This is a modern-English version of Man a Machine, originally written by La Mettrie, Julien Offray de. It has been thoroughly updated, including changes to sentence structure, words, spelling, and grammar—to ensure clarity for contemporary readers, while preserving the original spirit and nuance. If you click on a paragraph, you will see the original text that we modified, and you can toggle between the two versions.

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Original Front Cover.

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MAN A MACHINE.

MAN A MACHINE.

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Julien Offray de la Mettrie

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Original Title Page.

MAN A MACHINE
CHICAGO
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.
1912
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PREFACE.

The French text presented in this volume is taken from that of a Leyden edition of 1748, in other words, from that of an edition published in the year and in the place of issue of the first edition. The title page of this edition is reproduced in the present volume. The original was evidently the work of a Dutch compositor unschooled in the French language, and is full of imperfections, inconsistencies, and grammatical blunders. By the direction of the publishers these obviously typographical blunders have been corrected by M. Lucien Arréat of Paris.

The French text in this volume comes from a Leyden edition from 1748, which is the same year and place as the first edition. The title page of this edition is included in the current volume. The original was clearly put together by a Dutch typesetter who didn't know French well, resulting in many mistakes, inconsistencies, and grammatical errors. At the request of the publishers, these obvious typographical errors have been corrected by M. Lucien Arréat from Paris.

The translation is the work of several hands. It is founded on a version made by Miss Gertrude C. Bussey (from the French text in the edition of J. Assezat) and has been revised by Professor M. W. Calkins who is responsible for it in its present form. Mademoiselle M. Carret, of the Wellesley College department of French, and Professor George Santayana, of Harvard University, have given valued assistance; and this opportunity is taken to acknowledge their kindness in solving the problems of interpretation which have been submitted to them. It should be added that the translation sometimes subordinates the claims of English structure and style in the effort to render La Mettrie’s meaning exactly. The paragraphing of the French is usually followed, but the italics and the capitals are not reproduced. The page-headings of the translation refer back to the pages of the French text; and a few words inserted by the translators are enclosed in brackets.

The translation is the result of multiple contributors. It is based on a version by Miss Gertrude C. Bussey (from the French text in J. Assezat's edition) and has been revised by Professor M. W. Calkins, who is responsible for its current form. Mademoiselle M. Carret from the Wellesley College French department and Professor George Santayana from Harvard University have provided valuable help; this is an acknowledgment of their generosity in addressing the interpretation challenges presented to them. It's worth noting that the translation sometimes prioritizes capturing La Mettrie’s meaning over adhering strictly to English structure and style. The paragraphing of the French text is typically maintained, but italics and capital letters are not duplicated. The page headings in the translation refer back to the pages of the French text, and a few words added by the translators are enclosed in brackets.

The philosophical and historical Notes are condensed and adapted from a master’s thesis on La Mettrie presented by Miss Bussey to the faculty of Wellesley College. [1]

The philosophical and historical notes have been summarized and adapted from a master’s thesis on La Mettrie that Miss Bussey submitted to the faculty of Wellesley College. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

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FREDERIC THE GREAT’S EULOGY ON JULIEN OFFRAY DE LA METTRIE.

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Julien Offray de la Mettrie was born in Saint Malo, on the twenty-fifth of December, 1709, to Julien Offray de la Mettrie and Marie Gaudron, who were living by a trade large enough to provide a good education for their son. They sent him to the college of Coutance to study the humanities; he went from there to Paris, to the college of Plessis; he studied his rhetoric at Caen, and since he had much genius and imagination, he won all the prizes for eloquence. He was a born orator, and was passionately fond of poetry and belles-lettres, but his father thought that he would earn more as an ecclesiastic than as a poet, and destined him for the church. He sent him, the following year, to the college of Plessis where he studied logic under M. Cordier, who was more a Jansenist than a logician.

Julien Offray de la Mettrie was born in Saint Malo on December 25, 1709, to Julien Offray de la Mettrie and Marie Gaudron, who had a trade that provided a good education for their son. They sent him to the College of Coutance to study the humanities; from there, he moved to Paris to attend the College of Plessis; he studied rhetoric in Caen, and since he had a lot of talent and imagination, he won all the prizes for eloquence. He was a natural speaker and had a strong passion for poetry and belles-lettres, but his father believed he would make more money as a clergyman than as a poet, so he aimed to prepare him for the church. The next year, he was sent back to the College of Plessis, where he studied logic under M. Cordier, who was more of a Jansenist than a logician.

It is characteristic of an ardent imagination to seize forcefully the objects presented to it, as it is characteristic of youth to be prejudiced in favor of the first opinions that are inculcated. Any other scholar would have adopted the opinions of his teacher but that was not enough for young La Mettrie; he became a Jansenist, and wrote a work which had great vogue in that party. [4]

It’s typical for a passionate imagination to strongly grasp the ideas it encounters, just as it’s common for young people to be biased toward the first beliefs they learn. While most students would just accept their teacher's views, young La Mettrie wanted more; he became a Jansenist and wrote a book that became very popular in that movement. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

In 1725, he studied natural philosophy at the college of Harcourt, and made great progress there. On his return to Brittany, M. Hunault, a doctor of Saint Malo, had advised him to adopt the medical profession. They had persuaded his father, assuring him that a mediocre physician would be better paid for his remedies than a good priest for absolutions. At first young La Mettrie had applied himself to the study of anatomy: for two years he had worked at the dissecting-table. After this, in 1725, he took the degree of doctor at Rheims, and was there received as a physician.

In 1725, he studied natural philosophy at Harcourt College and made significant progress there. Upon returning to Brittany, M. Hunault, a doctor from Saint Malo, advised him to pursue a career in medicine. They convinced his father, assuring him that a mediocre doctor would earn more from his treatments than a good priest would from granting absolutions. Initially, young La Mettrie focused on studying anatomy; he spent two years working at the dissecting table. Following this, in 1725, he earned his medical degree in Rheims and was accepted as a physician there.

In 1733, he went to Leyden to study under the famous Boerhaave. The master was worthy of the scholar and the scholar soon made himself worthy of the master. M. La Mettrie devoted all the acuteness of his mind to the knowledge and to the healing of human infirmities; and he soon became a great physician.

In 1733, he went to Leiden to study under the famous Boerhaave. The master was deserving of the scholar, and the scholar quickly proved himself worthy of the master. M. La Mettrie focused all of his sharp intellect on understanding and healing human ailments, and he soon became a great physician.

In the year 1734, during his leisure moments, he translated a treatise of the late M. Boerhaave, his Aphrodisiacus, and joined to it a dissertation on venereal maladies, of which he himself was the author. The old physicians in France rose up against a scholar who affronted them by knowing as much as they. One of the most celebrated doctors of Paris did him the honor of criticizing his work (a sure proof that it was good). La Mettrie replied; and, to confound his adversary still more, he composed in 1736 a treatise on vertigo, esteemed by all impartial physicians.

In 1734, during his free time, he translated a work by the late M. Boerhaave, his Aphrodisiacus, and included a paper on sexually transmitted diseases that he authored himself. The established physicians in France were outraged by a scholar who dared to match their knowledge. One of the most prominent doctors in Paris even took the time to critique his work (which was a sure sign it was good). La Mettrie responded, and to further embarrass his opponent, he wrote a treatise on vertigo in 1736, which was respected by all fair-minded physicians.

By an unfortunate effect of human imperfection a certain base jealousy has come to be one of the characteristics of men of letters. This feeling incites [5]those who have reputations, to oppose the progress of budding geniuses. This blight often fastens on talents without destroying them, but it sometimes injures them. M. La Mettrie, who was advancing in the career of science at a giant’s pace, suffered from this jealousy, and his quick temper made him too susceptible to it.

Due to an unfortunate aspect of human nature, a certain petty jealousy has become one of the traits of writers. This feeling drives [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]those with established reputations to hinder the progress of emerging talents. This negative influence often clings to abilities without completely undermining them, but it can sometimes cause harm. M. La Mettrie, who was making rapid strides in his scientific career, faced this jealousy, and his short temper made him especially vulnerable to it.

In Saint Malo, he translated the “Aphorisms” of Boerhaave, the “Materia Medica,” the “Chemical Proceedings,” the “Chemical Theory,” and the “Institutions,” by this same author. About the same time, he published an abstract of Sydenham. The young doctor had learned by premature experience, that if he wished to live in peace, it was better to translate than to compose; but it is characteristic of genius to escape from reflection. Counting on himself alone, if I may speak thus, and filled with the knowledge he had gained from his infinitely skilful researches into nature, he wished to communicate to the public the useful discoveries he had made. He published his treatise on smallpox, his “Practical Medicine,” and six volumes of commentary on the physiology of Boerhaave. All these works appeared at Paris, although the author had written them at Saint Malo. He joined to the theory of his art an always successful practice, which is no small recommendation for a physician.

In Saint Malo, he translated Boerhaave's "Aphorisms," the "Materia Medica," the "Chemical Proceedings," the "Chemical Theory," and the "Institutions." Around the same time, he published a summary of Sydenham. The young doctor quickly learned that if he wanted to live in peace, it was better to translate than to create original work; but it’s typical of genius to break free from reflection. Depending on himself, if I may put it this way, and equipped with the knowledge he gained from his incredibly skilled research in nature, he wanted to share his useful discoveries with the public. He published his treatise on smallpox, his "Practical Medicine," and six volumes of commentary on Boerhaave's physiology. All these works were released in Paris, even though he wrote them in Saint Malo. He combined the theory of his profession with a consistently successful practice, which is a significant advantage for a physician.

In 1742, La Mettrie came to Paris, led there by the death of M. Hunault, his old teacher. Morand and Sidobre introduced him to the Duke of Gramont, who, a few days after, obtained for him the commission of physician of the guards. He accompanied the Duke to war, and was with him at the battle of Dettingen, at the siege of Freiburg, and at [6]the battle of Fontenoy, where he lost his patron, who was killed by a cannon shot.

In 1742, La Mettrie arrived in Paris, drawn there by the death of M. Hunault, his former teacher. Morand and Sidobre introduced him to the Duke of Gramont, who a few days later secured him the position of physician to the guards. He went to war with the Duke and was present at the battle of Dettingen, the siege of Freiburg, and at [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]the battle of Fontenoy, where he lost his patron, who was killed by a cannon shot.

La Mettrie felt this loss all the more keenly, because it was at the same time the reef on which his fortune was wrecked. This is what happened. During the campaign of Freiburg, La Mettrie had an attack of violent fever. For a philosopher an illness is a school of physiology; he believed that he could clearly see that thought is but a consequence of the organization of the machine, and that the disturbance of the springs has considerable influence on that part of us which the metaphysicians call soul. Filled with these ideas during his convalescence, he boldly bore the torch of experience into the night of metaphysics; he tried to explain by the aid of anatomy the thin texture of understanding, and he found only mechanism where others had supposed an essence superior to matter. He had his philosophic conjectures printed under the title of “The Natural History of the Soul.” The chaplain of the regiment sounded the tocsin against him, and at first sight all the devotees cried out against him.

La Mettrie felt this loss even more deeply because it was also the point where his fortune fell apart. Here’s what happened. During the Freiburg campaign, La Mettrie had a severe fever. For a philosopher, an illness is a lesson in physiology; he believed he could clearly see that thought is merely a result of how our bodies are structured, and that disruptions in our systems greatly affect what metaphysicians call the soul. Filled with these ideas during his recovery, he boldly brought the light of experience into the darkness of metaphysics; he attempted to explain the delicate nature of understanding through anatomy and found only mechanisms where others had imagined a higher essence beyond matter. He had his philosophical ideas published under the title "The Natural History of the Soul." The regiment's chaplain sounded the alarm against him, and at first glance, all the followers cried out against him.

The common ecclesiastic is like Don Quixote, who found marvelous adventures in commonplace events, or like the famous soldier, so engrossed with his system that he found columns in all the books he read. The majority of priests examine all works of literature as if they were treatises on theology, and filled with this one aim, they discover heresies everywhere. To this fact are due very many false judgments and very many accusations, for the most part unfair, against the authors. A book of physics should be read in the spirit of a [7]physicist; nature, the truth, is its sole judge, and should absolve or condemn it. A book of astronomy should be read in the same manner. If a poor physician proves that the blow of a stick smartly rapped on the skull disturbs the mind, or that at a certain degree of heat reason wanders, one must either prove the contrary or keep quiet. If a skilful astronomer proves, in spite of Joshua, that the earth and all the celestial globes revolve around the sun, one must either calculate better than he, or admit that the earth revolves.

The typical clergyman is like Don Quixote, who found incredible adventures in everyday situations, or like that famous soldier, so focused on his ideas that he saw themes in every book he read. Most priests look at all works of literature as if they were theological essays, and with this single perspective, they see heresies everywhere. This leads to many wrong judgments and many mostly unfair accusations against the authors. A book on physics should be read in the mindset of a physicist; nature, the truth, is its only judge and should determine its validity. A book on astronomy should be approached the same way. If a poor doctor shows that a sharp blow to the head can disturb the mind, or that at a certain temperature reason becomes confused, one must either prove otherwise or remain silent. If a skilled astronomer shows, despite Joshua's claims, that the earth and all the heavenly bodies orbit the sun, one must either calculate better than he does, or accept that the earth revolves.

But the theologians, who, by their continual apprehension, might make the weak believe that their cause is bad, are not troubled by such a small matter. They insisted on finding seeds of heresy in a work dealing with physics. The author underwent a frightful persecution, and the priests claimed that a doctor accused of heresy could not cure the French guards.

But the theologians, who might make the weak feel like their cause is bad with their constant worry, aren't bothered by such a minor issue. They were determined to find signs of heresy in a work about physics. The author faced terrible persecution, and the priests argued that a doctor accused of heresy couldn't treat the French guards.

To the hatred of the devotees was joined that of his rivals for glory. This was rekindled by a work of La Mettrie’s entitled “The Politics of Physicians.” A man full of cunning, and carried away by ambition, aspired to the place, then vacant, of first physician to the king of France. He thought that he could gain it by heaping ridicule upon those of his contemporaries who might lay claim to this position. He wrote a libel against them, and abusing the easy friendship of La Mettrie, he enticed him to lend to it the volubility of his pen, and the richness of his imagination. Nothing more was needed to complete the downfall of a man little known, against whom were all appearances, and whose only protection was his merit.

To the anger of his supporters was added that of his competitors for recognition. This rivalry was sparked by a work by La Mettrie called “The Politics of Physicians.” A cunning man, driven by ambition, sought the then-vacant position of chief physician to the king of France. He believed he could secure it by mocking his contemporaries who might want the role. He wrote a slanderous piece against them and, taking advantage of La Mettrie’s easy friendship, he persuaded him to lend the eloquence of his writing and the creativity of his imagination to it. Nothing more was needed to ensure the downfall of a man who was little known, and against whom all odds were stacked, with his only defense being his merit.

For having been too sincere as a philosopher and [8]too obliging as a friend, La Mettrie was compelled to leave his country. The Duke of Duras and the Viscount of Chaila advised him to flee from the hatred of the priests and the revenge of the physicians. Therefore, in 1746, he left the hospitals of the army where he had been placed by M. Sechelles, and came to Leyden to philosophize in peace. He there composed his “Penelope,” a polemical work against the physicians in which, after the fashion of Democritus, he made fun of the vanity of his profession. The curious result was that the doctors themselves, though their quackery was painted in true colors, could not help laughing when they read it, and that is a sure sign that they had found more wit than malice in it.

For being too honest as a philosopher and too generous as a friend, La Mettrie had to leave his country. The Duke of Duras and the Viscount of Chaila advised him to escape from the hatred of the priests and the revenge of the doctors. So, in 1746, he left the army hospitals where he had been placed by M. Sechelles and went to Leyden to think freely. There, he wrote his “Penelope,” a critical work against the doctors in which, like Democritus, he poked fun at the arrogance of his profession. Interestingly, even though the doctors were portrayed accurately, they couldn't help but laugh when they read it, which is a sure sign they found more humor than spite in it.

M. La Mettrie after losing sight of his hospitals and his patients, gave himself up completely to speculative philosophy; he wrote his “Man a Machine” or rather he put on paper some vigorous thoughts about materialism, which he doubtless planned to rewrite. This work, which was bound to displease men who by their position are declared enemies of the progress of human reason, roused all the priests of Leyden against its author. Calvinists, Catholics and Lutherans forgot for the time that consubstantiation, free will, mass for the dead, and the infallibility of the pope divided them: they all united again to persecute a philosopher who had the additional misfortune of being French, at a time when that monarchy was waging a successful war against their High Powers.

M. La Mettrie, after losing touch with his hospitals and patients, fully devoted himself to speculative philosophy; he wrote “Man a Machine” or, more accurately, he jotted down some strong ideas about materialism, which he likely intended to revise later. This work, guaranteed to upset those who, by their status, oppose the advancement of human reason, sparked outrage among all the priests in Leyden. Calvinists, Catholics, and Lutherans momentarily overlooked their disagreements over consubstantiation, free will, the mass for the dead, and the infallibility of the pope: they all came together to persecute a philosopher who also had the misfortune of being French, during a time when that monarchy was successfully battling their High Powers.

The title of philosopher and the reputation of being unfortunate were enough to procure for La Mettrie a refuge in Prussia with a pension from [9]the king. He came to Berlin in the month of February in the year 1748; he was there received as a member of the Royal Academy of Science. Medicine reclaimed him from metaphysics, and he wrote a treatise on dysentery, another on asthma, the best that had then been written on these cruel diseases. He sketched works on certain philosophical subjects which he had proposed to look into. By a sequence of accidents which befell him these works were stolen, but he demanded their suppression as soon as they appeared.

The title of philosopher and the infamous reputation he had were enough for La Mettrie to find refuge in Prussia with a pension from [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]the king. He arrived in Berlin in February 1748 and was welcomed as a member of the Royal Academy of Science. Medicine pulled him away from metaphysics, and he wrote a treatise on dysentery and another on asthma, which were the best works on these harsh diseases at that time. He outlined plans for certain philosophical topics he intended to explore. However, due to a series of unfortunate events, these works were stolen, but he demanded their suppression as soon as they surfaced.

La Mettrie died in the house of Milord Tirconnel, minister plenipotentiary of France, whose life he had saved. It seems that the disease, knowing with whom it had to deal, was clever enough to attack his brain first, so that it would more surely confound him. He had a burning fever and was violently delirious. The invalid was obliged to depend upon the science of his colleagues, and he did not find there the resources which he had so often found in his own, both for himself and for the public.

La Mettrie died in the house of Lord Tirconnel, the French minister plenipotentiary, whose life he had saved. It seems the illness, knowing who it was up against, was smart enough to hit his brain first, making it easier to confuse him. He had a high fever and was in a state of violent delirium. The patient had to rely on the expertise of his colleagues, and he didn’t find the help there that he had often provided for himself and for others.

He died on the eleventh of November, 1751, at the age of forty-three years. He had married Louise Charlotte Dréano, by whom he left only a daughter, five years and a few months old.

He died on November 11, 1751, at the age of forty-three. He had married Louise Charlotte Dréano, and he left behind only a daughter who was five years and a few months old.

La Mettrie was born with a fund of natural and inexhaustible gaiety; he had a quick mind, and such a fertile imagination that it made flowers grow in the field of medicine. Nature had made him an orator and a philosopher; but a yet more precious gift which he received from her, was a pure soul and an obliging heart. All those who are not imposed upon by the pious insults of the theologians mourn in La Mettrie a good man and a wise physician. [11]

La Mettrie was born with a natural and endless cheerfulness; he had a sharp mind, and such a creative imagination that it brought life to the field of medicine. Nature made him a speaker and a thinker; but an even more valuable gift he received was a pure soul and a generous heart. All those who aren't deceived by the sanctimonious attacks of the theologians remember La Mettrie as a good person and a wise doctor. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

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Facsimile of title page of the Leyden 1748 edition

Facsimile of title page of the Leyden 1748 edition

Facsimile of the title page of the Leyden 1748 edition

L’HOMME MACHINE.

The Man Machine.

Est-ce là ce Raion de l’Essence suprème,

Est-ce là ce Raion de l’Essence suprème,

Que l’on nous peint si lumineux?

Que l’on nous peint si lumineux?

Est-ce là cet Esprit survivant à nous même?

Est-ce là cet esprit qui survit en nous?

Il naît avec nos sens, croit, s’affoiblit comme eux.

Il naît avec nos sens, croit, s’affaiblit comme eux.

Helas! il périra de même.

Alas! He will perish too.

Voltaire.

Voltaire.

À LEYDE,

In Leiden,

De l’Imp. d’ELIE LUZAC, Fils.

From the Publisher ELIE LUZAC, Son.

MDCCXLVIII.

1748.

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L’HOMME MACHINE.

MAN A MACHINE.

[85]

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Il ne suffit pas à un sage d’étudier la nature et la vérité; il doit oser la dire en faveur du petit nombre de ceux qui veulent et peuvent penser; car pour les autres, qui sont volontairement esclaves des préjugés, il ne leur est pas plus possible d’atteindre la vérité, qu’aux grenouilles de voler.

It’s not enough for a wise person to study nature and truth; they must also dare to speak out for the small number of those who want to think and are able to. For the others, who willingly remain enslaved by prejudices, it’s just as impossible for them to reach the truth as it is for frogs to fly.

It is not enough for a wise man to study nature and truth; he should dare state truth for the benefit of the few who are willing and able to think. As for the rest, who are voluntarily slaves of prejudice, they can no more attain truth, than frogs can fly.

It's not enough for a wise person to study nature and truth; they should have the courage to declare the truth for the benefit of those few who are willing and capable of thinking. As for the others, who are willingly trapped by their biases, they are no more able to reach the truth than frogs are able to fly.

Je réduis à deux les systèmes des philosophes sur l’âme de l’homme. Le premier, et le plus ancien, est le système du matérialisme; le second est celui du spiritualisme.

Je réduis à deux les systèmes des philosophes sur l’âme de l’homme. Le premier, et le plus ancien, est le système du matérialisme; le second est celui du spiritualisme.

I reduce to two the systems of philosophy which deal with man’s soul. The first and older system is materialism; the second is spiritualism.

I narrow it down to two philosophical systems that address the human soul. The first, and older, system is materialism; the second is spiritualism.

Les métaphysiciens qui ont insinué que la matière pourrait bien avoir la faculté de penser, n’ont pas déshonoré leur raison. Pourquoi? C’est qu’ils ont cet avantage (car ici c’en est un) de s’être mal exprimés. En effet, demander si la matière peut penser, sans la considérer autrement qu’en elle-même, c’est demander si la matière peut marquer les heures. On voit d’avance que nous éviterons cet écueil, où Mr. Locke a eu le malheur d’échouer.

The metaphysicians who suggested that matter might have the ability to think haven't discredited their reasoning. Why? It's because they have the advantage (which is indeed an advantage here) of expressing themselves poorly. In fact, asking whether matter can think, without considering it in any other way than as it is, is like asking if matter can keep time. It's clear that we will avoid this pitfall, where Mr. Locke unfortunately failed.

The metaphysicians who have hinted that matter may well be endowed with the faculty of thought1 have perhaps not reasoned ill. For there is in this case a certain advantage in their inadequate way of expressing their meaning. In truth, to ask whether matter can think, without considering it otherwise than in itself, is like asking whether matter can tell time. It may be foreseen that we shall avoid this reef upon which Locke had the bad luck to make shipwreck.

The philosophers who have suggested that matter might actually have the ability to think1 might not be entirely off base. There’s a certain benefit in the way they’ve expressed this idea, even if it’s not quite adequate. Honestly, asking if matter can think without thinking about it in any other way is like asking if matter can tell time. It's clear we’re going to steer clear of this problem that Locke unfortunately encountered.

Les Leibniziens, avec leurs monades, ont élevé une hypothèse inintelligible. Ils ont plutôt spiritualisé la matière, que matérialisé l’âme. Comment peut-on définir un être dont la nature nous est absolument inconnue?

Les Leibniziens, avec leurs monads, ont proposé une hypothèse incompréhensible. Ils ont plutôt spiritualisé la matière que matérialisé l’âme. Comment peut-on définir un être dont la nature nous est totalement inconnue?

The Leibnizians with their monads have set up an unintelligible hypothesis. They have rather spiritualized matter than materialized the soul. How can we define a being whose nature is absolutely unknown to us?2

The Leibnizians with their monads have created an unclear hypothesis. They have made matter more spiritual than they have made the soul material. How can we define a being whose nature is completely unknown to us?2

Descartes, et tous les Cartésiens, parmi lesquels il y a longtemps qu’on a compté les Malebranchistes, [14]ont fait la même faute. Ils ont admis deux substances distinctes dans l’homme, comme s’ils les avaient vues et bien comptées.

Descartes and all the Cartesian philosophers, including the Malebranchists, have made the same mistake for a long time. They accepted two distinct substances in humans, as if they had seen and accurately counted them. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

Descartes and all the Cartesians, among whom the followers of Malebranche have long been numbered, [86]have made the same mistake. They have taken for granted two distinct substances in man, as if they had seen them, and positively counted them.

Descartes and all the Cartesians, including Malebranche's followers, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]have made the same mistake. They assumed there are two separate substances in people, as if they had seen them and definitively counted them.

Les plus sages ont dit que l’âme ne pouvait se connaître que par les seules lumières de la Foi: cependant, en qualité d’êtres raisonnables, ils ont cru pouvoir se réserver le droit d’examiner ce que l’Ecriture a voulu dire par le mot Esprit, dont elle se sert en parlant de l’âme humaine; et dans leurs recherches, s’ils ne sont pas d’accord sur ce point avec les théologiens, ceux-ci le sont-ils davantage entr’eux sur tous les autres?

Les plus sages ont dit que l’âme ne pouvait se connaître que par les seules lumières de la Foi : cependant, en tant qu'êtres raisonnables, ils ont cru pouvoir se réserver le droit d’examiner ce que l’Écriture a voulu dire par le mot Esprit, qu’elle utilise en parlant de l’âme humaine ; et dans leurs recherches, s’ils ne sont pas d’accord sur ce point avec les théologiens, ceux-ci le sont-ils davantage entre eux sur tous les autres ?

The wisest men have declared that the soul can not know itself save by the light of faith. However, as reasonable beings they have thought that they could reserve for themselves the right of examining what the Bible means by the word “spirit,” which it uses in speaking of the human soul. And if in their investigation, they do not agree with the theologians on this point, are the theologians more in agreement among themselves on all other points?

The wisest people have claimed that the soul can only know itself through the light of faith. However, as rational beings, they believe they can interpret what the Bible means by the word “spirit,” which it uses when talking about the human soul. And if, in their research, they disagree with theologians on this matter, are the theologians truly in agreement with each other on all other points?

Voici en peu de mots le résultat de toutes leurs réflexions.

Voici en résumé le résultat de toutes leurs réflexions.

S’il y a un Dieu, il est auteur de la Nature, comme de la Révélation; il nous a donné l’une, pour expliquer l’autre; et la Raison, pour les accorder ensemble.

S'il y a un Dieu, il est l'auteur de la Nature, tout comme de la Révélation; il nous a donné l'une pour expliquer l'autre, et la Raison pour les harmoniser.

Se défier des connaissances qu’on peut puiser dans les corps animés, c’est regarder la Nature et la Révélation comme deux contraires qui se détruisent; et par conséquent, c’est oser soutenir cette absurdité: que Dieu se contredit dans ses divers ouvrages, et nous trompe.

Se défier des connaissances qu’on peut puiser dans les corps animés, c’est regarder la Nature et la Révélation comme deux contraires qui se détruisent; et par conséquent, c’est oser soutenir cette absurdité: que Dieu se contredit dans ses divers ouvrages, et nous trompe.

Here is the result in a few words, of all their reflections. If there is a God, He is the Author of nature as well as of revelation. He has given us the one to explain the other, and reason to make them agree.

Here’s the summary of all their thoughts in a few words. If there is a God, He created both nature and revelation. He provided us with one to help us understand the other, and reason to ensure they align.

To distrust the knowledge that can be drawn from the study of animated bodies, is to regard nature and revelation as two contraries which destroy each the other, and consequently to dare uphold the absurd doctrine, that God contradicts Himself in His various works and deceives us.

To distrust the knowledge gained from studying living beings is to see nature and revelation as two opposing forces that undermine each other, and ultimately to support the ridiculous idea that God contradicts Himself in His different creations and misleads us.

S’il y a une Révélation, elle ne peut donc démentir la Nature. Par la Nature seule, on peut découvrir le sens des paroles de l’Evangile, dont l’expérience seule est la véritable interprète. En effet, les autres commentateurs jusqu’ici n’ont fait qu’embrouiller la vérité. Nous allons en juger par l’auteur du Spectacle de la Nature. “Il est étonnant, dit-il (au sujet de Mr. Locke), qu’un homme qui dégrade notre âme jusqu’à la croire une âme de boue, ose établir la Raison pour juge et souverain arbitre [15]des mystères de la Foi; car, ajoute-t-il, quelle idée étonnante aurait-on du Christianisme, si l’on voulait suivre la Raison?”

If there is a Revelation, it cannot contradict Nature. Only through Nature can we uncover the meaning of the words of the Gospel, which experience alone is the true interpreter. Indeed, all the other commentators so far have only muddied the truth. We will judge this by the author of the Spectacle de la Nature. "It is surprising," he says (regarding Mr. Locke), "that a man who degrades our soul to the point of believing it is a soul of mud, dares to establish Reason as the judge and sovereign arbiter [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] of the mysteries of Faith; for, he adds, what an astonishing idea one would have of Christianity if one were to follow Reason?"

If there is a revelation, it can not then contradict nature. By nature only can we understand the meaning of the words of the Gospel, of which experience is the only true interpreter. In fact, the commentators before our time have only obscured the truth. We can judge of this by the author of the “Spectacle of Nature.”3 “It is astonishing,” he says concerning Locke, “that a man who degrades our soul far enough to consider it a soul of clay should dare set up reason as judge and sovereign [87]arbiter of the mysteries of faith, for,” he adds, “what an astonishing idea of Christianity one would have, if one were to follow reason.”

If there’s a revelation, it can’t contradict nature. We can only understand the meaning of the Gospel through nature, and experience is the only true interpreter. In fact, commentators before us have only confused the truth. We can tell this by looking at the author of the “Spectacle of Nature.”3 “It’s astonishing,” he says about Locke, “that a person who belittles our soul enough to think of it as just a soul of clay would have the audacity to make reason the judge and ruler [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] of the mysteries of faith, because,” he adds, “what a strange perspective on Christianity one would have if we followed reason.”

Outre que ces réflexions n’éclaircissent rien par rapport à la Foi, elles forment de si frivoles objections contre la méthode de ceux qui croient pouvoir interpréter les Livres Saints, que j’ai presque honte de perdre le temps à les réfuter.

Outre que ces réflexions n’éclaircissent rien par rapport à la Foi, elles forment de si frivoles objections contre la méthode de ceux qui croient pouvoir interpréter les Livres Saints, que j’ai presque honte de perdre le temps à les réfuter.

Not only do these reflections fail to elucidate faith, but they also constitute such frivolous objections to the method of those who undertake to interpret the Scripture, that I am almost ashamed to waste time in refuting them.

Not only do these thoughts fail to clarify faith, but they also present such pointless objections to the approach of those who try to interpret the Scripture that I’m nearly embarrassed to spend time arguing against them.

1º. L’excellence de la Raison ne dépend pas d’un grand mot vide de sens (l’immatérialité); mais de sa force, de son étendue, ou de sa clairvoyance. Ainsi une âme de boue, qui découvrirait, comme d’un coup d’œil, les rapports et les suites d’une infinité d’idées difficiles à saisir, serait évidemment préférable à une âme sotte et stupide qui serait faite des éléments les plus précieux. Ce n’est pas être philosophe, que de rougir avec Pline de la misère de notre origine. Ce qui parait vil, est ici la chose la plus précieuse, et pour laquelle la nature semble avoir mis le plus d’art et le plus d’appareil. Mais comme l’homme, quand même il viendrait d’une source encore plus vile en apparence, n’en serait pas moins le plus parfait de tous les êtres, quelle que soit l’origine de son âme, si elle est pure, noble, sublime, c’est une belle âme, qui rend respectable quiconque en est doué.

1º. The excellence of Reason doesn't depend on a big empty word (immateriality); it relies on its strength, scope, or clarity. Thus, a soul of mud that could instantly grasp the connections and consequences of countless complex ideas would obviously be better than a foolish and stupid soul made of the most precious elements. It's not philosophical to be embarrassed with Pliny about the misery of our origins. What seems lowly here is actually the most valuable thing, and for which nature appears to have invested the most artistry and effort. But just as a person, even if they came from an even more seemingly vile source, would still be the most perfect of all beings, regardless of the origin of their soul, if it is pure, noble, and sublime; it is a beautiful soul that commands respect from anyone who possesses it.

The excellence of reason does not depend on a big word devoid of meaning (immateriality), but on the force, extent, and perspicuity of reason itself. Thus a “soul of clay” which should discover, at one glance, as it were, the relations and the consequences of an infinite number of ideas hard to understand, would evidently be preferable to a foolish and stupid soul, though that were composed of the most precious elements. A man is not a philosopher because, with Pliny, he blushes over the wretchedness of our origin. What seems vile is here the most precious of things, and seems to be the object of nature’s highest art and most elaborate care. But as man, even though he should come from an apparently still more lowly source, would yet be the most perfect of all beings, so whatever the origin of his soul, if it is pure, noble, and lofty, it is a beautiful soul which dignifies the man endowed with it.

The greatness of reason doesn’t come from fancy words that mean nothing (like immateriality), but from the strength, scope, and clarity of reason itself. Therefore, a “soul of clay” that can quickly grasp the connections and implications of countless complex ideas is clearly better than a foolish soul, even if that soul is made of the most valuable elements. A person isn’t a philosopher just because, like Pliny, they feel ashamed of our miserable beginnings. What appears worthless is actually one of the most valuable things, as if it's the result of nature’s finest craftsmanship and careful attention. However, just as a person, even if they came from a seemingly more humble origin, would still be the most perfect of beings, so too, regardless of the origin of their soul, if it is pure, noble, and elevated, it is a beautiful soul that brings dignity to the person who possesses it.

La seconde manière de raisonner de Mr. Pluche me parait vicieuse, même dans son système, qui tient un peu du fanatisme; car si nous avons une idée de la Foi, qui soit contraire aux principes les plus clairs, aux vérités les plus incontestables, il faut croire, pour l’honneur de la Révélation et de son Auteur, que cette idée est fausse, et que nous ne [16]connaissons point encore les sens des paroles de l’Evangile.

La seconde manière de raisonner de Mr. Pluche me paraît erronée, même dans son système, qui ressemble un peu au fanatisme ; car si nous avons une idée de la Foi qui contredit les principes les plus clairs, les vérités les plus indéniables, il faut croire, pour l’honneur de la Révélation et de son Auteur, que cette idée est incorrecte, et que nous ne [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]connaissons pas encore le sens des paroles de l’Evangile.

Pluche’s second way of reasoning seems vicious to me, even in his system, which smacks a little of fanaticism; for [on his view] if we have an idea of faith as being contrary to the clearest principles, to the most incontestable truths, we must yet conclude, out of respect for revelation and its author, [88]that this conception is false, and that we do not yet understand the meaning of the words of the Gospel.

Pluche’s second way of reasoning seems flawed to me, even within his own system, which has a hint of fanaticism; because according to his view, if we have an idea of faith that contradicts the clearest principles and the most undeniable truths, we must still conclude, out of respect for revelation and its author, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] that this understanding is incorrect, and that we do not yet grasp the meaning of the words of the Gospel.

De deux choses l’une; ou tout est illusion, tant la Nature même, que la Révélation; ou l’expérience seule peut rendre raison de la Foi. Mais quel plus grand ridicule que celui de notre auteur? Je m’imagine entendre un péripatéticien, qui dirait: “Il ne faut pas croire l’expérience de Toricelli: car si nous la croyions, si nous allions bannir l’horreur du vide, quelle étonnante philosophie aurions-nous?”

De deux choses l’une; ou tout est illusion, tant la Nature même, que la Révélation; ou l’expérience seule peut rendre raison de la Foi. Mais quel plus grand ridicule que celui de notre auteur? Je m’imagine entendre un péripatéticien, qui dirait: “Il ne faut pas croire l’expérience de Toricelli: car si nous la croyions, si nous allions bannir l’horreur du vide, quelle étonnante philosophie aurions-nous?”

Of the two alternatives, only one is possible: either everything is illusion, nature as well as revelation, or experience alone can explain faith. But what can be more ridiculous than the position of our author! Can one imagine hearing a Peripatetic say, “We ought not to accept the experiments of Torricelli,4 for if we should accept them, if we should rid ourselves of the horror of the void, what an astonishing philosophy we should have!”

Of the two choices, only one works: either everything is an illusion, both nature and revelation, or experience alone can justify faith. But what could be more absurd than our author's stance! Can you picture a Peripatetic saying, “We shouldn't trust Torricelli's experiments,4 because if we do, if we free ourselves from the fear of the void, what an incredible philosophy we'd have!”

J’ai fait voir combien le raisonnement de Mr. Pluche est vicieux,1 afin de prouver premièrement que s’il y a une Révélation, elle n’est point suffisamment démontrée par la seule autorité de l’Eglise et sans aucun examen de la Raison, comme le prétendent tous ceux qui la craignent. Secondement, pour mettre à l’abri de toute attaque la méthode de ceux qui voudraient suivre la voie que je leur ouvre, d’interpréter les choses surnaturelles, incompréhensibles en soi, par les lumières que chacun a reçues de la nature.

J'ai montré à quel point le raisonnement de M. Pluche est erroné, 1 pour prouver d'abord que, s'il y a une Révélation, elle n'est pas suffisamment démontrée uniquement par l'autorité de l'Église sans aucun examen de la Raison, comme le soutiennent tous ceux qui en ont peur. Ensuite, pour protéger la méthode de ceux qui veulent suivre la voie que je leur propose, qui consiste à interpréter les phénomènes surnaturels, incompréhensibles en soi, à la lumière des connaissances que chacun a reçues de la nature.

L’expérience et l’observation doivent donc seules nous guider ici. Elles se trouvent sans nombre dans les Fastes des médecins, qui ont été philosophes, et non dans les philosophes, qui n’ont pas été médecins. Ceux-ci ont parcouru, ont éclairé le labyrinthe de l’homme; ils nous ont seuls dévoilé ces ressorts cachés sous des enveloppes qui dérobent à nos yeux tant de merveilles. Eux seuls, contemplant tranquillement notre âme, l’ont mille fois surprise, et dans sa misère, et dans sa grandeur, sans plus la mépriser dans l’un de ces états, que l’admirer dans l’autre. Encore une fois, voilà les seuls physiciens [17]qui aient droit de parler ici. Que nous diraient les autres, et surtout les théologiens? N’est-il pas ridicule de les entendre décider sans pudeur, sur un sujet qu’ils n’ont point été à portée de connaître, dont ils ont été au contraire entièrement détournés par des études obscures, qui les ont conduits à mille préjugés, et pour tout dire en un mot, au fanatisme, qui ajoute encore à leur ignorance dans le mécanisme des corps.

L’expérience et l’observation doivent donc seules nous guider ici. Elles se trouvent sans nombre dans les Fastes des médecins, qui ont été philosophes, et non dans les philosophes, qui n’ont pas été médecins. Ceux-ci ont parcouru, ont éclairé le labyrinthe de l’homme; ils nous ont seuls dévoilé ces ressorts cachés sous des enveloppes qui dérobent à nos yeux tant de merveilles. Eux seuls, contemplant tranquillement notre âme, l’ont mille fois surprise, et dans sa misère, et dans sa grandeur, sans plus la mépriser dans l’un de ces états, que l’admirer dans l’autre. Encore une fois, voilà les seuls physiciens [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] qui aient droit de parler ici. Que nous diraient les autres, et surtout les théologiens? N’est-il pas ridicule de les entendre décider sans pudeur, sur un sujet qu’ils n’ont point été à portée de connaître, dont ils ont été au contraire entièrement détournés par des études obscures, qui les ont conduits à mille préjugés, et pour tout dire en un mot, au fanatisme, qui ajoute encore à leur ignorance dans le mécanisme des corps.

I have shown how vicious the reasoning of Pluche is1 in order to prove, in the first place, that if there is a revelation, it is not sufficiently demonstrated by the mere authority of the Church, and without any appeal to reason, as all those who fear reason claim: and in the second place, to protect against all assault the method of those who would wish to follow the path that I open to them, of interpreting supernatural things, incomprehensible in themselves, in the light of those ideas with which nature has endowed us. Experience and observation should therefore be our only guides here. Both are to be found throughout the records of the physicians who were philosophers, and not in the works of the philosophers who were not physicians. The former have traveled through and illuminated the labyrinth of man; they alone have laid bare to us those springs [of life] hidden under the external integument which conceals so many wonders from our eyes. They alone, tranquilly contemplating our soul, have surprised it, a thousand times, both in its wretchedness and in its glory, and they have no more despised [89]it in the first estate, than they have admired it in the second. Thus, to repeat, only the physicians have a right to speak on this subject.5 What could the others, especially the theologians, have to say? Is it not ridiculous to hear them shamelessly coming to conclusions about a subject concerning which they have had no means of knowing anything, and from which on the contrary they have been completely turned aside by obscure studies that have led them to a thousand prejudiced opinions,—in a word, to fanaticism, which adds yet more to their ignorance of the mechanism of the body?

I have demonstrated how flawed Pluche's reasoning is1 to show, firstly, that if there is a revelation, it's not adequately proven by just the authority of the Church without any reference to reason, as those who fear reason claim; and secondly, to safeguard the method of those who wish to follow the path I’ve opened to them, interpreting supernatural things that are incomprehensible by looking through the lens of the ideas nature has given us. Experience and observation should be our only guides here. Both can be found in the records of physicians who were also philosophers, not in the works of philosophers who weren’t physicians. The former have navigated through and clarified the complexities of man; they alone have revealed to us those hidden springs of life beneath the external covering that conceals so many wonders from our sight. They alone, calmly observing our soul, have caught glimpses of it, countless times, in both its misery and its glory, and they have neither disdained [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] it in its lowest state nor have they overly admired it in its highest. Therefore, to reiterate, only physicians have the right to discuss this topic.5 What could others, especially theologians, possibly contribute? Isn’t it absurd to hear them brazenly make conclusions about a subject they have no way of understanding, and from which they’ve been completely diverted by obscure studies that have led them to countless biased opinions—in short, to fanaticism, which only deepens their ignorance of the body’s mechanisms?

Mais, quoique nous ayons choisi les meilleurs guides, nous trouverons encore beaucoup d’épines et d’obstacles dans cette carrière.

Mais, même si nous avons choisi les meilleurs guides, nous trouverons encore beaucoup d'épines et d'obstacles dans ce parcours.

But even though we have chosen the best guides, we shall still find many thorns and stumbling blocks in the way.

But even though we’ve chosen the best guides, we’ll still encounter many thorns and obstacles along the way.

L’homme est une machine si composée, qu’il est impossible de s’en faire d’abord une idée claire, et conséquemment de la définir. C’est pourquoi toutes les recherches que les plus grands philosophes ont faites à priori, c’est à dire, en voulant se servir en quelque sorte des ailes de l’esprit, ont été vaines. Ainsi ce n’est qu’à posteriori, ou en cherchant à demêler l’âme comme au travers les organes du corps, qu’on peut, je ne dis pas découvrir avec évidence la nature même de l’homme, mais atteindre le plus grand degré de probabilité possible sur ce sujet.

Man is such a complex machine that it’s impossible to form a clear idea of him at first and, consequently, to define him. That’s why all the research that the greatest philosophers have conducted a priori, trying to use the wings of the mind, has been in vain. Thus, it’s only a posteriori, by trying to untangle the soul through the organs of the body, that one can, not discover with certainty the very nature of man, but reach the highest degree of probability possible on this subject.

Man is so complicated a machine6 that it is impossible to get a clear idea of the machine beforehand, and hence impossible to define it. For this reason, all the investigations have been vain, which the greatest philosophers have made à priori, that is to say, in so far as they use, as it were, the wings of the spirit. Thus it is only à posteriori or by trying to disentangle the soul from the organs of the body, so to speak, that one can reach the highest probability concerning man’s own nature, even though one can not discover with certainty what his nature is.

Man is such a complex machine6 that it’s impossible to fully understand the machine beforehand, which makes it impossible to define it. Because of this, all the efforts by the greatest philosophers have been in vain when they approach it à priori, meaning when they try to use, in a sense, the wings of the spirit. Instead, it’s only à posteriori or by attempting to separate the soul from the body’s organs, so to speak, that one can come to the highest likelihood regarding man’s true nature, even though one cannot definitively determine what that nature is.

Prenons donc le bâton de l’expérience, et laissons là l’histoire de toutes les vaines opinions des philosophes. Etre aveugle, et croire pouvoir se passer de ce bâton, c’est le comble de l’aveuglement. Qu’un moderne a bien raison de dire qu’il n’y a que la vanité seule qui ne tire pas des causes secondes le même parti que des premières! On peut et on doit même admirer tous ces beaux génies dans leurs travaux les plus inutiles, les Descartes, les Malebranche, les Leibnitz, les Wolf, etc.; mais quel fruit, [18]je vous prie, a-t-on retiré de leurs profondes méditations et de tous leurs ouvrages? Commençons donc et voyons, non ce qu’on a pensé, mais ce qu’il faut penser pour le repos de la vie.

Let's take the stick of experience and set aside all the empty opinions of philosophers. Being blind and thinking you can do without that stick is the height of blindness. A modern person is right to say that only vanity doesn't get the same benefits from secondary causes as it does from primary ones! We can and should admire all these brilliant minds in their most useless works—Descartes, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Wolf, etc.—but what fruit, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] tell me, have we gained from their deep meditations and all their writings? So let's get started and see not what has been thought, but what we need to think for the peace of life.

Let us then take in our hands the staff of experience,7 paying no heed to the accounts of all the idle theories of philosophers. To be blind and to think that one can do without this staff is the worst kind of blindness. How truly a contemporary writer says that only vanity fails to gather from secondary causes the same lessons as from primary [90]causes! One can and one even ought to admire all these fine geniuses in their most useless works, such men as Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz, Wolff and the rest, but what profit, I ask, has any one gained from their profound meditations, and from all their works? Let us start out then to discover not what has been thought, but what must be thought for the sake of repose in life.

Let's pick up the staff of experience,7 ignoring all the empty theories from philosophers. Being blind and thinking you can go without this staff is the worst kind of blindness. A contemporary writer wisely says that only vanity fails to learn from secondary causes the same lessons as from primary [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] causes! We can and should appreciate all these brilliant minds and their seemingly pointless work, like Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz, Wolff, and others, but what real benefit has anyone gained from their deep thoughts and writings? Let’s set out to find not what has been thought, but what needs to be thought for peace in life.

Autant de tempéraments, autant d’esprits, de caractères et de mœurs différentes. Galien même a connu cette vérité, que Descartes, et non Hippocrate, comme le dit l’auteur de l’histoire de l’Ame, a poussée loin, jusqu’à dire que la médecine seule pouvait changer les esprits et les mœurs avec le corps. Il est vrai, la mélancolie, la bile, le phlegme, le sang etc., suivant la nature, l’abondance et la diverse combinaison de ces humeurs, de chaque homme font un homme différent.

As many temperaments as there are, there are different minds, characters, and behaviors. Galen even recognized this truth, which Descartes, not Hippocrates, as the author of the history of the Soul states, expanded on, going so far as to say that only medicine could change the minds and behaviors alongside the body. It’s true that melancholy, bile, phlegm, blood, etc., depending on their nature, abundance, and various combinations, make each person unique.

There are as many different minds, different characters, and different customs, as there are different temperaments. Even Galen8 knew this truth which Descartes carried so far as to claim that medicine alone can change minds and morals, along with bodies. (By the writer of “L’histoire de l’âme,”9 this teaching is incorrectly attributed to Hippocrates.10) It is true that melancholy, bile, phlegm, blood etc.—according to the nature, the abundance, and the different combination of these humors—make each man different from another.11

There are as many different minds, characters, and customs as there are different temperaments. Even Galen8 recognized this truth, which Descartes extended to the point of claiming that medicine can change not just bodies but also minds and morals. (This teaching is mistakenly attributed to Hippocrates by the writer of “The story of the soul,”9.) It's true that melancholy, bile, phlegm, blood, etc.—depending on their nature, quantity, and various combinations—make each person unique.11

Dans les maladies, tantôt l’âme s’éclipse et ne montre aucun signe d’elle-même; tantôt on dirait qu’elle est double, tant la fureur la transporte; tantôt l’imbécilité se dissipe: et la convalescence d’un sot fait un homme d’esprit. Tantôt le plus beau génie devenu stupide, ne se reconnait plus. Adieu toutes ces belles connaissances acquises à si grands frais, et avec tant de peine!

Dans les maladies, parfois l’âme s’efface et ne montre aucun signe d’elle-même ; parfois on dirait qu’elle est double, tant la rage la transporte ; parfois l’imbécilité se dissipe : et la convalescence d’un idiot fait un homme intelligent. Parfois, le plus grand génie devenu stupide ne se reconnaît plus. Adieu à toutes ces belles connaissances acquises à si grand coût et avec tant de peine !

Ici c’est un paralytique, qui demande si sa jambe est dans son lit: là c’est un soldat qui croit avoir le bras qu’on lui a coupé. La mémoire de ses anciennes sensations, et du lieu où son âme les rapportait, fait son illusion et son espèce de délire. Il suffit de lui parler de cette partie qui lui manque, pour lui en rappeller et faire sentir tous les mouvements; ce qui se fait avec je ne sais quel déplaisir d’imagination qu’on ne peut exprimer.

Here is a paralyzed man asking if his leg is in his bed; over there is a soldier who believes he still has the arm that was amputated. The memory of his past sensations, and the place where his mind takes him, creates his illusion and a kind of delirium. Just talking to him about the missing part brings back and makes him feel all the movements; this happens with a sort of unpleasant imagination that is hard to express.

Celui-ci pleure, comme un enfant, aux approches de la mort, que celui-là badine. Que fallait-il à Caius Julius, à Sénèque, à Pétrone pour changer [19]leur intrépidité en pusillanimité ou en poltronnerie? Une obstruction dans la rate, dans le foie, un embarras dans la veine porte. Pourquoi? Parceque l’imagination se bouche avec les viscères; et de là naissent tous ces singuliers phénomènes de l’affection hystérique et hypocondriaque.

Celui-ci pleure, comme un enfant, aux approches de la mort, que celui-là badine. Que fallait-il à Caius Julius, à Sénèque, à Pétrone pour changer [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] leur intrépidité en pusillanimité ou en poltronnerie? Une obstruction dans la rate, dans le foie, un embarras dans la veine porte. Pourquoi? Parce que l’imagination se bouche avec les viscères; et de là naissent tous ces singuliers phénomènes de l’affection hystérique et hypocondriaque.

In disease the soul is sometimes hidden, showing no sign of life; sometimes it is so inflamed by fury that it seems to be doubled; sometimes, imbecility vanishes and the convalescence of an idiot produces a wise man. Sometimes, again, the greatest genius becomes imbecile and loses the sense of self. Adieu then to all that fine knowledge, acquired at so high a price, and with so much trouble! Here is a paralytic who asks if his leg is in bed with him; there is a soldier who thinks that he still has the arm which has been cut off. The memory of his old sensations, and of the place to which they were referred by his soul, is the cause of his illusion, and of this kind of delirium. The mere mention of the member which he has lost is enough to recall it to his mind, and [91]to make him feel all its motions; and this causes him an indefinable and inexpressible kind of imaginary suffering. This man cries like a child at death’s approach, while this other jests. What was needed to change the bravery of Caius Julius, Seneca, or Petronius into cowardice or faintheartedness? Merely an obstruction in the spleen, in the liver, an impediment in the portal vein? Why? Because the imagination is obstructed along with the viscera, and this gives rise to all the singular phenomena of hysteria and hypochondria.

In sickness, the soul can sometimes become hidden, showing no signs of life; other times, it’s so overwhelmed with rage that it feels like it’s doubled in size; and then, there are moments when foolishness disappears, and the recovery of someone once considered simple-minded transforms them into a wise individual. Conversely, the greatest geniuses can lose their intellect entirely and forget who they are. So, farewell to all that fine knowledge, gained at such a high cost and with so much effort! Here’s a patient who wonders if his leg is in bed with him; there’s a soldier who believes he still has the arm that has been amputated. The memory of his past sensations, connected to the place in his soul they belonged, causes this illusion and leads to a form of delirium. Just mentioning the lost limb is enough to bring it back to his mind and [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]make him feel all its movements; this leads to an indescribable and inexpressible kind of imaginary pain. One man cries like a child facing death, while another jokes about it. What could transform the courage of Caius Julius, Seneca, or Petronius into fearfulness or timidity? Just a blockage in the spleen, the liver, or an obstruction in the portal vein? Why? Because the imagination is blocked along with the internal organs, leading to all the unique symptoms of hysteria and hypochondria.

Que dirais-je de nouveau sur ceux qui s’imaginent être transformés en loups-garous, en coqs, en vampires, qui croient que les morts les sucent? Pourquoi m’arrêterais-je à ceux qui voient leur nez, ou autres membres, de verre, et à qui il faut conseiller de coucher sur la paille, de peur qu’ils ne se cassent, afin qu’ils en retrouvent l’usage et la véritable chair, lorsque mettant le feu à la paille on leur fait craindre d’être brûlés: frayeur qui a quelquefois guéri la paralysie? Je dois légèrement passer sur des choses connues de tout le monde.

Que dirais-je de nouveau sur ceux qui s'imaginent être transformés en loups-garous, en coqs, en vampires, qui croient que les morts les sucent ? Pourquoi m’arrêterais-je à ceux qui voient leur nez, ou d’autres membres, en verre, et à qui il faut conseiller de dormir sur la paille, de peur qu’ils ne se cassent, afin qu’ils retrouvent leur usage et leur vraie chair, lorsque, en mettant le feu à la paille, on leur fait craindre d’être brûlés : une peur qui a parfois guéri la paralysie ? Je dois passer légèrement sur des choses connues de tous.

What can I add to the stories already told of those who imagine themselves transformed into wolf-men, cocks or vampires, or of those who think that the dead feed upon them? Why should I stop to speak of the man who imagines that his nose or some other member is of glass? The way to help this man regain his faculties and his own flesh-and-blood nose is to advise him to sleep on hay, lest he break the fragile organ, and then to set fire to the hay that he may be afraid of being burned—a fear which has sometimes cured paralysis. But I must touch lightly on facts which everybody knows.

What can I add to the stories already told about those who imagine they’ve turned into werewolves, roosters, or vampires, or about those who believe that the dead are feeding on them? Why should I bother talking about the guy who thinks his nose or some other body part is made of glass? The best way to help this guy regain his senses and his normal flesh-and-blood nose is to suggest he sleep on hay, so he doesn’t break that delicate structure, and then to set fire to the hay to make him afraid of getting burned—a fear that has sometimes cured paralysis. However, I must briefly touch on facts that everyone already knows.

Je ne serai pas plus long sur le détail des effets du sommeil. Voyez ce soldat fatigué! il ronfle dans la tranchée, au bruit de cent pièces de canons! Son âme n’entend rien, son sommeil est une parfaite apoplexie. Une bombe va l’écraser; il sentira peut-être moins ce coup qu’un insecte qui se trouve sous le pied.

Je ne vais pas m’attarder davantage sur les détails des effets du sommeil. Regardez ce soldat épuisé ! Il ronfle dans la tranchée, au son de cent canons ! Son âme n’entend rien, son sommeil est une véritable inconscience. Une bombe va s’abattre sur lui ; il ressentira peut-être cette explosion moins qu’un insecte sous un pied.

Neither shall I dwell long on the details of the effects of sleep. Here a tired soldier snores in a trench, in the middle of the thunder of hundreds of cannon. His soul hears nothing; his sleep is as deep as apoplexy. A bomb is on the point of crushing him. He will feel this less perhaps than he feels an insect which is under his foot.

I won't spend much time on the details of sleep's effects. Here, a weary soldier snores in a trench, surrounded by the roar of hundreds of cannons. He hears nothing; his sleep is as deep as a coma. A bomb is about to crush him. He'll probably feel this less than an insect under his foot.

D’un autre côté, cet homme que la jalousie, la haine, l’avarice ou l’ambition dévore, ne peut trouver aucun repos. Le lieu le plus tranquille, les boissons les plus fraîches et les plus calmantes, tout est inutile à qui n’a pas délivré son cœur du tourment des passions.

D’un autre côté, cet homme que la jalousie, la haine, l’avarice ou l’ambition dévore, ne peut trouver aucun repos. Le lieu le plus tranquille, les boissons les plus fraîches et les plus calmantes, tout est inutile à qui n’a pas délivré son cœur du tourment des passions.

On the other hand, this man who is devoured by jealousy, hatred, avarice, or ambition, can never find any rest. The most peaceful spot, the freshest and most calming drinks are alike useless to one [92]who has not freed his heart from the torment of passion.

On the other hand, a man consumed by jealousy, hatred, greed, or ambition can never find peace. The most tranquil place and the most refreshing drinks are of no use to someone [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] who hasn't liberated his heart from the pain of passion.

L’âme et le corps s’endorment ensemble. A mesure que le mouvement du sang se calme, un doux sentiment de paix et de tranquillité se répand dans toute la machine; l’âme se sent mollement [20]s’appesantir avec les paupières et s’affaisser avec les fibres du cerveau: elle devient ainsi peu à peu comme paralytique, avec tous les muscles du corps. Ceux-ci ne peuvent plus porter le poids de la tête; celle là ne peut plus soutenir le fardeau de la pensée; elle est dans le sommeil, comme n’étant point.

L’âme et le corps s’endorment ensemble. À mesure que le mouvement du sang se calme, un doux sentiment de paix et de tranquillité se répand dans tout le corps; l’âme se sent lentement s’alourdir avec les paupières et s’affaisser avec les fibres du cerveau : elle devient ainsi peu à peu comme paralysée, avec tous les muscles du corps. Ceux-ci ne peuvent plus porter le poids de la tête; celle-ci ne peut plus soutenir le fardeau de la pensée; elle est dans le sommeil, comme si elle n’était pas.

The soul and the body fall asleep together. As the motion of the blood is calmed, a sweet feeling of peace and quiet spreads through the whole mechanism. The soul feels itself little by little growing heavy as the eyelids droop, and loses its tenseness, as the fibres of the brain relax; thus little by little it becomes as if paralyzed and with it all the muscles of the body. These can no longer sustain the weight of the head, and the soul can no longer bear the burden of thought; it is in sleep as if it were not.

The soul and body fall asleep together. As the blood flow slows down, a soothing sense of peace spreads through the entire system. The soul gradually feels heavier as the eyelids droop and releases its tension, just like the brain's fibers relax; slowly, it becomes almost paralyzed, and so do all the muscles in the body. They can no longer hold up the weight of the head, and the soul can no longer manage the weight of thought; in sleep, it feels as if it doesn't exist.

La circulation se fait-elle avec trop de vitesse? l’âme ne peut dormir. L’âme est-elle trop agitée, le sang ne peut se calmer; il galope dans les veines avec un bruit qu’on entend: telles sont les deux causes réciproques de l’insomnie. Une seule frayeur dans les songes fait battre le cœur à coups redoublés, et nous arrache à la nécessité, ou à la douceur du repos, comme feraient une vive douleur ou des besoins urgents. Enfin, comme la seule cessation des fonctions de l’âme procure le sommeil, il est, même pendant la veille (qui n’est alors qu’une demi-veille), des sortes de petits sommeils d’âme très fréquents, des rêves à la Suisse, qui prouvent que l’âme n’attend pas toujours le corps pour dormir; car si elle ne dort pas tout-à-fait, combien peu s’en faut-il! puisqu’il lui est impossible d’assigner un seul objet auquel elle ait prêté quelque attention, parmi cette foule innombrable d’idées confuses, qui comme autant de nuages remplissent, pour ainsi dire, l’atmosphère de notre cerveau.

Is the circulation too fast? The soul cannot rest. If the soul is too restless, the blood can't settle; it races through the veins with a noise that can be heard: these are the two corresponding causes of insomnia. A single fear in dreams makes the heart pound erratically and pulls us away from the need or comfort of rest, just like a sharp pain or urgent needs would. Ultimately, since the only cessation of the soul's functions brings sleep, there are, even during wakefulness (which is then only a half-wakefulness), frequent small soul sleeps, Swiss dreams, which show that the soul doesn't always wait for the body to sleep; for if it isn't completely asleep, it's very close to it! Since it cannot focus on a single object that it has paid any attention to amid the countless vague ideas that, like clouds, fill the atmosphere of our brain.

Is the circulation too quick? the soul can not sleep. Is the soul too much excited? the blood can not be quieted: it gallops through the veins with an audible murmur. Such are the two opposite causes of insomnia. A single fright in the midst of our dreams makes the heart beat at double speed and snatches us from needed and delicious repose, as a real grief or an urgent need would do. Lastly as the mere cessation of the functions of the soul produces sleep, there are, even when we are awake (or at least when we are half awake), kinds of very frequent short naps of the mind, vergers’ dreams, which show that the soul does not always wait for the body to sleep. For if the soul is not fast asleep, it surely is not far from sleep, since it can not point out a single object to which it has attended, among the uncounted number of confused ideas which, so to speak, fill the atmosphere of our brains like clouds.

Is the circulation too fast? The soul can't sleep. Is the soul too excited? The blood can't settle down; it rushes through the veins with a noticeable murmur. These are the two opposing causes of insomnia. A single scare in the middle of our dreams makes the heart race and pulls us away from the rest we desperately need, just like real sorrow or urgent needs would. Finally, since the simple stopping of the soul's functions leads to sleep, there are, even when we're awake (or at least half-awake), many brief mental naps, daydreams, that show the soul doesn't always wait for the body to sleep. Because if the soul isn't fully asleep, it definitely isn't far from it, as it can't focus on a single thing among the countless scattered ideas that, so to speak, fill our minds like clouds.

L’opium a trop de rapport avec le sommeil qu’il procure, pour ne pas le placer ici. Ce remède enivre, ainsi que le vin, le café, et chacun à sa manière, et suivant sa dose. Il rend l’homme heureux dans un état qui semblerait devoir être le tombeau du sentiment, comme il est l’image de la mort. Quelle douce léthargie! L’âme n’en voudrait jamais sortir. Elle était en proie aux plus grandes [21]douleurs; elle ne sent plus que le seul plaisir de ne plus suffrir et de jouir de la plus charmante tranquillité. L’opium change jusqu’à la volonté; il force l’âme qui voulait veiller et se divertir, d’aller se mettre au lit malgré elle. Je passe sous silence l’histoire des poisons.

L'opium has too much to do with the sleep it brings not to mention it here. This remedy intoxicates, just like wine or coffee, each in its own way and depending on the amount. It makes a person happy in a state that seems like it should bury all feeling, just like death does. What a sweet lethargy! The soul never wants to escape it. It was tormented by the greatest pains; now it only feels the pleasure of no longer suffering and enjoying the most delightful tranquility. Opium even changes one's will; it forces the soul that wanted to stay awake and have fun to go to bed against its own wishes. I won't discuss the story of poisons.

Opium is too closely related to the sleep it produces, to be left out of consideration here. This drug intoxicates, like wine, coffee, etc., each in [93]its own measure and according to the dose.12 It makes a man happy in a state which would seemingly be the tomb of feeling, as it is the image of death. How sweet is this lethargy! The soul would long never to emerge from it. For the soul has been a prey to the most intense sorrow, but now feels only the joy of suffering past, and of sweetest peace. Opium even alters the will, forcing the soul which wished to wake and to enjoy life, to sleep in spite of itself. I shall omit any reference to the effect of poisons.

Opium is too closely linked to the sleep it causes to ignore it here. This drug brings intoxication, like wine or coffee, each in its own way and depending on the dosage. It makes a person feel happy in a state that might seem like the end of all feelings, resembling death itself. How delightful is this drowsiness! The soul would happily stay in this state forever. It has suffered so much pain, but now it only experiences the joy of past suffering and a deep sense of peace. Opium even changes the will, making the soul that wanted to wake up and enjoy life fall asleep against its own wishes. I won’t discuss the effects of poisons.

C’est en fouettant l’imagination, que le café, cet antidote du vin, dissipe nos maux de tête et nos chagrins, sans nous en ménager, comme cette liqueur, pour le lendemain.

C’est en fouettant l’imagination, que le café, cet antidote du vin, dissipe nos maux de tête et nos chagrins, sans nous en ménager, comme cette liqueur, pour le lendemain.

Contemplons l’âme dans ses autres besoins.

Contemplate the soul in its other needs.

Coffee, the well-known antidote for wine, by scourging the imagination, cures our headaches and scatters our cares without laying up for us, as wine does, other headaches for the morrow. But let us contemplate the soul in its other needs.

Coffee, the popular remedy for wine, clears our minds, relieves our headaches, and helps us forget our worries without giving us, like wine does, new headaches for tomorrow. But let's consider the deeper needs of the soul.

Le corps humain est une machine qui monte elle-même ses ressorts; vivante image du mouvement perpétuel. Les aliments entretiennent ce que la fièvre excite. Sans eux l’âme languit, entre en fureur et meurt abattue. C’est une bougie dont la lumière se ranime, au moment de s’éteindre. Mais nourrissez le corps, versez dans ses tuyaux des sucs vigoureux, des liqueurs fortes; alors l’âme généreuse comme elles s’arme d’un fier courage et le soldat que l’eau eut fait fuir, devenu féroce, court gaiement à la mort au bruit des tambours. C’est ainsi que l’eau chaude agite un sang que l’eau froide eut calmé.

The human body is a machine that builds its own springs; a living image of perpetual motion. Food sustains what fever stirs up. Without it, the soul withers, becomes enraged, and dies defeated. It's like a candle whose light rekindles just as it's about to go out. But feed the body, pour strong juices and powerful liquids into its channels; then the generous soul, like them, arms itself with fierce courage, and the soldier who once fled from water now fiercely charges into death at the sound of drums. This is how hot water stirs up a blood that cold water would have calmed.

The human body is a machine which winds its own springs. It is the living image of perpetual movement. Nourishment keeps up the movements which fever excites. Without food, the soul pines away, goes mad, and dies exhausted. The soul is a taper whose light flares up the moment before it goes out. But nourish the body, pour into its veins life-giving juices and strong liquors, and then the soul grows strong like them, as if arming itself with a proud courage, and the soldier whom water would have made flee, grows bold and runs joyously to death to the sound of drums. Thus a hot drink sets into stormy movement the blood which a cold drink would have calmed.

The human body is like a machine that winds its own springs. It is the living picture of constant movement. Food fuels the motions that fever ignites. Without nourishment, the soul weakens, goes insane, and eventually fades away. The soul is like a candle whose flame flickers just before it goes out. But if you feed the body, pumping life-giving fluids and strong drinks into its veins, the soul becomes strong like them, arming itself with bold confidence, and the soldier who would have fled in fear now charges joyfully to his death to the beat of drums. In this way, a hot drink sends the blood into a fierce frenzy, while a cold drink would have calmed it.

Quelle puissance d’un repas! La joie renaît dans un cœur triste; elle passe dans l’âme des convives qui l’expriment par d’aimables chansons, où les Français excellent. Le mélancolique seul est accablé, et l’homme d’étude n’y est plus propre.

What power a meal has! Joy is revived in a sad heart; it flows into the souls of the guests, who express it through delightful songs, where the French excel. Only the melancholic individual is weighed down, and the studious person is no longer suited for it.

What power there is in a meal! Joy revives in a sad heart, and infects the souls of comrades, who express their delight in the friendly songs in which the Frenchman excels. The melancholy man alone [94]is dejected, and the studious man is equally out of place [in such company].

What power there is in a meal! Joy lifts a sad heart and spreads to the souls of friends, who show their happiness in the cheerful songs the Frenchman sings so well. The lonely man [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]remains downcast, and the serious person feels just as out of place [in such company].

La viande crue rend les animaux féroces; les hommes le deviendraient par la même nourriture; cela est si vrai, que la nation anglaise, qui ne mange pas la chair si cuite que nous, mais rouge et sanglante, parait participer de cette férocité plus ou [22]moins grande, qui vient en partie de tels aliments, et d’autres causes, que l’éducation peut seule rendre impuissantes. Cette férocité produit dans l’âme l’orgueil, la haine, le mépris des autres nations, l’indocilité et autres sentiments, qui dépravent le caractère, comme des aliments grossiers font un esprit lourd, épais, dont la paresse et l’indolence sont les attributs favoris.

La viande crue rend les animaux féroces; les hommes le deviendraient par la même nourriture; cela est si vrai, que la nation anglaise, qui ne mange pas la chair si cuite que nous, mais rouge et sanglante, semble partager cette férocité plus ou [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] moins grande, qui vient en partie de tels aliments, et d'autres causes, que l'éducation peut seule rendre impuissantes. Cette férocité produit dans l'âme l'orgueil, la haine, le mépris des autres nations, l'indocilité et d'autres sentiments, qui dépravent le caractère, comme des aliments grossiers font un esprit lourd, épais, dont la paresse et l'indolence sont les attributs favoris.

Raw meat makes animals fierce, and it would have the same effect on man. This is so true that the English who eat meat red and bloody, and not as well done as ours, seem to share more or less in the savagery due to this kind of food, and to other causes which can be rendered ineffective by education only. This savagery creates in the soul, pride, hatred, scorn of other nations, indocility and other sentiments which degrade the character, just as heavy food makes a dull and heavy mind whose usual traits are laziness and indolence.

Raw meat makes animals aggressive, and it would do the same for humans. This is evident in the English, who eat their meat red and bloody, rather than well-cooked like ours. They seem to have a bit of that savagery attributed to this type of food, along with other issues that education alone can help address. This savagery fosters feelings of pride, hatred, contempt for other nations, stubbornness, and other attitudes that lessen one's character, just as heavy food leads to a dull and sluggish mind, characterized by laziness and apathy.

Mr. Pope a bien connu tout l’empire de la gourmandise, lorsqu’il dit: “Le grave Catius parle toujours de vertu, et croit que, qui souffre les vicieux est vicieux lui-même. Ces beaux sentiments durent jusqu’à l’heure du diner; alors il préfère un scélérat, qui a une table délicate, à un saint frugal.

Mr. Pope definitely understood the entire realm of indulgence when he said: “The serious Catius always talks about virtue and believes that anyone who tolerates the wicked is wicked themselves. These noble sentiments last until dinner time; then he prefers a villain with a fine meal over a frugal saint."

Pope understood well the full power of greediness when he said:13

Pope understood well the full power of greed when he said:13

“Catius is ever moral, ever grave,

“Catius is always serious, always solemn,

Thinks who endures a knave is next a knave,

Thinks who puts up with a dishonest person is almost as dishonest themselves,

Save just at dinner—then prefers no doubt,

Save just at dinner—then prefers no doubt,

A rogue with ven’son to a saint without.”

A rogue with venom to a saint without.

“Considérez, dit-il ailleurs, le même homme en santé, ou en maladie; possédant une belle charge, ou l’ayant perdue; vous le verrez chérir la vie, ou la détester, fou à la chasse, ivrogne dans une assemblée de province, poli au bal, bon ami en ville, sans foi à la cour.”

“Consider, he said elsewhere, the same man in health or sickness; having a great job or having lost it; you’ll see him cherish life or hate it, crazy while hunting, drunk at a provincial gathering, polite at the dance, a good friend in the city, and untrustworthy at court.”

Elsewhere he says:

Elsewhere, he states:

“See the same man in vigor, in the gout

“See the same man in good health, in pain from gout”

Alone, in company, in place or out,

Alone, with others, in a location or not,

Early at business and at hazard late,

Early at work and taking risks late,

Mad at a fox chase, wise at a debate,

Mad at a fox hunt, smart in a debate,

Drunk at a borough, civil at a ball,

Drunk at a bar, polite at a party,

Friendly at Hackney, faithless at White Hall.”

Friendly at Hackney, untrustworthy at White Hall.”

Nous avons eu en Suisse un bailli, nommé Steiguer de Wittighofen; il était à jeûn le plus intègre et même le plus indulgent des juges; mais malheur au misérable qui se trouvait sur la sellette, lorsqu’il avait fait un grand diner! Il était homme à faire pendre l’innocent, comme le coupable.

Nous avons eu en Suisse un bailli nommé Steiguer de Wittighofen. Quand il était sobre, il était l'un des juges les plus intègres et même les plus indulgents. Mais malheur à celui qui se retrouvait sur le banc des accusés après qu'il ait pris un gros dîner ! Il était capable de faire pendre l'innocent, tout comme le coupable.

In Switzerland we had a bailiff by the name of M. Steigner de Wittighofen. When he fasted he was a most upright and even a most indulgent judge, but woe to the unfortunate man whom he found on the culprit’s bench after he had had a large dinner! He was capable of sending the innocent like the guilty to the gallows.

In Switzerland, we had a bailiff named M. Steigner de Wittighofen. When he was fasting, he was a very fair and even quite lenient judge, but poor was the man who crossed his path after he had a big dinner! He could easily send the innocent to the gallows just like the guilty.

Nous pensons, et même nous ne sommes honnêtes gens, que comme nous sommes gais, ou braves; tout dépend de la manière dont notre machine est montée. On dirait en certains moments que l’âme habite dans l’estomac, et que Van Helmont, en mettant son siège dans le pylore, ne se serait trompé qu’en prenant la partie pour le tout.

Nous pensons, et même nous sommes honnêtes, que notre humeur, que ce soit la joie ou le courage, dépend de la façon dont notre corps fonctionne. Parfois, on a l'impression que l'âme réside dans l'estomac, et que Van Helmont, en plaçant son siège dans le pylore, n'aurait eu tort que de considérer une partie comme l'ensemble.

We think we are, and in fact we are, good men, [95]only as we are gay or brave; everything depends on the way our machine is running. One is sometimes inclined to say that the soul is situated in the stomach, and that Van Helmont,14 who said that the seat of the soul was in the pylorus, made only the mistake of taking the part for the whole.

We believe we are, and we really are, good people, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]but only when we are cheerful or courageous; everything relies on how well our system is functioning. One might even suggest that the soul is located in the stomach, and that Van Helmont,14 who claimed that the seat of the soul was in the pylorus, merely misinterpreted a specific part as the entirety.

A quels excès la faim cruelle peut nous porter! [23]Plus de respect pour les entrailles auxquelles on doit ou on a donné la vie; on les déchire à belles dents, on s’en fait d’horribles festins; et dans la fureur dont on est transporté, le plus faible est toujours la proie du plus fort.

What extremes can cruel hunger drive us to! [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]No more respect for the insides that give or have given life; we tear into them with our teeth, turning them into horrific feasts; and in the frenzy we feel, the weakest is always the prey of the strongest.

La grossesse, cette émule désirée des pâles couleurs, ne se contente pas d’amener le plus souvent à sa suite les goûts dépravés qui accompagnent ces deux états: elle a quelquefois fait exécuter à l’âme les plus affreux complots; effets d’une manie subite, qui étouffe jusqu’à la loi naturelle. C’est ainsi que le cerveau, cette matrice de l’esprit, se pervertit à sa manière, avec celle du corps.

La grossesse, cette imitation désirée des couleurs pâles, ne se limite pas à entraîner souvent les goûts dépravés qui accompagnent ces deux états : elle a parfois poussé l'âme à réaliser les complots les plus horribles ; effets d'une manie soudaine qui étouffe même la loi naturelle. C'est ainsi que le cerveau, cette matrice de l'esprit, se pervertit à sa façon, tout comme le corps.

Quelle autre fureur d’homme ou de femme, dans ceux que la continence et la santé poursuivent! C’est peu pour cette fille timide et modeste d’avoir perdu toute honte et toute pudeur; elle ne regarde plus l’inceste, que comme une femme galante regarde l’adultère. Si ses besoins ne trouvent pas de prompts soulagements, ils ne se borneront point aux simples accidents d’une passion utérine, à la manie, etc.; cette malheureuse mourra d’un mal, dont il y a tant de médecins.

Quelle autre fureur d’homme ou de femme, dans ceux que la continence et la santé poursuivent! C’est peu pour cette fille timide et modeste d’avoir perdu toute honte et toute pudeur; elle ne regarde plus l’inceste, que comme une femme galante regarde l’adultère. Si ses besoins ne trouvent pas de prompts soulagements, ils ne se borneront point aux simples accidents d’une passion utérine, à la manie, etc.; cette malheureuse mourra d’un mal, dont il y a tant de médecins.

To what excesses cruel hunger can bring us! We no longer regard even our own parents and children. We tear them to pieces eagerly and make horrible banquets of them; and in the fury with which we are carried away, the weakest is always the prey of the strongest....

To what extremes brutal hunger can drive us! We no longer even think of our own parents and children. We eagerly tear them apart and create terrible feasts from them; and in the rage that consumes us, the weakest always falls victim to the strongest....

Il ne faut que des yeux pour voir l’influence nécessaire de l’âge sur la raison. L’âme suit les progrès du corps, comme ceux de l’éducation. Dans le beau sexe, l’âme suit encore la délicatesse du tempérament: de là cette tendresse, cette affection, ces sentiments vifs, plutôt fondés sur la passion que sur la raison, ces préjugés, ces superstitions, dont la forte empreinte peut à peine s’effacer, etc. L’homme, au contraire, dont le cerveau et les nerfs participent de la fermeté de tous les solides, a l’esprit, ainsi que les traits du visage, plus nerveux: [24]l’éducation, dont manquent les femmes, ajoute encore de nouveaux degrés de force à son âme. Avec de tels secours de la nature et de l’art, comment ne serait-il pas plus reconnaissant, plus généreux, plus constant en amitié, plus ferme dans l’adversité? etc. Mais, suivant à peu près la pensée de l’auteur des Lettres sur les Physionomies, qui joint les grâces de l’esprit et du corps à presque tous les sentiments du cœur les plus tendres et les plus délicats ne doit point nous envier une double force, qui ne semble avoir été donnée à l’homme, l’une, que pour se mieux pénétrer des attraits de la beauté, l’autre, que pour mieux servir à ses plaisirs.

You only need eyes to see the necessary influence of age on reason. The soul develops alongside the body, just like education. In women, the soul also reflects the delicacy of temperament: hence this tenderness, this affection, these strong feelings, which are more based on passion than reason, along with these prejudices and superstitions that leave a deep mark that can hardly be erased, etc. The man, on the other hand, whose brain and nerves share the firmness of solid things, has a mind, as well as facial features, that are more intense: [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]the education that women lack adds new levels of strength to his soul. With such support from nature and art, how could he not be more grateful, more generous, more constant in friendship, and more steadfast in adversity? etc. But, following the thought of the author of Letters on Physiognomy, who connects the graces of mind and body to almost all the most tender and delicate feelings of the heart, we should not envy a double strength that seems to have been given to man, one to better appreciate the charms of beauty, the other to better serve his pleasures.

One needs only eyes to see the necessary influence of old age on reason. The soul follows the progress of the body, as it does the progress of education. In the weaker sex, the soul accords also with delicacy of temperament, and from this delicacy follow tenderness, affection, quick feelings due more to passion than to reason, prejudices, and superstitions, whose strong impress can hardly be effaced. Man, on the other hand, whose brain and nerves partake of the firmness of all solids, has not only stronger features but also a more vigorous mind. Education, which women lack, strengthens his mind still more. Thus with such help of nature and art, why should not a man be more grateful, more generous, more constant in friendship, stronger in adversity? But, to follow almost exactly the thought of the author of the “Lettres sur la Physiognomie,”15 the sex which unites the charms of the mind and of the body with almost all the tenderest and most delicate feelings of the heart, should not envy us the two capacities which seem to have been given to man, the one merely to enable him better [96]to fathom the allurements of beauty, and the other merely to enable him to minister better to its pleasures.

One just needs to look to see how old age impacts reason. The soul reflects the development of the body, similar to the way it reflects the growth of education. In women, the soul also aligns with a sensitive temperament, leading to tenderness, affection, and strong emotions that often come from passion rather than logic, along with biases and superstitions that leave a lasting mark. Men, however, who have brains and nerves that are as solid as strong materials, not only have more distinct features but also a more robust mind. The education that women typically miss out on further strengthens men's minds. With such advantages from nature and nurture, why shouldn’t a man be more grateful, more generous, more steadfast in friendship, and more resilient in tough times? But, to closely follow the thoughts of the author of the “Letters on Physiognomy,”15 the gender that combines the beauties of the mind and body with almost all the gentlest and most sensitive feelings of the heart shouldn’t resent us for the two abilities that seem to have been given to men: one to help him better appreciate the charms of beauty, and the other to help him enjoy its pleasures.

Il n’est pas plus nécessaire d’être aussi grand physionomiste que cet auteur pour deviner la qualité de l’esprit par la figure ou la forme des traits, lorsqu’ils sont marqués jusqu’à un certain point, qu’il ne l’est d’être grand médecin pour connaître un mal accompagné de tous ses symptomes évidents. Examinez les portraits de Locke, de Steele, de Boerhaave, de Maupertuis, etc. vous ne serez point surpris de leur trouver des physionomies fortes, des yeux d’aigle. Parcourez-en une infinité d’autres, vous distinguerez toujours le beau du grand génie, et même souvent l’honnête homme du fripon. On a remarqué, par exemple, qu’un poète célèbre réunit (dans son portrait) l’air d’un filou, avec le feu de Prométhée.

It’s not any more necessary to be as skilled at reading faces as this author to guess someone's intellect based on their appearance, especially when their features are pronounced to a certain degree, than it is to be a great doctor to recognize an illness that has all its obvious symptoms. Look at the portraits of Locke, Steele, Boerhaave, Maupertuis, etc., and you won’t be surprised to find they have strong faces and eagle-like eyes. Check out countless others, and you'll always be able to tell the beautiful from the great genius, and often even the decent person from the trickster. It has been noted, for example, that a famous poet has (in his portrait) the look of a con artist combined with the intensity of Prometheus.

It is no more necessary to be just as great a physiognomist as this author, in order to guess the quality of the mind from the countenance or the shape of the features, provided these are sufficiently marked, than it is necessary to be a great doctor to recognize a disease accompanied by all its marked symptoms. Look at the portraits of Locke, of Steele, of Boerhaave,16 of Maupertuis,17 and the rest, and you will not be surprised to find strong faces and eagle eyes. Look over a multitude of others, and you can always distinguish the man of talent from the man of genius, and often even an honest man from a scoundrel. For example, it has been noticed that a celebrated poet combines (in his portrait) the look of a pickpocket with the fire of Prometheus.

It’s not necessary to be as skilled at reading faces as this author to figure out what someone’s thinking just by looking at their face or features, as long as those features are distinctive enough. Similarly, you don’t have to be a top-notch doctor to spot a disease when all the major symptoms are there. Look at the portraits of Locke, Steele, Boerhaave,16 Maupertuis,17 and others, and you won’t be surprised to see strong faces and sharp eyes. If you check out a bunch of others, you can usually tell the talented person from the genius, and sometimes even an honest person from a crook. For instance, it’s been noted that a famous poet's portrait has the look of a pickpocket combined with the intensity of Prometheus.

L’histoire nous offre un mémorable exemple de la puissance de l’air. Le fameux Duc de Guise était si fort convaincu que Henri III. qui l’avait eu tant de fois en son pouvoir, n’oserait jamais l’assassiner, qu’il partit pour Blois. Le chancelier Chyverni apprenant son départ, s’écria: voilà un homme perdu! [25]Lorsque sa fatale prédiction fut justifiée par l’événement, on lui en demanda la raison. Il y a vingt ans, dit-il, que je connais le Roi; il est naturellement bon et même faible; mais j’ai observé qu’un rien l’impatiente et le met en fureur, lorsqu’il fait froid.

L'histoire nous donne un exemple mémorable de la puissance de l'air. Le fameux Duc de Guise était tellement sûr que Henri III, qui l'avait eu tant de fois à sa merci, n'oserait jamais l'assassiner, qu'il partit pour Blois. En apprenant son départ, le chancelier Chyverni s'écria : voilà un homme perdu! [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] Lorsque sa fatale prédiction se réalise, on lui demande pourquoi. Il y a vingt ans, dit-il, que je connais le Roi; il est naturellement bon et même faible; mais j’ai remarqué qu’un détail l'impatiente et le met en colère, surtout quand il fait froid.

History provides us with a noteworthy example of the power of temperature. The famous Duke of Guise was so strongly convinced that Henry the Third, in whose power he had so often been, would never dare assassinate him, that he went to Blois. When the Chancelor Chiverny learned of the duke’s departure, he cried, “He is lost.” After this fatal prediction had been fulfilled by the event, Chiverny was asked why he made it. “I have known the king for twenty years,” said he; “he is naturally kind and even weakly indulgent, but I have noticed that when it is cold, it takes nothing at all to provoke him and send him into a passion.”

History gives us a striking example of the impact of temperature. The well-known Duke of Guise was so confident that Henry the Third, who had held power over him many times, would never dare to kill him that he went to Blois. When Chancellor Chiverny heard about the duke’s departure, he exclaimed, “He is doomed.” After this grim prediction turned out to be true, Chiverny was asked why he said it. “I have known the king for twenty years,” he replied; “he is naturally kind and somewhat weak-hearted, but I’ve noticed that when it’s cold, it doesn’t take much to provoke him and push him into a rage.”

Tel peuple a l’esprit lourd et stupide; tel autre l’a vif, léger, pénétrant. D’où cela vient-il, si ce n’est en partie, et de la nourriture qu’il prend, et de la semence de ses pères,2 et de ce chaos de divers éléments qui nagent dans l’immensité de l’air? L’esprit a, comme le corps, ses maladies épidémiques et son scorbut.

Tel peuple a l’esprit lourd et stupide; tel autre l’a vif, léger, pénétrant. D’où cela vient-il, si ce n’est en partie, et de la nourriture qu’il prend, et de la semence de ses pères,2 et de ce chaos de divers éléments qui nagent dans l’immensité de l’air? L’esprit a, comme le corps, ses maladies épidémiques et son scorbut.

One nation is of heavy and stupid wit, and another quick, light and penetrating. Whence comes this difference, if not in part from the difference [97]in foods, and difference in inheritance,2 and in part from the mixture of the diverse elements which float around in the immensity of the void? The mind, like the body, has its contagious diseases and its scurvy.

One nation has a heavy and dull mind, while another is quick, light, and sharp. What causes this difference if not partly because of the variation in foods, differences in inheritance, and also from the mix of different elements that exist in the vastness of the void? The mind, just like the body, can suffer from contagious diseases and scurvy.

Tel est l’empire du climat, qu’un homme qui en change se ressent malgré lui de ce changement. C’est une plante ambulante, qui s’est elle-même transplantée; si le climat n’est plus le même, il est juste qu’elle dégénère, ou s’améliore.

Tel est l’empire du climat, qu’un homme qui en change se ressent malgré lui de ce changement. C’est une plante ambulante, qui s’est elle-même transplantée; si le climat n’est plus le même, il est juste qu’elle dégénère, ou s’améliore.

Such is the influence of climate, that a man who goes from one climate to another, feels the change, in spite of himself. He is a walking plant which has transplanted itself; if the climate is not the same, it will surely either degenerate or improve.

The influence of climate is so strong that when someone moves from one climate to another, they can't help but notice the change. They are like a plant that has been transplanted; if the climate is different, it will either decline or thrive.

On prend tout encore de ceux avec qui l’on vit, leurs gestes, leurs accents, etc., comme la paupière se baisse à la menace du coup dont on est prévenu, ou par la même raison que le corps du spectateur imite machinalement, et malgré lui, tous les mouvements d’un bon pantomime.

On still picks up everything from those we live with, their gestures, their accents, etc., just like an eyelid drops in response to a blow we know is coming, or for the same reason that a spectator's body instinctively mimics, even against their will, all the movements of a good mime.

Furthermore, we catch everything from those with whom we come in contact; their gestures, their accent, etc.; just as the eyelid is instinctively lowered when a blow is foreseen, or as (for the same reason) the body of the spectator mechanically imitates, in spite of himself, all the motions of a good mimic.18

Furthermore, we pick up everything from the people we interact with; their gestures, their accents, etc.; just like the eyelid instinctively shuts when a blow is expected, or as (for the same reason) the body of the spectator automatically mimics, despite themselves, all the movements of a skilled actor.18

Ce que je viens de dire prouve que la meilleure compagnie pour un homme d’esprit, est la sienne, s’il n’en trouve une semblable. L’esprit se rouille avec ceux qui n’en ont point, faute d’être exercé: à la paume, on renvoie mal la balle à qui la sert mal. J’aimerais mieux un homme intelligent, qui n’aurait eu aucune éducation, que s’il en eût eu une mauvaise, pourvu qu’il fût encore assez jeune. Un [26]esprit mal conduit est un acteur que la province a gâté.

Ce que je viens de dire prouve que la meilleure compagnie pour un homme d’esprit, c’est lui-même, s’il ne trouve pas quelqu’un de similaire. L’esprit s’atrophie en présence de ceux qui n’en ont pas, faute d’être exercé : à la paume, on renvoie mal la balle à celui qui la sert mal. Je préfèrerais un homme intelligent qui n’a pas eu d’éducation plutôt que s’il en avait reçu une mauvaise, tant qu'il est encore assez jeune. Un [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] esprit mal dirigé est un acteur que la province a gâté.

From what I have just said, it follows that a brilliant man is his own best company, unless he can find other company of the same sort. In the society of the unintelligent, the mind grows rusty for lack of exercise, as at tennis a ball that is served badly is badly returned. I should prefer an intelligent man without an education, if he were still young enough, to a man badly educated. A badly trained mind is like an actor whom the provinces have spoiled.

From what I’ve just said, it follows that a smart person is his own best company, unless he can find others just as intelligent. In the company of those who lack intelligence, the mind gets dull from lack of use, like a tennis ball that’s poorly served and poorly returned. I’d rather have an intelligent person without formal education, if they’re still young enough, than someone who’s poorly educated. A poorly trained mind is like an actor who’s been ruined by working in the provinces.

Les divers états de l’âme sont donc toujours corrélatifs à ceux du corps. Mais, pour mieux démontrer toute cette dépendance et ses causes, servons-nous ici de l’anatomie comparée; ouvrons les entrailles de l’homme et des animaux. Le moyen de connaître la nature humaine, si l’on n’est éclairé par un juste parallèle de la structure des uns et des autres!

Les différents états d'esprit sont donc toujours liés à ceux du corps. Mais, pour mieux montrer toute cette dépendance et ses causes, utilisons ici l'anatomie comparée; ouvrons les entrailles de l'homme et des animaux. Quel meilleur moyen de comprendre la nature humaine, si ce n'est à travers une comparaison juste de la structure de l'un et de l'autre!

Thus, the diverse states of the soul are always correlative with those of the body.19 But the better to show this dependence, in its completeness and its causes, let us here make use of comparative anatomy; let us lay bare the organs of man and [98]of animals. How can human nature be known, if we may not derive any light from an exact comparison of the structure of man and of animals?

Thus, the different states of the soul are always connected to those of the body.19 To better demonstrate this dependence, along with its complexities and causes, let’s use comparative anatomy; let’s examine the organs of humans and [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]animals. How can we understand human nature if we don’t gain any insight from a precise comparison of the structure of humans and animals?

En général, la forme et la composition du cerveau des quadrupèdes est à peu près la même que dans l’homme. Même figure, même disposition partout; avec cette différence essentielle, que l’homme est de tous les animaux celui qui a le plus de cerveau, et le cerveau le plus tortueux, en raison de la masse de son corps. Ensuite le singe, le castor, l’éléphant, le chien, le renard, le chat, etc., voilà les animaux qui ressemblent le plus à l’homme; car on remarque aussi chez eux la même analogie graduée, par rapport au corps calleux, dans lequel Lancisi avait établi le siège de l’âme, avant feu Mr. de la Peyronnie, qui cependant a illustré cette opinion par une foule d’expériences.

In general, the shape and structure of the brains of quadrupeds are pretty much the same as in humans. The same figure, the same arrangement everywhere; with the essential difference that humans have the largest brain of all animals and the most convoluted brain, due to the size of their body. Next are monkeys, beavers, elephants, dogs, foxes, cats, etc., which are the animals that most resemble humans; because there is also a similar graduated analogy observed in them regarding the corpus callosum, in which Lancisi had established the seat of the soul, before the late Mr. de la Peyronnie, who nonetheless supported this opinion with a wealth of experiments.

Après tous les quadrupèdes, ce sont les oiseaux qui ont le plus de cerveau. Les poissons ont la tête grosse; mais elle est vide de sens, comme celle de bien des hommes. Ils n’ont point de corps calleux et fort peu de cerveau, lequel manque aux insectes.

Après tous les quadrupèdes, ce sont les oiseaux qui ont le plus de cerveau. Les poissons ont la tête grosse ; mais elle est vide de sens, comme celle de bien des hommes. Ils n’ont point de corps calleux et fort peu de cerveau, lequel manque aux insectes.

In general, the form and the structure of the brains of quadrupeds are almost the same as those of the brain of man; the same shape, the same arrangement everywhere, with this essential difference, that of all the animals man is the one whose brain is largest, and, in proportion to its mass, more convoluted than the brain of any other animal; then come the monkey, the beaver, the elephant, the dog, the fox, the cat. These animals are most like man, for among them, too, one notes the same progressive analogy in relation to the corpus callosum in which Lancisi—anticipating the late M. de la Peyronie20—established the seat of the soul. The latter, however, illustrated the theory by innumerable experiments. Next after all the quadrupeds, birds have the largest brains. Fish have large heads, but these are void of sense, like the heads of many men. Fish have no corpus callosum, and very little brain, while insects entirely lack brain.

In general, the form and structure of the brains of quadrupeds are almost the same as those of the human brain; they have the same shape and arrangement everywhere, with one key difference: among all animals, humans have the largest brain, and proportionally, it is more convoluted than any other animal's brain. Next in line are the monkey, the beaver, the elephant, the dog, the fox, and the cat. These animals resemble humans the most because they also show a similar progression in relation to the corpus callosum, where Lancisi—anticipating the later M. de la Peyronie20—identified the seat of the soul. The latter supported his theory with countless experiments. Following all the quadrupeds, birds have the largest brains. Fish have large heads, but they lack intelligence, similar to many humans. Fish do not have a corpus callosum and possess very little brain, while insects completely lack a brain.

Je ne me répandrai point en un plus long détail des variétés de la nature, ni en conjectures, car les unes et les autres sont infinies, comme on en [27]peut juger en lisant les seuls traités de Willis, De Cerebro, et De Anima Brutorum.

Je ne vais pas entrer dans plus de détails sur les variétés de la nature, ni faire des suppositions, car les deux sont infinies, comme on peut le comprendre en lisant seulement les traités de Willis, De Cerebro, et De Anima Brutorum. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

I shall not launch out into any more detail about the varieties of nature, nor into conjectures concerning them, for there is an infinite number of both, as any one can see by reading no further than the treatises of Willis “De Cerebro” and “De Anima Brutorum.”21

I won’t go into more detail about the different types of nature or speculate about them, since there are countless variations, as anyone can see by just looking at Willis’s works “De Cerebro” and “On the Soul of Animals.”21

Je conclûrai seulement ce qui s’en suit clairement de ces incontestables observations: 1o que plus les animaux sont farouches, moins ils ont de cerveau; 2o que ce viscère semble s’agrandir, en quelque sorte, à proportion de leur docilité; 3o qu’il y a ici une singulière condition imposée éternellement par la nature, qui est que plus on gagnera du côté de l’esprit, plus on perdra du côté de l’instinct. Lequel l’emporte, de la perte ou du gain?

I'll conclude with the following clear points based on these undeniable observations: 1. The more skittish the animals are, the less intelligence they have; 2. This organ seems to grow, in a way, in proportion to their tameness; 3. There is a peculiar condition imposed eternally by nature, which is that the more one gains in intellect, the more one loses in instinct. Which prevails, loss or gain?

I shall draw the conclusions which follow clearly from these incontestable observations: 1st, that the fiercer animals are, the less brain they have; 2d, that this organ seems to increase in size in proportion to the gentleness of the animal; 3d, that nature seems here eternally to impose a singular condition, [99]that the more one gains in intelligence the more one loses in instinct. Does this bring gain or loss?

I will clearly state the conclusions that come from these undeniable observations: 1st, the fiercer animals are, the less brain they have; 2nd, this organ seems to grow in size in relation to the gentleness of the animal; 3rd, nature seems to consistently impose a unique condition, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] that the more one gains in intelligence, the more one loses in instinct. Does this result in gain or loss?

Ne croyez pas, au reste, que je veuille prétendre par là que le seul volume du cerveau suffise pour faire juger du degré de docilité des animaux; il faut que la qualité réponde encore à la quantité, et que les solides et les fluides soient dans cet équilibre convenable qui fait la santé.

Ne croyez pas, au reste, que je veuille prétendre par là que le seul volume du cerveau suffise pour faire juger du degré de docilité des animaux; il faut que la qualité réponde encore à la quantité, et que les solides et les fluides soient dans cet équilibre convenable qui fait la santé.

Do not think, however, that I wish to infer by that, that the size alone of the brain, is enough to indicate the degree of tameness in animals: the quality must correspond to the quantity, and the solids and liquids must be in that due equilibrium which constitutes health.

Don't think that I'm trying to imply that the size of the brain alone is enough to indicate how domesticated an animal is: the quality needs to match the quantity, and the solids and liquids must be in the right balance that defines health.

Si l’imbécile ne manque pas de cerveau, comme on le remarque ordinairement, ce viscère péchera par une mauvaise consistance, par trop de mollesse, par exemple. Il en est de même des fous; les vices de leur cerveau ne se dérobent pas toujours à nos recherches; mais si les causes de l’imbécilité, de la folie, etc. ne sont pas sensibles, où aller chercher celles de la variété de tous les esprits? Elles échapperaient aux yeux des lynx et des argus. Un rien, une petite fibre, quelque chose que la plus subtile anatomie ne peut découvrir, eut fait deux sots d’Erasme et de Fontenelle, qui le remarque lui même dans un de ses meilleurs Dialogues.

If the fool doesn't lack intelligence, as is usually noted, this organ might fail due to a poor structure, perhaps too much softness, for example. The same goes for the insane; the flaws in their minds don't always hide from our observations; but if the causes of foolishness, madness, etc. aren't obvious, where can we go to find the reasons behind the diversity of all minds? They would escape even the keenest observers. A tiny detail, a little fiber, something that the most delicate anatomy can't uncover, could have made two fools out of Erasmus and Fontenelle, as he himself points out in one of his best Dialogues.

Outre la mollesse de la moëlle du cerveau, dans les enfants, dans les petits chiens et dans les oiseaux, Willis a remarqué que les corps cannelés sont effacés et comme décolorés dans tous ces animaux, [28]et que leurs stries sont aussi imparfaitement formées que dans les paralytiques. Il ajoute, ce qui est vrai, que l’homme a la protubérance annulaire fort grosse; et ensuite toujours diminutivement par dégrés, le singe et les autres animaux nommés ci-devant, tandis que le veau, le bœuf, le loup, la brebis, le cochon, etc. qui ont cette partie d’un très petit volume, ont les nattes et testes fort gros.

Besides the softness of the brain's marrow, in children, small dogs, and birds, Willis noticed that the striate bodies are faded and almost colorless in all these animals, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]and that their stripes are as imperfectly formed as in those who are paralyzed. He adds, and this is true, that humans have a very large medullary protrusion; and then, progressively smaller, the monkey and the other previously mentioned animals, while the calf, bull, wolf, sheep, pig, etc., which have this part at a very small volume, have very large nerves and cells.

If, as is ordinarily observed, the imbecile does not lack brain, his brain will be deficient in its consistency—for instance, in being too soft. The same thing is true of the insane, and the defects of their brains do not always escape our investigation. But if the causes of imbecility, insanity, etc., are not obvious, where shall we look for the causes of the diversity of all minds? They would escape the eyes of a lynx and of an argus. A mere nothing, a tiny fibre, something that could never be found by the most delicate anatomy, would have made of Erasmus and Fontenelle22 two idiots, and Fontenelle himself speaks of this very fact in one of his best dialogues.

If, as is usually seen, an imbecile doesn't lack brain matter, their brain will still be lacking in consistency—for example, it may be too soft. The same goes for those who are insane, and the flaws in their brains don't always go unnoticed. But if the reasons for imbecility, insanity, etc., aren’t clear, where should we look for the reasons behind the differences in all minds? They could escape even the sharpest observer. A mere speck, a tiny fiber, something that could never be detected by the most precise anatomy, could have turned Erasmus and Fontenelle22 into two idiots, and Fontenelle himself mentions this in one of his best dialogues.

Willis has noticed in addition to the softness of the brain-substance in children, puppies, and birds, that the corpora striata are obliterated and discolored in all these animals, and that the striations are as imperfectly formed as in paralytics....

Willis has noticed that, along with the softness of the brain tissue in children, puppies, and birds, the corpora striata are missing and discolored in all these animals, and that the striations are just as poorly developed as in those with paralysis....

On a beau être discret et réservé sur les conséquences qu’on peut tirer de ces observations et de tant d’autres sur l’espèce d’inconstance des vaisseaux et des nerfs, etc.: tant de variétés ne peuvent être des jeux gratuits de la nature. Elles prouvent du moins la nécessité d’une bonne et abondante organisation, puisque dans tout le règne animal l’âme, se raffermissant avec le corps, acquiert de la sagacité, à mesure qu’il prend des forces.

On can be discreet and reserved about the conclusions we can draw from these observations and many others regarding the kind of inconsistency in the vessels and nerves, etc.: so many variations cannot simply be random acts of nature. They at least demonstrate the need for a good and abundant organization, since in the entire animal kingdom, as the soul strengthens with the body, it gains insight as the body grows stronger.

However cautious and reserved one may be about the consequences that can be deduced from these observations, and from many others concerning the kind of variation in the organs, nerves, etc., [one must admit that] so many different varieties can not be the gratuitous play of nature. They prove at least the necessity for a good and vigorous physical [100]organization, since throughout the animal kingdom the soul gains force with the body and acquires keenness, as the body gains strength.

However careful and reserved someone might be about the implications that can come from these observations, along with many others regarding the types of changes in organs, nerves, etc., [one must admit that] so many different varieties cannot simply be attributed to random chance in nature. They at least demonstrate the need for a strong and healthy physical [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]organization, since throughout the animal kingdom, the spirit grows stronger with the body and becomes sharper as the body gains strength.

Arrêtons-nous à contempler la différente docilité des animaux. Sans doute l’analogie la mieux entendue conduit l’esprit à croire que les causes dont nous avons fait mention produisent toute la diversité qui se trouve entr’eux et nous, quoiqu’il faille avouer que notre faible entendement, borné aux observations les plus grossières, ne puisse voir les liens qui règnent entre la cause et les effets. C’est une espèce d’harmonie que les philosophes ne connaîtront jamais.

Arrêtons-nous pour réfléchir à la différente docilité des animaux. Sans doute l’analogie la mieux comprise amène l’esprit à croire que les causes que nous avons mentionnées produisent toute la diversité qui existe entre eux et nous, bien qu’il faille admettre que notre faible compréhension, limitée aux observations les plus évidentes, ne peut percevoir les liens qui existent entre la cause et les effets. C’est une espèce d’harmonie que les philosophes ne connaîtront jamais.

Let us pause to contemplate the varying capacity of animals to learn. Doubtless the analogy best framed leads the mind to think that the causes we have mentioned produce all the difference that is found between animals and men, although we must confess that our weak understanding, limited to the coarsest observations, can not see the bonds that exist between cause and effects. This is a kind of harmony that philosophers will never know.

Let’s take a moment to think about how different animals learn. It’s easy to believe that the reasons we’ve talked about are what create all the differences between animals and humans. However, we have to admit that our limited understanding, based only on the most basic observations, can’t grasp the connections between causes and effects. This is a kind of harmony that philosophers will never fully understand.

Parmi les animaux, les uns apprennent à parler et à chanter; ils retiennent des airs et prennent tous les tons aussi exactement qu’un musicien. Les autres, qui montrent cependant plus d’esprit, tels que le singe, n’en peuvent venir à bout. Pourquoi cela, si ce n’est par un vice des organes de la parole?

Parmi les animaux, certains apprennent à parler et à chanter; ils mémorisent des mélodies et reproduisent tous les tons aussi précisément qu'un musicien. D'autres, qui montrent pourtant plus d'intelligence, comme les singes, n'y parviennent pas. Pourquoi est-ce, sinon à cause d'une limitation des organes de la parole?

Mais ce vice est-il tellement de conformation, [29]qu’on n’y puisse apporter aucun remède? en un mot serait-il absolument impossible d’apprendre une langue à cet animal? Je ne le crois pas.

Mais ce vice est-il tellement de conformation, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]qu’on n’y puisse apporter aucun remède? En un mot, serait-il absolument impossible d’apprendre une langue à cet animal? Je ne le crois pas.

Among animals, some learn to speak and sing; they remember tunes, and strike the notes as exactly as a musician. Others, for instance the ape, show more intelligence, and yet can not learn music. What is the reason for this, except some defect in the organs of speech? But is this defect so essential to the structure that it could never be remedied? In a word, would it be absolutely impossible to teach the ape a language?23 I do not think so.

Among animals, some can learn to speak and sing; they remember melodies and hit the notes just like a musician. Others, like apes, display more intelligence but still can't learn music. What explains this, if not a flaw in their speech organs? Is this flaw so fundamental to their structure that it can't be fixed? In short, would it be completely impossible to teach an ape a language?23 I don't believe so.

Je prendrais le grand singe préférablement à tout autre, jusqu’à ce que le hasard nous eût fait découvrir quelque autre espèce plus semblable à la nôtre, car rien ne répugne qu’il y en ait dans des régions qui nous sont inconnues. Cet animal nous ressemble si fort, que les naturalistes l’ont appelé homme sauvage, ou homme des bois. Je le prendrais aux mêmes conditions des écoliers d’Amman; c’est-à-dire, que je voudrais qu’il ne fût ni trop jeune ni trop vieux; car ceux qu’on nous apporte en Europe sont communément trop âgés. Je choisirais celui qui aurait la physionomie la plus spirituelle, et qui tiendrait le mieux dans mille petites opérations ce qu’elle m’aurait promis. Enfin, ne me trouvant pas digne d’être son gouverneur, je le mettrais à l’école de l’excellent maître que je viens de nommer, ou d’un autre aussi habile, s’il en est.

I would prefer to take the great ape over any other until chance leads us to discover another species that’s more similar to us, because nothing stops the idea that there might be some in regions that are unknown to us. This animal resembles us so much that naturalists have called it wild man or man of the woods. I would choose it under the same conditions as the students in Amman; that is, I would want it to be neither too young nor too old, because those typically brought to us in Europe are usually too old. I would select the one with the most expressive face and who would best keep up with the thousand little tasks it promised me. Ultimately, feeling unworthy to be its guardian, I would enroll it with the excellent teacher I just mentioned, or with another equally skilled if one exists.

I should choose a large ape in preference to any other, until by some good fortune another kind should be discovered, more like us, for nothing prevents there being such an one in regions unknown to us. The ape resembles us so strongly that naturalists have called it “wild man” or “man of the woods.” I should take it in the condition of the pupils of Amman,24 that is to say, I should not want it to be too young or too old; for apes that are brought to Europe are usually too old. I would choose the one with the most intelligent face, and the one which, in a thousand little ways, best lived up to its look of intelligence. Finally [101]not considering myself worthy to be his master, I should put him in the school of that excellent teacher whom I have just named, or with another teacher equally skilful, if there is one.

I should choose a large ape over any other option until, by some stroke of luck, another species more similar to us is discovered, as there's nothing stopping such a creature from existing in places we don’t yet know. The ape resembles us so much that naturalists have referred to it as the “wild man” or “man of the woods.” I would want it to be in the same condition as the pupils of Amman,24 meaning I wouldn't want it to be too young or too old; usually, the apes brought to Europe are too old. I would choose the one with the most intelligent expression and the one that, in a thousand subtle ways, best lived up to its intelligent looks. Lastly, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]not feeling worthy of being its master, I would enroll it in the school of that excellent teacher I've just mentioned, or with another equally skilled teacher, if one exists.

Vous savez par le livre d’Amman, et par tous ceux3 qui ont traduit sa méthode, tous les prodiges qu’il a su opérer sur les sourds de naissance, dans les yeux desquels il a, comme il le fait entendre lui-même, trouvé des oreilles; et en combien peu de temps enfin il leur a appris à entendre, parler, lire, et écrire. Je veux que les yeux d’un sourd voient plus clair et soient plus intelligents que s’il ne l’était pas, par la raison que la perte d’un membre ou d’un sens peut augmenter la force ou la pénétration d’un autre: mais le singe voit et entend; il comprend ce qu’il entend et ce qu’il voit; il conçoit si parfaitement les signes qu’on lui fait, qu’à tout autre jeu, [30]ou tout autre exercice, je ne doute point qu’il ne l’emportât sur les disciples d’Amman. Pourquoi donc l’éducation des singes serait-elle impossible? Pourquoi ne pourrait-il enfin, à force de soins, imiter, à l’exemple des sourds, les mouvemens nécessaires pour prononcer? Je n’ose décider si les organes de la parole du singe ne peuvent, quoiqu’on fasse, rien articuler; mais cette impossibilité absolue me surprendrait, à cause de la grande analogie du singe et de l’homme, et qu’il n’est point d’animal connu jusqu’à présent, dont le dedans et le dehors lui ressemblent d’une manière si frappante. Mr. Locke, qui certainement n’a jamais été suspect de crédulité, n’a pas fait difficulté de croire l’histoire que le Chevalier Temple fait dans ses Mémoires, d’un perroquet qui répondait à propos et avait appris, comme nous, à avoir une espèce de conversation suivie. Je sais qu’on s’est moqué4 de ce grand métaphysicien; mais qui aurait annoncé à l’univers qu’il y a des générations qui se font sans œufs et sans femmes, aurait-il trouvé beaucoup de partisans? Cependant Mr. Trembley en a découvert, qui se font sans accouplement, et par la seule section. Amman n’eût-il pas aussi passé pour un fou, s’il se fût vanté, avant que d’en faire l’heureuse expérience, d’instruire, et en aussi peu de temps, des écoliers tels que les siens? Cependant ses succès ont étonné l’univers, et comme l’auteur de l’Histoire des Polypes, il a passé de plein vol à l’immortalité. Qui doit à son génie les miracles qu’il opère, l’emporte à mon gré sur qui doit les siens au hasard. Qui a trouvé l’art d’embellir le plus beau des règnes, et de lui donner des perfections qu’il n’avait [31]pas, doit être mis au-dessus d’un faiseur oisif de systèmes frivoles, ou d’un auteur laborieux de stériles découvertes. Celles d’Amman sont bien d’un autre prix; il a tiré les hommes de l’instinct auquel ils semblaient condamnés; il leur a donné les idées, de l’esprit, une âme en un mot, qu’ils n’eûssent jamais eue. Quel plus grand pouvoir!

You know from the book by Amman, and from all those 3 who have translated his method, about all the amazing things he has achieved for those who were born deaf. In the eyes of these individuals, he has, as he indicates himself, found ears; and in a very short time, he has taught them to hear, speak, read, and write. I want the eyes of a deaf person to see more clearly and be more insightful than someone who can hear, because the loss of a limb or a sense can enhance the power or understanding of another: but the monkey sees and hears; it understands what it hears and sees; it perfectly grasps the signs made to it, so that in any other game, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] or any other exercise, I have no doubt that it would outshine Amman's students. So why would training monkeys be impossible? Why couldn’t it finally, with enough effort, mimic the necessary movements to speak, just like the deaf do? I cannot say if a monkey’s speech organs can, no matter what is done, articulate anything; but I would be surprised by this absolute impossibility, considering the close similarity between monkeys and humans, and that there is no known animal to date whose insides and outsides resemble those of humans so strikingly. Mr. Locke, who certainly was never suspected of gullibility, did not hesitate to believe the story that Sir Temple recounts in his Memoirs about a parrot that responded appropriately and had learned, like us, to have a kind of continuous conversation. I know that people have mocked 4 this great metaphysician; but who would have believed anyone who announced to the world that there are generations that occur without eggs and without females? Would he have found many supporters? Yet Mr. Trembley discovered them, which happen without mating, and solely through division. Would Amman not also have been considered a fool if he had boasted, before having made his successful experiment, of teaching students like his in such a short time? Nevertheless, his successes astonished the world, and like the author of the History of Polyps, he soared to immortality. Whoever owes their miracles to their genius surpasses those who owe theirs to chance. Whoever has found the art of enhancing the most beautiful of realms and giving it qualities it didn’t have [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] should be placed above a lazy schemer of trivial theories or a laborious author of barren discoveries. Amman’s findings are of much greater value; he has pulled humans from the instinct to which they seemed condemned; he has given them ideas, intellect, a soul in short, that they would never have had. What greater power is there!

You know by Amman’s work, and by all those3 who have interpreted his method, all the wonders he has been able to accomplish for those born deaf. In their eyes he discovered ears, as he himself explains, and in how short a time! In short he taught them to hear, speak, read, and write. I grant that a deaf person’s eyes see more clearly and are keener than if he were not deaf, for the loss of one member or sense can increase the strength or acuteness of another, but apes see and hear, they understand what they hear and see, and grasp so perfectly the signs that are made to them, that I doubt not that they would surpass the pupils of Amman in any other game or exercise. Why then should the education of monkeys be impossible? Why might not the monkey, by dint of great pains, at last imitate after the manner of deaf mutes, the motions necessary for pronunciation? I do not dare decide whether the monkey’s organs of speech, however trained, would be incapable of articulation. But, because of the great analogy between ape and man25 and because there is no known animal whose external and internal organs so strikingly resemble man’s, it would surprise me if speech were absolutely impossible to the ape. Locke, who was certainly never suspected of credulity, found no difficulty in believing the story told by Sir William Temple26 in his memoirs, about a parrot which could answer rationally, and which had learned to carry [102]on a kind of connected conversation, as we do. I know that people have ridiculed4 this great metaphysician; but suppose some one should have announced that reproduction sometimes takes place without eggs or a female, would he have found many partisans? Yet M. Trembley27 has found cases where reproduction takes place without copulation and by fission. Would not Amman too have passed for mad if he had boasted that he could instruct scholars like his in so short a time, before he had happily accomplished the feat? His successes have, however, astonished the world; and he, like the author of “The History of Polyps,” has risen to immortality at one bound. Whoever owes the miracles that he works to his own genius surpasses, in my opinion, the man who owes his to chance. He who has discovered the art of adorning the most beautiful of the kingdoms [of nature], and of giving it perfections that it did not have, should be rated above an idle creator of frivolous systems, or a painstaking author of sterile discoveries. Amman’s discoveries are certainly of a much greater value; he has freed men from the instinct to which they seemed to be condemned, and has given them ideas, intelligence, or in a word, a soul which they would never have had. What greater power than this!

You know from Amman's work and from all those3 who have interpreted his method, all the amazing things he has been able to achieve for those who are deaf. In their eyes, he discovered ears, as he explains himself, and in such a short time! In short, he taught them to hear, speak, read, and write. I admit that a deaf person's eyes see more clearly and are sharper than they would be if they weren't deaf, since losing one sense can heighten another, but apes see and hear, they understand what they hear and see, and grasp the signs made to them so well that I have no doubt they would outperform Amman's students in any game or task. So why should teaching monkeys be impossible? Why couldn't a monkey, through great effort, eventually mimic the movements needed for speech, just like deaf mutes do? I won’t claim that a monkey’s speech organs, no matter how trained, would be capable of articulation. However, given the strong similarities between apes and humans25 and the fact that there’s no known animal that has such clear resemblances to humans' internal and external organs, it would be surprising if speech were completely impossible for apes. Locke, who certainly was never thought to be gullible, had no trouble believing the story told by Sir William Temple26 in his memoirs about a parrot that could respond intelligently and learned to maintain [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] a type of ongoing conversation, like we do. I know that some have mocked4 this great thinker; but what if someone had claimed that reproduction sometimes happens without eggs or a female—would many have supported that idea? Yet M. Trembley27 found cases where reproduction occurs without mating and through fission. Wouldn’t Amman himself have been considered mad if he had bragged that he could teach students like his in such a short time before successfully doing so? His achievements have, however, amazed the world; and he, like the author of “The History of Polyps,” has gained immortality in one leap. Anyone who attributes the miracles they perform to their own talent surpasses, in my opinion, those who rely on luck. The one who has discovered how to enhance the most beautiful aspects of [nature’s] kingdom and add qualities it didn’t have should be held in higher regard than a creator of meaningless systems or a diligent author of fruitless discoveries. Amman’s findings are undoubtedly of far greater importance; he has freed people from the instinct they seemed bound to and has given them ideas, intelligence, or in simple terms, a soul that they would never have had. What greater power could there be than this!

Ne bornons point les ressources de la nature; elles sont infinies, surtout aidées d’un grand art.

Ne bornons point les ressources de la nature; elles sont infinies, surtout aidées d’un grand art.

Let us not limit the resources of nature; they are infinite, especially when reinforced by great art.

Let's not restrict nature's resources; they're limitless, especially when enhanced by great art.

La même mécanique, qui ouvre le canal d’Eustachi dans les sourds, ne pourrait-il le déboucher dans les singes? Une heureuse envie d’imiter la prononciation du maître, ne pourrait-elle mettre en liberté les organes de la parole, dans les animaux qui imitent tant d’autres signes, avec tant d’adresse et d’intelligence? Non seulement je défie qu’on me cite aucune expérience vraiment concluante, qui décide mon projet impossible et ridicule; mais la similitude de la structure et des opérations du singe est telle, que je ne doute presque point, si on exerçait parfaitement cet animal, qu’on ne vînt enfin à bout de lui apprendre à prononcer, et par conséquent à savoir une langue. Alors ce ne serait plus ni un homme sauvage, ni un homme manqué: ce serait un homme parfait, un petit homme de ville, avec autant d’étoffe ou de muscles que nous-mêmes, pour penser et profiter de son éducation.

La même mécanique qui ouvre le canal d’Eustachi chez les sourds pourrait-elle également le déboucher chez les singes ? Une envie de bien imiter la prononciation du maître pourrait-elle libérer les organes de la parole chez des animaux qui imitent tant d'autres signes avec tant d'habileté et d'intelligence ? Non seulement je défie qu’on me cite une expérience vraiment concluante qui prouve que mon projet est impossible et ridicule ; mais la similitude de la structure et des opérations des singes est telle que je ne doute presque pas qu'avec un entraînement adéquat, on pourrait leur apprendre à prononcer et, par conséquent, à comprendre une langue. Alors, cela ne serait plus un homme sauvage ni un homme raté : ce serait un homme accompli, un petit citadin, avec une aussi bonne constitution physique que nous, capable de penser et de bénéficier de son éducation.

Could not the device which opens the Eustachian canal of the deaf, open that of apes? Might not a happy desire to imitate the master’s pronunciation, liberate the organs of speech in animals that imitate so many other signs with such skill and intelligence? [103]Not only do I defy any one to name any really conclusive experiment which proves my view impossible and absurd; but such is the likeness of the structure and functions of the ape to ours that I have very little doubt that if this animal were properly trained he might at last be taught to pronounce, and consequently to know, a language. Then he would no longer be a wild man, nor a defective man, but he would be a perfect man, a little gentleman, with as much matter or muscle as we have, for thinking and profiting by his education.

Couldn’t the device that opens the Eustachian canal in deaf people also work for apes? Isn’t it possible that a strong desire to mimic their master’s pronunciation could help animals, which are so skilled at imitating other signs, develop their speech? [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]I challenge anyone to name a truly conclusive experiment that proves my view to be impossible and ridiculous. The similarities in structure and function between apes and humans give me confidence that if these animals were properly trained, they could ultimately learn to speak and understand a language. Then, they wouldn’t just be wild creatures or impaired beings; instead, they could become fully developed individuals, little gentlemen, with as much capacity for thought and learning as we have.

Des animaux à l’homme, la transition n’est pas violente; les vrais philosophes en conviendront. Qu’était l’homme, avant l’invention des mots et la connaissance des langues? Un animal de son espèce, qui avec beaucoup moins d’instinct naturel que les autres, dont alors il ne se croyait pas roi, n’était distingué du singe et des autres animaux [32]que comme le singe l’est lui-même; je veux dire par une physionomie qui annonçait plus de discernement. Réduit à la seule connaissance intuitive des Leibniziens, il ne voyait que des figures et des couleurs, sans pouvoir rien distinguer entr’elles; vieux, comme jeune, enfant à tout âge, il bégayait ses sensations et ses besoins, comme un chien affamé, ou ennuyé de repos, demande à manger ou à se promener.

From animals to humans, the transition isn't abrupt; true philosophers would agree. What was man before the invention of words and the understanding of languages? An animal of his kind who, with much less natural instinct than others—of which he did not consider himself the king—was distinguished from the ape and other animals [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] only as the ape distinguishes itself; I mean by a face that showed more discernment. Reduced to the only intuitive knowledge of the Leibnizians, he saw only shapes and colors, unable to tell them apart; old or young, a child at any age, he babbled his sensations and needs like a hungry dog, or one bored of resting, asking for food or a walk.

The transition from animals to man is not violent, as true philosophers will admit. What was man before the invention of words and the knowledge of language?28 An animal of his own species with much less instinct than the others. In those days, he did not consider himself king over the other animals, nor was he distinguished from the ape, and from the rest, except as the ape itself differs from the other animals, i. e., by a more intelligent face. Reduced to the bare intuitive knowledge of the Leibnizians he saw only shapes and colors, without being able to distinguish between them: the same, old as young, child at all ages, he lisped out his sensations and his needs, as a dog that is hungry or tired of sleeping, asks for something to eat, or for a walk.

The shift from animals to humans isn't a violent one, as true philosophers would agree. What was a human before the invention of words and understanding of language?28 Just another animal of his own kind, with far less instinct than others. Back then, he didn’t see himself as superior to the other animals, nor was he really different from apes, except in the way that apes differ from other animals—specifically, by having a more intelligent face. Reduced to the basic intuitive understanding of the Leibnizians, he perceived only shapes and colors without being able to differentiate between them: the same whether young or old, he expressed his feelings and needs like a dog that, hungry or tired from sleeping, asks for food or a walk.

Les mots, les langues, les lois, les sciences, les beaux-arts sont venus; et par eux enfin le diamant brut de notre esprit a été poli. On a dressé un homme, comme un animal; on est devenu auteur, comme portefaix. Un géomètre a appris à faire les démonstrations et les calculs les plus difficiles, comme un singe à ôter ou mettre son petit chapeau, et à monter sur son chien docile. Tout s’est fait par les signes; chaque espèce a compris ce qu’elle a pu comprendre: et c’est de cette manière que les hommes ont acquis la connaissance symbolique, ainsi nommée encore par nos philosophes d’Allemagne.

Words, languages, laws, sciences, and the fine arts have all emerged; and through them, the raw diamond of our minds has been polished. We have been molded like animals; becoming authors has turned into a task as mundane as that of a porter. A mathematician has learned to do the most complex proofs and calculations, just as a monkey learns to take off or put on its little hat and to climb on its obedient dog. Everything has been accomplished through symbols; each species has understood what it could comprehend: and it is in this way that humans have gained symbolic knowledge, as our German philosophers have also called it.

Words, languages, laws, sciences, and the fine arts have come, and by them finally the rough diamond of our mind has been polished. Man has been trained in the same way as animals. He has become an author, as they became beasts of burden. A geometrician has learned to perform the most difficult demonstrations and calculations, as a monkey [104]has learned to take his little hat off and on, and to mount his tame dog. All has been accomplished through signs, every species has learned what it could understand, and in this way men have acquired symbolic knowledge, still so called by our German philosophers.

Words, languages, laws, sciences, and fine arts have emerged, and through them, the rough gem of our mind has finally been polished. Humans have been trained in a way similar to animals. They have become creators, just as animals have become pack animals. A mathematician has learned to carry out the toughest proofs and calculations, just like a monkey [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]has learned to take its little hat on and off and to ride its trained dog. Everything has been achieved through signs; each species has learned what it could grasp, and in this way, humans have gained symbolic knowledge, a term still used by our German philosophers.

Rien de si simple, comme on voit, que la mécanique de notre éducation! Tout se réduit à des sons, ou à des mots, qui de la bouche de l’un passent par l’oreille de l’autre dans le cerveau, qui reçoit en même temps par les yeux la figure des corps, dont ces mots sont les signes arbitraires.

Nothing is as straightforward as it seems when it comes to the mechanics of our education! It all comes down to sounds or words that travel from one person's mouth to the other person's ear and then to the brain, which simultaneously receives through the eyes the shape of the bodies that these words represent as arbitrary signs.

Nothing, as any one can see, is so simple as the mechanism of our education. Everything may be reduced to sounds or words that pass from the mouth of one through the ears of another into his brain. At the same moment, he perceives through his eyes the shape of the bodies of which these words are the arbitrary signs.

Nothing, as anyone can see, is simpler than how we learn. Everything can be broken down into sounds or words that come from one person’s mouth, travel through the ears of another, and enter their brain. At the same time, they see the shapes of the objects these words represent.

Mais qui a parlé le premier? Qui a été le premier précepteur du genre human? Qui a inventé les moyens de mettre à profit la docilité de notre organisation? Je n’en sais rien; le nom de ces heureux et premiers génies a été perdu dans la nuit des temps. Mais l’art est le fils de la nature; elle a dû longtemps le précéder. [33]

Mais qui a parlé le premier? Qui a été le premier enseignant de l'humanité? Qui a trouvé comment tirer parti de notre capacité d'apprentissage? Je ne sais pas; le nom de ces premiers génies a été perdu dans les âges. Mais l'art est le fils de la nature; elle a dû le précéder longtemps. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

But who was the first to speak? Who was the first teacher of the human race? Who invented the means of utilizing the plasticity of our organism? I can not answer: the names of these first splendid geniuses have been lost in the night of time. But art is the child of nature, so nature must have long preceded it.

But who was the first to speak? Who was the first teacher of humanity? Who figured out how to use the flexibility of our bodies? I can’t answer that: the names of these early brilliant minds have been lost to history. But art is a product of nature, so nature must have come first.

On doit croire que les hommes les mieux organisés, ceux pour qui la nature aura épuisé ses bienfaits, auront instruit les autres. Ils n’auront pu entendre un bruit nouveau, par exemple, éprouver de nouvelles sensations, être frappé de tous ces beaux objets divers qui forment le ravissant spectacle de la nature, sans se trouver dans le cas de ce sourd de Chartres dont le grand Fontenelle nous a le premier donné l’histoire, lorsqu’il entendit pour la première fois à quarante ans le bruit étonnant des cloches.

On must believe that the best-organized men, those for whom nature has exhausted its benefits, will have taught the others. They won't have been able to hear a new sound, for instance, experience new sensations, or be struck by all those beautiful, diverse objects that create the lovely spectacle of nature, without finding themselves in the case of that deaf man from Chartres, whose story was first told to us by the great Fontenelle, when he heard the stunning sound of the bells for the first time at the age of forty.

We must think that the men who were the most highly organized, those on whom nature had lavished her richest gifts, taught the others. They could not have heard a new sound for instance, nor experienced new sensations, nor been struck by all the varied and beautiful objects that compose the ravishing spectacle of nature without finding themselves in the state of mind of the deaf man of Chartres, whose experience was first related by the great Fontenelle,29 when, at forty years, he heard for the first time, the astonishing sound of bells.

We should consider that the most organized men, those who were given the greatest gifts by nature, taught others. They couldn't have heard a new sound, experienced new sensations, or been amazed by all the diverse and beautiful objects that make up the stunning display of nature without being in the same mindset as the deaf man of Chartres. His story was first shared by the great Fontenelle,29 when, at the age of forty, he heard the incredible sound of bells for the first time.

De là serait-il absurde de croire que ces premiers mortels essayèrent à la manière de ce sourd, ou à celle des animaux et des muets (autre espèce d’animaux), d’exprimer leurs nouveaux sentiments par des mouvements dépendants de l’économie de leur imagination, et conséquemment ensuite par des sons spontanés propres à chaque animal, expression naturelle de leur surprise, de leur joie, de leurs transports, ou de leurs besoins? Car sans doute ceux que la nature a doués d’un sentiment plus exquis, ont eu aussi plus de facilité pour l’exprimer.

De là serait-il absurde de croire que ces premiers mortels essayèrent à la manière de ce sourd, ou à celle des animaux et des muets (autre espèce d’animaux), d’exprimer leurs nouveaux sentiments par des mouvements dépendants de l’économie de leur imagination, et conséquemment ensuite par des sons spontanés propres à chaque animal, expression naturelle de leur surprise, de leur joie, de leurs transports, ou de leurs besoins? Car sans doute ceux que la nature a doués d’un sentiment plus exquis, ont eu aussi plus de facilité pour l’exprimer.

Would it be absurd to conclude from this that the first mortals tried after the manner of this deaf man, or like animals and like mutes (another kind [105]of animals), to express their new feelings by motions depending on the nature of their imagination, and therefore afterwards by spontaneous sounds, distinctive of each animal, as the natural expression of their surprise, their joy, their ecstasies and their needs? For doubtless those whom nature endowed with finer feeling had also greater facility in expression.

Would it be crazy to think that the first humans, like this deaf man, or like animals and mutes (another type [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]of animals), tried to communicate their new emotions through gestures based on their imagination, and then later through spontaneous sounds unique to each animal, as a natural way to express their surprise, joy, ecstasy, and needs? Surely, those naturally gifted with more sensitivity also had an easier time expressing themselves.

Voilà comme je conçois que les hommes ont employé leur sentiment, ou leur instinct, pour avoir de l’esprit, et enfin leur esprit, pour avoir des connaissances. Voilà par quels moyens, autant que je puis les saisir, on s’est rempli le cerveau des idées, pour le réception desquelles la nature l’avait formé. On s’est aidé l’un par l’autre; et les plus petits commencements s’agrandissant peu à peu, toutes les choses de l’univers ont été aussi facilement distinguées qu’un cercle.

Here’s how I see men using their feelings or instincts to gain wit, and ultimately their intellect to acquire knowledge. This is how, as far as I can understand, people filled their minds with ideas for which nature had designed them. They helped each other out; and as the smallest beginnings gradually grew, everything in the universe became as easily distinguishable as a circle.

That is the way in which, I think, men have used their feeling and their instinct to gain intelligence and then have employed their intelligence to gain knowledge. Those are the ways, so far as I can understand them, in which men have filled the brain with the ideas, for the reception of which nature made it. Nature and man have helped each other; and the smallest beginnings have, little by little, increased, until everything in the universe could be as easily described as a circle.

That's how I see it: men have used their feelings and instincts to gain intelligence, and then used that intelligence to acquire knowledge. As far as I can understand, those are the ways men have filled their brains with the ideas for which nature designed them. Nature and humanity have supported each other; the smallest beginnings have gradually grown, until everything in the universe can be described as simply as a circle.

Comme une corde de violon ou une touche de clavecin frémit et rend un son, les cordes du cerveau, [34]frappées par les rayons sonores, ont été excitées à rendre ou à redire les mots qui les touchaient. Mais comme telle est la construction de ce viscère, que dès qu’une fois les yeux bien formés pour l’optique ont reçu la peinture des objets, le cerveau ne peut pas ne pas voir leurs images et leurs différences: de même, lorsque les signes de ces différences ont été marqués, ou gravés dans le cerveau, l’âme en a nécessairement examiné les rapports; examen qui lui était impossible sans la découverte des signes, ou l’invention des langues. Dans ces temps, où l’univers était presque muet, l’âme était à l’égard de tous les objets, comme un homme qui, sans avoir aucune idée des proportions, regarderait un tableau, ou une pièce de sculpture: il n’y pourrait rien distinguer; ou comme un petit enfant (car alors l’âme était dans son enfance) qui, tenant dans sa main un certain nombre de petits brins de paille ou de bois, les voit en général d’une vue vague et superficielle, sans pouvoir les compter ni les distinguer. Mais qu’on mette une espèce de pavillon, ou d’étendard, à cette pièce de bois, par exemple, qu’on appelle mât, qu’on en mette un autre à un autre pareil corps; que le premier venu se nombre par le signe 1 et le second par le signe ou chiffre 2; alors cet enfant pourra les compter, et ainsi de suite il apprendra toute l’arithmétique. Dès qu’une figure lui paraîtra égale à une autre par son signe numératif, il conclûra sans peine que ce sont deux corps différents; que 1 et 1 font deux, que 2 et 2 font 4,5 etc.

Like a violin string or a harpsichord key that vibrates and produces a sound, the strings of the brain, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]struck by sound waves, have been activated to express or repeat the words that touch them. But because of the construction of this organ, once the well-formed eyes for optics have received the image of objects, the brain cannot help but see their images and differences: similarly, when the signs of these differences have been marked or engraved in the brain, the soul necessarily examines their relationships; an examination that would be impossible without the discovery of signs or the invention of languages. In those times when the universe was nearly silent, the soul related to all objects like a person who, having no sense of proportions, would look at a painting or a sculpture: they wouldn’t be able to distinguish anything; or like a small child (for then the soul was in its infancy) who, holding a handful of small pieces of straw or wood, sees them generally in a vague and superficial way, unable to count or differentiate them. But if a type of flag or standard is attached to one of these pieces of wood, for example, called a mast, and another similar object is marked as well; if the first one is counted by the sign 1 and the second by the sign or number 2; then this child will be able to count them, and thus he will learn all of arithmetic. As soon as a figure appears equal to another by its numerical sign, he will easily conclude that these are two different objects; that 1 and 1 make 2, that 2 and 2 make 4, 5 etc.

As a violin string or a harpsichord key vibrates and gives forth sound, so the cerebral fibres, struck by waves of sound, are stimulated to render or repeat the words that strike them. And as the structure of the brain is such that when eyes well formed for seeing, have once perceived the image of objects, the brain can not help seeing their images and their differences, so when the signs of these differences have been traced or imprinted in the brain, the soul necessarily examines their relations—an examination that would have been impossible without the discovery of signs or the invention of language. At the time when the universe was almost dumb, the soul’s attitude toward all objects was that of a man without any idea of proportion toward a picture or a piece of sculpture, [106]in which he could distinguish nothing; or the soul was like a little child (for the soul was then in its infancy) who, holding in his hand small bits of straw or wood, sees them in a vague and superficial way without being able to count or distinguish them. But let some one attach a kind of banner, or standard, to this bit of wood (which perhaps is called a mast), and another banner to another similar object; let the first be known by the symbol 1, and the second by the symbol or number 2, then the child will be able to count the objects, and in this way he will learn all of arithmetic. As soon as one figure seems equal to another in its numerical sign, he will decide without difficulty that they are two different bodies, that 1 + 1 make 2, and 2 + 2 make 4,5 etc.

As a violin string or a harpsichord key vibrates and produces sound, the nerve fibers in the brain, when hit by sound waves, are activated to express or repeat the words that affect them. Just as the brain is structured so that when well-formed eyes perceive images of objects, it can't help but see their images and differences, when the signs of these differences are traced or stored in the brain, the soul necessarily analyzes their connections—an analysis that would be impossible without the invention of signs or language. When the universe was nearly silent, the soul's relationship with all objects was like that of a person with no sense of proportion looking at a painting or sculpture, unable to distinguish anything; or the soul resembled a small child (since the soul was then in its early stages) who, holding small pieces of straw or wood, sees them in a vague and superficial way without the ability to count or differentiate them. But if someone attaches a kind of banner or standard to a piece of wood (which might be called a mast), and another banner to another similar object; if the first is identified by the symbol 1, and the second by the symbol or number 2, then the child will be able to count the objects, thus learning all of arithmetic. As soon as one number appears equal to another in its numerical representation, the child will easily determine that they are two distinct items, that 1 + 1 equals 2, and 2 + 2 equals 4, 5 etc.

C’est cette similitude réelle, ou apparente, des [35]figures, qui est la base fondamentale de toutes les vérités et de toutes nos connaissances, parmi lesquelles il est évident que celles dont les signes sont moins simples et moins sensibles sont plus difficiles à apprendre que les autres, en ce qu’elles demandent plus de génie pour embrasser et combiner cette immense quantité de mots par lesquels les sciences dont je parle expriment les vérités de leur ressort: tandis que les sciences qui s’annoncent par des chiffres, ou autres petits signes, s’apprennent facilement; et c’est sans doute cette facilité qui a fait la fortune des calculs algébriques, plus encore que leur évidence.

It's the real or apparent similarity of the [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] figures that forms the fundamental basis of all truths and all our knowledge. Among these, it's clear that those with less simple and less intuitive signs are harder to learn than the others, as they require more genius to grasp and combine the immense amount of words through which the sciences I'm talking about express their truths. Meanwhile, the sciences that are presented with numbers or other small signs are easier to learn; and it's undoubtedly this ease that has contributed to the success of algebraic calculations, even more than their clarity.

This real or apparent likeness of figures is the fundamental basis of all truths and of all we know. Among these sciences, evidently those whose signs are less simple and less sensible are harder to understand than the others, because more talent is required to comprehend and combine the immense number of words by which such sciences express the truths in their province. On the other hand, the sciences that are expressed by numbers or by other small signs, are easily learned; and without doubt this facility rather than its demonstrability is what has made the fortune of algebra.

This real or seeming similarity of figures is the foundation of all truths and everything we know. Among these fields of study, it's clear that those with less straightforward and less apparent signs are more difficult to grasp than the others, because they require more skill to understand and connect the vast number of terms used to convey the truths in their area. Conversely, the subjects expressed through numbers or other simple symbols are easier to learn; and undoubtedly, this ease rather than its demonstrability is what has contributed to the success of algebra.

Tout ce savoir dont le vent enfle le ballon du cerveau de nos pédants orgueilleux, n’est donc qu’un vaste amas de mots et de figures, qui forment dans la tête toutes les traces par lesquelles nous distinguons et nous nous rappellons les objets. Toutes nos idées se réveillent, comme un jardinier qui connaît les plantes se souvient de toutes leurs phases à leur aspect. Ces mots et ces figures qui sont désignés par eux, sont tellements liés ensemble dans le cerveau, qu’il est assez rare qu’on imagine une chose sans le nom ou le signe qui lui est attaché.

All this knowledge that the wind inflates in the balloons of our arrogant pedants is just a vast heap of words and figures, which create in the mind all the traces by which we distinguish and remember things. All our ideas come to life, like a gardener who knows the plants remembers all their stages by their appearance. These words and figures that are designated by them are so interconnected in the brain that it’s quite rare to imagine something without the name or sign attached to it.

All this knowledge, with which vanity fills the balloon-like brains of our proud pedants, is therefore but a huge mass of words and figures, which form in the brain all the marks by which we distinguish [107]and recall objects. All our ideas are awakened after the fashion in which the gardener who knows plants recalls all stages of their growth at sight of them. These words and the objects designated by them are so connected in the brain that it is comparatively rare to imagine a thing without the name or sign that is attached to it.

All this knowledge, which vanity fills the balloon-like heads of our arrogant know-it-alls, is just a huge collection of words and numbers that create in the mind all the marks we use to distinguish [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] and remember things. All our ideas are triggered in the same way a gardener who knows plants remembers all their growth stages at the sight of them. These words and the things they refer to are so linked in the brain that it’s pretty uncommon to think of something without the name or label that goes with it.

Je me sers toujours du mot imaginer, parceque je crois que tout s’imagine, et que toutes les parties de l’âme peuvent être justement réduites à la seule imagination, qui les forme toutes; et qu’ainsi le jugement, le raisonnement, la mémoire ne sont que des parties de l’âme nullement absolues, mais de véritables modifications de cette espèce de toile médullaire, sur laquelle les objets peints dans l’œil sont renvoyés, comme d’une lanterne magique. [36]

I always use the word imagine because I believe that everything can be imagined, and that all parts of the soul can essentially be reduced to just imagination, which shapes them all; thus, judgment, reasoning, and memory are merely parts of the soul that aren’t absolute but are real modifications of this kind of medullary canvas, on which the images seen by the eye are projected, like from a magic lantern. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

I always use the word “imagine,” because I think that everything is the work of imagination, and that all the faculties of the soul can be correctly reduced to pure imagination in which they all consist.30 Thus judgment, reason, and memory are not absolute parts of the soul, but merely modifications of this kind of medullary screen upon which images of the objects painted in the eye are projected as by a magic lantern.

I always use the word “imagine” because I think everything comes from imagination, and that all the aspects of the soul can be summed up as pure imagination, which is what they consist of.30 So, judgment, reason, and memory aren’t separate parts of the soul, but just different ways that this kind of core screen reflects the images of objects seen by the eye, like a magic lantern.

Mais si tel est ce merveilleux et incompréhensible résultat de l’organisation du cerveau; si tout se conçoit par l’imagination, si tout s’explique par elle; pourquoi diviser le principe sensitif qui pense dans l’homme? N’est-ce pas une contradiction manifeste dans les partisans de la simplicité de l’esprit? Car une chose qu’on divise ne peut plus être, sans absurdité, regardée comme indivisible. Voilà où conduit l’abus des langues, et l’usage de ces grands mots, spiritualité, immatérialité, etc., placés à tout hasard, sans être entendus, même par des gens d’esprit.

But if this is the wonderful and incomprehensible result of the brain's organization; if everything is understood through imagination, if everything can be explained by it; why separate the thinking sensitive principle in humans? Isn't this a clear contradiction for those who support the simplicity of the mind? Because something that is divided can no longer be considered indivisible without being absurd. This is where the misuse of language leads us, and the use of grand words like spirituality, immateriality, etc., thrown around randomly, often without being understood, even by intelligent people.

But if such is the marvelous and incomprehensible result of the structure of the brain, if everything is perceived and explained by imagination, why should we divide the sensitive principle which thinks in man? Is not this a clear inconsistency in the partisans of the simplicity of the mind? For a thing that is divided can no longer without absurdity be regarded as indivisible. See to what one is brought by the abuse of language and by those fine words (spirituality, immateriality, etc.) used haphazard and not understood even by the most brilliant.31

But if this is the amazing and beyond comprehension result of the brain's structure, if everything is perceived and explained by imagination, why should we split the sensitive principle that thinks in humans? Isn’t it an obvious inconsistency for those who believe in the simplicity of the mind? Something that is divided can’t logically be considered indivisible. Look where the misuse of language leads us, along with those lofty terms (spirituality, immateriality, etc.) that are thrown around without being understood, even by the brightest minds.31

Rien de plus facile que de prouver un système, fondé comme celui-ci sur le sentiment intime et l’expérience propre de chaque individu. L’imagination, ou cette partie fantastique du cerveau, dont la nature nous est aussi inconnue que sa manière d’agir, est-elle naturellement petite, ou faible? elle aura à peine la force de comparer l’analogie, ou la ressemblance de ses idées; elle ne pourra voir que ce qui sera vis-à-vis d’elle, ou ce qui l’affectera le plus vivement; et encore de quelle manière! Mais toujours est-il vrai que l’imagination seule aperçoit; que c’est elle qui se représente tous les objets, avec les mots et les figures qui les caractérisent; et qu’ainsi c’est elle encore une fois qui est l’âme, puisqu’elle en fait tous les rôles. Par elle, par son pinceau flatteur, le froid squelette de la raison prend des chairs vives et vermeilles; par elle les sciences fleurissent, les arts s’embellissent, les bois parlent, les échos soupirent, les rochers pleurent, le marbre respire, tout prend vie parmi les corps inanimés. C’est elle encore qui ajoute à la tendresse d’un cœur amoureux le piquant attrait de la volupté; elle la fait germer [37]dans le cabinet du philosophe, et du pédant poudreux; elle forme enfin les savants comme les orateurs et les poëtes. Sottement décriée par les uns, vainement distinguée par les autres, qui tous l’ont mal connue, elle ne marche pas seulement à la suite des Grâces et des beaux-art, elle ne peint pas seulement la nature, elle peut aussi la mesurer. Elle raisonne, juge, pénètre, compare, approfondit. Pourrait-elle si bien sentir les beautées des tableaux qui lui sont tracés, sans en découvrir les rapports? Non; comme elle ne peut se replier sur les plaisirs des sens, sans en goûter toute la perfection ou la volupté, elle ne peut réfléchir sur ce qu’elle a mécaniquement conçu, sans être alors le jugement même.

Nothing is easier than proving a system based like this on the deep feelings and personal experiences of each individual. Is the imagination, or that fanciful part of the brain, whose nature we know as little as how it works, naturally small or weak? It hardly has the strength to compare the analogy or resemblance of its ideas; it can only see what is directly in front of it or what affects it most intensely; and even then, in what way! But it is true that only the imagination perceives; it is what represents all objects, with the words and figures that characterize them; and thus, it is once again the soul, since it plays all its roles. Through it, with its flattering brush, the cold skeleton of reason takes on living, rosy flesh; through it, the sciences blossom, the arts are beautified, the woods speak, the echoes sigh, the rocks weep, the marble breathes, everything comes to life among inanimate bodies. It is also what adds to the tenderness of a loving heart the exciting allure of pleasure; it makes it germinate in the philosopher’s study and in the dusty pedant’s room; it ultimately shapes scholars just as it does orators and poets. Foolishly discredited by some, vainly distinguished by others, who have all misunderstood it, it does not only follow the Graces and the fine arts; it doesn’t just paint nature, it can also measure it. It reasons, judges, penetrates, compares, delves deeper. Could it feel the beauty of the paintings drawn for it so well without discovering their connections? No; just as it cannot withdraw into the pleasures of the senses without tasting all their perfection or pleasure, it cannot reflect on what it has mechanically conceived without being, at that moment, the very judgment itself.

Nothing is easier than to prove a system based, as this one is, on the intimate feeling and personal experience of each individual. If the imagination, or, let us say, that fantastic part of the brain whose nature is as unknown to us as its way of acting, be naturally small or weak, it will hardly be able to [108]compare the analogy or the resemblance of its ideas, it will be able to see only what is face to face with it, or what affects it very strongly; and how will it see all this! Yet it is always imagination which apperceives, and imagination which represents to itself all objects along with their names and symbols; and thus, once again, imagination is the soul, since it plays all the rôles of the soul. By the imagination, by its flattering brush, the cold skeleton of reason takes on living and ruddy flesh, by the imagination the sciences flourish, the arts are adorned, the wood speaks, the echoes sigh, the rocks weep, marble breathes, and all inanimate objects gain life. It is imagination again which adds the piquant charm of voluptuousness to the tenderness of an amorous heart; which makes tenderness bud in the study of the philosopher and of the dusty pedant, which, in a word, creates scholars as well as orators and poets. Foolishly decried by some, vainly praised by others, and misunderstood by all; it follows not only in the train of the graces and of the fine arts, it not only describes, but can also measure nature. It reasons, judges, analyzes, compares, and investigates. Could it feel so keenly the beauties of the pictures drawn for it, unless it discovered their relations? No, just as it can not turn its thoughts on the pleasures of the senses, without enjoying their perfection or their voluptuousness, it can not reflect on what it has mechanically conceived, without thus being judgment itself.

Nothing is easier than to prove a system based, as this one is, on the deep feelings and personal experiences of each individual. If the imagination, or let’s say that fantastic part of the brain whose nature is as mysterious to us as its way of acting, is naturally small or weak, it will hardly be able to [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]compare the analogy or resemblance of its ideas; it will only see what is directly in front of it or what impacts it strongly. But how does it see all this? Yet it is always imagination that perceives and imagines all objects along with their names and symbols; thus, once again, imagination is the soul since it plays all the roles of the soul. Through imagination, with its flattering touch, the cold skeleton of reason gains living and vibrant flesh; through imagination, the sciences thrive, the arts are beautified, wood speaks, echoes sigh, rocks weep, marble breathes, and all inanimate objects come to life. It is imagination again that adds the delightful charm of sensuality to the tenderness of a loving heart; it makes tenderness blossom in the thoughts of philosophers and dusty pedants, which, in short, creates scholars as well as orators and poets. Foolishly criticized by some, vainly praised by others, and misunderstood by all; it not only follows the path of grace and fine arts but also describes and can measure nature. It reasons, judges, analyzes, compares, and investigates. Could it feel so deeply the beauty of the pictures presented to it unless it discovers their connections? No, just as it cannot focus on the pleasures of the senses without appreciating their perfection or their sensuality, it cannot reflect on what it has mechanically conceived without thus being judgment itself.

Plus on exerce l’imagination, ou le plus maigre génie, plus il prend, pour ainsi dire, d’embonpoint; plus il s’agrandit, devient nerveux, robuste, vaste et capable de penser. La meilleure organisation a besoin de cet exercice.

Plus on exerce l’imagination, ou le plus maigre génie, plus il prend, pour ainsi dire, d’embonpoint; plus il s’agrandit, devient nerveux, robuste, vaste et capable de penser. La meilleure organisation a besoin de cet exercice.

The more the imagination or the poorest talent is exercised, the more it gains in embonpoint, so to speak, and the larger it grows. It becomes sensitive, [109]robust, broad, and capable of thinking. The best of organisms has need of this exercise.

The more you use your imagination or the least skilled talent, the more it develops, so to speak, and the bigger it gets. It becomes sensitive, strong, broad, and able to think. Even the best of beings needs this kind of exercise. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

L’organisation est le premier mérite de l’homme; c’est en vain que tous les auteurs de morale ne mettent point au rang des qualités estimables celles qu’on tient de la nature, mais seulement les talents qui s’acquièrent à force de réflexions et d’industrie: car d’où nous vient, je vous prie, l’habileté, la science et la vertu, si ce n’est d’une disposition qui nous rend propres à devenir habiles, savants et vertueux? Et d’où nous vient encore cette disposition, si ce n’est de la nature? Nous n’avons de qualités estimables que par elle; nous lui devons tout ce que nous sommes. Pourquoi donc n’estimerais-je pas autant ceux qui ont des qualités naturelles, que ceux qui brillent par des vertus acquises, et comme d’emprunt? Quel que soit le mérite, de quelque endroit [38]qu’il naisse, il est digne d’estime; il ne s’agit que de savoir le mesurer. L’esprit, la beauté, les richesses, la noblesse, quoiqu’enfants du hasard, ont tous leur prix, comme l’adresse, le savoir, la vertu, etc. Ceux que la nature a comblés de ses dons les plus précieux, doivent plaindre ceux à qui ils ont été refusés; mais ils peuvent sentir leur supériorité sans orgueil, et en connaisseurs. Une belle femme serait aussi ridicule de se trouver laide, qu’un homme d’esprit de se croire un sot. Une modestie outrée (défaut rare à la vérité) est une sorte d’ingratitude envers la nature. Une honnête fierté, au contraire, est la marque d’une âme belle et grande, que décèlent des traits mâles moulés comme par le sentiment.

L'organisation est le premier atout de l'homme. C'est en vain que tous les auteurs de morale ne reconnaissent pas parmi les qualités précieuses celles qui viennent de la nature, mais seulement les talents qui s'acquièrent par la réflexion et le travail. Car d'où viennent, je vous le demande, l'habileté, la science et la vertu, sinon d'une disposition qui nous rend aptes à devenir habiles, savants et vertueux ? Et d'où vient aussi cette disposition, sinon de la nature ? Nous n'avons de qualités admirables que grâce à elle ; nous lui devons tout ce que nous sommes. Alors pourquoi ne valoriserais-je pas autant ceux qui ont des qualités naturelles que ceux qui brillent par des vertus acquises, et comme empruntées ? Quel que soit le mérite, peu importe d'où il vient, il mérite d'être apprécié ; il s'agit juste de savoir comment le mesurer. L'esprit, la beauté, les richesses, la noblesse, bien qu'issues du hasard, ont tous leur prix, tout comme l'habileté, le savoir, la vertu, etc. Ceux que la nature a comblés de ses dons les plus précieux devraient plaindre ceux à qui ils ont été refusés ; mais ils peuvent ressentir leur supériorité sans orgueil, et en connaisseurs. Une belle femme serait aussi ridicule de se trouver laide qu'un homme d'esprit de se croire sot. Une modestie excessive (un défaut rare, il est vrai) est une sorte d'ingratitude envers la nature. En revanche, une fierté honnête est le signe d'une âme belle et grande, révélée par des traits masculins façonnés comme par le sentiment.

Man’s preeminent advantage is his organism.32 In vain all writers of books on morals fail to regard as praiseworthy those qualities that come by nature, esteeming only the talents gained by dint of reflection and industry. For whence come, I ask, skill, learning, and virtue, if not from a disposition that makes us fit to become skilful, wise and virtuous? And whence again, comes this disposition, if not from nature? Only through nature do we have any good qualities; to her we owe all that we are. Why then should I not esteem men with good natural qualities as much as men who shine by acquired and as it were borrowed virtues? Whatever the virtue may be, from whatever source it may come, it is worthy of esteem; the only question is, how to estimate it. Mind, beauty, wealth, nobility, although the children of chance, all have their own value, as skill, learning and virtue have theirs. Those upon whom nature has heaped her most costly gifts should pity those to whom these gifts have been refused; but, in their character of experts, they may feel their superiority without pride. A beautiful woman would be as foolish to think herself ugly, as an intelligent man to think himself a fool. An exaggerated modesty (a rare fault, to be sure) is a kind of ingratitude towards nature. An honest pride, on the contrary, is the mark of a strong and beautiful soul, revealed by manly features moulded by feeling.

Man's greatest advantage is his biology.32 It's pointless for all the moral writers to ignore the natural qualities we possess and only value the skills gained through thought and hard work. Because I ask, where do skill, knowledge, and virtue come from, if not from a natural tendency that allows us to become skilled, wise, and virtuous? And where does this tendency come from, if not from nature? We owe all our good qualities to nature; everything we are, we owe to her. So why shouldn't I value people with good natural traits just as much as those who excel through learned or borrowed virtues? Whatever the virtue, regardless of its origin, it deserves respect; the only question is how to evaluate it. Intelligence, beauty, wealth, and nobility, even if they come from chance, all hold their own value, just like skill, knowledge, and virtue. Those whom nature has blessed with her finest gifts should feel compassion for those who lack these gifts; yet, as experts, they can acknowledge their superiority without arrogance. A beautiful woman would be just as foolish to think of herself as ugly as an intelligent man would be to think of himself as a fool. Excessive modesty (which is indeed a rare flaw) can be seen as a form of ingratitude toward nature. In contrast, genuine pride reflects a strong and beautiful soul, expressed through manly features shaped by deep emotion.

Si l’organisation est un mérite, et le premier mérite, et la source de tous les autres, l’instruction est le second. Le cerveau le mieux construit, sans elle, le serait en pure perte; comme sans l’usage du monde, l’homme le mieux fait ne serait qu’un paysan grossier. Mais aussi quel serait le fruit de la plus excellente école, sans une matrice parfaitement ouverte à l’entrée ou à la conception des idées? Il est aussi impossible de donner une seule idée à un homme privé de tous les sens, que de faire un enfant à une femme à laquelle la nature aurait poussé la distraction jusqu’à oublier de faire une vulve, comme je l’ai vu dans une, qui n’avait ni fente, ni vagin, ni matrice, et qui pour cette raison fut démariée après dix ans de mariage.

Si l'organisation est un atout, et le premier atout, et la source de tous les autres, l'instruction est le deuxième. Un cerveau bien développé, sans elle, serait totalement inutilisé; de même, sans l'expérience du monde, l'homme le mieux fait ne serait qu'un paysan sans finesse. Mais quel serait le bénéfice de la meilleure école, sans un environnement parfaitement propice à l'accueil ou à la compréhension des idées? Il est aussi impossible de transmettre une idée à une personne privée de tous les sens que de faire un enfant à une femme à qui la nature aurait laissé l'oubli de créer une vulve, comme j'ai vu chez une femme qui n'avait ni fente, ni vagin, ni utérus, et qui, pour cette raison, a été divorcée après dix ans de mariage.

If one’s organism is an advantage, and the preeminent advantage, and the source of all others, education is the second. The best made brain would [110]be a total loss without it, just as the best constituted man would be but a common peasant, without knowledge of the ways of the world. But, on the other hand, what would be the use of the most excellent school, without a matrix perfectly open to the entrance and conception of ideas? It is ... impossible to impart a single idea to a man deprived of all his senses....

If someone's body is an advantage, the biggest advantage, and the source of all others, education is the second. The best brain would [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]be completely useless without it, just like the best person would be just an ordinary peasant without understanding how the world works. But, on the other hand, what’s the point of having the best school if there isn't a perfect environment open to accepting and understanding ideas? It's ... impossible to teach even one idea to someone who has lost all their senses....

Mais si le cerveau est à la fois bien organisé et bien instruit, c’est une terre féconde parfaitement ensemencée, qui produit le centuple de ce qu’elle a reçu: ou (pour quitter le style figuré souvent nécessaire, [39]pour mieux exprimer ce qu’on sent et donner des grâces à la Vérité même), l’imagination élevée par l’art à la belle et rare dignité de génie, saisit exactement tous les rapports des idées qu’elle a conçues, embrasse avec facilité une foule étonnante d’objets, pour en tirer enfin une longue chaîne de conséquences, lesquelles ne sont encore que de nouveaux rapports, enfantés par la comparaison des premiers, auxquels l’âme trouve une parfaite ressemblance. Telle est, selon moi, la génération de l’esprit. Je dis trouve, comme j’ai donné ci-devant l’épithète d’apparente à la similitude des objets: non que je pense que nos sens soient toujours trompeurs, comme l’a prétendu le Père Malebranche, ou que nos yeux naturellement un peu ivres ne voient pas les objets tels qu’ils sont en eux mêmes, quoique les microscopes nous le prouvent tous les jours, mais pour n’avoir aucune dispute avec les Pyrrhoniens, parmi lesquels Bayle s’est distingué.

But if the brain is both well-organized and well-informed, it’s a fertile land perfectly sown, producing a hundredfold of what it has received: or (to drop the often necessary figurative style, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]to better express what one feels and pay homage to Truth itself), the imagination, elevated by art to the beautiful and rare dignity of genius, precisely grasps all the connections of the ideas it has conceived, easily encompasses an astonishing array of subjects, and ultimately draws a long chain of consequences, which are just new connections birthed from comparing the originals, to which the soul finds a perfect resemblance. Such is, in my opinion, the generation of the spirit. I say finds, as I previously referred to the similarity of objects as apparent: not because I believe our senses are always deceiving, as Father Malebranche claimed, or that our eyes, slightly tipsy by nature, do not see objects as they are in themselves, although microscopes prove this daily, but to avoid any dispute with the Pyrrhonians, among whom Bayle has stood out.

But if the brain is at the same time well organized and well educated, it is a fertile soil, well sown, that brings forth a hundredfold what it has received: or (to leave the figures of speech often needed to express what one means, and to add grace to truth itself) the imagination, raised by art to the rare and beautiful dignity of genius, apprehends exactly all the relations of the ideas it has conceived, and takes in easily an astounding number of objects, in order to deduce from them a long chain of consequences, which are again but new relations, produced by a comparison with the first, to which the soul finds a perfect resemblance. Such is, I think, the generation of intelligence.33 I say “finds” as I before gave the epithet “apparent” to the likeness of objects, not because I think that our senses are always deceivers, as Father Malebranche has claimed, or that our eyes, naturally a little unsteady, fail to see objects as they are in themselves, (though microscopes prove this to us every day) but in order to avoid any dispute with the Pyrrhonians,34 among whom Bayle35 is well known.

But if the brain is both well organized and well educated, it acts like fertile soil that's well sown, producing a hundredfold of what it has absorbed. The imagination, elevated by art to the unique and beautiful level of genius, understands all the connections between the ideas it has conceived and easily takes in an astonishing number of objects to draw out a long chain of consequences. These are just new relationships formed by comparing them with the original ones, to which the soul recognizes a perfect resemblance. This, I believe, is how intelligence is generated.33 I use the word "finds" because I previously described the likeness of objects as "apparent," not because I believe our senses always deceive us, as Father Malebranche has suggested, or that our eyes, which are naturally a bit unreliable, fail to see things as they truly are (even though microscopes show us this daily), but to avoid any argument with the Pyrrhonians,34 among whom Bayle35 is well known.

Je dis de la vérité en général ce que Mr. de Fontenelle dit de certaines en particulier, qu’il faut la sacrifier aux agréments de la société. Il est de la douceur de mon caractère d’obvier à toute dispute, lorsqu’il ne s’agit pas d’aiguiser la conversation. Les Cartésiens viendraient ici vainement à la charge avec leur idées innées; je ne me donnerais certainement pas le quart de la peine qu’a prise Mr. Locke pour attaquer de telles chimères. Quelle utilité, en effet, de faire un gros livre, pour prouver une doctrine qui était érigée en axiome il y a trois mille ans?

I generally agree with what Mr. de Fontenelle says about certain truths: they should be sacrificed for the pleasures of society. It’s in my nature to avoid any argument when it doesn’t enhance the conversation. The Cartesians would come here in vain with their innate ideas; I certainly wouldn’t put in even a fraction of the effort that Mr. Locke did to challenge such fantasies. After all, what’s the point of writing a huge book to prove a doctrine that was established as an axiom three thousand years ago?

I say of truth in general what M. de Fontenelle says of certain truths in particular, that we must sacrifice it in order to remain on good terms with society. And it accords with the gentleness of my [111]character, to avoid all disputes unless to whet conversation. The Cartesians would here in vain make an onset upon me with their innate ideas. I certainly would not give myself a quarter of the trouble that M. Locke took, to attack such chimeras. In truth, what is the use of writing a ponderous volume to prove a doctrine which became an axiom three thousand years ago?

I agree with what M. de Fontenelle says about certain truths: sometimes we have to let go of the truth to keep good relationships in society. It fits my gentle nature to steer clear of arguments unless they spark a conversation. The Cartesians would struggle to challenge me with their claims of innate ideas. I wouldn't put in a fraction of the effort that M. Locke did to argue against such illusions. Honestly, what’s the point of writing a heavy book to prove a belief that became a basic truth three thousand years ago?

Suivant les principes que nous avons posés, et que nous croyons vrais, celui qui a le plus d’imagination [40]doit être regardé comme ayant le plus d’esprit, ou de génie, car tous ces mots sont synonymes; et encore une fois c’est par un abus honteux qu’on croit dire des choses différentes, lorsqu’on ne dit que différents mots ou différents sons, auxquels on n’a attaché aucune idée ou distinction réelle.

Following the principles we've established and believe to be true, the person with the most imagination [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] should be seen as the most intelligent or genius, since all these words are synonyms; and again, it’s a shameful misuse of language to think we’re saying different things when we’re just using different words or sounds that carry no real meaning or distinction.

According to the principles which we have laid down, and which we consider true; he who has the most imagination should be regarded as having the most intelligence or genius, for all these words are synonymous; and again, only by a shameful abuse [of terms] do we think that we are saying different things, when we are merely using different words, different sounds, to which no idea or real distinction is attached.

Based on the principles we've established and believe to be true, the person with the most imagination should be seen as the most intelligent or gifted, since all these terms are interchangeable. Furthermore, it's only through a ridiculous misuse of language that we think we're expressing different concepts when we're really just using different words or sounds that carry no real meaning or distinction.

La plus belle, la plus grande, ou la plus forte imagination, est donc la plus propre aux sciences, comme aux arts. Je ne décide point s’il faut plus d’esprit pour exceller dans l’art des Aristotes, ou des Descartes, que dans celui des Euripides ou des Sophocles; et si la nature s’est mise en plus grands frais pour faire Newton que pour former Corneille (ce dont je doute fort), mais il est certain que c’est la seule imagination diversement appliquée qui a fait leur différent triomphe et leur gloire immortelle.

The most beautiful, the greatest, or the strongest imagination is therefore the most suited to science, just like to the arts. I can’t decide whether it takes more intellect to excel in the art of Aristotle or Descartes than in that of Euripides or Sophocles; nor do I know if nature put more effort into making Newton than into forming Corneille (which I seriously doubt). However, it is certain that it is that unique imagination, applied in different ways, that has brought them their distinct triumphs and their immortal glory.

The finest, greatest, or strongest imagination is then the one most suited to the sciences as well as to the arts. I do not pretend to say whether more intellect is necessary to excel in the art of Aristotle or of Descartes than to excel in that of Euripides or of Sophocles, and whether nature has taken more trouble to make Newton than to make Corneille, though I doubt this. But it is certain that imagination alone, differently applied, has produced their diverse triumphs and their immortal glory.

The best imagination is the one that fits both science and art. I'm not claiming that it takes more intelligence to master Aristotle or Descartes than it does to master Euripides or Sophocles, nor am I sure if nature put more effort into making Newton than Corneille, although I doubt it. However, it's clear that imagination, applied in different ways, has led to their various successes and lasting fame.

Si quelqu’un passe pour avoir peu de jugement, avec beaucoup d’imagination; cela veut dire que l’imagination trop abandonnée à elle même, presque toujours comme occupée à se regarder dans le miroir de ses sensations, n’a pas assez contracté l’habitude de les examiner elles-mêmes avec attention; plus profondément pénétrée des traces, ou des images, que de leur vérité ou de leur ressemblance.

If someone seems to have little judgment but a lot of imagination, it means that the imagination, too free to roam on its own and often just focused on reflecting on its own feelings, hasn't developed the habit of examining them closely enough; it's more absorbed by impressions or images than by their truth or likeness.

If one is known as having little judgment and much imagination, this means that the imagination has been left too much alone, has, as it were, occupied most of the time in looking at itself in the mirror of its sensations, has not sufficiently formed the habit of examining the sensations themselves [112]attentively. [It means that the imagination] has been more impressed by images than by their truth or their likeness.

If someone is seen as lacking good judgment and having a lot of imagination, it means that their imagination has been too free to wander. It's like it's spent most of its time focusing on its own reflections rather than really looking closely at the actual sensations. This suggests that the imagination is more influenced by images than by the reality or accuracy of those images. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

Il est vrai que telle est la vivacité des ressorts de l’imagination, que si l’attention, cette clé ou mère des sciences, ne s’en mêle, il ne lui est guères permis que de parcourir et d’effleurer les objets.

Il est vrai que telle est la vivacité des ressorts de l’imagination, que si l’attention, cette clé ou mère des sciences, ne s’en mêle, il ne lui est guères permis que de parcourir et d’effleurer les objets.

Truly, so quick are the responses of the imagination that if attention, that key or mother of the sciences, does not do its part, imagination can do little more than run over and skim its objects.

Honestly, the imagination responds so quickly that if attention, the key or foundation of all sciences, doesn’t do its job, the imagination can only glance over and skim its subjects.

Voyez cet oiseau sur la branche, il semble toujours prêt à s’envoler; l’imagination est de même. Toujours emportée par le tourbillon du sang et des esprits, une onde fait une trace, effacée par celle qui suit; l’âme court après, souvent en vain: il faut [41]qu’elle s’attende à regretter ce qu’elle n’a pas assez vite saisi et fixé: et c’est ainsi que l’imagination, véritable image du temps, se détruit et se renouvelle sans cesse.

Look at that bird on the branch, it always seems ready to take flight; imagination is the same. Always caught up in the whirlwind of blood and thoughts, one wave leaves a mark, erased by the one that follows; the soul runs after, often in vain: it must [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]expect to regret what it didn't grasp and hold onto quickly enough: and that's how imagination, the true reflection of time, is constantly destroyed and renewed.

See that bird on the bough: it seems always ready to fly away. Imagination is like the bird, always carried onward by the turmoil of the blood and the animal spirits. One wave leaves a mark, effaced by the one that follows; the soul pursues it, often in vain: it must expect to regret the loss of that which it has not quickly enough seized and fixed. Thus, imagination, the true image of time, is being ceaselessly destroyed and renewed.

See that bird on the branch? It always looks like it's about to take off. Imagination is like that bird, constantly pushed along by the chaos of our emotions and energy. One thought leaves a trace, quickly washed away by the next; the mind chases it, often in vain: it has to be ready to regret what it couldn't grab and hold onto in time. So, imagination, the true reflection of time, is constantly being destroyed and reborn.

Tel est le chaos et la succession continuelle et rapide de nos idées; elles se chassent, comme un flot pousse l’autre; de sorte que si l’imagination n’emploie, pour ainsi dire, une partie de ses muscles pour être comme en équilibre sur les cordes du cerveau, pour se soutenir quelque temps sur un objet qui va fuir et s’empêcher de tomber sur un autre, qu’il n’est pas encore temps de contempler, jamais elle ne sera digne du beau nom de jugement. Elle exprimera vivement ce qu’elle aura senti de même; elle formera des orateurs, des musiciens, des peintres, des poètes, et jamais un seul philosophe. Au contraire si, dès l’enfance, on accoutume l’imagination à se brider elle-même, à ne point se laisser emporter à sa propre impétuosité, qui ne fait que de brillants enthousiastes, à arrêter, contenir ses idées, à les retourner dans tous les sens, pour voir toutes les faces d’un objet, alors l’imagination prompte à juger embrassera par le raisonnement la plus grande sphère d’objets, et sa vivacité, toujours de si bon augure dans les enfants, et qu’il ne s’agit que de régler par l’étude et l’exercice, ne sera plus qu’une pénétration clairvoyante, sans laquelle on fait peu de progrès dans les sciences.

Such is the chaos and the continuous, rapid succession of our thoughts; they chase each other, like one wave pushes another; so that if the imagination doesn't use, so to speak, some of its strength to balance itself on the strings of the brain, to hold itself for a while on an object that is about to flee and prevent itself from falling on another that it's not yet time to contemplate, it will never earn the beautiful name of judgment. It will express vividly what it has felt in the same way; it will produce orators, musicians, painters, poets, and never a single philosopher. On the contrary, if from childhood, one trains the imagination to restrain itself, to not let itself be carried away by its own impulsiveness, which merely creates brilliant enthusiasts, to stop and contain its ideas, to turn them around in every direction to see all sides of an object, then the imagination ready to judge will embrace through reasoning the broadest sphere of objects, and its liveliness, always so promising in children, which only needs to be regulated through study and practice, will become a penetrating insight, without which little progress is made in the sciences.

Such is the chaos and the continuous quick succession of our ideas: they drive each other away even as one wave yields to another. Therefore, if imagination does not, as it were, use one set of its muscles to maintain a kind of equilibrium with the fibres of the brain, to keep its attention for a while upon an object that is on the point of disappearing, and to prevent itself from contemplating prematurely another object—[unless the imagination does all this], it will never be worthy of the fine name of judgment. It will express vividly what it has perceived in the same fashion: it will create orators, musicians, painters, poets, but never a single philosopher. On the contrary, if the imagination be trained from childhood to bridle itself and to keep from being carried away by its own impetuosity—an impetuosity which creates only brilliant enthusiasts—and to check, to restrain, its ideas, to examine [113]them in all their aspects in order to see all sides of an object, then the imagination, ready in judgment, will comprehend the greatest possible sphere of objects, through reasoning; and its vivacity (always so good a sign in children, and only needing to be regulated by study and training) will be only a far-seeing insight without which little progress can be made in the sciences.

The chaos and constant rapid flow of our ideas push each other away, just like waves moving one after another. So, if the imagination doesn't, in a sense, use its "muscles" to balance itself with the brain's processes, keeping its focus on something that’s about to fade away and not getting distracted by another thought too soon—unless it does all this, it will never deserve the prestigious title of judgment. It will vividly express what it has noticed the same way: it will create orators, musicians, painters, poets, but never a single philosopher. On the other hand, if the imagination is trained from childhood to hold back and not get swept away by its own impulsiveness—an impulsiveness that only makes for brilliant enthusiasts—and to pause, restrain its ideas, and look at them from all angles to understand the full picture, then the imagination, ready for judgment, will grasp the widest range of concepts through reasoning; and its liveliness (which is always a good sign in children and just needs to be channeled through study and training) will become a far-reaching insight, without which little progress can be made in the sciences.

Tels sont les simples fondements sur lesquels a été bati l’édifice de la logique. La nature les avait jetés pour tout le genre humain; mais les uns en ont profité, les autres en ont abusé.

Tels sont les simples fondements sur lesquels a été bati l’édifice de la logique. La nature les avait jetés pour tout le genre humain; mais les uns en ont profité, les autres en ont abusé.

Such are the simple foundations upon which the edifice of logic has been reared. Nature has built these foundations for the whole human race, but some have used them, while others have abused them.

These are the basic principles on which the structure of logic has been built. Nature has established these foundations for all of humanity, but some people have used them wisely, while others have misused them.

Malgré toutes ces prérogatives de l’homme sur les animaux, c’est lui faire honneur que de le ranger [42]dans la même classe. Il est vrai que, jusqu’à un certain âge, il est plus animal qu’eux, parce qu’il apporte moins d’instinct en naissant.

Malgré toutes ces prérogatives de l’homme sur les animaux, c’est lui faire honneur que de le ranger [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] dans la même classe. Il est vrai que, jusqu’à un certain âge, il est plus animal qu’eux, parce qu’il apporte moins d’instinct en naissant.

Quel est l’animal qui mourrait de faim au milieu d’une rivière de lait? L’homme seul. Semblable à ce vieux enfant dont un moderne parle d’après Arnobe, il ne connait ni les aliments qui lui sont propres, ni l’eau qui peut le noyer, ni le feu qui peut le réduire en poudre. Faites briller pour la première fois la lumière d’une bougie aux yeux d’un enfant, il y portera machinalement le doigt, comme pour savoir quel est le nouveau phénomène qu’il aperçoit; c’est à ses dépens qu’il en connaîtra le danger, mais il n’y sera pas repris.

Quel est l’animal qui mourrait de faim au milieu d’une rivière de lait? L’homme seul. Comme ce vieux enfant dont un moderne parle d’après Arnobe, il ne connaît ni les aliments qui lui sont propres, ni l’eau qui peut le noyer, ni le feu qui peut le réduire en poudre. Faites briller pour la première fois la lumière d’une bougie aux yeux d’un enfant, il y portera machinalement le doigt, comme pour savoir quel est le nouveau phénomène qu’il aperçoit; c’est à ses dépens qu’il en connaîtra le danger, mais il n’y sera pas repris.

Mettez-le encore avec un animal sur le bord d’un précipice! lui seul y tombera; il se noie, où l’autre se sauve à la nage. A quatorze ou quinze ans, il entrevoit à peine les grands plaisirs qui l’attendent dans la reproduction de son espèce; déjà adolescent, il ne sait pas trop comment s’y prendre dans un jeu que la nature apprend si vite aux animaux: il se cache, comme s’il était honteux d’avoir du plaisir et d’être fait pour être heureux, tandis que les animaux se font gloire d’être cyniques. Sans éducation, ils sont sans préjugés. Mais voyons encore ce chien et cet enfant qui ont tous deux perdu leur maître dans un grand chemin: l’enfant pleure, il ne sait à quel saint se vouer; le chien, mieux servi par son odorat que l’autre par sa raison, l’aura bientôt trouvé.

Mettez-le encore avec un animal au bord d'un précipice ! Lui seul tombera ; il se noie, tandis que l'autre nage pour se sauver. À quatorze ou quinze ans, il peine à envisager les grands plaisirs qui l'attendent en se reproduisant ; déjà adolescent, il n'a pas vraiment idée de comment s'y prendre dans un jeu que la nature enseigne si rapidement aux animaux : il se cache, comme s'il avait honte de ressentir du plaisir et d'être destiné à être heureux, tandis que les animaux se vantent d'être cyniques. Sans éducation, ils n'ont pas de préjugés. Mais regardons encore ce chien et cet enfant qui ont tous deux perdu leur maître sur un grand chemin : l'enfant pleure, ne sait à quel saint se vouer ; le chien, mieux équipé par son odorat que l'autre par sa raison, l'aura bientôt retrouvé.

In spite of all these advantages of man over animals, it is doing him honor to place him in the same class. For, truly, up to a certain age, he is more of an animal than they, since at birth he has less instinct. What animal would die of hunger in the midst of a river of milk? Man alone. Like that child of olden time to whom a modern writer, refers, following Arnobius,36 he knows neither the foods suitable for him, nor the water that can drown him, nor the fire that can reduce him to ashes. Light a wax candle for the first time under a child’s eyes, and he will mechanically put his fingers in the flame as if to find out what is the new thing that he sees. It is at his own cost that he will learn of the danger, but he will not be caught again. Or, put the child with an animal on a precipice, the child alone falls off; he drowns where the animal would save itself by swimming. At fourteen or fifteen years the child knows hardly anything of the great pleasures in store for him, in the reproduction of his species; when he is a youth, he [114]does not know exactly how to behave in a game which nature teaches animals so quickly. He hides himself as if he were ashamed of taking pleasure, and of having been made to be happy, while animals frankly glory in being cynics. Without education, they are without prejudices. For one more example, let us observe a dog and a child who have lost their master on a highway: the child cries and does not know to what saint to pray, while the dog, better helped by his sense of smell than the child by his reason, soon finds his master.

Despite all these advantages of humans over animals, it's respectful to consider them in the same category. Because, really, until a certain age, humans are more animal-like than they are, since at birth they have less instinct. What animal would starve in a river of milk? Only humans. Like that ancient child a modern writer refers to, following Arnobius,36 they don't know what foods are good for them, what water can drown them, or what fire can turn them to ashes. If you light a wax candle for the first time in front of a child, they'll instinctively reach for the flame to discover what this new thing is. They’ll learn about danger the hard way, but after that, they won’t make the same mistake again. Or, if you place the child next to an animal at the edge of a cliff, only the child falls; they drown where the animal would swim to safety. At fourteen or fifteen, the child knows little about the great pleasures waiting for them in procreation; as a young adult, they [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]don’t know how to navigate a game that nature teaches animals so quickly. They hide as if ashamed to enjoy themselves or to be made for happiness, while animals openly revel in being straightforward. Without education, they lack prejudices. For another example, let’s look at a dog and a child who have lost their owner on a road: the child cries and has no idea which saint to pray to, while the dog, guided by its sense of smell better than the child's reasoning, quickly finds its owner.

La nature nous avait donc faits pour être au dessous des animaux, ou du moins pour faire par là même mieux éclater les prodiges de l’éducation, qui seule nous tire du niveau et nous élève enfin au-dessus d’eux. Mais accordera-t-on la même distinction [43]aux sourds, aux aveugles-nés, aux imbéciles, aux fous, aux hommes sauvages, ou qui ont été élevés dans les bois avec les bêtes, à ceux dont l’affection hypocondriaque a perdu l’imagination, enfin à toutes ces bêtes à figure humaine, qui ne montrent que l’instinct le plus grossier? Non, tous ces hommes de corps, et non d’esprit, ne méritent pas une classe particulière.

La nature nous a donc créés pour être en dessous des animaux, ou du moins pour faire ressortir encore plus les merveilles de l’éducation, qui seule nous tire de notre niveau et nous élève enfin au-dessus d’eux. Mais accordera-t-on la même distinction [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] aux sourds, aux aveugles de naissance, aux personnes simples d'esprit, aux fous, aux hommes sauvages, ou à ceux qui ont été élevés dans les bois avec les bêtes, à ceux dont l'affection hypocondriaque a perdu l'imagination, enfin à toutes ces personnes qui ressemblent à des bêtes humaines et ne montrent que l'instinct le plus basique? Non, tous ces hommes de corps, et non d'esprit, ne méritent pas une catégorie particulière.

Thus nature made us to be lower than animals or at least to exhibit all the more, because of that native inferiority, the wonderful efficacy of education which alone raises us from the level of the animals and lifts us above them. But shall we grant this same distinction to the deaf and to the blind, to imbeciles, madmen, or savages, or to those who have been brought up in the woods with animals; to those who have lost their imagination through melancholia, or in short to all those animals in human form who give evidence of only the rudest instinct? No, all these, men of body but not of mind, do not deserve to be classed by themselves.

Thus, nature made us to be lower than animals, or at least to show even more, because of that inherent inferiority, the amazing power of education which alone elevates us from the level of animals and lifts us above them. But should we give this same distinction to the deaf and the blind, to those with intellectual disabilities, the insane, or savages, or to those who have been raised in the woods with animals; to those who have lost their imagination due to depression, or in short to all those human-like beings who only display the most basic instincts? No, all these, individuals of body but not of mind, do not deserve to be classified separately.

Nous n’avons pas dessein de nous dissimuler les objections qu’on peut faire en faveur de la distinction primitive de l’homme et des animaux, contre notre sentiment. Il y a, dit-on, dans l’homme une loi naturelle, une connaissance du bien et du mal, qui n’a pas été gravée dans le cœur des animaux.

Nous n’avons pas l’intention de cacher les objections qu’on peut faire en faveur de la distinction originale entre l’homme et les animaux, contre notre point de vue. On dit qu’il y a chez l’homme une loi naturelle, une compréhension du bien et du mal, qui n’a pas été inscrite dans le cœur des animaux.

We do not intend to hide from ourselves the arguments that can be brought forward against our belief and in favor of a primitive distinction between men and animals. Some say that there is in man a natural law, a knowledge of good and evil, which has never been imprinted on the heart of animals.

We don’t plan to ignore the arguments against our belief that suggest a basic difference between humans and animals. Some argue that humans have a natural law, an understanding of good and evil, that has never been instilled in animals.

Mais cette objection, ou plutôt cette assertion est-elle fondée sur l’expérience, sans laquelle un philosophe peut tout rejeter? En avons-nous quelqu’une qui nous convainque que l’homme seul a été éclairé d’un rayon refusé à tous les autres animaux? S’il n’y en a point, nous ne pouvons pas plus connaître par elle ce qui se passe dans eux, et même dans les hommes, que ne pas sentir ce qui affecte l’intérieur de notre être. Nous savons que nous pensons et que nous avons des remords: un sentiment intime ne nous force que trop d’en convenir; mais pour juger des remords d’autrui, ce sentiment qui est dans nous est insuffisant: c’est pourquoi il en faut croire les autres hommes sur leur parole, ou sur les signes sensibles et extérieurs que nous avons remarqués en nous-mêmes, lorsque nous éprouvions la même conscience et les mêmes tourments.

But is this objection, or rather this assertion, based on experience, without which a philosopher can dismiss everything? Do we have any evidence that convinces us that humans alone have been illuminated by a light denied to all other animals? If not, we cannot know any more about what happens within them, and even within humans, than we can feel what affects the core of our being. We know that we think and that we have regrets: an inner feeling compels us to admit this; but to judge the regrets of others, this feeling within us is not enough: that's why we must believe other people at their word, or based on the external signs we have observed in ourselves when we felt the same conscience and the same torments.

But is this objection, or rather this assertion, based on observation? Any assertion unfounded on observation may be rejected by a philosopher. Have we ever had a single experience which convinces [115]us that man alone has been enlightened by a ray denied all other animals? If there is no such experience, we can no more know what goes on in animals’ minds or even in the minds of other men, than we can help feeling what affects the inner part of our own being. We know that we think, and feel remorse—an intimate feeling forces us to recognize this only too well; but this feeling in us is insufficient to enable us to judge the remorse of others. That is why we have to take others at their word, or judge them by the sensible and external signs we have noticed in ourselves when we experienced the same accusations of conscience and the same torments.

But is this objection, or rather this claim, based on observation? Any claim not grounded in observation can be dismissed by a philosopher. Have we ever had a single experience that convinces us that humans alone have been enlightened by a light denied to all other animals? If there’s no such experience, we cannot know what goes on in animals’ minds or even in the minds of other people any more than we can avoid feeling what affects our own inner being. We know that we think and feel remorse—an intimate sensation makes us recognize this all too well; however, this feeling within us is not enough for us to judge the remorse of others. That’s why we have to take others at their word or judge them by the observable and external signs we’ve noticed in ourselves when we faced the same guilt and the same struggles.

Mais pour décider si les animaux qui ne parlent point ont reçu la loi naturelle, il faut s’en rapporter [44]conséquemment à ces signes dont je viens de parler, supposé qu’ils existent. Les faits semblent le prouver. Le chien qui a mordu son maître qui l’agaçait, a paru s’en repentir le moment suivant; on l’a vu triste, fâché, n’osant se montrer, et s’avouer coupable par un air rampant et humilié. L’histoire nous offre un exemple célèbre d’un lion qui ne voulut pas déchirer un homme abandonné à sa fureur, parce qu’il le reconnut pour son bienfaiteur. Qu’il serait à souhaiter que l’homme même montrât toujours la même reconnaissance pour les bienfaits et le même respect pour l’humanité! On n’aurait plus à craindre les ingrats, ni ces guerres qui sont le fléau du genre humain et les vrais bourreaux de la loi naturelle.

But to decide if animals that don’t speak have received natural law, we must rely on the signs I just mentioned, assuming they exist. The facts seem to support this. The dog that bit its owner, who was annoying it, appeared to regret its actions moments later; it was seen looking sad, angry, not daring to show itself, and confessing guilt with a crawling, humbled expression. History gives us a famous example of a lion that refused to attack a man left at its mercy because it recognized him as its benefactor. How wonderful it would be if humans consistently showed the same gratitude for kindness and the same respect for humanity! We would no longer have to fear the ungrateful or the wars that are the scourge of humankind and the true executioners of natural law.

In order to decide whether animals which do not talk have received the natural law, we must, therefore, have recourse to those signs to which I have just referred, if any such exist. The facts seem to prove it. A dog that bit the master who was teasing it, seemed to repent a minute afterwards; it looked sad, ashamed, afraid to show itself, and seemed to confess its guilt by a crouching and downcast air. History offers us a famous example of a lion which would not devour a man abandoned to its fury, because it recognized him as its benefactor. How much might it be wished that man himself always showed the same gratitude for kindnesses, and the same respect for humanity! Then we should no longer fear either ungrateful wretches, or wars which are the plague of the human race and the real executioners of the natural law.

To determine whether animals that don’t speak have received natural law, we need to refer to the signs I just mentioned, if any exist. The evidence seems to support this. A dog that bit its owner for teasing it appeared to feel remorse shortly afterward; it looked sad, ashamed, and hesitant to show itself, as if confessing its guilt by crouching and looking down. History gives us a well-known example of a lion that wouldn’t eat a man left at its mercy because it recognized him as its savior. It’s to be hoped that humans would always show the same gratitude for kindness and respect for one another! If that were the case, we wouldn’t have to fear ungrateful people or wars, which are a scourge on humanity and true violators of natural law.

Mais un être à qui la nature a donné un instinct si précoce, si éclairé, qui juge, combine, raisonne et délibère, autant que s’étend et le lui permet la sphère de son activité; un être qui s’attache par les bienfaits, qui se détache par les mauvais traitements et va essayer un meilleur maître; un être d’une structure semblable à la nôtre, qui fait les mêmes opérations, qui a les mêmes passions, les mêmes douleurs, les mêmes plaisirs, plus ou moins vifs suivant l’empire de l’imagination et la délicatesse des nerfs; un tel être enfin ne montre-t-il pas clairement qu’il sent ses torts et les nôtres, qu’il connait le bien et le mal et, en un mot, a conscience de ce qu’il fait? Son âme qui marque comme la nôtre les mêmes joies, les mêmes mortifications, les mêmes déconcertements, serait-elle sans aucune répugnance à la vue de son semblable déchiré, ou après l’avoir lui-même impitoyablement mis en pièces? Cela posé, le don précieux dont il s’agit n’aurait point été [45]refusé aux animaux; car puisqu’ils nous offrent des signes évidents de leur repentir, comme de leur intelligence, qu’y a-t-il d’absurde à penser que des êtres, des machines presque aussi parfaites que nous, soient, comme nous, faites pour penser et pour sentir la nature?

But a being to whom nature has given such early, enlightened instincts, who judges, combines, reasons, and deliberates as far as their area of activity allows; a being who gets attached through kindness, who detaches from mistreatment and seeks out a better master; a being with a structure similar to ours, who performs the same actions, who has the same passions, the same pains, and the same pleasures, more or less intense depending on the power of imagination and the sensitivity of the nerves; such a being clearly shows that they feel their wrongs and ours, that they know good and evil, and, in short, are aware of what they do. Their soul, which marks the same joys, the same sufferings, the same confusions as ours, would it not feel any reluctance upon seeing their kind torn apart, or after having mercilessly torn them apart themselves? Given this, the precious gift in question would not have been [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] denied to animals; because since they show us clear signs of both their remorse and their intelligence, what is absurd about thinking that beings, machines nearly as perfect as we are, are, like us, made to think and to feel nature?

But a being to which nature has given such a precocious and enlightened instinct, which judges, combines, reasons, and deliberates as far as the [116]sphere of its activity extends and permits, a being which feels attachment because of benefits received, and which leaving a master who treats it badly goes to seek a better one, a being with a structure like ours, which performs the same acts, has the same passions, the same griefs, the same pleasures, more or less intense according to the sway of the imagination and the delicacy of the nervous organization—does not such a being show clearly that it knows its faults and ours, understands good and evil, and in a word, has consciousness of what it does? Would its soul, which feels the same joys, the same mortification and the same discomfiture which we feel, remain utterly unmoved by disgust when it saw a fellow-creature torn to bits, or when it had itself pitilessly dismembered this fellow-creature? If this be granted, it follows that the precious gift now in question would not have been denied to animals: for since they show us sure signs of repentance, as well as of intelligence, what is there absurd in thinking that beings, almost as perfect machines as ourselves, are, like us, made to understand and to feel nature?

But a being that nature has given such an advanced and insightful instinct, one that judges, combines, reasons, and deliberates as far as its sphere of activity allows, a being that feels attachment because of benefits received and leaves a master who treats it poorly to seek out a better one, a being with a structure like ours that performs the same actions, has the same passions, the same sorrows, and the same pleasures—more or less intense depending on the influence of the imagination and the sensitivity of the nervous system—doesn't such a being clearly demonstrate that it recognizes its faults and ours, understands good and evil, and, in short, has awareness of its actions? Would its soul, which experiences the same joys, the same humiliation, and the same discomforts we do, remain completely indifferent when witnessing a fellow creature being torn apart or when it itself brutally dismembers that fellow creature? If this is accepted, it follows that this valuable gift we’re discussing would not have been denied to animals: since they show us clear signs of remorse as well as intelligence, what is so unreasonable about believing that beings, nearly as complex as we are, are, like us, capable of understanding and feeling nature?

Qu’on ne m’objecte point que les animaux sont pour la plupart des êtres féroces, qui ne sont pas capables de sentir les maux qu’ils font; car tous les hommes distinguent-ils mieux les vices et les vertus? Il est dans notre espèce de la férocité, comme dans la leur. Les hommes qui sont dans la barbare habitude d’enfreindre la loi naturelle, n’en sont pas si tourmentés que ceux qui la transgressent pour la première fois, et que la force de l’exemple n’a point endurcis. Il en est de même des animaux, comme des hommes. Les uns et les autres peuvent être plus ou moins féroces par tempérament, et ils le deviennent encore plus avec ceux qui le sont. Mais un animal doux, pacifique, qui vit avec d’autres animaux semblables, et d’aliments doux, sera ennemi du sang et du carnage, il rougira intérieurement de l’avoir versé; avec cette différence peut-être que, comme chez eux tout est immolé aux besoins, aux plaisirs et aux commodités de la vie, dont ils jouissent plus que nous, leurs remords ne semblent pas devoir être si vifs que les nôtres, parceque nous ne sommes pas dans la même nécessité qu’eux. La coutume émousse et peut-être étouffe les remords, comme les plaisirs.

Don’t tell me that animals are mostly fierce beings who can't feel the harm they cause; because don’t all humans better distinguish between vices and virtues? In our species, there’s a fierceness, just like in theirs. People who are brutalized by the habit of breaking natural law aren’t as tormented as those who break it for the first time, and those who haven’t been hardened by the force of example. It’s the same with animals as it is with humans. Both can be more or less fierce by nature, and they can become more so with those who are. But a gentle, peaceful animal that lives with other similar animals and feeds on gentle foods will be an enemy of bloodshed and carnage; it will feel an internal shame for having caused it. Perhaps the difference lies in the fact that, since for them everything is sacrificed to the needs, pleasures, and comforts of life, which they enjoy more than we do, their remorse doesn’t seem to be as intense as ours because we aren’t in the same necessity as they are. Custom dulls and perhaps stifles remorse, just like pleasures.

Let no one object that animals, for the most part, are savage beasts, incapable of realizing the evil that they do; for do all men discriminate better between vice and virtue? There is ferocity in our species as well as in theirs. Men who are in the barbarous habit of breaking the natural law are not tormented as much by it, as those who transgress it for the first time, and who have not been hardened by the force of habit. The same thing is true of animals as of men—both may be more or less ferocious in temperament, and both become [117]more so by living with others like themselves. But a gentle and peaceful animal which lives among other animals of the same disposition and of gentle nurture, will be an enemy of blood and carnage; it will blush internally at having shed blood. There is perhaps this difference, that since among animals everything is sacrificed to their needs, to their pleasures, to the necessities of life, which they enjoy more than we, their remorse apparently should not be as keen as ours, because we are not in the same state of necessity as they. Custom perhaps dulls and perhaps stifles remorse as well as pleasures.

Let’s not claim that animals are mostly savage creatures that can’t understand the harm they cause; do all humans really distinguish better between right and wrong? There’s brutality in our species just like there is in theirs. People who regularly break natural laws aren't as troubled by it as those who do so for the first time and haven’t been desensitized by habit. This goes for both animals and humans—each can be more or less aggressive in nature, and both can become more aggressive by being around others like them. However, a gentle and peaceful animal living among others of the same temperament will reject violence and bloodshed; it will internally struggle at the thought of killing. There might be one key difference: since animals prioritize their needs, desires, and basic survival—enjoying life more than we do—perhaps their guilt isn’t as intense as ours, because we’re not in the same desperate situation. Maybe routine dulls or even suppresses both guilt and pleasure.

Mais je veux pour un moment supposer que je me trompe, et qu’il n’est pas juste que presque tout l’univers ait tort à ce sujet, tandis que j’aurais seul raison; j’accorde que les animaux, même les plus [46]excellents, ne connaissent pas la distinction du bien et du mal moral, qu’ils n’ont aucune mémoire des attentions qu’on a eues pour eux, du bien qu’on leur a fait, aucun sentiment de leurs propres vertus; que ce lion, par exemple, dont j’ai parlé après tant d’autres, ne se souvienne pas de n’avoir pas voulu ravir la vie à cet homme qui fut livré à sa furie, dans un spectacle plus inhumain que tous les lions, les tigres et les ours; tandis que nos compatriotes se battent, Suisses contre Suisses, frères contre frères, se reconnaissent, s’enchaînent, ou se tuent sans remords, parce qu’un prince paie leurs meurtres: je suppose enfin que la loi naturelle n’ait pas été donnée aux animaux, quelles en seront les conséquences? L’homme n’est pas pétri d’un limon plus précieux; la nature n’a employé qu’une seule et même pâte, dont elle a seulement varié les levains. Si donc l’animal ne se repent pas d’avoir violé le sentiment intérieur dont je parle, ou plutôt s’il en est absolument privé, il faut nécessairement que l’homme soit dans le même cas: moyennant quoi adieu la loi naturelle et tous ces beaux traités qu’on a publiés sur elle! Tout le règne animal en serait généralement dépourvû. Mais réciproquement si l’homme ne peut se dispenser de convenir qu’il distingue toujours, lorsque la santé le laisse jouïr de lui-même, ceux qui ont de la probité, de l’humanité, de la vertu, de ceux qui ne sont ni humains, ni vertueux, ni honnêtes gens; qu’il est facile de distinguer ce qui est vice, ou vertu, par l’unique plaisir ou la propre répugnance qui en sont comme les effets naturels, il s’ensuit que les animaux formés de la même matière, à laquelle il n’a peut-être manqué qu’un degré de fermentation pour égaler les [47]hommes en tout, doivent participer aux mêmes prérogatives de l’animalité, et qu’ainsi il n’est point d’âme, ou de substance sensitive, sans remords. La réflexion suivante va fortifier celles-ci.

But I want to assume for a moment that I'm wrong, and that it’s not true that almost everyone in the universe is wrong about this while I’m the only one who is right; I admit that animals, even the most [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]excellent ones, don’t understand the difference between right and wrong, that they have no memory of the kindnesses shown to them or the good done to them, and no awareness of their own virtues; that this lion, for example, whom I've mentioned after so many others, doesn't remember choosing not to take the life of that man who was left at his mercy in an inhuman spectacle worse than all lions, tigers, and bears; while our fellow countrymen fight, Swiss against Swiss, brothers against brothers, recognize each other, chain each other, or kill without remorse, simply because a prince pays them to commit murder: I finally assume that natural law wasn’t given to animals; what would the consequences be? Man is not made from a more precious clay; nature has only used one single kind of material, varying only its leaven. So if an animal doesn’t regret breaking that inner sense I’m talking about, or if it’s completely devoid of it, then man must necessarily be in the same situation: which means farewell to natural law and all those fine treaties published about it! The entire animal kingdom would be generally deprived of it. But conversely, if man cannot help but recognize that he always distinguishes, when his health allows him to enjoy himself, those who have integrity, humanity, virtue, from those who are neither human, nor virtuous, nor honest; that it is easy to distinguish vice from virtue by the simple pleasure or aversion that are like their natural effects, it follows that animals made from the same material, which may have only lacked a degree of fermentation to be equal to [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]men in every way, must share in the same privileges of animality, and thus there is no soul, or sensitive substance, without remorse. The following reflection will reinforce these points.

But I will suppose for a moment that I am utterly mistaken in concluding that almost all the world holds a wrong opinion on this subject, while I alone am right. I will grant that animals, even the best of them, do not know the difference between moral good and evil, that they have no recollection of the trouble taken for them, of the kindness done them, no realization of their own virtues. [I will suppose], for instance, that this lion, to which I, like so many others, have referred, does not remember at all that it refused to kill the man, abandoned to its fury, in a combat more inhuman than one could find among lions, tigers and bears, put together. For our compatriots fight, Swiss against Swiss, brother against brother, recognize each other, and yet capture and kill each other without remorse, because a prince pays for the murder. I suppose in short that the natural law has not been given animals. What will be the consequences of this supposition? Man is not moulded from a costlier clay; nature has used but one dough, and has merely varied the leaven. Therefore if animals do not repent for having violated [118]this inmost feeling which I am discussing, or rather if they absolutely lack it, man must necessarily be in the same condition. Farewell then to the natural law and all the fine treatises published about it! The whole animal kingdom in general would be deprived of it. But, conversely, if man can not dispense with the belief that when health permits him to be himself, he always distinguishes the upright, humane, and virtuous, from those who are not humane, virtuous, nor honorable: that it is easy to tell vice from virtue, by the unique pleasure and the peculiar repugnance that seem to be their natural effects, it follows that animals, composed of the same matter, lacking perhaps only one degree of fermentation to make it exactly like man’s, must share the same prerogatives of animal nature, and that thus there exists no soul or sensitive substance without remorse.37 The following consideration will reinforce these observations.

But for a moment, let’s assume I’m completely wrong in thinking that almost everyone in the world has the wrong opinion on this topic, and I’m the only one who’s correct. I’ll concede that animals, even the best ones, don’t understand the difference between moral good and evil, that they don’t remember the care given to them or the kindness shown, and have no awareness of their own virtues. For example, let’s say that this lion, which I, like many others, have mentioned, doesn’t remember that it chose not to kill the man whom it could have easily attacked, in a battle that’s more brutal than anything you’d see among lions, tigers, and bears combined. Our fellow countrymen fight, Swiss against Swiss, brothers against brothers, recognizing each other yet capturing and killing one another without guilt, simply because a prince pays for the murder. In short, I assume that animals haven’t been given natural law. What would this assumption lead to? Humans aren’t made from some superior material; nature has used the same basic ingredients, just mixed them differently. So if animals don’t feel guilty for violating this deep instinct I’m discussing, or if they completely lack it, then humans must necessarily be in the same boat. Goodbye to natural law and all the grand treatises written about it! The entire animal kingdom would lack it completely. But on the flip side, if humans cannot ignore the belief that when they are well, they can always tell the good, kind, and virtuous people from those who aren’t: that it’s easy to distinguish between vice and virtue by the unique pleasure and particular disgust that seem to be their natural outcomes, then it follows that animals, made of the same substance, perhaps differing only slightly in their composition compared to humans, must share the same qualities of animal nature, and thus, there is no soul or sentient being without remorse.37 The following consideration will strengthen these observations.

On ne peut détruire la loi naturelle. L’empreinte en est si forte dans tous les animaux, que je ne doute nullement que les plus sauvages et les plus féroces n’aient quelques moments de repentir. Je crois que la fille sauvage de Châlons en Champagne aura porté la peine de son crime, s’il est vrai qu’elle ait mangé sa sœur. Je pense la même chose de tous ceux qui commettent des crimes, même involontaires, ou de tempérament: de Gaston d’Orléans qui ne pouvait s’empêcher de voler; de certaine femme qui fut sujette au même vice dans la grossesse, et dont ses enfants héritèrent; de celle qui dans le même état, mangea son mari; de cette autre qui égorgeait les enfants, salait leurs corps, et en mangeait tous les jours comme du petit salé; de cette fille de voleur anthropophage, qui la devint à 12 ans, quoiqu’ayant perdu père et mère à l’âge d’un an elle eût été élevée par d’honnêtes gens, pour ne rien dire de tant d’autres exemples dont nos observateurs sont remplis, et qui prouvent tous qu’il est mille vices et vertus héréditaires, qui passent des parents aux enfants, comme ceux de la nourrice à ceux qu’elle allaite. Je dis donc et j’accorde que ces malheureux ne sentent pas pour la plupart sur le champ l’énormité de leur action. La boulimie, par exemple, ou la faim canine, peut éteindre tout sentiment; c’est une manie d’estomac qu’on est forcé de satisfaire. Mais revenues à elles-mêmes, et comme désenivrées, quels remords pour ces femmes qui se rappellent le meurtre qu’elles ont [48]commis dans ce qu’elles avaient de plus cher! quelle punition d’un mal involontaire, auquel elles n’ont pu résister, dont elles n’ont eu aucune conscience! Cependant ce n’est point assez apparemment pour les juges. Parmi les femmes dont je parle, l’une fut rouée, et brûlée, l’autre enterrée vive. Je sens tout ce que demande l’intérêt de la société. Mais il serait sans doute à souhaiter qu’il n’y eût pour juges que d’excellents médecins. Eux seuls pourraient distinguer le criminel innocent, du coupable. Si la raison est esclave d’un sens dépravé, ou en fureur, comment peut-elle le gouverner?

On can't destroy natural law. Its imprint is so strong in all animals that I have no doubt even the wildest and fiercest have moments of regret. I believe the wild girl from Châlons en Champagne must have faced the consequences of her crime, if it's true that she ate her sister. I think the same about everyone who commits crimes, even if they’re unintentional or due to temperament: like Gaston d'Orléans, who couldn’t help but steal; or a certain woman who had the same vice during pregnancy, and from whom her children inherited it; or the one who, in the same condition, ate her husband; or another who slaughtered children, salted their bodies, and ate them daily like preserved meat; or the girl from a cannibal thief, who became one at age 12, even though she had lost her parents at a year old and was raised by decent people, not to mention countless other examples that our observers are filled with, all proving that there are countless hereditary vices and virtues passed from parents to children, just as those from a wet nurse to the infants she cares for. So, I say and agree that most of these unfortunate people don't immediately feel the enormity of their actions. Bulimia, for instance, or insatiable hunger, can dull all feeling; it's a stomach obsession they have to satisfy. But once they come back to themselves, almost sober again, what remorse for those women who recall the murder they committed of what they held most dear! What punishment for an involuntary wrong they couldn’t resist, of which they had no awareness! Yet apparently, that’s not enough for the judges. Among the women I mention, one was hanged and burned, the other buried alive. I understand what society's interest demands. But it would surely be better if only excellent doctors were judges. They alone could distinguish the innocent criminal from the guilty one. If reason is enslaved by a depraved or furious sense, how can it govern?

It is impossible to destroy the natural law. The impress of it on all animals is so strong, that I have no doubt that the wildest and most savage have some moments of repentance. I believe that that cruel maid of Chalons in Champagne must have sorrowed for her crime, if she really ate her sister. I think that the same thing is true of all those who commit crimes, even involuntary or temperamental crimes: true of Gaston of Orleans who could not help stealing; of a certain woman who was subject to the same crime when pregnant, and whose children inherited it; of the woman who, in the same condition, ate her husband; of that other woman who killed her children, salted their bodies, and ate a piece of them every day, as a little relish; of that [119]daughter of a thief and cannibal who at twelve years followed in his steps, although she had been orphaned when she was a year old, and had been brought up by honest people; to say nothing of many other examples of which the records of our observers are full, all of them proving that there are a thousand hereditary vices and virtues which are transmitted from parents to children as those of the foster mother pass to the children she nurses. Now, I believe and admit that these wretches do not for the most part feel at the time the enormity of their actions. Bulimia, or canine hunger, for example, can stifle all feeling; it is a mania of the stomach that one is compelled to satisfy, but what remorse must be in store for those women, when they come to themselves and grow sober, and remember the crimes they have committed against those they held most dear! What a punishment for an involuntary crime which they could not resist, of which they had no consciousness whatever! However, this is apparently not enough for the judges. For of these women, of whom I tell, one was cruelly beaten and burned, and another was buried alive. I realize all that is demanded by the interest of society. But doubtless it is much to be wished that excellent physicians might be the only judges. They alone could tell the innocent criminal from the guilty. If reason is the slave of a depraved or mad desire, how can it control the desire?

It is impossible to eliminate natural law. Its influence on all living beings is so profound that I’m certain the wildest and most savage creatures experience moments of regret. I believe that the cruel maid from Chalons in Champagne must have felt remorse for her crime if she really did eat her sister. I think this holds true for anyone who commits crimes, even unintentional or emotional ones: true for Gaston of Orleans, who couldn't help but steal; for a certain woman who faced the same urge while pregnant, which her children inherited; for the woman who, in a similar state, ate her husband; for the other woman who killed her children, salted their bodies, and ate a piece of them every day as a snack; for the daughter of a thief and cannibal, who followed in his footsteps at twelve years old despite being orphaned at one and raised by decent people; not to mention many other examples that our observers' records are full of, all proving that there are countless inherited vices and virtues passed from parents to children, just like the traits of a wet nurse pass to the children she cares for. Now, I acknowledge that these unfortunate individuals often don't fully grasp the severity of their actions at the moment. Conditions like bulimia, or ravenous hunger, can suppress all feeling; it's a stomach's obsession that one feels compelled to fulfill. But what a burden of remorse awaits them when they regain clarity and sober up, reminding themselves of the horrors they committed against those they loved most! What a punishment for a crime they didn’t intend to commit and were completely unaware of! However, apparently that's not enough for the judges. For the women I mentioned, one was brutally beaten and burned, while another was buried alive. I understand the demands of societal interests. But surely it would be better if skilled doctors were the only ones judging these cases. They could distinguish the innocent from the guilty. If reason is enslaved to a twisted or insane desire, how can it control that desire?

Mais si le crime porte avec soi sa propre punition plus ou moins cruelle; si la plus longue et la plus barbare habitude ne peut tout-à-fait arracher le repentir des cœurs les plus inhumains; s’ils sont déchirés par la mémoire même de leurs actions; pour quoi effrayer l’imagination des esprits faibles par un enfer, par des spectres, et des précipices de feu, moins réels encore que ceux de Pascal6? Qu’est-il besoin de recourir à des fables, comme un pape de bonne foi l’a dit lui-même, pour tourmenter les malheureux mêmes qu’on fait périr, parce qu’on ne les trouve pas assez punis par leur propre conscience, qui est leur premier bourreau? Ce n’est pas que je veuille dire que tous les criminels soient injustement [49]punis; je prétends seulement que ceux dont la volonté est dépravée, et la conscience éteinte, le sont assez par leurs remords, quand ils reviennent à eux-mêmes; remords, j’ose encore le dire, dont la nature aurait dû en ce cas, ce me semble, délivrer des malheureux entraînés par une fatale nécessité.

But if crime carries its own punishment, sometimes severe; if even the longest and harshest habits can't completely erase remorse from the most inhumane hearts; if they are tormented by the very memory of their actions; why frighten the weak-minded with hell, with ghosts, and fiery chasms, which are even less real than those of Pascal6? What is the need to turn to fables, as a well-meaning pope himself has said, to torment the unfortunate who are being condemned, because they aren’t deemed punished enough by their own conscience, which is their first executioner? It’s not that I want to say that all criminals are unjustly [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] punished; I only assert that those whose will is corrupt and whose conscience is extinguished are adequately punished by their remorse when they come to their senses; remorse, I dare say again, from which nature should have freed the unfortunate caught in a fatal necessity.

But if crime carries with it its own more or less cruel punishment, if the most continued and most barbarous habit can not entirely blot out repentance in the crudest hearts, if criminals are lacerated by the very memory of their deeds, why should we [120]frighten the imagination of weak minds, by a hell, by specters, and by precipices of fire even less real than those of Pascal?6 Why must we have recourse to fables, as an honest pope once said himself, to torment even the unhappy wretches who are executed, because we do not think that they are sufficiently punished by their own conscience, their first executioner? I do not mean to say that all criminals are unjustly punished; I only maintain that those whose will is depraved, and whose conscience is extinguished, are punished enough by their remorse when they come to themselves, a remorse, I venture to assert, from which nature should in this case have delivered unhappy souls dragged on by a fatal necessity.

But if crime comes with its own more or less harsh consequences, if even the most ingrained and brutal habits can't completely erase remorse in the toughest hearts, if criminals are tormented by the very memory of their actions, why should we [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]scare the imaginations of vulnerable minds with hell, ghosts, and fire-filled chasms even less real than those of Pascal?6 Why do we have to resort to myths, as a wise pope once said, to torment even the miserable souls who are executed, because we believe they aren’t adequately punished by their own guilty conscience, their first executioner? I'm not saying that all criminals are punished unfairly; I just argue that those whose will is corrupt and whose conscience is dead feel enough pain from their remorse when they come to their senses, a remorse, I dare say, from which nature should have rescued these unfortunate souls driven by a tragic fate.

Les criminels, les méchants, les ingrats, ceux enfin que ne sentent pas la nature, tyrans malheureux et indignes du jour, ont beau se faire un cruel plaisir de leur barbarie, il est des moments calmes et de réflexion, où la conscience vengeresse s’élève, dépose contr’eux, et les condamne à être presque sans cesse déchirés de ses propres mains. Qui tourmente les hommes, est tourmenté par lui-même; et les maux qu’il sentira seront la juste mesure de ceux qu’il aura faits.

Les criminels, les méchants, les ingrats, ceux qui ne ressentent pas la nature, tyrans malheureux et indignes du jour, peuvent prendre un cruel plaisir à leur barbarie, mais il existe des moments de calme et de réflexion, où la conscience vengeresse se lève, se retourne contre eux, et les condamne à être presque constamment déchirés par leurs propres mains. Celui qui tourmente les autres est tourmenté par lui-même ; et les souffrances qu'il endurera seront la juste mesure des maux qu'il aura causés.

Criminals, scoundrels, ingrates, those in short without natural feelings, unhappy tyrants who are unworthy of life, in vain take a cruel pleasure in their barbarity, for there are calm moments of reflection in which the avenging conscience arises, testifies against them, and condemns them to be almost ceaselessly torn to pieces at their own hands. Whoever torments men is tormented by himself; and the sufferings that he will experience will be the just measure of those that he has inflicted.

Criminals, scoundrels, ingrates—people who lack basic human feelings—unhappy tyrants who don't deserve to live, foolishly take a cruel pleasure in their brutality. Yet, there are quiet moments of reflection when their guilty conscience kicks in, condemning them and causing them to suffer endlessly at their own hands. Anyone who torments others will end up being tormented themselves, and the pain they feel will reflect the pain they have caused.

D’un autre côté, il y a tant de plaisir à faire du bien, à sentir, à reconnaître celui qu’on reçoit, tant de contentement à pratiquer la vertu, à être doux, humain, tendre, charitable, compatissant et généreux (ce seul mot renferme toutes les vertus), que je tiens pour assez puni quiconque a le malheur de n’être pas né vertueux.

D’un autre côté, il y a tellement de plaisir à faire le bien, à ressentir, à reconnaître ce qu’on reçoit, tellement de satisfaction à pratiquer la vertu, à être doux, humain, tendre, charitable, compatissant et généreux (ce seul mot englobe toutes les vertus), que je considère comme suffisamment puni quiconque a la malchance de ne pas être né vertueux.

On the other hand, there is so much pleasure in [121]doing good, in recognizing and appreciating what one receives, so much satisfaction in practising virtue, in being gentle, humane, kind, charitable, compassionate and generous (for this one word includes all the virtues), that I consider as sufficiently punished any one who is unfortunate enough not to have been born virtuous.

On the other hand, there is so much joy in [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]doing good, in recognizing and appreciating what you receive, so much satisfaction in practicing virtue, in being gentle, humane, kind, charitable, compassionate, and generous (since this one word covers all the virtues), that I think anyone unfortunate enough not to have been born virtuous is already punished enough.

Nous n’avons pas originairement été faits pour être savants; c’est peut-être par une espèce d’abus de nos facultés organiques, que nous le sommes devenus; et cela à la charge de l’Etat, qui nourrit une multitude de fainéants, que la vanité a decorés du nom de philosophes. La nature nous a tous créés uniquement pour être heureux; oui, tous, depuis le ver qui rampe, jusqu’à l’aigle qui se perd dans la nue. C’est pourquoi elle a donné à tous les animaux quelque portion de la loi naturelle, portion plus [50]ou moins exquise selon que le comportent les organes bien conditionnés de chaque animal.

Nous n'avons pas été créés à l'origine pour être érudits ; peut-être que nous le sommes devenus à cause d'un certain abus de nos capacités organiques, et cela aux dépens de l'État, qui entretient une multitude de paresseux que la vanité appelle des philosophes. La nature nous a tous faits uniquement pour être heureux ; oui, tous, depuis le ver qui rampe jusqu'à l'aigle qui se perd dans les nuages. C'est pourquoi elle a donné à tous les animaux une part de la loi naturelle, une part plus [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] ou moins raffinée selon le fonctionnement des organes de chaque animal.

We were not originally made to be learned; we have become so perhaps by a sort of abuse of our organic faculties, and at the expense of the State which nourishes a host of sluggards whom vanity has adorned with the name of philosophers. Nature has created us all solely to be happy38—yes, all of us from the crawling worm to the eagle lost in the clouds. For this cause she has given all animals some share of natural law, a share greater or less according to the needs of each animal’s organs when in normal condition.

We weren't originally meant to be educated; we've become that way, maybe due to a misuse of our natural abilities, and at the cost of the State, which supports a lot of lazy people whom vanity has called philosophers. Nature created us all just to be happy38—yes, every one of us, from the tiny worm to the eagle soaring in the clouds. For this reason, she has given all animals some amount of natural law, with that amount varying based on the needs of each animal’s organs when they’re in a normal state.

A présent, comment définirons-nous la loi naturelle? C’est un sentiment qui nous apprend ce que nous ne devons pas faire, parce que nous ne voudrions pas qu’on nous le fît. Oserais-je ajouter à cette idée commune, qu’il me semble que ce sentiment n’est qu’une espèce de crainte, ou de frayeur, aussi salutaire à l’espèce qu’a l’individu; car peut-être ne respectons-nous la bourse et la vie des autres, que pour nous conserver nos biens, notre honneur et nous-mêmes; semblables à ces Ixions du Christianisme qui n’aiment Dieu et n’embrassent tant de chimériques vertus, que parce qu’ils craignent l’enfer.

Now, how do we define natural law? It’s a feeling that teaches us what we shouldn’t do, because we wouldn’t want it to be done to us. Dare I add to this common idea, that it seems to me this feeling is just a type of fear, or dread, that is as beneficial to the species as it is to the individual; for perhaps we only respect the property and lives of others to preserve our own possessions, our honor, and ourselves; like those Ixions of Christianity who love God and embrace so many fanciful virtues, only because they fear hell.

Now how shall we define natural law? It is a feeling that teaches us what we should not do, because we would not wish it to be done to us. Should I dare add to this common idea, that this feeling seems to me but a kind of fear or dread, as salutary to the race as to the individual; for may it not be true that we respect the purse and life of others only to save our own possessions, our honor, and ourselves; like those Ixions of Christianity39 who love God and embrace so many fantastic virtues, merely because they are afraid of hell!

Now, how should we define natural law? It's a sense that tells us what we shouldn’t do because we wouldn’t want it done to us. Should I dare to add to this common understanding that this sense seems to me to be a kind of fear or dread, beneficial to both humanity and the individual? For isn’t it true that we respect the belongings and lives of others mainly to protect our own possessions, our honor, and ourselves; much like those Ixions of Christianity39 who love God and embrace all sorts of lofty virtues simply because they fear hell!

Vous voyez que la loi naturelle n’est qu’un sentiment intime, qui appartient encore à l’imagination, comme tous les autres, parmi lesquels on compte la pensée. Par conséquent elle ne suppose évidemment ni éducation, ni révélation, ni législateur, à moins qu’on ne veuille la confondre avec les lois civiles, à la manière ridicule des théologiens.

Vous voyez que la loi naturelle n’est qu’un sentiment intime, qui appartient encore à l’imagination, comme tous les autres, parmi lesquels on compte la pensée. Par conséquent elle ne suppose évidemment ni éducation, ni révélation, ni législateur, à moins qu’on ne veuille la confondre avec les lois civiles, à la manière ridicule des théologiens.

You see that natural law is but an intimate feeling that, like all other feelings (thought included), belongs also to imagination. Evidently, therefore, natural law does not presuppose education, revelation, nor legislator,—provided one does not propose [122]to confuse natural law with civil laws, in the ridiculous fashion of the theologians.

You can see that natural law is just a deep feeling that, like all other feelings (including thoughts), is also part of our imagination. So, it's clear that natural law doesn’t require education, revelation, or a lawmaker—unless one tries to mix up natural law with civil laws, in the silly way that theologians do.

Les armes du fanatisme peuvent détruire ceux qui soutiennent ces vérités; mais elles ne détruiront jamais ces vérités mêmes.

Les armes du fanatisme peuvent détruire ceux qui soutiennent ces vérités; mais elles ne détruiront jamais ces vérités mêmes.

The arms of fanaticism may destroy those who support these truths, but they will never destroy the truths themselves.

The forces of fanaticism may harm those who believe in these truths, but they will never eliminate the truths themselves.

Ce n’est pas que je révoque en doute l’existence d’un Etre suprême; il me semble au contraire que le plus grand degré de probabilité est pour elle: mais comme cette existence ne prouve pas plus la nécessité d’un culte, que toute autre, c’est une vérité théorique, qui n’est guère d’usage dans la pratique: de sorte que, comme on peut dire, d’après tant d’expériences, que la religion ne suppose pas l’exacte [51]probité, les mêmes raisons autorisent à penser que l’athéisme ne l’exclut pas.

It's not that I doubt the existence of a supreme being; on the contrary, I think the highest likelihood supports it. However, this existence doesn't necessarily require worship any more than any other belief does. It's a theoretical truth that doesn't have much practical use. Therefore, one can say, based on many experiences, that religion doesn't require exact probity, and the same reasons allow us to think that atheism doesn't exclude it either.

I do not mean to call in question the existence of a supreme being; on the contrary it seems to me that the greatest degree of probability is in favor of this belief. But since the existence of this being goes no further than that of any other toward proving the need of worship, it is a theoretic truth with very little practical value. Therefore, since we may say, after such long experience, that religion does not imply exact honesty, we are authorized by the same reasons to think that atheism does not exclude it.

I’m not questioning the existence of a supreme being; in fact, I think there’s a strong likelihood that this belief is true. However, because the existence of this being doesn’t provide any more evidence for the need to worship than any other belief, it’s more of a theoretical truth that has little practical value. So, since we can say, after such extensive experience, that religion doesn’t guarantee complete honesty, we are also justified in thinking that atheism doesn’t rule it out either.

Qui sait d’ailleurs si la raison de l’existence de l’homme ne serait pas dans son existence même? Peut-être a-t-il été jeté au hasard sur un point de la surface de la terre, sans qu’on puisse savoir ni comment, ni pourquoi, mais seulement qu’il doit vivre et mourir, semblable à ces champignons, qui paraissent d’un jour à l’autre, ou à ces fleurs qui bordent les fossés et couvrent les murailles.

Qui sait d’ailleurs si la raison de l’existence de l’homme ne serait pas dans son existence même? Peut-être a-t-il été jeté au hasard sur un point de la surface de la terre, sans qu’on puisse savoir ni comment, ni pourquoi, mais seulement qu’il doit vivre et mourir, semblable à ces champignons, qui paraissent d’un jour à l’autre, ou à ces fleurs qui bordent les fossés et couvrent les murailles.

Furthermore, who can be sure that the reason for man’s existence is not simply the fact that he exists?40 Perhaps he was thrown by chance on some spot on the earth’s surface, nobody knows how nor why, but simply that he must live and die, like the mushrooms which appear from day to day, or like those flowers which border the ditches and cover the walls.

Furthermore, who can say for sure that the reason for human existence isn't just the fact that we exist?40 Maybe we ended up here by chance on some part of the earth, and no one knows how or why, but only that we have to live and die, like the mushrooms that pop up daily, or like those flowers that line the ditches and cover the walls.

Ne nous perdons point dans l’infini, nous ne sommes pas faits pour en avoir la moindre idée; il nous est absolument impossible de remonter à l’origine des choses. Il est égal d’ailleurs pour notre repos, que la matière soit éternelle, ou qu’elle ait été créée, qu’il y ait un Dieu, ou qu’il n’y en ait pas. Quelle folie de tant se tourmenter pour ce qu’il est impossible de connaître, et ce qui ne nous rendrait pas plus heureux, quand nous en viendrions à bout.

Ne vous perdons pas dans l'infini, nous ne sommes pas faits pour en avoir la moindre idée ; il nous est absolument impossible de remonter à l'origine des choses. De toute façon, cela ne change rien à notre tranquillité, que la matière soit éternelle, ou qu'elle ait été créée, qu'il y ait un Dieu, ou qu'il n'y en ait pas. Quelle folie de tant se tourmenter pour ce qu'il est impossible de connaître, et qui ne nous rendrait pas plus heureux, une fois que nous avons compris.

Let us not lose ourselves in the infinite, for we are not made to have the least idea thereof, and are absolutely unable to get back to the origin of things. Besides it does not matter for our peace of mind, whether matter be eternal or have been created, whether there be or be not a God. How foolish to torment ourselves so much about things which we can not know, and which would not make us any happier even were we to gain knowledge about them! [123]

Let’s not get lost in the endlessness, as we’re not designed to grasp it and can’t truly return to the source of everything. Also, it doesn’t really affect our peace of mind if matter is eternal or has been created, or if there is a God or not. It’s silly to stress so much about things we can’t know and that wouldn’t make us any happier even if we did understand them! [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

Mais, dit-on, lisez tous les ouvrages des Fénelon, des Nieuventit, des Abadie, des Derham, des Raï, etc. Eh bien! que m’apprendront-ils? ou plutôt que m’ont-ils appris? Ce ne sont que d’ennuyeuses répétitions d’écrivains zélés, dont l’un n’ajoute à l’autre qu’un verbiage, plus propres à fortifier qu’à saper les fondements de l’athéisme. Le volume des preuves qu’on tire du spectacle de la nature, ne leur donne pas plus de force. La structure seule d’un doigt, d’une oreille, d’un œil, une observation de Malpighi, prouve tout, et sans doute beaucoup mieux que Descartes et Malebranche; ou tout le reste ne prouve rien. Les déistes, et les Chrétiens mêmes devraient donc se contenter de faire observer [52]que, dans tout le règne animal, les mêmes vues sont exécutées par une infinité de divers moyens, tous cependant exactement géométriques. Car de quelles plus fortes armes pourrait-on terrasser les athées? Il est vrai que si ma raison ne me trompe pas, l’homme et tout l’univers semblent avoir été destinés à cette unité de vues. Le soleil, l’air, l’eau, l’organisation, la forme des corps, tout est arrangé dans l’œil, comme dans un miroir qui présente fidèlement à l’imagination les objets qui y sont peints, suivant les lois qu’exige cette infinie variété de corps qui servent à la vision. Dans l’oreille, nous trouvons partout une diversité frappante, sans que cette diverse fabrique de l’homme, des animaux, des oiseaux, des poissons, produise différents usages. Toutes les oreilles sont si mathématiquement faites, qu’elles tendent également au seul et même but, qui est d’entendre. Le hasard, demande le déiste, serait-il donc assez grand géomètre, pour varier ainsi à son gré les ouvrages dont on le suppose auteur, sans que tant de diversité pût l’empêcher d’atteindre la même fin? Il objecte encore ces parties évidemment contenues dans l’animal pour de futurs usages, le papillon dans la chenille, l’homme dans le ver spermatique, un polype entier dans chacune de ses parties, la valvule du trou ovale, le poumon dans le fœtus, les dents dans leurs alvéoles, les os dans les fluides, qui s’en détachent et se durcissent d’une manière incompréhensible. Et comme les partisans de ce système, loin de rien négliger pour le faire valoir, ne se lassent jamais d’accumuler preuves sur preuves, ils veulent profiter de tout, et de la faiblesse même de l’esprit en certain cas. Voyez, disent-ils, les Spinoza, les Vanini, [53]les Desbarreaux, les Boindin, apôtres qui font plus d’honneur que de tort au déisme! La durée de la santé de ces derniers a été la mesure de leur incrédulité: et il est rare en effet, ajoutent-ils, qu’on n’abjure pas l’athéisme, dès que les passions se sont affaiblies avec le corps qui en est l’instrument.

But, they say, read all the works of Fénelon, Nieuventit, Abadie, Derham, Raï, etc. Well! what will they teach me? Or rather, what have they taught me? They are nothing but boring repetitions from zealous writers, each adding only more words, better suited to strengthen than undermine the foundations of atheism. The volume of evidence drawn from the spectacle of nature gives them no more weight. The structure of a finger, an ear, an eye, an observation by Malpighi, proves everything, and undoubtedly much better than Descartes and Malebranche; or else everything else proves nothing. Deists, and even Christians, should be satisfied to observe [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] that throughout the animal kingdom, the same ideas are executed by an infinite variety of means, all however precisely geometric. For what stronger weapons could one use to defeat atheists? It is true that if my reason does not deceive me, man and the entire universe seem to have been destined for this unity of vision. The sun, air, water, the organization, the shape of bodies—all is arranged in the eye like a mirror that faithfully presents to the imagination the objects painted in it, according to the laws required by this infinite variety of bodies serving vision. In the ear, we find everywhere a striking diversity, without this diverse manufacture of man, animals, birds, fishes producing different uses. All ears are so mathematically made that they all aim equally at the one and same goal, which is to hear. Is chance, asks the deist, really such a great geometer, to vary at will the works supposedly created by it, without so much diversity preventing it from achieving the same end? He also points out those parts evidently contained in the animal for future uses, the butterfly in the caterpillar, man in the sperm cell, an entire polyp in each of its parts, the valve of the oval hole, the lung in the fetus, the teeth in their sockets, the bones in the fluids that detach and harden in an incomprehensible way. And as the supporters of this system, far from neglecting anything to promote it, never tire of accumulating evidence upon evidence, they want to benefit from everything, even from the weakness of the spirit in certain cases. Look, they say, at Spinoza, Vanini, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] Desbarreaux, Boindin—apostles who bring more honor than harm to deism! The longevity of these latter's health has been the measure of their unbelief: and it’s indeed rare, they add, that one does not renounce atheism as soon as passions have weakened alongside the body, which is their instrument.

But, some will say, read all such works as those of Fénelon,41 of Nieuwentyt,42 of Abadie,43 of Derham,44 of Rais,45 and the rest. Well! what will they teach me or rather what have they taught me? They are only tiresome repetitions of zealous writers, one of whom adds to the other only verbiage, more likely to strengthen than to undermine the foundations of atheism. The number of the evidences drawn from the spectacle of nature does not give these evidences any more force. Either the mere structure of a finger, of an ear, of an eye, a single observation of Malpighi46 proves all, and doubtless much better than Descartes and Malebranche proved it, or all the other evidences prove nothing. Deists,47 and even Christians, should therefore be content to point out that throughout the animal kingdom the same aims are pursued and accomplished by an infinite number of different mechanisms, all of them however exactly geometrical. For what stronger weapons could there be with which to overthrow atheists? It is true that if my reason does not deceive me, man and the whole universe seem to have been designed for this unity of aim. The sun, air, water, the organism, the shape of bodies,—everything is brought to a focus in the eye as in a mirror that faithfully presents to the imagination all the objects reflected in it, in accordance with the laws required by the infinite variety of bodies which take part in vision. In ears we find everywhere a striking variety, and yet the difference of structure in men, animals, birds, and fishes, does not produce different uses. All ears are so mathematically made, that they tend equally to one and the same end, namely, hearing. But would [124]Chance, the deist asks, be a great enough geometrician to vary thus, at pleasure, the works of which she is supposed to be the author, without being hindered by so great a diversity from gaining the same end? Again, the deist will bring forward as a difficulty those parts of the animal that are clearly contained in it for future use, the butterfly in the caterpillar, man in the sperm, a whole polyp in each of its parts, the valvule in the oval orifice, the lungs in the foetus, the teeth in their sockets, the bones in the fluid from which they detach themselves and (in an incomprehensible manner) harden. And since the partisans of this theory, far from neglecting anything that would strengthen it, never tire of piling up proof upon proof, they are willing to avail themselves of everything, even of the weakness of the mind in certain cases. Look, they say, at men like Spinoza, Vanini,48 Desbarreau,49 and Boindin,50 apostles who honor deism more than they harm it. The duration of their health was the measure of their unbelief, and one rarely fails, they add, to renounce atheism when the passions, with their instrument, the body, have grown weak.

But some will say, read works by Fénelon,41 Nieuwentyt,42 Abadie,43 Derham,44 Rais,45 and others. Well, what will they teach me, or rather, what have they taught me? They are just boring repetitions from enthusiastic writers, each one adding more words to the others, likely to reinforce rather than weaken the foundations of atheism. The number of examples drawn from nature doesn't make these examples any stronger. Either the mere structure of a finger, an ear, or an eye, a single observation by Malpighi46, proves everything, and probably much better than Descartes and Malebranche did, or all the other examples prove nothing at all. Deists,47 and even Christians, should just point out that throughout the animal kingdom, the same goals are pursued and achieved through an infinite number of different mechanisms, all of which are geometrically precise. What better arguments could there be to challenge atheists? It's true that if I'm not mistaken, both man and the entire universe seem to have been designed for this unity of purpose. The sun, air, water, the organism, the shape of bodies — everything focuses in the eye like a mirror that accurately reflects all the objects seen through it, in line with the laws needed by the countless different bodies that participate in vision. In ears, we see a remarkable variety everywhere, yet the differences in structure among humans, animals, birds, and fish do not result in different functions. All ears are constructed so mathematically that they all serve the same purpose, which is hearing. But would [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]Chance, the deist asks, be capable enough as a geometrician to vary the works it supposedly creates at will, without being hindered by such great diversity while still achieving the same goal? Again, the deist will point out those parts of animals clearly present for future use, such as the butterfly in the caterpillar, man in the sperm, a whole polyp in each of its parts, the valvule in the oval orifice, lungs in the fetus, teeth in their sockets, and bones in the fluid they detach from and, in an incomprehensible way, harden. And since supporters of this theory never hesitate to strengthen it further and are always collecting proof upon proof, they are willing to use everything, even the weaknesses of the mind in certain cases. Look, they argue, at people like Spinoza, Vanini,48 Desbarreau,49 and Boindin,50 representatives who elevate deism more than they diminish it. The length of their health was the measure of their disbelief, and they often note that one rarely holds on to atheism when the passions, with their tool, the body, have weakened.

Voilà certainement tout ce qu’on peut dire de plus favorable à l’existence d’un Dieu, quoique le dernier argument soit frivole, en ce que ces conversions sont courtes, l’esprit reprenant presque toujours ses anciennes opinions et se conduisant en conséquence, dès qu’il a recouvré ou plutôt retrouvé ses forces dans celles du corps. En voilà du moins beaucoup plus que n’en dit le médecin Diderot dans ses Pensées philosophiques, sublime ouvrage qui ne convaincra pas un athée. Que répondre en effet à un homme qui dit? “Nous ne connaissons point la nature: des causes cachées dans son sein pourraient avoir tout produit. Voyez à votre tour le polype de Trembley! ne contient-il pas en soi les causes qui donnent lieu à sa régénération? quelle absurdité y aurait-il donc à penser qu’il est des causes physiques pour lesquelles tout a été fait, et auxquelles toute la chaîne de ce vaste univers est si nécessairement liée et assujettie, que rien de ce qui arrive ne pouvait pas ne pas arriver; des causes dont l’ignorance absolument invincible nous a fait recourir à un Dieu, qui n’est pas même un être de raison, suivant certains? Ainsi, détruire le hasard, ce n’est pas prouver l’existence d’un Etre supreme, puisqu’il peut y avoir autre chose qui ne serait ni hasard, ni Dieu, je veux dire la Nature, dont l’étude par conséquent ne peut faire que des [54]incrédules, comme le prouve la façon de penser de tous ses plus heureux scrutateurs.”

Here's everything we can say that supports the existence of God, although the last argument is weak because these conversions are brief; the mind almost always returns to its old beliefs and acts accordingly once it regains, or rather rediscovers, its strength along with the body. At least there's much more here than what the doctor Diderot mentions in his Pensées philosophiques, a remarkable work that won't convince an atheist. What can you say to someone who claims, “We don't know nature: hidden causes within it could have produced everything. Look at Trembley's polyp! Doesn't it contain within itself the causes for its regeneration? What absurdity would there be in thinking that there are physical causes for which everything was made, and to which all the links of this vast universe are so necessarily connected and subjected that nothing that happens could not happen? Causes whose absolutely invincible ignorance has led us to resort to a God, who isn’t even a being of reason, according to some? Thus, eliminating chance doesn't prove the existence of a Supreme Being, since there could be something else that is neither chance nor God, I mean Nature, whose study can only produce [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] skeptics, as demonstrated by the way all its most successful explorers think.”

That is certainly the most that can be said in favor of the existence of God: although the last argument is frivolous in that these conversions are short, and the mind almost always regains its former opinions and acts accordingly, as soon as it has regained or rather rediscovered its strength in that of the body. That is, at least, much more than was said by the physician Diderot,51 in his “Pensées Philosophiques,” a sublime work that will not convince a single atheist. What reply can, in truth, be [125]made to a man who says, “We do not know nature; causes hidden in her breast might have produced everything. In your turn, observe the polyp of Trembley:52 does it not contain in itself the causes which bring about regeneration? Why then would it be absurd to think that there are physical causes by reason of which everything has been made, and to which the whole chain of this vast universe is so necessarily bound and held that nothing which happens, could have failed to happen,53—causes, of which we are so invincibly ignorant that we have had recourse to a God, who, as some aver, is not so much as a logical entity? Thus to destroy chance is not to prove the existence of a supreme being, since there may be some other thing which is neither chance nor God—I mean, nature. It follows that the study of nature can make only unbelievers; and the way of thinking of all its more successful investigators proves this.”

That's definitely the most that can be said in support of the existence of God: although the final argument is weak because these conversions are short-lived, and the mind almost always returns to its previous beliefs and actions as soon as it regains or, more accurately, rediscovers its strength in the body. At least that is much more than what was said by the physician Diderot,51 in his “Philosophical Thoughts,” a remarkable work that won't convince a single atheist. What can you really say to someone who argues, “We don’t understand nature; hidden causes within it might have produced everything. In your turn, consider Trembley's polyp:52 doesn’t it have within it the causes that lead to regeneration? So why would it be absurd to think that there are physical causes through which everything has come into being, and to which the entire chain of this vast universe is so necessarily connected and held that nothing that happens could have failed to happen,53—causes of which we are so completely unaware that we have turned to a God, who, as some claim, is not even a logical entity? So, eliminating chance doesn’t prove the existence of a supreme being, since there could be something else that is neither chance nor God—I mean, nature. Therefore, the study of nature can only lead to disbelief; and the mindset of all its more successful researchers confirms this.”

Le poids de l’univers n’ébranle donc pas un véritable athée, loin de l’écraser; et tous ces indices mille et mille fois rebattus d’un Créateur, indices qu’on met fort au-dessus de la façon de penser dans nos semblables, ne sont évidents, quelque loin qu’on pousse cet argument, que pour les Antipyrrhoniens, ou pour ceux qui ont assez de confiance dans leur raison pour croire pouvoir juger sur certaines apparences, auxquelles, comme vous voyez, les athées peuvent en opposer d’autres peut-être aussi fortes et absolument contraires. Car si nous écoutons encore les naturalistes, ils nous diront que les mêmes causes qui dans les mains d’un chimiste et par le hasard de divers mélanges ont fait le premier miroir, dans celles de la nature ont fait l’eau pure, qui en sert à la simple bergère: que le mouvement qui conserve le monde, a pu le créer; que chaque corps a pris la place que sa nature lui a assignée; que l’air a dû entourer la terre, par la même raison que le fer et les autres métaux sont l’ouvrage de ses entrailles; que le soleil est une production aussi naturelle, que celle de l’électricité; qu’il n’a pas plus été fait pour échauffer la terre et tous ses habitants, qu’il brûle quelquefois, que la pluie pour faire pousser les grains, qu’elle gâte souvent; que le miroir et l’eau n’ont pas plus été faits pour qu’on pût s’y regarder, que tous les corps polis qui ont la même propriété: que l’œil est à la vérité une espèce de trumeau dans lequel l’âme peut contempler l’image des objets, tels qu’ils lui sont représentés par ces corps: mais qu’il n’est pas démontré que cet organe ait été réellement fait exprès pour cette contemplation, [55]ni exprès placé dans l’orbite; qu’enfin il se pourrait bien faire que Lucrèce, le médecin Lamy et tous les Epicuriens anciens et modernes eûssent raison, lorsqu’ils avancent que l’œil ne voit que par ce qu’il se trouve organisé, et placé comme il l’est, que posées une fois les mêmes règles de mouvement que suit la nature dans la génération et le développement des corps, il n’était pas possible que ce merveilleux organe fût organisé et placé autrement.

Le poids de l’univers n’affecte donc pas un véritable athée, loin de l’écraser; et tous ces arguments mille et mille fois répétées d’un Créateur, arguments qu’on met bien au-dessus de la façon de penser de nos semblables, ne sont évidents, peu importe combien on pousse cet argument, que pour les Antipyrrhoniens, ou pour ceux qui ont assez confiance dans leur raisonnement pour croire pouvoir juger sur certaines apparences, auxquelles, comme vous le voyez, les athées peuvent opposer d’autres, peut-être tout aussi fortes et totalement contraires. Car si nous écoutons encore les naturalistes, ils nous diront que les mêmes causes qui, dans les mains d’un chimiste, et par le hasard de divers mélanges, ont créé le premier miroir, dans celles de la nature ont donné l’eau pure, que la simple bergère utilise : que le mouvement qui maintient le monde a pu le créer ; que chaque corps a pris la place que sa nature a déterminée ; que l’air a dû entourer la terre, pour la même raison que le fer et les autres métaux sont l'ouvrage de ses entrailles ; que le soleil est une production aussi naturelle que celle de l’électricité ; qu’il n’a pas été fait pour réchauffer la terre et tous ses habitants, qu’il brûle parfois, plus que la pluie n’a été faite pour faire pousser les grains, qu’elle peut souvent détériorer ; que le miroir et l’eau n’ont pas été faits pour qu’on puisse s’y voir, que tous les corps polis ayant la même propriété : que l’œil est en réalité une sorte de trumeau dans lequel l’âme peut admirer l’image des objets, tels qu’ils lui sont présentés par ces corps : mais qu’il n’est pas prouvé que cet organe ait été réellement conçu spécifiquement pour cette contemplation, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] ni expressément placé dans l’orbite ; qu’enfin il se pourrait bien que Lucrèce, le médecin Lamy et tous les Epicuriens anciens et modernes aient raison, lorsqu’ils soutiennent que l’œil ne voit que parce qu’il est organisé et placé comme il l’est, que si l’on posait une fois les mêmes règles de mouvement que suit la nature dans la génération et le développement des corps, il n’était pas possible que ce merveilleux organe soit organisé et placé autrement.

The weight of the universe therefore far from crushing a real atheist does not even shake him. All these evidences of a creator, repeated thousands and thousands of times, evidences that are placed far above the comprehension of men like us, are self-evident (however far one push the argument) only to the anti-Pyrrhonians,54 or to those who have enough confidence in their reason to believe themselves capable of judging on the basis of certain phenomena, against which, as you see, the atheists can urge others perhaps equally strong and absolutely opposed. For if we listen to the naturalists again, they will tell us that the very causes which, in a chemist’s hands, by a chance combination, made the first mirror, in the hands of nature made the [126]pure water, the mirror of the simple shepherdess; that the motion which keeps the world going could have created it, that each body has taken the place assigned to it by its own nature, that the air must have surrounded the earth, and that iron and the other metals are produced by internal motions of the earth, for one and the same reason; that the sun is as much a natural product as electricity, that it was not made to warm the earth and its inhabitants, whom it sometimes burns, any more than the rain was made to make the seeds grow, which it often spoils; that the mirror and the water were no more made for people to see themselves in, than were all other polished bodies with this same property; that the eye is in truth a kind of glass in which the soul can contemplate the image of objects as they are presented to it by these bodies, but that it is not proved that this organ was really made expressly for this contemplation, nor purposely placed in its socket, and in short that it may well be that Lucretius,55 the physician Lamy,56 and all Epicureans both ancient and modern were right when they suggested that the eye sees only because it is formed and placed as it is,57 and that, given once for all, the same rules of motion followed by nature in the generation and development of bodies, this marvelous organ could not have been formed and placed differently.

The weight of the universe, therefore, far from overwhelming a true atheist, doesn’t even faze him. All these proofs of a creator, repeated countless times, proofs that are beyond the understanding of people like us, are obvious (no matter how far you push the argument) only to the anti-Pyrrhonians,54 or to those who have enough faith in their reasoning to consider themselves capable of judging based on certain phenomena, against which, as you can see, atheists can bring forward equally strong and completely opposing arguments. If we listen to the naturalists again, they will tell us that the very causes that, in the hands of a chemist, by chance made the first mirror, in nature’s hands created the [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]pure water, the mirror of the simple shepherdess; that the motion which keeps the world going could have created it, that each body has taken the place assigned to it by its own nature, that the air must have surrounded the earth, and that iron and the other metals are produced by internal motions of the earth, for the same reason; that the sun is as natural a product as electricity, that it wasn’t created to warm the earth and its inhabitants, whom it sometimes burns, any more than the rain was created to help the seeds grow, which it often destroys; that the mirror and the water were no more made for people to see themselves in than all other polished surfaces with this same property; that the eye is essentially a type of glass in which the soul can view the image of objects as they are presented by these surfaces, but it’s not proven that this organ was specifically made for this kind of viewing, nor that it was intentionally placed in its socket, and in short, it may well be that Lucretius,55 the physician Lamy,56 and all Epicureans, both ancient and modern, were correct when they suggested that the eye sees only because it’s shaped and positioned as it is,57 and that, once established, the same rules of motion followed by nature in generating and developing bodies mean that this remarkable organ could not have been formed or positioned any differently.

Tel est le pour et le contre, et l’abrégé des grandes raisons qui partageront éternellement les philosophes. Je ne prends aucun parti.

Tel est le pour et le contre, et l’abrégé des grandes raisons qui partageront éternellement les philosophes. Je ne prends aucun parti.

“Non nostrum inter vos tantas componere lites.”

“It's not our place to settle such disputes among you.”

Such is the pro and the con, and the summary of those fine arguments that will eternally divide the philosophers. I do not take either side.

Such is the pro and the con, and the summary of those fine arguments that will always divide the philosophers. I don’t take either side.

“Non nostrum inter vos tantas componere lites.”58

“It's not our place to resolve such disputes among you.”58

C’est ce que je disais à un Français de mes amis, aussi franc Pyrrhonien que moi, homme de beaucoup de mérite, et digne d’un meilleur sort. Il me fit à ce sujet une réponse fort singulière. Il est vrai, me dit-il, que le pour et le contre ne doit point inquiéter l’âme d’un philosophe, qui voit que rien n’est démontré avec assez de clarté pour forcer son consentement, et même que les idées indicatives qui s’offrent d’un côté, sont ausitôt détruites par celles qui se montrent de l’autre. Cependant, reprit-il, l’univers ne sera jamais heureux, à moins qu’il ne soit athée. Voici quelles étaient les raisons de cet abominable homme. Si l’athéisme, disait-il, était généralement répandu, toutes les branches de la religion seraient alors détruites et coupées par la racine. Plus de guerres théologiques; plus de soldats de religion; soldats terribles! la nature infectée d’un poison sacré, reprendrait ses droits et sa pureté. Sourds à toute autre voix, les mortels tranquilles ne suivraient que les conseils spontanés [56]de leur propre individu, les seuls qu’on ne méprise point impunément et qui peuvent seuls nous conduire au bonheur par les agréables sentiers de la vertu.

C'est ce que je disais à un ami français, aussi sceptique que moi, un homme très respectable, qui mérite mieux. Il m'a donné une réponse assez étrange à ce sujet. Il est vrai, m'a-t-il dit, que le pour et le contre ne devraient pas troubler l'esprit d'un philosophe, qui constate que rien n'est prouvé assez clairement pour obliger son accord, et que les idées qui viennent d'un côté sont rapidement contredites par celles qui viennent de l'autre. Cependant, reprit-il, l'univers ne sera jamais heureux à moins qu'il ne soit athée. Voici les raisons de cet homme abominable. Si l'athéisme était largement répandu, toutes les branches de la religion seraient alors complètement détruites. Plus de guerres théologiques; plus de soldats de la foi; soldats redoutables! La nature, libérée d'un poison sacré, retrouverait ses droits et sa pureté. Insensibles à toute autre voix, les humains paisibles ne suivraient que les conseils naturels de leur propre personnalité, les seuls qu'on ne peut mépriser sans conséquence et qui peuvent véritablement nous mener au bonheur sur les agréables chemins de la vertu. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

This is what I said to one of my friends, a Frenchman, [127]as frank a Pyrronian as I, a man of much merit, and worthy of a better fate. He gave me a very singular answer in regard to the matter. “It is true,” he told me, “that the pro and con should not disturb at all the soul of a philosopher, who sees that nothing is proved with clearness enough to force his consent, and that the arguments offered on one side are neutralized by those of the other. However,” he continued, “the universe will never be happy, unless it is atheistic.”59 Here are this wretch’s reasons. If atheism, said he, were generally accepted, all the forms of religion would then be destroyed and cut off at the roots. No more theological wars, no more soldiers of religion—such terrible soldiers! Nature infected with a sacred poison, would regain its rights and its purity. Deaf to all other voices, tranquil mortals would follow only the spontaneous dictates of their own being the only commands which can never be despised with impunity and which alone can lead us to happiness through the pleasant paths of virtue.

This is what I said to one of my friends, a Frenchman, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] as straightforward a skeptic as I, a man of considerable merit, deserving of a better fate. He gave me a quite unique response regarding the matter. “It’s true,” he said, “that the pros and cons shouldn’t disturb the soul of a philosopher, who realizes that nothing is proven clearly enough to demand his agreement and that the arguments on one side are canceled out by those on the other. However,” he continued, “the universe will never be happy unless it is atheistic.”59 Here are this unfortunate man’s reasons. If atheism, he argued, were widely accepted, all forms of religion would then be eradicated at their roots. No more religious wars, no more terrible soldiers of faith! Nature, free from a sacred poison, would reclaim its rights and purity. Unmoved by any other voices, peaceful individuals would follow only the natural impulses of their own being, the only directives that can never be ignored without consequence and which alone can guide us to happiness along the rewarding paths of virtue.

Telle est la loi naturelle; quiconque en est rigide observateur, est honnête homme, et mérite la confiance de tout le genre humain. Quiconque ne la suit pas scrupuleusement, a beau affecter les spécieux dehors d’une autre religion, est un fourbe, ou un hypocrite dont je me défie.

T such is the natural law; anyone who strictly follows it is an honest person and deserves the trust of all humanity. Anyone who doesn’t adhere to it closely, no matter how much they pretend to follow another religion, is a deceitful trickster or a hypocrite whom I distrust.

Such is natural law: whoever rigidly observes it is a good man and deserves the confidence of all the human race. Whoever fails to follow it scrupulously affects, in vain, the specious exterior of another religion; he is a scamp or a hypocrite whom I distrust.

Natural law is like this: anyone who strictly follows it is a good person and earns the trust of all humanity. Anyone who doesn’t adhere to it closely may try to appear as if they follow another faith, but ultimately, they are either a rogue or a hypocrite whom I cannot trust.

Après cela, qu’un vain peuple pense différemment; qu’il ose affirmer qu’il y va de la probité même, à ne pas croire la Révélation; qu’il faut en un mot un autre religion que celle de la nature, quelle qu’elle soit! quelle misère! quelle pitié! et la bonne opinion que chacun nous donne de celle qu’il a embrassée! Nous ne briguons point ici le suffrage du vulgaire. Qui dresse dans son cœur des autels à la superstition, est né pour adorer des idoles, et non pour sentir la vertu.

Après cela, qu’un peuple ignorante pense différemment; qu’il ose affirmer qu’il s'agit de l’intégrité même, à ne pas croire à la Révélation; qu’il faut en d’autres termes une religion différente de celle de la nature, peu importe laquelle! Quelle tristesse! Quelle pitié! Et la bonne opinion que chacun a de celle qu’il a choisie! Nous ne cherchons pas ici l’approbation du grand public. Qui dresse dans son cœur des autels à la superstition est né pour adorer des idoles, et non pour ressentir la vertu.

After this, let a vain people think otherwise, let them dare affirm that even probity is at stake in not believing in revelation, in a word that another religion than that of nature is necessary, whatever it may be. Such an assertion is wretched and pitiable; and so is the good opinion which each one gives us of the religion he has embraced! We do [128]not seek here the votes of the crowd. Whoever raises in his heart altars to superstition, is born to worship idols and not to thrill to virtue.

After this, let a superficial people think differently; let them dare to claim that even honesty is at stake in not believing in revelation, and that a religion beyond the natural world is necessary, whatever that may be. Such a claim is pathetic and miserable; and so is the favorable opinion that each person has of the religion they've chosen! We do [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]not seek the approval of the masses. Whoever builds altars to superstition in their heart is destined to worship idols, not to be inspired by virtue.

Mais puisque toutes les facultés de l’âme dépendent tellement de la propre organisation du cerveau et de tout le corps, qu’elles ne sont visiblement que cette organisation même: voilà une machine bien éclairée! car enfin quand l’homme seul aurait reçu en partage la loi naturelle, en serait-il moins une machine? Des roues, quelques ressorts de plus que dans les animaux les plus parfaits, le cerveau proportionnellement plus proche du cœur, et recevant aussi plus de sang, la même raison donnée; que sais-je enfin? des causes inconnues produiraient toujours cette conscience délicate, si facile à blesser, ces remords qui ne sont pas plus étrangers à la matière que la pensée, et en un mot toute la différence qu’on suppose ici. L’organisation suffirait-elle donc [57]a tout? oui, encore une fois. Puisque la pensée se développe visiblement avec les organes, pourquoi la matière dont ils sont faits ne serait-elle pas aussi susceptible de remords, quand une fois elle a acquis avec le temps la faculté de sentir?

Mais puisque toutes les capacités de l’âme dépendent tellement de l’organisation propre du cerveau et de tout le corps, qu’elles ne sont manifestement que cette organisation elle-même : voilà une machine bien éclairée ! Car finalement, quand l’homme aurait reçu en partage la loi naturelle, cela ferait-il de lui moins une machine ? Des roues, quelques ressorts de plus que dans les animaux les plus parfaits, le cerveau proportionnellement plus près du cœur, et recevant aussi plus de sang, la même raison donnée ; que puis-je dire enfin ? Des causes inconnues produiraient toujours cette conscience délicate, si facile à blesser, ces remords qui ne sont pas plus étrangers à la matière que la pensée, et en un mot toute la différence qu’on suppose ici. L’organisation suffirait-elle donc [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]à tout ? Oui, encore une fois. Puisque la pensée se développe visiblement avec les organes, pourquoi la matière dont ils sont faits ne serait-elle pas aussi susceptible de remords, une fois qu'elle a acquis avec le temps la capacité de sentir ?

But since all the faculties of the soul depend to such a degree on the proper organization of the brain and of the whole body, that apparently they are but this organization itself, the soul is clearly an enlightened machine. For finally, even if man alone had received a share of natural law, would he be any less a machine for that? A few more wheels, a few more springs than in the most perfect animals, the brain proportionally nearer the heart and for this very reason receiving more blood—any one of a number of unknown causes might always produce this delicate conscience so easily wounded, this remorse which is no more foreign to matter than to thought, and in a word all the differences that are supposed to exist here. Could the organism then suffice for everything? Once more, yes; since thought visibly develops with our organs, why should not the matter of which they are composed be susceptible of remorse also, when once it has acquired, with time, the faculty of feeling?

But since all the abilities of the soul rely heavily on the proper structure of the brain and the entire body, to the point where they seem to be just that structure, the soul is clearly a sophisticated machine. Ultimately, even if humans alone had received a portion of natural law, would that make them any less of a machine? Just a few more gears, a few more springs than in the most advanced animals, and with the brain positioned closer to the heart, receiving more blood—any one of various unknown factors could easily produce this fragile conscience that can be easily hurt, this remorse that is no more unrelated to matter than it is to thought, and in short, all the differences that are thought to exist here. Could the organism then be enough for everything? Once again, yes; since thought clearly evolves with our organs, why shouldn't the matter they're made of also be capable of remorse, once it has gradually developed the ability to feel?

L’âme n’est donc qu’un vain terme dont on n’a point d’idée, et dont un bon esprit ne doit se servir que pour nommer la partie qui pense en nous. Posé le moindre principe de mouvement, les corps animés auront tout ce qu’il leur faut pour se mouvoir, sentir, penser, se repentir, et se conduire en un mot dans le physique, et dans le moral qui en dépend.

L'soul is just an empty term that we don't really understand, and a reasonable person should only use it to refer to the part of us that thinks. Once you establish even the simplest principle of movement, living beings will have everything they need to move, feel, think, repent, and essentially navigate both the physical and the moral realms that depend on it.

The soul is therefore but an empty word, of which no one has any idea, and which an enlightened man should use only to signify the part in us that thinks.60 Given the least principle of motion, animated bodies will have all that is necessary for moving, feeling, thinking, repenting, or in a word for conducting themselves in the physical realm, and in the moral realm which depends upon it.

The soul is just an empty term that no one really understands, and an enlightened person should only use it to refer to the part of us that thinks.60 With even the simplest principle of movement, living beings have everything they need to move, feel, think, regret, or, in short, to navigate both the physical world and the moral one that is connected to it.

Nous ne supposons rien; ceux qui croiraient que toutes les difficultés ne seraient pas encore levées, vont trouver des expériences, qui achèveront de les satisfaire.

Nous ne faisons aucune supposition ; ceux qui pensent que toutes les difficultés ne sont pas encore résolues vont découvrir des expériences qui les satisferont pleinement.

Yet we take nothing for granted; those who perhaps think that all the difficulties have not yet been [129]removed shall now read of experiments that will completely satisfy them.

Yet we take nothing for granted; those who might think that all the difficulties haven't been [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]resolved will now read about experiments that will fully satisfy them.

1. Toutes les chairs des animaux palpitent après la mort, d’autant plus longtemps que l’animal est plus froid et transpire moins: les tortues, les lézards, les serpents, etc. en font foi.

1. All animal flesh twitches after death, especially for longer if the animal is colder and sweats less: turtles, lizards, snakes, etc. are proof of this.

1. The flesh of all animals palpitates after death. This palpitation continues longer, the more cold blooded the animal is and the less it perspires. Tortoises, lizards, serpents, etc. are evidence of this.

1. The bodies of all animals twitch after they die. This twitching lasts longer the more cold-blooded the animal is and the less it sweats. Turtles, lizards, snakes, and so on show this.

2. Les muscles séparés du corps, se retirent, lorsqu’on les pique.

2. The muscles separated from the body pull back when they're poked.

2. Muscles separated from the body contract when they are stimulated.

2. Muscles taken out of the body contract when they're stimulated.

3. Les entrailles conservent longtemps leur mouvement péristaltique, ou vermiculaire.

3. The intestines maintain their peristaltic or wave-like movement for a long time.

3. The intestines keep up their peristaltic or vermicular motion for a long time.

3. The intestines continue their smooth, wave-like movement for an extended period.

4. Une simple injection d’eau chaude ranime le cœur et les muscles, suivant Cowper.

4. A simple injection of hot water revitalizes the heart and muscles, according to Cowper.

4. According to Cowper,61 a simple injection of hot water reanimates the heart and the muscles.

4. According to Cowper,61 a straightforward injection of hot water revives the heart and muscles.

5. Le cœur de la grenouille, surtout exposé au soleil, encore mieux sur une table ou une assiette chaude, se remue pendant une heure et plus, après avoir été arraché du corps. Le mouvement semble-t-il perdu sans ressource? il n’y a qu’à piquer le cœur, et ce muscle creux bat encore. Harvey a fait la même observation sur les crapauds.

5. The frog's heart, especially when exposed to the sun, even better on a warm table or plate, continues to move for an hour or more after being removed from the body. Does the movement seem to be aimless? Just poke the heart, and this hollow muscle will still beat. Harvey made the same observation about toads.

5. A frog’s heart moves for an hour or more after it has been removed from the body, especially when exposed to the sun or better still when placed on a hot table or chair. If this movement seems totally lost, one has only to stimulate the heart, and that hollow muscle beats again. Harvey62 made this same observation on toads.

5. A frog's heart keeps beating for an hour or more after it's taken out of the body, especially when it's exposed to the sun or even better, when it's placed on a hot table or chair. If the movement seems completely gone, you just need to stimulate the heart, and that hollow muscle will start beating again. Harvey62 noticed the same thing with toads.

6. Bacon de Verulam, dans son Traité Sylva-Sylvarum, [58]parle d’un homme convaincu de trahison, qu’on ouvrit vivant, et dont le cœur jeté dans l’eau chaude sauta à plusieurs reprises, toujours moins haut, à la distance perpendiculaire de 2 pieds.

6. Bacon of Verulam, in his essay Sylva-Sylvarum, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] talks about a man found guilty of treason, who was opened alive, and whose heart, thrown into hot water, jumped several times, each time lower, to a vertical distance of 2 feet.

6. Bacon of Verulam63 in his treatise “Sylva Sylvarum” cites the case of a man convicted of treason, who was opened alive, and whose heart thrown into hot water leaped several times, each time less high, to the perpendicular height of two feet.

6. Bacon of Verulam63 in his work “Sylva Sylvarum” mentions a case of a man convicted of treason, who was opened up while still alive, and whose heart, when thrown into hot water, jumped several times, each time a little less high, reaching a maximum height of two feet.

7. Prenez un petit poulet encore dans l’œuf; arrachez lui le cœur; vous observerez les mêmes phénomènes, avec à peu près les mêmes circonstances. La seule chaleur de l’haleine ranime un animal prêt à périr dans la machine pneumatique.

7. Take a small chicken still in the egg; tear out its heart; you will observe the same phenomena, under roughly the same circumstances. The mere warmth of your breath revives an animal on the verge of dying in the pneumatic machine.

7. Take a tiny chicken still in the egg, cut out the heart and you will observe the same phenomena as before, under almost the same conditions. The warmth of the breath alone reanimates an animal about to perish in the air pump.

7. Take a small chicken still in the egg, remove the heart, and you will see the same phenomena as before, under nearly the same conditions. The warmth of the breath alone revives an animal that is about to die in the air pump.

Les mêmes expériences que nous devons à Boyle et à Sténon, se font dans les pigeons, dans les chiens, dans les lapins, dont les morceaux de cœur se remuent, comme les cœurs entiers. On voit le même mouvement dans les pattes de taupe arrachées.

Les mêmes expériences que nous devons à Boyle et à Sténon se font sur des pigeons, des chiens et des lapins, dont les morceaux de cœur bougent comme des cœurs entiers. On observe le même mouvement dans les pattes de taupe arrachées.

The same experiments, which we owe to Boyle64 and to Sténon,65 are made on pigeons, dogs, and rabbits. Pieces of their hearts beat as their whole [130]hearts would. The same movements can be seen in paws that have been cut off from moles.

The same experiments, which we owe to Boyle64 and to Steno,65 are carried out on pigeons, dogs, and rabbits. Pieces of their hearts beat just like their entire [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]hearts would. The same movements can be observed in paws that have been severed from moles.

8. La chenille, les vers, l’araignée, la mouche, l’anguille offrent les mêmes choses à considérer; et le mouvement des parties coupées augmente dans l’eau chaude, à cause du feu qu’elle contient.

8. The caterpillar, the worms, the spider, the fly, and the eel offer the same things to consider; and the movement of the severed parts increases in hot water due to the heat it contains.

8. The caterpillar, the worm, the spider, the fly, the eel—all exhibit the same phenomena; and in hot water, because of the fire it contains, the movement of the detached parts increases.

8. The caterpillar, the worm, the spider, the fly, the eel—all show the same behaviors; and in hot water, due to the heat it holds, the movement of the separate parts speeds up.

9. Un soldat ivre emporta d’un coup de sabre la tête d’un coq d’Inde. Cet animal resta debout, ensuite il marcha, courut; venant à rencontrer une muraille, il se tourna, battit des ailes, en continuant de courir, et tomba enfin. Etendu par terre, tous les muscles de ce coq se remuaient encore. Voilà ce que j’ai vu, et il est facile de voir à peu près ces phénomènes dans les petits chats, ou chiens, dont on a coupé la tête.

9. A drunken soldier struck off the head of a turkey with one swing of his sword. The animal stood there for a moment, then it started walking, running; when it ran into a wall, it turned, flapped its wings, continued running, and finally collapsed. Lying on the ground, all the muscles of that turkey were still twitching. That’s what I saw, and it's not hard to observe similar phenomena in little cats or dogs that have had their heads cut off.

9. A drunken soldier cut off with one stroke of his sabre an Indian rooster’s head. The animal remained standing, then walked, and ran: happening to run against a wall, it turned around, beat its wings still running, and finally fell down. As it lay on the ground, all the muscles of this rooster kept on moving. That is what I saw myself, and almost the same phenomena can easily be observed in kittens or puppies with their heads cut off.

9. A drunken soldier swung his saber and chopped off the head of an Indian rooster in one quick move. The rooster stayed standing for a moment, then started to walk and even ran a little. When it bumped into a wall, it turned around, flapped its wings while still moving, and eventually collapsed. As it lay there, all the muscles in the rooster kept twitching. That’s what I saw myself, and you can see something similar happen with kittens or puppies when their heads are removed.

10. Les polypes font plus que de se mouvoir, après la section; ils se reproduisent dans huit jours en autant d’animaux qu’il y a de parties coupées. J’en suis fâché pour le système des naturalistes sur la génération, ou plutôt j’en suis bien aise; car que cette découverte nous apprend bien à ne jamais rien [59]conclure de général, même de toutes les expériences connues, et les plus décisives!

10. Polyps do more than just move after being cut; they reproduce within eight days into as many animals as there are cut parts. I'm frustrated for the naturalists' system on generation, or rather, I'm quite pleased; because this discovery teaches us never to draw any general conclusions, even from all the known and most decisive experiments! [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

10. Polyps do more than move after they have been cut in pieces. In a week they regenerate to form as many animals as there are pieces. I am sorry that these facts speak against the naturalists’ system of generation; or rather I am very glad of it, for let this discovery teach us never to reach a general conclusion even on the ground of all known (and most decisive) experiments.

10. Polyps do more than just move after being cut into pieces. In a week, they can regenerate and form as many new animals as there are pieces. I’m sorry that these facts contradict the naturalists’ theory of generation; or rather, I’m actually glad about it, because let this discovery remind us to never jump to a general conclusion, even based on all known (and most conclusive) experiments.

Voilà beaucoup plus de faits qu’il n’en faut, pour prouver d’une manière incontestable que chaque petite fibre, ou partie des corps organisés, se meut par un principe qui lui est propre, et dont l’action ne dépend point des nerfs, comme les mouvements volontaires, puisque les mouvements en question s’exercent sans que les parties qui les manifestent aient aucun commerce avec la circulation. Or, si cette force se fait remarquer jusques dans des morceaux de fibres, le cœur, qui est un composé de fibres singulièrement entrelacées, doit avoir la même propriété. L’histoire de Bacon n’était pas nécessaire pour me le persuader. Il m’était facile d’en juger, et par la parfaite analogie de la structure du cœur de l’homme et des animaux; et par la masse même du premier, dans laquelle ce mouvement ne se cache aux yeux, que parce qu’il y est étouffé; et enfin parce que tout est froid et affaissé dans les cadavres. Si les dissections se faisaient sur des criminels suppliciés, dont les corps sont encore chauds, on verrait dans leur cœur les mêmes mouvements qu’on observe dans les muscles du visage des gens décapités.

Here are far more facts than needed to undeniably prove that each tiny fiber or part of organized bodies moves by its own principle, which doesn't depend on the nerves, like voluntary movements do, since the movements in question occur without the parts showing them having any connection to circulation. Now, if this force can be observed even in small pieces of fiber, the heart, which is made up of intricately woven fibers, must have the same property. Bacon’s account wasn’t necessary for me to be convinced. It was easy to judge by the perfect analogy of the structure of the human heart and that of animals; and by the mass of the heart itself, where this movement is not visible only because it is suppressed; and finally because everything is cold and collapsed in corpses. If dissections were performed on executed criminals, whose bodies are still warm, one would see in their hearts the same movements observed in the facial muscles of decapitated individuals.

Here we have many more facts than are needed to prove, in an incontestable way, that each tiny fibre or part of an organized body moves by a principle which belongs to it. Its activity, unlike voluntary motions, does not depend in any way on the nerves, since the movements in question occur in parts of the body which have no connection with the circulation. But if this force is manifested even in sections of fibres the heart, which is a composite of peculiarly connected fibres, must possess the same property. I did not need Bacon’s story to persuade [131]me of this. It was easy for me to come to this conclusion, both from the perfect analogy of the structure of the human heart with that of animals, and also from the very bulk of the human heart, in which this movement escapes our eyes only because it is smothered, and finally because in corpses all the organs are cold and lifeless. If executed criminals were dissected while their bodies are still warm, we should probably see in their hearts the same movements that are observed in the face-muscles of those that have been beheaded.

Here, we have far more evidence than we need to clearly show that every tiny fiber or part of an organized body moves according to a principle that is inherent to it. Its activity, unlike voluntary movements, does not depend on the nerves at all, since these movements happen in parts of the body that aren’t connected to the circulation. But if this force can be seen even in sections of fibers, then the heart, which is made up of uniquely connected fibers, must have the same property. I didn’t need Bacon’s story to convince [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]me of this. It was easy for me to reach this conclusion, both because the structure of the human heart is very similar to that of animals, and also because of the sheer size of the human heart, where this movement is not visible to us simply because it is suppressed, and ultimately because in corpses, all the organs are cold and lifeless. If executed criminals were dissected while their bodies were still warm, we would probably see the same movements in their hearts as we observe in the facial muscles of those who have been beheaded.

Tel est ce principe moteur des corps entiers, ou des parties coupées en morceaux, qu’il produit des mouvements non déréglés, comme on l’a cru, mais très réguliers, et cela, tant dans les animaux chauds et parfaits, que dans ceux qui sont froids et imparfaits. Il ne reste donc aucune ressource à nos adversaires, si ce n’est que de nier mille et mille faits que chacun peut facilement vérifier.

This is the driving principle of entire bodies or parts broken into pieces, which produces movements that are not disordered, as previously thought, but very regular, both in warm and perfect animals and in those that are cold and imperfect. Thus, our opponents have no recourse except to deny countless facts that anyone can easily verify.

The motive principle of the whole body, and even of its parts cut in pieces, is such that it produces not irregular movements, as some have thought, but very regular ones, in warm blooded and perfect animals as well as in cold and imperfect ones. No resource therefore remains open to our adversaries but to deny thousands and thousands of facts which every man can easily verify.

The main principle behind the movement of the entire body, and even of its individual parts when severed, is designed to create not chaotic movements, as some believe, but very orderly ones, in both warm-blooded and fully developed animals as well as in cold-blooded and less developed ones. Thus, our opponents have no choice but to reject thousands upon thousands of facts that anyone can easily confirm.

Si on me demande à présent quel est le siège de [60]cette force innée dans nos corps, je réponds qu’elle réside très clairement dans ce que les anciens ont appellé parenchyme; c’est à dire dans la substance propre des parties, abstraction faite des veines, des artères, des nerfs, en un mot de l’organisation de tout le corps; et que par conséquent chaque partie contient en soi des ressorts plus ou moins vifs, selon le besoin qu’elles en avaient.

If you ask me now where the source of this innate power in our bodies lies, I would say it is clearly found in what the ancients referred to as parenchyma; that is, in the specific substance of the parts, apart from the veins, arteries, nerves, in short, from the organization of the whole body; and therefore each part contains within itself springs that are more or less active, depending on the needs they had.

If now any one ask me where is this innate force in our bodies, I answer that it very clearly resides in what the ancients called the parenchyma, that is to say, in the very substance of the organs not including the veins, the arteries, the nerves, in a word, that it resides in the organization of the whole body, and that consequently each organ contains within itself forces more or less active according to the need of them.

If someone asks me where this innate force is in our bodies, I respond that it clearly exists in what the ancients referred to as the parenchyma, meaning in the actual substance of the organs, excluding the veins, arteries, and nerves. In short, it exists in the overall structure of the body, and therefore each organ has forces within it that are more or less active depending on what is needed.

Entrons dans quelque détail de ces ressorts de la machine humaine. Tous les mouvements vitaux, animaux, naturels et automatiques se font par leur action. N’est-ce pas machinalement que le corps se retire, frappé de terreur à l’aspect d’un précipice inattendu? que les paupières se baissent à la menace d’un coup, comme on l’a dit? que la pupille s’étrécit au grand jour pour conserver la rétine, et s’élargit pour voir les objets dans l’obscurité? n’est-ce pas machinalement que les pores de la peau se ferment en hiver, pour que le froid ne pénètre pas l’intérieur des vaisseaux? que l’estomac se soulève, irrité par le poison, par une certaine quantité d’opium, par tous les émétiques, etc.? que le cœur, les artères, les muscles se contractent pendant le sommeil, comme pendant la veille? que le poumon fait l’office d’un souflet continuellement exercé? n’est-ce pas machinalement qu’agissent tous les sphincters de la vessie, du rectum, etc.? que le cœur a une contraction plus forte que tout autre muscle? que les muscles érecteurs font dresser la verge dans l’homme, comme dans les animaux qui s’en battent le ventre, et même dans l’enfant, capable d’érection, pour peu que cette partie soit irritée? Ce qui prouve, pour le dire en passant, qu’il est un ressort singulier dans ce membre, encore peu connu, et qui produit [61]des effets qu’on n’a point encore bien expliqués, malgré toutes les lumières de l’anatomie.

Let's go into some detail about these mechanisms of the human machine. All vital movements—animal, natural, and automatic—are carried out through their action. Isn’t it automatic that the body recoils, struck by terror at the sight of an unexpected cliff? That the eyelids close at the threat of a blow, as has been said? That the pupil constricts in bright light to protect the retina, and expands to see objects in the dark? Isn’t it automatic that the pores of the skin close in winter, so that the cold doesn't penetrate the blood vessels? That the stomach rises, irritated by poison, a certain amount of opium, or all emetics, etc.? That the heart, arteries, and muscles contract during sleep just like they do when we're awake? That the lung acts like a continuously working bellows? Isn’t it automatic how all the sphincters of the bladder, the rectum, etc., function? That the heart has a stronger contraction than any other muscle? That the erecting muscles make the penis stand in men, just as in animals that show off, and even in a child capable of an erection, as long as that area is stimulated? This shows, just to note, that there is a unique mechanism in that member, still not very well understood, which produces [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]effects that have yet to be fully explained, despite all the knowledge of anatomy.

Let us now go into some detail concerning these springs of the human machine. All the vital, animal, natural, and automatic motions are carried on by their action. Is it not in a purely mechanical way that the body shrinks back when it is struck with terror at the sight of an unforeseen precipice, [132]that the eyelids are lowered at the menace of a blow, as some have remarked, and that the pupil contracts in broad daylight to save the retina, and dilates to see objects in darkness? Is it not by mechanical means that the pores of the skin close in winter so that the cold can not penetrate to the interior of the blood vessels, and that the stomach vomits when it is irritated by poison, by a certain quantity of opium and by all emetics, etc.? that the heart, the arteries and the muscles contract in sleep as well as in waking hours, that the lungs serve as bellows continually in exercise, ... that the heart contracts more strongly than any other muscle?66...

Let’s dive into the details about these elements of the human body. All vital, instinctive, natural, and automatic movements are driven by their action. Isn’t it purely mechanical how the body flinches in fear when faced with an unexpected cliff, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] how eyelids drop at the threat of an incoming blow, as some have pointed out, and how the pupil shrinks in bright daylight to protect the retina, then expands to see in the dark? Isn’t it through mechanical processes that the skin's pores tighten in winter so the cold can’t invade the blood vessels, and that the stomach expels contents when irritated by toxins, certain amounts of opium, or any emetics, etc.? How the heart, arteries, and muscles contract during sleep as well as when awake, and how the lungs act like bellows constantly during physical activity,... how the heart contracts more forcefully than any other muscle?66...

Je ne m’étendrai pas davantage sur tous ces petits ressorts subalternes connus de tout le monde. Mais il en est un autre plus subtil, et plus merveilleux qui les anime tous; il est la source de tous nos sentiments, de tous nos plaisirs, de toutes nos passions, de toutes nos pensées; car le cerveau a ses muscles pour penser, comme les jambes pour marcher. Je veux parler de ce principe incitant, et impétueux, qu’Hippocrate appelle ενορμων (l’âme). Ce principe existe, et il a son siège dans le cerveau à l’origine des nerfs, par lesquels il exerce son empire sur tout le reste du corps. Par là s’explique tout ce qui peut s’expliquer, jusqu’aux effets surprenants des maladies de l’imagination.

I won’t go into detail about all those little known mechanisms that everyone is familiar with. But there is another one, subtler and more remarkable, that drives them all; it is the source of all our feelings, all our pleasures, all our passions, and all our thoughts; because the brain has its muscles for thinking, just as the legs do for walking. I’m referring to this inciting and impulsive principle that Hippocrates calls ενορμων (the soul). This principle exists, and it is located in the brain at the origin of the nerves, through which it exerts its influence over the rest of the body. This explains everything that can be explained, including the surprising effects of imaginative illnesses.

Mais, pour ne pas languir dans une richesse et une fécondité mal entendue, il faut se borner à un petit nombre de questions et de réflexions.

Mais, pour ne pas s'ennuyer dans une richesse et une fertilité mal comprises, il faut se limiter à un petit nombre de questions et de réflexions.

Pourquoi la vue ou la simple idée d’une belle femme nous cause-t-elle des mouvements et des désirs singuliers? Ce qui se passe alors dans certains organes, vient-il de la nature même de ces organes? Point du tout; mais du commerce et de l’espèce de sympathie de ces muscles avec l’imagination. Il n’y a ici qu’un premier ressort excité par le bene placitum des anciens, ou par l’image de la beauté, qui en excite un autre, lequel était fort assoupi, quand l’imagination l’a éveillé: et comment cela, si ce n’est par le désordre et le tumulte du sang et des esprits, qui galopent avec une promptitude extraordinaire, et vont gonfler les corps caverneux?

Why does the sight or even the mere thought of a beautiful woman stir unique feelings and desires in us? What happens in certain organs doesn’t come from their inherent nature at all; rather, it results from the interaction and the type of sympathy these muscles have with the imagination. There is only a primary trigger activated by the ancient notion of bene placitum or by the image of beauty, which then stimulates another response that was quite dormant until the imagination awakened it. And how does this happen, except through the disorder and turmoil of the blood and spirits, racing with extraordinary speed and filling the cavernous bodies?

Puisqu’il est des communications évidentes entre [62]la mère et l’enfant7, et qu’il est dur de nier des faits rapportés par Tulpius et par d’autres écrivains aussi dignes de foi (il n’y en a point qui le soient plus), nous croirons que c’est par la même voie que le fœtus ressent l’impétuosité de l’imagination maternelle, comme une cire molle reçoit toutes sortes d’impressions; et que les mêmes traces, ou envies de la mère, peuvent s’imprimer sur le fœtus, sans que cela puisse se comprendre, quoiqu’en disent Blondel et tous ses adhérents. Ainsi nous faisons réparation d’honneur au P. Malebranche, beaucoup trop raillé de sa crédulité par les auteurs qui n’ont point observé d’assez près la nature et ont voulu l’assujettir à leur idées.

Since there are obvious connections between [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]the mother and the child7, and it's hard to deny facts reported by Tulpius and other trustworthy writers (none are more reliable), we believe that it is through the same channel that the fetus feels the intense emotions of the mother’s imagination, just like soft wax takes on various impressions; and that the same marks or desires of the mother can be impressed upon the fetus, even though it's difficult to understand how, despite what Blondel and all his followers say. Thus, we restore honor to Father Malebranche, who has been mocked too much for his credulity by authors who haven't closely observed nature and have tried to force it into their ideas.

I shall not go into any more detail concerning all these little subordinate forces, well known to all. But there is another more subtle and marvelous force, which animates them all; it is the source of all our feelings, of all our pleasures, of all our passions, and of all our thoughts: for the brain has its muscles for thinking, as the legs have muscles for walking.67 I wish to speak of this impetuous principle that Hippocrates calls ενορμων (soul). This principle exists and has its seat in the brain at the origin of the nerves, by which it exercises its control over all the rest of the body. By this fact is explained all that can be explained, even to the surprising effects of maladies of the imagination....

I won't go into more detail about all these minor forces that everyone knows. But there’s another, more subtle and amazing force that drives them all; it’s the source of all our feelings, pleasures, passions, and thoughts: the brain has its muscles for thinking, just like our legs have muscles for walking.67 I want to talk about this intense principle that Hippocrates calls ενορμών (soul). This principle exists and is located in the brain at the origin of the nerves, through which it controls the rest of the body. This fact explains everything that can be explained, even the surprising effects of illnesses related to the imagination....

Voyez le portrait de ce fameux Pope, au moins le Voltaire des Anglais. Les efforts, les nerfs de son génie sont peints sur sa physionomie; elle est toute en convulsion; ses yeux sortent de l’orbite, ses sourcils s’élèvent avec les muscles du front. Pourquoi? C’est que l’origine des nerfs est en travail et que tout le corps doit se ressentir d’une espèce d’accouchement aussi laborieux. S’il n’y avait une corde interne qui tirât ainsi celles du dehors, d’où viendraient tous ces phénomènes? Admettre une âme, pour les expliquer, c’est être réduit à l’opération du St. Esprit.

Regardez le portrait de ce fameux Pape, un peu le Voltaire des Anglais. Les efforts, les nerfs de son génie sont visibles sur son visage; il est complètement tordu; ses yeux sortent de leurs orbites, ses sourcils se soulèvent avec les muscles de son front. Pourquoi ? C'est parce que l'origine des nerfs est en action et que tout le corps doit en ressentir un type d'accouchement aussi laborieux. S'il n'y avait pas une corde intérieure qui tirait ainsi celles de l'extérieur, d'où viendraient tous ces phénomènes ? Accepter une âme pour les expliquer, c'est se retrouver réduit à l'opération du St. Esprit.

Look at the portrait of the famous Pope who is, to say the least, the Voltaire of the English. The effort, the energy of his genius are imprinted upon his countenance. It is convulsed. His eyes protrude from their sockets, the eyebrows are raised with the muscles of the forehead. Why? Because the brain is in travail and all the body must share [133]in such a laborious deliverance. If there were not an internal cord which pulled the external ones, whence would come all these phenomena? To admit a soul as explanation of them, is to be reduced to [explaining phenomena by] the operations of the Holy Spirit.

Look at the portrait of the famous Pope who is, to say the least, the Voltaire of the English. The effort and energy of his genius show in his face. It’s tense. His eyes bulge from their sockets, and his eyebrows are raised along with the muscles of his forehead. Why? Because the brain is working hard, and the whole body must participate in this intense process. If there weren’t an internal connection pulling the external ones, where would all these signs come from? To attribute it to a soul as an explanation is to reduce the explanation to the workings of the Holy Spirit. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

En effet, si ce qui pense en mon cerveau n’est pas une partie de ce viscère, et conséquemment de tout le corps, pourquoi, lorsque tranquille dans mon lit je forme le plan d’un ouvrage, ou que je poursuis un raisonnement abstrait, pourquoi mon sang s’échauffe-t-il? pourquoi la fièvre de mon esprit [63]passe-t-elle dans mes veines? Demandez-le aux hommes d’imagination, aux grandes poètes, à ceux qu’un sentiment bien rendu ravit, qu’un goût exquis, que les charmes de la nature, de la vérité ou de la vertu transportent! Par leur enthousiasme, par ce qu’ils vous diront avoir éprouvé, vous jugerez de la cause par les effets: par cette harmonie que Borelli, qu’un seul anatomiste a mieux connue que tous les Leibniziens, vous connaîtrez l’unité matérielle de l’homme. Car enfin si la tension des nerfs qui fait la douleur, cause la fièvre, par laquelle l’esprit est troublé et n’a plus de volonté; et que réciproquement l’esprit trop exercé trouble le corps, et allume ce feu de consomption qui a enlevé Bayle dans un âge si peu avancé; si telle titillation me fait vouloir, me force de désirer ardemment ce dont je ne me souciais nullement le moment d’auparavant; si à leur tour certaines traces du cerveau excitent le même prurit et les mêmes désirs, pourquoi faire double ce qui n’est évidemment qu’un? C’est en vain qu’on se récrie sur l’empire de la volonté. Pour un ordre qu’elle donne, elle subit cent fois le joug. Et quelle merveille que le corps obéisse dan l’état sain, puisqu’un torrent de sang et d’esprits vient l’y forcer, la volonté ayant pour ministres une légion invisible de fluides plus vifs que l’éclair, et toujours prêts a la servir! Mais comme c’est par les nerfs que son pouvoir s’exerce, c’est aussi par eux qu’il est arrêté. La meilleure volonté d’un amant épuisé, les plus violents désirs lui rendront-ils sa vigueur perdue? Hélas! non; et elle en sera la première punie, parceque, posées certaines circonstances, il n’est pas dans sa puissance de ne pas vouloir du plaisir. Ce que j’ai dit de la paralysie, etc. revient ici. [64]

En effet, si ce qui pense dans ma tête n'est pas une partie de mon cerveau, et donc de tout mon corps, pourquoi, quand je suis tranquille dans mon lit et que je planifie un projet, ou que je fais un raisonnement abstrait, pourquoi mon sang s'échauffe-t-il ? Pourquoi la fièvre de mon esprit [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] passe-t-elle dans mes veines ? Demandez aux personnes imaginatives, aux grands poètes, à ceux que ravit un sentiment bien exprimé, un goût exquis, ou les charmes de la nature, de la vérité ou de la vertu ! Par leur enthousiasme, par ce qu'ils vous diront avoir ressenti, vous jugerez de la cause par les effets : par cette harmonie que Borelli, qu'un seul anatomiste a mieux connue que tous les Leibniziens, vous comprendrez l'unité matérielle de l'homme. Car enfin, si la tension des nerfs qui cause la douleur provoque la fièvre, par laquelle l'esprit est troublé et ne peut plus vouloir ; et que vice versa, un esprit trop exercé trouble le corps, et embrase ce feu de consommation qui a emporté Bayle à un âge si jeune ; si cette certaine stimulation me fait désirer ardemment ce dont je ne me souciais pas du tout juste avant ; si à leur tour certaines impressions du cerveau excitent le même besoin et les mêmes désirs, pourquoi faire double de ce qui n'est clairement qu'un ? C'est en vain qu'on se plaint de l'emprise de la volonté. Pour chaque ordre qu'elle donne, elle subit cent fois le joug. Et quelle merveille que le corps obéisse dans un état sain, puisque un torrent de sang et d'esprits vient le forcer, la volonté ayant pour ministres une légion invisible de fluides plus vifs que l'éclair, toujours prêts à la servir ! Mais comme c'est par les nerfs que son pouvoir s'exerce, c'est aussi par eux qu'il est arrêté. La meilleure volonté d'un amoureux épuisé, les désirs les plus violents lui rendront-ils sa vigueur perdue ? Hélas ! non ; et elle en sera la première punie, parce que, sous certaines circonstances, il n'est pas en son pouvoir de ne pas vouloir du plaisir. Ce que j'ai dit de la paralysie, etc. revient ici. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

In fact, if what thinks in my brain is not a part of this organ and therefore of the whole body, why does my blood boil, and the fever of my mind pass into my veins, when lying quietly in bed, I am forming the plan of some work or carrying on an abstract calculation? Put this question to men of imagination, to great poets, to men who are enraptured by the felicitous expression of sentiment, and transported by an exquisite fancy or by the charms of nature, of truth, or of virtue! By their enthusiasm, by what they will tell you they have experienced, you will judge the cause by its effects; by that harmony which Borelli,68 a mere anatomist, understood better than all the Leibnizians, you will comprehend the material unity of man. In short, if the nerve-tension which causes pain occasions also the fever by which the distracted mind loses its will-power, and if, conversely, the mind too much excited, disturbs the body (and kindles that inner fire which killed Bayle while he was still so young); if an agitation rouses my desire and my ardent wish for what, a moment ago, I cared nothing about, and if in their turn certain brain impressions excite the same longing and the same desires, then why should we regard as double what is manifestly one being? In vain you fall back on the power of the will, since for one order that the will gives, it bows a hundred times to the yoke.69 And what wonder that in [134]health the body obeys, since a torrent of blood and of animal spirits70 forces its obedience, and since the will has as ministers an invisible legion of fluids swifter than lightning and ever ready to do its bidding! But as the power of the will is exercised by means of the nerves, it is likewise limited by them.....

In fact, if what I'm thinking doesn’t come from my brain and, therefore, isn’t part of my whole body, why do I feel my blood boiling, and why does the fever in my mind flow through my veins when I’m lying quietly in bed, planning a task or working through a complex thought? Ask imaginative people, great poets, or those who are completely captivated by the beautiful expression of emotion, or moved by the wonders of nature, truth, or virtue! By their enthusiasm and what they share about their experiences, you’ll understand the cause through its effects; through the harmony that Borelli,68 a simple anatomist, understood better than all the Leibnizians, you will grasp the material unity of humanity. In short, if the nerve tension that causes pain also triggers the fever that makes the distracted mind lose its willpower, and if, conversely, an overly excited mind disrupts the body (and ignites that inner fire which killed Bayle so young); if an emotional stir awakens my desire and eagerness for things I didn’t care about moments ago, and if certain brain impressions spark the same longing and desires, then why should we think of them as two separate entities when they are clearly one? It's futile to lean on the power of will, for for every command the will gives, it submits a hundred times to its constraints.69 And it’s no surprise that in [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] health the body complies, since a flood of blood and vital spirits70 enforces its obedience, and the will is supported by an unseen army of fluids that move faster than lightning and are always ready to act! But since the power of the will operates through the nerves, it is also limited by them.....

La jaunisse vous surprend! ne savez vous pas que la couleur des corps dépend de celle des verres au travers desquels on les regarde! Ignorez-vous que telle est la teinte des humeurs, telle est celle des objets, au moins par rapport à nous, vains jouets de mille illusions? Mais ôtez cette teinte de l’humeur aqueuse de l’œil; faites couler la bile par son tamis naturel: alors l’âme ayant d’autres yeux, ne verra plus jaune. N’est ce pas encore ainsi qu’en abattant la cataracte, ou en injectant le canal d’Eustachi, on rend la vue aux aveugles, et l’ouie aux sourds? Combien de gens qui n’étaient peut-être que d’habiles charlatans dans des siècles ignorants, ont passé pour faire de grands miracles! La belle âme et la puissante volonté, qui ne peut agir qu’autant que les dispositions du corps le lui permettent, et dont les goûts changent avec l’âge et la fièvre! Faut-il donc s’étonner si les philosophes ont toujours eu en vue la santé du corps pour conserver celle de l’âme, si Pythagore a aussi soigneusement ordonné la diète, que Platon a défendu le vin? Le régime qui convient au corps, est toujours celui par lequel les médecins sensés prétendent qu’on doit préluder, lorsqu’il s’agit de former l’esprit, de l’élever à la connaissance de la vérité et de la vertu; vains sons dans le désordre des maladies et le tumulte des sens! Sans les préceptes de l’hygiène, Epictète, Socrate, Platon, etc. prêchent en vain: toute morale est infructueuse, pour qui n’a pas la sobrieté en partage: c’est la source de toutes les vertus comme l’intempérance est celle de tous les vices.

Jaundiced, are you surprised? Don’t you know that the color of our bodies depends on the tint of the glasses through which we look at them? Are you unaware that whatever color our humors are, that’s how the objects will appear to us, at least in relation to ourselves, mere playthings of a thousand illusions? But remove that color from the watery humor of the eye; let the bile flow through its natural filter: then the soul, having different eyes, will no longer see yellow. Isn’t it true that by removing cataracts or clearing the Eustachian tubes, we restore sight to the blind and hearing to the deaf? How many people, who might have just been clever charlatans in ignorant centuries, have been thought to perform great miracles! The beautiful soul and the powerful will can only act to the extent that the body allows, and these desires change with age and fever! Should we be surprised that philosophers have always considered physical health essential for the soul’s well-being, and that Pythagoras was as careful about diet as Plato was against wine? The regimen that suits the body is always the one which sensible doctors claim one should begin with when it comes to shaping the mind, raising it to the understanding of truth and virtue; empty sounds amidst the chaos of disease and the turmoil of the senses! Without the principles of hygiene, Epictetus, Socrates, Plato, etc., preach in vain: all morality is fruitless for those who lack temperance; it is the source of all virtues just as intemperance is the root of all vices.

Does the result of jaundice surprise you? Do you not know that the color of bodies depends on the color of the glasses through which we look at them,71 and that whatever is the color of the humors, such is the color of objects, at least for us, vain playthings of a thousand illusions? But remove this color from the aqueous humor of the eye, let the bile flow through its natural filter, then the soul having new eyes, will no longer see yellow. Again, is it not thus, by removing cataract, or by injecting the Eustachian canal, that sight is restored to the blind, or hearing to the deaf? How many people, who were perhaps only clever charlatans, passed for miracle workers in the dark ages! Beautiful the soul, and powerful the will which can not act save by permission of the bodily conditions, and whose tastes change with age and fever! Should we, then, be astonished that philosophers have always had in mind the health of the body, to preserve the health of the soul, that Pythagoras72 gave rules for the diet as carefully as Plato forbade wine?73 The regime suited to the body is always the one with which sane physicians think they must begin, when it is a question of forming the mind, and of instructing it in the knowledge of truth and virtue; but these are vain words in the disorder of illness, and in the tumult of the senses. Without the precepts of hygiene, [135]Epictetus, Socrates, Plato, and the rest preach in vain: all ethics is fruitless for one who lacks his share of temperance; it is the source of all virtues, as intemperance is the source of all vices.

Are you surprised by the outcome of jaundice? Don't you realize that the color of our bodies depends on the lenses we view them through,71 and whatever hue the fluids have, that’s the color of the objects for us, mere playthings of countless illusions? But take away this tint from the eye's aqueous humor; let the bile flow through its natural filter. Then the soul, with newfound eyes, will no longer see yellow. Isn't it true that by removing cataracts or clearing the Eustachian canal, vision is restored to the blind or hearing to the deaf? How many individuals, who were probably just clever con artists, were seen as miracle workers in the dark ages! The soul is beautiful, and the will is powerful, yet it can only act with the body's conditions, which can change with age and fever! Should we be surprised that philosophers have always emphasized the body’s health to maintain the soul’s health? That Pythagoras72 gave dietary rules as carefully as Plato banned wine?73 The ideal regimen for the body is always the one that wise physicians believe should be the starting point when it comes to shaping the mind and teaching it about truth and virtue. But these are just empty words in the chaos of illness and the turmoil of the senses. Without hygiene practices, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]Epictetus, Socrates, Plato, and the others are preaching in vain: all ethics are pointless for anyone lacking moderation; it is the root of all virtues, as lack of moderation is the root of all vices.

En faut-il davantage (et pourquoi irais-je me perdre dans l’histoire des passions, qui toutes s’expliquent par l’ενορμων d’Hippocrate) pour prouver [65]que l’homme n’est qu’un animal, ou un assemblage de ressorts, qui tous se montent les uns par les autres, sans qu’on puisse dire par quel point du cercle humain la nature a commencé? Si ces ressorts diffèrent entr’eux, ce n’est donc que par leur siège et par quelques degrés de force, et jamais par leur nature; et par conséquent l’âme n’est qu’un principe de mouvement, ou une partie matérielle sensible du cerveau, qu’on peut, sans craindre l’erreur, regarder comme un ressort principal de toute la machine, qui a une influence visible sur tous les autres, et même parait avoir été fait le premier; en sorte que tous les autres n’en seraient qu’une émanation, comme on le verra par quelques observations que je rapporterai et qui ont été faites sur divers embryons.

En faut-il davantage (et pourquoi irais-je me perdre dans l'histoire des passions, qui toutes s'expliquent par l'ενορμών d'Hippocrate) pour prouver [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] que l'homme n'est qu'un animal, ou un assemblage de ressorts, qui tous se montent les uns par les autres, sans qu'on puisse dire par quel point du cercle humain la nature a commencé? Si ces ressorts diffèrent entre eux, ce n'est donc que par leur siège et par quelques degrés de force, et jamais par leur nature; et par conséquent l'âme n'est qu'un principe de mouvement, ou une partie matérielle sensible du cerveau, qu'on peut, sans craindre l'erreur, regarder comme un ressort principal de toute la machine, qui a une influence visible sur tous les autres, et même paraît avoir été fait le premier; de sorte que tous les autres n'en seraient qu'une émanation, comme on le verra par quelques observations que je rapporterai et qui ont été faites sur divers embryons.

Is more needed, (for why lose myself in discussion of the passions which are all explained by the term, ενορμων, of Hippocrates) to prove that man is but an animal, or a collection of springs which wind each other up, without our being able to tell at what point in this human circle, nature has begun? If these springs differ among themselves, these differences consist only in their position and in their degrees of strength, and never in their nature; wherefore the soul is but a principle of motion or a material and sensible part of the brain, which can be regarded, without fear of error, as the mainspring of the whole machine, having a visible influence on all the parts. The soul seems even to have been made for the brain, so that all the other parts of the system are but a kind of emanation from the brain. This will appear from certain observations, made on different embryos, which I shall now enumerate.

Is more needed? (Why lose myself in a discussion about the passions that are all explained by the term, ενορμών, from Hippocrates.) To prove that man is just an animal, or a collection of springs that wind each other up, without us being able to identify where in this human circle nature begins? If these springs are different from one another, those differences only lie in their positions and their strengths, but never in their nature. Thus, the soul is merely a principle of motion or a material and sensory part of the brain, which can be accurately considered the mainspring of the entire system, having a visible effect on all the parts. The soul seems to have been designed for the brain, making all the other parts of the system merely an extension of the brain. This will be evident from certain observations made on different embryos, which I will now outline.

Cette oscillation naturelle, ou propre à notre machine, et dont est douée chaque fibre, et, pour ainsi dire, chaque élément fibreux, semblable à celle d’une pendule, ne peut toujours s’exercer. Il faut la renouveler, à mesure qu’elle se perd; lui donner des forces, quand elle languit; l’affaiblir, lorsqu’elle est opprimée par un excès de force et de vigueur. C’est en cela seul que la vraie médecine consiste.

Cette oscillation naturelle, propre à notre corps, et dont chaque fibre, et presque chaque élément fibreux est doté, ressemble à celle d'une pendule, mais ne peut pas toujours se manifester. Il faut la rétablir au fur et à mesure qu'elle s'affaiblit; lui donner de l'énergie quand elle s'épuise; la diminuer lorsqu'elle est surchargée par un excès de force et de vigueur. C'est dans cela que réside la véritable médecine.

This oscillation, which is natural or suited to our machine, and with which each fibre and even each fibrous element, so to speak, seems to be endowed, like that of a pendulum, can not keep up forever. It must be renewed, as it loses strength, invigorated when it is tired, and weakened when it is disturbed by excess of strength and vigor. In this alone, true medicine consists.

This natural oscillation, which fits our bodies and seems to be present in every fiber and even in each fibrous element, like that of a pendulum, cannot last indefinitely. It needs to be refreshed as it loses energy, reinvigorated when it becomes fatigued, and weakened when it's overpowered by too much strength and energy. This is the essence of true medicine.

Le corps n’est qu’une horloge, dont le nouveau chyle est l’horloger. Le premier soin de la nature, quand il entre dans le sang, c’est d’y exciter une sorte de fièvre, que les chimistes, qui ne rêvent que fourneaux, ont dû prendre pour une fermentation. Cette fièvre procure une plus grande filtration d’esprits, qui machinalement vont animer les muscles et le cœur, comme s’ils y étaient envoyés par ordre de la volonté.

Le corps n’est qu’une horloge, dont le nouveau chyle est l’horloger. Le premier soin de la nature, quand il entre dans le sang, c’est d’y exciter une sorte de fièvre, que les chimistes, qui ne rêvent que fourneaux, ont dû prendre pour une fermentation. Cette fièvre procure une plus grande filtration d’esprits, qui machinalement vont animer les muscles et le cœur, comme s’ils y étaient envoyés par ordre de la volonté.

The body is but a watch, whose watchmaker is the new chyle. Nature’s first care, when the chyle [136]enters the blood, is to excite in it a kind of fever74 which the chemists, who dream only of retorts, must have taken for fermentation. This fever produces a greater filtration of spirits, which mechanically animate the muscles and the heart, as if they had been sent there by order of the will.

The body is like a watch, and the new chyle is its watchmaker. Nature’s first priority, when the chyle [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] enters the blood, is to spark a kind of fever74 in it that chemists, who only think about their retorts, must mistake for fermentation. This fever causes a higher filtration of spirits, which mechanically energize the muscles and the heart, as if they were sent there by the will's command.

Ce sont donc les causes ou les forces de la vie qui entretiennent ainsi durant 100 ans le mouvement [66]perpétuel des solides et des fluides, aussi nécessaire aux uns qu’aux autres. Mais qui peut dire si les solides contribuent à ce jeu, plus que les fluides, et vice versa? Tout ce qu’on sait, c’est que l’action des premiers serait bientôt anéantie, sans le secours des seconds. Ce sont les liqueurs qui par leur choc éveillent et conservent l’élasticité des vaisseaux, de laquelle dépend leur propre circulation. De là vient qu’après la mort le ressort naturel de chaque substance est plus ou moins fort encore suivant les restes de la vie, auxquels il survit, pour expirer le dernier. Tant il est vrai que cette force des parties animales peut bien se conserver et s’augmenter par celle de la circulation, mais qu’elle n’en dépend point, puisqu’elle se passe même de l’intégrité de chaque membre, ou viscère, comme on l’a vu.

Ce sont donc les causes ou les forces de la vie qui entretiennent ainsi durant 100 ans le mouvement [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]perpétuel des solides et des fluides, aussi nécessaire aux uns qu’aux autres. Mais qui peut dire si les solides contribuent à ce jeu, plus que les fluides, et vice versa? Tout ce qu’on sait, c’est que l’action des premiers serait bientôt anéantie, sans le secours des seconds. Ce sont les liquides qui, par leur choc, éveillent et conservent l’élasticité des vaisseaux, de laquelle dépend leur propre circulation. De là vient qu’après la mort, le ressort naturel de chaque substance est plus ou moins fort encore, selon les restes de la vie auxquels il survit, pour expirer le dernier. Tant il est vrai que cette force des parties animales peut bien se conserver et s’augmenter par celle de la circulation, mais qu’elle n’en dépend point, puisqu’elle se passe même de l’intégrité de chaque membre ou viscère, comme on l’a vu.

These then are the causes or the forces of life which thus sustain for a hundred years that perpetual movement of the solids and the liquids which is as necessary to the first as to the second. But who can say whether the solids contribute more than the fluids to this movement or vice versa? All that we know is that the action of the former would soon cease without the help of the latter, that is, without the help of the fluids which by their onset rouse and maintain the elasticity of the blood vessels on which their own circulation depends. From this it follows that after death the natural resilience of each substance is still more or less strong according to the remnants of life which it outlives, being the last to perish. So true is it that this force of the animal parts can be preserved and strengthened by that of the circulation, but that it does not depend on the strength of the circulation, since, as we have seen, it can dispense with even the integrity of each member or organ.

These are the causes or forces of life that sustain for a hundred years the constant movement of solids and liquids, which is just as essential to both. But who can say whether the solids contribute more to this movement or the fluids do? All we know is that the action of the solids would soon stop without the support of the fluids, which, by their presence, stimulate and maintain the elasticity of the blood vessels that rely on their own circulation. Therefore, after death, the natural resilience of each substance remains somewhat strong based on the remnants of life that it outlasts, as they are the last to fade away. It’s true that the vitality of the animal parts can be preserved and strengthened by the circulation, but it does not rely on the strength of the circulation, since, as we've seen, it can function without the complete integrity of each part or organ.

Je n’ignore pas que cette opinion n’a pas été goûtée de tous les savants, et que Stahl surtout l’a fort dédaignée. Ce grand chimiste a voulu nous persuader que l’âme était la seule cause de tous nos mouvements. Mais c’est parler en fanatique, et non en philosophe.

Je sais que cette opinion n'a pas été appréciée par tous les chercheurs, et que Stahl, en particulier, l'a beaucoup méprisée. Ce grand chimiste a voulu nous convaincre que l'âme était la seule cause de tous nos mouvements. Mais c'est parler comme un fanatique, et non comme un philosophe.

I am aware that this opinion has not been relished by all scholars, and that Stahl especially had much scorn for it. This great chemist has wished to persuade us that the soul is the sole cause of all our movements. But this is to speak as a fanatic and not as a philosopher.

I know that not all scholars have appreciated this viewpoint, and Stahl in particular had a lot of disdain for it. This prominent chemist tried to convince us that the soul is the only reason for all our movements. But that's more like the talk of a fanatic than a philosopher.

Pour détruire l’hypothèse Stahlienne, il ne faut pas faire tant d’efforts que je vois qu’on en a faits avant moi. Il n’y a qu’à jeter les yeux sur un joueur de violon. Quelle souplesse! Quelle agilité dans les doigts! Les mouvements sont si prompts, qu’il ne paraît presque pas y avoir de succession. Or, je prie, ou plutôt je défie les Stahliens de me dire, eux qui connaissent si bien tout ce que peut notre âme, comment il serait possible qu’elle exécutât si vite tant de mouvements, des mouvements qui se passent si loin d’elle, et en tant d’endroits [67]divers. C’est supposer un joueur de flûte qui pourrait faire de brillantes cadences sur une infinité de trous qu’il ne connaitrait pas, et auxquels il ne pourrait seulement pas appliquer le doigt.

Pour démolir l'hypothèse Stahlienne, il n'est pas nécessaire de fournir les efforts que je constate avoir été déployés avant moi. Il suffit de regarder un violoniste. Quelle souplesse ! Quelle agilité dans ses doigts ! Les mouvements sont si rapides qu'on dirait qu'il n'y a presque pas de succession. Alors, je demande, ou plutôt je mets au défi les Stahliens de m'expliquer, eux qui connaissent si bien ce que peut notre âme, comment il serait possible qu'elle réalise autant de mouvements si vite, des mouvements qui se produisent si loin d'elle et à tant d'endroits [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] divers. Cela supposerait un flûtiste capable de jouer de brillantes cadences sur une multitude de trous qu'il ne connaît pas et auxquels il ne pourrait même pas mettre le doigt.

To destroy the hypothesis of Stahl,75 we need not make as great an effort as I find that others have [137]done before me. We need only glance at a violinist. What flexibility, what lightness in his fingers! The movements are so quick, that it seems almost as if there were no succession. But I pray, or rather I challenge, the followers of Stahl who understand so perfectly all that our soul can do, to tell me how it could possibly execute so many motions so quickly, motions, moreover, which take place so far from the soul, and in so many different places. That is to suppose that a flute player could play brilliant cadences on an infinite number of holes that he could not know, and on which he could not even put his finger!

To disprove Stahl's hypothesis,75 we don't need to try as hard as others have [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] before me. Just take a look at a violinist. The flexibility and lightness in his fingers! The movements are so fast that it seems like there’s no sequence at all. But I ask, or rather I challenge, the supporters of Stahl who claim to fully understand everything our soul can do, to explain how it’s possible to execute so many motions so quickly, especially when these actions happen far from the soul and in so many different places. That would be like saying a flute player could play stunning cadences on countless holes he couldn't even see, and on which he couldn't even place his fingers!

Mais disons avec Mr. Hecquet qu’il n’est pas permis à tout le monde d’aller à Corinthe. Et pourquoi Stahl n’aurait-il pas été encore plus favorisé de la nature en qualité d’homme, qu’en qualité de chimiste et de praticien? Il fallait (heureux mortel!) qu’il eût reçu une autre âme que le reste des hommes; une âme souveraine, qui non contente d’avoir quelque empire sur les muscles volontaires, tenait sans peine les rênes de tous les mouvements du corps, pouvait les suspendre, les calmer, ou les exciter à son gré. Avec une maîtresse aussi despotique, dans les mains de laquelle étaient en quelque sorte les battements du cœur et les lois de la circulation, point de fièvre sans doute; point de douleur; point de langueur; ni honteuse impuissance, ni facheux priapisme. L’âme veut, et les ressorts jouent, se dressent, ou se débandent. Comment ceux de la machine de Stahl se sont-ils sitôt détraqués? Qui a chez soi un si grand médecin, devrait être immortel.

But let’s agree with Mr. Hecquet that not everyone is allowed to go to Corinth. And why shouldn’t Stahl have been even more favored by nature as a person than as a chemist and practitioner? It must be (lucky soul!) that he had a different spirit than the rest of humanity; a sovereign spirit that, not only capable of exerting some control over the voluntary muscles, effortlessly held the reins of all bodily movements, could suspend, calm, or excite them at will. With such a controlling force at play, which in a sense governed the heartbeat and the laws of circulation, there was undoubtedly no fever; no pain; no weakness; neither shameful impotence nor troublesome priapism. The spirit wants, and the mechanisms respond, standing up or falling apart. How is it that the mechanisms of Stahl's machine malfunctions so quickly? Anyone who has such a great doctor at home should be immortal.

But let us say with M. Hecquet76 that all men may not go to Corinth.77 Why should not Stahl have been even more favored by nature as a man than as a chemist and a practitioner? Happy mortal, he must have received a soul different from that of the rest of mankind,—a sovereign soul, which, not content with having some control over the voluntary muscles, easily held the reins of all the movements of the body, and could suspend them, calm them, or excite them, at its pleasure! With so despotic a mistress, in whose hands were, in a sense, the beating of the heart, and the laws of circulation, there could certainly be no fever, no pain, no weariness,...! The soul wills, and the springs play, contract or relax. But how did the springs of Stahl’s machine get out of order so soon? He who has in himself so great a doctor, should be immortal.

But let's agree with M. Hecquet76 that not all men can go to Corinth.77 Why shouldn't Stahl have been even more naturally gifted as a person than as a chemist and practitioner? Lucky man, he must have had a soul that's different from everyone else's—a powerful soul that, not satisfied with just controlling the voluntary muscles, could easily manage all the body movements, stopping, calming, or energizing them at will! With such a controlling force, which had in some ways the power over the heartbeat and circulation, there wouldn’t be any fever, no pain, no exhaustion...! The soul commands, and the springs respond, contracting or relaxing. But how did the springs in Stahl's system break down so quickly? Someone with such a great healer within should be immortal.

Stahl, au reste, n’est pas le seul qui ait rejeté le principe d’oscillation des corps organisés. De plus grands esprits ne l’ont pas employé, lorsqu’ils ont voulu expliquer l’action du cœur, l’érection du penis, etc. Il n’y a qu’à lire les Institutions de médecine de Boerhaave, pour voir quels laborieux et séduisants systèmes, faute d’admettre une force aussi frappante dans tous les corps, ce grand homme a été obligé d’enfanter à la sueur de son puissant génie. [68]

Stahl, by the way, isn't the only one who dismissed the principle of oscillation in organized bodies. Even greater minds have avoided it when trying to explain the action of the heart, the erection of the penis, and so on. Just read Boerhaave's Institutions of Medicine to see the intricate and appealing systems this great man was forced to create, out of the necessity of not accepting such a striking force in all bodies, all stemming from his powerful genius. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

Moreover, Stahl is not the only one who has rejected the principle of the vibration of organic bodies. Greater minds have not used the principle [138]when they wished to explain the action of the heart, ... etc. One need only read the “Institutions of Medicine” by Boerhaave78 to see what laborious and enticing systems this great man was obliged to invent, by the labor of his mighty genius, through failure to admit that there is so wonderful a force in all bodies.

Moreover, Stahl isn't the only one who has dismissed the idea of the vibration of organic bodies. Greater minds have not relied on this principle [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] when trying to explain how the heart works, ... etc. Just read the “Institutions of Medicine” by Boerhaave78 to see the complex and fascinating systems this great man had to create, using the brilliance of his intellect, because he failed to recognize that such an extraordinary force exists in all bodies.

Willis et Perrault, esprits d’une plus faible trempe, mais observateurs assidus de la nature, que le fameux professeur de Leyde n’a connue que par autrui et n’a eue, pour ainsi dire, que de la seconde main, paraissent avoir mieux aimé supposer une âme généralement répandue par tout le corps, que le principe dont nous parlons. Mais dans cette hypothèse qui fut celle de Virgile et de tous les Epicuriens, hypothèse que l’histoire du polype semblerait favoriser à la première vue, les mouvements qui survivent au sujet dans lequel ils sont inhérents viennent d’un reste d’âme, que conservent encore les parties qui se contractent, sans être désormais irritées par le sang et les esprits. D’où l’on voit que ces écrivains dont les ouvrages solides éclipsent aisément toutes les fables philosophiques, ne se sont trompés que sur le modèle de ceux qui ont donné à la matière la faculté de penser, je veux dire, pour s’être mal exprimés, en termes obscurs, et qui ne signifient rien. En effet, qu’est ce que ce reste d’âme, si ce n’est la force motrice des Leibniziens, mal rendue par une telle expression, et que cependant Perrault surtout a véritablement entrevue. Voy. son Traité de la Mécanique des Animaux.

Willis and Perrault, who were less intellectually robust but keen observers of nature—whom the famous professor of Leiden only knew through others and, so to speak, only secondhand—seem to have preferred to assume a soul that is generally spread throughout the body rather than the principle we're discussing. However, in this hypothesis, which was also that of Virgil and all the Epicureans, an idea that the history of the polyp might seem to support at first glance, the movements that persist in the subject to which they belong arise from a remnant of the soul that the contracting parts still retain, even though they are no longer stimulated by blood and spirits. Thus, we see that these writers, whose substantial works easily overshadow all the philosophical fables, were only mistaken in the model of those who attributed the ability to think to matter. I mean, they expressed themselves poorly, using obscure terms that signify nothing. Indeed, what is this remnant of the soul, if not the driving force of the Leibnizians, poorly described by such a term, yet which Perrault especially has truly glimpsed? See his Treatise on the Mechanics of Animals.

Willis79 and Perrault,80 minds of a more feeble stamp, but careful observers of nature (whereas nature was known to the famous Leyden professor only through others and second hand, so to speak) seem to have preferred to suppose a soul generally extended over the whole body, instead of the principle which we are describing. But according to this hypothesis (which was the hypothesis of Vergil and of all Epicureans, an hypothesis which the history of the polyp might seem at first sight to favor) the movements which go on after the death of the subject in which they inhere are due to a remnant of soul still maintained by the parts that contract, though, from the moment of death, these are not excited by the blood and the spirits. Whence it may be seen that these writers, whose solid works easily eclipse all philosophic fables, are deceived only in the manner of those who have endowed matter with the faculty of thinking, I mean to say, by having expressed themselves badly in obscure and meaningless terms. In truth, what is this remnant of a soul, if it is not the “moving force” of the Leibnizians (badly rendered by such an expression), which however Perrault in particular has really foreseen. See his “Treatise on the Mechanism of Animals.”

Willis79 and Perrault,80 though not as strong-minded, were careful observers of nature (while the famous Leyden professor only understood nature through others and secondhand). They seem to have preferred to believe in a soul that spreads throughout the entire body, rather than the principle we are discussing. According to this theory (which was also held by Vergil and all the Epicureans, and one which the history of the polyp might initially seem to support), the movements that occur after the death of the subject are due to a remnant of the soul still held by the contracting parts, even though these parts are no longer stimulated by blood and spirits post-death. This shows that these writers, whose substantial works easily overshadow all philosophical myths, are mistaken in the same way that those who attribute thought to matter are—by expressing themselves poorly in obscure and nonsensical language. In reality, what is this remnant of a soul, if not the “moving force” of the Leibnizians (which is poorly labeled), which Perrault, in particular, has actually anticipated. See his “Treatise on the Mechanism of Animals.”

A présent qu’il est clairement démontré contre les Cartésiens, les Stahliens, les Malebranchistes, et les théologiens peu dignes d’être ici placés, que la matière se meut par elle-même, non seulement lorsqu’elle est organisée, comme dans un cœur entier, par exemple, mais lors même que cette organisation est détruite, la curiosité de l’homme voudrait savoir comment un corps, par cela même qu’il est originairement doué d’un souffle de vie, se trouve en conséquence orné de la faculté de sentir, et enfin par [69]celle-ci de la pensée. Et pour en venir à bout, ô bon Dieu, quels efforts n’ont pas faits certains philosophes! et quel galimatias j’ai eu la patience de lire à ce sujet!

A présent qu'il est clairement démontré contre les Cartésiens, les Stahliens, les Malebranchistes, et les théologiens peu dignes d’être ici placés, que la matière se meut par elle-même, non seulement lorsqu’elle est organisée, comme dans un cœur entier, par exemple, mais lors même que cette organisation est détruite, la curiosité de l’homme voudrait savoir comment un corps, par cela même qu’il est originairement doué d’un souffle de vie, se trouve en conséquence orné de la faculté de sentir, et enfin par [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]celle-ci de la pensée. Et pour en venir à bout, ô bon Dieu, quels efforts n’ont pas faits certains philosophes! et quel galimatias j’ai eu la patience de lire à ce sujet!

Now that it is clearly proved against the Cartesians, [139]the followers of Stahl, the Malebranchists, and the theologians who little deserve to be mentioned here, that matter is self-moved,81 not only when organized, as in a whole heart, for example, but even when this organization has been destroyed, human curiosity would like to discover how a body, by the fact that it is originally endowed with the breath of life, finds itself adorned in consequence with the faculty of feeling, and thus with that of thought. And, heavens, what efforts have not been made by certain philosophers to manage to prove this! and what nonsense on this subject I have had the patience to read!

Now that it's clearly proven against the Cartesians, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]the followers of Stahl, the Malebranchists, and some theologians who really don't deserve mention here, that matter moves on its own,81 not just when it's organized, like in a whole heart, for example, but even when that organization is destroyed, human curiosity wants to know how a body, because it originally has the breath of life, ends up having the ability to feel and therefore to think. And, wow, what efforts have been made by certain philosophers to try to prove this! And how much nonsense on this topic I have had the patience to read!

Tout ce que l’expérience nous apprend, c’est que tant que le mouvement subsiste, si petit qu’il soit dans une ou plusieurs fibres, il n’y a qu’à les piquer, pour réveiller, animer ce mouvement presque éteint, comme on l’a vu dans cette foule d’expériences dont j’ai voulu accabler les systèmes. Il est donc constant que le mouvement et le sentiment s’excitent tour à tour, et dans les corps entiers, et dans les mêmes corps dont la structure est détruite; pour ne rien dire de certaines plantes qui semblent nous offrir les mêmes phénomènes de la réunion du sentiment et du mouvement.

Everything that experience teaches us is that as long as movement exists, no matter how small it may be in one or more fibers, a simple poke is enough to awaken and energize that almost extinguished movement, as we've seen in a multitude of experiments that I wanted to overwhelm the systems with. It is therefore clear that movement and sensation excite each other in turn, both in entire bodies and in the very bodies whose structure has been destroyed; not to mention certain plants that seem to exhibit the same phenomena of the connection between sensation and movement.

All that experience teaches us is that while movement persists, however slight it may be, in one or more fibres, we need only stimulate them to re-excite and animate this movement almost extinguished. This has been shown in the host of experiments with which I have undertaken to crush the systems. It is therefore certain that motion and feeling excite each other in turn, both in a whole body and in the same body when its structure is destroyed, to say nothing of certain plants which seem to exhibit the same phenomena of the union of feeling and motion.

All that experience teaches us is that as long as there’s some movement, no matter how small, in one or more fibers, we just need to stimulate them to reignite and revive that nearly extinguished movement. This has been demonstrated in the countless experiments I've conducted to challenge existing theories. It’s clear that motion and sensation trigger each other, both in an entire organism and within the same organism when its structure is damaged, not to mention certain plants that seem to show similar phenomena of the connection between sensation and movement.

Mais de plus, combien d’excellents philosophes ont démontré que la pensée n’est qu’une faculté de sentir, et que l’âme raisonnable n’est que l’âme sensitive appliquée à contempler les idées, et à raisonner! Ce qui serait prouvé par cela seul que lorsque le sentiment est éteint, la pensée l’est aussi, comme dans l’apoplexie, la léthargie, la catalepsie, etc. Car ceux qui ont avancé que l’âme n’avait pas moins pensé dans les maladies soporeuses, quoiqu’elle ne se souvint pas des idées qu’elle avait eues, ont soutenu une chose ridicule.

Mais en plus, combien d’excellents philosophes ont prouvé que la pensée n’est qu’une capacité de ressentir, et que l’âme raisonnable n’est que l’âme sensible appliquée à contempler des idées et à raisonner ! Cela serait prouvé rien que par le fait que lorsque le sentiment est éteint, la pensée l’est aussi, comme dans l’apoplexie, la léthargie, la catalepsie, etc. Car ceux qui ont affirmé que l’âme avait tout de même pensé dans les maladies soporeuses, même si elle ne se souvenait pas des idées qu’elle avait eues, ont soutenu une idée ridicule.

But furthermore, how many excellent philosophers have shown that thought is but a faculty of feeling, and that the reasonable soul is but the feeling soul engaged in contemplating its ideas and in reasoning! This would be proved by the fact alone that when feeling is stifled, thought also is checked, for instance in apoplexy, in lethargy, in catalepsis, etc. For it is ridiculous to suggest that, during these stupors, the soul keeps on thinking, [140]even though it does not remember the ideas that it has had.

But also, how many great philosophers have shown that thinking is just a way of feeling, and that a rational mind is just a feeling mind focused on its ideas and reasoning! This is proven by the simple fact that when feelings are suppressed, thinking is also halted, as seen in conditions like a stroke, lethargy, and catalepsy, etc. It's absurd to think that during these states, the mind keeps thinking, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]even if it can't recall the ideas it had.

Pour ce qui est de ce développement, c’est une folie de perdre le temps à en rechercher le mécanisme. La nature du mouvement nous est aussi inconnue que celle de la matière. Le moyen de découvrir comment il s’y produit, à moins que de ressusciter avec l’auteur de l’Histoire de l’Ame l’ancienne et inintelligible doctrine des formes substantielles! Je suis [70]donc aussi consolé d’ignorer comment la matière, d’inerte et simple, devient active et composée d’organes, que de ne pouvoir regarder le soleil sans verre rouge: et je suis d’aussi bonne composition sur les autres merveilles incompréhensibles de la nature, sur la production du sentiment et de la pensée dans un être qui ne paraissait autrefois à nos yeux bornés qu’un peu de boue.

As for this development, it’s a waste of time to look for its mechanism. The nature of movement is as unknown to us as that of matter. The way to find out how it happens, unless we were to revive with the author of l’Histoire de l’Ame the ancient and incomprehensible doctrine of substantial forms! I’m [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] therefore just as comforted by my ignorance of how issue, inert and simple, becomes active and composed of organs, as I am by my inability to look at the sun without a red glass; and I feel just as at ease regarding the other incomprehensible wonders of nature, about the production of feeling and thought in a being that once appeared to our limited eyes as just a bit of mud.

As to the development of feeling and motion, it is absurd to waste time seeking for its mechanism. The nature of motion is as unknown to us as that of matter.82 How can we discover how it is produced unless, like the author of “The History of the Soul,” we resuscitate the old and unintelligible doctrine of substantial forms? I am then quite as content not to know how inert and simple matter becomes active and highly organized, as not to be able to look at the sun without red glasses; and I am as little disquieted concerning the other incomprehensible wonders of nature, the production of feeling and of thought in a being which earlier appeared to our limited eyes as a mere clod of clay.

When it comes to understanding feelings and motion, it’s silly to spend time trying to find out how they work. The essence of motion is just as mysterious to us as that of matter.82 How can we figure out how it occurs unless, like the writer of “The History of the Soul,” we revive the old, confusing idea of substantial forms? I’m perfectly fine not knowing how lifeless and simple matter becomes active and complex, just like I can’t look at the sun without special glasses; and I’m not worried about other baffling aspects of nature, like how feelings and thoughts arise in a being that once seemed like just a lump of clay to our limited perception.

Qu’on m’accorde seulement que la matière organisée est douée d’un principe moteur, qui seul la différencie de celle qui ne l’est pas (eh! peut-on rien refuser à l’observation la plus incontestable?) et que tout dépend dans les animaux de la diversité de cette organisation, comme je l’ai assez prouvé; c’en est assez pour deviner l’énigme des substances et celle de l’homme. On voit qu’il n’y en a qu’une dans l’univers et que l’homme est la plus parfaite. Il est au singe, aux animaux les plus spirituels, ce que le pendule planétaire de Huygens est à une montre de Julien le Roi. S’il a fallu plus d’instruments, plus de rouages, plus de ressorts pour marquer les mouvements des planètes, que pour marquer les heures, ou les répéter; s’il a fallu plus d’art à Vaucanson pour faire son Fluteur, que pour son Canard, il eût dû en employer encore davantage pour faire un Parleur; machine qui ne peut plus être regardée comme impossible, surtout entre les mains d’un nouveau Prométhée. Il était donc de même nécessaire que la nature employât plus d’art et d’appareil pour faire et entretenir une machine, qui pendant un siècle entier pût marquer tous les battements du cœur et de l’esprit; car si on n’en voit pas au pouls les heures, c’est du moins le baromètre de la chaleur et de la vivacité, par laquelle on peut [71]juger de la nature de l’âme. Je ne me trompe point, le corps humain est une horloge, mais immense, et construite avec tant d’artifice et d’habileté, que si la roue qui sert à marquer les secondes vient à s’arrêter, celle des minutes tourne et va toujours son train, comme la roue des quarts continue de se mouvoir; et ainsi des autres, quand les premières, rouillées, ou dérangées par quelque cause que ce soit, ont interrompu leur marche. Car n’est-ce pas ainsi que l’obstruction de quelques vaisseaux ne suffit pas pour détruire, ou suspendre le fort des mouvements, qui est dans le cœur, comme dans la pièce ouvrière de la machine; puisqu’au contraire les fluides dont le volume est diminué, ayant moins de chemin a faire, le parcourent d’autant plus vite, emportés comme par un nouveau courant, que la force du cœur s’augmente en raison de la résistance qu’il trouve à l’extrémité des vaisseaux? Lorsque le nerf optique seul comprimé ne laisse plus passer l’image des objets, n’est-ce pas ainsi que la privation de la vue n’empêche pas plus l’usage de l’ouïe, que la privation de ce sens, lorsque les fonctions de la portion molle sont interdites, ne suppose celle de l’autre? N’est-ce pas ainsi encore que l’un entend, sans pouvoir dire qu’il entend (si ce n’est après l’attaque du mal) et que l’autre qui n’entend rien, mais dont les nerfs linguaux sont libres dans le cerveau, dit machinalement tous les rêves qui lui passent par la tête? Phénomènes qui ne surprennent point les médecins éclairés. Ils savent à quoi s’en tenir sur la nature de l’homme; et pour le dire en passant: de deux médecins, le meilleur, celui qui mérite le plus de confiance, c’est toujours, à mon avis, celui qui est le plus versé dans la physique, [72]ou la mécanique du corps humain, et qui laissant l’âme et toutes les inquiétudes que cette chimère donne aux sots et aux ignorans, n’est occupé sérieusement que du pur naturalisme.

Qu’on me permette simplement de dire que la matière organisée a un principe moteur, qui est ce qui la distingue de celle qui ne l’est pas (eh ! peut-on vraiment nier l'observation la plus indiscutable ?) et que tout chez les animaux dépend de la diversité de cette organisation, comme je l'ai suffisamment prouvé ; cela suffit pour deviner le mystère des substances et celui de l’homme. On voit qu'il n'y en a qu'une dans l'univers et que l'homme est le plus parfait. Il est pour le singe, pour les animaux les plus intelligents, ce que le pendule planétaire de Huygens est à une montre de Julien le Roi. S'il a fallu plus d'instruments, plus de rouages, plus de ressorts pour marquer les mouvements des planètes que pour indiquer les heures, ou les répéter ; s'il a fallu plus de savoir-faire à Vaucanson pour faire son Fluteur que pour son Canard, il aurait dû en utiliser encore plus pour créer un Parleur; une machine qui ne peut plus être considérée comme impossible, surtout entre les mains d'un nouveau Prométhée. Il était donc nécessaire que la nature utilise plus d'art et de moyens pour créer et entretenir une machine qui puisse marquer tous les battements du cœur et de l'esprit pendant une centaine d'années ; car si on ne voit pas l'heure au pouls, c’est au moins le baromètre de la chaleur et de la vivacité, à partir duquel on peut [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]juger de la nature de l’âme. Je ne me trompe pas, le corps humain est une horloge immense, construite avec tant d'ingéniosité et de précision, que si la roue qui marque les secondes s'arrête, celle des minutes continue à tourner, tout comme la roue des quarts continue de bouger ; et ainsi de suite, même lorsque les premières, rouillées ou altérées par quelque cause que ce soit, interrompent leur mouvement. Car n'est-ce pas ainsi que l'obstruction de quelques vaisseaux ne suffit pas à détruire ou suspendre les mouvements majeurs, qui sont dans le cœur, comme dans le mécanisme de la machine ; puisque, au contraire, les fluides dont le volume est réduit, ayant moins de chemin à parcourir, le traversent plus rapidement, entraînés comme par un nouveau courant, car la force du cœur s'augmente proportionnellement à la résistance qu'il rencontre à l’extrémité des vaisseaux ? Lorsque le nerf optique est comprimé et n laisse plus passer l'image des objets, n'est-ce pas ainsi que la perte de la vue n'empêche pas l'engagement de l'ouïe, tout comme la perte de ce sens, lorsque les fonctions de la portion molle sont interdites, ne suppose pas une diminution de l'autre ? N'est-ce pas encore le cas qu'une personne entend sans pouvoir dire qu'elle entend (sauf après l'apparition de la maladie) et qu'une autre, qui n'entend rien, mais dont les nerfs linguaux sont actifs dans le cerveau, exprime machinalement tous les rêves qui lui traversent l'esprit ? Phénomènes qui ne surprennent pas les médecins éclairés. Ils savent ce qu'il en est de la nature humaine ; et pour le dire en passant : parmi deux médecins, le meilleur, celui qui mérite le plus de confiance, c'est toujours, à mon avis, celui qui est le plus instruit en physique, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]ou la mécanique du corps humain, et qui, délaissant l’âme et toutes les préoccupations que cette chimère suscite chez les naïfs et les ignorants, s'engage sérieusement uniquement dans le pur naturalisme.

Grant only that organized matter is endowed with a principle of motion, which alone differentiates it from the inorganic (and can one deny this in the face of the most incontestable observation?) and that among animals, as I have sufficiently proved, everything depends upon the diversity of this organization: these admissions suffice for guessing the riddle of substances and of man. It [thus] appears that there is but one [type of organization] in the universe, and that man is the most perfect [example]. He is to the ape, and to the most intelligent animals, as the planetary pendulum of Huyghens83 is to a watch of Julien Leroy.84 More instruments, more wheels and more springs were necessary to mark the movements of the planets than to mark or strike the hours; and Vaucanson,85 who needed more skill for making his flute player [141]than for making his duck, would have needed still more to make a talking man, a mechanism no longer to be regarded as impossible, especially in the hands of another Prometheus. In like fashion, it was necessary that nature should use more elaborate art in making and sustaining a machine which for a whole century could mark all motions of the heart and of the mind; for though one does not tell time by the pulse, it is at least the barometer of the warmth and the vivacity by which one may estimate the nature of the soul. I am right! The human body is a watch, a large watch constructed with such skill and ingenuity, that if the wheel which marks the seconds happens to stop, the minute wheel turns and keeps on going its round, and in the same way the quarter-hour wheel, and all the others go on running when the first wheels have stopped because rusty or, for any reason, out of order. Is it not for a similar reason that the stoppage of a few blood vessels is not enough to destroy or suspend the strength of the movement which is in the heart as in the mainspring of the machine; since, on the contrary, the fluids whose volume is diminished, having a shorter road to travel, cover the ground more quickly, borne on as by a fresh current which the energy of the heart increases in proportion to the resistance it encounters at the ends of the blood-vessels? And is not this the reason why the loss of sight (caused by the compression of the optic nerve and by its ceasing to convey the images of objects) no more hinders hearing, than the loss of hearing (caused by obstruction of the functions of the auditory nerve) implies the loss of sight? In the same way, finally, does not one man [142]hear (except immediately after his attack) without being able to say that he hears, while another who hears nothing, but whose lingual nerves are uninjured in the brain, mechanically tells of all the dreams which pass through his mind? These phenomena do not surprise enlightened physicians at all. They know what to think about man’s nature, and (more accurately to express myself in passing) of two physicians, the better one and the one who deserves more confidence is always, in my opinion, the one who is more versed in the physique or mechanism of the human body, and who, leaving aside the soul and all the anxieties which this chimera gives to fools and to ignorant men, is seriously occupied only in pure naturalism.

Grant only that organized matter has a principle of motion, which sets it apart from inorganic matter (and can anyone deny this in light of undeniable observation?). If we accept that everything in animals hinges on the variety of this organization, as I have sufficiently demonstrated, these admissions are enough to unravel the mystery of substances and humanity. It seems there is just one form of organization in the universe, and that humanity is the most advanced example of it. Man is to the ape, and to the smartest animals, as Huyghens' planetary pendulum83 is to a watch made by Julien Leroy.84 More tools, more gears, and more springs were necessary to track the movements of the planets than to keep time. Vaucanson,85 who required more skill to create his flute player [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] than his duck, would need even more expertise to create a talking man, a feat no longer deemed impossible, especially by someone like another Prometheus. Likewise, nature had to employ more intricate techniques to create and maintain a machine that could for a whole century record every movement of the heart and mind. While one doesn't tell time by the pulse, it serves as a gauge for the warmth and liveliness from which one might assess the nature of the soul. I am correct! The human body is like a watch, a large watch crafted with such skill and ingenuity that if the second hand stops, the minute hand continues, as do the quarter-hour hand and all others, even if the initial gears have ceased due to rust or any other reason. Isn't it true that the blockage of a few blood vessels isn't enough to destroy or halt the energy of movement in the heart, akin to the mainspring of the machine? On the contrary, as the volume of fluids decreases, they travel a shorter distance more quickly, propelled as if by a fresh current that the heart's vigor increases in response to the resistance it meets in the blood vessels? And doesn't the loss of sight (caused by pressure on the optic nerve and its failure to transmit images) not impede hearing, just as the loss of hearing (due to dysfunction of the auditory nerve) does not mean the loss of sight? Similarly, can one man [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] hear (except right after his attack) without being able to articulate that he hears, while another, who hears nothing but has intact linguistic nerves in the brain, can mechanically recount all the dreams that occur in his mind? These occurrences do not astonish knowledgeable physicians at all. They understand what to think about human nature, and (to clarify further) among two physicians, the more competent one and the one who earns more trust is always, in my opinion, the one who is more knowledgeable about the physical or mechanical aspects of the human body, who, aside from the soul and the concerns that this chimera raises for fools and the uninformed, is solely focused on pure naturalism.

Laissons donc le prétendu Mr. Charp se moquer des philosophes qui ont regardé les animaux, comme des machines. Que je pense différemment! Je crois que Descartes serait un homme respectable à tous égards, si, né dans un siècle qu’il n’eût pas dû éclairer, il eût connu le prix de l’expérience et de l’observation, et le danger de s’en écarter. Mais il n’est pas moins juste que je fasse ici une authentique réparation à ce grand homme, pour tous ces petits philosophes mauvais plaisants, et mauvais singes de Locke, qui, au lieu de rire impudemment au nez de Descartes, feraient mieux de sentir que sans lui le champ de la philosophie, comme celui du bon esprit sans Newton, serait peut être encore en friche.

Let’s let the so-called Mr. Charp mock the philosophers who viewed animals as machines. What a different opinion I have! I believe Descartes would be a respectable man in every way if, born in a century he shouldn’t have illuminated, he had understood the value of experience and observation, and the danger of straying from them. But it’s equally fair that I make an authentic defense of this great man against all those little philosophers, bad jokers, and poor imitations of Locke, who, instead of shamelessly laughing in Descartes’s face, would do better to realize that without him, the field of philosophy, like that of good sense without Newton, might still be fallow.

Therefore let the pretended M. Charp deride philosophers who have regarded animals as machines. How different is my view! I believe that Descartes would be a man in every way worthy of respect, if, born in a century that he had not been obliged to enlighten, he had known the value of experiment and observation, and the danger of cutting loose from them. But it is none the less just for me to make an authentic reparation to this great man for all the insignificant philosophers—poor jesters, and poor imitators of Locke—who instead of laughing impudently at Descartes, might better realize that without him the field of philosophy, like the field of science without Newton, might perhaps be still uncultivated.

So let the fake M. Charp make fun of philosophers who see animals as machines. My perspective is completely different! I believe that Descartes would deserve respect in every way if, born in a time he didn't have to enlighten, he had understood the importance of experimentation and observation, as well as the risks of straying from them. However, it’s still fair for me to genuinely honor this great man in light of all the mediocre philosophers—pathetic clowns, and poor imitators of Locke—who, instead of arrogantly mocking Descartes, should acknowledge that without him, the field of philosophy, much like science without Newton, might still be untouched.

Il est vrai que ce célèbre philosophe s’est beaucoup trompé, et personne n’en disconvient. Mais enfin il a connu la nature animale; il a le premier parfaitement démontré que les animaux étaient de pures machines. Or, après une découverte de cette importance et qui suppose autant de sagacité, le moyen, sans ingratitude, de ne pas faire grâce à toutes ses erreurs!

Il est vrai que ce célèbre philosophe s’est beaucoup trompé, et personne n’en disconvient. Mais enfin il a connu la nature animale; il a le premier parfaitement démontré que les animaux étaient de pures machines. Or, après une découverte de cette importance et qui suppose autant de sagacité, le moyen, sans ingratitude, de ne pas faire grâce à toutes ses erreurs!

This celebrated philosopher, it is true, was much deceived, and no one denies that. But at any rate he understood animal nature, he was the first to prove completely that animals are pure machines.86 [143]And after a discovery of this importance demanding so much sagacity, how can we without ingratitude fail to pardon all his errors!

This famous philosopher, it's true, was greatly misled, and no one disputes that. But still, he really grasped animal nature; he was the first to fully demonstrate that animals are just machines.86 [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]And after such an important discovery that required so much insight, how can we fail to forgive all his mistakes without being ungrateful!

Elles sont à mes yeux toutes réparées par ce grand aveu. Car enfin, quoiqu’il chante sur la distinction des deux substances, il est visible que ce n’est qu’un tour d’adresse, une ruse de style, pour faire avaler aux théologiens un poison caché à l’ombre d’une analogie qui frappe tout le monde, et qu’eux seuls ne voient pas. Car c’est elle, c’est cette forte analogie qui force tous les savants et les vrais juges [73]d’avouer que ces êtres fiers et vains, plus distingués par leur orgueil que par le nom d’hommes, quelque envie qu’ils aient de s’élever, ne sont au fond que des animaux et des machines perpendiculairement rampantes. Elles ont toutes ce merveilleux instinct, dont l’éducation fait de l’esprit, et qui a toujours son siège dans le cerveau, et à son défaut, comme lorsqu’il manque ou est ossifié, dans la moëlle allongée, et jamais dans le cervelet; car je l’ai vu considérablement blessé, d’autres8 l’ont trouvé squirreux, sans que l’âme cessât de faire ses fonctions.

They all seem repaired in my eyes by this great confession. Because, after all, even though he sings about the distinction between the two substances, it's clear that it's just a clever trick, a stylistic ruse, to make theologians swallow a hidden poison masked by an analogy that is obvious to everyone except them. For it is this strong analogy that forces all scholars and true judges to admit that these proud and vain beings, more distinguished by their arrogance than by the name of humans, no matter how much they want to elevate themselves, are fundamentally just animals and machines that crawl upright. They all share this amazing instinct, which education turns into intelligence, and which always resides in the brain, or, in its absence—as when it's missing or ossified—in the elongated marrow, and never in the cerebellum; since I have seen it significantly injured, others have found it squirrel-like, without the soul ceasing to perform its functions.

In my eyes, they are all atoned for by that great confession. For after all, although he extols the distinctness of the two substances, this is plainly but a trick of skill, a ruse of style, to make theologians swallow a poison, hidden in the shade of an analogy which strikes everybody else and which they alone fail to notice. For it is this, this strong analogy, which forces all scholars and wise judges to confess that these proud and vain beings, more distinguished by their pride than by the name of men however much they may wish to exalt themselves, are at bottom only animals and machines which, though upright, go on all fours. They all have this marvelous instinct, which is developed by education into mind, and which always has its seat in the brain, (or for want of that when it is lacking or hardened, in the medulla oblongata) and never in the cerebellum; for I have often seen the cerebellum injured, and other observers7 have found it hardened, when the soul has not ceased to fulfil its functions.

In my view, they are all forgiven by that big confession. After all, even though he praises the differences between the two substances, it’s clearly just a clever trick, a stylistic ruse, to make theologians accept a harmful idea hidden beneath a comparison that everyone else sees and which they alone fail to notice. It’s this strong analogy that pushes all scholars and wise judges to admit that those proud and vain beings, distinguished more by their arrogance than by the title of men, no matter how much they might want to elevate themselves, are essentially just animals and machines that, despite being upright, move on all fours. They all possess this amazing instinct, which is developed through education into thought, and which is always located in the brain— or, when that’s absent or hardened, in the medulla oblongata— and never in the cerebellum; for I have often seen the cerebellum damaged, and other observers7 have found it hardened, while the soul continues to operate normally.

Etre machine, sentir, penser, savoir distinguer le bien du mal, comme le bleu du jaune, en un mot être né avec de l’intelligence et un instinct sûr de morale, et n’être qu’un animal, sont donc des choses qui ne sont pas plus contradictoires qu’être un singe ou un perroquet et savoir se donner du plaisir. Car, puisque l’occasion se présente de le dire, qui eut jamais deviné à priori qu’une goutte de la liqueur qui se lance dans l’accouplement fit ressentir des plaisirs divins, et qu’il en naîtrait une petite créature, qui pourrait un jour, posées certaines lois, jouir des mêmes délices? Je crois la pensée si peu incompatible avec la matière organisée, qu’elle semble en être une propriété, telle que l’électricité, la faculté motrice, l’impénétrabilité, l’étendue, etc.

Être une machine, ressentir, penser, savoir faire la différence entre le bien et le mal, comme on distingue le bleu du jaune, en un mot, être né avec de l'intelligence et un instinct moral fiable, tout en n'étant qu'un animal, ne sont donc pas plus contradictoires que d'être un singe ou un perroquet et de savoir se faire plaisir. Car, puisque l'occasion se présente de le dire, qui aurait jamais pu deviner à l'avance qu'une goutte du liquide impliqué dans la reproduction pourrait causer des plaisirs divins, et qu'elle donnerait naissance à une petite créature qui pourrait, un jour, sous certaines conditions, profiter des mêmes délices ? Je crois que la pensée est si peu incompatible avec la matière organisée qu'elle semble en être une propriété, tout comme l'électricité, la capacité de mouvement, l'impenetrabilité, l'étendue, etc.

To be a machine, to feel, to think, to know how to distinguish good from bad, as well as blue from yellow, in a word, to be born with an intelligence and a sure moral instinct, and to be but an animal, are therefore characters which are no more contradictory, than to be an ape or a parrot and to be able to give oneself pleasure.... I believe that thought is so little incompatible with organized matter, that it seems to be one of its properties on [144]a par with electricity, the faculty of motion, impenetrability, extension, etc.

To be a machine, to feel, to think, to know how to distinguish good from bad, as well as blue from yellow—in short, to be born with intelligence and a clear moral instinct, and to be just an animal—are traits that are no more contradictory than being an ape or a parrot and being able to enjoy oneself.... I believe that thought is so little incompatible with organized matter that it seems to be one of its properties, alongside electricity, the ability to move, impenetrability, extension, etc. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

Voulez vous de nouvelles observations? En voici qui sont sans réplique et qui prouvent toutes que l’homme ressemble parfaitement aux animaux dans son origine, comme dans tout ce que nous avons déjà cru essentiel de comparer.

Voulez-vous de nouvelles observations? Voici celles qui sont sans réponse et qui prouvent toutes que l'homme ressemble parfaitement aux animaux dans son origine, tout comme dans tout ce que nous avons déjà jugé essentiel de comparer.

J’en appelle à la bonne foi de nos observateurs. [74]Qu’ils nous disent s’il n’est pas vrai que l’homme dans son principe n’est qu’un ver, qui devient homme, comme la chenille papillon. Les plus graves9 auteurs nous ont appris comment il faut s’y prendre pour voir cet animalcule. Tous les curieux l’ont vu, comme Hartsoeker, dans la semence de l’homme, et non dans celle de la femme; il n’y a que les sots qui s’en soient fait scrupule. Comme chaque goutte de sperme contient une infinité de ces petits vers lorsqu’ils sont lancés à l’ovaire, il n’y a que le plus adroit, ou le plus vigoureux qui ait la force de s’insinuer et de s’implanter dans l’œuf que fournit la femme, et qui lui donne sa première nourriture. Cet œuf, quelquefois surpris dans les trompes de Fallope, est porté par ces canaux à la matrice, où il prend racine, comme un grain de blé dans la terre. Mais quoiqu’il y devienne monstrueux par sa croissance de 9 mois, il ne diffère point des œufs des autres femelles, si ce n’est que sa peau (l’amnios) ne se durcit jamais, et se dilate prodigieusement, comme on en peut juger en comparant les fœtus trouvés en situation et près d’éclore (ce que j’ai eu le plaisir d’observer dans une femme morte un moment avant l’accouchement), avec d’autres petits embryons très proches de leur origine: car alors c’est toujours l’œuf dans sa coque, et l’animal dans l’œuf, qui, gêné dans ses mouvements, cherche machinalement à voir le jour; et pour y réussir, il commence par rompre avec la tête cette membrane, d’oû il sort, comme le poulet, l’oiseau, etc., de la leur. J’ajouterai une observation que je ne trouve nulle part; c’est que l’amnios n’en est pas plus mince, pour s’être prodigieusement étendu; [75]semblable en cela à la matrice dont la substance même se gonfle de sucs infiltrés, indépendamment de la réplétion et du déploiement de tous ses coudes vasculeux.

J’appelle à la bonne volonté de nos observateurs. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] Dites-nous si ce n’est pas vrai que l’homme, à la base, n’est qu’un ver, qui devient un homme, comme une chenille devient un papillon. Les auteurs les plus sérieux9 nous ont appris comment observer cet animalcule. Tous les curieux l’ont vu, comme Hartsoeker, dans le sperme masculin, et non dans le féminin ; seuls les idiots s’en sont offusqués. Comme chaque goutte de sperme contient une infinité de ces petits vers lorsqu'ils atteignent l'ovaire, seul le plus adroit ou le plus fort parvient à s’insinuer et à s’implanter dans l'œuf que fournit la femme, ce qui lui donne sa première nourriture. Cet œuf, parfois capturé dans les trompes de Fallope, est transporté par ces canaux à l'utérus, où il prend racine, comme un grain de blé dans le sol. Mais bien qu'il devienne monstrueux pendant les neuf mois de croissance, il ne diffère pas des œufs d'autres femelles, si ce n’est que sa peau (l’amnios) ne se durcit jamais et se dilate énormément, comme on peut le juger en comparant les fœtus trouvés en position et proches de l’éclosion (ce que j’ai eu le plaisir d’observer chez une femme décédée juste avant l'accouchement) avec d’autres petits embryons très proches de leur origine : car, à ce moment-là, c’est toujours l'œuf dans sa coquille, et l’animal dans l'œuf, qui, gêné dans ses mouvements, cherche instinctivement à voir le jour ; et pour y parvenir, il commence par rompre avec sa tête cette membrane, d'où il sort, comme le poulet, l'oiseau, etc., le font de leurs coquilles. Je dirai une observation que je ne trouve nulle part ; c’est que l’amnios n’est pas plus mince, en raison de son étirement prodigieux ; [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] semblable en cela à l’utérus dont la substance elle-même se gonfle de sucs infiltrés, indépendamment de la réplétion et du déploiement de tous ses coudes vasculaires.

Do you ask for further observations? Here are some which are incontestable and which all prove that man resembles animals perfectly, in his origin as well as in all the points in which we have thought it essential to make the comparison....

Do you want more observations? Here are some that are undeniable and demonstrate that humans are very much like animals, both in their origins and in all the aspects we've considered important for comparison...

Voyons l’homme dans et hors de sa coque; examinons avec un microscope les plus jeunes embryons, de 4, de 6, de 8 ou de 15 jours; après ce temps les yeux suffisent. Que voit-on? la tête seule; un petit œuf rond avec deux points noirs qui marquent les yeux. Avant ce temps, tout étant plus informe, on n’aperçoit qu’une pulpe médullaire, qui est le cerveau, dans lequel se forme d’abord l’origine des nerfs, ou le principe du sentiment, et le cœur qui a déjà par lui-même dans cette pulpe la faculté de battre: c’est le punctum saliens de Malpighi, qui doit peut-être déjà une partie de sa vivacité à l’influence des nerfs. Ensuite peu-à-peu on voit la tête allonger le col, qui en se dilatant forme d’abord le thorax, où le cœur a déjà descendu, pour s’y fixer; après quoi vient le bas ventre qu’une cloison (le diaphragme) sépare. Ces dilatations donnent l’une, les bras, les mains, les doigts, les ongles, et les poils; l’autre les cuisses, les jambes, les pieds, etc., avec la seule différence de situation qu’on leur connait, qui fait l’appui et le balancier du corps. C’est une végétation frappante. Ici, ce sont des cheveux qui couvrent le sommet de nos têtes; là, ce sont des feuilles et des fleurs. Partout brille le même luxe de la nature; et enfin l’esprit recteur des plantes est placé où nous avons notre âme, cette autre quintessence de l’homme.

Let's look at humanity both inside and outside its shell; let's examine with a microscope the youngest embryos, at 4, 6, 8, or 15 days old; after this time, the eyes are enough. What do we see? Just the head; a small round egg with two black dots marking the eyes. Before this time, everything is more shapeless, and we only see a medullary pulp, which is the brain, in which the origin of the nerves first forms, or the principle of feeling, along with the heart that already has the ability to beat within this pulp: it's the punctum saliens of Malpighi, which may already owe part of its liveliness to the influence of the nerves. Gradually, we see the head elongate the neck, which expands to first form the thorax, where the heart has already descended to anchor itself; after that comes the lower abdomen, separated by a partition (the diaphragm). These expansions give rise to one set, the arms, hands, fingers, nails, and hair; and the other set, the thighs, legs, feet, etc., with only the difference of placement that we know, which provides the support and balance of the body. It's a striking type of growth. Here, we have hair covering the tops of our heads; there, we see leaves and flowers. Everywhere shines the same lavishness of nature; and finally, the governing spirit of plants is placed where we have our soul, this other essence of humanity.

Let us observe man both in and out of his shell, let us examine young embryos of four, six, eight or fifteen days with a microscope; after that time our eyes are sufficient. What do we see? The head alone; a little round egg with two black points which mark the eyes. Before that, everything is formless, and one sees only a medullary pulp, which is the brain, in which are formed first the roots of the nerves, that is, the principle of feeling, and the heart, which already within this substance has the power of beating of itself; it is the punctum saliens of Malpighi, which perhaps already owes a part of its excitability to the influence of the nerves. Then little by little, one sees the head lengthen from the neck, which, in dilating, forms first the thorax inside which the heart has already sunk, there to become stationary; below that is the abdomen which is divided by a partition (the diaphragm). One of these enlargements of the body forms the arms, the hands, the fingers, the nails, and the hair; the other forms the thighs, the legs, the feet, etc., which differ only in their observed situation, and which constitute the support and the balancing pole of the body. The whole process is a strange sort of growth, like that of plants. On the tops of our heads is hair in place of which the plants have leaves and flowers; everywhere is shown the same [145]luxury of nature, and finally the directing principle of plants is placed where we have our soul, that other quintessence of man.

Let's observe humans both inside and out of their shells. Let's take a look at embryos of four, six, eight, or fifteen days with a microscope; after that point, our eyes will suffice. What do we see? Just the head; a small round shape with two black dots that represent the eyes. Before that, everything is formless, and all we see is a medullary pulp, which is the brain, where the roots of the nerves—the basis of sensation—and the heart first form, which already has the ability to beat on its own. This is Malpighi's punctum saliens, which might already owe part of its excitability to nerve influence. Gradually, we see the head lengthening from the neck, which expands to create the thorax, where the heart has already settled down. Below that is the abdomen, separated by a partition (the diaphragm). One of these body enlargements forms the arms, hands, fingers, nails, and hair; the other creates the thighs, legs, feet, and so on, which differ only in their position and serve as the body’s support and balance. The whole process is a strange type of growth, much like that of plants. On the tops of our heads, we have hair instead of leaves and flowers; everywhere displays the same [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]richness of nature, and ultimately, the guiding principle of plants is placed where we have our soul, that other essence of humanity.

Telle est l’uniformité de la nature qu’on commence à sentir, et l’analogie du règne animal et végétal, de l’homme à la plante. Peut-être même [76]y a-t-il des plantes animal, c’est-à-dire qui en végétant, ou se battent comme les polypes, ou font d’autres fonctions propres aux animaux?

Telle est l’uniformité de la nature qu’on commence à sentir, et l’analogie du règne animal et végétal, de l’homme à la plante. Peut-être même [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]y a-t-il des plantes animales, c’est-à-dire qui en végétant, ou se battent comme les polypes, ou font d’autres fonctions propres aux animaux?

Voilà à peu près tout ce qu’on sait de la génération. Que les parties qui s’attirent, qui sont faites pour s’unir ensemble et pour occuper telle ou telle place, se réunissent toutes suivant leur nature; et qu’ainsi se forment les yeux, le cœur, l’estomac et enfin tout le corps, comme de grands hommes l’ont écrit, cela est possible. Mais, comme l’expérience nous abandonne au milieu des ces subtilités, je ne supposerai rien, regardant tout ce qui ne frappe pas mes sens comme un mystère impénétrable. Il est si rare que les deux semences se rencontrent dans le congrès, que je serais tenté de croire que la semence de la femme est inutile à la génération.

Voici à peu près tout ce que l’on sait sur la génération. Les parties qui s’attirent et qui sont faites pour s’unir et occuper une certaine place se réunissent toutes selon leur nature ; et ainsi se forment les yeux, le cœur, l’estomac et finalement tout le corps, comme de grands hommes l'ont écrit, cela est possible. Mais, puisque l’expérience nous abandonne au milieu de ces subtilités, je ne vais rien supposer, considérant tout ce qui ne frappe pas mes sens comme un mystère insondable. Il est si rare que les deux semences se rencontrent dans le processus, que je serais tenté de croire que la semence de la femme est inutile à la génération.

Mais comment en expliquer les phénomènes, sans ce commode rapport de parties, qui rend si bien raison des ressemblances des enfants, tantôt au père, et tantôt à la mère? D’un autre côté, l’embarras d’une explication doit-elle contrebalancer un fait? Il me parait que c’est le mâle qui fait tout, dans une femme qui dort, comme dans la plus lubrique. L’arrangement des parties serait donc fait de toute éternité dans le germe, ou dans le ver même de l’homme. Mais tout ceci est fort au-dessus de la portée des plus excellents observateurs. Comme ils n’y peuvent rien saisir, ils ne peuvent pas plus juger de la mécanique de la formation et du développement des corps, qu’une taupe du chemin qu’un cerf peut parcourir.

Mais comment expliquer ces phénomènes sans ce lien pratique entre les parties, qui explique si bien pourquoi les enfants ressemblent parfois à leur père et parfois à leur mère ? D'un autre côté, est-ce que la difficulté d'une explication doit contrebalancer un fait ? Il me semble que c'est le mâle qui est responsable dans une femme qui dort, tout autant que chez la plus lubrique. La disposition des parties serait donc déterminée éternellement dans le germe, ou même dans le ver de l'homme. Mais tout cela est bien au-dessus de la compréhension des meilleurs observateurs. Comme ils ne peuvent rien saisir, ils ne peuvent pas davantage juger de la mécanique de la formation et du développement des corps, qu'une taupe ne peut juger du chemin qu'un cerf pourrait parcourir.

Such is the uniformity of nature, which we are beginning to realize; and the analogy of the animal with the vegetable kingdom, of man with plant. Perhaps there even are animal plants, which in vegetating, either fight as polyps do, or perform other functions characteristic of animals....

Such is the consistency of nature, which we are starting to understand; and the similarity between animals and plants, and between humans and vegetation. There might even be plant-like animals that, while growing, either fight like polyps do or carry out other functions typical of animals...

Nous sommes de vraies taupes dans le champ de la nature; nous n’y faisons guères que le trajet de cet animal; et c’est notre orgueil qui donne des [77]bornes à ce qui n’en a point. Nous sommes dans le cas d’une montre qui dirait: (un fabuliste en ferait un personnage de conséquence dans un ouvrage frivole) “Quoi! c’est ce sot ouvrier qui m’a faite, moi qui divise le temps! moi qui marque si exactement le cours du soleil; moi qui répète à haute voix les heures que j’indique! non, cela ne se peut pas.” Nous dédaignons de même, ingrats que nous sommes, cette mère commune de tous les règnes, comme parlent les chimistes. Nous imaginons ou plutôt supposons une cause supérieure à celle à qui nous devons tout, et qui a véritablement tout fait d’une manière inconcevable. Non, la matière n’a rien de vil, qu’aux yeux grossiers qui la méconnaissent dans ses plus brillants ouvrages; et la nature n’est point une ouvrière bornée. Elle produit des millions d’hommes avec plus de facilité et de plaisir, qu’un horloger n’a de peine à faire la montre la plus composée. Sa puissance éclate également et dans la production du plus vil insecte, et dans celle de l’homme le plus superbe; le règne animal ne lui coûte pas plus que le végétal, ni le plus beau génie qu’un épi de blé. Jugeons donc par ce que nous voyons, de ce qui se dérobe à la curiosité de nos yeux et de nos recherches, et n’imaginons rien au delà. Suivons le singe, le castor, l’éléphant, etc., dans leurs opérations. S’il est évident qu’elles ne peuvent se faire sans intelligence, pourquoi la refuser à ces animaux? et si vous leur accordez une âme, fanatiques, vous êtes perdus; vous aurez beau dire que vous ne décidez point sur sa nature, tandis que vous lui ôtez l’immortalité; qui ne voit que c’est une assertion gratuite? qui ne voit qu’elle doit être ou mortelle, ou immortelle, [78]comme la nôtre, dont elle doit subir le même sort quel qu’il soit! et qu’ainsi c’est tomber dans Scilla pour vouloir éviter Caribde?

Nous sommes vraiment comme des taupes dans le champ de la nature; nous ne faisons guère plus que suivre le chemin de cet animal; et c’est notre orgueil qui impose des [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]limites à ce qui n’en a pas. Nous sommes comme une montre qui dirait : (un fabuliste en ferait un personnage important dans une œuvre légère) “Quoi ! c’est ce bête ouvrier qui m’a fabriquée, moi qui divise le temps ! Moi qui indique si parfaitement le mouvement du soleil; moi qui annonce à haute voix les heures que j’indique ! Non, ce n’est pas possible.” Nous méprisons de même, ingrats que nous sommes, cette mère commune de tous les règnes, comme le disent les chimistes. Nous imaginons ou plutôt supposons une cause supérieure à celle à qui nous devons tout, et qui a vraiment tout créé de façon inconcevable. Non, la matière n’a rien de vile, excepté dans les yeux grossiers qui la méconnaissent dans ses plus brillants travaux; et la nature n’est pas une ouvrière limitée. Elle produit des millions d’hommes avec plus de facilité et de plaisir qu’un horloger n’en a pour faire la montre la plus complexe. Sa puissance se manifeste aussi bien dans la production du plus humble insecte que dans celle de l’homme le plus extraordinaire; le règne animal ne lui coûte pas plus que le végétal, ni le plus grand génie qu’un épi de blé. Jugeons donc par ce que nous voyons, de ce qui échappe à notre curiosité et à nos recherches, et n’imaginons rien de plus. Suivons le singe, le castor, l’éléphant, etc., dans leurs actions. S’il est évident qu’elles ne peuvent se faire sans intelligence, pourquoi la refuser à ces animaux ? Et si vous leur donnez une âme, fanatiques, vous êtes perdus ; vous aurez beau dire que vous ne vous prononcez pas sur sa nature, tout en lui niant l’immortalité ; qui ne voit que c’est une assertion gratuite ? Qui ne voit qu’elle doit être soit mortelle, soit immortelle, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]comme la nôtre, qui doit subir le même destin, quel qu’il soit ! Et ainsi, c’est tomber dans Scilla pour vouloir éviter Caribde?

We are veritable moles in the field of nature; we achieve little more than the mole’s journey and it is our pride which prescribes limits to the limitless. We are in the position of a watch that should say (a writer of fables would make the watch a hero in a silly tale): “I was never made by that fool of a workman, I who divide time, who mark so exactly the course of the sun, who repeat aloud the hours which I mark! No! that is impossible!” In the same way, we disdain, ungrateful wretches that we are, this common mother of all kingdoms, as the chemists say. We imagine, or rather we infer, a cause superior to that to which we owe all, and which truly has wrought all things in an inconceivable fashion. No; matter contains nothing base, except to the vulgar eyes which do not recognize her in her most splendid works; and nature is no stupid workman. She creates millions of men, with a facility and a pleasure more intense than the effort of a watchmaker in making the most complicated watch. Her power shines forth equally in creating the lowliest insect and in creating the most highly developed man; the animal kingdom costs her no more than the vegetable, and the most splendid genius no more than a blade of wheat. Let us then judge by what we [146]see of that which is hidden from the curiosity of our eyes and of our investigations, and let us not imagine anything beyond. Let us observe the ape, the beaver, the elephant, etc., in their operations. If it is clear that these activities can not be performed without intelligence, why refuse intelligence to these animals? And if you grant them a soul, you are lost, you fanatics! You will in vain say that you assert nothing about the nature of the animal soul and that you deny its immortality. Who does not see that this is a gratuitous assertion; who does not see that the soul of an animal must be either mortal or immortal, whichever ours [is], and that it must therefore undergo the same fate as ours, whatever that may be, and that thus [in admitting that animals have souls], you fall into Scylla in the effort to avoid Charybdis?

We are like moles in the realm of nature; we achieve little more than the mole’s journey, and it is our pride that sets limits on the limitless. We’re like a watch that should declare (a fable writer would make the watch a hero in a ridiculous tale): “I was never made by that foolish workman, I who measure time, who accurately track the sun's path, who loudly announce the hours I record! No way! That’s impossible!” Similarly, we ungrateful beings disdain this common mother of all realms, as chemists would put it. We picture, or rather we assume, a higher cause behind everything we owe our existence to, which has genuinely shaped everything in unimaginable ways. No; matter holds nothing lowly, except in the eyes of those who fail to see her in her most magnificent works; and nature is no foolish craftsman. She creates millions of beings with more ease and joy than it takes for a watchmaker to build the most intricate clock. Her power shines equally in forming the smallest insect and the most advanced human; the animal kingdom doesn't cost her more than the plant kingdom, and a brilliant mind costs no more than a blade of grass. So let’s judge by what we see of what’s hidden from our curiosity and exploration, and not presume anything beyond that. Let’s observe the ape, the beaver, the elephant, and others in their actions. If it's clear that these activities can't happen without intelligence, why deny intelligence to these animals? And if you accept they have a soul, you're in trouble, you fanatics! You’ll say you don’t claim to know about the nature of an animal’s soul and that you deny its immortality. Who doesn’t see that this is an unfounded claim; who doesn’t see that an animal’s soul must be either mortal or immortal, just like ours, and thus it must face the same fate as ours, whatever that is, leading you into Scylla while trying to avoid Charybdis?

Brisez la chaîne de vos préjugés; armez-vous du flambeau de l’expérience et vous ferez à la nature l’honneur qu’elle mérite, au lieu de rien conclure à son désavantage, de l’ignorance où elle vous a laissé. Ouvrez les yeux seulement, et laissez-là ce que vous ne pouvez comprendre; et vous verrez que ce laboureur dont l’esprit et les lumières ne s’étendent pas plus loin que les bords de son sillon, ne diffère point essentiellement du plus grand génie, comme l’eût prouvé la dissection des cerveaux de Descartes et de Newton: vous serez persuadé que l’imbécile ou le stupide sont des bêtes à figure humaine, comme le singe plein d’esprit est un petit homme sous une autre forme; et qu’enfin tout dépendant absolument de la diversité de l’organisation, un animal bien construit, à qui on a appris l’astronomie, peut prédire une éclipse, comme la guérison ou la mort, lorsqu’il a porté quelque temps du génie et de bons yeux à l’école d’Hippocrate et au lit des malades. C’est par cette file d’observations et de vérités qu’on parvient à lier à la matière l’admirable propriété de penser, sans qu’on en puisse voir les liens, parce que le sujet de cet attribut nous est essentiellement inconnu.

Break the chain of your prejudices; arm yourself with the torch of experience, and you will do nature the honor it deserves, instead of drawing conclusions that disadvantage it from the ignorance it has left you in. Just open your eyes and let go of what you cannot understand; you will see that the farmer whose mind and knowledge do not reach beyond the edges of his furrow is not essentially different from the greatest genius, as proven by dissecting the brains of Descartes and Newton: you will be convinced that the fool or the simpleton are human-shaped animals, just as the clever monkey is a little man in another form; and that ultimately everything depends on the diversity of organization, as a well-constructed animal trained in astronomy can predict an eclipse, like healing or death, when it has spent some time with genius and keen observation at Hippocrates' school and by the bedside of the sick. It is through this series of observations and truths that we come to connect the remarkable property of thinking to matter, even though we cannot see the links, because the subject of this attribute is fundamentally unknown to us.

Break the chain of your prejudices, arm yourselves with the torch of experience, and you will render to nature the honor she deserves, instead of inferring anything to her disadvantage, from the ignorance in which she has left you. Only open wide your eyes, only disregard what you can not understand, and you will see that the ploughman whose intelligence and ideas extend no further than the bounds of his furrow, does not differ essentially from the greatest genius,—a truth which the dissection of Descartes’s and of Newton’s brains would have proved; you will be persuaded that the imbecile and the fool are animals with human faces, as the intelligent ape is a little man in another shape; in short, you will learn that since everything depends absolutely on difference of organization, a well constructed animal which has studied astronomy, can [147]predict an eclipse, as it can predict recovery or death when it has used its genius and its clearness of vision, for a time, in the school of Hippocrates and at the bedside of the sick. By this line of observations and truths, we come to connect the admirable power of thought with matter, without being able to see the links, because the subject of this attribute is essentially unknown to us.

Break the chain of your prejudices, equip yourselves with the light of experience, and you'll give nature the respect she deserves instead of making negative assumptions based on the ignorance she has left you with. Just open your eyes wide, ignore what you can't comprehend, and you'll realize that the farmer whose knowledge and ideas are limited to his field is not fundamentally different from the greatest genius — a truth that could be demonstrated by examining Descartes's and Newton's brains. You'll come to understand that the imbecile and the fool are just humans with a different appearance, just like an intelligent ape is simply a little man in another form; in short, you'll learn that since everything is entirely dependent on variations in organization, a well-structured being that has studied astronomy can predict an eclipse, just as it can foresee recovery or death after applying its intellect and clarity of vision, for a time, in the school of Hippocrates and at the bedside of the sick. Through these observations and truths, we establish a connection between the amazing power of thought and matter, even though we can't see the links because the essence of this attribute remains fundamentally unknown to us.

Ne disons point que toute machine, ou tout animal, périt tout-à-fait, ou prend une autre forme, après la mort; car nous n’en savons absolument rien. Mais assurer qu’une machine immortelle est une chimère, ou un être de raison, c’est faire un raisonnement aussi absurde que celui que feraient des chenilles, qui, voyant les dépouilles de leurs semblables, [79]déploreraient amèrement le sort de leur espèce qui leur semblerait s’anéantir. L’âme de ces insectes (car chaque animal a la sienne) est trop bornée pour comprendre les métamorphoses de la nature. Jamais un seul des plus rusés d’entr’eux n’eût imaginé qu’il dût devenir papillon. Il en est de même de nous. Que savons-nous plus de notre destinée, que de notre origine? Soumettons-nous donc à une ignorance invincible de laquelle notre bonheur dépend.

Let's not say that every machine or animal completely perishes or takes on a different form after death; because we absolutely know nothing about it. But claiming that an immortal machine is a fantasy or a mere creation of reason is just as absurd as if caterpillars, upon seeing the remains of their kind, would mourn the fate of their species, believing it to be extinguished. The soul of these insects (as every animal has one) is too limited to understand the transformations of nature. Not a single one of the cleverest among them would have imagined that it would become a butterfly. The same goes for us. What do we really know about our destiny, just as much as we know about our origin? So let’s resign ourselves to an invincible ignorance upon which our happiness depends.

Let us not say that every machine or every animal perishes altogether or assumes another form after death, for we know absolutely nothing about the subject. On the other hand, to assert that an immortal machine is a chimera or a logical fiction, is to reason as absurdly as caterpillars would reason if, seeing the cast-off skins of their fellow-caterpillars, they should bitterly deplore the fate of their species, which to them would seem to come to nothing. The soul of these insects (for each animal has his own) is too limited to comprehend the metamorphoses of nature. Never one of the most skilful among them could have imagined that it was destined to become a butterfly. It is the same with us. What more do we know of our destiny than of our origin? Let us then submit to an invincible ignorance on which our happiness depends.

Let’s not claim that every machine or animal completely disappears or takes on a different form after death, because we truly know nothing about this topic. On the flip side, saying that an immortal machine is just a fantasy or a logical impossibility is as ridiculous as caterpillars thinking that when they see the discarded skins of their fellow caterpillars, they should mourn the end of their kind, which they would see as leading to nothing. The soul of these insects (since every animal has its own) is too limited to understand the transformations in nature. Not even the most skilled among them could have imagined they were meant to become butterflies. It's the same with us. What do we really know about our fate compared to our beginnings? So let’s accept an unavoidable ignorance that our happiness depends on.

Qui pensera ainsi, sera sage, juste, tranquille sur son sort, et par conséquent heureux. Il attendra la mort, sans la craindre, ni la désirer; et chérissant la vie, comprenant à peine comment le dégoût vient corrompre un cœur dans ce lieu plein de délices; plein de respect pour la nature, plein de reconnaissance, d’attachement et de tendresse, à proportion du sentiment et des bienfaits qu’il en a reçus, heureux enfin de la sentir, et d’être au charmant spectacle de l’univers, il ne le détruira certainement jamais dans soi, ni dans les autres. Que dis-je! plein d’humanité, il en aimera le caractère jusques dans ses ennemis. Jugez comme il traitera les autres! Il plaindra les vicieux, sans les haïr; ce ne seront à ses yeux que des hommes contrefaits. Mais en faisant grâce aux défauts de la conformation de l’esprit et du corps, il n’en admirera pas moins leurs beautés et leurs vertus. Ceux que la nature aura favorisés lui paraîtront mériter plus d’égards que ceux qu’elle aura traités en marâtre. C’est ainsi qu’on a vu que les dons naturels, la source de tout ce qui s’acquiert, trouvent dans la bouche et le cœur du matérialiste des hommages que tout autre leur refuse injustement. Enfin le [80]matérialiste convaincu, quoi que murmure sa propre vanité, qu’il n’est qu’une machine, ou un animal, ne maltraitera point ses semblables; trop instruit sur la nature de ces actions, dont l’inhumanité est toujours proportionnée au degré d’analogie prouvée ci devant; et ne voulant pas en un mot, suivant la loi naturelle donnée à tous les animaux, faire à autrui ce qu’il ne voudrait pas qu’il lui fît.

Anyone who thinks this way will be wise, fair, and at peace with their fate, and therefore happy. They will await death without fear or desire; and while cherishing life, they will hardly understand how disgust can corrupt a heart in this place full of delights; full of respect for nature, full of gratitude, attachment, and tenderness, in proportion to the feelings and benefits they have received from it, they will be happy to feel it and to experience the beautiful spectacle of the universe. They will never destroy it within themselves or in others. What am I saying! Filled with humanity, they will love its character even in their enemies. Just think about how they will treat others! They will pity the wicked without hating them; to them, they will only appear as warped humans. However, in excusing the flaws of the mind and body, they will still admire their beauties and virtues. Those favored by nature will seem to them more deserving of respect than those who have been treated like a stepchild. Thus, it has been observed that natural gifts, the source of everything acquired, receive admiration from the materialist that others unjustly deny them. Finally, the convinced materialist, despite the murmurs of their own vanity, believing they are just a machine or an animal, will not mistreat their fellows; too informed about the nature of actions, whose inhumanity is always proportional to the degree of analogy proven earlier; and not wanting, in short, according to the natural law given to all animals, to do to others what they would not want done to themselves.

He who so thinks will be wise, just, tranquil about his fate, and therefore happy. He will await death without either fear or desire, and will cherish life (hardly understanding how disgust can corrupt a heart in this place of many delights); he will be filled with reverence, gratitude, affection, and tenderness for nature, in proportion to his feeling of the benefits he has received from nature; he will be happy, in short, in feeling nature, and in being [148]present at the enchanting spectacle of the universe, and he will surely never destroy nature either in himself or in others. More than that! Full of humanity, this man will love human character even in his enemies. Judge how he will treat others. He will pity the wicked without hating them; in his eyes, they will be but mis-made men. But in pardoning the faults of the structure of mind and body, he will none the less admire the beauties and the virtues of both. Those whom nature shall have favored will seem to him to deserve more respect than those whom she has treated in stepmotherly fashion. Thus, as we have seen, natural gifts, the source of all acquirements, gain from the lips and heart of the materialist, the homage which every other thinker unjustly refuses them. In short, the materialist, convinced, in spite of the protests of his vanity, that he is but a machine or an animal, will not maltreat his kind, for he will know too well the nature of those actions, whose humanity is always in proportion to the degree of the analogy proved above [between human beings and animals]; and following the natural law given to all animals, he will not wish to do to others what he would not wish them to do to him.

Anyone who thinks this way will be wise, fair, at peace with their fate, and therefore happy. They will face death without fear or longing and will appreciate life (hardly understanding how disgust can taint a heart in this place full of delights); they will be filled with respect, gratitude, affection, and kindness toward nature, depending on how much they feel they’ve benefited from it; in short, they will find happiness in experiencing nature and by being [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]present for the beautiful spectacle of the universe, and they will surely never harm nature either in themselves or in others. Moreover! Full of humanity, this person will appreciate human character even in their enemies. Just imagine how they will treat others. They will feel sorry for the wicked without hating them; to them, they will just seem like poorly made individuals. Yet while forgiving the flaws in mind and body, they will still admire the beauty and virtues of both. Those whom nature has favored will seem to them to deserve more respect than those whom she has treated harshly. Thus, as we have seen, natural gifts, the source of all knowledge, earn the admiration from the materialist that every other thinker unjustly denies them. In short, the materialist, convinced, despite their vanity's protests, that they are just a machine or animal, will not mistreat their kind, as they will understand the nature of those actions, whose humanity is always proportional to the analogy proven earlier [between humans and animals]; and following the natural law applied to all animals, they will not do to others what they would not want done to themselves.

Concluons donc hardiment que l’homme est une machine; et qu’il n’y a dans tout l’univers qu’une seule substance diversement modifiée. Ce n’est point ici une hypothèse élevée à force de demandes et de suppositions: ce n’est point l’ouvrage du préjugé, ni même de ma raison seule; j’eusse dédaigné un guide que je crois si peu sûr, si mes sens portant, pour ainsi dire, le flambeau, ne m’eûssent engagé à la suivre, en l’éclairant. L’expérience m’a donc parlé pour la raison; c’est ainsi que je les ai jointes ensemble.

Concluding boldly, we can say that humans are machines; and that there is only one substance in the entire universe, modified in different ways. This is not a theory built on endless questions and assumptions: it’s not the result of prejudice or even just my reason alone; I would have rejected a guide I consider so unreliable if my senses hadn’t, so to speak, lit the way, encouraging me to follow. Experience has thus spoken to reason; this is how I have linked them together.

Let us then conclude boldly that man is a machine, and that in the whole universe there is but a single substance differently modified. This is no hypothesis set forth by dint of a number of postulates and assumptions; it is not the work of prejudice, nor even of my reason alone; I should have disdained a guide which I think to be so untrustworthy, had not my senses, bearing a torch, so to speak, induced me to follow reason by lighting the way themselves. [149]Experience has thus spoken to me in behalf of reason; and in this way I have combined the two.

Let’s confidently wrap this up by saying that humans are machines and that there’s only one type of substance in the entire universe, just altered in different ways. This isn’t just a theory based on a bunch of assumptions or personal biases; it’s not solely a product of my reasoning, which I would consider unreliable. However, my senses have guided me, like a torch lighting the path, encouraging me to follow reason. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] Experience has spoken on behalf of reason, and that’s how I’ve brought the two together.

Mais on a dû voir que je ne me suis permis le raisonnement le plus rigoureux et le plus immédiatement tiré, qu’à la suite d’une multitude d’observations physiques qu’aucun savant ne contestera; et c’est encore eux seuls que je reconnais pour juges des conséquences que j’en tire; récusant ici tout homme à préjugés, et qui n’est ni anatomiste, ni au fait de la seule philosophie qui soit ici de mise, celle du corps humain. Que pourraient contre un chêne aussi ferme et solide ces faibles roseaux de la théologie, de la métaphysique et des écoles; armes puériles, semblables aux fleurets de nos salles, qui peuvent bien donner le plaisir de l’escrime, mais jamais entamer son adversaire. Faut-il dire que je parle de ces idées creuses et triviales, de [81]ces raisonnements rebattus et pitoyables, qu’on fera sur la prétendue incompatibilité de deux substances qui se touchent et se remuent sans cesse l’une et l’autre, tant qu’il restera l’ombre du préjugé ou de la superstition sur la terre? Voilà mon système, ou plutôt la vérité, si je ne me trompe fort. Elle est courte et simple. Dispute à présent qui voudra! [83]

But we had to see that I only permitted myself the most rigorous and immediately derived reasoning after a multitude of physical observations that no scientist will contest; and it is only they that I recognize as judges of the conclusions I draw; rejecting here anyone with biases who is neither an anatomist nor well-versed in the only philosophy applicable here, that of the human body. What could weak reeds of theology, metaphysics, and schools do against such a strong and solid oak? Childish weapons, like the foil in our training rooms, can provide the pleasure of fencing but will never wound the opponent. Should I mention these hollow and trivial ideas, these tired and pitiful arguments made about the supposed incompatibility of two substances that touch and move each other nonstop as long as any shadow of prejudice or superstition remains on earth? Here is my system, or rather the truth, if I am not greatly mistaken. It is short and simple. Let anyone dispute it now!

But it must have been noticed that I have not allowed myself even the most vigorous and immediately deduced reasoning, except as a result of a multitude of observations which no scholar will contest; and furthermore, I recognize only scholars as judges of the conclusions which I draw from the observations; and I hereby challenge every prejudiced man who is neither anatomist, nor acquainted with the only philosophy which can here be considered, that of the human body. Against so strong and solid an oak, what could the weak reeds of theology, of metaphysics, and of the schools, avail,—childish arms, like our parlor foils, that may well afford the pleasure of fencing, but can never wound an adversary. Need I say that I refer to the empty and trivial notions, to the pitiable and trite arguments that will be urged (as long as the shadow of prejudice or of superstition remains on earth) for the supposed incompatibility of two substances which meet and move each other unceasingly? Such is my system, or rather the truth, unless I am much deceived. It is short and simple. Dispute it now who will. [151]

But it should be obvious that I haven't allowed myself to engage in even the most vigorous and straightforward reasoning, except as a result of many observations that no scholar would dispute; furthermore, I only recognize scholars as judges of the conclusions I draw from these observations. I challenge anyone who's biased, and isn't an anatomist or knowledgeable about the only relevant philosophy—the philosophy of the human body. Against such a strong and solid foundation, what could the weak arguments of theology, metaphysics, and academia achieve? They are like childish weapons, similar to our parlor foils, which may provide some fun in practice but can never harm an opponent. Do I need to point out that I'm referring to the empty and trivial ideas, the pathetic and clichéd arguments that will be put forward (as long as prejudice and superstition exist on earth) about the supposed incompatibility of two substances that constantly interact and influence each other? This is my system, or rather the truth, unless I'm greatly mistaken. It’s clear and straightforward. Let anyone dispute it now. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]


1 Il péche evidemment par une pétition de principe. 

1 He obviously sins by a petition of principle.

2 L’histoire des animaux et des hommes prouve l’empire de la semence des pères sur l’esprit et le corps des enfants. 

2 The story of animals and humans shows the influence of the father's genes on the minds and bodies of their children.

3 L’auteur de l’Histoire naturelle de l’âme etc. 

3 The author of the Natural History of the Soul etc.

4 L’auteur de l’Hist. de l’âme. 

4 The author of the History of the Soul.

5 Il y a encore aujourd’hui des peuples, qui, faute d’un plus grand nombre de signes, ne peuvent compter que jusqu’à 20. 

5 There are still people today who, due to a lack of more symbols, can only count up to 20.

6 Dans un cercle, ou à table, il lui fallait toujours un rempart de chaises, ou quelqu’un dans son voisinage du côté gauche, pour l’empêcher de voir des abîmes épouvantables dans lesquels il craignait quelquefois de tomber, quelque connaissance qu’il eut de ces illusions. Quel effrayant effet de l’imagination, ou d’une singulière circulation dans un lobe du cerveau! Grand homme d’un côté, il était à moitié fou de l’autre. La folie et la sagesse avaient chacun leur département, ou leur lobe, séparé par la faux. De quel côté tenait-il si fort à Mrs. de Port-Royal? J’ai lu ce fait dans un extrait du traité du vertige de Mr. de la Mettrie. 

6 In a circle, or at a table, he always needed a barrier of chairs, or someone next to him on his left side, to prevent him from seeing the terrifying abysses he sometimes feared he might fall into, despite his awareness of these illusions. What a frightening effect of the imagination, or a peculiar circulation in a lobe of the brain! A great man on one side, he was half crazy on the other. Madness and wisdom each had their own territory, or their lobe, separated by the scythe. How strongly did he hold on to Mrs. de Port-Royal? I read this in an excerpt from the treatise on dizziness by Mr. de la Mettrie.

7 Au moins par les vaisseaux. Est-il sûr qu’il n’y en a point par les nerfs? 

7 At least through the vessels. Is it certain that there are none through the nerves?

8 Haller dans les Transact. Philosoph. 

8 Haller in the Transact. Philosoph. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

9 Boerhaave, Inst. Med. et tant d’autres. 

9 Boerhaave, Inst. Med. and many others. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__


1 He evidently errs by begging the question. 

1 He clearly makes a mistake by assuming what he needs to prove.

2 The history of animals and of men proves how the mind and the body of children are dominated by their inheritance from their fathers. 

2 The history of animals and humans shows how children’s minds and bodies are shaped by their inheritance from their parents.

3 The author of “The Natural History of the Soul.” 

3 The author of “The Natural History of the Soul.”

4 The author of “The History of the Soul.” 

4 The author of “The History of the Soul.”

5 There are peoples, even to-day, who, through lack of a greater number of signs, can count only to 20. 

5 There are communities even today that, because they don't have a larger set of symbols, can only count up to 20.

6 In a company, or at table, he always required a rampart of chairs or else some one close to him at the left, to prevent his seeing horrible abysses into which (in spite of his understanding these illusions) he sometimes feared that he might fall. What a frightful result of imagination, or of the peculiar circulation in a lobe of the brain! Great man on one side of his nature, on the other he was half-mad. Madness and wisdom, each had its compartment, or its lobe, the two separated by a fissure. Which was the side by which he was so strongly attached to Messieurs of Port Royal? (I have read this in an extract from the treatise on vertigo by M. de la Mettrie.) 

6 In a company or at the table, he always needed a barrier of chairs or someone sitting close to his left to stop him from seeing the terrifying voids that he sometimes feared he might fall into, even though he understood that these were just illusions. What a terrifying outcome of imagination or some peculiar activity in a part of the brain! On one hand, he was a great man, but on the other, he was somewhat crazy. Madness and wisdom each had their own space or lobe, separated by a divide. Which side of him was he so strongly connected to the gentlemen of Port Royal? (I read this in an excerpt from M. de la Mettrie's treatise on vertigo.)

7 Haller in the Transact. Philosoph. 

7 Haller in the Transact. Philosoph. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

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THE NATURAL HISTORY OF THE SOUL.

BY JEAN OFFRAY DE LA METTRIE.

BY JEAN OFFRAY DE LA METTRIE.

EXTRACTS. [153]

EXTRACTS. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

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CHAPTER II. CONCERNING MATTER.

All philosophers who have examined attentively the nature of matter, considered in itself, independently of all the forms which constitute bodies, have discovered in this substance, diverse properties proceeding from an absolutely unknown essence. Such are, (1) the capacity of taking on different forms, which are produced in matter itself, by which matter can acquire moving force and the faculty of feeling; (2) actual extension, which these philosophers have rightly recognized as an attribute, but not as the essence, of matter.

All philosophers who have carefully looked into the nature of matter, by itself and apart from all the forms that make up objects, have found in this substance various properties that come from a completely unknown essence. These include: (1) the ability to take on different forms, which arise within matter itself, allowing it to gain moving force and the capacity for sensation; (2) actual extension, which these philosophers have rightly acknowledged as an attribute, but not the essence, of matter.

However, there have been some, among others Descartes, who have insisted on reducing the essence of matter to simple extension, and on limiting all the properties of matter to those of extension; but this opinion has been rejected by all other modern philosophers, ... so that the power of acquiring moving force, and the faculty of feeling as well as that of extension, have been from all time considered as essential properties87 of matter.

However, there have been some, including Descartes, who insisted on simplifying the essence of matter to just extension, claiming that all properties of matter are linked to extension. However, this view has been dismissed by all other modern philosophers, ... so the ability to gain momentum, as well as the capacity to feel and extend, have always been seen as fundamental properties87 of matter.

All the diverse properties that are observed in this unknown principle demonstrate a being in which these same properties exist, a being which must therefore exist through itself. But we can not conceive, or rather it seems impossible, that a being [154]which exists through itself should be able neither to create nor to annihilate itself. It is evident that only the forms to which its essential properties make it susceptible can be destroyed and reproduced in turn. Thus, does experience force us to confess that nothing can come from nothing.

All the different traits we see in this unknown principle illustrate a being that has these same traits, a being that must therefore exist on its own. However, we can't imagine—or it seems impossible—that a being [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] that exists on its own could neither create itself nor destroy itself. Clearly, only the forms that its essential traits allow it to have can be destroyed and recreated. Hence, experience compels us to admit that nothing can come from nothing.

All philosophers who have not known the light of faith, have thought that this substantial principle of bodies has existed and will exist forever, and that the elements of matter have an indestructible solidity which forbids the fear that the world is going to fall to pieces. The majority of Christian philosophers also recognize that the substantial principle of bodies exists necessarily through itself, and that the power of beginning or ending does not accord with its nature. One finds that this view is upheld by an author of the last century who taught theology in Paris.

All philosophers who haven't experienced the light of faith have believed that this fundamental principle of matter has always existed and will continue to exist indefinitely, and that the elements of matter have a solidness that can't be destroyed, which means there's no need to worry about the world falling apart. Most Christian philosophers also agree that the fundamental principle of matter exists necessarily on its own, and that the ability to start or end doesn’t align with its nature. This perspective is supported by an author from the last century who taught theology in Paris.

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CHAPTER III. CONCERNING THE EXTENSION OF MATTER.

Although we have no idea of the essence of matter, we can not refuse to admit the existence of the properties which our senses discover in it.

Although we don't understand the true nature of matter, we can't deny the existence of the properties that our senses uncover in it.

I open my eyes, and I see around me only matter, or the extended. Extension is then a property which always belongs to all matter, which can belong to matter alone, and which therefore is inseparable from the substance of matter.

I open my eyes, and I see nothing but matter, or the physical world. Extension is a property that always belongs to all matter, can only belong to matter, and is therefore inseparable from the essence of matter.

This property presupposes three dimensions in the substance of bodies, length, width, and depth. Truly, if we consult our knowledge, which is gained entirely from the senses, we cannot conceive of matter, or the substance of bodies, without having [155]the idea of a being which is at the same time long, broad, and deep; because the idea of these three dimensions is necessarily bound up with our idea of every magnitude or quantity.

This property assumes three dimensions in the substance of bodies: length, width, and depth. In fact, if we look at our knowledge, which we acquire entirely through our senses, we can’t imagine matter or the substance of bodies without also having the idea of something that is simultaneously long, wide, and deep; because the concept of these three dimensions is intrinsically linked to our understanding of any size or quantity.

Those philosophers who have meditated most concerning matter do not understand by the extension of this substance, a solid extension composed of distinct parts, capable of resistance. Nothing is united, nothing is divided in this extension; for there must be a force which separates to divide, and another force to unite the divided parts. But in the opinion of these physical philosophers matter has no actually active force, because every force can come only from movement, or from some impulse or tendency toward movement, and they recognize in matter, stripped of all form by abstraction, only a potential moving force.

Those philosophers who have thought the most about matter don’t see the extension of this substance as a solid stretching made up of separate parts that can resist. Nothing gets connected, nothing gets split in this extension; there has to be one force that separates to create division and another force that brings the divided parts back together. However, these physical philosophers believe that matter doesn’t have an actively working force because any force can only come from movement or from some push or pull toward movement, and they only see matter, devoid of all form by abstraction, as just a potential force for movement.

This theory is hard to conceive, but given its principles, it is rigorously true in its consequences. It is one of those algebraic truths which is more readily believed than conceived by the mind.

This theory is difficult to grasp, but based on its principles, it is definitely true in its outcomes. It's one of those algebraic truths that people tend to believe more easily than they can fully understand.

The extension of matter is then but a metaphysical extension, which according to the idea of these very philosophers, presents nothing to affect our senses. They rightly think that only solid extension can make an impression on our senses. It thus seems to us that extension is an attribute which constitutes part of the metaphysical form, but we are far from thinking that extension constitutes its essence.

The extension of matter is just a metaphysical extension, which, according to these philosophers, doesn't present anything that affects our senses. They are correct in believing that only solid extension can make an impression on our senses. So, it seems to us that extension is an attribute that is part of the metaphysical form, but we certainly don’t believe that extension makes up its essence.

However, before Descartes, some of the ancients made the essence of matter consist in solid extension. But this opinion, of which all the Cartesians have made much, has at all times been victoriously [156]combated by clear reasons, which we will set forth later, for order demands that we first examine to what the properties of extension can be reduced.

However, before Descartes, some ancient thinkers believed that the essence of matter was solid extension. However, this view, which the Cartesians heavily relied on, has always been effectively challenged by clear reasons, which we will discuss later, as we first need to examine what the properties of extension can be reduced to.

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CHAPTER V. CONCERNING THE MOVING FORCE OF MATTER.

The ancients, persuaded that there is no body without a moving force, regarded the substance of bodies as composed of two primitive attributes. It was held that, through one of these attributes, this substance has the capacity for moving and, through the other, the capacity for being moved.88 As a matter of fact, it is impossible not to conceive these two attributes in every moving body, namely, the thing which moves, and the same thing which is moved.

The ancients believed that no physical object exists without a force that moves it, considering the essence of objects to be made up of two basic traits. They thought that one of these traits gives the substance the ability to move, while the other allows it to be moved.88 In reality, you can't help but see these two traits in every moving object: the thing that moves and the same thing that gets moved.

It has just been said that formerly the name, matter, was given to the substance of bodies, in so far as it is susceptible of being moved. When capable of moving this same matter was known by the name of “active principle”.... But these two attributes seem to depend so essentially on each other that Cicero, in order better to state this essential and primitive union of matter with its moving principle, says that each is found in the other. This expresses very well the idea of the ancients.

It has just been said that in the past, the term "matter" referred to the substance of objects as long as it could be moved. When it was capable of movement, this same matter was called the “active principle.” However, these two characteristics seem to be so closely linked that Cicero, to capture this fundamental and original connection between matter and its moving principle, states that each is found within the other. This effectively conveys the ancient idea.

From this it is clear that modern writers have given us but an inexact idea of matter in attempting (through a confusion ill understood) to give this name to the substance of bodies. For, once more, matter, or the passive principle of the substance of bodies, constitutes only one part of this substance. Thus it is not surprising that these modern [157]thinkers have not discovered in matter moving force and the faculty of feeling.

From this, it's clear that modern writers have provided us with an incomplete understanding of matter by trying (through a misunderstanding) to label it as the substance of bodies. Once again, matter, or the passive principle of the substance of bodies, makes up only one part of this substance. Therefore, it's not surprising that these modern [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]thinkers have not found in matter the ability to move or the capacity to feel.

It should now be evident at the first glance, it seems to me, that if there is an active principle it must have, in the unknown essence of matter, another source than extension. This proves that simple extension fails to give an adequate idea of the complete essence or metaphysical form of the substance of bodies, and that this failure is due solely to the fact that extension excludes the idea of any activity in matter. Therefore, if we demonstrate this moving principle, if we show that matter, far from being as indifferent as it is supposed to be, to movement and to rest, ought to be regarded as an active, as well as a passive substance, what resource can be left to those who have made its essence consist in extension?

It should now be clear at first glance, it seems to me, that if there is an active principle, it must come from something other than just the extension of matter. This shows that simple extension doesn't adequately capture the full essence or metaphysical nature of the substance of bodies, and this shortcoming is because extension takes away the idea of any activity in matter. So, if we can demonstrate this moving principle and show that matter, rather than being as indifferent to movement and rest as it's thought to be, should be seen as both an active and a passive substance, what can those who define its essence solely in terms of extension rely on?

The two principles of which we have just spoken, extension and moving force, are then but potentialities of the substance of bodies; for in the same way in which this substance is susceptible of movement, without actually being moved, it also has always, even when it is not moving itself, the faculty of spontaneous motion.

The two principles we've just discussed, extension and moving force, are essentially just possibilities of the substance of objects. Just as this substance can be capable of movement without actually being in motion, it also always has, even when it isn’t moving itself, the ability for spontaneous motion.

The ancients have rightly noticed that this moving force acts in the substance of bodies only when the substance is manifested in certain forms; they have also observed that the different motions which it produces are all subject to these different forms or regulated by them. That is why the forms, through which the substance of bodies can not only move, but also move in different ways, were called material forms.

The ancients correctly noted that this moving force only affects the substance of bodies when that substance is expressed in specific forms; they've also seen that the various motions it creates are all influenced or controlled by these different forms. That's why the forms that allow the substance of bodies to move, and to move in various ways, were referred to as material forms.

Once these early masters had cast their eyes on [158]all the phenomena of nature, they discovered in the substance of bodies, the power of self-movement. In fact, this substance either moves itself, or when it is in motion, the motion is communicated to it by another substance. But can anything be seen in this substance, save the substance itself in action; and if sometimes it seems to receive a motion that it has not, does it receive that motion from any cause other than this same kind of substance, whose parts act the one upon the other?

Once these early masters looked around at all the natural phenomena, they recognized that bodies have the ability to move on their own. Essentially, this substance either moves itself or, when it's in motion, that motion is transferred to it by another substance. But can we see anything in this substance other than the substance itself in action? And if it sometimes appears to receive a motion that it doesn't actually have, could that motion come from any source other than this same type of substance, where the parts influence one another?

If, then, one infers another agent, I ask what agent, and I demand proofs of its existence. But since no one has the least idea of such an agent, it is not even a logical entity. Therefore it is clear that the ancients must have easily recognized an intrinsic force of motion within the substance of bodies, since in fact it is impossible to prove or conceive any other substance acting upon it.

If someone is thinking about inferring another agent, I want to know what that agent is, and I need evidence of its existence. But since no one has the slightest clue about such an agent, it’s not even a logical concept. So it's clear that ancient thinkers must have clearly understood an inherent force of motion within the substance of objects, as it’s really impossible to prove or imagine any other substance acting on it.

Descartes, a genius made to blaze new paths and to go astray in them, supposed with some other philosophers that God is the only efficient cause of motion, and that every instant He communicates motion to all bodies. But this opinion is but an hypothesis which he tried to adjust to the light of faith; and in so doing he was no longer attempting to speak as a philosopher or to philosophers. Above all he was not addressing those who can be convinced only by the force of evidence.

Descartes, a brilliant mind meant to forge new paths and sometimes wander off course, believed, along with some other philosophers, that God is the only real cause of motion and that every moment He bestows motion to all objects. However, this belief is merely a hypothesis that he tried to align with the principles of faith; in doing so, he ceased to speak as a philosopher or to philosophers. Most importantly, he was not addressing those who can only be persuaded by solid evidence.

The Christian Scholastics of the last centuries have felt the full force of this reflection; for this reason they have wisely limited themselves to purely philosophic knowledge concerning the motion of matter, although they might have shown that God Himself said that He had “imprinted an active principle [159]in the elements of matter (Gen. i; Is. lxvi).”

The Christian Scholastics of the last few centuries have deeply considered this idea; for this reason, they have wisely focused solely on philosophical knowledge about the motion of matter, even though they could have pointed out that God Himself stated that He had “imprinted an active principle [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]in the elements of matter (Gen. i; Is. lxvi).”

One might here make up a long list of authorities, and take from the most celebrated professors the substance of the doctrine of all the rest; but it is clear enough, without a medley of citations, that matter contains this moving force which animates it, and which is the immediate cause of all the laws of motion.

One could create a lengthy list of experts and take the essence of their teachings from the most renowned professors, but it's obvious, without needing a jumble of references, that matter holds this driving force that brings it to life and is the direct cause of all motion laws.

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CHAPTER VI. CONCERNING THE SENSITIVE FACULTY OF MATTER.

We have spoken of two essential attributes of matter, upon which depend the greater number of its properties, namely extension and moving force. We have now but to prove a third attribute: I mean the faculty of feeling which the philosophers of all centuries have found in this same substance. I say all philosophers, although I am not ignorant of all the efforts which the Cartesians have made, in vain, to rob matter of this faculty. But in order to avoid insurmountable difficulties, they have flung themselves into a labyrinth from which they have thought to escape by this absurd system “that animals are pure machines.”89

We’ve talked about two key properties of matter that most of its characteristics depend on: extension and force of motion. Now, we just need to establish a third property: the ability to feel, which philosophers throughout history have recognized in this substance. I say “all philosophers” despite knowing the various attempts by Cartesian thinkers to deny matter this ability, though they’ve been in vain. To sidestep huge challenges, they’ve trapped themselves in a maze, believing they can escape with the ridiculous idea that “animals are just machines.”89

An opinion so absurd has never gained admittance among philosophers, except as the play of wit or as a philosophical pastime. For this reason we shall not stop to refute it. Experience gives us no less proof of the faculty of feeling in animals than of feeling in men....

An opinion so ridiculous has never been accepted among philosophers, except as a joke or a philosophical hobby. For this reason, we won’t bother refuting it. Experience provides us with just as much evidence of the ability to feel in animals as it does in humans....

There comes up another difficulty which more nearly concerns our vanity: namely, the impossibility of our conceiving this property as a dependence or attribute of matter. Let it not be forgotten [160]that this substance reveals to us only ineffable characters. Do we understand better how extension is derived from its essence, how it can be moved by a primitive force whose action is exerted without contact, and a thousand other miracles so hidden from the gaze of the most penetrating eyes, that (to paraphrase the idea of an illustrious modern writer) they reveal only the curtain which conceals them?

There’s another challenge that relates more to our vanity: the impossibility of seeing this property as a characteristic or feature of matter. Let’s not forget [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] that this substance shows us only indescribable traits. Do we really understand better how extension comes from its essence, how it can be moved by a fundamental force that acts without direct contact, and a thousand other mysteries so hidden from even the sharpest observers that (to put it in the words of a well-known modern writer) they merely reveal the curtain that hides them?

But might not one suppose as some have supposed, that the feeling which is observed in animated bodies, might belong to a being distinct from the matter of these bodies, to a substance of a different nature united to them? Does the light of reason allow us in good faith to admit such conjectures? We know in bodies only matter, and we observe the faculty of feeling only in bodies: on what foundation then can we erect an ideal being, disowned by all our knowledge?

But could one not think, as some have thought, that the sensations seen in living beings might belong to a distinct entity separate from the physical matter of these beings, to a different kind of substance connected to them? Does reason allow us to genuinely entertain such ideas? We only know matter in physical bodies, and we observe the ability to feel only in those bodies: on what basis can we then construct a concept of an ideal being, one that is unsupported by all our knowledge?

However, we must admit, with the same frankness, that we are ignorant whether matter has in itself the faculty of feeling, or only the power of acquiring it by those modifications or forms to which matter is susceptible; for it is true that this faculty of feeling appears only in organic bodies.

However, we have to acknowledge, with the same honesty, that we don't know if matter itself has the ability to feel, or if it can only gain that ability through the changes or forms it can take on; because it's true that this ability to feel only shows up in living things.

This is then another new faculty which might exist only potentially in matter, like all the others which have been mentioned; and this was the hypothesis of the ancients, whose philosophy, full of insight and penetration, deserves to be raised above the ruins of the philosophy of the moderns. It is in vain that the latter disdain the sources too remote from them. Ancient philosophy will always hold its own among those who are worthy to judge [161]it, because it forms (at least in relation to the subject of which I am treating) a system that is solid and well articulated like the body, whereas all these scattered members of modern philosophy form no system. [163]

This is yet another new ability that might only exist potentially in matter, like all the others that have been mentioned; and this was the idea of the ancients, whose philosophy, rich in insight and depth, deserves to be elevated above the remnants of modern philosophy. It's pointless for modern thinkers to dismiss sources that are too far removed from them. Ancient philosophy will always stand strong among those who are qualified to evaluate it, because it represents a system that is solid and well-organized like a body, while all these disconnected parts of modern philosophy lack a coherent system. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

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APPENDIX.

OUTLINES AND NOTES.

Outlines and notes.

BY GERTRUDE CARMAN BUSSEY. [165]

BY GERTRUDE CARMAN BUSSEY. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

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LA METTRIE’S RELATION TO HIS PREDECESSORS AND TO HIS SUCCESSORS.

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I. The Historical Relation of La Mettrie to René Descartes (1596–1650).

The most direct source of La Mettrie’s work, if the physiological aspect of his system is set aside, is found in the philosophy of Descartes. In fact it sometimes seems as if La Mettrie’s materialism grew out of his insistence on the contradictory character of the dualistic system of Descartes. He criticises Descartes’s statement that the body and soul are absolutely independent, and takes great pains to show the dependence of the soul on the body. Yet though La Mettrie’s system may be opposed to that of Descartes1 from one point of view, from another point of view it seems to be a direct consequence of it. La Mettrie himself recognizes this relationship and feels that his doctrine that man is a machine, is a natural inference from Descartes’s teaching that animals are mere machines.2 Moreover La Mettrie carries on Descartes’s conception of the body as a machine, and many of his detailed discussions of the machinery of the body seem to have been drawn from Descartes. [166]

The most direct source of La Mettrie’s work, if we set aside the physiological aspect of his system, is found in Descartes' philosophy. It sometimes seems like La Mettrie’s materialism arises from his insistence on the contradictory nature of Descartes' dualistic system. He criticizes Descartes’ claim that the body and soul are completely independent and goes to great lengths to show how the soul depends on the body. Yet, while La Mettrie’s system may oppose Descartes' from one angle, from another perspective it appears to be a direct result of it. La Mettrie acknowledges this connection and believes that his doctrine stating that humans are machines is a natural conclusion from Descartes' teaching that animals are simply machines. Furthermore, La Mettrie continues Descartes' idea of the body as a machine, and many of his detailed discussions about the body's machinery seem to be influenced by Descartes. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

It should be noted that La Mettrie did justice to Descartes, and realized how much all philosophers owed to him. He insisted moreover that Descartes’s errors were due to his failure to follow his own method.3 Yet La Mettrie’s method was different from that of Descartes, for La Mettrie was an empiricist4 without rationalistic leaning. As regards doctrine: La Mettrie differed from Descartes in his opinion of matter. Since he disbelieved in any spiritual reality, he gave matter the attributes of motion and thought, while Descartes insisted that the one attribute of matter is extension.5 It was a natural consequence of La Mettrie’s disbelief in spiritual substance that he could throw doubt on the existence of God.6 On the other hand the belief in God was one of the foundations of Descartes’s system. La Mettrie tried to show that Descartes’s belief in a soul and in God was merely designed to hide his true thought from the priests, and to save himself from persecution.7

It’s important to note that La Mettrie acknowledged Descartes and recognized how much all philosophers owed to him. He also argued that Descartes’s mistakes were a result of not sticking to his own method.3 However, La Mettrie’s approach was different from Descartes’s because La Mettrie was an empiricist4 without any rationalist tendencies. Regarding doctrine: La Mettrie disagreed with Descartes on his views about matter. Since he didn’t believe in any spiritual reality, he attributed movement and thought to matter, while Descartes maintained that the only characteristic of matter is extension.5 It was a natural outcome of La Mettrie’s disbelief in spiritual substance that he could question the existence of God.6 In contrast, belief in God was one of the cornerstones of Descartes’s philosophy. La Mettrie attempted to demonstrate that Descartes’s belief in a soul and in God was merely a way to conceal his true ideas from the priests and to protect himself from persecution.7

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IIa. The Likeness of La Mettrie to the English Materialists, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and John Toland (1670–1721).

The influence of Descartes upon La Mettrie cannot be questioned but it is more difficult to estimate the influence upon him of materialistic philosophers. [167]Hobbes published “The Leviathan” in 1651 and “De Corpore” in 1655. Thus he wrote about a century before La Mettrie, and since the eighteenth century was one in which the influence of England upon France was very great, it is easy to suppose that La Mettrie had read Hobbes. If so, he must have gained many ideas from him. The extent of this influence is, however, unknown, for La Mettrie rarely if ever quotes from Hobbes, or attributes any of his doctrines to Hobbes.

The influence of Descartes on La Mettrie is undeniable, but it's harder to determine how much materialistic philosophers influenced him. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]Hobbes published "The Leviathan" in 1651 and "De Corpore" in 1655. He wrote about a century before La Mettrie, and since the eighteenth century saw a strong influence of England on France, it's reasonable to assume that La Mettrie was familiar with Hobbes. If that’s the case, he likely picked up several ideas from him. However, the extent of this influence is unclear, as La Mettrie rarely, if ever, quotes Hobbes or attributes any of his doctrines to him.

In the first place, both Hobbes and La Mettrie are thoroughgoing materialists. They both believe that body is the only reality, and that anything spiritual is unimaginable.8 Furthermore their conceptions of matter are very similar. According to La Mettrie, matter contains the faculty of sensation and the power of motion as well as the quality of extension.9 This same conception of matter is held by Hobbes, for he specifically attributes extension and motion to matter, and then reduces sensation to a kind of internal motion.10 Thus sensation also may be an attribute of matter. Moreover Hobbes and La Mettrie are in agreement on many smaller points, and La Mettrie elaborates much that is suggested in Hobbes. They both believe that the passions are dependent on bodily conditions.11 They agree in the belief that all the differences in men are due to differences in the constitution and organization [168]of their bodies.12 They both discuss the nature and importance of language.13

In the first place, both Hobbes and La Mettrie are complete materialists. They both believe that the body is the only reality, and that anything spiritual is beyond imagination.8 Furthermore, their ideas about matter are quite similar. According to La Mettrie, matter has the ability to sense and the power to move, as well as the quality of taking up space.9 Hobbes holds a similar view of matter, as he specifically assigns extension and motion to it, and further reduces sensation to a type of internal motion.10 Thus, sensation can also be seen as a characteristic of matter. Moreover, Hobbes and La Mettrie agree on many smaller points, with La Mettrie expanding on a lot of what Hobbes suggests. They both believe that emotions depend on physical conditions.11 They share the view that the differences among people arise from variations in their bodily structure and organization [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__].12 They also both explore the nature and significance of language.13

Hobbes differs from La Mettrie in holding that we can be sure that God exists as the cause of this world.14 However even though he thinks that it is possible to know that God exists, he does not believe that we can know his nature.

Hobbes varies from La Mettrie in that he believes we can be certain of God's existence as the cause of this world.14 However, even though he thinks it's possible to know that God exists, he doesn't believe we can understand his nature.

La Mettrie’s system may be regarded as the application of a system like that of Hobbes to the special problem of the relation of soul and body in man; for if there is nothing in the universe but matter and motion, it inevitably follows that man is merely a very complicated machine.

La Mettrie's system can be seen as applying a system similar to Hobbes's to the specific issue of the relationship between the soul and body in humans; because if the universe consists only of matter and motion, it inevitably means that humans are just very complex machines.

There is great similarity also between the doctrine of La Mettrie and that of Toland. It is interesting to note the points of resemblance and of difference. Toland’s “Letters to Serena,” which contain much of his philosophical teaching, were published in 1704. There is a possibility therefore that La Mettrie read them and gained some suggestions from them.

There is a strong similarity between La Mettrie's ideas and those of Toland. It's interesting to highlight both the similarities and the differences. Toland's “Letters to Serena,” which express much of his philosophical views, were published in 1704. This suggests that La Mettrie may have read them and drawn some inspiration from them.

The point most emphasized in Toland’s teaching15 is that motion is an attribute of matter. He argues for this belief on the ground that matter must be essentially active in order to undergo change,16 and that the conception of the inertness of matter is based on the conception of absolute rest, and that this absolute rest is nowhere to be [169]found.17 Since motion is essential to matter, there is no need, Toland believes, to account for the beginning of motion. Those who have regarded matter as inert have had to find some efficient cause for motion, and to do this, they have held that all nature is animated. But this pretended animation is utterly useless, since matter is itself endowed with motion.18 The likeness to La Mettrie is evident. La Mettrie likewise opposes the doctrine of the animation of matter, and the belief in any external cause of motion.19 Yet he feels the need of postulating some beginning of motion,20 and although he uses the conception so freely, he does not agree with Toland that the nature of motion is known. He believes that it is impossible to know the nature of motion,21 while Toland believes that the nature of motion is self-evident.22

The main point emphasized in Toland’s teaching15 is that motion is a property of matter. He argues for this belief on the basis that matter must be inherently active to change__,16 and that the idea of matter being inert relies on the concept of absolute rest, which is nowhere to be [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]found.17 Since motion is essential for matter, Toland believes there’s no need to explain the start of motion. Those who see matter as inert have had to find some efficient cause for motion, leading them to claim that all of nature is animated. However, this supposed animation is completely unnecessary, as matter itself possesses motion.18 The similarity to La Mettrie is clear. La Mettrie also rejects the idea of the animation of matter and any external cause of motion.19 However, he feels the need to propose some beginning of motion__,20 and while he uses the concept freely, he doesn’t agree with Toland that the nature of motion is understood. He believes it’s impossible to know the nature of motion__,21 while Toland believes that the nature of motion is self-evident.22

Another point of contrast between Toland and La Mettrie is in their doctrines of God. Toland believes that God, “a pure spirit or immaterial being,” is necessary for his system,23 while La Mettrie questions God’s existence and insists that immateriality and spirituality are fine words that no one understands.

Another point of contrast between Toland and La Mettrie is in their beliefs about God. Toland believes that God, “a pure spirit or immaterial being,” is necessary for his system, 23 while La Mettrie questions God's existence and argues that immateriality and spirituality are just fancy words that no one really understands.

It must be admitted, in truth, that La Mettrie and Toland have different interests and different points of view. Toland is concerned to discover the essential nature of matter, while La Mettrie’s problem [170]is to find the specific relation of body and mind. On this relation, he builds his whole system.

It has to be acknowledged that La Mettrie and Toland have different interests and perspectives. Toland focuses on uncovering the fundamental nature of matter, while La Mettrie’s concern is to determine the specific connection between body and mind. He constructs his entire system around this connection.

b. The Relation of La Mettrie to an English Sensationalist: John Locke (1632–1704).

Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding” was published in 1690, and La Mettrie, like most cultured Frenchmen of the Enlightenment, was influenced by his teaching. The main agreement between Locke and La Mettrie is in their doctrine that all ideas are derived from sensation. Both vigorously oppose the belief in innate ideas,24 teaching that even our most complex and our most abstract ideas are gained through sensation. But La Mettrie does not follow Locke in analyzing these ideas and in concluding that many sensible qualities of objects—such as colors, sounds, etc.—have no existence outside the mind.25 He rejects Locke’s doctrine of spiritual substances,26 and opposes Locke’s theistic teaching, laying stress, on the other hand, upon Locke’s admission of the possibility that “thinking being may also be material.”27

Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding” was published in 1690, and La Mettrie, like most educated French people during the Enlightenment, was influenced by his ideas. The main agreement between Locke and La Mettrie is their belief that all ideas come from sensory experiences. Both strongly reject the notion of innate ideas, teaching that even our most complex and abstract ideas are obtained through sensation. However, La Mettrie does not follow Locke in analyzing these ideas and concluding that many qualities of objects—like colors and sounds—do not exist outside the mind. He rejects Locke’s idea of spiritual substances and disagrees with Locke’s theistic views, instead emphasizing Locke’s acknowledgment of the possibility that “thinking beings may also be material.”

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IIIa. The Likeness, probable but unacknowledged, to La Mettrie, of the French Sensationalists, Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715–1780) and Claude Adrien Helvetius (1715–1771).

Condillac’s “Traité des sensations” was published about ten years after La Mettrie’s “L’histoire naturelle [171]de l’âme,” and therefore it is probable that Condillac had read this work, and gained some ideas from it. Yet Condillac never mentions La Mettrie’s name nor cites his doctrines. This omission may be accounted for by the fact that the works of La Mettrie had been so condemned that later philosophers wished to conceal the similarity of their doctrines to his. Whether the sensationalists were influenced by his teachings or not, there is such a profound likeness in their teachings, that La Mettrie may well be regarded as one of the first French sensationalists as well as one of the leading French materialists of the time.

Condillac’s “Treatise on sensations” was published about ten years after La Mettrie’s “Natural history of the soul,” so it’s likely that Condillac had read this work and got some ideas from it. However, Condillac never mentions La Mettrie’s name or references his theories. This omission might be because La Mettrie’s works were so heavily criticized that later philosophers preferred to hide the similarities between their ideas and his. Regardless of whether the sensationalists were influenced by his teachings, there is such a striking resemblance in their philosophies that La Mettrie could easily be considered one of the first French sensationalists and one of the top French materialists of his time.

Condillac and La Mettrie agree that experience is the source of all knowledge. As Lange suggests,28 La Mettrie’s development of reason from the imagination may have suggested to Condillac the way to develop all the faculties from the soul. La Mettrie asserts that reason is but the sensitive soul contemplating its ideas, and that imagination plays all the rôles of the soul, while Condillac elaborates the same idea, and shows in great detail how all the faculties of the soul are but modifications of sensation.29

Condillac and La Mettrie agree that experience is the source of all knowledge. As Lange suggests, 28 La Mettrie’s development of reason from imagination may have inspired Condillac to explore how to develop all the faculties from the soul. La Mettrie argues that reason is just the sensitive soul reflecting on its ideas and that imagination fulfills all the roles of the soul, while Condillac expands on this idea and explains in detail how all the faculties of the soul are simply variations of sensation.29

Both La Mettrie and Condillac believe that there is no gulf between man and the lower animals; but this leads to a point of disagreement between the two philosophers, for Condillac absolutely denies that animals can be mere machines,30 and we must suppose that he would the more ardently oppose the teaching that man is merely a complicated machine! [172]Condillac finally, unlike La Mettrie, believes in the existence of God. A final point of contrast also concerns the theology of the two writers. La Mettrie insists that we can not be sure that there is any purpose in the world, while Condillac affirms that we can discern intelligence and design throughout the universe.31

Both La Mettrie and Condillac agree that there's no significant difference between humans and lower animals; however, this leads to a disagreement between the two philosophers because Condillac strongly rejects the idea that animals are just machines, and we can assume he would vehemently oppose the idea that humans are simply complex machines! [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] Unlike La Mettrie, Condillac believes in the existence of God. Another key difference between the two thinkers is their views on theology. La Mettrie argues that we can't be certain there's any purpose in the world, while Condillac claims we can see intelligence and design throughout the universe.31

Like La Mettrie and Condillac, Helvetius teaches that all the faculties of the mind can be reduced to sensation.32 Unlike La Mettrie, he specifically distinguishes the mind from the soul, and describes the mind as a later developed product of the soul or faculty of sensation.33 This idea may have been suggested by La Mettrie’s statement that reason is a modification of sensation. Helvetius, however, unlike La Mettrie, does not clearly decide that sensation is but a result of bodily conditions, and he admits that sensation may be a modification of a spiritual substance.34 Moreover, he claims that climate and food have no effect on the mind, and that the superiority of the understanding is not dependent on the strength of the body and its organs.35

Like La Mettrie and Condillac, Helvetius argues that all mental faculties can be traced back to sensation.32 Unlike La Mettrie, he clearly differentiates between the mind and the soul, describing the mind as a more advanced outcome of the soul or the faculty of sensation.33 This idea might have been inspired by La Mettrie’s claim that reason is a variation of sensation. However, Helvetius, unlike La Mettrie, does not definitively state that sensation is merely a product of physical conditions, and he acknowledges that sensation could be a modification of a spiritual substance.34 Additionally, he asserts that climate and food do not influence the mind, and that the superiority of understanding is not reliant on the strength of the body and its organs.35

La Mettrie and Helvetius resemble each other in ethical doctrine. Both make pleasure and pain the ruling motives of man’s conduct. They claim that all the emotions are merely modifications of corporeal pleasure and pain, and that therefore the only principle of action in man is the desire for pleasure and the fear of pain.36 [173]

La Mettrie and Helvetius are similar in their ethical beliefs. Both argue that pleasure and pain are the main drivers of human behavior. They assert that all emotions are just variations of physical pleasure and pain, and that the only motivation for actions in humans is the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain.36 [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

b. The Likeness to La Mettrie of the French Materialist, Baron Paul Heinrich Dietrich von Holbach (1723–1789).

As Condillac and Helvetius emphasize the sensationalism taught by La Mettrie, so Holbach’s book is a reiteration and elaboration of the materialism set forth in La Mettrie’s works. The teaching of Holbach is so like that of La Mettrie, that the similarity can hardly be a coincidence.

As Condillac and Helvetius highlight the sensationalism presented by La Mettrie, Holbach's book is a restatement and expansion of the materialism outlined in La Mettrie's writings. Holbach's views are so similar to those of La Mettrie that it seems unlikely to be mere coincidence.

La Mettrie regards experience as the only teacher. Holbach dwells on this same idea, and insists that experience is our only source of knowledge in all matters.37 Holbach likewise teaches that man is a purely material being. He disbelieves in any spiritual reality whatsoever, and makes matter the only substance in the world. He lays stress, also, on one thought which is a natural consequence of La Mettrie’s teaching. La Mettrie has limited the action of the will and has insisted that the will is dependent on bodily conditions. Holbach goes further and declares repeatedly that all freedom is a delusion, and that man is controlled in every action by rigid necessity.38 This teaching seems to be the natural outcome of the belief that man is a machine.

La Mettrie sees experience as the only teacher. Holbach focuses on this same idea and insists that experience is our only source of knowledge in all matters. 37 Holbach also teaches that humans are purely material beings. He doesn't believe in any spiritual reality at all, making matter the only substance in the world. He emphasizes another idea that naturally follows from La Mettrie’s teachings. La Mettrie has restricted the action of the will and claimed that the will depends on physical conditions. Holbach takes it further and repeatedly states that all freedom is an illusion, and that humans are governed in every action by strict necessity. 38 This teaching appears to be the logical result of the belief that humans are machines.

Holbach’s atheistic theology is more extreme than his predecessor’s, for La Mettrie admits that God may exist, while Holbach vigorously opposes the possibility. Moreover Holbach holds the opinion, barely suggested by La Mettrie, that an atheistic doctrine would ameliorate the condition of mankind.39 [174]He insists that the idea of God has hindered the progress of reason and interfered with natural law. Holbach is indeed the only one of the philosophers here discussed, who frankly adopts a fatalistic and atheistic doctrine of the universe. In these respects, his teaching is the culmination of French materialism. [175]

Holbach’s atheistic theology is more extreme than that of his predecessor, since La Mettrie acknowledges that God might exist, while Holbach strongly denies the possibility. Furthermore, Holbach believes, only hinted at by La Mettrie, that an atheistic doctrine would improve the human condition.39 [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]He argues that the belief in God has obstructed the advancement of reason and disrupted natural law. Holbach is indeed the only philosopher discussed here who openly embraces a fatalistic and atheistic understanding of the universe. In these ways, his teachings represent the peak of French materialism. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]


1L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” chapters XI, VIII. 

1The natural history of the soul,” chapters XI, VIII.

2 “Man a Machine,” p. 142. Cf. La Mettrie’s commentary on Descartes’s teaching in “Abrégé des systèmes philosophiques,” Œuvres, Tome 2. 

2 “Man a Machine,” p. 142. See La Mettrie’s commentary on Descartes's ideas in “Summary of philosophical systems,” Œuvres, Volume 2.

3Abrégé des systèmes, Descartes,” p. 6, Œuvres Philosophiques, Tome 2. 

3System Overview, Descartes,” p. 6, Philosophical Works, Volume 2. 

4 “Man a Machine,” page 89. Cf. “L’histoire naturelle de l’âme” (or “Traité de l’âme”), Œuvres, 1746, p. 229. 

4 “Man a Machine,” page 89. See “The natural history of the soul” (or “Treatise on the soul”), Œuvres, 1746, p. 229. 

5 Descartes, “Principles,” Part II, Prop. 4. 

5 Descartes, “Principles,” Part II, Prop. 4. 

6 “Man a Machine,” pp. 122–126. 

6 “Man vs. Machine,” pp. 122–126. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

7 Ibid., p. 142. 

7 Same source, p. 142. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

8 Hobbes, “Leviathan,” Part III, Chap. 34; Part I, Chap. XII, Open Court Edition, p. 169. 

8 Hobbes, “Leviathan,” Part III, Chap. 34; Part I, Chap. XII, Open Court Edition, p. 169.

9L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” Chapters III, V, and VI. 

9The Natural History of the Soul,” Chapters III, V, and VI.

10 “Leviathan, Part I, Chap. I. Cf. “Concerning Body,” Part IV, Chap. XXV, 2. 

10 “Leviathan,The text is empty. Please provide a short phrase for modernization. Part I, Chap. I. See “Concerning Body,” Part IV, Chap. XXV, 2.

11 “Man a Machine,” pp. 90–91. 

11 “Man a Machine,” pp. 90–91. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

12 “Leviathan,” Part I, Chap. VI, Molesworth Ed., p. 40. Cf. “Man a Machine,” p. 90. 

12 “Leviathan,” Part I, Chap. VI, Molesworth Ed., p. 40. Cf. “Man a Machine,” p. 90. 

13 Ibid., Part I, Chap. IV. Cf. “Man a Machine,” p. 103. 

13 Ibid., Part I, Chap. IV. See “Man a Machine,” p. 103.

14 Ibid., Part I, Chap. XII. 

14 Same source, Part I, Chapter 12.

15 “Letters to Serena,” V, p. 168. 

15 “Letters to Serena,” V, p. 168.

16 Ibid., p. 196. 

16 Same source, p. 196. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

17 Ibid., p. 203. 

17 Same source., p. 203. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

18 Ibid., p. 199. 

18 Same source, p. 199. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

19L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” Chap. V, p. 94. 

19The natural history of the soul,” Chap. V, p. 94.

20 “Man a Machine,” p. 139. 

20 “Man a Machine,” p. 139. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

21 “Man a Machine, p. 140. 

21 “Human vs Machine, p. 140. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

22 “Letters to Serena,” V, p. 227. 

22 “Letters to Serena,” V, p. 227. 

23 Ibid., V, p. 234. 

23 Same source, V, p. 234. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

24 John Locke, “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” Book I, Book II, Chap. I. 

24 John Locke, “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” Book I, Book II, Chap. I.

25 Locke, “Essay,” Book II, Chap. 8. 

25 Locke, “Essay,” Book II, Chap. 8.

26 Ibid., Book II, Chap. 23. 

26 Same source, Book II, Chap. 23.

27 Ibid., Book IV, Chap. 10. For La Mettrie’s summary of Locke, cf. his “Abrégé des systèmes,” Œuvres, Tome 2. 

27 Same source., Book IV, Chapter 10. For La Mettrie's overview of Locke, see his “Summary of systems,” Œuvres, Volume 2.

28 F. A. Lange, “History of Materialism,” Vol. II, Chap. II. 

28 F. A. Lange, “History of Materialism,” Vol. II, Chap. II.

29Traité des sensations,” Part I. 

29 “Treatise on Sensations,” Part I. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

30Traité des animaux,” Chap. I, p. 454. 

30Treatise on Animals,” Chap. I, p. 454. 

31Traité des animaux,” Chap. VI, p. 577 ff. 

31Treatise on Animals,” Chap. VI, p. 577 ff. 

32 “Treatise on Man,” Sect. II, Chap. I, p. 96. 

32 “Treatise on Man,” Sect. II, Chap. I, p. 96.

33 Ibid., Sect. II, Chap. II, p. 108. 

33 Same source, Section II, Chapter II, page 108.

34 “Essays on the Mind,” Essay II, Chap. I, p. 35. 

34 “Essays on the Mind,” Essay II, Chap. I, p. 35.

35 “Treatise on Man,” Chap. XII, p. 161. 

35 “Treatise on Man,” Chap. XII, p. 161.

36 Ibid., Chap. IX, p. 146; Chap. VII, p. 129. 

36 Same source., Chap. IX, p. 146; Chap. VII, p. 129. 

37Système de la nature,” Vol. I, Chap. I, p. 6. 

37System of nature,” Vol. I, Chap. I, p. 6. 

38Système de la nature,” Vol. I, Chap. VI, p. 94. 

38System of nature,” Vol. I, Chap. VI, p. 94.

39 Ibid., Vol. II, Chap. XVI, p. 451, and Chap. XXVI, p. 485. Cf. “Man a Machine,” pp. 125–126. 

39 Same source., Vol. II, Chap. XVI, p. 451, and Chap. XXVI, p. 485. See also “Man a Machine,” pp. 125–126.

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OUTLINE OF LA METTRIE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE.

PAGES1
I. Insistence on the Empirical Standpoint 16f.; 88f.; 72, 142
II. Arguments in Favor of Materialism:
a. The “Soul” is Affected,
1. By Disease 18f.; 90f.
2. By Sleep 19f.; 91f.
3. By Drugs 20; 92
4. By Food 21f.; 93ff.
5. By Age and Sex 23f.; 95f.
6. By Temperature and Climate 24f.; 96ff.
b. There is No Sharp Distinction Between Men and Animals (Machines) 28f., 100ff.; 41ff., 113ff.; 75f., 142f.
c. Bodily Movements are Due to the “Motive Power” of the Body 51ff., 129ff.
III. Conception of Matter.
a. Matter is Extended 154f.
b. Matter Has the Power of Motion 70, 140; 156ff.
c. Matter Has the Faculty of Feeling 159ff.
IV. Conception of Man:
a. Man is a Machine 17, 89; 21, 93; 56, 128; 69, 140f.; 73, 143; 80, 148
b. All Man’s Faculties Reduce to Sense and Imagination 35ff., 107ff.
c. Man is Like Animals in Being Capable of Education 38, 110
d. Man is Ignorant of His Destiny 79, 147
V. Theological Doctrine:
a. The Existence of God is Unproved and Practically Unimportant 50, 122
b. The Argument from Design is Ineffective Against the Hypothesis of Mechanical Causality 51ff., 124ff.
c. Atheism Makes for Happiness 55, 126f.

[176]

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1 The references are to pages of this book. 

1 The references point to pages in this book.

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NOTES.1

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NOTE ON FREDERICK THE GREAT’S EULOGY.

This translation is made from the third volume, pp. 159 ff. of “Œuvres de Fréderic II., Roi de Prusse, Publiées du vivant de l’Auteur,” Berlin, 1789.

This translation is made from the third volume, pp. 159 ff. of “Works of Frederick II, King of Prussia, Published During the Author's Lifetime,” Berlin, 1789.

La Mettrie was received at the court of Frederick the Great, when he had been driven from Holland on account of the heretical teaching of “L’Homme Machine,” The “Eloge” was read by Darget, the secretary of the king, at a public meeting of the Academy of Berlin, to which, at the initiative of Frederick, La Mettrie had been admitted.

La Mettrie was welcomed at the court of Frederick the Great after being forced to leave Holland due to the controversial ideas in “The Machine Man.” The "Eloge" was read by Darget, the king's secretary, at a public meeting of the Academy of Berlin, where La Mettrie had been admitted at Frederick's suggestion.

The careful reader will not fail to note that Frederick’s arithmetic is at fault, and that La Mettrie died at the age of forty-one, not forty-three, years.

The attentive reader will notice that Frederick’s math is off, and that La Mettrie died at the age of forty-one, not forty-three.

At a few points, perhaps, the Eloge demands elucidation. Coutances, like Caen, is a Norman town. St. Malo lies, just over the border, in Brittany. La Mettrie’s military service was with the French in the Silesian wars against Maria Theresa. The battle of Dettingen was fought in Bavaria and was won by the Austrians through the aid given by George II of England to Maria Theresa. The battle of Fontenoy in the Netherlands was the only victory of the French in this war.

At a few points, the Eloge might need some clarification. Coutances, like Caen, is a town in Normandy. St. Malo is just over the border in Brittany. La Mettrie served in the French military during the Silesian wars against Maria Theresa. The battle of Dettingen took place in Bavaria and was won by the Austrians with support from George II of England for Maria Theresa. The battle of Fontenoy in the Netherlands was the only victory for the French in this war.


Other accounts of the life of La Mettrie are:

Other accounts of La Mettrie's life are:

J. Assézat, Introduction to “L’Homme Machine,” Paris, 1865.

J. Assézat, Introduction to “The Machine Man,” Paris, 1865.

F. A. Lange, “History of Materialism.”

F. A. Lange, “History of Materialism.”

Ph. Damiron, “Histoire de la philosophie du dix-huitième siècle,” Paris, 1858.

Ph. Damiron, “History of 18th Century Philosophy,” Paris, 1858.

N. Quépat, “La philosophie matérialiste au XVIIIe siècle. Essai sur La Mettrie, sa vie, et ses œuvres.” Paris, 1873. [177]

N. Quépat, “Materialist philosophy in the 18th century. Essay on La Mettrie, his life, and his works.” Paris, 1873. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

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NOTES ON MAN A MACHINE.

1.Matter may well be endowed with the faculty of thought.” Although La Mettrie attempts to “avoid this reef,” by refraining from the use of these words, yet he asserts throughout his work that sensations, consciousness, and the soul itself are modifications of matter and motion.

1.Matter might actually have the ability to think.” Even though La Mettrie tries to “steer clear of this issue” by not using these terms, he consistently argues in his work that sensations, consciousness, and even the soul are just changes in matter and motion.

The possibility of matter being endowed with the faculty of thought, is denied by Elie Luzac, the publisher of “L’homme machine,” in his work “L’homme plus que machine.” In this work he tries to disprove the conclusions of “L’homme machine.” He says: “We have therefore proved by the idea of the inert state of matter, by that of motion, by that of relations, by that of activity, by that of extension, that matter can not be possessed of the faculty of thinking”.... “To be brief, I say, that if, by a material substance, we understand that matter which falls under the cognizance of our senses, and which is endowed with the qualities we have mentioned, the soul can not be material: so that it must be immaterial, and, for the same reason, God could not have given the faculty of thinking to matter, since He can not perform contradictions.”2

Elie Luzac, the publisher of “The human machine,” disputes the idea that matter can think in his work “The human more than machine.” In this text, he attempts to refute the conclusions of “The human machine.” He states: “We have thus demonstrated, through the concept of matter's inert state, movement, relationships, activity, and extension, that matter cannot possess the ability to think.”... “To sum it up, I assert that if by a material substance we mean the matter that our senses perceive, and which has the qualities we mentioned, then the soul cannot be material: therefore, it must be immaterial. Consequently, for the same reason, God could not give the ability to think to matter, as He cannot create contradictions.”2

2.How can we define a being whose nature is absolutely unknown to us?” La Mettrie uses this as an argument against the belief in a soul, and yet he later admits that the “nature of motion is as unknown to us as the nature of matter.” It is difficult then to see why there is more reason to doubt the existence of spirit, than to doubt the existence of matter. Locke makes this point very well. “It is for want of reflection that we are apt to think that our senses show us nothing but material things. Every act of sensation, when duly considered, [178]gives us an equal view of both parts of nature, the corporeal and spiritual.”3... “If this notion of immaterial spirit may have, perhaps, some difficulties in it not easy to be explained, we have therefore no more reason to deny or doubt the existence of such spirits, than we have to deny or doubt the existence of body because the notion of body is cumbered with some difficulties, very hard and perhaps impossible to be explained or understood by us.”4

2.How can we define a being whose nature is completely unknown to us?” La Mettrie uses this to argue against the belief in a soul, and yet he later acknowledges that the “nature of motion is just as unknown to us as the nature of matter.” It's hard to see why we should doubt the existence of spirit more than we doubt the existence of matter. Locke expresses this well. “It’s because we don’t reflect that we tend to think our senses only show us material things. Every sensation, when considered properly, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]provides us with an equal perspective of both aspects of nature, the physical and spiritual.”3... “If the idea of an immaterial spirit has some challenges that aren’t easy to explain, we have no more reason to deny or doubt the existence of such spirits than we do to deny or doubt the existence of bodies, simply because the concept of bodies also has complexities that are very difficult or perhaps impossible for us to explain or understand.”4

3.Author of the ‘Spectacle de la nature.’” Noel Antoine Pluche (1688–1761) was a Jansenist author. He was Director of the College of Laon, but was deprived of his position on account of his refusal to adhere to the bull “Unigenitus.” Rollin then recommended him to Gasville, intendant of Normandy, who entrusted him with his son’s education. He finally settled in Paris. His principal works are: “Spectacle de la nature,” (Paris, 1739); “Mécanique des langues et l’art de les enseigner,” (Paris, 1751); “Harmonie des Psaumes et de l’Evangile,” (Paris, 1764); “Concorde de la géographie des différents ages,” (Paris, 1765).5

3.Author of the ‘Nature's spectacle.’” Noel Antoine Pluche (1688–1761) was a Jansenist writer. He served as the Director of the College of Laon but lost his position due to his refusal to accept the bull “Unigenitus.” Rollin then recommended him to Gasville, the intendant of Normandy, who put him in charge of his son’s education. He eventually settled in Paris. His main works include: “Nature's spectacle,” (Paris, 1739); “Mechanics of languages and the art of teaching them,” (Paris, 1751); “Harmony of the Psalms and the Gospel,” (Paris, 1764); “Agreement on the geography of different ages,” (Paris, 1765).5

La Mettrie describes Pluche in the “Essais sur l’esprit et les beaux esprits” thus: “Without wit, without taste, he is Rollin’s pedant. A superficial man, he had need of the work of M. Réaumur, of whom he is only a stale and tiresome imitator in the flat little sayings scattered in his dialogues. It was with the works of Rollin as with the ‘Spectacle de la Nature,’ one made the fortune of the other: Gaçon praised Person, Person praised Gaçon, and the public praised them both.”6

La Mettrie describes Pluche in the “Essays on the Mind and Great Minds” like this: “Lacking wit and taste, he’s just Rollin’s pedant. A shallow man, he relies on the work of M. Réaumur, whom he merely mimics in the bland little sayings scattered throughout his dialogues. The relationship between the works of Rollin and the ‘Nature's Spectacle’ was such that one made the other famous: Gaçon praised Person, Person praised Gaçon, and the public appreciated them both.”6

This quotation from La Mettrie occurs in Assézat’s edition of La Mettrie’s “L’homme machine,” which was published as the second volume of the series “Singularités physiologiques” (1865). Assézat was a French publisher and writer. He was at one time Secretary of the Anthropological Society, and collaborated with other writers in the publication of “La Revue Nationale,” “La Revue de Paris,” and “La Pensée nouvelle.” His notes to “L’Homme Machine” show great knowledge [179]concerning physiological subjects. He intended to publish a complete edition of Diderot’s works, but overwork on this undermined his health, so that he was unable to complete it.7

This quote from La Mettrie is found in Assézat’s edition of La Mettrie’s “The human machine,” which was released as the second volume in the “Physiological singularities” series (1865). Assézat was a French publisher and writer. He once served as Secretary of the Anthropological Society and worked with other authors on publications like “National Review,” “The Paris Review,” and “The New Thought.” His notes on “The Machine Man” demonstrate extensive knowledge [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] about physiological topics. He planned to publish a complete edition of Diderot’s works, but his excessive workload affected his health, preventing him from finishing it.7

4. Torricelli was a physicist and mathematician who lived from 1608 to 1647. He was a disciple of Galileo, and acted as his amanuensis for three months before Galileo’s death. He was then nominated as grand-ducal mathematician and professor of mathematics in the Florentine Academy. In 1643, he made his most famous discovery. He found that the height to which a liquid will rise in a closed tube, depends on the specific gravity of the liquid, and concludes from this that the column of liquid is sustained by atmospheric pressure. This discovery did away with the obscure idea of a fuga vacui, and laid bare the principle on which mercurial barometers are constructed. For a long time the mercurial thermometer was called the “Torricellian tube,” and the vacuum which the barometer includes is still known as a “Torricellian vacuum.”8

4. Torricelli was a physicist and mathematician who lived from 1608 to 1647. He was a student of Galileo and served as his Understood! Please provide the text you would like me to modernize. for three months before Galileo’s death. He was then appointed as the grand-ducal mathematician and a professor of mathematics at the Florentine Academy. In 1643, he made his most famous discovery. He found that the height to which a liquid will rise in a closed tube depends on the specific gravity of the liquid and concluded that the column of liquid is supported by atmospheric pressure. This discovery eliminated the obscure idea of a fuga vacui and clarified the principle behind the construction of mercurial barometers. For a long time, the mercurial thermometer was referred to as the “Torricellian tube,” and the vacuum within the barometer is still called a “Torricellian vacuum.”8

5.Only the physicians have a right to speak on this subject.” Luzac says: “’Tis true that if the materiality of the soul was proved, the knowledge of her would be an object of natural philosophy, and we might with some appearance of reason reject all arguments to the contrary which are not drawn from that science. But if the soul is not material, the investigation of its nature does not belong to natural philosophy, but to those who search into the nature of its faculties, and are called metaphysicians.”9

5.Only doctors should speak on this topic.” Luzac says: “It is true that if the soul’s materiality were proven, understanding it would fall under natural philosophy, and we could reasonably dismiss any opposing arguments not based on that field. However, if the soul isn't physical, then understanding its nature doesn't belong to natural philosophy, but to those who explore the nature of its abilities, known as metaphysicians.”9

6.Man is ... a machine.” This is the first clear statement of this theory, which as the title of the work indicates, is the central doctrine of this work. Descartes had strongly denied the possibility of conceiving man as a machine. “We may easily conceive a machine to be so constructed that it emits vocables, and even that it emits some correspondent to the action upon it of external objects which cause a change in its organs,... but not that it should emit them variously so [180]as appositely to reply to what is said in its presence, as men of the lowest grade of intellect can do.”10

6.Man is ... a machine.” This is the first clear statement of this theory, which, as the title of the work suggests, is the main idea of this work. Descartes strongly rejected the idea of thinking of humans as machines. “We can easily imagine a machine built to produce sounds, and even that it could make sounds in response to the actions of outside things that affect its parts,... but we can't imagine it could respond in a varied way, appropriately replying to what is said to it, like even the simplest-minded humans can.” 10

7.Let us then take in our hands the staff of experience.” La Mettrie repeatedly emphasizes the belief that knowledge must come from experience. Moreover he confines this experience to sense experience, and concludes “L’histoire naturelle de l’âme” with these words: “No senses, no ideas. The fewer senses there are: the fewer ideas. No sensations experienced, no ideas. These principles are the necessary consequence of all the observations and experiences that constitute the unassailable foundation of this work.”

7.Let us then take the staff of experience into our hands.” La Mettrie repeatedly emphasizes that knowledge must come from experience. He limits this experience to sensory experience and concludes “The natural history of the soul” with these words: “No senses, no ideas. The fewer senses there are, the fewer ideas. No sensations experienced, no ideas. These principles are the inevitable result of all the observations and experiences that form the solid foundation of this work.”

This doctrine is opposed to the teaching of Descartes, who insists that “neither our imagination nor our senses can give us assurance of anything unless our understanding intervene.11 Moreover Descartes believes that the senses are fallacious, and that the ideal method for philosophy is a method corresponding to that of mathematics.12 Condillac and Holbach agree with La Mettrie’s opinion. Thus, Condillac teaches that man is nothing more than what he has become by the use of his senses.13 And Holbach says: “As soon as we take leave of experience, we fall into the chasm where our imagination leads us astray.”14

This belief goes against Descartes’ teaching, who argues that “neither our imagination nor our senses can assure us of anything unless our understanding steps in.” Moreover, Descartes thinks the senses can be misleading, and that the best approach for philosophy should reflect that of mathematics. Condillac and Holbach share La Mettrie’s viewpoint. Condillac states that a person is simply what they have become through their senses. Holbach adds: “Once we disregard experience, we plunge into the abyss where our imagination misguides us.”

8. “Galen (Galenus) Claudius, 130 to circa 210 A. D. An eminent Greek physician and philosopher. Born at Pergamus, Mysia, he studied both the Platonic and Peripatetic systems of philosophy. Satyrus instructed him in anatomy. He traveled extensively while young to perfect his education. About 165 A. D. he moved to Rome, and became very celebrated as a surgeon and practising physician, attending the family of Marcus Aurelius. He returned to Pergamus, but probably visited Rome three or four times afterwards. He wrote in philosophy, logic, and medicine. Many, probably most, of his works are lost. He was the one medical authority for thirteen [181]centuries, and his services to logic and to philosophy were also great.”15

8. “Galen (Galenus) Claudius, 130 to circa 210 A.D. An influential Greek doctor and philosopher. Born in Pergamus, Mysia, he studied both the Platonic and Peripatetic philosophies. Satyrus taught him anatomy. He traveled a lot in his youth to enhance his education. Around 165 A.D., he moved to Rome, where he became well-known as a surgeon and practicing physician, treating the family of Marcus Aurelius. He returned to Pergamus but likely visited Rome three or four more times afterward. He wrote on philosophy, logic, and medicine. Many, if not most, of his works are lost. He was the medical authority for thirteen [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] centuries, and his contributions to logic and philosophy were significant.”15

9. The author of “L’histoire de l’âme” is La Mettrie himself.

9. The author of “The story of the soul” is La Mettrie himself.

10. Hippocrates is often termed the “father of medicine.” He was born in Cos in 460 B. C. He studied medicine under his father, Heraclides, and Herodicus of Selymbria; and philosophy under Gorgias and Democritus. He was the first to separate medicine from religion and from philosophy. He insisted that diseases must be treated by the physician, as if they were governed by purely natural laws. The Greeks had such respect for dead bodies that Hippocrates could not have dissected a human body, and consequently his knowledge of its structure was limited, but he seems to have been an acute and skilful observer of conditions in the living body. He wrote several works on medicine, and in one of them showed the first principles on which the public health must be based. The details of his life are hidden by tradition, but it is certain that he was regarded with great respect and veneration by the Greeks.16

10. Hippocrates is often called the “father of medicine.” He was born in Cos in 460 B.C. He studied medicine under his father, Heraclides, and Herodicus of Selymbria, and philosophy under Gorgias and Democritus. He was the first to separate medicine from religion and philosophy. He insisted that diseases should be treated by physicians as if they were governed by purely natural laws. The Greeks respected dead bodies so much that Hippocrates could not have dissected one, which limited his knowledge of human anatomy, but he seems to have been a keen and skilled observer of living conditions. He wrote several medical texts, and in one of them, he laid out the basic principles for public health. The specifics of his life are lost to history, but it's clear that he was held in great respect and reverence by the Greeks.16

11.The different combinations of these humors....” Compare this with Descartes’s statement that the difference in men comes from the difference in the construction and position of the brain, which causes a difference in the action of the animal spirits.17

11.The different combinations of these humors....” Compare this with Descartes’s claim that the differences among people arise from how their brains are built and positioned, leading to variations in the behavior of the animal spirits.17

12.This drug intoxicates, like wine, coffee, etc., each in its own measure, and according to the dose.” Descartes also speaks of the effect of wine. “The vapors of wine, entering the blood quickly, go from the heart to the brain, where they are converted into spirits, which being stronger and more abundant than usual are capable of moving the body in several strange fashions.”18 [182]

12.This drug is intoxicating, much like wine, coffee, and so on, each in its own way and depending on the amount.” Descartes also discusses the effects of wine. “The vapors of wine, quickly entering the bloodstream, travel from the heart to the brain, where they transform into spirits, which, being stronger and more plentiful than normal, can cause the body to move in various unusual ways.”18 [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

13. The quotation from Pope is from the “Moral Essays,” published 1731 to 1735, Epistle I, 1, 69.

13. The quote from Pope is from the "Moral Essays," published from 1731 to 1735, Epistle I, 1, 69.

14. Jan Baptista Van Helmont (1578–1644) was a Flemish physician and chemist. He is noted for having demonstrated the necessity of the balance in chemistry, and for having been among the first to use the word “gas.” His works were published as “Ortus Medicinae,” 1648.19

14. Jan Baptista Van Helmont (1578–1644) was a Flemish doctor and chemist. He is known for showing the importance of the balance in chemistry and for being one of the first to use the term “gas.” His works were published as “Medicine Rise,” 1648.19

15. The author of “Lettres sur la physiognomie” was Jacques Pernety or Pernetti. He was born at Chazelle-sur-Lyon, was for some years canon at Lyons, and died there in 1777.20

15. The author of “Letters on Physiognomy” was Jacques Pernety or Pernetti. He was born in Chazelle-sur-Lyon, served as a canon in Lyon for several years, and passed away there in 1777.20

16. Boerhaave. See Note 78.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Boerhaave. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

17. Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698–1759) was a French mathematician, astronomer and philosopher. He supported the Newtonian theory against the Cartesians. In 1740 he became president of the Academy of Berlin. He was the head of the expedition which was sent by Louis XV to measure a degree of longitude in Lapland. Voltaire satirized Maupertuis in the “Diatribe du Docteur Akakia.”21

17. Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698–1759) was a French mathematician, astronomer, and philosopher. He backed Newton's theories in opposition to the Cartesians. In 1740, he became president of the Academy of Berlin. He led the expedition sent by Louis XV to measure a degree of longitude in Lapland. Voltaire mocked Maupertuis in the “Diatribe by Dr. Akakia.”21

18. Luzac sums up the preceding facts by saying: “Here are a great many facts, but what is it they prove? only that the faculties of the soul arise, grow, and acquire strength in proportion as the body does; so that these same faculties are weakened in the same proportion as the body is.... But from all these circumstances it does not follow that the faculty of thinking is an attribute of matter, and that all depends on the manner in which our machine is made, that the faculties of the soul arise from a principle of animal life, from an innate heat or force, from an irritability of the finest parts of the body, from a subtil ethereal matter diffused through it, or in a word, from all these things taken together.”22

18. Luzac summarizes the earlier points by stating: “There are a lot of facts here, but what do they really prove? They only show that the abilities of the soul develop, grow, and gain strength in line with the body; so these same abilities weaken just as the body does.... However, from all this, it doesn’t follow that the ability to think is a characteristic of matter, and that everything depends on how our body is constructed, that the abilities of the soul come from a principle of animal life, from an internal heat or force, from the sensitivity of the body’s finest parts, from a subtle ethereal matter spread throughout it, or to put it simply, from all these things combined.”22

19.The diverse states of the soul are therefore always correlative [183]with those of the body.” This view is in diametrical opposition to the teaching of Descartes, who says: “The soul is of a nature wholly independent of the body.”23 Yet Descartes also states that there is an intimate connection between the two. “The Reasonable Soul ... could by no means be educed from the power of matter ... it must be expressly created; and it is not sufficient that it be lodged in the human body, exactly like a pilot in a ship, unless perhaps to move its members, but ... it is necessary for it to be joined and united more closely to the body, in order to have sensations and appetites similar to ours, and thus constitute a real man.”23

19.The different states of the soul are always connected [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] to those of the body.” This perspective directly contradicts Descartes' teaching, which claims: “The soul is completely independent of the body.”23 However, Descartes also mentions that there is a close relationship between the two. “The Reasonable Soul ... cannot be derived from the properties of matter ... it must be specifically created; and it’s not enough for it to simply exist in the human body, like a pilot in a ship, unless perhaps to move its limbs, but ... it is essential for it to be more closely joined to the body to experience sensations and desires like ours, thus making a real human.”23

Holbach later emphasizes this close connection between body and soul, which is so insisted upon by La Mettrie. “If freed from our prejudices we wish to see our soul, or the moving principle which acts in us, we shall remain convinced that it is part of our body, that it can not be distinguished from the body except by an abstraction, that it is but the body itself considered relatively to some of the functions or faculties to which its nature and particular organization make it susceptible. We shall see that this soul is forced to undergo the same changes as the body, that it grows and develops with the body.... Finally we can not help recognizing that at some periods it shows evident signs of weakness, sickness, and death.”24

Holbach later highlights this close connection between the body and soul, which La Mettrie strongly emphasizes. “If we set aside our biases and want to understand our soul, or the driving force within us, we’ll realize that it’s part of our body. It can only be separated from the body conceptually; it’s essentially the body viewed in relation to certain functions or abilities that its nature and specific structure allow. We will see that this soul undergoes the same changes as the body, growing and developing alongside it... Ultimately, we cannot ignore the fact that, at certain times, it clearly shows signs of weakness, illness, and death.”24

20. “Peyronie (François Gigot de la), a French surgeon, born in Montpellier, the fifteenth of January, 1678, died the twenty-fifth of April, 1747. He was surgeon of the hospital of Saint-Eloi de Montpellier and instructor of anatomy to the Faculty; then, in 1704, served in the army. In 1717 he became reversioner of the position of first surgeon to Louis XV; in 1731, steward of the Queen’s palace; in 1735, a doctor of the King; in 1736, first surgeon of the King, and chief of the surgeons of the kingdom. The greatest merit of La Peyronie is for having founded the Academy of Surgery in Paris, and for having gained special protection for surgery and surgeons in France. He wrote little.”25 [184]

20. “Peyronie (François Gigot de la), a French surgeon, was born in Montpellier on January 15, 1678, and passed away on April 25, 1747. He served as the surgeon at the Saint-Eloi hospital in Montpellier and taught anatomy at the Faculty; then, in 1704, he joined the army. In 1717, he became the first surgeon for Louis XV; in 1731, he became the steward of the Queen’s palace; in 1735, he earned the title of doctor to the King; and in 1736, he became the King’s chief surgeon and the head of the surgeons in the kingdom. La Peyronie's greatest achievement is founding the Academy of Surgery in Paris and gaining special recognition for surgery and surgeons in France. He wrote little.”25 [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

21. “Willis, Thomas (1621–1675), English physician, was born at Great Bedwin, Wiltshire, on 27th January, 1621. He studied at Christ Church, Oxford; and when that city was garrisoned for the king he bore arms for the Royalists. He took the degree of bachelor of medicine in 1646, and after the surrender of the garrison applied himself to the practice of his profession. In 1660, shortly after the Restoration, he became Sedleian professor of natural philosophy in place of Dr. Joshua Cross, who was ejected, and the same year he took the degree of doctor of physic.... He was one of the first members of the Royal Society, and was elected an honorary fellow of the Royal College of Physicians in 1664. In 1666, ... he removed to Westminster, on the invitation of Dr. Sheldon, Archbishop of Canterbury.... He died at St. Martin’s on 11th November, 1675, and was buried in Westminster Abbey.”26

21. “Willis, Thomas (1621–1675), an English physician, was born in Great Bedwin, Wiltshire, on January 27, 1621. He studied at Christ Church, Oxford; and when the city was occupied for the king, he fought for the Royalists. He earned his bachelor’s degree in medicine in 1646, and after the garrison surrendered, he focused on practicing his profession. In 1660, shortly after the Restoration, he became the Sedleian professor of natural philosophy, replacing Dr. Joshua Cross, who was dismissed. That same year, he received his doctorate in medicine.... He was one of the first members of the Royal Society and was elected an honorary fellow of the Royal College of Physicians in 1664. In 1666, ... he moved to Westminster at the invitation of Dr. Sheldon, Archbishop of Canterbury.... He passed away at St. Martin’s on November 11, 1675, and was buried in Westminster Abbey.”26

22. Fontenelle, Bernard le Bovier de. Born at Rouen, France, February 11, 1657; died at Paris, January 9, 1757. A French advocate, philosopher, poet, and miscellaneous writer. He was the nephew (through his mother) of Corneille, and was ‘one of the last of the Précieux, or rather the inventor of a new combination of literature and gallantry which at first exposed him to not a little satire’ (Saintsbury). He wrote ‘Poésies pastorales’ (1688), ‘Dialogues des morts’ (1683), ‘Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes’ (1686), ‘Histoire des oracles’ (1687), ‘Eloges des académiciens’ (delivered 1690–1740).”27

22. Fontenelle, Bernard le Bovier de. Born in Rouen, France, on February 11, 1657; died in Paris on January 9, 1757. He was a French lawyer, philosopher, poet, and a diverse writer. He was the nephew (through his mother) of Corneille and was ‘one of the last of the Précieux, or rather the creator of a new blend of literature and romance that initially made him a target for quite a bit of satire’ (Saintsbury). He wrote ‘Pastoral poems’ (1688), ‘Dialogues of the dead’ (1683), ‘Conversations about the plurality of worlds’ (1686), ‘History of oracles’ (1687), and ‘Accolades for the academics’ (delivered 1690–1740).”27

23.In a word, would it be absolutely impossible to teach the ape a language? I do not think so.” Compare with this Haeckel’s statement of the relation between man’s speech and that of apes. “It is of especial interest that the speech of apes seems on physiological comparison to be a stage in the formation of articulate human speech. Among living apes there is an Indian species which is musical; the hylobates syndactylus sings a full octave in perfectly pure harmonious half-tones. No impartial philologist can hesitate any longer to admit that our elaborate rational language has been slowly and gradually developed out of the imperfect speech of our Pliocene simian ancestors.”28 [185]

23.In short, is it completely impossible to teach an ape a language? I don't think so.” Compare this to Haeckel’s observation about the connection between human speech and that of apes. “It’s particularly interesting that, physiologically speaking, ape speech appears to be a step in the development of human speech. Among living apes, there’s an Indian species that is musical; the hylobates syndactylus can sing a full octave in perfectly pure, harmonious half-tones. No unbiased linguist can deny that our complex rational language has slowly and gradually evolved from the limited speech of our Pliocene simian ancestors.”28 [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

24. Johann Conrad Amman was born at Schaffhausen, in Switzerland, in 1669. After his graduation at Basle, he practised medicine at Amsterdam. He devoted most of his attention to the instruction of deaf mutes. He taught them by attracting their attention to the motion of his lips, tongue, and larynx, while he was speaking, and by persuading them to imitate these motions. In this way, they finally learned to articulate syllables and words, and to talk. In his works “Surdus Loquens,” and “Dissertatio de Loquela,” he explained the mechanism of speech, and made public his method of instruction. From all accounts it seems that his success with the deaf mutes was remarkable. He died about 1730.29

24. Johann Conrad Amman was born in Schaffhausen, Switzerland, in 1669. After graduating from Basle, he practiced medicine in Amsterdam. He focused primarily on teaching deaf people. He gained their attention by showing them the movements of his lips, tongue, and larynx while he spoke, encouraging them to mimic these motions. Through this method, they eventually learned to form syllables and words, and to communicate. In his works “Deaf Speaker” and “Dissertation on Speech,” he detailed the mechanics of speech and shared his teaching approach. It seems that his success with deaf individuals was remarkable. He passed away around 1730.29

25.... the great analogy between ape and man....” Compare Haeckel: “Thus comparative anatomy proves to the satisfaction of every unprejudiced and critical student the significant fact that the body of man and that of the anthropoid ape are not only peculiarly similar, but they are practically one and the same in every important respect.”30

25.... the great analogy between ape and man....” Compare Haeckel: “Thus, comparative anatomy convinces any unbiased and thoughtful student of the important fact that the body of humans and that of the great apes are not only remarkably similar but are essentially the same in every important way.”30

26. Sir William Temple was born in London in 1628. He attended the Puritan College of Emmanuel, Cambridge, but left without taking his degree. After an extensive tour on the continent, he settled in Ireland in 1655. His political career began with the accession of Charles II in 1660. He is particularly noted for concluding “The Triple Alliance” between England, the United Netherlands, and Sweden, and for his part in bringing about the marriage of William and Mary, which completed the alliance of England and the Netherlands. Temple was not as successful in political work at home as abroad, for he was too honest to care to be concerned in the intrigues in English affairs, at that time. He retired from politics and died at Moor Park in 1699.

26. Sir William Temple was born in London in 1628. He attended the Puritan College of Emmanuel, Cambridge, but left without earning his degree. After a long trip across the continent, he settled in Ireland in 1655. His political career began with the rise of Charles II in 1660. He is well-known for negotiating “The Triple Alliance” between England, the United Netherlands, and Sweden, and for his involvement in the marriage of William and Mary, which solidified the alliance between England and the Netherlands. Temple was not as successful in politics at home as he was abroad because he was too honest to get involved in the political maneuvering of that time in England. He stepped back from politics and passed away at Moor Park in 1699.

Temple wrote several works on political subjects. His “Memoirs” were begun in 1682; the first part was destroyed before it was published, the second part was published without his consent, and the third part was published by Swift after Temple’s death. His fame rests more on his diplomatic work than on his writings.31 [186]

Temple wrote several works on political topics. He started his "Memoirs" in 1682; the first part was lost before it could be published, the second part was released without his approval, and the third part was published by Swift after Temple passed away. His reputation is based more on his diplomatic efforts than on his writings.31 [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

27. “Trembley (Abraham) a Swiss naturalist, born in Geneva, the third of September, 1700, died in Geneva, the twelfth of May, 1784. He was educated in his native city, and in the Hague, where he became tutor of the son of an English resident, and later the tutor of the young duke of Richmond, with whom he traveled in Germany and Italy. In 1760, he obtained the position of librarian at Geneva, and gained a seat in the council of the ‘Two Hundred.’ His admirable works on the fresh-water snake procured for him his election as member of the Royal Society of London, and as correspondent of the Academy of Sciences in Paris. From 1775 to 1782 he published several works on natural religion, and articles on natural history in the ‘Philosophical Transactions,’ 1742–57. His most important work is ‘Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire d’un genre de polype d’eau douce’ (Leyden, 1744; Paris, 2 volumes).”32

27. “Trembley (Abraham) was a Swiss naturalist, born in Geneva on September 3, 1700, and he died in Geneva on May 12, 1784. He received his education in his hometown and in The Hague, where he became a tutor for the son of an English resident and later for the young Duke of Richmond, with whom he traveled through Germany and Italy. In 1760, he became the librarian in Geneva and earned a position on the council of the ‘Two Hundred.’ His excellent work on the freshwater eel earned him election to the Royal Society of London and made him a correspondent for the Academy of Sciences in Paris. From 1775 to 1782, he published several works on natural religion and wrote articles on natural history in the ‘Philosophical Transactions’ from 1742 to 1757. His most significant work is ‘Memoirs to Contribute to the History of a Type of Freshwater Polyp’ (Leyden, 1744; Paris, 2 volumes).”32

28.What was man before the invention of words and the knowledge of language? An animal.” Compare this with the statement of Hobbes: “The most noble and profitable invention of all others was that of Speech, consisting of names or appellations, and their connexion, ... without which there had been amongst men neither commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves.”33

28.What was a person before words and language were invented? An animal.” Compare this with Hobbes's statement: “The most valuable and beneficial invention of all was Speech, made up of names and their connections, ... without which there would be no commonwealth, society, contracts, or peace among people, just like there is none among lions, bears, and wolves.”33

29. Fontenelle. See note 22.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Fontenelle. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

30.All the faculties of the soul can be correctly reduced to pure imagination.” Compare with this La Mettrie’s statement in “L’histoire naturelle de l’âme”: “The more one studies all the intellectual faculties, the more convinced one remains, that they are all included in the faculty of sensation, upon which they all depend so essentially that without it the soul could never perform any of its functions.”34 This resembles Condillac’s doctrine of sensation: “Judgment, reflexion, desires, passions, etc., are nothing but sensation itself which is [187]transformed in diverse ways.”35 Helvetius also says: “All the operations of the mind are reducible to sensation.”36

30.All the faculties of the soul can be essentially boiled down to pure imagination.” Compare this with La Mettrie’s statement in “The natural history of the soul”: “The more you study all the intellectual faculties, the more you’re convinced that they are all part of the faculty of sensation, which they all rely on so crucially that without it the soul could never carry out any of its functions.”34 This is similar to Condillac’s view on sensation: “Judgment, reflection, desires, passions, etc., are simply various forms of sensation that are [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]transformed in different ways.”35 Helvetius also states: “All the workings of the mind can be traced back to sensation.”36

31.See to what one is brought by the abuse of language, and by the use of those fine words (spirituality, immateriality, etc.).” Compare Hobbes, “Though men may put together words of contradictory signification, as spirit and incorporeal; yet they can never have the imagination of anything answering to them.”37

31.Look at what happens when language is misused and when people throw around fancy words (like spirituality, immateriality, etc.).” Compare Hobbes, “Even though people can combine words that mean opposite things, like spirit and incorporeal, they can never truly imagine anything that fits those ideas.”37

32.Man’s preëminent advantage is his organism.” Luzac says: “This no more proves that organization is the chief merit of man, than that the form of a musical instrument constitutes the chief merit of the musician. In proportion to the goodness of the instrument, the musician charms by his art, and the case is the same with the soul. In proportion to the soundness of the body, the soul is in better condition to exert her faculties.”38

32.Man’s main advantage is his body.” Luzac says: “This doesn’t prove that having a good body is the most important quality of a person, just as the design of a musical instrument doesn’t determine the musician’s actual talent. The better the instrument, the more the musician can impress with their skill, and the same goes for the soul. The healthier the body, the more effectively the soul can use its abilities.”38

33.Such is, I think, the generation of intelligence.” Luzac argues against this statement thus: “But if thought and all the faculties of the soul depended only on the organization as some pretend, how could the imagination draw a long chain of consequences from the objects it has embraced?”39

33.This is, I believe, the nature of intelligence.” Luzac counters this claim by saying, “But if thinking and all the abilities of the mind were solely based on the organization, as some suggest, how could the imagination create a long chain of consequences from the things it has encountered?”39

34. Pyrrhonism is “the doctrine of Pyrrho of Elis which has been transmitted chiefly by his disciple Timon. More generally, radical Scepticism in general.”40

34. Pyrrhonism is “the teaching of Pyrrho of Elis, mostly passed down by his follower Timon. More broadly, it refers to radical skepticism.”40

35. Pierre Bayle was born at Carlat in 1647. Although the child of Protestant parents, he was converted by the Jesuits. After his reconversion to Protestantism, he was driven out of France, and took refuge first in Geneva, and then in Holland. In 1675 he became professor of philosophy at the Protestant College of Sedan, and in 1681 professor of philosophy and [188]history at Rotterdam. In 1693 he was forced to resign from his position on account of his religious views.

35. Pierre Bayle was born in Carlat in 1647. Although he was the child of Protestant parents, he was converted by the Jesuits. After returning to Protestantism, he was expelled from France and sought refuge first in Geneva, then in Holland. In 1675, he became a philosophy professor at the Protestant College of Sedan, and in 1681, he took on the role of philosophy and [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]history professor in Rotterdam. In 1693, he had to resign from his position due to his religious beliefs.

Bayle was one of the leading French sceptics of the time. He was a Cartesian, but questioned both the certainty of one’s own existence, and the knowledge derived from it. He declared that religion is contrary to the human reason, but that this fact does not necessarily destroy faith. He distinguished religion not only from science, but also from morality, and vigorously opposed those who considered a certain religion necessary for morality. He did not openly attack Christianity, yet all that he wrote awakened doubt, and his work exerted an extensive influence for scepticism.

Bayle was one of the top French skeptics of his time. He followed Descartes’ philosophy but questioned both the certainty of one’s own existence and the knowledge that comes from it. He stated that religion goes against human reason, but that doesn’t mean it destroys faith. He separated religion not just from science but also from morality and strongly opposed those who believed a specific religion was essential for moral behavior. While he didn’t directly attack Christianity, everything he wrote raised doubt, and his work had a significant impact on skepticism.

His principal work is the “Dictionnaire historique et critique,” published 1695–1697, and containing a vast amount of knowledge, expressed in a piquant and popular style. This fact made the book widely read both by scholars and by superficial readers.

His main work is the “Historical and Critical Dictionary,” published from 1695 to 1697, which contains a huge amount of information, written in an engaging and accessible style. This fact made the book popular among both serious scholars and casual readers.

36. Arnobius the Elder was born at Sicca Venerea in Numidia, in the latter part of the third century A. D. He was at first an opponent of Christianity, but was afterwards converted, and wrote “Adversus Gentes” as an apology for Christianity. In this work, he tries to answer the complaints made against Christians on the ground that the disasters of the time were due to their impiety; vindicates the divinity of Christ; and discusses the nature of the human soul. He concludes that the soul is not immortal, for he believes that the belief in the immortality of the soul would have a deteriorating influence on morality. For translation of his work compare Vol. XIX of the “Ante-Nicene Christian Library.”41

36. Arnobius the Elder was born in Sicca Venerea, Numidia, in the late third century A.D. He initially opposed Christianity but later converted and wrote “Against the Nations” as a defense of Christianity. In this work, he attempts to address the criticisms aimed at Christians who were blamed for the disasters of the time due to their impiety; he defends the divinity of Christ and explores the nature of the human soul. He concludes that the soul is not immortal because he believes that the idea of soul immortality would negatively impact morality. For a translation of his work, see Vol. XIX of the “Ante-Nicene Christian Library.”41

37.There exists no soul or sensitive substance without remorse.” Condillac had said: “There is something in animals besides motion. They are not pure machines: they feel.”42 La Mettrie also attributed remorse to animals, but believed that they are none the less machines. Luzac said in comment: “What renders these systems completely ridiculous, is, that the persons who pronounce men machines, give them properties which belie their assertion. If beings are but machines, why do they grant a natural law, an internal sense, a kind [189]of dread? These are ideas which can not be excited by objects which operate on our senses.”43

37.No soul or sensitive being exists without feeling remorse.” Condillac said: “There’s more to animals than just movement. They’re not just machines: they have feelings.” 42 La Mettrie also acknowledged that animals feel remorse, but insisted that they are still machines. Luzac commented: “What makes these arguments totally absurd is that the people who claim humans are machines give them traits that contradict their statement. If we’re just machines, why do they ascribe a natural law, an internal sense, or a kind of fear to us? These are concepts that can’t be stirred by the things that impact our senses.” 43

38.Nature has created us solely to be happy.” This is a statement of the doctrine, which La Mettrie develops in his principal ethical work “Discours sur le Bonheur.” He teaches that happiness rests upon bodily pleasure and pain. In “L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” La Mettrie states that all the passions can be developed from two fundamental passions, of which they are but modifications, love and hatred, or desire and aversion.44 Like La Mettrie, Helvetius makes corporeal pleasure and pain the ruling motives for man’s conduct. Thus he writes: “Pleasure and pain are and always will be the only principles of action in man.”45... “Remorse is nothing more than a foresight of bodily pain to which some crime has exposed us.”46 He definitely makes happiness the end of human action. “The end of man is self-preservation and the attainment of a happy existence.... Man, to find happiness, should save up his pleasures, and refuse all those which might change into pains.... The passions always have happiness as an object: they are legitimate and natural, and can not be called good or bad except on account of their influence on human beings. To lead men to virtue, we must show them the advantages of virtuous actions.”47 Holbach, finally, goes further than La Mettrie or Helvetius, and makes purely mechanical impulses the motives of man’s action. “The passions are ways of being or modifications of the internal organs, attracted or repulsed by objects, and are consequently subject in their own way to the physical laws of attraction and repulsion.”48

38.Nature has created us solely to be happy.” This reflects the idea that La Mettrie discusses in his main ethical work “Talk on Happiness.” He explains that happiness is based on physical pleasure and pain. In “The natural history of the soul,” La Mettrie indicates that all passions stem from two basic feelings, which are merely their variations: love and hatred, or desire and aversion.44 Like La Mettrie, Helvetius considers physical pleasure and pain to be the main motivators of human behavior. He states, “Pleasure and pain are and always will be the only principles of action in man.”45... “Remorse is nothing more than anticipating the physical pain that some crime has put us at risk of experiencing.”46 He firmly believes that happiness is the ultimate goal of human actions. “The goal of man is self-preservation and the pursuit of a happy life.... To achieve happiness, a person should stockpile their pleasures and avoid those that might turn into pains.... The passions always aim for happiness: they are legitimate and natural, and can’t be labeled good or bad except in terms of their impact on people. To guide individuals toward virtue, we need to demonstrate the benefits of virtuous actions.”47 Holbach, ultimately, goes even further than La Mettrie or Helvetius, suggesting that purely mechanical impulses drive human actions. “The passions are states of being or changes in the internal organs, drawn to or repelled by objects, and are therefore subject, in their own way, to the physical laws of attraction and repulsion.”48

39.Ixions of Christianity.” Ixion, for his treachery, stricken with madness, was cast into Erebus, where he was continually scourged while bound to a fiery wheel, and forced to cry: “Benefactors should be honored.”

39.Ixions of Christianity.” Ixion, because of his betrayal, was driven mad and thrown into Erebus, where he was constantly whipped while tied to a burning wheel, and made to shout: “Benefactors deserve respect.”

40.Who can be sure that the reason for man’s existence [190]is not simply the fact that he exists?” Luzac opposes this by saying: “If the reason of man’s existence was in man himself, this existence would be a necessary consequence of his own nature; so that his own nature would contain the cause or reason of his existence. Now since his own nature would imply the cause of his existence, it would also imply his existence itself, so that man could no more be considered as non-existent than a circle can be considered without radii or a picture without features or proportions.... If the existence of man was in man himself, he would then be an invariable being.”49

40.Who can say for sure that the reason for a person's existence [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] is not just the simple fact that they exist?” Luzac counters this by stating: “If the reason for a person's existence came from within themselves, then their existence would be a necessary result of their nature; therefore, their nature would contain the cause or reason for their existence. Since their own nature would imply the cause of their existence, it would also imply their existence itself, meaning a person couldn't be considered non-existent any more than a circle can exist without radii or a painting without features or proportions.... If a person's existence relied solely on themselves, they would indeed be an unchanging being.”49

41. “Fénelon (François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon), born at Château de Fénelon, Dordogne, France, August 6, 1651, died at Cambrai, France, January 7, 1715. A celebrated French prelate, orator, and author. He became preceptor of the sons of the dauphin in 1689, and was appointed archbishop of Cambrai in 1695. His works include ‘Les aventures de Télémaque’ (1699), ‘Dialogues des morts’ (1712), ‘Traité de l’éducation des filles’ (1688), ‘Explication des maximes des saints’ (1697), etc. His collected works were edited by Leclère (38 vols., 1827–1830).”50

41. “Fénelon (François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon), born at Château de Fénelon, Dordogne, France, on August 6, 1651, died in Cambrai, France, on January 7, 1715. He was a renowned French bishop, speaker, and writer. He became the tutor to the sons of the dauphin in 1689 and was appointed archbishop of Cambrai in 1695. His works include ‘The Adventures of Telemachus’ (1699), ‘Conversations with the dead’ (1712), 'Treatise on Girls' Education’ (1688), ‘Explanation of the saints' maxims’ (1697), and others. His complete works were edited by Leclère (38 vols., 1827–1830).”50

42. “Nieuwentyt (Bernard), a Dutch mathematician, born in West-Graftdijk the tenth of August 1654, died at Purmerend the thirtieth of May, 1718. An unrelenting Cartesian, he combated the infinitesimal calculus, and wrote a polemic against Leibnitz, concerning this subject. He wrote a theological dissertation translated into French under the title “L’existence de Dieu démontrée par les merveilles de la nature (Paris, 1725).”51

42. “Nieuwentyt (Bernard), a Dutch mathematician, was born in West Graftdijk on August 10, 1654, and passed away in Purmerend on May 30, 1718. A steadfast Cartesian, he opposed infinitesimal calculus and wrote a critique against Leibnitz on this topic. He also penned a theological dissertation that was translated into French under the title “The existence of God demonstrated by the wonders of natureI'm sorry, but it seems that there is no text provided for me to modernize. Please provide the text you'd like me to work on. (Paris, 1725).”51

43. “Abadie, James (Jacques), born at Nay, Basse-Pyrénées, probably in 1654; died at London, September 25, 1725. A noted French Protestant theologian. He went to Berlin about 1680 as minister of the French church there, and thence to England and Ireland; was for a time minister of the French church in the Savoy; and settled in Ireland as dean of Killaloe in 1699. His chief work is the ‘Traité de la vérité de la religion [191]chrétienne’ (1684), with its continuation ‘Traité de la divinité de nôtre Seigneur Jesus-Christ’ (1689).”52

43. “Abadie, James (Jacques), born in Nay, Basse-Pyrénées, likely in 1654; died in London on September 25, 1725. He was a well-known French Protestant theologian. He moved to Berlin around 1680 as the minister of the French church there, and then went on to England and Ireland; he served for a time as the minister of the French church in the Savoy and settled in Ireland as the dean of Killaloe in 1699. His main work is the ‘Treatise on the Truth of the Christian Religion [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]’ (1684), along with its continuation ‘Treatise on the Divinity of Our Lord Jesus Christ’ (1689).”52

44. “Derham (William), English theologian and scholar, born in Stoughton, near Worcester, in 1657, died at Upminster in 1735. Pastor of Upminster in the county of Essex, he could peacefully devote himself to his taste for mechanics and natural history. Besides making studies of watch-making, and of fish, birds, and insects, published in part in the Transactions of the Royal Society, he wrote several works on religious philosophy. The most important, which was popular for a long time and was translated into French (1726), has as title ‘Physico-Theology, or the Demonstration of the Existence and the Attributes of God, by the Works of His Creation’ (1713). He wrote as complement, in 1714, his ‘Astro-Theology, or the Demonstration of the Existence and Attributes of God by the Observation of the Heavens.’”53

44. “Derham (William), an English theologian and scholar, was born in Stoughton, near Worcester, in 1657, and died in Upminster in 1735. As the pastor of Upminster in Essex, he was able to dedicate his time to his interests in mechanics and natural history. In addition to studying watch-making and researching fish, birds, and insects, some of which were published in the Transactions of the Royal Society, he authored several works on religious philosophy. His most significant work, which was widely popular and translated into French in 1726, is titled ‘Physico-Theology, or the Demonstration of the Existence and the Attributes of God, by the Works of His Creation’ (1713). He followed this with ‘Astro-Theology, or the Demonstration of the Existence and Attributes of God by the Observation of the Heavens’ in 1714.”53

45. Rais, or Cardinal de Retz (1614–1679), was a French politician and author. From his childhood he was intended for the church. He took an active part in the movement against Cardinal Mazarin, and later became cardinal, but lost his popularity, and was imprisoned at Vincennes. After escaping from there he returned to France and settled in Lorraine, where he wrote his ‘Mémoires,’ which tell of the court life of his time.54

45. Rais, or Cardinal de Retz (1614–1679), was a French politician and writer. From a young age, he was meant for the church. He actively participated in the opposition against Cardinal Mazarin and later became a cardinal himself, but he lost his popularity and was imprisoned in Vincennes. After escaping from there, he returned to France and settled in Lorraine, where he wrote his ‘Memories,’ which recount the court life of his era.54

46. Marcello Malpighi (1628–1694) was a renowned Italian anatomist and physiologist. He held the position of lecturer on medicine at Bologna in 1656, a few months later became professor at Pisa, was made professor at Bologna in 1660, went from there to Messina, though he later returned to Bologna. In 1691 he became physician to Pope Innocent XII. Malpighi is often known as the founder of microscopic anatomy. He was the first to see the marvelous spectacle of the circulation of the blood on the surface of a frog’s lung. He discovered the vesicular structure of the human lung, the structure of the secreting glands, and the mucous character [192]of the lower stratum of the epidermis. He was the first to undertake the finer anatomy of the brain, and he accurately described the distribution of grey matter, and of the fibre tracts in the cord. His works are: “De pulmonibus (Bologna, 1661), “Epistolae anatomicae narc. Malpighi et Car. Fracassati” (Amsterdam, 1662), “De Viscerum Structura” (London, 1669), “Anatome Plantarum” (London, 1672), “De Structura Glandularum conglobatarum” (London, 1689).55

46. Marcello Malpighi (1628–1694) was a famous Italian anatomist and physiologist. He started as a lecturer in medicine at Bologna in 1656, became a professor at Pisa a few months later, took a position as a professor at Bologna in 1660, then moved to Messina, though he eventually returned to Bologna. In 1691, he became the physician to Pope Innocent XII. Malpighi is often regarded as the founder of microscopic anatomy. He was the first to observe the amazing sight of blood circulation on the surface of a frog’s lung. He discovered the vesicular structure of the human lung, the structure of the secreting glands, and the mucous nature [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] of the lower layer of the epidermis. He was the first to explore the finer anatomy of the brain and accurately described the distribution of gray matter and the fiber tracts in the spinal cord. His works include: “About the lungs (Bologna, 1661), “Anatomical Letters of Narcissus Malpighi and Carlo Fracassati” (Amsterdam, 1662), “On the Structure of Organs” (London, 1669), “Plant Anatomy” (London, 1672), “On the Structure of Lymph Nodes” (London, 1689).55

47. Deism is a system of thought which arose in the latter part of the seventeenth century. Its most important representatives in England were Toland, Collins, Chubb, Shaftsbury, and Tindal. They insisted on freedom of thought and speech, and claimed that reason is superior to any authority. They denied the necessity of any supernatural revelation, and were consequently vigorously opposed by the church. Partly because of this opposition by the church, many of them argued against Christianity, and tried to show that an observance of moral laws is the only religion necessary for man. They taught that happiness is man’s chief end, and that, since man is a social being, his happiness can best be gained by mutual helpfulness. Although they declared that nature is the work of a perfect being, they had a mechanical conception of the relation of God to the world, and did not, like later theists, find evidence of God’s presence in all the works of nature.56

47. Deism is a way of thinking that emerged in the late seventeenth century. Its main figures in England included Toland, Collins, Chubb, Shaftsbury, and Tindal. They advocated for freedom of thought and expression, arguing that reason is more important than any authority. They rejected the need for any supernatural revelation, which led to strong opposition from the church. Because of this opposition, many of them criticized Christianity and argued that following moral laws is the only essential religion for humanity. They believed that happiness is the primary goal of life, and since humans are social beings, this happiness is best achieved through helping one another. Although they stated that nature is created by a perfect being, they viewed the relationship between God and the world in a mechanical way and did not, like later theists, see evidence of God's presence in all aspects of nature.56

48. “Vanini, Lucilio, self-styled Julius Cæsar. Born at Taurisano, kingdom of Naples, about 1585; burned at the stake at Toulouse, France, February 19, 1619. An Italian free thinker, condemned to death as an atheist and magician. He studied at Rome and Padua, became a priest, traveled in Germany and the Netherlands, and began teaching at Lyons, but was obliged to flee to England, where he was arrested. After his release he returned to Lyons, and about 1617 settled at Toulouse. Here he was arrested for his opinions, condemned, and on the same day executed. His chief works are: ‘Amphitheatrum aeternae Providentiae’ (1615), ‘De admirandis naturae reginae deaeque mortalium arcanis’ (1616).”57 [193]

48. “Vanini, Lucilio, who called himself Julius Cæsar. He was born in Taurisano, in the kingdom of Naples, around 1585; he was burned at the stake in Toulouse, France, on February 19, 1619. An Italian free thinker, he was sentenced to death for being an atheist and a magician. He studied in Rome and Padua, became a priest, traveled through Germany and the Netherlands, and started teaching in Lyons, but had to flee to England, where he was arrested. After his release, he returned to Lyons and around 1617 settled in Toulouse. There, he was arrested for his views, condemned, and executed on the same day. His main works include: ‘Amphitheater of Eternal Providence’ (1615) and ‘On the wonders of nature, the queen of the gods and the secrets of mortals.’ (1616).”57 [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

49. Desbarreaux (Jacques Vallée). A French writer, born at Paris in 1602, who died at Chalon-sur-Saône the ninth of May, 1673. He wrote a celebrated sonnet on penitence, but was rather an unbeliever and sceptic than a penitent. Guy Patin, hearing of his death, said: “He infected poor young people by his licence. His conversation was very dangerous and destructive to the public.”58

49. Desbarreaux (Jacques Vallée). A French writer, born in Paris in 1602, who died in Chalon-sur-Saône on May 9, 1673. He wrote a famous sonnet about repentance, but he was more of a skeptic and non-believer than actually penitent. When Guy Patin heard about his death, he remarked: “He led young people astray with his permissiveness. His conversations were very risky and harmful to the public.”58

50. Boindin (Nicolas), French scholar and author, born the twenty-ninth of May 1676 at Paris, where he died the thirtieth of November 1751. He was in the army for a while, but retired on account of ill health. He then gave himself up to literature, and wrote several plays. In 1706 he was elected Royal censor and associate of the Academy of Inscriptions. His liberty, or, as it was then called, license of mind, shut the doors of the French Academy to him, and would have caused his expulsion from the Academy of Inscriptions if he had not been so old. He died without retracting his opinions.59

50. Boindin (Nicolas), a French scholar and author, was born on May 29, 1676, in Paris, where he died on November 30, 1751. He served in the army for a while but retired due to health issues. He then devoted himself to literature and wrote several plays. In 1706, he was elected Royal censor and became an associate of the Academy of Inscriptions. His independent thinking, or what was then referred to as license of mind, kept him from being accepted into the French Academy and would have led to his expulsion from the Academy of Inscriptions if he hadn't been so old. He passed away without changing his views.59

51. Denis Diderot (1713–1784) was one of the leaders of the intellectual movement of the eighteenth century. He was at first influenced by Shaftsbury, and was enthusiastic in his support of natural religion. In his “Pensées philosophiques” (1746) he tries to show that the discoveries of natural science are the strongest proofs for the existence of God. The wonders of animal life are enough to destroy atheism for ever. Yet, while he opposes atheism, he also opposes vigorously the intolerance and bigotry of the church. He claims that many of the attributes ascribed to God are contrary to the very idea of a just and loving God.

51. Denis Diderot (1713–1784) was one of the leaders of the intellectual movement of the eighteenth century. Initially, he was influenced by Shaftesbury and was passionate in his support of natural religion. In his “Philosophical thoughts” (1746), he attempts to demonstrate that the discoveries of natural science provide the strongest evidence for the existence of God. The marvels of animal life are enough to eliminate atheism permanently. However, while he opposes atheism, he also fiercely challenges the intolerance and bigotry of the church. He argues that many of the qualities attributed to God are inconsistent with the very concept of a just and loving God.

Later, Diderot was influenced by La Mettrie and by Holbach, and became an advocate of materialism which he set forth in “Le rêve d’Alembert” and in the passages contributed to the “Système de la nature.” Diderot was the editor of the “Encyclopédie.”60

Later, Diderot was influenced by La Mettrie and Holbach, and he became a supporter of materialism, which he explained in “Alembert's Dream” and in the sections he contributed to the “System of nature.” Diderot was the editor of the “Encyclopedia.”60

52. Trembley. See note 27. [194]

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Trembley. See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__]

53.Nothing which happens, could have failed to happen.” An enunciation of the doctrine so insisted upon by Holbach. “The whole universe ... shows us only an immense and uninterrupted chain of cause and effect.”61... “Necessity which regulates all the movements of the physical world, controls also those of the moral world.”62

53.Nothing that happens could have happened any differently.” This is a statement of the belief that Holbach emphasized. “The entire universe ... presents us with nothing but a vast and continuous chain of cause and effect.” 61... “The necessity that governs all the movements of the physical world also influences those of the moral world.” 62

54.All these evidences of a creator, repeated thousands ... of times ... are self-evident only to the anti-Pyrrhonians.” La Mettrie holds an opinion contrary not only to that of Descartes and Locke, but also to that of Toland, Hobbes, and Condillac. Descartes, for instance, says: “Thus I very clearly see that the certitude and truth of all science depends on the knowledge alone of the true God.”63 Hobbes asserts: “For he that from any effect he seeth come to pass should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, ... shall at last come to this, that there must be, as even the heathen philosophers confessed, one first mover, that is a first and an eternal cause of all things, which is that which men mean by the name of God.”64 Toland’s words are: “All the jumbling of atoms, all the Chances you can suppose for it, could not bring the Parts of the Universe into their present Order, nor continue them in the same, nor cause the Organization of a Flower or a Fly.... The Infinity of Matter ... excludes ... an extended corporeal God, but not a pure Spirit or immaterial Being.”65 Condillac writes: “A first cause, independent, unique, infinite, eternal, omnipotent, immutable, intelligent, free, and whose providence extends over all things: that is the most perfect notion of God that we can form in this life.”66 Locke declares: “From what has been said it is plain to me we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a God than of anything our senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay I presume I may say, that we more certainly know that there is a God, than that there is anything else without us.”67 [195]

54.All these signs of a creator, repeated thousands ... of times ... are obvious only to those who reject doubt.” La Mettrie has a viewpoint that contradicts not only Descartes and Locke but also Toland, Hobbes, and Condillac. Descartes, for example, states: “I can clearly see that the certainty and truth of all knowledge depend solely on the understanding of the true God.”63 Hobbes claims: “Anyone who reasons from any effect they see happening to its immediate cause, and from there to the cause of that cause, ... will ultimately conclude that there must be, as even the ancient philosophers acknowledged, one first mover, which is the first and eternal cause of everything, and that is what people mean by the term God.”64 Toland says: “No amount of random atomic movements, or all the chances you could think of, could arrange the Parts of the Universe into their current Order, maintain them like that, or create the structure of a Flower or a Fly.... The Infinity of Matter ... excludes ... a physical God, but not a pure Spirit or immaterial Being.”65 Condillac writes: “A first cause—independent, unique, infinite, eternal, all-powerful, unchanging, intelligent, free, and whose providence covers everything: that is the most complete idea of God that we can formulate in this life.”66 Locke states: “From what has been discussed, it is clear to me that we have more certain knowledge of God's existence than of anything our senses have not directly revealed to us. In fact, I would suggest that we know more certainly that there is a God than that there is anything else outside of us.”67 [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

55. “Lucretius (Titus Lucretius Carus). Born at Rome, probably about 96 B.C., died October 15, 55 B.C. A celebrated Roman philosophical poet. He was the author of ‘De rerum natura,’ a didactic and philosophical poem in six books, treating of physics, of psychology, and (briefly) of ethics from the Epicurean point of view. He committed suicide probably in a fit of insanity. According to a popular but doubtless erroneous tradition, his madness was due to a love-philter administered to him by his wife.”68

55. “Lucretius (Titus Lucretius Carus). Born in Rome, probably around 96 B.C., died on October 15, 55 B.C. A renowned Roman philosophical poet. He was the author of ‘On the nature of things,’ a didactic and philosophical poem in six books that covers physics, psychology, and (briefly) ethics from an Epicurean perspective. He likely committed suicide during a bout of insanity. According to a popular but likely incorrect story, his madness was caused by a love potion given to him by his wife.”68

56. “Lamy (Bernard) was born in Mans in the year 1640. He studied first in the college of this city. He later went to Paris, and at Saumar studied philosophy under Charles de la Fontenelle, and theology under André Martin and Jean Leporc. He was at length called to teach philosophy in the city of Angers. He wrote a great many books on theological subjects. His philosophical works are: ‘L’art de parler’ (1675), ‘Traité de méchanique, de l’équilibre, des solides et des liqueurs’ (1679), ‘Traité de la grandeur en général’ (1680), ‘Entretiens sur les sciences’ (1684), ‘Eléments de géométrie,’ (1685).”69

56. “Lamy (Bernard) was born in Mans in 1640. He first studied at the college in this city. Later, he went to Paris, where he studied philosophy under Charles de la Fontenelle and theology with André Martin and Jean Leporc at Saumur. Eventually, he was invited to teach philosophy in Angers. He wrote many books on theological topics. His philosophical works include: ‘The art of speaking’ (1675), ‘Treatise on Mechanics, Equilibrium, Solids, and Liquids’ (1679), ‘Treatise on Grandeur in General’ (1680), ‘Discussions on science’ (1684), and ‘Geometry elements’ (1685).”69

57.The eye sees only because it is formed and placed as it is.” La Mettrie doubts whether there is any purpose in the world. Condillac, on the other hand, teaches that purpose and intelligence are shown forth in the universe. “Can we see the order of the parts of the universe, the subordination among them, and notice how so many different things compose such a permanent whole, and remain convinced that the cause of the universe is a principle without any knowledge of its effects, which without purpose, without intelligence, relates each being to particular ends, subordinated to a general end?”70

57.The eye sees only because it’s shaped and positioned the way it is.” La Mettrie questions if there’s any real purpose in the universe. Condillac, on the other hand, argues that purpose and intelligence are evident in the world around us. “Can we observe the order among different parts of the universe, the hierarchy between them, and see how so many diverse elements create a stable whole, and still believe that the universe’s cause is a principle that lacks understanding of its effects, relating each being to specific purposes without intention, subordinated to a greater purpose?”70

58.Non nostrum inter vos tantas componere lites.” Vergil, Eclogue III, line 108.

58.We cannot settle such great disputes among you..” Vergil, Eclogue III, line 108.

59.The universe will never be happy unless it is atheistic.” Although La Mettrie calls this a “strange opinion” it is clear [196]that he secretly sympathizes with it. Holbach affirms this doctrine very emphatically. “Experience teaches us that sacred opinions were the real source of the evils of human beings. Ignorance of natural causes created gods for them. Imposture made these gods terrible. This idea hindered the progress of reason.”71 “An atheist ... is a man who destroys chimeras harmful to the human race, in order to lead men back to nature, to experience, and to reason, which has no need of recourse to ideal powers, to explain the operations of nature.”72

59.The universe will never be truly happy unless it is atheistic.” Although La Mettrie calls this a “strange opinion,” it’s clear [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] that he secretly agrees with it. Holbach strongly supports this idea. “Experience shows us that religious beliefs were the real source of human suffering. Ignorance of natural causes led them to create gods. Deception made these gods frightening. This belief hampered the progress of reason.” 71 “An atheist ... is someone who shatters harmful illusions for humanity, aiming to bring people back to nature, to experience, and to reason, which doesn’t need to rely on imagined powers to explain how nature works.” 72

60.The soul is therefore but an empty word.” Contrast this with Descartes’s statement: “And certainly the idea I have of the human mind ... is incomparably more distinct than the idea of any corporeal object.”73 Compare this doctrine, also, with Holbach’s assertion: “Those who have distinguished the soul from the body seem to have only distinguished their brains from themselves. Truly the brain is the common center, where all the nerves spread in all parts of the human body, terminate and join together.... The more experience we have, the more we are convinced that the word ‘spirit’ has no meaning even to those who have invented it, and can be of no use either in the physical or in the moral world.”74

60.The soul is therefore just an empty term.” Contrast this with Descartes’s statement: “And certainly the idea I have of the human mind ... is far clearer than the idea of any physical object.”73 Compare this view, also, with Holbach’s assertion: “Those who have separated the soul from the body seem to have only separated their brains from themselves. Truly the brain is the common center, where all the nerves spread throughout the human body, end and connect.... The more experience we gain, the more we are convinced that the term ‘spirit’ has no real meaning even for those who created it, and can be of no use in either the physical or moral realm.”74

61. William Cowper (1666–1709) was an English anatomist. He was drawn into a controversy with Bidloo, the Dutch physician, by publishing under his own name Bidloo’s work on the anatomy of human bodies. His principal works are: “Myotamia reformata” (London, 1694) and “Glandularum descriptio” (1702).75

61. William Cowper (1666–1709) was an English anatomist. He got involved in a dispute with Bidloo, the Dutch physician, by publishing Bidloo’s work on human anatomy under his own name. His main works include: “Myotamia reformata” (London, 1694) and “Description of glands” (1702).75

62. William Harvey (1578–1657), an English physician and physiologist, is renowned for his discovery of the circulation of the blood. He was educated at Canterbury and Cambridge, and took his doctor’s degree at Cambridge in 1602. During [197]his life he held the position of Lumleian lecturer at the College of Physicians, and of physician extraordinary to James I. His principal works are: “Exercitatio de motu cordis et sanguinis” (1628), and “Exercitationes de generatione animalium” (1651).76

62. William Harvey (1578–1657), an English doctor and physiologist, is famous for discovering blood circulation. He was educated at Canterbury and Cambridge, and earned his doctor's degree at Cambridge in 1602. Throughout [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]his life, he served as the Lumleian lecturer at the College of Physicians and as physician extraordinary to James I. His main works include: “Exercise on the Motion of the Heart and Blood” (1628) and “Animal generation exercises” (1651).76

63. Francis Bacon (1551–1626) was one of the first to revolt against scholasticism and to introduce a new method into science and philosophy. He claimed that to know reality, and consequently to gain new power over reality, man must stop studying conceptions, and study matter itself. Yet he did not himself know how to gain a more accurate knowledge of nature, so that he could not put into practice the method which he himself advocated. His works are full of scholastic conceptions, though many of the implications of his system are materialistic. Lange claims,77 indeed, that if Bacon had been more consistent and daring, he would have reached strictly materialistic conclusions. The account of the motion of the heart of the dead convict is found in “Sylva Sylvarum.”78 This book, published in 1627, a year after Bacon’s death, contains the account of Bacon’s experiments, and of his theories in matters of physiology, physics, chemistry, medicine, and psychology.

63. Francis Bacon (1551–1626) was one of the first to challenge scholasticism and introduce a new approach to science and philosophy. He argued that to understand reality and, as a result, gain more control over it, people need to stop focusing on concepts and start examining the actual substance of the world. However, he didn’t actually figure out how to obtain a more precise understanding of nature, so he couldn’t apply the method he recommended. His writings are filled with scholastic ideas, even though many of the implications of his system lean towards materialism. Lange claims,77 in fact, that if Bacon had been more consistent and bold, he would have arrived at strictly materialistic conclusions. The description of the heart's motion in the dead convict can be found in “Sylva Sylvarum.”78 This book, published in 1627, a year after Bacon’s death, includes the details of Bacon’s experiments and his theories on physiology, physics, chemistry, medicine, and psychology.

64. Robert Boyle, one of the greatest natural philosophers of his age, studied at Eton for three years, and then became the private pupil of the rector of Stalbridge. He traveled through France, Switzerland, and Italy, and while at Florence, studied the work of Galileo. He decided to devote his life to scientific work, and in 1645 became a member of a society of scientific men, which later grew into the Royal Society of London. His principal work was the improvement of the air-pump, and by that the discovery of the laws governing the pressure and volume of gases.

64. Robert Boyle, one of the leading scientists of his time, studied at Eton for three years before becoming the private student of the rector of Stalbridge. He traveled through France, Switzerland, and Italy, and while in Florence, he studied Galileo's work. He decided to dedicate his life to science, and in 1645 he joined a group of scientists that later evolved into the Royal Society of London. His main achievement was improving the air pump, which led to the discovery of the laws governing gas pressure and volume.

Boyle was also deeply interested in theology. He gave liberally for the work of spreading Christianity in India and America, and by his will endowed the “Boyle Lectures” to [198]demonstrate the Christian religion against atheists, theists, pagans, Jews, and Mohammedans.79

Boyle was also very interested in theology. He generously donated to the efforts of spreading Christianity in India and America, and through his will, he established the “Boyle Lectures” to [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] demonstrate the Christian faith against atheists, theists, pagans, Jews, and Muslims.79

65. Nicolas Sténon was born at Copenhagen, 1631, and died at Schwerin in 1687. He studied at Leyden and Paris, and then settled in Florence, where he became the physician of the grand duke. In 1672 he became professor of anatomy at Florence, but three years later he gave up this position and entered the church. In 1677 he was made Bishop of Heliopolis and went to Hanover, then to Munster, and finally to Schwerin. His principal work is the “Discours sur l’anatomie du cerveau” (Paris, 1669).80

65. Nicolas Sténon was born in Copenhagen in 1631 and died in Schwerin in 1687. He studied in Leyden and Paris, then moved to Florence, where he became the physician to the grand duke. In 1672, he became a professor of anatomy in Florence, but three years later he left that position and joined the church. In 1677, he was appointed Bishop of Heliopolis and traveled to Hanover, then to Munster, and finally to Schwerin. His main work is the “Talk on brain anatomy” (Paris, 1669).80

66. La Mettrie’s account of involuntary movements is much like that of Descartes. Descartes says: “If any one quickly passes his hand before our eyes as if to strike us, we shut our eyes, because the machinery of our body is so composed that the movement of this hand towards our eyes excites another movement in the brain, which controls the animal spirits in the muscles that close the eyelids.”81

66. La Mettrie’s description of involuntary movements is quite similar to Descartes'. Descartes states: “When someone quickly moves their hand in front of our eyes as if to hit us, we shut our eyes because our body's system is set up in such a way that the movement of this hand towards our eyes triggers another movement in the brain, which directs the animal spirits in the muscles that close the eyelids.”81

67.The brain has its muscles for thinking, as the legs have muscles for walking.” Neither Condillac nor Helvetius go so far. Helvetius explicitly states that it is an open question whether sensation is due to a material or to a spiritual substance.82

67.The brain has muscles for thinking, just as the legs have muscles for walking.” Neither Condillac nor Helvetius goes this far. Helvetius clearly says that it's still an open question whether sensation comes from a physical or a spiritual substance.82

68. Giovanni Alfonso Borelli (1608–1670) was the head of the so-called iatro-mathematical sect. He tried to apply mathematics to medicine in the same way in which it had been applied to the physical sciences. He was wise enough to restrict the application of his system to the motion of the muscles, but his followers tried to extend its application and were led into many absurd conjectures. Borelli was at first professor of mathematics at Pisa, and later professor of medicine at Florence. He was connected with the revolt of Messina and was obliged to leave Florence. He retired to Rome, [199]where he was under the protection of Christina, Queen of Sweden, and remained there until his death in 1679.83

68. Giovanni Alfonso Borelli (1608–1670) was the leader of the iatro-mathematical movement. He aimed to apply mathematics to medicine just like it was applied to the physical sciences. He wisely limited his approach to the movement of muscles, but his followers attempted to broaden its use and ended up with many ridiculous theories. Borelli started as a mathematics professor at Pisa, then became a medicine professor in Florence. He was involved in the Messina revolt and had to flee Florence. He moved to Rome, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] where he was protected by Christina, Queen of Sweden, and stayed there until his death in 1679.83

69.For one order that the will gives, it bows a hundred times to the yoke.” Descartes, on the other hand, teaches that the soul has direct control over its voluntary actions and thoughts, and indirect control over its passions.84 La Mettrie goes further than to limit the extent of the will, and questions whether it is ever free: “The sensations which affect us decide the soul either to will or not to will, to love or to hate these sensations according to the pleasure or the pain which they cause in us. This state of the soul thus determined by its sensations is called the will.”85 Holbach insists on this point and contends that all freedom is a delusion: “[Man’s] birth depends on causes entirely outside of his power; it is without his permission that he enters this system where he has a place; and without his consent that, from the moment of his birth to the day of his death, he is continually modified by causes that influence his machine in spite of his will, modify his being, and alter his conduct. Is not the least reflexion enough to prove that the solids and fluids of which the body is composed, and that the hidden mechanism that he considers independent of external causes, are perpetually under the influence of these causes, and could not act without them? Does he not see that his temperament does not depend on himself, that his passions are the necessary consequences of his temperament, that his will and his actions are determined by these same passions, and by ideas that he has not given to himself?... In a word, everything should convince man that during every moment of his life, he is but a passive instrument in the hands of necessity.”86

69.For every command the will gives, it submits a hundred times to the burden.” Descartes, on the other hand, teaches that the soul has direct control over its voluntary actions and thoughts, and indirect control over its emotions.84 La Mettrie goes further than just limiting the will’s extent; he questions whether it’s ever truly free: “The sensations that affect us determine the soul either to will or not to will, to love or to hate these sensations depending on the pleasure or pain they cause us. This state of the soul, shaped by its sensations, is what we call the will.”85 Holbach emphasizes this idea, arguing that all freedom is an illusion: “[A person's] birth is dependent on causes completely outside their control; it’s without their consent that they enter this world where they belong, and without their agreement that, from birth to death, they are continuously shaped by factors that affect them despite their will, alter their being, and change their behavior. Isn’t the slightest reflection enough to show that the solids and liquids making up the body, and the hidden mechanisms thought to be independent of external causes, are always influenced by these factors and couldn’t operate without them? Doesn’t one realize that their temperament isn’t within their control, that their emotions are necessary results of that temperament, that their will and actions are determined by those same emotions and by ideas they didn’t create for themselves?... In short, everything should convince people that at every moment of their lives, they are merely a passive instrument in the hands of necessity.”86

70. The theory of animal spirits, held by Galen and elaborated by Descartes, is that the nerves are hollow tubes containing a volatile liquid, the animal spirits. The animal spirits were supposed to circulate from the periphery to the brain [200]and back again, and to perform by their action all the functions of the nerves.

70. The theory of animal spirits, proposed by Galen and expanded upon by Descartes, suggests that nerves are hollow tubes filled with a volatile liquid known as animal spirits. These animal spirits are believed to flow from the body's outer areas to the brain [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] and back, enabling them to carry out all the functions of the nerves.

71. Berkeley uses the fact that the color of objects varies, as one argument for his idealistic conclusion.87

71. Berkeley points out that the color of objects changes, which supports his idealistic conclusion.87

72. It is hard to tell what Pythagoras himself taught, but it is certain that he taught the kinship of animals and men, and upon this kinship his rule for the abstinence from flesh was probably based. Among the writings of the later Pythagoreans we find strange rules for diet which are plainly genuine taboos. For example they are commanded “to abstain from beans, not to break bread, not to eat from a whole loaf, not to eat the heart, etc.”88

72. It's difficult to know exactly what Pythagoras taught, but it's clear that he believed in the connection between animals and humans, and this belief likely influenced his rule about avoiding meat. In the writings of later Pythagoreans, we see some unusual dietary restrictions that are clearly real taboos. For instance, they are instructed “to avoid beans, not to break bread, not to eat from a whole loaf, not to eat the heart, and so on.”88

73. Plato forbade the use of wine in his ideal republic.89

73. Plato banned the use of wine in his perfect society.89

74.Nature’s first care, when the chyle enters the blood, is to excite in it a kind of fever.” Thus, warmth is the first necessity for the body. Compare with this, Descartes’s statement: “There is a continual warmth in our heart, ... this fire is the bodily principle of all the movements of our members.”90 This is one of the many instances in which La Mettrie’s account of the mechanism of the body is similar to that of Descartes.

74.Nature’s first priority, when the chyle enters the blood, is to trigger a sort of fever in it.” So, warmth is the body's primary requirement. In contrast, Descartes said, “There is a constant warmth in our heart,... this fire is the physical principle behind all movements of our limbs.” 90 This is one of the many cases where La Mettrie’s explanation of the body's mechanics aligns with Descartes.

75. “Stahl (George Ernst), born at Ansbach, Bavaria, October 21, 1660; died at Berlin, May 14, 1734. A noted German chemist, physician of the King of Prussia from 1716. His works include: ‘Theoria medica vera’ (1707), ‘Experimenta et observationes chemicae’ (1731), etc.”91

75. “Stahl (George Ernst), born in Ansbach, Bavaria, on October 21, 1660; died in Berlin on May 14, 1734. He was a prominent German chemist and served as the physician to the King of Prussia starting in 1716. His works include: ‘True medical theory’ (1707), ‘Chemical experiments and observations’ (1731), and more.”91

76. Philip Hecquet (1661–1737) was a celebrated French physician. He studied at Rheims, and in 1688 became the physician of the nuns of Port Royal des Champs. He returned to Paris in 1693 and took his doctor’s degree in 1697. [201]He was twice dean of the faculty of Paris. In 1727 he became the physician of the religious Carmelites of the suburb of Saint Jacques, and remained their physician for thirty-two years.92

76. Philip Hecquet (1661–1737) was a renowned French physician. He studied in Rheims and, in 1688, became the doctor for the nuns at Port Royal des Champs. He returned to Paris in 1693 and earned his medical degree in 1697. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]He served as dean of the faculty of Paris twice. In 1727, he became the physician for the Carmelite order in the Saint Jacques neighborhood and continued in that role for thirty-two years.92

77. The quotation: “All men may not go to Corinth,” is translated from Horace, Ep. 1, 19, 36. “Non cuivis homini contigit adire Corinthum.”

77. The quotation: “Not everyone gets to go to Corinth,” is translated from Horace, Ep. 1, 19, 36. “Not every man gets the chance to visit Corinth..”

78. Hermann Boerhaave was born at Voorhout near Leyden, on December 31, 1668. His father, who belonged to the clerical profession, destined his son for the same calling and so gave him a liberal education. At the University of Leyden, he studied under Gronovius, Ryckius and Frigland. At the death of his father, Boerhaave was left without any provision and supported himself by teaching mathematics. Vandenberg, the burgomaster of Leyden, advised him to study medicine, and he decided to devote himself to this profession. In 1693 he received his degree and began to practice medicine. In 1701 he was made “Lecturer on the Institutes of Medicine” at the University of Leyden. Thirteen years later he was appointed Rector of the University, and the same year became Professor of Practical Medicine there. He introduced into the university the system of clinical instruction. Boerhaave’s merit was widely recognized, and his fame attracted many medical students from all Europe to the University of Leyden. Among these was La Mettrie whose whole philosophy was profoundly influenced by the teaching of Boerhaave. In 1728 Boerhaave was elected into the Royal Academy of Sciences of Paris, and two years later he was made a member of the Royal Society of London. In 1731 his health compelled him to resign the Rectorship at Leyden. At this time he delivered an oration, “De Honore, Medici Servitute.” He died after a long illness on April 23, 1738. The city of Leyden erected a monument to him in the Church of St. Peter, and inscribed on it: “Salutifero Boerhaavii genio Sacrum.”

78. Hermann Boerhaave was born in Voorhout near Leyden on December 31, 1668. His father, who was a clergyman, intended for his son to follow in his footsteps and provided him with a solid education. At the University of Leyden, he studied under Gronovius, Ryckius, and Frigland. After his father's death, Boerhaave had no financial support and made a living by teaching mathematics. Vandenberg, the mayor of Leyden, encouraged him to study medicine, which led him to pursue this career. In 1693, he earned his degree and began practicing medicine. By 1701, he became a "Lecturer on the Institutes of Medicine" at the University of Leyden. Thirteen years later, he was appointed Rector of the University and also became a Professor of Practical Medicine that same year. He implemented a system of clinical instruction at the university. Boerhaave's contributions were widely acknowledged, and his reputation attracted many medical students from across Europe to Leyden, including La Mettrie, whose entire philosophy was deeply influenced by Boerhaave's teachings. In 1728, Boerhaave was elected to the Royal Academy of Sciences in Paris, and two years later, he joined the Royal Society of London. In 1731, his health forced him to resign as Rector at Leyden. During this time, he delivered a speech titled “De Honore, Medici Servitute.” After a prolonged illness, he died on April 23, 1738. The city of Leyden honored him with a monument in the Church of St. Peter, inscribed: “Healing Genius of Boerhaave Sacred.”

Boerhaave was a careful and brilliant student, an inspiring teacher, and a skilful practitioner. There are remarkable accounts of his skill in discovering symptoms, and in diagnosing diseases. His chief works are: “Institutiones Medicae” (Leyden, [202]1708); “Aphorismi de cognoscendis et curandis Morbis” (Leyden, 1709), “Libellus de Materia Medica et Remediorum Formulis” (Leyden, 1719), “Institutiones et Experimentae Chemicae” (Paris, 1724).93

Boerhaave was a meticulous and talented student, an inspiring teacher, and a skilled practitioner. There are impressive accounts of his ability to identify symptoms and diagnose illnesses. His major works include: “Medical Institutions” (Leyden, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]1708); “Aphorisms on Understanding and Treating Diseases” (Leyden, 1709), “Book on Herbal Medicine and Formulas for Remedies” (Leyden, 1719), “Chemical Institutions and Experiments” (Paris, 1724).93

79. Willis. (See Note 21.)

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Willis. (See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.)

80. Claude Perrault (1613–1688) was a French physician and architect. He received his degree of doctor of medicine at Paris and practised medicine there. In 1673 he became a member of the Royal Academy of Sciences. Although he never abandoned his work in mathematics, in the natural sciences, and in medicine, he is more noted as an architect than as a physician or scientist. He was the architect of one of the colonnades of the Louvre, and of the Observatory.94

80. Claude Perrault (1613–1688) was a French doctor and architect. He earned his medical degree in Paris and practiced there. In 1673, he became a member of the Royal Academy of Sciences. While he never stopped working in mathematics, natural sciences, and medicine, he is better known as an architect than as a doctor or scientist. He designed one of the colonnades of the Louvre and the Observatory.94

81.Matter is self-moved.” In “L’histoire naturelle de l’âme” La Mettrie claims that motion is one of the essential properties of matter. See “L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” Chap. V.

81.Matter moves on its own.” In “The natural history of the soul” La Mettrie argues that motion is one of the key characteristics of matter. See “The natural history of the soul,” Chap. V.

82.The nature of motion is as unknown to us as that of matter.” Unlike La Mettrie, Toland holds that it is possible to know the nature of matter, and declares that motion and matter can not be defined, because their nature is self-evident.95 Holbach, resembling La Mettrie, teaches that it is futile to seek to know the ultimate nature of matter, or the cause for its existence. “Thus if any one shall ask whence matter came, we shall say that it has always existed. If any one ask, whence came movement in matter, we shall answer that for this same reason matter must have moved from eternity, since motion is a necessary consequence of its existence, its essence, and of its primitive properties, such as extent, weight, impenetrability, shape, etc.... The existence of matter is a fact; the existence of motion is another fact.”96

82.The nature of motion is as unknown to us as that of matter.” Unlike La Mettrie, Toland believes that it's possible to understand the nature of matter and states that motion and matter cannot be defined, because their essence is self-evident.95 Holbach, similar to La Mettrie, argues that it is pointless to try to understand the ultimate nature of matter or the reason for its existence. “So, if anyone asks where matter came from, we will say that it has always existed. If anyone asks, where did movement in matter come from, we will respond that for the same reason, matter must have been moving forever since motion is a necessary result of its existence, its essence, and its fundamental properties, like size, weight, impenetrability, shape, etc.... The existence of matter is a fact; the existence of motion is another fact.”96

83. Huyghens (Christian) was born at The Hague, 1629, and died there in 1695. He was a Dutch physicist, mathematician, [203]and astronomer. He is celebrated for the invention of the pendulum clock which could measure the movements of the planets, for the improvement of the telescope, and for the development of the wave-theory of light. His principal work is “Horologium Oscillatorium” (1673).97

83. Huyghens (Christian) was born in The Hague in 1629 and passed away there in 1695. He was a Dutch physicist, mathematician, [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__] and astronomer. He is known for inventing the pendulum clock, which could accurately measure planetary movements, enhancing the telescope, and developing the wave theory of light. His main work is “Horologium Oscillatorium” (1673). 97

84. Julien Leroy (1686–1759) was a celebrated French watchmaker. He excelled in the construction of pendulums and of large clocks. Some have attributed the construction of the first horizontal clock to him, but this is doubtful. Among many other inventions and improvements of clocks, he invented the compensating pendulum which bears his name.98

84. Julien Leroy (1686–1759) was a renowned French watchmaker. He was skilled in making pendulums and large clocks. Some people credit him with creating the first horizontal clock, but that's uncertain. Among many other inventions and improvements for clocks, he created the compensating pendulum that carries his name.98

85. Jacques de Vaucanson (1709–1782) was a French mechanist. From his childhood he was always interested in mechanical contrivances. In 1738 he presented to the French Academy his remarkable flute player. Soon after, he made a duck which could swim, eat, and digest, and an asp which could hiss and dart on Cleopatra’s breast. He later held the position of inspector of the manufacture of silk. In 1748 he was admitted to the Academy of Sciences. His machines were left to the Queen, but she gave them to the Academy, and in the disturbances which followed the pieces were scattered and lost. Vaucanson published: “Mécanisme d’un flûteur automate” (Paris, 1738).99

85. Jacques de Vaucanson (1709–1782) was a French inventor. Since his childhood, he was always fascinated by mechanical devices. In 1738, he showcased his impressive flute player to the French Academy. Soon after, he created a duck that could swim, eat, and digest food, along with an asp that could hiss and dart like it was on Cleopatra’s breast. He later became the inspector of silk production. In 1748, he was admitted to the Academy of Sciences. His machines were initially left to the Queen, but she donated them to the Academy, and during the upheaval that followed, the pieces were scattered and lost. Vaucanson published: “Mechanism of an automated flutist” (Paris, 1738).99

86. “[Descartes] understood animal nature; he was the first to prove completely that animals are pure machines.” Contrast this with La Mettrie’s former reference in “L’histoire naturelle de l’âme” to “this absurd system ‘that animals are pure machines.’ Such a laughable opinion,” he adds, “has never gained admittance among philosophers.... Experience does not prove the faculty of feeling any less in animals than in men.”100 It is evident that La Mettrie’s opposition to this ‘absurd system’ was based upon his insistence on the similarity of men and animals. In “L’homme machine” he argues from the same premiss, that animals are machines, that men are like animals, and that therefore men also are machines. [204]

86. “[Descartes] understood animal nature; he was the first to fully demonstrate that animals are just machines.” This contrasts with La Mettrie’s earlier comments in “The natural history of the soul” about “this ridiculous idea ‘that animals are pure machines.’ Such a laughable opinion,” he adds, “has never been accepted among philosophers.... Experience does not show any less capacity for feeling in animals than in humans.” 100 It's clear that La Mettrie’s challenge to this ‘ridiculous idea’ was rooted in his belief in the similarities between humans and animals. In “The machine man,” he argues from the same premise that if animals are machines, then humans are like animals and therefore humans are also machines. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

[__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

NOTES ON THE EXTRACTS FROM “The Natural History of the Soul.”

87. Matter, according to La Mettrie, is endowed with extensity, the power of movement, and the faculty of sensation. As La Mettrie says, this conception was not held by Descartes, who thought that the essential attribute of matter is extension. “The nature of body consists not in weight, hardness, color, and the like but in extension alone—in its being a substance extended in length, breadth and height.”101 Hobbes’s conception of matter is very similar to that of La Mettrie. He specifically attributes motion to matter: “Motion and magnitude are the most common accidents of all bodies.”102 He does not name sensation as an attribute of matter, but he reduces sensation to motion. “Sense is some internal motion in the sentient.”103 Since motion is one of the attributes of matter, and since matter is the only reality in the universe, sensation must be attributed to matter.

87. Matter, according to La Mettrie, has extensity, the ability to move, and the capacity for sensation. As La Mettrie points out, this idea was not accepted by Descartes, who believed that the key characteristic of matter is extension. “The essence of a body is not found in its weight, hardness, color, and similar qualities but in extension alone—in being a substance that extends in length, width, and height.”101 Hobbes’s view of matter is very much like La Mettrie's. He specifically connects motion to matter: “Motion and magnitude are the most common traits of all bodies.”102 He doesn’t identify sensation as a property of matter, but he reduces sensation to motion. “Sense is some internal movement in the one perceiving.”103 Since motion is one of the properties of matter, and since matter is the only reality in the universe, sensation must be linked to matter.

88. La Mettrie always insists that matter has the power of moving itself, and resents any attempt to show that the motion is due to an outside agent. In this opinion he is in agreement with Toland. Toland says that those who have regarded matter as inert have had to find some efficient cause for motion; and to do this, they have held that all nature is animated. This pretended animation, however, is utterly useless, since matter is itself endowed with motion.

88. La Mettrie consistently argues that matter can move on its own and dislikes any suggestion that its movement is caused by something external. He shares this view with Toland, who states that those who see matter as lifeless have had to look for an outside force to explain motion, leading them to conclude that all of nature is alive. However, this supposed liveliness is completely pointless, as matter inherently possesses the ability to move.

89.This absurd system ... that animals are pure machines.” (See Note 86.) [205]

89.This ridiculous system ... that animals are just machines.” (See Note 86.) [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]


1 Page-references are to the editions cited on pp. 205–207, except references to “Man a Machine” which are to this translation. The translated or original title of a French book is cited according as the editor has made use of translation or of French text. 

1 Page references are to the editions mentioned on pp. 205–207, except for references to “Man a Machine,” which are to this translation. The translated or original title of a French book is cited based on whether the editor has used the translation or the French text.

2 “Man More than a Machine,” pp. 10, 12. For statement of the editions to which these Notes make reference, see pp. 205–207. 

2 “Man More than a Machine,” pp. 10, 12. To find out which editions these Notes refer to, see pp. 205–207.

3 Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” Book II. Chap. XXIII, § 15. 

3 Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” Book II. Chap. XXIII, § 15.

4 Ibid., § 31. 

4 Same source, § 31. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

5 Condensed and translated from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 26. 

5 Condensed and translated from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 26.

6 Translated from a note of Assézat in “L’homme machine.” 

6 Translated from a note of Assézat in “The man machine.” 

7 Condensed and translated from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 4. 

7 Condensed and translated from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 4. 

8 Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 9th ed., Vol. XXIII. All references are to this edition. 

8 Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 9th ed., Vol. XXIII. All references are to this edition.

9 “Man More than a Machine,” p. 5. 

9 “Humans Are More than Machines,” p. 5. 

10 “Discourse on Method,” Part. V. 

10 "Discourse on Method," Part V. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

11 “Discourse on Method,” Part IV. 

11 “Discourse on Method,” Part IV. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

12 “Meditations,” II. 

12 “Meditations,” II. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

13 Traité des sensations,” Part IV, Chap. IX, § 5. 

13 Guide to Sensations,” Part IV, Chap. IX, § 5.

14Système de la nature,” Vol. I, Chap. I. 

14System of nature,” Vol. I, Ch. I.

15 Quoted from Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. I. 

15 Quoted from Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. I. 

16 Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XI. 

16 Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XI.

17Les passions de l’âme,” Part I, Art. XV, and Art. XXXIX. 

17The passions of the heart,” Part I, Art. XV, and Art. XXXIX.

18 Ibid., Part I, Art. XV. 

18 Same source, Part I, Art. XV.

19 Condensed from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX. 

19 Condensed from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX. 

20 Translated and condensed from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 26. 

20 Translated and summarized from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 26.

21 Condensed from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX. 

21 Condensed from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX.

22 “Man More than a Machine,” p. 23. 

22 “Man More than a Machine,” p. 23. 

23 “Discourse on Method,” V, last paragraph. 

23 “Discourse on Method,” V, last paragraph.

24Système de la nature,” Vol. I, Chap. VII. 

24System of nature,” Vol. I, Ch. 7.

25 Translated from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 26. 

25 Translated from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 26. 

26 Quoted from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XXIV. 

26 Quoted from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XXIV.

27 Quoted from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX. 

27 Quoted from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX.

28 E. Haeckel, “The Riddle of the Universe,” Chap. III. 

28 E. Haeckel, “The Riddle of the Universe,” Chap. III.

29 Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. I. 

29 Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. I. 

30 “The Riddle of the Universe,” Chap. II. 

30 “The Riddle of the Universe,” Chap. II. 

31 Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XXIII. 

31 Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XXIII.

32 Translated from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 31. 

32 Translated from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 31. 

33 “Leviathan,” Part I, Chap. IV. 

33 “Leviathan,” Part 1, Chap. 4. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

34L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” Chap. XIV. p. 199. 

34The Natural History of the Soul,” Chap. XIV. p. 199.

35Traité des sensations,” p. 50. Cf. ibid., Chap. XII (2). 

35Essays on Feelings,” p. 50. See ibid., Chap. XII (2).

36 “Treatise on Man,” Sect. II, Chap. I, p. 4. Cf. “Essays on Mind,” Essay I, Chap. I, p. 7. 

36 “Treatise on Man,” Sect. II, Chap. I, p. 4. Cf. “Essays on Mind,” Essay I, Chap. I, p. 7.

37 “Leviathan,” Part I, Chap. XII. 

37 “Leviathan,” Part I, Chapter 12. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

38 “Man More than a Machine,” p. 25. 

38 “Man More than a Machine,” p. 25. 

39 Ibid., p. 26. 

39 Same source, p. 26. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

40 Quoted from Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy, Vol. II. 

40 Quoted from Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy, Vol. II.

41 Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. II. 

41 Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. II. 

42Traité des animaux,” Chap. I, p. 454. 

42Treatise on Animals,” Chap. I, p. 454.

43 “Man More than a Machine,” p. 65. 

43 “Humans Are More Than Just Machines,” p. 65.

44L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” Chap. X, § XII. 

44The Natural History of the Soul,” Ch. 10, § 12.

45 “Treatise on Man,” Chap. X. 

45 “Treatise on Man,” Chapter 10. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

46 Ibid., Chap. VII. 

46 Same source, Chap. VII. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

47Le vrai sens du système de la nature,” Chap. IX. 

47The real meaning of the natural system,” Chap. IX. 

48 Ibid., Vol. I, Chap. VIII, p. 140. 

48 Same source., Vol. I, Chap. VIII, p. 140. 

49 “Man More than a Machine,” pp. 71 and 72. 

49 “Man More than a Machine,” pp. 71 and 72.

50 Quoted from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX. 

50 Quoted from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX. 

51 Translated from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 24. 

51 Translated from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 24.

52 Quoted from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX. 

52 Quoted from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX. 

53 Translated from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 14. 

53 Translated from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 14. 

54 Condensed from the Century Dictionary, Vol. X. 

54 Condensed from the Century Dictionary, Vol. X. 

55 Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XV. 

55 Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XV. 

56 Cf. A. W. Benn, “History of English Rationalism,” Vol. I, Chap. III. 

56 See A. W. Benn, “History of English Rationalism,” Volume I, Chapter III.

57 Quoted from the Century Dictionary, Vol. X. 

57 Quoted from the Century Dictionary, Vol. X. 

58 Translated and condensed from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 14. 

58 Translated and summarized from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 14.

59 Translated and condensed from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 7. 

59 Translated and shortened from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 7. 

60 Condensed from F. A. Lange, “History of Materialism,” Vol. II, Chap. I, and from W. Windelband, “History of Philosophy,” Part V, Chap. I. 

60 Condensed from F. A. Lange, “History of Materialism,” Vol. II, Chap. I, and from W. Windelband, “History of Philosophy,” Part V, Chap. I.

61Système de la nature,” Vol. I, Chap. I, p. 12. 

61System of nature,” Vol. I, Chap. I, p. 12.

62 Ibid., Vol. II, Chap. XI. Cf. Vol. I, Chap. VII. 

62 Ibid., Vol. II, Chap. XI. See Vol. I, Chap. VII.

63 “Meditations,” III and V. 

63 “Meditations,” III and V. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

64 “Leviathan,” Part I, Chap. XII. 

64 “Leviathan,” Part 1, Chap. 12. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

65 “Letters to Serena,” V, p. 235. 

65 “Letters to Serena,” V, p. 235. 

66Traité des animaux,” Chap. VI, p. 585. 

66Treatise on Animals,” Chap. VI, p. 585. 

67 “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” Book IV, Chap. X. 

67 “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” Book IV, Chap. X.

68 Quoted from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX. 

68 Quoted from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX. 

69 Translated and condensed from the Dictionnaire des Sciences philosophiques, Vol. III, Paris, 1847. 

69 Translated and shortened from the Dictionnaire des Sciences philosophiques, Vol. III, Paris, 1847. 

70Traité des animaux,” Chap. VI. 

70Treatise on Animals,” Chapter 6. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

71 Système de la nature,” Vol. II, Chap. XVI, p. 451. 

71 Natural System,” Vol. II, Chap. XVI, p. 451. 

72 Ibid., Chap. XXVI, p. 485. Cf. Luzac’s criticism in “Man More than a Machine,” p. 94. 

72 Same source., Chapter 26, page 485. See Luzac’s critique in “Man More than a Machine,” page 94.

73 “Meditations,” IV. 

73 "Meditations," IV. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

74Système de la nature,” Vol. I, Chap. VII, pp. 121–122. 

74System of nature,” Vol. I, Chap. VII, pp. 121–122.

75 Condensed and translated from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 13. 

75 Condensed and translated from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 13. 

76 Condensed from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX. 

76 Summarized from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX. 

77 F. A. Lange, “History of Materialism,” Vol. I, Sec. II, Chap. III. 

77 F. A. Lange, “History of Materialism,” Vol. I, Sec. II, Chap. III.

78Sylva Sylvarum sive Historia Naturalis Latio Transcripta a J. Gruteo. Lug. Batavos, 1648. Cf. Bk. IV, Experiment 400. 

78Sylva Sylvarum or Natural History in Latin Transcribed by J. Gruteo. Leiden, 1648. See Bk. IV, Experiment 400.

79 Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. IV. 

79 Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. IV.

80 Translated and condensed from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 30. 

80 Translated and summarized from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 30.

81Les passions de l’âme,” Part I, Art. 13. 

81The passions of the heart,” Part I, Art. 13. 

82 “Essays on the Mind,” Essay I, Chap. I, pp. 4ff. 

82 “Essays on the Mind,” Essay I, Chapter I, pages 4 and following.

83 Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. IV. 

83 Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. IV. 

84Les passions de l’âme,” Part I, Art. 41. 

84The passions of the soul,” Part I, Art. 41.

85L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” Chap. XII, p. 164. Cf. Chap. XII, p. 167. 

85The natural history of the soul,” Chap. XII, p. 164. See Chap. XII, p. 167.

86Système de la nature,” Vol. I, Chap. VI, pp. 89ff. 

86System of nature,” Vol. I, Chapter VI, pages 89 and following.

87 “Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous,” I, Open Court edition; pp. 27, 28, 29. Cf. “Principles of Human Knowledge,” par. 10, 15. 

87 “Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous,” I, Open Court edition; pp. 27, 28, 29. See “Principles of Human Knowledge,” par. 10, 15.

88 Quoted from J. Burnet, “Early Greek Philosophy,” Chap. II. 

88 Quoted from J. Burnet, “Early Greek Philosophy,” Chap. II.

89 Republic, III, 403. 

89 Republic, III, 403. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

90Les passions de l’âme,” Part I, Art. VIII. 

90The passions of the spirit,” Part I, Art. VIII. 

91 Quoted from the Century Dictionary, Vol. X. 

91 Quoted from the Century Dictionary, Vol. X.

92 Translated and condensed from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 19. 

92 Translated and summarized from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 19.

93 Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. III. 

93 Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. III.

94 Translated and condensed from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 26. 

94 Translated and condensed from La Grande Encyclopedia, Vol. 26.

95 “Letters to Serena,” V. 

95 “Letters to Serena,” V. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

96Système de la nature,” Vol. II, Chap. II, p. 32. 

96System of nature,” Vol. II, Chapter II, p. 32.

97 Condensed from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX. 

97 Condensed from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX. 

98 Translated and condensed from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 22. 

98 Translated and shortened from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 22. 

99 Translated and condensed from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 31. 

99 Translated and condensed from La Grande Encyclopédie, Vol. 31. 

100L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” Chap. VI. 

100The Natural History of the Soul,” Chap. VI.

101 “Principles of Metaphysics,” Part II, Prop. 4. 

101 “Principles of Metaphysics,” Part II, Prop. 4.

102 “De Corpore,” Part III, Chap. XV. 

102 “On the Body,” Part III, Chapter XV.

103 Ibid., Part IV, Chap. XXV, (2). 

103 Same source, Part IV, Chap. XXV, (2).

[__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

WORKS CONSULTED AND CITED IN THE NOTES.

(An asterisk indicates the edition to which reference is made.)

(An asterisk indicates the edition being referenced.)

Julien Offray de la Mettrie.
1745 Natural history of the soul.” The Hague. (This work appears as “Treatise on the Soul” in La Mettrie’s collected works.)
1748 The man machine.” Leyden.
The Machine Man by La Mettrie, with an introduction and notes.” J. Assézat. Paris, 1865.
1751 Philosophical works.” London (Berlin).
1764 * Philosophical Works of Mr. de la Mettrie,” Amsterdam. Besides “The human machine” and “Treatise on the Soul,” the “Philosophical works” contain the following (dates of first publication added in parentheses):
  • “Abrégé des systèmes.”
  • “L’homme plante” (1748).
  • “Les animaux plus que machines” (1750).
  • “L’Anti-Sénèque” (1748).
  • “L’art de jouir” (1751).
  • “Système d’Epicure.”
Elie Luzac.
1748 The man more than machine.” London (Leyden).
* “Man More than a Machine,” translated from the French of Elie Luzac, and printed with the translation of “Man a Machine” for G. Smith, 1750.
René Descartes.
1637 Philosophical essays,” including “Discourse on Method.
* “The Discourse on Method,” translated by John Veitch. Open Court Publishing Co., 1903.
1641 Meditations on First Philosophy.” [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]
1644 Principles of Philosophy.”
* “The Meditations and Selections from the Principles of Philosophy,” translated by John Veitch. Open Court Publishing Co., 1905.
1650 The passions of the soul.”
* Works of Descartes,” Vol. IV. Edited by Victor Cousin, Paris, 1824.
John Toland.
1704 * “Letters to Serena.” London. Printed for Bernard Lintot.
Thomas Hobbes.
1650 “Human Nature or the Fundamental Elements of Policie.” London.
1651 “Leviathan; Or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical & Civil.” London.
1655 Philosophy of Elements Section One: On the Body.” London.
* English Works edited by Sir William Molesworth, 1839–45. Volume III. Leviathan.
Volume IV. Human Nature.
John Locke.
1690 “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. London.
* Edition of Books II and IV (with omissions) preceded by the English version of Le Clerc’s “Historical Tribute to the Late Mr. Locke,” ed. M. W. Calkins. Open Court Publishing Co., 1905.
Etienne Bonnot de Condillac.
1754 Treatise on Sensations.” Paris and London.
1755 Treatise on Animals.” Paris and London.
* Complete works,” 23 vols. Edited by Guillaume Arnoux and Mousnier. Paris, 1798. Vol. III. “Treatise on Sensations. Animal Treaty.”
Baron P. H. D. von Holbach.
1770 Nature's system,” par M. Mirabaud [really Von Holbach].
* New edition with notes and corrections by Diderot. Paris, 1821. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]
C.A. Helvetius.
1758 Of the mind.” Paris.
* Of the mind, or Essays on the mind and its several faculties,” translated from the French by William Mulford. London, 1810.
1772 About man, his abilities, and his education.” 2 vols. London.
* “A Treatise on Man; His Intellectual Faculties and His Education,” translated from the French, with notes, by W. Hooper, M. D., 1810.
Frederick the Great.
* Works of Frederick II, King of Prussia, published during the author's lifetime.” Berlin, 1789: “Eulogy for Julien Offray de la Mettrie,” Vol. III, pp. 159 ff.
Francis Bacon.
* Sylva Sylvarum, or Natural History,” transcripta a J. Grutero Lug. Batavor. 1648.
F.A. Lange.
* “History of Materialism,” translated by Ernest Chester Thomas, Boston, 1877.
W. Windelband.
* “History of Philosophy,” translated by J. H. Tufts, New York, 1898.
A.W. Benn
* “History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century.” London, 1906.
The Great Encyclopedia. A Condensed Overview of Sciences, Literature, and Arts, by a Society of Scholars and Literary Figures.” Paris, 1885–1903.
“The Encyclopaedia Britannica. A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and General Literature.” Ninth Edition.
“The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia.” New York.
“Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology,” edited by J. M. Baldwin. London and New York, 1901.

[209]

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[__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

INDEX OF NAMES AND TITLES.

(Italicised numerals refer to pages of the French text.)

(Italicized numerals refer to pages of the French text.)

Abadie, James (Jacques), 51, 123, 190.

Abadie, James (Jacques), 51, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Abrégé des systèmes philosophiques,” by La Mettrie, 165, 166, 170, 205.

Summary of philosophical systems,” by La Mettrie, 165, 166, 170, 205.

Academy of Berlin, 176, 182.

Academy of Berlin, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Academy of Inscriptions, 193.

Academy of Inscriptions, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Academy of Sciences at Paris, 186, 203.

Academy of Sciences in Paris, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Academy of Surgery at Paris, 183.

Paris Surgery Academy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Adversus Gentes,” by Arnobius, 188.

“Adversus Gentes,” by Arnobius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

America, 197.

America, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Amman, Johann Conrad, 29, 30, 100, 101, 102, 185.

Amman, Johann Conrad, 29, 30, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__.

Amphitheatrum aeternae Providentiae,” by Vanini, 192.

“Amphitheater of Eternal Providence,” by Vanini, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Amsterdam, 185.

Amsterdam, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Anatome Plantarum,” by Malpighi, 192.

“Anatomy of Plants,” by Malpighi, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Angers, 195.

Angers, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ansbach, 200.

Ansbach, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

“Ante-Nicene Christian Library,” 188.

"Ante-Nicene Christian Library," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Anthropological Society, 178.

Anthropology Society, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Anti-Pyrrhonians, 54, 125, 194.

Anti-Pyrrhonians, 54, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Aphorismi de cognoscendis et curandis Morbis,” by Boerhaave, 5, 202.

Aphorisms on Understanding and Treating Diseases,” by Boerhaave, 5, 202.

Aphrodisiacus,” by Boerhaave, 4.

“Aphrodisiacus,” by Boerhaave, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Aristotle, 40, 111.

Aristotle, 40, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Arnobius the Elder, 42, 113, 188.

Arnobius the Elder, 42, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Arnoux, Guillaume, 206.

Arnoux, Guillaume, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

L’art de jouir,” by La Mettrie, 205.

The art of pleasure,” by La Mettrie, 205.

L’art de parler,” by Lamy, 195.

“Speaking Art,” by Lamy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Assézat, J., 176, 178, 205.

Assézat, J., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

“Astro-Theology,” by Derham, 191.

“Astro-Theology” by Derham, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Bacon, Francis, 57, 59, 129, 130, 197, 207.

Bacon, Francis, 57, 59, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__.

Baldwin, J. M., 181, 187, 207.

Baldwin, J. M., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Basle, 185.

Basel, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Bavaria, 176, 200.

Bavaria, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Bayle, Pierre, 39, 63, 110, 133, 187–188.

Bayle, Pierre, 39, 63, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__–188.

Benn, A. W., 192, 207.

Benn, A. W., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Berkeley, George, 200.

Berkeley, George, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Berlin, 9, 190, 200.

Berlin, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Bidloo, Nikolaus, 196.

Bidloo, Nikolaus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Blois, 24, 96.

Blois, 24, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Blondel, François, 62.

Blondel, François, 62.

Boerhaave, Hermann, 4, 5, 24, 67, 74, 96, 138, 182, 201–202.

Boerhaave, Hermann, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, 24, 67, 74, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__–202.

Boindin, Nicolas, 53, 124, 193.

Boindin, Nicolas, 53, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Bologna, 191.

Bologna, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Borelli, Giovanni Alfonso, 63, 133, 198.

Borelli, Giovanni Alfonso, 63, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Boyle, Robert, 58, 129, 197.

Boyle, Robert, 58, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Brittany, 4, 176.

Brittany, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Burnet, J., 200.

Burnet, J., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Caen, 3, 176.

Caen, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Calkins, M. W., iv, 206.

Calkins, M. W., iv, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Calvinists, 8.

Calvinists, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Cambrai, 190.

Cambrai, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Cambridge, 185, 196.

Cambridge, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Canterbury, 184, 196.

Canterbury, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Carlat, 187.

Carlat, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Carmelites, 201.

Carmelites, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Cartesians, 13, 39, 68, 85, 111, 138–139, 155, 159, 182, 188, 190.

Cartesians, 13, 39, 68, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__–139, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_10__.

Catholics, 8. [210]

Catholics, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__]

Catius, 22, 94.

Catius, 22, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

“Century Dictionary,” 182, 184, 190, 191, 192, 195, 197, 200, 203, 207.

“Century Dictionary,” __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__.

Chaila, Viscount of, 8.

Chaila, Viscount of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Chalons, Maid of, 47, 118.

Chalons, Maid of, 47, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Chalon-sur-Saône, 193.

Chalon-sur-Saône, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Champagne, 118.

Champagne, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Charles II of England, 185.

Charles II of England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Charp, 72, 142.

Charp, 72, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Chartres, 33, 104.

Chartres, 33, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Charybdis, 78, 146.

Charybdis, 78, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Château de Fénelon, 190.

Château de Fénelon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Chazelle-sur-Lyon, 182.

Chazelle-sur-Lyon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

“Chemical Proceedings,” by Boerhaave, 5.

“Chemical Proceedings,” by Boerhaave, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

“Chemical Theory,” by Boerhaave, 5.

“Chemical Theory” by Boerhaave, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Chiverny, Chancelor, 24, 96.

Chiverny, Chancellor, 24, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Christ Church, Oxford, 184.

Christ Church, Oxford, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Christianity, 15, 50, 87, 121, 197.

Christianity, 15, 50, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Christians, 51, 123.

Christians, 51, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Christina, Queen of Sweden, 199.

Christina, Queen of Sweden, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Chubb, Thomas, 192.

Chubb, Thomas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius, 156.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Cleopatra, 203.

Cleopatra, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

College of Physicians, 197.

College of Physicians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Collins, Anthony, 192.

Collins, Anthony, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Concorde de la géographie des différents ages,” by Pluche, 178.

Concord on the Geography of Different Ages,” by Pluche, 178.

Condillac, Etienne Bonnot de, 170–173, 180, 186, 188, 194, 195, 198, 206.

Condillac, Etienne Bonnot de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__–173, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__.

Copenhagen, 198.

Copenhagen, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Cordier, 3.

Cordier, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Corinth, 67, 137.

Corinth, 67, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Corneille, Pierre, 40, 111, 184.

Corneille, Pierre, 40, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Cos, 181.

'Cause, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Cousin, Victor, 206.

Cousin, Victor, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Coutances, 3, 176.

Coutances, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Cowper, William, 57, 129, 196.

Cowper, William, 57, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Damiron, Ph., 176.

Damiron, Ph., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Darget, 176.

Darget, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

De admirandis naturae reginae et mortalium arcanis,” by Vanini, 192.

On the wonders of nature's queen and the mysteries of mortals,” by Vanini, 192.

De Anima Brutorum,” by Willis, 27, 98.

“De Anima Brutorum,” by Willis, 27, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

De Cerebro,” by Willis, 27, 98.

“De Cerebro,” by Willis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

De Corpore,” by Hobbes, 167, 204, 206.

De Corpore” by Hobbes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

De l’esprit,” by Helvetius, 207;
see “Essays on the Mind.”

Of the spirit,” by Helvetius, 207;
see “Essays on the Mind.”

De l’homme, de ses facultés, et de son éducation,” by Helvetius, 207;
see “A Treatise on Man.”

About Humans, Their Abilities, and Their Education,” by Helvetius, 207;
see “A Treatise on Man.”

De pulmonibus,” by Malpighi, 192.

“On the Lungs,” by Malpighi, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

De rerum natura,” by Lucretius, 195.

“On the Nature of Things,” by Lucretius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

De Structura Glandularum conglobatarum,” by Malpighi, 192.

On the Structure of Glands,” by Malpighi, 192.

De Viscerum Structura,” by Malpighi, 192.

“De Viscerum Structura,” by Malpighi, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Deism, 192.

Deism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Deists, 51, 123, 124.

Deists, 51, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Democritus, 8, 181.

Democritus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Derham, William, 51, 123, 191.

Derham, William, 51, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Desbarreaux, Jacques Vallée, 53, 124, 193.

Desbarreaux, Jacques Vallée, 53, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Descartes, René, 13, 17, 18, 40, 51, 72, 78, 85, 90, 111, 123, 142, 146, 153, 155, 165–166, 179, 180, 181, 183, 194, 196, 198, 199, 200, 203, 204, 205.

Descartes, René, 13, 17, 18, 40, 51, 72, 78, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_10__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_11__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_12__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_13__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_14__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_15__–166, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_16__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_17__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_18__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_19__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_20__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_21__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_22__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_23__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_24__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_25__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_26__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_27__.

Dettingen, 5, 176.

Dettingen, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

“Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,” by Berkeley, 200.

“Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,” by Berkeley, 200.

Dialogues des morts,” by Fénelon, 190.

“Dialogues of the Dead,” by Fénelon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Dialogues des morts,” by Fontenelle, 27, 184.

“Dialogues of the Dead,” by Fontenelle, 27, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Diatribe du Docteur Akakia,” by Voltaire, 182.

Doctor's Diatribe Akakia,” by Voltaire, 182.

“Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology,” ed. by Baldwin, 181, 187, 207.

“Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology,” ed. by Baldwin, 181, 187, 207.

Dictionnaire des Sciences philosophiques,” 195.

“Philosophical Sciences Dictionary,” __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Dictionnaire historique et critique,” by Bayle, 188.

Historical and Critical Dictionary,” by Bayle, 188.

Diderot, Denis, 53, 124, 179, 193, 206.

Diderot, Denis, 53, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Discours sur l’anatomie du cerveau,” by Sténon, 198.

Speech on brain anatomy,” by Sténon, 198.

Discours sur le Bonheur,” by La Mettrie, 189.

Speech on Happiness,” by La Mettrie, 189.

“Discourse on Method,” by Descartes, 180, 183, 205. [211]

“Discourse on Method” by Descartes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__]

Dissertatio de Loquela,” by Amman, 185.

“Dissertation on Speech,” by Amman, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Don Quixote, 6.

Don Quixote, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Dordogne, 190.

Dordogne, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Dréano, Louise Charlotte, 9.

Dréano, Louise Charlotte, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Duras, Duke of, 8.

Duras, Duke of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

“Early Greek Philosophy,” by Burnet, 200.

"Early Greek Philosophy," by Burnet, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

“Eclogues,” by Vergil, 195.

“Eclogues,” by Virgil, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Elementorum Philosophiae, Sectio Prima,” by Hobbes, 206.
See “De Corpore.”

Philosophy of Elements, Section One,” by Hobbes, 206.
See “De Corpore.”

Eléments de géométrie,” by Lamy, 195.

“Geometry Elements,” by Lamy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Elis, Pyrrho of, 187.

Elis, Pyrrho of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Eloge historique de feu Mr. Locke,” by Le Clerc, 206.

Historical Eulogy for the Late Mr. Locke,” by Le Clerc, 206.

Eloges des académiciens,” by Fontenelle, 184.

Eloges des académiciens,” by Fontenelle, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

“Encyclopaedia Britannica,” 179, 181, 184, 185, 188, 192, 198, 199, 202, 207.

“Encyclopaedia Britannica,” __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__.

Encyclopédie,” ed. by Diderot, 193.

“Encyclopedia,” ed. by Diderot, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

England, 167, 185, 190, 192.

England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

“Enlightenment, the,” 170.

“The Enlightenment,” __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes,” by Fontenelle, 184.

Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds,” by Fontenelle, 184.

Entretiens sur les sciences,” by Lamy, 195.

Conversations on Science,” by Lamy, 195.

Epictetus, 64, 135.

Epictetus, 64, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Epicureans, 55, 68, 126, 138.

Epicureans, 55, 68, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Epistolae anatomicae narc. Malpighi et Car. Fracassati,” 192.

Anatomical Letters on Narcotics Malpighi and Car. Fracassati,” 192.

“Epodes,” by Horace, 201.

“Epodes” by Horace, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Erasmus, 27, 99.

Erasmus, 27, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Erebus, 189.

Erebus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Essais philosophiques,” by Descartes, 205.

“Philosophical Essays,” by Descartes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Essais sur l’esprit, et les beaux esprits,” by La Mettrie, 178.

Essays on the Mind and Great Minds,” by La Mettrie, 178.

“Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” by Locke, 170, 178, 194, 206.

“Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” by Locke, 170, 178, 194, 206.

“Essays on the Mind,” by Helvetius, 172, 187, 198, 207.

“Essays on the Mind,” by Helvetius, 172, 187, 198, 207.

Essex, 191.

Essex, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Eton, 197.

Eton, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

“Eulogy” on La Mettrie, by Frederick the Great, 1–9, 176, 207.

“Eulogy” on La Mettrie, by Frederick the Great, 1–9, 176, 207.

Euripides, 40, 111.

Euripides, 40, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Europe, 29, 100, 201.

Europe, 29, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Exercitatio de motu cordis et sanguinis,” by Harvey, 197.

Exercise on the movement of the heart and blood,” by Harvey, 197.

Exercitationes de generatione animalium,” by Harvey, 197.

Animal breeding exercises,” by Harvey, 197.

L’existence de Dieu démontrée par les merveilles de la nature,” by Nieuwentyt, 190.

The existence of God shown through the marvels of nature.,” by Nieuwentyt, 190.

Experimenta et observationes chemicae,” by Stahl, 200.

Chemical experiments and observations,” by Stahl, 200.

Explication des maximes des saints,” by Fénelon, 190.

Explanation of the maxims of the saints,” by Fénelon, 190.

Fallope (Fallopius or Fallopio) Gabriello, 74.

Fallope (Fallopius or Fallopio) Gabriello, 74.

Fénelon, François de Salignac de la Mothe, 51, 123, 190.

Fénelon, François de Salignac de la Mothe, 51, 123, 190.

Florence, 197, 198.

Florence, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Florentine Academy, 179.

Florentine Academy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Fontenelle, Bernard de, 27, 33, 39, 99, 104, 110, 184, 186.

Fontenelle, Bernard de, 27, 33, 39, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__.

Fontenelle, Charles de la, 195.

Fontenelle, Charles de la, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Fontenoy, Battle of, 6, 176.

Battle of Fontenoy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

France, 7, 9, 167, 183, 184, 187, 190, 191, 192, 197.

France, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__.

Frederic II, the Great, 3, 176, 207.

Frederic II, the Great, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Freiburg, 5.

Freiburg, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

French Academy, the, 193, 203.

French Academy, the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Frigland, 201.

Frigland, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Galen, Claudius, 18, 90, 180, 199.

Galen, Claudius, 18, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Galileo Galilei, 179, 197.

Galileo Galilei, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Gaston of Orleans, 47, 118.

Gaston of Orleans, 47, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Gasville, 178.

Gasville, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Gaudron, Marie, 3.

Gaudron, Marie, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Geneva, 186, 187.

Geneva, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

George II of England, 176.

George II of England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Germany, 32, 186, 192.

Germany, 32, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Glandularum descriptio,” by Cowper, 196.

“Glandular Description,” by Cowper, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Gorgias, 181.

Gorgias, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Gramont, Duke of, 5.

Duke Gramont, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Great Bedwin, 184.

Great Bedwin, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Gronovius, Johann Friedrich, 201.

Gronovius, Johann Friedrich, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Grutero, J., 207.

Grutero, J., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Guise, Duke of, 24, 96.

Guise, Duke of, 24, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Hackney, 94.

Hackney, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Haeckel, Ernst, 184, 185.

Haeckel, Ernst, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

“Hague, The,” 186, 202. [212]

“Hague, The,” __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__]

Haller, Albrecht von, 73, 143.

Haller, Albrecht von, 73, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Hanover, 198.

Hanover, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Harcourt, College of, 4.

Harcourt College, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Harmonie des Psaumes et de l’Evangile,” by Pluche, 178.

Harmony of the Psalms and the Gospel,” by Pluche, 178.

Hartsoeker, Nicolas, 74.

Hartsoeker, Nicolas, 74.

Harvey, William, 57, 129, 196.

Harvey, William, 57, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Hecquet, Philip, 67, 137, 200.

Hecquet, Philip, 67, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Heliopolis, Bishop of, 198.

Bishop of Heliopolis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Helvetius, Claude Adrien, 170–172, 173, 187, 189, 198, 207.

Helvetius, Claude Adrien, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__–172, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__.

Henry III, 24, 96.

Henry III, 24, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Heraclides, 181.

Heraclides, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Herodicus of Selymbria, 181.

Herodicus of Selymbria, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hippocrates, 18, 61, 64, 78, 90, 132, 135, 147, 181.

Hippocrates, 18, 61, 64, 78, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__.

Histoire de la philosophie du dix-huitième siècle,” by Damiron, 176.

History of 18th Century Philosophy,” by Damiron, 176.

Histoire des oracles,” by Fontenelle, 184.

Histoire des oracles,” by Fontenelle, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

l’Histoire des Polypes,” by Trembley, 30;
seeMémoires pour servir à l’histoire d’un genre de polype d’eau douce.

The History of Polyps,” by Trembley, 30;
seeMemoirs to contribute to the history of a type of freshwater polyp.

l’Histoire naturelle de l’âme,” by La Mettrie, 18, 29, 30, 69, 90, 166, 167, 169, 170, 180, 181, 186, 189, 199, 202, 203, 204, 205.

The Natural History of the Soul,” by La Mettrie, 18, 29, 30, 69, 90, 166, 167, 169, 170, 180, 181, 186, 189, 199, 202, 203, 204, 205.

“History of English Rationalism,” by Benn, 192, 207.

“History of English Rationalism,” by Benn, 192, 207.

“History of Materialism,” by Lange, 171, 176, 193, 197, 207.

“History of Materialism” by Lange, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

“History of Philosophy” by Windelband, 193, 207.

“History of Philosophy” by Windelband, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Hobbes, Thomas, 166–168, 186, 187, 194, 204, 206.

Hobbes, Thomas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__–168, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__.

Holbach, P. H. D. von, 173–174, 180, 183, 189, 193, 194, 196, 199, 202, 206.

Holbach, P. H. D. von, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__–174, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__.

Holland, 176, 187.

Holland, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

L’homme machine,” by La Mettrie, 11–81, 176, 178, 203, 205;
see “Man a Machine.

The machine man,” by La Mettrie, 11–81, 176, 178, 203, 205;
see “Man a Machine.

L’homme plante,” by La Mettrie, 205.

“Man as Machine,” by La Mettrie, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

L’homme plus que machine,” by Luzac, 177, 205;
see “Man more than a machine.”

The human more than machine,” by Luzac, 177, 205;
see “Man more than a machine.”

Hooper, W., 207.

Hooper, W., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Horace, 201.

Horace, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Horologium Oscillatorium,” by Huyghens, 203.

“Horological Oscillator,” by Huyghens, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

“Human Nature,” by Hobbes, 206.

“Human Nature,” by Hobbes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hunault, 4, 5.

Hunault, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Huyghens, Christian, 70, 140, 202.

Huyghens, Christian, 70, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

India, 58, 197.

India, 58, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Innocent XII, Pope, 191.

Innocent XII, Pope, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Institutiones et Experimentae Chemicae,” by Boerhaave, 202.

Institutions and Chemical Experiments,” by Boerhaave, 202.

Institutiones Medicae,” by Boerhaave, 5, 67, 74, 138, 201.

Institutiones Medicae,” by Boerhaave, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, 67, 74, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Ireland, 185, 190.

Ireland, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Italy, 186, 197.

Italy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Ixion, 189.

Ixion, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ixions of Christianity, 50, 121, 189.

Ixions of Christianity, 50, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

James I, 197.

James I, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Jansenist, 3, 178.

Jansenist, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Jesuits, 187.

Jesuits, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Jews, 198.

Jews, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Joshua, 7.

Joshua, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Julius, Caius, 18, 91.

Julius, Caius, 18, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Killaloe, 190.

Killaloe, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

La Grande Encyclopédie,” 178, 179, 182, 183, 186, 190, 191, 193, 196, 198, 201, 202, 203, 207.

La Grande Encyclopédie,” __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_10__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_11__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_12__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_13__.

La Mettrie, Julien Offray de, the elder, 3.

La Mettrie, Julien Offray de, the elder, 3.

La Mettrie, Julien Offray de, the writer, 3–9, 48, 120, 151, 165–174, 176, 177, 180, 181, 183, 186, 188, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205.

La Mettrie, Julien Offray de, the author, 3–9, 48, 120, 151, 165–174, 176, 177, 180, 181, 183, 186, 188, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205.

La Pensée Nouvelle,” 178.

“New Thought,” __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

La philosophie matérialiste au XVIIIe siècle,” by N. Quépat, 176.

Materialist Philosophy in the 18th Century,” by N. Quépat, 176.

La Revue de Paris,” 178.

“Paris Review,” __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

La Revue Nationale,” 178.

"National Review," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Lamy, Bernard, 55, 126, 195.

Lamy, Bernard, 55, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Lancisi, Giovanni-Maria, 26, 98.

Lancisi, Giovanni-Maria, 26, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Lange, F. A., 171, 176, 193, 197, 207.

Lange, F. A., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Laon, College of, 178.

Laon College, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Lapland, 182.

Lapland, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Le Clerc, Jean, 206.

Le Clerc, Jean, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Leclère, 190.

Leclère, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Leibniz, 17, 90, 190. [213]

Leibniz, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__]

Leibnizians, 13, 32, 63, 68, 85, 103, 133, 138.

Leibnizians, 13, 32, 63, 68, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__.

Leporc, Jean, 195.

Leporc, Jean, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Le rêve d’Alembert,” by Diderot, 193.

“D'Alembert's Dream,” by Diderot, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Leroy, Julien, 70, 140, 203.

Leroy, Julien, 70, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Les animaux plus que machines,” by La Mettrie, 205.

Animals over machines,” by La Mettrie, 205.

Les aventures de Télémaque,” by Fénelon, 190.

The Adventures of Telemachus,” by Fénelon, 190.

Les passions de l’âme,” by Descartes, 181, 198, 199, 200, 206.

The passions of the soul,” by Descartes, 181, 198, 199, 200, 206.

“Letters to Serena,” by Toland, 168, 169, 194, 202, 206.

“Letters to Serena” by Toland, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Lettres sur la physiognomie,” by Pernety, 24, 95, 182.

Letters on Physiognomy,” by Pernety, 24, 95, 182.

“Leviathan, The,” by Hobbes, 167, 168, 186, 187, 194, 206.

“Leviathan” by Hobbes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__.

Leyden, 4, 8, 11, 68, 138, 198, 201.

Leyden, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, 11, 68, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__.

Leyden, University of, 201.

Leyden University, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Libellus de Materia Medica et Remediorum Formulis,” by Boerhaave, 202.

Book on Medicinal Substances and Formulas for Remedies,” by Boerhaave, 202.

Lintot, Bernard, 206.

Lintot, Bernard, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Locke, John, 13, 14, 24, 30, 39, 72, 85, 86, 96, 101, 111, 142, 170, 177, 178, 194, 206.

Locke, John, 13, 14, 24, 30, 39, 72, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_10__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_11__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_12__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_13__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_14__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_15__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_16__.

London, 186, 190.

London, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Lorraine, 191.

Lorraine, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Louis XV, 182, 183.

Louis XV, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Louvre, 202.

Louvre, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Lucretius (Titus Lucretius Carus), 55, 126, 195.

Lucretius (Titus Lucretius Carus), 55, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Lutherans, 8.

Lutherans, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Luzac, Elie, 11, 177, 179, 182, 187, 188, 190, 196, 205.

Luzac, Elie, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__.

Lyons, 182, 192.

Lyons, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Malebranche, Nicolas, 17, 39, 51, 62, 85, 90, 110, 123.

Malebranche, Nicolas, 17, 39, 51, 62, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__.

Malebranchists, 13, 68, 139.

Malebranchists, 13, 68, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Malpighi, Marcello, 51, 75, 123, 144, 191.

Malpighi, Marcello, 51, 75, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

“Man a Machine,” by La Mettrie, 8, 83, 85, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 174, 177, 205;
seeL’homme Machine.”

“Man a Machine,” by La Mettrie, 8, 83, 85, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 174, 177, 205;
seeThe Machine Man.”

“Man More than a Machine,” by Luzac, 177, 179, 182, 187, 189, 190, 196, 205;
seeL’homme plus que machine.”

“Man More than a Machine,” by Luzac, 177, 179, 182, 187, 189, 190, 196, 205;
seeThe human more than machine.”

Mans, 195.

Dude, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Marcus Aurelius, 180.

Marcus Aurelius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Maria Theresa, 176.

Maria Theresa, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Martin, André, 195.

Martin, André, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Mary II, of England, 185.

Mary II, of England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Materialists, 166, 167, 173.

Materialists, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Materia Medica,” by Boerhaave, 5.

“Materia Medica,” by Boerhaave, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Maupertuis, Pierre Louis Moreau de, 24, 96, 182.

Maupertuis, Pierre Louis Moreau de, 24, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Mazarin, Cardinal, 191.

Cardinal Mazarin, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Mécanique des langues et l’art de les enseigner,” by Pluche, 178.

Language mechanics and the art of teaching them,” by Pluche, 178.

Mécanisme d’un flûteur automate,” by Vaucanson, 203.

Mechanism of an automated flutist,” by Vaucanson, 203.

Meditationes de prima philosophia,” by Descartes, 180, 194, 196, 205, 206.

Meditations on first philosophy,” by Descartes, 180, 194, 196, 205, 206.

Mémoires,” by Rais, 191.

“Mémoires,” by Rais, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire d’un genre de polype d’eau douce,” by Trembley, 186.

Memoirs on the History of a Type of Freshwater Polyp,” by Trembley, 186.

“Memoirs,” by Temple, 30, 101, 185.

“Memoirs” by Temple, 30, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Messina, 191, 198.

Messina, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Mirabaud (really von Holbach), 206.

Mirabaud (actually von Holbach), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Mohammedans, 198.

Muslims, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Molesworth, Sir William, 206.

Molesworth, Sir William, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Montpellier, 183.

Montpellier, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

“Moral Essays,” by Pope, 182.

“Moral Essays” by Pope, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Morand, Sauveur-François, 5.

Morand, Sauveur-François, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Mousnier, 206.

Mousnier, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Mulford, William, 207.

Mulford, William, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Munster, 198.

Munster, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Myotamia reformata,” by Cowper, 196.

“Myotamia reformata,” by Cowper, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Mysia, 180.

Mysia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Nay, Basse-Pyrénées, 190.

No, Basse-Pyrénées, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Netherlands, The, 176, 185, 192.

Netherlands, The, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Newton, Sir Isaac, 40, 72, 78, 111, 142, 146.

Newton, Sir Isaac, 40, 72, 78, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__.

Nieuwentyt, Bernard, 51, 123, 190.

Nieuwentyt, Bernard, 51, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Normandy, 178.

Normandy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Numidia, 188.

Numidia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Observatory (Paris), 202.

Observatory (Paris), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Œuvres complètes,” de Condillac, 206.

“Complete Works,” by Condillac, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Œuvres de Descartes, 206.

“Descartes' Works” __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Œuvres de Fréderic II,” 207. [214]

“Frédéric II's Works,” __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__]

Œuvres philosophiques de la Mettrie,” 205.

“Philosophical Works of La Mettrie,” __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Orleans, Gaston of, 47, 118.

Orleans, Gaston of, 47, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Ortus medicinae,” by Van Helmont, 182.

Ortus medicinae,” by Van Helmont, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Oxford, Christ Church, 184.

Oxford, Christ Church, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Padua, 192.

Padua, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Paris, 4, 5, 154, 178, 183, 184, 186, 193, 195, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203.

Paris, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_10__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_11__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_12__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_13__.

Pascal, Blaise, 48, 120.

Pascal, Blaise, 48, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Patin, Guy, 193.

Patin, Guy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Penelope,” by La Mettrie, 8.

“Penelope,” by La Mettrie, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pensées philosophiques,” by Diderot, 53, 124, 193.

“Philosophical Thoughts,” by Diderot, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Pergamus, 180.

Pergamus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Peripatetic, 16, 88, 180.

Nomadic, 16, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Pernety, Jacques, 182.

Pernety, Jacques, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Perrault, Claude, 68, 138, 202.

Perrault, Claude, 68, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Petronius, 18, 91.

Petronius, 18, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Peyronie, François Gigot de la, 26, 98, 183.

Peyronie, François Gigot de la, 26, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

“Philosophical Transactions,” 73, 143, 186, 191.

“Philosophical Transactions,” 73, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

“Physico-Theology,” by Derham, 191.

“Physico-Theology” by Derham, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pisa, 191, 198.

Pisa, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Plato, 64, 134, 135, 200.

Plato, 64, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Plessis, 3.

Plessis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pliny, 15, 87.

Pliny, 15, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Pluche, Noel Antoine, 15, 16, 87, 88, 178.

Pluche, Noel Antoine, 15, 16, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Poésies pastorales,” by Fontenelle, 184.

“Pastoral Poems,” by Fontenelle, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pope, Alexander, 22, 62, 94, 132, 182.

Pope, Alexander, 22, 62, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Port Royal, 48, 120, 200.

Port Royal, 48, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

“Practical Medicine,” by La Mettrie, 5.

"Practical Medicine" by La Mettrie, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Précieux, The, 184.

Precious, The, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Principia philosophiae,” by Descartes, 166, 204, 206.

“Principles of Philosophy,” by Descartes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

“Principles of Human Knowledge,” by Berkeley, 200.

“Principles of Human Knowledge,” by Berkeley, 200.

Prometheus, 24, 70, 96, 141.

Prometheus, 24, 70, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Protestant College of Sedan, 187.

Protestant College of Sedan, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Prussia, 8, 200.

Prussia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Puritan College of Emmanuel, Cambridge, 185.

Emmanuel College, Cambridge, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Purmerend, 190.

Purmerend, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pyrrho of Elis, 187.

Pyrrho of Elis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pyrrhonian, 39, 55, 110, 127.

Pyrrhonian, 39, 55, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Pyrrhonism, 187.

Pyrrhonism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pythagoras, 64, 134, 200.

Pythagoras, 64, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Pythagoreans, 200.

Pythagoreans, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Quépat, N., 176.

Quépat, N., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Rais, or Cardinal de Retz, 51, 123, 191.

Rais, or Cardinal de Retz, 51, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Réaumur, René Antoine Ferchault de, 178.

Réaumur, René Antoine Ferchault de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

“Republic,” by Plato, 200.

“Republic,” by Plato, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Restoration, the, 184.

Restoration, the, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Retz, Cardinal de; see Rais.

Retz, Cardinal de; see Rais.

Rheims, 4, 200.

Rheims, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Richmond, Duke of, 186.

Duke of Richmond, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Rollin, Charles, 178.

Rollin, Charles, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Rome, 180, 192, 195, 198.

Rome, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Rotterdam, 188.

Rotterdam, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Rouen, 184.

Rouen, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Royal Academy of Science of Berlin, 9.

Royal Academy of Science of Berlin, 9.

Royal Academy of Sciences of Paris, 201, 202.

Royal Academy of Sciences of Paris, 201, 202.

Royal College of Physicians, 184.

Royal College of Physicians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Royal Society of London, 184, 186, 197, 201.

Royal Society of London, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Royalists, 184.

Royalists, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ryckius, Theodore, 201.

Ryckius, Theodore, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Saint Eloi de Montpellier, Hospital of, 183.

Saint Eloi de Montpellier, Hospital of, 183.

Saint Jacques, 201.

Saint Jacques, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Saint Malo, 4, 5.

Saint Malo, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Saint Martin’s, 184.

Saint Martin’s, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Saintsbury, George Edward Bateman, 184.

Saintsbury, George Edward Bateman, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Saumar, 195.

Saumar, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Satyrus, 180.

Satyrus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Savoy, 190.

Savoy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Schaffhausen, 185.

Schaffhausen, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Scholastics, Christian, 158.

Scholastics, Christian, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Schwerin, 198.

Schwerin, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Scylla, 78, 146.

Scylla, 78, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Sechelles, 8.

Sechelles, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Sedan, Protestant College of, 187.

Protestant College Sedan, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Selymbria, Herodicus of, 181.

Selymbria, Herodicus of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Seneca, 18, 91.

Seneca, 18, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Sensationalists, 170.

Sensationalists, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Shaftsbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3d Earl of, 192, 193. [215]

Shaftsbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3d Earl of, 192, 193. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__]

Sheldon, Gilbert, Archbishop of Canterbury, 184.

Sheldon, Gilbert, Archbishop of Canterbury, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Sicca, Venerea, 188.

Sicca, Venerea, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Sedobre, 5.

Sedobre, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Singularités physiologiques,” 178.

“Physiological Singularities,” __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Smith, G., 205.

Smith, G., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Socrates, 64, 135.

Socrates, 64, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Sophocles, 40, 111.

Sophocles, 40, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Spectacle de la nature,” 14, 86, 178.

“Nature's spectacle,” 14, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Spinoza, Baruch, 52, 124.

Spinoza, Baruch, 52, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Stahl, George Ernst, 66, 67, 68, 136, 137, 139, 200.

Stahl, George Ernst, 66, 67, 68, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__.

Stalbridge, 197.

Stalbridge, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Steele, Sir Richard, 24, 96.

Steele, Sir Richard, 24, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Steigner de Wittighofen, 22, 94.

Steigner de Wittighofen, 22, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Sténon, Nicolas, 58, 129, 198.

Sténon, Nicolas, 58, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Stoughton, 191.

Stoughton, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Surdus Loquens,” by Amman, 185.

Surdus Loquens,” by Amman, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Sweden, 185.

Sweden, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Swift, Jonathan, 185.

Swift, Jonathan, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Switzerland, 20, 94, 185, 197.

Switzerland, 20, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Sydenham, Thomas, 5.

Sydenham, Thomas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Sylva Sylvarum,” by Bacon, 58, 129, 197, 207.

Sylva Sylvarum,” by Bacon, 58, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Système d’Epicure,” by La Mettrie, 205.

“Epicurean System,” by La Mettrie, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Système de la nature,” by Holbach, 173, 180, 183, 189, 193, 194, 196, 199, 202, 206.

System of nature,” by Holbach, 173, 180, 183, 189, 193, 194, 196, 199, 202, 206.

Taurisano, 192.

Taurisano, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Temple, Sir William, 30, 101, 185.

Temple, Sir William, 30, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

“The History of Polyps,” by Trembley, 102;
seeMémoires pour servir à l’histoire d’un genre de polype d’eau douce.”

“The History of Polyps,” by Trembley, 102;
seeMemoirs to Contribute to the History of a Type of Freshwater Polyp.”

“The Natural History of the Soul,” by La Mettrie, 6, 101, 102, 140, 151–161;
seeL’histoire naturelle de l’âme.”

“The Natural History of the Soul,” by La Mettrie, 6, 101, 102, 140, 151–161;
seeThe natural history of the soul.”

Theoria medica vera,” by Stahl, 200.

“The true medical theory,” by Stahl, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

“The Politics of Physicians,” by La Mettrie, 7.

“The Politics of Physicians,” by La Mettrie, 7.

“The Riddle of the Universe,” by Haeckel, 184, 185.

“The Riddle of the Universe,” by Haeckel, 184, 185.

Thomas, E. C., 207.

Thomas, E. C., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Timon, 187.

Timon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Tindal, Matthew, 192.

Tindal, Matthew, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Tirconnel, Milord, 9.

Tirconnel, my lord, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Toland, John, 166, 168–170, 192, 194, 202, 204, 206.

Toland, John, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__–170, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__.

Torricelli, Evangelista, 16, 88, 179.

Torricelli, Evangelista, 16, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Toulouse, 192.

Toulouse, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Traité de la divinité de notre Seigneur Jesus Christ,” by Abadie, 191.

Treatise on the Divinity of Our Lord Jesus Christ,” by Abadie, 191.

Traité de la grandeur en général,” by Lamy, 195.

"Treatise on Greatness in General," by Lamy, 195.

Traité de la méchanique de l’équilibre, des solides et des liqueurs,” by Lamy, 195.

Treatise on the Mechanics of Balance, Solids, and Liquids,” by Lamy, 195.

Traité de la méchanique des animaux,” by Perrault, 68, 138.

"Treatise on the Mechanics of Animals," by Perrault, 68, 138.

Traité de la vérité de la religion chrétienne,” by Abadie, 190.

Treatise on the Truth of the Christian Religion,” by Abadie, 190.

Traité de l’éducation des filles,” by Fénelon, 190.

Treatise on the education of girls,” by Fénelon, 190.

Traité des animaux,” by Condillac, 171, 172, 188, 194, 195, 206.

“Animal Treatise,” by Condillac, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__.

Traité des sensations,” by Condillac, 170, 171, 180, 187, 206.

“Treatise on Sensations,” by Condillac, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

“Treatise on Man,” by Helvetius, 172, 187, 189, 207;
seeDe l’homme.”

“Treatise on Man,” by Helvetius, 172, 187, 189, 207;
seeOf man.”

Trembley, Abraham, 30, 53, 102, 125, 186, 193.

Trembley, Abraham, 30, 53, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__.

Tufts, J. H. 207.

Tufts, J. H. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Tulpius, Nicolas Dirx, 62.

Tulpius, Nicolas Dirx, 62.

“Two Hundred,” Council of the, at Geneva, 186.

“Two Hundred,” Council of the, at Geneva, 186.

Upminster, 191.

Upminster, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

University of Leyden, 201.

University of Leiden, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Vandenberg, 201.

Vandenberg, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Van Helmont, Jan Baptista, 22, 95, 182.

Van Helmont, Jan Baptista, 22, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Vanini, Lucilio, 52ff., 124, 192.

Vanini, Lucilio, 52ff., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Vaucanson, Jacques de, 70, 140, 203.

Vaucanson, Jacques de, 70, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Veitch, John, 205, 206.

Veitch, John, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Vergil, 68, 138, 195.

Vergil, 68, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Verulam, Bacon of, 57, 129;
see Francis Bacon.

Bacon of Verulam, 57, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
see Francis Bacon.

Vincennes, 191.

Vincennes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Voltaire, François Marie Adouet de, 11, 62, 132, 182.

Voltaire, François Marie Arouet de, 11, 62, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Voorhout, 201.

Voorhout, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Westgraafdak, 190. [216]

Westgraafdak, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. [__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__]

Westminster Abbey, 184.

Westminster Abbey, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

White Hall, 94.

White Hall, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

William of Orange, 185.

William of Orange, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Willis, Thomas, 27, 68, 98, 99, 138, 184, 202.

Willis, Thomas, 27, 68, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__.

Wiltshire, 184.

Wiltshire, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Windelband, W., 193, 207.

Windelband, W., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Wittighofen, Steigner de, 22, 94.

Wittighofen, Steigner de, 22, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Wolff, Christian, 17, 90.

Wolff, Christian, 17, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Worcester, 191.

Worcester, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Colophon

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Scans of this book can be found on the Internet Archive (copy 1, 2).

Related Library of Congress catalog page: 13004432.

Related Library of Congress catalog page: 13004432.

Related Open Library catalog page (for source): OL6554950M.

Related Open Library catalog page (for source): OL6554950M.

Related Open Library catalog page (for work): OL2453226W.

Related Open Library catalog page (for work): OL2453226W.

Related WorldCat catalog page: 274236.

Related WorldCat catalog page: __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Related LibraryThing page: 97524.

Related LibraryThing page: __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

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  • 2016-05-09 Started.

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Corrections

The following corrections have been applied to the text:

The following corrections have been made to the text:

Page Source Correction
39 aus aux
59 siége siège
61, 215 , .
70 matiére matière
121 cloulds clouds
129 Stenon Sténon
157 moxing moving
165, 205, 210, 214 Réné René
167, 169, 192, 197, 205, 206, 206, 212, 213 [Not in source]
168 differes differs
172 . ,
178 Reaumur Réaumur
179 amenuensis amanuensis
180, 186, 191 [Not in source] .
180, 184, 196, 206 [Not in source]
189 developes develops
190 ,, , ‘
190 Westgraafdak West-Graftdijk
190 diet died
190
194 , [Deleted]
198 posiiton position
202 Encyclopèdie Encyclopédie
204 exension extension
206 completes complètes
207 Wiliam William
209 : .
210 Chateau Château
212 Memoires Mémoires
212 servire servir
212 Leibnitz Leibniz
213 Mecanique Mécanique
214 [Not in source] ,

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