This is a modern-English version of Discoveries Made Upon Men and Matter and Some Poems, originally written by Jonson, Ben. It has been thoroughly updated, including changes to sentence structure, words, spelling, and grammar—to ensure clarity for contemporary readers, while preserving the original spirit and nuance. If you click on a paragraph, you will see the original text that we modified, and you can toggle between the two versions.

Scroll to the bottom of this page and you will find a free ePUB download link for this book.


CASSELL’S NATIONAL LIBRARY.

CASSELL’S NATIONAL LIBRARY.

 

Findings
MADE UPON MEN AND MATTER
AND
SOME POEMS

BY
BEN JOHNSON.

BY
BEN JOHNSON.

CASSELL & COMPANY, Limited:
LONDON, PARIS & MELBOURNE.
1892.

CASSELL & COMPANY, Limited:
LONDON, PARIS & MELBOURNE.
1892.

INTRODUCTION

Ben Jonson’s “Discoveries” are, as he says in the few Latin words prefixed to them, “A wood—Sylva—of things and thoughts, in Greek ‘ὕλη’” [which has for its first meaning material, but is also applied peculiarly to kinds of wood, and to a wood], “from the multiplicity and variety of the material contained in it.  For, as we are commonly used to call the infinite mixed multitude of growing trees a wood, so the ancients gave the name of Sylvæ—Timber Trees—to books of theirs in which small works of various and diverse matter were promiscuously brought together.”

Ben Jonson's “Discoveries” are, as he mentions in the few Latin words at the beginning, “A wood—Sylva—of things and thoughts, in Greek ‘ὕλη’” [which primarily means material but is also specifically associated with kinds of wood, and to a wood], “because of the multitude and variety of the material it contains. Just as we often refer to the vast mix of growing trees as a wood, the ancients called their collections of small works on various topics Sylvæ—Timber Trees.”

In this little book we have some of the best thoughts of one of the most vigorous minds that ever added to the strength of English literature.  The songs added are a part of what Ben Jonson called his “Underwoods.”

In this little book, we have some of the best ideas from one of the most powerful thinkers who ever contributed to the richness of English literature. The songs included are part of what Ben Jonson referred to as his “Underwoods.”

Ben Jonson was of a north-country family from the Annan district that produced Thomas Carlyle.  His father was ruined by religious persecution in the reign of Mary, became a preacher in Elizabeth’s reign, and died a month before the poet’s birth in 1573.  Ben Jonson, therefore, was about nine years younger than Shakespeare, and he survived Shakespeare about twenty-one years, dying in August, 1637.  Next to Shakespeare Ben Jonson was, in his own different way, the man of most mark in the story of the English drama.  His mother, left poor, married again.  Her second husband was a bricklayer, or small builder, and they lived for a time near Charing Cross in Hartshorn Lane.  Ben Jonson was taught at the parish school of St. Martin’s till he was discovered by William Camden, the historian.  Camden was then second master in Westminster School.  He procured for young Ben an admission into his school, and there laid firm foundations for that scholarship which the poet extended afterwards by private study until his learning grew to be sworn-brother to his wit.

Ben Jonson came from a family in the north, specifically from the Annan area that also produced Thomas Carlyle. His father faced financial ruin due to religious persecution during Mary’s reign, became a preacher during Elizabeth’s reign, and passed away a month before the poet was born in 1573. This means Ben Jonson was about nine years younger than Shakespeare and outlived him by about twenty-one years, dying in August 1637. Next to Shakespeare, Ben Jonson was, in his own unique way, the most significant figure in the history of English drama. After being left in financial straits, his mother remarried. Her second husband worked as a bricklayer or a small builder, and they lived for a while near Charing Cross on Hartshorn Lane. Ben Jonson attended the parish school of St. Martin’s until he was noticed by William Camden, the historian. At that time, Camden was the second master at Westminster School. He helped young Ben gain entry into his school, where he laid strong foundations for the scholarship that the poet later expanded through private study, eventually matching his learning with his wit.

Ben Jonson began the world poor.  He worked for a very short time in his step-father’s business.  He volunteered to the wars in the Low Countries.  He came home again, and joined the players.  Before the end of Elizabeth’s reign he had written three or four plays, in which he showed a young and ardent zeal for setting the world to rights, together with that high sense of the poet’s calling which put lasting force into his work.  He poured contempt on those who frittered life away.  He urged on the poetasters and the mincing courtiers, who set their hearts on top-knots and affected movements of their lips and legs:—

Ben Jonson started off in life with nothing. He briefly worked in his stepfather's business. He signed up to fight in the wars in the Low Countries. After returning home, he joined the theater. By the end of Queen Elizabeth’s reign, he had written three or four plays, showcasing a youthful passion for correcting injustices alongside a strong sense of the poet's mission, which gave his work lasting power. He looked down on those who wasted their lives. He challenged the pretentious poets and the over-the-top courtiers, who cared more about hairstyles and pretentious gestures than anything meaningful:—

“That these vain joys in which their wills consume
Such powers of wit and soul as are of force
To raise their beings to eternity,
May be converted on works fitting men;
And for the practice of a forcéd look,
An antic gesture, or a fustian phrase,
Study the native frame of a true heart,
An inward comeliness of bounty, knowledge,
And spirit that may conform them actually
To God’s high figures, which they have in power.”

"That these empty pleasures where their desires drain
Such strength of mind and spirit that could elevate
Their existence to forever,
Might be redirected toward meaningful pursuits;
And instead of putting on a forced smile,
An exaggerated pose, or pretentious words,
They should explore the genuine nature of a true heart,
An inner beauty of generosity, wisdom,
And essence that could align them truly
With God’s grand ideals, which they have the ability to achieve."

Ben Jonson’s genius was producing its best work in the earlier years of the reign of James I.  His Volpone, the Silent Woman, and the Alchemist first appeared side by side with some of the ripest works of Shakespeare in the years from 1605 to 1610.  In the latter part of James’s reign he produced masques for the Court, and turned with distaste from the public stage.  When Charles I. became king, Ben Jonson was weakened in health by a paralytic stroke.  He returned to the stage for a short time through necessity, but found his best friends in the best of the young poets of the day.  These looked up to him as their father and their guide.  Their own best efforts seemed best to them when they had won Ben Jonson’s praise.  They valued above all passing honours man could give the words, “My son,” in the old poet’s greeting, which, as they said, “sealed them of the tribe of Ben.”

Ben Jonson was at his creative peak during the early years of James I's reign. His Volpone, The Silent Woman, and The Alchemist first came out alongside some of Shakespeare's greatest works between 1605 and 1610. Later in James's reign, he focused on creating masques for the Court and grew disillusioned with the public stage. When Charles I became king, Jonson's health had deteriorated due to a stroke. He briefly returned to the stage out of necessity but found his closest supporters among the best young poets of the time. They regarded him as their mentor and father figure, believing their best work was validated by his praise. They cherished the honor of being called “My son” by the old poet, feeling it marked them as part of Jonson's legacy.

H. M.

H.M.

SYLVA

Rerum et sententiarum quasi Ὕλη dicta a multiplici materia et varietate in iis contentáQuemadmodùm enim vulgò solemus infinitam arborum nascentium indiscriminatim multitudinem Sylvam dicere: ità etiam libros suos in quibus variæ et diversæ materiæ opuscula temere congesta erant, Sylvas appellabant antiqui: Timber-trees.

About things and opinions, it could be said that they are like the substance drawn from multiple materials and the variety contained within them. Just as we usually refer to the countless trees growing indistinguishably as a forest, the ancients also called their books, in which various and diverse works were carelessly assembled, forests. Timber-trees.

TIMBER;
OR,
DISCOVERIES MADE UPON MEN AND MATTER,
AS THEY HAVE EMERGED FROM HIS DAILY READINGS,
OR HAD THEIR REFLUX TO HIS UNUSUAL
NOTION OF THE PRESENT.

Tecum habita, ut nôris quam sit tibi curta supellex [11]

Live here, so you understand the limits of your furniture [11]

Pers. Sat. 4.

Pers. Sat. 4.

Fortuna.—Ill fortune never crushed that man whom good fortune deceived not.  I therefore have counselled my friends never to trust to her fairer side, though she seemed to make peace with them; but to place all things she gave them, so as she might ask them again without their trouble, she might take them from them, not pull them: to keep always a distance between her and themselves.  He knows not his own strength that hath not met adversity.  Heaven prepares good men with crosses; but no ill can happen to a good man.  Contraries are not mixed.  Yet that which happens to any man may to every man.  But it is in his reason, what he accounts it and will make it.

Fortuna.—Bad luck never defeated a man that good luck didn't deceive. I've advised my friends to never fully trust her seemingly kind side, even if she appears to be on friendly terms with them; instead, they should keep everything she gives them ready to be taken back without hassle. They should always maintain a distance between her and themselves. A person who has never faced hardship doesn't truly know their own strength. Life prepares good people with challenges, but nothing truly bad can happen to a good person. Opposites don't mix. However, what's experienced by one person can happen to anyone. Ultimately, it's up to each individual how they perceive and respond to it.

Casus.—Change into extremity is very frequent and easy.  As when a beggar suddenly grows rich, he commonly becomes a prodigal; for, to obscure his former obscurity, he puts on riot and excess.

Case.—Transformation into extremes is quite common and simple. For example, when a beggar suddenly becomes rich, he often turns into a spendthrift; in an effort to hide his previous poverty, he indulges in excess and extravagance.

Consilia.—No man is so foolish but may give another good counsel sometimes; and no man is so wise but may easily err, if he will take no others’ counsel but his own.  But very few men are wise by their own counsel, or learned by their own teaching.  For he that was only taught by himself [12] had a fool to his master.

Advice.—No one is so foolish that they can't give decent advice to someone else sometimes; and no one is so wise that they won't make mistakes if they only follow their own advice. But very few people are truly wise from their own counsel or knowledgeable from their own teaching. Because someone who is only taught by themselves [12] had a fool for a teacher.

Fama.—A Fame that is wounded to the world would be better cured by another’s apology than its own: for few can apply medicines well themselves.  Besides, the man that is once hated, both his good and his evil deeds oppress him.  He is not easily emergent.

Fama.—A reputation that’s damaged in the eyes of the world is better restored by someone else’s apology than by its own; because few people can effectively heal their own wounds. Besides, a man who is once hated finds both his good and bad actions weigh heavily on him. It’s hard for him to recover.

Negotia.—In great affairs it is a work of difficulty to please all.  And ofttimes we lose the occasions of carrying a business well and thoroughly by our too much haste.  For passions are spiritual rebels, and raise sedition against the understanding.

Negotiation.—In significant matters, it's challenging to satisfy everyone. And often, we miss the chance to handle a situation effectively and thoroughly because we rush too much. Passion can act like a rebellious spirit, stirring up conflict against reason.

Amor patriæ.—There is a necessity all men should love their country: he that professeth the contrary may be delighted with his words, but his heart is there.

Love of Country.—It's essential for everyone to love their country: anyone who claims otherwise might be pleased with their own words, but their heart isn't in it.

Ingenia.—Natures that are hardened to evil you shall sooner break than make straight; they are like poles that are crooked and dry, there is no attempting them.

Ingenia.—You’ll find it easier to break those who are hardened by evil than to straighten them out; they’re like crooked and dry poles, completely unbendable.

Applausus.—We praise the things we hear with much more willingness than those we see, because we envy the present and reverence the past; thinking ourselves instructed by the one, and overlaid by the other.

Applausus.—We are much more eager to praise what we hear than what we see, because we envy the present and admire the past; believing we learn from the former and are burdened by the latter.

Opinio.—Opinion is a light, vain, crude, and imperfect thing; settled in the imagination, but never arriving at the understanding, there to obtain the tincture of reason.  We labour with it more than truth.  There is much more holds us than presseth us.  An ill fact is one thing, an ill fortune is another; yet both oftentimes sway us alike, by the error of our thinking.

Opinion.—Opinion is a trivial, superficial, and flawed concept; it resides in our imagination but never reaches our understanding where it could gain the nuance of reason. We struggle with it more than with truth. There is much more that restrains us than that which truly weighs on us. A bad fact is one thing, but bad luck is another; yet both often influence us in the same way due to our thinking mistakes.

Impostura.—Many men believe not themselves what they would persuade others; and less do the things which they would impose on others; but least of all know what they themselves most confidently boast.  Only they set the sign of the cross over their outer doors, and sacrifice to their gut and their groin in their inner closets.

Imposture.—Many men don't even believe what they try to persuade others of; they do even less of the things they try to push onto others; but most of all, they don’t truly know what they confidently brag about. They only mark the sign of the cross on their front doors and indulge their desires in private.

Jactura vitæ.—What a deal of cold business doth a man misspend the better part of life in! in scattering compliments, tendering visits, gathering and venting news, following feasts and plays, making a little winter-love in a dark corner.

Jactura vitæ.—How much time does a person waste in the coldest ways throughout life! By giving compliments, making social calls, collecting and sharing gossip, attending parties and shows, and indulging in a bit of romance in the shadows.

Hypocrita.—Puritanus Hypocrita est Hæreticus, quem opinio propriæ perspicaciæ, quâ sibi videtur, cum paucis in Ecclesiâ dogmatibus errores quosdam animadvertisse, de statu mentis deturbavit: unde sacro furore percitus, phrenetice pugnat contra magistratus, sic ratus obedientiam præstare Deo. [14]

Hypocrite.—The Puritan hypocrite is a heretic, who, due to his own perception, believes he has noticed some errors in the Church's few doctrines, has thrown himself off balance mentally: as a result, driven by a sacred madness, he fights frantically against the authorities, thinking he is offering obedience to God. [14]

Mutua auxilia.—Learning needs rest: sovereignty gives it.  Sovereignty needs counsel: learning affords it.  There is such a consociation of offices between the prince and whom his favour breeds, that they may help to sustain his power as he their knowledge.  It is the greatest part of his liberality, his favour; and from whom doth he hear discipline more willingly, or the arts discoursed more gladly, than from those whom his own bounty and benefits have made able and faithful?

Mutua auxilia.—Learning needs rest: authority provides it. Authority needs advice: learning offers it. There is such a partnership between the prince and those he favors that they can support his power as he supports their knowledge. It is a significant aspect of his generosity and favor; from whom does he receive guidance more willingly, or discuss the arts more enthusiastically, than from those whom his own kindness and benefits have empowered and trusted?

Cognit. univers.—In being able to counsel others, a man must be furnished with a universal store in himself, to the knowledge of all nature—that is, the matter and seed-plot: there are the seats of all argument and invention.  But especially you must be cunning in the nature of man: there is the variety of things which are as the elements and letters, which his art and wisdom must rank and order to the present occasion.  For we see not all letters in single words, nor all places in particular discourses.  That cause seldom happens wherein a man will use all arguments.

Cognit. univers.—To be able to advise others, a person must have a broad knowledge base within themselves, encompassing all of nature—that is, the fundamental principles and foundational ideas: these are the sources of all reasoning and creativity. But most importantly, you need to understand human nature: this holds a variety of elements and ideas, which your skills and wisdom must organize and apply to the situation at hand. After all, we don’t always see every letter in individual words, nor do we consider every aspect in specific discussions. It’s rare that a person will use every argument available in a given situation.

Consiliarii adjunctProbitas, Sapientia.—The two chief things that give a man reputation in counsel are the opinion of his honesty and the opinion of his wisdom: the authority of those two will persuade when the same counsels uttered by other persons less qualified are of no efficacy or working.

Advisor. Integrity, Wisdom.—The two main qualities that earn a person respect in advice are their reputation for honesty and their reputation for wisdom: the influence of these two will sway decisions when the same advice given by others who are less qualified has little impact.

Vita recta.—Wisdom without honesty is mere craft and cozenage.  And therefore the reputation of honesty must first be gotten, which cannot be but by living well.  A good life is a main argument.

Vita recta.—Wisdom without honesty is just manipulation and deceit. That’s why you need to establish a reputation for honesty first, which can only come from living a good life. A good life is a key point.

Obsequentia.—Humanitas.—Solicitudo.—Next a good life, to beget love in the persons we counsel, by dissembling our knowledge of ability in ourselves, and avoiding all suspicion of arrogance, ascribing all to their instruction, as an ambassador to his master, or a subject to his sovereign; seasoning all with humanity and sweetness, only expressing care and solicitude.  And not to counsel rashly, or on the sudden, but with advice and meditation.  (Dat nox consilium. [17a])  For many foolish things fall from wise men, if they speak in haste or be extemporal.  It therefore behoves the giver of counsel to be circumspect; especially to beware of those with whom he is not thoroughly acquainted, lest any spice of rashness, folly, or self-love appear, which will be marked by new persons and men of experience in affairs.

Obsequentia.—Humanitas.—Solicitudo.—Next, aim for a good life by inspiring love in the people we advise. This means downplaying our own abilities and avoiding any hint of arrogance, giving credit for their success entirely to their guidance, like an ambassador serving his master or a subject serving his ruler. We should approach everything with kindness and compassion, only showing care and concern. And we shouldn’t give advice on a whim or suddenly, but rather thoughtfully and after careful consideration. (Dat nox consilium. [17a]) Because many foolish things can come from wise people if they rush or speak off the cuff. Therefore, the advisor should be cautious, especially with those they don’t know well, to avoid showing any hint of rashness, foolishness, or self-interest, which would be obvious to newcomers and experienced individuals.

Modestia.—Parrhesia.—And to the prince, or his superior, to behave himself modestly and with respect.  Yet free from flattery or empire.  Not with insolence or precept; but as the prince were already furnished with the parts he should have, especially in affairs of state.  For in other things they will more easily suffer themselves to be taught or reprehended: they will not willingly contend, but hear, with Alexander, the answer the musician gave him: Absit, o rex, ut tu meliùs hæc scias, quàm ego. [17b]

Modesty.—Boldness.—And to the prince, or his superior, to act with modesty and respect. Yet without flattery or dominance. Not with arrogance or orders; but as if the prince already possessed the qualities he should have, especially in matters of state. In other areas, they will more easily allow themselves to be taught or corrected: they will not willingly argue, but will listen, like Alexander did when he heard the musician's reply: May it not be, O king, that you know this better than I do. [17b]

Perspicuitas.—Elegantia.—A man should so deliver himself to the nature of the subject whereof he speaks, that his hearer may take knowledge of his discipline with some delight; and so apparel fair and good matter, that the studious of elegancy be not defrauded; redeem arts from their rough and braky seats, where they lay hid and overgrown with thorns, to a pure, open, and flowery light, where they may take the eye and be taken by the hand.

Clarity.—Elegance.—A person should express themselves according to the nature of the topic they are discussing, so that their audience can appreciate their expertise with some enjoyment; and present good and beautiful content in a way that those who appreciate elegance are not disappointed; bringing the arts out from their rough and neglected places, where they were hidden and overrun with thorns, into a clear, open, and inviting light, where they can catch the eye and draw people in.

Natura non effæta.—I cannot think Nature is so spent and decayed that she can bring forth nothing worth her former years.  She is always the same, like herself; and when she collects her strength is abler still.  Men are decayed, and studies: she is not.

Natura non effæta.—I can't believe that Nature is so worn out and diminished that she can't produce anything worthwhile compared to her past. She's always the same, true to herself; and when she gathers her strength, she's even more capable. People and their knowledge may fade, but Nature doesn’t.

Non nimiùm credendum antiquitati.—I know nothing can conduce more to letters than to examine the writings of the ancients, and not to rest in their sole authority, or take all upon trust from them, provided the plagues of judging and pronouncing against them be away; such as are envy, bitterness, precipitation, impudence, and scurrilous scoffing.  For to all the observations of the ancients we have our own experience, which if we will use and apply, we have better means to pronounce.  It is true they opened the gates, and made the way that went before us, but as guides, not commanders: Non domini nostri, sed duces fuêre. [19a]   Truth lies open to all; it is no man’s several.  Patet omnibus veritas; nondum est occupataMultum ex illâ, etiam futuris relicta est. [19b]

Don't trust the ancients too much.—I know that nothing contributes more to knowledge than examining the writings of the ancients and not solely relying on their authority or taking everything they say at face value, as long as the vices of judgment and condemnation—like envy, bitterness, haste, arrogance, and rude mocking—are kept at bay. For alongside all the insights of the ancients, we have our own experiences, which if we choose to use and apply, give us better tools to make judgments. It's true they opened the doors and paved the way for us, but they should be seen as guides, not masters: Not our masters, but our leaders. [19a] Truth is accessible to everyone; it doesn't belong to any one person. Truth is open to all; it is not yet claimed. Much of it, even still left for the future. [19b]

Dissentire licet, sed cum ratione.—If in some things I dissent from others, whose wit, industry, diligence, and judgment, I look up at and admire, let me not therefore hear presently of ingratitude and rashness.  For I thank those that have taught me, and will ever; but yet dare not think the scope of their labour and inquiry was to envy their posterity what they also could add and find out.

Dissentire licet, sed cum ratione.—If I disagree with some people, whose intelligence, hard work, dedication, and judgment I respect and admire, I hope I won't be accused of being ungrateful or reckless. I am grateful to those who have taught me, and I always will be; however, I don't believe that their efforts and research were meant to hold back future generations from discovering and contributing their own insights.

Non mihi credendum sed veritati.—If I err, pardon me: Nulla ars simul et inventa est et absoluta. [19c]  I do not desire to be equal to those that went before; but to have my reason examined with theirs, and so much faith to be given them, or me, as those shall evict.  I am neither author nor fautor of any sect.  I will have no man addict himself to me; but if I have anything right, defend it as Truth’s, not mine, save as it conduceth to a common good.  It profits not me to have any man fence or fight for me, to flourish, or take my side.  Stand for truth, and ’tis enough.

Don’t believe me, believe the truth.—If I’m wrong, please forgive me: No art is both invented and perfected at the same time. [19c] I don't want to be on the same level as those who came before me; I want my reasoning to be compared with theirs, and for trust to be placed in either of us based on what can be proven. I’m not the creator or supporter of any particular group. I don’t want anyone to be devoted to me; instead, if I have something valid, defend it as the Truth’s, not mine, unless it serves the common good. It doesn't benefit me to have anyone defend or support me, to brag about, or take my side. Stand for the truth, and that’s enough.

Scientiæ liberales.—Arts that respect the mind were ever reputed nobler than those that serve the body, though we less can be without them, as tillage, spinning, weaving, building, &c., without which we could scarce sustain life a day.  But these were the works of every hand; the other of the brain only, and those the most generous and exalted wits and spirits, that cannot rest or acquiesce.  The mind of man is still fed with labour: Opere pascitur.

Scientiæ liberales.—Arts that value the mind have always been seen as more noble than those that focus on physical tasks, even though we really can't do without them, like farming, spinning, weaving, building, etc., which are essential to survive even a single day. But those tasks are done by everyone's hands; the other arts require only the brain and are the works of the most generous and elevated minds and spirits, who cannot rest or settle down. The mind of man is constantly nourished by work: Opere pascitur.

Non vulgi sunt.—There is a more secret cause, and the power of liberal studies lies more hid than that it can be wrought out by profane wits.  It is not every man’s way to hit.  There are men, I confess, that set the carat and value upon things as they love them; but science is not every man’s mistress.  It is as great a spite to be praised in the wrong place, and by a wrong person, as can be done to a noble nature.

Non vulgi sunt.—There’s a deeper reason, and the true power of a liberal education is more mysterious than what can be understood by ordinary minds. Not everyone can grasp it. I admit there are people who assign value to things based on their personal preferences, but knowledge isn’t something everyone can master. It’s just as insulting to be praised in the wrong setting and by the wrong person as it is to be wronged when possessing a noble spirit.

Honesta ambitio.—If divers men seek fame or honour by divers ways, so both be honest, neither is to be blamed; but they that seek immortality are not only worthy of love, but of praise.

Honest ambition.—If different people pursue fame or honor through various means, and both are honorable, neither should be criticized; but those who seek immortality are not only deserving of love but also of praise.

Maritus improbus.—He hath a delicate wife, a fair fortune, a family to go to and be welcome; yet he had rather be drunk with mine host and the fiddlers of such a town, than go home.

Bad husband.—He has a lovely wife, a good fortune, and a welcoming family to return to; yet he would rather get drunk with the innkeeper and the musicians in some town than go home.

Afflictio pia magistra.—Affliction teacheth a wicked person some time to pray: prosperity never.

Affliction is a good teacher.—Hard times sometimes make a wicked person pray; good times never do.

Deploratis facilis descensus Averni.—The devil take all.—Many might go to heaven with half the labour they go to hell, if they would venture their industry the right way; but “The devil take all!” quoth he that was choked in the mill-dam, with his four last words in his mouth.

Deploratis facilis descensus Averni.—To hell with everything.—Many could reach heaven with half the effort they put into going to hell if they would just apply their hard work in the right direction; but “To hell with everything!” said the guy who drowned in the millpond, with his last four words stuck in his throat.

Ægidius cursu superat.—A cripple in the way out-travels a footman or a post out of the way.

Ægidius cursu superat.—A person with a disability on the path can outpace a pedestrian or a wayward messenger.

Prodigo nummi nauci.—Bags of money to a prodigal person are the same that cherry-stones are with some boys, and so thrown away.

Prodigo nummi nauci.—Bags of money mean nothing to a wasteful person, just like cherry pits do to some kids, and they're just as easily tossed aside.

Munda et sordida.—A woman, the more curious she is about her face is commonly the more careless about her house.

Munda et sordida.—The more a woman is concerned about her appearance, the more likely she is to neglect her home.

Debitum deploratum.—Of this spilt water there is a little to be gathered up: it is a desperate debt.

Debitum deploratum.—There’s not much to salvage from this spilled water: it’s a hopeless debt.

Latro sesquipedalis.—The thief [22] that had a longing at the gallows to commit one robbery more before he was hanged.

Latro sesquipedalis.—The thief [22] who wanted to pull off one last robbery before he was hanged.

And like the German lord, when he went out of Newgate into the cart, took order to have his arms set up in his last herborough: said was he taken and committed upon suspicion of treason, no witness appearing against him; but the judges entertained him most civilly, discoursed with him, offered him the courtesy of the rack; but he confessed, &c.

And just like the German lord, when he was taken from Newgate and put into the cart, arranged to have his coat of arms displayed at his last moment: he was said to have been arrested and charged with treason, with no witnesses against him; however, the judges treated him very politely, talked with him, and even offered him the option of the rack; but he confessed, etc.

Calumniæ fructus.—I am beholden to calumny, that she hath so endeavoured and taken pains to belie me.  It shall make me set a surer guard on myself, and keep a better watch upon my actions.

Calumniæ fructus.—I am grateful to calumny for trying so hard to slander me. It will make me be more careful about myself and pay closer attention to my actions.

Impertinens.—A tedious person is one a man would leap a steeple from, gallop down any steep lull to avoid him; forsake his meat, sleep, nature itself, with all her benefits, to shun him.  A mere impertinent; one that touched neither heaven nor earth in his discourse.  He opened an entry into a fair room, but shut it again presently.  I spoke to him of garlic, he answered asparagus; consulted him of marriage, he tells me of hanging, as if they went by one and the same destiny.

Impertinens.—A tedious person is someone you'd jump off a steeple to avoid, or run down a steep hill to get away from; you'd give up food, sleep, and everything else just to steer clear of him. He's just a total nuisance; someone who doesn't touch on anything meaningful in his conversations. He opened the door to a nice room but shut it again right away. I brought up garlic, and he responded with asparagus; I asked about marriage, and he talked about hanging, as if they were both tied to the same fate.

Bellum scribentium.—What a sight it is to see writers committed together by the ears for ceremonies, syllables, points, colons, commas, hyphens, and the like, fighting as for their fires and their altars; and angry that none are frighted at their noises and loud brayings under their asses’ skins.

Bellum scribentium.—What a spectacle it is to see writers hooked together by their ears over ceremonies, syllables, punctuation, colons, commas, hyphens, and so on, battling as if for their lives and their sanctuaries; and upset that no one is scared by their ruckus and loud braying under their skins.

There is hope of getting a fortune without digging in these quarries.  Sed meliore (in omne) ingenio animoque quàm fortunâ, sum usus. [23]

There is a chance of finding wealth without having to dig in these quarries. But with a better mind and spirit than luck, I'm skilled. [23]

“Pingue solum lassat; sed juvat ipse labor.” [24a]

“Lazy soil drains you; but hard work itself is enjoyable.” [24a]

Differentia inter doctos et sciolos.—Wits made out their several expeditions then for the discovery of truth, to find out great and profitable knowledges; had their several instruments for the disquisition of arts.  Now there are certain scioli or smatterers that are busy in the skirts and outsides of learning, and have scarce anything of solid literature to commend them.  They may have some edging or trimming of a scholar, a welt or so; but it is no more.

Difference between the learned and the superficial.—Smart individuals embarked on various quests to discover truth and acquire valuable knowledge; they had different tools for the exploration of the arts. Now there are certain superficial learners who focus on the fringes and surface of education, possessing hardly any substantial literature to their credit. They might have a bit of academic flair or a touch of sophistication, but that's about it.

Impostorum fucus.—Imposture is a specious thing, yet never worse than when it feigns to be best, and to none discovered sooner than the simplest.  For truth and goodness are plain and open; but imposture is ever ashamed of the light.

Impostorum fucus.—Imposture is a deceptive thing, but it’s never worse than when it pretends to be the best, and it’s revealed faster to the simplest among us. Truth and goodness are straightforward and clear; however, imposture is always ashamed of being exposed.

Icunculorum motio.—A puppet-play must be shadowed and seen in the dark; for draw the curtain, et sordet gesticulatio. [24b]

Icunculorum motio.—A puppet show has to be performed in the dark; because once you pull back the curtain, et sordet gesticulatio. [24b]

Principes et administri.—There is a great difference in the understanding of some princes, as in the quality of their ministers about them.  Some would dress their masters in gold, pearl, and all true jewels of majesty; others furnish them with feathers, bells, and ribands, and are therefore esteemed the fitter servants.  But they are ever good men that must make good the times; if the men be naught, the times will be such.  Finis exspectandus est in unoquoque hominum; animali ad mutationem promptissmo. [25a]

Principes et administri.—There's a big difference in how some leaders understand things, just like there's a difference in the quality of their advisors. Some will embellish their rulers with gold, pearls, and all the true symbols of royalty; others will adorn them with feathers, bells, and ribbons, and as a result, they're considered more suitable servants. But it’s always good people who can navigate tough times; if the individuals are bad, the times will reflect that. The end must be awaited in every person; the animal is most ready for change. [25a]

Scitum Hispanicum.—It is a quick saying with the Spaniards, Artes inter hæredes non dividi. [25b]  Yet these have inherited their fathers’ lying, and they brag of it.  He is a narrow-minded man that affects a triumph in any glorious study; but to triumph in a lie, and a lie themselves have forged, is frontless.  Folly often goes beyond her bounds; but Impudence knows none.

Scitum Hispanicum.—It's a common saying among Spaniards, Artes inter hæredes non dividi. [25b] Still, they have inherited their fathers’ deceit, and they take pride in it. A narrow-minded person revels in any honorable pursuit; but to take pride in a lie, especially one they have created themselves, is shameless. Folly often goes too far; but Impudence has no limits.

Non nova res livor.—Envy is no new thing, nor was it born only in our times.  The ages past have brought it forth, and the coming ages will.  So long as there are men fit for it, quorum odium virtute relictâ placet, it will never be wanting.  It is a barbarous envy, to take from those men’s virtues which, because thou canst not arrive at, thou impotently despairest to imitate.  Is it a crime in me that I know that which others had not yet known but from me? or that I am the author of many things which never would have come in thy thought but that I taught them?  It is new but a foolish way you have found out, that whom you cannot equal or come near in doing, you would destroy or ruin with evil speaking; as if you had bound both your wits and natures ’prentices to slander, and then came forth the best artificers when you could form the foulest calumnies.

Non nova res livor.—Envy is nothing new, nor did it just appear in our time. It has existed in the past, and it will continue to exist in the future. As long as there are people capable of feeling it, quorum odium virtute relictâ placet, it will always be present. It’s a cruel kind of envy to try to take away the virtues of those whom you cannot match, and out of your inability, you foolishly despair of imitating. Is it my fault that I know things that others only learned from me? Or that I am the source of many ideas that you would never have thought of if I hadn’t taught them? You’ve found a silly way to deal with this; instead of trying to achieve what you cannot, you seek to destroy or ruin those who excel by speaking ill of them, as if you’ve trained both your intellect and character to slander, and only then emerged as the best at creating the worst lies.

Nil gratius protervo lib.—Indeed nothing is of more credit or request now than a petulant paper, or scoffing verses; and it is but convenient to the times and manners we live with, to have then the worst writings and studies flourish when the best begin to be despised.  Ill arts begin where good end.

Nil gratius protervo lib.—Honestly, nothing is more popular or in demand right now than a sarcastic article or mocking poems; it fits the times and attitudes we experience to see the worst writings and pursuits thrive just as the best are starting to be ignored. Bad arts take off where good ones stop.

Jam literæ sordent.—Pastus hodiern. ingen.—The time was when men would learn and study good things, not envy those that had them.  Then men were had in price for learning; now letters only make men vile.  He is upbraidingly called a poet, as if it were a contemptible nick-name: but the professors, indeed, have made the learning cheap—railing and tinkling rhymers, whose writings the vulgar more greedily read, as being taken with the scurrility and petulancy of such wits.  He shall not have a reader now unless he jeer and lie.  It is the food of men’s natures; the diet of the times; gallants cannot sleep else.  The writer must lie and the gentle reader rests happy to hear the worthiest works misinterpreted, the clearest actions obscured, the innocentest life traduced: and in such a licence of lying, a field so fruitful of slanders, how can there be matter wanting to his laughter?  Hence comes the epidemical infection; for how can they escape the contagion of the writings, whom the virulency of the calumnies hath not staved off from reading?

Words are cheap.—Today's Feast.—There was a time when people would learn and appreciate good things, not envy those who possessed them. Back then, knowledge was valued; now, education only makes people look bad. Being called a poet has become an insult, as if it were a derogatory nickname: but the educators have devalued learning—complaining and flashy rhymers, whose work the masses eagerly consume because they are attracted to the vulgarity and arrogance of such minds. Nowadays, a writer won't get readers unless he mocks and deceives. This is what people crave; it's the trend of the times; fashionable people can’t sleep otherwise. A writer has to lie, and the polite reader is satisfied listening to the most admirable works being twisted, clear actions being obscured, and the most innocent lives being slandered: and in this freedom to deceive, a landscape so rich in falsehoods, how can there be a shortage of material for laughter? Thus, the widespread infection arises; for how can those who haven’t been dissuaded by the viciousness of slanders avoid being tainted by such writing?

Sed seculi morbus.—Nothing doth more invite a greedy reader than an unlooked-for subject.  And what more unlooked-for than to see a person of an unblamed life made ridiculous or odious by the artifice of lying?  But it is the disease of the age; and no wonder if the world, growing old, begin to be infirm: old age itself is a disease.  It is long since the sick world began to dote and talk idly: would she had but doted still! but her dotage is now broke forth into a madness, and become a mere frenzy.

Sed seculi morbus.—Nothing draws in a greedy reader like an unexpected topic. And what could be more unexpected than seeing a person with a good reputation made ridiculous or hated by deceit? But this is the sickness of our time; it’s no surprise that as the world ages, it starts to weaken: old age itself is a kind of sickness. It's been a long time since this troubled world started to lose its grip and speak nonsense: I wish it had just stayed delusional! But now its delusion has turned into madness and become a total frenzy.

Alastoris malitia.—This Alastor, who hath left nothing unsearched or unassailed by his impudent and licentious lying in his aguish writings (for he was in his cold quaking fit all the while), what hath he done more than a troublesome base cur? barked and made a noise afar off; had a fool or two to spit in his mouth, and cherish him with a musty bone?  But they are rather enemies of my fame than me, these barkers.

Alastoris malitia.—This Alastor, who has left nothing unexamined or untouched by his shameless and outrageous lies in his feverish writings (since he was shivering the whole time), what has he done more than a bothersome, lowly dog? He barked and made a commotion from a distance; had a few fools to spit in his mouth and feed him a stale bone? But these barkers are more enemies of my reputation than of me.

Mali Choragi fuere.—It is an art to have so much judgment as to apparel a lie well, to give it a good dressing; that though the nakedness would show deformed and odious, the suiting of it might draw their readers.  Some love any strumpet, be she never so shop-like or meretricious, in good clothes.  But these, nature could not have formed them better to destroy their own testimony and overthrow their calumny.

Mali Choragi fuere.—It’s a skill to know how to dress up a lie nicely, to give it an appealing exterior; so that even if the truth looks ugly and repulsive, the attractive presentation might captivate the audience. Some people will embrace any deceitful charm, no matter how cheap or flashy it is, as long as it’s in nice clothes. But in doing so, they couldn't be more perfectly designed to undermine their own credibility and dismantle their deceit.

Hear-say news.—That an elephant, in 1630, came hither ambassador from the Great Mogul, who could both write and read, and was every day allowed twelve cast of bread, twenty quarts of Canary sack, besides nuts and almonds the citizens’ wives sent him.  That he had a Spanish boy to his interpreter, and his chief negociation was to confer or practise with Archy, the principal fool of state, about stealing hence Windsor Castle and carrying it away on his back if he can.

Rumor has it.—That an elephant, in 1630, arrived here as an ambassador from the Great Mogul, who could both read and write, and received daily twelve loaves of bread, twenty quarts of Canary wine, along with nuts and almonds provided by the citizens' wives. That he had a Spanish boy as his interpreter, and his main mission was to discuss or plan with Archy, the chief court jester, about stealing Windsor Castle and carrying it away on his back if possible.

Lingua sapientis, potius quâm loquentis.—A wise tongue should not be licentious and wandering; but moved and, as it were, governed with certain reins from the heart and bottom of the breast: and it was excellently said of that philosopher, that there was a wall or parapet of teeth set in our mouth, to restrain the petulancy of our words; that the rashness of talking should not only be retarded by the guard and watch of our heart, but be fenced in and defended by certain strengths placed in the mouth itself, and within the lips.  But you shall see some so abound with words, without any seasoning or taste of matter, in so profound a security, as while they are speaking, for the most part they confess to speak they know not what.

The language of the wise, rather than that of the talkative.—A wise tongue shouldn't be reckless and aimless; it should be guided, as if held back by reins, from the heart and deep within the chest. It was wisely stated by that philosopher that we have a wall or barrier of teeth in our mouths to keep our words in check; that our speech’s impulsiveness should not only be slowed down by the protection of our heart but also defended by certain forces found in the mouth itself and around the lips. Yet, you will see some people overflowing with words, lacking any flavor or substance, who, while speaking, frequently admit they don't really know what they are saying.

Of the two (if either were to be wished) I would rather have a plain downright wisdom, than a foolish and affected eloquence.  For what is so furious and Bedlam like as a vain sound of chosen and excellent words, without any subject of sentence or science mixed?

Of the two (if I had to choose) I'd prefer straightforward wisdom over pretentious, showy eloquence. Because what feels more chaotic and insane than a bunch of fancy and impressive words strung together, with no real meaning or knowledge behind them?

Optanda.—Thersites Homeri.—Whom the disease of talking still once possesseth, he can never hold his peace.  Nay, rather than he will not discourse he will hire men to hear him.  And so heard, not hearkened unto, he comes off most times like a mountebank, that when he hath praised his medicines, finds none will take them, or trust him.  He is like Homer’s Thersites.

Optanda.—Thersites Homeri.—Those who can’t stop talking will never be quiet. Instead of keeping to themselves, they’ll even pay people to listen to them. And when they’re listened to, not truly heard, they often come across like a quack who, after boasting about his cures, realizes that nobody wants to try them or believe him. He’s just like Homer’s Thersites.

Άμετροεπης, ακριτόμυθος; speaking without judgement or measure.

Άμετροεπης, ακριτόμυθος; speaking without judgment or restraint.

“Loquax magis, quàm facundus,
Satis loquentiæ, sapientiæ parum.[31a]
Γλωσσης τοι θησαυρος εν ανθρωποισιν αριστος
φειδωλης, πλειστη δε χαρις κατα μετρον ιουσης. [31b]
Optimus est homini linguæ thesaurus, et ingens
Gratia, quæ parcis mensurat singula verbis.”

“Talkative rather than eloquent,
Enough speaking, but lacking in wisdom.[31a]
The treasure of language
is the greatest among humans.
It is frugal,
but richness increases
as it uses measured words. [31b]
The greatest treasure for a person is language, and immense
Grace, which measures everything carefully with words.”

Homeri Ulysses.—Demacatus Plutarchi.—Ulysses, in Homer, is made a long-thinking man before he speaks; and Epaminondas is celebrated by Pindar to be a man that, though he knew much, yet he spoke but little.  Demacatus, when on the bench he was long silent and said nothing, one asking him if it were folly in him, or want of language, he answered, “A fool could never hold his peace.” [31c]  For too much talking is ever the index of a fool.

Homer's Ulysses.—Demacatus Plutarch.—In Homer, Ulysses is portrayed as a thoughtful man who takes his time before speaking; and Pindar praises Epaminondas as someone who, despite his vast knowledge, spoke very little. Demacatus, when he was silent for a long time on the bench and said nothing, was asked whether it was due to foolishness or a lack of words. He replied, “A fool could never keep quiet.” [31c] Because excessive talking is always a sign of foolishness.

“Dum tacet indoctus, poterit cordatus haberi;
Is morbos animi namque tacendo tegit.” [32a]

“While the unlearned remains silent, he can be considered wise;
For he conceals the troubles of the mind by being silent.” [32a]

Nor is that worthy speech of Zeno the philosopher to be passed over with the note of ignorance; who being invited to a feast in Athens, where a great prince’s ambassadors were entertained, and was the only person that said nothing at the table; one of them with courtesy asked him, “What shall we return from thee, Zeno, to the prince our master, if he asks us of thee?”  “Nothing,” he replied, “more but that you found an old man in Athens that knew to be silent amongst his cups.”  It was near a miracle to see an old man silent, since talking is the disease of age; but amongst cups makes it fully a wonder.

Nor should we disregard the wise words of Zeno the philosopher; when he was invited to a feast in Athens, where ambassadors from a great prince were being entertained, he was the only one who didn’t say anything at the table. One of the ambassadors politely asked him, “What should we report back to our master the prince if he asks about you?” Zeno replied, “Just that you found an old man in Athens who knew how to be silent while drinking.” It was almost miraculous to see an old man being quiet, since talking is usually a common trait of old age; but being silent while drinking makes it truly remarkable.

Argute dictum.—It was wittily said upon one that was taken for a great and grave man so long as he held his peace, “This man might have been a counsellor of state, till he spoke; but having spoken, not the beadle of the ward.”  Εχεμυθια. [32b]  Pytag. quàm laudabilis!  γλωσσης προ των αλλων κρατει, θεοις επομενος.  Linguam cohibe, præ aliis omnibus, ad deorum exemplum. [33a]  Digito compesce labellum. [33b]

Witty saying.—It was cleverly said about someone who was considered a serious and respectable man as long as he kept quiet, “This man could have been a state advisor until he spoke; but once he did, he wasn't even the local constable.” Εχεμυθια. [32b] Pytag. how commendable! γλωσσης προ των αλλων κρατει, θεοις επομενος. Control your tongue, above all else, by the example of the gods. [33a] Use your finger to keep your lips in check. [33b]

Acutius cernuntur vitia quam virtutes.—There is almost no man but he sees clearlier and sharper the vices in a speaker, than the virtues.  And there are many, that with more ease will find fault with what is spoken foolishly than can give allowance to that wherein you are wise silently.  The treasure of a fool is always in his tongue, said the witty comic poet; [33c] and it appears not in anything more than in that nation, whereof one, when he had got the inheritance of an unlucky old grange, would needs sell it; [33d] and to draw buyers proclaimed the virtues of it.  Nothing ever thrived on it, saith he.  No owner of it ever died in his bed; some hung, some drowned themselves; some were banished, some starved; the trees were all blasted; the swine died of the measles, the cattle of the murrain, the sheep of the rot; they that stood were ragged, bare, and bald as your hand; nothing was ever reared there, not a duckling, or a goose.  Hospitium fuerat calamitatis. [34a]  Was not this man like to sell it?

Acutius cernuntur vitia quam virtutes.—Almost everyone notices the faults in a speaker more clearly and sharply than the strengths. Many find it easier to criticize foolish speech than to appreciate the wise words you say quietly. The witty comic poet said that a fool’s treasure is always in his words; [33c] and this is even more evident in a certain nation, where one person, after inheriting a cursed old farm, decided to sell it; [33d] and to attract buyers, he boasted about its supposed benefits. “Nothing ever prospered here,” he claimed. “No owner ever died peacefully in bed; some were hanged, some drowned themselves; some were exiled, some starved; the trees were all scorched; the pigs died of measles, the cattle of a plague, the sheep rotted; those that survived were ragged, bare, and as bald as your hand; nothing ever thrived here, not even a duckling or a goose.” Hospitium fuerat calamitatis. [34a] Was this man really trying to sell it?

Vulgi expectatio.—Expectation of the vulgar is more drawn and held with newness than goodness; we see it in fencers, in players, in poets, in preachers, in all where fame promiseth anything; so it be new, though never so naught and depraved, they run to it, and are taken.  Which shews, that the only decay or hurt of the best men’s reputation with the people is, their wits have out-lived the people’s palates.  They have been too much or too long a feast.

Vulgi expectatio.—The expectations of the common people are more captivated by novelty than by quality; we see this in fencers, performers, poets, and preachers, in anyone where fame promises something new. Even if it's terrible and lacking in value, they flock to it and are easily deceived. This shows that the only reason the best individuals lose their reputation with the public is that their ideas have outlasted the people's tastes. They've become too much of a good thing, or they've overstayed their welcome.

Claritas patriæ.—Greatness of name in the father oft-times helps not forth, but overwhelms the son; they stand too near one another.  The shadow kills the growth: so much, that we see the grandchild come more and oftener to be heir of the first, than doth the second: he dies between; the possession is the third’s.

Claritas patriæ.—The father's big reputation often doesn’t support the son but instead burdens him; they are too close together. The shadow stunts growth: so much so that we often see the grandchild inherit before the second child does. The second child is left in the middle; the inheritance goes to the third.

Eloquentia.—Eloquence is a great and diverse thing: nor did she yet ever favour any man so much as to become wholly his.  He is happy that can arrive to any degree of her grace.  Yet there are who prove themselves masters of her, and absolute lords; but I believe they may mistake their evidence: for it is one thing to be eloquent in the schools, or in the hall; another at the bar, or in the pulpit.  There is a difference between mooting and pleading; between fencing and fighting.  To make arguments in my study, and confute them, is easy; where I answer myself, not an adversary.  So I can see whole volumes dispatched by the umbratical doctors on all sides: but draw these forth into the just lists: let them appear sub dio, and they are changed with the place, like bodies bred in the shade; they cannot suffer the sun or a shower, nor bear the open air; they scarce can find themselves, that they were wont to domineer so among their auditors: but indeed I would no more choose a rhetorician for reigning in a school, than I would a pilot for rowing in a pond.

Eloquentia.—Eloquence is a vast and varied thing, and it has never truly belonged to any one person entirely. Those who can attain even a bit of her grace are fortunate. However, some may consider themselves masters and absolute rulers of her, but I think they might be mistaken. Being eloquent in academic settings or forums is different from being effective at the bar or in the pulpit. There’s a distinction between debating and arguing; between practicing and engaging in real combat. It’s easy to formulate arguments in my study and refute them since I am arguing with myself, not an opponent. I can observe entire volumes being discussed by the shadowy scholars all around, but bring them into the real arena: let them face the light, and they change just like beings raised in darkness; they can’t withstand the sun or rain, nor can they thrive in the open air; they can barely recognize themselves after once having dominated among their audience. Honestly, I wouldn't choose a rhetorician to rule in a classroom any more than I would select a pilot to row in a pond.

Amor et odium.—Love that is ignorant, and hatred, have almost the same ends: many foolish lovers wish the same to their friends, which their enemies would: as to wish a friend banished, that they might accompany him in exile; or some great want, that they might relieve him; or a disease, that they might sit by him.  They make a causeway to their country by injury, as if it were not honester to do nothing than to seek a way to do good by a mischief.

Amor et odium.—Love that is naive and hatred have nearly the same outcomes: many foolish lovers want the same things for their friends as their enemies do. For example, they might wish a friend to be banished so they can join him in exile, or desire a great need so they can offer help, or even wish for an illness just to be by his side. They create a path to their goals through harm, as if it were more honorable to act than to simply avoid doing wrong instead of trying to do good through a negative action.

Injuria.—Injuries do not extinguish courtesies: they only suffer them not to appear fair.  For a man that doth me an injury after a courtesy, takes not away that courtesy, but defaces it: as he that writes other verses upon my verses, takes not away the first letters, but hides them.

Injuria.—Injuries don’t erase kindness; they just make it less noticeable. When someone wrongs me after I’ve shown them kindness, they don’t remove that kindness, they just tarnish it. It's like how someone who writes their own verses over mine doesn’t erase the original letters, but simply covers them up.

Beneficia.—Nothing is a courtesy unless it be meant us; and that friendly and lovingly.  We owe no thanks to rivers, that they carry our boats; or winds, that they be favouring and fill our sails; or meats, that they be nourishing.  For these are what they are necessarily.  Horses carry us, trees shade us, but they know it not.  It is true, some men may receive a courtesy and not know it; but never any man received it from him that knew it not.  Many men have been cured of diseases by accidents; but they were not remedies.  I myself have known one helped of an ague by falling into a water; another whipped out of a fever; but no man would ever use these for medicines.  It is the mind, and not the event, that distinguisheth the courtesy from wrong.  My adversary may offend the judge with his pride and impertinences, and I win my cause; but he meant it not to me as a courtesy.  I scaped pirates by being shipwrecked; was the wreck a benefit therefore?  No; the doing of courtesies aright is the mixing of the respects for his own sake and for mine.  He that doeth them merely for his own sake is like one that feeds his cattle to sell them; he hath his horse well dressed for Smithfield.

Beneficia.—Nothing is a courtesy unless it’s intended for us, and that should be friendly and caring. We don’t owe any thanks to rivers for carrying our boats, or to winds for being favorable and filling our sails, or to food for nourishing us. These things do what they do by necessity. Horses carry us, trees give us shade, but they don’t know it. It’s true that some people might receive a courtesy and not realize it, but no one has ever received one from someone who didn’t know it. Many people have been cured of illnesses by chance, but those weren’t actual remedies. I’ve known someone who was helped with a fever by falling into water; another who was cured of an illness by being whipped. But no one would consider these to be medicines. It’s the mindset, not the event, that distinguishes a courtesy from a wrong. My opponent might offend the judge with their pride and rudeness, and I might win my case; but that doesn’t mean it was intended as a courtesy to me. I escaped pirates by getting shipwrecked; does that mean the wreck was a benefit? No; truly giving courtesies means mixing intentions for both one’s own benefit and for mine. Someone who gives courtesies solely for their own benefit is like a person who feeds their cattle just to sell them; they have their horse well-groomed for the market.

Valor rerum.—The price of many things is far above what they are bought and sold for.  Life and health, which are both inestimable, we have of the physician; as learning and knowledge, the true tillage of the mind, from our schoolmasters.  But the fees of the one or the salary of the other never answer the value of what we received, but served to gratify their labours.

Valor rerum.—Many things are worth a lot more than their buying and selling prices. Life and health, which are priceless, come from our doctors; while learning and knowledge, the real cultivation of the mind, come from our teachers. However, the fees for one or the salary for the other never reflect the true value of what we gain, but just compensate their work.

Memoria.—Memory, of all the powers of the mind, is the most delicate and frail; it is the first of our faculties that age invades.  Seneca, the father, the rhetorician, confesseth of himself he had a miraculous one, not only to receive but to hold.  I myself could, in my youth, have repeated all that ever I had made, and so continued till I was past forty; since, it is much decayed in me.  Yet I can repeat whole books that I have read, and poems of some selected friends which I have liked to charge my memory with.  It was wont to be faithful to me; but shaken with age now, and sloth, which weakens the strongest abilities, it may perform somewhat, but cannot promise much.  By exercise it is to be made better and serviceable.  Whatsoever I pawned with it while I was young and a boy, it offers me readily, and without stops; but what I trust to it now, or have done of later years, it lays up more negligently, and oftentimes loses; so that I receive mine own (though frequently called for) as if it were new and borrowed.  Nor do I always find presently from it what I seek; but while I am doing another thing, that I laboured for will come; and what I sought with trouble will offer itself when I am quiet.  Now, in some men I have found it as happy as Nature, who, whatsoever they read or pen, they can say without book presently, as if they did then write in their mind.  And it is more a wonder in such as have a swift style, for their memories are commonly slowest; such as torture their writings, and go into council for every word, must needs fix somewhat, and make it their own at last, though but through their own vexation.

Memory.—Memory, of all the mental abilities, is the most delicate and fragile; it’s the first of our faculties that age affects. Seneca, the father, the orator, admitted that he had an extraordinary memory, not just to take in but to retain. In my youth, I could repeat everything I had created, and I continued that way until I was past forty; since then, it has significantly declined. Yet I can still recite entire books I've read and poems from certain friends that I've chosen to remember. It used to be reliable; but now, shaken by age and laziness, which weakens even the strongest abilities, it can do some things but can’t promise much. With practice, it can improve and become useful. Anything I memorized when I was young and a boy comes to mind quickly and effortlessly; however, what I try to remember now, or have tried in recent years, it stores away more carelessly, often losing it, so that I retrieve my own (though I often ask for it) as if it were new and borrowed. I don't always find what I'm looking for right away; but while I’m focused on something else, what I was searching for will come to me, and what I sought with difficulty tends to show up when I’m not actively thinking about it. Now, in some people, I’ve found it works as wonderfully as nature, because whatever they read or write, they can say it back instantly as if they had just composed it in their minds. It’s even more impressive in those who write quickly, as their memories are usually the slowest; those who agonize over their writing, deliberating on every word, must eventually fix something in their minds and make it their own, even if it’s through their own frustration.

Comit. suffragia.—Suffrages in Parliament are numbered, not weighed; nor can it be otherwise in those public councils where nothing is so unequal as the equality; for there, how odd soever men’s brains or wisdoms are, their power is always even and the same.

Comit. suffragia.—Votes in Parliament are counted, not evaluated; and it can't be any different in those public bodies where nothing is as unequal as the idea of equality; because there, no matter how unusual people's ideas or intelligence may be, their influence is always equal and the same.

Stare à partibus.—Some actions, be they never so beautiful and generous, are often obscured by base and vile misconstructions, either out of envy or ill-nature, that judgeth of others as of itself.  Nay, the times are so wholly grown to be either partial or malicious, that if he be a friend all sits well about him, his very vices shall be virtues; if an enemy, or of the contrary faction, nothing is good or tolerable in him; insomuch that we care not to discredit and shame our judgments to soothe our passions.

Stare à partibus.—Some actions, no matter how beautiful and generous, are often clouded by petty and mean misunderstandings, whether from envy or bad intentions, which judge others based on their own flaws. It's as if the times have become entirely biased or spiteful; if someone is a friend, everything about them seems fine, and even their faults are seen as virtues. But if they are an enemy or from a different side, nothing they do is considered good or acceptable; we disregard our own judgments just to satisfy our emotions.

Deus in creaturis.—Man is read in his face; God in His creatures; not as the philosopher, the creature of glory, reads him; but as the divine, the servant of humility; yet even he must take care not to be too curious.  For to utter truth of God but as he thinks only, may be dangerous, who is best known by our not knowing.  Some things of Him, so much as He hath revealed or commanded, it is not only lawful but necessary for us to know; for therein our ignorance was the first cause of our wickedness.

God in creation.—You can read a person’s character in their face; God can be seen in His creations; not in the way a philosopher, the creature of glory, perceives Him, but in the way the divine, the servant of humility, does. Yet even he needs to be cautious about being too inquisitive. Speaking about God’s truth based only on personal thoughts can be risky, as He is best understood through our recognition of our own limitations. There are aspects of Him that He has revealed or commanded, and it’s not just acceptable but essential for us to understand these; our ignorance of them was the primary cause of our wrongdoing.

Veritas proprium hominis.—Truth is man’s proper good, and the only immortal thing was given to our mortality to use.  No good Christian or ethnic, if he be honest, can miss it; no statesman or patriot should.  For without truth all the actions of mankind are craft, malice, or what you will, rather than wisdom.  Homer says he hates him worse than hell-mouth that utters one thing with his tongue and keeps another in his breast.  Which high expression was grounded on divine reason; for a lying mouth is a stinking pit, and murders with the contagion it venteth.  Beside, nothing is lasting that is feigned; it will have another face than it had, ere long. [41]  As Euripides saith, “No lie ever grows old.”

Veritas proprium hominis.—Truth is what truly belongs to humanity, and it’s the only immortal thing we've been given to use during our short lives. No good Christian or person of any kind, if they’re being honest, can overlook it; no politician or patriot should either. Without truth, all human actions become trickery, malice, or whatever else you want to call it, rather than wisdom. Homer says he hates more than anything else the person who says one thing with their mouth while keeping something else hidden in their heart. This strong statement is rooted in divine reason; a lying tongue is a filthy pit and spreads poison with its words. Furthermore, nothing deceitful lasts; it will soon show a different face than it had before. [41] As Euripides says, “No lie ever grows old.”

Nullum vitium sine patrocinio.—It is strange there should be no vice without its patronage, that when we have no other excuse we will say, we love it, we cannot forsake it.  As if that made it not more a fault.  We cannot, because we think we cannot, and we love it because we will defend it.  We will rather excuse it than be rid of it.  That we cannot is pretended; but that we will not is the true reason.  How many have I known that would not have their vices hid? nay, and, to be noted, live like Antipodes to others in the same city? never see the sun rise or set in so many years, but be as they were watching a corpse by torch-light; would not sin the common way, but held that a kind of rusticity; they would do it new, or contrary, for the infamy; they were ambitious of living backward; and at last arrived at that, as they would love nothing but the vices, not the vicious customs.  It was impossible to reform these natures; they were dried and hardened in their ill.  They may say they desired to leave it, but do not trust them; and they may think they desire it, but they may lie for all that; they are a little angry with their follies now and then; marry, they come into grace with them again quickly.  They will confess they are offended with their manner of living like enough; who is not?  When they can put me in security that they are more than offended, that they hate it, then I will hearken to them, and perhaps believe them; but many now-a-days love and hate their ill together.

Nullum vitium sine patrocinio.—It's strange that there’s no vice without its support, and when we have no other excuse, we say we love it and can’t let it go. As if that makes it any less of a fault. We believe we can't change because we think we can’t, and we love it because we defend it. We’d rather make excuses for it than be rid of it. Claiming we can't is a pretense; the real reason is that we won't. How many have I known who wouldn’t want to hide their vices? They live like they're on the opposite side of the world from others in the same city, never seeing the sunrise or sunset for years, watching like they're observing a corpse by torchlight; they wouldn’t sin in the usual way, believing that’s too ordinary; they’d rather do it differently or in a strange way, just for the infamy. They were eager to live in reverse, and in the end, they only wanted the vices, not the bad habits. It was impossible to change these people; they were set and hardened in their wrongdoing. They might say they want to stop, but don’t believe them; they might think they want to, but they could be lying about it. They occasionally get annoyed with their foolishness; however, they quickly reconcile with it again. They’ll admit they’re probably not happy with their way of living; who isn’t? But when they can assure me they feel more than just annoyed and actually hate it, then I might listen to them and maybe believe them. But nowadays, many love and hate their wrongdoings at the same time.

De vere argutis.—I do hear them say often some men are not witty, because they are not everywhere witty; than which nothing is more foolish.  If an eye or a nose be an excellent part in the face, therefore be all eye or nose!  I think the eyebrow, the forehead, the cheek, chin, lip, or any part else are as necessary and natural in the place.  But now nothing is good that is natural; right and natural language seems to have least of the wit in it; that which is writhed and tortured is counted the more exquisite.  Cloth of bodkin or tissue must be embroidered; as if no face were fair that were not powdered or painted! no beauty to be had but in wresting and writhing our own tongue!  Nothing is fashionable till it be deformed; and this is to write like a gentleman.  All must be affected and preposterous as our gallants’ clothes, sweet-bags, and night-dressings, in which you would think our men lay in, like ladies, it is so curious.

On True Wit.—I often hear people say that some men aren't witty because they're not witty all the time; nothing is more foolish than that. Just because an eye or a nose is a great feature on a face, does that mean we should only have eyes or noses? I believe the eyebrows, forehead, cheeks, chin, lips, and any other part are just as necessary and natural. But nowadays, nothing natural is considered good; straightforward language seems to lack wit, while something twisted and tortured is seen as more refined. Fabric must be embroidered to be valuable; it's as if no face can be beautiful unless it's powdered or painted! We believe there's no beauty unless we contort our own language! Nothing is stylish until it's deformed; and this is what it means to write like a gentleman. Everything must be affected and ridiculous, just like our fashionable men's clothing, accessories, and nightwear, so meticulously arranged that you'd think they sleep like ladies.

Censura de poetis.—Nothing in our age, I have observed, is more preposterous than the running judgments upon poetry and poets; when we shall hear those things commended and cried up for the best writings which a man would scarce vouchsafe to wrap any wholesome drug in; he would never light his tobacco with them.  And those men almost named for miracles, who yet are so vile that if a man should go about to examine and correct them, he must make all they have done but one blot.  Their good is so entangled with their bad as forcibly one must draw on the other’s death with it.  A sponge dipped in ink will do all:—

Censura de poetis.—Nothing in our time, I've noticed, is more ridiculous than the ongoing opinions about poetry and poets; we'll hear things praised and celebrated as the best writings that someone wouldn't even bother to wrap any good medicine in; they wouldn’t even use them to light their cigarette. And those people almost regarded as miraculous, who are so bad that if someone were to examine and correct them, they would turn everything they’ve done into one big mess. Their good is so mixed up with their bad that you have to drag one down along with the other. An ink-soaked sponge will handle it all:—

“—Comitetur Punica librum
Spongia.—” [44a]

“—Punic committee book
Sponge.—” [44a]

Et paulò post,

And soon after,

“Non possunt . . . multæ . . . lituræ
. . . una litura potest.”

“Non possunt . . . multæ . . .
. . . one correction is enough.”

CestiusCiceroHeathTaylorSpenser.—Yet their vices have not hurt them; nay, a great many they have profited, for they have been loved for nothing else.  And this false opinion grows strong against the best men, if once it take root with the ignorant.  Cestius, in his time, was preferred to Cicero, so far as the ignorant durst.  They learned him without book, and had him often in their mouths; but a man cannot imagine that thing so foolish or rude but will find and enjoy an admirer; at least a reader or spectator.  The puppets are seen now in despite of the players; Heath’s epigrams and the Sculler’s poems have their applause.  There are never wanting that dare prefer the worst preachers, the worst pleaders, the worst poets; not that the better have left to write or speak better, but that they that hear them judge worse; Non illi pejus dicunt, sed hi corruptius judicant.  Nay, if it were put to the question of the water-rhymer’s works, against Spenser’s, I doubt not but they would find more suffrages; because the most favour common vices, out of a prerogative the vulgar have to lose their judgments and like that which is naught.

CestiusCiceroHeathTaylorSpenser.—Yet their faults haven't harmed them; in fact, many have benefited from them, as they've been admired for nothing else. This misguided belief becomes stronger against the best individuals once it takes hold among the uninformed. Cestius, in his time, was favored over Cicero, as much as the ignorant dared to prefer. They learned about him by heart and often spoke of him; however, one cannot assume something is so foolish or crude that it won't find an admirer, or at least a reader or audience. The puppets are now seen despite the puppeteers; Heath’s epigrams and the Sculler’s poems receive their applause. There are always those who dare to prefer the worst speakers, the worst advocates, the worst poets; not because the better have stopped writing or speaking well, but because those who listen judge poorly; Non illi pejus dicunt, sed hi corruptius judicant. In fact, if we were to compare the water-rhymer’s works to Spenser’s, I have no doubt they would find more supporters; because most people favor common flaws, as there is a tendency among the masses to lose their judgment and appreciate what is bad.

Poetry, in this latter age, hath proved but a mean mistress to such as have wholly addicted themselves to her, or given their names up to her family.  They who have but saluted her on the by, and now and then tendered their visits, she hath done much for, and advanced in the way of their own professions (both the law and the gospel) beyond all they could have hoped or done for themselves without her favour.  Wherein she doth emulate the judicious but preposterous bounty of the time’s grandees, who accumulate all they can upon the parasite or fresh-man in their friendship; but think an old client or honest servant bound by his place to write and starve.

Poetry, in today’s age, has proven to be a disappointing partner for those who have completely devoted themselves to her, or fully committed to her circle. Those who have only given her a passing nod and occasionally dropped by, she has done a lot for and helped along in their own careers (both in law and religion) more than they could have hoped or achieved on their own without her support. In this way, she mirrors the foolish generosity of the wealthy elite, who gather as much as they can from the sycophants or newcomers in their midst, but expect an old client or loyal employee to struggle or go unnoticed merely because of their position.

Indeed, the multitude commend writers as they do fencers or wrestlers, who if they come in robustiously and put for it with a deal of violence are received for the braver fellows; when many times their own rudeness is a cause of their disgrace, and a slight touch of their adversary gives all that boisterous force the foil.  But in these things the unskilful are naturally deceived, and judging wholly by the bulk, think rude things greater than polished, and scattered more numerous than composed; nor think this only to be true in the sordid multitude, but the neater sort of our gallants; for all are the multitude, only they differ in clothes, not in judgment or understanding.

Indeed, the crowd praises writers just like they do fencers or wrestlers. If these athletes come in strong and use a lot of force, they’re seen as the bravest guys. But often, their own roughness leads to their downfall, and just a small hit from their opponent can neutralize all that wild energy. In these matters, the inexperienced are easily fooled; they judge solely based on size, believing that raw power is better than refinement and that chaos is more numerous than composition. This isn't just true for the common crowd, but for the more refined of our elite as well. Everyone is part of the crowd; they only differ in their clothing, not in their judgment or understanding.

De Shakspeare nostrat.—Augustus in Hat.—I remember the players have often mentioned it as an honour to Shakspeare, that in his writing (whatsoever he penned) he never blotted out a line.  My answer hath been, “Would he had blotted a thousand,” which they thought a malevolent speech.  I had not told posterity this but for their ignorance who chose that circumstance to commend their friend by wherein he most faulted; and to justify mine own candour, for I loved the man, and do honour his memory on this side idolatry as much as any.  He was, indeed, honest, and of an open and free nature, had an excellent phantasy, brave notions, and gentle expressions, wherein he flowed with that facility that sometimes it was necessary he should be stopped.  “Sufflaminandus erat,” [47a] as Augustus said of Haterius.  His wit was in his own power; would the rule of it had been so, too.  Many times he fell into those things, could not escape laughter, as when he said in the person of Cæsar, one speaking to him, “Cæsar, thou dost me wrong.”  He replied, “Cæsar did never wrong but with just cause;” and such like, which were ridiculous.  But he redeemed his vices with his virtues.  There was ever more in him to be praised than to be pardoned.

De Shakspeare nostrat.—Augustus in Hat.—I remember the actors often mentioning it as a point of pride for Shakespeare that in his writing (whatever he wrote) he never crossed out a line. My response has been, “I wish he had crossed out a thousand,” which they considered a harsh comment. I wouldn’t have shared this with future generations if not for their ignorance in choosing that fact to celebrate their friend in an area where he was most flawed; and to justify my honesty, because I loved the man and honor his memory, not to the point of idolatry, as much as anyone. He was, indeed, sincere and had an open and free spirit, with a brilliant imagination, bold ideas, and gentle expressions, where his flow was so natural that sometimes it was necessary to hold him back. “Sufflaminandus erat,” [47a] as Augustus said about Haterius. His wit was within his own control; if only he had controlled it better, too. Many times he got into situations that led to laughter, like when he said in the character of Caesar, when someone spoke to him, “Caesar, you are wronging me.” He replied, “Caesar never wronged anyone without just cause;” and similar lines, which were absurd. But he balanced his faults with his strengths. There was always more to commend in him than to forgive.

Ingeniorum discrimina.—Not. 1.—In the difference of wits I have observed there are many notes; and it is a little maistry to know them, to discern what every nature, every disposition will bear; for before we sow our land we should plough it.  There are no fewer forms of minds than of bodies amongst us.  The variety is incredible, and therefore we must search.  Some are fit to make divines, some poets, some lawyers, some physicians; some to be sent to the plough, and trades.

Ingeniorum discrimina.—Not. 1.—I've noticed a lot of differences in intelligence; there are many variations, and it's somewhat of an art to understand them, to recognize what each nature and disposition can handle. Just like we should plow our land before planting, we need to consider these differences. There are just as many types of minds as there are bodies among us. The variety is astonishing, so we have to explore. Some people are suited to be clergy, some poets, some lawyers, some doctors; others are meant for farming and trades.

There is no doctrine will do good where nature is wanting.  Some wits are swelling and high; others low and still; some hot and fiery; others cold and dull; one must have a bridle, the other a spur.

There’s no belief that can help if nature is lacking. Some people are boastful and proud; others are quiet and reserved; some are passionate and intense; others are apathetic and dull; one needs guidance, the other needs motivation.

Not. 2.—There be some that are forward and bold; and these will do every little thing easily.  I mean that is hard by and next them, which they will utter unretarded without any shamefastness.  These never perform much, but quickly.  They are what they are on the sudden; they show presently, like grain that, scattered on the top of the ground, shoots up, but takes no root; has a yellow blade, but the ear empty.  They are wits of good promise at first, but there is an ingenistitium; [49a] they stand still at sixteen, they get no higher.

Not. 2.—Some people are bold and forward; they take on every small task easily. I mean tasks that are close by, which they will share without hesitation or embarrassment. They don’t accomplish much, but they do it quickly. They are what they seem at first; they show up suddenly, like seeds scattered on the ground that sprout but don’t take root; they have green shoots but empty ears. They seem promising at first, but there is an ingenistitium; [49a] they remain stagnant at sixteen, and they never grow beyond that.

Not. 3.—You have others that labour only to ostentation; and are ever more busy about the colours and surface of a work than in the matter and foundation, for that is hid, the other is seen.

Not. 3.—You have others who only work for show and are always more focused on the appearance and surface of a piece than on its substance and foundation, because the foundation is hidden while the surface is visible.

Not. 4.—Others that in composition are nothing but what is rough and broken.  Quæ per salebras, altaque saxa cadunt. [49b]  And if it would come gently, they trouble it of purpose.  They would not have it run without rubs, as if that style were more strong and manly that struck the ear with a kind of unevenness.  These men err not by chance, but knowingly and willingly; they are like men that affect a fashion by themselves; have some singularity in a ruff cloak, or hat-band; or their beards specially cut to provoke beholders, and set a mark upon themselves.  They would be reprehended while they are looked on.  And this vice, one that is authority with the rest, loving, delivers over to them to be imitated; so that ofttimes the faults which be fell into the others seek for.  This is the danger, when vice becomes a precedent.

Not. 4.—Others that are made up of nothing but rough and broken parts. Which fall through the thickets, and the high rocks. [49b] And if it were to flow smoothly, they intentionally disrupt it. They wouldn’t want it to run without bumps, as if that unevenness makes it sound stronger and more masculine. These people don’t err by accident, but knowingly and willingly; they’re like individuals who adopt a unique style for themselves; perhaps with some distinct flair in a ruffled cloak, or a fancy headband; or their beards specifically styled to attract attention and stand out. They want to be called out while they’re being observed. And this flaw, one that is respected among the rest, is willingly passed down to them to imitate, so that often the mistakes made by one are sought after by the others. This is the danger when vice sets a precedent.

Not. 5.—Others there are that have no composition at all; but a kind of tuning and rhyming fall in what they write.  It runs and slides, and only makes a sound.  Women’s poets they are called, as you have women’s tailors.

Not. 5.—There are others who don’t have any structure at all; instead, they focus on rhythm and rhyme in what they write. It flows and glides, producing only sound. They are referred to as women’s poets, similar to how we have women’s tailors.

“They write a verse as smooth, as soft as cream,
In which there is no torrent, nor scarce stream.”

“They write a verse that's as smooth and soft as cream,
In which there’s no rushing water, nor even a trickle.”

You may sound these wits and find the depth of them with your middle finger.  They are cream-bowl or but puddle-deep.

You can test these ideas and see how deep they really are with your middle finger. They are either bowl deep or just puddle deep.

Not. 6.—Some that turn over all books, and are equally searching in all papers; that write out of what they presently find or meet, without choice.  By which means it happens that what they have discredited and impugned in one week, they have before or after extolled the same in another.  Such are all the essayists, even their master Montaigne.  These, in all they write, confess still what books they have read last, and therein their own folly so much, that they bring it to the stake raw and undigested; not that the place did need it neither, but that they thought themselves furnished and would vent it.

Not. 6.—Some people go through every book and examine all papers thoroughly, writing down whatever they come across without any real selection. Because of this, they end up criticizing something one week and praising it in another. This applies to all essayists, including their master Montaigne. In everything they write, they always admit what books they’ve recently read, showcasing their own foolishness as they present their thoughts unrefined and without proper consideration; not that the content required it, but because they believe they’re prepared and want to share their ideas.

Not. 7.—Some, again who, after they have got authority, or, which is less, opinion, by their writings, to have read much, dare presently to feign whole books and authors, and lie safely.  For what never was, will not easily be found, not by the most curious.

Not. 7.—Some people, after gaining authority or, at the very least, a reputation from their writings, claim to have read extensively and boldly invent entire books and authors, lying with confidence. Because what never existed will not be easily discovered, not even by the most inquisitive.

Not. 8.—And some, by a cunning protestation against all reading, and false venditation of their own naturals, think to divert the sagacity of their readers from themselves, and cool the scent of their own fox-like thefts; when yet they are so rank, as a man may find whole pages together usurped from one author; their necessities compelling them to read for present use, which could not be in many books; and so come forth more ridiculously and palpably guilty than those who, because they cannot trace, they yet would slander their industry.

Not. 8.—Some try to distract their readers from their own flaws by making clever claims against all reading and falsely promoting their own abilities. They think they can throw off suspicion about their sneaky thefts, but they are so obvious that one can find entire pages lifted from a single author. Their needs force them to read for immediate use, which can't be found in many books, resulting in them appearing even more foolish and obviously guilty than those who, unable to follow the trail, resort to disparaging the hard work of others.

Not. 9.—But the wretcheder are the obstinate contemners of all helps and arts; such as presuming on their own naturals (which, perhaps, are excellent), dare deride all diligence, and seem to mock at the terms when they understand not the things; thinking that way to get off wittily with their ignorance.  These are imitated often by such as are their peers in negligence, though they cannot be in nature; and they utter all they can think with a kind of violence and indisposition, unexamined, without relation either to person, place, or any fitness else; and the more wilful and stubborn they are in it the more learned they are esteemed of the multitude, through their excellent vice of judgment, who think those things the stronger that have no art; as if to break were better than to open, or to rend asunder gentler than to loose.

Not. 9.—But those who are the most miserable are the stubborn ones who disregard all help and skills; they rely on their own abilities (which might be great), yet they mock all effort and appear to laugh at the terms without understanding the concepts behind them, thinking this will allow them to cleverly escape their ignorance. These individuals are often imitated by peers who are just as negligent, even though they cannot match them in capability; they express whatever comes to mind with a sort of forcefulness and reluctance, without considering the relevance to the person, place, or any other context. The more headstrong and obstinate they are, the more they are admired by the masses, due to their flawed sense of judgment, who believe that things lacking finesse are inherently stronger, as if breaking something is better than opening it, or tearing apart is gentler than loosening it.

Not. 10.—It cannot but come to pass that these men who commonly seek to do more than enough may sometimes happen on something that is good and great; but very seldom: and when it comes it doth not recompense the rest of their ill.  For their jests, and their sentences (which they only and ambitiously seek for) stick out, and are more eminent, because all is sordid and vile about them; as lights are more discerned in a thick darkness than a faint shadow.  Now, because they speak all they can (however unfitly), they are thought to have the greater copy; where the learned use ever election and a mean, they look back to what they intended at first, and make all an even and proportioned body.  The true artificer will not run away from Nature as he were afraid of her, or depart from life and the likeness of truth, but speak to the capacity of his hearers.  And though his language differ from the vulgar somewhat, it shall not fly from all humanity, with the Tamerlanes and Tamer-chains of the late age, which had nothing in them but the scenical strutting and furious vociferation to warrant them to the ignorant gapers.  He knows it is his only art so to carry it, as none but artificers perceive it.  In the meantime, perhaps, he is called barren, dull, lean, a poor writer, or by what contumelious word can come in their cheeks, by these men who, without labour, judgment, knowledge, or almost sense, are received or preferred before him.  He gratulates them and their fortune.  Another age, or juster men, will acknowledge the virtues of his studies, his wisdom in dividing, his subtlety in arguing, with what strength he doth inspire his readers, with what sweetness he strokes them; in inveighing, what sharpness; in jest, what urbanity he uses; how he doth reign in men’s affections; how invade and break in upon them, and makes their minds like the thing he writes.  Then in his elocution to behold what word is proper, which hath ornaments, which height, what is beautifully translated, where figures are fit, which gentle, which strong, to show the composition manly; and how he hath avoided faint, obscure, obscene, sordid, humble, improper, or effeminate phrase; which is not only praised of the most, but commended (which is worse), especially for that it is naught.

Not. 10.—It’s inevitable that those who often try to do more than necessary might occasionally stumble upon something good and great; but that happens very rarely. And when it does, it doesn’t make up for all their bad. Their jokes and their statements—those they chase so eagerly—stand out more because everything else about them is lowly and vile; just like how lights are more visible in deep darkness than in a faint shadow. Because they say whatever comes to mind (no matter how inappropriate), they’re considered to have more to say, while the educated always choose their words carefully and maintain balance, reflecting back on their original intentions to create a cohesive and proportional whole. A true craftsman won’t shy away from Nature as if he fears her, nor will he stray from reality and the likeness of truth, but will communicate to his audience’s understanding. And even if his language differs slightly from common speech, it won’t completely reject humanity, unlike the Tamerlanes and Tamer-chains of the recent past, who only had exaggerated performances and loud shouting to impress the ignorant onlookers. He knows it’s his skill to present his work in a way that only other craftsmen can appreciate. In the meantime, he might be labeled barren, dull, thin, a poor writer, or whatever degrading term they can come up with by those who, lacking effort, judgment, knowledge, or even basic sense, are favored over him. He congratulates them and their luck. A future age, or more just people, will recognize the worth of his efforts, his wisdom in organizing his thoughts, his sharpness in arguing, the strength he brings to his readers, the sweetness with which he engages them; in his critiques, the sharpness he employs; in humor, the charm he possesses; how he influences people’s emotions; how he breaks through and captivates them, making their thoughts align with his writing. Then, in his delivery, one can see which words are appropriate, which are ornate, which are elevated, what translates beautifully, where metaphors are suitable, which are gentle and which are powerful, showcasing a strong composition; and how he has steered clear of weak, obscure, vulgar, lowly, inappropriate, or effeminate language; language that is not only praised by many, but is ironically commended (which is worse), especially for its flaws.

Ignorantia animæ.—I know no disease of the soul but ignorance, not of the arts and sciences, but of itself; yet relating to those it is a pernicious evil, the darkener of man’s life, the disturber of his reason, and common confounder of truth, with which a man goes groping in the dark, no otherwise than if he were blind.  Great understandings are most racked and troubled with it; nay, sometimes they will rather choose to die than not to know the things they study for.  Think, then, what an evil it is, and what good the contrary.

Ignorance of the soul.—I know of no affliction of the soul except ignorance, not ignorance of skills and knowledge, but ignorance of itself; yet this relates to those as a harmful curse, clouding a person's life, disrupting their reasoning, and muddling the truth, leaving a person to stumble around in the dark, just like someone who is blind. Those with great minds are often the most burdened by it; in fact, sometimes they would rather die than live without knowing the things they pursue. Consider, then, how detrimental this is, and how beneficial its opposite.

Scientia.—Knowledge is the action of the soul and is perfect without the senses, as having the seeds of all science and virtue in itself; but not without the service of the senses; by these organs the soul works: she is a perpetual agent, prompt and subtle; but often flexible and erring, entangling herself like a silkworm, but her reason is a weapon with two edges, and cuts through.  In her indagations oft-times new scents put her by, and she takes in errors into her by the same conduits she doth truths.

Science.—Knowledge is an activity of the soul and is complete without the senses, as it contains the seeds of all knowledge and virtue within itself; however, it relies on the senses for support. The soul operates through these organs: it is constantly active, quick, and perceptive; but it can also be flexible and misguided, sometimes getting caught up like a silkworm. Yet, its reason is a double-edged sword that cuts through confusion. In its search for understanding, it is often led astray by new distractions and can absorb errors just as easily as it does truths.

Otium Studiorum.—Ease and relaxation are profitable to all studies.  The mind is like a bow, the stronger by being unbent.  But the temper in spirits is all, when to command a man’s wit, when to favour it.  I have known a man vehement on both sides, that knew no mean, either to intermit his studies or call upon them again.  When he hath set himself to writing he would join night to day, press upon himself without release, not minding it, till he fainted; and when he left off, resolve himself into all sports and looseness again, that it was almost a despair to draw him to his book; but once got to it, he grew stronger and more earnest by the ease.  His whole powers were renewed; he would work out of himself what he desired, but with such excess as his study could not be ruled; he knew not how to dispose his own abilities, or husband them; he was of that immoderate power against himself.  Nor was he only a strong, but an absolute speaker and writer; but his subtlety did not show itself; his judgment thought that a vice; for the ambush hurts more that is hid.  He never forced his language, nor went out of the highway of speaking but for some great necessity or apparent profit; for he denied figures to be invented for ornament, but for aid; and still thought it an extreme madness to bind or wrest that which ought to be right.

Otium Studiorum.—Leisure and relaxation benefit all types of study. The mind is like a bow; it’s more powerful when it’s not overworked. But what really matters is the state of a person’s spirit—knowing when to engage the mind and when to let it be. I’ve known someone who was intense on both ends, unable to take breaks from his studies or pick them up again. When he committed to writing, he would work through the night without a break, pushing himself so hard that he would eventually faint. And then when he stopped, he would indulge in all sorts of distractions, making it almost impossible to get him back to his books. But once he started again, he became stronger and more focused because of the break. His entire ability was refreshed; he would create what he wanted, but with such intensity that he couldn't control his study habits; he didn’t know how to manage his abilities or conserve them; he had an excessive drive against himself. He wasn't just a strong speaker and writer; he was excellent at it. However, his cleverness didn’t show; he thought of it as a flaw because hidden traps are more harmful. He never forced his language or strayed from normal speech unless absolutely necessary or beneficial; he believed that rhetorical devices should exist to assist, not just for decoration, and thought it was utterly foolish to twist or manipulate something that should be straightforward.

Stili eminentia.—Virgil.—Tully.—Sallust.—It is no wonder men’s eminence appears but in their own way.  Virgil’s felicity left him in prose, as Tully’s forsook him in verse.  Sallust’s orations are read in the honour of story, yet the most eloquent.  Plato’s speech, which he made for Socrates, is neither worthy of the patron nor the person defended.  Nay, in the same kind of oratory, and where the matter is one, you shall have him that reasons strongly, open negligently; another that prepares well, not fit so well.  And this happens not only to brains, but to bodies.  One can wrestle well, another run well, a third leap or throw the bar, a fourth lift or stop a cart going; each hath his way of strength.  So in other creatures—some dogs are for the deer, some for the wild boar, some are fox-hounds, some otter-hounds.  Nor are all horses for the coach or saddle, some are for the cart and paniers.

Styles. Virgil. Cicero. Sallust.—It’s no surprise that a person’s greatness shows up in their own unique way. Virgil’s talent didn’t carry over to prose, just as Cicero’s didn’t in poetry. Sallust’s speeches are appreciated for their storytelling, yet they remain among the most eloquent. Plato’s speech he delivered for Socrates isn’t worthy of either the supporter or the person being defended. Furthermore, within the same type of oratory and on the same topic, you can find someone who argues strongly but presents poorly; another who prepares well but doesn’t come across as effectively. This applies not only to minds but also to bodies. Some people can wrestle well, others run effectively, a third group excels at jumping or throwing weights, and some can lift or stop a cart—each has their own way of being strong. The same goes for other animals—some dogs are bred for hunting deer, some for wild boar, some are fox hounds, and some are otter hounds. Not all horses are fit for pulling carriages or riding; some are better suited for pulling carts and carrying loads.

De Claris Oratoribus.—I have known many excellent men that would speak suddenly to the admiration of their hearers, who upon study and premeditation have been forsaken by their own wits, and no way answered their fame; their eloquence was greater than their reading, and the things they uttered better than those they knew; their fortune deserved better of them than their care.  For men of present spirits, and of greater wits than study, do please more in the things they invent than in those they bring.  And I have heard some of them compelled to speak, out of necessity, that have so infinitely exceeded themselves, as it was better both for them and their auditory that they were so surprised, not prepared.  Nor was it safe then to cross them, for their adversary, their anger made them more eloquent.  Yet these men I could not but love and admire, that they returned to their studies.  They left not diligence (as many do) when their rashness prospered; for diligence is a great aid, even to an indifferent wit; when we are not contented with the examples of our own age, but would know the face of the former.  Indeed, the more we confer with the more we profit by, if the persons be chosen.

On Famous Orators.—I have known many great speakers who could captivate their audiences with spontaneous words, but when they prepared or studied, they often fell short of expectations and didn't live up to their reputation. Their natural eloquence exceeded their knowledge, and what they expressed was often more impressive than what they actually understood. Their circumstances deserved more attention from them than their efforts showed. People with quick minds and sharper instincts tend to be more engaging in their original ideas than in what they simply present. I've even seen some who were forced to speak out of necessity completely outshine themselves; it was better for both them and their audience that they were caught off guard rather than rehearsed. At such moments, it wasn’t wise to challenge them, as their anger fueled their eloquence. Still, I couldn't help but admire these individuals for returning to their studies. They didn't abandon hard work (as many do) just because their impulsiveness paid off; diligence is a significant advantage, even to an average talent, especially when we seek to understand not just our own time but the past as well. In fact, the more we engage with others, the more we benefit, provided we choose our associates wisely.

Dominus Verulamius.—One, though he be excellent and the chief, is not to be imitated alone; for no imitator ever grew up to his author; likeness is always on this side truth.  Yet there happened in my time one noble speaker who was full of gravity in his speaking; his language (where he could spare or pass by a jest) was nobly censorious.  No man ever spake more neatly, more pressly, more weightily, or suffered less emptiness, less idleness, in what he uttered.  No member of his speech but consisted of his own graces.  His hearers could not cough, or look aside from him, without loss.  He commanded where he spoke, and had his judges angry and pleased at his devotion.  No man had their affections more in his power.  The fear of every man that heard him was lest he should make an end.

Dominus Verulamius.—One person, even if they are excellent and the best, shouldn’t be the only one considered for imitation; no imitator ever truly reaches their original. Similarity always falls short of truth. However, during my time, there was a remarkable speaker who had a serious and impactful way of speaking; when he chose to bypass humor, his language was profoundly critical. No one spoke more clearly, more forcefully, or with more substance, lacking any triviality or idleness in what he said. Every part of his speech reflected his own unique qualities. His audience couldn’t cough or look away without missing something important. He commanded attention and could evoke strong emotions, both anger and admiration, from his listeners. No one had more control over their feelings than he did. The greatest fear among those who listened to him was that he would finish.

Scriptorum catalogus. [59a]  Cicero is said to be the only wit that the people of Rome had equalled to their empire.  Ingenium par imperio.  We have had many, and in their several ages (to take in but the former seculum) Sir Thomas More, the elder Wiat, Henry Earl of Surrey, Chaloner, Smith, Eliot, B. Gardiner, were for their times admirable; and the more, because they began eloquence with us.  Sir Nicolas Bacon was singular, and almost alone, in the beginning of Queen Elizabeth’s time.  Sir Philip Sidney and Mr. Hooker (in different matter) grew great masters of wit and language, and in whom all vigour of invention and strength of judgment met.  The Earl of Essex, noble and high; and Sir Walter Raleigh, not to be contemned, either for judgment or style.  Sir Henry Savile, grave, and truly lettered; Sir Edwin Sandys, excellent in both; Lord Egerton, the Chancellor, a grave and great orator, and best when he was provoked; but his learned and able (though unfortunate) successor is he who hath filled up all numbers, and performed that in our tongue which may be compared or preferred either to insolent Greece or haughty Rome.  In short, within his view, and about his times, were all the wits born that could honour a language or help study.  Now things daily fall, wits grow downward, and eloquence grows backward; so that he may be named and stand as the mark and ακμη of our language.

Scriptorum catalogus. [59a] Cicero is said to be the only wit that the people of Rome matched with their empire. Ingenium par imperio. We have had many great minds throughout different eras (just considering the previous seculum), like Sir Thomas More, the elder Wiat, Henry Earl of Surrey, Chaloner, Smith, Eliot, B. Gardiner, who were remarkable for their times; even more so because they initiated eloquence among us. Sir Nicolas Bacon was unique and almost solitary at the beginning of Queen Elizabeth's reign. Sir Philip Sidney and Mr. Hooker (in different subjects) became great masters of wit and language, showcasing all the vigor of invention and strength of judgment. The Earl of Essex, noble and distinguished; and Sir Walter Raleigh, who should not be underestimated for either judgment or style. Sir Henry Savile, serious and truly knowledgeable; Sir Edwin Sandys, excellent in both areas; Lord Egerton, the Chancellor, a serious and powerful orator, best when provoked; but it is his learned and capable (though unfortunate) successor who has matched or even surpassed what was achieved in our language compared to arrogant Greece or proud Rome. In summary, during his time and observation, all the wits who could elevate a language or aid in study were born. Now, things are declining, wits are diminishing, and eloquence is regressing; thus, he may be named and regarded as the standard and ακμη of our language.

De augmentis scientiarum.—Julius Cæsar.—Lord St. Alban.—I have ever observed it to have been the office of a wise patriot, among the greatest affairs of the State, to take care of the commonwealth of learning.  For schools, they are the seminaries of State; and nothing is worthier the study of a statesman than that part of the republic which we call the advancement of letters.  Witness the care of Julius Cæsar, who, in the heat of the civil war, writ his books of Analogy, and dedicated them to Tully.  This made the late Lord St. Alban entitle his work Novum Organum; which, though by the most of superficial men, who cannot get beyond the title of nominals, it is not penetrated nor understood, it really openeth all defects of learning whatsoever, and is a book

De augmentis scientiarum.—Julius Cæsar.—Lord St. Alban.—I've always noticed that a wise patriot should prioritize the welfare of education in the midst of significant state matters. Schools are the foundations of the state, and nothing is more crucial for a politician than focusing on the enhancement of knowledge. Just look at Julius Cæsar, who, during the chaos of the civil war, wrote his books on Analogy and dedicated them to Tully. This inspired the late Lord St. Alban to name his work Novum Organum; although many superficial people, who can't see beyond the title, don't truly understand or appreciate it, the book addresses all flaws in learning and is a foundational text.

“Qui longum note scriptori proroget ævum.” [62a]

“Who extends the writer's time into a long age.” [62a]

My conceit of his person was never increased toward him by his place or honours; but I have and do reverence him for the greatness that was only proper to himself, in that he seemed to me ever, by his work, one of the greatest men, and most worthy of admiration, that had been in many ages.  In his adversity I ever prayed that God would give him strength; for greatness he could not want.  Neither could I condole in a word or syllable for him, as knowing no accident could do harm to virtue, but rather help to make it manifest.

My opinion of him was never influenced by his position or honors; I respect him for his intrinsic greatness. To me, he always seemed like one of the greatest men worthy of admiration in many ages, based on his achievements. During his tough times, I always hoped that God would give him strength because he was already great. I couldn't express sympathy for him, knowing that nothing could harm virtue; instead, hardships only reveal its true nature.

De corruptela morum.—There cannot be one colour of the mind, another of the wit.  If the mind be staid, grave, and composed, the wit is so; that vitiated, the other is blown and deflowered.  Do we not see, if the mind languish, the members are dull?  Look upon an effeminate person, his very gait confesseth him.  If a man be fiery, his motion is so; if angry, it is troubled and violent.  So that we may conclude wheresoever manners and fashions are corrupted, language is.  It imitates the public riot.  The excess of feasts and apparel are the notes of a sick state, and the wantonness of language of a sick mind.

De corruptela morum.—The mind can't be one way while the wit is another. If the mind is calm, serious, and composed, the wit is too; if the mind is corrupted, then the wit is also damaged. Don’t we see that when the mind is weak, the body is sluggish? Just look at an effeminate person; their very walk gives them away. If someone is passionate, their movements reflect that; if they're angry, their actions become erratic and forceful. Therefore, we can conclude that wherever morals and customs are corrupted, language follows suit. It mirrors the chaos of society. The excess of feasting and fancy clothing highlights a sick society, while the frivolity of language indicates a troubled mind.

De rebus mundanis.—If we would consider what our affairs are indeed, not what they are called, we should find more evils belonging to us than happen to us.  How often doth that which was called a calamity prove the beginning and cause of a man’s happiness? and, on the contrary, that which happened or came to another with great gratulation and applause, how it hath lifted him but a step higher to his ruin? as if he stood before where he might fall safely.

On worldly matters.—If we were to look at what our situations really are, not just what we label them, we’d realize we have more problems than what actually happens to us. How often does something called a disaster turn out to be the start and source of someone's happiness? And conversely, how often does something that happens to someone else with a lot of cheers and celebration only raise them a little higher before their downfall? It’s as if they are standing right on the edge where they could fall safely.

Vulgi mores.—Morbus comitialis.—The vulgar are commonly ill-natured, and always grudging against their governors: which makes that a prince has more business and trouble with them than ever Hercules had with the bull or any other beast; by how much they have more heads than will be reined with one bridle.  There was not that variety of beasts in the ark, as is of beastly natures in the multitude; especially when they come to that iniquity to censure their sovereign’s actions.  Then all the counsels are made good or bad by the events; and it falleth out that the same facts receive from them the names, now of diligence, now of vanity, now of majesty, now of fury; where they ought wholly to hang on his mouth, as he to consist of himself, and not others’ counsels.

Vulgi mores.—Morbus comitialis.—The common people are often mean-spirited and always resentful towards their leaders, which means a prince has more challenges and issues with them than Hercules had with the bull or any other creature; they have more heads than can be managed with a single bridle. There weren’t as many types of animals in the ark as there are of base natures among the crowd, especially when it comes to their wrongdoing of judging their sovereign's actions. Then all decisions are evaluated as good or bad based on the results; and it turns out that the same actions are labeled by them at different times as diligence, vanity, majesty, or rage; when they should completely rely on his judgment, just as he should be independent of others' advice.

Princeps.—After God, nothing is to be loved of man like the prince; he violates Nature that doth it not with his whole heart.  For when he hath put on the care of the public good and common safety, I am a wretch, and put off man, if I do not reverence and honour him, in whose charge all things divine and human are placed.  Do but ask of Nature why all living creatures are less delighted with meat and drink that sustains them than with venery that wastes them? and she will tell thee, the first respects but a private, the other a common good, propagation.

Princeps.—After God, nothing should be loved by man more than the prince; anyone who doesn’t love him wholeheartedly goes against nature. When he takes on the responsibility for the public good and common safety, I am truly miserable and less than human if I don’t respect and honor him, the one in whose care all things divine and human are entrusted. Just ask Nature why all living creatures take less pleasure in food and drink that sustains them compared to the pleasure of sex that depletes them, and she will tell you that the former caters to personal needs, while the latter serves a common good, which is procreation.

De eodem.—Orpheus’ Hymn.—He is the arbiter of life and death: when he finds no other subject for his mercy, he should spare himself.  All his punishments are rather to correct than to destroy.  Why are prayers with Orpheus said to be the daughters of Jupiter, but that princes are thereby admonished that the petitions of the wretched ought to have more weight with them than the laws themselves.

De eodem.—Orpheus’ Hymn.—He is the judge of life and death: when he finds no other reason for his mercy, he should show it to himself. All his punishments are meant to correct rather than to destroy. Why are prayers associated with Orpheus said to be the daughters of Jupiter? It’s to remind rulers that the pleas of the unfortunate should hold more importance for them than the laws themselves.

De opt. Rege Jacobo.—It was a great accumulation to His Majesty’s deserved praise that men might openly visit and pity those whom his greatest prisons had at any time received or his laws condemned.

De opt. Rege Jacobo.—It was a significant addition to His Majesty’s well-deserved reputation that people could openly visit and show compassion for those whom his largest prisons had ever held or his laws had judged.

De Princ. adjunctis.—Sed verè prudens haud concipi possit Princeps, nisi simul et bonus.—Lycurgus.—Sylla.—Lysander.—Cyrus.—Wise is rather the attribute of a prince than learned or good.  The learned man profits others rather than himself; the good man rather himself than others; but the prince commands others, and doth himself.

De Princ. adjunctis.—But truly, a wise ruler can't be conceived, unless he is also good.—Lycurgus.—Sylla.—Lysander.—Cyrus.—Wisdom is more characteristic of a prince than being knowledgeable or good. The knowledgeable person benefits others more than themselves; the good person benefits themselves more than others; but the prince leads others and also serves himself.

The wise Lycurgus gave no law but what himself kept.  Sylla and Lysander did not so; the one living extremely dissolute himself, enforced frugality by the laws; the other permitted those licenses to others which himself abstained from.  But the prince’s prudence is his chief art and safety.  In his counsels and deliberations he foresees the future times: in the equity of his judgment he hath remembrance of the past, and knowledge of what is to be done or avoided for the present.  Hence the Persians gave out their Cyrus to have been nursed by a bitch, a creature to encounter it, as of sagacity to seek out good; showing that wisdom may accompany fortitude, or it leaves to be, and puts on the name of rashness.

The wise Lycurgus only enforced laws that he followed himself. Sylla and Lysander, on the other hand, didn’t do this; one lived a very indulgent life while imposing strict frugality through laws, and the other allowed behaviors in others that he avoided himself. However, a prince’s wisdom is his greatest asset and protection. In his planning and discussions, he anticipates future events; in his fair judgment, he remembers the past and understands what should be done or avoided in the present. This is why the Persians claimed that Cyrus was raised by a dog, a creature known for its ability to seek out goodness, showing that wisdom can go hand in hand with strength, or it can fade away and be mistaken for recklessness.

De malign. studentium.—There be some men are born only to suck out the poison of books: Habent venenum pro victu; imô, pro deliciis. [66a]  And such are they that only relish the obscene and foul things in poets, which makes the profession taxed.  But by whom?  Men that watch for it; and, had they not had this hint, are so unjust valuers of letters as they think no learning good but what brings in gain.  It shows they themselves would never have been of the professions they are but for the profits and fees.  But if another learning, well used, can instruct to good life, inform manners, no less persuade and lead men than they threaten and compel, and have no reward, is it therefore the worst study?  I could never think the study of wisdom confined only to the philosopher, or of piety to the divine, or of state to the politic; but that he which can feign a commonwealth (which is the poet) can govern it with counsels, strengthen it with laws, correct it with judgments, inform it with religion and morals, is all these.  We do not require in him mere elocution, or an excellent faculty in verse, but the exact knowledge of all virtues and their contraries, with ability to render the one loved, the other hated, by his proper embattling them.  The philosophers did insolently, to challenge only to themselves that which the greatest generals and gravest counsellors never durst.  For such had rather do than promise the best things.

On the Bad Students.—There are some people who seem to be born just to drain the poison from books: They have poison for food; indeed, for pleasure. [66a] And these are the ones who only appreciate the obscene and vile aspects in poets, which burdens the profession. But by whom? By those who are always on the lookout for it; and if they hadn’t had this hint, they value literature so unjustly that they think no education is worthwhile unless it brings in profit. This shows they would never have pursued their professions if not for the financial benefits. But if another kind of learning, when applied well, can teach a good life, shape manners, and persuade and lead people just as effectively as they threaten and compel, without any reward, does that make it the worst kind of study? I can’t believe that the pursuit of wisdom belongs only to philosophers, or that piety is the sole domain of the divine, or that political knowledge belongs exclusively to politicians; rather, the one who can imagine a commonwealth (the poet) can govern it with advice, strengthen it with laws, correct it with judgments, and enrich it with religion and morals—all in one. We don’t just expect from him a way with words or an exceptional talent for verse, but a deep understanding of all virtues and their opposites, along with the skill to make the former desirable and the latter detestable through his unique presentation. Philosophers arrogantly claim as their own the very things that the greatest generals and the wisest advisors wouldn’t dare to promise. For such people would rather do than just promise the best things.

Controvers. scriptores.—More Andabatarum qui clausis oculis pugnant.—Some controverters in divinity are like swaggerers in a tavern that catch that which stands next them, the candlestick or pots; turn everything into a weapon: ofttimes they fight blindfold, and both beat the air.  The one milks a he-goat, the other holds under a sieve.  Their arguments are as fluxive as liquor spilt upon a table, which with your finger you may drain as you will.  Such controversies or disputations (carried with more labour than profit) are odious; where most times the truth is lost in the midst or left untouched.  And the fruit of their fight is, that they spit one upon another, and are both defiled.  These fencers in religion I like not.

Controvers. scriptores.—More Andabatarum qui clausis oculis pugnant.—Some religious debaters are like loudmouths in a bar who grab whatever's nearby, whether it's a candlestick or drinking mugs, and turn everything into a weapon. Often, they fight blindfolded and just hit the air. One is milking a goat while the other is holding a sieve. Their arguments flow like spilled drinks on a table, easily swept away by your finger. These debates (which require more effort than they yield in results) are unpleasant; most of the time, the truth gets lost in the chaos or is ignored altogether. And the outcome of their bickering is that they just end up spitting on each other and getting dirty. I don't like these religious sparrers.

Morbi.—The body hath certain diseases that are with less evil tolerated than removed.  As if to cure a leprosy a man should bathe himself with the warm blood of a murdered child, so in the Church some errors may be dissimuled with less inconvenience than they can be discovered.

Morbi.—The body has certain diseases that are more bearable than removed. Just as one might think that to cure leprosy, a person should bathe in the warm blood of a murdered child, in the Church, some errors might be hidden with less trouble than if they were exposed.

Jactantia intempestiva.—Men that talk of their own benefits are not believed to talk of them because they have done them; but to have done them because they might talk of them.  That which had been great, if another had reported it of them, vanisheth, and is nothing, if he that did it speak of it.  For men, when they cannot destroy the deed, will yet be glad to take advantage of the boasting, and lessen it.

Jactantia intempestiva.—People who brag about their own achievements aren’t believed to be discussing them because they’ve actually accomplished them; rather, it seems like they’ve only done them so they can boast. What could have been seen as impressive, if someone else had mentioned it about them, becomes insignificant if they’re the ones talking about it. Because when people can’t erase the act, they’ll still be eager to take advantage of the boasting and downplay it.

Adulatio.—I have seen that poverty makes me do unfit things; but honest men should not do them; they should gain otherwise.  Though a man be hungry, he should not play the parasite.  That hour wherein I would repent me to be honest, there were ways enough open for me to be rich.  But flattery is a fine pick-lock of tender ears; especially of those whom fortune hath borne high upon their wings, that submit their dignity and authority to it, by a soothing of themselves.  For, indeed, men could never be taken in that abundance with the springes of others’ flattery, if they began not there; if they did but remember how much more profitable the bitterness of truth were, than all the honey distilling from a whorish voice, which is not praise, but poison.  But now it is come to that extreme folly, or rather madness, with some, that he that flatters them modestly or sparingly is thought to malign them.  If their friend consent not to their vices, though he do not contradict them, he is nevertheless an enemy.  When they do all things the worst way, even then they look for praise.  Nay, they will hire fellows to flatter them with suits and suppers, and to prostitute their judgments.  They have livery-friends, friends of the dish, and of the spit, that wait their turns, as my lord has his feasts and guests.

Flattery.—I've noticed that being poor makes me do things I shouldn't; honest people should avoid that and find better ways to succeed. Even if someone is hungry, they shouldn't act like a parasite. In moments when I considered giving up my integrity for wealth, plenty of opportunities were available to get rich. But flattery is a great way to unlock the ears of those who have been lifted high by fortune; they lower their dignity and authority by comforting themselves with it. In truth, people wouldn’t fall for the traps of others’ flattery if they remembered how much more valuable the bitterness of honesty is, compared to all the sweet lies that come from deceitful voices, which are not praise but poison. Now, it’s reached such ridiculousness, or rather madness, that someone who flatters them mildly or sparingly is seen as an enemy. If their friend doesn’t approve of their bad behavior, even if they don’t outright challenge them, they are still considered an adversary. Even when they do everything wrong, they still expect praise. In fact, they will pay people to flatter them with gifts and meals, and to sell their judgments. They have friends who only show up for the food, just like my lord has his feasts and guests.

De vitâ humanâ.—I have considered our whole life is like a play: wherein every man forgetful of himself, is in travail with expression of another.  Nay, we so insist in imitating others, as we cannot when it is necessary return to ourselves; like children, that imitate the vices of stammerers so long, till at last they become such; and make the habit to another nature, as it is never forgotten.

On Human Life.—I believe our entire life is like a play: where everyone, forgetting themselves, struggles to express someone else. In fact, we are so focused on imitating others that we often can’t return to our true selves when we need to; like children who mimic the faults of stutterers for so long that they end up becoming one themselves, making those habits a part of their nature, which is never forgotten.

De piis et probis.—Good men are the stars, the planets of the ages wherein they live and illustrate the times.  God did never let them be wanting to the world: as Abel, for an example of innocency, Enoch of purity, Noah of trust in God’s mercies, Abraham of faith, and so of the rest.  These, sensual men thought mad because they would not be partakers or practisers of their madness.  But they, placed high on the top of all virtue, looked down on the stage of the world and contemned the play of fortune.  For though the most be players, some must be spectators.

De piis et probis.—Good people are like stars and planets in the ages they live in, shining a light on the times. God never left the world without them: like Abel, an example of innocence; Enoch, a symbol of purity; Noah, a testament to faith in God’s mercy; Abraham, a representation of faith; and others. Sensual people thought they were crazy for not joining in their madness. But those virtuous individuals, standing at the pinnacle of all virtues, looked down on the world and disregarded the chaos of fortune. For while most are players in the game, some must remain spectators.

Mores aulici.—I have discovered that a feigned familiarity in great ones is a note of certain usurpation on the less.  For great and popular men feign themselves to be servants to others to make those slaves to them.  So the fisher provides bait for the trout, roach, dace, &c., that they may be food to him.

Mores aulici.—I've found that pretending to be familiar among the powerful is a sign of their control over those with less power. Influential and popular people act like they're serving others to turn them into their subordinates. Just like a fisherman uses bait to catch trout, roach, dace, etc., so that those fish become his meal.

Impiorum querela.—Augusties.—Varus.—Tiberius.—The complaint of Caligula was most wicked of the condition of his times, when he said they were not famous for any public calamity, as the reign of Augustus was, by the defeat of Varus and the legions; and that of Tiberius, by the falling of the theatre at Fidenæ; whilst his oblivion was eminent through the prosperity of his affairs.  As that other voice of his was worthier a headsman than a head when he wished the people of Rome had but one neck.  But he found when he fell they had many hands.  A tyrant, how great and mighty soever he may seem to cowards and sluggards, is but one creature, one animal.

Impiorum querela.—Augusties.—Varus.—Tiberius.—Caligula's complaint reflected the wicked nature of his times when he claimed they weren't known for any significant public disaster, unlike the reign of Augustus marked by Varus's defeat and the legions, and Tiberius's reign remembered for the theater collapse at Fidenæ; while his own legacy was overshadowed by the prosperity of his reign. His other remark was more suited for a executioner than a king when he wished that the people of Rome had just one neck. Yet, he found out when he fell that they had many hands. A tyrant, no matter how great and powerful they may appear to cowards and sloths, is just one being, one creature.

Nobilium ingenia.—I have marked among the nobility some are so addicted to the service of the prince and commonwealth, as they look not for spoil; such are to be honoured and loved.  There are others which no obligation will fasten on; and they are of two sorts.  The first are such as love their own ease; or, out of vice, of nature, or self-direction, avoid business and care.  Yet these the prince may use with safety.  The other remove themselves upon craft and design, as the architects say, with a premeditated thought, to their own rather than their prince’s profit.  Such let the prince take heed of, and not doubt to reckon in the list of his open enemies.

Nobilium ingenia.—I have observed that among the nobility, some are so dedicated to serving the prince and the community that they seek no personal gain; these individuals should be honored and loved. There are others who feel no obligation at all, and they fall into two categories. The first includes those who prioritize their own comfort or, due to vice, nature, or self-interest, avoid responsibility and effort. Still, the prince can work with these individuals without much risk. The second group actively distances themselves with cunning and intention, as architects might say, with a calculated focus on benefiting themselves rather than the prince. The prince should be wary of these individuals and should not hesitate to consider them among his open enemies.

Principum. varia.—Firmissima verò omnium basis jus hæreditarium Principis.—There is a great variation between him that is raised to the sovereignty by the favour of his peers and him that comes to it by the suffrage of the people.  The first holds with more difficulty, because he hath to do with many that think themselves his equals, and raised him for their own greatness and oppression of the rest.  The latter hath no upbraiders, but was raised by them that sought to be defended from oppression: whose end is both easier and the honester to satisfy.  Beside, while he hath the people to friend, who are a multitude, he hath the less fear of the nobility, who are but few.  Nor let the common proverb (of he that builds on the people builds on the dirt) discredit my opinion: for that hath only place where an ambitious and private person, for some popular end, trusts in them against the public justice and magistrate.  There they will leave him.  But when a prince governs them, so as they have still need of his administrations (for that is his art), he shall ever make and hold them faithful.

Principum. varia.—But the strongest foundation of all is the hereditary right of the Prince.—There is a significant difference between someone who ascends to power through the support of his peers and someone who gains it through the vote of the people. The first has a harder time maintaining his position because he has to deal with many who consider themselves his equals, and who elevated him for their own benefit and to oppress others. The latter has no criticisms aimed at him, as he was raised up by those seeking protection from oppression; their goal is both easier to achieve and more honorable. Additionally, with the support of the people, who are numerous, he has less to fear from the nobility, who are only a few. And don’t let the common saying (that he who builds on the people builds on the dirt) undermine my view: that only applies when an ambitious private individual, for some personal gain, relies on them against public justice and authority. In such cases, they will abandon him. However, when a prince governs them in a way that keeps them dependent on his leadership (for that is his skill), he will always make and keep them loyal.

Clementia.—Machiavell.—A prince should exercise his cruelty not by himself but by his ministers; so he may save himself and his dignity with his people by sacrificing those when he list, saith the great doctor of state, Machiavell.  But I say he puts off man and goes into a beast, that is cruel.  No virtue is a prince’s own, or becomes him more, than this clemency: and no glory is greater than to be able to save with his power.  Many punishments sometimes, and in some cases, as much discredit a prince, as many funerals a physician.  The state of things is secured by clemency; severity represseth a few, but irritates more. [74a]  The lopping of trees makes the boughs shoot out thicker; and the taking away of some kind of enemies increaseth the number.  It is then most gracious in a prince to pardon when many about him would make him cruel; to think then how much he can save when others tell him how much he can destroy; not to consider what the impotence of others hath demolished, but what his own greatness can sustain.  These are a prince’s virtues: and they that give him other counsels are but the hangman’s factors.

Clementia.—Machiavelli.—A prince should show cruelty not directly, but through his ministers; that way, he can protect his own dignity and reputation by sacrificing others when he chooses, says the great political thinker, Machiavelli. But I believe that when he does this, he loses his humanity and becomes beastly, which is cruel. There is no virtue more fitting for a prince than mercy: and no greater honor than the power to save. In some cases, excessive punishments can bring more shame to a prince, just as too many deaths can discredit a doctor. The situation is secured through mercy; severity controls a few, but provokes many. [74a] Pruning trees makes their branches grow thicker, and eliminating certain enemies often increases their numbers. Therefore, it is most admirable for a prince to grant pardons, especially when many around him urge cruelty; to focus on how much he can save rather than how much he can destroy; to consider not what others’ weakness has torn down, but what his own strength can uphold. These are the true virtues of a prince; those who advise otherwise are merely agents of execution.

Clementia tutela optima.—He that is cruel to halves (saith the said St. Nicholas [74b]) loseth no less the opportunity of his cruelty than of his benefits: for then to use his cruelty is too late; and to use his favours will be interpreted fear and necessity, and so he loseth the thanks.  Still the counsel is cruelty.  But princes, by hearkening to cruel counsels, become in time obnoxious to the authors, their flatterers, and ministers; and are brought to that, that when they would, they dare not change them; they must go on and defend cruelty with cruelty; they cannot alter the habit.  It is then grown necessary, they must be as ill as those have made them: and in the end they will grow more hateful to themselves than to their subjects.  Whereas, on the contrary, the merciful prince is safe in love, not in fear.  He needs no emissaries, spies, intelligencers to entrap true subjects.  He fears no libels, no treasons.  His people speak what they think, and talk openly what they do in secret.  They have nothing in their breasts that they need a cypher for.  He is guarded with his own benefits.

Clementia tutela optima.—The one who is cruel to his subjects (as St. Nicholas said [74b]) loses just as much by being cruel as he does by being kind: at that point, it's too late to be cruel, and any favors he gives will be seen as fear and necessity, which means he won’t get gratitude. Still, the advice to act cruelly remains. But when rulers listen to harsh advice, they become increasingly dependent on those who flatter them and carry out their orders; they reach a point where they can’t change direction even if they want to; they must continue to defend their cruelty with more cruelty, unable to break the pattern. They then become as bad as those who advised them, and ultimately, they will come to despise themselves more than their subjects do. In contrast, a merciful ruler is secure because of love, not fear. He doesn’t need messengers, spies, or informants to catch his loyal subjects. He fears no criticism or betrayal. His people say what they really think and discuss what they do behind closed doors. They have nothing to hide. He is protected by his own kindness.

ReligioPalladium Homeri.—Euripides.—The strength of empire is in religion.  What else is the Palladium (with Homer) that kept Troy so long from sacking?  Nothing more commends the Sovereign to the subject than it.  For he that is religious must be merciful and just necessarily: and they are two strong ties upon mankind.  Justice the virtue that innocence rejoiceth in.  Yet even that is not always so safe, but it may love to stand in the sight of mercy.  For sometimes misfortune is made a crime, and then innocence is succoured no less than virtue.  Nay, oftentimes virtue is made capital; and through the condition of the times it may happen that that may be punished with our praise.  Let no man therefore murmur at the actions of the prince, who is placed so far above him.  If he offend, he hath his discoverer.  God hath a height beyond him.  But where the prince is good, Euripides saith, “God is a guest in a human body.”

Religio. Palladium Homeri.—Euripides.—The strength of an empire lies in its religion. What else is the Palladium (with Homer) that kept Troy from being destroyed for so long? Nothing else bonds the ruler to the people quite like it. A truly religious person must be merciful and just, and those are two powerful connections to humanity. Justice is the virtue that innocence takes joy in. Yet even that isn't without risk; it might sometimes choose to be alongside mercy. Misfortune can be seen as a crime, and in those cases, innocence is supported just as much as virtue. Moreover, virtue itself can sometimes be punished; based on the times, doing the right thing may even bring us condemnation disguised as praise. So, no one should complain about the actions of the prince, who is elevated far above them. If he does wrong, there will always be someone to reveal it. God exists at a level beyond him. But when the prince is good, Euripides says, “God is a guest in a human body.”

Tyranni.—Sejanus.—There is nothing with some princes sacred above their majesty, or profane, but what violates their sceptres.  But a prince, with such a council, is like the god Terminus, of stone, his own landmark, or (as it is in the fable) a crowned lion.  It is dangerous offending such a one, who, being angry, knows not how to forgive; that cares not to do anything for maintaining or enlarging of empire; kills not men or subjects, but destroyeth whole countries, armies, mankind, male and female, guilty or not guilty, holy or profane; yea, some that have not seen the light.  All is under the law of their spoil and licence.  But princes that neglect their proper office thus their fortune is oftentimes to draw a Sejanus to be near about them, who at last affect to get above them, and put them in a worthy fear of rooting both them out and their family.  For no men hate an evil prince more than they that helped to make him such.  And none more boastingly weep his ruin than they that procured and practised it.  The same path leads to ruin which did to rule when men profess a licence in government.  A good king is a public servant.

Tyranni.—Sejanus.—Some princes view nothing as sacred or profane except what challenges their authority. But a prince surrounded by such advisors is like the stone god Terminus, marking his own boundaries, or like a crowned lion from the fable. It's risky to cross someone like this; when they're angry, they don't know how to forgive. They don't care about expanding or maintaining their empire; rather than just killing individuals or subjects, they devastate entire regions, armies, and populations—men, women, innocent or guilty, sacred or profane—even those who've never seen the light. Everything falls under their power and permission. However, when princes neglect their responsibilities, they often end up attracting someone like Sejanus to their side, who eventually seeks to outmaneuver them, instilling a real fear of wiping them and their families out. No one hates a tyrant more than those who helped create him. And no one mourns his downfall more dramatically than those who conspired against him. The path that leads to destruction is the same one that leads to power when people claim freedom in governance. A good king is a servant of the public.

Illiteratus princeps.—A prince without letters is a pilot without eyes.  All his government is groping.  In sovereignty it is a most happy thing not to be compelled; but so it is the most miserable not to be counselled.  And how can he be counselled that cannot see to read the best counsellors (which are books), for they neither flatter us nor hide from us?  He may hear, you will say; but how shall he always be sure to hear truth, or be counselled the best things, not the sweetest?  They say princes learn no art truly but the art of horsemanship.  The reason is the brave beast is no flatterer.  He will throw a prince as soon as his groom.  Which is an argument that the good counsellors to princes are the best instruments of a good age.  For though the prince himself be of a most prompt inclination to all virtue, yet the best pilots have needs of mariners besides sails, anchor, and other tackle.

Illiteratus princeps.—A prince who can’t read is like a pilot without eyes. Everything he does is just feeling around in the dark. In ruling, it's great to not be forced into anything, but it’s truly miserable to not have guidance. And how can he seek guidance if he can’t read the best advisors (which are books) since they neither flatter us nor deceive us? You might say he can listen, but how can he be sure he’s hearing the truth or receiving the best advice instead of just the sweetest? They say princes only truly learn one skill, which is riding. The reason is that a noble horse doesn’t flatter. It can throw a prince just as easily as it can throw its groom. This shows that the best advisors for princes are vital for a good era. Even if the prince is eagerly inclined toward virtue, the best leaders still need sailors along with their sails, anchors, and other equipment.

Character principis.—Alexander magnus.—If men did know what shining fetters, gilded miseries, and painted happiness thrones and sceptres were there would not be so frequent strife about the getting or holding of them; there would be more principalities than princes; for a prince is the pastor of the people.  He ought to shear, not to flay his sheep; to take their fleeces, not their the soul of the commonwealth, and ought to cherish it as his own body.  Alexander the Great was wont to say, “He hated that gardener that plucked his herbs or flowers up by the roots.”  A man may milk a beast till the blood come; churn milk and it yieldeth butter, but wring the nose and the blood followeth.  He is an ill prince that so pulls his subjects’ feathers as he would not have them grow again; that makes his exchequer a receipt for the spoils of those he governs.  No, let him keep his own, not affect his subjects’; strive rather to be called just than powerful.  Not, like the Roman tyrants, affect the surnames that grow by human slaughters; neither to seek war in peace, nor peace in war, but to observe faith given, though to an enemy.  Study piety toward the subject; show care to defend him.  Be slow to punish in divers cases, but be a sharp and severe revenger of open crimes.  Break no decrees or dissolve no orders to slacken the strength of laws.  Choose neither magistrates, civil or ecclesiastical, by favour or price; but with long disquisition and report of their worth by all suffrages.  Sell no honours, nor give them hastily, but bestow them with counsel and for reward; if he do, acknowledge it (though late), and mend it.  For princes are easy to be deceived; and what wisdom can escape where so many court-arts are studied?  But, above all, the prince is to remember that when the great day of account comes, which neither magistrate nor prince can shun, there will be required of him a reckoning for those whom he hath trusted, as for himself, which he must provide.  And if piety be wanting in the priests, equity in the judges, or the magistrates be found rated at a price, what justice or religion is to be expected? which are the only two attributes make kings akin to God, and is the Delphic sword, both to kill sacrifices and to chastise offenders.

Character principis.—Alexander magnus.—If people really understood what shiny chains, fake happiness, and empty power thrones and scepters represent, there wouldn't be so much conflict over obtaining or maintaining them. There would be more rulers than actual royals, because a prince should care for the people. He should nurture, not harm them; take from them what’s beneficial, not their very essence, and should care for them as if they are part of himself. Alexander the Great used to say, “He despised the gardener who pulled his plants up by the roots.” A person might drain an animal until it bleeds; churn milk until it becomes butter, but if you grab its nose too hard, it will bleed. A bad prince is one who plucks his subjects’ feathers in a way they can never grow back, making his treasury a place where he collects the spoils of those he leads. No, he should keep what is his, not covet what is theirs; he should want to be known as just rather than powerful. He shouldn't strive for the ruthless titles that come from slaughtering humans, nor seek conflict during peace or peace during conflict, but rather keep his word, even to an enemy. He should show compassion toward his subjects and be willing to protect them. Be careful about punishing in various situations, but be quick and harsh when dealing with serious crimes. Don’t break laws or ignore orders that weaken legal authority. Appoint magistrates, whether civil or religious, based on merit and thorough investigation, not favoritism or bribes. Don’t sell honors or give them out hastily; award them with careful consideration and for merit; if mistakes are made, acknowledge and correct them. Because rulers can easily be misled, and what sort of wisdom can prevail in an environment where numerous courtly tricks are employed? Above all, a prince must remember that when the final day of judgment comes, which no ruler can escape, he will be held accountable for those he has entrusted, as well as for himself, which he must prepare for. And if the priests lack piety, the judges lack fairness, or the magistrates are found to be corrupt, what justice or faith can anyone expect? These are the two qualities that make kings resemble God, acting as the sword of Delphi, both to deliver sacrifices and punish wrongdoers.

De gratiosis.—When a virtuous man is raised, it brings gladness to his friends, grief to his enemies, and glory to his posterity.  Nay, his honours are a great part of the honour of the times; when by this means he is grown to active men an example, to the slothful a spur, to the envious a punishment.

On Graciousness.—When a virtuous person rises, it brings joy to their friends, sadness to their enemies, and pride to their descendants. Indeed, their honors contribute significantly to the honor of the era; by this means, they serve as an example to those who are active, a motivation to the lazy, and a punishment to the envious.

Divites.—Heredes ex asse.  He which is sole heir to many rich men, having (besides his father’s and uncle’s) the estates of divers his kindred come to him by accession, must needs be richer than father or grandfather; so they which are left heirs ex asse of all their ancestors’ vices, and by their good husbandry improve the old and daily purchase new, must needs be wealthier in vice, and have a greater revenue or stock of ill to spend on.

Riches.—Heirs by full share. The person who is the sole heir to many wealthy individuals, having inherited not only from their father and uncle but also from various relatives through inheritance, must be wealthier than their father or grandfather; similarly, those who inherit ex asse all the vices of their ancestors, and through their own careful management improve upon the old and continually acquire new, must be wealthier in vice as well, possessing a greater amount of wrongdoing or resources devoted to it.

Fures publici.—The great thieves of a state are lightly the officers of the crown; they hang the less still, play the pikes in the pond, eat whom they list.  The net was never spread for the hawk or buzzard that hurt us, but the harmless birds; they are good meat:—

Fures publici.—The biggest thieves in a state are often the officials of the crown; they face little consequence, act as predators in the pond, and feast on whoever they choose. The traps were never set for the hawk or buzzard that harmed us, but for the innocent birds; they make for good meals:—

“Dat veniam corvis, vexat censura columbas.” [81a]
“Non rete accipitri tenditur, neque milvio.” [81b]

“Give permission to the crows, but the criticism bothers the doves.” [81a]
“A net is not set for the hawk, nor for the kite.” [81b]

Lewis XI.—But they are not always safe though, especially when they meet with wise masters.  They can take down all the huff and swelling of their looks, and like dexterous auditors place the counter where he shall value nothing.  Let them but remember Lewis XI., who to a Clerk of the Exchequer that came to be Lord Treasurer, and had (for his device) represented himself sitting on fortune’s wheel, told him he might do well to fasten it with a good strong nail, lest, turning about, it might bring him where he was again.  As indeed it did.

Lewis XI.—But they’re not always safe, especially when they encounter wise leaders. They can strip away all the bluster and arrogance in their demeanor, and like skilled listeners, they can challenge someone’s worth. They just need to remember Lewis XI., who told a Clerk of the Exchequer, who had become Lord Treasurer and depicted himself sitting on Fortune’s wheel, that he might want to secure it with a strong nail, or else it might spin him back to where he started. And indeed, it did.

De bonis et malis.—De innocentiâ.—A good man will avoid the spot of any sin.  The very aspersion is grievous, which makes him choose his way in his life as he would in his journey.  The ill man rides through all confidently; he is coated and booted for it.  The oftener he offends, the more openly, and the fouler, the fitter in fashion.  His modesty, like a riding-coat, the more it is worn is the less cared for.  It is good enough for the dirt still, and the ways he travels in.  An innocent man needs no eloquence, his innocence is instead of it, else I had never come off so many times from these precipices, whither men’s malice hath pursued me.  It is true I have been accused to the lords, to the king, and by great ones, but it happened my accusers had not thought of the accusation with themselves, and so were driven, for want of crimes, to use invention, which was found slander, or too late (being entered so fair) to seek starting-holes for their rashness, which were not given them.  And then they may think what accusation that was like to prove, when they that were the engineers feared to be the authors.  Nor were they content to feign things against me, but to urge things, feigned by the ignorant, against my profession, which though, from their hired and mercenary impudence, I might have passed by as granted to a nation of barkers that let out their tongues to lick others’ sores; yet I durst not leave myself undefended, having a pair of ears unskilful to hear lies, or have those things said of me which I could truly prove of them.  They objected making of verses to me, when I could object to most of them, their not being able to read them, but as worthy of scorn.  Nay, they would offer to urge mine own writings against me, but by pieces (which was an excellent way of malice), as if any man’s context might not seem dangerous and offensive, if that which was knit to what went before were defrauded of his beginning; or that things by themselves uttered might not seem subject to calumny, which read entire would appear most free.  At last they upbraided my poverty: I confess she is my domestic; sober of diet, simple of habit, frugal, painful, a good counseller to me, that keeps me from cruelty, pride, or other more delicate impertinences, which are the nurse-children of riches.  But let them look over all the great and monstrous wickednesses, they shall never find those in poor families.  They are the issue of the wealthy giants and the mighty hunters, whereas no great work, or worthy of praise or memory, but came out of poor cradles.  It was the ancient poverty that founded commonweals, built cities, invented arts, made wholesome laws, armed men against vices, rewarded them with their own virtues, and preserved the honour and state of nations, till they betrayed themselves to riches.

On Good and Evil.—On Innocence.—A good person will steer clear of any sin. The mere stain is painful, prompting them to choose their path in life just as they would on a journey. The wicked person travels through everything with confidence; they are prepared for it. The more they sin, the more brazenly and shamelessly, like it’s in style. Their modesty, like an old jacket, becomes less cared for the more it’s worn. It’s still good enough for the dirt and the paths they take. An innocent person doesn’t need grand words; their innocence speaks for itself. Otherwise, I wouldn’t have escaped so many times from the dangers where people’s malice has chased me. It’s true I’ve faced accusations from lords, the king, and powerful figures, but it turns out my accusers hadn’t fully thought through their charges and were, as a result, forced to resort to fabrications when they couldn’t find real crimes—these turned out to be slander or, having begun so boldly, they were too late in looking for excuses for their rashness, which weren’t given to them. They ought to think about how likely their accusations were to stand when those who plotted them were afraid to be the ones making them. They weren’t satisfied with just inventing charges against me; they also tried to twist the misunderstandings of the ignorant against my profession. Though I could have dismissed their hired foolishness as petty complaints from a group of loudmouths gossiping about others' misfortunes, I couldn’t leave myself undefended. I have ears that are untrained to hear lies or to endure false statements about me that I could easily prove untrue about them. They accused me of writing poetry, when I could point out that many of them couldn’t even read it, making their opinions laughable. They even attempted to use my own writings against me, but only in parts (a brilliant move of malice), as if any text couldn't seem dangerous and offensive if removed from its context. Or as if isolated statements couldn’t be subject to slander that would appear innocent in their entirety. Finally, they criticized my poverty: I admit she is my constant companion; she’s moderate in her needs, straightforward in her ways, economical, hardworking, and a good advisor who keeps me from cruelty, arrogance, and other frivolities that wealth fosters. But if they were to look past all the great and monstrous evils, they would never find these in poor households. Those are the product of wealthy tyrants and powerful hunters, while no important work or anything worthy of praise or remembrance has ever emerged from anything but humble beginnings. It was ancient poverty that built societies, established cities, innovated the arts, created fair laws, armed people against vice, rewarded them with their own virtues, and upheld the honor and state of nations until they betrayed themselves for riches.

Amor nummi.—Money never made any man rich, but his mind.  He that can order himself to the law of Nature is not only without the sense but the fear of poverty.  O! but to strike blind the people with our wealth and pomp is the thing!  What a wretchedness is this, to thrust all our riches outward, and be beggars within; to contemplate nothing but the little, vile, and sordid things of the world; not the great, noble, and precious!  We serve our avarice, and, not content with the good of the earth that is offered us, we search and dig for the evil that is hidden.  God offered us those things, and placed them at hand, and near us, that He knew were profitable for us, but the hurtful He laid deep and hid.  Yet do we seek only the things whereby we may perish, and bring them forth, when God and Nature hath buried them.  We covet superfluous things, when it were more honour for us if we would contemn necessary.  What need hath Nature of silver dishes, multitudes of waiters, delicate pages, perfumed napkins?  She requires meat only, and hunger is not ambitious.  Can we think no wealth enough but such a state for which a man may be brought into a premunire, begged, proscribed, or poisoned?  O! if a man could restrain the fury of his gullet and groin, and think how many fires, how many kitchens, cooks, pastures, and ploughed lands; what orchards, stews, ponds and parks, coops and garners, he could spare; what velvets, tissues, embroideries, laces, he could lack; and then how short and uncertain his life is; he were in a better way to happiness than to live the emperor of these delights, and be the dictator of fashions; but we make ourselves slaves to our pleasures, and we serve fame and ambition, which is an equal slavery.  Have not I seen the pomp of a whole kingdom, and what a foreign king could bring hither?  Also to make himself gazed and wondered at—laid forth, as it were, to the show—and vanish all away in a day?  And shall that which could not fill the expectation of few hours, entertain and take up our whole lives, when even it appeared as superfluous to the possessors as to me that was a spectator?  The bravery was shown, it was not possessed; while it boasted itself it perished.  It is vile, and a poor thing to place our happiness on these desires.  Say we wanted them all.  Famine ends famine.

Amor nummi.—Money never truly makes a person rich, but rather their mind does. Someone who can align themselves with the law of Nature is free from the feeling and fear of poverty. Oh! But the goal is to blind people with our wealth and showiness! How miserable it is to flaunt all our riches outwardly while being broke inside; to focus only on the small, disgusting, and petty things of the world instead of the great, noble, and valuable ones! We serve our greed, and instead of appreciating the good things the earth offers us, we dig for the harmful secrets hidden away. God provided us with what He knew would benefit us and placed it right in front of us, but He buried the harmful things deep. Yet we only seek the things that could lead us to ruin and bring them out when God and Nature have buried them. We desire unnecessary things, when it would be more dignified for us to disregard the necessary ones. What does Nature need with silver dishes, countless waiters, fancy servers, or perfumed napkins? She only needs food, and hunger knows no ambition. Can we consider any wealth sufficient if it leads a person to be imprisoned, humiliated, or poisoned? Oh! If a person could control their cravings and consider how many resources—how many kitchens, cooks, fields, orchards, ponds, parks, coops, and storages—they could forgo; what luxury fabrics, embroideries, and laces they could live without; and remember how short and uncertain life is, they would be better off seeking happiness rather than living as the emperor of these pleasures and dictating trends. Yet we make ourselves slaves to our pleasures, serving fame and ambition, both of which are equal forms of slavery. Have I not seen the splendor of an entire kingdom and what a foreign king could bring here? To make himself the center of attention—displayed for all to see—and then vanish within a day? And should something that failed to meet expectations for even a few hours occupy our entire lives, when it seemed just as unnecessary to the owners as it did to me as a spectator? The showiness was on display, not truly owned; while it boasted, it faded away. It's degrading and foolish to base our happiness on these desires. Suppose we lacked them all. Hunger begets hunger.

De mollibus et effœminatis.—There is nothing valiant or solid to be hoped for from such as are always kempt and perfumed, and every day smell of the tailor; the exceedingly curious that are wholly in mending such an imperfection in the face, in taking away the morphew in the neck, or bleaching their hands at midnight, gumming and bridling their beards, or making the waist small, binding it with hoops, while the mind runs at waste; too much pickedness is not manly.  Not from those that will jest at their own outward imperfections, but hide their ulcers within, their pride, lust, envy, ill-nature, with all the art and authority they can.  These persons are in danger, for whilst they think to justify their ignorance by impudence, and their persons by clothes and outward ornaments, they use but a commission to deceive themselves: where, if we will look with our understanding, and not our senses, we may behold virtue and beauty (though covered with rags) in their brightness; and vice and deformity so much the fouler, in having all the splendour of riches to gild them, or the false light of honour and power to help them.  Yet this is that wherewith the world is taken, and runs mad to gaze on—clothes and titles, the birdlime of fools.

On the Soft and Effeminate.—There's nothing brave or solid to be expected from those who are always well-groomed and scented, and who daily carry the fragrance of their tailor; those who obsess over fixing minor flaws in their appearance, like removing blemishes from their necks, or whitening their hands at night, fussing over their beards, or shrinking their waists with hoops, while their minds are left to wander aimlessly; being overly meticulous isn't manly. Not from those who joke about their external flaws but conceal their deeper wounds—pride, lust, envy, and bad temper—with all the artifice and authority they can muster. These individuals are at risk, for while they believe they can cover their ignorance with boldness and their image with clothes and outward adornments, they only grant themselves permission to deceive. If we choose to see with our understanding rather than our senses, we can recognize virtue and beauty (even when cloaked in rags) in their true form; and we can also see vice and ugliness much more clearly when they're draped in the glitter of wealth or illuminated by the false lights of honor and power. Yet this is what captures the attention of the world and drives it mad—clothing and titles, the traps for fools.

De stultitiâ.—What petty things they are we wonder at, like children that esteem every trifle, and prefer a fairing before their fathers!  What difference is between us and them but that we are dearer fools, coxcombs at a higher rate?  They are pleased with cockleshells, whistles, hobby-horses, and such like; we with statues, marble pillars, pictures, gilded roofs, where underneath is lath and lime, perhaps loam.  Yet we take pleasure in the lie, and are glad we can cozen ourselves.  Nor is it only in our walls and ceilings, but all that we call happiness is mere painting and gilt, and all for money.  What a thin membrane of honour that is! and how hath all true reputation fallen, since money began to have any!  Yet the great herd, the multitude, that in all other things are divided, in this alone conspire and agree—to love money.  They wish for it, they embrace it, they adore it, while yet it is possessed with greater stir and torment than it is gotten.

On Stupidity.—What trivial things we marvel at, like kids who value every little thing and prefer treats over their parents! What’s the difference between us and them, except that we’re more expensive fools, show-offs at a higher cost? They get excited about shells, whistles, and toy horses; we’re satisfied with statues, marble columns, paintings, and gilded ceilings, which are often just flimsy plaster and maybe dirt. Yet we enjoy the deception and are happy to fool ourselves. It’s not just in our walls and ceilings, but everything we call happiness is just decoration and gold, all for the sake of money. What a flimsy concept of honor that is! And how much true reputation has declined since money started to matter! Yet the vast crowd, the masses, who disagree on almost everything, all come together in this one thing—to love money. They crave it, they cling to it, they worship it, even though having it comes with more stress and turmoil than getting it.

De sibi molestis.—Some men what losses soever they have they make them greater, and if they have none, even all that is not gotten is a loss.  Can there be creatures of more wretched condition than these, that continually labour under their own misery and others’ envy?  A man should study other things, not to covet, not to fear, not to repent him; to make his base such as no tempest shall shake him; to be secure of all opinion, and pleasing to himself, even for that wherein he displeaseth others; for the worst opinion gotten for doing well, should delight us.  Wouldst not thou be just but for fame, thou oughtest to be it with infamy; he that would have his virtue published is not the servant of virtue, but glory.

De sibi molestis.—Some people, no matter what losses they face, only make them seem bigger, and if they haven’t lost anything, they see everything that’s not gained as a loss. Can there be anyone more miserable than those who are constantly burdened by their own suffering and other people’s envy? A person should focus on other things—like not craving, not fearing, and not regretting—so that they can build a foundation that no storm can shake; to be secure in their own opinions and find satisfaction in themselves, even if it upsets others; for the worst reputation earned from doing the right thing should make us happy. If you would only be just for the sake of reputation, then you should be just even if it brings you shame; someone who wants their virtue recognized isn’t serving virtue but rather seeking glory.

Periculosa melancholia.—It is a dangerous thing when men’s minds come to sojourn with their affections, and their diseases eat into their strength; that when too much desire and greediness of vice hath made the body unfit, or unprofitable, it is yet gladded with the sight and spectacle of it in others; and for want of ability to be an actor, is content to be a witness.  It enjoys the pleasure of sinning in beholding others sin, as in dining, drinking, drabbing, &c.  Nay, when it cannot do all these, it is offended with his own narrowness, that excludes it from the universal delights of mankind, and oftentimes dies of a melancholy, that it cannot be vicious enough.

Periculosa melancholia.—It's a dangerous situation when people's minds linger on their passions, and their issues drain their strength; that when excessive desire and greed for vice have left the body unfit or useless, it still finds joy in seeing it in others; and due to the inability to participate, it settles for being a spectator. It derives pleasure from the sins of others, like dining, drinking, and partying, etc. In fact, when it can't engage in any of these, it feels frustrated by its own limitations that prevent it from sharing in the pleasures of humanity, and often ends up suffering from a sadness because it can't be wicked enough.

Falsæ species fugiendæ.—I am glad when I see any man avoid the infamy of a vice; but to shun the vice itself were better.  Till he do that he is but like the ’pientice, who, being loth to be spied by his master coming forth of Black Lucy’s, went in again; to whom his master cried, “The more thou runnest that way to hide thyself, the more thou art in the place.”  So are those that keep a tavern all day, that they may not be seen at night.  I have known lawyers, divines—yea, great ones—of this heresy.

Avoiding False Appearances.—I feel glad when I see someone steer clear of the shame of a vice; but it’s even better to avoid the vice itself. Until that happens, he’s like an apprentice who, not wanting to be caught by his master coming out of Black Lucy’s, sneaks back inside; to whom his master shouts, “The more you run that way to hide, the more you are stuck in that place.” The same goes for those who hang out at a tavern all day to avoid being seen at night. I’ve known lawyers, clergy—yes, even notable ones—who subscribe to this kind of thinking.

Decipimur specie.—There is a greater reverence had of things remote or strange to us than of much better if they be nearer and fall under our sense.  Men, and almost all sorts of creatures, have their reputation by distance.  Rivers, the farther they run, and more from their spring, the broader they are, and greater.  And where our original is known, we are less the confident; among strangers we trust fortune.  Yet a man may live as renowned at home, in his own country, or a private village, as in the whole world.  For it is virtue that gives glory; that will endenizen a man everywhere.  It is only that can naturalise him.  A native, if he be vicious, deserves to be a stranger, and cast out of the commonwealth as an alien.

Decipimur specie.—We tend to hold a greater respect for things that are distant or unfamiliar to us than for things that are much better but closer and within our reach. People, and almost all kinds of beings, earn their reputation through distance. Rivers, the farther they flow from their source, become wider and larger. When our origins are known, we feel less confident; among strangers, we rely on luck. However, a person can be just as renowned in their own country or a small village as they are in the entire world. It is virtue that brings glory; that will make someone feel at home anywhere. It is the only thing that can truly integrate them. A local, if they are corrupt, deserves to be treated like a stranger and excluded from the community as an outsider.

Dejectio Aulic.—A dejected countenance and mean clothes beget often a contempt, but it is with the shallowest creatures; courtiers commonly: look up even with them in a new suit, you get above them straight.  Nothing is more short-lived than pride; it is but while their clothes last: stay but while these are worn out, you cannot wish the thing more wretched or dejected.

Dejectio Aulic.—A downcast expression and shabby clothes often lead to disdain, but that’s mostly from superficial people; courtiers usually. If you show up in a new outfit, you’ll immediately rise above them. Nothing is more fleeting than pride; it only lasts as long as their clothes. Once those wear out, you couldn’t wish for anything more miserable or downhearted.

Poesis, et pictura.—Plutarch.  Poetry and picture are arts of a like nature, and both are busy about imitation.  It was excellently said of Plutarch, poetry was a speaking picture, and picture a mute poesy.  For they both invent, feign and devise many things, and accommodate all they invent to the use and service of Nature.  Yet of the two, the pen is more noble than the pencil; for that can speak to the understanding, the other but to the sense.  They both behold pleasure and profit as their common object; but should abstain from all base pleasures, lest they should err from their end, and, while they seek to better men’s minds, destroy their manners.  They both are born artificers, not made.  Nature is more powerful in them than study.

Poetry, and painting.—Plutarch. Poetry and painting are similar arts that focus on imitation. Plutarch said it well: poetry is a speaking picture, and painting is a silent poem. Both of them create, imagine, and design many things, shaping everything they create for the benefit and service of Nature. However, of the two, the pen is more noble than the brush; the pen communicates to the intellect, while the brush appeals to the senses. They both aim for pleasure and benefit, but they should avoid any low pleasures that might lead them astray from their purpose. In their pursuit to enrich people's minds, they must not compromise their morals. They are both innate craftspeople, not simply trained. Nature holds more power over them than study.

De pictura.—Whosoever loves not picture is injurious to truth and all the wisdom of poetry.  Picture is the invention of heaven, the most ancient and most akin to Nature.  It is itself a silent work, and always of one and the same habit; yet it doth so enter and penetrate the inmost affection (being done by an excellent artificer) as sometimes it overcomes the power of speech and oratory.  There are divers graces in it, so are there in the artificers.  One excels in care, another in reason, a third in easiness, a fourth in nature and grace.  Some have diligence and comeliness, but they want majesty.  They can express a human form in all the graces, sweetness, and elegancy, but, they miss the authority.  They can hit nothing but smooth cheeks; they cannot express roughness or gravity.  Others aspire to truth so much as they are rather lovers of likeness than beauty.  Zeuxis and Parrhasius are said to be contemporaries; the first found out the reason of lights and shadows in picture, the other more subtlely examined the line.

On Painting.—Anyone who doesn’t love painting is harming truth and all the wisdom of poetry. Painting is a divine creation, the most ancient and closest to Nature. It is a silent art form that remains consistent; yet, when created by a skilled artisan, it can deeply touch the heart, sometimes surpassing the power of words and eloquence. It has various qualities, just like its creators. Some excel in precision, others in reasoning, some in ease, and others in natural beauty and grace. Some exhibit diligence and charm, but they lack grandeur. They can depict human forms with all the grace, sweetness, and elegance, but lack authority. They can only capture smooth faces; they can’t convey roughness or seriousness. Others aim for accuracy so much that they become more enamored with likeness than with beauty. Zeuxis and Parrhasius are said to be contemporaries; the former discovered the principles of light and shadow in painting, while the latter more subtly explored line.

De stylo.—Pliny.—In picture light is required no less than shadow; so in style, height as well as humbleness.  But beware they be not too humble, as Pliny pronounced of Regulus’s writings.  You would think them written, not on a child, but by a child.  Many, out of their own obscene apprehensions, refuse proper and fit words—as occupy, Nature, and the like; so the curious industry in some, of having all alike good, hath come nearer a vice than a virtue.

On Style.—Pliny.—In painting, light is just as important as shadow; similarly, in writing, both grandeur and simplicity are needed. But be careful not to let simplicity go too far, as Pliny commented on Regulus’s writings. You would think they were written, not by an adult, but by a child. Many, due to their own inappropriate sensitivities, avoid the right and suitable words—like occupy, nature, and so on; thus, the obsessive pursuit by some to make everything equally good has become more of a flaw than a quality.

De progres. picturæ. [93]  Picture took her feigning from poetry; from geometry her rule, compass, lines, proportion, and the whole symmetry.  Parrhasius was the first won reputation by adding symmetry to picture; he added subtlety to the countenance, elegancy to the hair, love-lines to the face, and by the public voice of all artificers, deserved honour in the outer lines.  Eupompus gave it splendour by numbers and other elegancies.  From the optics it drew reasons, by which it considered how things placed at distance and afar off should appear less; how above or beneath the head should deceive the eye, &c.  So from thence it took shadows, recessor, light, and heightnings.  From moral philosophy it took the soul, the expression of senses, perturbations, manners, when they would paint an angry person, a proud, an inconstant, an ambitious, a brave, a magnanimous, a just, a merciful, a compassionate, an humble, a dejected, a base, and the like; they made all heightnings bright, all shadows dark, all swellings from a plane, all solids from breaking.  See where he complains of their painting Chimæras [94] (by the vulgar unaptly called grotesque) saying that men who were born truly to study and emulate Nature did nothing but make monsters against Nature, which Horace so laughed at. [95] The art plastic was moulding in clay, or potter’s earth anciently.  This is the parent of statuary, sculpture, graving, and picture; cutting in brass and marble, all serve under her.  Socrates taught Parrhasius and Clito (two noble statuaries) first to express manners by their looks in imagery.  Polygnotus and Aglaophon were ancienter.  After them Zeuxis, who was the lawgiver to all painters; after, Parrhasius.  They were contemporaries, and lived both about Philip’s time, the father of Alexander the Great.  There lived in this latter age six famous painters in Italy, who were excellent and emulous of the ancients—Raphael de Urbino, Michael Angelo Buonarotti, Titian, Antony of Correggio, Sebastian of Venice, Julio Romano, and Andrea Sartorio.

De progres. picturæ. [93] Picture took its inspiration from poetry, and from geometry it drew its rules, compass, lines, proportions, and overall symmetry. Parrhasius was the first to gain fame by introducing symmetry to painting; he added subtlety to the face, elegance to the hair, and emotional lines to the expression, and by the consensus of all artists, he earned respect in the outer details. Eupompus added richness through numbers and other refinements. From optics, it derived the principles that determine how objects at a distance appear smaller, and how positioning above or below the eye can create illusions. It also incorporated shadows, depth, light, and highlights. From moral philosophy, it captured the soul, the expressions of senses, emotions, and traits, painting representations of angry, proud, fickle, ambitious, brave, noble, just, merciful, compassionate, humble, dejected, and base characters; they made all highlights bright, all shadows dark, all elevations pronounced, and all forms distinct. Notice where he criticizes their depictions of Chimeras [94] (inappropriately referred to as grotesque by the masses), saying that those who were truly meant to study and emulate Nature only created monstrous distortions of it, something Horace mockingly noted. [95] The art of sculpture originated with molding clay or pottery. This is the source of statuary, sculpture, engraving, and painting; cutting in brass and marble all fall under this category. Socrates taught Parrhasius and Clito (two renowned sculptors) how to convey emotions through expressions in their art. Polygnotus and Aglaophon were earlier artists. Following them was Zeuxis, who became a foundational figure for all painters; then came Parrhasius. They were contemporaries, living around the time of Philip, the father of Alexander the Great. In this later period, six famous painters thrived in Italy, excelling and competing with the ancients—Raphael of Urbino, Michelangelo Buonarotti, Titian, Antonio Allegri da Correggio, Sebastiano del Piombo, Giulio Romano, and Andrea del Sarto.

Parasiti ad mensam.—These are flatterers for their bread, that praise all my oraculous lord does or says, be it true or false; invent tales that shall please; make baits for his lordship’s ears; and if they be not received in what they offer at, they shift a point of the compass, and turn their tale, presently tack about, deny what they confessed, and confess what they denied; fit their discourse to the persons and occasions.  What they snatch up and devour at one table, utter at another; and grow suspected of the master, hated of the servants, while they inquire, and reprehend, and compound, and dilate business of the house they have nothing to do with.  They praise my lord’s wine and the sauce he likes; observe the cook and bottle-man; while they stand in my lord’s favour, speak for a pension for them, but pound them to dust upon my lord’s least distaste, or change of his palate.

Parasiti ad mensam.—These are the flatterers who butter up my influential lord, praising everything he does or says, whether it's true or false; they create stories to please him; they craft compliments for his ears, and if their flattery isn’t accepted, they quickly change their tune, flip their narrative, deny what they previously said, and admit to things they once rejected; they adapt their conversations to suit the people and situations. What they grab and consume at one gathering, they share at another; they become suspected by the master and disliked by the servants, all while meddling in issues of the household that are none of their concern. They rave about my lord’s wine and his favorite dishes; they keep an eye on the cook and the steward; as long as they’re in my lord’s good graces, they advocate for a pension for themselves, but at the slightest sign of my lord’s displeasure or change in taste, they are quick to tear them apart.

How much better is it to be silent, or at least to speak sparingly! for it is not enough to speak good, but timely things.  If a man be asked a question, to answer; but to repeat the question before he answer is well, that he be sure to understand it, to avoid absurdity; for it is less dishonour to hear imperfectly than to speak imperfectly.  The ears are excused, the understanding is not.  And in things unknown to a man, not to give his opinion, lest by the affectation of knowing too much he lose the credit he hath, by speaking or knowing the wrong way what he utters.  Nor seek to get his patron’s favour by embarking himself in the factions of the family, to inquire after domestic simulties, their sports or affections.  They are an odious and vile kind of creatures, that fly about the house all day, and picking up the filth of the house like pies or swallows, carry it to their nest (the lord’s ears), and oftentimes report the lies they have feigned for what they have seen and heard.

How much better it is to be silent, or at least to speak less! It's not just about saying good things, but also saying them at the right time. If someone asks a question, it’s fine to repeat it before answering, just to make sure you understand it and avoid any confusion; it’s less embarrassing to listen imperfectly than to speak imperfectly. Ears can be excused, but understanding cannot. When faced with things unknown, it’s wise not to give an opinion, as pretending to know too much can damage your credibility if you say the wrong thing. Also, don't try to win your patron's favor by getting involved in family disputes or prying into their private matters, their interests, or affections. Such people are despicable, buzzing around the house all day, picking up dirt like magpies or swallows, and bringing it back to their nests (the lord’s ears), often spreading lies they’ve made up based on what they claim to have seen and heard.

Imò serviles.—These are called instruments of grace and power with great persons, but they are indeed the organs of their impotency, and marks of weakness.  For sufficient lords are able to make these discoveries themselves.  Neither will an honourable person inquire who eats and drinks together, what that man plays, whom this man loves, with whom such a one walks, what discourse they hold, who sleeps with whom.  They are base and servile natures that busy themselves about these disquisitions.  How often have I seen (and worthily) these censors of the family undertaken by some honest rustic and cudgelled thriftily!  These are commonly the off-scouring and dregs of men that do these things, or calumniate others; yet I know not truly which is worse—he that maligns all, or that praises all.  There is as a vice in praising, and as frequent, as in detracting.

Servants of the ego.—These are known as tools of grace and power among influential people, but they are really just signs of their weakness and inability. Truly capable leaders can make these observations themselves. An honorable person wouldn’t pry into who’s dining together, what someone else is playing, who another loves, who someone is strolling with, the conversations they have, or who is spending the night together. It’s lowly and servile individuals who occupy themselves with such matters. How many times have I seen, justly, these family critics taken down a notch by some honest farmer with a good whack! Those who engage in such gossip are usually the worst of humanity, either slandering others or defaming all. However, I truly don't know which is worse—those who criticize everyone or those who praise everyone. There is as much vice in praise as there is in criticism.

It pleased your lordship of late to ask my opinion touching the education of your sons, and especially to the advancement of their studies.  To which, though I returned somewhat for the present, which rather manifested a will in me than gave any just resolution to the thing propounded, I have upon better cogitation called those aids about me, both of mind and memory, which shall venture my thoughts clearer, if not fuller, to your lordship’s demand.  I confess, my lord, they will seem but petty and minute things I shall offer to you, being writ for children, and of them.  But studies have their infancy as well as creatures.  We see in men even the strongest compositions had their beginnings from milk and the cradle; and the wisest tarried sometimes about apting their mouths to letters and syllables.  In their education, therefore, the care must be the greater had of their beginnings, to know, examine, and weigh their natures; which, though they be proner in some children to some disciplines, yet are they naturally prompt to taste all by degrees, and with change.  For change is a kind of refreshing in studies, and infuseth knowledge by way of recreation.  Thence the school itself is called a play or game, and all letters are so best taught to scholars.  They should not be affrighted or deterred in their entry, but drawn on with exercise and emulation.  A youth should not be made to hate study before he know the causes to love it, or taste the bitterness before the sweet; but called on and allured, entreated and praised—yea, when he deserves it not.  For which cause I wish them sent to the best school, and a public, which I think the best.  Your lordship, I fear, hardly hears of that, as willing to breed them in your eye and at home, and doubting their manners may be corrupted abroad.  They are in more danger in your own family, among ill servants (allowing they be safe in their schoolmaster), than amongst a thousand boys, however immodest.  Would we did not spoil our own children, and overthrow their manners ourselves by too much indulgence!  To breed them at home is to breed them in a shade, whereas in a school they have the light and heat of the sun.  They are used and accustomed to things and men.  When they come forth into the common-wealth, they find nothing new, or to seek.  They have made their friendships and aids, some to last their age.  They hear what is commanded to others as well as themselves; much approved, much corrected; all which they bring to their own store and use, and learn as much as they hear.  Eloquence would be but a poor thing if we should only converse with singulars, speak but man and man together.  Therefore I like no private breeding.  I would send them where their industry should be daily increased by praise, and that kindled by emulation.  It is a good thing to inflame the mind; and though ambition itself be a vice, it is often the cause of great virtue.  Give me that wit whom praise excites, glory puts on, or disgrace grieves; he is to be nourished with ambition, pricked forward with honour, checked with reprehension, and never to be suspected of sloth.  Though he be given to play, it is a sign of spirit and liveliness, so there be a mean had of their sports and relaxations.  And from the rod or ferule I would have them free, as from the menace of them; for it is both deformed and servile.

It recently pleased you, my lord, to ask for my thoughts on the education of your sons, particularly regarding their academic progress. Although I initially responded with only a few ideas, which reflected my willingness more than provided a solid solution to the issue, I have since given it more thought. I've gathered my insights and memories, which I hope will clarify my thoughts for your lordship's inquiry. I admit, my lord, what I will offer may seem trivial and minor, being written for children. However, education has its early stages just like living beings do. We see that even the strongest people started from infancy, and the wisest had to spend time learning their letters and sounds. Therefore, it's crucial to pay close attention to their beginnings, understanding and assessing their natures; some children are naturally inclined toward certain subjects, yet they are all ready to explore various topics gradually and with variety. Change serves as a refreshing element in education, introducing knowledge through the enjoyment of learning. That's why school is often referred to as a play or game, and letters are best taught to students in that spirit. They shouldn't be frightened or discouraged as they start but rather motivated through practice and competition. A young person shouldn’t be made to dislike studying before even having the chance to appreciate it, nor should they experience the unpleasantness before knowing the sweetness; they should be invited, encouraged, persuaded, and praised—even when they don’t deserve it. For this reason, I recommend sending them to an excellent public school, which I believe is the best option. I worry that your lordship may resist this, preferring to keep them close to home, fearing that their behavior might be negatively influenced elsewhere. However, they are at greater risk at home, among bad servants (assuming they are safe with their schoolmaster), than among a thousand unruly boys. How unfortunate it is that we often damage our own children’s behavior by being overly lenient! Raising them at home is like raising them in a shadow, while in a school, they benefit from the brightness and warmth of the sun. There, they become familiar with different experiences and people. When they enter society, they won't find anything new or unexpected. They've formed friendships and support networks that may last a lifetime. They hear what is expected of others as well as themselves, receiving both praise and correction; all of which they use to enrich their own knowledge and skills. Eloquence would suffer if we only conversed with individuals, speaking only between one person and another. That's why I disapprove of private education. I would send them where their efforts are continually encouraged by praise, and that enthusiasm is fueled by competition. It’s beneficial to stimulate the mind; although ambition can be a flaw, it frequently leads to great virtues. Give me a young person whose ambition is stirred by praise, who seeks glory and feels disappointment when shamed; such a person must be nurtured with ambition, motivated by honor, corrected when wrong, and never suspected of laziness. Even if they enjoy play, it shows a spirited nature, as long as there is a balance in their leisure activities. I would want them free from punishment or threats, as those are both unseemly and demeaning.

De stylo, et optimo scribendi genere.—For a man to write well, there are required three necessaries—to read the best authors, observe the best speakers, and much exercise of his own style; in style to consider what ought to be written, and after what manner.  He must first think and excogitate his matter, then choose his words, and examine the weight of either.  Then take care, in placing and ranking both matter and words, that the composition be comely; and to do this with diligence and often.  No matter how slow the style be at first, so it be laboured and accurate; seek the best, and be not glad of the froward conceits, or first words, that offer themselves to us; but judge of what we invent, and order what we approve.  Repeat often what we have formerly written; which beside that it helps the consequence, and makes the juncture better, it quickens the heat of imagination, that often cools in the time of setting down, and gives it new strength, as if it grew lustier by the going back; as we see in the contention of leaping, they jump farthest that fetch their race largest; or, as in throwing a dart or javelin, we force back our arms to make our loose the stronger.  Yet, if we have a fair gale of wind, I forbid not the steering out of our sail, so the favour of the gale deceive us not.  For all that we invent doth please us in conception of birth, else we would never set it down.  But the safest is to return to our judgment, and handle over again those things the easiness of which might make them justly suspected.  So did the best writers in their beginnings; they imposed upon themselves care and industry; they did nothing rashly: they obtained first to write well, and then custom made it easy and a habit.  By little and little their matter showed itself to them more plentifully; their words answered, their composition followed; and all, as in a well-ordered family, presented itself in the place.  So that the sum of all is, ready writing makes not good writing, but good writing brings on ready writing yet, when we think we have got the faculty, it is even then good to resist it, as to give a horse a check sometimes with a bit, which doth not so much stop his course as stir his mettle.  Again, whether a man’s genius is best able to reach thither, it should more and more contend, lift and dilate itself, as men of low stature raise themselves on their toes, and so ofttimes get even, if not eminent.  Besides, as it is fit for grown and able writers to stand of themselves, and work with their own strength, to trust and endeavour by their own faculties, so it is fit for the beginner and learner to study others and the best.  For the mind and memory are more sharply exercised in comprehending another man’s things than our own; and such as accustom themselves and are familiar with the best authors shall ever and anon find somewhat of them in themselves, and in the expression of their minds, even when they feel it not, be able to utter something like theirs, which hath an authority above their own.  Nay, sometimes it is the reward of a man’s study, the praise of quoting another man fitly; and though a man be more prone and able for one kind of writing than another, yet he must exercise all.  For as in an instrument, so in style, there must be a harmony and consent of parts.

On Style, and the Best Way to Write.—To write well, a person needs three essential things: to read the best authors, observe the best speakers, and practice their own writing style a lot. In terms of style, they should think about what they want to say and how to say it. They must first reflect and develop their ideas, then select their words and weigh both carefully. It's important to arrange both the ideas and the words in a way that makes the composition attractive, and to do this diligently and often. No matter how slow the writing feels at first, as long as it is well thought out and accurate, one should aim for the best and not be satisfied with the first thoughts that come to mind. We must evaluate what we create and organize what we approve of. Frequently revisiting what we have previously written helps with continuity and improves coherence; it reignites creative energy, which can fade during the writing process, giving it new strength, just like athletes who jump further when they take a longer run-up, or javelin throwers who pull their arms back to enhance their throw. However, if the writing is flowing well, I don’t discourage exploring that direction, provided we’re not misled by the momentum. Everything we create initially pleases us in our thoughts, or else we wouldn’t write it down. But the safest approach is to return to our judgment and reconsider those things that might be too easy to seem credible. The best writers did the same at the beginning; they required themselves to be careful and diligent; they didn’t act impulsively. They first learned to write well, and then it became easier through practice. Little by little, their ideas became more abundant; their words aligned, their structure fell into place; everything, like a well-run household, organized itself. Ultimately, the point is, quick writing doesn’t equal good writing; instead, good writing leads to easier writing. Yet, when we feel confident in our ability, it’s wise to hold back sometimes, like how a rider might pull gently on the reins, not stopping the horse but energizing it. Likewise, a writer’s talent should constantly strive to grow and expand, just as shorter individuals raise themselves on their toes and often manage to reach the same height, if not surpass it. Additionally, while seasoned writers should work independently and rely on their own skills, beginners should study the best writers. Understanding the works of others sharpens the mind and memory more than reflecting on one’s own ideas. Those who familiarize themselves with great authors will frequently find traces of their influences in their own thoughts, even if they aren’t always aware of it, able to express something similar to theirs, which holds greater authority than their own. In fact, sometimes citing another author effectively is a reward of one’s efforts. Even if a person is more inclined or suited to a particular style of writing, they should still practice all styles. Just like with musical instruments, style requires harmony and agreement among its parts.

Præcipiendi modi.—I take this labour in teaching others, that they should not be always to be taught, and I would bring my precepts into practice, for rules are ever of less force and value than experiments; yet with this purpose, rather to show the right way to those that come after, than to detect any that have slipped before by error, and I hope it will be more profitable.  For men do more willingly listen, and with more favour, to precept, than reprehension.  Among divers opinions of an art, and most of them contrary in themselves, it is hard to make election; and, therefore, though a man cannot invent new things after so many, he may do a welcome work yet to help posterity to judge rightly of the old.  But arts and precepts avail nothing, except Nature be beneficial and aiding.  And therefore these things are no more written to a dull disposition, than rules of husbandry to a soil.  No precepts will profit a fool, no more than beauty will the blind, or music the deaf.  As we should take care that our style in writing be neither dry nor empty, we should look again it be not winding, or wanton with far-fetched descriptions; either is a vice.  But that is worse which proceeds out of want, than that which riots out of plenty.  The remedy of fruitfulness is easy, but no labour will help the contrary; I will like and praise some things in a young writer which yet, if he continue in, I cannot but justly hate him for the same.  There is a time to be given all things for maturity, and that even your country husband-man can teach, who to a young plant will not put the pruning-knife, because it seems to fear the iron, as not able to admit the scar.  No more would I tell a green writer all his faults, lest I should make him grieve and faint, and at last despair; for nothing doth more hurt than to make him so afraid of all things as he can endeavour nothing.  Therefore youth ought to be instructed betimes, and in the best things; for we hold those longest we take soonest, as the first scent of a vessel lasts, and the tint the wool first receives; therefore a master should temper his own powers, and descend to the other’s infirmity.  If you pour a glut of water upon a bottle, it receives little of it; but with a funnel, and by degrees, you shall fill many of them, and spill little of your own; to their capacity they will all receive and be full.  And as it is fit to read the best authors to youth first, so let them be of the openest and clearest. [106a]  As Livy before Sallust, Sidney before Donne; and beware of letting them taste Gower or Chaucer at first, lest, falling too much in love with antiquity, and not apprehending the weight, they grow rough and barren in language only.  When their judgments are firm, and out of danger, let them read both the old and the new; but no less take heed that their new flowers and sweetness do not as much corrupt as the others’ dryness and squalor, if they choose not carefully.  Spenser, in affecting the ancients, writ no language; yet I would have him read for his matter, but as Virgil read Ennius.  The reading of Homer and Virgil is counselled by Quintilian as the best way of informing youth and confirming man.  For, besides that the mind is raised with the height and sublimity of such a verse, it takes spirit from the greatness of the matter, and is tinctured with the best things.  Tragic and lyric poetry is good, too, and comic with the best, if the manners of the reader be once in safety.  In the Greek poets, as also in Plautus, we shall see the economy and disposition of poems better observed than in Terence; and the latter, who thought the sole grace and virtue of their fable the sticking in of sentences, as ours do the forcing in of jests.

Teaching Methods.—I undertake this effort to teach others so that they won't always need to be taught, and I want to put my principles into practice because rules are generally less effective and valuable than hands-on experience. My goal is more to guide those who come after me than to criticize those who have made mistakes in the past, and I think this will be more beneficial. People are generally more eager to listen to advice than to criticism. Among different opinions on an art, many of which contradict each other, it can be challenging to choose. Therefore, even if a person can't come up with new ideas after so many have been introduced, they can still help future generations judge the old ideas correctly. However, arts and teachings are useless unless nature is supportive and helpful. So, these lessons aren't meant for those with dull sensibilities, just as farming guidelines won't help poor soil. No teachings will benefit a fool, just like beauty won't help a blind person or music a deaf one. Just as we should ensure our writing isn't dry or lacking substance, we should also ensure it isn't convoluted or overly extravagant in descriptions; both are flaws. However, what's worse is what comes from a lack of substance rather than excess. The remedy for barrenness is simple, but no amount of work will help what lacks growth. I'll appreciate some things in a young writer, but if he continues those habits, I can't help but dislike him for it. There’s a time for everything to mature, and even a farmer knows not to prune a young plant too soon, as it fears the tool and can't handle the scar. Similarly, I wouldn't tell a novice writer about all their mistakes right away, as it might discourage and dishearten them, eventually leading to despair. Nothing is more harmful than making someone so fearful of mistakes that they become paralyzed. Therefore, youth should be taught early and with the best materials, because we remember what we learn first, just as the first scent of a jar lingers and the first dye a wool receives sets its color. Thus, a teacher should adjust their methods and work within the student's weaknesses. If you pour too much water into a bottle at once, it barely absorbs any; but with a funnel and gradually, you can fill many without wasting much. To match their ability, they will absorb and be full. Additionally, it’s wise to introduce young people first to the best authors—those that are straightforward and clear. [106a] For example, Livy before Sallust, Sidney before Donne; and be cautious about introducing them to Gower or Chaucer too early, as they might fall too much in love with the past without understanding its depth, leaving their language rough and lacking. Once their judgment is strong and secure, they can explore both the old and the new, but also be careful that their new knowledge and enjoyment do not spoil them as much as the dryness and harshness of the old if they don’t choose wisely. Spenser, in his admiration for the ancients, created no true language; however, I would recommend him for his content, similar to how Virgil studied Ennius. Quintilian advises reading Homer and Virgil as the best way to educate youth and strengthen adults. This is because the mind is elevated by the grandeur and sublimity of such verses, gaining inspiration from the greatness of the content and being enriched with the finest ideas. Tragic and lyrical poetry, as well as comedy at its best, are also beneficial if the moral character of the reader is secure. In Greek poets, as well as in Plautus, we see better structure and arrangement of poems compared to Terence; the latter believed that the charm and virtue of their narratives lay solely in inserting quotes, much like how our modern writers force in jokes.

Fals. querel. fugiend. Platonis peregrinatio in Italiam.—We should not protect our sloth with the patronage of difficulty.  It is a false quarrel against Nature, that she helps understanding but in a few, when the most part of mankind are inclined by her thither, if they would take the pains; no less than birds to fly, horses to run, &c., which if they lose, it is through their own sluggishness, and by that means become her prodigies, not her children.  I confess, Nature in children is more patient of labour in study than in age; for the sense of the pain, the judgment of the labour is absent; they do not measure what they have done.  And it is the thought and consideration that affects us more than the weariness itself.  Plato was not content with the learning that Athens could give him, but sailed into Italy, for Pythagoras’ knowledge: and yet not thinking himself sufficiently informed, went into Egypt, to the priests, and learned their mysteries.  He laboured, so must we.  Many things may be learned together, and performed in one point of time; as musicians exercise their memory, their voice, their fingers, and sometimes their head and feet at once.  And so a preacher, in the invention of matter, election of words, composition of gesture, look, pronunciation, motion, useth all these faculties at once: and if we can express this variety together, why should not divers studies, at divers hours, delight, when the variety is able alone to refresh and repair us?  As, when a man is weary of writing, to read; and then again of reading, to write.  Wherein, howsoever we do many things, yet are we (in a sort) still fresh to what we begin; we are recreated with change, as the stomach is with meats.  But some will say this variety breeds confusion, and makes, that either we lose all, or hold no more than the last.  Why do we not then persuade husbandmen that they should not till land, help it with marl, lime, and compost? plant hop-gardens, prune trees, look to bee-hives, rear sheep, and all other cattle at once?  It is easier to do many things and continue, than to do one thing long.

Fals. querel. fugiend. Platonis peregrinatio in Italiam.—We shouldn't disguise our laziness by claiming that things are too hard. It’s a misguided complaint against Nature that she only assists a select few in understanding, when most people could grasp things if they just put in the effort; just like birds fly and horses run, which they would only fail to do because of their own sluggishness, turning into her oddities rather than her offspring. I admit, Nature is more tolerant of hard work in children than in adults; they don’t feel the pain or judge the effort involved; they don’t measure what they’ve accomplished. It’s more our thoughts and reflections that wear us out than the actual exhaustion. Plato wasn’t satisfied with the knowledge he could gain in Athens, so he traveled to Italy to learn from Pythagoras. Still feeling undereducated, he went to Egypt to learn from the priests and their secrets. He worked hard, and so must we. We can learn many things at once, like musicians who train their memory, voice, fingers, and sometimes their whole bodies all at the same time. Likewise, a preacher uses all of his skills simultaneously when coming up with topics, selecting words, and managing his gestures, expressions, pronunciation, and movements. If we can combine this variety in our expression, why should pursuing different subjects at different times not be enjoyable, since variety can refresh and rejuvenate us? When someone gets tired of writing, they can switch to reading; and vice versa. In doing a variety of things, we always feel somewhat renewed when starting something new; change revitalizes us, just like our stomachs are revived by different foods. However, some will argue that this variety causes confusion and leads us to forget everything or only remember the most recent thing. Then why not convince farmers that they shouldn’t cultivate land, amend it with marl, lime, and compost; plant hop-gardens, prune trees, manage beehives, raise sheep, and care for all their livestock at the same time? It's actually easier to juggle multiple tasks and keep going than to focus on just one task for a long time.

Præcept. element.—It is not the passing through these learnings that hurts us, but the dwelling and sticking about them.  To descend to those extreme anxieties and foolish cavils of grammarians, is able to break a wit in pieces, being a work of manifold misery and vainness, to be elementarii senes.  Yet even letters are, as it were, the bank of words, and restore themselves to an author as the pawns of language: but talking and eloquence are not the same: to speak, and to speak well, are two things.  A fool may talk, but a wise man speaks; and out of the observation, knowledge, and the use of things, many writers perplex their readers and hearers with mere nonsense.  Their writings need sunshine.  Pure and neat language I love, yet plain and customary.  A barbarous phrase has often made me out of love with a good sense, and doubtful writing hath wracked me beyond my patience.  The reason why a poet is said that he ought to have all knowledges is, that he should not be ignorant of the most, especially of those he will handle.  And indeed, when the attaining of them is possible, it were a sluggish and base thing to despair; for frequent imitation of anything becomes a habit quickly.  If a man should prosecute as much as could be said of everything, his work would find no end.

Præcept. element.—It's not going through these lessons that harms us, but getting stuck on them. Falling into extreme anxiety and pointless debates like those of grammarians can completely break a mind, being a source of endless misery and futility, to be elementarii senes. However, letters are, in a way, the foundation of words, and they return to an author like the pawns of language: but talking and eloquence are not the same. Speaking and speaking well are two different things. A fool can talk, but a wise person speaks; and from observation, knowledge, and experience, many writers confuse their readers and listeners with nonsense. Their writings need clarity. I appreciate pure and neat language, yet it should be plain and customary. A barbaric phrase has often turned me against good sense, and unclear writing has tested my patience beyond limits. The reason a poet is said to require knowledge in all areas is so he won't be ignorant, especially about the topics he will cover. Indeed, when it’s possible to attain such knowledge, it would be lazy and lowly to give up; for frequent imitation of anything quickly becomes a habit. If someone were to pursue everything that could be said about a topic, their work would never end.

De orationis dignitate.  ’Εγκυκλοπαιδεία.—Metaphora.  Speech is the only benefit man hath to express his excellency of mind above other creatures.  It is the instrument of society; therefore Mercury, who is the president of language, is called deorum hominumque interpres. [110a]  In all speech, words and sense are as the body and the soul.  The sense is as the life and soul of language, without which all words are dead.  Sense is wrought out of experience, the knowledge of human life and actions, or of the liberal arts, which the Greeks called ’Εγκυκλοπαιδείαν.  Words are the people’s, yet there is a choice of them to be made; for verborum delectus origo est eloquentiæ. [111a]  They are to be chosen according to the persons we make speak, or the things we speak of.  Some are of the camp, some of the council-board, some of the shop, some of the sheepcote, some of the pulpit, some of the Bar, &c.  And herein is seen their elegance and propriety, when we use them fitly and draw them forth to their just strength and nature by way of translation or metaphor.  But in this translation we must only serve necessity (nam temerè nihil transfertur à prudenti) [111b] or commodity, which is a kind of necessity: that is, when we either absolutely want a word to express by, and that is necessity; or when we have not so fit a word, and that is commodity; as when we avoid loss by it, and escape obsceneness, and gain in the grace and property which helps significance.  Metaphors far-fetched hinder to be understood; and affected, lose their grace.  Or when the person fetcheth his translations from a wrong place as if a privy councillor should at the table take his metaphor from a dicing-house, or ordinary, or a vintner’s vault; or a justice of peace draw his similitudes from the mathematics, or a divine from a bawdy house, or taverns; or a gentleman of Northamptonshire, Warwickshire, or the Midland, should fetch all the illustrations to his country neighbours from shipping, and tell them of the main-sheet and the bowline.  Metaphors are thus many times deformed, as in him that said, Castratam morte Africani rempublicam; and another, Stercus curiæ Glauciam, and Canâ nive conspuit Alpes.  All attempts that are new in this kind, are dangerous, and somewhat hard, before they be softened with use.  A man coins not a new word without some peril and less fruit; for if it happen to be received, the praise is but moderate; if refused, the scorn is assured.  Yet we must adventure; for things at first hard and rough are by use made tender and gentle.  It is an honest error that is committed, following great chiefs.

De orationis dignitate.  ’Εγκυκλοπαιδεία.—Metaphora.  Speech is the only way for humans to showcase their superiority of mind over other creatures. It serves as the tool for society; that's why Mercury, the god of language, is referred to as deorum hominumque interpres. [110a]  In every form of speech, words and meaning are like the body and the soul. Meaning is the life and soul of language, without which words are lifeless. Meaning comes from experience, an understanding of human life and actions, or the liberal arts, which the Greeks called ’Εγκυκλοπαιδείαν.  Words belong to the people, but we need to choose them carefully; for verborum delectus origo est eloquentiæ. [111a]  We should pick words based on who we are speaking for or the topics we are discussing. Some words come from the military, others from politics, some from trades, some from farming, some from preaching, and some from law, etc. Their elegance and appropriateness show when we use them correctly and draw out their true strength and meaning through translation or metaphor. However, in this translation, we must only fulfill necessity (nam temerè nihil transfertur à prudenti) [111b]  or utility, which is a form of necessity: when we absolutely need a word to express a thought, that’s necessity; or when we don’t have a suitable word, that’s utility; as when we avoid loss and prevent any awkwardness while enhancing the grace and appropriateness that aids meaning. Far-fetched metaphors can make understanding difficult, and those that are overly affected lose their charm. Or when someone chooses metaphors from an inappropriate source, like if an advisor were to draw a metaphor from a gambling house, or a tavern, or if a justice of the peace took his comparisons from math, or if a theologian sourced from a brothel, or if a man from Northamptonshire, Warwickshire, or the Midlands constantly used shipping analogies with his local neighbors, mentioning the main-sheet and bowline. Metaphors can often become distorted, like when someone said, Castratam morte Africani rempublicam; and another, Stercus curiæ Glauciam, and Canâ nive conspuit Alpes.  All new attempts in this area are risky and somewhat challenging until they become familiar through usage. A person doesn’t create a new word without some risk and little reward; if it happens to be accepted, the praise is modest, but if rejected, the ridicule is certain. Yet we must take the risk; for things that are initially tough and rough can become smooth and gentle with time. It is a noble mistake to make by following great leaders.

Consuetudo.—Perspicuitas, Venustas.—Authoritas.—Virgil.—Lucretius.—Chaucerism.—Paronomasia.—Custom is the most certain mistress of language, as the public stamp makes the current money.  But we must not be too frequent with the mint, every day coining, nor fetch words from the extreme and utmost ages; since the chief virtue of a style is perspicuity, and nothing so vicious in it as to need an interpreter.  Words borrowed of antiquity do lend a kind of majesty to style, and are not without their delight sometimes; for they have the authority of years, and out of their intermission do win themselves a kind of grace like newness.  But the eldest of the present, and newness of the past language, is the best.  For what was the ancient language, which some men so dote upon, but the ancient custom?  Yet when I name custom, I understand not the vulgar custom; for that were a precept no less dangerous to language than life, if we should speak or live after the manners of the vulgar: but that I call custom of speech, which is the consent of the learned; as custom of life, which is the consent of the good.  Virgil was most loving of antiquity; yet how rarely doth he insert aquai and pictai!  Lucretius is scabrous and rough in these; he seeks them: as some do Chaucerisms with us, which were better expunged and banished.  Some words are to be culled out for ornament and colour, as we gather flowers to strew houses or make garlands; but they are better when they grow to our style; as in a meadow, where, though the mere grass and greenness delight, yet the variety of flowers doth heighten and beautify.  Marry, we must not play or riot too much with them, as in Paronomasies; nor use too swelling or ill-sounding words!  Quæ per salebras, altaque saxa cadunt. [114a]  It is true, there is no sound but shall find some lovers, as the bitterest confections are grateful to some palates.  Our composition must be more accurate in the beginning and end than in the midst, and in the end more than in the beginning; for through the midst the stream bears us.  And this is attained by custom, more than care of diligence.  We must express readily and fully, not profusely.  There is difference between a liberal and prodigal hand.  As it is a great point of art, when our matter requires it, to enlarge and veer out all sail, so to take it in and contract it, is of no less praise, when the argument doth ask it.  Either of them hath their fitness in the place.  A good man always profits by his endeavour, by his help, yea, when he is absent; nay, when he is dead, by his example and memory.  So good authors in their style: a strict and succinct style is that where you can take away nothing without loss, and that loss to be manifest.

Custom.—Clarity, Beauty.—Authority.—Virgil.—Lucretius.—Chaucerism.—Wordplay.—Custom is the most reliable guide for language, just like the official mark gives value to money. But we shouldn't overdo it with new words, creating them every day, nor should we pull words from the farthest past; the main quality of a style is clarity, and nothing is worse than needing an interpreter. Words from ancient times can add a sense of majesty to our writing, and they can be enjoyable too; they carry the weight of years and gain a kind of charm from their age, almost like something new. But the best mix is the freshness of current language and the richness of the past. What was the old language, which some people romanticize, but just old custom? Yet when I say custom, I don’t mean the common one; that would be a guideline just as harmful to language as living like everyone else is to life. I refer to the speech custom that comes from the agreement of the educated, just as the lifestyle custom is based on the consensus of the good. Virgil loved the past, yet how rarely did he use words like aquai and pictai! Lucretius is rough and raw in this regard; he seeks out those words, just as some of us look for Chaucerisms, which would be better removed. Some words are picked out for flair and color, as we gather flowers to decorate homes or make wreaths; but they are best when they blend into our style, just like in a meadow, where the plain grass is pleasing, but the variety of flowers enhances the beauty. However, we shouldn't play around too much with them, like in wordplay, nor use overly pompous or awkward-sounding words! Quæ per salebras, altaque saxa cadunt. [114a] It's true that every sound will find some admirers, as even the most bitter sweets can please some tastes. Our writing should be more carefully crafted at the start and end than in the middle, and especially more refined at the end than at the beginning; for the flow carries us through the middle. And this is achieved more by habit than by strict diligence. We must express ourselves clearly and fully, not excessively. There’s a difference between being generous and being wasteful. Just as it's an important skill to expand and let loose when necessary, it’s equally praiseworthy to pull in and condense when the topic demands it. Both have their place. A good person always gains from their efforts, even when they're absent; indeed, even after their death, through their example and memory. The same goes for good writers: a concise and clear style is one from which you cannot remove a single element without causing a noticeable loss.

De Stylo.—Tracitus.—The Laconic.—Suetonius.—Seneca and Fabianus.—The brief style is that which expresseth much in little; the concise style, which expresseth not enough, but leaves somewhat to be understood; the abrupt style, which hath many breaches, and doth not seem to end, but fall.  The congruent and harmonious fitting of parts in a sentence hath almost the fastening and force of knitting and connection; as in stones well squared, which will rise strong a great way without mortar.

De Stylo.—Tracitus.—The Laconic.—Suetonius.—Seneca and Fabianus.—The brief style conveys a lot in just a few words; the concise style doesn't fully convey enough and leaves some things to be inferred; the abrupt style has many breaks and seems to drop off instead of concluding. The appropriate and harmonious arrangement of parts in a sentence has the strength and effectiveness of knitting and connection, much like well-cut stones that can stand tall for a great height without mortar.

Periodi.—Obscuritas offundit tenebras.—Superlatio.—Periods are beautiful when they are not too long; for so they have their strength too, as in a pike or javelin.  As we must take the care that our words and sense be clear, so if the obscurity happen through the hearer’s or reader’s want of understanding, I am not to answer for them, no more than for their not listening or marking; I must neither find them ears nor mind.  But a man cannot put a word so in sense but something about it will illustrate it, if the writer understand himself; for order helps much to perspicuity, as confusion hurts.  (Rectitudo lucem adfert; obliquitas et circumductio offuscat. [116a])  We should therefore speak what we can the nearest way, so as we keep our gait, not leap; for too short may as well be not let into the memory, as too long not kept in.  Whatsoever loseth the grace and clearness, converts into a riddle; the obscurity is marked, but not the value.  That perisheth, and is passed by, like the pearl in the fable.  Our style should be like a skein of silk, to be carried and found by the right thread, not ravelled and perplexed; then all is a knot, a heap.  There are words that do as much raise a style as others can depress it.  Superlation and over-muchness amplifies; it may be above faith, but never above a mean.  It was ridiculous in Cestius, when he said of Alexander:

Periods.—Obscurity casts shadows.—Exaggeration.—Periods are appealing when they aren’t too long; they have their strength, much like a spear or a javelin. Just as we must ensure our words and ideas are clear, if obscurity arises from the listener’s or reader’s lack of understanding, I’m not responsible for that, just as I’m not responsible for them not paying attention; I can’t provide them with ears or a mind. However, a person cannot express something so poorly that nothing around it helps illustrate its meaning, if the writer understands what they’re saying; clarity benefits from order, while confusion harms it. (Straightness brings light; crookedness and digression obscure. [116a]) Thus, we should aim to speak in the most straightforward manner, maintaining our flow without jumping around; for something too brief may just as easily be forgotten as something too lengthy may be disregarded. Anything that loses elegance and clarity transforms into a riddle; the obscurity is noted, but not the worth. That gets lost and is overlooked, like the pearl in the fable. Our style should be like a strand of silk, easy to follow by the right thread, not tangled and complicated; otherwise, it all becomes a knot, a mess. Some words can elevate a style just as others can diminish it. Exaggeration and excess amplify; it may go beyond belief, but never beyond moderation. It was absurd when Cestius remarked about Alexander:

“Fremit oceanus, quasi indignetur, quòd terras relinquas.” [117a]

“Fremit ocean, as if it resents that you leave the land.” [117a]

But propitiously from Virgil:

But luckily from Virgil:

“Credas innare revulsas
Cycladas.” [117b]

“Beliefs cast aside
Cyclades.” [117b]

He doth not say it was so, but seemed to be so.  Although it be somewhat incredible, that is excused before it be spoken.  But there are hyperboles which will become one language, that will by no means admit another.  As Eos esse P. R. exercitus, qui cælum possint perrumpere, [118a] who would say with us, but a madman?  Therefore we must consider in every tongue what is used, what received.  Quintilian warns us, that in no kind of translation, or metaphor, or allegory, we make a turn from what we began; as if we fetch the original of our metaphor from sea and billows, we end not in flames and ashes: it is a most foul inconsequence.  Neither must we draw out our allegory too long, lest either we make ourselves obscure, or fall into affectation, which is childish.  But why do men depart at all from the right and natural ways of speaking? sometimes for necessity, when we are driven, or think it fitter, to speak that in obscure words, or by circumstance, which uttered plainly would offend the hearers.  Or to avoid obsceneness, or sometimes for pleasure, and variety, as travellers turn out of the highway, drawn either by the commodity of a footpath, or the delicacy or freshness of the fields.  And all this is called εσχηματισμενη or figured language.

He doesn’t say it was this way, but it seemed to be so. Although it’s somewhat unbelievable, that’s excused before it’s even said. But there are exaggerations that fit one language and can’t accept another. Like Eos esse P. R. exercitus, qui cælum possint perrumpere, [118a] who would say the same in our language, but only a madman? So, we have to consider in every language what is commonly used and accepted. Quintilian warns us that in any translation, metaphor, or allegory, we shouldn’t stray from what we started with; if we draw our metaphor from the sea and waves, we shouldn’t end in flames and ashes: that’s a really bad inconsistency. Also, we shouldn’t stretch our allegory too long, so we don’t become unclear or fall into pretentiousness, which is childish. But why do people deviate from the right and natural ways of speaking at all? Sometimes it’s out of necessity when we’re forced or think it’s more appropriate to speak in vague terms, or indirectly, which if stated plainly might offend listeners. Or to avoid anything inappropriate, or sometimes just for fun and variety, like travelers who stray from the main road, tempted either by the convenience of a path, or the charm or freshness of the fields. And all this is called εσχηματισμενη or figured language.

Oratio imago animi.—Language most shows a man: Speak, that I may see thee.  It springs out of the most retired and inmost parts of us, and is the image of the parent of it, the mind.  No glass renders a man’s form or likeness so true as his speech.  Nay, it is likened to a man; and as we consider feature and composition in a man, so words in language; in the greatness, aptness, sound structure, and harmony of it.

Oratio imago animi.—Language reveals a person most clearly: Speak, so I can see you. It comes from the deepest parts of us and reflects the true essence of our mind. No mirror captures a person’s appearance as accurately as their speech. In fact, it can be compared to a person; just as we examine someone’s features and physique, we should examine the words in language—their richness, suitability, structure, and harmony.

Structura et statura, sublimis, humilis, pumila.—Some men are tall and big, so some language is high and great.  Then the words are chosen, their sound ample, the composition full, the absolution plenteous, and poured out, all grave, sinewy, and strong.  Some are little and dwarfs; so of speech, it is humble and low, the words poor and flat, the members and periods thin and weak, without knitting or number.

Structure and stature, lofty, humble, diminutive.—Some people are tall and big, just like some language is elevated and grand. The words are carefully selected, their sound rich, the composition complete, the conclusions abundant, and expressed in a serious, robust, and powerful manner. Others are small and diminutive; similarly, their speech is modest and low, the words lacking and flat, the sentences and phrases thin and weak, without coherence or rhythm.

Mediocris plana et placida.—The middle are of a just stature.  There the language is plain and pleasing; even without stopping, round without swelling: all well-turned, composed, elegant, and accurate.

Mediocris plana et placida.—The middle ground is just right. There, the language is straightforward and appealing; it flows smoothly, without any awkwardness: everything is well-structured, composed, elegant, and precise.

Vitiosa oratio, vastatumensenormisaffectataabjecta.—The vicious language is vast and gaping, swelling and irregular: when it contends to be high, full of rock, mountain, and pointedness; as it affects to be low, it is abject, and creeps, full of bogs and holes.  And according to their subject these styles vary, and lose their names: for that which is high and lofty, declaring excellent matter, becomes vast and tumorous, speaking of petty and inferior things; so that which was even and apt in a mean and plain subject, will appear most poor and humble in a high argument.  Would you not laugh to meet a great councillor of State in a flat cap, with his trunk hose, and a hobbyhorse cloak, his gloves under his girdle, and yond haberdasher in a velvet gown, furred with sables?  There is a certain latitude in these things, by which we find the degrees.

Vicious language, vastbulgingenormousaffecteddebased.—The vicious language is expansive and gaping, swollen and irregular: when it tries to be elevated, filled with grandeur and sharpness; while when it aims low, it is demeaning and crawls, full of swamps and holes. And based on their subject, these styles shift and lose their identities: for what is high and noble, discussing excellent topics, becomes vast and cumbersome when speaking of trivial and inferior matters; similarly, what is balanced and suitable for a simple subject appears most lacking and humble when addressing a lofty theme. Wouldn’t it be amusing to see a high-ranking official in a flat cap, with his baggy pants, and a hobbyhorse cloak, his gloves tucked under his belt, alongside that tailor in a velvet gown trimmed with fur? There is a certain range in these matters, through which we discern the differences.

Figura.—The next thing to the stature, is the figure and feature in language—that is, whether it be round and straight, which consists of short and succinct periods, numerous and polished; or square and firm, which is to have equal and strong parts everywhere answerable, and weighed.

Figure.—The next aspect after stature is the figure and style of language—that is, whether it is rounded and straight, consisting of short and concise sentences, numerous and well-crafted; or square and solid, meaning it has equal and strong elements that are consistent and balanced throughout.

Cutis sive cortexCompositio.—The third is the skin and coat, which rests in the well-joining, cementing, and coagmentation of words; whenas it is smooth, gentle, and sweet, like a table upon which you may run your finger without rubs, and your nail cannot find a joint; not horrid, rough, wrinkled, gaping, or chapped: after these, the flesh, blood, and bones come in question.

Skin and Coat. Composition.—The third is the skin and coat, which relies on the smooth, seamless connection and blending of words; when it is smooth, gentle, and pleasing, like a surface where you can run your finger without any bumps, and where your nail can't find a seam; not harsh, rough, wrinkled, open, or cracked: following this, the flesh, blood, and bones are considered.

Carnosaadipataredundans.—We say it is a fleshy style, when there is much periphrasis, and circuit of words; and when with more than enough, it grows fat and corpulent: arvina orationis, full of suet and tallow.  It hath blood and juice when the words are proper and apt, their sound sweet, and the phrase neat and picked—oratio uncta, et benè pasta.  But where there is redundancy, both the blood and juice are faulty and vicious:—Redundat sanguine, quia multo plus dicit, quam necesse est.  Juice in language is somewhat less than blood; for if the words be but becoming and signifying, and the sense gentle, there is juice; but where that wanteth, the language is thin, flagging, poor, starved, scarce covering the bone, and shows like stones in a sack.

Carnosaadipataredundans.—We refer to it as a fleshy style when there's a lot of circumlocution and excessive wording; when it becomes overly bloated and heavy: arvina orationis, filled with fat and grease. It has vitality and substance when the words fit well and are suitable, their sound pleasant, and the phrasing neat and refined—oratio uncta, et benè pasta. But when there's an excess, both the vitality and substance are flawed and lacking:—Redundat sanguine, quia multo plus dicit, quam necesse est. Juice in language is somewhat less than blood; for if the words are appropriate and meaningful, and the sense is gentle, there is juice; but where that is absent, the language is thin, weak, poor, starving, barely covering the bone, and resembles stones in a sack.

Jejuna, macilenta, strigosa.—Ossea, et nervosa.—Some men, to avoid redundancy, run into that; and while they strive to have no ill blood or juice, they lose their good.  There be some styles, again, that have not less blood, but less flesh and corpulence.  These are bony and sinewy; Ossa habent, et nervos.

Thin, slean, rough.—Bony, and nervous.—Some people, to avoid being repetitive, end up doing that; and while they try to keep things civil, they end up losing their kindness. There are also some styles that may not have less blood, but have less flesh and fat. These are bony and sinewy; They have bones, and nerves.

Notæ domini Sti. Albani de doctrin. intemper.—Dictator.—Aristoteles.—It was well noted by the late Lord St. Albans, that the study of words is the first distemper of learning; vain matter the second; and a third distemper is deceit, or the likeness of truth: imposture held up by credulity.  All these are the cobwebs of learning, and to let them grow in us is either sluttish or foolish.  Nothing is more ridiculous than to make an author a dictator, as the schools have done Aristotle.  The damage is infinite knowledge receives by it; for to many things a man should owe but a temporary belief, and suspension of his own judgment, not an absolute resignation of himself, or a perpetual captivity.  Let Aristotle and others have their dues; but if we can make farther discoveries of truth and fitness than they, why are we envied?  Let us beware, while we strive to add, we do not diminish or deface; we may improve, but not augment.  By discrediting falsehood, truth grows in request.  We must not go about, like men anguished and perplexed, for vicious affectation of praise, but calmly study the separation of opinions, find the errors have intervened, awake antiquity, call former times into question; but make no parties with the present, nor follow any fierce undertakers, mingle no matter of doubtful credit with the simplicity of truth, but gently stir the mould about the root of the question, and avoid all digladiations, facility of credit, or superstitious simplicity, seek the consonancy and concatenation of truth; stoop only to point of necessity, and what leads to convenience.  Then make exact animadversion where style hath degenerated, where flourished and thrived in choiceness of phrase, round and clean composition of sentence, sweet falling of the clause, varying an illustration by tropes and figures, weight of matter, worth of subject, soundness of argument, life of invention, and depth of judgment.  This is monte potiri, to get the hill; for no perfect discovery can be made upon a flat or a level.

Notes from Lord St. Albans on learning.Dictator.—Aristotle.—It was observed by the late Lord St. Albans that the first issue with learning is focusing too much on words; the second is getting caught up in trivial matters; and the third problem is deception, or the appearance of truth: falsehood supported by gullibility. All these are the distractions of learning, and allowing them to take root in us is either lazy or foolish. Nothing is more absurd than making an author a dictator, like Aristotle has been in schools. The harm done to knowledge by this is immeasurable; for many things deserve only a temporary belief and a suspension of our own judgment, not a complete surrender or a constant captivity. Let's give due respect to Aristotle and others, but if we can discover more truth and relevance than they did, why should we be resented? While we strive to add knowledge, we should be careful not to diminish or distort it; we can enhance it, but not inflate it. By discrediting falsehood, the value of truth increases. We must not wander around, like troubled individuals craving praise, but calmly work to separate opinions, identify errors, revive ancient ideas, and question past times; avoid aligning with the present or following any aggressive advocates, mix no dubious matters with the straightforwardness of truth, but gently turn the soil around the root of the issue, and steer clear of pointless conflicts, blind belief, or foolish naivety, seeking the harmony and connection of truth; only stoop to what is absolutely necessary and what is convenient. Then carefully observe where the style has declined, where it flourished with choice language, smooth and clear sentence structure, pleasing cadence, varying illustrations using figures of speech, weight of content, value of the subject matter, sound reasoning, creativity, and depth of judgment. This is monte potiri, to conquer the hill; for no perfect discovery can be made on flat ground.

De optimo scriptore.—Cicero.—Now that I have informed you in the knowing of these things, let me lead you by the hand a little farther, in the direction of the use, and make you an able writer by practice.  The conceits of the mind are pictures of things, and the tongue is the interpreter of those pictures.  The order of God’s creatures in themselves is not only admirable and glorious, but eloquent: then he who could apprehend the consequence of things in their truth, and utter his apprehensions as truly, were the best writer or speaker.  Therefore Cicero said much, when he said, Dicere recte nemo potest, nisi qui prudenter intelligit. [124a]  The shame of speaking unskilfully were small if the tongue only thereby were disgraced; but as the image of a king in his seal ill-represented is not so much a blemish to the wax, or the signet that sealed it, as to the prince it representeth, so disordered speech is not so much injury to the lips that give it forth, as to the disproportion and incoherence of things in themselves, so negligently expressed.  Neither can his mind be thought to be in tune, whose words do jar; nor his reason in frame, whose sentence is preposterous; nor his elocution clear and perfect, whose utterance breaks itself into fragments and uncertainties.  Were it not a dishonour to a mighty prince, to have the majesty of his embassage spoiled by a careless ambassador? and is it not as great an indignity, that an excellent conceit and capacity, by the indiligence of an idle tongue, should be disgraced?  Negligent speech doth not only discredit the person of the speaker, but it discrediteth the opinion of his reason and judgment; it discrediteth the force and uniformity of the matter and substance.  If it be so then in words, which fly and escape censure, and where one good phrase begs pardon for many incongruities and faults, how shall he then be thought wise whose penning is thin and shallow? how shall you look for wit from him whose leisure and head, assisted with the examination of his eyes, yield you no life or sharpness in his writing?

On the Best Writer.—Cicero.—Now that I've shared this knowledge with you, let me guide you a bit further in how to use it and help you become a skilled writer through practice. The ideas in our minds are like pictures, and our words are the interpreters of those images. The way God has arranged his creations is not only magnificent and glorious but also speaks volumes: the person who can understand the true nature of things and express that understanding accurately is the best writer or speaker. Cicero said a lot when he stated, No one can speak correctly, unless they understand wisely. [124a] The shame of poor speaking would be minor if only the tongue were embarrassed, but just like a badly engraved image of a king on a seal is more a mark of dishonor for the prince than for the wax or the signet, disordered speech is more an injury to the true nature of things than to the lips that speak it. One cannot be considered mentally organized if their words clash; nor can their reasoning be sound if their sentences are illogical; nor can their speech be clear and perfect if their expression breaks into fragments and uncertainties. Wouldn't it be a disgrace for a powerful prince to have the dignity of his mission undermined by a careless ambassador? Isn't it just as insulting for an excellent idea and capability to be tarnished by the negligence of a lazy tongue? Careless speech not only undermines the speaker's reputation but also taints the perception of their reasoning and judgment; it undermines the strength and consistency of the content itself. If this is true for words, which can slip by unnoticed and where one well-placed phrase can excuse many flaws and inconsistencies, how can we consider someone wise if their writing is thin and shallow? How can you expect cleverness from someone whose thoughts and reflections, even when carefully considered, lack any vitality or sharpness in their writing?

De stylo epistolari.—Inventio.—In writing there is to be regarded the invention and the fashion.  For the invention, that ariseth upon your business, whereof there can be no rules of more certainty, or precepts of better direction given, than conjecture can lay down from the several occasions of men’s particular lives and vocations: but sometimes men make baseness of kindness: As “I could not satisfy myself till I had discharged my remembrance, and charged my letters with commendation to you;” or, “My business is no other than to testify my love to you, and to put you in mind of my willingness to do you all kind offices;” or, “Sir, have you leisure to descend to the remembering of that assurance you have long possessed in your servant, and upon your next opportunity make him happy with some commands from you?” or the like; that go a-begging for some meaning, and labour to be delivered of the great burden of nothing.  When you have invented, and that your business be matter, and not bare form, or mere ceremony, but some earnest, then are you to proceed to the ordering of it, and digesting the parts, which is had out of two circumstances.  One is the understanding of the persons to whom you are to write; the other is the coherence of your sentence; for men’s capacity to weigh what will be apprehended with greatest attention or leisure; what next regarded and longed for especially, and what last will leave satisfaction, and (as it were) the sweetest memorial and belief of all that is passed in his understanding whom you write to.  For the consequence of sentences, you must be sure that every clause do give the cue one to the other, and be bespoken ere it come.  So much for invention and order.

On the Art of Letter Writing.—Invention.—When writing, you need to consider both creativity and structure. For creativity, which comes from your subject matter, there are no rules that provide more certainty or better guidance than what you can deduce from the unique situations of people's lives and professions. However, sometimes people take a kind gesture for granted: Like saying, “I couldn’t feel satisfied until I expressed my thoughts and sent my praise to you,” or, “My only purpose is to show my love for you and to remind you of my willingness to assist you in any way,” or “Sir, do you have the time to remember the loyalty you’ve received from your servant and, when you next have the chance, make him happy with some instructions from you?” or something similar, which begs for meaning and struggles to express the heavy burden of emptiness. Once you’ve developed your ideas, and your message has substance rather than just form or mere pleasantries, but actually conveys something significant, you should then organize it and break down the components, which involves two considerations. One is understanding the individuals you’re addressing; the other is ensuring your sentences flow coherently. Think about what your readers are likely to pay attention to most, what they will find the most appealing, and what will leave them with a satisfying memory and a positive impression of everything conveyed in your message. For the flow of sentences, make sure that each part connects and leads logically to the next, and that they are anticipated before they are expressed. That covers creativity and structure.

Modus.—1.  Brevitas.—Now for fashion: it consists in four things, which are qualities of your style.  The first is brevity; for they must not be treatises or discourses (your letters) except it be to learned men.  And even among them there is a kind of thrift and saving of words.  Therefore you are to examine the clearest passages of your understanding, and through them to convey the sweetest and most significant words you can devise, that you may the easier teach them the readiest way to another man’s apprehension, and open their meaning fully, roundly, and distinctly, so as the reader may not think a second view cast away upon your letter.  And though respect be a part following this, yet now here, and still I must remember it, if you write to a man, whose estate and sense, as senses, you are familiar with, you may the bolder (to set a task to his brain) venture on a knot.  But if to your superior, you are bound to measure him in three farther points: first, with interest in him; secondly, his capacity in your letters; thirdly, his leisure to peruse them.  For your interest or favour with him, you are to be the shorter or longer, more familiar or submiss, as he will afford you time.  For his capacity, you are to be quicker and fuller of those reaches and glances of wit or learning, as he is able to entertain them.  For his leisure, you are commanded to the greater briefness, as his place is of greater discharges and cares.  But with your betters, you are not to put riddles of wit, by being too scarce of words; not to cause the trouble of making breviates by writing too riotous and wastingly.  Brevity is attained in matter by avoiding idle compliments, prefaces, protestations, parentheses, superfluous circuit of figures and digressions: in the composition, by omitting conjunctions [not only, but also; both the one and the other, whereby it cometh to pass] and such like idle particles, that have no great business in a serious letter but breaking of sentences, as oftentimes a short journey is made long by unnessary baits.

Modus.—1.  Brevitas.—Now for style: it consists of four key aspects that define your writing. The first is brevity; your letters should not be long essays or discussions, except when addressing academics. Even among them, it's important to be concise. Therefore, you should focus on the clearest parts of your understanding and use the most impactful words you can think of, so you can easily communicate your ideas to someone else and clarify their meaning thoroughly and distinctly, ensuring the reader won't need to revisit your letter. While respect is an important factor, if you're writing to someone whose background and understanding you know well, you can take bolder risks in your arguments. However, when writing to a superior, you must consider three additional factors: first, your relationship with them; second, their ability to understand your letters; third, their time to read them. Based on your relationship, you should adjust your length and tone—shorter and more familiar when you have their favor, or longer and more humble if not. As for their capacity, you can be more insightful and sophisticated if they can grasp those ideas. Regarding their time, be especially concise since they likely have more responsibilities. But with those of higher status, don’t create confusing puzzles with too few words, nor should you fill your writing with unnecessary fluff that makes it feel excessive. Brevity in content is achieved by cutting out unnecessary flattery, introductions, exaggerations, and digressions; in structure, by skipping conjunctions like not only, but also; both, and, therefore, and similar filler words that don't contribute much to a serious letter, just making sentences longer, like how a short trip can drag on with pointless stops.

Quintilian.—But, as Quintilian saith, there is a briefness of the parts sometimes that makes the whole long: “As I came to the stairs, I took a pair of oars, they launched out, rowed apace, I landed at the court gate, I paid my fare, went up to the presence, asked for my lord, I was admitted.”  All this is but, “I went to the court and spake with my lord.”  This is the fault of some Latin writers within these last hundred years of my reading, and perhaps Seneca may be appeached of it; I accuse him not.

Quintilian.—But, as Quintilian says, sometimes there's such a brevity in the details that it makes the whole story longer: “As I reached the stairs, I grabbed a pair of oars, they pushed off, I rowed quickly, I arrived at the court gate, I paid my fare, went up to see my lord, and I was let in.” All of this really means, “I went to the court and spoke with my lord.” This is a flaw in some Latin writers I've read in the past hundred years, and maybe Seneca might be guilty of it; I’m not saying he is.

2.  Perspicuitas.—The next property of epistolary style is perspicuity, and is oftentimes by affectation of some wit ill angled for, or ostentation of some hidden terms of art.  Few words they darken speech, and so do too many; as well too much light hurteth the eyes, as too little; and a long bill of chancery confounds the understanding as much as the shortest note; therefore, let not your letters be penned like English statutes, and this is obtained.  These vices are eschewed by pondering your business well and distinctly concerning yourself, which is much furthered by uttering your thoughts, and letting them as well come forth to the light and judgment of your own outward senses as to the censure of other men’s ears; for that is the reason why many good scholars speak but fumblingly; like a rich man, that for want of particular note and difference can bring you no certain ware readily out of his shop.  Hence it is that talkative shallow men do often content the hearers more than the wise.  But this may find a speedier redress in writing, where all comes under the last examination of the eyes.  First, mind it well, then pen it, then examine it, then amend it, and you may be in the better hope of doing reasonably well.  Under this virtue may come plainness, which is not to be curious in the order as to answer a letter, as if you were to answer to interrogatories.  As to the first, first; and to the second, secondly, &c. but both in method to use (as ladies do in their attire) a diligent kind of negligence, and their sportive freedom; though with some men you are not to jest, or practise tricks; yet the delivery of the most important things may be carried with such a grace, as that it may yield a pleasure to the conceit of the reader.  There must be store, though no excess of terms; as if you are to name store, sometimes you may call it choice, sometimes plenty, sometimes copiousness, or variety; but ever so, that the word which comes in lieu have not such difference of meaning as that it may put the sense of the first in hazard to be mistaken.  You are not to cast a ring for the perfumed terms of the time, as accommodation, complement, spirit &c., but use them properly in their place, as others.

2.  Clarity.—The next key feature of letter writing is clarity, which is often messed up by trying too hard to be witty or by showing off some obscure jargon. Using too few words can obscure meaning just as much as using too many; just as too much light can hurt the eyes, so can too little. A lengthy court document can confuse understanding just as much as a brief note can; therefore, don’t let your letters read like English laws, and this can be avoided. These pitfalls can be overcome by thoroughly thinking through your business and clearly expressing your thoughts, which is greatly aided by saying them out loud and allowing them to be evaluated by both your own senses and the judgment of others; this is why many good scholars speak awkwardly, similar to a wealthy person who can’t readily offer specific items from their shop due to lack of clarity. As a result, shallow but talkative people often engage listeners more effectively than wise individuals. However, writing allows for quicker corrections since everything is subject to the final review of the eyes. First, think it through, then write it down, then review it, and finally revise it, which increases your chances of doing well. Under this quality, simplicity also comes into play, meaning you shouldn’t fuss over the order of answering a letter as if you were responding to questions. Address the first point first, and the second one second, etc. but aim to maintain a method that has a careful yet easygoing style, similar to how women dress with a careful kind of casualness; although with some men, you shouldn’t joke or play tricks. Nevertheless, even the delivery of the most important topics can carry a grace that pleases the reader’s imagination. There should be a variety of terms, but not an excess; for instance, when discussing abundance, you can use words like choice, plenty, copiousness, or variety, as long as they don’t have such different meanings that they risk causing misunderstanding. Avoid using trendy terms like accommodation, complement, spirit, etc., as fancy jargon, but rather use them properly in context, just like everyone else.

3.  Vigor—There followeth life and quickness, which is the strength and sinews, as it were, of your penning by pretty sayings, similitudes, and conceits; allusions from known history, or other common-place, such as are in the Courtier, and the second book of Cicero De Oratore.

3. Vigor—Next comes life and energy, which serve as the strength and backbone of your writing through clever phrases, comparisons, and ideas; references from well-known history or other common sources, such as those found in the Courtier and the second book of Cicero's De Oratore.

4.  Discretio.—The last is, respect to discern what fits yourself, him to whom you write, and that which you handle, which is a quality fit to conclude the rest, because it doth include all.  And that must proceed from ripeness of judgment, which, as one truly saith, is gotten by four means, God, nature, diligence, and conversation.  Serve the first well, and the rest will serve you.

4. Discretio.—The last point is about knowing what suits you, the person you’re writing to, and the topic at hand. This quality is essential to wrap everything up, as it encompasses all aspects. It should come from a mature judgment, which, as someone wisely said, is acquired through four means: God, nature, hard work, and conversation. Attend to the first well, and the others will follow.

De Poetica.—We have spoken sufficiently of oratory, let us now make a diversion to poetry.  Poetry, in the primogeniture, had many peccant humours, and is made to have more now, through the levity and inconstancy of men’s judgments.  Whereas, indeed, it is the most prevailing eloquence, and of the most exalted caract.  Now the discredits and disgraces are many it hath received through men’s study of depravation or calumny; their practice being to give it diminution of credit, by lessening the professor’s estimation, and making the age afraid of their liberty; and the age is grown so tender of her fame, as she calls all writings aspersions.

De Poetica.—We’ve talked enough about oratory, so let’s turn our attention to poetry. Poetry, in its origins, had many flaws, and now it has even more due to the fickleness and inconsistency of people’s opinions. In reality, it's the most powerful form of eloquence and has the highest character. Unfortunately, it has faced many discredits and slurs as a result of people's efforts to twist or slander it; their tactic is to diminish its credibility by lowering the status of those who practice it, making society wary of its freedom. The times have become so sensitive about its reputation that they label all writings as accusations.

That is the state word, the phrase of court (placentia college), which some call Parasites place, the Inn of Ignorance.

That is the state word, the term used in court (placentia college), which some refer to as Parasites place, the Inn of Ignorance.

D. Hieronymus.—Whilst I name no persons, but deride follies, why should any man confess or betray himself why doth not that of S. Hierome come into their mind, Ubi generalis est de vitiis disputatio, ibi nullius esse personæ injuriam? [133a]  Is it such an inexpiable crime in poets to tax vices generally, and no offence in them, who, by their exception confess they have committed them particularly?  Are we fallen into those times that we must not—

D. Hieronymus.—While I don't mention any specific individuals but poke fun at foolishness, why should anyone admit or betray their own shortcomings? Why doesn't the saying from St. Jerome come to mind, Ubi generalis est de vitiis disputatio, ibi nullius esse personæ injuriam? [133a] Is it such an unforgivable offense for poets to criticize vices in general, yet no wrongdoing for those who, by their specific actions, admit they have committed them? Have we really come to a point where we cannot—

“Auriculas teneras mordaci rodere vero.” [133b]

“Auriculas teneras mordaci rodere vero.” [133b]

Remedii votum semper verius erat, quam spes. [133c]Sexus fæmin.—If men may by no means write freely, or speak truth, but when it offends not, why do physicians cure with sharp medicines, or corrosives? is not the same equally lawful in the cure of the mind that is in the cure of the body?  Some vices, you will say, are so foul that it is better they should be done than spoken.  But they that take offence where no name, character, or signature doth blazon them seem to me like affected as women, who if they hear anything ill spoken of the ill of their sex, are presently moved, as if the contumely respected their particular; and on the contrary, when they hear good of good women, conclude that it belongs to them all.  If I see anything that toucheth me, shall I come forth a betrayer of myself presently?  No, if I be wise, I’ll dissemble it; if honest, I’ll avoid it, lest I publish that on my own forehead which I saw there noted without a title.  A man that is on the mending hand will either ingenuously confess or wisely dissemble his disease.  And the wise and virtuous will never think anything belongs to themselves that is written, but rejoice that the good are warned not to be such; and the ill to leave to be such.  The person offended hath no reason to be offended with the writer, but with himself; and so to declare that properly to belong to him which was so spoken of all men, as it could be no man’s several, but his that would wilfully and desperately claim it.  It sufficeth I know what kind of persons I displease, men bred in the declining and decay of virtue, betrothed to their own vices; that have abandoned or prostituted their good names; hungry and ambitious of infamy, invested in all deformity, enthralled to ignorance and malice, of a hidden and concealed malignity, and that hold a concomitancy with all evil.

The remedies have always been more truthful, than hope. [133c]Women.—If men can't write freely or speak the truth unless it doesn’t offend, then why do doctors use sharp medicines or corrosives? Isn’t it equally acceptable to treat the mind the same way we treat the body? You might say some vices are so horrible that it’s better for them to be acted out than discussed. But those who are offended when no names or labels are attached seem to be affected like women, who react strongly to anything bad said about their gender, as if the insult were aimed at them personally; conversely, when they hear praise for good women, they assume it applies to all. If I see something that affects me, should I immediately expose myself? No, if I’m smart, I’ll hide it; if I’m decent, I’ll steer clear of it, so I don’t highlight something on my face that was noted without being labeled. A man on the path to improvement will either honestly confess or wisely hide his issue. The wise and virtuous will never think anything written applies to them personally; instead, they’ll be glad that good people are warned not to act that way, and that bad people decide to change. Anyone who feels offended has no reason to be upset with the writer, but with themselves; they underscore what pertains to them by claiming something meant for all, as no fault can truly belong to one person, except for those who willfully and desperately accept it. I know well who I displease—those raised in a time of declining virtue, committed to their own vices; who have given up or tarnished their good names; who are hungry and ambitious for infamy, wrapped in all sorts of ugliness, enslaved by ignorance and malice, with a hidden and concealed evil, and who willingly accompany all wrongdoing.

What is a Poet?

Poeta.—A poet is that which by the Greeks is called κατ εξοχην, ο ποιητής, a maker, or a feigner: his art, an art of imitation or feigning; expressing the life of man in fit measure, numbers, and harmony, according to Aristotle; from the word ποιειν, which signifies to make or feign.  Hence he is called a poet, not he which writeth in measure only, but that feigneth and formeth a fable, and writes things like the truth.  For the fable and fiction is, as it were, the form and soul of any poetical work or poem.

Poet.—A poet is what the Greeks refer to as κατ εξοχην, ο ποιητής, a creator or a storyteller; their craft is one of imitation or invention, capturing the essence of human life through appropriate measure, rhythm, and harmony, as Aristotle notes. This comes from the word ποιειν, which means to create or pretend. Therefore, a poet is not just someone who writes in verse, but someone who invents and shapes a narrative, crafting stories that feel true. The narrative and imagination are essentially the form and spirit of any poetic work or poem.

What mean, you by a Poem?

Poema.—A poem is not alone any work or composition of the poet’s in many or few verses; but even one verse alone sometimes makes a perfect poem.  As when Æneas hangs up and consecrates the arms of Abas with this inscription:—

Poema.—A poem isn't just any piece or creation by the poet, whether it's long or short; sometimes, even a single line can create a complete poem. Just like when Æneas displays and dedicates Abas's armor with this inscription:—

“Æneas hæc de Danais victoribus arma.” [136a]

“Aeneas talks about the triumphant weapons of the Danes.” [136a]

And calls it a poem or carmen.  Such are those in Martial:—

And calls it a poem or carmen. Such are those in Martial:—

“Omnia, Castor, emis: sic fiet, ut omnia vendas.” [136b]

“Castor, buy everything; that way, you’ll be able to sell everything.” [136b]

And—

And—

“Pauper videri Cinna vult, et est pauper.” [136c]

“Cinna wants to appear poor, and he actually is poor.” [136c]

Horatius.—Lucretius.—So were Horace’s odes called Carmina, his lyric songs.  And Lucretius designs a whole book in his sixth:—

Horatius.—Lucretius.—That's what Horace's odes were called, Carmina, his lyric songs. And Lucretius outlines an entire book in his sixth:—

“Quod in primo quoque carmine claret.” [136d]

“This is evident in every single song.” [136d]

Epicum.—Dramaticum.—Lyricum.—Elegiacum.—Epigrammat.—And anciently all the oracles were called Carmina; or whatever sentence was expressed, were it much or little, it was called an Epic, Dramatic, Lyric, Elegiac, or Epigrammatic poem.

Epic.—Drama.—Lyrics.—Elegy.—Epigram.—In ancient times, all oracles were referred to as Carmina; any statement expressed, no matter how long or short, was termed an Epic, Dramatic, Lyric, Elegiac, or Epigrammatic poem.

But how differs a Poem from what we call Poesy?

Poesis.—Artium regina.—Poet. differentiæ.—Grammatic.—Logic.—Rhetoric.—Ethica.—A poem, as I have told you, is the work of the poet; the end and fruit of his labour and study.  Poesy is his skill or craft of making; the very fiction itself, the reason or form of the work.  And these three voices differ, as the thing done, the doing, and the doer; the thing feigned, the feigning, and the feigner; so the poem, the poesy, and the poet.  Now the poesy is the habit or the art; nay, rather the queen of arts, which had her original from heaven, received thence from the Hebrews, and had in prime estimation with the Greeks transmitted to the Latins and all nations that professed civility.  The study of it (if we will trust Aristotle) offers to mankind a certain rule and pattern of living well and happily, disposing us to all civil offices of society.  If we will believe Tully, it nourisheth and instructeth our youth, delights our age, adorns our prosperity, comforts our adversity, entertains us at home, keeps us company abroad, travels with us, watches, divides the times of our earnest and sports, shares in our country recesses and recreations; insomuch as the wisest and best learned have thought her the absolute mistress of manners and nearest of kin to virtue.  And whereas they entitle philosophy to be a rigid and austere poesy, they have, on the contrary, styled poesy a dulcet and gentle philosophy, which leads on and guides us by the hand to action with a ravishing delight and incredible sweetness.  But before we handle the kinds of poems, with their special differences, or make court to the art itself, as a mistress, I would lead you to the knowledge of our poet by a perfect information what he is or should be by nature, by exercise, by imitation, by study, and so bring him down through the disciplines of grammar, logic, rhetoric, and the ethics, adding somewhat out of all, peculiar to himself, and worthy of your admittance or reception.

Poetry.—Queen of the Arts.—Poet's Differences.—Grammar.—Logic.—Rhetoric.—Ethics.—A poem, as I mentioned before, is the creation of the poet; it's the result of his effort and study. Poetry is his skill or craft of creation; it's the very fiction itself, the reason or essence of the work. These three aspects— the finished piece, the act of creating, and the creator— correlate to the poem, the poetry, and the poet. Poetry is the habit or the art; in fact, it’s the queen of the arts, originating from heaven, inherited from the Hebrews, and highly valued by the Greeks, passed down to the Latins and all civilized nations. The study of it (if we believe Aristotle) provides humanity with a certain guideline and model for living well and happily, preparing us for all social responsibilities. If we trust Cicero, it nurtures and guides our youth, delights us in old age, enhances our success, comforts us during hardship, entertains us at home, keeps us company when we travel, accompanies us through our activities and leisure, sharing our periods of rest and recreation; to the extent that the wisest and most knowledgeable consider it the supreme guide to manners and closely related to virtue. While they regard philosophy as a strict and serious form of poetry, they conversely describe poetry as a sweet and gentle philosophy that leads and guides us to action with enchanting delight and incredible sweetness. But before we explore the types of poems and their specific differences, or pay homage to the art itself like a beloved, I want to guide you to understand who our poet is or should be in terms of nature, practice, imitation, study, and bring him through the disciplines of grammar, logic, rhetoric, and ethics, adding elements from each that are unique to him and deserving of your attention.

1.  Ingenium.—Seneca.—Plato.—Aristotle.—Helicon.—Pegasus.—Parnassus.—Ovid.—First, we require in our poet or maker (for that title our language affords him elegantly with the Greek) a goodness of natural wit.  For whereas all other arts consist of doctrine and precepts, the poet must be able by nature and instinct to pour out the treasure of his mind, and as Seneca saith, Aliquando secundum Anacreontem insanire jucundum esse; by which he understands the poetical rapture.  And according to that of Plato, Frustrà poeticas fores sui compos pulsavit.  And of Aristotle, Nullum magnum ingenium sine mixturâ dementiæ fuitNec potest grande aliquid, et supra cæteros loqui, nisi mota mens.  Then it riseth higher, as by a divine instinct, when it contemns common and known conceptions.  It utters somewhat above a mortal mouth.  Then it gets aloft and flies away with his rider, whither before it was doubtful to ascend.  This the poets understood by their Helicon, Pegasus, or Parnassus; and this made Ovid to boast,

1. Ingenium.—Seneca.—Plato.—Aristotle.—Helicon.—Pegasus.—Parnassus.—Ovid.—First, we need our poet or creator (since our language gracefully lends him that title from the Greek) to have a natural talent for wit. While other arts rely on theories and guidelines, a poet must instinctively share the wealth of his thoughts. As Seneca said, Sometimes it is delightful to go a bit mad like Anacreon; referring to the ecstatic state of poetry. And as Plato stated, It’s pointless to knock at the poetical door if you are not truly composed. And Aristotle asserted, No great talent was ever without a touch of madness. Nothing significant, and above others in speech, can occur unless the mind is stirred. From here, it ascends, almost by a divine prompting, when it disregards common and familiar ideas. It expresses thoughts that transcend ordinary speech. Then it rises and takes flight with its rider, to heights that were once uncertain to reach. This is what poets meant by their Helicon, Pegasus, or Parnassus; and this is the reason Ovid boasted,

“Est deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo
Sedibus æthereis spiritus ille venit.” [139a]

“God is inside us, and with that feeling, we become warm
That spirit comes from the heavenly places.” [139a]

Lipsius.—Petron. in. Fragm.—And Lipsius to affirm, Scio, poetam neminem præstantem fuisse, sine parte quadam uberiore divinæ auræ.  And hence it is that the coming up of good poets (for I mind not mediocres or imos) is so thin and rare among us.  Every beggarly corporation affords the State a mayor or two bailiffs yearly; but Solus rex, aut poeta, non quotannis nascitur.  To this perfection of nature in our poet we require exercise of those parts, and frequent.

Lipsius.—Petron. in. Fragm.—And Lipsius claims, Scio, poetam neminem præstantem fuisse, sine parte quadam uberiore divinæ auræ. And that’s why there are so few great poets emerging among us (I’m not talking about mediocre ones). Every small town produces a mayor or two bailiffs each year, but Solus rex, aut poeta, non quotannis nascitur. To achieve this level of natural talent in our poet, we need consistent practice of those skills.

2.  Exercitatio.—Virgil.—Scaliger.—Valer. Maximus.—Euripides.—Alcestis.—If his wit will not arrive suddenly at the dignity of the ancients, let him not yet fall out with it, quarrel, or be over hastily angry; offer to turn it away from study in a humour, but come to it again upon better cogitation; try another time with labour.  If then it succeed not, cast not away the quills yet, nor scratch the wainscot, beat not the poor desk, but bring all to the forge and file again; torn it anew.  There is no statute law of the kingdom bids you be a poet against your will or the first quarter; if it comes in a year or two, it is well.  The common rhymers pour forth verses, such as they are, ex tempore; but there never comes from them one sense worth the life of a day.  A rhymer and a poet are two things.  It is said of the incomparable Virgil that he brought forth his verses like a bear, and after formed them with licking.  Scaliger the father writes it of him, that he made a quantity of verses in the morning, which afore night he reduced to a less number.  But that which Valerius Maximus hath left recorded of Euripides, the tragic poet, his answer to Alcestis, another poet, is as memorable as modest; who, when it was told to Alcestis that Euripides had in three days brought forth but three verses, and those with some difficulty and throes, Alcestis, glorying he could with ease have sent forth a hundred in the space, Euripides roundly replied, “Like enough; but here is the difference: thy verses will not last these three days, mine will to all time.”  Which was as much as to tell him he could not write a verse.  I have met many of these rattles that made a noise and buzzed.  They had their hum, and no more.  Indeed, things wrote with labour deserve to be so read, and will last their age.

2. Exercise.—Virgil.—Scaliger.—Valerius Maximus.—Euripides.—Alcestis.—If his creativity doesn’t suddenly reach the greatness of the ancients, he shouldn’t get discouraged or angry too quickly. He should take a break from studying, but then return to it after some reflection; try again with effort. If it still doesn't work out, don’t give up yet, don’t scratch the walls in frustration, don’t hit the poor desk, but take everything back to the workshop and refine it again; reshape it. There’s no law forcing you to be a poet against your will or within the first few weeks; if it takes a year or two, that’s fine. Ordinary poets produce verses, whatever they may be, ex tempore; but none of it is worth a day’s life. A rhymer and a poet are not the same thing. It’s said of the incomparable Virgil that he produced his verses like a bear, then polished them. Scaliger the elder noted that he created many verses in the morning, which he trimmed down by evening. Valerius Maximus recorded something memorable yet humble about Euripides, the tragic poet, in his response to Alcestis, another poet. When Alcestis was told that Euripides had produced only three verses in three days with great difficulty, boasting that he could easily write a hundred in that time, Euripides replied, “That may be true, but here’s the difference: your verses won’t last those three days, mine will last forever.” Which was a clear way of saying he couldn’t write a verse. I’ve encountered many who made noise and buzzed. They had their sound and nothing more. Indeed, things written with effort deserve to be read that way and will endure their time.

3.  Imitatio.—Horatius.—Virgil.—Statius.—Homer.—Horat.—Archil.—Alcæus, &c.—The third requisite in our poet or maker is imitation, to be able to convert the substance or riches of another poet to his own use.  To make choice of one excellent man above the rest, and so to follow him till he grow very he, or so like him as the copy may be mistaken for the principal.  Not as a creature that swallows what it takes in crude, raw, or undigested, but that feeds with an appetite, and hath a stomach to concoct, divide, and turn all into nourishment.  Not to imitate servilely, as Horace saith, and catch at vices for virtue, but to draw forth out of the best and choicest flowers, with the bee, and turn all into honey, work it into one relish and savour; make our imitation sweet; observe how the best writers have imitated, and follow them.  How Virgil and Statius have imitated Homer; how Horace, Archilochus; how Alcæus, and the other lyrics; and so of the rest.

3. Imitatio.—Horatius.—Virgil.—Statius.—Homer.—Horat.—Archil.—Alcæus, &c.—The third requirement for our poet or creator is imitation, the ability to take the wealth or essence of another poet and make it his own. He should choose one outstanding figure above the others and follow him until he becomes like him, or so similar that the copy could be mistaken for the original. Not like a creature that simply swallows everything raw and unprocessed, but one that consumes with interest, digests, divides, and transforms everything into nourishment. Not to imitate blindly, as Horace said, and catch at faults while claiming to seek virtue, but to extract from the best and finest elements, like a bee, and turn it all into honey, creating a unified flavor; make our imitation enjoyable; observe how the greatest writers have imitated and follow their lead. Look at how Virgil and Statius imitated Homer; how Horace followed Archilochus; how Alcæus and other lyric poets did the same; and likewise for the rest.

4.  Lectio.—Parnassus.—Helicon.—Arscoron.—M. T. Cicero.—Simylus.—Stob.—Horat.—Aristot.—But that which we especially require in him is an exactness of study and multiplicity of reading, which maketh a full man, not alone enabling him to know the history or argument of a poem and to report it, but so to master the matter and style, as to show he knows how to handle, place, or dispose of either with elegancy when need shall be.  And not think he can leap forth suddenly a poet by dreaming he hath been in Parnassus, or having washed his lips, as they say, in Helicon.  There goes more to his making than so; for to nature, exercise, imitation, and study art must be added to make all these perfect.  And though these challenge to themselves much in the making up of our maker, it is Art only can lead him to perfection, and leave him there in possession, as planted by her hand.  It is the assertion of Tully, if to an excellent nature there happen an accession or conformation of learning and discipline, there will then remain somewhat noble and singular.  For, as Simylus saith in Stobæus, Ουτε φύσις ίκανη yινεται τεχνης ατερ, ουτε παν τέχνη μη φυσιν κεκτημένη, without art nature can never be perfect; and without nature art can claim no being.  But our poet must beware that his study be not only to learn of himself; for he that shall affect to do that confesseth his ever having a fool to his master.  He must read many, but ever the best and choicest; those that can teach him anything he must ever account his masters, and reverence.  Among whom Horace and (he that taught him) Aristotle deserved to be the first in estimation.  Aristotle was the first accurate critic and truest judge—nay, the greatest philosopher the world ever had—for he noted the vices of all knowledges in all creatures, and out of many men’s perfections in a science he formed still one art.  So he taught us two offices together, how we ought to judge rightly of others, and what we ought to imitate specially in ourselves.  But all this in vain without a natural wit and a poetical nature in chief.  For no man, so soon as he knows this or reads it, shall be able to write the better; but as he is adapted to it by nature, he shall grow the perfecter writer.  He must have civil prudence and eloquence, and that whole; not taken up by snatches or pieces in sentences or remnants when he will handle business or carry counsels, as if he came then out of the declaimer’s gallery, or shadow furnished but out of the body of the State, which commonly is the school of men.

4. Reading.—Parnassus.—Helicon.—Arscoron.—M. T. Cicero.—Simylus.—Stob.—Horace.—Aristotle.—But what we especially need from him is a thorough dedication to study and a wide range of reading, which make a well-rounded person. This not only allows him to understand the history or main ideas of a poem and discuss them, but also to master the content and style, showing he knows how to use, arrange, or fit either elegantly when necessary. He shouldn't think he can suddenly become a poet just by imagining he's been to Parnassus or by merely washing his lips, as they say, in Helicon. There’s much more that goes into becoming one; natural talent, practice, imitation, and study must all combine to perfect these qualities. And although these factors play a big role in shaping a creator, it's Art alone that can lead him to perfection and keep him there, as if placed by her hand. Tully asserts that if an excellent nature is accompanied by learning and discipline, something noble and unique will remain. As Simylus says in Stobæus, Ουτε φύσις ίκανη yινεται τεχνης ατερ, ουτε παν τέχνη μη φυσιν κεκτημένη, without art nature can never be perfect; and without nature, art cannot exist. But our poet must be careful not to rely solely on learning from himself; anyone seeking to do that admits to having a fool as a mentor. He must read widely, but always from the best and most selective sources; those who can teach him anything must always be regarded as his masters and respected. Among them, Horace and Aristotle, who taught him, rightly deserve to be held in the highest regard. Aristotle was the first accurate critic and the truest judge—indeed, the greatest philosopher the world has ever known—because he identified the flaws in all types of knowledge and crafted one art from the many strengths found in various individuals. He taught us both how to judge others correctly and what we should specifically imitate in ourselves. But all this is useless without a natural wit and a particularly poetic nature. For no one, upon learning or reading this, will immediately write better; rather, as one is naturally inclined, one will become a better writer. He needs civil prudence and eloquence, and that fully—not just bits and pieces in sentences or fragments when addressing matters or leading discussions, as if he just stepped out of a rhetorician's booth, or only partially informed by the workings of the State, which is typically the school of men.

Virorum schola respub.—Lysippus.—Apelles.—Nævius.—The poet is the nearest borderer upon the orator, and expresseth all his virtues, though he be tied more to numbers, is his equal in ornament, and above him in his strengths.  And (of the kind) the comic comes nearest; because in moving the minds of men, and stirring of affections (in which oratory shows, and especially approves her eminence), he chiefly excels.  What figure of a body was Lysippus ever able to form with his graver, or Apelles to paint with his pencil, as the comedy to life expresseth so many and various affections of the mind?  There shall the spectator see some insulting with joy, others fretting with melancholy, raging with anger, mad with love, boiling with avarice, undone with riot, tortured with expectation, consumed with fear; no perturbation in common life but the orator finds an example of it in the scene.  And then for the elegancy of language, read but this inscription on the grave of a comic poet:

School of Men.—Lysippus.—Apelles.—Nævius.—The poet is the closest neighbor to the orator, expressing all his virtues; although he is more bound to rhythm, he is equal to him in style and superior in strengths. And among them, comedy is the nearest, because in moving people’s minds and stirring emotions (where oratory shines and proves its greatness), it excels the most. What figure of a body could Lysippus ever carve with his chisel, or Apelles paint with his brush, that compares to how comedy captures so many and diverse feelings of the mind? There, the audience sees some rejoicing with joy, others brooding in sadness, enraged with anger, crazed with love, boiling with greed, ruined by excess, tortured by anticipation, consumed by fear; no disturbance in everyday life but the orator finds an example of it in the performance. And as for the elegance of language, just read this inscription on the grave of a comic poet:

“Immortales mortales si fas esset fiere,
Flerent divæ Camœnæ Nævium poetam;
Itaque postquam est Orcino traditus thesauro,
Obliti sunt Romæ linguâ loqui Latinâ.” [146a]

“Eternal mortals, if it were possible,
The divine Muses would mourn for the poet Naevius;
And so, after he was taken to the riches of Orcus,
They forgot to speak Latin in Rome.” [146a]

L. Ælius Stilo.—Plautus.—M. Varro.—Or that modester testimony given by Lucius Ælius Stilo upon Plautus, who affirmed, “Musas, si Latinè loqui voluissent, Plautino sermone fuisse loquuturas.”  And that illustrious judgment by the most learned M. Varro of him, who pronounced him the prince of letters and elegancy in the Roman language.

L. Ælius Stilo.—Plautus.—M. Varro.—Or that modest testimony given by Lucius Ælius Stilo regarding Plautus, who stated, “If the Muses had wanted to speak in Latin, they would have spoken in Plautus' style.” And that famous judgment by the highly knowledgeable M. Varro about him, who declared him the master of literature and elegance in the Roman language.

Sophocles.—I am not of that opinion to conclude a poet’s liberty within the narrow limits of laws which either the grammarians or philosophers prescribe.  For before they found out those laws there were many excellent poets that fulfilled them, amongst whom none more perfect than Sophocles, who lived a little before Aristotle.

Sophocles.—I don’t agree that a poet's freedom should be restricted by the strict rules set by grammarians or philosophers. Before those rules were established, there were many amazing poets who naturally followed them, and none was more accomplished than Sophocles, who lived shortly before Aristotle.

Demosthenes.—Pericles.—Alcibiades.—Which of the Greeklings durst ever give precepts to Demosthenes? or to Pericles, whom the age surnamed Heavenly, because he seemed to thunder and lighten with his language? or to Alcibiades, who had rather Nature for his guide than Art for his master?

Demosthenes.—Pericles.—Alcibiades.—Which of the Greeks would ever dare to give advice to Demosthenes? Or to Pericles, whom people called Heavenly because he seemed to speak with the power of thunder and lightning? Or to Alcibiades, who relied more on his natural instincts than on the training of an artist?

Aristotle.—But whatsoever nature at any time dictated to the most happy, or long exercise to the most laborious, that the wisdom and learning of Aristotle hath brought into an art, because he understood the causes of things; and what other men did by chance or custom he doth by reason; and not only found out the way not to err, but the short way we should take not to err.

Aristotle.—Whatever nature inspired in those who were most fortunate, or what long practice taught those who were most diligent, Aristotle transformed into an art through his wisdom and knowledge. He grasped the underlying causes of things, and while others relied on chance or tradition, he used reason. He not only discovered how to avoid mistakes but also identified the quickest path to do so.

Euripides.—Aristophanes.—Many things in Euripides hath Aristophanes wittily reprehended, not out of art, but out of truth.  For Euripides is sometimes peccant, as he is most times perfect.  But judgment when it is greatest, if reason doth not accompany it, is not ever absolute.

Euripides.—Aristophanes.—Aristophanes cleverly criticized many things in Euripides, not for show, but out of honesty. For Euripides is sometimes at fault, even though he is right most of the time. However, when judgment is at its peak, it isn’t always perfect if it lacks reason.

Cens. Scal. in Lil. Germ.—Horace.—To judge of poets is only the faculty of poets; and not of all poets, but the best.  Nemo infeliciùs de poetis judicavit, quàm qui de poetis scripsit. [148a]  But some will say critics are a kind of tinkers, that make more faults than they mend ordinarily.  See their diseases and those of grammarians.  It is true, many bodies are the worse for the meddling with; and the multitude of physicians hath destroyed many sound patients with their wrong practice.  But the office of a true critic or censor is, not to throw by a letter anywhere, or damn an innocent syllable, but lay the words together, and amend them; judge sincerely of the author and his matter, which is the sign of solid and perfect learning in a man.  Such was Horace, an author of much civility, and (if any one among the heathen can be) the best master both of virtue and wisdom; an excellent and true judge upon cause and reason, not because he thought so, but because he knew so out of use and experience.

Cens. Scal. in Lil. Germ.—Horace.—Only poets have the ability to judge other poets, and not just any poets, but the best ones. Nemo infeliciùs de poetis judicavit, quàm qui de poetis scripsit. [148a] Some might argue that critics are like handymen who usually create more problems than they solve. Just look at their issues and those of grammarians. It's true that many individuals are worse off because of interference, and the numerous doctors have harmed many healthy patients with their misguided treatments. However, the role of a true critic or censor is not to toss around letters carelessly or condemn innocent syllables, but to piece together the words and improve them; to judge the author and their work sincerely, which reflects real and complete knowledge. Such was Horace, a writer of great civility, and (if anyone among the pagans can be) the finest teacher of both virtue and wisdom; a remarkable and fair judge based on cause and reason, not just because he thought so, but because he understood so through experience.

Cato, the grammarian, a defender of Lucilius. [149a]

Cato, the grammarian, a supporter of Lucilius. [149a]

“Cato grammaticus, Latina syren,
Qui solus legit, et facit poetas.”

“Cato the grammarian, Latin enchantress,
Who reads alone and creates poets.”

Quintilian of the same heresy, but rejected. [149b]

Quintilian of the same belief, but dismissed. [149b]

Horace, his judgment of Chœrillus defended against Joseph Scaliger. [149c]  And of Laberius against Julius. [149d]

Horace, defending his judgment of Chœrillus against Joseph Scaliger. [149c] And of Laberius against Julius. [149d]

But chiefly his opinion of Plautus [149e] vindicated against many that are offended, and say it is a hard censure upon the parent of all conceit and sharpness.  And they wish it had not fallen from so great a master and censor in the art, whose bondmen knew better how to judge of Plautus than any that dare patronise the family of learning in this age; who could not be ignorant of the judgment of the times in which he lived, when poetry and the Latin language were at the height; especially being a man so conversant and inwardly familiar with the censures of great men that did discourse of these things daily amongst themselves.  Again, a man so gracious and in high favour with the Emperor, as Augustus often called him his witty manling (for the littleness of his stature), and, if we may trust antiquity, had designed him for a secretary of estate, and invited him to the palace, which he modestly prayed off and refused.

But mainly, his view on Plautus [149e] defended against many who are offended and say it's a harsh criticism of the originator of all cleverness and wit. They wish it hadn't come from such a great master and critic in the art, whose servants understood Plautus better than anyone who dares to support the intellectual community today. They couldn't have been unaware of the views of the times he lived in, when poetry and the Latin language were flourishing, especially since he was a man so engaged and familiar with the opinions of the great thinkers who discussed these matters daily among themselves. Moreover, he was a man so esteemed and favored by the Emperor that Augustus often referred to him as his witty little man (because of his small stature), and, if we can believe historical accounts, had intended to make him a secretary of state and invited him to the palace, which he modestly declined.

Terence.—Menander.  Horace did so highly esteem Terence’s comedies, as he ascribes the art in comedy to him alone among the Latins, and joins him with Menander.

Terence.—Menander. Horace held Terence’s comedies in such high regard that he credited him as the sole master of comedic art among the Latins, placing him alongside Menander.

Now, let us see what may be said for either, to defend Horace’s judgment to posterity and not wholly to condemn Plautus.

Now, let's examine what can be said for both sides, to support Horace's opinion for future generations and not entirely criticize Plautus.

The parts of a comedy and tragedy.—The parts of a comedy are the same with a tragedy, and the end is partly the same, for they both delight and teach; the comics are called διδάσκαλοι, of the Greeks no less than the tragics.

The parts of a comedy and tragedy.—The elements of a comedy are the same as those of a tragedy, and their endings are somewhat similar, as both entertain and educate; the comedians are referred to as διδάσκαλοι, just like the tragedians in Greek culture.

Aristotle.—Plato.—Homer.—Nor is the moving of laughter always the end of comedy; that is rather a fowling for the people’s delight, or their fooling.  For, as Aristotle says rightly, the moving of laughter is a fault in comedy, a kind of turpitude that depraves some part of a man’s nature without a disease.  As a wry face without pain moves laughter, or a deformed vizard, or a rude clown dressed in a lady’s habit and using her actions; we dislike and scorn such representations which made the ancient philosophers ever think laughter unfitting in a wise man.  And this induced Plato to esteem of Homer as a sacrilegious person, because he presented the gods sometimes laughing.  As also it is divinely said of Aristotle, that to seen ridiculous is a part of dishonesty, and foolish.

Aristotle.—Plato.—Homer.—Not every instance of laughter is the goal of comedy; it often seeks to amuse the audience or to mock them. As Aristotle accurately points out, laughter in comedy can be a flaw, a kind of moral failing that tarnishes part of a person's nature without being an illness. Just like a grimace without pain produces laughter, or an ugly mask, or a crude jester dressed as a lady and mimicking her behavior; we find such portrayals distasteful and contemptible, which led ancient philosophers to believe that laughter was inappropriate for a wise person. This also prompted Plato to regard Homer as irreverent for occasionally showing the gods laughing. Moreover, it has been said of Aristotle that appearing ridiculous is a sign of dishonesty and foolishness.

The wit of the old comedy.—So that what either in the words or sense of an author, or in the language or actions of men, is awry or depraved does strangely stir mean affections, and provoke for the most part to laughter.  And therefore it was clear that all insolent and obscene speeches, jests upon the best men, injuries to particular persons, perverse and sinister sayings (and the rather unexpected) in the old comedy did move laughter, especially where it did imitate any dishonesty, and scurrility came forth in the place of wit, which, who understands the nature and genius of laughter cannot but perfectly know.

The wit of the old comedy.—What’s off or twisted in an author’s words or ideas, or in people's language or actions, often stirs up petty feelings and usually leads to laughter. It's obvious that all rude and inappropriate comments, jokes directed at good people, harm done to individuals, and twisted or unexpected remarks in old comedy made people laugh, especially when they imitated dishonesty, and when crudity replaced true wit, which anyone who understands the nature of laughter would definitely recognize.

Aristophanes.—Plautus.—Of which Aristophanes affords an ample harvest, having not only outgone Plautus or any other in that kind, but expressed all the moods and figures of what is ridiculous oddly.  In short, as vinegar is not accounted good until the wine be corrupted, so jests that are true and natural seldom raise laughter with the beast the multitude.  They love nothing that is right and proper.  The farther it runs from reason or possibility with them the better it is.

Aristophanes.—Plautus.—In this, Aristophanes offers a wealth of material, having surpassed Plautus and anyone else in this genre, and uniquely capturing all the various ways to express what’s ridiculous. In short, just as vinegar isn’t considered good until the wine goes bad, true and natural jokes rarely make the crowd laugh. They don’t appreciate anything that’s sensible or appropriate. The more it strays from logic or reality, the better they like it.

Socrates.—Theatrical wit.—What could have made them laugh, like to see Socrates presented, that example of all good life, honesty, and virtue, to have him hoisted up with a pulley, and there play the philosopher in a basket; measure how many foot a flea could skip geometrically, by a just scale, and edify the people from the engine.  This was theatrical wit, right stage jesting, and relishing a playhouse, invented for scorn and laughter; whereas, if it had savoured of equity, truth, perspicuity, and candour, to have tasten a wise or a learned palate,—spit it out presently! this is bitter and profitable: this instructs and would inform us: what need we know any thing, that are nobly born, more than a horse-race, or a hunting-match, our day to break with citizens, and such innate mysteries?

Socrates.—Theatrical wit.—What could have made them laugh more than seeing Socrates, the perfect example of a good life, honesty, and virtue, being hoisted up with a pulley to play the philosopher in a basket? Measuring how far a flea could jump geometrically, using a precise scale, and entertaining the crowd from that contraption. This was theatrical wit, genuine stage humor, meant for mockery and laughter; whereas, if it had involved fairness, truth, clarity, and honesty, something that a wise or educated person would appreciate— it would be immediately dismissed! This is harsh but useful: this teaches and informs us. Why should we, being of noble birth, need to know anything beyond a horse race or a hunting match, the daily activities with citizens, and such inherent mysteries?

The cart.—This is truly leaping from the stage to the tumbril again, reducing all wit to the original dung-cart.

The cart.—This is really jumping from the stage to the cart again, turning all cleverness back into the original dung-cart.

Of the magnitude and compass of any fable, epic or dramatic.

What the measure of a fable is.—The fable or plot of a poem defined.—The epic fable, differing from the dramatic.—To the resolving of this question we must first agree in the definition of the fable.  The fable is called the imitation of one entire and perfect action, whose parts are so joined and knit together, as nothing in the structure can be changed, or taken away, without impairing or troubling the whole, of which there is a proportionable magnitude in the members.  As for example: if a man would build a house, he would first appoint a place to build it in, which he would define within certain bounds; so in the constitution of a poem, the action is aimed at by the poet, which answers place in a building, and that action hath his largeness, compass, and proportion.  But as a court or king’s palace requires other dimensions than a private house, so the epic asks a magnitude from other poems, since what is place in the one is action in the other; the difference is an space.  So that by this definition we conclude the fable to be the imitation of one perfect and entire action, as one perfect and entire place is required to a building.  By perfect, we understand that to which nothing is wanting, as place to the building that is raised, and action to the fable that is formed.  It is perfect, perhaps not for a court or king’s palace, which requires a greater ground, but for the structure he would raise; so the space of the action may not prove large enough for the epic fable, yet be perfect for the dramatic, and whole.

What the measure of a fable is.—The fable or plot of a poem defined.—The epic fable, differing from the dramatic.—To answer this question, we first need to agree on the definition of a fable. The fable is defined as the imitation of one complete and perfect action, where all the parts are so connected that nothing in its structure can be changed or removed without disturbing the whole, which has a proportional size in its components. For example, if someone wants to build a house, they would first select a spot for it, defining it within certain boundaries; similarly, in constructing a poem, the action intended by the poet corresponds to the location in a building, and that action has its own size, scope, and proportion. Just as a palace requires different dimensions than a private house, an epic poem demands a larger scale than other poems, since what is location in one is action in the other; the difference is a matter of space. Thus, from this definition, we conclude that a fable is the imitation of one complete and entire action, just as one complete and entire space is necessary for a building. By perfect, we mean that nothing is lacking, just as space is essential for the building that is being constructed, and action is crucial for the fable being created. It may be perfect not for a palace or a king's residence, which needs a larger foundation, but suitable for the structure the poet intends to create; therefore, while the extent of the action might be insufficient for an epic fable, it could still be perfect and whole for a dramatic one.

What we understand by whole.—Whole we call that, and perfect, which hath a beginning, a midst, and an end.  So the place of any building may be whole and entire for that work, though too little for a palace.  As to a tragedy or a comedy, the action may be convenient and perfect that would not fit an epic poem in magnitude.  So a lion is a perfect creature in himself, though it be less than that of a buffalo or a rhinocerote.  They differ but in specie: either in the kind is absolute; both have their parts, and either the whole.  Therefore, as in every body so in every action, which is the subject of a just work, there is required a certain proportionable greatness, neither too vast nor too minute.  For that which happens to the eyes when we behold a body, the same happens to the memory when we contemplate an action.  I look upon a monstrous giant, as Tityus, whose body covered nine acres of land, and mine eye sticks upon every part; the whole that consists of those parts will never be taken in at one entire view.  So in a fable, if the action be too great, we can never comprehend the whole together in our imagination.  Again, if it be too little, there ariseth no pleasure out of the object; it affords the view no stay; it is beheld, and vanisheth at once.  As if we should look upon an ant or pismire, the parts fly the sight, and the whole considered is almost nothing.  The same happens in action, which is the object of memory, as the body is of sight.  Too vast oppresseth the eyes, and exceeds the memory; too little scarce admits either.

What we understand by whole.—We call something whole and perfect if it has a beginning, a middle, and an end. So, the space of any building can be whole and complete for that purpose, even if it's too small for a palace. Similarly, a tragedy or a comedy can have a suitable and complete action that wouldn’t work for an epic poem in terms of size. A lion is a perfect creature in its own right, even though it's smaller than a buffalo or a rhinoceros. They differ only in species; each is entirely its own kind, and both have their parts, as well as a whole. Therefore, just like in any body, there is a necessary proportional grandeur in every action that is the subject of a worthwhile work, neither too large nor too small. What happens to our eyes when we look at a body, happens to our memory when we contemplate an action. I think of a monstrous giant like Tityus, whose body covered nine acres; my eyes linger on every part, but I can never grasp the whole at once. In a fable, if the action is too grand, we can't fully comprehend the entire thing in our imagination. On the other hand, if it's too small, it provides no pleasure; it doesn't hold our gaze; we see it briefly, and then it disappears. If we were to look at an ant, the individual parts are hard to see, and the whole is almost negligible. The same goes for action, which is the object of memory, just as a body is for sight. Something too vast overwhelms the eyes and stretches the memory, while something too small hardly registers at all.

What is the utmost bounds of a fable.—Now in every action it behoves the poet to know which is his utmost bound, how far with fitness and a necessary proportion he may produce and determine it; that is, till either good fortune change into the worse, or the worse into the better.  For as a body without proportion cannot be goodly, no more can the action, either in comedy or tragedy, without his fit bounds: and every bound, for the nature of the subject, is esteemed the best that is largest, till it can increase no more; so it behoves the action in tragedy or comedy to be let grow till the necessity ask a conclusion; wherein two things are to be considered: first, that it exceed not the compass of one day; next, that there be place left for digression and art.  For the episodes and digressions in a fable are the same that household stuff and other furniture are in a house.  And so far from the measure and extent of a fable dramatic.

What are the limits of a fable.—In every action, it is essential for the poet to understand his limits, determining how far he can go with appropriate balance and necessary proportion; that is, until good fortune turns bad or bad fortune turns good. Just as a body without proportion cannot be aesthetically pleasing, neither can an action in comedy or tragedy thrive without proper limits: and among all limits, the one that is considered best for the nature of the subject is the one that is the largest, until it can expand no further; thus, it is important for the action in tragedy or comedy to develop until it’s necessary to reach a conclusion. In this, two things should be considered: first, it should not exceed the scope of one day; second, there should be room for digression and artistry. The episodes and digressions in a fable are like household items and furnishings in a home. Therefore, the measure and extent of a dramatic fable should be carefully defined.

What by one and entire.—Now that it should be one and entire.  One is considerable two ways; either as it is only separate, and by itself, or as being composed of many parts, it begins to be one as those parts grow or are wrought together.  That it should be one the first away alone, and by itself, no man that hath tasted letters ever would say, especially having required before a just magnitude and equal proportion of the parts in themselves.  Neither of which can possibly be, if the action be single and separate, not composed of parts, which laid together in themselves, with an equal and fitting proportion, tend to the same end; which thing out of antiquity itself hath deceived many, and more this day it doth deceive.

What by one and whole.—Now that it should be one and whole. One can be understood in two ways; either as it stands separate and alone, or as something made up of many parts that come together to form a whole. It cannot truly be one if it exists solitary, by itself—no one who has engaged with literature would claim that, especially considering the need for a proper size and equal proportion of the parts individually. Neither of these can exist if the action is singular and separate, not composed of parts that, when combined in a suitable and balanced way, lead to the same result; this misconception has misled many since ancient times, and continues to mislead even more today.

Hercules.—Theseus.—Achilles.—Ulysses.—Homer and Virgil.—Æneas.—Venus.—So many there be of old that have thought the action of one man to be one, as of Hercules, Theseus, Achilles, Ulysses, and other heroes; which is both foolish and false, since by one and the same person many things may be severally done which cannot fitly be referred or joined to the same end: which not only the excellent tragic poets, but the best masters of the epic, Homer and Virgil, saw.  For though the argument of an epic poem be far more diffused and poured out than that of tragedy, yet Virgil, writing of Æneas, hath pretermitted many things.  He neither tells how he was born, how brought up, how he fought with Achilles, how he was snatched out of the battle by Venus; but that one thing, how he came into Italy, he prosecutes in twelve books.  The rest of his journey, his error by sea, the sack of Troy, are put not as the argument of the work, but episodes of the argument.  So Homer laid by many things of Ulysses, and handled no more than he saw tended to one and the same end.

Hercules.—Theseus.—Achilles.—Ulysses.—Homer and Virgil.—Æneas.—Venus.—There are so many from the past who believed that the actions of one person, like Hercules, Theseus, Achilles, Ulysses, and other heroes, could be considered as one singular narrative; this idea is both misguided and incorrect. A single person can accomplish many different things that don’t necessarily align with the same purpose: a notion recognized by not only the greatest tragic poets but also by the finest epic poets, Homer and Virgil. Although epic poetry is usually broader and more expansive than tragedy, Virgil, in writing about Æneas, leaves out a lot of details. He doesn't explain how he was born, raised, how he fought Achilles, or how Venus rescued him from battle; instead, he focuses solely on how he arrived in Italy across twelve books. The rest of his journey, including his struggles at sea and the fall of Troy, are included not as the main story but as side stories. Similarly, Homer omitted many aspects of Ulysses’ journey, only addressing what directly contributed to a singular purpose.

Theseus.—Hercules.—Juvenal.—Codrus.—Sophocles.—Ajax.—Ulysses.—Contrary to which, and foolishly, those poets did, whom the philosopher taxeth, of whom one gathered all the actions of Theseus, another put all the labours of Hercules in one work.  So did he whom Juvenal mentions in the beginning, “hoarse Codrus,” that recited a volume compiled, which he called his Theseide, not yet finished, to the great trouble both of his hearers and himself; amongst which there were many parts had no coherence nor kindred one with another, so far they were from being one action, one fable.  For as a house, consisting of divers materials, becomes one structure and one dwelling, so an action, composed of divers parts, may become one fable, epic or dramatic.  For example, in a tragedy, look upon Sophocles, his Ajax: Ajax, deprived of Achilles’ armour, which he hoped from the suffrage of the Greeks, disdains; and, growing impatient of the injury, rageth, and runs mad.  In that humour he doth many senseless things, and at last falls upon the Grecian flock and kills a great ram for Ulysses: returning to his senses, he grows ashamed of the scorn, and kills himself; and is by the chiefs of the Greeks forbidden burial.  These things agree and hang together, not as they were done, but as seeming to be done, which made the action whole, entire, and absolute.

Theseus.—Hercules.—Juvenal.—Codrus.—Sophocles.—Ajax.—Ulysses.—In contrast to this, and foolishly, some poets, criticized by the philosopher, gathered the stories of Theseus and combined all the labors of Hercules into one work. Similarly, the one mentioned by Juvenal at the beginning, “hoarse Codrus,” recited an unfinished collection he called his Theseide, which caused great frustration for both his audience and himself; among these were many parts that had no connection or relationship to each other, so far removed from being one story, one fable. Just like how a house, made of different materials, becomes a single structure and residence, an action made up of various parts can form one tale, whether epic or dramatic. For instance, in a tragedy, look at Sophocles’ Ajax: Ajax, stripped of Achilles’ armor, which he expected from the support of the Greeks, feels disdain; and, unable to contain his anger over the insult, he rages and goes mad. In that state, he does many irrational things and ultimately attacks the Greek flock, killing a large ram intended for Ulysses. Once he regains his senses, he feels ashamed of his mockery and takes his own life; the Greek leaders, however, deny him a proper burial. These events align and connect not as they actually occurred, but as they appear to have happened, creating a complete, coherent, and definitive action.

The conclusion concerning the whole, and the parts.—Which are episodes.—Ajax and Hector.—Homer.—For the whole, as it consisteth of parts, so without all the parts it is not the whole; and to make it absolute is required not only the parts, but such parts as are true.  For a part of the whole was true; which, if you take away, you either change the whole or it is not the whole.  For if it be such a part, as, being present or absent, nothing concerns the whole, it cannot be called a part of the whole; and such are the episodes, of which hereafter.  For the present here is one example: the single combat of Ajax with Hector, as it is at large described in Homer, nothing belongs to this Ajax of Sophocles.

The conclusion about the whole, and the parts.—Which are episodes.—Ajax and Hector.—Homer.—The whole consists of parts, and without all the parts, it isn't the whole; to make it complete requires not only the parts but also that those parts are valid. A part of the whole was valid; if you remove it, you either alter the whole or it ceases to be the whole. If it's a part that, whether present or absent, doesn't affect the whole, it cannot be considered a part of the whole; these are the episodes, which will be discussed later. For now, here's one example: the duel between Ajax and Hector, as it is detailed in Homer, has no relevance to this Ajax of Sophocles.

You admire no poems but such as run like a brewer’s cart upon the stones, hobbling:—

You only appreciate poems that stumble along like a brewer’s cart over the stones.

“Et, quæ per salebras, altaque saxa cadunt,
   Accius et quidquid Pacuviusque vomunt.
Attonitusque legis terraï, frugiferaï.” [160a]

“So, what gets lost in the bushes and steep cliffs,
   Accius and whatever Pacuvius produces.
Amazed by the rules of the earth, the bountiful land.” [160a]

SOME POEMS.

TO WILLIAM CAMDEN.

Camden! most reverend head, to whom I owe
All that I am in arts, all that I know—
How nothing’s that! to whom my country owes
The great renown, and name wherewith she goes!
Than thee the age sees not that thing more grave,
More high, more holy, that she more would crave.
What name, what skill, what faith hast thou in things!
What sight in searching the most antique springs!
What weight, and what authority in thy speech!
Men scarce can make that doubt, but thou canst teach.
Pardon free truth, and let thy modesty,
Which conquers all, be once o’ercome by thee.
Many of thine, this better could, than I;
But for their powers, accept my piety.

Camden! most revered leader, to whom I owe
All that I am in the arts, all that I know—
How insignificant that is! to whom my country owes
The great fame and name with which she is known!
The age sees nothing more serious,
More elevated, more sacred, that it desires more than you.
What name, what skill, what faith do you have in things!
What insight in exploring the most ancient sources!
What impact, and what authority in your words!
Men can hardly question that, but you can teach.
Pardon the truth, and let your humility,
Which conquers all, be once defeated by you.
Many of your people could do this better than I;
But for their talents, accept my devotion.

ON MY FIRST DAUGHTER.

Here lies, to each her parents’ ruth,
Mary, the daughter of their youth;
Yet, all heaven’s gifts, being heaven’s due,
It makes the father less to rue.
At six months’ end, she parted hence,
With safety of her innocence;
Whose soul heaven’s queen, whose name she bears,
In comfort of her mother’s tears,
Hath placed amongst her virgin-train;
Where, while that severed doth remain,
This grave partakes the fleshly birth;
Which cover lightly, gentle earth!

Here lies, for the grief of her parents,
Mary, their youthful daughter;
Yet, all of heaven’s blessings, being heaven’s gift,
Make the father feel less regret.
After six months, she left this world,
Safeguarding her innocence;
Her soul, belonging to the queen of heaven, whose name she carries,
Finds comfort in her mother’s tears,
And has joined the group of virgins in heaven;
While this earthly separation remains,
This grave holds her physical body;
So gently cover it, kind earth!

ON MY FIRST SON.

Farewell, thou child of my right hand, and joy;
My sin was too much hope of thee, loved boy;
Seven years thou wert lent to me, and I thee pay,
Exacted by thy fate, on the just day.
Oh! could I lose all father, now! for why,
Will man lament the state he should envy?
To have so soon ’scaped world’s, and flesh’s rage,
And, if no other misery, yet age!
Rest in soft peace, and, asked, say here doth lie
Ben Jonson his best piece of poetry;
For whose sake, henceforth, all his vows be such,
As what he loves may never like too much.

Bye, you child of my right hand and joy;
My sin was having too much hope for you, beloved boy;
You were lent to me for seven years, and now I must repay,
Required by your fate, on this destined day.
Oh! if only I could lose all as a father, now! For why,
Should a man mourn the situation he should envy?
To have so quickly escaped the world's and flesh's rage,
And, if nothing else, at least age!
Rest in gentle peace, and when asked, say here lies
Ben Jonson's best piece of poetry;
For your sake, from now on, all his vows will be such,
That whatever he loves may never be loved too much.

TO FRANCIS BEAUMONT.

How I do love thee, Beaumont, and thy muse,
That unto me dost such religion use!
How I do fear myself, that am not worth
The least indulgent thought thy pen drops forth!
At once thou mak’st me happy, and unmak’st;
And giving largely to me, more thou takest!
What fate is mine, that so itself bereaves?
What art is thine, that so thy friend deceives?
When even there, where most thou praisest me,
For writing better, I must envy thee.

How I love you, Beaumont, and your muse,
You treat me with such reverence!
How I worry that I’m not worthy
Of even the slightest kind thought your pen offers!
You make me happy and then take it away;
By giving me so much, you end up taking more!
What fate is mine, that leaves me so empty?
What skill do you have, that so misleads your friend?
Even when you praise me the most,
I find myself envious of your writing.

OF LIFE AND DEATH.

The ports of death are sins; of life, good deeds:
Through which our merit leads us to our meeds.
How wilful blind is he, then, that would stray,
And hath it in his powers to make his way!
This world death’s region is, the other life’s:
And here it should be one of our first strifes,
So to front death, as men might judge us past it:
For good men but see death, the wicked taste it.

The ports of death are sins; of life, good deeds:
Through which our actions guide us to our rewards.
How stubbornly blind is he, then, who would wander,
And has the ability to find his path!
This world is the realm of death, the next is life:
And here it should be one of our main struggles,
To confront death, so that people might consider us beyond it:
For good people only see death, while the wicked experience it.

INVITING A FRIEND TO SUPPER.

To-night, grave sir, both my poor house and I
Do equally desire your company;
Not that we think us worthy such a guest,
But that your worth will dignify our feast,
With those that come; whose grace may make that seem
Something, which else could hope for no esteem.
It is the fair acceptance, sir, creates
The entertainment perfect, not the cates.
Yet shall you have, to rectify your palate,
An olive, capers, or some bitter salad
Ushering the mutton; with a short-legged hen,
If we can get her, full of eggs, and then,
Lemons and wine for sauce: to these, a coney
Is not to be despaired of for our money;
And though fowl now be scarce, yet there are clerks,
The sky not falling, think we may have larks.
I’ll tell you of more, and lie, so you will come:
Of partridge, pheasant, woodcock, of which some
May yet be there; and godwit if we can;
Knat, rail, and ruff, too.  Howsoe’er, my man
Shall read a piece of Virgil, Tacitus,
Livy, or of some better book to us,
Of which we’ll speak our minds, amidst our meat;
And I’ll profess no verses to repeat:
To this if aught appear, which I not know of,
That will the pastry, not my paper, show of.
Digestive cheese, and fruit there sure will be;
But that which most doth take my muse and me,
Is a pure cup of rich canary wine,
Which is the Mermaid’s now, but shall be mine:
Of which had Horace, or Anacreon tasted,
Their lives, as do their lines, till now had lasted.
Tobacco, nectar, or the Thespian spring,
Are all but Luther’s beer, to this I sing.
Of this we will sup free, but moderately,
And we will have no Pooly’ or Parrot by;
Nor shall our cups make any guilty men;
But at our parting we will be as when
We innocently met.  No simple word
That shall be uttered at our mirthful board,
Shall make us sad next morning; or affright
The liberty that we’ll enjoy to-night.

Tonight, dear sir, both my humble home and I
would truly love your company;
Not that we think we deserve such a guest,
But that your presence will elevate our feast,
Along with those who’ll join us; their grace may make it
Something that would otherwise not warrant much respect.
It's the warm acceptance that creates
A perfect gathering, not just the food.
Still, you'll have something to whet your appetite,
An olive, capers, or some bitter greens
To go along with the mutton; with a small hen,
If we can find one, full of eggs, and then,
Lemons and wine for sauce: a rabbit
Shouldn’t be impossible for our budget;
And although birds are rare now, there are clerks,
The sky isn't falling, we could still have larks.
I’ll tell you more, and stretch the truth, so you’ll come:
Of partridge, pheasant, woodcock, some of which may
Still be around; and godwit if we can;
Knot, rail, and ruff, too. However, my man
Will read us a piece of Virgil, Tacitus,
Livy, or something of greater interest,
Of which we’ll share our thoughts while we eat;
And I won’t recite any verses in return:
If anything new comes up that I don’t know,
It will be the dessert, not my paper, that shows it.
There will definitely be some cheese and fruit;
But what excites my muse and me the most
Is a fine cup of rich canary wine,
Which belongs to the Mermaid now, but will be mine:
If Horace or Anacreon had tasted it,
Their lives, just like their lines, would’ve lasted till now.
Tobacco, nectar, or the Thespian spring,
Are all just Luther’s beer compared to this I sing.
We will enjoy this freely, but in moderation,
And we won’t have any Pooly or Parrot with us;
Nor will our cups make us feel guilty;
But when we part, we will be just like when
We innocently met. No simple word
That’s spoken at our joyful table,
Will make us sad the next morning; or frighten
The freedom we’ll enjoy tonight.

EPITAPH ON SALATHIEL PAVY,
A child of Queen Elizabeth’s chapel.

Weep with me all you that read
   This little story;
And know for whom a tear you shed,
   Death’s self is sorry.
’Twas a child that so did thrive
   In grace and feature,
As heaven and nature seemed to strive
   Which owned the creature.
Years he numbered scarce thirteen
   When fates turned cruel;
Yet three filled zodiacs had he been
   The stage’s jewel;
And did act, what now we moan,
   Old men so duly;
As, sooth, the Parcæ thought him one
   He played so truly.
So, by error to his fate
   They all consented;
But viewing him since, alas, too late!
   They have repented;
And have sought to give new birth,
   In baths to steep him;
But, being so much too good for earth,
   Heaven vows to keep him.

Cry with me, all of you who read
this little story;
And know for whom you shed a tear,
Death itself is sorry.
It was a child who flourished
in grace and beauty,
As if heaven and nature strove
over who owned this being.
He barely reached thirteen years
when fate turned cruel;
Yet he had shone like a jewel on stage
through three filled zodiacs;
And performed, as we now mourn,
like old men so dutifully;
For, truly, the Fates thought he was one
who acted so genuinely.
So, by mistake, they agreed to his fate,
without realizing;
But looking back now, alas, too late!
They have regretted;
And have tried to give him new life,
in baths to revive him;
But being far too good for this world,
heaven vows to keep him.

EPITAPH ON ELIZABETH, L. H.

Wouldst thou hear what man can say
In a little?  Reader, stay.
Underneath this stone doth lie
As much beauty as could die
Which in life did harbour give
To more virtue than doth live.
If, at all, she had a fault
Leave it buried in this vault.
One name was Elizabeth,
The other let it sleep with death.
Fitter, where it died, to tell,
Than that it lived at all.  Farewell.

Would you like to hear what a person can say
in just a few words? Reader, hold on.
Under this stone lies
as much beauty as could die
which in life held more virtue
than is found in the living.
If she had any faults at all,
let them stay buried in this vault.
One name was Elizabeth,
the other should rest with death.
It's better to tell where she died
than to say she lived at all. Farewell.

EPITAPH ON THE COUNTESS OF PEMBROKE.

Underneath this sable hearse
Lies the subject of all verse,
Sidney’s sister, Pembroke’s mother:
Death! ere thou hast slain another,
Learned, and fair, and good as she,
Time shall throw a dart at thee.

Below this black hearse
lies the focus of all poetry,
Sidney's sister, Pembroke's mother:
Death! before you take another,
smart, beautiful, and kind as she,
time will aim a shot at you.

TO THE MEMORY OF MY BELOVED MASTER WILLIAM SHAKSPEARE, AND WHAT HE HATH LEFT US.

To draw no envy, Shakspeare, on thy name,
Am I thus ample to thy book and fame;
While I confess thy writings to be such,
As neither man, nor muse can praise too much.
’Tis true, and all men’s suffrage.  But these ways
Were not the paths I meant unto thy praise;
For silliest ignorance on these may light,
Which, when it sounds at best, but echoes right;
Or blind affection, which doth ne’er advance
The truth, but gropes, and urgeth all by chance;
Or crafty malice might pretend this praise,
And think to ruin, where it seemed to raise.
These are, as some infamous bawd, or whore,
Should praise a matron; what would hurt her more?
But thou art proof against them, and, indeed,
Above the ill-fortune of them, or the need.
I, therefore, will begin: Soul of the age!
The applause! delight! and wonder of our stage!
My Shakspeare rise!  I will not lodge thee by
Chaucer, or Spenser, or bid Beaumont lie
A little further off, to make thee room:
Thou art a monument without a tomb,
And art alive still, while thy book doth live
And we have wits to read, and praise to give.
That I not mix thee so, my brain excuses,
I mean with great, but disproportioned Muses;
For if I thought my judgment were of years,
I should commit thee surely with thy peers,
And tell how far thou didst our Lily outshine,
Or sporting Kyd, or Marlow’s mighty line.
And though thou hadst small Latin and less Greek,
From thence to honour thee, I will not seek
For names: but call forth thundering Eschylus,
Euripides, and Sophocles to us,
Pacuvius, Accius, him of Cordoua dead,
To live again, to hear thy buskin tread,
And shake a stage; or, when thy socks were on,
Leave thee alone for the comparison
Of all that insolent Greece, or haughty Rome
Sent forth, or since did from their ashes come.
Triumph, my Britain, thou hast one to show,
To whom all scenes of Europe homage owe.
He was not of an age, but for all time!
And all the Muses still were in their prime,
When, like Apollo, he came forth to warm
Our ears, or like a Mercury to charm!
Nature herself was proud of his designs,
And joyed to wear the dressing of his lines!
Which were so richly spun, and woven so fit,
As, since, she will vouchsafe no other wit.
The merry Greek, tart Aristophanes,
Neat Terence, witty Plautus, now not please;
But antiquated and deserted lie,
As they were not of nature’s family.
Yet must I not give nature all; thy art,
My gentle Shakspeare, must enjoy a part.
For though the poet’s matter nature be,
His heart doth give the fashion: and, that he
Who casts to write a living line, must sweat,
(Such as thine are) and strike the second heat
Upon the Muse’s anvil; turn the same,
And himself with it, that he thinks to frame;
Or for the laurel, he may gain a scorn;
For a good poet’s made, as well as born.
And such wert thou!  Look how the father’s face
Lives in his issue, even so the race
Of Shakspeare’s mind and manners brightly shines
In his well-turnèd, and true filèd lines;
In each of which he seems to shake a lance,
As brandished at the eyes of ignorance.
Sweet Swan of Avon! what a sight it were
To see thee in our water yet appear,
And make those flights upon the banks of Thames,
That so did take Eliza, and our James!
But stay, I see thee in the hemisphere
Advanced, and made a constellation there!
Shine forth, thou star of poets, and with rage,
Or influence, chide, or cheer the drooping stage,
Which, since thy flight from hence, hath mourned like night,
And despairs day, but for thy volume’s light.

To stir up no jealousy, Shakespeare, with your name,
Am I this generous toward your work and fame;
While I admit your writings are so remarkable,
That neither man nor muse can praise them enough.
It’s true, and everyone agrees. But these
Are not the ways I intended to praise you;
For foolish ignorance may land on these words,
Which, when it sounds best, merely echoes back;
Or blind affection, which never truly advances
The truth, but stumbles and pushes everything by chance;
Or sneaky malice might pretend to offer praise,
And think to ruin where it seemed to uplift.
These are like some infamous pimp or whore
Praising a respectable woman; what could hurt her more?
But you are beyond their reach, and, indeed,
Above the bad fortune of them, or their need.
So, I will begin: Soul of the age!
The applause! the delight! and wonder of our stage!
My Shakespeare, rise! I won’t place you beside
Chaucer or Spenser, nor ask Beaumont to lie
A little further away to make space for you:
You are a monument without a tomb,
And remain alive as long as your book is alive
And we have minds to read, and praise to give.
That I don’t mix you in this way, my mind excuses,
I mean with great but mismatched Muses;
For if I thought my judgment were of age,
I would surely place you with your peers,
And tell how far you outshine our Lily,
Or playful Kyd, or Marlow’s mighty lines.
And although you had little Latin and even less Greek,
To honor you, I will not search
For names: but I’ll call forth thundering Aeschylus,
Euripides, and Sophocles to join us,
Pacuvius, Accius, and the one from Cordoba who’s dead,
To live again, to hear your steps on stage,
And shake the ground; or, when you were in socks,
Leave you alone for comparison
With all the arrogant Greece, or proud Rome
That sent forth, or since have arisen from their ashes.
Rejoice, my Britain, you have one to show,
To whom all of Europe’s scenes owe their respect.
He was not just of an age, but for all time!
And all the Muses were still in their prime,
When he came forth like Apollo to warm
Our ears, or like Mercury to charm!
Nature herself took pride in his designs,
And loved to wear the dress of his lines!
Which were so richly spun, and woven so perfectly,
That since then, she has offered no other wit.
The lively Greek, sharp Aristophanes,
Neat Terence, witty Plautus, now don’t please;
But are outdated and abandoned,
As if they were not part of nature’s family.
Yet I must not give nature all the credit; your art,
My gentle Shakespeare, deserves part of the praise.
For although the poet’s material is nature,
His heart gives it shape: and, he
Who aims to write a lively line must work hard,
(Such as yours are) and strike the second heat
On the Muse’s anvil; turn the same,
And get involved with it, if he hopes to create;
Or for the laurel, he may earn scorn;
For a great poet is made, as much as born.
And such were you! Look how the father’s face
Lives in his children; even so the essence
Of Shakespeare’s mind and manners shines brightly
In his well-crafted and true-filled lines;
In each of which he seems to shake a lance,
As if to challenge the eyes of ignorance.
Sweet Swan of Avon! what a sight it would be
To see you still appear in our waters,
And make those flights along the banks of Thames,
That so captivated Eliza, and our James!
But wait, I see you in the sky
Elevated and made a constellation there!
Shine bright, you star of poets, and with fury,
Or influence, chastise, or lift the weary stage,
Which, since your departure, has mourned like night,
And despairs of day, but for your volume’s light.

TO CELIA.

Drink to me only with thine eyes,
   And I will pledge with mine;
Or leave a kiss but in the cup,
   And I’ll not look for wine.
The thirst that from the soul doth rise
   Doth ask a drink divine:
But might I of Jove’s nectar sup,
   I would not change for thine.

Beverage to me only with your eyes,
And I’ll toast with mine;
Or just leave a kiss in the cup,
And I won’t look for wine.
The thirst that comes from the soul
asks for a drink from the divine:
But if I could sip Jove’s nectar,
I wouldn’t trade it for yours.

I sent thee late a rosy wreath,
   Not so much honouring thee,
As giving it a hope that there
   It could not withered be.
But thou thereon didst only breathe,
   And sent’st it back to me:
Since when it grows, and smells, I swear,
   Not of itself, but thee.

I sent you a floral wreath late at night,
Not so much to honor you,
As to offer a hope that it
Would not wither away.
But you only breathed on it,
And sent it back to me:
Since then it grows and its fragrance, I swear,
Comes not from itself, but from you.

THE TRIUMPH OF CHARIS.

   See the chariot at hand here of Love,
      Wherein my lady rideth!
   Each that draws is a swan or a dove,
      And well the car Love guideth.
   As she goes, all hearts do duty
         Unto her beauty;
   And, enamoured, do wish, so they might
         But enjoy such a sight,
   That they still were to run by her side,
Through swords, through seas, whither she would ride.

Check it out the chariot of Love here,
      Where my lady rides!
   Each one pulling it is a swan or a dove,
      And Love steers the carriage well.
   As she moves, all hearts pay their respects
         To her beauty;
   And those in love wish that they could
         Just see such a
   Sight, and that they could run by her side,
Through swords, through seas, wherever she would ride.

   Do but look on her eyes, they do light
      All that Love’s world compriseth!
   Do but look on her hair, it is bright
      As Love’s star when it riseth!
   Do but mark, her forehead’s smoother
         Than words that soothe her!
   And from her arched brows, such a grace
         Sheds itself through the face,
   As alone there triumphs to the life
All the gain, all the good, of the elements’ strife.

Just look into her eyes, they light up
      Everything that Love includes!
   Just look at her hair, it shines
      Like Love's star when it rises!
   Just notice, her forehead is smoother
         Than words that comfort her!
   And from her arched brows, such a grace
         Shines through her face,
   As if it alone embodies
All the benefits, all the goodness, from nature's struggles.

   Have you seen but a bright lily grow
      Before rude hands have touched it?
   Have you marked but the fall o’ the snow
      Before the soil hath smutched it?
   Have you felt the wool of beaver?
         Or swan’s down ever?
   Or have smelt o’ the bud o’ the brier?
         Or the nard in the fire?
   Or have tasted the bag of the bee?
O so white!  O so soft!  O so sweet is she!

Have you ever seen a bright lily grow
      Before it’s been touched by rough hands?
   Have you noticed the snow falling
      Before the ground was dirty?
   Have you felt the fur of a beaver?
         Or ever the down of a swan?
   Or have you smelled the bud of a briar?
         Or the nard in a fire?
   Or have you tasted honey from a bee?
Oh so white! Oh so soft! Oh so sweet is she!

IN THE PERSON OF WOMANKIND.
An Apology Song.

Men, if you love us, play no more
   The fools or tyrants with your friends,
To make us still sing o’er and o’er
   Our own false praises, for your ends:
      We have both wits and fancies too,
      And, if we must, let’s sing of you.

Men, if you love us, stop acting like fools or tyrants with your friends, so that we keep singing our own false praises for your benefit. We have our own intelligence and creativity too, and if it comes to it, let's sing about you instead.

Nor do we doubt but that we can,
   If we would search with care and pain,
Find some one good in some one man;
   So going thorough all your strain,
      We shall, at last, of parcels make
      One good enough for a song’s sake.

Nor do we doubt that we can,
   If we take the time to look closely,
Find something good in someone;
   So going through all your effort,
      We will, in the end, create
      One good enough for a song’s sake.

And as a cunning painter takes,
   In any curious piece you see,
More pleasure while the thing he makes,
   Than when ’tis made—why so will we.
      And having pleased our art, we’ll try
      To make a new, and hang that by.

And just like a clever artist does,
   In any interesting piece you see,
They enjoy the process of creating
   More than the final product—so will we.
      And having satisfied our craft, we’ll try
      To create something new, and display it next to it.

ODE

To the Immortal Memory and Friendship of that Noble Pair, Sir Lucius Cary and Sir Henry Morison.

To the Lasting Memory and Friendship of that Noble Pair, Sir Lucius Cary and Sir Henry Morison.

I.

THE TURN.

   Brave infant of Saguntum, clear
   Thy coming forth in that great year,
When the prodigious Hannibal did crown
His cage, with razing your immortal town.
      Thou, looking then about,
      Ere thou wert half got out,
   Wise child, didst hastily return,
   And mad’st thy mother’s womb thine urn.
How summed a circle didst thou leave mankind
Of deepest lore, could we the centre find!

Bold child of Saguntum, clear
Your arrival in that great year,
When the amazing Hannibal celebrated
His victory by destroying your immortal town.
You, looking around then,
Before you were fully out,
Smart kid, quickly went back,
And made your mother’s womb your
resting place.
How perfect a circle did you leave humanity
Of profound knowledge, if only we could find the center!

THE COUNTER-TURN.

   Did wiser nature draw thee back,
   From out the horror of that sack,
Where shame, faith, honour, and regard of right,
Lay trampled on? the deeds of death and night,
      Urged, hurried forth, and hurled
      Upon th’ affrighted world;
   Sword, fire, and famine, with fell fury met,
   And all on utmost ruin set;
As, could they but life’s miseries foresee,
No doubt all infants would return like thee.

Did wiser nature pull you back,
From the horror of that sack,
Where shame, faith, honor, and respect for right,
Lay trampled? The acts of death and night,
Urged, rushed forth, and
Thrown
Upon the terrified world;
Sword, fire, and famine, with cruel rage met,
And all aimed at complete destruction;
As if they could foresee life’s miseries,
No doubt all babies would come back like you.

THE STAND.

For what is life, if measured by the space
      Not by the act?
Or maskèd man, if valued by his face,
      Above his fact?
   Here’s one outlived his peers,
   And told forth fourscore years;
   He vexèd time, and busied the whole state;
      Troubled both foes and friends;
      But ever to no ends:
   What did this stirrer but die late?
How well at twenty had he fallen or stood!
For three of his fourscore he did no good.

For what is life if it's measured by the space
      Instead of by the action?
Or a masked man, if judged by his appearance,
      Rather than his deeds?
   Here’s someone who outlived his peers,
   And lived for eighty years;
   He annoyed time and occupied the whole state;
      Disturbed both enemies and friends;
      But always to no purpose:
   What did this troublemaker achieve except to die late?
How well could he have done at twenty!
For three of his eighty years, he did no good.

II.

THE TURN

   He entered well, by virtuous parts,
   Got up, and thrived with honest arts;
He purchased friends, and fame, and honours then,
And had his noble name advanced with men:
      But weary of that flight,
      He stooped in all men’s sight
         To sordid flatteries, acts of strife,
         And sunk in that dead sea of life,
So deep, as he did then death’s waters sup,
But that the cork of title buoyed him up.

He started off strong, through good qualities,
Got up, and prospered with honest skills;
He gained friends, reputation, and honors,
And saw his noble name recognized among others:
But tired of that rise,
He lowered himself in everyone’s view
To cheap flattery, acts of conflict,
And sank in that dead sea of life,
So deep that he almost drowned in death’s waters,
Except that his title kept him afloat.

THE COUNTER-TURN

   Alas! but Morison fell young:
   He never fell,—thou fall’st, my tongue.
He stood a soldier to the last right end,
A perfect patriot, and a noble friend;
      But most, a virtuous son.
      All offices were done
   By him, so ample, full, and round,
   In weight, in measure, number, sound,
As, though his age imperfect might appear,
His life was of humanity the sphere.

Alas! But Morison died young:
He never fell,—you fall, my tongue.
He stood as a soldier until the very end,
A true patriot, and a great friend;
But most of all, a good son.
He completed all his duties
So thoroughly, completely, and perfectly,
In weight, measure, number, and sound,
As if, though his age might seem incomplete,
His life was the essence of humanity.

THE STAND

Go now, and tell out days summed up with fears,
      And make them years;
Produce thy mass of miseries on the stage,
      To swell thine age;
   Repeat of things a throng,
   To show thou hast been long,
Not lived: for life doth her great actions spell.
   By what was done and wrought
   In season, and so brought
To light: her measures are, how well
Each syllabe answered, and was formed, how fair;
These make the lines of life, and that’s her air!

Go now and share the days filled with fears,
      And turn them into years;
Show off your pile of sorrows on stage,
      To make you seem wise with age;
   Repeat a crowd of tales,
   To prove you’ve been around,
Not just alive: because life reveals her true deeds
   By what was achieved and done
   In time, and how it was brought
To light: her measures are, how well
Each syllable matched, and was shaped, how beautifully;
These create the verses of life, and that’s her essence!

III.

THE TURN

   It is not growing like a tree
   In bulk, doth make men better be;
Or standing long an oak, three hundred year,
To fall a log at last, dry, bald, and sear:
      A lily of a day,
      Is fairer far in May,
   Although it fall and die that night;
   It was the plant, and flower of light.
In small proportions we just beauties see;
And in short measures, life may perfect be.

It’s not about growing like a tree,
In bulk, that makes people better;
Or standing for three hundred years like an oak,
Just to end up as a dry, bald log;
A lily that blooms for a day,
Is way more beautiful in May,
Even though it might fall and die that night;
It was the plant and flower of light.
In smaller portions, we can see true beauty;
And in shorter spans, life can be perfect.

THE COUNTER-TURN

   Call, noble Lucius, then for wine,
   And let thy looks with gladness shine:
Accept this garland, plant it on thy head
And think, nay know, thy Morison’s not dead
      He leaped the present age,
      Possessed with holy rage
   To see that bright eternal day;
   Of which we priests and poets say,
Such truths, as we expect for happy men:
And there he lives with memory and Ben.

Call, noble Lucius, then for wine,
And let your face shine with joy:
Accept this garland, place it on your head
And believe, no, know, your Morison’s not dead
He jumped into the next life,
Filled with holy passion
To witness that bright, eternal day;
Of which we priests and poets speak,
Such truths, as we hope for joyful people:
And there he lives with memory and Ben.

THE STAND

Jonson, who sung this of him, ere he went,
         Himself to rest,
Or taste a part of that full joy he meant
         To have expressed,
      In this bright Asterism!
      Where it were friendship’s schism,
   Were not his Lucius long with us to tarry,
      To separate these twi-
      Lights, the Dioscouri;
   And keep the one half from his Harry,
But fate doth so alternate the design
Whilst that in heaven, this light on earth must shine.

Jonson, who sang this about him before he rested,
         Himself to rest,
Or experienced some of that complete joy he intended
         To have expressed,
      In this bright constellation!
      Where it would be a break in friendship,
   If his Lucius were not here to stay,
      To separate these two-
      Lights, the Dioscouri;
   And keep the one half from his Harry,
But fate changes the plan
While in heaven, this light on earth must shine.

IV.

THE TURN

   And shine as you exalted are;
   Two names of friendship, but one star:
Of hearts the union, and those not by chance
Made, or indenture, or leased out t’advance
      The profits for a time.
      No pleasures vain did chime,
   Of rhymes, or riots, at your feasts,
   Orgies of drink, or feigned protests:
But simple love of greatness and of good,
That knits brave minds and manners more than blood.

And shine as you are exalted;
Two names for friendship, but one star:
The union of hearts, and not by chance
Made, or bound by contract, or rented to enhance
Short-term gains.
No empty pleasures rang,
With rhymes, or wild parties at your gatherings,
Or drunken revelries, or fake protests:
But a simple love of greatness and goodness,
That connects brave minds and character more than blood.

THE COUNTER-TURN

   This made you first to know the why
   You liked, then after, to apply
That liking; and approach so one the t’other,
Till either grew a portion of the other:
      Each styled by his end,
      The copy of his friend.
   You lived to be the great sir-names,
   And titles, by which all made claims
Unto the virtue; nothing perfect done,
But as a Cary, or a Morison.

This made you first understand why
   You liked something, and then, later, applied
That liking; and approached each other
Until one became a part of the other:
      Each defined by his goal,
      A reflection of his friend.
   You lived to earn the grand last names,
   And titles, by which everyone made claims
To the virtue; nothing was truly perfect,
Except as a Cary or a Morison.

THE STAND

And such a force the fair example had,
         As they that saw
The good, and durst not practise it, were glad
         That such a law
      Was left yet to mankind;
      Where they might read and find
   Friendship, indeed, was written not in words;
      And with the heart, not pen,
      Of two so early men,
   Whose lines her rolls were, and records;
Who, ere the first down bloomed upon the chin,
Had sowed these fruits, and got the harvest in.

And the strong example had such an impact,
         As those who
Saw the good and didn’t dare to practice it were glad
         That such a
      Law
      Was still available to humanity;
      Where they could read and discover
   That friendship wasn’t written just in words;
      But with the heart, not a pen,
      Of two young men,
   Whose stories were documented;
Who, before the first hair blossomed on their chins,
Had planted these seeds and reaped the rewards.

PRÆLUDIUM.

And must I sing?  What subject shall I choose!
Or whose great name in poets’ heaven use,
For the more countenance to my active muse?

And must I sing? What topic should I pick!
Or whose famous name in the poets’ realm should I use,
To give my creative spirit more encouragement?

Hercules? alas, his bones are yet sore
With his old earthly labours t’ exact more
Of his dull godhead were sin.  I’ll implore

Hercules? Unfortunately, his bones still ache
From his past earthly labors to gain more
Of his dull divinity would be a sin. I'll ask

Phœbus.  No, tend thy cart still.  Envious day
Shall not give out that I have made thee stay,
And foundered thy hot team, to tune my lay.

Phœbus. No, keep your cart still. Envious day
Won’t know that I’ve made you stop,
And worn out your fiery team, to set my song.

Nor will I beg of thee, lord of the vine,
To raise my spirits with thy conjuring wine,
In the green circle of thy ivy twine.

Nor will I ask you, lord of the vine,
To lift my spirits with your magical wine,
In the green circle of your ivy twine.

Pallas, nor thee I call on, mankind maid,
That at thy birth mad’st the poor smith afraid.
Who with his axe thy father’s midwife played.

Pallas, I don't call on you either, woman of mankind,
Who scared the poor smith at your birth.
He acted as the midwife for your father with his axe.

Go, cramp dull Mars, light Venus, when he snorts,
Or with thy tribade trine invent new sports;
Thou, nor thy looseness with my making sorts.

Go, cramped dull Mars, bright Venus, when he
snorts,
Or with your tribade trine create new games;
Neither you nor your looseness match my creation.

Let the old boy, your son, ply his old task,
Turn the stale prologue to some painted mask;
His absence in my verse is all I ask.

Let the kid, your son, do his usual thing,
Rehash the same old story with some flashy show;
All I want is his absence in my poetry.

Hermes, the cheater, shall not mix with us,
Though he would steal his sisters’ Pegasus,
And rifle him; or pawn his petasus.

Hermes, the trickster, won't hang out with us,
Even if he would snatch his sisters’ Pegasus,
And rummage through him; or sell his petasus.

Nor all the ladies of the Thespian lake,
Though they were crushed into one form, could make
A beauty of that merit, that should take

Nor all the ladies of the Thespian lake,
Though they were crushed into one form, could make
A beauty of that merit, that should take

My muse up by commission; no, I bring
My own true fire: now my thought takes wing,
And now an epode to deep ears I sing.

My inspiration isn't bought; no, I unleash
My own genuine passion: now my thoughts take flight,
And now I sing a verse for those who truly listen.

EPODE.

Not to know vice at all, and keep true state,
   Is virtue and not fate:
Next to that virtue, is to know vice well,
   And her black spite expel.
Which to effect (since no breast is so sure,
   Or safe, but she’ll procure
Some way of entrance) we must plant a guard
   Of thoughts to watch and ward
At th’ eye and ear, the ports unto the mind,
   That no strange, or unkind
Object arrive there, but the heart, our spy,
   Give knowledge instantly
To wakeful reason, our affections’ king:
   Who, in th’ examining,
Will quickly taste the treason, and commit
   Close, the close cause of it.
’Tis the securest policy we have,
   To make our sense our slave.
But this true course is not embraced by many:
   By many! scarce by any.
For either our affections do rebel,
   Or else the sentinel,
That should ring ’larum to the heart, doth sleep:
   Or some great thought doth keep
Back the intelligence, and falsely swears
   They’re base and idle fears
Whereof the loyal conscience so complains.
   Thus, by these subtle trains,
Do several passions invade the mind,
   And strike our reason blind:
Of which usurping rank, some have thought love
   The first: as prone to move
Most frequent tumults, horrors, and unrests,
   In our inflamèd breasts:
But this doth from the cloud of error grow,
   Which thus we over-blow.
The thing they here call love is blind desire,
   Armed with bow, shafts, and fire;
Inconstant, like the sea, of whence ’tis born,
   Rough, swelling, like a storm;
With whom who sails, rides on the surge of fear,
   And boils as if he were
In a continual tempest.  Now, true love
   No such effects doth prove;
That is an essence far more gentle, fine,
   Pure, perfect, nay, divine;
It is a golden chain let down from heaven,
   Whose links are bright and even;
That falls like sleep on lovers, and combines
   The soft and sweetest minds
In equal knots: this bears no brands, nor darts,
   To murder different hearts,
But, in a calm and god-like unity,
   Preserves community.
O, who is he that, in this peace, enjoys
   Th’ elixir of all joys?
A form more fresh than are the Eden bowers,
   And lasting as her flowers;
Richer than Time and, as Times’s virtue, rare;
   Sober as saddest care;
A fixèd thought, an eye untaught to glance;
   Who, blest with such high chance,
Would, at suggestion of a steep desire,
   Cast himself from the spire
Of all his happiness?  But soft: I hear
   Some vicious fool draw near,
That cries, we dream, and swears there’s no such thing,
   As this chaste love we sing.
Peace, Luxury! thou art like one of those
   Who, being at sea, suppose,
Because they move, the continent doth so:
   No, Vice, we let thee know
Though thy wild thoughts with sparrows’ wings do fly,
   Turtles can chastely die;
And yet (in this t’ express ourselves more clear)
   We do not number here
Such spirits as are only continent,
   Because lust’s means are spent;
Or those who doubt the common mouth of fame,
   And for their place and name,
Cannot so safely sin: their chastity
   Is mere necessity;
Nor mean we those whom vows and conscience
   Have filled with abstinence:
Though we acknowledge who can so abstain,
   Makes a most blessèd gain;
He that for love of goodness hateth ill,
   Is more crown-worthy still
Than he, which for sin’s penalty forbears:
   His heart sins, though he fears.
But we propose a person like our Dove,
   Graced with a Phœnix’ love;
A beauty of that clear and sparkling light,
   Would make a day of night,
And turn the blackest sorrows to bright joys:
   Whose odorous breath destroys
All taste of bitterness, and makes the air
   As sweet as she is fair.
A body so harmoniously composed,
   As if natùre disclosed
All her best symmetry in that one feature!
   O, so divine a creature
Who could be false to? chiefly, when he knows
   How only she bestows
The wealthy treasure of her love on him;
   Making his fortunes swim
In the full flood of her admired perfection?
   What savage, brute affection,
Would not be fearful to offend a dame
   Of this excelling frame?
Much more a noble, and right generous mind,
   To virtuous moods inclined,
That knows the weight of guilt: he will refrain
   From thoughts of such a strain,
And to his sense object this sentence ever,
   “Man may securely sin, but safely never.”

Not knowing vice at all, and maintaining a true state,
is virtue, not fate:
Next to that virtue is knowing vice well,
and driving out her black spite.
To achieve this (since no heart is completely secure,
or safe, but she’ll find
some way to get in) we must set up a guard
of thoughts to watch and protect
the eyes and ears, the gateways to the mind,
so no strange or unkind
influence can enter, but our heart, our spy,
gives us knowledge instantly
to our alert reason, the king of our emotions:
who, in examining,
will quickly detect the betrayal, and address
the root cause of it.
This is the safest policy we have,
to make our senses our servants.
But this true path is not embraced by many:
by many! hardly by any.
For either our emotions rebel,
or the guard,
that should alert the heart, is asleep:
or some strong thought holds
back the intelligence, falsely claiming
they’re baseless fears
that the loyal conscience so complains about.
Thus, through these subtle tricks,
various passions invade the mind,
and blind our reason:
of this usurping rank, some have considered love
the greatest: as likely to incite
the most frequent turmoil, horror, and unrest,
in our inflamed hearts:
but this arises from the fog of error,
which we thus exaggerate.
What they call love here is blind desire,
armed with bow, arrows, and fire;
inconstant, like the sea from which it’s born,
rough and swelling, like a storm;
those who sail with it ride on a wave of fear,
and churn as if they were
in a constant tempest. Now, true love
shows none of these effects;
that is an essence far more gentle, fine,
pure, perfect, indeed divine;
it’s a golden chain let down from heaven,
whose links are bright and smooth;
that falls like sleep on lovers, and binds
the softest and sweetest minds
in equal ties: this bears no brands, nor arrows,
to wound different hearts,
but, in calm and god-like unity,
preserves community.
O, who is he that, in this peace, enjoys
the elixir of all joys?
A form fresher than the bower of Eden,
and lasting as its flowers;
richer than Time and, as Time’s virtue, rare;
sober as the deepest care;
a fixed thought, an eye not taught to glance;
who, blessed with such high chance,
would, at the suggestion of a deep desire,
throw himself from the spire
of all his happiness? But wait: I hear
some foolish person drawing near,
who claims we dream, and swears there’s no such thing,
as this chaste love we sing.
Peace, Luxury! you’re like one of those
who, being at sea, think,
because they move, the land does too:
No, Vice, we let you know
though your wild thoughts with sparrow wings fly,
turtles can die chastely;
and yet (to express ourselves more clearly)
we do not include here
those spirits who are only continent,
because lust’s means are spent;
or those who doubt the common voice of fame,
and for their place and name,
cannot sin so safely: their chastity
is pure necessity;
nor do we mean those whom vows and conscience
have filled with abstinence:
though we acknowledge those who can so abstain,
achieve a most blessed gain;
he who, for the love of goodness, hates evil,
is more worthy of a crown still
than he who refrains just to avoid sin’s penalty:
his heart still sins, though he fears.
But we propose a person like our Dove,
adorned with a Phoenix’s love;
a beauty of such clear and sparkling light,
would turn night into day,
and change the darkest sorrows into bright joys:
whose fragrant breath destroys
all bitterness and makes the air
as sweet as she is fair.
A body so harmoniously composed,
as if nature revealed
all her best symmetry in that one form!
O, who could be false to such a divine creature?
especially when he knows
how only she grants
the wealthy treasure of her love to him;
making his fortunes thrive
in the full flood of her admired perfection?
What savage, brutish affection,
would not worry about offending a lady
of this exceptional beauty?
Much more a noble, generous mind,
inclined to virtuous moods,
that knows the weight of guilt: he will avoid
thoughts of such a nature,
and remind himself constantly with this saying,
“Man may sin securely, but never safely.”

AN ELEGY.

Though beauty be the mark of praise,
   And yours, of whom I sing, be such
   As not the world can praise too much,
Yet is ’t your virtue now I raise.

Even though beauty is the mark of admiration,
   And yours, of whom I sing, is such
   That the world couldn’t praise it enough,
Still, it’s your character that I highlight now.

A virtue, like allay, so gone
   Throughout your form, as though that move,
   And draw, and conquer all men’s love,
This subjects you to love of one,

A virtue, like allay, so gone
Throughout your form, as though that move,
And draw, and conquer all men’s love,
This subjects you to the love of one,

Wherein you triumph yet: because
   ’Tis of yourself, and that you use
   The noblest freedom, not to choose
Against or faith, or honour’s laws.

Where you still succeed: because
It’s about yourself, and that you exercise
The highest freedom, to not choose
Against either faith or the laws of honor.

But who could less expect from you,
   In whom alone Love lives again?
   By whom he is restored to men;
And kept, and bred, and brought up true?

But who could expect less from you,
In whom Love comes back to life?
By whom he is returned to people;
And kept, nurtured, and raised right?

His falling temples you have reared,
   The withered garlands ta’en away;
   His altars kept from the decay
That envy wished, and nature feared;

His crumbling temples you've restored,
The dried-up garlands removed;
His altars saved from the decay
That jealousy wanted, and nature dreaded;

And on them burns so chaste a flame,
   With so much loyalty’s expense,
   As Love, t’ acquit such excellence,
Is gone himself into your name.

And on them burns such a pure flame,
   With so much loyalty involved,
   As Love, to honor such greatness,
Has turned himself into your name.

And you are he: the deity
   To whom all lovers are designed,
   That would their better objects find;
Among which faithful troop am I;

And you are that person: the god
To whom all lovers are meant,
Who would discover their true matches;
Among this loyal group, I am one;

Who, as an offering at your shrine,
   Have sung this hymn, and here entreat
   One spark of your diviner heat
To light upon a love of mine;

Who, as a gift at your altar,
Have sung this song, and now ask
For just one spark of your divine fire
To shine upon a love of mine;

Which, if it kindle not, but scant
   Appear, and that to shortest view,
   Yet give me leave t’ adore in you
What I, in her, am grieved to want.

Which, if it doesn’t spark but only
Shows a little bit, and just for a short time,
Still let me admire in you
What I, in her, am pained to miss.

FOOTNOTES

[11]  “So live with yourself that you do not know how ill yow mind is furnished.”

[11] “So live with yourself that you aren’t aware of how poorly your mind is set up.”

[12]  Αυτοδίδακτος

Self-taught

[14]  “A Puritan is a Heretical Hypocrite, in whom the conceit of his own perspicacity, by which he seems to himself to have observed certain errors in a few Church dogmas, has disturbed the balance of his mind, so that, excited vehemently by a sacred fury, he fights frenzied against civil authority, in the belief that he so pays obedience to God.”

[14] “A Puritan is a hypocritical heretic who, believing he has spotted some mistakes in certain church beliefs, has thrown his mind off balance. Fueled by a passionate zeal, he fights fiercely against civil authority, thinking that he is actually obeying God.”

[17a]  Night gives counsel.

Night gives advice.

[17b]  Plutarch in Life of Alexander.  “Let it not be, O King, that you know these things better than I.”

[17b] Plutarch in Life of Alexander. “Please, King, don’t think you know this better than I do.”

[19a]  “They were not our lords, but our leaders.”

[19a] “They weren't our lords, but our leaders.”

[19b]  “Much of it is left also for those who shall be hereafter.”

[19b]  “A lot of it is also left for those who come after us.”

[19c]  “No art is discovered at once and absolutely.”

[19c] "No piece of art is found all at once and completely."

[22]  With a great belly.  Comes de Schortenhien.

[22]  With a big belly.  Here comes de Schortenhien.

[23]  “In all things I have a better wit and courage than good fortune.”

[23] “In everything, I have more intelligence and bravery than luck.”

[24a]  “The rich soil exhausts; but labour itself is an aid.”

[24a] “The fertile soil gets worn out; but hard work is still helpful.”

[24b]  “And the gesticulation is vile.”

“And the gestures are bad.”

[25a]  “An end is to be looked for in every man, an animal most prompt to change.”

[25a] “You should expect an end from every person, who is an animal quick to change.”

[25b]  Arts are not shared among heirs.

[25b] Arts are not passed down to heirs.

[31a]  “More loquacious than eloquent; words enough, but little wisdom.”—Sallust.

[31a] “Talkative but not very articulate; plenty of words, but not much insight.”—Sallust.

[31b]  Repeated in the following Latin.  “The best treasure is in that man’s tongue, and he has mighty thanks, who metes out each thing in a few words.”—Hesiod.

[31b] Repeated in the following Latin. “The greatest treasure is in that man's words, and he deserves great gratitude who conveys everything in just a few phrases.”—Hesiod.

[31c]  Vid. Zeuxidis pict. Serm. ad Megabizum.—Plutarch.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Zeuxidis pict. Serm. ad Megabizum.—Plutarch.

[32a]  “While the unlearned is silent he may be accounted wise, for he has covered by his silence the diseases of his mind.”

[32a] “When an uneducated person is quiet, they can be seen as wise because their silence hides the issues in their thinking.”

[32b]  Taciturnity.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__  Quietness.

[33a]  “Hold your tongue above all things, after the example of the gods.”—See Apuleius.

[33a] “Keep quiet above all else, following the example of the gods.”—See Apuleius.

[33b]  “Press down the lip with the finger.”—Juvenal.

[33b] “Press the lip down with your finger.”—Juvenal.

[33c]  Plautus.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Plautus.

[33d]  Trinummus, Act 2, Scen. 4.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Trinummus, Act 2, Scene 4.

[34a]  “It was the lodging of calamity.”—Mart. lib. 1, ep. 85.

[34a] “It was a place of disaster.” —Mart. lib. 1, ep. 85.

[41]  [“Ficta omnia celeriter tanquam flosculi decidunt, nec simulatum potest quidquam esse diuturnum.”—Cicero.]

[41] [“All things that are false quickly fall away, like flowers that drop, and nothing falsely pretended can last long.” —Cicero.]

[44a]  Let a Punic sponge go with the book.—Mart. 1. iv. epig. 10.

[44a]  Let a Punic sponge be included with the book.—Mart. 1. iv. epig. 10.

[47a]  He had to be repressed.

[47a] He needed to be held back.

[49a]  A wit-stand.

A wit-stand.

[49b]  Martial. lib. xi. epig. 91.  That fall over the rough ways and high rocks.

[49b] Martial. lib. xi. epig. 91. That tumble over the rough paths and steep rocks.

[59a]  Sir Thomas More.  Sir Thomas Wiat.  Henry Earl of Surrey.  Sir Thomas Chaloner.  Sir Thomas Smith.  Sir Thomas Eliot.  Bishop Gardiner.  Sir Nicolas Bacon, L.K.  Sir Philip Sidney.  Master Richard Hooker.  Robert Earl of Essex.  Sir Walter Raleigh.  Sir Henry Savile.  Sir Edwin Sandys.  Sir Thomas Egerton, L.C.  Sir Francis Bacon, L.C.

[59a]  Sir Thomas More.  Sir Thomas Wyatt.  Henry, Earl of Surrey.  Sir Thomas Chaloner.  Sir Thomas Smith.  Sir Thomas Eliot.  Bishop Gardiner.  Sir Nicholas Bacon, L.K.  Sir Philip Sidney.  Master Richard Hooker.  Robert, Earl of Essex.  Sir Walter Raleigh.  Sir Henry Savile.  Sir Edwin Sandys.  Sir Thomas Egerton, L.C.  Sir Francis Bacon, L.C.

[62a]  “Which will secure a long age for the known writer.”—Horat. de Art. Poetica.

[62a]  “This will ensure a lasting legacy for the well-known writer.”—Horat. On the Art of Poetry.

[66a]  They have poison for their food, even for their dainty.

[66a]  They have poison in their food, even in their delicacies.

[74a]  Haud infima ars in principe, ubi lenitas, ubi severitas—plus polleat in commune bonum callere.

[74a] It's not a small skill in a leader, where kindness and firmness—have more power for the common good.

[74b]  i.e., Machiavell.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__  i.e., Machiavelli.

[81a]  “Censure pardons the crows and vexes the doves.”—Juvenal.

[81a] “Criticism lets the bad ones off the hook and annoys the good ones.”—Juvenal.

[81b]  “Does not spread his net for the hawk or the kite.”—Plautus.

[81b] “He doesn’t cast his net for the hawk or the kite.” —Plautus.

[93]  Parrhasius.  Eupompus.  Socrates.  Parrhasius.  Clito.  Polygnotus.  Aglaophon.  Zeuxis.  Parrhasius.  Raphael de Urbino.  Mich.  Angelo Buonarotti.  Titian.  Antony de Correg.  Sebast. de Venet.  Julio Romano.  Andrea Sartorio.

[93] Parrhasius. Eupompus. Socrates. Parrhasius. Clito. Polygnotus. Aglaophon. Zeuxis. Parrhasius. Raphael from Urbino. Michelangelo Buonarotti. Titian. Antony Correggio. Sebastiano of Venice. Giulio Romano. Andrea Sartorio.

[94]  Plin. lib. 35. c. 2, 5, 6, and 7.  Vitruv. lib. 8 and 7.

[94] Plin. book 35, chapters 2, 5, 6, and 7. Vitruv. book 8 and 7.

[95]  Horat. in “Arte Poet.”

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Horace in “The Art of Poetry.”

[106a]  Livy, Sallust, Sidney, Donne, Gower, Chaucer, Spenser, Virgil, Ennius, Homer, Quintilian, Plautus, Terence.

[106a] Livy, Sallust, Sidney, Donne, Gower, Chaucer, Spenser, Virgil, Ennius, Homer, Quintilian, Plautus, Terence.

[110a]  The interpreter of gods and men.

[110a] The interpreter of gods and people.

[111a]  Julius Cæsar.  Of words, see Hor. “De Art. Poet.;” Quintil. 1. 8, “Ludov. Vives,” pp. 6 and 7.

[111a] Julius Caesar. For words, see Hor. “De Art. Poet.;” Quintil. 1. 8, “Ludov. Vives,” pp. 6 and 7.

[111b]  A prudent man conveys nothing rashly.

[111b] A wise person says nothing thoughtlessly.

[114a]  That jolt as they fall over the rough places and the rocks.

[114a]  That jolt when they hit the rough spots and the rocks.

[116a]  Directness enlightens, obliquity and circumlocution darken.

[116a] Being straightforward brings clarity, while being indirect and long-winded creates confusion.

[117a]  Ocean trembles as if indignant that you quit the land.

[117a] The ocean shakes as if it's upset that you left the land.

[117b]  You might believe that the uprooted Cyclades were floating in.

[117b] You might think that the uprooted Cyclades were drifting in.

[118a]  Those armies of the people of Rome that might break through the heavens.—Cæsar.  Comment. circa fin.

[118a] Those armies of the people of Rome that could break through the heavens.—Cæsar. Comment. circa fin.

[124a]  No one can speak rightly unless he apprehends wisely.

[124a]  No one can speak correctly unless they understand wisely.

[133a]  “Where the discussion of faults is general, no one is injured.”

[133a] “When the talk about faults is broad, no one gets hurt.”

[133b]  “Gnaw tender little ears with biting truth.”—Per Sat. 1.

[133b] “Bite into those sweet little ears with harsh reality.”—Per Sat. 1.

[133c]  “The wish for remedy is always truer than the hope.”—Livius.

[133c] “The desire for a solution is always more genuine than the expectation.” —Livius.

[136a]  “Æneas dedicates these arms concerning the conquering Greeks.”—Virg. Æn. lib. 3.

[136a] “Aeneas dedicates these weapons about the victorious Greeks.”—Virg. Æn. lib. 3.

[136b]  “You buy everything, Castor; the time will come when you will sell everything.”—Martial, lib. 8, epig. 19.

[136b] “You buy everything, Castor; the day will come when you’ll sell everything.”—Martial, lib. 8, epig. 19.

[136c]  “Cinna wishes to seem poor, and is poor.”

[136c] “Cinna wants to appear poor, and actually is poor.”

[136d]  “Which is evident in every first song.”

[136d] “Which is clear in every debut song.”

[139a]  “There is a god within us, and when he is stirred we grow warm; that spirit comes from heavenly realms.”

[139a] “There’s a divine spark inside us, and when it’s ignited, we feel warmth; that spirit comes from the heavens.”

[146a]  “If it were allowable for immortals to weep for mortals, the Muses would weep for the poet Nævius; since he is handed to the chamber of Orcus, they have forgotten how to speak Latin at Rome.”

[146a]  “If it were okay for immortals to cry for mortals, the Muses would cry for the poet Nævius; since he has been taken to the realm of the dead, they have forgotten how to speak Latin in Rome.”

[148a]  “No one has judged poets less happily than he who wrote about them.”—Senec. de Brev. Vit, cap. 13, et epist. 88.

[148a] “No one has evaluated poets more poorly than the one who wrote about them.”—Senec. de Brev. Vit, cap. 13, et epist. 88.

[149a]  Heins, de Sat. 265.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Heins, de Sat. 265.

[149b]  Pag. 267.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Page 267.

[149c]  Pag. 270. 271.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__  Page 270. 271.

[149d]  Pag. 273, et seq.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__  Pg. 273, et seq.

[149e]  Pag. in comm. 153, et seq.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__  Page in common 153, and following.

[160a]  “And which jolt as they fall over the rough uneven road and high rocks.”—Martial, lib. xi. epig. 91.

[160a] “And the jolt they get as they tumble over the bumpy, uneven road and high rocks.” —Martial, lib. xi. epig. 91.


Download ePUB

If you like this ebook, consider a donation!