ransom organized by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Carthage, case of the, 506

Carthage, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Castro, de, 40

Castro, of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Catharine, Empress of Russia, 355, 357

Catharine, Empress of Russia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Cattaro, access refused to belligerent warships at, 418

Cattaro, entry denied to warring ships at, 418

Cesarewitch, case of the, 423

Cesarewitch, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Cessation of hostilities, simple, 323, 324

End of hostilities, simple, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Chablais and Faucigny, neutralisation of, 88

Chablais and Faucigny, neutralization of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Chambers of Reunion, the so-called, 61

Chambers of Reunion, as they say, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Charles XII. of Sweden, dictum of, 147

Charles XII of Sweden, dictum of, 147

Charleston, blockade of, 450, 465

Charleston blockade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Chauvinism, 38

Chauvinism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Chino-Japanese War (1894), referred to on:

Chino-Japanese War (1894), referred to on:

asylum on neutral man-of-war, 423

asylum on neutral warship, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Citizens. See Private individuals

Citizens. Check __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Civil war:

Civil War

commencement of, 374

start of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

neutrality during, 365

neutrality during __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

termination of, 323

termination of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Clinton, Sir Henry, 198

Clinton, Sir Henry, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Coal as contraband, 487

Coal as illegal trade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Columbia, case of the, 390

Columbia, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Commerce during war:

Trade in wartime:

between belligerents' subjects, 135, 275

between warring parties' subjects, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

between subjects of belligerents and neutrals, 352, 365, 385, 428

between subjects of warring parties and those who are neutral, 352, 365, 385, 428

Commercen, case of the, 501

Business, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Commercia belli, 274

Commercial warfare, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Commercial blockade, 452

Trade embargo, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Commercial treaty. See Treaties

Trade agreement. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Commission: of Arbitration, 18

Commission: Arbitration, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

of Inquiry, 7

of Inquiry, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Compensation for violations of the Laws of War, 319-321, 439

Compensation for violations of the Laws of War, 319-321, 439

Complaints of belligerents, 302, 303

Complaints from fighters, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Compromis, 26-31

Compromise, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-31

Compromise clause, 5, 17

Compromise clause, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Compulsive settlement of State differences. See State differences

Compulsive resolution of state disputes. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Concentration camps, 153, 190

Concentration camps, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Conference of Berlin (1885), 11

Conference of Berlin (1885), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

[Pg 695] Confiscantur ex navibus res, ex rebus naves, 219

[Pg 695] Goods are seized from ships, and ships from goods, 219

Confiscation: at outbreak of war, 139, 140, 174-182, 204, 218

Confiscation: at the start of the war, 139, 140, 174-182, 204, 218

for carrying contraband, 508-514

for smuggling, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-514

Congo Conference of Berlin, 11

Congo Conference in Berlin, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Congress of Vienna (1815), 88

Congress of Vienna (1815), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Conquest, 325. See also Subjugation

Conquest, 325. See also __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Consolato del mare, 218, 219, 349, 352, 534

Maritime Consulate, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__

Consular activity, rupture of, 129

Consular activity, break of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Continuous voyage, doctrine of, 469, 472, 491, 499-506

Continuous voyage doctrine, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__-506

Continuous transport: doctrine of, 499-506

Continuous transport: doctrine of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-506

partial recognition of, by Declaration of London, 505

partial recognition of, by Declaration of London, 505

Contraband of war:

War contraband:

absolute, 481, 483, 490, 498, 505

absolute, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__

analogous of. See Unneutral Service

similar to. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

articles for use of carrying vessel not considered, 493

articles for carrying vessel not considered, 493

beasts of burden as, 486

beasts of burden as, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

carriage of, 386, 495-514

carriage of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-514

capture for, 506

capture for, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

circuitous, 499-506

circuitous, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-506

consequences of, 506-514

consequences of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-514

Continental opinion on, 504

Continental views on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

direct, 497

direct, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

indirect, 500-506

indirect, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-506

penal by municipal law, 495

prohibited by local law, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

penalty for, 508-514

penalty for __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-514

without knowledge of war, 140, 235, 512

without knowledge of war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

coal as, 487

coal as, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

conception of, 480-495

concept of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-495

conditional, 481, 485, 491, 498, 506

conditional, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__

pre-emption of, 510, 512

preempting, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

continuous transports, doctrine of, 499-506

continuous transport, doctrine of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-506

cotton as, 487

cotton like, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

definition of, 480

definition of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

foodstuffs as, 486

food items as, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

horses as, 486

horses as, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

hostile destination essential to, 490

hostile destination vital to, 490

money as, 487

money as, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

seizure of, during blockade, 290

seizure during blockade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

seizure of, without seizure of vessel, 513

seizure of, without taking the vessel, 513

Contraband vessels, 390, 494

Smuggler ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Contract debts, 25, 46

Contract debts, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Contracts between subjects of belligerents, 137, 138, 333

Contracts between parties involved in conflict, 137, 138, 333

Contributions, 183-187, 264, 267

Contributions, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-187, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Convoy: vessels under enemy, 542

Convoy: ships under enemy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

vessels under neutral, 535-537, 543

vessels under neutral, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-537, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Convoy of evacuation, 160

Evacuation convoy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Cook, Captain, safe-conduct granted to, 232

Cook, Captain, safe passage granted to, 232

Copenhagen:

Copenhagen:

Battle of (1801), 356

Battle of 1801, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Treaty of (1830), 542

Treaty of 1830, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Corfu, neutralisation of, 88, 369

Corfu, neutralization of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Cotton as contraband, 487

Cotton as illegal goods, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Court of Arbitration at the Hague. See Permanent Court of Arbitration

Court of Arbitration at The Hague. See Permanent Court of Arbitration

Courts of Justice, during occupation of country, 214

Courts of Justice, during the occupation of a country, 214

Crete:

Crete:

blockade of, 49, 51

blockade of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

during the Turco-Italian War, 87

during the Italo-Turkish War, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Crimean War, referred to on:

Crimean War, known as:

asylum to men-of-war, 418

asylum for warships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

blockade, 453, 454, 464, 465

blockade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

contraband, 501

contraband, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

enemy property at sea under neutral flag, 220

enemy property at sea under a neutral flag, 220

enemy subjects on belligerent's territory, 132

enemy subjects on the belligerent's territory, 132

letters of marque, 220

letters of marque, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

loans, flotation of, 431

loans, flotation of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

merchantmen at outbreak of war, 140, 235

merchant ships at the start of the war, 140, 235

D

D

Danous, case of the, 112

Danous, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Danube, blockade of the, 453, 454

Danube, blockade of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Dardanelles, 102

Dardanelles, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Dead, treatment of the, 162, 254

Dead, treatment of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Dearborn, General, reprisal by, 307

Dearborn, General, retaliation by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Declaration concerning:

Statement about:

diffusion of asphyxiating gases, 82, 150, 250

diffusion of toxic gases, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

expanding (Dum-Dum) bullets, 82, 149, 250

expanding (Dum-Dum) bullets, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

launching of projectiles from balloons, 82, 150, 250

launching projectiles from balloons, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Declaration of:

Declaration of:

Brussels (1874), 81, 171

Brussels (1874), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

London (1909), 83, 360, 554

London (1909), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

referred to on:

referred to at:

[Pg 696] blockade, 452-478

blockade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-478

capture of neutral vessels, 547-552

capture of neutral ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-552

contraband, 480-514

contraband, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-514

enemy character, 107, 113, 117

enemy character, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

free articles, 492

free articles, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

transfer of enemy vessels, 118

transfer of enemy ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

transfer of enemy goods, 120

transfer of enemy goods, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

trial of neutral vessels, 555-558

trial of neutral ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-558

unneutral service, 435, 515-532

unbiased service, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-532

visitation of vessels, 536, 537, 540-545

vessel visitation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__-545

Paris (1856), 52, 79, 100, 101, 103, 130, 220, 221, 226, 242, 303, 354, 358, 384, 385, 452, 461, 481, 536

Paris (1856), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_10__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_11__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_12__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_13__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_14__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_15__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_16__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_17__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_18__

St. Petersburg (1868), 80, 149, 250

St. Petersburg (1868), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Declarations of:

Declarations of:

blockade, 456-459

blockade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-459

contraband, 484, 488

contraband, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

neutrality, 374

neutrality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

war, 122-125

war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-125

Delagoa Bay, case of, 502

Delagoa Bay, example of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Den Beer Portugael, General, and rules on bombardment, 266

Den Beer Portugael, General, and rules on bombardment, 266

Denmark, treaty by, affecting neutrality, 372, 389

Denmark, affected by a treaty regarding neutrality, 372, 389

Swedish territory sold by, 205

Swedish land sold by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Deserters, 105, 335

Deserters, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Despatches:

Dispatches:

bearers of, 197

bearers of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

carriage of, for enemy, 435, 515, 516, 521-524, 525, 526, 528, 531

carrying for enemy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__-524, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__

right of sending, 194

sending rights, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Dessaix, case of the, 244

Dessaix, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Destruction of enemy property:

Destruction of enemy assets:

arms and ammunition, 189

weapons and ammo, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

during bombardment, 195

during bombardment, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

merchantmen, 242-245

merchant ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-245

monuments, 189

monuments, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

necessary, 188

necessary, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

provisions, 189

supplies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

wanton, 187

wasteful, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

works of art, 189

artworks, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Devastation, general, 190

Devastation, overall, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

De Wütz v. Hendricks, 430

De Wütz v. Hendricks, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Diana, case of the, 236, 422

Diana, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Dieppe, blockade of, 454

Dieppe, blockade of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Diplomacy, 75

Diplomacy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Diplomatic envoys:

Diplomatic representatives:

capture of, 154

capture of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

carriage of, by neutrals, 517-521

neutral transport of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-521

despatches of, 435

dispatches of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

found on enemy territory by a belligerent, 384

found on enemy territory by a hostile party, 384

in besieged towns, 194

in besieged towns, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

letters of marque granted by, 357

letters of marque issued by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Diplomatic intercourse, rupture of, 129

Break in diplomatic relations, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Discovery, case of the, 232

Discovery, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Distress, vessels in circumstances of, 418, 472

Distress, vessels in emergencies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Distribution of Prize Money Proclamation (1866), 248

Distribution of Prize Money Proclamation (1866), 248

Doelwijk, case of the, 505, 556

Doelwijk, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Dogger Bank, case of, 7, 15

Dogger Bank, case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Dolus non purgatur circuitu, 499

Fraud is not excused by a circuitous route, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Domicile of owner determines character of goods, 115

Domicile of owner determines character of goods, 115

Drago doctrine, 25

Drago Doctrine, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Duclair, British coal-vessels at, 448

Duclair, British coal ships at, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Dum-Dum bullets, 149, 250

Dum-Dum bullets, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Dunant, Jean Henry, on treatment of wounded, 155

Dunant, Jean Henry, on the treatment of the wounded, 155

Dupleix, case of the, 89

Dupleix, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Dutch East India squadron, attempted seizure of, 350

Dutch East India squadron, attempted seizure of, 350

E

E

Edmonds, Colonel, 82

Edmonds, Colonel, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Effects of outbreak of war on:

Impact of the outbreak of war on:

belligerents' property on enemy territory, 139

enemy territory property of belligerents, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

belligerents' subjects in enemy State, 131

subjects of belligerents in enemy State, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

diplomatic relations, 129

diplomatic ties, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

merchantmen, 140-143

merchant ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-143

persona standi in judicio, 133

legal standing in court, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

States in general, 128

States overall, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

trade between belligerents' subjects, 135

trade between warring parties' citizens, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

treaties, 129

treaties, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

El Arish, capitulation of, 287-289

El Arish, surrender of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-289

Elba, case of the, 424

Elba, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Elisabeth, case of the, 236

Elisabeth, case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Embargo:

Embargo:

conception of, 44-46

conception of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-46

different kinds of, 45

different types of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

instance of, 40

instance of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

practice of, 140, 446

practice of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Emblems of:

Symbols of:

hospital ships, 258

hospital ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

medical service of armies, 161

military healthcare, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Emilia, case of the, 110

Emilia, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Ems, exclusion of the river, from blockade, 454

Ems, the river's exclusion from the blockade, 454

Enemy character:

Antagonist:

conception of, 106

concept of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

of goods, 115-117

of goods, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-117

when transferred, 119

when transferred, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

of individuals:

of people:

enemy subjects domiciled in enemy country, 110-112

enemy subjects living in enemy country, 110-112

enemy subjects in neutral countries, 112

enemy nationals in neutral countries, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

neutral subjects domiciled in enemy country, 109-112, 385

neutral subjects living in enemy territory, 109-112, 385

neutral subjects serving in armed forces of belligerents, 109

neutral subjects serving in the armed forces of warring parties, 109

neutral subjects serving in police and administration of belligerents, 109

neutral subjects serving in the police and administration of warring parties, 109

of vessels, 112-115

of vessels, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-115

when transferred, 117

when moved, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

unneutral service creating, 524-526

unbiased service creation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-526

Enemy convoy, 542

Enemy convoy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Enemy property. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Enemy territory, occupation of:

Occupied enemy territory:

an aim of warfare, 204

a goal of war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

constructive, 208

constructive, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

courts of justice, position of during, 214

courts of justice, position of during, 214

duties arising from, 210

duties from __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

end of, 210

end of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

envoys' position during, 384

envoys' position during __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

neutral property during, 384

neutral property during, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

officials' position during, 213

officials' stance during, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

[Pg 697] rights arising from, 210-213

[Pg 697] rights arising from, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-213

treatment of inhabitants during, 210-213

treatment of residents during, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-213

treatment of subjects of neutrals during, 213, 384

treatment of subjects of neutrals during, 213, 384

when effected, 98, 206

when implemented, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Enemy vessels:

Hostile ships:

appropriation of, 238-249

appropriation of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-249

attack and seizure of, 225-237

attack and seizure of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-237

effect of seizure of, 231

effect of seizure of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

furnishing of, by neutrals, 358, 372, 375, 389, 405-409

furnishing by neutrals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__-409

immunity from attack granted to, 232-237

immunity from attack granted to, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-237

in neutral waters, 395-397, 400-404

in international waters, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-397, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-404

legitimate attack on, 225

legitimate attack on __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

medical and hospital staff of, 260

medical and hospital staff of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

neutral goods on, 232, 542

neutral goods on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

postal correspondence on, 237, 385

mail correspondence on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

religious staff on, 260

religious staff on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

sick bays on, 257

sick bays on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Enlistment Act, Foreign:

Enlistment Act, Foreign:

American, 358, 375

American, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

British, 358, 375, 494

British, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Escape from captivity, 170, 172

Escape from captivity, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Espionage, 196-199, 262, 313

Espionage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-199, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Euridice, case of the, 426

Euridice, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Explosive bullets, 149, 250

Explosive rounds, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

F

F

Facultas bellandi, 90

Warfare skill, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Fanny, case of the, 542

Fanny, the case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Faravelli, bombardment of Turkish vessels in the harbour of Beirut by Italian naval forces under Admiral, 269

Faravelli, the bombing of Turkish ships in the Beirut harbor by Italian naval forces led by Admiral, 269

Faucigny, neutralisation of, 88

Faucigny, neutralization of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Fécamp, blockade of, 454

Fécamp, blockade of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Federal States, wars by members of, 63, 68, 92

Federal States, wars by members of, 63, 68, 92

Fictitious blockade, 461

Fictitious blockade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Fides etiam hosti servanda, 273

Trust must also be kept with the enemy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Fiore, 504

Fiore, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

First Armed Neutrality, 354-356, 370, 461, 462, 481

First Armed Neutrality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-356, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__

First Coalition, 357

First Coalition, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Fishing-boats, immunity from seizure, 234

Fishing boats can't be seized, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Flag: character of vessel determined by, 112

Flag: the type of vessel determined by, 112

transfer of vessels to neutral, 117

transfer of ships to neutral, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

use of false, 201, 262

use of fake, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Flags of truce:

Peace flags:

abuse of, 203, 281

abuse of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

bearers, treatment of, 279

bearers, treatment of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

capitulations and, 286

capitulations and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

land warfare and, 278

land warfare and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

meaning of, 278

meaning of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

naval warfare and, 278

naval warfare and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

occasions when used, 278-282, 287, 302

occasions when used, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-282, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Flight. See Escape

Flight. View __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Flinders, safe-conduct granted to, 233

Flinders, safe passage granted to, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Florida, case of the, 443

Florida, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Foodstuffs as contraband, 486

Food as contraband, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Foraging, 181

Foraging, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Foreign Enlistment Act. See Enlistment Act

Foreign Enlistment Act. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Formosa, blockade of, 49, 52

Taiwan, blockade of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Forsigtigheten, case of the, 426

Caution, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Franciska, case of the, 465

Franciska, case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Franco-British wars referred to on:

Franco-British wars mentioned on:

(1793), property in enemy State of belligerents, 139

(1793), property in enemy State of belligerents, 139

(1803), subjects of belligerents on enemy territory, 131

(1803), subjects of belligerents on enemy territory, 131

(1793), treaty obligations, 372

(1793), treaty commitments, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Franco-German War, referred to on:

Franco-German War, mentioned on:

angary, 447, 448

angary, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

armistices, 291, 292, 296, 297

armistices, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

asylum to belligerents, 411, 415

asylum for warring parties, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

belligerents' subjects on enemy territory, 132

enemy territory subjects, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

blockade, 454

blockade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

cable laying, 436

cable installation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

capitulation, 286

surrender, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

courts of justice, 215

courts of law, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

diplomatic envoys in besieged towns, 194

diplomatic envoys in besieged towns, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Franctireurs, 96

Franctireurs, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

hostages, 317

hostages, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

loans, flotation of, 431

loans, raising funds for, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

merchantmen, 222, 235, 236, 244

merchant ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

neutral asylum, 411, 415

neutral asylum, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

neutrality, 89, 368, 369, 400, 413, 415

neutrality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__

passage of volunteers through neutral territory, 399

passage of volunteers through neutral territory, 399

peace treaty, 329, 338

peace treaty, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

pilotage, 433

navigating, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

postliminium, 342

postliminium, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

prisoners of war, 250, 336

prisoners of war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

prizes, 244

awards, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

reprisals, 306, 308

reprisals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

sieges, 193

sieges, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

supplies by neutrals, 427, 428

supplies by neutrals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

suspension of arms, 291

drop arms, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

train-wrecking, 318

train-wrecking, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

unorganised hostile expedition, 400

chaotic hostile mission, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

vessels sailing under flag of another State, 233

vessels sailing under the flag of another state, 233

volunteer fleet, 100, 303

volunteer fleet, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Franctireurs, 96

Franctireurs, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Frankfort, Treaty of (1871), 329, 338, 343

Frankfort Treaty (1871), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Frankfort-on-the-Main, subjugation of, 327

Frankfurt, subjugation of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Freden, case of the, 441

Freden, the case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

[Pg 698] Frederick II. of Prussia:

Frederick II of Prussia:

forcible levies by, 205

forcible charges by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

reprisals by, 43, 44

reprisals by __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Frederikshamm, Peace treaty of (1809), 205

Frederikshamm, Peace Treaty (1809), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Free articles, 481, 483, 492-494

Free articles, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__-494

French Prize Courts set up in America, 357, 395

French Prize Courts established in America, 357, 395

Friendship and Commerce, treaties of, 167, 221, 371, 508

Friendship and Commerce treaties, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

Fürst Bismarck, case of the, 390

Fürst Bismarck, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

G

G

Gaëta, blockade of, 49

Gaeta, blockade of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Gelderland, case of the, 433

Gelderland case, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

General, case of the, 502

General, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

General Armstrong, case of the, 442

General Armstrong, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Genêt, letters of marque granted by, 357, 395

Genêt, letters of marque granted by, 357, 395

Geneva: Court of Arbitration, 444

Geneva: Arbitration Court, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Société d'utilité publique, 155

Public utility company, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Geneva Convention:

Geneva Conventions

adaptation of the principles of, to naval warfare, 80, 82, 252-262

adaptation of the principles of, to naval warfare, 80, 82, 252-262

application of the, 163

application of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

general provisions of the, 164

general provisions of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

non-combatants and the, 415

non-combatants and the __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

origin of the, 154

origin of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

prisoners and the, 151, 250

prisoners and the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

wounded and dead and the, 80, 154-165, 181

wounded and dead, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-165, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Geneva Cross, 161, 162, 164, 203, 258

Geneva Cross, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__

Genoa, capitulation of, 284

Genoa, surrender of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

German coast, blockade of, 454

German coast, blockade of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

German contract for felling trees in French forests, 342

German contract for cutting down trees in French forests, 342

Gessner on carriage of contraband, 504

Gessner on smuggling, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Good offices:

Good services:

complaints by belligerents to neutrals settled by, 303

complaints by warring parties to neutral nations resolved by, 303

duty of asking for, 13

responsibility to ask for, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

duty of offering, 10, 13

duty to offer, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

duty of receiving offer of, 13

duty of receiving an offer of, 13

Hague Convention, rules regarding, 12-14

Hague Convention, rules about, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-14

mediation compared with, 11

mediation vs. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

purpose of, 10, 328

purpose of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Russo-Japanese War and, 15

Russo-Japanese War and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

value of, 14

value of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Goods sold by and to enemy subjects, enemy character of, 115, 119, 135-138, 249

Goods sold by and to enemy subjects, enemy character of, 115, 119, 135-138, 249

Government officials, deposition by enemy of, 214

Government officials, deposition by enemy of, 214

Greece, blockades of, 48, 49, 51

Greece, blockades of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Grossovoi, case of the, 422

Grossovoi, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Grotius, cited on:

Grotius, referenced on:

armistices, 295, 297

ceasefires, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

captivity, 166

captivity, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

contraband, 480, 481

contraband, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

enemy subjects on belligerent's territory, 110

enemy subjects on the belligerent's territory, 110

declaration of war, 121

declaration of war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

destruction of enemy property, 189

destruction of enemy assets, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

neutrality, 349, 361

neutrality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Guerilla war, 70, 190, 209

Guerilla warfare, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

H

H

Hague Conventions concerning:

Hague Conventions about:

bombardment by naval forces in time of war (IX.), 83, 265, 268-270

bombardment by naval forces during wartime (IX.), 83, 265, 268-270

capture in maritime war, restrictions on the exercise of the right of (XI.), 83, 105, 233, 234, 237, 250, 360, 385, 522-524, 526

capture in maritime war, restrictions on the exercise of the right of (XI.), 83, 105, 233, 234, 237, 250, 360, 385, 522-524, 526

commencement of hostilities (III.), 82, 123-127, 363, 374

start of hostilities (III.), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-127, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

debts, employment of force for the recovery of contract (II.), 25, 46

debts, using force to recover a contract (II.), 25, 46

disputes, pacific settlement of (I.), 6, 12-14, 20, 23-33, 122

disputes, peaceful resolution of (I.), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-14, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__-33, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__

Geneva Convention, adaptation of the principles of (X.), 82, 236, 250, 251, 252-262, 274, 413, 424, 425

Geneva Convention, adaptation of the principles of (X.), 82, 236, 250, 251, 252-262, 274, 413, 424, 425

International Prize Court, establishment of an (XII.), 108, 114, 117, 240, 241, 245, 360, 552, 555, 563, 565-579

International Prize Court, establishment of an (XII.), 108, 114, 117, 240, 241, 245, 360, 552, 555, 563, 565-579

merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities, status of enemy (VI.), 83, 140-143, 235

merchant ships at the start of the conflict, status of enemy (VI.), 83, 140-143, 235

merchant ships, conversion of, into war-ships (VII.), 83, 103, 360, 376

merchant ships, conversion of, into warships (VII.), 83, 103, 360, 376

mines, laying of automatic submarine contact (VIII.), 83, 227-229, 360, 445, 463

mines, installing automatic underwater contact (VIII.), 83, 227-229, 360, 445, 463

neutral Powers and persons in war on land, rights and duties of (V.), 83, 94, 107, 108-110, 359, 364, 371, 382, 383, 384, 387, 389, 390, 393, 398, 399, 412, 414, 427, 431, 434, 435, 448

neutral Powers and individuals in land warfare, rights and responsibilities of (V.), 83, 94, 107, 108-110, 359, 364, 371, 382, 383, 384, 387, 389, 390, 393, 398, 399, 412, 414, 427, 431, 434, 435, 448

neutral Powers in maritime war, rights and duties of (XIII.), 83, 359, 376, 380, 382, 383, 384, 389, 394, 395, 396, 400, 401-404, 408, 418-423, 427, 432, 436, 441, 443, 445, 494

neutral Powers in maritime war, rights and duties of (XIII.), 83, 359, 376, 380, 382, 383, 384, 389, 394, 395, 396, 400, 401-404, 408, 418-423, 427, 432, 436, 441, 443, 445, 494

war on land, laws and customs of (IV.), referred to on:

war on land, laws and customs of (IV.), referred to on:

angary, exercise of right of, 448

exercise of right of angary, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

armistices, 290, 291, 293, 296, 297, 298

armistices, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__

assault, bombardment and siege, 192-195

assault, bombardment, and siege, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-195

booty, 177

booty, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Bureau of Information, 171

Information Bureau, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

capitulations, 286, 289

capitulations, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

[Pg 699] compensation, 320, 438

compensation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

espionage, treason, ruses, 196-199, 201, 202, 313, 315

espionage, treason, tricks, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-199, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__

flags of truce, 278-281

flags of truce, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-281

Geneva Convention, 80

Geneva Convention, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

irregular forces, guerilla bands and levies en masse, 70, 96, 97, 313

irregular forces, guerrilla groups, and mass levies en masse, 70, 96, 97, 313

killing and wounding, 147, 148

killing and injuring, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

means of land warfare, 145, 148

means of land warfare, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

means of securing legitimate warfare, 301, 304, 308, 319, 321

means of securing legitimate warfare, 301, 304, 308, 319, 321

non-combatants, 95

civilians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

occupation of enemy territory, 206, 207, 211, 214

occupation of enemy territory, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

parole, 170

parole, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

persona standi in judicio, 134

party standing in court, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

prisoners of war, 167, 169, 172, 250, 336

prisoners of war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__

private individuals, 153, 298

private users, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

property in enemy State, 140, 174-182, 188-190

property in enemy state, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-182, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__-190

property of the dead, 163, 274

property of the deceased, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

quarter, 147

quarter, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

relief societies, 171

relief organizations, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

requisitions and contributions, 184, 185, 186, 438, 448

requisitions and contributions, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__

telegraph cables, 271

telegraph wires, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Hague Court of Arbitration. See Permanent Court of Arbitration

Hague Arbitration Court. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Hague Declarations concerning:

Hague Declarations about:

asphyxiating gases, prohibition of use of, 82, 150, 250

asphyxiating gases, ban on usage of, 82, 150, 250

bullets, expanding, prohibition of use of, 82, 149, 250

bullets, expanding, ban on use of, 82, 149, 250

projectiles, prohibition of discharge of certain, 82, 150, 227, 250

projectiles, ban on firing certain, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

Hague Peace Conferences: of 1899: 17, 81, 149, 150, 156, 222, 252;

Hague Peace Conferences: 1899: __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__;

of 1907: 81, 108, 123, 140, 222, 223, 224, 233, 234, 252, 320, 383

of 1907: __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_10__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_11__

Haimun, case of the, 437

Haimun, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Hale, case of Captain Nathan, 199

Hale, Captain Nathan case, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Hall, on requisitions and contributions in naval warfare, 264

Hall, on requisitions and contributions in naval warfare, 264

Halleck, on:

Halleck, regarding:

abuse of flag of truce, 281

abuse of truce flag, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

ruses, 263

tricks, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

stratagems and perfidy, 202

tricks and betrayal, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Hanover, subjugation of, 327

Hanover, conquest of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Hansa, the, 62, 219

Hansa, the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Harmony, case of the, 110

Harmony, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Hautefeuille, on:

Hautefeuille, on:

justification of blockade, 455

justification for blockade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

right of visitation of neutral vessels, 534

right of visitation of neutral vessels, 534

Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (1901), 89

Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (1901), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Heads of States: power of making treaties when prisoner, 331

Heads of States: authority to make treaties when captured, 331

violence against, 147, 153

violence against, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Heffter on occupation of enemy territory, 205

Heffter on taking enemy land, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Heilborn, on war material on neutral territory, 416

Heilborn, regarding war materials on neutral ground, 416

Henfield, Gideon, case of, 358

Henfield, Gideon, case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Hertha, case of the, 89

Hertha, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Herzog, case of the, 502, 552

Herzog, the case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Hesse-Cassel:

Hesse-Kassel:

case of the Domains of, 344

case of the Domains of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

subjugation of, 327

subjugation of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Hipsang, case of the, 548

Hipsang, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Hobbs v. Henning, 503

Hobbs v. Henning, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Holland, blockade of, 49

Holland, blockade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Holland on:

Holland on:

armistices, 290

ceasefires, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

bombardment, 266

bombing, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

contraband, 522

contraband, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

doctrine of continuous voyage, 500, 503

doctrine of continuous voyage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

indemnities, 180

indemnities, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

pacific blockade, 48

pacific blockade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

release of neutral prize, 552

release of neutral prize, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Hon-kohe Bay, Russian fleet in, 404

Honkohe Bay, Russian fleet in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Horses as contraband, 486

Horses as illegal goods, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Hospital ships, 236, 254-257

Hospital ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-257

emblem of, 258

emblem of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Hostages, 153, 213, 246, 317-319

Hostages, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__-319

Hostilities:

Conflict:

between belligerents. See War

between rivals. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

by and against neutrals, 386, 387

by and against neutrals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

effect of simple cessation of, 323, 324

effect of just stopping __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

instances of simple cessation of, 323

instances of simple stopping of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Hübner, proposal regarding Prize Courts, 559

Hübner's proposal on Prize Courts, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Huddy, Joshua, case of, 306

Huddy, Joshua, case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Hussar, case of the, 263

Hussar, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

I

I

Icona, case of the, 548

Icon, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Iltis, case of the, 424

Iltis, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Imina, case of the, 503

Imina, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Indemnities for:

Indemnities for:

neutral cargo on destroyed enemy vessels, 244, 245

neutral cargo on destroyed enemy ships, 244, 245

neutral innocent cargo on destroyed neutral vessels, 550

neutral innocent cargo on destroyed neutral vessels, 550

private property, 142, 180, 182, 184

private property, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

Indians, as members of regular forces, 99

Indians, as part of the regular forces, 99

Industrie, case of the, 525

Case study on industry, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Inflexible, case of the, 282

Inflexible, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Information regarding military and naval operations, 211, 434

Information regarding military and naval operations, 211, 434

Inquiry Commissions, 7

Inquiry Commissions, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Institute of International Law on:

Institute of International Law on:

aerial warfare, 151

air combat, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

angary, 447

angary, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

[Pg 700] bombardment, 266-268

bombing, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-268

capture, 546

capture, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

carriage of contraband, 504, 510

smuggling, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

commencement of war, 123

start of war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

contributions and requisitions, 265

contributions and requests, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

effect of war on treaties, 131

impact of war on treaties, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

insurrection, 92, 366

insurrection, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

laws of war, 81

laws of war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

mines, sub-marine, 229, 445

mines, submarine, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

neutrality, 408

neutrality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

pacific blockade, 50, 53

pacific blockade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Prize Courts, 553, 560

Prize Courts, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

prizes, 244

prizes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

reprisals, 308-309

reprisals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-309

submarine cables, 271, 272

submarine cables, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

visitation, 534

visit, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Insurgents as belligerents, 69, 92

Insurgents as combatants, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Intercourse:

Sex:

between subjects of belligerents, 135-138, 275, 333

between warring parties, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-138, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

between subjects of neutrals and belligerents, 117, 352, 365, 385, 428

between subjects of neutrals and belligerents, 117, 352, 365, 385, 428

International Bureau of the International Court of Arbitration, 27

International Bureau of the International Court of Arbitration, 27

acts as registry for Commissions at the Hague, 8

acts as a registry for Commissions at the Hague, 8

acts as registry for the International Prize Court, 562, 569, 573, 579

acts as a registry for the International Prize Court, 562, 569, 573, 579

International Commission of Inquiry:

International Inquiry Commission:

in the Dogger Bank case, 7, 15

in the Dogger Bank case, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

procedure at an, 7-9

procedure at an, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-9

International Conference at the Hague (1904), 256, 257

International Conference at the Hague (1904), 256, 257

International Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, 271

International Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, 271

International Court of Arbitration. See Permanent Court of Arbitration

International Arbitration Court. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

International Postal Union, in time of war, 130

International Postal Union, in war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

International Prize Court:

International Court of Justice:

action in damages in the, 577-579

action for damages in the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-579

Administrative Council of the, 569

Admin Council of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

competence of the, 529, 541, 569-571

competence of the __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__-571

constitution of the, 565-569

constitution of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-569

Convention (XII.) for the establishment of an, 563

Convention (XII.) for the establishment of an, 563

costs of parties before the, 576

costs of parties before the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

expenses of the, 576

expenses of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

law to be applied by the, 571

law to be applied by the, 571

personnel of the, 565

staff of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

procedure of the, 572-577, 578

procedure of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-577, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

projects for an, 360, 559-563

projects for an, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-563

registry of the, 569, 573, 579

registry of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

seat of the, 568

seat of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

tasks for the, 542, 543, 544, 545, 554, 557

tasks for the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__

International Rivers, blockade of, 454

International Rivers, blockage of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Intervention:

Intervention:

conception of, 54

idea of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

distinguished from participation, 54

distinguished from engagement, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

illegitimate warfare and, 302

illegitimate warfare and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

instance of, 388

instance of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

mode of, 55

method of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

right of, 304

right of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

time of, 55

time of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Invasion in contradistinction to occupation, 98, 206

Invasion is not occupation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Invincible, case of the, 282

Invincible, the case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Ionian Islands, neutrality of, 88, 369

Ionian Islands, neutrality of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Irregular forces, definition of, 96

Irregular forces, definition of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Italian Marine Code (1865), 222

Italian Maritime Code (1865), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Italian Prize Commission, 556

Italian Award Committee, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

J

J

Jakoga, Major, case of, 199, 315

Jakoga, Major, case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Jameson raid, 62

Jameson raid, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Jemchug, case of the, 423

Jemchug, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Johanna Emilie, case of the, 110

Johanna Emilie, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Joinville, Prince de, on bombardment, 266

Joinville, Prince de, on blast, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Jus:

Jus:

angariae, 45, 446

angariae, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

belli, 91

belli, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

postliminii, 339

postliminii, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

See also Right

Check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

K

K

Kaiserin Maria Theresia, case of the, 390

Kaiserin Maria Theresia, case of the, 390

Kamranh Bay, Russian fleet in, 404

Kamranh Bay, with the Russian fleet in, 404

Keith, Lord, and capitulation of El Arish, 288

Keith, Lord, and the surrender of El Arish, 288

Kléber, General, and capitulation of El Arish, 287

Kléber, General, and surrender of El Arish, 287

Kleen, on carriage of contraband, 504

Kleen, regarding smuggling illegal goods, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Knight Commander, case of the, 548

Knight Commander: The Case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Korea, 87

Korea, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

as theatre of war, 387, 395

as a battleground, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Korietz, case of the, 388, 424, 442

Korietz, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Kow-shing, case of the, 114, 424

Kow-shing, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Kriegs-manier, 84

War-style, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Kruger, President, conveyance to Europe, 433

Kruger, President, traveling to Europe, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

L

L

La Santissima Trinidad, case of the, 405

La Santissima Trinidad, case of the, 405

Lambermont, Baron, cited on private individuals who commit hostile acts, 66

Lambermont, Baron, referenced individuals who engage in hostile actions, 66

Land warfare:

Land combat:

aims of, 144

goals of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

assault, 191-193

assault, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-193

[Pg 701] asylum during. See Neutral asylum

asylum during. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

bombardment, 191-195

bombing, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-195

captivity. See Captivity

captivity. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

contributions, 153, 186, 212

contributions, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

convoys of evacuation, 160

evacuation convoys, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

dead, treatment of the, 162

dead, treatment of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

distinguished from sea warfare, 145

different from naval warfare, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

emblems denoting medical establishments and personnel, 161, 203

emblems indicating medical facilities and staff, 161, 203

enemy property. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

espionage, 196-199

espionage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-199

expanding bullets, 149

expanding bullets, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

explosive bullets, 149

explosive bullets, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

explosives from balloons, 150

balloon explosives, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

flags of truce, 278

truce flags, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

killing of combatants, 146

killing of fighters, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

lawful practices in, 144, 148

lawful practices in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

means of, 144

ways to, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

medical establishments, units, and material, 158, 195, 493

medical facilities, departments, and supplies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

medical personnel, 159

healthcare workers, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

objects of means of, 145

methods of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

occupation. See Enemy territory, occupation of

occupation. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, job of

prisoners, who may be made, 151, 152, 153, 169. See also Prisoners of War

prisoners, who can be made, 151, 152, 153, 169. See also Prisoners of War

projectiles: from balloons, 150

projectiles: from balloons, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

diffusing noxious gases, 150

releasing toxic gases, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

quarter, refusal of, 147

quarter, refusal of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

requisitions, 153, 183-186, 212

requisitions, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-186, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

ruses, 200-203

tricks, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-203

sick, treatment of, 154-165

illness, medical care for, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-165

siege, 191-194

siege, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-194

stratagems, 200-203

tactics, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-203

treason, 199

treason, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

unlawful practices in, 144, 148, 192, 193

unlawful practices in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

violence against enemy persons, 146, 151, 153

violence against enemy individuals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

wounded, treatment of, 154-165

wounded, treatment of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-165

wounding of combatants, 146, 148

wounding of fighters, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Lapérouse, Count, granted safe-conduct, 233

Lapérouse, Count, granted safe passage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Laws of war:

Laws of warfare:

binding force of, 83

binding force of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

development of, 79-83

development of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-83

origin of, 78, 79

origin of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

treaties regarding, 79-83

treaties about, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-83

Legitimate warfare, means of securing, 300-321

Legitimate warfare, means of securing, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-321

Le Hardy contre La Voltigeante, 111

Le Hardy vs La Voltigeante, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Lena, case of the, 422

Lena, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

L'Espiègle, case of the, 443

L'Espiègle, the case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Letters of marque, 42, 46, 100, 220, 239, 351, 357, 399, 534

Letters of marque, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__

Levies:

Fees:

en masse, 97, 152, 190, 313

in bulk, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

forcible, 205, 211

forcibly, 205, 211

on neutral territories forbidden, 398

forbidden in neutral territories, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Licences:

Licenses:

special, of ingress and egress during blockade, 453

special, of entry and exit during blockade, 453

to trade, 275

to swap, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Lichtenstein, war with Prussia, 323

Lichtenstein, war with Prussia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Lieber, on rules of war, 80

Lieber, on the laws of war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Lien on war material, 416

Lien on military equipment, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Lion, case of the, 424

Lion's case, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Lippencott, Captain, case of, 307

Lippencott, Captain, case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Loans, 430-432

Loans, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-432

London: Declaration of. See Declaration of London

London: Declaration. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Naval Conference of (1908-9), 108, 360, 536, 577

Naval Conference of (1908-9), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

Treaty of (1863), 88

Treaty of (1863), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Louis XIV.: Ordinance of 1681, concerning neutral property, 219

Louis XIV: Ordinance of 1681, regarding neutral property, 219

practice of embargo, 446

embargo practice, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Louis Napoleon, award of, in the case of the General Armstrong, 442

Louis Napoleon, award of, in the case of the General Armstrong, 442

Ludwig, case of the, 244

Ludwig, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Lushington, on blockade, 462, 463, 464

Lushington, under blockade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Luxemburg, neutrality of, 91, 368, 393, 413

Luxembourg, neutrality of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

Luxor, case of the, 507, 558

Luxor, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

M

M

Madison, Mr., reprisal by, 307

Madison, Mr., retaliation by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Magellan, Straits of, neutralisation of, 89

Magellan, Straits of, neutralization, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Mailbags during war, 237, 385, 524

Mailbags in wartime, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Mailboats during war, 236, 526, 531, 535

Mailboats in wartime, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

Malacca, case of the, 102

Malacca, the case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Manchuria, 87, 387, 395

Manchuria, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Man-of-war, neutral, as an asylum, 423

Man-of-war, neutral, as a safe haven, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Manouba, case of the, 531

Manouba, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Marauding, 316

Marauding, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Maritime Convention of St. Petersburg (1801), 356, 536

Maritime Convention of St. Petersburg (1801), 356, 536

Martens, von, 18

Martens, von, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Mason, Mr., case of seizure of, 519, 530

Mason, Mr., case of seizure of, 519, 530

Mediation, 10-15

Mediation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-15

difference between good offices and, 11

difference between good offices and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

duty of asking for, 13

duty to ask for, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

duty of offering, 10, 13

duty of providing, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

duty of receiving, 13

duty of receiving, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Hague Convention, rules regarding, 12-14

Hague Convention, rules about, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-14

legal value of, 5

legal value of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

occasions for, 10, 303, 328

occasions for, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

particular form of, 14

specific type of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

right of offering, 10, 15

right to offer, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

value of, 14

value of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

[Pg 702] Mediatorial Conference possible, 10

Mediatorial Conference possible, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Medical establishments, &c. See Land Warfare, also Naval warfare

Medical institutions, &c. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, also __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Menam, blockade of, 49

Menam, block, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Menou, General, and capitulation of El Arish, 288

Menou, General, and surrender of El Arish, 288

Merchantmen, enemy:

Enemy merchant ships:

appropriation of, 218-224, 238-249

appropriation of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-224, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-249

attacking, 313

attacking, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

attack on, 104, 225, 226

attack on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

conversion into men-of-war, 100-104

conversion into warships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-104

conversion into men-of-war after

conversion to warships after

capture, 104, 231

capture, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

crews of, 104, 250

crews of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

destruction of, 242-245

destruction of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-245

immunity from seizure of, 234, 235

immunity from seizure of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

neutral goods on, 218-220, 244, 384

neutral goods on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-220, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

ransom of, 245

ransom of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

restoration of, 247

restoration of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

sale of, 117, 248

sale of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

sale of goods on, in transitu, 119, 249

sale of goods in transit, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

seizure of, 231

seizure of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

status of, at outbreak of war, 140-143

status of, at outbreak of war, 140-143

voyage of, at outbreak of war, 235

voyage of, at the outbreak of war, 235

Merchantmen, neutral:

Neutral merchant ships:

crews of, 250

crews of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

enemy goods on, 115, 218-224, 356, 385

enemy goods on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-224, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

giving transport to belligerents, 433, 525

transporting fighters, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

rendering unneutral service, 386, 434, 524

providing biased service, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

rescuing wounded, &c., 259

rescuing the injured, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

under convoy, 355, 535, 543

under escort, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

under enemy flag, 112-115, 233, 248

under enemy flag, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-115, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Messina, blockade of, 49

Messina, blockade of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Meteor, case of the, 405

Meteor, the case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Metz, battle of, 393, 413

Metz, Battle of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Mexico, blockade of, 49

Mexico, blockade of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Military operations and neutrals, 386-397

Military ops and neutral parties, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-397

Military preparations and neutrals, 397-409

Military readiness and neutral parties, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-409

Militia, 94

Militia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Mines:

Mines:

Convention concerning the laying of, 228, 463

Installation convention for, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

floating mechanical, 227-231

floating machine, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-231

submarine contact, 227-231, 445, 463

submarine contact, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-231, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Mitylene, seizure of the island of, 43

Mitylene, takeover of the island of, 43

Modena, subjugation of, 327

Modena, conquest of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Modeste, case of the, 441

Modeste, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Money as contraband, 487

Money as illegal goods, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Montara, case of the, 114

Montara, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Moynier, Gustave, 155

Moynier, Gustave, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Municipal neutrality laws, 364, 375, 418, 422

Municipal neutrality laws, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

Municipal officials, deposition by enemy, 214

Municipal officials, deposition by adversary, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

N

N

Nancy Court of Appeal, case of, 215

Nancy Court of Appeal, case of, 215

Naniwa, case of the, 114, 423

Naniwa, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Napoleon I.:

Napoleon I

act of reprisals by, 131

retaliation by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Berlin decrees of (1806), 357, 453

Berlin decrees (1806), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

seizure of works of art by, 177

seizure of works of art by, 177

troops ordered by, to march through neutral territory, 391

troops ordered by to march through neutral territory, 391

Nassau, subjugation of, 327

Nassau, conquering, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Nationality of owner determines character of goods, 116

Nationality of the owner determines the nature of the goods, 116

Naval Code: Italian, 222

Naval Code: Italian, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

United States. See United States

United States. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Naval Conference of London. See London

London Naval Conference. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Naval Prize Act (1864), 245, 247

Naval Prize Act (1864), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Naval Prize Bill (1911), 240, 245, 247

Naval Prize Act (1911), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Naval warfare:

Naval combat:

aims of, 216

goals of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

asylum during. See Neutral asylum

asylum during. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

bombardment of enemy coast, 266-270

enemy coast bombardment, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-270

cables, interference with submarine, 271

cables, interference with sub, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

contributions, 264

contributions, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

dead, treatment of, 254

dead, treatment of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

enemy merchantmen. See Merchantmen; Prizes

enemy merchant ships. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

espionage, 262

spying, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

flags of truce, 278

peace flags, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

French Ordinances relating to, 219

French Laws regarding, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

hospital ships, 236, 254-257

hospital ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-257

hospital staff on ships, 260

hospital staff on ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

law of, impending codification, 224

law of, upcoming codification, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

lawful practices, 217

legal practices, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

means of, 216, 225

ways of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

medical staff on ship, 260

medical team on board, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

objects of, 218

objects of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

prisoners, who may be made, 250

prisoners who may be made, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

private property at sea during, 218-223

private property at sea during, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-223

prizes. See Prizes; Prize Courts

prizes. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

religious staff on ship, 260

ship's religious leader, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

requisitions, 264

requisitions, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

restrictions on the right of capture, 232-237

restrictions on the right of capture, 232-237

ruses, 262

strategies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

shipwrecked, treatment of, 253

shipwrecked, care for, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

sick, treatment of, 253

illness, treatment of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

treason, 262

treason, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

unlawful practices, 217

illegal activities, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

[Pg 703] violence: against combatants, 249

violence: against fighters, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

against non-combatants, 250

against civilians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

against enemy civilians, 251

against enemy civilians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

wounded:

injured

articles destined for the, 493

articles intended for the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

treatment of, 253

treatment of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

neutral ships assisting, 259, 423-425

neutral ships assisting, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-425

Navarino, battle of, 48

Navarino, Battle of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Negotiation:

Negotiation:

conception of, 6

idea of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

effect of, 9

effect of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

importance of, 9

importance of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

legal value of, 5

legal value of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

peace, 328

peace, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

procedure during, 6

procedure during, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Negroes, as members of regular forces, 99

Negroes, as members of regular forces, 99

Nelson, 356

Nelson, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Nereide, case of the, 542

Nereide, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ case

Netherlands, right of convoy claimed by the, 535

Netherlands, right of convoy claimed by the, 535

Neumayr de Ramsla, 349

Neumayr de Ramsla, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Neutral asylum:

Safe haven:

abuse of, 420-423

abuse of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-423

exterritoriality of men-of-war in, 419

exterritoriality of warships in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

facilities rendered to vessels in, 402, 404, 420, 422, 423

facilities offered to ships in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__

fugitive soldiers and, 413-415

fugitive soldiers and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-415

in general, 409

generally, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

land and naval forces distinguished as regards, 417

land and naval forces distinguished in terms of, 417

land forces and, 409-416

land forces and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-416

naval forces and, 417-425

naval forces and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-425

neutral men-of-war as, 423

neutral warships as, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

non-combatants of belligerent forces and, 415

non-combatants of warring parties and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

option of State to grant, 417

option for State to grant, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

prisoners of war and, 410, 419

prisoners of war and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

vessels in distress in, 418

vessels in distress in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

war material in, 415

war supplies in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Neutral goods:

Neutral products:

innocent, on destroyed neutral vessels, 550

innocent, on destroyed neutral ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

on enemy men-of-war, 232, 542

on enemy warships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

on such enemy merchantmen as are being destroyed, 244

on enemy merchant ships that are being destroyed, 244

Neutralisation, temporary, 89

Neutralization, temporary, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Neutralised States as belligerents, 91, 93, 386-389

Neutralized States as combatants, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__-389

Neutrality:

Neutrality:

angary, right of, 446-449

angary, right to, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-449

armed, definition of, 369

armed, meaning of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

the First and the Second. See First Armed Neutrality; Second Armed Neutrality

the First and Second. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

asylum, to land forces, 409-416

asylum, to ground troops, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-416

naval forces, 417-425

navy forces, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-425

war material, 415

military equipment, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

belligerents to recognise, 367

belligerents to acknowledge, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

benevolent, 370

kind, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

blockade. See Blockade

blockade. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

characteristics of, 361-368

characteristics of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-368

civil war and, 365

civil war and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

commencement of, 373-377

start of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-377

conception of, 361

concept of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

contraband. See Contraband of war

contraband. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Conventions, 383

Conferences, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

conventional, 369

traditional, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

declarations of, 374

declarations of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

definition of, 361

definition of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

development and institution of, 347-360

development and establishment of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-360

different kinds of, 368-372

different types of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-372

end of, 377

end of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

in general, 369

overall, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

impartiality, contents of duty of, 362, 381, 383

impartiality, duty contents of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

instances of, 350

instances of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

intercourse during, no cessation of, 365, 385

intercourse continuously, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

knowledge of war necessary for, 373

war knowledge necessary for, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

laws prescribing attitude of, 375-377

laws dictating attitude of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-377

military operations and, 386-397

military operations and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-397

military preparations and, 397-409

military preparations and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-409

oath of, 212, 364

oath of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

partial, 369

partial, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

perfect, 370

perfect, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

perpetual, 368

everlasting, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

qualified, 370-372, 389, 392

qualified, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-372, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

rights and duties derived from, 363, 378-386

rights and responsibilities from, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-386

rule of 1756, 114, 353, 499

rule of 1756, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

treaties affecting, 371-372

treaties impacting, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-372

violation of. See Violation of neutrality

violation of. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

voluntary, 369

voluntary, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Neutrals:

Neutrals:

asylum. See Neutral asylum

asylum. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

belligerents occupying territory of, 394

belligerents occupying territory of, 394

conduct in general of, 362, 378

conduct in general of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

depôts and factories of belligerents on territory of, 397

depots and factories of warring parties on the territory of, 397

fugitive soldiers in custody of, 413-415

fugitive soldiers in custody of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-415

hostilities by and against, 386-389

hostilities for and against, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-389

impartiality of, 362, 381-383, 386

impartiality of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-383, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

intercourse between enemy and, 365, 385

intercourse between enemy and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

loans by, to belligerents, 430

loans to combatants, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

on the part of subjects of, 430-432

on the part of subjects of, 430-432

men-of-war, built and fitted out by, 405-409

warships, built and equipped by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-409

passage of, through waters of, 393

passage through the waters of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

rescuing wounded, &c., 259, 424

rescuing the injured, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

supplied by, 389

provided by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

military operations and, 386-397

military operations and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-397

information regarding, 434-437

info about, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-437

[Pg 704] military preparations and, 397-409

military preparations and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-409

mines, laying of, by, 445

mining, conducted by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

naval operations and, 400-409

naval operations and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-409

information regarding, 434-437

info about, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-437

organisation of hostile expeditions by, 400

organizing hostile missions by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

pilotage by, 432

pilotage by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Prize Courts on territory of, 395

Prize Courts on the territory of, 395

prizes of belligerents and, 395

prizes of combatants and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

relations of, with belligerents, 378-449

relations with belligerents, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-449

representation at International Prize Court, 569

representation at International Prize Court, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

rights and duties of, 363, 378-386

rights and responsibilities of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-386

services by, to belligerents, 389, 432-437

services provided to rival forces, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-437

subjects of, fighting for belligerents, 390

subjects of, fighting for belligerents, 390

supplies by, to belligerents, 375, 405-409, 426-430

supplies for combatants, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-409, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__-430

on part of subjects of, 427-430

on part of subjects of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-430

transport by, 424, 433-434

transport by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-434

troops, levy of, by, 398

troops, levy by __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

supplied by, 389, 398

supplied by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

vessels of, rescuing wounded, 259, 424

vessels for rescuing the wounded, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Neutral territory:

Neutral ground:

as a base of naval operations forbidden, 400-404

as a base for naval operations is prohibited, 400-404

as an asylum, 410-416, 425

as an asylum, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-416, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

despatches carried over, 435

dispatches carried over, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

other uses made of, by belligerents, 394-399, 400

other uses made of, by belligerents, 394-399, 400

passage through, 372, 382, 391-394, 399

pass through, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__-394, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

shipwrecked, the, on, 424

shipwrecked on __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Newspaper correspondents in naval warfare, 437

Newspaper reporters in naval warfare, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Niagara, case of the, 465

Niagara, the case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Nickolsburg, Preliminaries of, 329

Nickolsburg, Preliminary __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Nigretia, case of the, 519

Nigretia, the case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Nimeguen, Peace of (1678), 61

Nimeguen, Peace of (1678), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Non-combatants:

Civilians:

attached to armies, 95, 151, 158-161, 169

attached to armies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__-161, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

attached to naval forces, 250, 254-257, 415

attached to naval forces, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-257, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Non-hostile relations, 273-299

Friendly relations, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-299

North-Eastern Boundary Dispute between U.S.A. and Great Britain, 19

North-Eastern Boundary Dispute between the U.S. and Great Britain, 19

North-German Confederation, 100

North German Confederation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

North Sea outrage. See Dogger Bank

North Sea scandal. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Northern war, selling of territories during, 205

Northern war, selling of territories during, 205

Notification:

Alert:

of blockade, 457-459

of blockade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-459

of bombardment, 194

of bombing, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

of contraband, 484, 488

of contraband, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

of outbreak of war, 125, 374

of outbreak of war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Novara, case of the, 233

Novara case of the __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Novik, case of the, 423

Novik, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

O

O

Occupation of enemy territory. See Enemy territory

Occupation of enemy territory. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Oki, Captain Teisuki, 199, 315

Okay, Captain Teisuki, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Oldhamia, case of the, 548

Oldhamia, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Oleg, case of the, 423

Oleg, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Open Sea:

Open Sea

angary, right of, on, 447

angary, right of, on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

belligerents in neutral ports leaving for, 401, 402, 421

belligerents in neutral ports leaving for, 401, 402, 421

capture on the, 526

capture on the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

contraband on, 495

contraband on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

despatch carriers on, 526, 528, 531

send carriers on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

enemy property found on, by belligerents, 547

enemy property found on, by belligerents, 547

goods on neutral vessels on, 495-514

goods on neutral ships on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-514

jurisdiction over foreign subjects on, 364

jurisdiction over foreign subjects __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

mechanical mines in, 227

mechanical mines in __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

neutral merchantmen on, 128

neutral merchant ships on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

neutralisation of parts of, 88-90

neutralization of parts of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-90

order on the, in thirteenth century, 239

order on the, in thirteenth century, 239

region of war, 85

war zone, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

telegraph cables in, 271, 272

telegraph cables in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

visitation on, 534

visitation on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Orange Free State, annexation of, 327

Orange Free State annexation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

effective occupation of, 209

effective occupation of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Ordinances by France on neutral ships and goods, 219

Ordinances by France on neutral ships and goods, 219

Orinoco Steamship Company, case of, 19

Orinoco Steamship Company, case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Orozembo, case of the, 518

Orozembo, the case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Outbreak of war:

War outbreak:

after declaration, 123

after declaration, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

after initiative hostile acts, 126

after initiative hostile actions, 126

after ultimatum, 125

after the ultimatum, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

effects of. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

in general, 121

generally, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

notification of, 125

notification of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

P

P

Pacific blockade:

Pacific blockade:

admissibility of, 50, 52

admissibility of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

development of, 48

development of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

disposal of vessels seized during, 52

disposal of seized vessels, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

instances of, 48, 49, 51, 52

instances of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

mode of, 52

method of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

third States and, 51

third States and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

value of, 53

value of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

variations of practice in, 51

practice variations in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

war not necessarily caused by, 53

war not necessarily caused by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

[Pg 705]Pacifico, Don, case of, 41, 49

Pacifico, Don, case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Palme, case of the, 233

Palme case, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Panama Canal, neutralisation of the, 89

Panama Canal, its neutralization, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Papal States, 327

Papal States, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Paris:

Paris:

Act of November (1815), 392

Act of November 1815, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Declaration of (1856). See Declaration of Paris

Declaration of 1856. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Peace treaty of. See Peace treaty

Peace treaty of. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Parma, subjugation of, 327

Parma, conquest of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Parole, release on, 170, 172

Parole, release on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Pascal, case of the, 424

Pascal, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Passage through neutral territory:

Crossing neutral territory:

of individuals intending to enlist, 399

of people planning to join, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

of prisoners of war and wounded, 412

of prisoners of war and wounded, 412

of troops, 372, 382, 391

of troops, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

of wounded, 392

of injured, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Passports, 276

Passports, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Paul, Emperor, armed neutrality in reign of, 355, 356

Paul, Emperor, armed neutrality during his reign, 355, 356

Paxo, neutralisation of, 88, 369

Paxo, neutralization of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Peace:

Peace

negotiations for, 328

negotiations for __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

preliminaries of, 329

preliminary details of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

restoration of condition of, 332

restoration of condition of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Peace Conferences. See Hague Peace Conferences

Peace Talks. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Peace Societies, so-called, 22

Peace Societies, as they're called, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Peace treaty of:

Peace treaty of:

Amiens (1802), 332

Amiens (1802), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Berlin (1878), 330

Berlin (1878), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Bukarest (1886), 92

Bucharest (1886), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Frankfort (1871), 329, 338, 343

Frankfort (1871), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Frederikshamm (1809), 205

Frederikshamm (1809), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

London (1863), 88; (1864), 88

London (1863), 88; (1864), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Nimeguen (1678), 61

Nijmegen (1678), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Paris (1856), 11

Paris (1856), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Portsmouth (1905), 15, 329, 331, 555

Portsmouth (1905), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

Prague (1866), 329

Prague (1866), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Pyrenees (1659), 537

Pyrenees (1659), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

San Stefano (1878), 330, 335

San Stefano (1878), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Westminster (1654), 535

Westminster (1654), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Zürich (1859), 329

Zürich (1859), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Perfidy, instances of, 202, 263, 281, 285

Betrayal, examples of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

Permanent Court of Arbitration, 13, 22, 23, 26, 157, 561

Permanent Court of Arbitration, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__

Administrative Council of the, 565, 569

Administrative Council of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

International Bureau of the, 8, 27, 562, 569, 573, 579

International Bureau of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__

procedure of the, 27-31

procedure of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-31

Persia, emblem of medical service, 161, 259

Persia, symbol of health, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Persona standi in judicio of alien enemies, 133

Persona standi in judicio of alien enemies, 133

Peterburg, case of the, 102

Petersburg, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Peterhoff, case of the, 454, 470, 500, 501

Peterhoff case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

Phillimore on:

Phillimore on:

blockade, 462

blockade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

continuous voyage, 500

ongoing journey, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

reprisals, 42

reprisals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

violations of neutrality, 371

violating neutrality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Pillage, 181

Loot, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Pilotage by neutrals, 432

Neutral pilotage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Poison in warfare, 85, 148, 193, 249

Poison in warfare, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

Port Arthur, battle of, 423

Port Arthur, Battle of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

blockade of, 227, 436

blockade of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

surrender of, 285

surrender of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Portalis, declaration by, 64

Portalis, statement by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Portsmouth, Peace treaty of (1905), 15, 329, 331, 555

Portsmouth Peace Treaty (1905), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

Portugal, treaty affecting neutrality of, 372

Portugal, treaty affecting its neutrality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Postal Convention:

Mail Agreement:

between Great Britain and Holland (1843), 237

between Great Britain and Holland (1843), 237

between Great Britain and France (1860), 236

between Great Britain and France (1860), 236

Postal correspondence during war 236, 385, 524

Postal mail during war __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Postilion, case of the, 112, 115

Postilion, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Postliminium:

Postliminium:

conception of, 339

concept of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

effects of, 340

effects of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

illegitimate acts and, 343

illegitimate actions and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

interregnum debars, 343

interregnum prevents, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

legitimate acts unaffected by, 342

legitimate acts unaffected by __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

revival of former state of things, 341

revival of the old situation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Prague, Treaty of (1866), 329

Prague Treaty (1866), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Preliminaries of peace, 329

Peace talks, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Prévost, General, reprisal by, 307

Prévost, General, retaliation by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Princesse Marie, case of the, 548

Princess Marie, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Prisoners of war, 134, 151, 152, 153, 165-173, 250, 306, 308, 316, 335, 411, 419, 420

Prisoners of war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__-173, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_10__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_11__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_12__

Private enemy property:

Enemy property:

appropriation of, 174, 179-182

appropriation of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-182

at sea, 218, 221-224

at sea, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-224

booty on battlefield, 163, 177, 181

booty on the battlefield, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

conveyed into belligerents' territory, 182

conveyed into enemy territory, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

destruction of, 187-191

destruction of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-191

during bombardment, 194, 195

during bombardment, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

immovable, 179

immovable, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

on enemy territory, 139-143

on enemy territory, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-143

personal, 180

personal, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

transport, means of, 180

transport, means of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

utilisation of, 179

use of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

war material, 180

war materials, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

works of art and science, 180, 195

art and science, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Private individuals:

Private individuals:

during siege and bombardment, 193, 194

during siege and bombardment, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

hostility in arms of, 97, 152, 312

hostility in arms of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

intercourse and trade with enemy subjects, 135, 405, 427-432, 434-437

intercourse and trade with enemy subjects, 135, 405, 427-432, 434-437

of neutral States, treatment of, 363-365

of neutral States, treatment of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-365

[Pg 706]persona standi in judicio, 133

[Pg 706]legal standing, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

position at outbreak of war, 131

position at start of war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

position in general as regards war, 63-67

position in general as regards war, 63-67

property of, on enemy territory, 139

property of, in enemy territory, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

requisitions in kind and service from, 152, 184-187, 211-213

requisitions in kind and service from, 152, 184-187, 211-213

violence against, 151, 251

violence against, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Privateering, 103, 219, 353

Privateering, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Privateers, 99, 357, 372, 534

Privateers, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

Prize Courts:

Prize Courts:

adjudication by, 231, 240

adjudication by __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

appeal against judgment of, 241, 529, 530, 555, 557

appeal against judgment of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__

blockade runners, adjudication of, 476

blockade runners, trial of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

captured neutral vessel to be tried by, 510-514, 529, 530, 544, 547-552

captured neutral vessel to be tried by, 510-514, 529, 530, 544, 547-552

claims after judgment of, 557

claims after judgment of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

conduct of neutral vessels to, 547

conduct of neutral vessels to, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

continuous voyage and, 499

continuous voyage and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

discretion of, as to confiscation, 544

discretion about confiscation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

origin of, 238

origin of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

practice of, 553

practice of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

purpose of, 239

purpose of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

reform projects for, 559

reform projects for __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

territory on which instituted, 240, 395

territory where established, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Prizes:

Awards:

abandonment of, 246

abandonment of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

cargo of, 242

cargo of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

conduct of, to Prize Court, 241, 546

conduct of, to Prize Court, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

crew of, 105, 231, 242, 547

crew of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

destruction of, 242, 547

destruction of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

distribution of prize money, 248

prize money distribution, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

fate of, 231, 247

fate of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

hostage for ransom, 246

ransom hostage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

loss of, 246

loss of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

neutral goods on, 242, 244, 530

neutral goods on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

ransom of, 245

ransom of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

recapture of, 246, 551

recapture of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

safe keeping on neutral territory, 395

safekeeping on neutral ground, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

sale of, 396

sale of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

effect of, 248

impact of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Property. View __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Prussian Regulations regarding Naval Prizes, 505

Prussian Rules on Naval Prizes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Public enemy property:

Public enemy property:

appropriation of, 174-178, 183

appropriation of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-178, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

at sea, 218

at sea, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

booty on battlefield, 163, 177

booty on the battlefield, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

destruction of. See Destruction of enemy property

destruction of. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

during bombardment, 195

during attack, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

immoveable, 174-175

immovable, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-175

moveable, 176-177

movable, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-177

on enemy territory, 139

in enemy territory, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

utilisation of, 175, 176

use of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Pufendorf, 295

Pufendorf, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Pursuit, right of. See Right of pursuit

Right to pursue. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Pyrenees, Peace treaty of (1659), 537

Pyrenees Peace Treaty (1659), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Q

Q

Qualification of belligerents, 90-92

Qualification of combatants, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-92

Qualified neutrality, 370-372, 389, 392

Qualified neutrality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-372, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Quarter:

Quarter:

duty of giving, 147, 231, 249

duty of giving, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

refusal of, 147

refusal of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Quartering of soldiers, 181, 185

Quartering of soldiers, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

R

R

Railways, use of, in war, 139, 176, 180, 447, 448

Railway use in war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__

Ramillies, case of the, 263

Ramillies case, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Ransom of prize, 245

Ransom for prize, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Rapid, case of the, 522

Rapid, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Ras-el-Tin Fort, case of, 282

Ras-el-Tin Fort, example of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Rebellion contrasted with war, 62

Rebellion vs. war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Rebels, 70

Rebels, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Recapture of prizes, 246, 551

Recapture of prizes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Receptum arbitri, 17

Arbitrator's decision, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Recognition as a belligerent Power, 69

Recognition as a warring power, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Red Cross, 161, 164, 203, 258

Red Cross, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

Red Sea, proposed neutralisation of, 90

Red Sea, proposed neutralization of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Region of war, 85-90

War zone, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-90

exclusion from, through neutralisation, 88

exclusion by neutralization, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Relief Societies, 171

Relief Societies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Reparation for:

Compensation for:

exercise of right of angary, 385

exercise of right of angary, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

violation of neutrality, 352, 380, 442

breach of neutrality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Repatriation, 172, 173

Repatriation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Reprisals:

Retaliation:

admissibility of, 40, 46, 281, 305

admissibility of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

arbitrariness in, danger of, 306

arbitrariness in, risk of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

by whom performed, 41

by who performed, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

cessation of, 46

end of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

conception of, 38

idea of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

embargo, 40, 44. See also Embargo

embargo, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__. See also __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

inception of, 46

start of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

instances of, 131, 147, 306-308

instances of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__-308

kinds of, 42, 44

types of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

laws of war not binding in case of, 84

laws of war not binding in case of, 84

objects of, 42

objects of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

peace, distinguished from war, 46, 305

peace, not like war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

proportionate to wrong done, 44

proportional to the wrong done, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

restriction of, proposed, 308

restriction of, proposed, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

value of, 46, 305

value of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

[Pg 707]Requisitions, 153, 181, 183-186, 212, 264, 267

Requisitions, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__-186, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__

Reshitelni, case of the, 389, 442

Reshitelni, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Resistance to visitation, forcible, 540-543

Resistance to visit, forced, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-543

Retorsion:

Retorsion:

conception and characteristics of, 36

conception and traits of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

exercise of, 37

exercise of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

importance of, 36

importance of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

justification for, 37

justification for, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

reprisals contrasted with, 38

reprisals vs. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

value of, 38

value of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Reuss, M. de, 40

Reuss, M. de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Riga, blockade of, 464

Riga, siege of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Right:

Right:

of angary, 446-449, 510

of anger, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-449, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

of convoy, 535

of convoy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

of pursuit of a vanquished army into neutral territory, 352, 387

of chasing a defeated army into neutral territory, 352, 387

of pursuit of a defeated fleet into neutral waters, 352, 387, 422

of chasing a defeated fleet into neutral waters, 352, 387, 422

of stoppage in transitu, 120

of stoppage in transit, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

of visit and search, 290, 533

of visit and search, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

See also Jus

Check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Rio de Janeiro, blockade of, 49

Rio de Janeiro, blockade of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Rio Grande, blockade of the, 454

Blockade of the Rio Grande, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Rivier, 84

Riviera, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Riza Bey, Colonel, made prisoner, 531

Riza Bey, Colonel, was taken prisoner, 531

Roberts, Lord:

Lord Roberts:

action concerning train wrecking, 318

action regarding train wreck, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

proclamations during South African War, 318

proclamations during the South African War, 318

reprisal by, 306

reprisal by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Robe d'ennemy confisque celle d'amy, 219

Enemy's robe confiscated, that of a friend, 219

Roche, Hon. J. B., case of, 376

Roche, Hon. J. B., case of, 376

Rojdestvensky, Admiral, in territorial waters, 404

Rojdestvensky, Admiral, in territorial seas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

North Sea outrage and, 7

North Sea scandal and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Rouen, blockade of, 454

Rouen, blockade of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Rule of 1756, 114, 353, 499

Rule of 1756, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Ruses:

Tricks:

characteristics of, 200

characteristics of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

distinguished from perfidy, 202

distinguished from betrayal, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

kinds of, 201, 262

types of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Russo-Japanese War referred to on:

Russo-Japanese War mentioned on:

armistice, 331

truce, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

asylum to men-of-war, 422, 423

asylum to warships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

booty on battlefield, 182

booty on battlefield, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

capitulation, 285

surrender, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

contraband, 486, 488

contraband, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

declaration of war, 123

war declaration, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

destruction of enemy merchantmen, 243

destruction of enemy merchant ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

destruction of neutral prizes, 548

destruction of neutral awards, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Dogger Bank case, 7

Dogger Bank situation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

disguised soldiery, 202, 302

disguised soldiers, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

enemy subjects on belligerent's territory, 132

enemy subjects on the opponent's territory, 132

hospital ships, 256

hospital ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

intervention, 388

intervention, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

irregular forces, 96

irregular troops, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

loans, flotation of, 431, 432

loans, flotation of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

mechanical mines, 227

mechanical mines, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

merchantmen at outbreak of war, 235

merchant ships at war outbreak, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

neutrality, 87, 359, 375, 387, 390, 422

neutrality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__

peace negotiations, 329, 331

peace talks, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

prisoners of war, 336, 424

prisoners of war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

prizes, destruction of, 243

prizes, destruction of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

region of war, 87, 387, 395

region of conflict, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

release of neutral prizes, 555

release of neutral prizes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

telegraphic facilities, 436

telegraph services, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

unneutral service, 519, 525

unbiased service, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

volunteer fleets, 102

volunteer fleets, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

warships in neutral waters, 404

warships in neutral waters, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

war treason, 315

war treason, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Russo-Swedish War (1788), referred to on neutrality, 372, 389

Russo-Swedish War (1788), known for its stance on neutrality, 372, 389

Russo-Turkish War (1877), referred to on:

Russo-Turkish War (1877), referred to on:

flag, use of false, 262

flag, false use, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

loans, 431

loans, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

merchantmen at outbreak of war, 235

merchantmen at the outbreak of war, 235

peace negotiations, 330

peace talks, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

S

S

Safe-conducts, granting of, 232, 276

Safe conducts, granting of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Safeguards, 277

Safeguards, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

St. Kilda, case of the, 548

St. Kilda, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

St. Petersburg:

Saint Petersburg:

Declaration of. See Declaration of St. Petersburg

Declaration of. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Maritime Convention of (1801), 356, 536

Maritime Convention of 1801, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Sale of vessels in time of war, 117, 248, 390, 426

Sale of ships in wartime, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

San Stefano, Peace treaty of, 330, 335

San Stefano, Peace Treaty, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Sardinia, subjugation of States by, 327

Sardinia, state control by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Scott, Sir William:

Scott, Sir William:

neutral property on armed enemy vessels condemned by, 542

neutral property on armed enemy vessels condemned by, 542

on capture of enemy vessels in neutral waters, 443

on capture of enemy ships in neutral waters, 443

on contraband, 503

on illegal items, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

on unneutral service, 519

on neutral service, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

on vessels under neutral convoy, 543

on ships under neutral convoy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

See also Stowell, Lord

Check this out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Scouting, 197

Scouting, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Scouts, use of armed natives as, 99

Scouts, using armed locals as __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Sea warfare. See Naval warfare

Naval warfare. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Search:

Search:

resistance to, 540-545

resistance to, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-545

right of, over merchantmen, 533-540

right of, over merchant ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-540

during armistice, 290

during ceasefire, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Second Armed Neutrality, 355-357, 370, 461, 468, 481, 536

Second Armed Neutrality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-357, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__

[Pg 708]Sedan, battle of, 393

Sedan, battle of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Seizure, immunity of vessels from, 232-237

Vessel seizure immunity, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-237

See also Enemy vessels

Check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Servia, 62, 91

Servia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Seven Years' War, forcible levies in, 205

Seven Years' War, forced conscriptions in, 205

Ship. View __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Ship papers, 543-545

Ship documents, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-545

Shipwrecked, treatment of the, 252-262, 424

Shipwrecked, treatment of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-262, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Sicilian sulphur monopoly, 39, 45

Sicilian sulfur monopoly, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Sicilies, subjugation of the Two, 327

Sicily, conquest of the Two, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Sick-bays, 257

Sick bays, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Siege, 191, 193

Siege, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Silesia, passage of troops through, 391

Silesia, troop movements, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Silesian loan, case of the, 44, 557

Silesian loan, the case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Sinnet, Mr., case of, 376

Sinnet, Mr., case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Slidell, Mr., case of seizure of, 519, 530

Slidell, Mr., case of seizure of, 519, 530

Smith, Sir Sidney, and capitulation of El Arish, 287

Smith, Sir Sidney, and the surrender of El Arish, 287

Smolensk, case of the, 102

Smolensk, the case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Solferino, battle of, 155

Battle of Solferino, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

South African Republic:

South Africa:

annexation of, 326, 327

annexing __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

effective occupation of, 209

effective occupation of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

South African War referred to on:

South African War referenced on:

amnesty, 334

amnesty, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

concentration camps, 190

concentration camps, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

devastation, 190

devastation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

enemy character, 109

enemy character, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

enemy subjects on belligerent's territory, 132

enemy subjects on the belligerent's territory, 132

hostages, 318

hostages, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

natives as scouts, 99

natives as guides, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

need of an International Prize Court, 561

need of an International Prize Court, 561

neutrality, 359

neutrality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

neutrals' subjects fighting in the, 109

neutral subjects fighting in the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

passage of troops, 372

troop movement, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

prisoners, 147

prisoners, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

repatriation, 173

repatriation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

reprisals during, 306

reprisals during, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

subjugation, 327

subjugation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

transport, 433

transport, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

vessel, release of, 552

vessel, release of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Spanish-American War referred to on:

Spanish-American War mentioned on:

cable laying, 436

cable installation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

cancellation of treaties, 129

cancelling treaties, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

flag, use of false, 262

flag, misuse of false, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

merchantmen at outbreak of war, 235

merchantmen at the outbreak of war, 235

Spanish Armada, prisoners from, on neutral territory, 411

Spanish Armada, prisoners from, on neutral territory, 411

Spanish Colonies' War of Independence, sale of vessels in (1825), 426

Spanish Colonies' War of Independence, sale of ships in (1825), 426

Spies, 196, 262

Spies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Springbok, case of the, 470, 500, 501

Springbok case, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Stackelburg, Baron de, case of, 43

Stackelburg, Baron de, case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

State differences:

State differences:

amicable settlement of, 3-33

amicable settlement of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-33

four ways, 5

four ways, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

compulsive settlement of, 34-56

compulsive resolution of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-56

conception, 34

conception, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

four ways, 5, 34

four ways, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

ultimatums and demonstrations, 35

ultimatums and protests, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

war distinguished from, 34

war distinguished from, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Law of Nations and, 4

Law of Nations and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

legal, 3-5

legal, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-5

causes of, 3

causes of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

settlement of, 4

settlement of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

political, 3-5

political, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-5

causes of, 3

causes of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

settlement of, 4

settlement of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

States:

States:

duty of, in neutrality, 363

duty of neutrality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

qualification to make war, 90-93

qualification to wage war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-93

Stephen Hart, case of the, 470

Stephen Hart, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Stockholm, Convention of (1905), 89

Stockholm Convention (1905), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Stoessel, General accused of perfidy, 285

Stoessel, the general accused of betrayal, 285

Stone-blockade, 450, 463

Stone blockade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Stoppage in transitu, right of, 120

Right of stoppage in transit, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Story, Mr. Justice, 501, 542

Story, Mr. Justice, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Stowell, Lord:

Stowell, Lord:

on immunity of fishing-boats, 234

on fishing boat immunity, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

on Prize Courts, 554

on Prize Courts, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

See also __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Strassburg, 61, 193

Strasbourg, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Stratagems. See Ruses

Tactics. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Strategic blockade, 452

Strategic blockade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Subjugation:

Subjugation:

definition of, 326

definition of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

formal end of war, 326

formal end of war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

instances of, 326

instances of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Submarine cables, 271, 436

Submarine cables, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Submarine mines. See Mines

Submarine mines. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Subsidies, 430-432

Subsidies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-432

Suez Canal, neutralisation of, 88, 102

Suez Canal, neutralization of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Suspension of arms, 291

Arms suspension, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Swineherd, case of the, 332

Swineherd, the case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Swiss Bundesrath, on treatment of wounded, 155

Swiss Bundesrath, on treatment of wounded, 155

Swiss Federal Council and the Geneva Convention, 164

Swiss Federal Council and the Geneva Convention, 164

Switzerland, neutralisation of, 91, 348, 358, 363, 368, 369, 392, 413, 415, 428

Switzerland's neutrality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__

troops marched through, 392

troops marched through, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Sybille, case of the, 263

Sybille, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

T

T

Tagus, blockade of the, 49

Blockade of the Tagus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Talbot, case of the, 424

Talbot, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Telegraph cable, interference with submarine, 271-272

Telegraph cable, interference with submarine, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-272

use of, by belligerents, 435-437

use of, by combatants, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-437

Telegraphy, wireless, 436, 437

Telecommunication, wireless, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

[Pg 709]Temeraire, case of the, 282

Temeraire, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Tetardos, case of the, 548

Tetardos, the case of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Tetens, proposal regarding Prize Courts, 560

Tetens, proposal on Prize Courts, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Thea, case of the, 548

Thea, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Theatre of war, 85

War zone, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Torpedoes, 227

Torpedoes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Trading between belligerent's subjects. See Intercourse

Trading between warring parties. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Train-wrecking, 318

Train wreck, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Traitors, 105

Betrayers, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Transfer: of enemy goods, 119

Transfer: of enemy property, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

of enemy vessels, 117

of enemy ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Transmission of intelligence for the enemy, 521

Transmission of intelligence to the enemy, 521

Transport on the part of neutrals, 424, 433, 434

Transport by neutral parties, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Transvaal. See South African Republic

Transvaal. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Treason, 199, 262, 313-316, 318

Treason, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__-316, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

Treaties:

Treaties:

cancellation of, at outbreak of war, 129

cancellation of, at outbreak of war, 129

cancellation through violation by one party, 339

cancellation due to a breach by one party, 339

interpretation of, 20, 26

interpretation of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

of Arbitration, 16, 20, 21

of Arbitration, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

of Commerce (1871), 221, 509

of Commerce (1871), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

(1894), 17

(1894), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

of Friendship and Commerce (1785), 167, 221, 508

of Friendship and Commerce (1785), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

(1778), 371

(1778), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Treaty of:

Treaty of:

Buenos Ayres (1881), 89

Buenos Aires (1881), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Copenhagen (1830), 542

Copenhagen (1830), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Washington (1871), 557

Washington (1871), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Westminster (1654), 535

Westminster (1654), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Treaty of peace:

Peace treaty:

amnesty under, 334

amnesty under __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

breach of, 338

breach of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

competence to conclude, 330

authority to finalize, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

contracts, suspended, and, 333

contracts suspended __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

date of, 331

date of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

effects of, 332-337

effects of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-337

forces in distant parts, effect on, 332

forces in distant parts, effect on, 332

form of, 330

type of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

interpretation of stipulations of, 337

interpretation of stipulations of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

negotiations for, 328

negotiations for __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

normal end of war, 327

normal end of war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

parts of, 330

parts of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

performance of, 337

performance of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

preliminaries of, 329

preliminaries of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

principle of uti possidetis, 334

principle of uti possidetis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

prisoners of war, release of, 335

POWs, release of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

revival of treaties, 336

revival of agreements, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Trent, case of the, 519, 530

Trent, case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Trial of captured neutral vessels, 553-558

Trial of seized neutral vessels, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-558

Tripoli, ultimatum threatening occupation of, 126

Tripoli, ultimatum threatening occupation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Tsu Shima, battle of, 423

Tsushima, Battle of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Turco-Italian War (1911), referred to on:

Turco-Italian War (1911), referred to on:

bombardment by naval forces, 269, 303

naval forces bombardment, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

carriage of contraband, 506

smuggling, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

complaints to neutral Powers during, 303

complaints to neutral parties during, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

mediation, 11

mediation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Red Sea, proposed neutralisation of, 90

Red Sea, proposed neutralization of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

region of war, 87, 89

war zone, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

rules of the Declaration of London, 360

rules of the Declaration of London, 360

subjects of belligerent expelled from enemy territory, 132

subjects of belligerent removed from enemy territory, 132

subjects of belligerent on enemy territory, 132

subjects of belligerent on enemy territory, 132

unneutral service, 531

unbiased service, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Turco-Servian War (1877), violation of neutrality during, 391

Turco-Servian War (1877), violation of neutrality during, 391

Turkey, emblem of medical service of, 161, 259

Turkey, a symbol of medical service of, 161, 259

Tuscany, subjugation of, 327

Tuscany, conquest of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Twee Gebroeders, case of the, 443

Twee Gebroeders, the case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

U

U

Ukase of 1809, 357

Ukase of 1809, 357

Ultimatum, 35, 125

Ultimatum, 35, 125

Umpire in arbitration, 16, 32

Arbitration umpire, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

United States of North America:

United States

Foreign Enlistment Act of, 358, 375

Foreign Enlistment Act of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Instructions for the Government of Armies of the, in the Field (1863), 67, 80, 98

Instructions for the Government of Armies in the Field (1863), 67, 80, 98

International Prize Court and the, 577

International Prize Court and the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

neutrality of, 371, 398, 400

neutrality of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

War code: land, 67, 80, 98

War code: land, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

naval 83, 217, 224, 233, 243, 262, 265, 272, 285, 447, 460, 486

naval __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_10__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_11__

Unneutral service, 386, 434

Unbiased service, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

capture for, 526

capture for, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

carriage of despatches, 515, 521-524, 528, 531, 532

delivery of messages, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-524, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__

consequences of, 526-532

consequences of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-532

diplomatic personages, carriage of, for enemy, 519, 532

diplomatic figures, transport of, for adversary, 519, 532

enemy character created by, 524

enemy character made by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

enemy persons, carriage of, 515, 517-521

enemy individuals, transport of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-521

kinds of, 515

types of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

mailboats carrying despatches, 526, 531

mailboats delivering messages, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

penalty for, 527

penalty for, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

seizure of despatches, 530, 531

seizing of dispatches, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

seizure of enemy persons, 530, 531

capture of enemy personnel, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

transmission of intelligence, 521

information exchange, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Uriu, Admiral, in Korean neutral waters, 388

Uriu, Admiral, in Korean neutral waters, 388

Uti possidetis, principle of, 324, 334

Uti possidetis, principle of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Usus in bello, 78

Use in war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

V

V

[Pg 710]Variag, case of the, 388, 424, 442

Variag case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Vassal States, wars by, 62, 68, 91, 92

Vassal States, wars by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

Vattel on:

Vattel discusses:

armistices, 295

ceasefires, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

loans to belligerents, 430

loans to combatants, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

neutrality, 350

neutrality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

occupation of territory, 205

occupation of territory, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

perfidy, 263

betrayal, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

reprisals, 44

reprisals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Vega, case of the, 233

Vega, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Venezuela:

Venezuela:

blockade of, 50, 52

blockade of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

boundary dispute (1900), 18

boundary dispute (1900), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Venus, case of the, 112

Venus, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Versailles, Preliminaries of Peace of, 329

Versailles, Preliminary Peace Agreement, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Vessels. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Victor, case of the, 427

Victor, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Vienna Congress, Act of 1815, 88

Vienna Congress, 1815 Act, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Vigilantibus jura sunt scripta, 295

The law is written for the vigilant, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Villafranca, preliminaries of Peace Treaty of, 329

Villafranca, preliminaries of Peace Treaty of, 329

Violation of:

Breach of:

armistices, 297

ceasefires, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

capitulations, 289

surrenders, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

neutral territory, 384

neutral ground, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

neutrality, 93, 438-445, 371, 380, 507

neutrality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-445, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__

conception of, 438

concept of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

consequences of, 439

consequences of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

distinguished from end of, 439

distinguished from the end of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

mines laid to prevent, 445

mines placed for prevention, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

negligence by neutrals conducive to, 444

negligence by neutrals that contributes to, 444

neutrals and, 440

neutrals and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

reparation from belligerents for, 352, 380, 442

compensation from warring parties for, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

what constitutes, 389-409, 412, 422, 426, 429, 430, 433, 435-437

what constitutes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-409, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__-437

peace treaties, 338

peace agreements, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

rules of war, 310

rules of warfare, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Violence: in land warfare, 146-154

Violence: in land combat, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-154

in naval warfare, 249-251

in naval combat, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-251

Visitation of neutral vessels:

Visiting neutral ships:

armistice and, 534

armistice and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

conception of right of, 533

right of conception, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

convoyed vessels, 355, 535-537, 542

convoyed ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-537, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

exercise of, 534

exercise of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

mailboats, 535

mailboats, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

men-of-war, 535

warships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

papers and, 543-545

papers and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-545

private vessels, 535

private boats, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

procedure, 538

procedure, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

resistance to, 540-543

resistance to, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-543

by neutral convoy, 543

by neutral transport, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

consequences of, 540

consequences of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

rules regarding, no universal, 537

rules regarding, no universal, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

search, 539

search, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

stopping vessels for purpose of, 538

stopping vessels for the purpose of, 538

what constitutes, 541

what defines, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Vladimirowka, occupation by the Japanese, 96

Vladimirowka, occupied by Japan, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Voluntary Aid Societies, 158-160

Voluntary Aid Groups, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-160

Volunteer corps, 94

Volunteer group, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Volunteer fleet, 100-104

Volunteer fleet, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-104

Vorwärts, case of the, 244

Forward, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Vrow Houwina, case of the, 501

Vrow Houwina, case of the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

W

W

War:

War:

aerial warfare, 150, 192, 207, 227

air combat, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

armed forces in, 63

military in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

belligerents. See Belligerents

belligerents. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

causes of, 72-75

causes of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-75

just, 74

just, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

pretexts distinct from, 75

pretexts different from, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

cessation of hostilities, simple, 290, 323-324

ceasefire, simple, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-324

characteristics of, 59-72

characteristics of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-72

civil, 68, 323

civil, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

commencement of, 121

start of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

conception of, 60-63

understanding of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-63

declaration of, 122-125

declaration of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-125

diminution of, 75

reduction of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

effects of the outbreak of, 128-143

effects of the outbreak of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-143

ends of, 67, 76

ends of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

enemy character. See Enemy character

enemy character. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

guerilla, 70-72

guerrilla, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-72

illegitimate, 300

illegitimate, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

initiative hostile acts, 126-128

hostile acts initiative, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-128

kinds of, 76

types of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

land. See Land warfare

land. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

laws of. See Laws of war

laws of. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

legality of, 59

legality of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

legitimate, 300

legit, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

means of securing, 300-321

ways to secure, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-321

manifestoes of, 121

manifestos of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

naval. See Naval warfare

naval. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

non-hostile relations of belligerents during, 273-299

non-hostile relations between opponents during, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-299

outbreak of, 121-128. See also Effects of outbreak of war

outbreak of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-128. See also __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

participants in, 62

participants in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

poison and poisoned arms in, 85, 148, 193, 249

poison and poisoned weapons in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

postliminium. See Postliminium

postliminium. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

pretexts for, 75

pretexts for, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

private individuals:

private citizens:

status during, 63-67

status during, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-67

hostilities by, 97, 152, 298, 312

hostilities by, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

purpose of, 67

purpose of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

region of, 85-90

region of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-90

right to make, 91

right to make, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

sea. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

subjugation. See Subjugation.

subjugation. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

temporary condition, a, 322

temporary condition, a, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

termination of, 322-332

termination of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-332

territory neutralised in case of, 88-90

territory neutralized if __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-90

theatre of, 85

theater of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

treaty of peace. See Treaty of peace

peace treaty. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

ultimatum, 125

ultimatum, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

violation of rules of, 310

rule violation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

War crimes:

War crimes:

conception of, 309

concept of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

kinds of, 310-316

types of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-316

punishment for committing, 316

punishment for committing, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

effect of treaty of peace on, 335

effect of treaty of peace on, 335

War criminals:

War criminals:

in land warfare, 66, 96, 97, 197, 289, 303, 334

in land warfare, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__

in naval warfare, 226

in naval combat, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

War of Secession (1861), 63

Civil War (1861), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Washburne, case of Mr., 194

Washburne, Mr. Case, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Washington:

Washington:

Three Rules of, 18, 406, 444

Three Rules of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Treaty of, 557

Treaty of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Wellington, Duke of, on bombardment, 266

Duke of Wellington on bombardment, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Westlake, proposition for Court of Appeal in prize cases, 560

Westlake's proposal for the Court of Appeal in prize cases, 560

Westminster, Treaty of (1654), 535

Westminster, Treaty of (1654), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Wheaton, on resistance to visitation, 542

Wheaton, on avoiding visits, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

William, case of the, 499

William, the case of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Wireless telegraphy, use of by belligerents, 435-437

Wireless telegraphy, used by fighters, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-437

Wounded:

Injured:

articles for the use of, 493

articles for the use of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

treatment of, 154-165, 252-262, 393

treatment of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-165, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__-262, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Z

Z

Zouche, on contraband, 508

Zouche, on smuggling, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Zürich, Peace of (1859), 329

Zürich Peace (1859), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

THE END

THE END

Printed by Ballantyne, Hanson & Co.
Edinburgh & London

Printed by Ballantyne, Hanson & Co.
Edinburgh & London


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