This is a modern-English version of The Englishman in China During the Victorian Era, Vol. 1 (of 2): As Illustrated in the Career of Sir Rutherford Alcock, K.C.B., D.C.L., Many Years Consul and Minister in China and Japan, originally written by Michie, Alexander. It has been thoroughly updated, including changes to sentence structure, words, spelling, and grammar—to ensure clarity for contemporary readers, while preserving the original spirit and nuance. If you click on a paragraph, you will see the original text that we modified, and you can toggle between the two versions.

Scroll to the bottom of this page and you will find a free ePUB download link for this book.

Transcriber's Note:

Transcriber's Note:

Obvious typographical errors have been corrected. Inconsistent spelling and hyphenation in the original document have been preserved.

Obvious typos have been fixed. Inconsistent spelling and hyphenation in the original document have been kept the same.

In the caption to the illustration facing page 370, KOLENGSOO should possibly be KULANGSU.

In the caption to the illustration facing page 370, KOLENGSOO should probably be KULANGSU.

THE ENGLISHMAN IN CHINA

Chap. xxiii.: Tsze-kung asked, saying, "Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all one's life?" The Master said, "Is not Reciprocity such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others."

Chap. 23.: Tsze-kung asked, "Is there a single word that can guide a person’s actions throughout their life?" The Master replied, "Isn't Mutual exchange that word? Don’t do to others what you wouldn’t want done to yourself."

Mr Alcock, at the age of 34.
from a drawing by L. A. de Fabeck, 1843.
Walker & Cockerell ph. sc.

Mr Alcock, at the age of 34.
from a drawing by L. A. de Fabeck, 1843.
Walker & Cockerell PhD.

THE ENGLISHMAN IN CHINA

DURING THE VICTORIAN ERA

THE ENGLISHMAN IN CHINA

DURING THE VICTORIAN AGE

AS ILLUSTRATED IN
THE CAREER OF

SIR RUTHERFORD ALCOCK, K.C.B., D.C.L.

MANY YEARS CONSUL AND MINISTER IN
CHINA AND JAPAN

AS SEEN IN
THE CAREER OF

SIR RUTHERFORD ALCOCK, K.C.B., D.C.L.

FOR MANY YEARS, CONSUL AND MINISTER IN __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
China and Japan

BY
ALEXANDER MICHIE
AUTHOR OF
'THE SIBERIAN OVERLAND ROUTE,' 'MISSIONARIES
IN CHINA,' ETC.

BY
ALEXANDER MICHIE
WRITER OF
'Siberian Overland Route,' 'Missionaries'
IN CHINA, ETC.

VOL. I.

VOL. 1.

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
MDCCCC

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
1900

All Rights reserved

All rights reserved


PREFACE.


Reminiscences of the Far East called up by the death of Sir Rutherford Alcock in November 1897 prompted the writer to send a contribution on the subject to 'Blackwood's Magazine.' Being appreciated by the family, the article suggested to them some more substantial memorial of the deceased statesman, a scheme with which the writer fell in the more readily that it seemed to harmonise with the task which friends had been already urging upon him—that of writing some account of occurrences in the Far East during his own residence there. For there was no other name round which these events could be so consistently grouped during the thirty years when British policy was a power in that part of the world. As Consul and Minister Alcock was so interwoven with the history of the period that neither the life of the man nor the times in which he lived could be treated apart. And the personal element renders his connection with Far Eastern affairs particularly instructive, for, combining the highest executive qualities with a philosophic grasp of the problems with which he had to deal, he at vi the same time possessed the faculty of exposition, whereby the vital relation between the theoretical and the practical sides of Far Eastern politics was made plain. The student may thus draw his lessons equally from the actions and the reflections of this great official.

Remembrances of the Far East triggered by the death of Sir Rutherford Alcock in November 1897 led the writer to contribute an article on the topic to 'Blackwood's Magazine.' The family appreciated it, which inspired them to consider a more significant tribute to the late statesman. The writer was more than willing to join this effort since it aligned with what friends had already encouraged him to do—write about events in the Far East during his time there. No other name could so consistently connect these events over the thirty years when British policy influenced that region. As Consul and Minister, Alcock was deeply embedded in the history of that era, making it impossible to separate his life from the times in which he lived. The personal connection makes his involvement in Far Eastern affairs especially enlightening, as he combined exceptional leadership qualities with a thoughtful understanding of the challenges he faced. He also had a talent for clear communication, illustrating the crucial link between the theoretical and practical aspects of Far Eastern politics. Thus, students can learn valuable lessons from both the actions and thoughts of this influential official.

The life history of Sir Rutherford Alcock is that of the progressive development of a sterling character making in all circumstances the most of itself, self-reliant, self-supporting, without friends or fortune, without interest or advantage of any kind whatsoever. From first to last the record is clear, without sediment or anything requiring to be veiled or extenuated. Every achievement, great or small, is stamped with the hall-mark of duty, of unfaltering devotion to the service of the nation and to the interests of humanity.

The life story of Sir Rutherford Alcock showcases the steady growth of a remarkable character that always makes the most out of its circumstances, being self-reliant and self-sustaining, without the backing of friends or wealth, or any personal gain. From beginning to end, the record is clear, without any impurities or anything needing to be hidden or downplayed. Every accomplishment, big or small, reflects a strong sense of duty and unwavering commitment to serving the nation and the welfare of humanity.

A copious and facile writer, he has left singularly little in the way of personal history. The only journal he seems ever to have kept was consigned by him to oblivion, a few early dates and remarks having alone been rescued. When in recent years he was approached by friends on the subject of auto-biography, he was wont to reply, "My life is in my work; by that I am content to be remembered." We must needs therefore take him at his word and judge by the fruit what was the nature of the tree.

A prolific and easy writer, he has left surprisingly little personal history. The only journal he seems to have kept has been lost to time, with only a few early dates and notes having been saved. When friends recently asked him about writing an autobiography, he would usually say, "My life is in my work; that's how I want to be remembered." Therefore, we must take him at his word and judge the quality of the work to understand the nature of the person.

In the following work the reader may trace in more or less continuous outline the stages by which the present relation between China and foreign nations has been reached. In the earlier portion the course of events indicated is comparatively simple, being confined to Anglo-Chinese developing into Anglo-Franco-Chinese vii relations. In the latter portion, corresponding roughly with the second volume, the stream becomes subdivided into many collateral branches, as all the Western nations and Japan, with their separate interests, came to claim their share, each in its own way, of the intercourse with China. It is hoped that the data submitted to the reader will enable him to draw such conclusions as to past transactions as may furnish a basis for estimating future probabilities.

In the following work, readers can follow a mostly continuous outline of how the current relationship between China and foreign nations developed. The earlier sections present a relatively straightforward progression, focusing on how Anglo-Chinese relations evolved into Anglo-Franco-Chinese relations. In the later sections, roughly corresponding to the second volume, the narrative branches out into many related areas as all the Western nations and Japan, each with their own interests, sought to engage with China in their own ways. It is hoped that the information provided will help readers draw conclusions about past events that can serve as a foundation for assessing future possibilities.

The scope of the work being restricted to the points of contact between China and the rest of the world, nothing recondite is attempted, still less is any enigma solved. It is the belief of the author that the so-called Chinese mystery has been a source of needless mystification; that the relation between China and the outer world was intrinsically simple; and that to have worked from the basis of their resemblances to the rest of humanity would have been a shorter way to an amicable understanding with the Chinese than the crude attempt to accommodate Western procedure to the uncomprehended differences which divided them. It needed no mastery of their sociology to keep the Chinese strictly to their written engagements and to deter them from outrage. But discussion was the invitation to laxity; and laxity, condoned and pampered, then defiant and triumphant, lies at the root of the disasters which have befallen the Chinese Empire itself, and now threaten to recoil also upon the foreign nations which are responsible for them. This responsibility was never more tersely summed up than by Mr Burlingame in his capacity of Chinese Envoy. After sounding the Foreign Office that astute diplomatist was able to inform the Tsungli-Yamên in 1869 that "the viii British Government was so friendly and pacific that they would endure anything." The dictum, though true, was fatal, and the operation of it during thirty subsequent years explains most that has happened during that period, at least in the relations between China and Great Britain.

The focus of this work is limited to the interactions between China and the rest of the world. It doesn't aim to tackle complex issues or solve any mysteries. The author believes that the so-called Chinese mystery has led to unnecessary confusion; the relationship between China and the outside world is fundamentally straightforward. Approaching it by recognizing their similarities to the rest of humanity would have been a quicker path to a friendly understanding with the Chinese than forcing Western methods onto the unrecognized differences separating them. There was no need for deep knowledge of their sociology to hold the Chinese to their agreements and prevent them from causing trouble. However, discussion encouraged leniency; and when leniency is tolerated and encouraged, it becomes defiant and victorious, which is at the heart of the troubles that have afflicted the Chinese Empire and now threaten to impact the foreign nations responsible for them. This accountability was succinctly expressed by Mr. Burlingame, serving as the Chinese Envoy. After assessing the Foreign Office, that perceptive diplomat informed the Tsungli-Yamen in 1869 that the viii British Government was so friendly and peaceful that they would tolerate anything. While this statement was accurate, it was also detrimental, and the effects of this policy over the following thirty years clarify much of what occurred during that time, particularly in the relations between China and Great Britain.

A word as to the orthography may be useful to the reader. The impossibility of transliterating Chinese sounds into any alphabetical language causes great confusion in the spelling of names. A uniform system would indeed be most desirable, but common practice has already fixed so many of them that it seems better, in a book intended for general reading, not to depart too much from the conventional usage, or attempt to follow any scientific system, which must, after all, be based upon mispronunciation of the Chinese sounds.

A note about spelling might be helpful to the reader. The challenge of representing Chinese sounds in any alphabetic language leads to a lot of confusion in how names are spelled. It would be great to have a consistent system, but since so many names are already established, it seems better, in a book meant for general readers, not to stray too far from the usual conventions or try to adopt any scientific system, which ultimately relies on mispronouncing the Chinese sounds.

As regards personal names, it may be convenient to call attention to the distinction between Chinese and Manchu forms. In the case of the former the custom is to write the nomen, or family name, separately, and the pre-nomen (which by Chinese practice becomes the post-nomen) by itself, and, when it consists of two characters, separated by a hyphen—e.g., Li (nomen) Hung-chang (post-nomen). In the case of Manchus, who are known not by a family name, but by what may be termed, for want of a better expression, their pre-nomen, it is customary to write the name in one word, without hyphens—for example, Kiying, Ilipu. As the Chinese name usually consists of three characters or syllables, and the Manchu usually of two, the form of name affords a prima facie indication of the extraction of the personage ix referred to. Polysyllabic names, as San-ko-lin-sin, are generally Mongol.

When it comes to personal names, it’s helpful to point out the difference between Chinese and Manchu forms. For Chinese names, the family name (or nomen) is written separately from the given name (or pre-nomen), which, according to Chinese convention, becomes the post-nomen. If the given name has two characters, they are separated by a hyphen—e.g. Li (nomen) Hung-chang (post-nomen). In contrast, Manchus are identified not by a family name but rather by what we might call their pre-nomen, and their names are usually written as a single word without hyphens—for example, Kiying, Ilipu. Because Chinese names typically have three characters or syllables while Manchu names usually have two, the structure of the name gives a prima facie indication of the person's background ix. Names with multiple syllables, like San-ko-lin-sin, are generally Mongol.

The sovereign is not referred to by name, the terms Kwanghsu, Tungchih, and so forth, being the Chinese characters chosen to designate, or, as we might say, idealise the reign, in the same way as impersonal titles are selected for houses of business.

The ruler isn't called by name; terms like Kwanghsu, Tungchih, and others are the Chinese characters chosen to represent or, as we might say, idealize the reign, similar to how impersonal titles are chosen for businesses.

I desire to express my deep obligation to Sir Rutherford Alcock's stepdaughter Amy, Lady Pelly, without whose efficient aid the book could not have been compiled. It is a subject of regret to all concerned that Lady Alcock herself did not live to see the completion of a task in the inception of which she took a keen and loving interest.

I want to express my heartfelt gratitude to Sir Rutherford Alcock's stepdaughter, Amy, Lady Pelly, without whose help the book could not have been put together. It’s a shame for everyone involved that Lady Alcock didn’t live to see the finished work that she cared about so deeply from the start.

To the other friends who have in different ways helped in the production of the book, and particularly to Mr William Keswick, M.P., for the loan of his valuable Chinnery and Crealock drawings, my best thanks are due.

To my other friends who have helped in various ways with the production of the book, and especially to Mr. William Keswick, M.P., for lending his valuable Chinnery and Crealock drawings, I extend my heartfelt thanks.

A. M.

A.M.

London, November 2nd, 1900.

London, November 2, 1900.

Postscript.—The legend on the front cover is a paraphrase of Chapter xxiii., Book xv., of the Analects of Confucius, Dr Legge's translation of which has been adopted by me as the motto of these volumes.

Postscript.—The phrase on the front cover is a rewording of Chapter xxiii., Book xv., from the Analects of Confucius, and I've used Dr. Legge's translation as the motto for these volumes.

CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME.


CHAPTER PAGE
I. THE ARMY SURGEON—
I. YOUTH 1
II. THE PENINSULA, 1832-1837 8
III. ENGLAND, 1838-1844 23
II. SENT TO CHINA 29
  FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH CHINA 31
III. ANTECEDENTS OF THE WAR—
I. THE OPIUM TRADE 42
II. THE SEQUEL TO THE SURRENDER OF OPIUM 55
IV. THE FIRST CHINA WAR, 1839-1842 60
V. THE TREATY OF 1842 78
VI. THE FRUITS OF THE WAR AND PROSPECTS OF PEACE 86
VII. THE NEW INTERCOURSE: CANTON, 1842-1847 93
VIII. THE NEW TREATY PORTS—FOOCHOW, AMOY, NINGPO 112
IX. SHANGHAI 124
I. THE TSINGPU AFFAIR 129
II. REBELLION 135
III. THE CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS 143
IV. CREATION OF THE FOREIGN CUSTOMS 149
V. MR ALCOCK'S DEPARTURE FROM SHANGHAI 156
X. CONSUL ALCOCK'S VIEWS ON GENERAL POLICY 161
XI. TRADE UNDER THE TREATY OF NANKING 167
I. TEA 178
II. SILK 187
III. OPIUM 191
IV. CHINESE EXPORTS 200
V. BRITISH EXPORTS 203
VI. NATIVE TRADE 207 xii
XII. SHIPPING 211
XIII. THE TRADERS—
I. FOREIGN 248
II. CHINESE 263
XIV. HONGKONG 271
XV. MACAO 287
XVI. PIRACY 299
XVII. THE ARROW WAR 308
I. THE EARL OF ELGIN AND HIS MISSION 320
II. LORD ELGIN'S SECOND MISSION 349
XVIII. INTERCOURSE UNDER THE TREATIES OF 1858 AND 1860—
I. THE DIPLOMATIC OVERTURE 361
II. NEW PORTS AND OPENING OF YANGTZE 369
III. ADMIRAL HOPE'S POLICY TOWARDS INSURGENTS 375
IV. THE LAY-OSBORN FLOTILLA 387
V. THE END OF THE REBELLION 392
VI. EVACUATION OF CANTON 396
VII. DEATH OF THE EMPEROR 397
VIII. INFLUENCE OF THESE EVENTS ON PROGRESS OF DIPLOMACY 398
 
APPENDIX.
I. NOTE ON OUR PRESENT POSITION AND THE STATE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH CHINA, BY CONSUL ALCOCK, JANUARY 19, 1849 411
II. CONFIDENTIAL DESPATCH BY CONSUL ALCOCK TO SIR GEORGE BONHAM, JANUARY 13, 1852 428
III. CONFIDENTIAL DESPATCH TO SIR GEORGE BONHAM, DATED JUNE 17, 1852. (EXTRACT) 432
IV. ACCOUNT OF THE SALT TRADE ANNEXED TO MR PARKES' SUMMARY OF THE NATIVE MARITIME TRADE OF FOOCHOW, 1846. (EXTRACTS) 439

ILLUSTRATIONS TO THE FIRST VOLUME.


PAGE
MR RUTHERFORD ALCOCK AT THE AGE OF THIRTY-FOUR. Frontispiece
  From a drawing by L. A. de Fabeck.  
MACAO 48
H.M. SHIPS IMOGEN AND ANDROMACHE PASSING BOCCA TIGRIS BATTERIES 70
THE LAKES, NINGPO 114
THE FIRST CONSULAR RESIDENCE AT FOOCHOW 116
BRIDGE OVER RIVER MIN 120
THE SECOND CONSULAR RESIDENCE AT FOOCHOW, 1848 122
BAMBOO BRIDGE AT FOOCHOW 124
COUNTRY WATERWAY NEAR SHANGHAI 126
ENTRANCE TO SZE-KING, NEAR SHANGHAI 136
RUSTIC SCENE NEAR SHANGHAI 156
VILLAGE ON THE CANALS 200
DENT'S VERANDAH, MACAO 294
GEORGE CHINNERY 298
  From an oil-painting by himself.  
SIR FREDERICK BRUCE 348
MR LOCH DEPARTS FROM PEKING FOR ENGLAND WITH CHINESE TREATY 354
MONSEIGNEUR MOUILLI 356
FIRST BRITISH CONSULATE AT KOLENGSOO, 1844 370
 
MAPS.
MAP OF CANTON WATERS 62
YANGTZE AND GRAND CANAL 75
MOUTH OF YANGTZE AND CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO 132
ROADS AND WATERWAYS BETWEEN PEKING AND TIENTSIN 331

THE ENGLISHMAN IN CHINA.

THE BRIT IN CHINA.


CHAPTER I.

The Army Surgeon.

I. YOUTH.

Birth at Ealing—Motherless childhood—Feeble health—Irregular schooling—Medical education—Student days in Paris—Wax-modelling—Admission to College of Surgeons—House Surgeon at Westminster Hospital.

Birth in Ealing—Childhood without a mother—Poor health—Unsteady education—Medical training—Student life in Paris—Wax modeling—Accepted into the College of Surgeons—House Surgeon at Westminster Hospital.

Born in the same year as Mr Gladstone, May 1809, John Rutherford Alcock[1] predeceased that statesman by only six months. His birthplace was Ealing, and he died in Westminster, after a residence there in retirement of twenty-seven years. Being a delicate infant, he was baptised in Ealing church when one day old. His childhood was deprived of its sunshine by the loss of his mother, and it does not appear that his father, a medical man of some note, and an artist to boot, was equal to filling the void in the young life. Consequently boyhood had for him none of the halo of a golden age, but was, on the contrary, a grey and cheerless memory, 2 furnishing tests of hardihood rather than those glowing aspirations which generally kindle young ambitions.

Born in the same year as Mr. Gladstone, May 1809, John Rutherford Alcock[1] died just six months before that statesman. He was born in Ealing and passed away in Westminster, where he spent twenty-seven years in retirement. As a fragile infant, he was baptized in Ealing church when he was just one day old. His childhood lost its brightness with the death of his mother, and it seems that his father, who was a well-known doctor and also an artist, wasn't able to fill the gap in his young life. As a result, his boyhood didn’t have the charm of a golden age; instead, it became a dull and sorrowful memory, presenting challenges of resilience rather than the inspiring aspirations that usually fuel young ambitions. 2

His early life was passed with relatives in the north of England, and he went to school at Hexham, where he had for companions Sir John Swinburne and Mr Dawson Lambton.

His early life was spent with relatives in northern England, and he attended school in Hexham, where he was friends with Sir John Swinburne and Mr. Dawson Lambton.

Of his school-days there is little to remark. Indeed his early education seems to have been most irregular, having been subject to long and frequent interruptions on account of ill-health, which necessitated sea-voyages and other changes of air. Nevertheless the diligence which was part of his nature compensated for these drawbacks of his youth, and set its seal on his whole after-career.

Of his school days, there's not much to say. In fact, his early education was quite irregular, affected by long and frequent breaks due to health issues that required him to take sea trips and change environments. However, the diligence that was part of his character made up for these setbacks in his youth and left a lasting impact on his entire later career.

On returning to his father's house at the age of fifteen, the boy began his medical education, being, according to the fashion of the day, apprenticed to his father, and at the same time entered as a student at the Westminster Hospital and the Royal Westminster Ophthalmic Hospital under that distinguished surgeon, G. J. Guthrie. His passion for art had already asserted itself, and he was enabled to indulge it by constant visits to Chantrey's studio, where, "amid the musical sounds of the chisel on the marble, with snatches of airs from the workmen, where all breathed a calm and happy repose, he passed delightful hours." His half-holidays were spent at Chantrey's in modelling.

On returning to his father's house at the age of fifteen, the boy started his medical education, apprenticed to his father, as was common at the time. He also enrolled as a student at Westminster Hospital and the Royal Westminster Ophthalmic Hospital under the renowned surgeon G. J. Guthrie. His love for art had already emerged, and he enjoyed it through regular visits to Chantrey's studio, where "amid the musical sounds of the chisel on the marble, with snippets of tunes from the workers, where everything exuded a calm and happy atmosphere, he spent wonderful hours." He spent his half-holidays at Chantrey's practicing modeling.

In the following year he visited Paris, and seems ever after to have looked back on the gay city as a kind of paradise, for there the world first really opened to the young man of sixteen. Then began that life of work and enjoyment, so blended as to be inseparable, which continued without intermission for more than seventy years. In the stimulating atmosphere of Paris, 3 and its free and independent life, the boy's faculties rapidly developed. He seemed, indeed, to expand suddenly into full manhood. Destined for the medical profession, he worked hard at anatomy, chemistry, and natural history, while taking also a keen interest in artistic and literary subjects; mastered French and Italian; and, in short, turned his twelve or eighteen months' sojourn to highly practical account.

In the following year, he visited Paris and seemingly always looked back on the lively city as a kind of paradise, because that's when the world first opened up to the sixteen-year-old. Thus began a life of work and enjoyment, so intertwined that it became inseparable, continuing without a break for over seventy years. In the vibrant atmosphere of Paris, 3 and its free and independent lifestyle, the boy's abilities quickly developed. He truly seemed to suddenly step into full manhood. Aiming for a career in medicine, he studied hard in anatomy, chemistry, and natural history, while also taking a strong interest in artistic and literary topics; he mastered French and Italian and made the most of his twelve to eighteen months' stay.

From a small pocket-book containing notes of the journey to France, and part of his work in Paris, we give some extracts illustrative of the boy's character and powers of observation.

From a small pocket notebook that has notes about the trip to France and part of his work in Paris, we provide some excerpts that illustrate the boy's character and his observational skills.

It was on the 17th of August 1825 that the party embarked at the Custom-House Stairs for Calais, the voyage occupying fourteen hours. On landing the lad "amused himself by observing the effects in the sky and the sea, and by picking up shells, bones of birds and animals, which having remained in the sea until perfectly clean, looked beautiful and white as ivory." Simple things interested him, and after dinner at the Hôtel Meurice in Paris he "listened with much pleasure to a man playing airs on what he called an American flute"—which he goes on to describe: "The tones were mellow in the extreme, and the airs he played I think were much superior in sweetness to any I have ever heard from an instrument so clear," and so on. Obviously a subjective impression; it is his own emancipation that beautifies the simplest things and inspires the simplest sounds. Like the convalescent in Gray—

It was on August 17, 1825, that the group set off from the Custom-House Stairs to Calais, with the trip taking fourteen hours. After arriving, the boy entertained himself by watching the effects in the sky and the sea, and by collecting shells and the bones of birds and animals, which, after staying in the water until they were perfectly clean, looked stunning and white like ivory. He found joy in simple things, and after dinner at the Hôtel Meurice in Paris, he "listened with great pleasure to a man playing tunes on what he called an American flute"—which he goes on to describe: "The tones were incredibly mellow, and the melodies he played were, in my opinion, much sweeter than anything I’ve ever heard from such a clear instrument," and so on. Clearly a personal impression; it is his own sense of freedom that enhances even the simplest things and inspires the most basic sounds. Like the convalescent in Gray—

"The meanest floweret of the vale,

"The tiniest flower in the valley,

The simplest note that swells the gale,

The simplest message that amplifies the wind,

The common sun, the air, the skies,

The common sun, the air, the skies,

To him are opening Paradise."

"Paradise is opening for him."

On his first Sunday in Paris he was "much struck 4 with the beauty of the paintings and a great number of pieces sculptured in bas-relief." Then he walked in the gardens of the Tuileries, "which in extent, in statues and in fountains, in the appearance of it taking it altogether, far exceeded anything my imagination had conceived concerning it."

On his first Sunday in Paris, he was "greatly impressed by the beauty of the paintings and the numerous sculptures in bas-relief." Then he walked through the gardens of the Tuileries, which "in size, statues, and fountains, and overall appearance, far surpassed anything I had imagined about it."

At Versailles he was "highly delighted with many of the paintings. The gardens are extremely extensive and the fountains very numerous; ... but it is all extremely artificial, and therefore soon fatigues the eye." In these slight observations are perceptible the artistic instinct and sense of fitness, faculties which served him so admirably in his future work, and might have won him distinction in other fields than those in which his lot was ultimately cast.

At Versailles, he was "really impressed by many of the paintings. The gardens are really vast and there are tons of fountains; ... but it all feels very artificial and quickly becomes tiring to look at." In these brief remarks, you can see his artistic instinct and sense of what works well, qualities that really helped him in his later work, and could have earned him recognition in other areas besides the ones he ultimately chose.

He was in Paris for a serious purpose, the study of medicine and surgery, and seriously he followed it. At the same time he mixed freely in the artistic and literary society of the French capital, and left none of his talents uncultivated. A characteristic incident in his educational career was his mastering the art of modelling in wax and in plaster. Following up his experiments in Chantrey's studio, he took regular lessons in Paris, and attained such proficiency that, young as he was, he was able to maintain himself while in that city by the sale of his anatomical models. For one of these he mentions receiving fifty guineas, and a few years after "for two arms and two legs the size of life" he notes receiving 140 guineas. These also won for him distinctions at home, for in the year 1825 he was awarded the "Gold Isis Medal" of the Society of Arts, and in the following year the "large gold medal" of that society, for original models in 5 coloured wax. And it may be mentioned as characteristic that although in later years an active member of that society, Sir H. T. Wood, the secretary, who knew him well, was unaware of Sir Rutherford Alcock's having so early in life received the society's medals. "The fact is an interesting one," he says, "and I am glad to have had my attention drawn to it." Some of these works were preserved in the Museum of the College of Surgeons, while others, prepared in special wax, were bought by Government for the use of the Indian medical schools.

He was in Paris for a serious reason: to study medicine and surgery, and he approached his studies with great seriousness. At the same time, he engaged freely with the artistic and literary community in the French capital, honing all his skills. A notable moment in his education was when he learned to model in wax and plaster. Building on his experiments in Chantrey's studio, he took regular lessons in Paris and became so skilled that, despite his youth, he was able to support himself in the city by selling his anatomical models. For one of these, he mentioned receiving fifty guineas, and a few years later, he noted that he earned 140 guineas for "two arms and two legs the size of life." These achievements also earned him recognition back home; in 1825, he received the "Gold Isis Medal" from the Society of Arts, and the following year, the "large gold medal" from the same society for original models in 5 colored wax. Interestingly, even though Sir H. T. Wood, the society's secretary who knew him well, was an active member in later years, he was unaware that Sir Rutherford Alcock had received those medals so early in his life. "The fact is an interesting one," he remarked, "and I’m glad to have had my attention drawn to it." Some of these works were kept in the Museum of the College of Surgeons, while others, created in special wax, were purchased by the Government for use in Indian medical schools.

From the small pocket-book to which we have already referred, and which contains concise notes of his course of instruction in modelling under a M. Dupont, we extract the note of his first lesson. It shows thoroughness of mind, keenness of observation, and the instinct for accuracy which enabled him so soon to attain to excellence in the art, and led to success in all the other pursuits of his life:—

From the small notebook we already mentioned, which has brief notes on his modeling lessons with M. Dupont, we pull out the note from his first lesson. It demonstrates his deep understanding, sharp observation skills, and instinct for precision that allowed him to quickly excel in the art, contributing to his success in all his other endeavors in life:—

Sept. 1.—To-day my first lesson in modelling began. I saw M. Dupont work upon a mask of a little boy's face in wax. He opened the eyes, but did not in my opinion make them quite correct. The only thing I observed in particular was his using oil very freely with his tool. I afterwards saw three moulds of a thigh near the hip after amputation, cast in wax. One was soaked in water, another was rubbed with soft-soap, and a third was well oiled. The one that was oiled produced the most perfect cast, but I should have thought both water, soap, and oil were used much too freely. They were all cast in wax of a deep red colour, and one of them was placed in the stump of one of the thighs of the model on which M. Dupont was engaged. It was not quite large enough for the thigh in some places, and too large in others. This he altered without scruple, so that when the stump was finished, though it looked extremely natural, it was by no means accurate.

Sept. 1.—Today, my first lesson in modeling started. I watched M. Dupont work on a wax mask of a little boy's face. He opened the eyes, but I didn't think he got them quite right. The only thing I noticed in particular was how freely he used oil with his tool. Later, I saw three molds of a thigh near the hip after amputation, cast in wax. One was soaked in water, another was rubbed with soft soap, and the third was well oiled. The oiled one produced the best cast, but I thought they all used water, soap, and oil way too liberally. They were all cast in a deep red wax color, and one of them was fitted into the stump of one of the thighs of the model that M. Dupont was working on. It didn’t fit quite right in some areas and was too big in others. He adjusted it without hesitation, so when the stump was finished, it looked very natural, but it wasn’t accurate at all.

Before quitting the life in Paris the following sample of its popular amusements as they presented themselves to the young student may be interesting to readers, and it is unfortunately the last entry in the pocket-book, and almost the last assistance we shall get from journals during the seventy years of crowded life which followed:—

Before leaving Paris, the following example of its popular entertainment, as seen by a young student, might interest readers. Unfortunately, this is the last note in the pocketbook and nearly the last insight we’ll have from journals during the busy seventy years that followed:—

I went yesterday [Sunday, September 10, 1826] to the Swiss Mountain, very extensive gardens on the Boulevards, where the most respectable part of the pleasure-seeking Parisians assemble on Sunday: you pay ten sous admittance. Here there is a large establishment for dinners where you may dine as at the restaurateurs, in a public room, or there are a long suite of apartments for parties of four, six, or twelve each, looking out into the gardens, and immediately before the windows was the space enclosed by trees, which form a canopy over it, and which is allotted to dancing. On one side is the orchestra; and when I heard it there was a very excellent band of musicians in it. It was rather unfavourable weather, as there were in the course of the day several very heavy showers, yet there seemed to be a very great number of elegantly dressed females and respectable-looking men; and some even highly-dressed, which is a wonder, I think, for the gentlemen in Paris seem to dress as much inferior to us as the French ladies dress better than the English. Indeed it is quite delightful to see the great taste with which they dress and the elegance of contour in all their figures. I don't know how it happens, but I never recollect seeing a French woman that was at all above the lowest class of society that was a slovenly or slattern figure, and very few that were not really elegant, though their faces are, generally speaking, plain.

I went yesterday [Sunday, September 10, 1826] to the Swiss Mountain, which has vast gardens on the Boulevards where the most respectable pleasure-seeking Parisians gather on Sundays. The entry fee is ten sous. There’s a large dining area where you can eat like at a restaurant, either in a public space or in a series of rooms for groups of four, six, or twelve, all overlooking the gardens. Right outside the windows is a space enclosed by trees that creates a canopy overhead, designated for dancing. On one side, there’s the orchestra, and when I listened, the musicians were really talented. The weather wasn’t great, with several heavy showers throughout the day, but there were still a lot of elegantly dressed women and respectable-looking men, some quite stylishly dressed, which is surprising because the gentlemen in Paris seem to dress less sophisticated than we do, while the French ladies dress much better than the English. It’s truly lovely to see the great taste in their outfits and the elegance in their figures. I can’t explain it, but I’ve never seen a French woman, other than from the lowest class, who looked untidy, and very few who weren’t genuinely elegant, even though, generally speaking, their faces are plain.

After having dined I went to see the Swiss Mountain, which had made a noise whilst I was at dinner that very much resembled distant thunder. I had no idea what it was; my surprise may therefore be conceived when, on coming suddenly in sight of it, I saw a man, apparently sitting on a chair, whirl past me with a velocity more resembling the speed of lightning than anything I had before seen,—so much so, that though from the top to the bottom where they drop might be about 7 200 feet, I had merely time to perceive that there was a man seated on some sort of vehicle like a chair.

After dinner, I went to check out the Swiss Mountain, which had made a sound that reminded me of distant thunder while I was eating. I had no idea what it was; so you can imagine my surprise when I suddenly caught sight of it and saw a man, seemingly sitting in a chair, fly past me at a speed that was more like lightning than anything I'd ever seen before. It was so fast that even though the drop from the top to the bottom was about 7 200 feet, I barely had time to realize that there was a man sitting on some sort of vehicle that looked like a chair.

The mountain consisted of boards raised at an angle of about from 60° to 70° with the ground, and gradually becoming level. The distance from where they set off to where they stop I have before stated, I think, to be about 200 feet.

The mountain was made up of boards angled at about 60° to 70° with the ground, gradually leveling off. The distance from where they started to where they stopped is, I believe, about 200 feet.

This platform is sufficiently broad to allow three of the vehicles to go down and one to return up at the same time—that is to say, there are four iron grooves accurately fitted to the small wheels on which the vehicles move. There are horses as well as chairs for both ladies and gentlemen. I saw several gentlemen on horseback and one lady. The horses appear to me to be real horses' hides, perhaps covering a wooden horse. They are accoutred with saddle, stirrups, and bridle. One person who came down on one of these horses rose and fell in his stirrups as though riding a real horse; it created much laughter, and the people surrounding immediately called out "Un Anglais! un Anglais!" I believe he was an Englishman. It had a ridiculous effect to observe the anxiety depicted on the countenances of the heroes, and compare them, with the knowledge of their perfect safety, with the laughing groups that surrounded them. Sometimes a veteran hero would mount one of the horses and come down with triumph in his countenance; the effect then became still more ridiculous, for he seemed like a great baby mounted on a hobby-horse proportionately large. But so it is through life, I think; one sees people capable of being elated as much by actions little in themselves, but enlarged for the instant by circumstances, as, for instance, in this case—the rapidity of motion, the gay crowd, and the distant music—as they would have been by an action really great in itself but unembroidered by outward show.

This platform is wide enough to let three vehicles go down while one comes back up at the same time—that is to say, there are four iron grooves perfectly fitted to the small wheels that the vehicles move on. There are both horses and chairs for both ladies and gentlemen. I noticed several gentlemen on horseback and one lady. The horses look to me like genuine horse hides, possibly covering a wooden horse. They are equipped with saddles, stirrups, and bridles. One person who came down on one of these horses wobbled in his stirrups as if he were riding a real horse; it got a lot of laughs, and the people around immediately shouted, "An Englishman! An Englishman!" I believe he was indeed English. It was amusing to see the anxious expressions on the faces of the riders, knowing they were completely safe, contrasted with the laughter of the groups around them. Occasionally, a veteran hero would mount one of the horses and come down with a triumphant look on his face; it became even more ridiculous because he looked like a big baby riding a disproportionately large hobby horse. But that's how life is, I think; you see people who can be just as excited by actions that seem minor but are made grand by their circumstances—like the swift motion, the cheerful crowd, and the distant music—as they would be by something truly significant but devoid of all the extra flair.

Hearing the music and wishing to see the dancing I had heard so much of, I approached the dancers. We read that the French enjoy dancing with great zest; certes, to see them dance a quadrille, one would not say so: 'tis true it is a dance in which custom has forbidden much exertion, still the entire listlessness they show induced me to think it was a task rather than a pleasure. But when a lively waltz struck up and the waltzing began, I....

Hearing the music and wanting to see the dancing I had heard so much about, I went over to the dancers. People say the French love to dance with a lot of energy; however, watching them dance a quadrille, you wouldn't necessarily think that: it's true that it’s a dance where tradition has deemed it inappropriate to put in too much effort, but the complete lack of enthusiasm they showed made me feel it was more like a chore than something enjoyable. But when an upbeat waltz started playing and the waltzing began, I....

Here the notes break off. 8

Here the notes end. 8

Of the student's life of four years from 1828 to 1832 there is little which can or need be said. For two years and a half out of the four he was house surgeon at the Westminster Hospital and the Ophthalmic Hospital, having received, at the age of twenty-one, the diploma from the Royal College to practise surgery. During this period he continued modelling, and took pupils in that art. Writing for periodicals also occupied some of his leisure time.

Of the student’s life over four years from 1828 to 1832, there isn’t much that can or needs to be said. For two and a half years of that time, he was the house surgeon at Westminster Hospital and the Ophthalmic Hospital, having received his diploma from the Royal College to practice surgery at the age of twenty-one. During this time, he also continued modeling and took on students in that art. Writing for magazines also took up some of his free time.

No sooner was his student career ended than an opening presented itself which determined the future course of his life, but in a way very different from what could possibly have been anticipated.

No sooner did his time as a student come to an end than an opportunity arose that would shape the future of his life, but in a way that was very different from what anyone could have expected.

II. THE PENINSULA, 1832-1837.

Dynastic quarrel in Portugal—Foreign legion—Mr Alcock enters the service, 1832—Character of the force and its leaders—Colonel Shaw—Incidents of the campaign—Important medical services of Mr Alcock—Joins the Spanish Foreign Legion, 1836—Termination of the campaign.

Dynastic conflict in Portugal—Foreign legion—Mr. Alcock joins the service, 1832—Nature of the force and its leaders—Colonel Shaw—Events of the campaign—Significant medical contributions of Mr. Alcock—Becomes a part of the Spanish Foreign Legion, 1836—End of the campaign.

There were troubles in Portugal. The usurper Dom Miguel was on the throne. It was proposed to seat the rightful sovereign, Donna Maria, there—her father, Dom Pedro, ex-Emperor of Brazil, who assumed the title of Duke of Braganza, heading the movement.

There were issues in Portugal. The usurper Dom Miguel was on the throne. It was suggested to place the rightful sovereign, Donna Maria, there—her father, Dom Pedro, former Emperor of Brazil, who took the title of Duke of Braganza, leading the movement.

Sympathy was excited in France and England, in both of which countries irregular forces were levied to co-operate with the constitutional party in Portugal led by his imperial majesty. It was a kind of service which tempted alike young bloods and old soldiers who had been languishing in peace and idleness since 1815, 9 and a small army of "Liberators" was got together in England, with a corresponding naval force.

Sympathy was stirred in France and England, where both countries raised irregular forces to support the constitutional party in Portugal led by his imperial majesty. This kind of service attracted both young recruits and older soldiers who had been inactive and idle since 1815, 9 and a small army of "Liberators" was assembled in England, along with a matching naval force.

It has been mentioned that young Alcock had studied under the eminent army surgeon Guthrie. Feelings of regard had sprung up between the two which extended far beyond the professional sphere. Not only had the boy been a favourite pupil whose aptitude reflected credit on his teacher, but it is quite evident that a personal affection which lasted their respective lifetimes was rekindled during the years they subsequently spent together in Westminster. When, therefore, Mr Guthrie was applied to by Mr O'Meara, who had been in attendance on Napoleon at St Helena, to recommend a surgeon for the British-Portuguese force, Guthrie sent at once for Alcock and discussed with him his professional prospects. The upshot was that as, considering his youth,—he was then only twenty-two,—it was useless for him to think of beginning practice in London, a few years might be most advantageously passed in military service abroad. The young man was only too eager to close with the offer then made to him, which not only afforded the prospect of active professional work, but seemed to open the way for adventures such as the soul of a young man loveth. Within twenty-four hours of accepting the offer Alcock was on the way to Portsmouth and the Azores. For some time after his arrival there he did duty on board ship. His ambition being cramped by this restricted service, however, he was anxious to be transferred to the military force. He accordingly applied to Colonel Hodges, who commanded the marine battalion, to be taken on his 10 staff. The colonel looked at him with some hesitation owing to his extremely youthful appearance, but on hearing that he had been specially recommended by Guthrie, said, "Oh, that is a different matter; come along."

It’s been noted that young Alcock had trained under the well-known army surgeon Guthrie. A bond had formed between them that went beyond just professional respect. Not only was the boy a favorite pupil whose abilities reflected positively on his teacher, but it’s clear that a personal friendship, which lasted their entire lives, was rekindled during the years they spent together in Westminster. So, when Mr. Guthrie was approached by Mr. O'Meara, who had been attending to Napoleon at St. Helena, for a recommendation for a surgeon for the British-Portuguese force, Guthrie immediately called Alcock to discuss his career options. The outcome was that, considering his youth—he was only twenty-two at the time—it wouldn’t be practical for him to start practicing in London just yet, so it would be much more beneficial for him to spend a few years serving in the military abroad. The young man eagerly accepted the offer, which not only promised active professional work but also opened up possibilities for adventures that a young man craves. Within twenty-four hours of accepting the offer, Alcock was on his way to Portsmouth and the Azores. For a while after he arrived there, he served on board a ship. However, feeling constrained by this limited service, he wanted to be transferred to the military force. He therefore applied to Colonel Hodges, who commanded the marine battalion, to join his 10 staff. The colonel hesitated a bit, given Alcock’s very youthful looks, but once he learned that Alcock had been specifically recommended by Guthrie, he said, "Oh, that’s a different matter; come along."

Of the Peninsular expeditions of 1832-37 the interest for the present generation lies less in their origin, aims, and results, than in their conduct and incidents. They were episodes which have left no marks on the general course of history visible to the ordinary observer, and are memorable chiefly for their dramatic effects, the play of character, the exhibitions of personal courage, capacity, and devotion; of jealousy, intrigue, and incapacity; of love and hate; and of the lights and shadows that flit across the theatre of human life. Interferences in other people's quarrels naturally bring to the surface all the incongruities. The auxiliaries are sure to be thought arrogant whether they are really so or not, and the protégés are no less certain to be deemed ungrateful. Each party is apt to underestimate the exploits of the other and to exaggerate his own. They take widely different views of the conditions under which their respective services are rendered; they misconstrue each other's motives, assessing them at their lowest apparent value. Each side looks for certain sentimental acknowledgments from the other, while daily frictions and inevitable misunderstandings continually embitter the disappointment felt at their absence. And there are not two parties, but many. There are wheels within wheels; sections playing on each other tricks which savour of treachery on the one side, while on the other side there may be sulks which are constructive mutiny. 11 The question of pay is naturally a constant source of bitterness, for countries that need foreign assistance are impecunious and dilatory. Few of them would be entitled to the certificate which Dugald Dalgetty gave to his excellent paymasters, the Dutch. Yet in spite of drawbacks, there is a kind of method in the whole business, a movement towards a goal, though at a maximum of cost, with the greatest waste and the most poignant regrets over mismanagement.

Of the Peninsular expeditions from 1832 to 1837, what interests the current generation is less about their origin, goals, and outcomes, and more about how they were carried out and the incidents surrounding them. They were events that haven’t significantly impacted the overall flow of history as seen by the average person, and they are mostly remembered for their dramatic moments, the interplay of characters, and displays of personal bravery, skills, and dedication; as well as jealousy, scheming, and incompetence; love and hate; and the contrasting highs and lows that move across the stage of human life. Getting involved in others' conflicts naturally exposes all the discrepancies. The helpers are likely to come off as arrogant whether they are or not, and the beneficiaries are just as likely to be seen as ungrateful. Each side tends to downplay the achievements of the other while inflating their own. They have vastly different perceptions of the conditions under which their services are offered; they misinterpret each other's intentions, judging them at their most minimal value. Each side seeks certain emotional acknowledgments from the other, while daily tensions and unavoidable misunderstandings continuously heighten the frustration over their absence. Furthermore, there aren’t just two sides, but many. There are layers within layers; factions pulling on each other with tricks that may seem treacherous from one perspective, while the other side might be sulking in a way that resembles rebellion. 11 The issue of payment is obviously a constant source of resentment, as countries needing foreign help are often broke and slow to respond. Few would earn the commendation that Dugald Dalgetty gave to his reliable Dutch paymasters. Yet in spite of the challenges, there’s a certain logic to the whole operation, a movement toward a goal, albeit at an extremely high cost, with significant waste and deep regrets over mismanagement.

But what in these irregular campaigns is so remarkable as to be almost repugnant to common reason is the devotion of the mercenary soldier. This inspiriting sentiment, which springs up spontaneously like a wild-flower in desert places, seems to put patriotism in the shade as a motive for sacrifice. The hired soldier, though an alien, is often indeed more faithful than the son of the soil, perhaps for the reason that his allegiance is of a simpler nature, more categorical and explicit. The direct personal character of such alien allegiance and its transferability are exemplified in the lives of soldiers of fortune in general: never better, perhaps, than in the wild and dangerous career of Alexander Gardner, colonel of artillery in the service of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, whose Memoirs have been recently edited by Major Hugh Pearse. Is it the fighting instinct, hereditary heroism, or military discipline that makes the soldier? Is it the cause that inspires him, or is it only devotion to his immediate leader? Explain it how we may, the British Legion both in Portugal and in Spain maintained the character of their race for pluck and tenacity as well as if they had been fighting for their own king and country. And this is rendered still 12 more remarkable when the promiscuous manner of their muster is considered. Clandestine engagements in the slums of Soho, under the guise of labour or emigrant contracts, in evasion of the Foreign Enlistment Acts; surreptitious journeys, as "hop-pickers," to Gravesend; secret embarkations under cover of night; and the disciplining of a mob composed of the dregs of the streets, afford subject of some graphic and humorous descriptions on the part of the officers concerned in raising the squad and licking them into shape. It must have required a very sanguine faith in the radical qualities of the stock for any officer of repute to consent to "march through Coventry" with such a herd of scalliwags.

But what stands out in these irregular campaigns, almost to the point of defying common sense, is the loyalty of the mercenary soldier. This inspiring sentiment, which springs up spontaneously like a wildflower in barren places, seems to overshadow patriotism as a reason for sacrifice. The hired soldier, even though he’s a foreigner, often proves to be more loyal than the local recruit, perhaps because his allegiance is more straightforward, clear-cut, and explicit. The direct personal nature of this foreign loyalty and its transferability are illustrated in the lives of fortune-seeking soldiers: never better, perhaps, than in the wild and perilous journey of Alexander Gardner, artillery colonel in the service of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, whose Memoirs have recently been edited by Major Hugh Pearse. Is it the fighting instinct, inherited courage, or military training that creates a soldier? Is it the cause that motivates him, or is it simply loyalty to his immediate leader? However we explain it, the British Legion, both in Portugal and Spain, upheld their reputation for bravery and determination as if they were fighting for their own king and country. This is made even more remarkable when you consider the chaotic way they were recruited. Secret meetings in the slums of Soho, disguised as laborers or immigrants to get around the Foreign Enlistment Acts; covert trips to Gravesend posing as "hop-pickers"; loading up under the cover of night; and organizing a ragtag group formed from street outcasts all provide material for some vivid and humorous accounts from the officers involved in forming and shaping the squad. It must have taken an unusually optimistic belief in the inherent qualities of the men for any respectable officer to agree to "march through Coventry" with such a band of misfits.

The officer who seems to have had a principal share in collecting these raw levies, and distinguished himself in both campaigns in the Peninsula, in which he bore a leading part, has left us some racy descriptions of the force and its experiences in the field. Sir Charles Shaw was himself a typical soldier by nature and by practice. Circumstances alone would determine whether it should be as a soldier of fortune, a patriot defending hearths and homes, or as an Ishmaelite adventurer, that his sword would be unsheathed. The sporting and adventurous instinct scents danger afar, like the war-horse in the book of Job which laughs at the spears. The manner in which he came to embrace the profession of arms was itself so characteristic as to deserve mention.

The officer who played a key role in gathering these raw recruits and made a name for himself in both campaigns in the Peninsula, where he took a leading role, has given us some colorful accounts of the troops and their experiences in the field. Sir Charles Shaw was a quintessential soldier by nature and experience. Only circumstances would decide if he would unsheathe his sword as a soldier of fortune, a patriot defending families and homes, or as an adventurous wanderer. The adventurous spirit detects danger from a distance, like the warhorse in the book of Job that scoffs at the spears. The way he chose the military profession was so typical that it deserves a mention.

As a youth he was passionately devoted to sport, and when that momentous question the choice of a profession came up for consideration, sport decided it in favour of law, for the somewhat original reason 13 that the young gentleman had observed that lawyers seemed to enjoy the longest holidays! He had begun his studies, and was on his way to St Andrews to enter on a new course when an incident occurred which diverted the current of his thoughts. He met a batch of French prisoners of war being removed from one garrison to another, whose misery affected him so much that he was instantly seized with the idea of becoming a soldier. The particular form in which the inspiration took him was that he put himself in the position of one of these prisoners and imagined himself the hero of his own and his comrades' deliverance.

As a young man, he was deeply passionate about sports, and when the crucial question of choosing a career came up, sports led him to favor law for the rather unique reason that he noticed lawyers seemed to have the longest vacations! He had started his studies and was heading to St Andrews to begin a new course when an event occurred that shifted his thoughts. He encountered a group of French prisoners of war being transferred from one camp to another, and their suffering impacted him so much that he was immediately struck by the idea of becoming a soldier. The way this inspiration hit him was that he imagined himself as one of these prisoners and envisioned himself as the hero of his own and his comrades' rescue.

His studies at St Andrews, perturbed by the new passion, made indifferent progress. The historic golf-links afforded some relief, acting as a kind of neutral soothing medium between antagonistic aspirations. But the final solution of his troubles came from a famous piece of water which is there, called the Witches' Pond. The virtue of this water was great in the barbaric age when the curse of witchcraft lay heavy on the land. The suspected person was thrown into the water. If she floated, her guilt was proven and she was incontinently burned; if she sank, it proved the high specific gravity of flesh and bone. Happy thought! The young man would subject his life's destiny to this convenient ordeal. He would jump into the pond, and either sink as a lawyer or emerge as a soldier!

His studies at St Andrews were disrupted by a new passion and were making slow progress. The historic golf course offered some relief, serving as a neutral space that eased his conflicting desires. But the real resolution to his troubles came from a well-known body of water there, called the Witches' Pond. This water had great significance in the ancient times when the curse of witchcraft weighed heavily on the land. If someone was suspected, they were thrown into the water. If they floated, their guilt was confirmed, and they were immediately burned; if they sank, it showed the high density of flesh and bone. What a clever idea! The young man decided to put his life's fate to this convenient test. He would jump into the pond, and either sink as a lawyer or come out as a soldier!

After this original form of baptism, initiation into the mysteries soon followed, and the young soldier saw much active service during the Napoleonic wars in the Peninsula and in the Low Countries. He 14 missed Waterloo through being on other duty, and in the piping times of peace which followed that decisive battle an idyllic life at Richmond seemed to bound the horizon of his unsatisfied ambition for some fifteen years. From a totally unexpected quarter the call to arms reached him in his retreat, and suddenly roused all his sleeping energies. The offer of a commission in the service of the young Queen of Portugal met with an eager response, and Shaw entered heart and soul into the service of Donna Maria.

After this initial baptism, initiation into the mysteries quickly followed, and the young soldier had a lot of active service during the Napoleonic wars in the Peninsula and in the Low Countries. He 14 missed Waterloo because he was on another duty, and during the peaceful times that came after that decisive battle, a simple life in Richmond seemed to define the limits of his unfulfilled ambition for about fifteen years. Out of the blue, a call to arms found him in his retreat and suddenly awakened all his dormant energy. The opportunity for a commission in the service of the young Queen of Portugal was met with enthusiasm, and Shaw fully committed himself to the service of Donna Maria.

As well as being an active soldier, Major Shaw was a lively correspondent, and it is from his letters to his family that we get the most brilliant flash-lights on the incidents of his military career generally, and more particularly on that exciting portion of it which most concerns the subject of these volumes. These letters were edited and published by himself at the close of the operations in Spain.

As an active soldier, Major Shaw was also an enthusiastic letter writer, and it’s through his letters to his family that we get the most vivid insights into the events of his military career overall, especially during the thrilling parts that are most relevant to the topics of these volumes. He edited and published these letters himself at the end of the operations in Spain.

Colonel Hodges, who commanded the foreign brigade in Portugal, and seems to have left the queen's service in a huff, also published a narrative of the campaign, of which, however, the historical value is not enhanced by its apologetic and explanatory motive.

Colonel Hodges, who led the foreign brigade in Portugal and seems to have left the queen's service in frustration, also published a narrative of the campaign. However, its historical value isn’t improved by its apologetic and explanatory tone.

From the contemporary notes of these two officers we get generous and emphatic testimony to the manner in which Mr Alcock acquitted himself under the ordeal of severe military service. Indeed his comrades and commanding officers, first in Portugal and afterwards in Spain, seem to have vied with each other in spontaneous eulogy of the conduct of the young surgeon, none of them more flattering than General De Lacy Evans, who commanded in 15 Spain. It is the record of a hero and a philanthropist, of high military ardour subordinated to still higher duty both to the cause he was serving and to the comrades whose lives were under his care. The valour of a non-combatant makes no less a demand on the virile stamina than the valour of the soldier,—oftentimes indeed more, since he lacks the stimulus of active conflict and confronts danger passive and unarmed. A few extracts from these really remarkable testimonials may still be read with pleasure after the lapse of sixty years.

From the accounts of these two officers, we get clear and strong praise for how Mr. Alcock handled the challenges of intense military service. His fellow soldiers and commanding officers, first in Portugal and later in Spain, seemed to compete in praising the actions of the young surgeon, with none more complimentary than General De Lacy Evans, who was in charge in 15 Spain. It's a record of a hero and a humanitarian, showcasing high military enthusiasm put second to an even greater duty to both the cause he served and the comrades whose lives depended on him. The bravery of a non-combatant requires just as much strength and resilience as that of a soldier, and often even more, since they lack the incentive of direct conflict and face danger defenseless and unarmed. A few excerpts from these truly remarkable testimonials are still enjoyable to read even after sixty years.

Shaw writes to his family:—

Shaw messages his family:—

A peasant led the way (they wear no shoes and their feet are like hands). I took off my shoes, and after getting down about fifty yards, I looked up and saw a favourite soldier of mine close above me, and an intimate friend of Ramus, the assistant-surgeon Alcock (a nice young fellow), following. I ordered the soldier to halt; but his answer of, "I'll follow your honour to death, captain," made me silent. I tried military authority with young Alcock, as I saw he was much excited; but no, his professional services were, he thought, required, and follow he would. Every moment expecting he would roll down, I clasped my toes and fingers close to the precipice, that he might fall without sweeping me with him: such is selfish nature! Two or three times I determined to return, but the soldier's speech forced me on. We reached the bottom in about half an hour, and, believe me, I returned thanks.

A peasant led the way (they're barefoot and their feet are like hands). I took off my shoes, and after walking down for about fifty yards, I looked up and saw one of my favorite soldiers close above me, along with Alcock, Ramus's close friend and assistant-surgeon (a nice young guy), following us. I ordered the soldier to stop; but his response, "I'll follow you to the death, captain," caught me off guard. I tried to use my authority with young Alcock since he seemed really excited; but no, he thought his skills were needed and insisted on following. Every moment, I expected he would roll down, so I held onto the edge tightly, hoping he'd fall without taking me with him: such is human nature! A couple of times, I decided to turn back, but the soldier's words motivated me to keep going. We reached the bottom in about half an hour, and believe me, I was thankful.

I proceeded along the rocky beach, and there found poor Ramus lying on a rock, in a sleeping position, with all his clothes torn, and a dreadful gash in his head; his body all broken; but with an expression of countenance indicating he had suffered no pain. I was astonished to see him without his shoes; but in ascending a sharp rock I found them, with the marks where his heels had caught as he tumbled backwards head foremost. Finding that our descent had been useless, I told those who had come down that I would not allow them 16 to risk their lives in ascending, and sent off a peasant to get a boat; but he failed both in this and in getting ropes to pull us up. Self again stepped in, and as senior I led the way—one great reason being that no one could tumble back on me! I reached the top—hands torn and feet bruised; and to my joy young Alcock made his appearance, but so faint that I was obliged to supply him liberally with my brandy.

I walked along the rocky beach and found poor Ramus lying on a rock, asleep, with all his clothes torn and a terrible gash on his head; his body was broken, but he looked like he hadn’t felt any pain. I was shocked to see that he was barefoot, but as I climbed a sharp rock, I found his shoes, with marks showing where his heels had caught as he fell backward headfirst. Realizing our descent had been useless, I told those who had come down with me that I wouldn’t let them risk their lives by trying to climb back up, and I sent a peasant to get a boat; but he couldn’t manage that or find any ropes to pull us up. I took charge again, and since I was the senior, I led the way—partly because no one could fall back on me! I made it to the top—my hands all torn and my feet bruised; to my relief, young Alcock appeared, but he was so weak that I had to give him plenty of my brandy.

The duty which now had to be performed by the medical men was of the most arduous character. The surgeon of the British battalion, Souper, carried away by the military spirit instilled into him by being an actor in the "Three Days of July," resigned his commission as surgeon, and on this day commenced and finished his military career, being killed at Hodges' side while carrying orders to the French battalion. His place was filled up by Mr Rutherford Alcock, who had the same love for "fire," but for a different object—that of being close at hand to give prompt assistance to any one who was wounded. Although young, Alcock was old in knowledge and experience: he was highly respected by all who knew him, and beloved by those who entered into action, as they felt assured that he thought not of his own safety when his services could be of benefit to them. In the most exposed situations I saw him this day, dressing officers and men with the same coolness as if he were in a London hospital; and I cannot refrain from expressing envy at the gratified feeling he must ever possess when he thinks of the number of human beings he has saved by his knowledge, experience, bravery, and activity, both at Oporto, Vittoria, and St Sebastian. But his trials after the fight of the 29th of September were great.

The task that the medical team had to handle was incredibly challenging. The surgeon of the British battalion, Souper, fueled by the military spirit he gained from participating in the "Three Days of July," resigned his position as surgeon and this day marked the beginning and end of his military career, as he was killed at Hodges' side while delivering orders to the French battalion. His role was taken over by Mr. Rutherford Alcock, who shared the same passion for "fire," but with a different goal—being close by to quickly help anyone who got injured. Although young, Alcock was wise beyond his years: he was highly respected by everyone who knew him and loved by those going into battle, as they knew he didn’t think about his own safety when his help could make a difference for them. I saw him in the most dangerous situations this day, treating officers and soldiers with the same calmness as if he were in a hospital in London; I can't help but feel envious of the satisfaction he must feel when he reflects on the numerous lives he has saved with his knowledge, experience, courage, and quick actions, both at Oporto, Vittoria, and St. Sebastian. However, his challenges after the fight on September 29th were significant.

Owing to the fights of Pennafiel, Ponte Fereira, and the different affairs on the Lugar das Antas, the wards allotted to the British in the general hospitals were full; therefore, one may form some idea of the misery of the British when scattered among the different hospitals, speaking a language which was not understood. Measures were taken by Hodges and Alcock to gather the wounded foreigners together, but the Minister of War threw every impediment in the way of this; almost making one suspect, that now that the soldier had done his work and was useless, the sooner he died the better.

Due to the battles at Pennafiel, Ponte Fereira, and various issues at Lugar das Antas, the wards assigned to the British in the general hospitals were overcrowded. This gives you an idea of the suffering the British endured when spread across different hospitals, speaking a language that wasn't understood. Hodges and Alcock took steps to gather the injured foreigners, but the Minister of War put obstacles in their way, almost making it seem like, now that the soldier had done his job and was no longer useful, it would be better if he died sooner.

Truth compels me to state a fact I should wish to avoid, but it is right that those who are to be soldiers should know 17 the value that is sometimes put upon their services. The words were made use of by Dom Pedro, but from what I have seen of him, I think others must have at the moment prompted him. The medical man was mentioning that it would be necessary to amputate the legs and arms of some of the British. "No, no," said Dom Pedro, "you British are fond of amputations, because your men are to have pensions, and that is expensive."

Truth forces me to share something I'd rather avoid, but it's important for those who will be soldiers to understand the value that is sometimes placed on their services. The words were used by Dom Pedro, but from what I've observed of him, I believe others must have influenced him at that moment. The doctor mentioned that some of the British would need to have their legs and arms amputated. "No, no," said Dom Pedro, "you British are fond of amputations because your men will receive pensions, and that’s costly."

No application from myself as commanding the battalion; from Alcock, as senior medical officer; nor from Hodges, as the representative of the foreigners, had any effect on Augustinho José Freire: thus the poor fellows, crowded together, without beds, without nurses, without clothes, and even without medicines, died in numbers.

No request from me as the battalion commander; from Alcock, the senior medical officer; or from Hodges, the representative of the foreigners, had any impact on Augustinho José Freire: so the poor guys, crammed together, without beds, without nurses, without clothes, and even without medicine, died in large numbers.

The references to Alcock's services are so frequent in these letters, so unconventional and spontaneous, as to prove the deep and lasting impression the young surgeon had made on his companions in arms. "I am glad for all your sakes to tell you that my wounds have healed in an extraordinary manner.... I consider myself greatly indebted to Alcock both for his skill and attention." And at the close of the Portuguese campaign: "I wonder if Alcock knows that he has got the decoration of the Tower and Sword? No man in the service deserves it more, both for bravery and kindness to the wounded." "The scarcity of medicines was dreadful; but with the active and willing assistance of Alcock, and the Portuguese medical gentlemen, it is quite wonderful what has been accomplished."

The mentions of Alcock's services are so common in these letters, so genuine and spontaneous, that they show the deep and lasting impact the young surgeon had on his fellow soldiers. "I'm happy to tell you all that my wounds have healed incredibly well.... I owe a lot to Alcock for his skill and care." And at the end of the Portuguese campaign: "I wonder if Alcock knows he's received the decoration of the Tower and Sword? No one in the service deserves it more, both for bravery and for being kind to the wounded." "The lack of medicine was terrible; but with Alcock's active and eager help, along with the Portuguese medical professionals, it's amazing what has been accomplished."

The bad condition of the hospitals at Oporto is the burden of many references in both Shaw's letters and Hodges' more formal narrative; and as the only records of the campaign from Alcock's own pen happen to be in official documents connected with 18 the medical service, we give in extenso one of his despatches, showing in an inexperienced boy of twenty-three a maturity of judgment and a broad grasp of duty, with, what is perhaps more important, a mastery of work, that would not discredit a veteran.

The poor state of the hospitals in Oporto is mentioned several times in both Shaw's letters and Hodges' more formal account. Since Alcock's only records of the campaign are in official documents related to the 18 medical service, we are providing in extenso one of his reports, which reveals that even as a twenty-three-year-old, he displayed mature judgment, a strong sense of duty, and, perhaps most importantly, an impressive grasp of the work that would impress a seasoned veteran.

Oporto, Sept. 20, 1832.

Oporto, Sept. 20, 1832.

Sir,—The danger to which the patients were found to be exposed by the fire of the enemy caused their removal to a place of greater safety, where they might at least have nothing to fear from the enemy's shells. This change in the arrangements, however, has been in other respects extremely disadvantageous to the sick and wounded men. They are now crowded from the higher parts of the building into the corridors and ground-floors—a situation well known to be unfavourable to the recovery of sick men, from the air being so much less pure. Our own men, including the English sailors, have been placed in one ward, which, though of tolerably large dimensions, is very far from affording the necessary space and quantum of air required for forty-eight or fifty patients, which for some time has been the average—an average which we may rather expect to see increased than diminished during the approaching wet season. Moreover, from peculiar localities, it is quite impossible efficiently to ventilate the room, or to ensure a free circulation of air, which is as essential as any other means employed for the recovery of health.

Mr.,—The danger to which the patients were exposed from enemy gunfire led to their relocation to a safer place, where they would at least not have to worry about enemy shells. However, this change in arrangements has been extremely disadvantageous for the sick and injured. They are now compressed from the upper parts of the building into the corridors and ground floors—a situation that is well-known to be harmful to the recovery of sick individuals due to the significantly less clean air. Our own men, including the English sailors, have been placed in one ward, which, although fairly large, is far from providing the necessary space and amount of air required for 48 or 50 patients, which has been the average for some time—an average we can expect to increase rather than decrease during the upcoming wet season. Furthermore, due to certain local conditions, it is nearly impossible to ventilate the room effectively or ensure a proper circulation of air, which is just as crucial as any other means employed for regaining health.

It is under these circumstances that I feel not only authorised, but bound in duty, to draw your attention to the subject; assured that in any measures proposed for the benefit or wellbeing of the men under your command it is only necessary to show they are really required to meet your cordial support. Many difficulties, and many disadvantageous arrangements, have always attended the treatment of the patients in the present establishment; but these last compulsory changes, when added to the former state, place my patients in too dangerous a position to allow me to be silent or inactive. Situated as we are, I cannot promise the speedy recovery of any of the gunshot wounds, nor indeed of the sick generally, and their liability to any of the epidemics unfortunately so common in crowded hospitals renders me exceedingly anxious 19 to have some steps taken to place them in a more favourable position.

It’s in this situation that I feel not only authorized but obligated to bring this issue to your attention. I’m confident that any measures suggested for the benefit or well-being of the men under your command will only need to show that they are truly necessary to earn your full support. There have always been many challenges and unfavorable arrangements in how we treat patients at this facility; however, these recent compulsory changes, along with the previous conditions, put my patients in such a dangerous position that I can’t remain silent or inactive. Given our circumstances, I can’t guarantee the quick recovery of any of the gunshot wounds or even the sick in general, and their vulnerability to the epidemics that are unfortunately so common in crowded hospitals makes me extremely anxious to take steps that will improve their situation. 19

The means I have to submit for your consideration and approval are, I believe and hope, extremely feasible. I desire to have some large dwelling-house appropriated for the reception of all English and French sick and wounded, by which means the General Hospital would be relieved of nearly a hundred patients, and of those, moreover, who, from the difference of language, are a fruitful and constant source of trouble and inconvenience—nay, more, of irregularity as prejudicial to the patients as it is discreditable to a military establishment of such importance. Many houses well adapted for this purpose might easily be mentioned, already at the disposal of the Government by the flight of the owners. One I could point out at this moment which, from a superficial inspection, I believe might be advantageously appropriated—a corner house in the Praça de St Ildefonso, adjoining the church.

The ideas I have for you to consider and approve are, I believe and hope, really feasible. I want to have a large house set aside to care for all English and French sick and injured, which would lighten the load at the General Hospital by nearly a hundred patients. These patients, due to the language barrier, cause a lot of trouble and inconvenience—actually, it leads to issues that are harmful to their care and reflect poorly on a military establishment of such significance. There are many houses that would work well for this purpose, available because their owners have fled. One that I can point out right now is a corner house in the Praça de St Ildefonso, next to the church, which I believe could be used effectively after a quick look.

The advantages which would accrue from this arrangement cannot for a moment be counterbalanced by the trouble or difficulty of first organising the separate establishment. The patients could then be classed and placed in different rooms, and not, as now, promiscuously crowded together—surgical and medical, fevers and amputations; by which arrangement their liability to any epidemic would be exceedingly diminished, while the patients would be more immediately under the eye and control of the medical attendants. Both surgeon and patient would thus be placed under more favourable circumstances, and the general service much facilitated by the removal of foreign troops from an establishment entirely Portuguese.

The benefits that would come from this setup far outweigh any hassle or challenge of initially organizing a separate establishment. The patients could then be categorized and placed in different rooms instead of being randomly packed together—surgical and medical cases, fevers and amputations. This arrangement would greatly reduce their risk of exposure to any epidemics, while allowing medical staff to keep a closer watch over the patients. Both the surgeon and the patient would be in a better situation, and the overall service would improve significantly by having foreign troops removed from a completely Portuguese establishment.

In glancing at the advantages, I should omit one of very great importance if I did not submit to you the facility it would afford for the good treatment of wounded and sick officers. Instead of being attended at their own quarters, often just within the first line, to their own great risk and the inconvenience of the surgeon, they would be removed to a place of safety, and where, moreover, from being entirely under medical command, their rank would procure them none of those injurious indulgences in the way of diet, &c., which even the wisest of us are apt to risk the enjoyment of when in our power. They might easily enjoy every necessary 20 comfort, while they would be carefully guarded from all imprudent excess.

When looking at the benefits, I would be neglecting something very important if I didn’t mention the ease it would provide for properly caring for wounded and sick officers. Instead of being treated at their own quarters, often just behind the front lines, putting themselves at great risk and causing challenges for the surgeon, they would be moved to a safe location. Additionally, since they would be completely under medical supervision, their rank wouldn't grant them any of those harmful indulgences in terms of diet, etc., that even the wisest among us tend to indulge in when given the chance. They could easily receive every necessary comfort while being carefully protected from any unwise excess.

The chief difficulties I foresee, and which I have no doubt will immediately present themselves to your mind, appear to me very far from insurmountable. I require the assistance of no Portuguese officer whatever, except a commissary or purveyor, on whom I can fully depend, for the due and regular supply of fuel, meat, wine, fowls, and such other articles as are required for the good treatment of the patients, and which are daily supplied to the General Hospital. This is of the greatest importance, as any irregularity in this branch of the service would not only cripple my efforts, but be of serious injury to all under my care. In addition to this I should require one Portuguese domestic to every fifteen cases, for the purpose of cooking, washing the linen, keeping the wards clean, and such other menial duties as are independent of those appertaining to the orderlies. The expense of a separate establishment ought to be, and would be, of the most trifling kind. The same beds, trussels, and utensils, now exclusively appropriated to us, would be equally serviceable in any other hospital. Two or three boilers, and a few cooking utensils, with a slipper bath, are really the chief and most expensive things required. I may safely leave it to you, sir, to decide if this can cause any grievous outlay.

The main challenges I anticipate, which I’m sure will come to your mind right away, seem to me quite manageable. I only need help from one Portuguese officer, like a commissary or supplier, whom I can fully depend on for the regular supply of fuel, meat, wine, poultry, and other items necessary for properly caring for the patients, similar to what’s provided daily to the General Hospital. This is crucial because any disruption in this service would not only hinder my efforts but could seriously harm everyone under my care. Additionally, I would need one Portuguese staff member for every fifteen patients to help with cooking, laundry, keeping the wards clean, and other chores that don't fall under the orderlies' responsibilities. The cost of a separate setup should be minimal. The same beds, cots, and equipment currently designated for us would be just as useful in any other hospital. Two or three boilers and some cooking tools, along with a slipper bath, are really the main and most costly items needed. I trust you can decide if this will incur any significant expense.

Should it be any convenience, or be deemed by you, sir, advantageous to the service, to the English and French might be added the wounded Portuguese soldiers of your brigade. I have little more to add, but should you require further detail, I beg to refer to a letter addressed to Major Shaw on this subject. I am fully conscious and aware of the labour I am entailing on myself, and that which is still more irksome, the heavy responsibility, but I have a duty to perform. I neither court the labour nor desire the responsibility; but if they come as a consequence of my efforts to do that duty I can look steadfastly on them, and I trust I have energy and perseverance enough to do all that depends upon me in spite of them. My most ardent wish is to prove myself worthy of the confidence you have honoured me with, and the trust conferred upon me.—I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient humble servant,

If it's convenient for you, sir, and beneficial for the service, please consider adding the wounded Portuguese soldiers from your brigade to the English and French. I don't have much more to say, but if you need more details, I refer you to a letter I sent to Major Shaw on this matter. I fully understand the work I'm taking on, and even more so, the heavy responsibility it brings, but I have a duty to fulfill. I don't seek the work or the responsibility, but if they come as part of my duty, I can face them head-on, and I believe I have enough energy and determination to handle everything that's expected of me despite these challenges. My greatest wish is to show that I'm worthy of the trust you've placed in me. I remain, sir, your obedient humble servant,

Rutherford Alcock.

Rutherford Alcock.

To Colonel Hodges,
commanding Foreign Brigade, &c., &c.

To Colonel Hodges,
in charge of the Foreign Brigade, and so on.

As the campaign in defence of the Queen of Portugal closed, that in defence of the Queen Christina of Spain opened, and their rough experiences in the former did not deter either Colonel Shaw or Surgeon Alcock from accepting service in the Spanish Legion organised and commanded by De Lacy Evans. "On my arrival in London," writes Shaw in 1836, "you may suppose how delighted I was to find my friend Alcock at the head of the medical department, as his experiences in difficulties made him decidedly the most proper man." As it is no part of our plan to trace the operations, we give one characteristic letter from Colonel Shaw. It is dated San Sebastian, 2 o'clock, May 6, 1836:—

As the campaign to defend the Queen of Portugal wrapped up, the effort to support Queen Christina of Spain began. The tough times they faced in the previous campaign didn’t discourage Colonel Shaw or Surgeon Alcock from joining the Spanish Legion organized and led by De Lacy Evans. "When I arrived in London," Shaw wrote in 1836, "you can imagine how happy I was to find my friend Alcock leading the medical department, as his experience in tough situations made him the best choice." Since we don’t plan to outline the operations, we’ll share one notable letter from Colonel Shaw. It’s dated San Sebastian, 2 o'clock, May 6, 1836:—

My dear Mother.—The steamer is detained, so I write to you once more. I and my brigade are so fatigued and cut up that we have been allowed to return here for the night. We had a terrible morning's work of it, the brigade having lost, in killed and wounded, about 400 men and 27 officers; others not so much. How I escaped I know not; kind Providence was my protector. My watch is smashed, the ball having cut through cloak, coat, trousers, drawers, and shirt, and only bruised me. A spent ball hit me on the chest, and my gaiter was cut across by another. We had dreadful lines to force: very steep, vomiting fire; and the clay up to our ankles made us so slow that they picked as they chose. The enemy not only behaved well behind their lines, but charged out, and twice or thrice put us for a moment in confusion. Alcock is slightly wounded.

Dear Mom.—The steamer is delayed, so I’m writing to you again. My brigade and I are so worn out and in bad shape that we've been allowed to return here for the night. We had a brutal morning, losing about 400 men and 27 officers in killed and wounded; others had fewer losses. I don’t know how I made it through; I can only say that kind Providence was looking after me. My watch is broken, a bullet went through my cloak, coat, trousers, underwear, and shirt, and only left me bruised. A stray bullet hit my chest, and another cut across my gaiter. We had to tackle some dreadful positions: very steep, shooting fire; and the clay that was up to our ankles slowed us down so much that they picked us off as they pleased. The enemy not only fought well from behind their lines, but they charged out and put us in confusion a couple of times. Alcock has a minor wound.

And as an agreeable pendant to the severe strictures on the state of the Portuguese hospitals, the following may fitly close our extracts from these racy records of arduous military adventure:—

And as a fitting addition to the harsh criticisms of the Portuguese hospitals, the following may appropriately conclude our excerpts from these vivid accounts of challenging military expeditions:—

Bayonne, September, 1836.

Bayonne, September 1836.

When you land, introduce yourself to my friend Alcock, and beg him to take you through the hospitals. You will, or I am 22 greatly mistaken, be agreeably surprised by the prevailing cleanliness and regularity, as also the care and attendance bestowed on the sick and wounded. Alcock has had a most difficult card to play. He knows well that there are many disabled poor fellows who, if they were in the British service, would be sent to England, certain of receiving their pensions; but he is also aware that a poor fellow sent to England from the service of Queen Christina, instead of receiving his pension, is generally left to starve. It is therefore from a praiseworthy charity that he keeps many in hospital, under his own eye, in order that they may in this manner get as much as will keep body and soul together.

When you arrive, introduce yourself to my friend Alcock and ask him to show you around the hospitals. You will be pleasantly surprised by the cleanliness and order, as well as the care and attention given to the sick and injured. Alcock is in a tough position. He knows that many disabled soldiers, if they were in the British service, would be sent back to England and would definitely receive their pensions; but he also realizes that a soldier sent to England from Queen Christina's service often ends up starving instead of receiving help. So, out of genuine compassion, he keeps many of them in the hospital under his supervision, ensuring they get enough to survive.

Mr Alcock retired from military service in 1837 with the rank of Deputy-Inspector of Hospitals, having received the Order of the Tower and Sword together with the war medal of the three years' service in Portugal, and the Cross of the Order of Charles III. and Commander's Cross of Isabella the Catholic, with medals for the two principal actions against the Carlists.

Mr. Alcock retired from military service in 1837 with the title of Deputy-Inspector of Hospitals, having been awarded the Order of the Tower and Sword, as well as the war medal for three years of service in Portugal, the Cross of the Order of Charles III, and the Commander's Cross of Isabella the Catholic, along with medals for the two main battles against the Carlists.

The six years of Peninsular experiences he declared to have been "the most stirring and attractive of his life," and in some portions of that period he had "more complete personal gratification and material happiness than could be safely anticipated in the future." He was now to have six years of quite a different experience, which led up to the turning-point in his life. 23

The six years spent in the Peninsula were, in his words, "the most exciting and fulfilling of his life." During parts of that time, he found "more personal satisfaction and material happiness than he could realistically expect in the future." Now, he was about to enter six years of a completely different experience, which would lead to a turning point in his life. 23

III. ENGLAND, 1838-1844.

Returns to England, 1838—Alcock resumes professional work—Prize essays and publications—Sir James Paget's testimonial—A Commissioner for adjusting Peninsular claims—Appointed Inspector of Anatomy, 1842—Imperfections of the Anatomy Act—Marriage to Miss Bacon, 1841—His enforced abandonment of a surgical career.

Returns to England, 1838—Alcock resumes professional work—Prize essays and publications—Sir James Paget's testimonial—A Commissioner for adjusting Peninsular claims—Appointed Inspector of Anatomy, 1842—Flaws in the Anatomy Act—Marriage to Miss Bacon, 1841—His forced departure from a surgical career.

On his return to England in 1838 Alcock at once resumed the work of his profession. In that year he published in a small 8vo volume 'Notes on the Medical History and Statistics of the British Legion of Spain'; and in 1839, and again in 1841, he carried off the Jacksonian prizes of the Royal College of Surgeons awarded for the best essays on subjects selected by the Council. The first of these was "On Concussion or Commotion of the Brain"; the second, "On Injuries of the Thorax and Operations on its Parietes"; and naturally the value of the papers lay in the extent to which the author was able to draw on his own observation and experience of gunshot wounds during his seven years of Peninsular service.

On his return to England in 1838, Alcock immediately went back to his professional work. That year, he published a small 8vo volume titled 'Notes on the Medical History and Statistics of the British Legion of Spain'; and in 1839, and again in 1841, he won the Jacksonian prizes from the Royal College of Surgeons for the best essays on topics chosen by the Council. The first of these essays was "On Concussion or Commotion of the Brain," and the second was "On Injuries of the Thorax and Operations on its Parietes." Naturally, the value of these papers was based on how much the author could draw from his own observations and experiences with gunshot wounds during his seven years of service in the Peninsular War.

Of these contributions to medical literature Sir James Paget remarks that "they may make one regret that he was ever induced to give up the study of surgery. For they show an immense power of accurately observing and recording facts, and of testing his own and others' opinions by the help of all the knowledge of the facts possessed by others at that time.... I doubt whether in the first half of this century better essays on gunshot wounds of the head and of the thorax had been written."

Of these contributions to medical literature, Sir James Paget notes that "they may make one regret that he was ever persuaded to give up studying surgery. Because they demonstrate an incredible ability to accurately observe and record facts, and to test his own and others' opinions with the knowledge of facts available at that time.... I doubt that in the first half of this century, better essays on gunshot wounds of the head and thorax were ever written."

And the small volume dealing with hospital experiences 24 in Spain has drawn from the same eminent authority the comment that "it tells in a most graphic and clear manner the difficulties which, sixty years ago, beset the practice of surgery and the care of troops during war. These difficulties may have been greater at that time in Spain than in any other country in Western Europe, and may be thought now impossible, but they may be read with great interest, and one cannot doubt that Sir Rutherford Alcock's true account of them helped to remedy them, ... contributed to the improvement of the medical department of the army in this country."

And the small book about hospital experiences 24 in Spain has received feedback from the same respected expert, stating that "it describes in a very vivid and clear way the challenges that, sixty years ago, faced the practice of surgery and the care of soldiers during wartime. These challenges may have been more severe in Spain at that time than in any other country in Western Europe, and might now seem unbelievable, but they can be read with great interest, and one cannot deny that Sir Rutherford Alcock's accurate account of them helped to address these issues, ... contributed to the improvement of the medical department of the army in this country."

Mr Alcock joined the Royal Medical and Chirurgical Society in 1839, and was appointed Lecturer in Surgery at Sydenham College, where he delivered a series of lectures on complicated injuries, amputations, &c.

Mr. Alcock became a member of the Royal Medical and Chirurgical Society in 1839 and was appointed as a Lecturer in Surgery at Sydenham College, where he gave a series of lectures on complicated injuries, amputations, etc.

His professional labours were soon diversified by an employment which could scarcely have been consistent with a large practice, though in the beginning of his surgical career it might not seem to involve much sacrifice except of time. But it was arduous, onerous, and absolutely gratuitous. Great trouble had arisen between the Spanish Government and the Foreign Legion in regard to pay. No settlement could be obtained, and eventually a commission was appointed to examine and adjudicate the numerous claims, to which commission Mr Alcock was appointed by express and unanimous request of the general and the field officers of the corps. His qualifications for such an office were quite exceptional, for to first-rate business capacity, which had been shown in the campaign, he added a knowledge of the language and the country which was not common, and a character which commanded 25 universal confidence. His work on this commission extended over two years, and was brought to a satisfactory termination in 1839.

His professional work was soon varied by a job that probably wouldn’t have matched a busy practice, although in the early days of his surgical career it might not have seemed like much of a sacrifice apart from his time. But it was tough, burdensome, and completely unpaid. There was significant conflict between the Spanish Government and the Foreign Legion over pay. No resolution could be reached, and eventually, a commission was formed to review and resolve the many claims, to which Mr. Alcock was appointed at the express and unanimous request of the general and the field officers of the corps. His qualifications for this role were quite exceptional; in addition to his top-notch business skills demonstrated during the campaign, he also had a rare understanding of the language and the country, along with a reputation that inspired 25 universal confidence. His work on this commission lasted for two years and was successfully concluded in 1839.

No sooner were the labours of the Spanish commission concluded than Mr Alcock was, in 1840, appointed by the Foreign Office to a similar duty in an Anglo-Portuguese commission constituted by the two Governments to adjust the claims of British subjects who had served in the Miguelite war of 1832-35. The work of that commission also was satisfactorily accomplished in 1844, and, as in the Spanish commission, Mr Alcock's labours were given without remuneration, in order, as he said, that his judgment might be unbiassed.[2]

No sooner did the work of the Spanish commission finish than Mr. Alcock was appointed by the Foreign Office in 1840 to a similar role in an Anglo-Portuguese commission set up by the two Governments to settle the claims of British subjects who had fought in the Miguelite war from 1832 to 1835. This commission also completed its work satisfactorily in 1844, and, just like with the Spanish commission, Mr. Alcock performed his duties without payment, so that, as he stated, his judgment could remain impartial.[2]

During the course of the Spanish commission Mr Alcock was, in 1842, appointed, on the strong recommendation of Sir Benjamin Brodie, to a post under the Home Office, that of Inspector of Anatomy. It would be distasteful and of no utility to rake up the circumstances which set on foot an agitation culminating in the passing of an Act of Parliament in 1832 known as "The Anatomy Act." Like many other Acts of legislature in this country, it was a compromise by which difficulties were sought to be evaded by cunningly devised phrases whereby the thing that was meant was so disguised as to appear to be something else. "The Act failed in two most important points; it failed in honesty, and was wanting in the extent of the powers conferred." In short, after ten years' trial the Act was becoming unworkable, and a reform in 26 its administration was imperatively demanded. It was at that critical moment that Mr Alcock was nominated as one of the two inspectors under the Act, and he entered on his duties with his well-proved practical energy. Before the end of the first year a long and interesting report was sent in by the inspectors, and we may judge by the sample of the Hospital Report in Oporto how thoroughly they exposed the difficulties and how practically they proposed to overcome them. A second report followed in 1843. But Government is a lumbering machine, always waiting for some stronger compulsion than a mere demonstration of what ought to be; and we are not surprised, therefore, to find fifteen years later, and fourteen after his connection with the Home Department had ceased, Mr Alcock still writing the most lucid and matter-of-fact memoranda on the conditions under which competent inspectors might be induced "to work a very imperfect Act of Parliament."

During the Spanish commission, Mr. Alcock was appointed in 1842 to a position under the Home Office as Inspector of Anatomy, thanks to a strong recommendation from Sir Benjamin Brodie. It wouldn't be useful to go into the details that sparked the movement leading to the passing of an Act of Parliament in 1832 known as "The Anatomy Act." Like many other laws in this country, it was a compromise that tried to avoid problems with cleverly crafted wording that obscured its true intent. "The Act failed in two crucial areas: it lacked honesty and did not provide adequate powers." In short, after ten years of being in effect, the Act was becoming unworkable, and a reform of its administration was urgently needed. At that critical moment, Mr. Alcock was appointed as one of the two inspectors under the Act, and he took on his duties with his well-established practical vigor. Before the end of the first year, the inspectors submitted a long and interesting report, and we can see from the Hospital Report in Oporto how thoroughly they addressed the challenges and how practically they proposed to solve them. A second report followed in 1843. However, government is a slow-moving entity, often waiting for stronger pressure than just a clear demonstration of what should be done; so, it’s not surprising that fifteen years later, and fourteen years after he left the Home Department, Mr. Alcock was still writing clear and straightforward memoranda on how competent inspectors could be encouraged "to operate under a very flawed Act of Parliament."

It was during the period under review that the most interesting episode in a young man's life occurred. On the 17th of May 1841, when he had just completed his thirty-second year, he was married to Miss Bacon, daughter of the sculptor of that name. The ceremony took place at St Margaret's, Westminster, Dean Milman, then a Canon of Westminster, officiating. His domestic bliss was unruffled, the couple being profoundly congenial.

It was during this time that the most interesting event in a young man's life happened. On May 17, 1841, just after he turned thirty-two, he married Miss Bacon, the daughter of the sculptor with the same name. The ceremony was held at St. Margaret's, Westminster, with Dean Milman, who was a Canon of Westminster, officiating. His domestic happiness was steady, as the couple was deeply compatible.

But now "a change came o'er the spirit of his dream." The career which opened before the young surgeon was full of promise. So far as the personal factor was concerned, no man could have started 27 with a better equipment. There were efficiency, thoroughness, enthusiasm, courage, and common-sense; there were, as we have seen in the student days, manual dexterity and exactness and artistic power of no contemptible order; there was, in short, every attribute of an accomplished surgeon, who must in the course of nature rise to eminence. A chair of military surgery was ready for him at King's College, and an assistant-surgeonship at Westminster Hospital. All that, however, had to be sacrificed and a new departure taken, in consequence of an illness which left its mark in the form of paralysis of hands and arms, and thus put an end to "all dreams of surgical practice."

But now "a change came over the spirit of his dream." The path ahead for the young surgeon was full of potential. As far as the personal aspects were concerned, no one could have started with better qualifications. He had efficiency, thoroughness, enthusiasm, courage, and common sense; as we’ve seen from his time as a student, he possessed manual dexterity, precision, and artistic skill of no small measure; in short, he had every quality of a skilled surgeon destined to achieve greatness. A position in military surgery was waiting for him at King’s College, along with a role as an assistant surgeon at Westminster Hospital. However, all of that had to be given up, and a new direction taken, due to an illness that resulted in paralysis of his hands and arms, effectively ending "all dreams of surgical practice."

This malady was a legacy from the Peninsula. Like Cæsar, "he had a fever when he was in Spain," a rheumatic fever of a particularly severe type contracted at the siege of San Sebastian. This entailed indescribable pain and misery during many months, and, in spite of partial recoveries, seems to have left its after-effects seven years later in what he calls the "mysterious" affection in his hands. It was indeed considered remarkable that he should have survived an attack of so formidable a character. He never recovered the use of his thumbs, which marred the legibility of his writing to the end of his life.

This illness was a leftover from the Peninsula. Like Caesar, "he had a fever when he was in Spain," a particularly severe rheumatic fever he caught during the siege of San Sebastian. This caused indescribable pain and suffering for many months, and despite some partial recoveries, it seems to have left lasting effects seven years later in what he refers to as the "mysterious" condition in his hands. It was indeed seen as extraordinary that he had survived such a serious illness. He never regained the use of his thumbs, which made his writing hard to read for the rest of his life.

His professional career being thus rudely closed, it might well have appeared to a man of thirty-five that his life was shipwrecked ere the voyage was well begun. It would have been in accord with the short-sighted judgment which men usually form of their own fortunes. But

His professional career suddenly ended, it might have seemed to a thirty-five-year-old that his life was ruined before it even truly began. This would match the shortsighted views people often have about their own futures. But

"There's a divinity that shapes our ends,

"There's a higher power that influences our outcomes,

Rough-hew them how we will;"—

Shape them as we want;—

and Alcock learned, what many before and since have learned, that prosperity and adversity oft visit men in disguise, and are liable to be mistaken the one for the other. Providence employs for its favourites an alchemy whereby the very ashes of their misery may be transmuted into pure gold; and what looks like disaster is but the rending of the veil which concealed a world of richer promise than that which they abandon with regret.

and Alcock learned, like many before and after him, that success and failure often come to people in unexpected ways and can easily be mistaken for each other. Fate has a way of turning the very remnants of their suffering into something valuable; what seems like a disaster is just the tearing away of the veil that hid a world of greater possibilities than the one they leave behind with sadness.

CHAPTER II.

Shipped to China.

Importance of appointment—New position created by Treaty of Nanking—Exceptional responsibility of the new consuls—The evolution and scope of foreign intercourse—Pioneer traders—Mutual experiences of Chinese and foreigners—Results—English inheritors of the record—An intolerable state of things—Drastic remedy—Where it failed—Chasm between Eastern and Western ideas—Commerce alone supplied a safe medium of intercourse—Its healing qualities—But social and political concomitants created friction—Arbitrary interferences of Chinese Government—Their traditional mode of treating barbarians—Denial of human rights—Absence of law in their intercourse—Spasmodic resistance to Chinese tyranny aggravated the evils—East India Company submitted for the sake of gain—Close of the Company's charter—Followed by endeavour of British Government to establish official intercourse—Determined resistance of Chinese—Lord Napier, first British envoy, not received—Loaded with insults—Contradictory instructions given by British Government—To conciliate Chinese as in days of Company, and at same time to open diplomatic relations—Lord Napier's appeal to experience—His death at Macao—Captain Ellis, a third envoy, reverts to the policy of submission—Has no success.

Importance of appointment—New position created by the Treaty of Nanking—Exceptional responsibility of the new consuls—The evolution and scope of foreign trade—Pioneer traders—Mutual experiences of Chinese and foreigners—Results—The English inheritors of the record—An unbearable situation—Drastic remedy—Where it failed—The gap between Eastern and Western ideas—Commerce alone provided a safe medium of interaction—Its healing qualities—But social and political factors created friction—Arbitrary interferences by the Chinese Government—Their traditional way of dealing with outsiders—Denial of human rights—Lack of law in their interactions—Spasmodic resistance to Chinese rule worsened the issues—The East India Company submitted for profit—Close of the Company's charter—Followed by the British Government's effort to establish official relations—Determined resistance from the Chinese—Lord Napier, the first British envoy, was not welcomed—Loaded with insults—Conflicting instructions from the British Government—To appease the Chinese as during the Company era, while also opening diplomatic relations—Lord Napier's appeal to experience—His death in Macao—Captain Ellis, a third envoy, returns to the policy of submission—He has no success.

When thus thrown upon his beam-ends in 1844, an appointment was conferred on Mr Alcock which was not only honourable to him but creditable to the Government which selected him. He was among the five chosen to fill the office of consul in China under the treaty of Nanking, which had been concluded in 1842. And if any event in human life be deserving of 30 such distinction, the opening thus provided for the talents of Mr Alcock is on many grounds entitled to rank as providential. To the end of his days he himself recognised that his previous training had not been thrown away, but "had been unconsciously preparing him for the great work of his life." The Minister responsible for the appointment may be excused if, while selecting a man of proved capacity for a post of unknown requirements, he did not realise the full value of the service he was rendering to his country. Governments are not always so perspicacious in gauging the merits of the uncovenanted, and other nominations made under circumstances not dissimilar have shown how easily the efficiency of the candidate may be subordinated to considerations extraneous to the public weal.

When he found himself in a tough spot in 1844, Mr. Alcock received an appointment that was not only honorable for him but also reflected well on the Government that chose him. He was one of five selected to serve as consul in China under the Treaty of Nanking, which was finalized in 1842. If any moment in life deserves such recognition, the opportunity presented to Mr. Alcock is certainly significant for many reasons. Until the end of his life, he acknowledged that his past experiences had not been wasted but had "unconsciously prepared him for the great work of his life." The Minister who made the appointment can be forgiven for not fully appreciating the value of the service he was providing to the country while selecting a capable person for a position with unknown demands. Governments don’t always see the full potential of candidates who aren't officially recognized, and other appointments made under similar circumstances have demonstrated how easily the suitability of a candidate can be overlooked due to factors unrelated to the public good.

The China consulates were a new creation, a venture into the unknown, a voyage without landmarks or chart, where success depended on the personal qualities of the pioneer navigators—their judgment, resourcefulness, and faculty of initiative. Great issues hung upon the opening of the new world of the Far East, the success of which was largely in the hands of the agents who were employed, for they were practically beyond the reach of instructions. There was no telegraph, and the so-called Overland Route to India was just beginning to be exploited for the conveyance of mails and passengers. Nor was it possible for even the wisest Government to frame general instructions providing for eventualities out of the range of common experience. The conditions of service were therefore such as to constitute an ordeal under which a bureaucratic official would shrivel into uselessness or worse, 31 while to a strong man they were a powerful stimulant, the very breath of life.

The China consulates were a new creation, a venture into the unknown, a journey without maps or guides, where success relied on the personal qualities of the pioneering navigators—their judgment, resourcefulness, and initiative. Important issues depended on the opening of the new world in the Far East, success resting largely in the hands of the agents employed, as they were practically beyond the reach of instructions. There was no telegraph, and the so-called Overland Route to India was just starting to be used for the transport of mail and passengers. Even the wisest government couldn't create general instructions to cover situations outside the scope of everyday experience. Consequently, the conditions of service were such that a bureaucratic official would become ineffective or worse, 31 while for a strong individual, they were a powerful motivator, the very breath of life.

It was therefore a matter of serious consequence who should be intrusted with the actual inauguration of the new relations with China; and in the course of the present narrative it will probably appear that it was a happy accident by which the country lost one distinguished surgeon among many and gained in exchange a political representative whose services must be considered unique.

It was, therefore, very important who should be given the responsibility of starting the new relations with China; and as this story unfolds, it will likely become clear that it was a fortunate coincidence that the country lost one notable surgeon among many and gained instead a political representative whose contributions are truly one-of-a-kind.

FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH CHINA.

To understand fully the state of our relations with China created by the treaty of Nanking, the whole history not only of our own commercial intercourse, but of that of the nations who were our forerunners in the Far East, would have to be kept in mind. For much as we tried and hoped then, and ever since, to confine the international question to a few bald propositions respecting trade, personal protection, and so forth, it is impossible to eliminate the historical, the human, and the general political elements from the problem. For both good and evil we are the necessary outcome of our own antecedents, as are the Chinese of theirs, and if we had acquired a stock of experience of the Chinese, no less had they of us; indeed, if we fairly consider the matter, theirs was the more comprehensive. For to the Chinese we represented not ourselves alone, nor the East India Company, nor a generation or two of timid traders, but Christendom as a whole—our Spanish, Portuguese, 32 and Dutch precursors, the Romish propaganda, and all the abortive missions to Peking.

To fully understand our relationship with China after the Treaty of Nanking, we need to consider the complete history of not only our own trade interactions but also those of the countries that came before us in the Far East. No matter how much we tried and hoped to limit the international issues to just a few basic points about trade, personal protection, and similar topics, it's impossible to ignore the historical, human, and broader political aspects of the situation. Both our positive and negative outcomes stem from our past, just as the Chinese experience their own history; in fact, if we look at it fairly, theirs is more extensive. To the Chinese, we represented not just ourselves, the East India Company, or a handful of cautious traders, but all of Christendom—our Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch predecessors, the Roman Catholic missions, and all the failed attempts to reach Peking.

For three centuries and more what may be called the foreign education of the Chinese had been proceeding: their habits were being formed in so far as their dealings with strangers were concerned, and their judgment was being trained by the authentic data with which they had been plentifully supplied. European intercourse, in short, had been one long lesson to the Chinese in the art of managing men from the West. Without meaning it, we had been teaching them how to treat us, just as we train animals to perform tricks; and the worst we can say of the Chinese is that they have bettered the instruction, to their loss perhaps as well as ours.

For over three centuries, the foreign education of the Chinese has been underway: their habits have been shaped in relation to their interactions with outsiders, and their judgment has been refined by the real information they’ve received in abundance. In short, European interactions have been a long lesson for the Chinese in how to deal with people from the West. Unintentionally, we’ve been teaching them how to handle us, much like how we train animals to do tricks; and the most negative thing we can say about the Chinese is that they’ve improved upon our teachings, which may be a loss for both them and us.

In the chronicles of that long history there are many deeds worthy of remembrance, as well as many of another hue, neither being confined to one side. There were good and bad among the early adventurers, as there are at all times in every other section of mankind. Of two brothers, for example, connected with the very early times, the first comer ingratiated himself with the Chinese, and left such a good impression behind him that the second was received with open arms: very soon, however, he abused the liberality of the natives, committing outrages upon them, which led ultimately to his forcible expulsion from the country and to restrictions on the outlets for trade. Taking it as a whole, the record of the pioneers in China is rather a despicable one, in which violence, cupidity, and cowardice formed large ingredients.

In the long history documented here, there are many notable actions to remember, as well as plenty of others that aren't so great, with both sides represented. Among the early pioneers, some were good and some were not, just like in any other part of humanity throughout history. Take, for instance, two brothers from those early days: the first one won over the Chinese and left such a positive impression that the second was welcomed with open arms. However, he soon took advantage of the locals' generosity and committed acts of violence against them, which ultimately got him kicked out of the country and led to restrictions on trade. Overall, the legacy of the early explorers in China is pretty shameful, filled with violence, greed, and cowardice.

The English, as latest comers, being served heirs to 33 the turpitudes of all Europe, paid the penalty for the misdeeds and shortcomings of their predecessors and their neighbours, as well as for their own. The penalty was the intolerable degradation they had been made to endure, with ever-increasing aggravation, at the only port where they were permitted to trade—Canton.

The English, as the newest arrivals, inherited the wrongdoings of all of Europe, paying the price for the mistakes and failures of their predecessors and neighbors, as well as their own. The cost was the unbearable humiliation they had to endure, which only grew worse, at the only port where they were allowed to trade—Canton.

As there are forms of impurity which can only be cleansed by fire, so there was no possible remedy for the miseries of Anglo-Chinese intercourse short of open war. The hostilities begun in 1839, and brought to a conclusion by the treaty of Nanking in 1842, were naturally held as a drastic liquidation of long-standing grievances and the harbinger of a new era of peace and mutual respect. Why even the decisive and one-sided war should have proved an inadequate solvent of the perennial strife may partly appear as our story proceeds.

As there are types of impurity that can only be cleansed by fire, there was no possible solution for the troubles in Anglo-Chinese relations other than outright war. The conflict that started in 1839 and ended with the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 was seen as a harsh resolution of long-standing issues and a sign of a new era of peace and mutual respect. Why even this clear and one-sided war turned out to be an insufficient remedy for the ongoing conflict will become clearer as our story unfolds.

The chasm between the Chinese and the Western world, as then represented by Great Britain, was in fact much too deep to be bridged over by any convention. Intercommunion between bodies so alien was as the welding of heterogeneous metals, contact without fusion. From one point of view, indeed, circumstances were highly favourable to a sympathetic attachment, for there is no safer medium of intercourse between nations than the commerce which blesses him that buys and him that sells. It was the pursuit of commerce alone that drew men from afar to the Asiatic coasts, and the reciprocal desire on the part of the natives which opened for the strangers, be it ever so little, the gates of the Chinese empire. The purely commercial relation left little to be desired on the side of mutual goodwill. 34 The impression of it left on the mind of old residents in Canton is thus recorded by Mr W. C. Hunter, an American merchant, who lived there from 1824: "From the facility of all dealings with the Chinese who were assigned to transact business with us, together with their proverbial honesty, combined with a sense of perfect security to person and property, scarcely a resident of any lengthened time—in short, any 'Old Canton'—but finally left them with regret."

The gap between the Chinese and the Western world, as represented by Great Britain at the time, was really too wide to be bridged by any agreement. Interaction between such different cultures was like trying to weld different metals together—there was contact, but no real connection. From one perspective, the situation was actually quite favorable for forming a bond, since trade is one of the safest ways for countries to connect with each other. It was the pursuit of commerce that brought people from far away to the shores of Asia, and it was the local desire for trade that opened the otherwise closed gates of the Chinese empire, even if just a little. This purely commercial relationship didn't leave much to be desired when it came to goodwill between both parties. 34 The lasting impression of this experience on old residents in Canton is summed up by Mr. W. C. Hunter, an American merchant who lived there starting in 1824: "Thanks to the ease of dealings with the Chinese who handled business for us, along with their well-known honesty and a solid sense of safety for people and property, hardly any resident who stayed for a while—essentially any 'Old Canton'—left without feeling a sense of regret."

Mr Hunter goes further and testifies to the "vigilant care over the personal safety of strangers who came to live in the midst of a population whose customs and prejudices were so opposed to everything foreign."

Mr. Hunter goes on to testify about the "diligent care for the personal safety of newcomers who came to live among a community whose customs and biases were so against anything foreign."

Why, then, was it that on the ground-level of common material interest, and under the sunshine of the protection spontaneously accorded by authority, the parties failed in two hundred years to evolve between them a modus vivendi? The solution of this riddle can only be found in a patient survey of events both before and after the war.

Why, then, was it that at the level of shared material interest, and with the support freely given by those in power, the parties were unable to create a modus vivendi in two hundred years? The answer to this puzzle can only be found through a careful examination of events both before and after the war.

It would carry us far beyond our limits even to summarise the history of foreign intercourse with China. Nor is such a task necessary, since our concern lies mainly with those later developments which culminated in the war of 1839-42, a glance at which seems essential to any fair appreciation of the sequel.

It would take us way beyond our limits even to summarize the history of foreign relations with China. However, such a task isn't necessary since our focus is primarily on the later developments that led to the war of 1839-42, which is crucial for understanding the aftermath.

That there was no material cause of difference between the Chinese Government and people on the one hand and the foreign traders and their representatives on the other was made manifest by the persistence and continuous growth of their mutual commerce. And their common appreciation of the advantages of the trade is shown by the readiness 35 of each in turn to resort to the threat of stopping business as a means of pressure on the other side. It is not therefore the substance, but the accidents and conditions, of the intercourse that generated the friction which led through outrage to reprisals; and the two conditions most fruitful in conflict were the necessary absence of law and the inevitable incomprehension of each others status.

That there was no significant difference between the Chinese government and people on one side and the foreign traders and their representatives on the other was clear from the ongoing and growing trade between them. Their shared understanding of the benefits of this trade is evident in how each side was willing to threaten to stop business to pressure the other. Therefore, it's not the core issues, but the circumstances and conditions of their interactions that caused the conflicts that resulted in outraged responses. The two main factors that led to these conflicts were the lack of legal framework and the inevitable misunderstanding of each other's positions.

Left to themselves, the traders on either side, though without law, would have been a law to themselves, both parties having been habituated to a discipline of custom more potent within its sphere than any code, commercial or penal. But as no problem in life can ever be isolated, so in this case the twofold interference of the State and the populace constantly obstructed the genial flow of commercial intercourse.

Left to their own devices, the traders on both sides, though without any formal laws, would have operated according to their own rules, as both groups were used to a set of customs that functioned more powerfully within their context than any commercial or legal code. However, since no issue in life exists in a vacuum, in this case, the dual interference from the government and the public continuously disrupted the smooth exchange of commercial activities.

The interference of the Chinese bore no resemblance to the restrictions imposed on trade by Western Governments, for these, even when most oppressive, are usually specific and calculable. There is a tariff of duties, there are harbour and police regulations, and there are the laws of the land. The peculiarity of the Chinese official supervision of foreign trade was that it was incalculable and arbitrary, governed by cupidities and jealousies, and subject to individual caprice. Having barbarians to deal with, the Chinese authorities followed the maxims of their ancient kings and "ruled them by misrule, which is the true and the only way of ruling them." And finding the barbarians submissive, they grew accustomed to practise on them such indignities as a wanton schoolboy might inflict on a captive animal, unrestrained by any consideration save the risk of retaliation. The 36 Chinese had no conscience to be shocked by the persecution of foreigners, for in relation to them justice and injustice were meaningless terms. Such arrogance was not so much the result of any formulated belief as of a traditional feeling lying at the bottom of their moral conceptions; and just as the Chinese people to-day speak of foreigners, without consciousness of offence, as "devils," so did the best educated officials in the days before the war sincerely regard strangers as an inferior, if not a degraded, race. As late as 1870 a British representative writing to the Chinese Prime Minister complained that "the educated class, both by speech and writing, lets the people see that it regards the foreigner as a barbarian, a devil, or a brute." And there has been no change since except what is enforced by prudence. To the absence of law in their intercourse was therefore superadded a special negation of human rights, naturally accompanied by an overbearing demeanour on the side of the natives. The strangers were in effect outlawed. The attempts made from time to time to assert their independence resembled the spasmodic kicking of the ox against the goad which led rather to aggravation than amelioration of the pain. The prevailing tone was that of submission, inviting more and more aggression, until the cup overflowed and war ensued.

The interference from the Chinese was nothing like the trade restrictions set by Western governments, which, even when they were at their worst, were usually clear and predictable. There are tariffs, harbor regulations, police rules, and the laws of the land. What made Chinese official oversight of foreign trade unique was that it was unpredictable and arbitrary, driven by personal greed and jealousy, and subject to individual whims. When dealing with foreigners, the Chinese authorities adhered to the principles of their ancient kings and “controlled them by misrule, which is the true and only way of ruling them.” As they found the foreigners submissive, they became accustomed to treating them with indignities like a reckless schoolboy might do to a captured animal, limited only by the fear of retaliation. The 36 Chinese had no qualms about persecuting foreigners, as the concepts of justice and injustice were meaningless to them in that context. This arrogance stemmed not from a set ideology but from a traditional sentiment deeply rooted in their moral views; just as today the Chinese people refer to foreigners as "devils" without realizing it's offensive, so did the most educated officials before the war genuinely see outsiders as an inferior, if not degraded, race. As recently as 1870, a British representative wrote to the Chinese Prime Minister, complaining that "the educated class, both through speech and writing, makes it clear that it views foreigners as barbarians, devils, or brutes." Since then, the only change has been what is demanded by caution. The lack of law in their interactions was compounded by a total disregard for human rights, which naturally led to an arrogant attitude from the locals. The foreigners were, in effect, treated as outlaws. The occasional attempts to assert their independence resembled the futile kicking of an ox against the goad, which only intensified the pain rather than alleviating it. The overall feeling was one of submission, inviting more and more aggression until it all boiled over into war.

If we ask how it could happen that Britons of any class came to submit to such ignominy, the only answer forthcoming is that they did it for the sake of gain. And if, further, we try to press home the responsibility to any particular quarter, there is very little doubt that the principal blame must be laid at the door of the 37 East India Company, which ruled and monopolised the English trade with China until the expiration of their charter in 1834. The Board of Directors in Leadenhall Street demanded remittances, and cared nothing for the indignities which their distant agents might be forced to undergo in order to supply these demands. "The interests at stake were too valuable to be put at issue upon considerations of a personal nature, ... and the Court leave the vindication of the national honour to the Crown." Such was their unchanging attitude. The agents on their side, balancing the pros and cons, concluded that at any cost they must retain the favour of the omnipotent Board. By this course of procedure the prestige which would have protected British subjects from outrage was bartered away; the Chinese were induced by the subservience of the Company's officers to practise constantly increasing insolence, and small blame to them. The demeanour of the Company's representatives was that of men carrying out instructions against their better judgment. Occasionally, indeed, their judgment got the better of their instructions, and they would attempt to make a stand for their rights. A case occurred in 1831 when new restrictions on the export of silver were imposed by the Chinese authorities. Mr H. H. Lindsay, head of the Company's committee, resented the proceeding, and threatened to stop the trade. In the event, however, the committee gave way, and in token of surrender delivered the keys of their factory to a Chinese mandarin.

If we wonder how it was possible for Britons of any class to accept such shame, the only explanation is that they did it for profit. And if we try to assign blame to a specific source, it's clear that the main responsibility lies with the 37 East India Company, which controlled and monopolized English trade with China until their charter expired in 1834. The Board of Directors on Leadenhall Street demanded profits and showed no concern for the humiliations their distant agents might face to meet those demands. "The stakes were too high to jeopardize over personal matters,... and the Court leaves the defense of national honor to the Crown." This was their consistent stance. The agents, weighing the pros and cons, decided that they had to maintain the support of the all-powerful Board at any cost. By following this path, they sacrificed the prestige that would have shielded British subjects from mistreatment; the Chinese, encouraged by the subservience of the Company's officers, became increasingly arrogant, and it’s hard to blame them. The behavior of the Company’s representatives was that of individuals executing orders against their better judgment. Occasionally, their judgment would prevail over their orders, and they would attempt to stand up for their rights. An example occurred in 1831 when the Chinese authorities imposed new restrictions on exporting silver. Mr. H. H. Lindsay, head of the Company’s committee, opposed this action and threatened to halt trade. However, in the end, the committee backed down and as a sign of surrender, handed over the keys to their factory to a Chinese mandarin.

The process which had been consecrated by time naturally did not stop when the principal cause of it was removed. It continued uninterrupted after the 38 monopoly of the Company had ceased. Indeed the case became much aggravated when the British agents, beginning with Lord Napier, became representatives of the Crown instead of the Company. And so little was the position understood by the authorities in Great Britain that, yielding to considerations of convenience, they appointed some of the very men whom the Chinese had been long accustomed to treat with contumely to be the representatives of the King. But the Chinese had a true presentiment of the nature of the changes which this new departure threatened. They had learned from Captain Weddell, Commodore Anson, and others what were the pretensions of the commander of a Kings ship; and then justly inferred that a King's representative would stand on a wholly different footing from a Company's superintendent. They resolved, therefore, to nip in the bud every effort to open international relations, employing to that end all the weapons which were familiar to them. The viceroy of Canton not only declined communication with the British envoy, but imprisoned him and intercepted his letters, so that a naval force was required to release him from captivity. Yet it was not malevolence but policy that guided the hand of the Chinese authorities—the settled policy of keeping foreigners at arm's-length at all costs.

The process that had been established over time didn’t just stop when its main cause was removed. It continued without interruption after the 38 Company’s monopoly ended. In fact, things got much worse when British agents, starting with Lord Napier, became representatives of the Crown rather than the Company. The authorities in Great Britain didn’t fully understand the situation; bending to convenience, they appointed some of the very men that the Chinese had long treated with disdain to represent the King. However, the Chinese had an accurate sense of the implications of these changes. They had learned from Captain Weddell, Commodore Anson, and others about the expectations of a King's ship commander, and correctly inferred that a King's representative would be in a completely different position than a Company’s superintendent. Therefore, they decided to stop any attempts to establish international relations right from the start, using all the familiar tactics at their disposal. The viceroy of Canton not only refused to communicate with the British envoy but also imprisoned him and intercepted his letters, so a naval force was needed to free him from captivity. Yet, it was not malice but policy that drove the actions of the Chinese authorities—the firm policy of keeping foreigners at a distance at all costs.

The rule of conduct enjoined by the British Government on the first representatives of the Crown in China was emphatically conciliation, as in the time of the East India Company and its superintendents. They were to "cautiously abstain from all unnecessary use of menacing language, or from making any appeal for protection to our military or naval force (except in extreme cases), or to do anything to irritate the feelings or revolt the 39 opinions or prejudices of the Chinese people." That article of the "Sign-manual Instructions to the Superintendents of Trade in China" was faithfully carried out; while the one ordering the envoy to "take up your residence at the port of Canton" could not be obeyed because the Chinese provincial authorities placed their veto on it. The conciliatory demeanour of the British representative was met by the refusal, accompanied by the grossest insults, of the Chinese to receive or acknowledge him. And not by insults only, such as perverting the phonetic rendering of his name by the substitution of characters bearing odious meanings, and by various indignities offered to his person, but by interference with his domestic servants, and even cutting off his food-supply, did they coerce him into abandoning his post at Canton. Their conduct evoked the opinion from Lord Napier, in reporting the incidents to his Government, that "the viceroy of Canton was guilty of an outrage on the British Crown calling for redress," which drew from the Duke of Wellington (February 2, 1835) the chilling comment that "it is not by force and violence that his Majesty intends to establish a commercial intercourse between his subjects and China, but by the other conciliatory measures so strongly inculcated in all the instructions which you have received." Lord Napier's despatches prove that he understood the situation perfectly. "What advantage or what point did we ever gain," he wrote, "by negotiating or humbling ourselves before these people, or rather before their Government? The records show nothing but subsequent humiliation and disgrace. What advantage or what point, again, have we ever lost that was just and reasonable, by acting with promptitude and vigour? 40 The records again assure us that such measures have been attended with complete success." And he recommended his Government "to consult immediately on the best plan to be adopted for commanding a commercial treaty, or a treaty which shall secure the just rights and embrace the interests, public and private, of all Europeans,—not of British alone, but of all civilised people coming to trade according to the principles of international law."

The conduct expected by the British Government from its first representatives in China was clearly one of conciliation, similar to the approach during the time of the East India Company and its supervisors. They were instructed to "avoid unnecessary threatening language, not to call for military or naval support (unless in extreme cases), and to refrain from actions that might upset or offend the feelings, opinions, or prejudices of the Chinese people." This directive from the "Sign-manual Instructions to the Superintendents of Trade in China" was strictly followed; however, the order for the envoy to "establish his residence at the port of Canton" was impossible to follow because the Chinese provincial authorities vetoed it. The British representative's conciliatory attitude was met with outright refusal and gross insults from the Chinese, who would not accept or recognize him. The insults included distorting the phonetic pronunciation of his name by using characters with offensive meanings, various indignities directed at him personally, interfering with his servants, and even cutting off his food supply, forcing him to abandon his position in Canton. This conduct led Lord Napier to report to his government that "the viceroy of Canton committed an outrage against the British Crown that required redress," which prompted the Duke of Wellington (February 2, 1835) to respond coolly that "his Majesty does not intend to establish a commercial relationship with China through force and violence, but through the conciliatory measures emphasized in all of your instructions." Lord Napier's reports show he grasped the situation well. He stated, "What benefit or advantage have we ever gained by negotiating or humbling ourselves before these people, or more accurately, their Government? The records indicate nothing but subsequent humiliation and disgrace. What benefit or advantage did we ever lose that was fair and reasonable by acting decisively and vigorously? The records confirm that such actions have been fully successful." He urged his government "to quickly discuss the best strategy for securing a commercial treaty that would protect the fair rights and interests of all Europeans—not just the British, but all civilized nations trading according to international law principles."

Driven to death by Chinese official barbarities, and by the discouragement of his own Government, Lord Napier was succeeded first by one then by another of the East India Company's old staff, who could only maintain themselves by sinking their character as British national envoys and submitting to the indignities which the Chinese more than ever delighted in imposing on them, increasing in virulence in proportion as the resistance to them grew weaker.

Driven to death by the brutalities of Chinese officials and the discouragement from his own government, Lord Napier was succeeded first by one and then by another from the East India Company's old staff. They could only hold onto their positions by compromising their roles as British national envoys and putting up with the humiliations that the Chinese increasingly took pleasure in inflicting on them, which became more intense as the resistance to them weakened.

The line of policy inculcated upon Lord Napier was, in fact, scrupulously followed after his death, notably by Captain Charles Elliot, the third in succession, who received the King's commission in 1836. That officer indeed went far beyond his instructions in his efforts to conciliate the Chinese; for though repeatedly ordered by Lord Palmerston to communicate with the authorities direct, and not through the Hong merchants;[3] and not to head his communications with the word "petition"; and notwithstanding his own reiterated opinion in the same sense, Captain Elliot entirely yielded to the Chinese 41 pretensions. He communicated through the Hong merchants, and explicitly received the "commands" of the authorities with "reverence." As was natural, the more he conceded the more was exacted from him, until conciliation reached the point of exhaustion and there was nothing left to give up. Matters had nearly reached this stage when the British envoy could thus address the Governor of Canton (through the Hong merchants) in 1837: "The undersigned respectfully assures his Excellency that it is at once his duty and his anxious desire to conform in all things to the imperial pleasure." The result of this extreme humility was that Captain Elliot was forced to strike his flag at Canton and withdraw to the Portuguese settlement of Macao, on the ground that he was unable to maintain intercourse with the authorities on the conditions prescribed for him by her Majesty's Government.

The policy that Lord Napier promoted was strictly followed after his death, especially by Captain Charles Elliot, the third in line, who received the King's commission in 1836. That officer actually went well beyond his instructions in trying to appease the Chinese; even though he was repeatedly told by Lord Palmerston to communicate directly with the authorities, not through the Hong merchants, and not to start his communications with the word "petition"; and despite his own repeated opinions on the same matter, Captain Elliot completely yielded to the Chinese demands. He communicated through the Hong merchants and explicitly received the authorities' "commands" with "reverence." Naturally, the more he gave in, the more was demanded from him, until his efforts at conciliation reached a breaking point where there was nothing left to concede. Things were almost at this critical stage when the British envoy could address the Governor of Canton (through the Hong merchants) in 1837: "The undersigned respectfully assures his Excellency that it is at once his duty and his anxious desire to conform in all things to the imperial pleasure." The outcome of this extreme humility was that Captain Elliot was forced to lower his flag at Canton and retreat to the Portuguese settlement of Macao, claiming he could not maintain communication with the authorities under the conditions set by her Majesty's Government.

CHAPTER III.

Causes of the War.

I. THE OPIUM TRADE.

Its increase caused alarm to Chinese Government by throwing the balance of trade against China—English manufacturers deplored the same fact—Drain of silver—Government opposition to the importation of opium—Official participation in the trade—The reign of sham—Illustrated by Mr Hunter—Captain Elliot volunteers to prevent smuggling—Rebuffed by Canton authorities—The principal patrons of the opium trade—Imperial Government and the opium traffic—Proposals to legalise it—The Empress—Commissioner Lin appointed to suppress trade—His uncompromising proceedings at Canton—Imprisonment of the foreign merchants, and of the British envoy—Surrender of opium by Captain Elliot.

Its growth alarmed the Chinese government by upsetting the trade balance against China—English manufacturers lamented the same issue—Drain of silver—Government opposition to the import of opium—Official involvement in the trade—The era of deception—Illustrated by Mr. Hunter—Captain Elliot volunteers to stop smuggling—Rebuffed by the Canton authorities—The main supporters of the opium trade—Imperial government and the opium business—Suggestions to legalize it—The Empress—Commissioner Lin appointed to eliminate the trade—His firm actions in Canton—Imprisonment of foreign merchants and the British envoy—Surrender of opium by Captain Elliot.

Commerce itself had also for some time been a source of disquietude, and it is an interesting circumstance that it was the same feature of it which caused anxiety to both sides. The balance of trade was against China, which in the year 1838 had to provide bullion to the amount of upwards of £2,000,000 sterling to pay for the excess of imports over exports. English manufacturers deplored the fact that the purchasing power of China was restricted by the paucity of her commodities suitable for foreign markets, while the Chinese authorities saw with genuine alarm a yearly drain of what they deemed 43 the life-blood of their national wealth; for not only was silver and gold bullion exported in what to them were large amounts, but the vessels which brought raw cotton and opium from India were frequently ballasted for the return voyage with the copper coinage of the country. Crude, arbitrary, and quite ineffectual devices were resorted to by the Chinese for the arrest or mitigation of the leakage of the precious metal. Opium, being the commodity which the people most imperatively demanded, was always paid for in hard cash, while ordinary merchandise might be bartered against Chinese produce. It is not therefore difficult to understand how, without prejudice to moral or political considerations, the article opium should have become so conspicuous a factor in the agony which preceded the war.

Commerce had also been a source of concern for some time, and it's interesting to note that the same issue troubled both sides. The balance of trade was unfavorable for China, which in 1838 had to provide over £2,000,000 sterling in bullion to cover the excess of imports over exports. English manufacturers lamented that China's purchasing power was limited due to the lack of commodities suitable for foreign markets, while Chinese officials were genuinely alarmed by the yearly drain of what they considered the life-blood of their national wealth; not only was silver and gold bullion exported in what seemed to them to be large amounts, but the ships bringing raw cotton and opium from India often returned loaded with the country's copper coins. The Chinese resorted to crude, arbitrary, and ineffective measures to stop or reduce the outflow of precious metals. Opium, being the commodity most eagerly demanded by the people, was always paid for in cash, while everyday goods could be traded for Chinese products. Therefore, it's not hard to see how, without any moral or political implications, opium became such a significant factor in the turmoil leading up to the war.

In characterising the relations then subsisting between the Chinese and foreigners as lawless, it is not meant that China is a country governed without law, although it is true that even in the purely domestic administration of the State legality is systematically travestied. But in connection with foreign relations, and almost as a necessity of the case, every trace of legality was obliterated in practice, and the merchants were constantly entangled in a labyrinth of illusions and pitfalls. No regulation was, or was ever intended to be, carried out as promulgated; it was generally something quite different that was aimed at, and it is literally true that the law was more honoured in the breach than in the observance.

In describing the relationship between the Chinese and foreigners as chaotic, it doesn't imply that China is a lawless country. While it's true that even in domestic governance the law is often distorted, in terms of foreign relations, every semblance of legality was practically erased, creating a confusing and tricky environment for merchants. No regulations were enforced as intended; instead, the actual goals were usually quite different. It's literally the case that the law was more often ignored than followed.

Many Chinese eagles swooped on the carcass of foreign trade; various authorities competed for the spoil; and the constantly changing orders were often 44 merely stratagems by which one set of officials sought to steal an advantage over another. The rules of the game were perfectly understood, and the loftiest professions of public duty were the invariable concomitant of the most corrupt practice.

Many Chinese eagles swooped down on the carcass of foreign trade; various authorities vied for the spoils; and the constantly changing orders were often merely tactics used by one group of officials to gain an edge over another. The rules of the game were well understood, and the highest claims of public duty always accompanied the most corrupt practices.

The two principal trade authorities in Canton were the viceroy of the two provinces, and the hoppo, who held an independent commission from Peking as superintendent of the customs. Smuggling was of course systematic. Though there were severe dormant laws against it whereby unwary individuals might on occasion be entrapped, yet the practice was openly carried on in every department of traffic, its chief patrons being the viceroy and the hoppo. The importation of opium was officially prohibited, but no branch of trade was so effectually protected. The depot ships lay in what was regarded as the outer waters of China—that is, the archipelago in the estuary of the Canton river. But the drug was brought to land in the viceroy's own boats and to his profit. The traffic was conducted under a fluctuating arrangement between the native merchants and the authorities, the latter taking frequent occasion to pick quarrels with the former in order to have a pretext for extortion. The fees levied upon the opium-dealers were divided among the officials, but they could never trust each other to deal fairly in the distribution of the takings. By way of check on sharp practice a Chinese war-vessel was in the habit of visiting the receiving ships, taking from them an account of their deliveries, and at the same time making a small levy for the commanders personal behoof, for which a formal receipt was granted.

The main trade authorities in Canton were the viceroy of the two provinces and the hoppo, who had an independent role from Peking as the customs superintendent. Smuggling was, of course, widespread. Although there were strict laws against it that could catch unsuspecting individuals off guard, the practice was openly carried out in every area of trade, with the viceroy and the hoppo being the main supporters. The import of opium was officially banned, yet no trade was as well-protected as this one. The depot ships were stationed in what was considered the outer waters of China—that is, the islands in the estuary of the Canton River. However, the drug was brought ashore in the viceroy's own boats and benefited him directly. The trade was organized through a fluctuating arrangement between local merchants and the authorities, who frequently picked fights with the merchants to create excuses for extorting money. The fees collected from the opium dealers were shared among the officials, but they could never fully trust each other to distribute the money fairly. To monitor for dishonest practices, a Chinese warship regularly visited the receiving ships, taking note of their deliveries while also collecting a small fee for the commander's personal use, for which a formal receipt was issued.

A new hoppo came to Canton in 1837, and, as had 45 been the custom with his predecessors, he inaugurated his commission by issuing drastic edicts, in concert with the viceroy, against the sale of opium, even going through the form of arresting some of the dealers. This demonstration, like all that had gone before, was merely intended to cover a heavier exaction than had yet been levied. The dealers and boatmen refused the terms, and by way of protest the latter burned their boats. Whereupon the two high officers built boats of their own, which, with the Government ones already employed in the business, brought the whole of the opium to Canton. In this manner was the trade resumed after a temporary stoppage caused by the strike of the dealers and boat-owners against the extortions of the viceroy and hoppo. Nor was there ever any secret in Peking respecting these proceedings. Indeed the occasion of any high official travelling to the capital was always marked by a great enhancement of the market price of opium, of which the official or his retinue invariably carried a large quantity for sale there. This circumstance was published in the trade circulars printed in Canton, without the least concealment of the name of the mandarin under whose protection the drug was transported. The hoppo was, and still is, an imperial protégé, and it was, and is still, perfectly understood that he divides the proceeds of his Canton harvest with his patrons. It is for that purpose that he receives the appointment. And this was a trade proscribed under extreme penalties by imperial edict! It is needless to trace the network of elusion in which the administrative ingenuity of Chinese officialdom was exercised, and the specimen given above may be taken as typical of the 46 system. "Nevertheless, during the year 1838 very serious and determined measures began to be adopted by the Chinese authorities, directed generally against the trade in opium; and imperial edicts threatened death as the punishment for both the dealers in and smokers of the drug."

A new hoppo arrived in Canton in 1837, and, following the tradition of his predecessors, he kicked off his role by issuing strict orders, alongside the viceroy, to stop the sale of opium, even going so far as to arrest some of the dealers. This action, like all those before it, was simply a way to justify a larger tax than had ever been collected before. The dealers and boatmen rejected the terms, and as a protest, the boatmen burned their boats. In response, the two officials built their own boats, which, along with the Government boats already involved in the trade, brought all the opium to Canton. This is how the trade resumed after a brief halt due to the strike by the dealers and boat owners protesting against the viceroy and hoppo’s extortion. There was never any secrecy in Peking about these actions. In fact, whenever a high official traveled to the capital, it often led to a significant increase in the market price of opium, which the official or his entourage would bring in large amounts to sell there. This information was openly published in trade circulars printed in Canton, without any attempt to hide the name of the mandarin under whose protection the drug was transported. The hoppo was, and still is, an imperial protégé, and it has always been understood that he shares the profits from his Canton activities with his superiors. This was the reason he received the position. And this was a trade that was officially banned under severe penalties by imperial decree! There’s no need to trace the complex ways in which Chinese officials avoided the law, and the example given above can be seen as typical of the system. "Nevertheless, during the year 1838, the Chinese authorities began to take very serious and determined actions aimed generally at curbing the opium trade; imperial edicts threatened death as the punishment for both dealers and users of the drug."

It is hardly possible outside of China to realise the systematic make-believe under which public affairs are carried on.

It’s nearly impossible outside of China to understand the systematic illusion under which public affairs operate.

Life and business in Canton, says Mr Hunter,[4] was a conundrum as insoluble as the Sphinx; everything worked smoothly by acting in direct opposition to what we were told to do. Certainly we were told to "listen and obey," to "tremble and not by obstinacy and irregularity to court the wrath of the imperial will"! We were reminded from time to time that we were "sojourning in the land on sufferance." We were threatened and re-threatened with the "direst penalties if we sold foreign mud to the people; truly forbearance could no longer be exercised." Yet we continued to sell the drug as usual. Our receiving ships at Lintin must no longer loiter at that anchorage, but "forthwith either come into port or return to their respective countries." The heart of the ruler of all within the Four Seas was indeed full of compassion and had been indulgent to the barbarians. But now no more delay could be granted, "cruisers would be sent to open their irresistible broadsides" upon the foreign ships. Yet in spite of these terrors the ships never budged. We were "forbidden to wander about except three times a-month, and that not without a linguist," but we walked whenever we pleased, and the linguist is the last person we ever saw.

Life and business in Canton, says Mr. Hunter, was a puzzle as tricky as the Sphinx; everything ran smoothly by doing the exact opposite of what we were told to do. We were definitely told to "listen and obey," to "tremble and not bring about the wrath of the imperial will with our stubbornness and disobedience"! We were reminded from time to time that we were "staying in the land on sufferance." We were threatened and warned again about the "worst penalties if we sold foreign mud to the people; truly, we could no longer exercise forbearance." Yet we continued to sell the drug as usual. Our receiving ships at Lintin were no longer allowed to hang around at that anchorage, but "immediately either enter port or return to their respective countries." The heart of the ruler of all within the Four Seas was indeed filled with compassion and had been permissive toward the barbarians. But now no more delays could be given; "cruisers would be sent to unleash their irresistible firepower" on the foreign ships. Yet in spite of these threats, the ships never moved. We were "forbidden to wander around more than three times a month, and only with a linguist," but we walked whenever we wanted, and the linguist was the last person we ever saw.

And so on through a long catalogue of prohibitions to the disregard of which the officials themselves were always parties.

And so on through a long list of rules that the officials themselves often ignored.

We get an exact description also of the mode in which the opium trade was carried on from the pen 47 of Mr Hunter, himself an actor as well as an eyewitness. It furnishes a perfect illustration of the reign of sham which prevails generally in China:—

We also get a detailed account of how the opium trade was conducted from the perspective of Mr. Hunter, who was both involved and an eyewitness. It perfectly illustrates the widespread hypocrisy that exists in China:—

We anchored on the inside of the island of Namoa close by two English brigs, the Omega and Governor Findlay. Inshore of us were riding at anchor two men-of-war junks, with much bunting displayed; one bore the flag of a foo-tseang or commodore. Knowing the "formalities" to be gone through with the mandarins, we expected a visit from one, and until it was made no Chinese boat would come alongside, nor would a junk, not even a bumboat. We had no sooner furled sails and made everything shipshape, when his "Excellency" approached in his gig—a sort of scow as broad as she was long.... He was received at the gangway by Captain Forster. His manner and bearing were easy and dignified. When cheroots and a glass of wine had been offered, the "commodore" inquired the cause of our anchoring at Namoa. The shroff gave him to understand that the vessel, being on her way from Singapore to Canton, had been compelled, through contrary winds and currents, to run for Namoa to replenish her wood and water. Having listened attentively, the great man said that "any supplies might be obtained, but when they were on board, not a moment must be lost in sailing for Whampoa, as the Great Emperor did not permit vessels from afar to visit any other port." He then gravely pulled from his boot a long red document and handed it to his secretary, that we might be informed of its purport. It was as follows:—

We anchored on the inside of Namoa Island, close to two English brigs, the Omega and the Governor Findlay. Inshore of us were two war junks at anchor, displaying a lot of flags; one raised the flag of a foo-tseang or commodore. Knowing the "formalities" we had to go through with the mandarins, we anticipated a visit from one. Until that visit happened, no Chinese boat would come alongside, nor would any junk, not even a bumboat. We had barely furled our sails and made everything shipshape when his "Excellency" approached in his gig—a type of flat-bottom boat that was as wide as it was long. He was received at the gangway by Captain Forster. His manner and demeanor were relaxed yet dignified. After offering cheroots and a glass of wine, the "commodore" asked why we were anchored at Namoa. The shroff let him know that the vessel, on her way from Singapore to Canton, had to head for Namoa to replenish her wood and water due to contrary winds and currents. After listening carefully, the dignitary stated that "any supplies could be obtained, but once they were on board, we must sail for Whampoa without delay, as the Great Emperor does not allow vessels from afar to visit any other port." He then solemnly took a long red document from his boot and handed it to his secretary so we could be informed of its content. It was as follows:—

An Imperial Edict.

An Imperial Decree.

As the port of Canton is the only one at which outside barbarians are allowed to trade, on no account can they be permitted to wander about to other places in the "Middle Kingdom." The "Son of Heaven," however, whose compassion is as boundless as the ocean, cannot deny to those who are in distress from want of food, through adverse seas and currents, the necessary means of continuing their voyage. When supplied they must no longer loiter, but depart at once. Respect this.

As the port of Canton is the only place where foreigners are allowed to trade, they can't be permitted to roam around other areas in the "Middle Kingdom." However, the "Son of Heaven," whose compassion is as vast as the ocean, cannot refuse those who are in distress from hunger, due to rough seas and currents, the essential means to continue their journey. Once they are supplied, they must not linger but leave immediately. Respect this.

Tao-kuang, 17th year, 6th moon, 4th sun. 48

Tao Kwang, 17th year, 6th month, 4th day. 48

This "imperial edict" having been replaced in its envelope and slipped inside of his boot (for service on the chance of another foreign vessel "in distress"), his Excellency arose from his seat, which was a signal for all his attendants to return to the boat, except his secretary. The two were then invited to the cabin to refresh, which being done, we proceeded to business. The mandarin opened by the direct questions, "How many chests have you on board? Are they all for Namoa? Do you go farther up the coast?" Intimating at the same time that there the officers were uncommonly strict, and were obliged to carry out the will of the "Emperor of the Universe," &c. But our answers were equally as clear and prompt, that the vessel was not going north of Namoa, that her cargo consisted of about 200 chests. Then came the question of cumsha, and that was settled on the good old Chinese principle of "all same custom." Everything being thus comfortably arranged, wine drunk, and cheroots smoked, his Excellency said "Kaou-tsze" (I announce my departure).... Chinese buyers came on board freely the moment they saw the "official" visit had been made. A day or two after, several merchant junks stood out from the mainland for the anchorage. As they approached we distinguished a private signal at their mastheads, a copy of which had been furnished to us before leaving Capshuymun. We hoisted ours, the junks anchored close to us, and in a surprisingly short time received from the Rose in their own boats the opium, which had been sold at Canton, and there paid for, deliverable at this anchorage. It was a good illustration of the entire confidence existing between the foreign seller in his factory at Canton and the Chinese buyers, and of a transaction for a breach of any of the conditions of which there existed no legal redress on one side or the other.

This "imperial edict" was put back in its envelope and tucked into his boot (just in case there was another foreign vessel "in distress"). His Excellency got up from his seat, signaling all his attendants to return to the boat, except for his secretary. They were then invited to the cabin to refresh themselves, and after that, we got down to business. The mandarin started off with direct questions: "How many chests do you have on board? Are they all for Namoa? Are you going further up the coast?" He hinted that the officers there were particularly strict and had to carry out the orders of the "Emperor of the Universe," etc. However, our answers were just as clear and quick: the vessel wasn’t going north of Namoa and had about 200 chests on board. Then came the question of cumsha, which was resolved using the good old Chinese principle of "all same custom." With everything comfortably arranged, we drank wine and smoked cheroots, and his Excellency said "Kaou-tsze" (I announce my departure).... Chinese buyers boarded freely as soon as they saw the "official" visit had taken place. A day or two later, several merchant junks set out from the mainland to anchor nearby. As they got closer, we saw a private signal at their mastheads, a copy of which we had received before leaving Capshuymun. We raised ours, the junks anchored close to us, and in a remarkably short time, we received from the Rose in their own boats the opium that had been sold in Canton and was already paid for, deliverable at this anchorage. This illustrated the complete trust between the foreign seller in his factory at Canton and the Chinese buyers, and highlighted a transaction for which there was no legal remedy for any breach of conditions on either side.

MACAO.

MACAU.

From his asylum in Macao Captain Elliot thought he saw an opportunity for making a fresh attempt to ingratiate himself with the Chinese authorities. Disregarding the fact that the only return for his previous efforts at conciliation had been accumulated insult and odious accusations against himself personally, Captain Elliot resolved on trying once more. 49 So, when the opium agitation broke out in 1838-39, he volunteered his assistance in suppressing smuggling in the river. The viceroy, being the head and front of the abuse, spurned the offer, saying, what was perfectly true, that he could stop the traffic himself by a stroke of the pen.

From his refuge in Macao, Captain Elliot thought he saw a chance to try again to win over the Chinese authorities. Ignoring that his previous attempts at making peace only resulted in more insults and nasty accusations directed at him, Captain Elliot decided to give it another shot. 49 So, when the opium crisis erupted in 1838-39, he offered his help in stopping smuggling along the river. The viceroy, being the main figure behind the issue, rejected the offer, stating, quite correctly, that he could end the trade himself with a simple stroke of the pen.

Ignoring the rebuff, Captain Elliot did nevertheless issue an order that "all British-owned schooners, or other vessels habitually or occasionally engaged in the illicit opium traffic, within the Bocca Tigris, should remove before the expiration of three days, and not again return within the Bocca Tigris, being so engaged." And they were at the same time distinctly warned, that if "any British subjects were feloniously to cause the death of a Chinaman in consequence of persisting in the trade within the Bocca Tigris, he would be liable to capital punishment; that no owners of such vessels so engaged would receive any assistance or interposition from the British Government in case the Chinese Government should seize any of them; and that all British subjects employed in these vessels would be held responsible for any consequences which might arise from forcible resistance offered to the Chinese Government, in the same manner as if such resistance were offered to their own or any other Government, in their own or in any foreign country." This gratuitous assumption of the functions of the Chinese executive plunged Captain Elliot into still greater difficulties, and prepared the way for the tragic events which were to follow a year later. In vulgar parlance he "gave himself away" to the Chinese, for in professing to be able to stop opium traffic within the river he tacitly 50 accepted the responsibility of stopping it also in the estuary, where the British depot ships lay at anchor. It was, in fact, the driving home of this responsibility by the Chinese which was the apparent occasion of the war. For it is certain that during his three years of office as representative of the Crown of England Captain Elliot had given no provocation to the Chinese, nor had he in any way withstood their aggression.

Ignoring the rejection, Captain Elliot did nonetheless give an order that "all British-owned schooners or other vessels habitually or occasionally involved in the illegal opium trade, within the Bocca Tigris, must leave within three days and not return to the Bocca Tigris while engaged in such activities." At the same time, they were clearly warned that if "any British subjects were to unlawfully cause the death of a Chinese person as a result of continuing the trade within the Bocca Tigris, they would face capital punishment; that no owners of such vessels engaged in this trade would receive any help or intervention from the British Government should the Chinese Government seize any of them; and that all British subjects working on these vessels would be held accountable for any consequences arising from any forceful resistance to the Chinese Government, just as if such resistance were directed at their own or any other Government in their country or abroad." This unwarranted assumption of authority over the Chinese executive led Captain Elliot into even greater troubles and set the stage for the tragic events that would unfold a year later. In simple terms, he "gave himself away" to the Chinese, as by claiming he could stop the opium trade within the river, he implicitly accepted the responsibility of halting it in the estuary where the British depot ships were anchored. In fact, it was the Chinese insistence on this responsibility that seemingly sparked the war. For it is clear that during his three years in office as the representative of the Crown of England, Captain Elliot had not provoked the Chinese in any way nor had he resisted their aggression.

But a sudden change now came over the scene. The opium question had been for some time debated in the imperial counsels with considerable earnestness, the issue turning on the alternatives of suppressing or legalising the traffic. It seems likely that in those deliberations the reigning emperor, Tao-kuang, played a very secondary part; indeed as an active factor in the government of the country he appears to have been of little more account than his successors have been. He is described as an amiable but weak man, sensible of the difficulties of his country, but misinformed with regard to them by the favourites around him. The most interesting personality about the Imperial Court at that time appears to have been the empress, who had raised herself to that exalted position by her talents as well as by her fascinations. Though her career was a very short one, she exercised a potent influence on affairs throughout the whole empire. She was credited with a rare power of judging men and of selecting them for offices of trust. She was a reformer of abuses and a true patriot; but what was most remarkable, considering the order of ideas which surrounded her, she held liberal views as to the extension 51 of foreign intercourse, and was at the head of the party which was in favour of legalising the opium traffic. A memorial addressed to her urging this measure was submitted by the emperor to the governor of Canton, Tang, who with his colleagues reported on it favourably. The success of the empress's policy enraged her enemies and stirred them to the most strenuous efforts to compass her fall. The emperor, it is said, remained neutral in this strife. The opposition party prevailed, gaining over the emperor to their side while he was smarting from the grief caused by the death of his own son from opium, an event which enlisted his personal feelings against the drug.

But a sudden change now came over the scene. The opium issue had been debated in the imperial council for some time with serious attention, focusing on whether to suppress or legalize the trade. It seems likely that during these discussions, the reigning emperor, Tao-kuang, had a very minor role; in fact, as an active participant in governing the country, he appears to have been of little more significance than his successors were. He is described as a kind but weak man, aware of his country’s challenges, but misled about them by the favorites around him. The most intriguing figure at the Imperial Court during that time seems to have been the empress, who rose to her high position because of her talents and charm. Although her time in power was brief, she had a strong influence on matters throughout the empire. She was noted for her exceptional ability to judge people and choose them for positions of trust. She was a reformer of injustices and a true patriot; but most notably, considering the prevailing mindset around her, she held progressive views on expanding foreign relations and led the faction that supported legalizing the opium trade. A memorial urging this measure was presented to her by the emperor to the governor of Canton, Tang, who and his colleagues reported positively on it. The success of the empress's policy infuriated her enemies and drove them to make intense efforts to bring about her downfall. The emperor, it is said, remained neutral in this conflict. The opposing faction ultimately triumphed, winning the emperor’s support while he was still grieving the loss of his own son to opium, an event that personally turned his feelings against the drug.

So far, however, had the question been carried, that the legalisation of the opium trade was fully anticipated by Captain Elliot up to the very hour that the storm burst.

So far, however, had the question been raised, that Captain Elliot fully expected the legalization of the opium trade right up until the moment the storm hit.

The final decision of the Government was to put an end to the trade, for which purpose they sent an imperial commissioner to Canton, armed with full authority to carry out the emperor's edicts. He arrived at his post, March 10, 1839. Commissioner Lin, the best known character, with the exception of Captain Elliot himself, in connection with the war, was a man of uncommon energy and resolution, and was therefore in some respects well chosen for the extraordinary task which was imposed upon him. He was a native of Fukien province, an official of high standing, having been Governor-General of the Central Provinces, the Hu Kwang. He was now appointed Governor-General of the Two Kwang and Imperial Commissioner for dealing with the opium 52 question. As a Chinese administrator he had been popular, and was no doubt possessed of many high qualities.[5] It is possible that had he taken time to study the foreign question with which he had to deal, and had he not been betrayed by his too easy initial successes, he might have been the means of placing the foreign relations of his country on a footing of mutual accommodation. A reasonable man would have perceived the utter impossibility of preventing the Chinese people from purchasing a commodity for which they had an overmastering desire. He showed great ignorance of human nature in proposing to break his countrymen of opium-smoking within a year, after which time offenders were to be beheaded.[6] This was but a sample of his violence and of his incapacity to see two sides of a question. It must be remembered, however, that he had undertaken to carry out the emperor's instructions, and it is difficult to pronounce what amount of latitude he might have allowed himself in the interpretation of them.

The government's final decision was to end the trade, so they sent an imperial commissioner to Canton, fully authorized to enforce the emperor's orders. He arrived on March 10, 1839. Commissioner Lin, the most recognized figure associated with the war after Captain Elliot, was a man of remarkable energy and determination, making him a suitable choice for the unusual task assigned to him. He was from Fukien province and was a high-ranking official, having served as Governor-General of the Central Provinces, Hu Kwang. Now, he was appointed Governor-General of the Two Kwang and Imperial Commissioner to address the opium issue. As a Chinese administrator, he had a strong following and possessed many admirable qualities. It’s possible that if he had taken the time to understand the foreign issue he faced and hadn’t been misled by his early successes, he could have helped establish a better relationship between his country and foreign powers. A reasonable person would have recognized the impossibility of stopping the Chinese people from buying something they desperately wanted. He displayed a lack of understanding of human nature by suggesting he could end opium smoking among his countrymen within a year, after which offenders would be executed. This was just one example of his brutality and inability to see multiple sides of an issue. However, it should be noted that he was tasked with executing the emperor's orders, and it's hard to say how much freedom he had in interpreting them.

His proceedings were of an uncompromising character most unusual with Chinese. Possessing full authority, he exercised it to the utmost, terrorising all the local officials into absolute subservience. The governor of Canton, himself deeply implicated in the opium 53 traffic, a fact well known to the Imperial Commissioner, was constrained to save himself by affecting the utmost zeal in executing the commissioner's behests. Having thus disposed of all the opposition with which Chinese high officials have usually to reckon from their subordinates, Lin gave the rein to his headstrong temper, and instead of effecting reform, plunged his country into a war which shattered the imperial prestige.

His actions were very extreme, which is not typical for Chinese leaders. Having complete power, he used it fully, intimidating all the local officials into total obedience. The governor of Canton, who was also heavily involved in the opium trade—a fact that the Imperial Commissioner was well aware of—had to pretend to be extremely eager to carry out the commissioner’s orders to save himself. Having dealt with the usual challenges from Chinese high officials' subordinates, Lin let his stubbornness take over and instead of bringing about reform, he dragged his country into a war that damaged the empire's reputation.

Within three weeks of Lin's arrival in Canton the drastic measures against foreigners, and particularly against the opium trade, culminated in his imprisoning the whole of the merchants within their factories at Canton, menacing them with further outrages on their person. At this crisis Captain Elliot, having left his residence at Macao, made his way under difficulties to Canton, that he might share the captivity of his countrymen and act as their head and mouthpiece. Having thus got the superintendent of trade into his power, Commissioner Lin preferred most extravagant demands upon him, including the delivery to the Chinese of all opium owned by British merchants, which amounted to 20,000 chests valued at upwards of £2,000,000. The imprisoned merchants had no choice but to yield to the demand made upon them by the representative of the British Crown; and as the recent agitations had interfered greatly with the course of trade, their assent to the terms was no doubt soothed by the reflection that they were making a clearance sale of their goods to a solvent purchaser, her Majesty's Government. They issued their delivery orders for the opium on the 27th March 1839. It is to the credit of Commissioner Lin that in a memorial 54 to the throne he commended the loyalty of certain of the British merchants.[7]

Within three weeks of Lin's arrival in Canton, the harsh measures against foreigners, especially those involved in the opium trade, peaked with him imprisoning all the merchants inside their factories in Canton, threatening them with further harm. At this critical moment, Captain Elliot left his home in Macao and made his way to Canton under difficult circumstances so he could share in the captivity of his fellow countrymen and act as their leader and spokesperson. Once he had the superintendent of trade under his control, Commissioner Lin made outrageous demands, including that all opium owned by British merchants be handed over to the Chinese, totaling 20,000 chests valued at over £2,000,000. The imprisoned merchants had no choice but to comply with the demands made by the representative of the British Crown; since recent unrest had greatly disrupted trade, they likely found some comfort in the thought that they were selling their goods to a reliable buyer—her Majesty's Government. They issued delivery orders for the opium on March 27, 1839. It's noteworthy that Commissioner Lin, in a memorial to the throne, praised the loyalty of certain British merchants. 54 [7]

This grand concession to the demand of Commissioner Lin was but the climax of all the antecedent steps of British submission. There was no haggling, but a prompt and unconditional surrender in the following terms:—

This major concession to Commissioner Lin's demand was just the peak of all the previous acts of British submission. There was no negotiating; it was a swift and total surrender in the following terms:—

Elliot to the Imperial Commissioner.

Elliot to the Imperial Officer.

Canton, March 27, 1839.

Canton, March 27, 1839.

Elliot, &c., &c., has now the honour to receive for the first time your Excellency's commands, bearing date the 26th day of March, issued by the pleasure of the Great Emperor, to deliver over into the hands of honourable officers to be appointed by your Excellency all the opium in the hands of British subjects.

Elliot, etc., etc., now has the honor to receive for the first time your Excellency's orders, dated March 26th, issued by the Great Emperor's command, to hand over all the opium held by British subjects to the honorable officers designated by your Excellency.

Elliot must faithfully and completely fulfil these commands, and he has now respectfully to request that your Excellency will be pleased to indicate the point to which the ships of his nation, having opium on board, are to proceed, so that the whole may be delivered up.

Elliot must fully and faithfully carry out these orders, and he would now like to respectfully ask your Excellency to indicate where the ships from his country, loaded with opium, should go so that everything can be handed over.

The faithful account of the same shall be transmitted as soon as it is ascertained.

The accurate report will be sent as soon as it's confirmed.

Captain Elliot did not even give himself time to verify the figures, and in his haste committed himself to the delivery of more opium than was actually in being. The consequence was that he could not deliver until fresh importations arrived, when he was obliged to enter the market as an opium merchant and purchase sufficient to enable him to fulfil his engagement.

Captain Elliot didn’t even take the time to double-check the numbers, and in his rush, he promised to deliver more opium than he actually had. As a result, he couldn’t make the delivery until new imports arrived, which forced him to step into the market as an opium dealer and buy enough to meet his commitment.

II. THE SEQUEL TO THE SURRENDER OF OPIUM.

Captain Elliot complains of his lengthened imprisonment—The continued cruelties of Commissioner Lin—Subservience of the Portuguese—English merchants driven from their homes in Macao to seek refuge on shipboard—Pursued by the vengeance of the Commissioner—Chinese claim absolute jurisdiction over person and property—Demand for an English seaman for execution.

Captain Elliot complains about his extended imprisonment—The ongoing cruelty of Commissioner Lin—The submissiveness of the Portuguese—English merchants forced out of their homes in Macao to seek refuge on ships—Pursued by the Commissioner’s wrath—Chinese demand complete control over people and property—Request for an English sailor for execution.

The interesting question in all this is how the Chinese authorities were impressed with the magnanimous sacrifice of over £2,000,000 sterling worth of private property as a ransom for the liberties of British subjects. They were certainly not impressed favourably, for Captain Elliot, together with the whole community, was detained for many weeks after the delivery of the opium close prisoners in Canton, and cut off from all outside communication. A week after the surrender Captain Elliot wrote to Lord Palmerston, "The blockade is increasing in closeness.... This is the first time in our intercourse with this empire that its Government has taken the unprovoked initiative in aggressive measures against British life, property, and liberty, and against the dignity of the British Crown." On the same day the Imperial Commissioner threatened to cut off the water-supply from the beleaguered merchants. A week later Captain Elliot wrote, "The blockade is not relaxed, ... the reverse is the case;" and he was constrained, though with evident reluctance, to characterise "the late measures as public robbery and wanton violence." Commissioner Lin's "continuance of the state of restraint, insult, and dark intimidation, subsequently to the surrender, has classed the case amongst the most shameless violences which one nation 56 has yet dared to perpetrate against another." And there is a forlorn pathos in his confession, a fortnight later, of the futility of "remonstrances from a man in my present situation to a high Chinese officer determined to be false and perfidious."

The interesting question here is how the Chinese authorities were struck by the generous sacrifice of over £2,000,000 worth of private property as a ransom for the freedom of British citizens. They certainly didn’t respond positively, as Captain Elliot and the entire community were held for many weeks after the delivery of the opium, essentially cut off from all outside communication. A week after the surrender, Captain Elliot wrote to Lord Palmerston, "The blockade is getting tighter.... This is the first time in our dealings with this empire that its Government has taken unprovoked aggressive actions against British life, property, and liberty, and against the dignity of the British Crown." On the same day, the Imperial Commissioner threatened to cut off the water supply for the trapped merchants. A week later, Captain Elliot wrote, "The blockade isn’t easing up; in fact, it’s getting worse,” and he reluctantly described "the recent actions as public robbery and wanton violence." Commissioner Lin's "continuation of the state of restraint, insult, and dark intimidation, after the surrender, has placed this case among the most shameless acts of violence one nation has dared to commit against another." There is a sense of tragic futility in his admission, two weeks later, about the uselessness of "pleas from someone in my current position to a high-ranking Chinese official who is determined to be deceitful and treacherous."

Nor did the Chinese appetite for cruelty cease to grow by what it fed upon even after the crisis of the Canton imprisonment was over. The British community, when forced to seek safety on board of their ships, were pursued from anchorage to anchorage by the implacable vengeance of the Imperial Commissioner. The natives were by proclamation ordered to "intercept and wholly cut off all supplies" from the English, some of whom "had gone to reside on board the foreign ships at Hongkong, and it was to be apprehended that in their extremity some may land at the outer villages and hamlets along the coast to purchase provisions," in which case the "people were to drive them back, fire upon or make prisoners of them." "Even when they land to take water from the springs, stop their progress and let them not have it in their power to drink." Another proclamation stated that "poison had been put into this water; let none of our people take it to drink." During the summer of 1839 many murderous outrages were perpetrated by the Commissioner's orders on English small craft wherever they were found isolated or defenceless.

Nor did the Chinese hunger for cruelty stop growing based on what it fed on, even after the crisis of the Canton imprisonment was over. The British community, when forced to seek safety on board their ships, was relentlessly pursued from anchorage to anchorage by the unyielding vengeance of the Imperial Commissioner. The locals were ordered by proclamation to "intercept and completely cut off all supplies" from the English, some of whom "had gone to stay on board the foreign ships at Hongkong, and it was feared that in their desperation some might land at the outer villages and hamlets along the coast to buy food," in which case the "people were to drive them back, fire upon them, or capture them." "Even when they land to get water from the springs, stop them and do not let them drink." Another proclamation stated that "poison had been put into this water; let none of our people drink it." During the summer of 1839, many deadly attacks were carried out by the Commissioner's orders on English small boats whenever they were found alone or defenseless.

It is not necessary to pursue these barbarities in detail. Sufficient has been advanced to illustrate the spirit in which the Chinese Government, in a time of peace and without a vestige of provocation, drove the retreating and absolutely submissive English to desperation. And their characteristic manner of recompensing 57 servility was illustrated with cynical humour in a long memorandum drawn up during the progress of the war by Commissioner Lin, the author of the savage proceedings just referred to. "Since," he says, "the English are so eager for the recommencement of their traffic, let us couple the grant with another stipulation, that they present us with the head of Elliot, the leader in every mischief, the disturber of the peace, and the source of all this trouble"—the last statement containing more truth than probably the writer himself fully realised.

It’s not necessary to go into detail about these brutal actions. Enough has been said to show the mindset of the Chinese Government, which, in a time of peace and without any provocation, pushed the retreating and completely submissive English to desperation. Their typical way of rewarding such servility was shown with cynical humor in a lengthy memorandum created during the war by Commissioner Lin, the person behind the harsh actions just mentioned. "Since," he states, "the English are so eager to resume their trade, let’s add another condition that they give us the head of Elliot, the one who caused all the trouble, disrupted the peace, and is responsible for this whole situation"—this last remark holds more truth than the writer likely realized.

Under such conditions it was obviously impossible to place the persons and property of British subjects at the mercy of Chinese officials. Yet this is what the authorities at Canton insisted upon,—"full submission to Chinese penal legislation, involving capital punishment by Chinese forms of trial." This was no new claim. The Chinese were simply following the precedents. English, French, and Americans had each in turn given up their men to be strangled on the demand of the Chinese authorities, and though the right had not been exercised for nearly twenty years, Lin evidently thought the occasion favourable for reviving it. He furnished a clear explanation of what a Chinese trial would be by demanding of the British representative the unconditional surrender for execution of the alleged murderer of a Chinese. To Captain Elliot's almost penitential protestations, that he had been unable to discover the assumed murderer among the numerous liberty men of ships of more than one nationality who had been in the scuffle, the Chinese authorities paid no regard whatever. The Queen's representative was publicly denounced 58 in scurrilous language by Commissioner Lin for concealing and failing to deliver up an offender, and for criminal violation of the laws of China as "shown by our reiterated proclamations and clear commands." This truculent proclamation being followed by an ultimatum giving ten days for the surrender of the unknown murderer under threat of the extermination of the British community, the latter had to escape in a body from Canton to seek refuge in Macao, whence they were expelled by the authorities of that settlement at the behest of the Chinese commissioner. This act of loyalty on the part of the Portuguese was duly acknowledged by the Imperial Commissioners reply, through his subordinate officials, in the following terms:—

Under these circumstances, it was clearly impossible to leave British citizens and their property at the mercy of Chinese officials. However, that’s exactly what the authorities in Canton demanded—“full submission to Chinese laws, including capital punishment through Chinese legal processes.” This wasn’t a new demand; the Chinese were simply following past actions. The English, French, and Americans had each, in turn, surrendered their people to be executed at the Chinese authorities’ request. Although this right hadn’t been enforced for nearly twenty years, Lin clearly saw this as a good opportunity to revive it. He clearly explained what a Chinese trial would entail by demanding the unconditional surrender of a British citizen accused of murdering a Chinese person. Captain Elliot’s almost desperate protests that he couldn’t find the so-called murderer among the many crew members from various nationalities involved in the scuffle were completely ignored by the Chinese officials. The Queen’s representative was publicly attacked in harsh terms by Commissioner Lin for hiding and failing to hand over a suspect, as well as for violating Chinese laws as “evidenced by our repeated proclamations and clear commands.” This aggressive announcement was followed by an ultimatum giving ten days for the surrender of the unknown suspect, threatening the annihilation of the British community if they didn’t comply. As a result, the British had to flee Canton en masse to find safety in Macao, but they were expelled from there by the local authorities at the request of the Chinese commissioner. This act of loyalty from the Portuguese was duly acknowledged by the Imperial Commissioner’s response, through his subordinates, in the following terms:—

We have received from his Excellency the Imperial Commissioner a reply to our representation that the English foreigners had, one and all, left Macao, and that the Portuguese Governor and Procurador had ably and strenuously aided in their expulsion, and faithfully repressed disorder. The reply is to this effect:—

We have received a response from his Excellency the Imperial Commissioner regarding our statement that all the English foreigners have left Macao, and that the Portuguese Governor and Procurador have effectively and actively supported their removal, while also maintaining order. The response is as follows:—

That the Portuguese Governor and Procurador having thus ably obeyed the commands for their expulsion, evinces the respectful sense of duty of those officers, and merits commendation. I, the High Commissioner, in company with the Governor, will personally repair to Macao to soothe and encourage. And you are required to pay instant obedience hereto, by making this intention known to them.

That the Portuguese Governor and Procurador have skillfully followed the orders for their removal shows their respect for their duty and deserves praise. I, the High Commissioner, along with the Governor, will personally go to Macao to reassure and support them. You are expected to immediately inform them of this plan.

Captain Elliot, in a despatch to the Portuguese governor, characterised his act as a participation "in measures of unprecedented inhospitality and enmity against British subjects."[8] 59

Captain Elliot, in a message to the Portuguese governor, described his actions as a part of "unprecedented hostility and unfriendliness towards British subjects."[8] 59

Into the merits of the opium question itself, or of that unique transaction, the surrender of £2,000,000 sterling worth of the commodity by a British agent on the mere demand of a Chinese official, it would be impossible to enter within the limits of space assigned to us. But it is obvious that such a demand, made within two years of the time when the viceroy of Canton was building a flotilla to carry the merchants' drug from the receiving ships to his provincial capital, was something so extravagant that compliance with it must be followed either by open war or by complete submission and the abandonment of China as a trading field. It is of course conceivable that had the ordinary Chinese canon been applied to the case, and the proclamations of Commissioner Lin been interpreted, like those that had gone before, as the inaugural bombast of a newcomer, the demands might have been evaded with impunity. The Portuguese, in fact, did evade them by the simple expedient of sending their opium to sea for a time and bringing it back again. There is some ground for the surmise that the High Commissioner himself reckoned on evasion, and was even embarrassed by his unexpected success in having such an enormous amount of property frankly thrown on his hands. Our collision with China may thus be said to have been brought about by a breach in the continuity of precedents on both sides,—we reckoning up to a certain point on the continuance of sham, and the Chinese on the continuance of submission. Both were misled, and there was no way of reconciliation but by the arbitrament of force. 60

Into the merits of the opium issue itself, or of that unique situation, the handover of £2,000,000 worth of the product by a British agent simply at the request of a Chinese official, it's impossible to delve into within the space we have. However, it's clear that such a request, made just two years after the viceroy of Canton was assembling a flotilla to transport the merchants' drug from receiving ships to his provincial capital, was so outrageous that meeting it would lead either to outright war or total surrender and the loss of China as a trading partner. It’s certainly possible that if the usual Chinese approach had been applied in this case, and if Commissioner Lin's proclamations had been interpreted, like those before, as the grandstanding of a newcomer, the demands could have been ignored without consequence. The Portuguese actually managed to dodge them by simply sending their opium out to sea for a while and then bringing it back. There’s some reason to believe that the High Commissioner himself expected evasion and was even unsettled by his unexpected success in having such a large amount of property thrust upon him. Our conflict with China can therefore be said to have been sparked by a breakdown in the continuity of precedents on both sides—we were counting on the continuation of the deception, while the Chinese were relying on the continuation of submission. Both sides were misled, and the only way to resolve the conflict was through the use of force. 60

CHAPTER IV.

First Opium War, 1839-1842.

Captain Elliot despatches his only ship to India with a report of the situation—The helplessness of the British community and persecutions by the Chinese during three months—Arrival of two ships—The Chinese attack them and are defeated—Expedition from India and England arrives—Canton river blockaded—Attempts to appeal to Central Government rebuffed—Squadron sent to the Peiho—Kishen appointed to treat—Expedition returns south—Negotiations opened near Canton—Bogue forts destroyed by British ships—Illusory negotiations—River blockaded, but commerce partially resumed—Extensive war preparations by Chinese—Captain Elliot's confidence in the Chinese—Hostilities carried on—Canton commanded and ransomed—Triumph of the populace—Operations extended to northern coasts—Agreement between Captain Elliot and Kishen repudiated by both sovereigns—Arrival of Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker—War vigorously prosecuted—Towns and forts taken—Nanking threatened—Commissioners Ilipu and Kiying appointed to treat—Treaty concluded at Nanking, August 29, 1842—The character of Ilipu.

Captain Elliot sends his only ship to India with a report on the situation—the vulnerability of the British community and the persecution by the Chinese over three months. Two ships arrive. The Chinese attack them but are defeated. An expedition from India and England arrives. The Canton River is blockaded. Attempts to appeal to the Central Government are turned down. A squadron is sent to the Peiho. Kishen is assigned to negotiate. The expedition heads back south. Discussions begin near Canton. The Bogue forts are destroyed by British ships. Negotiations prove to be misleading. The river is blockaded, but trade partially resumes. The Chinese prepare extensively for war. Captain Elliot remains confident in the Chinese. Clashes continue. Canton is captured and held for ransom. The local populace celebrates. Operations extend to the northern coasts. The agreement between Captain Elliot and Kishen is rejected by both leaders. Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker arrives. The war is pursued vigorously. Towns and forts are captured. Nanking is threatened. Commissioners Ilipu and Kiying are appointed to negotiate. A treaty is signed in Nanking on August 29, 1842. The character of Ilipu.

Captain Elliot, after the severities to which he and his countrymen had been subjected, despatched a vessel to Calcutta with a report on the situation to the Governor-General of India, making a corresponding report at the same time to London. The departure of this, the only vessel at the disposal of the British agent, left him and the mercantile community in a helpless predicament during three critical months, and it was natural that the Chinese should take advantage of so favourable an opportunity to fill the cup of their cruelties fuller than 61 ever. The only form of reprisal which was left to the unfortunate Captain Elliot was his intimation to the merchants that he had moved both the British and Indian Governments to forbid the admission of tea and other Chinese produce into their territories—an announcement which is said to have irritated Commissioner Lin excessively. On September 11, 1839, however, her Majesty's ship Volage appeared on the scene. Her commander, Captain Smith, considered that the least he could do in defence of his countrymen was to blockade the Canton river by way of retaliation for "the stoppage of the supplies of food by order of the Chinese Government, and for the Chinese people having been ordered to fire upon and seize her Majesty's subjects wherever they went; and that certain of them had been actually cut off."

Captain Elliot, after the harsh treatment he and his fellow countrymen faced, sent a ship to Calcutta with a report on the situation for the Governor-General of India, while also informing London. The departure of this single vessel, the only one available to the British agent, left him and the business community in a powerless situation for three crucial months, and it wasn't surprising that the Chinese took this opportunity to escalate their cruelty more than ever. The only option left for the unfortunate Captain Elliot was to inform the merchants that he had urged both the British and Indian Governments to ban the import of tea and other Chinese goods into their territories—an announcement that reportedly angered Commissioner Lin greatly. However, on September 11, 1839, Her Majesty's ship Volage arrived on the scene. Her captain, Captain Smith, felt that the least he could do to defend his fellow countrymen was to blockade the Canton River as retaliation for "the Chinese Government halting food supplies and ordering their people to fire on and capture Her Majesty's subjects wherever they went; and that some of them had actually been cut off."

This slight evidence of vitality on the part of the English produced an immediate effect on the Chinese: their violent proclamations against Elliot were withdrawn; provisions were no longer prohibited; and certain negotiations were inaugurated for the resumption of trade outside the Barrier; whereupon Captain Smith promptly raised the blockade.

This small sign of life from the English had an instant impact on the Chinese: their harsh statements against Elliot were retracted; food supplies were no longer banned; and some discussions began for the revival of trade outside the Barrier; as a result, Captain Smith quickly lifted the blockade.

Before long, however, the Chinese resumed their offensive attitude, endeavoured to compel British trading ships to enter within the Bogue, and renewed their demands for the murderer of a Chinaman, failing which the foreign ships were ordered to depart within three days on pain of immediate destruction. They accordingly withdrew to the anchorage of Tongku, which became the rendezvous of all the ships of war. Difficulties continued to increase on both sides, without prospect of any solution, until the 29th of October, 62 when another British man-of-war, the Hyacinth, arrived and joined the Volage. These vessels proceeded to Chuenpee, with Captain Elliot on board, for the purpose of eliciting from the Commissioner some explicit declaration of his intentions. They were at once attacked by the Chinese admiral with a fleet of twenty-nine war-junks, which they beat off; and thus occurred the first hostile encounter between the armed forces of the two nations.

Before long, however, the Chinese resumed their aggressive stance, tried to force British trading ships to enter the Bogue, and renewed their demands for the murderer of a Chinese national. If their demands weren’t met, they ordered the foreign ships to leave within three days, threatening immediate destruction if they didn’t comply. As a result, the ships retreated to the anchorage at Tongku, which became the meeting point for all the warships. Tensions continued to rise on both sides, with no resolution in sight, until October 29th, 62 when another British warship, the Hyacinth, arrived and joined the Volage. These ships set off for Chuenpee, with Captain Elliot on board, to get a clear statement of intentions from the Commissioner. They were immediately attacked by the Chinese admiral, who commanded a fleet of twenty-nine war junks, but they successfully fought them off; this marked the first hostile clash between the armed forces of the two nations.

MAP OF CANTON WATERS.

MAP OF CANTON WATERS.

Of the operations which followed, extending over nearly three years, full accounts were given at the time, none better than the 'Narrative of the Voyages and Services of the Nemesis from 1840-43,' by W. D. Bernard, with which may be profitably compared Dr Eitel's concise history,[9] published forty years later, with all the documents before him.

Of the operations that followed, lasting almost three years, detailed reports were made at the time, none better than the 'Narrative of the Voyages and Services of the Nemesis from 1840-43,' by W. D. Bernard, which can be effectively compared to Dr. Eitel's brief history, [9] published forty years later, with all the documents available to him.

The British Government came to the conclusion that the limits of forbearance had been overstepped. The action of the Chinese authorities during 1839 forced on it the choice of two alternatives, to abandon British subjects and their interests or to exact reasonable treatment for them from the Chinese. The latter was selected, and it was resolved to demand a commercial treaty under which foreign trade might be carried on with security to person and property. In support of this decision military and naval forces, equipped in England and in India, assembled on the coast of China during the spring of 1840. Among the novelties of this equipment were a number of small light-draught iron steamers, the most famous of which was the Nemesis, built for the Honourable Company by Mr Laird of Birkenhead, drawing only six feet laden. This exceedingly mobile little craft, under her energetic commander, W. H. Hall, performed almost incredible services as the maid-of-all-work of the expedition. The blockade of the Canton river, which had been established and withdrawn several times, was finally declared on the 28th of June 1840, as a first step in the regular war programme, by Commodore Sir Gordon Bremer. A few days later the command of the fleet was assumed by Rear-Admiral the Hon. George Elliot, 64 who was also appointed joint-plenipotentiary with Captain Charles Elliot.

The British Government concluded that their patience had been pushed too far. The actions of the Chinese authorities in 1839 forced them to choose between abandoning British citizens and their interests or demanding fair treatment for them from China. They chose the latter and decided to push for a commercial treaty that would ensure the safety of foreign trade and property. To support this decision, military and naval forces were gathered on the coast of China in the spring of 1840, equipped in England and India. Among the new additions were several small, shallow-draft iron steamers, the most notable being the Nemesis, built for the Honourable Company by Mr. Laird of Birkenhead, which drew only six feet when loaded. This remarkably agile vessel, under the command of W. H. Hall, achieved nearly unbelievable feats as the primary support of the expedition. The blockade of the Canton River, which had been established and lifted several times, was finally declared on June 28, 1840, as the first step in the official war plan by Commodore Sir Gordon Bremer. A few days later, Rear-Admiral the Hon. George Elliot took command of the fleet and was also appointed as a joint-plenipotentiary alongside Captain Charles Elliot.

Before commencing a general war upon the Emperor of China every resource was exhausted for opening communications with the Imperial Government through other channels than that of Canton. The frigate Blonde was despatched for this purpose to the harbour of Amoy, where the local officials not only refused to receive a letter from the English admiral, but ordered an attack upon the boat conveying it on shore. The frigate retaliated for this insult by opening fire upon the Chinese batteries and war-junks, after which she returned to Hongkong to report proceedings to the admiral. About this time, early in July 1840, the island of Chusan was taken and occupied. The attempt to deliver a letter from Lord Palmerston addressed to the Cabinet at Peking, by way of Ningpo, having been frustrated by the authorities at that port, a blockade was established of Hangchow Bay and the mouth of the Yangtze. It had been Captain Elliot's favourite device, as it came to be that of all his successors, to apply pressure to the Court of Peking by means of a blockade of this the main artery of the Chinese empire, and it was by following up this scheme that the war thus commenced in 1840 was actually brought to a successful issue in 1842.

Before starting a general war against the Emperor of China, every effort was made to open communication with the Imperial Government through channels other than Canton. The frigate Blonde was sent to the harbor of Amoy for this purpose, where the local officials not only refused to accept a letter from the English admiral but also ordered an attack on the boat that carried it to shore. In retaliation for this insult, the frigate opened fire on the Chinese batteries and war-junks, after which she returned to Hongkong to report back to the admiral. Around this time, in early July 1840, the island of Chusan was captured and occupied. The attempt to deliver a letter from Lord Palmerston to the Cabinet in Peking, via Ningpo, was thwarted by the authorities at that port, leading to a blockade of Hangchow Bay and the mouth of the Yangtze. Captain Elliot had favored this strategy, which became the approach of all his successors, to put pressure on the Court of Peking with a blockade of this key route of the Chinese empire, and it was by pursuing this plan that the war that began in 1840 was successfully concluded in 1842.

The attempts to gain access to the Court through the southern seaports having failed, the venue was shifted to the neighbourhood of the capital itself. A heavy squadron of ships accordingly anchored off the mouth of the Peiho—a demonstration which was sufficiently menacing to the capital to induce the Court to appoint an official to parley with Captain Elliot, and 65 also to receive the undelivered letter from Lord Palmerston. Kishen, a Manchu of high rank, was chosen for this service by the emperor. The first, perhaps the sole, object of Kishen's diplomacy was to relieve the apprehensions of the Court by procuring the prompt withdrawal of the foreign forces. This end was achieved in one short conference with Captain Elliot, when Tientsin was pronounced to be too near the emperor's palace for negotiations, and it was decided that the scene should be shifted back to Canton, a new commissioner being appointed to supersede Lin, the impracticable. The squadron thereupon, about the end of September, withdrew to Chusan. It was generally believed that an armistice had been arranged pending negotiations, but it was soon discovered that the only truce made applied exclusively to the island of Chusan, where it had been declared. The two English plenipotentiaries repaired to Macao in November.

The efforts to access the Court through the southern seaports had failed, so the location was moved closer to the capital. A large group of ships anchored off the mouth of the Peiho—this show of force was serious enough to prompt the Court to appoint someone to negotiate with Captain Elliot and 65 to accept the undelivered letter from Lord Palmerston. The emperor selected Kishen, a high-ranking Manchu, for this task. The main, perhaps only, goal of Kishen's diplomatic mission was to ease the Court's fears by securing the quick withdrawal of foreign troops. This was accomplished in a brief meeting with Captain Elliot, during which it was noted that Tientsin was too close to the emperor's palace for talks, and the decision was made to move negotiations back to Canton, with a new commissioner appointed to replace the difficult Lin. As a result, the squadron withdrew to Chusan around the end of September. It was widely believed that a ceasefire had been arranged while negotiations took place, but it soon became clear that the only truce applied solely to the island of Chusan, where it had been declared. The two English representatives went to Macao in November.

All this while extensive preparations for hostilities were vigorously prosecuted in the neighbourhood of Canton. Attempts to communicate under flag of truce were repelled by force, and it was remarked that the Chinese were sufficiently well versed in the significance of the white flag to make free use of it for their own protection, while disregarding its employment by the other side. The Imperial Commissioner, Kishen, reached Canton at the end of November, his arrival coinciding in point of time with the invaliding of Admiral Elliot, the co-plenipotentiary, thus leaving the British negotiations once more in the sole hands of Captain Elliot until such time as Sir Gordon Bremer was appointed as his associate.

All this time, extensive preparations for conflict were actively underway in the area around Canton. Attempts to communicate under a flag of truce were forcefully rejected, and it was noted that the Chinese were knowledgeable enough about the meaning of the white flag to use it freely for their own protection, while ignoring its use by the other side. The Imperial Commissioner, Kishen, arrived in Canton at the end of November, his arrival coinciding with Admiral Elliot's removal from duty, leaving the British negotiations once again solely in Captain Elliot's hands until Sir Gordon Bremer was appointed as his partner.

Of the two diplomatists who had now to confront 66 each other it would be difficult to say whether the English or Chinese was the more anxious to avert hostilities. To avoid precipitating a conflict negotiations were not pressed home by either party, nor were any steps taken to give effect to the conference which had been held between them at Tientsin.

Of the two diplomats who now had to face each other, it was hard to tell whether the English or the Chinese was more eager to prevent conflict. To avoid triggering a confrontation, neither side pushed too hard in the negotiations, nor did they take any actions to implement the agreements made during their conference in Tientsin.

The hostile demonstrations of the Chinese, and the extraordinary exertions they were putting forth to place themselves in a position to bar the entrance to the river, compelled the British naval commander-in-chief to assume the offensive by attacking the outer defences at its mouth. The forts and guns were destroyed as well as the Chinese fleet of war-junks, native Indian troops and Royal Marines forming an important part of the attacking force. There remained extensive fortifications within the embouchure, and every preparation was made on both sides for resuming the contest on the following morning; but just as the British guns were about to open fire a small sampan, with an old woman and a man on board, was sent off by the Chinese admiral proposing a cessation of hostilities. This unpromising overture did actually eventuate in an armistice, holding out the prospect of a treaty of peace, but with the details as usual carefully kept in the background. During the period of truce granted by Captain Elliot the Chinese continued as active as ever in strengthening and extending their defences. This necessitated continued precautions on the British side, for it is to be noted throughout all the proceedings that the naval and military commanders never shared the illusions of Captain Elliot as regards the conciliatory intentions of the Chinese. They formed their 67 opinions upon what they saw with their eyes, and not by what any Chinese official professed with his lips.

The aggressive protests from the Chinese and the intense efforts they were making to block access to the river forced the British naval commander to take the offensive by attacking the outer defenses at the mouth of the river. The forts and guns were destroyed, along with the Chinese fleet of war-junks, while native Indian troops and Royal Marines played a significant role in the attacking force. There were still extensive fortifications inside the river's entrance, and both sides prepared to continue the battle the next morning. Just as the British guns were about to fire, a small boat with an old woman and a man on board was sent by the Chinese admiral to propose a ceasefire. This seemingly unpromising proposal led to an armistice, offering the possibility of a peace treaty, though the specifics were kept under wraps as usual. During the ceasefire granted by Captain Elliot, the Chinese remained as active as ever in reinforcing and expanding their defenses. This required ongoing caution from the British side, as it should be noted that the naval and military leaders never held the same illusions as Captain Elliot regarding the Chinese's peaceful intentions. They formed their opinions based on what they observed firsthand, rather than what any Chinese official claimed.

On January 20, thirteen days after the attack on Chuenpee forts, Captain Elliot announced from Macao that "preliminary arrangements had been concluded. Hongkong was to be ceded, and an indemnity of $6,000,000 to be paid by the Chinese; direct official intercourse on terms of equality, and trade to be resumed, within ten days." This good effect, he added, was "due to the scrupulous good faith of every eminent person with whom negotiations are still pending." The British plenipotentiary did not lose an hour in carrying out his part of the incomplete compact, which was the substantial one of rendering back to the Chinese their captured forts. The ceremony of the rendition of the Chuenpee forts was performed on the 21st, when the British flag was formally struck and the Chinese hoisted in its place under a salute from the flagship. On the other side the occupation of Hongkong by the British forces proceeded just as if the arrangements between the plenipotentiaries had been definitive.

On January 20, thirteen days after the attack on the Chuenpee forts, Captain Elliot announced from Macao that "preliminary arrangements had been finalized. Hong Kong was to be ceded, and an indemnity of $6,000,000 was to be paid by the Chinese; direct official communication on equal terms, and trade was to resume within ten days." He added that this positive outcome was "due to the unwavering good faith of every prominent individual with whom negotiations are still ongoing." The British representative wasted no time in fulfilling his part of the incomplete agreement, which included the significant act of returning the captured forts to the Chinese. The ceremony for the return of the Chuenpee forts took place on the 21st, when the British flag was officially lowered and the Chinese flag was raised in its place under a salute from the flagship. Meanwhile, the British forces continued to occupy Hong Kong as if the agreements between the representatives were final.

Serious conferences then ensued between the British and Chinese plenipotentiaries within the river, at a point known as the Second Bar. The blockade was nevertheless maintained, so that a French corvette which arrived to watch the course of events was unable to enter the river. Captain Elliot, however, invited her commander to accompany him and "assist" at his interview with Kishen. In the meanwhile the conciliatory attitude of the Chinese commissioner was severely denounced from the throne, and while these conferences were proceeding, messengers of war were 68 on their way from Peking charged with nothing less than the extermination of the barbarians. Kishen was degraded, and instead of peaceable negotiations, a proclamation was placarded on the walls of Canton offering $50,000 each for the heads of the British plenipotentiary and the commodore.

Serious conferences took place between the British and Chinese representatives in the river, at a spot known as the Second Bar. The blockade continued, preventing a French corvette that arrived to observe the situation from entering the river. Captain Elliot invited her captain to join him and “assist” at his meeting with Kishen. Meanwhile, the conciliatory stance of the Chinese commissioner was heavily criticized from the throne, and while these conferences were ongoing, messengers of war were on their way from Peking with orders for nothing less than the elimination of the foreigners. Kishen was demoted, and instead of peaceful negotiations, a proclamation was posted on the walls of Canton offering $50,000 for the heads of the British representative and the commodore.

After the expiration of this one-sided truce open hostilities were re-entered upon. The Bogue forts had to be once more captured, and the British flag re-hoisted. That accomplished, the blockade of the river was raised. This somewhat remarkable step was no doubt due to the overmastering anxiety shown throughout by Captain Elliot for the immediate resumption of trade, he having learnt in the Company's school to place the current season's business above every other consideration. It appears certain that the quite disproportionate value attached by him to this one object obscured his perspective, if indeed it did not vitiate his whole policy. Trading vessels were permitted to proceed up-river, but under the peculiar reservation that the stakes, chains, and barriers placed by the Chinese to obstruct navigation should first be removed. The fleet, nevertheless, had still to fight its way up to Canton, Captain Elliot meanwhile never ceasing to make overtures of peace to the Chinese. There were truces and suspensions of hostilities, all of the same nature, binding only on one side, and such a medley of peace and war as seemed rather to belong to the middle ages than to the nineteenth century. Trade was pushed on all the more briskly for the general fear that the duration of peace was likely to be brief; and as both parties were alike interested in getting the season's produce shipped, 69 the Chinese authorities were not ill-pleased to see commerce thus carried on while they employed the interval in hurrying forward their grand preparations for the crushing of the invading force. Hostilities were suspended by an agreement on March 20, 1841, and Captain Elliot, after residing some time in the foreign factory, where he had opportunities of sounding the disposition of the new commissioners, declared himself perfectly satisfied with their "assurances of good faith," which he repeated in the same public manner a fortnight later—that is, a month after the suspension of hostilities. On leaving the Canton factory Captain Elliot, strong in the faith he professed, urged on the senior naval officer the propriety of moving his ships away from the city in order to show our peaceful disposition, the guard of marines which had been stationed for the protection of the factories to be at the same time withdrawn.

After the end of this one-sided truce, hostilities resumed. The Bogue forts had to be captured again, and the British flag was raised once more. Once that was done, the blockade of the river was lifted. This somewhat notable decision was likely due to Captain Elliot's intense desire for the immediate resumption of trade, as he had learned in the Company's school to prioritize the current season's business above everything else. It seems clear that the disproportionate value he placed on this single goal skewed his perspective, if not entirely corrupted his entire policy. Trading vessels were allowed to proceed up the river, but only under the condition that the stakes, chains, and barriers set by the Chinese to block navigation be removed first. The fleet still had to fight its way to Canton, while Captain Elliot continued to seek peace with the Chinese. There were truces and pauses in hostilities, all of the same nature, which were binding only on one side, creating a mix of peace and war that seemed more fitting for the Middle Ages than the nineteenth century. Trade progressed even more vigorously due to the common fear that the peace wouldn't last long; and since both parties were equally interested in getting the season's produce shipped, the Chinese authorities were not unhappy to see commerce continue this way while they hurried to prepare for defeating the invading forces. Hostilities were suspended by an agreement on March 20, 1841, and after spending some time in the foreign factory—where he had the chance to gauge the new commissioners' intentions—Captain Elliot declared himself completely satisfied with their "assurances of good faith," which he reiterated publicly two weeks later—one month after the suspension of hostilities. When leaving the Canton factory, Captain Elliot, confident in his beliefs, urged the senior naval officer to move his ships away from the city to demonstrate our peaceful intentions, while also withdrawing the guard of marines that had been assigned to protect the factories.

The mercantile community by no means participated in the confidence of the plenipotentiary, nor, as we have said, did the naval commanders. Indeed so little satisfied were they with the turn of affairs, that Sir Gordon Bremer left in a Company's steamer for Calcutta to lay the situation before the Governor-General of India.[10] This occurred in the middle of April. In the beginning of May troops were seen pouring into the forts near the city. An immense number of fire-rafts in preparation to burn the fleet 70 could not be concealed, while placards of a most menacing character were posted about the city walls. Captain Elliot, whether he was shaken in his belief in the pacific assurances of the Chinese authorities or not, returned to the scene, on board the Nemesis, on the 10th of May, and it is said that, in order to show the Chinese that he still believed in their good faith, he was accompanied on this one occasion by his wife, probably the first European woman who had set foot in Canton.

The trading community definitely did not share the trust of the ambassador, nor did the naval leaders, as we mentioned earlier. In fact, they were so unhappy with how things were going that Sir Gordon Bremer took a Company steamer to Calcutta to explain the situation to the Governor-General of India. This happened in mid-April. By early May, troops were seen streaming into the forts near the city. A huge number of fire-rafts were being prepared to set fire to the fleet, which couldn’t be hidden away, while threatening posters were plastered on the city walls. Captain Elliot, whether he had lost faith in the peaceful promises of the Chinese authorities or not, came back to the scene on the Nemesis on May 10th. It’s said that, to demonstrate to the Chinese that he still trusted them, he brought his wife along this time, likely making her the first European woman to step foot in Canton.

Several weeks more elapsed before the British plenipotentiary allowed himself to be finally disillusioned. Then he issued a proclamation to the merchants warning them to be prepared to leave the factories at a moment's notice, while the inevitable Nemesis was moved close up for the protection of the foreign community generally. The Chinese had employed the greatest ingenuity in masking their warlike preparations, and even at the last, when they saw that concealment was no longer possible, they attempted to allay the apprehensions of the foreigners by issuing an edict in order "to calm the feelings of the merchants and to tranquillise commercial business,"—their object being, as it was confidently alleged, to take the whole community by surprise and completely annihilate them.

Several more weeks went by before the British representative finally faced the truth. He then issued a warning to the merchants, telling them to be ready to leave the factories at a moment's notice, while the inevitable retribution was brought in closer for the protection of the foreign community as a whole. The Chinese had used incredible cleverness to hide their military preparations, and even at the last minute, when they realized they could no longer keep it hidden, they tried to ease the foreigners' fears by issuing an edict to "calm the feelings of the merchants and stabilize commercial business,"—their real aim, as was confidently claimed, being to catch the entire community off guard and completely wipe them out.

H.M. SHIPS IMOGEN AND ANDROMACHE PASSING BOCCA TIGRIS BATTERIES.

H.M. Ships Imogen and Andromache Passing Bocca Tigris Batteries.

Although thus attempting to lull the foreigners, the Chinese authorities had previously warned the natives, through the elders, to remove their families and effects from the neighbourhood of the river. On the very day after the soothing proclamation, May 21, the signal for the renewal of the war was given by the launching of a number of ingeniously contrived 71 fire-rafts, which were dropped down by the tide upon the English vessels with the design of burning them at their anchors. This scheme failed in its object, partly from miscalculation,—only ten or twelve out of about a hundred being ignited,—and partly from the intrepidity of the British officers and seamen in grappling with those they could reach in their boats, and towing them out of their intended course. Indeed the destructive effects of these elaborate engines were turned on the Chinese themselves, some of the rafts taking the ground close to the city and setting fire to the suburbs. This fiasco was followed on the one side by an attack on the forts and the destruction of a very large fleet of war-junks, and on the other by the demolition and pillage of the foreign factories, not however without some curious discrimination.

Although they tried to calm the foreigners, the Chinese authorities had already warned the locals, through the elders, to evacuate their families and belongings from the area near the river. The very next day after the soothing announcement, May 21, the signal to restart the war was given by launching several cleverly designed 71 fire-rafts, which were carried down by the tide towards the British ships, aiming to burn them while they were anchored. This plan didn’t work as intended, partly due to miscalculations—only ten or twelve out of about a hundred caught fire—and partly because of the bravery of the British officers and sailors, who managed to grapple with those they could reach in their boats and tow them away from their intended targets. In fact, the destructive impact of these elaborate devices ended up affecting the Chinese themselves, as some rafts ran aground close to the city and ignited the suburbs. This failure was followed by an attack on the forts and the destruction of a large fleet of war junks, along with the demolition and looting of the foreign factories, though not without some strange distinctions.

The attack on Canton was now undertaken in earnest. On the 26th May the heights in rear of the city had been captured and were held in force, so that the whole Chinese position was completely commanded. Everything was ready for the assault, which would have been a bloodless affair, an elevation just within the wall affording a military vantage-ground from which the whole city could have been dominated without the least risk by a very small force. At this critical moment Captain Elliot appeared to stay the hand of Sir Hugh Gough and Commodore Senhouse, the commanders of the military and naval forces respectively. Captain Elliot had, in fact, granted a truce in order to discuss, not the terms of peace with China, but merely the conditions on which the British forces should retire from Canton. The principal 72 of these were that the city should be evacuated by all the Chinese and Manchu troops, estimated at 45,000, over whom the authorities proved that they had perfect control; and that the authorities should pay the ransom of $6,000,000, in consideration of which all the river forts were to be restored to the Chinese, under the proviso that the forts below Whampoa were not to be rearmed until the final conclusion of peace. From first to last 1200 pieces of cannon had been captured or destroyed in these river forts, which would in any case have taken some time to replace.

The attack on Canton was now in full swing. On May 26th, the heights behind the city were captured and held firmly, giving complete control over the entire Chinese position. Everything was set for an assault that could have been carried out without any bloodshed; a spot just inside the wall provided a tactical advantage from which a very small force could dominate the whole city without any risk. At this crucial moment, Captain Elliot intervened to halt the actions of Sir Hugh Gough and Commodore Senhouse, the leaders of the military and naval forces, respectively. Captain Elliot had actually granted a truce to discuss not the peace terms with China but simply the conditions under which British forces would pull back from Canton. The main conditions were that all Chinese and Manchu troops, estimated at 45,000, should evacuate the city, which the authorities proved they could control effectively; and that the authorities would pay a ransom of $6,000,000, in exchange for which all the river forts would be returned to the Chinese, with the condition that the forts below Whampoa would not be rearmed until a final peace agreement was reached. In total, 1,200 pieces of cannon had been captured or destroyed in these river forts, which would have taken considerable time to replace.

The incident which closed this transaction having an important bearing upon future events, it merits particular attention. Two days after the agreement was concluded the armed Braves of the city and locality began to assemble in great numbers on the heights threatening the British position, and they even advanced to the attack. Fighting ensued, which lasted two days, during which the Chinese force was constantly augmenting, and, though more than once dispersed by the British, it was only to reassemble in greater numbers and renew the attack. Thus the ransoming of the city seemed to be but the beginning of strife. At length the British commander insisted upon the prefect of Canton going out to the Braves and causing them to disperse, after which the British force re-embarked. The incident left on the minds of the Cantonese the conviction that they were invincible, for they took to themselves the whole credit of expelling the barbarians.[11] This belief was destined to bear much bitter fruit in after-days. 73

The event that wrapped up this deal was significant for what was to come, so it deserves special attention. Two days after the agreement was finalized, the armed groups from the city and surrounding areas started gathering in large numbers on the hills, threatening the British position, and they even launched an attack. Fighting broke out and lasted for two days, during which the Chinese forces kept growing. Although the British managed to disperse them more than once, the groups just regrouped in even larger numbers and continued their assault. It became clear that the ransoming of the city was just the start of more conflict. Eventually, the British commander demanded that the prefect of Canton go out to the groups and get them to disperse, after which the British forces boarded their ships. This incident left the people of Canton with the belief that they were unbeatable, as they took full credit for driving out the foreigners. This belief would lead to many troubles in the future. 73

The emperor repudiated all these pacific arrangements, and ordered that as soon as the English ships had withdrawn new and stronger forts were to be erected and armed. After the anomalous episode of Canton the war was transferred to the northern coasts. Hongkong, with its capacious and well-sheltered harbour and facilities for ingress and egress, was found to be an admirable naval and military base, and the island soon became a scene of intense activity afloat and ashore. The Chinese were attracted to it in great numbers. Tradesmen, mechanics, builders, carpenters, servants, boatmen, market-people, and common labourers flocked into the island, where one and all found profitable employment both under the British Government and in connection with the commercial establishment which had already been set up there. It is estimated that during the year 1841 not less than 15,000 natives from the mainland had taken up their quarters in the new possession of Great Britain, and were naturally of material assistance in the fitting out of the great expedition which was about to invade the eastern seaboard. One drawback, unfortunately, soon showed itself in the sickness and mortality of the troops, who were attacked by a fever attributed, rightly or wrongly, to the breaking up of the soil, which was composed of decomposed granite. Possibly, however, the hardships of campaigning in the unhealthy delta of the Canton river predisposed the men, when the excitement was over, to attacks of the diseases associated with the name of Hongkong. This disastrous epidemic left to the colony an evil reputation, which survived many years of hygienic improvement. 74

The emperor rejected all these peaceful arrangements and ordered that as soon as the English ships left, new and stronger forts should be built and armed. After the unusual events at Canton, the war moved to the northern coasts. Hong Kong, with its spacious and well-protected harbor and access points, was found to be a great naval and military base, and the island quickly became very busy both at sea and on land. Many Chinese were drawn to it. Traders, mechanics, builders, carpenters, domestic workers, boatmen, market vendors, and laborers flocked to the island, where they all found good jobs, both with the British Government and in the commercial operations that had already started there. It’s estimated that during 1841, at least 15,000 locals from the mainland settled in Britain’s new possession and were naturally a significant help in preparing for the major expedition that was about to invade the eastern coastline. Unfortunately, one downside soon became apparent: the sickness and death among the troops. They were struck by a fever believed, rightly or wrongly, to be caused by the disturbed soil, which consisted of decomposed granite. However, the challenges of campaigning in the unhealthy delta of the Canton River may have made the soldiers more susceptible, once the excitement faded, to illnesses linked to Hong Kong. This devastating epidemic gave the colony a bad reputation that lingered for many years despite improvements in hygiene. 74

The agreement concluded between Captain Elliot and Kishen, repudiated by the emperor, was no less emphatically disapproved of by the Government of Great Britain. Captain Elliot was recalled, and quitted China on August 24, Sir Henry Pottinger, the new plenipotentiary, having arrived, in company with Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker, on the 10th, to the great joy of every one. The war was thereupon pursued systematically and with vigour.

The agreement that Captain Elliot made with Kishen, which the emperor rejected, was firmly disapproved by the British Government as well. Captain Elliot was recalled and left China on August 24. Sir Henry Pottinger, the new plenipotentiary, arrived on the 10th, along with Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker, to everyone's great delight. The war was then carried on systematically and with energy.

The twelve months over which these operations extended will not seem long if we consider that the coast of China, with its marvellous archipelago, was then scarcely known to navigators; that the ships were propelled by sails; that they had to operate nearly 1000 miles from their base—and that a place of which they held precarious possession; and that the greatest caution was required in moving a squadron of fifty vessels, besides transports and store-ships. Indeed the real matter for surprise—and it reflects the highest credit on the officers concerned—is that in an expedition of such magnitude, including the advance of 200 miles up the Yangtze, a river till then quite unknown, so few casualties occurred. It should also be remembered that in this war against China precautions of quite unusual stringency were observed for the protection of private property and the avoidance of injury to the population.

The twelve months during which these operations took place won't seem long when we consider that the coast of China, with its amazing archipelago, was hardly known to sailors at the time; that the ships were powered by sails; that they had to operate nearly 1,000 miles from their base—and that they had only a shaky hold on the territory; and that moving a squadron of fifty ships, along with transports and supply ships, required extreme caution. In fact, what’s truly surprising—and it speaks volumes about the officers involved—is that in an expedition of such scale, which included advancing 200 miles up the Yangtze, a river that was completely unfamiliar until then, there were so few casualties. It's also worth noting that during this war against China, unusually strict precautions were taken to protect private property and to minimize harm to the local population.

The Chinese Government was allowed ample time for reflection between each step in the hostile advance, yet neither the capture of the coast forts and cities nor the incursions which were made from convenient points into the interior sufficed to bring the Court of Peking to sue for terms. Amoy, Chinhae, Chapu, 75 Ningpo, Wusung, and Shanghai were taken in succession, and Chusan was reoccupied. The Chinese defence of these various places was far from contemptible, excepting only as regarded the antiquity of its methods and the inefficiency of its weapons. The fortifications at the various ports were very extensive, and were mounted with an immense number of guns. The troops in most cases stood bravely the attack by superior weapons and skill, in several cases waiting for the bayonet charge before abandoning their earthworks. It was not until the fleet had made its way up the Yangtze, secured the Grand Canal which connects the rich rice-growing provinces with the northern capital, and had taken its station in front of Nanking, the southern capital, that the strategic centre of the empire was reached.

The Chinese government had plenty of time to think between each phase of the aggressive advance, yet the capture of the coastal forts and cities, along with the raids into the interior from convenient locations, didn’t lead the Court of Peking to seek negotiations. Amoy, Chinhae, Chapu, 75 Ningpo, Wusung, and Shanghai fell one after another, and Chusan was retaken. The Chinese defense of these places was far from ineffective, except for the outdated tactics and poor quality of their weapons. The fortifications at the various ports were extensive and equipped with a vast number of guns. In most cases, the troops bravely confronted superior firepower and skill, often holding their ground until the bayonet charge before retreating from their positions. It wasn’t until the fleet advanced up the Yangtze, secured the Grand Canal that links the fertile rice-growing provinces to the northern capital, and positioned itself in front of Nanking, the southern capital, that the strategic heart of the empire was reached.

YANGTZE AND GRAND CANAL.

Yangtze River and Grand Canal.

At Nanking, therefore, commissioners were appointed to treat with Sir Henry Pottinger, and as they had 76 nothing to do but acquiesce in his demands with the best grace, while at the same time saving the face of the Imperial Government as much as the circumstances of such a surrender would allow, the long-desired treaty of commerce was at last concluded on August 29, 1842.

At Nanking, commissioners were appointed to negotiate with Sir Henry Pottinger, and since they had no choice but to agree to his demands as gracefully as possible while also trying to preserve the dignity of the Imperial Government as much as the situation would permit, the long-awaited trade treaty was finally signed on August 29, 1842.

The two Imperial Commissioners intrusted with the negotiations were men of the highest distinction and rank, Ilipu and Kiying. Of the latter it was said that he was the first high officer who since the commencement of the war had dared to tell the naked truth to his imperial master. Their joint memorial to the throne, on which the imperial instructions for signing the treaty were based, was remarkable for its clearness, simplicity, and outspokenness, contrasting in these respects strongly with the customary tone of flattery, evasion, and bombast. Of Kiying we shall hear further in the sequel.

The two Imperial Commissioners in charge of the negotiations were distinguished men of high rank, Ilipu and Kiying. People said Kiying was the first senior officer to tell his emperor the unvarnished truth since the war began. Their joint memorial to the throne, which served as the basis for the imperial instructions to sign the treaty, was notable for its clarity, straightforwardness, and directness, standing in stark contrast to the usual tone of flattery, evasion, and grandiosity. We will hear more about Kiying later.

Ilipu was already an old man and infirm. His name is never mentioned by contemporary writers without respect amounting almost to veneration. Governor-general in Nanking, he had been appointed Imperial Commissioner and ordered to Ningpo to get the dependent island Chusan cleared of foreigners. He had thus been brought into communication with the foreign commanders in connection with the occupation of Ningpo and the capture of Chapu, out of which a correspondence ensued alike honourable to both sides. A number of Chinese prisoners, after having their wounds attended to and their wants provided for, with a small present of money, were restored to liberty by the British commander. This unexpected action seemed to impress Ilipu, who in return sent down 77 to Chapu a number of English prisoners, who had been for some time incarcerated at Hangchow, treating them handsomely, according to his lights. The despatch of the prisoners was accompanied by a respectful letter to Sir Hugh Gough and Sir William Parker, probably the first communication deserving to be so styled that ever passed between a high Chinese officer and a foreigner. These circumstances augured well for the success of future intercourse. Ilipu was sent to Canton as High Commissioner to arrange details as to the carrying out of the treaty. He died there, and was succeeded by Kiying, who brought the ratification of the treaty to Hongkong in June 1843.

Ilipu was already an old man and in poor health. His name is always mentioned by contemporary writers with a level of respect that borders on reverence. As the governor-general in Nanking, he had been appointed Imperial Commissioner and sent to Ningpo to clear the dependent island of Chusan of foreigners. This placed him in contact with the foreign commanders regarding the occupation of Ningpo and the capture of Chapu, which led to a correspondence that was respectful to both sides. A number of Chinese prisoners, after having their injuries treated and their needs met, along with a small monetary gift, were released by the British commander. This unexpected gesture seemed to impress Ilipu, who in return sent a number of English prisoners, who had been held in Hangchow for some time, back to Chapu, treating them generously to the best of his ability. The release of the prisoners was accompanied by a respectful letter to Sir Hugh Gough and Sir William Parker, likely the first communication worthy of the term to ever occur between a high-ranking Chinese officer and a foreigner. These events boded well for future engagements. Ilipu was later sent to Canton as High Commissioner to work out the details of the treaty. He died there and was succeeded by Kiying, who brought the treaty ratification to Hongkong in June 1843.

CHAPTER V.

The 1842 Treaty.

A one-sided bargain—Not deemed by Chinese obligatory—Condemned by powerful parties—The Chinese conscience against it—Fulfilment therefore could not be voluntary—The Chinese and Manchus compared—Repugnance to treaty common to them both—Much determination needed to obtain fulfilment.

A one-sided deal—not considered mandatory by the Chinese—denounced by powerful groups—the Chinese moral stance against it—so fulfillment could not be voluntary—the Chinese and Manchus compared—both share a reluctance towards the treaty—considerable effort is required to achieve compliance.

Out of such antecedents in peace and war it was a moral impossibility that normal international relations between Chinese and foreigners should follow the conclusion of peace.

Out of such backgrounds in peace and war, it was a moral impossibility for normal international relations between Chinese people and foreigners to develop after the peace was concluded.

The treaty signed at Nanking by Sir Henry Pottinger in 1842, simple and explicit in its grammatical construction, and fulfilling as far as words could do so all the conditions of a charter of fair trade, was tainted with the vices of a one-sided bargain. Indeed the Chinese did not regard it in the light of a bargain at all, but as a yoke temporarily imposed on them which it was their business to shake off. Sir John Davis has told us that "at Peking almost every Chinese of rank and influence was opposed to the fulfilment of the stipulations of the treaty. The negotiators of it shared in the odium of the cowardly generals who had deceived their sovereign by false representations of their powers of defence." The 79 obligations of the treaty, in fact, sat so lightly on their consciences, that only so far as they were held rigorously to its provisions would they observe them.

The treaty signed in Nanking by Sir Henry Pottinger in 1842 was straightforward and clear in its language, and it aimed to meet all the requirements of a fair trade agreement, but it was marred by the flaws of a lopsided deal. In fact, the Chinese saw it not as a deal at all, but as a burden they needed to free themselves from. Sir John Davis noted that "in Peking, almost every influential Chinese person opposed fulfilling the treaty's terms. The negotiators were blamed along with the cowardly generals who misled their emperor with false claims about their defensive capabilities." The 79 obligations of the treaty weighed so little on their consciences that they would only adhere to its terms as strictly as they were forced to.

The open-mouthed denunciation of the treaty in high quarters was but the textual confirmation of what was obvious in the nature of the case, that the Chinese Government regarded the treaty of Nanking as a ruse de guerre, a mere expedient for purchasing present relief, "a temporary arrangement in order to recover from our losses."

The blunt condemnation of the treaty by those in power was just a clear reflection of what was already evident: the Chinese Government saw the Treaty of Nanking as a ruse de guerre, simply a tactic to gain immediate relief, "a temporary solution to recover from our losses."

The official animus and the political conscience were thus entirely on the side of what we call bad faith, a state of things which has come down unabated to our own time, though prudence on the one side and pressure on the other have generally toned down the outward manifestation of it.

The official hostility and the political awareness were completely aligned with what we now refer to as bad faith. This situation has persisted unchanged into our current time, although caution from one side and pressure from the other have generally softened its outward expression.

Fulfilment of the treaty under these circumstances could only be hoped for by the actual employment of the coercive agency which had secured its signature, or by the conviction, firmly rooted in the minds of the Chinese, that such agency was always ready to be invoked. But as perpetual coercion on the part of Great Britain was not to be thought of, the establishment and maintenance of satisfactory working relations demanded on the part of the British agents responsible for the execution of the treaty a rare combination of personal qualities. They had, in fact, to assume a power which they did not possess, to trade upon the prestige which their country had gained by the success of its arms, trusting that their pretensions might be tacitly acquiesced in. Had this attitude been consistently maintained, in small as well as in great things, from the very outset, there is no telling 80 whether the observance of the treaty might not have become a matter of Chinese routine, and in time acquired the sacred authority of custom. But the contrary was the case, and it was not the observance but the non-observance of the treaty that was allowed to acquire the sanction of custom.

Fulfilling the treaty under these circumstances could only be hoped for through the actual use of the force that secured its signature, or by the strong belief among the Chinese that such force was always ready to be used. However, since continuous coercion from Great Britain was not an option, maintaining good working relationships required British agents responsible for enforcing the treaty to have a unique mix of personal qualities. They essentially had to project a power they didn't actually have, relying on the prestige their country had earned through military success, hoping that their claims would be quietly accepted. If this attitude had been consistently maintained, in both minor and major issues, from the very beginning, it’s uncertain whether the treaty's observance might have become a regular practice for the Chinese and eventually gained the respected authority of custom. Unfortunately, the opposite happened; it was the disregard for the treaty that was allowed to become conventional.

The conduct of the war offered conclusive evidence that though certain individuals, from either better knowledge or higher principle than their contemporaries, were inclined to meet their enemies fairly, yet the conscience of the State, as authoritatively represented in the emperor's edicts, rejected as absurd the notion of keeping any kind of faith with the barbarians. Hence the barren result of all appeals to the binding authority of the compact, unless when backed by force; hence also the efficacy of every application of force in the dealings of foreign nations with China whether before or after the treaty of 1842. This consideration is indeed of the essence of our Chinese relations, though habitually ignored in the conduct of our intercourse.

The way the war was conducted clearly showed that while some people, either due to better understanding or higher principles than those around them, were willing to face their enemies honestly, the State's conscience, as represented by the emperor's decrees, found it ridiculous to believe in keeping any trust with the barbarians. This explains the fruitless outcomes of all appeals to the authority of agreements unless backed by force; it also clarifies why any use of force has been effective in how foreign nations interact with China, whether before or after the treaty of 1842. This idea is really central to our relations with China, even though it's often overlooked in our dealings.

As regards the attitude of the Chinese Government towards foreigners in connection with the war and the peace, an interesting and suggestive distinction has been drawn by Sir John Davis between the two elements in the Government, the Chinese and the Manchu,—a distinction which has been independently made by other observers. It is therefore a point well worthy of being kept in view both in the conduct of official intercourse and in speculations as to the future of the Chinese empire. Sir John Davis, who, first as a Company's agent in China, then for a short time as British envoy before the war, and eventually 81 chief superintendent of trade for some years after that event, had much experience in dealing with officials of the two races, is emphatic on the point that moderation and humanity were always found on the side of the Manchus, while implacable ferocity allied with treachery distinguished the Chinese officials. The war, he says, was solely the work of the latter, the peace, of the former. "New Tajin was a thorough Chinese, and, like the rest of his tribe, vociferous for war while it was absent, but unable to sustain its presence; while the Tartars were generally advocates for peace, though they did their duty in an emergency." The antithetic character of the two races shown collectively and individually has been a matter of general remark by foreigners acquainted with both. "Ilipu," says Davis, "a Manchu by birth, possessed the un-Chinese quality of straightforwardness and honesty of purpose.... As an early adviser of the sovereign, he had endeavoured to dissuade him from risking a foreign quarrel in making the English a party to the question of restricting the consumption of opium among his own subjects."

Regarding the attitude of the Chinese Government towards foreigners during the war and peace, Sir John Davis pointed out an interesting distinction between two elements in the Government: the Chinese and the Manchu. This distinction has been noted by other observers as well. It's important to consider this when engaging in official interactions and speculating about the future of the Chinese empire. Sir John Davis, who had extensive experience working with officials of both races—first as a Company agent in China, then briefly as a British envoy before the war, and eventually as chief superintendent of trade for several years after—strongly emphasized that moderation and humanity were typically found among the Manchus, while the Chinese officials were marked by unyielding ferocity and deceit. He stated that the war was exclusively the result of the Chinese officials, whereas the peace was due to the Manchus. "New Tajin was completely Chinese and, like others of his kind, was loud in his calls for war when it was not present, but unable to handle it when it came; meanwhile, the Tartars generally supported peace, although they fulfilled their duties in emergencies." The contrasting nature of the two races has been frequently noted by foreigners familiar with both. "Ilipu," Davis notes, "a Manchu by birth, had the un-Chinese trait of honesty and straightforwardness... As an early advisor to the sovereign, he tried to persuade him against provoking a foreign conflict by involving the English in the issue of restricting opium consumption among his own people."

The Manchu Kishen, who replaced Commissioner Lin on the failure of the latter, was also a man of good faith. He did his best first to avoid and then to terminate the war, and in the middle of it concluded a convention with Captain Elliot by which Hongkong was ceded and six millions of dollars were to be paid as ransom for Canton. Yet having been admonished by the emperor "to arouse the patriotism of the nation and send the heads of the rebellious barbarians to Peking in baskets, for to treat them reasonably is out of the question," he had to excuse himself by resort 82 to a false pretence of treachery. The convention he represented as a ruse, because "his reinforcements were yet far off"; but he declared that, "bearing the barbarians many a grudge," he only abided his time "for exterminating them whenever it can be done." In the impeachment of that capable statesman one of the charges was, "You gave to the barbarians Hongkong as a dwelling-place, contrary to our law of indivisibility," to which he was fain to answer, "I pretended to do so, from the mere force of circumstances, to put them off for a time, but had no such serious intention; ... a mere feint to avert the further outrages of the barbarians."

The Manchu Kishen, who took over for Commissioner Lin after his failure, was also a man of integrity. He tried his best to first avoid and then end the war, and during it, he made an agreement with Captain Elliot that ceded Hong Kong and set a ransom of six million dollars for Canton. However, after being urged by the emperor to "inspire the nation's patriotism and send the heads of the rebellious barbarians to Peking in baskets, as treating them reasonably is not an option," he had to cover himself with a false claim of treachery. He framed the agreement as a trick, claiming that "his reinforcements were still far away"; but stated that, "holding many grudges against the barbarians," he was just waiting for the right moment "to eradicate them whenever possible." In the impeachment of that skilled politician, one of the charges was, "You gave the barbarians Hong Kong as a place to live, which goes against our law of indivisibility," to which he regrettably replied, "I pretended to do so, forced by circumstances, to stall them for a while, but had no real intention; ... it was just a ruse to prevent further atrocities by the barbarians."

He took up similar ground in apologising for the conduct of Admiral Kwan, a brave and respectable officer, who had asked and obtained an armistice in the Canton river: "He has agreed to a truce with the barbarians merely to gain time and be in a state to resist them."

He addressed similar points while apologizing for Admiral Kwan's actions, a brave and honorable officer, who requested and received a ceasefire in the Canton river: "He agreed to a truce with the enemies just to buy some time and prepare to fight back against them."

The courtesy of the Manchus was no less conspicuous. Lord Jocelyn, as quoted by Mr Hunter, remarked, after a meeting with Kishen: "He rose at our entrance and received the mission with great courtesy and civility. Indeed the manners of these high mandarins would have done honour to any courtier in the most polished Court of Europe." A French envoy was similarly impressed in an interview with Kiying: "I have visited many European Courts," he said, "and have met and known many of the most distinguished men belonging to them, but for polished manners, dignity, and ease I have never seen these Chinese surpassed."

The courtesy of the Manchus was just as noticeable. Lord Jocelyn, as Mr. Hunter quoted, noted after meeting with Kishen: "He stood up when we entered and welcomed the mission with great politeness and respect. In fact, the manners of these high officials would have impressed even the most refined courtiers in Europe." A French envoy felt similarly after his meeting with Kiying: "I have been to many European Courts," he said, "and I've met and known many of their most distinguished individuals, but I've never seen anyone surpass these Chinese in elegance, dignity, and grace."

While the noblest of the officials were thus driven to assume a perfidy which was not really in their heart 83 in order to accommodate themselves to the prevailing temper, the baser minds were clamouring open-mouthed for meeting honour with dishonour. For it is instructive to recall that the most truculent officials—Commissioner Lin, for example—based their slippery strategy on the known good faith of the barbarians, "which made their engagements sacred," as the Roman generals took advantage of the Sabbatical prejudices of the Jews. The Chinese could afford to play fast and loose with their end of the rope, knowing the other end to be secured to a pillar of good faith. The commissioners who signed the treaty in their report to the throne also testified that "the English had acted with uniform sincerity."

While the noblest officials were forced to act in ways that didn’t truly reflect their feelings 83 to fit in with the current mood, the less honorable were loudly demanding to match dishonor with dishonor. It’s worth noting that the most aggressive officials—like Commissioner Lin—crafted their deceitful tactics based on the known integrity of the foreigners, “which made their agreements sacred,” similar to how Roman generals exploited the Sabbath beliefs of the Jews. The Chinese figured they could manipulate their end of the deal, secure in the knowledge that the other end was anchored to a foundation of trust. The commissioners who signed the treaty reported to the throne that “the English had acted with consistent sincerity.”

The confiding spirit of the English tempted the common run of Chinese officials to practise systematic deception. Thus a disreputable Tartar, who was governor of Canton, reported that he had "resolved to get rid of them by a sum of money, as by far the cheapest way.... But once having got rid of them, and blocked up all the passages leading to Canton, we may again cut off their commerce, and place them in the worst possible position," thus anticipating almost to the letter what took place at the Taku forts in the second war between 1858-59. A pamphlet, attributed to Commissioner Lin, whose wanton atrocities had provoked the war, after testifying to the habitual good faith of the barbarian, urged the Government "never to conclude a peace: an armistice, a temporary arrangement for the present, in order to recover from our losses, is all we desire."

The trusting nature of the English led many Chinese officials to engage in systematic deception. For instance, a disreputable Tartar, who was the governor of Canton, claimed that he had "decided to get rid of them with a sum of money, as it was by far the cheapest option.... But after getting rid of them and sealing off all the routes to Canton, we can cut off their trade again and put them in the worst possible situation," almost predicting what actually happened at the Taku forts during the second war between 1858-59. A pamphlet, attributed to Commissioner Lin, whose reckless actions had sparked the war, after affirming the usual good faith of the foreigners, urged the Government "never to finalize a peace: an armistice, a temporary arrangement for now, to recover from our losses, is all we want."

The Manchu and Chinese races are the complement of each other in the economy of the State. The 84 Manchus, with their military heredity, were best fitted for the imperial rôle, while the Chinese are by tradition rather men of business than administrators. From which it may be inferred that the material progress of the country will rest more with the Chinese with all their faults than with the Manchus with their governing instincts. The Peking Court, indeed, has been long under the numerically preponderant influence of the Chinese, and except in matters of dynastic interest they are Chinese rather than Manchu ethics which govern the acts of State. The counsels of such men as Lin and the Chinese party generally prevailed, as we have seen, over those of the distinguished Manchus, some of them belonging to the imperial family, who had to do with the foreign imbroglio, and it was in full accord with Chinese sentiment that the Emperor Tao-kuang was brought to declare that such a nation as the English should not be allowed to exist on the earth.

The Manchu and Chinese races complement each other in the state's economy. The Manchus, with their military background, were better suited for the imperial role, while the Chinese are traditionally more business-oriented than administrative. This suggests that the country's material progress will depend more on the Chinese, with all their flaws, than on the Manchus, who have a knack for governance. The Peking Court has long been influenced by the numerically dominant Chinese, and except for issues related to the dynasty, it is primarily Chinese ethics that dictate state actions. As we have seen, the advice of figures like Lin and the broader Chinese party often took precedence over that of notable Manchus, including some from the imperial family, who dealt with foreign conflicts. It was in line with Chinese sentiment when Emperor Tao-kuang declared that a nation like the English should not be allowed to exist on Earth.

Much of the hostility to the treaty may no doubt be fairly referable to the military humiliation of a Government to whom war was rebellion and rebellion parricide. Nor is the exasperation of the Chinese against their conquerors to be measured by those chivalrous standards which have been evolved from the traditions of nations accustomed, even in war, to meet as equals. They were playing the game under a different set of rules. But when every such allowance has been made, the moral principle governing Chinese official conduct cannot be designated by any word in Western vocabularies but perfidy. Belligerency as understood by Western nations did not enter into their conception, and their war tactics of kidnapping, poisoning the 85 water, torturing and massacring prisoners, and so forth, differed little from their procedure in time of peace, being in either case based on the implicit negation of human rights in connection with foreigners.

Much of the hostility towards the treaty can be attributed to the military humiliation of a government that viewed war as rebellion and rebellion as betrayal. The frustrations of the Chinese against their conquerors shouldn’t be judged by the noble standards that come from the traditions of nations used to interacting as equals, as they were operating under a different set of rules. However, when all allowances are considered, the moral principle guiding Chinese official conduct can only be described with a word from Western vocabularies: perfidy. The idea of belligerency as understood by Western nations didn’t factor into their view, and their war tactics—such as kidnapping, poisoning the 85 water, torturing, and massacring prisoners—were not much different from their actions in peacetime, as both were fundamentally based on a disregard for human rights concerning foreigners.

It may thus be seen what difficulties had to be encountered, even under the treaty, in guiding the intercourse between Chinese and foreigners into safe and peaceable channels; how much depended on the tact and capacity of the newly appointed consuls, and how little assistance they could hope for from the department which commissioned them. For no matter how perspicacious the Home Government might from time to time be, they were as much in the hands of their representatives after as they had been before the war. The distance was too great and the communication too slow for the most vigilant ministry to do more than issue general instructions. "The man on the spot" would act as his judgment or his feelings or his power prompted as emergencies might arise, and we have seen how even the clear intentions of Lord Palmerston were thwarted by the idiosyncrasies of some of his agents in China.

It can be seen what challenges had to be faced, even under the treaty, in steering the interactions between Chinese people and foreigners toward safe and peaceful paths; how much relied on the skill and ability of the newly appointed consuls, and how little support they could expect from the department that sent them. No matter how insightful the Home Government might occasionally be, they were just as dependent on their representatives after the war as they had been before. The distance was too vast and the communication too slow for even the most attentive ministry to do more than issue broad guidelines. "The person on the ground" would act based on his judgment, feelings, or authority as situations arose, and we have seen how even Lord Palmerston's clear intentions were undermined by the quirks of some of his agents in China.

CHAPTER VI.

THE OUTCOMES OF THE WAR AND HOPES FOR PEACE.

Pretensions of British and Chinese irreconcilable—International equality inconceivable by Chinese—British aims as set forth by merchants—The inadequacy of their demands—Clearer insight of their Government—Unsteadiness of British policy—Consistency of Chinese policy—Treaty to be observed so far as needful to obviate another war—Canton irreconcilable—Ransoming the city in 1841 the cause of much subsequent trouble there.

Pretensions of British and Chinese are irreconcilable—International equality is unimaginable for the Chinese—British goals, as described by merchants—The inadequacy of their demands—A clearer understanding of their Government—Inconsistency of British policy—Consistency of Chinese policy—The treaty is to be followed as necessary to prevent another war—Canton remains unyielding—Ransoming the city in 1841 led to a lot of subsequent trouble there.

The pretensions of the contending parties being absolutely irreconcilable, no spontaneous accommodation was possible between them. The Chinese could never acknowledge, or even comprehend, equality among nations, the single relationship of victor and victim being the beginning and the end of their international ethics. If, therefore, they ever set before their minds the issue to be decided by a war, it must have assumed the brutal but simple oriental form, Whose foot is to be on the other's neck? The question, then, to be submitted to the ordeal of battle between Great Britain and China was, Which should be the uppermost; which should henceforth dictate to the other? In justice to the Chinese, it must be admitted that they realised more clearly than their adversary what the quarrel really signified. What disconcerted them and led to chronic misunderstanding in the sequel was the after-discovery 87 that the victor was slack in claiming the fruits of his victory. Whether they really expected success to attend their arms may be an open question, for their ingrained habit of boasting of their prowess may have deceived even themselves. With this caveat the temper in which the Chinese entered on hostilities may be gathered from a proclamation of the High Commissioner and the viceroy of Canton in September 1839:—

The conflicting sides had completely irreconcilable views, so no natural agreement was possible between them. The Chinese could never accept or even understand the idea of equality among nations; for them, the only relationship was that of victor and victim, which defined their international morals. Therefore, if they ever considered the possibility of war, it would have taken on the harsh but straightforward Eastern perspective: Who would have their foot on the other's neck? The question up for debate in the battle between Great Britain and China was which side would dominate and dictate terms moving forward. To be fair to the Chinese, it's clear they understood better than their opponent what the conflict truly meant. What confused them and led to ongoing misunderstandings later was the realization that the victor was slow to assert the benefits of their win. Whether they genuinely expected to triumph remains uncertain, as their long-standing habit of boasting about their strength might have misled even themselves. With this in mind, the attitude with which the Chinese approached the conflict can be inferred from a proclamation by the High Commissioner and the viceroy of Canton in September 1839:—

Let it be asked [they say], though the foreign soldiers be numerous, can they amount to one tenth-thousandth part of ours? Though it be allowed that the foreign guns are powerful and effective, can their ammunition be employed for any long period and not be expended? If they venture to enter the port, there will be but a moment's blaze and they will be turned to cinders. If they dare to go on shore, it is permitted to all the people to seize and kill them. How can these foreigners then remain unawed?

Let’s ask this, they say: even with so many foreign soldiers, can they equal even one ten-thousandth of ours? While it's true that their guns are strong and effective, can they keep using their ammo for long without running out? If they try to enter the port, it will be a brief flash before they're reduced to ashes. If they dare to step on land, everyone is allowed to capture and kill them. How can these foreigners not feel afraid?

From the British point of view the object of the China expedition was set forth with conspicuous moderation by the merchants of London and of the great industrial centres. And here it seems not unfitting to remark upon the lively and intelligent interest which the commercial community of that period was wont to take in the affairs of China. The trade of Great Britain and of British India with that country had not reached the annual value of £12,000,000 sterling including treasure, yet we find in the years 1839 and 1840 a series of ably drawn memorials to Government bearing the signatures of all the important houses in the kingdom, showing the most intimate acquaintance with everything that was passing in China, even though they failed to apprehend the full signification thereof. The signatories of these papers pointed out 88 without circumlocution the measures necessary to be taken in order to place the commercial interests of her Majesty's subjects on a satisfactory footing. It would appear, therefore, that it was from the independent merchants and manufacturers of Great Britain and British India that the true inspiration came to Lord Palmerston, who was then Foreign Minister; and not the inspiration only, but the courage which was needed to throw over the pusillanimous traditions of the Honourable East India Company, and to apply the maxims of common-sense to our relations with the Chinese authorities.

From the British perspective, the purpose of the China expedition was presented with notable restraint by the merchants of London and the major industrial centers. It’s worth noting the strong and insightful interest that the business community of that time had in China’s affairs. The trade between Great Britain, British India, and China hadn’t yet reached an annual value of £12,000,000, including treasure, yet in 1839 and 1840, there were a series of well-crafted petitions to the Government signed by all the significant firms in the country, demonstrating a deep understanding of events in China, even if they didn’t fully grasp their implications. The signers of these documents pointed out 88 directly the necessary steps to secure the commercial interests of Her Majesty's subjects. Thus, it seems that the real inspiration for Lord Palmerston, who was then the Foreign Minister, came from the independent merchants and manufacturers of Great Britain and British India; not only the inspiration but also the courage needed to discard the timid traditions of the Honourable East India Company and to apply common sense to our relationships with the Chinese authorities.

Among the memorials addressed to, and by request of, the Foreign Secretary, that from the East India and China Association, representing the merchants of London interested in the Far East, gives perhaps the clearest exposition of the whole case from the commercial point of view. After a succinct historical résumé of our successes and failures in China, each traced to its cause, the memorialists state their opinion that "submission will now only aggravate the evil, and that an attempt should be made, supported by a powerful force, to obtain such concessions from China as would place the trade upon a secure and permanent footing." And they conclude with an outline of the commercial treaty which they think would conduce to that result.

Among the memorials addressed to, and at the request of, the Foreign Secretary, the one from the East India and China Association, representing London merchants interested in the Far East, provides perhaps the clearest explanation of the entire situation from a business perspective. After a brief overview of our successes and failures in China, with each tied to its cause, the memorialists express their belief that "just giving in will only make things worse, and that there should be an effort, backed by a strong force, to secure concessions from China that would place trade on a stable and lasting basis." They finish with a proposal for a commercial treaty that they believe would help achieve that goal.

First. Admission not only to Canton, but to certain ports to the northward—say Amoy, Fuh-cho-foo, Ningpo, and the Yang-che-keang and Kwan-chou—situated between 29° and 32° north latitude, near the silk, nankin, and tea districts, and it is on this coast that the chief demand for British woollens, longells, and camlets exists. 89

First. Access not only to Canton but also to specific ports to the north—like Amoy, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and the Yangtze River and Kwangchou—located between 29° and 32° north latitude, close to the silk, nankeen, and tea regions. It's along this coast that there is the highest demand for British wool, long cloth, and camlets. 89

Second. Commercial relations to be maintained at these places, or at Canton, generally with the Chinese natives; but if the trade be limited to certain hongs, which we must strongly deprecate, then the Government to be guarantees of the solvency of such parties so chosen by it.

Second. Commercial relations should be maintained at these locations, or in Canton, primarily with the local Chinese population; however, if trade is restricted to specific hongs, which we strongly oppose, then the Government should ensure the financial stability of those selected parties.

Third. That British subjects in China carrying on a legitimate trade shall not be treated by the Government or its officials as inferiors, but be left free in their social and domestic relations to adopt European customs, to possess warehouses, and to have their wives and families with them, and to be under the protection of the Chinese laws from insult and oppression.

Third. British citizens in China who are engaged in legitimate trade should not be treated by the Government or its officials as less than others, but be allowed the freedom in their social and family lives to adopt European customs, own warehouses, have their wives and families with them, and be protected by Chinese laws from insults and mistreatment.

Fourth. That a tariff of duties, inwards and outwards, be fixed and agreed upon by the British and Chinese Governments, and no alteration be made but by mutual consent.

Fourth. That a tariff of import and export duties be established and agreed upon by the British and Chinese Governments, and no changes should be made without mutual consent.

Fifth. That the Queen's representative, as superintendent of the trade, be allowed direct communication with the Emperor and his Ministers, as well as with the local authorities; and that he be permitted to reside at Peking, or at a given port, for the protection of British subjects and the regulation of the trade.

Fifth. That the Queen's representative, as the trade supervisor, should have direct communication with the Emperor and his Ministers, as well as with local authorities; and that he should be allowed to live in Peking or at a designated port, to protect British subjects and manage the trade.

Sixth. That in the event of any infraction of the Chinese laws, the punishment for the same shall be confined to the offender; and British subjects shall not be considered responsible for the acts of each other, but each man for his own—the innocent not being confounded with the guilty.

Sixth. In the event of any violation of Chinese laws, the punishment shall only apply to the offender; British subjects will not be held responsible for each other's actions, but rather each person is responsible for their own—innocent individuals will not be mixed up with the guilty.

Seventh. That supposing the Chinese to refuse opening their ports generally, the cession by purchase, or otherwise, of an island be obtained, upon which a British factory could be established.

Seventh. Assuming the Chinese refuse to open their ports to trade overall, we should aim to acquire an island through purchase or other means, where we can set up a British trading post.

Upon terms such as these the British trade with China could, we think, be carried on with credit and advantage to this country; and if force must be used to obtain them, we cannot believe that the people of Great Britain and the European community in general would offer any objection to its exercise; at least we humbly suggest that the adoption of this course is worth the trial, for if it be not followed, the only alternative seems to be the abandonment of this important and growing commerce to smugglers and to piracy.—We have, &c.,

Upon terms like these, we believe British trade with China could be conducted successfully and benefit this country. If force is necessary to achieve this, we doubt that the people of Great Britain and the European community at large would oppose its use. At the very least, we suggest that trying this approach is worth it, because if we don’t, the only other option appears to be leaving this important and expanding trade to smugglers and pirates. —We have, &c.,

G. G. de H. Larpent.
John Abel Smith.
W. Crawford.

G. G. de H. Larpent.
John Abel Smith.
W. Crawford.

These stipulations, and the hypothetical form in which they were advanced, show how imperfect, after all, was the grasp which the mercantile community had as yet taken of the situation. While fully recognising the necessity of force and urging its employment, they yet seem to have clung to the hope that in some way or another the expected treaty was to be the result of amicable negotiation. They did not clearly realise that as without force nothing could be obtained, so with force everything could be.

These conditions and the way they were presented reveal just how limited the understanding of the business community was regarding the situation. While they fully acknowledged the need for force and advocated for its use, they still seemed to hold on to the hope that somehow the anticipated treaty would come from friendly negotiation. They didn’t clearly understand that just as nothing could be gained without force, everything could be achieved with it.

And from what an abyss the status of British subjects had come to be regarded when it could be deemed a boon that they be placed under the protection of Chinese law—instead of being kept for ever outside the pale of law and of common human suffrages! Fortunately the Government, profiting by past experience and better versed in political science, held a more consistent course than that marked out for it by the merchants, and went far beyond them in the concessions demanded of the Chinese Government. Instead of trusting to Chinese law, protection for the persons and property of British subjects was provided for under the laws of Great Britain, a stipulation in the treaty which has been the palladium of the liberties of all nationalities in China for sixty years. The ambiguity which characterised the public appreciation of the China question, even when expressed through the most authoritative channel, deserves to be noted here on account of the influence it was destined to exercise on the future conduct of affairs; for though the British Government was perspicacious in the conduct of the war and in arranging terms of peace, yet, lacking the sustained support of a well-instructed public opinion, 91 its Chinese policy was subject to many backslidings. During protracted intervals of inadvertence the pernicious influences which it was the purpose of the war to suppress were allowed to regain lost ground, with the result that during the whole sixty years our Chinese intercourse has been marred by the chronic recrudescence of the old hostile temper which inspired the outrages before the war.

And from how low the status of British subjects had fallen when it was considered a benefit for them to be placed under Chinese law—instead of being permanently excluded from law and basic human rights! Fortunately, the Government, learning from past experiences and being more knowledgeable in political science, took a more consistent approach than what the merchants had suggested and demanded more concessions from the Chinese Government. Instead of relying on Chinese law, the protection for the safety and property of British subjects was ensured under British law, a provision in the treaty that has safeguarded the liberties of all nationalities in China for sixty years. The confusion that marked public understanding of the China issue, even when conveyed through the most authoritative sources, is worth noting here due to its impact on future actions; for while the British Government was insightful in its management of the war and in negotiating peace terms, it lacked the ongoing backing of an informed public opinion, 91 which led to many setbacks in its Chinese policy. During long periods of neglect, the harmful influences that the war aimed to eliminate were allowed to regain momentum, leading to the unfortunate truth that throughout the sixty years, our interactions with China have been affected by the persistent resurgence of the hostile attitudes that sparked the outrages prior to the war.

On the part of the Chinese Court there was undoubtedly a desire for such substantial fulfilment of the treaty as might obviate the risk of a renewal of the war. The final instruction of the Emperor Tao-kuang while the negotiations were proceeding was, "Be careful to make such arrangements as shall cut off for ever all cause of war, and do not leave anything incomplete or liable to doubt." And so long, at least, as the material guarantee of Chusan was retained by Great Britain—that is, until 1846—no open violation was to be apprehended. The Chinese war party, however—as distinguished from the more reasonable Manchus—were furious in their denunciations of the treaty; and it was the opinion of Sir John Davis that the situation was only saved by the financial exhaustion of the country: "the ordinary taxes could not be collected." There would in any circumstances have been a strong presumption of covert evasion being resorted to, a presumption which was reduced to a certainty by the indulgence extended to that ancient focus of mischief, Canton. By one of those aberrations of judgment which it is scarcely unfair to call characteristic, Captain Elliot desired to save Canton, of all places in the Chinese empire, from the pressure of war, and in 1841, in the midst of hostilities on the coast, he accepted ransom for the city, 92 a transaction so inexplicable that her Majesty's Treasury, at a loss what to do with the money, after much explanatory correspondence declared itself unable to appropriate the fund in the manner intended by her Majesty's representative. The arrogance of the Cantonese had been so immeasurably puffed up by this misguided clemency that the peace left the populace of the city and district absolutely convinced of their invincibility. As the eradication of this dangerous delusion was among the primary purposes of the war, so the pandering to the pride of Canton proved, as was inevitable, the malignant root of all subsequent bitterness.[12]

On the part of the Chinese Court, there was definitely a desire for a solid fulfillment of the treaty to avoid the risk of war starting up again. The final instruction from Emperor Tao-kuang during the negotiations was, "Make sure to arrange things in a way that eliminates any cause for war forever, and don’t leave anything unfinished or uncertain." As long as Great Britain held onto the material guarantee of Chusan—which lasted until 1846—there was no real fear of open conflict. However, the Chinese war party, unlike the more reasonable Manchus, was furious in their criticism of the treaty; Sir John Davis believed the situation was only saved because the country was financially drained: "the ordinary taxes could not be collected." There would have likely been a strong tendency toward covert evasion regardless, a tendency that became certain due to the leniency shown to that long-standing troublemaker, Canton. In one of those misjudged decisions that seems almost typical, Captain Elliot wanted to protect Canton, above all other places in China, from the consequences of war, and in 1841, during hostilities along the coast, he accepted a ransom for the city. This decision was so baffling that her Majesty's Treasury, unsure of what to do with the money, eventually stated it couldn’t allocate the funds as her Majesty's representative intended after much back-and-forth correspondence. The arrogance of the Cantonese was massively inflated by this misguided mercy, leaving the people in the city and surrounding areas completely convinced of their invincibility. Since one of the main goals of the war was to eliminate this dangerous misconception, the catering to Canton’s pride ultimately became the toxic origin of all the bitterness that followed.

CHAPTER VII.

THE NEW INTERCOURSE: CANTON, 1842-1847.

The fundamental difficulty of giving effect to the treaty—Necessity for thoroughness—Character of Kiying, Imperial Commissioner—His amicable relations with British Superintendent of Trade—Turbulence of Canton—Outrages on British merchants—Condoned by Chinese Government, if not encouraged both by imperial and provincial authorities—Sir John Davis's testimony—His passive treatment—False policy of allowing Chinese Government to screen itself behind the mob—Postponement of entry into city—Climax in affair—Evacuation of Chusan—Increase of insults at Canton—Sir John Davis palliates and then asks for redress—Sudden reaction in his policy consequent on Lord Palmerston's becoming Foreign Secretary—His clear despatches—Sir John Davis makes a raid on the river defences—Has the city at his mercy—But makes an unsatisfactory agreement—Withdraws protection in spite of remonstrance of merchants—Massacre of six Englishmen in 1847—Redress—Whole question of British protection brought up—Canton consul objects to ship of war at factories—Palmerston orders one to be there—Agreement to defer entry into city till 1849—People intoxicated with their success—The potency of the people—Its limitations—Interesting correspondence—Final agreement dictated by people and signed by Sir John Davis and Kiying.

The main challenge of implementing the treaty—The need for thoroughness—The character of Kiying, the Imperial Commissioner—His friendly relations with the British Superintendent of Trade—The chaos in Canton—Attacks on British merchants—Overlooked by the Chinese Government, if not supported by both imperial and provincial officials—Sir John Davis's account—His passive approach—The misguided policy of letting the Chinese Government hide behind the mob—Delay in entering the city—The peak of the situation—The withdrawal from Chusan—Rising insults in Canton—Sir John Davis plays down the issues and then asks for compensation—A sudden change in his approach following Lord Palmerston's appointment as Foreign Secretary—His clear communications—Sir John Davis conducts a raid on the river defenses—He has the city in his grasp—But reaches an unsatisfactory agreement—Withdraws protection despite protests from merchants—The massacre of six Englishmen in 1847—Seeking redress—The entire issue of British protection is raised—The Canton consul objects to a warship at the factories—Palmerston orders one to be sent—Agreement to delay entry into the city until 1849—The people filled with confidence from their success—The power of the people—Its limitations—Engaging correspondence—The final agreement dictated by the people and signed by Sir John Davis and Kiying.

To carry out a treaty which was odious to Chinese officials in general, most of all to the bureaucracy and populace of the main centre of intercourse, Canton, required an effort analogous to that of maintaining a body of water at an artificial level—success in either case depending on completeness. It is easier to keep the reservoir intact than to compromise with leakages, as in certain conditions of the human will total abstinence 94 is less irksome than moderation. To carry out the treaty, the whole treaty, and nothing but the treaty, would seem, therefore, to have been the obvious course for British agents to follow, a course suited equally to strong and to weak characters. This was, no doubt, understood by some, though not by all, of the British staff,—fifty years ago, as in our own day; but in the distribution of the personnel it fell out that the fundamental condition of success was least realised just where it was most imperatively needed—to wit, at that intermittent volcano, Canton. For even the close proximity of the chief superintendent—only 120 miles distant—at Hongkong was insufficient to keep the cistern of our Canton relations water-tight. Sir John Davis, on the whole a competent official, shared to some extent in the common human imperfection of knowing what was right without always doing, or being able to do, it. He is indeed himself the most candid witness to the breakdown of the patchwork policy which he permitted to grow up in Canton, perhaps because he could not do otherwise.

Carrying out a treaty that was deeply unpopular with Chinese officials, especially the bureaucracy and the general public in the main hub of interaction, Canton, required an effort similar to maintaining a body of water at an artificial level—success in either case depended on totality. It's easier to keep a reservoir intact than to deal with leaks; under certain human conditions, total abstinence is less challenging than moderation. Therefore, executing the treaty—the whole treaty, and nothing but the treaty—seemed to be the obvious path for British agents to take, a path suitable for both strong and weak personalities. This was probably understood by some, though not all, of the British staff—fifty years ago, just as in our time. However, in the arrangement of the personnel, it turned out that the fundamental condition for success was least realized when it was most urgently needed—specifically, at that unpredictable hotspot, Canton. Even the close proximity of the chief superintendent—just 120 miles away in Hong Kong—was not enough to keep our relations in Canton secure. Sir John Davis, generally a competent official, shared to some extent in the common human flaw of knowing what was right without always doing or being able to do it. He was indeed the most honest witness to the failure of the mixed policy that he allowed to develop in Canton, perhaps because he couldn't do otherwise.

The first British plenipotentiaries under treaty were exceptionally fortunate in their Chinese colleague, the High Commissioner, Kiying. He being a near kinsman of the emperor, and, with Ilipu, the principal instrument in promoting the conclusion of peace, his appointment must have been considered the best recognition the Court could accord of the validity of the treaty. "Kiying," says Sir J. Davis, "was by far the most remarkable person with whom Europeans have ever come in contact in that part of the world; the most elevated in rank as well as 95 the most estimable in character." Intercourse with Kiying, therefore, was pleasant, and conducive to self-respect.

The first British negotiators under the treaty were incredibly lucky to have Kiying, the High Commissioner, as their Chinese counterpart. Being a close relative of the emperor and one of the key players in securing peace, his selection must have been seen as a strong acknowledgment by the court of the treaty's legitimacy. "Kiying," says Sir J. Davis, "was by far the most remarkable person with whom Europeans have ever interacted in that part of the world; the highest in rank as well as the most admirable in character." Thus, dealing with Kiying was enjoyable and fostered a sense of self-respect.

Both officials were unfortunate in having to reckon with an intractable peace-disturbing element in their mutual relations. This is the name which, for want of a more exact designation, must be given to the people of Canton, "who, through every event since 1839, remained incorrigible in the real hatred and affected contempt for foreigners."

Both officials were unfortunate in dealing with a persistent issue in their relationship. This is the name, lacking a more precise term, that must be assigned to the people of Canton, "who, through every event since 1839, have remained unchangeable in their genuine hatred and feigned contempt for foreigners."

It has always been, and still is, the practice of the Chinese authorities to make use of the populace in their aggressions on strangers. There is at all times in China, as in most countries, an inexhaustible fund of anti-foreign sentiment ready to be drawn upon by agitators, whether within the Government circle or not, and subject also to spontaneous explosion. By working on these latent passions, and inflaming the popular mind by the dissemination of odious calumnies, Government could at any moment foment an anti-foreign raid. It was a political engine in the use of which Chinese officialdom had become thoroughly expert. It was tempting by its cheapness, and it had, moreover, the special fascination for them that in the event of being called to account for outrage they could disavow the excesses of the "poor ignorant people." Such a force, however, is not without its drawbacks to those who employ it. Like a fire, which is easy to kindle but hard to control, the popular excitement was apt to extend beyond the limits assigned by its instigators, and many an engineer has thus been hoist by his own petard. "Otho had not sufficient authority to prevent crime, though he could command it," says Tacitus; and 96 the observation fits the case of successive generations of Chinese rulers as if it had been written for each one of them separately.

It has always been, and still is, the practice of the Chinese authorities to use the general population in their attacks on outsiders. There is always in China, as in most countries, a never-ending supply of anti-foreign sentiment that agitators, whether in the government or not, can tap into, and that can also erupt spontaneously. By exploiting these underlying feelings and stirring up public opinion through the spread of hateful lies, the government could at any moment instigate an anti-foreign uprising. This was a political tactic that Chinese officials had become very skilled at. It was appealing because it was inexpensive, and it also had the added appeal that if they were held responsible for any violence, they could distance themselves from the actions of the "poor ignorant people." However, using such a force has its downsides for those who wield it. Like a fire that is easy to ignite but hard to control, public enthusiasm could easily go beyond what its instigators intended, and many an architect of such actions has ended up being caught in their own trap. "Otho had not sufficient authority to prevent crime, though he could command it," says Tacitus; and 96 this observation applies to successive generations of Chinese rulers as if it had been written just for them.

The rowdy population of Canton enjoyed special immunity from official control. Not only had they been habitually pampered for two hundred years, and diligently taught to tyrannise over and despise foreigners, but during the war they were allowed to organise themselves independently of the authorities, and to claim the honour of driving the invaders off on the occasion when the city was admitted to ransom. On the mendacious reports of these transactions reaching him, the emperor not only bestowed rewards on the leaders but encouraged the populace to further hostile measures against the foreigners. The liberal distribution of arms during the war proved afterwards a powerful incentive to crimes of violence, of which outrages on foreigners were but one development.

The unruly people of Canton enjoyed a special immunity from official control. They had not only been spoiled for two hundred years and taught to bully and look down on foreigners but were also allowed to organize independently of the authorities during the war. They took credit for driving the invaders away when the city was ransomed. Based on the false reports about these events that reached him, the emperor rewarded the leaders and encouraged the locals to take more hostile actions against foreigners. The widespread distribution of weapons during the war later became a strong incentive for violent crimes, with attacks on foreigners being just one of the outcomes.

The self-organised, self-trained bands of Canton were by no means disposed to submit tamely to the new order of things, in the settlement of which they had had no voice. They had bettered their official instruction in the storing up and practising of hatred and contempt for foreigners, and they did not choose suddenly to recant merely because their Government had been coerced into making a treaty in a distant province. Consequently, within three short months of its signature notices were placarded inciting the people to violence; very soon an organised attack on the British factories was made, and the buildings were burned down.

The self-organized, self-trained groups in Canton were definitely not willing to accept the new situation without a fight, especially since they hadn’t had a say in it. They had improved upon their official guidelines by building up and expressing hatred and contempt for foreigners, and they weren’t about to change their minds just because their Government had been pressured into signing a treaty far away. As a result, just three months after the treaty was signed, posters appeared urging people to commit acts of violence; soon after, there was a coordinated assault on the British factories, which were set on fire.

So far from attempting to repress such outrages, the governor of Canton, "while the ruins were still smoking," 97 reported to the throne that the people "in their natural indignation had committed some excesses against the grasping barbarians," and a very gracious answer was vouchsafed to an offer of the people of certain outlying villages to join the armed bands of the city. The Imperial Government as well as the provincial government was thus identified with the popular hostility to foreigners, and opposition to the fulfilment of the treaty. "The excesses of the Canton mob," writes Sir John Davis, "were perpetually and annually resumed, up to the public decapitation of the four murderers of the Englishmen in 1847, with the subsequent punishment of eleven more."

Instead of trying to stop these violent acts, the governor of Canton, "while the ruins were still smoking," 97 reported to the throne that the people "in their natural outrage had committed some excesses against the greedy foreigners," and the throne graciously accepted an offer from the residents of certain nearby villages to join the armed groups in the city. The Imperial Government, along with the provincial government, was thus aligned with the public's anger towards foreigners and the resistance to fulfilling the treaty. "The violent acts of the Canton mob," writes Sir John Davis, "were repeatedly and annually revived, culminating in the public execution of the four murderers of the Englishmen in 1847, followed by the punishment of eleven more."

But this is surely remarkable testimony from the Minister of Great Britain who was charged with the protection of his nationals[13] from wrong? With British garrisons in occupation of Kulangsu and Chusan, a military and naval force in Hongkong, and a Chinese commissioner professedly willing to afford protection and redress to foreigners, the acquiescence of the British authorities in these recurrent outrages seems to stand in need of explanation. The native authorities, it was clear, would not, even if they dared, coerce the Canton populace. Kiying himself, though meaning to be just, and ready to enforce redress against individual culprits, recoiled before the mob. So it would appear did the British representative, who, though vigilant in requiring compliance with the treaty in minor respects, seemed to be paralysed whenever the Cantonese were in question. 98 He had been too long accustomed to their practices not to be aware of the cumulative quality of these outrages, and he was too practical a philosopher not to know the wisdom of arresting the virulent stream at its fountain-head. Yet "the miserable policy of the Chinese Government ... had permitted the populace of Canton ... to reach the culminating-point of organised misrule in 1846," British merchants being the sufferers. Why was nothing done to protect them at least from the consequences of this misrule?

But this is definitely striking evidence from the Minister of Great Britain, who was responsible for protecting his nationals from harm. With British troops stationed in Kulangsu and Chusan, a military and naval presence in Hong Kong, and a Chinese commissioner seemingly willing to provide protection and redress to foreigners, the British authorities' acceptance of these ongoing outrages needs some explaining. It was clear that the local authorities would not, even if they had the guts, constrain the people of Canton. Kiying himself, despite wanting to be fair and prepared to seek justice against those responsible, backed down in front of the mob. The British representative seemed to do the same; although he was quick to demand adherence to the treaty on minor issues, he appeared paralyzed when it came to matters involving the Cantonese. He had been around long enough to know the ongoing nature of these outrages, and he was too practical not to understand the importance of stopping the toxic flow at its source. Yet "the miserable policy of the Chinese Government ... had allowed the people of Canton ... to reach the peak of organized misrule in 1846," leaving British merchants to bear the consequences. Why was nothing done to at least protect them from the fallout of this misrule? 98

The intricacies of the relation between the criminal rabble of Canton and the authorities there it would be hopeless to unravel, just as it would be vain to make such an attempt with regard to analogous cases which are to this day of constant recurrence. But no special penetration is needed to discover the falsity of a policy of allowing an organised government to plead its inability to control its own populace. Once admit such a plea and the security of the stranger is gone, for he has relinquished his hold on the Government without being compensated by any alternative security. Such was the state of things which had been allowed to grow up in Canton, producing the only fruit possible—outrage, ever increasing in violence and ending in massacre.

The complexities of the relationship between the criminal underworld in Canton and the local authorities are too complicated to untangle, just like similar situations that continue to happen today. But it doesn’t take a deep understanding to see the flaw in a policy that allows a government to claim it can't manage its own citizens. Once you accept that excuse, the safety of outsiders disappears because they lose their hold on the government without any other form of protection. This was the situation that had developed in Canton, leading to the only outcome possible—outrage, escalating violence, and ultimately, massacre.

The postponement of the right of entry into the city conferred by treaty was a test case which gave the Chinese the clue to the weakness of British policy. The consequences would have been less pernicious had the right been frankly surrendered from the first, for to have it merely deferred from time to time on the avowed ground of the populace not being ready to acquiesce in it was to flatter the mob beyond measure 99 while feeding their passion for violence. It was in this manner that the British Government had "given itself away" to the lawless rowdies of Canton.

The delay in the right to enter the city granted by treaty was a situation that revealed the weaknesses in British policy. The consequences would have been less severe if the right had been openly given up from the beginning, because simply postponing it occasionally under the excuse that the people weren't ready to accept it was excessively flattering to the crowd while encouraging their violent tendencies. This was how the British Government had essentially "given in" to the unruly troublemakers of Canton. 99

The "climax" referred to by Sir John Davis occurred at an interesting juncture of time, for it was in 1846 that the last British soldier quitted Chinese soil, and Sir John Davis testifies that the restoration of Chusan had produced a change for the worse in the tone of the Chinese authorities. Kiying himself forgot his urbanity and acted "with a degree of brusquerie, not to say insolence, never before exhibited by him."

The "climax" mentioned by Sir John Davis happened at a significant moment because it was in 1846 that the last British soldier left Chinese soil. Sir John Davis noted that the return of Chusan had worsened the attitude of the Chinese officials. Kiying himself lost his politeness and acted "with a degree of brusquerie, not to mention insolence, that he had never shown before."

A riotous attack on the foreign factories broke out in July 1846, in which the merchants were compelled in a body to defend themselves against an immense number of assailants. For this outbreak Sir John Davis blamed one of the English merchants, and got him irregularly fined by the consul. A murderous assault was committed on two British seamen in the city of Canton in October following. In the ordinary routine he reported the occurrence to the Foreign Office in a despatch of seven lines. "Two English merchant seamen," he said, "having strayed into the town, had been violently ill-used by the populace"; adding that he "considered it to be the duty of the consul to prevent seamen wandering through Canton." He at the same time instructed the consul to find some means of punishing the master of the ship for allowing his men liberty, and proposed placing greater power in the hands of the consul for the restraint of British subjects generally. Above this level the plenipotentiary seemed unable to rise.

A chaotic attack on foreign factories erupted in July 1846, forcing the merchants to band together to defend themselves against a huge number of attackers. For this incident, Sir John Davis blamed one of the English merchants and had him fined by the consul in an irregular manner. A violent assault took place against two British sailors in the city of Canton the following October. In a brief report of seven lines, he informed the Foreign Office about the situation. "Two English merchant sailors," he stated, "had wandered into town and were violently mistreated by the locals," adding that he "believed it was the consul's duty to stop sailors from roaming around Canton." He also instructed the consul to find a way to punish the captain of the ship for giving his crew too much freedom and suggested giving the consul more authority to control British subjects in general. Beyond this point, the plenipotentiary seemed unable to go further.

In March 1847 an English party of six, including Colonel Chesney, commanding the Royal Artillery in Hongkong, narrowly escaped murder at the hands of a 100 riotous mob during an excursion up the Canton river. They strayed much farther than the two sailors had done, and if they did not fare worse it was due to the almost miraculous interposition of a Chinese officer with his followers, he himself being roughly handled by the mob. It would not do to apply to Colonel Chesney's case the homœopathic treatment which was thought appropriate to the others, and Sir John Davis made a formal demand on the Chinese authorities for the punishment of the aggressors. The cup of Chinese iniquity was deemed full, and the avenger was at last let loose.

In March 1847, a group of six Brits, including Colonel Chesney, who led the Royal Artillery in Hong Kong, narrowly escaped being killed by a riotous mob while on a trip up the Canton river. They ventured much farther than the two sailors had, and if they didn't have a worse outcome, it was thanks to an almost miraculous intervention by a Chinese officer and his followers, although he himself was roughly treated by the mob. It wouldn't have been appropriate to apply the same approach to Colonel Chesney's situation that was thought suitable for the others, so Sir John Davis formally demanded that the Chinese authorities punish the aggressors. The situation involving Chinese wrongdoing was considered to have reached its limit, and the avenger was finally set loose.

Whence, it is pertinent to ask, came this sudden access of vigour in the British representative?

Whence, it is pertinent to ask, came this sudden access of vigour in the British representative?

The juncture of time above referred to was interesting from another point of view, for coincidently with the evacuation of Chusan and the renewed arrogance of the Chinese, a political event took place in the western hemisphere which had an important bearing on the whole attitude of Great Britain. There was a change of Government, Palmerston succeeding Aberdeen at the Foreign Office. The influence of Lord Palmerston on Chinese affairs during his long public career was so remarkable, that the ebb and flow of British prestige may be traced as closely by his periods of office as the course of the oceanic tide by the phases of the moon. Let any patriotic Englishman ransack the records of the sixty odd years of that statesman's full activity, and he will find no despatch or speech on the subject of China, even down to our own day, that will afford him such genuine satisfaction as those emanating from Lord Palmerston. They are so much the embodiment 101 of common-sense that they might sometimes be considered commonplace; practical, true, clear as a bugle-note. He had been barely six months in office when one of his terse despatches to Sir John Davis turned that cautious official for the time being into a hero. The astonishment of Sir John may be imagined when, in reply to his placid report of the outrage on the two seamen, he received a curt communication from the Foreign Office in which his attention was directed to the punishment, not of the victims, but of the perpetrators, of the outrage.

The time period mentioned above was interesting from another perspective, because along with the evacuation of Chusan and the renewed arrogance of the Chinese, a political event occurred in the western hemisphere that significantly impacted Great Britain's overall stance. There was a change in Government, with Palmerston taking over from Aberdeen at the Foreign Office. Lord Palmerston's influence on Chinese affairs throughout his long public career was so notable that the rise and fall of British prestige can be closely traced alongside his time in power, much like ocean tides follow the moon’s phases. Any patriotic Englishman looking through the records of the sixty-plus years of that statesman's active career will find no dispatch or speech regarding China, even to this day, that brings as much genuine satisfaction as those from Lord Palmerston. They are so infused with common sense that they might sometimes seem ordinary; practical, truthful, and clear as a bugle’s call. He had only been in office for about six months when one of his straightforward dispatches to Sir John Davis turned that cautious official into a temporary hero. One can only imagine Sir John’s astonishment when, in response to his calm report about the outrage on the two seamen, he received a blunt communication from the Foreign Office that focused on punishing the perpetrators of the outrage, not the victims.

I have [wrote Lord Palmerston, January 12, 1847] to instruct you to demand the punishment of the parties guilty of this outrage; and you will, moreover, inform the Chinese authorities in plain and distinct terms that the British Government will not tolerate that a Chinese mob shall with impunity maltreat British subjects in China whenever they get them into their power; and that if the Chinese authorities will not by the exercise of their own power punish and prevent such outrages, the British Government will be obliged to take the matter into their own hands.

I wrote to Lord Palmerston on January 12, 1847, to instruct you to demand punishment for those responsible for this outrage. You should also clearly inform the Chinese authorities that the British Government will not accept a situation where a Chinese mob can mistreat British citizens in China without consequences. If the Chinese authorities do not use their own power to punish and prevent such acts, the British Government will have no choice but to take matters into their own hands.

Sir John Davis was the more ready to respond to this stirring appeal that it reached him just as he had entered on a correspondence with the Chinese respecting the attack on Colonel Chesney's party. The turn of the tide was marked with unusual distinctness in a single sentence of the plenipotentiary's despatch dated March 27, 1847. "The records of the Foreign Office," wrote Sir John, "will convince your lordship that during the last three years I have been rigidly tied down by my instructions to the most forbearing policy.... The time has, in my opinion, certainly arrived when decision becomes 102 necessary and further forbearance impolitic." The inspiration of these instructions may be inferred from a speech of Lord Stanley's in 1845, in which he said, speaking of China, "I believe, so far as our later experience has gone, that there is no nation which more highly values public faith in others; and up to the present moment I am bound to say there never was a government or a nation which more strictly and conscientiously adhered to the literal fulfilment of the engagements into which it had entered." This from a Minister of the Crown, after three years of continuous outrages in Canton and of refusal to fulfil a specific article in the treaty, reflects either on the superintendent of trade in China as having withheld information from the Government, or on the Government itself in arriving at conclusions diametrically opposed to the tenor of their agent's despatches. If it be any justification of the Government theory to say so, the sentiments expressed by Lord Stanley were echoed by the newspapers of the day. "The Chinese," said one of them, "have acted with exemplary good faith, nor is there the least probability of their failing in future to do so."

Sir John Davis was more than ready to respond to this urgent call because it reached him just as he had begun correspondence with the Chinese about the attack on Colonel Chesney's group. The shift in perspective was clearly marked in a single sentence from the plenipotentiary's dispatch dated March 27, 1847. "The records of the Foreign Office," wrote Sir John, "will show your lordship that for the past three years I have been strictly limited by my instructions to a very patient policy.... In my opinion, the time has certainly come when a decision is necessary and further patience is unwise." The influence behind these instructions can be inferred from a speech by Lord Stanley in 1845, where he stated, referring to China, "I believe, based on our recent experiences, that there is no nation that values public trust in others more highly; and up until now I must say there has never been a government or nation that has adhered more closely and conscientiously to the exact fulfillment of the commitments it has made." This statement from a Minister of the Crown, after three years of ongoing outrages in Canton and the refusal to uphold a specific clause in the treaty, either implicates the superintendent of trade in China for withholding information from the Government or reflects poorly on the Government for reaching conclusions that contradict their agent's reports. If it's any justification for the Government's stance, the sentiments expressed by Lord Stanley were also echoed by the newspapers of the time. "The Chinese," said one of them, "have acted with commendable good faith, and there is no likelihood that they will fail to continue doing so."

Under the new afflatus, and backed handsomely by the naval and military commanders, Sir John Davis proceeded to prick the bubble of mob lawlessness and to reduce the Anglo-Chinese relations to working order. This he did by a sudden raid on the Canton river defences, without apparently any diplomatic preliminaries. By a brilliant feat of arms General D'Aguilar with a detachment from the Hongkong garrison, conveyed by three small steamers of the China squadron, swept the defences of the Canton 103 river, blew up the magazines, spiked 827 pieces of heavy cannon, and placed the city of Canton "entirely at our mercy, ... all without the loss of one British life." Under the intoxication of such a triumph the plenipotentiary might be pardoned the illusion that the Canton troubles were now at an end. "The Chinese yielded in five minutes what had been delayed as many months." And yet it proved to be a fool's paradise after all in which he found shelter, for the old fatality of half-measures that has marred so many British victories overshadowed Sir John Davis's first essay in diplomacy. The agreement in seven articles concluded with Kiying on April 6, 1847, contained such blemishes as the British negotiator could perceive clearly enough when the work of other officials was in question. Having laid down broadly that the good faith of the Chinese Government bore a direct relation to the hostages they had given, yet the plenipotentiary, when he came to business on his own account, abandoned the securities which were actually in his hands, and, either from misgivings of some sort, or under the impulse of a sudden reconversion, he threw himself unreservedly on the good faith of the Chinese without any guarantee whatever.

Under the new inspiration, and strongly supported by the naval and military leaders, Sir John Davis set out to burst the bubble of mob lawlessness and restore proper relations between the British and Chinese. He did this through a sudden assault on the defenses of the Canton River, seemingly without any prior diplomatic discussions. In a remarkable military maneuver, General D'Aguilar, with a detachment from the Hong Kong garrison transported by three small steamers from the China squadron, took control of the Canton River defenses, destroyed the munitions depots, disabled 827 pieces of heavy artillery, and rendered the city of Canton "entirely at our mercy, ... all without losing a single British life." Fueled by such a victory, the plenipotentiary might be excused for believing that the troubles in Canton were over. "The Chinese conceded in five minutes what had been postponed for months." Yet, it turned out to be a false sense of security, as the long-standing issue of half-measures that has marred many British victories loomed over Sir John Davis's first attempt at diplomacy. The agreement in seven articles made with Kiying on April 6, 1847, contained flaws that were apparent to the British negotiator when considering the actions of other officials. Despite having stated that the good faith of the Chinese Government was directly tied to the hostages they had provided, the plenipotentiary, when it came to his own dealings, abandoned the securities that were actually in his possession. Whether out of concerns of some kind or a sudden change of heart, he fully relied on the good faith of the Chinese without any guarantees whatsoever.

With regard to the protection to be afforded to the merchants and the prevention of attacks upon them, Lord Palmerston wrote in December 1846: "Wherever British subjects are placed in danger, in a situation which is accessible to a British ship of war, thither a British ship of war ought to be, and will be ordered, not only to go but to remain as long as its presence may be required. I see no reason for cancelling the 104 instructions given to you for the constant presence of a ship of war within reach of the factories at Canton." This promise of Lord Palmerston's was the sheet-anchor of the merchants' security. The question of having a ship of war close to the factories divided the mercantile from the local official view, and as the Home Government had so clearly adopted the former, the merchants took courage to stand up for what they deemed their rights. Learning that Sir John Davis, in the plenitude of his military success, had resolved to withdraw all her Majesty's forces from Canton, they ventured to make a strong remonstrance against such a step. Sir John, however, while consenting to the retention of a portion of the force, never allowed himself to be convinced of the need of any such measure. Writing to his Government in August 1847, he declared that "the Canton factories were never less in need of the presence of such a vessel than at present,"—an opinion frequently reiterated until November 20, when "for the first time since the peace it may be confidently predicated that a steamer will not be required." This was within sixteen days of the most cruel and revolting massacre of six young Englishmen at Hwang-chu-ke, within three miles of the city. The absence of a ship of war at that moment was deeply deplored, because several of the victims were kept alive long enough to have been rescued had there been any British force at hand.

Regarding the protection of merchants and preventing attacks on them, Lord Palmerston wrote in December 1846: "Wherever British citizens are in danger and accessible to a British warship, a British warship should be sent, and will be ordered, not only to go but to stay as long as its presence is needed. I see no reason to cancel the 104 instructions given to you for the constant presence of a warship within reach of the factories at Canton." This promise from Lord Palmerston was a key source of security for the merchants. The issue of having a warship near the factories created a divide between the mercantile perspective and the local official view, and since the Home Government clearly supported the merchants, they felt empowered to assert what they believed were their rights. When they learned that Sir John Davis, riding high on his military successes, planned to withdraw all of Her Majesty's forces from Canton, they boldly protested against such a decision. However, Sir John, while agreeing to keep a portion of the force, was never convinced of the necessity of maintaining any such measure. In a letter to his government in August 1847, he stated that "the Canton factories were never less in need of the presence of such a vessel than they are now," a sentiment he consistently repeated until November 20, when "for the first time since the peace it can be confidently stated that a steamer will not be needed." This was just sixteen days before the brutal and shocking massacre of six young Englishmen at Hwang-chu-ke, only three miles from the city. The lack of a warship at that time was greatly lamented because several of the victims were kept alive long enough to have been rescued if any British forces had been nearby.

This massacre naturally produced a profound impression on the Canton community, who felt that their warnings and petitions had been cruelly disregarded. The resident British merchants, in a memorial to Lord Palmerston, quoted his lordship's own instruction as to 105 the stationing of a British ship of war at Canton, and said "it was with the utmost surprise and regret they beheld that officer [Sir J. Davis] shutting his eyes to the danger that menaced us, ... and withholding the protection he had been directed to afford." "The heavy calamity which has befallen us," they add, "is the result of this infatuation."

This massacre understandably had a huge impact on the Canton community, who felt that their warnings and requests had been callously ignored. The British merchants in the area, in a letter to Lord Palmerston, referenced his own instruction regarding the deployment of a British warship in Canton, and stated, "it was with great surprise and sadness that we watched that officer [Sir J. Davis] turning a blind eye to the danger that threatened us, ... and withholding the protection he was instructed to provide." "The serious disaster that has struck us," they continued, "is the outcome of this delusion."

So much for the protection of life and property resulting from the armed expedition of 1847. The value of the new agreement, purely local in its bearing, which was the result of the successful invasion, was esteemed but lightly by the merchants. In their memorial, written in the month of August, they said: "If it is not deemed expedient to carry out a general measure in the manner contemplated by the 4th article of the new agreement, it would be much better that the merchants be again left to themselves"; while respecting the military raid and its consequences, they represented that "the just alarm occasioned by the expedition four months ago, and the excitement kept up by these fruitless negotiations, have done incalculable injury to the trade without bettering the position of foreigners in the least."

So much for the protection of life and property that came from the armed expedition of 1847. The new agreement, which was mainly local in focus and resulted from the successful invasion, was not taken seriously by the merchants. In their memorial written in August, they stated: "If it’s not practical to implement a broad measure as outlined in the 4th article of the new agreement, it would be much better to leave the merchants to their own devices again"; while acknowledging the military raid and its aftermath, they argued that "the genuine concern caused by the expedition four months ago, along with the ongoing excitement from these pointless negotiations, has caused huge damage to trade without improving the situation for foreigners at all."

Such diverse views of policy held by the principal parties concerned are typical of the relations which have subsisted between the protectors and the protected throughout a great part of the period which has elapsed since the British Government established relations with China in 1834.

Such different perspectives on policy held by the main parties involved are typical of the relationships that have existed between the protectors and the protected for a large part of the time since the British Government established relations with China in 1834.

These occurrences at Canton and the decided action taken by the British Government brought up in a definite form the whole question of the safety of British interests in China, and the means by which 106 it was to be secured. The conversion of Sir John Davis, though much, was not everything. The aim of Lord Palmerston's policy was still liable to be deflected by the perturbing influence of a minor planet in the system. The consul in Canton gave him almost as much trouble in his day as the famous Tiverton butcher did afterwards in his; and the patience with which his lordship endeavoured to enlighten his agent on the most elementary principles of human action was admirable. It had been the practice of the consul "to report to your Excellency another wanton and unprovoked attack on the part of the populace upon a party of Englishmen," and at the same time to deprecate any measures of defence, whether by organising volunteers among the residents or having a British ship of war stationed where she could be seen.

These events in Canton and the firm actions taken by the British Government clearly brought up the entire issue of protecting British interests in China and how it would be achieved. Sir John Davis's conversion, while important, wasn't everything. Lord Palmerston's policy was still at risk of being disrupted by the troublesome influence of a minor player in the situation. The consul in Canton caused nearly as much hassle for him in his time as the infamous Tiverton butcher did later on; the way his lordship patiently tried to educate his agent on the most basic principles of human behavior was impressive. The consul had a habit of "reporting to your Excellency another wanton and unprovoked attack by the locals against a group of Englishmen," while simultaneously discouraging any defensive measures, whether by organizing volunteers among the residents or having a British warship positioned where it could be seen.

The consul's object in all this was to avoid exciting suspicion in the minds of the Chinese populace. Sir John Davis, who had all along agreed with the consul, had now to tell his subordinate that "Viscount Palmerston was of opinion that we shall lose all advantages which we have gained by the war if we take the low tone which has been adopted at Canton."

The consul's goal in all of this was to prevent raising any suspicion among the Chinese people. Sir John Davis, who had always agreed with the consul, now had to inform his subordinate that "Viscount Palmerston believed that we will lose all the advantages we gained from the war if we adopt the low tone that has been taken in Canton."

We must stop [continued his lordship] on the very threshold any attempt on their part to treat us otherwise than as their equals.... The Chinese must learn and be convinced that if they attack our people and our factories they will be shot.... So far from objecting (as the Consul had done) to the armed association, I think it a wise security against the necessity of using force.... Depend upon it that the best way of keeping any men quiet is to let them see that you are able and determined to repel force by force, and the Chinese are not in the least different in this respect from the rest of mankind.

We need to put a stop to any attempts on their part to treat us as anything less than their equals.... The Chinese must understand and be convinced that if they attack our people and our factories, they will be shot.... Instead of opposing the armed association (like the Consul did), I see it as a smart way to prevent the need for using force.... Trust me, the best way to keep anyone calm is to show them that you can and will respond to force with force, and the Chinese are no different in this regard from anyone else.

In the light of the history of the subsequent fifty years, one is tempted to say that Lord Palmerston's dictum puts the eternal China question in a nutshell.

In light of the history from the last fifty years, it's tempting to say that Lord Palmerston's statement summarizes the ongoing China issue perfectly.

But when we reflect on the consequences of a man "of great experience" needing such lectures and yet left for years undisturbed at a centre of turbulence like Canton, can we greatly wonder at the periodical harvest of atrocities which followed?

But when we think about the consequences of a man "with a lot of experience" needing such lectures and yet being left for years without disturbance in a chaotic place like Canton, can we really be surprised by the periodic outbreaks of violence that followed?

The one important article in the April agreement was that suspending for a definite period of two years the operation of the article of the treaty of Nanking conferring the right of entering the city of Canton and the other ports of trade. Sir John Davis demanded either permission to "return your Excellency's visit in the city, or that a time be specifically named after which there shall be general free ingress for British subjects." To which Kiying replied, "The intention of entering the city to return my visit is excellent. The feelings of the people, however, are not yet reconciled to it." And Kiying easily had his way. Sir John thereupon explicitly sanctioned a definite delay of two years in the exercise of this treaty right, representing the privilege in his report to Lord Palmerston as of little importance.

The key point in the April agreement was the decision to suspend for a set period of two years the part of the Treaty of Nanking that allowed entry into the city of Canton and other trade ports. Sir John Davis requested either permission to "return your Excellency's visit in the city, or a specific time after which British subjects would have unrestricted access." Kiying responded, "The idea of entering the city to return my visit is great. However, the people are not yet ready for that." Kiying got his way without much effort. Sir John then officially agreed to a two-year delay in exercising this treaty right, downplaying the privilege in his report to Lord Palmerston as not significant.

Such, however, was not the view either of the Chinese or the British community of Canton. The throwing open of the city was by the latter considered the essential object of the recent expedition, and in their memorial to Lord Palmerston the merchants stated that the Braves having declared their determination to oppose the English at all costs, the withdrawal of our troops re infectâ "intoxicated all ranks of the people with an imaginary triumph." Exclusion from 108 the city thus remained as a trophy in the hands of the reactionaries, to become in 1856 the crux of a new dispute and a new war.

However, neither the Chinese nor the British community in Canton saw it that way. The British viewed the opening of the city as the main goal of the recent expedition, and in their letter to Lord Palmerston, the merchants pointed out that the Braves had declared their intention to resist the English at any cost. They argued that the withdrawal of our troops re infectâ "filled everyone with a false sense of victory." Exclusion from 108 the city remained a win for the reactionaries, which would become the center of a new conflict and new war in 1856.

It was no imaginary, but a very real, triumph for "the people"; and even looking back on the transaction with the advantage of fifty years' experience, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it was an inversion of judgment to have a city entirely at your mercy and then yield to the city instead of making the city yield to you. The least that could have been expected was, that while the troops were on the spot they should have vindicated the treaty of Nanking once for all by opening the city gates and thus eliminating the most pregnant source of future strife.

It wasn't just imaginary; it was a very real victory for "the people." Even looking back on this event with fifty years of experience, it's hard not to conclude that it was a poor decision to have a city completely at your mercy and then give in to the city instead of making it submit to you. The least that could have been expected was that while the troops were there, they would have upheld the treaty of Nanking once and for all by opening the city gates, thus removing the most significant source of future conflict.

On one point Sir John Davis was in agreement with the memorialists—namely, in "tracing back the conduct of the Canton populace to the operations of 1841, on which occasion they were spared by our forces at the rear of the city." But the merchants were pointing out to Lord Palmerston that Sir John Davis was himself implicitly following that very precedent.

On one point, Sir John Davis agreed with the memorialists—specifically, in "tracing back the actions of the Canton populace to the events of 1841, when our forces at the back of the city spared them." However, the merchants were pointing out to Lord Palmerston that Sir John Davis was implicitly following that very precedent himself.

The China career of Sir John Davis was destined to a tragic finale, for in the midst of a series of decidedly optimistic despatches he was startled by the news of the Hwang-chu-ke murders. Expiation was as prompt as could have been reasonably expected, the High Commissioner not daring to afford provocation for a further punitive expedition which might not have ended quite so easily as that of the previous April.

The China career of Sir John Davis was bound for a tragic ending, as right in the middle of a number of thoroughly optimistic reports, he was shocked by the news of the Hwang-chu-ke murders. The response was as quick as anyone could have reasonably hoped for, with the High Commissioner not wanting to provoke a new punitive expedition that could have been much more difficult than the one from the previous April.

The Canton imbroglio of 1847 threw into strong relief the potency of the Chinese demos and its relation to the Central Government. The pretensions of the populace and the stress of events drove the Imperial 109 Government into a corner and forced it to show its hand, with the result that the occult combination which had been the despair of British officials for fourteen years was resolved into its elements, and for a time made amenable to treatment. It was demonstrated by this experiment that though the Imperial Government dared not, except in extremity, oppose any popular movement, yet when necessity required the authorities assumed an easy mastery. Sir John Davis wrote in one of his latest despatches, "Kiying had clearly proved his power over the people when he chooses to exercise it." Coerced themselves, the authorities applied corresponding coercion to the people, even at the behest of foreigners, "truckling" to whom was equally disgraceful to both the Chinese parties. The interaction of the two Powers exemplified in a memorable way the principle of all Chinese intercourse, that boldness begets timidity and gentleness arrogance. When the people asserted themselves the authorities yielded and fell into line with them, and when the authorities asserted themselves the people succumbed. Such were the lessons of the Canton operations of 1847, lessons since forgotten and relearned again and again at ever-increasing cost.

The Canton situation of 1847 highlighted the power of the Chinese people and their connection to the Central Government. The demands of the population and the pressure of events pushed the Imperial Government into a tight spot, forcing it to reveal its strategies. This led to the breakdown of the complex issues that had frustrated British officials for fourteen years, making them somewhat manageable for a while. This situation showed that while the Imperial Government was hesitant to oppose any popular movement unless absolutely necessary, in times of need, the authorities could easily take control. Sir John Davis noted in one of his recent reports, "Kiying has clearly demonstrated his authority over the people when he chooses to use it." Under pressure themselves, the authorities responded to the people with similar force, even at the request of foreigners, with "catering" to them being equally embarrassing for both Chinese sides. The interaction of these two forces illustrated a significant principle of Chinese relations: that boldness leads to timidity and gentleness leads to arrogance. When the people stood up for themselves, the authorities gave in and followed their lead, and when the authorities took a stand, the people surrendered. These were the lessons from the Canton operations of 1847, lessons that have been forgotten and relearned repeatedly at an escalating cost.

But the relations between the Government and the people bore also a quasi-diplomatic character. They dealt with each other as if they were two Estates of the realm having parallel or concurrent jurisdiction. The most remarkable phase, however, of the popular pretensions which was evolved under the unaccustomed pressure of the British Minister was the attempt of the populace to diplomatise direct with him. So curious an incident may still be studied with profit. The new 110 departure of the people was the more startling in that they had been hitherto known only as a ferocious and lawless mob addicted to outrage, whose hatred of foreigners gained in bitterness by a long immunity from reprisals. Now that they had felt the "mailed fist" of a man of fact, and were almost in the act of delivering up their own heroes for execution, they sought to parley with the Power they had despised.

But the relationship between the Government and the people also had a somewhat diplomatic nature. They interacted as if they were two Estates of the realm with parallel or overlapping authority. However, the most notable aspect of the popular demands that emerged under the unexpected pressure from the British Minister was the attempt by the people to negotiate directly with him. This curious incident is still worth studying. The new approach from the people was even more surprising considering they had previously been known only as a violent and unruly mob prone to chaos, whose resentment towards foreigners grew deeper due to a long history without retaliation. Now that they had experienced the "mailed fist" of a decisive leader and were almost in the process of handing over their own heroes for execution, they sought to communicate with the Power they had once scorned.

The elders of the murderous villages, in the midst of his stern demands, sent a memorial to Sir John Davis full of amity and goodwill. "Come and let us reason together" was the burden of this novel address. The elders proposed a convention for the suppression of outrages, somewhat on the lines of the Kilmainham Treaty, to supersede the law of the land. "The former treaty drawn up in Kiangnan was not well understood by the common people"; in other words, it was wanting in validity, for "the resolutions of Government are in nowise to be compared to those self-imposed by the people.... Were not this preferable to the fruitless proclamations and manifestos of government?" "It has, therefore," they say, "been resolved to invite the upright and influential gentry and literati of the whole city to meet together, and, in concert with the wealthy and important merchants of your honourable nation, establish a compact of peace."

The leaders of the violent villages, amid his strict demands, sent a letter to Sir John Davis filled with friendliness and goodwill. "Let's come together and discuss" was the main point of this new message. The leaders suggested a meeting to stop the violence, somewhat similar to the Kilmainham Treaty, to override the existing laws. "The previous treaty created in Kiangnan was not well understood by the average people"; in other words, it lacked legitimacy, because "the government's resolutions can't be compared to those decided by the people.... Wouldn't this be better than the unproductive proclamations and manifestos from the government?" "Therefore," they state, "we have decided to invite the honest and influential gentry and scholars of the whole city to gather and, together with the wealthy and significant merchants from your honorable nation, establish a peace agreement."

Though he could not receive such a communication officially, Sir John Davis forwarded a copy to the Foreign Office, to whom he imparted his belief that the author was no other than Kiying himself—a surmise which was soon confirmed. The paper was extensively circulated; its arguments and phraseology were adopted by Kiying in his official correspondence with 111 Sir John Davis. "The compact of peace" which closed their negotiations amounted to no more, indeed, than police protection for foreigners in their country walks, which, however, was counterbalanced by a new restriction excluding them from the villages as they had already been from the city. The interesting point is that, such as it was, it was the proposal of the people ratified by the two plenipotentiaries.

Though he couldn't officially receive such communication, Sir John Davis sent a copy to the Foreign Office, where he shared his belief that the author was none other than Kiying himself—a guess that was soon confirmed. The paper was widely circulated; its arguments and language were used by Kiying in his official correspondence with 111 Sir John Davis. "The compact of peace" that ended their negotiations amounted to little more than police protection for foreigners on their walks, but this was offset by a new restriction barring them from the villages as they had already been barred from the city. The interesting point is that, as limited as it was, it was the proposal of the people ratified by the two plenipotentiaries.


From this hurried sketch of affairs at Canton during the first five years of the new intercourse we see that the secular policy of China had undergone no change as a result of the treaty. The settled determination of the Government to exclude foreigners from the country and keep them in strict subjection at the farthest maritime outpost of the empire had been overcome by violence; but the Chinese never abandoned the hope of retrieving their position in whole or in part, nor did they forego any opportunity of avenging their military defeat. A frontal attack being out of the question, the invader could be perpetually worried by guerilla tactics, his sentries caught napping, his chiefs bamboozled: what had been lost through force might thus be won back by force and fraud judiciously blended, for craft is the natural resource of the weak. The conditions of the contest have varied with the international developments of fifty years, but time has worked no change in the nature of the struggle East v. West. 112

From this quick overview of events in Canton during the first five years of the new relationship, we can see that China’s secular policy didn’t change because of the treaty. The government’s firm determination to keep foreigners out and confine them to the furthest coastal area of the empire had been overcome through violence. However, the Chinese never gave up hope of regaining their position, either in full or in part, nor did they miss any chance to get back at their military defeat. Since a direct assault was not a viable option, the invaders could be constantly harassed through guerrilla tactics, with their sentries caught off guard and their leaders deceived. What had been lost through force could be regained through a clever combination of force and deception because cunning is the natural resource of the weak. The context of the conflict has changed with international developments over fifty years, but time has not altered the nature of the struggle between East and West. 112

CHAPTER VIII.

THE NEW TREATY PORTS—FOOCHOW, AMOY, NINGPO.

Visit of Chinese commissioners to Hongkong—A supplementary treaty negotiated—Chinese thereby obtain control of junk trade of colony—Vain efforts to recover the lost ground—New ports criticised—Amoy—Alcock's temporary residence there, 1844—Interpreter Parkes—Foochow—Bad beginning—Insolence of mandarin and mob—Lost ground recovered during Alcock's consulate—His family arrive—Little trade—Difficulties of diverting the Bohea trade from old routes—Alcock's commercial reports—Their grasp of salient points in a fresh range of subjects.

Visit of Chinese officials to Hong Kong—A supplementary treaty negotiated—The Chinese gain control of the junk trade in the colony—Fruitless attempts to regain lost territory—New ports face criticism—Amoy—Alcock's temporary stay there in 1844—Interpreter Parkes—Foochow—A problematic start—Rudeness from the mandarin and locals—Ground lost is regained during Alcock's consulate—His family arrives—Limited trade—Challenges of redirecting the Bohea trade from traditional routes—Alcock's commercial reports—Their understanding of key issues across a new range of topics.

It accorded with the fitness of things that the negotiator of the treaty should remain to carry out its provisions. Sir Henry Pottinger was appointed the first Governor of Hongkong, Chief Superintendent of Trade, and Minister Plenipotentiary for Great Britain; Kiying and two associates Imperial Commissioners for China. Intercourse between them was of the most agreeable character. Though the wound to the pride of China was deep and still fresh, the Imperial Commissioners' acceptance of the new state of things exceeded what the most stoical philosophy could call for. They came in person, on invitation, to the alienated island, there to exchange the ratifications of the Nanking treaty; entered heartily into the life of the community, showed great interest in 113 their nascent institutions, and "returned to Canton charmed with English civilisation." China then was really converted, and Kiying the patron saint of the young colony! That adroit Manchu, however, had a purpose to serve by his effusive bonhomie: it was nothing less than to undermine the treaty of Nanking.

It made sense for the person negotiating the treaty to stick around and make sure its terms were carried out. Sir Henry Pottinger was appointed as the first Governor of Hong Kong, Chief Superintendent of Trade, and Minister Plenipotentiary for Great Britain; Kiying and two colleagues were appointed as Imperial Commissioners for China. Their interactions were quite pleasant. Although China felt deeply wounded and still hurt, the Imperial Commissioners' acceptance of the new situation went beyond what anyone could have expected. They personally visited the newly alienated island at the invitation to exchange the ratifications of the Nanking treaty; they engaged enthusiastically with the community, showed a strong interest in their developing institutions, and "returned to Canton charmed with English civilization." China was genuinely transformed, and Kiying became the patron saint of the young colony! However, this clever Manchu had his own agenda behind his friendly demeanor: it was nothing less than to undermine the treaty of Nanking.

So long as Sir Henry Pottinger was negotiating under the guns of her Majesty's ships he was master of the situation, but when pitted against the Chinese in the open field the position was reversed, for they had definite aims and knew how to gain them. Arrangements were found necessary for the conduct of trade at the five consular ports; the relations between the colony of Hongkong and the empire of China, as regards criminals, debtors, &c., required definition; and, more important still, the native shipping frequenting its harbour had to be regulated. The negotiations required for these purposes afforded Kiying a favourable opportunity for giving effect to the reactionary policy of the Chinese Government. The supplementary treaty was negotiated at the Bogue between Sir Henry Pottinger and Kiying in October 1843. The Chinese version seems to have been signed by the British agent without his having before him a textual English translation: by its provisions the Chinese authorities engaged to protect the junk traffic in colonial waters. Sir Henry Pottinger did not realise the kind of weapon he had thus placed in the hands of his friends until its damaging effects were demonstrated by experience. Then what had been lost by diplomacy was sought to be partially regained by persuasion. To this end 114 strenuous efforts were made by successive governors of Hongkong to induce Kiying to forego some of the powers which had been inadvertently conferred on him, as their exercise was proving ruinous to the trade of the island. But as this result was precisely what had been intended by the Chinese, nothing short of another war would have moved them to yield a single point.

As long as Sir Henry Pottinger was negotiating under the guns of Her Majesty's ships, he had control of the situation. However, when faced with the Chinese in the open field, the tables turned, as they had clear goals and knew how to achieve them. It became necessary to set up arrangements for trade at the five consular ports; the relationship between the colony of Hong Kong and the Chinese Empire regarding criminals, debtors, etc., needed clarification; and, even more importantly, the native shipping using its harbor had to be regulated. These negotiations gave Kiying a good chance to push the Chinese Government's reactionary policies. The supplementary treaty was negotiated at the Bogue between Sir Henry Pottinger and Kiying in October 1843. The Chinese version seems to have been signed by the British agent without having a textual English translation in front of him: according to its provisions, the Chinese authorities agreed to protect junk traffic in colonial waters. Sir Henry Pottinger didn’t realize the kind of leverage he had unknowingly given to his allies until its negative impacts became apparent through experience. What had been lost through diplomacy was attempted to be partially regained through persuasion. To achieve this, 114 the successive governors of Hong Kong made strong efforts to convince Kiying to give up some of the powers he had unintentionally gained, as their use was proving harmful to the island's trade. But since this outcome was exactly what the Chinese had aimed for, nothing short of another war would have persuaded them to concede any points.

His hesitation to exercise the right of entry into the city of Canton conferred by the treaty of Nanking, while allowing the Chinese the full advantage of the concessions gained by them under the supplementary treaty, must likewise be held as a blemish on the policy of Sir Henry Pottinger. The best palliation of these errors of the first treaty-maker is perhaps to be found in the fact that his successors, with many years of actual experience to guide them, have fallen into the same errors of both omission and commission.

His reluctance to use the right to enter the city of Canton granted by the treaty of Nanking, while letting the Chinese fully benefit from the concessions they gained under the supplementary treaty, should also be seen as a fault in Sir Henry Pottinger's policy. The best way to explain these mistakes of the initial treaty-maker might be that his successors, despite having many years of real experience to inform them, have repeated the same mistakes of both omission and commission.

In other respects Sir Henry Pottinger's arrangements for giving effect to the treaty seem to have been as practical as the untried circumstances would allow.

In other respects, Sir Henry Pottinger's plans for implementing the treaty appear to have been as practical as the untested situation would permit.

THE LAKES, NINGPO.

The Lakes, Ningbo.

The opening of the new ports, with the exception of Shanghai, was unfavourably commented upon by a section of the English press, not perhaps unwilling to score a point against the "Tory Government, which was alone answerable for the treaty of Nanking." They denounced the opening of so many ports on the ground that it would only multiply points of collision with the Chinese. Three years later the 'Times' pronounced "Amoy, Foochow, and Ningpo as good for nothing as places of trade," while Hongkong 115 itself was equally despised as a commercial colony. Some of the journals resuscitated the idea which had been freely discussed during the years preceding the war, and advocated the acquisition in sovereignty of islands as emporia instead of ports on the mainland, and it is worthy of remark that the same idea was again revived by Mr Cobden twenty years later. "Get two other small islands," he said in 1864; "merely establish them as free ports" on the model of Hongkong. And this with a view to superseding the treaty ports on the coast, where trade had been established for twenty years.

The opening of the new ports, except for Shanghai, received negative feedback from some of the English press, who seemed eager to critique the "Tory Government, which was solely responsible for the treaty of Nanking." They criticized the opening of so many ports, arguing that it would only increase potential conflicts with the Chinese. Three years later, the 'Times' declared "Amoy, Foochow, and Ningpo are useless for trade," while Hong Kong 115 was similarly looked down upon as a trading outpost. Some newspapers revived the idea that had been widely discussed before the war, suggesting that acquiring sovereignty over islands would be more beneficial than opening ports on the mainland. Notably, Mr. Cobden brought up this same concept again twenty years later. "Get two other small islands," he said in 1864; "just establish them as free ports" modeled after Hong Kong, aiming to replace the treaty ports along the coast where trade had been established for twenty years.

Three of the new ports—Shanghai, Ningpo, and Amoy—were opened under Sir Henry Pottinger's auspices in 1843; Foochow in 1844. These places, distributed at approximately equal intervals along the coast-line of 1000 miles between Shanghai and Canton, were not chosen at random. They had all been at one time or another entrepots of foreign commerce with either Europe, Southern Asia, or Japan. Foochow had been many years before strongly recommended by one of the East India Company's tea-tasters as most desirable for the shipment of tea. An expedition equipped by the Company under Mr Hamilton Lindsay, who, like the other servants of the Company, was versed in the Chinese language, visited the northern coast in the chartered ship Amherst in 1832, and gained the first authentic information concerning the commercial capabilities of Shanghai. Mr Gutzlaff, who acted as secretary and coadjutor to Mr Lindsay's mission, made several adventurous voyages, including one in Chinese disguise, in a native junk, to Tientsin. Though the coast had not yet been surveyed, and 116 navigation was in consequence somewhat dangerous, a good deal of fairly accurate information, some of it already obsolete, was by these means placed at the disposal of those who made the selection of the treaty ports. Ningpo was noted for its literary culture, for the respectability and intelligence of its inhabitants, and their friendly disposition towards foreigners. But although it was the entrepot of a flourishing coasting trade, the shallowness of its river, the want of anchorage at its embouchure, and its vicinity to Shanghai, combined to preclude the growth of foreign commerce at the port of Ningpo.

Three of the new ports—Shanghai, Ningpo, and Amoy—were opened under Sir Henry Pottinger's guidance in 1843, with Foochow following in 1844. These locations, spaced roughly evenly along the 1000-mile coastline between Shanghai and Canton, were not selected randomly. They had all been significant centers of foreign trade with Europe, Southern Asia, or Japan at various times. Foochow had been strongly recommended many years earlier by one of the East India Company's tea-tasters as ideal for shipping tea. An expedition organized by the Company under Mr. Hamilton Lindsay, who, like other Company employees, spoke Chinese, visited the northern coast on the chartered ship Amherst in 1832 and provided the first reliable information about Shanghai's commercial potential. Mr. Gutzlaff, who served as secretary and assistant to Mr. Lindsay's mission, undertook several adventurous journeys, including one disguised as a Chinese person, traveling on a local junk to Tientsin. Although the coast hadn't been surveyed yet, making navigation somewhat risky, a considerable amount of reasonably accurate information, some of which was already outdated, was gathered for those choosing the treaty ports. Ningpo was known for its literary culture, the respectability and intelligence of its residents, and their welcoming attitude towards foreigners. However, despite being a hub for a thriving coastal trade, the shallow river, lack of anchorage at its mouth, and proximity to Shanghai prevented the growth of foreign commerce at the port of Ningpo.

THE FIRST CONSULAR RESIDENCE AT FOOCHOW.

THE FIRST CONSULAR RESIDENCE AT FOOCHOW.

It was to Foochow that Mr Alcock was appointed in 1844, by Mr Davis (as he then was), who had recently succeeded Sir Henry Pottinger. The new consul, however, made his actual début at Amoy, where he was detained for four months, from November 1844 to March 1845, acting for the titular consul at that port. There he at once displayed that energy and clear-sightedness which were to become so conspicuous in his subsequent career. Two important matters had to be arranged within the period named—the evacuation of the island of Kulangsu by the British garrison and the future residence of the consul. Trifling as this last may seem, it was a matter of no small consideration in China, where, to paraphrase Polonius, the dwelling oft proclaims the man. It was one of the innumerable devices of the Chinese authorities for degrading new-comers in the eyes of the populace to force them to live, as at Canton, within a confined space or in squalid tenements. Mr Alcock knew by instinct the importance of prestige, while his Peninsular 117 training had taught him the value of sanitation. Following these two guiding stars, he overbore the obstruction of the officials, and not only obtained a commodious site but had a house built to his own specification during his temporary incumbency of the office. That, and his general bearing towards the authorities, stamped on the Amoy consulate the impress of dignity which has never been wholly effaced. He was most fortunate, it must be allowed, in his instruments, chiefly in the interpreter whom he found at Amoy, a man, or rather a boy—for he was only sixteen—entirely after his own heart. That was Harry Parkes, one of the bravest and best of our empire-builders. It is indeed to the journals and letters of Sir Harry Parkes, edited by Mr Stanley Lane-Poole, and to notes supplied for that biography by Sir Rutherford Alcock himself in 1893, that we are chiefly indebted for the record of their joint proceedings at Amoy, Foochow, and to some extent also Shanghai, from 1844 to 1848. The consul made a favourable first impression on the young interpreter, who described him in a family letter as "tall but slimly made, standing about six feet in his boots; ... very gentlemanly in his manners and address, and exceedingly polite." It was not, however, till he reached his proper post, Foochow, that the mettle of the new consul and interpreter was seriously tested.

Mr. Alcock was appointed to Foochow in 1844 by Mr. Davis, who had recently taken over from Sir Henry Pottinger. However, the new consul actually started his duties at Amoy, where he was held up for four months, from November 1844 to March 1845, acting for the official consul at that port. There, he immediately showcased the energy and clear vision that would stand out in his later career. Two major issues needed to be sorted out during that time: the withdrawal of the British garrison from the island of Kulangsu and the future residence of the consul. Although this last point might seem trivial, it was a significant matter in China, where, as Polonius might say, a person's home often reflects their status. One of the many tactics used by the Chinese authorities to diminish newcomers in the eyes of the public was to confine them to cramped spaces or shabby accommodations, as seen in Canton. Mr. Alcock instinctively understood the importance of prestige, and his experience from the Peninsular campaigns taught him the value of sanitation. Guided by these principles, he overcame the resistance of local officials, securing a spacious location and even having a house built to his specifications during his temporary time in office. His approach and demeanor towards the authorities left a lasting impression of dignity on the Amoy consulate. He was particularly lucky to have supportive staff, especially the interpreter he met at Amoy, a young man—he was only sixteen—who suited him perfectly. That was Harry Parkes, one of the most courageous and capable empire-builders of his time. We owe much of our understanding of their joint activities in Amoy, Foochow, and, to some extent, Shanghai from 1844 to 1848 to the journals and letters of Sir Harry Parkes, edited by Mr. Stanley Lane-Poole, along with notes provided for that biography by Sir Rutherford Alcock himself in 1893. The consul made a positive first impression on the young interpreter, who described him in a family letter as "tall but slim, about six feet in his boots; very gentlemanly in his manners and address, and extremely polite." However, it wasn't until he reached his actual position in Foochow that the true strength of the new consul and interpreter was put to the test.

Foochow was of superior rank to the other two ports, being, like Canton, at once a provincial capital and the seat of a governor-general or viceroy of two provinces—namely, Fukien and Chêkiang—and possessing a Manchu garrison. The Chinese Government was believed to have been most reluctant to open Foochow 118 as a trading port at all, which seemed reason enough for the British negotiators insisting on its being opened. Its trade was small, which perhaps rendered the port the more suitable for the experimental purpose of testing the principles which were to govern the new intercourse.

Foochow was ranked higher than the other two ports, being, like Canton, both a provincial capital and the headquarters of a governor-general or viceroy of two provinces—Fukien and Chêkiang—and also having a Manchu garrison. It was thought that the Chinese Government was very hesitant to open Foochow 118 as a trading port at all, which seemed like enough reason for the British negotiators to insist on its opening. Its trade was small, which might have made the port more suitable for the experimental purpose of testing the principles that would govern the new interactions.

As the leading occurrences there have been set forth at some length by Mr Stanley Lane-Poole in the above-mentioned work, there is the less reason for us to linger over details. We find that on arrival at the end of March 1845 Mr Alcock discovered that he had not to maintain, but to regain, the prestige which had already been lost at Foochow. Canton was, in fact, repeating itself both as regards the arrogance of the Chinese and the acquiescence of British officials. Exclusion from the city and various other indignities had been imposed on the consul, who, on his part, had followed the course which had proved so fatal at Canton of currying favour by submission. Living in a shed,[14] where Mr Davis on a flying visit was ashamed to receive return calls from the native authorities, keeping up no great state, afraid even to hoist his consular flag for fear of hurting the feelings of the Chinese, the consul soon brought upon himself and his nationals the inevitable consequences of his humility. Mob violence and outrages, encouraged at first by the authorities in order to cow the foreigners, had attained dimensions which at last alarmed the 119 authorities themselves, all within two years of the opening of the port. Mr Alcock set himself sternly to oppose this downward current, but a year elapsed before the violence of the people and the studied rudeness of the officials were finally stamped out. For, curiously enough, as Mr Lane-Poole has so well pointed out, every outrage in Canton found its echo at Foochow, showing clearly where lay the "centre of disturbance," as our meteorologists express it.

As the main events have been thoroughly discussed by Mr. Stanley Lane-Poole in the work mentioned earlier, there's less reason for us to dwell on the specifics. We see that when Mr. Alcock arrived at the end of March 1845, he found that he had to not just maintain, but to reclaim the prestige that had already been lost in Foochow. Canton was essentially repeating itself in terms of the Chinese attitude and the compliance of British officials. The consul faced exclusion from the city and various indignities, and he followed the same misguided approach used in Canton of trying to gain favor through submission. Living in a shed, [14] where Mr. Davis, during a brief visit, was embarrassed to return calls from local authorities, and maintaining no significant presence, even hesitating to raise his consular flag out of fear of offending the Chinese, the consul soon brought inevitable consequences upon himself and his countrymen due to his humility. Mob violence and attacks, initially encouraged by the authorities to intimidate foreigners, grew to such a scale that it eventually alarmed the authorities themselves, all within two years of the port's opening. Mr. Alcock sternly set out to oppose this downward trend, but it took a year before the violence from the populace and the deliberate rudeness from officials were finally suppressed. Because, interestingly enough, as Mr. Lane-Poole has noted, every incident of violence in Canton had its parallel at Foochow, clearly indicating where the "center of disturbance" lay, as our meteorologists would phrase it.

In the end, however, the ascendancy of the British authority was completely achieved. The consul and the interpreter between them succeeded in getting proud Tartars put in the common pillory and lesser ruffians severely flogged, while before they left Foochow in 1846 they had extorted from the authorities substantial pecuniary compensation for injuries sustained by British subjects. The credit of these vigorous measures no doubt belonged in the first instance to Sir John Davis, the chief superintendent, who had been so struck with the deplorable condition of things on his first official visit to the port in 1844 that he empowered the new consul to find the remedy. The effect of this resolute policy on the mandarins was as prompt and natural as the effect of the submissive policy had been, and it is instructive to read the testimony of Sir John Davis that, after redress had been exacted, "the consul was on the best terms with the local authorities," which is the perpetual lesson taught in all our dealings with the Chinese.

In the end, however, British authority was fully established. The consul and the interpreter managed to get arrogant Tartars put in the public pillory and lesser criminals severely punished. Before they left Foochow in 1846, they also forced the local authorities to provide significant financial compensation for damages suffered by British citizens. The credit for these strong actions primarily goes to Sir John Davis, the chief superintendent, who was so impacted by the terrible situation during his first official visit to the port in 1844 that he gave the new consul the power to find a solution. The impact of this firm policy on the mandarins was as immediate and straightforward as the submissive policy had been. It's interesting to note that Sir John Davis stated that after justice was served, "the consul was on the best terms with the local authorities," which is a constant lesson we learn in all our interactions with the Chinese.

Foochow is distinguished among the coast ports of China by the beauty and even grandeur of its scenery and the comparative salubrity of its climate. The city itself contains above half a million of people, covers an 120 extensive area on the left bank of the river Min, and is connected with the foreign quarter by a stone bridge of forty-five "arches," which are not arches but spaces between the piers on which huge granite slabs are laid horizontally, forming the roadway. The houses and business premises of the merchants, the custom-house and foreign consulates, are all now situated on Nantai, an island of some twenty miles in circumference, which divides the main stream of the Min from its tributary, the Yungfu. In the early days the British consulate was located within the walled city, in the grounds of a Buddhist temple, three miles from the landing-place and business quarter on Nantai, and approached through narrow and exceedingly foul-smelling streets.

Foochow stands out among China’s coastal ports because of its beautiful and even grand scenery, as well as its relatively healthy climate. The city itself has over half a million residents and covers a large area on the left bank of the Min River. It’s connected to the foreign quarter by a stone bridge with forty-five "arches," which are really just gaps between the piers that support massive granite slabs, creating the roadway. The homes and businesses of merchants, along with the customs house and foreign consulates, are now located on Nantai, an island with a circumference of about twenty miles, which separates the main flow of the Min from its tributary, the Yungfu. In the early days, the British consulate was situated within the walled city, in the grounds of a Buddhist temple, three miles from the landing area and business district on Nantai, accessible only through narrow and extremely unpleasant-smelling streets.

Mrs Alcock joined her husband as soon as tolerable accommodation could be prepared for her, and being the first foreign lady who had set foot in the city, her entry excited no small curiosity among the people. A year later Mrs and Miss Bacon, Mrs Alcock's mother and sister, were added to the family party, and though curiosity was still keen, they were safely escorted through the surging crowd to their peaceful enclave in the heart of the city. The situation was suggestive of monastic life. Being on high ground the consulate commanded a superb mountain view, with the two rivers issuing from their recesses and the great city lying below forming a picturesque foreground, while in the middle distance the terraced rice-fields showed in their season the tenderest of all greens. The circumstances were conducive to the idyllic life of which we get a glimpse in the biography of Sir Harry Parkes, who shared it. He speaks in the warmest terms of the kindness he received from Mr and Mrs Alcock, who 121 tended him through a fever which, but for the medical skill of the consul—no other professional aid being available—must have ended fatally. They helped him with books, enlarged his field of culture, and there is no doubt that daily intercourse with this genial and accomplished family did much to supply the want of that liberal education from which the boy had been untimely cut adrift. The value of such parental influence to a lad who had left school at thirteen can hardly be over-estimated, and he did not exaggerate in writing, "I can never repay the Alcocks the lasting obligations I am under to them."

Mrs. Alcock joined her husband as soon as a decent place could be set up for her, and being the first foreign lady to arrive in the city, her presence sparked a lot of curiosity among the locals. A year later, Mrs. Bacon and her daughter, Mrs. Alcock's mother and sister, joined the family, and while interest was still high, they were safely guided through the bustling crowd to their calm enclave in the city center. The setting felt somewhat monastic. Positioned on elevated ground, the consulate offered a breathtaking view of the mountains, with two rivers flowing from their sources and the sprawling city below creating a beautiful scene, while in the distance, the terraced rice fields displayed the softest greens in their season. The surroundings contributed to the idyllic life that we glimpse in the biography of Sir Harry Parkes, who experienced it. He spoke very highly of the kindness he received from Mr. and Mrs. Alcock, who took care of him during a fever that, without the consul’s medical expertise—since no other professional help was available—would likely have been fatal. They supported him with books, broadened his cultural horizon, and it’s clear that daily interactions with this friendly and talented family greatly helped fill the gap left by the lack of a solid education after he had been forced to leave school at thirteen. The importance of such parental guidance for a young man in his situation can hardly be overstated, and he did not exaggerate when he wrote, "I can never repay the Alcocks the lasting obligations I am under to them."

BRIDGE OVER RIVER MIN.

Bridge over River Min.

During the first few years there was practically no foreign trade at Foochow except in opium, which was conducted from a sea base beyond port limits, a trade which was invisible alike to Chinese and British authorities in the sense in which harlequin is invisible to clown and pantaloon. The spasmodic attempts which were made to open up a market for British manufactures met with no encouragement, for only one British merchant maintained a precarious existence, and the question of abandoning the port was mooted. The prospect of commercial development at Foochow depended on its vicinity to that classic centre of the tea cultivation, the famous Bohea range, about 250 miles to the westward, whose name, however, was used to cover many inferior products. Ten years more elapsed before this advantageous position was turned to practical account, owing to the serious obstacles that stood in the way of changing the established trade route to Canton and the absence of aggressive energy sufficient to overcome them. Through the enterprise of an American 122 merchant in alliance with Chinese, Foochow began to be a shipping port for tea about the year 1853, growing year by year in importance until it rivalled Canton and Shanghai. But as its prosperity has always rested on the single article, the fortunes of the port have necessarily fallen with the general decay of the Chinese tea trade.

During the first few years, there was almost no foreign trade at Foochow except for opium, which was carried out from a sea base beyond the port limits. This trade was invisible to both Chinese and British authorities, much like how a harlequin is invisible to a clown and pantaloon. The sporadic attempts to establish a market for British goods received no support since only one British merchant managed to survive there, and discussions about abandoning the port were raised. The potential for commercial growth at Foochow relied on its proximity to the well-known Bohea range, about 250 miles to the west, which was famous for tea cultivation, although its name was also used for many lower-quality products. It took another ten years before this advantageous location was utilized effectively due to the significant obstacles that hindered the shift in the established trade route to Canton and the lack of enough drive to overcome them. Thanks to the efforts of an American merchant in partnership with Chinese traders, Foochow started to become a shipping port for tea around 1853, increasing in significance each year until it competed with Canton and Shanghai. However, since its success has always depended on this one product, the fortunes of the port have inevitably declined with the overall decrease in the Chinese tea trade.

Apart from the task of putting the official intercourse on a good working basis, of maintaining order between the few foreigners, residents, and visitors, and the native population, the consular duties at a port like Foochow were necessarily of the lightest description. But it was not in Mr Alcock's nature to make a sinecure of his office. He was a stranger to the country, about which he had everything to learn. He was surrounded by problems all of great interest, and some of them pressing urgently for solution, and he had to make a success of his port or "know the reason why." Among the fruits of his labours during the latter part of his term at Foochow are a series of commercial reports, partly published by Government, which bear witness to exhaustive research into every circumstance having any bearing on the genesis of trade, and applying to those local, and to him absolutely novel, conditions the great root principles which are of universal validity. Considering how alien to his previous experience was the whole range of such subjects, his at once grappling with them and firmly seizing their salient features showed a mind of no common capacity. For there was nothing perfunctory about those early treatises; on the contrary, they were at once more polished and more profound than most things of the same 123 kind which have appeared during the subsequent half century. The principal generalisations of recent commentators on the trade of China were in fact set forth in the three Foochow consular reports of 1845-46, while many supposed new lights which the discussions of the last few years have shed on Chinese character and methods had been already displayed, and in a more perfect form, in the buried records of the superintendency of trade in China.

Apart from the job of establishing official relations and keeping order among the small number of foreign residents and visitors and the local population, the consular duties at a port like Foochow were generally quite light. However, it wasn’t in Mr. Alcock’s nature to treat his position as an easy ride. He was new to the country and had a lot to learn. He faced numerous interesting challenges, some of which required immediate attention, and he needed to make his port successful or "know the reason why." Among the results of his efforts during the later part of his time in Foochow are a series of commercial reports, some of which were published by the Government, reflecting thorough research into every factor affecting trade development, applying universal principles to those local and unfamiliar conditions. Given how foreign all of this was to his previous experience, his ability to tackle these topics and grasp their main points demonstrated an exceptional intellect. There was nothing half-hearted about those early reports; in fact, they were more refined and insightful than most contemporaneous writings on similar subjects that have emerged over the last fifty years. The key conclusions from recent commentators on China’s trade were actually outlined in the three Foochow consular reports from 1845-46, while many so-called new insights into Chinese character and methods that have come up in recent discussions were already presented, in a more complete form, in the archived records of the trade superintendency in China.

THE SECOND CONSULAR RESIDENCE AT FOOCHOW, 1848.

THE SECOND CONSULAR RESIDENCE AT FUZHOU, 1848.

CHAPTER IX.

SHANGHAI.

Shanghai—Importance of its situation—Consul Balfour—Germ of municipal institutions—The foreign settlements—Confidence and civility of the natives—Alcock appointed consul, 1846—Excursions into the country—Their limitations—Responsibilities of consuls.

Shanghai—Importance of its location—Consul Balfour—Foundation of local government—The foreign settlements—Trust and courtesy of the locals—Alcock appointed consul, 1846—Trips into the countryside—Their limitations—Duties of consuls.

Of the four new ports, Shanghai, by far the most important, had been fortunate in the selection of its first consul. This was Captain George Balfour of the Madras Artillery, who, like a wise master-builder, laid the foundations of what is now one of the greatest emporia in the world. Captain Balfour had managed the beginnings of the settlement so judiciously that the merchants enjoyed the fullest facilities for prosecuting their business, while the consul maintained good relations with the native authorities and no hostile feeling existed between the foreign and native communities. The circumstances of the place were favourable to all this: the foreign residents were not, as at Canton, confined to a narrow space; they had abundance of elbow-room and perfect freedom of movement in the surrounding district, which was well provided with footpaths and an excellent system of waterways. The people of that part of the country are of a peaceable and rather timid disposition. Altogether, a healthy condition of things 125 had grown up, there seemed to be no grievance felt on either side, while the material prosperity of the natives rapidly increased as a result of a great and expanding foreign trade, to which they had never been accustomed. The regulation of business accommodation and residence was very simple and worked automatically. A certain area, ample for every purpose that could be foreseen, was set apart by the Chinese Government for the residence of foreigners, the location having been indicated by Sir Henry Pottinger on his way from Nanking after the signing of the treaty. The rights of the native proprietors were in no way interfered with, the merchants and others who desired to settle were at liberty to deal with the natives for the purchase of building lots, and as the prices paid were so much above the normal value of the land there was no essential difficulty in effecting purchases. But there being so many interested parties, several years elapsed before the whole area had passed into the possession of foreign occupants. The land remained the property of the Crown, held under perpetual lease, subject only to a small ground-rent, which was collected through the consulates, as at this day. Roads were gradually marked out and jetties for boats were built on the river frontage, and what is now a municipal council served by a large secretarial staff and an imposing body of police, and handling a budget amounting to £130,000, came into existence under the modest title of a "Committee for Roads and Jetties." In the beginning there seems to have been an idea of forming separate reservations of land for the subjects of the three treaty Powers—Great Britain, France, and the United States; but the exigencies of 126 business soon effaced the theoretical distinction as between England and America, whose separate ideal settlements were merged for all practical purposes into one cosmopolitan colony, in which the Powers coming later on the scene enjoyed the same rights as the original pioneers.

Of the four new ports, Shanghai, by far the most important, was lucky to have a great first consul. This was Captain George Balfour of the Madras Artillery, who, like a skilled master-builder, laid the groundwork for what is now one of the biggest trading hubs in the world. Captain Balfour managed the beginnings of the settlement so wisely that the merchants had all the facilities they needed for their business, while the consul kept good relations with the local authorities, and there was no hostility between the foreign and native communities. The circumstances in the area were favorable for this: the foreign residents weren’t confined to a small space like in Canton; they had plenty of room to move around freely in the surrounding area, which was well-equipped with paths and a great system of waterways. The people in that part of the country are peaceful and somewhat timid. Overall, a healthy situation had developed, with no grievances from either side, while the local people’s material prosperity grew rapidly due to a booming foreign trade that they had never experienced before. The organization of business and living arrangements was straightforward and functioned smoothly. A specific area, more than enough for any foreseeable needs, was set aside by the Chinese Government for the residence of foreigners, as suggested by Sir Henry Pottinger on his way from Nanking after signing the treaty. The rights of the local landowners were not interfered with; merchants and others seeking to settle could negotiate with the locals for the purchase of land, and since the prices paid were significantly higher than the normal land value, buying land was not a significant problem. However, with so many parties involved, it took several years for the entire area to be fully occupied by foreigners. The land remained Crown property, held under a perpetual lease, subject only to a small ground rent, which was collected through the consulates, just like today. Roads were gradually laid out, and jetties for boats were built along the riverfront. Eventually, what is now a municipal council, supported by a large secretarial team and a significant police force, managing a budget of £130,000, emerged under the humble title of "Committee for Roads and Jetties." Initially, there seems to have been an idea to create separate land reservations for the subjects of the three treaty powers—Great Britain, France, and the United States; but the needs of business quickly blurred the theoretical distinctions between England and America, merging their separate ideal settlements into one cosmopolitan colony, where later arriving powers enjoyed the same rights as the original pioneers.

BAMBOO BRIDGE AT FOOCHOW.

Bamboo Bridge in Fuzhou.

To ground thus wisely prepared Mr Alcock succeeded in the autumn of 1846. His four months at Amoy and eighteen at Foochow were only preparatory for the real work which lay before him in the consulate at Shanghai, whither he carried in his train the interpreter Parkes, with whom he had grown accustomed to work so efficiently. Shanghai by this time was already realising the position assigned to it by nature as a great commercial port, and the resident community, 120 Europeans all told, was already forming itself into that novel kind of republic which is so flourishing to-day, while its commercial interests were such as to give its members weight in the administration of their own affairs as well as in matters of public policy.

To ground his efforts wisely, Mr. Alcock succeeded in the autumn of 1846. His four months in Amoy and eighteen months in Foochow were only a warm-up for the real work ahead of him at the consulate in Shanghai, where he brought along the interpreter Parkes, with whom he had become accustomed to working effectively. By this time, Shanghai was already starting to fulfill its natural role as a major commercial port, and the resident community, totaling 120 Europeans, was beginning to form that unique type of republic that thrives today. Its commercial interests gave its members significant influence in managing their own affairs as well as in public policy matters.

COUNTRY WATERWAY NEAR SHANGHAI.

Waterway near Shanghai.

The level country round Shanghai was, as we have said, very favourable for excursions by land and water, affording tourists and sportsmen congenial recreation. The district was in those days remarkably well stocked with game. Pheasants of the "ring-necked" variety, now so predominant in English preserves, abounded close up to the city wall, and were sometimes found in the gardens of the foreign residents. Snipe, quail, and wildfowl were plentiful in their season, the last named in great variety. All classes of the foreign community took advantage of the freedom of locomotion which they enjoyed. Newly arrived missionaries, no less than newly arrived sportsmen, 127 were encouraged by the ease and safety with which they could prosecute their vocation in the towns and villages accessible from Shanghai. Within the radius authorised by treaty the foreigners soon became familiar objects in a district which is reckoned to support a population as dense as that of Belgium. Not only did friendly relations exist, but a wonderful degree of confidence was established between the natives and foreign tourists. It was not the custom in those days for foreigners to carry money, the only coinage available being of a clumsy and non-portable character. They paid their way by "chits" or orders upon their comprador, and it was not uncommon for them in those early days to pay for supplies during their excursions into the interior by a few hieroglyphics pencilled on a scrap of paper, which the confiding peasant accepted in perfect good faith, and with so little apprehension that sometimes a considerable interval would elapse before presentation of these primitive cheques—until, perhaps, the holder had occasion to make a journey to Shanghai.

The flat land around Shanghai was, as we've mentioned, really great for trips on land and water, giving tourists and sports enthusiasts enjoyable recreation. Back then, the area was surprisingly full of wildlife. Ring-necked pheasants, now common in English reserves, were plentiful right up to the city wall and could sometimes be spotted in the gardens of foreign residents. Snipe, quail, and wildfowl were abundant during their seasons, with the latter available in many varieties. All parts of the foreign community took advantage of the freedom to move around. Newly arrived missionaries, just like new sportsmen, 127 were encouraged by how easy and safe it was to pursue their work in the towns and villages near Shanghai. Within the treaty-designated area, foreigners quickly became familiar sights in a region reputed to have a population density comparable to Belgium. Not only were friendly relations fostered, but there was also a remarkable level of trust between the locals and foreign visitors. Back then, it wasn't common for foreigners to carry cash, as the available currency was awkward and hard to transport. They settled their expenses with "chits" or orders issued to their comprador, and it was quite usual for them during early excursions into the countryside to pay for supplies with a few scribbles on a scrap of paper, which trusting peasants accepted without question. Sometimes, a long time would pass before these rudimentary checks were presented—until the holder had a reason to travel back to Shanghai.

But although the foreigner in his proper costume moved freely within the prescribed area, it was considered hazardous to venture beyond these limits. It was also, of course, a nominal contravention of the treaty, for the consequences of which the traveller must take the whole risk. Those, therefore—and they were exceedingly few—who could not repress the desire to penetrate into the interior adopted as a disguise the costume of the natives. It was thus that Fortune made his explorations into the tea districts of China. The notion that either difficulty or danger attended these distant excursions gradually disappeared, 128 and about the year 1855 sportsmen and travellers began to explore the forbidden country without any disguise at all, to the great amusement of the populace, and to the profit of the priests of the temples where they found accommodation.

But even though the foreigner in his proper outfit moved freely within the designated area, it was considered risky to go beyond those limits. It was also, of course, a nominal violation of the treaty, for which the traveler had to bear all the consequences. Therefore, those—who were very few—who couldn’t suppress the urge to venture into the interior disguised themselves in the clothing of the locals. This is how Fortune conducted his explorations into China’s tea regions. The idea that these distant trips involved either difficulty or danger gradually faded away, 128 and around 1855, adventurers and travelers started to explore the restricted area without any disguise at all, much to the amusement of the locals and the benefit of the priests in the temples where they found lodging.

The consular authorities occupied a peculiar and highly responsible position in China. Their nationals being exempt from native jurisdiction, and subject only to the laws of their own country, promulgated, interpreted, and, when occasion arose, executed, by the consul, that functionary was morally answerable to the people and the Government of China for the good behaviour of his countrymen. On the other hand, it was his primary duty to defend them against all aggression of the Chinese. Between these two opposite duties the consul needed all the discretion, courage, and good judgment that he could command; and it was but natural that individual temperament or the pressure of local circumstances should cause diversity in the mode in which the consuls interpreted their instructions and balanced the different claims of their public duty. As has been said before, Captain Balfour had shown himself most judicious in all his arrangements for the protection and advancement of his countrymen in Shanghai. Foreseeing, notwithstanding the peaceable disposition of the natives, that risks might attend unfettered intercourse with the interior, he had thought it prudent to restrict the rambles of British subjects to the limits of a twenty-four hours' journey from Shanghai,—a limit which coincided with curious exactness with the "thirty-mile radius" of defence against the rebels which was laid down by Admiral Hope eighteen years later. 129

The consular officials held a unique and highly responsible role in China. Their nationals were exempt from local laws and only subject to their own country's laws, which were enacted, interpreted, and enforced by the consul. As a result, the consul was morally accountable to the people and government of China for the behavior of his countrymen. On the flip side, his main duty was to protect them from any aggression from the Chinese. Balancing these two conflicting responsibilities required the consul to use all the discretion, courage, and good judgment he could muster; naturally, individual personality or local circumstances led to different ways that consuls interpreted their instructions and balanced their public duties. As previously mentioned, Captain Balfour had proven to be very wise in all his efforts to protect and support his fellow countrymen in Shanghai. He anticipated, despite the peaceful nature of the locals, that there could be risks involved in unrestricted contact with the interior, so he deemed it wise to limit British subjects' travels to within a twenty-four-hour journey from Shanghai—a limit that oddly matched the "thirty-mile radius" of defense against the rebels set by Admiral Hope eighteen years later. 129

I. THE TSINGPU AFFAIR.

Attack on three missionaries—Redress extorted by Consul Alcock—Its lasting effect.

Attack on three missionaries—Compensation forced by Consul Alcock—Its long-term impact.

Affairs in Shanghai had followed a placid and uneventful course until an incident occurred which brought into sudden activity the latent forces of disorder. Within little more than a year after the arrival of Mr Alcock at his new post an outrage was perpetrated on the persons of three English missionaries, which led to the first and the last important struggle between the British and Chinese authorities in Shanghai. The assailants of Messrs Medhurst, Lockhart, and Muirhead, the three missionaries concerned, were not the peaceably disposed natives of the place, but the discharged crews of the Government grain-junks, who had been cast adrift by the officials and left to shift for themselves after the manner of disbanded soldiers. The attack took place at a small walled town called Tsingpu, within the authorised radius, and the three Englishmen came very near losing their lives. Mr Alcock lost not a moment in demanding full redress from the Chinese authorities, who instinctively sheltered themselves under the old evasive pleas which had proved so effective at Canton. It happened that the highest local official, the Taotai, had had experience of the southern port, and, entirely unaware that he was confronted in Shanghai with a man of very different calibre from any he had encountered before, he brought out all the rusty weapons of the Canton armoury, in sure and certain hope of reducing 130 the consul's demands to nullity. Evasion being exhausted, intimidation was tried, and the consul and his interpreter were threatened with the vengeance of an outraged people, quite in the Canton manner. But intimidation was the very worst tactics to try on two Englishmen of the stamp of Alcock and Parkes, and when that card had been played the Chinese game was up.

Affairs in Shanghai had been calm and uneventful until an incident triggered the latent forces of chaos. Just over a year after Mr. Alcock arrived at his new post, an attack occurred against three English missionaries, which led to the first and last major conflict between the British and Chinese authorities in Shanghai. The attackers of Messrs. Medhurst, Lockhart, and Muirhead, the three missionaries involved, were not the peaceful locals but rather the discharged crews of the Government grain-junks, who had been abandoned by officials and left to fend for themselves like disbanded soldiers. The assault happened in a small walled town called Tsingpu, within the authorized area, and the three Englishmen nearly lost their lives. Mr. Alcock wasted no time demanding full compensation from the Chinese authorities, who instinctively fell back on the old evasive excuses that had worked so well in Canton. Interestingly, the highest local official, the Taotai, had experience with the southern port and, completely unaware that he was dealing with someone far more capable than anyone he had faced before, brought out all the outdated tactics from the Canton playbook, hoping to render the consul's demands ineffective. Once evasion was exhausted, intimidation was attempted, and the consul and his interpreter were threatened with the wrath of an angry populace, just like in Canton. However, intimidation was the worst approach to take with Englishmen like Alcock and Parkes, and once that tactic was attempted, the Chinese strategy was doomed.

The situation was one of those critical ones that test moral stamina, that discriminate crucially between a man and a copying-machine. It was also one which illuminated, as by an electric flash, the pivotal point of all our relations with China then as now, for the principle never grows old. It is therefore important to set forth the part played by the responsible officer, the support he obtained, the risks he ran, and the effective results of his action. An absolutely unprovoked murderous outrage had been perpetrated on three Englishmen; the Chinese authorities refused redress with insolence and evasion; acquiescence in the denial of justice would have been as fatal to future good relations at Shanghai as it had been in the previous decade in Canton. What was the official charged with the protection of his countrymen to do? He had no instructions except to conciliate the Chinese; there was no telegraph to England; communication even with the chief superintendent of trade at Hongkong, 850 miles off, was dependent on chance sailing vessels. Delay was equivalent to surrender. Now or never was the peremptory alternative presented to the consul, who, taking his official life in his hands, had to decide and act on his own personal responsibility. Had time allowed of an 131 exchange of views with the plenipotentiary in Hongkong, we know for certain that nothing would have been done, for the first announcement of Mr Alcock's strong measures filled Mr Bonham (who had just succeeded Sir John Davis) with genuine alarm.

The situation was one of those critical moments that test moral strength, distinguishing a person from an automated machine. It also highlighted, like a flash of light, the key point of all our interactions with China, both then and now, because the principle never ages. It's important to outline the role played by the responsible officer, the support he received, the risks he took, and the effective results of his actions. A completely unprovoked murderous attack had been carried out against three Englishmen; the Chinese authorities responded with insolence and evasion in denying justice. Accepting this denial would have been just as damaging to future relations in Shanghai as it had been a decade earlier in Canton. What was the official responsible for protecting his fellow countrymen supposed to do? He had no instructions other than to appease the Chinese; there was no telegraph to England; even communication with the chief trade superintendent in Hong Kong, 850 miles away, relied on random sailing ships. Delay meant surrender. The consul faced a decisive moment, risking his official position as he had to make a decision and take action based on his own judgment. If there had been time for an 131 exchange of thoughts with the plenipotentiary in Hong Kong, we know for sure that nothing would have been done, because the first notice of Mr. Alcock's strong measures genuinely alarmed Mr. Bonham (who had just taken over from Sir John Davis).

Considering the instructions [he wrote] with which you have been furnished from the Foreign Office, dated December 18, 1846, and the limited power and duties of a consul, I cannot but express my regret that you should have taken the steps you have seen fit to do without previous reference to her Majesty's plenipotentiary, as undoubtedly, under the peremptory orders recently received from her Majesty's Government, I should not have considered myself warranted in sanctioning, &c., &c.

Considering the instructions you received from the Foreign Office, dated December 18, 1846, and the limited authority and responsibilities of a consul, I must express my regret that you took the steps you did without first consulting Her Majesty's plenipotentiary. Clearly, under the strict orders recently issued by Her Majesty's Government, I would not have felt justified in approving, etc., etc.

Fortunately for the consul and for the peaceful development of British trade, one of Palmerston's specific instructions had been obeyed in Shanghai. There was a British ship of war in port, the 10-gun brig Childers, and, what was of still more importance, a real British man on board of her, Commander Pitman, who shared to the full the Consul's responsibility for what was done.

Fortunately for the consul and for the smooth growth of British trade, one of Palmerston's specific instructions had been followed in Shanghai. There was a British warship in port, the 10-gun brig Childers, and, even more importantly, a genuine British man on board her, Commander Pitman, who fully shared the Consul's responsibility for what was done.

The measures adopted by Consul Alcock—when negotiation was exhausted—were to announce to the Chinese authorities that, until satisfaction had been obtained, no duties should be paid on cargo imported or exported in British ships: furthermore, that the great junk fleet of 1400 sail, laden and ready for sea with the tribute rice for Peking, should not be allowed to leave the port. The Childers, moored in the stream below the junk anchorage, was in a position to make this a most effective blockade. The rage of the Taotai rose to fever heat, and it was then he threatened, and 132 no doubt attempted to inflame the populace and the whole vagabond class. The Taotai ordered some of the rice-laden junks to proceed; but though there were fifty war-junks to guard them, the masters dared not attempt to pass the ideal barrier thrown across the river by the resolute Captain Pitman.

The actions taken by Consul Alcock—when negotiations were over—were to inform the Chinese authorities that, until they received satisfaction, no duties should be paid on cargo brought in or sent out on British ships: additionally, that the large fleet of 1,400 junks, loaded and ready to sail with tribute rice for Peking, should not be allowed to leave the port. The Childers, anchored in the stream below the junk anchorage, was positioned to enforce a highly effective blockade. The anger of the Taotai reached a boiling point, and it was then he threatened, and 132 no doubt tried to incite the local population and the entire vagabond class. The Taotai ordered some of the rice-filled junks to move; however, even though there were fifty war-junks to protect them, the captains were too afraid to attempt to get past the perfect barrier created across the river by the determined Captain Pitman.

MOUTH OF YANGTZE AND CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO.

MOUTH OF YANGTZE AND CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO.

The outrage took place on the 8th of March. On the 13th the consul presented an ultimatum to the Taotai giving him forty-eight hours to produce the 133 criminals. This being disregarded, the measures above referred to were enforced, with the full approval, it may be mentioned, of the consuls of the two other treaty Powers. At the same time Vice-Consul Robertson, with Parkes for interpreter, was despatched to Nanking on board her Majesty's ship Espiègle to lay the whole case before the viceroy of Kiangnan. The matter was there promptly attended to, full redress was ordered, and the culprits punished exactly three weeks after the assault. The embargo on the rice-junks was removed, and affairs resumed their normal course.[15] The effect of this lesson has never been effaced, harmony having prevailed between British and Chinese officials and people in Shanghai and the province from that day to this.

The incident happened on March 8th. On the 13th, the consul issued an ultimatum to the Taotai, giving him forty-eight hours to hand over the criminals. When this was ignored, the previously mentioned actions were taken, with the full endorsement of the consuls from the other two treaty Powers. Meanwhile, Vice-Consul Robertson, with Parkes as an interpreter, was sent to Nanking aboard Her Majesty's ship Espiègle to present the entire situation to the viceroy of Kiangnan. The issue was quickly addressed there, full compensation was ordered, and the offenders were punished exactly three weeks after the attack. The ban on the rice-junks was lifted, and things returned to normal. The impact of this situation has never faded; there has been harmony between British and Chinese officials and people in Shanghai and the province ever since.

The circumstances were of course very unusual which placed such ready means of bloodless coercion in the hands of the British consul. The fortuitous coincidence of the time of the outrage with the period of departure of the grain fleet placed a weapon in the consul's hands which of itself would have eventually brought the Chinese to terms, should the matter in the mean time not have been taken out of the hands of the consul and dealt with from Hongkong by the plenipotentiary, whose views have been given above. So soon as the detention of the grain fleet became known to the Government of Peking, orders of a very drastic nature would undoubtedly have been despatched to the viceroy of the province, and both he and his subordinate would have been made answerable for their incompetence in imperilling 134 the supply of rice for the Government. But the pressure was doubly intensified by the appearance of a foreign ship of war under the walls of Nanking. Six years had not elapsed since a similar demonstration had brought the Government to its knees, and to have allowed such an invasion a second time would have drawn down the imperial wrath on the luckless provincial authorities. For Nanking differs from the other provincial capitals, such as Canton and Foochow, inasmuch as it is near the strategic centre of the empire, commanding the main artery of communication with the interior of the country, at the point of intersection of the Yangtze river by the famous Imperial Canal which connects the capital with the richest region in the Yangtze valley. A blockade of the sea-going grain fleet with a simultaneous blockade of these inland waters, so easily effected, would have throttled China. The viceroy, who sent a report on the transaction to the throne by special express, explained away his own hasty action by saying "that the appearance of the barbarian chiefs at the provincial city may have caused anxiety in the sacred breast."

The situation was obviously very unusual, putting such quick methods of non-violent pressure in the hands of the British consul. The lucky timing of the incident coinciding with the grain fleet's departure gave the consul a tool that would have eventually forced the Chinese to negotiate, had the issue not been taken out of his hands and managed from Hong Kong by the plenipotentiary, whose opinions have been mentioned above. As soon as the detention of the grain fleet reached the government in Peking, they would have surely sent harsh orders to the viceroy of the province, holding both him and his subordinate accountable for their failure to secure the rice supply for the government. However, the pressure was doubled by the presence of a foreign warship near Nanking. Just six years earlier, a similar show of force had brought the government to submit, and allowing such an invasion again would have sparked severe anger from the imperial authorities towards the unfortunate provincial leaders. Nanking is different from other provincial capitals like Canton and Foochow because it is close to the strategic heart of the empire, controlling the main route of communication with the interior at the point where the Yangtze River intersects with the famous Imperial Canal, which links the capital to the richest areas in the Yangtze Valley. A blockade of the sea-going grain fleet along with a simultaneous blockade of these inland waters, which could be easily accomplished, would have suffocated China. The viceroy, who sent a report on the incident to the throne via special express, justified his hasty actions by saying "that the appearance of the barbarian chiefs at the provincial city may have caused anxiety in the sacred breast."

The verdict of the Home Government on the episode was substantially the same as that on Sir John Davis's brilliant expedition on the Canton river the year before: "Gratified with your success, but don't do it again;" in other words, "Do it at your peril, leaving us to applaud or repudiate according to the event." Perhaps it would be more just to say that there were then, as always, conflicting views in the British Cabinet, the apparent vacillations of the Government depending a good deal on which of its 135 members happened, for the moment, to have the parole,—whether the Foreign Secretary, the Colonial Secretary, or other Minister indited the despatch.

The government's decision on the situation was basically the same as their response to Sir John Davis's impressive trip along the Canton river the previous year: "We're pleased with your success, but don't do it again;" in other words, "Proceed at your own risk, and we'll either celebrate or reject it based on the outcome." It might be fairer to say that there were always differing opinions within the British Cabinet, with the government's apparent indecisiveness largely depending on which member happened to be in charge at that moment—whether it was the Foreign Secretary, the Colonial Secretary, or another minister writing the message.

Commenting some years later on the general question of our relations with China, Mr Alcock wrote as follows: "A salutary dread of the immediate consequences of violence offered to British subjects, certainty of its creating greater trouble and danger to the native authorities personally than even the most vigorous efforts to protect the foreigners and seize their assailants will entail, seems to be the best and only protection in this country for Englishmen." Palmerston himself could not have laid down the law and common-sense of the case with greater precision.

Commenting years later on our relationship with China, Mr. Alcock wrote: "A healthy fear of the immediate consequences of violence against British citizens, and the certainty that it would create more trouble and danger for the local authorities than even the strongest efforts to protect foreigners and catch their attackers will cause, seems to be the best and only protection for Englishmen in this country." Palmerston himself couldn't have expressed the logic of the situation more clearly.

II. REBELLION.

Taiping rebellion—Rebel occupation of Shanghai—Encroachment of investing force on foreign settlement—Driven off by Anglo-American forces—The French quarrel with insurgents—Consequent enlargement of French concession—The assumption of self-government by the Anglo-American community—Exemplary conduct of Chinese authorities after their defeat—French belligerency—Difficult question of neutrality—Treatment of native refugees.

Taiping rebellion—Rebel takeover of Shanghai—Invasion of foreign investment forces in settlements—Driven out by British and American troops—The French conflict with insurgents—Resulting expansion of the French concession—The decision by the British and American community to self-govern—Admirable actions of Chinese officials following their defeat—French aggressiveness—Complicated issue of neutrality—Treatment of local refugees.

Affairs went smoothly and prosperously in Shanghai for another five years, when the greatest calamity that has visited China in modern times cast its shadow on the province and on the city. The appalling ravages of the Taiping rebellion, which, originating in the southern province of Kwangsi, followed the great trade-routes to the Yangtze-kiang and down the course of that stream, leaving absolute desolation in its wake, reached the southern capital, 136 Nanking, on March 8, 1853. The city was paralysed, and surrendered on the 19th, apparently without a struggle; the whole Tartar garrison, numbering 20,000, were put ruthlessly to the sword, not a soul being spared. The whole country, officials and people alike, was thrown into a state of abject fear. The ease with which such Government forces as there were succumbed to the onslaught of the rebel hordes may very well have prompted the rowdy element, which exists more or less everywhere, to make raids on their own account. Such a band, belonging as was supposed to certain secret societies, but without any connection with the main body of the Taipings, who were at the time applying fire and sword to the populous towns on the Yangtze, surprised and captured the walled city of Shanghai. "The news," says an eyewitness, "came like thunder from a clear sky;" there was no thought of the city being in danger either from within or without. The people were panic-stricken at first, but fear with them seemed near akin to criminality, and the scene enacted was what was repeated thousands of times and over a wide area—one of general pillage and destruction. "Several hundred of the usually innocent and simple country-folk—who must have scented their prey as the eagle does the carcass, for as yet it was early morning—fell upon the custom-house, whence they carried off chairs, tables, windows, doors, everything that was portable, leaving the floor littered with books and papers, which were being kicked about and trodden on in a most unceremonious way."

Affairs went smoothly and successfully in Shanghai for another five years, until the worst disaster in modern Chinese history cast its shadow over the province and the city. The devastating effects of the Taiping rebellion, which started in the southern province of Kwangsi, followed the major trade routes to the Yangtze River and swept through, leaving complete destruction behind, reached the southern capital, 136 Nanking, on March 8, 1853. The city was paralyzed and surrendered on the 19th, seemingly without a fight; the entire Tartar garrison of 20,000 was ruthlessly killed, with not a single person spared. The entire country, both officials and citizens, was thrown into a state of utter fear. The speed at which the government forces fell to the rebel hordes likely encouraged some of the rowdy elements, present in every society, to raid on their own. A group, thought to be part of certain secret societies but with no ties to the main Taiping army—who at that moment were attacking the crowded Yangtze towns—surprised and took control of the walled city of Shanghai. "The news," says an eyewitness, "came like thunder from a clear sky;" there was no perception that the city was in danger from any side. The people were initially panic-stricken, but their fear quickly turned to chaos, resulting in widespread looting and destruction. "Several hundred of the normally innocent and simple country folks—who must have sensed their opportunity like an eagle does a carcass, for it was still early morning—attacked the custom-house, from which they took away chairs, tables, windows, doors, everything that was movable, leaving the floor strewn with books and papers that were being kicked around and trampled in a very unceremonious manner."

ENTRANCE TO SZE-KING, NEAR SHANGHAI.

Entrance to Sze-King, near Shanghai.

For a period of eighteen months, beginning in September 1853 and ending in February 1855, these rebels 137 held possession of the city. It took a little time before the authorities were able to gather any force to expel them. But they did commence a species of siege which ultimately succeeded in its object. There would be no interest in tracing its progress. What we have to note is the effect which the interregnum produced on the relations between the foreign officials and community and the Chinese.

For eighteen months, from September 1853 to February 1855, these rebels 137 took over the city. It took a while for the authorities to assemble a force to drive them out. However, they began a kind of siege that eventually achieved its goal. There’s no need to detail the progress of this. What we need to focus on is the impact that this period of unrest had on the relationships between foreign officials, the community, and the Chinese.

The first was of a very remarkable character, being nothing less than an armed collision between such foreign forces as could be mustered and the imperialist troops who were investing the city. The Chinese soldiers were in camp at a short distance outside of the foreign settlement, which was exempt from the operations of the war. But the discipline of Chinese troops is never very efficient, and unruly stragglers from the camps kept the foreigners in the settlement in constant hot water. It became, in fact, dangerous for them to take their recreation in the open ground at the back of the settlement, which was used as a racecourse. Immunity from reprisals produced its invariable result, and the aggressions of the soldiery became more persistent and better organised. The foreigners were at last driven to retaliate in their own defence. After a formidable inroad of the Chinese troops, the three treaty consuls met hastily and decided on sending a demand to the Chinese general for the withdrawal of all his soldiers from the vicinity of the settlement, failing which, his position would be attacked at four o'clock the same afternoon by all the available foreign forces. These were, marines and bluejackets from her Britannic Majesty's ships Encounter 138 and Grecian, marines and sailors from the United States ship Plymouth, some sailors from the merchant ships in port, and about 200 of the residents as infantry volunteers. The English force was commanded by Captain O'Callaghan, who was accompanied by Consul Alcock; the Americans were led by Captain Kelley, who was accompanied by Consul Murphy; while the volunteers were commanded by Vice-Consul Wade, subsequently her Majesty's Minister to China. The attack on the Chinese position was completely successful; indeed there was apparently very little resistance, a circumstance which was attributed by Mr Wetmore, who was in the action from beginning to end, to the uncovenanted co-operation of the rebels within the city. It was, nevertheless, according to him, writing nearly forty years after, "a hazardous, if not a reckless, undertaking."

The first was a very notable event, being nothing less than an armed clash between the foreign forces that could be gathered and the imperial troops surrounding the city. The Chinese soldiers were camped just outside the foreign settlement, which was shielded from the war's effects. However, Chinese troop discipline was never very strong, and unruly stragglers from the camps kept the foreigners in the settlement constantly on edge. It became, in fact, dangerous for them to spend their free time in the open area at the back of the settlement, which served as a racecourse. The immunity from retaliation led to the usual outcome, and the soldiers' aggressions became more frequent and organized. The foreigners were ultimately forced to respond in their defense. After a significant incursion by the Chinese troops, the three treaty consuls quickly met and decided to send a demand to the Chinese general for the withdrawal of all his soldiers from the area around the settlement. If he failed to comply, his position would be attacked at four o'clock that afternoon by all available foreign forces. These included marines and sailors from Her Britannic Majesty's ships Encounter and Grecian, marines and sailors from the United States ship Plymouth, some sailors from the merchant ships in port, and about 200 local residents as infantry volunteers. The English force was led by Captain O'Callaghan, who was joined by Consul Alcock; the Americans were commanded by Captain Kelley, who was accompanied by Consul Murphy; while the volunteers were led by Vice-Consul Wade, who later became Her Majesty's Minister to China. The assault on the Chinese position was completely successful; in fact, there seemed to be very little resistance, a situation that Mr. Wetmore, who participated from start to finish, attributed to the unexpected cooperation of rebels within the city. Nevertheless, according to him, writing nearly forty years later, it was "a hazardous, if not reckless, undertaking."

Her Majesty's Government, in a despatch from the Foreign Office dated June 16, "entirely approved of Mr Alcock's proceedings, and they considered that he displayed great courage and judgment in circumstances of no ordinary difficulty"; while the British community unanimously conveyed their warmest thanks to Consul Alcock, Vice-Consul Wade, and the naval officers concerned, for "saving their lives and property from the most imminent jeopardy." And they add that "any symptoms of hesitation and timid policy would inevitably have led to serious consequences and far greater loss of life."

Her Majesty's Government, in a message from the Foreign Office dated June 16, "fully approved of Mr. Alcock's actions and believed that he showed great courage and judgment in very challenging circumstances"; meanwhile, the British community collectively expressed their heartfelt gratitude to Consul Alcock, Vice-Consul Wade, and the naval officers involved, for "saving their lives and property from imminent danger." They also noted that "any signs of hesitation and a timid approach would have undoubtedly resulted in serious consequences and much greater loss of life."

It is to be remarked that the French took no part in this common defence of the settlement, in explanation of which it must be noted that they had never fallen kindly into the cosmopolitan system, 139 but as years went on kept themselves more and more apart, expanding what was a mere consular residence until it covered two populous suburbs embracing half of the circuit of the walled city, and what began as a settlement came to be spoken of as a "concession."

It's worth noting that the French did not participate in this collective defense of the settlement. To clarify, they never fully embraced the cosmopolitan system, 139 and over time, they distanced themselves further, expanding what was initially just a consular residence until it encompassed two bustling suburbs, taking up half of the walled city's perimeter. What started as a settlement eventually came to be referred to as a "concession."

In this situation it was not difficult for them to pick a quarrel on their own account with the rebels, which led to an ineffectual bombardment of the city by French ships of war moored close under the walls. Guns were then landed in the suburb, which was thereafter embraced within the limits of the French concession, the houses being demolished to give play to the artillery. A cannonade lasting many days resulted in a practical breach in the city wall, which was followed up by a combined assault by the French and the imperialist troops, with whom they had allied themselves. The attack was repulsed with severe loss to the assailants.

In this situation, it wasn't hard for them to start a fight with the rebels, which led to an ineffective bombardment of the city by French warships anchored close to the walls. They then landed guns in the suburb, which was included within the boundaries of the French concession, with houses being torn down to make way for the artillery. A bombardment that lasted several days resulted in a significant breach in the city wall, which was followed by a coordinated assault by the French and the imperialist troops they had teamed up with. The attack was beaten back with heavy losses for the attackers.

Among the results of these operations and of the lapse of organised government during eighteen months the most direct was perhaps the establishment of the French on the ground where their batteries had been placed. For reasons military or otherwise, a tabula rasa was made of an immense populous suburb, the ground then admitting of easy occupation and the laying out of streets and roads. The area thus occupied by the French is separated from the cosmopolitan settlement of Shanghai by a tidal creek.

Among the outcomes of these operations and the breakdown of organized government over the past eighteen months, the most immediate was probably the French establishing themselves where their artillery had been set up. For various military or other reasons, a tabula rasa was created in a large, densely populated suburb, making the ground easy to occupy and allowing for the planning of streets and roads. The area taken over by the French is divided from the diverse community of Shanghai by a tidal creek.

Results less showy, but more important in the interests of humanity and international commerce, were very soon apparent in the cosmopolitan settlement. The first of these was the assumption by the foreign 140 community of the function of self-government and self-protection, and the foundation of that important municipality, which has established as fine a record of public service as any such body has ever done. The inroads of vagabondage and crime would, without the protective measures extemporised for the occasion, have swamped the foreign quarter and reduced it to the desolate condition of the native city. And this necessity of relying on their own strength has no doubt given to the community of Shanghai that tone of self-confidence which has characterised successive generations of them.

Results that were less flashy but more significant for humanity and international trade became clear in the diverse settlement. The first of these was the foreign community taking on the roles of self-governance and self-protection, leading to the establishment of a vital municipality that has maintained as impressive a record of public service as any similar organization. Without the emergency protective measures implemented, the issues of homelessness and crime would have overwhelmed the foreign quarter, leaving it in the same desolate state as the native city. This need to depend on their own strength has undoubtedly given the Shanghai community a sense of self-confidence that has defined successive generations.

The effect of the collision on the relations between the foreign and Chinese authorities can hardly be understood without some explanatory words. In countries where the soldier, sudden and quick in quarrel, seeks the bubble reputation in the cannon's mouth, there is a psychological figment called military honour, which may be symbolised in various ways, as, for example, by a rag at the end of a stick for which brave men will cheerfully die. The warlike traditions which have evolved European codes of honour have no existence in China. Revanche, therefore, did not enter into the heads of the defeated Chinese commanders, who contented themselves with posting placards about their camps stating that "the barbarians were about to be annihilated, but that they had ransomed themselves for 300,000 taels, and that an additional 300,000 would be required." Their conduct, however, was quite exemplary during the remainder of the siege, their chief solicitude being to avoid encroaching on the foreign quarter. Whatever be the explanation, the fact is that the Chinese were on better terms with the foreign 141 officials after than they had been before the battle of "Muddy Flat," fought on the 4th of April 1854. Within ten days they were amicably settling in concert the ground for a new camp, which would not hamper the military operations of the besiegers nor yet compromise the sanctity of the foreign settlement.

The impact of the collision on the relationship between the foreign and Chinese authorities is hard to grasp without some context. In countries where soldiers, quick to quarrel, chase after fame in battle, there's a psychological concept known as military honor, often represented in different ways, like a rag tied to a stick for which brave people will gladly sacrifice their lives. The martial traditions that shaped European codes of honor don’t exist in China. Therefore, revenge didn’t cross the minds of the defeated Chinese commanders, who simply put up signs around their camps declaring that "the barbarians were about to be wiped out, but they had paid a ransom of 300,000 taels, with an additional 300,000 required." However, their behavior was quite commendable during the rest of the siege, with their main concern being to avoid intruding on the foreign quarter. Whatever the reason, it is clear that the Chinese had a better rapport with the foreign officials after the battle of "Muddy Flat," fought on April 4, 1854, than they did before. Within ten days, they were amicably working together to establish the grounds for a new camp that wouldn’t disrupt the military efforts of the besiegers or compromise the integrity of the foreign settlement.

Thus there was no obstacle whatever in the way of concerting with the nearest representatives of the Government of China all those measures which were demanded by the position of neutrality assumed by the British Government between the insurgents and imperialist forces, and also for the regulation and control of the Chinese refugees, who poured into the foreign settlement to escape the rapine of savage war. The neutrality of the British representative was difficult to maintain: by force of circumstances it took a benevolent form towards the beleaguered rebels, who were dependent for their continued existence upon supplies received from and through the foreign settlement. The situation was complicated by the action of the French, who, having quarrelled with the insurgents, entered on the stage as a third belligerent. Thereupon the French authorities made a grievance of "the scandal of supplies being furnished to the declared enemies of the French in the sight and under the protection of our English guard," France being at the time allied with Great Britain in prosecuting the war in the Crimea. Consul Alcock, whose sense of propriety had already been considerably shocked by the facilities which the position of the cosmopolitan settlement afforded for conveying supplies into the city, treated the appeal of his French colleague with respect, and made it the text of a representation to the senior naval officer, urging him, if 142 possible, to devise means in conjunction with the measures which were already being adopted in the settlement for enforcing British neutrality, so that "we may be able to give an honest answer to all three belligerents—imperialists, insurgents, and French." This policy was at the same time proclaimed by a unanimous resolution of the largest meeting of residents ever, up to that time, assembled in Shanghai.

Thus, there was no obstacle in coordinating with the closest representatives of the Chinese Government regarding all the measures required by the British Government's neutral stance between the insurgents and imperial forces, as well as for managing and controlling the Chinese refugees who fled into the foreign settlement to escape the brutality of war. The British representative found it challenging to maintain neutrality; due to the circumstances, it turned into a supportive stance towards the beleaguered rebels, who relied on supplies coming from the foreign settlement to survive. The situation became more complicated by the actions of the French, who, after falling out with the insurgents, entered the scene as a third party involved in the conflict. The French authorities then raised concerns about "the scandal of supplies being provided to the declared enemies of the French under the watch and protection of our English guard," given that France was allied with Great Britain in the conflict in Crimea at that time. Consul Alcock, whose sense of propriety was already disturbed by how easily supplies could be sent into the city from the cosmopolitan settlement, took the appeal from his French colleague seriously and used it to prompt the senior naval officer, urging him, if possible, to come up with a way to work together with the measures already in place in the settlement to enforce British neutrality, so that "we can give an honest answer to all three parties involved—imperialists, insurgents, and French." This policy was simultaneously announced by a unanimous resolution from the largest gathering of residents ever held in Shanghai up to that point.

The question of the influx of refugees seems not to have met with such a prompt solution, but that was due rather to the British plenipotentiary's caution than to the obstruction of the Chinese. In a despatch to Sir John Bowring, dated June 5, 1854, the consul thus describes the evil in question:—

The issue of the arrival of refugees doesn’t seem to have been addressed quickly, but that was more because of the British representative’s careful approach than the resistance from the Chinese. In a message to Sir John Bowring, dated June 5, 1854, the consul describes the problem as follows:—

As regards the strange and altogether unsatisfactory position in which we are placed by the pouring in of a large Chinese population, who have squatted down within our limits contrary to the standing edicts of their own authorities, and run up whole streets of wooden and brick tenements, giving cover to every species of vice and filth, I have only to remark that a walk through the settlement [the governor was expected on a visit] will, I am convinced, satisfy your Excellency that the evil is already too great and increasing at too rapid a rate to be overlooked. The health of foreign residents, the security of their property, and the very tenability of the place as a foreign location, alike render it imperative that a jurisdiction of some kind should be promptly and energetically asserted.

Regarding the strange and completely unsatisfactory situation we face due to a large influx of Chinese immigrants, who have settled here despite their own government's prohibitions, and have erected entire streets of wooden and brick buildings that harbor every kind of vice and filth, I can only say that a walk through the settlement [the governor was expected on a visit] will surely convince your Excellency that the problem is already far too serious and is growing too quickly to ignore. The health of foreign residents, the security of their property, and the overall viability of this area as a foreign settlement all necessitate that some form of jurisdiction be established promptly and vigorously.

The important negotiations which, within three months, issued in the birth of the Foreign Maritime Customs, must be regarded as by far the most important outcome of the rebel episode of 1854-55. 143

The crucial negotiations that, within three months, led to the creation of the Foreign Maritime Customs, should be seen as the most significant result of the rebel events of 1854-55. 143

III. THE CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS.

Extent and audacity of smuggling—Alcock's determination to suppress it—His report on the position—Corruption of the Chinese customs service—Efforts of the British Government to co-operate in collecting dues—Nullified by treaties with other Powers—Consequent injury to all foreign trade—Unexpected solution of the difficulty during the interregnum—Impetus given to trade by the Taiping rebellion—Alcock with French and American consuls takes over the customs and collects all dues in trust for the Chinese Government—Promissory notes employed—Conditions which made it impossible to enforce payment—Notes ultimately cancelled.

Extent and boldness of smuggling—Alcock's determination to put a stop to it—His report on the situation—Corruption within the Chinese customs service—Efforts by the British Government to assist in collecting fees—Undermined by treaties with other countries—Resulting harm to all foreign trade—Unexpected resolution of the issue during the transitional period—Boost given to trade by the Taiping rebellion—Alcock, along with French and American consuls, takes over customs and collects all fees in trust for the Chinese Government—Promissory notes used—Conditions that made it impossible to enforce payment—Notes ultimately canceled.

Certain crying evils in foreign intercourse having arrested the attention of Consul Alcock from the day of his arrival in China, he bent himself strenuously to the task of overcoming or mitigating them. They formed the subject-matter of many anxious reports to his superiors, for Mr Alcock always took both a serious and a comprehensive view of his duties. For many years there seemed little hope of a successful issue to these labours; but at last a rift in the clouds opened up the prospect of coping with at least one of them, and that was smuggling. So universal was this practice that it seemed a necessary and natural feature of all commercial dealings in China. As its roots lay deep in the Chinese character and civilisation, no stigma attached to the venality of the officials charged with the collection of the maritime revenues. Although the practice was in extent universal, it was by no means wholesale in degree, and where the facilities for evading duties were so tempting, merchants must often have been astonished at their own moderation.

Certain troubling issues in foreign relations caught the attention of Consul Alcock from the moment he arrived in China, prompting him to work hard to address or lessen them. These issues were the focus of many concerned reports to his superiors, as Mr. Alcock always approached his responsibilities with both seriousness and thoroughness. For many years, there seemed to be little hope for a successful resolution to these challenges; however, eventually, a breakthrough emerged that indicated progress could be made at least on smuggling. This practice was so widespread that it appeared to be an essential and natural part of all business interactions in China. Since its origins were deeply embedded in the Chinese character and culture, there was no shame associated with the corruption of the officials responsible for collecting maritime taxes. While the practice was widespread, it wasn't done on a massive scale, and given the tempting opportunities to evade taxes, merchants must have often been surprised by their own restraint.

Among the legends of the coast, it is true, there were certain tours de force in the way of smuggling which 144 made good topics for walnuts-and-wine conversation among a community which was rather lacking in subjects of general interest,—as of an apocryphal ship clearing from China in ballast or with coal which would mysteriously land in England a full cargo of tea, which had been taken on board without being passed through the custom-house. Conversely, a shipload of manufactured goods taken on board in England would melt on the passage to China like a cargo of ice, so far as the records in the Chinese custom-house would show. One special feat was kept alive, post-prandially, for many years as the acme of audacious smuggling. British goods were entered at the custom-house "for re-exportation," and no duty paid. The merchant packed the empty cases with silk, which was thus shipped under the original English marks, and was described as calicoes, on which a "drawback" was claimed of import duties which had never been paid at all. Such racy anecdotes belonged to the order of Rabelaisian humour which inspired the boast of a certain Lancashire manufacturer at the time when, owing to the scarcity and high price of cotton, the "filling" of shirtings with plaster of Paris and other substances to make up the required weight of the piece was raised to almost the dignity of a fine art. Complaints being made by the consumer that the cloth so compounded would not wash, this genial Lancastrian declared that for his part he would never rest satisfied until he could turn out his calicoes without any cotton in them at all.

Among the local legends, it’s true that there were some impressive smuggling tricks that made for great stories during walnut-and-wine discussions in a community that didn't have many interesting topics. These included tales of an imaginary ship leaving China completely empty or loaded with coal, which would somehow arrive in England with a full load of tea, having avoided customs. On the flip side, a shipment of manufactured goods from England would mysteriously disappear in transit to China, according to the Chinese customs records. One particular escapade remained a highlight of daring smuggling for years. British goods would be declared at customs "for re-exportation," avoiding any duty fees. The merchant would fill the empty cases with silk, shipping it under the original English labels and describing it as calicoes, while claiming a "drawback" for import duties that had never been paid. These entertaining stories belonged to a type of humor reminiscent of Rabelais, which inspired a boast from a Lancashire manufacturer during a time when cotton was scarce and expensive. To make up the weight of shirtings, he employed plaster of Paris and other materials to such an extent that it almost became a fine art. When consumers complained that the treated fabric wouldn’t wash, this affable Lancastrian confidently declared he wouldn’t rest until he could produce his calicoes without using any cotton at all.

Shanghai, of course, was the great centre of the smuggling trade. What smuggling was done at Canton, being the only other important entrepot, was on a system which was regulated by the customs authorities 145 themselves, and the testimony of Mr Alexander Matheson before the House of Commons Committee was to the effect that their tariff was so light that it was not worth the merchant's while to smuggle. Such, however, was not the view taken by Mr Consul Alcock, who regarded the smuggling system as a very serious evil, against which he waged a relentless war. He not only compelled, as far as lay in his power, the British merchants to comply with the letter of the treaty in their dealings with the customs, but he further considered himself bound to enforce on the Chinese officials themselves the proper discharge of their duty. In these efforts to abolish irregular practices, which all deplored, many of the British merchants were only too willing to co-operate with the consul's efforts, and the Foreign Office was repeatedly moved to take some action in the reform of these abuses. The difficulties and anomalies of the situation were fully set forth by Mr Alcock in many reports made to his superior, the chief superintendent of trade, as the following extract, written in 1851, will exemplify:—

Shanghai, of course, was the major hub for the smuggling trade. The smuggling that occurred in Canton, the only other significant trading port, operated under a system regulated by the customs authorities themselves. The testimony of Mr. Alexander Matheson before the House of Commons Committee indicated that their tariff was so low that it wasn't worth the merchants' time to smuggle. However, Mr. Consul Alcock viewed the smuggling situation as a serious problem, and he fought vigorously against it. He not only pushed, as much as he could, for British merchants to adhere to the treaty in their dealings with customs, but he also felt it was his duty to ensure that the Chinese officials properly fulfilled their responsibilities. In their efforts to eliminate the irregular practices that everyone condemned, many British merchants were more than willing to support the consul’s initiatives, and the Foreign Office was repeatedly prompted to take action to reform these abuses. The challenges and inconsistencies of the situation were thoroughly detailed by Mr. Alcock in many reports submitted to his superior, the chief superintendent of trade, as the following excerpt from 1851 illustrates:—

How the commercial and custom-house system of the West and the very opposite principles and practice of the East might be combined so that both should work together with the least possible friction and prejudice, was a difficult problem, no doubt, for those who had the framing of existing treaties. How even the trading operations of foreign merchants, based upon good faith and honesty, could be in any way associated with the corrupt and inept administration of the Chinese custom-house, so that the revenue of the latter alone should be liable to suffer and not the foreign trade, though apparently a simpler task, seems to have presented to the negotiators insuperable difficulties. For one or other of these problems, nevertheless, it was essential they should find some adequate solution, or whatever treaties might be signed their real mission was unfulfilled, 146 and the basis of all future trading relations left unstable and unsatisfactory.

How the commercial and customs system of the West and the completely different principles and practices of the East could be combined to ensure that both operated smoothly with minimal friction and bias was certainly a challenging issue for those who were creating the current treaties. Figuring out how the trading activities of foreign merchants, based on good faith and honesty, could be linked to the corrupt and ineffective management of the Chinese customs house, so that only the revenue from the latter would be affected instead of the foreign trade, although it seemed like an easier task, clearly posed significant challenges for the negotiators. Nevertheless, it was crucial for them to find a suitable solution to one or both of these issues; otherwise, no matter what treaties were signed, their real mission would remain unaccomplished, and the foundation of all future trading relationships would be left unstable and unsatisfactory. 146

We cannot suppose this important fact was overlooked by the British Government, which, on the contrary, appears to have sought earnestly to meet the difficulty by undertaking in good faith to co-operate with the Chinese authorities in collecting the duties on British trade. Neither is it clear that failure would have attended such a course had not a disturbing element been speedily introduced from without for which adequate provision does not seem to have been made. We allude to the ratification of treaties with other Governments which should repudiate all obligation on this point to contribute to the protection of the Chinese revenue. It might have been supposed that the Chinese Government, having obtained so great and unquestionable an advantage from the Power they had most to fear, would scarcely have been so foolish as to throw it away upon the first occasion, yet such proved to be the fact, and some credit was taken by the United States commissioner for the omission of all co-operative clauses. Two treaties in consequence came into operation, founded upon different principles—the one subversive of the other in a very essential point. So much was this the case that no fair trial could be given to the provisions of the British treaty respecting the payment of duties, and any attempt to act upon the system contemplated in it became altogether unpracticable so soon as the alteration of our navigation laws opened our ports to foreign shipping.

We can't assume that the British Government overlooked this important fact. On the contrary, it seems that they genuinely tried to address the issue by committing to work with the Chinese authorities to collect duties on British trade. It’s also unclear whether this approach would have failed if an unsettling factor hadn't quickly been introduced from outside, for which they didn’t appear to be prepared. We refer to the ratification of treaties with other governments that effectively dismissed any obligation to help protect Chinese revenue. One might think that the Chinese Government, after gaining such significant and undeniable advantages from the power they feared most, would be unlikely to throw it away at the first opportunity, but that’s exactly what happened. The United States commissioner even took some credit for excluding all co-operative clauses. As a result, two treaties came into effect based on different principles—one directly undermining the other at a critical point. It was so much the case that no fair evaluation could be made of the provisions in the British treaty regarding duty payments, and any attempt to follow the system outlined in it became completely impractical once the changes to our navigation laws allowed foreign shipping in our ports.

We found that to secure the essential objects of these treaties as they now stand there is one thing plainly wanting and yet essential, an honest and efficient custom-house, and who does not see that this is unattainable in China? Too much or too little has been done, therefore. We should either have refused to concede a right to levy maritime duties, or obtained as the condition some better guarantee for its impartial exercise. It should have been remembered that although a foreign Power might give this right to the Emperor of China, it could not so easily give him honest and faithful servants, without which custom-house duties cannot be fairly levied. The very attempt to profit by such a right partially, and with manifestly imperfect means, could not fail to prove injurious to the trade it was the great object of the treaties to 147 develop and protect. It is superfluous now to say that against this evil no sufficient provision was made, and the result has been perpetual and irreconcilable antagonism. From the first day the American treaty came into operation the contracting parties, Chinese and foreign, have been placed in a false position in regard to each other and to the permanent interests of both. The emperor had obtained a right he could not unaided duly exercise, and the foreign merchant was laid under a legal obligation which under such circumstances tended to make his trading privileges nugatory. The former was daily exposed to the loss of the whole or a part of a revenue to which he was by treaty legally entitled, as the price of commercial privileges to the foreigner; and the latter, in so far as he recognised his obligation to pay to such revenue, was debarred from trading with advantage or profit.

We realized that to secure the key aspects of these treaties as they are now, there’s one clearly missing yet crucial element: a fair and effective customs system, and who can argue that this is impossible to achieve in China? Either too much or too little has been done. We should have either refused to allow the right to impose maritime duties or made it a condition to secure some better guarantee for its fair enforcement. It should have been noted that while a foreign power could grant this right to the Emperor of China, it couldn’t easily provide him with honest and reliable officials, without whom customs duties cannot be fairly collected. Trying to take advantage of this right with such insufficient and flawed resources could only harm the trade that the treaties were meant to foster and protect. It’s unnecessary to say that no adequate measures were taken against this issue, leading to ongoing and irreconcilable conflict. From the moment the American treaty began, both Chinese and foreign parties have found themselves in a misleading position regarding each other and their shared long-term interests. The emperor gained a right he could not effectively exercise on his own, and the foreign merchant was placed under a legal obligation that, under these circumstances, made his trading rights almost meaningless. The former faced the daily risk of losing all or part of the revenue he was legally entitled to by treaty, which he had to trade away to grant privileges to foreigners; and the latter, having acknowledged his obligation to pay that revenue, was prevented from trading profitably.

Loss to the custom-house is palpably only one of the mischiefs resulting, and injury to foreign trade is the direct consequence in a far more important degree. There may be some disposed to question this, but when no man can calculate on entering into an operation within 15 or 20 per cent of the prime cost of his merchandise before it shall leave his hands, and his next-door neighbour may gain advantage over him to this amount, while the ordinary margin of profit seldom exceeds that range, it is difficult to arrive at any other conclusion. And when we consider that the natural tendency of partial smuggling is to raise the price in the buying and to lower it in the selling market, its disastrous influence on the general prosperity of the trade must be too plain to admit of contradiction. However it may temporarily enrich a few, it must eventually impoverish many.

Loss to the customs office is clearly just one of the problems that arise, and harm to foreign trade is a direct result to a much greater extent. Some might question this, but when no one can predict entering into a deal within 15 or 20 percent of the original cost of their goods before they leave their hands, and their neighbor can gain an advantage over them by that amount, while the usual profit margin rarely exceeds that range, it’s hard to come to any other conclusion. And when we consider that the natural result of some smuggling is to raise prices for buyers and lower them for sellers, its harmful impact on overall trade prosperity is too obvious to deny. While it may temporarily benefit a few, it will ultimately hurt many.

The British plenipotentiary may have thought that smuggling, so far as the interests of trade were concerned, would affect only the Chinese revenue: the American commissioner clearly must have concluded so, and on this supposition acted. But experience has abundantly proved such a conclusion erroneous, and based upon a partial view of the whole case.

The British representative might have believed that smuggling, in terms of trade interests, would only impact Chinese revenue: the American commissioner obviously must have thought this way and acted on that assumption. However, experience has clearly shown that this conclusion is incorrect and represents a limited perspective on the overall situation.

The solution of all these difficulties, and the end of the apparently hopeless struggle to set things right, came about in a way that must have been totally unexpected 148 by all parties. It was through the capture of Shanghai by the rebel band in 1853.

The solution to all these challenges, and the conclusion of the seemingly hopeless fight to fix things, happened in a way that must have been completely unexpected by everyone involved. It occurred with the takeover of Shanghai by the rebel group in 1853. 148

The day the city fell the functions of the custom-house ceased, but trade continued without interruption; indeed the export trade was naturally stimulated by the eagerness of the natives to convert their produce into money, and by the desire of the foreign merchants to get their purchases safely on board ship. But there was no one in a position to collect the dues. Mr Alcock, never timid when he had a case for action which satisfied his own mind, proposed to his French and American colleagues, who also never seemed to hesitate to follow his lead, a method of bridging over the interregnum of the Chinese authority and at the same time establishing for the first time the precedent of collecting full duties. The plan was that the consuls should themselves perform the functions which the Chinese officials had never performed—take a rigid account of the goods landed and shipped, and receive the amount of the duty on them, to be held in trust for the Chinese Government when it should once more be resuscitated in Shanghai. Not in coin, however, but in promissory notes payable on conditions which were complicated by the necessity of maintaining equality of treatment between the various nationalities concerned. The contingencies were, in fact, such that it would never have been possible to enforce payment of the notes, and in the end they were all cancelled and returned to the merchants, so that during the ten months between September 1853 and July 1854 there were no duties collected at all at the port of Shanghai. 149

The day the city fell, the customs house stopped operating, but trade carried on without a hitch; in fact, the export trade picked up because the locals were eager to turn their goods into cash, and the foreign merchants wanted to get their purchases loaded onto ships safely. However, there was no one around to collect the fees. Mr. Alcock, who was never shy when he had a cause he believed in, suggested to his French and American colleagues—who also seemed ready to back him—a way to get through the gap left by the Chinese authority while also setting a precedent for collecting full duties for the first time. The idea was that the consuls would take on the responsibilities that Chinese officials had neglected—keeping a strict record of the goods that were landed and shipped, and collecting the duty on those goods to hold in trust for the Chinese Government once it was revived in Shanghai. But not in cash; instead, they would be in promissory notes that came with complicated conditions to ensure fairness among the different nationalities involved. The circumstances were such that it would have been impossible to enforce payment of the notes, and ultimately all of them were canceled and returned to the merchants, meaning that during the ten months from September 1853 to July 1854, no duties were collected at the port of Shanghai. 149

IV. CREATION OF THE FOREIGN CUSTOMS.

The provisional system—British and American ships pay full dues—Other nations enter and clear free—Americans follow the same course—Alcock's strict views of neutrality—Danger of infringing it by establishment of Government officials within the foreign colony—Breakdown of the provisional system—Alcock calls upon the Imperial Government—Custom-house re-established by the Taotai Wu—Reappearance of all abuses—Alcock's remonstrances—Antecedents of Wu—He makes private arrangements and admits vessels free of dues—Alcock allows British ships to do likewise—Shanghai thus becomes a free port—Alcock's efforts to meet the difficulty—First idea of the foreign customs—Conditions of success—Conference with the Taotai—Delegates appointed—New custom-house inaugurated July 12, 1854—Mr H. N. Lay appointed Inspector-General—Conditions and essential features which caused immediate and permanent success of the foreign customs.

The temporary system—British and American ships pay full fees—Other countries can enter and leave for free—Americans do the same—Alcock’s strict stance on neutrality—Risk of violating it by having government officials in the foreign colony—Collapse of the temporary system—Alcock appeals to the Imperial Government—Customs office re-established by the Taotai Wu—Return of all issues—Alcock's protests—Background of Wu—He makes private deals and lets ships in without fees—Alcock permits British ships to do the same—Shanghai thus becomes a free port—Alcock’s efforts to resolve the issue—Initial concept of the foreign customs—Requirements for success—Meeting with the Taotai—Delegates appointed—New customs office inaugurated on July 12, 1854—Mr. H. N. Lay appointed Inspector-General—Conditions and key features that led to the immediate and lasting success of the foreign customs.

The "provisional system," as it was called, worked smoothly for four months, but not equally, for while British and American ships paid full duties (in conditional promissory notes), those of other nationalities, having mercantile consuls, were entered and cleared exempt from all duty. One Prussian, one Hamburg, two Siamese, one Austrian, three Danish, and two Spanish—in all ten vessels—were so cleared between September and January, which was, of course, a serious injustice to the competing merchants on whose ventures full duties were levied. In vain might the British consul argue that the cargoes of these defaulting ships bore no larger a proportion to the whole trade than in normal conditions the smugglers would bear to the honest traders. The American consul, sympathising with the latter, notified on January 20, 1854, his secession from the provisional compact, to which decision he gave immediate effect by allowing two vessels, the Oneida and Science, to depart without payment or 150 security of any kind. It was impossible after this for the British authorities to continue to lay a burden on their nationals from which competitors were thus freeing themselves, the more especially as on broader considerations their collecting duties at all for the Chinese had been, three years previously, pronounced inexpedient by the British Government. However commendable, therefore, on political and moral grounds, and however convenient as a stop-gap, the provisional system was doomed. The next move was by some means or other to procure the re-establishment of a legal Chinese custom-house.

The "provisional system," as it was called, worked well for four months, but not evenly. British and American ships paid full duties (in conditional promissory notes), while ships from other nationalities, which had mercantile consuls, were allowed to enter and clear without paying any duties. During that time, ten vessels—one Prussian, one Hamburg, two Siamese, one Austrian, three Danish, and two Spanish—were cleared without duties between September and January. This was obviously a serious injustice to the competing merchants who were charged full duties. The British consul could argue all he wanted that the cargoes of these non-compliant ships represented a small fraction of trade; in normal conditions, smugglers would only make up a small part of honest traders. The American consul, sympathizing with the latter, announced on January 20, 1854, his withdrawal from the provisional agreement. He immediately put this decision into action by allowing two vessels, the Oneida and Science, to leave without any payment or security of any kind. After this, it was impossible for the British authorities to keep imposing a burden on their nationals while competitors were getting off scot-free, especially since the British Government had deemed it impractical to collect duties from the Chinese three years earlier. Therefore, although the provisional system was politically and morally commendable and a practical short-term solution, it was doomed to fail. The next step was to find a way to re-establish a legal Chinese customs house.

This would have been done at an earlier period but for the strict views held by Mr Alcock on the question of neutrality between the belligerents. The soil of the foreign settlement had been declared sacred and neutral. To permit any Chinese authority to use it even for fiscal purposes seemed a violation of its neutrality. Besides, native officials exercising their functions there would have had either to protect themselves by military force, however small, or to be protected by the foreigners, in either case compromising the neutrality of the settlement. When the Chinese officials proposed as an alternative to discharge customs functions afloat in the river, the same objections presented themselves. The foreigners must in that case also have defended the revenue collectors from attack by the rebels. The customs authority therefore remained dormant.

This could have been done earlier, but Mr. Alcock had strict views on maintaining neutrality between the warring parties. The land in the foreign settlement had been declared sacred and neutral. Allowing any Chinese authority to use it, even for tax purposes, seemed like a breach of its neutrality. Furthermore, local officials carrying out their duties there would have to either protect themselves with military force, no matter how small, or rely on the foreigners for protection, which would compromise the settlement's neutrality. When Chinese officials suggested an alternative to handle customs duties on the river, the same objections arose. In that case, the foreigners would also have to protect the revenue collectors from attacks by the rebels. As a result, the customs authority remained inactive.

But on the breakdown of the provisional system whereby the three treaty consuls acted as trustees for the Chinese Government, there was no alternative left between making Shanghai absolutely a free port and setting up some sort of native custom-house. As the 151 lesser evil—to say no more—Mr Alcock chose the latter, and within three weeks of the lapse of the provisional system he had "called upon the imperial authorities to re-establish a custom-house in some convenient locality," offering at the same time to afford them the necessary facilities for working it. The custom-house was, in fact, re-established by the Taotai Wu on February 9, when the provisional system of collecting duties, a system never favoured by the British Government, was finally and officially terminated.

But when the temporary system, where the three treaty consuls acted as trustees for the Chinese Government, fell apart, there was no choice left between making Shanghai completely a free port or setting up some kind of local custom-house. As the 151 lesser evil—need I say more—Mr. Alcock chose the latter, and within three weeks of the end of the temporary system, he had "called upon the imperial authorities to re-establish a custom-house in some convenient location," also offering them the necessary support to operate it. The custom-house was, in fact, re-established by the Taotai Wu on February 9, when the temporary duty collection system, which the British Government never supported, was finally and officially ended.

The reinstatement of the custom-house under the superintendency of the Taotai Wu was the signal for the prompt reappearance of all the worst irregularities in an exaggerated form.

The reopening of the customs house under the supervision of Taotai Wu triggered the quick return of all the worst irregularities, but in a more exaggerated way.

The admonitions that official received from Mr Alcock on his treaty rights and on the necessity for strictness and impartial accuracy were completely thrown away. The Taotai had been formerly a merchant in Canton, under the name Samqua; and whether it was the passion for a "deal" inspired by early training, or the corruption of good manners by subsequent association with official life, or, as is most likely, a double dose of both, without the checks appropriate to either, he, the superintendent of customs, fell at once to making private bargains with individual merchants. By arrangement with him a Bremen ship, the Aristides, was allowed to enter and clear without complying with a single customs or port regulation or the payment of any dues, save what may have been paid to Wu himself by way of douceur. Two American ships and one British were dealt with in similar fashion. These facts being brought to the notice of Mr Alcock, he called the Taotai to account, and on receiving only subterfuges 152 instead of explanation, he thenceforth allowed openly to British ships the same privileges that the Chinese authorities had voluntarily, though secretly, conferred on those who chose to make corrupt bargains with them. That is to say, Shanghai became now—from April 1854—absolutely a free port.

The warnings that the official received from Mr. Alcock about his treaty rights and the need for strictness and unbiased accuracy were completely ignored. The Taotai had previously been a merchant in Canton, known as Samqua; whether it was a desire for a "deal" from his early training, the corruption of good manners from later involvement in official life, or, most likely, a combination of both without the proper checks, the customs superintendent immediately began making private deals with individual merchants. He arranged for a Bremen ship, the Aristides, to enter and leave without following any customs or port regulations or paying any fees, except possibly what might have been paid directly to Wu as a bribe. Two American ships and one British ship were treated in a similar way. When Mr. Alcock became aware of these facts, he held the Taotai accountable, and when he received only evasions instead of a proper explanation, he then allowed British ships to openly enjoy the same privileges that the Chinese authorities had secretly granted to those willing to make corrupt deals. In other words, Shanghai became completely a free port starting in April 1854.

At last, then, there was a real tabula rasa inviting a fresh experiment; and Mr Alcock immediately applied his mind to devising some new expedient to meet the difficulty. The Chinese superintendent, however willing to compound to his own advantage for the customs dues, was as little pleased with its complete abolition as the foreign authorities themselves, and he had made sundry alternative proposals, based on his experience at Canton, for the effective collection of duties. It seemed, however, that in the hands of such a facile official, or any one likely to succeed him, his remedies against smuggling were worse than the disease, and the necessity of a new departure began seriously to occupy the minds of the treaty consuls. The outcome was a novel scheme, which was mooted in a despatch to Sir John Bowring, dated May 1, 1854, in which Consul Alcock, while recognising that "the attempt will not be unaccompanied by serious difficulties," declared that he "did not relinquish all hope of success if the collection of duties can in any way be brought under the effective control of the three treaty Powers as to the executive of the custom-house administration."

At last, there was a true tabula rasa inviting a fresh start, and Mr. Alcock immediately began thinking of a new way to address the issue. The Chinese superintendent, while willing to negotiate for his own benefit regarding the customs fees, was just as unhappy about their complete removal as the foreign authorities were. He made several alternative suggestions, based on his experience in Canton, for effectively collecting duties. However, it seemed that in the hands of such a flexible official, or anyone likely to take his place, his solutions to combat smuggling were worse than the problem itself, and the need for a new approach began to seriously concern the treaty consuls. The result was a new plan proposed in a dispatch to Sir John Bowring, dated May 1, 1854, in which Consul Alcock stated that, while he acknowledged "the attempt will not be without serious challenges," he "did not give up all hope of success if the collection of duties can in any way be brought under the effective control of the three treaty Powers regarding the management of the customs administration."

"On any other basis," he added, "I believe every effort to benefit the Chinese revenue and at the same time protect the honest merchant must in the nature of things prove nugatory." The idea took further shape in a memorandum of suggestions drawn up by Mr 153 Alcock on 15th June, when he stated that "the sole issue out of the difficulties by which the whole subject is beset under existing treaties is to be sought in the combination of a foreign element of probity and vigilance with Chinese authority."

"On any other basis," he added, "I think that any effort to improve Chinese revenue while also protecting honest merchants will ultimately be pointless." This idea took more form in a memorandum of suggestions created by Mr 153 Alcock on June 15th, when he stated that "the only way to resolve the difficulties surrounding this issue under current treaties is to find a balance between a foreign element of integrity and oversight with Chinese authority."

He adds as the first condition of success the "free concurrence of the Chinese authorities" in any scheme which may be concocted, and then proposes "the association with the Chinese executive of a responsible and trustworthy foreign inspector of customs as the delegate of the three treaty Powers, to be appointed by the consuls and Taotai conjointly at a liberal salary." This is put down at $6000 per annum, the whole foreign staff to cost $12,000, and various details of administration follow.

He states that the first requirement for success is the "full agreement of the Chinese authorities" in any plan that may be developed, and then suggests "the partnership with the Chinese executive of a reliable and trustworthy foreign customs inspector as the representative of the three treaty powers, to be appointed by the consuls and Taotai together at a generous salary." This salary is set at $6000 per year, with the total cost for the foreign staff being $12,000, followed by various administrative details.

It argues well for the absence of international jealousy in those days that Mr Alcock proposed that a French gentleman of the name of Smith, in the French consular service, should be the inspector whom he and the American consul agreed to recommend to the Taotai. In a despatch to M. Edan on the 27th of June 1854 he solicited his official sanction to the appointment.

It makes a strong point about the lack of international jealousy back then that Mr. Alcock suggested a French gentleman named Smith, who was in the French consular service, as the inspector that he and the American consul decided to recommend to the Taotai. In a letter to M. Edan on June 27, 1854, he requested his official approval for the appointment.

The next step was a conference where the three treaty consuls—Alcock, Murphy, and Edan—received the Taotai, who discussed with them and then adopted substantially, though with some modifications, the "suggestions" above quoted.

The next step was a conference where the three treaty consuls—Alcock, Murphy, and Edan—met with the Taotai, who discussed and then largely accepted the "suggestions" mentioned above, although with some modifications.

Instead of one delegate from the three consuls, it was decided that each was to appoint one, the three delegates then forming a "board of inspectors with a single and united action." As many questions of national and international jurisdiction were likely to 154 arise out of the executive functions of the inspectors, provision was made for dealing with them, and as far as human ingenuity could foresee without any experience to guide, every contingency, down to the minutiæ of internal administration, was considered in the instructions given to the inspectors. The announcement of the newly-constituted Customs Board was formally made by the consuls on July 6, and the new custom-house was inaugurated on the 12th, the three inspectors being Mr T. F. Wade, British; Mr Lewis Carr, American; and M. Smith, French.

Instead of having one delegate from the three consuls, it was decided that each consul would appoint one delegate, and the three delegates would form a "board of inspectors with a single and united action." Since many issues of national and international jurisdiction were likely to arise from the executive functions of the inspectors, arrangements were made to address them. As far as human ingenuity could predict without any past experience to guide them, every possible situation, down to the details of internal administration, was taken into account in the instructions given to the inspectors. The announcement of the newly-formed Customs Board was officially made by the consuls on July 6, and the new customs house was opened on the 12th. The three inspectors were Mr. T. F. Wade from Britain, Mr. Lewis Carr from America, and M. Smith from France.

The new custom-house was an immediate success: it fulfilled every purpose for which it was created, yielding its full revenue to the Chinese Government, and putting an end to the temptations of traders to seek illicit advantages over each other. It says much for the soundness of the principles on which it was established that not only has the custom-house of 1854 survived the shock of rebellion and war, of extended treaties, of the multiplication of trading-ports from five to thirty and of treaty Powers from three to thirteen, but its roots have struck deep and its branches have spread wide over every portion of the empire, and that in spite of the opposition of powerful provincial officials, whose revenues it curtailed by diverting them into the imperial channel. The triumvirate Board under which the institution was launched was little more than nominal, the direction of the customs being a one-man power from the outset, one only of the three inspectors possessing either the knowledge, capacity, or zeal needed to infuse life into the new department.

The new custom-house was an instant success: it achieved every goal it was designed for, generating its full revenue for the Chinese Government and eliminating the temptations for traders to seek unfair advantages over one another. It speaks volumes about the solid principles on which it was built that not only has the custom-house of 1854 endured the upheaval of rebellion and war, the expansion of treaties, and the rise of trading ports from five to thirty and treaty Powers from three to thirteen, but its roots have taken hold and its branches have spread widely across the entire empire. This has happened despite the resistance from powerful provincial officials, whose revenues were impacted as they were redirected into the imperial system. The Board of three that initiated the institution had little real power, as the customs were essentially run by a single individual from the very beginning, with only one of the three inspectors having the knowledge, ability, or enthusiasm needed to energize the new department.

The first English inspector, who was only lent for a time to start the new enterprise, was replaced in a few 155 months by Mr H. N. Lay, interpreter to the consulate, who definitively retired from the British in order to enter the Chinese service, while Mr Wade returned to his vice-consular duties. The functions of the Board of Inspectors were soon consolidated in the office of Inspector-General, which was conferred upon Mr Lay, and held by him until 1863, when he was obliged to resign the service of the Chinese Government in consequence of their failure to ratify his engagements in connection with the Osborn flotilla.

The first English inspector, who was only temporarily assigned to kick off the new venture, was replaced in a few 155 months by Mr. H. N. Lay, interpreter for the consulate. He ultimately retired from British service to join the Chinese government, while Mr. Wade went back to his vice-consular duties. The responsibilities of the Board of Inspectors were quickly brought together under the role of Inspector-General, which was given to Mr. Lay and held by him until 1863, when he was forced to resign from the Chinese Government because they didn’t honor his agreements regarding the Osborn flotilla.

It only remains to mention in this place that coincident with the establishment of the maritime customs in Shanghai came the instructions from her Majesty's Government to cancel the promissory notes, amounting to a million of dollars, which had been given by the British merchants for duties during the interregnum, the conditions attached rendering them legally invalid.

It should be noted that when the maritime customs were set up in Shanghai, her Majesty's Government instructed the cancellation of the promissory notes totaling a million dollars that had been issued by British merchants for duties during the interim period, as the conditions attached made them legally invalid.

Although the organisation of the foreign customs was an expedient to meet an emergency never likely to recur, the transaction, nevertheless, forms a brief epitome of the ideal foreign relations with China, and it is useful therefore to note what were its essential features and the conditions of its creation.

Although the setup of the foreign customs was a quick solution for a temporary emergency, this situation still serves as a short summary of the ideal foreign relations with China. It's helpful to highlight its key elements and the circumstances that led to its establishment.

First. The Chinese Government were reduced to helplessness and were amenable to advice.

First. The Chinese Government was brought to a point of helplessness and was open to suggestions.

Second. Corruption and laxity were inherent in their nature and ineradicable except by external force.

Second. Corruption and laxity were part of their nature and could only be eliminated by external force.

Third. The external force, to be savingly applied, must not be subversive of Chinese authority, but must supply the element in administration in which the natives are absolutely wanting, and which is so tersely summarised by Mr Alcock as "vigilance and probity."

Third. The external support, to be effectively applied, must not undermine Chinese authority but should provide the aspect of governance that the locals completely lack, which Mr. Alcock neatly sums up as "vigilance and honesty."

Fourth. This combination of Chinese authority with 156 foreign vigilance and probity, which has rendered the Chinese customs service a kind of miracle of reform, was capable of renovating the whole Chinese administration. Why it has not been extended into the other departments of state is only another form of lament over lost opportunities.

Fourth. This blend of Chinese authority with 156 foreign oversight and integrity, which has made the Chinese customs service a remarkable example of reform, had the potential to transform the entire Chinese administration. The fact that it hasn't been implemented in the other state departments is just another way of expressing regret over missed opportunities.

Fifth. That the system was established on the broadest cosmopolitan basis.

Fifth. That the system was set up on the widest global foundation.

V. MR ALCOCK'S DEPARTURE FROM SHANGHAI.

Promoted to Canton—Impression he had made upon the European colony of Shanghai—Their confidence in his integrity and ability—His domestic life—First literary work—Condition of affairs at Canton—Difficulties and obstructions—Alcock leaves for home before the outbreak of 1856.

Promoted to Canton—The impression he made on the European community in Shanghai—Their trust in his honesty and skills—His home life—His first piece of writing—The situation in Canton—Challenges and barriers—Alcock departs for home before the start of 1856.

With these distinguished services Mr Alcock's career in Shanghai was brought to a close. He was promoted to the senior consulate at Canton, but he remained long enough in his northern post to see the city of Shanghai once more in possession of the constituted authorities and the restoration of peace in the vicinity of the port. Being practically starved out, the insurgents set fire to the city and made the best escape they could during the night, which happened to be the last night of the Chinese year, 17th February 1855. Some may have escaped, but the greater part fell into the hands of their enemies, and for weeks afterwards many a ghastly trophy in the neighbourhood attested the ruthless treatment which the fugitives received, recalling the realistic picture in a certain epitaph of Villon. 157

With these distinguished services, Mr. Alcock's time in Shanghai came to an end. He was promoted to the senior consulate in Canton, but he stayed long enough in his northern position to witness the city of Shanghai once again being under the control of the authorized authorities and the restoration of peace around the port. Facing starvation, the insurgents set fire to the city and made a desperate escape during the night, which was the last night of the Chinese year, February 17, 1855. Some may have managed to escape, but most fell into the hands of their enemies, and for weeks afterward, many gruesome trophies in the area showed the brutal treatment that the fugitives endured, reminiscent of a vivid description in a certain epitaph by Villon. 157

RUSTIC SCENE NEAR SHANGHAI.

Rural scene near Shanghai.

On his departure from Shanghai in April of that year Mr Alcock received a flattering testimonial from the British residents, who were cordially joined by both French and Americans. This compliment had the special value of being practically unanimous, while yet by no means undiscriminating. As a curious characteristic of the social relations of the community at that time, it may be mentioned that the document was presented in two parts, substantially the same, but differently worded. The explanation of the dual presentation is to be found in the etiquette which was commonly observed between the Montagues and the Capulets of the period, it being considered a point of honour that neither should follow the signature of the other; hence the two leading members of the community had each to head a separate list.

On his departure from Shanghai in April of that year, Mr. Alcock received a flattering testimonial from the British residents, who were warmly joined by both the French and Americans. This compliment was especially valuable as it was practically unanimous, yet still discerning. An interesting aspect of the community's social relations at that time is that the document was presented in two parts, which were essentially the same but worded differently. The reason for this dual presentation comes from the etiquette commonly observed between the Montagues and the Capulets of the era, as it was considered a matter of honor that neither should follow the signature of the other; thus, the two leading members of the community had to each head a separate list.

It was impossible for an officer of such strict views and such an uncompromising character to live for eight years in the midst of an independent population whom he had to treat as his subjects without provoking occasional resentment, and creating friction in carrying out the details of his administration. Moreover, his public acts were of too decisive a quality to commend themselves to universal approval. Yet, frankly recognising all this, the memorialists state, "In whatever degree as individuals we may have approved or dissented from any of your acts of public policy, we are all ready to do justice to the singleness of purpose and sense of public duty under which you have uniformly acted. We believe that you have throughout held in view your conscientious convictions of what was right and just, and that no undue external influence has at any time operated to divert you from them." In fact, the 158 Shanghai community—quorum pars fui—were proud of their consul, and looked up to him as soldiers do to a commander in whom they have absolute confidence. They felt themselves ennobled by contact with a character sans peur et sans reproche. Above all, he represented before the Chinese authorities the dignity of his country in a manner which has rarely been equalled, and gratitude for that patriotic service would of itself have covered a multitude of sins. The feeling of respect so generated reconciled the residents to that which in another man might have been held to savour of coldness, for in social life he was reserved, if not somewhat haughty in his bearing,—partly no doubt from temperament, but chiefly from absorption in the duties and responsibilities of his office, in researches into all the matters which concerned his work, and in the study of subjects which were congenial to his mind. It may also be said, without reflection on either party, that those robust recreations which engrossed the leisure of younger men—and the community was very young—were not of a kind with which the consul had much personal sympathy. His own distractions were more of a literary and reflective order. He did not unbend to gain popularity.

It was impossible for an officer with such strict views and an uncompromising character to live for eight years among an independent population he had to treat as his subjects without occasionally provoking resentment and creating friction in his administration. Additionally, his public actions were too decisive to gain universal approval. Acknowledging this, the memorialists state, "Regardless of how we individually might have agreed or disagreed with your public policy decisions, we are all ready to recognize the single-minded purpose and sense of public duty with which you have consistently acted. We believe that you have always held firm to your conscientious convictions of what is right and just, and that no undue external pressures have ever swayed you from them." In fact, the 158 Shanghai community—quorum pars fui—were proud of their consul and regarded him with the same respect that soldiers have for a commander they trust completely. They felt uplifted by their association with a person sans peur et sans reproche. Above all, he represented the dignity of his country before the Chinese authorities in a way that is rarely matched, and gratitude for that patriotic service alone would have overshadowed a multitude of faults. The respect he inspired made the residents tolerant of what might have seemed coldness from another person, for in social situations he was reserved, if not somewhat haughty—partly due to his temperament, but mainly because he was deeply focused on the duties and responsibilities of his office, researching everything related to his work, and studying subjects that interested him. It can also be said, without offending either side, that the vigorous activities that occupied the free time of younger men—who made up a large part of the community—were not the kind the consul personally enjoyed. His own pastimes were more literary and introspective. He didn't relax to gain popularity.

His domestic life left him nothing to desire in the way of society. To his wife he was most devoted, and to her he addressed, in half soliloquy, a series of thoughts on religious subjects which reveal more than anything the deep earnestness of his nature. When this loving helpmeet was snatched from his side in March 1853, the calm exterior was little disturbed; but having to face that immense gap in his life, he was thrown more than ever on his mental resources. His isolation was 159 the more keenly felt when he was relieved from the heavy demand which the affairs of Shanghai had made on his energies, and it was in the comparative leisure of Canton that he composed his first serious political contribution to periodical literature, an outlet for his thoughts which proved such an attraction to him to the end of his life. His first essay was an article in the 'Bombay Quarterly Review' on "The Chinese Empire and its Destinies," published in October 1855. It was soon followed by a second, entitled "The Chinese Empire and its Foreign Relations," a paper which fills no less than seventy-eight pages of the 'Review.' The two together form an able disquisition on the state of China which has not become obsolete by lapse of time.

His home life left him with no desire for social interaction. He was deeply devoted to his wife, sharing with her, almost as if in a monologue, a series of thoughts on religious matters that highlighted the seriousness of his character. When this loving partner was taken from him in March 1853, he maintained a calm facade; however, facing the enormous void in his life pushed him to rely even more on his intellectual abilities. His sense of isolation became even more pronounced when he was freed from the heavy demands that Shanghai had placed on him, and it was during the relative quiet of Canton that he wrote his first significant political piece for periodical literature, a pursuit that captured his interest for the rest of his life. His first essay was an article in the 'Bombay Quarterly Review' titled "The Chinese Empire and its Destinies," published in October 1855. It was quickly followed by a second piece, "The Chinese Empire and its Foreign Relations," which spans a substantial seventy-eight pages in the 'Review.' Together, these works present a competent analysis of China's situation that remains relevant over time.

It was during the same period also that he composed that series of short essays which were published anonymously under the title of 'Life's Problems.' Instead of attempting any appreciation of that little volume, we prefer to quote the impression it made on one reader many years afterwards. In a letter of Dora Greenwell, published in her Memoirs, she says: "I have met with a friend, a book that seems to take my whole rational nature along with it. I have seen no such book now or at any former time; and it is a book I have often longed for, yet never hoped for—a book contemplating life as it is in a Christian spirit, yet from the natural standpoint."

It was during the same time that he wrote a series of short essays that were published anonymously under the title 'Life's Problems.' Instead of trying to evaluate that little book, we prefer to share the impression it left on one reader many years later. In a letter from Dora Greenwell, published in her Memoirs, she writes: "I have come across a friend, a book that seems to engage my entire rational being. I haven't encountered a book like this now or at any other time; it's a book I've often wished for but never expected—a book that looks at life as it is in a Christian spirit, yet from a natural perspective."

The consulate in Canton during the year that Mr Alcock occupied the post presented nothing of sensational interest. There was a superficial lull there, the lull before the storm which burst in October 1856, after Mr Alcock had left for home on his first well-earned 160 furlough. The chronic obstruction to business and the old difficulties in communicating with the Chinese authorities formed the burden of his reports to his chief, Sir John Bowring. The question of direct intercourse and of access to the city, which had been put off from time to time, was still unsettled. The definitive postponement of the treaty right of entry till 1849 had not rendered the solution of it one whit easier. On the contrary, the concession had only served to confirm the Chinese officials and people in their determination to resist the claim for ever. On the accession of Lord Palmerston to the Premiership in 1855 the dormant claim was revived, and Sir John Bowring was instructed by the Government to obtain unrestricted intercourse with the native authorities and the full exercise of the right of admission to all the cities which were opened to trade, Canton included. To repeated applications of this tenor the Viceroy Yeh replied by the traditional evasions, thus laying the train for the explosion which soon followed.

The consulate in Canton during the year Mr. Alcock held the position had nothing particularly dramatic happening. There was a calmness, the calm before the storm that hit in October 1856, after Mr. Alcock returned home for his first well-deserved 160 break. The ongoing obstacles to business and the usual issues with communicating with the Chinese authorities dominated his reports to his boss, Sir John Bowring. The issue of direct interactions and access to the city, which had been postponed repeatedly, was still unresolved. The definitive delay of the treaty right of entry until 1849 hadn’t made things any easier. In fact, this concession only strengthened the determination of Chinese officials and citizens to resist the claim indefinitely. When Lord Palmerston became Prime Minister in 1855, the long-dormant claim was brought back to life, and Sir John Bowring was instructed by the Government to secure unrestricted communication with local authorities and full access to all cities open to trade, including Canton. In response to repeated requests of this nature, Viceroy Yeh responded with the usual evasions, setting the stage for the explosion that would soon occur.

Mr Alcock being personally severed from the chain of events which led to the outbreak of hostilities in the autumn of 1856, it will be convenient here to suspend the narrative and glance at some of those general questions which form the subject-matter of our relations with China. 161

Mr. Alcock was personally disconnected from the chain of events that led to the start of the conflict in the fall of 1856, so it's a good point to pause the story and take a look at some of the broader issues that relate to our relationship with China. 161

CHAPTER X.

CONSUL ALCOCK'S PERSPECTIVES ON OVERALL POLICY.

Essays on international relations—Foresight—Its connection with succeeding events—The Canton city question resuscitated.

Essays on international relations—Foresight—Its link to future events—The Canton city issue brought back to life.

Among serious students of the international problems arising out of the forced intercourse of the Western nations with China, Sir Rutherford Alcock occupies the first rank. In the long roll of consular and diplomatic agents employed by the British Government since 1833 he stands alone in the effort to evolve a reasonable working scheme out of the chaos of blunders and misunderstandings which marked the opening of China to foreign trade. Mr Taylor Meadows, another consular officer, though equally far-sighted, was perhaps too philosophical for the exigencies of current business. Consul Alcock's political philosophy, on the other hand, grew entirely out of the facts with which he had to deal from day to day, and was therefore essentially practical.

Among serious students of the international issues arising from the forced interaction of Western nations with China, Sir Rutherford Alcock stands out. In the long list of consular and diplomatic agents employed by the British Government since 1833, he is unique in his attempt to create a sensible working approach from the chaos of mistakes and misunderstandings that characterized the opening of China to foreign trade. Mr. Taylor Meadows, another consular officer, though equally perceptive, may have been too philosophical for the demands of the time. On the other hand, Consul Alcock's political philosophy was entirely based on the realities he faced each day, making it fundamentally practical.

It might seem that fifty-year-old disquisitions on what we now call the "China question" must have too much of the musty odour of ancient history about them to afford profitable reading to a generation 162 which has only been aroused by the thunder of events to take an interest—and that as yet perfunctory—in the affairs of the Far East. But as Mr Alcock had the faculty of getting to the heart of things, of seizing the principles which do not change, his early studies have lost neither validity nor value through the lapse of years. On these well-digested observations, accordingly, modern inquirers may confidently rely as on a corner-stone of Anglo-Chinese politics well and truly laid. And the lapse of time, so far from detracting from the utility of these opinions, enhances their value. For by extending the base of observation over a long period, errors due to personal equation, change of circumstance, and other temporary causes, are eliminated from the survey, and the seeker after truth is thus furnished with a trustworthy criterion by which he may verify his conclusions. The forecast of 1849, realised in the developments of 1900, affords strong proof that the earlier generalisations were not the result of ingenious speculation.

It might seem that fifty-year-old discussions on what we now call the "China question" are too outdated to interest a generation that has only just started paying attention to the events in the Far East. However, since Mr. Alcock had a knack for getting to the core of issues and understanding the principles that remain unchanged, his early studies are still relevant and valuable today. Modern researchers can confidently rely on these well-considered insights as a solid foundation of Anglo-Chinese politics. In fact, the passing of time actually increases the significance of these views. By broadening the observation period, we eliminate errors from personal bias, changing circumstances, and other temporary factors, providing those seeking truth with a reliable standard to verify their findings. The predictions from 1849, which became evident in the events of 1900, strongly demonstrate that those early conclusions were not just the product of clever guessing.

It seems reasonable, therefore, here to introduce some of the reflections of Consul Alcock while he was as yet comparatively new to China. These occur in various forms, as in confidential despatches, in private memoranda, and notes for literary articles apparently never extended. One of these notes, dated January 19, 1849, summing up the results of six years' working of the treaty of Nanking, may well serve as a landmark in the record of foreign intercourse with China.

It seems appropriate, then, to share some of Consul Alcock's thoughts while he was still relatively new to China. These reflections appear in different forms, such as confidential dispatches, private memos, and notes for literary articles that were apparently never finished. One of these notes, dated January 19, 1849, summarizing the outcomes of six years of the Nanking treaty's implementation, could serve as an important milestone in the history of foreign relations with China.

Some extracts from this and other papers are printed for the convenience of the reader in an Appendix to the 163 present volume.[16] Though bearing directly on the policy of the time when they were written, they are no less applicable to present circumstances. They show that nothing had changed then, as nothing has changed since, in the attitude of the Chinese to foreign nations. "The same arrogant and hostile spirit exists, and their policy is still to degrade foreigners in the eyes of the people.... Without the power [on our part] of commanding attention to any just demands, there is every reason to believe the Chinese rulers would still be the most impracticable of Orientals.... We cannot hope that any effort of ours or of the emperor would suffice to change at once the character and habits of the people or even the population of a city."

Some excerpts from this and other papers are included for the reader's convenience in an Appendix to the 163 current volume. Although they directly relate to the policies of the time they were written, they are just as relevant to today's situations. They illustrate that nothing has changed then, just as nothing has changed since, regarding the Chinese attitude towards foreign nations. "The same arrogant and hostile spirit remains, and their policy continues to undermine foreigners in the eyes of the people... Without our ability to draw attention to any reasonable demands, we have every reason to think that the Chinese leaders would still be among the most difficult of Orientals... We cannot expect that any effort from us or the emperor would be enough to instantly transform the character and habits of the people or even the residents of a city."

While advocating a resolute policy in maintaining all British rights granted by treaty, the far-sighted consul uttered a timely caution against pushing demands for concessions too far. In this he was in accord with the policy, often enunciated by the British Government, of not imperilling what we already possessed by striving after more. Mr Alcock indicates clearly the danger which threatened British interests from the prospective influx of Western Powers pressing through the doors which Great Britain might be constrained to open:—

While promoting a strong stance on upholding all British rights granted by treaty, the insightful consul issued a timely warning about pushing demands for concessions too far. He aligned with the policy, frequently stated by the British Government, of not jeopardizing what we already had by seeking more. Mr. Alcock clearly points out the danger that British interests faced from the potential influx of Western Powers pushing through the doors that Great Britain might have to open:—

Powers who, having no such great interests to jeopardise, are without this beneficial and most needful check, and may therefore be induced to repeat at a semi-barbarian Court the intrigues and counter-projects for the destruction of our influence and the injury of our trade in the East which are at work in our own times in every capital in Europe, as formerly in India and the Eastern Archipelago.

Powers that don’t have significant interests at stake lack this important and necessary check, and may therefore be tempted to engage in intrigues and counter-plans at a semi-barbarian court to undermine our influence and damage our trade in the East, similar to what is happening right now in every capital in Europe, as it did before in India and the Eastern Archipelago.

Nor could a much more accurate description of the state of affairs now existing be given than the picture of the future drawn by Consul Alcock:—

Nor could a much more accurate description of the current situation be given than the vision of the future presented by Consul Alcock:—

Russia, France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, and America, with their several jealousies and united rivalry with England, their missionary enterprises or commercial and political schemes clashing in their aim and development, are all capable of creating such turmoil, strife, and disturbance throughout the empire, if free access to the Court and the provinces were insisted upon by Great Britain, as could only end in the ejection of Europeans from China as formerly from Japan, or an intestine war in which European force would probably be involved on opposite sides, and to their mutual destruction as States with commercial interests in the country. These, again, might lead to attempts at territorial possession, suggested in the first instance, as in India, in self-defence, and afterwards continued from necessity. With Russia spreading her gigantic arms to the north and east, Great Britain on the south and west, Spain, Holland, and Portugal with their colonies in the Chinese and Indian seas, a struggle for superiority on the soil of China for exclusive advantages or predominant influence might be centred in Peking and embroil the whole of Europe in hostile relations.

Russia, France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, and America, each with their own jealousies and united rivalry against England, their missionary efforts or commercial and political plans conflicting in purpose and execution, all have the potential to create massive turmoil, strife, and disturbances across the empire. If Great Britain insisted on unrestricted access to the Court and the provinces, it could lead to the expulsion of Europeans from China, similar to what happened in Japan, or a civil war where European forces might end up on opposite sides, ultimately leading to their mutual destruction as nations with business interests in the region. This could also spark attempts at territorial control, initially justified as self-defense, but later driven by necessity. With Russia expanding to the north and east, Great Britain to the south and west, and Spain, Holland, and Portugal with their colonies in the Chinese and Indian seas, a battle for dominance in China for exclusive benefits or major influence could center in Beijing and drag all of Europe into hostile relations.

An interesting feature in the prognostications of both Mr Alcock and Mr Meadows in those early days was the ignoring of the Power which is now assuming such an active part in the rearrangement of the Far East. Germany was not even thought of as a world Power, but her entry on the stage has only added confirmation to the soundness of all these predictions.

An interesting aspect of the predictions made by Mr. Alcock and Mr. Meadows in those early days was their failure to acknowledge the power that is now playing such a significant role in the restructuring of the Far East. Germany wasn’t even considered a global power, but her emergence has only strengthened the validity of all these forecasts.

The more immediate significance, however, of the elaborate exposition of the Anglo-Chinese situation which we are now considering, lay in its connection with the chain of events which followed within a few years, and its coincidence with the progress in the 165 views of the British Government, which might almost be traced back to the date of the paper. The year 1849 was one of the critical epochs in foreign intercourse with China, for it was then that the last promissory note as to the opening of Canton became due, and was dishonoured. The years of grace successively granted to the Chinese authorities to enable them to prepare for the execution of the treaty stipulation had been used by them, or at any rate by the populace, to render its execution permanently impossible. Mr Bonham, who proceeded up the river to apply for the fulfilment of the agreement of 1847, which promised admission to the city within two years, was received, not with the suave evasion of Kiying but with the coarse rebuff of Governor-General Seu, who amid popular enthusiasm caused a memorial arch to be erected to commemorate the third repulse of the barbarians. The turning-point of affairs had been now reached; the scales fell from the eyes of the British Government. Reluctantly they were driven to the conclusion that they had for seven years been trifled with, that their agents, one after another, had been duped; that while they deluded themselves by imagining that by their concessions they were pouring oil on water, they were, in fact, throwing that inflammable substance on fire. Such systematic blunders could not be made with impunity. It began, in short, to be perceived that the ground so weakly surrendered at Canton could not be recovered without, in the prophetic words of Lord Palmerston, "coming to blows" once more with the Chinese.

The more immediate significance of the detailed explanation of the Anglo-Chinese situation that we're looking at now lies in its connection to the series of events that followed in a few years, and how it coincided with the changing views of the British Government, which can almost be traced back to the date of this report. The year 1849 was a crucial point in foreign relations with China, as it was the time when the last promise regarding the opening of Canton was due and was not honored. The extensions granted to the Chinese authorities to help them get ready to fulfill the treaty terms were used, at least by the public, to make the execution of those terms permanently impossible. Mr. Bonham, who went up the river to request the fulfillment of the 1847 agreement that promised access to the city within two years, was met not with the smooth avoidance of Kiying but with the harsh rejection from Governor-General Seu, who, amidst public support, had a memorial arch built to celebrate the third defeat of the "barbarians." The turning point had now arrived; the British Government finally saw the situation clearly. Reluctantly, they reached the conclusion that they had been toyed with for seven years, that their agents had been deceived one after another; while they had convinced themselves that their concessions were calming tensions, they were actually pouring fuel on the fire. Such persistent mistakes could not go unpunished. In short, it began to be understood that the ground that had been weakly given up at Canton could not be taken back without, in the prescient words of Lord Palmerston, "coming to blows" with the Chinese once again.

The attention of the British Government being thus 166 seriously directed to China, they entered into correspondence with their plenipotentiary, the governor of Hongkong, as to the best means of arresting the decline of British prestige and of placing the interests of trade and residence on a satisfactory footing. The plenipotentiary had no resource but one for obtaining either information or advice on such large questions, and that was always Consul Alcock at Shanghai, a thousand miles from the seat of trouble, who had not then even seen Canton. Mr Alcock was alert to respond to the invitation of his chief, copiously, fearlessly, and with masterly lucidity as well as comprehensiveness. In a despatch to Sir George Bonham dated January 13, 1852, the development of the new policy may be traced.[17] And the whole situation is fully laid bare in a further despatch of June 17, 1852.[18]

The British Government, therefore, began to focus seriously on China. They communicated with their representative, the governor of Hong Kong, about the best ways to stop the decline of British influence and to ensure that trade and residency interests were on solid ground. The only resource available to gather information or advice on such significant matters was Consul Alcock in Shanghai, a thousand miles away from the problems, who had not even visited Canton at that time. Mr. Alcock was quick to respond to his superior's request, providing detailed, bold, and clearly articulated insights. In a letter to Sir George Bonham dated January 13, 1852, the evolution of the new policy can be identified. Additionally, the entire situation is thoroughly explained in another letter dated June 17, 1852.

This confidential official correspondence,[19] carried on for a number of years, constitutes a natural introduction to the chapter of history which was about to open. In the transactions which led to a second rupture with China Consul Alcock had personally no part, for he was on leave in England, but there also his voice was heard in the discussion of the causes and objects of the war.

This confidential official correspondence, [19] went on for several years and serves as a natural introduction to the chapter of history that was about to unfold. In the events that led to a second break with China, Consul Alcock had no personal involvement since he was on leave in England, but his opinions were still considered in the discussions about the reasons and goals of the war.

In a series of letters to the press, during 1857-58, commenting on the progress of events, Mr Alcock endeavoured to keep the British public informed of what was transpiring in China, the reasons for it, and the probable consequences. These letters were republished in pamphlet form, of course anonymously.

In a series of letters to the press between 1857 and 1858, Mr. Alcock tried to keep the British public updated on what was happening in China, why it was happening, and what the likely outcomes would be. These letters were published again as a pamphlet, of course anonymously.

CHAPTER XI.

TRADE UNDER THE TREATY OF NANKING.

Trade the sole motive in all British and American dealings with China—Simplicity of this trade—Chief staple imports and exports—Data for any review of Chinese trade—Mutual alarm caused by excess of imports—Peculiar conditions of British trade—Entailing a loss of over 30 per cent, yet steadily maintained—System of barter—Consequent impossibility of clear accounts—And ignorance of position at any given moment—Trade also hampered by traditions of the East India Company—Such as that of keeping large stores on hand—Gradual improvement on these methods—Advantages of landed investment in China—Perceived and acted on by the Jesuits—And later by foreign merchants—The American trade—Similarity of currency—Excess of Chinese exports met by shipments of specie—And later by credits on London banks.

Trade is the main focus in all British and American interactions with China—Simplicity of this trade—Key imports and exports—Data for any evaluation of Chinese trade—Mutual concern caused by a surplus of imports—Unique conditions of British trade—Resulting in a loss of over 30 percent, yet consistently upheld—Barter system—Leading to unclear accounts—And lack of understanding of the situation at any given time—Trade is also restricted by the traditions of the East India Company—Such as keeping large inventories—Gradual improvements on these methods—Benefits of land investments in China—Recognized and acted upon by the Jesuits—and later by foreign merchants—The American trade—Similarity of currency—Excess of Chinese exports offset by shipments of gold and silver—And later by credits in London banks.

Whatever may be said of that of other nations, the intercourse of Great Britain and the United States with China, from the earliest period to the latest, whether in peace or war, has had no other object than trade between the nations, and therefore all the steps in that intercourse must be judged in their relation to the promotion of international commerce. War and diplomacy, geographical exploration and reforms, even literary researches and mutual instruction, being all ancillary to the main purpose, it seems fitting to consider as briefly as may be what manner of thing it was which set, and still keeps, all these auxiliary forces in motion. 168

No matter what others might say, the relationship between Great Britain and the United States with China, from the beginning to now, whether in peace or during conflict, has primarily aimed at trade between the nations. Therefore, all aspects of this relationship should be evaluated based on how they contribute to international commerce. War, diplomacy, geographical exploration, reforms, and even literary studies and mutual education have all served to support this main goal. It’s appropriate to briefly consider what initiated and continues to drive all these supporting efforts. 168

From its first introduction till now one feature has characterised the Chinese foreign trade, and that is its simplicity. Both on the export and the import side a few staple commodities have made up its whole volume, and in this respect the statistics of to-day differ but little from those of fifty years ago. The leading Chinese imports at the conclusion of the first war were: From India, opium and raw cotton, to which has been added, since the development of steam factories, cotton yarn. From England, plain bleached and unbleached cotton goods, cotton yarn, some descriptions of woollens, iron and lead, account for nearly the whole value. The trade from the United States and the continent of Europe in those days did not greatly affect the general aggregate. The exports of Chinese produce were at the period in question almost confined to the one article—tea. Subsequently silk grew into importance, and soon exceeded in value the great speciality of China. Rhubarb was a commodity on which, next to tea, the Chinese affected to lay much stress, on the ground that foreigners were dependent upon it for the preservation of their health, and that stopping the supply might offer an easy means of coercing them. But the article never assumed any important commercial value. Sugar, camphor, and matting were also among the exports, the last named being much in demand in the United States. It is only of recent years, however, that anything like assorted cargoes of produce have been sent away from the Chinese ports. The trade has passed through many vicissitudes, has had its periodical ebb and flow, but has on the whole been prosaically progressive. And this has been 169 especially the case with the imports of British and other Western produce.

From its initial introduction until now, one thing has defined Chinese foreign trade: its simplicity. Both exports and imports have mainly consisted of a few staple commodities, and in this respect, today's statistics are not much different from those of fifty years ago. At the end of the first war, the main imports into China included opium and raw cotton from India, to which, with the rise of steam factories, cotton yarn was added. From England, plain bleached and unbleached cotton goods, cotton yarn, some types of woolen fabrics, iron, and lead accounted for nearly all the value. Trade from the United States and continental Europe didn't significantly impact the overall volume at that time. Chinese exports were largely centered around one item—tea. Later, silk became important and soon surpassed tea in value. Rhubarb was another commodity that the Chinese emphasized, claiming that foreigners needed it for their health and that cutting off the supply could be an easy way to exert control. However, it never held significant commercial value. Sugar, camphor, and matting were also among the exports, with matting being particularly popular in the United States. It is only in recent years that a variety of products have started to be shipped from Chinese ports. The trade has gone through many ups and downs, but overall, it has been steadily progressive. This has been especially true for the imports of British and other Western products. 169

It would be instructive to review the circumstances of the Chinese trade at successive stages of its progress, and to note the grievances of merchants and manufacturers at different epochs and the obstacles to commercial development as they were felt from time to time. It would be more interesting to do this were it possible to discriminate between permanent causes and temporary accidents. But it is not always what is of the most lasting importance that makes the strongest impression upon those who are actively engaged in the struggle for life. The trader does not greatly differ from the world at large in his love of a whipping-boy—that is to say, in the common tendency to attribute mischances to objective rather than to subjective causes. Prosperity, like good health, is, to those who enjoy it, its own sufficient explanation, the normal reward of the merit each one takes to himself as a matter of course. Adversity, on the other hand, is assigned to demonic origin, its victims being martyrs to the powers of nature or the hostile combinations of men. For these reasons it would be as difficult to gather from their own accounts what were the real helps and what the real hindrances to the traders' progress, as to draw general conclusions on the state of agriculture from conversations with working farmers. The commercial circular is a familiar product of the modern era of open trade. It undertakes to record the actual state of markets and to give the reasons why they are not otherwise. If one were to circumnavigate the globe and compare the ordinary run of these reports issuing from the great 170 emporia, one feature would be found common to them all—it is the bogy. Everything would be for the best—but for certain adverse influences. It may be the vagaries of some Finance Minister or Tariff Commission, the restraint of princes, war, pestilence, or famine—inundations here and droughts there; but a something there must always be to explain away the moral accountability of the individual traders, manufacturers, or planters. China and Japan have seldom been without such fatalistic obstacles to commerce. For many years the rebellion was the bête noire of merchants, then the mandarins, and smaller rebellions; the scarcity of specie at one period, at another the superabundance of cheap silver. In Burma the King of Ava stood for long as the root of all commercial evil. In Japan the Daimios and the currency served their turn. India is never without calamities sufficient to account for perhaps more than ever happens there. All such drawbacks, however, though real enough as far as they go, are never exhaustive, and seldom even reach to the core of the problem. They are as atmospheric phenomena, to be observed, taken advantage of, or provided against, and are extremely interesting to the individuals immediately affected by them. But as regards the general course of trade, such incidents are but as storms on the surface of the deep oceanic currents: it is the onward sweep of the great volume of traffic that alone possesses public interest. Of the circumstances which influence the course and direction of that beneficent current a collation of the utterances of traders would yield but a refracted account. So that in order to appreciate the progress of commerce we have to fall back on the unadorned columns of statistical tables, which themselves 171 leave something to be desired on the score of completeness.[20]

It would be useful to look back at the conditions of Chinese trade at various stages of its development and to take into account the complaints of merchants and manufacturers at different times, as well as the barriers to commercial growth that arose periodically. It would be more engaging to do this if we could distinguish between lasting issues and temporary setbacks. However, what is truly significant doesn’t always leave the strongest impression on those actively fighting for survival. Traders are not much different from others in their inclination to blame external factors for their troubles rather than internal ones. Success, like good health, is seen by those who have it as a natural outcome, the expected reward for their efforts. Conversely, hardship is often attributed to malevolent forces, and its victims are seen as martyrs to the whims of nature or the malicious actions of others. For these reasons, it would be just as challenging to determine from their own stories what genuinely helped or hindered traders’ progress as it would be to draw broad conclusions about agriculture from chats with local farmers. The commercial circular is a well-known product of today’s open trade era. It aims to document the current state of markets and explain why they are not any different. If one were to travel around the world and compare the general pattern of these reports from major trading centers, one common feature would emerge—it’s the scapegoat. Everything would be fine except for certain negative influences. It could be the whims of a Finance Minister or a Tariff Commission, the restrictions imposed by rulers, wars, plagues, or famines—floods in one area and droughts in another—but there invariably has to be something to deflect blame from the traders, manufacturers, or planters themselves. China and Japan have often faced such fatalistic challenges to trade. For many years, rebellion was the merchants' biggest nightmare, then the mandarins, and smaller uprisings; at one time, it was a lack of currency, at another, a surplus of cheap silver. In Burma, the King of Ava was long viewed as the source of all trade troubles. In Japan, the Daimios and the currency were the issues at hand. India almost always has enough disasters to explain whatever misfortunes occur there. However, while these drawbacks are quite real, they are never complete explanations and rarely even get to the heart of the issue. They are like weather patterns—observable, manageable, or to be prepared for—and they are fascinating to those directly impacted by them. But when it comes to the overall trajectory of trade, these events are just like storms on the surface of vast ocean currents: it’s the continuous flow of the substantial volume of trade that truly captures public interest. The factors that shape the progress and direction of that beneficial flow can only be partially understood through the reflections of traders. Therefore, to truly grasp the progress of commerce, we must rely on the straightforward data found in statistical tables, which still lack completeness.

With regard to certain periods of the China trade we have rather full data, as, for instance, in the decade following the war, when the working of the trade exercised the minds both of British merchants and of their Government in a degree which has scarcely been equalled since. The same may be predicated of the Chinese Government also, and, as has been observed in a previous chapter, it was an interesting coincidence that during that critical period it was the self-same grievance that pressed on both sides—namely, the insufficiency of the Chinese exported produce to pay for the goods imported. The effect of this on the Chinese Government was to excite unfeigned alarm at the steady drain of silver required to pay for the excess of their imports. On the British side the grievance came home to the manufacturers in the form of the incapacity of the Chinese to take off an adequate quantity of the products of English looms. The remedy proposed from the two sides was thoroughly characteristic of their respective traditions. On the Chinese side it was negative, obstructive, prohibitory, and absolutely vain. On the British side the proposal was positive, expansive, and in accord with the spirit of modern commerce. The Chinese remedy was to forbid the export of silver and the import of opium, which, being the article in most urgent demand, was usually paid for in bullion or in coined dollars. The English remedy was to stimulate the export of Chinese produce. But here a paradox stands in the way of a clear perception of the 172 position. The British trade was being carried on at a loss, which some of the merchants estimated at 33 per cent on the round venture. That is to say, manufactured goods were sold in China at a loss of 15 to 20 per cent, and the proceeds, being invested in Chinese produce, realised a further loss on sale in England of 17 or 20 per cent.

With regard to certain periods of the China trade, we have quite detailed information, particularly in the decade after the war, when the trade was a major concern for British merchants and their Government like never before. The same can be said for the Chinese Government, and as noted in a previous chapter, it was interesting that during that crucial time, both sides faced the same issue—the insufficient amount of Chinese exports to cover the goods they imported. This led to genuine concern for the Chinese Government due to the ongoing drain of silver needed to pay for their excess imports. For British manufacturers, the problem was that the Chinese couldn't buy enough of their textiles. The solutions proposed by each side reflected their distinct traditions. The Chinese approach was negative, obstructive, prohibitive, and ultimately pointless. In contrast, the British suggestion was positive, expansive, and aligned with modern commerce. The Chinese response was to ban the export of silver and the import of opium, which was in high demand and typically paid for with bullion or coins. The British remedy was to boost the export of Chinese goods. However, a paradox complicates the situation. The British trade was running at a loss, which some merchants estimated at 33 percent on the total venture. In other words, manufactured goods were sold in China at a 15 to 20 percent loss, and the money made from those sales, when invested in Chinese exports, faced an additional loss of 17 to 20 percent when sold in England.

To account for this unremunerative trade being carried on voluntarily year after year, it is necessary to remember the great distance of the two markets in the days before the introduction of steam and the shortening of the voyage by the piercing of the Suez Canal. We have to allow also for the gambling or speculative element which animates all commerce, and the "hope-on-hope-ever" spirit without which no distant adventure would ever be undertaken. The rationale of the phenomenon was reduced to a very simple expression by Mr Gregson, who, when asked by the Committee of the House of Commons if he could explain "the singular proceeding of continuing the trade for a series of years with perpetual losses on it," replied: "The manufacturers reason that as the losses have been considerable the exports will fall off, and therefore they may export again. They are generally deceived, because their neighbours taking the same view, the exports are kept up and the loss continues."

To explain why this unprofitable trade has been carried out willingly year after year, it’s important to consider the great distance between the two markets back when steam power wasn't available and before the Suez Canal was dug, which shortened the journey. We also need to factor in the gambling or speculative nature that drives all trade, and the "hope-on-hope-ever" attitude that encourages anyone to take on distant ventures. Mr. Gregson summed up the situation simply when asked by the Committee of the House of Commons to explain why this trade continued for years despite ongoing losses. He said, "Manufacturers believe that because the losses have been substantial, the exports will drop, and they can export again. They are usually misled because their neighbors think the same way, so exports remain stable and the losses keep happening."

The case thus bluntly stated by Mr Gregson was not such a temporary phase as might naturally have been concluded. The same remarkable features continued for many years afterwards more or less characteristic of the China trade, so that had another commission been appointed to consider the subject they would have been 173 surprised to find the old riddle still awaiting solution, Why so regular and simple a trade should be carried on apparently without profit? The data of supply and demand being well ascertained, prices remunerative to the merchant might have been expected to arrange themselves automatically. Further explanations seem, in fact, required to supplement Mr Gregson's, and some of these must appear somewhat whimsical and farfetched to the general reader. The peculiar method in vogue of stating accounts was not perhaps without its influence in obscuring the merchants' perceptions of the merits of their current operations. The trade being virtually conducted by barter, the sale of a particular parcel of goods did not necessarily close the venture. A nominal price was agreed upon between buyer and seller for the convenience of account-keeping, but this almost always had reference to the return investment in tea or other produce. So that British goods were regarded as a means of laying down funds in China for the purchase of tea, while tea was regarded as a return remittance for the proceeds of manufactured goods, and as a means of laying down funds in England for further investments in the same commodity for shipment to China. The trade thus revolving in an eternal circle, having neither beginning nor end, it was impossible to pronounce definitely at what particular point of the revolution the profit or loss occurred. A bad out-turn of goods exported would, it was hoped, be compensated for by the favourable result of the produce imported, and vice versâ, ad infinitum. Thus no transaction stood on its own merits or received the unbiassed attention of the merchants. Their accounts did not show the actual amount of loss or gain on a particular invoice, the 174 formula simply recording the price at which the venture, as an operation in exchange, "laid down the dollar." The par value of that coin being taken at 4s. 4d., the out-turn of a sterling invoice which yielded the dollar at any price below that was of course a gain, or anything above it a loss. But the gain or loss so registered was merely provisional. The dollar as such was never realised: it was but a fiction of the accountant, which acquired its substantial value only when reinvested in Chinese produce. The final criterion, therefore, was how much the dollar invoices of Chinese produce would yield back in sterling money when sold in London, and how that yield compared with the "laid-down" cost of the dollar in China. But even that finality was only provisional so long as the circuit of reinvestment was uninterrupted.

The situation that Mr. Gregson bluntly described was not just a temporary phase as one might have concluded. The same remarkable features persisted for many years, remaining somewhat typical of the China trade, so that if another commission had been set up to look into the matter, they would have been 173 surprised to discover the old mystery still waiting for an answer: Why should such a straightforward and predictable trade operate seemingly without profit? Given that supply and demand were well understood, one would expect prices that benefited merchants to sort themselves out automatically. Additional explanations seem, in fact, necessary to clarify Mr. Gregson's statements, and some of these might appear somewhat odd and outlandish to the general reader. The unusual way of presenting accounts likely influenced merchants' understanding of their current operations. Since the trade was essentially conducted by barter, selling a specific batch of goods didn’t necessarily mean closing the deal. A nominal price was agreed upon between buyer and seller mainly for bookkeeping purposes, but this almost always related to the later investment in tea or other products. So, British goods were viewed as a way to invest funds in China for purchasing tea, while tea was seen as a return for the earnings from manufactured goods and a way to invest back in England for more shipments to China. The trade thus revolved in a never-ending cycle, with neither a clear beginning nor an end, making it impossible to decisively state at which point in the cycle a profit or loss occurred. A poor outcome of exported goods would, it was hoped, be balanced by a favorable result from imported products, and vice versa, ad infinitum. Thus, no transaction stood on its own or received unbiased attention from the merchants. Their accounts didn’t reflect the actual amount of loss or gain on a specific invoice; it merely 174 recorded the price at which the venture, as a trading operation, “laid down the dollar.” Since the par value of that coin was set at 4s. 4d., any exported sterling invoice that yielded the dollar at a price below that was a gain, while anything above represented a loss. However, the gain or loss recorded was purely provisional. The dollar itself was never realized; it was merely an accountant's fiction that gained actual value only when reinvested in Chinese products. Therefore, the ultimate measure was how much the dollar invoices of Chinese products would bring in sterling when sold in London and how that amount compared to the "laid-down" cost of the dollar in China. But even that determination was only provisional as long as the cycle of reinvestment continued without interruption.

Merchants were not called upon to face their losses as they were made, nor could they realise their profits as they were earned. Long before one year's account could be closed, the venture of one or two subsequent years had been launched beyond recall, and the figures of the newest balance-sheet related to transactions which, having already become ancient history, were but a dry study compared with the new enterprises bearing the promise of the future and absorbing the whole interest of the merchant. Business was thus carried on very much in the dark, the eyes of the trader being constantly directed forward, while past experience was not allowed its legitimate influence in forming the judgment. A blind reliance on the equalising effect of averages was perhaps the safest principle on which such a commerce could be carried on. The merchants themselves were wont to say that after drawing the 175 clearest inferences from experience, and making the most careful estimates of probabilities, the wisest man was he who could act contrary to the obvious deductions therefrom. Business thus became a kind of concrete fatalism.

Merchants weren't required to confront their losses as they happened, nor could they cash in on their profits as they were made. Long before one year's accounts could be settled, the ventures of a year or two ahead had already been set in motion, irreversible. The latest balance sheet reflected deals that had already become ancient history, serving as little more than a dry analysis compared to the new projects that promised the future and captured the merchant's full attention. Business was often conducted in the dark, with traders continually looking ahead, while past experiences were not given their rightful weight in shaping decisions. A blind faith in the stabilizing power of averages was probably the safest approach for such commerce. The merchants themselves often remarked that after drawing the clearest conclusions from their experiences and making careful probability estimates, the smartest person was actually the one who could go against the obvious conclusions. Consequently, business transformed into a kind of tangible fatalism.

The China trade was, moreover, much hampered by certain traditions of the East India Company which long clung to its skirts. One of these relics of conservatism, transmitted from the days of the maritime wars, was the principle of storing up merchandise at both termini. It was an understood thing that the Company should never keep less than two years' supply of tea in the London warehouses, and long after the Company ceased to trade stocks of that commodity often amounted to nearly twelve months' consumption. Similarly, manufactured goods were accumulated, whether of set purpose or from the mere force of habit, in the China depots. The merchant seemed to have inherited the principle of holding merchandise for some ideal price, locking up his own or his constituents' capital, incurring cumulative charges on commodities which were all the while deteriorating in value, and eventually perhaps selling under some financial or other pressure. A certain satisfaction seems to have been derived from the contemplation of a full "go-down," as if the merchandise there stored had been realised wealth instead of a block to such realisation.

The China trade was also significantly hindered by certain traditions of the East India Company that lingered for a long time. One of these old customs, passed down from the days of maritime wars, was the practice of stockpiling goods at both ends of the trade route. It was generally accepted that the Company should never have less than a two-year supply of tea in the London warehouses, and even long after the Company stopped trading, stocks of tea often represented nearly twelve months' worth of consumption. In the same way, manufactured goods were accumulated, either intentionally or simply out of habit, in the China warehouses. The merchant seemed to have inherited the mentality of holding onto goods for some ideal price, tying up his own or his clients' money, racking up ongoing costs on items that were continuously losing value, and ultimately perhaps selling them under some kind of financial pressure or other urgency. There seemed to be a certain satisfaction in looking at a well-stocked warehouse, as if the goods stored there were realized wealth rather than a barrier to actually achieving it.

That primitive state of affairs is now a thing of the past, since the progress of the world during the last thirty years has revolutionised not the foreign trade of China, but the peculiar system on which it was carried on. The distribution of capital and the services of 176 Exchange banks exploded many conservative doctrines. The first merchants who, perceiving the necessity of reforming the habits of the trade, boldly resolved to "sell and repent" on the arrival of their merchandise, were pitied by their more antiquated neighbours, and thought to be likely to stand much in need of repentance. But in their case wisdom has been justified of her children.

That outdated way of doing things is now behind us, as the world has changed drastically over the last thirty years. This change has transformed not just China's foreign trade, but also the unique system that supported it. The allocation of capital and the services of 176 Exchange banks challenged many traditional beliefs. The first merchants who recognized the need to change trade practices and boldly decided to "sell and repent" upon receiving their goods were viewed with pity by their more old-fashioned neighbors, who thought they would soon regret their choices. However, in their case, wisdom has proven right about them.

This bald sketch of the trade customs inherited from the East India Company, though typical, is by no means exhaustive. There were, both before and after the treaty of Nanking, many byways and specialities and exceptions by which the vicious circle was broken with happy results to the individuals. Indeed at all points there have been collateral avenues to fortune, contributory enterprises more profitable than those which were purely commercial. The various ways of taxing commerce, as by insurance, freightage, storage, lighterage, packing, financing, &c., have afforded, on the whole, safe and good returns on capital. In countries where family improvidence is prevalent, and where capital is scarce and dear, as is the case generally in the Far East, both the opportunity and the inducement to invest in real estate are afforded to those who are in a position to take advantage of them,—for the same conditions which bring property into the market provide the tenants for the new proprietors. By following with that singleness of purpose which distinguishes all their proceedings the line of financial policy so obviously suggested by this state of things, the Jesuits, Lazarists, and other religious orders have gradually accumulated in every locality where they have settled a very large amount of 177 house property in and around populous centres. By this means they have laid whole communities of natives, and even foreigners, under permanent tribute to the Church, and have thereby rendered their missions independent of subventions from Christian countries. Many of the foreign merchants, following this worldly-wise example, have in like manner rendered themselves independent of mercantile business.

This brief overview of the trade practices inherited from the East India Company, while typical, is not exhaustive. Both before and after the Treaty of Nanking, there were many alternatives, specialties, and exceptions that broke the vicious cycle and led to positive outcomes for individuals. In fact, there have always been additional paths to wealth, with related ventures often being more profitable than purely commercial ones. Various ways of taxing commerce, such as insurance, freight, storage, lighterage, packing, financing, etc., have generally provided safe and good returns on investment. In regions where family irresponsibility is common, and where capital is rare and expensive, as is often the case in the Far East, there are opportunities and incentives for those able to invest in real estate—because the same conditions that put property on the market also create tenants for new owners. By pursuing the financial strategy clearly indicated by this situation with the determination that defines all their efforts, the Jesuits, Lazarists, and other religious orders have gradually amassed a significant amount of 177 property in and around densely populated areas. Through this, they have placed entire communities of locals, and even some foreigners, under a lasting obligation to the Church, making their missions financially independent from support from Christian countries. Many foreign merchants, following this practical example, have similarly made themselves independent of traditional commerce.

The American trade was for the most part exempt from the drawbacks as well as the advantages of the circuit system. The similarity of currency helped to simplify American commerce with China, and though from an early period the United States exported manufactures to that country, these went but a little way in payment for the products which they imported from China. Hence large shipments of specie had to be made to purchase their cargoes. No statistics exist, but Mr Hunter incidentally mentions one ship carrying amongst other cargo $350,000, and three other vessels carrying between them $1,100,000, which may be taken as typical of the course of trade prior to the abolition of the East India Company's monopoly. This mode of paying for produce was succeeded in after-years by credits on London banks, drafts under which supplied the most convenient medium of remittance to shippers of opium and other produce from India. The circuit was trilateral, and to a considerable extent remains so. 178

The American trade mostly avoided the downsides and upsides of the circuit system. The similarity in currency made American commerce with China easier, and although the United States started exporting manufactured goods to that country early on, these exports barely matched the value of the products imported from China. As a result, significant shipments of cash needed to be sent to pay for their cargoes. There aren't any official statistics, but Mr. Hunter notes that one ship carried cargo worth $350,000, and three other vessels together brought in $1,100,000, which could be seen as typical of trade before the East India Company's monopoly ended. This method of payment was later replaced by credits with London banks, which provided the most convenient way to send money to shippers of opium and other products from India. The trade route was three-way, and to a large extent, it still is. 178

I. TEA.

Causes of bad state of trade—Failure of hopes built on "free" trade—Efforts for improvement—Select Committee of 1847—Excessive duties in England—Irregularities in valuation—Annual consumption at this time—Revenue from the duties—Beginnings of the India tea trade—Mr Robert Fortune—Lord William Bentinck, Governor-General, introduces tea culture, 1834—Assam Company founded 1839—Fortune's missions to China—Tea-plant indigenous in India—Progress of scientific culture—Vicissitudes of the trade—Ultimate success of the India and Ceylon trade—An example of Western as against Eastern methods—Tea-planting introduced in Ceylon—Rapid increase there—Why China has been supplanted in the market—Ingenuity and enterprise of the Indian planters—A victory of race and progress—Obstructive measures of the Chinese Government.

Causes of the poor trade situation—Disappointment from expectations of "free" trade—Efforts to make improvements—Select Committee of 1847—High tariffs in England—Inconsistencies in valuation—Annual consumption at this time—Revenue from the tariffs—Origins of the India tea trade—Mr. Robert Fortune—Lord William Bentinck, Governor-General, introduces tea cultivation in 1834—Assam Company founded in 1839—Fortune's missions to China—Tea plant native to India—Advancements in scientific cultivation—Challenges in the trade—Final success of the India and Ceylon trades—A comparison of Western versus Eastern methods—Tea planting introduced in Ceylon—Rapid growth there—Reasons why China has lost its market dominance—Ingenuity and enterprise of Indian planters—A victory of race and progress—Obstructive actions of the Chinese Government.

There was an apparent inconsistency in the outcry for larger quantities of Chinese produce to balance the trade, while the small quantity that did come forward could only be sold at a loss. The explanation may partly be found in the "boom" which naturally ensued on the emancipation of the China trade from the oppressive monopoly of the East India Company, and in the disappointment which, no less naturally, succeeded the boom. To some extent also the onerous imposts laid upon the principal article of export—tea—by the British Exchequer might be held responsible for the anomaly; for the English duties were a mechanical dead-weight on the trade, impeding the free play of the other economic factors. There was a practically unlimited supply of tea in China, and a growing demand for it in England, and yet some £2,000,000 in specie was annually sent away from China as the balance of trade. How to commute that amount of silver into tea for the benefit of both countries might 179 be said to be the problem before the merchants and their Governments.

There was a clear inconsistency in the demand for more Chinese goods to balance trade, while the small amounts that did arrive could only be sold at a loss. The explanation may partly lie in the "boom" that naturally followed the lifting of the East India Company’s strict control over the China trade, and in the disappointment that inevitably followed the boom. Additionally, the heavy taxes imposed on the main export—tea—by the British government could also be blamed for the mismatch; these English duties were a significant barrier to trade, hindering the natural flow of other economic factors. China had an almost endless supply of tea and a rising demand for it in England, yet around £2,000,000 in cash left China each year as the trade balance. Figuring out how to turn that amount of silver into tea for the benefit of both countries could be seen as the challenge facing merchants and their governments. 179

The only means which appeared to them feasible to effect this object was to lower the British import duty. Among many interesting particulars concerning the actual state of the Chinese trade at that time, we get from the report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on "Commercial Relations with China," of 1847, an insight into the difficulties, such as in our day can scarcely be imagined, which stood in the way of any reduction of the tea duties.

The only way that seemed possible to achieve this goal was to reduce the British import tax. Among many interesting details about the current state of Chinese trade at that time, we learn from the report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on "Commercial Relations with China," from 1847, about the challenges, which today are hard to imagine, that blocked any reduction of the tea duties.

On the opening of what was called free trade with China—"free," that is to say, of the East India Company's monopoly—the duty was 96 per cent ad valorem on all teas sold at or under 2s. a pound, or 100 per cent on all above that price. These ad valorem duties worked iniquitously for both the Government and the merchants, the Customs levying the higher rate when the lower was appropriate, and the merchants redressing the injustice in their own fashion when occasion served. An attempt was made to remedy this regrettable situation by the reduction of tea to three classifications, and the conversion of the ad valorem duties into specific duties ranging from 1s. 6d. to 3s. per pound on these classifications. The arrangement was still found unworkable, and the most glaring irregularities were common. The same parcel of tea, absolutely uniform in quality, divided between London and Liverpool, would be assessed in one port on the lower, and in the other on the higher, scale of duties, and the Customs would grant no redress, though the overcharge might be ruinous to the trader.

On the start of what was called free trade with China—"free," meaning the end of the East India Company's monopoly—the tax was 96 percent ad valorem on all teas sold at or under 2s. a pound, or 100 percent on all above that price. These ad valorem taxes were unfair to both the Government and the merchants, with Customs applying the higher rate when the lower one was suitable, and merchants finding their own ways to address the injustice whenever they could. An attempt was made to fix this unfortunate situation by categorizing tea into three classifications and changing the ad valorem taxes into specific duties ranging from 1s. 6d. to 3s. per pound based on these classifications. However, the arrangement proved unmanageable, and significant irregularities became common. The same batch of tea, completely uniform in quality, could be assessed at one port on the lower scale of taxes and at another port on the higher scale, with Customs providing no remedy, even though the extra charges could be devastating for the trader.

This impossible state of things was remedied in 1836, 180 when the duties were converted to one uniform rate of 2s. per pound on all teas. Subsequently 5 per cent was added to this, so that the duty in 1847 was 2s. 2¼d. The object to which the Government inquiry was primarily directed was to gauge the effect on the consumption of tea of the raising or lowering of the duties, on which depended the ultimate retail price. The admission of competition in the Chinese trade in 1834 had the immediate effect of reducing the "laid-down" cost of tea, which promptly reacted upon the consumption of the article in England. But as the import duty remained unaltered, while the prime cost of the tea was much lowered, the Exchequer derived the whole benefit from the increased consumption.

This impossible situation was fixed in 1836, 180 when the duties were changed to a single uniform rate of 2s. per pound on all teas. Later, an additional 5 percent was added, making the duty in 1847 2s. 2¼d. The main goal of the Government inquiry was to understand how changes in the duties affected the consumption of tea, which influenced the final retail price. The opening up of competition in the Chinese trade in 1834 immediately lowered the "laid-down" cost of tea, which then boosted its consumption in England. However, since the import duty stayed the same while the main cost of tea dropped significantly, the Exchequer reaped all the benefits from the increased consumption.

The annual consumption at that time in Great Britain was 1 lb. 10 oz. per head, or 46,000,000 lb. in total, and it was shown that in every instance where the duty was lower the consumption was proportionately greater. In the Isle of Man, where the duty was 1s. per pound, the consumption quickly rose, when the restriction on the quantity allowed to be imported there was removed, to 2 lb. 10 oz. per head. In the Channel Islands it was 4 lb. 4 oz. per head. "In Newfoundland, Australia, and other colonies the consumption is very much larger per head than it is in this country." The Australian colonies have maintained to the present day their pre-eminence as tea-drinkers, their consumption averaging no less than 10 lb. per head. Consumption in Russia and the United States is estimated at a little over 1 lb. per head of the population.

The annual consumption at that time in Great Britain was 1 lb. 10 oz. per person, or 46,000,000 lb. in total. It was shown that in every case where the tax was lower, the consumption was proportionately higher. In the Isle of Man, where the tax was 1s. per pound, consumption quickly increased to 2 lb. 10 oz. per person when the limit on the amount allowed to be imported was lifted. In the Channel Islands, it was 4 lb. 4 oz. per person. "In Newfoundland, Australia, and other colonies, the consumption is much higher per person than it is in this country." The Australian colonies have continued to be the top tea-drinking regions, with their average consumption reaching no less than 10 lb. per person. Consumption in Russia and the United States is estimated at just over 1 lb. per person.

The colonists have always been the most intelligent consumers of the article. Forty years ago they substituted good black teas for the pungent green which had 181 supplied the wants of the mining camps and primitive sheep stations, and within the last few years they have shown their appreciation of the flavoury Ceylon leaf by taking every year a larger quantity in relative displacement of the rougher qualities which come from India. The "geographical distribution" of the taste for tea presents some rather curious facts. In the United Kingdom, for example, dealers find that Irish consumers demand the best quality of tea. The United States remained faithful to their green tea long after that description was discarded in Australia; and even when black tea came to be in part substituted, it was not the Ceylon or Chinese Congou, but the astringent Oolong kinds, such as are so largely supplied from Japan, which met the taste of American consumers.

The colonists have always been the smartest consumers of the product. Forty years ago, they switched from strong green teas to good black teas that had filled the needs of mining camps and basic sheep stations. In the last few years, they’ve shown their appreciation for the flavorful Ceylon leaf by buying larger amounts each year, replacing the rougher teas from India. The "geographical distribution" of tea preferences reveals some interesting facts. For instance, in the United Kingdom, dealers notice that Irish consumers want the best quality tea. The United States held onto their green tea long after it was phased out in Australia, and even when black tea started to replace it, it wasn’t the Ceylon or Chinese Congou; it was the astringent Oolong types, which are mostly supplied from Japan, that appealed to American consumers.

The cost price of tea had been so much reduced by the abolition of the East India Company's monopoly that the fixed rate of duty, instead of being equivalent, as it had been when originally fixed, to 100 per cent on the value, was estimated to average 165 per cent on Congou tea, which was much beyond what the Legislature intended when the tariff was decided; for while they reckoned on getting a revenue of £3,600,000, the increase in the quantity had been so considerable that the yield of the duty had risen to £5,000,000. The arguments and the evidence in favour of reducing the duties were unanswerable from every point of view. Yet the utmost which the advocates in 1847 seem to have hoped for was that it might be reduced to 1s. per pound, which they considered would entail a temporary loss to the revenue. But we see in our day that the Government draws nearly £4,000,000 from the article on a tariff rate of 4d. 182 per pound, while the consumption per head of population has risen to 6 lb., or a total of 235,000,000 lb. per annum.

The price of tea had dropped significantly due to the end of the East India Company's monopoly, so the fixed duty rate, instead of being equal to 100% of the value as it was originally set, was estimated to average 165% on Congou tea. This was much higher than what the Legislature intended when they decided on the tariff; they expected to collect a revenue of £3,600,000, but the increase in quantity was so large that the duty revenue rose to £5,000,000. The arguments and evidence for lowering the duties were convincing from every angle. However, the most that supporters in 1847 seemed to hope for was a reduction to 1s. per pound, which they thought would lead to a short-term loss in revenue. But as we see today, the Government collects nearly £4,000,000 from the product at a tariff rate of 4d. per pound, while the per capita consumption has increased to 6 lb., totaling 235,000,000 lb. per year. 182

While the mercantile community were thus straining after means of developing the tea trade from China there were causes at work, of which they seemed to have no suspicion, which have completely revolutionised that trade, reducing China to a quite secondary position as an exporter. Among the witnesses examined before the Committee of 1847 there was one who may almost be said to have held the fate of the Chinese tea trade in his hands, though probably he himself was unaware of it. This was Mr Robert Fortune, curator of the Physic Gardens at Chelsea, who had travelled in some of the tea districts of China as agent of the Horticultural Society of London, being also commissioned by the East India Company to investigate the processes of the growth and manufacture of tea in China, and to bring to India seeds and plants as well as skilled workmen to manipulate the leaves. The idea of cultivating tea in India had long been entertained by the Company. The plant itself had been found indigenous in Upper Assam twenty years before Fortune's day, but no practical notice was taken of the discovery until 1834, when the Government of India resolved to attempt the culture of the leaf. The scheme received its first embodiment in a Minute of Lord William Bentinck, the first Governor-General of India,[21] in 1834. The plan he laid down was to "select an intelligent agent, who should go to Penang and Singapore and in conjunction with authorities 183 and the most intelligent of Chinese agents should concert measures for obtaining the genuine plant, and actual cultivators." The state of affairs in China at the time did not favour the prosecution of such an enterprise. The native resources of India, however, began at once to be utilised. The Assam Company, the pioneer of tea-culture, was established in 1839, and continues its operations to our own day. After the treaty of peace and the successful establishment of trade at the new ports in China, Lord William Bentinck's ideas were realised in the two missions of Fortune, who succeeded in conveying to India nearly 20,000 plants from both the black and green tea countries of Central China. Although, judging from subsequent experience, India might by her unaided efforts have developed this great industry, yet it can hardly be doubted that the enterprise of the practical Scottish gardener applied the effective stimulus which raised tea-growing to the rank of a serious national interest. Hybridisation between the imported Chinese plants and those of indigenous growth proceeded actively, no less than one hundred varieties being thus produced. Planters now consider that the native plant would have served all their purposes without any intermixture, but probably nothing short of practical experience would have persuaded them of this.

While the business community was working hard to expand the tea trade from China, there were underlying factors at play that they seemed completely unaware of, which ultimately transformed that trade and pushed China into a much less significant role as an exporter. One of the witnesses examined by the Committee of 1847 was someone who could almost be said to have held the future of the Chinese tea trade in his hands, although he likely didn't realize it. This was Mr. Robert Fortune, curator of the Physic Gardens at Chelsea, who had traveled to some of China's tea-growing regions as an agent for the Horticultural Society of London. He was also commissioned by the East India Company to study how tea was grown and produced in China and to bring back seeds, plants, and skilled workers to process the leaves. The East India Company had long considered the idea of growing tea in India. The plant had been found naturally growing in Upper Assam twenty years before Fortune's time, but it wasn't until 1834 that practical steps were taken to utilize the discovery when the Government of India decided to attempt tea cultivation. The plan first appeared in a memorandum by Lord William Bentinck, the first Governor-General of India, in 1834. He proposed to "select an intelligent agent who would go to Penang and Singapore and work with local authorities and the most knowledgeable Chinese agents to arrange for obtaining the genuine plant and actual cultivators." However, the situation in China at the time was not suitable for pursuing such a project. Nonetheless, India’s local resources started being utilized right away. The Assam Company, which was the first to cultivate tea, was established in 1839 and is still operating today. After the peace treaty and the successful establishment of trade at new ports in China, Lord William Bentinck's ideas were realized through Fortune's two missions, where he successfully brought nearly 20,000 plants from the black and green tea regions of Central China to India. Although it seems likely that India could have developed this significant industry on its own eventually, it’s hard to deny that the efforts of the practical Scottish gardener provided the necessary boost that elevated tea-growing into a serious national interest. The hybridization between the imported Chinese plants and the native varieties was actively pursued, resulting in the creation of over one hundred varieties. Today, planters believe that the native plant would have been enough for their needs without any crossbreeding, but it’s likely that only practical experience could have convinced them of this.

The vicissitudes of tea-growing in India have been so sharp that they would form of themselves an interesting episode of industrial history. Mania and panic alternated during the experimental stages of the enterprise, with the inevitable result of wholesale transfers of property, so that of the early 184 pioneers comparatively few were destined to enjoy the ultimate reward of their sacrifices. Difficulties of many kinds dogged the steps of the planters, among these being the unsatisfactory land tenure and the supply of labour. The mortality among the imported coolies was for many years so heavy that the Government was eventually obliged to interfere with severe regulations, which were imposed in 1863. These and other difficulties being successfully grappled with, the prosperity of the industry flowed as smoothly as the Niagara river below the Falls, until the supply of tea from India and Ceylon had completely swamped that from the original home of the trade.

The ups and downs of tea-growing in India have been so dramatic that they could tell an interesting story in industrial history. Excitement and panic alternated during the experimental stages of the venture, leading to widespread transfers of property, so only a handful of the early 184 pioneers ended up enjoying the fruits of their sacrifices. The planters faced many challenges, including unsatisfactory land ownership and a lack of labor. For many years, the death toll among the imported laborers was so high that the Government had to step in with strict regulations, which were introduced in 1863. After overcoming these and other challenges, the prosperity of the industry flowed as smoothly as the Niagara River below the Falls, until the supply of tea from India and Ceylon completely overshadowed that from the trade's original home.

The supplanting of Chinese by Indian tea in the markets of the world—for even Russia is now an importer of the latter—is an interesting example of the encroachment of Western enterprise on the ancient province of Eastern habits. These are of course only general terms, for from all such comparisons Japan must be either excluded or classed rather among the foremost of the progressive nations than among her nearest geographical neighbours. When tea-cultivation was once shown to be "payable" in British Indian territory the energy of the Western people was quickly brought to bear on the industry, and through several cycles of success and failure, and over the dead bodies, so to speak, of many pioneers, the production available for and distributed in the English market has steadily grown from nothing up to 154,000,000 lb. per annum.

The replacement of Chinese tea by Indian tea in global markets—now even Russia imports Indian tea—is a fascinating example of how Western enterprise has influenced traditional Eastern practices. These are general observations, as Japan stands apart in this context, as it is more aligned with progressive nations than its close geographical neighbors. Once it was proven that tea cultivation was profitable in British India, the drive of Western entrepreneurs quickly focused on the industry. Through numerous ups and downs, and with many pioneers experiencing setbacks, the production available for the English market has steadily increased from nothing to 154,000,000 pounds per year.

The cultivation of tea was introduced at a much later period into Ceylon, where it most opportunely took the place of coffee, which had been ruined by disease, and 185 already the deliveries of tea from that island press hard on that from India itself, having reached 90,000,000 lb., or more than half of the Indian supply. The rate of progress in Ceylon has been most remarkable. In 1883 the most experienced residents in the island considered themselves sanguine in predicting that the export of tea would eventually reach the total of 20,000,000 lb.—it being at that time under 1,000,000 lb. While the products of India and Ceylon have thus been advancing by leaps and bounds, the import from China has dwindled down to 29,000,000 lb.,—about one-tenth part of a trade of which forty years ago she held an easy monopoly.

The production of tea was introduced much later in Ceylon, where it conveniently replaced coffee, which had been devastated by disease, and 185 tea exports from that island are now pressing hard against those from India, having reached 90,000,000 lbs., which is more than half of the Indian supply. The growth in Ceylon has been impressive. In 1883, the most experienced residents of the island were optimistic in predicting that tea exports would eventually hit 20,000,000 lbs.—up from under 1,000,000 lbs. at that time. While the production in India and Ceylon has surged, imports from China have dropped to 29,000,000 lbs.—about one-tenth of a trade that China easily dominated forty years ago.

How has such a gigantic displacement been brought about? Primarily, no doubt, from the vigorous following up of the discovery that tea could be profitably grown in India. But beyond that it is a victory of race over race, of progress over stagnation, of the spirit of innovation and experiment over that of conservative contentment. The Indian planters have made a personal study of all the conditions of tea-culture, have selected their plants, invented machinery to do all that the Chinese have done for centuries by manipulation, have put ample capital into the enterprise, and used the utmost skill in adapting their product to the taste of their customers. Moreover, they have by dint of advertising all over the world, attending exhibitions, and many other devices, forced their commodity into markets which would never have come to them. There was, on the other hand, no one interested in the success of Chinese tea-growers, whose plantations are in the interior of the country, subdivided into garden-plots, with no cohesion among their owners for aggressive 186 purposes. For though the Chinese can and do combine, it is usually in a negative sense, to obstruct and not to promote action, whereas the tea-growers of India have shown examples of intelligent co-operation of the aggressive and productive kind, not wasting power in seeking to impede rivals, but devoting their whole energies to the prosecution of their own business. And they have their reward.

How did such an enormous change happen? Mostly, it comes from the strong follow-up of the discovery that tea could be successfully grown in India. But beyond that, it represents a triumph of one group over another, of progress over stagnation, and of the spirit of innovation and experimentation over that of conservative satisfaction. The Indian planters have studied all the conditions for tea cultivation, chosen their plants, created machinery to perform tasks that the Chinese have done for centuries through manual labor, invested substantial capital into the business, and used their skills to adapt their product to their customers' tastes. Additionally, they have, through global advertising, attending exhibitions, and various other strategies, pushed their product into markets that would otherwise not have reached them. On the other hand, there was no one invested in the success of Chinese tea growers, whose plantations are located inland, divided into small garden plots, with no unity among the owners for aggressive initiatives. Although the Chinese can and do come together, it's usually for negative purposes, to hinder rather than to promote, while the tea growers in India have shown examples of intelligent, proactive cooperation, focusing their energies on growing their own business rather than trying to obstruct their competitors. And they have been rewarded for that.

The short-sightedness of the Government has no doubt contributed to the decline of the Chinese tea trade, through the excessive duties of one kind and another which they have continued to levy on the article from the place of growth to the port of shipment. It is fair to remember, however, that their exactions bear most heavily on the low grades, which, notwithstanding, continue to be shipped in quite as large quantities as is desirable in the interest of consumers; while the superior qualities, which are quite able to bear the taxes, have almost ceased to be imported into Great Britain, the whole supply finding its way to Russia. That country has long been celebrated, and justly so, for the excellence of its tea, for which fantastical reasons are wont to be given. The true reason is very simple. Russian merchants purchase the fine Chinese teas for which no market can now be found in England, the public taste having run so exclusively on the product of India and Ceylon that a cup of good Chinese tea has become a luxury reserved for those who have facilities for obtaining the article outside the ordinary channels of trade. 187

The government's shortsightedness has definitely contributed to the decline of the Chinese tea trade, due to the heavy taxes they've imposed on the product from where it's grown to the shipping port. It's worth noting, though, that these taxes hit the lower grades the hardest, which, despite this, are still shipped in quantities that consumers find acceptable. Meanwhile, the high-quality teas, which could easily handle the taxes, have nearly stopped being imported into Great Britain, with the entire supply going to Russia. That country has long been known, and rightly so, for the quality of its tea, often attributed to various fanciful reasons. The real reason is straightforward: Russian merchants buy the fine Chinese teas that now have no market in England, as public preference has shifted almost entirely to Indian and Ceylon teas, making a good cup of Chinese tea a luxury for those who can obtain it outside of standard trade routes. 187

II. SILK.

Balance of trade adjusted by Shanghai silk trade—China the original silk country—Silk chiefly exported from Canton—Advantages of the new port of Shanghai—Disease attacks the silkworm in Europe—Shanghai supplies the deficit—Efforts in Italy and France to obtain healthy seed from China and Japan—Disease overcome by M. Pasteur—Renewed prosperity of the European producers shared by the Chinese.

Balance of trade adjusted by Shanghai silk trade—China is the original silk country—Silk is mainly exported from Canton—Advantages of the new port of Shanghai—Diseases affect silkworms in Europe—Shanghai fills the gap—Attempts in Italy and France to get healthy seed from China and Japan—Disease conquered by M. Pasteur—Renewed prosperity of European producers also benefits the Chinese.

Within six years of the time when the merchants of England were earnestly seeking a remedy for the crying evil of the balance of trade against China, the whole difficulty had disappeared through the operation of natural causes. The great factor in bringing about the change was the rapid growth of the trade of Shanghai, and more particularly the large exportation of raw silk from that port. "The noble article," as the Italians fondly call it, already in 1853 represented a larger value than the tea exported; the turn of the tide had come; the balance of trade had shifted; and in a very few years silver flowed into the country more copiously than it had ever flowed out.

Within six years after English merchants were seriously looking for a solution to the significant issue of the trade deficit with China, the entire problem vanished due to natural factors. The main reason for this change was the rapid expansion of trade in Shanghai, especially the large export of raw silk from that port. "The noble article," as the Italians affectionately refer to it, had already surpassed the value of tea exports by 1853; the tide had turned; the trade balance had shifted; and within just a few years, silver was coming into the country more abundantly than it had ever left.

Of all the materials of commerce silk is perhaps the most classical. A fibre so lustrous, so pure, and so durable, has been the desire of all nations ancient and modern, and the peculiar interest excited by its humble origin enveloped the subject in myths and legends during the earlier intercourse between Europe and Asia. China was known to the ancients as the cradle of sericulture, deriving, in fact, from its most famous product the name Serica, by which it was known to the Greeks and Romans. There is not a silk-producing country in the world which is not 188 directly or indirectly indebted to China for the seed of the insect, if not also for the introduction of the white mulberry-tree, upon the leaves of which the caterpillar is fed. Though rivals have sprung up in many countries both in Europe and in Asia, China has not lost its reputation, or even its pre-eminence, as a producer of the article.

Of all the commercial materials, silk is probably the most classic. This fiber is so shiny, pure, and durable that it has been sought after by all nations, both ancient and modern. Its humble beginnings have sparked myths and legends throughout the early interactions between Europe and Asia. The ancients recognized China as the birthplace of sericulture, which is reflected in the name Serica, used by the Greeks and Romans. Every silk-producing country in the world is, either directly or indirectly, indebted to China for the silkworm's eggs, if not also for introducing the white mulberry tree, the leaves of which feed the caterpillars. Although competitors have emerged in many countries across Europe and Asia, China has maintained its reputation and even its leading position as a producer of silk.

The vicissitudes of the silk trade and cultivation would afford more varied interest than the comparatively simple annals of the displacement of tea. Though the subject falls outside the scope of the present work, the changes that have taken place in Chinese commerce cannot be intelligently followed without some reference to the animated competition which has been going on for more than forty years among the great silk-producing countries. The first in rank among these was Italy, France following at a considerable distance. The wants of Europe had been mainly supplied during centuries by the product of these countries, India and the Levant and some others contributing also their share. Japan had been growing silk for her own use during all the time that intercourse with the rest of the world was prohibited by severe laws, and she came later into the field as an exporter.

The ups and downs of the silk trade and its cultivation would be more engaging than the relatively straightforward history of tea's displacement. Although this topic isn't the focus of this work, understanding the shifts in Chinese commerce is not complete without mentioning the intense competition among the major silk-producing countries that has been going on for over forty years. Italy ranked first, with France far behind. For centuries, Europe mainly relied on products from these countries, with India, the Levant, and others also contributing. Japan had been producing silk for its own use while strict laws prevented interaction with the outside world, and it later entered the market as an exporter.

The quantity obtained from China previous to the opening of the five ports was all derived from the southern provinces, and was exported from Canton. In nothing was the pre-eminence of the new port of Shanghai over its older rival destined to be more marked than in the development of the silk trade. Its position within an easy canal journey of the richest silk-growing districts in the whole empire gave to the northern port advantages which were promptly turned 189 to account in co-operation between the foreign and the native merchants, resulting before many years in the growth of a healthy and most satisfactory trade. The supply of the article having up to that time been regulated by the home demand, the entry of an outside customer had a very stimulating effect upon the Chinese growers. Some years elapsed before the product of the newly opened districts could be fully tested and appreciated by the manufacturers in Europe. This time was well employed by the Chinese cultivators and traders in maturing their arrangements for bringing larger supplies to the foreign market, suited to the requirements of the new purchasers, as far as they were understood. The supply and demand had progressed evenly, admitting of good profits to both sides, until a stage was reached when the trade and cultivation were both ready to respond to a new stimulus, and just then the new stimulus was applied.

The quantity sourced from China before the five ports were opened came entirely from the southern provinces and was exported from Canton. The advantage of the new port of Shanghai over its older competitor became especially clear in the silk trade. Its location, within a short canal ride from the richest silk-growing areas in the entire empire, provided the northern port with benefits that were quickly leveraged in collaboration between foreign and local merchants. This cooperation led to a thriving and highly satisfactory trade within a few years. Until then, the supply of silk had been based solely on domestic demand, but the arrival of outside buyers had a very motivating effect on Chinese growers. It took several years for the output from the newly opened regions to be fully explored and valued by European manufacturers. During this time, Chinese farmers and traders effectively developed their operations to provide larger quantities for the foreign market, tailored to meet the new buyers' needs as much as possible. The balance of supply and demand evolved smoothly, allowing both sides to make good profits, until they reached a point where both trade and cultivation were ready for new growth, and at that moment, a new stimulus was introduced.

Disease began to attack the silkworms in Europe; the production of Italian and other silk became precarious, and inadequate to the demands of the manufacturing trade. Into the vacuum thus created supplies from China were ready to pour in, and highly remunerative prices awaited them. The export from Shanghai for the year 1856 was very large, and the result encouraged growers and native and foreign merchants to put forth still greater efforts in the following year, when the shipments from that port reached 90,000 bales, worth probably £10,000,000 sterling. These shipments, thrown on the market during the money panic of 1857, resulted disastrously, but the impetus given to the trade continued to be felt during many subsequent years. 190

Disease began to affect the silkworms in Europe; the production of Italian and other silk became unstable and insufficient to meet the demands of the manufacturing industry. In the gap created, supplies from China were ready to flood in, and lucrative prices were waiting for them. The export from Shanghai in 1856 was very large, and the outcome encouraged both local and foreign merchants to make even greater efforts the following year when shipments from that port reached 90,000 bales, valued at around £10,000,000 sterling. These shipments, released into the market during the financial panic of 1857, had disastrous results, but the boost given to the trade continued to be felt for many years afterward. 190

The Italians in the meanwhile, driven to their wits' end to save so valuable an industry, tried first to obtain healthy seed from China and Japan. The first experiments being unsuccessful, the eggs having hatched during the voyage, steamers were specially chartered and carefully fitted up with conveniences for preserving the precious commodity. Experiment was also made of sending the seed by the caravan route through Siberia to save the risk of premature incubation. In fact, Jason's quest of the Golden Fleece was scarcely characterised by more varied adventures than that of the Italians—the French also joining to a certain extent—after a healthy breed of silkworm. After many years of anxious and almost desperate efforts, some success was obtained in introducing Chinese and Japanese seed into Europe; but the produce of the exotic seed also in time became liable to attacks of the parasite, and it was not till science came to the aid of the cultivators that the true remedy was finally applied, and an important item in the national wealth of Southern Europe was saved. It was M. Pasteur who eventually furnished the means of detecting in the egg the germ of the destructive parasite; so that by sorting out the infected eggs and destroying them the race was purified. Thus the way was opened for the restoration of European culture to more than its pristine prosperity; for the many valuable lessons which the cultivators learnt in the school of their adversity have stood them in good stead now that fortune has again smiled upon them.

The Italians, meanwhile, desperate to save such a valuable industry, first tried to get healthy seeds from China and Japan. When the first experiments failed because the eggs hatched during the journey, special steamers were hired and equipped with the necessary facilities to keep the precious goods safe. They also experimented with sending the seeds via the caravan route through Siberia to avoid the risk of premature hatching. In fact, the Italians, along with some French involvement, faced as many varied challenges in their quest for a healthy breed of silkworm as Jason did in his search for the Golden Fleece. After many years of anxious and nearly hopeless efforts, they eventually had some success in bringing Chinese and Japanese seeds into Europe; however, the crops from these exotic seeds also became vulnerable to parasitic attacks. It wasn't until science came to the aid of the growers that a true solution was finally found, saving an important part of Southern Europe's national wealth. It was M. Pasteur who ultimately provided the means to detect the destructive parasite's germ in the eggs; by sorting out and destroying the infected ones, the breed was purified. This opened the way for the revival of European silkworm production to exceed its former glory; the many valuable lessons learned by the growers during their struggles have served them well now that luck has favored them again.

Notwithstanding the revival of European silk-culture, the silks of China and Japan and other Eastern countries still hold their own in the Western markets, 191 and continue to form an important constituent of the export trade of the Far East.[22] The European markets to which they are consigned are no longer indeed English, but French, German, American, and others, the last forty years having witnessed a revolution in the silk industries of Great Britain, and a virtual transference of the old industries of Spitalfields, Norwich, Macclesfield, and other districts to her manufacturing rivals.

Despite the resurgence of silk production in Europe, silks from China, Japan, and other Eastern countries continue to thrive in Western markets, 191 and remain a significant part of the export trade from the Far East.[22] The European markets they now reach are not just English, but also French, German, American, and others, as the last forty years have seen a dramatic shift in the silk industries of Great Britain, with much of the traditional production from Spitalfields, Norwich, Macclesfield, and other areas relocating to competing manufacturers.

III. OPIUM.

The largest and most interesting Chinese import—Peculiarities of the trade—Nominally contraband—But openly dealt in—Ships anchored in the Canton river—Or near the trading-ports—Wusung—Opium cargoes discharged into old hulks before entering Shanghai port—Importance of the opium traffic as a factor in foreign intercourse—The opium clippers—The opium market liable to much variation—Piracy—The clippers were armed—Occasionally attacked—Anomalous position—Alcock's aversion to the opium traffic—His reasons—Experience at Shanghai modifies his opinion—The trade being bound up with our Indian and Chinese commerce—No attempt to stop it could do other than aggravate the mischief—Still wishes to see the trade modified or abolished—Despatch to Sir J. Bowring—His desire to devise some scheme—His last proposal of 1870—Ambiguous attitude of the British Government—Inheritors of the East India Company's traditions—These forbad the carrying of opium in their ships—Question of legalising the traffic—1885 Chinese Government trebles the import duty and asks the help of the Hongkong Government for its collection.

The biggest and most intriguing Chinese import—The quirks of the trade—Technically illegal—But openly traded—Ships anchored in the Canton River—Or near the trade ports—Wusung—Opium cargoes unloaded into old ships before reaching Shanghai—The significance of the opium trade in foreign relations—The opium clippers—The opium market can change a lot—Piracy—The clippers were armed—Occasionally attacked—Strange situation—Alcock's dislike for the opium trade—His reasons—Experience in Shanghai changes his view—The trade being tied to our Indian and Chinese commerce—No efforts to stop it could do anything but make the problem worse—Still wants to see the trade adjusted or ended—Dispatch to Sir J. Bowring—His desire to come up with a plan—His last proposal in 1870—Unclear stance of the British Government—Heirs to the East India Company's traditions—These prohibited carrying opium on their ships—Debate over legalizing the trade—In 1885, the Chinese Government triples the import duty and seeks help from the Hong Kong Government for its collection.

The most interesting constituent of trade in China has always been opium, especially since the product of British India was so much improved and stimulated by the Government as practically to supersede in the China market the demand for the production of other countries. 192 The value of the opium imported exceeded that of all other articles, the figures being returned at $23,000,000 and $20,000,000 respectively for the year 1845. As the exports of Chinese produce were at that time estimated at $37,000,000, it is evident that opium played a most important part in the adjustment of the balance of trade; and as it came from India and the returns from it had to go thither, opium and raw cotton, which also came from India, formed the pivot of exchange. As the opium was paid for in silver and not by the barter of produce, it was natural to charge it with the loss of the silver which was annually shipped away from China, and which was assumed to reach the amount of £2,000,000 sterling, though that seems to be an exaggeration.

The most fascinating part of trade in China has always been opium, especially since the quality of the product from British India improved so much, backed by the Government, that it basically replaced the demand for opium from other countries in the China market. 192 The value of the opium imported was greater than that of all other goods, totaling $23,000,000 and $20,000,000 for the year 1845. At that time, the value of Chinese exports was estimated at $37,000,000, making it clear that opium was crucial in balancing trade; since it came from India and the profits had to go back there, opium and raw cotton, which also came from India, were central to the exchange. Since opium was paid for in silver rather than through trading goods, it made sense to attribute to it the loss of the silver that was shipped out of China each year, which was thought to be around £2,000,000 sterling, though that seems a bit high.

The trade in this commodity differs from all ordinary commerce in the conditions under which it has been carried on, and in the sentiments which have grown up concerning it. Until the treaty made by Lord Elgin in 1858 the importation of opium had been for many years nominally contraband, while yet the trade in it was as open as that in any other commodity and was as little interfered with by the Government. Laxity and connivance being the characteristics of Chinese officialdom, there would be nothing extraordinary even in the official patronage of a traffic which was forbidden by the State, so that it would not be safe to infer from the outward show what the real mind of the responsible Government was on that or any other subject. The necessity of saving appearances, an object always so dear to the Chinese heart, necessitated a special machinery for conducting the trade in opium. Before the war, as has been 193 already said, the ships carrying the drug anchored at certain rendezvous in the estuary of the Canton river, where they delivered their goods on the order of the merchants who were located in Canton or Macao. The vessels also made excursions up the coast, where they had direct dealings with the Chinese, the master acting as agent for the owners. And when the northern ports were opened, after the treaty of Nanking, the opium depot ships were stationed at convenient points on the coast in the vicinity of the trading-ports. The most important of these stations was at Wusung, on the Hwangpu river, nine miles by road from Shanghai. There were sometimes a dozen, and never less than half-a-dozen, hulks moored there, dismantled, housed-in, and unfit for sea. The supply was kept up in the earlier days by fast schooners and latterly by steamers, which in the period before the treaty of 1858 discharged their opium into these hulks without surveillance of any kind, and then proceeded up the river to Shanghai with the rest of their cargo, which, though often consisting of but a few odd packages, was taken charge of by the custom-house with the utmost punctilio, while the valuable cargo of opium was ignored as if it did not exist.

The trade in this commodity is different from regular commerce in the way it has been conducted and the attitudes that have developed around it. Until the treaty made by Lord Elgin in 1858, importing opium had been officially considered contraband for many years, yet the trade was as open as that of any other commodity and faced minimal interference from the Government. The laxity and complicity of Chinese officials were notable, and it was not unusual for official support to exist for a trade banned by the State. Therefore, it wouldn’t be safe to assume the actual views of the responsible Government based on appearances regarding this or any other issue. The need to maintain appearances, a concern very important to the Chinese, led to a special system for managing the opium trade. Before the war, as mentioned earlier, the ships carrying the drug anchored at specific meeting points in the Canton River estuary, where they delivered their goods based on orders from merchants located in Canton or Macao. The vessels also made trips up the coast, where they engaged directly with the Chinese, with the ship captain acting as an agent for the owners. After the northern ports were opened following the Treaty of Nanking, opium depot ships were positioned at strategic points along the coast near trading ports. The most significant of these stations was at Wusung, on the Hwangpu River, nine miles by road from Shanghai. There were sometimes about a dozen and never fewer than six hulks moored there, dismantled, covered, and unfit for sea travel. In the early days, the supply was maintained by fast schooners and later by steamers, which, before the treaty of 1858, unloaded their opium into these hulks without any supervision and then proceeded up the river to Shanghai with the rest of their cargo. Although this additional cargo often consisted of just a few odd packages, the custom-house handled it very carefully, while the valuable opium cargo was overlooked as if it didn’t exist.

The opium trade was a ruling factor in the general scheme of foreign intercourse and residence in China. The postal communication, for example, on the coast and between India and China was practically dependent on it; for, being a precious commodity, it could afford to pay very high charges for freight, and the opium clippers could be run regardless of expense, as will be more fully described in the Chapter on "Shipping." 194

The opium trade was a key element in how foreign interactions and presence worked in China. For instance, postal services along the coast and between India and China relied heavily on it; being a valuable product, it could cover very high shipping costs, allowing opium clippers to operate without worrying about expenses, as will be explained in the Chapter on "Shipping." 194

The high value of the article influenced the conduct of the trade in a variety of ways, one in particular being that the vessels carrying it had to go heavily armed. The coast of China before the war and after swarmed with pirates, to whom so portable an article as opium offered an irresistible temptation. The clippers on the coast were usually small schooners from 100 to 200 tons burthen, and though with their superior sailing powers they could always take care of themselves in a breeze, they would have been helpless in a calm unless prepared to stand to their guns. It was sometimes alleged by those opposed to the traffic that these vessels were little better than pirates themselves, inasmuch as they were forcing a trade prohibited by the laws of the empire, and were armed to resist the authorities. The opium-carriers were not unfrequently attacked by pirates, sometimes captured and destroyed by them; but there never seems to have been any interference or complaint on the part of the Government, even when prompted thereto by British consuls. Nevertheless it was an anomalous state of things, though one far from unusual in the first third of the century, that European vessels should ply their trade armed like privateers.

The high value of the article affected trade in various ways, especially because the vessels transporting it had to be heavily armed. The coast of China before and after the war was filled with pirates, for whom such a portable item as opium was an irresistible lure. The clippers on the coast were usually small schooners ranging from 100 to 200 tons, and while their superior sailing abilities allowed them to handle themselves in a breeze, they would have been defenseless in a calm unless they were ready to fight back. Those against the trade sometimes claimed that these vessels were little better than pirates themselves, as they were forcing a trade banned by the empire's laws and were armed to resist the authorities. The opium carriers were often attacked by pirates and sometimes captured or destroyed by them; however, there was rarely any interference or complaints from the Government, even when British consuls urged them to act. Nonetheless, it was an unusual situation, though not uncommon in the early part of the century, that European vessels operated in trade armed like privateers.

The attitude of Consul Alcock towards the opium trade was, from the earliest days of his consulship in Foochow until his final departure from China in 1870, one of consistent aversion, so decided, indeed, that in some of the arguments adduced in his Foochow reports against the trade the conclusion somewhat outran the premisses, as he in after years 195 acknowledged by marginal notes on those earlier despatches:—

The attitude of Consul Alcock toward the opium trade was one of strong disapproval, starting from the early days of his consulship in Foochow all the way until he left China in 1870. His aversion was so intense that in some of the arguments he made in his Foochow reports against the trade, his conclusions went a bit beyond the evidence presented. He later admitted this through marginal notes on those earlier reports:—

A trade prohibited and denounced alike as illegal and injurious by the Chinese authority constitutes a very anomalous position both for British subjects and British authorities, giving to the latter an appearance of collusion or connivance at the infraction of the laws of China, which must be held to reflect upon their integrity and good faith by the Chinese.

A trade that is banned and condemned as illegal and harmful by the Chinese government puts both British citizens and British authorities in a very awkward situation. It makes it look like the authorities are either involved in or turning a blind eye to the violation of Chinese laws, which could damage their reputation and trustworthiness in the eyes of the Chinese.

No small portion of the odium attaching to the illicit traffic in China falls upon the consular authorities under whose jurisdiction the sales take place, and upon the whole nation whose subjects are engaged in the trade; and the foundations of the largest smuggling trade in the world are largely extended, carrying with them a habit of violating the laws of another country.

No small part of the blame for the illegal trade in China falls on the consular authorities responsible for overseeing the sales, as well as on the entire nation whose citizens are involved in this trade. The roots of the biggest smuggling operation in the world are widely spread, fostering a culture of breaking the laws of another country.

The opium is of necessity inimical and opposed to the enlargement of our manufacturing trade.

The opium is necessarily harmful and goes against the growth of our manufacturing trade.

That which has been said of war may with still greater force apply to the illicit traffic in opium, "It is the loss of the many that is the gain of the few."

That which has been said about war can even more accurately apply to the illegal trade in opium: "The loss of the many is the gain of the few."

Whichever way we turn, evil of some kind connected with this monstrous trade and monopoly of large houses meets our eye.

No matter where we look, some form of evil linked to this terrible trade and the monopoly of big corporations confronts us.

In order to do justice to the agents in the traffic, he adds in the same report on the trade for 1845—

In order to give the agents in the trade their due, he adds in the same report on the trade for 1845—

While the cultivation and sale of opium are sanctioned and encouraged for the purposes of revenue in India, and those who purchase the drug deriving wealth and importance from the disposal of it in China are free from blame, it is vain to attempt to throw exclusive opprobrium upon the last agents in the transaction.

While growing and selling opium is allowed and promoted for revenue in India, and those who profit and gain status from selling it in China are not blamed, it's pointless to try to place all the blame on the final people involved in the process.

These were the impressions of a fresh and presumably unprejudiced mind taking its first survey of the state of our commercial intercourse with China. They were reflections necessarily of a somewhat abstract 196 character, formed on a very limited acquaintance with the actualities of a trade which did not yet exist in Foochow. A few years' experience at the great commercial mart of Shanghai widened the views of the consul materially, and showed him that there was more in this opium question than meets the eye of the mere philosopher. A confidential report on the subject made in 1852 treats the matter from a more statesman-like as well as a more businesslike point of view. In that paper he does more than deplore the evil, and while seeking earnestly for a remedy, fully recognises the practical difficulties and the danger of curing that which is bad by something which is worse.

These were the thoughts of a fresh and presumably unbiased mind taking its first look at the state of our commercial relationship with China. They were reflections that were somewhat abstract, based on a very limited understanding of a trade that didn’t yet exist in Foochow. A few years of experience at the major trading hub of Shanghai significantly broadened the consul's perspective and revealed that there was more to the opium issue than it appears to the average thinker. A confidential report on the subject drafted in 1852 addresses the issue from a more statesman-like and business-oriented perspective. In that document, he goes beyond just lamenting the problem; while actively searching for a solution, he fully acknowledges the practical challenges and the risk of trying to fix something bad with something worse.

The opium trade [he observes in a despatch to Sir John Bowring] is not simply a question of commerce but first and chiefly one of revenue—or, in other words, of finance, of national government and taxation—in which a ninth of the whole income of Great Britain and a seventh of that of British India is engaged.

The opium trade [he notes in a message to Sir John Bowring] isn't just about business; it's primarily a matter of revenue—or, in simpler terms, finance, national government, and taxes—where a ninth of all income in Great Britain and a seventh of that in British India is involved.

The trade of Great Britain with India in the year 1850 showed by the official returns an export of manufactures to the value of £8,000,000, leaving a large balance of trade against that country. A portion of the revenue of India has also to be annually remitted to England in addition, for payment of the dividends on Indian stock and a portion of the Government expenses. These remittances are now profitably made viâ China, by means of the opium sold there; and failing this, serious charges would have to be incurred which must curtail both the trade and the resources of the Indian Exchequer.

The trade between Great Britain and India in 1850 showed in the official records an export of manufactured goods worth £8,000,000, leaving a significant trade deficit with that country. Additionally, part of India's revenue has to be sent back to England each year to cover the dividends on Indian stock and some government expenses. These remittances are now effectively made via China, through the opium sold there; without this, substantial costs would need to be covered, which would limit both trade and the resources of the Indian treasury.

In China, again, scarcely a million and a half of manufactured goods can find a market; yet we buy of tea and silk for shipment to Great Britain not less than five millions, and the difference is paid by opium.

In China, barely a million and a half manufactured goods can find buyers; yet we purchase tea and silk for export to Great Britain totaling at least five million, with the difference covered by opium.

A trade of £10,000,000 in British manufactures is therefore at stake, and a revenue of £9,000,000—six to the British and three to the Indian Treasury. 197

A trade of £10,000,000 in British goods is therefore at stake, along with a revenue of £9,000,000—six million for the British Treasury and three million for the Indian Treasury. 197

Which of these is the more important in a national point of view,—the commerce, or the revenue derived from it? Both are, however, so essential to our interests, imperial and commercial, that any risk to either has long been regarded with distrust and alarm, and tends to give a character of timidity to our policy and measures for the maintenance of our relations with China—the more disastrous in its results, that to the oriental mind it is a sure indication of weakness, and to the weak the Chinese are both inexorable and faithless.

Which is more important from a national perspective—the trade itself or the revenue generated from it? Both are crucial to our imperial and commercial interests, so any threat to either is seen with suspicion and anxiety. This creates a cautious approach in our policies and actions related to our relationship with China. The unfortunate consequence is that, to the Eastern mindset, it signals weakness, and the weak find the Chinese to be both relentless and untrustworthy.

That the opium trade, illegal as it is, forms an essential element, interference with which would derange the whole circle of operations, must be too apparent to require further demonstration.

That the opium trade, illegal as it is, is an essential element, and interfering with it would disrupt the entire operation, should be obvious enough that it doesn't need further explanation.

Reference to the practical details of the colossal trade in which it plays so prominent a part shows that it is inextricably mixed up with every trading operation between the three countries, and that to recognise the one and ignore the other is about as difficult in any practical sense as to accept the acquaintance of one of the Siamese twins and deny all knowledge of his brother.

Reference to the practical details of the massive trade in which it plays such a significant role shows that it is deeply intertwined with every trading operation between the three countries, and that acknowledging one while ignoring the other is practically as challenging as recognizing one of the Siamese twins and claiming to know nothing about his brother.

No attempt of the British Government to stop or materially diminish the consumption could possibly avail, or be otherwise than productive of aggravated mischief to India, to China, and to the whole world, by giving a motive for its forced production where it is now unknown, and throwing the trade into hands less scrupulous, and relieved of all those checks which under the British flag prevent the trade from taking the worst characters of smuggling, and being confounded with other acts of a lawless and piratical nature affecting life and property, to the destruction of all friendly or commercial relations between the two races. It is also sufficient to bear in mind that it is a traffic, as has been shown, which vitalises the whole of our commerce in the East; that without such means of laying down funds the whole trade would languish, and its present proportions, colossal as they are, soon shrink into other and insignificant dimensions; that the two branches of trade are otherwise so inextricably interwoven, that no means could be devised (were they less essential to each other) of separating them. And finally, although Great Britain has much to lose, China in such a quixotic enterprise has little or nothing to gain.

No effort by the British Government to stop or significantly reduce consumption could possibly succeed, or would do anything other than cause even more harm to India, China, and the entire world. It would create a reason for its forced production in places where it's currently unknown and shift the trade into less ethical hands, removing all the safeguards that the British flag provides to prevent the trade from descending into smuggling and being mixed up with other illegal and dangerous activities that threaten life and property, ultimately ruining all friendly or commercial relations between the two races. It's also important to remember that this trade, as has been shown, supports our entire commerce in the East. Without such methods of generating funds, the whole trade would struggle, and its current massive scale would quickly diminish to a much smaller and insignificant size. The two branches of trade are so closely connected that there's no way to separate them (even if they weren't so essential to one another). Lastly, while Great Britain has a lot to lose, China has little or nothing to gain from such a foolish endeavor.

Notwithstanding all these weighty considerations, Mr Alcock never swerved in his desire to see "the opium trade, with all its train of contradictions, anomalies, and falsifying conditions," modified, if not done away with. In a careful despatch to Sir John Bowring dated May 6, 1854, reviewing our whole position in China, he thus expresses himself:—

Notwithstanding all these important points, Mr. Alcock never wavered in his desire to see "the opium trade, with all its contradictions, anomalies, and deceiving conditions," changed, if not eliminated. In a careful message to Sir John Bowring dated May 6, 1854, reviewing our entire situation in China, he expresses himself as follows:—

Any modification for the better in our relations must, I believe, begin here. We must either find means of inducing the Chinese Government to diminish the evil by legalising the trade, or enter the field of discussion ... with a stone wall before us.... The legalisation would go far to diminish the obstacle such an outrider to our treaty creates; but far better would it be, and more profitable in the end in view of what China might become commercially to Europe, America, and to Great Britain specially, if the Indian Government abandoned their three million sterling revenue from the cultivation of opium, and our merchants submitted to the temporary prejudice or inconvenience of importing silver for the balance of trade.

Any improvement in our relationships needs to start here. We either need to find ways to encourage the Chinese Government to improve the situation by legalizing the trade, or we'll be facing a huge barrier to real discussion. Legalizing the trade would significantly reduce the issues created by the current state of our treaty; however, it would be much better and ultimately more beneficial, considering China's potential commercial value to Europe, America, and especially Great Britain, if the Indian Government gave up its three million sterling revenue from opium cultivation, and our merchants were willing to deal with the temporary challenges of importing silver to balance the trade.

Nearly twenty years afterwards we find Mr Alcock still engaged on the problem how to diminish the trade in opium without dislocating both the trade and finance of India, his last act on retiring from China in 1870 having been to propose a fiscal scheme of rearrangement by which the opium trade might undergo a process of slow and painless extinction.[23]

Nearly twenty years later, Mr. Alcock is still working on how to reduce the opium trade without disrupting India's trade and finances. His final action before leaving China in 1870 was to suggest a financial plan for reorganizing the opium trade, aiming for a gradual and painless end to it.[23]

The attitude of the British Government towards the opium trade has always been ambiguous. Succeeding to the inheritance of the East India Company as the great growers of opium, they had to carry on its 199 traditions. These had led the Company in its trading days into some striking inconsistencies, for though they cultivated the poppy expressly for the China market, employing all the intelligence at their command to adapt their product to the special tastes of the Chinese, they yet refused to carry a single chest of it in their own ships which traded to China. By this policy they thought they could exonerate themselves in face of the Chinese authorities from participation in a trade which was under the ban of that Government. The importation of the drug was thus thrown upon private adventurers, and whenever the subject was agitated in Canton and Macao, none were so warm in their denunciations of the trade as the servants of the East India Company. This was notably the case with Captain Elliot, who, after leaving the Company's service and becoming representative of the Crown, never wearied in his strictures on the opium traffic.

The British Government's attitude towards the opium trade has always been unclear. Inheriting the East India Company's role as the main growers of opium, they had to continue its traditions. These traditions had led the Company into some notable contradictions. Even though they grew poppies specifically for the Chinese market, using all their knowledge to tailor their product to Chinese preferences, they still refused to ship any of it in their own vessels that traded with China. They believed this strategy would help them avoid responsibility in front of the Chinese authorities regarding a trade that was illegal according to that Government. Therefore, the importation of the drug fell to private traders, and whenever the issue was raised in Canton and Macao, no one criticized the trade more than the employees of the East India Company. This was especially true for Captain Elliot, who, after leaving the Company's service and becoming a representative of the Crown, relentlessly condemned the opium trade.

The question of legalising the traffic had frequently before been considered by the Chinese Government,[24] and it was fully expected that this was the policy which would prevail in Peking in 1837. The pendulum swung to the opposite side, namely, that of prohibition, and legalisation was not adopted until 1858. But once adopted, the idea made such progress that in 1885 the Chinese Government made a successful appeal to the British Government to be allowed to treble the import duty authorised in 1858, and that the Colonial Government of Hongkong should render them special assistance in collecting it.

The question of legalizing trafficking had often been discussed by the Chinese Government, [24] and it was fully expected that this would be the policy in Beijing in 1837. However, the pendulum swung in the opposite direction, towards prohibition, and legalization wasn’t adopted until 1858. But once it was adopted, the idea gained so much traction that in 1885, the Chinese Government successfully appealed to the British Government to allow them to triple the import duty that had been authorized in 1858, and that the Colonial Government of Hong Kong should provide them with special help in collecting it.

IV. CHINESE EXPORTS.

Efforts of the consuls to stimulate trade—Alcock's work at Foochow—His despatches—Exhibition of 1851—Exhibits of Chinese produce sent by Alcock.

Efforts by the consuls to boost trade—Alcock's work in Foochow—His reports—Exhibition of 1851—Chinese products showcased by Alcock.

VILLAGE ON THE CANALS.

CANAL VILLAGE.

The continuous efforts made by the consuls in the first decade after the treaty to stimulate the action of foreign merchants in laying hold of all the opportunities offered to them for extending their connections with the Chinese trade ought not to be passed over without notice. It was the burden of Consul Alcock's labours while in Foochow to gather information from every source, to digest it as well as he was able, and to lay it before his countrymen; and if he, in his despatches to the plenipotentiary, sometimes reflected on what seemed to him the apathy and want of enterprise of the merchants, that must be set down to a laudable zeal to make his office fruitful of benefit to his country. The same spirit animated his proceedings in Shanghai. The demand made for exhibits for the Great Exhibition of 1851 found Mr Alcock and his lieutenant Parkes eager to supply samples of Chinese products of every kind likely to be of commercial interest. On applying to the mercantile community of Shanghai for their co-operation in collecting materials, he found them not over-sanguine as to the results of such an effort, and in his despatch of December 1850 to the plenipotentiary he remarks that "the British and foreign residents in Shanghai appeared to feel that the impossibility of gaining access to the great seats of manufacture 201 or the producing districts for raw material placed them in too disadvantageous a position to do justice either to themselves or the resources of the empire, which could only be very inadequately represented, and in a way more calculated to mislead than instruct." "The conclusion," he goes on to say, "at which the mercantile community has arrived has gone far to paralyse all exertion on my part." Nevertheless, with the restricted means at his disposal, he set to work to collect specimens of Chinese produce and industry and to transmit them to the Board of Trade for the use of the Commissioners. Of objects of art he sent a great variety in bronze, inlaid wood, porcelain, soapstone, and enamels, and the fancy articles which have since acquired such great reputation in the world that dealers in European and American capitals send out commissions every year to make extensive purchases. Colours used by the Chinese for dyeing purposes in twenty shades of blue, silk brocades, and many valuable products of the Chinese looms, were well represented, and the commoner utensils, such as scissors, needles, and razors, some of which were within the last few years specially recommended in consular reports to the notice of English manufacturers, as if the suggestion were made for the first time. Of raw material, samples were sent of hemp, indigo, and many other natural products; and when it is considered how eager the British mercantile community appeared to be to increase their importation of Chinese produce—be it tea, silk, or any other commodity—in order to balance the export trade, it is interesting to observe that in those early days a number of articles of export were 202 described and classified, with an account of the districts of their origin, which have only taken their place in the list of exports from China within the last twenty years or so. These were sheep's wool of six different descriptions, and camels' hair, which are now so extensively dealt in at the northern ports of China. Perhaps these articles were not seen in bulk by foreigners until after the opening of the new ports in 1861, and it is worthy of remark that even after this discovery, and sundry experimental shipments, many years elapsed before the special products of Northern China became recognised articles of foreign trade. These now include straw plait, sheep's wool, goats' wools, goats' skins, dogs' skins, camels' hair, horses' tails, pigs' bristles, and a number of other articles of export which might perfectly well have been brought to the foreign market of Shanghai even before the opening of the northern ports. What was wanted was the knowledge that such products were procurable and the organisation of a market for their disposal in China, in Europe, and the United States. To stimulate inquiry into these matters was an object of the consular reports of the early days, and the fact that the seed then sown seemed to have been buried in sterile soil for thirty years affords a reasonable prospect that from the more advantageous basis on which commercial men now stand still larger developments of international commerce may be reserved to future adventurers. 203

The ongoing efforts by the consuls in the first ten years after the treaty to encourage foreign merchants to seize every opportunity to expand their connections with Chinese trade shouldn’t be overlooked. Consul Alcock worked hard while in Foochow to gather information from all available sources, process it as best as he could, and present it to his fellow countrymen. If he sometimes pointed out the seeming lack of enthusiasm and initiative among the merchants in his reports to the plenipotentiary, it was driven by a commendable desire to make his role beneficial for his country. The same determination characterized his actions in Shanghai. When the call for exhibits for the Great Exhibition of 1851 came, Mr. Alcock and his deputy Parkes eagerly sought to present samples of various Chinese products that could attract commercial interest. However, when he reached out to the Shanghai business community for assistance in gathering materials, he found them not overly optimistic about the outcomes of such an effort. In his December 1850 report to the plenipotentiary, he noted that "the British and foreign residents in Shanghai seemed to feel that their inability to access the major manufacturing centers or the raw material-producing regions put them at a significant disadvantage, preventing them from doing justice to either themselves or the resources of the empire, which could only be poorly represented, often misleading rather than informing." He added, "The conclusion the business community has drawn has largely paralyzed my efforts.” Still, working with the limited resources he had, he began collecting examples of Chinese products and industries to send to the Board of Trade for the Commissioners' use. He sent a wide variety of art objects in bronze, inlaid wood, porcelain, soapstone, and enamels, along with fancy items that have since gained significant global recognition, prompting dealers in Europe and America to send out requests for extensive purchases every year. The colors used by the Chinese for dyeing in twenty shades of blue, silk brocades, and many valuable products from Chinese looms were well-covered, along with everyday utensils like scissors, needles, and razors, some of which had been specially recommended in recent consular reports to the attention of English manufacturers, making it seem like a fresh suggestion. He also sent samples of raw materials like hemp, indigo, and various other natural products. Considering how eager the British business community seemed to be to increase their imports of Chinese products—whether tea, silk, or any other goods—to balance export trade, it’s intriguing to note that back then, several export items were described and categorized, including details about their regions of origin, which have only recently become recognized in the list of Chinese exports over the past twenty years or so. These included six types of sheep’s wool and camels’ hair, now widely traded at northern Chinese ports. Perhaps these products were not seen in large quantities by foreigners until after the new ports opened in 1861, and it’s worth noting that even after this discovery and several trial shipments, many years passed before the specific products from Northern China were acknowledged as foreign trade items. These now encompass straw plaiting, sheep’s wool, goats’ wool, goats' skins, dogs’ skins, camels’ hair, horse tails, pigs’ bristles, and several other export products that could have easily been introduced to the foreign market in Shanghai even before the northern ports opened. What was needed was knowledge that such products were available and a market organized for their sale in China, Europe, and the United States. Encouraging exploration into these issues was a goal of the early consular reports, and the fact that the seeds then planted seemed to have been buried in unproductive soil for thirty years offers a reasonable hope that, given the more favorable foundation on which modern commercial players now stand, even greater growth in international trade may await future adventurers.

V. BRITISH EXPORTS.

Slow increase—Turn of the scale by the Shanghai silk trade—Consequent inflow of silver to China—Alcock's comment on the Report of Select Committee—His grasp of the true state of affairs.

Slow increase—Shift in the scale due to the Shanghai silk trade—Resulting inflow of silver to China—Alcock's remarks on the Report of the Select Committee—His understanding of the actual situation.

This department of trade presents little else but a record of very slow improvement, with some rather violent fluctuations due to obvious and temporary causes. In the first year after the treaty of Nanking the value of shipments to China from the United Kingdom was £1,500,000; in 1852, £2,500,000; in 1861, £4,500,000, decreasing in 1862 to £2,300,000, and rising in 1863 to £3,000,000; after which period it steadily increased to £7,000,000, at which it has practically remained, with the exception of two or three years between 1885 and 1891, when it rose to £9,000,000.

This trade department shows very slow improvement overall, with some significant ups and downs caused by clear and temporary factors. In the year following the Treaty of Nanking, shipments to China from the UK were valued at £1,500,000; in 1852, they increased to £2,500,000; they rose again to £4,500,000 in 1861, then dropped to £2,300,000 in 1862, and climbed back up to £3,000,000 in 1863. After that, the value steadily grew to £7,000,000, where it has mostly stayed, aside from a couple of years between 1885 and 1891 when it peaked at £9,000,000.

The theory of the merchants who gave evidence before the Committee of 1847, that an increase in the exports from China was all that was needed to enable the Chinese to purchase larger quantities of manufactured goods, has by no means been borne out by the subsequent course of trade. For although the Chinese exports have been greatly extended since then, that of silk alone having more than sufficed to pay for the whole of the imports from abroad, there has been no corresponding increase in the volume of these importations. What happened was merely this, that the drain of silver from China, which was deplored on all sides up till about 1853, was converted into a steady annual inflow of silver 204 to China.[25] Consul Alcock, having been requested by her Majesty's chief superintendent of trade to make his comments on the Report of the Select Committee, dealt comprehensively with the whole question of the trade between Europe, India, and China, and evinced a wider grasp of the true state of the case than the London merchants had done. In a despatch dated March 23, 1848, the following passages occur:—

The theory presented by the merchants who testified before the Committee of 1847, claiming that an increase in exports from China was all that was needed for the Chinese to buy more manufactured goods, has not been supported by the trade developments that followed. Although Chinese exports have significantly increased since then, with silk alone being more than enough to cover all imports from abroad, there hasn't been a corresponding rise in the volume of these imports. What actually occurred was simply that the outflow of silver from China, which was lamented by many until about 1853, turned into a consistent annual inflow of silver to China. 204 Consul Alcock, after being asked by her Majesty's chief superintendent of trade to comment on the Report of the Select Committee, addressed the entire issue of trade between Europe, India, and China, showing a better understanding of the real situation than the London merchants did. In a dispatch dated March 23, 1848, the following passages appear:—

Nearly the whole of the evidence furnished by the witnesses on our trade is calculated to mislead those imperfectly acquainted with the details. The existence of this relation [the importation of opium and raw cotton from India] is kept out of sight, and conclusions are suggested which could only be maintained if the Indian imports into China did not form a part of our commerce, and did not come in direct competition with the import of staple manufactures.

Almost all the evidence provided by the witnesses about our trade is likely to mislead those who aren't fully informed about the details. The reality of this relationship [the importation of opium and raw cotton from India] is concealed, and conclusions are drawn that could only be upheld if the Indian imports into China were not part of our commerce and did not directly compete with the import of essential manufactured goods.

To counteract as far as may be in my power the erroneous tendency of the partial evidence which the Blue-Book contains on this part of the subject, I have ventured for the information of her Majesty's Government to bring forward such facts and inferences as seem to me to place in the strongest light the fallacy of the argument mainly insisted upon before the Committee—viz., that we have only our own consumption of tea to look to as indicating the extent to which we can exchange our manufactures—that this is the only limit of our imports into China. But imports of what? Not certainly of cotton and woollen goods, for we already export of tea and silk from China to the value of some four millions sterling, and cannot find a profitable market for manufactured goods to the amount of two millions; and a somewhat similar proportion, or disproportion rather, may be traced during the monopoly of the East India Company, during the free-trade period prior to the commencement of hostilities, and since the treaty. Say that from a 205 reduction of the tea duties or any other cause we double our exports from China as we have already done since 1833, from what data are we to infer that in this same proportion the export into China of British manufactures will increase; or in other words, that for every additional million of tea there will be an equivalent value expended upon our cotton fabrics?

To counteract, as much as I can, the misleading evidence found in the Blue-Book regarding this topic, I've decided to present factual information and reasoning that clearly highlight the flaws in the argument strongly emphasized before the Committee—namely, that we should only consider our own tea consumption as a measure of how much we can exchange for our manufactured goods, and that this is the only limit to our imports into China. But imports of what? Not cotton and wool products, that's for sure, since we already export tea and silk from China valued at around four million pounds, and we struggle to find a profitable market for manufactured goods worth even two million. A similar imbalance can be seen during the East India Company's monopoly, in the free-trade period before hostilities began, and since the treaty. Let's say that due to a reduction in tea duties or for some other reason we double our exports from China, as we've already done since 1833. What evidence do we have to suggest that British manufactured exports to China will increase by the same proportion? In other words, for every additional million of tea, will there be an equivalent amount spent on our cotton goods?

The anticipated result is contradicted by all past experience in China, and a moment's reflection must show that the essential elements have been overlooked. 1st, That there is a balance of trade against the Chinese of some $10,000,000, which must adjust itself before any increase of our exclusively British imports into China can be safely or reasonably expected, for which an additional export of 20,000,000 lb. of tea and 10,000 bales of silk is required. 2ndly, That if such increase of our exports hence restored the balance of trade to-morrow, the proportion in which an increased import of our goods would take place must depend upon the result of a competition of cotton goods against opium and raw cotton—all three objects in demand among the Chinese; and the proportion of each that may be taken under the assumed improvement depends upon the relative degree of preference exhibited by our customers for the different articles. The two latter have proved formidable rivals to our manufactures, nor is there any reason to anticipate beneficial change in that respect.

The expected outcome goes against everything we’ve learned from previous experiences in China, and just a moment of thought reveals that key factors have been ignored. First, there’s a trade imbalance negatively affecting China of about $10,000,000 that needs to be addressed before we can reasonably expect any increase in our purely British imports into China. To achieve this, we would need to export an additional 20,000,000 pounds of tea and 10,000 bales of silk. Secondly, even if such an increase in our exports were to restore the trade balance tomorrow, the extent to which our goods would be imported would depend on the competition between cotton goods, opium, and raw cotton—all of which are in demand in China. The amount of each item that could be sold based on this projected improvement relies on how our customers prefer these different products. The latter two have proven to be strong competitors against our manufactured goods, and there’s no reason to expect any positive change in that situation.

The argument, therefore, that the only limit to our imports into China is the consumption of tea and silk in Great Britain, if meant to be applied, as it appears to be in the evidence, exclusively to British imports—that is, to cotton and woollens—is fallacious, and can only be sustained by dropping the most important features of the import trade, by treating opium and raw cotton as though they had neither existence nor influence upon our British staple trade.

The argument that the only limit to our imports into China is the consumption of tea and silk in Great Britain, if intended to apply exclusively to British imports—meaning cotton and woolen products—is flawed. This argument can only hold up by ignoring the most important aspects of the import trade and pretending that opium and raw cotton don't exist or have any impact on our British staple trade.

The influence of this mode of reasoning is calculated to be the more mischievous that it comes from gentlemen of practical mercantile information, and purports to suggest a remedy for an evil which is, in truth, of our own creating, and must recur as often and as certainly as the same causes are in operation. The trade in China during the last three years has been a losing, and in many instances a ruinous, trade, not because the English do not drink more tea, or the Chinese do not find it convenient to wear more cotton of our manufacture, but simply 206 because in such market the supply has not been carefully regulated by an accurate estimate of the probable demand. Our merchants at home have unfortunately been led by such reasoning as I have quoted to assume that in proportion as we purchase more tea the Chinese would lay out more money in cotton goods, and that the one might be taken as a true estimate of the other. Hence came shipments after the treaty so disproportioned to the actual wants or state of demand in the Chinese market that an immediate glut, with the consequent and necessary depreciation in price, followed. Nor did the evil end here: a return was of necessity to be made for this enormous over-supply of goods, hence more tea was shipped than the legitimate demand of the English markets would have suggested or justified, and at the other end of the chain the same depreciation and ruinous loss was experienced....

The impact of this way of thinking is particularly harmful because it comes from knowledgeable businesspeople and seems to offer a solution for a problem we’ve caused ourselves, which will keep happening as long as the same factors are at play. Over the past three years, trade with China has been unprofitable and often devastating, not because the English drink less tea or the Chinese have stopped wearing our cotton, but simply 206 because the supply in that market hasn’t been managed based on an accurate understanding of the expected demand. Unfortunately, our merchants here have been misled by such reasoning to believe that as we buy more tea, the Chinese will spend more on cotton goods, treating the two as directly related. This led to shipments after the treaty that were far too large compared to the actual needs or demand in the Chinese market, resulting in an immediate surplus and the inevitable drop in prices. The problem didn’t end there: it was necessary to make returns for this massive over-supply of goods, leading to even more tea being shipped than what the English market could reasonably support, causing the same drop in prices and significant losses.

I have submitted in this and the preceding Reports my strong conviction that other conditions than a mere increase in our exports hence are essential. Of these I have endeavoured to show the principal and most important are access to the first markets, the removal of or efficient control over all fiscal pretexts for restricting the free circulation of our goods in the interior and the transit of Chinese produce thence to the ports, and, finally, the abolition of all humiliating travelling limits in the interior, which more than anything else tends to give the Chinese rulers a power of keeping up a hostile and arrogant spirit against foreigners, and of fettering our commerce by exactions and delays of the most injurious character.

I have expressed in this report and the previous ones my strong belief that simply increasing our exports isn't enough. I have tried to highlight that the key factors we need are access to major markets, the elimination or effective management of all fiscal excuses that limit the free movement of our goods within the country and the transportation of Chinese products from there to the ports, and finally, the removal of all demeaning travel restrictions in the interior. These restrictions, more than anything else, empower the Chinese rulers to maintain a hostile and arrogant attitude towards foreigners and to hinder our trade with excessive demands and delays that are extremely damaging.

The conditions of the trade were, in fact, simpler than the merchants had imagined. The Chinese entered into no nice estimates of the balance of imports and exports, but purchased the goods which were offered to them so far as they were adapted to their requirements—and there is no other rule for the guidance of foreign manufacturers in catering for the great Chinese market. 207

The trade conditions were actually simpler than the merchants had thought. The Chinese didn’t make detailed calculations about the balance of imports and exports; they simply bought what they needed based on what was available to them. This is the only guideline foreign manufacturers should follow when trying to sell in the huge Chinese market. 207

VI. NATIVE TRADE.

Inter-provincial trade—Advantages of the employment of foreign shipping—China exports surplus of tea and silk—Coasting-trade—Salt.

Inter-provincial trade—Benefits of using foreign shipping—China exports excess tea and silk—Coastal trade—Salt.

The great reservoir of all foreign commerce in China is the old-established local inter-provincial trade of the country itself, which lies for the most part outside of the sphere of foreign interest excepting so far as it has come within the last forty years to supply the cargoes for an ever-increasing fleet of coasting sailing-ships and steamers. This great development of Chinese commerce carried on in foreign bottoms was thus foreshadowed by Mr Alcock as early as 1848:—

The main source of all foreign trade in China is the long-standing local inter-provincial trade within the country, which for the most part operates outside of foreign interests, except that in the last forty years it has started providing cargo for a growing number of coasting sailing ships and steamers. This significant growth of Chinese commerce conducted in foreign vessels was anticipated by Mr. Alcock as early as 1848:—

The disadvantages under which the native trade is now carried on have become so burdensome as manifestly to curtail it, greatly to the loss and injury of the Chinese population, enhancing the price of all the common articles of consumption: any measures calculated, therefore, to exempt their commerce from the danger, delay, and loss attending the transport of valuable produce by junks must ultimately prove a great boon of permanent value, though at first it may seem the reverse.

The challenges facing native trade today have become so overwhelming that they clearly hinder it, causing significant loss and harm to the Chinese population, while driving up the prices of everyday goods. Therefore, any actions aimed at protecting their commerce from the risks, delays, and losses associated with transporting valuable products by junks will ultimately provide a lasting benefit, even if it may not seem that way at first.

In a political point of view the transfer of the more valuable portion of their junk trade to foreign bottoms is highly desirable, as tending more than any measures of Government to improve our position by impressing the Chinese people and rulers with a sense of dependence upon the nations of the West for great and material advantages, and thus rebuking effectually the pride and arrogance which lie at the root of all their hostility to foreigners.

From a political standpoint, shifting the more valuable part of their junk trade to foreign ships is very advantageous. This approach, more than any government actions, helps to enhance our standing by impressing the Chinese people and their leaders with their reliance on Western nations for significant material benefits, effectively challenging the pride and arrogance that drives their hostility toward foreigners.

In a commercial sense the direct advantage would consist in the profitable employment of foreign shipping to a greater extent: it would also assist the development of the resources of the five ports—more especially those which hitherto have done 208 little foreign trade. I have entered into some details to show how the carrying trade may work such results, particularly in reference to sugar, which promises to pave the way at this port to large shipments in this and other articles for the Chinese.

In a business sense, the main benefit would come from using foreign shipping more effectively to make a profit. It would also help develop the resources of the five ports, especially those that have previously had little foreign trade. I've provided some details to illustrate how the carrying trade can achieve these results, particularly regarding sugar, which looks promising for facilitating large shipments of this and other goods to China from this port.

A more effective blow will be given to piracy on the coast by a partial transfer of the more valuable freights to foreign vessels than by any measures of repression which either Government can carry out, for piracy will, in fact, cease to be profitable....

A more effective hit to piracy along the coast will come from shifting some of the more valuable shipments to foreign ships rather than through any enforcement actions either government can take, because piracy will essentially stop being profitable....

A further extension of the trade between our Australian settlements and China, and our colonies in the Straits with both, may follow as a natural result of any successful efforts in this direction,—the addition of a large bulky article of regular consumption like sugar alone sufficing to remove a great difficulty in the way of a Straits trade....

A further expansion of trade between our Australian settlements and China, as well as our colonies in the Straits, could easily result from any successful initiatives in this area. Just the addition of a large, bulky item like sugar, which is regularly consumed, would be enough to eliminate a significant barrier to Straits trade.

If this can be counted upon, I think it may safely be predicated that at no distant period a large and profitable employment for foreign shipping will be found here totally exclusive of the trade with Europe.

If we can rely on this, I believe it's fair to predict that soon there will be a significant and profitable opportunity for foreign shipping here, completely separate from trade with Europe.

It has been said with regard to tea that the quantity sold for export is but the overflow of what is produced for native consumption, and to silk the same observation would apply. Essentially a consuming country, it is the surplus of these two articles that China has been able to afford which has constituted the staple of export trade from first to last. It is an interesting question whether there may not be surpluses of some other Chinese products to be similarly drawn upon. If the foreign trade has been distinguished by its simplicity, being confined to a very few standard commodities, such cannot be predicated of the native trade, which is of a most miscellaneous character. It is impossible to give any statistical account of the coast and inland traffic of China. Any estimate of it would be scarcely more satisfactory than those which are so loosely made of the population. In the early days, when the ports 209 opened by the treaty of 1842 were still new ports, great pains were taken by the consuls to collect all the information they could respecting purely Chinese commerce, which they not unnaturally regarded as the source whence the material of an expanded foreign trade might in future be drawn. Especially was this the case at Foochow under the consulship of Mr Alcock and the assistantship of his energetic interpreter, Parkes. We find, for instance, among the returns compiled by that industrious officer of three months' trading in 1846, the quantities and valuations of over fifty articles of import and as many of export given in great detail: imports in 592 junks of 55,000 tons, and of exports in 238 junks of 22,000 tons. Of the sea-going junks he gives an interesting summary, distinguishing the ports with which they traded and their tonnage, with short abstracts of the cargoes carried. These amounted for the year to 1678 arrivals from twenty different places, and 1310 departures for twenty-four places; and this at a port of which the consul wrote in 1847, "No prospect of a British or other foreign trade at this port is apparent in the very remotest degree." Every traveller in every part of China is astonished at the quantity and variety of the merchandise which is constantly on the move. It is this that inspires confidence in the boundless potentialities of Chinese commerce, which seems only waiting for the link of connection between the resources of the empire and the enterprise of the Western world.

It has been said about tea that the amount sold for export is just the excess of what is produced for local consumption, and the same could be said for silk. As a primarily consuming country, it is the surplus of these two products that China has managed to export consistently. An interesting question is whether there might be surpluses of other Chinese products that could also be tapped into. While foreign trade has been characterized by its simplicity, limited to a very small number of standard goods, the domestic trade is quite diverse. It’s impossible to provide a statistical overview of the coastal and inland trade in China. Any estimate would be hardly more reliable than those loosely made regarding the population. In the early days, when the ports opened by the treaty of 1842 were still new, consuls worked hard to gather all the information they could about purely Chinese commerce, which they understandably saw as the source from which an expanded foreign trade might emerge in the future. This was particularly true in Foochow under Consul Mr. Alcock and his dedicated interpreter, Parkes. For example, among the reports compiled by that diligent officer during three months of trading in 1846, he detailed the quantities and values of over fifty items of import and as many of export: imports involved 592 junks totaling 55,000 tons, and exports included 238 junks totaling 22,000 tons. He provided an interesting summary of the sea-going junks, highlighting the ports they traded with and their tonnage, along with brief descriptions of their cargoes. For the year, there were 1,678 arrivals from twenty different locations and 1,310 departures to twenty-four locations; and this was at a port where the consul stated in 1847, "No prospect of a British or other foreign trade at this port is apparent in the very remotest degree." Every traveler in every part of China is amazed by the sheer volume and variety of merchandise that is constantly being transported. It is this that fuels confidence in the limitless potential of Chinese commerce, which seems just on the brink of connecting the empire’s resources with the enterprising spirit of the Western world.

Besides the sea-borne trade of which it was possible to make these approximate estimates, there is always in China an immense inland trade; and at the time when piracy was rampant on the coast, and before the 210 aid of foreign ships and steamers was obtained, all the goods whose value enabled them to pay the cost of carriage were conveyed by the inland routes, often indeed from one seaport to another, as, for instance, between Canton and Foochow, Ningpo, Shanghai, &c.; and it is still by the interior channels that much of the trade is done between Shanghai and the provinces to the north of it, which would appear, geographically speaking, to be more accessible from their own seaports.

Besides the sea trade that could be roughly estimated, China always has a huge inland trade. At the time when piracy was widespread along the coast, and before the help of foreign ships and steamers was secured, all goods that were valuable enough to cover transportation costs were moved via inland routes. Often, this meant transporting goods from one seaport to another, like between Canton and Foochow, Ningpo, Shanghai, etc. Even now, a lot of trade happens through the interior channels between Shanghai and the provinces to the north, which might seem more accessible from their own seaports.

The relation of the Government to the inter-provincial trade is, in general terms, that of a capricious tax-gatherer, laying such burdens on merchandise as it is found able and willing to bear. The arbitrary impositions of the officials are, however, tempered by the genius of evasion on the part of the Chinese merchant, and by mutual concession a modus vivendi is easily maintained between them.

The government's role in inter-provincial trade is generally that of an unpredictable tax collector, imposing burdens on goods as it sees fit and finds feasible. However, the random demands from officials are balanced out by the clever evasion strategies of Chinese merchants, and through mutual compromise, they easily maintain a workable relationship.

The item of trade in which Government comes into most direct relation with the trader is the article salt, which is produced all along the sea-coast, and is likewise obtained from wells in the western provinces. Like many other Governments, the Chinese have long treated salt as a Government monopoly. As the manner in which this is carried out illustrates in several points the ideas that lie at the root of Chinese administration, some notes on the subject made by Parkes at Foochow in 1846, and printed in an appendix to this volume, may still be of interest.[26]

The main item that connects the Government directly with traders is salt, which is produced along the coast and also sourced from wells in the western provinces. Like many other governments, the Chinese have long viewed salt as a government monopoly. The way this is managed reflects several key principles of Chinese administration. Some observations made by Parkes in Foochow in 1846, which are included in an appendix to this volume, may still be of interest. [26]

CHAPTER XII.

Shipping.

The East Indiaman—Opium clippers—Coasting craft—Trading explorations—Yangtze—Japan—Ocean trade—American shipping—Gold in California—Repeal of British Navigation Laws—Gold in Australia—Ocean rivalry—Tonnage for China—Regular traders—Silk—British and American competition—The China clipper—Steam—The Suez Canal—Native shipping—Lorchas.

The East Indiaman—Opium clippers—Coasting vessels—Trade explorations—Yangtze—Japan—Ocean trade—American shipping—Gold in California—Repeal of British Navigation Laws—Gold in Australia—Ocean rivalry—Tonnage for China—Regular traders—Silk—British and American competition—The China clipper—Steam—The Suez Canal—Local shipping—Lorchas.

Next in importance to the merchandise carried was the shipping which carried it. That stately argosy, the East Indiaman, was already invested with the halo of the past. Her leisurely voyages, once in two years, regulated by the monsoons, landing the "new" tea in London nearly a year old, and her comfortable habits generally, were matters of legend at the time of which we write. But a parting glance at the old is the best way of appreciating the new. The East Indiaman was the very apotheosis of monopoly. The command was reserved as a short road to fortune for the protégés of the omnipotent Directors in Leadenhall Street, and as with Chinese governors, the tenure of the post was in practice limited to a very few years, for the Directors were many and their cognates prolific. So many, indeed, were their privileges, perquisites, and "indulgences" that a captain was expected to have realised an ample independence 212 in four or five voyages; the officers and petty officers having similar opportunities, proportionate to their rank. They were allowed tonnage space, the captain's share being 56 tons, which they could either fill with their own merchandise or let out to third parties. The value of this, including the intermediate "port-to-port" voyage in India, may be judged from the figures given by one captain, who from actual data estimated the freight for the round voyage at £43 per ton. The captains enjoyed also the passage-money, valued by the same authority at £1500 per voyage. There were other "indulgences," scarcely intelligible in our days, which yet yielded fabulous results. These figures are taken from a statement submitted to the Honourable Company by Captain Innes, who claimed, on behalf of himself and comrades, compensation for the loss they sustained through the cessation of the monopoly. The captain showed that he made, on the average of his three last voyages, £6100 per voyage—of which £180 was pay!—without counting "profits on investments," for the loss of which he rather handsomely waived compensation. £8000 to £10,000 per voyage was reckoned a not extravagant estimate of a captain's emoluments. The Company employed chartered ships to supplement its own, and the command of one of them was in practice put up to the highest bidder, the usual premium being about £3000 for the privilege of the command, which was of course severely restricted to qualified and selected men.

Next in importance to the goods being shipped was the shipping itself. That grand ship, the East Indiaman, was already seen as a relic of the past. Her slow voyages, occurring every two years, timed with the monsoons, brought "new" tea to London that was nearly a year old, and her comfortable lifestyle were already legendary by the time we’re discussing. But looking back at the old is the best way to appreciate the new. The East Indiaman was the ultimate symbol of monopoly. The command was a shortcut to wealth for the favored individuals of the powerful Directors in Leadenhall Street, and similar to Chinese governors, the position was typically held for only a few years, since there were many Directors and their relatives were numerous. Their privileges, perks, and "indulgences" were so abundant that a captain was expected to achieve financial independence through four or five voyages; the officers and petty officers had similar opportunities based on their rank. They were allocated cargo space, with the captain receiving 56 tons, which they could fill with their own goods or rent out to others. The value of this, including the intermediate "port-to-port" journey in India, can be gauged from figures provided by one captain, who estimated the freight for the full journey at £43 per ton based on actual data. Captains also benefitted from passenger fees, valued by the same source at £1500 per voyage. There were other "indulgences," almost incomprehensible today, that generated incredible returns. These figures are drawn from a report submitted to the Honourable Company by Captain Innes, who argued, on behalf of himself and his teammates, for compensation due to the end of the monopoly. The captain showed that he earned an average of £6100 per voyage over his last three trips—of which £180 was salary!—without factoring in "profits on investments," for which he graciously waived compensation. £8000 to £10,000 per voyage was seen as a reasonable estimate of a captain's earnings. The Company hired additional chartered ships to supplement its own, and the command of one was usually auctioned to the highest bidder, with the typical fee around £3000 for the privilege, which was, of course, strictly limited to qualified and chosen men.

That such incredible privileges should be abused, to the detriment of the too indulgent Company, was only natural. The captains, in fact, carried on a 213 systematic smuggling trade with Continental ports as well as with ports in the United Kingdom where they had no business to be at all, though they found pretexts, à la Chinoise, such as stress of weather or want of water, if ever called to account. The Channel Islands, the Scilly Islands, and the Isle of Wight supplied the greatest facilities for the illicit traffic, and their populations were much alarmed when measures were threatened to suppress it. The inspecting commander reported officially from St Mary's, in 1828, "that these islands were never known with so little smuggling as this year, and the greatest part of the inhabitants are reduced to great distress in consequence, for hitherto it used to be their principal employment."[27] The ships were also met by accomplices on the high seas which relieved them of smuggled goods. What is so difficult to understand about such proceedings is that the Court of Directors, though not conniving, seemed helpless to check these irregularities. Their fulminations, resolutions, elaborate advertisements, and measures prescribed for getting evidence against offenders, bore a curious resemblance to those futile efforts which are from time to time put forth by the Chinese Government, which is equally impotent to suppress illicit practices in its administration. One cause of this impotence was also very Chinese in character. The smugglers had friends in office, who supplied them with the most confidential information.

That such amazing privileges would be misused, to the detriment of the overly lenient Company, was only to be expected. The captains were actually running a systematic smuggling operation with ports on the Continent as well as with ports in the United Kingdom where they had no business being, though they found excuses, à la Chinoise, like bad weather or low tide, whenever they were questioned. The Channel Islands, the Scilly Islands, and the Isle of Wight provided the best opportunities for this illegal trade, and their residents were greatly alarmed when measures were proposed to shut it down. The inspecting commander officially reported from St Mary's in 1828, "that these islands had never seen so little smuggling as this year, and most of the inhabitants are suffering greatly as a result, since it used to be their main source of income."[27] The ships were also met by accomplices on the high seas who relieved them of the smuggled goods. What is so hard to understand about this situation is that the Court of Directors, while not turning a blind eye, seemed powerless to stop these irregularities. Their loud complaints, resolutions, detailed ads, and measures designed to gather evidence against offenders bore a curious resemblance to the futile efforts sometimes made by the Chinese Government, which is equally unable to end illegal practices within its administration. One reason for this powerlessness was also quite characteristically Chinese. The smugglers had friends in high places who provided them with the most secret information.

The East India Company, nevertheless, in one important 214 respect received value for its money—in the competence of its officers. The greatest pains were taken to secure the efficiency of the service, for the ships were more than mere carriers or passenger-boats. They were maintained on a war-footing, and were manned by thoroughly disciplined crews. Many gallant actions at sea, even against regular men-of-war, stand to the credit of the Indiamen.

The East India Company, however, in one significant 214 way got its money's worth—in the skill of its officers. A lot of effort was made to ensure the service was efficient because the ships were more than just carriers or passenger boats. They operated on a military level and were crewed by highly trained teams. Several brave actions at sea, even against established warships, are credited to the Indiamen.

But what conceivable freight-money or profits on merchandise could support a trade carried on under such luxurious conditions! It was magnificent, indeed, but it was not business, and no surprise need be felt that the East India Company, while furnishing its employees with the means of fortune, made very little for its shareholders by either its shipowning or mercantile operations. The Company was a standing example of that not uncommon phenomenon, the progressionist become obstructionist, blocking the door which it opened. For many years it had played the part of dog-in-the-manger, keeping individual traders out while itself deriving little if any benefit from its monopoly. Whenever independent merchants succeeded—under great difficulties, of course—in gaining a footing, they invariably proved the superiority of their business methods; and it is to them, and not to the Company, that the development of trade in the Far East is due. English shipowners had constantly agitated for a share in the traffic round the Cape, and there were many Indian-owned ships engaged in the China trade, the Company's ostentatious abstention from carrying the opium which it grew affording this favourable opening for private adventurers. 215

But what kind of shipping costs or profits on goods could sustain a trade conducted under such extravagant conditions! It was impressive, for sure, but it wasn’t business, and it’s no surprise that the East India Company, while providing its employees with opportunities for wealth, generated very little for its shareholders through its shipping or trade operations. The Company was a classic example of that not-so-uncommon situation where progressives become obstructionists, blocking the way they themselves opened. For many years, it acted like a dog-in-the-manger, preventing individual traders from entering the market while gaining little to no benefit from its monopoly. Whenever independent merchants managed—despite significant challenges—to establish themselves, they consistently showed that their business practices were superior; it is thanks to them, and not the Company, that trade in the Far East developed. English shipowners had persistently called for a share of the traffic around the Cape, and there were many Indian-owned ships participating in the China trade, with the Company’s conspicuous choice not to carry the opium it produced creating a favorable opportunity for private traders. 215

It is somewhat surprising that the seafaring nations of the world, who were free from the restrictions which so cramped the British shipowners, should have suffered to endure so long a monopoly so baseless as that of the East India Company. The fact seems to prove the general depression of maritime energy in the early part of the century. But succeeding to such a patriarchal régime, it is little wonder that the common merchantmen, reduced to reasonable economical conditions, should have reaped a bountiful harvest. The Company's terms left a very handsome margin for shrinkage in the freight tariff, while still leaving a remunerative return to the shipowner. The expiration of the Company's charter, therefore, gave an immense stimulus to the common carriers of the ocean; though, starting from such an elevated plateau of profits, the inducements to improvements in the build and management of ships were not very urgent.

It’s a bit surprising that the maritime nations of the world, which weren’t held back by the limitations that restricted British shipowners, allowed a baseless monopoly like that of the East India Company to last for so long. This situation seems to reflect the overall decline of maritime activity in the early part of the century. However, following such a traditional setup, it’s no surprise that common merchant ships, now subjected to more reasonable economic conditions, were able to enjoy significant profits. The Company’s terms provided a substantial margin for reducing freight rates while still allowing shipowners to earn a good return. Thus, the end of the Company’s charter significantly boosted the common ocean carriers; although, beginning from such a high level of profits, there wasn’t a strong motivation for improving shipbuilding and management.

The size of the ships and their capacity for cargo underwent slow development in the first half of the century. The East Indiamen averaged about 1000 tons, some ships being as large as 1300, while those chartered by the Company seem to have run about 500 tons. All were bad carriers, their cargo capacity not exceeding their registered tonnage. In the ordinary merchant service which succeeded large ships were deemed unsuited to the China trade, 300 tons being considered a handy size, until the expansion of trade and necessity for speed combined with economical working forced on shipowners a larger type of vessel.

The size of ships and their cargo capacity developed slowly in the first half of the century. The East Indiamen typically weighed around 1,000 tons, with some reaching as large as 1,300 tons, while those chartered by the Company were about 500 tons. All were poor carriers, with their cargo capacity not exceeding their registered tonnage. In the ordinary merchant service that followed, larger ships were seen as unsuitable for the China trade, with 300 tons considered a practical size, until the growth of trade and the need for speed, combined with cost-effective operations, pushed shipowners to adopt a larger type of vessel.

Of quite another class were the opium clippers, which also in a certain sense represented monopoly in its long 216 struggle with open trade—the monopoly of capital, vested interests, and enterprise. The clippers, first sailing craft and then steamers, were able by means of the advantages they possessed to prolong the contest into the 'Sixties; indeed the echo of it had scarcely died away when the Suez Canal and the telegraph cable revolutionised the whole Eastern trade at a single stroke. The precious cargoes they carried, and scarcely less valuable intelligence, supplied the means of maintaining the opium-carriers in the highest efficiency. Every voyage was a race, the rivalry being none the less animated for the smallness of the competing field. Indeed, when reduced to a duel, the struggle became the keenest. It was only towards the close of the period that the opium-clipper system attained its highest organisation. The great China houses of Jardine, Matheson, & Co., and Dent & Co., then ran powerful steamers—the former firm chiefly between Calcutta and Hongkong—their time of departure from the Indian port being regulated so as to enable them to intercept the English mail-steamers on their arrival in Singapore, where they received on board their owners' despatches, with which they proceeded at once to Hongkong before the mail-steamer had taken in her coal. They had speed enough to give the P. and O. steamer two days on the run of 1400 miles; and making the land in daylight, they would slip into one of the snug bays at the back of the island at dusk and send their private mail-bag to the merchant-prince to digest with his port, and either lie hidden under the cliffs or put to sea again for a day or two with perhaps a number of impatient passengers on board.

Of a completely different category were the opium clippers, which in a way symbolized the monopoly in its ongoing battle with open trade—the monopoly of capital, vested interests, and enterprise. The clippers, initially sailing ships and then steamers, were able to extend the rivalry into the '60s; indeed, the echoes of it had barely faded when the Suez Canal and the telegraph cable transformed the entire Eastern trade in one fell swoop. The valuable cargoes they transported, and equally important information, provided the means to keep the opium carriers operating at peak efficiency. Every voyage was a race, and the competition became even more intense considering the limited field. When it turned into a direct showdown, the struggle was at its fiercest. It wasn't until the end of the period that the opium clipper system reached its highest organization. The major China houses of Jardine, Matheson, & Co., and Dent & Co., operated powerful steamers—the former mostly between Calcutta and Hong Kong—timing their departures from the Indian port to intercept the English mail steamers as they arrived in Singapore, where they boarded their owners' dispatches, then headed straight to Hong Kong before the mail steamer had refueled. They were fast enough to give the P. and O. steamer a two-day advantage over the 1,400-mile journey; and arriving during the day, they would slide into one of the quiet bays on the back of the island at dusk and send their private mailbag to the merchant-prince for him to enjoy with his port, either hiding under the cliffs or heading back out to sea for a day or two, possibly with a group of eager passengers on board.

The rival house of Dent & Co. devoted their energies 217 more especially to the China coast. Their fast steamers would start from Hongkong an hour after the arrival of the Indian and English mail, landing owners' despatches at the mouth of the Yangtze, whence they were run across country to Shanghai. To gain exclusive possession of a market or of a budget of news for ever so brief a period was the spur continuously applied to owners, officers, and men. How the public regarded these operations may be inferred from a note in Admiral Keppel's diary of 1843: "Anonymous opium-clipper arrived from Bombay with only owners' despatches. Beast."

The competing company Dent & Co. focused their efforts 217 primarily on the China coast. Their speedy steamers would leave Hong Kong an hour after the Indian and English mail arrived, delivering owners' dispatches at the mouth of the Yangtze, where they were then transported overland to Shanghai. Gaining exclusive access to a market or a piece of news, even for a short time, drove owners, officers, and crew constantly. How the public viewed these activities can be gathered from a note in Admiral Keppel's diary from 1843: "Anonymous opium-clipper arrived from Bombay with only owners' dispatches. What a jerk."

All this of course presupposed a common ownership of ship and cargo, or great liberties, if not risks, taken with the property of other people. In the years before the war this common management of ship and cargo was a simple necessity, for opium had to be stored afloat and kept ready for sailing orders. The 20,000 chests surrendered in 1839 might have been all sent away to Manila or elsewhere had that course of procedure been determined on. Captain John Thacker, examined before the Parliamentary Committee of 1840, being asked what he would have done in case the Chinese had ordered away the opium, answered, "I would have sent mine away to the Malay Islands, to exchange it for betel-nut and pepper.... I had a ship at Canton that I could not get freighted with tea, and I intended to send her away with the opium." A kind of solidarity between ship and cargo was thus an essential of the trade at that time, and what originated in necessity was continued as a habit for many years after its economical justification had ceased.

All of this, of course, assumed shared ownership of the ship and cargo, or significant liberties, if not risks, taken with other people's property. In the years leading up to the war, this shared management of ship and cargo was a straightforward necessity, since opium had to be stored on board and kept ready for sailing orders. The 20,000 chests surrendered in 1839 could have all been sent to Manila or elsewhere had that option been chosen. Captain John Thacker, who was questioned by the Parliamentary Committee in 1840, was asked what he would have done if the Chinese had ordered the opium to be removed. He replied, "I would have sent mine to the Malay Islands to trade it for betel-nut and pepper. I had a ship in Canton that I couldn’t load with tea, and I planned to send her off with the opium." This kind of solidarity between ship and cargo was essential to the trade at that time, and what began as a necessity continued as a habit for many years after its economic justification had vanished.

The ambition of owning or controlling ships became 218 a feature of the China trade, the smaller houses emulating the greater. It seemed as if the repute of a merchant lacked something of completeness until he had got one or more ships under his orders, and the first use the possession was put to was usually the attempt to enforce against all comers a quasi-monopoly either in merchandise or in news. To be able to despatch a vessel on some special mission, like Captain Thacker, had a fascination for the more enterprising of the merchants, which may perhaps be referred back to the circumstance that they were men still in the prime of life.

The desire to own or control ships became 218 a key part of the China trade, with smaller businesses trying to imitate the larger ones. It seemed like a merchant's reputation wasn't truly complete until he had one or more ships at his command, and the first thing he would typically do with this possession was to try to establish a sort of monopoly on either goods or information. Being able to send a ship on a special mission, like Captain Thacker, was exciting for the more adventurous merchants, which might be linked to the fact that they were still in the prime of their lives.

The passion was kept alive by the inducements offered by a series of events which crowded on each other between the years 1858 and 1861. Before that time the spread of rebellion, the prevalence of piracy, and the general state of unrest and distrust which prevailed among the Chinese commercial classes, threw them on the protection of foreign flags, and the demand for handy coasting craft was generously responded to by all maritime nations, but chiefly by the shipowners of Northern Europe. Such a mosquito fleet was perhaps never before seen as that which flew the flags of the Hanse Towns and of Scandinavia on the China coast between 1850 and 1860; and many a frugal family on the Elbe, the Weser, and the Baltic lived and throve out of the earnings of these admirably managed and well-equipped vessels. The vessels were mostly run on time-charters, which were exceedingly remunerative; for the standard of hire was adopted from a period of English extravagance, while the ships were run on a scale of economy—and efficiency—scarcely then dreamed of in England. A schooner of 219 150 tons register earning $1500 per month, which was a not uncommon rate, must have paid for herself in a year, for the dollar was then worth 5s. Yet the Chinese also made so much money by subletting their chartered tonnage that foreigners were tempted into the same business, without the same knowledge or assurance of loyal co-operation at the various ports traded with.

The passion was kept alive by the incentives offered by a series of events that piled up between 1858 and 1861. Before that time, the rise of rebellion, the prevalence of piracy, and the general unrest and distrust among the Chinese commercial classes pushed them to rely on foreign flags for protection. The demand for accessible coastal ships was eagerly met by all maritime nations, especially by shipowners in Northern Europe. Such a mosquito fleet had perhaps never been seen like the one that displayed the flags of the Hanse Towns and Scandinavia along the China coast between 1850 and 1860; many frugal families along the Elbe, the Weser, and the Baltic made their living from the earnings of these well-managed and well-equipped vessels. The ships were mostly operated on time-charters, which were extremely profitable; the hiring rates were based on a time of English extravagance, while the ships were operated with a level of economy—and efficiency—hardly imagined back in England. A schooner of 219 150 tons earning $1500 a month, which was a common rate, would have paid for itself in a year, as the dollar was worth 5s. At the same time, the Chinese made so much money by subletting their chartered capacity that foreigners were drawn into the same business, lacking the same knowledge or assurance of reliable cooperation at the various ports they did business with.

The habit of handling ships in this way, whether profitably or not, had the effect of facilitating the despatch of reconnoitring expeditions when openings occurred, and they did occur on a considerable scale within the period above mentioned. The year 1858 was an epoch in itself. It was the year of the treaty of Tientsin, which threw open three additional trading-ports on the coast, three within the Gulf of Pechili, and three on the Yangtze. Of the three northern ports, excepting Tientsin, very little was known to the mercantile community, and the selection of Têng-chow and Newchwang by the British plenipotentiary shows what a change has in the interval come over the relative intelligence of the Government and the merchants; for in those days, it would appear, the Government was as far in advance of the merchants in information about China as the merchants of a later period have been in advance of the Government. These unknown, almost unheard-of, ports excited much interest during the year that elapsed between the signing of the treaty and its ratification. Information about them from Chinese sources was therefore diligently sought after.

The way ships were managed back then, whether it was profitable or not, made it easier to send out reconnaissance missions whenever opportunities arose, and there were quite a few during the time mentioned. The year 1858 was significant on its own. It was the year of the Treaty of Tientsin, which opened three more trading ports on the coast, three within the Gulf of Pechili, and three on the Yangtze River. For the three northern ports, apart from Tientsin, very little was known to the business community, and the choice of Têng-chow and Newchwang by the British envoy indicates how much the Government's and merchants' understanding of China had shifted. Back then, it seems the Government was much more informed about China than the merchants, whereas in later times, the merchants have often been ahead of the Government in terms of information. These lesser-known, almost unfamiliar ports generated a lot of interest during the year between the signing of the treaty and its ratification. Because of this, information about them from Chinese sources was actively sought after.

Within a couple of miles of the foreign settlement of Shanghai—and it was the same thing in the Ningpo 220 river—compact tiers of large sea-going junks lay moored head and stern, side to side, forming a continuous platform, so that one could walk across their decks out into the middle of the river. Their masts, without yards or rigging, loomed like a dense thicket on the horizon. Of their numbers some idea may be formed when we remember that 1400 of them were found loaded at one time in 1848 with tribute rice. Of this enormous fleet of ships and their trade the foreign mercantile community of Shanghai was content to remain in virtual ignorance. They traded to the north, and were vaguely spoken of as "Shantung junks"—Shantung then standing for everything that was unknown north of the thirty-second parallel. The map of China conveyed about as much to the mercantile communities on the coast in those days as it did to the British public generally before the discussions of 1898. These junks carried large quantities of foreign manufactured goods and opium to the unknown regions at the back of the north wind, of which some of the doors were now being opened. How was one to take advantage of the opening, and be first in the field? Time must be taken by the forelock, and a certain amount of commercial exploration entered into in order to obtain data on which to base ulterior operations. Accordingly in the spring of 1859, a few months before the period fixed for the exchange of ratifications of the treaty, several mercantile firms equipped, with the utmost secrecy, trading expeditions to the Gulf of Pechili. Their first object was to discover what seaport would serve as the entrepot of Têngchow, since that city, though near enough to salt water to have been bombarded for a frolic by the Japanese navy in 1894, 221 possessed no anchorage. The several sets of argonauts, among whom was the writer of this book, seeking for such an anchorage, found themselves, in the month of April, all together in the harbour of Yentai, which they misnamed Chefoo, a name that has become stereotyped. Obviously, then, that would be the new port, especially as the bay and the town showed all the signs of a considerable existing traffic. It was full forty miles from Têngchow, but there was no nearer anchorage. The foreign visitors began at once to cultivate relations with the native merchants, tentatively, like Nicodemus, making their real business by night, while the magnificent daylight was employed in various local explorations. These were full of fresh interest, the Shantung coast being the antithesis of the Yangtze delta; for there were found donkeys instead of boats, stony roads instead of canals, bare and barren mountains instead of soft green paddy- or cotton-fields, stone buildings, and a blue air that sparkled like champagne.

Within a couple of miles of the foreign settlement of Shanghai—and it was the same with the Ningpo 220 river—groups of large ocean-going junks were moored head to stern, side by side, creating a continuous platform, making it possible to walk across their decks into the middle of the river. Their masts, without yards or rigging, rose like a dense forest on the horizon. You can get an idea of their numbers when you consider that 1,400 of them were loaded at one time in 1848 with tribute rice. The foreign trading community in Shanghai remained mostly unaware of this enormous fleet of ships and their trade. They traded to the north and were vaguely referred to as "Shantung junks"—with Shantung representing everything that was unknown north of the thirty-second parallel. The map of China meant about as much to the trading communities on the coast back then as it did to the British public before the discussions of 1898. These junks transported large quantities of foreign goods and opium to the obscure regions of the north wind, some of which doors were starting to open. How could one take advantage of this opportunity and be the first to explore? Time had to be seized, along with a degree of commercial exploration to gather information for future operations. So, in the spring of 1859, a few months before the scheduled exchange of ratifications of the treaty, several trading firms secretly organized trading expeditions to the Gulf of Pechili. Their primary goal was to find a seaport that could act as the hub for Têngchow, since that city, even though it was close enough to saltwater to have been bombarded playfully by the Japanese navy in 1894, 221 had no proper anchorage. The various groups of adventurers, including the author of this book, searching for such an anchorage, found themselves together in April in the harbor of Yentai, which they incorrectly named Chefoo, a name that has become standard. Clearly, that would be the new port, especially since the bay and town showed clear signs of significant existing trade. It was a full forty miles from Têngchow, but there was no closer anchorage. The foreign visitors immediately began to cultivate relationships with the local merchants, cautiously, like Nicodemus, conducting their main business at night while using the bright daylight for various local explorations. These explorations were filled with new interest, as the Shantung coast was the complete opposite of the Yangtze delta; donkeys were found instead of boats, stony roads instead of canals, bare mountains instead of lush green rice or cotton fields, stone buildings, and a blue sky that sparkled like champagne.

Our own particular movable base of operations was one smart English schooner, loaded with mixed merchandise, and commanded by a sea-dog who left a trail of vernacular in his wake. Soon, however, we were able to transfer our flag to a commodious houseboat, of a hybrid type suited to the sheltered and shallow waters of the Lower Yangtze, but not, strictly speaking, seaworthy. Next, a Hamburg barque came and acted as store-ship, releasing the English schooner for more active service. The master of that craft was also a character, full of intelligence, but rough, and the trail of tobacco juice was over all, with strange pungent odours in the cuddy. 222

Our main movable base of operations was a sleek English schooner, filled with various goods, and led by a veteran sailor who left a distinct mark wherever he went. Soon enough, we managed to switch our flag to a spacious houseboat, a hybrid type designed for the calm and shallow waters of the Lower Yangtze, but not really suitable for the open sea. Next, a Hamburg barque arrived to serve as a supply ship, freeing up the English schooner for more active duties. The captain of that vessel was quite a character, sharp-minded but rough around the edges, and there was a trail of tobacco juice everywhere, mixed with strange, strong smells in the living quarters. 222

Having thus inserted the thin end of the wedge, pegged out mentally the site of the future settlement, and trifles of that sort, the pioneers of commerce waited for the official announcement of the port being opened. Meantime there was the unknown Newchwang to be discovered, at the extreme north-east corner of the Gulf of Liaotung, and for this purpose the boat aforesaid presented a very tempting facility. The trip was accomplished, not without anxiety and detention on the way by stress of weather, and the British flag was shown in the Liao river, to the best of our knowledge, for the first time in May 1859. Many other ports and harbours in the gulf were visited during the summer and autumn. Weihai-wei became very familiar, not as a place of trade, which it never was, but as a convenient anchorage better sheltered than Chefoo. How blind were the pioneers to the destinies of these gulf ports and the gulf itself! How little did they dream of the scenes that peaceful harbour was to witness, the fortifications which were to follow, the Chinese navy making its last desperate stand there like rats caught in a trap; and finally, the British flag flying over the heights!

Having inserted the thin end of the wedge, mentally marked out the site of the future settlement, and similar things, the pioneers of commerce waited for the official announcement that the port was opening. In the meantime, there was the unknown Newchwang to explore, located at the far northeast corner of the Gulf of Liaotung, and for this purpose, the boat mentioned earlier offered a very appealing option. The trip was completed, not without anxiety and delays due to bad weather, and the British flag was flown in the Liao River, as far as we know, for the first time in May 1859. Many other ports and harbors in the gulf were visited during the summer and autumn. Weihai-wei became quite familiar, not as a trading hub, which it never was, but as a convenient anchorage better sheltered than Chefoo. How blind were the pioneers to the future of these gulf ports and the gulf itself! How little did they imagine the events that peaceful harbor would witness, the fortifications that would be built, the Chinese navy making its last desperate stand there like rats caught in a trap; and finally, the British flag flying over the heights!

The treaty of course was not ratified, though the news of the repulse of the British plenipotentiary at Taku only reached the pioneers in the form of tenebrous Chinese rumours with an ominous thread of consistency running through their various contradictions. The most conclusive evidence, however, of the turn affairs had taken was the interference of the officials with the native merchants and people at Chefoo, whom they forbade intercourse with the foreigners, and made responsible for the presence of 223 the foreign ships. The ships, therefore, had to move out of sight, and it was in this predicament that the harbour of Weihai-wei offered such a welcome refuge.

The treaty, of course, was not ratified, although the news of the British envoy's defeat at Taku only reached the pioneers as vague Chinese rumors, which had a troubling consistency amid their various contradictions. The most compelling evidence of how things had changed was the officials' interference with the local merchants and people in Chefoo, whom they prohibited from interacting with foreigners and held accountable for the presence of the foreign ships. Consequently, the ships had to leave sight, and it was in this situation that the harbor of Weihai-wei provided a much-needed refuge.

To put an end to the intolerable suspense in Chefoo the Hamburger was got under weigh and sailed to the westward. On approaching the mouth of the Peiho the situation at once revealed itself: not one English ship visible, but the Russian despatch-boat America, and one United States ship, with which news was exchanged, and from which the details of the Taku disaster were ascertained. This news, of course, knocked all the commercial adventures which had been set on foot in the gulf into "pie." Nothing remained but to wind them up with as little sacrifice as possible,—a process which was not completed till towards Christmas.

To end the unbearable wait in Chefoo, the Hamburger set sail to the west. As it neared the mouth of the Peiho, the situation became clear: there wasn't a single English ship in sight, only the Russian dispatch boat America and one U.S. ship. They exchanged news, and from that ship, the details of the Taku disaster were learned. This information completely derailed all the commercial ventures that had been started in the gulf. The only option left was to wrap them up with minimal loss, a task that wasn't finished until around Christmas.

The three ports to be opened on the Yangtze stood on quite a different footing. They had not been named, and their opening was somewhat contingent on the position of the hostile forces then occupying the river-banks. The navigation, moreover, was absolutely unknown above Nanking, and it was left to Captain Sherard Osborn to explore the channel and to Lord Elgin to make a political reconnaissance at the same time in H.M.S. Furious, of which cruise Laurence Oliphant has left us such a delightful description. It was not, however, till 1861 that the great river was formally opened by Admiral Sir James Hope. Trade then at once burst upon the desolate scene like the blossoms of spring. On the admiral's voyage up to Hankow, on the 600 miles of stream scarcely a rag of sail was to be seen. Within three months the surface 224 of the river was alive with Chinese craft of all sorts and sizes. The interior of China had for years been dammed up like a reservoir by the Taipings, so that when once tapped the stream of commerce gushed out, much beyond the capacity of any existing transport. The demand for steamers was therefore sudden, and everything that was able to burn coal was enlisted in the service. The freight on light goods from Hankow to Shanghai commenced at 20 taels, or £6, per ton for a voyage of three days. The pioneer inland steamer was the Fire Dart, which had been built to the order of an American house for service in the Canton river. She was soon followed by others built expressly for the Yangtze, and before long regular trade was carried on. Again the tradition asserted itself of every mercantile house owning its own river steamer, some more than one. Steamers proved a mine of wealth for a certain time. Merchants were thereby enticed into a technical business for which they had neither training nor aptitude, and the natural consequences were not very long delayed.

The three ports to be opened on the Yangtze were in a completely different situation. They hadn’t been named yet, and their opening depended somewhat on the status of the hostile forces occupying the riverbanks. Additionally, navigation above Nanking was completely uncharted, leaving Captain Sherard Osborn to explore the channel while Lord Elgin conducted a political reconnaissance at the same time on H.M.S. Furious, which Laurence Oliphant has described so wonderfully. However, it wasn't until 1861 that the great river was officially opened by Admiral Sir James Hope. Trade then immediately surged into the barren landscape like spring flowers blooming. During the admiral's journey up to Hankow, there was hardly a sail in sight for the 600 miles of river. Within three months, the surface of the river was bustling with Chinese boats of all kinds and sizes. The interior of China had been effectively dammed up like a reservoir by the Taipings for years, so when it finally opened, a flood of commerce came rushing out, far exceeding the capacity of any existing transportation. As a result, the demand for steamers rose sharply, and everything that could burn coal was brought into service. The freight cost on light goods from Hankow to Shanghai started at 20 taels, or £6, per ton for a three-day journey. The first inland steamer was the Fire Dart, built for an American company for use on the Canton river. She was soon followed by others specifically built for the Yangtze, and before long, regular trade was established. Again, the tradition emerged of every mercantile house owning its own river steamer, with some owning more than one. Steamers became a significant source of wealth for a while. Merchants were drawn into a business they had no training or skill for, and the inevitable consequences didn’t take long to show up.

While on the subject of river steamers, it is interesting to recall that in the beginning English merchants sent their orders for the Yangtze to the United States. The vessels were light, roomy, and luxurious, admirably adapted to their work. In the course of a few years, however, the tables were turned, and the Americans themselves came to the Clyde builders with their specifications, and had their river steamers built of iron. Many economies and great improvements have been made in the construction and management of these vessels since 1861, but we need not pursue the matter into further detail here. 225

While we're on the topic of river steamers, it's interesting to note that at first, English merchants sent their orders for the Yangtze to the United States. The ships were lightweight, spacious, and comfortable, perfect for their purpose. However, after a few years, the situation changed, and Americans began going to the Clyde builders with their own specifications, opting for their river steamers to be made of iron. Since 1861, there have been many cost-saving measures and significant improvements in the construction and management of these vessels, but we don't need to go into further detail here. 225

The opening of the Yangtze made a revolution in the tea trade, for the product of Central China, which formerly was carried on men's backs over the Meiling Pass to Canton, could now be brought by water cheaply and quickly to Hankow, which in the very year of its opening became a subsidiary shipping port—subsidiary, that is, to Shanghai, where the ocean voyage began. Before long, however, this great central mart became an entrepot for ocean traffic. To the steamer Scotland, owned by Messrs W. S. Lindsay & Co. and commanded by Captain A. D. Dundas, R.N., belongs the honour of being the first ocean steamer to ascend the river to Hankow, and thereby opening the interior of China to direct trade with foreign countries. And within two years a sailing vessel was towed up the river and loaded a cargo of the new season's tea for London.

The opening of the Yangtze revolutionized the tea trade because the tea from Central China, which used to be transported on men's backs over the Meiling Pass to Canton, could now be shipped by water quickly and at a lower cost to Hankow. In the very year it opened, Hankow became a secondary shipping port—secondary to Shanghai, where the ocean voyage started. Soon after, however, this major central market turned into a hub for ocean traffic. The steamer Scotland, owned by W. S. Lindsay & Co. and captained by A. D. Dundas, R.N., has the honor of being the first ocean steamer to navigate up the river to Hankow, thus opening up the interior of China to direct trade with foreign nations. Within two years, a sailing vessel was towed upriver and loaded with a cargo of the new season's tea for London.

But the most interesting item in the budget of that annus mirabilis 1858 was the opening of Japan to foreign intercourse. To contemporaries it was the discovery of a new world of activity, intelligence, beauty—an elaborate civilisation built on strange foundations. Could the veil of the future have been withdrawn for the men of that day, how their imaginations would have been staggered before the unrolling of an epic transcending in human interest all the creations of fiction! But before all things there was trade to be done with awakening Japan, nobody knew what or how; while the seductive novelties of the life, the art, the scenery, and the laws contested the supremacy of the claims of mundane commerce. Here was an ideal opening for the commercial pioneer. What kind of merchandise would the Japanese buy, and what had 226 they to sell, were naturally the first objects of inquiry. For this purpose ships with trial cargoes had to be sent hither and thither to explore, and there was work here for the kind of handy craft that had had such a run on the China coast. By their means was the foreign trade of the Japanese ports opened to the world. The clipper ship Mirage, laden with Manchester goods in which the late Sir John Pender was interested, lay several days in Shanghai waiting orders to proceed on an experimental trip to Japan as early as 1858, but the owners wisely concluded that the venture would be premature.

But the most interesting part of the budget for that amazing year, 1858, was Japan opening up to foreign trade. For people at the time, it was like discovering a new world of activity, intelligence, and beauty—an intricate civilization built on unusual foundations. If only the future had been revealed to them, their imaginations would have been blown away by an epic story that surpassed anything in fiction! But first, there was trade to be established with Japan, which was just beginning to awaken. Nobody knew what to trade or how; meanwhile, the alluring new experiences of life, art, scenery, and laws competed with the demands of regular commerce. It presented a perfect opportunity for a commercial pioneer. What kind of products would the Japanese want to buy, and what did they have to sell? These were naturally the first questions to investigate. To figure this out, ships with sample cargoes needed to be sent back and forth to explore, and there was an opportunity here for the skilled trades that had previously thrived on the China coast. Through this effort, the foreign trade of Japanese ports was opened up to the world. The clipper ship Mirage, carrying Manchester goods in which the late Sir John Pender had an interest, sat in Shanghai for several days waiting for orders to make an experimental trip to Japan as early as 1858, but the owners wisely decided that it was too soon for such a venture.

So far we have dealt only with what may be considered as the outriders of the host, and the subject would be very incomplete without giving some account of the main body, the common carriers of the international trade, filling by far the most important place in the economical system of the countries of their origin. While endeavouring to confine our attention as much as possible within the limits of the field embraced by the China, developing later into the Far Eastern, trade, the progress of the merchant shipping employed therein cannot be fully understood except from a standpoint more cosmopolitan. For the history of the Eastern shipping is intimately bound up with events which were taking place in other and widely-separated quarters of the globe in the middle of this century. Within the space of three to four years events happened of a world-moving character, forming the basis of the commercial revolution that has set its mark on the second half of the century. The catholicity of commerce and its unfailing inventiveness in supplying human wants were wonderfully illustrated at this time. 227 Events so different in their nature as the potato blight in one hemisphere, the production of gold in another, and the abrogation of the Navigation Laws in England, combined within these few years to revolutionise the world's shipping trade.

So far, we've only looked at what can be considered the scouts of the group, and the topic would be incomplete without discussing the main part—the primary carriers of international trade, which play a crucial role in the economies of their home countries. While trying to keep our focus mainly on the China trade, which later expanded into the Far Eastern trade, the growth of the merchant shipping involved can't be fully understood without a more global perspective. The history of Eastern shipping is closely tied to events happening in other, far-flung parts of the world in the middle of this century. In just three to four years, significant events occurred that laid the groundwork for the commercial revolution that defined the latter half of the century. The diversity of commerce and its constant creativity in meeting human needs were remarkably highlighted during this time. 227 Events as different as the potato blight in one part of the world, gold production in another, and the repeal of the Navigation Laws in England came together in these few years to completely transform global shipping trade.

In the year 1847 the world was first startled by the definitive announcement of gold discoveries in California, and four years later a similar phenomenon appeared in Australia. Coincidently with these events the first Universal Exhibition of the industries of all nations was held in Hyde Park, and whatever we may think of the relative influence of that and of the gold discoveries, there can be but one opinion as to the splendid advertisement which the Exposition lent to the golden promise of the Antipodes and the East Pacific. Thenceforth the whole world, industrial, commercial, and financial, beat with one pulse, a fact which has received constantly accumulating illustrations until the present day. It was as if the sectional divisions of the globe had been united in one great pool, forced to maintain a common level, subject only to disturbances of the nature of rising and falling waves. The new supplies of gold, by making money plentiful, inflated the price of all commodities and stimulated production in every department of agriculture and manufacture; but the time-worn yet ever-new passion for wealth, disseminated afresh throughout the civilised world, probably acted more powerfully on the material progress of mankind than the actual possession of the new riches. The rapid peopling of desert places created a demand for the necessaries of life—food, clothing, housing, tools, and appliances of every description. In a word, the tide 228 of humanity, rushing to America for food and to the goldfields for the means of buying it, made such calls on the carrying powers of the world as could not be satisfied without a stupendous effort.

In 1847, the world was shocked by the announcement of gold discoveries in California, and four years later, a similar situation arose in Australia. Around the same time, the first Universal Exhibition of industries from all nations was held in Hyde Park. Regardless of how we view the impact of that exhibition compared to the gold discoveries, it's clear that the Expo greatly promoted the golden opportunities in the Antipodes and the East Pacific. From that point on, the entire world—industrial, commercial, and financial—was connected like never before, a reality that has only grown stronger over time. It felt as though the different regions of the globe had merged into one vast pool, maintaining a common level, only disturbed by the ebb and flow of economic changes. The influx of gold made money more available, driving up prices of all goods and boosting production across agriculture and manufacturing. However, the age-old yet ever-renewing desire for wealth, spreading across the civilized world, likely had a more significant effect on human progress than the actual acquisition of these newfound riches. The rapid growth of once-empty areas created a greater demand for life's essentials—food, clothing, housing, tools, and various equipment. In short, the wave of people rushing to America for food and to the goldfields for the means to buy it placed demands on the world's transportation systems that required an immense effort to fulfill.

Of all nations the most responsive to the stimulus was beyond doubt the United States: it was there that shipbuilding had been making the most gigantic advances. The total tonnage afloat under the American flag bade fair at one time to rival that of Great Britain. The attention of the American shipping interest had been particularly directed towards China, where excellent employment rewarded the enterprise, not only in the ocean voyage out and home, but also in the coasting trade, which included the portable and very paying item of opium. English merchants and shipowners did not, of course, resign their share in the China trade without a struggle; but they were fighting on the defensive, and under the disadvantages incidental to that condition of warfare. Every improvement they introduced in the efficiency of their ships in order to cope with the advances of their rivals was promptly followed by a counter-move which gave the wide-awake Americans again the lead. About 1845 an important step forward was taken in the despatch of a new type of vessel from the United States to China which surpassed in speed the newest and best English ships. The British reply to this was the building of clippers, initiated in 1846 by Messrs Hall of Aberdeen. The first of these, a small vessel, having proved successful in competing for the coasting trade of China, larger ships of the clipper type were constructed, and so the seesaw went on.

Of all nations, the one that responded the most to the stimulus was definitely the United States: it was there that shipbuilding had been making the most significant advances. At one point, the total tonnage under the American flag seemed likely to rival that of Great Britain. The American shipping industry was especially focused on China, where great opportunities rewarded their efforts, not only in the long ocean voyages but also in the coasting trade, which included the lucrative and portable item of opium. English merchants and shipowners certainly didn't give up their stake in the China trade without a fight; however, they were on the defensive and at a disadvantage in that battle. Every improvement they made to increase the efficiency of their ships to compete with their rivals was quickly countered, allowing the quick-thinking Americans to regain the lead. Around 1845, a significant advancement was made with the dispatch of a new type of vessel from the United States to China that surpassed the speed of the best English ships. The British response to this was the construction of clippers, which began in 1846 by Messrs Hall of Aberdeen. The first of these, a small vessel, successfully competed in the coasting trade of China, leading to the construction of larger clipper ships, and thus the back-and-forth competition continued.

Then emigration to the United States, chiefly from 229 Ireland, made demands on the available tonnage which was indifferently met by vessels unfit for the work, and the American builders were not slow to see the advantage of placing a superior class of vessel on this important Atlantic service.

Then immigration to the United States, mainly from 229 Ireland, put pressure on the available shipping capacity, which was poorly handled by ships that weren't suitable for the job. American shipbuilders quickly recognized the opportunity to provide a better class of vessel for this vital Atlantic route.

Following close on this salutary competition—East and West—came one of the epoch-making events just alluded to, the gold-mining in California, which more decisively than ever threw the advantage in the shipping contest on the side of the United States. The ocean was the true route to California for emigrants and material; but the voyage was long, and impatience of intervening space being the ruling temper of gold-seekers, the shortening of the time of transit became a crying want for the living cargoes, and scarcely less for the perishable provisions which the new ships were designed to carry. Speed, comfort, and capacity had therefore to be combined in a way which had never before been attempted. The result was the historical American clipper of the middle of the century, beautiful to look on with her cloud of white cotton canvas, covering every ocean highway. These were vessels of large capacity, carrying one-half more dead-weight than their registered tonnage;[28] built and rigged like yachts, and attaining a speed never before reached on the high seas. The pioneer of this fine fleet made the voyage from New York to San Francisco, a "coasting voyage" from which foreign flags were excluded, and returned direct in ballast, the owners realising a handsome profit on the outward passage alone. The Americans not only had the Californian trade practically 230 in their own hands, but were prompt to turn the advantage which that gave them to profitable account in the competition for the trade of China. The ships, when empty, sailed across the Pacific, loading, at Canton or Shanghai, tea and other produce for London or New York, the three-cornered voyage occupying little more time than the direct route to China and back to which English ships were then confined. As the American clippers earned on the round about a third more freight than English ships could obtain on their out-and-home voyage, competition bore very hard on the latter. Larger and finer ships were constantly being added to the American fleet until they almost monopolised the trade not only between New York and San Francisco, but also between China and Great Britain. British shipping was, in fact, reduced to the greatest depression, the falling off in the supply of new tonnage being almost commensurate with the increase of that of the United States. A phenomenal advance was recorded also in the entries of foreign ships into British ports to the displacement of British-owned tonnage.

Following closely on this healthy competition—East and West—was one of the major events just mentioned, the gold mining in California, which decisively tipped the scales in the shipping contest in favor of the United States. The ocean was the best route to California for emigrants and supplies; however, the journey was lengthy, and the impatience of gold-seekers made the need for a faster transit urgent for the living cargo and also for the perishable goods that the new ships were meant to transport. Therefore, speed, comfort, and capacity had to be combined in a way that had never been done before. The result was the iconic American clipper of the mid-century, striking to behold with its cloud of white cotton canvas covering every ocean route. These were large-capacity vessels, carrying one-and-a-half times more dead weight than their registered tonnage; built and rigged like yachts, achieving speed never seen before on the open seas. The leader of this impressive fleet made the trip from New York to San Francisco, a "coasting voyage" where foreign flags were not allowed and returned directly in ballast, allowing the owners to make a substantial profit on the outward trip alone. The Americans not only held the Californian trade almost entirely but also quickly leveraged that advantage for profitable competition for the trade with China. The empty ships sailed across the Pacific, loading tea and other goods at Canton or Shanghai for London or New York, with the triangular voyage taking only slightly more time than the direct route to China and back that British ships were limited to at the time. Since American clippers earned about a third more freight on the roundabout route than British ships did on their direct voyages, this competition put significant pressure on the latter. Larger and finer ships were continuously added to the American fleet until they nearly monopolized trade not only between New York and San Francisco but also between China and Great Britain. British shipping, in fact, suffered greatly, with the decline in new tonnage almost matching the growth in that of the United States. There was also a remarkable increase in the entries of foreign ships into British ports, displacing British-owned tonnage.

It was at this most critical juncture that the heroic remedy of repeal of the Navigation Laws in 1850 consigned British shipowners to absolute despair; for if they could not hold their own while protected by these laws, how were they to survive the removal of the last barrier from the competition of the whole world? But the darkest hour was, as often happens, that before the dawn. The withdrawal of protective legislation proved the turning-point in the fortunes of the British shipowner. In part it was an efficient cause, inasmuch as it threw the shipowner entirely on his 231 own resources for his existence. He had to look to improvements in the efficiency and economy of his ships, for which it must be admitted there was considerable room. There were many conservative prejudices to be got rid of—that one, for example, which held it dangerous to have less than one foot in breadth to four in length, the adherence to which rendered British ships oval tubs compared with the American, which had for many years been proving the superiority of five and even six to one. The English axiom, which had so long resisted plain reason, had at last to yield to necessity. And so with many other antiquated conditions, including the quality and qualifications of masters, officers, and seamen.

It was at this critical moment that the bold decision to repeal the Navigation Laws in 1850 left British shipowners in complete despair. If they couldn't compete while being protected by these laws, how could they survive without the last barrier against global competition? But, as often happens, the darkest hour came just before the dawn. The removal of protective legislation turned out to be a pivotal moment for British shipowners. It pushed them to rely solely on their own resources for survival. They had to focus on improving the efficiency and economy of their ships, and it must be admitted there was plenty of room for improvement. Many outdated beliefs needed to be cast aside—like the one that insisted on having less than one foot in width for every four in length, which made British ships look like round tubs compared to American ones, which had consistently proven superior at five or even six to one. The English principle that had long resisted common sense finally had to give way to necessity. The same was true for many other outdated requirements, including the standards and qualifications for captains, officers, and sailors.

The exertions made in Great Britain to improve merchant shipping were at once stimulated and immeasurably assisted by the gold discoveries in Australia, an island in the South Pacific more absolutely dependent on sea communication than San Francisco on the American continent had been. It was, moreover, in British territory, where no exclusive privileges could be enjoyed, and where competition was entirely unfettered. Of course the clipper fleet of the United States was prepared to do for Australia what it had done so well for California; but the prospect of the carrying trade between Great Britain and her colonies falling into alien hands aroused the spirit of the English to make a supreme effort to at least hold their own, if not to recover lost ground.

The efforts made in Great Britain to enhance merchant shipping were both driven and significantly aided by the gold discoveries in Australia, an island in the South Pacific that relied even more on sea trade than San Francisco did on the American continent. Furthermore, it was part of British territory, where no special privileges existed and competition was completely unrestricted. Naturally, the U.S. clipper fleet was ready to do for Australia what it had previously done for California; however, the fear of the shipping trade between Great Britain and its colonies slipping into foreign control motivated the English to make a strong effort to at least maintain their position, if not reclaim lost ground.

The seven seas soon became alive with rival clipper ships of great size and power, and the newspapers chronicled the runs they made to Australia and California 232 in days, as they now record the hours consumed on steamer voyages across the Atlantic. Ancient barriers seemed to be submerged, and fusion of the ocean traffic of the world into one great whole opened the way to a new dispensation in the history of merchant shipping. Tonnage was tonnage all the world over, and became subject to the comprehensive control in which the gold and silver produced in distant countries was held by the great financial centres. But the ocean telegraph was not yet, and for twenty years more many gaps were left in the system of ocean communications, whence resulted seasons of plethora alternating with scarcity in particular lines of traffic.

The seven seas soon came alive with rival clipper ships of impressive size and strength, and the newspapers reported on their journeys to Australia and California 232 in days, just like they now track the hours spent on steamer trips across the Atlantic. Old barriers seemed to disappear, and the merging of global ocean traffic into one massive network paved the way for a new era in the history of merchant shipping. Tonnage was recognized worldwide and became subject to the centralized control where the gold and silver produced in distant lands was managed by major financial hubs. However, the ocean telegraph was still not in place, and for another twenty years, many gaps remained in the system of ocean communications, leading to cycles of oversupply and scarcity in specific trade routes.

There was probably no trade in which the overflow of the new output of tonnage was more quickly felt than in that of China. It became a common custom for vessels of moderate size which had carried goods and emigrants to Australia and California, whence no return cargoes were at that period to be had, to proceed to India or China in ballast—"seeking." This was a source of tonnage supply which the merchants resident in those countries had no means of reckoning upon, though such a far-reaching calculation might not be beyond the powers of a clear head posted at one of the foci of the commercial world. An example may be quoted illustrative of the local tonnage famine which occasionally prevailed during that transition period. An English ship arrived in ballast at Hongkong from Sydney in 1854. The owner's local agent, or "consignee," recommended the captain to proceed at once north to Shanghai, where, according to latest advices, he 233 would be sure to obtain a lading at a high rate of freight. The cautious skipper demurred to taking such a risk, and refused to move unless the agent would guarantee him £6, 10s. per ton for a full cargo for London. This was agreed. The ship reached the loading port at a moment when there was no tonnage available and much produce waiting shipment, and she was immediately filled up at about £7 or £8 per ton. It fell to the lot of this particular vessel, by the way, to carry a mail from Hongkong to Shanghai, the P. and O. Company's service being then only monthly, and no other steamer being on the line. It was just after the outbreak of the war with Russia. About a couple of days after the departure of the Akbar—for that was her name—when it was considered quite safe to do so, a resident American merchant, unable to contain himself, boasted of having sent by this English vessel the despatches of the Russian admiral under sealed cover to a sure hand in Shanghai. The recipient of this confidence, like a good patriot, reported the circumstance promptly to the governor of the colony, and he to the senior naval officer, who with no less promptitude ordered a steam sloop, the Rattler, to proceed in chase of the ship. The pursuit was successful; the Russian despatches were taken out and brought back to Hongkong, where they were submitted to the polyglot governor, Sir John Bowring.

There was likely no trade where the excess of new cargo capacity was felt more quickly than in that of China. It became a common practice for mid-sized ships that had transported goods and immigrants to Australia and California, where there were no return cargoes available at the time, to sail to India or China empty—"seeking." This created a source of cargo capacity that merchants in those countries couldn't depend on, even though such extensive calculations might not be beyond a sharp mind positioned at one of the centers of trade. A notable example illustrates the local shortage of cargo ships that occasionally occurred during this transitional period. An English ship arrived empty at Hong Kong from Sydney in 1854. The owner's local agent, or "consignee," advised the captain to head straight north to Shanghai, where, according to the latest updates, he 233 would definitely find a load at a high freight rate. The cautious captain hesitated to take such a risk and refused to move unless the agent guaranteed him £6, 10s. per ton for a full cargo to London. This was agreed upon. The ship reached the loading port at a time when there were no available ships and a lot of produce waiting to be shipped, and she was immediately filled at around £7 or £8 per ton. Interestingly, this particular vessel was tasked with carrying a mail from Hong Kong to Shanghai, since the P. and O. Company's service was only monthly, and no other steamer was operating on that route. This happened just after the start of the war with Russia. About two days after the departure of the Akbar—this was her name—when it was considered safe, a local American merchant, unable to hold back, bragged about sending the Russian admiral's dispatches via this English vessel under sealed cover to a reliable contact in Shanghai. The recipient of this information, acting as a good patriot, quickly reported the situation to the governor of the colony, who in turn informed the senior naval officer. Without delay, the officer ordered a steam sloop, the Rattler, to pursue the ship. The chase was successful; the Russian dispatches were recovered and brought back to Hong Kong, where they were presented to the multi-lingual governor, Sir John Bowring.

Another incident of the same period will show how it was possible for a bold operator to exploit the tonnage of the world on a considerable scale without the aid of the telegraph, or even of rapid communication by letter. One such operator in London, 234 reckoning up the prospective supply and demand of tonnage throughout the world, foresaw this very scarcity in China of which we have just given an illustration. He thereupon proceeded to charter ships under various flags and engaged in distant voyages to proceed in ballast to the China ports, there to load cargoes for Europe. The wisdom of the operation was far from clear to the charterer's agents in China when they heard of ships coming to them from the four quarters of the world at a time when freights were low, with but little prospect of improvement, so far as they could see; but their outlook was circumscribed. Though as the ships began to arrive the difficulty of providing profitable freightage seemed to presage the ruin of the venture, yet subsequent arrivals justified the prevision of its author by earning for him highly remunerative freights. The tide had really risen as it had been foreseen; but it soon receded, and before the last charter had been fulfilled the time-factor, which is fatal to so many well-laid schemes, interposed, and probably caused the early profits to be swallowed up in the final losses.

Another incident from that time illustrates how a daring operator could take advantage of global shipping on a large scale without relying on the telegraph or even quick communication via letters. One such operator in London, 234, calculated the expected supply and demand for shipping worldwide and predicted the very shortage in China that we just described. He then went ahead and chartered ships under various flags, sending them on long journeys to the Chinese ports in ballast, where they would load cargoes for Europe. The logic behind this operation was not obvious to the charterer's agents in China when they learned that ships were coming from all over the world at a time when shipping rates were low, with little chance of improvement from their perspective; however, their view was limited. As the ships began to arrive, the challenge of finding profitable freight seemed to signal the venture's impending failure, but the subsequent arrivals proved the operator's prediction correct, earning him lucrative freight payments. The demand really did increase as anticipated; however, it quickly diminished, and before the last charter was fulfilled, the time factor—often detrimental to many well-planned endeavors—came into play, likely causing the initial profits to be consumed by eventual losses.

The bulk of the China traffic, however, was carried not by these erratic outsiders but by the regular traders, which loaded in London, Liverpool, or New York with manufactured goods, coal, and metals, and returned from China with tea, silk, and other produce. It must have been a profitable business, for the average freight homeward in the 'Forties and 'Fifties seems to have been about £5 per ton; and if we allow even one-third of that for the outward voyage, it would give the shipowner somewhere about £7 for the round 235 voyage, which was accomplished with ease within the twelve months. It must be remembered, however, that the expenses of running were proportionately high on the small vessels which were then in the trade. In the course of time, when speed and facilities of despatch at home and abroad had been further improved, the clippers from London took in Australia in the outward voyage by way of filling up the time until the tea crop was brought to market.

The majority of the China traffic, however, was handled not by those unpredictable outsiders but by the regular traders, who loaded up in London, Liverpool, or New York with manufactured goods, coal, and metals, and returned from China with tea, silk, and other products. It must have been a profitable business, as the average freight charge back home in the '40s and '50s was around £5 per ton; and if we estimate even one-third of that for the outbound trip, the shipowner would make about £7 for the whole journey, which was easily completed within a year. It's important to note, though, that running costs were relatively high for the smaller vessels that were in use at the time. Over the years, as speed and shipping facilities at home and abroad improved, the clippers from London added Australia to their outbound routes to fill the time until the tea harvest was ready for market. 235

When the great increase in the export of silk took place a special rate was paid on it to favourite ships on account of its high value. But though this precious article could afford, when necessary, extreme rates of freight, its total bulk was too small—about one-tenth of that of tea—to affect seriously the general carrying trade of China. A certain quantity was regularly shipped by the "overland route"—that is, by P. and O. Company's steamers to Suez, and thence by rail to Alexandria, to be there reshipped for its ultimate destination, Marseilles or Southampton. But the capacity of the steamers was so small that only a pro rata allotment of space was made to applicants, and the freight charged for it was at the rate of £25 per ton. Under exceptional conditions one sailing ship in the year 1856 carried a silk cargo of 6000 bales, valued at £750,000 sterling, which was said to be the largest amount ever ventured, up to that time, in any merchant vessel. It was so unexpectedly large that the shippers were unable fully to cover their risk by insurance. A singular fatality attended the outset of this voyage, showing the fallibility of human judgment even under the most favourable circumstances. The commander of this ship had been perhaps the most successful in the China trade, 236 and it was the extraordinary confidence that was placed in his judgment that induced the merchants to intrust to his care merchandise of such enormous value. Though much impressed with the sense of personal responsibility for its safety, he was yet tempted by a fine starlit night to break ground from the anchorage at Shanghai and drop down the river to Wusung, where he touched on the well-known bar, and was passed by the outward-bound mail-steamer the following morning. The ship was of course reported "on shore," and so the letters ordering insurance which the mail-steamer carried were rendered useless. The master, though the ship had lain but a few hours on soft mud, dared not proceed to sea with such a valuable cargo without examining the ship's bottom. To do this he had to be towed back to Shanghai, fourteen miles by river, discharge, strip off the copper, replace it, reload the cargo, and recommence the voyage. It proved much the longest she had ever made, and there was great anxiety among the merchants, especially among those of them who were only partially insured. But as fate would have it, while the ship was on the high seas her cargo was growing in value, the silk famine in Europe having in the mean time clearly declared itself; so that what with the delay of a month or two at the start and several weeks more on the passage, a time was gained for sufficient profit to accrue on the silk to lay the foundation of several respectable fortunes, and the commander, to whose error of judgment the result was due, was received in London with acclamation and with substantial gratuities from some of the fortunate owners of his cargo. The lucky craft was the Challenger, Captain Killick, which had distinguished herself in racing against the 237 American clipper Nightingale in 1852 and 1863, and was the first sailing-vessel to load tea at Hankow in 1863,—a historic ship.

When the big increase in silk exports happened, special rates were paid to preferred ships because of its high value. Although this valuable item could pay high shipping costs when needed, its overall volume was too small—about one-tenth of that of tea—to seriously impact the overall shipping trade in China. A certain amount was regularly shipped by the "overland route"—specifically, by P. and O. Company's steamers to Suez, then by rail to Alexandria, where it was reshipped to its final destinations, Marseilles or Southampton. However, the steamers had such limited capacity that only a pro rata share of space was allocated to applicants, with freight charged at £25 per ton. In exceptional circumstances, one sailing ship in 1856 carried a silk cargo of 6000 bales valued at £750,000 sterling, which was said to be the largest amount ever risked in any merchant vessel up to that time. It was so unexpectedly large that the shippers couldn’t fully insure it. A strange fate marked the beginning of this voyage, highlighting the fallibility of human judgment even in the most favorable situations. The captain of this ship had been one of the most successful in the China trade, and it was the extraordinary confidence placed in his judgment that led the merchants to trust him with such a huge-value merchandise. Though he felt a strong sense of personal responsibility for its safety, he was tempted by a beautiful starlit night to leave the anchorage at Shanghai and move down the river to Wusung, where he hit the well-known bar and was passed by the outward-bound mail-steamer the next morning. The ship was reported "on shore," rendering useless the letters ordering insurance that the mail-steamer carried. Although the ship had only been on soft mud for a few hours, the captain felt he couldn’t proceed to sea with such a valuable cargo without checking the ship's bottom. To do this, he had to be towed back to Shanghai, fourteen miles by river, unload, remove the copper, replace it, reload the cargo, and restart the voyage. It turned out to be the longest journey she had ever made, causing great anxiety among the merchants, especially those who were only partially insured. But as fate would have it, while the ship was at sea, her cargo was increasing in value due to a silk shortage in Europe that had become apparent; therefore, despite the month or two delay at the start and several more weeks in transit, enough profit was gained from the silk to lay the groundwork for several respectable fortunes. The captain, whose judgment error led to this outcome, was welcomed in London with cheers and substantial tips from some of the fortunate owners of his cargo. The lucky ship was the Challenger, Captain Killick, which had made a name for itself racing against the American clipper Nightingale in 1852 and 1863, and was the first sailing vessel to load tea at Hankow in 1863—a historic ship.

During the time of the deepest gloom in shipping circles, consequent on the repeal of the Navigation Laws, at a meeting where the ruin of the industry was proclaimed in chorus by the shipowners present, one man had the courage to rise up and stem the current of depression. "The British shipowners have at last sat down to play a fair and open game with the Americans, and, by Jove! we will trump them," were the words of Mr Richard Green, the eminent shipbuilder of Blackwall, as quoted by Mr W. S. Lindsay in his 'History of Merchant Shipping.' Mr Lindsay adds that Mr Green was as good as his word, for shortly after he built, to the order of Mr Hamilton Lindsay, a China merchant, the ship Challenger, of 600 or 700 tons, expressly to match the American Challenge, more than double her size, and thought to be the fastest ship then afloat. Though the two never met, the performances of the English, whether for speed or for dry carrying, quite eclipsed the American ship. It was with another competitor that the pioneer Blackwall clipper tried conclusions, and the circumstance suggests a somewhat whimsical association of the evolution of the China clipper with the Great Exhibition. A ship of exquisite model and finish had been built in America for the purpose of conveying visitors to that great gathering. She was put into the China trade, for which by her size she was well suited. Whether by prearrangement or not, she met the Challenger in 1852 in Shanghai, where they were both laden with tea simultaneously. Immense excitement was aroused, which took the usual 238 form of heavy wagers between the respective partisans on the issue of the race to London. It was a close thing, as sportsmen say, the British ship coming in two days ahead of her rival. Dissatisfied, as the owner of a yacht or of a racehorse is apt to be with his defeat, certain changes were made by the owners of the Nightingale in her equipment for the next year's voyage. The race was again run from the same port, on the same conditions—and with the same result, only still more in favour of the English ship.

During the darkest times in the shipping industry, following the repeal of the Navigation Laws, at a meeting where the shipowners were all declaring the industry's downfall, one man stood up to challenge the negativity. "British shipowners have finally decided to play a fair and open game with the Americans, and, by God! we will outplay them," said Mr. Richard Green, the well-known shipbuilder from Blackwall, as quoted by Mr. W. S. Lindsay in his 'History of Merchant Shipping.' Mr. Lindsay notes that Mr. Green delivered on his promise, as he soon built, for Mr. Hamilton Lindsay, a China merchant, the ship Challenger, weighing 600 or 700 tons, specifically to compete against the American Challenge, which was more than double her size and considered the fastest ship afloat at the time. Although the two never raced each other, the performance of the English ship, whether in speed or cargo capacity, far surpassed that of the American vessel. It was with another rival that the pioneering Blackwall clipper faced off, creating a somewhat amusing link between the development of the China clipper and the Great Exhibition. An exquisitely designed ship had been constructed in America to transport visitors to that grand event. Instead, she was put into the China trade, for which her size was well suited. Whether it was planned or not, she and the Challenger met in Shanghai in 1852, both loaded with tea at the same time. This sparked immense excitement, resulting in the usual heavy betting between supporters on the outcome of the race to London. It was a close contest, as sports enthusiasts would say, with the British ship arriving two days ahead of her competitor. Unsatisfied, as an owner of a yacht or racehorse often is after a loss, the owners of the Nightingale made modifications to her equipment for the following year's voyage. The race was again held from the same port under the same conditions—and with the same result, only even more in favor of the English ship.

A general excitement about such a trivial matter as the relative speed of two ships was only to be accounted for by the awakening consciousness of the significance of the English shipping revival which was then beginning. The interest extended much beyond the circle of those directly concerned. The deck of a mail steamer, to take an instance, became suddenly animated as the signals of a sailing-vessel were read out. Speaking a ship at sea was no such unusual occurrence, but when the name of Challenger was passed round, passengers and crew rushed to the side, gazing intently on the shapely black hull and white sails reflecting the morning sun. She was in the Straits of Malacca, on her way back to China to run her second heat. A young man among the passengers betraying ignorance of the cause of the commotion felt as small as if unable to name the last Derby winner. The world at that time seemed to have grown young. Imagination was directed to a dawn gilded with promise which the sequel has surely not belied!

A general excitement over something as trivial as the relative speed of two ships could only be explained by the growing awareness of the significance of the English shipping revival that was just starting. The interest reached far beyond those directly involved. For example, the deck of a mail steamer suddenly came to life as the signals of a sailing vessel were read out loud. Spotting a ship at sea wasn’t unusual, but when the name "Challenger" circulated among them, both passengers and crew rushed to the side, staring intently at the sleek black hull and white sails shining in the morning sun. She was in the Straits of Malacca, on her way back to China for her second heat. A young man among the passengers, confused about why everyone was so excited, felt as out of place as someone who couldn't name the last Derby winner. The world at that moment felt rejuvenated. Imagination was aimed at a dawn full of promise that, as time has shown, has truly delivered!

Thus the China Sea became a principal battle-ground whereon the struggle for ascendancy between the ships of Great Britain and the United States was most 239 strenuously fought out. It was, as Mr Green said, a fair and open contest, alike creditable to both sides, and an unmixed benefit to the world at large. The energy of the English shipping interest was thoroughly aroused, and the shipowners and shipbuilders of Scotland came speedily to the front. In a few years after the issue was joined between the United States and Great Britain, the shipbuilders of the latter country found a potent auxiliary in iron, which began to be used for sailing-ships.[29] The vessel that led the way in this innovation, combining great speed with the other conditions of success, was the Lord of the Isles, Captain Maxton, of Greenock, which distinguished herself by beating two of the fastest American clippers of twice her size in the run from Foochow to London in 1856. The gradual introduction of steam on long voyages, which followed the free use of iron, was also to the advantage of the British competitors; and thus from a combination of favouring circumstances and dogged efforts to turn them to account, the ascendancy of British shipping was finally established.

Thus, the China Sea became a main battleground where the struggle for dominance between the ships of Great Britain and the United States was fiercely fought. It was, as Mr. Green put it, a fair and open contest, commendable to both sides, and a pure benefit to the world at large. The energy of the British shipping industry was fully awakened, and the shipowners and shipbuilders from Scotland quickly rose to prominence. In just a few years after the conflict began between the United States and Great Britain, the shipbuilders in the latter country found a powerful ally in iron, which started being used for sailing ships. The vessel that led the way in this innovation, offering great speed alongside other conditions for success, was the Lord of the Isles, captained by Maxton from Greenock, which made a name for herself by outrunning two of the fastest American clippers that were twice her size in the journey from Foochow to London in 1856. The gradual introduction of steam for long voyages, which followed the widespread use of iron, also benefited the British competitors; and thus, through a combination of favorable circumstances and persistent efforts to make the most of them, British shipping ultimately established its dominance.

In sketching the performances of these vessels we have somewhat anticipated the advent of that famous fleet of tea clippers which commanded the traffic of the Far East for something like fifteen years. For the beginnings of that struggle we have to go back to the 240 year 1851, when the Leith clipper Ganges raced two Americans, the Flying Cloud and Bald Eagle, from China to London, finishing up with an interesting tack-and-tack contest up Channel from Weymouth, the English ship passing Dungeness six hours ahead. At that period the odds in mere numbers were so overwhelming against the English vessels that such occasional victories as the above were calculated to inspire the builders with courage to persevere. The Aberdeen clippers, Stornoway, Chrysolite, and Cairngorm, worthily followed the London-built Challenger in disputing the prize of speed with the best of their American contemporaries; and after the race of 1856, won, as has been mentioned, by the iron ship Lord of the Isles of Greenock, the American flag was practically eliminated from the annual contest. Competition, however, by no means slackened on that account, but rather increased in intensity. Past achievements opened the eyes of those interested to the possibilities of indefinite improvement in the build, rig, and equipment of ships, so that the idea took root and became a passion. Each year brought forth something new, giving birth in the following year to something still newer, until a type of ship was evolved which seemed to be the acme of design and execution. British clippers raced against each other for the blue ribbon of the ocean with as great zest as they had ever done when other flags were in the field.

In discussing the performances of these ships, we’ve somewhat predicted the arrival of that renowned fleet of tea clippers that dominated trade in the Far East for about fifteen years. To trace the origins of that competition, we need to go back to the 240 year 1851, when the Leith clipper Ganges raced against two American ships, the Flying Cloud and Bald Eagle, from China to London. It ended with an interesting tack-and-tack battle up the Channel from Weymouth, with the English ship passing Dungeness six hours ahead. At that time, the numerical advantage was so heavily tilted against the English vessels that occasional victories like this one inspired builders to keep going. The Aberdeen clippers, Stornoway, Chrysolite, and Cairngorm, followed the London-built Challenger in competing for speed against the best of their American counterparts. After the 1856 race, won, as previously mentioned, by the iron ship Lord of the Isles from Greenock, the American flag was practically removed from the annual competition. However, competition didn’t lessen; it actually became more intense. Past accomplishments revealed to those involved the endless possibilities for improving the design, rigging, and equipment of ships, sparking a passionate commitment to innovation. Each year introduced something new, leading to even newer advancements the following year, until a kind of ship emerged that seemed to represent the pinnacle of design and execution. British clippers raced fiercely against each other for the ocean's blue ribbon with as much enthusiasm as they ever had when other flags were competing.

The competition for speed received a great stimulus from the opening of Foochow as a regular tea-shipping port in 1856. The port had been hindered by official restrictions from enjoying its natural advantages at an earlier period, and it was mainly due to the enterprise 241 of the leading American house that these obstacles were at last removed and the produce of the Bohea hills diverted to its proper outlet. The event marked an epoch in the tea trade; for Foochow being so much closer to the plantations than the other two ports, it became possible to put on board there the first growth of the season with a prospect of landing the new teas in London a couple of months earlier than the trade had been accustomed to. It may be mentioned as one of the curiosities of conservatism that this very circumstance was used to the commercial prejudice of shipments from the new port. It was revolutionising the established routine of the trade, would interfere with the summer holidays, and it was gravely argued that October was the very earliest time when the London buyers could be induced to attend to the tea-market. But the fragrance of the new tea was irresistible in dispersing such cobwebs. So far from its coming too early to market, the best shipbuilders in the world were soon engaged in constructing ships that would accelerate the arrival of the new tea by as much as a couple of days. And so hungry was the trade that special arrangements were made to facilitate the brokers obtaining samples to sell by before the vessel passed Gravesend, and he would be an obscure grocer who was not able to display in his shop window a tea-chest bearing the name of the clipper on the day following her arrival in the dock. The annual tea-race from Foochow thus became one of the events of the year. Premiums were paid to the winner, and sliding scales of freight were in course of time introduced, graduated by the number of days on passage.

The race for speed got a significant boost when Foochow opened as a regular tea-shipping port in 1856. Before that, the port was held back by government restrictions that prevented it from using its natural advantages. It was largely thanks to the efforts of a leading American company that these obstacles were finally cleared, allowing tea from the Bohea hills to find its rightful outlet. This event marked a turning point in the tea trade; since Foochow was much closer to the plantations than the other two ports, it became possible to load the first harvest of the season there, with a chance of getting the new tea to London a couple of months earlier than usual. Interestingly, this very fact was viewed skeptically by some traditionalists who argued it would disrupt the established trading schedule and interfere with summer vacations. They believed that October was the earliest London buyers would be willing to pay attention to the tea market. However, the appealing aroma of the new tea quickly dispelled such outdated notions. Instead of being too early for the market, the best shipbuilders in the world soon began constructing vessels designed to bring the new tea in a couple of days sooner. The trade was so eager that special arrangements were made for brokers to get samples to sell before the ship even passed Gravesend. It was rare for a small grocer not to showcase a tea chest displaying the name of the clipper the day after it docked. Consequently, the annual tea race from Foochow became one of the highlights of the year. Winners were awarded prizes, and over time, sliding scales of freight charges were introduced, adjusted by the number of days spent in transit.

No better proof could be adduced of the high excellence 242 of the ships as well as of the good seamanship of their commanders than the exceeding closeness of the running on that long ocean voyage of twelve thousand miles. Several times it happened that vessels starting together would see nothing of each other during the hundred days' passage until the fog lifting in the Downs would reveal them close together, from which point the winning of the race depended on the pilot or the tug. Of the great race of 1866 Mr W. S. Lindsay, from whose valuable work on Merchant Shipping we have drawn freely for these details, says: "This race excited extraordinary interest among all persons engaged in maritime affairs. Five ships started—the Ariel, Taeping, Serica, Fiery Cross, and Taitsing. The three first left Foochow on the same day, but lost sight of each other for the whole voyage until they reached the English Channel, where they again met, arriving in the Thames within a few hours of each other." Very fast passages continued to be made after that time. The Ariel and Spindrift raced in 1868, and the Titania made a quick run in 1871; but Mr Lindsay awards the palm to the Sir Lancelot and Thermopylæ as "the two fastest sailing-ships that ever traversed the ocean." The former vessel, 886 tons register, made the run from Foochow to London in ninety days in 1868, and an interesting fact is recorded by the owners of that fine ship bearing on the propelling power of sails. Many experienced navigators had during the clipper-racing entertained misgivings as to the value of the excessive amount of sail and the heavy rig which were deemed necessary to the equipment of a clipper. The ships, they said, "buried themselves under the press of canvas." Writing seven 243 years after the performance just mentioned, the owner of the Sir Lancelot said: "After the mania for China clipper-sailing I had 8 feet cut off from all the lower masts, and reduced the masts aloft and the yards in proportion. Yet with that (and no doubt a proportionately reduced crew) she maintained her speed undiminished." This was not an uncommon experience.[30]

No better evidence could illustrate the high quality of the ships and the skill of their captains than the remarkable closeness of their journeys over that lengthy ocean trip of twelve thousand miles. Several times, ships starting together wouldn't see each other at all during the hundred-day passage, only to have the fog clear in the Downs and reveal them close together, at which point winning the race depended on the pilot or the tugboat. Regarding the great race of 1866, Mr. W. S. Lindsay, from whose valuable work on Merchant Shipping we've taken many details, says: "This race generated incredible interest among everyone involved in maritime activities. Five ships set off—the Ariel, Taeping, Serica, Fiery Cross, and Taitsing. The first three left Foochow on the same day but lost sight of each other for the entire voyage until they reached the English Channel, where they met again, arriving in the Thames within a few hours of each other." Fast passages continued to happen after that. The Ariel and Spindrift raced in 1868, and the Titania made a quick journey in 1871; however, Mr. Lindsay considers the Sir Lancelot and Thermopylæ as "the two fastest sailing ships that ever crossed the ocean." The former ship, weighing 886 tons, made the journey from Foochow to London in ninety days in 1868, and an interesting fact is noted by the owners of that impressive ship regarding the power of sails. Many experienced navigators had doubts during the clipper racing about the necessity of the large amount of sail and the heavy rig considered essential for a clipper's equipment. They argued that the ships "buried themselves under the weight of canvas." Seven years after the aforementioned performance, the owner of the Sir Lancelot stated: "After the craze for China clipper sailing, I had 8 feet taken off from all the lower masts, and I reduced the masts above and the yards proportionately. Yet with that (and undoubtedly a proportionately smaller crew), she maintained her speed without any loss." This wasn't an unusual experience.

It is not to be supposed that the produce of China or the imports into the country were all carried by clipper ships. Theirs was a special service reserved for the most valuable produce and for the first few weeks of the season. After that fitful fever the trade of the year settled down to what may be called daily-bread conditions, when ships with moderate speed, large capacity, and frugally sailed, made steady and substantial profits for their owners. It is a commonly accepted maxim that the race—for profits, at all events—is not always to the swift. It was a saying of Mr Green, whose firm owned a large fleet of ships in the Australian and Indian trade, that in his balance-sheet for the year he found that his slow ships had paid for his fast ones. Nor did this economic rule lose its validity when steam came to supersede sail.

It shouldn't be assumed that all the goods from China or imports to the country were transported by clipper ships. Those were specifically used for the most valuable products and for the initial weeks of the season. After that initial frenzy, the trade of the year settled into what could be described as "daily bread" conditions, where ships with moderate speed, large capacity, and economical sailing ensured steady and significant profits for their owners. It's a widely recognized truth that the race—for profits, at least—isn't always won by the fastest. Mr. Green, whose company had a large fleet of ships in the Australian and Indian trade, often said that his financial statements showed his slower ships were what paid for the faster ones. This economic principle didn't lose its relevance even when steam began to replace sail.

The clippers proper had not had a clear run of fifteen years when steamers began to trespass on their preserves. The possibility of a successful steam 244 voyage round the Cape began to be proved in 1864, and was demonstrated in 1866, when Mr Alfred Holt of Liverpool first established his "blue-funnel" line, beginning with the Ajax, Achilles, and Agamemnon. But though sailing clippers were displaced, the sporting element in the China trade was not extinguished. The opening of the Yangtze revived the interest in early arrivals of tea by bringing the "black leafs" of Hunan and Hupeh to the sea nearly as soon as the "red leafs," whose outlet was Foochow. The produce of the central provinces up till 1861 was conveyed by a slow and expensive route, a considerable portion of it on the backs of porters, to Canton. Hankow when opened became at once the entrepot for these teas, and sea-going ships began to load their cargoes in the very heart of the Chinese empire. For some years there had been two sets of races—one from Foochow and one from Hankow—which took the wind out of each other's sails, and the sport became somewhat stale.

The clippers hadn’t enjoyed a clear run for fifteen years when steamers started encroaching on their territory. The potential for a successful steam voyage around the Cape started to become evident in 1864 and was confirmed in 1866 when Mr. Alfred Holt from Liverpool launched his "blue-funnel" line, beginning with the Ajax, Achilles, and Agamemnon. However, even though sailing clippers were pushed aside, the competitive aspect of the China trade didn't die out. The opening of the Yangtze rekindled the interest in early tea arrivals by bringing the "black leafs" from Hunan and Hupeh to the coast almost as quickly as the "red leafs," which were shipped from Foochow. Up until 1861, the goods from the central provinces were transported via a slow and costly route, with a significant amount carried by porters to Canton. Once Hankow was opened, it immediately became the hub for these teas, and ocean-going ships began to load their cargoes right in the heart of the Chinese empire. For a few years, there were two sets of races—one from Foochow and one from Hankow—that competed against each other, making the sport feel a bit routine.

It was the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and the consequent improvements in the construction of steamships, that gave its full value to the Yangtze as a trade route. For then ocean steamers loaded at Hankow with all the advantages of the short route and convenient coaling-stations, and the old excitement of the Foochow racing was revived under a still higher pressure. Every year witnessed some new design for combining the maximum cargo and coal stowage with the maximum speed, so that new tea, which but a few years before was landed in November, now came to market early in July. The last great race occurred in 1883 between the Glenogle and Stirling Castle. By 245 that time Indian tea was rapidly gaining the ascendant in the great consuming marts, displacing the Chinese article, which could no longer afford the prestige of being carried by steamers built and run regardless of expense. Thenceforth all Far Eastern produce found an everyday level; merchandise was carried to and fro by regular lines, with measured intervals of sailing, all the year round, freights were fixed by common agreement, and the trade assumed a character of an omnibus traffic on a large scale.

It was the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the subsequent advancements in steamship construction that truly highlighted the Yangtze as a trade route. Ocean steamers could now load at Hankow, benefiting from the shorter route and convenient coaling stations, while the thrilling races at Foochow were revived with even more intensity. Each year brought new designs aimed at maximizing cargo and coal capacity along with speed, allowing fresh tea, which used to arrive in November just a few years earlier, to hit the market as early as July. The last major race took place in 1883 between the Glenogle and Stirling Castle. By 245, Indian tea was quickly becoming more popular in major markets, pushing out the Chinese tea, which could no longer afford the prestige of being transported by luxury steamers. From that point on, all Far Eastern goods reached a routine status; products were regularly transported back and forth by established lines, sailing at scheduled intervals year-round, freight costs were determined by mutual agreement, and trade took on the characteristics of large-scale public transportation.

The Suez Canal produced an immense lateral extension of trade with China by bringing the Black Sea, Mediterranean, and North Sea ports into direct communication with the ports of the Far East. The Russian volunteer fleet, composed of very large and swift steamers, each capable of conveying 2000 troops, carried tea direct from Hankow to Odessa. Trade with Marseilles and Genoa was developed by British and German enterprise as well as by the Messageries Maritimes of France. Antwerp, Bremen, and Hamburg became the terminal ports for important lines of steamers. The mercantile navy of Japan had not risen into general notice during the earlier time with which we are principally concerned, and it would deserve a treatise by itself.

The Suez Canal significantly expanded trade with China by connecting the Black Sea, Mediterranean, and North Sea ports directly to Far East ports. The Russian volunteer fleet, made up of large and fast steamers, each able to carry 2,000 troops, transported tea straight from Hankow to Odessa. Trade with Marseille and Genoa grew due to efforts by British and German enterprises as well as France's Messageries Maritimes. Antwerp, Bremen, and Hamburg became key terminal ports for major steamship routes. The Japanese mercantile navy had not gained much attention during the earlier period we’re focused on, and it deserves its own in-depth discussion.

By a process of natural selection native shipping in China and Japan has been extensively superseded by foreign, and an immense dislocation of capital has in consequence taken place. The effect of this has been severely felt on the China coast, especially in such large shipping ports as Taku, Shanghai, and Ningpo, where there were in former days large and prosperous 246 shipowning communities. The disturbance has probably been much less marked in Japan, owing to the greater agility of the people in adapting themselves to inevitable changes. Certain it is that in both countries there is still a large junk fleet employed in the coasting trade, being protected against foreign as well as steam competition by their light draught and their privilege of trading at ports not opened to foreign trade.

Through natural selection, native shipping in China and Japan has largely been replaced by foreign shipping, leading to a significant upheaval of capital. The impact has been strongly felt along the China coast, particularly in major shipping ports like Taku, Shanghai, and Ningpo, which used to have large and thriving shipowning communities. This disruption has likely been less pronounced in Japan, thanks to the people's greater ability to adapt to inevitable changes. It's certain that both countries still have a sizable fleet of junks engaged in coastal trade, benefiting from their shallow draft and the privilege of trading at ports that are closed to foreign trade as well as steam competition.

The temptation to evade the prohibition of foreign flags led in former days to sundry bizarre effects on the coast of China. The natives, finding it to their advantage to employ foreign vessels, exercised their ingenuity in making them look like Chinese craft. This would at first sight appear no easy matter, seeing that the Chinese junks carried no yards and their hulls were of a construction as different from that of a modern ship as was possible for two things to be which were intended for the same purpose. The junks possessed certain qualities conducive to buoyancy and safety, such as water-tight bulkheads, which at once strengthened the hull and minimised the danger of sinking. But their sailing properties, except with the wind "free," were beneath contempt. Their weatherly and seaworthy qualities commended vessels of foreign construction to the Chinese traders, while the talisman of the flag was deemed by them a protection against pirates, and perhaps also, on occasion, against official inquisition. Probably what on the whole the native owner or charterer would have preferred was that his ship should pass for foreign at sea and for native in port. To this end in some cases resort was had to hermaphrodite rigging, and very generally to two projecting boards, one on each side of the figurehead, 247 bearing the staring Chinese eye, such as the junks south of the Yangtze carry. The open eye on the ship's bow was to enable the Chinese port officials to close theirs to the unauthorised presence of strangers, and thus everything was arranged in the manner so dear to the Chinese character.

The temptation to get around the ban on foreign flags once led to a variety of strange outcomes along the coast of China. The locals, seeing the benefits of using foreign ships, got creative in making them resemble Chinese vessels. This might seem like a tough challenge at first, since Chinese junks lacked yards and their hulls were built very differently from modern ships, despite both being designed for the same purpose. The junks had certain features that enhanced buoyancy and safety, like water-tight bulkheads, which strengthened the hull and reduced the risk of sinking. However, their sailing capabilities, except when the wind was favorable, were quite poor. The superior weather-resistant and seaworthy characteristics of foreign ships attracted Chinese traders, who believed that having a foreign flag provided protection against pirates and, at times, against official scrutiny as well. Ultimately, what most native owners or charterers likely wanted was for their ship to be seen as foreign at sea but as native in port. To achieve this, some opted for hybrid rigging, and commonly added two protruding boards, one on each side of the figurehead, featuring the iconic Chinese eye, similar to what the junks south of the Yangtze display. The open eye on the ship's bow allowed Chinese port officials to overlook the unauthorized presence of outsiders, cleverly aligning everything with what was important to the Chinese mindset.

In the south of China the advantage of the flag was sought without the foreign appearance of the vessel. The foreign flag was hoisted on native-built small craft, a large fleet of which hailed from Macao under Portuguese colours, and were from time to time guilty of great irregularities on the coast. The Chinese of Hongkong, British subjects born and bred, registered their vessels and received colonial sailing letters, renewable at frequent intervals, as a check on bad behaviour. With these papers short trips were made along the south coast, and a local trade was carried on in the estuary of the Canton river. These vessels of about 100 or 200 tons burthen were called "lorchas," of which we shall hear more in subsequent chapters.

In southern China, the benefits of using a foreign flag were pursued without the ship appearing too foreign. The foreign flag was raised on locally built small boats, a large fleet of which came from Macao under Portuguese colors and occasionally engaged in significant misconduct along the coast. The Chinese in Hong Kong, who were British citizens by birth, registered their boats and received colonial sailing permits, which were renewed regularly as a safeguard against misbehavior. With these permits, short trips were taken along the southern coast, and local trade was conducted in the estuary of the Canton River. These boats, weighing around 100 to 200 tons, were called "lorchas," and we will discuss them more in the following chapters.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE TRADERS.

I. FOREIGN.

Their relations to their official representatives—And to the trading interests of their own countries—Their unity—High character—Liberality—Breadth of view.

Their relationships with their official representatives—And with the trading interests of their own countries—Their unity—Strong character—Generosity—Open-mindedness.

In the preceding portions of this narrative it has been shown how much the character of the principal officials on both sides influenced the progress of events. There was, however, yet another factor which contributed in a lesser degree and in a different manner to the general result which ought not to be entirely omitted from consideration, and that was the personal qualities and traditional characteristics of the two trading communities, foreign and Chinese. It was they who created the subject-matter of all foreign relations, and stood in the breach in all the struggles between foreign and native officials. It was their persons and their fortunes which were ever at stake; it was they who first felt the shock of disturbance, and were the first to reap the fruits of peace.

In the earlier parts of this story, we've seen how much the personalities of the main officials on both sides shaped the course of events. However, there was also another factor that played a smaller but different role in the overall outcome, which shouldn't be completely overlooked: the personal traits and traditional characteristics of the two trading communities, foreign and Chinese. They were the ones who created the topics for all foreign relations and stood in the middle of the conflicts between foreign and local officials. Their lives and livelihoods were always at risk; they were the first to feel the impact of disruptions and the first to benefit from peace.

The relation of the foreign mercantile community to their official representatives was not always free from friction, because the same high authority which enjoined 249 on the officials the protection of the persons and the promotion of the interests of the lay community empowered them also to rule over these their protégés, and to apply to them an arbitrary discipline in accordance with what they conceived to be the exigencies of the time. Duty in such circumstances must often have assumed a divided aspect, and rules of action must frequently have been put to a severe strain; nor is it surprising that, owing to these peculiar relationships, the resident communities should not have been able on all occasions to see eye to eye with the agents of their Governments.

The relationship between the foreign merchant community and their official representatives wasn't always smooth, as the same high authority that instructed officials to protect individuals and promote the interests of the local community also gave them the power to oversee their protégés and enforce strict discipline based on what they believed were the demands of the time. Under such circumstances, duty often had conflicting aspects, and the rules of action were frequently put to the test; it's not surprising that, due to these unique dynamics, the local communities couldn't always agree with their government agents.

In their national and representative character the China merchants were wont at different crises to have moral burdens laid on them which did not properly fit their shoulders. They were little affected by the shallow moralism of the pulpit, which, taken literally, would have counselled general liquidation and the distribution of the proceeds among the poor, leaving the common creditor out of account; but official sermons also were on certain occasions preached to, or at, the merchants, implying some obligation on their part to sacrifice individual advantage to the greater good of the greater number. Were there no other answer to such altruistic monitions, it would be sufficient to plead that under such theories of duty commerce could not exist, and its political accessories would become superfluous. No road to commercial prosperity has been discovered which could dispense with the prime motive for the exertion which makes for progress—to wit, individual ambition, cupidity, or by whatever term we choose to designate the driving power of the complex machine of civilised life. Mammon is, after all, a divinity whose 250 worship is as universal as that of Eros, and is scarcely less essential to the preservation of the race. Nor is it by collective, but by strictly individual, offerings that these deities are propitiated, and the high purposes of humanity subserved. It is no reproach, therefore, to the China merchants that they should have seized every opportunity for gain, totally irrespective of the general policy of their country. It was not for them to construe portents, but to improve the shining hour. And if it should at any time happen that the action of private persons, impelled by the passion for gain, embarrassed a diplomatist in his efforts to bring about some grand international combination, the fault was clearly his who omitted to take account of the ruling factor in all economic problems. The trade was not made for Government policy, but the policy for the trade, whose life-blood was absolute liberty of action and a free course for individual initiative. The success of British trade as a whole could only be the aggregate of the separate successes not otherwise attainable than by each member of the mercantile fraternity performing his own part with singleness of purpose. Nothing certainly could ever justify any trader in foregoing a chance of gain for the sake of an ideal benefit to the community, even if it were likely to be realised. A distinction must be drawn between the tradesman and the statesman. Though their functions may sometimes overlap, their respective duties to the State are of a different though complementary character.

In their national and representative roles, the China merchants often found themselves carrying moral responsibilities that didn't really fit them. They were largely unaffected by the simplistic moral judgments from the pulpit, which, if taken literally, would have suggested a total liquidation and sharing of the profits among the poor, ignoring the general creditor. However, on certain occasions, official sermons were directed at the merchants, implying some duty on their part to put the common good above their individual interests. If there were no other response to such altruistic messages, it would suffice to argue that under such notions of duty, commerce could not function, and its political aspects would become unnecessary. No path to commercial success has been found that could do without the main drive for efforts that lead to progress—namely, individual ambition, greed, or whatever term we choose to describe the motivating force of the complex system of civilized life. Ultimately, wealth is a deity whose worship is as widespread as that of love, and is hardly less vital for the survival of humanity. Moreover, it is not through collective, but through strictly individual, contributions that these deities are appeased, serving the greater aims of humanity. Therefore, it is not a fault of the China merchants that they took every opportunity to profit, completely independent of their country’s general policies. It was not their job to interpret omens, but to seize the moment. And if, at any point, the actions of private individuals, driven by the desire for profit, hampered a diplomat's efforts to create a significant international agreement, the fault clearly lies with the diplomat for failing to consider the key factor in all economic issues. Trade was not created for government policy; rather, policy existed for trade, whose lifeblood was total freedom of action and unimpeded individual initiative. The success of British trade as a whole could only be the sum of individual successes, which could only be achieved when each member of the trading community performed their role with a clear focus. Nothing could ever justify a trader passing up a chance to profit for the sake of an ideal benefit to the community, even if that benefit might seem achievable. A distinction must be made between the merchant and the statesman. While their roles may sometimes overlap, their duties to the State are of a different but complementary nature.

To the charge which from time to time has been levelled at the China merchants, that they were too narrow and too selfish, it may be plausibly replied that, on the contrary, they were if anything too 251 broad; for their individual interests were not so bound up with general progress as are the interests of colonists in a new country, where co-operation is essential. Progress meant, to the China merchants, the admitting of the flood of competition, which they were in no condition to meet. The general interests of the country required the opening of new markets; in a lesser degree the interests of the manufacturing section required the same thing; but the interests of the merchants, albeit they appeared to represent their country and its industries, were in fact opposed to expansion. Yet so strong in them was the race instinct for progress that their private advantage has oftentimes actually given way to it, so that we have seen throughout the developments of foreign intercourse with China the resident merchants placing themselves in the van in helping to let loose the avalanche which overwhelmed them and brought fresh adventurers to occupy the ground.

To the accusation that the China merchants were too narrow-minded and selfish, it can be reasonably argued that, on the contrary, they were perhaps too broad-minded. Their individual interests weren't as tightly linked to general progress as the interests of colonists in a new territory, where cooperation is crucial. For the China merchants, progress meant allowing in a flood of competition that they were unable to compete against. The overall interests of the country called for opening new markets; to a lesser extent, the manufacturing sector had similar needs. However, although the merchants seemed to represent their country and its industries, their interests were actually against expansion. Yet their strong instinct for progress often led them to prioritize it over their own private interests, so we often saw the resident merchants stepping up to help unleash the wave of change that ultimately overwhelmed them and brought in new adventurers to take their place.

Nor has the relation of the merchants, even to the operations in which they were engaged, been always clearly understood. Although they personified their national trade in the eyes of the world, the merchants were never anything more than the vehicles for its distribution, having no interest in its general extension, though a powerful interest in the increase of their individual share. The productions which provided the livelihood of many thousands of people in China, and perhaps of a still larger number in Great Britain and other manufacturing countries, did not concern them. A percentage by way of toll on merchandise passing through their warehouses was the limit of their ambition. A clear distinction should 252 therefore be drawn between the merchant and the producer or manufacturer; on which point some observations of Wingrove Cooke[31] are worth quoting:—

Nor has the relationship of the merchants, even to the activities they were involved in, always been clearly understood. Although they represented their national trade to the outside world, the merchants were never more than the means for its distribution, lacking any interest in its overall growth, though they had a strong interest in increasing their individual share. The products that supported the livelihoods of thousands of people in China, and perhaps an even larger number in Great Britain and other manufacturing countries, did not concern them. Earning a percentage as a toll on the merchandise that passed through their warehouses was the extent of their ambition. A clear distinction should therefore be made between the merchant and the producer or manufacturer; on this point, some comments from Wingrove Cooke[31] are worth quoting:—

"The calculations of the merchants do not extend beyond their own business. Why should they? Fortunately for himself, the merchant's optics are those of the lynx rather than those of the eagle. An extremely far-sighted commercial man must always run risks of bankruptcy, for the most absolutely certain sequences are often the most uncertain in point of time." The same writer, however, comments on the ignorance and narrowness of both British traders and manufacturers, and their failure to avail themselves of the opportunities offered to them of exploiting the trading resources of the Chinese. "There is no spirit of inquiry abroad," he says, "no energy at work, no notion of distracting the eye for a moment from watching those eternal shirtings, no thought whether you cannot make better shift with some other class of goods. Manchester made a great blind effort when the ports were opened, and that effort failed. Since then she has fallen into an apathy, and trusts to the chapter of accidents." As for the merchants on whom manufacturers relied to push the sale of their wares, "they come out here," he says, "to make fortunes in from five to seven years, not to force English calicoes up into remote places. Their work is to buy Chinese produce, but," he goes on, "if the English manufacturer wants extraordinary exertion, carefully collected information, and persevering up-country enterprise—and this is what he does want—he must do it himself. The 253 British export trade will not maintain mercantile houses, but it would pay for travelling agents acting in immediate connection with the home manufacturers, who should keep their principals at home well informed, and who should work their operations through the established houses here. The evil is that British goods are not brought under the eyes of the Chinaman of the interior cities."

"The calculations of merchants are limited to their own businesses. Why would they think otherwise? Luckily for them, merchants tend to have sharp eyes like a lynx rather than a far-off view like an eagle. A merchant who looks too far ahead always risks bankruptcy because the most certain outcomes are often the most unpredictable when it comes to timing." The same writer, however, points out the ignorance and narrow-mindedness of British traders and manufacturers, noting their failure to take advantage of the trading opportunities with the Chinese. "There's no spirit of inquiry around," he says, "no energy at work, no thought of taking a moment to look away from those endless fabric rolls, no consideration of whether they could do better with a different type of goods. Manchester made a half-hearted attempt when the ports opened, and that attempt failed. Since then, it has sunk into a state of indifference, relying on chance." As for the merchants whom manufacturers depended on to promote their products, "they come here," he says, "to make fortunes in five to seven years, not to push English textiles into far-off places. Their job is to buy Chinese goods, but," he continues, "if the English manufacturer wants significant effort, well-researched information, and persistent adventures in the countryside—and that's exactly what he needs—he has to do it himself. The 253 British export trade won't support trading companies, but it could pay for traveling agents who are directly connected with the manufacturers at home, keeping their principals well-informed and working through the established businesses here. The problem is that British products aren’t being brought to the attention of the Chinese in the inland cities."

The inaccuracies of some of these comments need not obscure the shrewd and prophetic character of the general advice tendered to the British manufacturers. After an interval of forty years they have begun to act upon it, and though their progress has as yet been slow, they are taking to heart another portion of Mr Cooke's advice, that "all dealing with the interior of China is impossible unless your agents speak the language of the people."

The inaccuracies of some of these comments shouldn't overshadow the insightful and foresighted nature of the general advice given to British manufacturers. After a gap of forty years, they have started to follow it, and although their progress has been slow so far, they are heeding another part of Mr. Cooke's advice: that "it's impossible to do business in the interior of China unless your agents speak the local language."

A certain divergence between the official and non-official view of affairs had begun to show itself in the period before the war. Before the close of the East India Company's monopoly the independent merchants perceived that their interests, as well as those of the Company itself, were prejudiced by the truckling tactics of its agents, and though few in number, the mercantile community began to give utterance to their grievances and to show they had a mind of their own on public commercial policy. As the whole position of foreigners in China rested on premisses which were essentially false, disappointment, irritation, and alarm were chronic. Every one concerned, official and unofficial, was aggrieved thereby, while no one was disposed to accept blame for the grievance. A tendency to recrimination was the natural consequence. When 254 their representatives failed to protect them against the aggressions of the Chinese the merchants complained, while the officials in their turn were not indisposed to retort by alleging provocative or injudicious conduct on the part of the merchants themselves as contributory to the ever-recurrent difficulties. Through the retrospective vista of two generations it is easy now to see where both parties were at fault—the merchants in making too little account of the difficulties under which their representatives were labouring, and the officials in failing to perceive that the causes of their disagreements with the Chinese lay altogether deeper than the casual imprudence of any private individual, even if that could be established. The despatches of the earlier "superintendents," notably those of Sir George Robinson, betray a certain jealousy of the political influence supposed to be wielded by the mercantile community of Canton working through their associations in England, and the superintendents seemed therefore concerned to cast discredit on mercantile opinion. It would have been strange enough, had it been true, that an isolated community of a hundred individuals should be torn by faction, yet it is a fact that on their assumed disagreements an argument was based for invalidating the representations which they occasionally made to the Home Government. Their views were disparaged, their motives impugned, and their short-sighted selfishness deplored. The note struck in 1835 has been maintained with variations down almost to our own day,—a circumstance which has to be borne in mind by those who aim at a fair appreciation of British relations with China during the last sixty years. 255

A noticeable gap between the official and unofficial perspectives started to appear in the period leading up to the war. Before the East India Company's monopoly ended, independent merchants realized that both their interests and those of the Company were being harmed by the appeasing tactics of its agents. Although they were few in number, the business community began expressing their complaints and showed they had their own opinions on public trade policies. Since the entire situation for foreigners in China was based on fundamentally flawed assumptions, disappointment, irritation, and anxiety became a constant state. Everyone involved, both official and unofficial, felt wronged, yet no one was willing to take responsibility for the issues. This naturally led to a tendency to blame one another. When their representatives couldn't protect them from Chinese aggression, the merchants voiced their complaints, while the officials were quick to assert that the merchants' own provocative or unwise actions contributed to the ongoing problems. Looking back over two generations, it’s clear that both sides share blame—the merchants for not understanding the challenges faced by their representatives, and the officials for not recognizing that the reasons behind their disputes with the Chinese ran far deeper than any alleged missteps by individuals, even if those could be proven. The dispatches from the early "superintendents," particularly those of Sir George Robinson, reveal a certain jealousy regarding the political influence attributed to the merchant community in Canton through their associations in England, leading the superintendents to discredit mercantile opinions. It would have been odd, if it were true, that a small community of a hundred people should be split by factions, yet their supposed disagreements were used to undermine the representations they occasionally made to the Home Government. Their opinions were belittled, their motives questioned, and their short-sighted selfishness lamented. The themes established in 1835 have continued, with variations, up to the present day—a reality that must be considered by those aiming for a fair understanding of British relations with China over the past sixty years. 255

Far, however, from being a disunited flock, the mercantile body in China generally have on the whole been singularly unanimous in their views of the political transactions with which their interests were bound up; while as to the old community of Canton, no epithet could be less appropriate than one which would imply discord. Concord was the enforced effect of their circumstances. Imprisoned within a narrow space, surrounded by a hostile people, exposed to a constant common peril, the foreign residents in Canton were bound to each other by the mere instinct of self-preservation. They became, in fact, what Nelson called his captains, a "band of brothers." The exclusion of females up till 1842, and the deterrent conditions of married life there even under the treaty, made it essentially a bachelor community, living almost like one family, or as comrades in a campaign. Of the disinterested hospitality and good-fellowship which continue to this day, even in the maturity of their domestic development, to characterise the foreign communities in China, the germ is doubtless to be discovered in that primitive society which oscillated between Canton and Macao during the thirty years which ended in 1856, in which year their factories were for the last time destroyed, and the old life finally broken up.

However, instead of being a divided group, the trading community in China has generally been surprisingly united in their opinions on the political matters that affected their interests. As for the old community in Canton, no term could be less fitting than one suggesting conflict. Unity was the forced result of their situation. Confined to a small area, surrounded by an unfriendly population, and facing a constant shared danger, the foreign residents in Canton were naturally linked by the instinct for survival. They became, in fact, what Nelson referred to as his captains, a "band of brothers." The exclusion of women until 1842, along with the challenges of married life even under the treaty, made it essentially a community of bachelors, living almost like one family or like soldiers on a campaign. The selfless hospitality and camaraderie that continue to characterize foreign communities in China today undoubtedly trace their roots to that early society, which fluctuated between Canton and Macao during the thirty years ending in 1856, the year their factories were destroyed for the last time, marking the end of their old way of life.

But there is something more to be credited to these early residents than the mutual loyalty prescribed for them by the peculiar conditions of their life. They exemplified in a special degree the true temper and feelings of gentlemen,—a moral product with which local conditions had also, no doubt, something to do. They lived in glass houses, with open doors; they 256 could by no means get away from one another, or evade a mutual observation which was constant and searching. Whatever standards, therefore, were recognised by the community, the individual members were constrained to live up to them in a society where words and deeds lay open to the collective criticism. And the standard was really a high one. Truth, honour, courage, generosity, nobility, were qualities common to the whole body; and those who were not so endowed by birthright could not help assuming the virtue they did not possess, and, through practice, making it eventually their own. Black sheep there were, no doubt, but being never whitewashed, they did not infect the flock, as happens in more advanced communities.

But there's more to appreciate about these early residents than just the loyalty shaped by their unique circumstances. They truly embodied the character and feelings of gentlemen—traits that were also influenced by their environment. They lived in glass houses with open doors; they couldn’t escape from one another or avoid constant, close observation. As a result, whatever standards the community upheld, each individual had to meet them in a society where words and actions were always subject to collective scrutiny. And those standards were genuinely high. Truth, honor, courage, generosity, and nobility were qualities shared by everyone, and those who weren’t born with these traits couldn’t help but adopt the virtues they lacked, eventually making them their own through practice. Sure, there were black sheep, but since they were never whitewashed, they didn’t corrupt the flock, unlike in more developed communities.

These intimate conditions favouring the formation of character were powerfully reinforced by the one feature of European life in China which was external to the residents, their contact with the surrounding mass of Chinese. The effect of intercourse with so-called inferior races is a question of much complexity, and large generalisations on such subjects are unsafe, each case being best considered on its proper merits. In their intercourse with the Chinese, certain points stood out like pillars of adamant to fix the principles by which the foreign residents were obliged to regulate their bearing towards the natives. In the first place, the strangers formed units hemmed in and pressed upon by thousands; therefore they must magnify themselves by maintaining an invincible prestige, they must in the eyes of that alien world always be heroes, and they must present a united front. Extending the same principles from the 257 material to the moral sphere, the foreigners must maintain the reputation of their caste for probity, liberality, and trustworthiness. Their word must be as good as their bond; they must on no account demean themselves before the heathen, nor tolerate any temptation from a Chinese source to take unfair advantage of their own kind, the Caucasian or Christian, or by whatever term we may indicate the white man. Whatever their private differences, no white man must permit himself to acquiesce in the disparagement of his own people in the view of the people of the country. They must be, one and all, above suspicion. Such were some of the considerations which were effective in maintaining the character of Europeans in China. Although association with a race so alien as the Chinese, with such different moral standards, must have had the usual deteriorating effects of such contact, yet the positive gain in the formation of character from the practice of such maxims of conduct as those above indicated probably left a balance of advantage with the China merchants.

These close-knit conditions that shaped character were greatly reinforced by a key aspect of European life in China—their interactions with the surrounding Chinese population. The impact of engaging with so-called "inferior races" is a complex issue, and making broad generalizations on the topic is risky; each situation should be evaluated on its own merits. During their dealings with the Chinese, certain principles stood out prominently, guiding how foreign residents had to conduct themselves toward the locals. Firstly, the foreigners were isolated units surrounded by thousands; therefore, they had to elevate themselves by maintaining a strong sense of prestige. In the eyes of that unfamiliar world, they always had to be seen as heroes, and they needed to present a united front. Extending these principles from a material to a moral perspective, the foreigners had to uphold the reputation of their group for honesty, generosity, and reliability. Their word should be as good as their promise; they must never lower themselves in front of the locals, nor give in to any temptation from a Chinese source to take unfair advantage of their own people, the Caucasian or Christian, or however we refer to white individuals. Regardless of their personal disagreements, no white person should allow themselves to accept any denigration of their own group in front of the local population. They all needed to be above suspicion. Such were some of the factors that helped maintain the character of Europeans in China. Even though associating with a culture as different as the Chinese, with such distinct moral standards, would typically have the usual negative effects of such interactions, the positive impact on character formation from adhering to these behavioral maxims likely resulted in a net benefit for the merchants in China.

The case would be imperfectly stated were mention not made of the process of natural selection which constituted the merchants a body of picked men. China was a remote country. It offered neither the facility of access nor the scope for adventure which in more recent times have attracted such streams of emigration to distant parts of the world. The mercantile body was a close corporation, automatically protected by barriers very difficult to surmount. The voyage itself occupied six months. Letters were rarely answered within a year. Hence all the machinery 258 of business had to be arranged with a large prescience. Even after the opening of the overland route to Suez communication with China was maintained by sailing-ships up till 1845, when the Lady Mary Wood, the first steamer of the P. and O. Company, reached Hongkong, with no accommodation for more than a few passengers, and carrying no more cargo than a good-sized lighter. And later still, when steamers carried the mails fortnightly to China, the expense of the trip was so great that only a chosen few could afford it. It took £150 to £170 to land a single man in Hongkong, and in those days when extensive outfits were thought necessary, probably as much more had to be laid out in that way. The merchants who established themselves in China after the opening of the trade were either themselves men of large means, or they were the confidential representatives of English and American houses of great position. There were no local banks, operations extended over one or two years, an immense outlay of capital was required, and credit had to be maintained at an exceedingly high level, not only as between the merchants in China and their correspondents in London, Liverpool, New York, and Boston, but between both and the financial centre of the world. Through such a winnowing-machine only good grain could pass. It was a natural result that the English and American merchants both in China and India should have been superior as a class to the average of other commercial communities. And what was true of partners and heads of houses was no less so of their "assistants." There were no "clerks," as the term is commonly used in England, 259 except Portuguese hailing from the neighbouring settlement of Macao. The young men sent from England were selected with as much care as it was possible to bestow, for they were precious. Not only were they costly, but it might take a year to make good casualties. Besides, in countries situated as China was then, where contingencies of health were never out of mind, it was not worth while to send out one who was a clerk and nothing more. There must be potential capacity as well, since it could never be foreseen how soon emergencies might arise which would require him to assume the most responsible duties. Hence every new hand engaged must enjoy the fullest confidence both of his immediate employers and of the home firm to which they were affiliated.

The situation would be poorly described if we didn't mention the process of natural selection that made the merchants a group of top-tier individuals. China was far away. It didn’t have the easy access or the adventurous spirit that has drawn so many people to distant lands in more recent times. The merchant community was a tight-knit group, automatically shielded by obstacles that were very hard to overcome. The journey itself took six months. Letters were rarely replied to within a year. Because of this, all the logistics of business had to be planned with a great deal of foresight. Even after the overland route to Suez opened, communication with China continued to rely on sailing ships until 1845, when the Lady Mary Wood, the first steamer from the P. and O. Company, arrived in Hongkong, with room for only a few passengers and carrying only as much cargo as a large lighter. Later, when steamers began delivering mail to China every two weeks, the cost was so high that only a select few could pay for it. It took £150 to £170 just to get one person to Hongkong, and at a time when extensive supplies were considered essential, it likely required even more money for that. The merchants who set up in China after trade opened were either wealthy individuals themselves or trusted representatives of well-established English and American companies. There were no local banks, projects lasted one or two years, significant amounts of capital were needed, and credit had to be kept at a very high level, not just between merchants in China and their contacts in London, Liverpool, New York, and Boston, but also between both groups and the world’s financial center. Only the best of the best could make it through such a rigorous selection process. It was a natural outcome that English and American merchants in both China and India were generally of higher quality than the average in other commercial communities. The same applied to partners and heads of businesses as well as their "assistants." There were no "clerks," as typically defined in England, except for a few Portuguese from the nearby settlement of Macao. The young men sent from England were chosen with great care because they were valuable. They were not only expensive, but it could take a year to replenish lost personnel. Plus, in a place like China at that time, where health issues were constantly a concern, it wasn’t worth sending someone out who was just a clerk. They needed to have potential as well, since it was impossible to predict when urgent situations might arise that would require them to take on significant responsibilities. Therefore, every new recruit had to have the complete trust of both their immediate employers and the home company they worked for.

As might be expected under such circumstances, family connections played a large part in the selection, and the tendency of the whole system was to minimise the gulf which in advanced societies separates the master from the man. In education and culture they were equals, as a consequence of which the reins of discipline might be held lightly, all service being willingly and intelligently rendered. The system of devolution was so fully developed that the assistant was practically master in his own department, for the success of which he was as zealous as the head. The "mess" régime under which in most houses the whole staff, employers and employees, sat at one table, tended strongly in the direction of a common social level.

As expected in such situations, family ties played a significant role in the selection process, and the overall system aimed to reduce the gap that advanced societies typically have between the boss and the worker. In terms of education and culture, they were equals, which meant that discipline could be administered more loosely, with all service provided willingly and intelligently. The system of delegating tasks was so well developed that the assistant acted almost as the boss in his own area, and he was just as invested in its success as the head was. The "mess" régime, where the entire staff, both employers and employees, gathered at one table in most houses, strongly encouraged a sense of common social standing.

What still further contributed much to raise the position of assistants was the tradition which the 260 merchants both in India and China inherited from the East India Company of what may be called pampering their employees. They were permitted to carry on trade on their own account, in the same commodities and with the same buyers and sellers, in which they possessed advantages over their employers in having all the firm's information at command with the privilege of using its machinery free of cost. The abuses to which such a system was liable are too obvious to be dwelt upon; but to be himself a merchant, sometimes more successful than his principal, though without his responsibilities, certainly did not detract from the social status of the assistant.

What also significantly boosted the status of assistants was the tradition that the 260 merchants in India and China inherited from the East India Company, which could be called pampering their employees. They were allowed to conduct their own trade in the same goods and with the same buyers and sellers, giving them advantages over their employers since they had access to all the firm’s information and could use its resources for free. The potential problems of such a system are too obvious to ignore, but being a merchant himself, sometimes even more successful than his boss without the same responsibilities, certainly did not lower the assistant's social status.

Sixty years ago the China community was composed of men in the prime of life. The average age was probably not over thirty—a man of forty was a grey-beard. In this respect an evolutionary change has come over the scene, and the average age of the adult residents must have risen by at least ten years. But the China community in all its stages of development has maintained the colonial characteristic of buoyancy and hopefulness. Reverses of fortune never appalled its members. Having been early accustomed to the alternations of fat years and lean, a disastrous season was to them but the presage of a bountiful one to follow; while a succession of bad years made the reaction only the more certain. This wellspring of hope has often helped the China merchants to carry the freshness of spring even into the snows of winter. The nature of their pursuits, moreover, fostered a comprehensive spirit. Trained in the school of wholesale dealing, and habituated to work on large curves, the China merchants have all through felt the blood of the 261 merchant princes in their veins, and it has even been alleged to their disadvantage that, like the scions of decayed families the world over, the pomp and circumstance were maintained after the material basis had in the natural course of affairs vanished. Nay, more, that the grandiose ideas appropriate to the heirs of a protected system have disqualified them for the contest in small things which the latter days have brought upon them.

Sixty years ago, the China community was made up of men in their prime. The average age was probably no more than thirty—anyone forty was considered old. In this respect, there has been an evolutionary change, and the average age of adult residents has likely increased by at least ten years. However, the China community, in all its stages of growth, has retained the colonial characteristics of optimism and resilience. Setbacks never discouraged its members. Accustomed to the ups and downs of prosperous and lean times from the beginning, a bad season was just a sign of a good one to come; meanwhile, a string of poor years only made the turnaround more certain. This source of hope has often helped the China merchants maintain the freshness of spring even in the harshest winters. Additionally, the nature of their work nurtured a broad-minded attitude. Trained in wholesale dealing and used to operating on a large scale, the China merchants have always felt the spirit of merchant princes in their veins, and it has even been said to their detriment that, like the heirs of fallen noble families everywhere, they continued to flaunt grandeur after the financial means to support it had naturally faded away. Moreover, their lofty ambitions, suited for those raised in a sheltered system, have hindered them in the small-scale challenges that modern times have presented.

Of that restricted, protected, quasi-aristocratic, half-socialistic society some of the traditions and spirit remain; but the structure itself could not possibly withstand the aggression of modern progress, and it has been swept away. New elements have entered into the composition of the mercantile and general society of the Far East, its basis has been widened and its relations with the great world multiplied. In innumerable ways there has been improvement, not the least being the development of family life and the more enduring attachment to the soil which is the result of prolonged residence. Living, if less luxurious, is vastly more comfortable, more refined, and more civilised, and men and women without serious sacrifices make their home in a country which in the earlier days was but a scene of temporary exile. Charities abound which were not before needed; the channels of humanity have broadened, though it cannot be said at the cost of depth, for whatever else may have changed, the generosity of the foreign communities remains as princely as in the good old days.

Of that limited, protected, semi-aristocratic, somewhat socialistic society, some of the traditions and spirit still exist; however, the structure itself couldn’t possibly withstand the pressure of modern progress, and it has been dismantled. New elements have come into play in the commercial and general society of the Far East, expanding its foundation and increasing its connections with the wider world. There have been countless improvements, not the least of which is the enhancement of family life and a stronger attachment to the land that comes from extended residency. Living, while less extravagant, is significantly more comfortable, more refined, and more civilized, and both men and women, without making serious sacrifices, can now call a country that was once just a temporary exile their home. There are numerous charities now that weren’t needed before; the channels of humanity have widened, although it can’t be said at the expense of depth, for whatever else may have altered, the generosity of the foreign communities remains just as grand as in the good old days.

Yet is it permissible to regret some of the robuster virtues of the generation that is past. The European solidarity vis-à-vis the Chinese world, which continued 262 practically unbroken into the eighth decade of the century, a tower of moral strength to foreigners and an object of respect to the Chinese, has now been thrown down. Not only in private adventures have foreigners in their heat of competition let themselves down to the level of Chinese tactics, but great financial syndicates have immersed themselves in intrigues which either did not tempt the men of the previous generation or tempted them in vain; and even the Great Powers themselves have descended into the inglorious arena, where decency is discarded like the superfluous garments of the gladiator, and where falsity, ultra-Chinese in quality, masquerades in Christian garb. The moral ascendancy of Christendom has been in a hundred ways shamelessly prostituted, leaving little visible distinction between the West and the East but superior energy and military force.

Is it acceptable to feel nostalgic about some of the stronger virtues of the past generation? The European unity in relation to China, which remained nearly unbroken into the 1980s, was a source of moral strength for outsiders and earned respect from the Chinese. That unity has now crumbled. Not only have individuals sunk to using Chinese tactics in their competitive pursuits, but large financial organizations have engaged in schemes that either didn't entice the previous generation or failed to sway them. Even the Great Powers have entered this shameful arena, where decency is cast off like the unnecessary gear of a gladiator, and where deceit, that is distinctly Chinese in nature, pretends to be something Christian. The moral superiority of Christendom has been shamelessly compromised in numerous ways, leaving little visible difference between the West and the East aside from greater energy and military might.

Take them for all in all, the China merchants have been in their day and generation no unworthy representatives of their country's interests and policy, its manhood and character. Their patriotism has not been toned down but expanded and rationalised by cosmopolitan associations, and by contact with a type of national life differing diametrically from their own. Breadth and moderation have resulted from these conditions, and a habit of tempering the exigencies of the day by the larger consideration of international problems has been characteristic of the mercantile bodies in China from first to last. And though statesmanship lies outside the range of busy men of commerce, it must be said in justice to the merchants of China that they have been consistently loyal to an ideal policy, higher in its aims and more practical in 263 its operation than that which any line of Western statesmen, save those of Russia, has been able to follow. It had been better if the continuous prognostications of such a compact body of opinion had been more heeded.

Overall, the Chinese merchants have, in their time, served as worthy representatives of their nation's interests and policies, as well as its spirit and character. Their patriotism has not diminished; instead, it has grown and become more reasoned through cosmopolitan connections and exposure to a type of national life that is completely different from their own. This has fostered a sense of breadth and moderation, along with the tendency to balance the urgent needs of the moment with broader international issues, which has been a defining feature of the merchant communities in China from the very beginning. While statesmanship may not be in the realm of busy businesspeople, it is fair to say that the merchants of China have remained consistently loyal to an ideal policy that is more ambitious in its goals and practical in its execution than anything pursued by any Western statesmen, except for those from Russia. It would have been better if the ongoing predictions from such a unified group of opinions had been given more attention. 263

II. CHINESE.

Business aptitude—High standard of commercial ethics—Circumstances hindering great accumulations.

Business skills—High standard of business ethics—Situations preventing large wealth accumulation.

As it requires two to make a bargain, it would be an imperfect account of the China trade which omitted such an important element as the efficiency of the native trader. To him is due the fact that the foreign commerce of his country, when uninterfered with by the officials of his Government, has been made so easy for the various parties concerned in it. Of all the accomplishments the Chinese nation has acquired during the long millenniums of its history, there is none in which it has attained to such perfect mastery as in the science of buying and selling. The Chinese possess the Jews' passion for exchange. All classes, from the peasant to the prince, think in money, and the instinct of appraisement supplies to them the place of a ready reckoner, continuously converting objects and opportunities into cash. Thus surveying mankind and all its achievements with the eye of an auctioneer, invisible note-book in hand, external impressions translate themselves automatically into the language of the market-place, so that it comes as natural to the Chinaman as to the modern American, or to any other commercial people, to reduce all 264 forms of appreciation to the common measure of the dollar. A people imbued with such habits of mind are traders by intuition. If they have much to learn from foreigners, they have also much to teach them; and the fact that at no spot within the vast empire of China would one fail to find ready-made and eager men of business is a happy augury for the extended intercourse which may be developed in the future, while at the same time it affords the clearest indication of the true avenue to sympathetic relations with the Chinese. In every detail of handling and moving commodities, from the moment they leave the hands of the producer in his garden-patch to the time when they reach the ultimate consumer perhaps a thousand miles away, the Chinese trader is an expert. Times and seasons have been elaborately mapped out, the clue laid unerringly through labyrinthine currencies, weights, and measures which to the stranger seem a hopeless tangle, and elaborate trade customs evolved appropriate to the requirements of a myriad-sided commerce, until the simplest operation has been invested with a kind of ritual observance, the effect of the whole being to cause the complex wheels to run both swiftly and smoothly.

Since it takes two to make a deal, leaving out the effectiveness of the local trader would give an incomplete overview of the China trade. It's thanks to him that foreign commerce in his country, when not interfered with by government officials, has become so straightforward for everyone involved. Among all the skills the Chinese nation has developed over its long history, none surpasses its mastery of buying and selling. The Chinese share the same passion for trading that Jews are known for. People from all walks of life, from farmers to royalty, think in terms of money, and their instinct for valuation acts as a mental calculator, constantly turning goods and opportunities into cash. They view humanity and its achievements through the lens of an auctioneer, pen and invisible notebook in hand, translating external impressions into the language of the marketplace. This process feels as natural to the Chinese as it does to modern Americans or any other commercial society, reducing all forms of value to a common dollar amount. A people with such a mindset are instinctive traders. While they have much to learn from foreigners, they also have plenty to teach them; the presence of eager and ready-made businesspeople all over China is a promising sign for the increased interactions to come, and it clearly indicates the best path to fostering good relations with the Chinese. From the moment goods leave the producer's hands in his garden to when they reach the final buyer, potentially a thousand miles away, the Chinese trader is highly skilled. They have thoroughly mapped out the timing and seasons, deftly navigating through complex currencies, weights, and measures that might seem like an impossible puzzle to outsiders. They've developed intricate trade customs that cater to the diverse needs of commerce, making even the simplest transactions feel like a ritual, ultimately allowing everything to operate both quickly and smoothly.

To crown all, there is to be noted, as the highest condition of successful trade, the evolution of commercial probity, which, though no monopoly of the Chinese merchants, is one of their distinguishing characteristics. It is that element which, in the generations before the treaties, enabled so large a commerce to be carried on with foreigners without anxiety, without friction, and almost without precaution. It has also led to the happiest personal relations between foreigners and the native trader. 265

To sum it all up, it’s important to highlight the evolution of business integrity as a key factor for successful trade. Although it’s not exclusive to Chinese merchants, it is one of their standout traits. This quality allowed for a significant amount of trade with foreigners in earlier generations, done smoothly, without worry, and with minimal precautions. It has also resulted in very positive personal relationships between foreign traders and local merchants. 265

When the business of the season was over [says Mr Hunter][32] contracts were made with the Hong merchants for the next season. They consisted of teas of certain qualities and kinds, sometimes at fixed prices, sometimes at the prices which should be current at the time of the arrival of the teas. No other record of these contracts was ever made than by each party booking them, no written agreements were drawn up, nothing was sealed or attested. A wilful breach of contract never took place, and as regards quality and quantity the Hong merchants fulfilled their part with scrupulous honesty and care.

When the season's business wrapped up [says Mr. Hunter][32] contracts were arranged with the Hong merchants for the next season. These contracts involved teas of specific qualities and types, sometimes at set prices and other times at the market prices when the teas arrived. There was no other record of these contracts besides each party noting them down; no written agreements were created, and nothing was officially sealed or witnessed. Deliberate breaches of contract never occurred, and the Hong merchants reliably met their obligations regarding quality and quantity with great honesty and attention to detail.

The Chinese merchant, moreover, has been always noted for what he himself graphically calls his large-heartedness, which is exemplified by liberality in all his dealings, tenacity as to all that is material with comparative disregard of trifles, never letting a transaction fall through on account of punctilio, yielding to the prejudices of others wherever it can be done without substantial disadvantage, a "sweet reasonableness," if the phrase may be borrowed for such a purpose, which obviates disputation, and the manliness which does not repine at the consequences of an unfortunate contract. Judicial procedure being an abomination to respectable Chinese, their security in commercial dealings is based as much upon reason, good faith, and non-repudiation as that of the Western nations is upon verbal finesse in the construction of covenants.

The Chinese merchant has always been known for what he calls his big-heartedness, which is shown in his generosity in all his dealings, his persistence regarding material matters while mostly ignoring insignificant details, and his refusal to let a deal fall through over minor issues. He is willing to accommodate the biases of others whenever it doesn't cause significant disadvantages, displaying a "sweet reasonableness," so to speak, that prevents arguments, along with a sense of manliness that doesn’t complain about the fallout from an unfortunate contract. Since traditional judicial procedures are seen as unacceptable by respectable Chinese, their security in business relies as much on reason, good faith, and keeping promises as that of Western nations depends on clever wording in contracts.

Two systems so diametrically opposed can hardly admit of real amalgamation without sacrifice of the saving principle of both. And if, in the period immediately succeeding the retirement of the East India Company, perfect harmony prevailed between the Chinese and the foreign merchant, the result was apparently attained by the foreigners practically falling 266 in with the principles and the commercial ethics of the Chinese, to which nothing has yet been found superior. The Chinese aptitude for business, indeed, exerted a peculiar influence over their foreign colleagues. The efficiency and alacrity of the native merchants and their staff were such that the foreigners fell into the way of leaving to them the principal share in managing the details of the business. When the venerable, but unnatural, Co-hong system of Old Canton was superseded by the compradoric, the connection between the foreign firm and their native staff became so intimate that it was scarcely possible to distinguish between the two, and misunderstandings have not unfrequently arisen through third parties mistaking the principal for the agent and the agent for the principal.

Two systems that are so fundamentally different can hardly come together without compromising the essential principles of both. Even though there was perfect harmony between the Chinese and foreign merchants right after the East India Company ended, this balance was mostly achieved by the foreigners aligning themselves with the principles and commercial ethics of the Chinese, which remain unmatched. Chinese business skills had a strong influence on their foreign partners. The effectiveness and eagerness of the local merchants and their teams were so significant that the foreigners often let them handle most of the business details. When the outdated Co-hong system of Old Canton was replaced by the comprador system, the relationship between the foreign companies and their local staff became so close that it was hard to tell them apart, and misunderstandings frequently occurred because third parties confused the principal with the agent and vice versa.

Such a relationship could not but foster in some cases a certain lordly abstraction on the part of the foreign merchant, to which climatic conditions powerfully contributed. The factotum, in short, became a minister of luxury, everywhere a demoralising influence, and thus there was a constant tendency for the Chinese to gain the upper hand,—to be the master in effect though the servant in name. The comprador was always consulted, and if the employer ventured to omit this formality the resulting transaction would almost certainly come to grief through inexplicable causes. Seldom, however, was his advice rejected, while many of the largest operations were of his initiation. Unlimited confidence was the rule on both sides, which often took the concrete form of considerable indebtedness, now on the one side now on the other, and was regularly shown in the despatch of large amounts of specie into the 267 far interior of the country for the purchase of tea and silk in the districts of their growth. For many years the old practice was followed of contracting for produce as soon as marketable, and sometimes even before. During three or four months, in the case of tea, large funds belonging to foreign merchants were in the hands of native agents far beyond the reach of the owners, who could exercise no sort of supervision over the proceedings of their agents. The funds were in every case safely returned in the form of produce purchased, which was entered to the foreign merchant at a price arbitrarily fixed by the comprador to cover all expenses. Under such a régime it would have needed no great perspicacity, one would imagine, to foretell in which pocket the profits of trading would eventually lodge. As a matter of fact, the comprador generally grew rich at the expense of his employer. All the while the sincerest friendship existed between them, often descending to the second or third generation.[33]

Such a relationship often led to a certain sense of superiority on the part of the foreign merchant, influenced heavily by the climate. The assistant became a symbol of luxury, creating a demoralizing effect, which resulted in the Chinese individuals often gaining the upper hand—being the true masters even if they were officially just the servants. The comprador was always consulted, and if the employer ignored this, the transaction would likely fail for reasons that couldn’t be explained. However, his advice was rarely turned down, with many of the biggest deals initiated by him. There was usually complete trust on both sides, often manifesting as significant debts that could swing back and forth, regularly displayed by the shipment of large amounts of cash into the 267 deeper areas of the country to buy tea and silk where they were produced. For many years, it was common practice to agree on produce as soon as it was available, and sometimes even beforehand. For three or four months in the case of tea, large sums belonging to foreign merchants were with local agents far beyond the owners’ control, who had no way to supervise their activities. The money was always safely returned in the form of the purchased produce, which was recorded for the foreign merchant at a price set by the comprador to cover all costs. Under such a system, it wouldn’t have taken much insight to predict where the profits from trading would end up. In fact, the comprador typically got rich at his employer's expense. Throughout this time, there was a genuine friendship between them, often lasting into the second or third generation.

It would be natural to suppose that in such an extensive commercial field as the empire of China, exploited by such competent traders, large accumulations of wealth would be the result. Yet after making due allowance for inducements to concealment, the wealth even of the richest families probably falls far short of that which is not uncommon in Western countries. Several reasons might be adduced for the limitation, chiefly the family system, which necessitates constant redistribution, and which 268 subjects every successful man to the attentions of a swarm of parasites, who, besides devouring his substance with riotous living, have the further opportunity of ruining his enterprises by their malfeasance. Yet although individual wealth may, from these and other causes, be confined within very moderate limits, the control of capital for legitimate business is ample. Owing to the co-operative system under which the financiers of the country support and guarantee each other, credit stands very high, enabling the widely ramified commerce of the empire to be carried on upon a very small nucleus of cash capital. The banking organisation of China is wonderfully complete, bills of exchange being currently negotiable between the most distant points of the empire, the circulation of merchandise maintaining the equilibrium with comparatively little assistance from the precious metals.

It would be natural to assume that in such a vast commercial space as the empire of China, managed by skilled traders, there would be significant wealth accumulation. However, even accounting for reasons to hide wealth, the riches of the richest families likely fall well short of what is common in Western countries. Several factors could explain this limitation, primarily the family system, which requires constant redistribution, and which 268 exposes every successful person to a host of dependents. These dependents, in addition to consuming his resources through extravagant living, also have the potential to ruin his business ventures through their wrongdoing. Although individual wealth may be restricted due to these and other reasons, the availability of capital for legitimate business activities is sufficient. Thanks to the cooperative system where the country’s financiers support and guarantee each other, credit is very strong, allowing the extensive commerce of the empire to function with very little cash capital. China's banking system is remarkably efficient, with bills of exchange easily negotiable between the most distant locations, and the circulation of goods maintaining balance with relatively little support from precious metals.

The true characteristics of a people probably stand out in a clearer light when they are segregated from the conventionalities of their home and forced to accommodate themselves to unaccustomed conditions. Following the Chinese to the various commercial colonies which they have done so much to develop, it will be found that they have carried with them into their voluntary exile the best elements of their commercial success in their mother country. The great emporium of Maimaichên, on the Siberian frontier near Kiachta, is an old commercial settlement mostly composed of natives of the province of Shansi, occupying positions of the highest respect both financially and socially. The streets of the town are regular, wide, and moderately clean. The 269 houses are solid, tidy, and tasteful, with pretty little courtyards, ornamental door-screens, and so forth, the style of the whole being described as superior to what is seen in the large cities within China proper. The very conditions of exile seem favourable to a higher scale of living, free alike from the incubus of thriftless relations and from the malign espionage of Government officials.

The true traits of a people become clearer when they’re separated from the norms of their home and have to adapt to new situations. If you follow the Chinese to the various commercial colonies they’ve helped develop, you’ll see they’ve brought with them the best aspects of their business success from their home country. The major market of Maimaichên, on the Siberian border near Kiachta, is an old trading settlement mainly inhabited by people from Shansi province, who hold highly respected positions both financially and socially. The streets are laid out in a grid, wide, and fairly clean. The 269 houses are sturdy, neat, and stylish, featuring charming little courtyards, decorative door screens, and so on, with the overall style being described as better than what you see in the larger cities within China. The very circumstances of exile seem to support a higher standard of living, free from the burden of wasteful relatives and the intrusive scrutiny of government officials.

In the Philippine Islands and in Java the Chinese emigrants from the southern provinces have been the life and soul of the trade and industry of these places. So also in the British dominions, as at Singapore and Penang, which are practically Chinese Colonies under the British flag. Hongkong and the Burmese ports are of course no exceptions.

In the Philippines and Java, Chinese immigrants from the southern provinces have been the backbone of trade and industry in these areas. Similarly, in the British territories like Singapore and Penang, which are essentially Chinese colonies under British rule. Hong Kong and the ports in Burma are no exception.

The description given by Mr Thomson[34] of the Chinese in Penang would apply equally to every part of the world in which the Chinese have been permitted to settle:—

The description provided by Mr. Thomson[34] about the Chinese in Penang could apply to any place in the world where the Chinese have been allowed to settle:—

Should you, my reader, ever settle in Penang, you will be there introduced to a Chinese contractor who will sign a document to do anything. His costume will tell you that he is a man of inexpensive yet cleanly habits. He will build you a house after any design you choose, and within so many days, subject to a fine should he exceed the stipulated time. He will furnish you with a minute specification, in which everything, to the last nail, will be included. He has a brother who will contract to make every article of furniture you require, either from drawings or from models. He has another brother who will fit you and your good lady with all sorts of clothing, and yet a third relative who will find servants, and contract to supply you with all the native and European delicacies in the market upon condition that his monthly bills are regularly honoured. 270

Should you, my reader, ever settle in Penang, you'll meet a Chinese contractor who will sign a document to agree to anything. His attire will show you that he leads a simple but clean lifestyle. He will build you a house according to any design you choose, and he'll finish it within a certain number of days, with a fine if he exceeds the agreed timeline. He'll provide you with a detailed specification that includes everything, down to the last nail. He has a brother who will create every piece of furniture you need, either from sketches or models. He has another brother who will supply you and your lady with all kinds of clothing, and yet a third relative who will find servants and agree to provide you with all the local and European delicacies in the market, as long as his monthly bills are paid on time. 270

It is, indeed, to Chinamen that the foreign resident is indebted for almost all his comforts, and for the profusion of luxuries which surround his wonderfully European-looking home on this distant island.

It is, indeed, to Chinese people that the foreign resident owes almost all his comforts and the abundance of luxuries that surround his impressively European-looking home on this distant island.

The Chinese are everywhere found enterprising and trustworthy men of business. Europeans, worried by the exhaustless refinements of the Marwarree or Bengali, find business with the Chinese in the Straits Settlements a positive luxury. Nor have the persecutions of the race in the United States and in self-governing British colonies wholly extinguished the spark of honour which the Chinese carry with them into distant lands. An old "'Forty-niner," since deceased, related to the writer some striking experiences of his own during a long commercial career in San Francisco. A Chinese with whom he had dealings disappeared from the scene, leaving a debt to Mr Forbes of several thousand dollars. The account became an eyesore in the books, and the amount was formally "written off" and forgotten. Some years after, Mr Forbes was surprised by a visit from a weather-beaten Chinese, who revealed himself as the delinquent Ah Sin and asked for his account. Demurring to the trouble of exhuming old ledgers, Mr Forbes asked Ah Sin incredulously if he was going to pay. "Why, certainly," said the debtor. The account was thereupon rendered to him with interest, and after a careful examination and making some corrections, Ah Sin undid his belt and tabled the money to the last cent, thereupon vanishing into space whence he had come. 271

The Chinese are commonly seen as enterprising and trustworthy businesspeople. Europeans, who are often frustrated by the complexities of dealing with the Marwarree or Bengali, find doing business with the Chinese in the Straits Settlements to be a refreshing experience. Despite the discrimination faced by the Chinese in the United States and British self-governing colonies, their sense of honor remains strong even in foreign lands. An old "Forty-niner," who has since passed away, shared some remarkable stories from his long career in San Francisco. He recalled a Chinese businessman who vanished, leaving a debt of several thousand dollars to Mr. Forbes. The debt became a nuisance in the records, and eventually, it was officially written off and forgotten. Years later, Mr. Forbes was surprised by a visit from a weathered Chinese man, who revealed himself as the debtor, Ah Sin, and asked about his account. When Mr. Forbes skeptically questioned whether he was actually going to pay, Ah Sin replied, "Of course." The account was presented to him along with interest, and after reviewing it and making a few adjustments, Ah Sin unbuckled his belt and laid down the exact amount owed, then disappeared back into the ether from which he had come. 271

CHAPTER XIV.

Hong Kong.

Two British landmarks—Chinese customs and Hongkong—Choice of the island—Vitality of colony—Asylum for malefactors—Chinese official hostility—Commanding commercial position—Crown Colony government—Management of Chinese population—Their improvement—English education—Material progress—Industrial institutions—Accession of territory.

Two British landmarks—Chinese customs and Hong Kong—Choice of the island—Vitality of the colony—Refuge for wrongdoers—Chinese official hostility—Strong commercial position—Crown Colony government—Management of the Chinese population—Their progress—English education—Material advancement—Industrial institutions—Expansion of territory.

The past sixty years of war and peace in China have left two landmarks as concrete embodiments of British policy—the Chinese maritime customs and the colony of Hongkong. These are documents which testify in indelible characters both to the motives and to the methods of British expansion throughout the world. For good and for evil their record cannot be explained away. Both institutions are typically English, inasmuch as they are not the fulfilment of a dream or the working out of preconcerted schemes, but growths spontaneously generated out of the local conditions, much like that of the British empire itself, and with scarcely more conscious foresight on the part of those who helped to rear the edifice.

The last sixty years of war and peace in China have left two significant symbols of British policy—the Chinese maritime customs and the colony of Hong Kong. These are clear indicators that reveal the motives and methods of British expansion around the globe. Their history, for better or worse, cannot be dismissed. Both institutions represent typical English characteristics, as they are not the result of a dream or pre-planned strategies, but rather developments that arose naturally from local conditions, much like the British Empire itself, and with little conscious foresight from those who contributed to building them.

The relation of the British empire to the world, which defies definition, is only revealed in scattered object-lessons. India throws some light upon it—the colonies much more; and though in some respects 272 unique in its character, Hongkong in its degree stands before the world as a realisation of the British ideal, with its faults and blunders as well as with its excellences and successes.

The connection between the British Empire and the world, which is hard to define, is only shown through scattered examples. India provides some insight, but the colonies reveal even more. Although unique in some ways, 272 Hong Kong represents the British ideal, showcasing both its strengths and its shortcomings.

The want of a British station on the China coast had long been felt, and during the ten years which preceded the cession innumerable proposals were thrown out, some of which distinctly indicated Hongkong itself as supplying the desideratum. But as to the status of the new port the various suggestions made neutralised each other, until the course of events removed the question out of the region of discussion and placed it in the lap of destiny.

The need for a British station on the China coast had been recognized for a long time, and in the ten years leading up to the cession, countless proposals were put forward, with some clearly suggesting Hong Kong as the perfect solution. However, regarding the status of the new port, the different suggestions contradicted each other, until events took over, moving the question beyond debate and into the hands of fate.

The earliest English visitors to the island described it as inhabited by a few weather-beaten fishermen, who were seen spreading their nets and drying their catch on the rocks. Cultivation was restricted to small patches of rice, sweet-potatoes, and buckwheat. The abundance of fern gave it in places an appearance of verdure, but it was on the whole a treeless, rugged, barren block of granite. The gentlemen of Lord Amherst's suite in 1816, who have left this record, made another significant observation. The precipitous island, twelve miles long, with its deep-water inlets, formed one side of a land-locked harbour, which they called Hongkong Sound, capable of sheltering any number of ships of the largest size. Into this commodious haven the English fugitives, driven first from Canton and then from Macao, by the drastic decree of the Chinese authorities in 1839, found a refuge for their ships, and afterwards a footing on shore for themselves. Stern necessity and not their wills sent them thither. The same necessity ordained that the little band, once 273 lodged there, should take root, and growth followed as the natural result of the inherent vitality of the organism. As Dr Eitel well points out, this small social body did not originate in Hongkong: it had had a long preparatory history in Macao, and in the Canton factories, and may be considered, therefore, in the light of a healthy swarm from the older hives.

The earliest English visitors to the island described it as home to a few weather-beaten fishermen, who were seen spreading their nets and drying their catch on the rocks. Farming was limited to small patches of rice, sweet potatoes, and buckwheat. The abundance of ferns gave it a somewhat green appearance in places, but overall, it was a treeless, rugged, barren chunk of granite. The gentlemen in Lord Amherst's group in 1816, who recorded this, made another important observation. The steep island, twelve miles long, with its deep-water inlets, formed one side of a landlocked harbor, which they named Hongkong Sound, capable of sheltering many large ships. Into this safe harbor, the English fugitives, first driven from Canton and then from Macao by the harsh decree of the Chinese authorities in 1839, found refuge for their ships and eventually a place to settle on land. They were forced there out of necessity, not by choice. This same necessity dictated that the small group, once settled there, should take root, leading to natural growth driven by their inherent vitality. As Dr. Eitel points out, this small community didn’t originate in Hongkong; it had a long preparatory history in Macao and in the Canton factories, and can therefore be seen as a healthy offshoot from the older communities.

During the first few years of the occupation the selection of the station was the subject of a good deal of cheap criticism in the press. A commercial disappointment and a political failure, it was suggested by some that the place should be abandoned. It was contrasted unfavourably with the island of Chusan, which had been receded to China under the same treaty which had ceded Hongkong to Great Britain; and even as late as 1858 Lord Elgin exclaimed, "How anybody in their senses could have preferred Hongkong to Chusan seems incredible."

During the first few years of the occupation, the choice of the station faced a lot of negative criticism in the media. Considered a commercial disappointment and a political failure, some people suggested that the location should be abandoned. It was unfavorably compared to the island of Chusan, which was returned to China under the same treaty that transferred Hong Kong to Great Britain; and even as late as 1858, Lord Elgin exclaimed, "It's hard to believe that anyone in their right mind could have chosen Hong Kong over Chusan."

But, in point of fact, there had been little or no conscious choice in the matter. The position may be said to have chosen itself, since no alternative was left to the first British settlers. As for Chusan, it had been occupied and abandoned several times. The East India Company had an establishment there in the beginning of the eighteenth century, and if that station was finally given up either on its merits or in favour of Hongkong, it was certainly not without experience of the value of the more northerly position. Whatever hypothetical advantages, commercial or otherwise, might have accrued from the retention of Chusan, the actual position attained by Hongkong as an emporium of trade, a centre of industry, and one of the great shipping ports in the world, furnishes an unanswerable 274 defence both of the choice of the site and the political structure which has been erected on it. Canton being at once the centre of foreign trade and the focus of Chinese hostility, vicinity to that city was an indispensable condition of the location of the British entrepot, and the place of arms from which commerce could be defended. And it would be hard even now to point to any spot on the Chinese coast which fulfilled the conditions so well as Hongkong.

But, in reality, there had been little or no conscious choice in the matter. The location seemed to choose itself, since the first British settlers had no other options. Chusan had been occupied and abandoned several times. The East India Company established a presence there in the early eighteenth century, and if that outpost was eventually abandoned—either due to its own shortcomings or in favor of Hong Kong—it certainly had some experience with the benefits of the more northern location. Whatever potential advantages, whether commercial or otherwise, might have come from keeping Chusan, the actual position achieved by Hong Kong as a trade hub, industrial center, and one of the major shipping ports in the world provides an undeniable defense for both the choice of the site and the political system built upon it. Since Canton was both the center of foreign trade and the focal point of Chinese opposition, being close to that city was essential for the location of the British trading post and the military base that could protect commerce. Even now, it would be tough to find any spot along the Chinese coast that meets these criteria as effectively as Hong Kong does.

The course of its development did not run smooth. It was not to be expected. The experiment of planting a British station in contact with the most energetic as well as the most turbulent section of the population of China was not likely to be carried out without mistakes, and many have been committed. Indeed, from the day of its birth down to the present time domestic dissensions and recriminations respecting the management of its affairs have never ceased.

The development wasn't smooth. This was to be expected. The experiment of setting up a British station among the most active and chaotic part of the Chinese population was bound to come with mistakes, and many have happened. In fact, from its inception until now, internal disagreements and accusations about how things are being managed have never stopped.

This was inevitable in a political microcosm having neither diversity of interest nor atmospheric space to soften the perspective. The entire interests of the colony were comprised within the focal distance of myopic vision. Molehills thus became mountains, and the mote in each brother's eye assumed the dimensions of animalcula seen through a microscope. The bitter feuds between the heads of the several departments of the lilliputian Government which prevailed during the first twenty years must have been fatal to any young colony if its progress had depended on the wisdom of its rulers. Happily a higher law governs all these things.

This was bound to happen in a small political environment lacking variety of interest or space to broaden its perspective. The entire focus of the colony was limited by narrow-minded thinking. Small issues ballooned into major problems, and the flaws in each person’s character appeared as large as microscopic organisms under a lens. The intense rivalries among the leaders of the tiny Government during the first twenty years could have seriously harmed any young colony if its success relied on the judgment of its leaders. Luckily, a greater force oversees all these matters.

Freedom carried with it the necessary consequences, and for many years the new colony was a tempting 275 Alsatia for Chinese malefactors, an asylum for pirates, who put on and off that character with wonderful facility, and could hatch their plots there fearless of surveillance. When the Taiping rebellion was at its height, piracy became so mixed with insurrection that the two were not distinguishable, and it required both firmness and vigilance on the part of the authorities to prevent the harbour of Hongkong becoming the scene of naval engagements between the belligerents. During the hostilities of 1857-58 a species of dacoity was practised with impunity by Chinese, who were tempted by rewards for the heads of Englishmen offered by the authorities of Canton.

Freedom came with its own consequences, and for many years, the new colony was an attractive 275 haven for Chinese criminals, a refuge for pirates, who switched between those identities easily and could plot their schemes there without fear of being watched. When the Taiping rebellion was at its peak, piracy became so intertwined with rebellion that they were nearly indistinguishable, requiring both strength and vigilance from the authorities to stop the Hong Kong harbor from becoming a battleground for the opposing sides. During the conflicts of 1857-58, a form of robbery was committed with no repercussions by Chinese individuals, tempted by rewards for the lives of Englishmen offered by the Canton authorities.

It cannot, therefore, be denied that the immigrants from the mainland in the first and even the second decade of its existence were leavened with an undesirable element, causing anxiety to the responsible rulers.

It can't be denied that the immigrants from the mainland in the first and even the second decade of its existence included some unwanted individuals, causing concern for the responsible leaders.

The Chinese authorities, as was natural, waged relentless war on the colony from its birth. Though compelled formally to admit that the island and its dependencies were a British possession, they still maintained a secret authority over the Chinese who settled there, and even attempted to levy taxes. As they could not lay hands on its trade, except the valuable portion of it which was carried on by native craft, they left no stone unturned to destroy that. By skilful diplomacy, for which they are entitled to the highest credit, they obtained control over the merchant junks trading to Hongkong, and imposed restrictions on them calculated to render their traffic impossible. By the same treaty they obtained the appointment of a British officer as Chinese revenue agent in Hongkong—a concession, however, disallowed 276 by the good sense of the British Government. But the Chinese were very tenacious of the idea of making Hongkong a customs station, never relaxing their efforts for forty years, until the convention of 1886 at last rewarded their perseverance by a partial fulfilment of their hopes.

The Chinese government, as expected, continuously fought against the colony from its inception. Although they had to formally acknowledge that the island and its surrounding areas were under British control, they still secretly asserted authority over the Chinese residents and even tried to collect taxes from them. Since they couldn’t control the overall trade, except for the valuable portion conducted by local boats, they did everything they could to undermine it. Through skilled diplomacy, which deserves great recognition, they gained control over the merchant junks trading to Hong Kong and imposed restrictions that made their business nearly impossible. Through the same treaty, they managed to have a British officer appointed as the Chinese revenue agent in Hong Kong—though this concession was eventually rejected by the sensible British Government. Nonetheless, the Chinese remained determined to turn Hong Kong into a customs station, tirelessly pursuing this goal for forty years until the 1886 convention finally gave them a partial achievement of their ambitions.

For reasons which, if not very lofty, are yet very human, the diplomatic and consular agents of Great Britain have never looked sympathetically on the colony—indeed have often sided with the Chinese in their attempts to curtail its rights.

For reasons that, while not particularly noble, are still very human, the diplomatic and consular agents of Great Britain have never viewed the colony favorably—indeed, they have often sided with the Chinese in their efforts to limit its rights.

Nor has the Home Government itself always treated the small colony with parental consideration. Before it was out of swaddling-clothes the Treasury ogre began to open his mouth and, like the East India Company, demand remittances. A military establishment was maintained on the island, not for the benefit of the residents, but for the security of a strategical position in the imperial system. The colonists were mulcted in a substantial share of the cost, which the governor was instructed to wring out of them. The defences themselves, however, were neglected, and allowed to grow obsolete and useless, and, if we mistake not, it was the civil community, and not the Government, that insisted on their being modernised. The compromise eventually arrived at was, that the colonists provided the guns and the imperial Government the forts. An interesting parallel to this was the case of Gibraltar, which possessed no dock until the civil community by sheer persistence, extending over many years, at length overcame the reluctance of the British Government to provide so essential an adjunct to its naval establishment. 277 The colony had suffered much from the war with China, but the Home Government refused it any participation in the indemnity extorted from the Chinese.

Nor has the Home Government always treated the small colony with parental care. Before it had fully developed, the Treasury monster started demanding remittances, just like the East India Company. A military presence was kept on the island, not for the benefit of the residents, but for the security of a strategic position in the imperial system. The colonists had to cover a significant portion of the costs, which the governor was instructed to squeeze out of them. However, the defenses were neglected and allowed to become outdated and useless, and if we remember correctly, it was the local community, not the Government, that pushed for their modernization. The compromise that was eventually reached was that the colonists supplied the artillery while the imperial Government provided the forts. A similar situation occurred in Gibraltar, which didn't have a dock until the local community finally convinced the British Government, after many years of persistence, to provide such a crucial part of the naval setup. 277 The colony had suffered greatly from the war with China, but the Home Government denied it any share of the indemnity taken from the Chinese.

But these and other drawbacks were counterbalanced, and eventually remedied, by the advantages offered by a free port and a safe harbour. Standing in the fair way of all Eastern commerce, which pays willing tribute to the colony, Hongkong attracted trade from all quarters in a steadily increasing volume, and became the pivot for the whole ocean traffic of the Far East.[35] The tide of prosperity could not be stayed—it invaded every section of the community. The character of the Chinese population was continuously raised. The best of them accumulated wealth: the poorest found remunerative employment for their labour. Crime, with which the colony had been tainted, diminished as much through the expulsive power of material prosperity as from the judicious measures of the executive Government, for the credit must not be denied to successive administrators for the improvement in the condition of the colony. Among those none was more deserving of praise than Sir Richard MacDonnell (1865-72), who on catching sight, as he entered the harbour, of an enormous building, which he was told was the jail, remarked, "I will not fill that, but stop the crime;" and he was nearly as good as his word,—a terror to evil-doers.

But these and other drawbacks were balanced out and eventually fixed by the benefits of having a free port and a safe harbor. Positioned along the main route of Eastern trade, which gladly contributes to the colony, Hong Kong drew in commerce from all directions at an ever-increasing pace, becoming the center of the entire ocean traffic in the Far East. The wave of prosperity couldn't be stopped—it spread to every part of the community. The quality of life for the Chinese population improved continuously. The most capable among them built wealth, while the less fortunate found decent jobs. Crime, which had once plagued the colony, decreased due to the push of economic growth and the wise actions of the government. The credit for the colony's improved condition should indeed be given to successive administrators. Among them, Sir Richard MacDonnell (1865-72) deserves special mention; upon seeing a huge building as he entered the harbor, which he was told was the jail, he said, "I will not fill that, but stop the crime," and he nearly lived up to his word—becoming a fearsome figure to wrongdoers.

A Crown colony is the form of government which challenges the most pungent criticism. The elected 278 members of its legislature, being a minority, can only in the last resort acquiesce in the decisions of the official majority who constitute the executive Government. Such a minority, however, is by no means wanting in influence, for it is, after all, publicity which is the safeguard of popular liberty. The freedom of speech enjoyed by an Opposition which has no fear of the responsibility of office before its eyes widens the scope of its criticisms, and imparts a refreshing vigour to the invective of those of its members who possess the courage of their convictions. It reaches the popular ear, and the apprehension of an adverse public opinion so stimulated can never fail to have its effect on the acts of the Administration. Under such a régime it seems natural that, other things being equal, each governor in turn should be esteemed the worst who has borne rule in the colony, and in any case his merits are never likely to be fairly gauged by any local contemporary estimate. King Stork, though fair and far-seeing, may be more obnoxious to criticism than King Log, who makes things pleasant during his official term.

A Crown colony is a form of government that attracts a lot of criticism. The elected 278 members of its legislature are a minority and can only agree with the decisions made by the official majority, who make up the executive government, as a last resort. However, this minority still holds significant influence because, ultimately, it's public awareness that protects people's freedom. The opposition, which isn't burdened by the responsibilities of holding office, has the freedom of speech to widen its critiques and gives bold members the chance to express their strong opinions. This criticism reaches the public, and the fear of negative public opinion can definitely impact the actions of the administration. In such a situation, it's natural for each governor to be deemed the worst during their term, and their actual performance is rarely assessed fairly by local opinions. King Stork, although fair and insightful, might face more criticism than King Log, who keeps things pleasant during his time in office.

Hongkong being established as a free port, the functions of Government were practically limited to internal administration, and the question of greatest importance was the control of the Chinese population which poured in. This was a new problem. Chinese communities had, indeed, settled under foreign rule before, as in the Straits Settlements, in Java, and in Manila, but at such distances from their home as rendered the settlers amenable to any local regulations which might be imposed on them. 279 Distance even acted as a strainer, keeping back the dregs. But Hongkong was nearer to China than the Isle of Wight is to Hampshire. Evil-doers could come and go at will. It could be overrun in the night and evacuated in the morning. Spies were as uncontrollable as house-flies, and whenever it suited the Chinese Government to be hostile, they proved their power to establish such a reign of terror in the colony that it was dangerous to stray beyond the beat of the armed policeman. Clearly it was of primary importance to come to terms with the native community, to reduce them to discipline, to encourage the good and discourage the bad among the Chinese settlers. As their numbers increased the public health demanded a yet stricter supervision of their habits. Sanitary science had scarcely dawned when the colony was founded, and its teachings had to be applied, as they came to light, to conditions of life which had been allowed to grow up in independence of its requirements. To tolerate native customs, domestic habits, and manner of living, while providing for the general wellbeing of a community in a climate which at its best is debilitating, taxed the resources of the British executive, and of course gave rise to perpetual recrimination. But the thing has been accomplished. Successive conflagrations have co-operated with the march of sanitary reform and the advance in their worldly circumstances in so improving the dwellings of the population, that their housing now compares not unfavourably with that of the native cities of India. The Southern Chinese are naturally cleanly, and appreciative of good order 280 when it is judiciously introduced among them, even from a foreign source.

With Hong Kong established as a free port, the government's role basically focused on managing internal affairs, and the main concern was controlling the influx of the Chinese population. This was a new challenge. Chinese communities had settled under foreign control before, such as in the Straits Settlements, Java, and Manila, but they were far enough from home that they generally followed local rules. 279 Distance even served as a filter, keeping the less desirable elements away. But Hong Kong was closer to China than the Isle of Wight is to Hampshire. Wrongdoers could come and go freely. The area could be taken over at night and cleared out by morning. Spies were as uncontrollable as houseflies, and whenever it suited the Chinese government to act hostile, they demonstrated their ability to create a climate of terror in the colony, making it unsafe to venture beyond the presence of armed police. Clearly, it was crucial to establish a good relationship with the native community, discipline them, encourage the positive, and discourage the negative among the Chinese settlers. As their numbers grew, public health required even stricter oversight of their behaviors. When the colony was founded, sanitary science was just beginning, and its principles had to be applied as they emerged, to living conditions that had developed without regard for these standards. Accepting native customs, domestic practices, and living styles while ensuring the overall health of a community in a climate that can be harsh was a challenge for the British administration, naturally leading to ongoing complaints. But this was achieved. Series of fires have coincided with improvements in sanitary reform and better living conditions, enhancing the housing of the population to a point where it is comparable to that in the native cities of India. The Southern Chinese are naturally clean and appreciate good order when it is introduced thoughtfully, even from foreign sources. 280

A more complex question was that of bringing an alien population such as the Chinese within the moral pale of English law, for law is vain unless it appeals to the public conscience. The imposition of foreign statutes on a race nursed on oral tradition and restrained from misdoing by bonds invisible to their masters was not an undertaking for which success could be safely foretold. The effect of a similar proceeding on the subtle natives of India has been described as "substituting for a recognised morality a mere game of skill, at which the natives can give us long odds and beat us." "The mercantile and money-lending classes in India," says Mr S. S. Thorburn, "delight in the intricacy and surprises of a good case in court." With the Chinese it has been otherwise. The population of Hongkong have so far assimilated the foreign law that, whether or not it satisfies their innate sense of right, it at least governs their external conduct, and crime has been reduced very low: as for litigation, it is comparatively rare; it is disreputable, and has no place in the Chinese commercial economy.

A more complex question was how to integrate an alien population like the Chinese into the framework of English law, since law is ineffective unless it resonates with the public's sense of morality. Imposing foreign laws on a group raised on oral traditions and constrained by invisible bonds was not a task for which success could be easily predicted. The impact of a similar approach on the subtle natives of India has been described as "replacing a recognized morality with a mere game of skill, where the natives can give us long odds and defeat us." "The commercial and money-lending classes in India," notes Mr. S.S. Thorburn, "enjoy the complexity and surprises of a good court case." With the Chinese, the situation has been different. The population of Hong Kong has so far adapted to foreign law to the extent that, whether or not it aligns with their inherent sense of justice, it at least governs their outward behavior, resulting in a significant drop in crime: as for lawsuits, they are relatively rare; it is seen as disreputable and has no place in the Chinese commercial system.

The best proofs of their acceptance of colonial rule is the constantly increasing numbers of the Chinese residents; the concentration of their trading capital there; their investments in real estate and in local industries; their identification with the general interests of the colony, and their adopting it as a home instead of a place of temporary exile. The means employed to conciliate the Chinese must be deemed on the whole to have been successful. There was first police supervision, 281 then official protection under a succession of qualified officers, then representation in the Colonial Legislature and on the commission of the peace. The colonial executive has wisely left to the Chinese a large measure of a kind of self-government which is far more effective than anything that could find its expression in votes of the Legislature. The administration of purely Chinese affairs by native committees, with a firm ruling hand over their proceedings, seems to fulfil every purpose of government. The aim has been throughout to ascertain and to gratify, when practicable, the reasonable wants of the Chinese, who have responded to these advances by an exhibition of public spirit which no society could excel. It is doubtful whether in the wide dominion of the Queen there are 250,000 souls more appreciative of orderly government than the denizens of the whilom nest of pirates and cut-throats—Hongkong.

The best evidence of their acceptance of colonial rule is the steadily increasing number of Chinese residents; the concentration of their trading capital there; their investments in real estate and local industries; their alignment with the general interests of the colony, and their choice to adopt it as a home instead of just a temporary refuge. The methods used to win over the Chinese can generally be seen as successful. First, there was police oversight, 281 then official protection from a series of qualified officers, then representation in the Colonial Legislature and on the commission of the peace. The colonial government has wisely entrusted the Chinese with a significant degree of self-governance, which is much more effective than anything that could be expressed through votes in the Legislature. The management of purely Chinese affairs by local committees, with a firm rule over their activities, seems to meet every purpose of governance. The goal has always been to understand and, when possible, satisfy the reasonable needs of the Chinese, who have responded to these efforts with a public spirit unmatched by any society. It’s uncertain whether there are 250,000 people in the vast empire of the Queen who appreciate orderly government more than the residents of the former haven of pirates and criminals—Hong Kong.

As an educational centre Hongkong fulfils a function whose value is difficult to estimate. From the foundation of the colony the subject engaged the attention of the executive Government, as well as of different sections of the civil community. The missionary bodies were naturally very early in the field, and there was for a good many years frank co-operation between them and the mercantile community in promoting schools both for natives and Europeans. In time, however, either their aims were found to diverge or else their estimate of achievement differed, and many of the missionary teaching establishments were left without support.

As an educational center, Hong Kong plays a role that's hard to quantify. Since the colony was established, this issue has garnered the attention of both the government and various parts of the community. Missionary organizations were naturally some of the first to get involved, and for quite a few years, they worked openly with the business community to support schools for both locals and Europeans. Over time, though, either their goals began to differ or their views on success varied, leading to many missionary educational institutions being left unsupported.

After an interval of languor, however, new life was infused into the educational schemes of the colony. 282 The emulation of religious sects and the common desire to bring the lambs of the flock into their respective folds inspired the efforts of the propagandists, their zeal reacting on the colonial Government itself with the most gratifying results, so far at least as the extension of the field of their common efforts was concerned.

After a period of inactivity, fresh energy was injected into the educational plans of the colony. 282 The competition among religious groups and the shared goal of bringing the young members of their communities into their respective groups motivated the efforts of the advocates, and their enthusiasm influenced the colonial Government itself with the most satisfying results, at least regarding the expansion of their collaborative efforts.

The Chinese had imported their own school systems, while taking full advantage of the educational facilities provided by the Government and the Christian bodies. Being an intellectual race, they are well able to assimilate the best that Christendom has to offer them. But the colonial system contents itself with a sound practical commercial education, which has equipped vast numbers of Chinese for the work of clerks, interpreters, and so forth, and has thus been the means of spreading the knowledge of the English language over the coast of China, and of providing a medium of communication between the native and European mind.

The Chinese brought in their own school systems while fully utilizing the educational resources offered by the government and Christian organizations. Being an educated people, they're well-equipped to adapt to the best that the Western world has to offer. However, the colonial system is satisfied with providing solid, practical commercial education, which has prepared many Chinese for jobs as clerks, interpreters, and similar roles. This approach has helped spread the English language along the coast of China and created a way to communicate between the local and European perspectives.

The material progress of Hongkong speaks volumes for the energy of its community. The precipitous character of the island left scarcely a foothold for business or residential settlement. The strip which formed the strand front of the city of Victoria afforded room for but one street, forcing extensions up the rugged face of the hill which soon was laid out in zig-zag terraces: foundations for the houses are scarped out of the rock, giving them the appearance of citadels. The locality being subject to torrential rains, streets and roads had to be made with a finished solidity which is perhaps unmatched. Bridges, culverts, and gutters all being constructed of hewn granite and fitted with impervious cement, the storm-waters are carried off as 283 clean as from a ship's deck. These municipal works were not achieved without great expense and skilfully directed labour, of which an unlimited supply can always be depended on. And the credit of their achievement must be equally divided between the Government and the civil community.

The material progress of Hong Kong clearly shows the energy of its community. The steep nature of the island provided little space for business or residential development. The area along the waterfront of Victoria city allowed for only one street, forcing expansions up the rocky hillside, which quickly became laid out in zig-zag terraces. The foundations for the houses were carved out of the rock, giving them the appearance of fortresses. Since the area experiences heavy rainfall, the streets and roads had to be constructed with a level of sturdiness that is probably unmatched. Bridges, culverts, and gutters are all made of cut granite and fitted with waterproof cement, allowing stormwater to be channeled away as 283 clean as from a ship's deck. These public works were not achieved without significant expense and skillfully managed labor, which is always readily available. The credit for these achievements should be shared equally between the Government and the local community.

The island is badly situated as regards its water-supply, which has necessitated the excavation of immense reservoirs on the side farthest from the town, the aqueduct being tunnelled for over a mile through a solid granite mass. These and other engineering works have rendered Hongkong the envy of the older colonies in the Far East. No less so the palatial architecture in which the one natural product of the island has been turned to the most effective account. The quarrying of granite blocks, in which the Chinese are as great adepts as they are in dressing the stones for building, has been so extensive as visibly to alter the profile of the island.

The island is poorly located when it comes to its water supply, which has led to the creation of huge reservoirs on the far side from the town, with an aqueduct tunneled for over a mile through solid granite. These and other engineering projects have made Hong Kong the envy of older colonies in the Far East. The impressive architecture showcasing the island’s only natural resource has contributed to this as well. The extraction of granite blocks, where the Chinese excel as much in shaping the stones for construction, has been so extensive that it has noticeably changed the island's profile.

A great deficiency of the island as a commercial site being the absence of level ground, the enterprise of the colonists has been incessantly directed towards supplying the want. Successive reclamations on the sea-front, costing of course large sums of money, have so enlarged the building area that the great thoroughfare called Queen's Road now runs along the back instead of the front of a new city, the finest buildings of all being the most recent, standing upon the newly reclaimed land. It is characteristic of such improvements, that, while in course of execution, they should be deemed senseless extravagance, due to the ambition of some speculator or the caprice of some idealist, thus perpetually illustrating the truth of the Scottish saying, "Fules and 284 bairns should never see a thing half done." Hongkong has been no exception to so universal a rule.

A major drawback of the island as a business location is the lack of flat land, so the colonists have consistently focused on addressing this issue. Ongoing land reclamation projects along the waterfront, which have obviously cost a lot, have significantly increased the building area. Now, the main road called Queen's Road runs at the back of a new city instead of the front, with the finest buildings being the most recent ones sitting on the newly created land. It's typical for such developments to be seen as pointless extravagance while they're in progress—thought to be driven by some speculator's ambition or an idealist's whim, which perfectly illustrates the Scottish saying, "Fools and bairns should never see a thing half done." Hong Kong has certainly followed this common pattern.

The industrial enterprise of the colony has fully kept pace with its progress in other respects. The Chinese quarter resembles nothing so much as a colony of busy ants, where every kind of handicraft is plied with such diligence, day in and day out, as the Chinese alone seem capable of. The more imposing works conducted by foreigners occupy a prominent place in the whole economy of the Far East. Engineering and shipbuilding have always been carried on in the colony. Graving-docks capable of accommodating modern battleships, and of executing any repairs or renewals required by them as efficiently as could be done in any part of the world, constitute Hongkong a rendezvous for the navies of all nations. Manufactures of various kinds flourish on the island. Besides cotton-mills, some of the largest sugar-refineries in the world, fitted with the most modern improvements, work up the raw material from Southern China, Formosa, the Philippines, and other sugar-growing countries in the Eastern Archipelago, thus furnishing a substantial item of export to the Australian colonies and other parts of the world. The colony has thereby created for itself a commerce of its own, while its strategical situation has enabled it to retain the character of a pivot on which all Far Eastern commerce turns.

The industrial growth of the colony has matched its progress in other areas. The Chinese district is like a colony of busy ants, where all kinds of crafts are worked on with incredible dedication, day in and day out, something only the Chinese seem to manage. The larger enterprises run by foreigners hold a significant place in the overall economy of the Far East. Engineering and shipbuilding have always been done in the colony. Dry docks that can accommodate modern battleships and carry out any necessary repairs just as efficiently as anywhere else in the world make Hong Kong a meeting point for the navies of all nations. Various types of manufacturing thrive on the island. In addition to cotton mills, some of the largest sugar refineries in the world, equipped with the latest technologies, process raw materials from Southern China, Formosa, the Philippines, and other sugar-producing areas in the Eastern Archipelago, providing a significant export to the Australian colonies and other regions. The colony has created its own commerce while its strategic location has allowed it to remain a central hub for all Far Eastern trade.

This pivotal position alone, and not the local resources of the place, enabled the colony to found one of the most successful financial organisations of the modern world. The Hongkong and Shanghai Bank has had a history not dissimilar from that of the 285 colony as a whole, one of success followed by periods of alternate depression and elation. Now in the trough of the wave and now on its crest, the bank has worked its way by inherent vitality through all vicissitudes of good or bad fortune, until it has gone near to monopolising the exchange business of the Far East, and has become the recognised medium between the money-market of London and the financial needs of the Imperial Chinese administration.

This key location, rather than the local resources, allowed the colony to establish one of the most successful financial organizations in the modern world. The Hongkong and Shanghai Bank has experienced a history similar to that of the 285 colony, marked by success followed by alternating periods of hardship and prosperity. At times at its lowest point and at others at its peak, the bank has navigated through all the ups and downs with its inherent strength, coming close to dominating the exchange business in the Far East and becoming the recognized link between London's money market and the financial needs of the Imperial Chinese government.

It should not be overlooked as a condition of its success that the great Hongkong Bank, like all other successful joint-stock enterprises, whether in Hongkong or in China, has from its origin borne a broad international character. Though legally domiciled in a British possession, representative men of all nationalities sit on its board and take their turn in the chairmanship as it comes round. The international character, indeed, may be cited as one of the elements of the success of the colony itself. No disability of any kind attaches to alien settlers, not even exclusion from the jury panel. They are free to acquire property, to carry on business, to indulge their whims, and to avail themselves of all the resources of the colony, and enjoy the full protection of person and property which natural-born British subjects possess. They come and go at their pleasure, no questions asked, no luggage examined, no permits required for any purpose whatever coming within the scope of ordinary life. Nor are they even asked whether they appreciate these advantages or not; in fact they are as free to criticise the institutions under which they live as if they had borne their part in creating them, which, in fact, they have done, and this it is which 286 marks the vitality of the British system, whether in the mother country or in its distant dependencies.

It shouldn't be ignored that the great Hongkong Bank, like all other successful joint-stock companies, whether in Hongkong or in China, has always had a broad international character since its inception. Although it's legally based in a British territory, representatives from all nationalities sit on its board and take turns chairing meetings. This international aspect can actually be seen as one of the key factors in the success of the colony itself. There are no restrictions for foreign settlers, not even exclusion from jury duty. They can freely buy property, run businesses, pursue their interests, and utilize all the colony's resources while enjoying the same protection of person and property as natural-born British citizens. They can come and go as they please, with no questions asked, no baggage searched, and no permits needed for any regular activities. They aren’t even asked if they appreciate these privileges; in fact, they can freely criticize the institutions they live under, just as if they had helped create them, which they actually have, and this highlights the strength of the British system, whether in the homeland or its far-flung territories. 286

The exceedingly cramped conditions of life on the island having proved such an obstacle to its development, the acquisition of a portion of the mainland forming one side of the harbour was at an early period spoken of as a desideratum for the colony. The idea took no practical shape, however, until the occupation of Canton by the Allied forces under the administration of Consul Parkes; and it is one of the most noteworthy achievements of that indefatigable man that, during the time when Great Britain was in fact at war with the Government of China, he should have succeeded, on his own initiative, in obtaining from the governor of the city a lease of a portion of land at Kowloon, which was subsequently confirmed by the convention of Peking in 1860. The improvement of artillery and other means of attack on sea-forts left the island very vulnerable, and the measures taken by the various European Powers to establish naval stations on the Chinese coast, together with the efforts which the country itself was making to become a modern military Power, rendered it a matter of absolute necessity, for the preservation of the island, that a sufficient area of the adjacent territory should be included within its defences. Following the example set by Germany and Russia, the British Government concluded an arrangement with the Government of China by which the needed extension was secured to Great Britain under a ninety-nine years lease. A convention embodying this agreement was signed at Peking in June 1898. 287

The extremely cramped living conditions on the island were a major barrier to its development. Early on, there was talk about acquiring a part of the mainland that formed one side of the harbor as a priority for the colony. However, the concept didn’t take any practical form until the occupation of Canton by the Allied forces under Consul Parkes. One of the most remarkable accomplishments of that tireless man was that, during a time when Great Britain was technically at war with the Chinese Government, he managed, on his own initiative, to secure a lease for a piece of land in Kowloon from the city’s governor, which was later confirmed by the Peking Convention in 1860. The advancements in artillery and other attack methods on coastal forts made the island very vulnerable. The actions taken by various European powers to establish naval bases along the Chinese coast, along with China's attempts to modernize its military, made it crucial for the island's safety to include a substantial area of the surrounding territory within its defenses. Following the lead of Germany and Russia, the British Government reached an agreement with the Chinese Government to ensure that the necessary expansion was secured for Great Britain through a ninety-nine-year lease. A convention formalizing this agreement was signed in Peking in June 1898. 287

CHAPTER XV.

MACAU.

Contrast with Hongkong—An interesting survival—Trading facilities—Relations with Chinese Government—Creditable to both parties—Successful resistance to the Dutch—Portuguese expulsion from Japan—English trading competitors enjoy hospitality of Macao—Trade with Canton—Hongkong becomes a rival—Macao eclipsed—Gambling, Coolie trade, Piracy—Population—Cradle of many improvements—Distinguished names.

Contrast with Hong Kong—An intriguing survival—Trading opportunities—Relations with the Chinese Government—Beneficial to both parties—Effective resistance to the Dutch—Portuguese expulsion from Japan—English trading rivals receive hospitality in Macao—Trade with Canton—Hong Kong emerges as a competitor—Macao overshadowed—Gambling, Coolie trade, Piracy—Population—Birthplace of many advancements—Notable figures.

The three hours' transit from Hongkong to Macao carries one into another world. The incessant scream of steam-launches which plough the harbour in all directions night and day gives place to the drowsy chime of church bells, and instead of the throng of busy men, one meets a solitary black mantilla walking demurely in the middle of a crooked and silent street. Perhaps nowhere is the modern world with its clamour thrown into such immediate contrast with that which belongs to the past.

The three-hour journey from Hong Kong to Macao takes you into another world. The constant roar of steam launches that crisscross the harbor day and night gives way to the soft chime of church bells, and instead of the hustle and bustle of busy people, you see a lone woman in a black mantilla walking quietly down a crooked, silent street. There's probably no other place where the noise of the modern world stands in such sharp contrast to the past.

The settlement of Macao is a monument of Chinese toleration and of Portuguese tenacity. The Portuguese learnt at an early stage of their intercourse the use of the master-key to good relations with the Chinese authorities. It was to minister freely to their cupidity, which the Portuguese could well afford to do out of the profits of their trading. To "maintain ourselves in 288 this place we must spend much with the Chinese heathen," as they themselves said in 1593 in a letter to Philip I. Macao is, besides, an interesting relic of that heroic age when a new heaven and a new earth became the dream of European adventurers. The spot was excellently well suited for the purposes, commercial and propagandist, which it was destined to serve; for in spite of the crimes and cruelties of the sixteenth century argonauts, the religious element was strongly represented in all their enterprises.[36] Situated outside the river proper, though within its wide estuary, and open to the sea, the settlement yet communicates by an inner passage or branch of the Pearl river with the city of Canton. It possesses two sheltered harbours adequate to the nautical requirements of the Middle Ages.

The settlement of Macao is a symbol of Chinese tolerance and Portuguese determination. The Portuguese quickly learned how to foster good relations with the Chinese authorities by catering to their desires, which the Portuguese could easily afford thanks to their trading profits. To "maintain ourselves in this place we must spend much with the Chinese heathen," as they noted in a letter to Philip I in 1593. Macao is also an intriguing remnant of that heroic era when European adventurers dreamed of a new world. The location was perfectly suited for both commercial and missionary purposes; despite the crimes and brutalities of the sixteenth-century explorers, the religious aspect played a significant role in all their ventures. Situated just outside the main river, yet within its vast estuary and open to the sea, the settlement connects by an inner channel of the Pearl River with the city of Canton. It has two sheltered harbors that were sufficient for the maritime needs of the Middle Ages.

The small peninsula of Macao combined business conveniences with salubrity of climate in a degree absolutely unrivalled in the torrid zone. Its picturesque scenery was always found refreshing to the eye wearied by long contemplation of brick walls, malarious swamps, or the monotonous glare of the melancholy ocean. From the Chinese point of view, also, it was an ideal location for strangers, since they could be thus kept out of sight, isolated like a ship in quarantine, and put under 289 effective restraint. The situation lent itself to the traditional Chinese tactics of controlling barbarians by stopping their food-supply, a form of discipline of which the efficacy had been proved at an early period in the history of the colony. The Chinese adopted all the measures they could think of to confine traders to Macao, where certain indulgences were held out to them, subject to good behaviour.

The small peninsula of Macao offered a unique mix of business advantages and a healthy climate that was unmatched in the hot region. Its beautiful scenery was always a refreshing sight for those tired of staring at brick walls, unhealthy swamps, or the dull glare of the dreary ocean. From the Chinese perspective, it was also the perfect spot for outsiders, as they could be kept out of view, isolated like a ship in quarantine, and placed under 289 effective control. The location supported the traditional Chinese strategy of managing outsiders by cutting off their resources, a method that had been proven effective early in the colony's history. The Chinese implemented every tactic they could think of to keep traders in Macao, where certain privileges were offered to them, contingent upon their good behavior.

The Portuguese adventurers of the early sixteenth century, to whom the modern world owes so much, did well in pitching on this "gem of the orient earth and open sea" as a link in their chain of trading stations, which extended from the coasts of Africa to the Japanese islands. To trade as such the Chinese Government never seem to have had any objection, nor, would it appear, to foreigners as such. So long as there was nought to fear from their presence, the ancient maxim of cherishing men from afar could be followed without reserve, for the Chinese are by nature not an unkindly people. Tradition, indeed, claims for the settlement of foreigners in the Cantonese archipelago a purely hospitable origin, a storm-beaten vessel having in the year 1517 received permission from the local authorities to repair damages and dry her cargo there. The Portuguese frequented several harbours before they settled at Macao, their principal station being the island of Sanchuan, where Xavier was buried. About the middle of the sixteenth century, the city of Canton being besieged by a large piratical force whose base of operations was Macao, the high provincial authorities in their extremity sought the aid of the Portuguese, who came promptly to the rescue of the city, defeated the pirates, and captured their stronghold. 290 Moved by mixed feelings of gratitude and policy, the Canton authorities thereupon sanctioned the Portuguese occupation of Macao, not ill-pleased to set up at that strategic point so effective a counterpoise to the native pirates.

The Portuguese explorers of the early sixteenth century, to whom the modern world owes so much, wisely chose this "gem of the orient earth and open sea" as part of their network of trading posts, which stretched from the coasts of Africa to the islands of Japan. The Chinese Government never seemed to have any issues with trade or with foreigners in general. As long as there was nothing to fear from their presence, the ancient principle of welcoming distant people could be practiced without hesitation, since the Chinese are naturally kind-hearted. Tradition claims that the settlement of foreigners in the Cantonese archipelago began with a purely hospitable act: in 1517, a storm-damaged ship was granted permission by the local authorities to make repairs and dry its cargo there. The Portuguese visited several ports before settling in Macao, their main station being the island of Sanchuan, where Xavier was buried. Around the middle of the sixteenth century, when the city of Canton was under siege by a large pirate force based in Macao, the provincial authorities urgently sought help from the Portuguese, who quickly came to the city's aid, defeated the pirates, and captured their stronghold. 290 Grateful but also strategic, the Canton authorities then allowed the Portuguese to occupy Macao, happy to establish an effective counterbalance to the local pirates at that key location.

It said as much for the tact of the Portuguese as for the forbearance of the Chinese authorities that such an isolated position as that of Macao should have been held without force, and only on the prestige of past achievements, on terms of mutual amity, for nearly four hundred years. The Portuguese squatters paid to the Chinese Government a ground-rent of about £150 per annum, in consideration of which they enjoyed practical independence. "The merchants, fully aware that their settlement at Macao was due neither to any conquest, nor as a return for services by co-operating in destruction of pirates, bore in mind two principles—to be on good terms with the provincial authorities, and to improve as much as possible their exclusive trade with China." The forms of administrative authority were indeed maintained by the Chinese, their permission being required to reside and to build houses and so forth—regulations which were more vexatious, perhaps, in theory than in fact. The exercise of Chinese jurisdiction over the person was asserted with moderation as regards the Portuguese, though full authority was maintained over the native population. The Portuguese, however, became dissatisfied with the relationship which had worked smoothly for three hundred years, and when the treaty-making era arrived they sought means to improve their status. By persistent efforts they gradually freed themselves from the overlordship 291 of China, this object being finally attained by good diplomacy in 1887, when the Imperial Government ceded to Portugal sovereign rights over Macao in consideration of assistance rendered by the colony in the collection of the Chinese opium revenue.

It reflects both the diplomacy of the Portuguese and the patience of the Chinese authorities that such a secluded place as Macao could be maintained without force, relying solely on the prestige of previous achievements and mutual goodwill for almost four hundred years. The Portuguese settlers paid the Chinese Government an annual ground rent of about £150, which allowed them to enjoy practical independence. "The merchants, fully aware that their presence in Macao was not a result of conquest or in exchange for any help in eliminating pirates, kept two principles in mind: to maintain good relations with the local authorities and to enhance their exclusive trade with China." The Chinese maintained certain forms of administrative authority, requiring their permission for residency and building, regulations that were likely more bothersome in theory than in practice. Chinese jurisdiction over individuals was applied lightly towards the Portuguese, while full authority remained over the local population. However, the Portuguese grew dissatisfied with the relationship that had functioned smoothly for three hundred years, and as the era of treaties began, they sought ways to elevate their status. Through persistent efforts, they gradually freed themselves from Chinese overlordship, achieving this goal through skilled diplomacy in 1887, when the Imperial Government granted Portugal sovereign rights over Macao in return for help with the collection of the Chinese opium revenue.

Macao did not escape the fortunes of the long war of commercial supremacy which was waged between Holland and Portugal, but the colony successfully resisted two attempts to reduce it in 1622 and 1627. Its resources at that period enabled the diminutive settlement even to play some part in the game of empire in China itself, for we are told that a force of 400 men from India, under the command of two Portuguese officers, proceeded by land to Peking to support the last Ming emperor in his struggle with the invading Manchus. These auxiliaries returned whence they came without seeing active service.

Macao was caught up in the long struggle for commercial dominance between Holland and Portugal, but the colony successfully resisted two attempts to conquer it in 1622 and 1627. At that time, its resources allowed the small settlement to even have some influence in the imperial game in China itself, as we learn that a force of 400 men from India, led by two Portuguese officers, traveled overland to Peking to support the last Ming emperor in his fight against the invading Manchus. These reinforcements returned home without experiencing any combat.

Although the Dutch failed to take military possession of Macao, they took other trading colonies, and succeeded eventually in wresting from the Portuguese their Asiatic commerce. They supplanted them entirely in Japan, whose "gold and spoils" had greatly enriched the colony. Being expelled, not without reason, in 1662, the Portuguese fugitives from Japan retired to Macao.

Although the Dutch didn’t manage to take military control of Macao, they did seize other trading colonies and eventually succeeded in taking over the Portuguese's Asian trade. They completely replaced them in Japan, where the "gold and spoils" significantly boosted the colony's wealth. After being expelled, not without cause, in 1662, the Portuguese refugees from Japan returned to Macao.

Other competitors also began to appear and to assert their right to participate in the trade of the Far East, and Macao became the hostelry for merchants of all nations, who carried on business with the great Chinese emporium, Canton. Chief among these guests were the Dutch and English East India Companies, both of which maintained establishments at Macao for some two hundred years. 292

Other competitors also started to show up and claim their right to be part of the trade in the Far East, and Macao became the lodging place for merchants from all over the world, who conducted business with the major Chinese market, Canton. Among these visitors, the Dutch and English East India Companies were the most prominent, both of which had operations in Macao for about two hundred years. 292

The English Company had made use of the Macao anchorage first under a treaty with the viceroy of Goa, and subsequently under Cromwell's treaty with the Portuguese Government in 1654, which permitted English ships to enter all the ports in the Portuguese Indies. Before the close of the seventeenth century ships were despatched direct from England to Macao. The English adventurers were not satisfied with the privilege of anchoring so far from the great emporium, but direct trade with Canton had yet to be fought for. The energetic Captain Weddell, commanding the ship London, in 1655 met the obstructive tactics of the Cantonese authorities by bombarding the Bogue forts and forcing his way up the river, after which he was received in friendly audience by the viceroy, and was granted full participation in the Canton trade, much to the chagrin, it is said, of the jealous Macao merchants.

The English Company first utilized the Macao harbor through a treaty with the viceroy of Goa, and later through Cromwell's treaty with the Portuguese Government in 1654, which allowed English ships to enter all ports in the Portuguese Indies. By the end of the seventeenth century, ships were sent directly from England to Macao. The English traders were not content with just anchoring so far from the main trading hub; they also had to fight for direct trade with Canton. The determined Captain Weddell, commanding the ship London, in 1655 dealt with the resistance from the Cantonese authorities by bombarding the Bogue forts and forcing his way up the river. Afterward, he was received in a friendly meeting with the viceroy and was granted full access to the Canton trade, much to the annoyance, it is said, of the envious Macao merchants.

The loss of its own direct commerce was thus compensated for by the tribute which the Portuguese colony was able to levy upon the general trade of China, by whomsoever carried on. Massive houses, with immense verandahs running all round them, and spacious and cool interior recesses, attest to this day the ancient glory of Macao. Though now neglected, and perhaps converted to baser uses, they afford a glimpse of the easy life led by the Company's agents and the merchants in the days before the treaty. During the business season, which was in the cool months, the whole mercantile community repaired to the factories at Canton while the ships lay at the deep-water anchorage of Whampoa, and between these two points the work of the year 293 was done—arduous enough, no doubt, while it lasted. In spite of some contemporary testimony to the contrary, one can hardly conceive the quasi-imprisonment within the Canton factories as a kind of life to be enjoyed, but only as one to be endured for an object. At any rate, when the last cargo of tea had been shipped off the scene was like the break-up of a school. The merchants and their whole establishment betook themselves to their sumptuous river barges, and glided down the stream to Macao, where the luxury of a long holiday awaited them. Once at least in every year the foreigners were in full accord with the Chinese authorities, who sternly forbade loitering, and kept up the form of peremptorily sending the merchants away as soon as their business had been done. Nevertheless, those who desired to remain found no difficulty.

The loss of its direct commerce was offset by the tribute the Portuguese colony could collect from the general trade of China, regardless of who was handling it. Large buildings with huge porches all around and spacious, cool interior areas still show the former glory of Macao. Although now neglected and possibly repurposed for lesser uses, they offer a glimpse into the comfortable lives of the Company’s agents and merchants before the treaty. During the business season, which took place in the cooler months, the entire trading community would head to the factories in Canton while the ships sat at the deep-water anchorage in Whampoa, and the year’s work was carried out between these two locations—challenging enough, undoubtedly, while it lasted. Despite some contemporary accounts suggesting otherwise, it’s hard to imagine the semi-imprisonment within the Canton factories as a life anyone would enjoy; it seemed more like something to be tolerated for a purpose. In any case, when the last shipment of tea was sent off, the scene resembled the end of a school term. The merchants and their entire staff would board their luxurious riverboats and drift down the river to Macao, where a long vacation awaited them. At least once a year, the foreigners were in complete agreement with the Chinese authorities, who strictly prohibited loitering and maintained the formality of decisively sending the merchants away as soon as their business was complete. Nevertheless, those who wanted to stay had no trouble doing so.

The Portuguese colony, whether or not under compulsion, played an ungracious part in the troubles which preceded the outbreak of war between Great Britain and China. To evict from their houses a company of helpless people and drive them to sea, even at the bidding of an oriental tyrant, was a proceeding little in keeping with the traditions of Lusitanian chivalry. But Englishmen may very well forgive the Portuguese this act of inhumanity, since it compelled the fugitives to seek a home of their own in the Canton waters, destined to eclipse the fading glories of "la cidade do nome de Deos da Macao."

The Portuguese colony, whether forced or not, played an ungracious role in the events leading up to the war between Great Britain and China. Expelling a group of vulnerable people from their homes and sending them to sea, even at the order of an Eastern tyrant, was not in line with the traditions of Lusitanian chivalry. However, the English might very well forgive the Portuguese for this act of cruelty, as it pushed the refugees to find a home for themselves in the waters of Canton, destined to overshadow the declining glories of "la cidade do nome de Deos da Macao."

The treaty of 1842, which enabled British merchants to set up house for themselves, deprived Macao of a large portion of its revenue; but even under this eclipse 294 the era of its prosperity did not then come quite to an end.

The treaty of 1842, which allowed British merchants to establish their own businesses, took away a significant amount of Macao's revenue; however, even during this downturn 294 the period of its prosperity did not completely end.

The occupation of Hongkong supplied to British traders all the wants which Macao had previously furnished, accompanied by a security which the Portuguese Administration was unable to confer. Its harbour was incomparably superior, fulfilling all the requirements of a modern seaport. These advantages were irresistible; nevertheless, the merchants vacated with evident reluctance the roomy mansions in which the pleasantest part of their lives had been spent. Several of them retained possession of their Macao homes, using them for purposes of recreation. "Dent's comfortable quarters at Macao" afforded an agreeable retreat for Admiral Keppel, and no doubt many others of the nautical brotherhood before and after his time; for the sea-breezes of Macao were almost as great a relief to the denizens of Queen's Road as to the community which, after the treaty, was permanently quartered in the Canton factories. To this day Macao, well served by fast and commodious steamers, remains a favoured resort for week-end tourist parties, picnics, honeymoons, and the like.

The occupation of Hong Kong provided British traders with everything that Macao had previously offered, along with a level of security that the Portuguese administration couldn’t provide. Its harbor was far superior, meeting all the needs of a modern port. These benefits were hard to resist; however, the merchants left their spacious homes, where they had spent some of the best times of their lives, with clear reluctance. Many of them kept their Macao residences, using them for leisure. "Dent's comfortable quarters at Macao" gave Admiral Keppel a nice getaway, and likely many others in the maritime community both before and after his time; the sea breezes of Macao were a refreshing escape for those on Queen's Road as well as for the community that, after the treaty, was permanently based in the Canton factories. To this day, Macao, served by fast and comfortable steamers, remains a popular destination for weekend getaways, picnics, honeymoons, and similar outings.

DENT'S VERANDAH, MACAO.

DENT'S VERANDA, MACAO.

The population of Macao is estimated at 75,000 Chinese and under 4000 Portuguese, of whom the percentage of pure blood is not large. The so-called Portuguese of the Chinese coast differ from those of Goa as the Chinese differ from the Indian natives. They supply a want in the general economy: in China, as clerks, for whose work they have, like the indispensable babu, a natural aptitude; in India, as domestic and personal servants. With the increase of typewriting and the practice of dictation in mercantile establishments 295 the clerical services of the Macaese are likely to assume less importance. They are good Catholics, smoke cigarettes, and are harmless.

The population of Macao is estimated to be around 75,000 Chinese and under 4,000 Portuguese, among whom the percentage of pure blood is not high. The so-called Portuguese along the Chinese coast are different from those in Goa, just as the Chinese are different from the Indian natives. They fill a gap in the overall economy: in China, as clerks, for whom they have a natural knack, similar to the essential babu; in India, as domestic and personal helpers. With the rise of typing and dictation practices in businesses, 295 the clerical roles of the Macaese are likely to become less significant. They are good Catholics, smoke cigarettes, and are generally harmless.

Though for many years Macao suffered depression from the loss of its foreign trade, its natural advantages in course of time attracted to it new branches of industry, which to some extent revived its drooping prosperity. Foreign and native merchants found it convenient to conduct a certain portion of their trade in tea and silk and other articles in the quiet old city, where burdens were light and labour abundant. Traffic of a less desirable character found also its natural domicile in the colony. It became the headquarters of the lucrative coolie trade, which there for many years found an asylum where it feared no law, human or divine. To the credit of the Portuguese Government, however, this traffic was abolished in 1874. Opium and gambling licences now provide the chief contributions to a colonial revenue, the surplus of which over expenditure furnishes a respectable annual tribute to the needy mother country.

Though for many years Macao went through a decline due to the loss of its foreign trade, its natural advantages eventually attracted new industries, which somewhat revived its struggling economy. Both foreign and local merchants found it convenient to conduct part of their trade in tea, silk, and other goods in the quiet old city, where the burdens were light and labor plentiful. Less desirable trade also found a home in the colony. It became the center of the profitable coolie trade, where for many years it operated without fear of any laws, human or divine. However, to the credit of the Portuguese Government, this trade was abolished in 1874. Now, opium and gambling licenses contribute mainly to colonial revenue, and the surplus over expenditures provides a respectable annual tribute to the needy mother country.

There is yet another species of enterprise historically associated with the colony which cannot be altogether omitted, though it should be mentioned with the extenuating circumstances. Piracy, as we have seen, was rampant on the coasts of Asia, as it was also in Europe, before Vasco da Gama doubled the Cape; and it was not to be expected in an age when successful buccaneers in the Atlantic were earning distinction by harassing the common enemy Spain, that an isolated colony in remote Asia, detached from Europe a century and a half earlier, should have anticipated the ethical refinements of the 296 awakening conscience of Christendom. Slavery itself was tolerated among the most enlightened races until the middle of the present century, and if the Macaese did feel a sneaking toleration for mitigated forms of it, as well as for other species of criminality which flourished all round them, it must be admitted the temptation lay very near to their hand. They had been brought up for centuries in close familiarity with the practices of the sea-rover. Though it cannot be said that piracy ever took rank as a domestic institution in patriarchal Macao, yet the openings for young men were much restricted by family custom, and instances have been reported of improvident sons laying unfilial hands on their fathers' junks on the coast with a view to rectifying the balance of the family finance. Whether or not such modes of redress were ever actually carried into effect, the fact that legends of this character should have woven themselves into the tissue of local gossip within comparatively recent times, and in connection with well-known names, indicates a state of feeling which should be allowed for in considering the relation of Macao to Chinese piracy.

There’s another type of enterprise historically linked to the colony that can’t be completely overlooked, although it should be mentioned with some context. Piracy, as we’ve seen, was widespread on the coasts of Asia, just as it was in Europe, before Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape. It’s not surprising that during a time when successful buccaneers in the Atlantic were becoming famous for attacking the common enemy, Spain, an isolated colony in remote Asia, separated from Europe a century and a half earlier, wouldn’t have anticipated the ethical developments of the awakening conscience of Christendom. Slavery itself was accepted among the most enlightened societies until the middle of this century, and if the Macanese had a grudging acceptance of milder forms of it, along with other types of crime that were common around them, it’s clear that the temptation was very close at hand. They had been raised for centuries in close contact with the ways of sea raiders. While piracy may not have been an established institution in patriarchal Macao, job opportunities for young men were quite limited due to family customs, and there have been reports of reckless sons taking inappropriate action against their fathers’ boats along the coast to fix the family’s financial issues. Whether or not such methods of addressing problems were ever put into practice, the fact that legends like this have become part of local gossip in relatively recent times, and linked to well-known names, reflects a mindset that should be considered when looking at Macao’s relationship with Chinese piracy.

The influence of Macao on the history of foreign relations with China extended much beyond the sphere of mere commercial interests. For three hundred years it was for foreigners the gate of the Chinese empire, and all influences, good and bad, which came from without were infiltrated through that narrow opening, which also served as the medium through which China was revealed to the Western world. It was in Macao that the first lighthouse was erected, a symbol of the illuminating mission of foreigners in China. It was 297 there also that the first printing-press was set up, employing movable type instead of the stereotype wooden blocks used by the Chinese. From that press was issued Morrison's famous Dictionary, and for a long series of years the Chinese Repository, a perfect storehouse of authentic information concerning the Chinese empire, conducted chiefly by English and American missionaries. The first foreign hospital in China was opened at Macao, and there vaccination was first practised. It was from Macao that the father of China missions, Matteo Ricci, started on his adventurous journey through the interior of the country in the sixteenth century, ultimately reaching the capital, where he established an influence over the Imperial Court scarcely less than miraculous, thus laying the foundation-stone of the Catholic propaganda in China. The little Portuguese settlement has therefore played no mean part in the changes which have taken place in the great empire of China.

The impact of Macao on the history of foreign relations with China went far beyond just commercial interests. For three hundred years, it served as the gateway to the Chinese empire for foreigners, allowing both positive and negative influences to come through that narrow opening, which also revealed China to the Western world. It was in Macao that the first lighthouse was built, symbolizing the enlightening mission of foreigners in China. It was 297 there that the first printing press was established, using movable type instead of the wooden blocks typically used by the Chinese. From that press came Morrison's well-known Dictionary, and for many years, the Chinese Repository, which was a valuable source of authentic information about the Chinese empire, was mainly managed by English and American missionaries. The first foreign hospital in China was opened in Macao, where vaccination was introduced. It was from Macao that Matteo Ricci, the father of Chinese missions, began his adventurous journey through the interior of the country in the sixteenth century, ultimately reaching the capital and establishing a nearly miraculous influence over the Imperial Court, thus laying the groundwork for Catholic missionary work in China. The small Portuguese settlement has therefore played a significant role in the transformations that have occurred in the vast empire of China.

Of the personages associated with its history, the most brilliant, or at least the best known, was St Francis Xavier, the apostle of the Indies,—a man of so magnetic a character that he was credited with the miraculous gift of tongues, while as a matter of fact he seems not to have been even an ordinarily good linguist, speaking to the natives of the Far East only through an interpreter. Xavier died and was buried in the neighbouring island of Sanchuan, whence his remains were transferred first to Macao itself and afterwards to Goa. The names of Xavier and Ricci cast a halo over the first century of the existence of Macao. Another of the earlier residents of world-wide fame was the poet Camöens, who in a grotto formed of granite blocks 298 tumbled together by nature, almost washed by the sea, sat and wrote the Portuguese epic 'The Lusiad,' celebrating the adventures of the great navigator Vasco da Gama. Of names belonging to the present century, or the English period, two only need be mentioned here. One was Robert Morrison, the father of English sinology, who was sent to China by the London Missionary Society in 1807. This remarkable man had mastered the initial difficulties of the Chinese language before leaving England. This he accomplished by the aid of a young Cantonese, and by diligent study of MSS. in the British Museum, and of a MS. Latin-Chinese dictionary lent to him by the Royal Society. His teacher accompanied him on the long voyage to China, during which Morrison laboured "from morning to midnight." In Canton a Pekingese teacher, a Catholic convert, was obtained, and the study of Chinese was carried on assiduously. The most enduring monument of these labours was the Chinese-English dictionary, which was printed by the East India Company at a cost of £15,000. This standard work has been the fountain from which all students of Chinese have drawn since his time.

Of the people linked to its history, the most notable, or at least the most famous, was St. Francis Xavier, the apostle of the Indies—a man with such a magnetic personality that he was thought to have the miraculous gift of tongues, although in reality, he didn't seem to be even a decent linguist, communicating with the natives of the Far East only through an interpreter. Xavier died and was buried on the nearby island of Sanchuan, from where his remains were later moved first to Macao itself and then to Goa. The names of Xavier and Ricci add an aura to the first century of Macao's existence. Another of the early residents of global renown was the poet Camöens, who in a grotto made of granite blocks, nearly washed by the sea, sat and wrote the Portuguese epic 'The Lusiad,' which tells the adventures of the great navigator Vasco da Gama. Among those from the present century, or the English period, only two are worth mentioning here. One was Robert Morrison, the father of English sinology, who was sent to China by the London Missionary Society in 1807. This remarkable man had mastered the initial challenges of the Chinese language before leaving England. He achieved this with the help of a young Cantonese and by diligently studying manuscripts in the British Museum, along with a Latin-Chinese dictionary borrowed from the Royal Society. His teacher accompanied him on the long journey to China, during which Morrison worked "from morning to midnight." In Canton, he found a Pekingese teacher, a Catholic convert, and they continued studying Chinese diligently. The most enduring result of these efforts was the Chinese-English dictionary, which was published by the East India Company at a cost of £15,000. This essential work has been the foundation for all students of Chinese since his time.

Art has had but one representative, an Irish gentleman named George Chinnery, who resided in Macao from 1825 till his death in 1852. Of Mr Chinnery's drawings and paintings there are many scattered collections, on some of which we have been able to draw for the illustrations in these volumes.

Art has had only one representative, an Irish gentleman named George Chinnery, who lived in Macao from 1825 until his death in 1852. There are many scattered collections of Mr. Chinnery's drawings and paintings, on some of which we have been able to draw for the illustrations in these volumes.

GEORGE CHINNERY.
(From an oil-painting by himself.)

GEORGE CHINNERY.
(From a painting he created.)

CHAPTER XVI.

Piracy.

Association with Hongkong and Macao—Activity of British navy in suppressing piracy—Its historic importance—Government relations with pirates—The convoy system—Gross abuse—Hongkong legislation—Progress of steam navigation—Fatal to piracy.

Association with Hong Kong and Macao—Activity of the British navy in fighting piracy—Its historic significance—Government dealings with pirates—The convoy system—Serious misuse—Hong Kong legislation—Advancement of steam navigation—Deadly for piracy.

A factor which has done so much to shape commercial intercourse with China as piracy cannot be properly ignored in a survey like the present. The settlements of Hongkong and Macao were forced into contact with this time-honoured institution, for these places are situated as near to the piratical centre as they are to that of the typhoon zone. From the time of the first war down to quite recent years the British squadron on the China station was almost engrossed in the two duties of surveying the coast and rivers, and of repressing piracy,—services which were not interrupted even during the progress of a war with the Imperial Government. Both proceedings were anomalous, being a usurpation of the sovereign functions of the Chinese Government. That Government, however, never evinced more than a languid interest in operations against its piratical subjects. Piracy, as such, seems indeed to have enjoyed that fatalistic toleration which the Chinese Government and people are wont to extend 300 to every species of abuse, on the principle that what cannot be cured must be endured. Nor is China the only country where banditti have established with their future victims a conventional relation like that of certain predatory animals which are said to live on easy terms with the creatures destined to become their prey. Successful leaders, whether of brigands or of sea-rovers, have from time to time attained high political status in the empire. Wingrove Cooke says:—

A major factor that greatly influenced trade with China is piracy, which can't be overlooked in this overview. The settlements of Hongkong and Macao found themselves dealing with this longstanding issue because they are located close to both the heart of piracy and the typhoon zone. From the time of the first war up until recent years, the British squadron stationed in China was mostly focused on two main tasks: surveying the coast and rivers and fighting piracy—efforts that continued even during conflicts with the Imperial Government. Both of these actions were unusual, as they took on roles that belonged to the Chinese Government. However, that government showed only a minimal interest in addressing the actions against its piratical subjects. Piracy seems to have received a sort of fatalistic acceptance from both the Chinese Government and people, who often feel that what can't be fixed must be tolerated. China is not the only place where bandits have formed a typical relationship with their future victims, similar to certain predatory animals that coexist peacefully with those they are meant to hunt. Successful leaders, whether they are brigands or pirates, have occasionally risen to prominent political positions within the empire. Wingrove Cooke states:— 300

Whenever anything occurs of historic importance we always find that some bandit has had a hand in it. The land was always full of them. When the Tartars possessed themselves of China, one of these bandit chiefs had just possessed himself of Peking, and the last of the Ming race had just hanged himself. It was a pirate who drove the Dutch out of Formosa; the son of a "celebrated pirate" who helped the Cantonese to defend their city against the Tartars; and it was a pirate who the other day destroyed the Portuguese piratical fleet at Ningpo. In all ages and at all times China has been coasted by pirates and traversed by bands of robbers.

Whenever something historic happens, we always find that some bandit has played a role in it. The land has always been full of them. When the Tartars took over China, one of these bandit leaders had just seized Peking, and the last of the Ming dynasty had just hanged himself. It was a pirate who drove the Dutch out of Formosa; the son of a "famous pirate" helped the Cantonese defend their city against the Tartars; and it was a pirate who recently destroyed the Portuguese pirate fleet at Ningpo. Throughout history and at all times, China has been navigated by pirates and crossed by gangs of robbers.

In the 'Peking Gazette,' which he quotes, the Imperial Government itself thus describes the rule of the robbers:—

In the 'Peking Gazette,' which he cites, the Imperial Government describes the rule of the robbers as follows:—

They carry off persons in order to extort ransoms for them; they falsely assume the characters of police officers; they build fast boats professedly to guard the grain-fields, and into these they put from ten to twenty men, who cruise along the rivers, violently plundering the boats of travellers, or forcibly carrying off the wives and daughters of the tanka boat people. The inhabitants of the villages and hamlets fear these robbers as they would tigers, and do not offer them any resistance. The husbandman must pay these robbers a charge, else as soon as his crop is ripe it is plundered, and the whole field laid bare. In the precincts of the metropolis they set fire to places during the night, that, under pretence of saving and defending, they may plunder and carry off.

They kidnap people to demand ransoms; they pretend to be police officers; they build fast boats supposedly to protect the grain fields, and they fill these with ten to twenty men who cruise the rivers, violently robbing travelers’ boats or forcibly stealing the wives and daughters of the tanka boat people. The villagers are as afraid of these robbers as they are of tigers and don’t resist them. Farmers have to pay these robbers a fee, or as soon as their crops are ripe, they'll get plundered, and the entire field will be stripped bare. In the outskirts of the city, they set fires at night, pretending to save and defend people while they actually plunder and steal.

When it suits the Government to enlist rebels or robbers in its service it condones their misdeeds, and confers on them rank and honour. The chief of the Black Flags, who kept up a guerilla war against the French in Tongking, was a recent case in point, as was also, if report speaks truly, the late gallant Admiral Ting, who perished in the Chinese forlorn-hope at Weihai-wei in 1895. The relationship between the authorities and the freebooters is often of so equivocal a character, that foreign naval officers in their crusade against pirates may have failed at times to make the proper discrimination. Vessels seized as pirates occasionally escaped the fate which should have awaited them by proving themselves revenue protectors. But if the Government ever suffered from cases of mistaken identity, the balance was handsomely redressed; for piracy and smuggling being ingeniously blended, the forces of the British colony might in their turn be induced, by information supplied by the Chinese authorities, to act as revenue cruisers, under the belief that they were being led against pirates. The hard fights resulting in the destruction of piratical fleets bearing all the evidences of criminality were, however, too frequent to permit any doubt as to the general character of the craft so treated.

When it benefits the Government to recruit rebels or thieves for its purposes, it overlooks their wrongdoings and grants them status and recognition. A good example is the leader of the Black Flags, who waged a guerrilla war against the French in Tonkin, as well as, if the reports are accurate, the brave Admiral Ting, who died in the Chinese last-ditch effort at Weihaiwei in 1895. The relationship between the authorities and the outlaws is often so ambiguous that foreign naval officers, while combating pirates, may sometimes struggle to differentiate between them. Vessels captured as pirates have occasionally escaped the consequences that should have come to them by proving to be revenue protectors. However, if the Government ever faced issues of mistaken identity, it was more than compensated; since piracy and smuggling are cleverly intertwined, the forces of the British colony might, at times, be misled by information from the Chinese authorities into acting as revenue cruisers, believing they were targeting pirates. Nonetheless, the intense battles that led to the destruction of pirate fleets, clearly showing signs of wrongdoing, were too common to leave any doubt about the overall nature of the vessels involved.

But the anti-piratical agency was not confined to the commissioned officers of her Majesty's navy. Foreigners of all nations were drawn into the coasting traffic, in various capacities, as an antidote to piracy, with benefit, no doubt, to legitimate trade, yet not without some serious drawbacks. Dr Eitel tells us that during the first decade after the war 302 the waters of Hongkong swarmed with pirates, that the whole coast-line was under the control of a blackmailing confederacy, and that the peaceful trading junk was obliged to be heavily armed, so that externally there was nothing to distinguish a trader from a pirate. During this period European seamen took service with the native pirates who made Hongkong their headquarters, whence they drew their supplies, and where they kept themselves informed as to the movements of valuable merchandise and of war-vessels. Foreigners were enlisted also in the service of the honest trader; Chinese merchants began to charter small European sailing-vessels for coasting voyages, whereby they gained the protection of a European flag, the prestige of a European crew, and the better sea-going qualities of a European vessel. Steamers also began to be employed to convoy the native junks.

But the anti-piracy efforts weren't just limited to the commissioned officers of Her Majesty's navy. People from all over the world got involved in coastal trading in different roles as a way to combat piracy, which undoubtedly benefited legitimate trade, although it did come with some serious downsides. Dr. Eitel notes that during the first decade after the war 302, the waters around Hong Kong were teeming with pirates, and the entire coastline was controlled by a blackmailing syndicate. As a result, trading junks had to be heavily armed, making it hard to tell a trader from a pirate at first glance. During this time, European sailors worked with the native pirates who used Hong Kong as their base; they sourced supplies from there and kept themselves updated on the movements of valuable goods and warships. Foreigners were also hired by honest traders; Chinese merchants started to charter small European sailing vessels for coastal trips, gaining the protection of a European flag, the prestige of a European crew, and the superior sea-faring capabilities of European ships. Steamers also began to be used to escort native junks.

The extension of the convoy system brought in its train the most terrible abuses, the class of foreigners so employed being as ready to sell their services to the pirates as to the merchants, and to turn from protector to oppressor of the honest trader with as much facility as Chinese fishermen and pirates interchange their respective parts. Many tragedies were enacted along the coast and rivers of China—many more, no doubt, than ever became known to the foreign public. Mr Medhurst, consul at Shanghai, said that the foreigners employed by the Chinese to protect their property on the water were guilty of atrocities of all kinds in the inner waters, which the Chinese authorities and people were unable to prevent. And Mr Adkins, consul at Chinkiang on the Yangtze, 303 reported in the same year, 1862, a series of brutal murders committed by foreigners on the river, with which the native authorities declined to interfere. The criminals, not being amenable to any jurisdiction but their own, were thus left free to commit their outrages, unless some representative of their own country happened to be on the spot. The Taiping rebellion attracted desperate characters from all quarters, to whom it was a matter of indifference under what flag they served—pillage being their sole inducement. The only conspicuous case of trial of a foreigner for piracy was that of a young American, Eli Boggs, who was condemned in the Supreme Court of Hongkong in 1857, and sentenced to transportation for life. From such experiences it is to be apprehended that should any part of the Chinese empire become disorganised, lawless foreigners will be a more terrible scourge to the inhabitants than even the native pirates and bandits.

The expansion of the convoy system led to horrific abuses, with foreign individuals willing to sell their services to both pirates and merchants, easily switching from being protectors to oppressors of honest traders—much like how Chinese fishermen and pirates exchange roles. Many tragedies occurred along the coasts and rivers of China—certainly more than what was ever reported to the foreign public. Mr. Medhurst, the consul in Shanghai, stated that foreign individuals hired by the Chinese to protect their property on the water committed numerous atrocities in the inland waters, which the Chinese authorities and people were powerless to prevent. Similarly, Mr. Adkins, the consul at Chinkiang on the Yangtze, 303 reported in the same year, 1862, a series of brutal murders by foreigners on the river, which the local authorities chose not to intervene in. The criminals were only accountable to their own standards, allowing them to continue their violent acts unless a representative from their country happened to be present. The Taiping rebellion attracted desperate individuals from everywhere, who cared little about what flag they served under—looting was their only motivation. The only notable case of a foreigner tried for piracy was that of a young American named Eli Boggs, who was convicted in the Supreme Court of Hong Kong in 1857 and sentenced to life in exile. Such experiences suggest that if any part of the Chinese empire becomes disorganized, lawless foreigners could become an even greater threat to the locals than native pirates and bandits.

Of the abuses developed by the convoy system, and of the character of the foreigners concerned therein, a graphic yet matter-of-fact account is given by Wingrove Cooke. As the state of rampant lawlessness which prevailed at the time on the China coast, and the traditional attitude of the Government towards freebooters, are so perfectly illustrated in his concise narrative of the destruction of a Portuguese convoy, no apology is needed for quoting a passage or two from Mr Cooke's letter dated Ningpo, August 24, 1857:—

Of the issues created by the convoy system, and of the nature of the foreigners involved, Wingrove Cooke provides a vivid yet straightforward account. His concise narrative about the destruction of a Portuguese convoy perfectly illustrates the rampant lawlessness that existed on the China coast at the time, along with the Government's traditional stance towards pirates. Therefore, there’s no need to apologize for quoting a passage or two from Mr. Cooke's letter dated Ningpo, August 24, 1857:—

The fishing-boats which ply off the mouth of the river Yung pay convoy duties to the extent of 50,000 dollars a-year; and the wood-junks that ply between Ningpo and Foochow, and the 304 other native craft, raise the annual payment for protection to 200,000 dollars (£70,000) annually. These figures are startling, but I have taken pains to ascertain their correctness.

The fishing boats operating at the mouth of the Yung River pay convoy fees of $50,000 a year, and the wood junks that run between Ningpo and Foochow, along with other local vessels, increase the total annual payment for protection to $200,000 (£70,000). These numbers are surprising, but I’ve made sure to verify their accuracy.

The vessels employed in this convoy service were Portuguese lorchas. These vessels were well armed and equipped. There were no mandarin junks and no Portuguese ships of war to cope with them or control them, and they became masters of this part of the coast. It is in the nature of things that these privateers should abuse their power. They are accused of the most frightful atrocities. It is alleged that they made descents upon villages, carried off the women, murdered the men, and burnt the habitations. They became infinitely greater scourges than the pirates they were paid to repel. It is alleged, also, that complaints to the Portuguese consul were vain; that Portuguese sailors taken red-handed and handed over to this consul were suffered to escape from the consular prison. Rightly or wrongly, the Chinese thought that the consul was in complicity with the ruffians who were acting both as convoy and as pirates.... The leader of the pirate fleet was—I am going back now to a time three years ago—a Cantonese named A'Pak. The authorities at Ningpo, in their weakness, determined to make terms with him rather than submit to the tyranny of the Portuguese.

The ships used in this convoy service were Portuguese lorchas. These vessels were well-armed and equipped. There were no mandarin junks and no Portuguese warships to counter them or keep them in check, and they gained control of this stretch of coastline. It’s just how things go that these privateers misused their power. They are accused of horrific atrocities. It’s said that they attacked villages, captured women, killed the men, and burned down homes. They became a far worse threat than the pirates they were supposed to fight against. It’s also claimed that complaints to the Portuguese consul were pointless; Portuguese sailors caught in the act and turned over to this consul were allowed to escape from consular custody. Right or wrong, the Chinese believed that the consul was in cahoots with the criminals who were acting as both convoy and pirates... The leader of the pirate fleet was—I’m going back to a time three years ago—a Cantonese named A’Pak. The authorities in Ningpo, feeling helpless, decided to negotiate with him rather than endure the oppression from the Portuguese.

A'Pak was made a mandarin of the third class; and his fleet—not altogether taken into Government pay, for that the Chinese could not afford—was nominally made over to A'Pak's brother.... After a few of these very sanguinary provocations, A'Pak—not, it is believed, without the concurrence of the Taotai of Ningpo—determined to destroy this Portuguese convoy fleet.

A'Pak was appointed a third-class mandarin, and his fleet—partially not funded by the government since the Chinese couldn't afford it—was officially transferred to A'Pak's brother. After a few of these bloody provocations, A'Pak—believed to have the support of the Taotai of Ningpo—decided to eliminate this Portuguese convoy fleet.

For this purpose A'Pak's brother collected his snake-boats and convoy junks from along the whole coast, and assembled about twenty of them, and perhaps 500 men. The Portuguese were not long in hearing of these preparations, but they seem to have been struck with panic. Some of their vessels went south, some were taken at the mouth of the river. Seven lorchas took refuge up the river, opposite the Portuguese consulate. The sailors on board these lorchas landed some of their big guns, and put the consulate in a state of defence, and perhaps hoped that the neighbourhood of the European houses and the character of the consulate would prevent an 305 attack. Not so. On the day I have above mentioned the Canton fleet came up the river. The Portuguese consul immediately fled. The lorchas fired one broadside at them as they approached, and then the crews deserted their vessels and made for the shore. About 200 Cantonese, accompanied by a few Europeans, followed these 140 Portuguese and Manila-men ashore. A fight took place in the streets. It was of very short duration, for the Portuguese behaved in the most dastardly manner. The Manila-men showed some spirit, but the Portuguese could not even persuade themselves to fight for their lives behind the walls of their consulate. The fortified house was taken and sacked by these Chinamen, the Portuguese were pursued among the tombs, where they sought refuge, and forty of them were shot down, or hunted and butchered with spears....

For this purpose, A'Pak's brother gathered his snake boats and convoy ships from all over the coast, bringing together about twenty of them and maybe 500 men. The Portuguese quickly heard about these plans, but they seemed to panic. Some of their ships headed south, while others were caught at the river’s mouth. Seven lorchas took shelter up the river, right across from the Portuguese consulate. The sailors on these lorchas unloaded some of their heavy guns and fortified the consulate, perhaps hoping that being near European buildings and the nature of the consulate would deter an attack. Not at all. On the day I mentioned earlier, the Canton fleet came up the river. The Portuguese consul immediately fled. The lorchas fired a broadside at them as they approached, and then the crews abandoned their ships and made for the shore. About 200 Cantonese, along with a few Europeans, pursued these 140 Portuguese and Manila men to the beach. A fight broke out in the streets. It was very brief, as the Portuguese acted in the most cowardly way. The Manila men showed some fight, but the Portuguese couldn't even convince themselves to defend their lives behind the walls of their consulate. The fortified house was taken and looted by these Chinese, the Portuguese were chased among the graves where they sought refuge, and forty of them were shot down or hunted and killed with spears.

Merciless as this massacre was, and little as is the choice between the two sets of combatants, it must be owned that the Cantonese acted with purpose and discipline. Three trading Portuguese lorchas which lay in the river with their flags flying were not molested; and no European, not a Portuguese, was even insulted by the infuriated butchers. The stories current of Souero and his Portuguese followers rivalled the worst of the tales of the buccaneers, and public opinion in Ningpo and the foreign settlement was strongly in favour of the Cantonese.

As brutal as this massacre was, and with little choice between the two groups of combatants, it has to be acknowledged that the Cantonese acted with determination and organization. Three Portuguese trading boats anchored in the river with their flags flying were left alone; no European, not even a Portuguese, was insulted by the enraged attackers. The rumors surrounding Souero and his Portuguese followers rivaled the worst stories about pirates, and public sentiment in Ningpo and the foreign settlement strongly supported the Cantonese.

But if Hongkong was the centre of piratical organisation, it was also the centre of effort to put it down. The exploits of her Majesty's ships, destroying many thousands of heavily-armed piratical junks, were loyally supplemented by the legislation and the police of the Colonial Government, which were continuously directed towards the extermination of piracy. These measures, however, did not appear to make any material impression on the pest. As part of his general policy of suppressing crime, the most drastic steps were taken by Sir Richard MacDonnell against pirates. He struck at the root of 306 the evil within the colony itself by penalising the receivers of stolen goods, and by a stricter surveillance over all Chinese vessels frequenting the harbour. He also endeavoured to secure the co-operation of the Chinese Government, without which no permanent success could be hoped for. This was not, indeed, the first time that Chinese co-operation had been invoked. In one of the hardest fought actions against a piratical stronghold—that of Sheipu Bay, near Ningpo, in 1856—her Majesty's brig Bittern was towed into action through the bottle-neck of the bay by a Chinese-owned steamer. But the assistance rendered to the Government of Hongkong by the steam-cruisers of the Chinese customs service was of too ambiguous a character to be of real use, smugglers rather than pirates being the object of the Chinese pursuit—smugglers of whom the high Chinese officials had good reason to be jealous.

But while Hong Kong was the hub of pirate activity, it was also the focal point of efforts to eliminate it. The actions of Her Majesty's ships, which destroyed thousands of heavily armed pirate junks, were consistently supported by the laws and the police of the Colonial Government, all aimed at ending piracy. However, these efforts didn’t seem to make a significant impact on the problem. In his broader strategy to combat crime, Sir Richard MacDonnell took severe measures against pirates. He targeted the root of the issue within the colony by punishing those who received stolen goods and by increasing oversight of all Chinese vessels in the harbor. He also sought to gain the cooperation of the Chinese Government, as lasting success was unlikely without it. This wasn’t the first time they had turned to the Chinese for help. In one of the toughest battles against a pirate stronghold—at Sheipu Bay, near Ningpo, in 1856—Her Majesty's brig Bittern was towed into battle through the narrow bay by a Chinese-owned steamer. However, the support from the steam cruisers of the Chinese customs service was too ambiguous to be genuinely helpful, as they were more focused on smugglers rather than pirates—smugglers that high-ranking Chinese officials had good reason to keep an eye on.

The result of the police activity and of regulations for the coast traffic was a great diminution in the number of piracy cases brought before colonial magistrates. This, however, by itself was not conclusive as to the actual decrease of the crime, for it may only have indicated a change of strategy forced on the pirates by the vigorous action of the Colonial Government. Foreign vessels were by no means exempt from the attentions of the piratical fleets, though they seldom fell a prey to open assault at sea. A different form of tactics was resorted to where foreigners were the object of attack: it was to embark as passengers a number of the gang with arms secreted, who rose at a signal and massacred the ship's officers. Even after steam vessels 307 had virtually superseded sailers on the coast this device was too often successful through want of care on the part of the master. These attacks were carried out with great skill and daring, sometimes on the short passage of forty miles between Hongkong and Macao, and in several instances almost within the harbour limits of Hongkong itself.

The result of police efforts and regulations for coastal traffic was a significant reduction in the number of piracy cases reported to colonial magistrates. However, this alone didn’t necessarily mean that actual piracy was on the decline; it might have just shown that the pirates had to change their strategy due to the strong actions taken by the Colonial Government. Foreign vessels weren’t completely safe from pirate fleets, although they rarely became targets of outright attacks at sea. A different tactic was used when the targets were foreigners: pirates would board as passengers with concealed weapons, waiting for a signal to attack and kill the ship's officers. Even after steamships mostly replaced sailing ships along the coast, this tactic often worked due to the captain's lack of vigilance. These attacks were executed with great skill and boldness, sometimes occurring on the short journey of forty miles between Hong Kong and Macao, and in several cases, nearly within the harbor limits of Hong Kong itself.

While awarding full credit to the indefatigable exertions of the British squadron in China—the only one that ever troubled itself in such matters—and to the unremitting efforts of the colony of Hongkong, the reduction, if not the extinction, of armed piracy on the coast of China must be attributed largely to the commercial development, in which the extension of the use of steam has played the principal part. Organised by foreigners, and employed by Chinese, lines of powerful steamers have gradually monopolised the valuable traffic, thus rendering the calling of the buccaneer obsolete and profitless. Foreign traders, however, do well not to forget the debt they owe to the institution which they have superseded. But for the pirates, and the scarcely less piratical exactions of officials, the Chinese would not have sought the assistance and the protection of foreign men, foreign ships, or foreign steamers. Piracy has thus not only worked towards its own cure, but has helped to inaugurate an era of prosperous trade, based on the consolidation of the interests of Chinese and foreigners, such as may foreshadow further developments in which the same elements of success may continue in fruitful combination. 308

While giving full credit to the tireless efforts of the British fleet in China—the only one that ever involved itself in such matters—and to the persistent work of the colony of Hong Kong, the decline, if not the end, of armed piracy on the Chinese coast should be mostly credited to commercial growth, with the expansion of steam power playing a key role. Organized by foreigners and operated by Chinese, fleets of powerful steamers have gradually taken over the valuable trade, making piracy outdated and unprofitable. However, foreign traders should not forget the debt they owe to the system they replaced. If it weren't for the pirates and the nearly as exploitative demands of officials, the Chinese wouldn't have sought the help and protection of foreign men, ships, or steamers. Piracy has therefore not only contributed to its own downfall but has also helped to start a thriving trade era, based on the collaboration of Chinese and foreigners, which may lead to further developments where these successful elements continue to combine effectively. 308

CHAPTER XVII.

The Arrow War, 1856-1860.

Lorchas—Outrage on the Arrow—Question of access to city—Tone of British Foreign Office—Firm tone of British Government—Destruction of Canton factories and flight of foreign residents—Operations in river.

Lorchas—Outrage on the Arrow—Question of access to the city—Tone of the British Foreign Office—Firm tone of the British Government—Destruction of Canton factories and flight of foreign residents—Operations in the river.

From the earliest days of the British occupation it had been the aim of the Canton authorities to destroy the "junk" trade of Hongkong by obstructive regulations, for which the supplementary treaty of 1843 afforded them a certain warrant. But as the Chinese began to settle in large numbers on the island the claims of free commerce asserted themselves, and gradually made headway against the restrictive schemes of the mandarins. The Government fostered the legitimate commercial ambition of the Chinese colonists by passing ordinances whereby they were enabled to register vessels of their own, sail them under the British flag, and trade to such ports as were open to British shipping. Certificates of registry were granted only to men of substance and respectability who were lessees of Crown land in the colony. The class of vessel for which colonial registers were granted was of native build and rig, more or less modified, of good sea-going qualities, 309 known by the local name of lorcha. Naturally the Canton authorities looked askance at any measure aimed at the liberation of trade, and so truculent an imperial commissioner as Yeh was not likely to miss an opportunity of wreaking vengeance on the "native-born" who dared to exercise privileges derived from residence in the hateful colony.

From the early days of the British occupation, the Canton authorities aimed to eliminate the "junk" trade in Hong Kong through restrictive regulations, which were somewhat backed by the supplementary treaty of 1843. However, as more Chinese people began settling on the island, the desire for free trade started to push back against the mandarins' restrictive plans. The government supported the legitimate business aspirations of the Chinese colonists by enacting laws that allowed them to register their own vessels, sail them under the British flag, and trade at ports open to British shipping. Registration certificates were only given to reputable individuals who held leases on Crown land in the colony. The type of vessel eligible for colonial registration was typically locally made and designed, known as a lorcha, which had good sea-going capabilities. Understandably, the Canton authorities viewed any efforts to free trade with suspicion, and a fierce imperial commissioner like Yeh was unlikely to pass up a chance to take revenge on the "native-born" who dared to enjoy privileges from living in the despised colony. 309

One of these registered vessels was the Arrow, commanded by an Englishman and manned by Chinese. This vessel was in the course of her traffic boarded at Canton at midday on October 8, 1856, by order of the Chinese authorities, with marked official ostentation, her crew forcibly carried off on a charge, according to a Chinese version, "of being in collusion with barbarians," and her ensign hauled down. How this outrage on the British flag was perpetrated, how resisted, and what came of it, have been so often set forth that there is no need to dwell upon the details here. The traditional insolence of the Chinese was reasserted in all its virulence, as in the days of Commissioner Lin, and once more the British agents were confronted with the dilemma of aggravating past griefs by submission or of putting their foot down and ending them. A single-minded and courageous man was in charge of British interests in Canton, and, left with a free hand, there could be no doubting the line Mr Parkes would take. The decision, however, lay with Sir John Bowring, governor of Hongkong, her Majesty's plenipotentiary and superintendent of trade, and with the naval commander-in-chief, Sir Michael Seymour.

One of these registered vessels was the Arrow, commanded by an Englishman and crewed by Chinese. This ship was boarded in Canton at noon on October 8, 1856, by order of the Chinese authorities, in a very public manner. Her crew was forcibly taken away on the accusation, according to the Chinese version, "of colluding with foreigners," and her flag was lowered. The details of how this violation of the British flag occurred, how it was resisted, and what resulted from it have been recounted so often that there's no need to go into them here. The traditional arrogance of the Chinese was displayed in full force, just like in the days of Commissioner Lin, and once again, British officials faced the choice of worsening past grievances through submission or putting their foot down to end them. A determined and brave man was leading British interests in Canton, and with a free hand, there was no question about the course Mr. Parkes would choose. However, the final decision rested with Sir John Bowring, the governor of Hong Kong, Her Majesty's representative and trade superintendent, along with the naval commander-in-chief, Sir Michael Seymour.

We have seen that the likelihood of sooner or later having to clear accounts with the authorities of Canton 310 had not been absent from the mind of her Majesty's Government for some years previously, though by no initial act of their own would they have brought the question to a crisis. If the governor entertained doubts whether the Arrow insult furnished adequate provocation, his decision was materially helped by the deadlock in relations which followed. A simple amende for the indignity offered to the flag was asked for, such as the Chinese were adepts in devising without "losing face"; but all discussion was refused; the viceroy would not admit any foreign official to a personal conference. The small Arrow question thus became merged in the larger one of access to the city, and to the provincial authorities, which had on various pretexts been denied to the British representatives in contravention of the treaty of 1842.

We have observed that the possibility of having to settle matters with the authorities of Canton 310 had been on the radar of her Majesty's Government for several years, although they would not have initiated a crisis on their own. If the governor had any doubts about whether the Arrow incident was enough provocation, his decision was significantly influenced by the diplomatic deadlock that followed. A simple amende for the disrespect shown to the flag was requested, something the Chinese were skilled at arranging without "losing face"; however, all discussions were shut down; the viceroy refused to allow any foreign official to meet with him personally. Thus, the minor Arrow issue became intertwined with the larger issue of gaining access to the city and the provincial authorities, which had been denied to British representatives under various pretenses, violating the treaty of 1842.

It happened that the question had lately assumed a somewhat definite place in the agenda of the British plenipotentiary. Lord Clarendon had in 1854 instructed Sir John Bowring to take any opportunity of bringing the "city question" to a solution, and Sir John addressed a long despatch to Commissioner Yeh on the subject in April of that year. It had no effect, and was followed up a few months later by an effort in another direction. The turbulent character of the Cantonese people and the impracticable arrogance of the imperial officers who successively held office there had often prompted an appeal to Cæsar, and more than one attempt had been made in times gone by to submit the Canton grievances to the judgment of the Imperial Court. These attempts were inspired by a total misconception of the relations between the provinces and the capital. In the year 1854, however, 311 it was decided to renew the effort to open direct communications with the Imperial Government. And circumstances seemed to promise a more favourable issue to the mission than had attended preceding ones. The time had come when a revision of the tariff and commercial articles of the treaties might be claimed, and besides the standing grievance at Canton there were sundry matters in connection with the fulfilment of the treaties which together constituted a justifying pretext for an unarmed expedition to the Peiho. The chances of a favourable reception were thought to be strengthened by the combination of the Treaty Powers. Sir John Bowring and the American Minister, Mr McLane, accordingly went together, with a competent staff of interpreters, to Tientsin, where they were soon followed by the French secretary of Legation.

It turned out that the question had recently become a significant item on the agenda of the British representative. Lord Clarendon had instructed Sir John Bowring in 1854 to seize any opportunity to resolve the "city question," and Sir John sent a lengthy dispatch to Commissioner Yeh on this topic in April of that year. It had no impact and was followed up a few months later by an effort in a different direction. The volatile nature of the people of Canton and the stubborn arrogance of the imperial officials who held office there had often led to appeals to the Emperor, and there had been more than one attempt in the past to submit the grievances of Canton to the Imperial Court. These attempts were fueled by a complete misunderstanding of the relationship between the provinces and the capital. In 1854, however, it was decided to renew efforts to establish direct communication with the Imperial Government. Circumstances appeared to offer a more favorable outcome for this mission than previous ones. It seemed like the time had come to request a revision of the tariff and commercial articles of the treaties, and aside from the ongoing grievances in Canton, there were various issues related to the enforcement of the treaties that provided a justifiable reason for an unarmed expedition to the Peiho. The likelihood of a warm welcome was believed to be increased by the unity of the Treaty Powers. Therefore, Sir John Bowring and the American Minister, Mr. McLane, traveled together, accompanied by a skilled team of interpreters, to Tientsin, where they were soon joined by the French secretary of Legation.

High officials were appointed to treat with them, because it was feared that if some courtesy were not shown them the barbarians would return south and join the rebels, who were then threatening the southern provinces. But the net result of the mission was that it was allowed to depart in peace. Lord Elgin, commenting on the proceedings, sums up the instructions to the Chinese officials, gathered from the secret reports afterwards discovered, as, "Get rid of the barbarians," which would be an equally exhaustive rendering of all the instructions ever given to Chinese plenipotentiaries. On the occasion of this visit to the Peiho the foreign plenipotentiaries resorted, as had been done on sundry previous occasions, to the oriental custom of approaching a great man gift in hand. In the depleted condition of the imperial treasury they 312 calculated that the recovery of the duties unpaid during the recent interregnum at Shanghai would be a tempting bait to the Peking Government. The offer, however, could not, it would appear, be intelligibly conveyed to the minds of the northern functionaries: unacquainted with commercial affairs, and misconstruing the proposal as a plea for the forgiveness of arrears, they at once conceded the sop to Cerberus, pleased to have such a convenient way of closing the mouths of the barbarians.

High-ranking officials were appointed to negotiate with them, as there was a concern that if some respect wasn't shown, the barbarians would head south and join the rebels, who were then posing a threat to the southern provinces. However, the overall outcome of the mission was that it was allowed to leave peacefully. Lord Elgin, commenting on the events, summarizes the instructions to the Chinese officials, collected from secret reports later found, as "Get rid of the barbarians," which could serve as a comprehensive summary of all the instructions ever given to Chinese envoys. During this visit to the Peiho, the foreign envoys followed the customary practice of presenting a gift when approaching a powerful figure, as had been done on several previous occasions. Given the depleted state of the imperial treasury, they thought that recovering the unpaid duties from the recent interruption in Shanghai would be an attractive offer for the Peking Government. However, it seems this proposal couldn't be clearly explained to the northern officials; unfamiliar with commercial matters and misinterpreting the proposal as a request for the forgiveness of debts, they readily accepted it, happy to have such an easy way to silence the barbarians.

In December following a favourable opportunity seemed to present itself for renewing the attack on the exclusiveness of Canton. The Taiping rebels had blockaded the river, and in a "pitched battle" defeated the imperialist fleet and were actually threatening the city. In this emergency Yeh implored the aid of the English forces. Sir John Bowring thereupon proceeded to Canton with a naval force of five ships to protect the foreign factories, the presence of the squadron having at the same time the desired deterrent effect on the rebels, who withdrew their forces. Now at last the governor felt confident that the barrier to intercourse was removed, and he applied to the viceroy for an interview; but Yeh remained obdurate, refused audience as before, and with all the old contumely. Precisely the same thing had happened in the north in 1853, when the governor of Kiangsu applied through Consul Alcock to the superintendent of trade, Sir George Bonham, for the assistance of one of her Majesty's ships in defending Nanking against the expected attack of the Taipings. Divers communications of like tenor had, during several months, led up to this definite application. The appeal 313 was most urgent, and yet in the title given to her Majesty's plenipotentiary the two important characters had been omitted, indicating that his power emanated from the ruler of an "independent sovereign state." "Such an omission," remarked Mr Alcock, "is characteristic of the race we have to deal with, for even in a time of danger to the national existence they cannot suppress their arrogance and contempt for barbarians." Arrogant and contemptuous of course they were, and yet it may perhaps be questioned whether such terms fully explain the mutilation of the plenipotentiary's official titles. Although they had been compelled by mechanical force to accord titles implying equality to foreign officials, yet in the innermost conviction of the Chinese an independent sovereign State was at that time almost unthinkable, and could only be expressed by a solecism. If, therefore, we ask how an imperial commissioner could demean himself by soliciting protection from the barbarians to whom he was denying the scantiest courtesy, we have to consider the point of view from which China had from time immemorial and without challenge regarded all the outer States. For it is the point of view that is paradoxical. To Yeh, considering barbarians merely as refractory subjects, there was no inconsistence in commanding their aid, while denying their requests. The position is analogous to that of Ultramontanes, who claim tolerance for themselves in heretical communities by a divine right which excludes the idea of reciprocity. This key to the history of foreign intercourse with China is too often forgotten.

In December, a promising opportunity arose to renew the attack on the exclusivity of Canton. The Taiping rebels had blockaded the river and defeated the imperial fleet in a "pitched battle," threatening the city. In this crisis, Yeh urgently sought help from the English forces. Sir John Bowring then went to Canton with a naval force of five ships to protect the foreign factories. The presence of the squadron had the desired deterrent effect on the rebels, who pulled back their forces. Finally, the governor felt sure that the barrier to communication was lifted, and he asked the viceroy for a meeting. However, Yeh remained stubborn, refusing to meet him as before, treating him with the same disdain. This exact situation had played out in the north in 1853, when the governor of Kiangsu asked Consul Alcock to request assistance from Sir George Bonham for one of her Majesty's ships to defend Nanking against the expected Taiping attack. Over several months, various communications led to this urgent request. Yet, in the title given to her Majesty's representative, two important titles were omitted, suggesting his authority came from the ruler of an "independent sovereign state." Mr. Alcock noted, "Such an omission is typical of the people we’re dealing with; even during a time when national survival is at stake, they can't hide their arrogance and disdain for outsiders." They were indeed arrogant and contemptuous, yet it can be questioned whether such terms fully explain the omission of the plenipotentiary's official titles. Even though they had been forced to grant titles implying equality to foreign officials, in the deepest belief of the Chinese, the idea of an independent sovereign state was almost unimaginable and could only be expressed through a verbal mistake. Therefore, if we wonder how an imperial commissioner could lower himself by seeking protection from the outsiders he was denying the slightest courtesy, we must consider the perspective from which China has long viewed all foreign states. This paradoxical viewpoint is crucial. To Yeh, seeing outsiders merely as disobedient subjects, there was no inconsistency in demanding their help while refusing their requests. This situation is similar to that of Ultramontanes, who claim tolerance for themselves in heretical communities based on a divine right that excludes the notion of reciprocity. This essential understanding of the history of foreign relations with China is often overlooked.

Nothing daunted, Sir John returned to the charge in June 1855, on the occasion of the appointment of 314 the new consul, Mr Alcock, whom he asked permission to introduce to the Imperial Commissioner. His letter was not even acknowledged for a month, and then in the usual contemptuous terms.

Nothing discouraged, Sir John went back to the task in June 1855, when the new consul, Mr. Alcock, was appointed. He requested permission to introduce him to the Imperial Commissioner. His letter went unacknowledged for a month and was then responded to in the usual dismissive manner.

So far, indeed, from Yeh's being mollified by the assistance indirectly accorded to him in defending the city from rebel attack, or by the succession of respectful appeals made to him by Sir John Bowring, a new campaign of aggression was inaugurated against the lives and liberties of the foreign residents in Canton. This followed the traditional course. Inflammatory placards denouncing foreigners, and holding them up to the odium of the populace, were extensively posted about the city and suburbs in the summer of 1856. These, as usual, were followed by personal attacks on isolated Englishmen found defenceless, and, following the precedents of ten years before, the outbreaks of anti-foreign feeling in Canton found their echo also in Foochow, where an American gentleman met his death in a riot which was got up there in July. So serious was the situation becoming that Mr Consul Parkes, who had succeeded Mr Alcock in June, solemnly warned the Imperial Commissioner that such acts, if not promptly discountenanced by the authorities (who of course were well known to be the instigators), must inevitably lead to deplorable consequences. The Chinese reply to this remonstrance was the outrage on the lorcha Arrow. To isolate that incident, therefore, would be wholly to miss the significance of it: it would be to mistake the match for the mine.

So far, instead of being calmed by the help he indirectly received in defending the city from rebel attacks, or by the respectful requests from Sir John Bowring, Yeh launched a new campaign against the lives and freedoms of foreign residents in Canton. This followed the traditional pattern. Inflammatory posters condemning foreigners and inciting public outrage were widely distributed throughout the city and suburbs in the summer of 1856. As usual, these were followed by personal assaults on isolated Englishmen who were left defenseless, and echoing the events of ten years earlier, the surge of anti-foreign sentiment in Canton was also felt in Foochow, where an American man lost his life in a riot there in July. The situation was becoming so serious that Mr. Consul Parkes, who had taken over from Mr. Alcock in June, formally warned the Imperial Commissioner that such acts, if not promptly condemned by the authorities (who, of course, were known to be the instigators), would inevitably lead to tragic consequences. The Chinese response to this warning was the assault on the lorcha Arrow. Isolating that incident would completely overlook its significance; it would be confusing the spark with the explosive.

Those who were on the spot and familiar with antecedent events could have no doubt whatever that, 315 in condoning the present insults, the British authorities would have invited greater and always greater, as in the days of Lin. The tone of recent despatches from the Foreign Office fortified the governor in taking a strong resolution; the clearness of Consul Parkes' view made also a deep impression on him; and yet another factor should not be altogether overlooked which contributed its share in bringing the two responsible officials to a definite decision. It was not an unknown phenomenon in public life that two functionaries whose co-operation was essential should mistrust each other. This was distinctly the case with Sir John Bowring and Sir Michael Seymour. They needed some connecting medium to make them mutually intelligible, and it was found in the influence of local public opinion. The mercantile community, which for twenty years, or as long as they had had utterance, had never wavered in the conviction that in strength alone lay their safety, were to a man for vigorous measures at Canton. And it happened that, scarcely perceived either by themselves or by the other parties concerned, they possessed a special channel for bringing the force of their views to bear on the two responsible men. Sir John Bowring had himself deplored "the enormous influence wielded by the great and opulent commercial houses" when adverse to his projects. He was now to experience that influence in another sense, without perhaps recognising it, for when the wind is fair it makes slight impression on those whose sails it fills.

Those who were present and familiar with past events couldn't doubt that, 315 by ignoring the current insults, the British authorities were only inviting more trouble, just like in Lin's time. The tone of recent messages from the Foreign Office encouraged the governor to take a firm stand; Consul Parkes' clear perspective also left a strong impact on him. Another factor shouldn't be overlooked, which helped bring the two key officials to a clear decision. It’s not uncommon in public life for two officials who need to work together to mistrust each other. This was definitely the case with Sir John Bowring and Sir Michael Seymour. They needed a way to communicate effectively, and that way was found in local public opinion. The business community, which had always believed that strength was the key to their safety, was unanimously in favor of strong measures in Canton. Interestingly, they had a unique way to express their views to the two responsible officials, though neither party fully recognized this. Sir John Bowring had lamented "the enormous influence wielded by the big, rich commercial houses" when they opposed his plans. Now, he would experience that influence in a different way, possibly without realizing it, for when the wind is favorable, it hardly affects those it supports.

Among the business houses in China two stood pre-eminent. One had a son of the plenipotentiary 316 for partner; both were noted for their princely hospitality, especially to officers of the navy. "Those princely merchants, Dent & Co., as well as Matheson," writes Admiral Keppel in his Diary, "kept open house. They lived in palaces." One of the two buildings occupied by the former firm, "Kiying House," which some twenty years later became the Hongkong Hotel, was as good as a naval club for all ranks, while admirals and post-captains found snug anchorage within the adjoining domain of the seniors of the firm. The two great houses did not always pull together, but on this occasion their separate action, converging on a single point, was more effectual than any half-hearted combination could have been. Night after night was the question of Canton discussed with slow deliberation and accumulating emphasis in the executive and the administrative, the naval and the political, camps respectively. Conviction was imbibed with the claret and cheroots, and it was not altogether without reason that what followed has sometimes been called the "Merchants' War."

Among the businesses in China, two were particularly prominent. One had a son of the ambassador as a partner; both were known for their lavish hospitality, especially towards navy officers. "Those generous merchants, Dent & Co., as well as Matheson," writes Admiral Keppel in his Diary, "always kept their doors open. They lived in luxurious houses." One of the two buildings used by the former firm, "Kiying House," which about twenty years later became the Hongkong Hotel, was practically a naval club for all ranks, while admirals and post-captains found a comfortable haven in the neighboring area of the firm's senior members. The two major businesses didn't always work together, but in this case, their individual efforts, focused on a single objective, proved to be more effective than any half-hearted collaboration could have been. Night after night, the situation in Canton was debated with careful thought and increasing intensity across the executive and administrative, naval and political spheres. Opinions were formed over claret and cigars, and it was not without reason that what followed has sometimes been referred to as the "Merchants' War."

The die was cast. The great Canton bubble, the bugbear of a succession of British Governments and representatives, was at last to be pricked, though with a delay which, however regrettable at the time, perhaps conduced to greater thoroughness in the long-run. Those of our readers who desire to trace the various operations against Canton during the twelve months which followed cannot do better than consult Mr Stanley Lane-Poole's 'Life of Sir Harry Parkes,' the volume of 'Times' correspondence by that sage observer and vivacious narrator, Mr Wingrove 317 Cooke, and the delightful sailors book recently published by Vice-Admiral Sir W. R. Kennedy. The campaign unfolded itself in a drama of surprises. The force at the admiral's disposal being too small to follow up the initial movement against the city, which gave no sign of yielding by first intention, Sir Michael Seymour had to content himself with intimating to the Viceroy Yeh that, notwithstanding his Excellency's interdict, he had, with a guard of bluejackets, visited the Viceregal Yamên; and with keeping hostilities alive by a blockade of the river while awaiting reinforcements.

The die was cast. The huge Canton crisis, the source of constant trouble for a series of British Governments and officials, was finally going to be addressed, though the delay, while unfortunate at the time, may have led to more thorough action in the long run. Readers interested in following the various operations against Canton in the twelve months that followed would do well to check out Mr. Stanley Lane-Poole's 'Life of Sir Harry Parkes,' the collection of 'Times' correspondence by the insightful and lively reporter, Mr. Wingrove Cooke, and the enjoyable sailors' book recently published by Vice-Admiral Sir W. R. Kennedy. The campaign unfolded like a dramatic series of surprises. The force at the admiral's disposal was too small to pursue the initial attack on the city, which showed no signs of yielding, so Sir Michael Seymour had to settle for notifying Viceroy Yeh that, despite his Excellency's ban, he had visited the Viceregal Yamên with a group of sailors, and he kept hostilities alive by blockading the river while waiting for reinforcements.

The Arrow incident occurred in October. In December the foreign factories were burned by the Chinese, and the Viceroy Yeh issued proclamations offering rewards for English heads. The mercantile community retired to Hongkong, a few to the quieter retreat of Macao. The vengeance of Commissioner Yeh pursued them exactly as that of Commissioner Lin had done in 1839. Assassinations were not infrequent on the outskirts of the city of Victoria; and in January 1857 the principal baker in the colony was induced to put a sack of arsenic into his morning supply of bread, which only failed of its effect through the excess of the dose acting as an emetic.

The Arrow incident happened in October. By December, the Chinese burned the foreign factories, and Viceroy Yeh issued proclamations offering rewards for English heads. The business community retreated to Hong Kong, while a few chose the quieter escape of Macao. Commissioner Yeh's vengeance tracked them down just like Commissioner Lin’s had in 1839. Assassinations weren’t uncommon on the outskirts of Victoria; in January 1857, the main baker in the colony was persuaded to mix a sack of arsenic into his morning bread supply, which only failed to have the desired effect because the large dosage acted as an emetic.

The early portion of the year 1857 was enlivened by active operations in hunting out Chinese war-junks in the various creeks and branches of the river, commenced by Commodore Elliot and continued on a brilliant scale by Commodore H. Keppel, who arrived opportunely in the frigate Raleigh, of which he speaks with so much pride and affection in his Memoirs. That 318 fine vessel, however, was lost on a rock approaching Macao, sinking in shallow water in the act of saluting the French flag, a war vessel of that nationality having been descried in the anchorage. The commodore and his officers and crew, thus detached, were soon accommodated with small craft good for river service, and in a very short time they made a memorable cutting-out expedition as far as the city of Fatshan, destroying formidable and well-posted fleets of war-junks in what the commodore described as "one of the prettiest boat actions recorded in naval history." Sir W. Kennedy served as a midshipman in those expeditions, and his descriptions supply a much-needed supplement to that of the Admiral of the Fleet, correcting it in some particulars and filling in the gaps in a wonderfully realistic manner. No adequate estimate can be formed of the importance of the year's operations in the Canton river without reading Admiral Kennedy's brilliant but simple story.

The beginning of 1857 was filled with active efforts to hunt down Chinese war junks in the various creeks and branches of the river. This initiative started with Commodore Elliot and was carried out on a grand scale by Commodore H. Keppel, who arrived just in time on the frigate Raleigh, which he talks about with great pride and affection in his Memoirs. Unfortunately, that 318 beautiful ship was lost on a rock near Macao, sinking in shallow water while saluting the French flag, as a warship of that nationality was spotted in the anchorage. The commodore and his officers and crew were soon provided with small boats suitable for river service, and shortly after, they undertook a memorable cutting-out expedition all the way to the city of Fatshan, destroying strong and well-positioned fleets of war junks in what the commodore described as "one of the prettiest boat actions recorded in naval history." Sir W. Kennedy served as a midshipman during those operations, and his accounts provide a much-needed supplement to the Admiral of the Fleet's narrative, correcting some details and filling in the gaps in a remarkably realistic way. One cannot fully appreciate the significance of that year's operations in the Canton river without reading Admiral Kennedy's engaging yet straightforward story.

The Canton imbroglio made the kind of impression that such occurrences are apt to do in England. The merits of the case being usually ignored, the bare incidents furnish convenient weapons with which to assail the Government that happens to be in office. Under such conditions statements can be made and arguments applied with all the freedom of a debating club. The Arrow trouble occasioned a temporary fusion of the most incongruous elements in English politics. When Lord Derby, Lord Lyndhurst, Bishop Wilberforce, Mr Cobden, Mr Bright, Mr Gladstone, and Mr Disraeli were found banded together as one man, it was neither common knowledge nor any sincere interest in the question at issue, but "unanimosity" towards the Premier, 319 that inspired them. The Opposition orators took their brief from the published despatches of Commissioner Yeh, which they assumed as the starting-point of the China question, and found no difficulty whatever in discovering all the nobility and good faith on the Chinese side, the perfidy and brutality on the side of the British representative. Though successful in carrying a vote of censure on the Government, the attitude of the Coalition did not impress the public, and Lord Palmerston's appeal to the electorate was responded to by his being returned to power by a large majority.

The Canton situation made an impression typical of such events in England. The actual merits of the case were usually ignored, and the bare facts provided easy tools to attack the Government in power. In this environment, claims could be made, and arguments could be formed with the freedom of a debate club. The Arrow issue brought together an unusual mix of factions in English politics. When Lord Derby, Lord Lyndhurst, Bishop Wilberforce, Mr. Cobden, Mr. Bright, Mr. Gladstone, and Mr. Disraeli joined forces, it wasn’t due to a common understanding or genuine interest in the matter at hand, but rather a shared "unanimosity" towards the Prime Minister, 319. The Opposition speakers based their arguments on the published dispatches from Commissioner Yeh, which they took as the starting point for the China issue, easily finding nobility and good faith on the Chinese side and deceit and cruelty from the British representative. Although they succeeded in passing a vote of censure against the Government, the Coalition's stance did not resonate with the public, and Lord Palmerston’s appeal to voters resulted in him being returned to power with a significant majority.

How very little the question itself affected public men in England may be inferred from the notices of it in the Memoirs, since published, of leading statesmen of the period. The fate of China, or of British commerce there, was not in their minds at all, their horizon being bounded by the immediate fate of the Ministry, to them the be-all and end-all of national policy. What deplorable consequences all over the world have arisen from the insouciance of British statesmen as regards all matters outside the arena of their party conflicts!

How little the question itself impacted public figures in England can be seen in the accounts now published in the Memoirs of key politicians from that time. The future of China or British trade there wasn't something they considered at all; their focus was solely on the immediate future of their government, which to them was the most important aspect of national policy. What terrible consequences have unfolded worldwide due to the indifference of British politicians towards issues outside their party battles!

Sir John Bowring was made the scapegoat of the war. A philosophical Radical, he had been president of the Peace Society, and his quondam friends could not forgive a doctrinaire who yielded to the stern logic of facts. As consul at Canton he had had better opportunities of studying the question of intercourse with the Chinese than any holder of his office either before or since his time. No one had worked more persistently for the exercise of the right of entry into Canton. Superseded in the office 320 of plenipotentiary by the appointment of the Earl of Elgin as High Commissioner for Great Britain, Sir John Bowring remained Governor of Hongkong, and it fell to him to "do the honours" to his successor, from whom he received scant consideration. Indeed Lord Elgin made no secret of his aversion to the colony and all its concerns, and marked his feeling towards the governor by determining that he should never see the city of Canton—that Promised Land so soon to be opened to the world through Sir John's instrumentality.

Sir John Bowring became the scapegoat for the war. A philosophical Radical, he had been the president of the Peace Society, and his former friends couldn't forgive a thinker who gave in to the harsh realities of facts. As consul in Canton, he had better chances to study the issue of trade with the Chinese than anyone else in his position before or after him. No one fought harder for the right to enter Canton. Replaced as plenipotentiary when the Earl of Elgin was appointed High Commissioner for Great Britain, Sir John Bowring stayed on as Governor of Hong Kong, and it was his job to “do the honors” for his successor, who hardly acknowledged him. In fact, Lord Elgin didn't hide his dislike for the colony and everything about it, showing his disdain for the governor by making sure he would never see the city of Canton—the Promised Land that would soon be opened to the world through Sir John’s efforts.

I. THE EARL OF ELGIN AND HIS MISSION.

Capture of Canton—The Treaty of Tientsin—Comments on the treaty—Sequel to the treaty—Omission to visit Peking—Comments thereon—How to deal with Chinese—Commissioners to Shanghai to negotiate the tariff—Two pressing questions to be settled—Delay of Commissioners' arrival—Resentment of Lord Elgin and change of tactics re Canton—Canton question same as Chinese question—Chinese demand for abandonment of Resident Minister—Lord Elgin's assent—Comments thereon—Treaty with Japan—The Taku disaster.

Capture of Canton—The Treaty of Tientsin—Thoughts on the treaty—Aftermath of the treaty—Not visiting Peking—Thoughts on that—How to approach the Chinese—Commissioners heading to Shanghai to discuss the tariff—Two urgent issues to resolve—Delay in the Commissioners' arrival—Lord Elgin's frustration and revised strategy regarding Canton—The Canton issue is the same as the Chinese issue—Chinese demand to get rid of the Resident Minister—Lord Elgin's agreement—Thoughts on that—Treaty with Japan—The Taku disaster.

The transports bringing the troops from England were meanwhile hurrying at top speed—not in those days a very high one—round the Cape of Good Hope, and the navy was being reinforced by several powerful ships, including the mosquito squadron of gunboats which were destined to play so useful a part, first in the operations of war, and subsequently in patrolling the coast and rivers for the protection of peaceful traders. Lord Elgin's arrival in Hongkong, coinciding in time with that of the frigates Shannon, commanded by Sir William Peel, and Pearl, Captain 321 Sotheby, put heart into the long-suffering British community at the port. But sinister news from India had reached Lord Elgin on his voyage to China, in consequence of which, and on the urgent request of the Governor-General, he took on himself to intercept the troopships wherever they could be met with, and turn their course to Calcutta. Before he had been many days in Hongkong, foreseeing an indefinite period of inaction in China, and being obliged in any case to wait the arrival of his French colleague, without whom no French co-operation could be had, Lord Elgin determined to proceed himself to Calcutta, taking with him the two frigates Shannon and Pearl. This welcome reinforcement not only arrived opportunely in India, but, as is well known, did heroic service in throwing back the tide of mutiny.

The ships bringing the troops from England were rushing at top speed—not that it was very fast back then—around the Cape of Good Hope, and the navy was being bolstered by several powerful ships, including the mosquito squadron of gunboats that were set to play an important role, first in the military operations, and later in patrolling the coast and rivers to protect peaceful traders. Lord Elgin's arrival in Hong Kong coincided with that of the frigates Shannon, commanded by Sir William Peel, and Pearl, Captain 321 Sotheby, which lifted the spirits of the long-suffering British community at the port. However, troubling news from India reached Lord Elgin during his journey to China, which led him, at the urgent request of the Governor-General, to take it upon himself to intercept the troopships wherever he could find them and redirect them to Calcutta. After a few days in Hong Kong, anticipating a long period of inactivity in China and needing to await the arrival of his French colleague—without whom no French cooperation could be achieved—Lord Elgin decided to head to Calcutta himself, bringing along the two frigates Shannon and Pearl. This welcome reinforcement not only arrived just in time in India but, as is well known, did heroic work in pushing back the tide of rebellion.

Fortune seemed in all this to be favouring the Chinese, nothing more hurtful threatening them than a passive blockade of the Canton river and its branches. But a fresh expedition was promptly despatched from England to take the place of that which had been diverted to India. A body of 1500 marines arrived in the autumn, and on them, supplemented by the Hongkong garrison, devolved the duty of bringing China to terms, the navy, of course, being the essential arm in all these operations.

Fortune seemed to be on the side of the Chinese in all of this, with nothing more damaging threatening them than a passive blockade of the Canton River and its branches. However, a new expedition was quickly sent from England to replace the one that had been redirected to India. A group of 1,500 marines arrived in the fall, and along with the Hong Kong garrison, they were tasked with bringing China to terms, with the navy being the key force in all these operations.

Lord Elgin returned to China in ample time to meet the French plenipotentiary, Baron Gros. His lordship's policy had from the first been an interesting theme for speculation, not less so as the time for putting it in force drew near. It had been surmised that his object would be to leave Canton alone, and set out on another wild-goose chase to the north. 322 That so futile a scheme should not be carried out without at least a protest, the mercantile community met Lord Elgin on his arrival in June with an address couched in the following terms:—

Lord Elgin returned to China just in time to meet the French representative, Baron Gros. His approach had always been an interesting topic for discussion, even more so as the time to implement it approached. People speculated that his goal would be to leave Canton alone and embark on another pointless mission to the north. 322 To ensure that such a pointless plan wasn't carried out without at least a complaint, the business community greeted Lord Elgin upon his arrival in June with a statement that read as follows:—

We venture upon no opinion at present respecting the readjustment of our relations with the empire at large, though always prepared to hold our advice and experience at your lordship's command; but upon that branch of the question which we distinguish as the "Canton difficulty" we would take this, the earliest opportunity, of recording our opinion—an opinion founded upon long, reluctant, and, we may add, traditional experience—that any compromise of it, or any sort of settlement which shall stop short of the complete humiliation of the Cantonese,—which shall fail to teach them a wholesome respect for the obligations of their own Government in its relations with independent Powers, and a more hospitable reception of the foreigner who resorts to their shores for the peaceable purposes of trade,—will only result in further suffering to themselves and further disastrous interruptions to us.

We currently have no opinion about readjusting our relations with the empire as a whole, but we are always ready to offer our advice and experience at your lordship's request. However, regarding the issue we refer to as the "Canton difficulty," we want to take this early opportunity to share our view—one based on extensive, reluctant, and, we might add, traditional experience—that any compromise or settlement that does not lead to the complete humiliation of the Cantonese, which doesn't ensure they learn to respect their government's obligations to independent Powers, and doesn’t promote a more welcoming attitude toward foreigners who come to their shores for peaceful trade, will only lead to more suffering for them and further disastrous interruptions for us.

Many of us have already been heavy sufferers by the present difficulty. It must be apparent to your lordship that our best interests lie upon the side of peace, and upon the earliest solid peace that can be obtained. But, notwithstanding this, we would most earnestly deprecate any settlement of the question which should not have eliminated from it the very last element of future disorder.

Many of us are already feeling the weight of the current challenge. It should be clear to you that our greatest interests are aligned with peace, particularly a lasting peace achieved as soon as possible. However, we strongly urge against any resolution of the issue that does not remove every possible cause of future conflict.

The meaning of these weighty words, as interpreted by Wingrove Cooke, was, "You must take Canton, my lord, and negotiate at Peking with Canton in your possession." And he adds, "Such is the opinion of every one here, from the highest to the lowest." We learn from his private letters that it was by no means the opinion of the new plenipotentiary. "The course I am about to follow," he writes, "does not square with the views of the merchants." Yet his reply to 323 their address was so diplomatic that he was able to say "it gave them for the moment wonderful satisfaction." The editor of Lord Elgin's letters suppresses the rest of the sentence. The new plenipotentiary hoped even "to conclude a treaty in Shanghai, and hasten home afterwards,"—a hope which could only coexist with an entire disregard of our whole previous experience in China; almost, one might argue, with an entire ignorance of the record.[37]

The meaning of these significant words, as interpreted by Wingrove Cooke, was, "You need to take Canton, my lord, and negotiate in Beijing with Canton under your control." He added, "That’s the opinion of everyone here, from the highest to the lowest." We learn from his private letters that the new plenipotentiary didn’t share this view at all. "The approach I'm planning to take," he writes, "doesn’t align with what the merchants think." Yet, his response to their address was so diplomatic that he could claim "it provided them with wonderful satisfaction for the moment." The editor of Lord Elgin's letters leaves out the rest of the sentence. The new plenipotentiary even hoped "to finalize a treaty in Shanghai and rush home afterward,"—a hope that could only exist if he completely ignored our entire past experience in China; one might argue, with nearly total ignorance of the record.[37]

On his return from India, however, and on the assembling of the Allied forces, he found that the course prescribed by history and common-sense was, after all, the only practical one to follow, and that was to commence hostilities at Canton. Yet Lord Elgin seems to have submitted to the inexorable demands of circumstances with no very good grace. Indeed his attitude towards the Canton overture and his mission generally was decidedly anomalous. The two leading ideas running through the published portion of his correspondence were, "It revolts me, but I do it"; and, "Get the wretched business over and hurry home." Lord Elgin's mental constitution, as such, is of no interest to us except as it affected his acts and left its impress on the national interests in China. From that point of view, however, it is public property, and as much an ingredient in the history as any other quality of the makers of it. First, we find him at variance with the Government which commissioned him, in that he speaks with shame of his mission: "That wretched question of the Arrow is a scandal to us." Why? 324 Her Majesty's Government had deliberated maturely on the Arrow question, had referred it to their law officers, had concluded it was a good case, and had written unreservedly in that sense to their representative in China. Was it, then, greater knowledge, or superior judgment, that inspired Lord Elgin to an opposite opinion? And in either case would it not have been better to have had the point cleared up before undertaking the mission?

On his return from India, however, and with the Allied forces coming together, he realized that following the course laid out by history and common sense was, after all, the only practical option, which was to start hostilities at Canton. Yet Lord Elgin seemed to accept the unyielding demands of the situation with little enthusiasm. His overall attitude towards the Canton proposal and his mission was quite strange. The two main ideas reflected in the public portions of his correspondence were, "I find this revolting, but I’ll do it"; and, "Let’s get this dreadful task done and get back home." Lord Elgin's mental state isn't particularly relevant to us except for how it influenced his actions and impacted national interests in China. From that perspective, though, it's public information and just as much a part of history as any other trait of those who shaped it. First, we see him at odds with the Government that commissioned him since he expresses shame about his mission: "That ridiculous question of the Arrow is a scandal for us." Why? 324 Her Majesty's Government had thought carefully about the Arrow issue, consulted their legal experts, concluded it was a strong case, and communicated that clearly to their representative in China. So, was it greater knowledge or better judgment that led Lord Elgin to a different opinion? And wouldn’t it have been wiser to resolve this issue before taking on the mission?

But, in point of fact, the Arrow question was not the question with which Lord Elgin had to deal, as it had long before been merged, as we have said, into the much larger one of our official relations with China.

But, in reality, the Arrow question wasn’t the issue that Lord Elgin had to address, as it had long been incorporated, as we mentioned, into the much bigger issue of our official relations with China.

The truth seems to be that Lord Elgin came to China filled with the conviction that in all our disputes the Chinese had been the oppressed and we the oppressors. Of our intercourse with them he had nothing more complimentary or more definite to say than that it was "scandalous." For his own countrymen he had never a good word, for the Chinese nothing but good—until they came into collision with himself, when they at once became "fools and tricksters." Having assembled a hostile force in front of Canton, he writes, December 22, 1857, "I never felt so ashamed of myself in my life.... When I look at that town I feel that I am earning for myself a place in the Litany immediately after 'plague, pestilence, and famine.'" Becoming gradually reconciled to events, however, he writes, "If we can take the city without much massacre I shall think the job a good one, because no doubt the relations of the Cantonese with the foreign population were very unsatisfactory." 325 But why "massacre," much or little? It was but a phantasy of his own he was thus deprecating. The curious point is, however, that Lord Elgin imagined that everybody was bent on this massacre except himself, and when all was over, and "there never was a Chinese town which suffered so little by the occupation of a hostile force," he appropriates the whole credit for this satisfactory issue! "If," he writes, "Yeh had surrendered on the mild demand made upon him, I should have brought on my head the imprecations both of the navy and the army, and of the civilians, the time being given by the missionaries and the women." An insinuation so purely hypothetical and so sweeping would not be seriously considered in any relation of life whatsoever; but no one who knows either the navy or the army would hesitate to affirm that the humanity of every officer and man in these services was as much beyond reproach as Lord Elgin's own, albeit it might assume a different form of expression. When the city, "doomed to destruction from the folly of its own rulers and the vanity and levity of ours," had been occupied, and the bugbear of massacre had vanished, the object of Lord Elgin's sympathies became shifted: "I could not help feeling melancholy when I thought that we were so ruthlessly destroying"—not the place or the people, but—"the prestige of a place which has been for so many centuries intact and undefiled by the stranger." Had he written this after witnessing some of the horrors of the city described by Wingrove Cooke, possibly these regrets for its defilement might have been less poignant. But though reverence for the mere antiquity of China is a most salutary lesson to inculcate in these our days, it is 326 pathetic to see the particular man whose mission was to humble her historical prestige tortured by compunctions for what he is doing. One is tempted to wish the "job" had been intrusted to more commonplace hands.

The truth is that Lord Elgin arrived in China believing wholeheartedly that in all our conflicts, the Chinese were the victims and we were the oppressors. He had nothing better to say about our interactions with them than that it was "scandalous." He never said anything positive about his own countrymen but praised the Chinese—until he had a conflict with them, at which point they became "fools and tricksters." After gathering an opposing force in front of Canton, he wrote on December 22, 1857, "I have never felt so ashamed of myself in my life... When I look at that town, I feel like I am earning myself a spot in the Litany right after 'plague, pestilence, and famine.'" However, as he gradually came to terms with the situation, he wrote, "If we can take the city without much massacre, I will consider it a good job, because without a doubt, the relationship between the Cantonese and the foreign population was very unsatisfactory." 325 But why "massacre," much or little? That was just a fantasy of his own that he was downplaying. The interesting part is that Lord Elgin thought everyone else was eager for this massacre except him, and when it was all done, and "there never was a Chinese town that suffered so little from the occupation of a hostile force," he took all the credit for this favorable outcome! "If," he wrote, "Yeh had surrendered to the gentle demand made upon him, I would have attracted the anger of both the navy and the army, and of the civilians, taking into account the influence of the missionaries and the women." Such a purely hypothetical and sweeping insinuation shouldn't be seriously considered in any situation; however, anyone familiar with the navy or the army would agree that the compassion of every officer and soldier in those services was as above reproach as Lord Elgin's own, even if it expressed itself differently. When the city—"doomed to destruction from the foolishness of its own rulers and the arrogance and superficiality of ours"—was occupied, and the fear of massacre disappeared, Lord Elgin's sympathies shifted: "I couldn’t help but feel sad when I thought that we were so ruthlessly destroying"—not the city or the people, but—"the prestige of a place that has remained intact and undefiled by outsiders for so many centuries." Had he written this after witnessing some of the horrors described by Wingrove Cooke, perhaps his regrets about its defilement might have been less intense. Though honoring the mere antiquity of China is an important lesson to remember in our times, it is 326 pitiful to see the particular man whose mission was to diminish her historical prestige plagued by guilt for what he was doing. One can't help but wish that the "job" had been given to someone more ordinary.

Some of those English officials by whose vanity and levity the "city was doomed to destruction" were also writing their private letters, and this was the purport. "I confidently hope," wrote Mr Parkes, before Lord Elgin's first arrival in China, "that a satisfactory adjustment of all difficulties may be attained with a slight effusion of blood. Canton, it is true, must fall. I see no hope of any arrangement being arrived at without this primary step being effected, but I trust that with the fall of that city hostilities may end, and that the emperor may then consent to receive a representative at Peking." However, as soon as he gets to actual business with the Chinese, Lord Elgin finds that he also has to be stern even as others. As early as January 10, 1858, a week after the occupation of the city, "I addressed the governor in a pretty arrogant tone. I did so out of kindness, as I now know what fools they are, and what calamities they bring upon themselves, or rather on the wretched people, by their pride and trickery." But what the novice was only beginning to find out the veterans had learned years before.[38]

Some of those English officials whose arrogance and carelessness led to the "city being doomed to destruction" were also writing their private letters, and this was the gist. "I confidently hope," wrote Mr. Parkes, before Lord Elgin's first arrival in China, "that we can resolve all difficulties with minimal loss of life. It's true that Canton must fall. I see no chance of reaching any agreement without this first step being taken, but I trust that with the fall of that city, fighting may come to an end, and the emperor might then agree to meet with a representative in Peking." However, once he gets down to business with the Chinese, Lord Elgin realizes that he has to be tough like everyone else. As early as January 10, 1858, a week after taking over the city, "I addressed the governor in a pretty arrogant tone. I did this out of concern, since I now see how foolish they are and what disasters they cause for themselves, or rather for the unfortunate people, because of their pride and deceit." But what the newcomer was just beginning to understand, the experienced had learned years earlier. [38]

His attitude to his countrymen generally is scarcely less censorious than towards the officials who had borne, 327 and were yet to bear, the burden and heat of the day in China. From Calcutta he wrote:—

His attitude towards his fellow countrymen is hardly any less critical than it is towards the officials who had faced, 327 and would continue to face, the challenges and pressures of the day in China. From Calcutta he wrote:—

It is a terrible business being among inferior races. I have seldom from man or woman since I came to the East heard a sentence which was reconcilable with the hypothesis that Christianity had ever come into the world. Detestation, contempt, ferocity, vengeance, whether Chinamen or Indians be the object.

It’s really frustrating to be around people from lesser races. Since arriving in the East, I’ve rarely heard anything from men or women that suggests Christianity has made any impact on the world. There's nothing but hatred, scorn, brutality, and revenge, whether directed at Chinese or Indians.

From China:—

From China: —

The whole world just now is raving mad with a passion for killing and slaying, and it is difficult for a person in his sober senses, like myself, to keep his own among them.

The whole world right now is completely crazy with a passion for killing and violence, and it's tough for someone clear-headed, like me, to maintain my sanity among all of this.

Again:—

Again:—

I have seen more to disgust me with my fellow-countrymen than I saw during the whole course of my previous life.... I have an instinct in me which loves righteousness and hates iniquity, and all this keeps me in a perpetual boil.... The tone of the two or three men connected with mercantile houses in China whom I find on board is all for blood and massacre on a great scale.

I’ve seen more that disgusts me about my fellow countrymen than I ever did in my entire previous life. I have this instinct that loves what’s right and detests what’s wrong, and it keeps me constantly agitated. The attitude of the few men associated with trading companies in China who are on board is all about blood and mass slaughter.

The perennial fallacy that underlies the "one-righteous-man" theory from the days of Elijah the Tishbite downwards, and the ineptitude of all indiscriminate invective, would be sufficient answer to such sweeping maledictions. Below these ebullitions of the surface, however, there lay a grave misgiving in Lord Elgin's mind concerning his mission as a whole, in which many thoughtful people must have shared: "Whose work are we engaged in when we burst thus with hideous violence and brutal energy into these darkest and most mysterious recesses of the traditions of the past?" This was written at Tientsin after the passage of the forts, and it is well worth recalling, now that the 328 vultures of Europe are wheeling round the moribund empire.

The ongoing misconception behind the "one-righteous-man" theory since the days of Elijah the Tishbite, along with the foolishness of random insults, should be enough to respond to such broad curses. However, beneath these outbursts, there was a serious doubt in Lord Elgin's mind about his mission overall, which many thoughtful individuals likely also felt: "Whose work are we involved in when we crash with such horrifying violence and brutal energy into these darkest and most mysterious parts of the traditions of the past?" This was written in Tientsin after passing the forts, and it's important to remember now that the 328 vultures of Europe are circling around the dying empire.

Canton city was occupied by the Allies on January 2, 1858. Commissioner Yeh was captured, carried on board the paddle-sloop Inflexible, and conveyed to Calcutta, where he eventually died. His absence made it easier to deal with the other authorities. He is perhaps the only Chinese official who has ever been made personally responsible for attacks on foreigners.

Canton city was taken over by the Allies on January 2, 1858. Commissioner Yeh was captured, taken aboard the paddle-sloop Inflexible, and transported to Calcutta, where he eventually died. His absence made it easier to negotiate with the other authorities. He is possibly the only Chinese official who has ever been held personally accountable for attacks on foreigners.

A provisional government was established under three commissioners nominated by the Allied commanders-in-chief, though in fact the labour and responsibility rested solely on one of the three, Mr Parkes. Having induced the native governor, Pikwei, to resume his functions and administer the affairs of the city, under supervision, order was partially established, and the chiefs, diplomatic and military, withdrew—much too abruptly, it was generally thought—to prepare an expedition to the north.

A temporary government was set up by three commissioners chosen by the Allied commanders-in-chief, but in reality, the work and responsibility fell entirely on one of them, Mr. Parkes. He managed to convince the local governor, Pikwei, to take back his duties and run the city's affairs under oversight. As a result, some order was restored, and the leaders—both diplomatic and military—left far too suddenly, as many believed, to get ready for an expedition to the north.

But the commissioners were left with inadequate forces to maintain order, fettered as they were by instructions which rendered them immobile. The British admiral, after nearly a year and a half's experience in the river, might have known something of the Canton problem, while the Allied plenipotentiaries apparently understood nothing of it. This was shown by what contemporary opinion designated Lord Elgin's "first symptom of weakness." When the figurehead Pikwei was brought from his prison to be invested with authority under the Allied commanders he coolly claimed precedence of the English admiral and general, and Lord Elgin, contrary to his own pre-arrangement of seats, &c., conceded the claim, thereby striking the keynote 329 of the relations which were to exist between the Allied commissioners and the Chinese officials. Lord Elgin had occasion to remember this when, in 1860, Prince Kung tried to lead him into a similar trap, whereby he himself would have been relegated to a second place. The result of these arrangements was very much what might have been expected. Finding the foreign garrison passive, the turbulent elements in the city and the surrounding villages soon began to fan the embers of their former fires. They refused to consider themselves conquered, and set about reorganising their forces as they had done on previous occasions, and, beginning with secret schemes of assassination, they became emboldened by impunity, and by-and-by mustered courage to attack and annoy the garrison of the city, which was as helpless to repel insults as the mounted sentries at the Horse Guards. The army of occupation was besieged, the prestige of the capture of the city was in a few months wholly dissipated, and the officials and gentry affected to believe that the barbarians were only in the river, their presence in the city being ostentatiously ignored in public correspondence. During the whole of the year 1858 the cry went up continuously from the commissioners and military commanders, but it remained practically unheeded by the chiefs in the far north, except in so far that they drew still shorter the tether of the beleaguered force, in order that they might avoid all possible collision with their Chinese assailants. Lord Elgin at first deemed the turbulence at Canton a good reason for effecting a speedy settlement with the Imperial Government; but, as we shall see presently, that settlement when made had no influence at all upon 330 either the Government officials or the gentry and populace of that city. The solution of the Canton problem was found in an entirely different direction.

But the commissioners were left with too few resources to keep order, constrained by orders that made them unable to act. The British admiral, after nearly a year and a half on the river, should have understood the Canton issue, while the Allied representatives seemed clueless. This became evident with what contemporary opinion called Lord Elgin's "first sign of weakness." When the figurehead Pikwei was brought from his imprisonment to be given authority under the Allied commanders, he confidently claimed superiority over the English admiral and general. Lord Elgin, going against his own seating arrangements, accepted this claim, thus setting the tone for how the Allied commissioners would relate to the Chinese officials. Lord Elgin would remember this when, in 1860, Prince Kung tried to trap him again, attempting to push him into a subordinate position. The outcome of these arrangements was rather predictable. Realizing the foreign garrison was inactive, the restless factions in the city and surrounding villages quickly began to stir up old conflicts. They refused to see themselves as defeated and started reorganizing their forces as they had done in the past. Starting with secret assassination plots, they grew bolder with each unpunished act and eventually gathered the courage to attack and provoke the city’s garrison, which was as powerless to respond as the mounted sentries at Horse Guards. The occupying army found itself besieged, the prestige gained from capturing the city completely eroded in just a few months, and the officials and gentry pretended the “barbarians” were only in the river, ostentatiously ignoring their presence in the city in public communications. Throughout all of 1858, the cries from the commissioners and military leaders went largely unheard by their superiors far to the north, except that they tightened the leash on the trapped force to avoid any conflict with their Chinese attackers. Initially, Lord Elgin thought the unrest in Canton meant a quick resolution with the Imperial Government was needed; however, as we will see, that agreement, when it came, had no impact on either the Government officials or the city’s gentry and populace. The solution to the Canton problem was pursued in an entirely different direction.

It may be mentioned here that besides the administration of the city, several important matters of business were arranged during the commissionership of Mr Parkes. There was the question of the site at Shameen for the future residence of foreigners; and the regulation of coolie emigration, which had been carried on in an unsatisfactory manner; and last, not least, the first lease of Kowloon, on the mainland facing Hongkong, and forming one side of the harbour. This important concession, as already said, was negotiated on the sole initiative of Mr Parkes, the military authorities being talked into it afterwards. It was the first response to the demand of Wingrove Cooke, Why we had not taken possession of the peninsula of Kowloon, for "if any other Powers should do so—and what is to prevent them—the harbour of Hongkong is lost to us." Several important exploratory expeditions were also undertaken in 1859, in which Parkes was everywhere warmly received by officials and people, one of these excursions being far up the West river, the opening of which, however, to foreign trade remained in abeyance for forty years thereafter.

It’s worth noting that while managing the city, several important business matters were addressed during Mr. Parkes's time as commissioner. There was the issue of the site in Shameen for the future residence of foreigners, the need to regulate coolie emigration, which had been handled poorly, and lastly, the first lease of Kowloon, located on the mainland opposite Hong Kong and forming one side of the harbor. This significant concession, as previously mentioned, was negotiated solely by Mr. Parkes, with the military authorities being convinced later. It was the first response to Wingrove Cooke's question about why we had not taken control of the Kowloon peninsula, for "if any other Powers should do so—and who’s to stop them—the harbor of Hong Kong is lost to us." Several important exploratory expeditions were also carried out in 1859, where Parkes was warmly welcomed by officials and locals. One of these trips went deep into the West River, although the opening of that area to foreign trade would remain stalled for another forty years.

ROADS AND WATERWAYS BETWEEN PEKING AND TIENTSIN.

ROADS AND WATERWAYS BETWEEN BEIJING AND TIANJIN.

The next object of the plenipotentiaries, of course, was to negotiate at Peking, or wherever properly accredited negotiators could be met with, Canton being held in pledge. Progress was slow, because the fleet was so largely composed of sailing-vessels, which must wait for the fair monsoon; and the plenipotentiaries did not assemble within the river Peiho—the forts at its mouth having been silenced and the guns captured—until June. There followed Lord Elgin to Tientsin the 331 French, American, and Russian Ministers, all bent on making treaties and on observing each other. The resources of Chinese resistance having been provisionally exhausted, imperial commissioners came to arrest the further progress of the foreigners by negotiations, or, to speak with strict accuracy, to concede the minimum that was necessary to induce them to depart. Such, we may be sure, was the beginning and the end of their instructions then, as it was afterwards. The work of negotiation, so far as the form went, seems to have fallen to Mr H. N. Lay, whose place was very soon to know him no more; 332 but, in the words of Lord Elgin, "anybody could have made the treaty."

The next goal of the representatives, of course, was to negotiate in Beijing, or wherever properly accredited negotiators could be found, since Canton was under siege. Progress was slow because the fleet mainly consisted of sailing ships, which had to wait for favorable monsoon winds; the representatives didn't gather in the Peiho River until June, as the forts at its mouth had been silenced and the cannons captured. Following Lord Elgin to Tianjin were the French, American, and Russian ministers, all intent on forming treaties and observing each other. With China's resources for resistance temporarily exhausted, imperial commissioners arrived to halt the foreigners' advance through negotiations, or to be precise, to concede just enough to persuade them to leave. It’s safe to say that this was the start and end of their instructions at that time, just as it was later. The negotiation work, at least in terms of form, seems to have fallen to Mr. H. N. Lay, whose role would soon be vacant; but, in Lord Elgin's words, "anybody could have made the treaty."

The contents of the treaty, signed June 26, 1858, fulfilled the instructions of Lord Clarendon, and the commercial articles which constituted its main body corresponded substantially with the desiderata of the merchants as set forth in their memorials in response to the invitation of Lord Elgin, the treaty going in advance of their demands on certain points and falling short of them on others. Opium was not mentioned, but was afterwards placed on the tariff; and a toleration clause for the Christian religion was inserted, without much apparent consideration for the consequences involved in it. A special memorandum from Consul Alcock, called for by the Foreign Office, had dwelt mainly on the precautions which should accompany the exercise of such new privileges as promiscuous residence in the interior; but, excepting in the case of merchants, where little or no risk was involved, the warnings of Mr Alcock were unheeded alike in the text of the treaty and in the subsidiary regulations.

The contents of the treaty, signed on June 26, 1858, fulfilled the instructions of Lord Clarendon, and the commercial articles that made up its main section mostly aligned with the needs of the merchants as outlined in their petitions in response to Lord Elgin's invitation. The treaty went beyond their requests on certain issues while falling short on others. Opium wasn't mentioned initially but was later added to the tariff, and a clause allowing for religious tolerance for Christians was included, without much thought for the consequences that might arise. A special memo from Consul Alcock, requested by the Foreign Office, focused on the precautions that should go along with the new rights like unrestricted residence in the interior. However, except for merchants, where there was little risk, Mr. Alcock's warnings were ignored in both the text of the treaty and the additional regulations.

"The most important matter gained by the treaty," however, in the opinion of Lord Elgin, was "the resident Minister at Peking," "without which," wrote Mr Parkes, "the treaty was not worth a straw." And substituting "lost" for "gained," such was also the opinion of the Chinese negotiators. It was, indeed, the universal opinion. Diplomatic representation at Peking might be fairly considered to have been the primary object of the war of 1857-58, as commercial extension and access to Canton had been that of 1839-42. And when "the miserable war was finished" and "his liberty regained" Lord Elgin cleared out his force, bag and baggage, as if 333 he had been escaping from something, leaving not a trace behind.

"The most important issue achieved by the treaty," however, according to Lord Elgin, was "the resident Minister at Peking," "without which," Mr. Parkes wrote, "the treaty was not worth anything." And if we replace "gained" with "lost," the Chinese negotiators shared the same view. This was, in fact, a common belief. Diplomatic representation at Peking could reasonably be seen as the main goal of the war of 1857-58, just as commercial expansion and access to Canton had been the goal from 1839-42. And when "the miserable war was over" and "his freedom regained," Lord Elgin pulled out his troops, completely and without a trace, as if he were fleeing from something, leaving nothing behind.

As this move constituted a veritable crisis in Anglo-Chinese relations, it seems advisable for a moment to consider its bearings. Judging after the event, it is of course easy to perceive the fatal error of Lord Elgin in hurrying away from the Peiho. A fair criticism of his policy will confine itself strictly to the circumstances as known at the time. His experience had so closely resembled that of his predecessors, that he was aware that the Chinese were "yielding nothing to reason and everything to fear." He had seen with his own eyes the Queen's ratifications of previous treaties exhumed from a collection of miscellaneous papers in Canton, they being, as Commissioner Yeh remarked, not worth sending to Peking; he knew that the treaty of Nanking had been observed by the Chinese only as far as force or fear compelled them, and that its crucial stipulation had been for many years evaded, and then with unmasked arrogance repudiated; he knew that the very war in which he had been engaged, and his whole mission to China, were caused and provoked by the refusal of the provincial authorities to admit his predecessors or himself within the walls of Canton. In his own ultimatum to Commissioner Yeh, Lord Elgin had asked no more than the execution of the treaty of Nanking, which included access to the city of Canton, and compensation for damage to British property. Yet the Chinese Government, dreading war as they did, had notwithstanding incurred its hazards rather than open the gates of a distant provincial city. How, then, were they likely to regard the, to them, infinitely greater 334 outrage of resident foreign Ministers in the sacred capital itself? This demand was practically the only one against which the Chinese commissioners made a stand. When everything had been written down ready for signature they drew back, saying it was as much as their heads were worth to subscribe such a condition. The answer was a peremptory threat to march on Peking, whereupon the commissioners signed the paper without another word. The crisis did not last twenty-four hours. No one could believe that a miracle of conversion had been wrought in that time, or that the enforced signature of the Imperial Commissioners had changed a fundamental principle of Chinese policy. What, under these circumstances, was the "present value" of the treaty? Was it so much as conceivable that it would be voluntarily carried out? Was it not evident rather that it was signed under duresse solely with the immediate view of getting the barbarians out of doors and leaving the key within? What said the imperial decree published in the 'Peking Gazette'? "The barbarians[39] had come headlong with their ships to Tientsin. Moved by the commands of Kweiliang and his colleagues, they have now weighed anchor and stood out to sea." If our former treaty needed a material guarantee for its execution, how much more this one? The test of good faith was in Lord Elgin's own hands; he should clearly have applied it, and presented himself at Peking for audience of the emperor. Perhaps it would have been refused, in which case he would have at least known where he stood. A campaign 335 against Peking would have been easy with the handy force he possessed, or at the worst he could have occupied Tientsin and the Taku forts until all questions were settled.

As this action marked a real crisis in Anglo-Chinese relations, it’s worth taking a moment to assess its implications. Looking back, it’s clear that Lord Elgin made a critical mistake by rushing away from the Peiho. A fair critique of his approach will only consider the information available at the time. His experience closely mirrored that of his predecessors, making him aware that the Chinese were "yielding nothing to reason and everything to fear." He had witnessed the Queen’s ratifications of previous treaties pulled from a stack of random papers in Canton, which Commissioner Yeh noted were not even worth sending to Peking; he understood that the Chinese followed the treaty of Nanking only as far as they were forced or frightened to do so, and that its key terms had been avoided for many years and later outright rejected; he also knew that the very war he was involved in, and his entire mission to China, stemmed from the provincial authorities’ refusal to let him or his predecessors enter Canton. In his ultimatum to Commissioner Yeh, Lord Elgin only requested the enforcement of the treaty of Nanking, which included access to the city of Canton and compensation for damages to British property. However, the Chinese Government, fearing war, chose to risk conflict rather than open the gates to a remote provincial city. How, then, could they possibly view the infinitely greater outrage of allowing foreign Ministers to reside in their sacred capital? This demand was nearly the only one the Chinese commissioners opposed. When everything was prepared for signature, they backed down, stating it was too dangerous for them to agree to such a condition. The response was a firm threat to march on Peking, which compelled the commissioners to sign without further discussion. The crisis lasted less than twenty-four hours. No one could believe a miraculous change had occurred in that time or that the forced signature of the Imperial Commissioners had altered a fundamental principle of Chinese policy. In light of this, what was the "present value" of the treaty? Could it even be imagined that it would be carried out voluntarily? It seemed clear that it had been signed under duress solely to get the foreigners to leave without conceding any more influence. What did the imperial decree published in the 'Peking Gazette' say? "The barbarians had come rushing in their ships to Tientsin. Following the instructions of Kweiliang and his colleagues, they have now set sail and gone out to sea." If our previous treaty required a material guarantee for its enforcement, how much more did this one? The test of good faith lay in Lord Elgin's hands; he should have insisted on it and presented himself at Peking to meet the emperor. Perhaps the audience would have been denied, but at least he would have known where he stood. A campaign against Peking would have been straightforward with the forces he had, or at worst, he could have occupied Tientsin and the Taku forts until all questions were resolved.

This was the view generally held at the time both by officials and the lay community in China, before any untoward consequences had revealed themselves. It was strongly expressed by Parkes, who deplored "the ominous omission that Lord Elgin had gone away to Japan without entering Peking or having an audience with the emperor." We have not the advantage of knowing what Wingrove Cooke would have said of it, but we may infer the prevailing opinion by what another newspaper correspondent wrote from Shanghai on the receipt of the first news of the signing of the treaty:—

This was the view commonly shared at the time by both officials and the general public in China, before any negative consequences had become apparent. Parkes expressed this concern strongly, lamenting "the troubling fact that Lord Elgin left for Japan without visiting Peking or meeting the emperor." We don't have the benefit of knowing what Wingrove Cooke would have thought about it, but we can gauge the prevailing opinion based on what another newspaper correspondent wrote from Shanghai upon hearing the first news of the treaty being signed:—

Shanghai, July 13, 1858.[40]

Shanghai, July 13, 1858.__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

The "Chinese War," properly so called, has now reached its termination, and the fleet in the Gulf of Pechili is dispersing. Lord Elgin arrived here yesterday with the new treaty, which his brother, the Hon. F. Bruce, carries home by the present mail. The document will not be published until it is ratified by the Queen, but in the mean time the chief points of it may be tolerably well guessed at. The diplomatists are confident that the new treaty will "give satisfaction." That is saying a good deal, but how could it be otherwise than satisfactory? The emperor was so terror-struck by our audacious advance on Tientsin, that he was ready to concede everything we wanted rather than see us approach any nearer to his capital. There could have been but little discussion—the ambassadors had simply to make their terms. The new treaty, then, provides for indemnification for losses at Canton, a contribution towards the expenses of the war (for which Canton is held as a guarantee), the opening of more ports for trade, freedom of access to the interior, toleration for Christians, and a resident 336 Minister at Peking. The only omission seems to be that Lord Elgin did not himself go to Peking; for unless the right of residence at the capital receives a practical recognition from the Chinese Government at once, it will certainly lead to vexatious discussion whenever we wish to exercise it. The right of entry into Canton, conceded by the treaty of Nanking, but not insisted on through the timidity of our representatives, ought to have taught us a useful lesson. While the emperor is in a state of alarm anything may be done with him, but when the pressure is removed and the fleet dispersed, Pharaoh's heart will certainly be hardened, and then Chinese ingenuity will be employed in evading as many of the provisions of the treaty as they dare. Let us hope, however, that when the weather cools a little and the thing can be done comfortably, Lord Elgin may still pay a friendly visit to his new allies at their headquarters [which he more than once threatened to do].

The "Chinese War," as it's properly called, has now come to an end, and the fleet in the Gulf of Pechili is breaking up. Lord Elgin arrived yesterday with the new treaty, which his brother, the Hon. F. Bruce, is taking home by the current mail. The document won’t be published until it’s approved by the Queen, but in the meantime, we can guess its main points pretty accurately. The diplomats are confident that the new treaty will "satisfy." That’s quite a statement, but how could it not be satisfactory? The emperor was so terrified by our bold move on Tientsin that he was willing to give up everything we wanted rather than see us get any closer to his capital. There couldn’t have been much discussion—the ambassadors just had to make their demands. So, the new treaty includes compensation for losses at Canton, a contribution toward the war expenses (with Canton as a guarantee), the opening of more ports for trade, access to the interior, tolerance for Christians, and a resident 336 Minister in Peking. The only missing element seems to be that Lord Elgin didn’t himself go to Peking; because unless the right to reside at the capital gets immediate practical recognition from the Chinese Government, it will definitely lead to annoying discussions whenever we want to exercise it. The right to enter Canton, granted by the treaty of Nanking but not insisted upon because of our representatives' fear, should have taught us a valuable lesson. While the emperor is anxious, anything can be negotiated, but once the pressure is off and the fleet is gone, Pharaoh’s heart will certainly harden, and then Chinese cleverness will be used to dodge as many of the treaty provisions as possible. Let’s hope that when things cool down a bit and it can be done more comfortably, Lord Elgin will still pay a friendly visit to his new allies at their headquarters [which he has threatened to do more than once].

Such was contemporary opinion unbiassed as yet by visible effects. When the tragedy took place a year later, of course people spoke out more clearly. Parkes then wrote:—

Such was the current opinion, still unaffected by visible outcomes. When the tragedy happened a year later, people naturally expressed themselves more clearly. Parkes then wrote:—

The Chinese Government never intended, nor do they intend, if they can avoid it, to carry out the Elgin treaty. It was granted by them against their will, and we omitted all precautions necessary to ensure its being carried out—I mean, in quitting Tientsin as we did in July 1858, instead of remaining there until the treaty had been actually carried into effect. You will recollect in what a hurry the admiral and Lord Elgin, one and all, were to leave and run off to recreate in Japan and elsewhere. By that step they just undid all they had previously done.

The Chinese government never intended, and doesn't intend, if they can help it, to fulfill the Elgin treaty. They agreed to it against their will, and we skipped all the necessary steps to make sure it was actually put into effect—I mean, by leaving Tientsin like we did in July 1858, instead of staying there until the treaty was really carried out. You’ll remember how eager the admiral and Lord Elgin were to leave and go relax in Japan and other places. With that move, they just completely reversed all their previous efforts.

Writing eighteen months after the event, and six months after the Taku repulse, Laurence Oliphant fully confirmed the views of Parkes. "The political importance," he observed, "of such an achievement"—i.e., a march to Peking—"it is impossible to overestimate. The much-vexed question of the reception of a 337 British Minister at the capital would have been set at rest for ever." He then goes on to give a number of exculpatory reasons for the omission, which would have been more convincing had they been stated by Lord Elgin himself in despatches written at the time.

Writing eighteen months after the event, and six months after the Taku repulse, Laurence Oliphant fully confirmed Parkes’s views. "The political significance," he noted, "of such an achievement"—i.e., a march to Peking—"is impossible to overstate. The long-debated issue of receiving a 337 British Minister in the capital would have been resolved forever." He then goes on to provide several justifications for the omission, which would have been more convincing if they had come directly from Lord Elgin himself in dispatches written at the time.

Nor was Lord Elgin's own explanation to the House of Lords any more satisfying. "In point of fact," he said, "I was never charged with the ratification of the treaty. The treaty was never placed in my possession. I never had the option of going to Peking." If his lordship had had a better case he would never have elected to rest his vindication on a piece of verbal finesse. Yet this speech gave their Lordships for the moment "wonderful satisfaction."[41]

Nor was Lord Elgin's explanation to the House of Lords any more satisfying. "Actually," he said, "I was never tasked with ratifying the treaty. The treaty was never given to me. I never had the choice to go to Peking." If he had a stronger case, he wouldn't have chosen to defend himself with such a clever twist of words. Yet this speech gave their Lordships, for the moment, "wonderful satisfaction."[41]

The omission to consummate the treaty was followed a few months later by an act of commission of which it is difficult to render any clear account, and which Oliphant in his 'Narrative' makes no attempt to explain, merely reproducing the official despatches. Before leaving China Lord Elgin pulled the key-stone from the arch of his own work, reducing the treaty to that condition which Parkes had described as "not worth a straw." At the instance of the Chinese commissioners he moved her Majesty's Government to suspend the operation of "the most important" article in it, the residence of a British Minister in Peking. It is needless to follow the arguments, utterly unreal and having no root either in history or in experience, by which this fatal course was urged upon the Government, for they were of the same species as those which had induced 338 her Majesty's Ministers to tolerate for fourteen years the exclusion of their representatives from Canton, the right to enter which city had just been recovered by force. It is most instructive to mark, as the key to many failures, how, like successive generations of youth, successive British agents in China have failed to profit by the experience of their predecessors, and have had in so many cases to buy their own at the expense of their country; for we see still the same thing indefinitely repeating itself, like a recurring decimal. Even at this the end of the nineteenth century we seem as far off as ever from laying hold of any saving principle, though it stares at us out of the whole panorama of our intercourse. Lord Elgin's procedure afforded at once the best example what to do and the clearest warning what to avoid in China, and it is the most useful for future guidance for the reason that effect followed cause as closely as report follows flash. It was his fate, much against his will apparently, to wage war on China in order to revindicate a right which had lapsed through the weakness and wrong-headedness of certain British representatives; yet in the closing act of a perfectly successful war he commits the self-same error on a more comprehensive scale, entailing on some future Government and plenipotentiary the necessity of making yet another war on China to recover what he was giving away. What is the explanation of this continuous repetition of the same mistake? It would seem that, knowing nothing of the Chinese, yet imagining they know something, the representatives of Great Britain and of other Powers, notably the United States, have been in the habit of evolving from their own consciousness and 339 keeping by them a subjective Chinaman with whom they play "dummy," and of course "score horribly," as the most recent diplomatic slang has it. Their despatches are full of this game—of reckoning without their host, who, when brought to book, turns out to be a wholly different personage from the intelligent automaton kept for Cabinet use. Then, under the shock of this discovery, denunciations of treachery—black, base, and so forth—relieve the feelings of the foiled diplomat, while the substance of his previous triumph has quite eluded him. To this kind of illusion Lord Elgin was by temperament more predisposed than perhaps any of his predecessors save Captain Elliot. Though convinced by his first encounter that Chinese statesmen were "fools and tricksters," the simulacrum soon asserted supremacy over the actuality of experience, and to the honour of the very persons so stigmatised he committed the interests of his country, abandoning all the securities which he held in his hand.

The failure to finalize the treaty was quickly followed a few months later by an action that is hard to explain clearly, and which Oliphant in his 'Narrative' doesn’t try to clarify, simply reproducing the official dispatches. Before leaving China, Lord Elgin removed the key element from the foundation of his own work, turning the treaty into something Parkes described as "not worth a straw." At the request of the Chinese commissioners, he urged her Majesty's Government to put on hold "the most important" part of it—the residency of a British Minister in Peking. There's no need to delve into the arguments, which were completely unrealistic and had no basis in history or experience, that led to this disastrous decision, as they were similar to those that had caused 338 her Majesty's Ministers to tolerate for fourteen years the exclusion of their representatives from Canton, a right that had just been regained by force. It’s very telling, as a key to many failures, how successive generations of British agents in China, like different generations of youth, have failed to learn from their predecessors, often paying for their own lessons at their country’s expense; we see the same thing repeating endlessly, like a recurring decimal. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, we seem just as far away from grasping any saving principle, even though it stares us in the face in the whole panorama of our relations. Lord Elgin's actions provide the best example of what to do and the clearest warning of what to avoid in China. It’s most useful for future guidance because the outcome followed the cause as closely as a report follows a flash. It seems it was his fate, much against his will, to wage war on China to reclaim a right that had been lost due to the weakness and poor judgment of certain British representatives; yet in the final act of a completely successful war, he makes the same mistake again on a larger scale, which will force some future government and diplomat to wage another war on China to recover what he was giving away. What explains this continuous repetition of the same mistake? It seems that, knowing nothing about the Chinese, yet believing they understand something, the representatives of Great Britain and other Powers, especially the United States, have the habit of creating a subjective version of a Chinaman in their minds, whom they play "dummy" with, and inevitably "score horribly," as the latest diplomatic slang puts it. Their dispatches are filled with this game of miscalculation, dismissing the reality of their actual counterpart, who, when finally engaged, turns out to be completely different from the smart automaton they’ve created for Cabinet discussions. Then, faced with this harsh reality, they vent their frustrations with accusations of treachery—black, base, and so on—while completely missing the essence of their earlier triumph. Lord Elgin was the type to be more inclined towards this kind of delusion than perhaps any of his predecessors except Captain Elliot. Although he became convinced after his first meeting that Chinese leaders were "fools and tricksters," the illusion soon took precedence over the reality of experience, and despite the dishonor of those he had disparaged, he compromised his country's interests, giving up all the guarantees he had in hand.

But what, then, is the secret of dealing with the Chinese which so many able men, not certainly intending to make failures, have missed? This interesting question is thus partially answered by Wingrove Cooke. "The result of all I hear and see," he wrote, "is a settled conviction that at present we know nothing—absolutely nothing—of the nature of those elements which are at work inside China. Crotchets, &c., are rife, but they are all the offspring of vain imaginings, not sober deductions from facts.... Treat John Chinaman as a man, and exact from him the duties of a civilised man, and you will have no more trouble with him." Which is but a paraphrase of Lord Palmerston's 340 prescription to consider the Chinese as "not greatly different from the rest of mankind." Such, however, has always been too simple a formula for the smaller minds. They would complicate it by trying, with ludicrous effect, to get behind the brain of the Chinese and play their opponent's hand as well as their own. Probably it matters less on what particular footing we deal with the Chinese than the consistency with which we adhere to it. To treat them as protégés, and excuse them as minors or imbeciles while yet allowing them the full licence and privileges of the adult and the sane, is manifestly absurd. To treat them as dependent and independent at the same time can lead to nothing but confusion and violent injustice. To allow engagements with them to become waste paper is the surest road to their ruin and our discomfiture. To let our Yea be Yea, and our Nay, Nay, is as much the Law and the Prophets in China as it is throughout the world of diplomacy. To this simplicity Lord Elgin had attained, at least in theory, when he told the merchants of Shanghai that in dealing with Chinese officials he had "been guided by two simple rules of action. I have never preferred a demand which I did not believe to be both moderate and just, and from a demand so preferred I have never receded."

But what is the secret to engaging with the Chinese that so many capable people, who definitely don’t intend to fail, have overlooked? This intriguing question is partially answered by Wingrove Cooke. "Based on everything I hear and see," he wrote, "I have a firm belief that right now we know nothing—absolutely nothing—about the forces at play inside China. Ideas are abundant, but they’re all products of wishful thinking, not rational conclusions from facts.... Treat a Chinese person as an individual, and demand the responsibilities of a civilized person from them, and you won’t have any trouble." This is simply a restatement of Lord Palmerston's prescription to regard the Chinese as "not very different from the rest of humanity." However, this has always been too straightforward a concept for smaller minds. They complicate it by attempting, with ridiculous results, to see inside the Chinese mindset and play their opponent's hand as well as their own. It probably matters less how we specifically engage with the Chinese than our consistency in doing so. Treating them as protégés, while regarding them as minors or incompetent, yet still granting them the full freedoms and privileges of adults who are sane, is clearly absurd. Treating them as both dependent and independent at the same time can only lead to confusion and severe injustice. Allowing agreements with them to become meaningless is the quickest path to their downfall and our discomfort. Sticking to our word is as fundamental in China as it is in the world of diplomacy everywhere. Lord Elgin arrived at this simplicity, at least in theory, when he told the merchants of Shanghai that when dealing with Chinese officials, he had "been guided by two simple rules of action. I have never made a demand I didn't believe to be both reasonable and just, and from such a demand, I have never backed down."

What misgiving troubled the repose of Lord Elgin as to the good faith of the Imperial Government on which he had ventured so much, may be partly inferred from his avidity in catching at any straw which might support his faith. Hearing that "his friends the two Imperial Commissioners" who had signed the treaty were appointed to meet him in Shanghai to arrange the tariff, Lord Elgin welcomed the news as "proof 341 that the emperor has made up his mind to accept the treaty." But as the emperor had already, by imperial decree dated 3rd July, and communicated in the most formal manner to Lord Elgin, expressly sanctioned the treaty before the plenipotentiary left Tientsin, wherefore the anxiety for further proofs of his good intentions? "This decree was forced out of the emperor," Mr Oliphant tells us, "by Lord Elgin's pertinacity"—and the threat of bringing up to Tientsin a regiment of British soldiers then at the mouth of the river! As a matter of fact, the mission of the two Imperial Commissioners was of quite another character from that assigned to it by Lord Elgin. The two men were sent to complete their task of preventing by every means the advent of the barbarians to Peking, just as Lord Elgin himself was, two years later, sent back to China to finish his work, which was to bring the said barbarians into the imperial city. Between two such missions there could be neither reconciliation nor compromise.

What doubt disturbed Lord Elgin's peace of mind regarding the sincerity of the Imperial Government, on which he had risked so much, can be partly inferred from his eagerness to seize any indication that might support his belief. When he heard that "his friends the two Imperial Commissioners" who had signed the treaty were appointed to meet him in Shanghai to discuss the tariff, Lord Elgin welcomed the news as "proof that the emperor has decided to accept the treaty." However, since the emperor had already, by an imperial decree dated July 3rd and communicated formally to Lord Elgin, explicitly approved the treaty before the plenipotentiary left Tientsin, why was there a need for further evidence of his good intentions? "This decree was forced out of the emperor," Mr. Oliphant tells us, "by Lord Elgin's insistence"—and the threat of bringing a regiment of British soldiers from the mouth of the river to Tientsin! In reality, the mission of the two Imperial Commissioners was quite different from what Lord Elgin believed. The two men were sent to do everything possible to prevent the barbarians from reaching Peking, just as Lord Elgin himself was sent back to China two years later to complete his task of bringing those same barbarians into the imperial city. There could be no reconciliation or compromise between such opposing missions.

There is authority for stating that the Imperial Commissioners were expressly sent by the emperor to Shanghai (1) to annul the whole treaty of Tientsin, and (2) failing the whole, as much of it as possible, but especially the article providing for a Minister at Peking. The ostensible purpose of the mission, from the foreign point of view, was the settlement of the tariff and trade regulations,—about which, however, the Chinese cared very little,—and delegates were appointed for this purpose. The labour was conscientiously performed, on one side at any rate, and the result was highly creditable to the delegates. It was by insertion in the tariff of imports that opium became recognised, chiefly, it would 342 appear, at the instance of the United States Minister, Mr W. B. Reed, who was on the spot.

There is evidence to say that the Imperial Commissioners were specifically sent by the emperor to Shanghai (1) to cancel the entire Treaty of Tientsin, and (2) if that wasn't possible, to cancel as much of it as they could, especially the part that called for a Minister in Peking. The main aim of the mission, from the foreign perspective, was to settle the tariff and trade regulations—about which the Chinese were hardly concerned—and delegates were appointed for this task. The work was done diligently, at least on one side, and the outcome was quite commendable for the delegates. It was by including opium in the import tariff that it was recognized, mainly at the suggestion of the United States Minister, Mr. W. B. Reed, who was there at the time.

Apart from the tariff two principal questions occupied the minds of the negotiators of the treaty—the actual situation at Canton on the part of the English, and the prospective residence in Peking on the part of the Chinese. Lord Elgin hoped, by an appeal to the treaty of peace, to put an end to the hostile proceedings of officials and people which had harassed the occupying force in Canton with impunity for nine months. But it was the treaty itself against which officials, gentry, and braves were making war, just as they had done in the case of the treaty of 1842. There was no ambiguity about the movement. The Government was carried on not in Canton but in the neighbouring city of Fatshan, where the Governor-General Huang, who had been appointed to succeed Yeh, held his court and issued his decrees. Two months after the occupation of Canton the puppet whom the Allies had installed there admitted that the object of the assemblage of braves was to retake the city. Two months after the signature of the treaty and its acceptance by the emperor the Governor-General Huang was publicly offering a reward of $30,000 for the head of Parkes, and was stimulating the people in every way to expel the foreigners from the city. All this was in perfect accord both with imperial policy and with Chinese ethics. It had the full sanction of the emperor, just as similar operations had formerly had of his father. For the grand purpose of destroying or impairing the treaty there was no distinction in the Chinese mind between legitimate and illegitimate, honourable or treacherous, methods. 343

Aside from the tariff, two main issues were on the minds of the treaty negotiators—the current situation in Canton regarding the British, and the future residence in Beijing for the Chinese. Lord Elgin hoped that by referencing the peace treaty, he could put a stop to the hostile actions of officials and locals that had harassed the occupying force in Canton without consequences for nine months. However, it was the treaty itself that officials, landlords, and rebels were fighting against, just as they had with the treaty of 1842. There was no doubt about the movement. The government was not functioning in Canton but in the nearby city of Fatshan, where the newly appointed Governor-General Huang, assigned to replace Yeh, held his court and issued decrees. Two months after the occupation of Canton, the figure installed by the Allies admitted that the goal of the assembled rebels was to reclaim the city. Just two months after the treaty was signed and accepted by the emperor, Governor-General Huang was publicly offering a $30,000 reward for Parkes's head and encouraging the people to drive the foreigners out of the city in every way possible. All of this was completely in line with imperial policy and Chinese ethics. It had the full backing of the emperor, just like similar actions had from his father in the past. In the Chinese perspective, there was no distinction between legitimate and illegitimate, honorable or treacherous methods when it came to the ultimate goal of undermining or destroying the treaty. 343

Lord Elgin, who had returned from Japan to Shanghai to meet the Imperial Commissioners in September, disappointed at their non-arrival, opened communications with them by a threat of returning to Tientsin and thus saving them the trouble of completing their slow journey to Shanghai. On their eventual arrival there he opened a diplomatic campaign against Canton by a demand (October 7) to know under what authority Huang and the military committees were organising attacks on the Allies. In reply the Imperial Commissioners naïvely proposed to promulgate the treaty. This frivolous answer provoked the rejoinder (October 9) that the treaty had been three months before publicly sanctioned by imperial decree, that something more than "documents and professions" were required to satisfy Lord Elgin on a question of "peace or war," and he demanded the removal of the Governor-General Huang. The commissioners then said they had denounced Huang to the throne, and hoped for his removal at no very distant date. They would also move his Majesty the Emperor to withdraw his authority from the hostile militia. Canton being thus disposed of, as he supposed, Lord Elgin proceeded to other business. But the hostilities at Canton continued without the least abatement for three months longer, until something more strenuous than diplomatising with the Imperial Commissioners was resorted to. The British Government had at last become exasperated, and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Malmesbury, wrote on October 14 to Lord Elgin, "The most severe measures against the braves are the only ones which will obtain the recognition by the Cantonese of the treaty of Tientsin." It was not long before Lord 344 Elgin himself became converted to the same belief, for on January 20, 1859, he wrote to General van Straubenzee, after some successful reprisals he had made on the village braves, that "advantage should be taken of the cool weather to familiarise the rural inhabitants of the vicinity of Canton with the presence of our troops, and to punish severely braves or others who venture to attack them." By this time also he had realised that the promise on which he relied in October had been evaded, and he told the Imperial Commissioners on January 22 that he would "have nothing more to say to them on Canton matters,—that our soldiers and sailors would take the braves into their own hands."

Lord Elgin, who had returned from Japan to Shanghai to meet the Imperial Commissioners in September, disappointed by their absence, threatened to go back to Tientsin, suggesting it would save them the trouble of completing their slow journey to Shanghai. When they eventually arrived, he launched a diplomatic campaign against Canton by demanding (October 7) to know under what authority Huang and the military committees were organizing attacks on the Allies. In response, the Imperial Commissioners naively suggested they would announce the treaty. This trivial answer led to Lord Elgin's reply (October 9) that the treaty had been publicly sanctioned by imperial decree three months earlier and that he required more than mere "documents and professions" to address a question of "peace or war," insisting on the removal of the Governor-General Huang. The commissioners then stated they had denounced Huang to the throne and hoped for his removal soon. They would also ask the Emperor to withdraw his authority from the hostile militia. With that settled regarding Canton, or so he thought, Lord Elgin moved on to other matters. However, hostilities in Canton continued unabated for three more months until more forceful measures than diplomacy with the Imperial Commissioners were needed. The British Government had finally become frustrated, and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Malmesbury, wrote to Lord Elgin on October 14 that "the most severe measures against the braves are the only ones which will gain the recognition of the treaty of Tientsin by the Cantonese." It wasn't long before Lord Elgin himself came to believe the same, for on January 20, 1859, he wrote to General van Straubenzee, after some successful reprisals against the village braves, that "we should take advantage of the cool weather to familiarize the rural inhabitants around Canton with our troops' presence and to punish severely any braves or others who attempt to attack them." By this time, he also realized that the promise he relied on in October had been avoided, and he told the Imperial Commissioners on January 22 that he would "have nothing more to say to them regarding Canton matters—that our soldiers and sailors would take the braves into their own hands."

The effect of the new tactics was immediate and satisfactory. When the Allied troops began to move about they were welcomed in the very hotbeds of hostility. "At Fatshan," writes General van Straubenzee on January 28, "we were received most courteously by the authorities and respectfully by the people." A five-days' excursion to Fa Yuen, the headquarters of the anti-foreign committee, was likewise a perfect success; and so everywhere throughout the Canton district. Lord Elgin was now able to assume a bolder tone with the Imperial Commissioners and address them in still plainer terms.

The impact of the new tactics was immediate and positive. When the Allied troops started to move around, they were welcomed in the very centers of hostility. "At Fatshan," writes General van Straubenzee on January 28, "we were warmly received by the authorities and respectfully by the people." A five-day trip to Fa Yuen, the headquarters of the anti-foreign committee, was also a complete success; and this was the case everywhere in the Canton district. Lord Elgin was now able to take a stronger stance with the Imperial Commissioners and speak to them in even clearer terms.

"The moderation of the Allies," he wrote to them in February, "has been misunderstood by the officials and gentry by whom the braves are organised.... This habit of insult and outrage shall be put down with the strong hand.... It shall be punished by the annihilation of all who persist in it." There was no need for any such extreme remedy, for as soon as 345 the burglars realised that the watch-dog had been loosed they ceased from troubling the household, and fell back on peaceful and respectable ways of life. "With the cessation of official instigation," Lord Elgin wrote in March, "hostile feeling on the part of the inhabitants appears to have subsided," thus falling into line with Consul Alcock, who wrote: "Clear proof was furnished that the long-nurtured and often-invoked hostility of the Cantonese was entirely of fictitious growth, due exclusively to the inclinations of the mandarins as a part of the policy of the Court of Peking." And then, too, the difficulty of removing the Governor-General Huang disappeared. He had, in fact, been unsuccessful in expelling the barbarians, just as Yeh had been, and the imperial decree superseding him naturally followed. His presence or absence had then become of no importance to the Allies, as, had he remained, he would have accepted the accomplished fact of the foreign supremacy with as good a grace as the gentry and their braves had done, for they never contemplated endangering their lives by fighting. Outrages on stragglers, assassination, kidnapping, and bravado filled up the repertory of their militant resources, and when these were no longer effective they retired into private life as if nothing had happened. The officials were no less acquiescent once they realised that they had a master.

"The Allies' restraint," he wrote to them in February, "has been misinterpreted by the officials and upper classes organizing the fighters. This pattern of insults and violence will be dealt with firmly. Those who continue it will face severe consequences." There was no need for such drastic measures, as soon as the burglars realized that the watch-dog had been unleashed, they stopped bothering the household and returned to living peaceful and respectable lives. "With the end of official provocation," Lord Elgin wrote in March, "hostility from the local people seems to have faded," echoing Consul Alcock, who stated: "It was clear evidence that the long-standing and often mentioned hostility of the Cantonese was completely fabricated, solely based on the attitudes of the mandarins as part of the policies from the Court of Peking." Additionally, the challenge of removing Governor-General Huang vanished. He had, in fact, failed to drive out the intruders, just as Yeh had, and the imperial decree replacing him naturally followed. His presence or absence became irrelevant to the Allies, as if he had stayed, he would have accepted the reality of foreign dominance as gracefully as the upper classes and their fighters had, since they never considered risking their lives by fighting. Their violent tactics against isolated individuals, assassination, kidnapping, and bravado made up their arsenal, and when these strategies stopped working, they retreated into private life as if nothing had happened. The officials were equally compliant once they recognized they had a superior.

The interest of this Canton episode lies in its relation to the Chinese question generally. Foreign intercourse with China is marked by a rhythm so regular that any part of it may be taken as an epitome of the whole, like a pattern of wall-paper. From Canton we learn that calculation of national advantage or danger, argument 346 from policy, even threats which are not believed, are so much "clouds and wind," not profitable even as mental exercises. What alone is valid is concrete fact; not treaties, but the execution of them.

The interest in this Canton episode comes from its connection to the broader Chinese situation. Foreign interactions with China follow a pattern so consistent that any part can represent the whole, like a wallpaper design. From Canton, we understand that calculations of national benefits or risks, policy arguments, and even threats that aren't taken seriously are merely "clouds and wind," offering no real benefit even as thought exercises. What truly matters is concrete reality; not treaties, but their implementation.

The Imperial Commissioners had in good time presented their own demand on Lord Elgin, and in most becoming terms, for between preferring and meeting a request there is all the difference in the world. The two Chinese signatories of the treaty frankly avowed that they had signed without scrutiny under military pressure, and that certain stipulations were highly inconvenient to the Imperial Government, particularly the right of keeping a Minister in residence in Peking. Lord Elgin agreed to move his Government, and the Government consented to waive the right, conditionally. Lord Elgin laid stress on the retention of the right as a right, forgetting that in China a right conditionally waived is a right definitely abandoned. Nor only so, but so far from consolidating what remains, it constitutes a vantage-ground for demanding further concessions, and in other fields of international relations besides that of China. Nothing therefore could have been wider of the mark than any expectation that "the decision of her Majesty's Government respecting residence in Peking would induce the Chinese Government to receive in a becoming manner a representative of her Majesty when he proceeds to the Peiho to exchange the ratification." Experience pointed to quite the opposite effect.

The Imperial Commissioners timely presented their demands to Lord Elgin, and they did so in very appropriate terms, because there’s a big difference between making a request and actually fulfilling it. The two Chinese officials who signed the treaty admitted they did so under military pressure and without thoroughly reviewing it, noting that some terms were quite inconvenient for the Imperial Government, especially the stipulation about having a Minister stay in Peking. Lord Elgin agreed to take this back to his Government, which then agreed to give up the right, but with conditions. Lord Elgin emphasized the importance of keeping the right as a right, overlooking the fact that in China, a right that is conditionally waived is effectively a right that has been fully abandoned. Furthermore, rather than strengthening what was left, it actually provided a point for demanding more concessions in other areas of international relations beyond just China. Therefore, any hope that "the decision of her Majesty's Government regarding the residence in Peking would encourage the Chinese Government to accept a representative of her Majesty appropriately when he goes to the Peiho to exchange the ratification" was completely misguided. Experience suggested that the opposite would occur.

These critical remarks are by no means intended either to belittle Lord Elgin's good work, to depreciate his real statesmanship, or to scoff at his sensibility and 347 high-mindedness. But his errors being like a flaw in a steel casting, pregnant with destruction, and as the same kind of flaw continues to vitiate many of our smaller diplomatic castings, the China question could not really be understood without giving proper consideration to them. For the rest, as a despatch writer Lord Elgin was both copious and able—he did not take a double first at Oxford for nothing. Still, his writings and orations are scarcely the source whence one would seek for light and leading on the Chinese problem. They are vitiated by self-vindication. Many of them are elaborate efforts to make the worse appear the better reason, while their political philosophy is based too much on speculative conceptions where ascertained data were available.

These critical comments are not meant to undermine Lord Elgin's good work, to downplay his real political skills, or to mock his sensitivity and high ideals. However, his mistakes are like a flaw in a steel casting, capable of causing significant damage, and since similar flaws continue to taint many of our smaller diplomatic efforts, the China issue cannot truly be understood without taking these into account. That said, as a writer of dispatches, Lord Elgin was both thorough and capable—he didn't earn a double first at Oxford for nothing. Still, his writings and speeches are not really the best sources for insights on the Chinese issue. They are clouded by a need to defend himself. Many of them are elaborate attempts to make the less favorable arguments seem more reasonable, while their political philosophy relies too much on theoretical ideas when solid data was available.

On the last day of July 1858 Lord Elgin with his suite set out on their memorable voyage to Japan, the narrative of which has been so skilfully woven by Laurence Oliphant. This episode will claim our attention later. His lordship came, saw, and conquered—returned to China in a month crowned with fresh laurels. At Shanghai he saw the tariff settled, and then performed another pioneer voyage of prodigious significance. This was up the Yangtze as far as the great central emporium Hankow. Captain Sherard Osborn was the Palinurus of that original and venturesome voyage. After that, Lord Elgin bent his steps towards England; but before leaving China the ghosts of things done and undone haunted him. "A variety of circumstances lead me to the conclusion that the Court of Peking is about to play us false," was the melancholy epitaph he wrote on his mixed policy, on his honest attempt to make war with rose-water, 348 and his subordination, on critical occasions, of judgment to sentiment.

On the last day of July 1858, Lord Elgin and his team set off on their famous journey to Japan, a tale skillfully told by Laurence Oliphant. We’ll dive into that episode later. His lordship came, saw, and conquered—returning to China in a month with new acclaim. In Shanghai, he witnessed the tariff being finalized, and then took another groundbreaking journey of great importance. This was up the Yangtze River all the way to the central hub of Hankow. Captain Sherard Osborn was the guiding force of that daring adventure. After that, Lord Elgin headed back to England; but before leaving China, he was haunted by the ghosts of his actions and inactions. "A variety of circumstances lead me to the conclusion that the Court of Peking is about to deceive us," was the sad comment he made about his mixed strategy, about his honest effort to wage war gently, 348 and his tendency, at critical moments, to let feelings override reason.

Meantime his brother Frederick, who had carried the Tientsin treaty to London, was returning with it and the Queen's ratification and his letter of credence as British Minister to China. The dénoûment of the plot was now at hand. The real mind of the Chinese Government was finally declared in the sanguinary reception the new envoy met with at the entrance of the Peiho in June 1859. Frederick Bruce was generally considered a man of larger calibre than his elder brother. "In disposition he was a fine, upright, honourable fellow," writes Sir Hope Grant, "and in appearance tall and strong made, with a remarkably good expression of countenance." But it took even him a long time to fathom the new situation. After his disastrous repulse from the Taku forts he wrote in August, "I regret much that when the permanent residence was waived it was not laid down in detail what the reception of the Minister at Peking was to be." But it was no question of detail that barred his passage to Peking. It was the settled determination never to see the face of any foreign Minister; and it seems strange that it should have taken not only another year but another war finally to convince the British plenipotentiaries and their Government that the message of China from first to last, from Peking and Canton, had been to fling the treaty in their face.

Meanwhile, his brother Frederick, who had taken the Tientsin treaty to London, was coming back with it along with the Queen's approval and his credentials as the British Minister to China. The conclusion of the plot was now at hand. The true stance of the Chinese Government was finally revealed in the violent reception the new envoy received at the entrance of the Peiho in June 1859. Frederick Bruce was generally viewed as a person of greater caliber than his older brother. "In personality, he was a great, upright, honorable guy," writes Sir Hope Grant, "and in appearance, tall and strong with a remarkably good expression." But even he took a long time to understand the new situation. After his disastrous failure at the Taku forts, he wrote in August, "I really regret that when the permanent residence was put aside, it wasn't clearly defined how the Minister was to be received in Peking." But it wasn’t a matter of details that blocked his entry to Peking. It was the firm decision never to meet with any foreign Minister; and it seems odd that it took not just another year but another war to finally convince the British negotiators and their Government that the message from China, from the very beginning, was to throw the treaty back in their faces.

SIR FREDERICK BRUCE.

SIR FREDERICK BRUCE.

II. LORD ELGIN'S SECOND MISSION.

Invasion of Peking—Convention of Peking—Establishment of the British Legation—Russian and British, a contrast.

Invasion of Beijing—Convention of Beijing—Establishment of the British Legation—Russian and British, a contrast.

The Chinese perfidy at Taku had of course to be avenged. A formidable expedition was equipped by the Allied Powers, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros being reappointed as plenipotentiaries. The history of the famous Peking campaign of 1860, with its tragic incidents, has been impressed on the world by so many writers, military and civil, most of them actors in the scenes they depict, that the barest outline of events may suffice in this place.

The Chinese betrayal at Taku had to be avenged. The Allied Powers organized a powerful expedition, with Lord Elgin and Baron Gros being reappointed as representatives. The story of the famous Peking campaign of 1860, filled with its tragic events, has been documented by numerous writers, both military and civilian, many of whom were participants in the events they describe, so just a simple outline of the events will be enough here.

In the preliminary agreement between the two Governments, the British military force was limited to 10,000 effectives; but the number actually placed in the field exceeded that figure by the consent of the French, whose forces were between 6000 and 7000. The British contingent was commanded by General Sir Hope Grant, the French by General Montauban, afterwards created Count Palikao,—"a fine, handsome, soldier-like man, apparently under sixty years of age."

In the initial agreement between the two governments, the British military presence was capped at 10,000 troops; however, the actual number deployed exceeded that limit with the French's approval, whose forces ranged from 6,000 to 7,000. The British forces were led by General Sir Hope Grant, while the French were commanded by General Montauban, later named Count Palikao—“a striking, well-built, soldier-like man, seemingly under sixty years old.”

The naval forces were commanded respectively by Vice-Admiral Sir James Hope, "a tall, noble-looking man, with a prepossessing and most gentlemanlike appearance,"[42] and by Admiral Page, "a superior man with a great deal of dry humour, but bad-tempered."[43]

The naval forces were led by Vice-Admiral Sir James Hope, "a tall, noble-looking man, with a charming and very gentlemanly appearance,"[42] and by Admiral Page, "a remarkable man with a lot of dry humor, but bad-tempered."[43]

The friction arising between Allies working together, waiting for each other, consulting at every step, taking 350 precedence of each other on alternate days, at first vexatious, was in the end overcome by the tact of the commanders on both sides.

The tension that came up between Allies collaborating, waiting for each other, checking in at every step, and taking turns on alternate days, which was initially frustrating, was eventually resolved thanks to the skillful diplomacy of the commanders on both sides.

The first operation of war was to occupy the harbour of Chusan as an intermediate base. After that the British force was conveyed in transports to Talien-wan, where they were disembarked, while the French were landed at Chefoo, on the opposite shore of the Gulf of Pechili. At these points preparations were made for the intended descent on the coast of the province of Chihli, between 200 and 300 miles to the westward. The British force included 1000 cavalry in splendid condition, and a battery of Armstrong guns, then for the first time used in active service. The French had no cavalry, the attempts to import horses from Japan were not successful, and the scarcity of draught-animals on their side caused great delay in the sailing of the expedition from the temporary depots. At length on July 26 a fleet of over 200 sail—a magnificent spectacle—carried the two armies to within twenty miles of the Peiho, where they anchored, waiting for favourable weather and a minute reconnaissance.

The first operation of the war was to take control of the harbor at Chusan as a temporary base. After that, the British forces were transported to Talien-wan, where they were unloaded, while the French landed at Chefoo, across the Gulf of Pechili. At these locations, preparations were made for the planned landing on the coast of the province of Chihli, about 200 to 300 miles to the west. The British forces included 1,000 cavalry in excellent condition, along with a battery of Armstrong guns, which were being used in active service for the first time. The French had no cavalry; their attempts to bring in horses from Japan were unsuccessful, and the lack of draft animals on their side caused significant delays in the expedition's departure from the temporary depots. Finally, on July 26, a fleet of over 200 ships—a magnificent sight—transported the two armies to within twenty miles of the Peiho, where they anchored, waiting for favorable weather and a thorough reconnaissance.

The one piece of strategy in the campaign was the choice of a landing-place. The Taku forts, which had been strong enough to repulse Sir James Hope with severe loss a year before, had been further strengthened, for to the Chinese it was a matter of life and death to bar the entrance to the Peiho. The chain barrier across the mouth of the river could not be forced under the concentrated fire of the forts; only the lightest draught vessels could approach within five miles; and a frontal attack was not to be thought of. But a decided difference of opinion between the Allied generals had disclosed 351 itself as to the mode of procedure. The French commander was determined to land on the coast to the southward of the forts; the English was still more resolute in selecting as a landing-place the mouth of the Peitang river, eight miles northward of Taku. So irreconcilable were their views that it was agreed that each should go his own way, only starting simultaneously. After more careful study, however, General Montauban came to think better of his own scheme, and proposed to Sir Hope Grant to join him in the landing at Peitang.

The main strategy in the campaign was choosing a landing spot. The Taku forts, which were strong enough to repel Sir James Hope with heavy losses a year earlier, had been further reinforced, as blocking the entrance to the Peiho was a matter of life and death for the Chinese. The chain barrier at the river's mouth couldn’t be breached under the concentrated fire from the forts; only the smallest vessels could approach within five miles, and a direct attack was out of the question. However, there was a significant disagreement between the Allied generals regarding their plan of action. The French commander was set on landing further south of the forts, while the English commander was even more determined to use the mouth of the Peitang river, eight miles north of Taku, as their landing site. Their differing opinions were so incompatible that it was decided each would proceed on their own but start at the same time. After further consideration, though, General Montauban reconsidered his initial plan and suggested to Sir Hope Grant that they should land together at Peitang.

So on August 2 the first detachments of 2000 from each army were disembarked, and the campaign proper commenced. The forts at Peitang were easily occupied, "a kind old man" pointing out where there were loaded shells which would explode on foot pressure on a gun-lock laid so as to fire a train. By means of a raised causeway leading through a sea of "briny slush," positions were reached whence the Taku forts could be attacked from the rear. Though bravely defended, the forts on the left bank were captured, and as they commanded those on the opposite bank no resistance was offered by the latter. The Peiho was thus opened for the conveyance of troops and stores to Tientsin, which was made the base of operations for the advance of the Allied armies on Peking.

So on August 2, the first detachments of 2000 from each army landed, and the main campaign began. The forts at Peitang were easily taken, with "a kind old man" showing where there were loaded shells that would explode if pressure was applied to a gun-lock set to fire a train. Using a raised causeway that led through a sea of "briny slush," they reached positions from which the Taku forts could be attacked from the rear. Despite a brave defense, the forts on the left bank were captured, and since they controlled those on the opposite bank, no resistance was offered by the latter. The Peiho River was thus opened for transporting troops and supplies to Tientsin, which became the base of operations for the advance of the Allied armies toward Peking.

The military movements were hampered by the presence of the two plenipotentiaries, who stopped on the way to negotiate with the unbeaten foe. Delay was not the only untoward consequence of these proceedings. At one moment a military disaster seemed to have been narrowly escaped. Taking advantage of 352 the singular credulity of the Allies, the Chinese, while engaging them in friendly negotiations, had planned to decoy the army into a convenient camping-ground at Changchia-wan, towards which the troops were marching, when, "To my surprise," writes the commander-in-chief, "we found a strong Tartar picket, who retired on our approach; and a little farther on were seen great bodies of cavalry and infantry, the latter drawn up behind a large nullah to our right front, displaying a number of banners." In the meantime the envoys, Parkes, Loch, and other officers, who had been negotiating with the higher mandarins at Tungchow, a couple of miles off, were seized and made prisoners with their escort, all being subsequently cruelly tortured, and most of them massacred, in accordance with Chinese practice in war.

The military movements were obstructed by the presence of the two diplomats, who halted on their way to negotiate with the undefeated enemy. Delay wasn’t the only unfortunate outcome of these events. At one point, a military disaster seemed to have been narrowly avoided. Taking advantage of the Allies' unusual gullibility, the Chinese, while engaging them in friendly discussions, had planned to lure the army into a suitable camping area at Changchia-wan, towards which the troops were marching. "To my surprise," the commander-in-chief writes, "we encountered a strong Tartar picket, who retreated upon our approach; and a little further, we saw large groups of cavalry and infantry, the latter positioned behind a substantial nullah to our right front, displaying several banners." Meanwhile, the envoys, Parkes, Loch, and other officers, who had been negotiating with the higher mandarins at Tungchow, a couple of miles away, were captured along with their escort, all of whom were subsequently cruelly tortured, with most of them massacred, following the Chinese practice in war.

Sir Hope Grant, finding his army of 4000 men in process of being hemmed in, attacked and routed the Chinese troops on September 18, resuming his march on the 21st, when the remainder of his force had joined him. He had not gone far, however, when the way was again barred, and another action had to be fought at the bridge Pali-chiao, ten miles from Peking, where General Montauban distinguished himself, and whence he derived his title.

Sir Hope Grant, seeing his army of 4,000 men getting cornered, attacked and defeated the Chinese troops on September 18. He continued his march on the 21st, once the rest of his force had regrouped with him. However, he hadn’t gone far before he was blocked again, leading to another battle at the Pali-chiao bridge, ten miles from Peking, where General Montauban made a name for himself and earned his title.

Far from owning themselves defeated, the Chinese on the morrow resumed negotiations as between equals. The Imperial Commissioners who had mismanaged the affair were replaced by Prince Kung, a brother of the emperor, who sent letters under a flag of truce, saying he was ready to come to terms, but "said nothing about our poor prisoners." The Allied plenipotentiaries declined to treat until the captives should be returned, 353 whereupon Prince Kung sent another letter saying they were safe, but would only be sent back on the restitution of the Taku forts and the evacuation of the river by the Allied fleets.

Far from accepting defeat, the Chinese resumed negotiations the next day as equals. The Imperial Commissioners who had mishandled the situation were replaced by Prince Kung, a brother of the emperor, who sent letters under a flag of truce, stating he was ready to negotiate, but "said nothing about our poor prisoners." The Allied representatives refused to negotiate until the captives were returned, 353 after which Prince Kung sent another letter saying they were safe, but would only be returned when the Taku forts were restored and the Allied fleets evacuated the river.

Lord Elgin had demanded that he should deliver the Queen's letter in person to the emperor. Prince Kung refused this demand, which Lord Elgin incontinently abandoned. Waxing bolder, Prince Kung next threatened that the entry of the Allied forces into the capital would be followed by the instant massacre of the prisoners. The plenipotentiaries retorted by intimating that the surrender of prisoners was a necessary condition of the suspension of hostilities. A week having been wasted in this vain seesaw, an ultimatum was sent into Peking on September 30. This was answered by the Chinese inviting the Allies to retire to Changchia-wan, the scene of the great defeat of their army, offering to sign the treaty there. And so the contest was maintained until the Allied artillery was planted within sixty yards of the north gate, and the hour was about to strike when the wall was to be battered down.

Lord Elgin insisted on delivering the Queen's letter personally to the emperor. Prince Kung refused this demand, which Lord Elgin quickly backed down from. Growing bolder, Prince Kung then threatened that if the Allied forces entered the capital, the prisoners would be instantly massacred. The diplomats responded by indicating that the release of prisoners was a necessary condition for stopping hostilities. After a week was wasted in this pointless back-and-forth, an ultimatum was sent to Peking on September 30. The Chinese responded by inviting the Allies to retreat to Changchia-wan, the site of their army's great defeat, offering to sign the treaty there. The standoff continued until the Allied artillery was set up just sixty yards from the north gate, and the moment was approaching when the wall would be taken down.

Most valuable information—the topography of the city—had been supplied by General Ignatieff, who accompanied the Allies. A map which he lent to Sir Hope Grant showed every street and house of importance in Peking, laid down by a scientific member of the Russian mission in the city. The data had been obtained by traversing the streets in a cart, from which angles were taken, while an indicator fixed to the wheel marked the distances covered. Without this plan the attack would have been made from the south side, as proposed by General Montauban, which would have 354 involved a march through the commercial or Chinese quarter, and the surmounting first of the Chinese and then of the Tartar wall. The map made it clear that from every point of view the north side offered the most eligible point of attack, where nothing intervened between a great open plain and the wall of the Manchu city.

Most valuable information—the layout of the city—was provided by General Ignatieff, who was with the Allies. A map he lent to Sir Hope Grant detailed every important street and building in Peking, created by a scientific member of the Russian mission in the city. The information was gathered by traveling the streets in a cart, where angles were recorded, and a device attached to the wheel tracked the distances covered. Without this map, the attack would have been launched from the south side, as General Montauban had proposed, which would have meant marching through the commercial or Chinese quarter and then crossing both the Chinese and Tartar walls. The map made it obvious that from every perspective, the north side was the best point for an attack, with nothing blocking the way between a vast open plain and the wall of the Manchu city.

Passing over the dramatic incidents of the destruction of the Summer Palace, an act of calculated vengeance for the murder and maltreatment of envoys and prisoners, the flight of the emperor on a hunting tour to Jêho, whence he never returned, the release of the prisoners and their account of the captivity, the new treaty was signed at the Hall of Ceremonies on October 22, 1860, by Prince Kung, "a delicate gentlemanlike man, evidently overcome with fear," and his coadjutor, Hangki. The treaties of Tientsin were ratified, and some further indemnities exacted. The special provisions introduced into the French treaty will be referred to in a subsequent chapter.[44]

Passing over the dramatic events of the destruction of the Summer Palace, which was a calculated act of revenge for the murder and mistreatment of envoys and prisoners, the emperor’s escape on a hunting trip to Jêho, from which he never returned, the release of the prisoners, and their accounts of their captivity, the new treaty was signed at the Hall of Ceremonies on October 22, 1860, by Prince Kung, "a refined and gentle man, clearly overwhelmed with fear," and his assistant, Hangki. The treaties of Tientsin were ratified, and further compensation was demanded. The specific provisions added to the French treaty will be discussed in a later chapter.[44]

The closing scene was marked by a degree of haste somewhat recalling Tientsin in 1858. The very slow advance on Peking brought the climax of the campaign unpleasantly close to the season when communication by water would be shut off by ice; "the weather became bitterly cold, some of the hills being covered with snow." And Sir Hope Grant's never-failing counsellor, Ignatieff, with "his usual extreme kindness," furnished him with the most important information that the Peiho would soon become frozen up and it would be unsafe to linger in Peking. Mr Loch's galloping off with the treaty, as shown in the illustration, 355 was rather typical of the whole business. The treaty as such was of little consequence—the fulfilment of its provisions was everything.

The closing scene was marked by a sense of urgency that somewhat reminded people of Tientsin in 1858. The very slow march towards Peking brought the peak of the campaign uncomfortably close to the time when travel by water would be blocked by ice; "the weather turned bitterly cold, and some hills were covered with snow." And Sir Hope Grant's ever-reliable advisor, Ignatieff, with "his usual extreme kindness," provided him with the crucial information that the Peiho would soon freeze over and it would be unsafe to stay in Peking. Mr. Loch galloping off with the treaty, as shown in the illustration, 355, was quite typical of the whole situation. The treaty itself was of little importance—the implementation of its provisions was everything.

MR LOCH DEPARTS FROM PEKING FOR ENGLAND WITH CHINESE TREATY.

MR LOCH LEAVES BEIJING FOR ENGLAND WITH CHINESE TREATY.

Some lessons, nevertheless, had been learned in the school of diplomatic adversity. Peking was not left without a locum tenens of the Minister, Tientsin was not left without a garrison, and the Taku forts were occupied by the Allies for a couple of years after the final conclusion of peace.

Some lessons, however, had been learned in the school of diplomatic challenges. Beijing wasn't left without an acting Minister, Tianjin wasn't left without a garrison, and the Taku forts were occupied by the Allies for a couple of years after the peace was finally concluded.

"Ring out the old; ring in the new." There seemed a natural fitness in the Hon. Frederick Bruce succeeding the Earl of Elgin as Minister plenipotentiary, and there was a dramatic finish in the farewell ceremonial when the retiring representative of the Queen vacated the seat of honour, placing therein his younger brother, whom he introduced to Prince Kung as the accredited agent of Great Britain. The new era was inaugurated; a real representative of her Britannic Majesty was installed in the capital of the Son of Heaven.

"Say goodbye to the old; welcome the new." It felt fitting for Hon. Frederick Bruce to take over from the Earl of Elgin as Minister plenipotentiary, and there was a dramatic conclusion to the farewell ceremony when the outgoing representative of the Queen left the seat of honor and placed his younger brother in it, introducing him to Prince Kung as the official representative of Great Britain. A new era had begun; a true representative of her Britannic Majesty was now in the capital of the Son of Heaven.

The season was late, and though two palaces had been granted on lease for the residences of the British and the French Ministers, many alterations and repairs were needed to render them fit for occupation, which could not be effected before the closing of the sea communication by ice. The Ministers therefore resolved to withdraw from Peking for the winter, placing their respective legations in charge of a junior consular officer, Mr Thomas Adkins, who volunteered to hold the post until the return of the plenipotentiaries in the following spring.

The season was late, and even though two palaces had been leased for the residences of the British and French Ministers, they required many changes and repairs to make them suitable for living in, which couldn’t be completed before the sea routes closed due to ice. Therefore, the Ministers decided to leave Peking for the winter, putting their legations in the hands of a junior consular officer, Mr. Thomas Adkins, who volunteered to take the position until the plenipotentiaries returned in the following spring.

Mr Adkins was not the only foreign sojourner in the Chinese capital. There was a French Lazarist priest, Mouilli by name, who, having successfully concealed 356 himself among his native Christians during the military advance of the Allies, emerged from his hiding-place on the triumphant entry of the ambassadors, and showed himself in the streets in a sedan chair with four bearers. There was the permanent Russian establishment within the city, with its unbroken record of 173 years. Originally composed of prisoners taken at the siege of Albazin, it had become a seminary of the Orthodox Church and a political vedette of the Russian empire, invaluable to the two masterful diplomatists who appeared suddenly on the scene in the years 1858 and 1860. The mission served as a speculum through which Russia could look into the inner recesses of the Chinese State, while to the Chinese it was a window of bottle-glass through which the external world was refracted for them. The Russian Government selects its agents on the principle on which we select university crews or All-England elevens—namely, the most fit. So important and far-sighted a scheme as the Peking mission was not left to chance or the claims of seniority, but was maintained in the highest efficiency. Its members—six ecclesiastical and four lay—were changed every ten years. All of them, from the Archimandrite downwards, were accomplished linguists, speaking Chinese like the natives, and masters also of the Manchu and Mongol languages. Their relations with the Chinese officials were unostentatious, yet brotherly. Few secrets, either of administration, dynastic politics, or official intrigue, no communications between the Government, provincial or imperial, and any foreigners, escaped record in the archives of the Russian mission. The personnel were protected from 357 outrage or insult by their own tact and their traditional prestige; and as the Daimios of Japan in their anti-foreign manifestos declared that every foreigner could be insulted with impunity except the Russians, so in China the name was a talisman of security. While the Anglo-French expedition was marching towards Peking the Russian Secretary, M. Popoff, had occasion to leave that city and pass the night at a native inn on the road to Tientsin. The place became filled with the retreating Chinese soldiery, and M. Popoff had the pleasure of hearing their excited conversation respecting himself. They were for dragging him out and killing him on the spot, when the landlord interposed. "That foreigner is a Russian," said he; "it will be dangerous to lay a hand on him."

Mr. Adkins wasn't the only foreign visitor in the Chinese capital. There was a French Lazarist priest named Mouilli, who successfully hid among his local Christian community during the military advance of the Allies. He emerged from hiding when the ambassadors triumphantly entered the city, appearing in the streets in a sedan chair carried by four bearers. There was also a permanent Russian presence in the city, with an unbroken history of 173 years. Initially made up of prisoners from the siege of Albazin, it had evolved into a seminary for the Orthodox Church and a political outpost for the Russian empire, crucial for the two prominent diplomats who suddenly appeared in 1858 and 1860. This mission allowed Russia to gain insights into the inner workings of the Chinese state, while for the Chinese, it acted as a distorted window into the outside world. The Russian government selects its agents based on the same principle as selecting university sports teams—namely, the most capable individuals. Such an important and strategic mission in Peking was not left to chance or seniority but was kept in top form. Its team—six clergy and four laypeople—was rotated every ten years. All of them, from the Archimandrite down, were skilled linguists, speaking Chinese fluently like the locals, and were also proficient in Manchu and Mongolian. Their relations with Chinese officials were discreet yet friendly. Few secrets, whether about administration, dynastic politics, or official scheming, as well as any communications between the provincial or imperial government and other foreigners, evaded capture in the Russian mission's archives. The personnel were shielded from attack or insult by their tact and longstanding prestige; similar to how the Daimyos of Japan stated in their anti-foreign manifestos that any foreigner could be insulted with no consequences except for the Russians, in China, their name was a symbol of safety. While the Anglo-French expedition was making its way to Peking, the Russian Secretary, M. Popoff, had to leave the city and spend the night at a local inn on the way to Tientsin. The place soon filled with retreating Chinese soldiers, and M. Popoff overheard their heated conversation about him. They were plotting to drag him out and kill him on the spot when the landlord intervened. "That foreigner is a Russian," he said; "it would be dangerous to touch him."

MONSEIGNEUR MOUILLI.

MONSIGNOR MOUILLI.

M. Popoff's errand was to meet General Ignatieff, who was making his way to Peking with the Allied forces. It was of the utmost importance that he should arrive simultaneously with the French and English plenipotentiaries in order to save China from her doom. China's extremity was Russia's opportunity for showing the sincerity of her long unbroken friendship. The foreigners had come to possess themselves of the empire and destroy the dynasty. Their ruthless character was soon to be shown in the burning and pillage of the Summer Palace. The Chinese Court's apprehension of the impending calamity was proved by the flight of the emperor to a quasi-inaccessible retreat. In that terrible crisis no sacrifice would have been deemed by the imperial family too great to "get rid of the barbarians." Confirming their own worst fears as to the designs of the invaders, 358 General Ignatieff revealed to them the only way of salvation. Nothing would arrest the schemes of the Allies but the intervention of a strong Power friendly to China. He had it in his power to make such representations to Baron Gros and Lord Elgin as would induce them to withdraw their troops. This essential service he offered to the Chinese for a nominal consideration. Only a rectification of frontier by inclusion of a sterile region inhabited by robbers and infested by tigers, where no mandarin could make a living, fit only for a penal settlement, with a rugged sea-coast where no Chinese sail was ever seen. Prince Kung jumped at the providential offer of deliverance, and so that great province called Primorsk, with its 600 miles of coast-line, which gave to Russia the dominion of the East—"Vladivostock"—was signed away by the panic-stricken rulers of China. A year later this transaction cropped up in conversation over the teacups, after the business of the day had been disposed of, between Prince Kung and a certain foreign diplomatist, who remarked that there was never the remotest intention on the part of the Allies of keeping a single soldier in China after the treaty was made. The Prince looked aghast, then said solemnly, "Do you mean to say we have been deceived?" "Utterly," replied the other; and then the dejection of the Prince was such as the foreigner, who lived to enjoy a twenty-years' acquaintance with him, declared he never saw in his or any other Chinese countenance. Thus General Ignatieff, without any force, in the vulgar sense, of his own, was adroit enough and bold enough to wield the forces of his belligerent neighbours so as to carry off the only 359 solid fruit of the war, while fulfilling the obligations of friendship for China and denouncing her spoilers.

M. Popoff's task was to meet General Ignatieff, who was heading to Peking with the Allied forces. It was crucial for him to arrive at the same time as the French and English diplomats to save China from disaster. China’s crisis was Russia's chance to demonstrate the sincerity of its long-standing friendship. The foreigners were intent on taking control of the empire and overthrowing the dynasty. Their ruthless nature would soon be evident in the burning and looting of the Summer Palace. The Chinese Court's fear of the impending disaster was confirmed by the emperor's flight to a nearly inaccessible retreat. In that dire moment, no sacrifice would seem too great to the imperial family to "get rid of the barbarians." Confirming their worst fears about the invaders' intentions, 358 General Ignatieff revealed to them the only way to save themselves. Nothing would stop the Allies' plans except the intervention of a strong Power that was friendly to China. He had the ability to make such representations to Baron Gros and Lord Elgin that would persuade them to withdraw their troops. This crucial service was offered to the Chinese for a nominal fee. All that was needed was a border adjustment by including a barren area inhabited by outlaws and plagued by tigers, where no mandarin could earn a living, suitable only for a penal colony, with a rugged coastline where no Chinese ship was ever seen. Prince Kung eagerly accepted this fortuitous offer of salvation, and so the vast province known as Primorsk, with its 600 miles of coastline, which granted Russia dominance in the East—"Vladivostock"—was signed away by the terrified rulers of China. A year later, this deal came up in conversation over tea, after the day's business was done, between Prince Kung and a certain foreign diplomat, who remarked that there was never any intention on the part of the Allies to keep even one soldier in China after the treaty was signed. The Prince looked shocked and then said solemnly, "Are you saying we have been deceived?" "Absolutely," the diplomat replied, and the despondency of the Prince was such that the foreigner, who had a twenty-year friendship with him, claimed he had never seen such a look on any Chinese face. Thus, General Ignatieff, lacking any military power of his own, was clever and bold enough to manipulate the forces of his warring neighbors to secure the only 359 tangible outcome of the war, while honoring his friendship with China and condemning her aggressors.

The Russian envoy had not the same incentive to hurry away from Peking as the other treaty-makers had, for the ice which would imprison them would afford him the most expeditious road for travel homewards through Siberia. He was nearly as much relieved as Prince Kung himself at getting rid of these "barbarians," for then he had the field of diplomacy all to himself. He made his treaty, and departed during the winter by the back door, across Mongolia.

The Russian envoy didn’t have the same urge to rush away from Beijing like the other treaty-makers did, because the ice that would trap them would actually provide him with the quickest route back home through Siberia. He was almost as relieved as Prince Kung himself to be rid of these "barbarians," as that left him with the entire diplomatic scene to himself. He finalized his treaty and left during the winter through the back door, traveling across Mongolia.

Ignatieff was a man well known in English society, and thoroughly conversant with England. Like most educated Russians, he was affable and sympathetic—a "charming fellow." He was courteous and companionable to the locum tenens of the English Legation, and in taking leave of Mr Adkins expressed the opinion that he would be all right in his isolation so long as the emperor did not return to Peking, but in that event his position would not be an enviable one. However, "if you fear any trouble, go over to the Russian mission: they will take care of you."

Ignatieff was a well-known figure in English society and had a good grasp of England. Like many educated Russians, he was friendly and easy to talk to—a "charming guy." He was polite and enjoyable to be around with the locum tenens of the English Legation, and when saying goodbye to Mr. Adkins, he mentioned that he would manage fine in his isolation as long as the emperor didn’t come back to Peking, but if that happened, his situation wouldn’t be great. Still, "if you’re worried about any trouble, head over to the Russian mission: they’ll look out for you."

The winter of 1860 left the statesmen of China some food for reflection. The thundering legions had passed like a tornado which leaves a great calm behind it. The "still small voice" had also departed, with a province in his chemadán, gained without a shot or even a shout. Two strongly contrasted foreign types had thus been simultaneously presented to the astonished Chinese. Can it be doubted which left the deeper impression?

The winter of 1860 gave China's leaders a lot to think about. The overwhelming forces had come and gone like a tornado, leaving a strange calm in its wake. The "still small voice" had also vanished, taking a province in his chemadán, acquired without a single shot fired or even a shout. Two very different foreign types had been presented at the same time to the shocked Chinese. Is there any doubt which one made a stronger impact?

Preparations were made during the winter for receiving the foreign Ministers in the spring. A 360 department of Foreign Affairs was created under the title of "Tsung-li Koh Kwoh She Yu Yamên," or briefly, "Tsungli-Yamên," the three original members being Prince Kung, Kweiliang, and Wênsiang. The Yamên was established by imperial decrees in January; Mr Bruce and M. Bourboulon arrived in March 1861, when diplomacy proper began, the thread of which will be resumed in a later section.

Preparations were made during the winter to welcome the foreign ministers in the spring. A 360 department of Foreign Affairs was created under the name "Tsung-li Koh Kwoh She Yu Yamên," or simply "Tsungli-Yamên." The three original members were Prince Kung, Kweiliang, and Wênsiang. The Yamên was established by imperial decrees in January; Mr. Bruce and M. Bourboulon arrived in March 1861, marking the beginning of proper diplomacy, which will be continued in a later section.

CHAPTER XVIII.

TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE TREATIES OF 1858 AND 1860.

I. THE DIPLOMATIC OVERTURE.

Spontaneous fulfilment of treaties not to be expected—Retreating attitude of foreign Ministers—Repression of British tourists—Hostility of Pekingese—Conciliation fails—Chinese refuse to conclude treaty with Prussia—Glimpse of the real truth—Rooted determination to keep out foreigners—Absence of the sovereign—Female regents—Diplomatic forms in abeyance—Foreign Ministers' task complicated by assumed guardianship of China—Pleasant intercourse with Manchu statesmen.

Spontaneous fulfillment of treaties is not to be expected—The retreating stance of foreign ministers—Restrictions on British tourists—Hostility from the people of Beijing—Attempts at conciliation fail—The Chinese refuse to finalize a treaty with Prussia—A glimpse of the real truth—A strong determination to keep foreigners out—The absence of the sovereign—Female regents—Diplomatic protocols are on hold—The foreign ministers' work is complicated by the assumed guardianship over China—Friendly interactions with Manchu statesmen.

When Mr Bruce and M. Bourboulon took up their residence in Peking on March 22, 1861, diplomacy was as yet a white sheet on which it was their part to trace the first characters. The treaty—for all the treaties were substantially one—was their charter; its integral fulfilment their only safety. For as it had not been a bargain of give-and-take between equals, but an imposition pure and simple by the strong upon the weak, there would be no spontaneous fulfilment of its obligations, rather a steady counter-pressure, as of water forcibly confined seeking out weak spots in the dam. Moreover, the two parties to the treaty, foreigners and Chinese, were not acquainted with each other: aims, incentives, temper and character, and the nature of the 362 considerations by which they respectively would be influenced, were all obscure. It was an uncertain situation, calling for vigilance and caution. There can be no doubt the pregnant importance of the first steps was realised by the representatives on both sides. The thoughts of the Chinese on that critical occasion can only be inferred from their acts. Of what was uppermost in the minds of the foreigners, or at least of the English Minister, we have some slight indications from the pen of a member of his staff, who, though not himself in the diplomatic circle, claims to be the authorised chronicler of the early days of the mission. This pretension is implicitly indorsed by the fact that the preface to Dr Rennie's book[45] was written in Government House, Calcutta, whither he followed Lord Elgin in the capacity of physician. When the Ministers had only been five days in Peking Dr Rennie wrote as follows: "Now is commencing perhaps the most difficult part of a permanent English residency at Peking—namely, the satisfying the Chinese that we are a tolerably harmless and well-intentioned people, inclined to live with them on terms of amity rather than the contrary, and that the desire of our Government is that its subjects should respect, as much as is consistent with reason, their national prejudices."

When Mr. Bruce and M. Bourboulon moved to Beijing on March 22, 1861, diplomacy was like a blank slate where they had to write the first lines. The treaty—since all the treaties were essentially the same—served as their foundation; its complete implementation was their only security. This wasn't a mutual agreement between equals; it was a straightforward imposition by the strong on the weak, meaning there wouldn't be any voluntary fulfillment of its terms. Instead, there would be a persistent pressure, like water that's been forcibly contained looking for weak spots in the dam. Furthermore, the two sides of the treaty, the foreigners and the Chinese, didn't know each other: their goals, motivations, moods, and the factors that would influence them were all unclear. It was a precarious situation that required alertness and carefulness. There's no doubt that both sides understood the crucial significance of their initial actions. The thoughts of the Chinese during that critical moment can only be guessed from their behaviors. We have some hints about what the foreigners, especially the British Minister, were thinking, thanks to a member of his staff who claimed to document the early days of the mission. This claim is backed by the fact that the preface to Dr. Rennie's book[45] was written in Government House, Calcutta, where he followed Lord Elgin as his physician. Just five days after the Ministers arrived in Beijing, Dr. Rennie wrote: "Now is beginning perhaps the most challenging part of having a permanent British presence in Beijing—namely, convincing the Chinese that we are a fairly harmless and well-meaning people, inclined to live with them in friendship rather than hostility, and that our Government wants its subjects to respect their national prejudices as much as is reasonable."

Such an immaculate sentiment placed in the very forefront of an ambassadorial programme, ushered in at the cost of two wars which shook the foundations of the Chinese empire, leaves something to be desired as a justification for being in Peking at all. But Dr Rennie indicates no other purpose for which foreign legations were established there. He does not get 363 beyond the mere "residency." A viceroy of India proclaiming at each stage of a "progress" that he was a man of peace, a bride hoping to lead a passably virtuous life, would scarcely be more naïve than a foreign Minister's pious aspiration to behave tolerably well to the Chinese. For where was the "difficulty," one is tempted to ask? It is explained by Dr Rennie.

Such a pure sentiment at the forefront of an ambassadorial program, which came at the cost of two wars that shook the Chinese empire's foundations, doesn't really justify the presence in Peking at all. But Dr. Rennie indicates no other reason for having foreign legations there. He doesn't go beyond the simple idea of "residency." A viceroy of India claiming at every step of a "progress" that he was a man of peace, a bride hoping to lead a somewhat virtuous life, would be hardly more naive than a foreign Minister's sincere wish to behave decently towards the Chinese. For where was the "difficulty," one might wonder? Dr. Rennie explains it.

Two English officers, it appears, had made an excursion to the Great Wall without the necessary consular and local authorisation, and had further shown "the bad taste, at a date so recent to its destruction," to visit the Summer Palace. A formal complaint of these indiscretions met Mr Bruce on his arrival, and credit must be given to the Chinese for their appreciation of the tactical value of what Scotswomen call "the first word of flytin'." They moved the first pawn, and put the British Minister at once on the defensive. He responded by an arbitrary exercise of authority whereby Englishmen were prohibited from visiting Peking. The restriction possessed little direct importance, since few persons were then affected by it; but as the opening act of the new diplomacy, its significance could hardly be overrated. Though "only a little one," it was a recession from the right conferred on the subjects of all treaty Powers to travel for business or pleasure not only to Peking, but throughout the Chinese empire. It was as the tuning-fork to the orchestra.

Two English officers had taken a trip to the Great Wall without the necessary consular and local approval, and they had also shown "bad taste, so soon after its destruction," by visiting the Summer Palace. When Mr. Bruce arrived, he was met with a formal complaint about these actions, and credit must be given to the Chinese for recognizing the strategic importance of what Scotswomen call "the first word of flytin'." They made the first move and immediately put the British Minister on the defensive. He reacted by exercising his authority, prohibiting Englishmen from visiting Peking. The restriction had little immediate impact since it affected very few people at the time; however, as the opening act of the new diplomacy, its significance could hardly be overstated. Although it was "only a little one," it represented a retreat from the right granted to the subjects of all treaty powers to travel for business or pleasure not just to Peking, but throughout the entire Chinese empire. It was like the tuning fork for the orchestra.

It is not permissible to suppose that the British Minister had not good reasons for swerving from the principle of exercising rights, great and small, for which, as he well knew, experience in China had been one long, unbroken, cogent argument. Dr Rennie furnishes his readers with the reason. "The Chinese," he 364 observes, "would seem to be very sensitive"; and "taking all the circumstances into consideration, ... the fear that casual visits on the part of strangers ... may prove antagonistic to the establishment of a harmonious feeling at the opening of a new era in our intercourse with the Chinese," the Minister resolved to keep Englishmen (and only them) out of the capital.

It’s not reasonable to think that the British Minister didn’t have good reasons for deviating from the principle of asserting rights, whether big or small, because, as he well understood, his experience in China had been one long, consistent, convincing argument. Dr. Rennie provides his readers with the explanation. "The Chinese," he 364 notes, "seem to be very sensitive"; and "taking all the circumstances into account, ... the fear that random visits from strangers ... may be detrimental to establishing a positive relationship at the start of a new phase in our interactions with the Chinese," the Minister decided to keep English people (and only them) out of the capital.

This explanation, like that of the purpose of the Legation itself, leaves on us a sense of inadequacy. These hyper-sensitive people had been engaged, only six months before, in torturing and massacring foreign envoys and prisoners, for which atrocities the destruction and sack of Yuen-ming-yuen was thought to be not too severe a reprisal. That the high officials who had committed these cruelties and endured the penalty should suddenly become so delicate that they could not bear the thought of a harmless tourist looking upon the ruins of the palace seems a somewhat fantastical idea. As for the sensitiveness of the townspeople, Dr Rennie himself had some experience of it three days after penning the above remarks. "A good deal of shouting and hooting," he says, was followed by "stones whizzing past me." Then "my horse was struck by a stone" and bolted. A similar experience befell another member of the Legation on the same day in another part of the city. Dr Rennie believed the stones to have been thrown by boys, which is probable enough. The favourite Chinese official palliation of outrages on foreigners is to attribute them to youths and poor ignorant people, which, however, in nowise softens the impact of the missile. Let us give the Chinese full credit for the virtues they possess—and they are many—but no one familiar with the streets of Peking 365 would consider delicacy their predominant characteristic. View the diplomatic incident how we please, it cannot be denied that the Chinese drew first blood in the new contest, and at the same time practically tested the disposition of the invading force.

This explanation, like the purpose of the Legation itself, leaves us feeling inadequate. Just six months earlier, these overly sensitive people had been torturing and massacring foreign envoys and prisoners, for which the destruction and looting of Yuen-ming-yuen was seen as a not too harsh response. It seems quite bizarre that the high officials who carried out these atrocities and faced consequences would suddenly become so delicate that they couldn't bear the thought of a harmless tourist looking at the palace ruins. Dr. Rennie himself had a taste of this sensitivity three days after writing those remarks. "A lot of shouting and hooting," he noted, was followed by "stones whizzing past me." Then "my horse was hit by a stone" and bolted. Another member of the Legation had a similar experience that same day in a different part of the city. Dr. Rennie thought the stones were thrown by boys, which seems likely. The common Chinese official excuse for attacks on foreigners is to blame them on youths and uninformed people, which doesn't lessen the impact of the stones. Let's give the Chinese credit for their many virtues, but anyone familiar with the streets of Peking 365 wouldn't say delicacy is their primary trait. However we view the diplomatic incident, it can't be denied that the Chinese started the conflict and at the same time practically tested the resolve of the invading force.

Another "straw" from Dr Rennie's journal may be noticed as indicating the set of the current. Apropos of the first commercial case that had been sent up from the ports to the Minister, he records the conclusion that "in almost every dispute which arises between ourselves and the Chinese we are in the first instance in the wrong; but, unfortunately [for whom?], the Chinese equally invariably adopt the wrong method of putting matters right," so that "the original wrong committed by us is entirely lost sight of." The observation refers exclusively to mercantile affairs, and it was a rather large generalisation to make after a month's experimental diplomacy in Peking.

Another "straw" from Dr. Rennie's journal highlights the direction of the current. Regarding the first commercial case that was sent from the ports to the Minister, he notes the conclusion that "in almost every dispute that arises between us and the Chinese, we are initially at fault; but, unfortunately [for whom?], the Chinese always tend to use the wrong approach to resolve the issue," so that "the original mistake made by us is completely overlooked." This observation is solely about business matters, and it was quite a broad generalization to make after a month of trial diplomacy in Beijing.

The Minister soon found that his efforts to placate the Chinese Government were not producing the intended effect. It was not the "casual visitor" that in any special way annoyed them, but the foreigner in all his moods and tenses, most of all Mr Bruce himself, his colleagues and their staff, medical and other, and all that they stood for. General Ignatieff had not, after all, conjured away the foreign plague, nor were the Chinese statesmen entirely reassured even as to their immunity from the military danger. In the month of April Admiral Hope, Brigadier-General Staveley, and Mr Parkes visited Peking, and were courteously received; but Prince Kung was visibly relieved, Dr Rennie tells us, when assured that the admiral was not to remain there. As for the general, his presence in 366 the vicinity was inevitable so long as a considerable British and French force remained in garrison in Tientsin and Taku. Like the Ministers themselves, he was an unpleasant necessity to be endured as well as may be. But being thus obliged to tolerate the greater evil, it would appear to Western reasoning that an admiral more or less in an inland town need not have so greatly upset Chinese equanimity. Prince Kung, however, was not yet able to look on such matters with Western eyes. Every foreigner kept at arm's-length, no matter what his rank or condition, was a gain, as every locust destroyed is a gain to the peasant.

The Minister quickly realized that his attempts to ease tensions with the Chinese Government weren't having the desired effect. It wasn't the "casual visitor" that particularly bothered them, but foreigners in general, especially Mr. Bruce himself, along with his colleagues and their staff, whether medical or otherwise, and everything they represented. General Ignatieff hadn't magically removed the foreign threat, and the Chinese leaders still felt uneasy about their safety from military danger. In April, Admiral Hope, Brigadier-General Staveley, and Mr. Parkes paid a visit to Peking, where they were treated courteously; however, Prince Kung visibly relaxed, as Dr. Rennie noted, when it was confirmed that the admiral would not be staying. As for the general, his presence nearby was unavoidable as long as a significant British and French force was stationed in Tientsin and Taku. Like the Ministers themselves, he was an uncomfortable necessity that had to be tolerated. Yet, from a Western perspective, it seemed that the presence of one more admiral in an inland town shouldn't have caused such unrest among the Chinese. However, Prince Kung wasn't ready to view these issues with a Western mindset. Keeping every foreigner at a distance, regardless of their rank or status, was seen as a victory, much like every locust eliminated is a victory for the farmer.

So when the Prussian envoy, Count Eulenberg, presented himself, the British Minister vouching for his respectability, for the purpose of making a treaty on the lines of those already made and ratified, his efforts were frustrated by every plausible device. The envoy was relegated to the most distant point at which it was deemed feasible to stay his progress—namely, Tientsin, where negotiations were vexatiously protracted during four months. The first and final sticking-point was the claim to residence in the capital, which the Chinese absolutely refused to concede. Eventually they agreed to compound for a deferred entry ten years after signature. This by haggling was finally reduced to five years, and the treaty was thereupon concluded in August 1861. The old Canton tactics were thus revived, as if nothing had happened since 1857.

So when the Prussian envoy, Count Eulenberg, arrived, the British Minister vouched for his credibility in order to negotiate a treaty similar to those already made and approved. However, his efforts were blocked by every reasonable excuse. The envoy was sent to the farthest location deemed reasonable to halt his progress—specifically, Tientsin—where negotiations dragged on unnecessarily for four months. The main issue was the demand for residency in the capital, which the Chinese flat-out refused to grant. Eventually, they agreed to a delayed entry ten years after the signing. After some bargaining, this was finally shortened to five years, and the treaty was concluded in August 1861. The old tactics from Canton were revived as if nothing had changed since 1857.

As the echo of Mr Bruce, Dr Rennie's comment on the proceeding is worth noting. "Looks very like merely gaining time, in hopes that, before that period expires, all foreign residence in the capital will be at an end." Here we catch a glimpse of the fundamental 367 truth underlying all Chinese diplomacy from first to last—the purpose, never relaxed for an instant, of some day expelling foreigners from the country. No foreigner could hope to unravel the tangle of Chinese reasoning so as to comprehend in what manner the exclusion of one State was to assist in the eviction of the representatives of four Great Powers already established in the capital; but it may be inferred from the above remark that Mr Bruce was beginning to perceive that good behaviour towards the Chinese was not the be-all and end-all of the functions of a British representative in China. There was another side. We know, in fact, though Dr Rennie does not record it, that Mr Bruce began to see the necessity of making a stand against the reactionary pressure of the Chinese; that he was resolved on bending the Ministers of the Yamên to his will—being satisfied he could do it—instead of yielding to theirs in the vain hope of gaining their confidence.

As we reflect on Mr. Bruce's thoughts, it's important to note Dr. Rennie's comment on the situation: "It seems like a tactic to buy time, hoping that before that period is up, all foreign presence in the capital will be over." Here, we catch a glimpse of the core truth behind all Chinese diplomacy—the unchanging aim to eventually drive out foreigners from the country. No foreigner could make sense of the complex reasoning of the Chinese to understand how excluding one nation would help get rid of the representatives of four major powers already in the capital; however, Mr. Bruce's comment suggests he was starting to realize that simply behaving well towards the Chinese wasn’t the only role of a British representative in China. There was more to consider. In fact, although Dr. Rennie doesn’t mention it, we know Mr. Bruce began to recognize the need to resist the conservative pressures from the Chinese; he was determined to influence the Ministers of the Yamên to align with his stance—confident he could do so—rather than giving in to their demands in the futile hope of winning their trust.

The grand desideratum had been at last obtained, access to the capital; but how different the realisation from the anticipation! There was no sovereign and no Court, only the shell of the nut without the kernel. And as diplomacy began so it continued, in successive illusions, partially dispelled, yet clung to with slow-dying hope.

The great goal had finally been achieved—access to the capital—but the reality was so different from what had been expected! There was no ruler and no royal Court, just the shell of the nut without the core. And as diplomacy started, it continued in a series of illusions, partially cleared away, yet held onto with a lingering hope.

At first sight, no doubt, the task of the foreign representatives seemed an easy one: they had but to lay down the law to a defeated Power, to hammer the softened metal. This course would have been as simple in fact as it was in principle had they been united, and had it been possible for them to take a simple view of their mission; but from the first their duty to their respective 368 countries was complicated, and in varying degrees, by what they conceived to be their duty towards China. It was inevitable that the attempt to follow two lines of policy divided by such cleavage should result in a fall into the crevasse. China, in fact, was too large a subject for either the treaty Powers or their agents to grasp. She made huge demands on the humanity, the indulgence, and the protection of the Powers who had broken down her wall of seclusion, and she had nothing in kind to offer them in return—neither gratitude nor co-operation, nor even good faith. For this China could be blamed only in so far as her own welfare was hindered by her irresponsiveness, for her statesmen were not far wrong in attributing to any motive rather than pure philanthropy the obtrusive solicitude of the Western Powers. International relations even between kindred peoples are in the nature of things selfish, or worse; and the more they assume an altruistic mask the more they lie open to suspicion. In this cynical view of the attitude of her neighbours China has never wavered.

At first glance, it certainly seemed like the job of the foreign representatives was an easy one: they just had to enforce their will on a defeated power and reshape it. This approach would have been straightforward in practice as it was in theory if they had been united and able to take a clear view of their mission. However, from the beginning, their duty to their respective 368 countries was complicated, to varying degrees, by their perceived responsibilities towards China. It was unavoidable that trying to pursue two conflicting policies would lead to a downfall. China was simply too vast a subject for either the treaty Powers or their agents to fully understand. She placed enormous demands on the compassion, tolerance, and protection of the Powers that had dismantled her walls of isolation, and she offered nothing substantial in return—neither gratitude, cooperation, nor even good faith. China could only be blamed to the extent that her own well-being was compromised by her lack of responsiveness, as her leaders were not far off in seeing that the Western Powers' self-serving concern was motivated by anything but true philanthropy. International relations, even among similar nations, tend to be selfish or worse; and the more they present an outwardly altruistic image, the more they invite suspicion. China has never wavered in this cynical understanding of her neighbors' attitudes.

Yet it was not all illusion and Dead Sea apples. Something had been gained by diplomatic access to the capital. The elaborate insolence of the Chinese mandarin had been exchanged for the urbanity of the well-bred Manchu. It became possible to converse. Foreigners were listened to with attention, and answered with an open countenance. The change was incalculable. It recalled the days of Lord Macartney and the Emperor Kienlung, of Sir John Davis's pleasant intercourse with Kiying, and of the agreeable impression left by the Manchu statesmen who were concerned from 1841 onwards in the conduct of war or the conclusion of 369 peace. If to the kindly personal relations which characterised the earlier years of Peking diplomacy no permanent tangible result could be definitely ascribed, who can tell what evils were staved off or calamity averted by these friendly amenities?

Yet it wasn't all just illusion and empty promises. Something was gained through diplomatic access to the capital. The elaborate arrogance of the Chinese official had been replaced by the sophistication of the well-mannered Manchu. It became possible to have a conversation. Foreigners were listened to attentively and responded to with an open demeanor. The change was immeasurable. It brought to mind the times of Lord Macartney and Emperor Kienlung, Sir John Davis's pleasant exchanges with Kiying, and the positive impression left by the Manchu leaders who were involved in the conduct of war or the signing of peace from 1841 onward. If the friendly personal relationships that characterized the early years of Peking diplomacy didn't lead to any lasting, concrete results, who can say what troubles were avoided or disasters averted by these friendly interactions?

In order, however, to appreciate the state of affairs in Peking in 1865, it is necessary to fill the gap in our narrative by an outline of events following the ratification of the treaty of Tientsin and Convention of Peking in October 1860.

In order to understand the situation in Peking in 1865, we need to fill in the gaps in our story with an overview of the events that took place after the ratification of the treaty of Tientsin and the Convention of Peking in October 1860.

II. NEW PORTS AND OPENING OF THE YANGTZE.

Seven new coast ports—Admiral Hope's Yangtze expedition—His relations with Taiping rebels—Hankow, Kiukiang, and Chinkiang opened to trade—Panic in Hankow, and exodus of population for fear of rebels.

Seven new coastal ports—Admiral Hope's expedition on the Yangtze—His interactions with the Taiping rebels—Hankow, Kiukiang, and Chinkiang opened for trade—Panic in Hankow and an exodus of people due to fear of the rebels.

The new ports opened to trade—Tientsin, Newchwang, and Chefoo in the North; Swatow, and two Formosan ports; Kiungchow in Hainan—added considerably to the range of foreign commerce, and necessitated a large extension of the foreign customs and of the consular services. But the most important feature in the new arrangements was the effective opening of the river Yangtze. It was interesting, as giving access to the commercial centre of the empire; and as bringing foreigners into direct contact, possibly conflict, with the Taiping rebels. For the banks of the great river were at the time checkered with the alternate strongholds of rebels and imperialists. Trade must therefore either be carried on on sufferance from both, or be efficiently protected from the 370 interference of either belligerent. Obviously this was a matter to be gone about discreetly.

The new ports opened for trade—Tientsin, Newchwang, and Chefoo in the North; Swatow, and two ports in Formosa; Kiungchow in Hainan—significantly expanded the scope of foreign commerce and required a major increase in foreign customs and consular services. However, the most crucial aspect of the new arrangements was the effective opening of the Yangtze River. This was notable as it provided access to the commercial heart of the empire and brought foreigners into direct contact, potentially conflict, with the Taiping rebels. At that time, the banks of the great river were marked by the alternating strongholds of rebels and imperial forces. Thus, trade had to be conducted either with the tolerance of both sides or be well-protected from the interference of either party. Clearly, this was something that needed to be handled carefully.

The course and capabilities of the great waterway, and the disposition of the military forces on its banks, had been well reconnoitred by Lord Elgin himself in 1858; and the ports to be opened, which were left unnamed in the treaty, were pretty definitely indicated in the survey then made. There were to be three in all. Chinkiang, which had been recently recovered from the rebels, situated at the intersection of the Imperial Canal and the Yangtze-kiang, was definitely fixed. The two others farther up river remained to be selected.

The layout and capabilities of the major waterway, along with the positioning of military forces along its banks, had been thoroughly explored by Lord Elgin himself in 1858. The ports to be opened, which were not specifically named in the treaty, were clearly indicated in the survey conducted at that time. There would be three in total. Chinkiang, which had recently been reclaimed from the rebels and is located at the junction of the Imperial Canal and the Yangtze River, was clearly established. The other two, further upstream, were yet to be chosen.

The opening of the river was by treaty made contingent on the restoration of imperial authority on its banks; but as there was nothing more likely to accelerate that consummation than commercial traffic on the river, the Chinese Government acquiesced in the British authorities making the experiment, at their own risk as regarded possible trouble with the insurgents. The object was to "throw open the general coasting trade of the river"; and Lord Elgin, on his departure from China, left the undertaking in the hands of Admiral Hope, to whom he attached Mr Parkes, withdrawn for the occasion from his duties as commissioner in Canton.

The opening of the river was made conditional by treaty on the restoration of imperial authority along its banks; however, since commercial traffic on the river was the best way to speed up that process, the Chinese Government allowed the British authorities to go ahead with the experiment at their own risk regarding potential issues with the insurgents. The goal was to "open up the general coasting trade of the river." When Lord Elgin left China, he handed over the project to Admiral Hope, who was assisted by Mr. Parkes, temporarily taken from his role as commissioner in Canton for this purpose.

FIRST BRITISH CONSULATE AT KOLENGSOO, AMOY, 1844.

FIRST BRITISH CONSULATE AT KOLENGSOO, AMOY, 1844.

The admiral started from Shanghai in advance of Mr Parkes, with a squadron of light-draught steamers, on February 11, 1861. He carried an exploring expedition composed of Colonel Sarel, Captain Blakiston, Mr Shereshewsky, and Dr A. Barton, whose proceedings are reported in Blakiston's 'Five Months on the Upper Yangtze'; several American missionaries; two Frenchmen, 371 afterwards distinguished, MM. Eugène Simon and A. Dupuis, the latter proving the means of eventually giving Tongking to France; a French military attaché; Lieut.-Colonel Wolseley, D.A.Q.-M.G.; and a delegation from the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, with several private persons. Whether the pilots presumed upon light draught and steam power, or whether the course of the river had changed so much since the previous surveys were made, the vessels got stranded, one after another, in the estuary; and as each grounded a companion was told off to stand by her, so that before they had got clear of what is known as the Langshan Crossing (the home of the famous breed of black poultry) the admiral's tender, the Coromandel, was the only vessel left in a mobile condition. Not to lose time, the admiral determined to push on in that non-combatant craft to Nanking, the rebel capital, and test the temper and intentions of the Taipings.

The admiral left Shanghai ahead of Mr. Parkes with a squadron of shallow-draft steamers on February 11, 1861. He led an exploratory mission that included Colonel Sarel, Captain Blakiston, Mr. Shereshewsky, and Dr. A. Barton, whose activities are documented in Blakiston's 'Five Months on the Upper Yangtze'; several American missionaries; two Frenchmen, 371 who later became notable, MM. Eugène Simon and A. Dupuis, with the latter playing a key role in ultimately giving Tongking to France; a French military attaché; Lieutenant Colonel Wolseley, D.A.Q.-M.G.; and a delegation from the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, along with some private individuals. It’s unclear whether the pilots relied too much on the shallow draft and steam power, or if the river’s course had changed significantly since the last surveys, but the vessels began to run aground, one after another, in the estuary. As each ship got stuck, another was assigned to stand by her, so that by the time they cleared what is known as the Langshan Crossing (the home of the famous black poultry breed), the admiral's tender, the Coromandel, was the only vessel still able to move. To avoid wasting time, the admiral decided to continue on that non-combatant craft to Nanking, the rebel capital, to gauge the mood and intentions of the Taipings.

As the steamer slowly approached the landing-place, in bright sunshine and a still atmosphere, the batteries on the river front were crowded, but remained silent.

As the steamer slowly made its way to the dock, with bright sunshine and a calm atmosphere, the defenses along the riverfront were packed with people, yet stayed quiet.

"What will you do, sir, if they fire?" the admiral was asked.

"What will you do, sir, if they fire?" the admiral was asked.

"Oh, I will just drop down out of range, and send and ask them what they mean by it," he replied, with deep deliberate utterance, not unlike Beaconsfield's.

"Oh, I'll just drop out of range and send a message to ask them what they mean by it," he replied, with a calm and careful tone, similar to Beaconsfield's.

An officer was sent ashore to parley, some rebel officers came on board, and the prospect of an amicable understanding appeared to be satisfactory. It was a critical juncture in the history both of the Taiping movement itself and of foreign relations with it and with China. Without exaggeration, it may be said 372 that the proximate fate of the Taipings then lay hidden within the brain of Sir James Hope, and each occasion of contact between him and them during the next few months added its definite contribution to the data on which the momentous decision was ultimately taken. Although he had then no higher opinion of the Taipings than that they were "an organised band of robbers," the admiral was resolved to give them fair play; and since no diplomatic intercourse could be held with insurgents, he determined to take relations with them under his own supervision (March 8, 1861). "The principle I shall adopt being that in the district of country of which they hold possession the Taiping authorities must be regarded as those of the de facto Government, ... and this principle being likely to lead to the payment of double duties (to rebels and imperialists) on all trade conducted at places in their possession, I am desirous of definite instructions on the subject."

An officer was sent ashore to negotiate, some rebel officers came on board, and it seemed like a peaceful agreement was achievable. It was a crucial moment in the history of the Taiping movement and its foreign relations with China. Without overstating the case, it can be said that the immediate fate of the Taipings was tied to the judgment of Sir James Hope, and each interaction between him and them over the next few months contributed important information to the decision that would eventually be made. Although he didn’t think highly of the Taipings—considering them "an organized band of robbers"—the admiral was committed to giving them a fair chance; and since no official diplomatic communication could be held with insurgents, he decided to manage relations with them himself (March 8, 1861). "The principle I will adopt is that in the areas they control, the Taiping authorities must be recognized as the de facto Government, ... and since this approach may result in having to pay double duties (to both rebels and imperialists) on all trade at the locations they hold, I am seeking clear instructions on this matter."

The first point to be settled with the rebel authorities at Nanking was the non-molestation of British traffic passing up and down the river within range of their batteries or otherwise, to secure which object it had been determined to station a ship of war abreast of the city. The sanction of the Taiping chiefs was wanted to this arrangement, which, however, without such sanction, it would have been all the more necessary to insist upon. The second point affected the general relations between foreign trade and the rebel movement. The next aim of the admiral was to arrive at an understanding with the leaders for the neutralisation of Shanghai and Wusung within an area of thirty miles round these two places. 373

The first issue to settle with the rebel authorities in Nanking was ensuring that British shipping could move freely up and down the river within range of their artillery. To achieve this, it was decided to position a warship near the city. Approval from the Taiping leaders was needed for this plan, which, without such approval, would have been even more critical to enforce. The second issue was related to the overall relationship between foreign trade and the rebel movement. The admiral's next goal was to reach an agreement with the leaders to neutralize Shanghai and Wusung within a thirty-mile radius around these two locations. 373

Not being prepared to enter into definite negotiations until the arrival of Mr Parkes, who had not yet joined the expedition, Sir James Hope returned to the squadron which he had left aground in the lower reaches of the river. But thinking the time and the opportunity might be usefully employed in gathering some acquaintance with the Taipings at their headquarters, he landed three volunteers at Nanking, whose presence he ascertained would not be unwelcome to the authorities there. They were to remain in the city as the guests of the rebels till the admiral's return. The party consisted of Lieut.-Colonel Wolseley, Mr P. J. Hughes, vice-consul designate of Kiukiang, and one of the Shanghai delegates. They were joined on shore by the Rev. William Muirhead, missionary, who had reached Nanking by land from Shanghai. The party was thus a thoroughly representative one. On the return of the admiral a week later, accompanied by Mr Parkes, the arrangements for a guard-ship were satisfactorily settled after some puerile obstruction, and the expedition proceeded on its way up the river to Hankow, where, as also at Kiukiang and Chinkiang, consular officers were established; and the Yangtze was declared open by notification in Shanghai on March 18, 1861.

Not being ready to start formal negotiations until Mr. Parkes arrived, who hadn’t joined the expedition yet, Sir James Hope went back to the squadron he had left stuck in the lower parts of the river. However, considering that the time and opportunity could be better used to get to know the Taipings at their headquarters, he sent three volunteers to Nanking, knowing they would be welcomed by the authorities there. They were to stay in the city as guests of the rebels until the admiral returned. The group included Lieutenant Colonel Wolseley, Mr. P. J. Hughes, who was the vice-consul designate of Kiukiang, and one of the Shanghai delegates. They were joined onshore by Rev. William Muirhead, a missionary who had arrived in Nanking from Shanghai by land. Therefore, the group was quite representative. When the admiral returned a week later with Mr. Parkes, they successfully settled the arrangements for a guard ship after a bit of unnecessary delay, and the expedition continued its journey up the river to Hankow, where consular officers were also based in Kiukiang and Chinkiang; and the Yangtze was declared open with a notification in Shanghai on March 18, 1861.

The expedition was fruitful in information concerning the rebels, all tending to confirm the purely destructive character of the movement. Certain incidents of the voyage were also most instructive to the visitors. While the expedition was still at Hankow the Taipings had captured a walled city, fifty miles distant, which had been passed by the squadron on its way up a few days before. The news created a universal panic 374 throughout the three cities, Wuchang, Hanyang, and Hankow, and the scene which followed could not be paralleled. It is thus laconically referred to in the report of the delegates of the Chamber of Commerce: "The abandonment was most complete, not a house nor a shop was open, and it became equally impossible to purchase goods, to check quotations, or pursue inquiries."

The expedition gathered a lot of information about the rebels, all pointing to the completely destructive nature of their actions. Some events during the voyage were also very educational for the visitors. While the expedition was still at Hankow, the Taipings captured a walled city fifty miles away, which the squadron had passed just a few days earlier. The news caused widespread panic throughout the three cities: Wuchang, Hanyang, and Hankow, and the scene that followed was unprecedented. The report from the delegates of the Chamber of Commerce summarized it this way: "The abandonment was total—no houses or shops were open, making it impossible to buy goods, check prices, or pursue inquiries."

One day the deep Han river was so packed with junks that one might almost walk from bank to bank over their mat coverings. The next day everything that could float was crowded with fugitive families with their household stuff huddled precariously on the decks, and such a fleet as, for number and picturesqueness, was probably never seen, covered the broad bosom of the Yangtze, making slow headway under sail against the current.

One day, the Han River was so crowded with small boats that you could almost walk from one bank to the other on their mats. The next day, everything that could float was filled with fleeing families whose belongings were piled precariously on the decks. Such a fleet, in terms of both size and appearance, had probably never been seen before, as it made its way slowly under sail against the current on the wide surface of the Yangtze.

Mr Parkes, eminently a man of fact, thus describes what he was witness to:—

Mr. Parkes, a man of facts, describes what he witnessed as follows:—

Darkness fell upon crowds of the people lying with their weeping families, and the débris of their property, under the walls of Wuchang, anxious only to escape from defences that should have proved their protection.... The noise and cries attending their embarkation continued throughout the night, but daylight brought with it a stillness that was not less impressive than the previous commotion. By that time all the fugitives had left the shore, and the river, as far as the eye could reach, was covered with junks and boats of every description bearing slowly away up-stream the bulk of the population of three cities, which a few days before we had computed at 1,000,000 of souls.

Darkness fell over the crowds of people lying with their crying families and the wreckage of their belongings under the walls of Wuchang, only wanting to escape from the defenses that were supposed to protect them.... The noise and cries during their boarding went on throughout the night, but when daylight came, a stillness settled in that was just as striking as the earlier chaos. By then, all the refugees had left the shore, and the river, as far as one could see, was filled with junks and boats of all kinds slowly drifting upstream, carrying away the majority of the population from three cities, which just a few days earlier we estimated to be around 1,000,000 people.

Of what came of this and many such another melancholy exodus of humanity, without resources, ready to brave any death rather than fall into the hands 375 of the destroyers, there is no record; and the scene at Hankow, magnified a hundred times, would give an inadequate conception of the havoc of the fifteen years of the Taiping rebellion.

Of what resulted from this and many other sad departures of humanity, without resources, willing to face any death rather than fall into the hands 375 of the destroyers, there is no record; and the scene at Hankow, amplified a hundred times, would provide an insufficient idea of the devastation caused by the fifteen years of the Taiping rebellion.

III. ADMIRAL HOPE'S POLICY TOWARDS INSURGENTS.

Devastation only to be expected of them—Enforces neutrality and respect for foreign property—Thirty-mile radius round Shanghai—Hesitancy of British Minister and Foreign Office—Overcome by firmness of Admiral—Capture of Ningpo by rebels—Arrangements for trade there—Bad faith of rebels—Shanghai to be defended—Its dangerous position—Ravages of rebels—Offensive movements against them—Clearing of the thirty-mile radius—Cordial relations between English and French admirals—Mr Bruce won over—The campaign—Recapture of Ningpo—Chinese raise foreign force—Ward—Burgevine—Chinese statesmen who organised the suppression of the rebellion—General Gordon takes command of the "Ever-Victorious Army."

Devastation was just what we expected from them—Maintaining neutrality and respect for foreign property—Thirty-mile radius around Shanghai—The British Minister and Foreign Office were hesitant—But Admiral’s firmness changed that—The rebels captured Ningpo—We made arrangements for trade there—The rebels showed bad faith—Shanghai needed to be defended—Its risky situation—The rebels caused widespread destruction—We started offensive moves against them—Clearing the thirty-mile radius—Good relationships between the English and French admirals—Mr. Bruce was convinced—The campaign—Recapturing Ningpo—The Chinese raised a foreign force—Ward—Burgevine—Chinese statesmen organized the suppression of the rebellion—General Gordon took command of the "Ever-Victorious Army."

None of the spectators was more profoundly impressed than Admiral Hope, and the spectacle undoubtedly helped to mature his views on the demerits of the rebellion. On April 6 he wrote to the Admiralty: "A period of anarchy, indefinite in duration, appears likely to ensue, in which the commercial towns of the empire will be destroyed, and its most productive provinces laid waste. For this state of things, so destructive to foreign trade, I see no remedy except the recognition by both parties, if practicable, of the neutrality of the consular ports, which would then become places of security in which the Chinese merchants and capitalists could take refuge." And towards the realisation of this scheme the first step was the obligation laid upon the rebel Government at Nanking that their forces should not 376 approach within thirty miles of Shanghai or Wusung. This idea, however, was but slowly assimilated by her Majesty's Minister at Peking and by the Government at home, and Lord Russell, while approving generally of the admiral's policy, stipulated that no force be used except in direct defence of British property. Mr Bruce wrote able despatches from Peking, in which the pros and cons, the contingencies and risks, of alternative courses were so well balanced, that the only practical conclusion that could possibly issue therefrom was that eventually arrived at,—to leave the decision to the admiral with a promise of support, whatever course he might adopt. The Foreign Office and the Peking Legation, in fact, faithfully represented the orthodox view of affairs, whereby national policy is primarily reduced to a game of safety for officials, and to the application of theories and general principles often having little bearing on the actualities of the case. The admiral's mind was cast in a different mould. To him the exigencies of the situation were everything, the official balance very little, the fear of responsibility nothing. The man on the spot, seeing clearly the right thing to do and resolved to do it, was bound in the end to gain the Government to his side, for Governments like a strong arm to lean on. With men like Sir James Hope there was no risk of complications arising, for complications arise mostly from the nervous dread of them, never from going straight and clear to the objective point. It needed a visit of the admiral to Peking, however, and the best part of a year's correspondence, to convert the British Government point by point to his views.

None of the spectators was more deeply impressed than Admiral Hope, and the event definitely influenced his thinking on the drawbacks of the rebellion. On April 6, he wrote to the Admiralty: "A period of chaos, lasting indefinitely, seems likely to follow, during which the commercial towns of the empire will be ruined, and its most productive provinces devastated. For this destructive situation to foreign trade, I see no solution except for both sides, if possible, to acknowledge the neutrality of the consular ports, which would then become safe havens where Chinese merchants and investors could find refuge." The first step towards realizing this plan was the requirement placed on the rebel Government in Nanking that their forces must not come within thirty miles of Shanghai or Wusung. However, this idea was slowly accepted by her Majesty's Minister in Peking and by the Government back home. Lord Russell, while generally supporting the admiral's approach, insisted that no force be used except for the direct defense of British property. Mr. Bruce sent clever dispatches from Peking, where he balanced the pros and cons, contingencies, and risks of different options so effectively that the only reasonable conclusion was the one ultimately reached—to leave the decision to the admiral with a commitment of support, no matter what path he chose. The Foreign Office and the Peking Legation, in fact, accurately represented the conventional view of events, where national policy is primarily a game of safety for officials and is based on theories and general principles that often don't relate to the realities of the situation. The admiral, however, had a different mindset. To him, the demands of the situation mattered the most, the official balance had little weight, and the fear of responsibility meant nothing. The person on the ground, clearly seeing the right action to take and determined to take it, would ultimately win the Government to his side, because Governments prefer a strong support. With leaders like Sir James Hope, there was little chance of complications arising, since complications often come from a nervous fear of them, not from straightforwardly pursuing the goal. It took a visit from the admiral to Peking and nearly a year of correspondence to persuade the British Government to accept his views step by step.

Meantime the Taiping rebels advanced to Ningpo, 377 the defence of which Mr Bruce had refused to sanction, and they captured the city on December 9, 1861, after engaging not to do so. The leaders there were interviewed by the French Admiral Protêt and the English Captain Corbett with a view to gaining a comprehension of their plans, and "to prevent the atrocities of which they have hitherto been guilty, and to endeavour to effect an arrangement by which trade can be conducted from the town. The French Rear-Admiral Protêt will act in concert with me," wrote Admiral Hope to Corbett, December 7.

In the meantime, the Taiping rebels moved toward Ningpo, 377 which Mr. Bruce had declined to defend, and they took the city on December 9, 1861, after promising not to do so. The leaders there were met by French Admiral Protêt and English Captain Corbett to understand their plans and "to prevent the atrocities they have committed so far, and to try to establish an arrangement to allow trade to continue from the town." Admiral Hope wrote to Corbett on December 7, "The French Rear-Admiral Protêt will work with me."

After the capture of the city the admiral instructed Captain Corbett that if the rebels wished to levy any duties, he was to see that in amount they did not exceed those stipulated in the imperial tariff. Arrangements were also made by the three treaty Powers for the protection of foreign life and the safety of the foreign quarter. The position was, however, a very difficult one, as the rebels had no idea of order or of keeping faith. Indeed the problem of protecting British subjects while observing Lord Russell's neutrality instructions was fast becoming impossible, for the conventions made with the Taiping authorities in Nanking were disregarded by them, and Shanghai itself was threatened.

After the city was captured, the admiral told Captain Corbett that if the rebels wanted to impose any duties, he should make sure they didn’t exceed those set by the imperial tariff. The three treaty Powers also organized measures for the protection of foreign lives and the safety of the foreign quarter. However, the situation was very complicated, as the rebels had no sense of order or honor. In fact, the task of safeguarding British citizens while following Lord Russell's neutrality instructions was quickly becoming unmanageable, because the agreements made with the Taiping authorities in Nanking were being ignored by them, and Shanghai itself was under threat.

The admiral's conception of what was required for the protection of British interests was all the while undergoing steady development, and in January he wrote that Kiukiang and Hankow had become as essential to our trade as Shanghai. Writing a month later, he pressed his plans still more definitely upon the Admiralty. "On every occasion," he said on February 21, 1862, "on which I have reported the 378 state of Shanghai since my return here, it has been my duty to bring the devastation and atrocities committed by the rebels in its immediate vicinity very prominently under their Lordships' notice. These proceedings have been conducted at a distance much too close to be consistent with the respect due to the occupation of the town by French and English forces, or to leave its supplies of provisions and native trade unaffected."

The admiral's understanding of what was needed to protect British interests was continually evolving. In January, he wrote that Kiukiang and Hankow had become just as important to our trade as Shanghai. A month later, he pushed his plans even more clearly on the Admiralty. "Every time," he stated on February 21, 1862, "that I have reported on the situation in Shanghai since my return here, I've had to highlight the destruction and atrocities carried out by the rebels nearby. These actions have taken place way too close to show proper respect for the occupation of the town by French and English forces, or to keep its food supplies and local trade unaffected."

The tension was at length relieved by the relaxation of Earl Russell's restrictions. He had already said that "it might be expedient" to protect the treaty ports, and that he was "of opinion that we ought to defend Shanghai and Tientsin as long as our forces [the garrison left from the Peking campaign] occupied these ports." But now, on March 11, 1862, he took a more practical view of the whole situation, and issued her Majesty's commands that "Admiral Hope should not only defend Shanghai and protect the other treaty ports, but also the British flag and the Yangtze, and generally that British commerce is to have the aid of her Majesty's ships of war."

The tension finally eased when Earl Russell lifted his restrictions. He had previously stated that "it might be necessary" to safeguard the treaty ports and that he believed "we should defend Shanghai and Tientsin as long as our forces [the garrison left from the Peking campaign] were in these ports." But now, on March 11, 1862, he took a more practical approach to the situation and issued her Majesty's orders that "Admiral Hope should not only defend Shanghai and protect the other treaty ports, but also the British flag and the Yangtze, and in general that British commerce should receive the support of her Majesty's warships."

During the winter of 1861-62 matters had become very critical in Shanghai. The rebel chiefs sent an intimation to the foreign consuls that it was their intention to capture the town, and they proceeded to burn the villages and ravage the country on both sides of the river within gun-shot of the military lines. Special local measures of defence were adopted by the residents, and fugitives in thousands flocked into the only asylum where their lives were safe. The pressure of these events led to yet more definite action on the part of Sir James Hope, who perceived that the effective 379 defence of Shanghai and its sources of supply involved aggressive movements against the rebels in order to drive them out of all the places they occupied within the thirty-mile radius. In all these proceedings the admiral went hand in hand with his French colleague, and with the commanders of the French and British military forces. An agreement signed by the four on February 13, 1862, settled the immediate question of the defence of the city of Shanghai. An appeal to the British Minister completed his conversion to a "forward policy." "I strongly recommend," wrote the admiral on February 22, "that the French and English commanders should be required by yourself and M. Bourboulon to free the country from rebels within a line"—specified; and the reply was as hearty and free from ambiguity as could be wished: "We can no more suffer Shanghai to be taken by famine or destroyed by insurrection than we can allow it to be taken by assault; and it requires but little experience in China to be assured that the effect of remaining on a strict defensive within the walls is to convince our assailants that we are unable to meet them in the field."

During the winter of 1861-62, things had become very critical in Shanghai. The rebel leaders informed the foreign consuls of their plan to capture the town, and they started burning villages and destroying the area on both sides of the river near the military lines. The residents took special local measures for defense, and thousands of refugees flocked into the only place where they could be safe. The urgency of these events pushed Sir James Hope to take more decisive action, as he recognized that effectively defending Shanghai and its supply lines required taking aggressive steps against the rebels to drive them out of all the areas they controlled within a thirty-mile radius. Throughout these efforts, the admiral collaborated closely with his French counterpart and the commanders of the French and British military forces. An agreement signed by the four on February 13, 1862, addressed the immediate issue of defending the city of Shanghai. An appeal to the British Minister solidified his commitment to a "forward policy." "I strongly recommend," the admiral wrote on February 22, "that you and M. Bourboulon require the French and English commanders to rid the country of rebels within a specified line"; the response was as enthusiastic and clear as could be: "We can no more allow Shanghai to be taken by famine or destroyed by uprising than we can permit it to be captured by assault; and it doesn’t take much experience in China to understand that remaining strictly defensive within the walls convinces our attackers that we are unable to confront them in the field."

The plan of campaign was settled in an agreement signed by Sir James Hope, Admiral Protêt, and Brigadier Staveley, April 22, 1862, and was carried out to the letter during the early summer and the autumn following. At an early period of the operations Admiral Protêt was killed: his loss was deeply lamented, most of all by his British colleague, with whom relations of exceptional intimacy had sprung up. "The extent to which I enjoyed his confidence and regard will ever prove a source of unmingled satisfaction 380 to me," wrote Sir James Hope on the day of the admiral's death, May 17, 1862, himself at the time confined to his cabin by wounds.

The campaign plan was finalized in an agreement signed by Sir James Hope, Admiral Protêt, and Brigadier Staveley on April 22, 1862, and it was executed precisely during the early summer and autumn that followed. Early in the operations, Admiral Protêt was killed; his loss was deeply mourned, especially by his British colleague, with whom he had developed an exceptionally close relationship. "The level of confidence and regard he had for me will always be a source of pure satisfaction to me," wrote Sir James Hope on the day of the admiral's death, May 17, 1862, while he was confined to his cabin due to injuries. 380

The rebel forces in Ningpo, who had been on their good behaviour for a short time, became aggressive and insulting, even going the length of offering rewards for foreign heads in the good old mandarin fashion. It is well to remember that even in their unkempt condition, and with everything to gain from the goodwill of foreigners, the Taiping rebels lacked nothing of the most arrogant of Chinese assumptions. The pretensions of the chief far exceeded those of the Emperors of China. The Taipings required foreigners to be subject to their jurisdiction, and they habitually applied derogatory terms to foreign countries. Such things were regarded much as the eccentricities of a lunatic might be. Nevertheless they were a faithful reflex of what is rooted in the Chinese mind.

The rebel forces in Ningpo, who had behaved themselves for a little while, became hostile and disrespectful, even offering rewards for foreign heads in the classic mandarin style. It's important to note that even in their disheveled state, and with everything to gain from the goodwill of foreigners, the Taiping rebels displayed all the arrogance typical of the Chinese. The ambitions of their leader surpassed even those of the Emperors of China. The Taipings insisted that foreigners fall under their authority and often referred to foreign countries in derogatory ways. These attitudes were viewed much like the quirks of a madman. Still, they reflected deeply ingrained beliefs within the Chinese mindset.

The position of foreigners and the foreign ships there having thus been rendered intolerable, the city was recaptured from the rebels by Commander Roderick Dew in the same month—a brilliant feat of arms. After the capture he wrote: "In the city itself, once the home of half a million of people, no trace or vestige of an inhabitant could be seen.... The canals were filled with dead bodies and stagnant filth." The recapture of Ningpo was the beginning of an Anglo-Franco-Chinese campaign against the rebels in Chêkiang which was carried on simultaneously with that round Shanghai.

The situation for foreigners and foreign ships had become unbearable, so in the same month, Commander Roderick Dew successfully recaptured the city from the rebels—an impressive military achievement. After the capture, he wrote: "In the city itself, once home to half a million people, there was no sign of any residents... The canals were filled with dead bodies and stagnant filth." The recapture of Ningpo marked the start of a joint Anglo-Franco-Chinese campaign against the rebels in Chêkiang, which was conducted at the same time as the efforts around Shanghai.

It is needless to follow in detail the operations which culminated two years later in the final suppression of the Taiping rebellion; but the relations which 381 grew up between the British and French commanders on the one side, and the Chinese military forces which were being organised on the other, were so fruitful in results as to merit their being held in particular remembrance. Though the history has been many times written, it may still not be considered supererogatory to trace some of the points of contact between the native and foreign motives and plans of action, and the evolution of the defensive idea which was the product of the combination.

It’s unnecessary to go into detail about the events that led to the final suppression of the Taiping rebellion two years later; however, the relationships that formed between the British and French commanders on one side and the Chinese military forces being organized on the other were so impactful that they deserve special attention. Although this history has been documented many times, it is still valuable to highlight some of the intersections between the local and foreign motivations and strategies, as well as the development of the defensive tactics that emerged from this collaboration.

The Taiping rebellion had devastated the central and southern provinces many years before the Chinese Government roused itself to a serious effort to resist it. The movement of repression originated with the Governor-General of the Hu provinces, whose chief lieutenant and successor was Tsêng Kwo-fan, Governor-General of Kiangnan at the time of which we now speak. His brother, Tsêng Kwo-chuan, the Governor of Chêkiang province, was the military leader, and Li Hung-chang, the most capable and energetic of them all, was governor of the province of Kiangsu. The imperialist forces had been gradually closing on Nanking, and it was thought probable that this hemming-in process forced the rebels to seek outlets and new feeding-grounds in the populous districts of Kiangsu and Chêkiang. The rebels had enlisted a number of foreigners in their ranks, and made great efforts to supply themselves with foreign arms and ammunition, for which purpose, among others, communication with the sea was most important for them. Li, futai (governor), also began to enlist foreigners and raise a special corps, drilled and armed in foreign fashion, and led by foreign officers. The foreign agent 382 in this enterprise on the imperialist side was Frederick Ward, to whom Mr Bruce referred in May 1861 as "a man called Ward, an ex-Californian fillibuster." Within a year Mr Bruce wrote, "In the Chinese force organised and led by Mr Ward I see the nucleus of a military organisation which may prove most valuable in the disturbed state of China." The truth is, "Ward's force," which became known by its high-flown Chinese title of the "Ever-Victorious Army," was seized on from its origin by Sir James Hope, whose encouragement and support were essentially serviceable to it in its early days. The admiral treated Ward as a comrade, fighting by his side, and thus giving the new levy a military status. While the Chinese troops were yet raw he co-operated with them by capturing positions from the rebels and trusting Ward's men to hold them, on the assurance of their leader that they were equal to that duty. Ward himself was an unpretentious, cool, and daring man, reckless of his own life. During his brief campaign he was riddled with bullets, one of which entering his mouth destroyed the palate and impaired his speech, and before long the fatal missile reached its mark. He was succeeded in the command by his second, Burgevine, who, though a good soldier, lacked Ward's tact and moderation, and got into trouble with his paymasters, to whom he used violence and threats. He was deposed from the command by Governor Li, which brought about a serious crisis, for the disciplined force of foreigners and Chinese was left without a head. In this emergency Li applied to the British authorities for the loan of an officer to command the disciplined force. The responsibility of the British representatives, naval and military, became 383 thus extended to finding a suitable Englishman to replace Burgevine. Their first selection was Captain Holland, R.M., who held the post for a short time, and was succeeded by Captain C. G. Gordon, R.E.

The Taiping rebellion had devastated the central and southern provinces many years before the Chinese Government made a serious effort to fight back. The movement to push back originated with the Governor-General of the Hu provinces, whose main assistant and successor was Tsêng Kwo-fan, the Governor-General of Kiangnan at the time we are discussing. His brother, Tsêng Kwo-chuan, was the Governor of Chêkiang province and the military leader, while Li Hung-chang, the most capable and energetic of them all, was governor of Kiangsu province. The imperialist forces had been gradually surrounding Nanking, and it was believed that this pressure drove the rebels to seek new territories and resources in the crowded regions of Kiangsu and Chêkiang. The rebels had recruited several foreigners to their cause and made significant efforts to obtain foreign weapons and ammunition, making communication with the sea crucial for them. Li, the governor, also began to recruit foreigners and form a special corps, trained and armed in a foreign style, with foreign officers in charge. The foreign agent on the imperialist side was Frederick Ward, whom Mr. Bruce referred to in May 1861 as "a man called Ward, an ex-Californian filibuster." Within a year, Mr. Bruce noted, "In the Chinese force organized and led by Mr. Ward, I see the nucleus of a military organization that may prove most valuable in the conflicted state of China." The truth is, "Ward's force," which gained the grand Chinese name "Ever-Victorious Army," was initially taken over by Sir James Hope, whose support was vital to its early success. The admiral treated Ward as a partner, fighting alongside him, thus granting the new unit military legitimacy. While the Chinese troops were still inexperienced, he worked with them to capture positions from the rebels and relied on Ward's men to hold those positions, based on Ward's assurance that they could handle the task. Ward was an unassuming, calm, and bold man, unconcerned for his own safety. During his short campaign, he was hit by several bullets, one of which entered his mouth, damaging his palate and affecting his speech, and soon enough, he was fatally wounded. He was succeeded in command by his second-in-command, Burgevine, who, although a competent soldier, lacked Ward's diplomacy and restraint and clashed with his financial backers, using threats and violence against them. He was removed from command by Governor Li, leading to a serious crisis, as the disciplined force of foreigners and Chinese was left leaderless. In this situation, Li turned to the British authorities for help in finding an officer to take charge of the disciplined force. The responsibility of the British naval and military representatives was then to find a suitable Englishman to replace Burgevine. Their first choice was Captain Holland, R.M., who held the position for a brief period before being succeeded by Captain C. G. Gordon, R.E.

Gordon had arrived in China in 1860 in time to share in the last act of the Peking campaign; he passed the year 1861 at Tientsin, where he was highly esteemed as a model man and meritorious officer. In the winter of 1861 he had conferences with Mr Bruce and Prince Kung on the question of suppressing the rebellion; but none of their ideas, nor the policy of the British Government, were then sufficiently advanced to lead to any practical result. Gordon accompanied his corps to Shanghai in the spring of 1862, and was engaged in the operations for clearing the thirty-mile radius under General Staveley, who spoke warmly of his daring reconnoitring services, for which Gordon had been already distinguished in the Crimea. In the following winter he was busy surveying and mapping the country which had been reconquered from the rebels, and in the spring of 1863 he was offered by his chief the leadership of Ward's force. Gordon's was no doubt the best selection that could have been made, having regard only to the abilities which were then recognised in him; for though General Staveley knew him well both in Tientsin and Shanghai, it is not claimed for him, or any one else, that he had prescience of those transcendent qualities and that magnetic power which the subsequent campaign against the rebels was the means of bringing to light. When Gordon took command of the "Ever-Victorious," the force had had two years' training and regular campaigning, and the men were entitled to rank as veteran troops. Gordon, however, was to infuse new 384 life into the corps by his dynamic personality and by the diligent use of the regenerative agency of "Sergeant What's-his-name." The number of foreigners actually employed in the force is doubtful, but detailed returns of killed and wounded in the course of a year's operations gave a hundred names. Gordon's faculty of control was probably more severely tested by his management of that motley foreign crew than of the whole indigenous force; but the best of which it was capable was got out of this fortuitous concourse of men, and under the inspiration of the commander several names of distinction emerged from the cosmopolitan group.

Gordon arrived in China in 1860 just in time to participate in the final stages of the Peking campaign. He spent 1861 in Tientsin, where he was highly regarded as a model citizen and a commendable officer. In the winter of 1861, he held discussions with Mr. Bruce and Prince Kung about the plan to suppress the rebellion; however, none of their ideas, nor the British Government's policies, were advanced enough at that time to lead to any real outcomes. Gordon traveled with his unit to Shanghai in the spring of 1862 and took part in operations to clear the thirty-mile radius under General Staveley, who praised his bold reconnaissance work, for which Gordon had already earned a reputation in the Crimea. The following winter, he focused on surveying and mapping the territory that had been retaken from the rebels, and in the spring of 1863, his superior offered him the leadership of Ward's force. Gordon was undoubtedly the best choice for this position, considering the skills he was recognized for at that time; while General Staveley knew him well from Tientsin and Shanghai, it can't be claimed that he, or anyone else, anticipated the exceptional qualities and magnetic influence that the upcoming campaign against the rebels would reveal. When Gordon assumed command of the "Ever-Victorious," the force had already received two years of training and regular military experience, and the soldiers were considered veterans. However, Gordon was set to breathe new life into the unit with his energetic personality and the effective use of "Sergeant What's-his-name." The exact number of foreigners serving in the force is uncertain, but detailed accounts of casualties over the course of a year listed around a hundred names. Gordon’s leadership skills were likely put to the test more by managing this diverse foreign group than by the indigenous forces; yet, he managed to extract the best performances from this random collection of men, and under his inspiring leadership, several notable figures emerged from the diverse group.

When Gordon took over the command in March 1863 it was six months since the thirty-mile radius had been entirely cleared of rebels, and the first duty of the "Ever-Victorious" was to keep that area clear; its second to carry the war as far as it was able into the regions beyond. Its efficiency, especially for this latter purpose, depended on the support and co-operation of the British and French commanders, whose troops remained in occupation of the treaty port of Shanghai. For a time there was danger of a lapse in this co-operation. The dismissed General Burgevine carried his grievances to Peking, and made such an impression by his plausible address on the American and British Ministers there, that Mr Bruce espoused his cause and wrote strong despatches to the British commander, Staveley (April 10, 1863), urging the reinstatement of Burgevine and the suppression of Gordon, to whom it was to be explained that the step was no reflection on him, &c. Again and again the Minister returned to the charge, both to the commander in Shanghai and to the Foreign Office at home; but the 385 Governor Li was firm, and adduced such cogent reasons for the dismissal of Burgevine that Major-General Brown, who had just succeeded to the British command, joined Li in resolutely protesting against the removal of Gordon, whom, it may be remarked, the English general had never yet seen. The men on the spot prevailed against the man who was theorising from a distance, and on the worst data conceivable, the culprit's own account of himself. Mr Bruce, who, as we have seen, was well acquainted with Gordon, must have had reasons for his policy not given in his official despatches, for these were inadequate and narrow for a man of his large capacity.

When Gordon took command in March 1863, it had been six months since the thirty-mile radius had been completely cleared of rebels, and the first duty of the "Ever-Victorious" was to maintain that area; its second was to push the war as far as possible into the surrounding regions. Its effectiveness, especially for this latter goal, relied on the support and cooperation of the British and French commanders, whose troops occupied the treaty port of Shanghai. For a time, there was a risk of a breakdown in this cooperation. The dismissed General Burgevine took his grievances to Peking, and made such an impression with his persuasive speech on the American and British Ministers there that Mr. Bruce took up his cause and wrote strong letters to the British commander, Staveley (April 10, 1863), urging Burgevine's reinstatement and Gordon's removal, explaining that this would not be a reflection on him, etc. Time and again, the Minister pressed this issue, both to the commander in Shanghai and to the Foreign Office back home; but Governor Li stood firm and gave such compelling reasons for Burgevine's dismissal that Major-General Brown, who had just taken over the British command, sided with Li in firmly protesting against removing Gordon, whom it’s worth noting the English general had never actually met. The local leaders prevailed against the man who was theorizing from afar, based on the worst possible information, which was the culprit's own version of events. Mr. Bruce, who, as we’ve seen, was well-acquainted with Gordon, must have had reasons for his approach that weren’t included in his official dispatches, as those were too limited and narrow for someone of his considerable capability.

We have said Major-General Brown had not then seen Gordon. He had arrived from India in April to relieve General Staveley of the command of the British troops in China. He was a wiry man and of an active temperament, and rapidly mastered the situation. Probably to him is due the credit of the first true perception of what manner of man this young engineer officer was. General Brown was for a few days after his arrival a guest in one of the spacious hongs in the Shanghai settlement, which had a wide verandah, giving access to all the bedrooms. One morning very early the general, excited by a message that had just reached him, rushed round in déshabillé calling for his host with a piece of coarse Chinese paper in his hand. "Do you know Major Gordon?" he said. "Why, yes, a very nice fellow, and reported to be a first-rate officer." "But," exclaimed the general, "he is a genius! Just look what I have received from him from the front," and he unfolded the whitey-brown paper with some rough diagrams, and a few not very legible pencil 386 notes indicating his position and plan of attack on Taitsan (where Captain Holland had been repulsed) and Kuensan,[46] both cities on the line of communication with the provincial capital, Soochow. "The man is a genius," reiterated the general, "and must be supported." A few days later another of these cryptic missives arrived, when a similar scene was repeated with redoubled emphasis. "I tell you that man is a military genius; that's what I call him, a military genius," said the dapper little soldier in his vivacious reiterative manner. "I'll support him for all I am worth." And then he developed his own plan of relieving the "Ever-Victorious" of garrison duty, leaving the whole force—secure of its base—free to engage in aggressive operations. This plan of giving effective support to Gordon's force was carried out to the letter, as subsequently described by the general in his official despatches reporting the capture of Taitsan and Kuensan: "I had a field force acting in conjunction, as a support, moving on the extreme edge of our boundary, ... which was of great assistance to Major Gordon in his operations." He adds: "Kuensan having fallen, Major Gordon now proposes to make it his headquarters; ... and as the futai intends to make Taitsan his headquarters, I shall bring it within the boundary, thus giving the imperialists every confidence to hold it, knowing they could receive support from me at any moment." How vital to the fortunes of the "Ever-Victorious Army" was this decided action of General Brown's was seen when, three months later, General Burgevine had gone over, with a certain following of malcontents, to the Taipings, a movement 387 which suggested to Gordon serious misgivings as to the loyalty of the foreigners remaining in his own force. Burgevine, however, had no success in the rebel camp, and soon, in a secret interview with Gordon, sued for safe-conduct and amnesty. Improving his acquaintance, however, with the new commander of the "Ever-Victorious," Burgevine's next proposal was the bold one of eliminating as between themselves all questions of conflicting loyalty to the respective belligerents by throwing over both, and by joining forces on their own account, to capture Soochow, and there raise an army to march on Peking. It was a partnership which did in nowise commend itself to Gordon, but the proposal served to show how shrewd Li Hung-chang had been in his estimate of the deposed leader.

We mentioned that Major-General Brown had not yet met Gordon. He arrived from India in April to take over command of the British troops in China from General Staveley. He was a wiry man with an active personality, quickly grasping the situation. He likely deserves credit for being the first to recognize what kind of man this young engineer officer was. For a few days after arriving, General Brown stayed as a guest in one of the spacious hongs in the Shanghai settlement, which had a wide verandah that accessed all the bedrooms. One early morning, excited by a message he had just received, the general rushed around in déshabillé calling for his host while holding a piece of rough Chinese paper. "Do you know Major Gordon?" he asked. "Oh yes, a really nice guy, and said to be an excellent officer." "But," the general exclaimed, "he's a genius! Look at what I just got from him from the front," and he unfolded the brownish paper, revealing some rough diagrams and a few not-so-legible pencil notes indicating his position and attack plan on Taitsan (where Captain Holland had been repulsed) and Kuensan, both cities along the communication line to the provincial capital, Soochow. "The man is a genius," the general repeated, "and he must be supported." A few days later, another one of these cryptic messages arrived, and a similar scene unfolded with even more excitement. "I'm telling you, that man is a military genius; that's what I call him, a military genius," said the dapper little soldier in his animated, repetitive manner. "I’ll support him with all I’ve got." He then laid out his own plan to relieve the "Ever-Victorious" of garrison duty, allowing the entire force—secure in its base—to engage in offensive operations. This plan to effectively support Gordon's force was executed precisely, as later described by the general in his official reports on the capture of Taitsan and Kuensan: "I had a field force working together as a support, moving along the far edge of our boundary, ... which was a significant help to Major Gordon in his operations." He added: "With Kuensan having fallen, Major Gordon now intends to make it his headquarters; ... since the futai plans to establish Taitsan as his headquarters, I’ll incorporate it within the boundary, giving the imperialists full confidence to hold it, knowing they could get support from me at any moment." How crucial General Brown's decisive action was for the fortunes of the "Ever-Victorious Army" became evident three months later when General Burgevine defected with a group of disgruntled individuals to the Taipings, which caused Gordon serious concerns about the loyalty of the foreigners still in his force. However, Burgevine had no success in the rebel camp and soon sought a secret meeting with Gordon to request safe passage and amnesty. In the meantime, as he developed his relationship with the new commander of the "Ever-Victorious," Burgevine boldly suggested that they set aside their conflicting loyalties to both sides and join forces to capture Soochow and then raise an army to march on Peking. This partnership didn’t appeal at all to Gordon, but it highlighted how astute Li Hung-chang had been in his assessment of the deposed leader.

IV. THE LAY-OSBORN FLOTILLA.

Orders sent through Mr Hart to Mr Lay—Fleet equipped under Captain Osborn, R.N.—Ratification of their agreements refused in Peking—Government would not place foreigners in a position of authority—Misunderstandings and final sacrifice of Mr Lay—Ships paid off and sold—Crucial question the recapture of Nanking.

Orders sent through Mr. Hart to Mr. Lay—Fleet equipped under Captain Osborn, R.N.—Ratification of their agreements refused in Beijing—The government would not put foreigners in a position of authority—Misunderstandings and the eventual sacrifice of Mr. Lay—Ships were decommissioned and sold—The critical issue was the recapture of Nanking.

The invincible distrust of foreign auxiliaries which dominates Chinese policy and prevents the empire from ever having an army or a navy, received another signal illustration in the same year in the great fiasco of the Lay-Osborn flotilla. Mr H. N. Lay, Inspector-General of Chinese Maritime Customs, was in England on leave in 1861, his locum tenens in Peking being Mr (now Sir) Robert Hart. Conferences with the Chinese Ministers on the naval weakness of the empire resulted in 388 a very important decision, in consequence of which Mr Hart was empowered to send to Mr Lay orders for certain armed vessels to be officered and manned by Englishmen. Mr Lay executed the rather "large order" according to his lights, engaging Captain Sherard Osborn to command the fleet, which was equipped on a war-footing. The foreign enlistment difficulties of the British Government were overcome, as the Government was by that time ready to go to any length in assisting the Government of China. The fleet duly arrived in China, and Mr Lay and Captain Osborn presented themselves in Peking to obtain ratification of their agreements from the Imperial Government. This was refused, the force was disbanded, and the ships sold, at a heavy pecuniary sacrifice to the Chinese, for they made no demur about payment.

The deep-seated distrust of foreign assistance that shapes Chinese policy and keeps the empire from ever establishing an army or navy was highlighted again that year with the failure of the Lay-Osborn flotilla. Mr. H. N. Lay, Inspector-General of Chinese Maritime Customs, was in England on leave in 1861, with Mr. (now Sir) Robert Hart acting as his replacement in Peking. Discussions with the Chinese Ministers about the naval weakness of the empire led to a significant decision, allowing Mr. Hart to send Mr. Lay orders for certain armed vessels to be staffed and commanded by Englishmen. Mr. Lay carried out this "big order" as best as he could, hiring Captain Sherard Osborn to lead the fleet, which was set up for war. The British Government's issues with foreign enlistment were resolved, as they were ready to assist the Chinese Government at all costs. The fleet successfully arrived in China, and Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn went to Peking to get their agreements approved by the Imperial Government. However, this approval was denied, the force was disbanded, and the ships were sold, resulting in a significant financial loss for the Chinese, who paid without hesitation.

The rock on which the scheme seemed to split was the contention of Mr Lay that the fleet was imperial, and that the commodore should take no orders from viceroys or provincial authorities, but only from the emperor, and through Mr Lay himself. This was a shock to the very edifice of Chinese Government, conceived of as feasible only under the belief that in its helpless condition the Government must accede to anything. But the scheme was really impossible. So also, however, was the alternative of provincialising the naval force, as has been shown by subsequent failures in the attempt to use the services of British officers in the Chinese navy. Such an instance of reckoning without your host was never heard of before or since. It was like a practical joke on a titanic scale. The ships were actually there, manned, officered, and armed. It was a dangerous knot, which had to be 389 promptly cut or untied. Following the line of least resistance, Mr Lay was made the scapegoat, on whose head the Minister "laid both his hands"—rather heavily—"confessing over him the iniquities of all," and sending him away into the wilderness. In the general interest the sacrifice of Mr Lay was perhaps the safest way out of the imbroglio, for he was a pugnacious little man in whose hands despotic power might have been attended with inconvenience. Nevertheless, the blame of the failure belonged to all the parties concerned—to Prince Kung, Wênsiang, Mr Hart, Mr Bruce, and the British Government. They each entered into the scheme with different ideas, more or less vague, except Mr Lay's own, which had perforce to be reduced to the definite when he came to draw up contracts with British naval officers, and to meet the strict requirements of British law. The Chinese Ministers of course could have no conception what a foreign-equipped navy really meant, nor had they probably fully divulged what was really in their mind; Mr Lay and Mr Hart were young men with large ideas, but without experience; Mr Bruce was a man of the world who had seen service, and was, from his position, the most responsible of them all, and therefore the most culpable in deceiving himself, and allowing the British Government to be misled. He approved of the project, or it could never have been carried out. But what was it precisely that he approved of? He "saw with pleasure that Captain Osborn was about to reorganise the preventive service" (October 6, 1862), and as late as February 8, 1863, he wrote to Prince Kung of the "speedy arrival of the steam flotilla which your Imperial Highness has so 390 wisely ordered"—as if it were a pair of official boots! Yet on the arrival of the flotilla it was found that everybody concerned was at cross-purposes, and the question naturally suggests itself, what steps her Majesty's Minister had taken to satisfy himself as to the real intentions of Prince Kung, whether they had been properly transmitted by Mr Hart and correctly interpreted by Mr Lay and fully communicated to her Majesty's Government. It appears that Mr Bruce had, in fact, undergone a change of mind—induced, no doubt, by cogent considerations—during Mr Lay's final sojourn in Peking. Having received a message from the Minister urging a stiff attitude with the Chinese Government and promising the full support of the Legation, Mr Lay proceeded to the Yamên and laid down the law strongly, as his manner was, in the full assurance that he had the British Minister at his back. But after thus burning his boats he found himself abandoned, for reasons of State which he was unable to appreciate. Such was the account of the crisis given at the time by Mr Lay himself to a confidential friend then residing in Peking. For the Chinese Government the scheme was necessarily a leap in the dark. For the British Government it involved a violent reversal of recently declared policy, and on a most important issue. It was consequently a case where extreme and minute precautions against possible misunderstandings would not have been superfluous, yet—so far as has yet been made public, for there is doubtless a missing link in the record—such seem to have been wholly absent from the inception of the enterprise.

The main issue with the scheme was Mr. Lay's claim that the fleet was imperial, insisting that the commodore should take orders only from the emperor and through him, not from viceroys or provincial authorities. This fundamentally challenged the structure of the Chinese Government, which was thought to be able to function only under the assumption that it must accept anything due to its weak state. However, the scheme was genuinely unworkable. Similarly, the idea of localizing the naval force also proved impossible, as later attempts to utilize British officers in the Chinese navy demonstrated. This situation was unprecedented, like a colossal prank. The ships were present, manned, commanded, and equipped. It was a complex problem that needed to be addressed quickly. Following the easiest course, Mr. Lay was made the scapegoat, receiving the brunt of the Minister's blame, with the Minister “laying both his hands” heavily on him, “confessing over him the iniquities of all,” and banishing him. Sacrificing Mr. Lay seemed to be the safest way to resolve the confusion in the general interest, as he was a combative little man whose despotic power might have caused problems. Nevertheless, the failure was a collective responsibility, shared by Prince Kung, Wênsiang, Mr. Hart, Mr. Bruce, and the British Government. They all had their own vague ideas about the scheme, unlike Mr. Lay who had to clarify his vision when dealing with British naval officers and adhering to British legal standards. The Chinese Ministers clearly had no real understanding of what a foreign-equipped navy entailed, nor did they probably candidly express their true thoughts. Mr. Lay and Mr. Hart were young, ambitious, but inexperienced. Mr. Bruce, being more worldly and having experience, bore the most responsibility and was thus the most at fault for misleading himself and allowing the British Government to be misled. He agreed with the project, or it could never have been implemented. But what exactly did he approve? He expressed optimism about Captain Osborn reorganizing the preventive service (October 6, 1862) and as late as February 8, 1863, he wrote to Prince Kung about the “speedy arrival of the steam flotilla which your Imperial Highness has so wisely ordered”—as if it were merely an order for official boots! Yet, upon the flotilla's arrival, it became clear that everyone involved was out of sync, leading to the obvious question of what actions her Majesty's Minister had taken to ensure he understood Prince Kung's real intentions, whether the message had been accurately conveyed by Mr. Hart, correctly interpreted by Mr. Lay, and fully communicated to her Majesty's Government. It seems Mr. Bruce had changed his mind—likely influenced by important considerations—during Mr. Lay's last visit to Peking. After receiving a message from the Minister advising a firm stance against the Chinese Government and promising the Legation's full support, Mr. Lay went to the Yamên and asserted his position confidently, believing he had the British Minister's backing. But after taking such a firm stand, he found himself deserted due to political reasons he couldn't grasp. This was how Mr. Lay described the crisis to a close friend in Peking at the time. For the Chinese Government, the initiative was a risky gamble. For the British Government, it meant a complete reversal of a recently stated policy on a critical issue. Extreme caution against any potential misunderstandings would have been wise, yet it seems such precautions were completely lacking from the very beginning of the project.

The crux of the question, no doubt, was the position 391 of Nanking. The lever Mr Lay employed to secure acceptance of his conditions was the prospect of the immediate capture of the Taiping capital, against which the provincial Government, represented by the Viceroy Tsêng, his brother, and the governor of Kiangsu, Li, were expending their forces. The temptation was exceedingly strong to close with Lay and secure the services—probably much overrated for that particular object—of the new flotilla, were it even by recourse to some ambiguous phrase which might leave a loophole of escape from the agreement when its immediate object had been served. Something like this might have been attempted but for the uncompromising attitude of Li Hung-chang, for it was he who smashed the flotilla scheme. It was true, he allowed, that the assistance of the ships would enable the viceroy's forces to capture the city at once; but, he added confidently, we shall succeed in time by our own resources, and it were better to lose the city and the province, and even the empire itself, than to place such power as Lay demanded in the hands of any foreigner. Burgevine was fresh in the futai's mind—was indeed at that very time in the rebel camp near him. Li's arguments clinched the matter. The flotilla was never commissioned. The whole chapter of experiences of the campaign in Kiangsu has left a vivid impression on the mind of Li Hung-chang: it was the most interesting period of his life, but no incident of it imparts such vivacity to his reminiscences as that of the Lay-Osborn fleet. Nothing warms him to dramatic locution like a reference to that episode. 392

The main issue, without a doubt, was the situation in Nanking. The strategy Mr. Lay used to get his conditions accepted was the likelihood of immediately capturing the Taiping capital, which the provincial Government, represented by Viceroy Tsêng, his brother, and the governor of Kiangsu, Li, were trying to do with their resources. The temptation to agree with Lay and gain the services—likely overestimated for that specific task—of the new flotilla was extremely appealing, even if it meant using some vague language that could allow a way out of the agreement once its immediate goal was achieved. Something like this might have been pursued if not for Li Hung-chang's unyielding stance, as he was the one who ultimately rejected the flotilla plan. He admitted that the help from the ships would allow the viceroy's forces to take the city quickly; however, he confidently asserted that they would eventually succeed using their own means, and it would be better to lose the city and the province, or even the entire empire, than to give such power as Lay requested to any foreigner. Burgevine was fresh in the futai's mind—he was actually nearby in the rebel camp at that time. Li's reasoning settled the matter. The flotilla was never commissioned. The entire experience of the campaign in Kiangsu left a strong impression on Li Hung-chang: it was the most fascinating time of his life, but nothing from that period stands out to him as vividly as the Lay-Osborn fleet episode. Nothing fuels his storytelling like a mention of that incident.

V. THE END OF THE REBELLION.

Gordon's brilliant campaign—His quarrel with Li Hung-chang—And reconciliation—Other French and English officers co-operate in suppression of rebellion—Russian aid offered.

Gordon's impressive campaign—His conflict with Li Hung-chang—And reconciliation—Other French and English officers collaborate in putting down the rebellion—Russian assistance offered.

Gordon's campaigning lasted one year: it was marked by great successes, sundry reverses, more than one crisis, and many discouragements. The famous quarrel with the futai Li was illustrative of several points of great utility to be borne in mind in considering the working relations of Eastern and Western peoples; but perhaps its chief interest lay in its revelation of the independent and dominating character of Gordon himself, which was his distinguishing mark through life. After a confused and scarcely intelligible bargain with the rebel chiefs at Soochow, by which their lives were to be spared, they were beheaded by order of Li. Gordon resented this, and, like another Achilles, withdrew to his tent. For this he was warmly applauded by General Brown, Mr Bruce, and the Foreign Office, who all denounced Li as the most odious criminal, with whom no further communication should be held. When, two months later, Gordon, without consultation with any of these parties, but not without friendly advice, changed his mind, resumed his friendship with the governor and active operations in the field, the same chorus of approval greeted his action as had previously been pronounced of his inaction. Mr Bruce wrote on February 10, 1864, to Prince Kung, among other things, that "Major Gordon is to be relieved from any communication with Governor 393 Li." Within a week Gordon, of his own motion, had abandoned that position, leaving to the Minister to explain the change of attitude in any way he pleased, which he did by resort to that token coinage of diplomatic fiction which serves the domestic purposes of the craft, but has no market-value outside its conventional domain. An able explanatory letter from Mr Hart, the new Inspector-General of Customs, who investigated the transaction on the spot, would have afforded to the Minister colourable grounds for "revision" of the earlier judgment, had he been allowed time to avail himself of it. But Gordon's action forced his hand, and left him no choice but to acquiesce first and find his reasons afterwards. The Foreign Office, however, being at a distance, could not be swung back again so quickly, and they had, on the impulse of the first advices, withdrawn their sanction for Major Gordon's serving the Chinese at all. This order reached him after he had, on his own motion, definitely resigned the service, so that there was no further clashing of authorities. Though the force contributed materially to the suppression of the rebellion, the final act, the capture of Nanking, was left to the unaided resources of the Viceroy Tsêng.

Gordon's campaign lasted a year: it was filled with significant successes, various setbacks, several crises, and many discouragements. The famous dispute with the futai Li highlighted several key points that are important to consider in the interactions between Eastern and Western cultures; but perhaps its main interest was in showing Gordon's independent and dominant personality, which defined him throughout his life. After a confusing and nearly incomprehensible agreement with the rebel leaders at Soochow, which was supposed to spare their lives, they were executed by order of Li. Gordon was angered by this and, like another Achilles, withdrew to his tent. For this, he received strong support from General Brown, Mr. Bruce, and the Foreign Office, all of whom denounced Li as the most horrible criminal, stating that there should be no further communication with him. Two months later, Gordon changed his mind without discussing it with any of these parties, though he received friendly advice, resumed his friendship with the governor, and became active in the field again. The same chorus of approval met his decision as had been given for his previous inaction. Mr. Bruce wrote on February 10, 1864, to Prince Kung, mentioning that "Major Gordon is to be relieved from any communication with Governor 393 Li." Within a week, Gordon had voluntarily abandoned that stance, leaving it to the Minister to explain the change in any way he saw fit, which he did using the typical diplomatic fiction that serves domestic purposes but holds no real value outside its conventional context. A well-crafted explanatory letter from Mr. Hart, the new Inspector-General of Customs, who investigated the matter on-site, would have given the Minister plausible reasons to "revise" his earlier judgment, if he had been given time to do so. But Gordon's actions forced the Minister's hand, leaving him no option but to agree first and find his reasons later. However, the Foreign Office, being far away, couldn't react quickly enough and had, on the spur of the moment from the initial reports, withdrawn their approval for Major Gordon's service in China altogether. This order reached him after he had already resigned from service on his own, so there was no further conflict of authority. Although the force significantly contributed to quelling the rebellion, the final act, the capture of Nanking, was left to the Viceroy Tsêng's solo efforts.

Not the least of Gordon's successes was the peaceable dissolution of the force when it had done its work; for the establishment was, for its size, enormously costly, and it was a two-edged sword in the hands of the Chinese. The "Ever-Victorious Army" was happy in the opportuneness of its death. A prolonged existence might easily have dispelled the wonderful prestige it had gained in its short career and limited scope. Perhaps, after all, its place in history owes everything to 394 the personality of its last leader, whose legacy to mankind is not so much a catalogue of achievements as a life—immortal.

Not the least of Gordon's achievements was the peaceful disbanding of the force after it completed its mission; for the establishment was extremely expensive for its size, and it was a double-edged sword in the hands of the Chinese. The "Ever-Victorious Army" was fortunate in the timing of its end. An extended existence could have easily undermined the remarkable reputation it had built in its brief existence and limited scope. Perhaps, after all, its place in history is entirely due to the personality of its last leader, whose legacy to humanity is not so much a list of accomplishments as a life—immortal.

The renown of Gordon and the brilliancy of his exploits have thrown unduly into the shade the Anglo-Chinese and Franco-Chinese campaign in the neighbouring province of Chêkiang, which had Ningpo for its sea base. In their degree these operations were no less essential to the ultimate overthrow of the rebellion than those in the province of Kiangsu, and, among many others, the names of Prosper Giquel, who afterwards managed the arsenal at the Pagoda anchorage, Foochow, and of the large-hearted bishop, Mgr. Delaplace, afterwards translated to the metropolitan see, where he died, deserve to be had in remembrance. Sundry risings in other provinces caused trouble and apprehension; but we may, for the purposes of this narrative, consider that the year 1864 witnessed the closing scene of the great rebellion.

The fame of Gordon and the brilliance of his actions have unfairly overshadowed the Anglo-Chinese and Franco-Chinese campaign in the nearby province of Chêkiang, which used Ningpo as its sea base. These operations were just as crucial to the final defeat of the rebellion as those in the province of Kiangsu. Among many others, the contributions of Prosper Giquel, who later managed the arsenal at the Pagoda anchorage in Foochow, and the compassionate bishop, Mgr. Delaplace, who was later appointed to the metropolitan see where he passed away, should be remembered. Various uprisings in other provinces caused issues and concern, but for the purposes of this narrative, we can consider that the year 1864 marked the end of the great rebellion.

It would be impossible, within any reasonable space, to follow even in outline the course of that stupendous devastation, exceeding in its wanton waste of human life the horrors of the Thirty Years' War in Germany: our concern has been only with that side of the movement with which foreign nations were forced into contact, with its political bearing, and its influence on the position of the Chinese Government. It happened that only two of the Powers were directly concerned in offensive operations against the rebels, but in the task of suppression they had the moral support of them all. Indeed, but for the French and English activity it seems probable that Russia was ready single-handed to undertake the whole business. The Russian Government 395 from time to time signified its approval of the action taken by the French and English in assisting the Chinese Government to put down the rebellion. Russia was included in the thanks of the Chinese to their foreign allies; she had at least furnished material in the shape of "10,000 rifles and several cannons." These arrived in Peking, after a protracted journey, at a time when the Russian Minister deemed it expedient to explain to his British colleagues that the arms had reference only to the rebellion. Moreover, Russia had, or professed to have, serious intentions of sending a large force of her own to co-operate in its suppression. M. Petchroff, a member of the Russian Legation, spent a month in Shanghai in the autumn of 1862 in frequent conferences on this subject with the Chinese authorities, the report of which he carried in person to Admiral Popoff, who was at the time in Japan. M. Petchroff called upon the British admiral while in Shanghai, and informed him of this project. It was not carried out, as Prince Gortchakoff explained to Lord Napier, because the Russian Government had not force enough available to render effective assistance, but they wished to show the Chinese that they were in hearty sympathy with the Anglo-French policy, and might, for moral effect, show their flag in co-operation, so far as prudence would allow.

It would be impossible, within any reasonable space, to outline the extent of that massive devastation, surpassing in its reckless loss of human life the horrors of the Thirty Years' War in Germany. Our focus has been only on the aspects of the situation that involved foreign nations, particularly its political implications and its effect on the Chinese Government's position. Only two of the powers were directly involved in offensive actions against the rebels, but they received the moral support of all the others in the effort to suppress the rebellion. In fact, if not for the actions of the French and English, it seems likely that Russia would have been ready to take on the entire mission by itself. The Russian Government 395 occasionally expressed its approval of the actions taken by the French and English in helping the Chinese Government to suppress the uprising. Russia was included in the gratitude expressed by the Chinese towards their foreign allies; she had at least provided materials in the form of "10,000 rifles and several cannons." These arrived in Beijing after a long journey, at a time when the Russian Minister found it appropriate to clarify to his British counterparts that the arms were meant solely for the rebellion. Furthermore, Russia had, or claimed to have, serious intentions of sending a significant force of her own to help suppress it. M. Petchroff, a member of the Russian Legation, spent a month in Shanghai in the autumn of 1862, frequently meeting with Chinese officials about this issue, the report of which he delivered personally to Admiral Popoff, who was then in Japan. While in Shanghai, M. Petchroff met with the British admiral and briefed him on this plan. It was not executed, as Prince Gortchakoff explained to Lord Napier, because the Russian Government did not have enough forces available to provide effective assistance, but they wanted to demonstrate to the Chinese that they fully supported the Anglo-French policy and might, for the sake of moral support, show their flag in cooperation, as far as caution permitted.

The importance of putting an end to the rebellion, and the value of foreign aid in doing so, were fully realised by the Peking Government. Of this the abortive, but costly, Osborn flotilla furnished proof enough; and the honours bestowed on Gordon by imperial decree were an expression of the unspeakable 396 relief which was felt in the palace at the dispelling of the hideous nightmare. A final decree summing up the movement, in a tone of restrained sincerity not usual in these conventional documents, says: "Words cannot convey any idea of the misery and desolation he [the Taiping chief] caused; the measure of his iniquity was full, and the wrath of both gods and men was roused against him."

The Peking Government fully understood the need to end the rebellion and the value of foreign aid in achieving that goal. The costly yet ineffective Osborn flotilla was clear evidence of this, and the honors bestowed on Gordon by imperial decree expressed the immense relief felt in the palace with the end of that horrible nightmare. A final decree summarizing the situation, in a tone of restrained sincerity that isn't typical for these formal documents, states: "Words cannot convey the extent of the misery and devastation he [the Taiping chief] caused; his wrongdoing was complete, and the anger of both gods and men was stirred against him."

VI. EVACUATION OF CANTON.

Good feeling and compliments on both sides—Mr Parkes's able administration of the city.

Good vibes and compliments from both sides—Mr. Parkes's skilled management of the city.

An event which passed off without the slightest sensation, because without hitch, was the evacuation of Canton by the Allied troops in October 1861. Were it only for one clause in the proclamation issued by the high Chinese authorities on the occasion, this transaction would form a valuable historical landmark:—

An event that happened without any fuss or problems was the evacuation of Canton by the Allied troops in October 1861. If not for one part of the proclamation issued by the high Chinese authorities at the time, this event would be an important historical milestone:—

During the occupation of Canton by the allied troops of England and France during a period of four years, their conduct has never been otherwise than friendly towards the military and people of the whole city, and the military and people having also corresponded with courtesy and friendship, harmony has been maintained from first to last. Now that the troops are being withdrawn, the consuls of England and France will continue to reside within the city, while the merchants and people of all nations will constantly pass in and out, or reside therein at their pleasure. It remains the duty of yourselves, the military and people, to continue to them the same respectful and courteous relations that have prevailed during the occupation.

During the four-year occupation of Canton by the allied troops from England and France, their behavior has always been friendly towards the military and the people of the entire city. Since the military and the locals have also interacted with courtesy and goodwill, harmony has been maintained from start to finish. Now that the troops are pulling out, the consuls from England and France will continue to live in the city, while merchants and people from all nations will regularly come and go or choose to reside there as they wish. It is now your responsibility, as the military and the citizens, to maintain the same respectful and courteous relationships that have existed during the occupation.

Compare this with the state of things existing only three years before! Much of the success of the occupation and its good permanent results were unquestionably due to the high qualities of Parkes, the British commissioner, who thus modestly refers to the matter in his despatch: "The confidence of the people in a strong and inoppressive Government, added to their own governable character, materially facilitated the task of maintaining order in a vast and most intricate city containing a population of upwards of 1,000,000 inhabitants." The "Canton question" was thus finally disposed of to the satisfaction of all parties.

Compare this to the situation just three years earlier! A lot of the success of the occupation and its lasting positive outcomes were undoubtedly thanks to the impressive qualities of Parkes, the British commissioner, who humbly mentioned in his report: "The trust of the people in a strong and fair government, combined with their own manageable nature, significantly made it easier to maintain order in a large and extremely complex city with a population of over 1,000,000 residents." The "Canton issue" was finally resolved to the satisfaction of everyone involved.

VII. DEATH OF THE EMPEROR.

His flight from the capital—Succession of his son—Regency of the two empresses—Prince Kung's sanguinary coup d'état.

His escape from the capital—His son's rise to power—The rule of the two empresses—Prince Kung's bloody coup d'état.

Next in importance to the suppression of the Taiping rebellion, the death of the Emperor Hsienfêng marked the period we are now considering. That unfortunate monarch, who deserted his capital against the strongest remonstrances of his advisers, on the approach of the Allied forces, died at his hiding-place in August 1861, and his only son was proclaimed in his stead under the style of Tungchih. The new emperor was a child, and provision had to be made for a regency. How this regency fell into the hands of two empresses—one the mother of the young emperor, the other the true widow of the deceased—was not very well understood by the foreigners then in the capital. Prince Kung's coup d'état, by which the 398 three male members of the regency were elaborately arraigned and then assassinated, was not organised to get rid of any imaginary "anti-foreign faction," as was too easily assumed at the time, but simply and solely to place the empire at the feet of himself and the emperor's mother. "Parties" in Peking have always been, and are to this day, a puzzle to foreigners, who, having seldom at the moment any trustworthy means of informing themselves, are apt to be carried away by "cries," sometimes got up for the purpose of misleading them,—for the Chinese are not at all averse from turning to account the half knowledge on which foreigners are prone to form their opinions.

Next in importance to the suppression of the Taiping rebellion, the death of Emperor Hsienfêng marked the period we are now discussing. That unfortunate monarch, who abandoned his capital despite strong advice from his counselors as the Allied forces approached, died in his hiding place in August 1861, and his only son was proclaimed as his successor under the name of Tungchih. The new emperor was a child, so a regency needed to be established. How this regency came to be controlled by two empresses—one being the mother of the young emperor and the other the true widow of the deceased—was not well understood by the foreigners in the capital at the time. Prince Kung's coup d'état, which intricately targeted the three male members of the regency for elaborate accusations followed by their assassination, was not organized to eliminate any supposed "anti-foreign faction," as was often assumed then, but purely to place the empire under his control and that of the emperor's mother. "Parties" in Peking have always been a puzzle to foreigners, who, lacking reliable ways to inform themselves, are often misled by "cries" that are sometimes deliberately fabricated to confuse them. The Chinese are quite adept at taking advantage of the limited knowledge that foreigners have to shape their opinions.

VIII. INFLUENCE OF THESE EVENTS ON PROGRESS OF DIPLOMACY.

Inadequacy of foreign diplomacy—Absence of sovereign—Allies committed to protection of China—Coercion impossible—Large outlook of Mr Bruce—The provincial versus imperial administration—Attempt to force Central Government to coerce provincial—Contemptuous attitude of Chinese Ministers—Sir F. Bruce's despair—He clutches at various straws—General reaction of Chinese.

Inadequacy of foreign diplomacy—Lack of a sovereign—Allies dedicated to protecting China—Coercion not possible—Mr. Bruce's broad perspective—The provincial versus imperial administration—Efforts to pressure the Central Government to coerce the provinces—Disdainful attitude of Chinese Ministers—Sir F. Bruce's despair—He grasps at different options—General reaction of the Chinese.

How did these various occurrences influence the progress of diplomatic relations with the Government? We have seen that diplomacy in Peking was a venture launched on imported capital, which, meeting with no indigenous support, was doomed from the first to feed upon itself. There was no dialect through which the foreign idea could translate itself to Chinese comprehension, no medium by which Chinese political conceptions could be made intelligible to the foreigner. When 399 Gordon could not get his meaning filtered through an interpreter, he called for a dictionary and put his finger on the word "idiotcy"—and the most orthodox interpreting could not get much beyond this point in establishing a common currency for the interchange of national ideas. The initial difficulty in imposing foreign forms, foreign terms, foreign procedure—of revolutionising at a stroke a system of administration petrified by ancient usage—would have existed even if the statesmen of China had been sincere converts to the innovation. The contrary was, of course, the case: they were as much opposed to the new relations as they had been to the military invasion itself. No help, therefore, was to be expected from the Chinese side in creating a workable scheme of international intercourse. They desired nothing of that kind, their ambition soaring no higher than the creation of a buffer against which external impulsion might expend its force. That buffer was the Tsungli-Yamên. Foreign diplomacy, therefore, if it were to subsist at all, must subsist on its own resources, the foundation of which was force. The force that brought foreigners to Peking must, either in esse or in posse, for an indefinite time keep them there and render them efficient. Force no doubt would have enabled the foreign Ministers to bring about even those structural changes in the Chinese system which were necessary to clear the ground for the operation of their diplomacy. But if there was one thing more than another of which Western Governments were determined to convince themselves, it was that the law of force was finally abrogated in China; that on a certain day at a certain hour, coincident with the signing (by force) of a sheet 400 of paper, the spirit of hostility had departed from the Chinese mind; and that the law of love and reason was, without preamble, to take the place of that which had brought about the new relations. Whether believed in or not, this curious paradox was to be the rule of all future action.

How did these different events affect the development of diplomatic relations with the government? We’ve seen that diplomacy in Beijing was an effort reliant on outside funding, which, lacking local support, was destined from the start to keep depleting itself. There was no language through which foreign ideas could be understood by the Chinese, and no means by which Chinese political thoughts could be made clear to outsiders. When 399 Gordon found he couldn’t get his point across through an interpreter, he asked for a dictionary and pointed to the word "idiocy"—and even the most traditional interpreting fell short of establishing a common language for exchanging national ideas. The initial challenge of imposing foreign systems, terms, and procedures—of suddenly overhauling an administration firmly rooted in ancient practices—would have existed even if China’s leaders had genuinely embraced the changes. The opposite was true: they were just as resistant to the new relationships as they had been to the military invasion itself. Therefore, no assistance was to be expected from the Chinese side in creating a workable plan for international communication. They wanted nothing of that sort, their ambition limited to creating a shield against which external pressures could exert their force. That shield was the Tsungli-Yamên. Foreign diplomacy, then, if it was to survive at all, had to rely on its own means, which were fundamentally based on force. The force that brought foreigners to Beijing had to, either in esse or in posse, keep them there for an indefinite period and make them effective. No doubt, force would have allowed the foreign Ministers to implement the structural changes in the Chinese system that were necessary to facilitate their diplomacy. But if there was one thing that Western governments were determined to convince themselves of, it was that the law of force was ultimately rendered obsolete in China; that on a specific day at a specific hour, coinciding with the signing (by force) of a document 400, the spirit of hostility had vanished from the Chinese mindset; and that the laws of love and reason were to effortlessly replace what had led to the new relations. Whether this was believed or not, this strange paradox was to guide all future actions.

The game that opens with the "king" off the board, and is afterwards continued with the "queen" protected, is an obviously impossible one. The foreign Ministers had to do with a Government of irresponsibility, and instead of teaching its members from the outset to recognise their new obligations—training them as children, which as regards foreign matters they really were—the foreign Ministers began by treating the Chinese Government rather as an infant too delicate for discipline, with the familiar results of such treatment. The diplomats betrayed so much anxiety to lure the sovereign back to his palace, that the Chinese Ministers soon learned to exploit this feeling for their own ends. That such and such a concession "would have a good effect at Jêho" was inducement enough to the foreign representatives to waive one point after another in the transaction of public business. When the emperor died, after six months of this régime of indulgence, the position was changed materially for the worse,—for the diplomats had now a veritable infant on their hands, with a female regent "behind the curtain." No prospect thenceforth of even the initial formality of delivering letters of credence until the child should grow up, by which time many things might happen. Thus the European scheme of diplomacy, which was to have been imposed bodily on the Court of Peking, stumbled 401 heavily on the threshold, and never recovered itself. But the Chinese recovered. Their fear of the "fierce barbarians" disappeared as they saw them throw away their weapons, and the process was resumed by which the fruits of the war and of the treaties of peace were gradually nibbled away.

The game that starts with the "king" off the board and then continues with the "queen" protected is clearly an impossible one. The foreign ministers dealt with a government that was irresponsible, and instead of teaching its members from the beginning to recognize their new obligations—training them like children, which they actually were concerning foreign affairs—the foreign ministers treated the Chinese government like a child too fragile for discipline, leading to familiar outcomes. The diplomats were so eager to get the emperor back to his palace that the Chinese ministers quickly learned to use this feeling to their advantage. The argument that a certain concession "would have a good effect at Jêho" was enough to convince the foreign representatives to back down on various points in dealing with public business. When the emperor died after six months of this indulgent regime, the situation worsened significantly, as the diplomats now had a real child on their hands, with a female regent "behind the curtain." There was no hope of even the basic formality of presenting letters of credence until the child grew up, by which point a lot could change. Thus, the European diplomatic scheme, which was supposed to be directly imposed on the Court of Peking, stumbled badly at the threshold and never regained its footing. But the Chinese managed to recover. Their fear of the "fierce barbarians" faded as they watched them discard their weapons, and the process of nibbling away at the gains from the war and the peace treaties resumed.

And of course the whole idea of coercing the Imperial Government, even had it ever been entertained, was openly reduced to nullity when the foreign Powers interfered for the suppression of the rebellion. The Allies could not knock down with one hand what they were propping up with the other, and thus the Imperial Government not only enjoyed immunity, but knew that they possessed it,—that their late conquerors were now fully committed to the upholding of the integrity of China and the maintenance of the dynasty. Any liberties might consequently be taken: remonstrances from the foreigners would be loud in proportion to their hollowness, but the barbarians could not attack a citadel full of their own hostages.

And of course, the whole idea of forcing the Imperial Government, even if it had ever been considered, was completely nullified when foreign powers stepped in to suppress the rebellion. The Allies couldn’t undermine something they were simultaneously supporting, and so the Imperial Government not only felt safe but also realized they were protected—that their recent conquerors were now completely committed to maintaining the integrity of China and preserving the dynasty. Because of this, they could take any liberties they wanted: complaints from the foreigners would be loud but empty, as the outsiders couldn’t assault a fortress filled with their own hostages.

Although remoteness from the scene of action and imperfect acquaintance with local requirements were apt to invalidate his conclusions on points of detail, and to compel him occasionally to follow where he might have been expected to guide the action of his subordinate executive, yet whenever Sir Frederick Bruce delivered his mind on the position of China and her foreign relations as a whole, his views were large, luminous, and statesmanlike. He foresaw from the first what the degradation of the Chinese Government must inevitably lead to. His outlook is revealed in a brief sentence in one of his earlier despatches: "The weakness of China rather than her 402 strength is likely to create a fresh Eastern question in these seas." There need be little doubt that that idea dominated his Chinese diplomacy. Severity, or even strictness, may well have seemed on the face of the matter inconsistent with the pious wish to strengthen China, yet we now know that what she then most needed was to be braced up to the fulfilment of her obligations as a necessity of her own wellbeing.

Although being distant from the situation and not fully understanding local needs often undermined his precise conclusions and sometimes forced him to follow rather than lead his subordinate executives, whenever Sir Frederick Bruce shared his thoughts on China’s overall situation and foreign relations, his insights were broad, clear, and statesmanlike. He anticipated from the beginning what the decline of the Chinese Government would inevitably cause. His perspective is captured in a short sentence from one of his earlier dispatches: "The weakness of China rather than her 402 strength is likely to create a fresh Eastern question in these seas." There is little doubt that this idea shaped his approach to Chinese diplomacy. Harshness, or even strictness, might have seemed contradictory to the genuine desire to strengthen China, yet we now understand that what was most needed at that time was to encourage her to meet her obligations as a matter of her own well-being.

The field of diplomacy in the orthodox sense being closed, and there being no foreign interests in Peking, the subject-matter for the Ministers' activity was furnished entirely from the trading-ports. Of these there were fifteen open in 1861. The kind of questions which arose may be generally defined as claims arising out of breaches of treaty by provincial officials, for which redress was sought from the Central Government. This was a reversal of Chinese methods, which, even had the Government been well disposed, would not have been easy to effect; and as the Government was hostile, difficulty became impossibility. The British Minister after a year's trial began to realise the magnitude of his Sisyphean task. "In a country like China," he wrote to the Foreign Office in July 1862, "where the principles of administration differ entirely from those practised by us, the conclusion of a treaty is the commencement, not the termination, of difficulties."

The field of diplomacy, in the traditional sense, was closed off, and there were no foreign interests in Beijing, so the Ministers' activities were completely focused on the trading ports. There were fifteen of these open in 1861. The kinds of issues that came up mainly involved claims due to treaty violations by local officials, for which they sought compensation from the Central Government. This was a flip of Chinese methods, which, even if the Government had been cooperative, would have been hard to implement; and since the Government was uncooperative, what was already difficult became impossible. After a year of trying, the British Minister began to understand the scale of his seemingly endless task. "In a country like China," he wrote to the Foreign Office in July 1862, "where the principles of administration are completely different from ours, the signing of a treaty is just the beginning, not the end, of difficulties."

To a consul he wrote at the same time: "The important result to be gained by the establishment of direct relations with the Government of Peking is the avoidance of local acts of violence.... Time will elapse before the new system will work smoothly 403 and efficiently, ... but you must not go beyond pacific efforts to remedy the abuses complained of." A few months later, in a general circular to consuls, he thus carefully recapitulated the instruction:—

To a consul he wrote at the same time: "The main benefit of establishing direct relations with the Government of Peking is to prevent local acts of violence.... It will take some time before the new system operates smoothly 403 and efficiently, ... but you should only engage in peaceful efforts to address the reported issues." A few months later, in a general circular to consuls, he carefully summarized the instructions:—

The object to be attained is that of forcing the local officials to observe the treaty ... through the pressure brought to bear upon them by the Peking Government, and thus escape from the false position in which we have hitherto been placed of coercing the local authorities and people, and thus doing the work of the Imperial Government. To initiate this new system of relations is a task which can only be effected gradually and patiently; but the attempt must be steadily and perseveringly made, in order that the Chinese Government may be forced to teach its people, &c.

The goal is to get local officials to follow the treaty by applying pressure from the Peking Government, allowing us to move away from the awkward situation of forcing local authorities and people to act, effectively doing the job of the Imperial Government. Starting this new way of working together is something that can only happen slowly and with patience; however, we must keep trying steadily and persistently so that the Chinese Government will be pushed to educate its people, etc.

And at the same time he summed up the situation to the Foreign Office in these words: "Our relations with China cannot be put upon a safe footing until the Imperial Government itself compels its local officers to observe treaties"—a matter in which the Central Government itself most needed compulsion!

And at the same time he summarized the situation to the Foreign Office with these words: "Our relationship with China can't be put on a stable foundation until the Imperial Government forces its local officials to adhere to treaties"—which is something the Central Government itself desperately needed to be compelled to do!

But all this about "forcing" the local officials and "forcing" the Imperial Government, without using any force, recalls the ancient Chinese maxim of "ruling barbarians by misrule." The world rested securely enough on the tortoise, but what did the tortoise itself rest on? With grim satisfaction must the Chinese Ministers have watched the foreigners entering on a desert campaign where they would exhaust their strength without reaching the enemy. The warnings and threats which alone the Minister allowed himself to use to enforce his demands or his admonitions, as the case might be, were to the Chinese mere blank cartridge. Prince Kung, replying to one of those 404 minatory despatches, "imagines that his Excellency uses this outspoken language for the purpose of stimulating the Chinese Government to activity. His Highness is sure that it is not his Excellency's desire to act in the manner indicated." And so on indefinitely. The impression made on the Chinese Government by the force of foreign diplomacy was likened by an American Minister twenty years afterwards to "boxing a feather-bed." The policy above described, inaugurated by Mr Bruce and followed consistently by the British Government, was pithily termed by Lord Salisbury, when in Opposition, as an "ideal policy" in pursuit of which the concrete interests of the country were allowed to lapse.

But all this about "forcing" local officials and "forcing" the Imperial Government without using any actual force brings to mind the ancient Chinese saying of "ruling barbarians by misrule." The world was securely supported by the tortoise, but what was the tortoise resting on? The Chinese Ministers must have watched with grim satisfaction as foreigners embarked on a pointless campaign where they would wear themselves out without ever confronting the enemy. The warnings and threats that the Minister allowed himself to use to enforce his demands or his advice, depending on the situation, were to the Chinese merely empty gestures. Prince Kung, responding to one of those threatening messages, "imagines that his Excellency uses this direct language to prompt the Chinese Government to take action. His Highness is certain that it is not his Excellency's intention to act in the way suggested." And so on endlessly. An American Minister would later compare the impact of foreign diplomacy on the Chinese Government to "boxing a feather-bed." The policy described above, initiated by Mr. Bruce and consistently followed by the British Government, was succinctly referred to by Lord Salisbury, when in Opposition, as an "ideal policy" that allowed the concrete interests of the country to fall by the wayside.

It would be tedious to trace in detail the process of disintegration of treaty rights which followed these interesting overtures. It will be more to the purpose to cite the British Minister's review of the results twelve months later in a despatch to Prince Kung. This despatch and the reply to it were deemed so important at the time that they were separately called for by the House of Commons, and were published as independent Blue Books (Nos. 6 and 8, 1864):—

It would be boring to go into detail about how treaty rights started to break down after these intriguing proposals. It’s more useful to mention the British Minister's summary of the outcomes a year later in a message to Prince Kung. This message and the response to it were considered so significant at the time that the House of Commons requested them separately, and they were published as independent Blue Books (Nos. 6 and 8, 1864):—

Sir Frederick Bruce wished the Prince of Kung to understand that he had reason to be greatly dissatisfied

Sir Frederick Bruce wanted the Prince of Kung to know that he had good reason to be very unhappy.

1. With the general disregard of treaty provisions manifested at the ports.

1. With the overall neglect of treaty agreements shown at the ports.

2. With the tone of the Government generally towards foreigners.

2. With the government's overall attitude towards foreigners.

It is entirely due to the exertions of the Allied forces that Shanghai and Ningpo are not now in rebel possession. Had Shanghai fallen, the imperial authority would have received a blow from which it could never have recovered....

It is completely thanks to the efforts of the Allied forces that Shanghai and Ningpo are not currently under rebel control. If Shanghai had fallen, the imperial authority would have suffered a blow from which it could never have recovered....

Sir F. Bruce did not look for any extraordinary demonstration 405 of gratitude for these services, but he had hoped that the Central Government would at least have insisted on the faithful observance of the treaty at the ports. He had hoped also that it would have addressed itself with some increase of vigour to the organisation of a competent executive.

Sir F. Bruce wasn't looking for any big show of gratitude for his services, but he had hoped that the Central Government would at least ensure the treaty was faithfully followed at the ports. He also hoped that it would become more active in organizing a competent executive.

These expectations have not been realised. At several of the ports the treaty is daily broken in matters great and small; and the Central Government, if not unwilling, shows itself unable to enforce a better order of things. The orders sent by the Foreign Board, when Sir Frederick Bruce complains, are not carried out, either because the local authorities do not stand in awe of the Foreign Board or because they do not believe the Foreign Board issues them in earnest....

These expectations have not been met. At several of the ports, the treaty is violated daily in both major and minor issues; and the Central Government, if not unwilling, seems unable to establish a better situation. The orders sent by the Foreign Board, when Sir Frederick Bruce raises a complaint, are not followed, either because the local authorities do not respect the Foreign Board or because they doubt the seriousness of the orders from the Foreign Board...

The Foreign Board has gone through the form of issuing instructions, but the causes of complaint remain as they were, either because the local authorities do not fear or because the Foreign Board does not care. Seeing that none of the authorities complained of have been punished or removed, that officials notoriously hostile to foreigners have been appointed to places in which they have increased opportunity of indulging in their anti-foreign tendencies, while officials of friendly disposition have been withdrawn, Sir Frederick Bruce is induced, however reluctantly, to infer that if the Imperial Government be not adverse to friendly intercourse, it is, at all events, indisposed to do what is necessary to teach the people and local authorities that China is sincerely desirous of friendly relations with foreign Powers....

The Foreign Board has issued instructions, but the complaints still stand, either because local authorities aren't worried or the Foreign Board simply doesn't care. Since none of the complained-about authorities have faced punishment or removal, and officials known to be hostile to foreigners have been appointed to positions where they can act on their anti-foreign feelings, while friendly officials have been removed, Sir Frederick Bruce reluctantly concludes that while the Imperial Government may not be against friendly relations, it is at least not willing to take the necessary steps to show the people and local authorities that China genuinely wants to maintain good relations with foreign powers....

It is for the Chinese Government to consider whether it will listen to these warnings, &c.

It is up to the Chinese Government to decide whether it will heed these warnings, etc.

Prince Kung's Reply, 19th June 1863.

Prince Kung's Reply, June 19, 1863.

With reference to the proposition on which the British Minister's note insists, that the treaty should rank with the law, the Prince has to observe that the principle that the treaty is identical with the laws of the Imperial Government, and that breach of treaty is the same thing as violation of the law, is the principle on which the Government of China proceeds, and its only desire is that foreign nations should regard the treaty in the same light....

With regard to the point emphasized in the British Minister's note that the treaty should hold the same status as law, the Prince notes that the principle that the treaty is equivalent to the laws of the Imperial Government, and that breaking a treaty is the same as breaking the law, is the principle on which the Chinese Government operates. Its only wish is for foreign nations to view the treaty in the same way...

As regards the cases still undetermined in the provinces, 406 the Prince hopes that the British Minister will refer to the record and inform him, case by case, of the particulars of each, and the Yamên will at once write to the Provincial Governments concerned to hurry them with the cases enumerated....

As for the unresolved cases in the provinces, 406 the Prince hopes that the British Minister will check the records and update him, one by one, on the details of each case, and the Yamên will promptly write to the relevant Provincial Governments to push them on the listed cases....

Sir Frederick Bruce's Reply, July 2, 1863.

Sir Frederick Bruce's Reply, July 2, 1863.

Your Imperial Highness states in explicit terms that the Government of China recognises the treaties as the law of the empire in its relations with foreigners, and that breaches of treaty are considered violations of those laws. But the despatch of your Imperial Highness contains nothing to show that this principle will be carried out in practice. I stated instances in which the authorities, in spite of the remonstrances of her Majesty's consul, had deliberately set aside the letter of the treaty for no other object than to curtail the privileges of her Majesty's subjects. Your Imperial Highness in your reply does not allude to these cases, nor do you inform me that any steps have been taken to remedy these grievances or to prevent a repetition of such conduct. I am simply requested to send in a list of the grievances complained of; and I am informed that the local authorities will be urged to settle them with speed. Such a proposal is entirely unsatisfactory; for what reason have I to suppose that the instructions now to be sent by your Imperial Highness will be attended to, when I see that the orders which I am assured were given by your Imperial Highness for the redress of outrages such as ... have been disobeyed?

Your Imperial Highness clearly states that the Government of China acknowledges the treaties as the law of the empire in its dealings with foreign nations, and that violations of these treaties are seen as breaches of that law. However, your Imperial Highness's message doesn't provide any assurance that this principle will be effectively upheld. I pointed out instances where the authorities, despite objections from her Majesty's consul, have intentionally disregarded the treaty just to limit the rights of her Majesty's subjects. In your reply, your Imperial Highness doesn’t mention these situations, nor do you tell me that any measures have been taken to address these issues or to prevent them from happening again. I have simply been asked to submit a list of the complaints, and I’m told that the local authorities will be encouraged to resolve them quickly. This suggestion is completely unsatisfactory; why should I believe that the instructions your Imperial Highness is sending will be followed when I can see that the orders I was assured your Imperial Highness issued for addressing incidents like ... have been ignored?

In these State Papers the relations present and prospective between China and the outer world are accurately represented. Putting aside local and temporary questions, the despatches might be dated 1873, 1883, or 1893, for the position remained substantially the same during the three decades.

In these State Papers, the current and future relations between China and the outside world are clearly portrayed. Ignoring local and temporary issues, the messages could have been dated 1873, 1883, or 1893, as the situation stayed largely unchanged over those three decades.

The attitude of the British Minister we see to be one of hopeless pleading and vague admonition; of the Chinese Ministers, elastic resistance. One wonders how far, under the mask of dull decorum, the Chinese 407 entered into the real humour of the situation: foreigners chafing impotently, but with their teeth drawn, occupying themselves largely with the preservation of China and the dynasty; urging reforms, military, financial, and administrative, while putting up with the non-fulfilment of the commonest obligations.

The British Minister appears to be in a state of desperate pleading and vague warnings, while the Chinese Ministers show flexible resistance. One wonders how much, behind their facade of dull formality, the Chinese 407 truly understand the absurdity of the situation: foreigners feeling frustrated but restrained, mostly focused on maintaining China and the dynasty; pushing for reforms in military, financial, and administrative areas while tolerating the failure to meet even the most basic obligations.

Sir F. Bruce was much too wise a man not to be perfectly conscious of the negative result of foreign diplomacy in Peking. His private letters, some of which were published by Mr Lay in 1864, are more emphatic on the point than his public despatches. He saw it was a case for desperate remedies, but unfortunately he had no remedy except such as aggravated the disease. Like a drowning man, Sir Frederick Bruce clutched at one straw, then another—first at the inspectorate of customs, then at the collective body of his colleagues—to redress the balance which lay so heavily against him. We see in the despatch of June 12, 1863, the inception of what became known as the "co-operative policy." That was an arrangement by which the cause of one foreigner was to be made the cause of all, so that the treaty Powers might present a solid front to the Chinese. Unfortunately such a policy bears no fruit, since half-a-dozen Powers with separate interests, and of varying tempers, can only unite in doing nothing. The co-operative policy, therefore, by tying the hands of all the Powers, rendered the Chinese more secure than ever from outside interference.

Sir F. Bruce was way too smart not to realize the failed outcome of foreign diplomacy in Peking. His private letters, some of which Mr. Lay published in 1864, emphasize this more than his official reports. He recognized it was a situation that called for drastic measures, but unfortunately, he only had solutions that made things worse. Like a drowning man, Sir Frederick Bruce grasped at one option after another—first the customs inspectorate, then his fellow diplomats—to try to restore balance that was heavily against him. In the dispatch from June 12, 1863, we see the beginning of what became known as the "co-operative policy." This was an arrangement where one foreigner’s issue would be supported by all, so the treaty Powers could present a united front to the Chinese. Unfortunately, such a policy ended up being ineffective since six different Powers with their own interests and varying moods could only come together to accomplish nothing. Therefore, the co-operative policy, by restricting the actions of all the Powers, made the Chinese more secure from outside interference than ever.

From Sir Frederick Bruce's despatches it may be gathered that the reason for the non-success of the Peking diplomacy was, that it was not founded on fact. It assumed that the Government of China was centralised 408 instead of decentralised; that the administration of the empire hinged on the initiative of Peking, from which distant point the resident Ministers could protect their respective national interests throughout the empire. This hypothesis, which might have graced an academic debate, was acted upon as if it was a reality, and the struggle to make it so has absorbed the resources of diplomacy for forty years. The real fact, however, was quite otherwise. The distinctive character of Chinese Government is not autocracy, but democracy and provincial autonomy. The springs of action work from below, not from above, and to reverse this order of the ages was to convert a court of appeal into a court of first instance: to sue for a tradesman's debt before the Lord Chancellor, requiring the legal machinery to be first turned upside down. Diplomacy in China has thus been a disheartening effort to drive in a wedge by its thick end without adequate leverage. It is possible, indeed, that force might have accomplished even as much as that, but force was the one thing the use of which was proscribed.

From Sir Frederick Bruce's reports, it can be understood that the reason the diplomacy with Peking failed was that it wasn’t based on reality. It assumed that the Chinese government was centralized instead of decentralized; that the administration of the empire relied on Peking’s initiative, allowing resident ministers to protect their national interests across the empire. This assumption, which might have been a good topic for an academic debate, was treated as if it were true, and the struggle to make it a reality has consumed diplomatic resources for forty years. In reality, however, the nature of Chinese government is not autocracy but democracy and provincial autonomy. The driving force comes from the ground up, not from the top down, and to alter this long-standing order would be like turning an appeals court into a trial court: suing a tradesman before the Lord Chancellor would require completely upending the legal system. Thus, diplomacy in China has been a demoralizing attempt to wedge in a block by its thick end without proper leverage. It’s possible, in fact, that force could have achieved at least that much, but the use of force was the one thing that was forbidden.

The redress of grievances being sought not where it could have been exacted, at the point affected, but in the capital, the Central Government was called on to exercise over the provincial officials a kind of control which had never been exercised before. The provincial officials, relieved from the local pressure which they respected, easily evaded the novel and unconstitutional interference of the capital, and violated the treaties with an impunity unknown in the days before the admission of the foreign Ministers to Peking. The treaties, no doubt, had become the 409 "law of the land" so far as a mere barbarian phrase could make them so, but a full-grown tree of Western legality could not so easily transplant itself to an alien and refractory soil. The argument from legality appealed, therefore, to the ear only. The practical conclusion to which Sir Frederick Bruce was led is very simply stated in two paragraphs of his letters to Prince Kung: "My object has been to seek redress through the Imperial Government, and to do away with the necessity of seeking redress by forcible demonstrations at the ports. But it is evident that the reluctance of your Imperial Highness to enter frankly into this policy renders my efforts ineffectual." "Either the Imperial Government is unwilling to use its influence to cause the treaties to be fairly carried out, or it has not the power to cause its orders to be obeyed." Sir Frederick would have hit still nearer the mark if he had omitted the "either," "or," and said simply the Imperial Government was both unwilling and unable.

The redress of grievances was being sought not where it could have been addressed, at the point affected, but in the capital, prompting the Central Government to exercise a type of control over the provincial officials that had never been used before. The provincial officials, free from the local pressure they respected, easily sidestepped the new and unconstitutional interference from the capital, violating the treaties with a level of impunity not seen before foreign Ministers were admitted to Peking. The treaties had, no doubt, become the 409 "law of the land" as much as a mere barbarian phrase could establish them, but a fully developed system of Western legality could not easily transplant itself to foreign and resistant soil. The argument from legality, therefore, resonated only on a surface level. The practical conclusion that Sir Frederick Bruce reached is simply expressed in two paragraphs of his letters to Prince Kung: "My goal has been to seek redress through the Imperial Government, avoiding the need for forcible demonstrations at the ports. But it’s clear that your Imperial Highness’s reluctance to embrace this policy makes my efforts ineffective." "Either the Imperial Government is unwilling to use its influence to ensure the treaties are properly executed, or it lacks the power to enforce its orders." Sir Frederick would have been even more accurate if he had omitted the "either" and "or," stating simply that the Imperial Government was both unwilling and unable.

Notwithstanding these definite views, the experiment of forcing a centralisation which would have been a revolution on the unintelligible Government of China had to be continued through many weary years that were to follow, during which time the rights conferred by treaty on foreigners fell more and more into abeyance.

Notwithstanding these clear opinions, the attempt to impose a centralization that would have revolutionized the confusing Government of China had to continue for many exhausting years to come, during which the rights granted by treaty to foreigners gradually fell more and more into neglect.

The progress in that direction made in the two first years is thus summarised by Mr H. N. Lay, the first Inspector-General of Customs, on his return to China in 1863:—

The progress made in that direction during the first two years is summarized by Mr. H. N. Lay, the first Inspector-General of Customs, upon his return to China in 1863:—

When I left China the emperor's Government, under the pressure of necessity, and with the beneficial terror established 410 by the Allied foray to Peking in 1860 fresh in their recollection, was in the best of moods, willing to be guided, grateful for help, and in return for that help prepared to do what was right by the foreigner. What did I find on my return? The face of things was entirely changed. There was the old insolent demeanour, the nonsensical language of exclusion, the open mockery of all treaties.... In short, all the ground gained by the treaty of 1858 had been frittered away, and we were thrust back into the position we occupied before the war,—one of helpless remonstrance and impotent menace; ... the labour of years lost through egregious mismanagement. The Foreign Board looked upon our European representatives as so many rois fainéants.... Prince Kung was no longer accessible.... He professed to be engaged with more important matters.

When I left China, the emperor's government, facing necessity and still shaken by the Allied invasion of Peking in 1860, was in a good place—open to guidance, grateful for support, and ready to treat foreigners fairly in exchange for that help. But what did I find when I returned? Everything had completely changed. There was the old arrogant attitude, the ridiculous rhetoric of exclusion, and the blatant disregard for all treaties. In short, all the progress made by the treaty of 1858 had been wasted, and we were back in the position we held before the war—powerless to protest and unable to threaten effectively; years of effort lost due to terrible mismanagement. The Foreign Board regarded our European representatives as nothing more than lazy kings. Prince Kung was no longer available; he claimed to be too busy with more important issues.


APPENDIX I.
NOTE ON OUR CURRENT SITUATION AND THE STATUS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH CHINA, BY CONSUL ALCOCK, JANUARY 19, 1849.

Section I.

Section 1.

The lesson of the past is very legibly written in the history of our relations,—oppression in the Chinese, increased by submission in the English. Resistance of the latter followed by concession in the former may be read in every stage, and the influence of the late war, beyond the tangible effects embodied in the provisions of the treaties, has been limited very much to outward forms: there is reason to suspect that the policy of the Chinese has been masked, not changed.

The lesson of the past is clearly outlined in the history of our interactions—oppression on the part of the Chinese, amplified by the submission of the English. You can see a cycle of resistance from the English followed by concessions from the Chinese at every stage. The impact of the recent war, aside from the concrete effects reflected in the treaty provisions, has largely been superficial. It seems likely that the Chinese policy has been concealed rather than altered.

The same arrogant and hostile spirit exists, and their policy is still to degrade foreigners in the eyes of the people, and to offer every obstacle which may with safety be interposed to any extended intercourse,—objects which they seek to carry out by various covert and indirect means. In this sense the letter of the treaty is often quoted, but any large interpretation can only be secured under a moral compulsion, as the least objectionable alternative. This may not, perhaps, be wholly owing to bad faith, for distrust and fear of foreigners probably influences the result. Hence all the principal advantages enjoyed under the treaty are only held by a species of personal tenure of precarious character, and a consul at one of the ports may lose more in a week than her Majesty's Government may find it easy to recover with costly and embarrassing efforts in a year. Our present relations consist in a never-ceasing struggle, under veiled appearances of amity; and the treaty extorted by force is generally sought to be eluded by cunning. They have no objection to the foreign trade as one of the elements of their 412 own prosperity, though they much underrate its importance; but to make it wholly acceptable [to them], the former humiliating conditions are wanting.

The same arrogant and hostile attitude remains, and their approach is still to undermine foreigners in the eyes of the public, while placing every possible obstacle that can be safely implemented to limit any broader interaction. They aim to achieve this through various subtle and indirect methods. In this context, the letter of the treaty is often cited, but any significant interpretation can only be reached under moral pressure, as the least objectionable option. This might not be entirely due to bad faith, as their distrust and fear of foreigners likely influence the outcome. As a result, all the main benefits granted under the treaty are only held through a type of personal and unstable arrangement, and a consul at any of the ports might lose more in a week than Her Majesty’s Government can easily recover after expensive and complicated efforts over a year. Our current relations consist of an ongoing struggle, hidden behind a façade of friendship; and the treaty, obtained by force, is usually avoided through clever tactics. They don’t oppose foreign trade as one of the factors contributing to their prosperity, although they significantly underestimate its importance; however, to make it fully acceptable to them, the previous humiliating conditions are absent.

The whole effort of the Chinese rulers seems to be limited to preserving peace as the first object, and, so far as may be compatible with this, to assimilate our present to our ancient position as the second.

The main goal of the Chinese rulers appears to be focused on maintaining peace as their top priority. As long as this objective can be met, they also aim to align our current situation with our historical position.

From the general bearing of our relations in connection with the past and the future, the nature and extent of the disadvantages under which we labour may be easily deduced:—

From the overall nature of our relationships regarding the past and the future, it's easy to understand the nature and extent of the challenges we face:—

1. Local insecurity to person and property at Canton.

1. Local insecurity for people and property in Canton.

2. Want of access to the first markets and of the means of pushing and verifying the consumption of our manufactures in the interior.

2. Lack of access to the primary markets and the means to promote and verify the consumption of our products in the domestic market.

3. Ill-adjusted rates of duty on several important articles.

3. Poorly set duty rates on several important items.

4. Want of reciprocity and equality in our political relations, and a certain inferiority in our position social and political.

4. A lack of reciprocity and equality in our political relationships, and a certain sense of inferiority in our social and political standing.

By the first we are menaced with perpetual danger of fatal collision and interruption to our commerce, while our general position is at the same time prejudiced. By the second we are deprived of any large market for our goods, and pay dearer for native produce. By the third the Straits, Indian, and the native carrying trade are all impeded in their growth and dwarfed in their proportions; and by the fourth insuperable difficulties in remedying abuses or amending our relations are encountered, our only means of action being upon Canton and its governor, acting as an imperial commissioner.

By the first, we face a constant threat of deadly collisions and interruptions to our trade, which also undermines our overall position. By the second, we lose access to a large market for our products and end up paying more for local goods. By the third, trade routes through the Straits, Indian Ocean, and local carriers are all slowed down and limited in growth. Finally, by the fourth, we encounter major obstacles in fixing problems or improving our relationships, with our only option being to act upon Canton and its governor, who acts as an imperial commissioner.

The full and rapid development of our commerce, a new and profitable field for our manufactures, and a better guarantee for the maintenance of our friendly relations, are the chief advantages to be sought in the removal of these disabilities.

The complete and quick growth of our trade, a new and profitable opportunity for our manufacturing sector, and a stronger assurance of maintaining our friendly relations are the main benefits we seek from eliminating these restrictions.

The practicability of maintaining our relations on their present unsatisfactory footing in the south must be very doubtful, nor is there much hope that any of the essential advantages above specified may be gained incidentally in the natural progress of time, and still less that the grounds of alarm should of themselves disappear. The causes of all that is bad in our position spring from too deep a source, and may be traced too far back, to admit of any such hope: a rooted conviction in the minds of a whole population, derived from 413 traditional knowledge of the humiliating and derogatory position voluntarily accepted by foreigners, cannot be effaced by a treaty, or even a short successful war which passed over the city that was the offending cause almost harmless. How far it may be possible to convert popular contempt and dislike into respect and fear, we cannot judge from experience: hitherto, in the steps taken to that end, either too much or too little has been attempted.

The practicality of keeping our relationships in the south at their current unsatisfactory level is highly questionable, and there’s little hope that any of the key benefits mentioned earlier will come about naturally over time. Even less likely is the chance that the reasons for concern will simply fade away. The issues with our situation run too deep and can be traced back too far for us to entertain such hopes. A deep-seated belief among the entire population, stemming from traditional knowledge of the humiliating and degrading position willingly accepted by outsiders, cannot be erased by a treaty or even a brief successful war that barely affected the city at the center of the issue. We can’t judge from experience how possible it is to turn popular disdain and dislike into respect and fear; thus far, in the efforts taken to achieve that, either too much or too little has been done.

There are practical difficulties of a peculiar and altogether local character [it is obvious] to any immediate amelioration of our position at Canton which do not exist elsewhere. Setting aside these considerations, it will be found that all that is most valuable and important in the advantages to be desired are of a nature to be granted by the sole exercise of the emperor's will: greater freedom of access, the modification of half-a-dozen items in the tariff, even the exchange of envoys between the two Courts, if this were deemed expedient, are all matters to be decided by a stroke of the vermilion pencil. No hostile populations interpose a practical negative to concessions such as these. The grounds upon which we may claim the revisal of some of the provisions of existing treaties are derived from the well-established conditions of all permanent relations of a friendly and commercial character between sovereign States in the civilised world.

There are specific local challenges that make it hard to improve our situation in Canton, which you won’t find elsewhere. Putting these issues aside, it turns out that the most valuable benefits we seek can be granted solely by the emperor’s decision: greater access, changes to a few items in the tariff, and even the exchange of envoys between the two Courts, if deemed necessary, are all decisions that can be made with a simple stroke of the emperor’s pen. There are no hostile populations blocking these kinds of concessions. The reasons we can ask for a review of certain treaty provisions come from the well-known standards of all lasting relationships that are friendly and commercial between sovereign states in the civilized world.

We may claim of right a modification of the basis of our relations on the injury resulting to our interests from the bad faith or impuissance (it matters little which) of the Chinese Government in giving execution to the treaties in force. We may insist upon prejudicial limits being abolished, since they have plainly failed in their ostensible object to secure freedom from molestation or injury which was the condition of their acceptance.

We can rightfully demand a change in the basis of our relationship due to the harm caused to our interests by the dishonesty or inability (it makes little difference which) of the Chinese Government in enforcing the existing treaties. We can insist that harmful limitations be removed, as they have clearly failed in their stated purpose of ensuring freedom from interference or harm, which was a requirement for their acceptance.

If it be the traditional policy of the Tartar dynasty to keep foreigners at the outer confines of the empire and in a degrading position, it may with better justice be the policy of Great Britain to obtain a direct action upon their centre, and freedom from idle and vexatious restrictions. The right of a nation to interdict intercourse and commerce, and therefore to determine upon what conditions it shall exist, is but an imperfect right, and subject to such modifications as the rights of other nations to the use of innocent objects of utility dictate; 414 and the refusal of a common right is an abuse of the sovereign power, and an injury to be resisted.

If it's the usual practice of the Tartar dynasty to keep foreigners at the edge of the empire and in a humiliating position, then it might be more just for Great Britain to take direct action against their center and free itself from pointless and annoying restrictions. A nation's right to restrict interaction and trade, and thus to decide under what conditions it can occur, is only a limited right and should be adjusted according to the rights of other nations to use harmless objects of utility; 414 and denying a common right is an abuse of sovereign power and a wrong that should be challenged.

China, however disposed its rulers may be to deny the fact, is one of a community of nations with common rights and obligations, and any claim to exemption from the recognised terms of national intercourse is inadmissible in the interest of all other countries. To admit such a right of exemption would be to allow the arrogated superiority in power and civilisation, and to pamper the hostile conceit of her people.

China, no matter how much its leaders may want to deny it, is part of a community of nations with shared rights and responsibilities. Any claim to be exempt from the established norms of international relations is unacceptable for the sake of all other countries. Allowing such a claim would mean giving in to a self-proclaimed superiority in strength and civilization and would encourage the arrogant attitudes of its people.

So long as the sovereign States of Europe will permit so obvious an inference it cannot be matter of surprise, and scarcely subject of reproach, to the Chinese, that they should be so ready to assert and so pertinacious in acting upon it.

As long as the independent nations of Europe continue to allow such a clear inference, it’s not surprising, and hardly something the Chinese should be criticized for, that they are so quick to assert and so determined in acting on it.

But even if exclusion from the territories, from all trade and intercourse, were an absolute right in the first instance, the Chinese have forfeited all claim to its exercise—first, by voluntarily entering into relations political and commercial in ages past with other States and people, by exchange of embassies, by opening their ports and territories and encouraging trade; and secondly, by aggressive wars and invasion of the territory of Europe by the Tartar and Mongolian races who have ruled the country.

But even if being excluded from the territories and all trade and interaction was an absolute right from the start, the Chinese have lost any claim to that right—first, by willingly engaging in political and commercial relationships in the past with other states and peoples, through sending embassies, opening their ports and territories, and promoting trade; and secondly, by initiating wars and invading European territory by the Tartar and Mongolian races that have governed the region.

China preserves her undoubted right of self-preservation as a political society and an empire, but this does not involve the incidental right of interdicting intercourse, because her own history shows that danger does not necessarily follow unlimited access, since as late as the seventeenth century such free communication existed with foreigners; and secondly, because the right of decision must be shared by the interdicted party.

China maintains her undeniable right to self-preservation as a political entity and an empire, but this doesn't include the automatic right to block communication, because her own history indicates that danger doesn't always come from unrestricted access—after all, free communication with foreigners was allowed as recently as the seventeenth century. Additionally, the right to make decisions must be shared with the party being prohibited.

Section II.

Section 2.

It is not enough, however, to determine the abstract principles upon which a policy may be founded—that which is just may not always be most expedient, and if both the one and the other, it may not be practicable.

It’s not enough, though, to figure out the abstract principles on which a policy can be based—what's fair may not always be the most practical, and even if it is both, it might not be doable.

The chief difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to place our relations on an improved basis may be traced to three principal sources:—

The main challenges we face in trying to improve our relationship can be traced back to three key areas:—

  • The Canton popular traditions and hostility.
  • The treaties in force.
  • The contraband trade in opium.

The characteristic features of our position at Canton and their origin are too well known to require illustration. To our political relations before the war, and the humble and in every way derogatory attitude assumed towards the Chinese, is clearly to be traced their present insolence, assumed superiority, and hostility on finding it questioned.

The key aspects of our situation in Canton and how they originated are too familiar to need explanation. Our political relations before the war, along with the submissive and completely disrespectful attitude we took toward the Chinese, clearly explain their current arrogance, false sense of superiority, and hostility when that is challenged.

The principle of narrow boundaries and restricted limits confirmed by the Treaty of Nanking virtually sanctioned the tradition of the past, which no mere verbal assertion of equality thus practically contradicted can modify. The repudiation of this principle and the establishment of a different footing seem to be essential to our political equality, which would form the best foundation of an improved social and commercial position, most especially in the south. Were our chief political relations with the Chinese Government not centred at Canton, it is very evident that that port would lose much of the importance which now attaches to the sayings and doings of its turbulent mob and impracticable authorities. Were the centre of our political action anywhere else, the local difficulties, troublesome as they are, must soon merge into comparative insignificance, and such a measure as this would seem an easier task to accomplish than to change the habits and the prejudices of a whole population.

The principle of narrow boundaries and limited limits established by the Treaty of Nanking effectively maintained the traditions of the past, which no mere claim of equality could change. Rejecting this principle and establishing a new foundation seems essential for our political equality, which would create the best basis for an improved social and commercial position, especially in the south. If our main political relations with the Chinese Government weren't based in Canton, it's clear that that port would lose much of the significance currently attached to the actions and behaviors of its chaotic crowds and impractical leaders. If our political activities were centered elsewhere, the local challenges, as annoying as they are, would soon become relatively minor, making this change seem easier to achieve than altering the habits and prejudices of an entire population.

If we turn from Canton and its unsatisfactory history of oriental insolence and presumption on the one side, and undue submission to their exigencies on the other, and consider the exemption from all such characteristics at Shanghai, the respective influences of the treaties and of local circumstances may be deduced by a comparison of the two chief ports.

If we look away from Canton and its disappointing history of Eastern arrogance and entitlement on one side, and excessive compliance with their demands on the other, and examine the absence of these traits in Shanghai, we can understand the effects of treaties and local circumstances by comparing the two major ports.

The various concurring circumstances terminating in the Tsingpu outrage, which threatened to approximate the position of the British at Shanghai to that occupied at Canton, have been detailed in the correspondence of the period. The position was seriously affected by the comparative immunity of whole villages participating in the murders at Canton in the previous year, by the atrocious features of the crime itself, and by the assumed necessity of the consul's inaction pending a reference to her Majesty's plenipotentiary, occupying several weeks.

The different factors leading up to the Tsingpu incident, which could have brought the British situation in Shanghai closer to what it was in Canton, have been explained in the correspondence from that time. The situation was significantly impacted by the fact that entire villages involved in the murders in Canton the previous year faced little consequence, by the horrific nature of the crime itself, and by the perceived need for the consul to remain inactive while waiting for a response from her Majesty's representative, which took several weeks.

Prompt redress was imperiously demanded by the interests at stake and the sinister aspect of affairs, and to enforce this coercive means were employed, leaving nothing to be desired. 416

Immediate action was urgently needed due to the significant interests involved and the troubling state of things, and to ensure this, forceful measures were taken, leaving nothing to be desired. 416

The most important of the results obtained was the demonstration of a power to shift the centre of action from a port where no progress could be made to a vulnerable point nearer to Peking where immediate attention could be commanded, and this was supplied by the mission to Nanking.

The most important result achieved was the ability to move the center of action from a port where no progress could be made to a vulnerable spot closer to Beijing where immediate attention could be focused, and this was provided by the mission to Nanjing.

From these two circumstances—the serious deterioration of our position, and the prompt and efficacious remedy provided—an important conclusion may be drawn as to our means of effecting any required change in our relations.

From these two factors—the serious decline of our situation and the quick and effective solution offered—an important conclusion can be drawn about how we can make any necessary changes in our relations.

In an empire vast in area as China, with an overflowing population, it is no slight advantage to be enabled, without a single battle, to invest and vigorously blockade the capital; and this it is in our power to effect by a small squadron at the mouth of the Grand Canal in the early spring, when Peking is dependent for its supplies for the year on the arrival of the grain and tribute junks by that channel. A more effective means of coercion this than the destruction of twenty cities on the confines of the Chinese territory or on the coast. With a starving Court and population around him, flight or concession appears to be the emperor's only alternatives.

In a vast empire like China, with a huge population, it’s a significant advantage to be able to surround and effectively blockade the capital without firing a single shot; we can achieve this with a small fleet positioned at the mouth of the Grand Canal in early spring when Peking relies on the arrival of grain and tribute ships through that route for its yearly supplies. This is a more effective way to exert pressure than destroying twenty cities along the borders or coast of China. Faced with a starving court and population, the emperor’s only options seem to be to flee or to concede.

The facility and the certainty with which this object may be attained are important considerations. The insurmountable obstacles to the advance of a European army into the interior are rendered nugatory and altogether unimportant by the knowledge of this highroad to the heart of the empire.

The ease and certainty of achieving this goal are important factors. The major obstacles preventing a European army from advancing into the interior become insignificant and irrelevant with the understanding of this main route to the heart of the empire.

The maintenance of our present relations is probably in no slight degree due to the secret consciousness of their weakness at this point.

The maintenance of our current relationships is likely significantly influenced by the unspoken awareness of their fragility at this point.

In any future policy that may be adopted, therefore, these facts and views are calculated to supersede the necessity for active hostilities, and must tend to avert from a peaceful and industrious population all the worst calamities of war, at the same time that they free her Majesty's Government from the embarrassment of a costly and protracted war in prospectu.

In any future policy that may be adopted, these facts and perspectives are meant to eliminate the need for active conflicts and should help protect a peaceful and hardworking population from the worst disasters of war, while also sparing Her Majesty's Government from the complications of an expensive and prolonged war in prospectu.

A simple and ready resource for commanding attention to any just demands is indeed invaluable in China, and without it there is every reason to believe the Chinese rulers would still be the most impracticable of Orientals. With such a power, no insuperable obstacles exist to the satisfactory solution of difficulties without either costly effort or interruption to the trade of the five ports; and it was the long-matured conviction of our 417 powerful action, by means of a command over the necessary supplies for Peking, that dictated the course followed in the Tsingpu affair.

A straightforward and accessible way to get attention for any reasonable requests is truly invaluable in China, and without it, there's every reason to think that Chinese leaders would still be the most difficult of people in the East. With such power, there aren't any insurmountable challenges to resolving issues satisfactorily without either significant effort or disruption to trade in the five ports; and it was the long-held belief in our 417 strong approach, through control over the essential supplies for Peking, that shaped the actions taken in the Tsingpu situation.

The Chinese view of the opium trade and our agency in it forms perhaps the chief obstacle to our taking that high ground with the rulers, and good position with the people, which the extension of our commercial interests demands. Let us look, then, to this opium traffic and the influence it actually exercises upon our position in China.

The Chinese perspective on the opium trade and our involvement in it is likely the main barrier to us achieving the elevated status with the rulers, and positive standing with the people, that our expanding commercial interests require. Let's examine the opium trade and the impact it truly has on our position in China.

It is no question here whether opium should be classed in the category of medicines, stimuli, or fatal poisons; the Chinese have decided that for themselves, and regard it only as a poison, and the British as the great producers, carriers, and sellers of the drug, to our own great profit and their undoubted impoverishment and ruin. Nor does their conviction end here: they believe to maintain this traffic we made war and dictated a humiliating peace, and that we are prepared to do so again, if they ventured on any interference to its prejudice.

There’s no doubt about whether opium should be seen as medicine, a stimulant, or a deadly poison; the Chinese have made their choice and see it strictly as a poison, while the British, as the main producers, transporters, and sellers of the drug, profit greatly at their expense, leading to their undeniable poverty and destruction. But their belief doesn’t stop there: they think we waged war and imposed a humiliating peace to keep this trade going, and they believe we would do it all over again if they tried to interfere with it.

These opinions may be false or true in their foundation, that is not the question, but, What is the influence they are calculated to exercise? Hostility and distrust can alone be traced to this source. No other feelings flow from it, and the consequences will meet us at every turn of our negotiations, in our daily intercourse, and every changing phase of our relations. As it overshadows with a sinister influence the whole field of our political action, so must it be seriously taken into account and calculated upon as an adverse element in all we attempt in China.

These opinions might be true or false at their core; that's not the point. The real question is, what impact are they likely to have? Only hostility and distrust can be traced back to this source. No other emotions come from it, and the results will confront us at every stage of our discussions, in our everyday interactions, and in every shift in our relationships. Just as it casts a dark shadow over our entire political landscape, we must seriously consider and factor it in as a negative element in everything we try to accomplish in China.

Accepted as un fait accompli, the best means of neutralising and counteracting its bad effects are alone to be considered, since the enormous capital, large revenue, and inseparable connection of our legitimate trade with opium, as a means of laying down funds in China, involved in the traffic, precludes all idea of its cessation or removal.

Accepted as un fait accompli, the best ways to neutralize and counteract its negative effects should be the only focus, since the vast capital, significant revenue, and unavoidable link of our legitimate trade with opium, as a way to invest funds in China, involved in the trade, rules out any thought of its end or elimination.

The effective protection lent to the chief opium-dealers, in their capacity of British merchants, resident at the ports under the provisions of the treaty, and the manifest inability of the Chinese either to bring the legal proof we should require against these principals, or of attacking by force their agents in the glaring infraction of the Chinese laws, at the opium stations, no doubt flings an air of insincerity over all our protestations 418 of non-intervention, while there is mockery in the invitation to assail large fleets of heavily-armed European vessels. Even if the Chinese for a single moment believed in the honesty of our declarations, they know the utter futility of any means of attack they possess against such superior force as the opium fleets present. This is the view taken by the Chinese, who, though they do not confess their own weakness, do not disguise or deny it to themselves.

The effective protection given to the main opium dealers, as British merchants living in the ports under the treaty, combined with the evident inability of the Chinese to provide the necessary legal evidence against these key players or to use force against their agents openly violating Chinese laws at the opium stations, certainly casts doubt on all our claims of non-intervention. There is a sense of mockery in suggesting that they attack large fleets of heavily armed European ships. Even if the Chinese momentarily believed in the sincerity of our statements, they understand the total uselessness of any attempts they might have against the superior force of the opium fleets. This reflects the viewpoint of the Chinese, who, while not openly admitting their weakness, do not hide or deny it to themselves. 418

The obstacles which these opinions create and fling in our path whenever advantages are sought at the hands of the Chinese in furtherance of our national interests are to be overcome before any progress can be made. There are three modes of dealing with them:—

The obstacles that these opinions create and throw in our way whenever we seek advantages from the Chinese to support our national interests must be overcome before we can make any progress. There are three ways to handle them:—

1. By arguments to prove the fallacy of their assumption that we were either the original cause of this traffic, or have now the power to put an end to it, or finally, that it is an unmixed evil.

1. By arguments to show the flaw in their belief that we were either the original cause of this problem, have the ability to stop it now, or that it is solely a bad thing.

2. By a modification in the demands we should, without this consideration, be entitled to insist upon.

2. By changing the demands, we should be entitled to insist on this without any further consideration.

3. By a mixture of kindness and decision, of instruction and intimidation, and, in last resort, by coercion for the attainment of all just and necessary concessions.

3. Through a blend of kindness and determination, teaching and intimidation, and ultimately, through coercion to achieve all fair and necessary concessions.

And as we should naturally begin with the first, and may eventually find ourselves compelled to resort to the last, so no doubt it will be expedient many times to combine all the different methods of overcoming the active or inert resistance we encounter in the Chinese rulers.

And just as we should start with the first, and might eventually find ourselves needing to go to the last, it will often be practical to use a mix of all the different ways to overcome the active or passive resistance we face from the Chinese rulers.

As to any remedy to be applied to the evils of the opium trade, there seems to be none open to either Government but its legalisation, which would strip it of its contraband character, and remove from the emperor the open reproach to his authority, while it might be made to yield a large revenue to his treasury.

As for any solution to the problems created by the opium trade, it seems that the only option available to either government is legalization. This would eliminate its illegal status and remove the public criticism of the emperor's authority, while also potentially generating significant revenue for his treasury.

If on a question of national policy or morality, this measure, as the lesser of two evils, is declined, there seems to be no help for the mischief which must accrue to us from being the chief agents in the traffic. But it is useless to disguise from ourselves the injurious influence it will unfailingly exercise upon our political action, when any rights on our part are weighed, and it is this which may entail the necessity of our flinging the weight of the sword into the opposite scale—sheathed 419 it may be, but not the less significant and compulsory in its effect.

If we reject this measure on a question of national policy or morality, thinking it’s the lesser of two evils, we have no solution for the damage we’ll cause by being the main players in this trade. It’s pointless to kid ourselves about the negative influence this will definitely have on our political actions whenever our rights are considered. This could lead us to the need to put the weight of the sword on the opposite side—sheathed 419 it may be, but it will still be meaningful and unavoidable in its impact.

The opium grief and the Canton hostility thus work together and dovetail into each other to our manifest prejudice, that port continuing to enjoy its old privilege of being the great exponent and centre of both. There we meet in their least veiled form the national adverseness to foreigners concentrated and localised—the conviction of injury and loss at our hands from opium, heightened into asperity and bitterness by the arrogance of their tempers and the consciousness of their weakness.

The pain from the opium trade and the resentment from Canton blend together, clearly showing our bias, as the port continues to hold its longstanding role as the main hub for both. Here, we clearly see the deep-seated hostility towards foreigners, rooted in feelings of harm and loss caused by opium, made even sharper by their frustration and awareness of their own vulnerability.

In no other port does it seem likely the same overt expression and concentration of adverse feelings will ever be experienced. It would appear the more important, therefore, to modify the virulent form they assume at Canton, and remove the bad precedent and example incessantly furnished by the Cantonese.

In no other port does it seem likely that the same open expression and intensity of negative feelings will ever be experienced. It seems more important, therefore, to change the extreme way they manifest in Canton and eliminate the bad example that's constantly set by the Cantonese.

The entrance into the city is obviously a question of principle, not of any direct practical advantage in a commercial sense. The freedom from annoyance, and security to property, are more truly so, and of these two the latter, by far the most essential and important to our interests, seems only to require more storage room for goods, away from a dense Chinese suburb which renders insurance from risk of fire impossible, and entails upon our merchants all the additional danger of fraud in the Chinese warehouse-keepers, who are of necessity the custodians of our goods.

The entrance to the city is clearly a matter of principle, rather than a direct practical benefit in a commercial sense. The freedom from disturbance and the security of property are much more significant, and of these two, the latter is by far the most crucial to our interests. It seems to necessitate more storage space for goods, away from a crowded Chinese neighborhood that makes fire insurance impossible, and exposes our merchants to the extra risk of fraud from the Chinese warehouse keepers, who are inevitably responsible for safeguarding our goods.

We cannot hope that any effort of ours or of the emperor will suffice to change at once the character and habits of a people, or even of the population of a city. But the last war has shown that with us it rests to bring at any time the pretensions of the Chinese rulers down to a nearer level with their military power; and if they cannot from inherent weakness do all that may be desirable, neither are they in a position to refuse any concession, clearly at their option to grant, and such are these which it would seem most important to Great Britain to secure: the nature of our demands and the circumstances under which they shall be preferred are considerations of policy and expediency. But the real question, and by far the most important, it will be obvious, is rather what it may be wise to demand, than what it may be possible to obtain. The danger of collision between the rival civilisations of the East and West 420 has long been foreseen, instinctively felt by the Chinese, and more clearly discerned by Europeans in the result of the late war; and the larger commercial interests growing up under, and in spite of, the present system of restrictions, has only tended, by partially extending the points of contact without placing our relations on a plain basis of reciprocity and equality, to increase the chances. It can only be hoped that the gradual introduction of European arts and ideas and their fructification may in some degree fuse and harmonise the discordant elements before the course of events which otherwise tend to precipitate a violent and disastrous collision are beyond our control. To such a peaceful and beneficial termination of the difficulties which unavoidably beset our relations with China, the efforts of all Western Powers should in the common interest be directed.

We can’t expect that any effort from us or the emperor will quickly change the character and habits of a people, or even the citizens of a city. However, the recent war has shown that it’s up to us to bring the claims of the Chinese leaders down to a level that matches their military strength. If they can’t do everything that’s desirable due to their inherent weaknesses, they also aren’t in a position to refuse any concessions that they can offer at their discretion. These are the things that seem most important for Great Britain to secure: the nature of our demands and the context in which they are made are matters of policy and practicality. But the real question, and by far the most crucial one, is what it would be wise to ask for rather than what might be possible to get. The threat of conflict between the competing civilizations of the East and West has long been anticipated, instinctively felt by the Chinese and more clearly recognized by Europeans following the recent war. The growing commercial interests developing under and despite the current restrictions have only served to create more points of contact without establishing our relationship on a foundation of mutual respect and equality, increasing the likelihood of conflict. We can only hope that the gradual introduction of European arts and ideas and their positive influence will help to merge and harmonize these conflicting elements before circumstances lead to a violent and disastrous clash that we cannot control. All Western powers should work together to ensure a peaceful and constructive resolution to the challenges that inevitably arise in our relations with China.

These considerations must act as the most powerful checks to any initiative measures of a large and comprehensive character for the improvement of our position and the more rapid development of our commerce.

These factors must serve as the strongest limitations on any large and comprehensive efforts to improve our situation and accelerate the growth of our trade.

In this point of view the two greatest obstacles to any advance are the large commercial interests and national revenue at stake, and the danger of being followed by the envoys of other foreign Powers who, having no such great interests to jeopardise, are without this beneficial and most needful check, and may therefore be induced to repeat at a semi-barbarian Court the intrigues and counter-projects for the destruction of our influence and the injury of our trade in the East which are at work in our own times in every capital in Europe, as formerly in India and the Eastern Archipelago.

From this perspective, the two biggest obstacles to any progress are the massive commercial interests and national revenue involved, and the risk of being trailed by representatives of other foreign powers who, without such significant interests at stake, lack this important and necessary restraint. As a result, they might be encouraged to engage in intrigues and schemes at a semi-barbaric court aimed at undermining our influence and harming our trade in the East, similar to what is happening in every European capital today, as it once did in India and the Eastern Archipelago.

Russia, France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, and America, with their several jealousies and united rivalry with England, their missionary enterprises or commercial and political schemes clashing in their aim and development, are all capable of creating such turmoil, strife, and disturbance throughout the empire, if free access to the Court and the provinces were insisted upon by Great Britain, as could only end in the ejection of Europeans from China as formerly from Japan, or an intestine war in which European power would probably be involved on opposite sides, and to their mutual destruction as States with commercial interests in the country. These, again, might lead to attempts at territorial possession, suggested in the first instance, as in India, in self-defence, and afterwards continued 421 from necessity. With Russia spreading her gigantic arms to the north and east, Great Britain on the south and west, Spain, Holland, and Portugal with their colonies in the Chinese and Indian seas, a struggle for superiority on the soil of China for exclusive advantages or predominant influence might be centred in Peking and embroil the whole of Europe in hostile relations. The same objection applies to all efforts to enlarge our intercourse and remove limitations, and has ever prevailed. It was recognised as an objection to the last war. The course of events urged on by the opium trade left but little alternative at the last, or there can be no doubt, with the additional fear of the uncertain result of a struggle with a vast empire like China, the resources of which were so imperfectly known, the British Government would have been deterred from any onward step, as these motives did in effect prevent any hostile aggression, so long as it was possible to avoid it, without the sacrifice of our trade.

Russia, France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, and America, each with their own rivalries and competition against England, along with their missionary efforts or commercial and political ambitions conflicting in their goals and progress, could all generate significant chaos, conflict, and unrest throughout the empire. This would happen if Great Britain insisted on having free access to the Court and the provinces, which could result in either driving Europeans out of China as was done in Japan or causing a civil war where European powers might end up fighting against each other, leading to mutual destruction as they all have commercial interests in the region. These conflicts might also prompt attempts at claiming territory, initially justified as self-defense, like in India, and later carried out out of necessity. With Russia extending its influence to the north and east, Great Britain to the south and west, and Spain, Holland, and Portugal controlling colonies in the Chinese and Indian seas, a struggle for dominance in China over exclusive benefits or significant influence could center around Peking and draw the entire continent of Europe into hostile relations. The same concerns apply to any attempts to expand our interactions and remove restrictions, and have always been a prevailing issue. This was acknowledged as a concern during the last war. The circumstances driven by the opium trade left little choice in the end, and it’s clear that with the added anxiety over the unpredictable nature of a confrontation with a vast empire like China—whose resources were poorly understood—the British Government would have been dissuaded from taking any further actions, as these reasons effectively prevented any aggressive moves as long as avoiding them did not compromise our trade.

The war over, it again prevailed, and we are once more in a position to accept as final the increased but limited advantages resulting, or to try for more, and by our policy to avert or provoke disturbing causes which must lead to change. The moderation which marked, and the policy which dictated, our treaties carried us back to the old ground of a nation trading by sufferance, under limitations and restrictions which kept us at the boundaries of the empire, and with us the rest of the Western world, the only difference being enlarged facilities and better guarantees for the pursuit of trade on the coast-line, and within the restricted limits of the five ports selected. It is now for the British Government to determine whether we should rest content with the revenue derived from an import of some 60 million lb. of tea and the export from India of 40,000 chests of opium, netting together some 7 millions sterling to the British and Indian Government, together with the incidental advantage of the raw produce of silk, promising to render us independent of Europe and the adjoining markets for the supply of this staple of an important branch of our manufactures at a cheaper rate, and the market for Indian cotton, the circumstances which lend to China nearly all its importance; or take measures, not free from danger and difficulty, of great prospective magnitude, both in a political and commercial sense, to make China a great market for our manufactures also. At present the Chinese take considerably 422 less than 2 millions sterling in annual value out of an aggregate production of some 70 millions. In this respect they are of less importance to us as customers than the West India colonies, the Italian States and islands, or one of the larger European States, so small a fraction do they absorb. The prospect that would urge us on should be the hope of seeing China take of our manufactures as large a share as all Europe, and instead of a couple of millions, create a demand for more than twenty. The produce of tea and silk we have, the market for opium and Indian cotton is ours. We want an equally large and beneficial market for our manufactures—our cotton fabrics, woollens, linen, and cutlery, for which our powers of production are all but unlimited.

The war is over, and we find ourselves able to accept the limited but increased benefits that have come from it, or we can push for more and adjust our policies to either avoid or provoke any disruptions that might lead to change. The moderation that defined our treaties brought us back to a situation where we're a nation trading on borrowed time, bound by limitations that keep us on the edges of the empire. The only real difference now is improved facilities and better guarantees for trade along the coastline and within the restricted limits of the five designated ports. It's now up to the British Government to decide if we should be satisfied with the revenue from about 60 million pounds of imported tea and the export of 40,000 chests of opium from India, which together bring in about 7 million pounds for the British and Indian Government. Additionally, we gain the benefit of raw silk, which promises to make us independent from Europe and nearby markets for this crucial material at a lower cost, as well as a market for Indian cotton, which is what gives China much of its significance. Alternatively, they could take measures—though not without risks and challenges—that could greatly expand both our political and commercial reach, turning China into a major market for our manufactured goods. Right now, the Chinese purchase less than 2 million pounds worth of our goods each year out of a total production of about 70 million. In this regard, they are less important to us as buyers than the West Indies, the Italian States and islands, or some of the larger European nations, as they absorb such a small fraction. What should drive us forward is the hope that China will begin to demand our manufactured goods in volumes comparable to what all of Europe takes—creating a market for more than twenty times what they currently buy instead of just a couple million. We already have the tea and silk; we control the opium and Indian cotton market. What we need is an equally large and beneficial market for our manufactured goods—cotton fabrics, woolens, linens, and cutlery—where our production capabilities are nearly unlimited.

Two questions suggest themselves, therefore, on the solution of which the decision should depend, it being assumed as unquestioned that something of risk and danger to that which we have must attend all effective efforts to win that which is as yet wanting.

Two questions come to mind, and the decision should rely on their answers, assuming it's accepted that there is always some risk and danger to what we have in any meaningful attempt to obtain what we still lack.

To the first four great commercial objects involved in our relations with China, as above specified, shall we sacrifice the fifth?

To the first four major commercial interests involved in our relations with China, as mentioned above, should we give up the fifth?

Or shall we peril all for the attainment of the fifth, by the endeavour to create a market for our manufactures which at present exists only in its rudiments, and to a small fractional value?

Or should we risk everything to achieve the fifth by trying to create a market for our products that currently only exists in its early stages and at a very small value?

If the extreme exiguity of the market for manufactures be not held to justify the voluntary incurrence of great risk or danger to our tea, silk, opium, and raw cotton trade, which form the great bulk of our commerce as it exists at the present day, British and Indian, it will only remain to be determined what are the various secondary means at our disposal for the improvement of this fifth or manufacturing branch as the primary object, and their respective chances of success on the one hand and dangers attending their adoption on the other. For the dangers, it must be well understood, are of two kinds—those attending failure, and those which may be consequent upon, and the ulterior results of, success in the first instance.

If the very limited nature of the manufacturing market isn't seen as a reason to take substantial risks with our tea, silk, opium, and raw cotton trade, which constitutes the majority of our current commerce between Britain and India, we’ll need to explore the various secondary options available for improving this manufacturing sector as our main goal, along with their chances of success on one side and the risks involved in pursuing them on the other. It should be clearly understood that these risks fall into two categories—those related to failure, and those that may arise from the eventual outcomes of initial success.

It being borne in mind that whatever we ask and obtain will be claimed and enjoyed by others, it is necessary to consider to what use they are liable to be turned by foreign Powers over whom we can exercise no control, and whose 423 interests or national jealousies may clearly be adverse to our position in China and the advancement of our commerce. To these various heads of a subject in every point of view great and important, and surrounded by doubts and difficulties of the most embarrassing character, the best information that can be brought by any one individual is insufficient for a perfectly satisfactory solution of the questions which must be discussed. All that can be attempted is to throw some additional light upon the general bearing of the whole, and to contribute such data and practical inferences, illustrative of our present position and its future prospects, as may help to suggest a safe conclusion as circumstances develop new phases in our relations and call for action.

Considering that whatever we ask for and receive will ultimately be claimed and enjoyed by others, it's essential to think about how foreign powers, over whom we have no control, may misuse it. Their interests or national rivalries could clearly conflict with our standing in China and the growth of our trade. These various aspects of the issue are significant and complex, surrounded by doubts and challenges that can be quite trying. The best information from any one person is not enough to satisfactorily resolve the questions at hand. All we can do is shine some additional light on the overall situation and provide data and practical insights that reflect our current position and its future prospects, which may help suggest a sound conclusion as circumstances evolve and require action.

Section III.

Section 3.

Assuming the present basis of our relations to continue, the best course to be pursued in actual circumstances, more especially for the maintenance of our advantageous position in the north, is worthy of consideration. The instructions lately received from her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs are of a nature to suggest inquiry under the three heads to which they refer:—

Assuming our current relationship stays the same, we need to think about the best way to handle the situation, particularly to keep our strong position in the north. The recent instructions we got from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs are worth looking into under the three topics they mention:—

1. Recourse to the authorities by British subjects in danger of popular violence.

1. Seeking help from the authorities by British citizens at risk of mob violence.

2. Reference in all cases to her Majesty's plenipotentiary for instructions.

2. Reference in all cases to Her Majesty's representative for instructions.

3. The verification of the punishment awarded to Chinese offenders.

3. The confirmation of the punishment given to Chinese offenders.

In reference to the instructions under the first of these heads, it is to be observed that even with such unusual facilities as some of the older missionaries possess who speak the dialect, and are often familiar with the localities they visit, the resource indicated cannot be counted upon as available.

In regard to the instructions under the first of these headings, it should be noted that even with the unusual advantages some of the older missionaries have, who speak the dialect and are often familiar with the areas they visit, the resource mentioned cannot be relied upon as accessible.

In the Tsingpu affair, as soon as they actually became sensible of danger, it was clearly impossible, nor in one case in a hundred is it probable, that such a resource will be in their power.

In the Tsingpu incident, as soon as they realized they were in danger, it was clearly impossible, and in only one out of a hundred cases is it likely that such a resource would be available to them.

In these cases the authorities keep out of the way, they and all their ragged staff of runners and police; and if otherwise, moved by a fear of worse consequences from the acts of the nearest British authority, the means they take to rescue a maltreated 424 foreigner are miserably ineffective and uncertain in their results. Whoever will read the details of the species of rescue effected in the Tsingpu business will see that it was by the merest chance the three Englishmen had not their brains beaten out, either before the arrival of the disguised runners or while they were waiting an opportunity of stepping in to render the unfortunate sufferers any service.

In these situations, the authorities stay away, along with their ragtag team of runners and police. If they do get involved, it’s often out of fear of worse repercussions from the nearest British authority. The attempts they make to help a mistreated 424 foreigner end up being woefully ineffective and unpredictable. Anyone who reads the details of the rescue attempt during the Tsingpu incident will see that it was pure luck the three Englishmen didn’t have their brains beaten out, either before the disguised runners arrived or while they were waiting for a chance to help the unfortunate victims.

It must be clear, therefore, that access to the authorities in emergencies of this nature must always be difficult and generally impracticable for a foreigner. Retreat to a boat or other place of safety is as little likely to be attainable.

It should be obvious, then, that getting help from the authorities in emergencies like this is usually tough and generally impossible for a foreigner. Finding safety in a boat or another secure location is also unlikely to happen.

A salutary dread of the immediate consequences of violence offered to British subjects, the certainty of its creating greater trouble and danger to the native authorities personally than even the most vigorous efforts to protect the foreigner and seize their assailants will entail, seems to be the best and only protection in this country for Englishmen. When the Chinese authorities of all ranks, from the viceroy at Nanking to the lowest police runners, are thoroughly imbued with this feeling, it will not only rouse them to greater energy but find its way to the populace by certain steps, and render such exertion unnecessary, and the nationality of an Englishman will become his safeguard. Hence the impolicy, not to say impossibility, of treating instances of personal outrage such as that of Tsingpu as police cases, and leaving redress to the ordinary administration of Chinese laws. Where justice exists only nominally, and her image should be represented not only blind but deaf, deplorable consequences would result from such a course. There seems to be a democratic spirit among the Chinese which renders the authorities especially averse to risk collision with the populace or any popular feeling. The Chih-hsien is himself exposed to insult and violence if he attempt to enforce the collection of the taxes in a bad season, and but lately he was besieged here in his own yamên. Not ten days ago the Taotai paid 1600 taels of silver to secure a piece of building-ground at the urgent demand of the French consul, rather than exert his authority to compel the owners to take the fair value of $400 offered, and upon the posts put up to mark the boundaries these parties did not hesitate to prohibit its appropriation. The principal check upon the people, and safeguard for the authorities in cases of popular disturbance, seems to be the conviction 425 under which every Chinese quails, of the terrible vengeance that may pursue them and their families, the tumult once over, if they should have been marked or recognised. In proportion as the magistrate is helpless before numbers, is his power large of wreaking summary and vengeful punishment upon each of the individuals that may form the mob, once separated from each other.

A helpful fear of the immediate consequences of violence offered to British subjects, along with the certainty that it creates more trouble and danger for local authorities than even their strongest efforts to protect foreigners and catch their attackers, seems to be the best and only protection for Englishmen in this country. When Chinese authorities at all levels, from the viceroy in Nanking to the lowest police runners, are fully aware of this, it will not only motivate them to act more decisively but will also influence the general public, making such efforts unnecessary, and an Englishman's nationality will become his shield. Thus, it's unwise, if not impossible, to treat instances of personal attacks like that of Tsingpu merely as police matters and leave the resolution to ordinary Chinese law. When justice only exists in name, and her embodiment is not only blind but also deaf, disastrous results could follow such an approach. There seems to be a democratic sentiment among the Chinese that makes the authorities especially reluctant to risk confronting the public or any popular sentiment. The Chih-hsien himself faces insults and violence if he tries to enforce tax collection during a difficult season, and just recently he was besieged in his own yamên. Not even ten days ago, the Taotai paid 1600 taels of silver to secure a piece of land at the urgent demand of the French consul rather than use his authority to make the owners accept the fair value of $400 offered, and the parties involved did not hesitate to prevent its appropriation with signs marking the boundaries. The main restraint on the people, and protection for the authorities during public disturbances, seems to be the belief that every Chinese person fears the terrible revenge that could follow them and their families, once the chaos settles, if they are recognized. The more helpless the magistrate feels in the face of crowds, the more he has potential to impose hasty and vengeful punishments on the individuals who made up the mob, once they are separated.

Considerations such as these necessarily influence her Majesty's consul on the spot, who each day has under his eyes these significant details, national and administrative. Where danger threatens to involve the persons or the property of British subjects, his sole direct resource is to fall back upon the treaty, and to cover with the ægis of national inviolability individual interests. By any other course he falls inevitably into the hopeless condition of one waiting for such redress as the common course of justice in China usually affords, where everything assuming its form is venal and arbitrary.

Considerations like these inevitably affect her Majesty's consul on the ground, who sees these important national and administrative details every day. When danger threatens the people or property of British citizens, his only immediate option is to rely on the treaty and protect individual interests under the shield of national inviolability. Any other route leaves him stuck in the hopeless situation of waiting for some kind of resolution from the usual legal process in China, where everything is corrupt and arbitrary.

The result of all efforts made to secure the apprehension of thieves or the recovery of property stolen from foreigners is conclusive as to the kind of security to be obtained for British subjects where infractions are dealt with as affairs of police in which justice is to take its ordinary course. In scarcely one instance has any redress been obtained since the port was opened. If thieves are overtaken, it is only that they may disgorge their booty for the benefit of the police sent after them, and the larger the amount the less chance is there of either apprehension or restitution. Witness Mr Hubertson's robbery, where his servant went off with nearly $10,000 in gold and silver, and he was promptly traced and pursued.

The outcome of all the efforts made to catch thieves or recover property stolen from foreigners clearly shows the level of security British citizens can expect when issues are treated as police matters in which justice is served as usual. In almost every case, no compensation has been received since the port opened. If thieves are caught, it’s usually just so they can hand over their stolen goods to the police who are after them, and the larger the amount stolen, the less likely it is for anyone to be caught or the property to be returned. Take Mr. Hubertson’s robbery as an example: his servant stole nearly $10,000 in gold and silver, and he was quickly tracked down and pursued.

Then in reference to the standing orders that, in case of difficulty arising, reference shall invariably be made to her Majesty's plenipotentiary for instructions. Instances have been very numerous showing the nullity of any means of action on the local authorities here through the Imperial Commissioner at Canton, not only in these matters, but in those treated on higher grounds, and affecting our political position. Last year (1847) not only a list of cases where no satisfactory exertion had been made to obtain redress for property stolen was forwarded, but the consul urged upon Sir John Davis, her Majesty's plenipotentiary at the time, the urgent necessity for the removal of the then acting magistrate at Shanghai, who had openly 426 reviled a consulate servant for taking the service of the barbarians, and dismissed him without redress. The only answer to be obtained from his Excellency Kiying was to the effect that the Chih-hsien, as a territorial officer, was not under his jurisdiction. Fortunately he was removed very shortly for misconduct in the management of Chinese affairs,—for however injurious his proceedings to the British, it was obvious neither redress nor assistance was to be obtained from Canton and the Imperial Commissioner.

Then, regarding the standing orders that in case of any difficulties, we should always refer to Her Majesty's plenipotentiary for instructions. There have been many examples showing that local authorities here have no real power to act through the Imperial Commissioner in Canton, not only on these issues but also on those that have broader implications for our political situation. Last year (1847), a list of cases where no satisfactory efforts had been made to get compensation for stolen property was sent, and the consul emphasized to Sir John Davis, the plenipotentiary at the time, the urgent need to remove the acting magistrate in Shanghai, who publicly insulted a consulate employee for engaging with the "barbarians" and dismissed him without any remedy. The only response from His Excellency Kiying was that the Chih-hsien, as a local officer, was not under his authority. Fortunately, he was removed shortly after for misconduct in handling Chinese affairs—because despite the harm his actions caused to the British, it was clear that no justice or help could be expected from Canton or the Imperial Commissioner.

The paramount necessity of protecting its subjects in distant countries is of course well understood by her Majesty's Government, and in an oriental State this can only be effected by letting it be known and felt that whoever attacks one of the solitary subjects will be held to have attacked the sovereign and the nation. By this policy a firman, far more potent than the Grand Seignior's in his own territory, is given to every Englishman abroad, ensuring his freedom from injury all over the world.

The vital need to protect its citizens in far-off countries is clearly recognized by her Majesty's Government, and in an Eastern country, this can only be achieved by making it known and felt that anyone who harms an individual subject will be seen as having attacked the sovereign and the nation. Through this approach, a decree, much more powerful than the Grand Seignior's in his own land, is granted to every Englishman overseas, guaranteeing his safety from harm worldwide.

The treaty viewed in this light becomes a real and efficient bulwark against encroachments, and without such safeguard, with Chinese management, it would at no distant period in all its most important provisions become null and void. No doubt inconvenience results from the necessity of treating casualties of collision between subjects of different countries as infractions of a solemn treaty; but the oriental, and in some respects very peculiar, character of the Chinese, and our relations with them, must be borne in mind, and the lesser of two evils chosen with such discretion and judgment as the circumstances imperatively demand.

The treaty, seen this way, becomes a strong and effective defense against interference, and without this protection, under Chinese management, it would soon become meaningless in all its key aspects. It's true that it's inconvenient to treat incidents involving people from different countries as violations of a formal treaty; however, we must keep in mind the unique characteristics of the Chinese and our relationship with them, and we should choose the lesser of two evils with the careful consideration and wisdom that the situation requires.

At a distant and isolated port like Shanghai, where a brig of war is by no means permanently stationed, the consul is left to his own resources, separated by an interval of many weeks from the assistance of her Majesty's plenipotentiary. When difficulties and emergencies supervene, it is only by prompt demands for redress, and firm resistance to any virtual negation of the rights and privileges guaranteed by treaty, that he can hope successfully to defend the very important interests confided to his charge.

At a remote and isolated port like Shanghai, where a warship isn't stationed permanently, the consul has to rely on his own resources, often waiting many weeks for help from the Queen's representative. When challenges and emergencies arise, he can only hope to successfully protect the crucial interests entrusted to him by urgently demanding redress and firmly resisting any attempts to undermine the rights and privileges guaranteed by treaty.

As regards the practicability and expediency of verifying the punishments of any Chinese offender by the presence of a British officer when a sentence is carried into execution, the 427 instruction received could only have been partially applicable to the Tsingpu offenders had it been earlier received, for the most serious punishment was banishment to a penal settlement in Tartary.

As for the practicality and appropriateness of having a British officer present to verify the punishments of any Chinese offender when a sentence is carried out, the 427 instruction we received would have only been somewhat relevant to the Tsingpu offenders if it had been received earlier, since the harshest punishment was exile to a penal settlement in Tartary.

But the whole subject is one of peculiar difficulty, nor can any hope be entertained of submitting in this place a satisfactory solution. It has long been felt that of all the provisions of the two treaties, that which provided for the due administration of the laws on Chinese offenders was the most nugatory. The chief difficulty consists in a British officer being present at all during a trial in a Chinese court, assuming the right were to be granted by treaty. Where the ordinary mode of questioning is by torture, a process utterly repugnant to our notions of justice and our sense of what is due to humanity and truth, are we by our presence to sanction and be made parties to such proceedings? Or are we to interfere and insist upon justice being administered not according to their usages, but ours? The objection to both courses seems equally valid, and yet without the presence of an efficient officer there is no guarantee whatever for the due administration of justice.

But this whole topic is really complicated, and there’s no chance we can come up with a satisfactory answer here. For a long time, it’s been clear that among all the rules in the two treaties, the one about properly handling legal cases involving Chinese offenders is the least effective. The main issue is whether a British officer can even be present during a trial in a Chinese court, assuming treaty rights allow it. When torture is the usual way of questioning—something completely against our ideas of justice and what we owe to humanity and truth—are we supposed to approve and become part of those actions just by being there? Or should we step in and demand that justice be served according to our standards, not theirs? Both options seem equally problematic, but without a competent officer present, there’s absolutely no guarantee that justice will be properly served.

As regards the presence of an officer at punishments, unless he is in a position to identify the criminal, which must often from the circumstances of the case be impossible, it may be questioned whether our national character is not in danger of being compromised without the real object of such risk being attained. Nothing could more effectually tend to lower us in the opinion of the Chinese than to be imposed upon by the jugglery of a substituted criminal, or the punishment of an innocent man at our instigation, or even the illegal and excessive punishment of a real offender. Yet to all these we are exposed when we take upon ourselves to watch the course of justice and verify the execution of the sentences. It may finally be observed that there are punishments recognised in the Chinese code revolting for their brutality, which an English officer could scarcely sanction with his presence without discredit to our national feeling. A lesser objection exists in the frequency of minor punishments for theft and petty misdemeanours, so that an interpreter would be required for this duty alone.

As for having an officer present during punishments, unless he can identify the criminal—which is often impossible given the circumstances—it’s questionable whether our national character risks being compromised without achieving the intended purpose. There's nothing that could damage our reputation with the Chinese more than being fooled by a fake criminal, punishing an innocent person at our request, or even allowing the illegal and harsh punishment of a real offender. By overseeing the justice process and confirming the execution of sentences, we expose ourselves to all these risks. Lastly, it's worth noting that there are brutal punishments recognized in the Chinese legal code that an English officer could hardly approve of without undermining our national values. A smaller issue is the frequent minor punishments for theft and petty crimes, which would require an interpreter solely for this responsibility.

These are some of the practical difficulties to the effective exercise of any check upon the proceedings of the Chinese 428 authorities in criminal informations against Chinese subjects, and to devise a remedy may require more consideration than has probably yet been given to the subject.

These are some of the practical challenges to effectively overseeing the actions of the Chinese 428 authorities in criminal cases against Chinese individuals, and coming up with a solution may need more thought than has likely been given to the issue so far.

From this review of our actual position at the most favourably situated of the northern ports, and the means by which it has been preserved from deterioration, and in many essential points materially improved, a correct inference may be drawn of the injurious consequences of any retrograde influence from Canton, direct or indirect.

From this review of our actual position at the best-located northern port, along with the ways in which it has been maintained and significantly improved in many key aspects, we can correctly infer the harmful effects of any backward influence from Canton, whether direct or indirect.


APPENDIX II.
CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE FROM CONSUL ALCOCK TO SIR GEORGE BONHAM, JANUARY 13, 1852.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's confidential despatch of the 17th ultimo, and although the departure of the Audax within three days of its receipt leaves me but little time for consideration or inquiry, I have devoted so much time and thought to the subject during the last five years that I venture to reply without delay.

I am honored to confirm that I received your Excellency's confidential message dated the 17th of last month. Even though the Audax is scheduled to leave within three days, giving me very little time to think or ask questions, I have spent so much time and thought on this topic over the last five years that I feel confident responding right away.

On the general scope of coercive measures adapted to ensure success in any negotiations with the Chinese Government, and more especially on the blockade of the Grand Canal as a very cogent means, I have already in my confidential report of January 19, 1849, and subsequently in another of February 13, 1850, submitted the opinion I had formed after long and careful study of our position in China; and further inquiries and experience of the people we have to deal with have only served to confirm the views contained in those reports.

On the overall approach to using forceful measures to ensure success in negotiations with the Chinese Government, particularly the blockade of the Grand Canal as a strong tactic, I have already laid out my opinion in my confidential report from January 19, 1849, and later in another one from February 13, 1850. This opinion was formed after extensive study of our situation in China, and further inquiries and experiences with the people we are dealing with have only reinforced the views expressed in those reports.

I took the responsibility of sending Mr Vice-Consul Robertson with the Espiègle to Nanking in the spring of 1848 with the strong conviction that at that particular season, with the tribute of grain uncollected and a thousand of these grain-junks actually under an embargo at Shanghai, any demonstration of force in the neighbourhood of the Grand Canal would command immediate attention, and the result went far to establish the 429 accuracy of the conclusion. Circumstances since then have, however, altered both in a favourable and an adverse sense. Taokuang, with his humiliating experience of the superiority of our arms and his known and acknowledged desire to avoid any further collision during his reign, is no longer on the throne; and his young successor, untaught by the experience of his father, has given very unequivocal signs of disposition to enter upon a different policy. On the other hand, a protracted and serious insurrection in the southern provinces has drained his treasury, weakened his authority, and now threatens, unless he finds means by force or bribery to put the insurgents down, at no distant period to affect the stability of his throne. If the arrogance of youth in the new sovereign should therefore dispose him on the one side to venture on a crusade against Western Powers, his perilous position in regard to his own provinces cannot fail to impress upon him the prudence of at least temporising until a more convenient season. I am led to think, therefore, from all I can learn, that the two contrary forces will go far to neutralise each other, and that Hsienfêng, with all his hostile feeling, will be at the present moment as accessible to reason, from the peculiarly embarrassing position in which he is placed, if backed by coercive means, as was his predecessor at the conclusion of the war.

I took on the task of sending Mr. Vice-Consul Robertson with the Espiègle to Nanking in the spring of 1848, strongly believing that at that time, with the crop tribute uncollected and many grain-junks held up in Shanghai, any display of force near the Grand Canal would get immediate attention, and the outcome largely confirmed that conclusion. However, circumstances have since changed both positively and negatively. Taokuang, having endured the humiliating experience of our military superiority and his desire to avoid more conflicts during his reign, is no longer in power; and his young successor, who hasn’t learned from his father’s experiences, has shown clear signs of wanting to pursue a different approach. On the flip side, a long and serious rebellion in the southern provinces has drained his treasury, weakened his authority, and now threatens, unless he finds a way through force or bribery to suppress the insurgents, to impact the stability of his throne in the near future. Thus, while the new ruler's youthful arrogance might tempt him to start a campaign against Western Powers, his precarious situation regarding his own territories will likely make him realize the wisdom of at least delaying any aggressive actions until a better time. From everything I gather, I believe that these opposing forces will largely balance each other out, and that Hsienfêng, despite his hostile feelings, will be as open to reason at the present moment, given his particularly tricky situation, if supported by forceful means, as his predecessor was at the end of the war.

From this your Excellency will perceive that I deem the present time, from the political condition of China, more favourable than any later period may be for the success of coercive measures. As regards the season of the year to be selected, both in reference to the navigation of the Yangtze-kiang and the transmission of the grain tribute, the blockading should not be commenced later than April. During the summer the sun melts the snow on the mountains and sends down the freshets, swelling the river until it overflows its banks with great accession of violence to the current. When the fleet sailed up in July 1842 many of the soundings taken were over paddy-fields, and altogether out of the bed of the river, as the soundings and observations of the Espiègle clearly demonstrated. The tribute also begins to be sent up to Peking from some parts as early as April. A fleet of grain-junks were at the mouth of the canal when the Espiègle made her appearance at the end of March in 1848.

From this, Your Excellency will see that I believe the current moment, given the political situation in China, is more favorable than any future time for the success of coercive actions. Regarding the best time of year to start, considering both the navigation of the Yangtze River and the transport of grain tribute, the blockade should not begin later than April. During the summer, the sun melts the snow on the mountains and creates floods, causing the river to swell and overflow its banks with significantly stronger currents. When the fleet sailed upstream in July 1842, many of the depth measurements were taken over rice fields, completely outside the riverbed, as the measurements and observations of the Espiègle clearly showed. The tribute also starts being sent to Beijing from certain areas as early as April. A fleet of grain junks was at the mouth of the canal when the Espiègle appeared at the end of March in 1848.

How far a blockade at the present time would have the desired 430 effect—that is, if made effective before the month of May—is a question upon which I cannot feel any doubt. Much would of course depend upon the suddenness of the descent, and therefore upon the previous secrecy observed; much upon the available nature of the force employed. Besides two or three large-class vessels, I am strongly persuaded there should be at least two small steamers of light draught of water, and one or two brigs, which would be quite as effective against any force the Chinese could bring to bear, and far more manageable and serviceable, as well as less costly, than larger vessels. If the result aimed at were not very promptly attained, it might be necessary to retake Chinkiang-fu as a base of operations, and to detach two or three small-class vessels to watch the entrances of water-courses and canals nearer the mouth of the Yangtze-kiang, of which there are at least four, and through them junks with tribute might otherwise pass to the north and into the Grand Canal at some point above the Yangtze-kiang, and between it and the Yellow river. There is also a very free communication with all the lowland districts south of the Yangtze-kiang and the north above Nanking by means of the Seu ho, which runs from Soochow west into the Yangtze-kiang at Wu Hu and Taiping. But from this point northward there does not appear to be any good water communication leading to the Grand Canal without descending the Yangtze-kiang as far as Iching and Kwachow on the two mouths of the Grand Canal at its junction with the Yangtze-kiang below Nanking. These secured would therefore stop the main traffic by the Seu ho route to the north for the relief of Peking. My own impression is that if no warning were given, nor time allowed for previous preparation, our demands would be granted within one month of the commencement of the blockade. If from any unforeseen cause, however, the negotiations were protracted, and the Chinese Government had leisure to recover from its panic and adopt plans for obtaining tribute and grain by circuitous routes, it would be in that case that Chinkiang-fu might be required, together with a good watch on the various tributaries of the Yangtze-kiang below and eastward of Nanking already referred to; and perhaps on the coast towards the Yellow river and the Peiho two or three cruisers might be required to intercept junks sent by sea with tribute. Such in effect is the intention of the Chinese Government at the present moment, without any reference 431 to us. The grain to be collected from the eight provinces, divided into upper and lower, consists of the common grain and of white rice, the latter for the consumption of the emperor and his Court, which it is intended shall be sent this season by sea from Shanghai,—a circumstance peculiarly favourable to the success of any blockading measures, since, as it would be necessary under any contingencies to cover Shanghai and our large interests there with an effective force, the same means would enable her Majesty's Government to lay an embargo on a large and especially important portion of the tribute already collected in the port. I do not imagine it would be contemplated to abandon Shanghai, and I am far from thinking it would be either necessary or expedient—though at Ningpo, Foochow, and perhaps Amoy, it might be considered well—to withdraw the few foreigners for a time. At Canton, no doubt, it would be imperative either to give adequate protection or to abandon the place. On this point I am scarcely called upon to offer an opinion. It probably does not enter into any plans contemplated to strike a blow at Canton, or to adopt any measure necessarily entailing bloodshed and heavy loss: were it otherwise, no doubt the fall of Canton and the humiliation of the Cantonese would in itself go far to read a salutary lesson throughout the empire, and especially at Peking, where there is reason to believe they look upon Canton and the Cantonese as affording the great barrier to our progress, from our inability to make any impression either upon the city or the people.

How effective a blockade would be right now—especially if it starts before May—is something I'm quite sure about. A lot depends on how quickly we move and how secretive we are beforehand, as well as the type of forces we deploy. In addition to two or three large ships, I strongly believe we should have at least two small, shallow draft steamers and one or two brigs. These would be just as effective against any Chinese forces, much easier to manage, more useful, and cheaper than larger ships. If we don't see results quickly, we might need to retake Chinkiang-fu as a base and send two or three smaller vessels to monitor the entrances to rivers and canals near the mouth of the Yangtze, of which there are at least four. This is crucial because junks carrying tribute could otherwise pass north into the Grand Canal at some point above the Yangtze and between it and the Yellow River. There’s also a strong communication route with the lowland areas south of the Yangtze and north above Nanking via the Seu ho, which flows from Soochow west into the Yangtze at Wu Hu and Taiping. However, from this point north, there doesn’t seem to be a good waterway to the Grand Canal without going down the Yangtze to Iching and Kwachow, where the Grand Canal meets it below Nanking. Securing these points would effectively halt the main traffic along the Seu ho route to the north for the benefit of Beijing. I believe that if there are no warnings and no time for preparation, our demands would be met within a month of starting the blockade. However, if unforeseen circumstances delay negotiations and the Chinese government gets a chance to recover from its panic and devise other ways to secure tribute and grain, we might need Chinkiang-fu. We’d also need to keep a close watch on several tributaries of the Yangtze below and east of Nanking, and potentially deploy a few cruisers along the coast near the Yellow River and Peiho to intercept junks carrying tribute by sea. This is essentially what the Chinese government is planning right now without involving us. The grain collected from the eight provinces, split into upper and lower, includes common grain and white rice—the latter intended for the emperor and his court. They plan to send this by sea from Shanghai this season, which presents a unique opportunity for successful blockade measures. Covering Shanghai and our significant interests there is necessary under any conditions, and this would also allow Her Majesty's Government to impose an embargo on a crucial part of the tribute already collected at that port. I doubt they would consider abandoning Shanghai, and I don't think that would be necessary or wise—though it might be prudent to withdraw the few foreigners temporarily from Ningpo, Foochow, and perhaps Amoy. In Canton, it would definitely be necessary to either provide adequate protection or abandon the place. I don't feel it's necessary to give an opinion on that. It seems unlikely that any plans include a direct attack on Canton or any action that would lead to violence and significant loss: if that were the case, the fall of Canton and the humiliation of its people would serve as a strong lesson throughout the empire, particularly in Beijing, where they likely view Canton and its people as a major obstacle to our progress, given our failure to make any impact there.

I do not, of course, presume to offer these suggestions on the general measures which might be found needful for the protection of British interests along the coast, and the distribution and economising of our forces while a blockade on the Yangtze-kiang was being effected, as better informed than your Excellency on such points, but merely refer to them incidentally as necessary parts of any plan for demanding redress by coercive measures at the mouth of the Grand Canal.

I don’t, of course, mean to imply that I know more than you, Your Excellency, about the general actions needed to protect British interests along the coast and how to effectively distribute and manage our forces while a blockade on the Yangtze River is in place. I just mention these points as necessary elements of any strategy for seeking compensation through force at the mouth of the Grand Canal.

For the better illustration of the points touched upon in this despatch in reference to the different points of access to the Grand Canal, either coastwise or by the Yangtze-kiang below Nanking and the two mouths of the canal, which will have to be borne in mind, I beg to enclose a very rough and hasty plan of the main channels, taken chiefly from the elaborate map of the empire published under the Jesuits, and which Mr Medhurst, 432 when my last confidential report was in hand, was good enough at my suggestion to work at on an enlarged scale, availing himself of all the additional information, by comparison of maps, itineraries, &c., that was accessible.

To better illustrate the points discussed in this message regarding the various access points to the Grand Canal, whether by sea or via the Yangtze River below Nanking and the canal’s two mouths, I’m enclosing a very rough and quick sketch of the main channels. This is primarily based on the detailed map of the empire published by the Jesuits, which Mr. Medhurst, 432 at my request, worked on at a larger scale while my last confidential report was being prepared, using all the extra information he could gather from comparing maps, itineraries, etc.

I shall be glad if in this somewhat hasty reply to your Excellency's despatch I have been able to afford such information as you have desired; but if not, or upon any other points it should appear that further inquiries can be prosecuted advantageously and without creating suspicion, I shall be happy to give my best efforts to carry out your Excellency's instructions.

I will be pleased if this quick response to your Excellency's message has provided the information you wanted; however, if it hasn’t, or if there are other matters where further inquiries could be beneficial and discreet, I will gladly do my best to fulfill your Excellency's instructions.


APPENDIX III.
CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO SIR GEORGE BONHAM, DATED JUNE 17, 1852. (EXTRACT.)

If I might without presumption express an opinion on our general policy in China, I should add that it seems in danger of being paralysed by the two antagonistic forces [alluded to in the preamble], and by necessities difficult to reconcile. The magnitude and extreme importance of our interests in the East—in commerce and revenue (for, as I have shown, the China trade is the connecting-link between Great Britain and India, and necessary to complete the circle of trading operations)—suggest on the one hand the necessity of avoiding all measures that may rashly jeopardise such interests, yet nevertheless make it imperative on the other to adopt firmly and unhesitatingly whatever steps may be necessary to prevent loss or deterioration. How these can best be reconciled is the problem to be solved. As late as the last war, throughout all our previous intercourse the attempt had been made to arrive at the solution by a system of temporising and concession, even to that which was unjust and injurious, and this steadily carried out, with a few rare and brief exceptions. Our policy since the treaty has manifested a tendency to an opposite course, encouraged no doubt by the result of the first determined stand made. It has, 433 nevertheless, been so hesitatingly developed that we appear to halt between the two. In words we have asserted resistance to insult or wrongful treatment, but in acts we have not seldom temporised and submitted. The fruit of this policy we now are beginning to reap. Principles of action have sometimes been asserted and then abandoned, instead of being persisted in until the end was accomplished. In dealing with the Chinese, however, nothing appears to be so necessary as to keep the ground once assumed. If this be true, there cannot be too much caution used in first asserting or contending for a right; but that step once taken, there is no safe halting-place between it and full success. A course of alternate opposition and submission cannot do otherwise than end in defeat; and defeat in this country is never limited to its immediate consequences. It has appeared, on looking back through the ten years which have now elapsed since the termination of the war, that the first half of the period was passed in comparative security under the strong influence its events were calculated to exercise on the Chinese mind; but, true to their invariable policy, they have never ceased to seek by every means in their power to make the British authorities develop under what instructions they were acting and to penetrate into their true spirit, in order to ascertain the limits to which our sufferance would extend and the nature of the powers of resistance or retaliation her Majesty's Government were ready to authorise. I think it cannot be matter of doubt to any one resident in China throughout this period, that during the latter portion the Chinese have felt assured of the essentially pacific determination of our Government and the policy of endurance and sufferance in all cases of minor wrongs. And, assured under such a system (with the known impossibility of any direct action in Peking), they have, during the last two years more especially, felt emboldened, systematically, by a series of apparently small encroachments and aggressions, to undermine our position, and to restore, as nearly as may be, the state of things existing before the war, extending the system to all the ports.

If I may, without being presumptuous, share my thoughts on our overall strategy in China, I believe it risks being paralyzed by the two opposing forces mentioned earlier, as well as by conflicting necessities. The scale and critical importance of our interests in the East—in trade and revenue (since, as I've pointed out, the China trade connects Great Britain and India and is essential for completing our trading operations)—suggest on one hand that we must avoid any actions that could jeopardize these interests recklessly. However, on the other hand, it’s imperative that we firmly and decisively take whatever steps are necessary to prevent loss or deterioration. Finding a way to balance these is the challenge we need to address. Even during the last war, throughout all our previous interactions, we tried to find a solution through a mix of waiting and concessions, even to things that were unfair and harmful, and this was consistently applied, with few brief exceptions. Since the treaty, our approach seems to have shifted to the opposite, no doubt influenced by the outcome of the first firm stance we took. Yet, it has developed so hesitantly that we seem to be stuck between two positions. In words, we have asserted our right to resist insults or wrongful treatment, but in actions, we have often hesitated and submitted. We are now starting to see the consequences of this policy. Principles have sometimes been stated and then abandoned, rather than being upheld until the goal was achieved. When dealing with the Chinese, however, it seems crucial to maintain a consistent stance. If this is correct, then we must be very careful when first asserting or claiming a right; but once that step is taken, there is no safe halfway point between claiming it and achieving full success. A pattern of alternating defiance and submission is bound to lead to defeat, and defeat in this context has consequences that extend far beyond the immediate situation. Looking back over the ten years since the end of the war, it appears that during the first half of that time, we were relatively secure, influenced by the strong impact of the war's events on the Chinese mindset. True to their consistent strategy, the Chinese have never stopped trying to figure out the instructions guiding the British authorities and to understand their true intentions in order to determine how far our tolerance would go and what powers of resistance or retaliation Her Majesty's Government was prepared to authorize. It seems clear to anyone in China during this time that, in the latter part of the period, the Chinese have been confident in our Government's fundamentally peaceful intentions and its policy of endurance in response to minor wrongs. Given this assurance (along with the well-known impossibility of any direct actions in Peking), over the last two years especially, they have felt encouraged, systematically making apparently minor encroachments and aggressions to undermine our position and restore the situation to what it was before the war, extending this approach to all the ports.

With this conviction I have thought it desirable to bring before her Majesty's plenipotentiary in detail many illustrations of the deteriorating influences at work at this port, and now venture to pass these rapidly in review, that their collective evidence may not be wanting. And in order that I may be 434 brief, I shall merely note in the margin the number and dates of various despatches bearing upon similar matters, without further reference to their contents. By these I think it will be seen that the general current and tendency of all the official acts for the last two years upon which I have frequently commented as they occurred has been distrust, and strongly adverse alike to our trade and the stability of our position.

With this belief, I thought it was important to present to Her Majesty's representative several examples of the negative impacts happening at this port. I will now quickly go through these examples so that their overall evidence is clear. To keep it concise, I will just note in the margins the number and dates of various reports related to similar issues, without going into their details. I believe it will be evident that the overall trend in all the official actions over the last two years, which I have often commented on as they happened, has been one of distrust, which is seriously detrimental to our trade and the stability of our position.

Evidence, I think, will be found in these records to establish the fact that the present Taotai Wu (or Samqua, as he is more familiarly known, of Canton trading memory) has been especially selected as the chief agent to initiate, and the fit instrument for carrying out, a retrograde policy: his character, means, and the general direction of his efforts to damage our local position, territorial and social—to cripple and restrict our trade, and to Cantonise the whole of our relations both with people and authorities in the north—are all in keeping with this mission, and incomprehensible on any other supposition.

Evidence, I believe, will be found in these records to establish that the current Taotai Wu (also known as Samqua, familiar to those who recall trading in Canton) has been specifically chosen as the main agent to initiate and effectively implement a backward policy. His character, resources, and the overall direction of his efforts to undermine our local standing—both territorial and social—aim to cripple and limit our trade and to align all our relations, with both people and authorities in the north, with Cantonese interests. This is all consistent with this mission and makes no sense under any other assumption.

The steps of his progress have been carefully watched, and in the despatches noted in the margin traced, together with their effects—neither very apparent on the surface. These may perhaps best be considered by aid of a somewhat arbitrary division as to subjects rather than chronologically, for they have generally run on conterminous and parallel lines. Starting from the Tsingpu affair, in the spring of 1848, and his baffled efforts to pluck from us the best fruit of the risks incurred to vindicate an important principle, from which date he hung about the place—in the background it is true, but not the less busy as a spy from Nanking, between which place and Shanghai, occasionally acting Taotai, at others absent, he oscillated until the fit time appeared to have arrived. After the accession of the new emperor, Lin was displaced from the Taotai office, and he was finally installed by "imperial appointment" to put his hand to the work before him. His steps may be traced in the sinister influences and obstruction brought to bear upon all our interests.

The steps of his progress have been closely monitored, and the dispatches noted in the margin outline them, along with their effects—neither of which are very obvious on the surface. These may be better analyzed by categorizing them into subjects rather than by chronology, since they have generally run along interconnected and parallel paths. Starting with the Tsingpu incident in the spring of 1848 and his frustrated attempts to extract from us the best return for the risks taken to uphold an important principle, from that point he lingered around the area—in the background, it's true, but still active as a spy from Nanking, moving between there and Shanghai, sometimes acting as Taotai and other times being absent, until the right moment came. After the new emperor took the throne, Lin was removed from the Taotai position, and he was ultimately appointed by the "imperial appointment" to tackle the work ahead of him. His actions can be traced through the harmful influences and obstacles imposed on all our interests.

The land tenure and regulations under which a foreign colony had rapidly risen covering more than a hundred acres of land, as an element of strength and independence to the British more especially, seems to have excited both the jealousy and the fears of the Chinese authorities. There seemed no limit to its progress and development; each year saw more and more land 435 occupied, while houses of a large and costly description rapidly filled up the vacant spaces.

The land tenure and regulations that allowed a foreign colony to quickly expand over more than a hundred acres of land, adding to the strength and independence of the British in particular, seems to have triggered both jealousy and fear among the Chinese authorities. There appeared to be no end to its growth and expansion; each year, more land was taken up, while large and expensive houses quickly filled the empty areas. 435

Before Wu came ostensibly upon the scene some progress had been made in the creation of difficulties, and the authorities having in the spring of 1849 granted a large and absurdly disproportionate tract to the French, over which the French consul claimed a territorial jurisdiction, the national susceptibilities of the Americans gave the opportunity of bringing French and Americans, and the latter and the English, into collision, and they were not slow to profit by it to set the land regulations practically aside while officially appearing to uphold them.

Before Wu appeared on the scene, some progress had been made in creating problems, and the authorities, in the spring of 1849, granted a large and ridiculously oversized area to the French, over which the French consul claimed territorial control. This situation stirred the national sensitivities of the Americans, creating an opportunity for conflicts between the French and Americans, as well as between the Americans and the English. They quickly took advantage of this situation to effectively ignore the land regulations while still maintaining the appearance of upholding them.

The desire of the community to carry out an extravagant and not very practicable scheme for a new park or exercise-course that should enclose nearly the whole arable ground and villages within our limits afforded the next opportunity, and the arrogant humour and superstitions of the Fukein clans supplied the ready instruments for inflicting a second blow upon the rights and security of the foreigner at Shanghai connected with the occupation of land.

The community's wish to pursue an ambitious and not very feasible plan for a new park or recreational area that would cover almost all the farmland and villages within our borders provided the next opportunity. The arrogant attitudes and superstitions of the Fukein clans offered the perfect tools for striking another blow against the rights and safety of foreigners in Shanghai related to land occupation.

These attacks and aggressions have since been perseveringly followed up—popular commotions, abusive and menacing placards, having all been used in turns to the damage of our position, and the result has been discredit, broken regulations, divided and antagonistic pretensions between the two most numerous classes of foreign residents—the British and American—and between all foreigners and the Fukein clans, the most turbulent and aggressive of the native population at the port,—a result of which, looking to all the present embarrassment and future danger to our interests it is calculated to produce, I am bound to say I think Samqua may well be proud. The national vanity of the French leading them to an absurd and useless acquisition, the love of exercise of the British leading the equestrians to press an ill-advised and impracticable scheme for a three-mile racecourse, and the national susceptibilities of the Americans leading them to dispute the land tenure which hitherto had been the condition of their own security,—all have been adroitly turned to the greatest advantage, to the profit of the Chinese and the serious detriment of the foreigner.

These ongoing attacks and aggressions have been persistently pursued—public disturbances, threatening and abusive signs have all been used in turn to undermine our position. The result has been a loss of credibility, disrupted regulations, and conflicting claims between the two largest groups of foreign residents—the British and American—and all foreigners and the Fukein clans, who are the most unruly and aggressive among the local population at the port. Considering all the current complications and potential risks to our interests this situation may create, I must say I think Samqua has every reason to feel proud. The national pride of the French has led them to seek an absurd and pointless acquisition, the British love for competition has prompted them to push for a poorly thought-out and impractical three-mile racetrack, and the national sensitivities of the Americans have caused them to challenge the land rights that have previously ensured their own safety—all of which have been cleverly exploited to the greatest advantage of the Chinese and to the serious detriment of the foreigners.

The progress made in creating obstacles to our commerce has been not less worthy of remark. For a system of total laxity in the custom-house administration under Lin a capricious 436 alternation of vigilance and neglect, under which oppressive acts of partiality and injustice are frequently perpetrated, has been substituted, to the great derangement of operations in trade. The carrying trade has been harassed and impeded, and the Taotai is now actively engaged in efforts to get the cargo-boats under his exclusive control, and to organise a cohong of five firms on the model of the ancient establishments at Canton, while already—I believe at his suggestion (indeed he scarcely denies it)—information has reached me that a new transit duty of seven mace per picul has been levied at Chung-An on the produce proceeding thence from the Black Tea districts to Shanghai. A duty of over 7 per cent, in violation of one of the most important of our treaty stipulations, with a monopoly of cargo-boats, a right to levy new transit duties, and a cohong—the three leading advantages secured by the treaty vanish. It is vain to disguise the fact, for nothing can be clearer or more certain. On these points I have been collecting detailed information, and shall shortly be enabled to write more fully on the subject. I beg your Excellency in the meantime to rest assured that the main facts have already been placed beyond doubt. In connection with these, freedom of access to different points in the interior and with Ningpo by the inland route as advantages long enjoyed have also attracted attention, and some more feeble efforts have been made to throw obstacles in the way.

The progress made in creating barriers to our commerce has been noteworthy. A system of complete leniency in the customs administration under Lin has been replaced by an erratic mix of scrutiny and neglect, where unfair acts of favoritism and injustice happen regularly, causing significant disruption to trade activities. The shipping industry has faced harassment and delays, and the Taotai is now actively working to take control of the cargo boats and set up a cohong of five firms based on the old structures at Canton. Additionally, I've received information—apparently at his suggestion, which he hardly denies—that a new transit fee of seven mace per picul has been imposed at Chung-An on goods coming from the Black Tea regions to Shanghai. This duty, exceeding 7 percent, violates one of the key provisions of our treaty, and with a monopoly over cargo boats and the authority to impose new transit fees, the three main benefits secured by the treaty disappear. It's pointless to deny this fact; nothing could be clearer. I've been gathering detailed information on these matters and will soon be able to provide a more thorough explanation. In the meantime, I assure your Excellency that the main facts are already indisputable. Additionally, the long-enjoyed advantages of free access to various places in the interior and to Ningpo via the inland route have drawn attention, and some weaker attempts have been made to create obstacles in this regard.

In the administration of justice perhaps more than in any other directions adverse influences have been brought to bear with complete effect. Redress for any injury inflicted on a foreigner, protection from frauds, or recovery of debts, are all wholly unattainable. The action of the Chinese tribunals in our behalf is null and void, and the course taken by the authorities in all cases referred to there amounts to a total denial of justice. The act of the Taotai in seizing and flogging Mr ——'s boatmen was only wanting to withdraw from the foreigners all protection dependent upon the Chinese laws and their administration under our treaties.

In the administration of justice, more than in any other area, negative influences have had a powerful impact. Getting compensation for any harm done to a foreigner, protection from fraud, or recovering debts is completely impossible. The actions of Chinese courts on our behalf are ineffective, and the decisions made by the authorities in all cases referred there result in a complete denial of justice. The Taotai’s decision to seize and punish Mr ——'s boatmen was simply a way to take away all protections that foreigners had under Chinese laws and the agreements we made.

Under these three heads, therefore, I would sum up the progressive and evident deterioration in our position here. The tenure of land, the operations of trade, the administration of justice, have all been objects of attack, and with serious prejudice. That, however, which is at present evident as the 437 effect of the steps taken, forms but a small part of the injury which will in a very short period be too manifest to be overlooked if no determined steps are taken to reverse the policy now pursued. The time, I am firmly persuaded, has arrived for meeting by energetic action these insidious attacks—as the least dangerous course—if our most important interests here are really to be defended with any effect.

Under these three points, I would sum up the clear and ongoing decline in our situation here. The way land is held, the way trade operates, and the way justice is administered have all come under attack, and with serious consequences. What is currently obvious as the effect of the actions taken is just a small part of the harm that will soon be too clear to ignore if no decisive measures are taken to change the current policy. I am strongly convinced that the time has come to counter these subtle attacks with strong action—this is the least dangerous approach—if we really want to defend our most important interests here effectively.

How this may best be done I feel your Excellency is entitled to demand from the officer who seeks so earnestly to impress you with a conviction that action is necessary, and I have no wish to shrink from the responsibility of suggesting measures by which I conceive some positive good may be effected, to repair the mischief, and much impending evil at all events averted.

How this can be best achieved, I believe you have the right to ask the officer who is so eager to convince you that action is needed. I don’t want to shy away from the responsibility of proposing ways that I think can bring about some positive change, fix the damage, and, at the very least, prevent serious harm.

In reference to the land, also, it would seem very desirable that some understanding should be come to with the United States chargé d'affaires by which any participation in the advantages of the British location, consistent with the security of all, should be freely conceded, while anything incompatible with this condition must be as certainly resisted, in their interest not less than ours. If Dr Parker prove impracticable I see no resource but a reference home, when I trust all the real importance of the questions at issue to the interests of British trade and the British position at this port will be steadily kept in view; nor should it be forgotten that in its maintenance all foreign States are deeply interested, whatever the Americans for the moment may think. Any injury to our position must recoil with double force upon so weak and small a minority as they are when left to stand alone.

Concerning the land, it seems very important to reach an agreement with the United States chargé d'affaires that allows for shared benefits from the British location, as long as everyone’s security is maintained. However, anything that contradicts this condition must be firmly opposed, in their interest as much as ours. If Dr. Parker turns out to be uncooperative, I see no option but to refer the matter back home, where I hope the true significance of the issues at stake regarding British trade and our status at this port will be given serious consideration; we should also remember that the maintenance of this position is of great interest to all foreign nations, no matter what the Americans might think at the moment. Any damage to our standing will impact them even more, as they are a weak and small minority when left to fend for themselves.

As regards the measures now in progress for organising a cohong, levying new transit duties, and creating a monopoly of cargo-boats, all tending in the most serious degree to fetter our trade, in indirect violation of the express stipulations of our treaty, I confess there seems to be but one course consistent with the credit of our Government or the defence of our interests, and that is resolutely and firmly to resist them as infractions of treaty. Two modes of doing this, however, suggest themselves. The one is by active proceedings—prohibiting the payment of any maritime duties by British subjects until satisfaction is obtained, and a distinct intimation that if this does not suffice other and more determined measures should 438 follow. The other involves a system of negation that would be peculiarly embarrassing to the Chinese local authorities, and eventually to the Government at Peking. This may be carried out by simply holding the treaty to be in abeyance by their own acts, and declining to take any steps with British subjects to enforce the conditions—whether as regarded customs, access to the interior, the purchase of land, or the administration of justice—so long as the measures objected to were persisted in.

Regarding the current efforts to organize a cohong, impose new transit duties, and create a monopoly on cargo boats, all of which seriously restrict our trade and indirectly violate our treaty terms, I believe there’s only one course that aligns with the integrity of our Government and the protection of our interests: we must firmly and resolutely resist these actions as treaty violations. Two approaches come to mind. The first is to take direct action—prohibiting British subjects from paying any maritime duties until we receive satisfaction, with a clear message that if this does not work, other and more determined measures should 438 follow. The second approach involves a strategy of negation that would put considerable pressure on the local Chinese authorities and, eventually, the Government in Peking. This could be achieved by asserting that the treaty is in abeyance due to their actions and refusing to engage with British subjects to enforce the treaty conditions—whether concerning customs, access to the interior, land purchases, or the administration of justice—until the disputed measures are abandoned.

In reference to these two courses, I will not hesitate to say that, if left to my discretion, I should adopt the first; but the condition of ultimate success would be the certainty that, if the object was not attained by such means, her Majesty's Government would feel pledged to send a squadron to the mouth of the Grand Canal next spring with an imperative demand for the Taotai's disgrace and the reversal of all this obnoxious policy, and authority to resort to coercive measures if not listened to.

In regard to these two options, I can confidently say that, if I had the choice, I would go with the first. However, for it to be successful, it’s essential that if the goal isn’t achieved through that approach, the government would be committed to sending a fleet to the entrance of the Grand Canal next spring, demanding the Taotai's removal and the reversal of all these unpopular policies, with the power to take forceful action if necessary.

If, however, it should be deemed preferable to incur the risk of doing nothing—or what, I confess, appears to me even more dangerous, to make protests, or demonstrations which there is no serious intention of following up to their legitimate conclusion—the negative policy is of course the only one to be attempted. The responsibility of the initiative would then be thrown upon the Chinese themselves. The tables would be turned, and the Chinese will be left to right themselves as they best could, while a large revenue will slip through their hands and manifold complications and embarrassments in their relations with foreigners arise to their confusion. The task, in fine, they now assign to us would devolve upon them, and their sole remedy, if they did not choose to give way, would be to stop the trade; but as that would be a plain and ostensible casus belli, they will not attempt it.

If it’s considered better to take the risk of doing nothing—or what seems even more dangerous to me, making protests or demonstrations without any real intention of following through to a proper conclusion—then the negative approach is clearly the only one to take. The responsibility for taking action would fall on the Chinese themselves. The situation would change, and the Chinese would have to sort things out as best they could, while a significant amount of revenue would slip away from them, leading to many complications and difficulties in their dealings with foreigners. Essentially, the task they want us to handle would fall to them, and their only option, if they don’t want to give in, would be to halt trade; but that would be a clear and obvious reason for conflict, so they won’t try it.

If, on the other side, nothing effective be done, I must frankly state my conviction that our position in the north will rapidly deteriorate, and our relations be embroiled, if not irreparably injured. I believe means for the amelioration of both may be safely taken, and have long been required; but I feel still more strongly convinced that at no distant period they must be taken, and the longer they are delayed the greater will be the ultimate cost, and the more imminent the hazard to our future trade and relations with China. 439

If, on the other hand, nothing effective is done, I must honestly say that I believe our position in the north will quickly worsen, and our relationships could become complicated, if not permanently damaged. I think that solutions for improving both areas can and should be implemented, and they have been needed for a long time; however, I feel even more strongly that they *must* be taken soon, and the longer we wait, the greater the overall cost will be, and the more likely we will face risks to our future trade and relationships with China. 439

If I am correct in these inferences, the conclusion of the whole must be that the time has arrived when it will be no longer safe to defer strong and effective measures in defence of our interests, and that there is a clear necessity for present action to avert at no distant period a costly war and a shock to this empire it is so ill capable of sustaining, that it must of necessity be attended with great peril not only to the present dynasty but to the existing social organisation of the country.

If I'm right in these conclusions, we’ve reached a point where it’s no longer safe to postpone strong and effective actions to protect our interests. There’s a clear need for immediate action to avoid a costly war in the near future and a blow to this empire that it can barely handle, which would bring significant danger not just to the current ruling dynasty but also to the existing social structure of the country.


APPENDIX IV.
REPORT ON THE SALT TRADE ATTACHED TO MR. PARKES' SUMMARY OF THE LOCAL MARITIME TRADE IN FOOCHOW, 1846. (SELECTED EXCERPTS.)

They have constituted the sale of salt a monopoly, which they place in the hands of a set of merchants whom they hold liable for the payment of a fixed amount of tax. This, in some instances, falls rather heavy upon them, but proves an easy measure to the authorities, who have thus but little trouble or expense of collection. All the supplies of salt are drawn from the sea-shore, and consequently there is an appointment of salt inspector in every maritime province, who superintends everything connected with the gabelle: he holds a high rank and receives good emoluments from the Government, 3000 taels per annum. It also forms one of the duties of the governor-general of the province to act as chief superintendent of salt excise.

They have created a salt monopoly, which they give to a group of merchants who are responsible for paying a fixed tax amount. This can be quite burdensome for them at times, but it's a straightforward process for the authorities, allowing for easy collection with minimal trouble or cost. All the salt comes from the seaside, so there’s an inspector in every coastal province overseeing everything related to the gabelle: he holds a high position and receives a good salary from the government, earning 3000 taels a year. It's also one of the responsibilities of the governor-general of the province to serve as the chief supervisor of salt excise.

Most of the supplies from Fukien have to be sent into the interior and the adjacent province of Kiangsi viâ Foochow. The salt is made all along the shore to the southward....

Most of the supplies from Fukien have to be sent into the interior and the nearby province of Kiangsi via Foochow. The salt is produced all along the southern coastline....

The salt is made at these places by people belonging to the various localities, and the manufacture gives employment to numbers of individuals, who in those sterile districts have few other means of subsistence. The general method of manufacture 440 is to collect the saturated loam from the beach in heaps, and thence to draw off the brine by drainage into large but shallow-built vats, when crystallisation is effected by exposure to the natural heat of the sun. The brine being all extracted from the heap, it is removed to the beach, and the same earth, having been immersed in the salt-tide, can again be used. In fine weather great quantities can thus be expeditiously manufactured, but a succession of rain stops the works, and a scarcity in the supplies is the consequence. The producers are exempted from all taxes or charges on the part of the Government, on the consideration that they are in mean labouring circumstances, though many of the salt-farms are very extensive, and some of their conductors possessed of better competence than the merchants, on whom the whole burden of taxation falls. Junks are despatched to these places by the salt merchants for freights.

The salt is produced in these areas by local people, and this manufacturing provides jobs for many individuals who have few other options for making a living in those barren regions. The general process of making salt 440 involves collecting the saturated soil from the beach into piles, then draining the brine into large, shallow vats where it crystallizes under the sun's heat. Once all the brine has been extracted, the remaining soil is taken back to the beach, and after being soaked in the saltwater, it can be used again. In good weather, a large amount can be produced quickly, but continuous rain halts production, leading to shortages. The salt producers are exempt from all taxes and fees from the government, given their low-income circumstances, even though many salt farms are quite large, and some operators are better off than the merchants who bear the full tax burden. Salt merchants send boats to these locations for shipping.

The Government system of exacting a fixed annual amount of gabelle is very defective, and places the trade, which might prosper under other management, on an unhealthy basis. When the trade is dull, it becomes still more depressed by the nature of the liabilities that the merchants have at all times equally to bear, and which then become burdensome; and again, on the other hand, in case of a thriving season, the revenue is in no way advantaged. Their wretched executive, however, prevents any improvement. They therefore content themselves with fixing a stated sum, upwards of 300,000 taels per annum; and if they can secure the requisite number of persons to undertake to dispose of a certain quantity of salt that will yield excise to this amount, they are content. Thus each merchant is bound to conduct the sale of the quantity that he undertakes, or rather is held responsible for the amount of duty due on such quantity, and having once paid this up, should he be so disposed, he is at perfect liberty to transport and sell more salt on his own account, duty free; whilst, on the other hand, should he, from a glut in the market or other circumstances, not be able to dispose of the quantity of which he had undertaken the sale, he has still to pay duty on the whole at a fixed unalterable rate.

The government’s system of collecting a set annual tax called gabelle is very flawed and puts the trade, which could thrive under better management, in a precarious situation. When business slows down, it becomes even worse because merchants are always burdened by these ongoing costs, which then become overwhelming. Conversely, during a successful season, there is no benefit to the revenue. Their ineffective management, however, blocks any improvement. They settle for setting a fixed amount over 300,000 taels each year; if they can find enough people to agree to sell a specific amount of salt that will generate this tax revenue, they're satisfied. As a result, each merchant is obligated to sell the amount they agreed to, or they are held accountable for the tax on that amount, and once they pay it off, they can freely transport and sell more salt on their own, without additional taxes. However, if they can't sell the amount they committed to due to an oversupply or other factors, they still have to pay taxes on the entire quantity at an unchanging rate.

It is therefore the imminent risk attending salt speculations that causes people of property to be so averse towards entering them. They involve a great outlay of capital, with continual 441 liability but uncertain remuneration. Thus, if a man embarks the whole or greater part of his means in speculations which do not succeed, he becomes instantly embarrassed with the Government, and, with no incomings to relieve him, may perhaps not succeed in recovering his first failure. Most of the merchants being men who are selected merely on account of their capital, the management of their business is entirely in the hands of those they employ, for whose honesty or capacity they are mainly dependent for success. The charges and expenses connected with carrying on a salt business are very great. Yet there are several instances of old merchants employing good managing men, and possessing plenty of supporting capital, having amassed large fortunes in the trade, though, on the contrary, cases are much more numerous of speculators having suffered losses and contracted debts with the Government. A debt to the State of no less than 1,450,000 taels by the salt dealers of Foochow has thus gradually collected.

The imminent risk associated with salt speculations is what makes wealthy individuals so reluctant to get involved. These ventures require significant investment, with ongoing liability but uncertain returns. So, if someone puts most or all of their money into unsuccessful speculations, they can quickly face financial troubles with the government and, without any income to help them, might not be able to recover from their initial loss. Most merchants are chosen mainly for their capital, leaving the management of their businesses entirely in the hands of their employees, relying on their honesty and skill for success. The costs and expenses of running a salt business are quite high. However, there are several instances of seasoned merchants who employ capable managers and have ample capital amassing considerable wealth in the trade, while many more speculators have faced losses and debts to the government. A debt of no less than 1,450,000 taels has gradually accumulated from the salt dealers of Foochow.

The nomination of salt merchants is almost invariably compulsory, and no one can retire from the business without he is totally unable from want of means to continue in it. In these cases the reflection that they were obliged to undertake the transactions that led to their ruin must add increased poignancy to their losses. When once, however, they have undertaken a transaction, they are much favoured by the authorities, who give them entertainments and confer honours and distinctions upon them. There are head merchants appointed, who hold some control over the proceedings of the others. To be a head merchant a man must be of known character and not owing anything to the Government. They are responsible for all the other merchants, who, however trustworthy, have all to be secured by the head merchants. In case of any merchant becoming in arrears with the payment of his duties, the salt inspector orders the head merchants to limit him to a certain time in which to liquidate all charges. According as the case needs, the head merchants convene and consult as to whether they should pray for an extension of the term or require some of the other merchants in substantial circumstances to lend the necessary amounts, or perhaps they may proceed to pay it themselves. If also they find that any of the other merchants are incompetent, from want of means, to manage their business, they represent the same to the salt inspector, that they may be 442 allowed to retire. At present there are four head merchants out of a total of sixty-one....

The nomination of salt merchants is usually mandatory, and no one can leave the business unless they are completely unable to continue due to lack of resources. In these situations, the fact that they had to engage in the dealings that led to their downfall must make their losses feel even more intense. However, once they take on a transaction, they receive significant support from the authorities, who host events and grant them honors and recognition. There are appointed head merchants who have some control over the actions of the others. To become a head merchant, a person must have a good reputation and must not owe anything to the government. They are accountable for all the other merchants, who, no matter how reliable, must all be backed by the head merchants. If any merchant falls behind on their duty payments, the salt inspector instructs the head merchants to set a deadline for them to pay off their debts. Depending on the situation, the head merchants gather to discuss whether they should request an extension of the deadline, ask some of the other financially stable merchants for loans, or possibly cover the payment themselves. If they discover that any of the other merchants cannot manage their business due to lack of funds, they inform the salt inspector so those merchants can be permitted to retire. Currently, there are four head merchants out of a total of sixty-one.

Smuggling is also carried on to some extent. As this, however, affects the vital interests of the salt merchants, they show great vigilance in investigating and reporting to the authorities any instances that may come within their knowledge, and for this purpose fit up and maintain several small vessels which keep up a constant watch against contraband proceedings.

Smuggling still happens to some extent. Since this impacts the essential interests of the salt merchants, they are very vigilant in investigating and reporting to the authorities any incidents they become aware of. For this reason, they equip and maintain several small boats that keep a constant lookout for illegal activities.

There are a multiplicity of fees and charges which prove very onerous to the merchants. [Here follows a list of forty-seven separate fees, dues, and charges, amounting to 15,300 taels, or about £5000 sterling, on 900,000 lb. weight, or about one-eighth of a penny per lb.]

There are many fees and charges that are really burdensome for the merchants. [Here follows a list of forty-seven separate fees, dues, and charges, amounting to 15,300 taels, or about £5000 sterling, on 900,000 lb. weight, or about one-eighth of a penny per lb.]

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

END OF VOLUME ONE.

PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS.

PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] He dropped the "John" so early in life that he was never known by it.

[1] He dropped the "John" so early in life that he was never called by it.

[2] The only valuable consideration he received for these labours was bestowed some years later, when his entry into the service of the Foreign Office was ante-dated to 1840, so as to include the period of the Peninsular commissions.

[2] The only real benefit he got for his efforts came years later when his start date at the Foreign Office was changed to 1840 to cover the time he spent on the Peninsular commissions.

[3] These were a syndicate appointed by the Chinese Government to conduct the foreign trade and be responsible to the Government for the proceedings of the foreign merchants.

[3] These were a group chosen by the Chinese Government to handle foreign trade and report to the Government about the activities of the foreign merchants.

[4] Bits of Old China. Kegan Paul.

[4] Bits of Old China. Kegan Paul.

[5] When he visited Macao later in the year 1839—after the events—there were public demonstrations in his honour, whether prompted by public respect for his despotic power or approval of the use he had just made of it, or merely a recognition of his previously established reputation, may very well remain an open question.

[5] When he visited Macao later in 1839—after the events—there were public demonstrations in his honor, whether driven by public respect for his authoritarian power or support for how he had just exercised it, or simply an acknowledgment of his previously established reputation, may well remain an open question.

[6] Possibly, however, this was but a specimen of the hyperbolic diction which is habitual with the Chinese. An official will threaten his servant with instant decapitation for a trifling offence, meaning nothing whatever thereby.

[6] This might just be an example of the exaggerated language that's common in Chinese culture. An official might threaten to behead his servant for a minor mistake, but he doesn't really mean it at all.

[7] As in its commutation for the surrender of slave property, so now the British Government inflicted serious injustice on the owners of the opium. Captain Elliot's drafts on the Treasury were dishonoured, he having had no authority to draw, and the merchants had to wait four years for a most inadequate payment.

[7] Just like it did when compensating for the surrender of slave property, the British Government caused significant unfairness to the opium owners. Captain Elliot's requests for funds from the Treasury were rejected because he didn't have permission to draw them, and the merchants had to wait four years for a payment that was far from satisfactory.

[8] "By the treaty of 1703," wrote Sir Anders Ljunstedt, the last chief of the Swedish Company's factory, "Portugal placed herself, as it were, under the protection of Great Britain. This Power never failed to render her ally the assistance she stood in need of either in Europe or her ultramarine dominions." The English had defended Macao against the French in 1803.

[8] "By the treaty of 1703," wrote Sir Anders Ljunstedt, the last chief of the Swedish Company's factory, "Portugal effectively put itself under the protection of Great Britain. This power consistently provided support to its ally whenever she needed it, whether in Europe or in her overseas territories." The English defended Macao against the French in 1803.

[9] Europe in Asia. Luzac & Co.

[9] Europe in Asia. Luzac & Co.

[10] Commodore Senhouse, who succeeded temporarily to the command, was so mortified by the course of diplomacy that his death at Hongkong in the month of June 1841 was believed to have been hastened thereby. His dying request was that his body should be taken to Macao, for burial, as he feared that further conciliatory measures might result in Hongkong being given back to the Chinese.

[10] Commodore Senhouse, who temporarily took over command, was so embarrassed by the diplomatic situation that people believed his death in Hong Kong in June 1841 was hastened by it. His last wish was for his body to be taken to Macao for burial, as he worried that any more attempts to make peace might lead to Hong Kong being returned to the Chinese.

[11] In a proclamation issued in 1844 it was said, "Remember how our people were persuaded not to fall upon and massacre your soldiers."

[11] In a statement released in 1844, it was mentioned, "Remember how our people were convinced not to attack and kill your soldiers."

[12] It is impossible to review, however summarily, the events of that period without free reference to the officer who was during the time charged with the care of British interests in China. But no pretence is made in these pages to pass a verdict on the public record of Captain Elliot. His acts involved too many solecisms in finance, for one thing, to have escaped the attention of Parliament; but, like others who come before that tribunal, he was neither attacked on his merits nor defended on his merits. None could question the sincerity of the encomiums passed by the Duke of Wellington and Lord Melbourne on his "courage, coolness, and self-devotion"; to which might well be added a quite exceptional fearlessness of responsibility. But the first representatives of the British Crown in China were doomed to failure by the nature of their commission. The terms of their instructions were more than contradictory—they were mutually destructive. To conciliate the Chinese while opening official relations with them was to mix the ingredients of an explosive. A dilemma was, in fact, presented unwittingly by the British Government to their agents. Lord Napier impaled himself on one horn—that of claiming a diplomatic status; Captain Elliot on the other—that of gaining over the Government by conciliation; and no earthly skill could have saved either of them.

[12] It's impossible to review, even briefly, the events of that time without mentioning the officer responsible for overseeing British interests in China. However, this text doesn’t aim to judge Captain Elliot’s public record. His actions included too many financial blunders to avoid scrutiny from Parliament; yet, like many who face that body, he wasn't assessed on his true merits or criticized on them. No one could doubt the sincerity of the praise given by the Duke of Wellington and Lord Melbourne regarding his "courage, calmness, and dedication," which could also include an exceptional fearlessness of responsibility. However, the first representatives of the British Crown in China were set up for failure by the nature of their mission. The terms of their instructions were not just contradictory—they were self-defeating. Trying to appease the Chinese while establishing official relations was like combining ingredients for an explosive. In fact, the British Government unwittingly presented a dilemma to their agents. Lord Napier trapped himself by claiming a diplomatic status, while Captain Elliot tried to win the government over through conciliation; no amount of skill could have rescued either of them.

[13] This convenient term, borrowed from the French, saves many periphrases and sometimes an ambiguity. Neither "fellow-countrymen," "fellow-subjects," nor "fellow-citizens" fully expresses the relationship between an official in an extra-territorialised country and those whom he protects and governs.

[13] This handy term, taken from the French, avoids a lot of wordiness and sometimes confusion. Neither "fellow-countrymen," "fellow-subjects," nor "fellow-citizens" accurately conveys the relationship between an official in a foreign territory and the people he protects and governs.

[14] "Mr Lay, who has been officiating as consul for some weeks, has been located in a miserable house built on piles on a mud flat, apart from the city, and above the bridge, where the tide, as it ebbs and flows, daily sweeps up to his door; and all efforts to obtain even decent accommodation in the city, where he is entitled to demand it, or in any but this pestilent locality, have been in vain."—'Times' Correspondent, Hongkong, October 22, 1844.

[14] "Mr. Lay, who has been serving as consul for a few weeks, is stuck in a rundown house built on stilts on a mud flat, away from the city and above the bridge, where the tides come in and out, reaching his door every day; all attempts to find even decent lodging in the city, where he's entitled to it, or anywhere but this awful area, have been unsuccessful."—'Times' Correspondent, Hong Kong, October 22, 1844.

[15] See this whole transaction described in his characteristic manner by De Quincey in his brochure on China, originally published in Titan, 1857.

[15] Check out this entire transaction detailed in his unique style by De Quincey in his booklet on China, first published in Titan, 1857.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

[20] The annual value of the whole foreign trade with China, imports and exports, is now about £70,000,000.

[20] The total value of all foreign trade with China, including imports and exports, is currently around £70,000,000.

[21] His predecessors had been governors of Fort William in Bengal.

[21] His predecessors had served as governors of Fort William in Bengal.

[22] Eastern countries send to Europe half of the whole consumption of the West—China yielding 35 per cent to 40 per cent of the entire supply, Japan 12 per cent.

[22] Eastern countries provide Europe with half of all the consumption in the West—China contributing 35 to 40 percent of the total supply, and Japan 12 percent.

[23] It is worth notice that this consistent opponent of the opium trade during fifty active years should have come under the ban of the Anti-Opium Society in England when the discussion of this important question degenerated into a mere polemic.

[23] It's worth noting that this steadfast opponent of the opium trade for fifty active years ended up being criticized by the Anti-Opium Society in England when the debate over this important issue turned into just a pointless argument.

[24] Import duty had been regularly levied on opium for a hundred years, the prohibition of importation having been decreed after 1796 (Eitel).

[24] Import duties have been consistently charged on opium for a hundred years, with the ban on importation established after 1796 (Eitel).

[25] During the last two decades important factors—such as foreign loans, armaments, and the like—have so influenced the movements of gold and silver that they bear no such simple relation to the "balance of trade" properly so called as was formerly the case.

[25] In the past twenty years, key factors—like foreign loans, weapons, and similar things—have affected the flow of gold and silver in ways that no longer reflect a straightforward connection to the "balance of trade" as it used to.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[27] For interesting details of the smuggling organisation which lasted up to the middle of the present century, see 'Smuggling Days and Smuggling Ways,' by the Hon. Henry N. Shore, R.N.

[27] For interesting details about the smuggling organization that lasted until the middle of this century, check out 'Smuggling Days and Smuggling Ways' by the Hon. Henry N. Shore, R.N.

[28] The modern ship carries 70 to 75 per cent of dead-weight over her registered tonnage, and of weight and measurement combined about double.

[28] The modern ship carries 70 to 75 percent of dead-weight over her registered tonnage, and when you combine weight and measurement, it's about double that.

[29] The American and British clippers were originally built of wood sheathed with metal. After that came trial of iron ships coated with tallow, but finally at the climax of the sailing clippers' notable races they were all of composite construction—i.e., iron frames planked with wood and sheathed with yellow metal. This type of vessel (now out of date) was the essential feature of the fastest sailing China clippers. Thereupon followed the iron and steel steamship as the permanent carrier, and the white-winged argosies were no more!

[29] The American and British clippers were originally made of wood covered with metal. Then there was an experiment with iron ships coated in tallow, but eventually, at the height of the sailing clippers' famous races, they were all made of composite materials—i.e., iron frames with wooden planking and coated in yellow metal. This type of ship (now outdated) was crucial to the fastest sailing China clippers. After that, the iron and steel steamship became the main carrier, and the white-winged argosies became a thing of the past!

[30] Mr James MacCunn of Greenock says that all these racing clippers, which were practically the same size, carried double crews, numbering about thirty-three all told, equal to that of a 2500-tons merchantman of to-day. The Sir Lancelot, besides the shingle ballast below the tea, carried 100 tons fitted kentledge in the limbers stowed between skin and ceiling, whereby great "stiffness" was ensured—a factor of much value in beating down the China Sea against the monsoon, and at other times in "carrying on" under a heavy press of canvas.

[30] Mr. James MacCunn of Greenock states that all these racing clippers, which were nearly the same size, had double crews, totaling about thirty-three people, comparable to that of a 2,500-ton merchant ship today. The Sir Lancelot, in addition to the shingle ballast below the tea, carried 100 tons of fitted kentledge in the limbers stored between the skin and ceiling, which ensured great "stiffness"—a crucial factor in battling the China Sea against the monsoon and during other times when "carrying on" with a heavy sail was necessary.

[31] China in 1857-58. Routledge.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ China 1857-58. Routledge.

[32] The Fankwae at Canton.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Fankwae in Guangzhou.

[33] Apart from their liberality in the conduct of business, the generosity of the Chinese mercantile class, their gratitude for past favours, are so remarkable as to be incomprehensible to the Western mind. An account of them would read like a "fairy tale."

[33] Besides their openness in business, the generosity of the Chinese merchant class and their appreciation for past favors are so striking that they can be hard for a Western perspective to understand. A description of them would sound like a “fairy tale.”

[34] The Straits of Malacca, &c. By J. Thomson.

[34] The Straits of Malacca, etc. By J. Thomson.

[35] The tonnage entered and cleared for the year 1898 amounted to 17,265,780, of which one-half was under the British flag.

[35] The total shipping volume for the year 1898 was 17,265,780, with half of it registered under the British flag.

[36] Nomenclature alone sufficiently attests this fact—whether of the ships that carried them or of the lands they christened, as Natal, Trinidad, &c. The gigantic cross carved in the granite face of Table Mountain (it is said) by Vasco da Gama proclaimed to the wide ocean the sanctity of his mission. English adventurers were strongly imbued with the same pious spirit. Down to our own day marine policies open with the words, "In the name of God, Amen"; while the bill of lading, which within the past generation has become packed with clauses like a composite Act of Parliament—all tending to absolve the owner from responsibility as carrier—formerly began with the words, "Shipped by the grace of God," and ended with the prayer that "God would send the good ship to her desired port in safety."

[36] The naming alone clearly shows this fact—whether it’s the ships that brought them or the places they named, like Natal, Trinidad, etc. The giant cross carved into the granite of Table Mountain (as it is said) by Vasco da Gama declared to the vast ocean the importance of his mission. English explorers were filled with the same devoted spirit. Even today, shipping policies start with the phrase, “In the name of God, Amen”; while the bill of lading, which in recent years has become overloaded with clauses like a mixed-up law book—all aimed at freeing the owner from responsibility as a carrier—used to start with the words, “Shipped by the grace of God,” and concluded with a request that “God would bring the good ship to her desired port safely.”

[37] "Verily," writes Wingrove Cooke, "Sir John Bowring, much abused as he is both here and at home, has taken a more common-sense view of these matters than the high diplomatists of England and France."

[37] "Honestly," writes Wingrove Cooke, "Sir John Bowring, as criticized as he is both here and back home, has a more practical perspective on these issues than the elite diplomats of England and France."

[38] Before the conclusion of his second mission Lord Elgin's opinion of at least one of those whom at the outset he disparaged had undergone considerable modification. "Parkes," he wrote in 1860, "is one of the most remarkable men I ever met for energy, courage, and ability combined. I do not know where I could find his match."

[38] Before finishing his second mission, Lord Elgin had significantly changed his view of at least one person he initially looked down upon. "Parkes," he wrote in 1860, "is one of the most extraordinary men I've ever encountered, combining energy, courage, and skill. I can't think of anyone who could match him."

[39] Lord Elgin protested against the use of this tabooed term, but took no exception to the statement as to his having obeyed the commands of the Imperial Commissioners.

[39] Lord Elgin objected to the use of this forbidden term, but did not dispute the claim that he had followed the orders of the Imperial Commissioners.

[40] 'The Scotsman,' September 18, 1858.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 'The Scotsman,' Sept 18, 1858.

[41] It seems to have been a general opinion at the time that Lord Elgin was deterred from proceeding to Peking by the protestations of his learned advisers, who declared that his doing so would "shatter the empire."

[41] It seems that many people at the time believed Lord Elgin was held back from going to Peking by the arguments of his knowledgeable advisers, who insisted that doing so would "shatter the empire."

[42] Sir Hope Grant's Journal.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Sir Hope Grant's Diary.

[43] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.

[44] Vol. ii. p. 224.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Vol. 2, p. 224.

[45] Peking and the Pekingese.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Beijing and the Pekingese.

[46] Kunshan or Quinsan.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Kunshan or Quinsan.


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