This is a modern-English version of Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology, originally written by Jung, C. G. (Carl Gustav).
It has been thoroughly updated, including changes to sentence structure, words, spelling,
and grammar—to ensure clarity for contemporary readers, while preserving the original spirit and nuance. If
you click on a paragraph, you will see the original text that we modified, and you can toggle between the two versions.
Scroll to the bottom of this page and you will find a free ePUB download link for this book.

COLLECTED PAPERS
ON
ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY
BY
BY
C. G. JUNG, M.D., LL.D.,
C. G. JUNG, M.D., LL.D.
FORMERLY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ZÜRICH.
FORMERLY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH.
AUTHORISED TRANSLATION
AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION
Edited by DR. CONSTANCE E. LONG,
Edited by Dr. Constance E. Long,
MEDICAL OFFICER, EDUCATION BOARD; MEMBER ADVISORY COMMITTEE INSURANCE ACT;
EX-PRESIDENT ASSOCIATION OF REGISTERED MEDICAL WOMEN, ETC.
MEDICAL OFFICER, EDUCATION BOARD; MEMBER OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE ACT;
FORMER PRESIDENT OF ASSOCIATION OF REGISTERED MEDICAL WOMEN, ETC.
SECOND EDITION (REPRINTED)
2nd Edition (Reprinted)

LONDON
LONDON
BAILLIÈRE, TINDALL AND COX
8, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN
BAILLIÈRE, TINDALL AND COX
8, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN
1920
1920s
[All rights reserved]
[All rights reserved]
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN.
PRINTED IN THE UK.
EDITOR'S PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION
The following papers have been gathered together from various sources, and are now available for the first time to English readers. The subject of psychoanalysis is much in evidence, and is likely to occupy still more attention in the near future, as the psychological content of the psychoses and neuroses is more generally appreciated and understood. It is of importance, therefore, that the fundamental writings of both the Viennese and Zürich Schools should be accessible for study. Several of Freud's works have already been translated into English. Dr. Jung's "Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido" was published in America in 1916 under the title of "The Psychology of the Unconscious." That work, read in conjunction with these papers, offers a fairly complete picture of the scientific and philosophic standpoint of the leader of the Zürich School. It is the task of the future to judge and expand the findings of both schools, and to work at the development of the new psychology, which is still in its infancy.
The following papers have been collected from various sources and are now available for the first time to English readers. The topic of psychoanalysis is very prominent and is likely to gain even more attention in the near future, as the psychological aspects of psychoses and neuroses become more widely recognized and understood. It is important that the foundational writings of both the Viennese and Zürich Schools are accessible for study. Several of Freud's works have already been translated into English. Dr. Jung's "Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido" was published in America in 1916 under the title "The Psychology of the Unconscious." That work, when read alongside these papers, provides a fairly complete picture of the scientific and philosophical perspective of the leader of the Zürich School. It is the responsibility of the future to evaluate and expand upon the findings of both schools and to advance the development of the new psychology, which is still in its early stages.
It will be a relief to many students of the unconscious to see it in another aspect than that of "a wild beast couched, waiting its hour to spring." Some readers have gathered that view of it from the writings of the Viennese School, a view which is at most that dangerous thing "a half-truth."
It will be a relief to many students of the unconscious to see it from a different perspective than that of "a wild beast lying in wait, ready to pounce." Some readers have gotten that idea from the writings of the Viennese School, which represents, at best, a dangerous thing: "a half-truth."
In the papers appearing for the first time in this edition (Chapters XIV. and XV.), Dr. Jung develops his ideas of introversion and extroversion, a contribution of the first importance to psychology. He agrees with Freud in regarding the neuroses to be the result of repression, but differs in his view as to the origin of repression. He finds this to lie[vi] not in sexuality per se, but rather in man's natural tendency to adapt to the demands of life one-sidedly, according to his type of mentality. The born extrovert adapts by means of feeling, thought being under repression and relatively infantile. The introvert's natural adaptation is by means of thought; feeling being more or less repressed remains undeveloped. In either type the neglected co-function is behind the adapted function. This inequality operating in the unconscious, brings about a conflict, which in certain subjects amounts to a neurosis, and in others produces a limitation of individual development. This view shifts the interpretation of repression on to a much more comprehensive basis than that of sexuality, although there can scarcely be a repression that does not include this instinct on account of its deep and far-reaching importance in man.
In the papers included for the first time in this edition (Chapters XIV and XV), Dr. Jung expands on his concepts of introversion and extroversion, which are crucial to psychology. He agrees with Freud that neuroses stem from repression but disagrees on the source of that repression. He believes it comes not from sexuality per se, but from a person's natural tendency to adapt to life's demands in a one-sided way, depending on their mental type. The natural extrovert adapts through feelings, with thoughts being repressed and relatively immature. The introvert, on the other hand, adapts through thought, while feelings are more or less repressed and undeveloped. In both types, the neglected function is the one that is suppressed. This imbalance in the unconscious creates a conflict, which can lead to neurosis in some individuals and limit personal development in others. This perspective broadens the understanding of repression beyond just sexuality, though it's hard to ignore that almost all repression involves this instinct due to its profound impact on humans.
There is no doubt that some even scientific persons have a certain fear of whither the study of the unconscious may lead. These fearful persons should be reminded that they possess an unconscious in spite of themselves, and that they share it in common with every human being. It is an extension of the individual. To study it is to deepen the self. All new discoveries have at one stage been called dangerous, and all new philosophies have been deemed heresies. It is as though we would once more consign radium to its dust-heaps, lest some day the new radiancy should over-power mankind. Indeed this particular thing has proved at once most dangerous and most precious. Man must learn to use his treasure, and in using it to submit to its own laws, which can only become known when it is handled and investigated.
There’s no doubt that even some scientists have a certain fear of where the study of the unconscious might lead. These anxious people should remember that they have an unconscious despite themselves, just like everyone else. It’s an extension of the individual. Studying it helps us understand ourselves better. Every new discovery has at one point been considered dangerous, and all new philosophies have been seen as heresies. It’s as if we would once again bury radium to avoid its potential to overpower humanity. In reality, this particular discovery has proven to be both extremely dangerous and incredibly valuable. Humans must learn to use their treasure, and in doing so, to submit to its own laws, which can only be understood when it is explored and examined.
Those who read this book with the attention it requires, will find they gain an impression of many new truths. The second edition is issued towards the end of the third year of the Great European war, at a time when much we have valued and held sacred is in the melting-pot. But we believe that out of the crucible new forms will arise. The study of psychoanalysis produces something of the effect of a war in the psyche; indeed, we need to make conscious this war in the[vii] inner things of the mind and soul if we would be delivered in the future from war in the external world. There is a parallelism between individual and international neurosis. In the pain of the upheaval, one recognises the birth-pangs of newer, and let us hope, truer thought, and more natural adaptations. We need a renewal of our philosophy of life to replace much that has perished in the general cataclysm, and it is because I see in the analytical psychology, which grows out of a scientific study of the unconscious, the germs of such a new construction, that I have gathered the following essays together. The translation is the work of various hands, the names of the different translators being given in a footnote at the beginning of each essay; for the editing I am responsible. The essays are, as far as possible, printed in chronological order, and those readers who are sufficiently interested will be able to discern in them the gradual development of Dr. Jung's present position in psychoanalysis.
Those who read this book with the focus it deserves will discover many new truths. The second edition is released towards the end of the third year of the Great European War, at a time when much of what we have valued and held sacred is being tested. However, we believe that from this challenge, new forms will emerge. Studying psychoanalysis creates a kind of internal conflict; indeed, we need to bring this internal battle to consciousness if we want to avoid future wars in the outside world. There's a parallel between individual and international neurosis. Amid the chaos, one can recognize the painful beginnings of new, hopefully more accurate ways of thinking and more natural adjustments. We need a renewal of our philosophy of life to replace much that has been lost in the overall upheaval, and it's because I see in analytical psychology, which stems from a scientific study of the unconscious, the seeds of such a reconstruction that I’ve compiled these essays. The translation involves various contributors, with the names of the different translators noted in a footnote at the beginning of each essay; I am responsible for the editing. The essays are arranged chronologically as much as possible, and those readers who are interested will be able to see the gradual evolution of Dr. Jung's current stance in psychoanalysis.
CONSTANCE E. LONG.
CONSTANCE E. LONG.
2, Harley Place, W.
June, 1917.2, Harley Place, W.
June 1917.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION
In agreement with my honoured collaborator, Dr. C. E. Long, I have made certain additions to the second edition. It should especially be mentioned that a new chapter upon "The Concept of the Unconscious" has been added. This is a lecture I gave early in 1916 before the Zürich Union for Analytical Psychology. It gives a general orientation of a most important problem in practical analysis, viz. of the relation of the psychological ego to the psychological non-ego. Chapter XIV. has been fundamentally altered, and I have used the opportunity to incorporate an article that should describe the results of more recent researches. In accordance with my usual mode of working, the description is as generalised as possible. My habit in my daily practical work is to confine myself for some time to studying my human material. I then abstract as generalised a formula as possible from the data collected, obtaining from it a point of view and applying it in my practical work, until it has either been confirmed, modified, or else abandoned. If it has been confirmed, I publish it as a general view-point, without giving the empirical material. I only introduce the material amassed in the course of my practice in the form of example or illustration. I therefore beg the reader not to consider the views I present as mere fabrications of my brain. They are, as a matter of fact, the results of extensive experience and ripe reflection.
In agreement with my esteemed colleague, Dr. C. E. Long, I've made some additions to the second edition. It's important to note that a new chapter on "The Concept of the Unconscious" has been included. This is based on a lecture I delivered in early 1916 at the Zürich Union for Analytical Psychology. It provides a general overview of a crucial issue in practical analysis: the relationship between the psychological ego and the psychological non-ego. Chapter XIV has been fundamentally revised, and I've taken this opportunity to include an article that describes the outcomes of more recent research. As is my usual approach, the description is as generalized as possible. In my daily practical work, I spend some time studying my human subjects, then I abstract the most generalized formula I can from the data collected, which gives me a perspective to apply in my practice until it has been either confirmed, modified, or abandoned. If confirmed, I publish it as a general viewpoint without providing the empirical data. I only introduce the material gathered during my practice in the form of examples or illustrations. Therefore, I ask the reader not to regard the views I present as mere inventions of my mind. They are, in fact, the results of extensive experience and thoughtful reflection.
These additions will enable the reader of the second edition to become familiar with the recent views of the Zürich School.
These updates will help the reader of the second edition get acquainted with the new perspectives from the Zürich School.
As regards the criticism encountered by the first edition of this work, I was pleased to find my writings were received[x] with much more open-mindedness among English critics than was the case in Germany, where they are met with the silence born of contempt. I am particularly grateful to Dr. Agnes Savill for an exceptionally understanding criticism in the Medical Press. My thanks are also due to Dr. T. W. Mitchell for an exhaustive review in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research. This critic takes exception to my heresy respecting causality. He considers that I am entering upon a perilous, because unscientific, course, when I question the sole validity of the causal view-point in psychology. I sympathise with him, but in my opinion the nature of the human mind compels us to take the final point of view. For it cannot be disputed that, psychologically speaking, we are living and working, day by day, according to the principle of directed aim or purpose, as well as that of causality. A psychological theory must necessarily adapt itself to this fact. What is plainly directed towards a goal cannot be given an exclusively causalistic explanation, otherwise we should be led to the conclusion expressed in Moleschott's famous enunciation: "Man is, what he eats." We must always bear the fact in mind that causality is a point of view. It affirms the inevitable and immutable relation of a series of events: a-b-d-z. Since this relation is fixed, and according to the view-point must necessarily be so, looked at logically the order may also be reversed. Finality is also a view-point, that is justified empirically solely by the existence of series of events, wherein the causal connection is indeed evident, but the meaning of which only becomes intelligible as producing final effect. Ordinary daily life furnishes the best instances of this. The causal explanation must be mechanistic, if we are not to postulate a metaphysical entity as first cause. For instance, if we adopt Freud's sexual theory and assign primary importance psychologically to the function of the genital glands, the brain is viewed as an appendage of the genital glands. If we approach the Viennese idea of sexuality with all its vague omnipotence, and trace it in a strictly scientific manner down to its psychological basis, we shall arrive at the first cause, according to which psychic life is for the most, or the most[xi] important part, tension and relaxation of the genital glands. If we assume for the moment that this mechanistic explanation be "true," it would be the sort of truth which is exceptionally tiresome and rigidly limited in scope. A similar statement would be that the genital glands cannot function without adequate nourishment, with its inference that sexuality is an appendage-function of nutrition! The truth contained in this is really an important chapter in the biology of lower forms of life.
Regarding the criticism faced by the first edition of this work, I was pleased to see that my writings were received[x] with much more open-mindedness among English critics than in Germany, where they encounter silence driven by contempt. I am especially thankful to Dr. Agnes Savill for her exceptionally understanding critique in the Medical Press. I also owe thanks to Dr. T. W. Mitchell for his thorough review in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research. This critic takes issue with my unconventional views on causality. He believes that I am embarking on a dangerous, unscientific path by questioning the sole validity of the causal perspective in psychology. While I understand his concerns, I think the nature of the human mind requires us to adopt a final viewpoint. It cannot be denied that, from a psychological perspective, we live and operate daily according to the principles of directed aim or purpose, as well as causality. A psychological theory must adapt to this fact. What is clearly directed toward a goal cannot be explained solely through a causal lens; otherwise, we would lead ourselves to the conclusion expressed in Moleschott's famous saying: "Man is, what he eats." We must always remember that causality is a point of view. It affirms the inevitable and unchanging relationship of a series of events: a-b-d-z. Since this relationship is fixed, and must be so according to this viewpoint, logically, the order could be reversed as well. Finality is also a viewpoint, which is justified empirically only by the existence of series of events, where the causal connection is evidently clear, but whose meaning only becomes clear as producing a final effect. Everyday life provides the best examples of this. The causal explanation must be mechanistic if we are not to posit a metaphysical entity as the first cause. For instance, if we accept Freud's sexual theory and assign primary psychological importance to the function of the genital glands, we view the brain as an appendage to the genital glands. If we approach the Viennese concept of sexuality with all its vague omnipotence and trace it down to its psychological foundation in a strictly scientific way, we will arrive at the first cause, according to which psychic life is, for the most part, tension and relaxation of the genital glands. If we temporarily assume this mechanistic explanation is "true," it would be a kind of truth that is exceptionally tiresome and rigidly limited. A similar statement would be that the genital glands cannot function without adequate nourishment, implying that sexuality is merely a byproduct of nutrition! The truth contained in this is actually an important chapter in the biology of lower forms of life.
But if we wish to work in a really psychological way, we shall want to know the meaning of psychological phenomena. After learning the kinds of steel the various parts of a locomotive are made of, and from what ironworks and mines they come, we do not really know anything about the locomotive's function, that is to say, its meaning. But "function" as conceived by modern science is by no means solely a causal concept; it is especially a final or "teleological" one. For it is utterly impossible to consider the soul from the causal view-point only; we are obliged to consider it also from the final point of view. As Dr. Mitchell also points out, it is impossible for us to think of the causal determination conjointly with a final connection. That would be an obvious contradiction. But our theory of cognition does not need to remain on a pre-Kantian level. It is well known that Kant showed very clearly that the mechanistic and the teleological view-points are not constituent (objective) principles, in some degree qualities of the object, but that they are purely regulative (subjective) principles of thought, and as such they are not mutually inconsistent. I can, for example, easily conceive the following thesis and antithesis:—
But if we want to approach this in a truly psychological way, we need to understand the meaning of psychological phenomena. After learning about the different types of steel used in a locomotive and where they come from, we still don’t really grasp the locomotive’s function, or its meaning. However, the concept of "function" in modern science isn't just about cause and effect; it's also about purpose or "teleology." It's impossible to view the soul from a purely causal perspective; we also have to look at it from the perspective of purpose. As Dr. Mitchell points out, we can't think of causal determination alongside final connection; that would simply be contradictory. However, our understanding of cognition can evolve beyond a pre-Kantian perspective. It's well-known that Kant clearly demonstrated that mechanical and teleological viewpoints are not constituent (objective) principles or inherent qualities of the object, but are rather purely regulative (subjective) principles of thought, and as such, they can coexist without conflict. For instance, I can easily conceive the following thesis and antithesis:—
Thesis: Everything came into existence according to mechanistic laws.
Thesis: Everything was created according to mechanical laws.
Antithesis: Some things did not come into existence according to mechanistic laws only.
Antithesis: Some things didn't exist solely due to mechanical laws.
Kant says to this: Reason cannot prove either of these principles, because a priori purely empirical laws of nature cannot give us a determinative principle regarding the potentiality of things.
Kant responds to this by saying that reason can't prove either of these principles, because a priori purely empirical laws of nature can't provide us with a definitive principle about the potentiality of things.
As a matter of fact, modern physics has necessarily been converted from the idea of pure mechanism to the final concept of the conservation of energy, because the mechanistic explanation only recognises reversible processes, whereas the actual truth is that the process of nature is irreversible. This fact led to the concept of an energy that tends towards relief of tension, and therewith also towards a definite final state.
In reality, modern physics has moved away from the idea of pure mechanism to the concept of energy conservation, because the mechanistic view only acknowledges reversible processes, while the truth is that natural processes are irreversible. This realization led to the idea of energy that seeks to relieve tension, and thus also aims for a specific final state.
Obviously, I consider both these points of view necessary, the causal as well as the final, but would at the same time lay stress upon the fact that since Kant's time we have come to know that the two view-points are not antagonistic if they are regarded as regulative principles of thought, and not as constituent principles of the process of nature itself.
Clearly, I believe both perspectives are essential—the causal and the final. However, I want to emphasize that since Kant’s time, we’ve learned that these two viewpoints aren’t opposing if we see them as guiding principles of thought rather than as fundamental principles of nature itself.
When speaking of the reviews, I must also mention those that seem to me beside the mark. I was once more struck by the fact that certain critics cannot distinguish between the theoretical explanation given by the author, and the phantastic ideas provided by the patient. One of my critics makes this confusion when discussing "Number Dreams." The associations to the quotation from the Bible in Chapter V. are, as every attentive reader must readily perceive, not arbitrary explanations of my own, but a cryptomnesic conglomeration emanating, not from my brain at all, but from that of the patient. Surely it is not difficult to perceive upon reflection that this conglomeration of numbers corresponds exactly to that unconscious psychological function from which proceeded all the mysticism of numbers, Pythagoric, Kabbalistic, and so forth, existent from untold ages.
When discussing the reviews, I also need to address those that I think miss the point. I was once again struck by the fact that some critics can't tell the difference between the theoretical explanation provided by the author and the fantastical ideas presented by the patient. One of my critics makes this mistake when talking about "Number Dreams." The connections to the biblical quote in Chapter V are, as any attentive reader should easily notice, not my arbitrary explanations but a mix of memories coming, not from me, but from the patient. It shouldn't be hard to realize that this mix of numbers perfectly aligns with the unconscious psychological function that has been behind the mysticism of numbers—Pythagorean, Kabbalistic, and so on—existing for ages.
I am grateful to my serious reviewers, and should like here to also express my thanks to Mrs. Harold F. McCormick for her generous help in the production of this book.
I appreciate my dedicated reviewers, and I would also like to thank Mrs. Harold F. McCormick for her generous assistance in producing this book.
C. G. JUNG.
C. G. Jung.
June, 1917.
June 1917.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION
This volume contains a selection of articles and pamphlets on analytical psychology written at intervals during the past fourteen years. These years have seen the development of a new discipline, and as is usual in such a case, have involved many changes of view-point, of concept, and of formulation.
This volume includes a collection of articles and pamphlets on analytical psychology that have been written over the past fourteen years. During this time, a new field has emerged, which, as often happens in such cases, has led to many shifts in perspective, concepts, and expressions.
It is not my intention to give a presentation of the fundamental concepts of analytical psychology in this book; it throws some light, however, on a certain line of development which is especially characteristic of the Zürich School of psychoanalysis.
It’s not my goal to provide a detailed overview of the key ideas of analytical psychology in this book; however, it does shed some light on a particular area of development that is especially typical of the Zürich School of psychoanalysis.
As is well known, the merit of the discovery of the new analytical method of general psychology belongs to Professor Freud of Vienna. His original view-points had to undergo many essential modifications, some of them owing to the work done at Zürich, in spite of the fact that he himself is far from agreeing with the standpoint of this school.
As is well known, the credit for discovering the new analytical method in general psychology goes to Professor Freud from Vienna. His original ideas had to be significantly changed, partly due to the work done in Zürich, even though he himself does not fully agree with this school's perspective.
I am unable to explain fully the fundamental differences between the two schools, but would indicate the following points: The Vienna School takes the standpoint of an exclusive sexualistic conception, while that of the Zürich School is symbolistic. The Vienna School interprets the psychological symbol semiotically, as a sign or token of certain primitive psychosexual processes. Its method is analytical and causal.
I can't fully explain the key differences between the two schools, but I would point out the following: The Vienna School adopts a strictly sexual view, while the Zürich School has a symbolic perspective. The Vienna School sees psychological symbols as signs or indicators of specific basic psychosexual processes. Its approach is analytical and causal.
The Zürich School recognises the scientific feasibility of such a conception, but denies its exclusive validity, for it does not interpret the psychological symbol semiotically only, but also symbolistically, that is, it attributes a positive value to the symbol.
The Zürich School acknowledges that this idea is scientifically possible, but it rejects the notion that it holds exclusive truth. They don't just interpret psychological symbols in a purely semiotic way; they also view them symbolically, meaning they assign a positive value to the symbol.
The value does not depend merely on historical causes; its chief importance lies in the fact that it has a meaning for the actual present, and for the future, in their psychological aspects. For to the Zürich School the symbol is not merely a sign of something repressed and concealed, but is at the same time an attempt to comprehend and to point out the way of the further psychological development of the individual. Thus we add a prospective import to the retrospective value of the symbol.
The value doesn't just rely on historical reasons; its main significance is that it has meaning for the present and future, particularly in terms of psychology. For the Zürich School, the symbol isn't just a sign of something hidden and suppressed, but also an effort to understand and indicate the path for further psychological growth of the individual. This way, we give a forward-looking importance to the backward-looking value of the symbol.
The method of the Zürich School is therefore not only analytical and causal, but also synthetic and prospective, in recognition that the human mind is characterised by "causæ" and also by "fines" (aims). The latter fact needs particular emphasis, because there are two types of psychology, the one following the principle of hedonism, and the other following the principle of power. Scientific materialism is pertinent to the former type, and the philosophy of Nietzsche to the latter. The principle of the Freudian theory is hedonism, while that of Adler (one of Freud's earliest personal pupils) is founded upon the principle of power.
The approach of the Zürich School is not just analytical and causal; it’s also synthetic and forward-looking, acknowledging that the human mind is defined by both "causæ" (causes) and "fines" (aims). This point is particularly important because there are two types of psychology: one based on the principle of hedonism and the other on the principle of power. Scientific materialism relates to the first type, while Nietzsche’s philosophy relates to the second. The core principle of Freud's theory is hedonism, whereas Adler’s (one of Freud's earliest personal students) is rooted in the principle of power.
The Zürich School, recognising the existence of these two types (also remarked by the late Professor William James), considers that the views of Freud and Adler are one-sided, and only valid within the limits of their corresponding type. Both principles exist within every individual, but not in equal proportions.
The Zürich School, acknowledging the presence of these two types (also noted by the late Professor William James), believes that Freud and Adler's perspectives are one-sided and only applicable within the boundaries of their respective types. Both principles are found in every individual, but not in equal measures.
Thus, it is obvious that each psychological symbol has two aspects, and should be interpreted according to the two principles. Freud and Adler interpret in the analytical and causal way, reducing to the infantile and primitive. Thus with Freud the conception of the "aim" is the fulfilment of desire, with Adler it is the usurpation of power. Both authors take the standpoint in their practical analytical work which brings to view only infantile and gross egoistic aims.
Thus, it's clear that each psychological symbol has two aspects and should be understood according to both principles. Freud and Adler analyze them in a way that breaks things down to the infantile and primitive. With Freud, the idea of the "aim" is about fulfilling desire, whereas for Adler, it's about seizing power. Both authors approach their practical analytical work from a perspective that highlights only childish and selfish motivations.
The Zürich School is convinced of the fact that within the limits of a diseased mental attitude the psychology is such as Freud and Adler describe. It is, indeed, just on account of such impossible and childish psychology that the individual[xv] is in a state of inward dissociation and hence neurotic. The Zürich School, therefore, in agreement with them so far, also reduces the psychological symbol (the phantasy products of the patient) to the fundamental infantile hedonism, or to the infantile desire for power. But Freud and Adler content themselves with the result of mere reduction, according to their scientific biologism and naturalism.
The Zürich School believes that when someone has a disordered mindset, their psychology aligns with what Freud and Adler describe. It’s actually this unrealistic and childish view of psychology that leaves a person feeling internally disconnected and thus neurotic. The Zürich School agrees with them up to this point and also interprets the psychological symbols (the fantasies created by the patient) as stemming from basic childish pleasure-seeking or a desire for power. However, Freud and Adler are satisfied with simply reducing these concepts based on their scientific biological and natural perspectives.
But here a very important question arises. Can man obey the fundamental and primitive impulses of his nature without gravely injuring himself or his fellow beings? He cannot assert either his sexual desire or his desire for power unlimitedly, and the limits are moreover very restricted. The Zürich School has in view also the final result of analysis, and regards the fundamental thoughts and impulses of the unconscious, as symbols, indicative of a definite line of future development. We must admit there is, however, no scientific justification for such a procedure, because our present-day science is based as a whole upon causality. But causality is only one principle, and psychology essentially cannot be exhausted by causal methods only, because the mind lives by aims as well. Besides this disputable philosophical argument, we have another of much greater value in favour of our hypothesis, namely, that of vital necessity. It is impossible to live according to the intimations of infantile hedonism, or according to a childish desire for power. If these are to be retained they must be taken symbolically. Out of the symbolic application of infantile trends, an attitude evolves which may be termed philosophic or religious, and these terms characterise sufficiently the lines of further development of the individual. The individual is not only an established and unchangeable complex of psychological facts, but also an extremely changeable entity. By exclusive reduction to causes, the primitive trends of a personality are reinforced; this is only helpful when at the same time these primitive tendencies are balanced by recognition of their symbolic value. Analysis and reduction lead to causal truth; this by itself does not help living, but brings about resignation and hopelessness. On the other hand, the recognition of the intrinsic[xvi] value of a symbol leads to constructive truth and helps us to live. It induces hopefulness and furthers the possibility of future development.
But a very important question comes up here. Can a person follow the basic and instinctive urges of their nature without seriously harming themselves or others? They can't act on their sexual desires or their craving for power without limits, and those limits are actually very narrow. The Zürich School also considers the end result of analysis and sees the fundamental thoughts and drives of the unconscious as symbols that point to a specific path for future growth. However, we have to admit that there is no scientific justification for this approach, because our current science is largely based on causality. But causality is just one principle, and psychology can't be completely understood through causal methods alone, because the mind also lives by goals. Besides this debatable philosophical argument, we have a much stronger point in favor of our hypothesis, which is the idea of vital necessity. It's impossible to live by the suggestions of childish pleasure-seeking or a naive desire for power. If these urges are to be maintained, they must be interpreted symbolically. From the symbolic understanding of childish impulses, an attitude emerges that can be described as philosophical or religious, and these concepts adequately represent the paths for an individual's further development. The individual is not just a fixed and unchangeable set of psychological facts, but also a highly adaptable being. By only focusing on causes, the primitive aspects of a personality are strengthened; this is only useful when these primitive tendencies are counterbalanced by recognizing their symbolic meaning. Analysis and reduction lead to causal truth; this alone doesn't help us live, but instead leads to resignation and despair. On the other hand, recognizing the inherent [xvi] value of a symbol leads to constructive truth and helps us live. It fosters hope and enhances the potential for future growth.
The functional importance of the symbol is clearly shown in the history of civilisation. For thousands of years the religious symbol proved a most efficacious means in the moral education of mankind. Only a prejudiced mind could deny such an obvious fact. Concrete values cannot take the place of the symbol; only new and more efficient symbols can be substituted for those that are antiquated and outworn, such as have lost their efficacy through the progress of intellectual analysis and understanding. The further development of mankind can only be brought about by means of symbols which represent something far in advance of himself, and whose intellectual meanings cannot yet be grasped entirely. The individual unconscious produces such symbols, and they are of the greatest possible value in the moral development of the personality.
The functional importance of the symbol is clearly shown in the history of civilization. For thousands of years, religious symbols have been a powerful tool for the moral education of humanity. Only a biased person could deny this obvious fact. Concrete values cannot replace the symbol; only new and more effective symbols can take the place of those that are outdated and worn out, like those that have lost their power through the progress of intellectual analysis and understanding. The further development of humanity can only be achieved through symbols that represent something far beyond ourselves, and whose intellectual meanings we can't fully grasp yet. The individual unconscious creates such symbols, and they are extremely valuable for the moral growth of the personality.
Man almost invariably has philosophic and religious views of the meaning of the world and of his own life. There are some who are proud to have none. These are exceptions outside the common path of mankind; they miss an important function which has proved itself to be indispensable to the human mind.
Man almost always has philosophical and religious perspectives on the meaning of the world and his own life. There are some who take pride in having none. These are exceptions outside the typical path of humanity; they overlook an important function that has proven to be essential for the human mind.
In such cases we find in the unconscious, instead of modern symbolism, an antiquated archaic view of the world and of life. If a requisite psychological function is not represented in the sphere of consciousness, it exists in the unconscious in the form of an archaic or embryonic prototype.
In these situations, we discover in the unconscious, rather than modern symbolism, an outdated, primitive perspective on the world and life. If a necessary psychological function isn’t present in our conscious awareness, it exists in the unconscious as an ancient or early model.
This brief résumé may show what the reader cannot find in this collection of papers. The essays are stations on the way of the more general views developed above.
This short résumé might reveal what the reader can't find in this collection of papers. The essays are stepping stones toward the broader ideas discussed earlier.
C. G. JUNG.
C. G. JUNG.
Zürich,
. January, 1916.
Zürich, . January 1916.
CONTENTS
PAGE | |
Editor's Preface to 2nd Edition | v |
Author's Preface to 2nd Edition | ix |
Author's Preface to the First Edition | xiii |
Difficulty of demarcation in borderline cases between epilepsy, hysteria, and mental deficiency—Somnambulism an hysterical manifestation—A case of spontaneous somnambulism, with some characters of protracted hysterical delirium—Other cases quoted—Charcot's classification of somnambulism—Naef's and Azam's cases of periodic amnesia—Proust's and Boileau's wandering-impulse cases—William James' case of Rev. Ansel Bourne—Other examples showing changes in consciousness—Hypnagogic hallucinations—Neurasthenic mental deficiency, Bleuler's case—Summing up of Miss Elsie K.'s case—Need of further scientific investigation in the field of psychological peculiarities.
Challenges in differentiating between epilepsy, hysteria, and mental impairment—Somnambulism as a hysterical symptom—A case of spontaneous somnambulism showing some traits of extended hysterical delirium—Other cases noted—Charcot's classification of somnambulism—Naef's and Azam's cases of periodic memory loss—Proust's and Boileau's cases of wandering impulse—William James's account of Rev. Ansel Bourne—Additional examples illustrating changes in consciousness—Hypnagogic hallucinations—Neurasthenic mental impairment, Bleuler's case—Summary of Miss Elsie K.'s case—The need for more scientific research in the field of psychological phenomena.
History of case—Accidental discovery of her mediumistic powers—Her somnambulic attacks, "attitudes passionelles," catalepsy, tachypnœa, trance speeches, etc.—Ecstasies—Her conviction of the reality of her visions—Her dreams, hypnagogic and hypnopompic visions—The elevation of her somnambulic character—Mental thought transference—S. W.'s double life—Psychographic communications—Description of séances—The Prophetess of Prevorst—Automatic writing—The two grandfathers—Appearance of other somnambulic personalities.
Case history—Unintentional discovery of her medium abilities—Her sleepwalking episodes, "intense behaviors," catalepsy, rapid breathing, trance speeches, etc.—Ecstasies—Her belief in the reality of her visions—Her dreams and experiences just before waking—The amplification of her sleepwalking traits—Mental thought transfer—S. W.'s double life—Psychographic communications—Description of sessions—The Prophetess of Prevorst—Automatic writing—The two grandfathers—Emergence of other sleepwalking personalities.
The psychograph and spiritualistic wonders—The grandfather the medium's "guide" or "control"—Ulrich von Gerbenstein—The somnambulic personalities have access to the medium's memory—Ivenes—S. W.'s amnesia for her ecstasies—Later séances—Her journeys on the other side—Oracular sayings—Conventi—Ivenes' dignity and superiority to her "guides"—Her previous incarnations—Her race-motherhood.
The psychograph and spiritual wonders—the forerunner of the medium's "guide" or "control"—Ulrich von Gerbenstein—The somnambulistic personalities tapping into the medium's memory—Ivenes—S. W.'s amnesia during her trances—Subsequent séances—Her journeys to the other side—Prophetic statements—Conventi—Ivenes' dignity and superiority over her "guides"—Her past lives—Her ancestral motherhood.
Her growing wilful deception—The waking state—Her peculiarities—Instability—Hysterical tendencies—Misreading—Errors of dispersion of attention discussed.
Her growing intentional deception—The conscious state—Her unique behaviors—Unpredictability—Hysterical tendencies—Misunderstandings—Mistakes due to divided attention discussed.
Table movements—Unconscious motor phenomena—Verbal suggestion and auto-suggestion—The experimenter's participation—The medium's unconscious response—Thought-reading—Table-tilting experiment, illustrated—Experiments with beginners—Myers' experiments in automatic writing—Janet's conversation with Lucie's subconsciousness—Example of the way the subconscious personality is constructed—Hallucinations appear with deepening hypnosis; some contributing factors—Comparison between dream symbols and appearance of somnambulic personalities—Extension of the unconscious sphere—The somnambulist's thinking is in plastic images, which are made objective in hallucinations—Why visual and not auditory hallucinations occur—Origin of hypnagogic hallucinations—Those of Jeanne d'Arc and others.
Table movements—Unconscious motor skills—Verbal suggestions and self-suggestions—The experimenter's role—The medium's unconscious responses—Telepathy—Table-tilting experiment, shown—Experiments with beginners—Myers' experiments in automatic writing—Janet's discussions with Lucie's subconscious—An example of how the subconscious personality forms—Hallucinations appear with deeper hypnosis; some factors that contribute—Comparison between symbols in dreams and characteristics of sleepwalking personalities—Expanding the unconscious mind—The sleepwalker's thought processes are vivid images that present as hallucinations—Reasons for visual versus auditory hallucinations—The roots of hypnagogic hallucinations—Those experienced by Joan of Arc and others.
Noticeable in S. W.'s case, also in Mary Reynolds'—Association with amnesic disturbances—Influence of puberty in our case—S. W.'s systematic anæsthesia—Ivenes not so much a case of double consciousness as one in which she dreams herself into a higher ideal state—Similar pathological dreaming found in the lives of saints—Mechanism of hysterical identification—S. W.'s dreams break out explosively—Their origin and meaning, and their subjective roots.
It's evident in S. W.'s situation, as well as in Mary Reynolds'—Association with memory loss—The impact of puberty in our case—S. W.'s ongoing numbness—Ivenes represents less a case of split consciousness and more one where she envisions herself in a higher ideal state—Similar pathological dreaming occurs in the lives of saints—The mechanism of hysterical identification—S. W.'s dreams come forth explosively—Their origin and meaning, along with their subjective roots.
In considering the origin of attack, two moments, viz. irruption of hypnosis, and the psychic stimulation, must be taken into account—In susceptible subjects relatively small stimuli suffice to bring about somnambulism—Our case approaches to hysterical lethargy—The automatisms transform lethargy into hypnosis—Her ego-consciousness is identical in all states—Secondary somnambulic personalities split off from the primary unconscious personality—All group themselves under two types, the gay-hilarious, and serio-religious—The automatic speaking occurs—This facilitates the study of the subconscious personalities—Their share of the consciousness—The irruption of the hypnosis is complicated by an hysterical attack—The automatism arising in the motor area plays the part of hypnotist—When the hypnotism flows over into the visual sphere the hysterical attack occurs—Grandfathers I. and II.—Hysterical dissociations belong to the superficial layers of the ego-complex—There are layers beyond the reach of dissociation—Effect of the hysterical attack.
To understand the origin of an attack, we need to consider two key moments: the start of hypnosis and the mental stimulation. For those who are vulnerable, even minor stimuli can trigger a trance-like state. In our case, it leans towards hysterical lethargy. The automatic behaviors turn lethargy into hypnosis. Her self-awareness remains consistent throughout all these states. Secondary somnambulistic personalities separate from the primary unconscious personality. These can be divided into two types: the cheerful and the serious-religious. Automatic speech appears, which helps us explore these subconscious personalities and their part of consciousness. The beginning of hypnosis becomes complicated by a hysterical attack. The automatism that arises in the motor area acts like a hypnotist. When hypnosis affects the visual area, a hysterical attack occurs. Grandfathers I and II. Hysterical dissociations are part of the outer layers of the ego complex, with deeper layers remaining unaffected by dissociation. This is the impact of the hysterical attack.
The serio-religious and the gay-hilarious explained by the anamnesis—Two halves of S. W.'s character—She is conscious of the painful contrast—She seeks a middle way—Her aspirations bring her to the puberty dream of the ideal Ivenes—The repressed ideas begin an autonomous existence—This corroborates Freud's disclosures concerning dreams—The relation of the somnambulic ego-complex and the waking consciousness.
The serious and religious side, along with the playful and carefree side, illustrated by memory—Two aspects of S. W.'s character—She recognizes the painful contrast—She seeks to find a balance—Her aspirations drive her towards the coming-of-age dream of the perfect Ivenes—The repressed thoughts begin to emerge on their own—This aligns with Freud's discoveries about dreams—The link between the sleepwalking ego-complex and the conscious mind.
The progress of this affection reached its maximum in 4-8 weeks—Thenceforth a decline in the plasticity of the phenomena—All degrees of somnambulism were observable—Her manifest character improved—Similar improvements seen in certain cases of double consciousness—Conception that this phenomenon has a teleological meaning for the future personality—As seen in Jeanne d'Arc and Mary Reynolds II.
The progression of this condition reached its peak within 4-8 weeks. After that, there was a decrease in the fluidity of the symptoms. All levels of sleepwalking were evident. Her apparent personality improved. Similar improvements were noted in some cases of split consciousness. There is a belief that this phenomenon has meaningful significance for the future self, as demonstrated in the cases of Joan of Arc and Mary Reynolds II.
S. W. shows primary susceptibility of the unconscious—Binet affirms the susceptibility of the hysteric is fifty times greater than that of normal—Cryptomnesia, a second additional creation—Cryptomnesic picture may enter consciousness intra-physically—Unconscious plagiarism explained—Zarathustra example—Glossolalia—Helen Smith's Martian language—The names in Ivenes' mystic system show rudimentary glossolalia—The Cryptomnesic picture may enter consciousness as a hallucination—Or arrive at consciousness by motor automatism—By automatisms regions formerly sealed are made accessible—Hypermnesia—Thought-reading a prototype for extraordinary intuitive knowledge of somnambulists and some normal persons—Association-concordance—Possibility that concept and feeling are not always clearly separated in the unconscious—S. W.'s mentality must be regarded as extraordinary.
S.W. reveals a key vulnerability of the unconscious—Binet notes that hysterics are fifty times more susceptible than normal individuals—Cryptomnesia is another form of creation—A cryptomnesic image can emerge in consciousness in a tangible way—Unconscious plagiarism defined—Example from Zarathustra—Glossolalia—Helen Smith's Martian language—The names in Ivenes' mystical system represent basic glossolalia—The cryptomnesic image can show up in consciousness as a hallucination—Or become conscious through motor automatism—Automatisms allow previously inaccessible areas to become reachable—Hypermnesia—Thought-reading acts as a model for the remarkable intuitive knowledge found in somnambulists and some normal individuals—Association-concordance—It's possible that concepts and feelings are not always clearly separated in the unconscious—S.W.'s mindset should be viewed as extraordinary.
The Association Method 94
The Association Method __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Lecture I.—Formula for test—Disturbances of reaction as complex-indicators—Discovery
of a culprit by means of test—Disturbances of reaction show emotional rather than intellectual causes—Principal types—Value of the experiment in dealing with neurotics.Lecture I.—Method for testing—Reactions affected as complex signals—Finding a cause through testing—Reaction disturbances suggest emotional rather than intellectual issues—Key types—The significance of experiments when dealing with neurotics.
Dr. Fürst's researches—Effect of environment and education on reactions—Effect of parental discord on children—Unconscious tendency to repetition of parental mistakes—Case of pathological association-concordance between mother and daughter—Neurosis, a counter-argument against the personality with which the patient is most nearly concerned—How to free the individual from unconscious attachments to the milieu.
Dr. Fürst's research—The effects of environment and education on behavior—The impact of parental conflict on children—Unconscious habits of repeating parental errors—Case of harmful associations—Understanding between mother and daughter—Neurosis as a challenge to the most significant aspects of the patient's personality—Strategies to assist individuals in breaking away from unconscious connections to their environment.
Importance of emotional processes in children—Little Anna's questions—Arrival of the baby brother—Anna's embarrassment and hostility—Introversion of the child—Of the adolescent—Her pathological interest in the Messina earthquake—The meaning of her fear—Anna's theories of birth—Meaning of her questions—Her father tells her something of origin of her little brother—Her fears now subside—The unconscious meaning of the child's wish to sit up late—Anna's equivalent to the "lumpf-theory" of little Hans—The stork-theory again—Author's remarks on the sexual enlightenment of the child.
The importance of emotional development in children—Little Anna's questions—The arrival of her baby brother—Anna's embarrassment and hostility—The child's introversion—The adolescent's introversion—Her unhealthy fascination with the Messina earthquake—The significance of her fears—Anna's theories about birth—What her questions really mean—Her father explains something about where her little brother came from—Her fears begin to lessen—The hidden meaning behind her desire to stay up late—Anna's take on little Hans' "lumpf-theory"—A revisit of the stork theory—The author's comments on children's sexual education.
Psychosexual relationship of child to father—Fürst's experiments quoted—The association experiment typical for man's psychological life—Adaptation to father—Father-complex productive of neurosis—Father-complex in man with masochistic and homosexual trends—Peasant woman "her father's favourite," tragic effect of the unconscious constellation—Case of eight-year-old boy with enuresis—Enuresis a sexual surrogate—Importance of infantile sexuality in life—Hence necessity for psychoanalytic investigation—The Jewish religion and the father-complex—Parental power guides the child like a higher controlling fate—The conflict for the development of the individual—Father-complex in Book of Tobias.
The psychosexual relationship between a child and their father—citing Fürst's experiments—illustrates the typical human psychological experience through association. Adapting to the father leads to a father complex, which can result in neurosis. This complex can be seen in men who have masochistic and homosexual inclinations. A peasant woman identified as "her father's favorite" shows the tragic effects of unconscious dynamics. There is a case of an eight-year-old boy experiencing bedwetting, which serves as a sexual substitute. The significance of early sexuality is crucial in life, highlighting the necessity for psychoanalytic exploration. The Jewish religion also relates to the father complex. Parental authority acts as a guiding force for the child, resembling a higher controlling fate, resulting in conflicts during individual development. The father complex is also present in the Book of Tobias.
Investigation of a rumour in a girls' school—The rumour arose from a dream—Teacher's suspicions—Was the rumour an invention and not, as alleged, the recital of a dream?—Interpolations in dreams—Collection of evidence—Duplication of persons an expression of their significance both in dreams and in dementia præcox—The additions and interpolations represent intensive unconscious participation—Hearsay evidence—Remarks.
Investigation of a rumor at a girls' school—The rumor originated from a dream—Teacher's suspicions—Was the rumor fabricated instead of being a true recounting of a dream?—Additions in dreams—Collecting evidence—Duplicating individuals highlights their significance in both dreams and schizophrenia—The additions and insertions indicate profound unconscious involvement—Hearsay evidence—Observations.
The dream is analysed by rumour—Psychoanalysis explains the construction of rumour—The dream gives the watchword for the unconscious—It brings to expression the ready-prepared sexual complexes—Marie X.'s unsatisfactory conduct brought her under reproof—Her indignation and repressed feelings lead to the dream—She uses this as an instrument of revenge against the teacher—More investigation needed in the field of rumour.
Dreams are analyzed through gossip—Psychoanalysis explains how gossip is created—Dreams show what’s hidden in the unconscious—They reflect existing sexual issues—Marie X.'s troubling behavior landed her in hot water—Her anger and repressed feelings manifest in the dream—She uses it to take revenge on the teacher—Further research is needed regarding gossip.
Symbolism of numbers has acquired fresh interest from Freud's investigations—Example of number dream of middle-aged man—How the number originates—A second dream also contains a number—Analysis—The wife's dream "Luke 137"—This dream is an example of cryptomnesia.
The symbolism of numbers has received renewed focus thanks to Freud's research—An example of a dream involving numbers from a middle-aged man—How the number is derived—A second dream also includes a number—Analysis—The wife's dream "Luke 137"—This dream illustrates cryptomnesia.
Bleuler's concept of ambivalency and ambitendency—Every tendency balanced by its opposite—Schizophrenic negativism—Bleuler's summary of its causes—The painfulness of the complex necessitates[xxi] a censorship of its expression—Thought disturbance the result of a complex—Thought pressure due to schizophrenic introversion—Resistance springs from peculiar sexual development—Schizophrenia shows a preponderance of introversion mechanisms—The value of the complex theory concept.
Bleuler's concept of ambivalence and ambitendency suggests that every tendency is opposed by its opposite—schizophrenic negativism—Bleuler's overview of its causes indicates that the discomfort of the complex necessitates the censorship of its expression—thought disturbances stem from a complex—thought pressure is a result of schizophrenic introversion—resistance emerges from atypical sexual development—schizophrenia shows a strong inclination toward introversion mechanisms—the importance of the complex theory idea.
Doctors know too little of psychology, and psychologists of medicine—Strong prejudice aroused by Freud's conception of the importance of the sexual moment—The commoner prejudices discussed—Psychoanalysis not a method of suggestion or reasoning—The unconscious content is reached via the conscious—Case of neurotic man with ergophobia for professional work—Case of neurotic woman who wants another child—Resistances against the analyst—Dream analysis the efficacious instrument of analysis—The scientist's fear of superstition—The genesis of dreams—Dream material is collected according to scientific method—The rite of baptism analysed—When the unconscious material fails, use the conscious—The physician's own complexes a hindrance—Interpretations of Viennese School too one-sided—Sexual phantasies both realistic and symbolic—The dream the subliminal picture of the individual's present psychology—Symbolism a process of comprehension by analogy—Analysis helps the neurotic to exchange his unconscious conflict for the real conflict of life.
Doctors understand very little about psychology, and psychologists understand very little about medicine—Strong biases influenced by Freud's views on the importance of sexuality—Common biases are discussed—Psychoanalysis involves more than just suggestion or reasoning—Unconscious thoughts are accessed through the conscious mind—Case study of a man with a fear of work (ergophobia)—Case study of a woman wanting another child—Resistance against the analyst—Dream analysis is an effective tool for understanding—Scientists’ fears about superstition—The origins of dreams—Dream content collected using scientific methods—Baptism analyzed—When unconscious material doesn’t work, use conscious thoughts—The doctor’s own issues can be a barrier—Interpretations from the Viennese School are too limited—Sexual fantasies can be both realistic and symbolic—Dreams represent the individual's current psychological state—Symbolism helps in understanding through analogy—Analysis assists neurotics in replacing their unconscious struggles with real-life conflicts.
Difficulties of public discussion—Competence to form an opinion presupposes a knowledge of the fundamental literature—The abandoned trauma theory—Fixation—The importance of the infantile past—Analysis discloses existence of innumerable unconscious phantasies—Œdipus complex—Fixation discussed—The critical moment for the outbreak of the neurosis—Predisposition—Author's energic view point—Application of the libido to the obstacle—Repression—Neurosis an act of adaptation that has failed—The energic view does not alter the technique of analysis—Analysis re-establishes the connection between the conscious and unconscious—Is a constructive task of great importance.
Challenges in public discussions—Being able to form an opinion requires familiarity with key literature—The overlooked trauma theory—Fixation—The importance of early childhood experiences—Analysis uncovers numerous unconscious fantasies—Oedipus complex—Understanding fixation—The crucial moment for the development of neurosis—Predisposition—The author’s dynamic viewpoint—Applying libido to the barrier—Repression—Neurosis is an unsuccessful attempt at adaptation—The dynamic viewpoint does not alter the method of analysis—Analysis reconnects the conscious and unconscious—It is a crucial constructive task.
The dream a means of re-establishing the moral equipoise—The dreamer finds therein the material for reconstruction—Methods discussed—The part played by "faith in the doctor"—Abreaction.
Dreams help restore moral balance—the dreamer discovers what they need to rebuild within them—Methods discussed—The importance of "trust in the doctor"—Abreaction.
For the patient any method that works is good, though some more valuable than others—The doctor must choose what commends itself to his scientific conscience—Why the author gave up the use of hypnotism—Three cases quoted—Breuer and Freud's method a great advance in psychic treatment—Evolution of author's views—Importance of conception that behind the neurosis lies a moral conflict—Divergence from Freud's sexual theory of neurosis—The doctor's responsibility for the cleanliness of his own hands—Necessity that the psychoanalyst should be analysed—He is successful in so far as he has succeeded in his own moral development.
For the patient, any effective method is acceptable, although some are more beneficial than others. The doctor must choose what aligns with his scientific principles. This is why the author discontinued the use of hypnotism. Three cases are mentioned. Breuer and Freud’s approach marked a major breakthrough in mental health treatment. The author’s perspective has changed over time. It's crucial to recognize that beneath the neurosis lies a moral conflict, which differs from Freud’s sexual theory of neurosis. The doctor is accountable for the purity of his own actions. It's important for the psychoanalyst to undergo their own analysis. Their success is linked to the degree of their own moral growth.
Opportunism v. scientific honour—Psychoanalysis no more than hypnotism gets rid of "transference"—Cases of enuresis nocturna, and of washing-mania treated by hypnosis—On what grounds should such useful treatment be dispensed with?—The difficulty of finding a rational solution for the moral conflict—The doctor's dilemma of the two consciences.
Opportunism vs. scientific integrity—Psychoanalysis, similar to hypnotism, deals with "transference"—Instances of bedwetting and compulsive washing treated with hypnosis—Why should we stop using such an effective treatment?—The challenge of finding a rational solution to the moral dilemma—The doctor's struggle with conflicting ethics.
Author's standpoint that of the scientist, not practical physician—The analyst works in spite of the transference—Psychoanalysis not the only way—Sometimes less efficacious than any known method—Cases must be selected—For the author and his patients it is the best way—The real solution of the moral conflict comes from within, and then only because the patient has been brought to a new standpoint.
The author views things from a scientific perspective, not as a practicing doctor. The analyst keeps working, even with the transference. Psychoanalysis isn't the only method available; sometimes it's less effective than other known approaches. Cases need to be selected carefully. For the author and his patients, it is the most effective method. True resolution of moral conflicts happens from within, and only after the patient gains a new perspective.
"What is truth?"—Parable of the prism—All man attains is relative truth—Fanaticism is the enemy to science—Psychoanalysis a method of dealing with basic motives of the human soul—Must not each case be treated individually?—Morals are above all relative.
"What is truth?"—Parable of the prism—Everything people achieve is a relative truth—Fanaticism stands against science—Psychoanalysis is a method to explore the basic motives of the human soul—Shouldn't each situation be treated individually?—Morals are mainly relative.
Definition of psychoanalysis—Technique—So-called chance is the law—Rules well-nigh impossible—The patients' unconscious is the analysts' best confederate—Questions of morality and education find solutions for themselves in later stages of analysis.
Definition of psychoanalysis—Technique—What appears to be random is actually governed by a law—Rules that are nearly impossible to follow—The patients' unconscious is the analysts' strongest ally—Questions about morality and education resolve themselves in the later phases of analysis.
Contradictions in psychoanalytic literature—Should the doctor canalise the patient's libido?—Does he not indirectly suggest dreams to patient?
Conflicts in psychoanalytic literature—Should the doctor guide the patient's libido?—Isn't he indirectly influencing the patient's dreams?
Different view-points in psychoanalysis—Vide Freud's causality and Adler's finality—Discussion of meaning of transference—The meaning of "line of least resistance"—Man as a herd-animal—Rich endowment with social sense—Should take pleasure in life—Error as necessary to progress as truth—Patient must be trained in independence—Analyst is caught in his own net if he makes hard-and-fast rules—Through the analyst's suggestion only the outer form, never the content, is determined—The patient may mislead the doctor, but this is disadvantageous and delays him.
Different perspectives in psychoanalysis—See Freud's ideas on causation and Adler's views on purpose—Discussion on the significance of transference—Understanding the concept of "line of least resistance"—Humans as social beings—Strong social instincts—Should find joy in life—Errors are just as important for progress as truths—Patients need to learn to be self-reliant—Analysts can get trapped in their own rigid rules—The analyst's suggestions shape only the external aspects, not the content—Patients can mislead their doctors, but this is unhelpful and causes delays.
The line of least resistance is a compromise with all necessities—The analyst as accoucheur—The neurotic's faith in authority—Altruism innate in man—He advances in response to his own law.
The easiest route is a compromise with all essentials—The analyst as a helping figure—The neurotic's reliance on authority—Innate kindness in humans—He moves forward based on his own principles.
Transference is the central problem of analysis—It may be positive or negative—Projection of infantile phantasies on the doctor—Biological "duties"—The psyche does not only react, but gives its individual reply—We have an actual sexual problem to-day—Evidences thereof—We have no real sexual morality, only a legal attitude—Our moral views are too undifferentiated—The neurotic is ill not because he has lost his faith in morality, but because he has not found the new authority in himself.
Transference is the key concern in therapy—it can be either positive or negative. It involves projecting childhood fantasies onto the therapist. There are biological "responsibilities" to consider. The mind doesn’t just react; it responds in its own unique way. We're dealing with a real sexual issue today, as indicated by various signs. We lack genuine sexual morality, only holding onto a legal standpoint. Our moral views are too simplistic. A neurotic person isn't unwell because they've lost faith in morality, but because they haven't found a new sense of authority within themselves.
Content of the unconscious—Defined as sum of all psychical processes below the threshold of consciousness—Answer to question how does the unconscious behave in neurosis found in its effect on normal consciousness—Example of a merchant—Compensating function of the unconscious—Symptomatic acts—Nebuchadnezzar's dream discussed—Intuitive ideas, and insane manifestations both emanate from the unconscious—Eccentricities pre-exist a breakdown—In mental disorder unconscious processes break-through into consciousness and disturb equilibrium—True also in fanaticism—Pathological compensation in case of paranoia—Unconscious processes have to struggle against resistances in the conscious mind—Distortion—In morbid conditions the function of the unconscious is one of compensation.
Content of the unconscious—Defined as all mental processes happening below the level of awareness—The answer to how the unconscious works in neurosis lies in its effect on normal awareness—Consider the example of a merchant—The compensating role of the unconscious—Symptomatic actions—Nebuchadnezzar's dream is examined—Both intuitive ideas and irrational behaviors arise from the unconscious—Eccentricities occur before a breakdown—In mental illness, unconscious processes invade awareness and disrupt balance—This is also true in fanaticism—Pathological compensation occurs in cases of paranoia—Unconscious processes have to fight against resistances in the conscious mind—Distortion—In unhealthy situations, the role of the unconscious mainly serves as compensation.
Striking contrast between hysteria and dementia præcox—Extroversion and Introversion—Repression—Hysterical transference and repression the mechanism of extroversion—Depreciation of the external world the mechanism of introversion—The nervous temperament pre-exists the illness—Examples of the two types from literature—James's Tough and Tender-minded—Warringer's Sympathy and Abstraction—Schiller's Naïf and Sentimental—Nietzsche's Apollien and Dionysian—Gross's Weakness and Reinforcement of Consecutive Function—Freud and Adler's Causalism and Finality—The fundamental need for further study of the two types.
There’s a clear difference between hysteria and schizophrenia—extroversion and introversion—repression—hysterical transference and repression as the way extroversion works—devaluing the outside world as the way introversion works—the nervous temperament exists before the illness—examples of both types from literature—James's Tough and Tender-minded—Warringer's Sympathy and Abstraction—Schiller's Naïf and Sentimental—Nietzsche's Apollonian and Dionysian—Gross's Weakness and Reinforcement of Consecutive Function—Freud and Adler's Causalism and Finality—there's a crucial need for more research on these two types.
The Psychology of Dreams 299
The Psychology of Dreams __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Psychic structure of dream contrasted with that of conscious thought—Why a dream seems meaningless—Freud's empirical evidence—Technique, analysis of a dream—The causal and teleological view of the dream—A typical dream with mythological content—Compensating function of dreams—Phallic symbols.
The psychic makeup of dreams versus conscious thinking—Reasons a dream seems meaningless—Freud's supporting evidence—Method for analyzing a dream—The causal and intentional perspective on dreams—An example of a dream featuring mythological aspects—The balancing function of dreams—Phallic symbols.
Discussion of psychological v. physical origin of mental disease—Mediæval conception of madness as work of evil spirits—Development of materialistic idea that diseases of the mind are diseases of the brain—Psychiatrists have come to regard function as accessory to the organ—Analysis of patients entering Burgholzi Asylum—A quarter only show lesions of the brain—The psychiatry of the future must advance by way of psychology—Cases of dementia præcox illustrating recent methods in psychiatry—The development of the outbreak at a moment of great emotion—Delusions determined by deficiencies in the patient's personality—Difficulties of investigation—Temporary remission of mental symptoms proves that reason survives in spite of preoccupation with diseased thoughts—Case of dementia præcox, showing exceeding richness of phantasy formations, and the continuity of ideas.
Discussion on the psychological versus physical causes of mental illness—Medieval beliefs about madness being caused by evil spirits—The rise of the idea that mental disorders are actually brain disorders—Psychiatrists now view function as secondary to the organ—Analysis of patients at Burghölzli Asylum—Only a quarter display brain lesions—The future of psychiatry needs to advance through psychology—Cases of dementia praecox showcasing new techniques in psychiatry—Development of the condition sparked by intense emotions—Delusions stemming from gaps in the patient's personality—Challenges in research—Temporary relief from mental symptoms indicates that reason remains, even when trapped in unhealthy thoughts—Case of dementia praecox revealing a complex web of fantasy and continuity of thoughts.
Freud's case of paranoid dementia—(Schreber case)—Two ways of regarding Goethe's "Faust"—Retrospective and prospective understanding—The scientific mind thinks causally—This is but one half of comprehension—Pathological and mythological formations, both structures of the imagination—Flournoy's case—Misunderstanding of author's analysis of it—Adaptations only possible to the introverted type by means of a world-philosophy—The extroverted type always arrives at a general theory subsequently—Psychasthenia is the neurosis of introversion, hysteria of extroversion—These diseases typify the general attitude of the types to the phenomena of the external world—The extreme difference in type a great obstacle to common understanding—The general result of the constructive method is a subjective view, not a scientific theory.
Freud's case of paranoid dementia—(Schreber case)—Two ways to view Goethe's "Faust"—Understanding it in hindsight and looking ahead—The scientific mind thinks in terms of cause and effect—This is only part of the understanding—Pathological and mythological creations are both forms of imagination—Flournoy's case—Misinterpretation of the author's analysis of it—Adaptations are only feasible for the introverted type through a world philosophy—The extroverted type usually develops a general theory later—Psychasthenia is the neurosis of introversion, while hysteria represents extroversion—These conditions reflect each type’s overall attitude toward the external world—The key differences between types create a significant barrier to mutual understanding—The end result of the constructive method is a subjective viewpoint, not a scientific theory.
Adler's views more fully discussed—The psychological events of the war force the problems of the unconscious on society—The psychology of individuals corresponds to the psychology of nations.
Adler's ideas discussed in more detail—The psychological impacts of the war highlight the issues of the unconscious in society—The psychology of individuals mirrors the psychology of nations.
The evolution of psychology—How little it has had to offer to the psychiatrist till Freud's discoveries—The origin and reception of psychoanalysis—The prejudiced attitude of certain physicians—Freud's view that his best work arouses greatest resistances—The Nancy School—Breuer's first case—"The talking cure"—The English "shock theory"—Followed by the trauma theory—Discussion of predisposition—Author's case of hysteria following fright from horses—The pathogenic importance of the hidden erotic conflict.
The development of psychology—How little it offered psychiatrists until Freud's findings—The beginnings and acceptance of psychoanalysis—The partial stance of some doctors—Freud's view that his most significant work encounters the greatest pushback—The Nancy School—Breuer's initial case—"The talking cure"—The English "shock theory"—Followed by trauma theory—A look at predisposition—The author's case of hysteria after being startled by horses—The damaging effects of concealed erotic conflict.
Humanity evolves its own restrictions on sexuality for the sake of the advance of civilisation—The presence of a grave sexual problem testifies to the need of more differentiated conceptions—The erotic conflict largely unconscious—Neurosis represents the[xxv] unsuccessful attempt of the individual to solve the problem in his own case—To understand the idea of the dream as a wish-fulfilment the manifest and latent content must be taken in review—The nature of unconscious wishes—Dream analysis leads to the deepest recesses of the unconscious—The analyst compared to the accoucheur—The highest development of the individual is sometimes in complete conflict with the herd-morality—Psychoanalysis provides the patient with a philosophy of life founded upon insight—Man has within himself the essence of morals—Both the moral and immoral man must accept the corrective of the unconscious—Our sexual morality too undifferentiated—Freud's sexual theory right to a point but too one-sided.
Humanity imposes its own boundaries on sexuality to help advance civilization. The presence of a significant sexual issue highlights the need for more nuanced understandings. The erotic conflict primarily exists at an unconscious level. Neurosis is an unsuccessful attempt by individuals to tackle their own problems. To understand dreams as wish-fulfillment, both the obvious and underlying content must be analyzed. This requires recognizing the nature of unconscious desires. Dream analysis delves into the deepest aspects of the unconscious. The analyst acts like a midwife. An individual's highest development can sometimes completely conflict with societal morals. Psychoanalysis provides the patient with a life philosophy rooted in insight. People inherently have a sense of morals. Both moral and immoral individuals must face the lessons from the unconscious. Our sexual morality is overly simplistic. Freud's sexual theory holds some validity but is too limited.
The superman—Nietzsche's failure to justify his theories by his life—His view also too one-sided—Adler's theory of neurosis founded upon the principle of power—Case of hysteria discussed from the standpoint of unconscious motivation.
The superman—Nietzsche's struggle to prove his theories through his own life—His viewpoint is also limited—Adler's theory of neurosis is rooted in the concept of power—The case of hysteria is analyzed through the lens of unconscious motivation.
Thinking the natural adaptive function for introvert, feeling for the extrovert—The sexual theory promulgated from the standpoint of feeling, the power theory from that of thought—Criticism of both theories indispensable—Symptoms of neurosis are aims at a new synthesis of life—Definition of positive value as energy in a useful form—In neurosis energy is located in an inferior form—Sublimation a transference of sexual energy to another sphere—Destiny often frustrates purely rational sublimations—Rationalism, the world-war an example of its breakdown—So-called "disposable energy"—Case of American business-man—The types have different problems—The feelings of the introvert relatively conventional and undifferentiated—The thinking of the extrovert colourless and dry—The types apt to marry, but not to understand one another—The theories of the types led to a new theory of psychogenic disturbances—Neurosis postulates the existence of an unconscious conflict—New theory declares it to lie between the natural conscious function and the repressed undifferentiated co-function—Repressed feelings of introvert projected as vague physical symptoms—Repressed thought of extrovert projected as hysterical symptoms—In analysis the libido liberated from the unconscious phantasies is projected on to the physician—It finds its way into the transference, which in turn is dissolved—The new channel for the libido is already found.
Considering the natural adaptive role of introverts and the emotions tied to extroverts—the sexual theory based on feelings and the power theory based on thought—it's essential to critique both theories. The symptoms of neurosis aim for a new synthesis of life. Positive value is defined as energy in a useful form, while in neurosis, energy is expressed in a less effective way. Sublimation is the process of redirecting sexual energy to a different area. Destiny often disrupts purely rational sublimations. Rationalism, as evidenced by the world war, reveals its shortcomings. The so-called "disposable energy" comes into play—illustrated by the case of an American businessman. The two types face different challenges. Introverts tend to have somewhat conventional and indistinct feelings, while extroverts often exhibit bland and dry thinking. These types are likely to marry but struggle to understand one another. The theories about these types led to a new theory of psychogenic disturbances. Neurosis indicates there’s an unconscious conflict. The new theory posits that conflict exists between the natural conscious function and the repressed undifferentiated co-function. Repressed feelings of introverts show up as vague physical symptoms, while repressed thoughts of extroverts manifest as hysterical symptoms. In analysis, the libido released from unconscious fantasies gets directed toward the therapist. This energy becomes part of the transference, which is then resolved. A new outlet for the libido has already been identified.
Transference a projection of unconscious contents on to the physician—Contents of the unconscious at first personal, later impersonal—Primordial images—A differentiation of the unconscious contents necessary—The deepest layers are now designated impersonal, absolute, collective, or super-personal—The libido now liberated in analysis sinks down into the unconscious, reviving original "thought-feelings"—Example in Mayer's idea of conservation of energy—The world-wide existence of the primordial images—The concept of God—Enantiodromia, the world-war an example of this—In analysis the pairs of opposites are torn asunder—This necessitates that patients learn to differentiate between the ego and non-ego.
Transference happens when unconscious thoughts are projected onto the therapist. At first, these thoughts are personal but later become impersonal. There are fundamental images from the unconscious that need to be identified. The deepest layers are now called impersonal, absolute, collective, or super-personal. The libido, once released in therapy, sinks back into the unconscious, reviving original "thought-feelings." An example is Mayer's idea of energy conservation. These primordial images exist globally. The concept of God is one of these images. Enantiodromia, as seen in worldwide conflicts, demonstrates this idea. In therapy, pairs of opposites are separated, making it crucial for patients to learn to differentiate between the ego and non-ego.
The transcendental function, a new way of regarding the psychological materials as a bridge between the two sides of the psyche—Example[xxvi] of method of synthesis of symbols of absolute unconscious—Dream of the crab.
The transcendental function provides a fresh viewpoint on psychological aspects, serving as a link between the two parts of the psyche—Example[xxvi] for the method of combining symbols from the absolute unconscious—Dream of the crab.
The unconscious homosexual tendencies—The causal-reductive method does not strictly follow the patient's own associations—It does not interpret the dream as subjective phenomenon—Interpretation on both objective and subjective planes necessary.
Unconscious homosexual tendencies—The causal-reductive method doesn’t fully rely on the patient's associations—It doesn’t view the dream as just a subjective experience—Interpretation needs to occur on both objective and subjective levels.
Homosexuality in this case an unconscious defence against acceptance of "more dangerous" tendencies—Fascination an unconscious compulsion—"Identifications" have power so long as they remain unconscious—Union of subjective and objective view of dream gives its full meaning.
In this situation, homosexuality acts as an unconscious defense mechanism against acknowledging "riskier" tendencies—Fascination is an unconscious urge—"Identifications" have influence as long as they remain unconscious—The mix of personal and external perspectives on a dream gives it complete meaning.
Projection in relation to transference—Projection of certain attributes not explicable on the ground of personal contents, but must be referred to the super-personal—Collective unconscious is sediment of all the experience of the universe throughout time—Certain features that have become prominent, e.g. gods and demons, are called "dominants" and have a character of universal psychological truth—These dominants become conscious as projections, explaining infatuations, incompatibilities, unconscious conflicts, etc.—The "magical demon" is the most primitive concept of God—Analysis traces home these projections to the non-ego—Fear belongs to the dominants of the collective unconscious—The next step is the detachment of these projections from the objects of consciousness—This liberates energy for further progress—The transcendental function—The hero-myth symbolises this differentiation of ego from non-ego.
Projection in terms of transference involves attributing certain traits that can't be explained by personal experiences to something outside the individual. The collective unconscious is the sum of all universal experiences over time. Certain key features, like gods and demons, are known as "dominants" and represent universal psychological truths. These dominants appear as projections that help explain infatuations, conflicts, and incompatibilities. The "magical demon" is one of the most basic concepts of God. Analysis seeks to trace these projections back to the non-ego. Fear is included among the dominants in the collective unconscious. The next step is to distinguish these projections from conscious objects. This release of energy allows for further growth. The transcendental function shows this differentiation between the ego and the non-ego. The hero myth symbolizes this distinction.
The types apprehend life by opposite methods—All psychic images have two sides, one directed towards the object, the other towards the soul (idea)—The feelings of the introvert are under repression, the thoughts of the extrovert—Analytical development of the unconscious brings out the secondary function in each type—The pairs of opposites being thus demonstrated need for synthesis arises—This is a compensatory process leading to enrichment of the individual.
The different personality types interpret life in various ways—Every mental image has two aspects, one directed at the external world and the other focused inward (idea)—Introverts tend to suppress their feelings, while extroverts concentrate on their thoughts—A thorough examination of the unconscious uncovers the secondary function in each personality type—As these opposing pairs are revealed, the necessity for integration becomes clear—This is a balancing act that improves the individual.
The unconscious is a source of danger when the individual is not at one with it—It also creates harmonious prospective combinations which can be an effective source of wisdom for the individual—The use of the phantasies in conjunction with conscious elaboration is the transcendental function—Not every individual passes through all the stages described—For some the end of analysis is reached when the cure is achieved—Others are under a moral necessity to reach a full psychological development.
The unconscious can be risky when a person isn't aligned with it. However, it also creates harmonious combinations that can provide valuable insights. Combining fantasies with conscious thought is an essential function. Not everyone experiences all the stages discussed. For some, the analysis concludes when they feel healed, while others believe they have a moral obligation to reach full psychological growth.
Development of concepts—Removal of repression does not empty the unconscious—Repression is a special phenomenon—The unconscious contains not only repressed material, but subliminal sense-impressions which have never reached consciousness—It is constantly busied with new phantasy formation—Patients are urged to retain their hold on repressed materials that analysis has brought into consciousness—Prolonged analysis reveals contents other than those of a personal nature—Necessity to differentiate a layer called the "personal" unconscious whose materials originate in the personal past—Their omission from consciousness constitutes a defect or neglect—The moral reaction against this neglect shows they could become conscious if sufficient trouble were taken—The gradual transference of the personal unconscious contents into consciousness extends the periphery of consciousness.
Concept development—Removing repression doesn't clear the unconscious—Repression is a unique experience—The unconscious contains not only repressed materials but also subtle impressions that have never reached consciousness—It's always creating new fantasies—Patients are encouraged to hold on to repressed materials that analysis has revealed—In-depth analysis uncovers contents that have significance beyond personal issues—It's important to distinguish a layer known as the "personal" unconscious, which holds materials from an individual's personal history—Being unaware of these materials indicates a flaw or oversight—The moral response to this oversight implies that they could become conscious with enough effort—Gradually bringing personal unconscious contents into consciousness broadens awareness.
First result is increased self-consciousness—May lead to a sense of God-Almightiness in one type, or to overwhelming self-depreciation in the other—A result of ascribing to oneself qualities or vices that do not belong individually but collectively—The collective pysche divided into collective mind and collective soul—The collective contains the "parties inférieures" of Janet; the conscious and personal unconscious contains the "parties supérieures"—Incorporation of the impersonal unconscious leads to a dissolution of the pairs of opposites—As seen in neurotic, who combines megalomania and sense of inferiority in extreme degree—Primitive man possesses the collective vices and virtues in an undifferentiated way—Mental conflict only begins with conscious personal development—Desire to be good brings about repression of the bad—Collective view-point, though necessary, is dangerous to individuality—Collective psyche is the result of psychological differentiation of the gregarious instincts—Dangers of identification with collective psyche—Recognition of the different psychology of the types a safeguard, promoting a proper respect for individuality of the opposite type—Individuation hampered by man's suggestibility and tendency to imitation.
The first outcome is increased self-awareness—This can result in feelings of God-like superiority in one type, or deep self-hatred in another—It's about attributing qualities or faults to oneself that don’t solely belong to the individual but to the group—The collective psyche is split into a collective mind and a collective soul—The collective includes the "parties inférieures" of Janet; the conscious and personal unconscious hold the "parties supérieures"—Incorporating the impersonal unconscious causes a breakdown of opposing pairs—This is evident in the neurotic, who intensely merges grandiosity with a deep sense of inferiority—Primitive humans have collective virtues and vices in a mixed-up way—Mental conflict begins only with conscious personal growth—The wish to be good can lead to suppressing the bad—While the collective perspective is necessary, it can threaten individuality—The collective psyche results from the psychological differentiation of social instincts—There are risks in identifying with the collective psyche—Understanding the different psychology of types serves as a protective measure, encouraging respect for the individuality of the opposite type—Individuation is challenged by human suggestibility and the tendency to imitate.
The personal unconscious contains repressed materials capable of becoming conscious—By also incorporating the impersonal contents the state of God-Almightiness is brought about—The "persona" a mask for the collective psyche—Development of God-Almightiness, physical concomitants—Dissolution of the persona results in release of phantasy—Analogy with mental derangement—Difference consists in that the unconscious is at first deliberately brought into consciousness by consent, and later that it is recognised as having psychic validity only.
The personal unconscious contains repressed materials that can become conscious. By incorporating impersonal contents, one achieves a state of God-like power. The "persona" serves as a mask for the collective psyche. Developing this God-like power has physical effects. When the persona breaks down, it results in the release of fantasies. This resembles mental instability, but the key difference is that the unconscious is initially brought into consciousness with consent, and later it's acknowledged as having only psychic validity.
(i) The Regressive Restoration of the Persona—Three ways open, (a) Regressive application of a reductive theory; (b) application of God-Almightiness as a "virile protest;" (c) recognition of the primitive archaic collective psychology in man—Temptation to[xxviii] solve the difficulty by forgetting one has an unconscious—This does not work—The unconscious cannot be deprived of libido, nor its activity stilled for any length of time.
(i) The Regressive Restoration of the Persona—There are three options: (a) Using a simplified theory in a backward manner; (b) Viewing the concept of an all-powerful God as a "manly rebellion;" (c) Recognizing the basic, ancient collective mindset in humans—There's a temptation to [xxviii] tackle this issue by pretending that one doesn’t have an unconscious—This strategy fails—The unconscious cannot be stripped of libido, nor can its activity be suppressed for any significant duration.
(ii) Identification with the Collective Psyche—God-Almightiness developed into a system—Identification increases feeling for life or sense of power, according to the type—This, mystically understood, is the "yearning for the mother" of the hero-myth, or the "incest-wish" of Freud—It is the collective psyche that has to be overcome—Identification with the collective psyche is a failure because being lost in it, a bearable or satisfactory life is impossible.
(ii) Identification with the Collective Psyche—The idea of an all-powerful God developed into a system—Identifying with it enhances one's sense of life or personal power, depending on the individual—Mystically interpreted, this reflects the "yearning for the mother" in hero myths, or Freud's "incest wish"—The collective psyche must be transcended—Identifying with the collective psyche results in failure because losing oneself in it makes a fulfilling or satisfying life impossible.
Neither regressive restoration of the persona, nor identification with collective psyche solves the problem—Psychology will have to admit a plurality of principles—Only the collective part of individual psychology can be the subject of scientific study—What belongs to the psychology of the individual requires its own text-book—The persona must be strictly separated from the concept of the individual—What is individual is the remnant which can never be merged into the collective—Analysis of the persona transfers greater value on to the individuality, increasing its conflict with collectivity—The persona is identical with a one-sided attitude, being a typical attitude in which thought or feeling or intuition dominates, causing relative repression of the other functions—Dissolution of persona indispensable to individuation—The more individual a person is the more he assimilates and develops those attributes that are the basis of a collective concept of human nature—Unifying function between the conscious and unconscious, between the collective and individual is found in the phantasies—Phantasy the creative soil for everything that has brought development to humanity—Phantasy not to be taken literally but hermeneutically—Hermeneutics adds analogies to those already given—Hermeneutical interpretation indicates the means of synthesis of the individual, provided as soon as the symbolic outlines of the path are understood they are followed up—Co-operation and honest endeavour essential to cure—The moral factor determines the cure—"Life-lines" have a short and ephemeral value—Dreams are compensatory to conscious thinking—Watch must be kept for dreams indicative of causes of error—Hence the patient must remain in contact with the unconscious—End of analysis reached when enough psychological insight and mastery of technique is acquired to enable individual to follow his ever-changing life-line, and to retain hold on the libido currents which give conscious support to his individuality.
Going back to a previous version of ourselves or simply conforming to the group mindset won't solve the issue—Psychology needs to acknowledge that there are various principles—Only the collective aspects of individual psychology can be studied scientifically—The study of individual psychology requires its own textbook—The persona must be clearly separated from the idea of the individual—What is genuinely individual is the part that can never fully merge with the collective—Analyzing the persona places greater emphasis on individuality, which increases its tension with the collective—The persona is tied to a one-sided perspective, a typical viewpoint where thought, feeling, or intuition is prioritized, leading to the relative suppression of the other functions—Dissolving the persona is crucial for achieving wholeness—The more an individual develops, the more they absorb and cultivate traits that are foundational to a collective understanding of human nature—The connecting element between the conscious and unconscious, and between the collective and individual, can be found in fantasies—Fantasy is the creative basis for everything that has contributed to human development—Fantasy should be interpreted metaphorically rather than literally—Interpretation introduces new analogies beyond those previously mentioned—Interpretation shows how to integrate the individual once the symbolic framework of the journey is understood and acted upon—Collaboration and sincere effort are vital for healing—The moral aspect is essential to the healing process—"Life-lines" have a short and transient significance—Dreams help counterbalance conscious thought—We need to pay attention to dreams that reveal sources of error—Thus, the patient must remain connected to the unconscious—The analysis concludes when sufficient psychological understanding and mastery of technique have been achieved, enabling the individual to navigate their ever-changing life-line and maintain a connection to the libido currents that support their individuality consciously.
ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY
CHAPTER I
ON THE PSYCHOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY OF SO-CALLED OCCULT PHENOMENA[1]
ON THE PSYCHOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY OF SO-CALLED OCCULT PHENOMENA[1]
In that wide field of psychopathic deficiency where Science has demarcated the diseases of epilepsy, hysteria and neurasthenia, we meet scattered observations concerning certain rare states of consciousness as to whose meaning authors are not yet agreed. These observations spring up sporadically in the literature on narcolepsy, lethargy, automatisme ambulatoire, periodic amnesia, double consciousness, somnambulism, pathological dreamy states, pathological lying, etc.
In that broad area of psychopathic disorders where Science has defined the conditions of epilepsy, hysteria, and neurasthenia, we come across various observations about certain rare states of consciousness, the meanings of which authors still do not agree on. These observations appear occasionally in the literature on narcolepsy, lethargy, automatisme ambulatoire, periodic amnesia, double consciousness, sleepwalking, pathological dreamy states, pathological lying, and so on.
These states are sometimes attributed to epilepsy, sometimes to hysteria, sometimes to exhaustion of the nervous system, or neurasthenia, sometimes they are allowed all the dignity of a disease sui generis. Patients occasionally work through a whole graduated scale of diagnoses, from epilepsy, through hysteria, up to simulation. In practice, on the one hand, these conditions can only be separated with great difficulty from the so-called neuroses, sometimes even are indistinguishable from them; on the other, certain features in the region of pathological deficiency present more than a mere analogical relationship not only with phenomena of normal psychology, but also with the psychology of the supernormal, of genius. Various as are the individual phenomena in this region, there is certainly no case that cannot be connected by some intermediate example with the other typical cases. This relationship in the pictures presented by hysteria and epilepsy is very close. Recently the view has even been maintained that there is no clean-cut frontier between epilepsy and hysteria, and that a difference[2] is only to be noted in extreme cases. Steffens says, for example[2]—"We are forced to the conclusion that in essence hysteria and epilepsy are not fundamentally different, that the cause of the disease is the same, but is manifest in a diverse form, in different intensity and permanence."
These conditions are sometimes linked to epilepsy, sometimes to hysteria, sometimes to nervous system exhaustion, or neurasthenia, and at times they are considered a disease in their own right. Patients often go through a whole range of diagnoses, from epilepsy to hysteria to faking illness. In practice, on one hand, these conditions are really hard to distinguish from what's called neuroses, and sometimes they can't even be told apart; on the other hand, certain characteristics related to pathological deficiencies connect more than just analogously with normal psychology but also with the psychology of the extraordinary, of genius. Despite the various individual phenomena in this area, there's definitely no case that can't be linked through some intermediary example to other typical cases. The relationship between the symptoms presented by hysteria and epilepsy is very close. Recently, some have even argued that there's no clear boundary between epilepsy and hysteria, and that the difference only becomes noticeable in extreme cases. Steffens states, for example—"We are forced to the conclusion that in essence hysteria and epilepsy are not fundamentally different, that the cause of the disease is the same, but manifests in different forms, intensities, and durations."
The demarcation of hysteria and certain borderline cases of epilepsy from congenital and acquired psychopathic mental deficiency likewise presents the greatest difficulties. The symptoms of one or other disease everywhere invade the neighbouring realm, so violence is done to the facts when they are split off and considered as belonging to one or other realm. The demarcation of psychopathic mental deficiency from the normal is an absolutely impossible task, the difference is everywhere only "more or less." The classification in the region of mental deficiency itself is confronted by the same difficulty. At best, certain classes can be separated off which crystallise round some well-marked nucleus through having peculiarly typical features. Turning away from the two large groups of intellectual and emotional deficiency, there remain those deficiencies coloured pre-eminently by hysteria or epilepsy (epileptoid) or neurasthenia, which are not notably deficiency of the intellect or of feeling. It is essentially in this region, insusceptible of any absolute classification, that the above-named conditions play their part. As is well known, they can appear as part manifestations of a typical epilepsy or hysteria, or can exist separately in the realm of psychopathic mental deficiency, where their qualifications of epileptic or hysterical are often due to the non-essential accessory features. It is thus the rule to place somnambulism among hysterical diseases, because it is occasionally a phenomenon of severe hysteria, or because mild so-called hysterical symptoms may accompany it. Binet says: "Il n'y a pas une somnambulisme, état nerveux toujours identique à lui-même, il y a des somnambulismes." As one of the manifestations of a severe hysteria, somnambulism is not an unknown phenomenon, but as a pathological entity, as a disease sui generis, it must[3] be somewhat rare, to judge by its infrequency in German literature on the subject. So-called spontaneous somnambulism, resting upon a foundation of hysterically-tinged psychopathic deficiency, is not a very common occurrence and it is worth while to devote closer study to these cases, for they occasionally present a mass of interesting particulars.
The distinction between hysteria and certain borderline cases of epilepsy from congenital and acquired psychopathic mental deficiency is extremely challenging. The symptoms of these conditions often overlap, making it difficult to separate them and assign them to one specific category. Differentiating psychopathic mental deficiency from what is considered normal is an impossible task; the difference is always just "more or less." The classification within mental deficiency itself faces the same issue. At best, some classes can be identified that center around specific, well-defined features. Beyond the two main groups of intellectual and emotional deficiencies, there are issues primarily characterized by hysteria or epilepsy (epileptoid) or neurasthenia, which don't show significant deficits in intellect or emotion. This area, which defies absolute classification, is where these conditions are relevant. As is widely recognized, they can manifest as part of typical epilepsy or hysteria, or they can exist separately within psychopathic mental deficiency, where their classification as epileptic or hysterical often depends on non-essential additional features. It is a common practice to categorize somnambulism among hysterical disorders because it can occasionally be a manifestation of severe hysteria or be accompanied by mild hysterical symptoms. Binet states: "There is no single type of somnambulism; there are different kinds of somnambulism." As a manifestation of severe hysteria, somnambulism is not uncommon, yet as a pathological condition, as a unique disease sui generis, it appears to be relatively rare, judging by its infrequency in German literature on the topic. So-called spontaneous somnambulism, based on a foundation of hysterically tinted psychopathic deficiency, is not very common, and it’s worthwhile to study these cases more closely since they often reveal a wealth of intriguing details.
Case of Miss Elise K., aged 40, single; book-keeper in a large business; no hereditary taint, except that it is alleged a brother became slightly nervous after family misfortune and illness. Well educated, of a cheerful, joyous nature, not of a saving disposition, always occupied with some big idea. She was very kind-hearted and gentle, did a great deal both for her parents, who were living in very modest circumstances, and for strangers. Nevertheless she was not happy, because she thought she did not understand herself. She had always enjoyed good health till a few years ago, when she is said to have been treated for dilatation of the stomach and tapeworm. During this illness her hair became rapidly white, later she had typhoid fever. An engagement was terminated by the death of her fiancé from paralysis. She had been very nervous for a year and a half. In the summer of 1897 she went away for change of air and treatment by hydropathy. She herself says that for about a year she has had moments during work when her thoughts seem to stand still, but she does not fall asleep. Nevertheless she makes no mistakes in the accounts at such times. She has often been to the wrong street and then suddenly noticed that she was not in the right place. She has had no giddiness or attacks of fainting. Formerly menstruation occurred regularly every four weeks, and without any pain, but since she has been nervous and overworked it has come every fourteen days. For a long time she has suffered from constant headache. As accountant and book-keeper in a large establishment, the patient has had very strenuous work, which she performs well and conscientiously. In addition to the strenuous character of her work, in the last year she had various new worries. Her brother was suddenly divorced.[4] In addition to her own work, she looked after his housekeeping, nursed him and his child in a serious illness, and so on. To recuperate, she took a journey on the 13th September to see a woman friend in South Germany. The great joy at seeing her friend from whom she had been long separated, and her participation in some festivities, deprived her of her rest. On the 15th, she and her friend drank half a bottle of claret. This was contrary to her usual habit. They then went for a walk in a cemetery, where she began to tear up flowers and to scratch at the graves. She remembered absolutely nothing of this afterwards. On the 16th she remained with her friend without anything of importance happening. On the 17th her friend brought her to Zürich. An acquaintance came with her to the Asylum; on the way she spoke quite sensibly, but was very tired. Outside the Asylum they met three boys, whom she described as the "three dead people she had dug up." She then wanted to go to the neighbouring cemetery, but was persuaded to come to the Asylum.
Case of Miss Elise K., 40 years old, single; bookkeeper in a large company; no hereditary issues, except there are claims that a brother became a bit anxious after family misfortunes and illness. She was well-educated, had a cheerful and joyful personality, and wasn't good at saving money, always preoccupied with some big idea. She was very kind and gentle, doing a lot for her parents, who lived in very modest conditions, as well as for strangers. Despite this, she wasn't happy because she felt she didn't understand herself. She had always been in good health until a few years ago when she was allegedly treated for stomach dilation and tapeworm. During this illness, her hair turned white quickly, and later she had typhoid fever. An engagement ended with her fiancé's death from paralysis. She had been very anxious for a year and a half. In the summer of 1897, she went away for fresh air and hydropathy treatment. She says that for about a year, there have been moments at work when her thoughts stop, but she doesn't fall asleep. However, she doesn't make mistakes in the accounts during those times. She often went to the wrong street and suddenly realized she was not in the right place. She hasn't experienced dizziness or fainting spells. Menstruation was regular every four weeks without pain, but since becoming anxious and overworked, it has come every fourteen days. She has suffered from constant headaches for a long time. As an accountant and bookkeeper in a large organization, she has had very demanding work, which she performs well and diligently. In addition to her demanding job, over the past year, she faced new worries. Her brother was suddenly divorced.[4] Besides her own work, she took care of his household, nursed him and his child during a serious illness, and so on. To recuperate, she traveled on September 13th to visit a female friend in South Germany. The great joy of seeing her long-separated friend and participating in some festivities kept her from resting. On the 15th, she and her friend shared half a bottle of claret. This was unusual for her. They then went for a walk in a cemetery, where she started to tear up flowers and scratch at the graves. She remembered absolutely nothing of this afterward. On the 16th, she stayed with her friend, and nothing significant happened. On the 17th, her friend brought her to Zürich. An acquaintance accompanied them to the Asylum; on the way, she spoke quite sensibly but was very tired. Outside the Asylum, they encountered three boys, whom she referred to as the "three dead people she had dug up." She then wanted to go to the nearby cemetery but was persuaded to go to the Asylum instead.
She is small, delicately formed, slightly anæmic. The heart is slightly enlarged to the left, there are no murmurs, but some reduplication of the sounds, the mitral being markedly accentuated. The liver dulness reaches to the border of the ribs. Patella-reflex is somewhat increased, but otherwise no tendon-reflexes. There is neither anæsthesia, analgesia, nor paralysis. Rough examination of the field of vision with the hands shows no contraction. The patient's hair is a very light yellow-white colour; on the whole she looks her age. She gives her history and tells recent events quite clearly, but has no recollection of what took place in the cemetery at C. or outside the Asylum. During the night of the 17th-18th she spoke to the attendant and declared she saw the whole room full of dead people—looking like skeletons. She was not at all frightened, but was rather surprised that the attendant did not see them too. Once she ran to the window, but was otherwise quiet. The next morning, while still in bed, she saw skeletons, but not in the afternoon. The following night at four o'clock she awoke and heard the dead children in the neighbouring[5] cemetery cry out that they had been buried alive. She wanted to go out to dig them up, but allowed herself to be restrained. Next morning at seven o'clock she was still delirious, but recalled accurately the events in the cemetery at C. and those on approaching the Asylum. She stated that at C. she wanted to dig up the dead children who were calling her. She had only torn up the flowers to free the graves and to be able to get at them. In this state Professor Bleuler explained to her that later on, when in a normal state again, she would remember everything. The patient slept in the morning, afterwards was quite clear, and felt herself relatively well. She did indeed remember the attacks, but maintained a remarkable indifference towards them. The following nights, with the exception of those of the 22nd and the 25th September, she again had slight attacks of delirium, when once more she had to deal with the dead. The details of the attacks differed, however. Twice she saw the dead in her bed, but she did not appear to be afraid of them, she got out of bed frequently, however, because she did not want "to inconvenience the dead"; several times she wanted to leave the room.
She is small, delicately built, and a bit anemic. The heart is slightly enlarged to the left, there are no murmurs, but some doubling of the sounds, with the mitral sounds being particularly strong. The liver dullness extends to the edge of the ribs. The knee-jerk reflex is somewhat heightened, but that's about it for the reflexes. There is no numbness, loss of pain sensation, or paralysis. A rough examination of the visual field with the hands shows no narrowing. The patient's hair is a very light yellow-white color; overall, she looks her age. She recounts her history and recent events quite clearly but has no memory of what happened in the cemetery at C. or outside the Asylum. During the night of the 17th-18th, she spoke to the attendant and claimed she saw the whole room filled with dead people—looking like skeletons. She wasn't scared at all, just surprised that the attendant couldn't see them too. At one point, she ran to the window but otherwise remained calm. The next morning, while still in bed, she saw skeletons, but not in the afternoon. The following night at four o'clock, she woke up and heard the dead children in the nearby cemetery crying out that they had been buried alive. She wanted to go out to dig them up, but let herself be held back. The next morning at seven, she was still delirious but accurately remembered the events in the cemetery at C. and those as she approached the Asylum. She said that in C., she wanted to dig up the dead children who were calling to her. She had only pulled up the flowers to clear the graves and get to them. In this state, Professor Bleuler told her that later, when she was feeling normal again, she'd remember everything. The patient slept in the morning, then was quite clear and felt relatively well. She did remember the episodes but showed a remarkable indifference toward them. On the following nights, except for the 22nd and 25th of September, she experienced slight episodes of delirium again, dealing once more with the dead. However, the details of these episodes varied. Twice she saw the dead in her bed, but she didn’t seem afraid of them; she frequently got out of bed because she didn’t want to "inconvenience the dead," and several times she wanted to leave the room.
After a few nights free from attacks there was a slight one on the 30th Sept., when she called the dead from the window. During the day her mind was clear. On the 3rd of October she saw a whole crowd of skeletons in the drawingroom, as she afterwards related, during full consciousness. Although she doubted the reality of the skeletons, she could not convince herself that it was a hallucination. The following night, between twelve and one o'clock—the earlier attacks were usually about this time—she was obsessed with the idea of dead people for about ten minutes. She sat up in bed, stared at a corner and said: "Well, come!—but they're not all there. Come along! Why don't you come? The room is big enough, there's room for all; when all are there, I'll come too." Then she lay down with the words: "Now they're all there," and fell asleep again. In the morning she had not the slightest recollection of any of these attacks. Very short attacks occurred in the nights of the 4th, 6th,[6] 9th, 13th and 15th of October, between twelve and one o'clock. The last three occurred during the menstrual period. The attendant spoke to her several times, showed her the lighted street-lamps, and trees; but she did not react to this conversation. Since then the attacks have altogether ceased. The patient has complained about a number of troubles which she had had all along. She suffered much from headache the morning after the attacks. She said it was unbearable. Five grains of Sacch. lactis promptly alleviated this; then she complained of pains in both fore-arms, which she described as if it were a teno-synovitis. She regarded the bulging of the muscles in flexion as a swelling, and asked to be massaged. Nothing could be seen objectively, and no attention being paid to it, the trouble disappeared. She complained exceedingly and for a long time about the thickening of a toenail, even after the thickened part had been removed. Sleep was often disturbed. She would not give her consent to be hypnotised for the night-attacks. Finally on account of headache and disturbed sleep she agreed to hypnotic treatment. She proved a good subject, and at the first sitting fell into deep sleep with analgesia and amnesia.
After a few nights without any attacks, there was a minor one on September 30th when she called out to the dead from the window. During the day, her mind was clear. On October 3rd, she claimed to see a whole bunch of skeletons in the drawing room while fully aware. Although she questioned whether the skeletons were real, she couldn't convince herself that it was just a hallucination. The following night, between midnight and 1 AM—when the earlier attacks usually occurred—she became fixated on the idea of dead people for about ten minutes. She sat up in bed, stared into a corner, and said, "Okay, come!—but they're not all here. Come on! Why aren't you coming? There’s enough space; when everyone is here, I’ll come too." Then she lay back down saying, "Now they're all here," and fell asleep again. In the morning, she had no memory of any of these incidents. There were brief attacks on the nights of October 4th, 6th, 9th, 13th, and 15th, all between midnight and 1 AM. The last three happened during her menstrual period. The attendant spoke to her multiple times, pointing out the street lamps and trees, but she didn’t respond to the conversation. After that, the attacks completely stopped. The patient complained about various issues she'd been experiencing all along. She suffered a lot from headaches the morning after the attacks, describing them as unbearable. Five grains of Sacch. lactis quickly relieved this, but then she started complaining about pain in both forearms, which she described like it was tenosynovitis. She viewed the bulging of her muscles when flexed as swelling and requested a massage. Nothing was visibly wrong, and since no attention was paid to it, the issue faded away. She complained a great deal and for an extended time about a toenail thickening, even after the thickened part was removed. Her sleep was often disrupted. She refused to allow herself to be hypnotized for the night attacks. Finally, due to the headaches and disturbed sleep, she agreed to hypnotic treatment. She turned out to be a good subject and fell into a deep sleep with pain relief and memory loss during the first session.
In November she was again asked whether she could now remember the attack on the 19th September which it had been suggested that she would recall. It gave her great trouble to recollect it, and in the end she could only state the chief facts, she had forgotten the details.
In November, she was asked again if she could now remember the attack from September 19th that people had suggested she would recall. She had a hard time bringing it to mind, and in the end, she could only mention the main facts; she had forgotten the details.
It should be added that the patient was not superstitious, and in her healthy days had never particularly interested herself in the supernatural. During the whole course of treatment, which ended on the 14th November, great indifference was evinced both to the illness and the cure. Next spring the patient returned for out-patient treatment of the headache, which had come back during the very hard work of these months. Apart from this symptom her condition left nothing to be desired. It was demonstrated that she had no remembrance of the attacks of the previous autumn, not even of those of the 19th September and earlier. On the[7] other hand, in hypnosis she could recount the proceedings in the cemetery and during the nightly disturbances.
It should be noted that the patient wasn’t superstitious, and during her healthy days, she had never really been interested in the supernatural. Throughout the treatment, which ended on November 14th, she showed a great indifference to both her illness and the cure. The following spring, the patient returned for outpatient treatment for the headache, which had resurfaced during the very intense work of those months. Aside from this symptom, her condition was otherwise satisfactory. It was shown that she had no recollection of the attacks from the previous autumn, not even those from September 19th and earlier. On the[7] other hand, while in hypnosis, she could recount what happened in the cemetery and during the nighttime disturbances.
By the peculiar hallucination and by its appearance our case recalls the conditions which V. Kraft-Ebing has described as "protracted states of hysterical delirium." He says: "Such conditions of delirium occur in the slighter cases of hysteria. Protracted hysterical delirium is built upon a foundation of temporary exhaustion. Excitement seems to determine an outbreak, and it readily recurs. Most frequently there is persecution-delirium with very violent anxiety, sometimes of a religious or erotic character. Hallucinations of all the senses are not rare, but illusions of sight, smell and feeling are the commonest, and most important. The visual hallucinations are especially visions of animals, pictures of corpses, phantastic processions in which dead persons, devils and ghosts swarm. The illusions of hearing are simply sounds (shrieks, howlings, claps of thunder) or local hallucinations, frequently with a sexual content."
By the unusual hallucination and its appearance, our case brings to mind the conditions that V. Kraft-Ebing described as "prolonged states of hysterical delirium." He states: "These delirious conditions occur in milder cases of hysteria. Prolonged hysterical delirium is based on a foundation of temporary exhaustion. Excitement seems to trigger an episode, and it can easily reoccur. Most often, there is persecution delirium accompanied by intense anxiety, which can sometimes have religious or erotic themes. Hallucinations involving all the senses are not uncommon, but illusions of sight, smell, and touch are the most frequent and significant. Visual hallucinations particularly include visions of animals, images of corpses, and fantastical processions featuring dead people, demons, and ghosts. The auditory illusions consist of various sounds (screams, wails, thunderclaps) or localized hallucinations, often with a sexual undertone."
This patient's visions of corpses, occurring almost always in attacks, recall the states occasionally seen in hystero-epilepsy. There likewise occur specific visions which, in contrast with protracted delirium, are connected with single attacks.
This patient's visions of corpses, which almost always happen during episodes, remind us of the conditions sometimes observed in hystero-epilepsy. There are also specific visions that, unlike prolonged delirium, are linked to individual episodes.
(1) A lady 30 years of age with grande hystérie had twilight states in which as a rule she was troubled by terrible hallucinations; she saw her children carried away from her, wild beasts eating them up, and so on. She has amnesia for the content of the individual attacks.[3]
(1) A 30-year-old woman with grande hystérie experienced twilight states during which she was typically plagued by horrifying hallucinations; she saw her children being taken from her, wild animals devouring them, and similar visions. She has no memory of the specific details of each episode.[3]
(2) A girl of 17, likewise a semi-hysteric, saw in her attacks the corpse of her dead mother approaching her to draw her to her. Patient has amnesia for the attacks.[4]
(2) A 17-year-old girl, who was also somewhat hysterical, experienced her episodes as the ghost of her deceased mother coming toward her, trying to pull her in. The patient has amnesia regarding the episodes.[4]
These are cases of severe hysteria wherein consciousness rests upon a profound stage of dreaming. The nature of the attack and the stability of the hallucination alone show a certain kinship with our case, which in this respect has [8]numerous analogies with the corresponding states of hysteria. For instance, with those cases where a psychical shock (rape, etc.) was the occasion for the outbreak of hysterical attacks, and where at times the original incident is lived over again, stereotyped in the hallucination. But our case gets its specific mould from the identity of the consciousness in the different attacks. It is an "Etat Second" with its own memory and separated from the waking state by complete amnesia. This differentiates it from the above-mentioned twilight states and links it to the so-called somnambulic conditions.
These are instances of severe hysteria where consciousness is influenced by a deep level of dreaming. The nature of the episode and the consistency of the hallucination show a clear connection to our case, which shares many similarities with the related states of hysteria. For example, in cases where a psychological trauma (like rape) triggered the onset of hysterical episodes, the original incident is sometimes experienced again, repeating itself in the hallucination. However, our case is uniquely shaped by the consistency of consciousness during the different episodes. It’s a “Second State” with its own memories, completely separate from the waking state by total amnesia. This sets it apart from the previously mentioned twilight states and connects it to what are known as somnambulic conditions.
Charcot[5] divides the somnambulic states into two chief classes:—
Charcot[5] categorizes the sleepwalking states into two main groups:—
1. Delirium with well-marked incoordination of representation and action.
Delirium with obvious symptoms and coordination issues.
2. Delirium with co-ordinated action. This approaches the waking state.
2. Delirium with coordinated action. This is close to the waking state.
Our case belongs to the latter class.
Our case falls into the latter category.
If by somnambulism be understood a state of systematised partial waking,[6] any critical review of this affection must take account of those exceptional cases of recurrent amnesias which have been observed now and again. These, apart from nocturnal ambulism, are the simplest conditions of systematised partial waking. Naef's case is certainly the most remarkable in the literature. It deals with a gentleman of 32, with a very bad family history presenting numerous signs of degeneration, partly functional, partly organic. In consequence of over-work at the age of 17 he had a peculiar twilight state with delusions, which lasted some days and was cured with a sudden recovery of memory. Later he was subject to frequent attacks of giddiness and palpitation of the heart and vomiting; but these attacks were never attended by loss of consciousness. At the termination of some feverish illness [9]he suddenly travelled from Australia to Zürich, where he lived for some weeks in careless cheerfulness, and only came to himself when he read in the paper of his sudden disappearance from Australia. He had a total and retrograde amnesia for the several months which included the journey to Australia, his sojourn there and the return journey.
If we understand somnambulism as a state of organized partial waking,[6] any critical review of this condition must consider those rare cases of repeated amnesia that have been observed from time to time. These, aside from sleepwalking, are the simplest forms of organized partial waking. Naef's case is definitely the most notable in the literature. It involves a 32-year-old man with a very bad family history showing numerous signs of degeneration, both functional and organic. Due to overwork at age 17, he experienced a strange twilight state with delusions that lasted several days and was resolved by a sudden recovery of memory. Later, he suffered frequent episodes of dizziness, heart palpitations, and vomiting; however, these episodes never involved loss of consciousness. After some feverish illness, he suddenly traveled from Australia to Zürich, where he lived for several weeks in a carefree state, only realizing what happened when he read in the newspaper about his sudden disappearance from Australia. He had complete and retrograde amnesia for the months that included his journey to Australia, his time there, and the return trip.
Azam[7] has published a case of periodic amnesia. Albert X., 12-1/2 years old, of hysterical disposition, was several times attacked in the course of a few years by conditions of amnesia in which he forgot reading, writing and arithmetic, even at times his own language, for several weeks at a stretch. The intervals were normal.
Azam[7] has published a case of periodic amnesia. Albert X., 12 and a half years old, with a hysterical temperament, experienced multiple episodes of amnesia over several years, during which he forgot how to read, write, and do arithmetic, and at times even forgot his own language, lasting for several weeks at a time. His intervals between episodes were normal.
Proust[8] has published a case of Automatisme ambulatoire with pronounced hysteria which differs from Naef's in the repeated occurrence of the attacks. An educated man, 30 years old, exhibits all the signs of grande hystérie; he is very suggestible, has from time to time, under the influence of excitement, attacks of amnesia which last from two days to several weeks. During these states he wanders about, visits relatives, destroys various objects, incurs debts, and has even been convicted of "picking pockets."
Proust[8] has published a case of Automatisme ambulatoire with notable hysteria that differs from Naef's due to the repeated nature of the episodes. A 30-year-old educated man shows all the signs of grande hystérie; he is highly suggestible and, at times of excitement, experiences memory loss that can last anywhere from two days to several weeks. During these episodes, he wanders around, visits relatives, destroys various items, racks up debts, and has even been convicted of "picking pockets."
Boileau describes a similar case[9] of wandering-impulse. A widow of 22, highly hysterical, became terrified at the prospect of a necessary operation for salpingitis; she left the hospital and fell into a state of somnambulism, from which she awoke three days later with total amnesia. During these three days she had travelled a distance of about 60 kilometres to fetch her child.
Boileau describes a similar case[9] of wandering impulse. A 22-year-old widow, who was very anxious, became frightened at the thought of a necessary surgery for salpingitis; she left the hospital and entered a state of sleepwalking, from which she woke up three days later with complete amnesia. During those three days, she had traveled around 60 kilometers to get her child.
William James has described a case of an "ambulatory sort."[10]
William James has described a case of an "ambulatory sort."[10]
The Rev. Ansel Bourne, an itinerant preacher, 30 years of age, psychopathic, had on a few occasions attacks of loss of consciousness lasting one hour. One day (January 17, 1887) he suddenly disappeared from Greene, after having [10]taken 551 dollars out of the bank. He remained hidden for two months. During this time he had taken a little shop under the name of H. J. Browne in Norriston, Pa., and had carefully attended to all purchases, although he had never done this sort of work before. On March 14, 1887, he suddenly awoke and went back home, and had complete amnesia for the interval.
The Rev. Ansel Bourne, a traveling preacher, 30 years old and mentally unstable, experienced several episodes of losing consciousness that lasted an hour. One day (January 17, 1887), he suddenly vanished from Greene after withdrawing 551 dollars from the bank. He stayed hidden for two months. During this time, he opened a small shop under the name H. J. Browne in Norriston, PA, where he managed all the purchases, even though he had never done this kind of work before. On March 14, 1887, he suddenly regained consciousness and returned home, having no memory of the time in between.
Mesnet[11] publishes the following case:—
F., 27 years old, sergeant in the African regiment, was wounded in the parietal bone at Bazeilles. Suffered for a year from hemiplegia, which disappeared when the wound healed. During the course of his illness the patient had attacks of somnambulism, with marked limitation of consciousness; all the senses were paralysed, with the exception of taste and a small portion of the visual sense. The movements were co-ordinated, but obstacles in the way of their performance were overcome with difficulty. During the attacks he had an absurd collecting-mania. By various manipulations one could demonstrate a hallucinatory content in his consciousness; for instance, when a stick was put in his hand he would feel himself transported to a battle scene, would place himself on guard, see the enemy approaching, etc.
F., 27 years old, a sergeant in the African regiment, was injured in the parietal bone at Bazeilles. He experienced hemiplegia for a year, which went away once the wound healed. Throughout his illness, he had episodes of sleepwalking, with a significant reduction in awareness; all his senses were paralyzed except for taste and a limited part of his vision. His movements were coordinated, but he struggled to overcome obstacles. During these episodes, he developed a bizarre obsession with collecting things. Through various manipulations, it was possible to reveal some hallucinatory experiences in his mind; for example, when a stick was placed in his hand, he would feel like he was transported to a battlefield, standing guard, and seeing the enemy approaching, etc.
Guinon and Sophie Waltke[12] made the following experiments on hysterics:—
Guinon and Sophie Waltke[12] conducted the following experiments on hysterics:—
A blue glass was held in front of the eyes of a female patient during a hysterical attack; she regularly saw the picture of her mother in the blue sky. A red glass showed her a bleeding wound, a yellow one an orange-seller or a lady with a yellow dress.
A blue glass was held up in front of a female patient during a hysterical episode; she often saw her mother’s face in the blue sky. A red glass revealed a bleeding wound, while a yellow one showed her an orange seller or a woman in a yellow dress.
Mesnet's case reminds one of the cases of occasional attacks of shrinkage of memory.
Mesnet's situation is similar to instances of occasional memory lapses.
MacNish[13] communicates a similar case.
An apparently healthy young lady suddenly fell into an abnormally long and deep sleep—it is said without prodromal [11]symptoms. On awaking she had forgotten the words for and the knowledge of the simplest things. She had again to learn to read, write, and count; her progress was rapid in this re-learning. After a second attack she again woke in her normal state, but without recollection of the period when she had forgotten things. These states alternated for more than four years, during which consciousness showed continuity within the two states, but was separated by an amnesia from the consciousness of the normal state.
A seemingly healthy young woman suddenly fell into an unusually long and deep sleep—reportedly without any warning signs. When she woke up, she had forgotten the names and knowledge of the simplest things. She had to learn how to read, write, and count all over again; she progressed quickly in this relearning. After a second episode, she woke up in her normal state again, but with no memory of the time when she had forgotten things. These states alternated for over four years, during which her consciousness showed continuity between the two states, but there was an amnesia separating it from her normal state.
These selected cases of various forms of changes of consciousness all throw a certain light upon our case. Naef's case presents two hysteriform eclipses of memory, one of which is marked by the appearance of delusions, and the other by its long duration, contraction of the field of consciousness, and desire to wander. The peculiar associated impulses are specially clear in the cases of Proust and Mesnet. In our case the impulsive tearing up of the flowers, the digging up of the graves, form a parallel. The continuity of consciousness which the patient presents in the individual attacks recalls the behaviour of the consciousness in MacNish's case; hence our case may be regarded as a transient phenomenon of alternating consciousness. The dreamlike hallucinatory content of the limited consciousness in our case does not, however, justify an unqualified assignment to this group of double consciousness. The hallucinations in the second state show a certain creativeness which seems to be conditioned by the auto-suggestibility of this state. In Mesnet's case we noticed the appearance of hallucinatory processes from simple stimulation of touch. The patient's subconsciousness employs simple perceptions for the automatic construction of complicated scenes which then take possession of the limited consciousness. A somewhat similar view must be taken about our patient's hallucinations; at least, the external conditions which gave rise to the appearance of the hallucinations seem to strengthen our supposition. The walk in the cemetery induces the vision of the skeletons; the meeting with the three boys arouses the hallucination of children buried alive whose voices the patient hears at night-time.[12] She arrived at the cemetery in a somnambulic state, which on this occasion was specially intense in consequence of her having taken alcohol. She performed actions almost instinctively about which her subconsciousness nevertheless did receive certain impressions. (The part played here by alcohol must not be underestimated. We know from experience that it does not only act adversely upon these conditions, but, like every other narcotic, it gives rise to a certain increase of suggestibility.) The impressions received in somnambulism subconsciously form independent growths, and finally reach perception as hallucinations. Thus our case closely corresponds to those somnambulic dream-states which have recently been subjected to a penetrating study in England and France.
These selected cases of different kinds of altered states of consciousness all shed some light on our situation. Naef's case shows two types of memory loss resembling hysteria; one is marked by delusions, while the other lasts a long time, narrows the scope of awareness, and leads to a desire to wander. The related impulses are particularly evident in the cases of Proust and Mesnet. In our case, the impulsive act of tearing up flowers and digging up graves draws a parallel. The continuity of consciousness during the individual episodes in our patient reminds us of the behavior seen in MacNish's case; thus, our case can be viewed as a temporary occurrence of alternating consciousness. However, the dreamlike hallucinatory nature of the limited consciousness in our case does not fully qualify it for this category of double consciousness. The hallucinations in the second state show a certain creativity that seems influenced by the self-suggestive nature of this state. In Mesnet's case, we noted the emergence of hallucinatory processes from simple touch stimulation. The patient's subconscious uses basic perceptions to automatically create complex scenes, which then take over the limited consciousness. A similar perspective should be applied to our patient’s hallucinations; at least, the external conditions that triggered these hallucinations seem to support our assumption. A walk in the cemetery sparks visions of skeletons; encountering three boys triggers hallucinations of children buried alive whose voices the patient hears at night.[12] She arrived at the cemetery in a sleepwalking state, which was particularly intense this time because she had consumed alcohol. She acted almost instinctively, yet her subconscious still registered certain impressions. (The role of alcohol here should not be overlooked. We know from experience that it not only negatively affects these conditions but, like any other narcotic, increases suggestibility.) The impressions gathered during sleepwalking form independent thoughts in the subconscious and, eventually, manifest as hallucinations. Thus, our case closely aligns with those sleepwalking dream states that have recently been the subject of detailed studies in England and France.
These lapses of memory, which at first seem without content, gain a content by means of accidental auto-suggestion, and this content builds itself up automatically to a certain extent. It achieves no further development, probably on account of the improvement now beginning, and finally it disappears altogether as recovery sets in. Binet and Féré have made numerous experiments on the implanting of suggestions in states of partial sleep. They have shown, for example, that when a pencil is put in the anæsthetic hand of a hysteric, letters of great length are written automatically whose contents are unknown to the patient's consciousness. Cutaneous stimuli in anæsthetic regions are sometimes perceived as visual images, or at least as vivid associated visual presentations. These independent transmutations of simple stimuli must be regarded as primary phenomena in the formation of somnambulic dream-pictures. Analogous manifestations occur in exceptional cases within the sphere of waking consciousness. Goethe,[14] for instance, states that[13] when he sat down, lowered his head and vividly conjured up the image of a flower, he saw it undergoing changes of its own accord, as if entering into new combinations.
These gaps in memory, which initially seem empty, acquire meaning through random suggestions, and this meaning develops on its own to some extent. It doesn't progress any further, probably due to the healing process that is beginning, and eventually, it disappears completely as recovery occurs. Binet and Féré conducted many experiments on how suggestions can be implanted during states of partial sleep. They demonstrated, for example, that when a pencil is placed in the anesthetized hand of a hysteric, long letters are automatically written whose meanings are unknown to the patient's awareness. Touch sensations in anesthetic areas can sometimes be perceived as visual images, or at least as vivid visual associations. These unique transformations of basic stimuli should be seen as fundamental phenomena in the creation of somnambulistic dream images. Similar occurrences happen in rare cases within waking consciousness. Goethe,[14] for instance, states that[13] when he sat down, lowered his head, and clearly imagined a flower, he saw it changing on its own, as if it were forming new combinations.
In half-waking states these manifestations are relatively frequent in the so-called hypnagogic hallucinations. The automatisms which the Goethe example illustrates are differentiated from the truly somnambulic, inasmuch as the primary presentation is a conscious one in this case; the further development of the automatism is maintained within the definite limits of the original presentation, that is, within the purely motor or visual region.
In semi-wakeful states, these experiences commonly occur in what's known as hypnagogic hallucinations. The automatisms illustrated by the Goethe example are distinct from true sleepwalking, as the initial experience is conscious in this case; the subsequent development of the automatism remains within the clear boundaries of the original experience, meaning it stays within the purely motor or visual realm.
If the primary presentation disappears, or if it is never conscious at all, and if the automatic development overlaps neighbouring regions, we lose every possibility of a demarcation between waking automatisms and those of the somnambulic state; this will occur, for instance, if the presentation of a hand plucking the flower gets joined to the perception of the flower or the presentation of the smell of the flower. We can then only differentiate it by the more or less. In one case we then speak of the "waking hallucinations of the normal," in the other, of the dream-vision of the somnambulists. The interpretation of our patient's attacks as hysterical becomes more certain by the demonstration of a probably psychogenic origin of the hallucination. This is confirmed by her troubles, headache and teno-synovitis, which have shown themselves amenable to suggestive treatment. The ætiological factor alone is not sufficient for the diagnosis of hysteria; it might really be expected a priori that in the course of a disease which is so suitably treated by rest, as in the treatment of an exhaustion-state, features would be observed here and there which could be interpreted as manifestations of exhaustion. The question arises whether the early lapses and later somnambulic attacks could not be conceived as states of exhaustion, so-called "neurasthenic crises." We know that in the realm of psychopathic mental deficiency there can arise the most diverse epileptoid accidents, whose classification under epilepsy or hysteria is at least doubtful. To quote C. Westphal: "On the basis of[14] numerous observations, I maintain that the so-called epileptoid attacks form one of the most universal and commonest symptoms in the group of diseases which we reckon among the mental diseases and neuropathies; the mere appearance of one or more epileptic or epileptoid attacks is not decisive for its course and prognosis. As mentioned, I have used the concept of epileptoid in the widest sense for the attack itself."[15]
If the main presentation disappears, or if it's never fully conscious, and if the automatic development overlaps with other areas, we lose all ability to distinguish between waking automatisms and those of the sleepwalking state; this will happen, for example, if the image of a hand picking a flower merges with the perception of the flower or the scent of the flower. We can then only differentiate it by degree. In one case, we refer to it as "waking hallucinations of the normal," and in the other, as the dream-like vision of sleepwalkers. The interpretation of our patient’s episodes as hysterical becomes more certain with evidence suggesting a likely psychological origin of the hallucination. This is supported by her issues, such as headaches and teno-synovitis, which have been responsive to suggestive treatment. The causal factor alone isn't sufficient for diagnosing hysteria; it could reasonably be expected that throughout a condition that is effectively treated by rest, as in cases of exhaustion, there would be signs here and there that could be seen as manifestations of exhaustion. The question arises whether the early lapses and later sleepwalking episodes could be understood as states of exhaustion, referred to as "neurasthenic crises." We know that within psychopathic mental deficiency, various epileptoid events can occur, and classifying them as either epilepsy or hysteria is at least questionable. To quote C. Westphal: "Based on numerous observations, I maintain that so-called epileptoid attacks are among the most universal and common symptoms in the category of diseases we classify as mental illnesses and neuropathies; merely having one or more epileptic or epileptoid episodes is not conclusive for its progression and prognosis. As mentioned, I have used the term epileptoid in the broadest sense for the episode itself."
The epileptoid moments of our case are not far to seek; the objection can, however, be raised that the colouring of the whole picture is hysterical in the extreme. Against this, however, it must be stated that every somnambulism is not eo ipso hysterical. Occasionally states occur in typical epilepsy which to experts seem parallel with somnambulic states,[16] or which can only be distinguished by the existence of genuine convulsions.[17]
The epileptoid moments in our case are easy to identify; however, one could argue that the overall tone is extremely hysterical. On the other hand, it's important to point out that not every instance of somnambulism is inherently hysterical. Sometimes, there are situations in typical epilepsy that experts find similar to somnambulistic states,[16] or which can only be differentiated by the presence of actual convulsions.[17]
I am indebted to Professor Bleuler for the report of the following case:—
I am grateful to Professor Bleuler for the report of the following case:—
An educated gentleman of middle age—without epileptic antecedents—had exhausted himself by many years of over-strenuous mental work. Without other prodromal symptoms (such as depression, etc.) he attempted suicide during a holiday; in a peculiar twilight state he suddenly threw himself into the water from a bank, in sight of many persons. He was at once pulled out and retained but a fleeting remembrance of the occurrence.
An educated middle-aged man—without any history of epilepsy—had worn himself out from years of intense mental work. Without any other early warning signs (like depression or similar issues), he tried to take his own life while on vacation; in a strange dazed state, he suddenly jumped into the water from the riverbank, right in front of many people. He was quickly rescued and only had a vague memory of what happened.
Bearing these observations in mind, neurasthenia must be allowed to account for a considerable share in the attacks[15] of our patient, Miss E. K. The headaches and the teno-synovitis point to the existence of a relatively mild hysteria, generally latent, but becoming manifest under the influence of exhaustion. The genesis of this peculiar illness explains the relationship which has been described between epilepsy, hysteria and neurasthenia.
Keeping these observations in mind, neurasthenia should be recognized as a significant factor in the episodes experienced by our patient, Miss E. K. The headaches and tenosynovitis suggest the presence of a relatively mild form of hysteria, usually inactive but becoming apparent due to exhaustion. The origin of this unique condition clarifies the connection that has been noted between epilepsy, hysteria, and neurasthenia.
Summary.—Miss Elise K. is a psychopathic defective with a tendency to hysteria. Under the influence of nervous exhaustion she suffers from attacks of epileptoid giddiness whose interpretation is uncertain at first sight. Under the influence of an unusually large dose of alcohol the attacks develop into definite somnambulism with hallucinations, which are limited in the same way as dreams to accidental external perceptions. When the nervous exhaustion is cured the hysterical manifestations disappear.
Summary.—Miss Elise K. is a psychopathic individual with a tendency towards hysteria. Due to nervous exhaustion, she experiences episodes of epileptoid dizziness that are initially unclear in their meaning. When she consumes an unusually large amount of alcohol, these episodes turn into clear sleepwalking with hallucinations, which are similarly confined to random external perceptions, just like dreams. Once her nervous exhaustion is treated, the hysterical symptoms disappear.
In the region of psychopathic deficiency with hysterical colouring, we encounter numerous phenomena which show, as in this case, symptoms of diverse defined diseases, which cannot be attributed with certainty to any one of them. These phenomena are partially recognised to be independent; for instance, pathological lying, pathological reveries, etc. Many of these states, however, still await thorough scientific investigation; at present they belong more or less to the domain of scientific gossip. Persons with habitual hallucinations, and also the inspired, exhibit these states; they draw the attention of the crowd to themselves, now as poet or artist, now as saviour, prophet or founder of a new sect.
In the area of psychopathic issues with a hysterical twist, we come across many phenomena that, similar to this case, show symptoms of various distinct diseases that can't be definitively linked to any single one. Some of these phenomena are partially understood to be independent; for example, pathological lying, pathological daydreaming, etc. However, many of these conditions still need thorough scientific research; right now, they mostly fall into the realm of scientific gossip. People who frequently experience hallucinations, as well as those who feel inspired, display these states; they attract public attention as poets or artists, or sometimes as saviors, prophets, or founders of new sects.
The genesis of the peculiar frame of mind of these persons is for the most part lost in obscurity, for it is only very rarely that one of these remarkable personalities can be subjected to exact observation. In view of the often great historical importance of these persons, it is much to be wished that we had some scientific material which would enable us to gain a closer insight into the psychological development of their peculiarities. Apart from the now practically useless productions of the pneumatological school at the beginning of the nineteenth century, German scientific literature is very poor in this respect; indeed, there seems to be real[16] aversion from investigation in this field. For the facts so far gathered we are indebted almost exclusively to the labours of French and English workers. It seems at least desirable that our literature should be enlarged in this respect. These considerations have induced me to publish some observations which will perhaps help to further our knowledge concerning the relationship of hysterical twilight-states and enlarge the problems of normal psychology.
The origin of the unusual mindset of these individuals is mostly shrouded in mystery, as it is only very rarely that we can closely observe one of these extraordinary personalities. Given their often significant historical impact, it would be greatly beneficial if we had some scientific data that could provide deeper insight into the psychological development of their distinct traits. Aside from the now largely irrelevant works of the pneumatological school from the early nineteenth century, German scientific literature is quite lacking in this area; in fact, there seems to be a genuine reluctance to explore this field. Most of what we know so far comes almost entirely from the efforts of French and English researchers. It seems at least necessary for our literature to be expanded in this regard. These reflections have motivated me to share some observations that may help enhance our understanding of the connection between hysterical twilight states and broaden the scope of normal psychology.
Case of Somnambulism in a Person with Neuropathic Inheritance (Spiritualistic Medium).
Sleepwalking Case in a Person with Neuropathic Inheritance (Spiritual Medium).
The following case was under my observation in the years 1899 and 1900. As I was not in medical attendance upon Miss S. W., a physical examination for hysterical stigmata unfortunately could not be made. I kept a complete diary of the séances, which I filled up after each sitting. The following report is a condensed account from these notes. Out of regard for Miss S. W. and her family a few unimportant dates have been altered and a few details omitted from the story, which for the most part is composed of very intimate matters.
The following case was observed by me in 1899 and 1900. Since I wasn't providing medical care for Miss S. W., a physical examination for hysterical symptoms couldn't be performed. I maintained a detailed diary of the sessions, which I updated after each sitting. The following report is a summarized account from these notes. Out of respect for Miss S. W. and her family, a few minor dates have been changed and some details have been left out, as the story mostly contains very personal information.
Miss S. W., 15½ years old. Reformed Church. The paternal grandfather was highly intelligent, a clergyman with frequent waking hallucinations (generally visions, often whole dramatic scenes with dialogues, etc.). A brother of the grandfather was an imbecile eccentric, who also saw visions. A sister of the grandfather, a peculiar, odd character. The paternal grandmother after some fever in her 20th year (typhoid?) had a trance which lasted three days, from which she did not awake until the crown of her head had been burned by a red-hot iron. During states of excitement later on she had fainting fits which were nearly always followed by a brief somnambulism during which she uttered prophesies. Her father was likewise a peculiar, original personality with bizarre ideas. All three had waking hallucinations (second-sight, forebodings, etc.). A third brother was also eccentric and odd, talented but one-sided. The mother has an inherited mental defect often bordering[17] on psychosis. The sister is a hysteric and visionary and a second sister suffers from "nervous heart attacks." Miss S. W. is slenderly built, skull somewhat rachitic, without pronounced hydrocephalus, face rather pale, eyes dark with a peculiar penetrating look. She has had no serious illnesses. At school she passed for average, showed little interest, was inattentive. As a rule her behaviour was rather reserved, sometimes giving place, however, to exuberant joy and exaltation. Of average intelligence, without special gifts, neither musical nor fond of books, her preference is for handwork—and day dreaming. She was often absent-minded, misread in a peculiar way when reading aloud, instead of the word Ziege (goat), for instance, said Gais, instead of Treppe (stair), Stege; this occurred so often that her brothers and sisters laughed at her. There were no other abnormalities; there were no serious hysterical manifestations. Her family were artisans and business people with very limited interests. Books of mystical content were never permitted in the family. Her education was faulty; there were numerous brothers and sisters and thus the education was given indiscriminately, and in addition the children had to suffer a great deal from the inconsequent and vulgar, indeed sometimes rough, treatment of their mother. The father, a very busy business man, could not pay much attention to his children, and died when S. W. was not yet grown up. Under these uncomfortable conditions it is no wonder that S. W. felt herself shut in and unhappy. She was often afraid to go home, and preferred to be anywhere rather than there. She was left a great deal with playmates and grew up in this way without much polish. The level of her education is relatively low and her interests correspondingly limited. Her knowledge of literature is also very limited. She knows the common school songs by heart, songs of Schiller and Goethe and a few other poets, as well as fragments from a song book and the psalms. Newspaper stories represent her highest level in prose. Up to the time of her somnambulism she had never read any books of a serious nature. At home and from friends she heard about table-turning and began to take an interest in it. She asked[18] to be allowed to take part in such experiments, and her desire was soon gratified. In July 1899, she took part a few times in table-turnings with some friends and her brothers and sisters, but in joke. It was then discovered that she was an excellent "medium." Some communications of a serious nature arrived which were received with general astonishment. Their pastoral tone was surprising. The spirit said he was the grandfather of the medium. As I was acquainted with the family I was able to take part in these experiments. At the beginning of August, 1899, the first attacks of somnambulism took place in my presence. They took the following course: S. W. became very pale, slowly sank to the ground, or into a chair, shut her eyes, became cataleptic, drew several deep breaths, and began to speak. In this stage she was generally quite relaxed; the reflexes of the lids remained, as did also tactile sensation. She was sensitive to unexpected noises and full of fear, especially in the initial stage.
Miss S. W., 15½ years old. Reformed Church. Her paternal grandfather was very intelligent, a clergyman who often experienced waking hallucinations (usually visions, often elaborate scenes with dialogues, etc.). A brother of the grandfather was an eccentric with intellectual disabilities and also had visions. A sister of the grandfather had a strange and quirky personality. The paternal grandmother had a fever when she was 20 (possibly typhoid?) and experienced a trance that lasted three days, waking only after the top of her head had been burned by a red-hot iron. Later in life, during episodes of excitement, she would faint, often followed by brief periods of sleepwalking where she would make prophecies. Her father was also an unusual, original person with strange ideas. All three had waking hallucinations (like second sight and premonitions). Another brother was eccentric and quirky, talented but one-dimensional. The mother has an inherited mental condition that often verges on psychosis. The sister experiences hysteria and visions, while another sister suffers from "nervous heart attacks." Miss S. W. is slender, with a somewhat deformed skull, no severe hydrocephalus, a rather pale face, and dark eyes with a unique, intense look. She hasn’t had any serious illnesses. In school, she was considered average, showed little interest, and was often inattentive. Generally, her behavior was quite reserved, although at times she would show bursts of joy and excitement. She has average intelligence, without any special talents; she’s neither musical nor fond of reading, preferring crafts and daydreaming. She was often absent-minded and misread aloud in a peculiar way, like saying Gais instead of Ziege (goat) and Stege instead of Treppe (stair)—this happened so often that her siblings laughed at her. There were no other abnormalities or serious hysterical symptoms. Her family were artisans and business people with very narrow interests. Mystical books were never allowed in the household. Her education was poor; with numerous siblings, education was given haphazardly, and they also endured rough and inconsistent treatment from their mother. The father, a very busy businessman, could not pay much attention to the kids and died while S. W. was still young. Given these uncomfortable circumstances, it’s no surprise that S. W. felt trapped and unhappy. She was often afraid to go home, preferring to be anywhere else. She spent a lot of time with playmates and grew up without much refinement. Her level of education is relatively low, and her interests limited. Her literary knowledge is also very basic. She knows common school songs by heart, along with songs by Schiller, Goethe, and a few other poets, as well as fragments from a songbook and the Psalms. Newspaper stories represent her highest prose-level exposure. Up until her episodes of sleepwalking, she had never read any serious books. She heard about table-turning from friends and became interested in it. She requested to join such experiments, and her wish was soon fulfilled. In July 1899, she participated a few times in table-turning sessions with friends and siblings, though it was all in jest. It was then discovered that she was an exceptional "medium." Serious communications emerged, met with widespread astonishment, particularly due to their pastoral tone. The spirit claimed to be the grandfather of the medium. As I was familiar with the family, I was able to participate in these sessions. At the beginning of August 1899, the first episodes of sleepwalking occurred in my presence. They unfolded as follows: S. W. would become very pale, slowly sink to the floor or into a chair, close her eyes, become cataleptic, take several deep breaths, and begin to speak. During this state, she was generally relaxed; the reflexes of her eyelids remained, as did her sense of touch. She was sensitive to unexpected noises and was particularly fearful, especially in the initial stages.
She did not react when called by name. In somnambulic dialogues she copied in a remarkably clever way her dead relations and acquaintances, with all their peculiarities, so that she made a lasting impression upon unprejudiced persons. She also so closely imitated persons whom she only knew from descriptions that no one could deny her at least considerable talent as an actress. Gradually gestures were added to the simple speech, which finally led to "attitudes passionelles" and complete dramatic scenes. She took up postures of prayer and rapture, with staring eyes, and spoke with impassionate and glowing rhetoric. She then made use exclusively of a literary German which she spoke with an ease and assurance quite contrary to her usual uncertain and embarrassed manner in the waking state. Her movements were free and of a noble grace, depicting most beautifully her varying emotions. Her attitude during these states was always changing and diverse in the different attacks. Now she would lie for ten minutes to two hours on the sofa or the ground, motionless, with closed eyes; now she assumed a half-sitting posture and spoke with changed tone and speech;[19] now she would stand up, going through every possible pantomimic gesture. Her speech was equally diversified and without rule. Now she spoke in the first person, but never for long, generally to prophesy her next attack; now she spoke of herself (and this was the most usual) in the third person. She then acted as some other person, either some dead acquaintance or some chance person, whose part she consistently carried out according to the characteristics she herself conceived. At the end of the ecstasy there usually followed a cataleptic state with flexibilitas cerea, which gradually passed over into the waking state. The waxy anæmic pallor which was an almost constant feature of the attacks made one really anxious; it sometimes occurred at the beginning of the attack, but often in the second half only. The pulse was then small but regular and of normal frequency; the breathing gentle, shallow, or almost imperceptible. As already stated, S. W. often predicted her attacks beforehand; just before the attacks she had strange sensations, became excited, rather anxious, and occasionally expressed thoughts of death: "she will probably die in one of these attacks; during the attack her soul only hangs to her body by a thread, so that often the body could scarcely go on living." Once after the cataleptic attack tachypnœa lasting two minutes was observed, with a respiration rate of 100 per minute. At first the attacks occurred spontaneously, afterwards S. W. could provoke them by sitting in a dark corner and covering her face with her hands. Frequently the experiment did not succeed. She had so-called "good" and "bad" days. The question of amnesia after the attacks is unfortunately very obscure. This much is certain, that after each attack she was quite accurately orientated as to what she had gone through "during the rapture." It is, however, uncertain how much she remembered of the conversations in which she served as medium, and of changes in her surroundings during the attack. It often seemed that she did have a fleeting recollection, for directly after waking she would ask: "Who was here? Wasn't X or Y here? What did he say?" She also showed that she was[20] superficially aware of the content of the conversations. She thus often remarked that the spirits had communicated to her before waking what they had said. But frequently this was not the case. If, at her request, the contents of the trance speeches were repeated to her she was often annoyed about them. She was then often sad and depressed for hours together, especially when any unpleasant indiscretions had occurred. She would then rail against the spirits and assert that next time she would beg her guides to keep such spirits far away. Her indignation was not feigned, for in the waking state she could but poorly control herself and her emotions, so that every mood was at once mirrored in her face. At times she seemed only slightly or not at all aware of the external proceedings during the attack. She seldom noticed when any one left the room or came in. Once she forbade me to enter the room when she was awaiting special communications which she wished to keep secret from me. Nevertheless I went in, and sat down with the three other sitters and listened to everything. Her eyes were open and she spoke to those present without noticing me. She only noticed me when I began to speak, which gave rise to a storm of indignation. She remembered better, but still apparently only in indefinite outlines, the remarks of those taking part which referred to the trance speeches or directly to herself. I could never discover any definite rapport in this connection.
She didn’t react when her name was called. During her sleepwalking dialogues, she remarkably copied her deceased relatives and acquaintances, capturing all their quirks, leaving a lasting impression on open-minded people. She even imitated people she only knew through descriptions so well that no one could deny her considerable talent as an actress. Over time, she added gestures to her simple speech, leading to dramatic poses and complete theatrical scenes. She took on postures of prayer and ecstasy, with wide eyes, speaking in passionate and vibrant tones. She then exclusively used a literary German, which she spoke with a confidence and fluency entirely different from her usual uncertain and awkward demeanor while awake. Her movements were graceful and free, beautifully expressing her shifting emotions. Her posture during these states was always changing and varied with each episode. Sometimes she would lie still on the sofa or floor for ten minutes to two hours, with her eyes closed; at other times, she would sit halfway up and speak with a changed tone; occasionally, she would stand, going through every imaginable pantomime. Her speech was varied and unpredictable. She sometimes spoke in the first person, but never for long, usually to predict her next episode; more often, she referred to herself in the third person. She acted as if she were someone else, either a deceased acquaintance or a random person, embodying the traits she imagined. At the end of these episodes, she usually fell into a cataleptic state with waxy flexibility, which eventually transitioned into wakefulness. The waxy, pale appearance was a nearly constant feature during these episodes, and it was genuinely concerning; it could happen at the start but often appeared halfway through. Her pulse was small but steady and of normal speed; her breathing was soft, shallow, or barely noticeable. As mentioned, S. W. often predicted her episodes in advance. Just before an episode, she experienced strange sensations, became agitated, somewhat anxious, and occasionally expressed thoughts of death: "she will probably die in one of these episodes; during the episode, her soul is only connected to her body by a thread, making it hard for the body to survive." Once, after a cataleptic episode, she experienced rapid breathing that lasted two minutes, with a rate of 100 breaths per minute. Initially, the episodes happened spontaneously, but later S. W. could trigger them by sitting in a dark corner and covering her face with her hands. Often, the attempt wouldn’t succeed. She had what were considered "good" and "bad" days. The question of memory loss after the episodes is unfortunately very unclear. It is certain that after each episode, she was aware of what she had experienced “during the ecstasy.” However, it’s uncertain how much she remembered of the conversations in which she acted as a medium and of her surroundings during the episode. It often seemed she had a fleeting memory, as she would immediately ask after waking: “Who was here? Wasn’t X or Y here? What did they say?” She also seemed to be somewhat aware of the conversation content. Frequently she commented that the spirits had communicated to her before waking what they had said. But often, that wasn’t the case. If, at her request, the trance speeches were repeated to her, she often became annoyed. She would then feel sad and depressed for hours, especially when any awkward indiscretions had occurred. She would complain about the spirits and insist that next time she would ask her guides to keep such spirits away. Her indignation was genuine, as in her waking state she struggled to control herself and her emotions, causing every mood to be instantly reflected on her face. At times, she seemed barely aware of what was happening around her during the episodes. She seldom noticed when someone entered or left the room. Once, she told me not to enter the room while she awaited special communications she wanted to keep secret from me. Nonetheless, I went in, sat down with the other three sitters, and listened to everything. Her eyes were open, and she spoke to those present without noticing me. She only recognized me when I began to speak, which caused a storm of indignation. She had a better recollection after that, but it still seemed to be only vague memories of comments related to the trance speeches or directly about herself. I could never find any definite connection in that regard.
In addition to these great attacks which seemed to follow a certain law in their course, S. W. produced a great number of other automatisms. Premonitions, forebodings, unaccountable moods and rapidly changing fancies were all in the day's work. I never observed simple states of sleep. On the other hand, I soon noticed that in the middle of a lively conversation S. W. became quite confused and spoke without meaning in a peculiar monotonous way, and looked in front of her dreamily with half-closed eyes. These lapses usually lasted but a few minutes. Then she would suddenly proceed: "Yes, what did you say?" At first she would not give any particulars about these lapses, she would reply off-hand that she was[21] a little giddy, had a headache, and so on. Later she simply said: "they were there again," meaning her spirits. She was subjected to the lapses much against her will; she often tried to defend herself: "I do not want to, not now, come some other time; you seem to think I only exist for you." She had these lapses in the streets, in business, in fact anywhere. If this happened to her in the street, she leaned against a house and waited till the attack was over. During these attacks, whose intensity was most variable, she had visions; frequently also, especially during the attacks where she turned extremely pale, she "wandered"; or as she expressed it, lost her body, and got away to distant places whither her spirits led her. Distant journeys during ecstasy strained her exceedingly; she was often exhausted for hours after, and many times complained that the spirits had again deprived her of much power, such overstrain was now too much for her; the spirits must get another medium, etc. Once she was hysterically blind for half an hour after one of these ecstasies. Her gait was hesitating, feeling her way; she had to be led; she did not see the candle which was on the table. The pupils reacted. Visions occurred in great numbers without proper "lapses" (designating by this word only the higher grade of distraction of attention). At first the visions only occurred at the beginning of the sleep. Once after S. W. had gone to bed the room became lighted up, and out of the general foggy light there appeared white glittering figures. They were throughout concealed in white veil-like robes, the women had a head-covering like a turban, and a girdle. Afterwards (according to the statements of S. W.), "the spirits were already there" when she went to bed. Finally she also saw the figures in bright daylight, though still somewhat blurred and only for a short time, provided there were no proper lapses, in which case the figures became solid enough to take hold of. But S. W. always preferred darkness. According to her account the content of the vision was for the most part of a pleasant kind. Gazing at the beautiful figures she received a feeling of delicious blessedness. More rarely there were terrible visions of a dæmonic[22] nature. These were entirely confined to the night or to dark rooms. Occasionally S. W. saw black figures in the neighbouring streets or in her room; once out in the dark courtyard she saw a terrible copper-red face which suddenly stared at her and frightened her. I could not learn anything satisfactory about the first occurrence of the vision. She states that once at night, in her fifth or sixth year, she saw her "guide," her grandfather (whom she had never known). I could not get any objective confirmation from her relatives of this early vision. Nothing of the kind is said to have happened until her first séance. With the exception of the hypnagogic brightness and the flashes, there were no rudimentary hallucinations, but from the beginning they were of a systematic nature, involving all the sense-organs equally. So far as concerns the intellectual reaction to these phenomena it is remarkable with what curious sincerity she regarded her dreams. Her entire somnambulic development, the innumerable puzzling events, seemed to her quite natural. She looked at her whole past in this light. Every striking event of earlier years stood to her in necessary and clear relationship to her present condition. She was happy in the consciousness of having found her real life-task. Naturally she was unswervingly convinced of the reality of her visions. I often tried to present her with some sceptical explanation, but she invariably turned this aside; in her usual condition she did not clearly grasp a reasoned explanation, and in the semi-somnambulic state she regarded it as senseless in view of the facts staring her in the face. She once said: "I do not know if what the spirits say and teach me is true, neither do I know if they are those by whose names they call themselves, but that my spirits exist there is no question. I see them before me, I can touch them, I speak to them about everything I wish, as naturally as I'm now talking to you. They must be real." She absolutely would not listen to the idea that the manifestations were a kind of illness. Doubts about her health or about the reality of her dream would distress her deeply; she felt so hurt by my remarks that when I was present she became reserved, and for a long time[23] refused to experiment if I was there; hence I took care not to express my doubts and thoughts aloud. From her immediate relatives and acquaintances she received undivided allegiance and admiration—they asked her advice about all kinds of things. In time she obtained such an influence upon her followers that three of her brothers and sisters likewise began to have hallucinations of a similar kind. Their hallucinations generally began as night-dreams of a very vivid and dramatic kind; these gradually extended into the waking time, partly hypnagogic, partly hypnopompic. A married sister had extraordinary vivid dreams which developed from night to night, and these appeared in the waking consciousness; at first as obscure illusions, next as real hallucinations, but they never reached the plastic clearness of S. W.'s visions. For instance, she once saw in a dream a black dæmonic figure at her bedside in animated conversation with a white, beautiful figure, which tried to restrain the black one; nevertheless the black one seized her and tried to choke her, then she awoke. Bending over her she then saw a black shadow with a human contour, and near by a white cloudy figure. The vision only disappeared when she lighted a candle. Similar visions were repeated dozens of times. The visions of the other two sisters were of a similar kind, but less intense.
In addition to these significant episodes that seemed to follow a certain pattern, S. W. frequently had other types of automatic behaviors. Premonitions, feelings of dread, strange moods, and rapidly changing ideas were all part of her daily life. I never saw her simply sleeping. Instead, I quickly noticed that during lively conversations, S. W. would become quite confused and speak in a peculiar, monotonous way while staring dreamily ahead with half-closed eyes. These episodes usually lasted only a few minutes before she'd suddenly ask, "Yes, what did you say?" At first, she didn't elaborate on these lapses, casually claiming she was just a bit dizzy, had a headache, and so on. Later, she would simply say, "they were there again," referring to her spirits. She experienced these lapses against her will and often tried to push back, saying, "I don't want to; not now, maybe another time; you seem to think I only exist for you." She had these lapses everywhere: on the streets, at work, essentially anywhere. If it happened outside, she would lean against a building and wait for the episode to pass. During these episodes, which varied in intensity, she experienced visions; often, especially when she became extremely pale, she felt like she "wandered" or, as she put it, lost her body and was transported to distant places led by her spirits. These distant journeys during her ecstatic states exhausted her; she would often be tired for hours afterward and frequently complained that the spirits had drained her of energy, saying that such strain was too much for her and that the spirits needed another medium. Once, she experienced hysterical blindness for half an hour after one of these ecstatic states. Her movements were unsteady, as she felt her way around; she needed assistance since she couldn’t see the candle on the table. Her pupils reacted normally. Visions occurred frequently, even without clear "lapses" (using this term only for a higher degree of distraction). Initially, visions only happened at the onset of sleep. Once, after S. W. had gone to bed, the room lit up, and out of the general hazy light appeared white, sparkling figures. They were always hidden in white, veil-like garments; the women wore a head covering like a turban and had a belt. Later (according to S. W.), "the spirits were already there" when she went to bed. Eventually, she even saw the figures in bright daylight, though still somewhat blurry and only briefly, unless there were proper lapses, in which case the figures became solid enough to grasp. But S. W. always preferred darkness. According to her, the content of the visions was mostly pleasant. Gazing at the beautiful figures filled her with a sense of bliss. Occasionally, she also experienced terrifying visions of a demonic nature, which were confined to the night or dark rooms. At times, S. W. saw black figures in nearby streets or her room; once, in a dark courtyard, she saw a horrifying copper-red face that stared at her and scared her. I couldn’t get any satisfactory details about when she first experienced these visions. She mentioned that once, at night in her fifth or sixth year, she saw her "guide," her grandfather (who she had never met). I could not get any objective confirmation from her family about this early vision. No one reported anything like it until her first séance. With the exception of the hypnagogic brightness and flashes, there were no basic hallucinations; from the start, they had a systematic nature, involving all her senses equally. In terms of her intellectual reaction to these phenomena, it’s striking how sincerely she regarded her dreams. Her entire somnambulistic development and the countless puzzling events seemed perfectly natural to her. She viewed her entire past through this lens. Every notable event from her earlier years felt connected to her current state. She felt fulfilled in the knowledge of having discovered her true life purpose. Naturally, she was unwaveringly convinced of the reality of her visions. I often tried to offer her a skeptical explanation, but she always dismissed it; in her usual state, she couldn’t clearly grasp a reasoned argument, and in the semi-somnambulistic state, she found it senseless given the facts she was experiencing. Once, she said, "I don’t know if what the spirits say and teach me is true, nor do I know if they are who they claim to be, but there’s no doubt my spirits exist. I see them in front of me, I can touch them, I talk to them about everything I want, just as naturally as I'm talking to you now. They must be real." She completely refused to entertain the idea that the manifestations were a form of illness. Doubts about her health or the reality of her dreams would deeply upset her; she felt so hurt by my comments that she became reserved in my presence, and for a long time, she wouldn’t experiment while I was there. So, I made sure not to express my doubts or thoughts out loud. From her close relatives and acquaintances, she received unwavering loyalty and admiration—they sought her advice on all sorts of matters. Over time, she gained enough influence over her followers that three of her siblings began to have similar hallucinations. Their experiences generally started as vivid and dramatic night dreams, which gradually spread into their waking hours, partly hypnagogic and partly hypnopompic. One of her married sisters had extraordinarily vivid dreams that developed from night to night, which then appeared in her waking consciousness; at first, these were vague illusions, later turning into real hallucinations, but they never achieved the vivid clarity of S. W.'s visions. For example, she once dreamed of a black demonic figure at her bedside engaged in a lively conversation with a beautiful white figure, which tried to stop the black one; however, the black figure grabbed her and attempted to choke her, waking her up. Leaning over her, she then saw a black shadow shaped like a person, alongside a white, cloudy figure. The vision only vanished when she lit a candle. Similar visions repeated dozens of times. The visions experienced by her other two sisters were of a similar kind, but less intense.
This particular type of attack with the complete visions and ideas had developed in the course of less than a month, but never afterwards exceeded these limits. What was later added to these was but the extension of all those thoughts and cycles of visions which to a certain extent were already indicated quite at the beginning. As well as the "great" attacks and the lesser ones, there must also be noted a third kind of state comparable to "lapse" states. These are the semi-somnambulic states. They appeared at the beginning or at the end of the "great" attacks, but also appeared without any connection with them. They developed gradually in the course of the first month. It is not possible to give a more precise account of the time of their appearance. In this state a fixed gaze, brilliant eyes, and a certain dignity and stateliness of movement are[24] noticeable. In this phase S. W. is herself, her own somnambulic ego.
This specific type of attack, with its complete visions and ideas, developed in less than a month but never went beyond that point. What came later was just an expansion of those thoughts and cycles of visions that were somewhat hinted at from the start. Along with the "great" attacks and the smaller ones, there’s also a third state that can be compared to "lapse" states. These are the semi-somnambulic states. They emerged at the beginning or end of the "great" attacks but could also arise independently. They developed gradually during the first month. It’s not possible to give a more detailed account of when they appeared. In this state, a fixed gaze, bright eyes, and a certain dignity and grace in movement are[24] noticeable. In this phase, S. W. is herself, her somnambulic ego.
She is fully orientated to the external world, but seems to stand with one foot, as it were, in her dream-world. She sees and hears her spirits, sees how they walk about in the room among those who form the circle, and stand first by one person, then by another. She is in possession of a clear remembrance of her visions, her journeys and the instructions she receives. She speaks quietly, clearly and firmly and is always in a serious, almost religious frame of mind. Her bearing indicates a deeply religious mood, free from all pietistic flavour, her speech is singularly uninfluenced by her guide's jargon compounded of Bible and tract. Her solemn behaviour has a suffering, rather pitiful aspect. She is painfully conscious of the great differences between her ideal world at night and the rough reality of the day. This state stands in sharp contrast to her waking existence; there is here no trace of that unstable and inharmonious creature, that extravagant nervous temperament which is so characteristic for the rest of her relationships. Speaking with her, you get the impression of speaking with a much older person who has attained through numerous experiences to a sure harmonious footing. In this state she produced her best results, whilst her romances correspond more closely to the conditions of her waking interests. The semi-somnambulism usually appears spontaneously, mostly during the table experiments, which sometimes announced by this means that S. W. was beginning to know beforehand every automatic communication from the table. She then usually stopped the table-turning and after a short time passed more or less suddenly into an ecstatic state. S. W. showed herself to be very sensitive. She could divine and reply to simple questions thought of by a member of the circle who was not a "medium," if only the latter would lay a hand on the table or on her hand. Genuine thought-transference without direct or indirect contact could never be achieved. In juxtaposition with the obvious development of her whole personality the continued existence of her earlier ordinary[25] character was all the more startling. She imparted with unconcealed pleasure all the little childish experiences, the flirtations and love-secrets, all the rudeness and lack of education of her parents and contemporaries. To every one who did not know her secret she was a girl of fifteen and a half, in no respect unlike a thousand other such girls. So much the greater was people's astonishment when they got to know her in her other aspect. Her near relatives could not at first grasp this change: to some extent they never altogether understood it, so there was often bitter strife in the family, some of them taking sides for and others against S. W., either with enthusiastic over-valuation or with contemptuous censure of "superstition." Thus did S. W., during the time I watched her closely, lead a curious, contradictory life, a real "double life" with two personalities existing side by side or closely following upon one another and contending for the mastery. I now give some of the most interesting details of the sittings in chronological order.
She is completely aware of the outside world, yet it feels like she has one foot in her dream world. She sees and hears her spirits, noticing how they move around the room among those in the circle, standing first by one person and then by another. She clearly remembers her visions, her journeys, and the guidance she receives. She speaks softly, clearly, and confidently, always carrying a serious, almost spiritual demeanor. Her presence reflects a deep religious mood, free from any overly pious tone, and her speech is notably uninfluenced by her guide's mixed-up language of scripture and pamphlets. Her solemn behavior seems almost suffering and pitiful. She is acutely aware of the stark contrast between her ideal world at night and the harsh reality of the daytime. This state stands in stark contrast to her waking life; here, there is no sign of her usual unstable and chaotic nature, or the overly sensitive temperament that characterizes her other interactions. Talking to her feels like conversing with someone much older who has gained a solid understanding of life through many experiences. In this state, she achieves her best results, while her more romantic thoughts align closely with her waking interests. The semi-somnambulism often occurs spontaneously, mainly during the table experiments, which sometimes revealed that she could anticipate every automatic message from the table. She would usually then stop the table-turning and, after a short time, would transition more or less suddenly into an ecstatic state. She showed herself to be highly sensitive, able to perceive and answer simple questions thought of by a circle member who wasn’t a “medium,” as long as that person placed a hand on the table or on hers. Genuine thought transfer without any direct or indirect contact couldn’t be achieved. In light of her overall personality development, the continued presence of her earlier ordinary character was even more surprising. She excitedly shared all her little childhood experiences, flirtations, and love secrets, as well as the rudeness and ignorance of her parents and peers. To everyone who didn’t know her secret, she appeared to be a fifteen-and-a-half-year-old girl, no different from a thousand others like her. The greater the shock when people discovered her other side. Her close family couldn’t initially comprehend this shift; to some extent, they never fully understood it, leading to frequent bitter disputes, with some supporting her passionately while others condemned her for "superstition." During the time I closely observed her, she lived an odd, contradictory life—a true "double life" with two personalities existing side by side or closely following each other, both striving for dominance. I will now present some of the most interesting details of the sessions in chronological order.
First and second sittings, August, 1899. S. W. at once undertook to lead the "communications." The "psychograph," for which an upturned glass tumbler was used, on which two fingers of the right hand were laid, moved quick as lightning from letter to letter. (Slips of paper, marked with letter and numbers, had been arranged in a circle round the glass.) It was communicated that the "medium's" grandfather was present and would speak to us. There then followed many communications in quick sequence, of a most religious, edifying nature, in part in properly made words, partly in words with the letters transposed, and partly in a series of reversed letters. The last words and sentences were produced so quickly that it was not possible to follow without first inverting the letters. The communications were once interrupted in abrupt fashion by a new communication, which announced the presence of the writer's grandfather. On this occasion the jesting observation was made: "Evidently the two 'spirits' get on very badly together." During this attempt darkness came on. Suddenly S. W. became very disturbed, sprang up in terror, fell on her knees and cried[26] "There, there, do you not see that light, that star there?" and pointed to a dark corner of the room. She became more and more disturbed, and called for a light in terror. She was pale, wept, "it was all so strange, she did not know in the least what was the matter with her." When a candle was brought she became calm again. The experiments were now stopped.
First and second sittings, August 1899. S. W. immediately took charge of the "communications." The "psychograph," which used an upturned glass tumbler with two fingers from the right hand resting on it, moved as fast as lightning from letter to letter. (Slips of paper marked with letters and numbers were arranged in a circle around the glass.) It conveyed that the "medium's" grandfather was present and would communicate with us. There followed numerous messages in rapid succession, mostly of a religious and uplifting nature, some in proper words, some with the letters mixed up, and others in a series of reversed letters. The last words and sentences came so quickly that it was impossible to keep up without first flipping the letters. At one point, the messages were abruptly interrupted by a new message that announced the presence of the writer's grandfather. Someone jokingly remarked, "Clearly the two 'spirits' aren't getting along well." During this session, it became dark. Suddenly, S. W. appeared very disturbed, jumped up in fear, fell to her knees, and cried, "Look, can’t you see that light, that star over there?" while pointing to a dark corner of the room. She grew more and more anxious and pleaded for a light in terror. She was pale, crying, saying it was all so strange and that she had no idea what was wrong with her. When a candle was brought, she calmed down. The experiments were then halted.
At the next sitting, which took place in the evening, two days later, similar communications from S. W.'s grandfather were obtained. When darkness fell S. W. suddenly leaned back on the sofa, grew pale, almost shut her eyes, and lay there motionless. The eyeballs were turned upwards, the lid-reflex was present as well as tactile sensation. The breathing was gentle, almost imperceptible. The pulse small and weak. This attack lasted about half an hour, when S. W. suddenly sighed and got up. The extreme pallor, which had lasted throughout the whole attack, now gave place to her usual pale pink colour. She was somewhat confused and distraught, indicated that she had seen all sorts of things, but would tell nothing. Only after urgent questioning would she relate that in an extraordinary waking condition she had seen her grandfather arm-in-arm with the writer's grandfather. The two had gone rapidly by in an open carriage, side by side.
At the next meeting, which took place in the evening two days later, we received similar messages from S. W.'s grandfather. When darkness fell, S. W. suddenly leaned back on the sofa, turned pale, almost closed her eyes, and lay there motionless. Her eyeballs rolled back, the lid reflex was present along with tactile sensation. Her breathing was light, almost imperceptible, and her pulse was small and weak. This episode lasted about half an hour, after which S. W. suddenly sighed and sat up. The extreme pallor that had lasted throughout the attack now changed to her usual pale pink color. She seemed a bit confused and unsettled, indicating that she had seen various things but wouldn’t say anything. Only after persistent questioning did she share that in a strange waking state, she had seen her grandfather walking arm in arm with the writer's grandfather. The two had quickly passed by in an open carriage, side by side.
III. In the third séance, which took place some days later, there was a similar attack of more than half an hour's duration. S. W. afterwards told of many white, transfigured forms who each gave her a flower of special symbolic significance. Most of them were dead relatives. Concerning the exact content of their talk she maintained an obstinate silence.
III. In the third séance, which happened a few days later, there was a similar episode that lasted over half an hour. S. W. later mentioned seeing many white, transformed figures, each of whom handed her a flower with special symbolic meaning. Most of them were deceased relatives. She remained stubbornly silent about the exact details of their conversation.
IV. After S. W. had entered into the somnambulic state she began to make curious movements with her lips, and made swallowing gurgling noises. Then she whispered very softly and unintelligibly. When this had lasted some minutes she suddenly began to speak in an altered deep voice. She spoke of herself in the third person. "She is not here, she has gone away." There followed several communications of a religious kind. From the content and the[27] way of speaking it was easy to conclude that she was imitating her grandfather, who had been a clergyman. The content of the talk did not rise above the mental level of the "communications." The tone of the voice was somewhat forced, and only became natural when, in the course of the talk, the voice approximated to the medium's own.
IV. After S. W. entered a trance-like state, she started making strange movements with her lips and producing swallowing, gurgling sounds. Then she whispered very softly and in a way that was hard to understand. After a few minutes of this, she suddenly began to speak in a deep, altered voice. She referred to herself in the third person. "She is not here; she has gone away." This was followed by several religious messages. From what she said and how she spoke, it was clear she was imitating her grandfather, who had been a clergyman. The content of her speech didn't go beyond the intellectual level of the "communications." The tone of her voice was somewhat forced, becoming more natural as the conversation continued and her voice started to resemble the medium's own.
(In later sittings the voice was only altered for a few moments when a new spirit manifested itself.)
(In later sessions, the voice only changed for a few moments when a new spirit appeared.)
Afterwards there was amnesia for the trance-conversation. She gave hints about a sojourn in the other world, and she spoke of an undreamed-of blessedness which she felt. It must be further noted that her conversation in the attack occurred quite spontaneously, and was not in response to any suggestions.
Afterwards, there was no memory of the trance conversation. She dropped hints about a visit to another world and talked about an unimaginable sense of bliss that she experienced. It's important to note that her conversation during the episode happened completely spontaneously and wasn’t triggered by any suggestions.
Directly after this séance S. W. became acquainted with the book of Justinus Kerner, "Die Seherin von Prevorst." She began thereupon to magnetise herself towards the end of the attack, partly by means of regular passes, partly by curious circles and figures of eight, which she described symmetrically with both arms. She did this, she said, to disperse the severe headaches which occurred after the attacks. In the August séances, not detailed here, there were in addition to the grandfather numerous spirits of other relatives who did not produce anything very remarkable. Each time when a new one came on the scene the movement of the glass was changed in a striking way; it generally ran along the rows of letters, touching one or other of them, but no sense could be made of it. The orthography was very uncertain and arbitrary, and the first sentences were frequently incomprehensible or broken up into a meaningless medley of letters. Generally automatic writing suddenly began at this point. Sometimes automatic writing was attempted during complete darkness. The movements began with violent backward jerks of the whole arm, so that the paper was pierced by the pencil. The first attempt at writing consisted of numerous strokes and zigzag lines about 8 cm. high. In later attempts there came first unreadable words, in large handwriting, which[28] gradually became smaller and clearer. It was not essentially different from the medium's own. The grandfather was again the controlling spirit.
Directly after this séance, S. W. got to know the book by Justinus Kerner, "Die Seherin von Prevorst." She then started to magnetize herself towards the end of the episode, partly using regular hand movements and partly by making curious circles and figure eights with both arms. She said she did this to relieve the severe headaches that followed the attacks. During the August séances, which aren't detailed here, there were, in addition to the grandfather, many spirits of other relatives who didn’t produce anything particularly remarkable. Each time a new spirit appeared, the movement of the glass changed in a noticeable way; it usually moved along the rows of letters, touching one or another, but it didn’t make any sense. The spelling was very inconsistent and random, and the initial sentences were often incomprehensible or broken into a meaningless jumble of letters. Generally, automatic writing would suddenly start at this point. Sometimes attempts at automatic writing were made in complete darkness. The movements began with violent backward jerks of the entire arm, causing the pencil to pierce the paper. The first attempt at writing consisted of numerous strokes and zigzag lines about 8 cm tall. In later attempts, it began with unreadable words in large handwriting, which gradually became smaller and clearer. It was not essentially different from the medium’s own. The grandfather was once again the controlling spirit.
V. Somnambulic attacks in September, 1899. S. W. sits upon the sofa, leans back, shuts her eyes, breathes lightly and regularly. She gradually becomes cataleptic, the catalepsy disappears after about two minutes, when she lies in an apparently quiet sleep with complete muscular relaxation. She suddenly begins to speak in a subdued voice: "No! you take the red, I'll take the white, you can take the green, and you the blue. Are you ready? We will go now." (A pause of several minutes during which her face assumes a corpse-like pallor. Her hands feel cold and are very bloodless.) She suddenly calls out with a loud, solemn voice: "Albert, Albert, Albert," then whispering: "Now you speak," followed by a longer pause, when the pallor of the face attains the highest possible degree. Again, in a loud solemn voice, "Albert, Albert, do you not believe your father? I tell you many errors are contained in N.'s teaching. Think about it." Pause. The pallor of the face decreases. "He's very frightened. He could not speak any more." (These words in her usual conversational tone.) Pause. "He will certainly think about it," S. W. now speaks again in the same tone, in a strange idiom which sounds like French or Italian, now recalling the former, now the latter. She speaks fluently, rapidly, and with charm. It is possible to understand a few words but not to remember the whole, because the language is so strange. From time to time certain words recur, as wena, wenes, wenai, wene, etc. The absolute naturalness of the proceedings is bewildering. From time to time she pauses as if some one were answering her. Suddenly she speaks in German, "Is time already up?" (In a troubled voice.) "Must I go already? Goodbye, goodbye." With the last words there passes over her face an indescribable expression of ecstatic blessedness. She raises her arms, opens her eyes,—hitherto closed,—looks radiantly upwards. She remains a moment thus, then her arms sink slackly, her eyes shut, the expression of her face[29] is tired and exhausted. After a short cataleptic stage she awakes with a sigh. She looks around astonished: "I've slept again, haven't I?" She is told she has been talking during the sleep, whereupon she becomes much annoyed, and this increases when she learns she has spoken in a foreign tongue. "But didn't I tell the spirits I don't want it? It mustn't be. It exhausts me too much." Begins to cry. "Oh, God! Oh, God! must then everything, everything, come back again like last time? Is nothing spared me?" The next day at the same time there was another attack. When S. W. has fallen asleep Ulrich von Gerbenstein suddenly announces himself. He is an entertaining chatterer, speaks very fluently in high German with a North-German accent. Asked what S. W. is now doing, after much circumlocution he explains that she is far away, and he is meanwhile here to look after her body, the circulation of the blood, the respiration, etc. He must take care that meanwhile no black person takes possession of her and harms her. Upon urgent questioning he relates that S. W. has gone with the others to Japan, to appear to a distant relative and to restrain him from a stupid marriage. He then announces in a whisper the exact moment when the manifestation takes place. Forbidden any conversation for a few minutes, he points to the sudden pallor occurring in S. W., remarking that materialisation at such a great distance is at the cost of correspondingly great force. He then orders cold bandages to the head to alleviate the severe headache which would occur afterwards. As the colour of the face gradually becomes more natural the conversation grows livelier. All kinds of childish jokes and trivialities are uttered; suddenly U. von G. says, "I see them coming, but they are still very far off; I see them there like a star." S. W. points to the North. We are naturally astonished, and ask why they do not come from the East, whereto U. von G. laughingly retorts: "Oh, but they come the direct way over the North Pole. I am going now; farewell." Immediately after S. W. sighs, wakes up, is ill-tempered, complains of extremely bad headache. She saw U. von G. standing by her body; what[30] had he told us? She gets angry about the "silly chatter" from which he cannot refrain.
V. Somnambulic attacks in September 1899. S. W. sits on the sofa, leans back, closes her eyes, and breathes lightly and regularly. She gradually becomes cataleptic, the catalepsy fades after about two minutes, and she lies in what appears to be a deep sleep with complete muscular relaxation. She suddenly starts to speak in a soft voice: "No! You take the red, I'll take the white, you can take the green, and you the blue. Are you ready? We will go now." (A pause of several minutes during which her face takes on a corpse-like pallor. Her hands feel cold and very bloodless.) She suddenly calls out in a loud, solemn voice: "Albert, Albert, Albert," then whispers: "Now you speak," followed by a longer pause, during which the pallor of her face reaches a peak. Again, in a loud solemn voice, "Albert, Albert, do you not believe your father? I tell you many errors are found in N.'s teaching. Think about it." Pause. The pallor of her face decreases. "He's very frightened. He could not speak anymore." (These words in her usual conversational tone.) Pause. "He will definitely think about it," S. W. now continues in the same tone, using a strange idiom that sounds like French or Italian, alternating between the two. She speaks fluently, quickly, and charmingly. It’s possible to catch a few words but hard to remember everything because the language is so strange. Occasionally, certain words repeat, like wena, wenes, wenai, wene, etc. The total naturalness of the situation is astonishing. From time to time she pauses as if someone is responding to her. Suddenly, she speaks in German, "Is time already up?" (In a troubled voice.) "Must I go already? Goodbye, goodbye." With the last words, an indescribable expression of ecstatic happiness crosses her face. She raises her arms, opens her eyes—previously closed—looks radiantly upward. She stays like that for a moment, then her arms drop loosely, her eyes shut, and her face shows an expression of tiredness and exhaustion. After a brief cataleptic stage, she awakens with a sigh. She looks around, surprised: "I've slept again, haven't I?" She's told she has been talking in her sleep, which annoys her greatly, and this annoyance grows when she learns she has spoken in a foreign language. "But didn't I tell the spirits I don't want that? It mustn't happen. It exhausts me too much." She begins to cry. "Oh, God! Oh, God! must everything, everything, come back again like last time? Is nothing spared for me?" The next day at the same time, there is another episode. When S. W. falls asleep, Ulrich von Gerbenstein suddenly announces himself. He is an entertaining chatterbox, speaks very fluently in standard German with a Northern German accent. When asked what S. W. is doing, after a lot of beating around the bush, he explains that she is far away while he keeps an eye on her body, the circulation of blood, the breathing, etc. He must ensure that no malevolent spirit takes over her and harms her. Upon urgent questioning, he shares that S. W. has gone with others to Japan, to appear to a distant relative and to dissuade him from a foolish marriage. He then whispers the exact moment when the manifestation occurs. Forbidden any conversation for a few minutes, he points out the sudden pallor in S. W. while noting that materialization at such a great distance takes a correspondingly huge amount of energy. He then orders cold compresses for her head to relieve the severe headache that will occur afterward. As the color of her face gradually returns to normal, the conversation becomes livelier. All kinds of childish jokes and trivial chatter are shared; suddenly U. von G. says, "I see them coming, but they are still very far away; I see them like a star." S. W. points to the North. We are obviously surprised and ask why they don't come from the East, to which U. von G. humorously replies: "Oh, but they are taking the direct route over the North Pole. I'm leaving now; goodbye." Shortly after, S. W. sighs, wakes up, is irritable, and complains of a terrible headache. She saw U. von G. standing by her body; what had he told us? She gets upset about the "silly chatter" that he can’t seem to avoid.
VI. Begins in the usual way. Extreme pallor; lies stretched out, scarcely breathing. Speaks suddenly, with loud, solemn voice: "Yes, be frightened; I am; I warn you against N.'s teaching. See, in hope is everything that belongs to faith. You would like to know who I am. God gives where one least expects it. Do you not know me?" Then unintelligible whispering; after a few minutes she awakes.
VI. It starts off like usual. She's very pale, lying down, barely breathing. Suddenly, she speaks in a loud, serious voice: "Yes, be afraid; I am; I caution you against N.'s teachings. Look, hope is everything that's part of faith. You want to know who I am. God provides where you least expect it. Don't you recognize me?" Then there's some mumbling that you can't understand; a few minutes later, she wakes up.
VII. S. W. soon falls asleep; lies stretched out on the sofa. Is very pale. Says nothing, sighs deeply from time to time. Casts up her eyes, rises, sits on the sofa, bends forward, speaks softly: "You have sinned grievously, have fallen far." Bends forward still, as if speaking to some one who kneels before her. She stands up, turns to the right, stretches out her hands, and points to the spot over which she has been bending. "Will you forgive her?" she asks, loudly. "Do not forgive men, but their spirits. Not she, but her human body has sinned." Then she kneels down, remains quite still for about ten minutes in the attitude of prayer. Then she gets up suddenly, looks to heaven with ecstatic expression, and then throws herself again on her knees, with her face bowed on her hands, whispering incomprehensible words. She remains rigid in this position several minutes. Then she gets up, looks again upwards with a radiant countenance, and lies down on the sofa; soon after she wakes.
VII. S. W. soon falls asleep, stretched out on the sofa. She looks very pale. She doesn't say anything and sighs deeply from time to time. She raises her eyes, gets up, sits on the sofa, leans forward, and speaks softly: "You have sinned greatly, fallen far." She leans forward even more, as if talking to someone who is kneeling in front of her. She stands up, turns to the right, extends her hands, and points to the spot where she has been leaning. "Will you forgive her?" she asks loudly. "Do not forgive men, but their spirits. Not her, but her human body has sinned." Then she kneels down, remaining completely still for about ten minutes in a prayerful position. Suddenly, she gets up, looks up to heaven with an ecstatic expression, then drops back to her knees, her face bowed on her hands, whispering words that are hard to understand. She stays rigid in this position for several minutes. Then she gets up, looks up again with a radiant expression, and lies back down on the sofa; soon after, she wakes up.
Development of the Somnambulic Personalities.
Development of Somnambulic Personalities.
At the beginning of many séances the glass was allowed to move by itself, when occasionally the advice followed in stereotyped fashion: "You must ask."
At the start of many séances, the glass was left to move on its own, and sometimes the advice was given in a predictable manner: "You need to ask."
Since convinced spiritualists took part in the séances, all kinds of spiritualistic wonders were of course demanded, and especially the "protecting spirits." In reply, sometimes names of well-known dead people were produced, sometimes[31] unknown names, e.g. Berthe de Valours, Elizabeth von Thierfelsenburg, Ulrich von Gerbenstein, etc. The controlling spirit was almost without exception the medium's grandfather, who once explained: "he loved her more than any one in this world because he had protected her from childhood up, and knew all her thoughts." This personality produced a flood of Biblical maxims, edifying observations, and song-book verses; the following is a specimen:—
Since convinced spiritualists participated in the séances, all sorts of spiritual wonders were naturally expected, especially the "protecting spirits." In response, sometimes names of famous deceased individuals were revealed, and other times unknown names, like Berthe de Valours, Elizabeth von Thierfelsenburg, Ulrich von Gerbenstein, etc. The controlling spirit was almost always the medium's grandfather, who once stated: "he loved her more than anyone else in this world because he had protected her since childhood and knew all her thoughts." This personality shared a stream of Biblical quotes, inspiring insights, and song lyrics; here is an example:—
Numerous similar elaborations betrayed by their banal, unctuous contents their origin in some tract or other. When S. W. had to speak in ecstasy, lively dialogues developed between the circle-members and the somnambulic personality. The content of the answers received is essentially just the same commonplace edifying stuff as that of the psychographic communications. The character of this personality is distinguished by its dry and tedious solemnity, rigorous conventionality and pietistic virtue (which is not consistent with the historic reality). The grandfather is the medium's guide and protector. During the ecstatic state he gives all kinds of advice, prophesies later attacks and the visions she will see on waking, etc. He orders cold bandages, gives directions concerning the medium's lying down or the date of the séances. His relationship to the medium is an extremely tender one. In liveliest contrast to this heavy dream-person stands a personality, appearing first sporadically, in the psychographic communications of the first séance. It soon disclosed itself as the dead brother of a Mr. R., who was then taking part in the séance. This dead brother, Mr. P. R., was full of commonplaces about brotherly love towards his living brother. He evaded particular questions in all[32] manner of ways. But he developed a quite astonishing eloquence towards the ladies of the circle and in particular offered his allegiance to one whom Mr. P. R. had never known when alive. He affirmed that he had already cared very much for her in his lifetime, had often met her in the street without knowing who she was, and was now uncommonly delighted to become acquainted with her in this unusual manner. With such insipid compliments, scornful remarks to the men, harmless childish jokes, etc., he took up a large part of the séance. Several of the members found fault with the frivolity and banality of this "spirit," whereupon he disappeared for one or two séances, but soon reappeared, at first well-behaved, often indeed uttering Christian maxims, but soon dropping back into the old tone. Besides these two sharply differentiated personalities, others appeared who varied but little from the grandfather's type; they were mostly dead relatives of the medium. The general atmosphere of the first two months' séances was accordingly solemnly edifying, disturbed only from time to time by Mr. P. R.'s trivial chatter. Some weeks after the beginning of the séances, Mr. R. left our circle, whereupon a remarkable change took place in Mr. P. R.'s conversation. He became monosyllabic, came less often, and after a few séances vanished altogether, later on he reappeared but with great infrequency, and for the most part only when the medium was alone with the particular lady mentioned. Then a new personality forced himself into the foreground; in contrast to Mr. P. R., who always spoke the Swiss dialect, this gentleman adopted an affected North-German way of speaking. In all else he was an exact copy of Mr. P. R. His eloquence was somewhat remarkable, since S. W. had only a very scanty knowledge of high German, whilst this new personality, who called himself Ulrich von Gerbenstein, spoke an almost faultless German, rich in charming phrases and compliments.[20]
Numerous similar explanations revealed their mundane, syrupy content, showing they came from some pamphlet or the like. When S. W. had to express ecstasy, lively conversations sprang up between the circle members and the sleepwalking personality. The responses were basically the same dull, moralizing stuff as the psychographic messages. This personality was marked by a dry and boring seriousness, strict conventionality, and a pious virtue that didn’t match historical reality. The grandfather acted as the medium's guide and protector. In the ecstatic state, he offered all kinds of advice, predicted upcoming attacks, and shared the visions she would experience upon waking, etc. He advised on cold bandages, how the medium should lie down, or the timing of the séances. His relationship with the medium was exceptionally tender. In sharp contrast to this heavy, dreamlike figure was another personality, which appeared sporadically in the psychographic messages from the first séance. It quickly revealed itself to be the deceased brother of a Mr. R., who was participating in the séance. This deceased brother, Mr. P. R., was full of clichés about brotherly love for his living brother. He avoided specific questions in many ways. However, he was surprisingly eloquent towards the women of the circle and particularly expressed his affection for a woman he had never met in life. He claimed to have cared for her a great deal when he was alive, often passing her in the street without recognizing her, and was now unusually happy to meet her in this unique manner. With such bland compliments, scornful remarks towards the men, harmless childish jokes, etc., he dominated much of the séance. Several members criticized the frivolity and banality of this "spirit," leading him to disappear for one or two séances, but he soon returned, initially behaving, often sharing Christian maxims, before slipping back into his old ways. Besides these two clearly distinct personalities, others emerged that closely resembled the grandfather's type, mostly being dead relatives of the medium. The overall atmosphere of the first two months' séances was thus solemnly moralizing, only occasionally disrupted by Mr. P. R.'s trivial chatter. A few weeks after the séances began, Mr. R. left our group, leading to a notable change in Mr. P. R.'s conversation. He became monosyllabic, appeared less frequently, and after a few séances, disappeared entirely. Later, he came back but rarely, mostly when the medium was alone with the specific lady mentioned. Then a new personality stepped forward; unlike Mr. P. R., who spoke in Swiss dialect, this gentleman used an affected North German manner of speaking. In every respect, he was an exact replica of Mr. P. R. His eloquence was somewhat remarkable since S. W. had only a very limited grasp of High German, whereas this new personality, who introduced himself as Ulrich von Gerbenstein, spoke almost flawless German, rich in charming phrases and compliments.[20]
Ulrich von Gerbenstein was a witty chatterer, full of[33] repartee, an idler, a great admirer of the ladies, frivolous, and most superficial.
Ulrich von Gerbenstein was a clever talker, full of[33] quick comebacks, a slacker, a big fan of women, shallow, and quite superficial.
During the winter of 1899-1900 he gradually came to dominate the situation more and more, and took over one by one all the above-mentioned functions of the grandfather, so that under his influence the serious character of the séances disappeared.
During the winter of 1899-1900, he slowly began to take control of the situation more and more, gradually assuming all the previously mentioned roles of the grandfather, which caused the serious tone of the séances to fade away.
All suggestions to the contrary proved unavailing, and at last the séances had on this account to be suspended for longer and longer intervals. There is a peculiarity common to all these somnambulic personalities which must be noted. They have access to the medium's memory, even to the unconscious portion, they are also au courant with the visions which she has in the ecstatic state, but they have only the most superficial knowledge of her phantasies during the ecstasy. Of the somnambulic dreams they know only what they occasionally pick up from the members of the circle. On doubtful points they can give no information, or only such as contradicts the medium's explanations. The stereotyped answer to these questions runs: "Ask Ivenes."[21] "Ivenes knows." From the examples given of different ecstatic moments it is clear that the medium's consciousness is by no means idle during the trance, but develops a striking and multiplex phantastic activity. For the reconstruction of S. W.'s somnambulic self we have to depend altogether upon her several statements; for in the first place her spontaneous utterances connecting her with the waking self are few, and often irrelevant, and in the second very many of these ecstatic states go by without gesture, and without speech, so that no conclusions as to the inner happenings can afterwards be drawn from the external appearances. S. W. is almost totally amnesic for the automatic phenomena during ecstasy as far as they come within the territory of the new personalities of her ego. Of all the other phenomena, such as loud talking, babbling, etc., which are directly connected with her own ego she usually has a clear remembrance. But in every case there is complete amnesia only during the first few minutes after the ecstasy.[34] Within the first half-hour, during which there usually prevails a kind of semi-somnambulism with a dreamlike manner, hallucinations, etc., the amnesia gradually disappears, whilst fragmentary memories emerge of what has occurred, but in a quite irregular and arbitrary fashion.
All suggestions to the contrary were ineffective, and eventually, the séances had to be held less and less frequently. There is a notable characteristic common to all these somnambulic personalities that must be highlighted. They can access the medium's memory, even the unconscious part, and they are also au courant with the visions she experiences during her ecstatic state, but they only have the most basic understanding of her fantasies during ecstasy. They only know about the somnambulic dreams based on snippets they receive from the members of the circle. On uncertain matters, they can't provide any information, or they only give answers that contradict the medium's explanations. The usual response to these inquiries is: "Ask Ivenes."[21] "Ivenes knows." The examples provided of different ecstatic moments show that the medium's consciousness is definitely not inactive during the trance; instead, it engages in a remarkable and complex imaginative activity. To reconstruct S. W.'s somnambulic self, we rely entirely on her various statements since, to begin with, her spontaneous comments linking her to her waking self are few and often unrelated. Additionally, many of these ecstatic states occur without any gestures or speech, making it impossible to draw conclusions about the internal experiences from external observations. S. W. is almost completely amnesic regarding the automatic phenomena during ecstasy as they pertain to the new personalities of her ego. She usually has a clear memory of all other phenomena, like loud talking, babbling, etc., that are directly connected to her own ego. However, in every instance, there is total amnesia for the first few minutes after the ecstasy.[34] Within the first half-hour, during which there is typically a kind of semi-somnambulism with a dreamlike quality, hallucinations, etc., the amnesia gradually fades, while fragmented memories of what happened begin to emerge in a completely irregular and arbitrary way.
The later séances were usually begun by our hands being joined and laid on the table, whereon the table at once began to move. Meanwhile S. W. gradually became somnambulic, took her hands from the table, lay back on the sofa, and fell into the ecstatic sleep. She sometimes related her experiences to us afterwards, but showed herself very reticent if strangers were present. After the very first ecstasy she indicated that she played a distinguished rôle among the spirits. She had a special name, as had each of the spirits; hers was Ivenes; her grandfather looked after her with particular care. In the ecstasy with the flower-vision we learnt her special secret, hidden till then beneath the deepest silence. During the séances in which her spirit spoke she made long journeys, mostly to relatives, to whom she said she appeared, or she found herself on the Other Side, in "That space between the stars which people think is empty, but in which there are really very many spirit-worlds." In the semi-somnambulic state which frequently followed her attacks, she once described, in peculiar poetic fashion, a landscape on the Other Side, "a wondrous, moon-lit valley, set aside for the races not yet born." She represented her somnambulic ego as being almost completely released from the body. It is a fully-grown but small, black-haired woman, of pronounced Jewish type, clothed in white garments, her head covered with a turban. She understands and speaks the language of the spirits, "for spirits still, from old human custom, do speak to one another, although they do not really need to, since they mutually understand one another's thoughts." She "does not really always talk with the spirits, but just looks at them, and so understands their thoughts." She travels in the company of four or five spirits, dead relatives, and visits her living relatives and acquaintances in order to investigate their life and their way of thinking; she further visits all places which lie[35] within the radius of these spectral inhabitants. From her acquaintanceship with Kerner's book, she discovered and improved upon the ideas of the black spirits who are kept enchanted in certain places, or exist partly beneath the earth's surface (compare the "Seherin von Prevorst"). This activity caused her much trouble and pain; in and after the ecstasy she complained of suffocating feelings, violent headache, etc. But every fortnight, on Wednesdays, she could pass the whole night in the garden on the Other Side in the company of holy spirits. There she was taught everything concerning the forces of the world, the endless complicated relationships and affinities of human beings, and all besides about the laws of reincarnation, the inhabitants of the stars, etc. Unfortunately only the system of the world-forces and reincarnation achieved any expression. As to the other matters she only let fall disconnected observations. For example, once she returned from a railway journey in an extremely disturbed state. It was thought at first something unpleasant had happened, till she managed to compose herself, and said, "A star-inhabitant had sat opposite to her in the train." From the description which she gave of this being, I recognised a well-known elderly merchant I happened to know, who has a rather unsympathetic face. In connection with this experience she related all kinds of peculiarities of these star-dwellers; they have no god-like souls, as men have, they pursue no science, no philosophy, but in technical arts they are far more advanced than men. Thus on Mars a flying-machine has long been in existence; the whole of Mars is covered with canals, these canals are cleverly excavated lakes and serve for irrigation. The canals are quite superficial; the water in them is very shallow. The excavating caused the inhabitants of Mars no particular trouble, for the soil there is lighter than the earth's. The canals are nowhere bridged, but that does not prevent communication, for everything travels by flying-machine. Wars no longer occur on the stars, for no differences of opinion exist. The star-dwellers have not human bodies, but the most laughable ones possible,[36] such as one would never imagine. Human spirits who are allowed to travel on the Other Side may not set foot on the stars. Equally, wandering star-dwellers may not come to the earth, but must remain at a distance of twenty-five metres above the earth's surface. Should they transgress they remain in the power of the earth, and must assume human bodies, and are only set free again after their natural death. As men, they are cold, hard-hearted, cruel. S. W. recognises them by a singular expression in which the "Spiritual" is lacking, and by their hairless, eyebrowless, sharply-cut faces. Napoleon was a star-dweller.
The later séances typically started with us joining hands and placing them on the table, which would immediately begin to move. Meanwhile, S. W. gradually became semi-conscious, took her hands off the table, lay back on the sofa, and fell into a trance-like sleep. She sometimes shared her experiences with us afterward, but was very reserved if there were strangers around. After her very first trance, she indicated that she played a significant role among the spirits. She had a unique name, like each of the spirits; hers was *Ivenes*; her grandfather looked after her particularly closely. During the ecstasy with the flower vision, we learned her special secret, which had been kept in the deepest silence until then. In the séances when her spirit spoke, she made long journeys, often to relatives, to whom she claimed to appear, or found herself in "That space between the stars which people think is empty, but which actually contains many spirit worlds." In the semi-conscious state that often followed her episodes, she once described, in a poetic way, a landscape on the Other Side, "a beautiful, moonlit valley, set aside for the races yet to be born." She portrayed her semi-conscious self as almost completely detached from her body. It’s a fully grown but small, black-haired woman of a distinct Jewish type, dressed in white garments, her head covered with a turban. She understands and speaks the language of the spirits, "for spirits still, by old human custom, do talk to each other, even though they don’t really need to since they can understand one another's thoughts." She "doesn’t always talk with the spirits; she just looks at them and understands their thoughts." She travels with four or five spirits, deceased relatives, and visits her living relatives and friends to observe their lives and thoughts; she also visits all places that lie [35] within the reach of these spectral inhabitants. From her familiarity with Kerner's book, she discovered and built on the ideas about black spirits who are enchanted in specific locations or exist partly underground (see "Seherin von Prevorst"). This activity caused her a lot of trouble and discomfort; during and after her ecstasies, she complained of suffocating sensations, intense headaches, etc. But every two weeks, on Wednesdays, she could spend the entire night in the garden on the Other Side in the company of benevolent spirits. There, she learned everything about the forces of the world, the endless complex relationships and connections among humans, and all about the laws of reincarnation, the inhabitants of the stars, etc. Unfortunately, only the system of world forces and reincarnation was expressed clearly. As for the other topics, she only let slip disconnected observations. For instance, once she returned from a train journey in an extremely agitated state. At first, it was thought something unpleasant had happened until she managed to calm down and said, "A star inhabitant sat across from me on the train." From her description of this being, I recognized a well-known elderly merchant I happened to know, who has a rather unappealing face. In connection with this encounter, she shared various peculiarities about these star-dwellers; they don’t have god-like souls like humans, they don’t pursue science or philosophy, but they are much more advanced in technical arts than humans. So on Mars, a flying machine has existed for a long time; the entire planet is filled with canals, these canals are cleverly constructed lakes that are used for irrigation. The canals are quite shallow; the water in them is very low. The excavation didn’t pose much trouble for the inhabitants of Mars, since the soil there is lighter than Earth's. The canals aren’t bridged, but that doesn’t stop communication, as everything travels by flying machine. Wars no longer happen on the stars, as there are no differences of opinion. The star-dwellers don’t have human bodies but rather the most ridiculous ones imaginable,[36] which one could never conceive. Human spirits who are allowed to travel on the Other Side may not set foot on the stars. Similarly, wandering star-dwellers are not allowed to come to Earth, but must remain twenty-five meters above the Earth's surface. If they violate this, they stay within the Earth’s influence and must take on human bodies, only to be freed again after their natural death. As humans, they are cold, hard-hearted, and cruel. S.W. identifies them by a distinctive expression lacking any "spiritual" quality, and by their hairless, eyebrowless, sharply defined faces. Napoleon was a star-dweller.
In her journeys she does not see the places through which she hastens. She has a feeling of floating, and the spirits tell her when she is at the right spot. Then, as a rule, she only sees the face and upper part of the person to whom she is supposed to appear, or whom she wishes to see. She can seldom say in what kind of surroundings she sees this person. Occasionally she saw me, but only my head without any surroundings. She occupied herself much with the enchanting of spirits, and for this purpose she wrote oracular sayings in a foreign tongue, on slips of paper which she concealed in all sorts of queer places. An Italian murderer, presumably living in my house, and whom she called Conventi, was specially displeasing to her. She tried several times to cast a spell upon him, and without my knowledge hid several papers about, on which messages were written; these were later found by chance. One such, written in red ink, was as follows:
In her travels, she doesn’t really notice the places she’s passing through. It feels like she’s floating, and the spirits guide her to the right spot. Usually, she only sees the face and upper body of the person she’s meant to connect with or wants to see. She rarely knows what the surroundings look like when she sees these people. Occasionally, she caught sight of me, but only my head without any context. She spent a lot of time enchanting spirits, writing mysterious messages in a foreign language on slips of paper that she hid in all sorts of strange places. An Italian murderer, supposedly living in my home, whom she called Conventi, particularly bothered her. She tried multiple times to cast a spell on him and, without me knowing, hid several notes with messages that were later found by chance. One such note, written in red ink, said:
Conventi
Convention
Marche. 4 govi
Marche. 4 cities
Ivenes.
Ivenes.
Conventi, go
Conventi, let's go
orden, Astaf
order, Astaf
vent.
vent.
Gen palus, vent allis
Gen palus, vent allis
ton prost afta ben genallis.
ton prost afta ben genallis.
Unfortunately, I never obtained any interpretation of this. S. W. was quite inaccessible in this matter. Occasionally the somnambulic Ivenes speaks directly to the public. She does so in dignified fashion, rather precociously, but she is not wearisomely unctuous and impossibly twaddling as are her two guides; she is a serious, mature person, devout and pious, full of womanly tenderness and great modesty, always yielding to the judgments of others. This expression of plaintive emotion and melancholy resignation is peculiar to her. She looks beyond this world, and unwillingly returns to reality; she bemoans her hard lot, and her unsympathetic family surroundings. Associated with this there is something elevated about her; she commands her spirits, despises the twaddling chatter of Gerbenstein, consoles others, directs those in distress, warns and protects them from dangers to body and soul. She is the intermediary for the entire intellectual output of all manifestations, but she herself ascribes it to the direction of the spirits. It is Ivenes who entirely controls S. W.'s semi-somnambulic state.
Unfortunately, I never got any explanation for this. S. W. was pretty hard to reach on this topic. Sometimes, the somnambulic Ivenes speaks directly to the audience. She does it in a dignified way, a bit ahead of her time, but she isn't annoyingly syrupy or excessively chatty like her two guides; she comes across as a serious, mature person—devout and pious, full of feminine tenderness and great modesty, always deferring to the opinions of others. This display of sad emotion and melancholic acceptance is unique to her. She looks beyond this world and reluctantly returns to reality; she laments her difficult situation and her unsupportive family environment. There’s something elevated about her; she commands her spirits, dismisses the pointless chatter of Gerbenstein, comforts others, guides those in distress, and warns and protects them from threats to their well-being. She is the channel for all the intellectual output of various manifestations, but she attributes it to the guidance of the spirits. It’s Ivenes who completely controls S. W.'s semi-somnambulic state.
In semi-somnambulism S. W. gave some of those taking part in the séances the opportunity to compare her with the "Seherin von Prevorst" (Prophetess of Prevorst). This suggestion was not without results. S. W. gave hints of earlier existences which she had already lived through, and after a few weeks she suddenly disclosed a whole system of reincarnations, although she had never before mentioned anything of the kind. Ivenes is a spiritual being who is something more than the spirits of other human beings. Every human spirit must incorporate himself twice in the course of the centuries. But Ivenes must incorporate herself at least once every two hundred years; besides herself only two other persons have participated in this fate, namely, Swedenborg and Miss Florence Cook (Crookes's famous medium). S. W. calls these two personages her brother and sister. She gave no information about their pre-existences. In the beginning of the nineteenth century Ivenes was Frau Hauffe, the Prophetess of Prevorst; at the end of the eighteenth century, a clergyman's wife in central Germany[38] (locality unknown). As the latter she was seduced by Goethe and bore him a child. In the fifteenth century she was a Saxon countess, and had the poetic name of Thierfelsenburg. Ulrich von Gerbenstein is a relative from that line. The interval of 300 years, and her adventure with Goethe, must be atoned for by the sorrows of the Prophetess of Prevorst. In the thirteenth century she was a noblewoman of Southern France, called de Valours, and was burnt as a witch. From the thirteenth century to the Christian persecution under Nero there were numerous reincarnations of which S. W. could give no detailed account. In the Christian persecution under Nero she played a martyr's part. Then comes a period of obscurity till the time of David, when Ivenes was an ordinary Jewess. After her death she received from Astaf, an angel from a high heaven, the mandate for her future wonderful career. In all her pre-existences she was a medium and an intermediary in the intercourse between this side and the other. Her brothers and sisters are equally old and have the like vocation. In her various pre-existences she was sometimes married, and in this way gradually founded a whole system of relationships with whose endless complicated inter-relations she occupied herself in many ecstasies. Thus, for example, about the eighth century she was the mother of her earthly father and, moreover, of her grandfather, and mine. Hence the striking friendship of these two old gentlemen, otherwise strangers. As Mme. de Valours she was the present writer's mother. When she was burnt as a witch the writer took it much to heart, and went into a cloister at Rouen, wore a grey habit, became Prior, wrote a work on Botany and died at over eighty years of age. In the refectory of the cloister there hung a picture of Mme. de Valours, in which she was depicted in a half-reclining position. (S. W. in the semi-somnambulic state often took this position on the sofa. It corresponds exactly to that of Mme. Recamier in David's well-known picture.) A gentleman who often took part in the séances, who had some slight resemblance to the writer, was also one of her sons from that period. Around this core[39] of relationship there grouped themselves, more or less intimately connected, all the persons in any way related or known to her. One came from the fifteenth century, another—a cousin—from the eighteenth century, and so on.
In a semi-trance state, S. W. allowed some participants in the séances to compare her to the "Seherin von Prevorst" (Prophetess of Prevorst). This suggestion had notable effects. S. W. hinted at past lives she had experienced, and after a few weeks, she unexpectedly revealed a complete system of reincarnations, even though she had never mentioned anything like that before. Ivenes is a spiritual being who is more than just the spirits of other humans. Every human spirit must reincarnate twice over the centuries. However, Ivenes needs to reincarnate at least once every two hundred years; aside from her, only two others share this fate: Swedenborg and Miss Florence Cook (the famous medium associated with Crookes). S. W. referred to these two figures as her brother and sister but did not provide any details about their past lives. In the early nineteenth century, Ivenes was Frau Hauffe, the Prophetess of Prevorst; in the late eighteenth century, she was a clergyman's wife in central Germany (the exact location is unknown). As that clergyman's wife, she was seduced by Goethe and had a child with him. In the fifteenth century, she was a Saxon countess with the poetic name of Thierfelsenburg. Ulrich von Gerbenstein is a relative from that lineage. The 300-year gap and her affair with Goethe must be balanced by the sorrows of the Prophetess of Prevorst. In the thirteenth century, she was a noblewoman from Southern France named de Valours and was burned as a witch. From that time until the Christian persecution under Nero, there were many reincarnations that S. W. could not elaborate on. During the Christian persecution under Nero, she acted as a martyr. Then there is a period of obscurity until the time of David, when Ivenes was just an ordinary Jewess. After her death, she received a mandate from Astaf, an angel from a high realm, guiding her future extraordinary path. In all her past lives, she served as a medium and a link between this world and the next. Her siblings are equally ancient and share this calling. Throughout her various past lives, she was occasionally married, which led to a complicated web of relationships that she explored in many ecstatic experiences. For example, around the eighth century, she was the mother of her earthly father as well as her grandfather, and mine. This explains the close friendship between these two older gentlemen, who otherwise appeared to be strangers. As Madame de Valours, she was the present author's mother. When she was burned as a witch, the author took it very hard, entered a cloister in Rouen, wore a gray habit, became Prior, wrote a book on botany, and died at over eighty years old. In the cloister's dining hall, there was a painting of Madame de Valours, where she was depicted in a half-reclining position. (S. W. in her semi-trance state often took this same position on the sofa. It closely resembles that of Madame Recamier in David's iconic painting.) A gentleman who frequently participated in the séances, who bore a slight resemblance to the author, was also one of her sons from that time. Around this core of relationships, all the people in any way connected or known to her formed various degrees of intimacy. One person was from the fifteenth century, another—a cousin—from the eighteenth century, and so forth.
From the three great family stocks grew by far the greater part of the present European peoples. She and her brothers and sisters are descended from Adam, who arose by materialisation; the other then-existing families, from whom Cain took his wife, were descended from apes. S. W. produced from this circle of relationship an extensive family-gossip, a very flood of romantic stories, piquant adventures, etc. Sometimes the target of her romances was a lady acquaintance of the writer's who for some undiscoverable reason was peculiarly antipathetic to her. She declared that this lady was an incarnation of a celebrated Parisian poisoner, who had achieved great notoriety in the eighteenth century. She maintained that this lady still continued her dangerous work, but in a much more ingenious way than formerly; through the inspiration of the wicked spirits who accompany her she had discovered a liquid which when merely exposed to the air attracted tubercle bacilli and formed a splendid developing medium for them. By means of this liquid, which she was wont to mix with the food, the lady had brought about the death of her husband (who had indeed died of tuberculosis); also one of her lovers, and of her own brother, for the sake of his inheritance. Her eldest son was an illegitimate child by her lover. As a widow she had secretly borne to another lover an illegitimate child, and finally she had had an unnatural relationship with her own brother (who was later on poisoned). In this way S. W. spun innumerable stories, in which she believed quite implicitly. The persons of these stories appeared in the drama of her visions, as did the lady before referred to, going through the pantomime of making confession and receiving absolution of sins. Everything interesting occurring in her surroundings was incorporated in this system of romances, and given an order in the network of relationships with a[40] more or less exact statement as to their pre-existences and the spirits influencing them. It fared thus with all who made S. W.'s acquaintance: they were valued at a second or first incarnation, according as they possessed a marked or indefinite character. They were generally described as relatives, and always exactly in the same definite way. Only subsequently, often several weeks later, after an ecstasy, there would make its appearance a new complicated romance which explained the striking relationship through pre-existences or through illegitimate relations. Persons sympathetic to S. W. were usually very near relatives. Most of these family romances were very carefully made up, so that to contradict them was impossible. They were always worked out with a quite bewildering certainty, and surprised one by an extremely clever evaluation of certain details which she had noticed or taken from somewhere. For the most part the romances had a ghastly character, murder by poison and dagger, seduction and divorce, forgery of wills, played the chief rôle.
From the three main family lines grew most of the current European peoples. She and her siblings are descendants of Adam, who came into being through materialization; the other families around at that time, from whom Cain took his wife, descended from apes. S. W. spun an elaborate web of family gossip, overflowing with romantic tales and intriguing escapades. Often, the focus of her stories was a female acquaintance of the writer's, who for some unknown reason strongly disliked her. She claimed that this woman was the reincarnation of a famous Parisian poisoner who gained infamy in the eighteenth century. She insisted that this woman continued her nefarious activities, now in much more clever ways; inspired by wicked spirits, she had found a liquid that, when exposed to air, attracted tubercle bacilli and created a perfect environment for them to thrive. Using this liquid, which she mixed into food, the woman had caused the death of her husband (who did indeed die of tuberculosis); she also killed one of her lovers and her own brother, all for the sake of inheritance. Her eldest son was an illegitimate child fathered by her lover. As a widow, she secretly had another illegitimate child with a different lover and even engaged in an incestuous relationship with her brother (who was later poisoned). This way, S. W. crafted countless stories, which she wholeheartedly believed. The characters in these tales appeared in the drama of her visions, along with the aforementioned lady, going through the motions of confessing sins and receiving absolution. Everything interesting around her became part of this intricate web of stories, organized according to their pre-existences and the spirits influencing them. This was true for everyone who met S. W.: they were assigned a ranking as a second or first incarnation based on the strength or vagueness of their character. They were typically labeled as relatives and always described in the same specific manner. Only later, sometimes weeks afterward, following a trance, would a new intricate story emerge that clarified the remarkable relationships through past lives or illegitimate ties. Those who were sympathetic to S. W. were usually very close relatives. Most of these family sagas were meticulously crafted, making them impossible to refute. They were filled with a striking level of certainty and surprised listeners with particularly clever interpretations of certain details she had observed or borrowed from somewhere. Generally, the tales had a dark theme, featuring murder by poison and daggers, seduction and divorce, and forged wills as central plots.
Mystic Science.—In reference to scientific questions S. W. put forward numerous suggestions. Generally towards the end of the séances there was talk and debate about various subjects of scientific and spiritistic nature. S. W. never took part in the discussion, but generally sat dreamily in a corner in a semi-somnambulic state. She listened to one and another, taking hold of the talk in a half-dream, but she could never relate anything connectedly; if asked about it only partial explanations were given. In the course of the winter hints emerged in various séances: "The spirits taught her about the world-forces and the strange revelations from the other side, yet she would not tell anything now." Once she tried to give a description, but only said: "On one side was the light, on the other the power of attraction." Finally, in March 1900, when for some time nothing had been heard of the teachings at the séances, she announced suddenly with a joyful face that she had now received everything from the spirits. She drew out a long narrow strip of paper upon which were numerous names.[41] Although I asked for it she would not let it leave her hands, but dictated the following scheme to me.
Mystic Science.—Regarding scientific questions, S. W. made many suggestions. Usually, towards the end of the séances, there were discussions about various scientific and spiritual topics. S. W. never joined in the conversation, instead sitting quietly in a corner in a dazed state. She listened, catching bits of the conversation in a half-dreamy way, but she could never express anything coherently; if asked about it, she only provided partial explanations. Throughout the winter, hints appeared in different séances: "The spirits taught her about the forces of the universe and the strange insights from the other side, but she wouldn’t share anything now." Once, she attempted to describe it, saying: "On one side was the light, on the other the force of attraction." Finally, in March 1900, after hearing nothing about the teachings at the séances for a while, she suddenly announced with a happy expression that she had now received everything from the spirits. She pulled out a long strip of paper covered in names.[41] Although I asked for it, she wouldn’t let it go, but dictated the following outline to me.
I can remember clearly that in the course of the winter of 1895 we spoke several times in S. W.'s presence of the forces of attraction and repulsion in connection with Kant's "Natural History of the Heavens"; we spoke also of the "Law of the Conservation of Energy," of the different forces of energy, and of the question whether the force of gravity was perhaps a form of movement. From this talk S. W. had plainly created the foundation of her mystic system. She gave the following explanation: The natural forces are arranged in seven circles. Outside these circles are three more, in which unknown forces intermediate between energy and matter are found. Matter is found in seven circles which surround ten inner ones. In the centre stands[42] the primary force, which is the original cause of creation and is a spiritual force. The first circle which surrounds the primary force is matter which is not really a force and does not arise from the primary force, but it unites with the primary force and from this union the first descendants are the spiritual forces; on the one hand the Good or Light Powers, on the other the Dark Powers. The Power Magnesor consists most of primary force; the Power Connesor, in which the dark might of matter is greatest, contains the least. The further outwards the primary force streams forth, the weaker it becomes, but weaker too becomes the power of matter, since its power is greatest where the collision with the primary power is most violent, i.e. in the Power Connesor. Within the circles there are fresh analogous forces of equal strength but making in the opposite direction. The system can also be described in a single series beginning with primary force, Magnesor, Cafor, etc., proceeding from left to right on the scheme and ascending with Tusa, Endos, ending with Connesor; only then the survey of the grade of intensity is made more difficult. Every force in the outer circle is combined from the nearest adjacent forces of the inner circle.
I clearly remember that during the winter of 1895, we talked several times in S. W.'s presence about the forces of attraction and repulsion in relation to Kant's "Natural History of the Heavens." We also discussed the "Law of the Conservation of Energy," the different forms of energy, and whether gravity might actually be a type of movement. From these conversations, S. W. had clearly built the foundation of her mystical system. She explained it like this: Natural forces are arranged in seven circles. Outside these circles, there are three more that contain unknown forces that lie between energy and matter. Matter is found in seven circles that surround ten inner ones. At the center stands[42] the primary force, which is the original cause of creation and is a spiritual force. The first circle surrounding the primary force is matter, which isn't really a force and doesn't come from the primary force, but it combines with the primary force, and from this union, the first descendants are the spiritual forces; on one side are the Good or Light Powers, and on the other side are the Dark Powers. The Power Magnesor is mostly primary force; the Power Connesor, where the dark might of matter is strongest, contains the least. The further the primary force radiates outward, the weaker it becomes, and the power of matter also decreases, since its power is greatest when it collides most violently with the primary power, i.e., in the Power Connesor. Within the circles, there are analogous forces of equal strength moving in the opposite direction. The system can also be described in a simple series starting with primary force, Magnesor, Cafor, etc., moving from left to right on the diagram and ascending with Tusa, Endos, and ending with Connesor; however, this way makes it harder to see the intensity levels. Every force in the outer circle is made up of the closest forces from the inner circle.
1. The Magnesor Group.—The so-called powers of Light descend in direct line from Magnesor, but slightly influenced by the dark side. The powers Magnesor and Cafor form together the so-called Life Force, which is no single power but is differently combined in animals and plants. Between Magnesor and Cafor there exists the Life Force of Man. Morally good men and those mediums who bring about interviews of good spirits on the earth have most Magnesor. Somewhere about the middle there stand the life forces of animals, and in Cafor that of plants. Nothing is known about Hefa, or rather S. W. can give no information. Persus is the fundamental power which comes to light in the phenomenon of the forces of locomotion. Its recognisable forces are Warmth, Light, Electricity, Magnetism, and two unknown forces, one of which only exists in comets. Of the powers of the seventh circle S. W. could only point out north[43] and south magnetism and positive and negative electricity. Deka is unknown. Smar is of peculiar significance, to be indicated below; it leads to—
1. The Magnesor Group.—The so-called powers of Light come directly from Magnesor, but are slightly influenced by the dark side. The powers of Magnesor and Cafor together form what is known as the Life Force, which isn’t a single power but is differently combined in animals and plants. Between Magnesor and Cafor lies the Life Force of Man. Morally good people and those mediums who connect with good spirits on earth possess the most Magnesor. Somewhere in the middle are the life forces of animals, and in Cafor are the forces of plants. Nothing is known about Hefa, or rather, S. W. can provide no information. Persus is the fundamental power that emerges in the phenomenon of locomotion forces. Its recognizable forces are Warmth, Light, Electricity, Magnetism, and two unknown forces, one of which exists only in comets. Of the powers of the seventh circle, S. W. could only identify north[43] and south magnetism and positive and negative electricity. Deka is unknown. Smar is of particular significance, which will be explained below; it leads to—
2. Hypnos Group.—Hypnos and Hyfonismus are powers which only dwell within certain beings, in those who are in a position to exert a magnetic influence upon others. Athialowi is the sexual instinct. Chemical affinity is directly derived from it. In the ninth circle under it arises indolence (that is the line of Smar). Svens and Kara are of unknown significance. Pusa corresponds to Smar in the opposite sense.
2. Hypnos Group.—Hypnos and Hyfonismus are powers that exist only in certain individuals, those who have the ability to influence others magnetically. Athialowi represents the sexual instinct. Chemical attraction comes directly from it. Indolence arises in the ninth circle below it (that is the line of Smar). Svens and Kara have unclear meanings. Pusa is the opposite of Smar.
3. The Connesor Group.—Connesor is the opposite pole of Magnesor. It is the dark and wicked power equal in intensity to the good power of light. While the good power creates, this one turns into the opposite. Endos is an elemental power of minerals. From these (significance unknown) gravitation proceeds, which on its side is designated as the elemental force of the forces of resistance that occur in phenomena (gravity, capillarity, adhesion and cohesion). Nakus is the secret power of a rare stone which controls the effect of snake poison. The two powers Smar and Pusa have a special importance. According to S. W., Smar develops in the bodies of morally good men at the moment of death. This power enables the soul to rise to the powers of light. Pusa behaves in the opposite way, for it is the power which conducts morally bad people to the dark side in the state of Connesor.
3. The Connesor Group.—Connesor is the opposite of Magnesor. It represents the dark and evil force that is equal in strength to the good force of light. While the good force creates, this one transforms things into the opposite. Endos is a fundamental power of minerals. From these (significance unknown) comes gravity, which is considered the foundational force of the resistive forces that occur in various phenomena (gravity, capillarity, adhesion, and cohesion). Nakus is the hidden power of a rare stone that counteracts the effects of snake venom. The two powers Smar and Pusa hold special significance. According to S. W., Smar emerges in the bodies of morally good people at the moment of death. This power allows the soul to ascend to the forces of light. Pusa functions in the opposite manner, as it directs morally bad individuals to the dark side in the state of Connesor.
In the sixth circle the visible world begins, which only appears to be so sharply divided from the other side in consequence of the fickleness of our organs of sense. In reality the transition is a very gradual one, and there are people who live on a higher stage of knowledge because their perceptions and sensations are more delicate than those of others. Great seers are enabled to see manifestations of force where ordinary people can perceive nothing. S. W. sees Magnesor as a white or bluish vapour, which chiefly develops when good spirits are near. Connesor is a dark vapour-like fluid, which, like Magnesor, develops on the appearance of "black" spirits. For instance, the night before the beginning[44] of great visions the shiny vapour of Magnesor spreads in thick layers, out of which, the good spirits grow to visible white forces. It is just the same with Connesor. But these powers have their different mediums. S. W. is a Magnesor medium, as were the Prophetess of Prevorst and Swedenborg. The materialisation mediums of the spiritualists are mostly Connesor mediums, because materialisation takes place much more easily through Connesor on account of its close connection with the properties of matter. In the summer of 1900 S. W. tried several times to produce the circles of matter, but she never arrived at other than vague and incomprehensible hints and afterwards spoke no more about this.
In the sixth circle, the visible world begins, which only seems to be sharply separated from the other side because of the inconsistency of our senses. In reality, the transition is very gradual, and there are people who exist at a higher level of understanding because their perceptions and sensations are more refined than those of others. Great seers can notice manifestations of energy where ordinary people see nothing. S. W. sees Magnesor as a white or bluish vapor, which mostly appears when good spirits are nearby. Connesor is a dark, vapor-like fluid that, like Magnesor, emerges in the presence of "black" spirits. For example, the night before the start[44] of significant visions, the shiny vapor of Magnesor spreads in thick layers, from which the good spirits become visible white forces. The same applies to Connesor. However, these powers have different mediums. S. W. is a Magnesor medium, just like the Prophetess of Prevorst and Swedenborg. The materialization mediums of spiritualists are mostly Connesor mediums because materialization occurs much more easily through Connesor due to its close connection to the properties of matter. In the summer of 1900, S. W. attempted several times to create circles of matter, but she never succeeded in producing anything other than vague and unclear hints and subsequently stopped discussing it.
Conclusion.—The really interesting and valuable séances came to an end with the production of the system of powers. Before this a gradual decline in the vividness of the ecstasies was noticeable. Ulrich von Gerbenstein came increasingly to the front, and filled up the séances with his childish chatter. The visions which S. W. had in the meantime likewise seem to have lost vividness and plasticity of formation, for S. W. was afterwards only able to feel pleasant sensations in the presence of good spirits, and disagreeableness in that of bad spirits. Nothing new was produced. There was something of uncertainty in the trance talks, as if feeling and seeking for the impression which she was making upon the audience, together with an increasing staleness in the content. In the outward behaviour of S. W. there arose also a marked shyness and uncertainty, so that the impression of wilful deception became ever stronger. The writer therefore soon withdrew from the séances. S. W. experimented afterwards in other circles, and six months after my leaving was caught cheating in flagranti delicto. She wanted to arouse again by spiritualistic experiments the lost belief in her supernatural powers; she concealed small objects in her dress, throwing them up in the air during the dark séance. With this her part was played out. Since then, eighteen months have passed during which I have not seen S. W. I have learnt from an observer who knew her in the[45] earlier days, that she has now and again strange states of short duration during which she is very pale and silent, and has a fixed glittering look. I did not hear any more of visions. She is said not to take part any longer in spiritualistic séances. S. W. is now in a large business, and according to all accounts is an industrious and responsible person who does her work eagerly and cleverly, giving entire satisfaction. According to the account of trustworthy persons, her character has much improved; she has become quieter, more regular and sympathetic. No other abnormalities have appeared in her. This case, in spite of its incompleteness, contains a mass of psychological problems whose exposition goes far beyond the limits of this little work. We must therefore be satisfied with a mere sketch of the various striking manifestations. For the sake of a more lucid exposition it seems better to review the various states separately.
Conclusion.—The truly fascinating and valuable séances ended with the introduction of the system of powers. Before that, there was a noticeable gradual decline in the intensity of the ecstasies. Ulrich von Gerbenstein increasingly took center stage, filling the séances with his childish chatter. The visions that S. W. had during this time also seemed to lose their intensity and clarity, as S. W. later could only feel pleasant sensations in the presence of good spirits and discomfort with bad spirits. Nothing new was being produced. There was a sense of uncertainty in the trance talks, as if she was feeling and seeking the impression she was making on the audience, along with a growing dullness in the content. S. W.'s outward behavior also showed marked shyness and uncertainty, which made the impression of deliberate deception even stronger. The writer therefore soon withdrew from the séances. S. W. later experimented in other circles, and six months after my departure, she was caught cheating in flagranti delicto. She tried to rekindle the lost belief in her supernatural powers through spiritualistic experiments; she hid small objects in her dress, tossing them into the air during the dark séance. With that, her role was over. Since then, eighteen months have passed, during which I haven’t seen S. W. I learned from an observer who knew her in the [45] earlier days that she occasionally has strange states of short duration where she appears very pale and silent, with a fixed, glittering gaze. I didn’t hear anything more about visions. It’s said that she no longer participates in spiritualistic séances. S. W. is now in a large business and, according to all reports, is an industrious and responsible person who works eagerly and skillfully, providing complete satisfaction. Trustworthy individuals state that her character has improved a lot; she has become quieter, more regular, and sympathetic. No other abnormalities have appeared in her. This case, despite being incomplete, contains a wealth of psychological problems that far exceed the limits of this brief work. Therefore, we must be content with just a rough outline of the various striking manifestations. For clarity, it seems better to review the different states separately.
1. The Waking State.—Here the patient shows various peculiarities. As we have seen, at school she was often distracted, lost herself in a peculiar way, was moody; her behaviour changes inconsequently, now quiet, shy, reserved, now lively, noisy and talkative. She cannot be called unintelligent, but she strikes one sometimes as narrow-minded, sometimes as having isolated intelligent moments. Her memory is good on the whole, but owing to her distraction it is much impaired. Thus, despite much discussion and reading of Kerner's "Seherin von Prevorst," for many weeks, she does not know, if directly asked, whether the author's name is Koerner or Kerner, nor the name of the Prophetess. All the same, when it occasionally comes up, the name Kerner is correctly written in the automatic communications. In general it may be said that her character has something extremely impulsive, incomprehensible, protean. Deducting the want of balance due to puberty, there remains a pathological residue which expresses itself in reactions which follow no rule and a bizarre unaccountable character. This character may be called déséquilibré, or unstable. Its specific mould is derived from traits which can certainly be regarded as hysterical. This is decidedly so in the conditions[46] of distraction. As Janet[22] maintains, the foundation of hysterical anæsthesia is the loss of attention. He was able to prove in youthful hysterics "a striking indifference and distracted attention in the whole region of the emotional life." Misreading is a notable instance, which beautifully illustrates hysterical dispersion of attention. The psychology of this process may perhaps be viewed as follows: during reading aloud attention becomes paralysed for this act and is directed towards some other object. Meanwhile the reading is continued mechanically, the sense impressions are received as before, but in consequence of the dispersion the excitability of the perceptive centre is lowered, so that the strength of the sense impression is no longer adequate to fix the attention in such a way that perception as such is conducted along the motor speech route; thus all the inflowing associations which at once unite with any new sense impression are repressed. The further psychological mechanism permits of only two possible explanations: (1) The admission of the sense impression is received unconsciously (because of the increase of threshold stimulus), in the perceptive centre just below the threshold of consciousness, and consequently is not incorporated in the attention and conducted back to the speech route. It only reaches verbal expression through the intervention of the nearest associations, in our case through the dialect expression[23] for the object. (2) The sense impression is perceived consciously, but at the moment of its entrance into the speech route it reaches a territory whose excitability is diminished by the dispersion of attention. At this place the dialect word is substituted by association for the motor speech image, and it is uttered as such. In either case it is certain that it is the acoustic dispersed attention which fails to correct the error. Which of the two explanations is correct cannot be proved in this case; probably both approach the truth, for the dispersion of attention seems to be general, and in each case concerns more than one of the centres engaged in the [47]act of reading aloud. In our case this phenomenon has a special value, for we have here a quite elementary automatic phenomenon. It may be called hysterical in so far as in this concrete case a state of exhaustion and intoxication, with its parallel manifestations, can be excluded. A healthy person only exceptionally allows himself to be so engaged by an object that he fails to correct the errors of a dispersed attention—those of the kind described. The frequency of these occurrences in the patient point to a considerable limitation of the field of consciousness, in so far as she can only master a relative minimum of elementary sensations flowing in at the same time. If we wish to describe more exactly the psychological state of the "psychic shady side," we might call it either a sleeping or a dream-state, according as passivity or activity predominated. There is, at all events, a pathological dream-state of very rudimentary extension and intensity and its genesis is spontaneous; dream-states arising spontaneously, with the production of automatisms, are generally regarded as hysterical on the whole. It must be pointed out that these instances of misreading occurred frequently in our subject, and that the term hysterical is employed in this sense; so far as we know, it is only on a foundation of hysterical constitution that spontaneous states of partial sleep or dreams occur frequently.
1. The Waking State.—In this state, the patient exhibits various peculiar traits. As we've noted, during school, she was often distracted, zoned out in a strange way, and was moody. Her behavior shifts randomly, at times quiet, shy, and reserved, and at other times lively, loud, and talkative. While she can't be considered unintelligent, there are moments when she appears narrow-minded and other moments when she displays flashes of intelligence. Her memory is generally good, but her distractions significantly impair it. For instance, despite weeks of discussing and reading Kerner's "Seherin von Prevorst," she cannot recall, when directly asked, whether the author's name is Koerner or Kerner, or the name of the Prophetess. However, when it occasionally comes up, the name Kerner is accurately written in her automatic notes. Overall, her character seems highly impulsive, puzzling, and changeable. If we set aside the imbalances linked to puberty, there remains a pathological aspect that is evident in her unpredictable reactions and her bizarre, unaccountable character. This character could be described as déséquilibré or unstable. Its unique structure comes from traits that can certainly be seen as hysterical. This is particularly noticeable in states of distraction. As Janet[22] argues, the basis of hysterical anesthesia is a lack of attention. He demonstrated in young hysterics "a striking indifference and distracted attention in all areas of emotional life." Misreading is a notable example that effectively illustrates this hysterical spread of attention. The psychology behind this process may be understood as follows: while reading aloud, attention becomes paralyzed for that act and shifts to another object. Meanwhile, the reading continues automatically, and the sensory impressions are received as before, but due to the distraction, the excitability of the perceiving part is lowered, so that the intensity of the impression is no longer strong enough to guide attention such that perception is directed through the speech mechanism; therefore, all incoming associations that would connect with any new sensory impression get suppressed. The further psychological mechanism allows for only two possible explanations: (1) The incoming sensory impression is received unconsciously (due to the heightened threshold of stimulus), in the perceptive center just below the threshold of consciousness, and thus it is not included in the attention and directed back to the speech mechanism. It only becomes verbally expressed through the nearest associations, in this case, through the dialect expression[23] for the object. (2) The sensory impression is consciously perceived, but at the moment it enters the speech process, it lands in an area whose excitability is decreased by the dispersed attention. Here, the dialect word replaces the motor speech image through association and is spoken as such. In either scenario, it is clear that it is the acoustic spread of attention that fails to correct the mistake. Which of the two explanations is correct cannot be proven in this instance; likely, both come close to the truth, as the spread of attention seems to be widespread and affects more than one of the centers involved in the[47] act of reading aloud. In this case, this phenomenon holds special significance, because we have a purely elementary automatic phenomenon. It may be termed hysterical in the sense that, in this specific case, a state of exhaustion and intoxication, along with its related manifestations, can be excluded. A healthy person rarely becomes so focused on an object that they fail to correct the errors attributed to a distracted attention—those of the kind described. The frequency of these instances in the patient indicates a significant limitation of her field of consciousness, as she can only handle a relatively small amount of basic sensations at once. If we want to accurately describe the psychological state of the "psychic shady side," we might refer to it as either a sleeping state or a dream state, depending on whether passivity or activity prevails. There is certainly a pathological dream state of very basic extent and intensity, and its origin is spontaneous; dream states that emerge spontaneously, accompanied by the production of automatisms, are generally considered hysterical overall. It's important to note that these misreading instances happened frequently with our subject, and that "hysterical" is used in this context; as far as we can tell, spontaneous states of partial sleep or dreams frequently occur only on a foundation of hysterical constitution.
Binet[24] has studied experimentally the automatic substitution of some adjacent association in his hysterics. If he pricked the anæsthetic hand of the patient without his noticing the prick, he thought of "points"; if the anæsthetic finger was moved, he thought of "sticks" or "columns." When the anæsthetic hand, concealed from the patient's sight by a screen, writes "Salpêtrière," she sees in front of her the word "Salpêtrière" in white writing on a black ground. This recalls the experiments above referred to of Guinon and Sophie Waltke.
Binet[24] has studied the automatic substitution of some adjacent associations in his patients through experiments. When he pricked the patient's anesthetic hand without them noticing, they thought of "points"; when the anesthetic finger was moved, they thought of "sticks" or "columns." When the anesthetic hand, hidden from the patient's view by a screen, writes "Salpêtrière," they see the word "Salpêtrière" displayed in white text on a black background. This brings to mind the earlier experiments conducted by Guinon and Sophie Waltke.
We thus find in our subject, at a time when there was nothing to indicate the later phenomena, rudimentary automatisms, fragments of dream manifestations, which imply in[48] themselves the possibility that some day more than one association would creep in between the perception of the dispersed attention and consciousness. The misreading shows us, moreover, a certain automatic independence of the psychical elements. This occasionally expands to a more or less fleeting dispersion of attention, although with very slight results which are never in any way striking or suspicious; this dispersedness approximates to that of the physiological dream. The misreading can be thus conceived as a prodromal symptom of the later events; especially as its psychology is prototypical for the mechanism of somnambulic dreams, which are indeed nothing but a many-sided multiplication and manifold variation of the elementary processes reviewed above. I never succeeded in demonstrating during my observations similar rudimentary automatisms. It would seem that in course of time the states of dispersed attention, to a certain extent beneath the surface of consciousness, at first of low degree have grown into these remarkable somnambulic attacks; hence they disappeared during the waking state, which was free from attacks. So far as concerns the development of the patient's character, beyond a certain not very extensive ripening, no remarkable change could be demonstrated during the observations lasting nearly two years. More remarkable is the fact that in the two years since the cessation (complete?) of the somnambulic attacks, a considerable change in character has taken place. We shall have occasion later on to speak of the importance of this observation.
We find in our topic, at a time when there were no signs of the later events, basic automatic behaviors and fragments of dream-like experiences, which imply that someday more than one connection might form between scattered attention and awareness. The misinterpretation shows us, in addition, a certain automatic independence of the mental elements. This sometimes leads to a brief scattering of attention, although with very minor results that are never particularly striking or suspicious; this scattered state is similar to that of a physiological dream. The misinterpretation can be viewed as an early sign of the later events; especially since its psychology serves as a model for the mechanism of sleepwalking dreams, which are essentially a diverse multiplication and variation of the basic processes discussed earlier. I was never able to demonstrate similar basic automatic behaviors during my observations. It appears that over time, the states of scattered attention, somewhat beneath the surface of awareness, initially of a low level, have developed into these notable sleepwalking episodes; thus, they vanished during the waking state, which was free from such episodes. Regarding the development of the patient's character, beyond a certain limited maturation, no significant change could be observed during the nearly two years of observations. It is more noteworthy that in the two years since the complete cessation of the sleepwalking episodes, a substantial change in character has occurred. We will later discuss the significance of this observation.
Semi-Somnambulism.—In S. W.'s case the following condition was indicated by the term semi-somnambulism. For some time after and before the actual somnambulic attack the patient finds herself in a state whose most salient feature can best be described as "preoccupation." She only lends half an ear to the conversation around her, answers at random, often gets absorbed in all manner of hallucinations; her face is solemn, her look ecstatic, visionary, ardent. Closer observation discloses a far-reaching alteration of the entire character. She is now serious, dignified; when she[49] speaks her subject is always an extremely serious one. In this condition she can talk so seriously, forcibly and convincingly, that one is tempted to ask oneself if this is really a girl of fifteen and a half. One has the impression of a mature woman possessed of considerable dramatic talent. The reason for this seriousness, this solemnity of behaviour, is given in her explanation that at these times she stands at the frontier of this world and the other, and associates just as truly with the spirits of the dead as with living people. And, indeed, her conversation is usually divided between answers to real objective questions and hallucinatory ones. I call this state semi-somnambulism because it coincides with Richet's own definition. He[25] says: "La conscience de cet individu persiste dans son intégrité apparente, toutefois des opérations très compliquées vont s'accomplir en dehors de la conscience sans que le moi volontaire et conscient paraisse ressentir une modification quelconque. Une autre personne sera en lui qui agira, pensera, voudra, sans que la conscience, c'est à dire le moi réfléchi conscient, aît la moindre notion."
Semi-Somnambulism.—In S. W.'s case, the condition referred to as semi-somnambulism manifests in a specific way. For a period before and after the actual somnambulic episode, the patient experiences a state characterized chiefly by "preoccupation." She pays only partial attention to the conversations happening around her, responds randomly, and often becomes engrossed in various hallucinations; her expression is serious, and her gaze is ecstatic, visionary, and intense. A closer look reveals a significant change in her overall character. She appears serious and dignified; when she speaks, her topics are always quite serious. In this state, she can communicate so seriously, powerfully, and convincingly that one might question if this is truly a girl of fifteen and a half. It feels like interacting with a mature woman who possesses considerable dramatic talent. The source of this seriousness and solemnity is found in her explanation that during these times, she stands at the border between this world and the next, and interacts just as genuinely with the spirits of the deceased as with living individuals. Indeed, her conversations typically oscillate between responses to tangible questions and hallucinatory ones. I refer to this state as semi-somnambulism because it aligns with Richet's own definition. He[25] states: "The consciousness of this individual remains intact in its apparent form; however, very complex operations occur outside of awareness without the voluntary and conscious self seeming to notice any change. Another person exists within her who acts, thinks, desires, without the consciousness—that is, the reflective conscious self—having the slightest awareness."
Binet[26] says of this term: "Le terme indique la parenté de cet état avec le somnambulisme véritable, et en suite il laisse comprendre que la vie somnambulique qui se manifeste durant la veille est réduite, déprimée, par la conscience normale qui la recouvre."
Binet[26] says about this term: "The term indicates the connection of this state with true somnambulism, and it suggests that the somnambulistic life that appears during wakefulness is diminished and suppressed by the normal consciousness that covers it."
Automatisms.
Automations.
Semi-somnambulism is characterised by the continuity of consciousness with that of the waking state and by the appearance of various automatisms which give evidence of an activity of the subconscious self, independent of that of consciousness.
Semi-somnambulism is marked by a continuous awareness similar to that of being awake and by the presence of various automatic behaviors that show the activity of the subconscious self, separate from that of conscious awareness.
Our case shows the following automatic phenomena:
Our case demonstrates the following automatic phenomena:
(1) Automatic movements of the table.
(1) Automatic motion of the table.
(2) Automatic writing.
(2) Automatic writing.
(3) Hallucinations.
(3) Hallucinations.
1. Automatic Movements of the Table.—Before the patient came under my observation she had been influenced by the suggestion of "table-turning," which she had first come across as a game. As soon as she entered the circle there appeared communications from members of her family which showed her to be a medium. I could only find out that, as soon as ever her hand was placed on the table, the typical movements began. The resulting communications have no interest for us. But the automatic character of the act itself deserves some discussion, for we may, without more ado, set aside the imputation that there was any question of intentional and voluntary pushing or pulling on the part of the patient.
1. Automatic Movements of the Table.—Before I started observing the patient, she had been influenced by the idea of "table-turning," which she had initially encountered as a game. As soon as she joined the circle, messages appeared from her family members that indicated she was a medium. I discovered that as soon as her hand rested on the table, the typical movements began. The resulting messages aren't relevant to us. However, the automatic nature of the act itself is worth discussing, as we can quickly dismiss any suggestion that the patient was intentionally and voluntarily pushing or pulling.
As we know from the investigations of Chevreul,[27] Gley, Lehmann and others, unconscious motor phenomena are not only of frequent occurrence among hysterical persons, and those pathologically inclined in other directions, but they are also relatively easily produced in normal persons who show no other spontaneous automatisms. I have made many experiments on these lines, and can confirm this observation. In the great majority of instances all that is required is enough patience to put up with an hour of quiet waiting. In most subjects, motor automatisms will be obtained in a more or less high degree if contra-suggestions do not intervene as obstacles. In a relatively small percentage the phenomena arise spontaneously, i.e. directly under the influence of verbal suggestion or of some earlier auto-suggestion. In this instance the case is powerfully affected by suggestion. In general, the particular predisposition is subject to all those laws which also hold good for normal hypnosis. Nevertheless, certain special circumstances are to be taken into account, conditioned by the peculiarity of the case. It is not a question of a total hypnosis, but of a partial one, limited entirely to the motor area of the arm, like the cerebral anæsthesia produced by "magnetic passes" for a painful spot in the[51] body. We touch the spot in question employing verbal suggestion or making use of some existing auto-suggestion, using the tactile stimulus which we know acts suggestively, to bring about the desired partial hypnosis. In accordance with this procedure, refractory subjects can be brought easily enough to an exhibition of automatism. The experimenter intentionally gives the table a slight push, or, better, a series of rhythmic but very slight taps. After a short time he notices that the oscillations become stronger, that they continue although he has interrupted his own intentional movements. The experiment has succeeded, the subject has unsuspectingly taken up the suggestion. By this procedure much more is obtained than by verbal suggestion. In very receptive persons and in all those cases where movement seems to arise spontaneously, the purposeful tremulous movements,[28] not perceptible by the subject, assume the rôle of agent provocateur.
As we've learned from the studies by Chevreul,[27] Gley, Lehmann, and others, unconscious motor phenomena frequently occur in hysterical individuals and those with other psychological issues. However, they can also be relatively easily triggered in normal individuals who do not show any other spontaneous automatisms. I've conducted many experiments on this topic and can affirm this observation. In most cases, all it takes is a bit of patience during an hour of quiet waiting. Most subjects will display motor automatisms to some degree, provided that counter-suggestions do not interfere. For a smaller number of people, these phenomena occur spontaneously, i.e. directly influenced by verbal suggestion or some prior auto-suggestion. In these cases, suggestion has a significant impact. Generally, the specific predisposition follows the same principles as those applicable to normal hypnosis. However, certain unique circumstances must be considered, based on the specifics of the case. This is not about total hypnosis, but rather a partial one, specifically limited to the motor functions of the arm, similar to the cerebral anesthesia caused by "magnetic passes" for a painful area in the[51] body. We address the specific area using verbal suggestion or leveraging existing auto-suggestions, applying a tactile stimulus known to have a suggestive effect to induce the desired partial hypnosis. Following this method, stubborn subjects can be easily prompted to demonstrate automatisms. The experimenter deliberately gives the table a slight push or, ideally, a series of rhythmic yet very light taps. After a brief period, he notices that the oscillations grow stronger and continue even after he has stopped his intentional movements. The experiment has succeeded; the subject has unwittingly accepted the suggestion. This method yields much greater results than verbal suggestion alone. In highly responsive individuals and in cases where movement appears to occur spontaneously, the intentional slight movements,[28] which are not perceived by the subject, take on the rôle of agent provocateur.
In this way persons who, by themselves, have never obtained automatic movements of a coarse calibre, sometimes assume the unconscious guidance of the table-movements, provided that the tremors are strong and that the medium understands their meaning. In this case the medium takes control of the slight oscillations and returns them considerably strengthened, but rarely at exactly the same instant, generally a few seconds later, in this way revealing the agent's conscious or unconscious thought. By means of this simple mechanism there may arise those cases of thought-reading so bewildering at first sight. A very simple experiment, that succeeds in many cases even with unpractised persons, will serve to illustrate this. The experimenter thinks, say, of the number four, and then waits, his hands quietly resting on the table, until he feels that the table makes the first[52] inclination to announce the number thought of. He lifts his hands off the table immediately, and the number four will be correctly tilted out. It is advisable in this experiment to place the table upon a soft thick carpet. By close attention the experimenter will occasionally notice a movement of the table which is thus represented.
In this way, people who have never independently made automatic movements of any significant size sometimes take on the unconscious control of the table movements, as long as the tremors are strong and the medium understands what they mean. In this situation, the medium takes over the small oscillations and amplifies them significantly, but rarely at exactly the same moment—usually a few seconds later—revealing the agent's conscious or unconscious thoughts. This straightforward mechanism can lead to those seemingly perplexing cases of thought-reading. A very simple experiment, which works in many cases even with inexperienced individuals, can illustrate this. The experimenter thinks of the number four and then waits, keeping their hands resting quietly on the table, until they feel the table make its first inclination to indicate the number they have in mind. They immediately lift their hands off the table, and the number four will be correctly tilted out. It’s a good idea to place the table on a soft, thick carpet for this experiment. By paying close attention, the experimenter will sometimes notice a movement of the table being represented.

Fig. 2.
Fig. 2.
(1) Purposeful tremors too slight to be perceived by the subject.
(1) Deliberate tremors that are too subtle for the person to detect.
(2) Several very small but perceptible oscillations of the table which indicate that the subject is responding to them.
(2) Multiple small but perceptible movements of the table indicate that the person is responding to them.
(3) The big movements (tilts) of the table, giving the number four that was thought of.
(3) The significant shifts (tilts) of the table, showing the number four that was thought of.
(ab) Denotes the moment when the operator's hands are removed.
(ab) Marks the moment when the operator's hands are removed.
This experiment succeeds excellently with well-disposed but inexperienced subjects. After a little practice the phenomenon indicated is wont to disappear, since by practice the number is read and reproduced directly from the purposeful movements.[29]
This experiment works really well with willing but inexperienced participants. After some practice, the observed phenomenon tends to vanish, as practice allows them to read and reproduce the numbers directly through intentional movements.[29]
In a responsive medium these purposeful tremors of the experimenter act just as the intentional taps in the experiment[53] cited above; they are received, strengthened and reproduced, although slightly wavering. Still they are perceptible and hence act suggestively as slight tactile stimuli, and by the increase of partial hypnosis give rise to great automatic movements. This experiment illustrates in the clearest way the increase step by step of auto-suggestion. Along the path of this auto-suggestion are developed all the automatic phenomena of a motor nature. How the intellectual content gradually mingles in with the purely motor need scarcely be elucidated after this discussion. There is no need of a special suggestion for the evoking of intellectual phenomena. From the outset it is a question of word-presentation, at least from the side of the experimenter. After the first aimless motor irrelevancies of the unpractised subject, some word-products or the intentions of the experimenter are soon reproduced. Objectively the occurrence of an intellectual content must be understood as follows:—
In a responsive medium, these deliberate tremors from the experimenter act just like the intentional taps mentioned in the experiment[53] above; they are received, amplified, and reproduced, although they may waver slightly. They are still noticeable and therefore serve as subtle tactile stimuli, and with the increase of partial hypnosis, they can lead to significant automatic movements. This experiment clearly illustrates the gradual increase of auto-suggestion. Along this path of auto-suggestion, all automatic motor phenomena develop. It's evident how the intellectual content gradually blends with the purely motor aspect, needing little explanation after this discussion. There's no need for a specific suggestion to trigger intellectual phenomena. From the beginning, it involves word-presentation, at least from the experimenter's perspective. After the initial aimless motor movements of the inexperienced subject, some word products or the intentions of the experimenter are quickly reproduced. Objectively, the emergence of intellectual content can be understood as follows:—
By the gradual increase of auto-suggestion the motor-range of the arm becomes isolated from consciousness, that is to say, the perception of the slight movement-impulse is concealed from consciousness.[30]
By slowly increasing auto-suggestion, the movement range of the arm becomes separated from awareness, meaning the perception of the small movement impulse is hidden from consciousness.[30]
By the knowledge gained from consciousness that some intellectual content is possible, there results a collateral excitation in the speech-area as the means immediately at hand for intellectual notification. The motor part of word-presentation is necessarily chiefly concerned with this aiming at notification.[31] In this way we understand the unconscious flowing over of speech-impulse to the motor-area[32] and conversely the gradual penetration of partial hypnosis into the speech-area.
By understanding that some intellectual content is possible through consciousness, there's a related activation in the speech area as the most immediate way to convey that knowledge. The motor aspect of presenting words mainly focuses on this goal of communication.[31] This explains how the unconscious drives speech impulses to the motor area[32] and, on the flip side, how partial hypnosis gradually influences the speech area.
In numerous experiments with beginners, as a rule I have[54] observed at the beginning of intellectual phenomena a relatively large number of completely meaningless words, also often a series of meaningless single letters. Later on, all kinds of absurdities are produced, e.g. words or entire sentences with the letters irregularly misplaced or with the order of the letters all reversed—a kind of mirror-writing. The appearance of the letter or word indicates a new suggestion; some sort of association is involuntarily joined to it, which is then realised. Remarkably enough, these are not generally the conscious associations, but quite unexpected ones, a circumstance showing that a considerable part of the speech-area is already hypnotically isolated. The recognition of this automatism again forms a fruitful suggestion, since invariably at this moment the feeling of strangeness arises, if it is not already present in the pure motor-automatism. The question, "Who is doing this?" "Who is speaking?", is the suggestion for the synthesis of the unconscious personality which as a rule does not like being kept waiting too long. Any name is introduced, generally one charged with emotion, and the automatic splitting of the personality is accomplished. How accidental and how vacillating this synthesis is at its beginning, the following reports from the literature show. Myers[33] communicates the following interesting observation on a Mr. A., a member of the Society for Psychical Research, who was making experiments on himself in automatic writing.
In many experiments with beginners, I've usually noticed that at the start of intellectual activities, there’s a fairly large number of completely meaningless words, along with a lot of random single letters. Later, various absurdities emerge, like words or entire sentences where the letters are jumbled or completely reversed—almost like mirror writing. The appearance of a letter or word triggers a new suggestion; an involuntary association gets attached to it, which then comes to life. Interestingly, these associations are usually not the ones that people are consciously aware of, but rather unexpected ones, indicating that a significant part of the speech area is already hypnotically isolated. Recognizing this automatic response creates a useful suggestion, as at this moment, the feeling of strangeness usually arises if it’s not already evident in the pure motor automatism. The questions, "Who is doing this?" and "Who is speaking?" act as the suggestion for the synthesis of the unconscious personality, which generally doesn’t like to be kept waiting for too long. Any name is brought up, typically one with emotional weight, and the automatic splitting of the personality takes place. How random and unstable this synthesis is at the beginning is demonstrated by the following reports from literature. Myers[33] shares an intriguing observation about a Mr. A., a member of the Society for Psychical Research, who was experimenting on himself with automatic writing.
Third Day.
Third Day.
Question: What is man?
Question: What is man?
Answer: TEFI H HASL ESBLE LIES.
Answer: TEFI H HASL ESBLE LIES.
Is that an anagram? Yes.
Is that an anagram? Yes.
How many words does it contain? Five.
How many words are there? Five.
What is the first word? SEE.
What’s the first word? SEE.
What is the second word? SEEEE.
What’s the second word? SEEEE.
See? Shall I interpret it myself? Try to.
See? Should I explain it myself? Go ahead and try.
Mr. A. found this solution: "Life is less able." He was astonished at this intellectual information, which seemed to him to prove the existence of an intelligence independent of his own. Therefore he went on to ask:
Mr. A. found this solution: "Life is less able." He was astonished by this piece of knowledge, which seemed to prove to him that there was an intelligence beyond his own. So, he continued to ask:
Who are you? Clelia.
Who are you? Clelia.
Are you a woman? Yes.
Are you a woman? Yes.
Have you ever lived upon the earth? No.
Have you ever lived on Earth? No.
Will you come to life? Yes.
Will you come to life? Yeah.
When? In six years.
When? In six years.
Why are you conversing with me? E if Clelia el.
Why are you talking to me? E if Clelia el.
Mr. A. interpreted this answer as: I Clelia feel.
Mr. A. understood this response as: I, Clelia, feel.
Fourth Day.
Fourth Day.
Question: Am I the one who asks the questions? Yes.
Question: Am I the one asking the questions? Yes.
Is Clelia there? No.
Is Clelia there? No.
Who is here then? Nobody.
Who is here then? Nobody.
Does Clelia exist at all? No.
Does Clelia even exist? No.
With whom then was I speaking yesterday? With no one.
Who was I talking to yesterday? No one.
Janet[34] conducted the following conversation with the subconsciousness of Lucie, who, meanwhile, was engaged in conversation with another observer. "M'entendez-vous?" asks Janet. Lucie answers by automatic writing, "Non." "Mais pour répondre il faut entendre?" "Oui, absolument." "Alors comment faites-vous?" "Je ne sais." "Il faut bien qu'il y ait quelqu'un qui m'entend?" "Oui." "Qui cela! Autre que Lucie. Eh bien! Une autre personne. Voulez-vous que nous lui donnions un nom?" "Non." "Si, ce sera plus commode," "Eh bien, Adrienne!" "Alors, Adrienne, m'entendez-vous?" "Oui."
Janet[34] had the following conversation with Lucie's subconscious, who was, at the same time, talking with another observer. "Do you hear me?" asks Janet. Lucie responds through automatic writing, "No." "But to respond, you have to hear?" "Yes, absolutely." "So how do you do it?" "I don’t know." "There must be someone who hears me?" "Yes." "Who is that? Someone other than Lucie. Well! Another person. Do you want us to give her a name?" "No." "Yes, it will be more convenient." "Well, Adrienne!" "So, Adrienne, do you hear me?" "Yes."
From these quotations it will be seen in what way the subconscious personality is constructed. It owes its origin purely to suggestive questions meeting a certain disposition[56] of the medium. The explanation is the result of the disintegration of the psychical complex; the feeling of the strangeness of such automatisms then comes in to help, as soon as conscious attention is directed to the automatic act. Binet[35] remarks on this experiment of Janet's: "Il faut bien remarquer que si la personnalité d'Adrienne a pu se créer, c'est qu'elle a rencontré une possibilité psychologique; en d'autres termes, il y avait là des phénomènes désagrégés vivant séparés de la conscience normale du sujet." The individualisation of the subconsciousness always denotes a considerable further step of great suggestive influence upon the further formation of automatisms.[36] So, too, we must regard the origin of the unconscious personalities in our case.
From these quotations, it's clear how the subconscious personality is formed. It originates purely from suggestive questions that resonate with a certain disposition of the medium. The explanation comes from the breakdown of the psychological complex; the feeling of strangeness regarding such automatisms emerges as soon as conscious attention is focused on the automatic action. Binet remarks on this experiment of Janet's: "It must be noted that if Adrienne's personality could be created, it was because it encountered a psychological possibility; in other words, there were disaggregated phenomena living separately from the subject's normal consciousness." The individualization of the subconscious always represents a significant further step with a strong suggestive influence on the continued development of automatisms. So, we should also consider the origin of the unconscious personalities in our case.
The objection that there is simulation in automatic table-turning may well be given up, when one considers the phenomenon of thought-reading from the purposeful tremors which the patient offered in such plenitude. Rapid, conscious thought-reading demands at the least an extraordinary degree of practice, which it has been shown the patient did not possess. By means of the purposeful tremors whole conversations can be carried on, as in our case. In the same way the suggestibility of the subconscious can be proved objectively if, for instance, the experimenter with his hand on the table desires that the hand of the medium should no longer be able to move the table or the glass; contrary to all expectation and to the liveliest astonishment of the subject, the table will immediately remain immovable. Naturally any other desired suggestions can be realised, provided they do not overstep by their innervations the region of partial hypnosis; this proves at the same time the limited nature of the hypnosis. Suggestions for the legs and the other arm will thus not be obeyed. Table-turning was not an automatism which belonged exclusively to the patient's semi-somnambulism: on the contrary, it [57]occurred in the most pronounced form in the waking state, and in most cases then passed over into semi-somnambulism, the appearance of this being generally announced by hallucinations, as it was at the first sitting.
The argument that there is faking in automatic table-turning might be set aside when we consider the phenomenon of thought-reading from the deliberate movements the participant displayed so clearly. Quick, conscious thought-reading requires an exceptional level of practice, which has been shown that the participant did not have. Through these deliberate movements, entire conversations can take place, as we saw in our case. Similarly, the suggestibility of the subconscious can be objectively demonstrated; for example, if the experimenter places their hand on the table and wishes that the medium's hand can no longer move the table or the glass, contrary to all expectations and to the participant's great surprise, the table will immediately remain still. Naturally, any other desired suggestions can be carried out, as long as they don’t overstep into partial hypnosis; this also demonstrates the limited nature of hypnosis. Suggestions for the legs and the other arm will not be followed. Table-turning was not an automatism that was solely part of the participant's semi-somnambulism; on the contrary, it occurred most prominently while fully awake, and in most cases would then transition into semi-somnambulism, with this shift usually being signaled by hallucinations, as it was at the first session.
2. Automatic Writing.—A second automatic phenomenon, which at the outset corresponds to a higher degree of partial hypnosis, is automatic writing. It is, according to my experience, much rarer and more difficult to produce than table-turning. As in table-turning, it is again a matter of a primary suggestion, to the conscious when sensibility is retained, to the unconscious when it is obliterated. The suggestion is, however, not a simple one, for it already bears in itself an intellectual element. "To write" means "to write something." This special element of the suggestion, which extends beyond the merely motor, often conditions a certain perplexity on the part of the subject, giving rise to slight contrary suggestions which hinder the appearance of the automatisms. I have observed in a few cases that the suggestion is realised, despite its relative venturesomeness (e.g. one directed towards the waking consciousness of a so-called normal person). However, it takes place in a peculiar way; it first displaces the purely motor part of the central system concerned in hypnosis, and the deeper hypnosis is then reached by auto-suggestion from the motor phenomenon, analogous to the procedure in table-turning described above. The subject,[37] who has a pencil in his hand, is purposely engaged in conversation whilst his attention is diverted from the writing. The hand begins to make movements, beginning with many upward strokes and zigzag lines, or a simple line is made. Occasionally it happens that the pencil does not touch the paper, but writes in the air. These movements must be conceived as purely motor phenomena, which correspond to the expression of the motor element in the presentation "write." This phenomenon is somewhat rare; generally single letters are first written, and what was said above of table-turning holds true of their combination into[58] words and sentences. True mirror-writing is also observed here and there. In the majority of cases, and perhaps in all experiments with beginners who are not under some very special suggestion, the automatic writing is that of the subject. Occasionally its character may be greatly changed,[38] but this is secondary, and is always to be regarded as a symptom of the intruding synthesis of a subconscious personality.
2. Automatic Writing.—A second automatic phenomenon, which at first relates to a higher level of partial hypnosis, is automatic writing. In my experience, it's much rarer and harder to achieve than table-turning. Similar to table-turning, it involves a primary suggestion: to the conscious mind when sensitivity is still present, and to the unconscious when it’s absent. However, the suggestion isn't straightforward; it already includes an intellectual component. "To write" means "to write something." This specific aspect of the suggestion, which goes beyond just motor actions, often leads to some confusion for the subject, resulting in minor conflicting suggestions that hinder the emergence of the automatisms. I've observed in a few cases that the suggestion is realized, despite its inherent risk (for instance, when directed at the waking consciousness of a so-called normal person). However, it occurs in a unique way; it initially displaces the purely motor part of the central system involved in hypnosis, and then deeper hypnosis is achieved through auto-suggestion stemming from the motor activity, similar to the process in table-turning described above. The subject,[37] holding a pencil, is intentionally engaged in conversation while their attention is taken away from writing. The hand starts to move, initially making many upward strokes and zigzag lines, or a simple line. Sometimes, the pencil doesn’t even touch the paper, but appears to write in the air. These movements should be seen as purely motor phenomena, which reflect the motor element in the instruction "write." This phenomenon is somewhat uncommon; usually, single letters are written first, and what was mentioned regarding table-turning applies to their combination into[58] words and sentences. True mirror-writing is also occasionally seen. In most cases, and likely in all experiments with beginners who aren't under some very specific suggestion, the automatic writing is that of the subject. Sometimes its nature may significantly change,[38] but this is secondary and should always be viewed as a symptom of the encroaching synthesis of a subconscious personality.

Fig. 3.
Fig. 3.
As stated, the patient's automatic writing never came to any very great development. In these experiments, generally carried out in darkness, she passed over into semi-somnambulism, or into ecstasy. The automatic writing had thus the same effect as the preliminary table-turning.
As mentioned, the patient's automatic writing never really developed much. In these experiments, usually conducted in the dark, she entered a state of semi-somnambulism or ecstasy. The automatic writing had the same effect as the initial table-turning.
3. The Hallucinations.—The nature of the passing into somnambulism in the second séance is of psychological importance. As stated, the automatic phenomena were progressing favourably when darkness came on. The most interesting event of this séance, so far, was the brusque interruption of the communication from the grandfather, which was the starting-point of various debates amongst the members of the circle. These two momentous occurrences, the darkness and the striking event, seem to have been the foundation for a rapid deepening of hypnosis, in consequence of which the hallucinations could be developed. The psychological mechanism of this process seems to be as follows. The influence of darkness upon the suggestibility of the[59] sense-organs is well known.[39] Binet[40] states that it has a special influence on hysterics, producing a state of sleepiness. As is clear from the foregoing, the patient was in a state of partial hypnosis and had constituted herself one with the unconscious personality in closest relationship to her in the domain of speech. The automatic expression of this personality is interrupted most unexpectedly by a new person, of whose existence no one had any suspicion. Whence came this cleavage? Obviously the eager expectation of this first séance had very much occupied the patient. Her reminiscences of me and my family had probably grouped themselves around this expectation; hence these suddenly come to light at the climax of the automatic expression. That it was just my grandfather and no one else—not, e.g., my deceased father, who, as she knew, was much closer to me than the grandfather whom I had never known—perhaps suggests where the origin of this new person is to be sought. It is probably a dissociation of the personality already present which seized upon the material next at hand for its expression, namely, upon the associations concerning myself. How far this is parallel to the experiences revealed by dream investigation (Freud's[41]) must remain undecided, for we have no means of judging how far the effect mentioned can be considered a "repressed" one. From the brusque interruption of the new personality, we may conclude that the presentations concerned were very vivid, with corresponding intensity of expectation. This perhaps was an attempt to overcome a certain maidenly shyness and embarrassment. This event reminds us vividly of the manner in which the dream presents to consciousness, by a more or less transparent symbolism, things one has never said to oneself clearly and openly. We do not know when this dissociation of the new personality occurred, whether it had been slowly [60]prepared in the unconscious, or whether it first occurred in the séance. In any case, this event meant a considerable increase in the extension of the unconscious sphere rendered accessible through the hypnosis. At the same time this event must be regarded as powerfully suggestive in regard to the impression which it made upon the waking consciousness of the patient. For the perception of this unexpected intervention of a new power must inevitably excite a feeling of the strangeness of the automatisms, and would easily suggest the thought that an independent spirit is here making itself known. Hence the intelligible association that she would finally be able to see this spirit. The situation that ensued at the second séance is to be explained by the coincidence of this energising suggestion with the heightened suggestibility conditioned by the darkness. The hypnosis, and with it the series of dissociated presentations, break through to the visual area, and the expression of the unconscious, hitherto purely motor, is made objective, according to the measure of the specific energy of the new system, in the shape of visual images with the character of hallucinations; not as a mere accompanying phenomenon of the word-automatism, but as a substituted function. The explanation of the situation that arose in the first séance, at that time unexpected and inexplicable, is no longer presented in words, but as a descriptive allegorical vision. The sentence "they do not hate one another, but are friends," is expressed in a picture. We often encounter events of this kind in somnambulism. The thinking of somnambulists is given in plastic images which constantly break into this or that sense-sphere and are made objective in hallucinations. The process of reflection sinks into the subconscious; only its end-results arise to consciousness either as presentations vividly tinged by the senses, or directly as hallucinations. In our case the same thing occurred as in the patient whose anæsthetic hand Binet pricked nine times, making her think of the figure 9; or as in Flournoy's[42] Helen Smith,[61] who, when asked during business-hours about certain patterns, suddenly saw the number of days (18) for which they had been lent, at a length of 20 mm. in front of her. The further question arises, why does the automatism appear in the visual and not in the acoustic sphere? There are several grounds for this choice of the visual sphere.
3. The Hallucinations.—The nature of entering into a state of sleepwalking during the second séance is psychologically significant. As noted, the automatic phenomena were progressing well when darkness fell. The most interesting event of this séance so far was the sudden interruption of the communication from the grandfather, which sparked various debates among the group members. These two crucial occurrences, the darkness and the surprising event, seem to have laid the groundwork for a quick deepening of hypnosis, which allowed for the development of hallucinations. The psychological mechanism behind this process appears to be as follows. The influence of darkness on the suggestibility of the sense organs is well known.[59] Binet states that it has a particular effect on hysterics, inducing a state of drowsiness. As is clear from the previous information, the patient was in a state of partial hypnosis and had merged with the unconscious personality that was closest to her in terms of communication. The automatic expression of this personality is unexpectedly interrupted by a new entity, whose existence nobody anticipated. Where did this division come from? Clearly, the eager anticipation of the first séance had occupied the patient a great deal. Her memories of me and my family had likely centered around this expectation, which is why they suddenly surfaced at the peak of the automatic expression. That it was specifically my grandfather and not someone else—like my deceased father, who she knew was much closer to me than the grandfather I had never met—perhaps suggests where the source of this new entity might be found. It probably stems from a dissociation of the already present personality that seized upon the most readily available material for expression, namely, the associations related to myself. To what extent this parallels the experiences revealed in dream research (Freud's) remains uncertain, as we have no way of determining how far the mentioned effect can be considered "repressed." Based on the abrupt interruption of the new personality, we can conclude that the ideas involved were very vivid, accompanied by a strong sense of expectation. This might have been an effort to overcome a certain level of maidenly shyness and embarrassment. This incident strongly reminds us of how dreams present to consciousness, through more or less transparent symbolism, things one has never fully articulated to oneself. We don't know when this dissociation of the new personality took place, whether it had been slowly formed in the unconscious or whether it emerged during the séance. In any event, this event significantly expanded the unconscious realm made accessible through hypnosis. At the same time, this occurrence should be viewed as highly suggestive regarding the impression it left on the waking consciousness of the patient. The perception of this unexpected introduction of a new force would inevitably provoke a sense of strangeness regarding the automatisms and would easily suggest the idea that an independent spirit was revealing itself. Thus, the understandable association that she might eventually be able to see this spirit. The situation that followed during the second séance can be explained by the coincidence of this energizing suggestion with the increased suggestibility brought about by the darkness. The hypnosis, along with the series of dissociated presentations, breaks through to the visual area, and the expression of the unconscious, which had been purely motor until then, is made objective, in line with the specific energy of the new system, in the form of visual images with hallucinatory characteristics; not merely as an accompanying phenomenon of the word automatism, but as a substituted function. The explanation for the situation that occurred during the first séance, which was unexpected and inexplicable at the time, is now presented not in words, but as a descriptive allegorical vision. The sentence "they do not hate one another, but are friends," is expressed through an image. We often encounter events like this in sleepwalking. The thinking of sleepwalkers is represented in vivid images that frequently break into various sensory realms and are made objective through hallucinations. The process of reflection descends into the subconscious; only its end-results surface in consciousness either as vividly sensory presentations or directly as hallucinations. In our case, the same phenomenon occurred as in the patient whose anesthetized hand Binet pricked nine times, causing her to think of the figure 9; or as in Flournoy's Helen Smith, who, when questioned during business hours about certain patterns, suddenly visualized the number of days (18) they had been lent, appearing 20 mm. in front of her. The further question arises, why does the automatism manifest in the visual sphere rather than the auditory sphere? There are several reasons for this choice of the visual realm.
(1) The patient is not gifted acoustically; she is, for instance, very unmusical.
(1) The patient doesn't have a natural talent for music; for example, she is quite unmusical.
(2) There was no stillness corresponding to the darkness which might have favoured the appearance of sounds; there was a lively conversation.
(2) There was no silence that matched the darkness that might have made sounds more noticeable; there was an animated conversation.
(3) The increased conviction of the near presence of spirits, because the automatism felt so strange, could easily have aroused the idea that a spirit might be seen, thus causing a slight excitation of the visual sphere.
(3) The stronger belief in the close presence of spirits, because the automatism felt so unusual, could easily have sparked the thought that a spirit might be seen, leading to a slight stimulation of the visual senses.
(4) The entoptic phenomena in darkness favoured the occurrence of hallucinations.
(4) The visual effects seen in darkness increased the chances of experiencing hallucinations.
The reasons (3) and (4)—the entoptic phenomena in the darkness and the probable excitation of the visual sphere—are of decisive importance for the appearance of hallucinations. The entoptic phenomena in this case play the same rôle in the auto-suggestion, the production of the automatism, as the slight tactile stimuli in hypnosis of the motor centre. As stated, flashes preceded the first hallucinatory twilight-state. Obviously attention was already at a high pitch, and directed to visual perceptions, so that the retina's own light, usually very weak, was seen with great intensity. The part played by entoptic perceptions of light in the origin of hallucinations deserves further consideration. Schüle[43] says: "The swarming of light and colour which stimulates and animates the field of vision, although in the dark, supplies the material for phantastic figures in the air before falling asleep. As we know, absolute darkness is never seen; a few particles of the dark field of vision are always illumined; flecks of light move here and there, and combine into all kinds of figures; it only needs a moderately active imagination to create[62] out of them, as one does out of clouds, certain known figures. The power of reasoning, fading as one falls asleep, leaves phantasy free play to construct very vivid figures. In the place of the light spots, haziness and changing colours of the dark visual field, there arise definite outlines of objects."[44]
The reasons (3) and (4)—the visual effects seen in darkness and the likely stimulation of the visual system—are crucial for the emergence of hallucinations. In this context, the visual effects serve a similar purpose in auto-suggestion and the creation of automatism as the light tactile sensations do in the hypnosis of the motor center. As mentioned, flashes came before the initial hallucinatory twilight state. Clearly, attention was already heightened and focused on visual perceptions, allowing the retina's own light, which is usually quite faint, to be perceived with great intensity. The role of visual perceptions of light in the development of hallucinations warrants further exploration. Schüle[43] says: "The flurry of light and color that stimulates and enlivens the visual field, even in darkness, provides the material for fantastical shapes in the air just before sleep. As we know, complete darkness is never truly experienced; a few particles of the dark visual field are always illuminated; flecks of light drift around and form various shapes; it only takes a moderately active imagination to create[62] familiar figures from them, just as one does with clouds. The reasoning ability diminishes as one falls asleep, allowing imagination to freely generate very vivid images. Instead of just light spots, the blurred and shifting colors of the dark visual field give rise to distinct outlines of objects."[44]
In this way hypnagogic hallucinations arise. The chief rôle naturally belongs to the imagination, hence imaginative people in particular are subject to hypnagogic hallucinations.[45] The hypnopompic hallucinations described by Myers arise in the same way.
In this way, hypnagogic hallucinations occur. The main rôle naturally belongs to the imagination, which is why imaginative people, in particular, experience hypnagogic hallucinations.[45] The hypnopompic hallucinations described by Myers happen in the same way.
It is highly probable that hypnagogic pictures are identical with the dream-pictures of normal sleep—forming their visual foundation. Maury[46] has proved from self-observation that the pictures which hovered around him hypnagogically were also the objects of the dreams that followed. G. Trumbull Ladd[47] has shown this even more convincingly. By practice he succeeded in waking himself suddenly two to five minutes after falling asleep. He then observed that the figures dancing before the retina at times represented the same contours as the pictures just dreamed of. He even states that nearly every visual dream is shaped by the retina's own light-figures. In our case the fantastic rendering of these pictures was favoured by the situation. We must not underrate the influence of the over-excited expectation which allowed the dull retina-light to appear with increased intensity.[48] The further formation of the retinal [63]appearances follows in accordance with the predominating presentations. That hallucinations appear in this way has been also observed in other visionaries. Jeanne d'Arc[49] first saw a cloud of light, and only after some time there stepped forth St. Michael, St. Catherine and St. Margaret. For a whole hour Swedenborg[50] saw nothing but illuminated spheres and fiery flames. He felt a mighty change in the brain, which seemed to him "release of light." After the space of one hour he suddenly saw red figures which he regarded as angels and spirits. The sun visions of Benvenuto Cellini[51] in Engelsburg are probably of the same nature. A student who frequently saw apparitions stated: "When these apparitions come, at first I only see single masses of light and at the same time am conscious of a dull noise in the ears. Gradually these contours become clear figures."
It’s very likely that hypnagogic images are the same as the dream images from regular sleep, forming their visual basis. Maury[46] showed through self-observation that the images he saw hypnagogically were also present in the dreams that followed. G. Trumbull Ladd[47] demonstrated this even more convincingly. Through practice, he managed to wake himself up suddenly two to five minutes after falling asleep. He observed that the figures dancing before his eyes sometimes mirrored the shapes of the pictures he had just dreamed. He even noted that almost every visual dream is influenced by the light figures on the retina. In our case, the unusual portrayal of these images was enhanced by the situation. We shouldn’t underestimate the impact of the heightened expectation that made the faint retina light appear more intense.[48] The further development of the retinal appearances aligns with the dominant images present. It has also been noted that hallucinations occur this way in other visionaries. Jeanne d'Arc[49] first saw a cloud of light, and only after some time did St. Michael, St. Catherine, and St. Margaret step forth. For an entire hour, Swedenborg[50] saw only glowing spheres and fiery flames. He felt a significant change in his brain, which he described as a "release of light." After one hour, he suddenly saw red figures that he considered angels and spirits. The sun visions of Benvenuto Cellini[51] in Engelsburg are likely similar in nature. A student who often saw apparitions remarked: "When these apparitions come, at first I only see individual masses of light and at the same time I hear a dull noise in my ears. Gradually, those shapes become clear figures."
The appearance of hallucinations occurred in a quite classical way in Flournoy's Helen Smith. I quote the cases in question from his article.[52]
The appearance of hallucinations happened in a pretty typical way in Flournoy's Helen Smith. I'm quoting the relevant cases from his article.[52]
"18 Mars. Tentative d'expérience dans l'obscurité. Mlle. Smith voit un ballon tantôt luminieux, tantôt s'obscurcissant.
"18 March. Attempt at an experiment in the dark. Ms. Smith sees a balloon that sometimes shines brightly and at other times dims."
"25 Mars. Mlle. Smith commence à distinguer de vagues lueurs, de longs rubans blancs, s'agitant du plancher au plafond, puis enfin une magnifique étoile qui dans l'obscurité s'est montrée à elle seule pendant toute la séance.
"25 March. Mlle. Smith begins to see vague lights, long white ribbons swaying from the floor to the ceiling, and finally a magnificent star that appeared all by itself in the darkness for the entire session."
"1 Avril. Mlle. Smith se sent très agitée, elle a des frissons, est partiellement glacée. Elle est très inquiète et voit tout à coup se balançant au-dessus de la table une figure grimaçante et très laide avec de longs cheveux rouges. Elle voit alors un magnifique bouquet de roses de nuances diverses; tout à coup elle voit sortir de dessous le bouquet un petit serpent, qui, rampant doucement, vient sentir les fleurs, les regarde," etc.
"1 April. Miss Smith feels very agitated, she's shivering, and partially cold. She's quite anxious and suddenly sees a grimacing and very ugly figure with long red hair swaying above the table. Then she sees a beautiful bouquet of roses in various shades; suddenly, she notices a small snake emerging from beneath the bouquet, which, slithering gently, comes to smell the flowers and looks at them," etc.
Helen Smith[53] says in regard to the origin of her vision of March:
Helen Smith[53] says about where her vision of March came from:
"La lueur rouge persista autour de moi et je me suis trouvée entourée de fleurs extraordinaires."
"La lueur rouge persistait autour de moi et je me suis retrouvée entourée de fleurs extraordinaires."
At all times the complex hallucinations of visionaries have occupied a peculiar place in scientific criticism. Macario[54] early separated these so-called intuition-hallucinations from others, since he maintains that they occur in persons of an eager mind, deep understanding and high nervous excitability. Hecker[55] expresses himself similarly but more enthusiastically.
At all times, the intricate hallucinations of visionaries have held a unique spot in scientific criticism. Macario[54] was among the first to distinguish these so-called intuition-hallucinations from others, arguing that they appear in people with an eager mind, deep understanding, and high nervous sensitivity. Hecker[55] echoes this but does so with more enthusiasm.
His view is that their condition is "the congenital high development of the spiritual organ which calls into active, free and mobile play the life of the imagination, bringing it spontaneous activity." These hallucinations are "precursors or signs of mighty spiritual power." The vision is "an increased excitation which is harmoniously adapted to the most complete health of mind and body." The complex hallucinations do not belong to the waking state, but prefer as a rule a partial waking state. The visionary is buried in his vision even to complete annihilation. Flournoy was also always able to prove in the visions of H.S. "un certain degré d'obnubilation." In our case the vision is complicated by a state of sleep whose peculiarities we shall review later.
His perspective is that their condition is "the natural enhancement of the spiritual capacity that activates, frees, and energizes the life of the imagination, leading to spontaneous activity." These hallucinations are "forerunners or indicators of great spiritual strength." The vision represents "increased stimulation that is harmoniously suited to the fullest health of mind and body." The intricate hallucinations do not occur in the fully awake state but usually prefer a partially conscious state. The visionary is so absorbed in their vision that it can lead to complete oblivion. Flournoy was also consistently able to demonstrate in the visions of H.S. "a certain degree of obscuration." In our case, the vision is complicated by a sleep state, the details of which we will discuss later.
The Change in Character.
Character Development.
The most striking characteristic of the second stage in our case is the change in character. We meet many cases in the literature which have offered the symptom of spontaneous character-change. The first case in a scientific publication is Weir-Mitchell's[56] case of Mary Reynolds.
The most notable feature of the second stage in our case is the change in personality. We come across many instances in the literature that have presented the symptom of spontaneous character change. The first case in a scientific publication is Weir-Mitchell's[56] case of Mary Reynolds.
This was the case of a young woman living in Pennsylvania in 1811. After a deep sleep of about twenty hours she had totally forgotten her entire past and everything she had learnt; even the words she spoke had lost their meaning. She no longer knew her relatives. Slowly she re-learnt to read and write, but her writing was from right to left. More striking still was the change in her character. Instead of being melancholy, she was now cheerful in the extreme. Instead of being reserved, she was buoyant and sociable. Formerly taciturn and retiring, she was now merry and jocose. Her disposition was totally changed.[57]
This was the story of a young woman living in Pennsylvania in 1811. After a deep sleep of about twenty hours, she completely forgot her entire past and everything she had learned; even the words she spoke lost their meaning. She no longer recognized her relatives. Gradually, she re-learned to read and write, but her writing went from right to left. Even more striking was the change in her personality. Instead of being sad, she was now extremely cheerful. Rather than being reserved, she became lively and social. Formerly quiet and withdrawn, she was now joyful and playful. Her entire disposition had changed.[57]
In this state she renounced her former retired life and liked to undertake adventurous excursions unarmed, through wood and mountain, on foot and horseback. In one of these excursions she encountered a large black bear, which she took for a pig. The bear raised himself on his hind legs and gnashed his teeth at her. As she could not drive her horse on any further, she took an ordinary stick and hit the bear until it took to flight. Five weeks later, after a deep sleep, she returned to her earlier state with amnesia for the interval. These states alternated for about sixteen years. But her last twenty-five years Mary Reynolds passed exclusively in her second state.
In this condition, she gave up her previous retired life and enjoyed going on adventurous trips unarmed, through woods and mountains, both on foot and horseback. During one of these adventures, she came across a large black bear, which she mistook for a pig. The bear stood up on its hind legs and bared its teeth at her. Unable to get her horse to move any further, she grabbed a regular stick and hit the bear until it ran away. Five weeks later, after a deep sleep, she returned to her previous state with no memory of the time in between. These states alternated for about sixteen years. But in her last twenty-five years, Mary Reynolds lived entirely in her second state.
Schroeder von der Kalk[58] reports on the following case: The patient became ill at the age of sixteen with periodic amnesia, after a previous tedious illness of three years. Sometimes in the morning after waking she passed through a peculiar choreic state, during which she made rhythmical movements with her arms. Throughout the whole day she would then exhibit a childish, silly behaviour and lost all her educated capabilities. (When normal she is very intelligent, well-read, speaks French well.) In the second state she begins to speak faulty French. On the second day she[66] is again at times normal. The two states are completely separated by amnesia.[59]
Schroeder von der Kalk[58] reports on the following case: The patient got sick at sixteen with periodic amnesia, following a long and difficult illness lasting three years. Sometimes in the morning after waking up, she experiences a strange choreic state, during which she makes rhythmic movements with her arms. Throughout the day, she displays childish and silly behavior, losing all her learned abilities. (When she's normal, she's very intelligent, well-read, and speaks French well.) In the second state, she starts to speak faulty French. On the second day, she[66] is normal again at times. The two states are completely separated by amnesia.[59]
Hoefelt[60] reports on a case of spontaneous somnambulism in a girl who, in her normal state, was submissive and modest, but in somnambulism was impertinent, rude and violent. Azam's[61] Felida was, in her normal state, depressed, inhibited, timid; and in the second state lively, confident, enterprising to recklessness. The second state gradually became the chief one, and finally so far suppressed the first state that the patient called her normal states, lasting now but a short time, "crises." The amnesic attacks had begun at 14½. In time the second state became milder and there was a certain approximation between the character of the two states. A very striking example of change in character is that worked out by Camuset, Ribot, Legrand du Saulle, Richer, Voisin, and put together by Bourru and Burot.[62] It is that of Louis V., a severe male hysteric with amnesic alternating character. In the first stage he is rude, cheeky, querulous, greedy, thievish, inconsiderate. In the second state he is an agreeable, sympathetic character, industrious, docile and obedient. This amnesic change of character has been used by Paul Lindau[63] in his drama "Der Andere" (The Other One).
Hoefelt[60] reports on a case of spontaneous sleepwalking in a girl who, while awake, was submissive and modest, but in her sleepwalking state was rude, brash, and aggressive. Azam's[61] Felida was, in her normal state, depressed, inhibited, and shy; but in the second state, she was lively, confident, and recklessly bold. The second state gradually became the dominant one, eventually suppressing the first state so much that the patient referred to her normal states, which now lasted only a short time, as "crises." The amnesic episodes began at 14½. Over time, the second state softened, and there was some blending of the characteristics of both states. A particularly striking example of character change is that described by Camuset, Ribot, Legrand du Saulle, Richer, Voisin, and compiled by Bourru and Burot.[62] This involves Louis V., a severely hysterical male with alternating amnesic personalities. In the first stage, he is rude, sassy, whiny, greedy, thieving, and inconsiderate. In the second state, he becomes an agreeable, sympathetic personality who is hardworking, compliant, and obedient. This amnesic change in character has been explored by Paul Lindau[63] in his play "Der Andere" (The Other One).
Rieger[64] reports on a case parallel to Lindau's criminal lawyer. The unconscious personalities of Janet's Lucie and Léonie (Janet, l.c.) and Morton Prince's[65] may also be regarded as parallel with our case. There are, however, therapeutic artificial products whose importance lies in the domain of the dissociation of consciousness and of memory.
Rieger[64] discusses a case similar to the criminal lawyer in Lindau's situation. The unconscious identities of Janet's Lucie and Léonie (Janet, l.c.) and Morton Prince's[65] can also be seen as comparable to our case. However, there are therapeutic artificial products that are significant in the area of dissociation of consciousness and memory.
In the above cases, the second state is always separated from the first by an amnesic dissociation, and the change [67]in character is, at times, accompanied by a break in the continuity of consciousness. In our case there is no amnesic disturbance; the passage from the first to the second stage follows quite gradually and the continuity of consciousness remains. The patient carries out in her waking state everything, otherwise unknown to her, from the field of the unconscious that she has experienced during hallucinations in the second stage.
In the situations mentioned above, the second state is always distinct from the first due to a dissociation that causes memory loss, and the change in character is sometimes linked to a disruption in the flow of consciousness. In our situation, there’s no memory disturbance; the transition from the first to the second stage happens smoothly, and the flow of consciousness stays intact. The patient is aware in her waking state of everything she previously didn’t know, drawn from the unconscious experiences she had during hallucinations in the second stage.
Periodic changes in personality without amnesic dissociation are found in the region of folie circulaire, but are rarely seen in hysterics, as Renaudin's[66] case shows. A young man, whose behaviour had always been excellent, suddenly began to display the worst tendencies. There were no symptoms of insanity, but, on the other hand, the whole surface of the body was anæsthetic. This state showed periodic intervals, and in the same way the patient's character was subject to vacillations. As soon as the anæsthesia disappeared he was manageable and friendly. When the anæsthesia returned he was overcome by the worst instincts, which, it was observed, even included the wish to murder.
Periodic changes in personality without memory loss are seen in the area of folie circulaire, but are rarely observed in hysterics, as Renaudin's[66] case demonstrates. A young man, who had always had excellent behavior, suddenly began to show the worst tendencies. There were no signs of insanity, but, on the flip side, the entire surface of his body was numb. This condition showed periodic intervals, and similarly, the patient's character fluctuated. As soon as the numbness disappeared, he was manageable and friendly. When the numbness returned, he was overtaken by his worst instincts, which, it was noted, even included the desire to kill.
Remembering that our patient's age at the beginning of the disturbances was 14-1/2, that is, the age of puberty had just been reached, one must suppose that there was some connection between the disturbances and the physiological character-changes at puberty. "There appears in the consciousness of the individual during this period of life a new group of sensations, together with the feelings and ideas arising therefrom; this continuous pressure of unaccustomed mental states makes itself constantly felt because the cause is always at work; the states are co-ordinated because they arise from one and the same source, and must little by little bring about deep-seated changes in the ego."[67] Vacillating moods are easily recognisable; the confused new, strong feelings, the inclination towards idealism, to exalted religiosity and mysticism, side by side with the falling back[68] into childishness, all this gives to adolescence its prevailing character. At this epoch the human being first makes clumsy attempts at independence in every direction; for the first time uses for his own purposes all that family and school have contributed hitherto; he conceives ideals, constructs far-reaching plans for the future, lives in dreams whose content is ambitious and egotistic. This is all physiological. The puberty of a psychopathic is a crisis of more serious import. Not only do the psychophysical changes run a stormy course, but features of a hereditary degenerate character become fixed. In the child these do not appear at all, or but sporadically. For the explanation of our case we are bound to consider a specific disturbance of puberty. The reasons for this view will appear from a further study of the second personality. (For the sake of brevity we shall call the second personality Ivenes—as the patient baptised her higher ego).
Remembering that our patient's age when the problems started was 14 and a half, which is around the age of puberty, we should consider that there might be a connection between these issues and the physiological changes that occur during puberty. "During this phase of life, individuals experience a new set of sensations, along with the feelings and ideas that come from them; this constant pressure of unfamiliar mental states is always felt because the cause is consistently present; these states are connected because they come from the same source, and they gradually lead to significant changes in the self." [67] Noticeable mood swings are apparent; the confusing new, intense feelings, the tendency towards idealism, heightened religiosity, and mysticism, alongside a regression into childish behavior, all contribute to the defining traits of adolescence. At this stage, a person makes awkward attempts at independence in all areas; for the first time, they use everything that their family and school have provided so far for their own goals; they develop ideals and create ambitious long-term plans, living in dreams that are both ambitious and self-centered. This is all part of normal development. However, the puberty of someone with psychopathy represents a more serious crisis. Not only do the psychophysical changes progress tumultuously, but features of hereditary degeneration also become prominent. In children, these traits are either absent or appear only sporadically. To understand our case, we must consider a specific disruption during puberty. The reasons for this will become clear in our further examination of the second personality. (For brevity, we will refer to the second personality as Ivenes—the name the patient gave to her higher self).
Ivenes is the exact continuation of the everyday ego. She includes the whole of her conscious content. In the semi-somnambulic state her intercourse with the real external world is analogous to that of the waking state, that is, she is influenced by recurrent hallucinations, but no more than persons who are subject to non-confusional psychotic hallucinations. The continuity of Ivenes obviously extends to the hysterical attack with its dramatic scenes, visionary events, etc. During the attack itself she is generally isolated from the external world; she does not notice what is going on around her, does not know that she is talking loudly, etc. But she has no amnesia for the dream-content of her attack. Amnesia for her motor expressions and for the changes in her surroundings is not always present. That this is dependent upon the degree of intensity of her somnambulic state and that there is sometimes partial paralysis of individual sense organs is proved by the occasion when she did not notice me; her eyes were then open, and most probably she saw the others, although she only perceived me when I spoke to her. This is a case of so-called systematised anæsthesia (negative hallucination) which is often observed in hysterics.
Ivenes is a direct continuation of the everyday self. She encompasses all her conscious thoughts. In a semi-somnambulant state, her interaction with the real external world is similar to that of the waking state; she is affected by recurring hallucinations, but no more than people who experience non-confusional psychotic hallucinations. The continuity of Ivenes clearly extends to the hysterical attack with its dramatic scenes, visionary events, and so on. During the attack itself, she is generally cut off from the external world; she doesn't notice what's happening around her, isn't aware that she's speaking loudly, and so forth. However, she has no amnesia regarding the dream content of her attack. Amnesia for her physical actions and for the changes in her environment isn't always present. This depends on the intensity of her somnambulant state, and sometimes there is partial paralysis of certain senses, as evidenced by the time she didn’t notice me; her eyes were open, and she likely saw the others, but only acknowledged me when I spoke to her. This is an example of what is called systematized anesthesia (negative hallucination), which is often seen in hysterics.
Flournoy,[68] for instance, reports of Helen Smith that during the séances she suddenly ceased to see those taking part, although she still heard their voices and felt their touch; sometimes she no longer heard, although she saw the movements of the lips of the speakers, etc.
Flournoy,[68] for example, mentions that Helen Smith experienced moments during the séances when she suddenly couldn’t see the people present, even though she could still hear their voices and feel their touches; at times, she could no longer hear them, but she could see their lips moving, and so on.
Ivenes is just the continuation of the waking self. She contains the entire consciousness of S. W.'s waking state. Her remarkable behaviour tells decidedly against any analogy with cases of double consciousness. The characteristics of Ivenes contrast favourably with the patient's ordinary self. She is a calmer, more composed personality; her pleasing modesty and accuracy, her uniform intelligence, her confident way of talking must be regarded as an improvement of the whole being; thus far there is analogy with Janet's Léonie. But this is the extent of the similarity. Apart from the amnesia, they are divided by a deep psychological difference. Léonie II. is the healthier, the more normal; she has regained her natural capabilities, she shows remarkable improvement upon her chronic condition of hysteria. Ivenes rather gives the impression of a more artificial product; there is something thought out; despite all her excellences she gives the impression of playing a part excellently; her world-sorrow, her yearning for the other side of things, are not merely piety but the attributes of saintliness. Ivenes is no mere human, but a mystic being who only partly belongs to reality. The mournful features, the attachment to sorrow, her mysterious fate, lead us to the historic prototype of Ivenes—Justinus Kerner's "Prophetess of Prevorst." Kerner's book must be taken as known, and therefore I omit any references to these common traits. But Ivenes is no copy of the prophetess; she lacks the resignation and the saintly piety of the latter. The prophetess is merely used by her as a study for her own original conception. The patient pours her own soul into the rôle of the prophetess, thus seeking to create an ideal of virtue and perfection. She anticipates her future. She incarnates in Ivenes what she wishes to be in twenty years—the assured, influential, wise, gracious,[70] pious lady. It is in the construction of the second person that there lies the far-reaching difference between Léonie II. and Ivenes. Both are psychogenic. But Léonie I. receives in Léonie II. what really belongs to her, while S. W. builds up a person beyond herself. It cannot be said "she deceives herself" into, but that "she dreams herself" into the higher ideal state.[69]
Ivenes is simply the next stage of the waking self. She holds the complete consciousness of S. W.'s waking state. Her extraordinary behavior clearly sets her apart from cases of double consciousness. The traits of Ivenes are a marked improvement over the patient's regular self. She is a calmer, more composed person; her pleasant modesty and accuracy, her consistent intelligence, and her confident manner of speaking should all be seen as enhancements of her entire being; so far, this shows some similarity to Janet's Léonie. But that's where the resemblance ends. Besides the amnesia, they are separated by a deep psychological difference. Léonie II. is healthier and more normal; she's regained her natural abilities and shows remarkable progress from her chronic hysteria. Ivenes, on the other hand, gives off a more artificial vibe; there’s something calculated about her; despite her many strengths, she feels like she’s playing a part exceptionally well; her world-weariness and longing for something beyond this life are not just piety but traits of saintliness. Ivenes isn’t just human; she’s a mystical being who only partially exists in reality. The sorrowful expressions, her attachment to sadness, and her mysterious fate lead us to the historical prototype of Ivenes—Justinus Kerner's "Prophetess of Prevorst." Kerner's book is assumed to be known, so I won’t reference those shared traits. However, Ivenes isn’t just a copy of the prophetess; she lacks the resignation and saint-like piety of the latter. The prophetess is merely the basis for her own original conception. The patient pours her own soul into the rôle of the prophetess, trying to create an ideal of virtue and perfection. She looks to her future. She embodies in Ivenes what she wants to become in twenty years—the assured, influential, wise, gracious, [70] pious lady. The significant difference between Léonie II. and Ivenes lies in how the second person is constructed. Both are psychogenic. But Léonie I. gets what is truly hers in Léonie II., while S. W. creates a persona that goes beyond herself. It can’t be said that "she deceives herself" into it; rather, it's that "she dreams herself" into this higher ideal state.[69]
The realisation of this dream recalls vividly the psychology of the pathological cheat. Delbruck[70] and Forel[71] have indicated the importance of auto-suggestion in the formation of pathological cheating and reverie. Pick[72] regards intense auto-suggestibility as the first symptom of the hysterical dreamer, making possible the realisation of the "day-dream." One of Pick's patients dreamt that she was in a morally dangerous situation, and finally carried out an attempt at rape on herself; she lay on the floor naked and fastened herself to a table and chairs. Or some dramatic person will be created with whom the patient enters into correspondence by letter, as in Bohn's case.[73] The patient dreamt herself into an engagement with a totally imaginary lawyer in Nice, from whom she received letters which she had herself written in disguised handwriting. This pathological dreaming, with auto-suggestive deceptions of memory amounting to real delusions and hallucinations, is pre-eminently to be found in the lives of many saints.[74]
The realization of this dream clearly reflects the mindset of a pathological liar. Delbruck[70] and Forel[71] have pointed out the significance of auto-suggestion in the development of pathological cheating and daydreaming. Pick[72] views intense auto-suggestibility as the initial sign of a hysterical dreamer, enabling the achievement of the "daydream." One of Pick's patients imagined herself in a morally risky situation and ultimately attempted to assault herself; she lay on the floor naked and tied herself to a table and chairs. Alternatively, a dramatic character may be created with whom the patient engages in correspondence, as in Bohn's case.[73] The patient imagined herself engaged to a completely fictional lawyer in Nice, receiving letters that she had written herself in disguised handwriting. This kind of pathological dreaming, accompanied by auto-suggestive distortions of memory that amount to real delusions and hallucinations, is especially prominent in the lives of many saints.[74]
It is only a step from the dreamlike images strongly [71]stamped by the senses to the true complex hallucinations.[75] In Pick's case, for instance, one sees that the patient, who persuades herself that she is the Empress Elizabeth, gradually loses herself in her dreams to such an extent that her condition must be regarded as a true "twilight" state. Later it passes over into hysterical delirium, when her dream-phantasies become typical hallucinations. The pathological liar, who becomes involved through his phantasies, behaves exactly like a child who loses himself in his play, or like the actor who loses himself in his part.[76] There is here no fundamental distinction from somnambulic dissociation of personality, but only a difference of degree, which rests upon the intensity of the primary auto-suggestibility or disintegration of the psychic elements. The more consciousness becomes dissociated, the greater becomes the plasticity of the dream situation, the less becomes the amount of conscious lying and of consciousness in general. This being carried away by interest in the object is what Freud calls hysterical identification. For instance, to Erler's[77] acutely hysterical patient there appeared hypnagogically little riders made of paper, who so took possession of her imagination that she had the feeling of being herself one of them. Similar phenomena normally occur to us in dreams in general, in which we think like "hysterics."[78]
It’s just a small step from vividly sensory dream images to real complex hallucinations. In Pick's case, for example, the patient convinces herself that she is Empress Elizabeth, and she gradually becomes so lost in her dreams that her state must be seen as a true "twilight" state. Eventually, it evolves into hysterical delirium, where her dream fantasies turn into typical hallucinations. The pathological liar, caught up in his fantasies, behaves exactly like a child immersed in play or like an actor completely absorbed in a role. There’s no fundamental difference from somnambulistic personality dissociation, just a matter of degree based on the intensity of the initial self-suggestion or disintegration of mental elements. The more dissociated consciousness becomes, the more fluid the dream situation is, and the less conscious lying and overall consciousness there is. This immersion in interest is what Freud calls hysterical identification. For example, Erler's acutely hysterical patient saw little paper riders in a hypnagogic state, which captivated her imagination to the point where she felt like she was one of them. Similar experiences typically occur in our dreams, where we think like "hysterics."
The complete abandonment to the interesting image explains also the wonderful naturalness of pseudological or somnambulic representation—a degree unattainable in conscious acting. The less waking consciousness intervenes by reflection and reasoning, the more certain and convincing becomes the objectivation of the dream, e.g. the roof-climbing of somnambulists.
The total surrender to the captivating image also accounts for the incredible naturalness of deceptive or sleepwalking behavior—a level that's impossible to reach in conscious acting. The less waking awareness gets involved through reflection and reasoning, the more authentic and convincing the representation of the dream becomes, like sleepwalkers climbing roofs.
Our patient develops her systems exclusively in the attack. In her normal state she is quite incapable of giving any new ideas or explanations; she must either transpose herself into somnambulism or await its spontaneous appearance. This exhausts the affinity to pseudologia phantastica and to pathological dream-states.
Our patient only develops her symptoms during an attack. When she's in her normal state, she's completely unable to come up with any new ideas or explanations; she either has to slip into a trance or wait for it to happen on its own. This leads to an intense connection to pseudologia phantastica and to pathological dream states.
Our patient's state is even differentiated from pathological dreaming, since it could never be proved that her dream-weavings had at any time previously been the objects of her interest during the day. Her dreams occur explosively, break forth with bewildering completeness from the darkness of the unconscious. Exactly the same was the case in Flournoy's Helen Smith. In many cases (see below), however, links with the perceptions of the normal states can be demonstrated: it seems therefore probable that the roots of every dream were originally images with an emotional accentuation, which, however, only occupied waking consciousness for a short time.[80] We must allow that in the origin of such dreams hysterical forgetfulness[81] plays a part not to be underestimated.
Our patient's condition is even different from pathological dreaming because it can never be shown that her dreams were anything she was interested in during the day. Her dreams happen suddenly and emerge with astonishing clarity from the depths of the unconscious. This was also true in Flournoy's Helen Smith. However, in many cases (see below), connections to perceptions in normal states can be shown: it seems likely that the roots of every dream originally came from images that had an emotional significance, which, however, only captured waking awareness for a brief moment.[80] We must acknowledge that hysterical forgetfulness[81] plays a significant role in the origin of such dreams.
Many images are buried which would be sufficient to put the consciousness on guard; associated classes of ideas[73] are lost and go on spinning their web in the unconscious, thanks to the psychic dissociation; this is a process which we meet again in the genesis of our dreams.
Many images are hidden that could alert our awareness; related ideas[73] get lost and continue to weave their web in the unconscious due to psychic dissociation; this process reappears in the creation of our dreams.
"Our conscious reflection teaches us that when exercising attention we pursue a definite course. But if that course leads us to an idea which does not meet with our approval, we discontinue and cease to apply our attention. Now, apparently, the chain of thought thus started and abandoned, may go on without regaining attention unless it reaches a spot of especially marked intensity, which compels renewed attention. An initial rejection, perhaps consciously brought about by the judgment on the ground of incorrectness or unfitness for the actual purpose of the mental act, may therefore account for the fact that a mental process continues unnoticed by consciousness until the onset of sleep."[82]
"Our conscious thought shows us that when we focus our attention, we follow a specific path. But if that path leads us to an idea that we don’t like, we stop and divert our attention elsewhere. Now, the chain of thought we started but left behind might continue on its own without pulling our attention back unless it hits a point of strong significance that demands our renewed attention. An initial rejection, possibly triggered by our judgment on its incorrectness or unsuitability for the task at hand, might explain why a mental process can go on unnoticed until we fall asleep."[82]
In this way we may explain the apparently sudden and direct appearance of dream-states. The entire carrying over of the conscious personality into the dream-rôle involves indirectly the development of simultaneous automatisms. "Une seconde condition peut amener la division de conscience; ce n'est pas une altération de la sensibilité, c'est une attitude particulière de l'esprit, la concentration de l'attention pour un point unique; il résulte de cet état de concentration que l'esprit devient distrait pour la reste et en quelque sorte insensible, ce qui ouvre la carrière aux actions automatiques, et ces actions peuvent prendre un caractère psychique et constituer des intelligences parasites, vivant côte à côte avec la personnalité normale qui ne les connaît pas."[83]
In this way, we can explain the seemingly sudden and direct onset of dream states. The complete transfer of the conscious personality into the dream role indirectly involves the development of simultaneous automatisms. "A second condition can lead to a division of consciousness; it is not a change in sensitivity but a specific mental attitude, the concentration of attention on a single point; as a result of this state of concentration, the mind becomes distracted from everything else and, in a way, unresponsive, which paves the way for automatic actions. These actions can take on a psychic character and form parasitic intelligences that exist alongside the normal personality, which is unaware of them."[83]
Our subject's romances throw a most significant light on the subjective roots of her dreams. They swarm with secret and open love-affairs, with illegitimate births and other sexual insinuations. The central point of all these ambiguous stories is a lady whom she dislikes, who is gradually made to assume the form of her polar opposite, and whilst Ivenes becomes the pinnacle of virtue, this lady is a sink of iniquity. But her reincarnation doctrines, in which she appears as the[74] mother of countless thousands, arises in its naïve nakedness from an exuberant phantasy which is, of course, very characteristic of the period of puberty. It is the woman's premonition of the sexual feeling, the dream of fruitfulness, which the patient has turned into these monstrous ideas. We shall not go wrong if we seek for the curious form of the disease in the teeming sexuality of this too-rich soil. Viewed from this standpoint, the whole creation of Ivenes, with her enormous family, is nothing but a dream of sexual wish-fulfilment, differentiated from the dream of a night only in that it persists for months and years.
Our subject's romantic experiences shed significant light on the personal roots of her dreams. They are filled with both secret and public love affairs, illegitimate births, and other sexual implications. The main focus of all these complicated stories is a woman she dislikes, who gradually takes on the role of her complete opposite, while Ivenes becomes the embodiment of virtue, and this lady represents moral decay. However, her ideas about reincarnation, where she appears as the[74]mother of countless thousands, arise in their naive simplicity from an overwhelming imagination, which is, of course, typical of the puberty stage. It reflects the woman's anticipation of sexual feelings, the dream of fertility, which the patient has transformed into these bizarre concepts. We won't be mistaken if we look for the peculiar nature of the issue in the overflowing sexuality of this overly fertile ground. From this perspective, the entire creation of Ivenes, with her large family, is merely a dream of sexual fulfillment, differing from a nighttime dream only in that it lasts for months and years.
Relation to the Hysterical Attack.
Relation to the Panic Attack.
So far one point in S. W.'s history has remained unexplained, and that is her attack. In the second séance she was suddenly seized with a sort of fainting fit, from which she awoke with a recollection of various hallucinations. According to her own statement, she had not lost consciousness for a moment. Judging from the external symptoms and the course of the attack, one is inclined to regard it as a narcolepsy, or rather a lethargy; such, for example, as Loewenfeld has described, and the more readily as we know that previously one member of her family (her grandmother) has had an attack of lethargy. It is possible to imagine that the lethargic disposition (Loewenfeld) had descended to our subject. In spiritualistic séances it is not usual to see hysterical convulsions. Our subject showed no sort of convulsive symptoms, but in their place, perhaps, the peculiar sleeping-states. Ætiologically, at the outset, two moments must be taken into consideration:
So far, one aspect of S. W.'s history has not been explained, which is her attack. During the second séance, she suddenly experienced a kind of fainting spell, and when she came to, she recalled various hallucinations. According to her own account, she didn't lose consciousness at all. Based on the external symptoms and the nature of the attack, one might think of it as a narcolepsy, or rather a lethargy; similar to what Loewenfeld has described, especially considering that a member of her family (her grandmother) had previously experienced an episode of lethargy. It's possible that this lethargic disposition (Loewenfeld) was inherited by our subject. In spiritualistic séances, it’s uncommon to witness hysterical convulsions. Our subject did not display any convulsive symptoms, but instead perhaps exhibited the unusual sleeping states. From a causal perspective, two factors must be considered at the outset:
1. The irruption of hypnosis.
The rise of hypnosis.
2. The psychic stimulation.
The psychic boost.
He made the following experiment: While the patient, who was in the completely waking state, was engaged in conversation by a second observer, Janet stationed himself behind her and by means of whispered suggestions made her unconsciously move her hand and by written signs give an answer to questions. Suddenly the patient broke off the conversation, turned round and with her supraliminal consciousness continued the previously subconscious talk with Janet. She had fallen into hypnotic somnambulism.[85]
He conducted the following experiment: While the patient, who was fully awake, was chatting with a second observer, Janet positioned himself behind her and used whispered suggestions to make her unconsciously move her hand and respond to questions with written signs. Suddenly, the patient stopped the conversation, turned around, and, with her conscious mind, continued the previously subconscious discussion with Janet. She had entered a state of hypnotic somnambulism.[85]
There is here a state of affairs similar to our patient's. But it must be noted that, for certain reasons discussed later, the sleeping state is not to be regarded as hypnotic. We therefore come to the question of—
There is a situation here similar to our patient's. But it should be noted that, for certain reasons discussed later, the sleeping state should not be considered hypnotic. We therefore come to the question of—
2. The Psychic Stimulation.—It is told of Bettina Brentano that the first time she met Goethe she suddenly fell asleep on his knee.[86]
2. The Psychic Stimulation.—It's said that when Bettina Brentano first met Goethe, she unexpectedly fell asleep on his knee.[86]
This ecstatic sleep in the midst of extremest torture, the so-called "witch-sleep," is well known in the history of trials for witchcraft.[87]
This ecstatic sleep in the middle of intense torture, the so-called "witch-sleep," is well known in the history of witchcraft trials.[87]
With susceptible subjects relatively insignificant stimuli suffice to bring about the somnambulic state. Thus a sensitive lady had to have a splinter cut out of her finger. Without any kind of bodily change she suddenly saw herself sitting by the side of a brook in a beautiful meadow, plucking flowers. This condition lasted as long as the slight operation and then disappeared spontaneously.[88]
With sensitive individuals, even minor stimuli can trigger a sleepwalking state. For example, a sensitive woman needed to have a splinter removed from her finger. Without any physical change, she suddenly found herself sitting next to a brook in a lovely meadow, picking flowers. This state lasted for the duration of the small procedure and then faded away on its own.[88]
Loewenfeld[89] has noticed unintentional inducement of hysterical lethargy through hypnosis.
Loewenfeld[89] has observed the unintentional triggering of hysterical lethargy through hypnosis.
The retention of one sense is not inconsistent with lethargy: thus in certain cases of trance the sense of hearing remains.[92]
The preservation of one sense doesn’t contradict lethargy: in some trance states, the sense of hearing still exists.[92]
In Bonamaison's[93] case not only was the sense of touch retained, but the senses of hearing and smell were quickened. The hallucinatory content and loud speaking is also met with in persons with hallucinations in lethargy.[94] Usually there prevails total amnesia for the lethargic interval. Loewenfeld's[95] case D. had, however, a fleeting recollection; in Bonamaison's case there was no amnesia. Lethargic patients do not prove susceptible to the usual waking stimuli, but Loewenfeld succeeded with his patient St. in turning the lethargy into hypnosis by means of mesmeric passes, thus combining it with the rest of consciousness during the attack.[96] Our patient showed herself absolutely insusceptible in the beginning of the lethargy, but later on she began to speak spontaneously, was incapable of giving any attention when her somnambulic ego was speaking, but could attend when it was one of her automatic personalities. In this last case it is probable that the hypnotic effect of the automatisms succeeded in achieving a partial transformation of the lethargy into hypnosis. When we consider that, according to Loewenfeld's view, the lethargic disposition must not be "too readily identified with the peculiar condition of the nervous apparatus in hysteria," then the idea of the family[77] heredity of this disposition in our case becomes not a little probable. The disease is much complicated by these attacks.
In Bonamaison's[93] case, not only was the sense of touch preserved, but the senses of hearing and smell were heightened. The hallucinatory experiences and loud speech are also seen in individuals with hallucinations during lethargy.[94] Typically, there is complete amnesia for the lethargic period. However, in Loewenfeld's[95] case D., there was a brief recollection; in Bonamaison's situation, there was no amnesia. Lethargic patients usually do not respond to typical waking stimuli, but Loewenfeld managed to turn lethargy into hypnosis with his patient St. by using mesmerism, thus merging it with the remaining consciousness during the episode.[96] Our patient initially showed no response at the start of the lethargy, but later began to speak spontaneously, unable to focus when her somnambulistic self was talking, though she could concentrate when one of her automatic personalities took over. In this last instance, it’s likely that the hypnotic influence of the automatisms helped partially shift the lethargy into hypnosis. Considering that, according to Loewenfeld's perspective, the lethargic state shouldn't be "too quickly equated with the unusual condition of the nervous system in hysteria," the notion of hereditary factors in this case becomes quite plausible. The disease is significantly complicated by these episodes.
So far we have seen that the patient's consciousness of her ego is identical in all the states. We have discussed two secondary complexes of consciousness and have followed them into the somnambulic attack, where they appear as the patient's vision when she had lost her motor activity during the attack. During the next attacks she was impervious to any external incidents, but on the other hand developed, within the twilight state, all the more intense activity, in the form of visions. It seems that many secondary series of ideas must have split off quite early from the primary unconscious personality, for already, after the first two séances, "spirits" appeared by the dozen. The names were inexhaustible in variety, but the differences between the personalities were soon exhausted and it became apparent that they could all be subsumed under two types, the serio-religious type and the gay-hilarious. So far it was really only a matter of two different unconscious personalities, which appeared under different names but had no essential differences. The older type, the grandfather, who had initiated the automatisms, also first began to make use of the twilight state. I am not able to remember any suggestion which might have given rise to the automatic speaking. According to the preceding view, the attack in such circumstances might be regarded as a partial auto-hypnosis. The ego-consciousness which remains and, as a result of its isolation from the external world, occupies itself entirely with its hallucinations, is what is left over of the waking consciousness. Thus the automatism has a wide field for its activity. The independence of the individual central spheres which we have proved at the beginning to be present in the patient, makes the automatic act of speaking appear intelligible. Just as the dreamer on occasion speaks in his sleep, so, too, a man in his waking hours may accompany intensive thought with an unconscious whisper.[97] The peculiar movements of[78] the speech-musculature are to be noted. They have also been observed in other somnambulists.[98]
So far, we have seen that the patient's awareness of her ego is the same in all states. We have discussed two secondary aspects of consciousness and followed them into the somnambulistic attack, where they appear as the patient's visions during the time she lost her motor activity. In subsequent attacks, she was unresponsive to any external events, but on the other hand, developed even more intense activity within the twilight state, manifesting as visions. It seems that several secondary streams of ideas likely split off early from the primary unconscious personality because, after just the first two sessions, "spirits" appeared by the dozen. The names were endless in variety, but the differences between the personalities quickly became minimal, revealing that they could all fit into two types: the serio-religious type and the gay-hilarious type. Up to this point, it was really just a matter of two different unconscious personalities showing up under different names but having no significant differences. The older type, the grandfather, who initiated the automatisms, was also the first to utilize the twilight state. I can't recall any suggestion that might have triggered the automatic speaking. Based on the previous perspective, the attack in these circumstances could be seen as a form of partial self-hypnosis. The ego-consciousness that remains, due to its separation from the external world, becomes entirely focused on its hallucinations, representing what is left of waking consciousness. This gives the automatism ample opportunity for its activity. The independence of the individual central spheres, which we established at the beginning, makes the automatic act of speaking understandable. Just as a dreamer may occasionally speak in their sleep, someone in a waking state can also quietly accompany intense thoughts with an unconscious whisper.[97] The unusual movements of[78] the speech muscles are noteworthy. These have also been observed in other somnambulists.[98]
These clumsy attempts must be directly paralleled with the unintelligent and clumsy movements of the table or glass, and most probably correspond to the preliminary activity of the motor portion of the presentation; that is to say, a stimulus limited to the motor-centre which has not previously been subordinated to any higher system. Whether the like occurs in persons who talk in their dreams, I do not know. But it has been observed in hypnotised persons.[99]
These awkward attempts should be compared to the awkward and uncoordinated movements of the table or glass, and they likely relate to the preliminary activity of the motor part of the presentation; in other words, a stimulus restricted to the motor center that hasn’t been controlled by any higher system. I can't say if this happens in people who talk in their sleep. However, it has been observed in hypnotized individuals.[99]
Since the convenient medium of speech was used as the means of communication, the study of the subconscious personalities was considerably lightened. Their intellectual compass is a relatively mediocre one. Their knowledge is greater than that of the waking patient, including also a few occasional details, such as the birthdays of dead strangers and the like. The source of these is more or less obscure, since the patient does not know whence in the ordinary way she could have procured the knowledge of these facts. These are cases of so-called cryptomnesia, which are too unimportant to deserve more extended notice. The intelligence of the two subconscious persons is very slight; they produce banalities almost exclusively, but their relation to the conscious ego of the patient when in the somnambulic state is interesting. They are invariably aware of everything that takes place during ecstasy and occasionally they render an exact report from minute to minute.[100]
Since the handy tool of speech was used for communication, studying the subconscious personalities became much easier. Their intellectual range is relatively average. They know more than the awake person, including a few random details like the birthdays of deceased strangers and such. The origin of this knowledge is generally unclear, as the patient is unsure how she could have learned these facts in a normal way. These instances are called cryptomnesia and aren’t significant enough to warrant further attention. The intelligence of the two subconscious personalities is quite limited; they mostly produce trivial comments, but their connection to the patient’s conscious self while in a trance state is intriguing. They are always aware of everything happening during that state and can sometimes provide an accurate report minute by minute.[100]
The subconscious persons only know the patient's phantastic changes of thought very superficially; they do not[79] understand these and cannot answer a single question concerning the situation. Their stereotyped reference to Ivenes is: "Ask Ivenes." This observation reveals a dualism in the character of the subconscious personalities difficult to explain; for the grandfather, who gives information by automatic speech, also appears to Ivenes and, according to her account, teaches her about the objects in question. How is it that, when the grandfather speaks through the patient's mouth, he knows nothing of the very things which he himself teaches her in the ecstasies?
The subconscious minds only have a shallow understanding of the patient’s strange changes in thinking; they can’t grasp these and can’t answer any questions about the situation. Their usual response regarding Ivenes is: "Ask Ivenes." This observation shows a complexity in the nature of the subconscious personalities that’s hard to explain; the grandfather, who communicates through automatic speech, also appears to Ivenes and, according to her, teaches her about the relevant objects. How is it that when the grandfather speaks through the patient, he is unaware of the very things he teaches her during those moments?
We must again return to the discussion of the first appearance of the hallucinations. We picture the vision, then, as an irruption of hypnosis into the visual sphere. That irruption does not lead to a "normal" hypnosis, but to a "hystero-hypnosis," that is, the simple hypnosis is complicated by a hysterical attack.
We need to go back to discussing the initial appearance of the hallucinations. We visualize the vision as an intrusion of hypnosis into the visual realm. This intrusion doesn't result in "normal" hypnosis, but rather in "hystero-hypnosis," meaning that simple hypnosis is complicated by a hysterical episode.
It is not a rare occurrence in the domain of hypnotism for normal hypnosis to be disturbed, or rather to be replaced by the unexpected appearance of hysterical somnambulism; the hypnotist in many cases then loses rapport with the patient. In our case the automatism arising in the motor area plays the part of hypnotist; the suggestions proceeding from it (called objective auto-suggestions) hypnotise the neighbouring areas in which a certain susceptibility has arisen. At the moment when the hypnotism flows over into the visual sphere, the hysterical attack occurs which, as remarked, effects a very deep-reaching change in a large portion of the psychical region. We must now suppose that the automatism stands in the same relationship to the attack as the hypnotist to a pathological hypnosis; its influence upon the further structure of the situation is lost. The hallucinatory appearance of the hypnotised personality, or rather of the suggested idea, may be regarded as the last effect upon the somnambulic personality. Thenceforward the hypnotist becomes only a figure with whom the somnambulic personality occupies itself independently: he can only state what is going on and is no longer the conditio sine qua non of the content of the somnambulic attack. The independent ego-complex of the attack, in our case Ivenes, has now the[80] upper hand. She groups her own mental products around the personality of the hypnotiser, that is, of the grandfather, now degraded to a mere image. In this way we are enabled to understand the dualism in the character of the grandfather. The grandfather I. who speaks directly to those present, is a totally different person and a mere spectator of his double, grandfather II., who appears as Ivenes' teacher. Grandfather I. maintains energetically that both are one and the same person, and that I. has all the knowledge which II. possesses, and is only prevented from giving information by the difficulties of speech. (The dissociation was of course not realized by the patient, who took both to be one person.) Grandfather I., if closely examined, however, is not altogether wrong, judging from one fact which seems to make for the identity of I. and II., viz. that they are never both present together. When I. speaks automatically, II. is not present; Ivenes remarks on his absence. Similarly, during the ecstasy, when she is with II., she cannot say where I. is, or she may learn only on returning from an imaginary journey that meanwhile I. has been guarding her body. Conversely I. never says that he is going on a journey with Ivenes and never explains anything to her. This behaviour should be noted, for if I. is really separate from II., there seems no reason why he should not speak automatically at the same time that II. appears, and be present with II. in the ecstasy. Although this might have been supposed possible, as a matter of fact it was never observed. How is this dilemma to be resolved? At all events there exists an identity of I. and II., but it does not lie in the region of the personality under discussion; it lies in the basis common to both; that is, in the personality of the subject which in deepest essence is one and indivisible. Here we come across the characteristic of all hysterical dissociations of consciousness. They are disturbances which only belong to the superficial, and none reaches so deep as to attack the strong-knit foundation of the ego-complex.
It’s not uncommon in the field of hypnosis for regular hypnosis to be interrupted, or even replaced, by the sudden onset of hysterical somnambulism; the hypnotist often loses connection with the patient in such cases. In our example, the automatism coming from the motor area acts like the hypnotist; the suggestions it produces (called objective auto-suggestions) hypnotize nearby areas that have become susceptible. When the hypnosis starts to affect the visual domain, a hysterical episode occurs, which, as mentioned, leads to significant changes in a large part of the psychological space. We should now assume that the automatism relates to the episode in the same way the hypnotist relates to a pathological hypnosis; its influence on the overall situation is diminished. The hallucinatory presence of the hypnotized personality, or rather the suggested idea, can be seen as the final impact on the somnambulic personality. From that point on, the hypnotist becomes just a figure with whom the somnambulic personality interacts independently: he can only observe what’s happening and is no longer the conditio sine qua non of the content of the somnambulic episode. The independent ego-complex of the episode, in our case Ivenes, is now dominant. She organizes her own mental creations around the personality of the hypnotist, who is now just an image of her grandfather. This helps us understand the duality in the character of the grandfather. Grandfather I., who speaks directly to those present, is completely different and merely a spectator of his second self, grandfather II., who serves as Ivenes’ teacher. Grandfather I. strongly insists they are the same person, claiming he has all the knowledge that II. has, and is only held back from sharing it by speech difficulties. (The patient, of course, doesn’t realize the dissociation and sees both as the same person.) However, if we look closely, Grandfather I. isn’t entirely wrong, based on one fact that suggests the identity of I. and II., which is that they are never both present at the same time. When I. speaks automatically, II. isn’t there; Ivenes notes his absence. Similarly, during the ecstasy, when she’s with II., she can’t say where I. is, or she might only realize upon returning from an imaginary journey that I. has been watching over her body. Conversely, I. never claims he’s going on a journey with Ivenes and doesn’t explain anything to her. This behavior is worth noting, because if I. is truly separate from II., there’s no reason he shouldn't be able to speak automatically at the same time II. appears, or be with II. during the ecstasy. Although this could have been thought possible, it was actually never observed. How do we solve this dilemma? In any case, there is an identity between I. and II., but it doesn’t lie within the personality being discussed; it lies in the common foundation that underlies both; that is, in the subject’s personality, which in its deepest essence is one and indivisible. Here we encounter the characteristic of all hysterical dissociations of consciousness. They are disturbances that only affect the surface, and none penetrate deeply enough to challenge the strong foundation of the ego-complex.
In many such cases we can find the bridge which, although often well-concealed, spans the apparently impassable abyss.[81] For instance, by suggestion, one of four cards is made invisible to a hypnotised person; he thereupon names the other three. A pencil is placed in his hand with the instruction to write down all the cards lying there; he correctly adds the fourth one.[101]
In many of these cases, we can discover the bridge that, while often hidden, crosses the seemingly impassable gap.[81] For example, through suggestion, one of four cards is made invisible to a hypnotized person; they then name the other three. A pencil is put in their hand with the instruction to write down all the cards present; they accurately include the fourth one.[101]
In the aura of his hystero-epileptic attacks a patient of Janet's[102] invariably had a vision of a conflagration, and whenever he saw an open fire he had an attack; indeed, the sight of a lighted match was sufficient to bring about an attack. The patient's visual field on the left side was limited to 30°, the right eye was shut. The left eye was fixed in the middle of a perimeter whilst a lighted match was held at 80°. The hystero-epileptic attack took place immediately. Despite the extensive amnesia in many cases of double consciousness, the patients' behaviour does not correspond to the degree of their ignorance, but it seems rather as if a deeper instinct guided their actions in accordance with their former knowledge. Not only this relatively slight amnesic dissociation, but the severe amnesia of the epileptic twilight-state, formerly regarded as irreparabile damnum, does not suffice to cut the inmost threads which bind the ego-complex in the twilight-state to the normal ego. In one case the content of the twilight-state could be grafted on to the waking ego-complex.[103]
In the presence of his hystero-epileptic episodes, a patient of Janet's[102] always experienced a vision of a fire, and whenever he encountered an open flame, he would have an attack; in fact, just seeing a lit match was enough to trigger one. The patient's visual field on the left side was restricted to 30°, and his right eye was closed. The left eye was focused straight ahead while a lit match was held at 80°. The hystero-epileptic attack would occur instantly. Despite the significant amnesia seen in many cases of double consciousness, the patients' behavior doesn't match the level of their unawareness; instead, it seems like a deeper instinct guided their actions based on their past knowledge. Not only is there this relatively mild amnesic separation, but also the severe amnesia experienced during the epileptic twilight state, which was previously considered irreparabile damnum, is not enough to sever the fundamental connections linking the ego-complex in the twilight state to the normal ego. In one instance, the content of the twilight state could be integrated into the waking ego-complex.[103]
Making use of these experiments for our case, we obtain the helpful hypothesis that those layers of the unconscious beyond reach of the dissociation endeavour to present the unity of automatic personality. This endeavour is shattered in the deeper-seated and more elemental disturbance of the hysterical attack,[104] which prevents a more complete synthesis by the tacking on of associations which are to a certain extent the most original individual property of supraliminal personality. As the Ivenes dream emerged it was fitted on to the figures accidentally in the field of vision, and henceforth remains associated with them.
Using these experiments for our case, we arrive at the useful idea that those layers of the unconscious inaccessible to dissociation try to show the unity of automatic personality. This effort is disrupted in the deeper and more fundamental disturbance of the hysterical attack,[104] which hinders a more complete synthesis by attaching associations that are to some extent the most original individual traits of supraliminal personality. As the Ivenes dream came into being, it was attached to the figures randomly in the field of vision, and from that point on, remains linked to them.
Relationship to the Unconscious Personality.
Connection to the Unconscious Self.
As we have seen, the numerous personalities become grouped round two types, the grandfather and Ulrich von Gerbenstein. The first produces exclusively sanctimonious religiosity and gives edifying moral precepts. The latter is, in one word, a "flapper," in whom there is nothing male except the name. We must here add from the anamnesis that at fifteen the patient was confirmed by a very bigoted clergyman, and at home she is occasionally the recipient of sanctimonious moral talks. The grandfather represents this side of her past, Gerbenstein the other half; hence the curious contrast. Here we have personified the chief characteristics of her past. On the one hand the sanctimonious person with a narrow education, on the other the boisterousness of a lively girl of fifteen who often overshoots the mark.[105] We find both sets of traits mixed in the patient in sharp contrast. At times she is anxious, shy, and extremely reserved; at others boisterous to a degree. She is herself often most painfully aware of these contradictions. This circumstance gives us the key to the source of the two unconscious personalities. The patient is obviously seeking a middle path between the two extremes; she endeavours to repress them and strains after some ideal condition. These strainings bring her to the puberty dream of the ideal Ivenes, beside whose figure the unacknowledged trends of her character recede into the background. They are not lost, however, but as repressed ideas, analogous to the Ivenes idea, begin an independent existence as automatic personalities.
As we've seen, the many personalities are grouped around two types: the grandfather and Ulrich von Gerbenstein. The grandfather is all about sanctimonious religiosity and offers moral lessons. Ulrich, on the other hand, is basically a "flapper," with nothing male about him except his name. It's worth noting from the anamnesis that the patient was confirmed by a very conservative clergyman at fifteen, and at home, she sometimes receives pious moral lectures. The grandfather represents this aspect of her past, while Gerbenstein symbolizes the other side, creating a striking contrast. Here, we see the main traits of her past personified. On one side is the pious person with a limited education, and on the other is the exuberance of a lively fifteen-year-old girl who often goes a bit overboard. We find both sets of traits in the patient, sharply contrasting with each other. Sometimes she is anxious, shy, and extremely reserved; other times, she's boisterous to the extreme. She's painfully aware of these contradictions, which gives us insight into the source of her two unconscious personalities. The patient is clearly trying to find a balance between the two extremes; she attempts to suppress them and strives for some ideal state. This struggle leads her to the puberty dream of the ideal Ivenes, whose figure makes the unacknowledged aspects of her character fade into the background. However, they aren't lost; instead, as repressed ideas, similar to the Ivenes concept, they start to exist independently as automatic personalities.
S. W.'s behaviour recalls vividly Freud's[106] investigations into dreams which disclose the independent growth of repressed thoughts. We can now comprehend why the hallucinatory persons are separated from those who write and speak [83]automatically. The former teach Ivenes the secrets of the Other Side, they relate all those phantastic tales about the extraordinariness of her personality, they create scenes where Ivenes can appear dramatically with the attributes of power, wisdom and virtue. These are nothing but dramatic dissociations of her dream-self. The latter, the automatic persons, are the ones to be overcome, they must have no part in Ivenes. With the spirit-companions of Ivenes they have only the name in common. A priori, it is not to be expected that in a case like ours, where these divisions are never clearly defined, that two such characteristic individualities should disappear entirely from a somnambulic ego-complex having so close a relation with the waking consciousness. And in fact, we do meet them in part in those ecstatic penitential scenes and in part in the romances crammed with more or less banal, mischievous gossip.
S. W.'s behavior strongly reminds us of Freud's[106] research into dreams that reveal the independent development of repressed thoughts. We can now understand why the hallucinatory figures are different from those who think and speak [83]automatically. The former teach Ivenes the secrets of the Other Side, sharing all those fantastic stories about how extraordinary her personality is; they create scenarios where Ivenes can dramatically appear with traits of power, wisdom, and virtue. These are just dramatic separations of her dream self. The latter, the automatic figures, are the ones to be overcome; they should have no part in Ivenes. The spirit companions of Ivenes only share a name with them. A priori, it’s not reasonable to expect that in a case like ours, where these divisions are never clearly defined, two such distinct individualities would completely vanish from a somnambulic ego-complex that has such a close connection with the waking mind. And indeed, we encounter them partially in those ecstatic penitential scenes and partially in the romances filled with more or less trivial, mischievous gossip.
Course.
Class.
It only remains to say a few words about the course of this strange affection. The process reached its maximum in four to eight weeks. The descriptions given of Ivenes and of the unconscious personalities belong generally to this period. Thenceforth a gradual decline was noticeable; the ecstasies grew meaningless and the influence of Gerbenstein became more powerful. The phenomena gradually lost their distinctive features, the characters which were at first well demarcated became by degrees inextricably mixed. The psychological contribution grew smaller and smaller until finally the whole story assumed a marked effect of fabrication. Ivenes herself was much concerned about this decline; she became painfully uncertain, spoke cautiously, feeling her way, and allowed her character to appear undisguised. The somnambulic attacks decreased in frequency and intensity. All degrees from somnambulism to conscious lying were observable. Thus the curtain fell. The patient[84] has since gone abroad. We should not underestimate the importance of the fact that her character has become pleasanter and more stable. Here we may recall the cases cited in which the second state gradually replaced the first state. Perhaps this is a similar phenomenon.
It only remains to say a few words about the course of this strange affection. The process reached its peak within four to eight weeks. The descriptions of Ivenes and the unconscious personalities generally come from this period. After that, a gradual decline was noticeable; the ecstasies became meaningless and the influence of Gerbenstein grew stronger. The phenomena slowly lost their distinct features, and the characters that were initially well-defined became increasingly intertwined. The psychological contribution diminished more and more until, eventually, the entire story seemed fabricated. Ivenes herself was very worried about this decline; she became painfully uncertain, spoke cautiously, feeling her way, and allowed her true character to come through. The somnambulic attacks decreased in both frequency and intensity. All levels from somnambulism to conscious lying were observable. Thus the curtain fell. The patient[84] has since gone abroad. We shouldn’t overlook the fact that her character has become more pleasant and stable. Here we can recall the cases mentioned where the second state gradually replaced the first state. Perhaps this is a similar phenomenon.
Schroeder von der Kalk's patient was 16 years old at the time of her illness; Felida 14-1/2, etc. We know also that at this period the future character is formed and fixed. In the case of Felida and of Mary Reynolds we saw that the character in state II. replaced that of state I. It is not therefore unthinkable that these phenomena of double consciousness are nothing but character-formations for the future personality, or their attempts to burst forth. In consequence of special difficulties (unfavourable external conditions, psychopathic disposition of the nervous system, etc.), these new formations, or attempts thereat, become bound up with peculiar disturbances of consciousness. Occasionally the somnambulism, in view of the difficulties that oppose the future character, takes on a marked teleological meaning, for it gives the individual, who might otherwise be defeated, the means of victory. Here I am thinking first of all of Jeanne d'Arc, whose extraordinary courage recalls the deeds of Mary Reynolds' II. This is perhaps the place to point out the similar function of the "hallucination téléologique" of which the public reads occasionally, although it has not yet been submitted to a scientific study.
Schroeder von der Kalk's patient was 16 years old when she got sick; Felida was 14 and a half, etc. We also know that during this time, a person's future character is formed and set. In the cases of Felida and Mary Reynolds, we observed that the character in state II replaced that of state I. So, it's not far-fetched to think that these occurrences of double consciousness might just be character formations for the future personality, or attempts to emerge. Due to certain challenges (unfavorable external conditions, a psychopathic disposition of the nervous system, etc.), these new formations, or attempts at them, become linked to unusual disturbances of consciousness. Sometimes, somnambulism, considering the challenges faced by the future character, carries a significant teleological meaning, as it provides the individual, who might otherwise feel defeated, a way to succeed. Here, I am primarily thinking of Jeanne d'Arc, whose remarkable courage reflects the actions of Mary Reynolds' II. This might be a good point to mention the similar role of the "hallucination téléologique," about which the public occasionally reads, although it hasn't undergone scientific study yet.
The Unconscious Additional Creative Work.
The Unconscious Extra Creative Work.
We have now discussed all the essential manifestations offered by our case which are of significance for its inner[85] structure. Certain accompanying manifestations may be briefly considered: the unconscious additional creative work. Here we shall encounter a not altogether unjustifiable scepticism on the part of the representative of science. Dessoir's conception of a second ego met with much opposition, and was rejected, as too impossible in many directions. As is known, occultism has proclaimed a pre-eminent right to this field and has drawn premature conclusions from doubtful observations. We are indeed very far from being in a position to state anything conclusive, since we have at present only most inadequate material. Therefore if we touch on the field of the unconscious additional creative work, it is only that we may do justice to all sides of our case. By unconscious addition we understand that automatic process whose result does not penetrate to the conscious psychic activity of the individual. To this region above all belongs thought-reading through table movements. I do not know whether there are people who can divine a whole long train of thought by means of inductions from the intentional tremulous movements. It is, however, certain that, assuming this to be possible, such persons must be availing themselves of a routine achieved after endless practice. But in our case long practice can be excluded without more ado, and there is nothing left but to accept a primary susceptibility of the unconscious, far exceeding that of the conscious.
We have now covered all the key aspects presented by our case that are important for its inner[85]structure. Certain related aspects can be briefly discussed: the unconscious additional creative work. Here, we will encounter some understandable skepticism from the scientific community. Dessoir's idea of a second ego faced a lot of opposition and was dismissed as too implausible in many ways. As is known, occultism has claimed a prominent right to this area and has drawn hasty conclusions from questionable observations. We are truly far from being able to make any definitive statements since we currently have only very limited material. Therefore, when we explore the area of unconscious additional creative work, it's only to give a fair assessment of all aspects of our case. By unconscious addition, we mean the automatic process whose outcome does not reach the individual's conscious mental activity. This area primarily includes thought-reading through table movements. I’m not sure if there are people who can grasp a whole long line of thought through inferences made from intentional movements. However, it is certain that, if this is possible, those individuals must be using a skill developed after countless hours of practice. But in our case, long practice can be dismissed without question, and we must accept that the primary sensitivity of the unconscious is much greater than that of the conscious.
This supposition is supported by numerous observations on somnambulists. I will mention only Binet's[110] experiments, where little letters or some such thing, or little complicated figures in relief were laid on the anæsthetic skin of the back of the hand or the neck, and the unconscious perceptions were then recorded by means of signs. On the basis of these experiments he came to the following conclusion: "D'après les calculs que j'ai pu faire, la sensibilité inconsciente d'une hystérique est à certains moments cinquante fois plus fine que celle d'une personne normale." A second additional creation coming under consideration in our case and in numerous[86] other somnambulists, is that condition which French investigators call "cryptomnesia."[111] By this term is meant the becoming conscious of a memory-picture which cannot be regarded as in itself primary, but at most is secondary, by means of subsequent recalling or abstract reasoning. It is characteristic of cryptomnesia that the picture which emerges does not bear the obvious mark of the memory-picture, is not, that is to say, bound up with the idiosyncratic super-conscious ego-complex.
This idea is backed by many observations of sleepwalkers. I'll only mention Binet's[110] experiments, where small letters or similar objects, or intricate raised figures, were placed on the insensitive skin of the back of the hand or neck, and the unconscious perceptions were then recorded using signs. From these experiments, he reached this conclusion: "Based on the calculations I've made, the unconscious sensitivity of a hysteric is at certain moments fifty times sharper than that of a normal person." A second additional phenomenon relevant to our discussion and to many[86] other sleepwalkers is the condition that French researchers refer to as "cryptomnesia."[111] This term refers to the becoming aware of a memory-image that cannot be considered primary in itself, but at most is secondary, through subsequent recall or abstract reasoning. A characteristic of cryptomnesia is that the memory-image that comes to mind doesn’t clearly show the characteristics of a memory-image; in other words, it isn’t linked to the unique super-conscious ego-complex.
Three ways may be distinguished in which the cryptomnesic picture is brought to consciousness.
Three ways can be identified in which the cryptomnesic image emerges into consciousness.
1. The picture enters consciousness without any intervention of the sense-spheres (intra-psychically). It is an inrushing idea whose causal sequence is hidden within the individual. In so far cryptomnesia is quite an everyday occurrence, concerned with the deepest normal psychic events. How often it misleads the investigator, the author or the composer into believing his ideas original, whilst the critic quite well recognises their source! Generally the individuality of the representation protects the author from the accusation of plagiarism and proves his good faith; still, cases do occur of unconscious verbal reproduction. Should the passage in question contain some remarkable idea, the accusation of plagiarism, more or less conscious, is justified. After all, a valuable idea is linked by numerous associations with the ego-complex; at different times, in different situations, it has already been meditated upon and thus leads by innumerable links in all directions. It can therefore never so disappear from consciousness that its continuity could be entirely lost from the sphere of conscious memory. We have, however, a criterion by which we can always recognise objectively intra-psychic cryptomnesia. The cryptomnesic presentation is linked to the ego-complex by the minimum of associations. The reason for this lies in the relation of the individual to the particular object, in the disproportion of interest to[87] object. Two possibilities occur: (1) The object is worthy of interest but the interest is slight in consequence of dispersion or want of understanding; (2) The object is not worthy of interest, consequently the interest is slight. In both cases an extremely labile connection with consciousness arises which leads to a rapid forgetting. The slight bridge is soon destroyed and the acquired presentation sinks into the unconscious, where it is no longer accessible to consciousness. Should it enter consciousness by means of cryptomnesia, the feeling of strangeness, of its being an original creation, will cling to it because the path by which it entered the subconscious has become undiscoverable. Strangeness and original creation are, moreover, closely allied to one another if one recalls the numerous witnesses in belles-lettres to the nature of genius ("possession" by genius).[112]
1. The image enters our awareness without any involvement from our senses (intra-psychically). It’s an idea that rushes in, with its causal connections hidden within the individual. Cryptomnesia happens quite often, related to the most ordinary psychological events. It frequently deceives the researcher, the writer, or the composer into thinking their ideas are original, while critics easily recognize their sources! Generally, the unique way an idea is expressed protects the creator from being accused of plagiarism and shows their good intentions; still, there are instances of subconscious verbal reproduction. If the passage in question contains a notable idea, then the accusation of plagiarism, whether fully conscious or not, is valid. After all, a valuable idea is connected to many associations with the ego-complex; at different times and in various situations, it has been reflected upon, leading to countless connections in every direction. Therefore, it can never vanish from our awareness completely to the point where its continuity is entirely lost from our conscious memory. However, we have a standard to objectively identify intra-psychic cryptomnesia. The cryptomnesic presentation is connected to the ego-complex through minimal associations. This occurs due to the individual's relationship with the specific object, reflected in the imbalance of interest towards the object. Two possibilities arise: (1) The object is interesting, but the interest is minimal due to distraction or lack of understanding; (2) The object isn’t interesting, hence the interest is low. In both scenarios, a very fragile connection with our consciousness develops, leading to quick forgetting. This weak link is soon broken, and the acquired presentation sinks into the unconscious, where it becomes inaccessible to awareness. If it surfaces through cryptomnesia, it will feel strange, as if it’s an original creation, because the route it took to enter the subconscious has become untraceable. Strangeness and original creation are, moreover, closely related if one considers the many testimonies in belles-lettres about the nature of genius ("possession" by genius).[112]
Apart from certain striking cases of this kind, where it is doubtful whether it is a cryptomnesia or an original creation, there are some cases in which a passage of no essential content is reproduced, and that almost verbally, as in the following example:—
Apart from a few notable instances like this, where it's hard to tell if it's a forgotten memory or something new, there are cases where a passage with no real significance is repeated, almost word for word, like in the following example:—
About that time when Zarathustra lived on the blissful islands, it came to pass that a ship cast anchor at that island on which the smoking mountain standeth; and the sailors of that ship went ashore in order to shoot rabbits! But about the hour of noon, when the captain and his men had mustered again, they suddenly saw a man come through the air unto them, and a voice said distinctly: "It is time! It is high time!" But when that person was nighest unto them (he passed by them flying quickly like a shadow, in the direction in which the volcano was situated) they recognised with the greatest confusion that it was Zarathustra. For all of them, except the captain, had seen him before, and they loved him, as the folk love, blending love and awe in equal parts. "Lo! there," said the old steersman, "Zarathustra goeth unto hell!"
Around the time when Zarathustra was living on the beautiful islands, a ship docked near the island with the smoking mountain. The sailors went ashore to hunt rabbits. But around noon, when the captain and his crew had gathered again, they suddenly saw a man flying through the air towards them, and a voice clearly said: "It’s time! It’s high time!" When that person got closest to them (he flew by quickly like a shadow towards the volcano), they realized with great confusion that it was Zarathustra. All of them, except the captain, had seen him before, and they admired him with a mix of love and awe. "Look! There," said the old steersman, "Zarathustra is going to hell!"
An extract of awe-inspiring import from the log of the ship "Sphinx" in the year 1686, in the Mediterranean.
An extract of amazing significance from the log of the ship "Sphinx" in the year 1686, in the Mediterranean.
Just. Kerner, "Blätter aus Prevorst," vol. IV., p, 57.
Just. Kerner, "Blätter aus Prevorst," vol. IV, p. 57.
The four captains and a merchant, Mr. Bell, went ashore on the island of Mount Stromboli to shoot rabbits. At three o'clock they called the crew together to go aboard, when, to their inexpressible astonishment, they saw two men flying rapidly over them through the air. One was dressed in black, the other in grey. They approached them very closely, in the greatest haste; to their greatest dismay they descended amid the burning flames into the crater of the terrible volcano, Mount Stromboli. They recognised the pair as acquaintances from London.
The four captains and a merchant, Mr. Bell, went ashore on Mount Stromboli to hunt rabbits. At three o'clock, they gathered the crew to head back aboard when, to their utter shock, they saw two men flying quickly above them. One was dressed in black, the other in grey. They came down close, in a hurry; to their horror, they descended into the raging flames of the terrifying volcano, Mount Stromboli. They recognized the two as acquaintances from London.
Frau E. Förster-Nietzsche, the poet's sister, told me, in reply to my inquiry, that Nietzsche took up Just. Kerner between the age of twelve and fifteen, when stopping with his grandfather, Pastor Oehler, in Pobler, but certainly never afterwards. It could never have been the poet's intention to commit a plagiarism from a ship's log; if this had been the case, he would certainly have omitted the very prosaic "to shoot rabbits," which was, moreover, quite unessential to the situation. In the poetical sketch of Zarathustra's journey into Hell there was obviously interpolated, half or wholly unconsciously, that forgotten impression from his youth.
Frau E. Förster-Nietzsche, the poet's sister, told me in response to my question that Nietzsche started reading Just. Kerner between the ages of twelve and fifteen while staying with his grandfather, Pastor Oehler, in Pobler, but definitely never after that. It could never have been the poet's intention to plagiarize from a ship's log; if that were the case, he would have definitely left out the very mundane "to shoot rabbits," which was also quite irrelevant to the situation. In the poetic sketch of Zarathustra's journey into Hell, there was clearly an insertion, either partially or completely unconsciously, of that forgotten impression from his youth.
This is an instance which shows all the peculiarities of cryptomnesia. A quite unessential detail, which deserves nothing but speedy forgetting, is reproduced with almost verbal fidelity, whilst the chief part of the narrative is, one[89] cannot say altered, but recreated quite distinctively. To the distinctive core, the idea of the journey to Hell, there is added a detail, the old, forgotten impression of a similar situation. The original is so absurd that the youth, who read everything, probably skipped through it, and certainly had no deep interest in it. Here we get the required minimum of associated links, for we cannot easily conceive a greater jump, than from that old, absurd story to Nietzsche's consciousness in the year 1883. If we picture to ourselves Nietzsche's mood at the time when "Zarathustra" was composed,[113] and think of the ecstasy that at more than one point approached the pathological, we shall comprehend the abnormal reminiscence. The second of the two possibilities mentioned, the acceptance of some object, not itself uninteresting, in a state of dispersion or half interest from lack of understanding, and its cryptomnesic reproduction we find chiefly in somnambulists; it is also found in the literary chronicles dealing with dying celebrities.[114]
This is an example that highlights all the quirks of cryptomnesia. A detail that isn’t very important, and should be quickly forgotten, is recalled almost word for word, while the main part of the story is, you can't say altered, but distinctly recreated. The core idea of the journey to Hell is supplemented by a detail, the old forgotten impression of a similar situation. The original is so ridiculous that the young reader, who devoured everything, likely skimmed through it and certainly wasn’t deeply interested. Here we find the necessary minimum of associated links, as it’s hard to imagine a bigger leap than from that old, absurd story to Nietzsche’s thoughts in 1883. If we imagine Nietzsche's mindset when "Zarathustra" was written, and consider the ecstasy that at times verged on the pathological, we can understand the unusual memory. The second of the two possibilities mentioned, the acceptance of some object that isn’t particularly uninteresting, while in a state of distraction or half interest due to a lack of understanding, and its cryptomnesic recall, primarily occurs in sleepwalkers; it is also found in literary accounts of dying celebrities.
Amid the exhaustive selection of these phenomena we are chiefly concerned with talking in a foreign tongue, the so-called glossolalia. This phenomenon is mentioned everywhere when it is a question of similar ecstatic conditions. In the New Testament, in the Acta Sanctorum,[115] in the Witchcraft Trials, more recently in the Prophetess of Prevorst, in Judge Edmond's daughter Laura, in Flournoy's Helen Smith. The last is unique from the point of view of investigation; it is found also in Bresler's[116] case, which is probably identical[90] with Blumhardt's[117] Gottlieben Dittus. As Flournoy shows, glossolalia is, so far as it really is independent speech, a cryptomnesic phenomenon, [Greek: Kat' exochên]. The reader should consult Flournoy's most interesting exposition.
Amid the extensive range of these phenomena, we are mainly focused on speaking in a foreign language, known as glossolalia. This phenomenon is frequently mentioned in discussions about similar ecstatic states. It appears in the New Testament, in the Acta Sanctorum,[115] during the Witchcraft Trials, more recently in the Prophetess of Prevorst, in Judge Edmond's daughter Laura, and in Flournoy's Helen Smith. The latter is unique from a research perspective; it is also present in Bresler's[116] case, which is likely the same as[90] Blumhardt's[117] Gottlieben Dittus. As Flournoy demonstrates, glossolalia, when it truly represents independent speech, is a cryptomnesic phenomenon, [Greek: Kat' exochên]. Readers should check out Flournoy's fascinating discussion.
In our case glossolalia was only once observed, when the only understandable words were the scattered variations on the word "vena." The source of this word is clear. A few days previously the patient had dipped into an anatomical atlas for the study of the veins of the face, which were given in Latin. She had used the word "vena" in her dreams, as happens occasionally to normal persons. The remaining words and sentences in a foreign language betray, at the first glance, their derivation from French, in which the patient was somewhat fluent. Unfortunately I am without the more accurate translations of the various sentences, because the patient would not give them; but we may hold that it was a phenomenon similar to Helen Smith's Martian language. Flournoy found that the Martian language was nothing but a childish translation from French; the words were changed but the syntax remained the same. Even more probable is the view that the patient simply ranged next to each other meaningless words that rang strangely, without any true word-formation;[118] she borrowed certain characteristic sounds from French and Italian and combined them into a kind of language, just as Helen Smith completed the lacunæ in the real Sanscrit words by products of her own resembling that language. The curious names of the mystical system can be reduced, for the most part, to known roots. The writer vividly recalls the botanical schemes found in every school atlas; the internal resemblance of the relationship of the planets to the sun is also pretty clear; we shall not be going astray if we see in the names reminiscences from popular astronomy. Thus can be explained the names [91]Persus, Fenus, Nenus, Sirum, Surus, Fixus, and Pix, as the childlike distortions of Perseus, Venus, Sirius and Fixed Star, analogous to the Vena variations. Magnesor vividly recalls Magnetism, whose mystic significance the patient knew from the Prophetess of Prevorst. In Connesor, the contrary to Magnesor, the prefix "con" is probably the French "contre." Hypnos and Hyfonismus recall hypnosis and hypnotism (German hypnotismus), about which there are the most superstitious ideas circulating in lay circles. The most used suffixes in "us" and "os" are the signs by which as a rule people decide the difference between Latin and Greek. The other names probably spring from similar accidents to which we have no clues. The rudimentary glossolalia of our case has not any title to be a classical instance of cryptomnesia, for it only consisted in the unconscious use of various impressions, partly optical, party acoustic, and all very close at hand.
In our case, glossolalia was only observed once, with the only understandable words being the scattered variations of the word "vena." The origin of this word is clear. A few days before, the patient had looked through an anatomical atlas to study the veins of the face, which were labeled in Latin. She had used the word "vena" in her dreams, like normal people sometimes do. The other words and sentences in a foreign language clearly show their French origins, as the patient had some fluency in it. Unfortunately, I lack precise translations of the various sentences because the patient refused to provide them; however, we can assume it was a phenomenon similar to Helen Smith's Martian language. Flournoy discovered that the Martian language was simply a childish translation from French; the words were altered, but the syntax remained intact. It's even more likely that the patient just put together random meaningless words that sounded interesting, without forming any real words; she borrowed certain distinct sounds from French and Italian and merged them into a kind of language, just like Helen Smith filled in the lacunæ in real Sanskrit words with her own versions that resembled that language. The strange names in the mystical system can mostly be traced back to known roots. I vividly remember the botanical diagrams in every school atlas; the connections between the planets and the sun are also quite clear; we won't be off track if we view the names as references from popular astronomy. This explains names like Persus, Fenus, Nenus, Sirum, Surus, Fixus, and Pix, as childish distortions of Perseus, Venus, Sirius, and Fixed Star, similar to the variations of Vena. Magnesor brings to mind magnetism, whose mystical significance the patient learned from the Prophetess of Prevorst. In contrast to Magnesor, Connesor likely has the prefix "con," derived from the French "contre." Hypnos and Hyfonismus reference hypnosis and hypnotism (German hypnotismus), which are surrounded by superstitious beliefs in everyday conversation. The suffixes "us" and "os" are often the indicators by which people typically differentiate between Latin and Greek. The other names probably arise from similar occurrences for which we have no clues. The rudimentary glossolalia in our case can't be classified as a classic instance of cryptomnesia, as it only involved the unconscious use of various impressions, both optical and acoustic, all very familiar.
2. The cryptomnesic image arrives at consciousness through the senses (as a hallucination). Helen Smith is the classic example of this kind. I refer to the case mentioned on the date "18 Mars."[119]
2. The cryptomnesic image enters awareness through the senses (like a hallucination). Helen Smith is a classic example of this type. I’m referring to the case noted on the date "18 Mars."[119]
3. The image arrives at consciousness by motor automatism. H. Smith had lost her valuable brooch, which she was anxiously looking for everywhere. Ten days later her guide Leopold informed her by means of the table where the brooch was. Thus informed, she found it at night-time in the open field, covered by sand.[120] Strictly speaking, in cryptomnesia there is not any additional creation in the true sense of the word, since the conscious memory experiences no increase of its function, but only an enrichment of its content. By the automatism certain regions are merely made accessible to consciousness in an indirect way, which were formerly sealed against it. But the unconscious does not thereby accomplish any creation which exceeds the capacity of consciousness qualitatively or quantitatively. Cryptomnesia is only an apparent additional creation, in contrast to hypermnesia, which actually represents an increase of function.[121]
3. The image reaches consciousness through automatic processes. H. Smith had lost her valuable brooch and was anxiously searching for it everywhere. Ten days later, her guide Leopold informed her of where the brooch was located. With this information, she found it at night in an open field, covered in sand.[120] Strictly speaking, in cryptomnesia, there isn't any true creation since conscious memory doesn’t actually enhance its function, but instead only enriches its content. Through automatism, certain areas of memory are indirectly made accessible to consciousness that were previously blocked. However, the unconscious does not create anything that surpasses the qualitative or quantitative capacity of consciousness. Cryptomnesia is merely an apparent additional creation, unlike hypermnesia, which genuinely represents a functional increase.[121]
We have spoken above of a receptivity of the unconscious greater than that of the consciousness, chiefly in regard to the simple attempts at thought-reading of numbers. As mentioned, not only our somnambulist but a relatively large number of normal persons are able to guess from the tremors lengthy thought-sequences, if they are not too complicated. These experiments are, so to speak, the prototype of those rarer and incomparably more astonishing cases of intuitive knowledge displayed at times by somnambulists.[122] Zschokke[123] in his "Introspection" has shown us that these phenomena do not belong only to the domain of somnambulism, but occur among non-somnambulic persons. The formation of such knowledge seems to be arrived at in various ways: first and foremost there is the fineness, already noted, of unconscious perceptions; then must be emphasised the importance of the enormous suggestibility of somnambulists. The somnambulist not only incorporates every suggestive idea to some extent, but actually lives in the suggestion, in the person of his doctor or observer, with that abandonment characteristic of the suggestible hysteric. The relation of Frau Hauffe to Kerner is a striking example of this. That in such cases there is a high degree of association-concordance can cause no astonishment; a condition which Richet might have taken more account of in his experiments in thought-transference. Finally there are cases of somnambulic additional creative work which are not to be explained solely by hyperæsthesia of the unconscious activity of the senses and association-concordance, but presuppose a highly developed intellectual activity of the unconscious. The deciphering of the purposive tremors demand an extreme sensitiveness and delicacy of feeling, both psychological and physiological, to combine the individual perceptions into a complete unity of thought, if it is at all permissible to make an analogy between the processes of cognition in the realm of the unconscious[93] and the conscious. The possibility must always be considered that in the unconscious, feeling and concept are not clearly separated, perhaps even are one. The intellectual elevation which certain somnambulists display in ecstasy, though a rare thing, is none the less one that has sometimes been observed.[124] I would designate the scheme composed by our patient as just one of those pieces of creative work that exceed the normal intelligence. We have already seen whence one portion of this scheme probably came. A second source is no doubt the life-crisis of Frau Hauffe, portrayed in Kerner's book. The external form seems to be determined by these adventitious facts. As already observed in the presentation of the case, the idea of dualism arises from the conversations picked up piecemeal by the patient during those dreamy states occurring after her ecstasies. This exhausts my knowledge of the sources of S. W.'s creations. Whence arose the root-idea the patient is unable to say. I naturally examined occultistic literature pertinent to the subject, and discovered a store of parallels with her gnostic system from different centuries scattered through all kinds of work mostly quite inaccessible to the patient. Moreover, at her youthful age, and with her surroundings, the possibility of any such study is quite excluded. A brief survey of the system in the light of her own explanations shows how much intelligence was used in its construction. How highly the intellectual work is to be estimated is a matter of opinion. In any case, considering her youth, her mentality must be regarded as quite extraordinary.
We have talked about how the unconscious mind is more receptive than the conscious mind, especially regarding simple attempts at reading thoughts about numbers. As mentioned, not only can our sleepwalker guess long sequences of thoughts from slight tremors, as long as they aren't too complex, but a significant number of normal people can do this as well. These experiments are essentially the model for the much rarer and truly astonishing cases of intuitive knowledge sometimes exhibited by sleepwalkers.[122] Zschokke[123] in his "Introspection" has shown us that these phenomena aren’t limited to sleepwalkers but also occur among non-sleepwalking individuals. The development of such knowledge seems to come about in several ways: primarily, there’s the subtlety of unconscious perceptions; then we must highlight the great suggestibility of sleepwalkers. The sleepwalker not only absorbs every suggestive idea to some degree but actually exists within the suggestion, in the presence of their doctor or observer, with a level of surrender characteristic of highly suggestible hysterics. The relationship between Frau Hauffe and Kerner is a striking example of this. That there is a strong level of association-concordance in such cases isn't surprising; it’s a condition Richet could have considered more in his thought-transference experiments. Finally, there are cases of additional creative work in sleepwalking that can’t be simply explained by heightened sensitivity of the unconscious sensory activity and association-concordance, but suggest a highly developed intellectual activity of the unconscious. Deciphering these purposeful tremors requires extreme sensitivity and finesse in both psychological and physiological senses to piece together individual perceptions into a cohesive thought, if it’s permissible at all to draw an analogy between cognitive processes in the unconscious[93] and in the conscious mind. We must always keep in mind that in the unconscious, feeling and concept may not be clearly separated, and could even be one. The intellectual depth that some sleepwalkers display during ecstasy, while rare, has been observed on occasion.[124] I would consider the scheme created by our patient to be one of those pieces of creative work that surpasses normal intelligence. We have already seen where some of this scheme likely originated. A second source is certainly the life-crisis of Frau Hauffe, depicted in Kerner's book. The external form appears to be shaped by these incidental facts. As noted in the presentation of the case, the idea of dualism emerges from snippets of conversations that the patient picked up during those dreamy states following her ecstasies. This sums up what I know about the sources of S. W.'s creations. The patient cannot pinpoint where the root idea came from. I naturally explored occult literature relevant to the topic and found numerous parallels with her gnostic system from various centuries scattered across many works, mostly inaccessible to the patient. Additionally, at her young age and given her environment, any possibility of such study is completely ruled out. A brief overview of the system, informed by her own explanations, shows how much intelligence went into its construction. How highly this intellectual work should be valued is subjective. In any case, considering her youth, her level of intellect must be regarded as quite extraordinary.
CHAPTER II
THE ASSOCIATION METHOD
The Association Method
Lecture I[125]
Lecture I __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
When you honoured me with an invitation to lecture at Clark University, a wish was expressed that I should speak about my methods of work, and especially about the psychology of childhood. I hope to accomplish this task in the following manner:—
When you honored me with an invitation to speak at Clark University, it was requested that I discuss my work methods, particularly the psychology of childhood. I hope to achieve this in the following way:—
In my first lecture I will give to you the view points of my association methods; in my second I will discuss the significance of the familiar constellations; while in my third lecture I shall enter more fully into the psychology of the child.
In my first lecture, I will share the perspectives of my association methods; in my second, I will discuss the importance of familiar constellations; and in my third lecture, I will delve deeper into child psychology.
I might confine myself exclusively to my theoretical views, but I believe it will be better to illustrate my lectures with as many practical examples as possible. We will therefore occupy ourselves first with the association test which has been of great value to me both practically and theoretically. The history of the association method in vogue in psychology, as well as the method itself, is, of course, so familiar to you that there is no need to enlarge upon it. For practical purposes I make use of the following formula:—
I could stick to just my theoretical ideas, but I think it's better to support my lectures with as many practical examples as I can. So, we'll start with the association test, which has been very helpful to me both in practice and theory. The history of the association method used in psychology, as well as the method itself, is obviously well-known to you, so there's no need to go into detail about it. For practical purposes, I use the following formula:—
- 1. head
- 2. green
- 3. water
- 4. to sing
- 5. dead
- 6. long
- 7. ship
- 8. to pay
- 9. window
- 10. friendly
- 11. to cook
- 12. to ask
- 13. cold
- 14. stem
- 15. to dance
- 16. village
- 17. lake
- 18. sick
- 19. pride
- 20. to cook
- 21. ink
- 22. angry
- 23. needle
- 24. to swim
- 25. voyage
- 26. blue
- 27. lamp
- 28. to sin
- 29. bread
- 30. rich
- 31. tree
- 32. to prick
- 33. pity
- 34. yellow
- 35. mountain
- 36. to die
- 37. salt
- 38. new
- 39. custom
- 40. to pray
- 41. money
- 42. foolish
- 43. pamphlet
- 44. despise
- 45. finger
- 46. expensive
- 47. bird
- 48. to fall
- 49. book
- 50. unjust
- 51. frog
- 52. to part
- 53. hunger
- 54. white
- 55. child
- 56. to take care
- 57. lead pencil
- 58. sad
- 59. plum
- 60. to marry
- 61. house
- 62. dear
- 63. glass
- 64. to quarrel
- 65. fur
- 66. big
- 67. carrot
- 68. to paint
- 69. part
- 70. old
- 71. flower
- 72. to beat
- 73. box
- 74. wild
- 75. family
- 76. to wash
- 77. cow
- 78. friend
- 79. luck
- 80. lie
- 81. deportment
- 82. narrow
- 83. brother
- 84. to fear
- 85. stork
- 86. false
- 87. anxiety
- 88. to kiss
- 89. bride
- 90. pure
- 91. door
- 92. to choose
- 93. hay
- 94. contented
- 95. ridicule
- 96. to sleep
- 97. month
- 98. nice
- 99. woman
- 100. to abuse
This formula has been constructed after many years of experience. The words are chosen and partially arranged in such a manner as to strike easily almost all complexes which occur in practice. As shown above, there is a regulated mixing of the grammatical qualities of the words. For this there are definite reasons.[126]
This formula has been developed after many years of experience. The words are selected and partly organized in a way that effectively addresses nearly all issues encountered in practice. As mentioned before, there is a controlled blending of the grammatical features of the words. There are specific reasons for this.[126]
Before the experiment begins the test person receives the following instruction: "Answer as quickly as possible with the first word that occurs to your mind." This instruction is so simple that it can easily be followed. The work itself, moreover, appears extremely easy, so that it might be expected any one could accomplish it with the greatest facility and promptitude. But, contrary to expectation, the behaviour is quite otherwise.
Before the experiment starts, the participant is given this instruction: "Respond as quickly as you can with the first word that comes to mind." This instruction is so straightforward that it can easily be followed. The task itself also seems really simple, so one might assume that anyone could do it with great ease and speed. However, unexpectedly, the behavior is quite different.
I.—An Example of a Normal Reaction Type.
I.—An Example of a Typical Reaction Type.
Stimulus word. | Reaction Time. Unit 0·2 second. | Reaction. | Reproduction. |
---|---|---|---|
head | 9 | foot | part of the body |
green | 11 | blouse | |
water | 14 | clear | light |
to sing | 6 | children | |
dead | 11 | do not like | |
long | 6 | short | I, tall |
ship | 7 | forth | |
to pay | 9 | bills | |
window | 9 | room | |
friendly | 10 | children | |
table | 9 | chair | room |
to ask | 10 | all kinds | |
cold | 7 | warm | |
stem | 6 | flower | |
to dance | 9 | I . . | like |
lake | 8 | Zürich | |
sick | 8 | sister | |
pride | 6 | people | |
to cook | 7 | woman | |
ink | 5 | black | |
angry | 10 | children | people |
needle | 9 | to prick | |
to swim | 10 | healthy | |
voyage | 9 | England | |
blue | 10 | pretty | like |
lamp | 6 | light | |
to sin | 8 | much | people |
bread | 10 | good | like, necessary |
rich | 9 | nice | |
tree | 6 | green | |
to prick | 9 | need |
II.—An Example of an Hysterical Reaction Type.
II.—An Example of a Hysterical Reaction Type.
Stimulus word. | Reaction Time. Unit 0·2 second. | Reaction. | Reproduction. |
---|---|---|---|
needle | 7 | to sew | |
to swim | 9 | water | ship [127] |
[128] | |||
voyage | 35 | to ride, motion, voyager | |
blue | 10 | colour | |
lamp | 7 | to burn | |
to sin | 22 | this idea is totally | |
strange to me, I do not | |||
recognize it | |||
bread | 10 | to eat | |
rich[129] | 50 | money, I don't know | possession |
brown | 6 | nature | green |
to prick | 9 | needle | |
pity | 12 | feeling | |
yellow | 9 | colour | |
mountain | 8 | high | |
to die | 8 | to perish | |
salt | 15 | salty (laughs) I don't | |
know | NaCl | ||
new | 15 | old | as an opposite |
custom | 10 | good | barbaric |
to pray | 12 | Deity | |
money | 10 | wealth | |
foolish | 12 | narrow minded, restricted | |
pamphlet | 10 | paper | |
despise | 30 | that is a complicated, too | |
foolish | |||
finger | 8 | hand, not only hand, but | |
also foot, a joint, | |||
member, extremity | |||
dear | 14 | to pay (laughs) | |
bird | 8 | to fly | |
to fall | 30 | _tomber_, I will say no | |
more, what do you | |||
mean by fall? | |||
book | 6 | to read | |
unjust | 8 | just | |
frog | 11 | quack | |
to part | 30 | what does that mean? | |
hunger | 10 | to eat | |
white | 12 | colour, everything | |
possible, light | |||
child | 10 | little, I did not hear | |
well, _bébé_ | |||
to take care | 14 | attention | |
lead pencil | 8 | to draw, everything | |
possible can be drawn | |||
sad | 9 | to weep, that is not | to be |
always the case | |||
plum | 16 | to eat a plum, pluck what | fruit |
do you mean by it? Is | |||
that symbolic? | |||
to marry | 27 | how can you? reunion, union | union, alliance |
The following diagrams illustrate the reaction times in an association experiment in four normal test-persons. The height of each column denotes the length of the reaction time.
The following diagrams show the reaction times in an association experiment involving four normal participants. The height of each column represents the length of the reaction time.

Fig. 4.
Fig. 4.

Fig. 5.
Fig. 5.

Fig. 6.
Fig. 6.

Fig. 7.
Fig. 7.
The succeeding diagram shows the course of the reaction time in hysterical individuals. The light cross-hatched columns denote the places where the test-person was unable to react (so-called failures to react).
The following diagram illustrates the reaction time in anxious individuals. The light cross-hatched columns indicate the instances where the test subject was unable to respond (referred to as failures to react).

Fig. 8.
Fig. 8.

Fig. 9.
Fig. 9.

Fig. 10.
Fig. 10.
The first thing that strikes us is the fact that many test-persons show a marked prolongation of the reaction time. This would seem to be suggestive of intellectual difficulties,—wrongly however, for we are often dealing with very intelligent persons of fluent speech. The explanation lies rather in the emotions. In order to understand the matter, comprehensively, we must bear in mind that the association experiments cannot deal with a separated psychic function,[100] for any psychic occurrence is never a thing in itself, but is always the resultant of the entire psychological past. The association experiment, too, is not merely a method for the reproduction of separated word couplets, but it is a kind of pastime, a conversation between experimenter and test-person. In a certain sense it is still more than that. Words really represent condensed actions, situations, and things. When I[101] give a stimulus word to the test-person, which denotes an action, it is as if I represented to him the action itself, and asked him, "How do you behave towards it? What do you think of it? What would you do in this situation?" If I were a magician, I should cause the situation corresponding to the stimulus word to appear in reality, and placing the test-person in its midst, I should then study his manner of reaction. The result of my stimulus words would thus undoubtedly approach infinitely nearer perfection. But as we are not magicians, we must be contented with the linguistic substitutes for reality; at the same time we must not forget that the stimulus word will almost without exception conjure up its corresponding situation. All depends[102] on how the test-person reacts to this situation. The word "bride" or "bridegroom" will not evoke a simple reaction in a young lady; but the reaction will be deeply influenced by the strong feeling tones evoked, the more so if the experimenter be a man. It thus happens that the test-person is often unable to react quickly and smoothly to all stimulus words. There are certain stimulus words which denote actions, situations, or things, about which the test-person cannot think quickly and surely, and this fact is demonstrated in the association experiments. The examples which I have just given show an abundance of long reaction times and other disturbances. In this case the reaction to the stimulus word is in some way impeded, that is, the adaptation to the stimulus word is disturbed. The stimulus words therefore act upon us just as reality acts; indeed, a person who shows such great disturbances to the stimulus words, is in a certain sense but imperfectly adapted to reality. Disease itself is an imperfect adaptation; hence in this case we are dealing with something morbid in the psyche,—with something which is either temporarily or persistently pathological in character, that is, we are dealing with a psychoneurosis, with a functional disturbance of the mind. This rule, however, as we shall see later, is not without its exceptions.
The first thing that stands out to us is that many test subjects display a noticeable increase in reaction time. This might suggest intellectual difficulties, but that's misleading because we often work with very intelligent individuals who communicate well. The explanation actually lies in their emotions. To fully understand this, we need to remember that association experiments can't focus on an isolated psychological function,[100] since any psychological event is never just a standalone occurrence, but always the result of the person’s entire psychological history. The association experiment isn't just a way to reproduce separate word pairs; it's more like a game, a dialogue between the experimenter and the test subject. In a way, it's even more than that. Words are really condensed actions, situations, and objects. When I[101] provide a stimulus word to the test subject that represents an action, it’s as if I'm presenting the action itself and asking, "How do you react to it? What do you think about it? What would you do in this situation?" If I were a magician, I would make the situation related to the stimulus word come to life; putting the test subject in the middle of it, I would then observe their reaction. The outcome of my stimulus words would likely be much more accurate that way. However, since we’re not magicians, we must settle for the linguistic substitutes for reality; at the same time, we shouldn't forget that the stimulus word will almost always evoke its corresponding situation. Everything depends[102] on how the test subject responds to this situation. The word "bride" or "bridegroom" won’t provoke a simple response from a young woman; instead, her reaction will be deeply affected by the intense feelings that come up, especially if the experimenter is a man. Therefore, it’s common for the test subject to struggle to respond quickly and smoothly to every stimulus word. There are specific stimulus words that refer to actions, situations, or things that the test subject can't think about quickly and confidently, and this is shown in the association experiments. The examples I’ve just given demonstrate a lot of long reaction times and other disruptions. In these cases, the reaction to the stimulus word is somehow hindered, meaning the adaptation to the stimulus word is disturbed. The stimulus words thus impact us just like reality does; in fact, a person who shows significant disruptions to the stimulus words is, in a way, not entirely well adapted to reality. Illness itself represents imperfect adaptation; thus, we’re dealing with something unhealthy in the psyche—something that is either temporarily or permanently pathological, meaning we’re looking at a psychoneurosis, a functional disturbance of the mind. However, as we will see later, this rule does have some exceptions.
Let us, in the first place, continue the discussion concerning the prolonged reaction time. It often happens that the test-person actually does not know what to answer to the stimulus word. He waives any reaction, and for the moment he totally fails to obey the original instructions, and shows himself incapable of adapting himself to the experimenter. If this phenomenon occurs frequently in an experiment, it signifies a high degree of disturbance in adjustment. I would call attention to the fact that it is quite indifferent what reason the test-person gives for the refusal. Some find that too many ideas suddenly occur to them; others, that they suffer from a deficiency of ideas. In most cases, however, the difficulties first perceived are so deterrent that they actually give up the whole reaction. The following example shows a case of hysteria with many failures of reaction:—
Let’s first continue the discussion about prolonged reaction time. It often happens that the participant really does not know how to respond to the stimulus word. They hesitate to react, and for a moment, they completely fail to follow the original instructions, showing they can’t adjust to the experimenter. If this happens frequently in an experiment, it indicates a high level of difficulty in adjusting. I’d like to point out that it doesn’t really matter what reason the participant gives for their refusal. Some say that too many thoughts suddenly come to mind; others claim they lack ideas altogether. However, in most cases, the challenges they first encounter are so overwhelming that they completely abandon the reaction. The following example illustrates a case of hysteria with many failed reactions:—
Stimulus word. | Reaction Time. Unit 0·2 second. | Reaction. | Reproduction. |
---|---|---|---|
to sing | 9 | nice | +[130] |
dead | 15 | awful | ? |
long[131] | 40 | the time, the journey | ? |
ship[132] | + | ||
to pay | 11 | money | |
window | 10 | big | high |
friendly | 50 | a man | human |
to cook | 10 | soup | + |
ink | 9 | black or blue | + |
angry | bad | ||
needle | 9 | to sew | + |
lamp | 14 | light | + |
to sin | |||
bread | 15 | to eat | + |
rich[133][134] | 40 | good, convenient | + |
yellow | 18 | paper | colour |
mountain | 10 | high | + |
to die | 15 | awful | + |
salt[135] | 25 | salty | + |
new | good, nice | ||
custom[136] | |||
to pray | |||
money[137] | 35 | to buy, one is able | + |
pamphlet | 16 | to write | + |
to despise[138] | 22 | people | + |
finger | |||
dear | 12 | thing | + |
bird | 12 | sings or flies | + |
In example II. we find a characteristic phenomenon. The test-person is not content with the requirements of the instruction, that is, she is not satisfied with one word, but reacts with many words. She apparently does more and better than the instruction requires, but in so doing she does not fulfil the requirements of the instruction. Thus she reacts:—custom—good—barbaric; foolish—narrow minded—restricted; family—big—small—everything possible.
In example II, we see a typical phenomenon. The test subject isn't satisfied with the instruction's requirements; in other words, she doesn't settle for one word but responds with many words. She seems to do more and better than what the instruction asks for, but in doing so, she doesn't meet the instruction's requirements. Her responses include:—custom—good—barbaric; foolish—narrow-minded—restricted; family—big—small—everything possible.
These examples show in the first place that many other words connect themselves with the reaction word. The test person is unable to suppress the ideas which subsequently occur to her. She also pursues a certain tendency which[104] perhaps is more exactly expressed in the following reaction: new—old—as an opposite. The addition of "as an opposite" denotes that the test-person has the desire to add something explanatory or supplementary. This tendency is also shown in the following reaction: finger—not only hand, also foot—a limb—member—extremity.
These examples first demonstrate that many other words are connected to the response word. The test subject is unable to suppress the ideas that come to her mind afterward. She also follows a specific tendency which[104] might be more accurately expressed in the following response: new—old—as opposites. The addition of "as opposites" indicates that the test subject wants to include something explanatory or supplementary. This tendency is also evident in the next response: finger—not just hand, also foot—a limb—member—extremity.
Here we have a whole series of supplements. It seems as if the reaction were not sufficient for the test-person, something else must always be added, as if what has already been said were incorrect or in some way imperfect. This feeling is what Janet designates the "sentiment d'incomplétude," but this by no means explains everything. I go somewhat deeply into this phenomenon because it is very frequently met with in neurotic individuals. It is not merely a small and unimportant subsidiary manifestation demonstrable in an insignificant experiment, but rather an elemental and universal manifestation which plays a rôle in other ways in the psychic life of neurotics.
Here we have a whole series of supplements. It seems like the reaction isn’t enough for the person being tested; there’s always something else that needs to be added, as if what has already been said is incorrect or somehow incomplete. This feeling is what Janet calls the "sentiment d'incomplétude," but that doesn’t fully explain everything. I delve into this phenomenon because it’s very common among neurotic individuals. It’s not just a minor and unimportant side effect shown in a trivial experiment, but rather a fundamental and universal manifestation that plays a rôle in other ways within the mental life of neurotics.
By his desire to supplement, the test-person betrays a tendency to give the experimenter more than he wants, he actually makes great efforts to find further mental occurrences in order finally to discover something quite satisfactory. If we translate this observation into the psychology of everyday life, it signifies that the test-person has a constant tendency to give to others more feeling than is required and expected. According to Freud, this is a sign of a reinforced object-libido, that is, it is a compensation for an inner want of satisfaction and voidness of feeling. This elementary observation therefore displays one of the characteristics of hysterics, namely, the tendency to allow themselves to be carried away by everything, to attach themselves enthusiastically to everything, and always to promise too much and hence perform too little. Patients with this symptom are, in my experience, always hard to deal with; at first they are enthusiastically enamoured of the physician, for a time going so far as to accept everything he says blindly; but they soon merge into an equally blind resistance against him, thus rendering any educative influence absolutely impossible.
By wanting to add more, the test subject tends to give the experimenter more information than needed. They actually put in a lot of effort to uncover additional thoughts, hoping to find something truly satisfying. If we relate this observation to everyday psychology, it means the test subject consistently tends to express more emotions than what’s necessary or expected by others. According to Freud, this indicates a heightened object-libido, serving as a compensation for an inner craving for fulfillment and a lack of emotional contentment. This basic observation highlights one of the traits of hysterics, specifically their tendency to get carried away with everything, to enthusiastically attach themselves to various things, and to always overpromise, resulting in underperformance. In my experience, patients with this symptom are often difficult to manage; at first, they are passionately taken with the physician, sometimes accepting everything he says without question; however, they quickly transition into a similar blind resistance against him, making any teaching influence completely impossible.
We see therefore in this type of reaction an expression of a tendency to give more than is asked or expected. This tendency betrays itself also in other failures to follow the instruction:—
We can observe in this type of reaction a tendency to give more than what is asked or expected. This tendency also shows itself in other failures to follow the instructions:—
to quarrel—angry—different things—I always quarrel at home;
to marry—how can you marry?—reunion—union;
plum—to eat—to pluck—what do you mean by it?—is it symbolic?
to sin—this idea is quite strange to me, I do not recognise it.to argue—angry—different issues—I always argue at home;
to get married—how can you get married?—coming together—union;
plum—to eat—to pick—what do you mean by that?—is it symbolic?
to sin—this idea is really strange to me, I don't understand it.
These reactions show that the test-person gets away altogether from the situation of the experiment. For the instruction was, that he should answer only with the first word which occurs to him. But here we note that the stimulus words act with excessive strength, that they are taken as if they were direct personal questions. The test-person entirely forgets that we deal with mere words which stand in print before us, but finds a personal meaning in them; he tries to divine their intention and defend himself against them, thus altogether forgetting the original instructions.
These reactions show that the test subject completely disconnects from the experiment's situation. The instruction was for them to respond with the first word that comes to mind. However, we notice that the stimulus words have an overwhelming effect, being interpreted as direct personal questions. The test subject entirely forgets that these are just printed words in front of them and instead finds personal meaning in them; they try to figure out the intent behind the words and defend themselves against them, completely overlooking the original instructions.
This elementary observation discloses another common peculiarity of hysterics, namely, that of taking everything personally, of never being able to remain objective, and of allowing themselves to be carried away by momentary impressions; this again shows the characteristics of the enhanced object-libido.
This basic observation reveals another common trait of hysterics: they take everything personally, struggle to stay objective, and easily get swept up by their immediate feelings. This also illustrates the features of heightened object-libido.
Yet another sign of impeded adaptation is the often occurring repetition of the stimulus words. The test-persons repeat the stimulus word as if they had not heard or understood it distinctly. They repeat it just as we repeat a difficult question in order to grasp it better before answering. This same tendency is shown in the experiment. The questions are repeated because the stimulus words act on hysterical individuals in much the same way as difficult personal questions. In principle it is the same phenomenon as the subsequent completion of the reaction.
Yet another sign of hindered adaptation is the frequent repetition of the stimulus words. The participants repeat the stimulus word as if they haven’t heard or understood it clearly. They do this just like we repeat a tough question to better grasp it before responding. This same behavior appears in the experiment. The questions are repeated because the stimulus words affect hysterical individuals similarly to challenging personal questions. Essentially, it’s the same phenomenon as the later completion of the reaction.
In many experiments we observe that the same reaction constantly reappears to the most varied stimulus words. These words seem to possess a special reproduction tendency, and it is very interesting to examine their relationship to the test-person. For example, I have observed a case in which the patient repeated the word "short" a great many times and often in places where it had no meaning. The test-person could not directly state the reason for the repetition of the word "short." From experience I knew that such predicates always relate either to the test-person himself or to the person nearest to him. I assumed that in this word "short" he designated himself, and that in this way he helped to express something very painful to him. The test-person is of very small stature. He is the youngest of four brothers, who, in contrast to himself, are all tall. He was always the "child" in the family; he was nicknamed "Short" and was treated by all as the "little one." This resulted in a total loss of self-confidence. Although he was intelligent, and despite long study, he could not decide to present himself for examination; he finally became impotent, and merged into a psychosis in which, whenever he was alone, he took delight in walking about in his room on his toes in order to appear taller. The word "short," therefore, stood to him for a great many painful experiences. This is usually the case with the perseverated words; they always contain something of importance for the individual psychology of the test-person.
In many experiments, we notice that the same reaction consistently shows up in response to a wide range of stimulus words. These words seem to have a unique tendency to be repeated, and it's quite interesting to explore their connection to the individual being tested. For instance, I've observed a case where the patient kept repeating the word "short" many times, often in situations where it didn't make sense. The individual couldn't directly explain why they kept saying "short." From experience, I knew that such repeated words usually relate either to the person themselves or to someone close to them. I suspected that by saying "short," he was referring to himself, which helped him express something very painful. The person is quite short in stature. He is the youngest of four brothers, all of whom are tall in comparison to him. He was always seen as the "child" in the family; he was nicknamed "Short" and treated as the "little one" by everyone. This led to a complete loss of self-confidence. Even though he was intelligent and had studied for a long time, he couldn't bring himself to present for examination; eventually, he became impotent and fell into a psychosis where, whenever he was alone, he found pleasure in walking around his room on his toes to seem taller. So, the word "short" represented many painful experiences for him. This is often the case with words that are repeated; they usually carry significant meaning for the individual psychology of the person being tested.
The signs thus far discussed are not found spread about in an arbitrary way through the whole experiment, but are seen in very definite places, namely, where the stimulus words strike against emotionally accentuated complexes. This observation is the foundation of the so-called "diagnosis of facts" (Tatbestandsdiagnostik). This method is employed to discover, by means of an association experiment, which is the culprit among a number of persons suspected of a crime. That this is possible I will demonstrate by the brief recital of a concrete case.
The signs we've talked about so far aren't scattered randomly throughout the experiment; they appear in very specific spots, particularly where the stimulus words interact with emotionally charged complexes. This observation forms the basis of what's called "diagnosis of facts" (Tatbestandsdiagnostik). This method is used to identify, through an association experiment, who is the culprit among several people suspected of a crime. I'll show that this is possible by briefly recounting a specific case.
On the 6th of February, 1908, our supervisor reported to[107] me that a nurse complained to her of having been robbed during the forenoon of the previous day. The facts were as follows: The nurse kept her money, amounting to 70 francs, in a pocket-book which she had placed in her cupboard where she also kept her clothes. The cupboard contained two compartments, of which one belonged to the nurse who was robbed, and the other to the head nurse. These two nurses and a third one, who was an intimate friend of the head nurse, slept in the room where the cupboard was. This room was in a section which was occupied in common by six nurses who had at all times free access to the room. Given such a state of affairs it is not to be wondered that the supervisor shrugged her shoulders when I asked her whom she most suspected.
On February 6, 1908, our supervisor told me that a nurse had complained about being robbed the day before in the morning. Here’s what happened: The nurse kept her money, totaling 70 francs, in a wallet that she had placed in her cupboard, which also held her clothes. The cupboard had two sections; one belonged to the robbed nurse, and the other to the head nurse. The two nurses and a third nurse, who was a close friend of the head nurse, slept in the room where the cupboard was located. This room was shared by six nurses who always had free access to it. Given this situation, it’s no surprise that the supervisor just shrugged when I asked her whom she suspected the most.
Further investigation showed that on the day of the theft, the above-mentioned friend of the head nurse was slightly indisposed and remained the whole morning in the room in bed. Hence, unless she herself was the thief, the theft could have taken place only in the afternoon. Of four other nurses upon whom suspicion could possibly fall, there was one who attended regularly to the cleaning of the room in question, while the remaining three had nothing to do in it, nor was it shown that any of them had spent any time there on the previous day.
Further investigation revealed that on the day of the theft, the aforementioned friend of the head nurse was feeling a bit unwell and stayed in bed all morning. Therefore, unless she was the thief herself, the theft could only have happened in the afternoon. Of the four other nurses who could potentially be suspects, one regularly cleaned the room in question, while the other three had no involvement in it, nor was there any evidence that they had spent time there the day before.
It was therefore natural that the last three nurses should be regarded for the time being as less implicated, so I began by subjecting the first three to the experiment.
It made sense to consider the last three nurses as less involved for now, so I started by putting the first three through the experiment.
From the information I had obtained of the case, I knew that the cupboard was locked but that the key was kept near by in a very conspicuous place, that on opening the cupboard the first thing which would strike the eye was a fur boa, and, moreover, that the pocket-book was between some linen in an inconspicuous place. The pocket-book was of dark reddish leather, and contained the following objects: a 50-franc banknote, a 20-franc piece, some centimes, a small silver watch-chain, a stencil used in the lunatic asylum to mark the kitchen utensils, and a small receipt from Dosenbach's shoeshop in Zürich.
Based on the information I gathered about the case, I knew the cupboard was locked, but the key was conveniently placed nearby. When you opened the cupboard, the first thing that would catch your eye was a fur boa, and the pocketbook was hidden among some linens in a less obvious spot. The pocketbook was made of dark reddish leather and contained the following items: a 50-franc banknote, a 20-franc coin, some change, a small silver watch chain, a stencil used at the mental asylum to label kitchen utensils, and a small receipt from Dosenbach's shoe shop in Zürich.
Besides the plaintiff, only the head nurse knew the exact particulars of the deed, for as soon as the former missed her money she immediately asked the head nurse to help her find it, thus the head nurse had been able to learn the smallest details, which naturally rendered the experiment still more difficult, for she was precisely the one most suspected. The conditions for the experiment were better for the others, since they knew nothing concerning the particulars of the deed, and some not even that a theft had been committed. As critical stimulus words I selected the name of the robbed nurse, plus the following words: cupboard, door, open, key, yesterday, banknote, gold, 70, 50, 20, money, watch, pocket-book, chain, silver, to hide, fur, dark reddish, leather, centimes, stencil, receipt, Dosenbach. Besides these words which referred directly to the deed, I took also the following, which had a special effective value: theft, to take, to steal, suspicion, blame, court, police, to lie, to fear, to discover, to arrest, innocent.
Besides the plaintiff, only the head nurse knew the exact details of what happened. As soon as the plaintiff realized her money was missing, she immediately asked the head nurse to help her find it. This allowed the head nurse to learn all the small details, which made the experiment even more challenging since she was the one most suspected. The conditions for the experiment were better for the others, as they knew nothing about the particulars of the incident, and some didn’t even know a theft had occurred. For the critical stimulus words, I selected the name of the robbed nurse, along with the following words: cupboard, door, open, key, yesterday, banknote, gold, 70, 50, 20, money, watch, pocketbook, chain, silver, to hide, fur, dark reddish, leather, centimes, stencil, receipt, Dosenbach. In addition to these words that referred directly to the incident, I also included the following, which had a particular impact: theft, to take, to steal, suspicion, blame, court, police, to lie, to fear, to discover, to arrest, innocent.
The objection is often made to the last species of words that they may produce a strong affective resentment even in innocent persons, and for that reason one cannot attribute to them any comparative value. Nevertheless, it may always be questioned whether the affective resentment of an innocent person will have the same effect on the association as that of a guilty one, and that question can only be authoritatively answered by experience. Until the contrary is demonstrated, I maintain that words of the above-mentioned type may profitably be used.
The argument is often raised about the last type of words, claiming they can trigger strong emotional reactions even in innocent people, and because of this, they shouldn't be given any relative value. Still, it can always be questioned whether an innocent person's emotional reaction will have the same impact on associations as that of someone guilty, and that question can only be definitively answered through experience. Until proven otherwise, I believe that words of the type mentioned above can be used beneficially.
I distributed these critical words among twice as many indifferent stimulus words in such a manner that each critical word was followed by two indifferent ones. As a rule it is well to follow up the critical words by indifferent words in order that the action of the first may be clearly distinguished. But one may also follow up one critical word by another, especially if one wishes to bring into relief the action of the second. Thus I placed together "darkish red" and "leather," and "chain" and "silver."
I spread these important words among twice as many neutral words so that each important word was followed by two neutral ones. Generally, it’s better to follow important words with neutral ones to make the first one's meaning clear. But you can also put one important word after another, especially if you want to highlight the second one. For example, I put together "darkish red" and "leather," and "chain" and "silver."
After this preparatory work I undertook the experiment[109] with the three above-mentioned nurses. Following the order of the experiment, I shall denote the friend of the head nurse by the letter A, the head nurse by B, and the nurse who attended to the cleaning of the room by C. As examinations of this kind can be rendered into a foreign tongue only with the greatest difficulty, I will content myself with presenting the general results, and with giving some examples. I first undertook the experiment with A, and judging by the circumstances she appeared only slightly moved. B was next examined; she showed marked excitement, her pulse being 120 per minute immediately after the experiment. The last to be examined was C. She was the most tranquil of the three; she displayed but little embarrassment, and only in the course of the experiment did it occur to her that she was suspected of stealing, a fact which manifestly disturbed her towards the end of the experiment.
After this preparatory work, I conducted the experiment[109] with the three nurses mentioned earlier. Following the order of the experiment, I’ll refer to the head nurse’s friend as A, the head nurse as B, and the nurse responsible for cleaning the room as C. Since these kinds of examinations are really hard to translate accurately into another language, I will just present the general results and provide some examples. I first conducted the experiment with A, and from the circumstances, she seemed only slightly affected. B was examined next; she displayed significant excitement, with her pulse at 120 beats per minute immediately after the experiment. The last to be examined was C. She was the calmest of the three; she showed minimal embarrassment, and it only occurred to her during the experiment that she was suspected of stealing, which clearly upset her towards the end of the experiment.
The general impression from the examination spoke strongly against the head nurse B. It seemed to me that she evinced a very "suspicious," or I might almost say, "impudent" countenance. With the definite idea of finding in her the guilty one I set about adding up the results. You will see that I was wrong in my surmise and that the test proved my error.
The overall impression from the examination strongly pointed to head nurse B. It seemed to me that she had a very "suspicious," or I could almost say, "brazen" expression. With the clear intention of finding her as the guilty party, I started tallying the results. You'll see that I was mistaken in my assumption and that the test confirmed my error.
One can make use of many special methods of computing, but they are not all equally good and equally exact. (One must always resort to calculation, as appearances are enormously deceptive.) The method which is most to be recommended is that of the probable average of the reaction time. It shows at a glance the difficulties which the person in the experiment had to overcome in the reaction.
One can use various special methods of calculation, but not all of them are equally effective or accurate. (You should always rely on calculations, as appearances can be very misleading.) The method that is most recommended is the probable average of the reaction time. It clearly illustrates the challenges that the person in the experiment had to overcome in their reaction.
The technique of this calculation is very simple. The probable average is the middle number of the various reaction times arranged in a series. The reaction times are, for example,[139] placed in the following manner: 5, 5, 5, 7, 7, 7, 7, 8, 9, 9, 9, 12, 13, 14. The number found in the middle (8) is the probable average of this series.
The method for this calculation is very straightforward. The probable average is the middle number of the different reaction times arranged in a sequence. The reaction times are, for example,[139] organized like this: 5, 5, 5, 7, 7, 7, 7, 8, 9, 9, 9, 12, 13, 14. The number in the middle (8) is the probable average of this series.
The probable averages of the reaction are:
The likely averages of the reaction are:
A | B | C |
10·0 | 12·0 | 13·5. |
No conclusions can be drawn from this result. But the average reaction times calculated separately for the indifferent reactions, for the critical, and for those immediately following the critical (post-critical) are more interesting.
No conclusions can be drawn from this result. However, the average reaction times calculated separately for the indifferent reactions, the critical reactions, and those immediately after the critical (post-critical) are more interesting.
From this example we see that whereas A has the shortest reaction time for the indifferent reactions, she shows in comparison to the other two persons of the experiment, the longest time for the critical reactions.
From this example, we see that while A has the shortest reaction time for the indifferent reactions, she has the longest time for the critical reactions compared to the other two participants in the experiment.
The Probable Average of the Reaction Time.
The Likely Average Reaction Time.
for | A | B | C |
---|---|---|---|
Indifferent reactions | 10·0 | 11·0 | 12·0 |
Critical reactions | 16·0 | 13·0 | 15·0 |
Post-critical reactions | 10·0 | 11·0 | 13·0 |
The difference between the reaction times, let us say between the indifferent and the critical, is 6 for A, 2 for B, and 3 for C, that is, it is more than double for A when compared with the other two persons.
The difference in reaction times, let’s say between the indifferent and the critical, is 6 for A, 2 for B, and 3 for C. This means A’s reaction time is more than double that of the other two people.
In the same way we can calculate how many complex indicators there are on an average for the indifferent, critical, etc., reactions.
In the same way, we can calculate how many complex indicators there are on average for indifferent, critical, etc., reactions.
The Average Complex-Indicators for each Reaction.
The Average Complex Indicators for each Reaction.
for | A | B | C |
---|---|---|---|
Indifferent reactions | 0·6 | 0·9 | 0·8 |
Critical reactions | 1·3 | 0·9 | 1·2 |
Post-critical reactions | 0·6 | 1·0 | 0·8 |
The difference between the indifferent and critical reactions for A = 0·7, for B = 0, for C = 0·4. A is again the highest.
The difference between the indifferent and critical reactions for A = 0.7, for B = 0, for C = 0.4. A is once again the highest.
Another question to consider is, the proportion of imperfect reactions in each case.
Another question to think about is the percentage of imperfect reactions in each case.
The result for A = 34%, for B = 28%, and for C = 30%.
The results are A = 34%, B = 28%, and C = 30%.
Here, too, A reaches the highest value, and in this, I believe, we see the characteristic moment of the guilt-complex in A. I am, however, unable to explain here circumstantially the reasons why I maintain that memory errors are related to an emotional complex, as this would lead me beyond the limits of the present work. I therefore refer the reader to my work "Ueber die Reproductionsstörrungen im Associationsexperiment" (IX Beitrag der Diagnost. Associat. Studien).[140]
Here, too, A reaches the highest value, and in this, I believe we see the defining moment of the guilt complex in A. However, I'm unable to explain in detail why I think memory errors are connected to an emotional complex, as that would take me beyond the scope of this work. I therefore refer the reader to my work "Ueber die Reproductionsstörrungen im Associationsexperiment" (IX Beitrag der Diagnost. Associat. Studien).[140]
As it often happens that an association of strong feeling tone produces in the experiment a perseveration, with the result that not only the critical association, but also two or three successive associations are imperfectly reproduced, it will be very interesting to see how many imperfect reproductions are so arranged in the series in our cases. The result of computation shows that the imperfect reproductions thus arranged in series are for A 64·7%, for B 55·5%, and for C 30·0%.
As is often the case, a strong emotional tone can lead to a repeated response in an experiment, resulting in not just the main association being recalled, but also two or three related associations being recalled imperfectly. It will be interesting to analyze how many of these imperfect reproductions are organized in the sequence in our cases. The calculations reveal that the imperfect reproductions arranged in series are 64.7% for A, 55.5% for B, and 30.0% for C.
Again we find that A has the greatest percentage. To be sure, this may partially depend on the fact that A also possesses the greatest number of imperfect reproductions. Given a small number of reactions, it is usual that the greater the total number of the same, the more the imperfect reactions will occur in groups. But this cannot account for the high proportion in our case, where, on the other hand, B and C have not a much smaller number of imperfect reactions when compared to A. It is significant that C with her slight emotions during the experiment shows the minimum of imperfect reproductions arranged in series.
Again, we see that A has the highest percentage. This may partly be due to the fact that A also has the highest number of imperfect reproductions. With a small number of reactions, it's typical that the more total reactions there are, the more imperfect reactions will happen in groups. However, this doesn't explain the high proportion in our case, where B and C have a fairly similar number of imperfect reactions compared to A. It's noteworthy that C, who shows slight emotions during the experiment, has the least amount of imperfect reproductions arranged in series.
As imperfect reproductions are also complex indicators, it is necessary to see how they distribute themselves in respect to the indifferent, critical, etc., reactions.
As flawed reproductions are also complicated signals, it's important to observe how they relate to indifferent, critical, and other reactions.
It is hardly necessary to bring into prominence the differences between the indifferent and the critical reactions[112] of the various subjects as shown by the resulting numbers of the table. In this respect, too, A occupies first place.
It’s unnecessary to highlight the differences between the indifferent and critical reactions[112] of the different subjects as indicated by the numbers in the table. In this regard, A is still in the top spot.
Imperfect Reproductions which Occur.
Imperfect reproductions that happen.
in | A | B | C |
---|---|---|---|
Indifferent reactions | 10 | 12 | 11 |
Critical reactions | 19 | 9 | 12 |
Post-critical reactions | 5 | 7 | 7 |
Naturally, here, too, there is a probability that the greater the number of the imperfect reproductions the greater is their number in the critical reactions. If we suppose that the imperfect reproductions are distributed regularly and without choice, among all the reactions, there will be a greater number of them for A (in comparison with B and C) even as reactions to critical words, since A has the greater number of imperfect reproductions. Admitting such a uniform distribution of the imperfect reproductions, it is easy to calculate how many we ought to expect to belong to each individual kind of reaction.
Naturally, there’s also a chance that the more imperfect reproductions there are, the more there will be in the critical reactions. If we assume that the imperfect reproductions are spread evenly and randomly among all the reactions, there will be more of them for A (compared to B and C) as responses to critical words, since A has more imperfect reproductions. Accepting this even distribution of imperfect reproductions, we can easily figure out how many we should expect to belong to each individual type of reaction.
From this calculation it appears that the disturbances of reproductions which concern the critical reactions for A greatly surpass the number expected, for C they are 0·9 higher, while for B they are lower.
From this calculation, it looks like the issues with reproductions that relate to the critical reactions for A are significantly higher than expected. For C, they are 0.9 higher, while for B, they are lower.
Imperfect Reproductions.
Imperfect Copies.
Which may be expected | Which really occur | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
For | Indifferent Reactions. | Critical Reactions. | Post-critical Reactions. |
Indifferent Reactions. | Critical Reactions. | Post-critical Reactions. |
A | 11·2 | 12·5 | 10·2 | 10 | 19 | 5 |
B | 9·2 | 10·3 | 8·4 | 12 | 9 | 7 |
C | 9·9 | 11·1 | 9·0 | 11 | 12 | 7 |
All this points to the fact that in the subject A the critical stimulus words acted with the greatest intensity, and hence[113] the greatest suspicion falls on A. Practically relying on the test one may assume the probability of this person's guilt. The same evening A made a complete confession of the theft, and thus the success of the experiment was confirmed.
All this indicates that in subject A, the critical stimulus words had the strongest impact, and therefore[113] the greatest suspicion is directed at A. Based on the test, one could assume there's a high likelihood of this person's guilt. That same evening, A fully confessed to the theft, confirming the success of the experiment.
Such a result is undoubtedly of scientific interest and worthy of serious consideration. There is much in experimental psychology which is of less use than the material exemplified in this test. Putting the theoretical interest altogether aside, we have here something that is not to be despised from a practical point of view, to wit, a culprit has been brought to light in a much easier and shorter way than is customary. What has been possible once or twice ought to be possible again, and it is well worth while to investigate some means of rendering the method increasingly capable of rapid and sure results.
Such a result is definitely of scientific interest and deserves serious attention. There’s plenty in experimental psychology that is less useful than what this test demonstrates. Setting aside the theoretical interest completely, we have something that’s not to be overlooked from a practical standpoint: a suspect has been identified in a much easier and quicker way than usual. What has been accomplished once or twice should be possible again, and it’s worth exploring ways to make the method even more effective and efficient in producing quick and reliable results.
This application of the experiment shows that it is possible to strike a concealed, indeed an unconscious complex by means of a stimulus word; and conversely we may assume with great certainty that behind a reaction which shows a complex indicator there is a hidden complex, even though the test-person strongly denies it. One must get rid of the idea that educated and intelligent test-persons are able to see and admit their own complexes. Every human mind contains much that is unacknowledged and hence unconscious as such; and no one can boast that he stands completely above his complexes. Those who persist in maintaining that they can, are not aware of the spectacles upon their noses.
This application of the experiment shows that it's possible to trigger a hidden, even an unconscious complex through a stimulus word; and conversely, we can confidently assume that behind a reaction that indicates a complex, there is an underlying complex, even if the test subject firmly denies it. We need to let go of the idea that educated and intelligent test subjects can see and acknowledge their own complexes. Every human mind holds a lot that is unrecognized and thus unconscious; and no one can claim to be completely free from their complexes. Those who insist they can are oblivious to the biases they are wearing.
It has long been thought that the association experiment enables one to distinguish certain intellectual types. That is not the case. The experiment does not give us any particular insight into the purely intellectual, but rather into the emotional processes. To be sure we can erect certain types of reaction; they are not, however, based on intellectual peculiarities, but depend entirely on the proportionate emotional states. Educated test-persons usually show superficial and linguistically deep-rooted associations, whereas the uneducated form more valuable associations and often of ingenious significance.[114] This behaviour would be paradoxical from an intellectual view-point. The meaningful associations of the uneducated are not really the product of intellectual thinking, but are simply the results of a special emotional state. The whole thing is more important to the uneducated, his emotion is greater, and for that reason he pays more attention to the experiment than the educated person, and his associations are therefore more significant. Apart from those determined by education, we have to consider three principal individual types:
It has long been believed that the association experiment allows us to differentiate certain intellectual types. That isn't true. The experiment doesn't provide us with any particular insight into the purely intellectual aspects but rather into emotional processes. Of course, we can identify certain reaction types; however, they aren't based on intellectual traits but rely entirely on the proportionate emotional states. Educated participants typically show superficial and linguistically ingrained associations, while the uneducated tend to form more meaningful associations, often with clever significance.[114] This behavior seems paradoxical from an intellectual standpoint. The meaningful associations of the uneducated aren't really products of intellectual thought; they’re simply results of a special emotional state. For the uneducated, the experience is more significant; their emotions are stronger, which leads them to pay more attention to the experiment than the educated person, making their associations therefore more meaningful. In addition to those determined by education, we need to consider three main individual types:
1. An objective type with undisturbed reactions.
1. A type of objective with unchanged reactions.
2. A so-called complex-type with many disturbances in the experiment occasioned by the constellation of a complex.
2. A complex type with numerous disruptions in the experiment due to the arrangement of a complex.
3. A so-called definition-type. The peculiarity of this type consists in the fact that the reaction always gives an explanation or a definition of the content of the stimulus word; e.g.:
3. A so-called definition type. The distinctive characteristic of this type is that the reaction consistently offers an explanation or a definition of the meaning of the stimulus word; e.g.:
apple,—a tree-fruit;
table,—a piece of household furniture;
to promenade,—an activity;
father,—chief of the family.apple— a fruit from a tree;
table— a piece of furniture for the home;
to promenade— a leisurely activity;
father— the head of the family.
This type is chiefly found in stupid persons, and it is therefore quite usual in imbecility. But it can also be found in persons who are not really stupid, but who do not wish to be taken as stupid. Thus a young student from whom associations were taken by an older intelligent woman student reacted altogether with definitions. The test-person was of the opinion that it was an examination in intelligence, and therefore directed most of his attention to the significance of the stimulus words; his associations, therefore, looked like those of an idiot. All idiots, however, do not react with definitions; probably only those react in this way who would like to appear smarter than they are, that is, those to whom their stupidity is painful. I call this widespread complex the "intelligence-complex." A normal test-person reacts in a most overdrawn manner as follows:
This type is mainly found in people who are not very bright, and so it's common in cases of low intelligence. However, it can also appear in individuals who aren't actually stupid but don’t want to be seen as such. For instance, a young student who was being judged by an older, smarter female student reacted entirely with definitions. The test subject believed it was a test of intelligence, so he focused most of his attention on the meaning of the words presented; as a result, his responses came off as nonsensical. Not all people with low intelligence react with definitions; likely, only those who want to seem smarter than they actually are do, meaning those for whom their lack of intelligence is distressing. I refer to this common issue as the "intelligence-complex." A typical test subject reacts in an exaggerated way as follows:
anxiety—heart anguish;
to kiss—love's unfolding;
to kiss—perception of friendship.anxiety—heartbreak;
to kiss—love's discovery;
to kiss—understanding of friendship.
This type gives a constrained and unnatural impression. The test-persons wish to be more than they are, they wish to exert more influence than they really have. Hence we see that persons with an intelligence-complex are usually unnatural and constrained; that they are always somewhat stilted, or flowery; they show a predilection for complicated foreign words, high-sounding quotations, and other intellectual ornaments. In this way they wish to influence their fellow-beings, they wish to impress others with their apparent education and intelligence, and thus to compensate for their painful feeling of stupidity. The definition-type is closely related to the predicate-type, or, to express it more precisely, to the predicate-type expressing personal judgment (Wertprädikattypus). For example:
This type gives off a forced and awkward vibe. The test subjects want to be more than they really are; they want to have more influence than they actually do. As a result, people with an intelligence complex often come across as unnatural and stiff; they tend to be rather pretentious or overly elaborate. They have a tendency to use complicated foreign words, grandiose quotes, and other intellectual embellishments. This is their way of trying to influence others and impress them with their apparent education and intelligence, hoping to make up for their uncomfortable feelings of inadequacy. The definition type is closely linked to the predicate type, or more specifically, to the predicate type that conveys personal judgment (Wertprädikattypus). For example:
flower—pretty;
money—convenient;
animal—ugly;
knife—dangerous;
death—ghastly.flower—pretty;
cash—convenient;
animal—ugly;
knife—dangerous;
death—grim.
In the definition type the intellectual significance of the stimulus word is rendered prominent, but in the predicate type its emotional significance. There are predicate-types which show great exaggeration where reactions such as the following appear:
In the definition type, the intellectual meaning of the stimulus word is emphasized, while in the predicate type, its emotional meaning takes the spotlight. Some predicate types exhibit a lot of exaggeration, leading to reactions like the following:
piano—horrible;
to sing—heavenly;
mother—ardently loved;
father—something good, nice, holy.Piano—awful;
Singing—fantastic;
Mom—truly loved;
Dad—something good, nice, and special.
In the definition-type an absolutely intellectual make-up is manifested or rather simulated, but here there is a very emotional one. Yet, just as the definition-type really conceals a lack of intelligence, so the excessive emotional expression conceals or overcompensates an emotional deficiency. This conclusion is very interestingly illustrated by the following discovery:—On investigating the influence of the familiar milieus on the association-type it was found that young[116] people seldom possess a predicate-type, but that, on the other hand, the predicate-type increases in frequency with advancing age. In women the increase of the predicate-type begins a little after the 40th year, and in men after the 60th. That is the precise time when, owing to the deficiency of sexuality, there actually occurs considerable emotional loss. If a test-person evinces a distinct predicate-type, it may always be inferred that a marked internal emotional deficiency is thereby compensated. Still, one cannot reason conversely, namely, that an inner emotional deficiency must produce a predicate-type, no more than that idiocy directly produces a definition-type. A predicate-type can also betray itself through the external behaviour, as, for example, through a particular affectation, enthusiastic exclamations, an embellished behaviour, and the constrained sounding language so often observed in society.
In the definition-type, a purely intellectual makeup is shown or rather pretended, while here we see a very emotional one. However, just as the definition-type often hides a lack of intelligence, excessive emotional expression masks or compensates for an emotional shortfall. This observation is quite intriguingly supported by the following finding:—When looking into how familiar environments affect the association-type, it was discovered that young [116] people rarely exhibit a predicate-type, while the predicate-type actually becomes more common as people get older. In women, the increase in the predicate-type starts just after age 40, and in men, it starts after age 60. This timing coincides with a significant emotional decline due to decreased sexuality. If a test subject shows a distinct predicate-type, it always indicates that a significant internal emotional deficit is being compensated for. However, one cannot assume the opposite is true, meaning that an internal emotional shortage must lead to a predicate-type, just as idiocy doesn’t directly create a definition-type. A predicate-type can also reveal itself through external behavior, such as through certain mannerisms, enthusiastic outbursts, an exaggerated way of acting, and the overly formal language often seen in social settings.
The complex-type shows no particular tendency except the concealment of a complex, whereas the definition and predicate types betray a positive tendency to exert in some way a definite influence on the experimenter. But whereas the definition-type tends to bring to light its intelligence, the predicate-type displays its emotion. I need hardly add of what importance such determinations are for the diagnosis of character.
The complex type doesn’t really show any specific tendency other than the concealment of a complex, while the definition and predicate types tend to positively influence the experimenter in some way. However, the definition type generally reveals its intelligence, while the predicate type expresses its emotions. It’s important to note how significant these distinctions are for understanding character.
After finishing an association experiment I usually add another of a different kind, the so-called reproduction experiment. I repeat the same stimulus words and ask the test-persons whether they still remember their former reactions. In many instances the memory fails, and as experience shows, these locations are stimulus words which touched an emotionally accentuated complex, or stimulus words immediately following such critical words.
After completing an association experiment, I typically follow it up with a different type of experiment, known as the reproduction experiment. I use the same stimulus words and ask the participants if they still recall their previous reactions. In many cases, their memory is lacking, and experience indicates that these are stimulus words that triggered an emotionally charged complex or are words that come right after such critical words.
This phenomenon has been designated as paradoxical and contrary to all experience. For it is known that emotionally accentuated things are better retained in memory than indifferent things. This is quite true, but it does not hold for the linguistic expression of an emotionally accentuated content. On the contrary, one very easily forgets what he has said under emotion, one is even apt to contradict himself[117] about it. Indeed, the efficacy of cross-examinations in court depends on this fact. The reproduction method therefore serves to render still more prominent the complex stimulus. In normal persons we usually find a limited number of false reproductions, seldom more than 19-20 per cent., while in abnormal persons, especially in hysterics, we often find from 20-40 per cent. of false reproductions. The reproduction certainty is therefore in certain cases a measure for the emotivity of the test-person.
This phenomenon has been labeled as paradoxical and contrary to all experience. It is known that emotionally charged events are remembered better than neutral ones. This is definitely true, but it doesn’t apply to the linguistic expression of emotionally charged content. In fact, people often forget what they said when emotional, and are even likely to contradict themselves[117] about it. Indeed, the effectiveness of cross-examinations in court relies on this fact. The reproduction method, therefore, helps to highlight the complex stimulus even more. In normal individuals, we typically see a limited number of false reproductions, usually no more than 19-20 percent, while in individuals with abnormalities, especially hysterics, we often find 20-40 percent of false reproductions. Thus, the accuracy of reproduction can serve as an indicator of the emotional intensity of the test subject.
By far the larger number of neurotics show a pronounced tendency to cover up their intimate affairs in impenetrable darkness, even from the doctor, so that he finds it very difficult to form a proper picture of the patient's psychology. In such cases I am greatly assisted by the association experiment. When the experiment is finished, I first look over the general course of the reaction times. I see a great many very prolonged intervals; this means that the patient can only adjust himself with difficulty, that his psychological functions proceed with marked internal frictions with resistances. The greater number of neurotics react only under great and very definite resistances; there are, however, others in whom the average reaction times are as short as in the normal, and in whom the other complex indicators are lacking, but, despite that fact, they undoubtedly present neurotic symptoms. These rare cases are especially found among very intelligent and educated persons, chronic patients who, after many years of practice, have learned to control their outward behaviour and therefore outwardly display very little if any trace of their neuroses. The superficial observer would take them for normal, yet in some places they show disturbances which betray the repressed complex.
The majority of neurotics tend to hide their personal issues in complete secrecy, even from their doctor, making it hard for him to understand the patient’s psychology. In such situations, the association experiment is very helpful to me. Once the experiment is complete, I first review the overall reaction times. I notice many prolonged intervals, indicating that the patient struggles to adjust and that their psychological functions operate with significant internal friction and resistance. Most neurotics only react under strong and very specific resistances; however, there are others whose average reaction times are as quick as those of normal individuals, and who lack the other complex indicators, yet still clearly exhibit neurotic symptoms. These rare cases are often found among highly intelligent and educated individuals, chronic patients who, after years of practice, have learned to control their outward behavior and thus show very little, if any, sign of their neuroses. A casual observer might take them for normal, but in some instances, they exhibit disturbances that reveal their repressed issues.
After examining the reaction times I turn my attention to the type of the association to ascertain with what type I am dealing. If it is a predicate-type I draw the conclusions which I have detailed above; if it is a complex type I try to ascertain the nature of the complex. With the necessary experience one can readily emancipate one's judgment from the test-person's[118] statements and almost without any previous knowledge of the test-persons it is possible under certain circumstances to read the most intimate complexes from the results of the experiment. I look at first for the reproduction words and put them together, and then I look for the stimulus words which show the greatest disturbances. In many cases merely assorting these words suffices to unearth the complex. In some cases it is necessary to put a question here and there. The matter is well illustrated by the following concrete example:
After looking at the reaction times, I focus on the type of association to determine which kind I’m dealing with. If it’s a predicate type, I draw the conclusions mentioned above; if it’s a complex type, I try to understand the nature of the complex. With enough experience, you can easily separate your judgment from what the test subject says, and, in some situations, you can read the most personal complexes from the experiment results even without prior knowledge of the subjects. I first look for the reproduced words and piece them together, then I search for the stimulus words that show the most significant disturbances. In many cases, just organizing these words is enough to uncover the complex. In some instances, I may need to ask a few questions. This is well illustrated by the following concrete example:
It concerns an educated woman of 30 years of age, married three years previously. Since her marriage she has suffered from episodic excitement in which she is violently jealous of her husband. The marriage is a happy one in every other respect, and it should be noted that the husband gives no cause for the jealousy. The patient is sure that she loves him and that her excited states are groundless. She cannot imagine whence these excited states originate, and feels quite perplexed over them. It is to be noted that she is a catholic and has been brought up religiously, while her husband is a protestant. This difference of religion did not admittedly play any part. A more thorough anamnesis showed the existence of an extreme prudishness. Thus, for example, no one was allowed to talk in the patient's presence about her sister's childbirth, because the sexual moment suggested therein caused her the greatest excitement. She always undressed in the adjoining room and never in her husband's presence, etc. At the age of 27 she was supposed to have had no idea how children were born. The associations gave the results shown in the accompanying chart.
It concerns an educated woman who is 30 years old and has been married for three years. Since her marriage, she has experienced episodes of intense jealousy toward her husband. The marriage is otherwise happy, and it’s important to note that her husband hasn’t done anything to provoke her jealousy. The woman is convinced that she loves him and acknowledges that her jealous feelings are irrational. She can’t understand where these feelings come from and is quite confused by them. It should also be noted that she is Catholic and was raised in a religious environment, while her husband is Protestant. This religious difference hasn’t been acknowledged as a factor. A more detailed examination revealed that she has extreme prudishness. For instance, no one was allowed to discuss her sister's childbirth in her presence because the sexual implications made her extremely anxious. She always changed clothes in a separate room, never in front of her husband, and at 27, she supposedly had no idea how children were born. The associations resulted in the data shown in the attached chart.
The stimulus words characterised by marked disturbances are the following: yellow, to pray, to separate, to marry, to quarrel, old, family, happiness, false, fear, to kiss, bride, to choose, contented. The strongest disturbances are found in the following stimulus words: to pray, to marry, happiness, false, fear, and contented. These words, therefore, more than any others, seem to strike the complex. The conclusions that can be drawn from this is that she is not indifferent to the fact that her husband is a protestant, that she again thinks[119] of praying, believes there is something wrong with marriage, that she is false, entertains fancies of faithlessness, is afraid (of the husband? of the future?), she is not contented with her choice (to choose) and she thinks of separation. The patient therefore has a separation complex, for she is very discontented with her married life. When I told her this result she was affected and at first attempted to deny it, then to mince over it, but finally she admitted everything I said and added more. She reproduced a large number of fancies of faithlessness, reproaches against her husband, etc. Her prudishness and jealousy were merely a projection of her own sexual wishes on her husband. Because she was faithless in her fancies and did not admit it to herself she was jealous of her husband.
The words that showed significant emotional disturbances are: yellow, to pray, to separate, to marry, to quarrel, old, family, happiness, false, fear, to kiss, bride, to choose, contented. The strongest emotional reactions were triggered by the words: to pray, to marry, happiness, false, fear, and contented. These words, more than any others, seem to resonate with her inner complexities. The conclusions we can draw from this are that she is not indifferent to the fact that her husband is a Protestant, that she often thinks about praying, believes there’s something wrong with marriage, feels that she is untruthful, harbors thoughts of infidelity, is afraid (possibly of her husband? or of the future?), she is not happy with her choice (to choose), and she thinks about separating. Therefore, the patient has a separation complex, as she is quite unhappy with her married life. When I shared these insights with her, she was affected and initially tried to deny it, then downplay it, but eventually she admitted everything I said and added more. She expressed a lot of thoughts about infidelity, complaints about her husband, and so on. Her prudishness and jealousy were merely a projection of her own sexual desires onto her husband. Because she was unfaithful in her fantasies and didn’t acknowledge it to herself, she felt jealous of her husband.

The blue columns represent failures of reproductions, the green ones represent repetitions of stimulus words, and the yellow columns show those associations in which the patient either laughed or made mistakes, using many words instead of one. The height of the columns represent the length of the reaction time.
The blue columns represent failed reproductions, the green ones show repeated stimulus words, and the yellow columns indicate instances where the patient either laughed or made mistakes, using multiple words instead of one. The height of the columns represents the response time.
[To face p. 118.
[See p. 118.
It is impossible in a lecture to give a review of all the manifold uses of the association experiment. I must content myself with having demonstrated to you a few of its chief uses.
It’s impossible in a lecture to cover all the various uses of the association experiment. I can only show you a few of its main uses.
Lecture II
Lecture II
THE FAMILIAL CONSTELLATIONS
Family Networks
Ladies and Gentlemen: As you have seen, there are manifold ways in which the association experiment may be employed in practical psychology. I should like to speak to you to-day about another use of this experiment which is primarily of theoretical significance. My pupil, Miss Fürst, M.D., made the following researches: she applied the association experiment to 24 families, consisting altogether of 100 test-persons; the resulting material amounted to 22,200 associations. This material was elaborated in the following manner: Fifteen separate groups were formed according to logical-linguistic standards, and the associations were arranged as follows:
Ladies and Gentlemen: As you have seen, there are many ways the association experiment can be used in practical psychology. Today, I want to talk to you about another application of this experiment that is mainly of theoretical importance. My student, Miss Fürst, M.D., conducted the following research: she applied the association experiment to 24 families, totaling 100 participants; the resulting data amounted to 22,200 associations. This data was organized in the following way: Fifteen separate groups were created based on logical-linguistic criteria, and the associations were arranged as follows:
Husband | Wife | Difference | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
I. | Co-ordination | 6·5 | 0·5 | 6 |
II. | Sub and supraordination | 7 | — | 7 |
III. | Contrast | — | — | — |
IV. | Predicate expressing a personal judgment | 8·5 | 95·0 | 86·5 |
V. | Simple predicate | 21·0 | 3·5 | 17·5 |
VI. | Relations of the verb to the subject or complement | 15·5 | 0·5 | 15·0 |
VII. | Designation of time, etc. | 11·0 | — | 11·0 |
VIII. | Definition | 11·0 | — | 11·0 |
IX. | Coexistence | 1·5 | — | 1·5 |
X. | Identity | 0·5 | 0·5 | — |
XI. | Motor-speech combination | 12·0 | — | 12·0 |
XII. | Composition of words | — | — | — |
XIII. | Completion of words | — | — | — |
XIV. | Clang associations | — | — | — |
XV. | Defective reactions | — | — | — |
Total | — | — | 173·5 | |
173·5 | ||||
Average difference | —— | = 11·5 | ||
15 |
As can be seen from this example, I utilise the difference to demonstrate the degree of the analogy. In order to find a basis for the sum of the resemblance I have calculated the differences among all Dr. Fürst's test-persons, not related among themselves, by comparing every female test-person with all the other unrelated females; the same has been done for the male test-persons.
As shown in this example, I use the difference to illustrate the extent of the analogy. To establish a foundation for the overall resemblance, I calculated the differences among all of Dr. Fürst's test subjects, who are not related to one another, by comparing each female test subject with all the other unrelated females; the same process was applied to the male test subjects.
The most marked difference is found in those cases where the two test-persons compared have no associative quality in common. All the groups are calculated in percentages, the greatest difference possible being 200/15 = 13·3 per cent.
The most noticeable difference is seen in those cases where the two test subjects being compared share no common associative qualities. All groups are calculated in percentages, with the maximum possible difference being 200/15 = 13.3 percent.
I. The average difference of male unrelated test-persons is 5·9 per cent., and that of females of the same group is 6 per cent.
I. The average difference for unrelated male test subjects is 5.9 percent, while for females in the same group, it is 6 percent.
II. The average difference between male related test-persons is 4·1 per cent., and that between female related tests-persons is 3·8 per cent. From these numbers we see that relatives show a tendency to agreement in the reaction type.
II. The average difference between male test subjects is 4.1 percent, and that between female test subjects is 3.8 percent. From these figures, we see that relatives tend to agree in the type of reaction.
III. Difference between fathers and children = 4·2.
" " mothers " " = 3·5.
III. Difference between fathers and children = 4·2.
" " mothers " " = 3.5.
The reaction types of children come nearer to the type of the mother than to the father.
Children tend to react more like their mothers than their fathers.
IV. Difference between fathers and their | sons | = 3·1. |
" " " " " | daughters | = 4·9. |
"moms" | sons | = 4·7. |
" " " " " | daughters | = 3·0. |

Fig. 11.
Fig. 11.
Tracing A. —— father; ..... mother; ++++ daughter.
Tracing A. — father; ..... mother; ++++ daughter.
I. Assoc. by co-ordination; II. sub and supraordination; III. contrast, etc. (see previous page).
I. Association by coordination; II. subordination and superordination; III. contrast, etc. (see previous page).
V. Difference between brothers = 4·7.
" " sisters = 5·1.
V. Difference between brothers = 4.7.
"sisters = 5.1.
If the married sisters are omitted from the comparison we get the following result:
If we leave out the married sisters from the comparison, we get this result:
Difference of unmarried sisters = 3·8.[122] These observations show distinctly that marriage destroys more or less the original agreement, as the husband belongs to a different type.
Difference of unmarried sisters = 3·8.[122] These observations clearly show that marriage significantly alters the original arrangement, as the husband belongs to a different category.
Difference between unmarried brothers = 4·8.
Difference between unmarried brothers = 4.8.
Marriage seems to exert no influence on the association forms in men. Nevertheless, the material which we have at our disposal is not as yet enough to allow us to draw definite conclusions.
Marriage doesn't seem to have any impact on the way men form associations. However, the information we have available isn't sufficient for us to make any definite conclusions.
VI. Difference between husband and wife = 4·7.
VI. Difference between husband and wife = 4.7.

Fig. 12.
Fig. 12.
Tracing B. —— husband; ..... wife.
Tracing B. —— husband; ..... wife.
This number sums up inadequately the different and very unequal values; that is to say, there are some cases which show extreme difference and some which show marked concordance.
This number doesn’t fully capture the various and unequal values; in other words, some cases show a huge difference while others show a clear agreement.
The different results are shown in the tracings (Figs. 11-15).
The different results are shown in the graphs (Figs. 11-15).
In the tracings I have marked the number of associations of each quality perpendicularly in percentages. The Roman letters written horizontally represent the forms of association indicated in the above tables.
In the diagrams, I've noted the percentage of associations for each quality vertically. The Roman letters written horizontally show the types of associations listed in the tables above.
Tracing A. The father (black line) shows an objective type, while the mother and daughter show the pure predicate type with a pronounced subjective tendency.
Tracing A. The father (black line) represents an objective type, while the mother and daughter exhibit a pure predicate type with a strong subjective inclination.
Tracing B. The husband and wife agree well in the[123] predicate objective type, the predicate subjective being somewhat more numerous in the wife.
Tracing B. The husband and wife agree well in the[123] predicate objective type, while the predicate subjective is somewhat more common in the wife.
Tracing C. A very nice agreement between a father and his two daughters.
Tracing C. A really nice deal between a dad and his two daughters.

Fig. 13.
Fig. 13.
Tracing C. —— father; ..... 1st daughter; ++++ 2nd daughter.
Tracing C. —— father; ..... 1st daughter; ++++ 2nd daughter.
Tracing D. Two sisters living together. The dotted line represents the married sister.
Tracing D. Two sisters living together. The dotted line represents the married sister.

Fig. 14.
Fig. 14.
Tracing D. —— single sister; ..... married sister.
Tracing D. —— single sister; ..... married sister.
Tracing E. Husband and wife. The wife is a sister of the two women of tracing D. She approaches very closely to the type of her husband. Her tracing is the direct opposite of that of her sisters.
Tracing E. Husband and wife. The wife is a sister of the two women of tracing D. She closely resembles her husband. Her tracing is the complete opposite of her sisters'.

Fig. 15.
Fig. 15.
Tracing E. —— husband; ..... wife.
Tracing E. —— husband; ..... wife.
The similarity of the associations is often very extraordinary. I will reproduce here the associations of a mother and daughter.
The similarity between their associations is often quite remarkable. I will share here the associations of a mother and daughter.
Stimulus Word. | Mother. | Daughter. |
---|---|---|
to pay attention | diligent pupil | pupil |
law | command of God | Moses |
dear | child | father and mother |
great | God | father |
potato | bulbous root | bulbous root |
family | many persons | 5 persons |
strange | traveller | traveller |
brother | dear to me | dear |
to kiss | mother | mother |
burn | great pain | painful |
door | wide | big |
hay | dry | dry |
month | many days | 31 days |
air | cool | moist |
coal | sooty | black |
fruit | sweet | sweet |
merry | happy child | child |
One might indeed think that in this experiment, where full scope is given to chance, individuality would become a factor of the utmost importance, and that therefore one might expect a very great diversity and lawlessness of associations. But as we see the opposite is the case. Thus the daughter lives contentedly in the same circle of ideas as her mother, not only in her thought but in her form of expression; indeed, she even uses the same words. What could be regarded as more inconsequent, inconstant, and lawless than a fancy,[125] a rapidly passing thought? It is not lawless, however, neither is it free, but closely determined within the limits of the milieu. If, therefore, even the superficial and manifestly most inconsequent formations of the intellect are altogether subject to the milieu-constellation, what must we not expect for the more important conditions of the mind, for the emotions, wishes, hopes, and intentions? Let us consider a concrete example, illustrated by tracing A.
One might think that in this experiment, where chance is given full rein, individuality would be extremely important, leading to a lot of variety and unpredictability in associations. But, in fact, the opposite is true. The daughter lives comfortably in the same set of ideas as her mother, not just in her thoughts but also in how she expresses them; she even uses the same words. What could seem more random, changeable, and chaotic than a fleeting thought? Yet, it’s not random or free; it’s actually closely defined by the surroundings. If even the most superficial and clearly inconsistent aspects of thinking are completely influenced by the environment, what should we expect of the more significant aspects of the mind, like feelings, desires, hopes, and intentions? Let's look at a specific example by examining A.[125]
The mother is 45 years old and the daughter 16 years. Both have a very distinct predicate-type expressing personal judgment, both differ from the father in the most striking manner. The father is a drunkard and a demoralised creature. We can thus readily understand that his wife experiences an emotional voidness which she naturally betrays by her enhanced predicate-type. The same causes cannot, however, operate in the case of the daughter, for, in the first place, she is not married to a drunkard, and, in the second, life with all its hopes and promises still lies before her. It is distinctly unnatural for the daughter to show an extreme predicate-type expressing personal judgment. She responds to the stimuli of the environment just like her mother. But whereas in the mother the type is in a way a natural consequence of her unhappy condition of life, this condition is entirely lacking in the daughter. The daughter simply imitates the mother; she merely appears like the mother. Let us consider what this can signify for a young girl. If a young girl reacts to the world like an old woman, disappointed in life, this at once shows unnaturalness and constraint. But more serious consequences are possible. As you know the predicate-type is a manifestation of intensive emotions; the emotions are always involved. Thus we cannot prevent ourselves from responding inwardly, at least, to the feelings and passions of our immediate environment; we allow ourselves to be infected and carried away by it. Originally the effects and their physical manifestations had a biological significance; i.e. they were a protective mechanism for the individual and the whole herd. If we manifest emotions, we can with certainty expect to receive emotions in return. That is the feeling of the predicate-type. What the 45-year-old[126] woman lacks in emotions, i.e. in love in her marriage relations she seeks to obtain in the outside world, and for that reason she is an ardent participant in the Christian Science movement. If the daughter imitates this situation she copies her mother, she seeks to obtain emotions from the outside. But for a girl of sixteen such an emotional state is, to say the least, quite dangerous; like her mother, she reacts to her environment as a sufferer soliciting sympathy. Such an emotional state is no longer dangerous in the mother, but for obvious reasons it is quite dangerous in the daughter. Once freed from her father and mother she will be like her mother, i.e. she will be a suffering woman craving for inner gratification. She will thus be exposed to the great danger of falling a victim to brutality and of marrying a brute and inebriate like her father.
The mother is 45 years old and the daughter is 16. Both have a very distinct way of expressing personal judgment, and they differ from the father in a noticeable way. The father is a drunk and a demoralized person. We can easily see that his wife feels an emotional emptiness, which she naturally expresses through her heightened way of talking. However, the same factors don’t apply to the daughter because, first of all, she is not married to a drunk, and second, she still has all of life’s hopes and promises ahead of her. It’s not natural for the daughter to exhibit such an extreme way of expressing personal judgment. She reacts to her surroundings just like her mother does. But while the mother’s behavior is somewhat a natural result of her unhappy life, the daughter doesn’t share that same situation. The daughter simply mimics her mother; she just seems like her. Let’s think about what this means for a young girl. If a young girl responds to the world like an older woman who is disappointed in life, it clearly shows something unnatural and constraining. But there could be even more serious consequences. As you know, the way we express ourselves is tied to deep emotions; emotions are always involved. So, we can't help but internally respond to the feelings and passions around us; we allow ourselves to be influenced and swept away by them. Originally, these effects and their physical signs had a biological purpose; they served as a protective mechanism for both the individual and the community. When we show emotions, we can expect to receive emotions in return. That’s what the way of expressing personal judgment is about. What the 45-year-old woman lacks in emotions—specifically, in love in her marriage—she tries to find in the outside world, which is why she’s an enthusiastic participant in the Christian Science movement. If the daughter mirrors this situation, she’s copying her mother and seeking emotions from outside sources. But for a 16-year-old girl, this emotional state is quite dangerous; similar to her mother, she responds to her environment as someone looking for sympathy. This emotional state may not be dangerous for the mother anymore, but it is definitely risky for the daughter. Once she breaks free from her father and mother, she might end up like her mother, that is, a suffering woman yearning for inner fulfillment. She would then face the serious risk of becoming a victim of cruelty and marrying a brutish drunk like her father.
This conception is of importance in the consideration of the influence of environment and education. The example shows what passes over from the mother to the child. It is not the good and pious precepts, nor is it any other inculcation of pedagogic truths that have a moulding influence upon the character of the developing child, but what most influences him is the peculiarly affective state which is totally unknown to his parents and educators. The concealed discord between the parents, the secret worry, the repressed hidden wishes, all these produce in the individual a certain affective state with its objective signs which slowly but surely, though unconsciously, works its way into the child's mind, producing therein the same conditions and hence the same reactions to external stimuli. We know the depressing effect mournful and melancholic persons have upon us. A restless and nervous individual infects his surroundings with unrest and dissatisfaction, a grumbler with his discontent, etc. Since grown-up persons are so sensitive to surrounding influences, we should certainly expect this to be even more noticeable among children, whose minds are as soft and plastic as wax. The father and mother impress deeply into the child's mind the seal of their personality; the more sensitive and mouldable the child the deeper is the impression. Thus things that are[127] never even spoken about are reflected in the child. The child imitates the gesture, and just as the gesture of the parent is the expression of an emotional state, so in turn the gesture gradually produces in the child a similar feeling, as it feels itself, so to speak, into the gesture. Just as the parents adapt themselves to the world, so does the child. At the age of puberty when it begins to free itself from the spell of the family, it enters into life with, so to say, a surface adaptation entirely in keeping with that of the father and mother. The frequent and often very deep depressions of puberty emanate from this; they are symptoms which are rooted in the difficulty of new adjustment. The youthful person at first tries to separate himself as much as possible from his family; he may even estrange himself from it, but inwardly this only ties him the more firmly to the parental image. I cite the case of a young neurotic who ran away from his parents; he was estranged from, and almost hostile to them, but he admitted to me that he possessed a special sanctum; it was a strong box containing his old childhood books, old dried flowers, stones, and even small bottles of water from the well at his home and from a river along which he walked with his parents, etc.
This idea is important when considering the impact of environment and education. The example illustrates what is passed from the mother to the child. It's not the good and pious teachings, nor any other educational truths that shape the developing child's character, but rather the unique emotional state that is completely unknown to their parents and teachers. The hidden tension between the parents, the secret worries, the repressed desires—all of these create a certain emotional state in the individual, with clear signs that slowly but surely, yet unconsciously, seep into the child's mind, forming similar conditions and reactions to external stimuli. We know how depressing and melancholic people affect us. A restless and nervous person spreads their unrest and dissatisfaction around, just as a grumbler shares their discontent, etc. Since adults are so sensitive to their surroundings, we should expect this to be even more pronounced in children, whose minds are as soft and pliable as wax. The mother and father leave a deep imprint of their personalities on the child's mind; the more sensitive and malleable the child, the deeper the impression. Therefore, things that are [127] never even mentioned are reflected in the child. The child mimics the gesture, and just as the parent's gesture conveys an emotional state, this gesture gradually evokes a similar feeling in the child, as they empathize with it, so to speak. Just as the parents adapt to the world, the child does too. During puberty, when the child starts to break free from the family's influence, they enter life with a surface adaptation that closely resembles that of their parents. The frequent and often intense depressions of puberty arise from this; they are symptoms rooted in the struggle for a new adjustment. Initially, the young person tries to distance themselves as much as possible from their family; they might even become estranged or hostile towards it, but inwardly, this only strengthens their connection to the image of their parents. I recall the case of a young neurotic who ran away from his parents; he was estranged from them and almost hostile, yet he admitted to having a special place—a strong box filled with his childhood books, dried flowers, stones, and even small bottles of water from the well at his home and from a river where he walked with his parents, etc.
The first attempts to assume friendship and love are constellated in the strongest manner possible by the relation to parents, and here one can usually observe how powerful are the influences of the familiar constellations. It is not rare, for instance, for a healthy man whose mother was hysterical to marry a hysteric, or for the daughter of an alcoholic to choose an alcoholic for her husband. I was once consulted by an intelligent and educated young woman of twenty-six who suffered from a peculiar symptom. She thought that her eyes now and then took on a strange expression which exerted a disagreeable influence on men. If she then looked at a man he became self-conscious, turned away and said something rapidly to his neighbour, at which both were either embarrassed or inclined to laugh. The patient was convinced that her look excited indecent thoughts in the men. It was impossible to convince her of the falsity[128] of her conviction. This symptom immediately aroused in me the suspicion that I dealt with a case of paranoia rather than with a neurosis. But as was shown only three days later by the further course of the treatment, I was mistaken, for the symptom promptly disappeared after it had been explained by analysis. It originated in the following manner: The lady had a lover who deserted her in a very marked manner. She felt utterly forsaken; she withdrew from all society and pleasure, and entertained suicidal ideas. In her seclusion there accumulated unadmitted and repressed erotic wishes which she unconsciously projected on men whenever she was in their company. This gave rise to the conviction that her look excited erotic wishes in men. Further investigation showed that her deserting lover was a lunatic, which she had not apparently observed. I expressed my surprise at her unsuitable choice, and added that she must have had a certain predilection for loving mentally abnormal persons. This she denied, stating that she had once before been engaged to be married to a normal man. He, too, deserted her; and on further investigation it was found that he, too, had been in an insane asylum shortly before,—another lunatic! This seemed to me to confirm with sufficient certainty my belief that she had an unconscious tendency to choose insane persons. Whence originated this strange taste? Her father was an eccentric character, and in later years entirely estranged from his family. Her whole love had therefore been turned away from her father to a brother eight years her senior; him she loved and honoured as a father, and this brother became hopelessly insane at the age of fourteen. That was apparently the model from which the patient could never free herself, after which she chose her lovers, and through which she had to become unhappy. Her neurosis which gave the impression of insanity, probably originated from this infantile model. We must take into consideration that we are dealing in this case with a highly educated and intelligent lady, who did not pass carelessly over her mental experiences, who indeed reflected much over her unhappiness, without, however, having any idea whence her misfortune originated.
The initial attempts to form friendships and romantic relationships are heavily influenced by one's relationship with their parents, and it's easy to see how strong the effects of these family dynamics can be. For example, it's not uncommon for a healthy man with a hysterical mother to marry a hysterical woman, or for the daughter of an alcoholic to choose an alcoholic husband. I was once consulted by a smart and educated twenty-six-year-old woman who had a strange symptom. She believed that her eyes sometimes had an unusual expression that made men uncomfortable. When she looked at a man, he would become self-conscious, look away, and quickly say something to his neighbor, which would leave both of them feeling awkward or laughing. The woman was convinced that her gaze caused men to have inappropriate thoughts. It was impossible to convince her that this belief was unfounded[128]. This symptom made me suspect that I was dealing with paranoia rather than a neurosis. However, just three days later, during the course of treatment, I realized I was wrong—the symptom quickly vanished once it had been clarified through analysis. It turned out that the lady had a boyfriend who left her in a very noticeable way. She felt completely abandoned; she withdrew from socializing and pleasure, and even had suicidal thoughts. In her isolation, she accumulated unacknowledged and repressed romantic desires, which she unconsciously projected onto men in their presence. This led her to believe that her gaze sparked erotic feelings in them. Further investigation revealed that her former boyfriend was mentally ill, something she hadn’t really noticed. I expressed my surprise at her poor choice and suggested that she must have a tendency to be attracted to mentally unstable people. She denied this, claiming she had once been engaged to a normal man, who had also abandoned her; upon investigation, it turned out he had also spent time in a mental hospital—another crazy guy! This seemed to reinforce my belief that she had an unconscious inclination to choose mentally ill partners. Where did this strange preference come from? Her father was an eccentric man, and in later years, he became completely estranged from the family. As a result, she redirected all her affection from her father to an older brother, whom she loved and respected like a father; this brother became hopelessly insane at the age of fourteen. That seemed to be the model she could never escape from when choosing her partners, leading her to unhappiness. Her neurosis, which resembled insanity, likely stemmed from this childhood pattern. We should keep in mind that we’re talking about a highly educated and intelligent woman who thought deeply about her mental experiences and reflected on her unhappiness, but had no idea where her misfortunes came from.
There are things which unconsciously appear to us as a matter of course, and it is for this reason that we do not see them truly, but attribute everything to the so-called congenital character. I could cite any number of examples of this kind. Every patient furnishes contributions to this subject of the determination of destiny through the influence of the familiar milieu. In every neurotic we see how the constellation of the infantile milieu influences not only the character of the neurosis, but also life's destiny, even in its minute details. The unhappy choice of a profession, and innumerable matrimonial failures can be traced to this constellation. There are, however, cases where the profession has been well chosen, where the husband or wife leaves nothing to be desired, and where still the person does not feel well but works and lives under constant difficulties. Such cases often appear under the guise of chronic neurasthenia. Here the difficulty is due to the fact that the mind is unconsciously split into two parts of divergent tendencies which are impeding each other; one part lives with the husband or with the profession, while the other lives unconsciously in the past with the father or mother. I have treated a lady who, after suffering many years from a severe neurosis, merged into a dementia præcox. The neurotic affection began with her marriage. This lady's husband was kind, educated, well to do, and in every respect suitable for her; his character showed nothing that would in any way interfere with a happy marriage. The marriage was nevertheless unhappy, all congenial companionship being excluded because the wife was neurotic.
There are things that unconsciously seem normal to us, and that's why we don't really see them but instead blame everything on so-called inherent traits. I could provide many examples of this. Each patient contributes to our understanding of how our environment shapes our destiny. In every neurotic, we can see how their childhood environment affects not just their neurosis but also their life path, even in small details. Poor career choices and countless marriage failures can be linked to this background. However, there are cases where individuals choose the right profession, have a great partner, yet still feel unwell, struggling with constant challenges. These situations often appear as chronic neurasthenia. The issue here is that the person's mind is unconsciously divided into two conflicting parts that hinder each other; one part is present with the spouse or career, while the other is stuck in the past with their parents. I treated a woman who, after suffering for many years from a severe neurosis, descended into dementia præcox. Her neurotic condition started with her marriage. This woman's husband was kind, educated, well-off, and a good match for her; his character was not problematic for a happy marriage at all. Nonetheless, the marriage was unhappy, as any potential companionship was overshadowed by the wife's neurosis.
The important heuristic axiom of every psychoanalysis reads as follows: If a person develops a neurosis this neurosis contains the counter-argument against the relation of the patient to the individual with whom he is most intimately connected. A neurosis in the husband loudly proclaims that he has intensive resistances and contrary tendencies against his wife; if the wife has a neurosis she has a tendency which diverges from her husband. If the person is unmarried the neurosis is then directed against the lover or the sweetheart or against[130] the parents. Every neurotic naturally strives against this relentless formulation of the content of his neurosis, and he often refuses to recognise it at any cost, but still it is always justified. To be sure, the conflict is not on the surface, but must generally be revealed through a painstaking psychoanalysis.
The key principle of every psychoanalysis is this: If someone develops a neurosis, this neurosis reflects their internal conflict regarding the person they’re closest to. A husband's neurosis clearly indicates that he has strong resistances and opposing feelings towards his wife; if the wife has a neurosis, it shows she has feelings that diverge from her husband. If the person is single, the neurosis is directed towards their partner or crush or against[130] their parents. Every neurotic naturally fights against this harsh reality of their neurosis, often refusing to acknowledge it at all costs, but it is always accurate. The conflict isn’t obvious; it usually needs to be uncovered through thorough psychoanalysis.
The history of our patient reads as follows:
The patient's history is as follows:
The father had a powerful personality. She was his favourite daughter, and entertained for him a boundless veneration. At the age of seventeen she for the first time fell in love with a young man. At that time she twice dreamt the same dream, the impression of which never left her in all her later years; she even imputed a mystic significance to it, and often recalled it with religious dread. In the dream she saw a tall, masculine figure with a very beautiful white beard; at this sight she was permeated with a feeling of awe and delight as if she experienced the presence of God Himself. This dream made the deepest impression on her, and she was constrained to think of it again and again. The love affair of that period proved to be one of little warmth, and was soon given up. Later the patient married her present husband. Though she loved her husband she was led continually to compare him with her deceased father; this comparison always proved unfavourable to her husband. Whatever the husband said, intended, or did, was subjected to this standard and always with the same result: "My father would have done all this better and differently." Our patient's life with her husband was not happy, she could neither respect nor love him sufficiently; she was inwardly dissatisfied. She gradually developed a fervent piety, and at the same time violent hysterical symptoms supervened. She began by going into raptures now over this and now over that clergyman; she was looking everywhere for a spiritual friend, and estranged herself more and more from her husband. The mental trouble manifested itself about ten years after marriage. In her diseased state she refused to have anything to do with her husband and child; she imagined herself pregnant by another man. In brief, the[131] resistances against her husband, which hitherto had been laboriously repressed, came out quite openly, and among other things manifested themselves in insults of the gravest kind directed against him.
The father had a strong personality. She was his favorite daughter and held an unwavering admiration for him. At seventeen, she fell in love with a young man for the first time. During that time, she had the same dream twice, which left a lasting impression on her throughout her life; she even attributed a mystical significance to it and often recalled it with a sense of reverence. In the dream, she saw a tall, masculine figure with a beautiful white beard, and she felt an overwhelming sense of awe and delight, as if she were experiencing the presence of God Himself. This dream left a profound impact on her, and she found herself thinking about it repeatedly. The love affair she had during that time was shallow and ended quickly. Later, she married her current husband. Although she loved him, she constantly compared him to her deceased father, and this comparison was never favorable to her husband. Whatever her husband said, intended, or did was measured against this standard, resulting in the same conclusion: "My father would have done this better and differently." Her life with her husband was unhappy; she could neither respect nor love him enough, which left her feeling dissatisfied. She gradually developed a deep piety, while at the same time experiencing intense hysterical symptoms. She would go into raptures over various clergymen, searching everywhere for a spiritual friend, and increasingly distancing herself from her husband. Her psychological issues began to surface about ten years after their marriage. In her troubled state, she refused to engage with her husband and child, imagining herself pregnant with another man. In short, the pent-up resistance against her husband, which she had been struggling to suppress, surfaced openly, manifesting itself in severe insults directed at him.
In this case we see how a neurosis appeared, as it were, at the moment of marriage, i.e. this neurosis expresses the counter-argument against the husband. What is the counter-argument? The counter-argument is the father of the patient, for she verified her belief daily that her husband was not the equal of her father. When the patient first fell in love there had appeared a symptom in the form of an extremely impressive dream or vision. She saw the man with the very beautiful white beard. Who was this man? On directing her attention to the beautiful white beard she immediately recognised the phantom. It was of course her father. Thus every time the patient merged into a love affair the picture of her father inopportunely appeared and prevented her from adjusting herself psychologically to her husband.
In this situation, we can see how a neurosis emerged, so to speak, at the time of marriage, which means this neurosis represents the argument against the husband. What is this argument? The argument is the patient’s father, as she constantly confirmed her belief that her husband did not measure up to her father. When the patient first fell in love, a symptom showed up in the form of a striking dream or vision. She saw a man with a very beautiful white beard. Who was this man? When she focused on the beautiful white beard, she immediately recognized the image. It was, of course, her father. Therefore, each time the patient engaged in a romantic relationship, the image of her father inconveniently surfaced and disrupted her ability to adjust psychologically to her husband.
I purposely chose this case as an illustration because it is simple, obvious, and quite typical of many marriages which are crippled through the neurosis of the wife. The cause of the unhappiness always lies in a too firm attachment to the parents. The infantile relationship has not been given up. We find here one of the most important tasks of pedagogy, namely, the solution of the problem how to free the growing individual from his unconscious attachments to the influences of the infantile milieu, in such a manner that he may retain whatever there is in it that is suitable and reject whatever is unsuitable. To solve this difficult question on the part of the child seems to me impossible at present. We know as yet too little about the child's emotional processes. The first and only real contribution to the literature on this subject has in fact appeared during the present year. It is the analysis of a five-year-old boy published by Freud.
I specifically chose this case as an example because it is straightforward, clear, and quite typical of many marriages that struggle due to the wife’s neurosis. The source of the unhappiness often stems from an overly strong attachment to the parents. The childish relationship hasn’t been let go of. Here lies one of the most important tasks of education: figuring out how to help the developing individual break free from their unconscious ties to the influences of their early environment, while still keeping what is valuable and discarding what isn't. Solving this challenging issue for the child seems impossible right now. We still don’t know enough about how children process emotions. In fact, the first and only significant contribution to literature on this topic has just been published this year—it’s an analysis of a five-year-old boy by Freud.
The difficulties on the part of the child are very great. They should not, however, be so great on the part of the parents. In many ways the parents could manage the love of children more carefully, more indulgently, and more[132] intelligently. The sins committed against favourite children by the undue love of the parents could perhaps be avoided through a wider knowledge of the child's mind. For many reasons I find it impossible to say anything of general validity concerning the bringing up of children as it is affected by this problem. We are as yet very far from general prescriptions and rules; indeed we are still in the realm of casuistry. Unfortunately, our knowledge of the finer mental processes in the child is so meagre that we are not yet in any position to say where the greatest trouble lies, whether in the parents, in the child, or in the conception of the milieu. Only psychoanalyses of the kind that Professor Freud has published in the Jahrbuch, 1909,[141] will help us out of this difficulty. Such comprehensive and profound observations should act as a strong inducement to all teachers to occupy themselves with Freud's psychology. This psychology offers more values for practical pedagogy than the physiological psychology of the present.
The challenges faced by children are significant. However, parents shouldn't struggle as much. In many ways, parents could handle their love for their children more carefully, with greater understanding, and more[132] intelligence. The mistakes made against favored children due to excessive parental love could perhaps be avoided with a deeper understanding of the child's mindset. For various reasons, I find it impossible to make any broad statements about raising children influenced by this issue. We are still quite far from general guidelines and rules; in fact, we're still navigating the complexities. Unfortunately, our understanding of children's intricate mental processes is so limited that we can't determine where the primary issues lie—whether with the parents, the child, or the environment. Only psychoanalyses like those published by Professor Freud in the Jahrbuch, 1909,[141] will help us find a way forward. These detailed and insightful observations should strongly encourage all educators to engage with Freud's psychology. This approach offers more value for practical teaching than the physiological psychology currently in use.
Lecture III
Lecture 3
EXPERIENCES CONCERNING THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF THE CHILD[142]
EXPERIENCES CONCERNING THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF THE CHILD[142]
Ladies and Gentlemen: In our last lecture we saw how important the emotional processes of childhood are for later life. In to-day's lecture I should like to give you some insight into the psychic life of the child through the analysis of a four-year-old girl. It is much to be regretted that there are few among you who have had the opportunity of reading the analysis of "Little Hans" (Kleiner Hans), which was published by Freud during the current year.[143] I ought to begin by giving you the content of that analysis, so that you might be in a position to compare Freud's results with those obtained by me, and observe the marked, and astonishing similarity between the unconscious creations of the two[133] children. Without a knowledge of the fundamental analysis of Freud, much in the report of the following case will appear strange, incomprehensible, and perhaps unacceptable to you. I beg you, however, to defer your final judgment and to enter upon the consideration of these new subjects with a kindly disposition, for such pioneer work in virgin soil requires not only the greatest patience on the part of the investigator, but also the unprejudiced attention of his audience. Because the Freudian investigations apparently involve a discussion of the most intimate secrets of sexuality many people have had a feeling of repulsion against them, and have therefore rejected everything as a matter of course without any real disproof. This, unfortunately, has almost always been the fate of Freud's doctrines up to the present. One must not come to the consideration of these matters with the firm conviction that they do not exist, for it may easily happen that for the prejudiced they really do not exist. One should perhaps assume the author's point of view for the moment and investigate these phenomena under his guidance. Only in this way can the correctness or otherwise of our observations be affirmed. We may err, as all human beings err. But the continual holding up to us of our mistakes—perhaps they are worse than mistakes—does not help us to see things more distinctly. We should prefer to see wherein we err. That should be demonstrated to us in our own sphere of experience. Thus far, however, no one has succeeded in meeting us on our own ground, nor in giving us a different conception of the things which we ourselves see. We still have to complain that our critics persist in maintaining complete ignorance about the matters in question. The only reason for this is that they have never taken the trouble to become thoroughly acquainted with our method; had they done this they would have understood us.
Ladies and Gentlemen: In our last lecture, we discussed how crucial childhood emotional processes are for later life. In today’s lecture, I’d like to give you insight into a child’s psychological life by analyzing a four-year-old girl. It’s unfortunate that many of you haven’t had the chance to read the analysis of "Little Hans" (Kleiner Hans), which Freud published this year.[143] I should start by sharing the content of that analysis so you can compare Freud’s findings with mine and notice the striking, and surprising, similarities between the unconscious thoughts of the two[133] children. Without understanding Freud's fundamental analysis, much of the report on the following case may seem strange, confusing, or even unacceptable to you. I ask you to hold off on your final judgment and approach these new topics with an open mind, as this groundbreaking work in uncharted territory requires not only great patience from the researcher but also unbiased attention from the audience. Because Freud’s investigations often delve into the most personal aspects of sexuality, many people have reacted with repulsion and have dismissed everything without any real evidence to argue against it. Sadly, this has been the common experience for Freud's theories up to now. One shouldn’t approach these topics with a firm belief that they don’t exist because it’s very possible that, for those with biases, they truly don’t exist. It might be helpful to temporarily adopt the author’s perspective and examine these phenomena under his guidance. Only in this way can we confirm whether our observations are correct or not. We might make mistakes, as everyone does. However, constantly being reminded of our errors—perhaps they’re worse than mere mistakes—doesn’t help us see things clearly. We’d rather understand where we’re wrong. That should be shown to us through our own experience. So far, no one has been able to meet us on our own terms or offer a different understanding of what we see ourselves. We continue to lament that our critics maintain complete ignorance about the issues at hand. The only reason for this ignorance is that they’ve never taken the time to fully understand our method; had they done so, they would have comprehended us.
The little girl to whose sagacity and intellectual vivacity we are indebted for the following observations is a healthy, lively child of emotional temperament. She has never been seriously ill, and never, even in the realm of the nervous system, had there been observed any symptoms prior to this[134] investigation. In the report which follows we shall have to waive any connected description, for it is made up of anecdotes which treat of one experience out of a whole cycle of similar ones, and which cannot, therefore, be arranged scientifically and systematically, but must rather be described somewhat in the form of a story. We cannot as yet dispense with this manner of description in our analytical psychology, for we are still far from being able in all cases to separate with unerring certainty what is curious from what is typical.
The little girl, whose insight and lively intelligence we owe the following observations to, is a healthy, energetic child with an emotional temperament. She has never been seriously ill and has not shown any symptoms, even in the nervous system, prior to this[134] investigation. In the report that follows, we will have to forgo a connected description, as it consists of anecdotes that reflect one experience out of many similar ones. These anecdotes cannot be organized scientifically and systematically, but rather must be described more like a story. We still need this narrative style in our analytical psychology, as we are far from being able to consistently differentiate the curious from the typical.
When the little daughter, whom we will call Anna, was about three years old, she once had the following conversation with her grandmother:
When Anna, the little girl we’ll refer to, was about three years old, she had this conversation with her grandmother:
Anna: "Grandma, why are your eyes so dim?"
Anna: "Grandma, why do your eyes look so dull?"
Grandma: "Because I am old."
Grandma: "Because I'm old."
A.: "But you will become young again."
A.: "But you'll feel young again."
G.: "No, do you know, I shall become older and older, and then I shall die."
G.: "No, you know, I'm just going to keep getting older, and eventually, I'll die."
A.: "Well, and then?"
A.: "And then what?"
G.: "Then I shall be an angel."
G.: "Then I'll be an angel."
A.: "And then will you be a little baby again?"
A.: "So, will you be a baby again?"
The child found here a welcome opportunity for the provisional solution of a problem. For some time before she had been in the habit of asking her mother whether she would ever have a living doll, a little child, a little brother. This naturally included the question as to the origin of children. As such questions appeared only spontaneously and indirectly, the parents attached no significance to them, but responded to them as lightly and in appearance as carelessly as the child seemed to ask them. Thus she once received from her father the pretty story that children are brought by the stork. Anna had already heard somewhere a more serious version, namely, that children, are little angels living in heaven, and are brought from heaven by the stork. This theory seems to have become the starting point for the investigating activity of the little one. From the conversation with the grandmother it could be seen that this theory was capable of wide application, namely, it not only solved[135] in a comforting manner the painful idea of parting and dying, but at the same time also the riddle of the origin of children. Such solutions which kill at least two birds with one stone were formerly tenaciously adhered to in science, and cannot be removed from the mind of the child without a certain amount of shock.
The child saw this as a great chance to temporarily solve a problem. For a while, she had been asking her mom if she would ever have a living doll, a little child, or a little brother. This naturally led to questions about where children come from. Since these questions came up randomly and indirectly, the parents didn’t think much of them and answered as casually as the child seemed to ask. Once, her dad told her the cute story that children come from the stork. Anna had also heard a more serious version somewhere, which said that children are little angels living in heaven and are brought down by the stork. This idea seemed to spark her curiosity. From her talks with her grandmother, it was clear that this theory could explain a lot; it not only eased the tough idea of separation and dying but also tackled the mystery of where children come from. Such solutions that address two issues at once were once held onto tightly in science, and it’s not easy to change a child's mind about them without causing some confusion.
Just as the birth of a little sister was the turning point in the history of "Little Hans," so in this case it was the birth of a brother, which happened when Anna had reached the age of four years. The pregnancy of the mother apparently remained unnoticed; i.e. the child never expressed herself on this subject. On the evening before the birth, when labour pains were beginning, the child was in her father's room. He took her on his knee and said, "Tell me, what would you say if you should get a little brother to-night?" "I would kill him" was the prompt answer. The expression "to kill" looks very serious, but in reality it is quite harmless, for "to kill" and "to die" in child language signify only to remove, either in the active or in the passive sense, as has already been pointed out a number of times by Freud. "To kill" as used by the child is a harmless word, especially so when we know that the child uses the word "kill" quite promiscuously for all possible kinds of destruction, removal, demolition, etc. It is, nevertheless, worth while to note this tendency (see the analysis of Kleiner Hans, p. 5).
Just like the arrival of a little sister was a pivotal moment in the story of "Little Hans," in this case, it was the birth of a brother, which took place when Anna was four years old. The mother's pregnancy seemed to go unnoticed; in other words, the child never mentioned it. On the night before the birth, when the labor pains started, the child was in her father's room. He held her on his lap and asked, "What would you say if you got a little brother tonight?" "I would kill him," was her quick reply. The phrase "to kill" may sound serious, but it’s actually quite innocent because "to kill" and "to die" in child language simply mean to remove, whether actively or passively, as Freud has pointed out several times. For the child, "to kill" is an innocent term, especially since we know she uses the word "kill" quite freely for different kinds of destruction, removal, demolition, etc. Still, it’s important to note this tendency (see the analysis of Kleiner Hans, p. 5).
The birth occurred early in the morning, and later the father entered the room where Anna slept. She awoke as he came in. He imparted to her the news of the advent of a little brother, which she took with surprise and strained facial expression. The father took her in his arms and carried her into the lying-in room. She first threw a rapid glance at her somewhat pale mother and then displayed something like a mixture of embarrassment and suspicion as if thinking, "Now what else is going to happen?" (Father's impression.) She displayed hardly any pleasure at the sight of the new arrival, so that the cool reception she gave it caused general disappointment. During the forenoon she kept very noticeably away from her mother; this was the more striking as[136] she was usually much attached to her. But once when her mother was alone she ran into the room, embraced her and said, "Well, aren't you going to die now?" Now a part of the conflict in the child's psyche is revealed to us. Though the stork theory was never really taken seriously, she accepted the fruitful re-birth hypothesis, according to which a person by dying helps a child into life. Accordingly the mother, too, must die; why, then, should the newborn child, against whom she already felt childish jealousy, cause her pleasure? It was for this reason that she had to seek a favourable opportunity of reassuring herself as to whether the mother was to die, or rather was moved to express the hope that she would not die.
The baby was born early in the morning, and later, the father entered the room where Anna was sleeping. She woke up when he came in. He shared the news with her that she had a little brother, which surprised her and made her frown. The father picked her up and carried her into the room with the new baby. She quickly glanced at her somewhat pale mother and showed a mix of embarrassment and suspicion, as if thinking, "What else is going to happen now?" (Father's impression.) She hardly showed any joy at seeing the new baby, and her indifferent reaction disappointed everyone. During the morning, she noticeably kept her distance from her mother, which was surprising since she usually felt very close to her. But once, when her mother was alone, she rushed into the room, hugged her, and asked, "Well, aren't you going to die now?" This reveals part of the inner conflict in the child's mind. Although she never really believed in the stork story, she accepted the idea that when someone dies, they help a child come into the world. So, her mother must die too; why then would she feel happy about a newborn baby, whom she already felt a childish jealousy toward? For this reason, she needed to find a good moment to reassure herself about whether her mother was going to die or to express her hope that she wouldn’t.
With this happy issue, however, the re-birth theory sustained a severe shock. How was it possible now to explain the birth of her little brother and the origin of children in general? There still remained the stork theory which, though never expressly rejected, had been implicitly waived through the assumption of the re-birth theory. The explanations next attempted unfortunately remained hidden from the parents as the child went to stay with her grandmother for a few weeks. From the latter's report the stork theory was often discussed, and was naturally reinforced by the concurrence of those about her.
With this happy development, however, the re-birth theory took a serious hit. How could they now explain the birth of her little brother and where children come from in general? The stork theory was still around, which, although never explicitly dismissed, had been implicitly set aside with the acceptance of the re-birth theory. The attempts at explanation unfortunately remained unknown to the parents since the child went to stay with her grandmother for a few weeks. From her grandmother's reports, the stork theory was frequently talked about, and it was naturally supported by those around her.
When Anna returned to her parents, she again, on meeting her mother, evinced the same mixture of embarrassment and suspicion which she had displayed after the birth. The impression, though inexplicable, was quite unmistakable to both parents. Her behaviour towards the baby was very nice. During her absence a nurse had come into the house who, on account of her uniform, made a deep impression on Anna; to be sure, the impression at first was quite unfavourable as she evinced the greatest hostility to her. Thus nothing could induce her to allow herself to be undressed and put to sleep by this nurse. Whence this resistance originated was soon shown in an angry scene near the cradle of the little brother in which Anna shouted at the nurse, "This is not your little brother, he is mine!" Gradually,[137] however, she became reconciled to the nurse, and began to play nurse herself; she had to have her white cap and apron, and "nursed" now her little brother, and now her doll.
When Anna came back to her parents, she once again showed the same mix of embarrassment and suspicion towards her mother that she had after the birth. It was an impression that, while hard to explain, was clear to both of her parents. Her interaction with the baby was very sweet. During her time away, a nurse had come to the house, and her uniform made a strong impression on Anna; initially, it was a negative one as she showed a lot of hostility towards her. Nothing could convince her to let the nurse undress her or put her to bed. The source of this resistance soon became clear in a heated scene by her little brother's crib, where Anna yelled at the nurse, "This is not your little brother, he is mine!" Gradually,[137] she warmed up to the nurse and started to play nurse herself; she had to have her white cap and apron, and she "nursed" both her little brother and her doll.
In contrast to her former mood she became unmistakably mournful and dreamy. She often sat for a long time under the table singing stories and making rhymes, which were partially incomprehensible but sometimes contained the "nurse" theme ("I am a nurse of the green cross"). Some of the stories, however, distinctly showed a painful feeling striving for expression.
In contrast to how she used to feel, she became clearly sad and lost in thought. She often sat for a long time under the table, singing stories and making up rhymes that were sometimes hard to understand but occasionally included the "nurse" theme ("I am a nurse of the green cross"). However, some of the stories clearly revealed a deep, painful feeling trying to come out.
Here we meet with a new and important feature in the little one's life: that is, we meet with reveries, even a tendency towards poetic fancies and melancholic attacks. All of them things which we are wont first to encounter at a later period of life, at a time when the youth or maiden is preparing to sever the family tie and to enter independently upon life, but is still held back by an inward, painful feeling of homesickness for the warmth of the parental hearth. At such a time the youth begins to replace what is lacking with poetic fancies in order to compensate for the deficiency. To approximate the psychology of a four-year-old child to that of the youth approaching puberty will at first sight seem paradoxical; the relationship lies, however, not in the age but rather in the mechanism. The elegiac reveries express the fact that a part of that love which formerly belonged, and should belong, to a real object, is now introverted, that is, it is turned inward into the subject and there produces an increased imaginative activity. What is the origin of this introversion? Is it a psychological manifestation peculiar to this age, or does it owe its origin to a conflict?
Here we encounter a new and significant aspect of the child's life: reveries, a tendency toward poetic thoughts and moments of melancholy. These are usually things we first notice at a later stage in life when a young person is about to break away from the family and step independently into the world, yet is still held back by a painful feeling of homesickness for the comfort of home. During this time, the young person begins to fill the gaps with poetic thoughts to make up for what is missing. While it might seem odd to compare the psychology of a four-year-old child to that of a youth approaching puberty, the connection isn't based on age but rather on the underlying mechanism. These melancholic daydreams indicate that part of the love that used to be directed toward a real object is now introverted, meaning it is turned inward and generates greater imaginative activity. What causes this introversion? Is it a psychological characteristic of this age, or is it a result of some inner conflict?
This is explained in the following occurrence. It often happened that Anna was disobedient to her mother, she was insolent, saying, "I am going back to grandma."
This is explained in the following occurrence. It often happened that Anna was disobedient to her mother; she would be rude, saying, "I'm going back to grandma."
Mother: "But I shall be sad when you leave me."
Mother: "But I'll be sad when you leave me."
Anna: "Oh, but you have my little brother."
Anna: "Oh, but you have my little brother."
This reaction towards the mother shows what the little one was really aiming at with her threats to go away again; she apparently wished to hear what her mother would say to[138] her proposal, that is, to see what attitude her mother would actually assume to her, whether her little brother had not ousted her altogether from her mother's regard. One must, however, give no credence to this little trickster. For the child could readily see and feel that, despite the existence of the little brother, there was nothing essentially lacking to her in her mother's love. The reproach to which she subjects her mother is therefore unjustified, and to the trained ear this is betrayed by a slightly affected tone. Such an unmistakable tone does not expect to be taken seriously and hence it obtrudes itself more vehemently. The reproach as such cannot be taken seriously by the mother, for it was only the forerunner of other and this time more serious resistances. Not long after the conversation narrated above, the following scene took place:
This reaction towards her mother shows what the little one was really after with her threats to leave again; she seemingly wanted to hear her mother's response to her proposal and see what attitude her mother would really take towards her, whether her little brother had completely pushed her out of her mother's affection. However, one should not believe this little trickster. The child could easily see and feel that, despite the little brother's presence, nothing essential was missing in her mother's love for her. The accusation she directs at her mother is therefore unjustified, and to a trained ear, this is revealed by a slightly forced tone. Such an unmistakable tone does not expect to be taken seriously, which is why it stands out even more. The mother cannot take the accusation seriously because it was only the precursor to other, more serious forms of resistance. Not long after the conversation mentioned above, the following scene unfolded:
Mother: "Come, we are going into the garden now!"
Mother: "Come on, we're heading to the garden now!"
Anna: "You are telling lies, take care if you are not telling the truth."
Anna: "You're just joking, be careful if you're not being honest."
M.: "What are you thinking of? I am telling the truth."
M.: "What are you thinking? I am being honest."
A.: "No, you are not telling the truth."
A.: "No, you're not telling the truth."
M.: "You will soon see that I am telling the truth: we are going into the garden now."
M.: "You'll see soon enough that I’m being truthful: we’re going to the garden now."
A.: "Indeed, is that true? Is that really true? Are you not lying?"
A.: "Really, is that true? Is that really true? You're not lying?"
Scenes of this kind were repeated a number of times. This time the tone was more rude and more vehement, and at the same time the accent on the word "lie" betrayed something special which the parents did not understand; indeed, at first they attributed too little significance to the spontaneous utterances of the child. In this they merely did what education usually does in general, ex officio. We usually pay little heed to children in every stage of life; in all essential matters, they are treated as not responsible, and in all unessential ma tters, they are trained with an automatic precision.
Scenes like this happened several times. This time the tone was ruder and more intense, and the emphasis on the word "lie" hinted at something deeper that the parents didn’t grasp; in fact, at first, they didn't think much of the child's spontaneous remarks. They were simply doing what education typically does, ex officio. We often overlook children at every stage of their lives; in all important matters, they’re treated as if they’re not responsible, while in all trivial matters, they’re taught with an automatic precision.
Under resistances there always lies a question, a conflict, of which we hear later and on other occasions. But usually[139] one forgets to connect the thing heard with the resistances. Thus, on another occasion, Anna put to her mother the following questions:—
Under resistance, there’s always a question, a conflict, that we hear about later and in different situations. But usually[139] one forgets to link what was heard with the resistances. So, on another occasion, Anna asked her mother the following questions:—
Anna: "I should like to become a nurse when I grow big—why did you not become a nurse?"
Anna: "I want to be a nurse when I grow up—why didn't you become a nurse?"
Mother: "Why, as I have become a mother I have children to nurse anyway."
Mother: "Well, now that I'm a mom, I have kids to take care of anyway."
A. (Reflecting): "Indeed, shall I be a lady like you, and shall I talk to you then?"
A. (Thinking): "So, will I be a woman like you, and will I be able to talk to you then?"
The mother's answer again shows whither the child's question was really directed. Apparently Anna, too, would like to have a child to "nurse" just as the nurse has. Where the nurse got the little child is quite clear. Anna, too, could get a child in the same way if she were big. Why did not the mother become such a nurse, that is to say, how did she get a child if not in the same way as the nurse? Like the nurse, Anna, too, could get a child, but how that fact might be changed in the future or how she might come to resemble her mother in the matter of getting children is not clear to her. From this resulted the thoughtful question, "Indeed, shall I be a lady like you? Shall I be quite different?" The stork theory evidently had come to naught, the dying theory met a similar fate; hence she now thinks one may get a child in the same way, as, for example, the nurse got hers. She, too, could get one in this natural way, but how about the mother who is no nurse and still has children? Looking at the matter from this point of view, Anna asks: "Why did you not become a nurse?" namely, "why have you not got your child in the natural way?" This peculiar indirect manner of questioning is typical, and evidently corresponds with the child's hazy grasp of the problem, unless we assume a certain diplomatic uncertainty prompted by a desire to evade direct questioning. We shall later find an illustration of this possibility. Anna is evidently confronted with the question "Where does the child come from?" The stork did not bring it; mother did not die; nor did mother get it in the same way as the nurse. She has, however, asked this question before and received the information from her father that the stork brings[140] children; this is positively untrue, she can never be deceived on this point. Accordingly, papa and mama and all the others lie. This readily explains her suspicion at the childbirth and her discrediting of her mother. But it also explains another point, namely, the elegiac reveries which we have attributed to a partial introversion. We know now what was the real object from which love was removed and uselessly introverted, namely, it had to be taken from the parents who deceived her and refused to tell her the truth. (What can this be which must not be uttered? What is going on here?) Such were the parenthetic questions of the child, and the answer was: Evidently this must be something to be concealed, perhaps something dangerous. Attempts to make her talk and to draw out the truth by means of artful questions were futile, so resistance is placed against resistance, and the introversion of love begins. It is evident that the capacity for sublimation in a four-year-old child is still too slightly developed to be capable of performing more than symptomatic services. The mind, therefore, depends on another compensation, namely, it resorts to one of the relinquished infantile devices for securing love by force, preferably that of crying and calling the mother at night. This had been diligently practised and exhausted during her first year. It now returns, and corresponding to the period of life has become well determined and equipped with recent impressions. It was just after the earthquakes in Messina, and this event was discussed at the table. Anna was extremely interested in everything, she repeatedly asked her grandmother to tell her how the earth shook, how the houses fell in and many people lost their lives. After this she had nocturnal fears, she could not be alone, her mother had to go to her and stay with her; otherwise she feared that an earthquake would happen, that the house would fall and kill her. During the day, too, she was much occupied with such thoughts. While walking with her mother she annoyed her with such questions as, "Will the house be standing when we return home? Are you sure there is no earthquake at home? Will papa still be living?" About every stone lying in the road she asked whether it was from an earthquake. A[141] building in course of erection was a house destroyed by the earthquake, etc. Finally, she began to cry out frequently at night that the earthquake was coming and that she heard the thunder. Each evening she had to be solemnly assured that there was no earthquake coming.
The mother's response again indicates where the child's question was really aimed. It seems Anna, too, would like to have a child to "nurse" just like the nurse does. It's clear where the nurse got her little child. Anna could also get a child in the same way if she were older. Why didn't the mother become a nurse, meaning how did she get a child if not like the nurse? Like the nurse, Anna could have a child, but she doesn't understand how that might change in the future or how she might come to resemble her mother in having children. This leads to her curious question, "Will I be a lady like you? Will I be completely different?" The stork theory clearly didn't hold up, and the dying theory met a similar end; so she now thinks one might get a child in the same way the nurse did. She believes she could also go about it naturally, but what about her mother who isn't a nurse and still has children? From this perspective, Anna asks, "Why didn’t you become a nurse?" meaning, "Why didn’t you get your child the natural way?" This unusual indirect way of questioning is typical and likely reflects the child's confused understanding of the issue, unless we assume some diplomatic uncertainty due to wanting to avoid direct questioning. We will later see an example of this possibility. Anna is clearly grappling with the question "Where do children come from?" The stork didn’t bring one; mother didn’t die; nor did mother acquire it in the same way as the nurse. However, she has asked this before and was told by her father that the stork brings[140] children; this is definitely untrue, so she feels she can't be misled on this. Therefore, both mama and papa, along with everyone else, are lying. This easily explains her skepticism about childbirth and her lack of trust in her mother. But it also clarifies another issue—specifically, the sad daydreams we attributed to a form of introversion. We now understand that the real source from which love was drawn away and uselessly internalized had to be taken from the parents who deceived her and wouldn’t tell her the truth. (What could this be that must remain unsaid? What is happening here?) These were the lingering questions of the child, and the answer seemed to be: Clearly, this must be something that must be hidden, perhaps something dangerous. Attempts to get her to speak and uncover the truth through clever questions were in vain, so resistance is met with resistance, and the internalization of love begins. It's clear that the ability to channel emotions in a four-year-old is still too underdeveloped to do anything more than make symptomatic gestures. Thus, her mind seeks another form of compensation, namely, she turns back to one of the abandoned childhood tactics for securing love through force, especially that of crying and calling for her mother at night. This behavior had been practiced diligently and exhausted during her first year. It now resurfaces, and according to her current age, it has become well-defined and influenced by recent experiences. It was just after the earthquakes in Messina, which were discussed at the dinner table. Anna was very curious about everything and repeatedly asked her grandmother to explain how the earth shook, how the buildings collapsed, and how many people lost their lives. Afterward, she had nighttime fears; she couldn't be alone, and her mother needed to stay with her; otherwise, she feared that an earthquake would occur, the house would collapse, and it would kill her. During the day, she was also very preoccupied with such thoughts. While walking with her mother, she troubled her with questions like, "Will the house still be standing when we get back home? Are you sure there’s no earthquake happening at home? Will papa still be alive?" About every stone on the ground, she asked if it was from an earthquake. A[141] building under construction was a house that had been destroyed by the earthquake, etc. Eventually, she began to frequently shout at night that an earthquake was coming and that she heard thunder. Every evening, she had to be solemnly reassured that there was no earthquake on the way.
Many means of calming her were tried, thus she was told, for example, that earthquakes only occur where there are volcanoes. But then she had to be satisfied that the mountains surrounding the city were not volcanoes. This reasoning led the child by degrees to a desire for learning, as strong as it was unnatural at her age, which showed itself in a demand that all the geological atlases and text-books should be brought to her from her father's library. For hours she rummaged through these works looking for pictures of volcanoes and earthquakes, and asking questions continually. Here we are confronted by an energetic effort to sublimate the fear into an eager desire for knowledge, which at this age made a decidedly premature exaction. But how many a gifted child suffering in exactly the same way with such problems, is "cosseted" through this untimely sublimation, by no means to its advantage. For, by favouring sublimation at this age one is merely strengthening manifestation of neurosis. The root of the eager desire for knowledge is fear, and fear is the expression of converted libido; that is, it is the expression of an introversion which has become neurotic, which at this age is neither necessary nor favourable for the development of the child.
Many ways of calming her were attempted, so she was told, for instance, that earthquakes only happen where there are volcanoes. But then she had to accept that the mountains surrounding the city were not volcanoes. This reasoning gradually led the child to develop a desire for knowledge, as intense as it was unusual for her age, which manifested in her request for all the geological atlases and textbooks to be brought to her from her father's library. For hours, she poured over these materials searching for pictures of volcanoes and earthquakes and constantly asking questions. Here we see an energetic effort to transform her fear into a strong desire for knowledge, which at this age was quite premature. But how many gifted children, struggling with similar issues, are "coddled" through this untimely transformation, to their detriment? By encouraging this transformation at such a young age, one is only reinforcing the signs of neurosis. The foundation of this eager desire for knowledge is fear, and fear is the expression of repressed desire; that is, it is the expression of an introversion that has become neurotic, which at this age is neither necessary nor beneficial for the child's development.
Whither this eager desire for knowledge was ultimately directed is explained by a series of questions which arose almost daily. "Why is Sophie (a younger sister) younger than I?" "Where was Freddie (the little brother) before? Was he in heaven? What was he doing there? Why did he come down just now, why not before?"
Whither this eager desire for knowledge was ultimately directed is explained by a series of questions which arose almost daily. "Why is Sophie (a younger sister) younger than me?" "Where was Freddie (the little brother) before? Was he in heaven? What was he doing there? Why did he come down just now, why not before?"
This state of affairs led the father to decide that the mother should tell the child when occasion offered the truth concerning the origin of the little brother. This having been done, Anna soon thereafter asked about the stork. Her mother told her that the story of the stork was not true, but[142] that Freddie grew inside his mother like the flowers in a plant. At first he was very little, and then he became bigger and bigger as a plant does. She listened attentively without the slightest surprise, and then asked, "But did he come out all by himself?"
This situation led the father to decide that the mother should tell the child when the opportunity arose the truth about how the little brother came to be. After this was done, Anna soon asked about the stork. Her mother explained that the story of the stork wasn’t true, but[142] that Freddie grew inside his mother like flowers in a plant. At first, he was very small, and then he grew bigger and bigger, just like a plant does. She listened carefully without any surprise and then asked, "But did he come out all by himself?"
Mother: "Yes."
Mother: "Yes."
Anna: "But he cannot walk!"
Anna: "But he can't walk!"
Sophie: "Then he crawled out."
Sophie: "So he crawled out."
Anna, overhearing her little sister's answer: "Is there a hole here? (pointing to the breast) or did he come out of the mouth? Who came out of the nurse?" She then interrupted herself and exclaimed, "No, no, the stork brought baby brother down from heaven." She soon left the subject and again wished to see pictures of volcanoes. During the evening following this conversation she was calm. The sudden explanation produced in the child a whole series of ideas, which manifested themselves in certain questions. New unexpected perspectives were opened; she rapidly approached the main problem, namely, the question, "Where did the baby come out?" Was it from a hole in the breast or from the mouth? Both suppositions are entirely qualified to form acceptable theories. We even meet with recently married women who still entertain the theory of the hole in the abdominal wall or of the Cæsarean section; this is supposed to betray a very unusual degree of innocence. But as a matter of fact it is not innocence; we are always dealing in such cases with infantile sexual activities, which in later life have brought the vias naturales into ill repute.
Anna, overhearing her little sister's question: "Is there a hole here? (pointing to the chest) or did he come out of the mouth? Who came out of the nurse?" Then she interrupted herself and said, "No, no, the stork brought baby brother down from heaven." She quickly changed the topic and wanted to see pictures of volcanoes again. That evening, she was calm. The sudden explanation triggered a whole set of ideas in the child, leading to certain questions. New unexpected perspectives opened up; she rapidly approached the main issue, which was the question, "Where did the baby come out?" Was it from a hole in the chest or from the mouth? Both ideas are completely valid in forming acceptable theories. We even encounter recently married women who still hold onto the theory of a hole in the abdominal wall or a C-section; this is thought to reveal a very unusual level of innocence. However, it's not really innocence; in such cases, we're dealing with childish sexual curiosity, which in later life has given the vias naturales a bad reputation.
It may be asked where the child got the absurd idea that there is a hole in the breast, or that the birth takes place through the mouth. Why did she not select one of the natural openings existing in the pelvis from which things come out daily? The explanation is simple. Very shortly before, our little one had invoked some educational criticism from her mother by a heightened interest in both openings with their remarkable excretions,—an interest not always in accord with the requirements of cleanliness and decorum. Then for the first time she became acquainted with the[143] exceptional laws relating to these bodily regions and, being a sensitive child, she soon learned that there was something here to be tabooed. This region, therefore, must not be referred to. Anna had simply shown herself docile and had so adjusted herself to the cultural demands that she thought (at least spoke) of the simplest things last. The incorrect theories substituted for correct laws sometimes persist for years until brusque explanations come from without. It is, therefore, no wonder that such theories, the forming of and adherence to which are favoured even by parents and educationalists should later become determinants for important symptoms in a neurosis, or of delusions in a psychosis, just as I have shown that in dementia præcox[144] what has existed in the mind for years always remains somewhere, though it may be hidden under compensations of a seemingly different kind.
It might be wondered where the child got the strange idea that there’s a hole in her chest or that birth happens through the mouth. Why didn’t she choose one of the natural openings in the pelvis from which things come out every day? The answer is simple. Not long before, our little one had caught her mother’s attention with her intense curiosity about both openings and their notable discharges—an interest not always in line with expectations of cleanliness and modesty. For the first time, she learned about the unique rules surrounding these body parts and, being a sensitive child, she quickly understood that there was something taboo about it. Therefore, this area shouldn’t be mentioned. Anna simply displayed a willingness to adjust to cultural expectations, thinking (or at least speaking) about the simplest things last. Incorrect beliefs that replace accurate knowledge can stick around for years until blunt explanations come from outside. So, it’s no surprise that such beliefs, which are even supported by parents and educators, might later play a role in significant symptoms of a neurosis or delusions in a psychosis, just as I have shown in the case of dementia præcox that what has been in the mind for years always remains somewhere, even if it’s hidden beneath compensations of a seemingly different nature.
But even before this question was settled as to where the child really comes out a new problem obtruded itself, viz. the children came out of the mother, but how is it with the nurse? Did some one come out of her too? This question was followed by the remark, "No, no, the stork brought down baby brother from heaven." What is there peculiar about the fact that nobody came out of the nurse? We recall that Anna identified herself with the nurse, and planned to become a nurse later, for she, too, would like to have a child, and she could have one as well as the nurse. But now when it is known that the little brother grew in mama, how is it now?
But even before this question was answered about where the child really comes from, a new issue popped up: the children came from the mother, but what about the nurse? Did someone come from her too? This led to the response, "No, no, the stork brought baby brother down from heaven." What’s strange about the fact that no one came from the nurse? We remember that Anna identified with the nurse and planned to become a nurse herself, since she also wanted to have a child, and she could have one just like the nurse. But now that we know the little brother grew in mom, what does that mean?
This disquieting question is averted by a quick return to the stork-angel theory which has never been really believed and which after a few trials is at last definitely abandoned. Two questions, however, remain in the air. The first reads as follows: Where does the child come out? The second, a considerably more difficult one, reads: How does it happen that mama has children while the nurse and the servants[144] do not? All these questions did not at first manifest themselves.
This troubling question is sidestepped by quickly returning to the stork-angel theory, which has never been truly believed and is ultimately abandoned after a few attempts. However, two questions still linger. The first is: Where does the child come from? The second, which is significantly more complex, is: How is it that mom has children while the nurse and the servants[144] do not? All these questions didn’t initially present themselves.
On the day following the explanation, while at dinner, Anna spontaneously remarked: "My brother is in Italy, and has a house of cloth and glass, but it does not tumble down."
On the day after the explanation, while having dinner, Anna casually said, "My brother is in Italy, and he has a house made of fabric and glass, but it doesn't fall down."
In this case, as in the others, it was impossible to ask for an explanation; the resistances were too great and Anna could not be drawn into conversation. This former officious and pretty explanation is very significant. For some three months the two sisters had been building a stereotyped fanciful conception of a "big brother." This brother knows everything, he can do and has everything, he has been and is in every place where the children are not; he is owner of great cows, oxen, horses, dogs; everything is his, etc. Every one has such a "big brother." We must not look far for the origin of this fancy; the model for it is the father who seems to correspond to this conception; he seems to be like a brother to mama. The children, too, have their similar powerful "brother." This brother is very brave; he is at present in dangerous Italy and inhabits an impossible fragile house, and it does not tumble down. For the child this realises an important wish: the earthquake is no longer to be dangerous; in consequence the child's fear disappeared and did not return. The fear of earthquakes now entirely vanished. Instead of calling her father to her bed to conjure away the fear, she now became very affectionate and begged him every night to kiss her.
In this situation, just like in the others, it was impossible to ask for an explanation; the resistance was too strong, and Anna couldn’t engage in conversation. This previous excessive and seemingly charming explanation is quite meaningful. For about three months, the two sisters had been creating a stereotypical and imaginative idea of a "big brother." This brother knows everything, can do anything, and has everything; he has been and is everywhere the children aren't; he owns great cows, oxen, horses, and dogs; everything belongs to him, and so on. Everyone has such a "big brother." We don’t need to look far for the source of this fantasy; the model is the father, who seems to fit this image; he appears to be like a brother to mom. The children also have their own powerful "brother." This brother is very brave; he is currently in dangerous Italy living in a seemingly fragile house, and it doesn’t collapse. For the child, this fulfills an important wish: the earthquake is no longer a threat; as a result, the child's fear vanished and didn’t come back. The fear of earthquakes entirely disappeared. Instead of calling her father to her bed to chase away her fear, she now became very affectionate and asked him every night to kiss her.
In order to test this new state of affairs the father showed her pictures illustrating volcanoes and earthquake devastations. Anna remained unaffected, she examined the pictures with indifference, remarking, "These people are dead; I have already seen that quite often." The picture of a volcanic eruption no longer had any attraction for her. Thus all her scientific interest collapsed and vanished as suddenly as it came. During the days following the explanation Anna had quite important matters to occupy herself with; she disseminated her newly acquired knowledge among those about her in the following manner: She began by again[145] circumstantially affirming what had been told her, viz. that Freddy, her younger sister, and herself had grown in her mother, that papa and mama grew in their mothers, and that the servants likewise grew in their respective mothers. By frequent questions she tested the true basis of her knowledge, for her suspicion was aroused in no small measure, so that it needed many confirmations to remove all her uncertainties.
To test this new situation, the father showed her pictures of volcanoes and the damage caused by earthquakes. Anna remained indifferent; she looked at the pictures without much interest and said, "These people are dead; I've seen that many times before." The image of a volcanic eruption no longer intrigued her. Her scientific curiosity faded away just as quickly as it had appeared. In the days after the explanation, Anna had important things to keep her busy; she shared her newfound knowledge with those around her in the following way: She started by once again[145] thoroughly confirming what she had been told, namely that Freddy, her younger sister, and she had grown inside their mother, that dad and mom grew in their mothers, and that the servants also grew inside their respective mothers. She frequently asked questions to test the foundation of her understanding, as her doubts were significantly raised, requiring many confirmations to clear all her uncertainties.
On one occasion the trustworthiness of the theory threatened to go to pieces. About a week after the explanation, the father was taken ill with influenza and had to remain in bed during the forenoon. The children knew nothing about this, and Anna, coming into the parents' bedroom, saw what was quite unusual, namely, that her father was remaining in bed. She again took on a peculiar surprised expression; she remained at a distance from the bed and would not come nearer; she was apparently again reserved and suspicious. But suddenly she burst out with the question, "Why are you in bed; have you a plant in your inside too?"
On one occasion, the reliability of the theory was in jeopardy. About a week after the explanation, the father got sick with the flu and had to stay in bed during the morning. The children were unaware of this, and Anna, entering her parents' bedroom, noticed something quite unusual: her father was still in bed. She again wore a look of surprise; she kept her distance from the bed and wouldn’t come closer; she seemed cautious and suspicious. But suddenly, she asked, "Why are you in bed? Do you have a plant inside you too?"
The father naturally had to laugh. He calmed her, however, by assuring her that children never grow in the father, that only women can have children, and not men; thereupon the child again became friendly. But though the surface was calm the problems continued to work in the dark. A few days later, while at dinner, Anna related the following dream: "I dreamed last night of Noah's ark." The father then asked her what she had dreamed about it, but Anna's answer was sheer nonsense. In such cases it is necessary only to wait and pay attention. A few minutes later she said to her mother, "I dreamed last night about Noah's ark, and there were a lot of little animals in it." Another pause. She then began her story for the third time. "I dreamed last night about Noah's ark, and there were a lot of baby animals in it, and underneath there was a lid and that opened and all the baby animals fell out."
The father couldn't help but laugh. He reassured her, explaining that men can't have children, only women can; that made the child feel better. However, even though everything seemed fine on the surface, there were still unresolved issues beneath. A few days later, during dinner, Anna shared a dream: "I dreamed about Noah's ark last night." The father asked her what she had dreamed, but Anna's response was just nonsense. In situations like this, you just have to wait and listen. A few minutes later, she told her mom, "I dreamed about Noah's ark last night, and there were a lot of little animals in it." After another pause, she began telling her story for the third time. "I dreamed about Noah's ark last night, and there were a lot of baby animals in it, and underneath there was a lid that opened and all the baby animals fell out."
The children really had a Noah's ark, but its opening, a lid, was on the roof and not underneath. In this way she delicately intimated that the story of the birth from mouth[146] or breast is incorrect, and that she had some inkling where the children came out.
The kids actually had a Noah's ark, but its opening, a lid, was on the roof instead of underneath. This way, she subtly suggested that the idea of birth from mouth[146] or breast is wrong, and that she had some idea of where the kids came out.
A few weeks then passed without any noteworthy occurrences. On one occasion she related the following dream: "I dreamed about papa and mama; they had been sitting late in the study, and we children were there too." On the face of this we find a wish of the children to be allowed to sit up as long as the parents. This wish is here realised, or rather it is utilised to express a more important wish, namely, to be present in the evening when the parents are alone; of course, quite innocently, it was in the study where she has seen all the interesting books, and where she has satiated her thirst for knowledge; i.e. she was really seeking an answer to the burning question, whence the little brother came. If the children were there they would find out.[145] A few days later Anna had a terrifying dream from which she awoke crying, "The earthquake is coming, the house has begun to shake." Her mother went to her and calmed her by saying that the earthquake was not coming, that everything was quiet, and that everybody was asleep. Whereupon Anna said: "I would like to see the spring, when all the little flowers are coming out and the whole lawn is full of flowers; I would like to see Freddy, he has such a dear little face. What is papa doing? What is he saying?" The mother said, "He is asleep, and isn't saying anything now." Little Anna then remarked with a sarcastic smile: "He will surely be sick again to-morrow."
A few weeks went by without anything significant happening. One day, she shared a dream: "I dreamed about dad and mom; they had been sitting late in the study, and we kids were there too." This shows the children's desire to stay up as late as their parents. Here, that wish is realized, or more accurately, it's used to express a deeper wish: to be there in the evening when the parents are alone; of course, quite innocently, it was in the study where she saw all the interesting books and satisfied her curiosity; i.e. she was really trying to find out the burning question of where the little brother came from. If the kids were there, they'd learn the answer.[145] A few days later, Anna had a scary dream that woke her up crying, "The earthquake is coming, the house has started to shake." Her mom went to her and reassured her that the earthquake wasn’t coming, that everything was calm, and that everyone was asleep. Then Anna said, "I want to see spring when all the little flowers are blooming and the whole lawn is full of flowers; I want to see Freddy, he has such a sweet little face. What is dad doing? What is he saying?" The mom replied, "He’s asleep and not saying anything right now." Little Anna then remarked with a sarcastic smile: "He’s definitely going to be sick again tomorrow."
This text should be read backwards. The last sentence was not meant seriously, as it was uttered in a mocking tone. When the father was sick the last time, Anna suspected that he had a "plant in his inside." The sarcasm signifies: "To-morrow papa is surely going to have a child." But this also is not meant seriously. Papa is not going to have a child; mama alone has children; perhaps she will have another child to-morrow; but where from? "What does papa do?" The formulation of the difficult problem seems[147] here to come to the surface. It reads: What does papa really do if he does not bear children? The little one is very anxious to have a solution for all these problems; she would like to know how Freddy came into the world, she would like to see how the little flowers come out of the earth in the spring, and these wishes are hidden behind the fear of earthquakes.
This text should be read backwards. The last sentence wasn’t meant seriously, as it was said in a mocking tone. When the father was sick last time, Anna thought he had a "plant inside him." The sarcasm means: "Tomorrow Dad is definitely going to have a child." But that’s not meant seriously either. Dad isn’t going to have a child; Mom has the kids; maybe she’ll have another one tomorrow; but where would it come from? "What does Dad do?" The tricky question seems[147] to pop up here. It asks: What does Dad actually do if he doesn't make kids? The little one is really eager to find answers to all these questions; she wants to know how Freddy came into the world, she wants to see how the little flowers burst out of the ground in spring, and these wishes are hidden behind her fear of earthquakes.
After this intermezzo Anna slept quietly until morning. In the morning her mother asked her what she had dreamed. She did not at first recall anything, and then said: "I dreamed that I could make the summer, and then some one threw a Punch[146] down into the closet."
After this break, Anna slept peacefully until morning. In the morning, her mother asked her what she had dreamed. At first, she couldn’t remember anything, and then she said: "I dreamed that I could create summer, and then someone tossed a Punch[146] down into the closet."
This peculiar dream apparently has two different scenes which are separated by "then." The second part draws its material from the recent wish to possess a Punch, that is, to have a boy doll just as mama has a little boy. Some one threw Punch down into the closet; one often lets other things fall down into the water closet. It is just like this that the children, too, come out. We have here an analogy to the "Lumpf-theory" of little Hans.[147] Whenever several scenes are found in one dream, each scene ordinarily represents a particular variation of the complex elaboration. Here accordingly the first part is only a variation of the theme found in the second part. The meaning of "to see the spring" or "to see the little flowers come out" we have already remarked. Anna now dreams that she can make the summer, that is she can bring it about that the little flowers shall come out. She herself can make a little child, and the second part of the dream represents this just as one makes a motion in the w.c. Here we find the egoistic wish which is behind the seemingly objective interest of the previous night's conversation.
This unusual dream seems to have two different scenes separated by "then." The second part is influenced by the recent desire to have a Punch, meaning to have a boy doll just like mom has a little boy. Someone tossed Punch into the closet; it's common for other things to fall into the toilet too. It's just like this that the children, too, come out. This reflects the "Lumpf-theory" of little Hans.[147] When multiple scenes appear in one dream, each scene usually represents a specific variation of the overall theme. In this case, the first part is just a variation of the theme presented in the second part. We've already discussed the meaning of "to see the spring" or "to see the little flowers come out." Anna now dreams that she can create the summer, meaning she can make the little flowers bloom. She can even create a little child, and the second part of the dream illustrates this just like making a movement in the toilet. Here, we uncover the selfish wish that lies behind the seemingly objective interest from the previous night’s conversation.
A few days later the mother was visited by a lady who expected soon to become a mother. The children seemed to take no interest in the matter, but the next day they amused[148] themselves with the following play which was directed by the elder girl; they took all the newspapers they could find in their father's paper-basket and stuffed them under their clothes, so that the imitation was unmistakable. During the night little Anna had another dream: "I dreamed about a woman in the city; she had a very big stomach." The chief actor in a dream is always the dreamer himself under some definite aspect; thus the childish play of the day before is fully solved.
A few days later, the mother was visited by a woman who was soon expecting to become a mother. The children didn’t seem interested in the situation, but the next day they entertained themselves with a play directed by the older girl. They gathered all the newspapers they could find in their dad's paper basket and stuffed them under their clothes, making the imitation obvious. That night, little Anna had another dream: "I dreamed about a woman in the city; she had a really big belly." The main character in a dream is always the dreamer themselves in some specific way, so the childish play from the day before makes complete sense.
Not long after, Anna surprised her mother with the following performance: She stuck her doll under her clothes, then pulled it out slowly head downwards, and at the same time remarked, "Look, the baby is coming out, now it is all out." By this means Anna tells her mother, "You see, thus I apprehend the problem of birth. What do you think of it? Is that right?" The play is really meant to be a question, for, as we shall see later, this idea had to be officially confirmed. That rumination on this problem by no means ended here, is shown by the occasional ideas conceived during the following weeks. Thus she repeated the same play a few days later with her Teddy Bear, who stands in the relation of an especially beloved doll. One day, looking at a rose, she said to her grandmother, "See, the rose is getting a baby." As her grandmother did not quite understand her, she pointed to the enlarged calyx and said, "Don't you see it is quite fat here?"
Not long after, Anna surprised her mother with this performance: She tucked her doll under her clothes, then slowly pulled it out headfirst, and at the same time said, "Look, the baby is coming out, now it is all out." With this, Anna was showing her mother, "You see, this is how I understand the idea of birth. What do you think? Is that right?" The play is really meant to be a question because, as we’ll see later, this idea needed official confirmation. The thinking about this issue didn’t stop here, as shown by the new ideas she came up with in the following weeks. A few days later, she repeated the same play with her Teddy Bear, whom she regarded as a particularly loved doll. One day, while looking at a rose, she said to her grandmother, "See, the rose is getting a baby." When her grandmother didn’t quite understand, she pointed to the enlarged calyx and said, "Don’t you see it’s quite fat here?"
Anna once quarrelled with her younger sister, and the latter exclaimed angrily, "I will kill you." Whereupon Anna answered, "When I am dead you will be all alone; then you will have to pray to God for a live baby." But the scene soon changed: Anna was the angel, and the younger sister was forced to kneel before her and pray to her that she should present to her a living child. In this way Anna became the child-dispensing mother.
Anna once had a fight with her younger sister, and the sister shouted angrily, "I will kill you." To this, Anna replied, "When I'm dead, you'll be all alone; then you'll have to pray to God for a living baby." But the scene quickly shifted: Anna was now the angel, and the younger sister had to kneel before her and pray for her to give her a living child. In this way, Anna became the mother who dispenses children.
Oranges were once served at table. Anna impatiently asked for one and said, "I am going to take an orange and swallow it all down into my stomach, and then I shall get a baby." Who does not think here of fairy tales in which childless[149] women become pregnant by swallowing fruit, fish, and similar things?[148] In this way Anna sought to solve the problem how the children actually come into the mother. She thus enters into a formulation which hitherto had not been defined with so much clearness. The solution follows in the form of an analogy, which is quite characteristic of the archaic thinking of the child. (In the adult, too, there is a kind of thinking by metaphor which belongs to the stratum lying immediately below consciousness; dreams bring the analogies to the surface; the same may be observed also in dementia præcox.) In German as well as in numerous foreign fairy tales one frequently finds such characteristic childish comparisons. Fairy tales seem to be the myths of the child, and therefore contain among other things the mythology which the child weaves concerning the sexual processes. The spell of the fairy tale poetry, which is felt even by the adult, is explained by the fact that some of the old theories are still alive in our unconscious minds. We experience a strange, peculiar and familiar feeling when a conception of our remotest youth is again stimulated. Without becoming conscious it merely sends into consciousness a feeble copy of its original emotional strength.
Oranges were once served at the table. Anna impatiently asked for one and said, "I’m going to take an orange and swallow it all down into my stomach, and then I’ll get a baby." Who doesn’t think of fairy tales where childless[149] women become pregnant by swallowing fruit, fish, and similar things?[148] In this way, Anna tried to solve the problem of how children actually come into the mother. She entered into a formulation that had not been defined so clearly before. The solution appears in the form of an analogy, which is typical of the primitive thinking of children. (Adults also have a kind of metaphorical thinking that exists just below consciousness; dreams bring these analogies to the surface, and the same can be seen in dementia præcox.) In German and many foreign fairy tales, you often find such characteristic childish comparisons. Fairy tales seem to be the myths of childhood and, among other things, contain the mythology that children create about sexual processes. The enchanting power of fairy tale poetry, which even adults feel, can be explained by the fact that some of the old theories still live in our unconscious minds. We experience a strange, unique, and familiar feeling when a concept from our distant youth is awakened again. Without becoming fully conscious, it simply brings a faint echo of its original emotional strength into awareness.
The problem how the child gets into the mother was difficult to solve. As the only way of taking things into the body is through the mouth, it could evidently be assumed that the mother ate something like a fruit, which then grows inside her. But then comes another difficulty, namely, it is clear enough what the mother produces, but it is not yet clear what the father is good for.
The question of how a child enters the mother was tough to answer. Since the only way to bring things into the body is through the mouth, it could be assumed that the mother consumed something like a fruit, which then grows inside her. However, another issue arises: it's obvious what the mother provides, but it's still unclear what role the father plays.
What does the father do? Anna now occupied herself exclusively with this question. One morning she ran into the parents' bedroom while they were dressing, she jumped into her father's bed, lay face downwards, kicked with her legs and called at the same time, "Look! does papa do that?" The analogy to the horse of "little Hans" which raised such disturbance with its legs, is very surprising.
What does the dad do? Anna was completely focused on this question now. One morning, she dashed into her parents' bedroom while they were getting dressed, jumped into her dad's bed, lay face down, kicked her legs, and shouted at the same time, "Look! Does dad do that?" The comparison to "little Hans" and his horse, which caused such a stir with its legs, is quite surprising.
With this last performance the problem seemed to be at[150] rest entirely, at least the parents found no opportunity to make any pertinent observations. That the problem should come to a standstill just here is not at all surprising, for this is really its most difficult part. Moreover, we know from experience that not many children go beyond these limits during the period of childhood. The problem is almost too difficult for the childish mind, which still lacks much knowledge necessary to its solution.
With this last performance, the issue seemed to be at[150] completely resolved, at least the parents didn’t find any chance to make relevant comments. It’s not surprising that the problem should come to a halt here, as this is really the toughest part. Furthermore, we know from experience that not many kids push past these boundaries during childhood. The problem is nearly too hard for a child’s mind, which still lacks a lot of the knowledge needed to solve it.
This standstill lasted about five months, during which no phobias or other signs of complex-elaboration appeared. After this lapse of time there appeared premonitory signs of some new incidents. Anna's family lived at that time in the country near a lake where the mother and children could bathe. As Anna was afraid to wade farther into the water than knee-deep, her father once put her into the water, which led to an outburst of crying. In the evening while going to bed Anna asked her mother, "Do you not believe that father wanted to drown me?" A few days later there was another outburst of crying. She continued to stand in the gardener's way until he finally placed her in a newly dug hole. Anna cried bitterly, and afterwards maintained that the gardener wished to bury her. Finally she awoke during the night with fearful crying. Her mother went to her in the adjoining room and quieted her. She had dreamed that "a train passed and then fell in a heap."
This standstill lasted about five months, during which no phobias or other signs of complex issues showed up. After this time, some early signs of new incidents emerged. Anna's family was living in the countryside near a lake where the mother and children could swim. Since Anna was afraid to go deeper into the water than knee-deep, her father once picked her up and put her in the water, which caused her to cry uncontrollably. That evening, as she was getting ready for bed, Anna asked her mother, "Don't you think Dad wanted to drown me?" A few days later, there was another episode of crying. She kept blocking the gardener's path until he finally set her down in a newly dug hole. Anna cried hard and later insisted that the gardener wanted to bury her. Eventually, she woke up in the middle of the night crying in fear. Her mother went to her in the next room and calmed her down. She had dreamed that "a train passed and then fell in a heap."
This tallies with the "stage coach" of "little Hans." These incidents showed clearly enough that fear was again in the air, i.e. that a resistance had again arisen preventing transference to the parents, and that therefore a great part of her love was converted into fear. This time suspicion was not directed against the mother, but against the father, who she was sure must know the secret, but would never let anything out. What could the father be doing or keeping secret? To the child this secret appeared as something dangerous, so that she felt the worst might be expected from the father. (This feeling of childish anxiety with the father as object we see again most distinctly in adults, especially in dementia præcox, which lifts the veil of obscurity[151] from many unconscious processes, as though it were following psychoanalytic principles.) It was for this reason that Anna came to the apparently absurd conclusion that her father wanted to drown her. At the same time her fear contained the thought that the object of the father had some relation to a dangerous action. This stream of thought is no arbitrary interpretation. Anna meanwhile grew a little older and her interest in her father took on a special colouring which is hard to describe. Language has no words to describe the quite unique kind of tender curiosity which shone in the child's eyes.
This ties in with the "stage coach" of "little Hans." These incidents clearly indicated that fear was in the air again, meaning that a resistance had emerged that prevented her from transferring her feelings to her parents, causing a significant part of her love to turn into fear. This time, her suspicion was aimed at the father, as she was convinced he must know the secret but would never reveal it. What could the father be doing or keeping hidden? To the child, this secret seemed dangerous, leading her to expect the worst from him. (We see this childish anxiety towards the father again most clearly in adults, especially in those with dementia præcox, which reveals many unconscious processes as if adhering to psychoanalytic principles.) For this reason, Anna came to the seemingly absurd conclusion that her father wanted to drown her. At the same time, her fear carried the thought that the object of the father was somehow related to a dangerous action. This line of thought isn't just a random interpretation. As Anna grew a bit older, her interest in her father took on a special nuance that is hard to describe. Language lacks the words to capture the unique kind of tender curiosity that sparkled in the child's eyes.
Anna once took marked delight in assisting the gardener while he was sowing grass, without apparently divulging the profound significance of her play. About a fortnight later she began to observe with great pleasure the young grass sprouting. On one of these occasions she asked her mother the following question: "Tell me, how did the eyes grow into the head?" The mother told her that she did not know. Anna, however, continued to ask whether God or her papa could tell this? The mother then referred her to her father, who might tell her how the eyes grew into the head. A few days later there was a family reunion at tea. When the guests had departed, the father remained at the table reading the paper and Anna also remained. Suddenly approaching her father she said, "Tell me, how did the eyes grow into the head?"
Anna used to really enjoy helping the gardener when he was planting grass, without really revealing the deeper meaning behind her actions. About two weeks later, she started to take great joy in watching the young grass grow. On one such occasion, she asked her mother, “Can you tell me how the eyes grow into the head?” The mother told her that she didn't know. But Anna kept asking if God or her dad could explain it. The mother suggested she ask her father, who might know how the eyes grew into the head. A few days later, the family was having tea together. After the guests left, her father stayed at the table reading the newspaper, and Anna remained too. Suddenly, she approached her dad and asked, “Can you tell me how the eyes grow into the head?”
Father: "They did not grow into the head; they were there from the beginning and grew with the head."
Father: "They didn't grow into the head; they were there from the start and grew with the head."
A.: "Were not the eyes planted?"
A.: "Weren't the eyes supposed to be there?"
F.: "No, they grew in the head like the nose."
F.: "No, they grew in the brain like the nose."
A.: "Did the mouth and the ears grow in the same way? and the hair, too?"
A.: "Did the mouth and ears grow the same way? And what about the hair?"
F.: "Yes, they all grew in the same way."
F.: "Yeah, they all grew the same way."
A.: "And the hair, too? But the mousies came into the world naked. Where was the hair before? Aren't there little seeds for it?"
A.: "What about the hair? But baby mice are born hairless. Where was the hair before? Don't they have little seeds for it?"
F.: "No; you see, the hair really came out of little grains which are like seeds, but these were already in the skin long[152] before and nobody sowed them." The father was now getting concerned; he knew whither the little one's thoughts were directed, but he did not wish to overthrow, for the sake of a former false application, the opportunely established seed-theory which she had most fortunately gathered from nature; but the child spoke with an unwonted seriousness which demanded consideration.
F.: "No; you see, the hair actually came from tiny grains that are like seeds, but these were already in the skin long[152] before, and no one planted them." The father was starting to worry; he realized where the child's thoughts were going, but he didn't want to dismantle, because of a past misunderstanding, the useful seed-theory she had wisely learned from nature. However, the child spoke with an unusual seriousness that required attention.
Anna (evidently disappointed, and in a distressed tone): "But how did Freddy get into mama? Who stuck him in? and who stuck you into your mama? Where did he come out from?"
Anna (clearly disappointed and sounding distressed): "But how did Freddy get into Mom? Who put him in there? And who put you in your mom? Where did he come out from?"
From this sudden storm of questions the father chose the last for his first answer. "Just think, you know well enough that Freddy is a boy; boys become men and girls women. Only women and not men can have children; now just think, where could Freddy come out from?"
From this sudden storm of questions, the father chose the last one for his first answer. "Come on, you know that Freddy is a boy; boys grow up to be men and girls grow up to be women. Only women, not men, can have children; so just think, where could Freddy possibly come from?"
A. (Laughs joyfully and points to her genitals): "Did he come out here?"
A. (Laughs happily and points to her genitals): "Did he come out here?"
Father: "Yes, of course, you certainly must have thought of this before?"
Father: "Yes, of course, you must have thought about this before?"
A. (Overlooking the question): "But how did Freddy get into mama? Did anybody plant him? Was the seed planted?"
A. (Overlooking the question): "But how did Freddy get into mom? Did someone plant him? Was the seed planted?"
This very precise question could no longer be evaded by the father. He explained to the child, who listened with the greatest attention, that the mother is like the soil and the father like the gardener; that the father provides the seed which grows in the mother, and thus gives origin to a baby. This answer gave extraordinary satisfaction; she immediately ran to her mother and said, "Papa has told me everything, now I know it all." She did not, however, tell what she knew.
This very specific question could no longer be avoided by the father. He explained to the child, who was listening intently, that the mother is like the earth and the father is like the gardener; the father provides the seed that grows in the mother, which leads to the creation of a baby. This answer was incredibly satisfying; she immediately ran to her mother and said, "Dad has told me everything, now I know it all." However, she didn’t share what she knew.
The new knowledge was, however, put into play the following day. Anna went to her mother and said, "Think, mama, papa told me how Freddy was a little angel and was brought from heaven by a stork." The mother was naturally surprised and said, "No, you are mistaken, papa surely never told you such a thing!" whereupon the little one laughed and ran away.
The next day, the new knowledge came into play. Anna went to her mom and said, "Guess what, Mom? Dad told me that Freddy was a little angel who was brought down from heaven by a stork." The mom was understandably surprised and replied, "No, you must be mistaken. Dad would never say something like that!" Then the little girl laughed and ran off.
This was apparently a mode of revenge. Her mother did not wish or was not able to tell her how the eyes grew into the head, hence she did not know how Freddy got into her. It was for this reason that she again tried her with the old story.
This was clearly a way of getting back at her. Her mother either didn't want to or couldn't explain how the eyes became part of the head, so she had no idea how Freddy got inside her. That’s why she tried to use the old story on her again.
I wish to impress firmly upon parents and educationists this instructive example of child psychology. In the learned psychological discussions on the child's psyche we hear nothing about those parts which are so important for the health and naturalness of our children, nor do we hear more about the child's emotions and conflicts; and yet they play a most important rôle.
I want to strongly highlight to parents and educators this important example of child psychology. In the academic discussions about a child's mind, we often overlook crucial aspects that are vital for our children's health and well-being, and we also hear little about their emotions and conflicts; yet these factors play a significant role.
It very often happens that children are erroneously treated as quite imprudent and irrational beings. Thus on indulgently remarking to an intelligent father, whose four-year-old daughter masturbated excessively, that care should be exercised in the presence of the child who slept in the same room as the parents, I received the indignant reply, "I can absolutely assure you that the child knows nothing about sexual matters." This recalls that distinguished old neurologist who wished to deny the attribute "sexual" to a childbirth phantasy which was represented in a dreamy state.
It often happens that children are mistakenly seen as entirely reckless and irrational. For instance, when I casually mentioned to a smart father, whose four-year-old daughter was excessively masturbating, that they should be cautious with the child sleeping in the same room, I got an angry response: "I can assure you the child doesn't know anything about sexual matters." This reminds me of a well-known old neurologist who wanted to argue that the term "sexual" didn’t apply to a childbirth fantasy that appeared in a dreamy state.
On the other hand, a child evincing neurotic talent exaggerated by neurosis may be urged on by solicitous parents. How easy and tempting it would have been, e.g. in the present case, to admire, excite, and develop prematurely the child's eager desire for learning, and thereby develop an unnatural blasé state and a precociousness masking a neurosis! In such cases the parents must look after their own complexes and complex tendencies and not make capital out of them at the expense of the child. The idea should be dismissed once for all that children are to be held in bondage by their parents or that they are their toys. They are characteristic and new beings. In the matter of enlightenment on sexual things it can be affirmed that they suffer from the preconceived opinion that the truth is harmful. Many neurologists are of opinion[154] that even in grown-ups enlightenment on their own psychosexual processes is harmful and even immoral. Would not the same persons perhaps refuse to admit the existence of the genitals themselves?
On the other hand, a child showing neurotic talent, intensified by neurosis, might be pushed by overanxious parents. How easy and tempting it would have been, e.g. in this situation, to praise, excite, and rush the child's eager desire for learning, ultimately creating an unnatural blasé state and premature development that conceals a neurosis! In these instances, parents need to manage their own issues and complex tendencies without exploiting them at the child's expense. The notion that children should be controlled by their parents or treated as playthings should be completely rejected. They are unique and new individuals. Regarding enlightenment on sexual matters, it's clear that children suffer from the belief that the truth is harmful. Many neurologists believe[154] that even for adults, understanding their own psychosexual processes is harmful and even immoral. Wouldn't those same people likely deny the existence of genitals altogether?
One should not, however, go from this extreme of prudishness to the opposite one, namely that of enlightenment à tout prix, which may turn out as foolish as it is disagreeable. In this matter I believe much discretion is advisable; still if children come upon an idea, they should be deceived no more than adults.
One shouldn’t swing from being overly prudish to the other extreme of being enlightened à tout prix, which can be just as foolish as it is unpleasant. In this case, I think it’s wise to exercise a lot of discretion; however, if kids stumble upon an idea, they shouldn’t be misled any more than adults would be.
I hope, ladies and gentlemen, that I have shown you what complicated psychic processes psychoanalytic investigation reveals in the child, and how great is the significance of these processes for the mental health as well as for the general psychic development of the child. What I have been unable to show is the universal validity of these observations. Unfortunately, I am not in a position to demonstrate this, for I do not know myself how much of it is universally valid. Only by accumulation of such observations and further penetration into the problems broached shall we gain a complete insight into the laws of psychical development. It is to be regretted that we are at present still far from this goal. But I confidently hope that educators and practical psychologists, whether physicians or deep-thinking parents, will not leave us too long unassisted in this immensely important and interesting field.
I hope, everyone, that I've shown you the complex mental processes that psychoanalytic research uncovers in children and how important these processes are for both their mental health and overall psychological development. What I haven't been able to prove is that these observations hold universally. Unfortunately, I can't show you how much of this is universally applicable, since I don’t know myself. Only by gathering more of these observations and diving deeper into the issues discussed can we gain a full understanding of the laws of psychological development. It’s unfortunate that we are still quite far from this goal. However, I genuinely hope that educators and practical psychologists, whether they are doctors or thoughtful parents, won't leave us alone for too long in this incredibly important and fascinating area.
Literature.
Literature.
1. Freud. "Die Traumdeutung," II Auflage. Deuticke, Wien, 1909.
1. Freud. "The Interpretation of Dreams," 2nd edition. Deuticke, Vienna, 1909.
2. —— ——. "Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre," Band I & II. Deuticke, Wien.
2. —— ——. "Collection of Short Writings on Neurosis," Volume I & II. Deuticke, Vienna.
3. —— ——. "Analyse der Phobie eines 5 jahrigen Knaben," Jahrbuch für Psychoanalytische u. Psychopathologische Forschungen, Band I. Deuticke, Wien, 1908.
3. —— ——. "Analysis of a 5-Year-Old Boy's Phobia," Journal of Psychoanalytic and Psychopathological Research, Volume I. Deuticke, Vienna, 1908.
4. Freud. "Der Inhalt der Psychose," Freud's Shriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde. Deuticke, 1908.
4. Freud. "The Content of Psychosis," Freud's Writings on Applied Psychology. Deuticke, 1908.
5. Jung. "Diagnostische Associationsstudien," Band I. Barth, Leipzig, 1906.
5. Jung. "Diagnostic Association Studies," Volume I. Barth, Leipzig, 1906.
6. —— ——. "Die Psychologische Diagnose des Thatbestandes." Carl Marhold, Halle, 1906.
6. —— ——. "The Psychological Diagnosis of the State of the Offense." Carl Marhold, Halle, 1906.
7. Jung. "Die Bedeutung des Vaters für das Schicksal des Einzelnen." Deuticke, Wien, 1908.
7. Jung. "The Importance of the Father for the Individual's Destiny." Deuticke, Vienna, 1908.
8. Jung. "The Psychology of Dementia Præcox," translated by Peterson and Brill, Journal of Mental and Nervous Diseases, Monograph Series, No. 2.
8. Jung. "The Psychology of Dementia Præcox," translated by Peterson and Brill, Journal of Mental and Nervous Diseases, Monograph Series, No. 2.
9. Fürst. "Statistische Untersuchungen über Wortassoziationen und über familiäre Übereinstimmung im Reactionstypus bei Ungebildeten," X. Beitrag der Diagnost. Assoc. Studien, vol. II.
9. Fürst. "Statistical Studies on Word Associations and Family Agreement in Reaction Type among the Uneducated," X. Contribution of the Diagnost. Assoc. Studies, vol. II.
10. Brill. "Psychological Factors in Dementia Præcox," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, vol. III., No. 4.
10. Brill. "Psychological Factors in Schizophrenia," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, vol. III, No. 4.
11. —— ——. "A case of Schizophrenia," American Journal of Insanity, vol. LXVI., No. 1.
11. —— ——. "A Case of Schizophrenia," American Journal of Insanity, vol. 66, no. 1.
12. "Le Nuove Vedute della Psicologia Criminale," Rivista de Psicologia Applicata, 1908, No. 4.
12. "New Perspectives on Criminal Psychology," Journal of Applied Psychology, 1908, No. 4.
13. "L'Analyse des Rêves," Année Psychologique, 1909, Tome XV.
13. "The Analysis of Dreams," Psychological Year, 1909, Volume XV.
14. "Associations d'idées Familiales," Archives de Psychologie, T. VII., No. 26.
14. "Family Associations of Ideas," Archives of Psychology, Vol. VII, No. 26.
CHAPTER III
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FATHER IN THE DESTINY OF THE INDIVIDUAL[149]
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FATHER IN THE DESTINY OF THE INDIVIDUAL[149]
Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt.
Fate guides the willing, drags the unwilling.
Freud has pointed out in many places[150] with unmistakable clearness that the psychosexual relationship of the child towards his parents, particularly towards the father, possesses an overwhelming importance in the content of any later neurosis. This relationship is in fact the infantile channel par excellence in which the libido flows back[151] when it encounters any obstacles in later years, thus revivifying long-forgotten dreams of childhood. It is ever so in life when we draw back before too great an obstacle—the menace of some severe disappointment or the risk of some too far-reaching decision—the energy stored up for the solution of the task flows back impotent; the by-streams once relinquished as inadequate are again filled up. He who has missed the happiness of woman's love falls back, as a substitute, upon some gushing friendship, upon masturbation, upon religiosity; should he be a neurotic he plunges still further back into the conditions of childhood which have never been quite forsaken, to which even the normal is fettered by more than one link—he returns to the relationship to father and mother. Every psychoanalysis carried out at all thoroughly shows this regression more or less plainly. One peculiarity which stands out in the works and views of Freud is that the relationship to the father is seen to possess an overwhelming importance. This importance of the father in the moulding of the child's[157] psycho-sexuality may also be discovered in a quite other and remote field, in the investigation of the family.[152] The most recent thorough investigations demonstrate the predominating influence of the father often lasting for centuries. The mother seems of less importance in the family.[153] If this is true for heredity on the physical side how much more should we expect from the psychological influences emanating from the father? These experiences, and those gained more particularly in an analysis carried out conjointly with Dr. Otto Gross, have impressed upon me the soundness of this view. The problem has been considerably advanced and deepened by the investigations of my pupil, Dr. Emma Fürst, into familial resemblances in the reaction-type.[154] Fürst made association experiments on one hundred persons belonging to twenty-four families. Of this extensive material, only the results in nine families and thirty-seven persons (all uneducated) have been worked out and published. But the painstaking calculations do already permit some valuable conclusions. The associations are classified on the Kræpelin-aschaffenburg scheme as simplified and modified by myself; the difference is then calculated between each group of qualities of the subjects experimented upon and the corresponding group of every other subject experimented upon. Thus we finally get the differentiation of the mean in reaction-type. The following is the result:—
Freud has clearly pointed out in various places[150] that the psychosexual relationship between a child and their parents, especially the father, is really important for understanding any later neurosis. This relationship is basically the primary way the libido channels back[151] when it hits obstacles later in life, reviving long-forgotten childhood dreams. Life often plays out this way: when we face a huge obstacle—like the threat of a major disappointment or the risk of a life-altering decision—the energy we had for tackling that situation drains away; the paths we once considered inadequate are filled again. Someone who has not experienced the joy of a woman's love may seek substitutes like intense friendships, masturbation, or religious devotion; if they are neurotic, they tend to retreat even further into childhood experiences that were never fully abandoned—experiences that even those who are considered normal are tied to in many ways—they return to their connections with their father and mother. Every thorough psychoanalysis shows this regression to some extent. One notable aspect of Freud's work is the crucial role the father plays in a child's[157] psychosexual development. This significance of the father can also be seen in a different area, the study of the family.[152] Recent comprehensive studies reveal that the father's influence often lasts for generations. The mother's role seems less significant in the family.[153] If this is true for physical heredity, we should expect even more from the psychological impacts that come from the father. These insights, along with those gained especially during a collaborative analysis with Dr. Otto Gross, have confirmed this perspective for me. The work of my student, Dr. Emma Fürst, on familial similarities in reaction types has further developed and deepened this issue.[154] Fürst conducted association experiments on one hundred people from twenty-four families. Out of this extensive data, only the results from nine families and thirty-seven individuals (all uneducated) have been analyzed and published. However, these meticulous calculations already allow for some valuable conclusions. The associations are categorized using the Krämpelinschaffenburg scheme, which I have simplified and modified; then, the differences between each group of qualities of the subjects and the corresponding groups of other subjects are calculated. This ultimately gives us the differentiation of the mean in reaction type. The following is the result:—
Non-related men differ among themselves by 5·9.
Non-related women differ among themselves by 6·0.
Related men differ among themselves by 4·1.
Related women differ among themselves by 3·8.Unrelated men have a variation of 5.9.
Unrelated women have a variation of 6.0.
Related men have a variation of 4.1.
Related women have a variation of 3.8.
Relatives, and especially related women, have therefore, on the average, resemblance in reaction-type. This fact means that the psychological adaptation of relatives differs but slightly.
Relatives, especially women in the family, tend to react similarly overall. This means that their psychological adjustments are generally quite similar.
An investigation into the various relationships gave the following:—
An investigation into the different relationships revealed the following:—
The mean difference of the husband and wife amounts to 4·7. The mean deviation of this mean is, however, 3·7, a very high figure, which signifies that the mean figure 4·7 is composed of very heterogeneous figures; there are married couples in whom the reaction type is very close and others in whom it is very slight. On the whole, however, father and son, mother and daughter stand remarkably close.
The average difference between husbands and wives is 4.7. However, the average deviation from this mean is 3.7, which is quite high. This indicates that the average figure of 4.7 is made up of very diverse numbers; some married couples have very similar reactions while others do not. Overall, though, fathers and sons, as well as mothers and daughters, tend to be remarkably similar.
The difference between father and son amounts to 3·1.
The difference between father and son is 3.1.
The difference between mother and daughter amounts to 3·0.
The difference between mother and daughter is 3.0.
With the exception of a few cases of married couples (where the difference fell to 1·4) these are the lowest differences. In Fürst's work there was a case where the difference between the forty-five year old mother and her sixteen year old daughter was only 0·5. But it was just in this case that the mother and daughter differed from the father's type by 11·8. The father is a coarse, stupid man, an alcoholic; the mother goes in for Christian Science. This corresponds with the fact that mother and daughter exhibit an extreme word-predicate type,[155] which is, in my experience, important semeiotically for the diagnosis of insufficiency in the sexual object. The word-predicate type transparently applies an excessive amount of emotion externally and displays emotions with the unconscious, but nevertheless obvious, endeavour to awaken echoing emotions in the experimenter. This view closely corresponds with the fact that in Fürst's material the number of word-predicates increases with the age of the subjects experimented upon.
Except for a few cases of married couples (where the difference dropped to 1.4), these are the lowest differences recorded. In Fürst's study, there was a case where the difference between the forty-five-year-old mother and her sixteen-year-old daughter was only 0.5. However, in this case, the mother and daughter differed from the father's type by 11.8. The father is a rough, uneducated man and an alcoholic; the mother practices Christian Science. This aligns with the fact that both the mother and daughter display an extreme word-predicate type,[155] which, in my experience, is significant semantically for diagnosing insufficiency in the sexual object. The word-predicate type applies an excessive amount of emotion outwardly and displays feelings with an unconscious, yet clear, attempt to evoke similar emotions in the observer. This perspective closely relates to the fact that in Fürst's data, the number of word-predicates increases with the age of the subjects involved in the experiments.
The fact of the extreme similarity between the reaction-type of the offspring and the parents is matter for thought. The association experiment is nothing but a small section from the psychological life of a man. At bottom daily life is nothing but an extensive and many-varied association experiment; in essence we react in life just as we do in the experiments. Although this truth is evident, still it requires a certain consideration and limitation. Let us take as an instance the case of the unhappy mother of forty-five years and her unmarried daughter of sixteen. The extreme word-predicate type of the mother is, without doubt, the precipitate of a whole life of disappointed hopes and wishes. One is not in the least surprised at the word-predicate type here. But the daughter of sixteen has really not yet lived at all; her real sexual object has not yet been found, and yet she reacts as if she were her mother with endless disillusions behind her. She has the mother's adaptation, and in so far she is identified with the mother. There is ample evidence that the mother's adaptation must be attributed to her relationship to the father. But the daughter is not married to the father and therefore does not need this adaptation. She has taken it over from the influence of her milieu, and later on will try to adapt herself to the world with this familial disharmony. In so far as an ill-assorted marriage is unsuitable, the adaptation resulting from it is unsuitable.
The striking similarity between the reactions of children and their parents is worth reflecting on. The association experiment is just a small slice of a person's psychological life. At its core, daily life is an elaborate and diverse association experiment; fundamentally, we react in life similarly to how we do in these experiments. Although this truth is clear, it still requires some thought and nuance. For instance, consider the case of a troubled 45-year-old mother and her 16-year-old unmarried daughter. The mother's extreme way of expressing herself undoubtedly stems from a lifetime of unfulfilled hopes and desires. It’s not surprising to see her reaction style. But the 16-year-old has hardly lived at all; she hasn’t discovered her true romantic interests yet, yet she responds as if she has a long history of disappointments like her mother. She inherits the mother's adaptation, which means she identifies with her mother in some ways. There's substantial evidence that the mother’s adaptation can be traced back to her relationship with the father. However, since the daughter isn't married to the father, she doesn't necessarily require this adaptation. She has absorbed it from her surroundings and will later attempt to fit into the world with this familial disharmony. In cases where a poorly matched marriage is problematic, the adaptations that come from it are also problematic.
Clearly such a fate has many possibilities. To adapt herself to life, this girl either will have to surmount the obstacles of her familial milieu, or, unable to free herself from them, she will succumb to the fate to which such an adaptation predisposes her. Deep within, unnoticed by any one, there may go on a glossing over of the infantile disharmony, or a development of the negative of the parents' character, accompanied by hindrances and conflicts to which she herself has no clue. Or, growing up, she will come into painful conflict with that world of actualities to which she is so ill-adapted till one stroke of fate after another gradually opens her eyes to the fact that it is herself, infantile and maladjusted, that is amiss. The source of infantile adaptation to the parents[160] is naturally the affective condition on both sides; the psycho-sexuality of the parents on one side and that of the child on the other. It is a kind of psychical infection; we know that it is not logical truth, but affects and their psychical expressions[156] which are here the effective forces. It is these that, with the power of the herd-instinct, press into the mind of the child, there fashioning and moulding it. In the plastic years between one and five there have to be worked out all the essential formative lines which fit exactly into the parental mould. Psychoanalytic experience teaches us that, as a rule, the first signs of the later conflict between the parental constellation and individual independence, of the struggle between repression and libido (Freud), occur before the fifth year.
Clearly, such a fate has many possibilities. To adapt to life, this girl will either have to overcome the obstacles of her family environment, or, unable to break free from them, she will succumb to the fate that such an adaptation leads her to. Deep down, unnoticed by anyone, there might be a covering up of the childhood disharmony, or a development of the negative traits of the parents' character, accompanied by challenges and conflicts that she herself doesn’t recognize. Alternatively, as she grows up, she will face painful clashes with the reality that she is poorly suited for, until one misfortune after another gradually makes her realize that she herself, in a childish and maladjusted state, is the issue. The source of childhood adaptation to the parents[160] is naturally the emotional condition on both sides; the psycho-sexual issues of the parents on one side and those of the child on the other. It's a kind of psychological infection; we know that it isn’t logical truth, but emotions and their psychological expressions[156] that are the real driving forces here. It is these that, with the power of group instinct, penetrate the child's mind, shaping and molding it. In the formative years between one and five, all the essential developmental lines must be created that fit precisely into the parental mold. Psychoanalytic experience teaches us that, as a rule, the first signs of later conflict between the parental influence and individual independence, of the struggle between repression and libido (Freud), appear before the fifth year.
The few following histories will show how this parental constellation obstructs the adaptation of the offspring. It must suffice to present only the chief events of these, that is the events of sexuality.
The few stories that follow will demonstrate how this parental situation hinders the children's adaptation. It will be enough to present only the main events, specifically the events related to sexuality.
Case 1.—A well-preserved woman of 55; dressed poorly but carefully in black with a certain elegance, the hair carefully dressed; a polite, obviously affected manner, precise in speech, a devotee. The patient might be the wife of a minor official or shopkeeper. She informs me, blushing and dropping her eyes, that she is the divorced wife of a common peasant. She has come to the hospital on account of depression, night terrors, palpitations, slight nervous twitchings in the arms, thus presenting the typical features of a slight climacteric neurosis. To complete the picture, she adds that she suffers from severe anxiety-dreams; in her dreams some man seems to be pursuing her, wild animals attack her, and so on.
Case 1.—A well-preserved woman of 55; dressed modestly yet elegantly in black, her hair styled neatly; she has a polite, somewhat affected manner, and speaks precisely, showing a deep devotion. The patient could be the wife of a minor official or a shopkeeper. She tells me, blushing and looking down, that she is the divorced wife of a common peasant. She has come to the hospital because of depression, night terrors, palpitations, and slight nervous twitches in her arms, showing the typical signs of a mild climacteric neurosis. To complete the picture, she adds that she suffers from intense anxiety dreams; in her dreams, it feels like some man is chasing her, wild animals are attacking her, and so on.
Her anamnesis begins with the family history. (So far as possible I give her own words.) Her father was a fine, stately, rather corpulent man of imposing appearance. He was very happy in his marriage, for her mother worshipped him. He was a clever man, a master-mechanic, and held[161] a dignified and honourable position. There were only two children, the patient and an elder sister. The sister was the mother's, and the patient her father's favourite. When the patient was five years old the father died suddenly from a stroke, at the age of forty-two. The patient felt herself very isolated and was from that time treated by the mother and the elder sister as the Cinderella. She noticed clearly enough that her mother preferred her sister to herself. Her mother remained a widow, her respect for her husband being too great to allow her to marry a second time. She preserved his memory "like a religious cult" and brought up her children in this way.
Her background starts with the family history. (As much as possible, I’m using her own words.) Her father was a distinguished, somewhat heavyset man with a commanding presence. He was very happy in his marriage because her mother adored him. He was smart, a skilled mechanic, and held[161] a respected and honorable position. There were just two children, the patient and an older sister. The sister was favored by the mother, while the patient was the favorite of her father. When the patient was five years old, her father died suddenly from a stroke at the age of forty-two. The patient felt very alone and from then on was treated by her mother and older sister like Cinderella. She clearly noticed that her mother preferred her sister over her. Her mother remained a widow, having too much respect for her husband to marry again. She kept his memory "like a religious cult" and raised her children in that manner.
Later on the sister married, relatively young; the patient did not marry till twenty-four. She never cared for young men, they all seemed insipid; her mind turned always to more mature men. When about twenty she became acquainted with a stately gentleman rather over forty, to whom she was much drawn. For various reasons the friendship was broken off. At twenty-four she became acquainted with a widower who had two children. He was a fine, stately, somewhat corpulent man, and had an imposing presence, like her father; he was forty-four. She married him and respected him enormously. The marriage was childless; the children by the first marriage died from an infectious disease. After four years of married life her husband also died. For eighteen years she remained his faithful widow. But at forty-six (just before the menopause) she experienced a great need of love. As she had no acquaintances she went to a matrimonial agency and married the first comer, a peasant of some sixty years who had been already twice divorced on account of brutality and perverseness; the patient knew this before marriage. She remained five unbearable years with him, when she also obtained a divorce. The neurosis set in a little later.
Later on, the sister got married at a relatively young age, while the patient didn’t marry until she was twenty-four. She never had an interest in young men; they all seemed dull to her. Her mind always gravitated towards older men. When she was around twenty, she met a distinguished gentleman who was a little over forty, and she felt a strong attraction to him. For various reasons, their friendship ended. At twenty-four, she met a widower with two children. He was a refined, somewhat heavy man with a commanding presence, similar to her father's; he was forty-four. She married him and held him in high regard. The marriage didn’t produce any children; the children from his first marriage died from an infectious disease. After four years of marriage, her husband passed away. She remained a devoted widow for eighteen years. But at forty-six (just before menopause), she felt a strong desire for love. Since she had no social circles, she turned to a marriage agency and married the first man who came along, a peasant in his sixties who had already been divorced twice due to his abusive and perverse behavior; the patient was aware of this before marrying him. She endured five intolerable years with him before finally obtaining a divorce. The neurosis began to develop shortly after that.
No further discussion will be required for those with psychoanalytic experience; the case is too obvious. For those unversed in psychoanalysis let me point out that up to her forty-sixth year the patient did but reproduce most[162] faithfully the milieu of her earliest youth. The sexuality which announced itself so late and so drastically, even here only led to a deteriorated edition of the father-surrogate; to this she is brought by this late-blossoming sexuality. Despite repression, the neurosis betrays the ever-fluctuating eroticism of the aging woman who still wants to please (affectation) but dares not acknowledge her sexuality.
No further discussion is needed for those with psychoanalytic experience; the case is too clear. For those who are not familiar with psychoanalysis, let me explain that until her forty-sixth year, the patient mainly replicated the environment of her earliest youth. The sexuality that emerged so late and so intensely only resulted in a lesser version of the father figure; this is what her late-emerging sexuality has led her to. Despite repression, the neurosis reveals the constantly shifting eroticism of the aging woman who still desires approval (affectation) but is too afraid to acknowledge her sexuality.
Case 2.—A man of thirty-four of small build and with a sensible, kindly expression. He is easily embarrassed, blushes often. He came for treatment on account of "nervousness." He says he is very irritable, readily fatigued, has nervous indigestion, is often deeply depressed so that he has thought of suicide.
Case 2.—A thirty-four-year-old man of small stature with a sensible, kind expression. He gets embarrassed easily and often blushes. He came in for treatment because of "nervousness." He mentions that he feels very irritable, gets tired easily, suffers from nervous indigestion, and often feels deeply depressed to the point of contemplating suicide.
Before coming to me for treatment he sent me a circumstantial autobiography, or rather a history of his illness, in order to prepare me for his visit. His story began: "My father was a very big and strong man." This sentence awakened my curiosity; I turned over a page and there read: "When I was fifteen a big lad of nineteen took me into the wood and indecently assaulted me."
Before coming to me for treatment, he sent me a detailed autobiography, or rather a history of his illness, to prepare me for his visit. His story began: "My father was a very big and strong man." This sentence piqued my interest; I flipped to the next page and read: "When I was fifteen, a big guy who was nineteen took me into the woods and assaulted me."
The numerous gaps in the patient's story induced me to obtain a more exact anamnesis from him, which produced the following remarkable facts.
The many gaps in the patient's story made me want to get a more accurate history from him, which revealed the following remarkable facts.
The patient is the youngest of three brothers. His father, a big, red-haired man, was formerly a soldier in the Papal Swiss Guard, and then became a policeman. He was a strict, gruff old soldier, who brought up his sons with military precision; he commanded them, did not call them by name, but whistled to them. He had spent his youth in Rome, where he acquired syphilis, from the consequences of which he still suffered in old age. He was fond of talking about his adventures in early life. His eldest son (considerably older than the patient) was exactly like him, he was big, strong and had reddish hair. The mother was a feeble woman, prematurely aged; exhausted and tired of life, she died at forty when the patient was eight years old. He preserved a tender and beautiful memory of his mother.
The patient is the youngest of three brothers. His father, a big guy with red hair, used to be a soldier in the Papal Swiss Guard before becoming a policeman. He was a strict, gruff old soldier who raised his sons with military precision; he commanded them, never called them by name, but whistled to get their attention. He had spent his youth in Rome, where he contracted syphilis, and he still dealt with its effects in his old age. He liked to talk about his adventures from earlier in his life. His oldest son (who was much older than the patient) looked just like him; he was big, strong, and had reddish hair. The mother was a weak woman, aged beyond her years; exhausted and tired of life, she passed away at forty when the patient was eight years old. He held onto a tender and beautiful memory of his mother.
When he went to school he was always the whipping-boy and always the object of his schoolfellows' mockery. The patient considers that his peculiar dialect was to blame for this. Later he was apprenticed to a severe and unkind master, under most trying conditions, from which all the other apprentices had run away, finding them intolerable. Here he held out for over two years. At fifteen the assault already mentioned took place, in addition to some other slighter homosexual experiences. Then fate sent him to France. There he made the acquaintance of a man from the South of France, a great boaster and Don Juan. He dragged the patient into a brothel; he went unwilling and out of fear. He was impotent there. Later he went to Paris, where his brother, a master-mason, the replica of his father, was leading a dissolute life. There the patient remained a long time, badly paid and helping his sister-in-law out of pity. The brother often took him along to a brothel, where the patient was always impotent. Here the brother asked him to make over to him his inheritance, 6000 francs. He first consulted his second brother, who was also in Paris, who urgently tried to dissuade him from giving the money to his brother, because it would only be squandered. Nevertheless the patient gave his all to his brother, who indeed soon squandered it. And the second brother, who would have dissuaded him, was also let in for 500 francs. To my astonished question why he had so light-heartedly given the money to his brother without any guarantee, he replied: he had asked for it, he was not a bit sorry about the money; he would give him another 6000 francs if he had it. The eldest brother came to grief altogether and his wife divorced him. The patient returned to Switzerland and remained for a year without regular employment, often suffering from hunger. During this time he made the acquaintance of a family where he became a frequent visitor. The husband belonged to some peculiar sect; he was a hypocrite and neglected his family. The wife was elderly, ill and weak, and moreover pregnant. There were six children and great poverty. The patient developed[164] warm affection for this woman and divided with her the little he possessed. She brought him her troubles, and said she felt sure she would die in childbed. Then he promised her (he who possessed nothing) to take charge of the children himself and bring them up. The wife did die in childbed. The orphanage-board interfered, however, and allowed him only one child. So he had a child but no family, and naturally could not bring it up by himself. He thus came to think of marrying. But as he had never been in love with any woman he was in great perplexity. It then occurred to him that his elder brother was divorced from his wife, and he resolved to marry her. He wrote his intention to her in Paris. She was seventeen years older than he, but not disinclined to the plan. She invited him to come to Paris to talk matters over. On the eve of this journey fate, however, willed that he should run a big iron nail into his foot so that he could not travel. After a little while, when the wound was healed, he went to Paris, and found that he had imagined his sister-in-law, and now his fiancée, to be younger and prettier than she really was. The wedding took place, and three months later the first coitus, at his wife's initiative. He himself had no desire for it. They brought up the child together, he in the Swiss and she in the French way, for she was a French woman. At the age of nine the child was run over and killed by a cyclist. The patient then felt very lonely and dismal at home. He proposed to his wife that she should adopt a young girl, whereupon she broke out into a fury of jealousy. Then for the first time he fell in love with a young girl, whilst at the same time the neurosis started, with deep depression and nervous exhaustion, for meanwhile his life at home had become a hell.
When he went to school, he was always the target of bullying and the subject of his classmates' ridicule. He believed that his unusual way of speaking was to blame for this. Later, he became an apprentice to a harsh and unkind master under tough conditions that drove all the other apprentices away. He managed to last over two years there. At fifteen, he experienced an assault, along with some other minor same-sex encounters. Then fate brought him to France. There, he met a man from the South of France who was a big talker and a womanizer. The man took him to a brothel against his will and out of fear. He was unable to perform there. Later, he traveled to Paris, where his brother, a master mason who was just like their father, was living a reckless life. The patient stayed there for a long time, underpaid and helping his sister-in-law out of compassion. His brother often brought him to a brothel, where he was always unable to perform. At one point, his brother asked him to give up his inheritance of 6000 francs. He first consulted his second brother, who was also in Paris and urgently tried to convince him not to give the money to their brother, insisting it would only be wasted. Nevertheless, the patient gave everything to his brother, who soon squandered it. The second brother, who had advised against it, ended up losing 500 francs himself. When I asked, surprised, why he had so carelessly given the money to his brother with no guarantee, he replied that his brother had asked for it and that he didn’t regret giving the money; he would give him another 6000 francs if he had it. The eldest brother ended up in trouble and got divorced. The patient returned to Switzerland and spent a year without regular work, often going hungry. During this time, he became a frequent visitor to a family in need. The husband belonged to a strange sect; he was a hypocrite and neglected his family. The wife was elderly, sick, weak, and pregnant. They had six children and lived in great poverty. The patient developed a deep affection for this woman and shared what little he had with her. She confided her worries to him, saying she feared she would die in childbirth. He promised her, despite having nothing, that he would take care of the children and raise them. Unfortunately, the wife did die in childbirth. However, the orphanage board stepped in and allowed him to take only one child. So he ended up with a child but no family and couldn’t raise it on his own. He then started to consider marriage. But since he had never loved a woman, he was quite confused. Then he remembered that his older brother was divorced, and decided to marry his ex-sister-in-law. He wrote to her about his intentions in Paris. She was seventeen years older than him but was open to the idea. She invited him to Paris to discuss it. However, just before his journey, fate had him accidentally drive a big iron nail into his foot, preventing him from traveling. After a little while, when the wound healed, he went to Paris and realized he had imagined his sister-in-law—and now fiancée—to be younger and prettier than she actually was. The wedding took place, and three months later they had sex for the first time, initiated by his wife, as he had no desire for it. They raised the child together: he in the Swiss way and she in the French way, since she was French. When the child was nine, a cyclist hit and killed them. The patient then felt very lonely and miserable at home. He suggested to his wife that they adopt a young girl, which made her extremely jealous. For the first time, he fell in love with a young girl, while at the same time, a neurosis set in, bringing deep depression and nervous exhaustion, as his home life had become a living nightmare.
My proposition to separate from his wife was refused out of hand, because he could not take upon himself to make the old woman unhappy on his account. He clearly prefers to be tormented still further; for it would seem that the recollection of his youth is more precious to him than any present joys.
My suggestion to separate from his wife was immediately shot down because he couldn't bring himself to make the old woman unhappy for his sake. It's obvious he would rather keep suffering; it seems like the memories of his youth are more valuable to him than any current happiness.
In this case also the whole movement of a life takes place in the magic circle of the familial constellation. The relation to the father is the strongest and most momentous issue; its masochistic homosexual colouring stands out clearly everywhere. Even the unhappy marriage is determined in every way through the father, for the patient marries the divorced wife of his eldest brother, which is as if he married his mother. His wife is also the representative of the mother-surrogate, of the friend who died in childbed.
In this case, the entire course of a life unfolds within the magic circle of family dynamics. The relationship with the father is the most significant and impactful aspect; its masochistic homosexual undertones are evident throughout. Even the unhappy marriage is heavily influenced by the father, as the individual marries the ex-wife of his oldest brother, which is as if he married his mother. His wife also acts as a stand-in for the mother and represents the friend who passed away during childbirth.
The neurosis started at the moment when the libido had obviously withdrawn from this relationship of infantile constellation, and approached, for the first time, the sexual end determined by the individual. In this, as in the previous case, the familial constellation proves to be by far the stronger; the narrow field vouchsafed by a neurosis is all that remains for the display of individuality.
The neurosis began when the libido clearly pulled away from this infantile relationship and, for the first time, focused on the individual’s defined sexual goal. In this case, just like in the previous one, the family dynamics are much more powerful; the limited space offered by a neurosis is all that’s left for expressing individuality.
Case 3.—A thirty-six year old peasant woman, of average intelligence, healthy appearance and robust build, mother of three healthy children. Comfortable family circumstances. Patient comes to the hospital for treatment for the following reasons: for some weeks she has been terribly wretched and anxious, has been sleeping badly, has terrifying dreams, and suffers also during the day from anxiety and depression. All these things are admittedly without foundation, she herself is surprised at them, and must admit her husband is perfectly right when he insists they are all "stuff and nonsense." All the same she cannot get away from them. Strange ideas come to her too; she is going to die and is going to hell. She gets on very well with her husband.
Case 3.—A thirty-six-year-old peasant woman, of average intelligence, healthy appearance, and robust build, mother of three healthy children. She has comfortable family circumstances. The patient comes to the hospital for treatment for the following reasons: for several weeks, she has been extremely miserable and anxious, has been sleeping poorly, has frightening dreams, and also suffers from anxiety and depression during the day. She knows these feelings are unfounded, is surprised by them, and has to agree with her husband that they are all "nonsense." Still, she cannot shake them off. She also has strange thoughts; she believes she is going to die and is going to hell. She gets along very well with her husband.
The psychoanalytic examination of the case immediately brought the following: some weeks before, she happened to take up some religious tracts which had long lain about the house unread. There she read that swearers would go to hell. She took this very much to heart, and has since thought it incumbent on her to prevent people swearing or she herself will go to hell. About a fortnight before she read these tracts, her father, who lived with her, suddenly died from a stroke. She was not actually present at his[166] death, but arrived when he was already dead. Her terror and grief were very great.
The psychoanalytic examination of the case immediately revealed the following: a few weeks prior, she came across some religious pamphlets that had been lying around the house for a long time, unread. In those pamphlets, she read that swearers would go to hell. She took this very seriously and has since felt it was her duty to stop people from swearing, or else she would go to hell herself. About two weeks before she read these pamphlets, her father, who lived with her, suddenly died from a stroke. She wasn't actually there when he[166] died but arrived after he had already passed. Her fear and sorrow were immense.
In the days following the death she thought much about it all, wondering why her father had to meet his end so abruptly. In the midst of such meditations it suddenly occurred to her that the last words she had heard her father say were: "I also am one of those who have fallen from the cart into the devil's clutches." The remembrance filled her with grief, and she recalled how often her father had sworn savagely. She wondered then whether there really were a life after death, and whether her father were in heaven or hell. During these musings she came across the tracts and began to read them, getting to the place where it said that swearers go to hell. Then came upon her great fear and terror; she overwhelmed herself with reproaches, she ought to have stopped her father's swearing, deserved punishment for her neglect. She would die and would be condemned to hell. Henceforth she was full of sorrow, moody, tormented her husband with this obsessive idea, and renounced all joy and happiness.
In the days after the death, she thought a lot about everything, wondering why her father had to die so suddenly. While reflecting on this, it hit her that the last words she heard her father say were: "I also am one of those who have fallen from the cart into the devil's clutches." The memory filled her with sorrow, and she remembered how often her father had cursed fiercely. She then questioned whether there was really life after death, and if her father was in heaven or hell. While lost in these thoughts, she found some pamphlets and started reading them, getting to the part that said that those who curse end up in hell. This brought her great fear and terror; she filled herself with guilt, thinking she should have stopped her father from swearing, and felt she deserved punishment for her neglect. She feared she would die and be condemned to hell. From then on, she was consumed by sadness, moody, troubled her husband with this obsessive thought, and gave up all joy and happiness.
The patient's life-history (reproduced partly in her own words) is as follows:—
The patient's life story (partly shared in her own words) is as follows:—
She is the youngest of five brothers and sisters and was always her father's favourite. The father gave her everything she wanted if he possibly could. For instance, if she wanted a new dress and her mother refused it, she could be sure her father would bring her one next time he went to town. The mother died rather early. At twenty-four the patient married the man of her choice, against her father's wishes. The father simply disapproved of her choice although he had nothing particular against the man. After the wedding she made her father come and live with them. That seemed a matter of course, she said, since the other relations had never suggested having him with them. The father was a quarrelsome swearer and drunkard. Husband and father-in-law, as may easily be imagined, got on extremely badly together. The patient would always meekly fetch her father spirits from the inn, although this gave rise perpetually to anger and altercations. But she finds her husband "all[167] right." He is a good, patient fellow with only one failing: he does not obey her father enough; she finds that incomprehensible, and would rather have her husband knuckle under to her father. All said and done, father is still father. In the frequent quarrels she always took her father's part. But she has nothing to say against her husband and he is usually right in his protests, but one must help one's father.
She is the youngest of five siblings and was always her father's favorite. He gave her everything she wanted whenever he could. For example, if she wanted a new dress and her mother said no, she could count on her dad to bring her one the next time he went to town. Her mother passed away fairly young. At twenty-four, she married the man she loved, against her father's wishes. Her dad disapproved of her choice, but he had nothing against the guy himself. After the wedding, she insisted that her father come live with them. It seemed obvious to her since the other family members never suggested having him with them. Her father was quarrelsome, foul-mouthed, and a drunk. It's easy to imagine that her husband and father-in-law didn’t get along at all. She always humbly fetched her father drinks from the inn, even though it led to constant fights and arguments. But she thinks her husband is "all[167] right." He’s a good, patient guy with just one flaw: he doesn’t listen to her father enough, which she finds confusing. She would prefer it if her husband just submitted to her dad. After all, a father is still a father. In their frequent disagreements, she always sided with her father. However, she has nothing against her husband, and he is usually right in his complaints, but one must help one's father.
Soon it began to seem to her that she had sinned against her father by marrying against his will, and she often felt, after one of these incessant wrangles, that her love for her husband had quite vanished. And since her father's death it is impossible to love her husband any longer, for his disobedience was the most frequent occasion of her father's fits of raging and swearing. At one time the quarrelling became too painful for the husband, and he induced his wife to find rooms for her father elsewhere, where he lived for two years. During this time husband and wife lived together peaceably and happily. But by degrees the patient began to reproach herself for letting her father live alone; in spite of everything he was her father. And in the end, despite the husband's protests, she fetched him home again because, as she said, in truth she did love her father better than her husband. Scarcely was the old man back in the house before strife was renewed. And so it went on till the father's sudden death.
Soon, she started to feel that she had wronged her father by marrying against his wishes, and often, after one of their endless arguments, she felt that her love for her husband had completely disappeared. Since her father's death, it has been impossible to love her husband any longer, as his disobedience was the main cause of her father's angry outbursts. At one point, the fighting became too much for her husband, and he convinced her to find another place for her father to live, where he stayed for two years. During that time, the husband and wife lived together peacefully and happily. But gradually, she began to feel guilty for allowing her father to live alone; after all, he was her father. In the end, despite her husband's objections, she brought him back home because, as she told him, she truly loved her father more than her husband. Hardly had the old man returned before the arguments started up again. And so it continued until her father's sudden death.
After this recital she broke out into a whole series of lamentations: she must separate from her husband: she would have done it long ago if it were not for the children. She had indeed done an ill-deed, committed a very great sin when she married her husband against her father's wish. She ought to have taken the man whom her father had wanted her to have. He certainly would have obeyed her father and then everything would have been right. Oh, her husband was not by a long way so kind as her father, she could do anything with her father, but not with her husband. Her father had given her everything she wanted. Now she would best of all like to die, so that she might be with her father.
After the recital, she burst into a series of laments: she had to leave her husband. She would have done it long ago if it weren't for the kids. She had indeed committed a terrible mistake, a huge sin when she married her husband against her father's wishes. She should have married the man her father wanted her to. He definitely would have listened to her dad, and then everything would have been fine. Oh, her husband was nowhere near as kind as her father; she could get her father to do anything, but not her husband. Her father had given her everything she desired. Now, more than anything, she wanted to die so she could be with her father.
When this outburst was over, I inquired eagerly on what[168] grounds she had refused the husband her father had suggested to her.
When this outburst was over, I eagerly asked on what[168] grounds she had rejected the husband her father had proposed to her.
The father, a small peasant on a lean little farm, had taken as a servant, just at the time when his youngest daughter came into the world, a miserable little boy, a foundling. The boy developed in most unpleasant fashion: he was so stupid that he could not learn to read or write or even speak quite properly. He was an absolute idiot. As he approached manhood there developed on his neck a series of ulcers, some of which opened and continually discharged pus, giving such a dirty, ugly creature a horrible appearance. His intelligence did not grow with his years, so he stayed on as servant in the peasant's house without any recognised wage.
The father, a small farmer with a struggling little farm, had taken in a pitiful boy as a servant just when his youngest daughter was born. The boy grew up in a most unpleasant way: he was so slow that he couldn’t learn to read, write, or even speak properly. He was essentially an idiot. As he got older, a series of sores appeared on his neck, some of which opened and constantly oozed pus, giving this dirty, unattractive boy a horrific look. His intelligence didn’t improve with age, so he continued to work as a servant in the farmer's house without any recognized pay.
To this youth the father wanted to marry his favourite daughter.
The father wanted to marry his favorite daughter to this young man.
The girl, fortunately, had not been disposed to yield, but now she regretted it, since this idiot would unquestionably have been more obedient to her father than her good man had been.
The girl, thankfully, hadn’t been inclined to give in, but now she regretted it, since this fool would definitely have been more obedient to her father than her good man had been.
Here, as in the foregoing case, it must be clearly understood that the patient is not at all weak-minded. Both possess normal intelligence, which unfortunately the blinkers of the infantile constellation prevent their using. That appears with quite remarkable clearness in this patient's life-story. The father's authority is never questioned! It makes not the least difference that he is a quarrelsome drunkard, the obvious cause of all the quarrels and disturbances; on the contrary, the lawful husband must give way to the bogey, and at last our patient even comes to regret that her father did not succeed in completely destroying her life's happiness. So now she sets about doing that herself through her neurosis, which compels in her the wish to die, that she may go to hell, whither, be it noted, the father has already betaken himself.
Here, just like in the previous case, it has to be clearly understood that the patient is not weak-minded at all. Both have normal intelligence, which, unfortunately, the limitations of their childish mindset prevent them from using. This is strikingly clear in this patient's life story. The father's authority is never questioned! It doesn’t matter that he is a quarrelsome drunk, the obvious cause of all the arguments and issues; rather, the lawful husband must take a back seat to the scary figure, and eventually, our patient even starts to regret that her father didn’t fully ruin her happiness. So now she tries to do that herself through her neurosis, which makes her wish to die, so she can go to hell, where, it should be noted, the father has already gone.
If we are ever disposed to see some demonic power at work controlling mortal destiny, surely we can see it here in these melancholy silent tragedies working themselves out[169] slowly, torturingly, in the sick souls of our neurotics. Some, step by step, continually struggling against the unseen powers, do free themselves from the clutches of the demon who forces his unsuspecting victims from one savage mischance to another: others rise up and win to freedom, only to be dragged back later to the old paths, caught in the noose of the neurosis. You cannot even maintain that these unhappy people are neurotic or "degenerates." If we normal people examine our lives from the psychoanalytic standpoint, we too perceive how a mighty hand guides us insensibly to our destiny and not always is this hand a kindly one.[157] We often call it the hand of God or of the Devil, for the power of the infantile constellation has become mighty during the course of the centuries in affording support and proof to all the religions.
If we ever feel like there’s some dark force at play controlling human fate, we can definitely see it in these tragic, quiet stories unfolding[169] slowly and painfully in the tortured souls of our neurotics. Some people, step by step, continually fight against these unseen forces and manage to break free from the grip of the demon that pushes its unsuspecting victims from one brutal misfortune to another; others rise up and achieve freedom, only to be pulled back to the old paths, trapped in the snare of their neurosis. You can’t even claim that these unfortunate individuals are neurotic or "degenerated." If we normal people examine our own lives through a psychoanalytic lens, we also see how a powerful hand guides us toward our destinies, and often this hand is not kind.[157] We frequently refer to it as the hand of God or the Devil, as the influence of our childhood experiences has grown powerful over the centuries, supporting and validating all religions.
But all this does not go so far as to say that we must cast the blame of inherited sins upon our parents. A sensitive child whose intuition is only too quick in reflecting in his own soul all the excesses of his parents must lay the blame for his fate on his own characteristics. But, as our last case shows, this is not always so, for the parents can (and unfortunately only too often do) fortify the evil in the child's soul, preying upon the child's ignorance to make him the slave of their complexes. In our case this attempt on the part of the father is quite obvious. It is perfectly clear why he wanted to marry his daughter to this brutish creature: he wanted to keep her and make her his slave for ever. What he did is but a crass exaggeration of what is done by thousands of so-called respectable, educated people, who have their own share in this educational dust-heap of enforced discipline. The[170] fathers who allow their children no independent possession of their own emotions, who fondle their daughters with ill-concealed eroticism and tyrannical passion, who keep their sons in leading-strings, force them into callings and finally marry them off "suitably," and the mothers who even in the cradle excite their children with unhealthy tenderness, later on make them into slavish puppets, and then at last, out of jealousy, destroy their children's love-life fundamentally, they all act not otherwise than this stupid and brutal boor.
But all this doesn’t mean we should blame our inherited sins solely on our parents. A sensitive child, who easily picks up on their parents’ excesses, must take responsibility for their own characteristics. However, as our last case illustrates, this isn’t always the case. Parents can (and too often do) reinforce the negativity within their child, exploiting their ignorance to make them slaves to their own issues. In our case, the father's attempts are quite evident. It’s clear why he wanted to marry his daughter to this brutish man: he wanted to keep her and make her his slave forever. What he did is simply an extreme version of what countless so-called respectable, educated people do, who share in this educational mess of enforced discipline. The[170] fathers who deny their children any independent emotions, who treat their daughters with thinly veiled eroticism and oppressive passion, who keep their sons under rigid control, push them into careers, and ultimately marry them off "appropriately," along with the mothers who, even from infancy, smother their children with unhealthy affection, later turn them into obedient puppets and ultimately, out of jealousy, ruin their children's love lives fundamentally—they all act just like this foolish and brutal man.
It will be asked, wherein lies the parents' magic power to bind their children to themselves, as with iron fetters, often for the whole of their lives? The psychoanalyst knows that it is nothing but the sexuality on both sides.
It will be asked, what is the parents' magic power to bind their children to them, almost like iron shackles, often for their entire lives? The psychoanalyst knows that it’s simply the sexuality on both sides.
We are always trying not to admit the child's sexuality. That view only comes from wilful ignorance, which happens to be very prevalent again just now.[158]
We constantly try to ignore the child's sexuality. This perspective stems from deliberate ignorance, which is unfortunately quite common right now.[158]
I have not given any real analysis of these cases. We therefore do not know what happened within the hearts of these puppets of fate when they were children. A profound insight into a child's mind as it grows and lives, hitherto unattainable, is given in Freud's contribution to the first half-yearly volume of Jahrbuch für Psychoanalytische u. Psychopathologische Forschungen. If I venture, after Freud's masterly presentation, to offer another small contribution to the study of the child-mind it is because the psychoanalytic records of cases seem to me always valuable.
I haven't provided any real analysis of these cases. So, we don't know what the fate of these individuals was like when they were children. Freud's work in the first half-yearly volume of Jahrbuch für Psychoanalytische u. Psychopathologische Forschungen offers a deep understanding of a child's mind as it grows and experiences life, which has been hard to reach until now. If I dare to add another small contribution to the study of the child's mind after Freud's outstanding presentation, it's because I believe psychoanalytic case records are always valuable.
Case 4.—An eight year old boy, intelligent, rather delicate-looking, is brought to me by his mother, on account of enuresis. During the consultation the child always hangs on to his mother, a pretty, youthful woman. The parents'[171] marriage is a happy one, but the father is strict, and the boy (the eldest child) is rather afraid of him. The mother compensates for the father's strictness by corresponding tenderness, to which the boy responds so much that he never gets away from his mother's apron-strings. He never plays with his schoolfellows, never goes alone into the street unless he has to go to school. He fears the boys' roughness and violence and plays thoughtful games at home or helps his mother with housework. He is extremely jealous of his father. He cannot bear it when the father shows tenderness to the mother.
Case 4.—An eight-year-old boy, bright and somewhat delicate-looking, is brought to me by his mother because of bedwetting. During the consultation, the child always clings to his mother, a pretty, youthful woman. The parents' [171] marriage is happy, but the father is strict, and the boy (the oldest child) is a bit afraid of him. The mother makes up for the father's sternness with her own kindness, which the boy responds to so much that he never strays far from her side. He doesn't play with his classmates and only goes out alone if he has to go to school. He's scared of the boys' roughness and aggression and prefers to play thoughtful games at home or help his mother with chores. He's very jealous of his father and can't stand it when his dad shows affection to his mom.
I took the boy aside and asked him about his dreams.
I pulled the boy aside and asked him about his dreams.
He dreams very often of a black snake which wants to bite his face. Then he cries out, and his mother has to come from the next room to his bedside.
He often dreams of a black snake that wants to bite his face. Then he screams, and his mother has to come from the next room to his bedside.
In the evening he goes quietly to bed. But when he falls asleep it seems to him that a wicked black man with a sabre or gun lies on his bed—a tall, thin man who wants to kill him.
In the evening, he quietly goes to bed. But when he falls asleep, it feels like a wicked black man with a saber or gun is lying on his bed—a tall, thin man who wants to kill him.
His parents sleep in the adjoining room. It often seems to him that something dreadful is going on there, as if there are great black snakes or wicked men who want to kill his Mamma. Then he has to cry out and his mother comes to comfort him.
His parents are sleeping in the next room. It often feels to him like something terrible is happening there, as if there are huge black snakes or evil men who want to hurt his Mom. Then he has to shout, and his mom comes to soothe him.
Every time he wets his bed he calls his mother, who has to settle him down again in dry things.
Every time he wets the bed, he calls his mom, who has to calm him down again and change him into dry clothes.
The father is a tall thin man. Every morning he stands at the washstand naked in full view of the child, to perform a thorough ablution. The child also tells me that at night he is often suddenly waked from sleep by a strange sound in the next room; then he is always horribly afraid as if something dreadful were going on in there, some struggle—but his mother quiets him, says there's nothing to be afraid of.
The father is a tall, slim guy. Every morning, he stands at the sink naked in plain sight of the child to wash up thoroughly. The child also tells me that at night he's often jolted awake by a strange noise from the next room; he's always really scared, feeling like something terrible is happening in there, some kind of struggle—but his mother calms him down, saying there’s nothing to be afraid of.
It is not difficult to see whence comes the black snake and who the wicked man is, and what is happening in the next room. It is equally easy to understand the boy's aim when he calls out for his mother: he is jealous and separates her from the father. This he does also in the daytime whenever he sees his father caressing her. So far the boy is simply his father's rival for his mother's love.
It’s not hard to figure out where the black snake comes from, who the bad guy is, and what’s going on in the next room. It’s just as easy to see the boy’s goal when he calls for his mother: he’s jealous and wants to divide her from his father. He does this during the day too, whenever he sees his dad showing her affection. Right now, the boy is simply competing with his father for his mother’s love.
But now comes the circumstance that the snake and the bad man also threaten him, there happens to him the same thing as to his mother in the next room. Thus he identifies himself with his mother and proposes a similar relationship for himself with his father. That is owing to his homosexual component which feels like a woman towards the father. What enuresis signifies in this case is, from the Freudian standpoint, not difficult to understand. The micturition dream throws light upon it. Let me refer to an analysis of the same kind in my article: "L'analyse des rêves, Année psychologique" (1909). Enuresis must be regarded as an infantile sex-surrogate; in the dream-life of adults too it is easily used as a cloak for the urge of sexual desire.
But now the situation is that the snake and the bad man also threaten him, which happens to him just like it did for his mother in the next room. This causes him to identify with his mother and seek a similar connection with his father. This is due to his homosexual aspect, which makes him feel feminine towards his father. What enuresis means in this case is, from a Freudian perspective, not hard to grasp. The bedwetting dream sheds light on it. Let me reference an analysis of a similar nature in my article: "L'analyse des rêves, Année psychologique" (1909). Enuresis should be seen as a childish sex surrogate; in the dream life of adults, it can also easily serve as a cover for sexual desire.
This little example shows what goes on in the mind of an eight year old boy, when he is in a position of too much dependence upon his parents, but the blame is also partly due to the too strict father and the too indulgent mother.
This small example illustrates what an eight-year-old boy thinks when he relies too heavily on his parents, but the responsibility also lies with the overly strict father and the overly indulgent mother.
The infantile attitude here, it is evident, is nothing but infantile sexuality. If now we survey all the far-reaching possibilities of the infantile constellation, we are forced to say that in essence our life's fate is identical with the fate of our sexuality. If Freud and his school devote themselves first and foremost to tracing out the individual's sexuality it is certainly not in order to excite piquant sensations, but to gain a deeper insight into the driving forces that determine that individual's fate. In this we are not saying too much, rather understating the case. If we can strip off the veils shrouding the problems of individual destiny, we can afterwards widen our view from the history of the individual to the history of nations. And first of all we can look at the history of religions, at the history of the phantasy-systems of whole peoples and epochs. The religion of the Old Testament elevated the paterfamilias to the Jehovah of the Jews whom the people had to obey in fear and dread. The Patriarchs are an intermediate stage towards the deity. The neurotic fear and dread of the Jewish religion, the imperfect, not to say unsuccessful attempt at the sublimation of a still too barbarous people, gave rise to the excessive[173] severity of the Mosaic Law, the ceremonial constraint of the neurotic.[159]
The childish attitude here is clearly just childish sexuality. If we look at all the extensive possibilities of this childhood phase, we must say that basically, our life's fate is intertwined with our sexuality. When Freud and his followers focus primarily on mapping out an individual's sexuality, it’s not to create thrilling sensations, but to gain a better understanding of the forces that shape that person's fate. We're not exaggerating here; if anything, we’re underselling the idea. If we can remove the layers that hide the issues of individual destiny, we can later broaden our perspective from the history of the individual to the history of nations. First, we can examine the history of religions and the fantasy systems of entire peoples and eras. The religion of the Old Testament elevated the paterfamilias to the Jehovah of the Jews, who the people had to obey out of fear and dread. The Patriarchs served as a bridge to the deity. The neurotic fear and anxiety within the Jewish religion, along with the incomplete, if not failed, attempt to elevate a still barbaric people, led to the excessive[173] severity of the Mosaic Law, which imposed ceremonial constraints on the neurotic.[159]
Only the prophets succeeded in freeing themselves from this constraint; in them the identification with Jehovah, the complete sublimation, is successful. They became the fathers of the people. Christ, the fulfilment of prophecy, put an end to this fear of God and taught mankind that the true relation to the Godhead is "love." Thus he destroyed the ceremonial constraint of the Law and gave the example of a personal loving relationship to God. The later imperfect sublimation of the Christian Mass leads again to the ceremonial of the Church from which occasionally the minds capable of sublimation among the saints and reformers have been able to free themselves. Not without cause therefore does modern theology speak of "inner" or "personal" experiences as having great enfranchising power, for always the ardour of love transmutes the dread and constraint into a higher, freer type of feeling.
Only the prophets managed to break free from this limitation; in them, the connection with Jehovah, the total transformation, was achieved. They became the founders of the people. Christ, the fulfillment of prophecy, ended this fear of God and taught humanity that the true connection to the divine is "love." In doing so, he abolished the ceremonial restrictions of the Law and demonstrated a personal, loving relationship with God. The later imperfect transformation of the Christian Mass leads back to the rituals of the Church, although occasionally, those capable of transformation among the saints and reformers have managed to escape it. That's why modern theology often refers to "inner" or "personal" experiences as having significant liberating power, since the passion of love always transforms fear and constraint into a higher, more liberated form of feeling.
What we see in the development of the world-process, the original source of the changes in the Godhead, we see also in the individual. Parental power guides the child like a higher controlling fate. But when he begins to grow up, there begins also the conflict between the infantile constellation and the individuality, the parental influence dating from the prehistoric (infantile) period is repressed, sinks into the unconscious but is not thereby eliminated; by invisible threads it directs the individual creations of the ripening mind as they appear. Like everything that has passed into the unconscious, the infantile constellation sends up into consciousness dim, foreboding feelings, feelings of mysterious guidance and opposing influences. Here are the roots of the first religious sublimations. In the place of the father, with his constellating virtues and faults, there appears, on the one hand, an altogether sublime deity, on the other the devil, in modern times for the most part largely whittled away by the perception of one's own moral responsibility. Elevated love is attributed to the former, a[174] lower sexuality to the latter. As soon as we approach the territory of the neurosis, the antithesis is stretched to the utmost limit. God becomes the symbol of the most complete sexual repression, the Devil the symbol of sexual lust. Thus it is that the conscious expression of the father-constellation, like every expression of an unconscious complex when it appears in consciousness, gets its Janus-face, its positive and its negative components. A curious, beautiful example of this crafty play of the unconscious is seen in the love-episode in the Book of Tobias. Sarah, the daughter of Raguel in Ecbatana, desires to marry; but her evil fate wills it that seven times, one after another, she chooses a husband who dies on the marriage-night. The evil spirit Asmodi, by whom she is persecuted, kills these husbands. She prays to Jehovah to let her die rather than suffer this shame again. She is despised even by her father's maid-servants. The eighth bridegroom, Tobias, is sent to her by God. He too is led into the bridal-chamber. Then the old Raguel, who has only pretended to go to bed, gets up again and goes out and digs his son-in-law's grave beforehand, and in the morning sends a maid to the bridal-chamber to make sure of the expected death. But this time Asmodi's part is played out, Tobias is alive.
What we observe in the development of the world process, the original source of changes in the divine, is also evident in the individual. Parental authority guides the child like a higher controlling fate. However, as the child begins to mature, a conflict arises between the childish instincts and individuality; the parental influence, rooted in early (childhood) experiences, gets repressed and sinks into the unconscious but isn’t eliminated. It still subtly shapes the individual's creative thoughts as they develop. Like anything that has slipped into the unconscious, the childish instincts bring forth vague, foreboding feelings—those of mysterious guidance and opposing forces. Here lie the roots of the first religious ideals. In place of the father, with his virtues and flaws, we see, on one hand, a lofty deity, and on the other, the devil, who in modern times is often diminished by our awareness of personal moral responsibility. Elevated love is attributed to the former and base sexuality to the latter. When we confront the realm of neuroses, this opposition becomes extreme. God symbolizes complete sexual repression, while the Devil represents sexual desire. Thus, the conscious expression of the father figure, like any expression of an unconscious complex when it emerges into consciousness, takes on a dual nature, with its positive and negative aspects. A fascinating example of this complex interplay of the unconscious is found in the love story in the Book of Tobias. Sarah, the daughter of Raguel in Ecbatana, wants to marry but is cursed so that seven times in a row, her chosen husband dies on their wedding night. The evil spirit Asmodi, who torments her, kills these husbands. She prays to Jehovah to let her die rather than endure this shame again. She is even scorned by her father's maidservants. The eighth groom, Tobias, is sent to her by God. He too is led into the bridal chamber. Then old Raguel, who pretended to sleep, gets up and sneaks out to dig his son-in-law’s grave in advance and sends a maid to the bridal chamber the next morning to check for the expected death. But this time, Asmodi’s role is over; Tobias is alive.
Unfortunately medical etiquette forbids me to give a case of hysteria which fits in exactly with the above instance, except that there were not seven husbands, but only three, ominously chosen under all the signs of the infantile constellation. Our first case too comes under this category and in our third we see the old peasant at work preparing to dedicate his daughter to a like fate.
Unfortunately, medical etiquette prevents me from sharing a case of hysteria that perfectly matches the example above, except it involved not seven husbands but only three, ominously picked according to all the signs of the childish constellation. Our first case also falls into this category, and in our third case, we observe the old farmer preparing to subject his daughter to a similar fate.
As a pious and obedient daughter (compare her beautiful prayer in chapter iii.) Sarah has brought about the usual sublimation and cleavage of the father-complex and on the one side has elevated her childish love to the adoration of God, on the other has turned the obsessive force of her father's attraction into the persecuting demon Asmodi. The legend is so beautifully worked out that it displays the father in his twofold aspect, on the one hand as the[175] inconsolable father of the bride, on the other as the secret digger of his son-in-law's grave, whose fate he foresees. This beautiful fable has become a cherished paradigm for my analysis, for by no means infrequent are such cases where the father-demon has laid his hand upon his daughter, so that her whole life long, even when she does marry, there is never a true union, because her husband's image never succeeds in obliterating the unconscious and eternally operative infantile father-ideal. This is valid not only for daughters, but equally for sons. A fine instance of such a father-constellation is given in Dr. Brill's recently published: "Psychological factors in dementia præcox. An analysis."[160]
As a devoted and obedient daughter (just look at her beautiful prayer in chapter iii.), Sarah has created the usual split and transformation of the father complex. On one side, she has elevated her innocent love into the worship of God, while on the other side, she has turned her father's overwhelming influence into the tormenting demon Asmodi. The story is crafted so beautifully that it shows the father in two ways: first, as the heartbroken father of the bride, and second, as the secret planner of his son-in-law's grave, aware of his fate. This touching tale has become a valuable example for my analysis, as it's not uncommon to see situations where the father-demon impacts his daughter so profoundly that, throughout her life, even after marrying, she can never truly unite with her husband, because his image can never replace the unconscious and perpetually influential childhood ideal of her father. This applies to both daughters and sons. A great example of such a father dynamic is found in Dr. Brill's recently published work: "Psychological factors in dementia præcox. An analysis."[160]
In my experience the father is usually the decisive and dangerous object of the child's phantasy, and if ever it happens to be the mother, I have been able to discover behind her a grandfather to whom she belonged in her heart.
In my experience, the father is typically the key figure in the child's imagination, often seen as intimidating. And if the mother does take that role, I've found there's usually a grandfather behind her who she feels a deep connection to.
I must leave this question open: my experience does not go far enough to warrant a decision. It is to be hoped that the experience of the coming years will sink deeper shafts into this still dark land which I have been able but momentarily to light up, and will discover to us more of the secret workshop of that fate-deciding demon of whom Horace says:
I have to leave this question unanswered: my experience isn't enough to make a decision. I hope that the experiences of the years to come will explore this still dark area more thoroughly than I’ve been able to illuminate for just a moment, and will reveal more of the hidden forces of that fate-deciding demon that Horace mentions:
CHAPTER IV
About a year ago the school authorities in N. asked me to give a professional opinion as to the mental condition of Marie X., a thirteen year old schoolgirl. Marie had been expelled from school because she had been instrumental in originating an ugly rumour, spreading gossip about her class-teacher. The punishment hit the child, and especially her parents, very hard, so that the school authorities were inclined to readmit her if protected by a medical opinion. The facts were as follows:—
About a year ago, the school officials in N. asked me to provide a professional opinion on the mental state of Marie X., a thirteen-year-old student. Marie had been expelled from school because she played a key role in starting a nasty rumor and spreading gossip about her teacher. This punishment affected her deeply, and her parents were particularly hurt by it, so the school officials were willing to let her back in if a medical opinion backed that decision. The details were as follows:—
The teacher had heard indirectly that the girls were attributing some equivocal sexual story to him. On investigation it was found that Marie X. had one day related a dream to three girl-friends which ran somewhat as follows:—
The teacher had heard indirectly that the girls were spreading some vague sexual rumor about him. Upon looking into it, it turned out that Marie X. had one day shared a dream with three of her girlfriends that went something like this:—
"The class was going to the swimming-baths. I had to go to the boys' because there was no more room. Then we swam a long way out in the lake (asked 'who did so': 'Lina P., the teacher, and myself'). A steamer came along. The teacher asked us if we wished to get into it. We came to K. A wedding was just going on there (asked 'whose': 'a friend of the teacher's'). We were also to take part in it. Then we went for a journey (who? 'I, Lina P., and the teacher'). It was like a honeymoon journey. We came to Andermatt, and there was no more room in the hotel, so we were obliged to pass the night in a barn. The woman got a child there, and the teacher became the godfather."
"The class was heading to the pool. I had to go to the boys' section because there was no more space. We swam a long way out in the lake (asked 'who went out there': 'Lina P., the teacher, and me'). A steamer came by. The teacher asked us if we wanted to get on it. We arrived in K. There was a wedding happening there (asked 'whose wedding': 'a friend of the teacher’s'). We were also invited to take part in it. Then we went on a trip (who went? 'Me, Lina P., and the teacher'). It felt like a honeymoon trip. We reached Andermatt, and there was no space left in the hotel, so we had to spend the night in a barn. A woman there had a baby, and the teacher became the godfather."
When I examined the child she told this dream. The teacher had likewise related the dream in writing. In this[177] earlier version the obvious blanks after the word "steamer" in the above text were filled up as follows: "We got up. Soon we felt cold. An old man gave us a blouse which the teacher put on." On the other hand, there was an omission of the passage about finding no room in the hotel and being obliged to pass the night in the barn.
When I talked to the child, she shared this dream. The teacher had also written down the dream. In this[177] earlier version, the obvious blanks after the word "steamer" in the text were filled in like this: "We got up. Soon we felt cold. An old man gave us a blouse that the teacher put on." However, there was a missing part about not finding a room in the hotel and having to spend the night in the barn.
The child told the dream immediately, not only to her three friends but also to her mother. The mother repeated it to me with only trifling differences from the two versions given above. The teacher, in his further investigations, carried out with deepest misgivings, failed, like myself, to get indications of any more dangerous material. There is therefore a strong probability that the original recital could not have run very differently. (The passage about the cold and the blouse seems to be an early interpolation, for it is an attempt to supply a logical relationship. Coming out of the water one is wet, has on only a bathing dress, and is therefore unable to take part in a wedding before putting on some clothes.) At first, of course, the teacher would not allow that the whole affair had arisen only out of a dream. He rather suspected it to be an invention. He was, however, obliged to admit that the innocent telling of the dream was apparently a fact, and that it was unnatural to regard the child as capable of such guile as to indicate some sexual equivocation in this disguised form. For a time he wavered between the view that it was a question of cunning invention, and the view that it was really a question of a dream, innocent in itself, which had been understood by the other children in a sexual way. When his first indignation wore off he concluded that Marie X.'s guilt could not be so great, and that her phantasies and those of her companions had contributed to the rumour. He then did something really valuable. He placed Marie's companions under supervision, and made them all write out what they had heard of the dream.
The child shared the dream right away, not just with her three friends but also with her mother. The mother told it to me with only minor differences from the two versions mentioned earlier. The teacher, during his further investigations, which he conducted with serious concerns, failed, like I did, to find any signs of more troubling material. So, there’s a strong chance that the original story couldn’t have been very different. (The part about the cold and the blouse seems to be an early addition, as it tries to create a logical connection. When you come out of the water, you’re wet, wearing only a bathing suit, and you can't participate in a wedding without getting dressed first.) At first, naturally, the teacher didn’t want to believe that the whole situation came solely from a dream. He suspected it might be made up. However, he had to admit that the innocent recounting of the dream was apparently a fact, and it was unreasonable to think the child had such deceitful intent as to mask some sexual meaning. For a while, he debated between the idea that it was clever fabrication and the notion that it was genuinely an innocent dream that the other kids had interpreted in a sexual way. Once his initial outrage subsided, he concluded that Marie X.'s guilt couldn’t be that significant, and that her fantasies and those of her friends contributed to the rumor. He then took a really constructive step. He put Marie's friends under supervision and had them all write out what they had heard about the dream.
Before turning our attention to this, let us cast a glance at the dream analytically. In the first place, we must accept the facts and agree with the teacher that we have to do with[178] a dream and not with an invention; for the latter the ambiguity is too great. Conscious invention tries to create unbroken transitions; the dream takes no account of this, but sets to work regardless of gaps, which, as we have seen, here give occasion for interpolations during the conscious revision. The gaps are very significant. In the swimming-bath there is no picture of undressing, being unclothed, nor any detailed description of their being together in the water. The omission of being dressed on the ship is compensated for by the above-mentioned interpolation, but only for the teacher, thus indicating that his nakedness was in most urgent need of cover. The detailed description of the wedding is wanting, and the transition from the steamer to the wedding is abrupt. The reason for stopping overnight in the barn at Andermatt is not to be found at first. The parallel to this is, however, the want of room in the swimming-bath, which made it necessary to go into the men's department; in the hotel the want of room again emphasises the separation of the sexes. The picture of the barn is most insufficiently filled out. The birth suddenly follows and quite without sequence. The teacher as godfather is extremely equivocal. Marie's rôle in the whole story is throughout of secondary importance, indeed she is only a spectator.
Before we dive into this, let’s take a closer look at the dream. First of all, we need to accept the facts and agree with the teacher that we’re dealing with a dream and not just an invention; the ambiguity is too significant in the latter case. Conscious invention aims for seamless transitions; the dream, however, ignores this and works with gaps, which, as we’ve noted, allow for additions during conscious revision. These gaps are very important. In the swimming pool, there’s no image of undressing, being naked, or any detailed account of them being together in the water. The lack of description of getting dressed on the ship is addressed by the previously mentioned addition, but only for the teacher, indicating that he urgently needed to hide his nakedness. There’s also no detailed description of the wedding, and the switch from the steamer to the wedding is abrupt. Initially, the reason for spending the night in the barn at Andermatt isn't clear. However, this parallels the lack of space in the swimming pool, which forced them into the men’s section; at the hotel, the lack of room again highlights the separation of the sexes. The scene in the barn is only sparsely filled in. The birth follows abruptly and without any clear order. The teacher serving as godfather is quite ambiguous. Marie's role in the entire narrative is consistently secondary; she is merely a spectator.
All this has the appearance of a genuine dream, and those of my readers who have a wide experience of the dreams of girls of this age will assuredly confirm this view. Hence the meaning of the dream is so simple that we may quietly leave its interpretation to her school-companions, whose declarations are as follows:
All of this looks like a real dream, and those of you reading who have a lot of experience with the dreams of girls this age will definitely agree with this. Therefore, the meaning of the dream is so straightforward that we can easily let her school friends interpret it, and their comments are as follows:
Aural Witnesses.
Audio Witnesses.
Witness I.—"M. dreamed that she and Lina P. had gone swimming with our teacher. After they had swum out in the lake pretty far, M. said she could not swim any further as her foot hurt her so much. The teacher said she might sit on my[162] back. M. got up and they swam out. After a time a steamer[179] came along and they got up on it. Our teacher seems to have had a rope by which he tied M. and L. together and dragged them out into the lake. They travelled thus as far as Z., where they stepped out. But now they had no clothes on. The teacher bought a jacket whilst M. and L. got a long, thick veil, and all three walked up the street along the lake. This was when the wedding was going on. Presently they met the party. The bride had on a blue silk dress but no veil. She asked M. and L. if they would be kind enough to give her their veil. M. and L. gave it, and in return they were allowed to go to the wedding. They went into the Sun Inn. Afterwards they went a honeymoon journey to Andermatt; I do not know now whether they went to the Inn at A. or at Z. There they got coffee, potatoes, honey, and butter."
Witness I.—"M. dreamed that she and Lina P. had gone swimming with our teacher. After they had swum pretty far out into the lake, M. said she couldn’t swim any further because her foot hurt a lot. The teacher said she could sit on my[162] back. M. got up, and they swam out again. After a while, a steamer[179] came by, and they climbed onto it. Our teacher seemed to have a rope with which he tied M. and L. together and pulled them out into the lake. They traveled this way all the way to Z., where they got off. But now they didn’t have any clothes on. The teacher bought a jacket while M. and L. got a long, thick veil, and all three walked up the street along the lake. This was during the wedding. Soon they encountered the party. The bride was wearing a blue silk dress but no veil. She asked M. and L. if they would be kind enough to give her their veil. M. and L. gave it to her, and in return, they were allowed to attend the wedding. They went into the Sun Inn. Later, they went on a honeymoon trip to Andermatt; I don't remember if they stayed at the Inn in A. or in Z. There they had coffee, potatoes, honey, and butter."
"I must not say any more, only the teacher finally was made godfather."
"I can't say anything more, just that the teacher finally became the godfather."
Remarks.—The roundabout story concerning the want of room in the swimming-bath is absent; Marie goes direct with her teacher to the bath. Their persons are more closely bound together in the water by means of the rope fastening the teacher and the two girls together. The ambiguity of the "getting up" in the first story has other consequences here, for the part about the steamer in the first story now occurs in two places; in the first the teacher takes Marie on his back. The delightful little slip "she could sit on my back" (instead of his), shows the real part taken by the narrator herself in this scene. This makes it clear why the dream brings the steamer somewhat abruptly into action, in order to give an innocent, harmless turn to the equivocal "getting up" instead of another which is common, for instance, in music-hall songs. The passage about the want of clothing, the uncertainty of which has been already noticed, arouses the special interest of the narrator. The teacher buys a jacket, the girls get a long veil (such as one only wears in case of death or at weddings). That the latter is meant is shown by the remark that the bride had none (it is the bride who wears the veil). The narrator, a girl-friend of Marie, here helps the dreamer to dream further: the possession[180] of the veil designates the bride or the brides, Marie and Lina. Whatever is shocking or immoral in this situation is relieved by the girls giving up the veil; it then takes an innocent turn. The narrator follows the same mechanism in the cloaking of the equivocal scene at Andermatt; there is nothing but nice food, coffee, potatoes, honey, butter, a turning back to the infantile life according to the well-known method. The conclusion is apparently very abrupt: the teacher becomes a godfather.
Remarks.—The roundabout story about the lack of space in the swimming pool is missing; Marie goes straight to the pool with her teacher. Their bodies are more closely connected in the water through the rope tying the teacher and the two girls together. The unclear "getting up" from the first story has different results here, as the part about the steamer from the first story appears in two places; initially, the teacher carries Marie on his back. The charming little mistake "she could sit on my back" (instead of his) reveals the narrator's real involvement in this scene. This clarifies why the dream suddenly introduces the steamer, giving an innocent twist to the ambiguous "getting up," rather than the more common interpretations found in music-hall songs. The section about the lack of clothing, which has already been noted as uncertain, particularly interests the narrator. The teacher buys a jacket, and the girls receive a long veil (typically worn at funerals or weddings). It's clear that this is meant to signify a bride since it's noted that the bride had none (the bride is the one who wears the veil). The narrator, a friend of Marie, helps the dreamer continue her dream: the possession[180] of the veil represents the bride or the brides, Marie and Lina. Anything shocking or immoral in this context is eased by the girls giving up the veil; it then shifts to a more innocent direction. The narrator employs the same tactic in obscuring the ambiguous scene at Andermatt; there's nothing but nice food, coffee, potatoes, honey, butter, a return to childhood life as per the familiar method. The ending seems quite abrupt: the teacher becomes a godfather.
Witness II.—M. dreamt she had gone bathing with L. P. and the teacher. Far out in the lake M. said to the teacher that her leg was hurting her very much. Then the teacher said she could get up on him. I don't know now whether the last sentence was really so told, but I think so. As there was just then a ship on the lake the teacher said she should swim as far as the ship and then get in. I don't remember exactly how it went on. Then the teacher or M., I don't really remember which, said they would get out at Z. and run home. Then the teacher called out to two gentlemen who had just been bathing there, that they might carry the children to land. Then L. P. sat up on one man, and M. on the other fat man, and the teacher held on to the fat man's leg and swam after them. Arrived on land they ran home. On the way the teacher met his friend who had a wedding. M. said: "It was then the fashion to go on foot, not in a carriage." Then the bride said she must now go along also. Then the teacher said it would be nice if the two girls gave the bride their black veils, which they had got on the way. I can't now remember how. The children gave it her, and the bride said they were really dear generous children. Then they went on further and put up at the Sun Hotel. There they got something to eat, I don't know exactly what. Then they went to a barn and danced. All the men had taken off their coats except the teacher. Then the bride said he ought to take off his coat also. Then the teacher hesitated but finally did so. Then the teacher was.... Then the teacher said he was cold. I must not tell any more; it is improper. That's all I heard of the dream.
Witness II.—M. dreamt she went swimming with L. P. and the teacher. Out in the lake, M. told the teacher that her leg was hurting a lot. The teacher replied that she could climb onto him. I can’t remember if that’s how it was said, but I think so. Just then, a boat appeared on the lake, and the teacher told her to swim towards it and then get in. I don’t quite recall what happened next. Then either the teacher or M., I can’t remember which, said they would get out at Z. and run home. The teacher called out to two gentlemen who had just been swimming there, asking them if they could carry the kids to shore. L. P. climbed onto one man, while M. got on the other heavyset man, and the teacher held onto the fat man's leg and swam after them. Once they reached land, they ran home. On the way, the teacher encountered a friend who was attending a wedding. M. commented, “Back then, it was trendy to walk, not take a carriage.” The bride mentioned that she should join them too. The teacher suggested it would be nice if the two girls gave the bride their black veils, which they had picked up along the way. I can't remember how exactly. The kids handed them over, and the bride said they were really sweet, generous children. Then they continued on and stopped at the Sun Hotel. They got something to eat; I’m not sure what. After that, they went to a barn to dance. All the men had taken off their coats except for the teacher. Then the bride said he should take off his coat too. The teacher hesitated but eventually did. Then the teacher was.... Then the teacher said he was cold. I can’t share more; it’s inappropriate. That’s all I remember from the dream.
Remarks.—The narrator pays special attention to the getting up, but is uncertain whether in the original it referred to getting up on the teacher or the steamer. This uncertainty is, however, amply compensated for by the elaborate invention of the two strangers who take the girls upon their backs. The getting up is too valuable a thought for the narrator to surrender, but she is troubled by the idea of the teacher seeing the object. The want of clothing likewise arouses much interest. The bride's veil has, it is true, become the black veil of mourning (naturally in order to conceal anything indelicate). There is not only no innocent twisting, but it is conspicuously virtuous ("dear, generous children"); the amoral wish has become changed into virtue which receives special emphasis, arousing suspicion as does every accentuated virtue.
Remarks.—The narrator focuses intently on the act of getting up, but is unsure whether it refers to getting up on the teacher or the steamer. This uncertainty, however, is more than made up for by the creative idea of the two strangers who carry the girls on their backs. The thought of getting up is too important for the narrator to let go of, but she is concerned about the teacher witnessing the situation. The lack of clothing also generates a lot of interest. The bride's veil has indeed transformed into the black veil of mourning (presumably to hide anything inappropriate). There's no innocent twisting of the situation; instead, it’s obviously virtuous ("dear, generous children"); the amoral desire has shifted into virtue, which stands out and raises suspicion just like any pronounced virtue does.
This narrator exuberantly fills in the blanks in the scene of the barn: the men take off their coats; the teacher also, and is therefore ... i.e. naked and hence cold. Whereupon it becomes too improper.
This narrator enthusiastically fills in the details of the barn scene: the men take off their coats; the teacher does too, which means he is... i.e. naked and therefore cold. At that point, it gets too inappropriate.
The narrator has correctly recognised the parallels which were suspected in the criticisms of the original dream; she has filled in the scene about the undressing which belongs to the bathing, for it must finally come out that the girls are together with the naked teacher.
The narrator has accurately identified the similarities that were hinted at in the criticisms of the original dream; she has added the scene about undressing that pertains to bathing, as it must ultimately be revealed that the girls are with the naked teacher.
Witness III.—M. told me she had dreamt: Once I went to the baths but there was no room for me. The teacher took me into his dressing-room. I undressed and went bathing. I swam until I reached the bank. Then I met the teacher. He said would I not like to swim across the lake with him. I went, and L. P. also. We swam out and were soon in the middle of the lake. I did not want to swim any further. Now I can't remember it exactly. Soon a ship came up, and we got up on the ship. The teacher said, "I am cold," and a sailor gave us an old shirt. The three of us each tore a piece of the shirt away. I fastened it round the neck. Then we left the ship and swam away towards K.
Witness III.—M. told me she had a dream: Once I went to the baths, but there was no room for me. The teacher took me into his dressing room. I got undressed and went for a swim. I swam until I reached the shore. Then I met the teacher. He asked if I wanted to swim across the lake with him. I agreed, and L. P. joined us too. We swam out and soon found ourselves in the middle of the lake. I didn’t want to swim any further. Now I can’t remember exactly what happened next. Soon a boat came by, and we climbed aboard. The teacher said, “I’m cold,” and a sailor gave us an old shirt. The three of us each tore a piece off the shirt. I tied mine around my neck. Then we left the boat and swam away towards K.
L. P. and I did not want to go further, and two fat men took us upon their backs. In K. we got a veil which we put[182] on. In K. we went into the street. The teacher met his friend who invited us to the wedding. We went to the Sun and played games. We also danced the polonaise; now I don't remember exactly. Then we went for a honeymoon journey to Andermatt. The teacher had no money with him, and stole some chestnuts in Andermatt. The teacher said, "I am so glad that I can travel with my two pupils." Then there is something improper which I will not write. The dream is now finished.
L. P. and I didn’t want to go any further, so two heavyset men carried us on their backs. In K., we got a veil that we put on. In K., we went out into the street. The teacher ran into his friend, who invited us to a wedding. We went to the Sun and played games. We even danced the polonaise; I can’t remember all the details now. Then we went on a honeymoon trip to Andermatt. The teacher didn’t have any money with him, so he stole some chestnuts in Andermatt. The teacher said, "I’m so happy I can travel with my two students." Then there’s something inappropriate that I won’t write about. The dream is now over.
Remarks.—The undressing together now takes place in the narrow space of the dressing-room at the baths. The want of dress on the ship gives occasion to a further variant. (The old shirt torn in three.) In consequence of great uncertainty the getting up on the teacher is not mentioned. Instead, the two girls get up on two fat men. As "fat" becomes so prominent it should be noted that the teacher is more than a little plump. The setting is thoroughly typical; each one has a teacher. The duplication or multiplication of the persons is an expression of their significance, i.e. of the stored-up libido.[163] (Compare the duplication of the attribute in dementia præcox in my "Psychology of Dementia Præcox.") In cults and mythologies the significance of this duplication is very striking. (Cp. the Trinity and the two mystical formulas of confession: "Isis una quæ es omnia. Hermes omnia solus et ter unus.") Proverbially we say he eats, drinks, or sleeps "for two." The multiplication of the personality expresses also an analogy or comparison—my friend has the same "ætiological value" (Freud) as myself. In dementia præcox, or schizophrenia, to use Bleuler's wider and better term, the multiplication of the personality is mainly the expression of the stored-up libido, for it is invariably the person to whom the patient has transference who is subjected to this multiplication. ("There are two professors N." "Oh, you are also Dr. J.; this morning another came to see me who called himself Dr. J.") It seems that, corresponding to the general tendency in schizophrenia, this splitting is an analytic degradation whose[183] motive is to prevent the arousing of too violent impressions. A final significance of the multiplication of personality which, however, does not come exactly under this concept is the raising of some attribute of the person to a living figure. A simple instance is Dionysos and his companion Phales, wherein Phales is the equivalent of Phallos, the personification of the penis of Dionysos. The so-called attendants of Dionysos (Satyri, Sileni, Mænades, Mimallones, etc.) consist of the personification of the attributes of Dionysos.
Remarks.—The undressing together now happens in the tight space of the dressing room at the baths. The lack of clothing on the ship leads to another variation. (The old shirt torn in three.) Due to significant uncertainty, the teacher’s role is not mentioned. Instead, the two girls climb onto two overweight men. As "fat" becomes so noticeable, it should be pointed out that the teacher is more than a bit plump. The setting is completely typical; everyone has a teacher. The doubling or multiplication of people symbolizes their significance, i.e. the accumulated libido.[163] (Compare the repetition of the trait in dementia præcox in my "Psychology of Dementia Præcox.") In cults and mythologies, the significance of this duplication is quite striking. (See the Trinity and the two mystical formulas of confession: "Isis una quæ es omnia. Hermes omnia solus et ter unus.") Proverbially, we say someone eats, drinks, or sleeps "for two." The multiplication of personality also expresses an analogy or comparison—my friend has the same "ætiological value" (Freud) as myself. In dementia præcox, or schizophrenia, to use Bleuler's broader and better term, the multiplication of personality mainly reflects the accumulated libido, as it is always the individual to whom the patient has transference that undergoes this multiplication. ("There are two professors N." "Oh, you are also Dr. J.; this morning, another came to see me who called himself Dr. J.") It appears that, in line with the general tendency in schizophrenia, this splitting is an analytical breakdown intended to prevent the triggering of overly intense impressions. A final meaning of personality multiplication, which doesn't exactly fit this concept, is the elevation of some attribute of the person to a living figure. A straightforward example is Dionysos and his companion Phales, where Phales represents Phallos, the embodiment of the penis of Dionysos. The so-called attendants of Dionysos (Satyri, Sileni, Mænades, Mimallones, etc.) are personifications of the attributes of Dionysos.
The scene in Andermatt is portrayed with a nice wit, or more properly speaking, dreamt further: "The teacher steals chestnuts," that is equivalent to saying he does what is prohibited. By chestnuts is meant roasted chestnuts, which on account of the incision are known as a female sexual symbol. Thus the remark of the teacher, that he was especially glad to travel with his pupils, following directly upon the theft of the chestnuts, becomes intelligible. This theft of the chestnuts is certainly a personal interpolation, for it does not occur in any of the other accounts. It shows how intensive was the inner participation of the school companions of Marie X. in the dream, resting upon similar ætiological requirements.
The scene in Andermatt is described with clever humor, or to be more precise, imagined further: "The teacher steals chestnuts," which means he’s doing something forbidden. The chestnuts refer to roasted chestnuts, which are considered a symbol of female sexuality due to the way they’re cut open. So, the teacher’s comment about being especially pleased to travel with his students, right after the chestnut theft, makes sense. This theft is definitely a personal addition, as it doesn't appear in any other accounts. It shows just how deeply involved Marie X's classmates were in the dream, based on similar background needs.
This is the last of the aural witnesses. The story of the veil, the pain in the feet, are items which we may perhaps suspect to have been suggested in the original narrative. Other interpolations are, however, absolutely personal, and are due to independent inner participation in the meaning of the dream.
This is the last of the listening witnesses. The story of the veil and the pain in the feet are elements we might suspect were added in the original narrative. Other additions, however, are completely personal and come from an independent inner involvement in the meaning of the dream.
Hearsay Evidence.
Rumor Evidence.
(I.) The whole school had to go bathing with the teacher. M. X. had no place in the bath in which to undress. Then the teacher said: "You can come into my room and undress with me." She must have felt very uncomfortable. When both were undressed they went into the lake. The teacher took a long rope and wound it round M. Then they both swam far out. But M. got tired, and then the teacher took[184] her upon his back. Then M. saw Lina P.; she called out to her, Come along with me, and Lina came. Then they all swam out still farther. They met a ship. Then the teacher asked, "May we get in? these girls are tired." The boat stopped, and they could all get up. I do not know exactly how they came ashore again at K. Then the teacher got an old night-shirt. He put it on. Then he met an old friend who was celebrating his wedding. The teacher, M. and L. were invited. The wedding was celebrated at the Crown in K. They wanted to play the polonaise. The teacher said he would not accompany them. Then the others said he might as well. He did it with M. The teacher said: "I shall not go home again to my wife and children. I love you best, M." She was greatly pleased. After the wedding there was the honeymoon journey. The teacher, M. and L. had to accompany the others also. The journey was to Milan. Afterwards they went to Andermatt, where they could find no place to sleep. They went to a barn, where they could stop the night all together. I must not say any more because it becomes highly improper.
(I.) The whole school had to go swimming with the teacher. M. X. had no place to change in the bath. Then the teacher said, "You can come into my room and change with me." She must have felt really uncomfortable. Once they were both changed, they went into the lake. The teacher took a long rope and wrapped it around M. Then they both swam far out. But M. got tired, so the teacher carried her on his back. M. then saw Lina P.; she called out to her, "Come along with me," and Lina came. So they all swam out even farther. They came across a boat. The teacher asked, "Can we get in? These girls are tired." The boat stopped, and they all climbed in. I'm not sure exactly how they got back to shore at K. Then the teacher found an old nightshirt. He put it on and ran into an old friend who was celebrating his wedding. The teacher, M., and L. were invited. The wedding was held at the Crown in K. They wanted to dance the polonaise. The teacher said he wouldn’t join them. Then the others insisted he might as well. He danced with M. The teacher said, "I won’t go home to my wife and kids. I love you most, M." She was really happy. After the wedding, they went on a honeymoon trip. The teacher, M., and L. had to join the others as well. The trip was to Milan. Later, they went to Andermatt, where they couldn’t find a place to sleep. They ended up in a barn where they could all stay for the night. I can’t say any more because it gets quite inappropriate.
Remarks.—The undressing in the swimming-bath is properly detailed. The union in the water receives a further simplification for which the story of the rope led the way; the teacher fastens himself to Marie. Lina P. is not mentioned at all; she only comes later when Marie is already sitting upon the teacher. The dress is here a jacket. The wedding ceremony contains a very direct meaning. "The teacher will not go home any more to wife and child." Marie is the darling. In the barn they all found a place together, and then it becomes highly improper.
Remarks.—The undressing in the swimming pool is clearly described. The connection in the water is further simplified, following the storyline of the rope; the teacher attaches himself to Marie. Lina P. isn't mentioned at all; she only appears later when Marie is already sitting on the teacher. The outfit is referred to as a jacket. The wedding ceremony carries a very straightforward meaning. "The teacher won't return home to his wife and child." Marie is the favorite. In the barn, they all find a space together, and then things become quite inappropriate.
(II.) It was said that she had gone with the school to the swimming-baths to bathe. But as the baths were over-full the teacher had called her to come to him. We swam out to the lake, and L. P. followed us. Then the teacher took a string and bound us to one another. I do not know now exactly how they again got separated. But after a long time they suddenly arrived at Z. There a scene is said to have taken place which I would rather not tell, for if it were true[185] it would be too disgraceful; also now I don't know exactly how it is said to have been, for I was very tired, only I also heard that M. X. is said to have told how she was always to remain with our teacher, and he again and again caressed her as his favourite pupil. If I knew exactly I would also say the other thing, but my sister only said something about a little child which was born there, and of which the teacher was said to have been the godfather.
(II.) It was said that she went with the school to the swimming pools to swim. But since the pools were overcrowded, the teacher called her over. We swam out to the lake, and L. P. followed us. Then the teacher tied us together with a string. I don’t really know how they got separated again. But after a long time, they suddenly showed up at Z. There’s a scene there that I’d rather not discuss because if it’s true[185], it would be too embarrassing; and honestly, I’m not exactly sure what people said because I was really tired. All I heard was that M. X. mentioned she was supposed to stay with our teacher, and he kept treating her like his favorite student. If I knew for sure, I would share the other details, but my sister only mentioned something about a little child that was born there, of which the teacher was said to be the godfather.
Remarks.—Note that in this story the improper scene is inserted in the place of the wedding ceremony, where it is as apposite as at the end, for the attentive reader will certainly have already observed that the improper scene could have taken place in the swimming-bath dressing-room. The procedure has been adopted which is so frequent in dreams as a whole; the final thoughts of a long series of dream images contain exactly what the first image of the series was trying to represent. The censor pushes the complex away as long as possible through ever-renewed disguises, displacements, innocent renderings, etc. It does not take place in the bathing-room, in the water the "getting up" does not occur, on landing it is not on the teacher's back that the girls are sitting, it is another pair who are married in the barn, another girl has the child, and the teacher is only—godfather. All these images and situations are, however, directed to pick out the complex, the desire for coitus. Nevertheless the action still occurs at the back of all these metamorphoses, and the result is the birth placed at the end of the scene.
Remarks.—Note that in this story, the inappropriate scene is inserted in place of the wedding ceremony, where it is just as relevant as it would be at the end. An attentive reader will surely have already noticed that the inappropriate scene could have happened in the swimming-bath dressing room. The technique used here is common in dreams: the final thoughts of a long series of dream images reflect exactly what the first image was trying to depict. The censor tries to push the complex away for as long as possible through various disguises, displacements, innocent representations, etc. It doesn’t take place in the bathing room, the “getting up” doesn’t happen in the water, and when they land, it’s not on the teacher’s back that the girls are sitting; it’s another couple who gets married in the barn, another girl has the baby, and the teacher is just the godfather. All these images and situations are, however, aimed at revealing the complex, the desire for sex. Still, the action is present behind all these transformations, and the outcome is the birth placed at the end of the scene.
(III.) Marie said: the teacher had a wedding with his wife, and they went to the "Crown" and danced with one another. M. said a lot of wild things which I cannot repeat or write about, for it is too embarrassing.
(III.) Marie said that the teacher got married to his wife, and they went to the "Crown" and danced together. M. said a lot of crazy things that I can't repeat or write about because it's too embarrassing.
Remarks.—Here everything is too improper to be told. Note that the marriage takes place with the wife.
Remarks.—Here everything is too inappropriate to say. Note that the marriage involves the wife.
(IV.) ... that the teacher and M. once went bathing, and he asked M. whether she wanted to come along too. She said "yes." When they had gone out together they met L. P., and the teacher asked whether she wished to come along. And they went out farther. Then I also heard that she said[186] that the teacher said L. P. and she were the favourite pupils. She also told us that the teacher was in his swimming drawers. Then they went to a wedding, and the bride got a little child.
(IV.) ... that the teacher and M. once went swimming, and he asked M. if she wanted to join them. She replied "yes." When they went out together, they ran into L. P., and the teacher asked if she wanted to come along too. So they went further out. Then I also heard her say[186] that the teacher said L. P. and she were the teacher's favorite students. She also mentioned that the teacher was in his swim trunks. After that, they attended a wedding, where the bride had a little child.
Remarks.—The personal relationship to the teacher is strongly emphasised (the "favourite pupils"), likewise the want of clothing ("swimming drawers").
Remarks.—The personal relationship with the teacher is strongly emphasized (the "favorite students"), as well as the lack of clothing ("swimming trunks").
(V.) M. and L. P. went bathing with the teacher. When M. and L. P. and the teacher had swum a little way, M. said: "I cannot go any further, teacher, my foot hurts me." Then the teacher said she should sit on his back, which M. did. Then a small steamer came along, and the teacher got into the ship. The teacher had also two ropes, and he fastened both children to the ship. Then they went together to Z. and got out there. Then the teacher bought himself a dressing jacket and put it on, and the children had put a cloth over themselves. The teacher had a bride, and they were in a barn. Both children were with the teacher and the bride in the barn, and danced. I must not write the other thing, for it is too awful.
(V.) M. and L. P. went swimming with the teacher. After they had swum for a bit, M. said, "I can't go any further, teacher; my foot hurts." The teacher told her to sit on his back, which M. did. Then a small boat came by, and the teacher climbed aboard. He also had two ropes, and he tied both children to the boat. They then headed to Z. and got out there. After that, the teacher bought himself a jacket and put it on, while the children covered themselves with a cloth. The teacher had a wife, and they were in a barn. Both children were with the teacher and his wife in the barn, and they danced. I can't write about the other thing because it's too terrible.
Remarks.—Here Marie sits upon the teacher's back. The teacher fastens the two children by ropes to the ship, from which it can be seen how easily ship is put for teacher. The jacket again emerges as the piece of clothing. It was the teacher's own wedding, and what is improper comes after the dance.
Remarks.—Here Marie is sitting on the teacher's back. The teacher secures the two children with ropes to the ship, showing just how easily the ship is managed by the teacher. The jacket reappears as the item of clothing. It was the teacher's own wedding, and what's inappropriate follows the dance.
(VI.) The teacher is said to have gone bathing with the whole school. M. could not find any room, and she cried. The teacher is said to have told M. she could come into his dressing-room.
(VI.) The teacher reportedly went swimming with the entire school. M. couldn't find a place to change, and she cried. The teacher supposedly told M. she could use his dressing room.
"I must leave out something here and there," said my sister, "for it is a long story." But she told me something more which I must tell in order to speak the truth. When they were in the bath the teacher asked M. if she wished to swim out into the lake with him. To which she replied, "If I go along, you come also." Then we swam until about half-way. Then M. got tired, and then the teacher pulled her by a cord. At K. they went on land, and from there to Z.[187] (The teacher was all the time dressed as in the bath.) There we met a friend, whose wedding it was. We were invited by this friend. After the ceremony there was a honeymoon journey, and we came to Milan. We had to pass one night in a barn where something occurred which I cannot say. The teacher said we were his favourite pupils, and he also kissed M.
"I have to leave some details out," my sister said, "because it’s a long story." But she told me something else that I need to share to be honest. While they were in the bath, the teacher asked M. if she wanted to swim out into the lake with him. She replied, "If I go, you come too." So we swam until we were about halfway. Then M. got tired, and the teacher pulled her by a cord. At K., they went to shore, and from there to Z.[187] (The teacher was dressed the same way he was in the bath the whole time.) There, we ran into a friend who was getting married. We got invited by this friend. After the ceremony, there was a honeymoon trip, and we ended up in Milan. We had to spend a night in a barn where something happened that I can't talk about. The teacher said we were his favorite students, and he also kissed M.
Remarks.—The excuse "I must leave out something here and there" replaces the undressing. The teacher's want of clothing is emphasised. The journey to Milan is a typical honeymoon. This passage also seems to be an independent fancy, due to some personal participation. Marie clearly figures as the loved one.
Remarks.—The excuse "I need to skip a few things here and there" takes the place of undressing. The teacher's lack of clothing is highlighted. The trip to Milan represents a classic honeymoon. This section also appears to be a personal thought, stemming from some personal involvement. Marie is clearly depicted as the beloved.
(VII.) The whole school and the teacher went bathing. They all went into one room. The teacher also. M. alone had no place, and the teacher said to her, "I have still room," she went. Then the teacher said, "Lie on my back, I will swim out into the lake with you." I must not write any more, for it is improper; I can hardly say it at all. Beyond the improper part which followed I do not know any more of the dream.
(VII.) The whole school and the teacher went swimming. They all went into one room. The teacher did too. M. was the only one without a place, and the teacher said to her, "I still have room," so she went. Then the teacher said, "Lie on my back, and I'll swim you out into the lake." I can’t write any more because it's inappropriate; it's hard for me to even say it. Besides the inappropriate part that followed, I don't remember any more of the dream.
Remarks.—The narrator approaches the basis. Marie is to lie upon the teacher's back in the bathing compartment. Beyond the improper part she cannot give any more of the dream.
Remarks.—The narrator gets closer to the main point. Marie is supposed to lie on the teacher's back in the bathing area. She can't share more of the dream beyond that inappropriate part.
(VIII.) The whole school went bathing. M. had no room and was invited by the teacher into his compartment. The teacher swam out with her and told her that she was his darling or something like that. When they got ashore at Z. a friend was just having a wedding and he invited them both in their swimming costumes. The teacher found an old dressing jacket and put it over the swimming drawers. He (the teacher) also kissed M. and said he would not return home to his wife any more. They were also both invited on the honeymoon journey. On the journey they passed Andermatt, where they could not find any place to sleep, and so had to sleep in the hay. There was a woman; the dreadful part now comes, it is not at all right to make[188] something serious into mockery and laughter. This woman got a small child. I will not say any more now, for it becomes too dreadful.
(VIII.) The whole school went swimming. M. had no space, so the teacher invited her into his area. He swam out with her and told her she was his favorite or something like that. When they reached the shore at Z., a friend of theirs was having a wedding and invited them both in their swimsuits. The teacher found an old bathrobe and put it over the swim trunks. He also kissed M. and said he wouldn't go home to his wife anymore. They were both invited on the honeymoon trip. During the trip, they passed through Andermatt, where they couldn’t find a place to sleep, so they had to sleep in the hay. There was a woman; the terrible part now comes, it’s not right to turn something serious into mockery and laughter. This woman had a small child. I won't say anything more for now, as it becomes too horrifying.
Remarks.—The narrator is thoroughgoing. (He told her simply she was his darling. He kissed her and said he would not go home to his wife.) The vexation about the silly tattling which breaks through at the end suggests some peculiarity in the narrator. From subsequent investigation it was found that this girl was the only one of the witnesses who had been early and intentionally given an explanation about sex by her mother.
Remarks.—The narrator is very detailed. (He told her straightforwardly that she was his sweetheart. He kissed her and said he wouldn’t go home to his wife.) The frustration about the silly gossip that comes out at the end hints at something unusual about the narrator. Further investigation revealed that this girl was the only witness whose mother had deliberately given her an explanation about sex at an early age.
Epicrisis.
Summary of findings.
So far as the interpretation of the dream is concerned, there is nothing for me to add; the children have taken care of all the essentials, leaving practically nothing over for psychoanalytic interpretation. Rumour has analysed and interpreted the dream. So far as I know rumour has not hitherto been investigated in this new capacity. This case certainly makes it appear worth while to fathom the psychology of rumour. In the presentation of the material I have purposely restricted myself to the psychoanalytic point of view, although I do not deny that my material offers numerous openings for the invaluable researches of the followers of Stern, Claparède, and others.
As for interpreting the dream, there's nothing more for me to add; the kids have covered all the basics, leaving almost nothing left for psychoanalytic interpretation. Rumour has analyzed and interpreted the dream. To my knowledge, rumour hasn't been looked into in this new role before. This case definitely seems to make it worthwhile to explore the psychology of rumour. In presenting the material, I've intentionally focused on the psychoanalytic perspective, although I acknowledge that my material provides many opportunities for the valuable research by followers of Stern, Claparède, and others.
The material enables us to understand the structure of the rumour, but psychoanalysis cannot rest satisfied with that. The why and wherefore of the whole manifestation demands further knowledge. As we have seen, the teacher, astonished by this rumour, was left puzzled by the problem, wondering as to its cause and effect. How can a dream which is notoriously incorrect and meaningless (for teachers are, as is well known, grounded in psychology) produce such effects, such malicious gossip? Faced by this, the teacher seems to have instinctively hit upon the correct answer. The effect of the dream can only be explained by its being "le vrai mot de la situation," i.e. that the dream formed the fit expression[189] for something that was already in the air. It was the spark which fell into the powder magazine. The material contains all the proofs essential for this view. I have repeatedly drawn attention to their own unrecognised participation in the dream by Marie's school-companions, and the special points of interest where any of them have added their own phantasies or dreams. The class consists of girls between twelve and thirteen years of age, who therefore are in the midst of the prodromata of puberty. The dreamer Marie X. is herself physically almost completely developed sexually, and in this respect ahead of her class; she is therefore a leader who has given the watchword for the unconscious, and thus brought to expression the sexual complexes of her companions which were lying there ready prepared.
The material helps us understand the structure of the rumor, but psychoanalysis needs more than that. We must know the reasons behind this whole situation. As we’ve seen, the teacher, surprised by this rumor, was left confused about its cause and effect. How can a dream that is clearly wrong and meaningless (since teachers are, as everyone knows, trained in psychology) create such effects and such malicious gossip? In response, the teacher seems to have instinctively arrived at the right answer. The impact of the dream can only be explained by it being "le vrai mot de la situation," i.e. that the dream was the perfect expression[189] for something that was already brewing. It was the spark that ignited the powder keg. The material provides all the evidence necessary for this perspective. I have repeatedly pointed out their own unrecognized involvement in the dream by Marie’s classmates and the specific points of interest where any of them have contributed their own fantasies or dreams. The class is made up of girls aged twelve to thirteen, who are in the early stages of puberty. The dreamer, Marie X., is herself almost fully developed physically, and in this regard, ahead of her peers; she is thus a leader who has given the signal for the unconscious and has expressed the sexual complexes of her classmates that were already there, waiting to be revealed.
As can be easily understood, the occasion was most painful to the teacher. The supposition that therein lay some secret motive of the schoolgirls is justified by the psychoanalytic axiom—judge actions by their results rather than by their conscious motives.[164] Consequently it would be probable that Marie X. had been especially troublesome to her teacher. Marie at first liked this teacher most of all. In the course of the latter half-year her position had, however, changed. She had become dreamy and inattentive, and towards the dusk of evening was afraid to go into the streets for fear of bad men. She talked several times to her companions about sexual things in a somewhat obscene way; her mother asked me anxiously how she should explain the approaching menstruation to her daughter. On account of this alteration in conduct Marie had forfeited the good opinion of her teacher, as was clearly evidenced for the first time by a school report, which she and some of her friends had received a few days before the outbreak of the rumour. The disappointment was so great that the girls had imagined all kinds of fancied acts of revenge against the teacher; for instance, they might push him on to the lines so that the train would run over him, etc. Marie was especially to the fore in these murderous phantasies. On the night of this great outburst of anger, when her former[190] liking for her teacher seemed quite forgotten, that repressed part of herself announced itself in the dream, and fulfilled its desire for sexual union with the teacher—as a compensation for the hate which had filled the day.
It's easy to see that the situation was very painful for the teacher. The idea that there was some hidden motive behind the schoolgirls' actions is supported by the psychoanalytic principle—evaluate actions based on their consequences rather than their conscious motives.[164] As a result, it’s likely that Marie X. had been particularly difficult for her teacher. Marie initially liked this teacher more than anyone else. However, during the latter half of the year, her feelings had changed. She had become dreamy and distracted, and in the evenings, she was afraid to go outside because of the fear of dangerous men. She discussed sexual topics with her friends in a somewhat inappropriate manner, and her mother asked me worriedly how to explain the onset of menstruation to her daughter. Because of this change in behavior, Marie lost her teacher's trust, which was clearly shown for the first time in a school report she and some friends received just days before the rumors began. The disappointment was so intense that the girls imagined all sorts of revenge against the teacher; for example, they thought about pushing him onto the train tracks so that a train would run him over, and so on. Marie was particularly vocal in these violent fantasies. On the night of this outpouring of anger, when her previous affection for her teacher seemed completely forgotten, that repressed part of her surfaced in a dream, fulfilling its desire for a sexual connection with the teacher as a way to compensate for the anger that had built up throughout the day.
On waking, the dream became a subtle instrument of her hatred, because the wish-idea was also that of her school companions, as it always is in rumours of this kind. Revenge certainly had its triumph, but the recoil upon Marie herself was still more severe. Such is the rule when our impulses are given over to the unconscious. Marie X. was expelled from school, but upon my report she was allowed to return to it.
On waking, the dream transformed into a quiet tool of her hatred, since the desire was also shared by her classmates, as it usually is in rumors like this. Revenge certainly had its victory, but the backlash on Marie was even worse. That's how it goes when our impulses are left to the unconscious. Marie X. was expelled from school, but after I reported it, she was allowed to come back.
I am well aware that this little communication is inadequate and unsatisfactory from the point of view of exact science. Had the original story been accurately verified we should have clearly demonstrated what we have now been only able to suggest. This case therefore only posits a question, and it remains for happier observers to collect convincing experiences in this field.
I know that this brief message is lacking and doesn't meet the standards of precise science. If the original story had been thoroughly verified, we would have been able to clearly show what we've only been able to hint at now. So, this case only raises a question, and it's up to better observers to gather convincing evidence in this area.
CHAPTER V
The symbolism of numbers which greatly engaged the imaginative philosophy of earlier centuries has again acquired a fresh interest from the analytic investigations of Freud and his school. But in the material of number-dreams we no longer discover conscious puzzles of symbolic concatenations of numbers but the unconscious roots of the symbolism of numbers. There is scarcely anything quite fundamentally new to offer in this sphere since the presentations of Freud, Adler and Stekel. It must here suffice to corroborate their experiences by recording parallel cases. I have had under observation a few cases of this kind which are worth reporting for their general interest.
The symbolism of numbers, which captivated the imaginative philosophy of earlier centuries, has gained new interest from the analytical research of Freud and his followers. However, in the realm of number-related dreams, we no longer find deliberate puzzles made up of symbolic numbers but rather the unconscious origins of number symbolism. There isn’t much fundamentally new to add in this area since the work of Freud, Adler, and Stekel. It's enough to support their findings by sharing similar cases. I have observed a few such cases that are worth reporting for their general interest.
The first three instances are from a middle-aged married man whose conflict of the moment was an extra-conjugal love affair. The piece of the dream from which I take the symbolised number is: in front of the manager his general subscription. The manager comments on the high number of the subscription. It reads 2477.
The first three examples are from a middle-aged married man who is dealing with an extramarital affair. The part of the dream that I use to symbolize the number is: in front of the manager, his general subscription. The manager comments on the high number of the subscription. It reads 2477.
The analysis of the dream brings out a rather ungentlemanly reckoning up of the expense of the affair, which is foreign to the generous nature of the dreamer, and which the unconscious makes use of as a resistance to this affair. The preliminary interpretation is, therefore, that the number has some financial importance and origin. A rough estimate of the expenses so far leads to a number which in fact approaches 2477 francs; a more exact reckoning, however, gives 2387 francs, which could be only arbitrarily translated into 2477. I then left the numbers to the free association of the patient;[192] it occurs to him that the figure in the dream should be divided as 24-77. Perhaps it is a telephone number; this supposition proves incorrect. The next association is that it is the total of some numbers. A reminiscence then occurs to him that he once told me that he had celebrated the 100th birthday of his mother and himself when his mother was 65 and he was 35 years old. (Their birthdays are on the same day.)
The analysis of the dream reveals quite an unrefined calculation of the cost of the situation, which doesn't align with the dreamer's generous character. The unconscious uses this as a way to resist the situation. So, the initial interpretation is that the number has financial significance and origin. A rough estimate of the expenses so far leads to a number close to 2477 francs; a more accurate calculation, however, gives 2387 francs, which could just as easily be rounded up to 2477. I then let the patient freely associate with the numbers; [192] he realizes that the figure in the dream might be split as 24-77. Maybe it’s a phone number; this idea turns out to be incorrect. The next association is that it is the sum of some numbers. Then he remembers that he once told me he celebrated the 100th birthday of both his mother and himself when she was 65 and he was 35 years old. (Their birthdays are on the same day.)
In this way the patient arrived at the following series of associations:—
In this way, the patient came to the following series of associations:—
He is born on | 26 II. |
His mistress | 28 VIII. |
His wife | 1 III. |
His mother (his father is long dead) | 26 II. |
His two children | 29 IV. |
and | 13 VII. |
The patient is born | II. 75. |
His mistress | VIII. 85. |
He is now 36 years old, his mistress 25.
He is now 36 years old, and his girlfriend is 25.
If this series of associations is written in the usual figures, the following addition is arrived at:—
If this series of associations is written in the usual figures, the following addition is reached:—
26. II. | = | 262 |
28. VIII. | = | 288 |
1. III. | = | 13 |
26. II. | = | 262 |
29. IV. | = | 294 |
13. VII. | = | 137 |
II. 75. | = | 275 |
VIII. 85 | = | 885 |
25 | = | 25 |
36 | = | 36 |
—— | ||
2477 |
This series, which includes all the members of his family, gives the number 2477.
This series, which includes all the members of his family, gives the number 2477.
This construction led to a deeper layer of the dream's meaning. The patient is most closely united to his family, but on the other hand very much in love. This situation[193] provokes a severe conflict. The detailed description of the manager's appearance (which I leave out for the sake of brevity) pointed to the analyst, from whom the patient rightly fears and desires firm control and criticism of his condition of dependence and bondage.
This setup revealed a deeper level of the dream's meaning. The patient feels strongly connected to his family but is also deeply in love. This situation[193] creates a major conflict. The in-depth description of the manager's appearance (which I’ll skip for brevity) indicated the analyst, from whom the patient both fears and craves strong guidance and critique regarding his feelings of dependence and entrapment.
The dream which followed soon afterwards, reported in brief, runs: The analyst asks the patient what he actually does at his mistress'? to which the patient replied he plays there, and that indeed on a very high number, on 152. The analyst remarks: "You are sadly cheated."
The dream that followed shortly after, summarized briefly, goes: The analyst asks the patient what he really does at his mistress’s place, to which the patient replies he plays there, and that indeed on a very high number, on 152. The analyst comments: "You are unfortunately deceived."
The analysis displayed again a repressed tendency to reckon up the expense of the affair. The amount spent monthly was close on 152 francs, it was from 148-158 francs. The remark that he was being cheated alludes to the point at issue in the difficulties of the patient with his mistress. She maintains that he had deflowered her; he, on the contrary, is firmly convinced that she was not a virgin, and that she had already been seduced by some one else at the time when he was seeking her favours and she was refusing him. The expression "number" leads to the associations: number of the gloves, calibre-number. From there the next step was to the fact that he recognized, at the first coitus, a noticeable width of the opening instead of the expected resistance of the hymen. To him, this is proof of the deception. The unconscious naturally makes use of this opportunity as an effective means of opposition to the relationship. 152 proves at first refractory to further analysis. The number on a subsequent occasion aroused the really not remote association, "house-number." Then came this series of associations. When the patient first knew her the lady lived at X Street No. 17, then Y Street No. 129, then Z Street No. 48.
The analysis once again showed a repressed tendency to calculate the costs of the situation. The amount spent each month was around 152 francs, fluctuating between 148 and 158 francs. The comment about being cheated refers to the core issue regarding the patient's troubles with his mistress. She insists that he took her virginity; he, on the other hand, firmly believes she was not a virgin and had already been seduced by someone else when he was pursuing her while she was rejecting him. The term "number" leads to associations like the number of gloves and caliber numbers. From there, he made the next connection that during their first sexual encounter, he noticed a significant width of the opening instead of the expected resistance of the hymen. To him, this serves as proof of her deceit. The unconscious naturally seizes this opportunity as an effective way to oppose the relationship. 152 initially proves resistant to further analysis. The number later triggered a related association, "house number." Then came a series of associations. When the patient first met her, she lived at X Street No. 17, then Y Street No. 129, and finally Z Street No. 48.
Here the patient thought that he had clearly gone far beyond 152, the total being 194. It then occurred to him that the lady had removed from No. 48 Z Street at his instigation for certain reasons; it must therefore run 194 - 48 = 146. She now lives in A Street No. 6, therefore 146 + 6 = 152.
Here the patient thought he had clearly gone far beyond 152, with the total being 194. Then it struck him that the lady had moved from No. 48 Z Street at his suggestion for certain reasons; it must therefore be 194 - 48 = 146. She now lives at A Street No. 6, so 146 + 6 = 152.
The following dream was obtained during a later part[194] of the analysis. The patient dreamt that he had received an account from the analyst in which he was charged interest for delay in payment from the period September 3rd to 29th. The interest on the total of 315 francs was 1 franc.
The following dream was obtained during a later part[194] of the analysis. The patient dreamt that he received a bill from the analyst where he was charged interest for late payment from September 3rd to 29th. The interest on the total of 315 francs was 1 franc.
Under this reproach of meanness and avariciousness levelled at the analyst, the patient covered, as analysis proved, a violent unconscious envy. Diverse things in the life of the analyst can arouse the patient's envy; one fact here in particular had recently made a marked impression. His physician had received an addition to the family. The disturbed relations between the patient and his wife unfortunately does not permit such an expectation in his case. Hence his ground for envy and invidious comparisons.
Under this accusation of being stingy and greedy directed at the analyst, the patient concealed, as analysis revealed, a strong unconscious envy. Various aspects of the analyst's life can trigger the patient's jealousy; one particular event had recently made a significant impact. His doctor had welcomed a new addition to the family. Unfortunately, the troubled relationship between the patient and his wife does not allow for such an expectation in his situation. Thus, this is his basis for envy and resentful comparisons.
As before, the analysis of 315 produces a separation into 3—1—5. To three he associates—his doctor has three children, just lately there is one in addition. He himself would have five children were all living; as it is he has 3 - 1 = 2 living; for three of the children were stillborn. The symbolism of the numbers is not exhausted by these associations.
As before, the analysis of 315 leads to a breakdown into 3—1—5. To three, he connects—his doctor has three children, and recently there’s one more. He would have five children if all were alive; as it stands, he has 3 - 1 = 2 living since three of the children were stillborn. The meaning of the numbers isn't limited to these associations.
The patient remarks that the period from 3rd to 29th September contains twenty-six days. His next thought is to add this and the other figures of the dream:
The patient notes that the time from September 3rd to September 29th has twenty-six days. His next thought is to add this and the other numbers from the dream:
- 26
- 315
- 1
- ___
- 342
- ___
With 342 he carries out the same operation as on 315, splitting it into 3—4—2. Whereas before it came out that his doctor had three children, and then had another, and the patient had five, now it runs: the doctor had three children, and now has four, patient has only two. He remarks on this that the second figure sounds like a rectification in contrast with the wish-fulfilment of the first.
With 342, he performs the same operation as with 315, breaking it down into 3—4—2. Previously, it turned out that his doctor had three children, then had another, while the patient had five. Now it goes: the doctor had three children, and now has four, while the patient has only two. He notes that the second figure seems like a correction compared to the wish-fulfillment of the first.
The patient, who had discovered this explanation for himself without my help, declared himself satisfied. His physician, however, was not; to him it seemed that the[195] above disclosures did not exhaust the rich possibilities that determined the unconscious images. The patient had, for instance, added to the figure five that of the stillborn children; one was born in the 9th month and two in the 7th. He also emphasised the fact that his wife had had two miscarriages, one in the 5th week and the other in the 7th. Adding these figures together we get the determination of the number 26.
The patient, who figured this out on his own without my help, said he was satisfied. His doctor, however, wasn't; he felt that the[195] information shared didn't cover all the rich possibilities behind the unconscious images. For example, the patient added to the figure five the number of stillborn children; one was born in the 9th month and two in the 7th. He also pointed out that his wife had two miscarriages, one in the 5th week and the other in the 7th. When we add these numbers together, we arrive at the total of 26.
Child of | 7 | months |
" " | 7 | " |
" " | 9 | " |
__ | ||
23 | " | |
2 miscarriages (5 + 7 weeks) | 3 | " |
__ | ||
26 | " | |
__ |
It seems as if the number twenty-six were determined by the number of the lost times of pregnancy. This time (twenty-six days) denotes, in the dream, a delay for which the patient was charged one franc interest. He has, in fact, suffered a delay through the lost pregnancies, for his doctor has, during the time the patient has known him, surpassed him with one child. One franc must be one child. We have already seen the tendency of the patient to add together all his children, even the dead ones, in order to outdo his rival. The thought that his physician had outdone him by one child could easily react immediately upon the determination of 1. We will therefore follow up this tendency of the patient and carry on his play with figures, by adding to the figure 26 the two complete pregnancies of nine months each.
It seems like the number twenty-six is linked to the number of lost pregnancies. This time (twenty-six days) in the dream represents a delay for which the patient was charged one franc in interest. He has actually experienced a delay due to the lost pregnancies, since during the time the patient has known his doctor, the doctor has had one more child than him. One franc must represent one child. We've already noted the patient's tendency to count all his children, including the deceased ones, to compete with his rival. The idea that his doctor has one more child could easily influence the determination of 1. Therefore, we'll continue to explore this tendency in the patient and play with numbers, by adding the two complete pregnancies of nine months each to the number 26.
26 + 9 + 9 = 44
26 + 9 + 9 = 44
If we follow the tendency to split up the numbers we get 2 + 6 and 4 + 4, two groups of figures which have only this in common, that each group gives 8 by addition. These numbers are, as we must notice, composed entirely of the months of pregnancy given by the patient. Compare with them those groups of figures which contain the information[196] as to the doctor's fecundity, viz. 315 and 342; it is to be noted that the resemblance lies in their sum-total giving 9 : 9 - 8 = 1. It looks as if here likewise the notion about the differentiation of 1 were carried out. As the patient remarked, 315 seems thus a wish-fulfilment, 342 on the other hand a rectification. An ingenious fancy playing round will discover the following difference between the two numbers:
If we break down the numbers, we get 2 + 6 and 4 + 4, two sets of figures that only have one thing in common: each set adds up to 8. It’s important to note that these numbers are entirely made up of the months of pregnancy reported by the patient. Now, if we look at the numbers that indicate the doctor's fertility, which are 315 and 342, we see that their total also adds up to 9: 9 - 8 = 1. It seems like the idea of differentiating 1 is also present here. The patient mentioned that 315 appears to represent a wish-fulfillment, whereas 342 seems to signify a correction. A clever exploration will reveal the following difference between the two numbers:
3 × 1 × 5 = 15. 3 × 4 × 2 = 24. 24 - 15 = 9
3 × 1 × 5 = 15. 3 × 4 × 2 = 24. 24 - 15 = 9
Here again we come upon the important figure 9, which neatly combines the reckoning of the pregnancies and births.
Here again we encounter the important figure 9, which neatly combines the counting of pregnancies and births.
It is difficult to say where the borderline of play begins; necessarily so, for the unconscious product is the creation of a sportive fancy, of that psychic impulse out of which play itself arises. It is repugnant to the scientific mind to have serious dealings with this element of play, which on all sides loses itself in the vague. But it must be never forgotten that the human mind has for thousands of years amused itself with just this kind of game; it were therefore nothing wonderful if this historic past again compelled admission in dream to similar tendencies. The patient pursues in his waking life similar phantastic tendencies about figures, as is seen in the fact already mentioned of the celebration of the 100th birthday. Their presence in the dream therefore need not surprise us. In a single example of unconscious determination exact proofs are often lacking, but the sum of our experiences entitles us to rely upon the accuracy of the individual discoveries. In the investigation of free creative phantasy we are in the region, almost more than anywhere else, of broad empiricism; a high measure of discretion as to the accuracy of individual results is consequently required, but this in nowise obliges us to pass over in silence what is active and living, for fear of being execrated as unscientific. There must be no parleying with the superstition-phobia of the modern mind; for this itself is a means by which the secrets of the unconscious are kept veiled.
It’s hard to pinpoint where play truly begins; it's a tricky issue since the unconscious outcome is the result of a playful imagination, that mental drive from which play emerges. The scientific mind tends to shy away from seriously engaging with this aspect of play, which is often vague. However, we must remember that for thousands of years, humans have entertained themselves with this type of game; it's not surprising that this historical past resurfaces in dreams with similar impulses. The patient expresses similar fantastical ideas about figures in their waking life, as shown by the previously mentioned celebration of the 100th birthday. Therefore, their appearance in dreams shouldn’t surprise us. In individual cases of unconscious determination, concrete evidence is often lacking, but the overall range of our experiences allows us to trust the accuracy of our findings. When we explore free creative imagination, we venture into a realm that relies significantly on broad empirical evidence; thus, we must exercise caution regarding the precision of particular results. However, this does not obligate us to ignore what is active and alive just because we fear being deemed unscientific. We shouldn't negotiate with the contemporary mind's fear of superstition; this very fear serves to keep the mysteries of the unconscious hidden.
It is of special interest to see how the problems of the patient are mirrored in the unconscious of his wife. His[197] wife had the following dream: She dreamt, and this is the whole dream: "Luke 137." The analysis of the number gives the following. To 1 she associates: The doctor has another child. He had three. If all her children were living she would have 7; now she has only 3 - 1 = 2. But she desires 1 + 3 + 7 = 11 (a twin number, 1 and 1), which expresses her wish that her two children had been pairs of twins, for then she would have reached the same number of children as the doctor. Her mother once had twins. The hope of getting a child by her husband is very precarious; this had for a long time turned her ideas in the unconscious towards a second marriage. Other phantasies pictured her as "done with," i.e. having reached the climacteric at 44. She is now 33 years old, therefore in 11 years she will have reached her 44th year. This is an important period as her father died in his 44th year. Her phantasy of the 44th year contains the idea of the death of her father. The emphasis on the death of her father corresponds to the repressed phantasy of the death of her husband, who is the obstacle to a second marriage. At this place the material belonging to the dream "Luke 137" comes in to solve the conflict. The dreamer is, one soon discovers, in no wise well up in her Bible, she has not read it for an incredible time, she is not at all religious. It would be therefore quite purposeless to have recourse to associations here. The dreamer's ignorance of her Bible is so great that she did not even know that the citation "Luke 137" could only refer to the Gospel of St. Luke. When she turned up the New Testament she came to the Acts of the Apostles. As chapter i. has only 26 verses and not 37, she took the 7th verse, "It is not for you to know the times or the seasons, which the Father hath put in his own power."
It’s particularly interesting to see how the patient’s issues are reflected in his wife’s unconscious. His [197] wife had the following dream: she dreamed, and this is the whole dream: "Luke 137." Analyzing the number reveals the following. She associates 1 with: The doctor has another child. He had three. If all her children were alive, she would have 7; now she has only 3 - 1 = 2. But she wants 1 + 3 + 7 = 11 (a double number, 1 and 1), which shows her wish that her two children were twins, as that would have given her the same number of kids as the doctor. Her mother once had twins. Her hope of having another child with her husband is very uncertain; this has led her unconscious thoughts to lean towards a second marriage for a long time. Other fantasies show her as "done with," i.e. reaching menopause at 44. She is currently 33, so in 11 years, she will be 44. This is a significant age since her father died at that age. Her fantasy about turning 44 includes the idea of her father's death. The focus on her father’s death relates to her repressed wish about her husband’s death, as he is the barrier to getting remarried. At this point, the material from the dream "Luke 137" comes into play to resolve the conflict. One quickly finds out that the dreamer isn't very knowledgeable about her Bible; she hasn't read it in ages and isn’t really religious. So, it would be pointless to analyze associations here. The dreamer is so unfamiliar with her Bible that she didn't even realize that the citation "Luke 137" could only refer to the Gospel of St. Luke. When she opened the New Testament, she landed on the Acts of the Apostles. Since chapter 1 only has 26 verses and not 37, she picked the 7th verse, "It is not for you to know the times or the seasons, which the Father hath put in his own power."
But if we turn to Luke i. 37, we find the Annunciation of the Virgin.
But if we look at Luke 1:37, we find the Annunciation of the Virgin.
Verse 35. The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee: therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God.
Verse 35. The Holy Spirit will come upon you, and the power of the Most High will cover you: therefore, that holy child will be called the Son of God.
Verse 36. And, behold, thy cousin Elisabeth, she hath also conceived a son in her old age: and this is the sixth month with her, who was called barren.
Verse 36. And look, your cousin Elisabeth has also gotten pregnant with a son in her old age, and she is now in her sixth month, who was called barren.
Verse 37. For with God nothing shall be impossible.
Verse 37. For with God, nothing is impossible.
The necessary continuation of the analysis of "Luke 137" demanded the looking up of Luke xiii. 7, where it says:
The required continuation of the analysis of "Luke 137" called for reviewing Luke xiii. 7, where it states:
Verse 6. A certain man had a fig tree planted in his vineyard; and he came and sought fruit thereon, and found none.
Verse 6. A man had a fig tree planted in his vineyard; he came looking for fruit on it but didn’t find any.
Verse 7. Then said he unto the dresser of his vineyard, Behold, these three years I come seeking fruit on this fig tree, and find none: cut it down; why cumbereth it the ground?
Verse 7. Then he said to the gardener of his vineyard, Look, for the past three years I've been coming to look for fruit on this fig tree, and I haven't found any: cut it down; why is it taking up space on the ground?
The fig-tree, which from antiquity has been a symbol of the male genital, is to be cut down on account of its unfruitfulness. This passage is in complete accord with innumerable sadistic phantasies of the dreamer, concerned with the cutting or biting off of the penis. The relation to her husband's unfruitful organ is obvious. That she withdraws her libido from her husband is clear for he is impotent as regard herself; it is equally clear that she undergoes regression to the father ("which the father hath put in his own power") and identifies herself with her mother who had twins.[166] By thus advancing her age the dreamer places her husband in regard to herself in the position of a son or boy, of an age at which impotency is normal. Furthermore, the desire to overcome her husband is easily understood from, and amply evidenced in her earlier analysis. It is therefore only a confirmation of what has been already said, if, following up the matter of "Luke 137," we find in Luke vii. verse 12, Now when he came nigh to the gate of the city, behold, there was a dead man carried out, the only son of his mother, and she was a widow. (13) And when the Lord saw her, he had compassion on her, and said unto her, Weep not. (14) And he came and touched the bier: and they that bare him stood still. And he said, Young man, I say unto thee, Arise.
The fig tree, which has been a symbol of male genitalia since ancient times, is to be cut down because it is unfruitful. This idea aligns perfectly with the many sadistic fantasies of the dreamer, focused on cutting or biting off the penis. The connection to her husband's unproductive organ is clear. It’s obvious that she is withdrawing her desire from her husband since he is impotent concerning her; it's equally clear that she is regressing to the father (“which the father hath put in his own power”) and identifying with her mother who had twins.[166] By casting herself in a younger role, the dreamer positions her husband as a son or boy in relation to her, at an age when impotence is normal. Furthermore, her desire to overpower her husband is easily understood and well-supported by her earlier analysis. Therefore, it only confirms what has already been stated that, following up on the matter of "Luke 137," we find in Luke 7:12, "As he approached the city gate, a dead person was being carried out—he was the only son of his mother, and she was a widow. (13) When the Lord saw her, his heart went out to her and he said, ‘Don’t cry.’ (14) Then he went up and touched the coffin, and those carrying it stood still. He said, ‘Young man, I say to you, get up!’"
In the particular psychological situation of the dreamer,[199] the allusion to the resurrection presents a delightful meaning as the cure of her husband's impotency. Then the whole problem would be solved. There is no need for me to point out in so many words the numerous wish-fulfilments contained in this material; they are obvious to the reader.
In the specific psychological situation of the dreamer,[199] the reference to resurrection carries a pleasing meaning as it relates to the healing of her husband's impotence. That would resolve the entire issue. I don’t need to elaborate on the many wish fulfillments present in this material; they are clear to the reader.
The important combination of the symbol "Luke 137" must be conceived as cryptomnesia, since the dreamer is quite unversed in the Bible. Both Flournoy[167] and myself[168] have already drawn attention to the important effects of this phenomenon. So far as one can be humanly certain, the question of any manipulation of the material with intent to deceive does not come into consideration in this case. Those well posted in psychoanalysis will be able to allay any such suspicion simply from the disposition and setting of the material as a whole.
The significant combination of the symbol "Luke 137" should be understood as cryptomnesia, since the dreamer isn’t familiar with the Bible. Both Flournoy[167] and I[168] have already highlighted the important effects of this phenomenon. As far as we can be reasonably sure, the issue of any manipulation of the material with the intent to deceive does not apply in this case. Those well-versed in psychoanalysis will be able to dispel any such suspicion based on the context and overall presentation of the material.
CHAPTER VI
A CRITICISM OF BLEULER'S "THEORY OF SCHIZOPHRENIC NEGATIVISM"[169]
A CRITICISM OF BLEULER'S "THEORY OF SCHIZOPHRENIC NEGATIVISM"[169]
Bleuler's work contains a noteworthy clinical analysis of "Negativism." Besides giving a very precise and discerning summary of the various manifestations of negativism, the author presents us with a new psychological conception well worthy of attention, viz. the concept of ambivalency and of ambitendency, thus formulating the psychological axiom that every tendency is balanced by its opposite tendency (to this must be added that positive action is produced by a comparatively small leaning to one side of the scale). Similarly all other tendencies, under the stress of emotions, are balanced by their opposites—thus giving an ambivalent character to their expression. This theory rests on clinical observation of katatonic negativism, which more than proves the existence of contrasting tendencies and values. These facts are well known to psychoanalysis, where they are summed up under the concept of resistance. But this must not be taken as meaning that every positive psychic action simply calls up its opposite. One may easily gain the impression from Bleuler's work that his standpoint is that, cum grano salis, the conception or the tendency of the Schizophrenic is always accompanied by its opposite. For instance, Bleuler says:—
Bleuler's work includes a significant clinical analysis of "Negativism." In addition to providing a clear and insightful summary of the different forms of negativism, the author introduces a new psychological idea that deserves attention, namely the concepts of ambivalency and ambitendency. This leads to the psychological principle that every tendency is countered by an opposing tendency (it should also be noted that positive action results from a relatively slight lean toward one side of the scale). Similarly, all other tendencies, when influenced by emotions, are opposed by their counterparts—creating an ambivalent character in their expression. This theory is based on clinical observations of katatonic negativism, which strongly supports the existence of contrasting tendencies and values. These observations are well recognized in psychoanalysis, where they are summarized under the concept of resistance. However, this shouldn't imply that every positive psychic action simply triggers its opposite. One might easily get the impression from Bleuler's work that his position is that, cum grano salis, the conception or tendency of the Schizophrenic is always paired with its opposite. For instance, Bleuler states:—
1. "Disposing causes of negativistic phenomena are: the ambitendency by which every impulse is accompanied by its opposite."
1. "The reasons behind negative behaviors are: the ambitendency where every impulse comes with its opposite."
2. "Ambivalency, which gives two opposed emotional expressions to the same idea, and would regard that idea as positive and negative at the same time."
2. "Ambivalency means having two conflicting emotional responses to the same idea, seeing that idea as both positive and negative at the same time."
3. "The schizophrenic splitting of the psyche prevents any final summing up of the conflicting and corresponding psychisms, so that the unsuitable impulse can be realised just as much as the right one, and the negative thought substituted for the right one." "On this theory, negative manifestations may directly arise, since non-selected positive and negative psychisms may stand for one another," and so on.
3. "The split of the psyche in schizophrenia stops any final assessment of the conflicting and matching mental states, allowing both the inappropriate impulse and the appropriate one to manifest, and the negative thought to replace the correct one." "According to this theory, negative expressions might emerge directly, as unchosen positive and negative mental states can represent each other," and so on.
If we investigate psychoanalytically a case of obvious ambivalency, i.e. of a more or less unexpected negative reaction instead of a positive one, we find that there is a strict sequence of psychological causes conditioning negative reaction. The tendency of this sequence is to disturb the intention of the contrasting or opposite series, that is to say, it is resistance set up by a complex. This fact, which has not yet been refuted by any other observations, seems to me to contradict the above-mentioned formulæ. (For confirmation, see my "Psychology of Dementia Præcox," p. 103.) Psychoanalysis has proved conclusively that a resistance always has an intention and a meaning; that there is no such thing as a capricious playing with contrasts. The systematic character of resistance holds good, as I believe I have proved, even in schizophrenia. So long as this position, founded upon a great variety of experience, is not disproved by any other observations, the theory of negativism must adapt itself to it. Bleuler in a sense supports this when he says: "For the most part the negative reaction does not simply appear as accidental, but is actually preferred to the right one." This is an admission that negativism is of the nature of resistance. Once admit this, and the primary importance of ambivalency disappears so far as negativism is concerned. The tendency to resistance remains as the only fundamental principle. Ambivalency can in no sense be put on all fours with the "schizophrenic splitting of the psyche," but must be regarded as a concept which gives expression to the universal and ever-present inner association of pairs of opposites. (One of the most remarkable examples of this is the "contrary meaning of root-words." See Freud's[202] "Essay on Dreams," Jahrbuch, vol. II., p. 179.) The same thing applies to ambitendency. Neither is specific of schizophrenia, but applies equally to the neuroses and the normal. All that is specific to katatonic negativism is the intentional contrast, i.e. the resistance. From this explanation we see that resistance is something different from ambivalency; it is the dynamic factor which makes manifest the everywhere latent ambivalency. What is characteristic of the diseased mind is not ambivalency but resistance. This implies the existence of a conflict between two opposite tendencies which has succeeded in raising the normally present ambivalency into a struggle of opposing components. (Freud has very aptly called this, "The separation of pairs of opposites.") In other words it is a conflict of wills, bringing about the neurotic condition of "disharmony within the self." This condition is the only "splitting of the psyche" known to us, and is not so much to be regarded as a predisposing cause, but rather as a manifestation resulting from the inner conflict—the "incompatibility of the complex" (Riklin).
If we analyze a case of clear ambivalence from a psychoanalytic perspective, meaning an unexpected negative reaction instead of a positive one, we find a specific sequence of psychological causes that lead to the negative response. This sequence tends to disrupt the intention of the contrasting or opposite series, which means it's resistance created by a complex. This fact, which hasn’t been disproved by any other observations, seems to contradict the previously mentioned theories. (For confirmation, see my "Psychology of Dementia Præcox," p. 103.) Psychoanalysis has shown that resistance always has an intention and meaning; there’s no such thing as a random play with contrasts. The systematic nature of resistance, as I believe I have demonstrated, even holds true in schizophrenia. As long as this position, based on a wide range of experiences, isn’t disproved by any other observations, the theory of negativism must adjust to it. Bleuler somewhat supports this when he states, "For the most part the negative reaction does not simply appear as accidental, but is actually preferred to the right one." This acknowledges that negativism is a form of resistance. Once we accept this, the primary significance of ambivalence fades when it comes to negativism. The tendency to resist becomes the only fundamental principle. Ambivalence cannot be equated with the "schizophrenic splitting of the psyche," but should be viewed as a concept that expresses the universal and always-present inner association of pairs of opposites. (One of the most notable examples of this is the "contrary meaning of root-words." See Freud's[202]"Essay on Dreams," Jahrbuch, vol. II., p. 179.) The same holds true for ambitendency. Neither is specific to schizophrenia, but applies equally to neuroses and normal behavior. What is specific to catatonic negativism is the intentional contrast, i.e., the resistance. From this explanation, we see that resistance is distinct from ambivalence; it is the dynamic factor that reveals the generally latent ambivalence. What defines the diseased mind is not ambivalence but resistance. This indicates a conflict between two opposing tendencies that has transformed the normally present ambivalence into a struggle of conflicting components. (Freud rightly termed this, "The separation of pairs of opposites.") In other words, it’s a conflict of wills, resulting in the neurotic condition of "disharmony within the self." This condition is the only "splitting of the psyche" recognized, and it should not be seen primarily as a predisposing cause, but rather as a manifestation arising from the inner conflict—the "incompatibility of the complex" (Riklin).
Resistance, as the fundamental fact of schizophrenic dissociation, thus becomes something which, in contra-distinction to ambivalency, is not eo ipso identical with the concept of the state of feeling, but is a secondary and supplementary one, with its own special and quasi independent psychological development; and this is identical with the necessary previous history of the complex in every case. It follows that the theory of negativism coincides with the theory of the complex, as the complex is the cause of the resistance.
Resistance, as the core aspect of schizophrenic dissociation, is therefore something that, in contrast to ambivalence, is not eo ipso the same as the concept of feeling, but is instead a secondary and additional factor, with its own unique and quasi independent psychological development; and this is linked to the essential background history of the complex in every situation. This means that the theory of negativism aligns with the theory of the complex, as the complex causes the resistance.
Bleuler summarises the causes of negativism as follows:
Bleuler summarizes the causes of negativism as follows:
(a) The autistic retirement of the patient into his own phantasies.
(a) The patient retreats into their own fantasies.
(b) The existence of a life-wound (complex) which must be protected from injury.
(b) There is a life-wound (complex) that needs protection from harm.
(c) The misconception of the environment and of its meaning.
(c) There is a misunderstanding of the environment and its significance.
(d) The directly hostile relation to environment.
(d) There is a direct antagonistic relationship with the environment.
(e) The pathological irritability of schizophrenics.
(e) People with schizophrenia often experience extreme irritability.
(f) The "press of ideas," and other aggravations of action and thought.
(f) The "flow of ideas" and other irritations in action and thought.
(g) Sexuality with its ambivalency on the emotional plane is often one of the roots of negative reaction.
(g) Sexuality, with its mixed emotions, is often a cause of negative reactions.
(a) Autistic withdrawal into one's own phantasies[170] is what I formerly designated as the obvious overgrowth of the phantasies of the complex. The strengthening of the complex is coincident with the increase of the resistance.
(a) Autistic withdrawal into one's own fantasies[170] is what I used to refer to as the clear expansion of the fantasies of the complex. The intensification of the complex happens alongside the rise in resistance.
(b) The life-wound (Lebenswund) is the complex which, as a matter of course, is present in every case of schizophrenia, and of necessity always carries with it the phenomena of autism or auto-erotism (introversion), for complexes and involuntary egocentricity are inseparable reciprocities. Points (a) and (b) are therefore identical. (Cf. "Psychology of Dementia Præcox," chapters ii. and iii.)
(b) The life-wound (Lebenswund) is the complex that is naturally present in every case of schizophrenia, and it always includes the traits of autism or auto-erotism (introversion), since complexes and unintentional self-centeredness are inseparable counterparts. Points (a) and (b) are thus the same. (Cf. "Psychology of Dementia Præcox," chapters ii. and iii.)
(c) It is proved that the misconception of environment is an assimilation of the complex.
(c) It has been shown that misunderstanding the environment is a way of simplifying something complex.
(d) The hostile relation to environment is the maximum of resistance as psychoanalysis clearly shows. (d) goes with (a).
(d) The antagonistic relationship with the environment represents the highest level of resistance, as psychoanalysis clearly demonstrates. (d) is connected to (a).
(e) "Irritability" proves itself psychoanalytically to be one of the commonest results of the complex. I designated it complex-sensibility. Its generalised form (if one may use such an expression) manifests itself as a damming up of the affect (= damming of the libido), consequent on increased resistance. So-called neurasthenia is a classical example of this.
(e) "Irritability" is shown through psychoanalysis to be one of the most common results of the complex. I referred to it as complex-sensibility. Its generalized form (if I can use that term) appears as a buildup of emotion (= buildup of the libido), resulting from increased resistance. What we call neurasthenia is a classic example of this.
(f) Under the term "press of ideas," and similar intellectual troubles, may be classified the "want of clearness and logic of the schizophrenic thinking," which Bleuler considers a predisposing cause. I have, as I may presume is known, expressed myself with much reserve on what he regards as the premeditation of the schizophrenic adjustment. Further and wider experience has taught me that the laws of the Freudian psychology of dreams and the[204] theory of the neuroses must be turned towards the obscurities of schizophrenic thinking. The painfulness of the elaborated complex necessitates a censorship of its expression.[171] This principle has to be applied to schizophrenic disturbance in thinking; and until it has been proved that this principle is not applicable to schizophrenia, there is no justification for setting up a new principle; i.e. to postulate that schizophrenic disturbance of ideas is something primary. Investigations of hypnagogic activity, as well as association reactions in states of concentrated attention, give psychical results which up to now are indistinguishable from the mental conditions in schizophrenia. For example excessive relaxation of attention suffices to conjure up images as like as two peas to the phantasies and expressions of schizophrenia. It will be remembered that I have attributed the notorious disturbances of attention in schizophrenia to the special character of the complex; an idea which my experience since 1906 have further confirmed. There are good reasons for believing specific schizophrenic thought-disturbance to be the result of a complex.
(f) The term "press of ideas" and similar intellectual issues can refer to the "lack of clarity and logic in schizophrenic thinking," which Bleuler sees as a likely contributing factor. As I believe is already known, I've been quite cautious in discussing what he views as the intentional aspect of the schizophrenic adaptation. Broader and more extensive experience has shown me that the principles of Freudian dream psychology and the[204] theory of neuroses should be applied to the complexities of schizophrenic thinking. The discomfort of the developed complex requires a limit on how it’s expressed.[171] This principle should be used when examining the disruptions in thinking caused by schizophrenia; until it can be demonstrated that this principle doesn’t apply to schizophrenia, there’s no reason to establish a new one; i.e. to assume that the disruption of ideas in schizophrenia is something fundamental. Research into hypnagogic activity, as well as reaction patterns during focused attention, shows psychological outcomes that are currently indistinguishable from mental conditions seen in schizophrenia. For instance, simply relaxing attention too much is enough to bring forth images that are strikingly similar to the fantasies and expressions seen in schizophrenia. It's worth noting that I've linked the well-known attention disturbances in schizophrenia to the unique nature of the complex; a notion further confirmed by my experiences since 1906. There are strong reasons to believe that specific thought disturbances in schizophrenia are the result of a complex.
Now as regards the symptoms of thought-pressure, it is first and foremost a thought-compulsion, which, as Freud has shown, is first a thought-complex and secondly a sexualisation of the thought. Then to the symptom of thought-pressure there is superadded at least a demoniac impulse such as may be observed in every vigorous release or production of libido.
Now, when it comes to the symptoms of thought-pressure, the first and most important aspect is a compulsion to think, which, as Freud pointed out, is primarily a complex of thoughts and secondarily a sexualization of the thought. Additionally, to the symptom of thought-pressure, there is at least one extra demonic impulse, similar to what you might see in any strong release or generation of libido.
Thought-pressure, on closer examination, is seen to be a result of schizophrenic introversion, which necessarily leads to a sexualisation of the thought; i.e. to an autonomy of the complex.[172]
Thought-pressure, when looked at more closely, turns out to be caused by a sort of inward-focused thinking associated with schizophrenia, which inevitably leads to a sexualization of thought; that is, to the independence of the complex.[172]
(g) The transition to sexuality appears from the psychoanalytical standpoint difficult to understand. If we consider that the development of resistance coincides in every case with the history of the complex we must ask ourselves: Is the complex sexual or not? (It goes without saying that[205]we must understand sexuality in its proper sense of psycho-sexuality.) To this question psychoanalysis gives the invariable answer: Resistance always springs from a peculiar sexual development. The latter leads in the well-known manner to conflict, i.e. to the complex. Every case of schizophrenia which has so far been analysed confirms this. It can therefore claim at least to be a working hypothesis, and one to be followed up. In the present state of our knowledge, it is therefore not easy to see why Bleuler only allows to sexuality a quasi-determining influence on the phenomena of negativism; for psychoanalysis demonstrates that the cause of negativism is resistance; and that with schizophrenia, as with all other neuroses, this arises from the peculiar sexual development.
(g) The transition to sexuality is hard to grasp from a psychoanalytical perspective. If we think about how resistance develops alongside the history of the complex, we have to ask: Is the complex sexual or not? (It’s important to understand sexuality in its true context of psycho-sexuality.) Psychoanalysis consistently answers this question: Resistance always comes from a specific sexual development. This development leads, as is well known, to conflict, i.e. to the complex. Every case of schizophrenia analyzed so far supports this. Therefore, it can be considered at least a working hypothesis worth exploring. Given our current understanding, it’s unclear why Bleuler attributes only a quasi-determining role to sexuality regarding the phenomena of negativism; psychoanalysis shows that the root of negativism is resistance, and that, for schizophrenia and all other neuroses, this arises from the specific sexual development.
It can scarcely be doubted to-day that schizophrenia, with its preponderance of the mechanisms of introversion, possesses the same mechanism as any other "psycho-neurosis." In my opinion, at any rate, its peculiar symptoms (apart from the clinical and anatomical standpoints) are only to be studied by psychoanalysis, i.e. when the investigation is mainly directed to the genetic impetus. I have, therefore, endeavoured to indicate how Bleuler's hypothesis stands in the light of the theory of complexes; I feel myself bound to emphasise the complex-theory in this relation, and am not disposed to surrender this conception, which is as illuminating as it was difficult to evolve.
It’s hard to deny today that schizophrenia, with its focus on introversion, operates under the same mechanisms as other "psycho-neuroses." In my view, its unique symptoms (aside from clinical and anatomical perspectives) can only be understood through psychoanalysis, meaning when the research is mainly focused on the underlying causes. Therefore, I have tried to show how Bleuler's hypothesis relates to the theory of complexes; I feel it is important to highlight the complex theory in this context, and I'm not willing to give up this idea, which is as enlightening as it was challenging to develop.
CHAPTER VII
Psychoanalysis is not only scientific, but also technical in character; and from results technical in their nature, has been developed a new psychological science which might be called "analytical psychology."
Psychoanalysis is not just scientific but also has a technical side; and from the results that are technical in nature, a new psychological science has emerged that could be called "analytical psychology."
Psychologists and doctors in general are by no means conversant with this particular branch of psychology, owing to the fact that its technical foundations are as yet comparatively unknown to them. Reason for this may be found in that the new method is exquisitely psychological, and therefore belongs neither to the realm of medicine nor to that of experimental psychology. The medical man has, as a rule, but little knowledge of psychology; and the psychologist has no medical knowledge. There is therefore a lack of suitable soil in which to plant the spirit of this new method. Furthermore, the method itself appears to many persons so arbitrary that they cannot reconcile it with their scientific conscience. The conceptions of Freud, the founder of this method, laid particular stress upon the sexual factor; this fact has aroused strong prejudice, and many scientific men are repelled merely by this feeling. I need hardly remark that such an antipathy is not a logical ground for rejecting a new method. The facts being so, it is obvious that the psychoanalyst should discuss the principles rather than the results of his method, when he speaks in public; for he who does not acknowledge the scientific character of the method cannot acknowledge the scientific character of its results.
Psychologists and doctors, in general, aren't very familiar with this specific area of psychology because its technical foundations are still relatively unknown to them. This is partly because the new method is highly psychological, which means it doesn’t fit neatly into either medicine or experimental psychology. Typically, medical professionals have little knowledge of psychology, and psychologists lack medical expertise. As a result, there's not a suitable environment to nurture the essence of this new method. Additionally, many people find the method so random that they can't align it with their scientific beliefs. Freud, the founder of this method, emphasized the sexual factor, which has led to significant bias, and many scientists are put off by this alone. It’s worth noting that such dislike isn't a logical reason to dismiss a new method. Given these circumstances, it’s clear that psychoanalysts should focus on discussing the principles of their method rather than its results in public, as those who don’t recognize the scientific nature of the method also won’t accept the scientific nature of its results.
Before I enter into the principles of the psychoanalytic method, I must mention two common prejudices against it.
Before I dive into the principles of the psychoanalytic method, I need to mention two common prejudices against it.
The first of these is that psychoanalysis is nothing but a somewhat deep and complicated form of anamnesis. Now it is well known that the anamnesis is based upon the evidence supplied by the patient's family, and upon his own conscious self-knowledge, revealed in reply to direct questions. The psychoanalyst naturally develops his anamnesic data as carefully as any other specialist; but this is merely the patient's history, and must not be confused with analysis. Analysis is the reduction of an actual conscious content of a so-called accidental nature, into its psychological determinants. This process has nothing to do with the anamnesic reconstruction of the history of the illness.
The first point is that psychoanalysis is basically a deep and complicated type of memory recall. It’s well known that this recall relies on information provided by the patient’s family and their own conscious self-awareness, which is revealed through direct questions. The psychoanalyst naturally gathers this memory data just like any other specialist would; however, this is just the patient's history and should not be confused with actual analysis. Analysis involves breaking down a person's conscious thoughts of a so-called accidental nature into their psychological influences. This process is unrelated to the reconstructed history of the illness.
The second prejudice, which is based, as a rule, upon a superficial knowledge of psychoanalytic literature, is that psychoanalysis is a method of suggestion, by which a faith or doctrine of living is imposed upon the patient, thereby effecting a cure in the manner of mental healing or Christian Science. Many analysts, especially those who have worked in psychoanalysis for a long time, previously used therapeutic suggestion, and are therefore familiar with its workings. They know that the psychoanalyst's method of working is diametrically opposed to that of the hypnotist. In direct contrast with therapeutic suggestion, the psychoanalyst does not attempt to force anything upon his patient which the latter does not see himself, and find reasonable with his own understanding. Faced with the constant desire on the part of the neurotic patient to receive suggestions and advice, the analyst just as constantly endeavours to lead him away from this passive receptive attitude, and make him use his common sense and powers of criticism, that equipped with these he may become fitted to meet the problems of life independently. We have often been accused of forcing interpretations upon patients, interpretations that were frequently quite arbitrary in character. I wish that one of these critics would make the attempt to force such arbitrary interpretations upon my patients, who are often persons of great intelligence and high culture, and who are, indeed, not infrequently my own colleagues. The impossibility of such[208] an undertaking would soon be laid bare. In psychoanalysis we are dependent upon the patient and his judgment, for the reason that the very nature of analysis consists in leading him to a knowledge of his own self. The principles of psychoanalysis are so entirely different from those of therapeutic suggestion that they are not comparable.
The second prejudice, which usually comes from a shallow understanding of psychoanalytic literature, is that psychoanalysis is a way of suggestion, where a certain belief or lifestyle is pushed onto the patient, similar to mental healing or Christian Science. Many analysts, especially those who have been in the field for a long time, previously relied on therapeutic suggestion and are therefore familiar with how it works. They understand that the way a psychoanalyst works is completely different from how a hypnotist operates. Unlike therapeutic suggestion, the psychoanalyst doesn't try to impose anything on the patient that the patient doesn't already see and find reasonable on their own. When faced with the constant desire of neurotic patients for suggestions and advice, the analyst consistently tries to guide them away from this passive mindset and encourages them to use their common sense and critical thinking so they can handle life's challenges independently. We've often been accused of imposing interpretations on our patients, interpretations that were often quite arbitrary. I wish one of these critics would try to force such arbitrary interpretations on my patients, who are often intelligent and cultured individuals, and many of whom are my own colleagues. The impossibility of such an endeavor would quickly become clear. In psychoanalysis, we rely on the patient and their judgment because the essence of analysis is to lead them to self-discovery. The principles of psychoanalysis are so fundamentally different from those of therapeutic suggestion that they can't really be compared.
An attempt has also been made to compare analysis with the reasoning method of Dubois, which is in itself a rational process. This comparison does not however hold good, for the psychoanalyst strictly avoids argument and persuasion with his patients. He must naturally listen to and take note of the conscious problems and conflicts of his patient, but not for the purpose of fulfilling his desire to obtain advice or direction with regard to his conduct. The problems of a neurotic patient cannot be solved by advice and conscious argument. I do not doubt that good advice at the right time can produce good results; but I do not know whence one can obtain the belief that the psychoanalyst can always give the right advice at the right time. The neurotic conflict is frequently, indeed as a rule, of such a character that advice cannot possibly be given. Furthermore, it is well known that the patient only desires authoritative advice in order that he may cast aside the burden of responsibility, referring himself and others to the opinion of the higher authority.
An effort has also been made to compare analysis with Dubois's reasoning method, which is itself a logical process. However, this comparison doesn't really hold up, as the psychoanalyst deliberately avoids argument and persuasion with their patients. They must listen to and consider the conscious problems and conflicts of the patient, but not to fulfill a wish for advice or guidance on their actions. The issues faced by a neurotic patient can't be resolved just by advice and logical discussion. I believe that good advice at the right moment can lead to positive outcomes, but I don't know where the belief comes from that the psychoanalyst can always provide the right advice when it's most needed. The neurotic conflict is often, in fact generally, of a nature that precludes giving advice. Moreover, it's well known that the patient mainly seeks authoritative advice to relieve themselves of the burden of responsibility, deferring to the opinions of a higher authority.
In direct contrast to all previous methods, psychoanalysis endeavours to overcome the disorders of the neurotic psyche through the subconscious, not through the conscious self. In this work we naturally have need of the patient's conscious content, for his subconsciousness can only be reached viâ the conscious. The material furnished by the anamnesis is the source from which our work starts. The detailed recital usually furnishes many valuable clues which make the psychogenic origin of the symptoms clear to the patient. This work is naturally only necessary where the patient is convinced that his neurosis is organic in its origin. But even in those cases where the patient is convinced from the very first of the psychic nature of his illness,[209] a critical survey of the history is very advantageous, since it discloses to him a psychological concatenation of ideas of which he was unaware. In this manner those problems which need special discussion are frequently brought to the surface. Work of this kind may occupy many sittings. Finally the explanation of the conscious material reaches an end, in so far as neither the patient nor the doctor can add anything to it that is decisive in character. Under the most favourable circumstances the end comes with the formulation of the problem which proved itself to be impossible of solution. Let us take, for instance, the case of a man who was once well, but who became a neurotic between the age of 35 and 40. His position in life is assured, and he has a wife and children. Parallel with his neurosis he developed an intense resistance towards his professional work. He observed that the first symptoms of neurosis became noticeable when he had to overcome a certain difficulty in regard to it. Later on his symptoms became aggravated with each successive difficulty that arose. An amelioration in his neurosis occurred whenever fortune favoured him in his professional work. The problem that results from a critical discussion of the anamnesis is as follows:—
In stark contrast to all previous methods, psychoanalysis aims to address the issues of the neurotic mind through the subconscious, rather than the conscious self. In this process, we obviously need the patient’s conscious thoughts, as the subconscious can only be accessed through the conscious. The information provided by the patient's history serves as the starting point for our work. The detailed account often presents many valuable insights that clarify the psychological origins of the symptoms for the patient. This examination is usually necessary when the patient believes that their neurosis has an organic cause. However, even in cases where the patient is initially convinced of the psychological nature of their illness,[209] a thorough review of their history is very beneficial, as it reveals a psychological connection of ideas that they were previously unaware of. This process often brings to light issues that require special attention. Such work may take many sessions. Ultimately, the explanation of the conscious material concludes when neither the patient nor the doctor can contribute anything essential. Ideally, this conclusion arrives with the identification of the problem that seems insurmountable. For example, consider a man who was once healthy but became neurotic between the ages of 35 and 40. He is well-established in life and has a wife and children. Alongside his neurosis, he developed a strong resistance to his job. He noticed that the first signs of neurosis appeared when he faced a specific challenge related to his work. Over time, his symptoms worsened with each new difficulty that emerged. His neurosis improved whenever he experienced success in his professional endeavors. The problem that arises from a critical analysis of the patient’s history is as follows:—
The patient is aware that if he could improve his work, the mere satisfaction that would result could bring about the much-desired improvement in his neurotic condition. He cannot, however, make his work more efficient because of his great resistance against it. This problem cannot be solved by any reasoning process.
The patient knows that if he could enhance his work, the simple satisfaction from it could lead to the much-needed improvement in his mental state. However, he is unable to make his work more effective due to his strong resistance. This issue can't be resolved through reasoning.
Let us take another case. A woman of 40, the mother of four children, became neurotic four years ago after the death of one of her children. A new period of pregnancy, followed by the birth of another child, produced a great improvement in her condition. The patient now lived in the thought that it would be a great help to her if she could have yet another child. Believing, however, that this could not happen, she attempted to devote her energies to philanthropic interests. But she failed to obtain the least satisfaction from this work. She observed a distinct alleviation[210] of her complaint whenever she succeeded in giving real, living interest to any matter, but she felt entirely incapable of discovering anything that could bring her lasting interest and satisfaction. It is clear that no process of reasoning can solve this problem.
Let’s consider another example. A 40-year-old woman, who is the mother of four children, became anxious and stressed four years ago after one of her children died. When she became pregnant again and gave birth to another child, her condition improved significantly. She now believed that having another child would really help her. However, thinking that this wasn't possible, she tried to focus her energy on charitable work. But she found no fulfillment in this effort. She noticed some relief from her issues whenever she managed to engage genuinely in something, yet she felt completely unable to find anything that could keep her interested and satisfied for long. It’s obvious that no amount of reasoning can fix this situation.
Here psychoanalysis must begin with the endeavour to solve the problem as to what prevents the patient from developing interests above and beyond her longing for a child.
Here, psychoanalysis must start by trying to understand what stops the patient from developing interests beyond her desire for a child.
Since we cannot assume that we know from the very beginning what the solution of such problems is, we must at this point trust to the clues furnished us by the individuality of the patient. Neither conscious questioning nor rational advice can aid us in the discovery of these clues, for the causes which prevent us from finding them are hidden from her consciousness. There is, therefore, no clearly indicated path by which to reach these subconscious inhibitions. The only rule that psychoanalysis lays down for our guidance in this respect, is to let the patient speak of that which occurs to him at the moment. The analyst must observe carefully what the patient says and, in the first instance, take due note thereof without attempting to force his own opinions upon him. Thus we observe that the patient whom I first mentioned begins by talking about his marriage, which we hitherto had reason to regard as normal. We now learn that he constantly has difficulties with his wife, and that he does not understand her in the least. This knowledge causes the physician to remark that the patient's professional work is clearly not his only problem; but that his conjugal relations are also in need of revision. This starts a train of thought in which many further ideas occur to the patient, concerning his married life. Hereupon follow ideas about the love affairs he had before his marriage. These experiences, related in detail, show that the patient was always somewhat peculiar in his more intimate relations with women, and that this peculiarity took the form of a certain childish egoism. This is a new and surprising point of view for him, and explains to him many of his misfortunes with women.
Since we can’t assume we know the solution to these problems right away, we need to rely on the signs given by the patient’s individuality. Neither conscious questioning nor rational advice will help us find these signs, because the reasons that prevent us from discovering them are hidden from her awareness. Therefore, there isn’t a clear path to uncover these subconscious blocks. The only guideline that psychoanalysis offers us here is to let the patient talk about whatever comes to mind. The analyst must carefully listen to what the patient says and initially take note of it without trying to impose his own opinions on them. For instance, we see that the patient I mentioned earlier starts discussing his marriage, which we previously thought was normal. We learn that he consistently has trouble with his wife and doesn't understand her at all. This realization leads the doctor to observe that the patient’s work isn’t his only issue; his marital relationship also needs attention. This prompts a flow of thoughts where the patient brings up various ideas about his married life. Then he thinks about the affairs he had before getting married. Sharing these experiences in detail reveals that the patient has always approached intimate relationships with women in a somewhat strange manner, characterized by a kind of childish selfishness. This is a new and surprising perspective for him, helping him understand many of his struggles with women.
We cannot in every case get so far as this on the simple[211] principle of letting the patient talk; few patients have their psychic material so much on the surface. Furthermore, many persons have a positive resistance against speaking freely about what occurs to them on the spur of the moment; it is often too painful to tell the doctor whom perhaps they do not entirely trust; in other cases because apparently nothing occurs to them, they force themselves to speak of matters about which they are more or less indifferent. This habit of not talking to the point by no means proves that patients consciously conceal their unpleasant contents, for such irrelevant speaking can occur quite unconsciously. In such cases it sometimes helps the patient if he is told that he must not force himself, that he must only seize upon the very first thoughts that present themselves, no matter how unimportant or ridiculous they may seem. In certain cases even these instructions are of no use, and then the doctor is obliged to have recourse to other expedients. One of these is the employment of the association test, which usually gives excellent information as to the chief momentary tendencies of the individual.
We can't always get to this point just by having the patient talk. Most patients don't have their feelings right on the surface. Additionally, many people resist speaking openly about what's on their mind in the moment; it can be too painful to share with a doctor they might not fully trust. In other cases, they might struggle to think of anything to say and end up discussing topics they don't really care about. This habit of not getting to the point doesn't necessarily mean that patients are consciously hiding their uncomfortable thoughts; sometimes, they speak off-topic without even realizing it. In these situations, it can help if the patient is told not to push themselves and just to focus on the first thoughts that come to mind, regardless of how trivial or silly they may seem. However, in some cases, even this advice doesn't work, and the doctor has to resort to other methods. One approach is using the association test, which often provides valuable insights into the person's current mental state.
A second expedient is dream analysis; this is the real instrument of psychoanalysis. We have already experienced so much opposition to dream analysis that a brief exposition of its principles is necessary. The interpretation of dreams, as well as the meaning given to them, is, as we know, in bad odour. It is not long since that oneirocritics were practised and believed in; nor is the time long past when even the most enlightened human beings were entirely under the ban of superstition. It is therefore comprehensible that our age should still retain a certain lively fear of those superstitions which have but recently been partially overcome. To this timidity in regard to superstition, the opposition to dream analysis is in a large measure due; but analysis is in no wise to blame for this. We do not select the dream as our object because we pay it the homage of superstitious admiration, but because it is a psychic product that is independent of the patient's consciousness. We ask for the patient's free thoughts, but he gives us little, or[212] nothing; or at best something forced or irrelevant. Dreams are free thoughts, free phantasies, they are not forced, and they are psychic phenomena just as much as thoughts are.
A second method is dream analysis; this is the real tool of psychoanalysis. We have faced so much resistance to dream analysis that a brief explanation of its principles is necessary. The interpretation of dreams and the meanings assigned to them are, as we know, frowned upon. It's not long ago that dream interpreters were practiced and accepted; nor is it far in the past when even the most educated people were completely caught up in superstition. Therefore, it’s understandable that our society still carries a certain strong fear of those superstitions that have only recently started to fade away. This fear of superstition contributes significantly to the opposition to dream analysis, but analysis is not to blame for this. We don’t choose dreams as our subject because we hold them in superstitious regard but because they are psychic products that exist independently of the patient’s consciousness. We ask for the patient's genuine thoughts, but he gives us little, or[212] nothing; or at best, something forced or irrelevant. Dreams are genuine thoughts, free fantasies; they are not forced, and they are psychic phenomena just as much as thoughts are.
It may be said of the dream that it enters into the consciousness as a complex structure, the connection between the elements of which is not conscious. Only by afterwards joining associations to the separate pictures of the dream, can the origin of these pictures, in certain recollections of the near and more remote past, be proved. One asks oneself: "Where have I seen or heard that?" And by the same process of free association comes the memory that one has actually experienced certain parts of the dream, some of them yesterday, some at an earlier date. This is well known, and every one will probably agree to it. Thus far the dream presents itself, as a rule, as an incomprehensible composition of certain elements which are not in the first instance conscious, but which are later recognised by the process of free association. This might be disputed on the ground that it is an a priori statement. I must remark, however, that this conception conforms to the only generally recognised working hypothesis as to the genesis of dreams, namely, the derivation of the dream from experiences and thoughts of the recent past. We are, therefore, upon known ground. Not that certain dream parts have under all circumstances been known to the individual, so that one might ascribe to them the character of being conscious; on the contrary, they are frequently, even generally, unrecognisable. Not until later do we remember having consciously experienced this or that dream part. We may therefore regard the dream from this point of view as a product that comes from a subconscious origin. The technical unfolding of these subconscious sources is a mode of procedure that has always been instinctively employed. One simply tries to remember whence the dream parts come. Upon this most simple principle the psychoanalytic method of solving dreams is based. It is a fact that certain dream parts are derived from our waking life and, indeed, from experiences which, owing to their notorious lack of importance, would frequently[213] have been consigned to certain oblivion, and were therefore well on their way towards becoming definitely subconscious. Such dream parts are the results of subconscious representations (images).
The dream enters our awareness as a complicated structure, with connections between its elements that aren't clear at first. We can only trace the origins of these dream images to specific memories from both the recent and distant past by connecting them later. You might ask yourself, "Where have I seen or heard that?" And through the same process of free association, you might recall that you've actually gone through certain parts of the dream, some as recently as yesterday and others from further back. This is well recognized, and most people would probably agree with it. Up to this point, dreams usually appear as baffling combinations of elements that aren't initially conscious but are later understood through free association. Some might argue against this by claiming it's an a priori statement. However, I want to note that this view aligns with the only widely accepted working theory about how dreams originate, which is that dreams arise from recent experiences and thoughts. So, we're on familiar ground. It's not the case that every part of a dream has always been known to the individual, which would make them conscious; in fact, many parts are often unrecognizable. Only later do we remember consciously experiencing this or that aspect of the dream. We can thus view the dream as a product coming from a subconscious source. Unpacking these subconscious origins is a method we've always intuitively used. You just try to remember where the dream parts come from. This very simple principle is the foundation of the psychoanalytic approach to interpreting dreams. It's a fact that certain parts of our dreams come from our waking lives, often from experiences that, due to their insignificance, would typically have been forgotten and were on their way to becoming truly subconscious. These dream parts result from subconscious images.
The principles according to which psychoanalysis solves dreams are therefore exceedingly simple, and have really been known for a long time. The further procedure follows the same path logically and consistently. If one spends considerable time over a dream, which really never happens outside psychoanalysis, one can succeed in finding more and more recollections for the separate dream parts. It is, however, not always possible to discover recollections for certain other parts; and then one must leave them for the time being, whether one likes it or not. When I speak of "recollections" I naturally do not mean merely memories of certain concrete experiences, but also of their inter-related meanings. The collected recollections are known as the dream material. With this material one proceeds according to a scientific method that is universally valid. If one has any experimental material to work up, one compares its separate parts and arranges them according to their similarities. Exactly the same course is pursued in dealing with the dream material; one gathers together its common characteristics, whether these be formal or material. In doing this one must absolutely get rid of certain prejudices. I have always observed that the beginner expects to find some tendency or other according to which he endeavours to mould his material. I have noticed this particularly in the cases of colleagues who were previously more or less violent opponents of psychoanalysis, owing to their well-known prejudices and misunderstandings. When fate willed that I should analyse them, and they consequently gained at last an insight into the method of analysis, it was demonstrated that the first mistake which they had been apt to make in their own psychoanalytic practice was that they forced the material into accord with their own preconceived opinions; that is, they allowed their former attitude towards psychoanalysis, which they were not able to appreciate objectively,[214] but only according to subjective phantasies, to have its influence upon their material. If one goes so far as to venture upon the task of examining the dream material, one must permit no comparison to frighten one away. The material consists, as a general rule, of very unequal images, from which it is under some circumstances most difficult to obtain the "tertium comparationis." I must forego giving you detailed examples of this, since it is quite impossible to introduce such extensive material into a lecture.
The principles behind how psychoanalysis interprets dreams are actually quite straightforward and have been understood for a long time. The process logically and consistently follows the same path. When someone spends a significant amount of time analyzing a dream, which usually only happens in psychoanalysis, they can uncover more and more memories related to different parts of the dream. However, it’s not always possible to find memories for certain other parts, and in such cases, you have to set them aside for now, whether you want to or not. When I refer to "memories," I’m not just talking about specific past experiences, but also their interconnected meanings. The gathered memories are referred to as the dream material. This material is handled using a scientific method that is universally applicable. When you have experimental material to analyze, you compare its individual components and organize them based on their similarities. The same approach is taken with dream material; you identify its common characteristics, whether they are formal or material. In doing this, it’s crucial to shed certain biases. I’ve always noticed that beginners tend to look for a specific tendency to shape their material. I’ve seen this especially in colleagues who were previously quite critical of psychoanalysis because of their known biases and misunderstandings. When fate led me to analyze them, causing them to finally gain insight into the analysis method, it became clear that their initial mistake in their own psychoanalytic practice was trying to force the material to conform to their preconceived ideas; that is, they allowed their prior stance toward psychoanalysis, which they couldn’t view objectively but only through subjective fantasies, to color their material. If you take the step of examining the dream material, you must not let any comparisons intimidate you. Generally, the material consists of very uneven images, which can sometimes make it difficult to find the "common denominator." I must refrain from providing detailed examples here since it's impossible to include such extensive material in a lecture.
One pursues, then, the same method in classifying the unconscious content, as is used everywhere in comparing materials for the purpose of drawing conclusions from them. One objection has often been made, namely: why should the dream have a subconscious content at all? This objection is unscientific in my opinion. Every psychological moment has its own history. Every sentence that I utter has, besides the meaning consciously intended by me, a meaning that is historical; and this last may be entirely different from the conscious meaning. I am purposely expressing myself somewhat paradoxically. I certainly should not take it upon myself to explain each sentence according to its individual-historical meaning. That is easier in the case of larger and more complex formations. Every one is certainly convinced of the fact that a poem—in addition to its manifest contents—is also particularly characteristic of its author, in its form, subject-matter, and the history of its origin. Whereas the poet gave skilful expression to a fleeting mood in his song, the historian of literature sees in it and beyond it, things which the poet would never have suspected. The analysis which the literary critic makes of the subject-matter furnished by the poet may be compared with psychoanalysis in its method, even to the very errors which occur therein. The psychoanalytic method may be aptly compared with historical analysis and synthesis. Let us assume, for instance, that we do not understand the meaning of the rite of baptism as it is practised in our churches to-day. The priest tells us that baptism means the reception of the child into the Christian community. But we are not satisfied with[215] this. Why should the child be sprinkled with water, etc.? In order that we may understand this rite we must gather together materials for comparison from the history of the rite, that is, from the memories of mankind appertaining to it; and this must be done from various points of view.
One follows the same approach in categorizing unconscious content as is used everywhere to compare materials for drawing conclusions. A common objection has been raised: why should dreams have any subconscious content at all? I think this objection is unscientific. Every psychological moment has its own history. Every statement I make has, besides the meaning I consciously intend, a historical meaning that can be completely different from the conscious one. I'm intentionally expressing this in a somewhat paradoxical way. I definitely wouldn’t claim to explain every statement according to its individual historical meaning. That's easier with larger and more complex ideas. Everyone surely believes that a poem—beyond its obvious contents—is particularly characteristic of its author, in terms of form, subject matter, and the history behind it. While the poet skillfully captures a fleeting mood in their work, the literary critic uncovers things that the poet may never have realized. The literary critic's analysis of the subject matter provided by the poet can be compared to psychoanalysis in its method, including the errors that can occur. The psychoanalytic method can be aptly compared to historical analysis and synthesis. Let’s take for instance that we don’t understand the meaning of the baptism rite practiced in our churches today. The priest tells us that baptism symbolizes the reception of the child into the Christian community. But we want to know more than that. Why is the child sprinkled with water, for example? To understand this rite, we need to gather materials for comparison from its historical background, which is tied to humanity's memories of it, and this needs to be approached from various viewpoints.
Firstly—Baptism is clearly a rite of initiation, a consecration. Therefore those memories, above all, must be assembled which preserve the rites of initiation.
Firstly—Baptism is definitely a ritual of initiation, a form of consecration. So, we must gather those memories, above all, that preserve the initiation rites.
Secondly—The act of baptism is performed with water. This especial form of procedure proves the necessity of welding together another chain of memories concerning rites in which water was used.
Secondly—Baptism is carried out with water. This specific practice emphasizes the importance of connecting it to other memories related to rituals that involved water.
Thirdly—The child is sprinkled with water when it is christened. In this case we must gather together all the forms of the rite, where the neophyte is sprinkled or where the child is submerged, etc.
Thirdly—The child is sprinkled with water during the baptism. In this case, we need to bring together all the variations of the rite, whether the new believer is sprinkled or the child is fully submerged, etc.
Fourthly—We must recollect all the reminiscences in mythology and all the superstitious customs which are in any respect similar to the symbolic act of baptism.
Fourthly—We must remember all the memories in mythology and all the superstitious customs that are in any way similar to the symbolic act of baptism.
In this manner we obtain a comparative study of the act of baptism. Thus we ascertain the elements from which baptism is derived; we further ascertain its original meaning, and at the same time make the acquaintance of a world rich in religious mythology, which makes clear to us all the multifarious and derived meanings of the act of baptism. Thus the analyst deals with the dream. He gathers together historical parallels for each dream part, even though they be very remote and attempts to construct the psychological history of the dream and the meanings that underlie it. By this monographic elaboration of the dream one gains, exactly as in the analysis of the act of baptism, a deep insight into the wonderfully subtle and significant network of subconscious determinations; an insight which, as I have said, can only be compared with the historical understanding of an act that we used only to consider from a very one-sided and superficial point of view.
In this way, we can conduct a comparative study of the act of baptism. We identify the elements that baptism comes from; we also uncover its original meaning, while gaining insight into a rich world of religious mythology, which clarifies the various and derived meanings of the act of baptism. Similarly, the analyst approaches a dream. They collect historical parallels for each part of the dream, even if they are quite distant, and try to piece together the psychological history of the dream and its underlying meanings. Through this detailed exploration of the dream, we achieve, just like in the analysis of baptism, a profound understanding of the intricate and significant web of subconscious influences; an understanding that, as I mentioned, can only be compared to the historical comprehension of an act that we previously viewed from a very narrow and superficial perspective.
I cannot disguise the fact that in practice, especially at the beginning of an analysis, we do not in all cases make[216] complete and ideal analyses of dreams, but that we more generally continue to gather together the dream associations until the problem which the patient hides from us becomes so clear that even he can recognize it. This problem is then subjected to conscious elaboration until it is cleared up as far as possible, and once again we stand before a question that cannot be answered.
I can't hide the fact that in practice, especially at the start of an analysis, we don’t always conduct complete and perfect analyses of dreams. Instead, we typically keep gathering dream associations until the issue that the patient is hiding from us becomes clear enough for him to see it. This issue is then examined consciously until it's resolved as much as possible, and once again, we face a question that remains unanswered.
You will now ask what course is to be pursued when the patient does not dream at all; I can assure you that hitherto all patients, even those who claimed never to have dreamed before, began to dream when they went through analysis. But on the other hand it frequently occurs that patients who began by dreaming vividly are suddenly no longer able to remember their dreams. The empirical and practical rule, which I have hitherto regarded as binding, is that the patient, if he does not dream, has sufficient conscious material, which he keeps back for certain reasons. A common reason is: "I am in the doctor's hands and am quite willing to be treated by him. But the doctor must do the work, I shall remain passive in the matter."
You might be wondering what to do when a patient doesn’t dream at all. I can assure you that so far, all patients, even those who claimed they never dreamed before, started dreaming once they began therapy. However, it's also common for patients who initially dreamed vividly to suddenly stop being able to remember their dreams. The practical rule I’ve always followed is that if a patient isn’t dreaming, they have enough conscious material that they're holding back for specific reasons. A typical reason is: "I’m in the doctor’s care and willing to be treated. But the doctor has to do the work; I’ll just stay passive in this."
Sometimes the resistances are of a more serious character. For instance, persons who cannot admit certain morally grave sides to their characters, project their deficiencies upon the doctor by calmly presuming that he is more or less deficient morally, and that for this reason they cannot communicate certain unpleasant things to him. If, then a patient does not dream from the beginning or ceases to dream he retains material which is susceptible of conscious elaboration. Here the personal relation between the doctor and his patient may be regarded as the chief hindrance. It can prevent them both, the doctor as well as the patient, from seeing the situation clearly. We must not forget that, as the doctor shows, and must show, a searching interest in the psychology of his patient, so, too, the patient, if he has an active mind, gains some familiarity with the psychology of the doctor and assumes a corresponding attitude towards him. Thus the doctor is blind to the mental attitude of the patient to the exact extent that he does not see himself[217] and his own subconscious problems. Therefore I maintain that a doctor must be analysed before he practises analysis. Otherwise the practice of analysis can easily be a great disappointment to him, because he can, under certain circumstances, reach a point where further progress is impossible, a situation which may make him lose his head. He is then readily inclined to assume that psychoanalysis is nonsense, so as to avoid the admission that he has run his vessel ashore. If you are sure of your own psychology you can confidently tell your patient that he does not dream because there is still conscious material to be disposed of. I say that one must be sure of one's self in such cases, for the opinions and unsparing criticisms to which one sometimes has to submit, can be excessively disturbing to one who is unprepared to meet them. The immediate consequence of such a loss of personal balance on the part of the doctor is that he begins to argue with his patient, in order to maintain his influence over him; and this, of course, renders all further analysis impossible.
Sometimes the resistances are more serious. For example, people who can’t acknowledge certain serious flaws in their character project their shortcomings onto the doctor by assuming that he is more or less morally lacking, and for this reason, they can't share certain uncomfortable things with him. If a patient doesn’t dream from the start or stops dreaming, they hold onto material that can be consciously worked through. Here, the personal relationship between the doctor and the patient can be the main obstacle. It can prevent both the doctor and the patient from seeing the situation clearly. We must remember that just as the doctor must show a keen interest in the psychology of his patient, the patient, if they have an active mind, can also gain an understanding of the doctor’s psychology and adopt a corresponding attitude toward them. Thus, the doctor is blind to the mental state of the patient to the extent that he doesn’t recognize himself and his own subconscious issues. Therefore, I argue that a doctor must undergo analysis before practicing it. Otherwise, the practice of analysis can be very disappointing for him because he may reach a point where further progress is impossible, a situation that could make him lose his composure. He may then quickly be inclined to think that psychoanalysis is nonsense, to avoid facing the fact that he has hit a dead end. If you are confident in your own psychology, you can assure your patient that they aren’t dreaming because there is still conscious material to deal with. I say it’s important to be sure of oneself in these situations, as the opinions and harsh criticisms one sometimes faces can be extremely unsettling for someone unprepared to handle them. The immediate result of such a loss of personal balance for the doctor is that he starts to argue with his patient to maintain his influence over them, which inevitably makes further analysis impossible.
I have told you that, in the first instance, dreams need only be used as sources of material for analysis. At the beginning of an analysis it is not only unnecessary, but also unwise, to make a so-called complete interpretation of a dream; for it is very difficult indeed to make a complete and really exhaustive interpretation. The interpretations of dreams that one sometimes reads in psychoanalytic publications are often one-sided, and not infrequently contestable formulations. I include among these certain one-sided sexual reductions of the Viennese school. In view of the comprehensive many-sidedness of the dream material one must beware, above all, of one-sided formulations. The many-sidedness of the meaning of a dream, not its singleness of meaning, is of the utmost value, especially at the beginning of the psychoanalytic treatment. Thus, for instance, a patient had the following dream not long after her treatment had begun: "She was in a hotel in a strange city. Suddenly a fire broke out; and her husband and her father, who were with her, helped her in the work of saving others." The patient[218] was intelligent, extraordinarily sceptical, and absolutely convinced that dream analysis was nonsense. I had difficulty in inducing her to give dream analysis even one trial. Indeed I saw at once that I could not inform my patient of the real content of the dream under these circumstances because her resistances were much too great. I selected the fire, the most conspicuous occurrence of the dream, as the starting point for obtaining her free associations. The patient told me that she had recently read in a newspaper that a certain hotel in Z. had been burnt down; that she remembered the hotel because she had once lived in it. At the hotel she had made the acquaintance of a man, and from this acquaintance a somewhat questionable love affair developed. In connection with this story the fact came out that she had already had quite a number of similar adventures, all of which had a certain frivolous character. This important bit of past history was brought out by the first free association with a dream-part. It would have been impossible in this case to make clear to the patient the very striking meaning of the dream. With her frivolous mental attitude, of which her scepticism was only a special instance, she could have calmly repelled any attempt of this kind. But after the frivolity of her mental attitude was recognised and proved to her, by the material that she herself had furnished, it was possible to analyse the dreams which followed much more thoroughly.
I’ve told you that, initially, dreams should only be used as material for analysis. At the start of an analysis, it’s not just unnecessary but also unwise to attempt a so-called complete interpretation of a dream; it’s indeed very challenging to create a complete and truly thorough interpretation. The dream interpretations you sometimes see in psychoanalytic publications are often one-sided and frequently disputable. I include here some of the overly simplistic sexual interpretations from the Viennese school. Given the complexity of dream material, we must especially be cautious of one-sided interpretations. The multiple meanings of a dream, not just a single meaning, are extremely valuable—especially at the beginning of psychoanalytic treatment. For instance, one patient had this dream shortly after her treatment began: "She was in a hotel in a strange city. Suddenly a fire broke out; and her husband and her father, who were with her, helped her in the work of saving others." The patient[218] was intelligent, highly skeptical, and completely convinced that dream analysis was nonsense. I struggled to get her to try dream analysis even once. I realized right away that I couldn’t reveal the real content of the dream under these circumstances because her resistance was too strong. I chose the fire, the most obvious part of the dream, as a starting point for her free associations. The patient told me that she had recently read in a newspaper about a hotel in Z. that had burned down; she remembered that hotel because she had once stayed there. While at the hotel, she had met a man, and from that acquaintance, a somewhat questionable relationship had developed. This important piece of her past came out through her first free association related to the dream. It would have been impossible to clarify the striking meaning of the dream to the patient in this case. Given her frivolous mindset, of which her skepticism was just a specific example, she could have easily dismissed any such attempt. But once her frivolous attitude was recognized and demonstrated to her through the material she provided, it became possible to analyze subsequent dreams much more thoroughly.
It is, therefore, advisable in the beginning to make use of dreams for the purpose of reaching the important subconscious material by means of the patient's free associations in connection with them. This is the best and most cautious method, especially for those who are just beginning to practise analysis. An arbitrary translation of the dreams is absolutely unadvisable. That would be a superstitious practice based on the acceptance of well-established symbolic meanings. But there are no fixed symbolic meanings. There are certain symbols that recur frequently, but we are not able to get beyond general statements. For instance, it is quite incorrect to assume that the snake, when it appears in dreams, has a merely phallic meaning; just as incorrect as it is to[219] deny that it may have a phallic meaning in some cases. Every symbol has more than one meaning. I can therefore not admit the correctness of exclusively sexual interpretations, such as appear in some psychoanalytic publications, for my experience has made me regard them as one-sided and therefore insufficient. As an example of this I will tell you a very simple dream of a young patient of mine. It was as follows: "I was going up a flight of stairs with my mother and sister. When we reached the top I was told that my sister was soon to have a child."
It’s advisable at the start to use dreams to tap into important subconscious material through the patient’s free associations related to them. This is the best and most careful method, especially for those who are just starting to practice analysis. Arbitrarily interpreting dreams is definitely not recommended. That would be a superstitious practice based on accepted symbolic meanings. But there aren’t any fixed symbolic meanings. There are certain symbols that appear often, but we can’t go beyond general statements. For example, it’s wrong to assume that a snake in dreams only means something phallic; just as wrong as it is to deny that it might have a phallic meaning in some instances. Every symbol has multiple meanings. Therefore, I can’t accept the accuracy of purely sexual interpretations, like those found in some psychoanalytic publications, since my experience has shown me they are one-sided and insufficient. To illustrate this, I’ll share a very simple dream from a young patient of mine. It went like this: "I was going up a flight of stairs with my mother and sister. When we reached the top, I was told that my sister was soon to have a child."
I shall now show you how, on the strength of the hitherto prevailing point of view, this dream may be translated so that it receives a sexual meaning. We know that the incest phantasy plays a prominent part in the life of a neurotic. Hence the picture "with my mother and sister" might be regarded as an allusion in this direction. The "stairs" have a sexual meaning that is supposedly well established; they represent the sexual act because of the rhythmic climbing of steps. The child that my patient's sister is expecting is nothing but the logical result of these premises. The dream, translated thus, would be a clear fulfilment of infantile desires which as we know play an important part in Freud's theory of dreams.
I will now show you how, based on the previously accepted perspective, this dream can be interpreted to reveal a sexual meaning. We know that the incest fantasy is a significant aspect of a neurotic's life. Therefore, the image "with my mother and sister" could be seen as a reference in this direction. The "stairs" carry a sexual meaning that is generally well understood; they symbolize the sexual act due to the rhythmic process of climbing steps. The child that my patient's sister is expecting is simply the natural outcome of these ideas. The dream, interpreted this way, would be a clear fulfillment of childhood desires, which, as we know, play a crucial role in Freud's theory of dreams.
Now I have analysed this with the aid of the following process of reasoning: If I say that the stairs are a symbol for the sexual act, whence do I obtain the right to regard the mother, the sister, and the child as concrete; that is, as not symbolic? If, on the strength of the claim that dream pictures are symbolic, I give to certain of these pictures the value of symbols, what right have I to exempt certain other dream parts from this process? If, therefore, I attach symbolic value to the ascent of the stairs, I must also attach a symbolic value to the pictures that represent the mother, the sister, and the child. Therefore I did not translate the dream, but really analysed it. The result was surprising. I will give you the free associations with the separate dream-parts, word for word, so that you can form your own opinions concerning the material. I should state in advance that the young man[220] had finished his studies at the university a few months previously; that he found the choice of a profession too difficult to make; and that he thereupon became a neurotic. In consequence of this he gave up his work. His neurosis took, among other things, a decidedly homosexual form.
Now I’ve analyzed this using the following reasoning: If I claim that the stairs symbolize the sexual act, what gives me the right to view the mother, sister, and child as concrete entities, rather than symbols? If I assert that dream images are symbolic and assign certain images symbol value, why can’t I do the same with other parts of the dream? Therefore, if I assign symbolic value to the ascent of the stairs, I must also assign symbolic meaning to the images of the mother, sister, and child. Consequently, I didn’t just translate the dream; I really analyzed it. The outcome was surprising. I’ll share the free associations for each part of the dream, word for word, so you can form your own opinions about the material. I should mention beforehand that the young man[220] had finished his university studies a few months earlier; he found it too difficult to choose a profession, which led him to become neurotic. As a result, he quit his job. His neurosis took on, among other things, a distinctly homosexual form.
The patient's associations with his mother are as follows: "I have not seen her for a long time, a very long time. I really ought to reproach myself for this. It is wrong of me to neglect her so." "Mother," then, stands here for something which is neglected in an inexcusable manner. I said to the patient: "What is that?" And he replied, with considerable embarrassment, "My work."
The patient's thoughts about his mother are as follows: "I haven't seen her in a long time, a really long time. I should be blaming myself for this. It's wrong of me to ignore her like this." "Mother," in this context, represents something that is being neglected in an unacceptable way. I asked the patient, "What is that?" And he answered, feeling quite embarrassed, "My work."
With his sister he associated as follows: "It is years since I have seen her. I long to see her again. Whenever I think of her I recall the time when I took leave of her. I kissed her with real affection; and at that moment I understood for the first time what love for a woman can mean." It is at once clear to the patient that his sister represents "love for woman."
With his sister, he shared the following: "It's been years since I've seen her. I really want to see her again. Every time I think about her, I remember the last time we said goodbye. I kissed her with genuine love, and in that moment, I realized for the first time what loving a woman can feel like." It's immediately clear to the patient that his sister symbolizes "love for a woman."
With the stairs he has this association: "Climbing upwards; getting to the top; making a success of life; being grown up; being great." The child brings him the ideas: "New born; a revival; a regeneration; to become a new man."
With the stairs, he thinks: "Climbing up; reaching the top; succeeding in life; being an adult; being awesome." The child gives him the ideas: "Newborn; a fresh start; a rebirth; becoming a new person."
One only has to hear this material in order to understand at once that the patient's dream is not so much the fulfilment of infantile desires, as it is the expression of biological duties which he has hitherto neglected because of his infantilism. Biological justice, which is inexorable, sometimes compels the human being to atone in his dreams for the duties which he has neglected in real life.
One only needs to listen to this material to immediately realize that the patient's dream is less about fulfilling childhood desires and more about expressing biological responsibilities that he has previously ignored due to his immaturity. Biological justice, which is relentless, sometimes forces a person to make up for the responsibilities he has overlooked in real life through his dreams.
This dream is a typical example of the prospective and teleological function of dreams in general, a function that has been especially emphasised by my colleague Dr. Maeder. If we adhered to the one-sidedness of sexual interpretation, the real meaning of the dream would escape us. Sexuality in dreams is, in the first instance, a means of expression, and by no means always the meaning and the object of the dream.[221] The unfolding of the prospective or teleological meaning of dreams is of particular importance as soon as analysis is so far advanced that the eyes of the patient are more easily turned upon the future, than upon his inner life and upon the past.
This dream is a classic example of the forward-looking and purpose-driven role of dreams in general, a role that my colleague Dr. Maeder has highlighted. If we stick to a narrow focus on sexual interpretation, we will miss the true meaning of the dream. Sexuality in dreams primarily serves as a way of expressing thoughts and feelings, and it’s not always the core meaning or purpose of the dream.[221] Understanding the forward-looking or purpose-driven significance of dreams becomes especially important when the analysis progresses to a point where the patient finds it easier to focus on the future rather than their inner life and past experiences.
In connection with the application of symbolism, we can also learn from the example furnished us by this dream, that there can be no fixed and unalterable dream symbols, but at best a frequent repetition of fairly general meanings. So far as the so-called sexual meaning of dreams, in particular, is concerned, my experience has led me to lay down the following practical rules:
In relating to the use of symbolism, we can also learn from the example provided by this dream that there are no fixed and unchanging dream symbols, only a frequent repetition of fairly general meanings. Regarding the so-called sexual meaning of dreams, my experience has led me to establish the following practical rules:
If dream analysis at the beginning of the treatment shows that the dream has an undoubted sexual meaning, this meaning is to be taken realistically; that is, it is proved thereby that the sexual problem itself must be subjected to a careful revision. If, for instance, an incest phantasy is clearly shown to be a latent content of the dream, one must subject the patient's infantile relations towards his parents and his brothers and sisters, as well as his relations towards other persons who are fitted to play the part of his father or mother in his mind, to a careful examination on this basis. But if a dream that comes in a later stage of the analysis has, let us say, an incest phantasy as its essential content, a phantasy that we have reason to consider disposed of, concrete value must not be attached to it under all circumstances; it must be regarded as symbolic. In this case symbolic value, not concrete value, must be attached to the sexual phantasy. If we did not go beyond the concrete value in this case, we should keep reducing the patient to sexuality, and this would arrest the progress of the development of his personality. The patient's salvation is not to be found by thrusting him back again into primitive sexuality; this would leave him on a low plane of civilisation whence he could never obtain freedom and complete restoration to health. Retrogression to a state of barbarism is no advantage at all for a civilised human being.
If dream analysis at the start of the treatment clearly shows that the dream has a sexual meaning, this meaning should be taken seriously; it indicates that the sexual issue itself needs careful review. For example, if an incest fantasy is clearly revealed as a hidden theme of the dream, it’s essential to closely examine the patient's early relationships with their parents and siblings, as well as how they relate to others who might represent their mother or father in their mind. However, if a dream later in the analysis features an incest fantasy, which we believe has been addressed, we shouldn't take it at face value; it should be viewed as symbolic. In this context, the sexual fantasy should be interpreted symbolically rather than literally. If we only focus on the literal interpretation, we risk reducing the patient to their sexuality, hindering their personal development. The patient's healing cannot come from reverting back to primitive sexual instincts; doing so would keep them stuck at a low level of civilization, preventing them from achieving true freedom and a complete recovery. Regressing to a state of barbarism offers no benefits for a civilized individual.
The above-mentioned formula, according to which the[222] sexuality of a dream is a symbolic or analogous expression, naturally also holds good in the case of dreams occurring in the beginning of an analysis. But the practical reasons that have induced us not to take into consideration the symbolic value of this sexual phantasy, owe their existence to the fact that a genuine realistic value must be given to the abnormal sexual phantasies of a neurotic, in so far as the latter suffers himself to be influenced in his actions by these phantasies. Experience teaches us that these phantasies not only hinder him from adapting himself suitably to his situation, but that they also lead him to all manner of really sexual acts, and occasionally even to incest. Under these circumstances, it would be of little use to consider the symbolic content of the dream only; the concrete content must first be disposed of.
The formula mentioned above, which states that the[222] sexuality of a dream is a symbolic or analogous expression, also applies to dreams that occur at the beginning of an analysis. However, the practical reasons that have led us to not consider the symbolic value of this sexual fantasy are due to the fact that we must assign genuine realistic value to the abnormal sexual fantasies of a neurotic, as they influence his actions. Experience shows us that these fantasies not only prevent him from adapting properly to his situation but also lead him to engage in various sexual acts, and sometimes even incest. Given these circumstances, it would be of little use to focus only on the symbolic content of the dream; we must first address the concrete content.
These arguments are based upon a different conception of the dream from that put forward by Freud; for, indeed, my experience has forced me to a different conception. According to Freud, the dream is in its essence a symbolic veil for repressed desires which are in conflict with the ideals of the personality. I am obliged to regard the dream structure from a different point of view. The dream for me is, in the first instance, the subliminal picture of the psychological condition of the individual in his waking state. It presents a résumé of the subliminal association material which is brought together by the momentary psychological situation. The volitional meaning of the dream which Freud calls the repressed desire, is, for me, essentially a means of expression. The activity of the consciousness, speaking biologically, represents the psychological effort which the individual makes in adapting himself to the conditions of life. His consciousness endeavours to adjust itself to the necessities of the moment, or, to put it differently: there are tasks ahead of the individual, which he must overcome. In many cases the solution is unknown; and for this reason the consciousness always tries to find the solution by the way of analogous experience. We always try to grasp what is unknown and in the future, according to our mental understanding of what has gone before. Now[223] we have no reasons for assuming that the unconscious follows other laws than those which apply to conscious thought. The unconscious, like the conscious, gathers itself about the biological problems and endeavours to find solutions for these by analogy with what has gone before, just as much as the conscious does. Whenever we wish to assimilate something that is unknown, we arrive at it by a process of comparison. A simple example of this is the well-known fact that, when America was discovered by the Spaniards, the Indians took the horses of the conquerors, which were strange to them, for large pigs, because pigs were familiar to their experience. This is the mental process which we always employ in recognising unknown things; and this is the essential reason for the existence of symbolism. It is a process of comprehension by means of analogy. The apparently repressed desires, contained in the dream, are volitional tendencies which serve as language-material for subconscious expression. So far as this particular point is concerned, I am in full accord with the views of Adler, another member of Freud's school. With reference to the fact that subconscious materials of expression are volitional elements or tendencies, I may say that this is dependent upon the archaic nature of dream thinking, a problem with which I have already dealt in previous researches.[174]
These arguments are based on a different understanding of dreams than what Freud proposed; my own experience has led me to this alternative view. According to Freud, dreams are essentially symbolic representations of repressed desires that conflict with personal ideals. However, I see the structure of dreams differently. For me, a dream is primarily a subconscious reflection of an individual's psychological state while awake. It summarizes the subliminal associations that come together based on the current psychological situation. The volitional meaning of the dream, which Freud refers to as repressed desire, is essentially a form of expression for me. Biologically speaking, consciousness reflects the psychological struggle an individual faces in adapting to life's conditions. Consciousness attempts to adjust to immediate needs, which means the individual has challenges to tackle. In many cases, the solutions are unknown, which is why consciousness seeks answers through analogous experiences. We always try to understand the unknown and the future based on our understanding of past experiences. Now, we have no reason to believe that the unconscious operates under different laws than those governing conscious thought. The unconscious, like the conscious mind, focuses on biological issues and looks for solutions through comparisons to past experiences, just like the conscious mind does. Whenever we try to understand something unfamiliar, we do so through a process of comparison. A well-known example of this is when the Spaniards discovered America and the Indians mistook the horses of the conquerors, which were new to them, for large pigs because pigs were familiar to them. This mental process is what we consistently use to recognize unknown things, and it's the fundamental reason for the existence of symbolism. It is a comprehension process through analogy. The seemingly repressed desires present in dreams are volitional tendencies that act as language material for subconscious expression. On this particular point, I fully agree with Adler, another member of Freud's school. Regarding the fact that subconscious expressive materials are volitional elements or tendencies, this depends on the primitive nature of dream thinking, a topic I have already explored in previous research.[174]
Owing to our different conception of the structure of the dream, the further course of analysis also gains a different complexion from that which it had until now. The symbolic valuation given to sexual phantasies in the later stages of analysis necessarily leads less to the reduction of the patient's personality into primitive tendencies, than to the extension and further development of his mental attitude; that is, it tends to make his thinking richer and deeper, thus giving him what has always been one of the most powerful weapons that a human being can have in his struggle to adapt himself to life. By following this new course logically, I have come to the conclusion that these religious and philosophical motive forces—the so-called metaphysical needs of the human[224] being—must receive positive consideration at the hands of the analyst. Though he must not destroy the motive forces that underlie them, by reducing them to their primitive, sexual roots, he must make them serve biological ends as psychologically valuable factors. Thus these instincts assume once more those functions that have been theirs from time immemorial.
Due to our different understanding of how dreams are structured, the analysis takes on a new direction that differs from what it has been thus far. The symbolic meaning attributed to sexual fantasies in the later stages of analysis naturally leads to an expansion and further development of the patient's mental attitude, rather than reducing their personality to basic instincts. This process enriches and deepens their thinking, providing them with one of the most powerful tools a person can have in adapting to life. By logically following this new path, I have concluded that these religious and philosophical motivating forces—the so-called metaphysical needs of human beings—should be given serious consideration by the analyst. While he should not undermine the underlying motivations by simplifying them to their basic sexual roots, he must allow these forces to serve biological purposes as psychologically significant factors. In this way, these instincts once again fulfill the roles they have historically held.
Just as primitive man was able, with the aid of religious and philosophical symbol, to free himself from his original state, so, too, the neurotic can shake off his illness in a similar way. It is hardly necessary for me to say, that I do not mean by this, that the belief in a religious or philosophical dogma should be thrust upon the patient; I mean simply that he has to reassume that psychological attitude which, in an earlier civilisation, was characterised by the living belief in a religious or philosophical dogma. But the religious-philosophical attitude does not necessarily correspond to the belief in a dogma. A dogma is a transitory intellectual formulation; it is the result of the religious-philosophical attitude, and is dependent upon time and circumstances. This attitude is itself an achievement of civilization; it is a function that is exceedingly valuable from a biological point of view, for it gives rise to the incentives that force human beings to do creative work for the benefit of a future age, and, if necessary, to sacrifice themselves for the welfare of the species.
Just as early humans were able, with the help of religious and philosophical symbols, to break free from their original state, the neurotic can also overcome their illness in a similar manner. I hardly need to say that I don’t mean to imply that a belief in a specific religious or philosophical doctrine should be imposed on the patient; rather, I simply mean that they need to adopt the psychological mindset that, in an earlier civilization, was characterized by a genuine belief in a religious or philosophical doctrine. However, this religious-philosophical mindset doesn’t necessarily equate to a belief in a doctrine. A doctrine is a temporary intellectual expression; it results from the religious-philosophical mindset and depends on the time and circumstances. This mindset itself is an achievement of civilization; it plays a crucial role from a biological perspective, as it creates the motivations that drive humans to engage in creative work for the benefit of future generations and, if necessary, to sacrifice themselves for the welfare of the species.
Thus the human being attains the same sense of unity and totality, the same confidence, the same capacity for self-sacrifice in his conscious existence that belongs unconsciously and instinctively to wild animals. Every reduction, every digression from the course that has been laid down for the development of civilisation does nothing more than turn the human being into a crippled animal; it never makes a so-called natural man of him. My numerous successes and failures in the course of my analytic practice have convinced me of the invariable correctness of this psychological orientation. We do not help the neurotic patient by freeing him from the demand made by civilisation; we can only help him[225] by inducing him to take an active part in the strenuous task of carrying on the development of civilisation. The suffering which he undergoes in performing this duty takes the place of his neurosis. But, whereas the neurosis and the complaints that accompany it are never followed by the delicious feeling of good work well done, of duty fearlessly performed, the suffering that comes from useful work, and from victory over real difficulties, brings with it those moments of peace and satisfaction which give the human being the priceless feeling that he has really lived his life.
Thus, a person achieves the same sense of unity and wholeness, the same confidence, and the same capacity for self-sacrifice in their conscious life that wild animals possess unconsciously and instinctively. Every setback or deviation from the path set for the development of civilization simply turns a person into a diminished animal; it doesn't create a so-called natural man. My many successes and failures in my analytical practice have convinced me of the consistent accuracy of this psychological perspective. We don't help the neurotic patient by freeing him from the expectations placed by civilization; we can only assist him[225] by encouraging him to actively engage in the challenging task of furthering the development of civilization. The suffering he experiences while fulfilling this duty replaces his neurosis. However, while neurosis and its accompanying complaints never lead to the gratifying feeling of a job well done or duty courageously performed, the suffering arising from meaningful work and triumph over real challenges brings moments of peace and fulfillment, providing a person with the invaluable sensation that they have truly lived their life.
CHAPTER VIII
After many years' experience I now know that it is extremely difficult to discuss psychoanalysis at public meetings and at congresses. There are so many misconceptions of the matter, so many prejudices against certain psychoanalytic views, that it becomes an almost impossible task to reach mutual understanding in public discussion. I have always found a quiet conversation on the subject much more useful and fruitful than heated discussions coram publico. However, having been honoured by an invitation from the Committee of this Congress as a representative of the psychoanalytic movement, I will do my best to discuss some of the fundamental theoretical conceptions of psychoanalysis. I must limit myself to this part of the subject because I am quite unable to place before my audience all that psychoanalysis means and strives for, all its various applications, its psychology, its theoretical tendencies, its importance for the realm of the so-called "Geisteswissenschaften," e.g. Mythology, Comparative Religion, Philosophy, &c. But if I am to discuss certain theoretical problems fundamental to psychoanalysis, I must presuppose my audience to be well acquainted with the development and main results of psychoanalytic researches. Unfortunately, it often happens that people believe themselves entitled to judge psychoanalysis who have not even read the literature. It is my firm conviction that no one is competent to form a judgment concerning the subject until he has studied the fundamental works on psychoanalysis.
After many years of experience, I now realize that discussing psychoanalysis at public meetings and congresses is extremely challenging. There are so many misconceptions and prejudices against certain psychoanalytic views that it almost becomes impossible to achieve mutual understanding in public discussions. I've always found that having a quiet conversation about the topic is much more useful and productive than getting into heated debates coram publico. Nevertheless, since I have been honored with an invitation from the Committee of this Congress as a representative of the psychoanalytic movement, I will do my best to discuss some of the fundamental theoretical concepts of psychoanalysis. I must limit myself to this area because I can't cover everything that psychoanalysis encompasses and aims for, including its various applications, its psychology, its theoretical directions, and its significance for the field of what are called "Geisteswissenschaften," such as Mythology, Comparative Religion, Philosophy, etc. However, if I'm going to discuss certain theoretical problems that are fundamental to psychoanalysis, I must assume that my audience is well acquainted with the development and main findings of psychoanalytic research. Unfortunately, it often happens that people feel entitled to judge psychoanalysis without even reading the literature. I strongly believe that no one is qualified to form an opinion about the subject until they have studied the foundational works on psychoanalysis.
In spite of the fact that Freud's theory of neurosis has been worked out in great detail, it cannot be said to be, on the whole, very clear or easily accessible. This justifies my giving[227] you a very short abstract of his fundamental views concerning the theory of neurosis.
In spite of Freud's theory of neurosis being developed in great detail, it can't be considered very clear or easily accessible overall. This justifies me giving[227] you a brief summary of his key ideas about the theory of neurosis.
You are aware that the original theory that hysteria and the related neuroses take their origin in a trauma or shock of sexual character in early childhood, was given up about fifteen years ago. It soon became obvious that the sexual trauma could not be the real cause of a neurosis, since trauma is found so universally; there is scarcely a human being who has not had some sexual shock in early youth, and yet comparatively few have incurred a neurosis in later life. Freud himself soon became aware that several of the patients who related an early traumatic event, had only invented the story of a so-called trauma; it had never taken place in reality, and was a mere creation of phantasy. Moreover, on further investigation it became quite obvious that even a trauma which had actually occurred was not always responsible for the whole of the neurosis, although it does sometimes look as if the structure of the neurosis depended entirely upon the trauma. If a neurosis were the inevitable consequence of a trauma it would be quite incomprehensible why neurotics are not incomparably more numerous.
You know that the original idea that hysteria and related neuroses come from a trauma or sexual shock in early childhood was abandoned about fifteen years ago. It quickly became clear that sexual trauma couldn’t be the real cause of neuroses since trauma is so common; hardly anyone goes through life without experiencing some sexual shock in their youth, yet only a small number end up with a neurosis later on. Freud himself soon realized that several patients who described an early traumatic event had actually made up the story of a so-called trauma; it had never really happened and was just a product of imagination. Furthermore, upon deeper investigation, it became evident that even a trauma that did occur wasn’t always the sole reason for the neurosis, even though it sometimes seems like the structure of the neurosis is completely based on the trauma. If a neurosis were an unavoidable result of a trauma, it would be hard to understand why there aren’t significantly more neurotics.
This apparently heightened shock-effect was clearly based upon the exaggerated and morbid phantasy of the patient. Freud also saw that this same phantasy manifested itself in relatively early bad habits, which he called infantile perversities. His new conception of the ætiology of a neurosis was based upon this further understanding and traced the neurosis back to some sexual activity in early infancy; this conception led on to his recent view that the neurotic is "fixed" to a certain period of his early infancy, because he still seems to preserve some trace of it, direct or indirect, in his mental attitude. Freud also makes the attempt to classify or to differentiate the neuroses, including dementia præcox, according to the stage of the infantile development in which the fixation took place.
This apparently heightened shock effect was clearly based on the exaggerated and morbid fantasy of the patient. Freud also noticed that this same fantasy showed up in relatively early bad habits, which he called infantile perversities. His new understanding of the causes of neurosis stemmed from this further insight and traced the neurosis back to some sexual activity in early infancy; this idea led to his recent view that neurotics are "fixed" to a certain period of their early infancy, as they still seem to retain some trace of it, either directly or indirectly, in their mental attitude. Freud also attempts to classify or differentiate the neuroses, including dementia præcox, according to the stage of infantile development where the fixation occurred.
From the standpoint of this theory, the neurotic appears to be entirely dependent upon his infantile past, and all his troubles in later life, his moral conflicts, and deficiencies, seem[228] to be derived from the powerful influence of that period. The therapy and its main preoccupation are in full accord with this view, and are chiefly concerned with the unravelling of this infantile fixation, which is understood as an unconscious attachment of the sexual libido to certain infantile phantasies and habits.
From this theory's perspective, the neurotic seems completely reliant on their childhood experiences, and all their struggles later in life, including their moral dilemmas and shortcomings, appear[228] to stem from the strong impact of that time. The therapy aligns with this idea and mainly focuses on unraveling this childhood fixation, which is seen as an unconscious connection of sexual energy to specific childhood fantasies and behaviors.
This is, so far as I can see, the essence of Freud's theory. But this conception neglects the following important question: What is the cause of this fixation of the libido to the old infantile phantasies and habits? We have to remember that almost all persons have at some time had infantile phantasies and habits exactly corresponding to those of a neurotic, but they do not become fixed to them; consequently, they do not become neurotic later on. The ætiological secret of the neurosis, therefore, does not consist in the mere existence of infantile phantasies, but lies in the so-called fixation. The manifold statements of the existence of infantile sexual phantasies in neurotic cases are worthless, in so far as they attribute an ætiological value to them, for the same phantasies can be found in normal individuals as well, a fact which I have often proved. It is only the fixation which seems to be characteristic. It is important to demand the nature of the proofs of the real existence of this infantile fixation. Freud, an absolutely sincere and thorough empiricist, would never have evolved this hypothesis had he not had sufficient grounds for it. The grounds are found in the results of the psychoanalytic investigations of the unconscious. Psychoanalysis discloses the unconscious existence of manifold phantasies, which have their end root in the infantile past and turn around the so-called "Kern-complex," or nucleus-complex, which may be designated in male individuals as the Œdipus-complex and in females as the Electra-complex. These terms convey their own meaning exactly. The whole tragic fate of Œdipus and Electra took place within the narrow confines of the family, just as the child's fate lies wholly within the family boundaries. Hence the Œdipus conflict is very characteristic of an infantile conflict, so also is the Electra conflict. The existence[229] of these conflicts in infancy is largely proven by means of psychoanalytic experience. It is in the realm of this complex that the fixation is supposed to have taken place. Through the highly potent and effective existence of the nucleus-complex in the unconscious of neurotics, Freud was led to the hypothesis, that the neurotic has a peculiar fixation or attachment to it. Not the mere existence of this complex—for everybody has it in the unconscious—but the very strong attachment to it is what is typical of the neurotic. He is far more influenced by this complex than the normal person; many examples in confirmation of this statement will be found in every one of the recent psychoanalytic histories of neurotic cases.
This is, as far as I can tell, the core of Freud's theory. However, this idea overlooks an important question: What causes this fixation of the libido on old childhood fantasies and habits? We need to remember that almost everyone has experienced childhood fantasies and habits similar to those of a neurotic at some point, yet they don't become stuck to them; as a result, they don't develop neuroses later on. Therefore, the underlying cause of neurosis doesn't simply lie in the existence of childhood fantasies, but in the so-called fixation. The many claims regarding the presence of childhood sexual fantasies in neurotic cases are not significant, as they give them an etiological value, when the same fantasies can also be found in normal individuals, which I've demonstrated numerous times. It is only the fixation that appears to be characteristic. It's crucial to question the nature of the evidence for this childhood fixation's real existence. Freud, being a completely honest and meticulous empiricist, would never have come up with this hypothesis without sufficient evidence. The evidence is found in the results of psychoanalytic studies of the unconscious. Psychoanalysis reveals the unconscious presence of various fantasies rooted in childhood and focused around the so-called "Kern-complex," or nucleus-complex, which can be referred to as the Oedipus complex in males and the Electra complex in females. These terms clearly convey their meanings. The entire tragic story of Oedipus and Electra unfolded within the narrow confines of the family, just as a child's story lies entirely within family boundaries. Thus, the Oedipus conflict is very much a reflection of a childhood conflict, and the same goes for the Electra conflict. The existence of these conflicts in childhood is mostly supported by psychoanalytic experience. It is within the framework of this complex that the fixation is believed to occur. Due to the powerful and effective presence of the nucleus-complex in the unconscious of neurotics, Freud proposed that neurotics have a unique fixation or attachment to it. It's not just the existence of this complex—since everyone has it in their unconscious—but the strong attachment to it that is typical of the neurotic. They are much more influenced by this complex than a normal person; many examples supporting this claim can be found in recent psychoanalytic histories of neurotic cases.
We must admit that this conception is a very plausible one, because the hypothesis of fixation is based upon the well-known fact, that certain periods of human life, and particularly infancy, do sometimes leave determining traces for ever. The only question is whether this principle is a sufficient explanation or not. If we examine persons who have been neurotic from infancy it seems to be confirmed, for we see the nucleus-complex as a permanent and powerful activity throughout the whole life. But if we take cases which never show any considerable traces of neurosis except at the particular time when they break down, and there are many such, this principle becomes doubtful. If there is such a thing as fixation, it is not permissible to base upon it a new hypothesis, claiming that at times during certain epochs of life the fixation becomes loosened and ineffective, while at others it suddenly becomes strengthened and effective. In such cases we find the nucleus-complex as active and as potent as in those which apparently support the theory of fixation. Here a critical attitude is peculiarly justifiable, when we consider the often-repeated observation that the moment of the outbreak of the disease is by no means indifferent; as a rule it is most critical. It usually occurs at the moment when a new psychological adjustment, that is, a new adaptation, is demanded. Such moments facilitate the outbreak of a neurosis, as every experienced neurologist knows. This fact[230] seems to me extremely significant. If the fixation were indeed real we should expect to find its influence constant, i.e. a neurosis continuous throughout life. This is obviously not the case. The psychological determination of a neurosis is only partially due to an early infantile predisposition; it is due to a certain actual cause as well. And if we carefully examine the kind of infantile phantasies and events to which the neurotic individual is attached, we shall be obliged to agree that there is nothing in them specific for neurosis. Normal individuals have pretty much the same kind of internal and external experiences, and are attached to them to an even astonishing degree, without developing a neurosis. You will find primitive people, especially, very much bound to their infantility. It now begins to look as if this so-called fixation were a normal phenomenon, and that the importance of infancy for the later mental attitude is natural and prevails everywhere. The fact that the neurotic seems to be markedly influenced by his infantile conflicts, shows that it is less a matter of fixation than of a peculiar use which he makes of his infantile past. It looks as if he exaggerated its importance, and attributed a very great artificial value to it (Adler, a pupil of Freud's, expresses a very similar view). It would be unjust to say that Freud confined himself to the hypothesis of fixation; he also was conscious of the impression I have just discussed. He called this phenomenon of reactivation or secondary exaggeration of infantile reminiscences "regression." But in Freud's conception it appears as if the incestuous desires of the Œdipus-complex were the real cause of the regression to infantile phantasies. If this were the case, we should have to postulate an unexpected intensity of the primary incestuous tendencies. This view led Freud to his recent comparison between the so-called psychological "incest-barrier" in children and the "incest-taboo" in primitive man. He supposes that a real incestuous desire has led the primitive man to the invention of a protective law; while to me it looks as if the incest-taboo is one among numerous taboos of all sorts, and due to the typical superstitious fear of primitive man, a fear existing independently of incest and its[231] interdiction. I am able to attribute as little particular strength to incestuous desires in childhood as in primitive humanity. I do not even seek the reason for regression in primary incestuous or any other sexual desires. I must state that a purely sexual ætiology of neurosis seems to me much too narrow. I base this criticism upon no prejudice against sexuality, but upon an intimate acquaintance with the whole problem.
We have to acknowledge that this idea is quite reasonable because the fixation hypothesis relies on the well-known fact that certain stages of life, especially infancy, can leave lasting impressions. The only question is whether this principle adequately explains everything. If we look at individuals who have been neurotic since childhood, it appears to support this, as we see the core issue remaining a strong influence throughout their lives. However, if we examine cases where there are no significant signs of neurosis until a specific breakdown moment, which happens quite often, this principle becomes questionable. If fixation exists, we can’t assume that it leads to a new theory stating that during certain life periods, fixation can loosen and become ineffective while at other times it unexpectedly strengthens. In these cases, the core issue is just as active and powerful as in those that seem to confirm the fixation theory. A critical viewpoint is particularly warranted when we consider the frequent observation that the timing of when a disease manifests is crucial; usually, it happens at a moment when a new psychological adjustment or adaptation is necessary. Such moments can trigger a neurosis, as every experienced neurologist knows. This fact seems extremely significant to me. If fixation were truly real, we would expect its influence to be constant, meaning a neurosis would persist throughout life. Clearly, that’s not the case. The psychological basis of a neurosis partially stems from an early childhood predisposition but is also influenced by a specific current cause. If we closely inspect the types of childhood fantasies and events that neurotic individuals cling to, we’ll have to agree that there’s nothing uniquely tied to neurosis in them. Normal individuals typically have similar internal and external experiences and are attached to them to a surprising degree without developing neuroses. You can see primitive people especially tied to their childhood. It now seems like this so-called fixation is a normal phenomenon, and that the significance of infancy for later mental attitudes is natural and widespread. The fact that neurotics appear significantly impacted by their childhood conflicts suggests it’s less about fixation and more about how they utilize their childhood experiences. It seems they inflate its importance and assign a largely artificial value to it (Adler, a student of Freud, shares a similar view). It’s not accurate to say that Freud limited himself to the fixation hypothesis; he was also aware of the point I've just made. He referred to this phenomenon of reactivation or secondary exaggeration of childhood memories as "regression." However, in Freud's view, it seems that the incestuous desires of the Oedipus complex are the primary cause of this regression to childhood fantasies. If that were true, we would have to assume an unexpected intensity of the initial incestuous tendencies. This perspective prompted Freud to recently compare the so-called psychological "incest barrier" in children to the "incest taboo" in primitive societies. He proposes that a genuine incestuous desire led primitive people to create a protective law; however, I believe the incest taboo is just one of many types of taboos, stemming from the typical superstitious fears of primitive people, fears that exist independently of incest and its prohibition. I attribute no significant strength to incestuous desires in childhood or primitive populations. I don’t even look for the root of regression in primary incestuous or any other sexual desires. I must assert that a purely sexual explanation for neurosis seems overly simplistic. I base this criticism not on any bias against sexuality but on a deep understanding of the entire issue.
Therefore I suggest that the psychoanalytic theory should be liberated from the purely sexual standpoint. In place of it I should like to introduce an energic view-point into the psychology of neurosis.
Therefore, I suggest that psychoanalytic theory should be freed from its strictly sexual perspective. Instead, I would like to introduce an energic viewpoint into the psychology of neurosis.
All psychological phenomena can be considered as manifestations of energy, in the same way as all physical phenomena are already understood as energic manifestations since Robert Mayer discovered the law of the conservation of energy. This energy is subjectively and psychologically conceived as desire. I call it libido, using the word in the original meaning of this term, which is by no means only sexual. Sallustius applies the term exactly in the way we do here: "Magis in armis et militaribus equis, quam in scortis et conviviis libidinem habebant."
All psychological phenomena can be seen as expressions of energy, just like all physical phenomena are already recognized as energetic expressions ever since Robert Mayer discovered the law of conservation of energy. This energy is understood subjectively and psychologically as desire. I refer to it as libido, using the word in its original sense, which is not limited to just sexual meaning. Sallustius uses the term exactly as we do here: "Magis in armis et militaribus equis, quam in scortis et conviviis libidinem habebant."
From a broader standpoint libido can be understood as vital energy in general, or as Bergson's élan vital. The first manifestation of this energy in the suckling is the instinct of nutrition. From this stage the libido slowly develops through manifold varieties of the act of sucking into the sexual function. Hence I do not consider the act of sucking as a sexual act. The pleasure in sucking can certainly not be considered as sexual pleasure, but as pleasure in nutrition, for it is nowhere proved that pleasure is sexual in itself. This process of development continues into adult life and is connected with a constantly increased adaptation to the external world. Whenever the libido, in the process of adaptation, meets an obstacle, an accumulation takes place which normally gives rise to an increased effort to overcome the obstacle. But if the obstacle seems to be insurmountable, and the individual renounces the overcoming of it, the stored-up libido makes a[232] regression. In place of being employed in the increased effort, the libido now gives up the present task and returns to a former and more primitive way of adaptation. We meet with the best examples of such regressions very frequently in hysterical cases where a disappointment in love or marriage gives rise to the neurosis. There we find the well-known disturbances of nutrition, resistance against eating, dyspeptic symptoms of all sorts, etc. In these cases the regressive libido, turning away from its application to the work of adaptation, holds sway over the function of nutrition and provokes considerable disturbance. Such cases are obvious examples of regression. Similar effects of regression are to be found in cases where there are no troubles in the function of nutrition, and here we readily find a regressive revival of reminiscences of a time long past. We find a revival of the images of the parents, of the Œdipus-complex. Here things and events of infancy—never before important—suddenly become so. They are regressively reanimated. Take away the obstacle in the path of life and this whole system of infantile phantasies at once breaks down and becomes again as inactive and as ineffective as before. But do not let us forget that, to a certain extent, it is at work influencing us always and everywhere. I cannot forbear to mention that this view comes very near Janet's hypothesis of the substitution of the "parties supérieures" of a function by its "parties inférieures." I would also remind you of Claparède's conception of neurotic symptoms as emotional reflexes of a primitive nature.
From a broader perspective, libido can be seen as vital energy in general, or as Bergson's élan vital. The first expression of this energy in infants is the instinct for nutrition. From this point, libido gradually develops through various forms of sucking into sexual function. Therefore, I do not view sucking as a sexual act. The pleasure derived from sucking cannot be considered sexual pleasure but rather as pleasure from nutrition, since it has not been proven that pleasure is inherently sexual. This developmental process continues into adulthood and is linked with an increasing adaptation to the external world. Whenever libido encounters an obstacle in this adaptation process, it builds up, leading to a stronger effort to overcome the challenge. However, if the obstacle seems impossible to conquer and the individual decides to give up, the accumulated libido experiences a[232] regression. Instead of being used to make increased efforts, libido now abandons the current task and reverts to a previous, more primitive way of adapting. We often see clear examples of such regressions in hysterical cases, where disappointment in love or marriage results in neurosis. In these situations, we find well-known issues with nutrition, resistance to eating, dyspeptic symptoms, and so on. In these cases, the regressive libido, turning away from its focus on adaptation efforts, takes control over nutritional function and causes significant disturbances. Such examples are clear cases of regression. Similar effects of regression can be seen even when there are no issues with nutrition, where we often witness a regressive revival of memories from long ago. We see a resurgence of parental images and the Oedipus complex here. Things and events from childhood that were never previously important suddenly gain significance. They are reanimated regressively. Remove the obstacle in life’s path, and this entire system of childhood fantasies collapses and becomes inactive and ineffective again. But let’s not forget that, to some extent, it is always at work, influencing us in every aspect of life. I must mention that this perspective is quite similar to Janet's hypothesis about the substitution of the "parties supérieures" of a function by its "parties inférieures." I would also remind you of Claparède's idea that neurotic symptoms are emotional reflexes of a primitive nature.
Therefore I no longer find the cause of a neurosis in the past, but in the present. I ask, what is the necessary task which the patient will not accomplish? The whole list of his infantile phantasies does not give me any sufficient ætiological explanation, because I know that these phantasies are only puffed up by the regressive libido, which has not found its natural outlet into a new form of adjustment to the demands of life.
Therefore, I no longer see the cause of a neurosis in the past, but in the present. I ask, what necessary task is the patient refusing to complete? The entire list of their childhood fantasies doesn’t provide me with a sufficient explanation, because I know that these fantasies are just inflated by the regressive libido, which hasn’t found its natural way to adapt to the demands of life.
You may ask why the neurotic has a special inclination not to accomplish his necessary tasks. Here let me point out[233] that no living being adjusts itself easily and smoothly to new conditions. The principle of the minimum of effort is valid everywhere.
You might wonder why someone who is neurotic struggles to get their important tasks done. I want to emphasize[233] that no living creature easily adapts to new situations. The principle of the minimum of effort applies universally.
A sensitive and somewhat inharmonious character, as a neurotic always is, will meet special difficulties and perhaps more unusual tasks in life than a normal individual, who as a rule has only to follow the well-established line of an ordinary life. For the neurotic there is no established way, for his aims and tasks are apt to be of a highly individual character. He tries to follow the more or less uncontrolled and half-conscious way of normal people, not fully realizing his own critical and very different nature, which imposes upon him more effort than the normal person is required to exert. There are neurotics who have shown their increased sensitiveness and their resistance against adaptation in the very first weeks of life, in their difficulty in taking the mother's breast, and in their exaggerated nervous reactions, &c. For this portion of a neurotic predisposition it will always be impossible to find a psychological ætiology, for it is anterior to all psychology. But this predisposition—you may call it "congenital sensitiveness" or by what name you like—is the cause of the first resistances against adaptation. In such case, the way of adaptation being blocked, the biological energy we call libido does not find its appropriate outlet or activity and therefore replaces an up-to-date and suitable form of adaptation by an abnormal or primitive one.
A sensitive and somewhat unbalanced character, like a neurotic often is, will encounter unique challenges and possibly more unusual tasks in life than a typical person, who usually only needs to follow the familiar path of ordinary life. For the neurotic, there isn’t a set way to go, as their goals and tasks tend to be highly individual. They attempt to follow the more or less uncontrolled and semi-conscious path of normal people, not fully grasping their own critical and very different nature, which demands more effort than what a normal person typically has to put in. There are neurotics who have displayed their heightened sensitivity and their struggle to adapt as early as the first weeks of life, evident in their difficulty with breastfeeding and exaggerated nervous reactions, etc. For this aspect of neurotic predisposition, it will always be impossible to find a psychological cause, as it precedes all psychology. But this predisposition—you can call it "inherent sensitivity" or whatever term you prefer—leads to the initial difficulties in adapting. In such cases, with the path to adaptation blocked, the biological energy we refer to as libido doesn't find its proper outlet or activity, substituting a more modern and suitable form of adaptation with an abnormal or primitive one.
In neurosis we speak of an infantile attitude or the predominance of infantile phantasies and desires. In so far as infantile impressions and desires are of obvious importance in normal people they are equally influential in neurosis, but they have here no ætiological significance, they are reactions merely, being chiefly secondary and regressive phenomena. It is perfectly true, as Freud states, that infantile phantasies determine the form and further development of neurosis, but this is not ætiology. Even when we find perverted sexual phantasies of which we can prove the existence in childhood, we cannot consider them of ætiological significance. A neurosis is not really originated by infantile sexual phantasies[234] and the same must be said of the sexualism of neurotic phantasy in general. It is not a primary phenomenon based upon a perverted sexual disposition, but merely secondary and a consequence of a failure to apply the stored-up libido in a suitable way. I realize that this is a very old view, but this does not prevent its being true. The fact that the patient himself very often believes that this infantile phantasy is the real cause of the neurosis, does not prove that he is right in his belief, or that a theory following the same belief is right either. It may look as if it were so, and I must confess that indeed very many cases do have that appearance. At all events, it is perfectly easy to understand how Freud came to this view. Every one having any psychoanalytic experience will agree with me here.
In neurosis, we discuss an immature mindset or the dominance of childish fantasies and desires. While childish impressions and wishes are clearly significant for healthy individuals, they have the same influence in neurosis, but don't hold any causal importance; they are merely reactions, mostly secondary and regressive events. Freud rightly points out that childhood fantasies shape the nature and progression of neurosis, but this doesn’t equate to causation. Even when we find distorted sexual fantasies that can be traced back to childhood, we can't treat them as having causal significance. A neurosis isn't actually caused by childhood sexual fantasies[234], and the same applies to neurotic sexual fantasies overall. These aren't primary phenomena driven by a distorted sexual inclination; instead, they are secondary and result from an inability to use stored libido properly. I know this perspective is quite old-fashioned, but that doesn’t make it any less accurate. Just because the patient often thinks that this childhood fantasy is the real cause of their neurosis doesn’t mean they're correct in that belief, nor does it validate a theory based on the same assumption. It may seem that way, and I must admit that many cases appear to support this idea. Regardless, it’s easy to see how Freud arrived at this conclusion. Anyone with psychoanalytic experience would likely agree with me.
To sum up: I cannot see the real ætiology of a neurosis in the various manifestations of infantile sexual development and their corresponding phantasies. The fact that they are exaggerated and put into the foreground in neurosis is a consequence of the stored-up energy or libido. The psychological trouble in neurosis, and neurosis itself, can be considered as an act of adaptation that has failed. This formulation might reconcile certain views of Janet's with Freud's view, that a neurosis is—under a certain aspect—an attempt at self-cure; a view which can be and has been applied to many diseases.
To sum up: I can't see the true cause of a neurosis in the different signs of early sexual development and their related fantasies. The fact that they are intensified and highlighted in neurosis is due to the accumulated energy or libido. The psychological issues in neurosis, and neurosis itself, can be thought of as a failed attempt to adapt. This interpretation might bring together some of Janet's perspectives with Freud's idea that a neurosis is—under certain conditions—an effort at self-healing; a concept that can be and has been applied to many illnesses.
Here the question arises whether it is still advisable to bring to light all the patient's phantasies by analysis, if we now consider them as of no ætiological significance. Psychoanalysis hitherto has proceeded to the unravelling of these phantasies because they were considered to be ætiologically significant. My altered view concerning the theory of neurosis does not change the procedure of psychoanalysis. The technique remains the same. We no longer imagine we are unearthing the end-root of the disease, but we have to pull up the sexual phantasies because the energy which the patient needs for his health, that is, for his adaptation, is attached to them. By means of psychoanalysis the connexion between the conscious and the libido in the[235] unconscious is re-established. Thus you restore this unconscious libido to the command of conscious intention. Only in this way can the formerly split-off energy become again applicable to the accomplishment of the necessary tasks of life. Considered from this standpoint, psychoanalysis no longer appears to be a mere reduction of the individual to his primitive sexual wishes, but it becomes clear that, if rightly understood, it is a highly moral task of immense educational value.
Here the question arises whether it’s still a good idea to bring all the patient's fantasies to light through analysis, if we now see them as having no causal significance. Psychoanalysis has traditionally focused on unraveling these fantasies because they were thought to be causally significant. My changed view regarding the theory of neurosis doesn’t alter the practice of psychoanalysis. The technique stays the same. We no longer believe we are uncovering the root cause of the illness, but we need to address the sexual fantasies because the energy the patient needs for their health, that is, for their adaptation, is tied to them. Through psychoanalysis, the connection between the conscious mind and the libido in the unconscious is re-established. This process returns the unconscious libido to the control of conscious intention. Only by doing this can the previously split-off energy be used again for the essential tasks of life. From this perspective, psychoanalysis doesn’t just reduce the individual to primitive sexual desires, but it becomes clear that, if understood correctly, it is a highly moral task of immense educational value.
CHAPTER IX
Correspondence between Dr. Jung and Dr. Loÿ appearing in "Psychotherapeutische Zeitfragen." Published by Dr. Loÿ, Sanatorium L'abri, Territet-Montreux, Switzerland, 1914.
Communication between Dr. Jung and Dr. Loÿ featured in "Psychotherapeutic Current Issues." Released by Dr. Loÿ, Sanatorium L'abri, Territet-Montreux, Switzerland, 1914.
I
From Dr. Loÿ.
From Dr. Loy.
12th January, 1913.
January 12, 1913.
What you said at our last conversation was extraordinarily stimulating. I was expecting you to throw light upon the interpretation of my own and my patients' dreams from the standpoint of Freud's "Interpretation of Dreams." Instead, you put before me an entirely new conception: the dream as a means of re-establishing the moral equipoise, fashioned in the realm below the threshold of consciousness. That indeed is a fruitful conception. But still more fruitful appears to me your other suggestion. You regard the problems of psychoanalysis as much deeper than I had ever thought: it is no longer merely a question of getting rid of troublesome pathological symptoms; the analysed person gets to understand not his anxiety-experiences alone, but his whole self most completely, and by means of this understanding he can build up and fashion his whole life anew. But he himself must be the builder, the Analyst only furnishes him with the necessary tools.
What you said in our last conversation was incredibly stimulating. I expected you to shed light on the interpretation of my dreams and my patients' dreams through the lens of Freud's "Interpretation of Dreams." Instead, you presented me with an entirely new idea: the dream as a way to restore moral balance, created in the part of the mind that lies below conscious awareness. That is indeed a valuable concept. But what seems even more valuable to me is your other suggestion. You see the issues in psychoanalysis as much deeper than I had ever realized: it’s not just about getting rid of bothersome symptoms; the person being analyzed comes to understand not just their anxiety experiences but their whole self in the fullest way, and through this understanding, they can completely reshape their life. However, they have to be the ones to build it up; the Analyst just provides the necessary tools.
To begin with, I would ask you to consider what justification there is for the original procedure of Breuer and Freud, now entirely given up both by Freud himself and by you, but practised by Frank, for instance, as his only method: I mean "the abreaction of the inhibited effects[237] under light hypnosis." Why have you given up the cathartic method? More particularly, has light hypnosis in psychocatharsis a different value from suggestion during sleep, long customary in treatment by suggestion? that is, has it only the value which the suggestionist contributes, or does it claim to possess only the value which the patient's belief bestows upon it? Or, again, is suggestion in the waking-state equivalent to suggestion in hypnoidal states? This Bernheim now asserts to be the case, after having used suggestion for many years exclusively in hypnosis. You will tell me we must talk of psychoanalysis, not of suggestion. But I really mean this: is not the suggestion, by means of which the psychocatharsis in the hypnoidal state produces therapeutic effects, (modified naturally, by the patients' age, etc.) the main factor in the therapeutic success of the psychocatharsis? Frank, in his "Affektstörungen," says: "these partial adjustments of effect, suggestibility and suggestion, are almost altogether omitted in the psychocathartic treatment in light sleep, in so far as the content of the reproduced presentations is concerned." Is that really true? Frank himself adds: "How can meditation upon the dreams of youth in itself lead to the discharge of the stored-up anxiety, whether in hypnoidal states or under any other conditions? Must one not suppose, with much greater probability, that the anxiety-states would become more pronounced through such concentration upon them?" [I have noticed that myself, and much more than I at all liked.] One does indeed say to the patient: "First we must stir up, then afterwards comes peace." And it does come. But does it not come in spite of the stirring-up process, because gradually, by means of frequent talks under light hypnosis, the patient gets such confidence in the doctor that he becomes susceptible to direct suggestion, and that produces at first improvement and finally, cure? I go still further: in an analysis in the waking-state, is not the patient's belief that the method employed will cure him, coupled with his ever-growing trust in the doctor, a main cause of his cure? And I ask even further: in every systematically carried-out therapeutic[238] treatment, is not faith in it, trust in the doctor, a main factor in its success? I will not indeed say the only factor, for one cannot deny that the physical, dietetic and chemical procedures, when properly selected, have a real effect in securing a cure, over and above the obvious effect of their indirect suggestion.
To start with, I’d like you to think about what justification there is for the original approach of Breuer and Freud, which has now been completely abandoned by Freud himself and by you, but is still practiced by Frank, for example, as his sole method: I’m talking about “the release of inhibited effects[237] through light hypnosis.” Why have you abandoned the cathartic method? More specifically, does light hypnosis in psychocatharsis have a different value compared to suggestion during sleep, which has long been used in treatment by suggestion? In other words, does it hold only the value that the suggestionist provides, or does it claim to possess only the value that the patient’s belief grants it? Or, is suggestion in a waking state equivalent to suggestion in hypnoidal states? This is what Bernheim currently claims, after using suggestion exclusively in hypnosis for many years. You might tell me we should focus on psychoanalysis, not suggestion. But my point is this: isn’t the suggestion that the psychocatharsis in the hypnoidal state generates therapeutic effects (modulated, of course, by the patient’s age, etc.) the key factor in the success of psychocatharsis? Frank, in his "Affektstörungen," states: "these partial adjustments of effect, suggestibility, and suggestion, are almost completely omitted in the psychocathartic treatment in light sleep, regarding the content of the reproduced presentations." Is that really accurate? Frank himself adds: "How can reflecting on the dreams of youth alone lead to the release of stored-up anxiety, whether in hypnoidal states or any other conditions? Shouldn’t we be more likely to assume that the anxiety states would become more pronounced through such focus on them?" [I’ve noticed that myself, and it’s much more than I would have liked.] People do indeed tell the patient: "First, we need to stir things up; then peace will follow." And peace does come. But doesn’t it arrive despite the stirring-up process, because gradually, through frequent discussions under light hypnosis, the patient develops such trust in the doctor that he becomes open to direct suggestion, which initially brings improvement and ultimately leads to a cure? I’ll go even further: in an analysis in the waking state, isn’t the patient’s belief that the method used will heal him, along with his increasing trust in the doctor, a major reason for his recovery? And I would argue further: in every systematically conducted therapeutic[238] treatment, isn’t faith in it and trust in the doctor a crucial factor in its success? I won’t go so far as to say it’s the only factor, because it’s undeniable that physical, dietary, and chemical treatments, when chosen appropriately, genuinely contribute to achieving a cure, beyond their obvious effects through indirect suggestion.
II
From Dr. Jung.
From Dr. Jung.
28th January, 1913.
January 28, 1913.
With regard to your question as to the applicability of the cathartic method, the following is my standpoint: every method is good if it serves its purpose, including every method of suggestion, even Christian Science, Mental Healing, etc. "A truth is a truth, when it works." It is quite another question whether a scientific physician can answer for it to his conscience should he sell little bottles of Lourdes-water because that suggestion is at times very useful. Even the so-called highly scientific suggestion-therapy employs the wares of the medicine-man and the exorcising Schaman. And please, why should it not? The public is not even now much more advanced and continues to expect miracles from the doctor. And truly those doctors should be deemed clever—worldly-wise in every respect—who understand the art of investing themselves with the halo of the medicine-man. Not only have they the biggest practices—they have also the best results. This is simply because countless physical maladies (leaving out of count the neuroses) are complicated and burdened with psychic elements to an extent scarcely yet suspected. The medical exorcist's whole behaviour betrays his full valuation of the psychic element when he gives the patient the opportunity of fixing his faith firmly upon the doctor's mysterious personality. Thus does he win the sick man's mind, which henceforth helps him indeed to restore his body also to health. The cure works best when the doctor really believes in his own formulæ, otherwise he may be overcome by scientific doubt and so lose the correct,[239] convincing tone. I, too, for a time practised hypnotic suggestion enthusiastically. But there befell me three dubious incidents which I want you to note:—
Regarding your question about the effectiveness of the cathartic method, here's my view: any method is useful if it achieves its goal, including all forms of suggestion, like Christian Science and Mental Healing, etc. "A truth is a truth when it works." It's another issue entirely whether a medical professional can feel right about selling small bottles of Lourdes water, even if that suggestion is sometimes quite helpful. Even the so-called scientifically-backed suggestion therapy uses the tools of traditional healers and shamans. And honestly, why shouldn't it? The public isn't much more enlightened today and still expects miracles from doctors. Those physicians should be seen as clever—wise in the worldly sense—who know how to present themselves like healers. Not only do they have the largest practices, but they also get the best results. This is simply because many physical ailments (excluding neuroses) are more complex and intertwined with psychological factors than we currently realize. A medical practitioner’s approach reveals their understanding of the psychological aspect when they provide the patient the chance to place their faith firmly in the doctor's enigmatic persona. This way, they capture the sick person's mind, which can then genuinely help in healing the body. Healing works best when the doctor truly believes in their own methods; otherwise, they might be plagued by scientific doubt, losing that correct, convincing tone. I, too, practiced hypnotic suggestion with great enthusiasm for a time. However, I experienced three questionable incidents that I'd like you to note:—
1. Once there came to me to be hypnotised for various neurotic troubles a withered peasant-woman of some fifty years old. She was not easy to hypnotise, was very restless, kept opening her eyes—but at last I did succeed. When I waked her after about half an hour she seized my hand and with many words testified to her overflowing gratitude. I said: "But you are by no means cured yet, so keep your thanks till the end of the treatment." She: "I am not thanking you for that, but—(blushing and whispering)—because you have been so decent." So she said, looked at me with a sort of tender admiration and departed. I gazed long at the spot where she had stood—and asked myself, confounded, "So decent?"—good heavens! surely she hadn't imagined, somehow or other.... This glimpse made me suspect for the first time that possibly the loose-minded person, by means of that notorious feminine (I should at that time have said "animal") directness of instinct, understood more about the essence of hypnotism than I with all my knowledge of the scientific profundity of the text-books. Therein lay my harmlessness.
1. One day, a frail peasant woman in her fifties came to me for hypnosis to help with various neurotic problems. She was difficult to hypnotize, very restless, and kept opening her eyes—but eventually, I succeeded. When I woke her up after about half an hour, she grabbed my hand and expressed her deep gratitude with many words. I said, "But you’re not cured yet, so save your thanks until the treatment is finished." She replied, "I'm not thanking you for that, but—" (blushing and whispering) "because you've been so decent." With that, she looked at me with a kind of tender admiration and left. I stared intently at the spot where she had stood, completely baffled, thinking, "So decent?"—good heavens! Surely she hadn’t somehow mistaken my intentions. This moment made me wonder for the first time if perhaps that straightforward femininity (back then, I might have called it "animal instinct") understood the essence of hypnotism better than I did, despite all my knowledge from the scholarly texts. That was where my innocence lay.
2. Next came a pretty, coquettish, seventeen-year-old girl with a harassed, suspicious mother. The young daughter had suffered since early girlhood from enuresis nocturna, which, among other difficulties, hindered her from going to a boarding-school abroad.
2. Next came a pretty, flirtatious seventeen-year-old girl with a frazzled, distrustful mother. The young girl had faced challenges since early childhood with enuresis nocturna, which, among other issues, prevented her from attending a boarding school overseas.
At once I thought of the old woman and her wisdom. I tried to hypnotise the girl; she laughed affectedly and prevented hypnosis for twenty minutes. Of course I kept quiet and thought: I know why you laugh; you have already fallen in love with me, but I will give you proof of my decency in gratitude for your wasting my time with your challenging laughter. I succeeded in hypnotising her. Success followed at once. The enuresis stopped, and I therefore informed the young lady later that, instead of Wednesday, I would not see her again for hypnosis till the following[240] Saturday. On Saturday she arrived with a cross countenance, presaging failure. The enuresis had come back again. I remembered my wise old woman, and asked: "When did the enuresis return?" She (unsuspecting), "Wednesday night." I thought to myself, There it is again, she wants to show me that I simply must see her on Wednesdays too; not to see me for a whole long week is too much for a tender, loving heart. But I was quite resolved to give no help to such annoying romancing, so I said, "To continue the hypnosis would be quite wrong under these circumstances. We must drop it for quite three weeks, to give the enuresis a chance to stop. Then come again for treatment." In my malicious heart I knew I should then be on my holiday and so the course of hypnotic treatment would come to an end. After the holidays my locum tenens told me the young lady had been there with the news that the enuresis had vanished, but her disappointment at not seeing me was very keen. The old woman was right, thought I.
Right away, I thought about the old woman and her wisdom. I tried to hypnotize the girl; she laughed pretentiously and fought off hypnosis for twenty minutes. Of course, I stayed quiet and thought: I know why you’re laughing; you’ve already fallen for me, but I’ll prove my decency in thanks for wasting my time with your teasing laughter. I managed to hypnotize her. Success came quickly. The bedwetting stopped, so I later told the young lady that, instead of Wednesday, I wouldn’t see her again for hypnosis until the following[240] Saturday. On Saturday, she showed up with a sulky face, signaling trouble. The bedwetting had returned. I remembered my wise old woman and asked, "When did the bedwetting come back?" She (unaware), replied, "Wednesday night." I thought to myself, There it is again, she wants to make sure I see her on Wednesdays too; going a whole week without seeing me is too much for a tender, loving heart. But I was determined not to indulge such annoying fantasies, so I said, "Continuing the hypnosis would be completely wrong under these circumstances. We need to take a break for three weeks, to give the bedwetting a chance to stop. Then come back for treatment." Deep down, I knew I’d be on holiday during that time, so the course of hypnotic treatment would come to an end. After the break, my locum tenens told me that the young lady had been there with the news that the bedwetting had disappeared, but her disappointment at not seeing me was quite intense. The old woman was right, I thought.
3. The third case gave my joy in suggestion its death-blow. This was the manner of it. She was a lady of sixty-five who came stumbling into the consulting-room with a crutch. She had suffered from pain in the knee-joint for seventeen years, and this at times kept her in bed for many weeks. No doctor had been able to cure her, and she had tried every possible remedy of present-day medicine. After I had suffered the stream of her narrative to flow over me for some ten minutes, I said, "I will try to hypnotise you, perhaps that will do you good." She, "Oh yes, please do!" leaned her head on one side and fell asleep before ever I said or did anything. She passed into somnambulism and showed every form of hypnosis you could possibly desire. After half an hour I had the greatest difficulty in waking her; when at last she was awake she jumped up: "I am well, I am all right, you have cured me." I tried to make timid objections, but her praises drowned me. She could really walk. Then I blushed and said, embarrassed, to my colleagues: "Look! behold the wondrously successful hypnotic therapy." That day saw the death of my connection[241] with treatment by suggestion; the therapeutic praise won by this case shamed and humiliated me. When, a year later, at the beginning of my hypnotic course, the good old lady returned, this time with the pain in her back, I was already sunk in hopeless cynicism; I saw written on her forehead that she had just read the notice of the re-opening of my clinic in the newspaper, that vexatious romanticism had provided her with a convenient pain in the back so that she might have a pretext for seeing me, and again let herself be cured in the same theatrical fashion. This proved true in every particular.
3. The third case crushed my enthusiasm for suggestion. Here’s how it went down. She was a sixty-five-year-old woman who came into the consulting room using a crutch. She’d been dealing with knee pain for seventeen years, which sometimes kept her bedridden for weeks at a time. No doctor had been able to help her, and she’d tried every possible treatment available. After listening to her story for about ten minutes, I said, “I’ll try to hypnotize you; maybe that will help.” She eagerly responded, “Oh yes, please do!” leaned her head to the side, and fell asleep before I could say or do anything. She entered a state of deep relaxation and demonstrated every form of hypnosis you could imagine. After half an hour, I had a hard time waking her; when she finally did wake up, she jumped up and declared, “I’m well, I’m fine, you’ve cured me.” I tried to express some hesitations, but her excitement drowned me out. She could actually walk. I felt embarrassed and said to my colleagues, “Look! Witness the amazing success of hypnotic therapy.” That day marked the end of my journey with treatment through suggestion; the praise I received from this case left me feeling ashamed. When, a year later, at the start of my hypnotic course, the same lovely lady returned, this time with back pain, I was already deep in cynicism. I could see she had just seen the announcement of my clinic reopening in the newspaper and thought her annoying romanticism had created a convenient backache just to have an excuse to see me and be theatrically cured again. Unfortunately, that turned out to be true in every way.
As you will understand, a man possessed of scientific conscience cannot endure such cases without embarrassment. There ripened in me the resolve to renounce suggestion altogether rather than to allow myself passively to be transformed into a miracle-worker. I wanted to understand what really went on in the souls of people. It suddenly seemed to me incredibly childish to think of dispelling an illness with charms, and that this should be the only result of our scientific endeavours for a psychotherapy. Thus for me the discovery of Breuer and Freud was a veritable deliverance. I took up their method with unalloyed enthusiasm and soon recognised how right Freud was, when at a very early date, indeed so far back as the Studien ueber Hysterie, he began to direct a searchlight upon the accompanying circumstances of the so-called trauma. I too soon discovered that certainly some traumata with an obvious etiological tinge are opportunely present. But the greater number appeared highly improbable. So many of them seemed so insignificant, even so normal, that at most one could regard them as just providing the opportunity for the neurosis to appear. But what especially spurred my criticism was the fact that so many traumata were simply inventions of phantasy which had never really existed. This perception was enough to make me sceptical about the whole trauma-theory. (But I have dealt with these matters in detail in my lectures on the theory of psychoanalysis).[177] I could no longer suppose that[242] the hundred and one cathartic experiences of a phantastically puffed-up or entirely invented trauma were anything but the effect of suggestion. It is well enough if it helps. If one only had not a scientific conscience and that impulsion towards the truth! I found in many cases, especially when dealing with more mentally gifted patients, that I must recognise the therapeutic limitations of this method. It is, of course, a definite plan, and convenient for the doctor, since it makes no particular demands upon his intellect for new adaptations. The theory and practice are both of the pleasantest simplicity: "The neurosis is caused by a trauma. The trauma is abreacted." When the abreaction takes place under hypnotism, or with other magical accessories (dark room, peculiar lighting, and the rest), I remember once more the wise old woman, who opened my eyes not merely to the magic influence of the mesmeric gestures, but also to the essential character of hypnotism itself. But what alienated me once for all from this relatively efficacious indirect method of suggestion, based as it is upon an equally efficacious false theory, was the perception I obtained at the same time that, behind the confused deceptive intricacies of neurotic phantasies, there stands a conflict, which may be best described as a moral one. With this there began for me a new era of understanding. Research and therapy now coincided in the attempt to discover the causes and the rational solution of this conflict. That is what psychoanalysis meant to me. Whilst I had been getting this insight, Freud had built up his sexual theory of the neurosis, and therewith had brought forward an enormous number of questions for discussion, all of which I thought deserved the profoundest consideration. Thus I have had the good fortune of co-operating with Freud for a long time, and working with him in the investigation of the problem of sexuality in neurosis. You, perhaps, know from some of my earlier work that I was always dubious somewhat concerning the significance of sexuality.[178] This has now become the exact point where I am no longer altogether of Freud's opinion.
As you can understand, a person with a scientific mindset can't deal with such cases without feeling uneasy. I came to the decision to completely reject suggestion rather than let myself be passively turned into a miracle worker. I wanted to truly understand what was happening in people’s minds. It suddenly seemed incredibly naive to believe that we could cure an illness with charms, and that this should be the only outcome of our scientific efforts in psychotherapy. So, for me, the discovery of Breuer and Freud was truly liberating. I embraced their method with sheer enthusiasm and quickly recognized how right Freud was when, way back during the Studies on Hysteria, he started to shine a light on the surrounding circumstances of what we call trauma. I soon found that some traumas with a clear cause do indeed show up. But the majority seemed quite unlikely. Many of them appeared so trivial, even so ordinary, that they could only be seen as giving a chance for the neurosis to develop. But what really fueled my skepticism was that so many traumas were simply figments of imagination that never actually happened. This realization was enough to make me doubtful about the entire trauma theory. (But I've discussed these matters in depth in my lectures on the theory of psychoanalysis).[177] I could no longer assume that the countless cathartic experiences based on an exaggerated or completely fabricated trauma were anything but the result of suggestion. It’s fine if it helps, but if only one didn’t have a scientific conscience and a drive for the truth! I found in many cases, especially with more intellectually capable patients, that I had to acknowledge the therapeutic limits of this method. It is certainly a clear-cut approach, and convenient for the doctor since it does not demand much intellect for new adaptations. The theory and practice are wonderfully simple: "The neurosis is caused by a trauma. The trauma is resolved." When the resolution occurs under hypnosis, or with other magical elements (dark rooms, unusual lighting, and so on), I recall the wise old woman who opened my eyes not just to the magical influence of mesmerizing gestures, but also to the essential nature of hypnosis itself. What ultimately turned me away from this relatively effective indirect method of suggestion, based on an equally effective false theory, was the realization that behind the tangled illusions of neurotic fantasies lies a conflict, which can best be described as a moral one. This marked the beginning of a new era of understanding for me. Research and therapy now converged in the quest to uncover the causes and the rational solution to this conflict. That is what psychoanalysis represented to me. While I was gaining this insight, Freud was developing his theory of sexuality in neurosis, introducing a vast number of questions for discussion, all of which I believed warranted deep consideration. Thus, I’ve had the good fortune to collaborate with Freud for a long time and work alongside him in exploring the issue of sexuality in neurosis. You might know from some of my earlier work that I’ve always been a bit skeptical about the importance of sexuality.[178] This has now become the exact point where I no longer fully agree with Freud.
I have preferred to answer your questions in rather non-sequent fashion. Whatever is still unanswered, let me now repeat: light hypnosis and complete hypnosis are but varying grades of intensity of unconscious attraction towards the hypnotist. Who can here venture to draw sharp distinctions? To a critical intelligence it is unthinkable that suggestibility and suggestion can be excluded in the cathartic method. They are present everywhere and are universal human attributes, even with Dubois and the psychoanalysts who think they work on purely rational lines. No technique, no self-deception avails here—the doctor works, nolens volens—and perhaps primarily—by means of his personality, that is by suggestion. In the cathartic treatment, what is of far more importance to the patient than the conjuring up of old phantasies is the being so often with the doctor, and having confidence and belief in him personally, and in his method. The belief, the self-confidence, perhaps also the devotion with which the doctor does his work, are far more important things to the patient (imponderabilia though they be) than the recalling of old traumata.[179]
I’ve chosen to answer your questions in a somewhat non-linear way. As for anything still unanswered, let me reiterate: light hypnosis and complete hypnosis are just different levels of intensity of unconscious attraction to the hypnotist. Who can really make clear distinctions here? It’s unimaginable to a discerning mind that suggestibility and suggestion can be overlooked in the cathartic method. They are everywhere and are universal human traits, even with Dubois and the psychoanalysts who believe they operate purely on rational principles. No technique, no self-deception can help here—the doctor works, willingly or unwillingly—and perhaps mainly—through his personality, which is essentially by suggestion. In cathartic treatment, what matters much more to the patient than bringing up old fantasies is spending time with the doctor and having faith and belief in him personally, as well as in his method. The belief, the self-assurance, and perhaps even the dedication with which the doctor approaches his work are far more significant to the patient (imponderabilia though they may be) than recalling old traumas.[179]
Ultimately we shall some day know from the history of medicine everything that has ever been of service; then perhaps at last we may come to the really desirable therapy, to psychotherapy. Did not even the old materia medica of filth have brilliant cures?—cures which only faded away with the belief in it!
Ultimately, someday we will understand from the history of medicine everything that has ever been helpful; then maybe we can finally reach the truly effective treatment—psychotherapy. Didn't even the old remedies made from filth have amazing cures?—cures that only disappeared once people stopped believing in them!
Because I recognise that the patient does attempt to lay hold of the doctor's personality, in spite of all possible rational safeguards, I have formulated the demand that the psychotherapeutist shall be held just as responsible for the cleanness of his own hands as is the surgeon. I hold it to be an absolutely indispensable preliminary that the psychoanalyst should himself first undergo an analysis, for his personality is one of the chief factors in the cure.
Because I understand that patients try to connect with the doctor's personality, despite all the rational safeguards, I have insisted that the psychotherapist should be just as accountable for their own integrity as a surgeon. I believe it is absolutely essential that the psychoanalyst undergoes their own analysis first, as their personality is one of the key factors in the healing process.
Patients read the doctor's character intuitively and they should find in him a human being, with faults indeed, but also a man who has striven at every point to fulfil his own human duties in the fullest sense. I think that this is the first healing factor. Many times I have had the opportunity of seeing that the analyst is successful with his treatment just in so far as he has succeeded in his own moral development. I think this answer will satisfy your question.
Patients intuitively read the doctor's character, and they should see him as a person—flawed, yes, but also someone who has genuinely tried at every moment to fulfill his human responsibilities to the fullest. I believe this is the primary factor in healing. I've often noticed that an analyst's success in treatment is closely tied to their own moral growth. I think this answer will address your question.
III
From Dr. Loÿ.
From Dr. Loÿ.
2nd February, 1913.
February 2, 1913.
You answer several of my questions in a decidedly affirmative sense. You take it as proved that in the cures by the cathartic method the main rôle is played by faith in the doctor and in his method, and not by the "abreaction" of real or imaginary traumata. I also. Equally I am at one with your view that the cures of the old materia medica of filth, as well as the Lourdes cures, or those of the Mental Healers, Christian Scientists and Persuasionists, are to be attributed to faith in the miracle-worker, rather than to any of the methods employed.
You answer several of my questions in a clearly positive way. You take it as a given that in treatments using the cathartic method, the main role is played by belief in the doctor and his method, not by the "abreaction" of real or imagined trauma. I agree. I'm also in line with your belief that the cures from the old materia medica of filth, as well as the cures at Lourdes or those by Mental Healers, Christian Scientists, and Persuasionists, are due to faith in the miracle worker rather than the specific methods used.
Now comes the ticklish point: the augur can remain an augur so long as he himself believes the will of the gods is made manifest by the entrails of the sacrificial beast. When he no longer believes, he has to ask himself: Shall I continue to use my augur's authority to further the welfare of the State, or shall I make use of my newer, and (I hope) truer convictions of to-day? Both ways are possible. The first is called opportunism; the second the pursuit of truth, and scientific honour. For a doctor, the first way brings perhaps therapeutic success and fame; the second, reproach: such a man is not taken seriously. What I esteem most highly in Freud and his school is just this passionate desire for truth. But again, it is precisely here that people pronounce a different verdict: "It is impossible for the busy practitioner to keep pace with the development[245] of the views of this investigator and his initiates." (Frank, "Affektstörungen Einleitung.")
Now comes the tricky part: the augur can stay an augur as long as he believes that the will of the gods is shown through the entrails of the sacrificial animal. When he stops believing, he has to ask himself: Should I keep using my augur's authority to support the State's welfare, or should I rely on my new, and (I hope) more accurate beliefs of today? Both options are valid. The first is called opportunism; the second is the pursuit of truth and scientific integrity. For a doctor, the first option might bring therapeutic success and recognition; the second may lead to criticism: such a person is not taken seriously. What I admire most in Freud and his school is this passionate quest for truth. But again, it's precisely here that people give a different judgment: "It's impossible for the busy practitioner to keep up with the development[245] of the views of this researcher and his followers." (Frank, "Affektstörungen Einleitung.")
One can easily disregard this little quip, but one must take more seriously one's self-criticism. We may have to ask ourselves whether, since science is an undivided, ever-flowing stream, we are justified in relinquishing on conscientious grounds any method or combination of methods by means of which we know cures can be achieved?
One might easily dismiss this little joke, but we should take our self-criticism more seriously. We might need to ask ourselves whether, since science is a continuous, ever-flowing stream, we can justify giving up any method or combination of methods that we know can lead to cures on ethical grounds.
Looking more closely at the fundamental grounds of your aversion to the use of hypnosis (or semi-hypnosis, the degree matters nothing) in treatment by suggestion, (which as a matter of fact every doctor and every therapeutic method makes use of willy-nilly, no matter what it is called), it is clear that what has disgusted you in hypnotism is at bottom nothing but the so-called "transference" to the doctor, which you, with your unalloyed psychoanalytic treatment, can get rid of as little as any one else, for indeed it plays a chief part in the success of the treatment. Your insistence that the psychoanalyst must be answerable for the cleanness of his own hands—(here I agree with you unreservedly)——is an inevitable conclusion. But, after all, does anything more "augurish" really cling to the use made of hypnosis in psychotherapeutic treatment, than to the quite inevitable use made of the "transference to the doctor" for therapeutic ends? In either case we must perforce "take shares" in faith as a healing agent. As for the feeling which the patient—whether man or woman—entertains for the doctor, is there never anything in the background save conscious or unconscious sexual desire? In many cases your view is most certainly correct; more than one woman has been frank enough to confess that the beginning of hypnosis was accompanied by voluptuous pleasure. But this is not true in all instances—or how would you explain the underlying feeling in the hypnotising of one animal by another, e.g. snake and bird? Surely you can say that there the feeling of fear reigns, fear which is an inversion of the libido, such as comes upon the bride in that hypnoidal state before she yields to her husband wherein pure sexual[246] desire rules, though possibly it contains an element of fear. However this may be, from your three cases I cannot draw any ethical distinction between the "unconscious readiness towards the hypnotist" and the "transference to the doctor" which should avail to condemn a combination of hypnotism and psychoanalysis as a method of treatment. You will ask why I cling to the use of hypnotism; or rather of hypnoidal states. Because I think there are cases that can be much more rapidly cured thereby, than through a purely psychoanalytic treatment. For example, in no more than five or six interviews I cured a fifteen-year-old girl who had suffered from enuresis nocturna from infancy, but was otherwise thoroughly healthy, gifted, and pre-eminent at school: she had previously tried all sorts of treatment without any result.
Looking more closely at the basic reasons behind your dislike for using hypnosis (or semi-hypnosis, the degree doesn't really matter) in suggestive therapy, (which, by the way, every doctor and every treatment method inevitably uses, no matter what it's called), it's clear that what has turned you off from hypnotism is really just the so-called "transference" to the doctor, which you, with your untainted psychoanalytic approach, can get rid of just as little as anyone else, because it actually plays a key role in the success of the treatment. Your insistence that the psychoanalyst must be responsible for the cleanliness of their own methods—(here I completely agree with you)—is an unavoidable conclusion. But really, does anything more "augurish" truly attach to the use of hypnosis in psychotherapeutic treatment than to the quite unavoidable use of "transference to the doctor" for therapeutic purposes? In either case, we must inevitably "invest" in faith as a healing agent. As for the feelings that the patient—whether male or female—has for the doctor, is there ever anything in the background other than conscious or unconscious sexual desire? In many cases, your perspective is definitely correct; more than one woman has openly admitted that the onset of hypnosis was accompanied by pleasurable sensations. But this isn't true in all situations—or how would you explain the underlying feelings in the hypnosis of one animal by another, e.g. snake and bird? Surely you can say that there, the feeling of fear dominates, fear that is a reversal of libido, similar to what happens to the bride in that hypnoidal state before she submits to her husband, where pure sexual desire reigns, though it may contain a hint of fear. However it may be, from your three cases I cannot find any ethical difference between the "unconscious readiness towards the hypnotist" and the "transference to the doctor" that could justify condemning the combination of hypnotism and psychoanalysis as a treatment method. You might ask why I stick to using hypnotism; or rather, hypnoidal states. Because I believe there are cases that can be cured much more quickly this way than through purely psychoanalytic treatment. For example, in just five or six sessions, I cured a fifteen-year-old girl who had dealt with enuresis nocturna since childhood, but was otherwise completely healthy, talented, and exceptional at school: she had previously tried all sorts of treatments without success.
Perhaps I ought to have sought out the psychoanalytic connexion between the enuresis and her psychosexual attitude and explained it to her, etc., but I could not, she had only the short Easter holidays for treatment: so I just hypnotised her and the tiresome trouble vanished. It was a lasting cure.
Perhaps I should have looked into the psychological link between her bedwetting and her attitude towards sexuality and explained it to her, but I couldn’t—she only had the short Easter break for treatment. So, I just hypnotized her and the annoying issue disappeared. It was a permanent solution.
In psychoanalysis I use hypnosis to help the patient to overcome "resistances."
In psychoanalysis, I use hypnosis to help the patient overcome "resistances."
Further, I use light hypnosis in association with psychoanalysis, to hasten the advance when the "re-education" stage comes.
Further, I use light hypnosis along with psychoanalysis to speed up progress when the "re-education" phase begins.
For example, a patient afflicted with washing-mania was sent to me after a year's psychocathartic treatment by Dr. X. The symbolic meaning of her washing-ceremonial was first made plain to her; she became more and more agitated during the "abreaction" of alleged traumata in childhood, because she had persuaded herself by auto-suggestion that she was too old to be cured, that she saw no "images," etc. So I used hypnosis to help her to diminish the number of her washings, "so that the anxiety-feeling would be banished"; and to train her to throw things on the ground and pick them up again without washing her hands afterwards, etc.
For example, a patient struggling with an obsession over washing was sent to me after a year of therapeutic treatment by Dr. X. The symbolic meaning of her washing rituals was explained to her; she became increasingly agitated during the "release" of supposed childhood traumas because she had convinced herself through self-suggestion that she was too old to be helped and that she saw no "images," etc. So I used hypnosis to help her reduce the number of times she washed her hands, "so that the feeling of anxiety would go away"; and to train her to drop things on the ground and pick them up again without washing her hands afterward, etc.
In view of these considerations, if you feel disposed to go further into the matter, I should be grateful if you would furnish me with more convincing reasons why hypnotic treatment must be dispensed with; and explain how to do without it, or with what to replace it in such cases. Were I convinced, I would give it up as you have done, but what convinced you has, so far, not convinced me. Si duo faciunt idem, non est idem.
In light of these points, if you're willing to explore this further, I would appreciate it if you could provide me with more compelling reasons for why hypnotic treatment should be avoided; and explain how to manage without it, or what can be used instead in those situations. If I were convinced, I would let it go like you have, but what convinced you hasn’t convinced me so far. Si duo faciunt idem, non est idem.
Now I want to consider another important matter to which you alluded, but only cursorily, and to put one question: behind the neurotic phantasies there stands, you say, almost always (or always) a moral conflict which belongs to the present moment. That is perfectly clear to me. Research and therapy coincide; their task is to search out the foundations and the rational solution of the conflict. Good. But can the rational solution always be found? "Reasons of expediency" so often bar the way, varying with the type of patient, for instance children, young girls and women from "pious" catholic or protestant families. Again that accursed opportunism! A colleague of mine was perfectly right when he began to give sexual enlightenment to a young French patient, a boy who was indulging in masturbation. Whereupon, like one possessed, in rushed a bigoted grandmother, and a disagreeable sequel ensued. How to act in these and similar cases? What to do in cases where there arises a moral conflict between love and duty (a conflict in married life)?—or in general between instinct and moral duty? What to do in the case of a girl afflicted with hysterical or anxiety symptoms, needing love and having no chance to marry, either because she cannot find a suitable man or because, being "well-connected," she wants to remain chaste? Simply try to get rid of the symptoms by suggestion? But that is wrong as soon as one knows of a better way. How to reconcile these two consciences: that of the man who does not want to confine his fidelity to truth within his own four walls; and that of the doctor who must cure, or if he dare not cure according to his real convictions (owing to opportunist-motives), must at least[248] procure some alleviation? We live in the present, but with the ideas and ideals of the future. That is our conflict. How resolve it?
Now I want to discuss another important issue you briefly touched on and ask one question: behind the neurotic fantasies, you say, there is almost always (or always) a moral conflict that is relevant to the present moment. That makes perfect sense to me. Research and therapy overlap; their goal is to uncover the underlying issues and find a rational solution to the conflict. Good. But can a rational solution always be found? "Reasons of expediency" frequently get in the way, varying with the type of patient, such as children, young girls, and women from "pious" Catholic or Protestant families. Once again, that unfortunate opportunism! A colleague of mine was absolutely right when he started to provide sexual education to a young French patient, a boy who was engaging in masturbation. Suddenly, like someone bewitched, his bigoted grandmother stormed in, and an unpleasant situation followed. What should we do in these and similar situations? How should we handle cases where there is a moral conflict between love and duty (a conflict in married life)?—or more generally, between instinct and moral obligation? What should be done when a girl is struggling with hysterical or anxiety symptoms, craving love but unable to marry, either because she can't find a suitable partner or because, being "well-connected," she wants to stay chaste? Should we just try to eliminate the symptoms through suggestion? But that feels wrong as soon as one is aware of a better approach. How do we reconcile these two consciences: that of the man who doesn’t want to limit his fidelity to just his home; and that of the doctor who must provide a cure or, if he cannot treat according to his true beliefs (due to opportunistic reasons), at least find some relief? We live in the present, but with the ideas and ideals of the future. That is our conflict. How can we resolve it?
IV
From Dr. Jung.
From Dr. Jung.
4th February, 1913.
February 4, 1913.
You have put me in some perplexity by the questions in your yesterday's letter. You have rightly grasped the spirit which dictated my last. I am glad you, too, recognise this spirit. There are not very many who can boast of such tolerance. I should deceive myself if I regarded my standpoint as that of a practical physician. First and foremost I am a scientist; naturally that gives me a different outlook upon many problems. In my last letter I certainly left out of count the doctor's practical needs, but chiefly that I might show you on what grounds we might be moved to relinquish hypnotic therapy. To remove the first objection at once, let me say that I did not give up hypnotism because I desired to avoid dealing with the basic motives of the human soul, but rather because I wanted to battle with them directly and openly. When once I understood what kind of forces play a part in hypnotism I gave it up, simply to get rid of all the indirect advantages of this method. As we psychoanalysts see regretfully every day—and our patients also—we do not work with the "transference to the doctor,"[180] but against it and in spite of it. It is just not upon the faith of the sick man that we can build, but upon his criticism. So much would I say at the outset upon this delicate question.
You’ve confused me with the questions in your letter from yesterday. You’ve correctly understood the essence of what I wrote last time. I’m glad you recognize this too. Not many people can claim such tolerance. I would be fooling myself if I thought my perspective was that of a practical doctor. Above all, I am a scientist; that naturally gives me a different view on many issues. In my last letter, I didn’t consider the doctor’s practical needs, mainly to show you the reasons why we might decide to move away from hypnotic therapy. To address the first concern right away, let me clarify that I didn’t abandon hypnotism to dodge the core motives of the human psyche, but rather because I wanted to confront them directly and openly. Once I understood the forces at play in hypnotism, I stopped using it to eliminate all the indirect benefits of that method. As we psychoanalysts regretfully see every day—and our patients do too—we do not work with the "transference to the doctor,"[180] but against it and in spite of it. We cannot build upon the faith of the patient, but on his criticism. That’s how much I wanted to say at the beginning regarding this sensitive issue.
As your letter shows, we are at one in regard to the theoretical aspect of treatment by suggestion. So we can now apply ourselves to the further task of coming to mutual understanding about the practical question.
As your letter indicates, we agree on the theoretical side of treatment through suggestion. Now we can focus on the next task of reaching a mutual understanding on the practical question.
Your remarks on the physician's dilemma—whether to be[249] magician or scientist—bring us to the heart of the discussion. I strive to be no fanatic—although there are not a few who reproach me with fanaticism. I contend not for the application of the psychoanalytic method solely and at all costs, but for the recognition of every method of investigation and treatment. I was a medical practitioner quite long enough to realise that practice obeys, and should obey, other laws than does the search after truth. One might almost say practice must first and foremost submit to the laws of opportunism. The scientist does great injustice to the practitioner if he reproaches him for not using the "one true" scientific method. As I said to you in my last letter: "A truth is a truth, when it works." But on the other hand, the practitioner must not reproach the scientist if in his search for truth and for newer and better methods, he makes trial of unusual ways. After all, it is not the practitioner but the investigator, and the latter's patient, who will have to bear any injury that may arise. The practitioner must certainly use those methods which he knows how to use to greatest advantage, and which give him the best relative results. My tolerance, indeed, extends, as you see, even to Christian Science. But I deem it most uncalled for that Frank, a practising doctor, should depreciate research in which he cannot participate, and particularly the very line of research to which he owes his own method. It is surely time to cease this running down of every new idea. No one asks Frank and all whom he represents to become psychoanalysts; we grant them the right to their existence, why should they always seek to cut ours short?
Your comments about the doctor's dilemma—whether to be[249] a magician or a scientist—get to the core of the conversation. I aim to be no extremist—though many accuse me of being one. I'm not arguing for the exclusive use of the psychoanalytic method at any cost, but for recognizing every method of investigation and treatment. I practiced medicine long enough to understand that practice follows—and should follow—different rules than the pursuit of truth. One might say that practice must primarily adhere to the laws of pragmatism. A scientist does a disservice to the practitioner if he criticizes him for not using the "one true" scientific method. As I mentioned in my last letter: "A truth is a truth when it works." However, the practitioner shouldn't criticize the scientist if, in his quest for truth and better methods, he explores unconventional approaches. Ultimately, it's not the practitioner but the researcher—and their patient—who will bear any consequences that result. The practitioner should definitely use those methods he knows how to apply most effectively and that yield the best relative results. My tolerance, as you can see, even extends to Christian Science. But I find it completely unnecessary for Frank, a practicing doctor, to undermine research in which he has no part, especially the very line of research that has shaped his own practice. It’s definitely time to stop dismissing every new idea. No one is asking Frank and those he represents to become psychoanalysts; we respect their right to exist, so why should they always try to undermine ours?
As my own "cures" show you, I do not doubt the effect of suggestion. Only I had the idea that I could perhaps discover something still better. This hope has been amply justified. Not for ever shall it be said—
As my own "cures" show you, I don't doubt the power of suggestion. I just thought I might find something even better. This hope has been more than validated. It won't be said forever—
I confess frankly were I doing your work I should often be in difficulties if I relied only on psychoanalysis. I can scarcely[250] imagine a general practice, especially in a sanatorium, with no other means than psychoanalysis. At Dr. Bircher's sanatorium in Zürich the principle of psychoanalysis is adopted completely by several of the assistants, but a whole series of other important educative influences are also brought to bear upon the patients, without which matters would probably go very badly. In my own purely psychoanalytic practice I have often regretted that I could not avail myself of the other methods of re-education that are naturally at hand in an institution—this, of course, only in special cases where one is dealing with extremely uncontrolled, uneducated persons. Which of us has shown any disposition to assert that we have discovered a panacea? There are cases in which psychoanalysis operates less effectively than any other known method. But who has ever claimed psychoanalysis should be employed in every sort of case, and on every occasion? Only a fanatic could maintain such a view. Patients for whom psychoanalysis is suitable have to be selected. I unhesitatingly send cases I think unsuitable to other doctors. As a matter of fact this does not happen often, because patients have a way of sorting themselves out. Those who go to an analyst usually know quite well why they go to him and not to some one else. However, there are very many neurotics well suited for psychoanalysis. In these matters every scheme must be looked at in due perspective. It is never quite wise to try to batter down a stone wall with your head. Whether simple hypnotism, the cathartic treatment, or psychoanalysis shall be used, must be determined by the conditions of the case and the preference of the particular doctor. Every doctor will obtain the best results with the instrument he knows best.
I honestly admit that if I were in your position, I would often run into problems if I relied solely on psychoanalysis. I can barely imagine a general practice, especially in a sanatorium, relying only on psychoanalysis. At Dr. Bircher's sanatorium in Zürich, several of the assistants fully adopt the principle of psychoanalysis, but there are also many other important educational influences applied to the patients, without which things would likely go very poorly. In my own strictly psychoanalytic practice, I've often wished I could use other methods of re-education that are naturally available in an institution—this applies especially to cases involving very uncontrolled, uneducated individuals. Who among us has ever claimed to have found a cure-all? There are situations where psychoanalysis works less effectively than any other known method. But who has ever said psychoanalysis should be used for every type of case and on every occasion? Only a fanatic could hold that belief. Patients suitable for psychoanalysis need to be carefully chosen. I have no hesitation in referring cases I believe are unsuitable to other doctors. Actually, this doesn't happen often because patients tend to self-select. Those who seek out an analyst generally know very well why they choose that particular person over someone else. Nevertheless, there are many neuroses that are well suited for psychoanalysis. In these matters, every approach needs to be viewed in context. It's never particularly wise to try to break down a stone wall with your head. Whether to use simple hypnotism, cathartic treatment, or psychoanalysis should be determined by the specifics of the case and the preference of the particular doctor. Every doctor will achieve the best results with the technique they know best.
But, barring exceptions, I must say definitely that for me, and for my patients also, psychoanalysis proves itself better than any other method. This is not merely a matter of feeling; from manifold experiences I know many cases can indeed be cured by psychoanalysis which are refractory to all other methods of treatment. I have many colleagues whose[251] experience is the same, even men engaged exclusively in practice. It is scarcely to be supposed that a method altogether contemptible would meet with so much support.
But, with a few exceptions, I definitely have to say that for me, and for my patients too, psychoanalysis works better than any other method. This isn’t just a matter of opinion; based on my extensive experience, I know that many cases can actually be treated with psychoanalysis that don’t respond to any other forms of treatment. I have many colleagues whose[251] experiences are the same, including those who focus solely on practice. It's hard to believe that a method that was completely worthless would receive so much support.
When once psychoanalysis has been applied in a suitable case, it is imperative that rational solutions of the conflicts should be found. The objection is at once advanced that many conflicts are intrinsically incapable of solution. That view is sometimes taken because only an external solution is thought of—and that, at bottom, is no real solution at all. If a man cannot get on with his wife he naturally thinks the conflict would be solved if he were to marry some one else. If such marriages are examined they are seen to be no solution whatsoever. The old Adam enters upon the new marriage and bungles it just as badly as he did the earlier one. A real solution comes only from within, and only then because the patient has been brought to a new standpoint.
Once psychoanalysis has been used in a suitable case, it is essential that rational solutions to the conflicts be found. Some argue that many conflicts are fundamentally unsolvable. This perspective often arises because only an external solution is considered—and that isn’t a real solution at all. If a man struggles to get along with his wife, he might naturally think the conflict would be resolved if he married someone else. However, if we look at these new marriages, they turn out to be no solution whatsoever. The same issues resurface in the new marriage just as poorly as in the previous one. A true solution comes only from within, and only when the patient has reached a new perspective.
Where an external solution is possible no psychoanalysis is necessary; in seeking an internal solution we encounter the peculiar virtues of psychoanalysis. The conflict between "love and duty" must be solved upon that particular plane of character where "love and duty" are no longer in opposition, for indeed they really are not so. The familiar conflict between "instinct and conventional morality" must be solved in such a way that both factors are taken satisfactorily into account, and this is only possible through a change of character. This change psychoanalysis can bring about. In such cases external solutions are worse than none at all. Naturally the particular situation dictates which road the doctor must ultimately follow, and what is then his duty. I regard the conscience-searching question of the doctor's remaining true to his scientific convictions as rather unimportant in comparison with the incomparably weightier question as to how he can best help his patient. The doctor must, on occasion, be able to play the augur. Mundus vult decipi—but the cure is no deception. It is true that there is a conflict between ideal conviction and concrete possibility. But we should ill prepare the ground for the seed of the future, were we to forget the tasks of the present, and sought only to[252] cultivate ideals. That is but idle dreaming. Do not forget that Kepler cast horoscopes for money, and that countless artists have been condemned to work for wages.
Where an external solution is possible, no psychoanalysis is needed; when looking for an internal solution, we discover the unique strengths of psychoanalysis. The conflict between "love and duty" must be resolved at the level of character where "love and duty" aren't really opposed, because they truly aren't. The common conflict between "instinct and conventional morality" needs to be addressed in a way that considers both aspects satisfactorily, and this can only happen through a change of character. Psychoanalysis can facilitate that change. In these situations, external solutions are worse than none at all. Naturally, the specific situation determines which path the doctor must take and what his duty is. I see the soul-searching dilemma of whether the doctor stays true to his scientific beliefs as relatively unimportant compared to the far more critical question of how he can best help his patient. The doctor must, at times, be able to act like a prophet. Mundus vult decipi—but the cure is not a deception. It is true that there is a conflict between ideal belief and real possibility. But we would poorly prepare the ground for the seed of the future if we forgot the tasks of the present and aimed only to[252]cultivate ideals. That is merely wishful thinking. Do not forget that Kepler cast horoscopes for money, and that many artists have had to work for a living.
V.
From Dr. Loÿ.
From Dr. Loy.
9th February, 1913.
February 9, 1913.
The selfsame passion for truth possesses us both when we think of pure research, and the same desire to cure when we are considering therapy. For the scientist, as for the doctor, we desire the fullest freedom in all directions, fullest freedom to select and use the methods which promise the best fulfilment of their ends at any moment. Here we are at one; but there remains a postulate we must establish to the satisfaction of others if we want recognition for our views.
The same passion for truth drives us both when we think about pure research, and the same desire to heal when we consider therapy. For both the scientist and the doctor, we seek complete freedom in every aspect, the freedom to choose and use the methods that seem most likely to achieve our goals at any given moment. Here we are united; however, we still need to establish a principle that others find acceptable if we want our views to be recognized.
First and foremost there is a question that must be answered, an old question asked already in the Gospels: What is Truth? I think clear definitions of fundamental ideas are most necessary. How shall we contrive a working definition of the conception "Truth"? Perhaps an allegory may help us.
First and foremost, there’s a question we need to answer, an old question already posed in the Gospels: What is Truth? I believe that clear definitions of basic concepts are essential. How can we come up with a practical definition of the concept “Truth”? Maybe an allegory can assist us.
Imagine a gigantic prism extending in front of the sun, so that its rays are broken up, but suppose man entirely ignorant of this fact. I exclude the invisible, chemical and ultra-violet rays. Men who live in a blue-lit region will say: "The sun sends forth blue light only." They are right and yet they are wrong: from their standpoint they are capable of perceiving only a fragment of truth. And so too with the inhabitants of the red, yellow, and in-between regions. And they will all scourge and slay one another to force their belief in their fragment upon the others—till, grown wiser through travelling in each others' regions, they come to the harmonious agreement that the sun sends out light of varying colours. That comprehends more truth, but it is not yet the Truth. Only when the giant lens shall have recombined the split-up rays, and when the invisible, chemical and heat rays have given proof of their own specific effects, will a view more[253] in accordance with the facts be able to arise, and men will perceive that the sun emits white light which is split up by the prism into differing rays with different peculiarities, which rays can be recombined by the lens into one mass of white light.
Imagine a huge prism standing in front of the sun, breaking up its rays, but suppose people are completely unaware of this. I’m not talking about the invisible, chemical, and ultraviolet rays. People living in a blue-lit area might say, “The sun only emits blue light.” They’re right, but they’re also wrong: from their perspective, they can only perceive a fragment of the truth. The same goes for those living in red, yellow, and other color regions. They will all fight and argue to impose their belief in their fragment on others—until, after exploring each other’s areas, they reach a harmonious understanding that the sun emits light in various colors. That captures more truth, but it still isn’t the Truth. Only when the giant lens has recombined the split rays, and the invisible, chemical, and heat rays have demonstrated their specific effects, will a perspective more[253] aligned with the facts emerge, and people will recognize that the sun emits white light, which is split by the prism into different rays with distinct characteristics, and these rays can be recombined by the lens into one mass of white light.
This example shows sufficiently well that the road to Truth leads through far-reaching and comparative observations, the results of which must be controlled by the help of freely chosen experiments, until well-grounded hypotheses and theories can be put forward; but these hypotheses and theories will fall to the ground as soon as a single new observation or experiment contradicts them.
This example clearly demonstrates that the path to Truth involves extensive and comparative observations, the outcomes of which need to be verified through freely chosen experiments, until well-supported hypotheses and theories can be proposed; however, these hypotheses and theories will be invalidated as soon as a single new observation or experiment contradicts them.
The way is difficult, and in the end all man ever attains to is relative truth. But such relative truth suffices for the time being, if it serves to explain the most important actual concatenations of the past, to light up present problems, to predict those of the future, so that we are then in a position to achieve adaptation through our knowledge. But absolute truth could be accessible only to omniscience, aware of all possible concatenations and combinations; that is not possible, for the concatenations and their combinations are infinite. Accordingly, we shall never know more than an approximate truth. Should new relationships be discovered, new combinations built up, then the picture changes, and with it the entire possibilities in knowledge and power. To what revolutions in daily life does not every new scientific discovery lead: how absurdly little was the beginning of our first ideas of electricity, how inconceivably great the results! Time and again it is necessary to repeat this commonplace, because one sees how life is always made bitter for the innovators in every scientific field, and now is it being made especially so for the disciples of the psychoanalytic school. Of course, every one admits the truth of this platitude so long as it is a matter of "academic" discussion, but only so long; just as soon as a concrete case has to be considered, sympathies and antipathies rush into the foreground and darken judgment. And therefore the scientist must fight tirelessly, appealing to logic and honour, for freedom of research in every field, and[254] must not permit authority, of no matter what political or religious tinge, to advance reasons of opportunism to destroy or restrict this freedom; opportunist reasons may be and are in place elsewhere, not here. Finally we must completely disavow that maxim of the Middle Ages: "Philosophia ancilla Theologiæ," and no less, too, the war-cries of the university class-rooms with their partisanship of one or other religious or political party. All fanaticism is the enemy of science, which must above all things be independent.
The path is challenging, and ultimately, all we can achieve is relative truth. But this relative truth is enough for now, as long as it helps us understand the crucial events of the past, sheds light on current issues, and forecasts future challenges. This way, we can adapt through our knowledge. Yet, absolute truth is only within the reach of an all-knowing being, aware of every possible connection and combination; that's not feasible since those connections and combinations are infinite. Thus, we'll never know more than an approximate truth. When new relationships are discovered and new combinations formed, everything changes, along with our knowledge and power. Every new scientific breakthrough leads to revolutions in daily life: how trivial our initial ideas about electricity were compared to the immense outcomes! We often have to reiterate this simple truth because we see how innovators in every scientific domain suffer, and now it's especially hard for those in the psychoanalytic school. Certainly, everyone acknowledges this cliché in "academic" discussions, but only until a specific case arises; then personal biases and emotions cloud judgment. Consequently, scientists must tirelessly advocate for logical and ethical freedom in research in every area, and[254] should not allow any authority, no matter its political or religious background, to promote opportunism as reasons to undermine or limit this freedom; opportunistic arguments belong elsewhere, not here. Ultimately, we must reject the medieval saying: "Philosophia ancilla Theologiæ," as well as the slogans of university classrooms that show loyalty to any particular religious or political faction. All fanaticism opposes science, which must, above all, be independent.
And when we turn from the search for Truth back once more to therapeutics, we see immediately that here too we are in agreement. In practice expediency must rule: the doctor from the yellow region must adapt himself to the sick in the yellow region, as must the doctor in the blue region, to his patients; both have the same object in view. And the doctor who lives in the white light of the sun must take into consideration the past experiences of his patients from the yellow or blue region, in spite of, or perhaps rather because of, his own wider knowledge. In such cases the way to healing will be long and difficult, may indeed lead more easily into a cul-de-sac, than in cases where he has to do with patients who, like himself, have already come to a knowledge of the white sunlight, or, one might say, when his patient-material has "already sorted itself out." With such sorted-out material the psychoanalyst can employ psychoanalysis exclusively; and may deem himself happy in that he need not "play the augur." Now, what are these psychoanalytic methods? If I understand you aright, from beginning to end it is a question of dealing directly and openly with the basic forces of the human soul, so that the analysed person, be he sick or sound or in some stage between—for health and sickness flow over by imperceptible degrees into one another—shall gradually have his eyes opened to the drama that is being acted within him. He has to come to an understanding of the development of the hostile automatisms of his personality, and by means of this understanding he must gradually learn to free himself from them; he must learn, too, how to[255] employ and strengthen the favourable automatisms. He must learn to make his self-knowledge real, and of practical use, to control his soul's workings so that a balance may be established between the spheres of emotion and reason. And what share in all this has the physician's suggestion? I can scarcely believe that suggestion can be altogether avoided till the patient feels himself really free. Such freedom, it goes without saying, is the main thing to strive for, and it must be active. The sick man who simply obeys a suggestion, obeys it only just so long as the "transference to the doctor" remains potent.
And when we shift our focus from the search for Truth back to treatments, it’s clear that we agree here as well. In practice, practicality must take precedence: the doctor from the yellow area must adapt to the patients in that region, just as the doctor in the blue area must do the same; both have the same goal in mind. The doctor who operates in the bright light of the sun must consider the past experiences of his patients from the yellow or blue areas, despite, or perhaps because of, his own broader knowledge. In such situations, the path to healing will be long and challenging, and may even lead more easily into a cul-de-sac, rather than when dealing with patients who, like him, have already experienced the bright sunlight, or, one might say, when his patient-base has "already sorted itself out." With such sorted-out cases, the psychoanalyst can use psychoanalysis exclusively and can feel fortunate that he doesn’t need to "play the augur." Now, what are these psychoanalytic methods? If I understand you correctly, from start to finish, it’s about engaging directly and openly with the basic forces of the human soul, so that the person being analyzed, whether sick or healthy or somewhere in between—since health and sickness blend into one another—gradually becomes aware of the drama unfolding within him. He needs to understand the development of the conflicting automatisms of his personality, and through this understanding, he must learn to free himself from them; he must also learn how to[255] utilize and strengthen the positive automatisms. He must learn to make his self-awareness genuine and practical, to manage the workings of his soul so that a balance can be achieved between emotions and reason. And what role does the physician's suggestion play in all of this? I can hardly believe that suggestion can be entirely avoided until the patient genuinely feels free. This kind of freedom, it goes without saying, is the ultimate goal to pursue, and it must be active. The sick person who simply complies with a suggestion does so only as long as the "transference to the doctor" remains strong.
But if he wishes to be able to adjust himself to all circumstances he must have fortified himself "from within." He should no longer need the crutches of faith, but be capable of encountering all theoretical and practical problems squarely, and of solving them by himself. That is surely your view? Or have I not understood correctly?
But if he wants to be able to adapt to any situation, he must strengthen himself "from within." He shouldn't rely on the crutches of faith anymore but should be able to face all theoretical and practical issues directly and solve them on his own. Is that your perspective? Or did I not understand correctly?
I next ask, must not every single case be treated differently, of course within the limits of the psychoanalytic method? For if every case is a case by itself, it must indeed demand individual treatment.
I then ask, shouldn't every single case be treated differently, of course within the limits of the psychoanalytic method? Because if every case is unique, it definitely requires individual treatment.
"Il n'y a pas de maladies, il n'y a que des malades," said a French doctor whose name escapes me. But on broad lines, what course, from a technical point of view, does analysis take, and what deviations occur most frequently? That I would gladly learn from you. I take for granted that all "augurs' tricks," darkened rooms, masquerading, chloroform, are out of the question.
"There's no such thing as illnesses, only sick people," said a French doctor whose name I can't remember. But in general, what path does analysis take from a technical standpoint, and what common deviations happen? I would love to learn about that from you. I assume that all "augurs' tricks," darkened rooms, masquerades, and chloroform are not on the table.
Psychoanalysis—purged so far as is humanly possible from suggestive influence—appears to have an essential difference from Dubois' psychotherapy. With Dubois, from the beginning conversation about the past is forbidden, and "the moral reasons for recovery" placed in the forefront; whilst psychoanalysis uses the subconscious material from the patient's past as well as present, for present self-understanding. Another difference lies in the conception of morality: morals are above all "relative." But what essential forms shall they assume at those moments when one can hardly avoid[256] suggestion? You will say, the occasion must decide. Agreed, as regards older people, or adults, who have to live in an unenlightened milieu. But if one is dealing with children, the seed of the future, is it not a sacred duty to enlighten them as to the shaky foundations of the so-called "moral" conceptions of the past, which have only a dogmatic basis; is it not a duty to educate them into full freedom by courageously unveiling Truth? I ask this not so much with regard to the analysing doctor as to the teacher. May not the creation of free schools be looked for as one task for the psychoanalyst?
Psychoanalysis—stripped as much as possible of suggestive influence—seems to fundamentally differ from Dubois' psychotherapy. With Dubois, discussing the past is off-limits from the start, and "the moral reasons for recovery" take center stage; meanwhile, psychoanalysis utilizes the subconscious material from the patient's past as well as their present for current self-understanding. Another difference lies in how morality is viewed: morals are primarily "relative." But what essential forms should they take at those moments when suggestion is almost unavoidable? You might say the situation should determine that. I agree, especially concerning older individuals or adults living in an unenlightened milieu. However, when it comes to children, the seeds of the future, isn't it a sacred duty to enlighten them about the shaky foundations of the so-called "moral" beliefs of the past, which are only based on dogma? Isn't it a responsibility to guide them toward true freedom by bravely revealing the Truth? I pose this question not so much regarding the analyzing doctor but in relation to the teacher. Shouldn't the establishment of free schools be viewed as a task for the psychoanalyst?
VI.
From Dr. Jung.
From Dr. Jung.
11th February, 1913.
February 11, 1913.
The idea of the relativity of "Truth" has been current for ages, but whether true or not, it does not stand in the way of anything save the beliefs of dogma and authority.
The concept of the relativity of "Truth" has been around for a long time, but whether it's true or not, it doesn't interfere with anything except the beliefs of dogma and authority.
You ask me, or indeed tell me—what psychoanalysis is. Before considering your views, permit me first to try and mark out the territory and definition of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis is primarily just a method—but a method complying with all the rigorous demands insisted upon to-day by the conception "method." Let it be made plain at once that psychoanalysis is not an anamnesis, as those who know everything without learning are pleased to believe. It is essentially a method for the exploration of the unconscious associations, into which no question of the conscious self enters. Again, it is not a kind of examination of the nature of an intelligence test, though this mistake is common in certain circles. It is no cathartic method, abreacting real and phantastic "traumata," with or without hypnosis. Psychoanalysis is a method which makes possible the analytic reduction of the psychic content to its simplest expression, and the discovery of the line of least resistance in the development of a harmonious personality. In neurosis, straightforward direction of life's energies is lacking, because opposing tendencies traverse and[257] hinder psychological adaptation. Psychoanalysis, so far as our present knowledge of it goes, thus appears to be simply a rational nerve-therapy.
You ask me, or even tell me—what psychoanalysis is. Before looking into your thoughts, let me first outline what psychoanalysis is all about. Psychoanalysis is mainly just a method—but a method that meets all the strict standards expected today by what we call "method." To be clear, psychoanalysis is not an anamnesis, despite what those who think they know everything might assume. It's primarily a method for exploring unconscious associations, which doesn't involve any conscious self-questions. Additionally, it is not a kind of examination like an intelligence test, even though some people mistakenly think that. It is not a cathartic method, releasing real and imaginary "traumas," with or without hypnosis. Psychoanalysis is a method that allows for the analytical reduction of mental content to its simplest form and the identification of the easiest path toward developing a balanced personality. In neurosis, a clear direction for life's energies is missing, as conflicting tendencies disrupt and[257] obstruct psychological adjustment. Psychoanalysis, as we currently understand it, thus seems to be just a rational nerve therapy.
For the technical application of psychoanalysis no programme can be formulated. There are only general principles, and, for the individual case, working rules. (Here let me refer you to Freud's work in volume I. of the Internationale Zeitschrift für Ärztliche Psychoanalyse.) My one working rule is to conduct the analysis as a perfectly ordinary, sensible conversation, and to avoid all appearance of medical magic.
For the practical use of psychoanalysis, no specific program can be outlined. There are only broad principles and, for each individual situation, guidelines. (Here, I’d like to point you to Freud's work in volume I of the International Journal of Medical Psychoanalysis.) My main guideline is to treat the analysis as a completely normal, sensible conversation and to steer clear of any semblance of medical mystique.
The leading principle of the psychoanalytic technique is to analyse the psychic material which offers itself then and there. Every interference on the part of the analyst, with the object of inducing the analysis to follow some systematic course, is a gross mistake in technique. So-called chance is the law and the order of psychoanalysis.
The main idea of the psychoanalytic technique is to analyze the psychic material that comes up in the moment. Any interference from the analyst aimed at making the analysis follow a specific path is a serious mistake in technique. What we call chance is actually the law and order of psychoanalysis.
Naturally in the beginning of the analysis the anamnesis and the diagnosis come first. The subsequent analytic process develops quite differently in every case. To give rules is well-nigh impossible. All one can say is that very frequently, quite at the beginning, a series of resistances have to be overcome, resistances against both method and man. Patients having no idea of psychoanalysis must first be given some understanding of the method. In those who already know something of it there are very often many misconceptions to set right, and frequently one has to deal also with many reproaches cast by scientific criticism. In either case the misconceptions rest upon arbitrary interpretations, superficiality, or complete ignorance of the facts.
Naturally, at the start of the analysis, the anamnesis and diagnosis come first. The following analytic process varies significantly in each case. It’s almost impossible to set rules. All that can be said is that very often, right at the beginning, a series of resistances need to be tackled—resistances against both the method and the therapist. Patients who know nothing about psychoanalysis must first be given some understanding of the approach. For those who already have some knowledge, there are often many misunderstandings to correct, and frequently one has to address various critiques from the scientific community. In both situations, the misconceptions stem from arbitrary interpretations, superficiality, or complete ignorance of the facts.
If the patient is himself a doctor his special knowledge may prove extremely tiresome. To intelligent colleagues it is best to give a complete theoretic exposition. With foolish and limited persons you begin quietly with analysis. In the unconscious of such folk there is a confederate that never refuses help. From the analysis of the very earliest dreams the emptiness of the criticism is obvious; and ultimately of the whole beautiful edifice of supposedly scientific scepticism[258] nothing remains, save a little heap of personal vanity. I have had amusing experiences here.
If the patient is a doctor themselves, their specialized knowledge can be quite exhausting. With insightful colleagues, it's best to provide a thorough theoretical explanation. When dealing with foolish or narrow-minded individuals, you should start gently with analysis. In their unconscious mind, there’s a part that always offers support. From analyzing their earliest dreams, the emptiness of their criticism becomes clear; in the end, all that's left of the supposedly scientific skepticism is just a small pile of personal pride. I've had some amusing experiences with this.
It is best to let the patient talk freely and to confine oneself to pointing out connexions here and there. When the conscious material is exhausted we come to the dreams, which furnish us with the subliminal material. If people have no dreams, as they allege, or if they forget them, there is usually still some conscious material that ought to be produced and discussed, but is kept back owing to resistances. When the conscious is emptied then come the dreams, which are indeed, as you know, the chief material of the analysis.
It’s best to let the patient speak freely and to just highlight connections when needed. Once the conscious material is fully explored, we move to the dreams, which provide us with the subconscious material. If people claim they don’t dream or can’t remember their dreams, there’s usually still some conscious material that needs to be brought up and discussed but is being held back due to resistance. Once the conscious mind is cleared, the dreams emerge, which are, as you know, the main focus of the analysis.
How the "Analysis" is to be made and what is to be said to patients depends, firstly, upon the material to be dealt with; secondly, on the doctor's skill; and, thirdly, on the patient's capacity. I must insist that no one ought to undertake analysis except on the basis of a sound knowledge of the subject; that necessitates an intimate understanding of the existing literature. Without this, the work may be bungled.
How the "Analysis" is performed and what is communicated to patients depends, first on the material being addressed; second on the doctor's expertise; and third on the patient's ability to understand. I must emphasize that no one should attempt analysis without a solid understanding of the subject; this requires a deep knowledge of the existing literature. Without this, the work may be mishandled.
I do not know what else to tell you beforehand. I must wait for further questions. In regard to questions of morality and education let me say that these belong to the later stages of the analysis, wherein they find—or should find—solutions for themselves. You cannot compile recipes out of psychoanalysis.
I don't know what else to say right now. I'll have to wait for more questions. When it comes to moral and educational issues, these are part of the later stages of the analysis, where they can—ideally—resolve themselves. You can't create a formula from psychoanalysis.
VII
From Dr. Loÿ.
From Dr. Loy.
10th February, 1913.
February 10, 1913.
You write that a solid knowledge of the psychoanalytic literature is necessary for initiation into psychoanalysis. I should agree, but with a certain reservation: the more one reads, the more one notices how many contradictions there are among the different writers, and less and less does one know—until one has had sufficient personal experience—to which view to give adherence, since quite frequently assertions are made without any proof. For example, I had thought (strengthened in the view by my own experience of suggestion-therapy) that the transference to the doctor might be an[259] essential condition in the patient's cure. But you write: "We psychoanalysts do not build upon the patient's faith, rather do we have to deal with his criticism." And Stekel writes, on the other hand (Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, 3rd year, vol. IV., p. 176, "Ausgänge der psychoanalytischen Kuren"): "Love for the doctor can become a power essential to recovery. Neurotics never get well for love of themselves. They recover out of love for the doctor. They give him that pleasure." Here again, surely, stress is laid on the power of suggestion? And yet Stekel too thinks he is a psychoanalyst pure and simple. On the other hand, you say in your letter of Jan. 20th that "the doctor's personality is one of the main factors in the cure." Should not this expression be translated: "When the doctor inspires respect in the patient and is worthy of his love, the patient will gladly follow his example and endeavour to recover from his neurosis and fulfil his human duties in the widest sense"? I think one can only emerge from all this uncertainty by means of much personal experience, which will indicate also which way best suits one's own personality and brings the greatest therapeutic success. This is a further reason for undergoing analysis oneself, to recognise fully what one is. I was decidedly in agreement with your definition of psychoanalysis in its first (negative) portion: psychoanalysis is neither an anamnesis nor a method of examination after the fashion of a test for intelligence, nor yet a psychocatharsis. In your second (positive) part, however, your definition: "Psychoanalysis is a method of discovering the line of least resistance to the harmonious development of the whole personality," seems to me valid for the patient's inertia, but not for the releasing of the sublimated libido with a view to the new direction of life. You consider that the neurosis causes a lack of singleness of aim in life, because opposing tendencies hinder psychic adaptation. True, but will not this psychic adaptation eventuate quite differently according as the patient, when well, directs his life either to the avoidance of pain merely (line of least resistance) or to the achievement of the greatest pleasure?—In the first case he would be more[260] passive, he would merely reconcile himself "to the emptiness of reality" (Stekel, loc. cit., p. 187). In the second he would be "filled with enthusiasm" for something or other or some person or other. But what will determine this choice of his as to whether he will be passive rather than active in his "second life"? In your view, will the determining factor manifest itself spontaneously in the course of the analysis, and must the doctor carefully avoid swaying the balance to one side or other by his influence? Or must he, if he does not renounce the right to canalise the patient's libido in some particular direction, renounce the right to be called a psychoanalyst, and is he to be regarded as "moderate" or altogether as "wild"?[181] (Cf. Furtmüller, "Wandlungen in der Freudschen Schule," Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, vols. IV., V., 3rd year, p. 191.) But I think you have already answered this question, since in your last letter you write: "Every interference on the part of the analyst is a gross mistake in technique. So-called chance is the law and the order of psychoanalysis." But, torn from its context, perhaps this does not quite give your whole meaning. With regard to detailed explanation of the psychoanalytic method before the beginning of the analysis, I think you agree with Freud and Stekel: give too little rather than too much. For the knowledge instilled into a patient remains more or less half-knowledge, and half-knowledge engenders "the desire to know better" (than the analyst), which only impedes progress. So, after brief explanation, first "let the patient talk," then and there point out connexions, then after the exhaustion of the conscious material, take dreams.
You write that a solid understanding of psychoanalytic literature is essential for getting into psychoanalysis. I agree, but with some reservations: the more you read, the more you notice the many contradictions between different authors, and before gaining enough personal experience, it becomes increasingly unclear which viewpoint to support, as often claims are made without proof. For instance, I believed (supported by my own experience with suggestion therapy) that the transference to the doctor might be a crucial condition for the patient's recovery. But you state, "We psychoanalysts do not rely on the patient's faith; we must deal with their criticism." On the other hand, Stekel claims in the Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, 3rd year, vol. IV, p. 176, "Outcomes of Psychoanalytical Treatments": "Love for the doctor can be a vital force for recovery. Neurotics don’t heal out of self-love. They recover out of love for the doctor. They derive pleasure from this." Here, once again, the emphasis seems to be on the power of suggestion? Yet Stekel also considers himself a true psychoanalyst. Meanwhile, you mention in your letter from January 20th that "the doctor's personality is one of the main factors in the cure." Shouldn’t that mean: "When the doctor earns the patient's respect and is worthy of their love, the patient will willingly follow their example and strive to recover from their neurosis and fulfill their human responsibilities broadly"? I believe we can only navigate this uncertainty through extensive personal experience, which will also reveal the best approach for one's personality and yield the greatest therapeutic success. This is another reason to go through personal analysis, to fully understand oneself. I was definitely on board with your definition of psychoanalysis in its initial (negative) part: psychoanalysis is neither an anamnesis nor a method of examination like an intelligence test, nor a psychocatharsis. However, in your second (positive) part, your definition: "Psychoanalysis is a method of discovering the line of least resistance to the harmonious development of the whole personality," seems valid for the patient's inertia but not for releasing sublimated libido to facilitate a new life direction. You argue that neurosis causes a lack of focus in life since conflicting tendencies obstruct psychic adaptation. True, but wouldn’t this psychic adaptation turn out quite differently depending on whether the patient, once well, directs their life merely to avoid pain (line of least resistance) or to seek the greatest pleasure? In the first scenario, they would be more passive, merely reconciling themselves "to the emptiness of reality" (Stekel, loc. cit., p. 187). In the second, they'd be "filled with enthusiasm" for something or someone. But what will determine their choice regarding whether they will be passive or active in their "second life"? In your view, will the determining factor emerge naturally during the analysis, and must the doctor carefully avoid influencing this balance? Or, if they refuse to relinquish the right to direct the patient's libido in a specific way, must they also give up the right to be called a psychoanalyst, and will they then be seen as "moderate" or entirely "wild"?[181] (Cf. Furtmüller, "Changes in the Freudian School," Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, vols. IV, V, 3rd year, p. 191.) But I think you've already addressed this in your last letter when you said: "Any interference from the analyst is a significant error in technique. What we call chance is the law and order of psychoanalysis." However, taken out of context, this might not fully capture your intention. Regarding a thorough explanation of the psychoanalytic method before starting analysis, I believe you concur with Freud and Stekel: provide less rather than more. The knowledge instilled in a patient remains mostly half-knowledge, and half-knowledge breeds "the desire to know better" (than the analyst), which only hinders progress. So, after a brief explanation, first "let the patient talk," then point out connections as needed, and once the conscious material is exhausted, delve into dreams.
But there another difficulty confronts me which I have already pointed out in our talks: you find the patient adapting himself to the doctor's tone, language, jargon, whether from conscious imitation, transference, or even resistance, when he can fight the analyst with his own weapons; how then can you possibly prevent his beginning to produce all manner of phantasies as supposedly real[261] traumata of early childhood, and dreams supposedly spontaneous which are in reality, though not designedly, directly or indirectly suggested? I then told you that Forel ("Der Hypnotismus") made his patients dream just what he wanted, and I have myself easily repeated the experiment. But if the analyst desires to suggest nothing, should he remain silent for the most part and let the patient speak—except that in interpreting dreams he may lay before the patient his own interpretation?
But there's another difficulty I'm facing that I’ve already mentioned in our discussions: you notice how the patient starts to adapt to the doctor's tone, language, and jargon, whether it's from conscious imitation, transference, or even resistance. When he can challenge the analyst with his own tools, how can you possibly stop him from creating various fantasies as supposedly real [261] traumas from early childhood, and dreams that seem spontaneous but are actually, albeit unintentionally, directly or indirectly suggested? I then told you that Forel ("Der Hypnotismus") had his patients dream exactly what he wanted, and I've easily replicated the experiment myself. But if the analyst wants to suggest nothing, should he mostly stay silent and let the patient talk—except when interpreting dreams, where he might present his own interpretation?
VIII
From Dr. Jung.
From Dr. Jung.
18th February, 1913.
February 18, 1913.
I cannot but agree with your observation that confusion reigns in psychoanalytic literature. Just at this moment different points of view are developing in the theoretical conception of the analytic results; not to mention many individual deviations. Over against Freud's almost purely causal conception, there has developed, apparently in absolute contradiction, Adler's purely final view, but in reality the latter is an essential complement of Freud's theory. I hold rather to a middle course, taking into account both standpoints. That discord still reigns round the ultimate questions of psychoanalysis need not surprise us when we consider the difficulty. The problem of the therapeutic effect of psychoanalysis is bound up in particular with supremely difficult questions, so that it would indeed be astonishing if we had yet reached final certitude. Stekel's statement to which you refer is very characteristic. What he says about love for the doctor is obviously true, but it is a simple affirmation, and not a goal or plumb-line of the analytic therapy. If his statement were the goal, many cures, it is true, would be possible, but also many calamities might result which are avoidable. But the aim is so to educate the patient that he will get well for his own sake[262] and by reason of his own determination, rather than to procure his doctor some sort of advantage; though of course it would be absurd from the therapeutic standpoint not to allow the patient to get better because in doing so he does the doctor a good turn also. It suffices if the patient knows it. But we must not prescribe for him which path he should take to recovery. Naturally it seems to me (from the psychoanalytic standpoint) an inadmissible use of suggestive influence if the patient is compelled to get better out of love for the doctor. And indeed such compulsion may sometimes take bitter revenge. The "you must and shall be saved" is no more to be commended in nerve-therapy than in any other department of life. It contradicts the principle of analytic treatment, which shuns all coercion and desires to let everything grow up from within. I do not, as you know, object to influencing by use of suggestion in general, but merely to a doubtful motivation. If the doctor demands that his patient shall get well from love of himself, the patient may easily reckon on reciprocal services and will without doubt try to extort them. I can but utter a warning against any such method. A far stronger motive for recovery—also a far healthier and ethically more valuable one—consists in the patient's thorough insight into the real state of affairs, the recognition of how things are now and how they ought to be. The man of any sort of worth will then discern that he can hardly sit down at ease in the quagmire of his neurosis.
I can't help but agree with your point that there's a lot of confusion in psychoanalytic literature. Right now, various perspectives are emerging in the theoretical understanding of analytical results, not to mention many individual variations. In contrast to Freud's almost entirely causal approach, Adler has developed a completely final view, which seems to contradict Freud, but actually, it complements his theory. I tend to take a middle ground, considering both viewpoints. The ongoing debate around the fundamental questions of psychoanalysis isn't surprising when we think about how challenging they are. The question of psychoanalysis's therapeutic effect is especially tied to some very complex issues, so it would be quite surprising if we had reached definite conclusions yet. Stekel's statement that you mentioned is very telling. His point about love for the doctor is clearly true but is simply a statement, not a goal or guiding principle of analytic therapy. If that were the goal, while many cures could potentially happen, it could also lead to many disasters that could have been avoided. The real aim is to empower the patient to get better for their own sake and through their own resolve, rather than to benefit the doctor in some way; though, of course, it would be ridiculous from a therapeutic perspective to prevent a patient from improving just because it also benefits the doctor. It's enough if the patient is aware of this. However, we shouldn't dictate which path the patient should follow to recovery. From a psychoanalytic perspective, I find it unacceptable to use suggestive influence if a patient feels pressured to get better solely out of love for the doctor. Such pressure can sometimes lead to some serious consequences. The "you must get better" attitude is just as inappropriate in nerve therapy as it is in any other area of life. It goes against the principle of analytic treatment, which avoids any coercion and aims to let things develop from within. As you know, I don’t oppose the use of suggestion in general; I just have concerns about questionable motivations. If the doctor insists that the patient should recover out of love for them, the patient might expect reciprocal favors and will probably try to demand them. I can only caution against such a method. A much stronger, healthier, and ethically sound motivation for recovery is the patient's deep understanding of their situation, recognizing how things currently are and how they should be. A person of any worth will then realize that they can't comfortably remain stuck in their neurotic struggles.
With your rendering of what I said about the healing power of personality I cannot entirely agree. I wrote that the doctor's personality has a power for healing because the patient reads the doctor's personality: not that he produces a cure through love of the doctor. The doctor cannot prevent the patient's beginning to behave himself towards his conflicts just as the doctor himself behaves, for nothing is finer than a neurotic's intuition. But every strong transference serves this same purpose. If the doctor makes himself charming, he buys off from the patient a series of resistances which he should have overcome, and whose overcoming will certainly have to be gone through later on. Nothing is won[263] by this technique; at most the beginning of the analysis is made easy for the patient (though this is not quite without its use in certain cases). To be able to crawl through a barbed wire fence without some enticing end in view testifies to an ascetic strength of will which you can expect neither from the ordinary person nor from the neurotic. Even the Christian religion, whose moral demands certainly reached a great height, thought it no scorn to represent the near approach of the Kingdom of Heaven as goal and reward of earthly pain. In my view, the doctor may well speak of the rewards which follow the toils of analysis. But he must not depict himself or his friendship, in hints or promises, as reward, if he is not seriously determined to keep his word.
I can’t completely agree with your interpretation of what I said about the healing power of personality. I mentioned that a doctor’s personality has a healing effect because the patient perceives it—not because the patient feels affection for the doctor. The doctor can't stop the patient from reacting to their own struggles in the same way the doctor does. A neurotic's intuition is incredibly sharp. But every strong transference serves this same purpose. If the doctor is charming, they can momentarily bypass a series of resistances that the patient will ultimately have to face later. This approach doesn’t really achieve anything; it merely makes the start of the analysis easier for the patient (though this can be helpful in some cases). To get through a barbed wire fence without a clear goal shows a level of willpower that you can’t usually expect from an average person or a neurotic. Even the Christian religion, which has high moral standards, didn’t shy away from presenting the approaching Kingdom of Heaven as a reward for earthly suffering. In my opinion, the doctor can rightfully talk about the rewards that come after the hard work of analysis. However, he should not imply that his friendship or presence is a reward unless he genuinely intends to follow through on that.
In regard to your criticism of my outline-definition of the conception of psychoanalysis, it must be observed that the road over the steep mountain is the line of least resistance only when a ferocious bull waits for you in the pleasant valley-road. In other words, the line of least resistance is a compromise with all demands, and not with inertia alone. It is prejudice to think that the line of least resistance coincides with the path of inertia. (That's what we thought in the days when we dawdled over Latin exercises.) Inertia is only an immediate advantage and leads to consequences which produce the worst resistances; as a whole, it does not lie in the direction of least resistance. Life along the line of least resistance is not synonymous with a man's regardless pursuit of his own egoistic desires. He who lives thus soon painfully perceives that he is not moving along the line of least resistance, for he is also a social being, and not merely a bundle of egoistic instincts, as some people rather like to depict him. This is best seen among primitive men and herd-animals, who all have a richly developed social sense. Without it, indeed, the herd could not exist at all. Man as herd-animal has therefore by no manner of means to subject himself to laws enforced on him from without; he carries his social imperatives within himself, a priori, as an inborn necessity. As you see, I here put myself in decided opposition to certain views—I think quite unjustified—which[264] have been put forth here and there inside the psychoanalytic movement.
Regarding your criticism of my outline-definition of the concept of psychoanalysis, it's important to note that the path over the steep mountain is the easiest route only when a fierce bull awaits you on the pleasant valley road. In other words, the easiest path is a compromise with all demands, not just with inertia alone. It's a misconception to think that the easiest path aligns with inertia. (That's what we believed back when we procrastinated on Latin homework.) Inertia is just an immediate benefit and leads to results that create the worst obstacles; overall, it doesn't follow the path of least resistance. Living along the path of least resistance doesn’t mean mindlessly chasing one’s own selfish desires. Those who do so soon realize that they aren’t actually moving along the easiest route, as they are also social beings, not merely a collection of selfish instincts, as some people prefer to portray them. This is most evident among primitive humans and herd animals, who all possess a well-developed social sense. Without it, the herd could not exist at all. Humans, as social animals, don’t need to submit to laws imposed on them from the outside; they carry their social imperatives within themselves, a priori, as an inborn necessity. As you can see, I firmly oppose certain perspectives—which I believe are quite unjustified—that have been expressed here and there within the psychoanalytic movement.
So the line of least resistance does not signify eo ipso the avoidance of unpleasure so much as the just balancing of unpleasure and pleasure. Painful activity by itself leads to no result but exhaustion. Man must be able to take pleasure in his life, or the struggle of life has no reward. What direction the patient's future life should take is not ours to judge. We must not imagine we know better than his own nature—or we prove ourselves educators of the worst kind. Psychoanalysis is but a means of removing stones from the path, and in no way a method (as hypnotism often pretends to be) of putting anything into the patient which was not there before. So we renounce any attempt to give a direction, and occupy ourselves only with setting in proper relief all that analysis brings into the light of day, in order that the patient may see clearly, and be in a position to draw the appropriate conclusions. Anything that he has not himself won, he does not in the long run believe in; and all that he has received from authority keeps him still infantile. He must rather be put in such a position as will enable him to take control of his own life. It is the art of the psychoanalyst to follow the patient's apparently mistaken paths without prejudice, and thus to discover his strayed and separated sheep. Working on a system, according to a preconceived scheme, we spoil the best results of the analysis. So I hold fast to the maxim you quote from me: "Every interference on the part of the analyst is a gross mistake in technique. So-called chance is the law and the order of psychoanalysis."
So, the path of least resistance doesn't just mean avoiding discomfort; it's about balancing discomfort and pleasure. Painful activities on their own only lead to exhaustion. A person needs to find joy in their life, or the struggle of living feels pointless. It's not our place to decide what direction the patient's future should take. We shouldn't assume we know better than their own instincts—doing so would make us the worst kind of teachers. Psychoanalysis is just a way to clear obstacles from the path, not a method (like hypnosis often claims) of implanting ideas that weren't there before. Therefore, we give up trying to provide direction and focus only on properly highlighting everything that analysis uncovers, so the patient can see clearly and make their own conclusions. Anything they haven’t achieved themselves won’t be believed in the long run, and everything given to them by authority keeps them dependent. They need to be placed in a position where they can take charge of their own life. The skill of the psychoanalyst is to follow the patient's seemingly misguided paths without bias and to find their lost thoughts and feelings. If we work with a rigid system based on a predetermined plan, we ruin the best outcomes of the analysis. So, I stick to the saying you quoted from me: "Every interference by the analyst is a serious error in technique. What we call chance is the law and order of psychoanalysis."
You surely recognise that the schoolmaster-view never releases us from the attempt to correct Nature and the desire to force upon her our limited "truths." In nerve-therapy we get so many wonderful experiences—unforeseen and impossible to foresee—that surely we ought to dismiss all hope of being infallibly able to point out the right path. The roundabout way and even the wrong way are necessary. If you deny this you must also deny that the errors in the[265] history of the whole world have been necessary. That indeed were a world-conception fit for a schoolmaster. For psychoanalysis this view suits not at all.
You surely recognize that the schoolmaster perspective never lets us stop trying to correct Nature and wanting to impose our limited "truths" on her. In nerve therapy, we encounter so many amazing experiences—unexpected and impossible to predict—that we should definitely give up any hope of being infallibly able to identify the right path. The indirect route and even the wrong path are necessary. If you argue against this, you must also argue that the mistakes in the [265] history of the entire world have been unnecessary. That would indeed be a worldview suitable for a schoolmaster. However, this perspective does not suit psychoanalysis at all.
The question as to how much the analyst involuntarily suggests to the patient is a very ticklish one. Undoubtedly that has a much more important place than psychoanalysts have till now admitted. Experience has convinced us that the patient rapidly avails himself of the ideas won through the analysis, and of whatever comes to light through the shaping of the dreams. You may obtain all manner of such impressions from Stekel's book: "Die Sprache des Traumes" ("The Language of the Dream"). I had once a most instructive experience: a very intelligent lady had from the beginning extreme transference phantasies which appeared in well-recognised erotic forms. Nevertheless she entirely declined to admit their existence. Of course she was betrayed by the dreams in which my own person was hidden behind some other figure, and often difficult to unveil. A long series of such dreams forced me at last to say: "So you see it is always like that, and the person of whom one has really dreamt is replaced and hidden by some one else in the manifest dream." Till then the patient had obstinately contested this point. But this time she could no longer evade it, and had to admit my rule—but only that she might play me a trick. Next day she brought me a dream in which she and I appeared in a manifest lascivious situation. I was naturally perplexed and thought of my rule. Her first association to the dream was the malicious question: "It's always true, isn't it, that the person of whom one is really dreaming is replaced by some one else in the manifest dream-content?"
The question of how much the analyst unintentionally suggests to the patient is quite delicate. It certainly plays a more significant role than psychoanalysts have previously acknowledged. Experience has shown us that patients quickly take on the ideas gained through analysis and anything revealed in their dreams. You can find various impressions of this in Stekel's book: "Die Sprache des Traumes" ("The Language of the Dream"). I once had a very enlightening experience: a very insightful woman had extreme transference fantasies from the start, which appeared in recognizable erotic forms. However, she completely refused to acknowledge their existence. Of course, her dreams betrayed her, where my own persona was concealed behind another figure, often hard to identify. A long series of such dreams ultimately forced me to say: "See, it’s always like this, and the person you’ve really dreamed of is replaced and hidden by someone else in the obvious dream." Until then, the patient had stubbornly denied this point. But this time she could no longer avoid it and had to accept my rule—but only so she could try to trick me. The next day, she brought me a dream where she and I were in a clear lascivious situation. I was understandably confused and thought of my rule. Her first association to the dream was the teasing question: "It’s always true, isn’t it, that the person one is truly dreaming of is replaced by someone else in the obvious dream content?"
Clearly, she had made use of her experience to find a protective formula by means of which she secured the open expression of her phantasies in an apparently innocent way.
Clearly, she had used her experience to create a safe method that allowed her to share her fantasies in a seemingly innocent manner.
This example aptly shows how patients avail themselves of insight gained during analysis; they use it symbolically. You get caught in your own net if you give credence to the idea of unalterable, permanent symbols. That has[266] already happened to more than one psychoanalyst. It is therefore fallacious to try to prove any particular theory from the dreams arising in the course of analysis. For this purpose the only conclusive dreams are those derived from demonstrably uninfluenced persons. In such cases one would only have to exclude the possibility of telepathic thought-reading. But if you concede this possibility you will have to subject very many things to a rigorous re-examination and, among others, many judicial verdicts.
This example clearly illustrates how patients make use of the insights gained during therapy; they apply it symbolically. You can get trapped in your own assumptions if you believe in the idea of unchangeable, permanent symbols. This has already happened to more than one psychoanalyst. Therefore, it's misleading to try to validate any specific theory based on the dreams that come up during therapy. The only dreams that can be considered definitive are those from individuals who are clearly not influenced. In such instances, one would just need to rule out the possibility of telepathic thought-reading. But if you accept this possibility, you'll have to re-evaluate a lot of things, including many judicial decisions.
But although we must do full justice to the force of suggestion, we must not overrate it. The patient is no empty sack into which you may stuff whatever you like; on the contrary, he brings his own predetermined contents which strive obstinately against suggestion and always obtrude themselves afresh. Through analytic "suggestions," only the outward form is determined, never the content—this is always being freshly impressed upon my notice. The form is the unlimited, the ever-changing; but the content is fixed, and only to be assailed slowly and with great difficulty. Were it not so, suggestion-therapy would be in every respect the most effective, profitable, and easiest therapy,—a real panacea. That, alas! it is not, as every honourable hypnotist will freely admit.
But while we need to acknowledge the power of suggestion, we shouldn’t overstate it. The patient isn’t just an empty vessel you can fill with whatever you want; instead, they come with their own established beliefs that resist suggestion and constantly push back. Through analytic “suggestions,” only the outer form is shaped, never the actual content—this has been consistently clear to me. The form is limitless and always changing; however, the content is fixed and can only be challenged slowly and with great effort. If it were otherwise, suggestion therapy would be the most effective, beneficial, and easiest treatment available—a true cure-all. Unfortunately, it is not, as any respectable hypnotist will openly agree.
To return to your question as to how far it is conceivable that patients may deceive the doctor by making use—perhaps involuntarily—of his expressions: this is indeed a very serious problem. The analyst must exercise all possible care and practise unsparing self-criticism if he would avoid, as far as possible, being led into error by patients' dreams. It may be admitted that they almost always use modes of expression in their dreams learnt in analysis—some more, some less. Interpretations of earlier symbols will themselves be used again as fresh symbols in later dreams. It happens not seldom, for instance, that sexual situations which appear in symbolic form in the earlier dreams, will appear "undisguised" in later ones, and here again they are the symbolic expression of ideas of another character capable of further analysis. The not infrequent dream[267] of incestuous cohabitation is by no means an "undisguised" content, but a dream as freshly symbolic and capable of analysis as all others. You surely only reach the paradoxical view that such a dream is "undisguised" if you are pledged to the sexual theory of neurosis.
To get back to your question about how likely it is for patients to mislead the doctor by using—perhaps unintentionally—his phrases: this is indeed a very serious issue. The analyst must be extremely careful and practice relentless self-reflection to avoid being misled by patients' dreams as much as possible. It’s true that they almost always express things in their dreams using phrases learned during analysis—some more so than others. Interpretations of earlier symbols will reappear as new symbols in later dreams. For example, it often happens that sexual situations presented symbolically in earlier dreams will show up "undisguised" in later ones, and these are again symbolic expressions of different ideas that can be further analyzed. The common dream of incestuous relationships is not at all "undisguised" content, but rather a dream that is just as fresh and symbolic as any others. You really only come to the contradictory conclusion that such a dream is "undisguised" if you are committed to the sexual theory of neurosis.
That the patient may mislead the doctor for a longer or shorter time by means of deliberate deception and misrepresentation is possible; just as occasionally happens in all other departments of medicine. Therewith the patient injures himself most, since he has to pay for every deception or suppression, with aggravated or additional symptoms. Deceptions are so obviously disadvantageous to himself that in the end he can scarcely avoid the definite relinquishment of such a course.
That the patient can mislead the doctor for a while through intentional deception and misrepresentation is possible, just like it sometimes happens in other areas of medicine. By doing this, the patient ultimately harms himself the most, as he has to deal with every lie or omission by experiencing worse or new symptoms. These deceptions are so clearly harmful to him that, in the end, he can hardly avoid completely giving up on that approach.
The technique of analysis we can best postpone for oral discussion.
The method of analysis is probably best saved for a conversation.
IX
From Dr. Loÿ.
From Dr. Loÿ.
23rd February, 1913.
February 23, 1913.
From your letter of 16th February I want first to single out the end, where you so admirably assign to its proper place the power of suggestion in psychoanalysis: "The patient is no empty sack, into which you can cram what you will; he brings his own predetermined content with him, with which one has always to reckon afresh." With this I fully agree, my own experience confirms it. And you add: "This content remains untouched by involuntary analytical suggestion, but its form is altered, proteus-fashion, beyond measure." So it becomes a matter of a sort of "mimicry" by which the patient seeks to escape the analyst, who is driving him into a corner and therefore for the moment seems to him an enemy. Until at last, through the joint work of patient and analyst—the former spontaneously yielding up his psychic content, the latter only interpreting and explaining—the analysis succeeds in bringing so much light into the darkness of the[268] patient's psyche that he can see the true relationships and, without any preconceived plan of the analyst's, can himself draw the right conclusions and apply them to his future life. This new life will betake itself along the line of least resistance—or should we not rather say, the least resistances, as a "compromise with all the necessities," in a just balancing of pleasure and unpleasure? It is not we who must arbitrarily seek to determine how matters stand for the patient and what will benefit him; his own nature decides. In other words, we must assume the rôle of the accoucheur who can bring out into the light of day a child already alive, but who must avoid a series of mistakes if the child is to remain able to live and the mother is not to be injured. All this is very clear to me, since it is only the application to the psychoanalytic method of a general principle which should have universal validity: never do violence to Nature. Hence I also see that the psychoanalyst must follow his patient's apparently "wrong roads" if the patient is ever to arrive at his own convictions and be freed once and for all from infantile reliance on authority. We ourselves as individuals have learnt or can only learn by making mistakes how to avoid them for the future, and mankind as a whole has created the conditions of its present and future stages of development quite as much by frequent travel along wrong paths as along the right road. Have not many neurotics—I do not know if you will agree, but I think so—become ill partly for the very reason that their infantile faith in authority has fallen to pieces? Now they stand before the wreckage of their faith, weeping over it, in dire distress because they cannot find a substitute which shall show them clearly whither their life's course should now turn. So they remain stuck fast betwixt infancy which they must unwillingly renounce, and the serious duties of the present and future (the moral conflict). I see, particularly in such cases, you are right in saying it is a mistake to seek to replace the lost faith in authority by another similar faith, certain to be useful only so long as the belief lasts. This applies to the deliberate use of suggestion in psychoanalysis, and the building upon[269] the transference to the doctor as the object of the analytic therapy. I am no longer in doubt about your maxim: "Every interference on the analyst's part is a gross mistake in technique. So-called chance is the law and the order of psychoanalysis." Further, I am entirely in agreement with you when you say that altruism necessarily must be innate in man considered as a herd-animal. The contrary would be the thing to be wondered at.
From your letter dated February 16, I want to highlight the end, where you brilliantly articulate the role of suggestion in psychoanalysis: "The patient is not an empty vessel to fill with whatever you want; he comes with his own predetermined content that must always be taken into account." I completely agree with this; my own experience supports it. You also mention: "This content remains unaffected by involuntary analytical suggestion, but its form is modified, shapeshifting beyond measure." It then becomes a matter of a kind of "mimicry" in which the patient attempts to escape the analyst, who seems to corner him and thus, for a time, appears as an adversary. Ultimately, through the collaborative effort of patient and analyst—the patient voluntarily revealing his inner content, while the analyst interprets and clarifies—the analysis successfully sheds light on the patient's mind, allowing him to perceive true relationships and, without any preconceived agenda from the analyst, to draw the right conclusions and apply them to his future. This new life will follow the path of least resistance—or should we say, the least resistances—as a "compromise with all the necessities," in a balanced consideration of pleasure and displeasure? It is not our place to arbitrarily decide what the patient needs or what will help him; his own nature determines that. In other words, we must take on the role of the midwife who can bring to light a child that is already alive, but who must avoid a series of mistakes to ensure the child can survive and the mother remains unharmed. This makes complete sense to me, as it applies the psychoanalytic method to a general principle that should have universal validity: never go against Nature. Therefore, I also recognize that the psychoanalyst must follow the patient's seemingly "wrong paths" if the patient is ever to reach his own beliefs and be liberated once and for all from childish dependence on authority. We as individuals learn—or can only learn—through making mistakes how to avoid them in the future, and humanity as a whole has shaped its present and future development largely through frequent journeys down wrong paths as much as along the right one. Haven’t many neurotics—I'm not sure if you’ll agree, but I think so—fallen ill partly because their childish trust in authority has shattered? They now stand amidst the ruins of that faith, lamenting it, in deep distress because they can’t find a substitute to clearly indicate which direction their life should take. Thus, they remain caught between the childhood they must reluctantly abandon and the serious responsibilities of the present and future (the moral conflict). I see, especially in such cases, you are correct in saying it’s a mistake to try to replace the lost faith in authority with another similar belief, which is useful only while it lasts. This applies to the intentional use of suggestion in psychoanalysis and the reliance on the transference to the doctor as a part of the analytic therapy. I am no longer doubtful about your principle: "Every intervention by the analyst is a significant mistake in technique. So-called chance is the law and order of psychoanalysis." Furthermore, I completely agree with you when you state that altruism must be inherent in humans as social beings. The opposite would be what is truly surprising.
I should be much disposed to agree that not the egoistic, but the altruistic instincts are primary. Love and trust of the child for the mother who feeds it, nurses, cherishes and pets it,—love of the man for his wife, regarded as the going out towards another's personality,—love for offspring, care for it,—love for kinsfolk, etc. The egoistic instincts owe their origin to the desire for exclusive possession of all that surrounds love, the desire to possess the mother exclusively, in opposition to the father and the brothers and sisters, the desire to have a woman for himself alone, the desire to possess exclusively ornaments, clothing, etc. But perhaps you will say I am paradoxical and that the instincts, egoistic or altruistic, arise together in the heart of man, and that every instinct is ambivalent in nature. But I have to ask if the feelings and instincts are really ambivalent? Are they exactly bipolar? Are the qualities of all emotions altogether comparable? Is love really the opposite of hate?
I tend to agree that it's not the selfish instincts, but the selfless ones that come first. A child's love and trust for the mother who feeds, nurtures, and cares for them— a man's love for his wife, which is a way of reaching out to another person— love for children, taking care of them— love for relatives, and so on. Selfish instincts come from the desire to possess everything surrounding love, like wanting the mother all to oneself, instead of sharing her with the father and siblings, wanting a woman exclusively for oneself, or wanting to have exclusive things like jewelry and clothes. But you might argue that I’m being contradictory and that both selfish and selfless instincts arise together in a person's heart, and that every instinct has both sides to it. But I have to ask, are feelings and instincts really two-sided? Are they truly bipolar? Can we really compare all the qualities of different emotions? Is love truly the opposite of hate?
However that may be, in any case it is well that man bears the social law within himself, as an inborn imperative; otherwise our civilised humanity would fare badly, having to subject themselves to laws imposed on them from outside only: they would be impervious to the inheritance of the earlier religious faiths, and would soon fall into complete anarchy. Man would then have to ask himself whether it would not be better to maintain by force an extreme belief in religious authority such as prevailed in the Middle Ages. For the benefits of civilisation, which strove to grant every individual as much outward freedom as was consistent with the freedom of others, would be well worth the sacrifice of free research. But the age of this use of force against nature is[270] past, civilised man has left this wrong track behind, not arbitrarily, but obeying an inner necessity, and we may look joyfully towards the future. Mankind, advancing in knowledge, will find its way across the ruins of faith in authority to the moral autonomy of the individual.
However that may be, it’s good that people carry the social law within themselves as a natural instinct; otherwise, our civilized society would struggle, relying solely on external laws imposed on them. They would be disconnected from the legacies of earlier religious beliefs and would quickly descend into complete chaos. People would then have to consider whether it would be better to forcefully cling to a strong belief in religious authority like in the Middle Ages. But the advancements of civilization, which aimed to provide everyone as much freedom as possible while respecting others' freedoms, would be well worth sacrificing free inquiry. Yet that era of using force against nature is[270] behind us. Civilized people have moved past this misguided path, not arbitrarily, but out of an inner necessity, and we can look forward to the future with hope. Humanity, progressing in understanding, will navigate through the remnants of faith in authority to achieve the moral independence of the individual.
X
From Dr. Jung.
From Dr. Jung.
March, 1913.
March 1913.
At various places in your letters it has struck me that the problem of "transference" seems to you particularly critical. Your feeling is entirely justified. The transference is indeed at present the central problem of analysis.
At different points in your letters, it has occurred to me that you find the issue of "transference" especially important. Your concern is completely valid. Transference is currently the main issue in therapy.
You know that Freud regards the transference as the projection of infantile phantasies upon the doctor. To this extent the transference is an infantile-erotic relationship. All the same, viewed from the outside, superficially, the thing by no means always looks like an infantile-erotic situation. As long as it is a question of the so-called "positive" transference, the infantile-erotic character can usually be recognised without difficulty. But if it is a "negative" transference, you can see nothing but violent resistances which sometimes veil themselves in seemingly critical or sceptical dress. In a certain sense the determining factor in such circumstances is the patient's relation to authority, that is, in the last resort, to the father. In both forms of transference the doctor is treated as if he were the father—according to the situation either tenderly or with hostility. In this view the transference has the force of a resistance as soon as it becomes a question of resolving the infantile attitude. But this form of transference must be destroyed, inasmuch as the object of analysis is the patient's moral autonomy. A lofty aim, you will say. Indeed lofty, and far off, but still not altogether so remote, since it actually corresponds to one of the predominating tendencies of our stage of civilisation, namely,[271] that urge towards individualisation by which our whole epoch deserves to be characterised. (Cf. Müller-Lyer: "Die Familie.") If a man does not believe in this orientation and still bows before the scientific causal view-point, he will, of course, be disposed merely to resolve this hostility, and to let the patient remain in a positive relationship towards the father, thus expressing the ideal of an earlier epoch of civilisation. It is commonly recognised that the Catholic Church represents one of the most powerful organisations based upon this earlier tendency. I cannot venture to doubt that there are very many individuals who feel happier under compulsion from others than when forced to discipline themselves. (Cf. Shaw: "Man and Superman.") None the less, we do our neurotic patients a grievous wrong if we try to force them all into the category of the unfree. Among neurotics, there are not a few who do not require any reminders of their social duties and obligations; rather are they born or destined to become the bearers of new social ideals. They are neurotic so long as they bow down to authority and refuse the freedom to which they are destined. Whilst we look at life only retrospectively, as is the case in the Viennese psychoanalytic writings, we shall never do justice to this type of case and never bring the longed-for deliverance. For in that fashion we can only educate them to become obedient children, and thereby strengthen the very forces that have made them ill—their conservative retardation and their submissiveness to authority. Up to a certain point this is the right way to take with the infantile resistance which cannot yet reconcile itself with authority. But the power which edged them out from their retrograde dependence on the father is not at all a childish desire for insubordination, but the powerful urge towards the development of an individual personality, and this struggle is their imperative life's task. Adler's psychology does much greater justice to this situation than Freud's.
You know that Freud sees transference as projecting childhood fantasies onto the therapist. In this way, transference can be considered an infantile-erotic relationship. However, looking at it from the outside, it doesn’t always come off as an infantile-erotic situation. With what’s called “positive” transference, the infantile-erotic nature is usually easy to spot. But when it’s a “negative” transference, all you notice are strong resistances that sometimes disguise themselves as critical or skeptical attitudes. In a way, the key factor here is the patient’s relationship to authority, ultimately referring back to the father. In both types of transference, the therapist is treated like a father figure—either affectionately or with hostility, depending on the situation. From this perspective, transference acts as a resistance once it comes to resolving the childhood mindset. However, this type of transference needs to be overcome because the goal of analysis is to help the patient achieve moral autonomy. You might say that's a lofty goal. True, it's ambitious and somewhat distant, yet not completely out of reach, as it aligns with a major trend in our current civilization, specifically, the drive for individualization that characterizes our era. (Cf. Müller-Lyer: "Die Familie.") If someone doesn’t believe in this direction and instead adheres strictly to the scientific cause-and-effect framework, they will likely just want to resolve the hostility, allowing the patient to remain positively connected to the father, thus reflecting the ideals of an earlier stage of civilization. It’s widely acknowledged that the Catholic Church is one of the most influential organizations grounded in this earlier tendency. I have no doubt there are many individuals who feel more content under external pressure than when tasked with self-discipline. (Cf. Shaw: "Man and Superman.") Nevertheless, we do a great disservice to our neurotic patients if we attempt to push them all into the unfree category. Among neurotics, there are many who don’t need reminders of their social responsibilities; rather, they are born or destined to bear new social ideals. They remain neurotic as long as they submit to authority and reject the freedom they are meant to embrace. If we only view life from a retrospective standpoint, as often seen in Viennese psychoanalytic writings, we will never truly understand this type of case and fail to provide the long-awaited liberation. By doing so, we merely train them to become obedient children, reinforcing the very forces that have made them ill—their conservative stagnation and submission to authority. To some extent, dealing with the infantile resistance that has yet to come to terms with authority is the right approach. However, the drive that pushes them away from their regressive dependence on the father is not just a childish wish to rebel, but rather a powerful motivation to develop an individual personality, and this struggle is their essential life challenge. Adler's psychology addresses this situation much more effectively than Freud's.
In the one case (that of infantile intractability) the positive transference signifies a highly important achievement, heralding cure; in the other (infantile submissiveness) it[272] portends a dangerous backsliding, a convenient evasion of life's duty. The negative transference represents in the first case an increased resistance, thus a backsliding and an evasion of duty, but in the second it is an advance of healing significance. (For the two types, cf. Adler's "Trotz und Gehorsam.")
In one situation (infantile intractability), positive transference is a significant achievement that signals progress toward healing; in another (infantile submissiveness), it[272] suggests a troubling regression, a way to avoid life's responsibilities. Negative transference in the first instance indicates heightened resistance, representing a regression and avoidance of duty, while in the second instance, it signifies progress toward healing. (For the two types, see Adler's "Trotz und Gehorsam.")
The transference then is, as you see, to be judged quite differently in different cases.
The transference, as you can see, should be evaluated quite differently in various situations.
The psychological process of "transference"—be it negative or positive—consists in the libido entrenching itself, as it were, round the personality of the doctor, the doctor accordingly representing certain emotional values. (As you know, by libido I understand very much what Antiquity meant by the cosmogenic principle of Eros; in modern terminology simply "psychic energy.") The patient is bound to the doctor, be it in affection, be it in opposition, and cannot fail to follow and imitate the doctor's psychic adaptations. To this he finds himself urgently compelled. And with the best will in the world and all technical skill, the doctor cannot prevent him, for intuition works surely and instinctively, in despite of the conscious judgment, be it never so strong. Were the doctor himself neurotic, and inadequate in response to the demands of the external life, or inharmonious within, the patient would copy the defect and build it up into the fabric of his own presentations: you may imagine the result.
The psychological process of "transference"—whether it's negative or positive—happens when the libido gets entrenched around the doctor's personality, making the doctor represent certain emotional values. (As you know, by libido I mean what Ancient cultures referred to as the cosmogenic principle of Eros; in today's terms, it's simply "psychic energy.") The patient becomes attached to the doctor, whether in affection or opposition, and inevitably follows and mimics the doctor's psychological responses. He feels a strong compulsion to do so. No matter how well-intentioned or skilled the doctor is, he can't stop this from happening, as intuition works automatically and instinctively, regardless of conscious judgment, no matter how strong it is. If the doctor is neurotic and unable to meet the demands of life, or is out of sync within himself, the patient will mirror that flaw and incorporate it into his own understanding: you can imagine the outcome.
Accordingly I cannot regard the transference as merely the transference of infantile-erotic phantasies; no doubt that is what it is from one standpoint, but I see also in it, as I said in an earlier letter, the process of the growth of feeling and adaptation. From this standpoint the infantile erotic phantasies, in spite of their indisputable reality, appear rather as material for comparison or as analogous pictures of something not understood as yet, than as independent desires. This seems to me the real reason of their being unconscious. The patient, not knowing the right attitude, tries to grasp at a right relationship to the doctor by way of comparison and analogy with his infantile experiences. It is not surprising that he gropes back for just the most intimate[273] relations of his childhood, to discover the appropriate formula for his attitude to the doctor, for this relationship also is very intimate, and to some extent different from the sexual relationship, just as is that of the child towards its parents. This relationship—child to parent—which Christianity has everywhere set up as the symbolic formula for human relationships, provides a way of restoring to the patient that directness of ordinary human emotion of which he had been deprived through the inroad of sexual and social values (from the standpoint of power, etc.). The purely sexual, more or less primitive and barbaric valuation, operates in far-reaching ways against a direct, simple human relationship, and thereupon a blocking of the libido occurs which easily gives rise to neurotic formations. By means of analysis of the infantile portion of the transference-phantasies, the patient is brought back to the remembrance of his childhood's relationship, and this—stripped of its infantile qualities—gives him a beautiful, clear picture of direct human intercourse as opposed to the purely sexual valuation. I cannot regard it as other than a misconception to judge the childish relationship retrospectively and therefore as exclusively a sexual one, even though a certain sexual content can in no wise be denied to it.
I can’t just think of the transference as simply the transfer of childish erotic fantasies; while that’s true from one perspective, I also see it, as I mentioned in an earlier letter, as the process of growing feelings and adapting. From this viewpoint, the childish erotic fantasies, despite their undeniable reality, seem more like material for comparison or similar examples of something not fully understood yet, rather than as separate desires. This appears to be the real reason they remain unconscious. The patient, unsure of the right approach, attempts to find a suitable relationship with the doctor by comparing it to his childhood experiences. It makes sense that he reaches back for the most personal relationships from his childhood to figure out how to relate to the doctor because this connection is also very personal and somewhat distinct from a sexual relationship, just like the one between a child and their parents. This child-parent relationship—which Christianity has consistently used as a symbolic model for human connections—offers a way for the patient to regain the straightforwardness of ordinary human emotions that he lost due to the influence of sexual and social values (from the perspective of power, etc.). The purely sexual, somewhat primitive and barbaric valuation significantly counters a direct, simple human relationship, and this leads to a blockage of libido that often results in neurotic issues. Through the analysis of the childish aspects of the transference fantasies, the patient is reminded of his childhood relationships, and this—without its childish elements—provides him with a clear, beautiful picture of direct human interaction as opposed to just the sexual valuation. I cannot see it as anything but a misconception to retrospectively judge the childish relationship and consider it exclusively sexual, even though a certain sexual element is undeniably present.
Recapitulating, let me say this much of the positive transference:—
Recapping, let me say this much about the positive transference:—
The patient's libido fastens upon the person of the doctor, taking the shape of expectation, hope, interest, trust, friendship and love. Then the transference produces the projection upon the doctor of infantile phantasies, often of predominatingly erotic tinge. At this stage the transference is usually of a decidedly sexual character, in spite of the sexual component remaining relatively unconscious. But this phase of feeling serves the higher aspect of the growth of human feeling as a bridge, whereby the patient becomes conscious of the defectiveness of his own adaptation, through his recognition of the doctor's attitude, which is accepted as one suitable to life's demands, and normal in its human relationships. By help of the analysis, and the recalling of his childish relationships, the road is seen which leads right[274] out of those exclusively sexual or "power" evaluations of social surroundings which were acquired in puberty and strongly reinforced by social prejudices. This road leads on towards a purely human relation and intimacy, not derived solely from the existence of a sexual or power-relation, but depending much more upon a regard for personality. That is the road to freedom which the doctor must show his patient.
The patient's attraction shifts towards the doctor, taking the form of expectation, hope, interest, trust, friendship, and love. Then, transference leads to the projection onto the doctor of childhood fantasies, often with a strong erotic element. At this point, the transference usually has a clear sexual aspect, even though the sexual component remains mostly unconscious. However, this emotional phase serves as a bridge for the development of human feelings, allowing the patient to recognize their own issues with adaptation by observing the doctor's attitude, which is seen as appropriate for life's demands and normal in human relationships. Through analysis and recalling past childhood relationships, the path emerges that leads directly out of those purely sexual or "power" evaluations of social interactions formed during puberty and heavily influenced by societal prejudices. This path moves towards a genuine human connection and intimacy, rooted not just in sexual or power dynamics, but much more in an appreciation for personality. That is the path to freedom that the doctor must guide the patient along.
Here indeed I must not omit to say that the obstinate clinging to the sexual valuation would not be maintained so tenaciously if it had not also a very deep significance for that period of life in which propagation is of primary importance. The discovery of the value of human personality belongs to a riper age. For young people the search for the valuable personality is very often merely a cloak for the evasion of their biological duty. On the other hand, an older person's exaggerated looking back towards the sexual valuation of youth, is an undiscerning and often cowardly and convenient retreat from a duty which demands the recognition of personal values and his own enrolment among the ranks of the priesthood of a newer civilisation. The young neurotic shrinks back in terror from the extension of his tasks in life, the old from the dwindling and shrinking of the treasures he has attained.
Here, I must point out that the stubborn attachment to sexual valuation wouldn’t be held onto so tightly if it didn’t carry significant meaning for that stage of life when procreation is key. The understanding of human personality’s worth comes with maturity. For young people, the pursuit of a valuable personality often serves as a cover to avoid facing their biological responsibilities. Conversely, an older person’s excessive nostalgia for the sexual valuation of youth represents a blind and often cowardly retreat from a duty that requires acknowledging personal values and committing to the ideals of a new civilization. The young neurotic recoils in fear from taking on more life responsibilities, while the older person fears losing the treasures they’ve accumulated.
This conception of the transference is, you will have noted, most intimately connected with the acceptance of the idea of biological "duties." By this term you must understand those tendencies or motives in human beings giving rise to civilisation, as inevitably as in the bird they give rise to the exquisitely woven nest, and in the stag to the production of antlers. The purely causal, not to say materialistic conception of the immediately preceding decades, would conceive the organic formation as the reaction of living matter, and this doubtless provides a position heuristically useful, but, as far as any real understanding goes, leads only to a more or less ingenious and apparent reduction and postponement of the problem. Let me refer you to Bergson's excellent criticism of this conception. From external forces[275] but half the result, at most, could ensue; the other half lies within the individual disposition of the living material, without which it is obvious the specific reaction-formation could never be achieved. This principle must be applied also in psychology. The psyche does not only react; it also gives its own individual reply to the influences at work upon it, and at least half the resulting configuration and its existing disposition is due to this. Civilisation is never, and again never, to be regarded as merely reaction to environment. That shallow explanation we may abandon peacefully to the past century. It is just these very dispositions which we must regard as imperative in the psychological sphere; it is easy to get convincing proof daily of their compulsive power. What I call "biological duty" is identical with these dispositions.
This idea of transference is, as you may have noticed, closely linked to accepting the concept of biological "duties." By this term, you should understand the tendencies or motives in humans that lead to civilization, just as they lead to the intricately built nest in birds and the growth of antlers in stags. The strictly causal, or even materialistic, viewpoint from the previous decades would see organic formation as simply the reaction of living matter. While this perspective may be useful in a heuristic sense, it ultimately offers only a clever and apparent simplification and postponement of the real issue. I encourage you to look at Bergson's excellent critique of this viewpoint. External forces can account for at most half the outcome; the other half comes from the individual nature of the living material, without which it's clear that the specific reaction-formation could never happen. This principle must also apply in psychology. The psyche doesn’t just react; it also provides its own unique response to the external influences it faces, and at least half of the resulting configuration and its current state stems from this. Civilization should never, and must never, be seen merely as a reaction to the environment. That superficial explanation can be left behind in the past century. It’s these very dispositions that we need to acknowledge as essential in the psychological realm; we can easily find convincing evidence of their compelling influence in our daily lives. What I refer to as "biological duty" is the same as these dispositions.
In conclusion, I must deal with a matter which seems to have caused you uneasiness, namely, the moral question. Among our patients we see many so-called immoral tendencies, therefore the thought involuntarily forces itself upon the psychotherapist as to how things would go if all these desires were to be gratified. You will have discerned already from my earlier letters that these desires must not be estimated too literally. As a rule it is rather a matter of unmeasured and exaggerated demands, arising out of the patient's stored-up libido, which have usurped a prominent position, usually quite against his own wish. In most cases the canalisation of the libido for the fulfilment of life's simple duties, suffices to reduce these exaggerated desires to zero. But in some cases it must be recognised that such "immoral" tendencies are in no way removed by analysis; on the contrary, they appear more often and more clearly, hence it becomes plain that they belong to the individual's biological duties. And this is particularly true of certain sexual claims, whose aim is an individual valuation of sexuality. This is not a question for pathology, it is a social question of to-day which peremptorily demands an ethical solution. For many it is a biological duty to work for the solution of this question, to discover some sort of[276] practical solution. (Nature, it is well known, does not content herself with theories.) To-day we have no real sexual morality, only a legal attitude towards sexuality; just as the early Middle Ages had no genuine morality for financial transactions, but only prejudices and a legal standpoint. We are not yet sufficiently advanced in the domain of free sexual activity to distinguish between a moral and an immoral relationship. We have a clear expression of this in the customary treatment, or rather ill-treatment, of unmarried motherhood. For a great deal of sickening hypocrisy, for the high tide of prostitution, and for the prevalence of sexual diseases, we may thank both our barbarous, undifferentiated legal judgments about the sexual situation, and our inability to develop a finer moral perception of the immense psychologic differences that may exist in free sexual activity.
In conclusion, I need to address a topic that seems to have caused you some discomfort, namely, the moral question. Among our patients, we encounter many so-called immoral tendencies, which raises the question for the psychotherapist about what would happen if all these desires were satisfied. You may have already gathered from my earlier letters that these desires shouldn't be taken too literally. Generally, it's a matter of unrestrained and exaggerated demands stemming from the patient's repressed libido that have taken center stage, often against their own wishes. In most cases, channeling the libido towards fulfilling life's basic responsibilities is enough to diminish these inflated desires to nothing. However, in some instances, it's clear that such "immoral" tendencies are not eliminated through analysis; instead, they emerge more frequently and more prominently, indicating that they are part of the individual's biological responsibilities. This is especially true for certain sexual claims aiming for an individual recognition of sexuality. This isn't a question of pathology; it's a social issue of today demanding an urgent ethical solution. For many, it's a biological duty to address this issue and find some sort of[276] practical solution. (Nature, as we know, isn’t satisfied with just theories.) Today, we lack a genuine sexual morality, existing only with a legal perspective on sexuality; much like how the early Middle Ages had no real morality regarding financial transactions, only biases and a legal viewpoint. We're not yet advanced enough in the area of free sexual activity to differentiate between a moral and an immoral relationship. This is clearly reflected in the typical treatment, or rather mistreatment, of unmarried motherhood. A lot of the repulsive hypocrisy, the surge in prostitution, and the spread of sexual diseases can be attributed to our primitive, simplistic legal judgments about sexuality, alongside our failure to cultivate a more nuanced moral understanding of the significant psychological differences that may arise in the context of free sexual activity.
This reference to the existence of an exceedingly complicated and significant problem may suffice to explain why we by no means seldom meet with individuals among our patients who are quite specially called, because of their spiritual and social gifts, to take an active part in the work of civilisation—for this they are biologically destined. We must never forget that what to-day is deemed a moral law will to-morrow be cast into the melting-pot and transformed, so that in the near or distant future it may serve as the basis of a new ethical structure. This much we ought to have learnt from the history of civilisation, that the forms of morality belong to the category of transitory things. The finest psychological tact is required with these critical natures, so that the dangerous corners of infantile irresponsibility, indolence and uncontrolledness may be turned, and a pure, untroubled vision of the possibility of a moral autonomous activity made possible. Five per cent. on money lent is fair interest, twenty per cent. is despicable usury. That point of view we have to apply equally to the sexual situation.
This mention of a very complex and important issue helps explain why we often encounter patients who are uniquely called, due to their spiritual and social talents, to actively contribute to civilization—it's their biological destiny. We must remember that what is considered a moral law today may be reassessed tomorrow and transformed, potentially becoming the foundation for a new ethical framework in the near or distant future. History teaches us that moral standards are temporary. It takes great psychological skill to navigate these critical personalities, helping them avoid the pitfalls of childish irresponsibility, laziness, and lack of control, while enabling a clear, untroubled view of the possibility of independent moral action. A five percent interest on loans is reasonable; twenty percent is exploitative usury. We need to apply this same perspective to sexual situations.
So it comes about that there are many neurotics whose innermost delicacy of feeling prevents their being at one with present-day morality, and they cannot adapt themselves[277] to civilisation as long as their moral code has gaps in it, the filling up of which is a crying need of the age. We deceive ourselves greatly if we suppose that many married women are neurotic only because they are unsatisfied sexually or because they have not found the right man, or because they still have a fixation to their infantile sexuality. The real ground of the neurosis is, in many cases, the inability to recognise the work that is waiting for them, of helping to build up a new civilisation. We are all far too much at the standpoint of the "nothing-but" psychology; we persist in thinking we can squeeze the new future which is pressing in at the door into the framework of the old and the known. And thus the view is only of the present, never of the future. But it was of most profound psychological significance when Christianity first discovered, in the orientation towards the future, a redeeming principle for mankind. In the past nothing can be altered, and in the present little, but the future is ours and capable of raising life's intensity to its highest pitch. A little space of youth belongs to us, all the rest of life belongs to our children.
Many neurotics have such a delicate sense of feeling that they struggle to connect with modern morality, and they can't adjust to civilization as long as their moral code is incomplete, which is desperately needed in today’s world. We mislead ourselves if we think that many married women are neurotic only because they’re sexually unfulfilled, haven’t found the right partner, or are still stuck in their childish sexual attitudes. The underlying cause of the neurosis, in many cases, is their inability to see the important work waiting for them, which is to help build a new civilization. We tend to have a "nothing-but" mindset; we keep trying to fit the future, which is pressing in, into the old and familiar framework. As a result, we only focus on the present and ignore the future. It was profoundly significant when Christianity first recognized that orientation toward the future is a redeeming principle for humanity. We can’t change the past and can do little in the present, but the future is ours, and it has the potential to elevate life's intensity to its greatest level. A brief period of youth is ours, but the rest of life belongs to our children.
Thus does your question as to the significance of the loss of faith in authority answer itself. The neurotic is ill not because he has lost his old faith, but because he has not yet found a new form for his finest aspirations.
Thus does your question about the significance of losing faith in authority answer itself. The neurotic is unwell not because he has lost his old faith, but because he has not yet found a new form for his highest aspirations.
CHAPTER X
ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY[182]
ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY[182]
When we speak of a thing as being "unconscious" we must not forget that from the point of view of the functioning of the brain a thing may be unconscious to us in two ways—physiologically or psychologically. I shall only deal with the subject from the latter point of view. So that for our purposes we may define the unconscious as "the sum of all those psychological events which are not apperceived, and so are unconscious."
When we talk about something being "unconscious," we shouldn't forget that, from the perspective of how the brain works, something can be unconscious to us in two ways—physiologically or psychologically. I will only address the topic from the psychological perspective. So, for our purposes, we can define the unconscious as "the total of all those psychological events that are not recognized and thus remain unconscious."
The unconscious contains all those psychic events which, because of the lack of the necessary intensity of their functioning, are unable to pass the threshold which divides the conscious from the unconscious; so that they remain in effect below the surface of the conscious, and flit by in subliminal phantom forms.
The unconscious holds all the mental events that, due to not having the necessary intensity to operate, can't cross the line separating the conscious from the unconscious. As a result, they stay beneath the surface of consciousness and appear in subtle, ghost-like forms.
It has been known to psychologists since the time of Leibniz that the elements—that is to say, the ideas and feelings which go to make up the conscious mind, the so-called conscious content—are of a complex nature, and rest upon far simpler and altogether unconscious elements; it is the combination of these which gives the element of consciousness. Leibniz has already mentioned the perceptions insensibles—those vague perceptions which Kant called "shadowy" representations, which could only attain to consciousness in an indirect manner. Later philosophers assigned the first place to the unconscious, as the foundation upon which the conscious was built.
Psychologists have known since Leibniz's time that the components—meaning the ideas and feelings that make up the conscious mind, or the so-called conscious content—are complex and rely on much simpler and completely unconscious elements. It's the way these come together that creates consciousness. Leibniz referred to the perceptions insensibles—those vague perceptions that Kant described as "shadowy" representations, which could only become conscious in an indirect way. Later philosophers emphasized the unconscious as the basis upon which the conscious mind is constructed.
But this is not the place to consider the many speculative theories nor the endless philosophical discussions concerning the nature and quality of the unconscious. We must be satisfied with the definition already given, which will prove quite sufficient for our purpose, namely the conception of the unconscious as the sum of all psychical processes below the threshold of consciousness.
But this isn't the right time to look at all the speculative theories or the endless philosophical debates about the nature and quality of the unconscious. We should stick with the definition we've already provided, which will be enough for our needs: the unconscious is seen as the total of all mental processes that occur below the level of consciousness.
The question of the importance of the unconscious for psychopathology may be briefly put as follows: "In what manner may we expect to find unconscious psychic material behave in cases of psychosis and neurosis?"
The question of how crucial the unconscious is for psychopathology can be simply stated: "How should we expect unconscious mental content to behave in cases of psychosis and neurosis?"
In order to get a better grasp of the situation in connexion with mental disorders, we may profitably consider first how unconscious psychic material behaves in the case of normal people, especially trying to visualize what in normal men is apt to be unconscious. As a preliminary to this knowledge we must get a complete understanding of what is contained in the conscious mind; and then, by a process of elimination we may expect to find what is contained in the unconscious, for obviously—per exclusionem—what is in the conscious cannot be unconscious. For this purpose we examine all activities, interests, passions, cares, and joys, which are conscious to the individual. All that we are thus able to discover becomes, ipso facto, of no further moment as a content of the unconscious, and we may then expect to find only those things contained in the unconscious which we have not found in the conscious mind.
To better understand the situation regarding mental disorders, we should first look at how unconscious mental material works in normal people, especially focusing on what tends to remain unconscious in them. Before diving into this, we need to fully understand what occupies the conscious mind; then, through a process of elimination, we can identify what lies in the unconscious since, obviously—per exclusionem—what is conscious cannot also be unconscious. To do this, we will examine all activities, interests, passions, concerns, and joys that the individual is aware of. Everything we discover this way becomes irrelevant as part of the unconscious, allowing us to expect that only those elements in the unconscious are things we haven't found in the conscious mind.
Let us take a concrete example: A merchant, who is happily married, father of two children, thorough and painstaking in his business affairs, and at the same time trying in a reasonable degree to improve his position in the world, carries himself with self-respect, is enlightened in religious matters, and even belongs to a society for the discussion of liberal ideas.
Let’s look at a specific example: A businessman, who is happily married and a father of two kids, is diligent and meticulous in his work while also striving in a reasonable way to better his situation in life. He carries himself with dignity, is informed about religious issues, and even belongs to a group that discusses progressive ideas.
What can we reasonably consider to be the content of the unconscious in the case of such an individual?
What can we realistically think of as the content of the unconscious for someone like this?
Considered from the above theoretical standpoint, everything in the personality that is not contained in the conscious[280] mind should be found in the unconscious. Let us agree, then, that this man consciously considers himself to possess all the fine attributes we have just described—no more, no less. Then it must obviously result that he is entirely unaware that a man may be not merely industrious, thorough, and painstaking, but that he may also be careless, indifferent, untrustworthy; for some of these last attributes are the common heritage of mankind and may be found to be an essential component of every character. This worthy merchant forgets that quite recently he allowed several letters to remain unanswered which he could easily have answered at once. He forgets, too, that he failed to bring a book home which his wife has asked him to get at the book-stall, where she had previously ordered it, although he might easily have made a note of her wish. But such occurrences are common with him. Therefore we are obliged to conclude that he is also lazy and untrustworthy. He is convinced that he is a thoroughly loyal subject; but for all that he failed to declare the whole of his income to the assessor, and when they raise his taxes, he votes for the Socialists.
From this theoretical perspective, everything in a person's personality that isn't in their conscious mind should be in the unconscious. So, let’s agree that this man believes he has all the great qualities we've just mentioned—no more, no less. Clearly, this means he is completely unaware that a person can be not only hardworking, careful, and meticulous but also careless, indifferent, and unreliable; some of these negative traits are common to everyone and are a crucial part of every character. This respectable merchant forgets that recently he left several letters unanswered that he could have easily replied to right away. He also forgets that he didn’t bring home a book his wife asked him to pick up at the book stall, where she had already ordered it, even though he could have easily noted her request. But these lapses happen to him often. So, we have to conclude that he is also lazy and untrustworthy. He believes he is a completely loyal citizen; however, he didn't report all his income to the tax assessor, and when they increase his taxes, he supports the Socialists.
He believes himself to be an independent thinker, yet a little while back he undertook a big deal on the Stock Exchange, and when he came to enter the details of the transaction in his books he noticed with considerable misgivings that it fell upon a Friday, the 13th of the month. Therefore, he is also superstitious and not free in his thinking.
He thinks of himself as an independent thinker, but not long ago he made a big trade on the Stock Exchange, and when he was entering the details of the transaction in his records, he noticed with some concern that it happened on a Friday, the 13th of the month. So, he is also superstitious and not completely free in his thinking.
So here we are not at all surprised to find these compensating vices to be an essential content of the unconscious. Obviously, therefore, the reverse is true—namely, that unconscious virtues compensate for conscious deficiencies. The law which ought to follow as the result of such deductions would appear to be quite simple—to wit, the conscious spendthrift is unconsciously a miser; the philanthropist is unconsciously an egoist and misanthrope. But, unfortunately, it is not quite so easy as that, although there is a basis of truth in this simple rule. For there are essential hereditary dispositions of a latent or manifest nature which upset the simple rule of compensation, and[281] which vary greatly in individual cases. From entirely different motives a man may, for instance, be a philanthropist, but the manner of his philanthropy depends upon his originally inherited disposition, and the way in which the philanthropic attitude is compensated depends upon his motives. It is not sufficient simply to know that a certain person is philanthropic in order to diagnose an unconscious egoism. For we must also bring to such a diagnosis a careful study of the motives involved.
So here we are not at all surprised to find these balancing flaws to be a key part of the unconscious. Clearly, the opposite is also true—that unconscious good qualities make up for conscious shortcomings. The principle that should follow from this reasoning seems quite straightforward: the conscious spender is unconsciously a saver; the philanthropist is unconsciously self-serving and misanthropic. However, it's unfortunately not as simple as that, even though there's some truth to this basic idea. There are essential inherited traits—either hidden or obvious—that disrupt this straightforward compensation rule, which can vary widely from person to person. For example, a person might be a philanthropist for completely different reasons, but how they express their philanthropy relies on their inherited traits, and the way their philanthropic nature is counterbalanced depends on their motivations. It's not enough to just know that someone is philanthropic to conclude they have an unconscious self-interest. We must also conduct a thorough examination of the motivations at play.
In the case of normal people the principal function of the unconscious is to effect a compensation and thus produce a balance. All extreme conscious tendencies are softened and toned down through an effective opposite impulse in the unconscious. This compensating agency, as I have tried to show in the case of the merchant, maintains itself through certain unconscious, inconsequent activities, as it were, which Freud has very well described as symptomatic acts (Symptom-handlungen).
For normal people, the main role of the unconscious is to create a balance by providing compensation. Any extreme conscious desires are moderated and toned down by a contrasting impulse in the unconscious. This compensating mechanism, as I have illustrated with the example of the merchant, operates through various unconscious, seemingly irrelevant activities, which Freud has aptly termed symptomatic acts (Symptom-handlungen).
To Freud we owe thanks also for having called attention to the importance of dreams, for by means of them, also, we are able to learn much about this compensating function. There is a fine historical example of this in the well-known dream of Nebuchadnezzar in the fourth chapter of the Book of Daniel, where Nebuchadnezzar at the height of his power had a dream which foretold his downfall. He dreamed of a tree which had raised its head even up to heaven and now must be hewn down. This is a dream which is obviously a counterpoise to the exaggerated feeling of royal power.
To Freud, we should also be grateful for highlighting the significance of dreams, as they allow us to learn a lot about this compensating function. A notable historical example of this is the famous dream of Nebuchadnezzar in the fourth chapter of the Book of Daniel, where Nebuchadnezzar, at the peak of his power, had a dream that predicted his downfall. He dreamed of a tree that had reached up to heaven and now needed to be cut down. This dream clearly serves as a counterbalance to his inflated sense of royal authority.
Now considering states in which the mental balance is disturbed, we can easily see, from what has preceded, wherein lies the importance of the unconscious for psychopathology. Let us ponder the question of where and in what manner the unconscious manifests itself in abnormal mental conditions. The way in which the unconscious works is most clearly seen in disturbances of a psychogenic nature, such as hysteria, compulsion neurosis, etc.
Now looking at states where mental balance is disrupted, we can clearly understand, from what we've discussed, why the unconscious is important for understanding psychological disorders. Let's think about how and where the unconscious shows up in abnormal mental conditions. The way the unconscious operates is most evident in psychogenic disturbances, like hysteria and obsessive-compulsive disorders.
We have known for a long time that certain symptoms[282] of these disturbances are produced by unconscious psychic events. Just as clear, but less recognised, are the manifestations of the unconscious in actually insane patients. As the intuitive ideas of normal men do not spring from logical combinations of the conscious mind, so the hallucinations and delusions of the insane arise, not out of conscious but out of unconscious processes.
We’ve known for a while that some symptoms[282] of these disturbances come from unconscious mental events. Just as obvious, but less acknowledged, are the signs of the unconscious in truly insane patients. Similar to how the intuitive ideas of regular people don't come from logical thinking, the hallucinations and delusions of the mentally ill don't come from conscious thought but from unconscious processes.
Formerly, when we held a more materialistic view of psychiatry we were inclined to believe that all delusions, hallucinations, stereotypic acts, etc., were provoked by morbid processes in the brain cells. Such a theory, however, ignores that delusions, hallucinations, etc., are also to be met with in certain functional disturbances, and not only in the case of functional disturbances, but also in the case of normal people. Primitive people may have visions and hear strange voices without having their mental processes at all disturbed. To seek to ascribe symptoms of that nature directly to a disease of the brain cells I hold to be superficial and unwarranted. Hallucinations show very plainly how a part of the unconscious content can force itself across the threshold of the conscious. The same is true of a delusion whose appearance is at once strange and unexpected by the patient.
In the past, when we had a more materialistic view of psychiatry, we tended to think that all delusions, hallucinations, stereotypical actions, etc., were caused by unhealthy processes in the brain cells. However, this theory overlooks the fact that delusions and hallucinations can also occur in some functional disturbances, and not only in those cases, but also in normal individuals. Indigenous people can experience visions and hear unusual voices without their mental processes being disturbed at all. I believe it's superficial and unjustified to directly link these kinds of symptoms to a disease of the brain cells. Hallucinations clearly show how a part of the unconscious mind can push its way into conscious awareness. The same goes for a delusion, which may suddenly appear in a way that is strange and unexpected for the person experiencing it.
The expression "mental balance" is no mere figure of speech, for its disturbance is a real disturbance of that equilibrium which actually exists between the unconscious and conscious content to a greater extent than has heretofore been recognised or understood. As a matter of fact, it amounts to this—that the normal functioning of the unconscious processes breaks through into the conscious mind in an abnormal manner, and thereby disturbs the adaptation of the individual to his environment.
The term "mental balance" isn’t just a metaphor; its disruption is a genuine disturbance of the equilibrium that exists between unconscious and conscious thoughts more than we’ve previously acknowledged or understood. Essentially, it means that the normal operations of unconscious processes intrude into the conscious mind in an unusual way, disrupting the individual's ability to adapt to their surroundings.
If we study attentively the history of any such person coming under our observation, we shall often find that he has been living for a considerable time in a sort of peculiar individual isolation, more or less shut off from the world of reality. This constrained condition of aloofness may be traced back to certain innate or early acquired peculiarities, which show themselves in the events of his life. For instance,[283] in the histories of those suffering from dementia præcox we often hear such a remark as this: "He was always of a pensive disposition, and much shut up in himself. After his mother died he cut himself off still more from the world, shunning his friends and acquaintances." Or again, we may hear, "Even as a child he devised many peculiar inventions; and later, when he became an engineer, he occupied himself with most ambitious schemes."
If we look closely at the lives of people we observe, we often find that they have been living in a kind of unique individual isolation, somewhat cut off from the real world. This forced state of being distant can usually be traced back to certain inherent or early learned traits that reveal themselves through their life experiences. For example,[283] in the stories of those experiencing dementia praecox, we often hear comments like: "He was always thoughtful and very withdrawn. After his mother passed away, he isolated himself even more from the world, avoiding friends and acquaintances." Alternatively, we might hear, "Even as a child, he came up with many unusual inventions; and later, when he became an engineer, he engaged in very ambitious projects."
Without discussing the matter further it must be plain that a counterpoise is produced in the unconscious as a compensation to the one-sidedness of the conscious attitude. In the first case we may expect to find an increasing pressing forward in the unconscious, of a wish for human intercourse, a longing for mother, friends, relatives; while in the second case self-criticism will try to establish a correcting balance. Among normal people a condition never arises so one-sided that the natural corrective tendencies of the unconscious entirely lose their value in the affairs of everyday life; but in the case of abnormal people, it is eminently characteristic that the individual entirely fails to recognise the compensating influences which arise in the unconscious. He even continues to accentuate his one-sidedness; this is in accord with the well-known psychological fact that the worst enemy of the wolf is the wolf-hound, the greatest despiser of the negro is the mulatto, and that the biggest fanatic is the convert; for I should be a fanatic were I to attack a thing outwardly which inwardly I am obliged to concede as right.
Without discussing the matter further, it's clear that a counterbalance is created in the unconscious as compensation for the one-sidedness of the conscious mindset. In the first scenario, we can expect to see an increasing push in the unconscious for human interaction, a desire for a mother, friends, and family; while in the second scenario, self-criticism will work to establish a correcting balance. Among normal individuals, a situation never becomes so one-sided that the natural corrective tendencies of the unconscious entirely lose their importance in daily life; however, in the case of abnormal individuals, it’s particularly noticeable that they completely fail to recognize the compensating influences that emerge in the unconscious. They even continue to emphasize their one-sidedness; this aligns with the well-known psychological truth that the worst enemy of the wolf is the wolf-hound, the biggest critic of the Black community is often the mixed-race individual, and the most extreme fanatic is usually the convert; because I would be a fanatic if I were to outwardly attack something that I inwardly recognize as right.
The mentally unbalanced man tries to defend himself against his own unconscious, that is to say, he battles against his own compensating influences. The man already dwelling in a sort of atmosphere of isolation, continues to remove himself further and further from the world of reality, and the ambitious engineer strives by increasingly morbid exaggerations of invention to disprove the correctness of his own compensating powers of self-criticism. As a result of this a condition of excitation is produced, from which results a great lack of harmony between the conscious and unconscious[284] attitudes. The pairs of opposites are torn asunder, the resulting division or strife leads to disaster, for the unconscious soon begins to intrude itself violently upon the conscious processes. Then odd and peculiar thoughts and moods supervene, and not infrequently incipient forms of hallucination, which clearly bear the stamp of the internal conflict.
The mentally unstable man tries to defend himself against his own unconscious, meaning he battles against his own compensating influences. Already living in a kind of isolated atmosphere, he continues to distance himself further and further from reality, while the ambitious engineer increasingly resorts to morbid exaggerations of invention to disprove his own abilities for self-criticism. This creates a state of excitation, leading to a significant lack of harmony between his conscious and unconscious attitudes. The opposing sides become torn apart, and this division or conflict brings disaster, as the unconscious soon starts to intrude forcefully on conscious thought. Then strange and unusual thoughts and feelings arise, and often early signs of hallucination appear, clearly reflecting the internal conflict.[284]
These corrective impulses or compensations which now break through into the conscious mind, should theoretically be the beginning of the healing process, because through them the previously isolated attitude should apparently be relieved. But in reality this does not result, for the reason that the unconscious corrective impulses which thus succeed in making themselves apparent to the conscious mind, do so in a form that is altogether unacceptable to consciousness.
These corrective impulses or compensations that are now emerging into the conscious mind should theoretically signal the start of the healing process, as they should relieve the previously isolated attitude. However, in reality, this doesn't happen because the unconscious corrective impulses that manage to surface in the conscious mind do so in a way that is completely unacceptable to our awareness.
The isolated individual begins to hear strange voices, which accuse him of murder and all sorts of crimes. These voices drive him to desperation and in the resulting agitation he attempts to get into contact with the surrounding milieu, and does what he formerly had anxiously avoided. The compensation, to be sure, is reached, but to the detriment of the individual.
The isolated person starts hearing unusual voices that accuse him of murder and various other crimes. These voices push him to the brink of despair, and in his resulting agitation, he tries to connect with the surrounding milieu, doing what he had previously tried to avoid at all costs. He achieves some form of compensation, but it comes at the expense of the individual.
The pathological inventor, who is unable to profit by his previous failures, by refusing to recognise the value of his own self-criticism, becomes the creator of still more preposterous designs. He wishes to accomplish the impossible but falls into the absurd. After a while he notices that people talk about him, make unfavourable remarks about him, and even scoff at him. He believes a far-reaching conspiracy exists to frustrate his discoveries and render them objects of ridicule. By this means his unconscious brings about the same results that his self-criticism could have attained, but again only to the detriment of the individual, because the criticism is projected into his surroundings.
The obsessed inventor, who can't learn from his past failures and refuses to see the worth of his own self-reflection, ends up creating even more ridiculous designs. He wants to achieve the impossible but ends up in absurdity. Eventually, he realizes that people are talking about him, making negative comments, and even mocking him. He believes there's a widespread conspiracy to sabotage his inventions and turn them into objects of mockery. In this way, his subconscious creates the same outcomes that his self-reflection could have achieved, but once again to the detriment of the individual, because the criticism is projected onto his surroundings.
An especially typical form of unconscious compensation—to give a further example—is the paranoia of the alcoholic. The alcoholic loses his love for his wife; the unconscious compensation tries to lead him back again to his duty, but[285] only partially succeeds, for it causes him to become jealous of his wife as if he still loved her. As we know, he may even go so far as to kill both his wife and himself, merely out of jealousy. In other words, his love for his wife has not been entirely lost, it has simply become subliminal; but from the realm of the unconscious it can now only reappear in the form of jealousy.
An especially common form of unconscious compensation—just to give another example—is the paranoia of an alcoholic. The alcoholic loses his love for his wife; the unconscious compensation tries to pull him back to his responsibilities, but[285] only partially succeeds, leading him to become jealous of his wife as if he still loved her. As we know, he might even go so far as to kill both his wife and himself, simply out of jealousy. In other words, his love for his wife hasn't completely disappeared; it has just become hidden. However, from the depths of the unconscious, it can now only surface as jealousy.
We see something of a similar nature in the case of religious converts. One who turns from protestantism to catholicism has, as is well known, the tendency to be somewhat fanatical. His protestantism is not entirely relinquished, but has merely disappeared into the unconscious, where it is constantly at work as a counter-argument against the newly acquired catholicism. Therefore the new convert feels himself constrained to defend the faith he has adopted in a more or less fanatical way. It is exactly the same in the case of the paranoiac, who feels himself constantly constrained to defend himself against all external criticism, because his delusional system is too much threatened from within.
We see something similar in the case of religious converts. Someone who switches from Protestantism to Catholicism often tends to become somewhat fanatical. Their Protestant beliefs aren’t completely let go; instead, they sink into the unconscious, where they continuously work as a counter-argument against their newly adopted Catholicism. As a result, the new convert feels a strong need to defend their faith in a more or less fanatical manner. This is exactly the same for a paranoid person, who feels a constant need to defend themselves against external criticism because their delusional beliefs are heavily threatened from within.
The strange manner in which these compensating influences break through into the conscious mind derives its peculiarities from the fact that they have to struggle against the resistances already existing in the conscious mind, and therefore present themselves to the patient's mind in a thoroughly distorted manner. And secondly, these compensating equivalents are obliged necessarily to present themselves in the language of the unconscious—that is, in material of a heterogeneous and subliminal nature. For all the material of the conscious mind which is of no further value, and can find no suitable employment, becomes subliminal, such as all those forgotten infantile and phantastic creations that have ever entered the heads of men, of which only the legends and myths still remain. For certain reasons which I cannot discuss further here, this latter material is frequently found in dementia præcox.
The unusual way these compensating influences come into the conscious mind has its quirks because they have to fight against the existing resistance in the conscious mind, showing up to the patient's mind in a very distorted way. Additionally, these compensating equivalents have to express themselves in the language of the unconscious—that is, using material that is diverse and beneath the surface. All the material in the conscious mind that no longer has value and can't be used effectively becomes subliminal, such as all those forgotten childhood memories and fantastic creations that have ever crossed people's minds, of which only the legends and myths remain. For certain reasons that I can't explain further here, this latter material is often found in dementia praecox.
I hope I may have been able to give in this brief contribution, which I feel to be unfortunately incomplete, a[286] glimpse of the situation as it presents itself to me of the importance of the unconscious in psychopathology. It would be impossible in a short discourse to give an adequate idea of all the work that has already been done in this field.
I hope I’ve been able to provide in this brief contribution, which I feel is unfortunately incomplete, a[286] glimpse of the situation as I see it regarding the importance of the unconscious in psychopathology. It would be impossible in a short talk to convey all the work that has already been done in this area.
To sum up, I may say that the function of the unconscious in conditions of mental disturbance is essentially a compensation of the content of the conscious mind. But because of the characteristic condition of one-sidedness of the conscious striving in all such cases, the compensating correctives are rendered useless. It is, however, inevitable that these unconscious tendencies break through into the conscious mind, but in adapting themselves to the character of the one-sided conscious aims, it is only possible for them to appear in a distorted and unacceptable form.
To sum up, I can say that the role of the unconscious during mental disturbances is basically to compensate for what's going on in the conscious mind. However, because of the typical one-sidedness of conscious efforts in these situations, the compensating corrections become ineffective. It’s unavoidable that these unconscious tendencies surface in the conscious mind, but as they adjust to the nature of those one-sided conscious goals, they can only emerge in a distorted and unacceptable way.
CHAPTER XI
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES[183]
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES[183]
It is well known that in their general physiognomy hysteria and dementia præcox present a striking contrast, which is seen particularly in the attitude of the sufferers towards the external world. The reactions provoked in the hysteric surpass the normal level of intensity of feeling, whilst this level is not reached at all by the precocious dement. The picture presented by these contrasted illnesses is one of exaggerated emotivity in the one, and extreme apathy in the other, with regard to the environment. In their personal relations this difference is very marked. Abstraction creates some exceptions here, for we remain in affective rapport with our hysterical patients, which is not the case in dementia præcox.
It’s well known that hysteria and dementia praecox show a stark contrast in their overall appearance, especially in how those affected react to the outside world. The responses seen in hysterics go far beyond the normal level of emotional intensity, while that level isn't even reached by those with precocious dementia. The contrasting conditions illustrate exaggerated emotions in one case and extreme indifference in the other when it comes to their surroundings. This difference is very clear in their personal relationships. However, abstraction offers some exceptions here, as we maintain an emotional connection with our hysterical patients, which isn’t the case for those with dementia praecox.
The opposition between these two nosological types is also seen in the rest of their symptomatology. From the intellectual point of view the products of hysterical imagination may be accounted for in a very natural and human way in each individual case by the antecedents and individual history of the patient; while the inventions of the precocious dement, on the contrary, are more nearly related to dreams than to normal consciousness, and they display moreover an incontestably archaic tendency, wherein mythological creations of primitive imagination are more in evidence than the personal memories of the patient. From the physical point of view we do not find in dementia præcox those symptoms[288] so common in the hysteric, which simulate well known or severe organic affections.
The difference between these two types of conditions is also evident in their other symptoms. From an intellectual perspective, the results of a hysterical imagination can be explained in a very natural and human way based on the patient’s background and personal history. In contrast, the ideas of someone with early-onset dementia are more related to dreams than to typical consciousness, and they show a noticeably archaic tendency, where mythological concepts from primitive imagination are more prominent than the patient's personal memories. Physically, we don’t find the symptoms in schizophrenia that are so common in hysterical patients, which mimic well-known or serious organic disorders.[288]
All this clearly indicates that hysteria is characterised by a centrifugal tendency of the libido,[184] whilst in dementia præcox its tendency is centripetal. The reverse occurs, however, where the illness has fully established its compensatory effects. In the hysteric the libido is always hampered in its movements of expansion and forced to regress upon itself; one observes that such individuals cease to partake in the common life, are wrapped up in their phantasies, keep their beds, or are unable to live outside their sick-rooms, etc. The precocious dement, on the contrary, during the incubation of his illness turns away from the outer world in order to withdraw into himself; but when the period of morbid compensation arrives, he seems constrained to draw attention to himself, and to force himself upon the notice of those around him, by his extravagant, insupportable, or directly aggressive conduct.
All this clearly shows that hysteria is marked by a outward pull of the libido,[184] while in dementia praecox, it's an inward pull. However, the opposite happens when the illness has fully settled into its compensatory effects. In hysterics, the libido is always restricted in its ability to expand and is forced to turn back on itself; it can be seen that these individuals stop engaging in daily life, become lost in their fantasies, stay in bed, or can't live outside their sickrooms, etc. The early-stage demented person, on the other hand, during the early part of their illness, turns away from the outside world to retreat into themselves; but once the period of unhealthy compensation begins, they seem driven to seek attention and force themselves into the awareness of those around them through their over-the-top, unbearable, or outright aggressive behavior.
I propose to use the terms "extroversion" and "introversion" to describe these two opposite directions of the libido, further qualifying them, however, as "regressive" in morbid cases where phantasies, fictions, or phantastic interpretations, inspired by emotivity, falsify the perceptions of the subject about things, or about himself. We say that he is extroverted when he gives his fundamental interest to the outer or objective world, and attributes an all-important and essential value to it: he is introverted, on the contrary, when the objective world suffers a sort of depreciation, or want of consideration, for the sake of the exaltation of the individual himself, who then monopolising all the interest, grows to believe no one but himself worthy of consideration. I will call "regressive extroversion" the phenomenon which Freud[289] calls "transference" (Übertragung), by which the hysteric projects into the objective world the illusions, or subjective values of his feelings. In the same way I shall call "regressive introversion," the opposite pathological phenomenon which we find in dementia præcox, where the subject himself suffers these phantastical transfigurations.
I suggest using the terms "extroversion" and "introversion" to describe these two opposing directions of the libido, but I’ll further qualify them as "regressive" in cases where fantasies, make-believe, or imaginative interpretations, driven by emotionality, distort the subject's perceptions of things or of themselves. We consider someone extroverted when they focus their primary interest on the external or objective world, assigning it significant and essential value; conversely, they are introverted when the external world is undervalued or dismissed to elevate their own individuality, leading them to believe that only they deserve attention. I will refer to "regressive extroversion" as the phenomenon Freud[289] calls "transference" (Übertragung), where the hysteric projects their illusions or subjective feelings into the objective world. Similarly, I’ll label the opposite pathological condition, seen in dementia præcox, as "regressive introversion," where the individual experiences these fanciful transformations themselves.
It is obvious that these two contrary movements of the libido, as simple psychic mechanisms, may play a part alternately in the same individual, since after all they serve the same purpose by different methods—namely, to minister to his well-being. Freud has taught us that in the mechanism of hysterical transference the individual aims at getting rid of disagreeable memories or impressions, in order to free himself from painful complexes, by a process of "repression." Conversely in the mechanism of introversion, the personality tends to concentrate itself upon its complexes, and with them, to isolate itself from external reality, by a process which is not properly speaking "repression," but which would be better rendered perhaps by the term "depreciation" (Entwertung) of the objective world.
It’s clear that these two opposing movements of the libido, as basic mental mechanisms, can take turns in the same person since they ultimately aim to promote well-being through different approaches. Freud has shown us that in the process of hysterical transference, a person tries to eliminate unpleasant memories or feelings to free themselves from painful complexes through a process called "repression." On the other hand, in the process of introversion, the personality tends to focus on its complexes and, as a result, isolates itself from external reality—not through "repression" in the strict sense, but perhaps better described as "depreciation" (Entwertung) of the outside world.
The existence of two mental affections so opposite in character as hysteria and dementia præcox, in which the contrast rests on the almost exclusive supremacy of extroversion or introversion, suggests that these two psychological types may exist equally well in normal persons, who may be characterised by the relative predominance of one or other of the two mechanisms. Psychiatrists know very well that before either illness is fully declared, patients already present the characteristic type, traces of which are to be found from the earliest years of life. As Binet pointed out so well, the neurotic only accentuates and shews in relief the characteristic traits of his personality. One knows, of course, that the hysterical character is not simply the product of the illness, but pre-existed it in a measure. And Hoch has shown by his researches into the histories of his dementia præcox patients, that this is also the case with them; dissociations or eccentricities were present before the onset of the illness. If this is so, one may certainly expect to meet the same[290] contrast between psychological temperaments outside the sphere of pathology. It is moreover easy to cull from literature numerous examples which bear witness to the actual existence of these two opposite types of mentality. Without pretending to exhaust the subject, I will give a few striking examples.
The existence of two mental conditions as different as hysteria and schizophrenia, where the difference lies in the nearly exclusive dominance of extroversion or introversion, suggests that these two psychological types can also be found in normal individuals, who may be marked by a relative dominance of one mechanism over the other. Psychiatrists are well aware that before either condition is fully developed, patients already exhibit the characteristic type, which can be traced back to their earliest years. As Binet pointed out, neurotics simply amplify and highlight the defining traits of their personality. It's understood that the hysterical character isn't just created by the illness but was already present to some degree before it developed. Hoch's research into the histories of his schizophrenia patients has shown that this is also true for them; dissociations or eccentricities were evident before the illness began. If this is the case, we can certainly expect to encounter the same contrast between psychological temperaments outside the realm of pathology. Moreover, it's easy to find numerous examples in literature that testify to the actual existence of these two opposite mental types. Without trying to cover the entire topic, I will provide a few notable examples.
In my opinion, we owe the best observations on this subject to the philosophy of William James.[185] He lays down the principle that no matter what may be the temperament of a "professional philosopher," it is this temperament which he feels himself forced to express and to justify in his philosophy. And starting from this idea, which is altogether in accord with the spirit of psychoanalysis, divides philosophers into two classes: the "tender-minded," who are only interested in the inner life and spiritual things; and the "tough-minded," who lay most stress on material things and objective reality. We see that these two classes are actuated by exactly opposite tendencies of the libido: the "tender-minded" represent introversion, the "tough-minded" extroversion.
In my view, we owe the best insights on this topic to the philosophy of William James.[185] He establishes the idea that regardless of a "professional philosopher's" temperament, it is this temperament that he feels compelled to express and validate in his philosophy. Starting from this notion, which aligns well with the essence of psychoanalysis, he categorizes philosophers into two groups: the "tender-minded," who focus solely on the inner life and spiritual matters, and the "tough-minded," who prioritize material aspects and objective reality. It’s clear that these two groups are motivated by completely opposite tendencies of the libido: the "tender-minded" symbolize introversion, while the "tough-minded" exemplify extroversion.
James says that the tender-minded are characterised by rationalism; they are men of principles and of systems, they aspire to dominate experience and to transcend it by abstract reasoning, by their logical deductions, and purely rational conceptions. They care little for facts, and the multiplicity of phenomena hardly embarrasses them at all: they forcibly fit data into their ideal constructions, and reduce everything to their a priori premises. This was the method of Hegel in settling beforehand the number of the planets. In the domain of mental pathology we again meet this kind of philosopher in paranoiacs, who, without being disquieted by the flat contradictions presented by experience, impose their delirious conceptions on the universe, and find means of interpreting everything, and according to Adler "arranging" everything, in conformity with their morbidly preconceived system.
James says that the tender-minded are defined by rationalism; they are people of principles and systems, aiming to control and go beyond experience through abstract reasoning, logical deductions, and purely rational ideas. They pay little attention to facts, and the variety of phenomena doesn’t really bother them at all: they force data into their ideal frameworks and reduce everything to their a priori premises. This was Hegel's approach when he predetermined the number of planets. In the area of mental pathology, we encounter this type of philosopher again in paranoiacs, who, unfazed by the obvious contradictions presented by experience, project their delusional ideas onto the universe and find ways to interpret everything, and according to Adler, "arrange" everything, to match their distorted preconceived system.
The other traits which James depicts in this type follow[291] naturally from its fundamental character. The tender-minded man, he says, is intellectual, idealist, optimist, religious, partisan of free-will, a monist, and a dogmatist. All these qualities betray the almost exclusive concentration of the libido upon the intellectual life. This concentration upon the inner world of thought is nothing else than introversion. In so far as experience plays a rôle with these philosophers, it serves only as an allurement or fillip to abstraction, in response to the imperative need to fit forcibly all the chaos of the universe within well-defined limits, which are, in the last resort, the creation of a spirit obedient to its subjective values.
The other traits that James describes in this type follow[291] naturally from its core nature. The tender-minded person, he argues, is intellectual, an idealist, an optimist, religious, a supporter of free will, a monist, and a dogmatist. All these qualities show a nearly complete focus of the libido on the intellectual life. This focus on the inner world of thought is nothing more than introversion. To the extent that experience plays a rôle for these philosophers, it only serves as a lure or a boost to abstraction, responding to the urgent need to forcibly impose order on the chaos of the universe, which ultimately stems from a spirit that conforms to its subjective values.
The tough-minded man is positivist and empiricist. He regards only matters of fact. Experience is his master, his exclusive guide and inspiration. It is only empirical phenomena demonstrable in the outside world which count. Thought is merely a reaction to external experience. In the eyes of these philosophers principles are never of such value as facts; they can only reflect and describe the sequence of phenomena and cannot construct a system. Thus their theories are exposed to contradiction under the overwhelming accumulation of empirical material. Psychic reality for the positivist limits itself to the observation and experience of pleasure and pain; he does not go beyond that, nor does he recognise the rights of philosophical thought. Remaining on the ever-changing surface of the phenomenal world, he partakes himself of its instability; carried away in the chaotic tumult of the universe, he sees all its aspects, all its theoretical and practical possibilities, but he never arrives at the unity or the fixity of a settled system, which alone could satisfy the idealist or tender-minded. The positivist depreciates all values in reducing them to elements lower than themselves; he explains the higher by the lower, and dethrones it, by showing that it is "nothing but such another thing," which has no value in itself.
The tough-minded person is a realist and empiricist. They focus only on factual matters. Experience is their guide, inspiration, and the only thing that matters. Only observable phenomena in the external world hold significance. Thought is just a response to external experiences. In the view of these thinkers, principles are never as valuable as facts; they can only reflect and describe the order of phenomena and cannot create a system. Therefore, their theories are vulnerable to contradiction due to the overwhelming accumulation of empirical evidence. For the empiricist, psychological reality is limited to the observation and experience of pleasure and pain; they do not go beyond that, nor do they recognize the validity of philosophical thought. Staying on the ever-changing surface of the observable world, they become part of its instability; swept away in the chaotic turmoil of the universe, they see all its aspects, all its theoretical and practical possibilities, but they never reach the unity or stability of a fixed system, which is what would satisfy the idealist or sensitive-minded person. The empiricist undervalues all values by reducing them to elements that are lesser; they explain the higher by the lower, diminishing it by showing that it is "just another thing," which holds no inherent value.
From these general characteristics, the others which James points out logically follow. The positivist is a sensualist, giving greater value to the specific realm of the[292] senses than to reflection which transcends it. He is a materialist and a pessimist, for he knows only too well the hopeless uncertainty of the course of things. He is irreligious, not being in a state to hold firmly to the realities of the inner world as opposed to the pressure of external facts; he is a determinist and fatalist, only able to show resignation; a pluralist, incapable of all synthesis; and finally a sceptic, as a last and inevitable consequence of all the rest.
From these general characteristics, the other traits that James points out logically follow. The positivist is a sensualist, valuing the specific realm of the[292] senses more than reflection that goes beyond it. He is a materialist and a pessimist, as he is all too aware of the hopeless uncertainty of how things unfold. He is irreligious, unable to firmly grasp the realities of the inner world in contrast to the pressure of external facts; he is a determinist and fatalist, only able to show resignation; a pluralist, lacking any ability to synthesize; and finally a skeptic, which is the inevitable result of all the rest.
The expressions, therefore, used by James, show clearly that the diversity of types is the result of a different localisation of the libido; this libido is the magic power in the depth of our being, which, following the personality, carries it sometimes towards internal life, and sometimes towards the objective world. James compares, for example, the religious subjectivism of the idealist, and the quasi-religious attitude of the contemporary empiricist: "Our esteem for facts has not neutralised in us all religiousness. It is itself almost religious. Our scientific temper is devout."[186]
The expressions used by James clearly show that the variety of types comes from different locations of the libido; this libido is the magical force deep within us that, following our personality, sometimes leads us towards inner life and other times towards the outside world. James compares, for example, the religious subjectivity of the idealist and the almost-religious attitude of the modern empiricist: "Our appreciation for facts hasn’t wiped out all our sense of the religious. It’s nearly religious itself. Our scientific mindset is devout."[186]
A second parallel is furnished by Wilhelm Ostwald,[187] who divides "savants" and men of genius into classics and romantics. The latter are distinguished by their rapid reactions, their extremely prompt and abundant production of ideas and projects, some of which are badly digested and of doubtful value. They are admirable and brilliant masters, loving to teach, of a contagious ardour and enthusiasm, which attracts many pupils, and makes them founders of schools, exercising great personal influence. Herein our type of extroversion is easily recognised. The classics of Ostwald are, on the contrary, slow to react; they produce with much difficulty, are little capable of teaching or of exercising direct personal influence, and lacking enthusiasm are paralysed by their own severe criticism, living apart and absorbed in themselves, making scarcely any disciples, but[293] producing works of finished perfection which often bring them posthumous fame. All these characteristics correspond to introversion.
A second parallel is provided by Wilhelm Ostwald,[187] who categorizes "experts" and creative individuals into classics and romantics. The romantics are marked by their quick reactions and their rapid and plentiful generation of ideas and projects, some of which are poorly thought out and questionable in value. They are impressive and talented teachers, radiating an infectious passion and enthusiasm that draws in many students, making them the founders of schools and enhancing their personal influence. This aligns clearly with our type of extroversion. In contrast, Ostwald's classics are slow to respond; they struggle to produce work, are not very capable of teaching or directly influencing others, and without enthusiasm, they are hindered by their own harsh self-critique, living mostly in isolation and deeply focused on themselves, creating very few followers, but[293] producing works of refined perfection that often earn them fame after they pass away. All these traits align with introversion.
We find a further very valuable example in the æsthetic theory of Warringer. Borrowing from A. Riegl his expression "Volonté d'art absolue" to express the internal force which inspires the artist, he distinguishes two forms, viz. sympathy (Einfühlung) and abstraction; and the term which he employs indicates that here, too, we witness the activity of the push of the libido, the stirring of the élan vital. "In the same way," says Warringer, "as the sympathetic impulse finds its satisfaction in organic beauty, so abstract impulse discovers beauty in the inorganic, which is the negation of all life, in crystallised forms, and in a general manner wherever the severity of abstract law reigns." Whilst sympathy represents the warmth of passion which carries it into the presence of the object in order to assimilate it and penetrate it with emotional values; abstraction, on the other hand, despoils the object of all that could recall life, and grasps it by purely intellectual thought, crystallised and fixed into the rigid forms of law,—the universal, the typical. Bergson also makes use of these images of crystallisation, solidification, etc., to illustrate the essence of intellectual abstraction.
We can find another very valuable example in Warringer's aesthetic theory. He uses A. Riegl's phrase "Volonté d'art absolue" to describe the internal drive that inspires artists, and he distinguishes between two forms: sympathy (Einfühlung) and abstraction. The term he uses shows that we are also observing the influence of libido, the stirring of the élan vital. "Similarly," Warringer says, "just as the sympathetic impulse finds satisfaction in organic beauty, the abstract impulse finds beauty in the inorganic, which negates all life, in crystallized forms, and generally wherever the strictness of abstract law prevails." While sympathy represents the warmth of passion that seeks to connect with and infuse the object with emotional values, abstraction strips the object of anything that might remind us of life and engages with it purely through intellectual thought, crystallized and fixed into rigid forms of law—the universal and the typical. Bergson also uses images of crystallization and solidification to illustrate the nature of intellectual abstraction.
Warringer's "abstraction" represents the process which I have already remarked as a consequence of introversion, namely, the exaltation of the intellect, in the place of the depreciated reality of the external world. "Sympathy" corresponds in fact to extroversion, for, as Lipps has pointed out, "What I perceive sympathetically in an object is, in a general manner life, and life is power, internal work, effort, and execution. To live, in a word, is to act, and to act is to experience intimately the force which we give out; experience creates activity, which is essentially of a spontaneous character." "Æsthetic enjoyment," said Warringer, "is the enjoyment of one's own self projected into the "object," a formula which corresponds absolutely with our definition of transference. This æsthetic conception does not refer to the positivist in James's sense; it is rather the attitude[294] of the idealist for whom psychological reality only is interesting, and worthy of consideration." Warringer adds, "what is essential lies not in the gradation of the feeling, but pre-eminently in the feeling itself; that is to say, the inner movement, the intimate life, the unfolding of the subject's own activity; the value of a line or of a form, depends in our eyes on the biological value it holds for us; that which gives beauty is solely our own vital feeling, which we unconsciously project into it." This view corresponds exactly with my own way of understanding the theory of the libido, in attempting to keep the true balance between the two psychological opposites of introversion and extroversion.
Warringer's "abstraction" represents a process I've already mentioned as a result of introversion, which is the elevation of intellect over the undervalued reality of the external world. "Sympathy," on the other hand, corresponds to extroversion because, as Lipps pointed out, "What I perceive sympathetically in an object is, in general, life, and life is power, internal work, effort, and execution. To live, in a nutshell, is to act, and to act is to deeply experience the force we emit; experience leads to activity, which is fundamentally spontaneous." Warringer states, "Aesthetic enjoyment is the enjoyment of one's own self reflected in the 'object,'” a definition that aligns perfectly with our understanding of transference. This aesthetic notion doesn't refer to the positivist sense in James’s view; it's more about the perspective of the idealist, for whom psychological reality is the only thing that matters and deserves attention. Warringer adds, "What truly matters is not the gradation of feeling but primarily the feeling itself; that is to say, the inner movement, the intimate life, the unfolding of the subject's own activity. The value of a line or a form depends on its biological significance for us; what gives beauty is entirely our own vital feeling, which we unconsciously project into it." This perspective aligns precisely with my understanding of the theory of libido, as I aim to maintain a true balance between the two psychological opposites of introversion and extroversion.
The polar opposite of sympathy is abstraction. The impulse of abstraction is conceived by Warringer "as the result of a great internal conflict of the human soul in the presence of the external world, and from the religious standpoint, it corresponds to a strong transcendental colouring of all the representations man has made to himself of reality." We recognise clearly in this definition the primordial tendency to introversion. To the introverted type the universe does not appear beautiful and desirable, but disquieting, and even dangerous; it is a manifestation against which the subject puts himself on the defensive; he entrenches himself in his inner fastness, and fortifies himself therein by the invention of geometrical figures, full of repose, perfectly clear even in their minutest details, the primitive magic power of which assures him of domination over the surrounding world.
The complete opposite of sympathy is abstraction. Warringer describes the impulse of abstraction "as the result of a significant internal struggle of the human soul when faced with the external world, and from a religious perspective, it aligns with a strong transcendental influence on all the images that humanity creates of reality." This definition clearly reflects the fundamental tendency toward introversion. For the introverted individual, the universe doesn’t seem beautiful or appealing; instead, it appears unsettling and even threatening. It’s a force against which they feel they need to defend themselves. They retreat into their inner sanctuary and strengthen it by creating geometric shapes, which are calm and distinctly clear in even the smallest details, and this primitive magical quality gives them a sense of control over the world around them.
"The need of abstraction is the origin of all art," says Warringer. Here is a great principle, which gains weighty confirmation from the fact that precocious dements reproduce forms and figures which present the closest analogy to those of primitive humanity, not only in their thoughts but also in their drawings.
"The need for abstraction is the foundation of all art," says Warringer. This is a significant principle, which is strongly supported by the fact that early-developing individuals create forms and figures that closely resemble those of primitive humans, not just in their ideas but also in their drawings.
We should recall that Schiller had already tried to formulate the same presentation in what he calls the naïve and sentimental types. The latter is in quest of nature, whilst the former is itself "all nature." Schiller also saw that these two types result from the predominance of psychological[295] mechanisms which might be met with in one and the same individual. "It is not only in the same poet," he said, "but even in the same work that these two types of mentality are found united.... The naïve poet pursues only nature and feeling in their simplicity, and all his effort is limited to the imitation and reproduction of reality. The sentimental poet, on the contrary, reflects the impression he receives from objects. The object here is allied to an idea, and the poetic power of the work depends on this alliance." These quotations shew what types Schiller had in view, and one recognises their fundamental identity with those with which we are here dealing.
We should remember that Schiller already attempted to define the same concepts with what he calls the naïve and sentimental types. The latter seeks nature, while the former is "all nature" itself. Schiller also observed that these two types arise from the dominance of psychological[295] mechanisms which can exist within a single individual. "It is not only in the same poet," he stated, "but even in the same work that these two types of mentality can be found together.... The naïve poet only pursues nature and feeling in their simplicity, and all his effort revolves around imitating and reproducing reality. The sentimental poet, in contrast, reflects the impression he gets from objects. In this case, the object is connected to an idea, and the poetic strength of the work relies on this connection." These quotes show what types Schiller had in mind, and one can see their fundamental similarity to those we're addressing here.
We find another instance in Nietzsche's contrast between the minds of Apollo and of Dionysus. The example which Nietzsche uses to illustrate this contrast is instructive—namely, that between a dream and intoxication. In a dream the individual is shut up in himself, in intoxication, on the contrary, he forgets himself to the highest degree, and, set free from his self-consciousness, plunges into the multiplicity of the objective world. To depict Apollo, Nietzsche borrows the words of Schopenhauer, "As upon a tumultuous sea, which disgorges and swallows by turns, lost to view in the mountains of foaming waves, the mariner remains seated tranquilly on his plank, full of confidence in his frail barque; so individual man, in a world of troubles, lives passive and serene, relying with confidence on the principle of 'individuation.'" "Yes," continues Nietzsche, "we might say that the unshakeable confidence in this principle, and the calm security of those whom it has inspired, have found in Apollo their most sublime expression, and we may always recognise in him the most splendid and divine personification of the principle of making an individual." The Apollien state, as Nietzsche conceives it, is consequently the withdrawal into oneself, that is, introversion. Conversely in the Dionysian state, psychic intoxication, indicates in his view the unloosening of a torrent of libido which expends itself upon things. "This is not only," says Nietzsche, "the alliance of man with man, which finds itself confirmed afresh under[296] the Dionysian enchantment; it is alienated Nature, hostile or enslaved, which also celebrates her reconciliation with her prodigal child,—man. Spontaneously Earth offers her gifts and the wild beasts from rock and desert draw near peacefully. The car of Dionysus is lost under flowers and garlands; panthers and tigers approach under his yoke."
We see another example in Nietzsche's comparison of the minds of Apollo and Dionysus. The specific example he uses to illustrate this contrast is quite telling—it's the difference between dreaming and being intoxicated. In a dream, a person is trapped within themselves, while in intoxication, they lose themselves completely and, freed from self-consciousness, dive into the richness of the outside world. To describe Apollo, Nietzsche quotes Schopenhauer: "Just as a sailor remains calm and confident on his small boat amidst a turbulent sea, lost amid the mountains of foaming waves, so too does an individual man live passively and peacefully in a troubled world, confidently relying on the principle of 'individuation.'" "Indeed," Nietzsche adds, "we can say that the unwavering faith in this principle and the calm assurance it inspires have found their most majestic expression in Apollo, who represents the most beautiful and divine embodiment of the idea of individuality." The Apollonian state, as Nietzsche envisions it, is essentially a retreat into oneself, or introversion. On the other hand, the Dionysian state, marked by psychic intoxication, represents the release of a torrent of desire that is directed outward towards things. "This is not only," Nietzsche states, "the bond between individuals, which is reaffirmed under the Dionysian spell; it is also Nature itself, alienated, hostile, or enslaved, that celebrates its reunion with its wayward child—man. The Earth generously offers her gifts, and wild animals from the mountains and deserts approach peacefully. The chariot of Dionysus is overwhelmed with flowers and garlands; panthers and tigers come near, drawn by his presence."
If we change Beethoven's "Hymn of Praise" into a picture, and giving rein to our imagination, contemplate the millions of beings prostrated and trembling in the dust, at such a moment the Dionysian intoxication will be near at hand. Then is the slave free; then all the rigid and hostile barriers which poverty and arbitrary or insolent custom have established between man and man are broken down. Now, by means of this gospel of universal harmony, each feels himself not only reunited, reconciled, fused with his neighbour, but actually identified with him, as if the veil of "Maïa was torn away, nothing remaining of it but a few shreds floating before the mystery of the Primordial Unity."[188] It would be superfluous to add comment to these quotations.
If we turn Beethoven's "Hymn of Praise" into an image, and let our imagination run wild, we can picture millions of beings bowing down and trembling in the dust. At that moment, the euphoric feeling of Dionysian intoxication will be close. In that instance, the slave is free; all the strict and hostile barriers that poverty and unyielding or arrogant customs have set up between people are shattered. Now, through this message of universal harmony, everyone feels not only united, reconciled, and merged with their neighbor, but actually one with them, as if the veil of "Maïa" has been ripped away, leaving just a few tattered pieces drifting before the mystery of the Primordial Unity.[188] It would be unnecessary to add comments to these quotes.
In concluding this series of examples culled outside my own special domain, I will quote the linguistic hypothesis of Finck,[189] where we also see the duality in question. The structure of language, according to Finck, presents two principal types: in one the subject is generally conceived as active: "I see him," "I strike him down;" in the other the subject experiences and feels, and it is the object which acts: "He appears to me," "He succumbs to me." The first type clearly shews the libido as going out of the subject,—this is a centrifugal movement; the second as coming out of the object,—this movement is centripetal. We meet with this latter introverted type especially in the primitive languages of the Esquimaux.
In wrapping up this series of examples drawn from outside my usual area of expertise, I want to mention Finck's linguistic hypothesis,[189] where we can also see the duality we're discussing. According to Finck, the structure of language has two main types: in one, the subject is usually seen as active: "I see him," "I strike him down;" in the other, the subject experiences and feels while the object acts: "He appears to me," "He succumbs to me." The first type clearly shows the libido moving away from the subject—this is a centrifugal movement; the second shows it coming from the object—this is centripetal. We find this latter, inward-focused type especially in the primitive languages of the Eskimos.
In the domain of psychiatry also these two types have been described by Otto Gross,[190] who distinguishes two forms[297] of mental debility: the one a diffuse and shallow consciousness, the other a concentrated and deep consciousness. The first is characterised by weakness of the consecutive function, the second by its excessive reinforcement. Gross has recognised that the consecutive function is in intimate relation with affectivity, from which we might infer that he is dealing once more with our two psychological types. The relation he establishes between maniac depressive insanity and the state of diffuse or extended and shallow mental disease shows that the latter represents the extroverted type; and the relation between the psychology of the paranoiac and repressed mentality, indicates the identity of the former with the introverted type.
In psychiatry, Otto Gross has described two types of mental debility: one characterized by a diffuse and shallow awareness, and the other by a concentrated and deep awareness. The first type is marked by a weakness in sequential thinking, while the second is defined by an excessive enhancement of it. Gross recognized that sequential thinking is closely linked to emotions, suggesting that he is addressing our two psychological types again. The connection he makes between manic-depressive disorder and the state of diffuse or shallow mental illness indicates that the latter represents the extroverted type; on the other hand, the relationship between the psychology of the paranoid and repressed mental states shows that the former aligns with the introverted type.
After the foregoing considerations no one will be astonished to find that in the domain of psychoanalysis we also have to reckon with the existence of these two psychological types.
After considering all of this, it's not surprising to see that in the field of psychoanalysis, we also need to take into account the presence of these two psychological types.
On the one side we meet with a theory which is essentially reductive, pluralist, causal and sensualist; this is Freud's standpoint. This theory limits itself rigidly to empirical facts, and traces back complexes to their antecedents and their elemental factors. It regards the psychological life as being only an effect, a reaction to the environment, and accords the greatest rôle and the largest place to sensation. On the other side we have the diametrically opposed theory of Adler[191] which is an entirely philosophical and finalistic one. In it phenomena are not reducible to earlier and very primitive factors, but are conceived as "arrangements," the outcome of intentions and of ends of an extremely complex nature. It is no longer the view of causality but of finality which dominates researches: the history of the patient and the concrete influences of the environment are of much less importance than the dominating principles, the "fictions directrices," of the individual. It is not essential for him to depend upon the object, and to find in it his fill of subjective enjoyment, but to protect his own individuality and to guarantee it against the hostile influences of the environment.
On one hand, we encounter a theory that is basically reductive, pluralistic, causal, and rooted in sensory experience; this is Freud's viewpoint. This theory strictly focuses on empirical facts, tracing complexes back to their origins and basic components. It sees psychological life as merely a result, a reaction to the environment, and gives the most importance to sensation. On the other hand, we have the completely opposite theory of Adler[191], which is entirely philosophical and purpose-driven. In this theory, phenomena are not reduced to earlier or very basic factors but are understood as "arrangements" that result from intentions and complex goals. It emphasizes purpose rather than causation in research: the patient's history and the specific influences from the environment matter much less than the overarching principles, the "fictions directrices," of the individual. It’s not crucial for a person to rely on the object and find their share of subjective enjoyment in it, but rather to safeguard their own individuality and protect it from the negative influences of the environment.
Whilst Freud's psychology has for its predominant note the centrifugal tendency, which demands its happiness and satisfaction in the objective world, in that of Adler the chief rôle belongs to the centripetal movement, which tends to the supremacy of the subject, to his triumph and his liberty, as opposed to the overwhelming forces of existence. The expedient to which the type described by Freud has recourse is "infantile transference," by means of which he projects phantasy into the object and finds a compensation for the difficulties of life in this transfiguration. In the type described by Adler what is characteristic is, on the contrary, the "virile protest," personal resistance, the efficacious safeguard which the individual provides for himself, in affirming and stubbornly enclosing himself in his dominating ideas.
While Freud's psychology focuses on the need for happiness and satisfaction in the external world, Adler's approach emphasizes the importance of personal agency, triumph, and freedom, standing against the overwhelming forces of existence. Freud's method involves "infantile transference," where he projects fantasy onto objects and finds comfort in this transformation to cope with life's challenges. On the other hand, Adler's perspective highlights the "masculine protest," characterized by personal resistance and the effective safeguard individuals create for themselves by firmly asserting and surrounding themselves with their dominant beliefs.
The difficult task of elaborating a psychology which should pay equal attention to the two types of mentality belongs to the future.
The challenging job of creating a psychology that gives equal focus to both types of mindset is something for the future.
CHAPTER XII
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DREAMS[192]
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DREAMS __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
A dream is a psychic structure which at first sight appears to be in striking contrast with conscious thought, because judging by its form and substance it apparently does not lie within the continuity of development of the conscious contents, it is not integral to it, but is a mere external and apparently accidental occurrence. Its mode of genesis is in itself sufficient to isolate a dream from the other contents of the conscious, for it is a survival of a peculiar psychic activity which takes place during sleep, and does not originate in the manifest and clearly logical and emotional continuity of the event experienced.
A dream is a mental construct that at first glance seems to be completely different from conscious thought. Its form and content don’t seem to fit with the ongoing development of conscious awareness; it feels separate and somewhat random. The way a dream is created is enough to set it apart from other conscious experiences, as it’s a remnant of a unique mental process that happens during sleep and doesn’t come from the clear, logical, and emotional continuity of the events experienced.
But a careful observer should have no difficulty in discovering that a dream is not entirely severed from the continuity of the conscious, for in almost every dream certain details are found which have their origin in the impressions, thoughts, or states of mind of one of the preceding days. In so far a certain continuity does exist, albeit a retrograde one. But any one keenly interested in the dream problem cannot have failed to observe that a dream has also a progressive continuity—if such an expression be permitted—since dreams occasionally exert a remarkable influence upon the conscious mental life, even of persons who cannot be considered superstitious or particularly abnormal. These occasional after-effects are usually seen in a more or less distinct change in the dreamer's frame of mind.
But someone who pays attention should easily notice that a dream isn’t totally disconnected from our waking thoughts, because in almost every dream, there are certain details that come from the experiences, thoughts, or emotions of the days leading up to it. In that sense, there is a kind of continuity, though it’s a backward one. However, anyone truly interested in dreams must have noticed that a dream also has a forward continuity—if that term is acceptable—since dreams can sometimes have a significant impact on our conscious thoughts, even for people who aren’t particularly superstitious or unusual. These occasional after-effects are often reflected in a noticeable change in the dreamer's mindset.
It is probably in consequence of this loose connection with the other conscious contents, that the recollected dream[300] is so extremely unstable. Many dreams baffle all attempts at reproduction, even immediately after waking; others can only be remembered with doubtful accuracy, and comparatively few can be termed really distinct and clearly reproduceable. This peculiar reaction with regard to recollection may be understood by considering the characteristics of the various elements combined in a dream. The combination of ideas in dreams is essentially phantastic; they are linked together in a sequence which, as a rule, is quite foreign to our current way of thinking, and in striking contrast to the logical sequence of ideas which we consider to be a special characteristic of conscious mental processes.
It’s likely due to this loose connection with other conscious thoughts that recalled dreams[300] are so unstable. Many dreams are impossible to recreate, even right after waking up; others can only be remembered with some uncertainty, and only a few can be considered truly clear and easily recalled. This odd reaction when it comes to memory can be understood by looking at the different elements that make up a dream. The way ideas come together in dreams is fundamentally fantastical; they’re connected in a sequence that’s usually pretty different from how we normally think, which sharply contrasts with the logical order of thoughts that we see as a key feature of conscious mental processes.
It is to this characteristic that dreams owe the common epithet of "meaningless." Before pronouncing this verdict, we must reflect that dreams and their chains of ideas are something that we do not understand. Such a verdict would therefore be merely a projection of our non-comprehension upon its object. But that would not prevent its own peculiar meaning being inherent in a dream.
It is this characteristic that leads to dreams being commonly called "meaningless." Before we make this judgment, we should consider that dreams and their sequences of thoughts are things that we do not fully understand. So, this conclusion would simply be a reflection of our lack of understanding onto the dream itself. However, this wouldn't stop a dream from having its own unique meaning.
In spite of the fact that for centuries endeavours have been made to extract a prophetic meaning from dreams, Freud's discovery is practically the first successful attempt to find their real significance. His work merits the term "scientific," because he has evolved a technique which, not only he, but many other investigators also assert achieves its object, namely, the understanding of the meaning of the dream. This meaning is not identical with the one which the manifest dream content seems to indicate.
Despite the fact that for centuries people have tried to extract prophetic meanings from dreams, Freud's discovery is essentially the first successful attempt to uncover their true significance. His work deserves to be called "scientific" because he developed a technique that not only he but also many other researchers claim effectively achieves its goal, which is understanding the meaning of the dream. This meaning is not the same as what the obvious content of the dream appears to suggest.
This is not the place for a critical discussion of Freud's psychology of dreams. But I will try to give a brief summary of what may be regarded as more or less established facts of dream psychology to-day.
This isn't the right setting for an in-depth critique of Freud's psychology of dreams. However, I will attempt to provide a short summary of what can be considered established facts about dream psychology today.
The first question we must discuss is, whence do we deduce the justification for attributing to dreams any other significance than the one indicated in the unsatisfying fragmentary meaning of the manifest dream content?
The first question we need to talk about is, where do we get the justification for giving dreams any significance beyond what is suggested by the unsatisfying, incomplete meaning of the obvious dream content?
As regards this point a particularly weighty argument is the fact that Freud discovered the hidden meaning of dreams[301] by empiric and not deductive methods. A further argument in favour of a possible hidden, as opposed to the manifest meaning of dreams, is obtained by comparing dream-phantasies with other phantasies (day-dreams and the like) in one and the same individual. It is not difficult to conceive that such day-phantasies have not merely a superficial, concrete meaning, but also a deeper psychological meaning. It is solely on account of the brevity that I must impose upon myself, that I do not submit materials in proof of this. But I should like to point out that what may be said about the meaning of phantasies, is well illustrated by an old and widely diffused type of imaginative story, of which Æsop's Fables are typical examples, wherein, for instance, the story is some objectively impossible phantasy about the deeds of a lion and an ass. The concrete superficial meaning of the fable is an impossible phantasm, but the hidden moral meaning is plain upon reflection. It is characteristic that children are pleased and satisfied with the exoteric meaning of the story. However, the best argument for the existence of a hidden meaning in dreams is provided by conscientious application of the technical procedure to solve the manifest dream content.
Regarding this point, a strong argument is the fact that Freud revealed the hidden meaning of dreams[301] through empirical rather than deductive methods. Another argument supporting a possible hidden meaning, as opposed to the obvious meaning of dreams, comes from comparing dream fantasies with other fantasies (like daydreams) in the same person. It's easy to understand that daydreams have not only a simple, concrete meaning but also a deeper psychological significance. Due to the need for brevity, I won’t provide specific evidence for this. However, I want to highlight that what can be said about the meaning of fantasies is well illustrated by an old and popular type of imaginative story, such as Æsop's Fables. For instance, a fable may present an impossible fantasy about the actions of a lion and an ass. The concrete, superficial meaning of the fable is an impossible fantasy, but the hidden moral meaning becomes clear upon reflection. It’s typical for children to enjoy and be satisfied with the straightforward meaning of the story. Nonetheless, the strongest argument for the existence of a hidden meaning in dreams is the careful application of the technical process to analyze the obvious dream content.
This brings us to our second main point, viz.—the question of analytic procedure. Here again I desire neither to defend nor to criticise Freud's views and discoveries, but rather to confine myself to what seem to me to be firmly established facts.
This leads us to our second main point, which is the question of analytic procedure. Once more, I don't intend to defend or criticize Freud's views and discoveries; instead, I want to focus on what I believe are well-established facts.
The fact that a dream is a psychic structure, does not give us the slightest ground for assuming that it obeys laws and designs other than those applicable to any other psychic structure. According to the maxim: principia explicandi prœter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda, we have to treat dreams, in analysis, just as any other psychic structure, until experience teaches us some better way.
The fact that a dream is a mental construct doesn’t provide any basis for thinking it follows rules or patterns different from those of other mental constructs. According to the principle: principia explicandi prœter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda, we need to analyze dreams just like any other mental construct, until we learn a better method through experience.
We know that every psychic construction considered from the standpoint of causality, is the resultant of previous psychic contents. Moreover, we know also that every psychic structure, considered from the standpoint of finality, has its[302] own peculiar meaning and purpose in the actual psychic process. This standard must also be applied to dreams. When, therefore, we seek a psychological explanation of a dream, we must first know what were the preceding experiences out of which it is combined. We must trace the antecedents of every element in the dream picture. For example: some one dreams "that he is walking in a street, a child is running in front of him, who is suddenly run over by a motor-car." We will trace the antecedents of this dream-picture, with the aid of the dreamer's recollections.
We understand that every mental construct, when looked at through the lens of causality, stems from previous mental contents. Additionally, we also recognize that every mental structure, when viewed through the lens of purpose, has its own distinct meaning and role in the current mental process. This principle should also be applied to dreams. Therefore, when we seek a psychological explanation for a dream, we must first identify the prior experiences that contributed to its formation. We need to trace back the origins of every element in the dream image. For instance, someone dreams "that he is walking down a street, and a child runs ahead of him, only to be suddenly hit by a car." We will trace the origins of this dream image using the dreamer's memories.
He recognises the street as one down which he had walked on the previous day. The child he acknowledges as his brother's child, whom he had seen on the previous evening when visiting his brother. The motor accident reminds him of an accident that had actually occurred a few days before, but of which he had only read an account in a newspaper. Popular opinion is known to be satisfied with this kind of explanation. People say: "Oh, that is why I dreamt such and such a thing!"
He recognizes the street as one he had walked down the day before. The child he acknowledges as his brother's kid, whom he had seen the night before while visiting his brother. The car accident reminds him of an incident that actually happened a few days prior, but he had only read about it in a newspaper. It's well-known that popular opinion tends to accept this kind of explanation. People say, "Oh, that’s why I dreamed about such and such a thing!"
Obviously this explanation is absolutely unsatisfactory from a scientific standpoint. The dreamer walked down many streets on the previous day; why was this particular one selected? He had read about several accidents; why did he select just this one? The mere disclosure of an antecedent is by no means sufficient; for a plausible determination of the dream presentation can only be obtained from the competition of various determinants. The collection of additional material proceeds, according to the principle of recollection that has been called the Association Method. The result, as will easily be understood, is the admission of a mass of multifarious and quite heterogeneous material, having apparently nothing in common but the fact of its evident associative connection with the dream contents, since it has been reproduced by means of this content.
Clearly, this explanation is totally inadequate from a scientific perspective. The dreamer walked down many streets the day before; why was this specific one chosen? He had read about several accidents; why did he pick just this one? Simply pointing out a past event isn’t enough; a convincing understanding of the dream can only come from the interplay of various factors. The gathering of additional material happens based on a recall principle known as the Association Method. The outcome, as you can imagine, is the inclusion of a large amount of diverse and unrelated material, which seems to have nothing in common except for its clear associative link to the dream content, since it has been remembered through this content.
How far the collection of such material should go, is an important question from the technical point of view. Since the entire psychic content of a life may be ultimately disclosed from any single starting point, theoretically the whole[303] previous life-experience might be found in every dream. But we only need to assemble just so much material as is absolutely necessary in order to comprehend the dream's meaning. The limitation of the material is obviously an arbitrary proceeding, according to that principle of Kant's whereby to comprehend is "to perceive to the extent necessary for our purpose." For instance, when undertaking a survey of the causes of the French Revolution, we could, in amassing our material, include not only the history of medieval France but also that of Rome and Greece, which certainly would not be "necessary for our purpose," since we can comprehend the historical genesis of the Revolution from much more limited material.
How far we should go in collecting such material is a significant question from a technical standpoint. Since the entire mental content of a life can ultimately be revealed from any single starting point, theoretically, every dream could contain traces of a person's whole life experience. However, we only need to gather enough material that is absolutely necessary to understand the dream's meaning. The choice of how much material to include is clearly a subjective decision, based on Kant's principle that to comprehend is "to perceive to the extent necessary for our purpose." For example, when examining the causes of the French Revolution, we could collect material that includes not only the history of medieval France but also that of Rome and Greece, which would certainly not be "necessary for our purpose," as we can grasp the historical background of the Revolution with much more limited information.
Except for the aforesaid arbitrary limitation, the collecting of material lies outside the investigator's discretion. The material gathered must now be sifted and examined, according to principles which are always applied to the examination of historical or any empirical scientific material. The method is an essentially comparative one, that obviously cannot be applied automatically, but is largely dependent upon the skill and aim of the investigator.
Except for the arbitrary limit mentioned above, collecting material is not up to the investigator’s discretion. The material collected now needs to be sorted and examined based on principles that are always used to examine historical or any empirical scientific material. The method is mainly comparative, which obviously can't be applied automatically and relies heavily on the skill and intention of the investigator.
When a psychological fact has to be explained, it must be remembered that psychological data necessitate a twofold point of view, namely, that of causality and that of finality. I use the word finality intentionally, in order to avoid confusion with the idea of "teleology." I use finality to denote immanent psychological teleology. In so far as we apply the view point of causality to the material that has been associated with the dream, we reduce the manifest dream content to certain fundamental tendencies or ideas. These, as one would expect, are elementary and universal in character.
When we need to explain a psychological fact, it's important to remember that psychological data require us to look at it from two perspectives: causality and finality. I choose the term finality deliberately to avoid mixing it up with "teleology." I use finality to refer to the internal psychological goals. When we apply the perspective of causality to the material linked to the dream, we break down the surface-level content of the dream into certain fundamental tendencies or ideas. As expected, these are basic and universal in nature.
For instance, a young patient dreams as follows: "I am standing in a strange garden, and pluck an apple from a tree. I look about cautiously, to make sure no one sees me."
For example, a young patient dreams like this: "I'm standing in a strange garden and picking an apple from a tree. I look around carefully to make sure no one is watching me."
The associated dream material is a memory of having once, when a boy, plucked a couple of pears surreptitiously from another person's garden.
The related dream content is a memory of once, as a boy, sneaking a couple of pears from someone else's garden.
The feeling of having a bad conscience, which is a prominent feature in the dream, reminds him of a situation he experienced on the previous day. He met a young lady in the street—a casual acquaintance—and exchanged a few words with her. At that moment a gentleman passed whom he knew, whereupon our patient was suddenly seized with a curious feeling of embarrassment, as if he had done something wrong. He associated the apple with the scene in Paradise, together with the fact that he had never really understood why the eating of the forbidden fruit should have been fraught with such dire consequences for our first parents. This had always made him feel angry; it seemed to him an unjust act of God, for God had made men as they were, with all their curiosity and greed.
The feeling of guilt that stands out in the dream reminds him of something that happened the day before. He ran into a young woman on the street—someone he knew casually—and they exchanged a few words. At that moment, a man he recognized walked by, and our patient suddenly felt a strange embarrassment, as if he had done something wrong. He connected the apple with the scene in Paradise and reflected on how he never fully understood why eating the forbidden fruit led to such terrible consequences for our first parents. This always made him feel angry; it seemed like an unfair act by God, since He created humans to be as they are, filled with curiosity and greed.
Another association was, that sometimes his father had punished him for certain things in a way that seemed to him incomprehensible. The worst punishment had been bestowed after he had secretly watched girls bathing.
Another association was that sometimes his father had punished him for certain things in a way that seemed completely baffling to him. The worst punishment he received was after he had secretly watched girls bathing.
That led up to the confession that he had recently begun a love affair with a housemaid, but had not yet carried it through to a conclusion. On the day before the dream he had had a rendezvous with her.
That led to the confession that he had recently started a romance with a housemaid, but hadn’t taken it all the way yet. The day before the dream, he had a meeting with her.
Upon reviewing this material we see that the dream contains a very transparent reference to the last-named incident. The connecting associative material shows that the apple episode is palpably meant for an erotic scene. For various other reasons, too, it may be considered extremely probable that this experience of the previous day is operative even in this dream. In the dream the young man plucks the apple of Paradise, which in reality he has not yet plucked. The remainder of the material associated with the dream is concerned with another experience of the previous day, namely, with the peculiar feeling of a bad conscience, which seized the dreamer when he was talking to his casual lady acquaintance; this, again, was connected with the fall of man in Paradise, and finally with an erotic misdemeanour of his childhood, for which his father had punished him severely. All these associations are linked together by the idea of guilt.
Upon reviewing this material, we see that the dream contains a clear reference to the previously mentioned incident. The related material shows that the apple episode is clearly intended for an erotic scene. For several other reasons, it may also be highly likely that this experience from the previous day is influencing this dream. In the dream, the young man picks the apple of Paradise, which in reality, he has not yet picked. The rest of the material related to the dream concerns another experience from the previous day, specifically the strange feeling of a bad conscience that came over the dreamer while he was talking to a casual female acquaintance; this, again, was tied to the fall of man in Paradise, and ultimately to an erotic misdeed from his childhood for which his father had punished him harshly. All these associations are connected by the idea of guilt.
In the first place we will consider this material from Freud's view-point of causality; in other words, we will "interpret" it, to use Freud's expression. A wish has been left unfulfilled from the day before the dream. In the dream this wish is realised in the symbolical apple scene. But why is this realisation disguised and hidden under a symbolic image instead of being expressed in a distinctly sexual thought? Freud would refer to the unmistakable sense of guilt shown up by the material, and say the morality that has been inculcated in the young man from childhood is bent on repressing such wishes, and to that end brands the natural craving as immoral and reprehensible. The suppressed immoral thought can therefore only achieve expression by means of a symbol. As these thoughts are incompatible with the moral content of the conscious ego, a psychic factor adopted by Freud called the Censor, prevents this wish from passing undisguised into consciousness.
First, we'll examine this material from Freud's perspective on causality; in other words, we will "interpret" it, as Freud would say. A wish has remained unfulfilled since the day before the dream. In the dream, this wish is fulfilled in the symbolic apple scene. But why is this fulfillment disguised and hidden under a symbolic image instead of being clearly expressed in a sexual thought? Freud would point to the clear sense of guilt revealed by the material and argue that the morality instilled in the young man from childhood seeks to repress such wishes, labeling the natural desire as immoral and unacceptable. Therefore, the suppressed immoral thought can only express itself through a symbol. Since these thoughts conflict with the moral framework of the conscious ego, a psychological factor Freud referred to as the Censor stops this wish from being expressed openly in consciousness.
Reviewing the dream from the standpoint of finality, which I contrast with that of Freud, does not—as I wish to establish explicitly—involve a denial of the dream's causæ, but rather a different interpretation of the associative material collected around the dream. The material facts remain the same, but the standard by which they are measured is altered. The question may be formulated simply as follows: What is this dream's purpose? What should it effect? These questions are not arbitrary, in as much as they may be applied to every psychic activity. Everywhere the question of the "why" and "wherefore" may be raised.
Reviewing the dream from the perspective of its finality, which I contrast with Freud's view, does not— as I want to make clear—deny the dream's causes, but rather offers a different interpretation of the associative material surrounding the dream. The factual elements remain unchanged, but the criteria by which they are evaluated are different. The question can be simply stated: What is the purpose of this dream? What should it achieve? These questions are not random, as they can be applied to every mental activity. Everywhere, the questions of "why" and "how" can be asked.
It is clear that the material added by the dream to the previous day's erotic experience, chiefly emphasises the sense of guilt in the erotic act. The same association has already been shown to be operative in another experience of the previous day, in the meeting with his casual lady acquaintance, when the feeling of a bad conscience was automatically and inexplicably aroused, as if, in that instance, too, the young man had done something wrong. This experience also plays a part in the dream, which is even intensified by[306] the association of additional, appropriate material; the erotic experience of the day before, being depicted by the story of the Fall which was followed by such a severe punishment.
It’s clear that the dream added material to the previous day's sexual experience that mainly highlights the guilt associated with the erotic act. This same connection was already evident in another incident from the previous day, during the meeting with his casual female friend, when he felt a sense of shame that was triggered inexplicably, as if he had done something wrong then too. This experience also influences the dream, which is further amplified by[306] the addition of related material; the sexual experience from the day before is illustrated through the story of the Fall, which was followed by a harsh punishment.
I maintain that there exists in the dreamer an unconscious propensity or tendency to conceive his erotic experiences as guilty. It is most characteristic that the association with the Fall of Man should ensue, the young man having never really grasped why the punishment should have been so drastic. This association throws light upon the reasons why the dreamer did not think simply, "I am doing what is not right." Obviously he does not know that he might condemn his own conduct as morally wrong. This is actually the case. His conscious belief is that his conduct does not matter in the least morally, as all his friends were acting in the same way; besides, for other reasons too, is unable to understand why a fuss should be made about it.
I believe that within the dreamer, there’s an unconscious tendency to view their sexual experiences as wrong. It’s telling that this leads to a connection with the Fall of Man, as the young man has never fully understood why the consequences were so severe. This connection helps explain why the dreamer didn’t simply think, "I’m doing something wrong." Clearly, he doesn’t realize that he could judge his own actions as morally wrong. In reality, he believes that his behavior isn’t morally significant at all, since all his friends are behaving the same way; plus, for other reasons, he can’t understand why it should be considered a big deal.
Whether this dream should be considered full or void of meaning depends upon a very important question, viz. whether the standpoint of morality, handed down to us through the ages by our forefathers is held to be full or void of meaning. I do not wish to wander off into a philosophical discussion of this question, but would merely observe that mankind must obviously have had very strong reasons for devising this morality, otherwise it would be truly incomprehensible why such restraints should be imposed upon one of man's strongest cravings. If we attach due value to this fact, we are bound to pronounce this dream to be full of meaning, for it reveals to the young man the necessity of facing his erotic conduct boldly from the view point of morality. Primitive races have in some respects extremely strict legislation concerning sexuality. This fact proves that sexual morality is a not-to-be-neglected factor in the soul's higher functions, but deserves to be taken fully into account. In the case in question it should be added, that the young man—influenced by his friends' example—somewhat thoughtlessly let himself be guided exclusively[307] by his erotic cravings, unmindful of the fact that man is a morally responsible being and must perforce submit—voluntarily or involuntarily—to a morality that he himself has created.
Whether this dream is considered meaningful or meaningless depends on an important question: whether the moral standards passed down to us by our ancestors are seen as meaningful or meaningless. I don't want to get lost in a philosophical debate about this, but it's clear that humanity must have had strong reasons for creating this system of morality; otherwise, it would be hard to understand why such limits would be placed on one of our strongest desires. If we recognize the significance of this, we have to say that this dream is meaningful, as it shows the young man the importance of confronting his sexual behavior from a moral standpoint. Primitive societies often have very strict rules about sexuality, which shows that sexual morality plays a crucial role in our higher functions and should be taken seriously. In this case, it should be noted that the young man, influenced by his friends, somewhat carelessly allowed himself to be guided solely by his sexual desires, forgetting that humans are morally responsible beings who must conform—either willingly or unwillingly—to a morality that they themselves have established.
In this dream we can discern a compensating function of the unconscious, consisting in the fact that those thoughts, propensities, and tendencies of a human personality, which in conscious life are too seldom recognised, come spontaneously into action in the sleeping state, when to a large extent the conscious process is disconnected.
In this dream, we can see a balancing role of the unconscious, where the thoughts, urges, and inclinations of a person that are rarely acknowledged in their waking life come to life naturally during sleep, when the conscious mind is mostly offline.
The question might certainly be raised, of what use is this to the dreamer if he does not understand the dream?
The question can definitely be asked: what good is this to the dreamer if they don't understand the dream?
To this I must remark that to understand is not an exclusively intellectual process, for—as experience proves—man may be influenced—nay, even very effectually convinced—by innumerable things, of which he has no intellectual understanding. I will merely remind my readers of the efficacy of religious symbols.
To this, I have to say that understanding isn’t just an intellectual process because— as experience shows—people can be influenced—even strongly convinced—by countless things that they don’t fully understand intellectually. I’ll just remind my readers of how powerful religious symbols can be.
The example given above might suggest the thought that the function of dreams is a distinctly "moral" one. Such it appears to be in this case, but if we recall the formula according to which dreams contain the subliminal materials of a given moment, we cannot speak simply of a "moral" function. For it is worthy of note that the dreams of those persons whose actions are morally unexceptionable, bring materials to light that might well be characterised as "immoral" in the current meaning of that term. Thus it is significant that St. Augustine was glad that God did not hold him responsible for his dreams. The unconscious is the unknown of a given moment, therefore it is not surprising that all those aspects that are essential for a totally different point of view should be added by dreams to the conscious psychological factors of a given moment. It is evident that this function of dreams signifies a psychological adjustment, a compensation essential for properly balanced action. In the conscious process of reflection it is indispensable that, so far as possible, we should realise all the aspects and consequences of a problem, in order to find the right solution. This process[308] is continued automatically in the more or less unconscious state of sleep, wherever—as our previous experience seems to show—all those other points of view occur to the dreamer (at least by way of allusion) that during the day were underestimated or even totally ignored; in other words, were comparatively unconscious.
The example mentioned above might lead to the idea that dreams have a distinctly "moral" purpose. This seems true in this case, but if we remember that dreams reflect the hidden materials of a specific moment, we can't just label it as a "moral" function. It’s interesting to note that the dreams of people whose actions are morally acceptable can reveal materials that might be considered "immoral" by today’s standards. It’s telling that St. Augustine was relieved that God didn’t hold him accountable for his dreams. The unconscious reflects the unknown of each moment, so it makes sense that dreams would incorporate aspects essential for a completely different perspective into our conscious psychological factors. It's clear that this function of dreams represents a psychological adjustment, a necessary balance for proper action. In our conscious thought process, it's essential that we try to understand all aspects and consequences of an issue to find the right solution. This process[308] continues automatically in the more or less unconscious state of sleep, where—based on our previous experiences—it seems that all those alternative viewpoints come to the dreamer (at least indirectly) that were overlooked or completely ignored during the day; in other words, they were relatively unconscious.
As regards the much-discussed symbolism of dreams, the value attached to it varies according to whether the standpoint of causality or of finality is adopted. According to Freud's causal view point it proceeds from a craving, viz. from the suppressed dream-wish. This craving is always somewhat simple and primitive, and is able to disguise itself under manifold forms. For instance, the young man in question might just as well have dreamt that he had to open a door with a key, or that he had to travel by aeroplane, or that he was kissing his mother, etc. From this standpoint all those things would have had the same meaning. In this way, the typical adherents of Freud's school have come to the point of interpreting—to give a gross instance—almost all long objects in dreams as phallic symbols.
Regarding the widely debated symbolism of dreams, the significance assigned to it changes depending on whether one approaches it from a causal or a finality perspective. According to Freud's causal viewpoint, it stems from a craving, specifically from the repressed dream-wish. This craving is generally quite simple and primitive and can take on various disguises. For example, the young man in question might have dreamt that he needed to unlock a door with a key, or that he had to fly in an airplane, or that he was kissing his mother, etc. From this perspective, all those scenarios would carry the same meaning. Thus, typical supporters of Freud's theories have reached the conclusion that, to give a blatant example, almost all long objects in dreams are interpreted as phallic symbols.
From the view-point of finality, the various dream pictures have each their own peculiar value. For instance, if the young man, instead of dreaming of the apple scene, had dreamt he had to open a door with a key, the altered dream picture would have furnished associative material of an essentially different character; that, again, would have resulted in the conscious situation being supplemented by associations of a totally different kind from those connected with the apple scene. From this point of view, it is the diversity of the dream's mode of expression that is full of meaning, and not the uniformity in its significance. The causal view-point tends by its very nature towards uniformity of meaning, that is, towards a fixed significance of symbols. On the other hand, the final view-point perceives in an altered dream picture, the expression of an altered psychological situation. It recognises no fixed meaning of symbols. From this standpoint all the dream pictures are important in themselves, each one having a special significance of its[309] own, to which it owes its inclusion in the dream. Keeping to our previous example, we see that from the standpoint of finality the symbol in this dream is approximately equivalent to a parable; it does not conceal, but it teaches. The apple scene recalls vividly the sense of guilt, at the same time disguising the real deed of our first parents.
From the perspective of finality, each dream image has its own unique value. For example, if the young man had dreamed of needing to unlock a door with a key instead of the apple scene, the changed dream image would provide associative material of a fundamentally different nature; this would then lead to the conscious situation being enriched by associations that are completely different from those tied to the apple scene. From this viewpoint, it's the variety in how the dream expresses itself that matters, not the consistency in its significance. The causal perspective tends to promote a uniform meaning, meaning that symbols have a fixed significance. In contrast, the final perspective sees an altered dream image as reflecting a different psychological situation. It does not recognize fixed meanings for symbols. From this angle, all dream images are significant in their own right, each carrying its own unique importance, which is why they are included in the dream. Sticking with our earlier example, we can see that from the perspective of finality, the symbol in this dream is akin to a parable; it does not hide meaning, but rather conveys it. The apple scene powerfully evokes feelings of guilt while also masking the actual actions of our first parents.
It is obvious we reach very dissimilar interpretations of the meaning of the dream, according to the point of view adopted. The question now arises, which is the better or truer version? After all, for us therapeuts it is a practical and not a merely theoretical necessity that leads us to seek for some comprehension of the meaning of dreams. In treating our patients we must for practical reasons endeavour to lay hold of any means that will enable us to train them effectually. It should be quite evident from the foregoing example, that the material associated with the dream has opened up a question calculated to make many matters clear to the young man, which, hitherto, he has heedlessly overlooked. But by disregarding these things he was really overlooking something in himself, for he possesses a moral standard and a moral need just like any other man. By trying to live without taking this fact into consideration, his life is one-sided and incomplete, so to say inco-ordinate; with the same consequences for the psychological life as a one-sided and incomplete diet would have for the physical. In order to develop a person's individuality and independence to the uttermost, we need to bring to fruition all those functions that have hitherto attained but little conscious development or none at all. In order to achieve this aim, we must for therapeutic reasons enter into all those unconscious aspects of things brought forward by the dream material. This makes it abundantly clear that the view-point of finality is singularly important as an aid to the practical development of the individual.
It’s clear that we come to very different interpretations of the meaning of a dream, depending on the perspective we take. The next question is, which interpretation is better or more accurate? For us therapists, it’s essential, not just theoretical, to seek some understanding of what dreams mean. When we treat our patients, we need to find practical methods to help them effectively. The previous example demonstrates that the content of the dream has raised questions that could clarify many issues for the young man, which he has carelessly ignored until now. However, by ignoring these things, he has actually overlooked something within himself because he has a moral compass and emotional needs just like anyone else. Trying to live without acknowledging this reality makes his life unbalanced and incomplete; it’s like having an uncoordinated existence that would have similar effects on his psychological well-being as an imbalanced diet would have on his physical health. To fully develop a person’s individuality and independence, we need to nurture all those aspects that have not received much conscious attention or any at all. To accomplish this, we must, for healing purposes, explore all the unconscious elements highlighted by the dream material. This clearly shows that the understanding of finality is particularly important as a support for the practical development of the individual.
The view-point of causality is obviously more in accord with the scientific spirit of our time, with its strictly causalistic reasoning. Much may be said for Freud's view as a scientific explanation of dream psychology. But I must[310] dispute its completeness, for the psyche cannot be conceived merely from the causal aspect, but necessitates also a final view-point. Only a combination of both points of view—which has not yet been attained to the satisfaction of the scientific mind, owing to great difficulties both of a practical and theoretical nature—can give us a more complete conception of the essence of dreams.
The perspective of causality clearly aligns more with the scientific mindset of our era, which relies heavily on causal reasoning. There's a lot to support Freud's perspective as a scientific explanation of dream psychology. However, I must[310]argue that it’s not fully comprehensive, since the psyche can't be understood solely from a causal standpoint; it also requires a final viewpoint. Only by combining both perspectives—which has yet to be satisfactorily achieved in the scientific community due to significant practical and theoretical challenges—can we develop a more complete understanding of the nature of dreams.
I would like to treat briefly of some further problems of dream psychology, that border on the general discussion of dreams. Firstly, as to the classification of dreams; I do not wish to overestimate either the practical or theoretical significance of this question. I investigate yearly some 1500-2000 dreams, and this experience enables me to state that typical dreams actually do exist. But they are not very frequent, and from the view-point of finality they lose much of the importance which attaches to them as a result of the fixed significance of symbols according to the causal view-point. It seems to me that the typical themes of dreams are of far greater importance, for they permit of a comparison with the themes of mythology. Many of these mythological themes—in the study of which Frobenius has rendered notable service—are also found in dreams, often with precisely the same significance. Unfortunately the limited time at my disposal, does not permit me to lay detailed materials before you: this has been done elsewhere.[193] But I desire to emphasise the fact that the comparison of the typical themes of dreams with those of mythology obviously suggests the idea (already put forward by Nietzsche) that from a phylogenetic point of view dream-thought should be conceived as an older form of thought. Instead of multiplying examples in explanation of my meaning, I will briefly refer you to our specimen dream. As you remember, that dream introduced the apple scene as a typical representation of erotic guilt. The gist of its purport is: "I am doing wrong in acting like this." But[311] it is characteristic that a dream never expresses itself in a logically abstract way, but always in the language of parable or simile. This peculiarity is also a characteristic feature of primitive languages, whose flowery idioms always strike us. If you call to mind the writings of ancient literature—e.g. the language of simile in the Bible—you will find that what nowadays is expressed by means of abstract expressions, could then only be expressed by means of simile. Even such a philosopher as Plato did not disdain to express certain fundamental ideas by means of concrete simile.
I want to briefly discuss some additional issues related to dream psychology that connect to the broader conversation about dreams. First, regarding the classification of dreams, I don’t want to overstate the practical or theoretical importance of this question. Each year, I analyze around 1,500 to 2,000 dreams, and this experience allows me to affirm that typical dreams do exist. However, they are not very common, and in terms of significance, they lose a lot of their value due to the established meanings of symbols based on a causal perspective. I believe that the typical themes of dreams are much more significant because they can be compared to themes in mythology. Many of these mythological themes—where Frobenius has made notable contributions—also appear in dreams, often carrying the same meanings. Unfortunately, the limited time I have does not allow me to provide detailed materials on this; that has been done elsewhere.[193] But I want to highlight that comparing the typical themes of dreams with those in mythology clearly suggests the idea (already proposed by Nietzsche) that, from a phylogenetic standpoint, dream-thought should be understood as an older form of thinking. Instead of listing examples to clarify my point, I will briefly refer you to our sample dream. As you may recall, that dream included the apple scene as a typical representation of erotic guilt. The main message is: "I am doing something wrong by acting this way." But[311] it’s important to note that a dream never communicates in a logically abstract manner; it always uses parables or metaphors. This characteristic is also a key feature of primitive languages, whose ornate expressions often strike us. If you think about the writings of ancient literature—e.g., the use of metaphor in the Bible—you’ll find that what we now express using abstract terms could only be conveyed through metaphor back then. Even a philosopher like Plato didn’t shy away from expressing certain foundational ideas through concrete metaphors.
Just as the body bears traces of its phylogenetic development, so also does the human mind. There is therefore nothing surprising in the possibility of the allegories of our dreams being a survival of archaic modes of thought.
Just as the body shows signs of its evolutionary history, so does the human mind. So, it’s not surprising that the allegories in our dreams might be remnants of ancient ways of thinking.
The theft of the apple in our example is a typical theme of dreams, often recurring with various modifications. It is also a well-known theme in mythology, and is found not only in the story of the Garden of Eden, but in numerous myths and fables of all ages and climes. It is one of those universally human symbols, which can reappear in any one, at any time. Thus, dream psychology opens up a way to a general comparative psychology, from which we hope to attain the same sort of understanding of the development and structure of the human soul, as comparative anatomy has given us concerning the human body.
The theft of the apple in our example is a common theme in dreams, often appearing with different variations. It’s also a well-known theme in mythology, appearing not only in the story of the Garden of Eden, but in many myths and fables from all times and places. It’s one of those universally human symbols that can show up in anyone, at any time. Therefore, dream psychology opens a pathway to a broader comparative psychology, from which we hope to gain similar insights into the development and structure of the human soul as comparative anatomy has provided about the human body.
CHAPTER XIII
THE CONTENT OF THE PSYCHOSES[194]
THE CONTENT OF THE PSYCHOSES__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Introduction
Introduction
My short sketch on the Content of the Psychoses which first appeared in the series of "Schriften zur Angewandten Seelenkunde" under Freud's editorship was designed to give the non-professional but interested public some insight into the psychological point of view of recent psychiatry. I chose by way of example a case of the mental disorder known as Dementia Præcox, which Bleuler calls Schizophrenia. Statistically this extensive group contains by far the largest number of cases of psychosis. Many psychiatrists would prefer to limit it, and accordingly make use of other nomenclature and classification. From the psychological standpoint the change of name is unimportant, for it is of less value to know what a thing is called than to know what it is. The cases of mental disorder sketched in this essay belong to well-known and frequently occurring types, familiar to the alienist. The facts will not be altered if these disorders are called by some other name than dementia præcox.
My brief overview on the Content of Psychoses, which was originally published in the series "Schriften zur Angewandten Seelenkunde" under Freud's editorial guidance, was intended to give the non-professional but curious public some insight into the psychological perspective of modern psychiatry. I chose an example of the mental disorder known as Dementia Præcox, which Bleuler refers to as Schizophrenia. Statistically, this wide-ranging group has the largest number of psychosis cases. Many psychiatrists would prefer to narrow its definition and use different naming and classification systems. From a psychological viewpoint, the name change doesn't matter; understanding what something is holds more significance than knowing what it is called. The mental disorders outlined in this essay represent well-known and commonly seen types familiar to psychiatrists. The reality of these cases won't change simply because they may be referred to by a name other than dementia præcox.
I have presented my view of the psychological basis in a work[195] whose scientific validity has been contested upon all sorts of grounds. For me it is sufficient justification that a psychiatrist of Bleuler's standing has fully accepted, in his great monograph on the disease, all the essential points in my work. The difference between us is as to the question whether, in relation to the anatomical basis, the psychological disorders should be regarded as primary or secondary. The resolution of this weighty question depends upon the general [313]problem as to whether the prevailing dogma in psychiatry—"disorders of the mind are disorders of the brain"—presents a final truth or not. This dogma leads to absolute sterility as soon as universal validity is ascribed to it. There are undoubted psychogenic mental diseases (the so-called hysterical) which are properly regarded as functional in contrast with organic diseases which rest upon demonstrable anatomical changes. Disorders of the brain should only be called organic when the psychic symptoms depend upon an undoubtedly primary disease of the brain. Now in dementia præcox this is by no means a settled question. Definite anatomical changes are present, but we are very far from being able to relate the psychological symptoms to these changes. We have, at least, positive information as to the functional nature of early schizophrenic conditions; moreover the organic character of paranoia and many paranoid forms is still in great uncertainty. This being so it is worth while to inquire whether manifestations of degeneration could not also be provoked by psychological disturbance of function. Such an idea is only incomprehensible to those who smuggle materialistic preconceptions into their scientific theories. This question does not even rest upon some fundamental and arbitrary spiritualism, but upon the following simple reflection. Instead of assuming that some hereditary disposition, or a toxæmia, gives rise directly to organic processes of disease, I incline to the view that upon the basis of predisposition, whose nature is at present unknown to us, there arises a non-adaptable psychological function which can proceed to develop into manifest mental disorder; this may secondarily determine organic degeneration with its own train of symptoms. In favour of this conception is the fact that we have no proof of the primary nature of the organic disorder, but overwhelming proofs exist of a primary psychological fault in function, whose history can be traced back to the patient's childhood. In perfect agreement with this conception is the fact that analytic practice has given us experience of cases where patients on the borderline of dementia præcox have been brought back to normal life.
I’ve shared my perspective on the psychological foundation in a work[195] that has faced challenges regarding its scientific validity for various reasons. For me, it’s enough that a psychiatrist of Bleuler’s caliber has completely accepted all the key points in my work in his significant monograph on the illness. The main difference between us is whether psychological disorders should be seen as primary or secondary in relation to the anatomical basis. The resolution of this important question relies on the broader issue of whether the dominant belief in psychiatry—that "mental disorders are brain disorders"—is ultimately true. This belief leads to a complete dead end once it is regarded as universally valid. There are certainly psychogenic mental illnesses (the so-called hysterical disorders) that are rightly classified as functional, in contrast to organic illnesses that are based on identifiable anatomical changes. Brain disorders should only be labeled as organic when the psychological symptoms clearly stem from a primary brain disease. However, in the case of dementia præcox, this is far from a resolved question. There are definite anatomical changes, but we are a long way from being able to connect the psychological symptoms to these changes. We at least have clear evidence of the functional nature of early schizophrenic conditions; additionally, the organic nature of paranoia and many paranoid forms remains highly uncertain. Given this, it’s worth exploring whether manifestations of degeneration could also be triggered by psychological disturbances in function. This idea is only baffling to those who insert materialistic assumptions into their scientific theories. This question doesn't rely on some arbitrary spiritualism but on a straightforward consideration. Rather than assuming that some hereditary predisposition or toxic condition directly leads to organic disease processes, I lean toward the belief that, based on a predisposition of which we currently know little, a non-adaptable psychological function can emerge that develops into a visible mental disorder; this may then secondarily lead to organic degeneration with its own set of symptoms. Supporting this view is the fact that we have no proof of the primary nature of the organic disorder, but there is strong evidence of a primary psychological dysfunction, the history of which can be traced back to the patient’s childhood. In complete alignment with this view is the fact that our analytical practice has given us experiences of cases where patients on the brink of dementia præcox have successfully returned to a normal life.
Even if anatomical lesions or organic symptoms were constantly present, science ought not to imagine the psychological standpoint could advisedly be neglected, or the undoubted psychological relationship be given up as unimportant. If, for instance, carcinoma were to prove an infectious disease the peculiar growth and degenerative process of carcinomatous cells would still be a constant factor requiring investigation on its own account. But, as I have said, the correlation between the anatomical findings and the psychological picture of the disease is so loose that it is extremely desirable to study the psychological side of it thoroughly.
Even if physical damage or obvious symptoms are always there, science shouldn't think that the psychological perspective can be ignored, or that the clear psychological connection is unimportant. For example, if cancer were found to be an infectious disease, the unique growth and breakdown of cancer cells would still need to be studied on its own. However, as I've mentioned, the link between physical findings and the psychological aspects of the disease is so weak that it's really important to thoroughly explore the psychological side of it.
Part I
Part I
Psychiatry is the stepchild of medicine. All the other branches of medicine have one great advantage over it—the scientific methods can be applied; there are things to be seen, and felt, physical and chemical methods of investigation to be followed: the microscope shows the dreaded bacillus, the surgeon's knife halts at no difficulty and gives us glimpses of most inaccessible organs of vital importance. Psychiatry, which engages in the exploration of the mind, stands ever at the door seeking in vain to weigh and measure as in the other departments of science. We have long known that we have to do with a definite organ, the brain; but only beyond the brain, beyond the morphological basis do we reach what is important for us—the mind; as indefinable as it ever was, still eluding any explanation, no matter how ingenious. Former ages, endowing the mind with substance, and personifying every incomprehensible occurrence in nature, regarded mental disorder as the work of evil spirits; the patient was looked upon as one possessed, and the methods of treatment were such as fitted this conception. This mediæval conception occasionally gains credence and expression even to-day. A classical example is the driving out of the devil which the elder Pastor Blumhardt carried out successfully in the famous case of Gottlieb in Deltus.[196] To the honour of the Middle[315] Ages let it also be said that there are to be found early evidences of a sound rationalism. In the sixteenth century at the Julius Hospital in Würzburg mental patients were already treated side by side with others physically ill, and the treatment seems to have been really humane. With the opening of the modern era, and with the dawn of the first scientific ideas, the original barbaric personification of the unknown Great Power gradually disappeared. A change arose in the conception of mental disease in favour of a more philosophic moral attitude. The old view that every misfortune was the revenge of the offended gods returned new-clothed to fit the times. Just as physical diseases can, in many cases, be regarded as self-inflicted on account of negligence, mental diseases were likewise considered to be due to some moral injury, or sin. Behind this conception the angry godhead also stood. Such views played a great rôle, right up to the beginning of last century, especially in Germany. In France, however, about the same time a new idea was appearing, destined to sway psychiatry for a hundred years. Pinel, whose statue fittingly stands at the gateway of the Salpetrière in Paris, took away the chains from the insane and thus freed them from the symbol of the criminal. In a very real way he formulated for the world the humane and scientific conception of modern times. A little later Esquirol and Bayle discovered that certain forms of insanity ended in death, after a relatively short time, and that certain constant changes in the brain could be demonstrated post mortem. Esquirol had described as an entity general paralysis of the insane, or as it was popularly called "softening of the brain," a disease which is always bound up with chronic inflammatory degeneration of the cerebral matter. Thus was laid the foundation of the dogma which you will find repeated in every text-book of psychiatry, viz. "diseases of the mind are diseases of the brain." Confirmation of this conception was added about the same time by Gall's discoveries which traced partial or complete loss of the power of speech—a psychical capacity—to a lesion in the region of the left lower frontal convolution. Somewhat later this view[316] proved to be of general applicability. Innumerable cases of extreme idiocy or other intense mental disorders were found to be caused by tumours of the brain. Towards the end of the nineteenth century Wernicke (recently deceased) localised the speech centre in the left temporal lobe. This epoch-making discovery raised hopes to the highest pitch. It was expected that at no distant day every characteristic and every psychical activity would be assigned a place in the cortical grey matter. Gradually, increased attempts were made to trace the primary mental changes in the psychoses back to certain parallel changes in the brain. Meynert, the famous Viennese psychiatrist, described a formal scheme in which the alteration in blood-supply in certain regions was to play the chief part in the origin of the psychoses. Wernicke made a similar but far more ingenious attempt at a morphological explanation of psychical disorders. The visible result of this tendency is seen in the fact that even the smallest and least renowned asylum has, to-day, its anatomical laboratory where cerebral sections are cut, stained, and microscoped. Our numerous psychiatric journals are full of morphological contributions, investigations into the structure and distribution of cells in the cortex, and other varying source of disorders in the different mental diseases.
Psychiatry is considered the neglected sibling of medicine. Unlike other branches of medicine, which benefit from scientific methods that allow for observation and physical investigation, psychiatry grapples with the mind, always at the threshold, struggling to quantify and qualify in the same way as other sciences. We’ve established that we are dealing with a specific organ, the brain; however, it is beyond the brain, beyond its physical structure, that we encounter what truly matters—the mind; it remains as elusive as ever, defying any form of explanation, no matter how clever. In earlier times, people attributed the mind with tangible essence and attributed every incomprehensible phenomenon in nature to malevolent spirits; thus, individuals with mental disorders were deemed possessed, and treatment methods were aligned with this belief. This medieval perspective occasionally resurfaces even today. A notable instance is the exorcism performed by Pastor Blumhardt in the well-known case of Gottlieb in Deltus.[196] To give credit to the Middle Ages, it should be acknowledged that there were early signs of rational thinking. In the sixteenth century at the Julius Hospital in Würzburg, mental patients were already being treated alongside those with physical ailments, and the care provided appeared to be genuinely humane. With the onset of the modern era and the emergence of scientific thought, the original barbaric personification of the unknown forces gradually faded away. Mental illness was redefined with a more philosophical moral perspective. The old belief that every misfortune was a punishment from offended gods reappeared, dressed in modern guise. Just like physical illnesses can often be seen as self-inflicted due to negligence, mental illnesses were similarly thought to result from some moral wrongdoing or sin. This idea was often tied to a wrathful deity. Such beliefs held significant influence right up until the beginning of the last century, particularly in Germany. However, around the same time in France, a new idea began to emerge, poised to influence psychiatry for the next hundred years. Pinel, whose statue fittingly stands at the entrance of the Salpetrière in Paris, removed the chains from the insane, liberating them from the stigma of criminality. He articulated to the world the humane and scientific understanding of modern times. Shortly thereafter, Esquirol and Bayle found that certain types of insanity led to death after a relatively short period and that distinct changes in the brain could be verified post mortem. Esquirol identified general paralysis of the insane, popularly known as "softening of the brain," as a specific condition tied to chronic inflammatory degeneration of brain matter. This laid the groundwork for the mantra repeated in every psychiatry textbook: "diseases of the mind are diseases of the brain." Around the same time, Gall's findings linked partial or complete loss of speech—a mental function—to damage in the left lower frontal cortex. Later, this notion proved broadly applicable as countless cases of severe intellectual impairment or other major mental disorders were found to stem from brain tumors. By the late nineteenth century, Wernicke (recently deceased) localized the speech center to the left temporal lobe. This groundbreaking discovery raised hopes to unprecedented levels. It was anticipated that soon, every characteristic and mental function would be mapped to specific areas of the cerebral cortex. There were increasing efforts to connect primary mental changes in psychoses back to corresponding alterations in the brain. Meynert, the renowned psychiatrist from Vienna, described a systematic approach wherein changes in blood supply in specific regions played a key role in the development of psychoses. Wernicke made a similar yet more sophisticated attempt to provide a morphological explanation for mental disorders. The visible outcome of this trend is reflected in the fact that even the smallest and least prestigious asylum today boasts its own anatomical laboratory for sectioning, staining, and microscopically examining brain tissues. Our many psychiatric journals are filled with morphological research, studies on cell structure and distribution in the cortex, and various sources of disorders across different mental health conditions.
Psychiatry has come into fame as gross materialism. And quite rightly, for it is on the road—or rather reached it long ago—to put the organ, the instrument, above function. Function has become the dependent accessory of its organs, the mind the dependent accessory of the brain. In modern mental therapy the mind has been the loser, whilst great progress has been made in cerebral anatomy; of the mind we know less than nothing. Current psychiatry behaves like a man who thinks he can unriddle the meaning and importance of a building by a mineralogical investigation of its stones. Let us attempt to realise in which mental diseases obvious changes in the brain are found, and what is their proportion.
Psychiatry has gained a reputation for being overly focused on materialism. This is justifiable, as it has prioritized the physical organ, the brain, over its functions for quite some time. Now, function has become a mere accessory to its organs, with the mind being a secondary aspect to the brain. In contemporary mental health treatment, the mind has suffered while significant advancements have been made in brain anatomy; we actually know less about the mind than ever. Today's psychiatry resembles a person who believes they can understand the meaning and significance of a building simply by examining the minerals in its stones. Let's try to understand which mental illnesses exhibit clear changes in the brain and what their prevalence is.
In the last four years we have received 1325 patients at Burgholzi;[197] 331 a year. Of these 9 per cent. suffered from[317] congenital psychic anomalies. By this is understood a certain inborn defect of the psyche. Of these 9 per cent., about a quarter were imbeciles. Here we meet certain changes in the brain such as microcephalus, hydrocephalus, malformations or absence of portions of the brain. The remaining three-quarters of these congenital defects present no typical changes in the brain.
In the last four years, we've treated 1,325 patients at Burgholzi;[197] that’s about 331 a year. Of these, 9 percent had congenital mental disorders. This refers to certain inborn defects of the psyche. Out of that 9 percent, around a quarter were classified as imbeciles. Here, we observe specific changes in the brain such as microcephalus, hydrocephalus, malformations, or missing parts of the brain. The remaining three-quarters of these congenital defects don’t show any typical brain changes.
Three per cent. of our patients suffer from epileptic mental troubles. In the course of epilepsy there arises gradually a typical degeneration of the brain. The degeneration is, however, only discoverable in severe cases and when the disease has existed for some time. If the attacks have only existed for a relatively short time, not more than a few years, the brain as a rule shows nothing. Seventeen per cent. of our patients suffer from progressive paralysis and senile dementia. Both diseases present characteristic changes in the brain. In paralysis there is most extensive shrinkage of the brain, so that the cortex is often reduced by one half. The frontal portions of the brain more especially, may be reduced to a third of the normal weight. There is a similar destruction of substance in senile decay.
Three percent of our patients experience mental issues related to epilepsy. Over time, epilepsy leads to a typical degeneration of the brain. However, this degeneration is usually only noticeable in severe cases and when the disease has been present for a while. If the seizures have only been happening for a relatively short period, no more than a few years, the brain typically shows nothing unusual. Seventeen percent of our patients suffer from progressive paralysis and senile dementia. Both of these conditions result in specific changes in the brain. In the case of paralysis, there is significant shrinkage of the brain, so much so that the cortex is often reduced by half. The frontal parts of the brain, in particular, can shrink to a third of their normal weight. A similar loss of substance occurs in senile decay.
Fourteen per cent. of the patients annually received are cases of poisoning, at least 13 per cent. of these being due to alcohol. As a rule in slight cases nothing is to be found in the brain; in only a relatively few severe cases is there shrinkage of the cortex, generally of slight degree. The number of these severe cases amounts to less than 1 per cent. of the yearly cases of alcoholism.
Fourteen percent of the patients received each year are cases of poisoning, with at least 13 percent of these caused by alcohol. Usually, in mild cases, there’s nothing unusual in the brain; only a relatively small number of severe cases show shrinkage of the cortex, which is generally minimal. The number of these severe cases is less than 1 percent of the annual cases of alcoholism.
Six per cent. of the patients suffer from so-called maniacal depressive insanity which includes the maniacs and the melancholics. The essence of this disease is readily intelligible to the public. Melancholia is a condition of abnormal sadness without disorder of intelligence or memory. Mania is the opposite, the rule being an abnormally excited state with great restlessness; likewise without deep disturbance of intelligence and memory. In this disease there are no demonstrable morphological changes in the brain.
Six percent of patients experience what's called manic-depressive illness, which includes both manic and melancholic states. This condition is generally well understood by the public. Melancholia is characterized by an unusual level of sadness without any disruption in intelligence or memory. Mania, on the other hand, involves an excessively excited state with significant restlessness, also without a serious impact on intelligence and memory. In this illness, there are no observable physical changes in the brain.
Forty-five per cent. of the patients suffer from the real and[318] common mental disease called dementia præcox. The name is a very unhappy one, for the dementia is not always precocious, nor in all cases is there dementia. Unfortunately the disease is too often incurable; even in the best cases, in those that recover, where the outside public would not observe any abnormality, there is always present some defect in the emotional life. The picture presented by the disease is extraordinarily diverse; generally there is some disorder of feeling, frequently delusions and hallucinations. As a rule there is nothing to be found in the brain. Even in cases of a most severe type, lasting for years, an intact brain is not infrequently found post mortem. In a few cases only certain slight changes are present which, however, cannot as yet be reduced to any law.
Forty-five percent of the patients suffer from a real and common mental illness called schizophrenia. The term is quite misleading, as the condition isn’t always early-onset, nor does it always involve dementia. Sadly, the illness is often incurable; even in the best cases—those that fully recover—there is usually some underlying emotional issue that the general public wouldn’t notice. The symptoms of the illness are incredibly varied; typically, there is some disturbance in feelings, and often delusions and hallucinations. Generally, no abnormalities can be found in the brain. Even in some very severe cases that last for years, an intact brain is frequently discovered during autopsies. Only in a few cases are there minor changes recognized, but these cannot yet be categorized by any set rule.
To sum up: in round figures a quarter of our insane patients show more or less clearly extensive changes and destruction of the brain, while three-fourths have a brain which seems to be generally unimpaired or at most exhibit such changes as give no explanation of the psychological disturbance.
To sum up: roughly a quarter of our mentally ill patients show clear signs of significant changes and damage to the brain, while three-quarters have brains that appear mostly intact or only display minor changes that don’t explain the psychological issues.
These figures offer the best possible proof that the purely morphological view-point of modern psychiatry leads only very indirectly, if at all, to the understanding of the mental disorder, which is our aim. We must take into account the fact that those mental diseases which show the most marked disturbances of the brain end in death; for this reason the chronic inmates of the asylum form its real population, consisting of some 70 to 80 per cent. of cases of dementia præcox, that is, of patients in whom anatomical changes are practically non-existent. The psychiatry of the future must come to grips with the core of the thing; the path is thus made clear—it can only be by way of psychology. Hence in our Zürich clinic we have entirely discarded the anatomical view and turned to the psychological investigation of insanity. As most of our patients suffer from dementia præcox we were naturally concerned with this as our chief problem.
These figures provide compelling evidence that the purely morphological perspective of modern psychiatry leads only indirectly, if at all, to understanding mental disorders, which is our goal. We need to consider that those mental illnesses that show the most significant disturbances in the brain often result in death; for this reason, the long-term residents of the asylum make up its real population, accounting for about 70 to 80 percent of cases of dementia præcox, which means patients who have almost no anatomical changes. The psychiatry of the future must address the core issues; it’s clear that this can only be achieved through psychology. Therefore, in our Zürich clinic, we have completely moved away from the anatomical perspective and focused on the psychological investigation of insanity. Since most of our patients suffer from dementia præcox, we have naturally focused on this as our primary concern.
The older asylum physicians paid great attention to the[319] psychological precursors of mental disorder, just as the public still does, following a true instinct. We accepted this hint and carefully investigated the previous psychological history wherever possible. Our trouble was richly rewarded, for we often found, to our surprise, that the disease broke out at a moment of some great emotion which, in its turn, had arisen in a so-called normal way. We found, moreover, that in the mental disease which ensued a number of symptoms occurred which it was quite labour in vain to study from the morphological standpoint. These same symptoms, however, were comprehensible when considered from the standpoint of the individual's previous history. Freud's fundamental investigations into the psychology of hysteria and dreams afforded us the greatest stimulus and help in our work.
The older asylum doctors paid close attention to the[319] psychological triggers of mental disorders, just like the public still does, following a true instinct. We took this cue and carefully looked into the patients' psychological backgrounds whenever we could. Our efforts were well rewarded, as we often found, to our surprise, that the illness occurred at a moment of intense emotion that had developed in what seemed like a normal way. Additionally, we discovered that in the resulting mental illness, there were several symptoms that were pointless to study from a purely structural perspective. However, these same symptoms made sense when viewed through the lens of the individual's past experiences. Freud's essential research into the psychology of hysteria and dreams provided us with invaluable insight and support in our work.
A few instances of the latest method in psychiatry will make the subject clearer than mere dry theory. In order to bring home to you the difference in our conception I will first describe the medical history in the older fashion, and subsequently give the solution characteristic of the new departure.
A few examples of the latest approach in psychiatry will illustrate the topic better than just boring theory. To clarify the difference in our understanding, I will first outline the medical history in the traditional way and then present the solution that represents the new direction.
The case to be considered is that of a cook aged 32; she had no hereditary taint, was always industrious and conscientious, and had never been noticeable for eccentric behaviour or the like. Quite recently she became acquainted with a young man whom she wished to marry. From that time on she began to show certain peculiarities. She often spoke of his not liking her much, was frequently out of sorts, ill-tempered, and sat alone brooding; once she ornamented her Sunday hat very strikingly with red and green feathers, another day she bought a pair of pince-nez in order to wear them when she went out walking with her fiancé. One day the sudden idea that her teeth were rather ugly would not let her rest, and she resolved to get a plate, although there was no absolute need. She had all her teeth out under an anæsthetic. The night after the operation she suddenly had a severe anxiety-attack. She cried and moaned that she was damned for ever, for she had committed a great sin; she should not have allowed[320] her teeth to be extracted. People must pray for her, that God might pardon her sin. In vain her friends attempted to talk her out of her fears, to assure her that the extraction of teeth was really no sin; it availed nothing. At day-break she became somewhat quieter; she worked throughout the day. On following nights the attacks were repeated. When consulted by the patient I found her quiet, but she wore a rather vacant expression. I talked to her about the operation, and she assured me it was not so dreadful to have teeth extracted, but still it was a great sin, from which position, despite every persuasion, she could not be moved. She continually repeated in plaintive, pathetic tones, "I should not have allowed my teeth to be extracted; oh yes, that was a great sin which God will never forgive me." She gave the impression of real insanity. A few days later her condition grew worse, and she had to be brought into the asylum. The anxiety-attack had extended and was persistent, and the mental disorder lasted for months.
The case we're looking at is about a 32-year-old cook. She had no family history of mental issues, was always hard-working and responsible, and had never shown any strange behavior. Recently, she met a young man she wanted to marry. After that, she started to display some odd traits. She often talked about how he didn’t seem to like her much, was frequently in a bad mood, and would sit alone deep in thought. One time, she decorated her Sunday hat with bright red and green feathers; another day, she bought a pair of pince-nez glasses to wear while walking with her fiancé. One day, the sudden thought that her teeth were ugly troubled her so much that she decided to get dentures, even though she didn’t really need them. She had all her teeth removed under anesthesia. The night after the surgery, she suddenly had a severe anxiety attack. She cried and moaned that she was doomed forever because she had committed a terrible sin; she shouldn’t have allowed her teeth to be taken out. She begged people to pray for her so God would forgive her sin. Despite her friends trying to reassure her that there was no wrongdoing in having teeth extracted, it didn’t help. By dawn, she was a bit calmer and worked through the day. Over the next few nights, the attacks continued. When I consulted her, I found her quiet but with a vacant look. I talked to her about the surgery, and she assured me that having teeth pulled wasn’t so bad, but she believed it was still a great sin that she couldn’t get past, despite all efforts to assure her otherwise. She repeatedly lamented, "I shouldn’t have let them take my teeth out; oh yes, that was a great sin that God will never forgive me." She appeared genuinely insane. A few days later, her condition worsened, and she had to be admitted to the asylum. The anxiety attacks became more severe and persistent, leading to months of mental disorder.
The history shows a series of entirely unrelated symptoms. Why all the queer story of the hat and pince-nez? Why those anxiety-attacks? Why this delusion that the extraction of her teeth was an unpardonable sin? Nothing here is clear. The morphologically-minded psychiatrist would say: This is just a typical case of dementia præcox; it is the essence of insanity, of madness, to talk of nothing but mysteries; the standpoint of the diseased mind towards the world is displaced, is "mad." What is no sin for the normal, the patient finds a sin. It is a bizarre delusion characteristic of dementia præcox. The extravagant lamentation about this supposed sin is what is known as "inadequate"[198] emotional emphasis. The queer ornamentation of the hat, the pince-nez, are bizarre notions such as are very common in these patients. Somewhere in the brain certain cells have fallen into disorder, and manufacture illogical, senseless ideas of one kind and another which are quite without psychological meaning. The patient is obviously a hereditary[321] degenerate with a weak brain, having a kink which is the origin of the disorder. For some reason or other the disease has suddenly broken out. It could just as easily have broken out at any other time. Perhaps we should have had to capitulate to these arguments had real psychological analysis not come to our aid. In filling up the certificate required for her removal to the asylum, it transpired that many years ago she had had an affair which terminated; her lover left her with an illegitimate child. Nobody had been told of this. When she was again in love a dilemma arose, and she asked herself, What will this new lover say about it? At first she postponed the marriage, becoming more and more worried, and then the eccentricities began. To understand these we must immerse ourselves in the psychology of a naïve soul. If we have to disclose some painful secret to a beloved person we try first to strengthen his love in order to obtain beforehand a guarantee of his forgiveness. We do it by flattery or by caresses, or we try to impress the value of our own personality in order to raise it in the eyes of the other. Our patient decked herself out with beautiful feathers, which to her simple taste seemed precious. The wearing of "pince-nez" increases the respect of children even of a mature age. And who does not know people who will have their teeth extracted, out of pure vanity, in order that they may wear a plate to improve their appearance?
The history shows a series of completely unrelated symptoms. Why the strange story about the hat and pince-nez? Why those anxiety attacks? Why the belief that getting her teeth extracted was an unpardonable sin? Nothing is clear here. A psychiatrist focused on morphology would say: This is just a typical case of dementia præcox; it’s the essence of insanity to focus on nothing but mysteries; the way a diseased mind views the world is skewed, is "mad." What isn’t a sin for a normal person, the patient sees as a sin. It’s a strange delusion typical of dementia præcox. The exaggerated lamenting about this supposed sin is what’s known as "inadequate" emotional emphasis. The odd decorations of the hat and the pince-nez are bizarre ideas that are very common among these patients. Somewhere in the brain, certain cells have gotten messed up and produce illogical, nonsensical ideas that lack psychological meaning. The patient is clearly a hereditary degenerate with a weak mind, having a quirk that is the source of the disorder. For some unknown reason, the disease has suddenly flared up. It could have erupted at any other time just as easily. Perhaps we would have had to yield to these arguments if real psychological analysis hadn’t come to our rescue. When filling out the certificate needed for her transfer to the asylum, it emerged that many years ago she had an affair that ended; her lover left her with an illegitimate child. No one had known about this. When she fell in love again, a dilemma arose, and she asked herself, What will this new lover think about it? At first, she delayed the marriage, growing increasingly anxious, and then the eccentricities began. To understand these, we need to delve into the psychology of a naïve soul. If we have to reveal a painful secret to someone we love, we first try to strengthen their love to secure their forgiveness in advance. We do this through flattery or affection, or we try to impress the value of our own personality to elevate how the other sees us. Our patient adorned herself with beautiful feathers, which seemed precious to her simple taste. Wearing pince-nez increases respect even from older children. And who hasn’t known people who get their teeth extracted purely out of vanity so they can wear a plate to enhance their appearance?
After such an operation most people have a slight, nervous reaction, and then everything becomes more difficult to bear. This was, as a matter of fact, just the moment when the catastrophe did occur, in her terror lest her fiancé should break with her when he heard of her previous life. That was the first anxiety-attack. Just as the patient had not acknowledged her secret in all these years, so she now sought to guard it, and shifted the fear in her guilty conscience on to the extraction of the teeth; she thus followed a method well known to us, for when we dare not acknowledge some great sin we deplore some small sin with the greater emphasis.
After such an operation, most people feel a slight, nervous reaction, and then everything becomes harder to deal with. This was actually the exact moment when the disaster happened, as she was terrified that her fiancé would end things once he learned about her past. That was the initial anxiety attack. Just as the patient had not acknowledged her secret all these years, she now tried to protect it and shifted the fear from her guilty conscience onto the tooth extraction; she followed a method we know well, where if we can't admit to a major sin, we lament a smaller one even more intensely.
The problem seemed insoluble to the weak and sensitive mind of the patient, hence the affect became insurmountably[322] great; this is the mental desire as presented from the psychological side. The series of apparently meaningless events, the so-called madness, have now a meaning; a significance appertains to the delusions, making the patient more human to us. Here is a person like ourselves, beset by universal human problems, no longer merely a cerebral machine thrown out of gear. Hitherto we thought that the insane patient revealed nothing to us by symptoms, save the senseless products of his disordered cerebral cells, but that was academic wisdom reeking of the study. When we penetrate into the human secrets of our patients, we recognise mental disease to be an unusual reaction to emotional problems which are in no wise foreign to ourselves, and the delusion discloses the psychological system upon which it is based.
The problem felt unsolvable to the weak and sensitive mind of the patient, making the emotional impact overwhelming[322]; this is the mental desire from a psychological perspective. The series of seemingly meaningless events, the so-called madness, now have meaning; there is significance to the delusions, making the patient more relatable to us. Here is someone just like us, struggling with common human issues, no longer just a malfunctioning brain. Until now, we believed that the insane patient showed us nothing through symptoms, except the nonsensical outcomes of their disrupted brain cells, but that was academic knowledge steeped in theory. When we delve into the human complexities of our patients, we see mental illness as an unusual response to emotional challenges that are not at all alien to us, and the delusion reveals the psychological framework that it rests upon.
The light which shines forth from this conception seems to us so enormously powerful because it forces us into the innermost depths of that tremendous disorder which is most common in our asylums, and hitherto least understood; by reason of the craziness of the symptoms it is the type that strikes the public as madness in excelsis.
The light that comes from this idea seems so incredibly powerful because it pushes us into the deepest parts of that huge chaos that is most common in our mental health facilities and the least understood until now; due to the craziness of the symptoms, it's the kind that the public sees as madness in excelsis.
The case which I have just sketched is a simple one. It is transparent. My second example is somewhat more complicated. It is the case of a man between 30 and 40 years of age; he is a foreign archæologist of great learning and most unusual intelligence. He was a precocious boy of quite excellent character, great sensitiveness and rare gifts. Physically he was small, always weakly, and a stammerer. He grew up and was educated abroad, and afterwards studied for several terms at B——. So far there had been no disorder of any kind. On the completion of his university career he became zealously absorbed in his archæological work, which gradually engulfed him to such an extent that he was dead to the world and all its pleasures. He worked incessantly, and buried himself entirely in his books. He became quite unsociable; before, awkward and shy in society, he now fled from it altogether, and saw no one beyond a few friends. He thus led the life of a hermit devoted entirely to science. A few years later, on a holiday tour, he revisited[323] B——, where he remained a few days. He walked a great deal in the environs of the town. His few acquaintances now found him somewhat strange, taciturn, and nervous. After a somewhat protracted walk he seemed tired, and said that he did not feel very well. He then remarked he must get himself hypnotised, he felt his nerves unsteady. On top of this he was attacked by physical illness, viz. inflammation of the lungs. Very soon a peculiar state of excitement supervened which led to suicidal ideas. He was brought to the asylum, where for weeks he remained in an extremely excited state. He was completely deranged, and did not know where he was; he spoke in broken sentences which no one could understand. He was often so excited and aggressive that it took several attendants to hold him. He gradually became quieter, and one day came to himself, as if waking out of a long, confused dream. He soon completely regained his health, and was discharged as cured. He returned to his home and again immersed himself in books. In the following years he published several remarkable works, but, as before, his life was that of a hermit living entirely in his books and dead to the world. He then gradually acquired the name of a dried-up misanthrope, lost to all meaning of the beauty of life. A few years after his first illness a brief holiday brought him again to B——. As before he took his solitary walks in the environs. One day he was suddenly overcome by a faint feeling, and lay down in the street. He was carried into a neighbouring house where he immediately became extremely excited. He began to perform gymnastics, jumped over the rails of the bed, turned somersaults in the room, began to declaim in a loud, voice, sang his own improvisations, etc. He was again brought to the asylum. The excitement continued. He extolled his wonderful muscles, his beautiful figure, his enormous strength. He believed that he had discovered a natural law by which a wonderful voice could be developed. He regarded himself as a great singer, and a marvellous reciter, and at the same time he was a great inspired poet and composer to whom verse and melody came spontaneously.
The case I just outlined is straightforward. It's clear-cut. My second example is a bit more complex. It's about a man between 30 and 40 years old; he's an incredibly knowledgeable and unusually intelligent foreign archaeologist. As a child, he was precocious with excellent character, great sensitivity, and rare talents. Physically, he was small, always frail, and had a stutter. He grew up and was educated abroad, then studied for several terms at B——. Up until that point, he showed no signs of any disorder. After finishing university, he became intensely focused on his archaeological work, which gradually consumed him to the point where he became detached from the world and its pleasures. He worked tirelessly and completely immersed himself in his books. He became very unsociable; previously awkward and shy in social settings, he now avoided them altogether, seeing only a few friends. He ended up living like a hermit, fully devoted to science. A few years later, during a holiday trip, he went back to B——, where he stayed for a few days. He spent a lot of time walking around the area. His few acquaintances found him somewhat strange, quiet, and on edge. After a long walk, he seemed tired and mentioned that he wasn't feeling well. He then said he needed to get hypnotized because his nerves felt unsteady. On top of that, he developed a physical illness, specifically lung inflammation. Soon after, he experienced a strange state of excitement, which led to suicidal thoughts. He was admitted to the asylum, where he remained in a highly agitated state for weeks. He was completely disoriented and didn't know where he was; he spoke in broken sentences that no one could understand. He often became so agitated and aggressive that it took several attendants to hold him down. Gradually, he calmed down, and one day he came to his senses as if waking from a long, confusing dream. He quickly regained his health and was discharged as cured. He returned home and immersed himself in books again. In the following years, he published several remarkable works, but, as before, his life was that of a hermit, absorbed entirely in his books and disconnected from the world. Over time, he earned the reputation of a bitter misanthrope, oblivious to the beauty of life. A few years after his first illness, a short holiday brought him back to B——. Again, he took solitary walks in the area. One day, he suddenly felt faint and lay down in the street. He was taken into a nearby house, where he immediately became extremely agitated. He started doing gymnastics, jumped over the bedrails, performed somersaults in the room, loudly declaimed, sang his own improvised songs, and so on. He was taken back to the asylum. The agitation continued. He praised his incredible muscles, his great physique, and his immense strength. He believed he had discovered a natural law that could develop a beautiful voice. He saw himself as a great singer, a brilliant reciter, and an inspired poet and composer, with verse and melody coming to him effortlessly.
All this was in pitiable and very remarkable contrast to reality. He is a small weakly man of unimposing build, with poorly developed muscles betraying at the first glance the atrophying effect of his studious life. He is unmusical, his voice is weak and he sings out of tune; he is a bad speaker, because of his stutter. For weeks he occupied himself in the asylum with peculiar jumping, and contortions of the body which he called gymnastics, he sang and declaimed. Then he became more quiet and dreamy, often stared thoughtfully in front of him for a long time, now and then sang a love song which, despite its want of musical expression, betrayed a pretty feeling for love's aspirations. This also was in complete contrast with the dryness and isolation of his normal life. He gradually became accessible for lengthy conversations.
All of this strikingly contrasted with reality. He is a small, frail man with an unimpressive build, and his underdeveloped muscles clearly show the weakening effects of his studious lifestyle. He has no musical talent; his voice is weak and he sings off-key. He struggles with public speaking due to his stutter. For weeks, he entertained himself in the asylum with odd jumping exercises and body contortions that he called gymnastics; he sang and performed recitations. Then he became quieter and more dreamy, often staring off thoughtfully for long periods, occasionally singing a love song that, despite its lack of musicality, revealed a genuine feeling for the aspirations of love. This too stood in stark contrast to the dryness and isolation of his ordinary life. Gradually, he became more open to having long conversations.
We will break off the history of the disease here, and sum up what is furnished so far by observation of the patient.
We will pause the history of the disease here and summarize what has been provided so far by observing the patient.
In the first illness the delirium broke out unexpectedly, and was followed by a mental disorder with confused ideas and violence which lasted for several weeks. Complete recovery appeared to have taken place. Six years later there was a sudden outbreak of mania, grandiose delusions, bizarre actions, followed by a twilight-stage gradually leading to recovery. Here we again see a typical case of dementia præcox, of the katatonic variety, especially characterised by peculiar movements and actions. In psychiatry the views obtaining at present would regard this as localised cellular disease of some part of the cortex, exhibiting confusional states, delusions of grandeur, peculiar contortions of the muscles, or twilight-states, which taken all together have as little psychological meaning as the bizarre shapes of a drop of lead thrown into water.
In the first illness, delirium appeared out of nowhere, followed by a mental disorder with confused thoughts and aggression that lasted several weeks. It seemed like a complete recovery had happened. Six years later, there was a sudden onset of mania, grandiose delusions, and strange behaviors, which led into a gradual recovery phase. This is another typical case of schizophrenia, particularly the catatonic type, marked by unusual movements and behaviors. Today, psychiatry views this as a localized cellular issue in a part of the cortex, showing confusion, grandiose delusions, unusual muscle contortions, or twilight states, which combined have as little psychological significance as the odd shapes formed by a drop of lead thrown into water.
This is not my view. It was certainly no accidental freak of the brain-cells that created the dramatic contrasts shown in the second illness. We can see that these contrasts, the so-called grandiose delusions, were very subtly determined by the deficiencies in the patient's personality. Without doubt, any one of us would naturally regard these deficiencies seriously[325] in ourselves. Who would not have the desire to find compensation for the aridness of his profession and of his life in the joys of poetry and music and to restore to his body the natural power and beauty stolen from it by the study's atmosphere? Do we not recall with envy the energy of a Demosthenes who, despite his stammering, became a great orator? If our patient thus fulfilled the obvious gaps in his physical and mental life by delusional wishes, the supposition is warranted that the whispered love-song which he sang from time to time filled up a painful blank in his being, which became more painful the more it was concealed. The explanation is not far to seek. It is simply the old story, born anew in every human soul, in a guise befitting the destined creature's highest sensibilities.
This isn't my opinion. It definitely wasn't just a random quirk of the brain that created the dramatic contrasts seen in the second illness. We can see that these contrasts, the so-called grandiose delusions, were subtly influenced by the patient's personality weaknesses. Undoubtedly, any of us would seriously view these weaknesses in ourselves. Who wouldn't want to find relief from the dullness of their profession and life in the joys of poetry and music, and to regain the natural strength and beauty taken away by their work environment? Do we not envy the energy of a Demosthenes who, despite his stutter, became a great speaker? If our patient filled the obvious gaps in his physical and mental life with delusional desires, it's reasonable to assume that the love song he occasionally sang filled a painful void within him, a pain that grew greater the more it was hidden. The explanation is easy to find. It’s simply the age-old story, expressed anew in every human soul, in a way that resonates with the unique sensitivities of each individual.[325]
When our patient was a student he learnt to know and love a girl-student. Together they made many excursions in the environs of the town, but his exceeding timidity and bashfulness (the lot of the stammerer) never permitted him an opportunity of getting out the appropriate words. Moreover, he was poor and had nothing to offer her but hopes. The time came for the termination of his studies; she went away, and he also, and they never saw one another again. And not long afterwards he heard she had married some one else. Then he relinquished his hopes, but he did not know that Eros never emancipates his slaves.
When our patient was in school, he got to know and love a female student. They went on many trips around the town together, but his extreme shyness and awkwardness (a common issue for someone who stammers) always held him back from expressing himself. Plus, he was poor and had nothing to offer her but his dreams. Eventually, his studies came to an end; she left, and so did he, and they never saw each other again. Not long after that, he found out that she had married someone else. He gave up on his hopes, but little did he know that Eros never frees his captives.
He buried himself in abstract learning, not to forget, but to work for her in his thoughts. He wanted to keep the love in his heart quite secret, and never to betray that secret. He would dedicate his works to her without her ever knowing it. The compromise succeeded, but not for long. Once he travelled through the town where he heard she lived—it seems to have been an accident that he travelled through that town. He did not leave the train, which only made a short halt there. From the window he saw standing in the distance a young woman with a little child, and thought it was she. Impossible to say whether it was really so or not. He does not think he felt any peculiar feeling at that moment; anyway he gave himself no trouble to ascertain whether it[326] was she, which makes the presumption strong that it was not really she. The unconscious wanted to be left in peace with its illusion. Shortly afterwards he again came to B——, the place of old memories. Then he felt something strange stir in his soul, an uneasy feeling, akin to Nietzsche's—
He threw himself into learning, not to forget, but to think about her. He wanted to keep the love in his heart a secret and never betray that secret. He planned to dedicate his work to her without her ever knowing. It worked for a while, but not for long. One time he traveled through the town where he heard she lived—it seemed like an accident that he went through that town. He didn’t get off the train, which only stopped there briefly. From the window, he saw a young woman with a little child in the distance and thought it was her. It’s impossible to say if it really was. He doesn’t think he felt anything special at that moment; anyway, he didn’t bother to check if it was her, which makes it likely that it wasn’t. His subconscious wanted to stay undisturbed with its illusion. Shortly after, he returned to B——, the place of old memories. Then he felt something strange stir in his soul, an uneasy feeling, similar to Nietzsche's—
Civilised man no longer believes in demons, he calls in the doctor. Our patient wanted to be hypnotised. Then madness overcame him. What was going on in him?
Civilized people no longer believe in demons; they call a doctor instead. Our patient wanted to be hypnotized. Then madness took over him. What was happening inside him?
He answered this question in broken sentences, with long pauses, in that twilight-stage that heralds convalescence. I give as faithfully as may be his own words. When he fell ill he suddenly lost the well-regulated world and found himself in the chaos of an overmastering dream, a sea of blood and fire; the world was out of joint; everywhere conflagration, volcanic outbreaks, earthquakes, mountains fell in, followed by enormous battles where the peoples fell upon one another; he became involved more and more in the battle of nature, he was right in the midst of those fighting, wrestling, defending himself, enduring unutterable misery and pain; gradually he was exalted and strengthened by a strange calming feeling that some one was watching his struggles, that his loved one saw all from afar. That was the time when he showed real violence to the attendants. He felt his strength increasing and saw himself at the head of great armies which he would lead to victory. Then more great battles and at length victory. He would try to get his loved one as prize of victory. As he drew near her the illness ceased, and he awoke from a long dream.
He answered this question in fragmented sentences, with long pauses, in that hazy state that signals recovery. I will share his own words as accurately as I can. When he got sick, he abruptly lost the structured world he knew and found himself in the chaos of an overwhelming dream, a sea of blood and fire; everything was out of balance; there were fires everywhere, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, mountains collapsing, followed by huge battles where people fought against one another; he became increasingly caught up in nature's battle, right in the middle of those who were fighting, struggling, defending himself, enduring indescribable misery and pain; gradually, he felt uplifted and empowered by a strange sense that someone was watching his struggles, that his loved one saw everything from afar. That was when he showed real aggression towards the attendants. He felt his strength growing and envisioned himself at the front of great armies that he would lead to victory. Then, there were more great battles and finally, victory. He aimed to win his loved one as a prize. As he got closer to her, the illness faded, and he woke from a long dream.
His daily life again began to follow the regular routine. He shut himself up in his work and forgot the abyss within himself. A few years later he is again at B—— Demon or Destiny? Again he followed the old trail and again was overborne by old memories. But this time he was not immersed in the depths of confusion. He remained orientated[327] and en rapport with his surroundings. The struggle was considerably milder, but he did gymnastics, practised the arts, and made good his deficiencies; then followed the dreamy stage with the love-songs, corresponding to the period of victory in the first psychosis. In this state, according to his own words, he had a dreamlike feeling as if he stood upon the borders of two worlds and knew not whether truth stood on the right or on the left. He told me, "It is said she is married, but I believe she is not, but is still waiting for me; I feel that it must be so. It is ever to me as if she were not married, and as if success were yet attainable."
His daily life started to get back into a routine. He immersed himself in his work and forgot the inner turmoil he felt. A few years later, he found himself back at B—— Demon or Destiny? He followed the same path again and was overwhelmed by old memories. But this time he wasn’t lost in confusion. He stayed grounded and connected to his surroundings. The struggle was much lighter, but he practiced gymnastics, honed his skills, and worked on his shortcomings; then came a dreamy phase filled with love songs, similar to the victorious period during his first psychosis. In that state, he described it as feeling dreamlike, as if he stood on the edge of two worlds, unsure whether truth was on the right or the left. He said to me, "They say she’s married, but I believe she’s not, and she’s still waiting for me; I feel it must be true. It’s always like she isn’t married, and that success is still possible."
Our patient here portrayed but a pale copy of the scene in the first attack of psychosis, when he, the victor, stood before his mistress. In the course of a few weeks after this conversation the scientific interests of the patient again began to predominate. He spoke with obvious unwillingness about his intimate life, he repressed it more and more, and finally turned away from it as if it did not belong to himself. Thus gradually the gate of the under-world became closed. There remained nothing but a certain tense expression, and a look which, though fixed on the outer world, was turned inwards at the same time; and this alone hinted at the silent activity of the unconscious, preparing new solutions for his insoluble problem. This is the so-called cure in dementia præcox.
Our patient here was just a shadow of the scene during his first psychotic episode, when he stood victorious in front of his mistress. In the weeks that followed this conversation, his scientific interests once again took over. He spoke with clear reluctance about his personal life, increasingly pushed it aside, and eventually avoided it as if it didn’t pertain to him. Gradually, the door to the underworld began to close. All that remained was a certain tense expression and a look that, while focused on the outside world, was also inwardly directed; this was the only sign of the quiet work of the unconscious, seeking new solutions for his unsolvable problem. This is what is referred to as the so-called cure in dementia præcox.
Hitherto we psychiatrists used not to be able to suppress a laugh when we read an artist's attempts to portray a psychosis. These attempts have been generally regarded as quite useless, for the writer introduces into his conception of the psychosis psychological relationships quite foreign to the clinical picture of the disease. But the artist has not simply proceeded to copy a case out of a psychiatric text-book; he knows as a rule better than the psychiatrist.
Until now, we psychiatrists couldn't help but laugh when we saw an artist's attempts to depict a psychosis. These efforts have usually been seen as pretty pointless, since the artist includes psychological relationships that are completely unrelated to the clinical picture of the illness. However, the artist doesn't just copy a case from a psychiatric textbook; they generally understand it better than the psychiatrist.
The case which I have sketched is not unique, it is typical of a whole class for which the artist Spitteler has created a model of universal validity; the model is Imago. I may take for granted that you know his book of that name. The psychological gulf, however, between the creation of the artist and the insane person is great. The world of the artist[328] is one of solved problems; the world of reality, that of unsolved problems. The mental patient is a faithful image of this reality. His solutions are unsatisfying illusions, his cure a temporary giving up of the problem, which yet goes on working in the depths of the unconscious, and at the appointed time again rises to the surface and creates new illusions with new scenery; part of the history of mankind is here seen abridged.
The case I’ve described isn't unique; it represents a whole category for which the artist Spitteler has created a model that’s universally relevant; that model is Imago. I can assume you’re familiar with his book by that title. However, the psychological distance between what the artist creates and the state of the insane person is significant. The artist’s world[328] consists of solved problems, while reality is full of unresolved issues. The mental patient reflects this reality accurately. Their solutions are just unsatisfying illusions, and their recovery is merely a temporary retreat from the problem, which continues to fester in the depths of their unconscious, only to resurface later, creating new illusions with different contexts; this reflects a condensed part of human history.
Psychological analysis is far from being able to explain in complete and illuminating fashion all cases of the disease with which we are here concerned. On the contrary, the majority remain obscure and difficult to understand, and chiefly because only a certain proportion of patients recover. Our last patient is noteworthy because his return to a normal state afforded us a survey of the period of his illness. Unfortunately the advantage of this standpoint is not always possible to us, for a great number of persons never find their way back from their dreams. They are lost in the maze of a magic garden where the same old story is repeated again and again in a timeless present. For patients the hands of the clock of the world remain stationary; there is no time, no further development. It makes no difference to them whether they dream for two days or thirty years. I had a patient in my ward who was five years without uttering a word, in bed, and entirely buried in himself. For years I visited him twice daily, and as I reached his bedside I could see at once that there was no change. One day I was just about to leave the room when a voice I did not recognise called out—"Who are you? What do you want here?" I saw with astonishment that it was the dumb patient who had suddenly regained his voice, and obviously his senses also. I told him I was his doctor, whereupon he asked angrily, why was he kept a prisoner here, and why did no one ever speak to him? He said this in an injured voice just like a normal person whom one had neglected for a couple of days. I informed him that he had been in bed quite speechless for five years and had responded to nothing, whereat he looked at me fixedly and without understanding. Naturally I tried[329] to discover what had gone on in him during these five years, but could learn nothing. Another patient with a similar symptom, when asked why he had remained silent for years, maintained, "Because I wanted to spare the German language."[199] These examples show that it is often impossible to lift the veil of the secret, for the patients themselves have neither interest nor pleasure in explaining their strange experiences, in which as a rule they realise nothing peculiar.
Psychological analysis can't fully and clearly explain all cases of the disease we're discussing. In fact, most cases are unclear and hard to understand, mainly because only a certain number of patients recover. Our last patient is significant because his return to a normal state allowed us to review his illness period. Unfortunately, this perspective isn't always available to us, as many individuals never return from their dreams. They find themselves lost in a magical garden where the same old story repeats endlessly in a timeless present. For these patients, the clock of the world stands still; there's no passage of time or progression. It doesn't matter to them if they dream for two days or thirty years. I had a patient in my ward who went five years without saying a word, lying in bed and completely withdrawn. For years, I visited him twice a day, and each time I arrived at his bedside, I could immediately see that there was no change. One day, just as I was about to leave the room, an unfamiliar voice called out—"Who are you? What do you want here?" To my surprise, it was the silent patient who had suddenly found his voice and, it seemed, his senses as well. I told him I was his doctor, which prompted him to ask angrily why he was being kept prisoner there and why no one ever spoke to him. He expressed this in an injured tone, just like someone normal who felt neglected for a couple of days. I informed him that he had been bed-ridden and unable to speak for five years and had not responded to anything, at which point he looked at me intently and seemed confused. Naturally, I tried to find out what had happened to him during those five years, but I couldn't get any information. Another patient with a similar symptom, when asked why he had remained silent for years, replied, "Because I wanted to spare the German language." These examples illustrate that it's often impossible to uncover the secret, as the patients themselves have no interest or enjoyment in explaining their strange experiences, which, in general, they don't perceive as unusual.
Occasionally the symptoms themselves are a sign-post to the understanding of the psychology of the disease.
Sometimes the symptoms themselves point to a better understanding of the psychology behind the disease.
We had a patient who was for thirty-five years an inmate at Burghölzli. For decades she lay in bed, she never spoke or reacted to anything, her head was always bowed, her back bent and the knees somewhat drawn up. She was always making peculiar rubbing movements with her hands, so as to give rise during the course of years to thick horny patches on her hands. She kept the thumb and index finger of her right hand together as in the movement of sewing. When she died I tried to discover what she had been formerly. Nobody in the asylum recalled ever having seen her out of bed. Only our chief attendant had a memory of having seen her sitting in the same attitude as that she afterwards took up in bed, at which time she was making rapid movements of extension of the arm across the right knee; it was said of her that she was sewing shoes, later that she was polishing shoes. As time went on the movements became more limited till finally there remained but a slight rubbing movement, and only the finger and thumb retained the sewing position. In vain I consulted our old attendant, she knew nothing about the patient's previous history. When the seventy-year-old brother came to the funeral I asked him what had been the cause of his sister's illness; he told me that she had had a love-affair, but for various reasons it had come to nothing. The girl had taken this so to heart that she became low-spirited. In answer to a query about her lover it was found that he was a shoemaker.
We had a patient who spent thirty-five years at Burghölzli. For decades, she lay in bed, never speaking or reacting to anything. Her head was always down, her back was hunched, and her knees were somewhat drawn up. She constantly made strange rubbing movements with her hands, which over the years created thick, calloused patches. She kept the thumb and index finger of her right hand together, as if she were sewing. When she died, I tried to find out about her past. No one in the asylum remembered ever seeing her out of bed. Only our head attendant vaguely recalled seeing her sitting in the same position she later took in bed, making quick arm movements across her right knee; it was said she was sewing shoes, and later that she was polishing shoes. As time passed, her movements became more limited, until only a slight rubbing motion remained, and only her finger and thumb stayed in the sewing position. I consulted our old attendant in vain; she knew nothing about the patient's background. When the seventy-year-old brother came to the funeral, I asked him what had caused his sister's illness. He told me she had had a love affair, but it hadn’t worked out for various reasons. She took it so hard that she became depressed. When I asked about her lover, we found out he was a shoemaker.
Unless you see here some strange play of accident, you[330] must agree that the patient had kept the memory-picture of her lover unaltered in her heart for thirty-five years.
Unless you see some odd twist of fate here, you[330] must agree that the patient had held onto the memory of her lover unchanged in her heart for thirty-five years.
One might easily think that these patients who give an impression of imbecility are only burnt-out ruins of humanity. But such is probably not the case. One can often prove directly that such patients register everything going on around them even with a certain curiosity, and have an excellent memory for it all. This is the reason why many patients become for a time pretty sensible again, and develop mental powers which one believed they had long since lost. Such intervals occur occasionally during serious physical disease, or just before death. We had a patient with whom it was impossible to carry on a sane conversation; he only produced a mad medley of delusions and words. He once fell seriously ill physically, and I expected it would be very difficult to treat him. Not at all. He was quite changed, he became friendly and amiable, and carried out all his doctor's orders patiently and gratefully. His eyes lost their evil darting looks, and shone quietly and understandingly. One morning I came to his room with the usual greeting: "Good morning. How are you getting on?" The patient answered me in the well-known way: "There again comes one of the dog and monkey troupe wanting to play the Saviour." Then I knew his physical trouble was over. From that moment the whole of his reason was as if "blown away" again.
One might easily think that these patients who seem to be completely lost are just burnt-out shells of humanity. But that’s probably not true. You can often see directly that these patients are aware of everything happening around them, even with a sense of curiosity, and remember it all very well. This is why many patients occasionally regain their senses for a time and show mental abilities that we thought they had long lost. Such moments can happen during serious physical illness or just before death. We had a patient with whom it was impossible to have a rational conversation; he only expressed a crazy mix of delusions and words. He once became seriously ill physically, and I thought it would be very hard to treat him. Not at all. He changed completely, became friendly and pleasant, and followed all his doctor's orders patiently and gratefully. His eyes lost their wild, darting look and shone quietly and understandingly. One morning, I walked into his room and greeted him as usual: "Good morning. How are you doing?" The patient responded in the familiar way: "Here comes one of the dog and monkey troupe wanting to play the Savior." That’s when I knew his physical troubles were over. From that point on, his reason seemed to be "blown away" again.
From these observations we see that reason still survives, but is pushed away into some corner by the complete preoccupation of the mind with diseased thoughts.
From these observations, we see that reason still exists, but it's pushed to the sidelines by the mind's total focus on unhealthy thoughts.
Why is the mind compelled to exhaust itself in the elaboration of diseased nonsense? On this difficult question our new insight throws considerable light. To-day we can say that the pathological images dominate the interests of the patient so completely, because they are simply derivatives of the most important questions that used to occupy the person when normal—what in insanity is now an incomprehensible maze of symptoms used to be fields of vital interest to the former personality.
Why is the mind driven to tire itself out with twisted nonsense? Our new understanding sheds significant light on this challenging question. Today, we can say that the pathological thoughts dominate the patient's interests so thoroughly because they are simply offshoots of the most important questions that once mattered to the person when they were normal—what is now a confusing web of symptoms in madness used to be areas of vital concern for the former self.
I will cite as an example a patient who was twenty years in the asylum. She was always a puzzle to the physicians, for the absurdity of her delusions exceeded anything that the boldest imagination could create.
I will cite as an example a patient who spent twenty years in the asylum. She was always a mystery to the doctors, as the ridiculousness of her delusions went beyond anything that even the wildest imagination could come up with.
She was a dressmaker by trade, born in 1845, of very poor family. Her sister early went wrong and was finally lost in the swamp of prostitution. The patient herself led an industrious, respectable, reserved life. She fell ill in 1886 in her 39th year—at the threshold of the age when so many a dream is brought to naught. Her illness consisted in delusions and hallucinations which increased rapidly, and soon became so absurd that no one could understand her wishes and complaints. In 1887 she came to the asylum. In 1888 her statements, so far as the delusions were concerned, were not intelligible. She maintained such monstrous things as that: "At night her spinal marrow had been torn out; pains in the back had been caused by substances that went through the walls and were covered with magnetism." "The monopoly fixed the sorrows which are not in the body and do not fly about in the air." "Excursions are made by breathing in chemistry, and by suffocation regions are destroyed."
She was a dressmaker by profession, born in 1845, into a very poor family. Her sister went off course early on and eventually ended up in prostitution. The patient herself led a hardworking, respectable, and quiet life. She fell ill in 1886 at the age of 39—right at the point in life when so many dreams get shattered. Her illness included delusions and hallucinations that quickly intensified, becoming so bizarre that no one could understand her needs and complaints. In 1887, she was admitted to the asylum. By 1888, her claims, particularly regarding her delusions, were incomprehensible. She insisted on such outrageous things as: "At night, my spinal cord was ripped out; the pain in my back was caused by things that passed through the walls and were infused with magnetism." "The monopoly fixed the sorrows that aren't in the body and don’t float around in the air." "Adventures happen by inhaling chemicals, and suffocating destroys regions."
In 1892 the patient styled herself the "Bank Note Monopoly, Queen of the Orphans, Proprietress of the Burghölzli Asylum;" she said: "Naples and I must provide the world with macaroni" (Nudel).
In 1892, the patient referred to herself as the "Bank Note Monopoly, Queen of the Orphans, Owner of the Burghölzli Asylum;" she said: "Naples and I need to bring macaroni to the world" (Nudel).
In 1896 she became "Germania and Helvetia from exclusively pure butter"; she also said, "I am Noah's Ark, the boat of salvation and respect."
In 1896, she became "Germania and Helvetia made only from pure butter"; she also stated, "I am Noah's Ark, the vessel of salvation and honor."
Since then the disease has greatly increased; her last creation is the delusion that she is the "lily red sea monster and the blue one."
Since then, the disease has increased significantly; her latest delusion is that she is the "red sea monster lily and the blue one."
These instances will show you how far the incomprehensibility of such pathological formations go. Our patient was for years the classic example of meaningless delusional ideas in dementia præcox; and many hundreds of medical students have received from the demonstration of this case a permanent impression of the sinister power of insanity. But even this[332] case has not withstood the newer technique of psychoanalysis. What the patient says is not at all meaningless; it is full of significance, so that he who has the key can understand without overmuch difficulty.
These examples will show you how far the incomprehensibility of these pathological conditions can extend. Our patient was for years the classic case of meaningless delusional thoughts in schizophrenia; and many hundreds of medical students have taken away from this case a lasting impression of the dark power of mental illness. But even this[332] case hasn’t stood up to the newer techniques of psychoanalysis. What the patient says is not meaningless at all; it is full of significance, so that anyone who has the key can understand it without too much difficulty.
Time does not allow me to describe the technique by means of which I succeeded in lifting the veil of her secret. I must content myself by giving a few examples to make the strange changes of thought and of speech in this patient clear to you.
Time doesn't allow me to explain the method I used to uncover her secret. I have to settle for providing a few examples to clarify the unusual shifts in thought and speech in this patient for you.
She said of herself that she was Socrates. The analysis of this delusion presented the following ideas: Socrates was the wisest man, the man of greatest learning; he was infamously accused, and had to die in prison at the hands of strange men. She was the best dressmaker, but "never unnecessarily cut a thread, and never allowed a piece of material to lie about on the floor." She worked ceaselessly, and now she has been falsely accused, wicked men have shut her up, and she will have to die in the asylum.
She claimed that she was Socrates. The analysis of this belief revealed the following points: Socrates was the wisest person, the most learned man; he was notoriously accused and had to die in prison at the hands of strangers. She was the best dressmaker, but "never cut a thread unnecessarily and never left a piece of fabric lying on the floor." She worked tirelessly, and now she has been falsely accused, evil men have locked her away, and she will have to die in the asylum.
Therefore she is Socrates; this is, as you see, simple metaphor, based upon obvious analogy. Take another example: "I am the finest professor and the finest artist in the world."
Therefore she is Socrates; this is, as you see, a straightforward metaphor, based on a clear analogy. Take another example: "I am the best professor and the best artist in the world."
The analysis furnishes the remarks that she is the best dressmaker and chooses the most beautiful models which show up well and waste little material; she puts on the trimming only where it can be seen. She is a professor, and an artist in her work. She makes the best clothes and calls them absurdly "The Schnecke Museum-clothes." Her customers are only such persons as frequent the Schnecke House and the Museum (the Schnecke House is the aristocratic club. It is near the Museum and the Library, another rendezvous of the aristocratic set of Zürich), for she is the best dressmaker and makes only Schnecke Museum[200] clothing.
The analysis presents the observation that she is the best dressmaker, selecting the most beautiful designs that look great and minimize waste; she only adds embellishments where they will be visible. She is both a teacher and an artist in her craft. She creates the finest clothing and humorously calls them "The Schnecke Museum-clothes." Her clients are exclusively those who frequent the Schnecke House and the Museum (the Schnecke House is the elite club located near the Museum and the Library, another meeting spot for Zürich's upper class), as she is the best dressmaker and only produces Schnecke Museum[200] clothing.
The patient also calls herself Mary Stuart. Analysis showed the same analogy as with Socrates: innocent suffering and death of a heroine.
The patient also calls herself Mary Stuart. Analysis revealed a similar pattern as with Socrates: the innocent suffering and death of a heroine.
"I am the Lorelei." Analysis: This is an old and well-known song: "I know not what it means," etc. Whenever she wants[333] to speak about her affairs people do not understand her, and say they don't know what it means; hence she is the Lorelei.
"I am the Lorelei." Analysis: This is a classic song: "I don’t know what it means," etc. Whenever she tries to discuss her situation, people don’t get it and say they don’t understand; that’s why she is the Lorelei.
"I am Switzerland." Analysis: Switzerland is free, no one can rob Switzerland of her freedom. The patient does not belong to the asylum, she would be free like Switzerland, hence she is Switzerland.
"I am Switzerland." Analysis: Switzerland is independent; no one can take away Switzerland's freedom. The patient doesn't belong to the asylum; she would be as free as Switzerland, so she is Switzerland.
"I am a crane." Analysis: In the "Cranes of Ibykus" it is said: "Whosoever is free of sin and fault shall preserve the pure soul of a child." She has been brought innocent to the asylum and has never committed a crime—hence she is a crane.
"I am a crane." Analysis: In the "Cranes of Ibykus" it is said: "Whoever is free of sin and fault will keep the pure soul of a child." She has been brought in innocent to the asylum and has never done anything wrong—so she is a crane.
"I am Schiller's Bell." Analysis: Schiller's Bell is the greatest work of the great master. She is the best and most industrious dressmaker, and has achieved the highest rung in the art of dressmaking—hence she is Schiller's Bell.
"I am Schiller's Bell." Analysis: Schiller's Bell is the greatest work of the master. She is the most talented and hardworking dressmaker, having reached the pinnacle of the art of dressmaking—so she is Schiller's Bell.
"I am Hufeland." Analysis: Hufeland was the best doctor. She suffers intolerably in the asylum and is moreover treated by the worst doctors. She is, however, so prominent a personality that she had a claim to the best doctors, that is to a doctor like Hufeland—hence she is Hufeland.
"I am Hufeland." Analysis: Hufeland was the best doctor. She suffers immensely in the asylum and is treated by the worst doctors. However, she is such a strong personality that she deserves the best doctors, meaning a doctor like Hufeland—so she is Hufeland.
The patient used the expression "I am" in a very arbitrary way. Sometimes it meant "it belongs to me" or "it is proper for me"; sometimes it means "I should have." This is seen from the following analysis:
The patient used the phrase "I am" very randomly. Sometimes it meant "it belongs to me" or "it suits me"; other times it meant "I should have." This is evident from the following analysis:
"I am the master-key." Analysis: The master-key is the key that opens all the doors of the asylum. Properly, according to all rights, the patient should long since have obtained this key for she has been for many years "the proprietress of the Burghölzli Asylum." She expresses this reflection very much simplified in the sentence, "I am the master-key."
"I am the master-key." Analysis: The master-key is the key that opens all the doors of the asylum. In reality, the patient should have received this key a long time ago because she has been for many years "the owner of the Burghölzli Asylum." She simplifies this thought in the statement, "I am the master-key."
The chief content of her delusions is concentrated in the following words:—
The main focus of her delusions is captured in these words:—
"I am the monopoly." Analysis: The patient means the banknote monopoly, which has belonged to her for some time. She believes that she possesses the monopoly of the entire bank notes of the world, thus creating enormous riches for herself, in compensation for the poverty and lowliness of her[334] lot. Her parents died early; hence she is the Queen of the Orphans. Her parents lived and died in great poverty. Her blessings are extended to them also, the dreamlike delusions of the patient benefit them in many ways. She says textually: "My parents are clothed by me, my sorely-tried mother, full of sorrow—I sat with her at table—covered in white with superfluity."
"I am the monopoly." Analysis: The patient means the banknote monopoly, which has belonged to her for a while. She believes that she possesses the monopoly on all the banknotes in the world, thus creating immense wealth for herself, as compensation for the poverty and lowliness of her[334] situation. Her parents died young; so she is the Queen of the Orphans. Her parents lived and passed away in severe poverty. Her blessings also extend to them; the dreamlike delusions of the patient benefit them in many ways. She says literally: "My parents are clothed by me, my deeply troubled mother, full of sorrow—I sat with her at the table—dressed in white with abundance."
This is another of these malleable hallucinations which the patient had daily. It is one of those scenes of wish-fulfilment, with poverty on one side and riches on the other, recalling Hauptmann's Hannele; more especially that scene where Gottwald says: "She was clothed in rags—now she is bedeckt in silken robes; and she ran about barefoot—now she has shoes of glass to her feet. Soon she will live in a golden castle and eat each day of baked meats. Here has she lived on cold potatoes...."
This is another one of those flexible hallucinations that the patient experienced every day. It's a scene of wish fulfillment, with poverty on one side and wealth on the other, reminiscent of Hauptmann's Hannele; especially the part where Gottwald says: "She was dressed in rags—now she’s wearing silken robes; and she used to run around barefoot—now she has glass slippers. Soon she’ll live in a golden castle and eat baked meats every day. Before, she lived on cold potatoes...."
The wish-fulfilments of our patient go even further. Switzerland has to furnish her with an income of 150,000 francs. The Director of the Burghölzli owes her 80,000 francs damages for wrongful incarceration. She is the proprietress of a distant island with silver mines, the "mightiest silver island in the world." Therefore she is also the greatest orator, possesses the most wonderful eloquence, for, as she says, "Speech is silver, silence gold." To her all the beautiful landed estates belong—all the rich quarters, towns and lands, she is the proprietress of a world, even a "threefold proprietress of the world." Whilst poor Hannele was only elevated to the side of the Heavenly Bridegroom, our patient has the "Key of Heaven," she is not only the honoured earthly queens Mary Stuart and Queen Louise of Prussia, but she is also the Queen of Heaven, the Mother of God as well as the Godhead. Even in this earthly world where she was but a poor, ill-regarded homely dressmaker she attained fulfilments of her human wishes, for she had taken three husbands from the best families in the town and her fourth was the Emperor Francis. From these marriages there were two phantom children—a little boy and a little girl. Just as she clothed, fed and feasted her parents, so she provided for the future of[335] her children. To her son she bequeathed the great bazaar of Zürich, therefore her son is a "Zur," for the proprietor of a Bazaar is a "Zur." The daughter resembles her mother; hence she becomes the proprietress of the asylum and takes her mother's place so that the mother is released from captivity. The daughter therefore receives the title of "Agency of Socrates," for she replaces Socrates in captivity.
The wish fulfillments of our patient go even further. Switzerland is supposed to provide her with an income of 150,000 francs. The Director of the Burghölzli owes her 80,000 francs in damages for wrongful imprisonment. She owns a distant island with silver mines, the "mightiest silver island in the world." That's why she is also the greatest orator, possessing incredible eloquence, because, as she says, "Speech is silver, silence is gold." All the beautiful estates belong to her—all the wealthy neighborhoods, towns, and lands; she is the owner of a world, even a "threefold owner of the world." While poor Hannele was only raised to the side of the Heavenly Bridegroom, our patient holds the "Key of Heaven"; she is not only the esteemed earthly queens Mary Stuart and Queen Louise of Prussia, but she is also the Queen of Heaven, the Mother of God, and the Godhead. Even in this earthly world, where she was just a poor, ill-regarded dressmaker, she achieved her human wishes, having married three husbands from the best families in town, and her fourth was Emperor Francis. From these marriages, there were two phantom children—a little boy and a little girl. Just as she clothed, fed, and entertained her parents, she secured the future of[335] her children. She left her son the great bazaar of Zürich, making him a "Zur," since the owner of a Bazaar is a "Zur." The daughter resembles her mother; thus, she becomes the owner of the asylum and takes her mother's place, allowing the mother to be freed from captivity. The daughter, therefore, receives the title "Agency of Socrates," as she takes Socrates' place in captivity.
These instances by no means exhaust the delusional fancies of the patient. But they will give you some idea, I hope, of the richness of her inner life although she was apparently so dull and apathetic, or, as was said imbecile, and sat for twenty years in her workroom, where she mechanically repaired her linen, occasionally uttering a complex of meaningless fragments which no one had hitherto been able to understand. Her odd lack of words can now be seen in another light; they are fragments of enigmatical inscriptions, of fairy-story phantasies, which have escaped from the hard world to found a world of their own. Here the tables are ever laden, and a thousand feasts are celebrated in golden palaces. The patient can only spare a few mysterious symbols for the gloomy dim shores of reality; they need not be understood, for our understanding has not been necessary for her for this long time.
These examples definitely don’t cover all the illusions of the patient. But I hope they give you some insight into the richness of her inner life, even though she seemed so dull and indifferent, or, as people called her, imbecile, as she sat for twenty years in her workroom, where she mechanically mended her linen, occasionally mumbling a jumble of meaningless phrases that no one had been able to decipher before. Her strange lack of words can now be viewed differently; they are pieces of mysterious inscriptions, glimpses into fairy tale fantasies that have broken free from the harshness of reality to create a world of their own. Here, the tables are always full, and a thousand feasts are held in golden palaces. The patient can only offer a few cryptic symbols to the dark, shadowy shores of reality; they don’t need to be understood, as our understanding hasn't been necessary for her for a long time.
Nor is this patient at all unique. She is one of a type. Similar phantasies are always found in patients of this kind, though not always in such profusion.
Nor is this patient at all unique. She is one of a kind. Similar fantasies are always found in patients like her, though not always in such abundance.
The parallels with Hauptmann's Hannele show that here likewise the artist has shown us the way with the free creation of his own phantasy. From this coincidence, which is not accidental, we may conclude that there is something common both to the artist and the insane and not to them alone. Every human being has also within himself that restless creative phantasy which is ever engaged in assuaging the harshness of reality. Whoever gives himself unsparingly and carefully to self-observation, will realise that there dwells within him something which would gladly hide and cover up all that is difficult and questionable in life, and thus procure an easy and free path. Insanity grants the upper hand to this something. When once it is uppermost, reality is more[336] or less quickly driven out. It becomes a distant dream, and the dream which enchains the patient wholly or in part, and often for life, has now the attributes of reality. We normal persons, who have to do entirely with reality, see only the products of disordered fancy, but not the wealth of that side of the mind which is turned away from us. Unfortunately only too often no further knowledge reaches us of the things which are transpiring on that other side, because all the bridges are broken down which unite this side with that.
The similarities with Hauptmann's Hannele show that here the artist has also led us through the free expression of his own imagination. From this connection, which isn’t coincidental, we can conclude that there’s something shared between the artist and the insane, and it doesn’t stop with them. Every person has that restless, creative imagination inside, always trying to ease the harshness of reality. Anyone who genuinely and thoroughly engages in self-reflection will realize there’s something inside them that wants to hide and cover up everything difficult and questionable in life, making way for a simpler, freer path. Insanity gives this something the upper hand. Once it takes control, reality is pushed out more or less quickly. It fades into a distant dream, and that dream, which captivates the individual completely or partially—and often for a lifetime—now takes on the qualities of reality. We, normal people, who deal entirely with reality, only see the outcomes of chaotic imagination, not the richness of that part of the mind that remains hidden from us. Unfortunately, we often have no further insight into what’s happening on that other side because all the connections that unite this side with the other have been severed.
We do not know to-day whether these new views are of universal or only of limited validity; the more carefully and perseveringly we examine our patients, the more we shall meet cases, which, despite apparent total imbecility, will yet afford us at least some fragmentary insight into the obscurities of the psychical life. This life is far removed from that mental poverty which the prevailing theories were compelled to accept.
We don't know today if these new perspectives are universally applicable or only have limited validity; the more carefully and persistently we study our patients, the more we'll encounter cases that, despite seeming completely incapable, will still provide us with at least some fragmentary understanding of the complexities of psychological life. This life is very different from the mental limitations that the dominant theories were forced to accept.
However far we are from being able to understand fully the concatenations of that obscure world, at least we may maintain, with complete assurance, that in dementia præcox there is no symptom which can be described as psychologically baseless and meaningless. The most absurd things are in reality symbols of ideas which are not only generally understandable, but also universally operative in the human heart. In insanity we do not discover anything new and unknown, but we look at the foundation of our own being, the source of those life-problems in which we are all engaged.
However far we are from fully understanding the connections of that obscure world, we can confidently say that in dementia præcox, there is no symptom that can be described as psychologically baseless or meaningless. The most absurd things are actually symbols of ideas that are not only generally understandable but also universally relevant to the human heart. In insanity, we don't discover anything new or unknown; instead, we examine the foundation of our own existence and the source of the life problems we all face.
Part II.[201]
Part II. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
The number of psychoanalytic investigations into the psychology of dementia præcox has considerably increased since the publication of my book upon the subject.[202] When, in 1903, I made the first analysis of a case of dementia præcox, there dawned on me a premonition of the possibilities of future discoveries in this sphere. This has been confirmed.
The number of psychoanalytic studies on the psychology of dementia praecox has significantly increased since my book on the subject was published.[202] When I did the first analysis of a dementia praecox case in 1903, I had a sense of the future discoveries that could be made in this area. This has been proven true.
Freud first submitted a case of paranoid dementia to [337]closer psychological investigation.[203] This he was enabled to do by means of an analytic technique perfected through his rich experiences with neurotics. He selected the famous autobiography of P. Schreber, "Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken." The patient could not be analysed personally, but having published his most interesting autobiography all the material wanted for an analysis was to be found in it.
Freud was the first to present a case of paranoid dementia for a deeper psychological analysis.[337] He was able to do this thanks to an analytic technique he refined through extensive experience with neurotics. He chose the well-known autobiography of P. Schreber, "Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken." Although the patient couldn't be analyzed directly, his fascinating autobiography contained all the material needed for the analysis.
In this study Freud shows out of what infantile forms of thought and instincts the delusional system was built up. The peculiar delusions which the patient had about his doctor whom he identified with God or with a god-like being, and certain other surprising and really blasphemous ideas, Freud was able to reduce most ingeniously to his infantile relationship to his father. This case also presented similar bizarre and grotesque concatenations of ideas to the one I have described. As the author himself says, his work confines itself to the task of pointing out those universally existent and undifferentiated foundations out of which we may say every psychological formation is historically developed.[204] This reductive analytical process did not, however, furnish such enlightening results in regard to the rich and surprising symbolism in patients of this kind as we had been accustomed to expect from the same method in the realm of the psychology of hysteria. In reading certain works of the Zürich school, for example, Maeder,[205] Spielrein,[206] Nelken,[207] Grebelskaja,[208] Itten,[209] one is powerfully impressed by the enormous symbol-formation in dementia præcox.
In this study, Freud reveals the infantile thought patterns and instincts that formed the basis of the delusional system. The unique delusions the patient had about his doctor, whom he equated with God or a god-like figure, along with other surprising and truly blasphemous ideas, can be cleverly traced back to his childhood relationship with his father. This case also displayed similar strange and grotesque connections of ideas to the one I've described. As the author mentions, his work focuses on identifying the universally present and undifferentiated foundations from which every psychological formation historically develops.[204] However, this analytical approach did not yield the enlightening results regarding the rich and surprising symbolism in patients of this nature that we had come to expect from the same method in hysteria psychology. When reading certain works from the Zürich school, such as Maeder,[205] Spielrein,[206] Nelken,[207] Grebelskaja,[208] and Itten,[209] one is strongly struck by the vast symbolic formation in dementia præcox.
Some of the authors still proceed essentially by the method of analytic reduction, tracing back the complicated delusional[338] formation into its simpler and more universal components, as I have done in the preceding pages. One cannot, however, resist the feeling that this method hardly does justice to the fulness and the almost overpowering wealth of phantastic symbol-formation, although it does undoubtedly throw a light upon the subject in certain directions.
Some of the authors still basically use the method of analytic reduction, breaking down the complex delusional[338] formation into its simpler and more universal elements, just like I did in the previous pages. However, it's hard to shake the feeling that this method doesn’t fully capture the richness and almost overwhelming abundance of imaginative symbol formation, even though it certainly sheds light on the topic in some ways.
Let me illustrate with an example. We should be thankful for a commentary upon "Faust" which traced back all the diverse material of Part II. to its historical sources, or for a psychological analysis of Part I. which pointed out how the dramatic conflict corresponds to a personal conflict in the soul of the poet; we should be glad of an exposition which pointed out how this subjective conflict is itself based upon those ultimate and universal human things which are nowise foreign to us since we all carry the seeds of them in our hearts. Nevertheless we should be a little disappointed. We do not read "Faust" just in order to discover that also we are, in all things, "human, all too human." Alas, we know that but too well already. Let any one who has not yet learnt it go for a little while out into the world and look at it without preconceptions and with open eyes. He will turn back from the might and power of the "too human," hungrily he will pick up his "Faust," not to find again what he has just left, but to learn how a man like Goethe shakes off these elemental human things and finds freedom for his soul. When we once know who was the "Proktophantasmist," to what chronological events the mass of symbols in Part II. relates, how it is all intimately bound up with the poet's own soul and conditioned by it, we come to regard this determination as less important than the problem itself—what does the poet mean by his symbolic creation? Proceeding purely reductively, one discovers the final meaning in these universal human things; and demands nothing further from an explanation than that the unknown and complicated shall be reduced to the known and simple. I should like to designate this kind of understanding as retrospective understanding. But there is another kind of understanding, which is not analytic reduction, but is of a synthetic[339] or constructive nature. I would designate this prospective understanding, and the corresponding method as the Constructive method.
Let me give you an example. We should appreciate a commentary on "Faust" that traced all the different elements of Part II back to their historical origins, or a psychological analysis of Part I that highlighted how the dramatic conflict mirrors a personal struggle within the poet's soul; we should be grateful for an explanation that shows how this inner conflict is rooted in those fundamental and universal human experiences that are not alien to us since we all carry the seeds of them in our hearts. However, we might feel a bit let down. We don't read "Faust" just to discover that we are, in every way, "human, all too human." Sadly, we already know that all too well. Anyone who hasn’t grasped this should spend some time in the world and observe it without biases and with open eyes. They will return from the overwhelming reality of the "too human," eagerly picking up their "Faust," not to retrace what they have just left behind, but to see how someone like Goethe shakes off these basic human struggles and finds freedom for his soul. Once we learn who the "Proktophantasmist" was, what chronological events the multitude of symbols in Part II refers to, and how it's all closely tied to the poet's own soul and shaped by it, we start to see this knowledge as less significant than the actual question—what does the poet mean by his symbolic creation? By looking at things purely in a reductive way, one finds the ultimate meaning in these universal human experiences; and expects nothing more from an explanation than that the unknown and complex be simplified into the known and straightforward. I would like to call this type of understanding retrospective understanding. But there’s another form of understanding that isn’t about analytic reduction; it’s more synthetic[339] or constructive. I would refer to this as prospective understanding, and its corresponding approach as the Constructive method.
It is common knowledge that present-day scientific explanation rests upon the basis of the causal principle. Scientific explanation is causal explanation. We are therefore naturally inclined, whenever we think scientifically, to explain causally, to understand a thing and to regard it as explained whenever it is reduced analytically to its cause and general principle. In so far Freud's psychological method of interpretation is strictly scientific.
It’s widely understood that modern scientific explanation is grounded in the principle of causality. Scientific explanation is all about causation. So, whenever we approach something scientifically, we tend to explain it in terms of its causes, believing we fully understand it when we break it down to its cause and overarching principle. In this sense, Freud’s psychological method of interpretation is distinctly scientific.
If we apply this method to "Faust" it must become clear that something more is required for a true understanding. It will even seem to us that we have not gathered the poet's deepest meaning if we only see in it universal foregone human conclusions. What we really want to find out is how this man has redeemed himself as an individual, and when we arrive at this comprehension then we shall also understand the symbol given by Goethe. It is true we may then fall into the error that we understand Goethe himself. But let us be cautious and modest, simply saying we have thereby arrived at an understanding of ourselves. I am thinking here of Kant's thought-compelling definition of comprehension, as "the realisation of a thing to the extent which is sufficient for our purpose."
If we use this approach with "Faust," it should become clear that we need something more for a genuine understanding. It might even feel like we haven't fully grasped the poet's deepest meaning if we only see it as just universal human conclusions. What we really want to discover is how this man has redeemed himself as an individual, and when we reach that understanding, we will also grasp the symbol presented by Goethe. It's true that we might then mistakenly think we understand Goethe himself. But let's be careful and humble, simply acknowledging that we have gained an understanding of ourselves. I'm thinking of Kant's thought-provoking definition of comprehension as "the realization of a thing to the extent that is sufficient for our purpose."
This understanding is, it is true, subjective, and therefore not scientific for those to whom science and explanation by the causal principle are identical. But the validity of this identification is open to question. In the sphere of psychology I must emphasise my doubt on this point.
This understanding is, it's true, subjective, and therefore not scientific for those who equate science with explanation based on causal principles. However, the validity of this identification is debatable. In the field of psychology, I want to stress my doubts about this.
We speak of "objective" understanding when we have given a causal explanation. But at bottom, understanding is a subjective process upon which we confer the quality "objective" really only to differentiate it from another kind of understanding which is also a psychological and subjective process, but upon which, without further ado, we bestow the quality "subjective." The attitude of to-day only grants scientific value to "objective" understanding on account of its[340] universal validity. This standpoint is incontestably correct wherever it is not a question of the psychological process itself, and hence it is valid in all sciences apart from pure psychology.
We refer to "objective" understanding when we provide a causal explanation. However, at its core, understanding is a subjective process, and we label it "objective" mainly to set it apart from another type of understanding that is also a psychological and subjective process, which we simply call "subjective." Today's perspective assigns scientific value to "objective" understanding due to its[340]universal validity. This viewpoint is undeniably true as long as we are not discussing the psychological process itself, making it applicable in all sciences except pure psychology.
To interpret Faust objectively, i.e. from the causal standpoint, is as though a man were to consider a sculpture from the historical, technical and—last but not least—from the mineralogical standpoint. But where lurks the real meaning of the wondrous work? Where is the answer to that most important question: what aim had the artist in mind, and how are we ourselves to understand his work subjectively? To the scientific spirit this seems an idle question which anyhow has nothing to do with science. It comes furthermore into collision with the causal principle, for it is a purely speculative constructive view. And the modern world has overthrown this spirit of scholasticism.
To interpret Faust objectively, i.e. from a causal perspective, is like a person examining a sculpture from historical, technical, and—importantly—from a mineralogical point of view. But where does the real meaning of this amazing work lie? Where can we find the answer to the most crucial question: what purpose did the artist intend, and how are we supposed to understand his work subjectively? To a scientific mindset, this seems like a pointless question that has nothing to do with science. It also conflicts with the causal principle, as it is purely a speculative and constructive perspective. Additionally, the modern world has rejected this spirit of scholasticism.
But if we would approach to an understanding of psychological things we must remember the fact of the subjective conditioning of all knowledge. The world is as we see it and not simply objective; this holds true even more of the mind. Of course it is possible to look at the mind objectively, just as at Faust, or a Gothic Cathedral. In this objective conception there is comprised the whole worth and worthlessness of current experimental psychology and psychoanalysis. The scientific mind, thinking causally, is incapable of understanding what is ahead; it only understands what is past, that is, retrospective. Like Ahriman, the Persian devil, it has the gift of After-Knowledge. But this spirit is only one half of a complete comprehension. The other more important half is prospective or constructive; if we are not able to understand what lies ahead, then nothing is understood. If psychoanalysis, following Freud's orientation, should succeed in presenting an uninterrupted and conclusive connection between Goethe's infantile sexual development and his work, or, following Adler, between the infantile struggle for power and the adult Goethe and his work, an interesting proposition would have been solved—we should have learnt how a masterpiece can be reduced to the simplest thinkable elements, which[341] are universal, and to be found working within the depths of everything and everybody. But did Goethe construct his work to this end? Was it his intention that it should be thus conceived?
But if we want to understand psychological matters, we have to remember that all knowledge is subjectively conditioned. The world is as we see it and not just objective; this is even more true for the mind. Of course, it's possible to look at the mind objectively, just like we would at Faust or a Gothic Cathedral. In this objective view lies the entire value and lack of value of current experimental psychology and psychoanalysis. The scientific mindset, thinking in terms of cause and effect, can only understand what has happened in the past, which is retrospective. Like Ahriman, the Persian devil, it has the gift of After-Knowledge. However, this perspective is only half of complete understanding. The other, more important half is prospective or constructive; if we can't understand what lies ahead, then we haven't understood anything. If psychoanalysis, following Freud’s approach, manages to show an unbroken and conclusive link between Goethe’s childhood sexual development and his work, or, following Adler, between the childhood struggle for power and the adult Goethe along with his work, it would be an interesting proposition resolved—we would learn how a masterpiece can be broken down into the simplest concepts, which[341] are universal and can be found operating in everyone and everything. But did Goethe create his work with this purpose in mind? Was it his intention for it to be understood this way?
It must be sufficiently clear that such an understanding, though undoubtedly scientific, would be entirely, utterly, beside the mark. This statement is valid for psychology in general. To understand the psyche causally, means to understand but half of it. The causal understanding of Faust enlightens us as to how it became a finished work of art, but reveals nothing of the living meaning of the poet. That meaning only lives if we experience it, in and through ourselves. In so far as our actual present life is for us something essentially new and not a repetition of all that has gone before, the great value of such a work is to be seen, not in its causal development, but in its living reality for our own lives. We should be indeed depreciating a work like Faust if we were only to regard it as something that has been perfected and finished; it is only understood when conceived as a becoming and as an ever new-experiencing.
It should be clear that this understanding, while definitely scientific, is completely off the mark. This applies to psychology in general. To understand the mind in terms of cause and effect means understanding just half of it. The causal explanation of Faust helps us see how it became a finished piece of art, but it doesn’t reveal anything about the poet’s living meaning. That meaning only exists when we experience it within ourselves. Since our present lives are essentially new and not just a repeat of what came before, the true value of such a work lies not in its causal development but in its living reality for our own lives. We would undermine a work like Faust if we only saw it as something that has been perfected and completed; it’s truly understood when viewed as a process of becoming and a continuous experience.
Thus we must regard the human psyche. Only on one side is the mind a Has Been, and as such subordinate to the causal principle. On the other side the mind is a Becoming that can only be grasped synthetically or constructively. The causal standpoint asks how it is this actual mind has become what it appears to-day? The constructive standpoint asks how a bridge can be built from this actual psyche to its own future?
Thus, we need to consider the human mind. On one hand, it's a Has Been, and in that sense, it's subject to the causal principle. On the other hand, the mind is a Becoming that can only be understood in a synthetic or constructive way. The causal perspective asks how this current mind has become what it is today. The constructive perspective asks how we can build a bridge from this current psyche to its future.
Just as the causal method finally reaches the general principles of human psychology by the analysis and reduction of individual events, so does the constructive standpoint reach aims that are general by the synthesis of individual tendencies. The mind is a point of passage and thus necessarily determined from two sides. On the one side it offers a picture of the precipitate of the past, and on the other side a picture of the germinating knowledge of all that is to come, in so far as the psyche creates its own future.
Just as the causal approach ultimately arrives at the general principles of human psychology by analyzing and breaking down individual events, the constructive viewpoint achieves general goals by bringing together individual tendencies. The mind acts as a crossing point and is thus influenced from two directions. On one side, it presents a snapshot of the past's outcomes, and on the other, it provides a glimpse of the emerging understanding of everything that is yet to come, as the psyche shapes its own future.
What has been is, on the one hand, the result and apex[342] of all that was—as such it appears to the causal standpoint; on the other hand, it is an expression of all that is to be. The future is only apparently like the past, but in its essence always new and unique, (the causal standpoint would like to invert this sentence) thus the actual formula is incomplete, germlike so to say, in relation to what is to be.
What has happened is, on one hand, the outcome and peak[342] of everything that was—this is how it seems from a causal perspective; on the other hand, it reflects everything that is yet to come. The future is only seemingly similar to the past, but at its core, it's always new and one-of-a-kind, (the causal perspective would like to flip this statement) so the actual formula is incomplete, in a sense, like a seed, concerning what is to come.
To get any conception of this expression of what is to be we are forced to apply a constructive interest to it. I almost felt myself tempted to say, "a scientific interest." But modern science is identical with the causal principle. So long as we consider the actual mind causally, that is scientifically, we elude the mind as a Becoming. This other side of the psyche can never be grasped by the exclusive use of the causal principle, but only by means of the constructive standpoint. The causal standpoint reduces things to their elements, the constructive standpoint elaborates them into something higher and more complicated. This latter standpoint is necessarily a speculative one.
To understand this idea of what is yet to be, we need to take a constructive interest in it. I almost wanted to say, "a scientific interest." But modern science is all about the causal principle. As long as we look at the mind purely from a causal perspective, which is scientific, we miss out on seeing the mind as a process of becoming. This other aspect of the psyche can't be understood solely through the causal approach; it requires a constructive viewpoint. The causal approach breaks things down into their basic elements, while the constructive approach builds them up into something more complex and advanced. This latter approach is inevitably speculative.
Constructive understanding is, however, differentiated from scholastic speculation because it imposes no general validity, but only subjective validity. When the speculative philosopher believes he has comprehended the world once for all by his System, he deceives himself; he has only comprehended himself and then naïvely projected that view upon the world. In reaction against this, the scientific method of the modern world has almost put an end to speculation and gone to the other extreme. It would create an "objective" psychology. In opposition to such efforts, the stress which Freud has placed upon individual psychology is of immortal merit. The extraordinary importance of the subjective in the development of the objective mental process was thus first brought adequately into prominence.
Constructive understanding is, however, different from academic speculation because it doesn’t claim universal truth, only personal truth. When a speculative philosopher thinks he has figured out the world once and for all with his System, he’s fooling himself; he has only understood himself and then naively projected that perspective onto the world. In contrast, the scientific method of the modern world has almost eliminated speculation and swung to the other extreme. It aims to create an "objective" psychology. Against such efforts, Freud's emphasis on individual psychology is of lasting significance. He was the first to adequately highlight the extraordinary importance of the subjective in the development of the objective mental process.
Subjective speculation lays no claim to universal validity, it is identical with constructive understanding. It is a subjective creation, which, looked at externally, easily seems to be a so-called infantile phantasy, or at least an unmistakable derivative of it; from an objective standpoint it must be judged as such, in so far as objective is regarded as identical[343] with scientific or causal. Looked at from within, however, constructive understanding means redemption.
Subjective speculation doesn't claim to be universally valid; it's the same as constructive understanding. It's a subjective creation that, from an outside perspective, can easily appear to be a childish fantasy or at least clearly comes from it. From an objective viewpoint, it should be assessed as such, as objective is seen as the same as scientific or causal. However, from an internal perspective, constructive understanding represents salvation.
"Creation—that is the great redemption from suffering and easiness of living."[210]
"Creation—that’s the ultimate escape from suffering and the simplicity of life."[210]
Starting from these considerations as to the psychology of those mental patients to whom the Schreber case belongs, we must, from the "objective-scientific" standpoint, reduce the structural phantasy of the patient to its simple and most generally valid elements. This Freud had done. But that is only half of the work to be done. The other half is the constructive understanding of Schreber's system. The question is: What end, what freedom, did the patient hope to achieve by the creation of his system?
Starting from these thoughts about the psychology of the mental patients related to the Schreber case, we need to, from an "objective-scientific" viewpoint, break down the patient’s structural fantasy into its simplest and most universally applicable elements. Freud accomplished this. But that’s only part of the task. The other part is to constructively understand Schreber's system. The question is: What goal, what freedom, did the patient hope to achieve by creating his system?
The scientific thinker of to-day will regard this question as inappropriate. The psychiatrist will certainly smile at it, for he is thoroughly assured of the universal validity of his causalism, he knows the psyche merely as something that is made, descendent, reactive. Not uncommonly there lurks the unconscious prejudice that the psyche is a brain-secretion.
The scientific thinker today would see this question as misplaced. The psychiatrist would definitely chuckle at it, as he is completely confident in the universal applicability of his causalism; he views the psyche simply as something that is created, developed, and reactive. Often, there’s an underlying bias that the psyche is just a product of brain activity.
Looking at such a morbid system without preconception, and asking ourselves what goal this delusional system is aiming at, we see, in fact, firstly, that it is endeavouring to get at something, and secondly, that the patient also devotes all his will-power to the service of the system. There are patients who develop their delusions with scientific thoroughness, often dragging in an immense material of comparison and proof. Schreber certainly belongs to this class. Others do not proceed so thoroughly and learnedly, but content themselves with heaping up synonymous expressions for that at which they are aiming. The case of the patient I have described, who assumes all kinds of titles, is a good instance of this.
Looking at such a dark system without any bias, and questioning what goal this misguided system is pursuing, we see, in fact, first, that it is trying to achieve something, and second, that the patient also puts all their willpower into supporting the system. There are patients who develop their delusions with scientific detail, often incorporating a vast amount of evidence and comparisons. Schreber definitely falls into this category. Others don’t go as in-depth or scholarly, but settle for piling up similar phrases for what they are aiming at. The case of the patient I described, who takes on various titles, is a good example of this.
The patient's unmistakable striving to express something through and by means of his delusion Freud conceives retrospectively, as the satisfaction of his infantile wishes by means of imagination. Adler reduces it to the desire for power.
The patient's clear attempt to communicate something through his delusion is seen by Freud, in hindsight, as the fulfillment of his childish desires through imagination. Adler simplifies it to a craving for power.
For him the delusion-formation is a "manly protest," a means of gaining security for himself against his menaced superiority. Thus characterised, this struggle is likewise infantile and the means employed—the delusional creation—is infantile because insufficient for its purpose; one can therefore understand why Freud declines to accept Adler's point of view. Freud, rightly on the whole, subsumes this infantile struggle for power under the concept of the infantile wish.
For him, forming delusions is a "manly protest," a way to protect himself against his threatened superiority. This struggle is also childish, and the method used—the creation of delusions—is childish because it isn’t effective for its purpose; this is why Freud rejects Adler's perspective. Freud, generally speaking, correctly categorizes this childish struggle for power under the idea of the childish wish.
The constructive standpoint is different. Here the delusional system is neither infantile nor, upon the whole, eo ipso pathological but subjective, and hence justified within the scope of the subjective. The constructive standpoint absolutely denies the conception that the subjective phantasy-creation is merely an infantile wish, symbolically veiled; or that it is merely that in a higher degree; it denies that it is a convulsive and egoistic adhesion to the fiction of its own superiority, in so far as these are to be regarded as finalistic explanations. The subjective activity of the mind can be judged from without, just as one can, in the end, so judge everything. But this judgment is inadequate, because it is the very essence of the subjective that it cannot be judged objectively. We cannot measure distance in pints. The subjective can be only understood and judged subjectively, that is, constructively. Any other judgment is unfair and does not meet the question.
The constructive viewpoint is different. In this case, the delusional system is neither childish nor, overall, eo ipso pathological, but rather subjective, and thus justified within the realm of the subjective. The constructive viewpoint completely rejects the idea that subjective fantasy creation is just a childish wish, symbolically masked; or that it is merely that to a greater extent. It denies that it is a frantic and self-centered cling to the illusion of its own superiority, as these are to be seen as final explanations. The subjective activity of the mind can be evaluated from the outside, just as everything else ultimately can be evaluated. However, this evaluation is insufficient because it inherently misses the essence of the subjective, which cannot be assessed objectively. We cannot measure distance in pints. The subjective can only be understood and assessed subjectively, meaning constructively. Any other evaluation is unjust and fails to address the question.
The absolute credit which the constructive standpoint confers upon the subjective, naturally seems to the "scientific" spirit as an utter violation of reason. But this scientific spirit can only take up arms against it so long as the constructive is not avowedly subjective. The constructive comprehension also analyses, but it does not reduce. It decomposes the delusion into typical components. What is to be regarded as the type at a given time is shown from the attainment of experience and knowledge reached at that time.
The complete trust that the constructive approach places in the subjective naturally appears to the "scientific" mindset as a total breach of reason. However, this scientific mindset will only oppose it as long as the constructive view isn’t openly recognized as subjective. The constructive understanding also analyzes, but it does not reduce. It breaks down the illusion into typical parts. What should be considered the type at any given moment is determined by the level of experience and knowledge obtained at that time.
Even the most individual delusional systems are not absolutely unique, occurring only once, for they offer striking and obvious analogies with other systems. From the comparative[345] analysis of many systems the typical formations are drawn. If one can speak of reduction at all, it is only a question of reduction to general type, but not to some universal principle obtained inductively or deductively, such as "Sexuality" or "Struggle for Power." This paralleling with other typical formations only serves for a widening of the basis upon which the construction is to be built. If one were to proceed entirely subjectively one would go on constructing in the language of the patient and in his mental range. One would arrive at some structure which was illuminating to the patient and to the investigator of the case but not to the outer scientific public. The public would be unable to enter into the peculiarities of the speech and thought of the individual case in question without further help.
Even the most individual delusional systems aren't completely unique; they show clear and obvious similarities to other systems. By comparing many systems, we can identify typical patterns. If we're talking about reduction at all, it's about reducing to a general type, not to some universal principle derived inductively or deductively, like "Sexuality" or "Struggle for Power." This comparison with other typical patterns simply helps broaden the foundation for building an understanding. If we were to approach it entirely subjectively, we'd end up constructing in the language of the patient and within their mental range. This would lead to a structure that makes sense to the patient and the investigator, but not to the broader scientific community. The public wouldn't be able to grasp the specific language and thought processes of the individual case without additional assistance.
The works of the Zürich school referred to contain careful and detailed expositions of individual material. In these materials there are very many typical formations which are unmistakably analogies with mythological formations[211]. There arose from the perception of this relationship a new and valuable source for comparative study. The acceptance of the possibility of such a comparison will not be granted immediately, but the question is only whether the materials to be compared really are similar or not. It will also be contended that pathological and mythological formations are not immediately comparable. But this objection must not be raised a priori, for only a conscientious comparison can determine whether any true parallelism exists or not. At the present moment all we know is that they are both structures of the imagination which, like all such products, rest essentially upon the activity of the unconscious. Experience must teach us whether such a comparison is valid. The results hitherto obtained are so encouraging that further work along these lines seems to me most hopeful and important. I made practical use of the constructive method in a case which Flournoy published in the Archives de Psychologie, although he offered no opinion as to its nature at that time.
The works of the Zürich school contain careful and detailed explanations of individual material. In these materials, there are many typical formations that clearly resemble mythological formations[211]. The recognition of this connection has created a new and valuable resource for comparative study. People might not immediately accept the possibility of such a comparison, but the real question is whether the materials being compared are actually similar. Some might argue that pathological and mythological formations aren't directly comparable. However, this objection shouldn't be raised a priori, since a thorough comparison is needed to determine if any real parallels exist. Right now, all we understand is that they are both constructs of the imagination which, like all such products, fundamentally rely on the activity of the unconscious. Experience will tell us whether this comparison holds true. The results we've obtained so far are promising enough that further exploration in this area seems both hopeful and important. I practically applied the constructive method in a case that Flournoy published in the Archives de Psychologie, even though he didn't offer any opinion on its nature at that time.
The case dealt with a rather neurotic young lady who, in Flournoy's publication, described how surprised she was at the connected phantasy-formations which penetrated from the unconscious into the conscious. I subjected these phantasies, which the lady herself reproduced in some detail, to my constructive methods and gave the results of these investigations in my book, "The Psychology of the Unconscious."
The case involved a rather anxious young woman who, in Flournoy's publication, expressed her surprise at the interconnected fantasies that emerged from the unconscious into her conscious mind. I analyzed these fantasies, which she described in detail, using my constructive methods and shared the findings from these investigations in my book, "The Psychology of the Unconscious."
This book has, I regret to say, met with many perhaps inevitable misunderstandings. But I have had one precious consolation, for my book received the approval of Flournoy himself, who published the original case which he knew personally. It is to be hoped that later works will make the standpoint of the Zürich school intelligible to a wider public. Whoever, by the help of this work, has taken the trouble to grasp the essence of the constructive method, will readily imagine how great are the difficulties of investigation, and how much greater still are the difficulties of objective presentation of such investigations.
This book has, unfortunately, faced many perhaps unavoidable misunderstandings. However, I have had one valuable consolation: my book was approved by Flournoy himself, who published the original case that he knew personally. Hopefully, future works will help make the perspective of the Zürich school clearer to a broader audience. Anyone who has taken the time to understand the essence of the constructive method through this work can easily imagine how challenging investigations can be, and how much even more challenging it is to present these investigations objectively.
Among the many difficulties and opportunities for misunderstanding I should like to adduce one difficulty which is especially characteristic. In an intensive study of Schreber's or any similar case, it will be discovered that these patients are consumed by the desire for a new world-philosophy which may be of the most bizarre kind. Their aim is obviously to create a system such as will help them in the assimilation of unknown psychical phenomena, i.e. enable them to adapt their own unconscious to the world. This arrangement produces a subjective system which must be considered as a necessary transition-stage on the path to the adaptation of their personality in regard to the world in general. But the patient remains stationary at this transitory stage and assumes his subjective view is the world's, hence he remains ill. He cannot free himself from his subjectivism and does not find the link to objective thinking, i.e. to society. He does not reach the real summit of self-understanding, for he remains with a merely subjective understanding of himself. But a mere subjective understanding is not real and adequate. As Feuerbach says: Understanding is only[347] real when it is in accord with that of some other rational beings. Then it becomes objective[212] and the link with life is reached.
Among the many challenges and chances for misunderstanding, I want to point out one difficulty that stands out. In a deep dive into Schreber's case or any similar situation, you’ll find that these patients are driven by the need for a new philosophy of the world, which can be quite unusual. Their goal is clearly to build a system that helps them understand unfamiliar psychological experiences, meaning they want to adjust their unconscious mind to fit the world around them. This setup creates a subjective system that should be viewed as a necessary phase in their journey towards adapting their personality to the broader world. However, the patient gets stuck at this transitional phase and assumes that their subjective perspective reflects the world's view, which keeps them unwell. They can’t break free from their subjective viewpoint and fail to connect with objective thinking, or society. They don’t achieve true self-understanding, as they are left with just a subjective view of themselves. But a mere subjective understanding isn’t genuine or adequate. As Feuerbach states: Understanding is only real when it aligns with that of other rational beings. Then it becomes objective and the connection to life is established.
I am convinced that not a few will raise the objection that in the first place the psychological process of adaptation does not proceed by the method of first creating a world-philosophy; secondly, that it is in itself a sign of unhealthy mental disposition even to make the attempt to adapt oneself by way of a "world-philosophy."
I’m sure that many will argue that, first of all, the psychological process of adapting doesn't start with creating a world philosophy; and, secondly, that trying to adapt through a "world philosophy" is actually an indication of an unhealthy mindset.
Undoubtedly there are innumerable persons who are capable of adaptation without creating any preliminary philosophy. If they ever arrive at any general theory of the world it is always subsequently. But, on the other hand, there are just as many who are only able to adapt themselves by means of a preliminary intellectual formulation. To everything which they do not understand they are unable to adapt themselves. Generally it comes about that they do adapt themselves just in so far as they can grasp the situation intellectually. To this latter group seem to belong all those patients to whom we have been giving our consideration.
Undoubtedly, there are countless people who can adapt without forming any prior philosophy. If they ever come up with a general theory about the world, it happens afterward. On the other hand, there are just as many who can only adjust by first creating an intellectual framework. They cannot adapt to anything they don’t understand. Typically, they adapt to the extent that they can intellectually grasp the situation. It seems that all the patients we’ve been discussing belong to this latter group.
Medical experience has taught us that there are two large groups of functional nervous disorders. The one embraces all those forms of disease which are designated hysterical, the other all those forms which the French school has designated psychasthenic. Although the line of demarcation is rather uncertain, one can mark off two psychological types which are obviously different; their psychology is diametrically opposed. I have called these—the Introverted and Extroverted types. The hysteric belongs to the type of Extroversion, the psychasthenic to the type of Introversion, as does dementia præcox, in so far as we know it to-day. This terminology, Introversion and Extroversion, is bound up with my way of regarding mental phenomena as forms of energy. I postulate a hypothetical fundamental striving which I designate libido.[213] In the classical use of the word, libido never [348]had an exclusively sexual connotation as it has in medicine. The word interest, as Claparède once suggested to me, could be used in this special sense, if this expression had to-day a less extensive application. Bergson's concept, élan vital, would also serve if this expression were less biological and more psychological. Libido is intended to be an energising expression for psychological values. The psychological value is something active and determining; hence it can be regarded from the energic standpoint without any pretence of exact measurement.
Medical experience has shown us that there are two major groups of functional nervous disorders. One includes all the conditions that are called hysterical, while the other encompasses those that the French school refers to as psychasthenic. Although the distinction isn't very clear, we can identify two psychological types that are obviously different; their psychology is completely opposed. I've labeled these—the Introverted and Extroverted types. The hysteric falls into the Extroversion category, while the psychasthenic belongs to the Introversion type, just like dementia præcox, as we understand it today. This terminology, Introversion and Extroversion, is connected to my perspective on mental phenomena as forms of energy. I propose a hypothetical fundamental drive that I call libido.[213] In its traditional use, the term libido never solely referred to sexual connotations as it does in medicine. The word interest, as Claparède once suggested to me, could be used in this specific sense if it didn't have such a wide application today. Bergson's idea of élan vital would also fit if that term were less biological and more psychological. Libido is meant to be an energizing term for psychological values. The psychological value is something active and determining; therefore, it can be looked at from an energetic standpoint without claiming precise measurement.
The introverted type is characterised by the fact that his libido is turned towards his own personality to a certain extent—he finds within himself the unconditioned value. The extroverted type has his libido to a certain extent externally; he finds the unconditioned value outside himself. The introvert regards everything from the aspect of his own personality; the extrovert is dependent upon the value of his object. I must emphasise the statement that this question of types is the question of our psychology, and that every further advance must probably proceed by way of this question. The difference between these types is almost alarming in extent. So far there is only one small preliminary communication by myself[214] on this theory of type, which is particularly important for the conception of dementia præcox. On the psychiatric side Gross[215] has called attention to the existence of two psychological types. His two types are (1) those with limited but deep consciousness, and (2) those with broad but superficial consciousness. The former correspond to my introverted and the latter to my extroverted type. In my article I have collected some other instances among which I would especially call attention to the striking description of the two types given by William James in his book on "Pragmatism." Fr. Th. Vischer has differentiated the two types very wittily by her division of the learned into[349] "reason-mongers," and "matter-mongers." In the sphere of psychoanalysis Freud follows the psychology of Extraversion, Adler that of Introversion. The irreconcilable opposition between the views of Freud and those of Adler (see especially his book "Über den nervösen Charakter") is readily explained by the existence of two diametrically opposed psychological types which view the same things from entirely different aspects. An Extrovert can hardly, or only with great difficulty, come to any understanding with an Introvert, on any delicate psychological question.
The introverted type is characterized by having their energy focused inward—they find true value within themselves. The extroverted type, on the other hand, directs their energy outward; they find value in the external world. The introvert views everything through the lens of their own personality, while the extrovert relies on the value of their external objects. I must stress that this topic of types is the key question in psychology, and any further progress likely needs to address this issue. The differences between these types are quite significant. So far, I have only shared a brief preliminary note[214] on this theory of types, which is crucial for understanding dementia præcox. From a psychiatric perspective, Gross[215] has pointed out the existence of two psychological types. His two types are (1) those with limited but deep awareness, and (2) those with broad but shallow awareness. The former aligns with my introverted type, while the latter aligns with my extroverted type. In my article, I have noted some additional examples, particularly highlighting the compelling description of the two types presented by William James in his work on "Pragmatism." Fr. Th. Vischer cleverly differentiates the two types by categorizing scholars into[349] "reason-mongers" and "matter-mongers." In psychoanalysis, Freud adheres to the psychology of Extraversion, whereas Adler follows that of Introversion. The fundamental conflict between Freud's and Adler's perspectives (especially evident in Adler's book "Über den nervösen Charakter") can be easily understood through the lens of these two completely opposing psychological types that perceive the same issues from entirely different viewpoints. An extrovert can hardly, or only with great difficulty, reach any understanding with an introvert on subtle psychological matters.
An Extrovert can hardly conceive the necessity which compels the Introvert to conquer the world by means of a system. And yet this necessity exists, otherwise we should have no philosophical systems and dogmas, presumed to be universally valid. Civilised humanity would be only empiricists and the sciences only the experimental sciences. Causalism and empiricism are undoubtedly mighty forces in our present-day mental life but it may come to be otherwise.
An extrovert can barely understand the need that drives an introvert to create a structured approach to navigating the world. Yet, this need is real; otherwise, we wouldn’t have philosophical systems and doctrines that are thought to be universally valid. Civilized society would consist solely of empiricists, and sciences would only be experimental. Causalism and empiricism are definitely powerful influences in our current thought processes, but that could change in the future.
This difference in type is the first great obstacle which stands in the way of an understanding concerning fundamental conceptions of our psychology. A second objection arises from the circumstance that the constructive method, faithful to itself, must adapt itself to the lines of the delusion. The direction along which the patient develops his morbid thoughts has to be accepted seriously, and followed out to its end; the investigator thus places himself at the standpoint of the psychosis. This procedure may expose him to the suspicion of being deranged himself; or at least risks a misunderstanding which is considered terribly disgraceful—he may himself have some world-philosophy! The confirmation of such a possibility is as bad as being "unscientific." But every one has a world-philosophy though not every one knows he has. And those who do not know it have simply an unconscious and therefore inadequate and archaic philosophy. But everything psychological that is allowed to remain in the mind neglected and not developed, remains in a primitive state. A striking instance of how universal theories are influenced by unconscious archaic points of view has been furnished by[350] a famous German historian whose name matters to us not at all. This historian took it for granted that once upon a time people propagated themselves through incest, for in the first human families the brother was assigned to the sister. This theory is wholly based upon his still unconscious belief in Adam and Eve as the first and only parents of mankind. It is on the whole better to discover for oneself a modern world-philosophy, or at least to make use of some decent system which will prevent any errors of that kind.
This difference in type is the first major obstacle to understanding the fundamental concepts of our psychology. A second issue comes from the fact that the constructive method, true to itself, must adapt to the lines of the delusion. The direction in which the patient develops their unhealthy thoughts has to be taken seriously and followed to its conclusion; the investigator thus has to adopt the perspective of the psychosis. This approach may lead to the suspicion that the investigator is deranged themselves, or at least risks a misunderstanding that is seen as terribly embarrassing—they might also have their own world-view! The confirmation of such a possibility is as bad as being "unscientific." But everyone has a world-view, even if not everyone realizes it. Those who are unaware of it simply possess an unconscious and therefore inadequate and outdated philosophy. But everything psychological that remains neglected and undeveloped in the mind stays in a primitive state. A striking example of how universal theories are influenced by unconscious archaic perspectives was provided by[350] a famous German historian whose name is not important to us. This historian assumed that at one point, people reproduced through incest, as the first human families had brothers assigned to their sisters. This theory is entirely based on his still unconscious belief in Adam and Eve being the first and only parents of humanity. It is overall better to discover a modern world-view for oneself or at least to use some solid system that will prevent errors like that.
One could put up with being despised as the possessor of a world-philosophy; but there is a greater danger. The public may come to believe the philosophy, beaten out by the constructive method, is to be regarded as a theoretical and objectively valid insight into the meaning of the world in general.
One could deal with being hated for having a worldview; however, there's a bigger problem. The public might start to think that the philosophy, shaped by the constructive approach, should be seen as a legitimate and objective understanding of the world’s meaning in general.
I must now again point out that it is an obstinate, scholastic misunderstanding not to be able to distinguish between a world-philosophy which is only psychological, and an extra-psychological theory, which concerns the objective thing. It is absolutely essential that the student of the results of the constructive method should be able to draw this distinction. In its first results the constructive method does not produce anything that could be called a scientific theory; it furnishes the psychological lines of development, a path so to say. I must here refer the reader to my book, "Psychology of the Unconscious."
I need to emphasize again that it's a stubborn, academic misunderstanding to not be able to tell the difference between a world philosophy that is purely psychological and a theory that goes beyond psychology and deals with objective reality. It's crucial for anyone studying the outcomes of the constructive method to make this distinction. Initially, the constructive method doesn't yield anything that would qualify as a scientific theory; it offers the psychological lines of development, a path, so to speak. I encourage the reader to check out my book, "Psychology of the Unconscious."
The analytic reductive method has the advantage of being much simpler than the constructive method. The former reduces to well-known universal elements of an extremely simple nature. The latter has, with extremely complicated material, to construct the further path to some often unknown end. This obliges the psychologist to take full account of all those forces which are at work in the human mind. The reductive method strives to replace the religious and philosophical needs of man, by their more elementary components, following the principle of the "nothing but," as James so aptly calls it. But to construct aright, we must accept the developed aspirations as indispensable components, essential elements, of spiritual growth. Such work extends far beyond[351] empirical concepts but that is in accordance with the nature of the human soul which has never hitherto rested content with experience alone. Everything new in the human mind proceeds from speculation. Mental development proceeds by way of speculation, never by way of limitation to mere experience. I realise that my views are parallel with those of Bergson, and that in my book the concept of the libido which I have given, is a concept parallel to that of "élan vital"; my constructive method corresponds to Bergson's "intuitive method." I, however, confine myself to the psychological side and to practical work. When I first read Bergson a year and a half ago I discovered to my great pleasure everything which I had worked out practically, but expressed by him in consummate language and in a wonderfully clear philosophic style.
The analytic reductive method is much simpler than the constructive method. The former breaks things down into well-known universal elements that are very straightforward. The latter has to work with very complicated material to create a path to often unknown outcomes. This forces psychologists to consider all the forces at play in the human mind. The reductive method aims to replace the religious and philosophical needs of people with their more basic components, following the principle of "nothing but," as James aptly puts it. But to construct properly, we must accept developed aspirations as essential components necessary for spiritual growth. This work goes far beyond[351] empirical concepts, aligning with the nature of the human soul, which has never been satisfied with mere experience. Everything new in the human mind comes from speculation. Mental development occurs through speculation, not by limiting ourselves to just experience. I recognize that my views align with those of Bergson, and that the concept of libido I’ve discussed is similar to his idea of "élan vital"; my constructive method corresponds to Bergson's "intuitive method." However, I focus on the psychological aspect and practical work. When I first read Bergson a year and a half ago, I was thrilled to find everything I’d worked out practically expressed by him in brilliant language and with wonderfully clear philosophical style.
Working speculatively with psychological material there is a risk of being sacrificed to the general misunderstanding which bestows the value of an objective theory upon the line of psychological evolution thus elaborated. So many people feel themselves in this way at pains to find grounds whether such a theory is correct or not. Those who are particularly brilliant even discover that the fundamental concepts can be traced back to Heraclitus or some one even earlier. Let me confide to these knowing folk that the fundamental ideas employed in the constructive method stretch back even beyond any historical philosophy, viz. to the dynamic "views" of primitive peoples. If the result of the constructive method were scientific theory, it would go very ill with it, for then it would be a falling back to the deepest superstition. But since the constructive method results in something far removed from scientific theory the great antiquity of the basic concepts therein must speak in favour of its extreme correctness. Not until the constructive method has presented us with much practical experience can we come to the construction of a scientific theory, a theory of the psychological lines of development. But we must first of all content ourselves with confirming these lines individually.
Working speculatively with psychological material comes with the risk of being misunderstood, which gives undue credibility to a supposedly objective theory of psychological evolution. Many people struggle to determine whether such a theory is correct. Some exceptionally bright individuals even find that the core concepts can be traced back to Heraclitus or even earlier thinkers. Let me share with these knowledgeable individuals that the fundamental ideas used in the constructive method actually date back even further than any recorded philosophy, to the dynamic "views" of primitive peoples. If the outcome of the constructive method were a scientific theory, it would be quite problematic, as that would mean a return to the deepest superstitions. However, since the constructive method leads to something fundamentally different from scientific theory, the great age of the basic concepts involved supports their extreme validity. Only after the constructive method has provided us with substantial practical experience can we begin to construct a scientific theory, a theory of the psychological lines of development. For now, we must be satisfied with confirming these lines one by one.
FOREWORD TO CHAPTER XIV
This essay was originally written in 1913, when I limited myself entirely to presenting an essential part of the psychological point of view inaugurated by Freud. A few months ago my Swiss publisher asked for a second and revised edition. The many and great changes which the last few years have brought about in our understanding of the psychology of the unconscious necessitated a substantial enlargement of my essay. In this new edition some expositions about Freud's theories are shortened, whilst Adler's psychological views are more fully considered, and—so far as the scope of this paper permits—a general outline of my own views are given. I must at the outset draw the reader's attention to the fact that this is no longer an easy "popular" scientific paper, but a presentation making great demands upon the patience and attention of the reader. The material is extremely complicated and difficult. I do not for a moment deceive myself into thinking this contribution is in any way conclusive or adequately convincing. Only detailed scientific treatises about the various problems touched upon in these pages could really do justice to the subject. Any one who wishes to go deeply into the questions that are raised here must be referred to the special literature of the subject. My attention is solely to give the orientation in regard to the newest concepts of the inner nature of unconscious psychology. I consider the subject of the unconscious to be specially important and opportune at this moment. In my opinion, it would be a great loss if this problem, concerning every one so closely as it does, were to disappear from the horizon of the educated lay public, by being interned in[353] some inaccessible specialised scientific journal. The psychological events that accompany the present war—the incredible brutalisation of public opinion, the epidemic of mutual calumnies, the unsuspected mania for destruction, the unexampled flood of mendacity, and man's incapacity to arrest the bloody demon—are they not, one and all, better adapted than anything else, to force obtrusively the problem of the chaotic unconscious—which slumbers uneasily beneath the ordered world of consciousness,—before the eyes of every thinking individual? This war has inexorably shown to the man of culture that he is still a barbarian. It testifies also what an iron scourge awaits him, if ever again it should occur to him to make his neighbour responsible for his own bad qualities. The psychology of the individual corresponds to the psychology of nations. What nations do, each individual does also, and as long as the individual does it, the nation will do it too. A metamorphosis in the attitude of the individual is the only possible beginning of a transformation in the psychology of the nation. The great problems of humanity have never been solved by universal laws, but always and only by a remodelling of the attitude of the individual. If ever there was a time when self-examination was the absolutely indispensable and the only right thing, it is now, in the present catastrophic epoch. But he who bethinks himself about his own being strikes against the confines of the unconscious, which indeed contains precisely that which it is most needful for him to know.
This essay was originally written in 1913, when I focused entirely on presenting a key aspect of the psychological viewpoint introduced by Freud. A few months ago, my Swiss publisher requested a second, revised edition. The significant changes in our understanding of the psychology of the unconscious over the last few years required a substantial expansion of my essay. In this new edition, some explanations about Freud's theories have been shortened, while Adler's psychological views are explored in greater depth, and—within the limits of this paper—I provide a general outline of my own perspectives. I must highlight from the start that this is no longer an easy "popular" scientific paper; it's a presentation that demands a lot of patience and attention from the reader. The material is extremely complex and challenging. I do not delude myself into thinking that this contribution is in any way final or sufficiently persuasive. Only detailed scientific works on the various issues touched upon in these pages can truly do justice to the topic. Anyone wanting to delve deeply into the questions raised here should refer to the specialized literature on the subject. My goal is solely to provide an overview of the latest concepts concerning the inner nature of unconscious psychology. I believe this subject is especially important and timely right now. In my view, it would be a significant loss if this issue, which affects everyone so intimately, were to fade from the awareness of the educated public by being buried in some inaccessible specialized scientific journal. The psychological events accompanying the current war—the astonishing brutalization of public opinion, the epidemic of mutual accusations, the unexpected mania for destruction, the unprecedented wave of deceit, and humanity's inability to stop the bloody chaos—are not, one and all, better suited than anything else to forcefully bring the problem of chaotic unconsciousness, which stirs uneasily beneath the orderly realm of consciousness, to the attention of every thoughtful individual? This war has unavoidably revealed to cultured people that they are still barbarians. It also warns of the severe consequences that await them if they ever again think to blame their neighbors for their own negative traits. The psychology of the individual reflects the psychology of nations. What nations do, individuals do as well, and as long as individuals continue this behavior, nations will too. A change in individual attitudes is the only possible starting point for transforming national psychology. The great problems of humanity have never been resolved by universal laws but always through a shift in individual attitudes. If there was ever a time when self-reflection was absolutely essential and the right thing to do, it is now, in this catastrophic era. But when someone reflects on their own existence, they confront the boundaries of the unconscious, which holds precisely what they most need to understand.
C. G. Jung.
C. G. Jung.
Küsnacht-Zürich,
March, 1917.
Küsnacht-Zürich,
March 1917.
CHAPTER XIV
Being a Survey of the Modern Theory and Method of Analytical Psychology
An Overview of the Current Theory and Method of Analytical Psychology
I.—The Beginnings of Psychoanalysis
I.—The Start of Psychoanalysis
In common with other sciences, psychology had to go through its scholastic-philosophic stage, and to some extent this has lasted on into the present time. This philosophic psychology has incurred our condemnation in that it decides ex cathedra what is the nature of the soul, and whence and how it derives its attributes. The spirit of modern scientific investigation has summarily disposed of all these phantasies and in their place has established an exact empiric method. We owe to this our present-day experimental psychology or "psychophysiology," as the French call it. This new direction originated with Fechner, that Janus-minded spirit, who in his remarkable Psychophysik (1860) embarked on the mighty enterprise of introducing the physical standpoint into the conception of psychical phenomena. The whole idea of this work—and not least its astonishing mistakes—proved most fruitful in results. For Wundt, Fechner's young contemporary, carried on his work, and it is Wundt's great erudition, enormous power of work and genius for elaborating methods of experimental research, which have given to modern psychology its prevailing direction.
Like other sciences, psychology had to go through its phase of scholastic philosophy, and to some extent, this has persisted into today. This philosophical approach to psychology has drawn our criticism because it makes authoritative claims about the nature of the soul and where its attributes come from. The spirit of modern scientific inquiry has dismissed all these notions and has instead established a precise empirical method. We owe our current experimental psychology, or "psychophysiology" as the French refer to it, to this shift. This new approach began with Fechner, that dual-minded thinker, who in his remarkable Psychophysik (1860) undertook the significant effort to introduce a physical perspective into the understanding of psychological phenomena. The overall concept of this work—and its remarkable errors—has led to fruitful outcomes. Wundt, Fechner's younger contemporary, expanded on his work, and it is Wundt's extensive knowledge, immense work ethic, and talent for developing methods of experimental research that have shaped the current direction of modern psychology.
Until quite recently experimental psychology remained essentially academic. The first notable attempt to utilise some few at any rate of its innumerable experimental methods in the service of practical psychology came from the psychiatrists of the former Heidelberg school (Kræpelin, Aschaffenburg, etc.); it is quite intelligible that the psychotherapists should be[355] the first to feel the urgent need for more exact knowledge of psychic processes.
Until very recently, experimental psychology was mostly academic. The first significant effort to use some of its countless experimental methods for practical psychology came from the psychiatrists of the old Heidelberg school (Kraepelin, Aschaffenburg, etc.); it's understandable that psychotherapists would be[355] the first to recognize the urgent need for a deeper understanding of mental processes.
Next came pedagogy, making its own demands upon psychology. Out of this has recently grown up an "experimental pedagogy," and in this field Neumann in Germany and Binet in France have rendered signal services. The physician, the so-called "nerve-specialist," has the most urgent need of psychological knowledge if he would really help his patients, for neurotic disturbances, such as hysteria, and all things classed as "nervousness," are of psychic origin, and necessarily demand psychic treatment. Cold water, light, air, electricity, magnetism, etc., are only effective temporarily, and quite often are of no use at all. They are frequently introduced into treatment in a not very commendable fashion, simply because reliance is placed upon their suggestive effect. But it is in his soul that the patient is really sick; in those most complicated and lofty functions which we scarcely dare to include in the province of medicine. The doctor must needs, in such a case, be a psychologist, must needs understand the human soul. He cannot evade the urgent demand upon him. So he naturally turns for help to psychology, since his psychiatry text-books have nothing to offer him. But modern experimental psychology is very far from being able to afford him any connected insight into the most vital psychic processes, that is not its aim. As far as possible it tries to isolate those simple elementary phenomena which border on the physiological, and then study them in an isolated state. It quite ignores the infinite variation and movement of the mental life of the individual, and accordingly, its knowledge and its facts are so many isolated details, uninspired by any comprehensive idea capable of bringing them into co-ordination. Hence it comes about that the inquirer after the secrets of the human soul, learns rather less than nothing from experimental psychology. He would be better advised to abandon exact science, take off his scholar's gown, say farewell to his study, and then, strong in manly courage, set out to wander through the world; alike through the horrors of prisons, lunatic asylums and hospitals, through dreary outlying taverns,[356] through brothels and gambling-halls, into elegant drawing-rooms, the Stock Exchanges, socialist meetings, churches, revival gatherings of strange religious sects, experiencing in his own person love and hate and every kind of suffering. He would return laden with richer knowledge than his yard-long text-books could ever have given him, and thus equipped, he can indeed be a physician to his patients, for he understands the soul of man. He may be pardoned if his respect for the "corner-stones" of experimental psychology is no longer very considerable. There is a great gulf fixed between what science calls "psychology," on the one hand, and what the practice of everyday life expects from psychology on the other.
Next came pedagogy, which made its own demands on psychology. Recently, this has led to the emergence of "experimental pedagogy," and in this area, Neumann in Germany and Binet in France have made significant contributions. Physicians, especially those specializing in the nerves, urgently need psychological knowledge to effectively help their patients, as neurotic issues like hysteria and everything categorized as "nervousness" are rooted in the psyche and require psychological treatment. Treatments like cold water, light, air, electricity, and magnetism may only provide temporary relief and are often ineffective. They are frequently used in treatment for their suggestive effects rather than their real benefits. However, the patient is truly suffering at a deeper level—within those complex and profound functions that we hesitate to link to medicine. In such cases, the doctor must be a psychologist and must understand the human soul. He cannot ignore this pressing need. Naturally, he turns to psychology for help, as his psychiatry textbooks offer little guidance. Yet modern experimental psychology doesn't provide a cohesive understanding of the critical psychological processes; that isn't its purpose. It aims to isolate simple, basic phenomena that border on physiology and study them separately. It largely overlooks the endless variety and dynamics of individual mental life, resulting in knowledge that consists of isolated facts lacking a unifying idea to connect them. Consequently, anyone seeking the secrets of the human soul learns less than nothing from experimental psychology. It would be wiser for them to abandon strict scientific methods, take off their scholar’s robes, bid farewell to their studies, and, with courage, venture out into the world—through the horrors of prisons, asylums, and hospitals, dreary roadside inns, brothels, and gambling dens, as well as elegant drawing rooms, stock exchanges, socialist meetings, and churches, experiencing firsthand love, hate, and all forms of suffering. They would return with richer knowledge than their lengthy textbooks could ever provide, and equipped with this understanding, they could truly be a healer for their patients, grasping the essence of the human soul. They may be excused if their regard for the "cornerstones" of experimental psychology is no longer very high. There is a significant gap between what science defines as "psychology" and what everyday life expects psychology to deliver.
This need became the starting-point of a new psychology whose inception we owe first and foremost to the genius of Sigmund Freud, of Vienna, to his researches into functional nervous disease. The new type of psychology might be described as "analytical psychology." Professor Bleuler has coined the name "Deep Psychology,"[217] to indicate that the Freudian psychology takes as its province the deeper regions, the "hinterland" of the soul, the "unconscious." Freud names his method of investigation "psychoanalysis."
This need became the starting point of a new psychology, which we owe mainly to the brilliance of Sigmund Freud from Vienna and his research into functional nervous disorders. This new type of psychology can be described as "analytical psychology." Professor Bleuler has coined the term "Deep Psychology,"[217] to highlight that Freudian psychology explores the deeper areas, the "hinterland" of the soul, the "unconscious." Freud refers to his method of investigation as "psychoanalysis."
Before we approach the matter more closely, we must first consider the relationship of the new psychology to the earlier science. Here we encounter a singular little farce which once again proves the truth of Anatole France's apothegm: "Les savants ne sont pas curieux."
Before we look into this matter more closely, we need to first think about how the new psychology relates to the earlier science. Here, we run into a peculiar little farce that once again confirms Anatole France's saying: "Scientists are not curious."
The first important piece of work[218] in this new field awakened only the faintest echo, in spite of the fact that it offered a new and fundamental conception of the neuroses. Certain writers expressed their approbation, and then, on the next page, proceeded to explain their cases of hysteria in the good old way. It was much as if a man should subscribe fully to the idea of the earth's being spherical, and yet continue to[357] represent it as flat. Freud's next publications[219] were practically unnoticed, although they contributed findings of immeasurable importance to the domain of psychiatry. When in 1900 he produced the first real psychological elucidation of the dream[220] (previously there had reigned over this territory a suitable nocturnal darkness), he was ridiculed; and when in the middle of the last decade he began to illumine the psychology of sexuality itself,[221] and at the same time the "Zürich school" decided to range itself on his side, a storm of abuse, sometimes of the coarsest kind, burst upon him, nor has it yet ceased to rage. At the last South-West German Congress of alienists in Baden-Baden, the adherents of the new psychology had the pleasure of hearing Hoche, University Professor of Psychiatry at Freiburg in Breisgau, describe the movement in a long and much-applauded address, as an outbreak of mental aberration among doctors. The old proverb: "Medicus medicum non decimat" was here quite put to shame. How carefully the question had been studied was shewn by the naïve remark of one of the most distinguished neurologists of Paris, which I myself heard at the International Congress in 1907: "It is true I have not read Freud's works (he did not happen to know any German!), but as for his theories, they are nothing but a mauvaise plaisanterie." Freud, dignified, masterly, once said to me, I first became clearly conscious of the value of my discoveries when they were met everywhere with resistance and anger; since that time I have judged the value of my work according to the degree of opposition provoked. It is against my sexual theory that the greatest indignation is felt, so it would seem therein lies my best work. Perhaps after all the real benefactors of mankind are its false teachers, for opposition to the false doctrine pushes men willy nilly into truth. Your truth-teller is a pernicious fellow, he drives men into error."
The first significant work[218] in this new field barely made a ripple, even though it presented a new and crucial understanding of neuroses. Some writers acknowledged its value but then immediately went back to explaining their cases of hysteria in the traditional way. It was like someone agreeing that the earth is round but still depicting it as flat.[357] Freud's subsequent publications[219] went mostly unnoticed, despite providing findings of immense importance to psychiatry. When he gave the first true psychological analysis of dreams in 1900[220], he faced ridicule; and when, in the mid-20th century, he began to shed light on the psychology of sexuality[221], and the "Zürich school" chose to support him, he was met with a torrent of abuse, often very harsh, and it hasn’t stopped. At the recent South-West German Congress of psychiatrists in Baden-Baden, supporters of the new psychology had the satisfaction of hearing Hoche, a University Professor of Psychiatry at Freiburg in Breisgau, describe the movement in a lengthy, well-received speech as a sign of mental disturbance among doctors. The old saying "Medicus medicum non decimat" was thoroughly embarrassed by this. The level of scrutiny the topic had received was evident from the naïve comment of one of Paris's leading neurologists that I overheard at the International Congress in 1907: "It’s true I haven’t read Freud's work (I don’t happen to know any German!), but his theories are nothing but a bad joke." Freud, composed and authoritative, once told me, "I first became fully aware of the value of my discoveries when they were met with resistance and anger everywhere; since then, I’ve assessed the worth of my work based on the level of opposition it provokes. The greatest outrage seems to be directed at my sexual theory, which suggests it may be my most valuable contribution. Perhaps the true benefactors of humanity are its false teachers, as defiance against false beliefs forces people toward the truth. A truth-teller is a dangerous individual; he leads people into error."
The reader must now calmly accept the idea that in this[358] psychology he is dealing with something quite unique, if not indeed with some altogether irrational, sectarian, or occult wisdom; for what else could possibly provoke all the scientific authorities to turn away on the very threshold and utterly refuse to cross it?
The reader must now calmly accept the idea that in this[358] psychology, he is dealing with something quite unique, if not even something completely irrational, sectarian, or occult; because what else could possibly cause all the scientific authorities to turn away at the very entrance and completely refuse to engage with it?
Accordingly, we must look more closely into this psychology. As long ago as Charcot's time it was recognised that neurotic symptoms are "psychogenic," that is, that they have their origin in the psyche. It was also known, thanks mainly to the work of the Nancy School, that every hysterical symptom can be exactly reproduced by means of suggestion. But how a hysterical system arises, and its relationship to psychic causes, were altogether unknown. In the beginning of the eighties Dr. Breuer, an old Viennese doctor, made a discovery[222] which was really the true starting-point of the new psychology. He had a very intelligent young patient (a woman) suffering from hysteria, who exhibited the following symptoms among others: A spastic paralysis of the right arm, occasional disturbances of consciousness or twilight-states, and loss of the power of speech in so far as she no longer retained any knowledge of her mother-tongue, and could only express herself in English (so-called systematic aphasia). They sought at that time, and still seek, in such a case to establish some theory of anatomical disturbance, although there was just as little disturbance in the arm-centre in the brain as in that of any normal man who boxes another's ears. The symptomatology of hysteria is full of anatomical impossibilities; such as the case of the lady who had lost her hearing completely through some hysterical malady. None the less she often used to sing, and once when she was singing her doctor sat down at the piano unnoticed by her and softly accompanied her. Passing from one strophe to another he suddenly altered the key, and she, quite unconscious of what she was doing, sang on in the altered key. Thus she heard—yet did not hear. The various forms of systematic blindness present similar phenomena. We have the case of a man suffering from complete hysterical blindness. In the course of the treatment he[359] recovers his sight, but at first, and for some long time, only partially: he could see everything with one exception—people's heads. He saw all the people around him without heads. Thus he saw—yet did not see. From a large number of like experiences it has long been concluded that it is only the patient's consciousness which does not see, does not hear, but the sense-function has nothing at all the matter with it. This state of affairs is directly contradictory to the essence of an organic disturbance, which always materially involves the function.
Accordingly, we need to examine this psychology more closely. As far back as Charcot's time, it was acknowledged that neurotic symptoms are "psychogenic," meaning they originate in the mind. It was also recognized, largely due to the work of the Nancy School, that any hysterical symptom can be accurately reproduced through suggestion. But how a hysterical system develops, and its link to psychological causes, was completely unknown. In the early 1880s, Dr. Breuer, an elderly doctor from Vienna, made a discovery[222] that truly marked the beginning of the new psychology. He treated a very intelligent young female patient suffering from hysteria, who displayed symptoms including a spastic paralysis of her right arm, occasional disturbances of consciousness or twilight states, and an inability to speak her native language, expressing herself only in English (which is known as systematic aphasia). At that time, and even now, there’s a tendency to search for an anatomical explanation for such cases, even though there was no disruption in the arm’s area of the brain, just like a normal person who gets their ears boxed. The symptom patterns of hysteria are full of anatomical impossibilities; for example, there was a case of a woman who completely lost her hearing due to a hysterical condition. Nevertheless, she frequently sang, and once, while she was singing, her doctor sat down at the piano without her noticing and softly accompanied her. Transitioning between strophes, he suddenly changed the key, and she, completely unaware, continued singing in the new key. Thus she heard—yet did not hear. The various types of systematic blindness show similar occurrences. We have a case of a man suffering from complete hysterical blindness. During treatment, he regained his sight, but initially, and for quite a while, it was only partial; he could see everything except one thing—people's heads. He saw everyone around him without heads. So he saw—yet did not see. From many similar experiences, it has long been concluded that it is solely the patient’s consciousness that fails to see or hear, while the sense functions remain perfectly intact. This situation directly contradicts the nature of an organic disturbance, which always materially affects the function.
After this digression let us return to Breuer's case. Since there was no organic cause for the disturbance, the case was clearly to be regarded as hysterical, that is, psychogenic. Dr. Breuer had noticed that if during her twilight-states (whether spontaneous or artificially induced) he let the patient freely express the reminiscences and phantasies that thronged in upon her, her condition was afterwards much improved for some hours. He made systematic use of this observation in her further treatment. The patient herself invented the appropriate name for it of "talking cure" or, in jest, "chimney sweeping."
After this aside, let’s get back to Breuer's case. Since there was no physical cause for the issue, the case was clearly seen as hysterical, meaning it was psychogenic. Dr. Breuer noticed that if, during her twilight states (whether they happened naturally or were triggered), he allowed the patient to freely share the memories and fantasies flooding her mind, her condition improved significantly for several hours afterward. He systematically applied this observation in her continued treatment. The patient herself came up with the fitting term “talking cure” or, jokingly, “chimney sweeping.”
Her illness began whilst she was nursing her dying father. It is easy to understand that her phantasies busied themselves mainly with this disturbing time. In the twilight-states memories of this period reappeared with photographic fidelity, distinct in every detail: no waking recollection is ever so plastically and exactly reproduced. The term hypermnesia is applied to this heightening of the power of memory, which occurs without difficulty in certain states of contracted consciousness. Remarkable things now came to light. Out of the many things told, one ran somewhat as follows.[223]
Her illness started while she was taking care of her dying father. It’s easy to see that her thoughts were mainly focused on this troubling time. In those in-between states, memories from that period came back with photographic clarity, vivid in every detail: no waking memory is ever recalled so clearly and precisely. The term hypermnesia describes this enhancement of memory, which can occur easily in certain altered states of consciousness. Remarkable things emerged. Among the many stories told, one went like this.[223]
On a certain night she was in a state of great anxiety about her father's high temperature. She sat by his bed, waiting for the surgeon who was coming from Vienna to perform an operation. Her mother had gone out of the room for a little while, and Anna (the patient) sat by the bed, with her right arm hanging over the back of her chair. She fell into a kind of waking-dream in which she saw a black snake come out[360] from the wall and approach the sick man, prepared to bite. (It is very probable that some real snakes had been seen in the fields behind the house, and that she had been frightened by them; this would furnish the material for her hallucination.) She wanted to drive the creature away, but felt paralysed; her right arm, hanging over the chair, had "gone to sleep," was anæsthetic and paretic, and as she looked her fingers turned into little snakes with death's heads (the nails). Probably she tried to drive the snake away with her paralysed right hand, and thereby the anæsthesia and paralysis became associated with the snake-hallucination. Even after the snake had disappeared, her terror remained great. She tried to pray, but found she had no words in any language, until at length she managed to remember some English nursery rhymes, and then she could go on thinking and praying in that language.
On one particular night, she was really anxious about her father's high fever. She sat by his bed, waiting for the surgeon who was coming from Vienna to perform surgery. Her mother had stepped out of the room for a bit, and Anna (the patient) sat by the bed, her right arm hanging over the back of her chair. She slipped into a sort of waking dream where she saw a black snake coming out from the wall and approaching the sick man, ready to bite. (It’s likely that some real snakes had been spotted in the fields behind the house, which could have scared her and influenced her hallucination.) She wanted to drive the creature away but felt paralyzed; her right arm, hanging over the chair, had "gone to sleep," feeling numb and weak. As she watched, her fingers seemed to turn into little snakes with death's heads (the nails). She probably tried to swat the snake away with her paralyzed right hand, causing the numbness and paralysis to become linked with the snake hallucination. Even after the snake was gone, her fear lingered. She attempted to pray but found she couldn't find the words in any language, until she finally recalled some English nursery rhymes, which allowed her to continue thinking and praying in that language.
This was the actual scene in which the paralysis and speech-disturbance arose; the describing it served to remove the speech-trouble, and in this same fashion the case was finally completely cured.
This was the actual scene where the paralysis and speech issues occurred; describing it helped to eliminate the speech problem, and in the same way, the case was ultimately fully resolved.
I must restrict myself to this one instance. In Breuer and Freud's book there is a wealth of similar examples. It is easy to understand that scenes such as these make a very strong impression, and accordingly there is an inclination to attribute a causal significance to them in the genesis of the symptoms. The then current conception of hysteria, arising from the English "nervous shock" theory, which Charcot strongly supported, came in conveniently to elucidate Breuer's discovery, hence arose the trauma-theory maintaining that the hysterical symptom and in so far as the symptoms comprise the disease, hysteria itself, arises from some psychic injury (or trauma), the effect of which is retained in the unconscious indefinitely. Freud, working as Breuer's colleague, amply confirmed this discovery. It was fully demonstrated that not one out of the many hundred hysterical symptoms came down ready made from heaven; they had already been conditioned by past psychic experiences. To some extent, therefore, this new conception opened up a field[361] of very important empirical work. But Freud's tireless spirit of inquiry could not long rest content at this superficial layer, since already there obtruded deeper and more difficult problems. It is obvious enough that moments of great fear and anxiety, such as Breuer's patient went through, would leave behind a lasting effect, but how is it that these happenings are themselves already deeply stamped with the mark of morbidity? Must we suppose that the trying sick-nursing in itself produce such a result? If so, such effects should occur much more frequently, for there are, unfortunately, many trying cases of sick-nursing, and the nurse's nervous constitution is by no means always of the soundest. To this problem medicine gives its admirable answer; the "x" in the calculation is predisposition; there is a tendency to these things. But for Freud the problem was, what exactly constitutes this predisposition? This question led logically to an investigation of all that had preceded the psychic trauma. It is a matter of common observation that distressing scenes have markedly different effects upon the different participants, and that things which to some are quite indifferent or even pleasant, such as frogs, mice, snakes, cats, excite the greatest aversion in others. There are the cases of women who can calmly be present at a very bad operation, but who tremble all over with horror and nausea at the touch of a cat. By way of illustration let me give the case of a young lady suffering from severe hysteria following a sudden fright.[224] She had been at a social gathering, and was on her way home at midnight accompanied by several acquaintances, when a carriage came up behind them at full speed. All the others moved out of the way, but she, beside herself with fright, ran down the middle of the road just in front of the horses. The coachman cracked his whip and cursed and swore in vain. She ran down the whole length of the street till a bridge was reached. There her strength failed her, and to escape the horses' feet in her despair she would have jumped into the water had not passers-by prevented her.[362] This same lady happened to be in Petrograd during that sanguinary Revolution of the 22nd of January, and saw a street cleared by the volleys of soldiers. All around her people were dropping down dead or wounded, but she retained her calmness and self-possession, and caught sight of a door which gave her escape into another street. These terrible moments agitated her neither at the time nor later on. She was quite well afterwards, indeed felt better than usual.
I need to limit myself to this one example. In Breuer and Freud's book, there are plenty of similar cases. It's easy to see how scenes like these leave a strong impression, leading to a tendency to believe they play a causal role in the development of symptoms. The then-popular view of hysteria, based on the English "nervous shock" theory that Charcot strongly endorsed, helped clarify Breuer's findings. This led to the trauma-theory, which suggests that hysterical symptoms, and thus hysteria as a whole, stem from some psychic injury (or trauma) that remains in the unconscious indefinitely. Freud, working as Breuer's colleague, thoroughly validated this discovery. It was clearly shown that none of the many hundreds of hysterical symptoms fell from the sky; they were conditioned by earlier psychic experiences. Therefore, this new perspective opened up a significant area of empirical research.[361] However, Freud's relentless curiosity couldn’t stay satisfied with this surface-level understanding, as deeper and more complex issues quickly emerged. It’s clear that moments of intense fear and anxiety, like those experienced by Breuer's patient, leave a lasting impact, but why are these events already deeply marked by pathology? Should we assume that the stressful experience of caregiving produces such an outcome? If so, we would expect these effects to be much more common, as there are, unfortunately, many difficult caregiving situations, and the caregiver's mental state isn’t always stable. Medical science provides an excellent answer to this issue: the "x" factor in the equation is predisposition; there is a tendency towards these issues. Yet for Freud, the question was, what exactly causes this predisposition? This inquiry naturally led to an exploration of everything that happened before the psychic trauma. It’s a well-known fact that upsetting experiences affect different people very differently, and things that are neutral or even enjoyable for some, like frogs, mice, snakes, or cats, can evoke intense aversion in others. Some women can remain calm during severe surgeries, yet tremble in horror and nausea at the mere idea of touching a cat. As an example, consider the case of a young woman suffering from severe hysteria after a sudden fright.[224] She was at a social event and was heading home at midnight with some friends when a carriage came speeding up behind them. Everyone else moved aside, but she, overwhelmed with fear, ran down the middle of the street directly in front of the horses. The coachman shouted and cracked his whip in vain. She ran the entire length of the street until she reached a bridge. There she lost her strength, and in her despair, she almost jumped into the water to escape the horses' hooves, had it not been for passersby who pulled her back.[362] This same woman was in Petrograd during the bloody Revolution of January 22nd and saw soldiers clearing a street with gunfire. All around her, people were falling dead or wounded, but she remained calm and composed, spotting a door that led to another street for her escape. These terrifying moments did not disturb her at the time nor later on. She felt perfectly fine afterwards, even better than usual.
Essentially similar reactions can quite often be observed. Hence it follows that the intensity of the trauma is of small pathogenic importance; the peculiar circumstances determine its pathogenic effect. Here, then, we have the key which enables us to unlock at least one of the anterooms to an understanding of predisposition. We must now ask what were the unusual circumstances in this carriage scene? The terror and apprehension began as soon as the lady heard the trampling horses. For a moment she thought this portended some terrible fate, her death, or something equally frightful; the next, she lost all sense of what she was doing.
Similar reactions can often be seen. This means that the severity of the trauma isn't very important for the disease; rather, the specific circumstances determine its impact. This is the key that helps us understand at least part of predisposition. Now, we need to ask what the unusual circumstances were in this carriage scene. The fear and anxiety started as soon as the lady heard the thundering horses. For a moment, she thought this meant something terrible was about to happen, her death, or something equally horrifying; then, she completely lost awareness of what she was doing.
This powerful impression was evidently connected in some way with the horses. The predisposition of the patient to react in such an exaggerated fashion to a not very remarkable incident, might result from the fact that horses had some special significance for her. It might be suspected that she had experienced some dangerous accident with them; this actually turned out to be the case. When a child of about seven years old she was out for a drive with the coachman; the horses shied and galloped at full speed towards a steep river-bank. The coachman jumped down, and shouted to her to do the same, but in her extreme terror she could scarcely bring herself to obey. She did, however, just manage to jump out in the nick of time, whilst the horses and carriage were dashed to pieces below. No proof is needed that such an experience must leave a lasting impression behind it. But it does not offer any explanation for such an exaggerated reaction to an inadequate stimulus. So far we only know that this later symptom had its prologue in childhood, but its pathological aspect remains obscure. To penetrate into[363] the heart of such a mystery it was necessary to accumulate further material. And the greater our experience the clearer does it become that in all cases with such traumatic experiences analysed up to the present, there co-exists a special kind of disturbance which can only be described as a derangement in the sphere of love. Not all of us give due credit to the anomalous nature of love, reaching high as heaven, sinking low as hell, uniting in itself all extremes of good and evil, of lofty and low.[225]
This strong impression was clearly linked to the horses in some way. The patient's tendency to react so intensely to a fairly ordinary incident might come from the fact that horses held special significance for her. It’s possible she had gone through a frightening experience with them, which turned out to be true. When she was about seven years old, she was out for a ride with the coachman; the horses got spooked and raced towards a steep riverbank. The coachman jumped down and yelled for her to do the same, but in her sheer terror, she could barely force herself to comply. She did manage to jump out just in time, while the horses and carriage were smashed to pieces below. It’s clear that such an experience would leave a lasting impact. However, it doesn’t explain the excessive reaction to a minor stimulus. So far, we only know that this later symptom had its roots in childhood, but its problematic aspect remains unclear. To unravel this mystery, more information was needed. The more experience we gather, the clearer it becomes that in all cases with traumatic experiences analyzed so far, there’s a unique kind of disturbance that can only be described as a disruption in the realm of love. Not everyone gives enough credit to the bizarre nature of love, which can reach as high as the heavens, sink as low as hell, and embodies all extremes of good and evil, high and low.[225]
As soon as Freud recognised this, a decisive change came about in his view. In his earlier researches, whilst more or less dominated by Charcot's trauma-theory, he had sought for the origin of the neurosis in actual traumatic experiences; but now the centre of gravity shifted to a very different point. This is best demonstrated by reference to our case; we can understand that horses might easily play a significant part in the patient's life, but it is not clear why there should be this later reaction, so exaggerated, so uncalled for. It is not her fear of horses which forms the morbid factor in this curious story; to get at the real truth we must remember our empirical conclusion, that, side by side with traumatic experiences, there is also invariably present some disturbance in the sphere of love. We must now go on to inquire whether perhaps there is anything unsatisfactory in this respect in the case under review.
As soon as Freud realized this, a significant shift occurred in his perspective. In his earlier research, largely influenced by Charcot's trauma theory, he searched for the origin of neurosis in real traumatic experiences. However, now the focus shifted to a very different aspect. This is best illustrated by looking at our case; we can see that horses might easily play an important role in the patient's life, but it’s unclear why there should be such an exaggerated and unwarranted reaction. It’s not her fear of horses that is the main problem in this unusual situation; to uncover the real truth, we must remember our empirical conclusion that, alongside traumatic experiences, there is always some issue related to love. We now need to investigate whether there’s anything unsatisfactory in this area in the case we’re examining.
Our patient has a young man friend, to whom she is thinking of becoming engaged, she loves him and expects to be happy with him. At first nothing more is discoverable; but the investigator must not let himself be deterred by a negative result in the beginning of this preliminary questioning. When the direct way does not lead to the desired end, an indirect way may be taken. We accordingly turn our attention back to that strange moment when she ran away in front of the horses. We inquire who were her companions[364] and what kind of social gathering was it, and find it was a farewell-party to her best friend, on her departure to a foreign health-resort on account of a nervous breakdown. We are told this friend is happily married and is the mother of one child. We may well doubt the assertion that she is happy. If she really were so, it is hardly to be supposed she would be "nervous" and in need of a cure. When I attacked the situation from a different vantage-ground, I learnt that our patient—after this episode—had been taken by her friends to the nearest safe place—her host's house. In her exhausted state he took charge of her. When the patient came to this part of her story, she suddenly broke off, was embarrassed, fidgeted and tried to turn the subject. Evidently some disagreeable reminiscences had suddenly cropped up. After obstinate resistances had been overcome, she admitted something very strange had happened that night. Her host had made her a passionate declaration of love, thus occasioning a situation that, in the absence of his wife, might well be considered both painful and difficult. Ostensibly this declaration came upon her like a "bolt from the blue." But a small dose of criticism applied to such an assertion soon apprises us that these things never do drop suddenly from the sky; they always have their previous history. It was a task of the following weeks to dig out piecemeal a long love-story. I will attempt to sketch in the picture as it appeared finally.
Our patient has a young male friend she’s thinking about getting engaged to; she loves him and expects to be happy with him. At first, nothing more can be found; however, the investigator should not be discouraged by an initial lack of information in this preliminary questioning. When a direct approach doesn’t yield the desired results, an indirect one can be taken. We then turn our focus back to that strange moment when she ran away from the horses. We ask who her companions were and what kind of social gathering it was and discover it was a farewell party for her best friend, who was leaving for a foreign health resort due to a nervous breakdown. We learn that this friend is happily married and a mother to one child. We can rightly question the claim that she is happy; if she truly were, it’s unlikely she would be "nervous" and in need of treatment. When I approached the situation from a different angle, I found out that after this episode, her friends took her to the nearest safe place—her host's house. In her exhausted state, he took care of her. When the patient reached this part of her story, she suddenly stopped, became embarrassed, fidgeted, and tried to change the topic. Clearly, some unpleasant memories had surfaced. After persistent resistance had been overcome, she admitted something very strange had happened that night. Her host had made a passionate declaration of love to her, creating a situation that, in his wife’s absence, could be seen as both uncomfortable and complicated. This declaration apparently took her by surprise, like a "bolt from the blue." But a bit of scrutiny reveals that these things never just happen out of nowhere; they always have a backstory. It became a task over the next few weeks to piece together a lengthy love story. I will now attempt to outline how it ultimately unfolded.
As a child the patient was a thorough tomboy, loved boys' boisterous games, laughed at her own sex, and would have nothing to do with feminine ways or occupations. After puberty, just when the sex-issue should have meant much to her, she began to shun all society; she seemingly hated and despised everything which could remind her even remotely of the biological destiny of mankind, and lived in a world of phantasy which had nothing in common with rude reality. Thus, till her twenty-fourth year, she escaped all the little adventures, hopes and expectations which ordinarily move a girl at this age. But finally she got to know the two men who were destined to destroy the thorny hedge which had grown up around her. Mr. A. was her best friend's husband;[365] Mr. B. was their bachelor-friend. She liked both; but pretty soon found B. the more sympathetic, and an intimacy grew up between them which made an engagement seem likely. Through her friendship with him and with Mrs. A., she often met Mr. A. His presence excited her inexplicably, made her nervous. Just at this time she went to a big party. All her friends were there. She became lost in thought, and in a reverie was playing with her ring, when suddenly it slipped out of her hand and rolled under the table. Both men tried to find it and Mr. B. managed to get it. With a meaning smile he put the ring back on her finger, and said, "You know what that means!" Overcome by some strange, irresistible feeling, she tore the ring from her finger and flung it out of the open window. Naturally a painful moment for all ensued, and she soon went away, much depressed. A little while after, so-called chance brought her for her summer holidays to the health-resort where A. and his wife were staying. It was then that Mrs. A. began to suffer from nerve-trouble, and frequently felt too unwell to leave the house. So our patient could often go out for walks alone with A. One day they were out in a small boat. She was boisterously merry and fell overboard. Mr. A. saved her with difficulty as she could not swim, and he managed to lift her into the boat in a half-unconscious state. Then he kissed her. This romantic event wove fast the bonds between them. In self-defence she did her best to get herself engaged to B. and to persuade herself that she loved him. Of course this queer comedy could not escape the sharp eye of feminine jealousy. Mrs. A., her friend, guessed the secret, and was so much upset by it that her nervous condition grew bad enough to necessitate her trying a cure at a foreign health-resort. At the farewell gathering the demon came to our patient and whispered: "To-night he will be alone, something must happen to you so that you can go to his house." And so indeed it came about; her strange behaviour made her friends take her to his house, and thus she achieved her desire.
As a child, the patient was a real tomboy, enjoyed boys' rowdy games, laughed at being a girl, and wanted nothing to do with feminine activities or roles. After puberty, just when she should have been more aware of gender issues, she started to avoid social interactions; she seemed to hate and reject anything that reminded her, even slightly, of her biological role in life, and lived in a fantasy world separate from harsh reality. Thus, until she turned twenty-four, she missed out on the little adventures, hopes, and expectations that usually interest girls her age. Eventually, she met two men who were fated to break down the thorny barrier she had built around herself. Mr. A. was her best friend's husband; Mr. B. was their single friend. She liked both of them, but soon found B. more appealing, and they developed a closeness that made an engagement seem possible. Through her friendship with him and with Mrs. A., she often saw Mr. A. His presence stirred something in her, making her anxious. Around this time, she attended a large party where all her friends were present. Lost in thought while playing with her ring, it suddenly slipped from her hand and rolled under the table. Both men tried to help find it, and Mr. B. managed to retrieve it. With a knowing smile, he placed the ring back on her finger and said, "You know what that means!" Overwhelmed by an inexplicable feeling, she ripped the ring off her finger and threw it out of the open window. This was obviously an awkward moment for everyone, and she soon left, feeling quite low. Shortly after, fate brought her to the health resort where A. and his wife were spending their summer vacation. At that time, Mrs. A. started experiencing nerve issues and often felt too ill to go out. This allowed our patient to take walks alone with A. One day, while they were in a small boat, she was feeling joyfully playful and accidentally fell overboard. Mr. A. managed to save her despite her inability to swim, lifting her back into the boat when she was half-conscious. Then, he kissed her. This romantic moment strengthened their connection. In a bid to protect herself, she tried to get engaged to B. and convince herself she loved him. Naturally, this odd situation didn’t go unnoticed by feminine jealousy. Mrs. A., her friend, sensed something was up and became so upset by it that her nerves worsened, leading her to seek treatment at a health resort abroad. During the farewell gathering, a dark thought came to our patient: "Tonight he will be alone; you need to do something to be able to go to his house." And indeed, her strange behavior led her friends to take her to his home, allowing her to fulfill her desire.
After this explanation the reader will probably be inclined to assume that only diabolical subtlety could think out and[366] set in motion such a chain of circumstances. There is no doubt about the subtlety, but the moral evaluation is less certain. I desire to lay special emphasis upon the fact that the patient was in no sense conscious of the motives of this dramatic performance. The incident apparently just came about of itself without any conscious motive whatsoever. But the whole previous history makes it perfectly clear that everything was most ingeniously directed towards the other aim; whilst the conscious self was apparently working to bring about the engagement to Mr. B., the unconscious compulsion to take the other road was still stronger.
After this explanation, the reader will likely think that only evil genius could come up with and[366] set into motion such a series of events. There's no doubt about the cleverness, but the moral judgment is less clear. I want to emphasize that the patient was not at all aware of the motives behind this dramatic situation. It seems like the incident just happened on its own without any conscious intention at all. However, the entire background clearly shows that everything was cleverly aimed at a different goal; while the conscious mind was seemingly working towards the engagement with Mr. B., the unconscious drive to take a different path was even stronger.
So once more we must return to our original question, whence comes the pathological, the peculiar and exaggerated reaction to the trauma? Relying on a conclusion obtained from other analogous experiences, we ventured the conjecture that in the present case we had to do with a disturbance in the love-life, in addition to the trauma. This supposition was thoroughly borne out; the trauma, which was apparently the cause of the illness, was merely the occasion for some factor, till then unconscious, to manifest itself. This was the significant erotic conflict. With this finding the trauma loses its pathogenic significance and is replaced by a much deeper and more comprehensive conception, which regards the erotic conflict as the pathogenic agent. This conception may be described as the sexual theory of the neurosis.
So once again we need to go back to our original question: where does the abnormal, the strange and intense reaction to the trauma come from? Based on conclusions drawn from similar experiences, we proposed that in this case, there was also a disturbance in the love life, in addition to the trauma. This idea was fully supported; the trauma, which seemed to be the cause of the illness, was really just the trigger for some unconscious factor to come to light. This was the significant erotic conflict. With this discovery, the trauma loses its disease-causing significance and is replaced by a much deeper and broader understanding, which sees the erotic conflict as the real cause of the problem. This viewpoint can be described as the sexual theory of neurosis.
I am often asked why it is just the erotic conflict rather than any other which is the cause of the neurosis. There is but one answer to this. No one asserts that this ought necessarily to be the case, but as a simple matter of fact it is always found to be so, notwithstanding all the cousins and aunts, godparents, and teachers, who rage against it. Despite all the indignant assertions to the contrary, the problem and conflicts of love are of fundamental importance for humanity,[226] and with increasingly careful study, it comes out ever more clearly that the love-life is of immensely greater importance than the individual suspects.
I often get asked why it's the erotic conflict, rather than any other type, that causes neurosis. There's only one answer to that. No one claims it should necessarily be the case, but as a straightforward fact, it always turns out to be true, despite all the cousins, aunts, godparents, and teachers who are upset about it. Regardless of all the angry claims against it, the problems and conflicts of love are fundamentally important for humanity,[226] and with increasingly careful study, it becomes clearer and clearer that love is far more significant than individuals realize.
As a consequence of the recognition that the true root of the neurosis is not the trauma, but the hidden erotic conflict, the trauma loses its pathogenic significance.
As a result of realizing that the real source of the neurosis isn't the trauma itself, but the underlying erotic conflict, the trauma loses its harmful importance.
II.—The Sexual Theory.
II.—The Sexual Theory.
Thus, it will be seen, the theory had to be shifted on to an entirely different basis, for the investigation now had to face the erotic conflict itself. Our example shows that this contains extremely abnormal elements and cannot, primâ facie, be compared with an ordinary love conflict. It is surprising, indeed hardly credible, that only the postulated affection should be conscious, whilst the real passion remained unknown to the patient. But in this case it is beyond dispute that the real erotic relation remained unillumined, whilst the field of consciousness was dominated by the assumption. If we try to formulate this fact, something like the following proposition results: in a neurosis, two erotic tendencies exist which stand in extreme opposition to one another, and one at least is unconscious. Against this formula the objection can be raised that it has obviously been derived from this one particular case, and is therefore lacking in general validity. The criticism will be the more readily urged because no one unpossessed of special reasons is willing to admit that the erotic conflict is of universal prevalence. On the contrary, it is assumed that this conflict belongs more properly to the sphere of novels, since it is generally depicted as something in the nature of such wild adventures as are described by Karin Michaelis in her "Aberrations of Marriage," or by Forel in "The Sexual Question." But indeed this is not the case; for we know the wildest and most moving dramas are not played on the stage, but every day in the hearts of ordinary men and women who pass by without exciting attention, and who betray to the world, save through the symbol of a nervous breakdown, nothing of the conflicts that rage within them. But what is so difficult for the layman to grasp is the fact that in most cases patients have no suspicion whatever of the internecine[368] war raging in their unconscious. But remembering that there are many people who understand nothing at all about themselves, we shall be less surprised at the realisation that there are also people who are utterly unaware of their actual conflicts.
Thus, it can be seen that the theory had to be fundamentally changed because the investigation now had to confront the erotic conflict directly. Our example illustrates that this conflict contains extremely unusual elements and cannot, primâ facie, be compared to a regular love conflict. It is surprising—almost unbelievable—that only the assumed affection should be conscious while the true passion remains unknown to the patient. However, in this case, it is clear that the actual erotic relationship stayed hidden, while the area of consciousness was dominated by this assumption. If we try to phrase this fact, we arrive at a proposition like this: in a neurosis, there are two erotic impulses that oppose each other strongly, and at least one of them is unconscious. An objection can be raised against this formulation, suggesting that it has clearly been derived from this particular case, and therefore lacks broader validity. This criticism will likely be made because no one without special reasons is willing to admit that the erotic conflict is widely prevalent. Instead, it's assumed that this conflict is more suited to the realm of novels, often depicted as something akin to the wild adventures described by Karin Michaelis in her "Aberrations of Marriage," or by Forel in "The Sexual Question." But that’s not accurate; we know that the most intense and touching dramas aren't performed on a stage, but occur daily in the hearts of ordinary men and women who go unnoticed and who reveal nothing of the conflicts that rage within them, except through the symbol of a nervous breakdown. What is particularly challenging for the layperson to understand is that in most cases, patients have no idea about the inner turmoil [368] taking place in their unconscious. Therefore, considering that many people are completely unaware of themselves, we should be less surprised by the fact that there are also individuals who are utterly oblivious to their actual conflicts.
If the reader is now inclined to admit the possible existence of pathogenic, and perhaps even of unconscious conflicts, he will certainly protest that they are not erotic conflicts. If this kind reader should happen himself to be somewhat nervous, the mere suggestion will arouse his indignation, for we are all inclined, as a result of our education in school and at home, to cross ourselves three times where we meet such words as "erotic" and "sexual"—and so we are conveniently able to think that nothing of that nature exists, or at least very seldom, and at a great distance from ourselves. But it is just this attitude which in the first instance brings about neurotic conflicts.
If the reader is now willing to acknowledge the potential existence of harmful, and maybe even unconscious, conflicts, he will surely argue that they are not sexual conflicts. If this kind reader happens to be a bit anxious, just mentioning it will provoke his anger, because we all tend, due to our upbringing in school and at home, to shy away from terms like "erotic" and "sexual"—and this allows us to conveniently believe that nothing of that sort exists, or at least very rarely and far removed from ourselves. But it is precisely this attitude that initially leads to neurotic conflicts.
We recognise that the course of civilisation consists in the progressive mastering of the animal element in man; it is a process of domestication which cannot be carried through without rebellion on the part of the animal nature still thirsting for its liberty. Humanity forces itself to endure the restrictions of the civilising process; but from time to time there comes a frenzied bursting of all bonds. Antiquity had experience of it in that wave of Dionysian orgies, surging hither from the East, which became an essentially characteristic element of antique culture. Its spirit was partly instrumental in causing the numerous sects and philosophic schools of the last century before Christ, to develop the Stoic ideal into asceticism; and in producing from the polytheistic chaos of those times, the ascetic twin-religions of Mithras and of Christ. A second clearly marked wave of the Dionysian impulse towards freedom swept over the Western world during the Renaissance. It is difficult to judge of one's own time, but we gain some insight if we note how the Arts are developing, what is the prevailing type of public taste, what men read and write, what societies they found, what "questions" are the order of the day, and against what the Philistines are fighting. We find in the long list of our present social[369] problems that the sexual question occupies by no means the last place. It agitates men and women who would shake the foundations of sexual morality, and throw off the burden of moral shame which past centuries have heaped upon Eros. The existence of these aspirations and endeavours cannot be simply denied, or declared indefensible; they exist and are therefore presumably not without justification. It is both more interesting and more useful to study carefully the basic causes of these movements than to chime in with the lamentations of the professional mourners over morals, who prophesy with unction the moral downfall of humanity. The moralist least of all trusts God, for he thinks that the beautiful tree of humanity can only thrive by dint of being pruned, bound, and trained on a trellis, whereas Father-Sun and Mother-Earth have combined to make it grow joyfully in accordance with its own laws, which are full of the deepest meaning.
We recognize that the path of civilization involves gradually controlling the animal instincts in humans; it's a process of taming that cannot happen without resistance from the animal nature that longs for freedom. Humanity forces itself to accept the limitations of this civilizing process, but occasionally, there are wild outbursts that break free from all constraints. The ancient world saw this in the wave of Dionysian revelries that surged in from the East, becoming a key part of ancient culture. This spirit contributed to the rise of various sects and philosophical schools in the century before Christ, evolving the Stoic ideal into asceticism, and creating the ascetic twin religions of Mithras and Christianity out of the polytheistic confusion of that era. A second significant wave of the Dionysian drive for freedom swept over the Western world during the Renaissance. It’s hard to evaluate one’s own time, but we can gain some understanding by observing how the arts are evolving, what the dominant public tastes are, what people read and write, what organizations they establish, what issues are currently trending, and what the conventional thinkers are opposing. Among our current social issues, the sexual question is certainly prominent. It concerns men and women who want to challenge the foundations of sexual morality and shed the burden of shame that earlier centuries placed upon love. These aspirations and efforts cannot simply be dismissed or deemed unjustifiable; they exist, and therefore likely have rationale. It’s both more intriguing and productive to deeply explore the root causes of these movements rather than join in the lamentations of the self-proclaimed moral guardians who predict a moral decline for humanity with such fervor. The moralist, above all, doubts the natural order, believing that the beautiful tree of humanity can only thrive if it is constantly pruned, restrained, and guided on a trellis, while Father-Sun and Mother-Earth have come together to enable it to grow joyfully according to its inherent laws, which are rich with meaning.
Serious people are aware that a very real sexual problem does exist at the present time. The rapid development of the towns, coupled with methods of work brought about by the extraordinary division of labour, the increasing industrialisation of the country and the growing security of life, combine to deprive humanity of many opportunities of expending emotional energy. Think of the life of the peasant, whose work so rich and full of change, affords him unconscious satisfaction by means of its symbolic content; a like satisfaction the factory-hand and the clerk can never know. Think of a life with nature; of those wonderful moments when, as lord and fructifier, man drives the plough through the earth, and with kingly gesture scatters the seed of the future harvest; see his justifiable awe before the destructive power of the elements, his joy in the fruitfulness of his wife, who gives him daughters and sons, who mean to him increased working power and enhanced prosperity. Alas! from all this we town-dwellers, we modern machines, are far, far removed.
Serious people understand that there is a very real sexual issue happening today. The rapid growth of towns, along with the new work methods created by the extreme division of labor, the increasing industrialization of the country, and the greater security in life, all combine to rob us of many chances to express our emotional energy. Think of a peasant's life, where work is rich and full of variety, providing him with an unconscious satisfaction through its symbolic meaning; a satisfaction that factory workers and office workers will never experience. Imagine a life connected with nature; those amazing moments when a person, as a master and nurturer, drives a plow through the earth, and with a majestic gesture sows the seeds for future harvests; see his rightful awe toward the destructive forces of nature, and his joy in his wife's fertility, as she gives him daughters and sons, who represent increased labor power and greater prosperity for him. Unfortunately, we urban dwellers, we modern machines, are far, far removed from all this.
Must we not admit that we are already deprived of the most natural and most beautiful of all satisfactions, since we can no longer contemplate the arrival of our own seed, the "blessing" of children, with unmixed pleasure? Marriages[370] where no artifices are resorted to are rare. Is this not an all-important departure from the joys which Mother Nature gave her first-born sons? Can such a state of affairs bring satisfaction? Note how men slink to their work, watch their faces at an early morning hour in the tram-cars. One of them makes his little wheels, and another writes trivial things which do not interest him. What wonder is it if such men belong to as many clubs as there are days in the week, and that among women little societies flourish, where they pour out on some particular hero or cause those unsatisfied desires which the man dulls at his restaurant or club, imbibing beer and playing at being important? To these sources of dissatisfaction is added a more serious factor. Nature has provided defenceless, weaponless man with a great amount of energy to enable him not merely to bear passively the grave dangers of existence, but also to conquer them. Mother Nature has equipped her son for tremendous hardships and has placed a costly premium on the overcoming of them, as Schopenhauer quite understood when he said that "happiness is really but the termination of unhappiness." Civilized people are, as a rule, shielded from the immediately pressing dangers, and they are therefore daily tempted to excess, for in man the animal always becomes rampant when he is not constrained by fierce necessity. Are we then indeed unrestrained? In what orgiastic festivals do we dispose of the surplus of vital power? Our moral views do not permit us that outlet.
Must we not admit that we are already missing out on the most natural and beautiful of all joys, since we can no longer look forward to the arrival of our own children, the "blessing" of offspring, with pure pleasure? Marriages[370] without any tricks are rare. Isn't this a significant departure from the joys that Mother Nature offered her first children? Can this situation really bring satisfaction? Just look at how men shuffle off to work, watch their expressions in the early morning on public transport. One of them handles his small tasks, while another writes meaningless things that don’t interest him. Is it any wonder that these men belong to as many clubs as there are days in the week, and that women have formed little societies where they vent their unfulfilled desires about some particular hero or cause, which the man dulls at his restaurant or club by drinking beer and pretending to be important? To this dissatisfaction, we add a more serious issue. Nature has given defenseless, unarmed humans a lot of energy to not just passively endure the harsh realities of life, but also to conquer them. Mother Nature has prepared her children for immense struggles and has placed a high cost on overcoming them, as Schopenhauer rightly noted when he said that "happiness is really just the end of unhappiness." Generally, civilized people are protected from immediate dangers, and because of that, they are tempted to excess every day, since in humans, the animal instinct tends to run wild when not restrained by harsh necessity. Are we then truly unrestrained? In what wild celebrations do we channel the excess of our vital energy? Our moral beliefs don’t allow such an outlet.
But reckon up in how many directions we are met by unsatisfied longings; the denial of procreation and begetting, for which purpose nature has endowed us with great energy; the unending monotony of our highly developed modern methods of "division of labour," which excludes any interest in the work itself; and above all our effortless security against war, lawlessness, robbery, epidemics, infant and woman mortality—all this gives a sum of surplus energy which must needs find an outlet. But how? A relatively few create quasi-natural dangers for themselves in reckless sport; many more, seeking to find some equivalent for their more primitive energy, take[371] to alcoholic excess; others expend themselves in the rush of money-making, or in the morbid performance of duties, in perpetual over-work. By such means they try to escape a dangerous storing-up of energy which might force mad outlets for itself. It is for such reasons that we have to-day a sexual question. It is in this direction that men's energy would like to expend itself as it has done from time immemorial in periods of security and abundance. Under such circumstances it is not only rabbits that multiply; men and women, too, become the sport of these accesses of nature: the sport, because their moral views have confined them in a narrow cage, the excessive narrowness of which was not felt so long as harsh external necessity pressed upon them with even greater constraint. But now the man of the cities finds the space too circumscribed. He is surrounded by alluring temptation, and like an invisible procureur there slinks through society the knowledge of preventive methods which evade all consequences. Why then moral restraint? Out of religious consideration for an angry God? Apart from the prevalence of widespread unbelief, even the believing man might quietly ask himself whether, if he himself were God, he would punish the youthful erotic uncontrol of John and Mary with twice twenty-four years of imprisonment and seething in boiling oil. Such ideas are no longer compatible with our decorous conception of God. The God of our time is necessarily much too tolerant to make a great fuss over it; (knavishness and hypocrisy are a thousand times worse). In this way the somewhat ascetic and hypocritical sexual morality of our time has had the ground cut from under its feet. Or is it the case that we are now protected from dissoluteness by superior wisdom, recognition of the nothingness of human happenings? Unfortunately we are very far from that; rather does the hypnotic power of tradition keep us in bonds, and through cowardice and thoughtlessness and habit the herd goes tramping on in this same path. But man possesses in the unconscious a fine scent for the spirit of his time; he has an inkling of his own possibilities and he feels in his innermost[372] heart the instability of the foundations of present-day morality, no longer supported by living religious conviction. It is thus the greater number of the erotic conflicts of our time originate. Instinct thirsting for liberty thrusts itself up against the yielding barriers of morality: men are tempted, they desire and do not desire. And because they will not and cannot think out to its logical conclusion what it is they really desire, their erotic conflict is largely unconscious; whence comes neurosis. Neurosis then is most intimately bound up with the problem of our times and represents an unsuccessful attempt of the individual to solve the general problem in his own person. Neurosis is a tearing in two of the inner self. For most men the reason of this cleavage is the fact that their conscious self desires to hold to its moral ideal, whilst the unconscious strives after the amoral ideal, steadfastly rejected by the conscious self. People of this kind would like to appear more decent than they really are. But the conflict is often of an opposite kind. There are those who do not outwardly live a decent life at all and do not place the slightest constraint upon their sexuality, but in reality this is a sinful pose assumed for goodness knows what reasons, for down below they have a decorous soul which has somehow gone astray in their unconscious, just as has the real immoral nature in the case of apparently moral people. Extremes of conduct always arouse suspicions of the opposite tendencies in the unconscious.
But think about how many ways we face unfulfilled desires: the denial of having children, for which nature has given us plenty of energy; the never-ending dullness of our advanced modern methods of "division of labor," which takes away any interest in the work itself; and above all, our carefree security against war, crime, theft, epidemics, and the deaths of infants and women—all of this creates a surplus of energy that needs an outlet. But how? A small number of people create almost natural dangers for themselves through reckless sports; many more, trying to find some equivalent for their basic energy, resort to excessive drinking; others spend themselves in the rush of making money or in the unhealthy performance of duties, working themselves to the bone. They try to avoid a dangerous buildup of energy that could lead to crazy outbursts. This is why we have a sexual question today. Men's energy wants to express itself as it always has in times of security and abundance. In such circumstances, it's not just rabbits that multiply; men and women also become the victims of these natural urges: victims, because their moral views have trapped them in a tight cage that they didn't feel was restricting while harsh external forces pressured them more severely. But now the urban man finds the space too limited. He is surrounded by tempting possibilities, and there’s an elusive procureur that slinks through society, spreading knowledge of preventive methods that avoid all consequences. So why the moral restraint? Out of religious fear of an angry God? Aside from the widespread disbelief, even a faithful person might quietly wonder if he were God, would he really punish the youthful erotic impulses of John and Mary with twenty-four years of imprisonment and boiling oil. Such ideas no longer fit our respectful view of God. The God of our time is inevitably too tolerant to make a big deal about it; (deceit and hypocrisy are a thousand times worse). Thus, the somewhat ascetic and hypocritical sexual morality of our time has lost its footing. Or are we now safeguarded from moral decay by superior wisdom, acknowledging the futility of human events? Unfortunately, we are far from that; instead, the hypnotic power of tradition keeps us in chains, and due to cowardice, thoughtlessness, and habit, the masses keep trudging along the same path. However, humans have an instinctive awareness of the spirit of their time; they have a sense of their own possibilities, and deep down, they feel the instability of the foundations of modern morality, which is no longer upheld by living religious belief. This is where most of the erotic conflicts of our time arise. Instinct yearning for freedom clashes against the yielding barriers of morality: people are tempted, they want and don't want. And because they can't think through to the logical conclusion of what they truly desire, their erotic conflict remains largely unconscious, leading to neurosis. Neurosis is closely tied to the issues of our era and represents an individual's failed attempt to address the larger problem within themselves. Neurosis is a splitting of the inner self. For most men, this split occurs because their conscious self wants to adhere to its moral ideals, while the unconscious pursues the amoral ideal, which the conscious self firmly rejects. These individuals want to appear more virtuous than they actually are. But sometimes the conflict is opposite. Some people don’t lead a decent life outwardly and don’t restrain their sexuality at all, yet in truth, this is a sinful facade for reasons unknown, because deep down they possess a decent soul that somehow got lost in their unconscious, just as the truly immoral nature is hidden in seemingly moral people. Extreme behavior always raises suspicions about the opposing tendencies hidden in the unconscious.
It was necessary to make this general statement in order to elucidate the idea of the "erotic conflict" in analytical psychology, for it is the key to the conception of neurosis. We can now proceed to consider the psychoanalytic technique. Obviously the main problem is, how to arrive by the shortest and best path at a knowledge of the patient's "unconscious." The method first used was hypnotism, the patient being questioned, on the production of spontaneous phantasies observed while in a state of hypnotic concentration. This method is still occasionally used, but in comparison with the present technique is primitive and frequently unsatisfactory. A second method, evolved by the Psychiatric Clinic, Zürich, was[373] the so-called association method,[227] which is chiefly of theoretic, experimental value. Its result is an extensive, though superficial orientation, concerning the unconscious conflict ("complex").[228] The more penetrating method is that of dream-analysis whose discovery belongs to Sigmund Freud.[229]
It was necessary to make this general statement to clarify the idea of the "erotic conflict" in analytical psychology, as it is key to understanding neurosis. Now we can look at the psychoanalytic technique. The main issue is how to quickly and effectively gain insight into the patient's "unconscious." The first method used was hypnotism, where the patient was questioned about spontaneous fantasies observed during a state of hypnotic concentration. This method is still used occasionally, but compared to today’s techniques, it is primitive and often unsatisfactory. A second method, developed by the Psychiatric Clinic in Zürich, was the so-called association method, which is mainly of theoretical and experimental value. Its outcome is a broad, albeit superficial, understanding of the unconscious conflict ("complex"). The more in-depth method is dream analysis, which was discovered by Sigmund Freud.
Of the dream it can be said that "the stone which the builders rejected has become the head of the corner." It is only in modern times that the dream (that fleeting and seemingly insignificant product of the soul), has met with such complete contempt. Formerly it was esteemed, as a harbinger of fate, a warning or a consolation, a messenger of the gods. Now we use it as a messenger of the unconscious; it must disclose to us the secrets which our unconscious self enviously hides from our consciousness, and it does so with astonishing completeness.
Of the dream, it can be said that "the stone which the builders rejected has become the head of the corner." Only in modern times has the dream (that fleeting and seemingly unimportant product of the soul) faced such complete disregard. In the past, it was valued as a sign of destiny, a warning or comfort, a messenger from the gods. Now we see it as a messenger of the unconscious; it must reveal to us the secrets that our unconscious self jealously conceals from our awareness, and it does so with surprising thoroughness.
On analytical investigation it becomes plain that the dream, as we remember it, is only a façade which conceals the contents within the house. But if, observing certain technical rules, we get the dreamer to talk about the details of his dream, it soon appears that his free associations group themselves in certain directions and round certain topics. These appear to be of personal significance, and have a meaning which at first sight would not be suspected. Careful comparison shows that they are in close and subtle symbolic connection with the dream-façade.[230] This particular complex of ideas in which all the threads of the dream unite, is the conflict for which we are seeking; is its particular form at the moment, conditioned by the immediate circumstances. What is painful and incompatible is in this way so covered up or split that we can call it a wish-fulfilment; but we must immediately add that the[374] wishes fulfilled in the dream do not seem at first sight to be our wishes, but rather the very opposite. For instance, a daughter loves her mother tenderly, but she dreams that her mother is dead; this causes her great grief. Such dreams, where apparently there is no trace of any wish-fulfilment are innumerable, and are a constant stumbling-block to our learned critics, for—incredible dictu—they still cannot grasp the simple distinction between the manifest and the latent content of the dream. We must guard against such an error; the conflict dealt with in the dream is an unconscious one, and equally so also is the manner its solution. Our dreamer has, as a matter of fact, the wish to get away from her mother—expressed in the language of the unconscious, she wants her mother to die. Now we know that a certain section of the unconscious contains all our lost memories, and also all those infantile impulses that cannot find any application in adult life—a series, that is, of ruthless childish desires. We may say that for the most part the unconscious bears an infantile stamp; like the child's simple wish: "Daddy, when Mummie is dead, will you marry me?" In a dream that infantile expression of a wish is the substitute for a recent wish to marry, which is painful to the dreamer for reasons still undiscovered. This thought, or rather the seriousness of its corresponding intention, is said to be "repressed into the unconscious" and must there necessarily express itself in an infantile way, for the material which is at the disposal of the unconscious consists chiefly of infantile memories. As the latest researches of the Zürich school have shown,[231] these are not only infantile memories but also "racial" memories, extending far beyond the limits of individual existence.
On closer examination, it becomes clear that the dream, as we recall it, is just a front that hides what's really inside. However, if we follow certain techniques and encourage the dreamer to share the details of their dream, it soon becomes evident that their free associations start to organize around specific themes and topics. These themes seem personally significant and have meanings that might not be immediately obvious. A careful comparison reveals they are intricately and subtly connected to the dream's surface. This complex of ideas, where all the threads of the dream come together, represents the conflict we are trying to understand; it's just its current form influenced by the immediate situation. What is painful and contradictory is masked or fragmented in such a way that we can call it wish fulfillment; however, we must quickly add that the wishes fulfilled in the dream don't initially seem to be our actual wishes, but rather the complete opposite. For example, a daughter deeply loves her mother, yet she dreams that her mother is dead, which causes her immense sadness. Such dreams, where there's seemingly no hint of wish fulfillment, are countless and often confusing for our learned critics because—incredible as it may seem—they still can't grasp the simple difference between the manifest and latent content of dreams. We must be cautious of this error; the conflict represented in the dream is unconscious, and so is the way it resolves. Our dreamer actually wishes to escape from her mother—translated through the unconscious, she wants her mother to die. We know that a part of the unconscious holds all our forgotten memories, along with all those childish impulses that can't be expressed in adult life—a collection of unfiltered childish desires. We can say that, for the most part, the unconscious carries an infantile quality; like a child's simple wish: "Daddy, when Mummie is dead, will you marry me?" In a dream, this childish expression of a wish substitutes for a recent painful desire to marry, for reasons that are still unexplored. This thought, or more accurately the seriousness of its corresponding intention, is said to be "repressed into the unconscious" and must express itself in a childish manner because the material available to the unconscious mostly consists of infantile memories. As recent research from the Zürich school has demonstrated, these aren't just childhood memories but also "racial" memories that extend far beyond individual existence.
Important desires which have not been sufficiently gratified, or have been "repressed," during the day find their symbolic substitution in dreams. Because moral tendencies usually predominate in waking hours, these ungratified desires which strive to realise themselves symbolically in the dream are, as rule, erotic ones. It is, therefore, somewhat rash to tell dreams before one who understands, for the[375] symbolism is often extremely transparent to him who knows the rules! The clearest in this respect are "anxiety-dreams" which are so common, and which invariably symbolise a strong erotic desire.
Important desires that have not been fulfilled or have been "repressed" during the day find their symbolic expression in dreams. Since moral considerations usually take precedence during waking hours, these unfulfilled desires that attempt to express themselves symbolically in dreams are mostly erotic in nature. Therefore, it can be a bit reckless to share dreams with someone who understands, as the [375] symbolism is often quite obvious to someone who knows the rules! The most evident in this regard are "anxiety dreams," which are very common and always symbolize a strong erotic desire.
Often the dream apparently deals with quite irrelevant details, thereby making a ridiculous impression; or else it is so unintelligible that we are simply amazed at it, and accordingly have to overcome considerable resistance in ourselves before we can set to work seriously to unravel its symbolic weaving by patient work. But when at last we penetrate into its real meaning we find ourselves at a bound in the very heart of the dreamer's secrets, and find to our astonishment that an apparently senseless dream is quite full of sense, and deals with extraordinarily important and serious problems of the soul. Having acquired this knowledge we cannot refrain from giving rather more credit to the old superstitions concerning the meaning of dreams for which our rationalising tendencies, until lately, had no use.
Often, dreams seem to focus on totally irrelevant details, which can make them seem ridiculous; or they can be so confusing that we're left in awe, forcing us to push through a lot of inner resistance before we can genuinely start to untangle their symbolic patterns through careful effort. But when we finally get to the core meaning, we find ourselves deeply embedded in the dreamer's secrets, and to our surprise, what seemed like a meaningless dream is actually filled with significance, addressing highly important and serious issues of the soul. With this understanding, we can't help but give more credit to the old beliefs about the meaning of dreams that our rationalizing tendencies had dismissed until recently.
As Freud says: "Dream-analysis is the via regia to the unconscious." Dream-analysis leads us into the deepest personal secrets, and it is therefore an invaluable instrument in the hand of the psychotherapist and educator. The objections of the opponents of this method are based, as might be expected, upon argument, which (setting aside undercurrents of personal feeling) show the bias of present-day Scholasticism. It so happens that it is just the analysis of dreams which mercilessly uncovers the deceptive morals and hypocritical affectations of man, and shows him the under side of his character; can we wonder if many feel that their toes have been rather painfully trodden upon? In connection with the dream-analysis I am always reminded of the striking statue of Carnal Pleasure in Bâle Cathedral, which shows in front the sweet smile of archaic sculpture, but behind is covered with toads and serpents. Dream-analysis reverses the figure and for once shows the other side. The ethical value of this reality-correction (Wirklichkeitscorrectur) cannot be disputed. It is a painful but extremely useful operation, which makes great demands on both physician and patient.
As Freud says: "Dream-analysis is the via regia to the unconscious." Dream-analysis takes us into our deepest personal secrets, making it an invaluable tool for therapists and educators. The criticisms from those against this method are largely based on arguments that, aside from personal feelings, reveal the biases of modern Scholasticism. It just happens that dream analysis ruthlessly exposes the deceptive morals and hypocritical behaviors of people, revealing the darker side of their character; can we be surprised that many feel like they've been stepped on? When I think about dream-analysis, I’m always reminded of the striking statue of Carnal Pleasure in Bâle Cathedral, which displays a sweet smile on the front but is covered with toads and serpents on the back. Dream-analysis flips this figure to reveal the other side. The ethical value of this reality-check (Wirklichkeitscorrectur) is undeniable. It’s a painful but extremely useful process that demands a lot from both the therapist and the patient.
Psychoanalysis, in so far as we are considering it as a therapeutic technique, consists mainly of the analysis of many dreams; the dreams in the course of the treatment bringing up successively the contents of the unconscious in order that they may be subjected to the disinfecting power of daylight, and in this process many a valuable thing believed to have been lost is found again. It is not surprising that for those persons who have adopted a certain pose towards themselves, psychoanalysis is at times a real torture, since in accordance with the old mystic saying, "Give all thou hast, then only shalt thou receive," there is first the necessity to get rid of almost all the dearly cherished illusions, to permit the advent of something deeper, finer, and greater, for only through the mystery of self-sacrifice is it possible to be "born-again." It is indeed ancient wisdom which again sees the daylight in psychoanalytic treatment, and it is a curious thing that this kind of psychic re-education proves to be necessary at the height of our modern culture; this education which in more than one respect can be compared to the technique of Socrates, even though psychoanalysis penetrates to much greater depths.
Psychoanalysis, when viewed as a therapeutic technique, mainly involves analyzing many dreams. Throughout treatment, dreams reveal the contents of the unconscious so they can be exposed to the cleansing light of day, allowing many valuable insights thought to be lost to be rediscovered. It’s not surprising that for individuals who maintain a certain facade about themselves, psychoanalysis can sometimes feel torturous. Following the old mystical saying, "Give all you have, then only will you receive," there is a need to let go of almost all the cherished illusions to make way for something deeper, more refined, and greater. Only through the mystery of self-sacrifice can one experience a "rebirth." This ancient wisdom reemerges in psychoanalytic treatment, and it's interesting that this kind of mental re-education is essential at the peak of our modern culture; this education can be compared to Socratic techniques in more than one way, even though psychoanalysis delves much deeper.
We always find in a patient some conflict, which at a particular point, is connected with the great problems of society; so that when the analysis has arrived at this point the apparently individual conflict is revealed as a universal conflict of the environment and the epoch. Neurosis is thus, strictly speaking, nothing but an individual attempt, however unsuccessful, at a solution of the general problem; it must be so, for a general problem, a "question," is not an end in itself; it only exists in the hearts and heads of individual men and women. The "question" which troubles the patient is—whether you like it or not—the "sexual" question, or more precisely, the problem of present-day sexual morality. His increased demands upon life and the joy of life, upon glowing reality, can stand the necessary limitations which reality sets, but not the arbitrary, ill-supported prohibitions of present-day morals, which would curb too much the creative spirit rising up from the depths of the darkness of the beasts[377] that perish. For the neurotic has in him the soul of a child that can but ill-endure arbitrary limitations of which it does not see the meaning; it tries to adopt the moral standard, but thereby only falls into deeper disunion and distress within itself. On the one hand it tries to suppress itself, and on the other to free itself—this is the struggle that is called Neurosis. If this conflict were altogether clear to consciousness it would of course never give rise to neurotic symptoms; these only arise when we cannot see the other side of our character, and the urgency of the problems of that other side. In these circumstances symptoms arise which partially express what is unrecognised in the soul. The symptom is, therefore, an indirect expression of unrecognised desires, which, were they conscious, would be in violent opposition to the sufferer's moral views. As we have already said, this dark side of the soul does not come within the purview of consciousness, and therefore the patient cannot deal with it, correct it, resign himself to it, or renounce it, for he cannot be said to possess the unconscious impulses. By being repressed from the hierarchy of the conscious soul, they have become autonomous complexes which can be brought again under control by analysis of the unconscious, though not without great resistance. There are a great many patients whose great boast it is that the erotic conflict does not exist for them; they are sure that the sexual question is nonsense, that they have, so to say, no sexuality. These people do not see that other things of unknown origin cumber their path, such as hysterical whims, underhand tricks, from which they make themselves, or those nearest them, suffer; nervous stomach-catarrh, pain here and there, irritability without reason, and a whole host of nervous symptoms. All which things show what is wrong with them, for relatively, only a few specially favoured by fate, avoid the great conflict.
We always find that a patient has some internal conflict that, at a certain point, connects to broader societal issues; so when the analysis reaches this point, the seemingly individual conflict is revealed as a universal issue rooted in the environment and the times. Neurosis is essentially an individual's attempt, however unsuccessful, to address a general problem; it has to be this way because a general problem, a "question," isn't an end in itself; it exists only in the hearts and minds of individual people. The "question" that troubles the patient is—like it or not—the "sexual" question, or more specifically, the issue of today's sexual morality. Their greater demands for life and enjoyment in reality can handle the necessary limits that reality imposes, but they cannot accept the arbitrary and unsupported restrictions of modern morals, which overly limit the creative spirit rising from the depths of base instincts[377] that fade away. For the neurotic has the soul of a child that struggles to endure arbitrary limitations without understanding their purpose; it tries to adopt the moral standard, but this only leads to deeper internal division and distress. On one hand, it tries to suppress itself, and on the other, it seeks freedom—this struggle is what we call Neurosis. If this conflict were entirely clear to consciousness, it would never result in neurotic symptoms; these emerge only when we cannot see the other side of our character and the urgency of the problems associated with that side. In such cases, symptoms surface that partially express what remains unrecognized in the soul. Therefore, the symptom is an indirect expression of unrecognized desires that, if they were conscious, would strongly oppose the sufferer's moral beliefs. As we mentioned, this dark side of the soul remains outside of consciousness, preventing the patient from addressing, correcting, accepting, or renouncing it, because they cannot be said to possess the unconscious impulses. By being repressed from the hierarchy of the conscious mind, these impulses become autonomous complexes that can be brought back under control through analysis of the unconscious, albeit with considerable resistance. Many patients proudly claim that the erotic conflict does not exist for them; they believe that the sexual question is nonsense and that they essentially lack sexuality. These individuals fail to recognize that other unidentified issues hinder their progress, such as hysterical outbursts or sneaky behaviors that cause suffering for themselves or those close to them; nervous stomach issues, localized pain, unexplained irritability, and a wide range of nervous symptoms. All of these indicate what is wrong with them, as relatively few people, particularly those favored by fate, escape the fundamental conflict.
Analytical psychology has already been reproached with setting at liberty the animal instincts of men, hitherto happily repressed, and causing thereby untold harm. This childish apprehension clearly proves how little trust is put in the efficacy of present-day moral principles. It is pretended that[378] only morals can restrain men from dissoluteness; a much more efficient regulator, however, is necessity, which sets much more real and convincing bounds than any moral principles. It is true that analysis liberates animal instincts, but not, as some have said, just in order to let them loose, but rather to make them available for higher application, in so far as this is possible to the particular individual, and in so far as such "sublimated" application is required. Under all circumstances it is an advantage to be in full possession of one's own personality, for otherwise the repressed desires will get in the way in a most serious manner, and overthrow us just in that place where we are most vulnerable. It is surely better that a man learn to tolerate himself, and instead of making war on himself convert his inner difficulties into real experiences, rather than uselessly repeat them again and again in phantasy. Then at least he lives, and does not merely consume himself in fruitless struggles. But when men are educated to recognise the baser side of their own natures, it may be hoped they will learn to understand and love their fellow-men better too. A decrease of hypocrisy and an increase of tolerance towards oneself, can have only good results in tolerance towards one's neighbours, for men are only too easily disposed to extend to others the unfairness and violence which they do to their own natures.
Analytical psychology has faced criticism for unleashing the animal instincts in people, which had been happily suppressed until now, and causing significant harm as a result. This naive concern clearly shows a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of today's moral principles. It's suggested that only morals can keep people from being immoral; however, a much stronger force is necessity, which sets far more real and convincing limits than any moral standards. While it's true that analysis frees animal instincts, it doesn't do so merely to let them run wild, but rather to make them useful for higher purposes, as much as possible for each individual and as much as such "sublimated" use is needed. In any case, it's beneficial to fully own one's personality; otherwise, repressed desires can seriously interfere and knock us down right where we are most vulnerable. It's definitely better for a person to learn to accept themselves, and instead of fighting against themselves, turn their internal struggles into real experiences rather than mindlessly reliving them in fantasy. At least then, they live rather than just waste away in pointless conflicts. When people are taught to recognize the darker aspects of their nature, we can hope that they'll also learn to understand and care for others better. Reduced hypocrisy and increased self-acceptance can only lead to positive outcomes in how we tolerate our neighbors, as people are often too quick to direct the unfairness and aggression they inflict upon themselves onto others.
Freud's theory of repression does, indeed, seem to postulate the existence only of people who, being too moral, are continually repressing the immorality of their natural instincts. According to this idea, the immoral man who allows his natural instincts an unbridled existence should be proof against neurosis. But daily experience proves this is obviously not the case; he may be just as neurotic as other men. If we analyse him, we find that it is simply his decency that has been repressed. Therefore, when an immoral man is neurotic, he represents what Nietzsche appropriately described as "the pale criminal," a man who does not stand upon the same level as his deed.[232]
Freud's theory of repression does seem to suggest that only people who are overly moral are constantly suppressing the immorality of their natural instincts. According to this idea, an immoral person who lets their natural instincts run free should be immune to neurosis. But daily experience shows that this isn't true; they can be just as neurotic as anyone else. If we analyze them, we find that it’s simply their decency that has been pushed down. So, when an immoral person is neurotic, they represent what Nietzsche aptly called "the pale criminal," someone who doesn’t align with their actions.[232]
The opinion may be held, that in such a case the repressed remnants of decency are merely infantile traditional legacies, that impose unnecessary fetters upon natural instincts, for which reason they should be eradicated. The principle "écraser l'infâme" would be the natural culmination of such an absolute let-instinct-live theory.[233] That would obviously be quite phantastic and nonsensical. It should, indeed, never be forgotten—and the Freudian School needs this reminder—that morality was not brought down upon tables of stone from Sinai and forced upon the people, but that morality is a function of the human soul, which is as old as humanity itself. Morality is not inculcated from without. Man has it primarily within himself—not the law indeed, but the essence of morals.
One might argue that in such cases, the suppressed bits of decency are just childish traditions that place unnecessary restrictions on natural instincts, which is why they should be eliminated. The principle "écraser l'infâme" would be the natural conclusion of such a strict let-instincts-live approach.[233] That would clearly be quite fantastic and absurd. It should never be forgotten—and the Freudian School needs to be reminded—that morality wasn’t handed down on stone tablets from Sinai and imposed on people, but rather that morality is a part of the human soul, as old as humanity itself. Morality doesn't come from outside influences. Humans have it primarily within themselves—not the law, but the essence of morals.
After all, does a more moral view-point exist than the let-instinct-live theory? Is there a more heroic morality than this? That is why Nietzsche, the heroic, is especially partial to it. It is natural and inborn cowardice that makes people say, "God preserve me from following my instincts," thinking that they thus prove their high moral standard. They do not understand that following one's bent is really much too costly for them, too strenuous, too dangerous, and finally it cuts somewhat against that sense of decency which most people associate rather with taste than with a categorical imperative. The unpardonable fault of the let-instinct-live theory is, that it is much too heroic, too idealogic for the multitude.
After all, is there a more moral viewpoint than the let-instinct-live theory? Is there a more heroic sense of morality than this? That's why Nietzsche, being the hero he is, especially favors it. It's natural cowardice that makes people say, "God protect me from following my instincts," thinking they are demonstrating a high moral standard. They don’t realize that following one's true nature is actually too demanding, too risky, and ultimately conflicts with the sense of decency that most people associate more with taste than a strict moral rule. The unforgivable flaw of the let-instinct-live theory is that it’s just too heroic, too idealistic for the average person.
There is, therefore, probably no other way for the immoral man but to accept the moral corrective of his unconscious, just as he who is moral must come to terms as best he may, with his demons of the netherworld. It cannot be gainsaid that the Freudian School is so convinced of the fundamental, and even exclusive importance of sexuality in neurosis, that it has been courageous enough to face the consequences of its convictions by heroically attacking the sexual morality of the present day. Many different opinions prevail upon this subject. What is significant is,[380] that the problem of sexual morality is being widely discussed at the present time. This is doubtless both useful and necessary, for hitherto we have not really had any sexual morality at all, but merely a low barbaric view, quite insufficiently differentiated. In the Middle Ages, usury was considered absolutely despicable, for at that time the morality of finance was not casuistically differentiated; there was nothing but a kind of lump-morality. So nowadays, there exists nothing but sexual morality in the lump. A girl who has an illegitimate child is condemned, without any inquiry as to whether she is a decent person or not. Any form of love that has no legal sanction is immoral, no matter whether it occurs between thoughtful people of value or irresponsible scamps. People are still barbarically hypnotised by the thing itself, to such an extent that they forget the individual.
There's probably no way for an immoral person to avoid the moral corrective of their subconscious, just as a moral person must deal with their inner demons as best they can. It's undeniable that the Freudian School believes in the fundamental, even exclusive, importance of sexuality in neurosis, and they've bravely confronted the implications of their beliefs by openly criticizing today's sexual morality. There are many differing opinions on this topic. What’s important is, [380] that the issue of sexual morality is being widely debated right now. This is certainly both useful and necessary because until now, we haven't really had any meaningful sexual morality at all, just a primitive understanding that lacks nuance. In the Middle Ages, usury was seen as absolutely despicable because financial morality wasn't differentiated; it was simply a kind of blanket morality. Today, we have only a generalized view of sexual morality. A girl who has an illegitimate child is condemned without any consideration of whether she is a good person or not. Any form of love that lacks legal approval is deemed immoral, regardless of whether it involves thoughtful individuals or reckless people. Society is still barbarically fixated on the act itself, to the point that they overlook the individual.
Therefore the discussion of and attack upon sexual morality of the present day signifies at bottom, a moral deed, constraining people towards a differentiated and really ethical conception of the subject.
Therefore, the discussion and criticism of today’s sexual morality ultimately represent a moral action, pushing people towards a nuanced and genuinely ethical understanding of the subject.
As already stated, Freud sees the great conflict between the ego and natural instinct chiefly under its sexual aspect. This aspect does exist, but a big query should be placed behind its actuality. The question is whether what appears in a sexual form must always essentially be sexuality? It is conceivable that one instinct may disguise itself under another. Freud himself has supplied several notable instances of such a disguise, proving therewith, convincingly, that many of the deeds and aims of human kind are, at bottom, nothing but somewhat figurative expressions substituted, on account of embarrassment, in place of important elementary things. The substitution is not seen through on account of reasons of mutual consideration. There is nothing to hinder certain elementary things being also pushed conveniently into the foreground, in place of more necessary but less pleasant ones, under the illusion that the elementary things only are really in question.
As already mentioned, Freud sees the main struggle between the ego and our natural instincts mostly in terms of sexuality. This aspect does exist, but we should really question its true nature. The issue is whether what appears to be sexual always has to be about sex. It's possible that one instinct can take the form of another. Freud himself has provided several compelling examples of such transformations, convincingly showing that many of humanity's actions and goals are, at their core, just figurative expressions that replace more fundamental issues due to discomfort. This substitution often goes unnoticed because of mutual considerations. There’s nothing stopping some basic issues from being conveniently highlighted instead of more necessary but less pleasant ones, under the mistaken belief that only the basic ones truly matter.
The theory of sexuality although one-sided is absolutely right[381] up to a certain point. It would, therefore, be just as false to repudiate it as to accept it as universally valid.
The theory of sexuality, while incomplete, is definitely correct[381] to some extent. So, it would be equally wrong to reject it as it would be to accept it as universally true.
III.—The other Viewpoint: the Will to Power.
III.—Another View: the Will to Power.
We have so far considered the problem of the psychology of unconscious processes mainly from the point of view of Freud. We have thereby doubtless gained an inkling of a real truth, which perhaps our pride, our consciousness of civilisation, tries to deny, although something else in us affirms it. This situation is extremely irritating to some people, arousing resistances, and at the same time they are terror-stricken by it, a fact which they are most unwilling to acknowledge. There is something terrible in admitting this conflict, for it is an acknowledgment of being swayed by instinct. Has it ever been understood what it means to confess to the sway of instinct? Nietzsche desired to be so swayed and advocated it most seriously. He even sacrificed himself throughout his whole life, with rare passion, to the idea of the Superman, that is to the idea of the man who, obeying his instincts, transcends even his very self. And what was the course of his life? It turned out as Nietzsche himself prophesied in the passage in "Zarathustra" relating to the fatal fall of the rope-dancer, of the man who did not want to be "surpassed." Zarathustra says to the dying rope-dancer: "Thy soul will be dead even sooner than thy body." And later, the dwarf says to Zarathustra: "Oh, Zarathustra, thou stone of wisdom! Thou threwest thyself high, but every thrown-stone must fall! Condemned of thyself, and to thine own stoning: oh, Zarathustra, far indeed threwest thou the stone—but upon thyself will it recoil!"
We have so far looked at the issue of the psychology of unconscious processes mainly through Freud's perspective. In doing so, we've likely gained a glimpse of a true reality that our pride and awareness of civilization might try to deny, even though another part of us recognizes it. This situation frustrates some people, triggering resistance while also filling them with fear, which they are reluctant to admit. There’s something daunting about recognizing this inner conflict, as it means acknowledging that we are influenced by our instincts. Has anyone ever fully grasped what it means to admit to being guided by instinct? Nietzsche wanted to be guided by his instincts and promoted this idea passionately. He dedicated his entire life to the concept of the Superman, the person who, by following their instincts, goes beyond their own limitations. And what was the outcome of his life? It turned out as Nietzsche himself foreshadowed in the passage in "Zarathustra" about the tragic fall of the rope-dancer, the person who didn’t want to be "surpassed." Zarathustra tells the dying rope-dancer: "Your soul will be dead even sooner than your body." Later, the dwarf tells Zarathustra: "Oh, Zarathustra, you stone of wisdom! You threw yourself high, but every thrown stone must fall! Condemned by yourself, and to your own stoning: oh, Zarathustra, you threw the stone far indeed—but it will rebound upon you!"
When he cried his "ecce homo" over himself, it was again too late, and the crucifixion of the soul began even before the body was dead. He who thus taught yea-saying to the instincts of life, must have his own career looked at critically, in order to discover the effects of this teaching upon the teacher. But if we consider his life from[382] this point of view, we must say that Nietzsche lived beyond instinct, in the lofty atmosphere of heroic "sublimity." This height could only be maintained by means of most careful diet, choice climate and above all by many opiates. Finally, the tension of this living shattered his brain. He spoke of yea-saying, but lived the nay. His horror of people, especially of the animal man, who lives by instinct, was too great. He could not swallow the toad of which he so often dreamt, and which he feared he must yet gulp down. The Zarathustrian lion roared all the "higher" men, who craved for life, back into the cavernous depths of the unconscious. That is why his life does not convince us of the truth of his teaching. The "higher man" should be able to sleep without chloral, and be competent to live in Naumburg or Basle despite "the fogs and shadows." He wants woman and offspring; he needs to feel he has some value and position in the herd, he longs for innumerable commonplaces, and not least for what is humdrum: it is this instinct that Nietzsche did not recognise; it is, in other words, the natural animal instinct for life.
When he cried his "ecce homo" about himself, it was already too late, and the crucifixion of the soul began even before the body died. He who taught the value of embracing life must have his own journey examined critically to understand how this teaching affected him. However, if we look at his life from this perspective, we must say that Nietzsche lived beyond instinct, in the elevated realm of heroic "sublimity." He could only maintain that height through a very careful lifestyle, a favorable environment, and especially through many opiates. Ultimately, the strain of this existence shattered his mind. He preached acceptance, but lived in denial. His fear of people, particularly instinct-driven individuals, was too intense. He couldn’t face the toad he often dreamt about and feared he would have to swallow. The Zarathustrian lion drove all the "higher" individuals, those longing for life, back into the dark depths of the subconscious. That’s why his life doesn’t convince us of the truth of his teachings. The "higher man" should be able to sleep without chloral and live in Naumburg or Basel despite "the fogs and shadows." He desires a partner and children; he needs to feel he has value and a place within the community, and he longs for countless ordinary experiences, especially for the mundane. This is the instinct that Nietzsche failed to recognize; in other words, it's the basic animal instinct for life.
But how did he live if it was not from natural impulse? Should Nietzsche really be accused of a practical denial of his natural instincts? He would hardly agree to that; indeed he might even prove, and that without difficulty, that he really was following his instincts in the highest sense. But we may well ask how is it possible that human instincts could have led him so far from humanity, into absolute isolation, into an aloofness from the herd which he supported with loathing and disgust? One would have thought that instinct would have united, would have coupled and begot, that it would tend towards pleasure and good cheer, towards gratification of all sensual desires. But we have quite overlooked the fact that this is only one of the possible directions of instinct. There exists not only the instinct for the preservation of the species (the sexual instinct), but also the instinct for the preservation of the self.
But how did he live if it wasn’t from natural impulse? Should Nietzsche really be accused of practically denying his natural instincts? He would hardly agree with that; in fact, he might even easily prove that he was truly following his instincts in the highest sense. However, we can ask how it’s possible that human instincts could have led him so far away from humanity, into absolute isolation, and into a detachment from the group that he supported with loathing and disgust? One would think that instinct would have united, paired up, and created life, that it would aim towards pleasure and happiness, towards fulfilling all sensual desires. But we’ve overlooked the fact that this is just one of the possible directions of instinct. There exists not just the instinct for the continuation of the species (the sexual instinct), but also the instinct for self-preservation.
Nietzsche obviously speaks of this latter instinct, that is of the will to power. Whatever other kinds of instinct may[383] exist are for him only a consequence of the will to power. Viewed from the standpoint of Freud's sexual-psychology this is a gross error, a misconception of biology, a bad choice made by a decadent neurotic human being. For it would be easy for any adherent of sexual psychology to prove that all that was too lofty, too heroic, in Nietzsche's conception of the world and of life, was nothing but a consequence of the repression and misconception of "instinct," that is of the instinct that this psychology considers fundamental.
Nietzsche clearly refers to this latter instinct, which is the will to power. Any other types of instincts that may exist are, for him, just a result of the will to power. From the perspective of Freud's sexual psychology, this is a serious mistake, a misunderstanding of biology, a poor choice made by a jaded, neurotic person. It would be easy for anyone who supports sexual psychology to demonstrate that everything that Nietzsche considered to be lofty or heroic about his view of the world and life is merely a result of the repression and misunderstanding of "instinct," specifically the instinct that this psychology views as fundamental.
This brings us to the question of perception, or rather it were better to say of the various lenses through which the world may be perceived. For it would hardly be permissible to pronounce a judgment on a life like Nietzsche's. It was lived with rare consistency, from the beginning to the fateful end, in accordance with his underlying natural fundamental instinct for power. It would hardly do to pronounce it to be merely figurative, otherwise we should make the same unjust condemnation that Nietzsche pronounced upon his polar opposite Richard Wagner, of whom he said, "Everything in him is false; what is genuine is hidden or disguised. He is an actor, in every bad and good meaning of the word." Why this judgment? Wagner is a precise representative of that other fundamental instinct, which Nietzsche overlooked, and upon which Freud's psychology is based. If we inquire whether the other main instinct—that of power—was unconsidered by Freud, we shall find that he has included it under the name of the "ego instinct." But these ego instincts drag out an obscure existence, according to his psychology, alongside the broad, all-too-broad, development of the sexual theme. In reality, however, human nature wages a cruel and hardly-to-be-ended warfare between the ego-principle and that of formless instinct. The ego is all barriers; instinct, on the other hand, is without any limits. Both principles are equally powerful. In a certain sense men may account themselves fortunate in being conscious of only one instinct: therefore he who is wise avoids getting to know the other. But if, after all, he does get to know the[384] other instinct, he is indeed a lost man. For then he enters upon the Faustian conflict. Goethe has shown us in the first part of "Faust" what the acceptance of instinct involves, and in the second part, what the acceptance of the ego and of his gruesome unconscious world would signify. Everything that is insignificant, petty, and cowardly in us shrinks from it, and would avoid it—and there is one admirable means of doing so. Namely, by discovering that the other thing in us is "another fellow," a live man who actually thinks, feels, does and desires all the things that are despicable and odious. In this way the bogey is seized, and the battle against him is begun to our satisfaction. Hence arise, also, those chronic idiosyncrasies of which the history of morals has preserved a few examples for us. The instance of Nietzsche contra Wagner, already cited, is particularly transparent. But ordinary human life is crammed full of such cases. It is by these ingenuous devices that man saves himself from the Faustian catastrophe for which he evidently lacks both courage and strength. But a sincere man knows that even his bitterest opponent, or any number of them, does not by any means equal his one worst adversary, that is his other self who "bides within his breast." Nietzsche unconsciously had Wagner in himself, that is why he envied him his Parsifal. But even worse, he was a Saul and also had Paul within. That is why Nietzsche became a stigmatised outcast of the Spirit; he had like Saul to experience Christification when "the other self" inspired him with his "ecce homo." Which man in him "broke down before the cross," Wagner or Nietzsche?
This brings us to the question of perception, or more accurately, the different lenses through which the world can be seen. It would be unfair to judge a life like Nietzsche’s. He lived it with remarkable consistency, from his beginning to his fateful end, in line with his deep-rooted instinct for power. To label it merely as figurative would lead to the same unjust condemnation that Nietzsche had towards his polar opposite, Richard Wagner, whom he called, "Everything in him is false; what is genuine is hidden or disguised. He is an actor, in every bad and good sense of the word." Why this judgment? Wagner is a clear representative of another fundamental instinct that Nietzsche overlooked, which Freud’s psychology is based upon. If we ask whether Freud considered the other main instinct—power—we'll find that he acknowledged it under the term "ego instinct." However, these ego instincts exist obscurely, according to his psychology, alongside the overly broad development of the sexual theme. In reality, human nature endures a cruel and seemingly endless struggle between the ego principle and formless instinct. The ego sets barriers, while instinct is limitless. Both principles are equally powerful. In a way, humans might count themselves lucky to be aware of just one instinct; thus, a wise person avoids exploring the other. But if he unwittingly does confront the[384] other instinct, he becomes a lost cause. For then he enters into the Faustian conflict. Goethe illustrates in the first part of "Faust" what embracing instinct entails, and in the second part, what acknowledging the ego and its horrifying unconscious world signifies. Everything that is insignificant, petty, and cowardly within us recoils from it and seeks to evade it—and there is a remarkable way to do so. By realizing that the other aspect of ourselves is "another person," a living human who actually thinks, feels, acts, and desires all the unpleasant and despicable things. This way, we confront the bogeyman, and the battle against him begins to our satisfaction. This also gives rise to those chronic idiosyncrasies that the history of morals has recorded for us. The example of Nietzsche versus Wagner, mentioned earlier, is especially clear. But everyday life is full of such instances. It is through these naive tactics that people save themselves from the Faustian disaster for which they apparently lack both courage and strength. However, a sincere person knows that even his fiercest opponent, or many opponents, doesn’t measure up to his most formidable adversary: his other self who "lurks within." Nietzsche unknowingly carried Wagner within himself; that’s why he envied him his Parsifal. But even worse, he had Saul and also Paul inside of him. That’s why Nietzsche became a stigmatized outcast of the Spirit; he had to experience Christification like Saul when "the other self" prompted him with his "ecce homo." Which part of him "broke down before the cross," Wagner or Nietzsche?
It was ordained by destiny that one of Freud's earliest pupils, Adler,[234] should formulate a view of neurosis as founded exclusively upon the principle of power. It is interesting and even fascinating to observe how totally different the same things appear when viewed in another light. In order to emphasise the main contrast, I would like at once to draw attention to the fact that, according to Freud, everything is a strictly causal consequence of previously-occurring[385] facts; Adler, on the contrary, sees everything as a finally conditioned arrangement. To take a simple example: A young woman begins to have attacks of terror. She wakes at night from some nightmare with a piercing cry; calming herself with difficulty, she clings to her husband, imploring him not to leave her, making him repeat again and again that he loves her, etc. Gradually a nervous asthma develops, attacks of which also come on during the day.
It was destined that one of Freud's earliest students, Adler,[234] would create a perspective on neurosis based solely on the idea of power. It's interesting and even captivating to see how completely different the same situations can look when viewed from a different angle. To highlight the key contrast, I want to point out that, according to Freud, everything is a direct causal result of earlier events; Adler, on the other hand, views everything as a final arrangement influenced by multiple factors. For instance: A young woman starts experiencing panic attacks. She wakes up at night from a nightmare with a sharp scream; struggling to calm down, she holds onto her husband, begging him not to leave her, asking him to tell her repeatedly that he loves her, and so on. Over time, she develops nervous asthma, with attacks that also occur during the day.
In such a case, the Freudian system begins at once to burrow in the inner causality of the illness: What did the initial anxiety-dreams contain. She recalls wild bulls, lions, tigers, bad men. What does the patient associate with them? She told a story of something that had happened to her when she was still single. It ran as follows: She was staying at a summer-resort in the mountains, a great deal of tennis was played, the usual acquaintances being made. There was a young Italian who played particularly well, and who also knew how to handle the guitar in the evenings. A harmless flirtation developed, leading once to a moon-light walk. On this occasion, the Italian temperament "unexpectedly" broke through, running away with the young man to the great terror of the unsuspecting girl. He "looked at her with such a look," that she could never forget it. This look follows her even in her dreams; the wild animals that persecuted her had it. As a matter of fact, does this look originally come from the Italian? Another reminiscence enlightens us. The patient had lost her father through an accident, when she was about fourteen years old. The father was a man of the world, and travelled a great deal. Not long before his death he took her to Paris, where, among other things, they visited the Follies Bergères. Something happened there that at the time made a deep impression upon her. As they were leaving the theatre, a rouged female suddenly pressed close up to her father in an impertinent way. She looked at her father in fear as to what he would do—and then she saw that look, that animal glare in his eyes. An inexplicable something clung to her day and night. From this moment her attitude to her[386] father was quite changed. At one instant she was irritable and full of venomous moods, at another she loved him extravagantly; then causeless fits of crying suddenly began, and, for a time, whenever her father was at home, she was tormented by terrible choking at table, with apparent attacks of suffocation, which were usually followed by voicelessness lasting from one to two days. When the news of her father's sudden death arrived, she was overcome by uncontrolled grief ending in hysterical laughter. But she soon calmed down, her condition improving quickly, and the neurotic symptoms disappearing almost completely. It seemed as if a veil of forgetfulness had descended over the past. Only the experience with the Italian roused something in her of which she was afraid. She had broken off completely with the young man. A few years later she married. The present neurosis only began after the birth of her second child, that is at the moment when she discovered that her husband took a certain tender interest in another woman.
In this situation, the Freudian system immediately starts digging into the underlying causes of the illness: What did the initial anxiety dreams reveal? She remembers wild bulls, lions, tigers, and bad men. What does the patient associate with them? She told a story about something that happened when she was still single. It went like this: She was at a summer resort in the mountains, where there was a lot of tennis and the usual socializing. There was a young Italian who played exceptionally well and also knew how to play the guitar in the evenings. A harmless flirtation developed, which led to a moonlit walk one time. On that occasion, the Italian temperament "unexpectedly" emerged, causing the young man to act in a way that terrified the unsuspecting girl. He "looked at her with such a gaze" that she could never forget it. This look haunts her even in her dreams; the wild animals that pursued her had that same look. In reality, does this look come from the Italian originally? Another memory sheds light on this. The patient lost her father in an accident when she was about fourteen. He was a worldly man who traveled a lot. Not long before his death, he took her to Paris, where they visited the Follies Bergères. Something happened there that made a deep impression on her. As they were leaving the theater, a heavily made-up woman suddenly pressed close to her father in a bold way. She looked at her father in fear of what he would do—and then she saw that look, that animal glare in his eyes. An unexplainable feeling latched onto her day and night. From that moment on, her relationship with her father changed completely. At times, she was irritable and filled with bitter mood swings; at other times, she loved him passionately. Then, for no reason, she started having sudden fits of crying, and for a while, whenever her father was home, she was plagued by terrible choking at the dinner table, with apparent suffocation attacks, which were usually followed by being mute for one to two days. When she heard about her father’s sudden death, she was overwhelmed by uncontrolled grief that turned into hysterical laughter. But she quickly calmed down, her condition improved rapidly, and the neurotic symptoms nearly disappeared. It was as if a fog of forgetfulness had settled over her past. Only the experience with the Italian stirred something in her that scared her. She completely cut ties with the young man. A few years later, she got married. The current neurosis only began after the birth of her second child, which was when she found out that her husband had a certain tender interest in another woman.
This history raises a number of questions. For instance, what do we know about the mother? It should be said of her that she was very nervous, and had tried many kinds of sanatoria and systems of cure. She also had symptoms of fear and nervous asthma. The relations between her and her husband had been very strained as far back as the patient could remember. The mother did not understand the father; the daughter always felt that she understood him better. She was moreover her father's declared favourite, being inwardly correspondingly cool towards her mother.
This history brings up several questions. For example, what do we know about the mother? It's important to note that she was very anxious and had tried various sanatoriums and treatment methods. She also experienced symptoms of anxiety and nervous asthma. The relationship between her and her husband had been very tense for as long as the patient could recall. The mother didn’t really understand the father; the daughter often felt she understood him better. Additionally, she was clearly her father’s favorite, while she was somewhat distant toward her mother.
These facts are indications for a survey of the meaning of the illness. Behind the present symptoms phantasies are operative, connected in the first place with the young Italian, but further clearly referring to the father, whose unhappy marriage furnished the little daughter with an early opportunity of acquiring a position that really should have been filled by her mother. Behind this conquest there lies, of course, a phantasy of being the woman who was really suited to her father. The first attack of neurosis broke out at the[387] moment when this phantasy received a violent shock, presumably similar to that the mother had once experienced (a fact that was, however, unknown to the child). The symptoms are easily comprehensible as the expression of disappointed and rejected love. The choking is based upon a sensation of tightening in the throat that is a well-known accompanying phenomenon of violent effects which we cannot quite "swallow." The metaphors of language often refer to similar physiological occurrences. When the father died, it seemed that her consciousness sorrowed deeply but her unconscious laughed, after the manner of Till Eulenspiegel, who was sad when he went downhill but was jolly when climbing laboriously, happy in anticipation of what was coming. When the father was at home the girl was low-spirited and ill, but whenever he was away she felt much better. Herein she resembles numerous husbands and wives who as yet are mutually hiding from each other the secret that they are not under all circumstances indispensable to one another.
These facts suggest a deeper exploration of the meaning of the illness. Behind the current symptoms are fantasies, primarily linked to the young Italian but also clearly connecting to the father, whose unhappy marriage provided the little girl with an early chance to take on a role that ideally should have been filled by her mother. Behind this achievement lies, of course, a fantasy of being the woman who truly suited her father. The first onset of neurosis occurred at the moment this fantasy faced a harsh blow, likely similar to what the mother had once gone through (a detail unknown to the child). The symptoms are easily understood as expressions of unfulfilled and rejected love. The choking sensation comes from a tightening in the throat, a well-known reaction to intense feelings we struggle to "swallow." Language often uses metaphors that relate to similar physiological reactions. When the father died, it seemed her conscious mind mourned deeply, while her unconscious mind laughed, reminiscent of Till Eulenspiegel, who was sad when going downhill but cheerful while laboriously climbing, happy with the anticipation of what lay ahead. When the father was at home, the girl felt down and unwell, but whenever he was away, she felt much better. In this, she mirrors many husbands and wives who are still hiding the secret from each other that they are not always essential to one another.
That the unconscious had some right to laugh was shown by the subsequent period of good health. She succeeded in letting all that had passed retire behind the trap-door. The experience with the Italian, however, threatened to bring the netherworld up again. But she quickly pulled the handle and shut the door. She remained quite well until the dragon of neurosis came creeping in, just when she imagined herself to be already safely out of her troubles, in the so-to-say perfected state of wife and mother. Sexual psychology finds the cause of the neurosis in the fact that the patient is not at bottom free from the father. This forces her to resuscitate her former experience at the moment when she discovered in the Italian the very same disturbing something that had formerly made such a deep impression upon her when perceived in her father. These recollections were naturally revived by the analogous experience with another man, and formed the starting-point of the neurosis. It might therefore be said that the content and cause of the neurosis lay in the conflict between the phantastic infantile-erotic[388] relation to the father on the one hand, and her love for the husband on the other.
That the unconscious had some reason to laugh was evident in the following period of good health. She managed to push everything that had happened behind the trap-door. However, the experience with the Italian threatened to bring everything up again. But she quickly pulled the handle and shut the door. She stayed well until the dragon of neurosis crept in, just when she thought she had successfully overcome her troubles, in what could be called the perfected state of being a wife and mother. Sexual psychology suggests that the cause of the neurosis lies in the fact that the patient isn't truly free from the father. This forces her to relive her past experiences at the moment she recognized in the Italian the same disturbing quality that had previously made a strong impression on her when she saw it in her father. These memories were naturally triggered by a similar experience with another man, which became the starting point of the neurosis. It could be said that the content and cause of the neurosis lay in the conflict between the fantasy of an infantile-erotic relationship with the father on one hand and her love for her husband on the other.
But if we now consider the course of the same illness from the standpoint of the other instinct, that is, of the will to power, a different complexion is put upon the matter. Her parents' unhappy marriage afforded an excellent opportunity for the exhibition of childish instinct for power. The instinct for power desires that, under all circumstances, the ego should be "on top," whether by straight or crooked means. At all costs the integrity of the personality must be preserved.
But if we now look at the development of the same illness from the perspective of the other instinct, specifically the will to power, the situation takes on a different appearance. Her parents' troubled marriage provided a great opportunity to show the child’s instinct for power. The instinct for power wants, in every situation, for the self to be "on top," whether through honest or dishonest means. Above all, the integrity of the personality must be maintained.
Every attempt, even what appears to be an attempt of the surroundings, to bring about the slightest subjection of the individual, is retorted to by the "masculine protest," as Adler expresses it. The mother's disappointment and her taking refuge in a neurosis brought about an opportunity for the development of power and the attainment of a dominating position. Love and excellence of conduct are, as everybody knows, extremely well-adapted weapons for the purposes of the instinct for power. Virtue is not seldom made the means of forcing recognition from others. Already as a child she knew how to obtain a privileged position with her father by means of specially pleasing and amiable behaviour, even occasionally to supplant her mother. This was not out of love for her father, although love was a good means of obtaining the coveted superiority. The hysterical laughter at the death of her father is a striking proof of this fact. One is inclined to consider such an explanation as a deplorable depreciation of love, if not actually a malicious insinuation. But let us pause a moment, reflect, and look at the world as it really is. Have we never seen those innumerable people who love, and believe in their love, only until its purpose is achieved, and who then turn away as if they had never loved? And, after all, does not Nature herself do the same? In fact, is a "purposeless" love possible? If so, it belongs to the highest human virtues, which confessedly are extremely rare. Perhaps there is a general disposition to reflect as little as possible about the nature and purpose of[389] love; discoveries might be made which would show the value of one's own love to be less considerable than we had supposed. However, it were dangerous to life to subtract anything from the value of fundamental instincts, perhaps specially so to-day, when we seem to have only a minimum of values left.
Every attempt, even those that seem to come from the environment, to impose any kind of subjugation on the individual is met with what Adler calls the "masculine protest." The mother’s disappointment and her retreat into a neurosis created a chance for the development of power and the achievement of a dominant position. Love and good behavior are, as everyone knows, very effective tools for the drive for power. Virtue is often used as a way to force recognition from others. Even as a child, she knew how to secure a special status with her father through particularly charming and friendly behavior, sometimes even at the expense of her mother. This wasn’t out of love for her father, although love was a useful means to gain the desired superiority. Her hysterical laughter at her father's death serves as a striking indicator of this. One might be tempted to view such an explanation as a sad undermining of love, if not outright malicious. But let's take a moment to pause, reflect, and see the world as it truly is. Haven’t we all witnessed countless people who love and believe in their love until their aim is achieved, only to turn away as if they had never loved? And doesn’t Nature itself do the same? In fact, is "purposeless" love even possible? If it is, it belongs to the highest human virtues, which are notoriously rare. Perhaps there is a general tendency to think as little as possible about the nature and purpose of [389] love; realizations might arise that could diminish the perceived value of one’s own love. However, it would be dangerous to diminish the value of fundamental instincts, especially today, when it seems we have so few values left.
So the patient had an attack of hysterical laughter at the death of her father; she had finally arrived at the top. It was hysterical laughter, therefore a psychogenic symptom, that is, something proceeding from unconscious motives and not from those of the conscious ego. That is a difference that should not be underrated, for it enables us to recognise whence and how human virtues arise. Their contraries led to hell, that is, in modern terms, to the unconscious, where the counterparts of our conscious virtue have long been gathering. That is why our very virtue makes us desire to know nothing of the unconscious; indeed, it is even the summit of virtuous wisdom to maintain that there is no unconscious at all. But unfortunately we are all in a like predicament with Brother Medardus in E. T. A. Hoffman's "The Elixir of the Devil": somewhere or other there exists a sinister, terrible brother, our own incarnate counterpart bound to us by flesh and blood, who comprehends everything, maliciously hoarding whatever we most desire should disappear beneath the table.
So the patient experienced an episode of hysterical laughter at her father's death; she had finally reached her breaking point. It was hysterical laughter, which is a psychogenic symptom, meaning it comes from unconscious motives rather than from the conscious self. This distinction is important because it helps us understand where and how human virtues originate. Their opposites lead to a darker place, or, in modern terms, to the unconscious, where the opposite of our conscious virtues have long been accumulating. That's why our very virtue makes us want to ignore the unconscious; in fact, it is the pinnacle of virtuous wisdom to argue that there is no unconscious at all. But unfortunately, we are all caught in a similar situation as Brother Medardus in E. T. A. Hoffmann's "The Elixir of the Devil": somewhere out there exists a sinister, terrifying counterpart, our own embodied shadow tied to us by flesh and blood, who understands everything and maliciously keeps everything we most want hidden away.
The first outbreak of neurosis occurred in our patient at the moment when she became aware of the fact that there was something in her father which she did not control. And then it dawned upon her of what use her mother's neurosis was. When one meets with an obstacle that cannot be overcome by sensible and charming means, there yet exists an arrangement hitherto unknown to her which her mother had been beforehand in discovering, and that is neurosis. That is the reason why she now imitates her mother. But, the astonished reader asks, what is supposed to be the use of neurosis? What does it effect? Whoever has had a pronounced case of neurosis in his immediate environment, knows all that can be "effected" by a neurosis. In fact, there is altogether no better means of tyrannising over a[390] whole household than by a striking neurosis. Heart attacks, choking fits, convulsions of all kinds achieve enormous effects, that can hardly be surpassed. Picture the fountains of pity let loose, the sublime anxiety of the dear kind parents, the hurried running to and fro of the servants, the incessant sounding of the call to the telephone, the hasty arrival of the physicians, the delicacy of the diagnosis, the detailed examinations, the lengthy courses of treatment, the considerable expense; and there, in the midst of all the uproar, lies the innocent sufferer, to whom the household is even overflowingly grateful, when he has recovered from the "spasms."
The first signs of neurosis appeared in our patient when she realized that there was something about her father that she couldn’t control. It then hit her how her mother’s neurosis was useful. When faced with a challenge that can't be tackled with rational and charming methods, there is, however, a strategy she didn’t know about until now—one her mother had already discovered—and that’s neurosis. That's why she's now copying her mother. But the surprised reader might wonder, what's the point of neurosis? What does it accomplish? Anyone who has dealt with a serious case of neurosis nearby knows exactly what can be "accomplished" by it. In fact, there’s no better way to dominate an entire household than through a dramatic neurosis. Heart attacks, choking episodes, and various convulsions create huge effects that are hard to surpass. Imagine the flood of pity unleashed, the intense anxiety of the concerned parents, the frantic running around by the staff, the constant ringing of the phone, the swift arrival of doctors, the careful diagnosis, the thorough examinations, the lengthy treatments, and the high costs; and in the middle of all this chaos lies the innocent sufferer, who the household is almost overflowing with gratitude toward once they recover from the "spasms."
The girl discovered this incomparable "arrangement" (to use Adler's term), applying it on occasion when the father was there with success. It became unnecessary when the father died, for now she was finally uppermost. The Italian was soon dismissed, because he laid too much stress upon her femininity by an inopportune reminder of his manliness. When the way opened to the possibility of a suitable marriage, she loved, adapting herself without any complaint to the deplorable rôle of the queen bee. As long as she held the position of admired superiority, everything went splendidly. But when her husband evinced a small outside interest, she was obliged again to have recourse to the extremely efficacious "arrangement," that is, to the indirect application of power, because she had once again come upon that thing—this time in her husband—that had already previously withdrawn her father from her influence.
The girl discovered this unique "arrangement" (as Adler called it), using it successfully at times when her father was present. It became unnecessary after her father passed away, as she was finally on top. She soon let go of the Italian because he emphasized her femininity with an untimely reminder of his masculinity. When the chance for a suitable marriage arose, she fell in love, adapting without complaint to the unfortunate role of the queen bee. As long as she maintained her admired superiority, everything went great. But when her husband showed a slight interest outside of their marriage, she had to resort once again to the very effective "arrangement," meaning the indirect use of power, because she encountered once more that thing—this time in her husband—that had previously pulled her father away from her influence.
That is how the matter appears from the standpoint of the psychology of power. I fear that the reader will feel as did the Kadi, before whom the counsel of one party spoke first. When he had ended, the Kadi said: "Thou hast spoken well. I perceive that thou art right." Then spoke the counsel for the other party, and when he had ended, the Kadi scratched himself behind his ear and said: "Thou hast spoken well. I perceive that thou also art right." There is no doubt that the instinct for power plays a most extraordinary part. It is true that the complexes of neurotic[391] symptoms are also exquisite "arrangements," that inexorably realise their aims with incredible obstinacy and unequalled cunning. The neurosis is final; that is, it is directed towards an aim. Adler merits considerable distinction for having demonstrated this.
That’s how the situation looks from the perspective of the psychology of power. I worry that the reader will feel like the Kadi did when he heard one side’s argument first. When they finished, the Kadi said, "You made a good point. I can see you’re right." Then the other side presented their argument, and once they were done, the Kadi scratched his ear and said, "You made a good point too. I see you’re right as well." There's no doubt that the desire for power plays a fascinating role. It's true that the complexes of neurotic symptoms are also effective "strategies" that relentlessly pursue their goals with remarkable stubbornness and unmatched cunning. The neurosis is definitive; it’s directed towards a specific aim. Adler deserves significant credit for demonstrating this.
Which of the two points of view is right? That is a question that might well cause much brain-racking. For the two explanations cannot be simply combined, being absolutely contradictory. In one case, it is love and its course that is the principal and decisive fact; and in the other case, it is the power of the ego. In the first case the ego is merely a kind of appendage to the passion for love; and in the second love is upon occasion merely a means to the end, that of gaining the upper hand. Whoever has the power of the ego most at heart rebels against the former conception, whilst he who cares most about love, will never be able to be reconciled to the latter.
Which of the two perspectives is correct? That's a question that could lead to a lot of deep thinking. The two explanations can't just be combined because they completely contradict each other. In one scenario, love and its journey are the main and deciding factors; in the other, it's the power of the ego. In the first scenario, the ego is just an extension of the passion for love; in the second, love is sometimes just a means to an end, which is to gain control. Those who prioritize the power of the ego often oppose the first view, while those who value love will never fully accept the second.
IV.—The Two Types of Psychology.
IV.—The Two Types of Psychology.
It is at this point that our most recent researches may suitably be introduced. We have found, in the first place, that there are two types of human psychology.[235] In the one type the fundamental function is feeling, and in the other it is thought. The one feels his way into the object, the other thinks about it. The one adapts himself to his surroundings by feeling, thinking coming later; whilst the other adapts himself by means of thought, preceded by understanding. The one who feels his way transfers himself to some extent to the object; whilst the other withdraws himself from the object to some extent, or pauses before it and reflects about it. The first we called the extroverted type, because in the main he goes outside himself to the object, the latter is called the introverted type, because in a major degree he turns away from the object, withdrawing into himself and thinking about it.
It’s at this point that we can introduce our latest research. We’ve found, first of all, that there are two types of human psychology.[235] In one type, the main function is feeling, and in the other, it’s thought. One type navigates the world through feelings, while the other thinks about it. The feeling type adapts to their surroundings using feelings first, with thinking coming later; whereas the thinking type adapts through thought, starting with understanding. The person who feels tends to immerse themselves in the object, while the thinker tends to pull back, pausing to reflect. We referred to the first type as the extroverted type, because they primarily move outward toward the object, and we called the second type the introverted type, since they mainly turn inward, withdrawing into themselves and reflecting on it.
These remarks only give the broadest outline of the two[392] types. But even this quite inadequate sketch enables us to recognise that the two theories are the outcome of the contrast between the two types. The sexual theory is promulgated from the standpoint of feeling, the power theory from that of thought; for the extrovert always places the accent upon the feelings that are connected with the object, whereas the introvert always puts the accent upon the ego, and is as much detached by thought from the object as possible.
These comments only provide the broadest outline of the two[392] types. But even this somewhat inadequate overview allows us to see that the two theories arise from the contrast between these two types. The sexual theory is presented from a feeling perspective, while the power theory takes a more intellectual approach; the extrovert always focuses on the feelings related to the object, whereas the introvert emphasizes the self and distances their thoughts from the object as much as possible.
The irreconcilable contradictions of the two theories are now to be understood, because both theories are the product of a one-sided psychology. We find an instance of the contrast of types in Nietzsche and Wagner. The dissension between the two is due to the contrast in their ideas of psychological values. What is most prized by the one is "affectation" for the other, and is deemed false to the very core. Each depreciates the other.
The conflicting contradictions of the two theories can now be understood, as both theories stem from a biased psychology. We see an example of the contrast in types with Nietzsche and Wagner. The disagreement between the two arises from their differing ideas about psychological values. What one values highly is seen as "affectation" by the other and is considered fundamentally false. Each one looks down on the other.
If we apply the sexual theory to an extrovert it tallies with the facts of the case; but if we apply it to an introvert, we simply maltreat and do violence to his psychology. The same applies to the contrary case. The relative rightness of the two hostile theories is explained by the fact that each one draws its material from cases that prove the correctness of the theory. There is a remnant of persons whom neither theory fits—has not every rule its exceptions?
If we apply the sexual theory to an extrovert, it matches the facts; but if we apply it to an introvert, we just misrepresent and disrespect their psychology. The same goes for the opposite case. The relative validity of the two opposing theories is explained by the fact that each one uses examples that confirm its own correctness. There are still some people who don’t fit into either theory—doesn't every rule have its exceptions?
Criticism of both theories is indispensable. Recognition of facts showed the necessity of overcoming their contrast, and of evolving a theory that should do justice not only to one or the other type, but equally to both.
Criticism of both theories is essential. Acknowledgment of the facts highlighted the need to move past their differences and develop a theory that fairly represents not just one type, but both equally.
Even the layman will to some extent have been struck by the fact that in spite of their correctness both theories really have a very unpleasant character and one not altogether pertinent under all circumstances to the strict views of science. The sexual theory is unæsthetic and unsatisfying intellectually. The power theory, on the other hand, is decidedly venomous. Both inevitably reduce high-flown ideals, heroic attitudes, pathos, and deep convictions, in a painful manner to a reality which is hackneyed and trite; that is, if these theories are applied to such things—but[393] they should certainly not be so applied. Both theories are really only therapeutic instruments out of the tool-chest of the physician, whose sharp and merciless knife cuts out all that is pernicious and diseased. It was just such a misapplication of theory Nietzsche tried with his destructive criticism of ideals. He regarded ideals as rampant diseases of the soul of humanity; as indeed they really are. However, in the hands of a good physician who really knows the human soul, who, as Nietzsche says, "has a finger for the slightest shade," who applies the treatment only to what is really diseased in a soul—in such hands both theories prove wholesome caustics. The application must be adapted to the individual case. It is a dangerous therapy in the hands of those who do not understand how to deal out the treatment. These applications of criticism do good when there is something that should and must be destroyed, dissolved or brought low, but can easily damage what is being built up, or growing in response to life's requirements.
Even someone who isn’t a specialist may have noticed that, despite their accuracy, both theories have a pretty unpleasant vibe and aren't entirely suitable under all circumstances according to strict scientific views. The sexual theory lacks aesthetic appeal and is intellectually dissatisfying. The power theory, on the other hand, is definitely toxic. Both reduce lofty ideals, heroic attitudes, emotional depth, and strong convictions in a painful way to a reality that feels cliché and worn out—if you apply these theories to those concepts, they shouldn’t really be applied that way. Both theories are actually just therapeutic tools from a doctor's kit, where a sharp and ruthless knife removes everything that is harmful and diseased. It was this kind of misuse of theory that Nietzsche criticized destructively regarding ideals. He saw ideals as rampant diseases of humanity’s soul, which they truly are. However, in the hands of a skilled physician who truly understands the human soul, who, as Nietzsche puts it, "can sense the slightest nuance," and applies treatment only to what is genuinely sick within a soul, both theories become helpful remedies. The treatment must be tailored to each individual case. It’s a risky therapy when handled by those who don’t know how to apply it effectively. These critical approaches can be beneficial when there’s something harmful that needs to be eradicated, dissolved, or diminished, but they can easily harm what is being cultivated and growing in response to life’s challenges.
Both theories might, therefore, be allowed to pass without attack, in so far as they, like medicinal poisons, are entrusted to the safe hands of the physician. But fate has ordained that they should not remain solely in the care of those who are qualified to use them. First of all they naturally became known to the medical public. Every practising physician has an indefinitely high percentage of neurotics among his patients; he is therefore more or less obliged to look out for new and suitable systems of treatment. He ultimately lights upon the difficult method of psychoanalysis. He is at first not competent for this, for how should he have learnt about the secrets of the human soul? Certainly not through his academic studies. The smattering of psychiatry that he acquired for his examination barely suffices to enable him to recognise the symptoms of the commonest mental disturbances, and is far from giving him any sufficient insight into the human soul. He is, therefore, practically quite unprepared to apply the analytic method. An unusually far-reaching knowledge of the soul is indeed necessary in order to be able to apply this caustic treatment with advantage.[394] One must be in a position to differentiate elements that are diseased and should be discarded, from those which are valuable and should be retained. This is plainly a matter of great difficulty. Any one who wishes to get a vivid impression of the way in which a psychologysing physician may unwarrantably violate a patient through an ignoble pseudo-scientific prejudice, should read what Moebius has written about Nietzsche. Or he may study various psychiatric writings about the "case of Christ," and will surely not hesitate to lament the lot of the patient whose fate it is to meet with such "understanding." Psychoanalysis—greatly to the regret of the medical man who, however, had not accepted it—then passed over into the hands of the teaching profession. This is right: for it is really, when rightly understood and handled, an educational method, and one of the social sciences. I would, however, never personally recommend that Freud's purely sexual analysis should be exclusively applied as an educational method. It might do much harm because of its one-sidedness. In order to make psychoanalysis available for educational purposes, all the metamorphoses that have been the work of the last few years were needed. The method had to be expanded from a general psychological point of view.
Both theories can be allowed to exist without criticism, as they are, like medicinal poisons, placed in the skilled hands of the doctor. However, fate has dictated that they should not be kept solely by those who are qualified to use them. Naturally, they first became known to the medical community. Every practicing physician has a high percentage of neurotics among their patients, so they are somewhat obligated to seek out new and effective treatment methods. Eventually, they come across the complex technique of psychoanalysis. Initially, they aren’t qualified to use it; after all, how could they have learned about the secrets of the human mind? Certainly not through their academic studies. The basic knowledge of psychiatry they picked up for their exams is barely enough to recognize the symptoms of common mental disorders and certainly doesn't provide a deep understanding of the human psyche. Consequently, they are largely unprepared to use the analytic method. A profound understanding of the mind is indeed necessary to apply this intensive treatment effectively. One must be able to distinguish between harmful elements that should be discarded and valuable ones that should be preserved. This is clearly a challenging task. Anyone who wants to grasp how a psychologist might unjustly harm a patient through despicable pseudo-scientific bias should read what Moebius wrote about Nietzsche. Or they could explore various psychiatric texts on the "case of Christ" and would surely feel sorry for the patient whose fate is to encounter such "understanding." Psychoanalysis—much to the dismay of doctors who didn't embrace it—then shifted to the hands of educators. This is appropriate, as it is really, when properly understood and applied, an educational technique and a part of the social sciences. However, I would never personally endorse applying Freud's purely sexual analysis as the sole educational method, as it could cause significant harm due to its one-sidedness. To make psychoanalysis useful for educational purposes, all the changes that have taken place in recent years were necessary. The method had to be broadened from a general psychological perspective.[394]
But the two theories of which I have spoken are not general theories. They are, as I have said, caustics to be applied, so to say, "locally," for they are both destructive and reductive. They explain to the patient that his symptoms come from here or there, and are "nothing but" this or that. It would be very unjust to wish to maintain that this reductive theory is wrong in a given case, but when exalted into a general explanation of the nature of the soul—whether sick or healthy—a reductive theory becomes impossible. For the human soul, whether it be sick or healthy, cannot be merely reductively explained. Sexuality it is true is always and everywhere present; the instinct for power certainly does penetrate the heights and the depths of the soul; but the soul itself is not solely either the one or the other, or even both together, it is also that which it has made and will[395] make out of them both. A person is only half understood when one knows how everything in him came about. Only a dead man can be explained in terms of the past, a living one must be otherwise explained. Life is not made up of yesterdays only, nor is it understood nor explained by reducing to-day to yesterday. Life has also a to-morrow, and to-day is only understood if we are able to add the indications of to-morrow to our knowledge of what was yesterday. This holds good for all expressions of psychological life, even for symptoms of disease. Symptoms of neurosis are not merely consequences of causes that once have been, whether they were "infantile sexuality" or "infantile instinct for power." They are endeavours towards a new synthesis of life. It must immediately be added, however, they are endeavours that have miscarried. None the less they are attempts; they represent the germinal striving which has both meaning and value. They are embryos that failed to achieve life, owing to unpropitious conditions of an internal and external nature.
But the two theories I mentioned aren't broad theories. They are, as I said, tools to be applied "locally," because they are both destructive and reductive. They inform the patient that their symptoms stem from this or that cause, and are "nothing but" this or that. It would be very unfair to argue that this reductive theory is wrong in a specific case, but when it's elevated to a general explanation of the nature of the soul—whether sick or healthy—a reductive theory becomes impossible. The human soul, whether sick or healthy, cannot be merely explained in reductive terms. Sexuality is indeed always and everywhere present; the instinct for power does penetrate the heights and depths of the soul; but the soul itself is not just one, the other, or even both combined; it is also what it has created and will[395]create from them both. A person is only partially understood when we know how everything within them came to be. Only a dead person can be explained solely in terms of the past; a living person requires a different explanation. Life isn't just made up of yesterdays, nor can it be understood or explained by reducing today to yesterday. Life also includes a tomorrow, and today is only understood if we can add the insights of tomorrow to our understanding of what was yesterday. This applies to all expressions of psychological life, including disease symptoms. Symptoms of neurosis are not merely the result of past causes, whether they be "infantile sexuality" or "infantile instinct for power." They are efforts towards a new synthesis of life. It must be added, however, that these are efforts that have failed. Still, they are attempts; they represent a fundamental striving that has both meaning and value. They are embryos that didn't achieve life because of unfavorable internal and external conditions.
The reader will now probably propound the question: What possible value and meaning can a neurosis have? Is it not a most useless and repulsive pest of humanity? Can being nervous do anybody good? Possibly, in a way similar to that of flies and other vermin, which were created by God in order that man might exercise the useful virtue of patience. Stupid as this thought is from the standpoint of natural science, it might be quite shrewd from that of psychology; that is, if we substitute "nervous symptoms" in the place of "vermin." Even Nietzsche, who had an uncommon disdain for anything stupid and trite in thought, more than once acknowledged how much he owed to his illness. I have known more than one person who attributed all his usefulness, and the justification for his existence even, to a neurosis, that hindered all decisive stupidities of his life, compelling him to lead an existence which developed what was valuable in him; material that would have been crushed had not the neurosis with its iron grip forced the man to keep to the place where he really belonged. There are[396] people the meaning of whose life—whose real significance—lies in the unconscious; in consciousness lies only all that is vain and delusive. With others the reverse is the case, and for them the neurosis has another significance. An extended reduction is appropriate to the one, but emphatically unsuitable to the other.
The reader might now ask the question: What value and meaning could a neurosis possibly have? Isn't it just a useless and repulsive nuisance for humanity? Can being anxious do anyone any good? Possibly, similar to how flies and other pests exist, which were created by God so that people could practice the useful virtue of patience. While this idea seems foolish from a natural science perspective, it could be quite insightful from a psychological angle; that is, if we replace "vermin" with "nervous symptoms." Even Nietzsche, who had a strong disdain for anything foolish and clichéd in thought, acknowledged more than once how much his illness contributed to his life. I have known several people who attributed all their usefulness—and even the justification for their existence—to a neurosis that prevented them from making all the major foolish mistakes in their lives, compelling them to live in a way that brought out their valuable qualities; qualities that would have been crushed if the neurosis hadn't forced them to stay where they truly belonged. There are[396] people whose life's meaning—whose real significance—is rooted in the unconscious; in their consciousness lies only that which is empty and misleading. For others, the situation is reversed, and for them, a neurosis holds a different significance. An extensive reduction may be suitable for one group, but it is clearly inappropriate for the other.
The reader will now, indeed, be inclined to agree to the possibility of certain cases of neurosis having such a significance but will nevertheless be ready to deny an expediency that is so far-reaching and full of meaning to ordinary cases of this illness. What value, for instance, might there be in the afore-mentioned case of asthma and hysterical attacks of fear? I confess that the value here is not so obvious, especially if the case be looked at from the standpoint of a reductive theory, that is, from that of a chronique scandaleuse of the psychological development of an individual.
The reader will likely agree that some cases of neurosis can hold significant meaning but might still be hesitant to accept such a far-reaching and meaningful application to typical instances of this illness. For example, what value could be found in the previously mentioned case of asthma and hysterical panic attacks? I admit that the value isn't so clear, especially when viewed through a reductive lens, that is, from the perspective of a chronique scandaleuse of an individual's psychological development.
We perceive that both the theories hitherto discussed have this one point in common, viz. they relentlessly disclose everything that is valueless in people. They are theories, or rather hypotheses, which explain wherein the cause of the sickness lies. They are accordingly concerned not with the values of a person, but with his lack of value that makes itself evident in a disturbing way. From this point of view, it is possible to be reconciled to both standpoints.
We see that both theories we've discussed so far share a common point: they consistently reveal everything that is worthless in people. They are theories, or more accurately, hypotheses, that explain where the root of the problem lies. As such, they focus not on a person's values, but on their lack of value that becomes painfully obvious. From this perspective, it's possible to find common ground between both viewpoints.
A "value" is a possibility by means of which energy may attain development. But in so far as a negative value is also a possibility through which energy may attain development—as may, for instance, be clearly seen in the very considerable manifestations of energy shown in neurosis—it also stands for a value, albeit it brings about manifestations of energy which are useless and harmful. In itself energy is neither useful nor harmful, neither full of value nor lacking in it; it is indifferent, everything depending upon the form into which it enters. The form gives the quality to the energy. On the other side, mere form without energy is also indifferent. Therefore in order to bring about a positive value, on the one hand energy is necessary, and upon the other a valuable[397] form. In a neurosis psychic energy is undoubtedly present, but in an inferior and not realisable form. Both the analytic methods that have been discussed above are of service only as solvents of this inferior form. They prove themselves good here as caustics.
A "value" is a possibility through which energy can develop. However, since a negative value is also a possibility for energy to develop—as can be clearly seen in the significant expressions of energy observed in neurosis—it represents a value, even if it leads to manifestations of energy that are pointless and harmful. Energy itself is neither useful nor harmful, nor is it inherently valuable or worthless; it is neutral, with everything depending on the form it takes. The form gives energy its quality. Likewise, mere form without energy is also neutral. Therefore, to create a positive value, energy is necessary on one side, and a valuable[397] form on the other. In neurosis, psychic energy is certainly present but in an inferior and unrealizable form. Both of the analytic methods discussed above serve only to dissolve this inferior form. They prove effective here as caustics.
By these methods we gain energy that is certainly free, but which, being as yet unapplied, is indifferent. Hitherto the supposition prevailed, that this newly acquired energy was at the patient's conscious disposal, that he might apply it in any way he liked. In so far as it was thought that the energy was nothing but the sexual impulse, people spoke of a sublimated application of the same, under the presumption that the patient could, without further ado, transfer what was thought of as sexual energy into a "sublimation"; that is, into a non-sexual form of use. It might, for instance, be transferred to the cultivation of an art, or to some other good or useful activity. According to this concept, the patient had the possibility of deciding, either arbitrarily or from inclination, how his energy should be sublimated.
By these methods, we gain energy that is definitely free, but since it's not yet in use, it's indifferent. Until now, the belief was that this newly acquired energy was at the patient's conscious disposal and that they could apply it however they wanted. It was thought that this energy was just the sexual impulse, and people talked about its sublimated use, assuming that the patient could easily convert what was seen as sexual energy into a "sublimation"; that is, into a non-sexual way of using it. For example, it could be directed toward developing an art or some other positive or useful activity. According to this idea, the patient had the option to decide, either randomly or based on their interests, how their energy should be sublimated.
This conception may be accorded a justification for its existence, in so far as it is at all possible for a human being to assign a definite direction to his life, in which its course should run. But we know that there is no human forethought nor philosophy which can enable us to give our lives a prescribed direction, except for quite a short distance. Destiny lies before us, perplexing us, and teeming with possibilities, and yet only one of these many possibilities is our own particular right way. Who should presume to designate the one possibility beforehand, even though he have the most complete knowledge of his own character that a man can have? Much can certainly be attained by means of will-power. But having regard to the fate of certain personalities with particularly strong wills, it is entirely misleading for us to want at all costs to change our own fate by power of will. Our will is a function that is directed by our powers of reflection; it depends, therefore, upon how our powers of reflection are constituted. In order to deserve its name reflection must be rational, that is, according to[398] reason. But has it ever been proved, or can it ever be proved, that life and destiny harmonise with our human reason, that is, that they are exclusively rational? On the contrary, we have ground for supposing that they are also irrational, that is to say, that in the last resort they too are based in regions beyond the human reason. The irrationality of the great process is shown by its so-called accidentalness, which perforce we ought to deny, since, obviously, we cannot think of a process not being causally and necessarily conditioned. But actually, accidentality exists everywhere, and does so indeed so obtrusively that we might as well pocket our causal philosophy! The rich store of life both is, and is not, determined by law; it is at the same time rational and irrational. Therefore, the reason and the will founded upon it are only valid for a short distance. The further we extend this rationally chosen direction, the surer we may be that we are thereby excluding the irrational possibilities of life, which have, however, just as good a right to be lived. Aye, we even injure ourselves, since we cut off the wealth of accidental eventualities by a too rigid and conscious direction. It was certainly very expedient for man to be able to give his life a direction; it would, therefore, be quite right to maintain that the attainment of reasonableness was the greatest achievement of mankind. But that is not to say that under all circumstances, this must or will always continue to be the case. The present fearful catastrophic world-war has tremendously upset the most optimistic upholder of rationalism and culture.
This idea can be justified in that it’s possible for a person to choose a clear path for their life. However, we know there’s no human foresight or philosophy that can truly provide a set direction for our lives beyond a short distance. Our destiny lies ahead, confusing us and filled with possibilities, yet only one of those possibilities is our unique path. Who can confidently choose that one possibility ahead of time, even if they have a deep understanding of their own character? A lot can definitely be achieved through willpower. But considering the fates of some people with particularly strong wills, it’s misleading to think we can change our fate solely through will. Our will is influenced by our reflective abilities; thus, it depends on how those abilities are shaped. To earn the name “reflection,” it must be rational, meaning it should align with reason. But has it ever been proven, or can it ever be proven, that life and destiny align with human reason, meaning that they are entirely rational? On the contrary, we have reason to believe they are also irrational, suggesting that, in the end, they stem from realms beyond human understanding. The irrationality of the larger process is evident in its so-called randomness, which we reluctantly acknowledge, since we can’t conceive of a process that isn’t causally and necessarily conditioned. Yet, randomness is present everywhere, so strongly that we might as well discard our causal philosophy! The vastness of life is both determined by laws and free from them; it is both rational and irrational. Therefore, the reasoning and will built on it are only valid for a short span. The further we stretch this rationally chosen path, the more we can be sure we’re shutting out the irrational possibilities of life, which equally deserve to be explored. Indeed, we harm ourselves when we restrict the potential of random occurrences through a too rigid and intentional direction. It was undoubtedly beneficial for humanity to be able to direct their lives; thus, it’s fair to say that achieving rationality has been humanity’s greatest accomplishment. But that doesn’t mean this will always be the case. The current terrifying global war has drastically shaken even the most optimistic proponents of rationalism and culture.
In 1913 Ostwald wrote[236] as follows: "The whole world agrees that the present state of armed peace is untenable, and is gradually becoming an impossible condition. It demands tremendous sacrifices from individual nations far surpassing the outlay for cultural purposes, without any positive values being gained thereby. Therefore, if mankind could discover ways and means of putting an end to these preparations for a war that will never come, this conscripting of a considerable part of the nation at the best and most[399] capable age for training for war purposes, if it could overcome all the innumerable other injuries caused by the present customs, such an enormous saving of energy would be effected, that an undreamt-of development of the evolution of culture might be expected. For like a hand-to-hand fight, war is the oldest, and also the most unsuitable of all possible means of solving a conflict between wills, being indeed accompanied by the most deplorable waste of energy. The complete setting aside of potential as well as of actual warfare is, therefore, absolutely one of the most important tasks of culture in our time, a real necessity from the point of view of energy."
In 1913, Ostwald wrote[236] as follows: "Everyone agrees that the current state of armed peace is unsustainable and is slowly becoming unmanageable. It demands huge sacrifices from individual nations, far exceeding the investment in cultural initiatives, without any real benefits in return. Therefore, if humanity could find ways to end these preparations for a war that will never come, this conscription of a significant portion of the population at the prime and most capable age for military training—if we could overcome all the countless other harms caused by the present customs—such a massive saving of energy would be achieved that we could expect an unprecedented advancement in cultural evolution. Just like a physical fight, war is the oldest and least effective means of resolving conflicts, resulting in tremendous energy waste. Completely eliminating both potential and actual warfare is, therefore, one of the most crucial tasks of culture in our time, a true necessity from the perspective of energy."
But the irrationality of destiny ordained otherwise than the rationality of the well-meaning thinker; since it not only determined to use the piled-up weapons and soldiers, but much more than that, it brought about a tremendous insane devastation and unparalleled slaughter. From this catastrophe humanity may possibly draw the conclusion, that only one side of fate can be mastered by rational intention.
But the unpredictability of fate decided things differently than what a good-intentioned thinker would rationally expect; it not only chose to use the amassed weapons and soldiers, but even more so, it caused a tremendous amount of senseless destruction and unmatched killing. From this disaster, humanity might conclude that only one aspect of fate can be controlled by rational intent.
What can be said of mankind in general applies also to individuals, for mankind as a whole consists of nothing but individuals. And whatever the psychology of mankind is, that is also the psychology of the individual. We are experiencing in the world-war a fearful balancing-up with the rational intentionality of organised culture. What is called "will" in the individual, is termed "imperialism" among nations, for the will is a demonstration of power over fate, that is, exclusion of what is accidental. The organisation of culture is a rational and "expedient" sublimation of free and indifferent energies, brought about by design and intention. The same is the case in the individual. And just as the hope of a universal international organisation of culture has experienced a cruel right-about through this war, so also must the individual, in the course of his life, often find that so-called "disposable" energies do not suffer themselves to be disposed of.
What can be said about humanity in general also applies to individuals because humanity as a whole is made up of individuals. Whatever the psychology of humanity is reflects the psychology of each person. The world war is showing us a frightening reckoning with the rational purpose of organized culture. What we call "will" in an individual is referred to as "imperialism" among nations, because will is a show of power over fate, meaning the exclusion of random events. The organization of culture is a rational and "practical" channeling of free and indifferent energies, created with design and intention. The same applies to individuals. Just as the hope for a universal international organization of culture has faced a harsh turnaround because of this war, individuals throughout their lives often find that so-called "disposable" energies can't be easily discarded.
I was once consulted by a business man of about forty-five, whose case is a good illustration of the foregoing. He was a typical American self-made man, who had worked[400] himself up from the bottom. He had been successful, and had founded a very extensive business. He had also gradually organised the business in such a way that he could now retire from its management. He had indeed resigned two years before I saw him. Until then he had only lived for his business, concentrating all his energy upon it, with that incredible intensity and one-sidedness that is so peculiar to the successful American man of business. He had bought himself a splendid country seat, where he thought he would "live," which he imagined to mean keeping horses, automobiles, playing golf and tennis, attending and giving parties, etc. But he had reckoned without his host. The energy that had become "disposable" did not enter into these tempting prospects, but betook itself capriciously to quite other ways. A couple of weeks after the commencement of his longed-for life of bliss, he began to brood over peculiar vague physical sensations. A few more weeks sufficed to plunge him into an unprecedented state of hypochondria. His nerves broke down completely. He, who was physically an uncommonly strong and exceptionally energetic man, became like a whining child. And that put an end to all his paradise. He fell from one apprehension to another, worrying himself almost to death. He then consulted a celebrated specialist, who immediately perceived quite rightly that there was nothing wrong with the man but lack of employment. The patient saw the sense of this, and betook himself to his former position. But to his great disappointment no interest for his business presented itself. Neither the application of patience nor determination availed to help. His energy would not by any means be forced back into the business. His condition naturally became worse than before. Energy that hitherto had been actively creative was now turned back into himself, with fearfully destructive force. His creative genius rose up, so to speak, in revolt against him, and instead of, as before, producing great organisations in the world, his demon now created equally clever systems of hypochondriac fallacies, by which the man was absolutely[401] crushed. When I saw him, he was already a hopeless moral ruin. I tried to make clear to him that such a gigantic amount of energy might indeed be withdrawn from business, but the problem remained as to where it should go. The finest horses, the fastest automobiles, and the most amusing parties are in themselves no inducement for energy, although it is certainly quite rational to think that a man who has devoted his whole life to serious work, has a natural right to enjoy himself. This would necessarily be the case if things happened "humanly" in destiny; first would come work, then well-earned leisure. But things happen irrationally and inconveniently enough, energy requires a congenial channel, otherwise it is dammed up and becomes destructive. My arguments met with no response, as was indeed to be expected. Such an advanced case can only be taken care of till death; it cannot be cured.
I was once approached by a businessman in his mid-forties, whose situation perfectly illustrates the point I just made. He was a classic example of a self-made American man, having worked his way up from nothing. He was successful and had built a large business. He had also organized the company in such a way that he could retire from managing it. In fact, he had stepped down two years before I met him. Until that point, he had dedicated his entire life to his business, pouring all his energy into it with the intense focus and single-mindedness typical of successful American entrepreneurs. He had purchased a beautiful country home, thinking he would finally "live," which he envisioned as owning horses, driving fancy cars, playing golf and tennis, and hosting and attending parties. But he underestimated the situation. The energy that had previously been "available" for work didn’t flow into these enticing activities; instead, it took unexpected directions. A couple of weeks into his long-desired life of leisure, he began to dwell on strange, vague physical feelings. A few weeks later, he fell into an unprecedented state of hypochondria. His nerves completely broke down. He, who had been physically strong and incredibly energetic, became like a whiny child. And that ended his ideal life. He spiraled from one worry to another, nearly worrying himself to death. He then consulted a well-known specialist who quickly realized that the only problem was his lack of purpose. The patient recognized this and returned to his former role. But to his immense disappointment, he found no interest in his business anymore. Neither patience nor determination could help. His energy wouldn’t go back into the business, no matter how hard he tried. As a result, his condition worsened. The energy that had previously fueled his creativity now turned inward with destructive force. His creative drive, so to speak, revolted against him, and instead of generating great companies, it now produced clever systems of hypochondriac delusions that completely crushed him. When I saw him, he was already a moral wreck. I attempted to explain to him that while a huge amount of energy can be taken away from work, the question remains as to where it should be directed. The best horses, the fastest cars, and the most fun parties aren’t motivating enough for energy; although it’s rational to think that someone who has dedicated their life to hard work deserves to enjoy themselves. Ideally, life should follow a "human" order: first work, then well-earned relaxation. But things often happen irrationally and inconveniently; energy needs a suitable outlet; otherwise, it gets blocked up and becomes destructive. My arguments received no response, which was to be expected. Such a severe case can only be managed until death; it cannot be cured.
This case clearly illustrates the fact that it does not lie in our power to transfer a "disposable" energy to whatever rationally chosen object we may like. Exactly the same may be said of those apparently available energies that are made available by the fact that the psychoanalytical caustic has destroyed their unsuitable forms. These energies can be arbitrarily applied, as has already been said, at the very most only for a short time. They resist following the rationally presented possibilities for any length of time. Psychic energy is indeed a fastidious thing, that insists upon having its own conditions fulfilled. There may be ever so much energy existing, but we cannot make it useful, so long as we do not succeed in finding a congenial channel for it.
This case clearly shows that we can't just transfer "disposable" energy to any object we choose. The same goes for those seemingly available energies that become accessible when the psychoanalytical process has removed their unsuitable forms. As mentioned before, these energies can only be applied arbitrarily, and even then, just for a short time. They resist sticking to the rational options presented for any length of time. Psychic energy is particularly picky, demanding that its specific conditions be met. There might be plenty of energy around, but we can’t utilize it unless we find a suitable outlet for it.
The whole of my research work for the last years has been concentrated upon this question. The first stage of this work was to discover the extent to which the two theories discussed above were tenable. The second stage consisted in the recognition of the fact, that these two theories correspond to two opposite psychological types, which I have designated the introversion and the extroversion types. William James[237] was struck by the existence of these two[402] types among thinkers. He differentiated them as the "tough-minded," and the "tender-minded." Similarly, Ostwald[238] discovered an analogous difference in the classical and romantic types among great scholars. I am not therefore alone in my ideas about the types, as is testified by mentioning only these two well-known names out of many others. Historical researches have proved to me that not a few of the great controversies in the history of thought were based upon the contrast between the types. The most significant case of this kind is the contrast between nominalism and realism, which, beginning with the difference between the Platonic and the Megarian schools, descended to scholastic philosophy, where Abelard won the immortal distinction of at least having ventured an attempt to unite the two contradictory standpoints in conceptualism. This conflict has continued down to the present day, where it finds expression in the antagonism of spiritualism and materialism.
My entire research over the past few years has focused on this question. The first stage of this work was to determine how valid the two theories discussed above are. The second stage involved recognizing that these two theories correspond to two opposing psychological types, which I have labeled introversion and extroversion. William James[237] noted the existence of these two[402] types among thinkers, referring to them as the "tough-minded" and the "tender-minded." Similarly, Ostwald[238] identified a similar distinction in classical and romantic types among major scholars. Therefore, I'm not alone in my views about these types, as evidenced by just these two well-known names among many others. Historical research has shown me that many significant debates in the history of thought were rooted in the contrast between these types. The most notable example is the contrast between nominalism and realism, which started with the difference between the Platonic and Megarian schools and carried through to scholastic philosophy, where Abelard achieved the lasting distinction of at least attempting to reconcile the two opposing viewpoints in conceptualism. This conflict has persisted to the present day, manifesting in the clash between spiritualism and materialism.
Just as in the general history of thought, so too every individual has a share in this contrast of types. Close investigation proves that people of opposite types have an unconscious predilection for marrying each other, that they may mutually complement one another. Each type has one function that is specially well developed, the introvert using his thought as the function of adaptation, thinking beforehand about how he shall act; whilst the extrovert, on the contrary, feels his way into the object by acting. To some extent he acts beforehand. Hence by daily application the one has developed his thought, and the other his feeling. In extreme cases the one limits himself to thinking and observing, and the other to feeling and acting. It is true that the introvert feels also, very deeply indeed, almost too deeply; that is why an English investigator[239] has gone so far as to describe his as "the emotional type." True, the emotion is there, but it all remains inside, and the more[403] passionate and deeper his feeling is, the quieter is his outward demeanour. As the proverb puts it, "Still waters run deep." Similarly, the extrovert thinks also, but that likewise mostly inside, whilst his feelings visibly go outside, that is why he is held to be full of feeling whilst the introvert is considered cold and dry. But as the feeling of the thinker goes inwards, it is not developed as a function adapted to external situations, but remains in a relatively undeveloped state. Similarly the thinking of one who feels remains also relatively undeveloped.
Just like in the broader history of ideas, every individual also embodies this contrast of personality types. A closer look shows that people with opposing traits tend to unconsciously prefer marrying each other, as they can complement one another. Each personality type has one function that's particularly well-developed: the introvert uses thought for adaptation, carefully considering how to act ahead of time, while the extrovert dives into situations through action. In some ways, the extrovert acts first. As a result, the introvert hones their thinking, and the extrovert hones their feeling. In extreme cases, the introvert might focus solely on thinking and observing, while the extrovert is all about feeling and acting. It's true that introverts do feel deeply—sometimes too deeply—which has led one English researcher[239] to label them as "the emotional type." While the emotion is certainly present, it's mostly kept inside, and the more intense the feeling, the calmer their external demeanor. As the saying goes, "Still waters run deep." Similarly, the extrovert does think, but that thought also primarily stays internal, while their feelings are expressed outwardly. That's why they're seen as warm and emotional, while introverts can come off as cold and distant. However, the feelings of a thinker remain inward and aren't developed in a way that adapts to outside situations, so they stay somewhat underdeveloped. Likewise, the thinking of a feeling type also remains relatively undeveloped.
But if comparatively well-adapted individuals are under consideration, then the introvert will normally be found to have his feeling directed outwards, and the result may be extraordinarily deceptive. He shows feelings; he is amiable, sympathetic, even emotional. But a critical examination of the expressions of his feelings reveals that they are markedly conventional. They are not individualised. He shows to every one, without any essential difference, the same friendliness and the same sympathy; whilst the extrovert's expressions of feeling are throughout delicately graded and individualised. With the introvert the expression of feelings is really a gesture that is artificially adopted and conventional. Similarly, the extrovert may apparently think, and that even very clearly and scientifically. But upon closer investigation, his thoughts are found to be really foreign property, merely conventional forms which have been artificially acquired. They lack anything individual and original, and are just as lukewarm and colourless as the conventional feelings of the introvert. Under these conventional disguises, quite other things are slumbering in both, which occasionally when awakened by some overpowering effect, suddenly break out to the astonishment and horror of the environment.
But when we look at individuals who are fairly well-adjusted, introverts usually seem to have their feelings directed outward, which can be very misleading. They express emotions; they are friendly, empathetic, even sentimental. However, a closer look at how they express their feelings shows that these emotions are quite conventional. They don't have a personal touch. They show the same friendliness and sympathy to everyone, without any significant variation; while extroverts’ emotional expressions are nuanced and personal. For introverts, showing feelings is more like an act they put on, something conventional. Similarly, extroverts may seem to think clearly and rationally. But if you dig deeper, you find that their thoughts are actually borrowed ideas, just conventional ways of thinking they’ve picked up. They lack originality and individuality, appearing as bland and uninspired as the introverted feelings. Beneath these conventional surfaces, different emotions and thoughts are resting in both types, which, when triggered by something powerful, can suddenly burst forth, shocking and alarming those around them.
Most civilised people incline more to one type than the other. Taken together they would supplement each other exceedingly well. That is why they are so apt to marry one another, and so long as they are fully occupied with adapting themselves to the necessities of life they suit one another[404] splendidly. But if the man has earned a competence, or if a big legacy drop from the sky, terminating the external urgencies of life, then they have time to occupy themselves with each other. Until now they stood back to back, defending themselves against want. But now they turn to each other expecting to understand one another; and they make the discovery that they have never understood one another. They speak different languages. Thus the conflict between the two types of psychology begins. This conflict is venomous, violent and full of mutual depreciation, even if it be conducted very quietly in the utmost intimacy. This is so because the value of the one is the worthlessness of the other. The one, starting from the standpoint of his valuable thinking, takes for granted that the feelings of the other correspond to his own inferior feelings, this because he knows absolutely nothing of any other feelings. But the other, starting from the standpoint of his valuable feelings, assumes that his partner has the same inferior thought that he himself has. Evidently there is plenty of work here for Goethe's Homunculus, who had to find out "why husband and wife get on so badly." Now as many cases of neurosis have a basis in such differences, I, as a physician, found myself obliged to relieve the Homunculus of some of his ungrateful task. I am glad to be able to say that many a sufferer has been helped in grave difficulties by the enlightenment I could give.
Most civilized people tend to lean more towards one type than the other. Together, these types complement each other really well. That’s why they often end up marrying each other, and as long as they’re focused on adapting to life’s necessities, they fit together perfectly. But once a man has made a decent living, or if a big inheritance unexpectedly comes in, ending the external pressures of life, they then have time to focus on each other. Until that point, they have been back-to-back, defending against hardship. But now they turn toward each other, expecting to understand one another, only to find out they’ve actually never understood each other at all. They speak different languages. This is where the conflict between the two psychological types begins. This conflict is toxic, intense, and filled with mutual disrespect, even if it's conducted very quietly in the closest intimacy. This is so because the value of one is the worthlessness of the other. One person, coming from their perspective of valuable thinking, assumes that the other person’s feelings are just inferior to theirs, simply because they know nothing else. Meanwhile, the other person, coming from their perspective of valuable feelings, assumes that their partner has the same inferior thoughts they do. Clearly, there’s a lot for Goethe’s Homunculus to figure out about "why husbands and wives don’t get along well." Since many cases of neurosis stem from these differences, I, as a physician, felt compelled to help the Homunculus with some of his challenging work. I’m pleased to say that many people have found relief from serious issues thanks to the insights I could provide.
The third stage of the path of increasing understanding consisted in formulating a theory of the psychology of types which would be of practical use for the development of man. Viewed from the newly-gained standpoint, there resulted, first of all, a totally new theory of psychogenic disturbances.
The third stage of the path of increasing understanding involved creating a theory of the psychology of types that would be practically useful for human development. From this new perspective, there emerged, above all, a completely new theory of psychogenic disturbances.
The foundation of the facts remains the same: the first hypothesis of every neurosis is the existence of an unconscious conflict. According to Freud's theory, this is an erotic conflict, or to speak more exactly, a battle of the moral consciousness against the unconscious infantile sexual world of phantasy and its transference to external objects. According to Adler's theory, it is a battle of the superiority of the ego against all oppressive influences, whether from inside or outside.
The core of the facts is unchanged: the primary hypothesis of every neurosis is the presence of an unconscious conflict. In Freud's theory, this is seen as an erotic conflict, or more precisely, a struggle between moral consciousness and the unconscious, childhood sexual fantasies, and their projection onto external objects. In Adler's theory, it is a struggle for the ego's superiority against all oppressive forces, whether internal or external.
But the new idea asserts that the neurotic conflict always takes place between the adapted function and the co-function that is undifferentiated, and that lies to a great extent in the unconscious; therefore in the case of the introvert, between thought and unconscious feeling, but in that of the extrovert, between feeling and unconscious thought.[240] Another theory of the etiological moment results from this. If a man who naturally adapts himself by thinking is faced by a demand that cannot be met by thinking alone, but which requires differentiated feeling, the traumatic or pathogenic conflict breaks out. On the contrary, the critical moment comes to the man who adapts by feeling when he is faced by a problem requiring differentiated thought. The afore-mentioned case of the business man is a clear example of this. The man was an introvert, who all through his life had left every consideration of sentiment in the background, that is, in the unconscious. But when, for the first time in his life, he found himself in a situation in which nothing could be done except by means of differentiated feeling, he failed utterly. At the same time, a very instructive phenomenon occurred; his unconscious feelings manifested themselves as physical sensations of a vague nature. This fact harmonises with a generally accepted experience in our psychology, to wit, that undeveloped feelings partake of the character of vague physical sensations, since undifferentiated feelings are as yet identical with subjective physical sensations. Differentiated feelings are of a more "abstract" objective nature. This phenomenon may well be the unconscious basis of the earliest statement of psychological types that is known to me; namely, the three types of the Valentinian School. They held the undifferentiated type to be the so-called hylic (material) man. He was ranked below the differentiated types, that is, the psychic (soulful) man, who corresponds to the extroversion type; and the pneumatic (spiritual) man, who corresponds to the[406] introversion type. For these gnostics the "pneumatikos" stood of course the highest. Christianity, with its "psychic" (spiritual) nature (principle of love), has indeed contested this privilege of the gnosis. But even this page may be turned in the course of time: since, if the signs of the age are not deceptive, we are now in the great final settlement of the Christian epoch. We know that, evolution not being uniformly continuous, when one form of creation has been outlived, the evolutionary tendency harks back to resume that form which, after having made a beginning, was left behind in an undeveloped state.
But the new idea states that the neurotic conflict always occurs between the adapted function and the co-function that is not fully developed and largely exists in the unconscious; therefore, for introverts, the conflict is between thought and unconscious feeling, while for extroverts, it’s between feeling and unconscious thought.[240] Another theory regarding the cause of this moment arises from this. If a person who naturally adapts by thinking encounters a challenge that cannot be resolved through thought alone but requires developed feeling, the traumatic or pathogenic conflict arises. Conversely, the critical moment occurs for someone who adapts by feeling when faced with a problem that needs refined thought. The case of the businessperson is a clear illustration of this. The individual was an introvert who had spent his life pushing aside any consideration of emotions, meaning they remained in the unconscious. But when, for the first time, he found himself in a situation that could only be resolved through refined feeling, he completely failed. At the same time, a very enlightening phenomenon happened; his unconscious feelings expressed themselves as physical sensations of an ambiguous nature. This aligns with a generally accepted insight in our psychology, namely that underdeveloped feelings often feel like vague physical sensations, since undifferentiated feelings are still indistinguishable from subjective physical sensations. Developed feelings, on the other hand, have a more "abstract" objective quality. This phenomenon may well be the unconscious basis of the earliest psychological type classifications I know of, namely the three types from the Valentinian School. They regarded the undifferentiated type as the so-called hylic (material) man, who was considered inferior to the differentiated types, that is, the psychic (soulful) man, corresponding to the extroverted type; and the pneumatic (spiritual) man, corresponding to the [406] introverted type. For these Gnostics, the "pneumatikos" held the highest status. Christianity, with its "psychic" (spiritual) nature (principle of love), has indeed challenged this supremacy of gnosis. However, this could change over time: if the signs of the age are to be believed, we are now in a significant final phase of the Christian epoch. We understand that evolution isn't always a smooth and continuous process; when one form of creation has been surpassed, the evolutionary trend can revert to revive a form that, after having had a start, was left behind in an underdeveloped state.
After this brief digression to generalities, let us return to our case. If a similar disturbance were to take place in an extrovert, he would have what are called hysterical symptoms, that is, symptoms that are also of an apparently physical nature, which, as our theory indicates, would this time represent the patient's unconscious undifferentiated thought. As a matter of fact, we find also a widespread region of phantasy as the basis of hysterical symptoms, of which many have been described in detail in the literature of the subject. They are phantasies of a pronounced sexual, that is physical complexion. But in reality they are undifferentiated thoughts, which in common with the undifferentiated feelings are to some extent physical, and therefore appear as what may be called physical symptoms.
After this quick detour into general ideas, let's get back to our case. If a similar disturbance happened in an extrovert, they would show what we call hysterical symptoms—symptoms that seem physical, which, as our theory suggests, would represent the patient’s unconscious, mixed-up thoughts. In fact, we also discover a broad range of fantasies underlying hysterical symptoms, many of which have been thoroughly described in the literature. These fantasies are notably sexual, meaning they have a physical aspect. But in reality, they are mixed-up thoughts that, like the blurred feelings, are somewhat physical, and that's why they show up as what could be called physical symptoms.
By taking up again here the thread that was dropped before, we can now clearly see why it is precisely in the neurosis that those values which are most lacking to the individual lie hidden. We might also now return to the case of the young woman, and apply to it the newly-won insight. She is an extrovert with an hysterical neurosis. Let us suppose that this patient had been "analysed," that is, that the treatment having made it clear to her what kind of unconscious thoughts lay behind her symptoms, she had regained possession of the psychic energy which by becoming unconscious had constituted the strength of the symptoms. The following practical question now arises: what can be done with the so-called available[407] energy? It would be rational, and in accordance with the psychological type of the invalid, to extrovert this energy again, that is to transfer it to an object, as for instance to philanthropic or some other useful activities. This way is possible only in exceptional cases—there are energetic natures who do not shrink from care and trouble in a useful cause, there are people who care immensely about just such occupations—otherwise it is not feasible. For it must not be forgotten, that in the case under consideration, the libido (that is the technical expression for the psychic energy) has found its object already unconsciously in the young Italian, or an appropriate real human substitute. Under these circumstances such a desirable sublimation, however natural, is out of the question. For the object of the energy usually affords a better channel than an ethical activity, however attractive. Unfortunately there are many people who always speak of a person, not as he is, but as he would be if their desires for him were realised. But the physician is necessarily concerned with the actual personality, which will obdurately remain the same, until its real character has been recognised on all sides. An analysis must necessarily be based upon the recognition of naked reality, not upon any arbitrarily selected phantasies about a person, however desirable.
By picking up the thread we left off earlier, we can now clearly see why it is specifically in neurosis that the values most lacking in a person are hidden. We can also return to the case of the young woman and apply this new understanding. She is an extrovert with a hysterical neurosis. Let’s assume this patient has been "analyzed," meaning the treatment has helped her understand the unconscious thoughts behind her symptoms, allowing her to regain the psychic energy that had been lost to her symptoms. The next practical question is: what can be done with the so-called available[407] energy? It would be logical, and in line with her psychological type, to redirect this energy outward, transferring it to an object, like engaging in philanthropic or other useful activities. This approach is only possible in exceptional cases—there are energetic individuals who don’t shy away from effort and challenges for a good cause, and some who are deeply passionate about such pursuits—otherwise, it isn’t practical. We must remember that in this case, the libido (the technical term for psychic energy) has already unconsciously found its object in the young Italian, or a suitable real human substitute. Given these circumstances, such a desirable sublimation, no matter how natural, is out of reach. The object of the energy usually provides a better outlet than ethical activities, no matter how appealing. Unfortunately, many people tend to talk about someone not as they truly are, but as they would be if their desires for that person were fulfilled. However, the physician must focus on the actual personality, which will stubbornly remain unchanged until its true nature is acknowledged by everyone. An analysis must be grounded in the recognition of raw reality, not on arbitrary fantasies about a person, no matter how desirable those fantasies may be.
The fact is that the so-called available energy unfortunately cannot be arbitrarily directed as desired. It follows its own channel, one which it had already found, even before we had quite released it from its bondage to the unadapted form. For we now make the discovery that the phantasies which were formerly occupied with the young Italian, have been transferred to the physician himself. The physician has therefore himself become the object of the unconscious libido. If this is not the case, or if the patient will on no account acknowledge the fact of transference, or again, if the physician either does not understand the phenomenon at all, or does so wrongly, then violent resistances make their appearance, which aim at completely breaking off relations with the doctor. At this point patients leave and look for[408] another doctor or for people who "understand" them; or if they hopelessly relinquish this search they go to pieces.
The reality is that the so-called available energy can't just be directed wherever we want. It follows its own path, one that it had already chosen, even before we had fully freed it from its inappropriate form. We now realize that the fantasies that were once focused on the young Italian have shifted to the physician himself. The physician has thus become the target of the unconscious desires. If this isn’t the case, or if the patient refuses to acknowledge the transference, or if the physician doesn’t understand this phenomenon either at all or incorrectly, strong resistances arise, aiming to completely sever ties with the doctor. At this point, patients either leave to find another doctor or people who "get" them; or if they hopelessly give up on this search, they fall apart.
But if the transference to the physician takes place and is accepted, a natural channel has thereby been found, which not only replaces the former, but also makes a discharge of the energic process possible, and provides a course that is relatively free from conflict. Therefore if the libido is allowed its natural course, it will of its own accord find its way into the transference. Where this is not the case, it is always a question either of arbitrary rebellion against the laws of Nature, or of some deficiency in the physician's work.
But if the transfer to the doctor happens and is accepted, a natural pathway has been established, which not only replaces the previous one but also allows for the release of the energy process and offers a route that is relatively free of conflict. So, if the libido is allowed to follow its natural path, it will naturally move into the transfer. When this isn’t the case, it usually raises the question of either a willful defiance against the laws of nature or some shortcoming in the doctor's work.
Into the transference every conceivable infantile phantasy is first of all projected; these must then be subjected to the caustic, that is, analytically dissolved. This was formerly called the dissolution of the transference. Thereby the energy is freed from this unsuitable form also, and once again we are confronted by the problem of disposable energy. We shall find that an object affording the most favourable channel has been chosen by Nature even before our search began.
Into the transference, every imaginable childish fantasy is initially projected; these must then be analyzed and broken down. This was previously known as the dissolution of the transference. By doing this, the energy is released from this inappropriate form, and we are once again faced with the issue of usable energy. We will discover that Nature has already selected the most suitable object for this purpose even before we began our exploration.
V.—The Personal and the Impersonal Unconscious
V.—The Personal and the Impersonal Unconscious
The fourth stage of our newly won insight is now reached. The analytical dissolution of the infantile transference phantasies was continued until it became sufficiently clear, even to the patient, that he was making his physician into father, mother, uncle, guardian, teacher, friend or any other kind of surrogate for parental authority conceivable. But, as experience is constantly proving, further phantasies make their appearance, representing the physician as saviour or as some other divine being. Obviously this is in flagrant contradiction to the sane reasoning of consciousness. Moreover, it appears that these divine attributes considerably overstep the bounds of the Christian conception in which we grew up. They even assume the guise of heathen allurements, and, for instance, not infrequently assume the form of animals.
The fourth stage of our newfound understanding has now been reached. The detailed analysis of the child's transference fantasies continued until it became clear enough, even to the patient, that he was turning his doctor into a father, mother, uncle, guardian, teacher, friend, or any other sort of stand-in for parental authority imaginable. However, as experience continually shows, new fantasies emerge, depicting the doctor as a savior or some other divine figure. Clearly, this is in direct conflict with the rational thinking of our consciousness. Furthermore, it seems that these divine traits greatly exceed the limits of the Christian beliefs we were raised with. They even take on the appearance of pagan temptations and, for example, frequently resemble animals.
The transference is in itself nothing but a projection of unconscious contents on to the analyst. At first it is the so-called superficial contents that are projected. During this stage the physician is interesting as a possible lover (somewhat after the manner of the young Italian in our case). Later on, he is a representation of the father, and is the symbol either of kindness or of severity, according to what the patient formerly imputed to his real father. Occasionally the doctor even appears to the patient as a kind of mother, which, though sounding somewhat strange, really lies well within the bounds of possibility. All these projections of phantasy have an underlying basis of personal reminiscences.
The transference is basically just a projection of unconscious thoughts onto the analyst. Initially, it's just the so-called superficial thoughts that get projected. During this stage, the doctor seems interesting as a potential romantic partner (similar to the young Italian in our case). Later, he becomes a stand-in for the father figure, symbolizing either kindness or strictness, depending on what the patient experienced with their own father. Sometimes, the doctor might even come off as a sort of mother figure, which might sound a bit odd, but is actually quite possible. All these imaginative projections are grounded in personal memories.
But presently other forms of phantasy appear, bearing an extravagantly effusive and impossible character. The physician now appears to be endowed with uncanny qualities; he may be either a wizard or a demoniacal criminal, or his counterpart of virtue, a saviour. Later on he appears as an incomprehensible mixture of both sides. It should be clearly understood that the physician does not appear to the patient's consciousness in these forms, but that phantasies come up to the surface representing the doctor in this guise. If, as is not seldom the case, the patient cannot forthwith perceive that his view of the physician is a projection of his own unconscious, then he will probably behave rather foolishly. Difficulties often arise at this stage of analysis, making severe demands upon the good will and patience of both physician and patient. In a few exceptional cases, a patient cannot refrain from disseminating the stupidest tales about the physician. Such people cannot get it into their head that, as a matter of fact, their phantasies originate in themselves, and have nothing or very little to do with the physician's actual character. The pertinacity of this error arises from the circumstance that there is no foundation of personal memory for this particular kind of projection. It is occasionally possible to prove that similar phantasies, for which neither parent gave reasonable occasion, had at some time in childhood been attached to the father or mother.
But right now, other forms of fantasy emerge, characterized by an overly dramatic and unrealistic essence. The doctor now seems to possess strange abilities; he might be a wizard or a malevolent criminal, or perhaps his virtuous counterpart, a savior. Later, he appears as an incomprehensible blend of both extremes. It's important to understand that the doctor doesn't appear to the patient's conscious mind in these forms, but rather fantasies arise that portray the doctor in this way. If, as often happens, the patient can't immediately recognize that their perception of the doctor is a projection of their own unconscious, they're likely to act rather foolishly. Challenges frequently arise at this stage of analysis, placing heavy demands on the goodwill and patience of both the doctor and the patient. In a few rare cases, a patient can't help but spread the most absurd stories about the doctor. These individuals struggle to understand that their fantasies actually come from within themselves and have little to do with the doctor’s true nature. The stubbornness of this misunderstanding stems from the fact that there's no personal memory basis for this kind of projection. Sometimes it can be shown that similar fantasies, for which neither parent provided a reasonable cause, were at some point in childhood linked to the father or mother.
In one of his shorter books, Freud has shown how[410] Leonardo da Vinci was influenced in his later life by the fact that he had two mothers. The fact of the two mothers (or the double descent) had indeed a reality in Leonardo's case, but it plays a part with other artists as well. Benvenuto Cellini had this phantasy of a double descent. It is unquestionably a mythological theme; many heroes of legend have two mothers. The phantasy is not founded upon the actual fact of the hero's having two mothers, but is a widespread "primordial image" belonging to the secrets of the universal history of the human mind. It does not belong to the sphere of personal reminiscences.
In one of his shorter books, Freud demonstrated how[410] Leonardo da Vinci was influenced in his later life by having two mothers. The situation of having two mothers (or double descent) was indeed real for Leonardo, but it also affects other artists. Benvenuto Cellini had this fantasy of a double descent. It's definitely a mythological theme; many legendary heroes have two mothers. This fantasy isn't based on the actual fact of the hero having two mothers, but rather it’s a common "primordial image" tied to the deeper truths of human history. It doesn't stem from personal memories.
In every individual, in addition to the personal memories, there are also, in Jacob Burckhardt's excellent phrase, the great "primordial images," the inherited potentialities of human imagination. They have always been potentially latent in the structure of the brain. The fact of this inheritance also explains the otherwise incredible phenomenon, that the matter and themes of certain legends are met with all the world over in identical forms. Further, it explains how it is that persons who are mentally deranged are able to produce precisely the same images and associations that are known to us from the study of old manuscripts. I gave some examples of this in my book on "The Psychology of the Unconscious." I do not hereby assert the transmission of representations, but only of the possibility of such representations, which is a very different thing.
In every person, along with personal memories, there are also, in Jacob Burckhardt's excellent phrase, the great "primordial images," the inherited potentials of human imagination. These have always been potentially present in the brain's structure. This inheritance also explains the otherwise astonishing phenomenon that the same themes and elements of certain legends appear worldwide in identical forms. Furthermore, it clarifies why people who are mentally unstable can create exactly the same images and associations that we recognize from studying ancient manuscripts. I provided some examples of this in my book "The Psychology of the Unconscious." I’m not claiming the transmission of representations, but rather the possibility of such representations, which is a very different matter.
It is therefore in this further stage of the transference that those phantasies are produced that have no basis in personal reminiscence. Here it is a matter of the manifestation of the deeper layers of the unconscious, where the primordial universally-human images are lying dormant.
It is therefore at this next stage of the transference that those fantasies are created that have no foundation in personal memories. Here, it involves the expression of the deeper layers of the unconscious, where the primal, universally human images are lying dormant.
This discovery leads to the fourth stage of the new conception: that is, to the recognition of a differentiation in the unconscious itself. We are now obliged to differentiate a personal unconscious and an impersonal or super-personal unconscious. We also term the latter the absolute or collective unconscious, because it is quite detached from what is personal, and because it is also absolutely universal, wherefore[411] its contents may be found in every head, which of course is not the case with the personal contents.
This discovery brings us to the fourth stage of the new understanding: recognizing a differentiation in the unconscious itself. We now have to distinguish between a personal unconscious and an impersonal or super-personal unconscious. The latter is also called the absolute or collective unconscious because it is entirely separate from what is personal and because it is completely universal, which means[411] its contents can be found in everyone, unlike personal contents.
The primordial images are quite the most ancient, universal, and deep thoughts of mankind. They are feeling just as much as thought, and might therefore be termed original thought-feelings.
The original images are the most ancient, universal, and profound thoughts of humanity. They are as much about emotion as they are about intellect, and could therefore be called original thought-feelings.
We have therewith now found the object selected by the libido when it was freed from the personal-infantile form of transference. Namely, that it sinks down into the depths of the unconscious, reviving what has been dormant there from immemorial ages. It has discovered the buried treasure out of which mankind from time to time has drawn, raising thence its gods and demons, and all those finest and most tremendous thoughts without which man would cease to be man.
We have now identified the object chosen by the libido once it was separated from the personal and infantile form of transference. It dives deep into the unconscious, bringing to life what has been inactive there for ages. It has uncovered the hidden treasure that humanity periodically taps into, from which we have created our gods and demons, as well as all those profound and significant ideas that define what it means to be human.
Let us take as an example one of the greatest thoughts to which the nineteenth century gave birth—the idea of the conservation of energy. Robert Mayer is the originator of this idea. He was a physician, not a physicist nor a natural philosopher, to either of whom the creation of such an idea would have been more germane. It is of great importance to realise that in the real sense of the word, Robert Mayer's idea was not created. Neither was it brought about through the fusion of the then-existent conceptions and scientific hypotheses. It grew in the originator, and was conditioned by him. Robert Mayer wrote (1841) to Griesinger as follows: "I by no means concocted the theory at the writing-desk." He goes on to report about certain physiological investigations that he made in 1840-41 as doctor on board ship, and continues: "If one wishes to be enlightened about physiological matters, some knowledge of physical processes is indispensable, unless one prefers to work from the metaphysical side, which is immensely distasteful to me. I therefore kept to physics, clinging to the subject with such ardour that, although it may well seem ridiculous to say so, I cared little about what part of the world we were in. I preferred to remain aboard where I could work uninterruptedly, and where many an hour gave me such a feeling[412] of being inspired in a way I can never remember having experienced either before or since.
Let’s consider one of the most significant ideas that emerged in the nineteenth century—the concept of conservation of energy. Robert Mayer was the one who came up with this idea. He was a doctor, not a physicist or a natural philosopher, which would have made more sense for someone creating such a concept. It's very important to understand that, in the true sense of the word, Robert Mayer's idea was not created. It didn’t come about by merging existing ideas and scientific theories. Instead, it developed within him, shaped by his own experiences. In a letter to Griesinger in 1841, Robert Mayer wrote: "I certainly did not come up with the theory at the writing desk." He went on to discuss some physiological studies he conducted in 1840-41 while working as a doctor on a ship, adding: "To truly understand physiological issues, some knowledge of physical processes is essential; unless you prefer the metaphysical approach, which I find very unappealing. So, I focused on physics with such passion that, even if it sounds absurd, I cared little about our location in the world. I preferred to stay on board where I could work without interruption, experiencing many hours that gave me a feeling[412] of being inspired in a way I can’t remember experiencing before or since."
"A few flashes of thought that thrilled through me"—this was in the harbour of Surabaja—"were immediately diligently pursued, leading again in their turn to new subjects. Those times are passed, but subsequent quiet examination of what then emerged, has taught me that it was a truth which can not only be subjectively felt, but also proved objectively; whether this could be done by one who has so little knowledge of physics as I have, is a matter which obviously, I must leave undecided."
"A few flashes of insight that excited me"—this was in the harbor of Surabaja—"were quickly followed up, leading me to new topics. Those days are gone, but later contemplation on what came up has taught me that it was a truth that can not only be personally experienced, but also proven in a factual way; whether someone with as little knowledge of physics as I have can do this is something I must leave unanswered."
Heim, in his book on Energetics, expresses the opinion: "that Robert Mayer's new thought did not gradually detach itself by dint of revolving it in his mind, from the conceptions of power transmitted from the past, but belongs to those ideas that are intuitively conceived, which, originating in other spheres of a mental kind, surprise thought, as it were, compelling it to transform its inherited notions conformably with those ideas."
Heim, in his book on Energetics, expresses the opinion: "that Robert Mayer's new idea didn't slowly separate itself by repeatedly thinking about it, from the power concepts passed down from the past, but is one of those ideas that are intuitively understood, which, coming from different areas of thought, catch our minds off guard, forcing them to reshape their inherited beliefs in line with those ideas."
The question now arises, whence did this new idea that forced itself upon consciousness with such elemental power spring? And whence did it derive such strength that it was able to effect consciousness so forcibly that it could be completely withdrawn from all the manifold impressions of a first voyage in the tropics? These questions are not easy to answer. If we apply our theory to this case the explanation would run as follows: The idea of energy and of its conservation must be a primordial image that lay dormant in the absolute unconscious. This conclusion obviously compels us to prove that a similar primordial image did really exist in the history of the human mind, and continued to be effective through thousands of years. As a matter of fact, evidence of this can be produced without difficulty. Primitive religions, in the most dissimilar regions of the earth, are founded upon this image. These are the so-called dynamistic religions, whose sole and distinctive thought is the existence of some universal magical power upon which everything depends. The well-known English scholars,[413] Taylor and Frazer, both wrongly interpreted this idea as animism. Primitive peoples do not mean souls or spirits by their conception of power, but in reality something that the American investigator Lovejoy[241] most aptly terms "primitive energetics."
The question now is, where did this new idea that intruded upon our awareness with such intense force come from? And where did it find the strength to impact our consciousness so strongly that we could completely detach from all the various experiences of a first journey in the tropics? These questions aren't easy to answer. If we apply our theory to this situation, the explanation would go like this: The idea of energy and its conservation must be a fundamental concept that was lying dormant in the absolute unconscious. This conclusion clearly requires us to prove that a similar fundamental concept actually existed in the history of the human mind, and that it remained influential for thousands of years. In fact, we can easily provide evidence for this. Primitive religions, in the most diverse parts of the world, are based on this concept. These are the so-called dynamistic religions, which revolve around the belief in a universal magical power upon which everything relies. The well-known English scholars, [413] Taylor and Frazer, both incorrectly interpreted this concept as animism. Primitive peoples do not refer to souls or spirits when they talk about power; instead, they mean something that the American researcher Lovejoy[241] aptly describes as "primitive energetics."
In an investigation appertaining to this subject, I showed that this notion comprises the idea of soul, spirit, God, health, physical strength, fertility, magic power, influence, might, prestige, curative remedies, as well as certain states of mind which are characterised by the setting loose of affects. Among certain Polynesians "Melungu" (that is this primitive concept of energy) is spirit, soul, demoniacal being, magic, prestige. If anything astonishing happens, the people cry "Melungu." This notion of power is also the first rendering of the concept of God among primitive peoples. The image has undergone many variations in the course of history. In the Old Testament this magic power is seen in the burning bush, and shines in the face of Moses. It is manifest in the Gospels as the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, as cloven tongues of fire from heaven. In Heraclitus it appears as universal energy, as "eternally living fire"; for the Persians it is the fiery brightness, haôma, divine mercy; for the Stoics it is heimarmene, the power of destiny. In mediæval legend it is seen as the aura, or the halo of the saint. It blazes forth in great flames from the hut where the saint is lying in ecstasy. The saints reflect the sum of this power, the storehouse of light, in their faces. According to ancient concepts this power is the soul itself; the idea of its immortality contains that of its conservation. The Buddhistic and primitive conception of the metempsychosis (transmigration of souls) contains the idea of its unlimited capacity for transformation under constant conservation.
In an investigation related to this topic, I demonstrated that this concept includes the ideas of soul, spirit, God, health, physical strength, fertility, magical power, influence, might, prestige, healing remedies, as well as certain mental states characterized by the release of emotions. Among some Polynesians, "Melungu" (which represents this basic idea of energy) signifies spirit, soul, demonic being, magic, and prestige. When something surprising occurs, people shout "Melungu." This notion of power is also the earliest expression of the concept of God among primitive cultures. The image has changed many times throughout history. In the Old Testament, this magical power is present in the burning bush and shines in Moses' face. It is evident in the Gospels as the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, represented as tongues of fire from heaven. In Heraclitus, it appears as universal energy, as "eternally living fire"; for the Persians, it is the fiery brightness, haôma, divine mercy; for the Stoics, it is heimarmene, the power of destiny. In medieval legend, it is seen as the aura or halo of a saint. It bursts forth in great flames from the hut where the saint lies in ecstasy. The saints reflect the totality of this power, the storehouse of light, in their faces. According to ancient beliefs, this power is the soul itself; the idea of its immortality includes the concept of its conservation. The Buddhist and primitive understanding of metempsychosis (transmigration of souls) holds the idea of its unlimited capacity for transformation under constant conservation.
This thought has obviously therefore been imprinted on the human brain for untold ages. That is why it lies ready in the unconscious of every one. Only certain conditions are needed in order to let it appear again. These conditions[414] were obviously fulfilled in the example of Robert Mayer. The greatest and best thoughts form themselves upon these primordial images, which are the ancient common property of humanity.
This idea has obviously been ingrained in the human mind for countless ages. That’s why it’s in the unconscious of everyone. Only certain conditions are needed to bring it to the surface again. These conditions[414] were clearly met in Robert Mayer's case. The greatest and most profound thoughts are based on these fundamental images, which are the shared heritage of humanity.
After this instance of the nascence of new ideas out of the treasury of primordial images, we will resume the further delineation of the process of transference. It was seen that the libido of the patient seizes upon its new object in those apparently preposterous and peculiar phantasies, namely the contents of the absolute unconscious. As I already observed, the unacknowledged projection of primordial images upon the physician constitutes a danger for further treatment which should not be undervalued. The images contain not only every beautiful and great thought and feeling of humanity, but also every deed of shame and devilry of which human beings have ever been capable. Now, if the patient cannot differentiate the physician's personality from these projections, there is an end to mutual understanding, and human relations become impossible. If however the patient avoids this Charybdis, he falls into the Scylla of introjecting these images, that is, he does not ascribe their qualities to the physician but to himself. This peril is just as great. If he projects, he vacillates between an extravagant and morbid deification, and a spiteful contempt of his physician. In the case of introjection, he falls into a ludicrous self-deification or moral self-laceration. The mistake that he makes in both cases consists in attributing the contents of the absolute unconscious to himself personally. Thus he makes himself into both God and devil. This is the psychological reason why human beings have always needed demons, and could not live without gods. There is the exception, of course, of a few specially clever specimens of the homo occidentalis of yesterday and the day before—supermen whose God is dead, wherefore they themselves become gods. There is also the example of Nietzsche, who confessedly required chloral in order to be able to exist. These supermen even become rationalistic petty gods, with thick skulls and cold hearts. The concept of God is simply a necessary psychological[415] function of an irrational nature that has altogether no connection with the question of God's existence. This latter question is one of the most fatuous that can be put. It is indeed sufficiently evident that man cannot conceive a God, much less realise that he actually exists, so little is he able to imagine a process that is not causally conditioned. Theoretically, of course, no accidentality can exist, that is certain, once and for all. On the other hand, in practical life, we are continually stumbling upon accidental happenings. It is similar with the existence of God; it is once and for all an absurd problem. But the consensus gentium has spoken of gods for æons past, and will be speaking of them in æons to come. Beautiful and perfect as man may think his reason, he may nevertheless assure himself that it is only one of the possible mental functions, coinciding merely with the corresponding side of the phenomena of the universe. All around is the irrational, that which is not congruous with reason. And this irrationalism is likewise a psychological function, namely the absolute unconscious; whilst the function of consciousness is essentially rational. Consciousness must have rational relations, first of all in order to discover some order in the chaos of disordered individual phenomena in the universe; and secondly, in order to labour at whatever lies within the area of human possibility. We are laudably and usefully endeavouring to exterminate so far as is practicable the chaos of what is irrational, both in and around us. Apparently we are making considerable progress with this process. A mental patient once said to me, "Last night, doctor, I disinfected the whole heavens with sublimate, and yet did not discover any God." Something of the kind has happened to us. Heraclitus, the ancient, that really very wise man, discovered the most wonderful of all psychological laws, namely, the regulating function of antithesis. He termed this "enantiodromia" (clashing together), by which he meant that at some time everything meets with its opposite. (Here I beg to remind the reader of the case of the American business man, which shows the enantiodromia most distinctly.) The rational[416] attitude of civilisation necessarily terminates in its antithesis, namely in the irrational devastation of civilisation. Man may not identify himself with reason, for he is not wholly a rational being, and never can or ever will become one. That is a fact of which every pedant of civilisation should take note. What is irrational cannot and may not be stamped out. The gods cannot and may not die. Woe betide those men who have disinfected heaven with rationalism; God-Almightiness has entered into them, because they would not admit God as an absolute function. They are identified with their unconscious, and are therefore its sport. (For where God is nearest, there the danger is greatest.) Is the present war supposed to be a war of economics? That is a neutral American "business-like" standpoint, that does not take the blood, tears, unprecedented deeds of infamy and great distress into account, and which completely ignores the fact that this war is really an epidemic of madness. The several parties project their unconscious upon each other, hence the mad confusion of ideas in every head. This is the enantiodromia that occurs in the individual life of man, as well as in that of peoples. The legend of the Tower of Babel turns out to be a tenable truth.
After this moment of new ideas emerging from the deep reservoir of primal images, we will continue to outline the process of transference. It was observed that the patient's libido fixes on a new object in those seemingly absurd and strange fantasies, namely the contents of the absolute unconscious. As I mentioned before, the unacknowledged projection of primal images onto the physician poses a significant risk for further treatment that should not be underestimated. These images encompass not only all the beautiful and profound thoughts and feelings of humanity but also every act of shame and wickedness that humans have ever committed. Now, if the patient cannot distinguish the physician's individuality from these projections, mutual understanding ceases, and human relationships become impossible. However, if the patient navigates away from this danger, they fall into the trap of introjecting these images, meaning they attribute these qualities to themselves rather than the physician. This danger is equally severe. If he projects, he swings between an extravagant, unhealthy idolization and a spiteful disdain for the physician. In the case of introjection, he slips into a ridiculous self-idolization or moral self-harm. The error he makes in both scenarios lies in attributing the contents of the absolute unconscious to himself personally. Thus, he becomes both God and devil. This is the psychological reason why humans have always needed demons and could not live without gods. There are, of course, exceptions among a few exceptionally clever specimens of the homo occidentalis of yesterday and the day before—supermen whose God is dead, leading them to become gods themselves. There’s also Nietzsche, who openly admitted to needing chloral just to survive. These supermen become rationalistic minor gods, with thick skulls and cold hearts. The concept of God is merely a necessary psychological function of an irrational nature that is entirely disconnected from the question of God's existence. This latter question is one of the most foolish that can be asked. It is quite evident that man cannot conceive of a God, much less realize that he actually exists, and is incapable of imagining a process that isn't causally driven. Theoretically, of course, no randomness can exist, that is certain, once and for all. On the other hand, in practical life, we constantly encounter accidental happenings. It's similar with the existence of God; it remains an absurd problem. But the consensus gentium has discussed gods for ages past and will continue to do so in future aeons. As beautiful and perfect as man may consider his reason, he can still assure himself that it’s only one possible mental function, merely coinciding with a corresponding aspect of universal phenomena. Everywhere lies the irrational, that which does not conform to reason. And this irrationality is also a psychological function, namely the absolute unconscious, while consciousness primarily functions rationally. Consciousness must maintain rational relationships, firstly to find some order in the chaos of disordered individual phenomena in the universe; and secondly, to work on whatever lies within the realm of human ability. We are commendably and usefully striving, as much as possible, to eliminate the chaos of the irrational, both within and around us. Apparently, we are making substantial progress in this endeavor. A mental patient once told me, "Last night, doctor, I disinfected the whole heavens with sublimate, and yet did not discover any God." Something like that has happened to us. Heraclitus, the ancient and truly wise man, discovered the most remarkable of all psychological laws, namely the regulating function of antithesis. He called this "enantiodromia" (clashing together), meaning that at some point, everything encounters its opposite. (Here I remind the reader of the case of the American businessman, which illustrates enantiodromia most clearly.) The rational attitude of civilization inevitably leads to its antithesis, namely the irrational destruction of civilization. Man should not identify himself with reason, as he is not entirely a rational being and never can or will be one. This is a fact that every pedant of civilization should take heed of. What is irrational cannot and should not be eradicated. The gods cannot and should not die. Woe betide those who have disinfected heaven with rationalism; God Almighty has taken up residence within them, as they refuse to acknowledge God as an absolute function. They are identified with their unconscious, making them its plaything. (For where God is closest, the danger is greatest.) Is this current war meant to be a war of economics? That’s a neutral American "business-like" perspective that overlooks the blood, tears, unprecedented acts of infamy, and immense suffering, completely ignoring that this war is truly an epidemic of madness. The various parties project their unconscious onto one another, resulting in the chaotic confusion of ideas in every mind. This represents the enantiodromia occurring in the individual lives of humans, as well as in the lives of nations. The legend of the Tower of Babel proves to be a valid truth.
Only he escapes from the cruel law of enantiodromia who knows how to separate himself from the unconscious—not by repressing it, for then it seizes him from behind—but by presenting it visibly to himself as something that is totally different from him.
Only he escapes from the harsh rule of enantiodromia who knows how to distance himself from the unconscious—not by pushing it away, because then it takes control of him from the shadows—but by making it clear to himself as something completely separate from him.
This gives the solution of the Scylla and Charybdis problem which I described above. The patient must learn to differentiate in his thoughts between what is the ego and what is the non-ego. The latter is the collective psyche or absolute unconscious. By this means he will acquire the material with which henceforward, for a long time, he will have to come to terms. Thereby the energy, that before was invested in unsuitable pathological forms, will have found its appropriate sphere. In order to differentiate the psychological ego from the psychological non-ego, man must necessarily stand upon firm feet in his ego-function; that is, he must fulfil[417] his duty towards life completely, so that he may in every respect be a vitally living member of human society. Anything that he neglects in this respect descends into the unconscious and reinforces its position, so that he is in danger of being swallowed up by it, if his ego-function is not established. Severe penalties are attached to that. As indicated by old Synesius, the "spiritualised soul (pneumatike psyché) becomes god and demon, a state in which it suffers the divine penalties," that is, it suffers being torn asunder by the Zagreus, an experience which Nietzsche also underwent at the beginning of his insanity, where, in "Ecce Homo," the God whom he was despairingly resisting in front assailed him from behind. Enantiodromia is the being torn asunder into the pairs of opposites, which opposites are only proper to "the god," and therefore also to the deified man, who owes likeness to God to his having prevailed over his gods.
This addresses the Scylla and Charybdis dilemma I mentioned earlier. The individual needs to learn to distinguish in their thoughts between what is the ego and what is the non-ego. The latter refers to the collective psyche or absolute unconscious. This understanding will provide the material they need to confront for a long time. Consequently, the energy that was previously tied up in inappropriate pathological forms will find its rightful place. To separate the psychological ego from the psychological non-ego, a person must establish a solid foundation in their ego function; in other words, they must fully meet their responsibilities to life so they can be a vital, contributing member of society. Anything they overlook in this regard sinks into the unconscious, reinforcing its hold, putting them at risk of being consumed by it if their ego function isn’t secured. There are serious consequences for that. As old Synesius indicated, the "spiritualized soul (pneumatike psyché) becomes god and demon, a state in which it endures divine penalties," meaning it suffers being torn apart by the Zagreus, an experience that Nietzsche also faced at the onset of his madness when, in "Ecce Homo," the God he desperately resisted from the front attacked him from behind. Enantiodromia is the being torn apart into opposing pairs, which opposites are unique to "the god," and thus also to the deified person, who resembles God through their victory over their own gods.
VI.—The Synthetic or Constructive Method
VI.—The Synthetic or Constructive Method
We now reach the fifth stage of progressive understanding. The coming to terms with the unconscious is a technical performance to which the name of transcendental function has been given because a new function is produced, which being based upon both real and imaginary, or rational and irrational data, makes a bridge between the rational and irrational functions of the psyche. The basis of the transcendental function is a new method of treating psychological materials such as dreams and phantasies. The theories previously discussed were based upon an exclusively causal-reductive procedure, which reduces the dream or phantasy to its component reminiscences, and the instinctive processes that underlie them. I have already stated the justification as well as the limitations of this proceeding. It reaches the end of its usefulness at the moment when the dream symbols no longer permit of a reduction to personal reminiscences or aspirations; that is when the images of the absolute unconscious begin to be produced. It would be quite inappropriate[418] to reduce these collective ideas to what is personal, and not only inappropriate but even actually pernicious, a fact that has been impressed upon me by disagreeable experiences. The values of the images or symbols of the absolute unconscious are only disclosed if they are subjected to a synthetic (not analytical) treatment. Just as analysis (the causally reductive procedure) disintegrates the symbol into its components, so the synthetic procedure synthesises the symbol into a universal and comprehensible expression. The synthetic procedure is by no means easy; I will therefore give an example, by means of which I can explain the whole process.
We now reach the fifth stage of progressive understanding. Coming to terms with the unconscious is a technical process known as transcendental function, because it creates a new function that connects both real and imaginary, or rational and irrational, aspects of the psyche. The foundation of the transcendental function is a new approach to handling psychological materials like dreams and fantasies. The theories we've discussed so far relied solely on a causal-reductive method, which breaks down the dream or fantasy into its individual memories and the instinctual processes behind them. I have already pointed out the justification and limitations of this approach. Its usefulness ends when dream symbols can no longer be reduced to personal memories or desires, which occurs when images from the absolute unconscious start to emerge. Reducing these collective ideas to the personal is not only inappropriate but can also be harmful, a fact that I learned through unpleasant experiences. The value of the images or symbols from the absolute unconscious is revealed only when they are treated synthetically (not analytically). Just as analysis (the causal-reductive method) breaks the symbol into its parts, the synthetic method combines the symbol into a universal and understandable expression. The synthetic method is quite challenging; therefore, I will provide an example to explain the entire process.
A patient had the following dream. She was just at the critical juncture between the analysis of the personal unconscious and the commencement of the production of the absolute unconscious. "I am on the point of crossing a broad and rapid stream. There is no bridge, but I find a ford where I can cross. As I am just on the point of doing so, a big crab that lay hidden in the water seizes my foot and does not let it go." She awoke in fear. Associations with the dream were as follows:—
A patient had the following dream. She was at a crucial moment between understanding her personal unconscious and starting to tap into the deeper, absolute unconscious. "I am about to cross a wide and fast-flowing stream. There’s no bridge, but I find a shallow spot where I can cross. Just as I'm about to do it, a large crab hiding in the water grabs my foot and won’t let go." She woke up feeling scared. The associations with the dream were as follows:—
1. Stream.—It forms a boundary that is difficult to cross. I must surmount an obstacle; I suppose it refers to the fact that I am getting on very slowly; I suppose I ought to reach the other side.
1. Stream.—It creates a barrier that's hard to cross. I need to overcome an obstacle; I think it points to the fact that I'm making very slow progress; I guess I should get to the other side.
2. Ford.—An opportunity for getting safely across, a possible way; otherwise the stream would be too difficult. The possibility of surmounting the obstacle lies in the analytical treatment.
2. Ford.—A chance to cross safely, a potential route; otherwise, the river would be too challenging. The ability to overcome the obstacle depends on careful analysis.
3. Crab.—The crab lay quite hidden in the water; I did not see it at first. Cancer is a fearful incurable illness. (A series of recollections of Mrs. X., who died of cancer, followed.) I am afraid of this illness. A crab[242] is an animal that walks backwards; obviously it wants to pull me down into the stream. It clutched me in a gruesome way, and I was awfully afraid. What prevents my getting across? Oh yes, I had another great scene with my friend.
3. Crab.—The crab was completely hidden in the water; I didn't notice it at first. Cancer is a terrifying and incurable disease. (A series of memories about Mrs. X., who passed away from cancer, followed.) I'm scared of this disease. A crab[242] is an animal that moves backward; clearly, it wants to drag me down into the stream. It gripped me in a horrible way, and I was really frightened. What’s stopping me from getting across? Oh right, I had another intense moment with my friend.
It must be explained that there is something special about[419] this friendship. We have here an ardent attachment, bordering on the homosexual. It has been going on for years. The friend is in many respects like the patient, and is also nervous. They have pronounced artistic interests in common. But the patient is the stronger personality of the two. They are both nervous, and their mutual relation being too engrossing, cuts them off too much from other possibilities of life. In spite of an "ideal friendship" they have at times tremendous scenes, owing to their mutual irritability. Evidently the unconscious wishes to put some distance between them, but they refuse to pay attention to it. A "scene" usually begins by one of them finding that she does not yet understand the other well enough, and that they ought to talk more openly together; whereupon both make enthusiastic endeavours to talk things out. Misunderstandings supervene almost directly, provoking fresh scenes, each worse than the last. The quarrel was in its way and faute de mieux a pleasure to both of them, which they were unwilling to relinquish. My patient, especially, was unable for a very long time to renounce the sweet pain of not being understood by her best friend, although, as she said, every scene "tired her to death." She had long since realised that this friendship had become superfluous, and that it was only from mistaken ambition that she clung to the belief that she could yet make something ideal out of it. The patient had formerly had an extravagant, fantastic relation to her mother, and after her mother's death had transferred her feelings to her friend.
It needs to be said that there’s something special about[419] this friendship. There’s a strong bond here, almost bordering on romantic. It’s been going strong for years. The friend is similar to the patient in many ways and is also anxious. They share a passion for the arts. However, the patient has the stronger personality of the two. Both of them are nervous, and their intense connection isolates them from other life opportunities. Despite having an "ideal friendship," they sometimes have major arguments because of their mutual irritability. Clearly, their subconscious desires to create some distance between them, but they ignore it. A "scene" usually starts when one of them realizes that she doesn't really understand the other well enough and suggests they should communicate more openly, leading both of them to enthusiastically try to work things out. Misunderstandings almost immediately arise, causing new conflicts, each one worse than the last. The quarrels were in their own way and faute de mieux a source of enjoyment for both, which they weren't ready to give up. My patient, in particular, took a long time to let go of the bittersweet pain of not being understood by her best friend, even though she admitted that each argument "exhausted her completely." She had already realized that this friendship had become unnecessary and that her attachment was fueled by misguided ambition, thinking she could still make something perfect out of it. The patient had once had an extravagant, fantastical relationship with her mother, and after her mother passed away, she transferred those feelings onto her friend.
VII.—Analytical (Causal-reductive) Interpretation.[243]
VII.—Analytical (Causal-reductive) Interpretation.[243]
This interpretation may be summed up in a sentence: "I understand that I ought to get to the other side of the stream (that is, give up the relation with the friend), but I would much rather that my friend did not let me out of her claws[420] (embrace)." That is, expressed as an infantile wish: Mother would like to attract me to herself again by the well-known mode of enthusiastic embraces. The incompatibility of the wish lies in the strong under-current of homosexuality, the existence of which had been abundantly proved by obvious facts. The crab seizes her foot. The patient having big, "manly" feet, she plays a masculine part towards her friend, having also corresponding sexual fantasies. The foot is known to have phallic significance. (Detailed evidence of this is to be found in Aigremont's writings.) The complete interpretation would run as follows: The reason why she will not let her friend go is because her unconscious homosexual wishes are set upon her. As these wishes are morally and æsthetically incompatible with the tendency of the conscious personality, they are repressed, and therefore unconscious. The fear is an expression of this repressed wish.
This interpretation can be summed up in a sentence: "I know I should get to the other side of the stream (that is, end the relationship with my friend), but I would much rather my friend not release me from her grip (embrace)." In other words, expressed as an infantile wish: I want to be drawn back to my mother by her familiar enthusiastic hugs. The conflict in this wish comes from the strong underlying homosexuality, which has been clearly demonstrated by obvious facts. The crab holds onto her foot. The patient, having large, "manly" feet, plays a masculine role with her friend, who also has corresponding sexual fantasies. The foot is known to have phallic significance. (Detailed evidence of this is found in Aigremont's writings.) The complete interpretation reads: The reason she won’t let her friend go is that her unconscious homosexual desires are controlling her. Since these desires conflict morally and aesthetically with her conscious self, they get repressed and remain unconscious. The fear is an expression of this repressed desire.
This interpretation is exceedingly depreciative of the patient's high-pitched conscious ideal of friendship. It is true at this point in analysis she would no longer have taken this interpretation amiss. Some time before certain facts had sufficiently convinced her of her homosexual tendency, so that she was able to acknowledge the existence of this inclination frankly, although it was of course painful for her to do so. Therefore if, at this stage of the treatment, I had informed her that this was the interpretation, I should not have encountered resistances from her. She had already overcome the painfulness of this unwelcome tendency by understanding it. But she would have said to me: "Why do we analyse this dream at all? It is only repeating what I have now known for a long while." It is true this interpretation does not reveal anything new to the patient, and it is therefore uninteresting and ineffective. This kind of interpretation would at the beginning of the treatment have been impossible in this case, because the patient's prudishness would under no circumstances have acknowledged it. The "venom" of understanding had to be instilled very carefully, and in the smallest of doses, until the patient gradually became more enlightened. But when the analytical or causal-reductive interpretation,[421] instead of furnishing something new, persistently brings the same material in different variations, then the moment has come when another mode of interpretation is called for. The causal-reductive procedure has certain drawbacks. First, it does not take strictly into account the patient's associations—e.g. in this case the association of the illness ("cancer") with "crab" (Krebs = cancer). Second, the particular choice of symbol remains obscure. For instance, why does the friend-mother appear as a crab? A prettier and more plastic representation would have been a nymph. ("Half dragged she him, half sank he down,"[244] etc.) An octopus, a dragon, a serpent, or a fish could have performed the same services. Third, the causal-reductive procedure completely ignores that a dream is a subjective phenomenon, and that consequently even an exhaustive interpretation can never connect the crab with the mother or the friend, but only with the dreamer's idea of them. The whole dream is the dreamer; she is the stream, the crossing, and the crab. That is to say these details are expressions of psychological conditions and tendencies in the subject's unconscious.
This interpretation severely undermines the patient’s clear-conscious ideal of friendship. At this stage in her analysis, she wouldn’t have taken this interpretation negatively. Previously, certain facts had sufficiently shown her her homosexual tendency, allowing her to openly acknowledge this inclination, even though it was painful for her. So, if I had told her that this was the interpretation at this point in treatment, I wouldn’t have faced resistance from her. She had already dealt with the discomfort of this unwanted tendency by understanding it. But she would have responded, “Why are we even analyzing this dream? It just repeats what I’ve known for a long time.” It’s true that this interpretation doesn’t reveal anything new to the patient, making it uninteresting and ineffective. At the beginning of treatment, such an interpretation would have been impossible because the patient’s modesty wouldn’t have accepted it. The “venom” of understanding needed to be introduced very cautiously, in small doses, until the patient gradually became more aware. But when the analytical or causal-reductive interpretation, instead of offering something new, keeps presenting the same material in various forms, it’s time to consider a different interpretation approach. The causal-reductive method has specific drawbacks. First, it doesn’t fully account for the patient’s associations—like in this case, the connection between “illness” (“cancer”) and “crab” (Krebs = cancer). Second, the choice of symbols remains unclear. For example, why does the friend-mother appear as a crab? A more attractive and vivid representation could have been a nymph. (“Half dragged she him, half sank he down,” etc.) An octopus, dragon, serpent, or fish could have served the same purpose. Third, the causal-reductive method completely overlooks the fact that a dream is a subjective experience, and thus even a thorough interpretation can only link the crab with the dreamer’s perception of the mother or friend, not with them directly. The entire dream is the dreamer; she is the stream, the crossing, and the crab. In other words, these details express psychological conditions and tendencies within the subject's unconscious.
I have therefore introduced the following terminology. I call interpretations in which the dream symbols are treated as representations of the real objects interpretation upon the objective plane. The opposite interpretation is that which connects every fragment of the dream (e.g. all the persons who do anything) with the dreamer himself. This is interpretation upon the subjective plane. Objective interpretation is analytical, because it dissects the dream contents into complexes of reminiscence, and finds their relation to real conditions. Subjective interpretation is synthetic, because it detaches the fundamental underlying complexes of reminiscence from their actual causes, regarding them as tendencies or parts of the subject, and reintegrating them with the subject. (In experiencing something I do not merely experience the object, but in the first place myself, although this is only the case if I render myself account of the experience.)
I’ve introduced the following terminology. I refer to interpretations where dream symbols are seen as representations of real objects as interpretation upon the objective plane. The opposite interpretation connects every part of the dream (e.g. all the characters who do anything) to the dreamer themselves. This is interpretation upon the subjective plane. Objective interpretation is analytical because it breaks down the dream content into complexes of memories and examines their connection to real conditions. Subjective interpretation is synthetic because it separates the core underlying complexes of memories from their actual causes, viewing them as tendencies or aspects of the subject, and then reintegrating them with the subject. (When I experience something, I don’t just experience the object, but first and foremost myself, although this only happens if I reflect on the experience.)
The synthetic or constructive procedure of interpretation[245] is therefore based upon the version on the subjective plane.
The synthetic or constructive process of interpretation[245] is therefore grounded in the perspective on the subjective level.
VIII.—The Synthetic (Constructive) Interpretation.
VIII.—The Synthetic (Constructive) Interpretation.
The patient is unconscious of the fact that it is in herself that the obstacle lies which should be overcome, the boundary that is difficult to cross which impedes further progress. But it is possible to cross the boundary. It is true that just here a peculiar and unexpected peril threatens, namely, something "animal" (non-human or super-human) which moves backwards and goes into the depths of the stream, wanting to draw down the dreamer as a whole personality. This danger is, moreover, like the deadly disease of cancer, which begins secretly somewhere, and is incurable (overpowering). The patient imagines that her friend hinders her, pulling her down. So long as this is her belief she must perforce influence her friend, "draw her up," teach, improve, educate her, and make futile and impractically idealistic efforts in order to avoid being dragged down herself. Of course, the friend makes similar endeavours, being in a like case with the patient. So both of them keep jumping upon each other like fighting cocks, each trying to fly over the other's head. The higher the point to which the one screws herself, the higher must the other also try to get. Why? Because each thinks the fault lies in the other, in the object. Interpretation of the dream on the subjective plane brings deliverance from this absurdity, for it shows the patient that she has something in herself that is hindering her from crossing the boundary; that is, from getting out of the one position or attitude into another. To interpret change of place as change of attitude is supported by the mode of expression in certain primitive languages, where, e.g., the phrase "I am on the point of going," is "I am at the place of going." In order to understand the language of dreams, we need plenty of parallels from the psychology of primitive peoples, as well as from historical[423] symbolism. This is so because dreams originate in the unconscious, which contains the residual potentialities of function of all preceding epochs of the history of the evolution of man.
The patient is unaware that the obstacle she needs to overcome lies within herself, a boundary that is hard to cross and prevents further progress. However, it's possible to get past this boundary. It's true that a strange and unexpected danger lurks here, something “animal” (non-human or super-human) that pulls back and sinks into the depths of the stream, trying to drag the dreamer down as a whole person. This danger is similar to the deadly disease of cancer, which starts quietly somewhere and is incurable (overpowering). The patient believes her friend is holding her back, dragging her down. As long as she thinks this, she feels compelled to influence her friend, “lift her up,” teach, improve, and make unrealistic and idealistic efforts to avoid being dragged down herself. Naturally, the friend makes similar efforts since she is in the same situation as the patient. So, they both keep jumping at each other like fighting roosters, each trying to get over the other’s head. The higher one tries to rise, the higher the other must also strive to go. Why? Because each thinks the problem lies with the other person, the object. Interpreting the dream from a personal perspective offers a way out of this absurdity, as it reveals to the patient that something within her is blocking her from crossing the boundary; that is, from moving from one position or mindset to another. Interpreting a change in place as a change in attitude is backed by the way certain primitive languages express this; for instance, the phrase "I am on the point of going," translates to "I am at the place of going." To understand the language of dreams, we need a lot of parallels from the psychology of primitive peoples, as well as from historical [423] symbolism. This is essential because dreams originate from the unconscious, which holds the residual potential of all previous stages in human evolution.
Obviously, in our interpretation everything now depends upon understanding what is meant by the crab. We know that it symbolizes something that comes to light in the friend (she connects the crab with the friend), and also something that came to light in the mother. Whether both mother and friend really have this quality in them is irrelevant as regards the patient. The situation will only be changed when the patient herself has changed. Nothing can be changed in the mother because she is dead. The friend cannot be urged to alter; if she wants to alter herself, that is her own affair. The fact that the quality in question is associated with the mother indicates that it is something infantile. What is there in common in the patient's relation both to her mother and her friend? What is common to both is a violently extravagant demand for love, the patient feeling herself overwhelmed by its passion. This claim is an overpowering infantile craving which is characteristically blind. What is in question here is a part of her libido that has not been educated, differentiated, nor humanized, retaining still the compulsive character of an instinct, because it has not yet been tamed by domestication. An animal is a perfectly appropriate symbol for this rôle of libido. But why is the animal a crab in this particular instance? The patient associates cancer with it, of which disease Mrs. X. died at the age the patient has just reached. It may, therefore, well be that this is an allusion to an identification with Mrs. X. We must therefore make inquiries about this Mrs. X. The patient relates the following facts about her: Mrs. X. was widowed early; she was very cheerful and enjoyed life. She had a number of adventures with men, especially with one particular man, a gifted artist, who the patient herself knew personally and who always impressed her as very fascinating and weird.
Clearly, in our interpretation, everything now hinges on understanding what the crab represents. We know it symbolizes something that emerges from the friend (she links the crab to the friend) and also something that surfaced with the mother. Whether both the mother and the friend actually possess this quality doesn’t matter to the patient. The situation will only shift when the patient herself changes. Nothing can be changed about the mother since she is deceased. The friend can’t be pressured to change; if she chooses to change, that’s her own decision. The fact that the quality in question is tied to the mother suggests it has an infantile aspect. What do the patient's relationships with her mother and her friend have in common? Both involve an incredibly intense demand for love, with the patient feeling overwhelmed by its intensity. This demand is a powerful, childlike craving that is characteristically irrational. What’s at play here is a part of her libido that hasn’t been developed, differentiated, or humanized, still holding the uncompromising nature of an instinct because it hasn’t been tamed through socialization. An animal is a fitting symbol for this aspect of libido. But why is the animal a crab in this particular case? The patient connects it with cancer, the disease that Mrs. X died from at the age the patient has just reached. Therefore, it’s likely an allusion to an identification with Mrs. X. We should investigate who this Mrs. X is. The patient shares the following details about her: Mrs. X was widowed early; she was very cheerful and loved life. She had several adventures with men, especially with one man, a talented artist, whom the patient knew personally and always found to be very intriguing and unusual.
An identification can only result from an unrecognized unconscious resemblance. Now what is the resemblance[424] between our patient and Mrs. X.? I was able here to remind the patient of a series of former fantasies and dreams, which had shown plainly that she also had a frivolous vein in her, although anxiously repressing it, because she vaguely feared it might seduce her to an immoral life. We have now gained a further essential contribution for a right understanding of the "animal" rôle, which evidently represents an untamed, instinctive greed, which in this case is directed to men. At the same time we understand a further reason why she cannot let go of her friend. She must cling to her in order not to fall a prey to this other tendency, which seems so much more dangerous. By these means she remains at an infantile homosexual stage, which serves her as a defence. (Experience proves this erection of defences to be one of the most effective motives for the retention of unadapted, infantile relations.) But in this missing libido in the animal rôle lies her well-being, the germ of her future healthy personality, which does not shrink from the hazards of human life.
An identification can only come from an unrecognized unconscious similarity. Now, what is the similarity[424] between our patient and Mrs. X? I was able to remind the patient of a series of past fantasies and dreams that clearly showed she also had a playful side, although she was anxiously repressing it because she vaguely feared it might lead her to an immoral life. We have now gained another important insight for a proper understanding of the "animal" role, which clearly represents an untamed, instinctive greed directed towards men in this case. At the same time, we understand another reason why she can't let go of her friend. She must hold onto her to avoid succumbing to this other tendency that seems much more dangerous. This way, she remains in an infantile homosexual stage, which serves as her defense. (Experience shows that building these defenses is one of the most effective reasons for holding onto maladaptive, childlike relationships.) But in this lack of libido in the animal role lies her well-being, the seed of her future healthy personality, which does not shy away from the risks of human life.
But the patient had drawn another conclusion from the fate of Mrs. X., having conceived her severe illness and early death as a punishment of fate for her gay life which the patient, although certainly not confessing to this feeling, always envied her. When Mrs. X. died, the patient pulled a long face, beneath which a "human, all too human," malicious satisfaction was hidden. As a punishment for this tendency the patient, taking Mrs. X.'s example as a warning, deterred herself from living and from further development, and burdened herself with the misery of this unsatisfying friendship. Of course this concatenation had not been consciously clear to her, otherwise she would never have acted as she had done. The truth of this conclusion can be proved by the material.
But the patient had come to a different conclusion based on Mrs. X's fate, believing that her severe illness and early death were a punishment for her carefree life, which the patient, though not openly admitting it, had always envied. When Mrs. X. passed away, the patient wore a long face, hiding a "human, all too human," spiteful satisfaction underneath. As a consequence of this tendency, the patient, using Mrs. X's example as a warning, held herself back from living fully and from personal growth, and weighed herself down with the misery of this unfulfilling friendship. Of course, she hadn’t consciously connected these dots; otherwise, she would never have acted the way she did. The validity of this conclusion can be supported by the evidence.
The history of this identification by no means ends here. The patient subsequently emphasized the fact that Mrs. X. had a not inconsiderable artistic capacity which developed only after her husband's death and which led to her friendship with the artist. This fact seems to be one of the essential incentives to the identification, if we call to mind that the patient had already told us what a striking impression she had[425] received from the artist. A fascination of this kind is never exclusively exercised by one person only upon the other. It is a phenomenon of reciprocal relation between two persons in so far as the fascinated person must provide a suitable predisposition. But she must be unconscious of this predisposition, otherwise there will be no fascination. Fascination is a phenomenon of compulsion which lacks conscious ground; that is, it is not a process of the will, but a phenomenon coming to the surface from the unconscious, and forcing itself compulsorily upon consciousness. All compulsions arise from unconscious motives. It must therefore be assumed that the patient possesses a similar unconscious predisposition to that of the artist. She becomes identified with this artist, and is also identified with him as man. Here we are at once reminded of the analysis of the dream, where we met an allusion to the "masculine" foot. As a matter of fact, the patient plays a thoroughly masculine part towards her friend, being the active one who continually takes the lead, commanding her friend and occasionally even forcing her somewhat violently to some course that only the patient desires. Her friend is distinctly feminine both in her external appearance and otherwise, whilst the patient is also externally of a somewhat masculine type. Her voice is stronger and deeper than that of her friend. She now describes Mrs. X. as a very feminine woman, her gentleness and amiability being comparable to that of her friend, so she thinks. This gives us a new clue. The patient is obviously playing towards her friend the artist's part towards Mrs. X. Thus she unconsciously completes her identification with Mrs. X. and her lover. In this way she is giving expression to her frivolous vein which she had repressed so carefully. She is not living it consciously, however, but is herself played upon by her own unconscious tendency.
The story of this identification doesn’t end here. The patient later pointed out that Mrs. X had a significant artistic talent that developed only after her husband's death and that this led to her friendship with the artist. This aspect appears to be one of the key motivations for the identification, especially considering that the patient had already shared how strongly the artist impressed her. Such fascination isn’t one-sided; it’s a mutual relationship where the fascinated person must have the right predisposition. However, this predisposition must be unconscious; otherwise, fascination doesn’t occur. Fascination is a compulsion arising from unconscious motives; it’s not a willful process but something that emerges from the unconscious and asserts itself upon awareness. All compulsions stem from these unconscious motives. Therefore, we can assume that the patient has a similar unconscious predisposition as the artist. She identifies with him, and she also identifies with him as a man. This reminds us of the dream analysis, where we encountered a reference to the “masculine” foot. In reality, the patient takes on a largely masculine role with her friend, being the active one who leads, directs, and sometimes even forces her friend into actions that only she wants. Her friend is distinctly feminine in both looks and demeanor, while the patient also has a somewhat masculine appearance. Her voice is stronger and deeper than her friend’s. She describes Mrs. X as a very feminine woman, saying her gentleness and kindness are similar to those of her friend. This gives us new insight. The patient is clearly adopting the artist's role towards Mrs. X. In doing so, she unconsciously completes her identification with Mrs. X and her lover. This way, she expresses her playful side that she has carefully suppressed. However, she is not consciously living this out; instead, she is being influenced by her own unconscious tendencies.
We now know a great deal about the crab: it represents the inner psychology of this untamed part of the libido. The unconscious identifications always keep drawing her on. They have this power because being unconscious they cannot be subjected to insight and correction. The crab is the symbol of the unconscious contents. These contents are always[426] seducing the patient to retain her relation to the friend. (The "crab goes backwards.") But the relation to the friend is synonymous with illness, she became nervous through it (hence the association of illness).
We now know a lot about the crab: it symbolizes the inner psychology of this wild part of the libido. The unconscious identifications keep drawing her in. They have this power because, being unconscious, they can’t be understood or fixed. The crab represents the unconscious contents. These contents are always[426]tempting the patient to maintain her connection to the friend. (The "crab moves backward.") But the connection to the friend is tied to illness; she became anxious because of it (hence the link between illness and this).
Strictly speaking, this really belongs to the analysis on the objective plane. But we must not forget that we only arrive at understanding by applying the subjective interpretation, which thereby proves itself to be an important heuristic principle. For practical purposes we might rest quite satisfied with the result we have already reached. But we seek here to satisfy all the requirements of the theory. Not all the associations have yet been used; neither is the significance of the choice of symbols yet demonstrated sufficiently.
Strictly speaking, this really belongs to the analysis on the objective level. But we must not forget that we can only achieve understanding by applying the subjective interpretation, which proves to be an important guiding principle. For practical purposes, we could be quite satisfied with the results we've already reached. However, we aim to meet all the requirements of the theory. Not all the associations have been used yet, and the significance of the choice of symbols has not been demonstrated enough.
We will now recur to the patient's remark that the crab lay hidden under the water in the stream, and that she had not seen it at first. She had not at first perceived the unconscious relations that have just been elucidated; they lay hidden in the water. But the stream is the obstacle preventing her from going across. It is precisely the unconscious relations binding her to her friend that have been hindering her. The unconscious was the obstacle. In this case, therefore, the water signifies the unconscious, or, it were better to say, the being unconscious the being hidden, for the crab is also something unconscious, namely, the portion of the libido that was hidden in the unconscious.
We will now return to the patient's comment about the crab being hidden under the water in the stream, and how she hadn't noticed it at first. Initially, she didn't recognize the unconscious connections we've just clarified; they were concealed beneath the surface. However, the stream acts as the barrier preventing her from crossing over. It's these unconscious ties to her friend that have been holding her back. The unconscious is the obstacle here. In this case, the water represents the unconscious, or more accurately, the state of being unconscious, the hidden aspect, because the crab also symbolizes something unconscious, specifically the part of the libido that was tucked away in the unconscious.
IX.—The Dominants of the Super-Personal Unconscious.
IX.—The Dominants of the Super-Personal Unconscious.
The task now lies before us of raising the unconscious data and their relations that have been hitherto understood upon the objective plane, to the subjective plane. To this end we must once more separate them from their objects, conceiving them as images, related in a subjective way to function-complexes in the patient's own unconscious. Raised to the subjective plane, Mrs. X. is the person who showed the patient the way to do something that the patient herself feared while unconsciously desiring it. Mrs. X. therefore represents[427] that which the patient would like to become, and yet does not quite want to. In a certain sense Mrs. X. is a picture of the patient's future character. The fascinating artist cannot be raised to the subjective plane, because the unconscious artistic gift lying dormant in the patient has already been covered over by Mrs. X. It would be quite right to say that the artist is the image of the masculine element in the patient, which not being consciously realised, is still lying in the unconscious. In a certain sense this is indeed true, the patient actually deluding herself as regards this matter. That is, she seems to herself to be particularly tender, sensitive and feminine, with nothing in the least masculine about her. She was indignantly amazed when I drew her attention to her masculine traits. But the reason why she is fascinated by something mysterious in the artist cannot be attributed to what is masculine in her. That seems to be completely unknown to her. And yet it must be hiding somewhere, for she has produced this feeling out of herself.
The task ahead of us is to bring the unconscious data and their relationships, which have previously been understood on an objective level, to the subjective level. To achieve this, we need to separate them once again from their objects, viewing them as images that are subjectively related to function-complexes in the patient's own unconscious. When elevated to the subjective level, Mrs. X. is the person who guided the patient towards something the patient feared while secretly wanting it. Therefore, Mrs. X. represents[427] what the patient wishes to become but isn’t fully ready for. In a sense, Mrs. X. embodies the patient’s potential future character. The compelling artist cannot be lifted to the subjective level because the patient's dormant artistic gift has already been overshadowed by Mrs. X. It would be accurate to say that the artist symbolizes the masculine aspect in the patient, which, although not consciously recognized, still resides in the unconscious. In a way, this is true, as the patient is genuinely deceiving herself about this issue. She perceives herself as especially tender, sensitive, and feminine, with no masculine qualities at all. She was astonished and offended when I pointed out her masculine traits. However, the reason she is drawn to the enigmatic nature of the artist cannot be linked to what is masculine within her. That seems to be entirely foreign to her. Yet, it must be concealed somewhere, as she has created this feeling from within herself.
Whenever a part of libido similar to this cannot be found, experience teaches us that it has always been projected. But into whom? Is it still attached to the artist? He has long ago disappeared from her horizon, and can hardly have taken the projection with him, because it was firmly fixed in the patient's unconscious. A similar projection is always actually present, that is, there must somewhere be some one upon whom this amount of libido is actually projected, otherwise she would have felt it consciously.
Whenever a part of libido like this can't be found, experience shows us that it has always been projected. But onto whom? Is it still connected to the artist? He has long since disappeared from her view and can hardly have taken the projection with him, since it was firmly rooted in the patient’s unconscious. A similar projection is always actually there; that is, there must be someone somewhere onto whom this amount of libido is actually projected; otherwise, she would have felt it consciously.
Thus we once more reach the objective plane, for we cannot discover this missing projection in any other way. The patient does not know any man except myself who means anything at all to her, and as her doctor I mean a good deal to her. Therefore she has probably projected this part upon me. It is true I had never noticed anything of the kind. But the exquisitely deceptive rôles are never presented to the analyst on the surface, coming to light always only outside the hour of treatment. I therefore carefully inquire: "Tell me what do I seem like to you when you are not with me? Am I just the same then?" Reply: "When I am with you, you are very[428] pleasant and kind; but when I am alone, or have not seen you for rather a long time, then the picture I have in my mind of you changes in an extraordinary way. Sometimes you seem quite idealized, and then again different." She hesitates; I help by saying: "Yes, what am I like then?" Reply: "Sometimes quite dangerous, sinister like an evil magician or demon. I do not know how I get hold of such ideas. You are not really a bit like that."
So we come back to the objective perspective, because we can’t find this missing piece in any other way. The patient doesn’t know anyone but me who means anything significant to her, and as her doctor, I mean a lot to her. That’s why she has probably projected this part onto me. It’s true that I never noticed anything like that before. But these cleverly deceptive roles are never obvious to the analyst; they only reveal themselves outside of the therapy sessions. So I carefully ask, “What do I seem like to you when you’re not with me? Am I the same then?” She replies, “When I’m with you, you’re very nice and kind; but when I’m alone, or haven’t seen you for a while, then the image I have of you changes a lot. Sometimes you seem almost idealized, and other times different.” She hesitates, and I prompt her by asking, “Yes, what am I like then?” She responds, “Sometimes you seem quite dangerous, sinister like an evil magician or demon. I don’t know why I think of such things. You’re not really like that at all.”
So this part was attached to me as part of a transference; that is why it was lacking in her inventory. Therewith we recognize a further important thing. I was confused with (identified with) the artist, and in her unconscious fantasy she is Mrs. X. I was easily able to prove this fact by means of material that had previously been brought to light (sexual fantasies). But I myself then am the obstacle, the crab, that is hindering her from getting across. The state of affairs would be critical if at this particular point we were to limit ourselves to the objective plane of interpretation. What would be the use of my explaining: "But I am not this artist at all, I am not in the least weird as he is, nor am I like an evil magician." That would leave the patient quite unconvinced because she would know as well I do that the projection would continue to exist all the same, and that it is really I who am hindering her further progress. It is at this point that many a treatment has come to a standstill. For there is no other way for the patient here of escaping from the embrace of the unconscious, but for the physician to raise himself to the subjective plane, where he is to be regarded as an image. But an image of what? This is where the greatest difficulty lies. The doctor will say: "An image of something in the patient's unconscious." But the patient may object: "What, am I to suppose myself to be a man, a mysteriously fascinating one to boot, a wicked wizard and a demon? No, I cannot accept that; it is nonsense. I'd sooner believe that you are all that." She is really, so to speak, quite right. It is too preposterous to want to transfer such things to herself. She cannot permit herself to be made into a demon, any more than can the physician. Her eyes flash, a wicked expression appears upon[429] her face, a glimmer of an unknown hate never seen before, something snake-like seeming to creep into her. I am suddenly faced by the possibility of a fatal misunderstanding with her. What is it? Is it disappointed love? Is she offended? Does she feel depreciated? There seems to lurk something of the beast of prey, something really demoniac in her glance. Is she then after all a demon? Or am I myself the beast of prey, the demon, and is this a terrified victim sitting before me, who is trying to defend herself with the brute force of despair against my wicked spells? But either idea must be nonsense, phantastical delusion. What have I come in contact with? What new string is vibrating? But it is only for a passing moment. The expression upon the patient's face becoming quiet again, she says, as if relieved: "It is extraordinary. I feel as if you had touched the point which I could never get over in relation to my friend. It is a horrible feeling, something non-human, wicked, and cruel. I cannot describe how queer this feeling is. At such moments it makes me hate and despise my friend, although I struggle against it with all my might and main."
So this part was tied to me because of a transference; that's why it was missing from her inventory. This leads us to recognize something important. I was mixed up with (identified with) the artist, and in her unconscious fantasy, she is Mrs. X. I could easily prove this with materials that had come to light before (sexual fantasies). But I, in fact, am the obstacle, the crab, preventing her from moving forward. It would be a critical situation if we limited ourselves to objective interpretation right now. What good would it do for me to say, "But I’m not the artist at all, I’m not weird like he is, nor am I like an evil magician"? That wouldn’t convince the patient because she knows, just like I do, that the projection will still exist and that I’m the one blocking her progress. Many treatments have stalled at this point. The only way for the patient to escape the grip of the unconscious is for the physician to elevate himself to a subjective level, where he is seen as an image. But an image of what? That’s where the biggest challenge lies. The doctor might say: "An image of something in the patient's unconscious." But the patient could respond: "What, am I supposed to think of myself as a man, a mysteriously fascinating one at that, a wicked wizard and a demon? No, I can't accept that; it's absurd. I’d sooner believe that you are all that." She would actually be quite right. It’s too ridiculous to expect her to internalize such things. She can’t allow herself to be turned into a demon, any more than the physician can. Her eyes flash, a wicked expression appears on her face, a hint of an unknown hatred emerges, something snake-like seems to creep into her. I suddenly confront the possibility of a grave misunderstanding with her. What is it? Is it unrequited love? Is she offended? Does she feel belittled? There seems to be something predatory lurking in her gaze, something truly demonic. Is she a demon after all? Or am I the predator, the demon, and is this a terrified victim sitting before me, trying to defend herself with sheer despair against my wicked spells? But either idea must be nonsense, a fanciful delusion. What have I come into contact with? What new string is resonating? But this is only for a brief moment. The expression on the patient's face settles down again, and she says, almost relieved: "It's extraordinary. I feel like you’ve touched the point I could never overcome regarding my friend. It’s a horrible feeling, something inhuman, wicked, and cruel. I can’t describe how strange this feeling is. In those moments, it makes me hate and despise my friend, even though I fight against it with all my strength."
An explanatory light is thrown upon what has happened by this observation. I have now taken the friend's place. The friendship has been overcome, the ice of repression is broken. The patient has without knowing it entered upon a new phase of her existence. I know that now upon me will fall everything painful and bad in the relation to the friend. So also will whatever was good in it, although in violent conflict with the mysterious unknown quantity X, about which the patient could never get clear. A new phase, therefore, of the transference supervenes, which, however, does not as yet make clearly apparent what the X that is projected upon me consists of.
An explanatory light is shed on what has happened by this observation. I've now taken the friend's role. The friendship has been overcome, and the ice of repression is broken. The patient has unknowingly entered a new phase of her existence. I realize that everything painful and negative in relation to the friend will now fall on me. The good aspects will also come to me, even though they clash with the mysterious unknown factor X, which the patient could never make clear. A new phase of the transference is emerging, but it doesn’t yet reveal what the X projected onto me actually consists of.
It is quite certain, that the most troublesome misunderstandings threaten if the patient should stick at this stage of the transference. In that case she will necessarily treat me as she treated her friend; that is the X will continually be somewhere in the air giving rise to misunderstandings. The end would probably be that she would see the evil demon in me,[430] because she is quite unable to accept the fact that she is herself the demon. All insoluble conflicts are brought about in this way. And an insoluble conflict signifies a standstill in life.
It’s pretty clear that the most problematic misunderstandings arise if the patient gets stuck at this stage of the transference. In that case, she will inevitably treat me the same way she treated her friend; that is, the X will always be hovering in the background, leading to misunderstandings. Ultimately, she would likely see me as the evil demon,[430] because she can't accept that she herself is the demon. All unsolvable conflicts come about this way. And an unsolvable conflict means a halt in life.
Another possibility is, that the patient should disregard the obscure point by applying her old preventative against this new difficulty. That is, she would repress it again, instead of keeping it conscious, which is the necessary and obvious demand of the whole method. Nothing is gained by such repression; on the contrary, the X threatens more from the unconscious where it is considerably more unpleasant.
Another option is that the patient could ignore the unclear issue by using her old method of prevention against this new challenge. In other words, she would push it down again instead of keeping it in mind, which is the essential and clear requirement of the entire approach. Repressing it doesn’t help; on the contrary, the X poses a greater threat from the unconscious where it is a lot more distressing.
Whenever such an unacceptable image emerges, one must decide whether at bottom it is destined to represent a human quality or not. "Magician" and "demon" may represent qualities that are described in this particular fashion, in order that they may speedily be recognized as not human but mythological qualities. Magician and demon being mythological figures aptly express the unknown "non-human" feelings which had surprised the patient. These attributes are not applicable to a human personality; being as a rule judgments of character intuitively and not critically approved, which are projected upon our fellow-beings, inevitably doing serious injury to human relations.
Whenever an unacceptable image comes up, one has to determine whether it ultimately represents a human quality or not. "Magician" and "demon" may symbolize qualities described in this way so they can quickly be recognized as not human but mythological qualities. The magician and demon, as mythological figures, effectively convey the unknown "non-human" feelings that startled the patient. These traits aren't applicable to a human personality; they are generally assessments of character intuitively made, rather than critically evaluated, and when projected onto others, they can seriously damage human relationships.
Such attributes always indicate that contents of the super-personal or absolute unconscious are being projected. Neither demons nor wicked magicians are reminiscences of personal experiences, although every one has, of course, at some time or other heard or read of them. Although one has heard of a rattle-snake, it would hardly be appropriate to describe a lizard or a blind-worm as a rattle-snake, simply because one was startled by their rustling. Similarly, one would hardly term a fellow-being a demon, unless some kind of demoniacal influence were closely associated with him. If, however, the demoniacal influence were really part of his personal character, it would show itself everywhere, and then this human being would be a demon, a kind of werwolf. But such an ascription is mythology; in other words, it is from the collective and not from the individual psyche. Inasmuch as through our unconscious[431] we have a share in the historical collective psyche, we naturally dwell unconsciously in a world of werwolves, demons, magicians, etc., these being things which have always affected man most profoundly. We have just as much a part in gods and devils, saviours and criminals. But it would be absurd to want to ascribe to one's personal self the possibilities that are potentially existing in the human unconscious. It is, therefore, essential to make as clear a distinction as possible between the personal and the impersonal assets of our psyche. This is by no means intended to nullify the occasional great effects due to the existence of the contents of the absolute unconscious; but these contents of the collective psyche should be differentiated from those belonging to the individual psyche. For simple-minded people, of course, these things were never separated, the projection of gods, demons, etc., not having been understood as a psychological function were simply accounted concretistical realities. Their projectional character was never perceived. It was only with the advent of the epoch of scepticism that it was realized that the gods did not really exist except as projections. With that the matter was set at rest. But the psychological function corresponding to it was by no means set at rest, for it lapsed into the unconscious and began to poison men with a surplus of libido that had hitherto been invested in the cult of idols or gods. Obviously, the depreciation and repression of such a powerful function as that of religion has serious consequences for the psychology of the individual. The reflux of this libido strengthens the unconscious prodigiously, so that it begins to exercise a powerful compulsory influence upon consciousness and its archaic collective contents. One period of scepticism came to a close with the horrors of the French Revolution. At the present time we are again experiencing an ebullition of the unconscious destructive powers of the collective psyche. The result is an unparalleled general slaughter. That is just what the unconscious was tending towards. This tendency had previously been inordinately strengthened by the rationalism of modern life, which by depreciating everything irrational, caused the function of irrationalism to sink into the unconscious.[432] But the function once in the unconscious will from thence work unceasing havoc, like an incurable disease whose centre cannot be eradicated. For then the individual and the nation alike are compelled to live irrationally, and even to apply their highest idealism and their best wit to make this madness of irrationalism as complete as possible. We see examples of this on a small scale in our patient. She turned from a possibility of life that seemed to her irrational (Mrs. X.) in order to live it in a pathological form, to her own loss, and with an unsuitable object.
These traits always show that we are projecting content from the super-personal or absolute unconscious. Neither demons nor evil sorcerers are memories of personal experiences, even though everyone has, at some point, heard or read about them. Just because someone has heard of a rattlesnake doesn't mean it's right to call a lizard or a blindworm a rattlesnake, simply because they startled you with their rustling. Similarly, you wouldn't call a fellow human a demon unless some demonic influence was clearly linked to them. However, if that demonic influence was genuinely part of their character, it would manifest in all aspects of their being, and then that person would be regarded as a demon, a kind of werewolf. But labeling someone like that falls into the realm of mythology; it's sourced from the collective rather than the individual psyche. Since our unconscious connects us to the historical collective psyche, we unknowingly exist in a world filled with werewolves, demons, magicians, etc.—entities that have always had a profound impact on humanity. We also share in the experiences of gods and devils, saviors and criminals. However, it would be ridiculous to attribute to our personal selves the potentialities that exist in the human unconscious. Therefore, it's crucial to clearly distinguish between the personal and impersonal components of our psyche. This isn't meant to dismiss the occasional significant effects produced by the absolute unconscious; it’s just that these elements from the collective psyche should be differentiated from those of the individual psyche. For simple-minded people, these aspects were never separated, so the projections of gods, demons, etc., were seen as concrete realities rather than understood as psychological functions. Their nature as projections was never recognized. It was only during the era of skepticism that people realized gods didn’t actually exist apart from being projections. Once that realization occurred, it was accepted. However, the psychological function related to this was by no means settled, as it slipped into the unconscious and began to negatively impact individuals with a surplus of libido that had previously been invested in the worship of idols or deities. Clearly, downplaying and repressing such a powerful function as religion has serious implications for individual psychology. The return of this libido greatly intensifies the unconscious, causing it to exert a strong and compulsory influence on consciousness and its ancient collective contents. One period of skepticism ended with the horrors of the French Revolution. Today, we are once again witnessing an eruption of the unconscious destructive powers of the collective psyche. The outcome is an unprecedented level of violence. This is precisely what the unconscious was moving toward. This tendency had previously been excessively amplified by the rationalism of modern life, which, by devaluing everything irrational, pushed the function of irrationalism into the unconscious.[432] Once this function is buried in the unconscious, it will wreak continuous havoc, like a chronic illness with a core that cannot be removed. Consequently, both individuals and nations are forced to live irrationally, using their highest ideals and best reasoning to make this madness of irrationalism as complete as possible. We observe this on a smaller scale in our patient. She turned away from a form of life that she found irrational (Mrs. X.) to live it in a pathological way, to her own detriment, with an inappropriate object.
There is, indeed, no possible alternative but to acknowledge irrationalism as a psychological function that is necessary and always existent. Its results are not to be taken as concrete realities (that would involve repression), but as psychological realities. They are realities because they are effective things, that is, they are actualities.
There really is no other option but to recognize irrationalism as a psychological function that is essential and always present. Its outcomes shouldn’t be seen as concrete realities (that would mean repressing them), but as psychological realities. They are considered realities because they are effective things, meaning they are actualities.
The collective unconscious is the sediment of all the experience of the universe of all time, and is also an image of the universe that has been in process of formation for untold ages. In the course of time certain features have become prominent in this image, the so-called dominants. These dominants are the ruling powers, the gods; that is, the representations resulting from dominating laws and principles, from average regularities in the issue of the images that the brain has received as a consequence of secular processes.
The collective unconscious is the accumulation of all experiences throughout the universe's history and is also an evolving representation of the universe that has been shaping for countless ages. Over time, certain aspects have stood out in this representation, known as dominants. These dominants are the main forces, the gods; they are the representations that arise from prevailing laws and principles, as well as from the regular patterns in the images the brain has processed due to long-term developments.
In so far as the images formed in the brain are relatively faithful portrayals of psychic happenings they will correspond to their dominants; that is, their general characteristic features, made prominent by the accumulation of similar experiences, will correspond to certain physical fundamental facts that are also universal. Hence it is possible to transfer unconscious images to physical events direct as intuitive ideas; e.g. ether the primeval breath or soul-substance appears in man's conceptions the whole world over; so, too, energy, the magic force, which is equally widespread.
As long as the images formed in the brain are fairly accurate representations of mental occurrences, they will relate to their main themes; meaning that their general characteristics, highlighted by the buildup of similar experiences, will align with certain physical fundamental truths that are also universal. Therefore, it’s possible to transfer subconscious images directly to physical events as intuitive ideas; for example, ether, the original breath or soul substance, appears in people’s beliefs all over the world; likewise, energy, the magical force, is equally widespread.
On account of their connection with physical things the dominants usually make their appearance as projections, appearing, indeed—if the projections are unconscious—in the[433] persons of the immediate environment, as a rule in the form of abnormal under- or over-valuations, which excite misunderstandings, conflict, infatuations, and various kinds of folly. People say: "He makes a god of So-and-so," or "So-and-so is X.'s bête noire." They also give rise to the formation of modern myths, that is, fantastic rumours, suspicions and prejudices.
Due to their connection with physical objects, the dominant traits often show up as projections, appearing—especially if these projections are unconscious—in the[433] individuals in the surrounding environment, usually as abnormal under- or over-valuations, leading to misunderstandings, conflicts, infatuations, and various kinds of foolishness. People say things like, "He idolizes So-and-so," or "So-and-so is X's bête noire." They also lead to the creation of modern myths, which consist of fantastic rumors, suspicions, and biases.
The dominants of the collective unconscious are therefore extremely important things of significant effect, to which great attention should be paid. They must not be repressed, but must be given most careful consideration. They usually appear as projections, and since projections are only attached where there is some external stimulus, it is very difficult to appraise them aright, on account of the relation of the unconscious images with the object. If some one projects the dominant of "devil" into a fellow-being, this occurs because this other person has something in him that makes the attachment of the devil dominant possible. But that is by no means to say that this person is therefore, so to speak, a devil; on the contrary, he may be a particularly good fellow, but being antipathetic to the one who projects, a "devilish effect" is brought about between the two. This does not mean that the one who projects is a devil, although he must recognize that he too, just as much, has something devilish in him, and has been gulled by it, inasmuch as he projected it; but that does not make him a devil; indeed, he may be just as decent a man as the other. In such a case the appearance of the devil dominant means: the two persons are incompatible (for the moment and for the near future), wherefore the unconscious splits them asunder and holds them apart from each other.
The dominant elements of the collective unconscious are crucial and have a significant impact, so they deserve careful attention. They shouldn't be suppressed but should be thoughtfully examined. They often show up as projections, and since projections only occur in response to some external trigger, it can be challenging to correctly assess them due to the relationship between the unconscious images and the object. If someone projects the dominant of "devil" onto another person, it's because that person has something in them that makes the "devil" projection possible. However, this does not mean that the person being projected onto is actually a devil; in fact, they might be a really good person. But if they don’t get along with the one projecting, it creates a "devilish effect" between them. This doesn’t imply that the projector is a devil, although they must recognize that they also have something devilish within themselves and have been misled by it by projecting it. But that doesn’t mean they are a devil; they might be just as decent as the other person. In this situation, the appearance of the devil dominant indicates that the two people are incompatible (at least for now), causing the unconscious to separate them and keep them apart.
One of the dominants that is almost always met in the analysis of projections of collective unconscious contents is the "magical demon;" it is of preponderating sinister effect. "The Golem," by Meyrink, is a good example of this; also the Thibetan wizard in Meyrink's "Fledermäusen," who lets the world-war loose by magic. Obviously Meyrink formed this image independently and freely out of his unconscious, by[434] giving word and picture to a feeling similar to the one that my patient had projected upon me. The dominant of magic also appears in "Zarathustra," whilst in "Faust" it is, so to say, the hero himself.
One of the key themes that often comes up in analyzing projections of the collective unconscious is the "magical demon," which has a strong, eerie impact. "The Golem" by Meyrink is a great example of this, as is the Tibetan wizard in Meyrink's "Fledermäusen," who unleashes a world war through magic. Clearly, Meyrink created this image independently and freely from his unconscious, by[434] giving expression to a feeling similar to what my patient projected onto me. The theme of magic also shows up in "Zarathustra," while in "Faust," it is, in a sense, the hero himself.
The picture of this demon is the lowest and most elementary concept of God. It is the dominant of the primitive tribal magic-man, or a singularly gifted personality endowed with magic power. This figure very frequently makes an appearance in my patient's unconscious as a dark-skinned being of Mongolian type.
The image of this demon represents the most basic and fundamental idea of God. It's the embodiment of the early tribal sorcerer or a uniquely talented individual with magical abilities. This character often appears in my patient's unconscious as a dark-skinned person of Mongolian descent.
An important step forward has been taken by the recognition of the dominants of the absolute unconscious. The magical or demoniac effect of the fellow-being is made to disappear by the feeling being realised as a definite projection of the absolute unconscious. On the other hand, a completely new and unsuspected task now lies before us: namely, the question in what way the ego should come to terms with this psychological non-ego. Should one rest satisfied with having verified the effective existence of unconscious dominants, leaving the matter to take care of itself?
An important step forward has been made by acknowledging the influences of the absolute unconscious. The magical or demonic effect of others fades away when the feeling is recognized as a clear projection of the absolute unconscious. On the other hand, a completely new and unexpected task now lies ahead: specifically, how should the ego reconcile with this psychological non-ego? Should we simply be content with having confirmed the real existence of unconscious influences and let things unfold on their own?
To leave it at this point would be the means of creating a permanent state of dissociation in the subject, a conflict between the individual psyche and the collective psyche. Upon the one side we should have the differentiated modern ego, whilst upon the other a kind of uncivilized negro representative of a thoroughly primitive state. That would mean that we should have what really does exist, a crust of civilization over a dark-skinned brute; the cleavage would be distinct and demonstrable before our very eyes. But such a dissociation requires immediate synthesis and cultivation of what is undeveloped. There must be a union of these two aspects.
Leaving things as they are would create a lasting split in the person, causing a conflict between their individual mind and the collective mindset. On one side, we would have the fully formed modern self, and on the other, a kind of uncivilized representation of a completely primitive state. This would mean that we actually have a layer of civilization over a dark-skinned primitive being; the divide would be clear and evident right before us. However, such a split demands an immediate merging and development of what is still underdeveloped. There needs to be a union of these two aspects.
Before entering upon this new question let us first return to the dream from which we started. The discussion has given us a broader understanding of the dream, and especially of an essential part of it, namely, the fear. This fear is a demoniac fear of the dominants of the collective unconscious. We saw that the patient identifies herself with Mrs. X., expressing thereby that she also has some relation to the[435] mysterious artist. It was apparent also that she identified the physician (myself) with the artist; and further that when taken upon the subjective plane, the image of the wizard dominants of the collective unconscious represented me.
Before we dive into this new topic, let's go back to the dream we started with. The discussion has given us a deeper understanding of the dream, particularly a crucial part of it: the fear. This fear is a powerful, haunting fear from the dominant forces in the collective unconscious. We observed that the patient identifies herself with Mrs. X., which shows that she also feels a connection to the[435]mysterious artist. It was also clear that she linked the physician (myself) with the artist; furthermore, when viewed from a subjective perspective, the image of the dominant forces in the collective unconscious represented me.
All this is covered in the dream by the symbol of the crab which walks backwards. The crab stands for the living content of the unconscious that can by no means be exhausted or rendered inoperative by analysis on the objective plane. But what we were able to do was to detach the mythological or collective psychological contents from the objects of consciousness, and to consolidate them as psychological realities outside the individual psyche.
All this is captured in the dream by the symbol of the crab that walks backwards. The crab represents the vibrant content of the unconscious that can't be fully expressed or made irrelevant through analysis on the objective level. But what we were able to do was to separate the mythological or collective psychological content from the objects of consciousness and solidify them as psychological realities outside the individual psyche.
So long as the absolute unconscious and the individual psyche are coupled together without differentiation, no progress can be made, or, as the dream expresses it, no boundary be crossed. If the dreamer does nevertheless prepare to cross the boundary, the unconscious that was hitherto unnoticed becomes animated, seizing her and dragging her down. The dream and its material characterize the absolute unconscious, on the one side as a lower animal living hidden in the depths of the water; and on the other side, as a dangerous disease that can only be cured by a timely operation. To what extent this characterization is appropriate has already been seen. As was pointed out, the animal symbol specially refers to what is extra human, that is super-personal; for the contents of the absolute unconscious are not merely the residue of archaic human functions, but also the residue of functions of the animal ancestry of mankind, whose duration of life was indeed vastly greater than the relatively brief epoch of specifically human existence. If such residues are active, they are apt, as nothing else is, not merely to arrest the progress of development, but also to divert the libido into regressive channels, until the quantity which the absolute unconscious has activated has been absorbed. The energy becomes profitable again after it has been consciously contrasted with the absolute unconscious, a process which enables it to be converted into a valuable source from which to draw. This transference of energy was established by religions in a[436] concretistic manner through cultural communication with the gods (the dominants of the absolute unconscious). But these modes and customs are too much at variance with our intellect and our moral sense for us to be able to declare this solution of the problem as still binding, or even possible. If, on the other hand, we apprehend the images of the unconscious as collective unconscious dominants, therefore as collective-psychological phenomena or functions, this hypothesis is in no way opposed to our intellect and conscience. This solution is rationally acceptable. We have thus gained the possibility of coming to terms with the activated residues of our ancestral history. This mode of settlement makes it possible to traverse the boundary line hitherto limiting us, and is therefore appropriately termed the transcendental function, which is synonymous with progressive development to a new attitude. In the dream this development is indicated by the other side of the stream.
As long as the absolute unconscious and the individual psyche are linked together without distinction, no progress can be made, or, as the dream suggests, no boundary can be crossed. If the dreamer attempts to cross the boundary, the previously unnoticed unconscious comes alive, grabbing hold of her and pulling her down. The dream and its elements represent the absolute unconscious, on one hand as a lower animal lurking in the depths of water; on the other hand, as a dangerous illness that can only be treated by a timely intervention. We've seen how fitting this description is. As mentioned, the animal symbol specifically refers to what is extra human, meaning super-personal; because the contents of the absolute unconscious are not just remnants of ancient human functions, but also traces of the functions of humanity's animal ancestors, whose lifespan far exceeded the relatively short period of purely human existence. When such remnants are active, they're more likely than anything else to not only halt development but also to redirect the libido into regressive paths, until the amount activated by the absolute unconscious has been absorbed. The energy becomes useful again after it has been consciously contrasted with the absolute unconscious, a process that allows it to be transformed into a valuable resource to draw from. Religions established this transfer of energy in a[436] concrete way through cultural interactions with the gods (the dominant aspects of the absolute unconscious). However, these practices and customs are too inconsistent with our intellect and moral understanding for us to consider this solution to the problem as still valid or even possible. On the other hand, if we perceive the images of the unconscious as collective unconscious dominants, thus as collective psychological phenomena or functions, this idea doesn't conflict with our intellect and conscience. This solution is rationally acceptable. We've gained the ability to reconcile with the activated remnants of our ancestral history. This approach allows us to cross the boundary that has been limiting us and is therefore aptly called the transcendental function, synonymous with progressive development toward a new mindset. In the dream, this development is represented by the other side of the stream.
The similarity to hero-myths is striking. The typical combat of the hero with the monster (the unconscious content) frequently takes place on the banks of some water; sometimes at a ford. This circumstance is prominent in legends of Red Indians, as, for example, in Longfellow's "Hiawatha." In the decisive battle the hero is swallowed by a monster (cf. story of Jonah), as Frobenius[246] has shown by means of extensive material. But inside the monster the hero begins to come to terms with the beast in his own way: whilst the creature swims with him towards the sunrise, he cuts off a valuable piece of the viscera, e.g. the heart, by which the monster lived, that is, the valuable energy by which the unconscious was activated. Through this deed he kills the monster, who then drifts to land, where the hero, born anew through the transcendental function (the "night-journey under the sea" of Frobenius), steps forth, often in company with all those beings whom the monster had previously swallowed. This enables the normal state to be restored, as the unconscious having been robbed of its energy no longer occupies a preponderating position. In this way the myth—which is the[437] dream of a people—graphically describes the problem with which our patient is concerned.[247]
The resemblance to hero myths is striking. The typical battle between the hero and the monster (representing the unconscious content) often happens by a body of water; sometimes at a crossing. This aspect is prominent in the legends of Native Americans, as seen in Longfellow's "Hiawatha." In the crucial fight, the hero gets swallowed by a monster (compare the story of Jonah), as Frobenius has demonstrated with extensive evidence. But inside the monster, the hero starts to confront the beast in his own way: while the creature swims with him toward the sunrise, he cuts off a valuable part of its insides, like the heart, which is the source of the monster's life—essentially, the powerful energy that activated the unconscious. By doing this, he defeats the monster, which then washes up on shore, where the hero, reborn through the transformative process (the "night journey under the sea" of Frobenius), emerges, often alongside all those beings that the monster had previously consumed. This restores the normal state, as the unconscious, having been stripped of its energy, no longer holds a dominant position. In this way, the myth—which is the dream of a people—vividly illustrates the issue our patient is dealing with.
The problem of how to come to terms with the absolute unconscious is a question apart. I must content myself here with a general survey of the new theory of the unconscious up to the transcendental function, leaving the presentation of the transcendental function itself to a later work.
The issue of how to deal with the absolute unconscious is a separate question. For now, I'll provide a general overview of the new theory of the unconscious up to the transcendental function, and I'll save the detailed discussion of the transcendental function for a future work.
X.—The Development of the Types of Introversion and Extroversion in the Analytical Process.
X.—The Development of Introversion and Extroversion in the Analytical Process.
The description of the analysis of the unconscious would be incomplete if a word were not said about the question whether this method is equally applicable to the two types. As a matter of fact, both the development and the conception of the unconscious are different for each type. Although making every effort to find out a formulation that shall be as universally valid as possible, we must emphatically impress upon our minds the fact that the two modes of conception of the types are essentially different; a universal formulation that is just, only becomes possible when both standpoints are given equal consideration. I do not conceal from myself the fact that this subject is of less interest to the layman than to the specialist. Nevertheless, certain aspects of the question are of such a general character that the layman should not find the perusal of this last section entirely without interest.
The description of the analysis of the unconscious wouldn't be complete without mentioning whether this method applies equally to both types. In reality, both the development and understanding of the unconscious differ for each type. While we strive to find a formulation that is as universally applicable as possible, we must strongly recognize that the ways of understanding the types are fundamentally different; a universal formulation that is fair only becomes feasible when both perspectives are considered equally. I’m aware that this topic is less interesting to the general public than to specialists. However, certain aspects of this question are broad enough that the general reader shouldn't find this final section completely unengaging.
Let us first consider the concept of the unconscious. I have here introduced the unconscious under the conception of a psychological function, namely, the function of the sum of all those psychic contents which do not reach the threshold of consciousness. I have divided the unconscious materials into personal—that is to reminiscences attributable to personal experiences, combinations and tendencies—and into impersonal collective contents, that is, those whose contents cannot be attributed to personal experiences.
Let’s first think about the idea of the unconscious. Here, I’m referring to the unconscious as a psychological function, specifically the function of all those mental contents that don’t reach our conscious awareness. I’ve categorized these unconscious materials into personal—meaning memories tied to individual experiences, combinations, and tendencies—and into impersonal collective contents, which are those that can’t be linked to personal experiences.
The contents of the psyche are fundamentally images indicating function on the one hand, and upon the other objects and the world generally. The conscious contains the recent object-images; the personal unconscious, the object-images of the individual past, so far as they have either been forgotten or repressed; whilst the absolute or collective unconscious contains the inherited world-images generally, under the form of primordial images or mythical themes. All psychic images have two sides: the one, being directed towards the object, is as faithful a likeness of the object as possible, framed without any intention or obligation to be anything else. The other side is directed towards the soul, that is towards the psychic function and the laws peculiar to it.
The contents of the mind are basically images that represent function on one side and objects and the world on the other. The conscious mind includes the recent object-images; the personal unconscious holds the object-images of a person's past, whether they have been forgotten or repressed; while the collective unconscious contains the inherited world-images in the form of archetypal images or mythical themes. All mental images have two aspects: one is aimed at the object and is intended to be as accurate a representation of the object as possible, without any intention or obligation to be anything more. The other aspect is aimed at the soul, meaning the mental function and its unique laws.
Let us take as an example, a primordial image out of a hero-myth. There is in the West a demon ancestress with a large mouth. The hero creeps into it, and at the same moment a certain little bird sings; the ancient dame shuts her mouth with a bang, and the hero disappears.
Let’s consider a classic image from a hero myth. In the West, there’s a demon ancestor with a big mouth. The hero sneaks inside, and just then, a little bird starts singing; the old woman slams her mouth shut, and the hero vanishes.
The side of the image directed towards the physical object means, the sun goes down in the evening into the mouth of the ocean. At this hour a certain little bird sings (which is an objective fact), and the sun disappears into the depths of the sea.
The side of the image facing the physical object means that the sun sets in the evening into the ocean's embrace. At this time, a small bird sings (which is a factual observation), and the sun sinks into the depths of the sea.
The side of the image directed towards the soul, that is the idea, signifies: The energy contained in consciousness disappears (like the sun in the evening) into the monster of the unconscious.
The side of the image that faces the soul, which is the idea, means: The energy held in consciousness fades away (like the sun at dusk) into the depths of the unconscious.
If we consider the collective-unconscious from the side of the soul or idea, it is something entirely distinct, and it must be differentiated, abstracted from the object, if its contents are to attain the perfection of an idea. If, on the other hand, we consider the collective-unconscious from the side of the physical object, that is as an image of the object, it is weaker and less clear than the object itself, and can only be brought to perfection if it is objectified, that is projected on to the object itself.
If we look at the collective unconscious from the perspective of the soul or the idea, it's something completely different, and we need to separate it, abstracted from the object, to achieve the ideal state of an idea. However, if we examine the collective unconscious from the viewpoint of the physical object, as an image of the object, it's weaker and less clear than the object itself and can only be perfected if it's made concrete, meaning projected onto the object itself.
As previously explained, there are two types of human[439] psychology that can be clearly distinguished, viz. introversion and extroversion. The introvert is characterised by the thought standpoint; the extrovert by the feeling standpoint. As I showed, they are quite different in their relation to the object: the introvert abstracting from the object and thinking about it, whilst the extrovert goes to the object and feels himself into it. The accent of value lies upon the ego for the introvert, but upon the object for the extrovert. The former's chief concern is the preservation of the ego; that of the latter the preservation of the object. The two types will adopt a different attitude towards the unconscious, namely, the introvert will and must seize the idea-side of the unconscious image; the extrovert, on the other hand, seizing the side of the physical reflection. The introvert will purify as far as possible the idea-side from the "alloy" of the concretistic admixture of the physical image, in order to arrive at the abstract idea; whilst, on the other hand, the extrovert will purify the physical image as far as possible from the "phantastic" admixture of the enveloping ideas. The former, by raising himself to a world of idea, will endeavour to overcome the disturbing influence of the unconscious; whilst the latter will approach the object as near as possible and project the unconscious image into the physical object, thus freeing himself from the grip of the unconscious.
As previously explained, there are two types of human[439] psychology that can be clearly distinguished: introversion and extroversion. The introvert is characterized by a focus on thoughts, while the extrovert is guided by feelings. As I showed, they relate to their environment quite differently: the introvert abstracts from the object and thinks about it, while the extrovert engages with the object and empathizes with it. For the introvert, the emphasis is on the self, whereas for the extrovert, it’s on the object. The introvert's main concern is preserving the self, while the extrovert focuses on preserving the object. The two types have different approaches to the unconscious; the introvert will and must grasp the idea behind the unconscious image, while the extrovert will focus on the physical reflection of it. The introvert will try to purify the idea from the "alloy" of the concrete physical image to reach the abstract idea, while the extrovert will aim to purify the physical image from the "fantastic" mix of surrounding ideas. The introvert, by elevating himself to a realm of ideas, will strive to overcome the disruptive influence of the unconscious, while the extrovert will get as close to the object as possible and project the unconscious image onto the physical object, thereby freeing himself from the hold of the unconscious.
What for the extrovert is a phantastic and disturbing admixture in the unconscious picture, is for the introvert precisely that which has the most value, for it is the germ of the pure idea, and vice versâ; what for the introvert are merely concretistical "imperfections," survivals of a physical origin, are for the extrovert a most valuable hint, the bridge by which the unconscious can be united with the object.
What the extrovert sees as a fantastic and troubling mix in their unconscious perception, the introvert views as incredibly valuable, as it represents the seed of a pure idea, and vice versa; what the introvert sees as simple "imperfections," remnants from a physical source, are for the extrovert a crucial clue, the link that connects the unconscious with the external world.
This description makes it manifest that the two types go contrary ways in the course of the development of their unconscious, arriving therefore at opposite extremes: the one at the idea, the other at the object of his feeling. The psychological characteristics of the types are eventually pushed to extremes, where according to the enantiodromic law the moment has arrived when in each case the "other" function[440] enters into its fully acknowledged right, that is, feeling in the case of the introvert, and thought in that of the extrovert. The introvert attains the lacking function of autonomous feeling by means of a differentiation and enhancement of his thought; whilst the extrovert, on the other hand, attains his thinking by the way of an increasingly differentiated love. These functions that hitherto were secondary are found at first in the unconscious, gradually reaching consciousness in the course of development. At first they are unconscious functions in a state that is more or less incompatible with consciousness and have the typical qualities of unconscious contents. These qualities are such as are not tolerated in consciousness. The lunatic Schreber[248] says most aptly that the language of God (the unconscious) is a somewhat archaic but vigorous German, of which he gives a few striking examples. As the contrary function that emerges from the unconscious into consciousness differs to such an extent from what appears to be acceptable to consciousness, the necessity arises of a technique for coming to terms with the contrary function. It is impossible to accept the contrary function as it stands, as it always drags extraneous qualities and accompanying circumstances with it from the absolute unconscious. Through the above-described development the extrovert has acquired an adaptation to the object that is absolutely real and free from all phantasies; he will therefore be able to turn his attention towards the "alloy" which for the introvert was the valuable germ of idea. From this he will then develop similar ideas to those which the introvert has already developed. Vice versâ, the introvert will now be able to turn his attention to those materials which before he was obliged to reject, as being side-tracks on the road to physical reality; that is, he will carry out the same clearing and winnowing in his feeling-relations, that the extrovert has already completed.
This description clearly shows that the two types move in opposite directions in the development of their unconscious, ultimately reaching opposite extremes: one focusing on ideas, the other on the objects of their feelings. The psychological traits of these types are pushed to extremes, at which point, according to the law of enantiodromia, the moment arrives when each type’s “other” function[440] is fully recognized, meaning feeling for the introvert and thought for the extrovert. The introvert achieves the needed function of autonomous feeling by differentiating and enhancing their thought, while the extrovert develops their thinking through increasingly differentiated love. These functions, previously secondary, start off unconscious, gradually becoming conscious as development progresses. Initially, they exist in a more or less incompatible state with consciousness and share typical qualities of unconscious content. These qualities are not accepted in consciousness. The madman Schreber[248] aptly states that the language of God (the unconscious) is a somewhat archaic but vigorous form of German, providing several striking examples. As the opposing function emerges from the unconscious into consciousness, it differs greatly from what consciousness deems acceptable, creating a need for a technique to deal with this opposing function. The opposing function cannot be accepted as it is, as it always brings along foreign qualities and circumstances from the absolute unconscious. Through the development described above, the extrovert has adapted to objects that are completely real and devoid of fantasies; thus, they can focus on the “alloy” which the introvert considered the valuable seed of an idea. From this, the extrovert will then develop ideas similar to those the introvert has already created. Vice versa, the introvert can now examine materials that they previously had to reject as distractions from physical reality; in other words, they will perform the same clearing and sorting in their emotional relations that the extrovert has already done.
The development of the contrary function that was hitherto unconscious, leads to individuation beyond the type, and[441] thereby to a new relation to the world and mind. The process which begins with the complementation of the types is the transcendental function, which leads to the new adaptation by means of the clearing and winnowing of unconscious feelings and thoughts that have been brought up by the contrary function that had been neglected.
The development of the opposing function that was previously unconscious leads to individuation beyond the type, and[441] thus to a new relationship with the world and the mind. The process that starts with complementing the types is the transcendental function, which results in new adaptation through the clearing and sorting of unconscious feelings and thoughts that have been brought up by the previously neglected opposing function.
Following the old maxim: "naturam si sequemur ducem nunquam aberrabimus," we have obeyed the natural impulse of the thinker to carry the principle of thought through to its utmost perfection attainable, as also that of the feeler, of carrying the principle of feeling through to the end. By these means the salutary extreme was produced, to wit, the hunger, the desire for the compensatory function. For, by means of thought, the one is landed in a lifeless ice-cold world of crystalline ideas; whereas, by means of feeling, the other reaches a limitless ocean of never ending flood of sentiment. The former will, therefore, yearn for living warmth of feeling, and the latter for the restrictive precision and solidity of thought.
Following the old saying: "If we follow nature as our guide, we will never stray," we have listened to the natural urge of the thinker to push the principle of thought to its highest form possible, just as the feeler aims to explore the principle of feeling to its fullest extent. This approach led to a healthy balance, specifically, the craving for a compensatory function. Through thought, one ends up in a cold, lifeless world of rigid ideas; whereas through feeling, the other finds themselves in an endless ocean of flowing emotions. Consequently, the thinker will long for the vibrant warmth of feeling, while the feeler will seek the precise clarity and stability of thought.
An enrichment of the individual is attained by this compensatory process, giving him greater decision and the possibility of a harmony that is complete in itself. The assimilation of the contrary function discloses new inner springs, which guarantee to the individual considerably greater independence from external conditions. This acquisition is an indisputable advantage that none would like to surrender in face of the fact so unavoidably connected with it, that a new adaptation and orientation of this kind places the individual in a certain contrast to the great bulk of people who yet have the old attitude. This contrast is no drawback; it is rather a welcome and effective spur to life and work, for thereby is created the channel required by our psychic energy for its development.
An individual's growth is achieved through this compensatory process, granting them greater decision-making power and the chance for a complete sense of harmony. Embracing opposing functions reveals new inner motivations, which provide the individual with much greater independence from external circumstances. This gain is an undeniable advantage that no one would want to give up, especially considering that this kind of new adaptation and orientation sets them apart from the majority of people who still hold onto the old mindset. This distinction is not a disadvantage; instead, it's a beneficial and powerful motivator for life and work, as it creates the necessary channel for our psychic energy to develop.
XI.—General Remarks on the Therapy.
XI.—General Comments on Therapy.
I have still to draw the reader's attention to an important fact. Throughout the course of this paper, I have seemed to[442] associate the idea of disturbance or even of peril with the unconscious. But it would give a false impression if we were only to emphasize the dangerous side of the unconscious. The unconscious is a source of danger when the individual is not at one with it. If we succeed in establishing the function or attitude that I call transcendental, the disharmony ceases, and we are permitted to enjoy the favourable side of the unconscious. In such case the unconscious vouchsafes us that furtherance and assistance which bountiful Nature is always ready to give to man in overflowing abundance. The unconscious possesses possibilities of wisdom that are completely closed to consciousness, for the unconscious has at its disposal not only all the psychic contents that are under the threshold because they had been forgotten or overlooked, but also the wisdom of the experience of untold ages, deposited in the course of time and lying potential in the human brain. The unconscious is continually active, creating combinations of its materials; these serve to indicate the future path of the individual. It creates prospective combinations just as our consciousness does, only they are considerably superior to the conscious combinations both in refinement and extent. The unconscious may therefore be an unparalleled guide for human beings.
I still need to highlight an important fact. Throughout this paper, I’ve seemed to[442] link the idea of disturbance or even danger to the unconscious. However, focusing only on the perilous side of the unconscious would create a misleading impression. The unconscious can be dangerous when a person is not in harmony with it. If we can establish what I call a transcendental function or attitude, that disharmony disappears, and we can enjoy the positive aspects of the unconscious. In that case, the unconscious grants us the support and help that generous Nature is always ready to offer in abundance. The unconscious holds possibilities of wisdom that are completely inaccessible to consciousness; it has at its fingertips not only all the psychological content that has been forgotten or disregarded but also the accumulated wisdom from countless ages, stored over time and lying dormant in the human brain. The unconscious is always active, forming combinations of its materials that help indicate the individual’s future path. It creates potential combinations just like our consciousness does, but they are far superior to the conscious combinations in both refinement and scope. Therefore, the unconscious can be an unmatched guide for human beings.
The reader must on no account suppose that the complicated psychological changes described must all be passed through in every individual case. In practice the treatment is adjusted according to the therapeutic result attained. The particular result arrived at may be reached at any stage of the treatment, quite apart from the seriousness or duration of the malady. The treatment of a serious case may last a long time, without the higher phases of the evolution ever being reached, or needing to be reached. There are comparatively few people who, after attaining the desired therapeutical result, pursue the further stages of evolution for the sake of their own development. It is, therefore, not the seriousness of the case which obliges one to pass through the whole development. In any case, only those people attain a higher degree of differentiation who are by nature destined[443] and called to it, that is, who have both a capacity and tendency towards the higher differentiation. This is a matter in which people are extremely different, just as among species of animals there are some that are stationary and conservative, and others that are evolutionary. Nature is aristocratic, but not in the sense of having reserved the possibility of differentiation exclusively for those species that stand high. Similarly, the possibility of the psychological development of human beings is not reserved for specially gifted individuals. In other words: neither special intelligence nor any other talent is necessary in order to achieve a far-reaching psychological development, inasmuch as in this development moral qualities step in to supplement where intellect does not suffice. But it must not be supposed under any circumstances that the treatment consists in grafting general formulas and complicated doctrines on to people; this is not so. Each one can acquire that which he needs, after his own fashion and in his own language. What I have here presented is only the intellectual formulation of the subject, founded upon preliminary scientific study of an empirical as well as a theoretical nature; but this formulation does not become a subject of discussion in the ordinary practical analytical work. The brief notes of cases that I have inserted give an approximate idea of the practical side of analysis.
The reader should not think that the complex psychological changes described must occur in every individual case. In reality, the treatment is tailored based on the therapeutic results achieved. The specific outcome can be reached at any point during treatment, regardless of how serious or long-lasting the condition is. Treatment for a severe case can take a long time without ever reaching the higher phases of development, nor is it necessary to reach them. There are relatively few individuals who, after achieving the desired therapeutic outcome, continue to pursue further developmental stages for their own growth. Therefore, it is not the severity of the case that requires one to go through the entire process. Ultimately, only those individuals who are naturally inclined and suited for it—who have both the capacity and the tendency for further differentiation—will reach a higher degree of differentiation. This varies significantly among people, similar to how species of animals differ, with some being static and conservative while others are evolutionary. Nature is selective, but not in the sense that differentiation is reserved solely for higher species. The potential for psychological development in humans is not limited to those who are particularly gifted. In other words, achieving significant psychological development does not require exceptional intelligence or any other talent, as moral qualities can compensate where intellect falls short. However, it should not be assumed under any circumstances that treatment involves applying general formulas and complicated doctrines to individuals; this is not the case. Each person can acquire what they need in their own way and in their own language. What I have presented here is only an intellectual outline of the topic, based on preliminary scientific study from both empirical and theoretical perspectives; but this outline does not become a subject of discussion in ordinary practical analytical work. The brief case notes I’ve included provide a general idea of the practical side of analysis.
The reader should realize that our new understanding of psychology has a side that is entirely practical, and another that is entirely theoretical. It is not merely a practical method of treatment or education, but it is also a scientific theory, that is closely related to other co-ordinated sciences.
The reader should understand that our new approach to psychology has a practical side and a theoretical side. It's not just a hands-on method of treatment or education; it’s also a scientific theory that closely connects to other related sciences.
Conclusion.
Conclusion.
In conclusion, I must beg the reader to pardon me for having ventured to say so many new and abstruse things in such a brief compass. I lay myself open to adverse criticism, because I conceive it to be the duty of every one who isolates himself by taking his own path, to tell others what he has found or discovered, whether it be a refreshing spring for the[444] thirsty, or a sandy desert of sterile error. The one helps, the other warns. Not the opinion of any individual contemporary will decide the truth and error of what has been discovered, but rather future generations and destiny. There are things that are not yet true to-day, perhaps we are not yet permitted to recognize them as true, although they may be true to-morrow. Therefore every pioneer must take his own path, alone but hopeful, with the open eyes of one who is conscious of its solitude and of the perils of its dim precipices. Our age is seeking a new spring of life. I found one and drank of it and the water tasted good. That is all that I can or want to say. My intention and my duty to society is fulfilled when I have described, as well as I can, the way that led me to the spring; the reproaches of those who do not follow this way have never troubled me, nor ever will. New ideas always encounter resistance from the old. That always was and always will be the case; it appertains to the self-regulation of mental progress.
In conclusion, I ask the reader to forgive me for sharing so many new and complex ideas in such a short space. I open myself up to criticism because I believe it's the responsibility of anyone who takes their own path to share what they've found or discovered, whether it's a refreshing spring for the[444] thirsty or a barren desert of falsehood. The first is helpful, the second is a warning. The validity of what has been discovered won’t be determined by the opinion of any single contemporary, but rather by future generations and fate. Some things may not seem true today; perhaps we're not yet ready to accept them as truth, even though they could be tomorrow. Therefore, every pioneer must forge their own path, alone but hopeful, with the awareness of their solitude and the dangers that lie ahead. Our society is searching for a new source of life. I found one, drank from it, and found it refreshing. That’s all I can or want to say. My intention and my duty to society are fulfilled when I describe, as best as I can, the journey that led me to this spring; the criticisms from those who choose not to follow this path have never bothered me, nor will they. New ideas will always face pushback from the old. That has always been the case and always will be; it's part of how mental progress self-regulates.
CHAPTER XV
I.—The Distinction between the Personal and the Impersonal Unconscious
I.—The Difference Between the Personal and the Impersonal Unconscious
Since the breach with the Viennese school upon the question of the fundamental explanatory principle of analysis—that is, the question if it be sexuality or energy—our concepts have undergone considerable development. After the prejudice concerning the explanatory basis had been removed by the acceptance of a purely abstract view of it, the nature of which was not anticipated, interest was directed to the concept of the unconscious.
Since the split with the Viennese school regarding the core explanatory principle of analysis—that is, whether it’s sexuality or energy—our ideas have evolved significantly. Once the bias surrounding the explanatory foundation was eliminated by adopting a purely abstract perspective, which was unexpected, attention shifted to the idea of the unconscious.
According to Freud's theory the contents of the unconscious are limited to infantile wish-tendencies, which are repressed on account of the incompatibility of their character. Repression is a process which begins in early childhood under the moral influence of environment; it continues throughout life. These repressions are done away with by means of analysis, and the repressed wishes are made conscious. That should theoretically empty the unconscious, and, so to say, do away with it; but in reality the production of infantile sexual wish-fantasies continues into old age.
According to Freud's theory, the contents of the unconscious are mostly made up of childhood desires that get pushed aside because they conflict with social norms. Repression starts in early childhood due to moral pressures from the environment and continues throughout a person's life. These repressed desires can be addressed through analysis, bringing them into consciousness. In theory, this should clear out the unconscious, effectively eliminating it; however, in reality, the creation of childhood sexual fantasies can persist into old age.
According to this theory, the unconscious contains only those parts of the personality which might just as well be conscious, and have really only been repressed by the processes of civilisation. According to Freud the essential content of the unconscious would therefore be personal. But although, from such a view-point the infantile tendencies of the unconscious are the more prominent, it would be a mistake to[446] estimate or define the unconscious from this alone, for it has another side.
According to this theory, the unconscious holds only those parts of the personality that could easily be conscious, but have been repressed by the demands of society. Freud argued that the core content of the unconscious is therefore personal. However, even though the childhood impulses in the unconscious are more noticeable from this perspective, it would be a mistake to[446] assess or define the unconscious based on that alone, as it has another aspect.
Not only must the repressed materials be included in the periphery of the unconscious, but also all the psychic material that does not reach the threshold of consciousness. It is impossible to explain all these materials by the principle of repression, for in that case by the removal of the repression a phenomenal memory would be acquired, one that never forgets anything. As a matter of fact repression exists, but it is a special phenomenon. If a so-called bad memory were only the consequence of repression, then those persons who have an excellent memory should have no repression, that is, be incapable of being neurotic. But experience teaches us that this is not the case. There are, undoubtedly, cases with abnormally bad memories, where it is clear that the main cause must be attributed to repression. But such cases are comparatively rare.
Not only must the repressed materials be included in the periphery of the unconscious, but also all the mental content that doesn't reach conscious awareness. It's impossible to explain all these materials purely through the idea of repression, because if that were the case, removing the repression would result in a perfect memory, one that never forgets anything. In reality, repression does exist, but it's a specific phenomenon. If a so-called bad memory were genuinely just a result of repression, then people with an excellent memory should have no repression at all, meaning they would not be prone to neurosis. However, experience shows us that this isn't true. There are certainly cases of exceptionally poor memories where it's clear that the primary cause is repression. But such cases are relatively rare.
We therefore emphatically say that the unconscious contains all that part of the psyche that is found under the threshold, including subliminal sense-perceptions, in addition to the repressed material. We also know—not only on account of accumulated experience, but also for theoretical reasons—that the unconscious must contain all the material that has not yet reached the level of consciousness. These are the germs of future conscious contents. We have also every reason to suppose that the unconscious is far from being quiescent, in the sense that it is inactive, but that it is probably constantly busied with the formation and re-formation of so-called unconscious phantasies. Only in pathological cases should this activity be thought of as comparatively autonomous, for normally it is co-ordinated with consciousness.
We strongly assert that the unconscious holds all parts of the psyche that lie beneath the surface, including subliminal perceptions, as well as repressed material. We know—not just because of accumulated experience but also for theoretical reasons—that the unconscious must contain all the material that has not yet reached consciousness. These are the seeds of future conscious thoughts. We also have plenty of reasons to believe that the unconscious is far from inactive; in fact, it is likely always engaged in creating and recreating so-called unconscious fantasies. Only in pathological cases should this activity be seen as somewhat independent, as it usually aligns with consciousness.
It may be assumed that all these contents are of a personal nature in so far as they are acquisitions of the individual life. As this life is limited, the number of acquisitions of the unconscious must also be limited, wherefore an exhaustion of the contents of the unconscious through analysis might be held to be possible. In other words, by the analysis of the unconscious the inventory of unconscious contents might be[447] completed, possibly in the sense that the unconscious cannot produce anything besides what is already known and accepted in the conscious. Also, as has already been said, we should have to accept the fact that the unconscious activity had thereby been paralysed, and that by the removal of the repression we could stop the conscious contents from descending into the unconscious. Experience teaches us that is only possible to a very limited extent. We urge our patients to retain their hold upon repressed contents that have been brought to consciousness, and to insert them in their scheme of life. But, as we may daily convince ourselves, this procedure seems to make no impression upon the unconscious, inasmuch as it goes on producing apparently the same phantasies, namely, the so-called infantile-sexual ones, which according to the earlier theory were based upon personal repressions. If in such cases analysis be systematically continued, an inventory of incompatible wish-phantasies is gradually revealed, whose combinations amaze us. In addition to all the sexual perversions every conceivable kind of crime is discovered, as well as every conceivable heroic action and great thought, whose existence in the analysed person no one would have suspected.
It can be assumed that all these contents are personal since they come from an individual’s life. Since this life is finite, the number of unconscious acquisitions must also be limited, which means that depleting the unconscious contents through analysis could be possible. In other words, through analyzing the unconscious, we might complete the inventory of unconscious contents, suggesting that the unconscious can only produce what is already known and accepted consciously. Also, as mentioned before, we must acknowledge that this unconscious activity would be paralyzed, and that by removing repression, we could prevent conscious thoughts from slipping into the unconscious. Experience shows us that this is only possible to a very limited degree. We encourage our patients to hold onto repressed contents that have come to consciousness and incorporate them into their lives. However, as we see daily, this approach seems to have little effect on the unconscious, which continues to produce the same kinds of fantasies, specifically the so-called infantile-sexual ones, which earlier theories claimed were based on personal repressions. If analysis continues systematically in such cases, an inventory of conflicting wish-phantasies gradually comes to light, and their combinations astonish us. Along with various sexual perversions, we uncover every imaginable kind of crime, as well as every conceivable heroic act and profound idea, whose existence in the analyzed person would have been unsuspected by anyone.
In order to give an example of this, I would like to refer to Maeder's Schizophrenic patient who called the world his picture-book. He was a locksmith's apprentice who fell ill very early in life; he had never been blessed with intellectual gifts. As regards his idea that the world was his picture-book and that he was turning its pages over when he looked about in the world, it is just Schopenhauer's world, conceived as will and representation, expressed in primitive picture-language. This idea has just as universal a character as Schopenhauer's. The difference consists in the fact that the patient's notion has stood still at an embryonic stage in a process of growth, whereas with Schopenhauer the same idea has been changed from a mere image into an abstraction expressed in terms that are universally valid.
To illustrate this, I'd like to mention Maeder's schizophrenic patient who referred to the world as his picture book. He was a locksmith apprentice who became ill at a young age and never had any intellectual talents. His belief that the world was his picture book and that he was flipping its pages as he observed his surroundings reflects Schopenhauer's view of the world, understood as will and representation, conveyed in a basic picture language. This idea is just as universal as Schopenhauer's. The difference is that the patient's concept has remained at an early developmental stage, while Schopenhauer's version has evolved from a simple image into an abstract idea expressed in universally applicable terms.
It would be false to assume that the patient's idea had a personal character and value. That would be to attribute to[448] him the dignity of a philosopher. But he alone is a philosopher who raises an image that has naturally sprung up into an abstract idea, thereby translating it into terms of universal validity. Schopenhauer's philosophical conception is his personal value, whereas the notion of the patient has merely an impersonal value of natural growth, in which personal proprietary rights can only be acquired by making an abstraction of the images, and translating them into terms that are universally valid. But it would be wrong if an exaggerated sense of the value of this achievement led us to ascribe to the philosopher the merit of having made or conceived the original image itself. The primordial image has also sprung up naturally in the philosopher, and is nothing but a part of the universal human heritage in which, theoretically at least, every one has a share. The golden apples come from the same tree whether they are gathered by a locksmith's apprentice or a Schopenhauer.
It would be inaccurate to think that the patient's idea had a personal significance. That would be to give him the stature of a philosopher. Only someone who can take a naturally occurring image and turn it into an abstract idea, thereby making it universally relevant, is a true philosopher. Schopenhauer's philosophical view is his personal contribution, while the patient’s idea only has an impersonal value that comes from natural development. Personal ownership of these ideas can only be earned by abstracting the images and translating them into universally accepted terms. However, it would be a mistake to let an inflated sense of the significance of this process make us credit the philosopher with creating or coming up with the original image. The essential image also arises naturally within the philosopher and is simply part of the universal human inheritance, which, at a theoretical level, everyone shares. The golden apples come from the same tree, regardless of whether they’re picked by a locksmith's apprentice or a Schopenhauer.
The recognition of such primordial images obliges me to differentiate between the contents of the unconscious; a differentiation of another kind than that between the pre-conscious and unconscious, or between the subconscious and unconscious. The justification for those distinctions cannot be discussed here; they have a value of their own and probably merit to be carried further as affording a point of view. The differentiation which I propose follows obviously from what has previously been said, namely, that in the so-called unconscious we must differentiate a layer which may be termed the personal unconscious. The materials contained in this layer are of a personal kind, inasmuch as on the one hand they may be characterised as acquisitions of the individual existence, and on the other as psychological factors which might just as well be conscious. It is, for instance, comprehensible that incompatible psychological elements succumb to repression on the one hand and are therefore unconscious, but on the other hand there exists the possibility of bringing the repressed contents into consciousness and keeping them there, once they are known and recognised. We recognise these materials as personal contents, because we can prove[449] their effects, their partial appearance, or their origin to lie in our personal past. They are integral constituents of the personality, and belong to a complete inventory of the same. They are constituents whose omission in consciousness implies an inferiority in one respect or another, not indeed an inferiority bearing the psychological character of an organic deformity or a natural defect, but rather the character of a neglect which arouses a moral reaction. The feeling of moral inferiority always indicates that in the portion omitted is something that according to the feelings should not be missing; or in other words, could be conscious if we took sufficient trouble about it. The sense of moral inferiority is not the result of a collision with the universal, in a certain sense arbitrary, moral law, but rather the result of a conflict with the personal ego, which by reason of the psychic economy demands an adjustment of the deficiency. Wherever a feeling of inferiority appears, it reveals not only the presence of a demand for the assimilation of an unconscious constituent, but also the possibility of such an assimilation. It is, after all, a person's moral qualities that make him assimilate his unconscious self and retain it in consciousness, whether he be forced to it by a recognition of its necessity, or by a painful neurosis. He who continues to tread this path of the realisation of his unconscious self, necessarily transposes the content of the personal unconscious into consciousness, whereby the periphery of the personality is considerably enlarged.
The acknowledgment of such basic images requires me to distinguish between the contents of the unconscious; a distinction that is different from that between the pre-conscious and unconscious, or between the subconscious and unconscious. The rationale for those distinctions can't be explored here; they hold their own significance and likely deserve further examination as a perspective. The distinction I suggest clearly follows from what I've said earlier, namely, that within the so-called unconscious, we need to identify a layer that can be called the personal unconscious. The material in this layer is personal, as it can be described on one hand as a result of individual existence, and on the other as psychological factors that could also be conscious. For example, it makes sense that conflicting psychological elements become repressed and thus unconscious, but there is also the chance to bring these repressed contents into consciousness and keep them there once they are understood and acknowledged. We see these materials as personal contents because we can trace their effects, partial appearances, or origins back to our personal history. They are essential parts of the personality and belong to the complete inventory of it. These are elements whose absence in consciousness suggests some kind of deficiency, not one that reflects an organic flaw or natural defect, but more a form of neglect that triggers a moral response. The feeling of moral inferiority suggests that something missing should really be there according to our feelings; in other words, it could be conscious if we made an effort to acknowledge it. The sense of moral inferiority doesn’t stem from a clash with a universal, somewhat arbitrary, moral law, but rather emerges from a conflict with the personal ego, which due to psychic balance, demands an adjustment for the deficit. Wherever a feeling of inferiority arises, it indicates not only the need to integrate an unconscious component but also the possibility of doing so. Ultimately, a person's moral qualities drive them to integrate their unconscious self and keep it in awareness, whether they are compelled by the recognition of necessity or by a painful neurosis. A person who continues down this path of realizing their unconscious self will inevitably bring the contents of the personal unconscious into consciousness, thereby greatly expanding the breadth of their personality.
II—The Consequences of the Assimilation of the Unconscious.
II—The Effects of Integrating the Unconscious.
This process of assimilating the unconscious leads to remarkable results. Some people build up from it an unmistakable, even unpleasantly increased self-consciousness or self-confidence; they "know everything," and are completely aware of everything so far as their unconscious is concerned. They think themselves accurately informed about everything that comes up from the unconscious. Others are[450] increasingly oppressed by the contents of the unconscious, they lose their self-reliance or their self-consciousness more and more, and come near to a state of depressed resignation in regard to all the extraordinary things the unconscious produces. The former undertake in the exuberance of their self-confidence, a responsibility for their unconscious that goes much too far, beyond every reasonable possibility; the latter ultimately decline to accept any responsibility in the depressing recognition of the powerlessness of the ego confronted by relentless Destiny, working through the unconscious.
This process of bringing the unconscious into awareness leads to remarkable outcomes. Some individuals develop a distinct, sometimes uncomfortably heightened self-awareness or self-confidence; they believe they “know everything” and are fully aware of all that their unconscious reveals. They think they have an accurate understanding of everything that emerges from the unconscious. Others are[450] increasingly weighed down by what lies in the unconscious, losing their confidence and self-awareness more and more, eventually approaching a state of resigned depression regarding all the unusual things that the unconscious produces. The former take on an excessive sense of responsibility for their unconscious, going well beyond what is reasonable; the latter ultimately refuse to accept any responsibility, facing the sobering realization of the ego's powerlessness against relentless Destiny, which operates through the unconscious.
If we give the two types close analytical consideration, we shall discover that behind the optimistic self-confidence of the former there is hidden a just as deep, or rather a far deeper, helplessness; a helplessness to which the conscious optimism acts as an unsuccessful effort at compensation. Behind the pessimistic resignation of the latter there is hidden a defiant desire for power, far exceeding in self-confidence the conscious optimism of the former type.
If we closely analyze the two types, we’ll find that beneath the optimistic self-confidence of the first type lies a profound, or even deeper, sense of helplessness; this helplessness is masked by a conscious optimism that seems to be an inadequate attempt to compensate. In contrast, behind the pessimistic resignation of the second type, there’s a rebellious desire for power, which far surpasses the self-confidence found in the optimistic mindset of the first type.
This condition of the personality may well be expressed by the idea of "God-Almightiness" (Gottähnlichkeit),[250] to which Adler has particularly drawn our attention.
This state of personality can be described by the concept of "God-Almightiness" (Gottähnlichkeit),[250] which Adler has specifically highlighted.
When the devil wrote the serpent's words in the student's album, Eritis sicut Deus scientes bonum et malum, he added:
When the devil wrote the serpent's words in the student's album, Eritis sicut Deus scientes bonum et malum, he added:
The idea of "likeness to God," or "God-Almightiness," is not a scientific one, although it characterises the psychological state of affairs most exactly. Still we must examine whence this attitude comes, and ask why it merits the name of "God-Almightiness." As the expression denotes, the patient's[451] abnormal condition is constituted by the fact that he ascribes to himself qualities or values which obviously do not belong to him, for "God-Almightiness" means being like the spirit which is set above the human spirit.
The concept of "likeness to God" or "God-Almightiness" isn't scientific, but it accurately reflects the psychological situation. We need to explore where this mindset originates and why it deserves the title of "God-Almightiness." As the term suggests, the patient's[451] abnormal state arises from the fact that they attribute to themselves qualities or values that clearly don’t belong to them, because "God-Almightiness" implies being similar to the spirit that transcends the human spirit.
If for psychological purposes we abstract from the hypostasis of the God-idea, we find that this expression does not only include every dynamic fact discussed in my book on "The Psychology of the Unconscious,"[251] but also a certain mental function having a collective character, which is of another order from that of the individual character of the mind. In the same way as the individual is not only an isolated and separate, but also a social being, so also the human mind is not only something isolated and absolutely individual, but also a collective function. And just as certain social functions or impulses are, so to speak, opposed to the ego-centric interests of the individual, so also the human mind has certain functions or tendencies which, on account of their collective nature, are to some extent opposed to the personal mental functions. This is due to the fact that every human being is born with a highly differentiated brain, which gives him the possibility of attaining a rich mental function that he has neither acquired ontogenetically nor developed. In proportion as human brains are similarly differentiated, the corresponding mental functions are collective and universal. This circumstance explains the fact that the unconscious of far-separated peoples and races possesses a remarkable number of points of agreement. One example among many others which has been demonstrated is the extraordinary unanimity shown by the autochthonous forms and themes of myths.
If we set aside the specific nature of the God-idea for psychological reasons, we find that this expression not only covers every dynamic aspect discussed in my book on "The Psychology of the Unconscious,"[251] but also involves a certain mental function that has a collective character, which is different from the individual aspects of the mind. Just as an individual is not only isolated and separate but also a social being, the human mind is not just something solitary and entirely individual, but also a collective function. Similarly, certain social functions or impulses can conflict with individual self-centered interests; the human mind has functions or tendencies that, due to their collective nature, somewhat oppose personal mental functions. This happens because every human is born with a highly specialized brain, allowing for a rich set of mental functions that they haven't developed or acquired over their lifetime. As human brains show similar differentiation, the resulting mental functions become collective and universal. This helps explain why the unconscious of widely separated peoples and races shares a surprising number of similarities. One notable example is the remarkable agreement found in the indigenous forms and themes of myths.
The universal similarity of brains results in a universal possibility of a similar mental function. This function is the collective psyche, which is divided into collective mind and collective soul.[252] In so far as there exist differentiations[452] corresponding to race, descent, or even family, so, beyond the level of the "universal" collective psyche, we find a collective psyche limited by race, descent, and family. To quote P. Janet, the collective psyche contains the "parties inférieures" of the mental function, that is, the part of the mental function which, being fixed and automatic in its action, inherited and present everywhere, is therefore super-personal or impersonal. The conscious and the personal unconscious contain as personal differentiations the "parties supérieures" of the mental function, therefore the part that has been acquired and developed ontogenetically.
The universal similarity of brains leads to a universal chance for similar mental functions. This function is the collective psyche, which is split into collective mind and collective soul.[252] As there are distinctions based on race, ancestry, or even family, beyond the realm of the "universal" collective psyche, we find a collective psyche constrained by race, ancestry, and family. To quote P. Janet, the collective psyche includes the "parties inférieures" of mental function, which are the aspects of mental function that are fixed and automatic in their action, inherited and present everywhere, making them super-personal or impersonal. The conscious mind and the personal unconscious contain the personal differentiations known as the "parties supérieures" of mental function, representing the parts that have been acquired and developed through individual growth.
An individual therefore who joins the a priori and unconsciously-given collective psyche on to his ontogenetically acquired assets, enlarges thereby the periphery of his personality in an unjustifiable way, with the corresponding consequences. Inasmuch as the collective psyche is the "partie inférieure" of the mental function, and therefore is the fundamental structure underlying every personality, it weighs heavily upon and depreciates the personality; a fact that is expressed in the afore-mentioned stifling of self-confidence, and in the unconscious increase of the ego-emphasis up to the point of a morbid will to power. Inasmuch as the collective psyche ranks even above the personality, because it is the mother foundation upon which all personal differentiations are based, and because it is the common mental function of the sum total of the individual, therefore its incorporation in the personality may evoke inflation of self-confidence, an inflation which is then compensated by an extraordinary sense of inferiority in the unconscious.
An individual who connects the a priori and inherently-shared collective psyche to their personally developed traits expands their personality in an unjustified way, with significant consequences. Since the collective psyche is the "lower part" of mental function and forms the basic structure of every personality, it heavily impacts and diminishes the personality; this is evident in the previously mentioned stifling of self-confidence and in the unconscious boost of ego until it leads to a pathological desire for power. Given that the collective psyche holds a higher status than the personality, as it is the foundational basis for all personal differences and represents the shared mental function of all individuals, its integration into the personality can lead to an inflated sense of self-confidence, which is then counteracted by an intense unconscious feeling of inferiority.
A dissolution of the pairs of opposites in the personality sets in if, through the assimilation of the unconscious, the collective psyche be included in the inventory of the personal mental functions. Alongside the pairs of opposites already alluded to that are so particularly evident in the neurotic, viz. megalomania and sense of inferiority, there are also many other pairs, of which I will only mention the specifically moral pair, that is, good and evil (scientes bonum et malum). They accompany the increase or depreciation of self-confidence.[453] The specific virtues and vices of humanity are contained in the collective psyche, just as everything else is. One man ascribes all the collective virtue to himself as his own personal merit; another accounts as personal guilt what is but collective vice. Both are just as illusionary as the sense of greatness and of inferiority, for imaginary virtues as well as imaginary vices are only the pairs of moral opposites contained in the collective psyche, which have become perceptible or have artificially been made conscious. How far the collective psyche contains these pairs of opposites is shown by primitive peoples, whose great virtue is praised by one observer; whereas another observer of the same race reports only the worst impressions. Both views are true of primitive man, whose personal differentiation is only beginning; his mental function is essentially collective. He is more or less identified with the collective psyche, and therefore without any personal responsibility or inner conflict; his virtues and vices are collective. Conflict only begins when a conscious personal development of the mind has already started, whereby the reason becomes aware of the irreconcilable nature of the pairs of opposites. The struggle to repress is the consequence of this realisation. Man wants to be good, therefore the bad must be repressed; this puts an end to the paradise of the collective psyche.
A dissolution of the pairs of opposites in personality occurs when the unconscious is integrated, bringing the collective psyche into the mix of personal mental functions. In addition to the pairs of opposites previously mentioned that are particularly evident in neurotic individuals, such as megalomania and feelings of inferiority, there are many other pairs, including the specifically moral pair of good and evil (scientes bonum et malum). These accompany the rise or fall of self-confidence.[453] The specific virtues and vices of humanity are part of the collective psyche, just like everything else. One person attributes all collective virtue to themselves as their own personal achievement; another person sees their personal guilt as merely a part of collective vice. Both perspectives are equally illusory, as imagined virtues and vices are just moral opposites present in the collective psyche that have become visible or consciously recognized. The extent to which the collective psyche holds these pairs of opposites is illustrated by primitive societies, where one observer praises their great virtues while another highlights only the negative aspects. Both views are valid for primitive people, whose individual differentiation is just beginning; their mental functioning is largely collective. They are largely identified with the collective psyche, resulting in a lack of personal responsibility or inner conflict; their virtues and vices are collective. Conflict begins only when conscious personal mental development has started, allowing reason to recognize the irreconcilable nature of these opposing pairs. The struggle to repress arises from this realization. A person wants to be good, so the bad must be repressed, effectively ending the paradise of the collective psyche.
The repression of the collective psyche, in so far as it was conscious, was a necessity for the development of the personality, because collective psychology and personal psychology are in a certain sense irreconcilable. In the history of thought, whenever a fresh psychological attitude acquires collective value the formation of schisms begins. Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in the history of religion. A collective point of view, although it may be necessary, is always dangerous for the individual. It is dangerous because it is apt to choke and smother personal differentiation. It has derived this capacity from the collective psyche, which is itself a result of psychological differentiation of the strong gregarious instincts of humanity. Collective thought and feeling, and collective accomplishment, are relatively easy in[454] comparison with individual function and performance; a fact that is only too prone to lead to a fining down to the collective level, and is peculiarly disastrous to personal development. The concomitant loss of personality is replaced—as is always the case in psychology—by an unconscious all-compelling binding to and identification with the collective psyche. It cannot be denied, and should be warningly emphasized that in the analysis of the unconscious, the collective psychology is merged into the personal psychology, with the afore-mentioned unpleasant consequences. These consequences are either bad for the individual's vital feeling (Lebensgefühl), or they injure his fellow-beings if he have any power over his environment. Being identified with the collective psyche he will inevitably try to force the claims of his unconscious upon others, for identification with the collective psyche is accompanied by a feeling of universal validity ("God-Almightiness"), which disregards the different psychology of his fellows.
The repression of the collective psyche, as far as it’s conscious, is necessary for personal development because collective psychology and personal psychology are, in some ways, incompatible. Throughout history, whenever a new psychological perspective gains collective value, divisions begin to form. This is especially clear in the history of religion. While a collective viewpoint may be necessary, it poses a risk to individuals. It can stifle and suppress personal differences. This ability comes from the collective psyche, which is a product of the psychological differentiation of humanity’s strong social instincts. Collective thought, feeling, and achievement are relatively easy compared to individual function and performance; this tendency often leads to a narrowing down to the collective level, which can be particularly harmful to personal growth. The accompanying loss of individuality is replaced—just as it always is in psychology—by an unconscious, compelling connection to and identification with the collective psyche. It must be acknowledged, and emphasized as a warning, that in analyzing the unconscious, collective psychology merges with personal psychology, leading to the aforementioned unpleasant consequences. These consequences can either negatively affect the individual’s sense of life or harm others if they have influence over their environment. By identifying with the collective psyche, they will inevitably try to impose their unconscious claims on others, as this identification comes with a sense of universal validity ("God-like power"), which ignores the differing psychologies of their peers.
The worst abuses of this kind may be removed by a clear understanding and appreciation of the fact that there are totally different psychological types, and that a psychology of one type cannot be forced into the mould of another. It is indeed almost impossible for one type to understand the other completely, and a perfect comprehension of another's individuality is impossible. Due regard for another's individuality is not only advisable but is absolutely essential in analysis, if the development of the other's personality is not to be stifled. It should not be forgotten that the one type thinks that he is leaving another person free when he grants him freedom of action, and the other type when he grants him freedom of thought. In analysis both must be conceded, in so far as reasons of self-preservation permit the analyst to accord them. An excessive desire to understand or explain things is just as useless and injurious as a lack of comprehension.
The worst abuses of this kind can be avoided by clearly understanding and appreciating that there are completely different psychological types, and that one type's psychology can't be forced into the framework of another. It's almost impossible for one type to fully understand the other, and perfect comprehension of someone else's individuality is unattainable. Respect for another person's individuality is not just recommended but absolutely crucial in analysis, if we want to avoid stifling the other person's personality development. We shouldn't forget that one type believes they are giving another person freedom when they allow them freedom of action, while the other type thinks they are providing freedom when they allow freedom of thought. In analysis, both need to be acknowledged, as long as the reasons for self-preservation allow the analyst to grant them. A strong desire to understand or explain everything is just as pointless and damaging as a lack of understanding.
The collective natural propensities and primary forms of idea and feeling which analysis of the unconscious has shown to be effective are an acquisition for the conscious personality which cannot be admitted unreservedly without prejudicial results.
The combined natural tendencies and main types of thoughts and emotions that the analysis of the unconscious has revealed to be influential are a gain for the conscious self that cannot be accepted entirely without harmful consequences.
In practical treatment[253] it is therefore of the utmost importance to keep the aim of individual development constantly before us. If for instance the collective psyche be conceived as a personal possession or as a personal burden, an unbearable weight or strain is put upon the personality. Hence we must make a clear distinction between the personal and the collective psyche. In practice this distinction is not easy because the personal grows out of the collective psyche, and is most closely joined with it. It is therefore difficult to say which materials are to be termed collective and which personal. There is no doubt, for instance, that the archaic symbols so often found in phantasies and dreams are collective factors. All primary propensities and forms of thought and feeling are collective; so is everything about which men are universally agreed, or which is universally understood, said or done. Upon close consideration it is astonishing to note how much of our so-called individual psychology is really[456] collective; so much that the individual element quite disappears. Individuation, however, is an indispensable psychological requirement. The crushing predominance of what is collective should make us realise what peculiar care and attention must be given to the delicate plant "individuality," if it is to develop.
In practical treatment[253] it is crucial to keep the goal of individual development at the forefront. For example, if we see the collective psyche as something personal or as a heavy burden, it places an unbearable strain on the individual. Therefore, we need to clearly differentiate between the personal and the collective psyche. This distinction is challenging because the personal psyche emerges from the collective one and is closely tied to it. It can be difficult to determine which aspects are collective and which are personal. There's no doubt that the ancient symbols that frequently appear in fantasies and dreams are collective elements. All primary instincts and forms of thought and feeling are collective, as are things that people universally agree upon or understand, say, or do. Upon close examination, it’s surprising to realize how much of our so-called individual psychology is actually collective, to the point where the individual aspect can almost vanish. Nonetheless, individuation is a vital psychological necessity. The overwhelming dominance of the collective should make us aware of how much care and attention the delicate plant of "individuality" requires to grow.
Human beings have a capacity which is of the utmost use for purposes of collectivism and most prejudicial to individuation, and that is the capacity to imitate. Collective psychology cannot dispense with imitation, without which the organization of the State and Society would be impossible. Imitation includes the idea of suggestibility, suggestive effect, and mental infection.
Human beings have an ability that is extremely useful for collectivism but very harmful to individuality, and that is the ability to imitate. Collective psychology cannot do without imitation; without it, the organization of the State and Society would be impossible. Imitation encompasses the concepts of suggestibility, suggestive impact, and mental contagion.
But we see daily how the mechanism of imitation is used, or rather abused, for the purposes of personal differentiation; some prominent personality, or peculiar trait or activity is simply imitated, which at least brings about an external differentiation from the environment. As a rule this delusive attempt to attain individual differentiation by means of imitation comes to a standstill as mere affectation, the individual remaining on the same plane as before, only a few degrees more sterile than formerly, and under an unconscious compulsory bondage to his environment.
But we see every day how the process of imitation is used, or rather misused, for personal distinction; a well-known personality, or unique trait or activity is simply copied, which at least creates a superficial difference from the surroundings. Usually, this misleading effort to achieve individual differentiation through imitation ends up being nothing more than pretentiousness, leaving the individual on the same level as before, only slightly more unoriginal than they were, and unconsciously trapped by their environment.
In order to find out what is really individual in us, we should have to give the matter deep thought, and we should certainly become aware how exceedingly difficult such a discovery is.
To truly understand what makes us unique, we need to think deeply about it, and we will definitely realize just how challenging that discovery can be.
III.—The Individual as an Excerpt of the Collective Psyche.
III.—The Individual as a Reflection of the Group's Mindset.
We now come to a problem the overlooking of which would cause the greatest confusion.
We now face a problem that, if ignored, would lead to a lot of confusion.
As I said before, the immediate result of the analysis of the unconscious is that additional personal portions of the unconscious are incorporated into the conscious. I called those parts of the unconscious which are repressed but capable of being made conscious, the personal unconscious. I[457] showed moreover that through the annexation of the deeper layers of the unconscious, which I called the impersonal unconscious, an extension of the personality is brought about which leads to the state of God-Almightiness ("Gottähnlichkeit"). This state is reached by a continuation of the analytical work, by means of which we have already re-introduced what is repressed to consciousness. By continuing analysis further we incorporate some distinctly impersonal universal basic qualities of humanity with the personal consciousness, which brings about the aforesaid enlargement, and this to some extent may be described as an unpleasant consequence of analysis.
As I mentioned earlier, the immediate outcome of analyzing the unconscious is that additional personal aspects of the unconscious are integrated into the conscious mind. I referred to those parts of the unconscious that are repressed yet can be made conscious as the personal unconscious. I[457] also demonstrated that by incorporating the deeper layers of the unconscious, which I termed the impersonal unconscious, a widening of the personality occurs that leads to a state of God-like power ("Gottähnlichkeit"). This state is achieved by continuing the analytical process, through which we have already brought repressed elements back into awareness. By furthering the analysis, we integrate some distinctly impersonal universal qualities of humanity with personal consciousness, resulting in the aforementioned expansion, which may somewhat be viewed as an uncomfortable side effect of analysis.
From this standpoint, the conscious personality seems to be a more or less arbitrary excerpt of the collective psyche. It appears to consist of a number of universal basic human qualities of which it is à priori unconscious, and further of a series of impulses and forms which might just as well have been conscious, but were more or less arbitrarily repressed, in order to attain that excerpt of the collective psyche, which we call personality. The term persona is really an excellent one, for persona was originally the mask which an actor wore, that served to indicate the character in which he appeared. For if we really venture to undertake to decide what psychic material must be accounted personal and what impersonal, we shall soon reach a state of great perplexity; for, in truth, we must make the same assertion regarding the contents of the personality as we have already made with respect to the impersonal unconscious, that is to say that it is collective, whereas we can only concede individuality to the bounds of the persona, that is to the particular choice of personal elements, and that only to a very limited extent. It is only by virtue of the fact that the persona is a more or less accidental or arbitrary excerpt of the collective psyche that we can lapse into the error of deeming it to be in toto individual, whereas as its name denotes, it is only a mask of the collective psyche; a mask which simulates individuality, making others and oneself believe that one is individual, whilst one is only acting a part through which the collective psyche speaks.
From this perspective, the conscious personality seems to be a somewhat random selection from the collective psyche. It appears to consist of several universal basic human traits that are à priori unconscious, along with a range of impulses and forms that could just as easily have been conscious but were more or less arbitrarily suppressed to arrive at that selection from the collective psyche, which we call personality. The term persona is actually a great one, as persona originally referred to the mask an actor wore to represent the character he was playing. If we truly attempt to determine what psychic material should be considered personal and what should be viewed as impersonal, we will quickly find ourselves confused; because, in reality, we must assert the same thing about the contents of personality that we have already remarked about the impersonal unconscious: that it is collective. We can only grant individuality to the limits of the persona, meaning the specific choice of personal elements, and even then only to a very limited extent. It’s only because the persona is a somewhat accidental or arbitrary selection from the collective psyche that we can mistakenly think it is in toto individual, when, as its name suggests, it is merely a mask of the collective psyche; a mask that simulates individuality, making oneself and others believe that one is an individual, while in fact, one is just playing a role through which the collective psyche expresses itself.
If we analyse the persona we remove the mask and discover that what appeared to be individual is at bottom collective. We thus trace "the Little God of the World" back to his origin, that is, to a personification of the collective psyche. Finally, to our astonishment, we realise that the persona was only the mask of the collective psyche. Whether we follow Freud and reduce the primary impulse to sexuality, or Adler and reduce it to the elementary desire for power, or reduce it to the general principle of the collective psyche which contains the principles of both Freud and Adler, we arrive at the same result; namely, the dissolution of the personal into the collective. Therefore in every analysis that is continued sufficiently far, the moment arrives when the aforesaid God-Almightiness must be realised. This condition is often ushered in by peculiar symptoms; for instance, by dreams of flying through space like a comet, of being either the earth, the sun, or a star, or of being either extraordinarily big or small, of having died, etc. Physical sensations also occur, such as sensations of being too large for one's skin, or too fat; or hypnagogic feelings of endless sinking or rising occur, of enlargement of the body or of dizziness. This state is characterised psychologically by an extraordinary loss of orientation about one's personality, about what one really is, or else the individual has a positive but mistaken idea of that which he has just become. Intolerance, dogmatism, self-conceit, self-depreciation, contempt and belittling of "not analysed" fellow-beings, and also of their opinions and activities, all very frequently occur. An increased disposition to physical disorders may also occasionally be observed, but this occurs only if pleasure be taken therein, thus prolonging this stage unduly.
If we analyze the persona, we take off the mask and find that what seemed to be individual is actually collective at its core. We trace "the Little God of the World" back to its origin, which is a representation of the collective psyche. Finally, to our surprise, we realize that the persona was merely a mask of the collective psyche. Whether we follow Freud and reduce the primary impulse to sexuality, or Adler and reduce it to the basic desire for power, or see it as the general principle of the collective psyche that encompasses both Freud and Adler's ideas, we end up with the same conclusion: the personal dissolves into the collective. Therefore, in any analysis that goes deep enough, a moment arrives when the mentioned God-Almightiness must be acknowledged. This condition is often introduced by unusual symptoms; for example, dreams of flying through space like a comet, being either the earth, the sun, or a star, or feeling either extraordinarily large or small, or experiencing death, etc. Physical sensations can also arise, such as feeling too big for one's skin or too overweight; or hypnagogic feelings of endlessly sinking or rising, of body enlargement or dizziness. Psychologically, this state is marked by a significant loss of orientation regarding one's personality, about what one truly is, or the individual holds a positive but incorrect idea of what they have just become. Intolerance, dogmatism, arrogance, self-deprecation, disdain, and belittling of those who haven't been analyzed, along with their opinions and activities, often occur. There may also be an increased tendency towards physical disorders, but this only happens if there is pleasure taken in it, which prolongs this stage unnecessarily.
The wealth of the possibilities of the collective psyche is both confusing and dazzling. The dissolution of the persona results in the release of phantasy, which apparently is nothing else but the functioning of the collective psyche. This release brings materials into consciousness of whose existence we had no suspicion before. A rich mine of mythological thought and feeling is revealed. It is very hard to hold one's own against such an overwhelming impression. That is why this[459] phase must be reckoned one of the real dangers of analysis, a fact that should not be concealed.
The abundance of possibilities within the collective mind is both confusing and fascinating. When the persona breaks down, it allows fantasies to emerge, which seem to be nothing more than the workings of the collective mind. This emergence brings to our awareness things we didn’t even know existed. A treasure trove of mythological thoughts and emotions is uncovered. It's really challenging to maintain our own sense of self in the face of such an overwhelming influence. That's why this[459] phase should be considered one of the real dangers of analysis, a truth that shouldn’t be hidden.
As may easily be understood, this condition is hardly bearable, and one would like to put an end to it as soon as possible, for the analogy with a mental derangement is too close. The essence of the most frequent form of derangement—dementia præcox or schizophrenia—consists, as is well known, in the fact that the unconscious to a large extent ejects and replaces the conscious. The unconscious is given the value of reality, being substituted for the reality function. The unconscious thoughts become audible as voices, or visible as visions, or perceptible as physical hallucinations, or they become fixed ideas of a kind that supersede reality. In a similar, although not in the same way, by the resolution of the persona of the collective psyche, the unconscious is drawn into the conscious. The difference between this state of mind and that of mental derangement consists in the fact that the unconscious is brought up by the help of the conscious analysis; at least that is the case in the beginning of analysis, when there are still strong cultural resistances against the unconscious to be overcome. Later on, after the removal of the barriers erected by time and custom, the unconscious usually proceeds, so to say, in a peremptory manner, sometimes even discharging itself in torrents into the consciousness. In this phase the analogy with mental derangement is very close. But it would only be a real mental disorder should the content of the unconscious take the place of the conscious reality, that is, in other words, if the contents of the unconscious were believed absolutely and without reserve.
As you can easily see, this situation is nearly unbearable, and one would want to end it as quickly as possible since it closely resembles a mental disorder. The essence of the most common type of disorder—dementia præcox or schizophrenia—mainly lies in the fact that the unconscious often pushes out and replaces the conscious mind. The unconscious is given the status of reality, taking the place of the reality function. Unconscious thoughts can manifest as voices, or appear as visions, or be felt as physical hallucinations, or they can turn into fixed ideas that override real experiences. In a similar but different way, through the breaking down of the persona within the collective psyche, the unconscious gets pulled into the conscious mind. The key difference between this mental state and actual mental disorder is that the unconscious is accessed through the help of conscious analysis; at least that's true at the beginning of analysis when there are still significant cultural barriers to overcome regarding the unconscious. Later on, after those barriers created by time and tradition are removed, the unconscious typically flows into consciousness quite forcefully, sometimes even pouring in rapidly. In this phase, the similarity to mental disorder is very strong. However, it would only qualify as a true mental disorder if the contents of the unconscious replaced the conscious reality, meaning that if the contents of the unconscious were completely and unreservedly believed.
IV.—The Endeavours to free the Individuality from the Collective Psyche.
IV.—The Struggle to Liberate Individuality from the Collective Mind.
1. The Regressive Restoration of the Persona.
1. The Backward Restoration of the Persona.
The unbearableness of thus being identified with the collective psyche forces us to find a radical solution. There are two ways open. The first possibility is the regressive one of[460] trying to restore the persona to its former condition, by endeavouring to restrain the unconscious by the application of a reductive theory; for instance, by declaring it to be nothing but long-repressed and overdue infantile sexuality, for which it would really be best to substitute the normal sexual function. This solution is based upon the unmistakable sexualistic symbolism of the language of the unconscious, and upon the concretistic interpretation of the same. Or an attempt may be made to apply the power theory, by conceiving the God-Almightiness as a "virile protest," and as an infantile striving for power and self-preservation: a theory for which support is found in the unmistakable pretensions to power that the unconscious material contains. A further possibility would be to declare the unconscious to be the archaic collective psychology of primitive man, an explanation that would not only cover the sexualistic symbolism and the "God-Almighty" aiming for power of the unconscious content, but would also apparently do justice to the religious, philosophical, and mythological aspects and tendencies of the unconscious content. In every case the conclusion arrived at is the same, viz. that the unconscious is nothing but this or that, which has already been adequately recognised and acknowledged as infantile, useless, meaningless, impossible, and out of date. There is nothing to be done but to shrug one's shoulders and resign one's self to the inevitable.
The difficulty of being linked to the collective mindset pushes us to seek a radical solution. We have two options. The first option is the regressive approach of[460] attempting to bring the persona back to its previous state by trying to control the unconscious using a simplified theory; for example, by claiming it’s nothing more than long-repressed childhood sexuality, suggesting it would be better to replace it with normal sexual function. This approach relies on the clear sexual symbolism in the language of the unconscious and its literal interpretation. Alternatively, we could apply the power theory, viewing God’s omnipotence as a "manly protest" and as a childish quest for power and self-preservation: a theory supported by the obvious aspirations to power found in unconscious material. Another possibility is to claim the unconscious represents the ancient collective psychology of primitive humans, an explanation that could address not only the sexual symbolism and the "God-like" pursuit of power in the unconscious, but also the religious, philosophical, and mythological elements present in unconscious content. In every case, the conclusion remains the same, namely that the unconscious is really just this or that, which has already been sufficiently acknowledged as childish, useless, meaningless, impossible, and outdated. There’s nothing to do but shrug it off and accept the inevitable.
To the patient there seems to be no alternative, if one wishes to continue to live sensibly, but to restore in so far as is possible that extract of the collective psyche termed persona, to lay the fact of analysis silently aside, and do one's utmost to forget that one possesses an unconscious. We shall find support in Faust's words:—
To the patient, it seems there’s no other choice if one wants to continue living reasonably, but to restore, as much as possible, that aspect of the collective mind called persona, to quietly set aside the reality of analysis, and to do everything possible to forget that one has an unconscious. We will find support in Faust's words:—
This would be a happy solution if one really could succeed in throwing off the unconscious to such an extent as to withdraw the libido from it, and so render it inoperative. But experience proves that energy cannot be withdrawn from the unconscious; it continues operative, for the unconscious contains and is indeed itself the source of libido, from which issue the primary psychic elements, thought-feelings, or feeling-thoughts—undifferentiated germs of idea and sentiment. It would therefore be a delusion to believe that by means of some, so to say, magical theory or method, the libido could be conclusively wrested from the unconscious, or that it could be to a certain extent disconnected. One may yield to this illusion for a time, but some day he will be obliged to declare with Faust:—
This would be a great solution if we could really manage to fully separate ourselves from the unconscious and withdraw the libido from it, making it inactive. But experience shows that energy can't be removed from the unconscious; it remains active because the unconscious is the source of libido, which gives rise to the primary psychic elements—thought-feelings or feeling-thoughts—essentially mixed germs of ideas and emotions. So, it would be misguided to think that, through some sort of magical theory or method, the libido could be completely extracted from the unconscious or partially disconnected from it. One might cling to this illusion for a while, but eventually, they will have to admit, like Faust:—
The unconscious cannot be "analysed" to a finish, and thus brought to a standstill. No one can wrest active force from it for any length of time. Therefore to act according to the method just described is only to deceive one's self, and is nothing but a new edition of an ordinary repression.
The unconscious can't be completely "analyzed" or brought to a halt. No one can extract active energy from it for an extended period. So, following the method described is just self-deception and simply a new version of regular repression.
2. The Identification with the Collective Psyche.
2. Connecting with the Collective Mind.
The second way would be that of identification with the collective psyche. That would mean the symptom of "God-Almightiness" developed into a system; in other words, one would be the fortunate possessor of the absolute truth, that had yet to be discovered; of the conclusive knowledge, which would be the people's salvation. This attitude is not necessarily megalomania ("Grössenwahn") in a direct form, but the well-known milder form of having a prophetic mission. Weak minds which, as is so often the case, have correspondingly an undue share of vanity and misplaced naïveté at their disposal, run a considerable risk of succumbing to this temptation. The obtaining access to the collective psyche signifies a renewal of life for the individual, whether this renewal of life be felt as something pleasant or unpleasant. It would seem desirable to retain a hold upon this renewal: for one person, because it increases his feeling for life ("Lebensgefühl"); for another, because it promises a great accretion to his knowledge. Therefore both of them, not wishing to deprive themselves of the rich values that lie buried in the collective psyche, will endeavour by every means possible to retain their newly gained union with the primal cause of life. Identification appears to be the nearest way to it, for the merging of the persona in the collective psyche is a veritable lure to unite one's self with this "ocean of divinity," and, oblivious of the past, to become absorbed in it. This piece of mysticism belongs to every finer individual, just as the "yearning for the mother"—the looking back to the source whence one originated—is innate in every one.
The second way would be through identification with the collective psyche. This means that the symptom of "God-Almightiness" turns into a system; in other words, someone becomes the lucky holder of absolute truth that has yet to be discovered, of the conclusive knowledge that would save the people. This attitude isn’t necessarily megalomania but rather a milder version of having a prophetic mission. Weak individuals, who often have an excessive amount of vanity and misplaced naivety, are at serious risk of falling for this temptation. Gaining access to the collective psyche represents a renewal of life for the individual, whether that renewal feels pleasant or unpleasant. It seems desirable to hold on to this renewal: for one person, it enhances their sense of life; for another, it promises significant increases in their knowledge. Thus, both, not wanting to give up the rich values buried in the collective psyche, will strive in every possible way to maintain their newly gained connection to the primal source of life. Identification seems to be the quickest route to this connection, as merging the persona with the collective psyche is an irresistible lure to unite oneself with this "ocean of divinity," becoming absorbed in it while forgetting the past. This mysticism is part of every sensitive individual, just as the "yearning for the mother"—the desire to return to the source of origin—is inherent in everyone.
As I have demonstrated explicitly before,[254] there is a special value and a special necessity hidden in the regressive longing—which, as is well-known, Freud conceives as "infantile fixation" or as "incest-wish." This necessity and longing is particularly emphasized in myths, where it is always the strongest and best of people, in other words, the hero, who[463] follows the regressive longing and deliberately runs into danger of letting himself be devoured by the monster of the maternal first cause. But he is a hero only because, instead of letting himself be finally devoured by the monster, he conquers it, and that not only once but several times. It is only through the conquest of the collective psyche that its true value can be attained, whether it be under the symbol of capture of treasure, of an invincible weapon, of a magical means of defence, or whatever else the myth devises as the most desirable possession. Hence whoever identifies himself with the collective psyche, also reaches the treasure which the dragon guards, but against his will and to his own great injury, by thus allowing himself (mythologically speaking) to be devoured by the monster and merged with it.
As I have made clear before,[254] there is a unique value and a crucial necessity hidden in regressive longing—which, as Freud famously described, is related to "infantile fixation" or the "incest-wish." This necessity and longing are particularly highlighted in myths, where it is always the strongest and best individuals, in other words, the hero, who[463] embraces this regressive longing and willingly steps into the danger of being consumed by the monster of the maternal origin. However, he is considered a hero only because, instead of allowing himself to be completely devoured by the monster, he overcomes it, not just once but multiple times. Only through conquering the collective psyche can its true value be realized, whether it’s depicted as capturing treasure, an unbeatable weapon, a magical means of protection, or whatever else the myth presents as the most coveted possession. Therefore, whoever aligns themselves with the collective psyche ultimately accesses the treasure guarded by the dragon, but against their will and to their own detriment, by allowing themselves (in mythological terms) to be consumed by the monster and merging with it.
Identification with the collective psyche is therefore a failure; this way ends just as disastrously as did the first, which led to the severance of the persona from the collective psyche.
Identification with the collective psyche is, therefore, a mistake; this path ends just as disastrously as the first, which resulted in a disconnect between the persona and the collective psyche.
V.—Leading Principles for the Treatment of Collective Identity.
V.—Key Principles for Managing Collective Identity.
In order to solve the problem how practical treatment can overcome the assimilation of the collective psyche, we must first of all make quite clear to ourselves what was the error of the two ways already described. We saw that neither the one way nor the other led to any appropriate result. The first way simply leads the patient back to the point of departure, having lost the vital values contained in the collective psyche. The second way leads him straight into the collective psyche, having lost that detached human existence which alone renders possible a bearable and satisfying life. There are on both sides values that should not be lost to the individual.
To solve the issue of how practical treatment can overcome the assimilation of the collective psyche, we first need to clarify the mistakes made with the two approaches already discussed. We observed that neither method produced the right outcomes. The first method merely takes the patient back to where they started, losing the essential values found in the collective psyche. The second method leads them directly into the collective psyche, sacrificing the independent human experience that is necessary for a manageable and fulfilling life. There are important values on both sides that individuals should not lose.
The mistake is, therefore, neither in the collective psyche nor in the individual psyche, but in allowing the one to exclude the other. The monistic tendency assists this propensity, for it always suspects and looks for one principle everywhere. As[464] a general psychological tendency, monism is a peculiarity of differentiated feeling and thought, corresponding to the keen desire to make the one or the other function the supreme psychological principle. The introversion type only knows the thought principle, and the extroversion type only that of feeling. This psychological monism—or it would be better to say monotheism—has the advantage of simplicity, and the disadvantage of one-sidedness. On the one hand, it signifies the exclusion of the variety and true riches of life; whilst on the other, it means the practicability of realizing the ideals of the present day and of the near past. But it does not in itself signify any actual possibility of human progress.
The mistake is not in the collective mindset or the individual mindset, but in allowing one to overshadow the other. The tendency toward monism supports this habit, as it always seeks out one principle everywhere. As[464] a general psychological tendency, monism is a characteristic of differentiated feelings and thoughts, reflecting a strong desire to establish one or the other as the ultimate psychological principle. The introverted type only recognizes the thought principle, while the extroverted type only acknowledges the feeling principle. This psychological monism—or perhaps better termed monotheism—offers simplicity but comes at the cost of being one-sided. On one hand, it signifies the exclusion of life’s diversity and true richness; on the other hand, it makes it easier to achieve the ideals of today and the recent past. However, it does not inherently indicate any real potential for human progress.
In the same way rationalism tends towards exclusiveness. Its essence is to exclude instantly whatever is opposed to its standpoint, whether it be intellectually logical or emotionally so. In regard to reason it is both monistic and autocratic. Special thanks are due to Bergson for having broken a lance for the right of the irrational to exist. Psychology will probably be obliged to acknowledge and to submit to a plurality of principles, in spite of the fact that this does not suit the scientific mind. Only so can psychology be saved from ship-wreck.
In the same way, rationalism tends to be exclusive. Its core principle is to immediately dismiss anything that opposes its viewpoint, whether that opposition is logically sound or emotionally valid. When it comes to reason, it is both singular and authoritarian. We owe special thanks to Bergson for advocating for the right of the irrational to exist. Psychology will likely need to recognize and accept a variety of principles, even though this doesn't align with the scientific mindset. Only by doing so can psychology avoid crashing and burning.
But with regard to individual psychology science must waive its claims. For to speak of a scientific individual psychology is in itself a contradictio in adjecto. It is necessarily always only the collective part of an individual psychology that can be the subject of scientific study, for the individual is—according to definition—something unique and incomparable. A "scientific" individual psychology is a denial of individual psychology. It may justly be suspected that individual psychology is indeed a projection of the psychology of him who defines it. Every individual psychology must have its own text-book, for the universal text-book only contains collective psychology.
But when it comes to individual psychology, science has to back off. Talking about a scientific individual psychology is inherently a contradictio in adjecto. It can only focus on the collective aspects of individual psychology, since an individual is—by definition—something unique and unrepeatable. A so-called "scientific" individual psychology actually contradicts the very idea of individual psychology. It's fair to assume that individual psychology is really just a reflection of the psychology of the person defining it. Each individual psychology needs its own textbook, because the universal textbook only covers collective psychology.
These remarks are intended to prepare for what has to be said about the treatment of the aforesaid problem. The fundamental error of both the afore-mentioned ways is simply that the subject is collectively identified with the one or the[465] other part of his psychology. His psychology is individual as well as collective, but not in such a manner as to merge the individual with what is collective, or the collective with what is individual. The persona must be strictly separated from the concept of the individual, in so far as the persona can be absolutely merged with the collective. But what is individual is just that which can never be absorbed in the collective, and is, too, never identical with the collective. Therefore, an identification with the collective or an arbitrary cutting-off from the collective is equivalent to illness; it is pathological.
These comments are meant to set the stage for discussing the treatment of the previously mentioned issue. The main mistake of both previously discussed approaches is that they wrongly equate the individual with a specific aspect of their psychology. A person's psychology is both individual and collective, but not in a way that combines the individual with the collective or vice versa. The persona must be clearly distinguished from the concept of the individual, as the persona can fully integrate with the collective. However, what is individual is precisely what cannot be absorbed into the collective and is also never the same as the collective. Therefore, identifying too closely with the collective or arbitrarily separating from it is a sign of dysfunction; it is pathological.
As has already been indicated, what is individual appears at first as the particular selection of those elements of the collective psyche that contribute to the composition of the persona. As I said before, the components are not individual but collective. It is only their combination, or the selection as a model of particular groups that had already been combined, which is individual. That would be the individual nucleus which is concealed by the personal mask. By the particular differentiation of the persona, the resistance is shown of the individuality to the collective psyche. By analysing the persona, we transfer a greater value to the individuality, increasing thereby its conflict with collectivity. This conflict obviously is a psychological conflict in the individual. The dissolution of the compromise between the two halves of a pair of opposites increases the effectiveness of the contrast. This conflict does not exist within the sphere of purely unconscious natural life, although the purely physiological life of the individual also has to comply with collective demands.
As mentioned earlier, the individual initially appears as a unique selection of elements from the collective psyche that shape the persona. As I noted before, these components are not individual; they are collective. It’s only their combination, or the selection from previously combined groups, that becomes individual. This represents the individual core hidden behind the personal mask. The specific differentiation of the persona highlights the individuality's resistance to the collective psyche. By analyzing the persona, we give more value to individuality, thereby increasing its conflict with collectivity. This conflict is clearly a psychological struggle within the individual. The breakdown of the compromise between the two opposing sides enhances the strength of the contrast. This conflict does not occur within the realm of purely unconscious natural life, even though the individual’s physiological life must also meet collective demands.
The natural unconscious attitude is harmonious; the body, with its capacities and needs, providing immediately indications and limitations, that prevent intemperance and lack of proportion. A differentiated psychological function, however, always inclines towards disproportion, on account of the one-sidedness which is cultivated by the conscious rationality of intention. What is called mental individuality, is, also, an expression of the individual corporeity, being, so to speak,[466] identical with it. This sentence might obviously also be reversed, a fact that does not materially alter the real psychological data concerning the intimate relation of the individuality to the body. At the same time, the body is also that which makes the subject resemble all others to a great extent, although it is the individual body that is differentiated from all others.
The natural unconscious attitude is balanced; the body, with its abilities and needs, gives immediate signals and limits that prevent excess and imbalance. However, a distinct psychological function tends to lean toward imbalance because of the one-sidedness fostered by the conscious rationality of intention. What we call mental individuality is also an expression of individual bodily existence, being, in a way, [466] identical to it. This statement could easily be flipped, but that doesn’t significantly change the real psychological facts regarding the close relationship between individuality and the body. At the same time, the body also makes the subject quite similar to others, even though it is the individual body that sets one apart from all the others.
Similarly the mental or moral individuality differs from all others, although in every respect it is so constituted as to place one person on an equality with all others. Every living creature that is able freely to develop itself individually without any coercion at all, will, through the perfecting of its individuality, soonest realize the ideal type of its species, and therefore, figuratively speaking, will have collective validity.
Similarly, mental or moral individuality varies from one person to another, even though it’s shaped in a way that allows everyone to be equal. Every living being that can develop itself freely without any pressure will, by refining its individuality, quickly achieve the ideal version of its species. Therefore, in a figurative sense, it will hold collective importance.
The persona is always identical with a typical attitude, in which one pyschological function dominates, e.g. feeling, or thought, or intuition. This one-sidedness always causes the relative repression of the other functions. In consequence of this circumstance, the persona is hindering to the development of the individual. The dissolution of the persona is, therefore, an indispensable condition of individuation. It is, therefore, to some extent impossible to achieve individuation by means of conscious intention; for conscious intention leads to a conscious attitude, which excludes everything that "does not suit." But the assimilation of the unconscious contents leads, on the contrary, to a condition in which conscious intention is excluded, being replaced by a process of development that appears to us irrational. This process alone signifies individuation, its product being individuality as defined above, viz. as something individual that is at the same time universal. So long as the persona exists individuality is repressed, betraying itself at most by the particular selection of personal requisites, of what might be called the actor's costumes. Only when the unconscious is assimilated does the individuality become more prominent, and with it also that uniting psychological phenomenon between the ego and non-ego, expressed by the word attitude, is now no longer a typical attitude but an individual one.
The persona always aligns with a typical attitude, where one psychological function takes over, like feeling, thought, or intuition. This imbalance tends to repress the other functions. As a result, the persona restricts the individual’s development. Therefore, breaking down the persona is essential for individuation. It’s somewhat impossible to achieve individuation through conscious intention alone; conscious intention leads to a mindset that rejects anything that "doesn't fit." In contrast, embracing unconscious content fosters a state where conscious intention is excluded, being substituted by a development process that seems irrational to us. This process is what signifies individuation, with its product being individuality as described earlier, as something unique that is also universal. As long as the persona is present, individuality is suppressed, revealing itself primarily through the specific selection of personal traits or what could be called the actor's costumes. Only when the unconscious is integrated does individuality stand out more, and with it, the psychological connection between the ego and non-ego, indicated by the term attitude, shifts from a typical attitude to an individual one.
What is paradoxical in these formulations arises from the same cause from which the conflict about the "universalia" formerly arose. The phrase "animal nullumque animal genus est" makes the fundamental paradox clearly comprehensible. What exists "really" is individual: that which is universal is existing psychologically, but being caused by the real-existing similarities of individual things. The individual is, therefore, the individual thing that has, to a greater or less extent, those attributes upon which the collective conception of "collectivity" rests; and the more individual he is, the more he develops those attributes that are the basis of a collective concept of human nature.
What is paradoxical in these ideas stems from the same issue that previously led to the debate about "universals." The phrase "animal nullumque animal genus est" highlights this fundamental paradox. What truly exists is individual: what is universal exists psychologically, but it’s influenced by the real similarities of individual things. The individual is, therefore, the specific thing that possesses, to varying degrees, those characteristics upon which the overall idea of "collectivity" is based; and the more individual someone is, the more they exhibit those traits that form the foundation of a collective understanding of human nature.
If a grotesque figure, suggested by the initial situation of our problem be permitted, it is Buridan's ass between the two bundles of hay. His questioning is obviously wrong: the question is not whether the hay-bundle on the right or the left be the better one, or whether he should begin to eat on the right or the left hand, but what he himself would like to do, what he is eager for—that is the point. He is thinking of the hay and not of himself, and therefore he does not know what he really wants.
If we can use a ridiculous example from our initial problem, it's like Buridan's ass caught between two bundles of hay. His thinking is clearly off: the issue isn't whether the hay on the right or left is better, or whether he should start eating from the right or the left, but what he actually wants to do, what he truly desires—that's the key. He's focused on the hay and not on himself, so he doesn't know what he really wants.
The question is: what at this moment is the natural direction of the growth of this individual?
The question is: what is the natural direction of this individual's growth right now?
This question cannot be settled by any philosophy, religion or good advice, but solely by an unprejudiced review of the psychological germs of life which have resulted from the natural co-operation of the conscious and unconscious on the one hand, and of the individual and the collective on the other. One person looks for them in the conscious, and another in the unconscious. But the conscious is only one side, and the unconscious is only the other. For it should never be forgotten that dreams are compensatory or complementary to consciousness. Were this not the case, we should be obliged to regard dreams as a source of knowledge superior to the conscious. This view would undoubtedly carry us back to the mentality of the augur, and we should have to accept all the consequences of such a superstitious attitude, unless, indeed, we look upon dreams as valueless, as does the vulgar mind.
This question can't be answered by any philosophy, religion, or good advice, but only through an unbiased examination of the psychological roots of life that come from the natural interaction between the conscious and unconscious mind, as well as between the individual and the collective. One person searches for these roots in the conscious mind, while another looks in the unconscious. However, the conscious is just one side, and the unconscious is the other. It’s important to remember that dreams serve as a balance or complement to consciousness. If that weren't true, we would have to consider dreams as a source of knowledge that outweighs consciousness. This perspective would certainly take us back to a mindset like that of ancient augurs, and we would have to accept all the implications of such a superstitious belief, unless we dismiss dreams as worthless, as many common people do.
We find the unifying function that we are seeking, in the phantasies in which everything that has any effectual determination is present. But phantasies have a bad reputation among psychologists. The psychoanalytical theories hitherto obtaining have treated them accordingly. For both Freud and Adler the phantasy is nothing but a so-called "symbolic" disguise of what both investigators suppose to be the primary propensities and aims. But in opposition to these views it should be emphasised—not for theoretical but for essentially practical reasons—that the phantasy may indeed be thus causally explained and depreciated, but that it nevertheless is the creative soil for everything that has ever brought development to humanity. The phantasy as a psychological function has a peculiar non-reducible value of its own, whose roots are in both the conscious and the unconscious contents, and in what is collective as well as in what is individual.
We discover the unifying function we’re looking for in the fantasies where everything with any real impact is present. However, fantasies have a bad reputation among psychologists. The psychoanalytical theories current until now have treated them accordingly. For both Freud and Adler, fantasy is merely a so-called "symbolic" disguise of what they believe to be the primary drives and goals. But contrary to these views, it’s important to highlight—not for theoretical reasons but for practical ones—that while fantasies can be causally explained and devalued, they are still the creative foundation for everything that has ever propelled human development. Fantasy, as a psychological function, has its own unique and irreplaceable value, with roots in both conscious and unconscious content, and in both collective and individual experiences.
But whence comes the bad reputation of the phantasy? It owes that reputation chiefly to the circumstance that it ought not to be taken literally. It is worthless if understood concretistically. If we understand semiotically, as Freud does, it is interesting from the scientific standpoint. But if it be understood hermeneutically, as an actual symbol, it provides us with the cue that we need in order to develop our life in harmony with ourselves.
But where does the bad reputation of fantasy come from? It mainly comes from the fact that it shouldn't be taken literally. It has no value if understood in a concrete way. If we understand it semiotically, like Freud does, it becomes interesting from a scientific perspective. But if it's understood hermeneutically, as an actual symbol, it gives us the insight we need to shape our lives in harmony with ourselves.
For the significance of a symbol is not that it is a disguised indication of something that is generally known,[255] but that it is an endeavour to elucidate by analogy what is as yet completely unknown and only in process of formation.[256] The phantasy represents to us that which is just developing under the form of a more or less apposite analogy. By analytical reduction to something universally known, we destroy the actual value of the symbol; but it is appropriate to its value and meaning to give it an hermeneutical interpretation.
For a symbol's importance isn't that it's just a hidden clue for something widely understood,[255] but that it's an attempt to clarify through analogy what is still completely unknown and only starting to take shape.[256] The fantasy shows us what is just beginning to develop through a somewhat fitting analogy. By breaking it down to something that everyone knows, we diminish the true value of the symbol; however, it makes sense to interpret it hermeneutically in line with its value and meaning.
The essence of hermeneutics—an art that was formerly much practised—consists in adding more analogies to that[469] already given by the symbol: in the first place, subjective analogies given by the patient as they occur to him; and in the second place, objective analogies provided by the analyst out of his general knowledge. The initial symbol is much enlarged and enriched by this procedure, the result being a highly complex and many-sided picture, which may now be reduced to tertia comparationis. Thence result certain psychological lines of development of an individual as well as collective nature. No science upon earth could prove the accuracy of these lines; on the contrary, rationalism could very easily prove that they are wrong. But these lines vindicate their validity by their value for life. The chief thing in practical treatment is that people should get a hold of their own life, not that the principle of their life should be provable or "right."
The essence of hermeneutics—an art that used to be widely practiced—lies in adding more analogies to those already provided by the symbol: first, subjective analogies offered by the patient as they come to mind; and second, objective analogies supplied by the analyst based on their general knowledge. This process greatly expands and enhances the initial symbol, resulting in a complex and multifaceted picture, which can then be distilled to tertia comparationis. This leads to certain psychological developmental paths that are both individual and collective in nature. No science on earth could prove the accuracy of these paths; in fact, rationalism could easily demonstrate that they are incorrect. However, these paths validate their significance through their value for life. The main goal in practical treatment is for people to gain control over their own lives, not necessarily that the principles of their lives be provable or "right."
Of course, true to the spirit of scientific superstition suggestion will be mooted. But it should long ago have been realised that a suggestion is only accepted by one it suits. Beyond that there is no suggestion, otherwise the treatment of neurosis would be extremely simple, for we should only need to suggest health. This pseudo-scientific talk about suggestion is based upon the unconscious superstition that suggestion actually possesses some real magic power. No one succumbs to suggestion unless from the very bottom of his heart he be willing to co-operate.
Of course, in keeping with the idea of scientific superstition, suggestion will be debated. However, it should have been understood long ago that a suggestion is only accepted by someone when it benefits them. Beyond that, there is no real suggestion; otherwise, treating neurosis would be very straightforward because we would just need to suggest health. This pseudo-scientific discussion about suggestion is rooted in the unconscious belief that suggestion has some real magical power. No one falls for suggestion unless, deep down, they genuinely want to cooperate.
By means of the hermeneutical treatment of the phantasies we arrive at the synthesis of the individual with the collective psyche, put theoretically, that is, but practically, one indispensable condition is yet lacking. For it belongs to the regressive disposition of the neurotic—a disposition in which he has been confirmed in the course of his illness—to take neither himself nor the world seriously, but always to rely on this or that method or circumstance to effect a cure, quite apart from his own serious co-operation. "But you can't wash the dog without getting his skin wet." No cure can be effected without unlimited willingness and absolute seriousness on the part of the patient. There are no magical cures for neurosis. Just as soon as we begin to elaborate the symbolic outlines of the[470] path, the patient must begin to walk thereon. If he delude himself and shirk it, no cure can result. He must really work and live according to what he has seen and recognised as the direction for the time being of his individual life-line, and must continue thereon until a distinct reaction of his unconscious shows him that he is beginning in good faith to go a wrong way.
Through the interpretive analysis of fantasies, we can connect the individual psyche with the collective psyche, at least in theory; however, there is still one essential condition missing in practice. The neurotic tends to have a regressive mindset, where, due to their illness, they do not take themselves or the world seriously. Instead, they rely on various methods or circumstances for healing, often neglecting their own serious involvement. "But you can't wash the dog without getting his skin wet." A genuine cure requires unlimited willingness and complete seriousness from the patient. There are no quick fixes for neurosis. As soon as we start to outline the symbolic aspects of the path, the patient needs to begin walking it. If they deceive themselves and avoid it, no healing will happen. They must genuinely engage and live according to what they have recognized as the current direction of their individual life, and continue along that path until their unconscious gives clear feedback that they are sincerely heading in the wrong direction.
He who does not possess this moral function of faithfulness to himself will never get rid of his neurosis; but he who has this faithfulness can find the way out.
He who lacks this moral quality of being true to himself will never overcome his neurosis; but he who has this integrity can find the way out.
Neither physician nor patient must yield to the delusion that "being analysed" is in itself sufficient to remove a neurosis. That would be deception and self-delusion. Ultimately it is infallibly the moral factor that decides between health and illness.
Neither the doctor nor the patient should fall for the misconception that "being analyzed" alone is enough to cure a neurosis. That would be misleading and a form of self-deception. In the end, it’s always the moral aspect that determines the line between health and illness.
By the construction of the individual's life-line the ever-varying trends and tendencies of his libido are made conscious. These life-lines are not identical with the "directing fictions" discovered by Adler, which are none other than arbitrary attempts to cut the persona off from the collective psyche, and to give it independence. It might rather be said that the "directing fiction" is an unsuccessful attempt to construct a life-line. The unsuitability of the "directing fiction" is also proved by the fact that the lines are tenaciously retained for much too long a time. The hermeneutically constructed life-line is short, for life follows no straight lines that indicate the future long beforehand, for, as Nietzsche says, "All truth is crooked." Life-lines are therefore neither principles nor ideals of universal validity, but points of view and adaptations of ephemeral validity. An abatement of vital intensity, a perceptible loss of libido, or an excessive passion or ecstasy—all show that one such line is left, and that a new line begins, or rather should begin. Sometimes it is enough to leave the revealing of the new line to the unconscious; but this course should indeed not be recommended to the neurotic under all circumstances, though there are cases where what is needed is to learn to trust to so-called chance. However, it is not advisable to let one's self drift for any length[471] of time; a watchful eye should at least be kept upon the reactions of the unconscious, that is to say, upon the dreams: these indicate like a barometer the one-sidedness of our attitude.[257] Therefore, I consider it necessary, in contrast to some other analysts, for the patient after analysis to remain in contact with the unconscious, if he would avoid a relapse. That is why I am convinced that the real end of analysis is reached when the patient has acquired adequate knowledge of the method to remain in contact with the unconscious, and sufficient psychological knowledge to be able to understand approximately his ever-changing life-line; otherwise he is not in a position to follow the direction of the libido currents in the unconscious, and thereby to gain conscious support in the development of his individuality. Every serious case of neurosis needs this weapon in order to maintain the cure.
By creating the individual's life-line, the constantly fluctuating trends and tendencies of their libido become clear. These life-lines are not the same as the "directing fictions" identified by Adler, which are merely arbitrary attempts to separate the persona from the collective psyche and provide it with independence. It might be better to say that the "directing fiction" is an unsuccessful effort to create a life-line. The inadequacy of the "directing fiction" is also shown by the fact that these lines are stubbornly held onto for far too long. The hermeneutically constructed life-line is brief, as life doesn’t follow direct paths that forecast the future well in advance; as Nietzsche stated, "All truth is crooked." Life-lines are therefore neither principles nor ideals with universal validity, but rather perspectives and adaptations of temporary validity. A decrease in vital intensity, a noticeable loss of libido, or an excessive passion or ecstasy—these all indicate that one life-line has ended, and a new one should begin. Sometimes, it’s enough to allow the unconscious to reveal the new line; however, this approach should not be recommended for the neurotic in all situations, although there are times when it’s essential to learn to trust in so-called chance. Still, it isn't wise to let oneself drift for too long; one should at least keep a watchful eye on the unconscious's reactions, namely, dreams, which act like a barometer reflecting our one-sided attitudes. Therefore, I believe it’s necessary, unlike some other analysts, for the patient to stay connected with the unconscious after analysis if they want to avoid a relapse. That’s why I’m convinced that the true conclusion of analysis occurs when the patient has gained the necessary knowledge of the method to maintain contact with the unconscious and enough psychological understanding to comprehend their ever-evolving life-line; otherwise, they won’t be able to track the direction of the libido currents in the unconscious and thus gain conscious support in developing their individuality. Every serious neurosis case requires this tool to sustain the cure.
In this sense analysis is not a method that is a medical monopoly, but rather an art or technique or science of psychological life, which he who has been cured must continue to foster, for the sake of his own welfare and that of his environment. If he understands this aright he will not pose as a psychoanalytical prophet nor as a public reformer, but truly understanding the common weal, he will first himself reap the benefit of the self-knowledge acquired in his[472] treatment, and then he will let the example of his life work what good it can, rather than indulge in aggressive talk and missionary propaganda.
In this way, analysis isn't just a method that belongs to the medical field; it's more like an art, technique, or science of psychological life. Those who have been healed should continue to nurture this for their own well-being and the well-being of those around them. If they truly grasp this, they won't act like a psychoanalytical prophet or a public reformer. Instead, by genuinely understanding the common good, they'll first benefit from the self-knowledge gained in their treatment, and then allow the example of their life to do its good work, rather than engage in aggressive rhetoric and missionary efforts.
Summary.
A. Psychological Material must be divided into Conscious and Unconscious Contents.
A. Psychological material must be divided into Aware and Unresponsive contents.
1. The conscious contents are partly personal, in so far as their universal validity is not recognised; and partly impersonal, that is, collective, in so far as their universal validity is recognised.
1. The conscious contents are partly personal, meaning their universal validity isn't acknowledged; and partly impersonal, which means they are collective, in that their universal validity is acknowledged.
2. The unconscious contents are partly personal, in so far as they concern solely repressed materials of a personal nature, that have once been relatively conscious and whose universal validity is therefore not recognised when they are made conscious; partly impersonal, in so far as the materials concerned are recognised as impersonal and of purely universal validity, of whose earlier even relative consciousness we have no means of proof.
2. The unconscious contents are partly personal, since they relate exclusively to repressed personal experiences that were once somewhat conscious, and their universal significance isn't acknowledged when they come to light; and partly impersonal, as they involve materials that are seen as impersonal and universally valid, without any evidence of their previous, even relative, awareness.
B. The Composition of the Persona.
B. The Makeup of the Persona.
1. The conscious personal contents constitute the conscious personality, the conscious ego.
1. The conscious personal experiences make up the conscious personality, the conscious self.
2. The unconscious personal contents constitute the self, the unconscious or subconscious ego.
2. The unconscious personal content makes up the self, the unconscious or subconscious ego.
3. The conscious and unconscious contents of a personal nature constitute the persona.
3. The conscious and unconscious personal elements make up the persona.
C. The Composition of the Collective Psyche.
C. The Composition of the Collective Psyche.
1. The conscious and unconscious contents of an impersonal or collective nature compose the psychological non-ego, the image of the object. These materials can appear analytically as projections of feeling or of opinion, but they are a priori[473] collectively identical with the object-imago, that is they appear as qualities of the object, and are only a posteriori recognised as subjective psychological qualities.
1. The conscious and unconscious elements of an impersonal or collective nature make up the psychological non-ego, the image of the object. These components can show up in analysis as projections of feelings or opinions, but they are a priori[473] collectively identical to the object-imago, meaning they come across as qualities of the object, and are only a posteriori recognized as subjective psychological traits.
2. The persona is that grouping of conscious and unconscious contents which is opposed as ego to the non-ego. The general comparison of personal contents of different individuals establishes their far-reaching similarity, extending even to identity, by which the individual nature of personal contents, and therewith of the persona, is for the most part suspended. To this extent the persona must be considered an excerpt of the collective psyche, and also a component of the collective psyche.
2. The persona is the collection of conscious and unconscious thoughts that acts as the ego in contrast to the non-ego. When we compare the personal thoughts of different people, we see a significant similarity that can even lead to identical traits, which often overshadows the unique nature of personal thoughts and, by extension, the persona. In this way, the persona should be seen as a part of the collective psyche and also as a contributor to it.
3. The collective psyche is therefore composed of the object-imago and the persona.
3. The collective mindset is therefore made up of the object-image and the persona.
D. What is Individual.
D. What is Individuality.
1. What is individual appears partly as the principle that decides the selection and limitation of the contents that are accepted as personal.
1. What is individual is partly defined by the principle that determines the selection and limitation of what is considered personal.
2. What is individual is the principle by which an increasing differentiation from the collective psyche is made possible and enforced.
2. What is individual is the principle that allows for and enforces an increasing differentiation from the collective mindset.
3. What is individual manifests itself partly as an impediment to collective accomplishment, and as a resistance against collective thinking and feeling.
3. What is individual shows up partly as an obstacle to group success and as a resistance to collective thought and emotion.
4. What is individual is the uniqueness of the combination of universal (collective) psychological elements.
4. What makes someone an individual is the unique combination of universal (collective) psychological elements.
E. We must divide the Conscious and Unconscious Contents into Individualistic and Collectivistic.
E. We need to separate the Conscious and Unconscious Contents into Individualistic and Collectivistic.
1. A content is individualistic whose developing tendency is directed towards the differentiation from the collective.
1. A content is individualistic when its development aims to stand out from the collective.
2. A content is collectivistic whose developing tendency aims at universal validity.
2. A content is collectivistic if its developing tendency aims for universal validity.
3. There are insufficient criteria by which to designate a given content as simply individual or collective, for uniqueness[474] is very difficult to prove, although it is a perpetually and universally recurrent phenomenon.
3. There aren't enough criteria to classify content as either individual or collective, since proving uniqueness[474] is quite challenging, even though it's a constantly occurring phenomenon worldwide.
4. The life-line of an individual is the resultant of the individualistic and collectivistic tendency of the psychological process at any given moment.
4. A person's life line reflects the balance between their individualistic and collectivistic tendencies in their psychological processes at any moment.
INDEX
- Aberrations of Marriage (Michaelis), 365
- Abreaction, 242
- Absolute unconscious, 430-36
- Abstract feelings, 405
- " concept 438, 448
- Abstraction, 293
- Accidentalness, 398
- Accoucheur, the analyst as, 268, 374
- Acts, symptomatic (Freud), 281
- Adaptation to father, 127, 160, 175
- " mom, 125, 159, 171, 232
- Adapted function, 405
- Adler, viii, ix, 191, 223, 260-61, 290, 297-98, 330, 340, 343-44, 349, 352, 384-85, 390-91, 404, 458, 470
- Alcohol, influence of, 12
- Altruism, 269
- Ambitendency, 200
- Ambivalency, 200, 269
- Amnesia of Ivenes, 68
- " periodic, 9
- Amnesic disturbances, 66-7
- Anæsthesia, systematic, 68
- Analysis not a reasoning method, 208
- " biases against, 206-07
- " sexual conception of, vii
- " v. interpretation, 219
- Analyst as accoucheur, 268, 374
- " must be analyzed, 244
- Analytical material compared with poet's material, 214
- " moral impact of psychology 375-76
- Anamnesis not psychoanalysis, 207
- Anna, little, 132-54
- Antithesis, regulating function of, 415
- Anxiety dreams, 160, 372
- Apollo, Introversion, 295
- Archaic view of life, x
- "Arrangements" (Adler), 297, 390
- Aschaffenburg, 352
- Ass, Buridan's, 467
- Assimilation by analogy, 223
- Assimilation of unconscious, 449[476]
- Association, co-ordinance to father, 157
- " known 120-32, 159
- " method 80
- Association-concordance (Kerner), 92
- " test, calculation in, 109
- " " guilt complex 107
- Attack, hysterical (Ivenes) ætiology of, 74
- Attention, dispersion of, 46-8
- Attitudes passionelles, 18
- Augur, medical, 244, 467
- Authority, faith in, 277
- Autochthonous myths, 451
- Auto-hypnosis, 77, 240
- Automatic personalities (Ivenes), 82
- " table movements, 49, 53, 57
- " writing 27, 49, 54, 57
- Automatism, motor cryptomnesia, 91
- " as a hypnotist, 79
- Automatisms, 13, 47, 49, 54
- " of S.W., 20
- Autonomous complexes, 375
- Auto-suggestion, 51, 53, 61
- " " (goal), 79
- Azam, case of Albert X., 9
- " Felida, 66
- Babel, tower of, 416
- Baptism, the rite analysed, 215
- Bayle, 315
- Bergson, 231, 274, 293, 315, 348, 357, 464
- Bernheim, 237
- Binet, 2, 12, 47, 56, 59, 60, 85, 289, 353
- Binet's definition of somnambulism, 49
- Biological duties, 274
- Bircher, 250
- Birth, theories of child, 134
- Bleuler, 5, 14, 201, 312, 354
- Bleuler's theory of negativism, 201
- Boileau's case, 9
- Bonamaison's case, 76
- Bourne, Ansel, case of, 9
- Bourru and Burot, 66
- Brains, similarity of, 451
- Bresler's case, 89
- Breuer, 236, 241
- Breuer's case, 356-358
- Brill, 175
- Burgholzi, cases of mental disease analysed, 316
- " " schizophrenia, 322, 328-35
- Buridan's ass, 467
- Calculation in association test, 109[477]
- Camuset, 66
- Case, Azam's, 9, 66
- " Boileau's, 9
- " Bonamaison's, 76
- " Bresler's, 89
- " Breuer's, 356-58
- " Dyce's, 84
- " Flournoy's, 69
- " Hoefelt's, 66
- " Janet's, 55
- " Kalk's, 65
- " Macnish's, 11
- " Mesnet's, 10-11
- " Naef's, 8
- " Pronst's, 9, 11
- " Renaudin's, 67
- " Schreber's, 343-46
- " Weir Mitchell's, 64-5, 84
- Case of Albert X. (Azam), 9
- " American business man, 399
- " Christ, 394
- " Elise K., 3-7
- " Felida (Azam), 66
- " Helen Smith (Flournoy), 69
- " little Anna, 132-54
- " little Hans, 132
- " Lucie (Janet), 55
- " Mary Reynolds (Weir-Mitchell), 64-5, 84
- " S. W., 16-45
- Cases of dementia præcox, 322, 328-35
- " mental illness analyzed (Burgholzi's), 316
- Catalepsy (Ivenes), 28
- Catharsis, 374
- Catholic Church, 271
- Causal principle in science, 339
- " view (Freud), 261
- Cellini, Benvenuto, 63
- Censor, Freud, 305
- Change in character (Azam's case), 66
- " " (Hoefelt's situation), 66
- " " (Ivenes) 84
- " " (Kalk's case), 65
- " " (Mary Reynolds), 64
- " " (S. W.), 69
- Charcot, 8, 356, 361
- " classification of somnambulic states, 8
- " trauma theory, 361
- Chevreul, 50
- Christ, religion of, 366
- Christian science, 126, 207, 244, 249
- Civilisation and neurosis, 224, 374[478]
- Claparède, 188, 232, 348
- " (footnote), 287
- Clark lectures, 94-156
- Classification of dreams, 310
- Co-function in unconscious, 405
- Collective psyche, 431-32, 455-59, 472
- " " identifying with, 459, 462
- " treatment of, 463
- " mind and spirit, 451
- " vices and virtues, 453
- Comparison of dream-symbols with somnambulic personalities, 59
- Compensation, unconscious, 201, 236, 280, 284, 285, 467
- Complex, concealment, 117
- " Electra, 228
- " incompatibility 202
- " Kern, 228
- " Oedipus, 228, 232
- " resistance 201
- " sensitivity, 203
- Complexes, autonomous, 377
- " function 426
- " doctors' own, 216, 243, 257
- Comprehension by analogy, 223
- Conflict moral, 225, 242, 247, 251
- Content, manifest and latent of dream, 372
- Conscious invention v. dream, 178
- " material, use in analysis, 216
- Consciousness alternating, 11
- " double 1
- Conservation of energy, 231, 411
- Constellation, parental, 160-75
- Constellations, familiar, 119-132
- Converted libido, 141
- Cook, Miss Florence, 37
- Correspondence of Jung and Loÿ, 236-77
- Counterparts of virtues, 389
- Creative work of unconscious, additional, 85
- Crucial points in Psychoanalysis, 236-77
- Cryptomnesia, 78, 86, 87, 199
- " Nietzsche example, 87
- Cryptomnesic hallucinations, 91
- " motor automatism 91
- Darkness, effect of, on suggestibility, 59
- Dawson Williams, Dr., 278
- Deception, Ivenes' wilful, 44
- " by patient, of doctor, 260, 266-67
- "Deep" Psychology, 354
- Defence mechanism, 424
- Deficiency, emotional, 2
- Deficiency, intellectual, 2[479]
- " mindful 2
- " anxious 14
- " psychopathic 3, 13
- Definition of libido, 156, 288
- Delbruck, 70
- Delirium, hysterical, 7
- Dementia præcox, 129, 143, 149, 151, 182, 201, 283, 312-18
- Depreciation by introverted type, 289
- Depressions of puberty, 127
- Dessoir, 85
- Diagnosis of facts, 106-13
- Diehl, 14
- Differentiation of what is individual, 456
- Dionysus, 183
- " extroversion 295
- Dionysian orgies, 366
- "Disposable" energy, 401
- Distortion produced by resistances, 285
- Dogma, 224
- Dominants of unconscious, 432-33
- Double consciousness, 1, 84
- Dragon, symbol of collective psyche, 463
- Dream-analysis the real instrument of the unconscious, 209, 373
- Dreams, anxiety, 160, 372
- " as myth, 436
- " association method, 302
- " classification of, 310
- " compensatory character of, 278-286, 467
- " conception of differing from Freud, 222
- " content, manifest and latent, 372
- " Freud's conception of, 222
- " instances of analysed, 147, 193, 217, 219, 303
- " many-sided, 217
- " moral function of, 309, 471
- " no arbitrary interpretation, 218
- " no fixed symbols, 218, 221, 265, 308
- " number, 191, 193, 197
- " objective interpretation of, 421
- " of crab analysed, 418
- " St. Augustine's, 307
- " subjective interpretation of, 421
- " symbolism of, 308
- " typical themes of, 310
- Dualism in Ivenes' subconscious personalities, 79
- Dubois, 208, 243, 255
- Duplication of attributes, 182
- Duty to children, parental, 153
- Duties biological, 274
- Ecce Homo, 381-84, 417
- Eccentricities pre-exist illness, 282, 289[480]
- Ecstasy, 15, 20
- " (Bettina Brentano), 75
- Ego-complex, 80, 86
- " " (Ivenes), 83
- " function, 416
- " instinct, 383
- " powerlessness of, 450
- " psychological, 434
- Ego, second (Dessoir), 85
- " somnambulic (Ivenes), 76
- Elan vital, 231
- Electra-complex, 228
- Emotional type, Fourneau Jordan, 402
- Empiricism, 291, 301
- Enantiodromia, 415-17
- Energic view point, 231
- Energy as Melungu, 413
- " conservation of, 411
- " "disposable," 401
- " primordial image of, 412
- " psychic, 401
- " transformation of, 413
- Entoptic phenomena, 61
- Enuresis nocturna, 170, 237, 239, 246
- Epilepsy, 1
- Epileptoid attacks, 14
- Erler, 71
- Erotic conflict, 364-65, 370
- Esquirol, 315
- Etat second, 8
- Etiological moment of neurosis, 405
- Exhaustive states, 13
- Experiments by Dr. Fürst, 157-58
- Extroversion, 288, 347, 391, 401-6, 437
- " backward 288
- Familial associations, 120-32, 159
- " constellations influence of, 127
- Fanaticism, 283
- Fascination, 425-27
- Father, adaptation to, 127, 160, 175
- Father-complex, 270
- Faust analysed, 338-41, 384, 460-61
- Fear of unconscious, 434
- Fechner, 352
- Feeling-thoughts, 461
- Feelings of extrovert, 403-5
- " introvert, 403-5
- Felida, case of, 84
- Féré, 12
- Feuerbach, 346[481]
- Final view (Adler), 261
- Finck (types), 296
- Fixation, Freud's view of, 227
- " childish, 228, 462
- Flournoy, 60, 78, 199, 345-46
- " case of Helen Smith, 69
- Folie circulaire, 67
- Forel, 70, 261
- Forel, The Sexual Question, 365
- Frank, 236, 245, 249
- Frazer, 413
- Freud, 59, 73, 82, 104, 132-33, 156, 170, 191, 227, 241, 281, 297-98, 305-08, 319, 343-44, 349, 354-55, 359, 371, 373, 381, 404, 409, 445, 458
- Freudian investigations, 133
- Freud's case of paranoid dementia, 336-37
- " dream interpretation, 222
- " approach, 339
- " dream psychology 300
- " publications, resistance to, 355
- " theory 261
- " " of childlike sexuality, 172
- Frobenius, 310, 436
- Function, adapted, 405
- " co- 405
- " complexes, 426
- " transcendental 417, 436, 441, 468
- Fürst's experiments, 119, 157-58
- Future character (Felida), 84
- " " (Mary Reynolds), 84
- Gall, 315
- Genesis of dreams, 212
- Genius, 1
- Gley, 50
- Glossolalia, 89-91
- " instances of, 28
- God-Almightiness, 450, 457, 462
- " " physical symptoms of, 458
- God's existence, 415
- " concept 451
- " basic idea of, 434
- " projection of, 432
- Goethe, 12, 339, 384, 460-61
- " psychic stimulation of, 75
- Gottähnlichkeit, 450
- Grandfathers I. and II. (Ivenes), 80
- Grebelskaja, 337
- Gross, 348
- " (types), 296-97
- Guilt complex, association test, 107[482]
- Guinon and Waltke, experiment of, 10, 47
- Hallucination, cryptomnesia, 91
- " hypnosis in production of, 58
- Hallucination téléologique, 84
- Hallucinations, 11, 15, 49, 58, 282
- " Helen Smith's, 63, 64
- " hypnagogic, 13, 23, 62
- " hypnopompic, 23, 62
- " in somnambulism, 60
- " intuitive, 64
- " negative, 68
- Hallucinatory persons, why separated, 83
- Hans, little, 132
- Haôma, 413
- Hecker, 64
- Hedonism, viii
- Hegel, 290
- Heim, 412
- Heimarmenê, 413
- Herd-animal, man a, 263
- " -soul, 455
- Hermeneutics, 468-69
- Hero, the, 462
- " myth, 438
- Hiawatha, 436
- Hoch, 289
- Hoche, 355
- Hoefelt, spontaneous somnambulism, 66
- Homunculus, 404
- Homosexual tendencies, 165, 172, 420
- Hypermnesia (footnote), 86
- Hypnagogic activities, 23, 71, 204
- " flashes 22
- Hypnopompical dreams, 23
- Hypnosis in production of hallucination, 58
- Hypnotic treatment, 6, 237
- " " oppositely opposed to psychoanalysis, 207
- Hypnotism, essential character of, 243
- " in automatic writing, 54, 56
- Hysteria, 1, 7
- " case of, 385
- " and extroversion, 406
- Hysteric, extreme sensibility of, 85
- Hysterical attack (Ivenes), ætiology of, 74
- " " induced by automatism, 79
- " deafness and paralysis (Breuer), 356
- " delirium, 71
- " dissociation, 81, 287
- " forgetfulness, 72
- Hysterical identification, 71[483]
- " sleepwalking (case of Elise K.), 3
- Hystero-epilepsy (Janet), 81
- Hystero-epileptic attacks, 81
- Hystero-hypnosis (Ivenes), 79
- Idea, abstract, 438, 448
- Identification with collective psyche, 420-25, 462-65
- " " God, 337
- " " motive 416
- Images, primordial, 410, 448
- " psychic, 438
- Imitation, 456
- Imperialism, 399
- Impersonal unconscious, 437
- Importance of the unconscious, 278
- " " types 348
- Incest-barrier, 230
- " -wishlist 462
- Individual, the, a changing identity, ix
- " metaphysical needs of, 223
- Individuality, 473, 457, 465
- Individuation, 440, 456
- Infantile fixation, 228, 462
- " environment, impact of, 131
- " transfer 298
- Infantility in primitive people, 230
- Inferiority, moral, 449
- Inspiration, 15
- Instances of dreams analysed, 217, 219
- Instinct-ego, 383
- Intelligence-complex, 114
- Interpolations in dreams, 176
- " in rumors, 176
- " vs. analysis, 219
- Interpretation, causal reductive, 419
- " objective, 421
- " subjective, 421
- " synthetic, 417
- Interpretation of Viennese school, one-sided, 217
- Introjection, 414
- Introversion, 137, 140, 288, 347, 391, 437, 401-3
- " neurosis in child, 140
- Intuitive hallucinations, 64
- Itten, 337
- Ivenes, 33-34, 68-84
- " journeys on other side, 34
- " mystic character, 69
- " oracular sayings, 36
- " race-motherhood, 39
- James, William, 290-92, 401[484]
- " " pragmatism, 348
- Janet, 46, 74, 81, 104, 232, 234, 452
- " automatic writing (case of Lucie), 55
- " Lucie and Léonie, 66
- " Léonie, 69
- Janus face, 174
- Jeanne d'Arc, 63, 84
- " " visions of, 63
- Jonah, 436
- Jung, correspondence with Loÿ, 236-277
- K., Miss Elise, case of, 15
- Kadi, the, 390
- Kalk's case, 65
- Kant, 278, 303, 339
- Katatonic dementia præcox, 324
- " negativity, 202
- Kern-complex, 228
- Kerner, 87, 88
- Kerner's book, 27, 35, 93
- " Prevorst Prophetess, 27, 69
- Kræpelin, 352
- Kraepelin-Aschaffenburg scheme, 157
- Kraft-Ebing, 7
- Lapses (case of S. W.), 20-23
- Laughter, symptomatic, 388
- Lebensgefühl, 462
- Legrand du Saulle, 66
- Lehmann, 50, 51
- Leibniz, 278
- Lethargy hysterical (Ivenes), 74
- " " (Loewenfeld), 76
- Let-instinct-live theory, 379
- Libido, 231, 347-48, 407, 471
- " animal rôle of, 423-26
- " canalisation of, 260, 274
- " defined, 156, 288
- " emanates from unconscious, 461
- " stored-up, 234
- Life, archaic view of, x
- Life-lines psychological, 470, 474
- Literature of psychoanalysis, 154-55
- Little Anna, 132-54
- Little Hans, 132
- Loewenfeld, 74-76
- Longfellow, 436
- Loÿ's correspondence with Jung, 236-77
- Lumpf-theory, 147
- Lying, pathological, 15, 70, 71
- Macario, 64[485]
- Macnish's case, 11
- Maeder, 337, 447
- Man a herd animal, 263, 269
- " hylic, etc., 405
- Martian language (Helen Smith), 90
- Masculinity, unconscious, 420, 427
- Masochism, 165
- Materia medica of filth, 243-44
- Maury, 62
- Mayer, Robert, 231, 411
- Medical augur, 244
- Medium, S. W. as, 18
- Megalomania, 462
- Megarian school of philosophy, 402
- Melungu, 413
- Memory, bad, due to repression, 446
- Mental balance, 282
- Mental deficiency (neurasthenic), 14
- Mesnet's case, 10-11
- Metaphysical needs of individual, 223
- Metempsychosis, 413
- Method of association, 370
- Meynert, 316
- Mind the, a Becoming, 341
- " collective, 451
- Mirror-writing, 54
- Misreading, 17, 46, 48
- Misunderstanding between types, 404
- Mithras, religion of, 366
- Moment, etiological, of neurosis, 405
- Monism psychological, 464
- Moral conflict, 225, 242, 247, 251
- Moral effect of analytical psychology, 375-76
- Mörchen, 14
- Mother, adaptation to, 125, 159, 171, 232
- Myers, automatic writing, 54
- Mysticism, 462
- Mystic science, S. W., 40-44
- Myth, the, 436
- " unanimity of autochthonous forms, forms of, 451
- Mythology, 226
- Naef's case, 8
- Naïve and sentimental types, 294
- Nancy school, 356
- Nebuchadnezzar's dream discussed, 281
- Necessity, vital, ix, 375
- Negativism, 200-201
- " reasons for (Bleuler), 202
- " catatonic 202
- Negativism, schizophrenic, 200[486]
- Nelken, 337
- Neumann, 353
- Neurasthenia, 1, 129
- Neurosis, 256, 370, 375
- " ætiology of, 234
- " and civilisation, 224, 374
- " cause of, 232, 404
- " " outbreak of, 229
- " counter-argument against husband, 129-31
- " failure in adaptation, 234
- " Freud's theory of, 227
- " good effect of, 395
- " introversion in child, 140
- " no magical cures of, 470
- " psychogenic in essence, 356
- " sexual ætiology of, too narrow, 231
- " the cause in present, 232
- " used for power effects, 388
- Neurotic, a bearer of social ideals, 271, 277
- " regressive tendency of, 469
- Neurotic's faith in authority, 268
- " special task, 233
- Nietzsche, 87, 88, 295-96, 310, 326, 343, 378, 381, 393, 414, 417, 470
- Nominalism, 402
- Non-ego, 416, 434
- Nucleus-complex, 228
- Number dreams, 292
- Objective interpretation on plane of, 421
- Occultism's premature conclusions, 85
- Occultist literature, gnostic systems, 93
- Œdipus-complex, 228, 232
- Opposition to Freud's publications, 355
- Ostwald, 292, 398, 402
- Pairs of opposites, 417, 452
- Paranoia, 128, 313
- Paranoid dementia, Freud's case, 336-37
- Parental duty to children, 153
- " constellation 160-75
- Parties supérieures (Janet), 232, 452
- Pathological cheat, psychology of, 70
- " dreaming of saints, 70
- Patient and doctor, personal relation, 216-219
- Patients' resistances, 117, 202-05, 216
- Perseveration, 106, 111
- Personality of doctor, 238, 243, 259
- Personal unconscious, 437, 448
- Persona, 457-66, 472
- Persuasion methods, 237
- Perversion, sexual, 447[487]
- Phales, 183
- Phantasies, release of, 458, 447
- " sexual 228
- " unifying role of, 468
- Phenomena, entoptic, 61
- " of double consciousness as character development, 84
- Philosophy world, 350
- Physical sensations as evidence of unconscious feelings, 405
- Physician as "father," 408
- Physician's own complexes, 243, 257
- Pick, 70, 71
- Pinel, 315
- Platonic school, 402
- Power, evaluation, 274
- " " (Adler), 340, 394
- Power standpoint, Adler on, viii, ix
- Predicate type, 125
- Predisposition to neurosis, 233, 359
- Press of ideas, 203
- Preyer, 51
- Primitive non-differentiation, 453
- Primordial images, 410, 414, 448
- Prism, parable of, 252
- Problems of the day, sexual, 276, 367-77
- Projection, 427-33
- " on doctor, 273, 407-8
- " of fantasies onto parents, 409
- " to religions, 435
- Prophetess of Prevorst, 27, 37, 69, 91-93
- Proust's case, 9-11
- Prudishness, 154
- " case of, 119
- Pseudologia phantastica, 72
- Pseudological representation, 71
- Psyche, collective, 431, 455, 458, 472
- Psychic images, 438
- " child's life, 132-56
- " material unconscious 279
- Psychoanalysis a high moral task, 235
- " defined 206, 256
- " literature about, 154-55
- " biases against, 206-07
- " method of, 257
- Psychoanalyst, education of, 244, 258, 266
- Psychocatharsis, 237
- Psychographic communications, 25
- Psychological disturbances, new theory of, 404
- " self and non-self, 434
- " realities, comfort of, 435
- Psychological types, study of, 287-98, 391
- Psychology, deep (Bleuler), 354[488]
- " of dreams, 299-311
- " of person, 464
- " of compulsive cheating, 70
- " of rumor, 176
- Puberty, changes in character at, 67
- " dreams of, 74, 178
- " of psychopathic, 68
- " somnambulic attacks at, 84
- " want of balance at, 45
- Race-motherhood (Ivenes), 39
- Rapport effective with hysterics, 81, 287
- Rationalism, 431, 464
- " opposite of, 416
- Reaction-times, 98-102
- " -type 157
- " " hysterical 97
- " " normal 96
- Realism, 402
- Reasoning method of Dubois, 208
- Reconstruction of life, 236
- Reflection, power of, 397
- Regression, 230, 232, 469
- Regressive extroversion, 288
- " introversion 289
- Reincarnation (Ivenes), 37-9
- Renaudin's case, Folie circulaire, 67
- Repressed contents to be retained in consciousness, 447
- " thoughts, personal growth of, 82
- Repression, 446
- " new edition of, 461
- Reproduction experiment, 116
- Resistances, patients', 117, 202-05, 216
- " causing distortion, 285
- Revenge, unconscious, 190
- Revolution, French, 431
- Reynolds, Mary, case of (change of character), 65
- Ribot, 66
- Richer, 66
- Richet, 92
- " definition of somnambulism, 49
- Rieger, 66
- Riegl, 293
- Riklin, 149
- Rumour, case of, 176
- " interpolations in, 176
- " not aware of invention, 178
- S. W., case of, 16-45
- Saints, pathological dreaming of, 70
- Sallust, 231[489]
- Schiller, 294
- Schisms, 453
- Schizophrenia, 201, 312, 447, 459
- " Bleuler's overview, 203
- Schizophrenic introversion, 204
- " splitting up, 201
- Scholasticism, 340, 352, 373
- School, Megarian v. Platonic, 402
- " the Nancy, 356
- " " Valentinian 405
- " " Zurich, 355
- Schoolmaster view, 264
- Schopenhauer, 295, 368, 447-48
- Schreber case, 337, 343, 346, 440
- Schüle, 61
- Semiotics, vii, 468
- Semi-somnambulic states, 23
- Semi-somnambulism (S. W.), 23, 37, 48-9
- Sexual enlightenment of children, 152, 247
- " ethics 380
- " perversion 447
- " fantasies, 228
- " today's issues, 277, 367-77
- Sexual question, Forel, 365
- Sexual surrogates, 172
- Sexuality, importance of infantile, 172
- " primitive man's view of, 306
- Sexualisation of thought, 204
- Significance of the father, 156
- " " " case 1 160
- " " " " 2 162
- " " " " 3 165
- " " " " 4 170
- " of numbered dreams, 191
- Slips of tongue, 179
- Smith, Helen, case of, 61, 63-64, 72, 91
- Socrates, 332, 374
- Somnambulic attacks, S. W., 28
- " " source of, 75
- " conversations, 18
- " personalities 30-33
- Somnambulism, 2, 8, 16, 18, 240
- Somnambulist's suggestibility, 92
- " thought in digital images, 60
- Spielrein, 337
- Standpoint, causal, final, viii
- Stanley Hall, Dr., 94
- Star-dwellers, 35, 36
- Stekel, 191, 259, 261
- Stereotypic acts, 282
- Stimulus word, 101[490]
- " " repeating, 105
- Study of psychological types, 287-98, 391-403
- Subconscious personality, how constructed, 55
- " Grandfathers I and II, 80
- Subjective interpretation of dreams, 421
- " roots of dreams, 73
- Sublimation, 140, 397-99
- Sucking as sexual act, 231
- Suggestibility, influence of darkness on, 59
- " sleepwalker, 92
- Suggestion, analysis not a method of, 207
- " by analyst, 261, 265, 266, 456, 469
- Superman, 414
- Super-personal unconscious, 426
- Superstition, scientific dread of, 211
- " unaware 280
- Swedenborg, 37
- " visions of 63
- Symbol interpreted semiotically, vii, 468
- " not repaired, 218, 221, 265, 308
- " mental two aspects of, viii
- " importance of spirituality, xi
- Symbolic meaning of sexual phantasies, 222
- Symbolism, 198, 224, 337
- " an experience, 222
- " Tobit 174
- " chestnuts, definition of, 183
- " God and the devil, 174
- " of dreams, 59, 218, 308
- " value of faith, 224
- Sympathy (extraversion), 293
- Symptomatic acts, 46, 179, 281
- " lols, 388
- Synesius, 417
- Synthetic procedure, 417
- Systematic anæsthesia, 68
- Table movements, 85
- Table-turning, 17, 24, 50
- Tachypnœa (case of S. W.), 19
- Taylor, 413
- Teleology, meaning in double consciousness, 84
- Telepathic thought-reading, 266
- Tender-minded and tough-minded, 290, 402
- Theories new, as caustics, 394
- " " of psychological disturbances, 404
- " " oversimplified 394
- Thought of extroverts, 403
- Thought-feelings, 411, 461
- Thought-pressure, 204
- Thought-reading, 85-92[491]
- Thought, somnambulic, in plastic images, 60
- " transference 24, 51, 56
- Till Eulenspiegel, 387
- Tongue, slips of, 179
- Tower of Babel, 446
- Transcendental function, 417, 436, 441
- Transference, 245-46, 270, 289, 407-13, 429, 435
- " childish 298
- " pros and cons, 270-72
- Trauma, sexual, 227, 242, 358, 361-62
- " Charcot's theory, 361
- Trumbull Ladd, 62
- Truth, what is it, 252, 256
- Twilight states, 71, 81
- Type, complex, 114
- " definition 114
- " outgoing, 288, 391, 439, 401
- " shy 288, 391, 439, 401
- " goal 11
- " predicate, 115
- Types (Finck), 296
- " (Gross) 296-97
- " importance of, 348
- " marriages between, 402
- " naive and sentimental, 294
- " psychological 287, 391, 439, 401
- Tough and tender-minded, 290
- Typical themes of dreams, 310
- Unconscious, absolute, 435
- " analysable to completion, 461
- " an extension of the self, vi
- " integration of, 449
- " payment 284
- " can't be emptied, 447
- " cause of anxiety, 404
- " feelings as body sensations, 405
- " LGBTQ+ identity, 420
- " distant, 437, 472
- " importance of the, 278
- " personal 437, 448, 456, 472
- " personalities (Ivenes), 77
- " future aspect of, 442
- " psychic stuff, 279
- " source of desire, 461
- " " " wisdom, 442
- " superstition 280
- " surge of, 459
- Understanding, prospective, 338, 442
- Understanding, retrospective, 338[492]
- Unifying function of phantasies, 468
- Value of religious symbolism, 224
- "Values," 392, 396, 404
- Viennese school, one-sided interpretations of, 217
- Vices and virtues, collective, 453
- Virtues, unconscious counterparts, 389
- Vischer, 348-49
- Visions, Benvenuto Cellini, 63
- " hypnagogic, 63, 71
- " of Jeanne d'Arc, 63
- " of S. W., 21
- " of Swedenborg, 63
- Visual images, 60
- " v. auditory hallucinations, 61
- "Vital necessity," ix
- Voisin, 66
- Volitional meaning of dreams, 222
- Wagner, 383
- Wandering impulse, cases of, 9
- War, vi, xi, 398, 399, 416
- Warringer, 293-94
- Washing mania, 246
- Wernicke, 316
- Westphal, 13
- Will, 397-99
- " to power, 381, 388, 458
- Wisdom of unconscious, 442
- Wish-phantasies, 447
- Witch-sleep, 75
- Word predicate, type defined, 158
- Word-presentation, 53
- Works of the Zürich school, 345-46
- World-philosophy, 350
- Wundt, 352
- Zarathustra, 381
- Zagreus, 417
- Zschokke, 92
- Zürich school, 355
- " " works of, 345-46
THE END
THE END
Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 8, Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, W.C.
Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 8 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2
FOOTNOTES:
[4] Idem, l.c., p. 487; cp. also Erler, Allg. Zeitschrift f. Psychiatrie, XXXV. p. 28; also Culerre, Allg. Zeit. f. Psych., XLVI., Litteraturbericht 356.
[4] Same source, ibid., p. 487; see also Erler, General Journal of Psychiatry, XXXV. p. 28; and Culerre, General Journal of Psych., XLVI., Literature Report 356.
[6] "Somnambulism must be conceived as systematised partial waking, in which a limited, connected presentation-complex takes place. Contrary presentations do not occur, at the same time the mental activity is carried on with increased energy within the limited sphere of the waking" (Lowenfeld, "Hypnotism," 1901, p. 289).
[6] "Somnambulism should be understood as a systematic form of partial waking, where a specific, cohesive set of thoughts occurs. Conflicting thoughts don't arise, while mental activity continues with heightened energy within this limited area of awareness" (Lowenfeld, "Hypnotism," 1901, p. 289).
[8] Trib. méd., March, 1890.
[10] "Principles of Psychology," p. 391.
[11] Mesnet, "De l'automatisme de la mémoire et du souvenir dans le somnambulisme pathologique." Union médicale, Juillet, 1874. Cf. Binet, "Les Altérations de la personnalité," p. 37. Cf. also Mesnet, "Somnambulisme spontané dans ses rapports avec l'hystérie," Arch. de Neurol., Nr. 69, 1892.
[11] Mesnet, "On the Automation of Memory and Remembrance in Pathological Somnambulism." Medical Union, July 1874. See Binet, "Personality Changes," p. 37. Also see Mesnet, "Spontaneous Somnambulism in Relation to Hysteria," Archives of Neurology, No. 69, 1892.
[12] Arch. de Neur., Mai, 1891.
[14] Goethe: Zur Naturwissenschaft in Allgemeinen. "I was able, when I closed my eyes and bent my head, to conjure the imaginary picture of a flower. This flower did not retain its first shape for a single instant, but unfolded out of itself new flowers composed of coloured petals and green leaves. They were not natural flowers, but phantastic ones. They were as regular in shape as a sculptor's rosettes. It was impossible to fix the creation which sprang up, nevertheless the dream-image lasted as long as I desired it to last; it neither faded nor grew stronger."
[14] Goethe: Zur Naturwissenschaft in Allgemeinen. "When I closed my eyes and lowered my head, I was able to visualize an imaginary flower. This flower didn’t hold its original shape for even a moment but blossomed into new flowers made of colorful petals and green leaves. They weren’t real flowers, but fantastic ones. They were as symmetrical as a sculptor's rosettes. It was impossible to capture the creation that emerged; however, the dream-image lasted as long as I wanted it to, neither fading nor intensifying."
[18] "Neurasthenische Krisen," Münch. Med. Wochenschr., März, 1902, "When the patients first describe their crises they generally give a picture that makes us think of epileptic depression. I have often been deceived in this way."
[18] "Neurasthenic Crises," Münch. Med. Wochenschr., March, 1902, "When patients first talk about their crises, they usually describe something that reminds us of epileptic depression. I have often been misled in this way."
[23] See page 17.
[24] Binet, "Les altérations de la personnalité."
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Binet, "Personality Changes."
[28] As is known, during the waking-state the hands and arms are never quite still, but are constantly subjected to fine tremors. Preyer, Lehmann, and others have proved that these movements are influenced in a high degree by the predominant presentations. Preyer shows that the outstretched hand drew small, more or less faithful, copies of figures which were vividly presented. These purposeful tremors can be demonstrated in a very simple way by experiments with the pendulum.
[28] It's well known that when we’re awake, our hands and arms are never completely still; they constantly have slight tremors. Preyer, Lehmann, and others have demonstrated that these movements are greatly influenced by what we are focusing on. Preyer shows that an outstretched hand creates small, more or less accurate copies of images that we see clearly. These intentional tremors can be easily shown through simple pendulum experiments.
[30] Analogous to certain hypnotic experiments in the waking state. Cf. Janet's experiment when by a whispered suggestion he induced a patient to lie flat on the ground without being aware of it ("L'Automatisme").
[30] Similar to some hypnotic experiments done while a person is awake. See Janet's experiment where he used a quiet suggestion to make a patient lie flat on the ground without them even realizing it ("L'Automatisme").
[31] Charcot's scheme of word-picture combination: 1, Auditory image. 2, Visual image. 3, Motor image., Speech image., Writing image. In Gilbert Ballet, "Die innerliche Sprache," Leipzig and Wien, 1890.
[31] Charcot's system of combining words and pictures: 1. Auditory image. 2. Visual image. 3. Motor image. 4. Speech image. 5. Writing image. In Gilbert Ballet, "Die innerliche Sprache," Leipzig and Wien, 1890.
[35] "Les Altérations," p. 132.
[36] "Une fois baptisé, le personnage inconscient est plus déterminé et plus net, il montre mieux ses caractères psychologiques" (Janet, "L'Automatisme," p. 318).
[36] "Once baptized, the unconscious character is more determined and clearer, and better displays their psychological traits" (Janet, "L'Automatisme," p. 318).
[38] Cf. Corresponding tests by Flournoy: "Des Indes à la planète Mara. Etude sur un cas de somnambulisme avec glossolalie." Paris and Genève, 1900.
[38] See corresponding tests by Flournoy: "From the Indies to the planet Mars. Study on a case of sleepwalking with glossolalia." Paris and Geneva, 1900.
[40] Binet, "Les Altérations," p. 157.
[42] Flournoy, l.c., p. 55.
[43] Schüle, "Handbuch," p. 134.
[45] Spinoza hypnopompically saw a "nigrum et scabiosum Brasilianum."—J. Müller, l.c.
[45] Spinoza, waking up, saw a "nigrum et scabiosum Brasilianum."—J. Müller, l.c.
In Goethe's "The Elective Affinities," at times in the half darkness Ottilie saw the figure of Edward in a dimly-lit spot. Compare also Cardanus, "imagines videbam ab imo lecti, quasi e parvulis annulis arcisque constantes, arborum, belluarum, hominum, oppidorum, instructarum acierum, bellicorum et musicorum instrumentorum aliorumque huius generis adscendentes, vicissimque descendentes, aliis atque aliis succedentibus" (Hieronymus Cardanus, "De subtilitate rerum").
In Goethe's "The Elective Affinities," there were moments when Ottilie saw Edward's figure in a dimly lit area. Also, compare with Cardanus: "I imagined I was seeing from the bottom of the bed, as if from little rings standing, trees, animals, people, towns, arranged with weapons, musical instruments, and other things of that kind ascending, and in turn descending, with one after another succeeding each other" (Hieronymus Cardanus, "De subtilitate rerum").
[46] "Le sommeil et les rêves," p. 134.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ "Sleep and Dreams," p. 134.
[48] Hecker says of the same condition, "There is a simple elemental vision, even without sense presentation, through over-excitation of mental activity, not leading to phantastic imagery, that is the vision of light free from form, a manifestation of the visual organs stimulated from within" ("Ueber Visionen," Berlin, 1848).
[48] Hecker describes the same condition, "There is a basic elemental vision, even without any sensory input, resulting from heightened mental activity that doesn’t produce fantastic imagery. It’s the vision of light without shape, a manifestation of the visual organs being stimulated from within" ("Ueber Visionen," Berlin, 1848).
[50] Hagen, l.c., p. 57.
[51] Goethe, "Benvenuto Cellini."
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Goethe, "Benvenuto Cellini."
[52] Flournoy, l.c., p. 32 ff.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Flournoy, l.c., p. 32 ff.
[53] Flournoy, l.c., p. 51.
[55] Ibid., VI. 285.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid., VI. 285.
[56] Coll. Physicians of Philadelphia, April 4, 1888. Also Harper's Magazine, 1869. Abstracted in extenso in William James's "Principles of Psychology," 1891, p. 391 ff.
[56] Coll. Physicians of Philadelphia, April 4, 1888. Also Harper's Magazine, 1869. Summarized in detail in William James's "Principles of Psychology," 1891, p. 391 ff.
[58] Schroeder von der Kalk, "Pathologie und Therapie der Geisteskrankheiten," p. 31: Braunschweig, 1863. Quoted in Allg. Zeit. f. Psych., XXII., p. 405.
[58] Schroeder von der Kalk, "Pathology and Treatment of Mental Illness," p. 31: Braunschweig, 1863. Quoted in General Journal for Psychology, XXII., p. 405.
[61] Azam, "Hypnotisme, Double Conscience," etc.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Azam, "Hypnotism, Dual Consciousness," etc.
[66] Quoted by Ribot, "Die Persönlichkeit."
Cited by Ribot, "The Personality."
[67] Ibid., p. 69.
[68] Flournoy, l.c., p. 59.
[69] "Les rêves somnambuliques, sortes de romans de l'imagination subliminale, analogues à ces histoires continues, que tant de gens se racontent à eux-mêmes et dont ils sont généralement les héros dans leurs moments de far niente ou d'occupations routinières qui n'offrent qu'un faible obstacle aux rêveries intérieures. Constructions fantaisistes, millefois reprises et poursuivies, rarement achevées, où la folle du logis se donne libre carrière et prend sa revanche du terne et plat terre à terre des réalités quotidiennes." (Flournoy, l.c., p. 8).
[69] "Sleepwalking dreams, like novels of subliminal imagination, are similar to the ongoing stories that many people tell themselves, where they are usually the heroes during their moments of idleness or routine activities that barely interrupt their inner daydreams. These fanciful constructions, repeated a thousand times and often left unfinished, allow the mind to roam freely and take its revenge on the dull and flat realities of everyday life." (Flournoy, l.c., p. 8).
[70] Delbruck, "Die Pathologische Lüge."
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Delbruck, "The Pathological Lie."
[71] Forel, "Hypnotisme."
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Forel, "Hypnosis."
[74] Görres, l.c.
[78] Binet, "Les hystériques ne sont pas pour nous que des sujets d'élection agrandissant des phénomènes qu'on doit nécessairement retrouver à quelque degré chez une foule d'autres personnes qui ne sont ni atteintes ni même effleurées par la nêvrose hystérique". ("Les altérations," p. 29)
[78] Binet, "Hysterics are not just subjects of choice for us, amplifying phenomena that we must necessarily find to some degree in many other people who are neither affected nor even touched by hysterical neurosis." ("Les altérations," p. 29)
[79] Delbrück, l.c., and Redlich, l.c. Cf. the development of delusions in epileptic stupor mentioned by Mörchen, "Essay on Stupor," pp. 51 and 59, 1901.
[79] Delbrück, l.c., and Redlich, l.c. See the development of delusions in epileptic stupor mentioned by Mörchen, "Essay on Stupor," pp. 51 and 59, 1901.
[80] Cf. Flournoy's very interesting supposition as to the origin of the Hindu cycle of H.S.: "Je ne serais pas étonné que la remarque de Martes sur la beauté des femmes du Kanara ait été le clou, l'atome crochu, qui a piqué l'attention subliminale et l'a très naturellement rivée sur cette unique passage avec les deux ou trois lignes consécutives, à l'exclusion de tout le contexte environnant beaucoup moins intérressant" (L.c., p. 285).
[80] See Flournoy's very interesting theory about the origin of the Hindu cycle of H.S.: "I wouldn't be surprised if Martes's comment on the beauty of the women from Kanara was the key detail that caught the subliminal attention and naturally focused it on this one passage along with the two or three following lines, ignoring the much less interesting surrounding context." (L.c., p. 285).
[81] Janet says, "From forgetfulness there arises frequently, even if not invariably, the so-called lying of hysteria. The same explanation holds good of a hysteric's whims, changes of mood, ingratitude—in a word, of his inconstancy. The link between the past and present, which gives to the whole personality its seriousness and poise, depends to a large extent upon memory" ("Mental States," etc., p. 67).
[81] Janet says, "Forgetfulness often leads to what we call hysterical lying, even if it's not always the case. The same explanation applies to a hysteric's moods, their shifts in attitude, and their emotional unreliability—in short, their inconsistency. The connection between past and present, which gives a person's personality its depth and stability, largely relies on memory" ("Mental States," etc., p. 67).
[83] Binet, l.c., p. 84.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Binet, l.c., p. 84.
[84] "Une autre considération rapproche encore ces deux états, c'est que les actes subconscients ont un effet en quelque sorte hypnotisant et contribuant par eux-mêmes à amener le somnambulisme" ("L'Automatisme," p. 329).
[84] "Another consideration that connects these two states is that subconscious actions have a somewhat hypnotic effect and contribute on their own to inducing somnambulism" ("L'Automatisme," p. 329).
[85] Janet, l.c., p. 329.
[86] In literature Gustave Flaubert has made use of a similar falling asleep at the moment of extreme excitement in his novel "Salambo." When the hero, after many struggles, has at last captured Salambo, he suddenly falls asleep just as he touches her virginal bosom.
[86] In literature, Gustave Flaubert used a similar moment of falling asleep at the peak of excitement in his novel "Salambo." When the hero, after many battles, finally captures Salambo, he suddenly falls asleep just as he touches her pure chest.
[90] Cf. here Flournoy, l.c., 65.
[92] Ibid., 734.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid., 734.
[94] Arch. f. Psych., XXII., 737.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Arch. f. Psych., XXII., 737.
[95] Ibid.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.
[96] Ibid., XXIII., p. 59 ff.
[98] Thus Flournoy writes, "Dans un premier essai Léopold (H.S.'s control-spirit) ne réussit qu'à donner ses intimations et sa pronunciation à Helen: après une séance où elle avait vivement souffert dans la bouche et le cou comme si on lui travaillait ou lui enlevait les organes vocaux, elle se mit à causer très naturellement."
[98] Flournoy writes, "In a first attempt, Léopold (H.S.'s controlling spirit) only managed to give hints and his pronunciation to Helen: after a session where she experienced intense pain in her mouth and neck, as if her vocal cords were being manipulated or removed, she began to speak quite naturally."
[99] Loewenfeld, Arch. f. Psych., XXIII., 60.
[100] This behaviour recalls Flournoy's observations: "Whilst H.S. as a somnambule speaks as Marie Antoinette, the arms of H.S. do not belong to the somnambulic personality, but to the automatism Leopold, who converses by gestures with the observer" (Flournoy, l.c., p. 125).
[100] This behavior brings to mind Flournoy's observations: "While H.S. is in a trance and speaking as Marie Antoinette, H.S.'s arms don't belong to the trance state personality but to the automatism Leopold, who communicates through gestures with the observer" (Flournoy, l.c., p. 125).
[104] The hysterical attack is not a purely psychical process. By the psychic processes only a pre-formed mechanism is set free, which has nothing to do with psychic processes in and for themselves (Karplus, Jahr. f. Psych., XVII.).
[104] A hysterical attack isn’t just a mental process. The mental processes only trigger a pre-existing mechanism that’s unrelated to mental processes themselves (Karplus, Jahr. f. Psych., XVII.).
[105] Carl Hauptmann, in his drama "Die Bergschmiede," has made use of the objectivation of certain linked association-complexes. In this play the treasure-seeker is met on a gloomy night by a hallucination of his entire better self.
[105] Carl Hauptmann, in his play "Die Bergschmiede," has utilized the objectification of certain interconnected complexes of associations. In this play, the treasure-seeker encounters a vision of his ideal self on a dark night.
[109] Flournoy, l.c., p. 28.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Flournoy, l.c., p. 28.
[111] Cryptomnesia must not be regarded as synonymous with Hypermnesia; by the latter term is meant the abnormal quickening of the power of recollection which reproduces the memory-pictures as such.
[111] Cryptomnesia should not be confused with Hypermnesia; the latter refers to an unusual enhancement of memory that reproduces the memory images themselves.
[112] "Has any one at the end of the nineteenth century any clear conception of what the poets in vigorous ages called inspiration? If not, I will describe it. The slight remnant of superstition by itself would scarcely have sufficed to reject the idea of being merely incarnation, merely mouthpiece, merely the medium of superior forces. The concept revelation in the sense that quite suddenly, with ineffable certainty and delicacy, something is seen, something is heard, something convulsing and breaking into one's inmost self, does but describe the fact. You hear—you do not seek; you accept—asking not who is the giver. Like lightning, flashes the thought, compelling without hesitation as to form—I have had no choice" (Nietzsche's "Works," vol. III., p. 482.).
[112] "Does anyone at the end of the nineteenth century really understand what the poets from lively times referred to as inspiration? If not, let me explain. The small remnant of superstition alone wouldn’t be enough to dismiss the idea of being simply an incarnation, just a mouthpiece, just the medium for greater forces. The idea of revelation, in the sense that something is suddenly seen with incredible clarity and finesse, that something is heard, something that shakes and disrupts your innermost self, truly captures the essence of it. You hear—you don’t seek; you accept—without questioning who is the giver. Like lightning, the thought flashes, compelling without any doubt about its form—there’s no choice in the matter" (Nietzsche's "Works," vol. III., p. 482.).
[113] "There is an ecstasy so great that the immense strain of it is sometimes relaxed by a flood of tears, during which one's steps now involuntarily rush, and anon involuntarily lag. There is the feeling that one is utterly out of hand, with the very distinct consciousness of an endless number of fine thrills and titillations descending to one's very toes;—there is a depth of happiness in which the most painful and gloomy parts do not act as antitheses to the rest, but are produced and required as necessary shades of colour in such an overflow of light" (Nietzsche, "Ecce Homo," vol. XVII. of English translation, by A. M. Ludovici, p. 103).
[113] "There’s a kind of joy so intense that sometimes it bursts into tears, causing your steps to hastily quicken and then slow down without your control. You feel like you’re completely overwhelmed, while you’re also acutely aware of countless little thrills and tingles rushing down to your toes;—there’s a profound happiness in which the most painful and dark moments don’t oppose the rest, but instead serve as essential shades in such a flood of brightness" (Nietzsche, "Ecce Homo," vol. XVII. of English translation, by A. M. Ludovici, p. 103).
[115] Cf. Goerres, "Die christliche Mystik."
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Goerres, "Christian Mysticism."
[117] Zündel, "Biographie Blumhardt's."
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Zündel, "Biographie Blumhardt."
[118] "Le baragouin rapide et confus dont on ne peut jamais obtenir la signification, probablement parce qu'il n'en a en effet aucune, n'est qu'un pseudo-langage (p. 193) analogue au baragouinage par lequel les enfants se donnent parfois dans leurs jeux l'illusion qu'ils parlent chinois, indien ou 'sauvage'" (p. 152, Flournoy, l.c.).
[118] "The rapid and confusing babble from which one can never derive any meaning, likely because it actually has none, is simply a pseudo-language (p. 193) similar to the gibberish that children sometimes use in their play to pretend they're speaking Chinese, Indian, or 'savage'" (p. 152, Flournoy, l.c.).
[119] See p. 63.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See page 63.
[120] Flournoy, l.c., p. 378.
[122] The limitation of the associative processes and the concentration of attention upon a definite sphere of presentation can also lead to the development of new ideas, which no effort of will in the waking state would have been able to accomplish (Loewenfeld, "Hypnotismus," p. 289).
[122] The limitation of associative processes and the focus of attention on a specific area of presentation can also result in the emergence of new ideas that no amount of willpower during waking hours could achieve (Loewenfeld, "Hypnotismus," p. 289).
[124] Gilles de la Tourette says, "We have seen somnambulic girls, poor, uneducated, quite stupid in the waking state, whose whole appearance altered so soon as they were sent to sleep. Whilst previously they were boring, now they are lively, alert, sometimes even witty" (Cf. Loewenfeld, l.c., p. 132).
[124] Gilles de la Tourette says, "We've observed girls who sleepwalk—poor, uneducated, and seemingly dull when awake—whose entire demeanor changes as soon as they fall asleep. While they were previously uninteresting, they become lively, engaged, and sometimes even witty." (Cf. Loewenfeld, l.c., p. 132).
[125] Lectures delivered at the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the opening of Clark University, September, 1909; translated from the German by Dr. A. A. Brill, of New York. Reprinted by kind permission of Dr. Stanley Hall.
[125] Lectures given during the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the opening of Clark University, September 1909; translated from German by Dr. A. A. Brill from New York. Reprinted with the kind permission of Dr. Stanley Hall.
[126] The selection of these stimulus words was naturally made for the German language only, and would probably have to be considerably changed for the English language.
[126] The choice of these stimulus words was obviously tailored for the German language only, and would likely need significant adjustments for the English language.
[127] Denotes misunderstanding.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Denotes confusion.
[130] + denotes Reproduced unchanged.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ + means Reproduced unchanged.
[131] Denotes misunderstanding.
Denotes misunderstanding.
[133] Denotes misunderstanding.
Misunderstanding indicated.
[151] Libido is what earlier psychologists called "will" or "tendency." The Freudian expression is denominatio a potiori. Jahrbuch, vol. I., p. 155, 1909.
[151] Libido is what earlier psychologists referred to as "will" or "tendency." The Freudian term is denominatio a potiori. Jahrbuch, vol. I., p. 155, 1909.
[152] Sommer, "Familienforschung und Vererbungslehre." Barth, Leipzig, 1907. Joerger, "Die Familie, Zero," Arch. für Rassen u. Gesellschaftsbiologie, 1905. M. Ziermer (pseudonym), "Genealogische Studien über die Vererbung geistiger Eigenschaften," ibid., 1908.
[152] Sommer, "Family Research and Genetics." Barth, Leipzig, 1907. Joerger, "The Family, Zero," Archives for Racial and Sociobiology, 1905. M. Ziermer (pen name), "Genealogical Studies on the Inheritance of Mental Traits," ibid., 1908.
[154] E. Fürst, "Statistische Untersuchungen über Wortassoziationen und über familiäre Übereinstimmung im Reaktionstypus bei Ungebildeten. Beitrag der diagnostischen Assoziationsstudien herausgegeben von Dr. C. G. Jung," Journal für Psychologie und Neurologie, Bd. II., 1907. (Reprinted in volume two of the Joint Reports.)
[154] E. Fürst, "Statistical Investigations on Word Associations and Family Agreement in Reaction Types among the Uneducated. Contribution of the Diagnostic Association Studies published by Dr. C. G. Jung," Journal of Psychology and Neurology, Vol. II, 1907. (Reprinted in volume two of the Joint Reports.)
[155] By this type I understand reactions where the response to the stimulus-word is a predicate subjectively accentuated instead of an objective relation, e.g., Flower, pleasant; frog, horrible; piano, terrible; salt, bad; singing, sweet; cooking, useful (see p. 124).
[155] By this type, I mean reactions where the response to the stimulus word is a subjective description rather than an objective relationship, e.g., flower, pleasant; frog, horrible; piano, terrible; salt, bad; singing, sweet; cooking, useful (see p. 124).
[157] Between whiles we believe ourselves masters of our acts at any given moment. But when we look back along our life's path and fix our eyes chiefly upon our unfortunate steps and their consequences, often we cannot understand how we came to do this and leave that undone, and it seems as if some power outside ourselves had directed our steps. Shakespeare says;
[157] Sometimes we think we're in control of our actions in the moment. But when we reflect on our lives and focus mostly on our mistakes and their outcomes, we often can't figure out how we ended up doing this instead of that, and it feels like some outside force had guided our choices. Shakespeare says;
Schopenhauer, "Ueber die anscheinende Absichtlichkeit im Schicksale des Einzelnen. Parerga und Paralipomena."
Schopenhauer, "On the Apparent Intentionality in the Fate of the Individual. Parerga and Paralipomena."
[158] This was seen in the Amsterdam Congress of 1907, where a prominent French savant assured us that the Freudian theory was but "une plaisanterie." This gentleman has demonstrably neither read Freud's latest works nor mine, he knows less about the subject than a little child. This opinion, so admirably grounded, ended with the applause of a well-known German professor. One can but bow before such thoroughness. At the same Congress another well-known German neurologist immortalised his name with the following intellectual reasoning: "If hysteria on Freud's conception does indeed rest on repressed affects, then the whole German army must be hysterical."
[158] This was evident at the Amsterdam Congress of 1907, where a well-known French scholar claimed that the Freudian theory was just "a joke." This individual clearly hadn't read Freud's latest works or mine, and he knows far less about the subject than a small child. This opinion, so impressively formulated, ended with applause from a famous German professor. One can only admire such thoroughness. At the same Congress, another notable German neurologist made his mark with this piece of reasoning: "If hysteria, according to Freud, is based on repressed emotions, then the entire German army must be hysterical."
[162] Author's italics.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Author's italics.
[168] See chapter I, p. 86.
[174] See "Psychology of the Unconscious."
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See "Psychology of the Unconscious."
[176] Translated by Mrs. Edith Eder.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Translated by Edith Eder.
[179] Thus a patient, who had been treated by a young colleague without very much result, once said to me: "Certainly I made great progress with him, and I am much better than I was. He tried to analyse my dreams. It's true he never understood them, but he took so much trouble over them. He is really a good doctor."
[179] So a patient, who had been treated by a young colleague with not much success, once told me: "I definitely made a lot of progress with him, and I feel much better than I did. He tried to analyze my dreams. It's true he never got them, but he put in so much effort with them. He is actually a good doctor."
[180] Defined in the Freudian sense, as the transference to the doctor of infantile and sexual phantasies. A more advanced conception of the transference perceives in it the important process of emotional approach [Einfühlung] which at first makes use of infantile and sexual analogies.
[180] Defined in the Freudian sense, as the transfer of childish and sexual fantasies to the doctor. A more advanced view of transference understands it as a crucial process of emotional connection [Einfühlung] that initially relies on childish and sexual comparisons.
[182] Paper given before the Section of Neurology and Psychological Medicine, Aberdeen, 1914. Reprinted from the British Medical Journal, by kind permission of the Editor, Dr. Dawson Williams.
[182] Paper presented at the Section of Neurology and Psychological Medicine, Aberdeen, 1914. Reprinted from the British Medical Journal, with permission from the Editor, Dr. Dawson Williams.
[183] Delivered at the Psychoanalytical Congress, Munich, 1913. Translated from Archives de Psychologie, by kind permission of the Editor, Dr. Claparède. Translator, C. E. Long.
[183] Delivered at the Psychoanalytical Congress, Munich, 1913. Translated from Archives de Psychologie, by kind permission of the Editor, Dr. Claparède. Translator, C. E. Long.
[184] "The concept of energy is that which comes nearest to the concept of libido. Libido can perhaps be described as "effect," or "capacity for effect." It is capable of transformation from one form to another. The metamorphosis can be sudden, as when one function replaces another in a moment of danger; or it can be gradual, as we see it in the process of sublimation, where the libido is led over a long and difficult path through a variety of forms into a different function."—Mary Moltzer.
[184] "The idea of energy closely resembles the idea of libido. Libido might be described as "effect" or "the ability to effect change." It can shift from one form to another. This change can happen suddenly, such as when one function takes over in an emergency; or it can be gradual, as we observe in sublimation, where libido is transformed over a long and challenging process through different forms into a new function."—Mary Moltzer.
[185] "Pragmatism," Chapter I.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ "Pragmatism," Chapter 1.
[186] "Pragmatism," ch. i., p. 14.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ "Pragmatism," ch. 1, p. 14.
[187] W. Ostwald "Grosse Männer," Leipzig, 1910 (11th Lecture, "Classics and Romanticists"). See also his contribution, "A propos de la Biologie du Savant," Bibliothèque Universelle, Oct., 1910.
[187] W. Ostwald "Great Men," Leipzig, 1910 (11th Lecture, "Classics and Romantics"). See also his contribution, "About the Biology of the Scholar," Universal Library, Oct., 1910.
[195] "The Psychology of Dementia Præcox," translated by Brill and Peterson, Monograph Series of the Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases, New York.
[195] "The Psychology of Dementia Præcox," translated by Brill and Peterson, Monograph Series of the Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases, New York.
[202] "The Psychology of Dementia Præcox."
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ "The Psychology of Dementia."
[210] Nietzsche, "Thus spake Zarathustra."
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Nietzsche, "Thus Spoke Zarathustra."
[213] This energy may also be designated as hormé. Hormé is a Greek word [Greek: hormê]—force, attack, press, impetuosity, violence, urgency, zeal. It is related to Bergson's "élan vital." The concept hormé is an energic expression for psychological values.
[213] This energy might also be referred to as hormé. Hormé is a Greek word [Greek: hormê]—meaning force, attack, pressure, impulsiveness, violence, urgency, zeal. It connects to Bergson's "élan vital." The idea of hormé is an energetic expression of psychological values.
[214] See p. 287.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See page 287.
[225] We may still apply to love the saying: "The heaven above, the heaven below, The sky above, the sky below, All things above, all things below, Succeed and prosper" (Old Mystic). Mephistopheles expresses the idea when he describes himself as "Part of that power which still produceth good, whilst ever scheming ill."
[225] We can still embrace the saying: "The heaven above, the heaven below, The sky above, the sky below, All things above, all things below, Succeed and prosper" (Old Mystic). Mephistopheles conveys this idea when he refers to himself as "Part of that power which still produces good, while always planning evil."
[230] The rules of dream-analysis, the laws of the structure of the dream and its symbolism, form almost a science; this is one of the most important chapters of the psychology of the unconscious whose comprehension requires very arduous study.
[230] The principles of dream analysis, the rules governing the structure of dreams and their symbols, are almost like a science; this is one of the key sections of the psychology of the unconscious, and understanding it demands a lot of hard work.
[232] Thus spake Zarathustra, p. 40.
Thus spoke Zarathustra, p. 40.
[233] The German "Auslebetheorie."
The German "Auslebetheorie."
[234] "Ueber den nervösen Charakter."
"On the nervous character."
[236] "The Philosophy of Values."
"The Philosophy of Values."
[237] "Pragmatism."
"Pragmatism."
[238] "Grosse Männer" ("Great Men").
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ "Great Men".
[240] I purposely describe only the two types here. Obviously, the possibility of the existence of other types is not thereby excluded. Other possibilities are known to us. I refrain from mentioning them, with a view to limiting the material.
[240] I'm intentionally outlining only the two types here. Clearly, this doesn’t rule out the possibility of other types existing. We are aware of other possibilities. I won’t bring them up to keep the material focused.
[241] The Monist, vol. xvi. p. 363.
[243] A parallel conception of the two kinds of interpretation is found in a commendable book by Silberer: "Probleme der Mystik und ihrer Symbolik" ("Problems of Mysticism and their Symbolism").
[243] A similar idea about the two types of interpretation can be found in an excellent book by Silberer: "Problems of Mysticism and their Symbolism."
[248] "Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken" ("Memoirs of a Neurasthenic Patient").
"Memoirs of a Neurasthenic Patient".
[250] In a certain sense the "likeness to God" is always a priori present even before analysis, not only in the neurotic, but also in the normal individual, with the difference only that the normal individual is effectively separated from the perception of the unconscious, whilst this separation becomes increasingly impossible to the neurotic. In consequence of his special sensitiveness, the neurotic is a priori more closely affected by the processes of the unconscious than is the normal person, wherefore the God-Almightiness becomes more distinct in him than in the normal individual. By means of the knowledge of the unconscious acquired through analysis the "God-likeness" is increased.
[250] In a way, the "likeness to God" is always present a priori, even before analysis, not just in the neurotic but also in the normal individual. The difference is that the normal person is effectively separated from the perception of the unconscious, while this separation becomes increasingly impossible for the neurotic. Due to their heightened sensitivity, the neurotic is a priori more affected by unconscious processes than the normal person, which makes the sense of God-Almightiness more prominent in them than in someone who is normal. Through the understanding of the unconscious gained through analysis, the "God-likeness" is enhanced.
[251] Pp. 69 and 95.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ pp. 69 and 95.
[252] The collective mind represents collective thought, the collective soul represents collective feeling, and the collective psyche represents the general collective psychological function.
[252] The collective mind represents shared thoughts, the collective soul represents shared feelings, and the collective psyche represents the overall collective psychological function.
[253] I should here observe that I am intentionally refraining from discussing our problem from the standpoint of the psychology of types. A specialised and somewhat complicated investigation was necessary in order to discover formulations appropriate to the types. For instance, "person" means something totally different to the extrovert from what it does to the introvert. I must content myself here with pointing out the difficulties such a task would involve. In the types, the conscious and real adapted function in childhood is collective, but soon acquires a personal character, and may retain this to the end, unless the individual feels impelled to develop his type to the uttermost. If this happens, the conscious real adapted function attains a degree of perfection which may claim universal validity and therefore bears a collectivistic character, in contrast to its originally collective character. According to this mode of expression collective psyche would be identical with "herd soul" in the individual; but the collectivistic psychology would be a highly differentiated adaptation to society. For the introvert the conscious real adapted function is thinking, which in the lower stages of development is entirely personal, but has a tendency to acquire a universal character of a collectivistic kind; his feeling remains distinctly personal so far as it is conscious, and collective-archaic in so far as it has remained unconscious or is repressed. The opposite applies to the feeling and thought of the extrovert. The introvert is always concerned with the endeavour to preserve the integrity of his ego, which results in a different attitude towards his own person from that of the extrovert, whose adaptation is made through his feelings, even at the cost of his own person. These few sentences indicate into what an extraordinarily difficult situation we should have been led had we considered our problem from the standpoint of the types.
[253] I want to note that I'm purposely avoiding discussing our issue from the perspective of personality types. A specialized and somewhat complex investigation was needed to find terms that fit the types. For example, "person" means something completely different to an extrovert than it does to an introvert. I can only highlight the challenges that such a task would involve. In terms of types, the conscious and truly adapted function in childhood is collective, but quickly takes on a personal aspect, which may continue to the end, unless the individual feels driven to develop their type fully. If this occurs, the consciously adapted function achieves a level of perfection that can be considered universally valid and thus takes on a collectivistic nature, contrasting with its original collective character. In this context, the collective psyche would be the same as the "herd soul" within the individual, while collectivistic psychology would be a highly differentiated adaptation to society. For the introvert, the consciously adapted function is thinking, which in its earlier stages is entirely personal, but tends to gain a universal, collectivistic quality; their feelings remain distinctly personal as far as they are conscious, and collective-archaic in terms of what stays unconscious or repressed. The reverse is true for the feeling and thought of the extrovert. The introvert is always focused on protecting the integrity of their ego, leading to a different attitude toward themselves compared to the extrovert, whose adaptation is shaped by their feelings, often at the expense of their individuality. These few sentences illustrate how incredibly complicated our situation would have become had we approached our issue from the perspective of personality types.
[254] "Psychology of the Unconscious."
"Psychology of the Unconscious."
[257] It should be borne in mind that no moral function is to be sought in this conception of dreams, nor do I look for it there. This function is just as little "teleological" in the sense of a philosophical teleology, that is to say of a set aim or purpose. It is in the first place compensatory, because it presents a subliminal picture of the actual situation. The phenomenon should first of all be understood from a purely causal standpoint. But it would be unjust to the essence of what is psychological if one were to consider it purely causally. For it does not only tolerate, but also demand, a final point of view. In other words, the question arises, what is the use of bringing just this material to constellation? This is not to assert that the final meaning of a phenomenon had already existed as an a priori given purpose in the preparatory stages of the phenomenon. It would not be permissible, according to the theory of cognition, to presuppose some pre-existing purpose from the unmistakable final meaning of biological mechanisms. But it would be narrow-minded if, with the justifiable omission of the teleological conclusion, one wished also to give up the point of view of finality. The utmost that can be said is, it is as if there were some pre-existing purpose present. In psychology one must be on one's guard against exclusive reliance either upon causality or upon teleology.
[257] It’s important to note that there’s no moral purpose to be found in this idea of dreams, nor am I looking for one. This purpose is not "teleological" in the philosophical sense, meaning there's no specific aim or intention. First and foremost, it’s compensatory because it offers a hidden view of the actual situation. The phenomenon should primarily be understood from a purely causal perspective. However, it would be unfair to the essence of psychology to consider it only in causal terms. It not only allows but also requires a final viewpoint. In other words, we must ask, what’s the point of bringing this specific material into focus? This doesn’t mean that the final meaning of a phenomenon already existed as a pre-determined purpose during its early stages. According to the theory of knowledge, it isn’t acceptable to assume a pre-existing purpose based on the clear final meaning of biological mechanisms. But it would be short-sighted to reject the notion of finality just because we omit the teleological conclusion. The most we can say is, it’s as if there were some pre-existing purpose involved. In psychology, we have to be careful not to rely exclusively on either causality or teleology.
Transcriber notes:
Transcriber notes:
P.22. 'Occasionlly' typo for 'Occasionally', changed.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 'Occasionally' typo for 'Occasionally', changed.
P.23. 'third kind of taste' changed 'taste' to 'state'.
P.23. 'third kind of taste' changed 'taste' to 'state'.
P.72. 'Our patent develops', 'patent' changed to 'patient'.
P.72. 'Our patient develops', 'patient' changed to 'patient'.
P.103. added '+ denotes' in footnote 9 for multiple footnote.
P.103. added '+ means' in footnote 9 for multiple footnote.
P.201. 'Pyschology' typo for 'Psychology', changed.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 'Psychology' typo corrected.
P.217. 'unnecessary' typo for 'unnecessary', changed.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 'unnecessary' typo corrected.
P.305. 'casuality' typo for 'causality', changed.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 'causality' typo for 'causality', changed.
P.340. 'beween' typo for 'between', changed.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 'between' typo for 'between', changed.
P.345. Placed footnote anchor after 'mythological formations', but could be elsewhere on the page. It may be an independant reference to the whole section.
P.345. A footnote anchor was added after 'mythological formations', but it might be located elsewhere on the page. It could serve as a standalone reference for the entire section.
P.384. 'castastrophe' typo for 'catastrophe', changed.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 'catastrophe' typo corrected.
P.451. 'colective' typo for 'collective', changed.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 'colective' typo for 'collective', corrected.
P.471. 'devolopment' typo for 'development' changed.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 'development' typo fixed.
P.482. in index, 'Hommunculus' is 'Homunculus' in the book, changed.
P.482. in index, 'Hommunculus' is 'Homunculus' in the book, changed.
Fixed various punctuation.
Fixed punctuation issues.
Download ePUB
If you like this ebook, consider a donation!