Bloody Beaches:
The Marines at Peleliu

Marines in
WWII
Commemorative Series

By Brigadier General Gordon D. Gayle U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

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by Brigadier General Gordon D. Gayle, USMC (Ret)

On D-Day, September 15, 1944, five infantry battalions from the 1st Marine Division—specifically the 1st, 5th, and 7th Marines—trundled across 600 to 800 yards of coral reef in amphibious tractors (LVTs) towards five designated landing beaches on the smoky, reportedly devastated Peleliu in the Palau Island group. This western point of the 1,000-mile-long Caroline archipelago was seen by some U.S. planners as a hindrance or a threat to the ongoing efforts against Japan’s Pacific empire.

The Marines in the LVTs had been told that their commanding general, Major General William H. Rupertus, thought the operation would be tough but quick, mainly because of the heavy amount and quality of naval gunfire and dive bombing planned to happen before their assault landing. Some were haunted by the bloody memories of their sister 2d Marine Division’s brutal assault across the reefs at Tarawa several months earlier. But as the 1st Division Marines looked over the edges of their landing craft, they saw an incredible scene of blasting and churning earth along the shore. Smoke, dust, and the geysers from exploding bombs and large-caliber naval shells gave the optimists some hope that the defenders would be casualties from the preparatory fire; at worst, they would be too shocked to respond quickly and effectively to the hundreds of Marines about to land among them.

2 Right in front of the first wave of troops with landing vehicles were armored amphibious tractors (LVTAs) equipped with 75mm howitzers. Their job was to target any surviving strongpoints or weapons that showed up on the beach as the following troops arrived. And just ahead of the armored tractors, as the naval gunfire moved toward deeper targets, a line of U.S. Navy fighter jets flew over, strafing back and forth along the beach defenses, parallel to the assault waves, trying to keep all beach defenders suppressed and intimidated as the Marines approached the defenses.3 At the same time, to obscure enemy observation and reduce Japanese fire on the landing waves, naval gunfire was redirected to the hill mass northeast of the landing beaches.

That "massif," which would later be known as the Umurbrogol Pocket, was the first of two deadly uncertainties that the division commander and his planners were unaware of. Even though General Rupertus had spent most of his division’s planning for the Peleliu landing on temporary duty in Washington, he had received thorough briefings for the operation.

The first uncertainty was the actual nature of Umurbrogol, which aerial photos suggested was a smoothly rounded hill running north to south, overlooking the landing beaches about 2,000 to 4,000 yards away. In those early photos, the elevated land looked covered in jungle scrub, but this was almost completely cleared away by the preparatory bombardment and subsequent heavy artillery fire aimed at it. Instead of a gently rounded hill, the Umurbrogol area was actually a complex system of sharply raised coral ridges, knobs, valleys, and sinkholes. It rose between 50 and 300 feet above the flat rest of the island, offering excellent locations for cave and tunnel defenses. The Japanese had fully utilized the advantages of this terrain during their lengthy occupation and defensive preparations.

The second unknown challenge for the Marines was the strategy created by Colonel Kunio Nakagawa, the officer in charge of the force on Peleliu, and his superior, Lieutenant General Sadae Inoue, who was back on Koror. Their defensive approach had shifted significantly from what General Rupertus encountered at Guadalcanal and Cape Gloucester, effectively undermining his idea of a hard but fast campaign.

Instead of counting on a supposed moral high ground to defeat the4 attackers at the beach and then using bushido spirit and banzai tactics to drive any survivors back into the sea, the defenders of Peleliu would hold off the attacking Marines for as long as they could, trying to inflict as much damage as possible. Instead of relying on spiritual superiority, they would combine the challenging terrain with the determined, disciplined Japanese soldiers to defend Peleliu at the highest possible cost to the invaders. This unpleasant surprise for the Marines represented a new and significant adjustment to the Japanese tactics used earlier in the war.

Little to nothing during the trip to the beaches and the landing revealed the nature of the revised Japanese tactical plan to the five Marine assault battalions. Bouncing across nearly half a mile of coral in front of the landing beaches (White 1 and 2, Orange 1, 2, and 3), the tractors passed several hundred “mines,” designed to destroy any craft that approached or drove over them. These “mines” were aerial bombs, set to be detonated by wired control from observation points on shore. However, the preliminary bombardment had disrupted the wire controls and blinded the observers so much that the defensive mining did little to slow down or destroy the attacking tractors.

As the tractors approached the beaches, they were subjected to indirect fire from mortars and artillery. Indirect fire aimed at moving targets creates more anxiety than actual damage, and only a few vehicles were lost during that phase of the Japanese defense. However, this fire showed that the initial bombardment hadn't eliminated all of the enemy's heavy firepower. More concerningly, as the leading waves got closer to the beaches, the LVTs were struck by heavy crossfire from artillery and anti-boat guns coming from hidden bunkers on the north and south flanks.

The defenses on the left (north) side of Beach White 1, attacked by the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Stephen V. Sabol), were particularly deadly and effective. They disrupted the critical left flank of the regiment and division. This was especially damaging to the larger landing plan, as these guns soon took out tractors carrying vital elements of the battalion’s and regiment’s command and control personnel and equipment. The battalion and then the regimental commander found themselves ashore in an incredibly brutal beach fight, lacking the communication tools needed to fully understand their situations or to take the necessary corrective actions.

The crucial task of capturing “The Point,” which overlooked the left side of the division, was assigned to one of the most experienced company commanders in the 1st Regiment: Captain George P. Hunt, a veteran of Guadalcanal and New Britain, who later became a long-serving managing editor of Life magazine after the war. Hunt had created detailed plans that outlined specific tasks for every part of his company. They practiced these plans until everyone was clear on their role and how it contributed to the overall strategy. Each person recognized the importance of their mission.

D-Day and H-Hour resulted in more casualties than expected. One of the company's platoons was pinned down all day during the fighting at the beach. The survivors from the rest of the company moved left, as planned, toward the flanking point. Moving forward with determination, they launched attacks on the numerous defensive positions. The openings in the pillboxes and casements were covered with small arms fire and smoke, then targeted with explosives and rifle grenades. The climax came at the main casement, which had been directing the heaviest and most effective artillery fire against the LVTs on the sides of the subsequent landing waves. A rifle grenade hit the gun muzzle and bounced into the casement, causing explosions and flames. Japanese defenders fled out the back of the blockhouse, their clothes on fire and ammunition detonating on their belts. That retreat had been expected, and some of Hunt’s Marines were positioned to take them down.5

At dusk, Hunt’s Company K held the Point, but by then the Marines had been reduced to platoon strength, with no nearby units in contact. Only unreliable radio communications managed to come through to call in supporting fire and urgently needed supplies. One LVT made it to the beach just before dark, bringing grenades, mortar shells, and water. It evacuated casualties as it left. The ammunition made a crucial difference in that night’s fierce fight against Japanese troops determined to take back the Point.

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The next afternoon, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Davis’ 1/1 moved Company B to connect with Hunt, to help hold onto the fiercely contested positions. Hunt’s company also recovered the survivors of the platoon that had been stuck in the beach fight throughout D-Day. Equally important, the company restored artillery and naval gunfire communications, which became critical during the second night. That night, the Japanese organized another, heavier counterattack—two companies—to target the Marines at the Point. It was narrowly defeated. By mid-morning on D plus 2, Hunt’s survivors, along with Company B, 1/1, controlled the Point and could see about 500 Japanese who had died defending it or trying to retake it.

To the right of Puller’s struggling 3rd Battalion, his 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Russell E. Honsowetz, faced artillery and mortar fire during the landing, along with machine-gun fire from still-active beach defenders. The same applied to the 5th Marines’ two assault battalions, Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Boyd’s 1/5 and Lieutenant Colonel Austin C. Shofner’s 3/5, which fought through the beach defenses and moved toward the edge of the clearing, looking east over the airfield area.

On the right flank of the division, Orange 3, Major Edward H. Hurst’s 3/7 had to cross directly in front of a strong defensive fortification that was protecting the beach, just like the Marines in the flanking position at the Point. Luckily, it wasn’t as close as the Point position, and it didn't cause as much damage. However, its side fire, along with some natural obstacles on the beach, caused Company K, 3/7, to land left of their planned landing beach, landing instead on the right half of beach Orange 2, which belonged to 3/5. Aside from being out of position and not in contact with the company to its right, Company K, 3/7, ended up mixing with Company K, 3/5, creating confusion and delays. Major Hurst had to spend time regrouping his separated battalion, using a large antitank ditch along his line of advance as a coordinating line. His advance to the east then resumed, somewhat delayed by his regrouping efforts.

Any delay was unacceptable to the division commander, who saw momentum as crucial for his success. The division's plan for the maneuver on the right had the 7th Marines (Colonel Herman H. Hanneken) landing two battalions in formation, both over Beach Orange 3. As Hurst’s leading battalion advanced, it was to be followed closely by Lieutenant Colonel John J. Gormley’s 1/7. Gormley’s unit was to link up with Hurst’s right flank and shift direction to the southeast and south as that area became accessible. He was then to attack southeast and south, with his left side aligned with Hurst’s right, and his own right positioned on the beach. After Hurst’s battalion reached the opposite shore, both units were to attack south, defending Scarlet 1 and Scarlet 2, the southern landing beaches.

At the end of a bloody first hour, all five battalions were on land. The closer each battalion got to Umurbrogol, the weaker its grip on the shallow beachhead. In the next two hours, three of the four remaining battalions would join the attack and push for the momentum that General Rupertus considered crucial.

Following closely behind Sabol’s 3/1, Colonel Puller of the 1st Marines landed his forward command group. As always, he was eager to be close to the battle, even if that meant sacrificing some ability to coordinate full supporting fires. With limited communications and now insufficient numbers of LVTs for follow-on waves, he struggled to understand and improve his regiment’s situation. His left unit (Company K, 3/1) had two of its platoons desperately trying to gain control at the Point. Puller’s plan to land Major Davis’ 1st Battalion behind Sabol’s 3/1 to strengthen the left flank was hindered by losses in LVTs at H-hour. Davis’ companies had to land one by one, and his battalion got committed to the fight in pieces. On the regiment’s right, Honsowetz’ 2/1 was heavily engaged but making progress toward capturing the western edges of the scrub that overlooked the airfield. He was linked on his right with Boyd’s 1/5, which was also in action.

In the southern area of the beachhead, Gormley’s 1/7 landed a bit late due to earlier losses in LVTs. The impact of early resistance would be felt for the rest of the day. Most of Gormley’s battalion landed on the correct (Orange 3) beach, but a few of his soldiers were pushed to the left by ongoing fire from the south side of the beach, landing on Orange 2, which was under the 5th Marines’ control. However, Gormley’s battalion managed to regroup behind 3/7, and as Hurst’s leading 3/7 moved east, Gormley’s 1/7 advanced southeast and south against fortified positions.

Hanneken’s battle against strong resistance from both the east and south unfolded roughly as planned. Suddenly, in the middle of the afternoon, the opposition became significantly tougher. Hurst’s 3/7 came across a blockhouse that was marked long ago on the Marines’ map and had been reported destroyed by naval gunfire before landing. In a similar situation encountered later during Puller’s advance inland, the blockhouse showed little sign of ever being hit by heavy fire. The preparations to attack and take down this blockhouse further delayed the 7th Marines’ progress, and the commanding general grew increasingly concerned about losing momentum.

On the enemy's side, Lieutenant General Sadae Inoue, a fifth-generation warrior with a strong military reputation, commanding the 14th Infantry Division, recently arrived from the Kwangtung Army in China. In March 1944, he met in Tokyo with Japanese Premier Hideki Tojo, who was also the Minister of War. Tojo had concluded that Japan could no longer hold the Palaus against the growing Allied naval dominance in the Western Pacific. Instead, he decided to sell the Palaus to the United States at the highest possible cost in terms of American lives and time. He ordered Inoue to take his division to the Palaus, assume command of all Japanese forces there, and defend the Palau Islands for as long as possible, denying their use to the Americans—and taking out as many as he could in the process.

As his division sailed to the Palaus, Inoue flew ahead, surveyed his new area from the air for two days, and decided that Peleliu (along with the airstrips on Angaur and Ngesebus) was crucial to his defenses. Earlier U.S. focus on Peleliu during the Task Force 58 strikes in March seemed to back up that assessment. To defend Peleliu, Inoue quickly appointed a commander, set a mission, and determined the necessary troop levels. Peleliu had been under the control of a rear admiral for some time, who had utilized his force's construction resources to build blockhouses and several reinforced concrete structures above ground, while also enhancing the existing caves and tunnels hidden beneath Peleliu's dense jungle, scrub, and vines.9

In these underground facilities, the admiral’s team had managed to survive the Task Force 58 March attacks. Above ground, planes and structures were destroyed. As Task Force 58 left, the Japanese came out, fixed what they could, but kept concentrating on underground facilities. Along with a small number of Korean labor troops, their total came to about 7,000, most of whom were untrained and lacked leadership for combat.

Leadership came in the form of Colonel Nakagawa, who commanded his 6,500-man 2d Infantry Regiment (Reinforced). They had extensive battle experience in China. They were equipped with 24 75mm artillery pieces, around 13–15 light tanks, about 100 .50-cal. machine guns, 15 81mm heavy mortars, and roughly 30 dual-purpose antiaircraft guns. On the island were also a significant number of very heavy (141mm) mortars, naval antiaircraft guns, and basic rocket launchers used to fire large, unguided naval shells. Most importantly, the regiment had Colonel Nakagawa and his experienced officers and noncommissioned officers. Nakagawa had already received nine medals for his leadership against the Chinese and was seen as a rising star within his officer corps.

Immediately upon arrival, Nakagawa surveyed his potential battle area from both the ground and the air. He identified the western beaches—White and Orange Beaches, used by the Marines—as the most likely landing spots. He promptly ordered his troops to set up defenses and fortify the beach. During this time, a bureaucratic conflict emerged. Vice Admiral Seiichi Itou, the highest-ranking officer and the senior naval officer on Peleliu, felt resentful about being subordinate to an Army officer who was much lower in rank than him.

From Koror, Lieutenant General Inoue sent Major General Kenjiro Murai to Peleliu to take over command of the island and to keep a line of communication with Colonel Nakagawa. Murai was young, well-respected, and, as Inoue's personal representative, was seen as senior to the admiral. He left Nakagawa in full charge of the operational mission, as Inoue intended. During the campaign, Nakagawa maintained operational control and received assistance and advice from General Murai, but was not directed by him.

Nakagawa understood his mission, the situation, and the power of American weaponry. He focused on maximizing his main advantage: the terrain. He positioned his forces strategically to cause as much damage and inflict as many casualties as possible during the expected landing, then planned to defend for as long as he could. On Peleliu, this provided both a vertical and horizontal aspect to the defense.

He assessed and recorded artillery and mortar weapons across the10 width and depth of the reef near both the eastern and western beaches, with plans for heavy concentrations along the edge of the western reef. He anticipated that the Americans would need to move follow-up waves from landing crafts to the amphibious vehicles crossing the reef. He targeted weapons on, and just inland from, the water’s edge to bombard landing troops with heavy fire. Offshore, he placed 500 wire-controlled “mines.”

Colonel Nakagawa oversaw the building of beach obstacles using rails and logs, and he ordered the digging of antitank ditches. He positioned troops in machine gun and mortar pits along the beaches and further inland, supported by all the available barbed wire. On the north and south sides of the beach, he built concrete bunkers to protect and hide antitank and antiboat artillery aimed at hitting the expected waves of landing craft.

Inland, he integrated the existing blockhouse and nearby reinforced buildings into supportive defensive complexes, complete with interconnected communication lines and trenches.

Although he thought the western beaches were the most likely target for an attack, he didn’t leave the southern (Scarlet) and eastern (Purple) beaches unguarded. He assigned one battalion to set up defenses in each area. The Purple Beaches were well-organized, with specific orders for the defenders to move into central Peleliu if the battle came from the west, as anticipated. However, the battalion assigned to the south, Scarlet Beach, had orders to hold those stronger, more permanent positions to the end. Nakagawa allocated about 500 infantry and artillery to defend Ngesebus and around 1,000 naval personnel to protect northern Peleliu. The 1,500 defenders of Angaur were not under his command.

The main part of his force and effort was focused on the 500 caves, tunnels, and firing positions in the coral ridges of central Peleliu. The naval units’ extensive earlier tunneling into the limestone ridges made the occupants mostly safe from general bombardments. Only lucky strikes into the entrances of caves or direct point-blank fire could damage the hidden defenses and their troops. The tunnels were built for or adapted to various uses: barracks, command centers, hospitals, storage and ammo depots, cooking areas with fresh water springs and drainage basins, and of course firing positions with elaborate concealment and protective features, including some sliding steel doors. Colonel Nakagawa anticipated very heavy prelanding bombardments. He expected his troops to survive them and then to fulfill his mission of delaying and harassing the Americans.

On Koror, Lieutenant General Inoue was focused on his main forces, preparing for expected attacks against Babelthuap. The Allied11 “Stalemate” plan had indeed called for an invasion of Babelthuap. As the anticipated invasion approached, Inoue issued a proclamation to his troops, clearly mirroring Tojo’s orders to delay and inflict damage. He emphasized the need to anticipate and withstand the naval bombardment and to use the terrain to cause casualties for the attackers. Without explicitly ordering troops to sacrifice themselves, he included the phrase, “we are ready to die honorably.” He further stated that dying, and losing the territory to the enemy, might help lead to a new phase of the war.

As the 1st Marines fought to secure the left flank, and the 7th Marines worked to isolate and take down the Japanese defenses in the southern part of Peleliu, the 5th Marines, led by Colonel Harold D. Harris, was tasked with pushing across the airfield, splitting the island in two, and then shifting north to secure the eastern half of the island. Shortly after the planned H plus one, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, under Major Gordon D. Gayle, landed at Beach Orange 2, following 3/5. They moved directly east, navigating through the dunes and scrub jungle, into and out of the antitank barrier, reaching the west edge of the clearing around the airfield. After passing through the lines of 3/5, Gayle’s battalion launched an attack west against scattered resistance from dugouts and bomb shelters near the southern end of the airfield, and through the scrub area slightly further south. The 3rd Battalion's mission was to clear that scrub while keeping in touch with 3/7 on its right, while 2/5 was supposed to advance across the open area to get to the far side of the island. Moving forward in its center and right, 2/5 fought all the way across the island by mid-afternoon, positioned its left rearward to maintain contact with 1/5, and then shifted its attack northward. The right flank of the 2nd Battalion linked up for a while with 3/5 in the woods south of the airfield, but then they lost contact.

By this point, the antitank ditch running along the center and right of Orange Beaches 1 and 2 stood out because of the number of command posts set up along it. Shofner’s 3/5 was there, along with Harris’ 5th Marines command post. An advance element of the division command post, led by Brigadier General Oliver P. Smith, the assistant division commander, landed and moved into the antitank ditch where they could see the airfield

The 1st Tank Battalion’s M-48A1 Sherman medium tanks, one-third of which had to be left behind at the last minute due to a lack of shipping, were unloaded as soon as possible using a new method to get over the reef. This tank landing plan was created in expectation of the Japanese quickly leveraging their armored forces.

The movement of fire and logistical support materials onto a beach still close to, and directly visible from, the commanding Umurbrogol heights was an unavoidable risk dictated by the terrain of Peleliu. As long as the enemy maintained observation from Umurbrogol over the airfield and beach activities, there was no choice but to press forward quickly, utilizing whatever fire support could be gathered and coordinated. Ongoing casualties at the beaches had to be accepted to enable the rapid advance. The commanding general’s emphasis on early momentum seemed to be spot on. Units on the left needed to assault towards the base of the Umurbrogol ridges and quickly reach the commanding peaks. In the center, the 5th Marines had to move quickly to secure alternative routes to outflank Umurbrogol. In the south, the 7th Marines needed to swiftly eliminate those now cut-off forces before they could join the fight against central Peleliu.

The movement of the 5th Marines across the airfield and to the western edge of the lagoon separating the airfield area from the eastern peninsula (Beach Purple) created a line of attacking Marines completely across that part of the island facing both east and north, towards what was thought to be the main center of Japanese strength. The 7th Marines, pushing east and south, finished splitting the enemy forces. Colonel Hanneken’s troops, fully engaged, were mostly hidden from observation by the enemy still north of the airfield and from the heights of Umurbrogol. There was a gap between13 the 5th’s right and the 7th’s left, but it didn’t seem to be in a crucial area.

Nevertheless, it was now clear that the D-Day phase-line objectives were not going to be met in either the south or the north. Alarmed by the loss of momentum, General Rupertus began deploying his reserves. First, he ordered the division reconnaissance company to go ashore, then, pressing the commanders already on the island, he ordered his one remaining unassigned infantry battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Spencer S. Berger’s 2/7, to land. No commander on land felt the need for 2/7, but Colonel Hanneken said he could find an assembly area where it wouldn't be in the way. General Rupertus ordered it to land, stating to his staff that he had now “shot his bolt!” On the beach, it was clear that what was needed in this chaotic situation was not more troops, but more space to maneuver and additional artillery.

General Rupertus started making plans to land himself and the main elements of his command group. Advice from the ADC onshore and his chief of staff, Colonel John T. Selden, convinced Rupertus to remain on the flagship. He compromised on that decision by ordering Colonel Selden ashore. By this time, the shortage of LVTs was frustrating the timely landing of subsequent waves. As a result, neither Selden’s small CP group nor Berger’s 2/7 could get past the transfer line in their landing craft and had to return to their ships despite their orders to land.

Into this division setup, around 1650, Colonel Nakagawa initiated his planned tank-infantry counterattack. All Marine leaders had been informed about the Japanese ability to launch an armored assault on D-Day and were well prepared. The attack came from the area north of the airfield and moved south, generally across the front of the 1st Marines’ positions on the eastern part of the airfield clearing. The attack made its way directly into the 5th Marines’ sector where Boyd’s 1/5 was positioned and extended across the southern part of the airfield. Marines in 2/1 and 1/5 opened fire on the attackers, targeting both infantry and tanks. A bazooka gunner in 2/1’s front took out two of the tanks. The commanding officer of 1/5 had his tanks hidden just behind the front lines. They fired on the Japanese armor, which pushed through the front lines and almost reached his forward command group. Boyd’s lines held strong, engaging the attackers, both infantry and tanks, with all available weapons.

Major John H. Gustafson, stationed at 2/5’s forward command post in the middle of the airfield, had his tank platoon nearby. Even though the enemy hadn't entered his area of operations yet, he sent the tank platoon into the chaos. Stories differ on who fired what, but within a few minutes, it was all finished. The attacking tanks were completely destroyed, and the Japanese infantry were essentially wiped out.

Colonel Nakagawa’s attack was brave, but it ended in complete failure. Even where the tanks broke through the Marine lines, they didn’t cause any Marine retreat. Instead, the Japanese tanks became the target of every kind of antitank fire. The light Japanese tanks were literally blown to pieces. More than 10014 were reported destroyed. That number, of course, reflected the amount of fire aimed at them; each Marine grenadier, antitank gunner, and tanker believed they had destroyed the tank they shot at and reported it as such.

With the counterattack wrapped up and the Japanese seemingly in chaos, 2/5 quickly picked up its attack again, heading north along the eastern side of the airfield. The battalion pushed halfway up the length of the airfield before stopping to get organized for the night. This was the furthest they advanced that day, over the best terrain in the division's area. It created the necessary space for artillery and logistical support to keep the attack going the next day.

However, that relatively advanced position had an exposed right, southern flank which created a gap in the regimental command structure. At that point, 3/5 was supposed to keep in touch with the north-facing 2/5 and the south-facing 3/7. But by 1700, 3/5’s battalion command and control had been completely taken out. The battalion executive officer, Major Robert M. Ash, had been killed earlier that day by a direct hit on his landing LVT. Around the time of the Japanese tank attack, a mortar barrage struck the 3/5 CP in the antitank ditch near the beach, killing several staff members and forcing the evacuation of the battalion commander. As of 1700, the three companies of 3/5 were not in communication with each other, nor with the16 battalions to their right and left.

The commanding officer of the 5th Marines ordered his executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis W. Walt, to take charge of 3/5 and reposition to close the gap between the 5th and 7th Marines. Major Gayle moved 2/5’s reserve company to his right flank to create a connection. Walt found and connected his 3/5 companies to establish a more continuous regimental line. By 10:30 PM, he had completed the connection, just in time. From that point, the bulge that the 5th Marines had created between Peleliu’s central and southern defenders faced a series of intense counterattacks that lasted throughout the night. The attacks came from both the north and south. None were particularly successful, but they were persistent enough to necessitate resupply of ammunition to the front-line companies. Dawn revealed numerous Japanese bodies north of the Marine lines.

Elsewhere along the 1st Division's front, there were more potentially dangerous night counterattacks. None of them succeeded in pushing the Marines back or breaking through the lines with any significant force. The most serious attack targeted Company K, 3/1, at their position on the Point, on the left side of the 1st Marines.

In the south, the 7th Marines faced significant night attacks from the Japanese battalion opposing them. However, the Marines were well-positioned, had the communication lines necessary to request fire support, including naval gunfire illumination. They successfully repelled all attacks without any crisis arising.

At the end of the first 12 hours on land, the 1st Marine Division had established its beachhead across the intended front. Only in the center did the depth come close to what had been planned. The position was strong everywhere except on the extreme left flank. General Smith, from his forward command post, was in communication with all three regimental commanders. The report he got from Colonel Puller on the left didn’t provide a clear understanding of the 1st Marines’ fragile hold on the Point. That was a result of Colonel Puller’s own limited information. The reports from the other two regiments accurately reflected their situations.

In addition to the three infantry regiments, the 1st Division had nearly three battalions of light artillery17 deployed and set up onshore. All 30 tanks were also on the beach. The shore party was operating on the beach, even though they were fully exposed to enemy observation during the day and faced intermittent enemy fire. The division had to keep pushing hard on D plus 1. The goal was to capture the key high points on the left, create opportunities for movement in the center, and eliminate the isolated defenders in the south.

At least two colonels on Peleliu wrapped up their workday with mistaken beliefs about their situations and sent back inaccurate reports to their superiors. At the end of the day, when General Smith finally got a phone line into the 1st Marines’ command post, he was told that the regiment had a strong hold on its beachhead and was roughly on the O-1 objective line. He wasn’t informed about the gaps in the lines, nor was Colonel Puller fully aware of the seriousness of Company K, 3/1's fight on the Point, where only 38 Marines were struggling to hold onto their position.

Colonel Nakagawa, on the other hand, reported that the Marines' landing attempt had been "put to rout." Inconsistently, he also claimed that his brave counterattack force had thrown the enemy into the sea.

With the start of a new day, the two rival commanders at Peleliu woke up from whatever sleep they had managed to get to confront harsh realities.

General Rupertus, frustrated by his earlier attempt to land his division reserve in the southern part of his beachhead, realized that his northern sector needed the most assistance, especially on the far left flank. Rupertus ordered 2/7 to move into Puller’s sector to be deployed there.

At the division headquarters at sea,18 more was learned about the scale of Marine D-Day casualties: 1,111, with 209 killed in action (KIA). While this wasn’t a large percentage of the overall reinforced divisional strength, the number was serious regarding combat readiness. Most of those 1,111 casualties occurred in eight of the division’s nine infantry battalions. Except in the center, Rupertus was not yet on the O-1 line, the first of eight planned phase lines.

Having gotten a limited understanding of the 1st Marines’ situation, Rupertus was more determined than ever to land quickly, see what he could, and do whatever he could to regain the lost momentum. The fact that he would have to operate with a bad leg from a sandy trench in a beach area still receiving light but frequent fire seemed less important to him than his need to see and know (General Rupertus had broken his ankle in a pre-assault training exercise, and his foot was in a cast for the entire operation.).

Over on Colonel Nakagawa’s side, despite the amazing reports coming from his headquarters, he could see a totally different situation from his high ground. The landing force had not been routed. On the beach, and within his view, was a division of American Marines spread across two miles of beachhead. They had taken heavy losses on D-Day, but were getting ready to fight again. As expected, their attack would begin with a barrage of naval gunfire, artillery, and air strikes. They would also have support from U.S. tanks that had quickly taken out the Japanese armor on D-Day.

In his D-Day counterattack, Nakagawa lost about one out of19 his five infantry battalions. In other areas, he suffered the loss of hundreds of his beach defenders during the fighting across the front throughout D-Day, as well as in his consistently unsuccessful nighttime assaults on the beachhead. Still, he had several thousand determined soldiers who were trained and equipped. They were positioned throughout strong and well-protected defensive structures and fortifications, with plenty of underground support facilities. All were armed with the discipline and resolve to take out many Americans.

As he had known from the beginning, Nakagawa’s edge was in the landscape and how he occupied and organized that landscape. For now, and until the moment he would be forced off the Umurbrogol heights that overlooked the airfield clearing, he maintained a superior position. He had excellent visibility over his attackers and concealed firepower to strike with deadly effect. His forces were mostly unseen by the Americans and relatively unaffected by their firepower. His chances of continuing to control crucial parts of the terrain appeared promising.

The Marines were launching attacks on fortified positions, which required careful and precise fire preparations. On the left flank, they were under intense pressure to move quickly, prioritizing speed over thorough preparation. With enemy observation and firepower controlling the entire Marine area, remaining stationary would only make them easy targets for the hidden enemy. General Rupertus’ worry about maintaining momentum was still relevant.

This put the pressure for a quick advance mainly on the 1st Marines on the left, and secondarily on the 5th near the airfield. In the south, the 7th Marines had already taken their section of the airfield's land. The dense scrub jungle mostly hid the regiment from view, and they faced defenses directed towards the sea, away from the airfield.

Puller’s 1st Marines, which had already taken the most casualties on D-Day, still had to tackle the toughest terrain and positions. They needed to launch an attack to support Company K, 3/1, on the Point and assault the ridges of Umurbrogol from south to north. To support that assault, Honsowetz had to shift his east-facing 2/1 to the left and capture and clear the built-up area between the airfield and the ridges. His battalion managed to do this on D plus 1 and 2, with the 5th Marines helping out in their area on the right. However, once he reached the base of the commanding ridges, he joined the fierce claw-scratch-and-scramble attack alongside Davis’ 1/1 against the Japanese in and around the ridges.

As Colonel Puller closed the gaps on his left and shifted his entire regiment north, he pivoted on Sabol’s 3/1 on the left. Sabol, supported by Company B, 1/1, made contact with and reinforced Company K at the Point. He then moved north, with his left on the beach and his right near the West Road at the base of the westernmost features of the Umurbrogol complex. In Sabol’s area, the terrain allowed for tank support and provided more opportunities for maneuver than the ridges further to the right. There was tough fighting, but after D-Day, Sabol’s battalion was able to advance north more quickly than the units on his right. His push against the enemy was restricted by the need to maintain contact with Davis’ 1/1 on his right.

The different speeds of movement along the line between Sabol’s flatter and more open area and Davis’ very rough action zone created an urgent need for backup. It was clear that tactically, they needed to push east into and across20 the rough terrain to systematically break down the complex defenses. That job was handled by Davis’ 1/1, Honsowetz’s 2/1, and Berger’s 2/7. However, more troops than Sabol had were required to move north through the open ground to start surrounding the tough Umurbrogol area and to figure out ways through the challenging landscape. By September 17, there was a critical need for reserves along the 1st Division’s left (west) direction of advance. But on that day, neither the division nor the III Amphibious Corps had any reserves available.

As Sabol’s 3/1 advanced through the easier terrain to the left of the 1st Marines, Davis’ 1/1 pushed into the center, with his left flank connecting the coral ridge area and Sabol’s more open flat zone. One of his early surprises, as he neared the base of the ridge, was finding another blockhouse that Admiral Oldendorf was said to have destroyed with pre-D-Day artillery fire. Even though it had been on the planning map for weeks, those who first came across it reported that the structure was “not having a mark on it!”

The blockhouse was part of an impressive defense network. It was connected to and supported by a system of pillboxes and emplacements, which it also supported. The walls were four feet thick and made of reinforced concrete. Fortunately, Davis received a naval gunfire support team that coordinated the fire from the USS Mississippi. Together, they quickly dealt with the entire complex, allowing 1/1 to advance until they encountered the much tougher Japanese ridge defense systems.

Major Davis, who would go on to win a Medal of Honor in the Korean War in 1950, said about the attack into and along those ridges, “It was the hardest assignment I've ever encountered.”

During the 1st Marines’ action in the first four days of the campaign, all three of its battalions fought alongside each other, scaling Umurbrogol’s rough, cave-filled coral ridges. Berger’s 2/7, initially in division reserve but assigned to the 1st Marines on D plus 1, was immediately thrust into the battle. Puller sent two separate companies from the battalion into the fight gradually. Shortly after, 2/7 was assigned a central zone of action between Colonel Puller’s 1st and 2nd Battalions. The 1st Marines continued to attack across a four-battalion front about 1,000 yards wide, facing determined and skilled defenders in underground caves and fortifications amidst a chaotic mix of ridges and cliffs. Every advance exposed the Marines to fresh fire from previously hidden positions on their flanks, in the rear, or from caves above or below the newly captured ground.

Nothing better illustrated the tactical challenges posed by Umurbrogol than the seizure of Hill 100 on September 19, followed by its withdrawal. This hill was located on a ridge bordering what was known as Horseshoe Valley at the eastern edge of the Pocket. It was in the area of Lieutenant Colonel Honsowetz’s 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, to which Company B of Major Ray Davis’s 1st Battalion was attached. Company B, 1/1, had landed with 242 men, but only had 90 remaining when its commander, Captain Everett P. Pope, received Honsowetz’s order to capture what the Marines were then referring to as Hill 100. The Japanese called it Higashiyama (East Mountain).

Initially supported by tanks, Pope’s company lost that support when the two leading tanks slipped off an access road. Continuing with only mortar support and facing heavy mortar and machine-gun fire from the defenders, Pope’s Marines21 reached the summit near twilight, only to find that the ridge’s northeast extension led to even higher ground, from which its defenders were firing down on the contested Hill 100. Equally threatening was the fire from enemy caves inside the parallel ridge to the west, known as Five Brothers. In the gathering darkness, Pope’s men, heavily supported by 2/1’s heavy mortars, managed to hold on. Throughout the night, there were multiple enemy probes and counterattacks on the ridge top. These were repelled by the supporting mortars and by close combat that involved not just rifles but also knives and even rocks, tossed alongside grenades as supplies dwindled. Pope’s men were still holding the ridge top when dawn broke, but the number of unwounded Marines had dropped to just eight. Pope was ordered to withdraw and was able to evacuate his wounded. However, he had to leave the dead on the ridge, which wouldn’t be recovered until October 3, when the ridge was finally recaptured for good. This action demonstrated and foreshadowed the Japanese defenders’ effective use of mutually supporting positions throughout Umurbrogol.

By D plus 4, the 1st Marines was just a name, having taken 1,500 casualties. This prompted a major clash between General Rupertus, who kept pushing Puller forward, and his boss, Major General Roy S. Geiger, commander of the III Amphibious Corps. Drawing from his own experiences leading large ground operations at Bougainville and Guam, Geiger understood well how such losses diminish the combat effectiveness of a dedicated fighting unit.

On September 21, after visiting Colonel Puller at his forward command post and seeing how exhausted he and his troops were, Geiger met with Rupertus and some of his staff at the 1st Division command post. Rupertus was still reluctant to admit that his division needed reinforcements, but Geiger overruled him. He ordered the newly available 321st Regiment Combat Team (RCT), from the 81st Infantry Division, which was on Angaur, to be attached to the Marine division. Geiger also instructed Rupertus to stand down the 1st Marines and send them back to Pavuvu, the division’s rear area base in the Russell Islands.

On September 21 (D plus 5), Rupertus had instructed his 7th Marines to take over from what remained of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 1st Marines. At that point, the 1st Marines reported 1,749 casualties. They stated that they had killed an estimated 3,942 Japanese soldiers, captured 10 defended coral ridges, destroyed three blockhouses, 22 pillboxes, 13 antitank guns, and 144 defended caves.

In the fighting, the assault battalions captured a significant portion of the ridge needed to prevent the enemy from seeing and effectively firing on the airfield and logistics areas. Light aircraft started flying from Peleliu’s battered, still-under-22repair airfield on D plus 5. With Purple Beach under American control, the division's supply route was secured. Although the Japanese still had some visibility over the now-operating airfield and rear areas, their diminished ability was more about harassment than posing a real threat.

Furthermore, the Marine front lines in the Umurbrogol had now reached close to what turned out to be the final Japanese defensive positions. The available intelligence didn’t indicate that, but the terrain and situation suggested that the assault requirements had been met, and that in the Umurbrogol it was time for siege tactics. The Japanese defenders also realized that when aerial observers were overhead, they could no longer safely roll their weapons out of their caves and fire barrages toward the beach or the airfield. When they tried to fire more than a round or two, they could expect quick counter-battery fire, a feared aerial attack from carrier-based planes, or—after September 24—from Marine attack planes operating from the field on Peleliu.

On Day 2, when the 1st Marines launched their expensive Umurbrogol attack, the 5th Marines to their right were also in a combat situation, but faced much less resistance and had easier ground to cover. Lieutenant Colonel Boyd’s 1/5 had to fight across the airfield from southwest to northeast and through the developed area, similar to what Honsowetz’s 2/1 encountered. The battalion came under observed fire from Umurbrogol and small arms fire from Japanese defenders in the rubble-filled area. Boyd's coordinated tank-infantry assault quickly secured the area. He soon gained control of that section and the east-west cross-island road, which could lead the 5th towards its next target, the eastern peninsula of Peleliu.

On the 5th Marines’ right, 2/5 faced a tougher challenge. Its progress was aggressively opposed by infantry in the woods on its right, along with artillery from Umurbrogol, which particularly targeted the tanks 2/5 was using to support its advance along the edge of the woods. It was never determined whether the Japanese infantry in those woods were stationed to defend that position or if they were simply surviving members from the D-Day counterattack. The fighting lasted all day and resulted in heavier casualties for Gayle’s battalion than D-Day had. By dusk, 2/5 had fought beyond the north end of the airfield and stopped for the night near the woods that hid the routes to the eastern peninsula.

As the two-battalion attack of the 5th Marines (D plus 1) was heavily engaged in the front and right, the regimental headquarters near the beach was struck by an artillery barrage, which, combined with the loss of 3/5’s commanding officer and executive officer on D-Day, led to a major shift in command assignments. The early D plus 1 barrage hit the regimental CP, took out several staff members, and trapped the regimental commander in the collapsing Japanese antitank trench where the CP was “sheltered.” Fortunately, the23 entrapment was temporary, and Colonel Harris emerged with a twisted and battered leg but was still able to move. Two of his main staff officers were casualties, and his sergeant major was killed. Harris chose not to be evacuated, but he needed help at the regimental CP. He ordered Lieutenant Colonel Walt back from the 3d Battalion to the regimental CP and instructed the commanding officer of 2/5 to send his executive officer, Major John H. Gustafson, to take command of 3/5. Then, Harris directed Boyd to send his 1/5 operations officer, Major Hierome Opie, to join 3/5 as Gustafson’s executive officer.

Fortunately, 3/5 was having a pretty quiet day, unlike the intense regrouping on D-Day night. After dawn, as 2/5 pushed north, 3/5 spread out along the eastern edge of the mangrove lagoon that separated Peleliu from the eastern peninsula. In that spot, 3/5 also connected with 3/7 as that battalion moved south. This way, 3/5 shielded each regiment's side from any Japanese movements across the water and into the rear of the advancing battalions. No such threat appeared, and as the afternoon went on, a more urgent need for 3/5 emerged.

As Walt went back to his spot next to the now only partly mobile Harris, Major Gustafson was instructed to get 3/5 into place to support and then replace 1/5, as it approached its O-2 objectives.

Throughout the next day (D plus 2), the 5th Marines stayed connected with the 1st Marines on their left and gained some control at the foot of the East Road. On the right, 2/5 pushed through the jungle and mangroves north of the airfield, along the road heading toward the eastern peninsula. The thick underbrush, almost impossible to navigate, slowed their progress significantly. However, it helped by hiding most of the advancing Marines from enemy observation from the high ground to 2/5’s north and northwest.

That forward position of the 5th Marines generally matched the northeast area of the airfield previously mentioned. Controlling that visual boundary meant that, in most areas on the regiment's right, frontline Marines were less exposed to enemy observation and direct fire from Umurbrogol. Similar to the 7th Marines, mostly concealed in the southern jungle, this reduced the necessity for a reckless assault. Now, there would be more freedom to move deliberately and to coordinate supporting fire more carefully.

In the south, from D plus 1 through D plus 3, the 7th Marines launched a strong assault against extensive fortifications behind the Scarlet Beaches. These were defended by a full battalion, the elite 2d Battalion, 15th Regiment. Even though they were isolated and surrounded by the Marines, this battalion showed its skill and understanding of Colonel Nakagawa’s orders and mission: to defend Peleliu at the highest possible cost. The 7th Marines attacked with 3/7 on the left and 1/7 on the right. They had the advantage of attacking the extensive and well-prepared defenses from the rear, plus both heavy fire support and terrain that allowed limited maneuvering in their favor. Both sides fought hard, but by 3:30 PM on September 18 (D plus 3), the battle was largely over. The Marines had destroyed an elite Japanese reinforced infantry battalion that was well positioned in a heavily fortified stronghold. Colonel Hanneken reported to General Rupertus that the 7th Marines’ objectives he had set for D-Day were all in place. The naval gunfire preparation was significantly less than planned. This gap was made up by time, as well as the courage, skill, and added casualties of the infantry companies of 1/7 and 3/7.

Now the 7th Marines, whose 2nd Battalion was already in the thick of the fight for Umurbrogol, were about to leave their own successful battle area and engage in a costly assault which, by this point, might have been better executed as a siege.

As the 7th Marines moved to its mission, the 5th Marines was once again successfully creating opportunities on Peleliu’s eastern “lobster claw” peninsula. Unfortunately, most of those opportunities were never taken advantage of.

By the end of D plus 2, the 5th Marines were positioned at the entrance to the eastern peninsula, right along the East Road just east of the 1st Marines’ intense fight in Umurbrogol. They had managed to move away from the intense gunfire coming from Umurbrogol and were planning an attack on the eastern peninsula via a narrow causeway, which was definitely expected to be defended by the Japanese. However, a D plus 3 reconnaissance of the causeway showed that it was not defended. The 2nd Battalion quickly seized the opportunity and moved across with force. Unfortunately, the attack was affected by its own supporting fire. The forward battalion command post group was targeted by Navy planes and subsequently hit by artillery fire, resulting in the loss of 18 battalion headquarters personnel due to “friendly fire.”

Nonetheless, a strong foothold across the causeway was established on D plus 3, and Colonel Harris of the 5th Marines moved to take advantage of it. In the afternoon, he reduced his forces on the East Road sector, assigned the previous 3/5 mission to Company L, 3/5, and gave the rest of 3/5 a new mission. He ordered Gustafson to secure a position within the bridgehead set up by 2/5 and instructed both battalions to capture and clear the eastern peninsula. Earlier, he thought such an attack would face the strong defending forces originally reported on the eastern peninsula. However, the apparent reduction in defending forces now seemed to provide an opportunity to quickly seize Purple Beach, which was a significant logistical target. Harris knew that the division would need to shift its logistical focus to Purple Beach, away from the fire from Umurbrogol and the threat of storms coming from the west.

Before dark, Gustafson moved two of his 3/5 companies across the causeway and set up his own CP group with the 2/5 CP, where the two commanders planned the next day's advance together. Anticipating little resistance, they instructed for quick movement but equipped their lead units with war dog sections to guard against ambush. Their lead companies headed out just after dawn. In the 3/5 sector, an ambush occurred, but the war dogs alerted them and successfully prevented the surprise attack.

By the end of D plus 4, the two battalions had cleared the main area of the eastern peninsula and had reached Purple Beach from behind. The defenses were quite impressive, but many were unoccupied. The enemy soldiers they encountered seemed more focused on hiding than on fighting, leading to speculation that Nakagawa’s trained infantry had been moved west to the battle on D-Day and/or D plus 1. By D plus 5, Purple Beach was cleared, along with the long peninsulas southwest and northeast of Purple Beach. On D plus 6, 2/5 took control of the two islands just north of the northeast peninsula, and the next day occupied the small unnamed islet located 1,000 yards east of the northern ridges of Peleliu.

From that position, as well as from positions on other islands and near Ngardololok, there seemed to be many chances to launch fire attacks against the cave-filled north-south ridges of central and northern Peleliu. Setting up heavy weapons would be quite challenging, but compared to the intense infantry battles happening in Umurbrogol, these challenges felt manageable. Many of the potential targets could have been exposed to direct, flat trajectory fire from the front of U.S. units moving north in central Peleliu. Corps artillery units had practiced this kind of direct fire before heading out for the Peleliu campaign. These tactical advantages and opportunities from the eastern peninsula were suggested but never utilized. It was only later, during the fighting for northern Peleliu, that the 5th Marines were able to secure close-range, heavy, single-gun fire support.

With southern and eastern Peleliu captured, an encirclement of the Japanese defenders in central Peleliu began, along with an attack on the Japanese holding northern Peleliu and the nearby islands of Ngesebus and Kongauru. This was the clear next tactical phase for combat on Peleliu. However, securing it was less critical for the main tactical and strategic objectives on Peleliu than for cleaning up the island. As Brigadier General Oliver P. Smith, the 1st Marine Division’s Assistant Commander, later put it, “by the end of the first week, the Division had control of everything on the island that it then needed, or later used.”

The airfield had been captured, was being repaired and upgraded, and was now operational. It no longer posed any threat, if it ever did, to MacArthur’s long-anticipated return to the Philippines. Peleliu’s best logistical beach (Purple) had been secured, creating a reliable supply route to the main battle areas. The Japanese defenders in25 their caves, as well as in northern Peleliu and on Ngesebus, still had some ability to disrupt American rear installations, but that was significantly reduced by the Marines’ counterfire.

Only two significant capabilities remained for the Japanese: they could fiercely defend their positions in the caves, and they had a limited ability to reinforce Peleliu from Babelthuap. Any reinforcement would have to come through small-unit infiltration, which had to contend with U.S. naval screening operations in the area. Similarly, the American encirclement of the determined Umurbrogol Pocket faced two challenges. The first was the absence of additional maneuver regiments from the III Amphibious Corps’ reserve. General Geiger actually had no corps reserve while waiting for some units to be released from the forces involved in the capture of Angaur. The landing by the 81st Infantry Division (excluding the 323d RCT) had been launched on September 17, after which there was no corps reserve available.

The operation on Angaur, along with the planning around it and the decision on when it should happen, had a significant impact on the Peleliu operation. Early on, naval planners suggested landing on Angaur before Peleliu. It was only when Major General Julian C. Smith, who was in charge of the Expeditionary Troops/X-Ray Planning Group, explained that this timing would allow the many Japanese forces in northern Palau to reinforce Peleliu that it was decided to attack Angaur only after the Peleliu landing was confirmed to be successful. However, the Angaur landing was launched before the success of the Peleliu landing was assured. The commanding general of the 81st Division wanted to land as soon as possible, and he was backed by his naval task unit commander, Rear Admiral William H. P. Blandy. Marine Major General Julian Smith opposed the September 17 date for the Angaur landing, arguing that committing the III Corps Reserve before the Peleliu operation was more fully developed would be premature. His advice was disregarded by Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson.

A related decision on September 17 committed the III Corps’ final reserve to the Ulithi landing. The task was assigned to the Western Attack Force, which was ordered to take Ulithi with “available resources.” Against General Smith’s advice, Wilkinson chose to commit the entire 323rd RCT, the 81st Division’s other maneuver element. The 321st then successfully occupied an undefended Ulithi while reserves were desperately needed at Peleliu.

By September 20, the 81st Division had defeated or trapped all the remaining survivors of Angaur's 1,400 defenders. The commander of the 81st declared Angaur secure. He assigned his 322nd RCT to finish the mop-up and informed General Geiger that the 321st RCT was ready for further operations. The shortage of troops to start surrounding Umurbrogol was no longer an issue.

The other obstacle to strengthening the division on Peleliu and surrounding the Pocket was General Rupertus's mindset. He was determined that his Marines could handle it without any assistance from the Army. The III Corps plan assigned the 81st Division to support the Marines in capturing Peleliu and then to take over for the 1st Marine Division for the cleanup, but the general kept pushing his commanders to “hurry up.”

Earlier, General Rupertus and Colonel Puller had dismissed a suggestion from the 5th Marines’ “Bucky” Harris to check out the Umurbrogol Pocket using the newly available light planes of Marine Observation Squadron 3. Harris’ own aerial reconnaissance, done right after those planes arrived on September 19, had shifted his perspective on the Umurbrogol from serious to critical. It made him believe that attacking the Pocket from the north would be less costly than the originally planned and ordered attempts from south to north. Both Puller and Rupertus told Harris that they already had their maps.

The prelanding maneuver plan was based on the tactical idea that, after taking the airfield, the261st Marine Division would move north along a line across the width of the main or western part of the island. Once they reached the southern edge of Umurbrogol, this idea and maneuver plan were outlined in a series of four phase lines running from west to east, showing an expected linear advance from south to north. It was clear that the advance through the flatter areas west and east of Umurbrogol was expected to happen at about the same speed as that through the higher central ground of Peleliu. This thinking might have aligned with Rupertus’ prediction of a three-day assault. Developments in Sabol’s sector to the west, and in the 5th Marines’ sector to the east, apparently didn’t alter the division's overall plans. Until more forces became available, such a linear advance may have seemed like the only option.

Even so, there was no clear reevaluation of the planned south-to-north push, and for days after the Pocket was sealed off at its northernmost point, the division commander kept ordering attacks from south to north, mostly sticking to the original landing plan. As “Bucky” Harris had realized during his early aerial reconnaissance of the Umurbrogol Pocket, these attacks would result in little more than casualties. Troops, heavily supported, could move into “the Horseshoe” and “Death Valley,” but the positions they reached ended up being unsustainable, and retreat was common by the end of the day.

Some of this thinking may have come from the shortcomings of the map being used. The 5th Marines created a new and more accurate sketch map in early October. It pinpointed and labeled the details within Umurbrogol well enough to help with maneuvering and fire coordination.

That mapping effort, by the way, resulted in the incorrect naming of Honsowetz’ Hill 100, where Captain Everett P. Pope earned his Medal of Honor. The 5th’s mapping team, sent out after Harris’ regiment was engaged against the Pocket, ran into Lieutenant Colonel Walt, the regimental executive officer, on Hill 100 while they were sketching, and named the hill after that.

Even after General Geiger ordered General Rupertus on September 21 to pull back Puller’s battered 1st Marines, General Rupertus believed that his Marines could soon clear the whole island by themselves. After reassessing the situation on the ground, Geiger ordered RCT 321 from Angaur and integrated it into the Marine division. Encircling the Umurbrogol Pocket was now tactically possible.

Capture of northern Peleliu and Ngesebus became more urgent with the discovery on September 23 that some of the enemy's significant troop strength in the northern Palaus was being transported by barge from Koror and Babelthuap into northern Peleliu.

Although the naval patrol assigned to prevent that reinforcing action had found and taken out some of the Japanese barges, most enemy troops appeared to have come ashore in the early morning of September 23. Colonel Nakagawa unexpectedly received reinforcements from a partially damaged infantry battalion in northern Peleliu.

A plan was quickly developed to surround the Pocket and cut off reinforcements to northern Peleliu. General Rupertus' team worked closely with chosen III Corps staff officers, and General Geiger was also there.

The plan was for two regiments to move up the West Road, with the Army's 321st Infantry leading the attack and the 5th Marines following. The Marines were to move through the Army unit once it passed beyond the Pocket on its right, and then the 5th would proceed to capture northern Peleliu and Ngesebus.

The 321st RCT, now experienced in battle, was assigned to advance up the West Road, alongside and just above the western edge of the coral uplift that marked the boundary between the flat western plain and the elevated coral “plateau.” This plateau, about 300 yards from west to east,27 formed the western edge of the Pocket. The plateau rose about 30–80 feet above the West Road. Its western edge, or “cliff,” was a chaotic mix of knobs and small ridges that towered over the West Road and needed to be captured and cleared to allow for unhindered use of the road.

Once the 321st RCT got past this up-lift and the Pocket it bordered, it aimed to explore east for any routes through the 600 yards needed to reach the eastern edge of that part of Peleliu. Any chances in that direction were to be taken advantage of to surround the Pocket from the north.

Behind the 321st RCT, the 5th Marines followed, pushed through, and attacked into northern Peleliu. Hanneken’s 7th Marines took over from the 1st, which was pulling back to the eastern peninsula, and also relieved the 5th Marines of their passive security role. The 5th was then assigned the task of capturing northern Peleliu and taking Ngesebus-Kongauru.

This maneuver would use the West Road, first as a tactical route north, then as the line of communication for ongoing operations to the north. The road was relatively “open” for about halfway, 400 yards, to the northern limit of the Pocket and was paralleled by the rugged “cliff” that formed the western edge of the elevated “plateau.” That feature was not a flat plateau, but a true moonscape of coral knobs, karst, and sinkholes. It had no defined ridges or patterns. The sinkholes ranged from the size of a room to that of a house, 10 to 30 feet deep, and covered in jungle and vines. The “plateau” was generally 30 to 100 feet above the plain of the road. About 200–300 yards further east, it dropped steeply into a sheer cliff, known as the China Wall by those Marines who looked up at it from the southern and eastern approaches to the Pocket. To them, that wall marked the western edge of the Pocket, and the coral “plateau” was essentially an impassable shoulder of the Pocket.

The plateau was completely impassable for vehicles. The coral sinkholes and raised bumps forced any infantry trying to get through to crawl, climb, or scramble down into a series of small areas with rough, jagged surfaces. Evacuating any casualties would mean dealing with the inevitable rough handling of stretchers and their injured occupants. The area was held and defended by scattered small units and individuals who didn't venture out and fiercely resisted anyone trying to cross their barren landscape. When Americans advanced along the West Road, these Japanese fighters ignored individuals and only fired at groups or individuals they considered prime targets.

The only tactical option along the West Road was to capture and hold the coral spires and cliffs that overlooked the road, and to defend those positions against infiltrators. Once those heights were taken, troop units and28 trucks could move along West Road. Until they were captured, the “cliff” provided cover and some protection to the occupying Japanese forces. Until those cliff positions were secured, the Japanese there could only be temporarily silenced by heavy firepower. As long as they remained in their commanding positions, the road couldn't be considered truly open.

Those terrain conditions lasted for about three-quarters of a mile along the West Road. There, at the northern end of the Pocket, the plateau of coral sinkholes blended into a more organized set of limestone ridges. These ridges sloped slightly northeast, expanding the coastal area to a width of 200 to 400 yards from east to west.

Into that environment, the 321st RCT was launched on September 23, following an hour of intense naval gunfire and artillery bombardment targeting the high ground overlooking the West Road. The initial Army reconnaissance patrols moved mainly west of the road, somewhat shielded from any Japanese forces still on the "cliff" just east of the road by vegetation and small terrain features. These tactics were effective until larger units of the 2nd Battalion, 321st, advanced alongside the West Road. Then they came under heavy fire from the elevated positions above the road.

The 321st’s 2nd Battalion had taken over from the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, along an east-west line across the road and up to the heights just above it. At that point, the 1st Marines were linked into the forward left flank of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines. The orders for the advance instructed 3/7 to follow behind the elements of 2/321 along the high ground as the troops captured the next western edge of the cliff and moved northward. However, the leading units along the ridge were quickly outpaced by other elements of 2/321 in the flat area to their west. Instead of moving north to take the ridge, the units assigned to that cliff abandoned it, sidestepping down to the road. They then advanced along the road and soon reported that 3/7 was not maintaining contact along the high ground.

On orders from Colonel Hanneken, the commanding officer of the 7th Marines, 3/7 captured the high ground that 2/321 had abandoned, but it came at a cost that didn't help inter-service relations. After that, 3/7 was gradually committed further along the ridge within the 321st's area of operations. This, of course, stretched 3/7 thin, as they still had to maintain contact on their right in the 7th Marines’ area, generally facing the southern shoulders of the Umurbrogol Pocket. Further north, as the 321st continued to advance, they were able to regain some of the high ground above their line of advance, and then held onto it.

Abreast the northern end of Umurbrogol Pocket, where the sinkhole terrain blended into more regular ridgelines, the 321st captured parts of a key feature, Hill 100. Along with an adjacent hill just east of East Road, known as Hill B, that position served as the northern edge of the Umurbrogol Pocket. Taking Hill B and strengthening their hold on Hill 100 would keep the 321st busy for the next three days.

As the regiment explored the eastern route across the north end of Umurbrogol, it also sent patrols north along the West Road. Near the buildings called “Radio Station,” it found a promising road junction. This was actually the intersection of West and East Roads. Colonel Robert F. Dark, the commanding officer of RCT 321, decided to take advantage of that route, heading back south, to introduce a new direction in his attack on Hill 100/Hill B. He organized a mobile task force with heavy armor and flamethrowers, named Task29 Force Neal, in honor of Captain George C. Neal. He sent it moving southeast and south to support 2/321’s efforts at the Hill 100/Hill B battle. Below that fight, the 7th Marines kept up the pressure on the south and east fronts of the Pocket, still attacking from south to north.

As those efforts were in progress, the 5th Marines received orders to join the ongoing campaign for northern Peleliu. Now relieved by the 1st Marines from their security duty on the eastern peninsula and the nearby three small islands, the 5th moved along the West Road to avoid the 321st action and take control of northern Peleliu. After getting the division order at 1100, the 5th motored, marched, and waded (off the northeastern islets) to and along the West Road. By 1300, its 1st Battalion was passing through the 321st lines at Garekoru, heading to attack the radio station installations identified by 321st patrols the day before.

In this area, the 5th Marines found flat ground, some open and some shaded by palm trees. The terrain was interrupted by familiar limestone ridges, but notably, most of the ridges stood alone. Attackers were not always at risk from flanking fire from mutually supporting defenses on nearby or parallel ridges, as had been the case in the Umurbrogol. The Japanese had fortified the northern ridges for defense just as thoroughly as they had in the Umurbrogol, with extensive tunnels and hidden gun positions. However, these positions could be targeted individually using focused tank, flamethrower, and demolition tactics. Additionally, it turned out that not all the defenders were trained infantrymen; many came from naval construction units.

On the U.S. side of the fight, a significant command factor influenced the campaign into northern Peleliu. Colonel Harold D. “Bucky” Harris was committed to fully utilizing all available firepower before sending his infantry into battle. His earlier aerial reconnaissance had given him insight into the terrain. This understanding reinforced his determination to keep using all available firepower and employing strategic tactics as he carried out his regiment’s assigned missions.

On the afternoon of September 25th, 1/5 took control of the Radio Station complex and the nearby part of a hill overlooking it. When 3/5 arrived, it was instructed to take the next high ground east of 1/5’s position. Then, when 2/5 arrived, it connected to the right of 3/5’s position and extended the regimental line back to the beach. This effectively cut contact with the 321st operations to the south but met Colonel Harris’ goal of advancing north as quickly as possible without stretching his lines too thin. By quickly establishing this regimental “beachhead,” the 5th Marines caught the defenders off guard with strong forces ready to challenge the cave defenses and fully engage them on the following day.

The next day, September 26, the 321st launched its three-pronged attack on Hill 100/Hill B (the northern edge of the Umurbrogol Pocket), while the 5th Marines assaulted four hills running east to west across Peleliu, known as Hills 1, 2, 3, and Radar Hill in Hill Row. This row was perpendicular to and south of the last northern ridge, Amiangal Mountain. These hills and the ridge were defended by around 1,500 infantry, artillerymen, naval engineers, and the battered reinforcing infantry battalion that landed on the night of September 23, hidden in caves and interconnected tunnels within the ridge and the hills. As the battle for Hill Row unfolded, Colonel Harris had his 2nd Battalion maneuver west of Hill Row to attack the Amiangal ridge to the north. Before nightfall, the 2nd Battalion had captured the southern end and crest of the ridge but was taking heavy fire from cave positions on the central and northwestern slopes of the ridge.30

What wasn’t fully understood yet was that the Marines were facing the most extensive system of caves and tunnels on Peleliu. They were attempting to invade the territory (and defensive base) of a long-established naval construction unit, most of whose members were more skilled as miners than soldiers. As night set in, the 2nd Battalion broke away from the units to its south and established a small battalion beachhead for the night.

The next morning, as the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, attempted to advance along the path leading to the northern edge of Amiangal Ridge, they encountered a wide and deep antitank ditch that prevented the attacking infantry from getting the close tank support they had effectively used earlier. At this point, the 5th Marines command31 requested, once again, for direct artillery support.

This time, division headquarters responded positively. During the night of September 27, Major George V. Hanna’s 8th 155mm Gun Battalion moved one of its guns into position in 2/5’s sector. The gun was about 180 yards from the front of Amiangal Ridge. The sight of that threat at dawn prompted enemy machine-gun fire that caused some casualties among the artillerymen. This fire was quickly suppressed by Marine infantry fire and then by the 155mm gun itself. Throughout the morning, the heavy 155mm fire rained down on Amiangal Ridge, destroying or blocking all identified caves on the west face, except for one. That one was a tunnel opening, located at ground level on the northwestern base of the hill. It was too close to friendly lines for the gun to target it. But by then, tanks had neutralized the tunnel opening, and a tank bulldozer filled in part of the antitank ditch. This allowed 2/5’s tank-infantry teams to approach the tunnel opening, blast and bulldoze it closed, and move around the northern edge of Amiangal. At the same time, Marines advanced up the slopes above the tunnel and seized the summit of the small mountain.

The term seizure is qualified, for although 2/5 held the outside of the hill, the stubborn Japanese defenders still held the inside. A maze of interconnected tunnels extended throughout the length and breadth of the Amiangal Ridge. From time to time, the Japanese inside the mountain would blast open a previously closed cave or tunnel entrance and come out to challenge the Marines. Despite their surprise effect, these counterattacks gave the Marines a rare and welcome opportunity to actually see their enemy in daylight. Such tactics were inconsistent with the general Japanese strategy for Peleliu and somewhat shortened the fight for the northern end of the island.

As the fighting continued, the 5th Marines gathered its 3rd Battalion, along with supporting tanks, amphibious vehicles, and all available naval gunfire and air support to carry out a shore-to-shore operation to take Ngesebus and Kongauru, located 600 yards north of Peleliu, on September 28.

There was an operation that was “made to look easy” but actually involved a single, strengthened (but low on resources) battalion facing around 500 well-prepared and entrenched Japanese infantry. For about 35 hours, the battalion carried out the most efficient single battalion operation of the entire Peleliu campaign.

Much of the effectiveness was thanks to the supporting aviation. VMF-114, led by Major Robert F. “Cowboy” Stout, had landed on Peleliu’s airstrip just three days before this landing, and immediately took on its main mission: supporting Marine ground operations. The Ngesebus landing was the first in the Pacific War where Marine aviation provided all the air support for a landing. As the LVTs entered the water from Peleliu’s shore, the naval gunfire unexpectedly rose, alarming the assault troops. Stout’s pilots quickly recognized the situation and resumed their strafing of Ngesebus until the LVTs were within 30 yards of the beach. They flew so low that the Marines watching thought some of them might shoot each other down with their ricochets. This action kept the Japanese defenders suppressed so effectively that the Marines in the first waves reached them before they could recover from the shock of the strafing planes.

The 3rd Battalion landed without any casualties. This allowed them to eliminate all the Japanese forces in beach defenses right away, and they then focused on the cave positions in the ridges and blockhouses. The ridges here, similar to those in northern Peleliu, stood alone rather than forming complex ridge systems. This made it difficult for the defenders to coordinate a mutual defense between cave positions. The attacking companies of 3/5 could use supporting tanks and concentrate all their firepower on each defensive position without being attacked from the sides and back. By nightfall on September 28, 3/5 had overrun most of the opposition. On September 29, it was a day of cleanup before Ngesebus was declared secure at 3:00 PM. As planned, the island was handed over to 2/321, and 3/5 moved to division reserve in the Ngardololok area.

Seizing Ngesebus by one depleted infantry battalion provided a striking example of a fundamental principle of war: effectively concentrating resources. To back that battalion, General Rupertus gathered most of his available firepower: a battleship, two cruisers, most of the divisional and corps artillery, nearly all of the division’s remaining armor, armored amphibious tractors, all troop-carrying amphibious tractors, and all Marine aviation on Peleliu.

Such focused support allowed the severely weakened 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, to swiftly take Ngesebus, eliminating 463 of Colonel Nakagawa’s experienced and well-positioned troops in 36 hours, at the cost of 48 American casualties.

Other maneuver elements on Peleliu also attacked during those 36 hours, but at an intensity that was scaled down due to the limited support resulting from General Rupertus’ complete focus on the day’s main objective.

As 3/5 was clearing Ngesebus, the rest of the 5th Marines was still fighting the Japanese in northeast Peleliu. After taking Akarakoro Point beyond Amiangal Mountain, 2/5 headed south. They pushed through the defenses east of the mountain using demolitions and flamethrowers, then continued south toward Radar Hill, the eastern stronghold of Hill Row. That area was being attacked from the south and west by 1/5. After two days, the two battalions were in control of the situation, at least on the34tops of the hills. Inside, however, there were still determined Japanese defenders who kept resisting the fight for Radar Hill, just like the defenders within the extensive tunnels of Amiangal Mountain. All could be silenced when the entrances to the caves or tunnels were blasted shut.

As these operations were happening, the 321st at the north end of Umurbrogol finished taking control of Hills 100 and Hill B, then cleared the ridge (Kamilianlul Mountain) and the road north to the area where the 5th Marines were operating. On September 30, the 321st took over from the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 5th Marines in northern Peleliu. That regiment regrouped in the Ngardololok area before it was once again necessary to deploy it to the Umurbrogol Pocket.

In a very real sense, the Umurbrogol Pocket represented the worst aspects of the post D-Day campaign for Peleliu. It was the site of some of the fiercest and most costly fighting on the island, as well as some of the best and worst tactical decisions of the campaign. The terrain there was the most difficult and challenging of the whole island. Pre-landing planning failed to recognize the Pocket for what it really was, a complicated cave and ridge fortress ideal for a determined and desperate defense. The plans for capturing the area treated the Pocket’s complex terrain as if it were simple, planning to conquer it alongside the flat land to the east and west in a straightforward, timed approach.

The southern slopes (commonly referred to as Bloody Nose) loomed over the landing beaches and airfield that the Pocket had to approach. Once those heights were taken by the brave and costly assaults of Puller’s 1st Marines (with Berger’s 2/7 attached), and after the division set up artillery controlled by aerial observers overhead, the situation changed dramatically. The defenders of the Pocket were left with only the ability to harass and delay the Americans, annoying them with sporadic fire attacks and nighttime raids. But35 after D plus 4, Umurbrogol’s defenders could no longer pose a serious threat to the division’s mission.

Nonetheless, after the key enemy observation points were taken, General Rupertus kept pushing for "momentum," as if capturing the Pocket was as urgent as taking the commanding heights to the south. The difficult nature of the terrain, along with its determined defenders, became intertwined with the resolute character of the general leading the 1st Marine Division. This mix was only sorted out over time and through the reluctant intervention of General Geiger. Most of the offensive efforts into the Pocket from September 21 to 29 were directed from south to north, moving into the openings or climbing up the ridges of the twin box canyons that defined the Pocket. Infantry, backed by tanks, air support, and flame-throwing LVTs, could push into the low ground, but generally found themselves surrounded on three sides. Japanese positions inside the canyon ridges, concealed from view and protected in their caves, were very capable of making the "captured" low ground impossible to hold. Other attacks aimed at taking the heights of the eastern ridges were initially successful, allowing small infantry units to scramble onto the bare ridge tops, but they soon came under fire from the opposing parallel ridges and caves. They faced strong nighttime counterattacks from Japanese forces who emerged from their caves under the cover of darkness.

During September 20, D plus 5, the 7th Marines took over from the 1st Marines along the south and southwest fronts of the Pocket. On the 21st, the 3rd and 1st Battalions started their attack into the Pocket from the southwest and south. These attacks made some limited initial progress behind heavy fire support and smoke, but they only managed to advance to positions that became unlivable once the supporting fire and smoke were lifted. The assault troops had to retreat under renewed fire support back to about where they started. There wasn’t much to show for the day’s brave efforts.

Attacks the next day (22 September) against the west side of the Pocket, from the West Road, up the western box canyon (Wildcat Bowl) and toward Higashiyama (Hill 140), were heavily backed by firepower, leading to early gains. However, most of these advances had to be abandoned by the end of the day, as all three attacking groups came under increasing fire from the Japanese hidden in interconnected cave positions. The 7th Marines had, without realizing it, gotten within about 100 yards of Colonel Nakagawa’s final command cave position. Nevertheless, many supporting ridges and hilltops would need to be taken out before a direct attack on that cave could stand any chance of success.

The battle for Umurbrogol Pocket had turned into a siege, needing siege tactics to resolve it. However, the commander of the 1st Marine Division still held on to the hope of a “breakthrough” against the enemy. He insisted that ongoing battalion and regimental attacks would lead to victory “very soon.”

When the 321st’s probes moved east36 near the northern end of the Pocket, bringing them close to cutting off that Pocket from the north, they sent out two battalions (2nd and 3rd) facing east to finish the encirclement.

This attack on Hill B, which was at the northern end of the Pocket, kept the 321st Infantry completely focused through September 26, while the 5th Marines were engaged in northern Peleliu. The 7th Marines continued to pressure the Pocket from the south and provided support on the west side. After the 321st's victory on the 26th, their mission was expanded to push into the Pocket from the north. They carried this out while also clearing the sporadically defended Kamilianlul Ridge to the north. Their attack south from Hill B and the nearby ridges made very little progress but allowed for some consolidation of the American position along the north side of the Pocket, which was now 400 yards wide in that area. On September 29, the 7th Marines were ordered to relieve the Army unit in that northern sector.

To relieve the 2/7 and 3/7 of their mostly fixed guard positions along the west and southwest sides of the Pocket, the division pulled hundreds of non-infantry personnel from combat support units (artillery, engineer, pioneer) and formed two mixed “infantillery” units. Under 11th Marines’ Lieutenant Colonel Richard B. Evans and 5th Marines’ Major Harold T. A. Richmond, they were tasked with maintaining the static defense in the areas previously held by 2/7 and 3/7. They confronted the karst plateau between the West Road and the Pocket.

The 7th Marines' flexibility was restored with this relief, as its 1st and 3rd Battalions took over from the 321st units on September 29, along the northern edge of the Pocket. Then on the 30th, they moved south, gaining better control of Boyd Ridge and its southern extension, known as Hill 100, Pope’s Ridge, or Walt Ridge. The latter overlooked the East Road, but Japanese defenders were still hiding in caves on the west side. The 7th Marines’ partial control of Pope Ridge provided limited oversight of the East Road, which helped stabilize the eastern side of the Pocket. However, the U.S. presence in the area still needed improvement.

On October 3, supported by the attached 3/5 (back from Ngesebus), the 7th Regiment launched a four-battalion attack. The plan was for 1/7 and 3/7 to strike from the north, targeting Boyd Ridge and the smaller ridges to its west, while 2/7 would assault Pope (Walt) Ridge from the south. The attached 3/5 was tasked with making a diversionary attack from the south into the Horseshoe Canyon and its guardian, the Five Sisters, to the west. This regimental attack against the Pocket committed four infantry “battalions,” which were now closer to company strength than actual battalions, against the heights near the southern end of the Pocket (Five Sisters), and the ridges at the eastern edge of the Pocket (Pope and Boyd Ridges). After heavy casualties, the attack was successful, but the Five Sisters (four of which 3/5 scaled) were not defensible and had to be abandoned after being captured.

The next day, October 4th, the 7th Marines with 3/5 still attached launched one more general attack—in the south, again to take, then abandon, positions on the Five Sisters; in the north, to try to advance and secure the positions that were taken earlier.

In the action on October 4, the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines made an unexpectedly quick advance and pushed to take Hill 120. The hope was that this would serve as a good starting point for the next day’s operation against the ridge to the west. However, Hill 120, like so many others in the Umurbrogol, was under enemy crossfire, making it impossible to hold. The attacking company had to be pulled back, suffering heavy casualties. Among those casualties was Captain James V. “Jamo” Shanley, who was in charge of Company L. His company was attacking Ridge/Hill 120 when several of his men were wounded. Shanley ran forward under heavy fire, rescued two men, and brought them to safety behind a tank. He then rushed back to help a third,37 when a mortar round exploded right behind him, mortally wounding him. His executive officer, Lieutenant Harold J. Collins, ran out to save him, only to be killed instantly by a Japanese antitank round.

For his bravery, Captain Shanley received a Gold Star (second) for the Navy Cross he earned at Cape Gloucester, New Britain. There, his company was at the forefront of capturing Hill 660, an important landmark in the Borgen Bay region.

The 7th Marines had now been in the brutal Umurbrogol battle for two weeks. General Rupertus decided to rotate them out, a move that General Geiger also recommended. Still committed to holding the Pocket with Marines, General Rupertus turned to his only remaining Marine regiment, the 5th.

Colonel Harris brought two solid ideas to this final push for his 5th Marines. First, the attack would come from the north, which provided the best chance to take one piece of territory or one ridge at a time. His 1st Battalion positions along the east side of the Pocket would be held in place, maybe adjusted or improved a little bit. No assaults would be launched from the south, where the 3rd Battalion was positioned in reserve.

Colonel Harris's aerial reconnaissance during the first week on Peleliu convinced him that siege tactics would be necessary to eliminate the numerous mutually defended positions within Umurbrogol. As he had previously stated in front of the corps and division commanders visiting his regimental command post, Harris maintained his policy to “be generous with ammunition and careful with ... men’s lives.” He was in a strong command position to prepare thoroughly before giving the order to advance.

The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines relieved the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines in position on October 5th, but only scouted areas where38 heavier firepower could be used. Engineer bulldozers were brought in to create paths into the northern ends of the box canyons, where LVT flamethrowers and tanks could operate later. A light artillery battery was set up along the West Road to fire directly into the west-facing cliffs at the north end of the Pocket, along with weapons carriers and tanks. Problematic sections of certain cliffs were literally demolished by direct fire, and the rubble was pushed into a ramp for tanks to climb toward improved firing positions. Light mortars were used extensively to clear vegetation from areas where firing caves were suspected, and planes loaded with napalm were deployed to bomb suspected targets just south of the key Hill 140, which 2/5 had chosen as its main objective.

As 2/5 took out successive firing positions in the north, 3/5 on October 7 sent a tank mission into the Horseshoe. This time, the goal was not to seize and hold territory, but to destroy by fire all identifiable targets on the faces of the Five Sisters, and on39 the western (lower) face of Hill 100 (Pope Ridge). When all ammunition was used up, the tanks withdrew to reload and then returned, accompanied by LVT flame-throwing tanks and protected by small infantry fire teams. Much more destruction was caused; a large number of Japanese soldiers were killed in caves, and many of the Japanese heavy weapons in those caves were shut down. Prior to this, some individual artillery pieces firing from inside the Horseshoe had occasionally bothered the airfield. No such nuisance attacks happened after the October 7 tank missions.

For the next six days, the 5th Marines headquarters provided all available support for small, gradual advances by 2/5 from the north. Light mortars were frequently used to clear vegetation from small objectives and paths of progress. Tanks and artillery fired at close range into all suspected caves or rough coral areas. Aerial bombardment with napalm was used to remove vegetation and, ideally, force some defenders further back into their caves. All advances were very limited, focused simply on gaining new firing positions. Progress was made by squads or small platoons.

The last position taken, Hill 140, just north of the Five Brothers, provided a firing location where a 75mm pack howitzer was brought in piece by piece, reassembled, fortified with sandbags, and then effectively operated from its strategic position. It was capable of firing into the entrance of a large cave at the bottom of the next ridge, which had been a source of heavy fire for several days.

Sandbagging this piece into position created specific challenges, as the only loose sand or dirt available had to be brought in from the beach or from occasional debris slides. Still, the use of sandbags in forward infantry positions started to increase, and the technique was later enhanced and widely adopted when the 81st Infantry Division soldiers took over the further reduction of the Pocket.

By this careful approach,40 a number of small bumps and ridges at the entrance of the two treacherous box canyons were captured. Direct fire could be aimed at the west side of Walt and Boyd Ridges, where 1/5 was located, but those cave-filled western slopes were shielded by other caves on the opposite, parallel ridge called Five Brothers.

A week of intense activity pushed the northern boundary of the Pocket another 500 yards south. On October 12, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was brought in to relieve the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines. The relief was badly affected, mainly because the forward positions being taken over were so close to the enemy. The incoming troops, including a company commander, were targeted by snipers during this handover, and a small group of the enemy retook a position that had previously been secured through consistent fire. Despite these setbacks and interruptions, the relief was finished on time, and on October 13, 3/5 continued the slow and careful advance.

Directly south of Hill 140, there didn't seem to be a viable path for advancement, so 3/5 changed their direction to the southwest, roughly following the West Road and moving into the coral badlands ahead of the defensive lines held by the composite units guarding West Road. While the composite units stayed in position, 3/5 moved across their front from north to south. This strategy cleared the coral badlands to an average depth of 75–150 yards over about 500 yards of the north-south front. This area, once considered unsuitable for anything other than the most expensive and challenging advances, was now crossed with the help of preparatory fire-scouring from napalm bombs. Major “Cowboy” Stout’s VMF-114 pilots dropped bombs just a hair's breadth away from both the advancing 3/5 front and the stationary composite units holding their ground just east of West Road.

A similar effort was then launched from the south by what was left of Lieutenant Colonel John Gormley’s 1/7. Together, these two advances captured and cleared about half of the depth of the coral badlands, between West Road and the China Wall. This clearing action allowed the combined “infantillery” unit to push its lines eastward and then hold, as far as the infantry had cleared, toward the back of China Wall.

Overall, the actions of the 5th and 7th Marines in October had shrunk the Pocket to an oval shape about 800 yards long from north to south and 400–500 yards wide from east to west. According to Colonel Nakagawa’s radio report back to Koror, he still had around 700 defenders inside the Pocket, but only 80 percent of them were effective. In early October, someone jokingly suggested that the situation in the Pocket be made clearer by surrounding it with barbed wire and labeling it as a prisoner of war camp. Though said in bitter humor, this idea acknowledged that the Pocket no longer played a role in the strategic balance, nor in the successful capture of Peleliu.

But it was still a major concern for Major General Rupertus, who wanted to take control of the Pocket before handing over the 81st Division’s assigned cleanup mission to Major General Mueller. In fact, Rupertus’ successful capture of Ngesebus and northern Peleliu had ended the enemy's ability to reinforce the now-isolated Japanese forces on Peleliu. This tactical situation had effectively secured Peleliu.

Without demanding an official confirmation that Peleliu had been successfully secured, which would have made the 1st Marine Division’s mission complete, General Geiger had been hinting for several days that as he continued his attacks into the Pocket, Rupertus should first replace the 5th and then the 7th Marines with his largest and freshest infantry regiment, the 321st RCT, still assigned to the 1st Marine Division. In response to such suggestions, General Rupertus stated that his Marines would “very shortly” take control of the Pocket.

Two events now shook General41 Rupertus’ confidence. First, the 81st Division was fully assembled with the return of its 323d RCT, which had just secured Ulithi, a crucial achievement. Second, the belief that Peleliu was effectively secured was confirmed by a message from Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet/Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas. Major General Geiger was instructed to pass command to Major General Mueller, whose 81st Division was now tasked with relieving the 1st Marine Division, cleaning up, and garrisoning Peleliu as originally planned. Rear Admiral George E. Fort, who succeeded Rear Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson as commander of operations in the Palaus, was instructed to transfer that responsibility to Vice Admiral John H. Hoover, a sub-area commander. After being relieved by the 81st Division, the 1st Marine Division would embark for their return to Pavuvu.

During the movement and turnover, tactical operations on land had to stay under the control of the 1st Marine Division until the 81st Division could relocate its command post from Angaur. General Mueller set up his command post near Peleliu’s Purple Beach on October 20. The Wildcat Division then took “custody” of the Pocket and became responsible for completely defeating its determined, capable, battle-weary defenders.

Meanwhile, the 5th Marines were replaced by the 321st RCT on October 15 and 16. While this change was happening, Lieutenant Colonel Gormley’s 1/7 was still engaged in the previously mentioned coral badlands operation, which was needed to allow the eastward movement of the containment lines protecting West Road. As a result, the relief of 1/7 was postponed until the next day. On October 17, a full-strength Company B, 1/323, which had recently arrived from Ulithi, took over from Gormley’s remaining battalion, roughly man for man.

When Major General Mueller took charge of the cleanup on Peleliu on October 20, he treated the situation as a siege and instructed his troops to act accordingly. For nearly six weeks, his two regiments, the 322nd and 323rd Infantry, along with 2/321, did just that. They used sandbags as an assault tool, hauling sand from the beaches and slowly moving the filled sandbags forward to get closer to positions from which they could fire at the Japanese caves and fortified positions. They extensively utilized tanks and flamethrowers, even improving the vehicle-mounted flamethrower. They extended a gasoline pipeline from a truck, which allowed them to use booster pumps to launch napalm hundreds of feet into Japanese defensive areas. Recognizing the effectiveness of the 75mm pack howitzer that the Marines had managed to position on Hill 140, they sought out other locations to place pack howitzers and fired directly into the defending caves. To meet their increasing need for sandbags on ridge-top “foxholes,” their engineers set up highlines to transport sand (along with ammo and rations) to those high points and ridges.

Notwithstanding these deliberate siege tactics, the 81st troops still faced death and injuries as they pressed against the fierce and stubborn Japanese defenses. The siege of the Umurbrogol Pocket took the complete efforts of the 81st Division’s 322d RCT and 323d RCT, along with 2/321, until November 27, 1944 (D plus 73).

This long siege operation took place within 25 miles of a much larger group of around 25,000 Japanese soldiers in the northern Palaus. With a few minor infiltrations here and there, those Japanese forces were cut off by U.S. Navy patrols and regular bombings from Marine Aircraft Group 11, which was based on Peleliu.

Difficult and expensive as the American advances were, the Japanese defenders in their underground positions faced an equally tough and even more discouraging situation. Water was scarce. Sanitation was poor to nonexistent. Rations were low, and ammunition was even harder to come by. As time went on, some of the Japanese, when given the chance, decided to leave their defenses and carry out pointless, usually suicidal night attacks. A very few managed43 to get captured.

Toward late November, even Major General Murai seemed to share this perspective. While still not in command, he suggested in a radio message to Lieutenant General Inoue on Koror a banzai finale for their extended defense. However, General Inoue rejected the proposal. By this point, Nakagawa's only way to communicate externally was via radio to Koror. As he had expected, all local wire communications had been destroyed. He had issued mission orders to guide his units through the final phase of defense.

As the tanks and infantry steadily moved forward, the engineers of the 81st Division worked to enhance the roads and ramps leading toward the core of the Japanese final position. This made it easier for the tanks and flamethrowers to methodically take out each cave and position while the infantry advanced their sandbag "foxholes."

On November 24, Colonel Nakagawa sent his final message to his superior in Koror. He reported that he had burned the colors of the 2d Infantry Regiment. He mentioned that the last 56 men had been divided into 17 infiltration teams, aiming to sneak past the American positions and “attack the enemy everywhere.” During the night of November 24-25, 25 Japanese soldiers, including two officers, were killed. Another soldier was captured the next morning. His interrogation, along with postwar records and interviews, led to the conclusion that Colonel Nakagawa and Major General Murai died in the command post, by ritual suicide.

The final two-day advance of the 81st Division's soldiers was truly a mopping-up operation. It was carefully conducted to find any tucked-away opposition. By midday on November 27, the north-moving units, protected on the east by other Army units, came face-to-face with the battalion moving south, near where the Japanese command post was later located. Colonel Arthur44 P. Watson, the commander of the 323rd, reported to General Mueller that the operation was over.

Not quite. Marine air on Peleliu continued to target the Japanese positions in Koror and Babelthuap, working alongside the Navy units to eliminate or contain any remaining Japanese forces in the northern Palaus. A recent casualty in that effort was the relentless Major Robert F. “Cowboy” Stout, whose VMF-114 had provided significant air support to the ground combat on Peleliu.

The unwavering resolve of the Japanese to fulfill their emperor’s war objectives was clearly represented by the last 33 prisoners taken on Peleliu. In March 1947, a small Marine guard attached to a small naval base on the island came across undeniable signs of a Japanese military presence in a cave in the Umurbrogol. During patrols and ambushes, they captured a survivor, a Japanese seaman who mentioned that 33 Japanese troops were still under the command of Lieutenant Tadamichi Yamaguchi. While the survivor indicated that there was some disagreement among this diverse group, it appeared that a final banzai attack was being planned.

The Navy garrison commander relocated all Navy personnel and about 35 dependents to a secure area and sent for reinforcements to Guam, along with a Japanese war crimes witness, Rear Admiral Michio Sumikawa. The admiral flew in and traveled by jeep along the roads near the suspected cave positions. Using a loudspeaker, he communicated the current situation. There was no response. Eventually, the Japanese seaman who had originally surrendered returned to the cave with letters from Japanese families45 and former officers from the Palaus, informing the holdouts about the end of the war. On April 21, 1947, the holdouts officially surrendered. Lieutenant Yamaguchi led 26 soldiers to a spot in front of 80 Marines in full battle gear. He bowed and handed his sword to the American naval commander on the scene.

What benefits did the conquest of Peleliu bring to the United States’ war effort? It ensured complete control over all of the Palaus, which slightly improved the security of MacArthur’s right flank as he moved westward and then northward from New Guinea into his campaign in the Philippines. Within the Palaus group, it eliminated facilities that had survived Admiral Marc A. Mitscher’s devastating strike in March 1944. It guaranteed total denial of support to the enemy from Koror’s submarine bases, further reducing the diminishing Japanese submarine capability east of the Philippines. The U.S. position on Peleliu completed the neutralization of around 25,000 Japanese troops in northern Palau. The landing on Peleliu did not help the Regimental Landing Team (RLT) 323 in its unopposed capture of Ulithi. Admiral William F. Halsey had previously thought that his forces could capture Ulithi without first taking Peleliu.

The most noticeable advantage of a quiet Peleliu was its role as a connection in the flight path and communication line from Hawaii and the Marianas to the Philippines. The occupation was useful, but not essential.

Such a judgment could be challenged, though, by the survivors of the Indianapolis' sinking on July 29, 1945. After delivering parts for atomic bombs to Tinian shortly before, the ship was on its way to the Philippines when it was unexpectedly torpedoed at night. The ship sank in just 12 minutes, and there was no report of the attack or the sinking. On the fourth day after the sinking, its 316 survivors (from a crew of 1,196) were spotted by a Navy patrol bomber flying out of Peleliu. That sighting led directly to their rescue and definitely wouldn’t have happened without the American occupation of Peleliu.

46 What was the cost of taking Peleliu? Marine casualties reached 6,526, including Navy corpsmen and doctors, with 1,252 of them killed. The 81st Division experienced a total of 3,089 casualties, including 404 killed in action. Overall, U.S. troop casualties for Peleliu, Angaur, and Ngesebus amounted to 9,615, with 1,656 dead.

By causing so many casualties, the Japanese effectively carried out their long-standing “delay and bleed” strategy. This tactic resulted in an estimated 10,900 casualties for them, with almost all of them killed. Only 202 prisoners of war were taken, just 19 of whom were Japanese military (seven Army, 12 Navy). The rest were laborers, mostly Korean. Among the Japanese military defenders, fewer than two out of every thousand were captured.

The costs at Peleliu carried plenty of warnings for the upcoming Allied operations across the Pacific toward Japan. Even with complete local air and naval dominance, extensive naval bombardment and bombs, the feared napalm weapons, and a 4:1 troop advantage, taking Peleliu resulted in one American casualty and 1,589 rounds of heavy and light ammunition for every single Japanese defender killed or pushed from their fortified position. A few months later, the assaults on Iwo Jima and Okinawa would validate this harsh reality of war against resolute Japanese defenders, well-led and entrenched in their defenses.

The question of whether the Peleliu operation was necessary is still a topic of debate, even now, over 52 years after the September 1, 1944, landing. The bravery and outstanding actions of the 1st Marine Division, its Marines and Navy corpsmen, and the soldiers of the 81st Infantry Division on that harsh island are documented in history. But there’s a lingering question about whether taking Peleliu was crucial, especially considering Admiral William F. Halsey’s recommendation to Admiral Nimitz, which he relayed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 13, 1944—just two days before D-Day—to call off the landing. By then, however, it was too late. And Peleliu was added to the long list of battles where Marines fought, struggled, and ultimately triumphed.

48

The main source for this pamphlet is the Marine Corps' official monograph, The Assault on Peleliu, by Maj Frank O. Hough, published by the Government Printing Office in 1950, while LtCol Gordon D. Gayle served as deputy director of Marine Corps history and editor of the monograph series. Other books referenced in this narrative include: George W. Garand and Truman R. Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations, vol IV, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II (Washington: Historical Division, HQMC, 1971); George P. Hunt, Coral Comes High (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946); E. B. Sledge, With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa (Presidio Press, 1981); Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991); Edward Behr, Hirohito: Behind the Myth (New York: Vantage Books & Random House, 1989); Bill D. Ross, Peleliu: Tragic Triumph, The Untold Story of the Pacific War's Forgotten Battle (New York: Random House, 1992); James H. Hallas, The Devil's Anvil: The Assault on Peleliu (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1944); Harry A. Gailey, Peleliu 1944 (Annapolis, Maryland: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Inc., 1983); Masataka Chihaya, Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941–45 (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962); Larry L. Woodward, Before the First Wave: The 3rd Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion—Peleliu and Okinawa (Manhattan, Kansas: Sunflower Univ. Press, 1944); Burke Davis, Marine: The Life of Lieutenant General Lewis B. (Chesty) Puller, USMC (Ret) (Boston: Little, Brown Company, 1962).

The Oral History and Personal Papers Collections at the Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C., include several interviews and diaries from people involved in the Peleliu operation. The documents from the following individuals were especially helpful: LtGen Oliver P. Smith; BGen Harold D. Harris; BGen Harold O. Deakin; and LtGen Lewis J. Fields, along with many personal interviews with veterans of the campaign—both officers and enlisted personnel.

The author would like to thank the Army Center of Military History for lending the photographs of Tom Lea’s artwork included in this pamphlet. He also wants to express gratitude to Phillip D. Orr for allowing the use of the fascinating photographs of Peleliu as it looked in 1994.

Colonel General Gordon D. Gayle, USMC (Ret), graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in June 1939 and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps. After finishing Basic School in Philadelphia in 1940, he was assigned to the 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division, where he participated in three Pacific campaigns: Guadalcanal, Cape Gloucester, and Peleliu. For his exceptional bravery while leading the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, on Peleliu, he received the Navy Cross.

He went back to the 1st Marine Division during the Korean War, initially serving as the executive officer of the 7th Marines, and then as G-3 on the division staff. He graduated from the Army’s Command and General Staff College. From 1963 to 1965, he led the Long Range Study Panel at Quantico, where he developed concepts for the Corps' operational, organizational, logistical, and R&D needs for the period leading up to 1985. He was promoted to brigadier general in 1964. After retiring in 1968, he joined the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University.