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THE HISTORY OF TAMMANY HALL


THE HISTORY OF
TAMMANY HALL

The History of Tammany Hall

BY
GUSTAVUS MYERS
Author of “A History of Public Franchises
in New York City,” etc., etc.

BY
Gustavus Myers
Author of “A History of Public Franchises
in New York City,” etc., etc.

SECOND EDITION
REVISED AND ENLARGED

2nd Edition
Revised and Expanded

Boni and Liveright's mark: two figures seated either side of a tree in a pot with BL on it

NEW YORK
BONI & LIVERIGHT, Inc.
1917

NEW YORK
BONI & LIVERIGHT, Inc.
1917

Copyright, 1917.
By Boni & Liveright, Inc.

Copyright, 1917.
By Boni & Liveright, Inc.


PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION (1901)

In most men’s minds a certain spell of wonder attaches to the career and character of the Tammany Society and Tammany Hall. The long continuance of this dual power; its control of the city, infrequently interrupted, throughout the century; the nature of its principles, the method of its practices and the character of its personnel—all these combine to furnish a spectacle which exerts over the general mind a peculiar and strong fascination.

In the minds of many, there’s a sense of awe surrounding the Tammany Society and Tammany Hall. Their long-lasting influence, with consistent control over the city throughout the century, often unbroken; the nature of their principles, their methods, and the character of the people involved—all of these elements create a spectacle that has a unique and powerful appeal to the public.

It was under the sway of this mood that I began the investigation which has resulted in this volume. I had no thought, on beginning, to carry the work so far: I sought merely to satisfy my curiosity regarding the more important particulars of Tammany’s history. But I soon learned that what I sought was not easily to be obtained. The few narratives already published were generally found to be either extravagant panegyrics, printed under the patronage of the Tammany Society, or else partisan attacks, violent in style and untruthful in statement. Usually both were characterized by their paucity of real information no less than by the number of their palpable errors of fact.

It was in this frame of mind that I started the investigation that led to this book. At first, I didn’t intend to take the research that far; I just wanted to satisfy my curiosity about the key details of Tammany’s history. But I quickly discovered that what I was looking for wasn’t easy to find. The few accounts already published tended to be either overly enthusiastic praises, endorsed by the Tammany Society, or biased attacks that were aggressive in tone and inaccurate in detail. Typically, both types lacked genuine information and were filled with obvious factual errors.

Turning from these, I determined to find the facts for myself. My search led me first through the files of all the available newspapers from 1789 to the present time, and thence—for origins and contributory causes—through publications as far back as 1788; thence through State and city histories, and a great number of biographies, sketches, essays, political pamphlets and broadsides. The fragmentary matter gleaned from these sources was found to be extremely valuable in helping to form the continuous thread of a narrative, and in determining[vi] contemporary spirit; but the statements and conclusions, particularly with regard to the character and conduct of public men, were generally contradictory and inconclusive. Realizing this, I began the last phase of my search—a task that has led me through numberless dreary pages of the Minutes and Documents of the Common Council (which for the years previous to 1881 exist only in manuscript), Journals and Documents of the Senate and Assembly, including the reports of various legislative committees; Congressional and Executive Records, Treasury Reports, Records of the Police, Common Pleas, Superior and Supreme Courts; Minutes of the Oyer and Terminer; Grand Jury Presentments, and Records of the Board of Supervisors. Finally, I have had the good fortune, in developing the story of the middle and later periods, of having secured many valuable interviews with a number of men who actively participated in the stirring events of thirty, forty and even fifty years ago.

Turning away from all that, I decided to discover the facts for myself. My search began with reviewing newspapers from 1789 to the present, and then diving deeper—looking for origins and contributing causes—into publications dating back to 1788; next, I explored state and city histories, along with numerous biographies, sketches, essays, political pamphlets, and broadsheets. The bits and pieces I gathered from these sources proved to be incredibly useful in weaving together a continuous narrative and capturing[vi] the contemporary spirit; however, the statements and conclusions, especially concerning the character and actions of public figures, were often contradictory and inconclusive. Aware of this, I entered the final phase of my research—a task that took me through countless tedious pages of the Minutes and Documents of the Common Council (which exist only in manuscript for the years before 1881), Journals and Documents of the Senate and Assembly, including reports from various legislative committees; Congressional and Executive Records, Treasury Reports, Records of the Police, Common Pleas, Superior, and Supreme Courts; Minutes of the Oyer and Terminer; Grand Jury Presentments, and Records of the Board of Supervisors. In the end, I was fortunate enough, while developing the story of the middle and later periods, to conduct many valuable interviews with individuals who played active roles in the significant events of thirty, forty, and even fifty years ago.

The purpose to write a book became fixed as my search progressed. The work is finished, and the result is now to be given to the public. What I have sought to produce is a narrative history—plain, compact and impartial. I have sought to avoid an indulgence, on the one hand, in political speculation, and on the other, in moralizing platitudes. Such deductions and generalizations as from time to time I have made, seem to me necessary in elucidating the narrative; without them the story would prove to the reader a mere chronology of unrelated facts.

The purpose of writing this book became clear as my research continued. The work is complete, and now it's time to share the result with the public. What I've aimed to create is a straightforward, concise, and unbiased narrative history. I've tried to steer clear of getting caught up in political speculation on one side and moralizing clichés on the other. The inferences and generalizations I've made along the way feel necessary to clarify the narrative; without them, the story would just be a series of unrelated facts.

If my narrative furnishes a sad story for the leaders and chieftains of the Tammany Society and the Tammany Hall political organization, the fault is not mine, but that of a multitude of incontestible public records. It was in no partizan spirit that I began the work, and in none that I now conclude it. I have always been an independent in politics; and I have even voted, when there seemed to me ample reason for doing so, a Tammany ticket. I have tried to set down nothing in malice, nor[vii] with such exceptions as are obviously necessary with regard to living men, to extenuate anything whatever. Those who may be tempted to consider my work partial and partizan, on account of the showing that it makes of Tammany corruption and inefficiency, will do well to read carefully the pages relating to the Whigs and to some other opponents of Tammany Hall.

If my story presents a sad account for the leaders and members of the Tammany Society and the Tammany Hall political organization, the blame isn’t mine but lies with a wealth of undeniable public records. I didn’t start this project with any political bias, and I'm not ending it that way either. I've always considered myself an independent voter; I’ve even cast my vote for a Tammany ticket when I felt it was justified. I’ve made an effort to write without malice, except where it’s obviously necessary to address living individuals, and I haven’t tried to downplay anything. Those who might think my work is biased because it shows Tammany's corruption and inefficiency should take a closer look at the sections that discuss the Whigs and other adversaries of Tammany Hall.


The records show that a succession of prominent Tammany leaders were involved in some theft or swindle, public or private. These peculations or frauds ranged, in point of time, from 1799 and 1805-6 to the later decades; in the matter of persons, from the founder of the Tammany Society to some of the subsequent “bosses,” and in gradation of amount, from the petty thousands taken by Mooney, Stagg and Page, in the first decade of the century, to the $1,220,000 taken by Swartwout in 1830-38 and the undetermined millions taken by Wood and Tweed in the fifties, sixties and first two years of the seventies. From nearly the beginning of its active political career, Tammany leaders, with generally brief interruptions, thus continued to abstract money from the city, the State and the nation—the interruptions to the practice generally coinciding with the periods when Tammany in those years was deprived of political power.

The records show that a series of prominent Tammany leaders were involved in various thefts or scams, whether public or private. These frauds occurred over a long period, from 1799 and 1805-6 up until later decades; they included everyone from the founder of the Tammany Society to subsequent “bosses,” and the amounts swindled ranged from the small thousands taken by Mooney, Stagg, and Page in the early 1800s, to the $1,220,000 taken by Swartwout between 1830 and 1838, and the countless millions taken by Wood and Tweed in the 1850s, 1860s, and the first two years of the 1870s. Almost from the start of its active political career, Tammany leaders, with only brief breaks, continued to siphon money from the city, the State, and the nation—these interruptions typically happened when Tammany was stripped of political power during those years.

My search has shown me the absurdity of the pretense that any vital distinction exists between the Tammany Society and the Tammany Hall political organization. Tammany members industriously propagate this pretense, but it has neither a historic nor an actual basis. From 1805, the date of the apparent separation of the organization from the society, the Sachems of the latter have ruled the policies of the former. Repeatedly, as in 1828, 1838, 1853, and 1857, they have determined the “regularity” of contending factions in the organization, and have shut the hall to members of the faction against which they have decided. The Sachems have at all times[viii] been the leaders in the political body, and the control of the society in every year that Tammany has held control of the city, has determined the division of plunder for the ensuing year. The Tammany Society and the Tammany political organization constitute a dual power—but, unlike Ormuzd and Ahrimanes, a duality working by identical means for an identical end.

My search has revealed the ridiculousness of claiming that there’s any real difference between the Tammany Society and the Tammany Hall political organization. Tammany members actively spread this idea, but it has no historical or factual foundation. Since 1805, when the organization seemingly separated from the society, the Sachems of the latter have controlled the policies of the former. Time and again, like in 1828, 1838, 1853, and 1857, they have decided which factions within the organization are “regular” and have barred members of the opposing faction. The Sachems have always been the leaders in the political body, and their control of the society each year that Tammany has dominated the city has dictated the distribution of resources for the coming year. The Tammany Society and the Tammany political organization are two powers—but, unlike Ormuzd and Ahrimanes, this duality operates in the same way for the same goal.

The records show that Tammany was thus, from the beginning, an evil force in politics. Its characteristics were formed by its first great leader, Aaron Burr, and his chief lieutenant, Matthew L. Davis; and whatever is distinctive of Tammany methods and policies in 1900 is, for the most part, but the development of features initiated by these two men one hundred years ago. It is curious to recall, on looking back to the time when my researches began, the abundant evidences of misapprehension regarding Tammany’s earlier history. “No especial discredit attached to Tammany Hall before Tweed’s time,” wrote, in effect, Mr. E. L. Godkin in an essay published a few years ago. State Senator Fassett, in 1890, made a similar statement in his report on the investigation of conditions in New York City. “Down to the time,” he says, “that the Tammany ‘ring,’ under the leadership of William M. Tweed, took possession of the government of New York City … the office [of Alderman] was held in credit and esteem.” The exact reverse of both statements is true; and abundant proof of my contention, I believe, will be found in the pages of this book. Another instance may be given—though the opinion expressed, instead of being founded upon misapprehension, may charitably be set down as one of misjudgment. “I was a Sachem of Tammany,” said a one-time noted politician recently, before the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents, “in the days when it was an honor to be a Sachem.” The precise time he did not specify; and it would be difficult to identify it from the description he has given. Certainly, since 1805, the office of Sachem[ix] has been one ill calculated, of itself, to bring particular honor to the incumbent.

The records show that Tammany has always been a corrupt force in politics. Its traits were shaped by its first major leader, Aaron Burr, and his main aide, Matthew L. Davis; and what defines Tammany's methods and policies in 1900 is mostly just the evolution of ideas started by these two men a hundred years earlier. It's interesting to think back to when I started my research and how many misconceptions existed about Tammany's earlier history. “No particular discredit was attached to Tammany Hall before Tweed’s time,” wrote, essentially, Mr. E. L. Godkin in an essay published a few years ago. State Senator Fassett echoed this in 1890 in his report on the investigation into conditions in New York City. “Until the time,” he says, “when the Tammany ‘ring,’ led by William M. Tweed, took control of New York City’s government… the office of Alderman was regarded with respect and esteem.” The exact opposite of both these statements is true, and plenty of evidence to support my argument will be found in the pages of this book. Another example can be mentioned—though the opinion expressed here may be more a case of misjudgment than misunderstanding. “I was a Sachem of Tammany,” said a once-famous politician recently, before the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents, “in the days when it was an honor to be a Sachem.” He didn’t specify exactly when that was, and it would be hard to pinpoint it given the vague description he provided. Certainly, since 1805, being a Sachem[ix] has not been a role that necessarily brought any real honor to the person holding it.

It would be dishonest to pretend for a moment that Tammany has been alone in its evil-doing; it has been simply the most ingenious and the most pretentious; and its practices have a historic continuity and persistence not shared by any of its rivals. The Whigs, for instance, sought in every possible way to outdo Tammany in election frauds; they stuffed ballot boxes, colonized voters, employed rowdies and thugs at the polls and distributed thousands of deceptive ballots for the use of their opponents. In fiscal frauds, likewise, they left a record well-nigh equaling that of Tammany. The Native Americans imitated both Whigs and Tammany men, and the Republicans have given instances at Albany of a wholesale venality unapproached in the history of legislative bodies. Among the few exceptions, during the earlier half of the century, to the general prostitution of civic ideals, was the career of the Workingmen’s party (1829-31) and of its successor, the Equal Rights party (1834-38). The principles of both these parties were far in advance of their time; and though the effect tended somewhat to the temporary heightening of political standards, a reaction followed, which again brought in a long period of fraud and corruption.

It would be dishonest to pretend for a moment that Tammany has been the only one engaging in wrongdoing; it has just been the most clever and the most showy. Its actions have a historical consistency and durability that none of its competitors can match. The Whigs, for example, tried in every imaginable way to outdo Tammany in election fraud; they stuffed ballot boxes, brought in voters from other places, hired thugs and troublemakers at the polls, and handed out thousands of misleading ballots for their opponents to use. In financial frauds, they nearly matched Tammany's record. The Native Americans copied both the Whigs and the Tammany members, and the Republicans have shown examples in Albany of corruption on a scale not seen in the history of legislative bodies. Among the few exceptions during the first half of the century to the widespread corruption of civic ideals were the Workingmen’s party (1829-31) and its successor, the Equal Rights party (1834-38). The principles of both these parties were ahead of their time; and while their impact did raise political standards temporarily, a backlash followed that led to another long period of fraud and corruption.

But shameful as this record is, it is one which, viewed in the light of present practises and present ideals, gives the basis for a robust faith in the future. The hiding of vice and the employment of indirect methods in cheating and plundering, are themselves an evidence of the existence of moral standards; and it is unquestionable that Tammany to-day outwardly conforms to ethical demands which would have been scoffed at a half century ago. No one can read the details of political history without acknowledging a growing betterment in political methods.

But as shameful as this record is, when we look at it through the lens of today’s practices and ideals, it actually provides a solid foundation for confidence in the future. The concealment of wrongdoing and the use of indirect tactics for cheating and stealing show that there are still moral standards in place. It’s clear that Tammany today outwardly meets ethical expectations that would have been laughed at fifty years ago. Anyone who studies political history can see that there has been a noticeable improvement in political methods.

“Hardly a man [before the Civil War] could be found,” says Jesse Macy in his recent History of Political Parties[x] in the United States, “who felt himself too virtuous to go into politics. The sensitively moral were not repelled by political methods which to-day are regarded as disgraceful.” And further along he says: “It is easy to forget that, from the very nature of moral progress, it often happens that intelligent moral leaders of one generation will in all good conscience say and do things which only the conscious hypocrite or the knave of a later generation can do.” Pessimism as to political progress secures no support from real research.

“Hardly a man [before the Civil War] could be found,” says Jesse Macy in his recent History of Political Parties[x] in the United States, “who thought he was too virtuous to get involved in politics. The morally sensitive were not put off by political methods that are seen as disgraceful today.” He continues, “It’s easy to forget that, due to the nature of moral progress, intelligent moral leaders of one generation can, in good faith, say and do things that only a conscious hypocrite or a rogue of a later generation would do.” Pessimism about political progress doesn't find support from genuine research.

It may be asked, and with some show of reason, how it has been possible for New York City to achieve its present rank in population, in wealth, in commerce and in transportation facilities; how it has acquired its splendid libraries, its magnificent buildings, its museums, its parks, its benevolent institutions, in the face of this continued dominancy of corruption, violence and fraud. The answer is simple: the city has grown despite these adverse influences. The harbor of New York is one factor; the Erie Canal (constructed notwithstanding the opposition of the dominant political party of the city) is another; the tremendous growth of the nation, and the thousand external influences that determined the location of the nation’s metropolis, are yet other factors. The city has grown to magnificence and world-wide influence; but it has paid dear tribute for every forward step it has taken. Imagination fails at picturing the metropolis that might have been, could the city throughout the century have been guided and controlled in the light of present-day civic ideals.

One might reasonably question how New York City has managed to become what it is today in terms of population, wealth, commerce, and transportation. How has it built its impressive libraries, stunning buildings, museums, parks, and charitable institutions despite the ongoing issues of corruption, violence, and fraud? The answer is straightforward: the city has thrived in spite of these challenges. The New York harbor is one contributing factor; the Erie Canal (which was built despite resistance from the city's dominant political party) is another. The massive growth of the nation and the myriad external factors that influenced the location of the nation’s capital also play a role. The city has achieved greatness and international significance, but it has paid a heavy price for every advancement it has made. It's hard to imagine what the metropolis could have been if the city had been guided by modern civic ideals throughout the past century.


The difficulties of securing the publication of this work by any of the regular publishing houses proved insurmountable. Two of the best known firms wrote that they could not encourage me to submit the manuscript to them for consideration. Four others considered its publication “inadvisable,” though their readers had returned favorable[xi] recommendations. One other declined it without giving reasons. More recently, when the offer of certain responsible persons who had read the manuscript, to guarantee the expense of its publication, was made to a certain house, the firm replied: “… we should hardly feel warranted in locking horns with Tammany Hall.…” It was thought that perhaps an out-of-town house might issue it, but here again declinations were forthcoming. Finally it was decided to attempt its publication by private subscription. To this end I solicited individual advances to a publication fund, from a number of the city’s public-spirited citizens. The appearance of the work at this time is due to the kindly interests of these men.

The challenges of getting this work published by any of the usual publishing houses turned out to be impossible. Two of the most well-known companies stated that they couldn't encourage me to submit the manuscript for their consideration. Four others found its publication “inadvisable,” despite their readers giving positive[xi] feedback. One other company turned it down without providing a reason. More recently, when some responsible individuals who had read the manuscript offered to cover the publication costs and approached a specific firm, the company responded: “… we should hardly feel warranted in locking horns with Tammany Hall.…” It was thought that perhaps a publisher from out of town might take it on, but again, there were refusals. Ultimately, it was decided to try publishing it through private subscriptions. To achieve this, I reached out for individual contributions to a publication fund from several civic-minded citizens in the city. The release of the work at this time is thanks to the generous support of these men.

Acknowledgments for the courtesies tendered me, and for material aid rendered in the project of issuing the work, are due to a number of persons: To the public-spirited citizens of different political faiths, who, while familiar with the scope of the work, contributed the funds for its publication without insisting upon a censorship of the manuscript or its alteration in any way for political purposes; and particularly to Mr. James B. Reynolds, Mr. James W. Pryor and Milo R. Maltbie, Ph. D.

Acknowledgments for the kindness shown to me and for the support provided in the project of publishing this work go to several people: To the community-minded citizens of various political beliefs, who, understanding the purpose of the work, contributed the funds for its publication without demanding control over the manuscript or any changes for political reasons; and especially to Mr. James B. Reynolds, Mr. James W. Pryor, and Milo R. Maltbie, Ph.D.

Gustavus Myers.

Gustavus Myers.

New York City, January, 1901.

New York City, January 1901.


FOREWORD TO THE NEW EDITION (1917)

Since the original publication of this work, a large number of inquiries have appeared in the Publisher’s Weekly and have come from other quarters requesting information as to where copies of The History of Tammany Hall could be obtained. For the last ten years this work has been in continuous demand but unavailable. For reasons fully set forth in the preface to that issue, the edition of 1901 was brought out in the face of difficulties. Not the least of these was the self-expressed dread of certain publishing houses to bring out a work which (as some of them frankly admitted in their letters of declination) might bring reprisals to them in some unexplained form or other.

Since the original publication of this work, a lot of inquiries have appeared in Publisher’s Weekly and have come from various sources asking where copies of The History of Tammany Hall can be found. For the past ten years, this work has been in constant demand but unavailable. The reasons are fully explained in the preface to that edition, but the 1901 publication was released despite facing numerous challenges. One of the main issues was the expressed fear from some publishing houses about releasing a work that might lead to repercussions, as some of them frankly stated in their rejection letters.

Hence to all intents and purposes, that edition was in the nature of a restricted private edition. Denied the usual and almost indispensable publication and distribution facilities by the publishing houses, the work necessarily was subject to obvious disadvantages, and, so far as circulation went, practically took rank as a suppressed book—not, it is true, suppressed by any particular agency, but by the circumstances of the case.

Hence, for all intents and purposes, that edition was essentially a limited private edition. Without the usual and almost essential publication and distribution support from the publishing houses, the work faced clear disadvantages and, in terms of circulation, effectively functioned as a suppressed book—not, to be clear, suppressed by any specific entity, but by the situation itself.

In 1913 Mr. Edward Kellogg Baird, a public-spirited attorney in New York City, kindly undertook, in behalf of the author (who was absent in another country at the time) to see whether some one of the publishing houses would not bring out a new edition of The History of Tammany Hall, brought down to date. In his letters to these publishers, Mr. Baird pointed out that there never had been any lack of general interest in this work, and referred to the extremely large number of reviews in important publications in many countries treating the book at[xiv] length and commending its purpose and scope. Mr. Baird also called the attention of publishers to the fact that the book was recognized as the only authority on the subject; that it had been tested by time; that there had never been a libel suit arising from any of the statements made therein; and that, therefore, there could be no valid objection on the part of any publisher that publication of further editions would lead to any legal trouble.

In 1913, Mr. Edward Kellogg Baird, a civic-minded lawyer in New York City, took it upon himself, on behalf of the author (who was out of the country at the time), to check if any publishing houses would be interested in releasing a new edition of The History of Tammany Hall, updated for the times. In his letters to these publishers, Mr. Baird emphasized that there had always been significant interest in this work and noted the numerous reviews in major publications across various countries discussing the book at[xiv] length and praising its goals and breadth. Mr. Baird also pointed out to publishers that the book was seen as the definitive authority on the topic; that it had stood the test of time; that there had never been a libel lawsuit related to any of its statements; and therefore, there couldn't be any legitimate reason for any publisher to worry that releasing further editions would result in legal issues.

With such possible objections thus disposed of in advance, Mr. Baird confidently expected that he would find at least one of the old-established publishers who would not be deterred by such considerations as influenced them to refuse publication in 1901. But the replies were virtually repetitions of those received twelve years previously. One of the first replies, dated February 24, 1913, from the senior member of a New York publishing house, read as follows:

With those possible objections addressed upfront, Mr. Baird was confident he would find at least one of the long-established publishers who wouldn't be put off by the concerns that led them to decline publication in 1901. However, the responses he received were nearly identical to those from twelve years earlier. One of the first replies, dated February 24, 1913, from the senior member of a New York publishing house, read as follows:

“For the very same reason that the author of The History of Tammany Hall was unable to obtain a publisher for the original edition, leads us to decide unfavorably so far as we are concerned. The policy of publishing the book was the first question raised by one of my partners, before he had a chance even to read the preface, and we as a firm have decided that the objection is too strong to permit us to bring the book out over our imprint. I am sorry that we must be so cowardly, for the book itself is worthy of reissue, and I personally should be glad to see it published by my firm.…”

“For the same reason that the author of The History of Tammany Hall couldn't find a publisher for the original edition, we have decided against it as far as we’re concerned. The decision to publish the book was the first issue raised by one of my partners, even before he had a chance to read the preface, and as a firm, we believe that the objection is too significant to allow us to publish it under our name. I'm sorry that we have to be so hesitant because the book itself deserves to be reissued, and I would personally be happy to see it published by my firm.…”

At about the same time, the head of another prominent and older New York publishing house—a citizen, by the way, who had served as foreman of a noted grand jury exposing Tammany corruption—wrote this reply:

At around the same time, the head of another well-known and established New York publishing house—a person, by the way, who had been the foreman of a famous grand jury that uncovered Tammany corruption—wrote this reply:

“I have given due consideration, with my partners, to the suggestion you are so kind to submit to us in regard to the publication of a new edition of The History of Tammany Hall brought down to date.… I must report that our judgment is adverse to the desirability of[xv] reissuing such a book with the imprint of our house. I should be individually interested in obtaining a copy for my own library in case you may be able to secure for the work a satisfactory arrangement with some other house.”

“I have carefully considered, along with my partners, the suggestion you kindly submitted regarding releasing a new edition of The History of Tammany Hall updated to the present day.… I must inform you that we believe it’s not a good idea to reissue this book under our publisher’s name. Personally, I would be interested in getting a copy for my own library if you can find a suitable arrangement with another publisher.”

An equally well-known New York publishing house sent this declination: “We have looked over with interest The History of Tammany Hall, which you were good enough to submit to us, but are sorry to say that after a careful examination we are unable to persuade ourselves that we could successfully undertake its publication.” The head of still another old-established New York publishing house wrote, on March 4, 1913, a long apologetic letter giving his reasons for not caring to undertake the publication of the work, the principal of those reasons being the plea that there was not sufficient prospect of gain “to compensate for some of the unpleasantness its publishers would have to endure.” Yet a year later a magazine published by this identical house contained a laudatory reference to “Myers’s excellent History of Tammany Hall.”

An equally well-known New York publishing house sent this rejection: “We have reviewed The History of Tammany Hall, which you kindly submitted to us, but we regret to inform you that after careful consideration, we don’t believe we can successfully publish it.” The head of another long-standing New York publishing house wrote a lengthy apologetic letter on March 4, 1913, explaining his reasons for not wanting to take on the publication of the work, the main reason being that there wasn’t enough potential profit “to justify some of the discomfort that its publishers would have to face.” Yet, a year later, a magazine published by this same house included a positive mention of “Myers’s excellent History of Tammany Hall.”

On April 10, 1913, Mr. Baird wrote to a prominent Boston publishing house. “Before offering the book,” Mr. Baird wrote in part, “I want to tell you frankly that it has been turned down by other publishers, not because of any lack of excellence or authenticity, but simply because, as several of the publishers have frankly acknowledged, they ‘are afraid of reprisals from Tammany Hall.’

On April 10, 1913, Mr. Baird wrote to a well-known publishing house in Boston. “Before presenting the book,” Mr. Baird wrote in part, “I want to be honest with you that it has been rejected by other publishers, not due to any lack of quality or authenticity, but simply because, as several of them have openly admitted, they ‘are worried about backlash from Tammany Hall.’”

“Your house has been suggested by a publisher as one which is probably not so timid as some others, and as you are located out of town you are therefore not subject to local influences, and I write to ask if you would be interested in having the publication submitted to you.

“Your house has been recommended by a publisher as one that is likely bolder than some others, and since you are based out of town, you are not influenced by local factors. I’m reaching out to see if you would be interested in having the publication sent to you.”

“I might add that I have been lecturing on this subject at the City Club and other prominent clubs in the city, and the subject itself seemed to bring out record audiences wherever the lecture was given, and it is because so many people have asked me where they can obtain copies of Mr.[xvi] Myers’s book, that I am prompted to endeavor to have a reprint of it.”

“I should mention that I've been giving lectures on this topic at the City Club and other well-known clubs in the city, and the topic itself has drawn record audiences wherever I’ve spoken. It’s because so many people have asked me where they can get copies of Mr.[xvi] Myers’s book that I feel encouraged to try to arrange for a reprint.”

The reply of the Boston publishing house was a curt declination.

The response from the Boston publishing house was a brief refusal.

Subsequently the following letter was received by the author from a prominent New York City attorney:

Subsequently, the author received the following letter from a prominent attorney in New York City:

“I have been endeavoring to purchase a copy of The History of Tammany Hall published by you, but as yet have been unable to find a copy in any of the book stores. I shall appreciate it very much if you can tell me where I can obtain a copy.

“I’ve been trying to buy a copy of The History of Tammany Hall that you published, but so far I haven’t been able to find one in any bookstores. I would really appreciate it if you could let me know where I can get a copy.”

“You may be interested to know that a few months ago a number of booksellers were given instructions to purchase and retire all outstanding copies of the book. For whose account this order was given I do not know. I am told by the booksellers that an advertisement for the book resulted in their being able to purchase only a few copies.”

“You might find it interesting that a few months ago, several booksellers were told to buy and remove all available copies of the book. I don’t know who requested this order. The booksellers have told me that an ad for the book only allowed them to purchase a few copies.”

To the present publishers the author gives all due appreciation for their unqualified recognition of the need of the publication of this work.

To the current publishers, the author expresses sincere gratitude for their complete acknowledgment of the necessity of publishing this work.

Gustavus Myers.

Gustavus Myers.

March, 1917.

March 1917.


CONTENTS

PAGE
Introduction to the First Edition (1901)v
Foreword to the Updated Edition (1917)xiii
CHAPTER I
Resistance to the Aristocracy—1789-17981
CHAPTER II
Aaron Burr in Charge—1798-180211
CHAPTER III
Tammany's Dispute with De Witt Clinton—1802-180917
CHAPTER IV
Slow recovery after disaster—1809-181529
CHAPTER V
Tammany in Total Control—1815-181737
CHAPTER VI
Clinton Keeps His Lead—1817-182047
CHAPTER VII
The Suffrage Challenge—1820-182256[xviii]
CHAPTER VIII
Challenges of the Presidential Factions—1822-182560
CHAPTER IX
The Jackson Element Wins—1825-182869
CHAPTER X
The Workers' Party—1829-183077
CHAPTER XI
Tammany and the Bank Battle—1831-183485
CHAPTER XII
The Equal Rights Party—1834-183794
CHAPTER XIII
Tammany "Cleaned Up"—1837-1838112
CHAPTER XIV
Whig Defeat Brings Tammany Back to Power—1838-1840117
CHAPTER XV
The Growth and Development of the “Gangs”—1840-1846128
CHAPTER XVI
“Barnburners” and “Hunkers”—1846-1850140
CHAPTER XVII
Loss and Win—1850-1852150
CHAPTER XVIII
“Hardshells” and “Softshells”—1852-1858161
CHAPTER XIX
A Chapter of Revelations—1853-1854167[xix]
CHAPTER XX
Fernando Wood's First Term—1854-1856174
CHAPTER XXI
Wood's Second Term—1856-1859181
CHAPTER XXII
The Civil War and Aftermath—1859-1867194
CHAPTER XXIII
The Tweed Gang—1867-1870211
CHAPTER XXIV
Tweed at Its Best—1870-1871225
CHAPTER XXV
Collapse and Spread of the "Ring"—1871-1872237
CHAPTER XXVI
Tammany Rises from the Ashes—1872-1874250
CHAPTER XXVII
John Kelly's Dictatorship—1874-1886258
CHAPTER XXVIII
The Rule of Richard Croker—1886-1897267
CHAPTER XXIX
The Rule of Richard Croker (Concluded)—1897-1901284
CHAPTER XXX
Tammany Under Remote Leadership—1901-1902290
CHAPTER XXXI
Charles F. Murphy's Rule—1902-1903299[xx]
CHAPTER XXXII
The Influence of Bribery and "Honest Graft"—1903-1905307
CHAPTER XXXIII
Murphy's Leadership Over Tammany Control—1906-1909324
CHAPTER XXXIV
Another Era of Government Corruption—1909-1911342
CHAPTER XXXV
“Chief” Murphy’s LeadershipMore Info 1912-1913356
CHAPTER XXXVI
Governor Sulzer's Impeachment and Tammany's Defeat—1913-1914375
CHAPTER XXXVII
Tammany's Current Status—1914-1917392

HISTORY OF TAMMANY HALL

Tammany Hall History

CHAPTER I
Resisting Aristocracy
1789-1798

The Society of St. Tammany, or Columbian Order, was founded on May 12, 1789, a fortnight later than the establishment of the National Government, by William Mooney.[1] “His object,” says Judah Hammond,[2] an early member of Tammany, “was to fill the country with institutions designed, and men determined, to preserve the just balance of power. His purpose was patriotic and purely republican. The constitution provided by his care contained, among other things, a solemn asseveration, which every member at his initiation was required to repeat and subscribe to, that he would sustain the State institutions and resist a consolidation of power in the general Government.”

The Society of St. Tammany, or Columbian Order, was established on May 12, 1789, two weeks after the creation of the National Government, by William Mooney.[1] “His goal,” says Judah Hammond,[2] an early member of Tammany, “was to spread institutions and gather individuals committed to maintaining the right balance of power. His aim was patriotic and completely republican. The constitution crafted under his guidance included, among other things, a serious declaration that every member was required to repeat and sign upon joining, affirming that he would support State institutions and oppose a concentration of power in the federal Government.”

Before the Revolution, societies variously known as the “Sons of Liberty” and the “Sons of St. Tammany” had been formed to aid the cause of independence. Tammany,[2] or Tamanend, was an Indian chief, of whom fanciful legends have been woven, but of whose real life little can be told. Some maintain that he lived in the neighborhood of Scranton, Pa., when William Penn arrived, and that he was present at the great council under the elm tree. His name is said to have been on Penn’s first treaty with the Indians, April 23, 1683. He is also described as a great chief of the Delaware nation, and his wigwam is said to have stood on the grounds now occupied by Princeton University. The fame of his wisdom, benevolence and love of liberty spreading to the colonists, they adopted his name for their patriotic lodges. When societies sprang up bearing the names of St. George, St. Andrew or St. David and proclaiming their fealty to King George, the Separatists dubbed Tammany a saint in ridicule of the imported saints. The Revolution over, the “Sons of Liberty” and the “Sons of St. Tammany” dissolved.

Before the Revolution, groups known as the “Sons of Liberty” and the “Sons of St. Tammany” were formed to support the independence movement. Tammany, or Tamanend, was an Indigenous chief about whom many fanciful legends exist, but little is known about his actual life. Some say he lived near Scranton, Pennsylvania, when William Penn arrived and was present at the significant council under the elm tree. His name reportedly appears on Penn’s first treaty with the Indigenous people, dated April 23, 1683. He is also described as a prominent chief of the Delaware nation, and it is said that his wigwam stood where Princeton University is now located. His reputation for wisdom, kindness, and love of freedom spread among the colonists, leading them to name their patriotic lodges after him. When groups emerged that had names like St. George, St. Andrew, or St. David and expressed loyalty to King George, the Separatists mockingly referred to Tammany as a saint in response to these imported saints. After the Revolution, both the “Sons of Liberty” and the “Sons of St. Tammany” dissolved.

The controversy over the adoption of the Federal constitution had the effect of re-uniting the patriotic lodges. The rich and influential classes favored Hamilton’s design of a republic having a President and a Senate chosen for life, and State governments elected by Congress. Opposed to this attempt toward a highly centralized government were the forces which afterward organized the Anti-Federalist party. Their leader in New York was Governor George Clinton. The greater number of the old members of the Liberty and Tammany societies, now familiarly known as “Liberty boys,” belonged to this opposition.

The debate over adopting the Federal Constitution brought together the patriotic lodges again. Wealthy and influential people supported Hamilton's vision of a republic with a President and a Senate elected for life, along with State governments chosen by Congress. Opposing this move towards a highly centralized government were the groups that later formed the Anti-Federalist party, led in New York by Governor George Clinton. Most of the old members of the Liberty and Tammany societies, now commonly called "Liberty boys," were part of this opposition.

During this agitation Hamilton managed to strengthen his party, by causing to be removed, in 1787, the political disabilities bearing upon the Tories. New York was noted for its Tories, more numerous in proportion than in any other colony, since here, under the Crown, offices were dispensed more liberally than elsewhere. In the heat of the Revolutionary War and the times immediately following it, popular indignation struck at them in severe[3] laws. In all places held by the patriot army a Tory refusing to renounce his allegiance to King George ran considerable danger not only of mob visit, but of confiscation of property, exile, imprisonment, or, in flagrant cases of adherence to the enemy, death. From 1783 to 1787 the “Liberty boys” of the Revolution, who formed the bulk of the middle and working classes, governed New York City politics. In freeing the Tories from oppressive laws, and opening political life to them, Hamilton at once secured the support of a propertied class (for many of them had succeeded in retaining their estates) numerous enough to form a balance of power and to enable him to wrest the control of the city from the “Liberty boys.”

During this turmoil, Hamilton managed to strengthen his party by getting rid of the political restrictions on the Tories in 1787. New York was known for its Tories, who were more numerous here than in any other colony, as the Crown handed out offices more freely than elsewhere. During the height of the Revolutionary War and shortly after, public outrage targeted them with harsh laws. In areas controlled by the patriot army, a Tory who refused to disavow his loyalty to King George faced serious risks, including mob attacks, confiscation of property, exile, imprisonment, or, in extreme cases of loyalty to the enemy, death. From 1783 to 1787, the “Liberty boys” of the Revolution, who made up a large part of the middle and working classes, dominated New York City politics. By relieving the Tories of oppressive laws and allowing them to participate in political life, Hamilton quickly gained the support of a wealthy class (since many had managed to keep their estates) large enough to tip the balance of power and enable him to take control of the city away from the “Liberty boys.”

The elevation to office of many of the hated, aristocratic supporters of Great Britain inflamed the minds of the “Liberty boys” and their followers, and made the chasm between the classes, already wide, yet wider. The bitterest feeling cropped out. Hamilton, put upon the defensive, took pains in his addresses to assure the people of the baselessness of the accusation that he aimed to keep the rich families in power. That result, however, had been partially assured by the State constitution of 1777. Gaging sound citizenship by the ownership of property, the draughtsmen of that instrument allowed only actual residents having freeholds to the value of £100, free of all debts, to vote for Governor, Lieutenant-Governor and State Senators, while a vote for the humbler office of Assemblyman was given only to those having freeholds of £20 in the county or paying forty shillings rent yearly. Poor soldiers who had nobly sustained the Revolutionary cause were justly embittered at being disqualified by reason of their poverty, while full political power was given to the property-owning Tories.

The rise to power of many of the despised aristocratic supporters of Great Britain fueled the anger of the "Liberty boys" and their followers, further widening the gap between the classes. Intense resentment emerged. Hamilton, feeling under attack, made a point in his speeches to reassure the public that the claim he sought to keep wealthy families in power was unfounded. However, that outcome had been partly guaranteed by the state constitution of 1777. By defining sound citizenship as ownership of property, the authors of that document allowed only actual residents with freeholds valued at £100, debt-free, to vote for Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, and State Senators, while only those with freeholds of £20 in the county or paying forty shillings rent annually could vote for the lower office of Assemblyman. Poor soldiers who had bravely fought for the Revolutionary cause were justifiably frustrated at being disqualified due to their poverty, while full political power was granted to the property-owning Tories.

“The inequality,” wrote one who lived in those days,

“The inequality,” wrote someone who lived in those days,

“was greatly added to by the social and business customs of the times.… There was an aristocracy and a democracy whose limits[4] were as clearly marked by manner and dress as by legal enactment.… The aristocracy controlled capital in trade, monopolized banks and banking privileges, which they did not hesitate to employ as a means of perpetuating their power.”

“was significantly influenced by the social and business customs of the time.… There was an aristocracy and a democracy, whose boundaries[4] were as clearly defined by behavior and fashion as by legal regulations.… The aristocracy controlled capital in trade and monopolized banks and banking privileges, which they readily used to maintain their power.”

Dr. John W. Francis tells, in his Reminiscences, of the prevalence in New York for years after the Revolution of a supercilious class that missed no opportunity of sneering at the demand for political equality made by the leather-breeched mechanic with his few shillings a day.

Dr. John W. Francis shares in his Reminiscences that in New York, years after the Revolution, there was a stuck-up class that seized every chance to mock the call for political equality from the working-class mechanic earning a few shillings a day.

Permeated with democratic doctrines, the populace detested the landed class. The founding of the Society of the Cincinnati was an additional irritant. Formed by the officers of the Continental army before disbandment, this society adopted one clause especially obnoxious to the radicals. It provided that the eldest male descendant of an original member should be entitled to wear the insignia of the order and enjoy the privileges of the society, which, it was argued, would be best perpetuated in that way. Jefferson saw a danger to the liberties of the people in this provision, since it would tend to give rise to a race of hereditary nobles, founded on the military, and breeding in turn other subordinate orders. At Washington’s suggestion the clause was modified, but an ugly feeling rankled in the public mind, due to the existence of an active party supposedly bent on the establishment of a disguised form of monarchy.

Filled with democratic beliefs, the people hated the landowners. The creation of the Society of the Cincinnati was another cause for annoyance. Established by the officers of the Continental army before they disbanded, this society included one clause that particularly angered the radicals. It stated that the oldest male descendant of an original member could wear the society's insignia and enjoy its privileges, which they argued would keep the society going in that way. Jefferson viewed this provision as a threat to people's freedoms because it could lead to a class of hereditary nobles based on military service, which would in turn create other subordinate classes. Following Washington’s suggestion, the clause was changed, but a negative sentiment lingered among the public because of an active group believed to be aiming for a hidden form of monarchy.

It was at such a juncture of movements and tendencies that the Society of St. Tammany or Columbian Order was formed. The new organization constituted a formal protest against aristocratic influences, and stood for the widest democratization in political life.

It was at a point of various movements and trends that the Society of St. Tammany, or Columbian Order, was created. The new organization was a formal protest against aristocratic influences and aimed for the broadest democratization in political life.

As a contrast to the old-world distinctions of the Cincinnati and other societies, the Tammany Society adopted aboriginal forms and usages. The officers held Indian titles. The head, or president, chosen from thirteen Sachems, corresponding to trustees, elected annually, was[5] styled Grand Sachem. In its early years the society had a custom, now obsolete, of conferring the honorary office of Kitchi Okemaw, or Great Grand Sachem, upon the President of the United States. Washington, John Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams and Jackson were hailed successively as the Great Grand Sachems of Tammany. After the Sachems came the Sagamore, or Master of Ceremonies, a Scribe, or secretary, and a Wiskinskie,[3] or doorkeeper. Instead of using the ordinary calendar designations, the society divided the year into seasons and these into moons. Its notices bore reckoning from the year Columbus discovered America, that of the Declaration of American Independence and of its own organization. Instead of inscribing: “New York, July, 1800,” there would appear: “Manhattan, Season of Fruits, Seventh Moon, Year of Discovery three hundred and eighth; of Independence twenty-fourth, and of the Institution the twelfth.” In early times the society was divided into tribes, one for each of the thirteen original States; there were the Eagle, Otter, Panther, Beaver, Bear, Tortoise, Rattlesnake, Tiger, Fox, Deer, Buffalo, Raccoon and Wolf tribes, which stood respectively for New York, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. A new member of the Tammany Society had the choice of saying to which of these tribes he cared to be attached. Frequently the members dressed in Indian garb and carried papooses in their public parades. They introduced the distinction between “long talks” and “short talks” in their public addresses. The name “Wigwam” was given to their meeting-place, and Barden’s Tavern was selected as their first home.

In contrast to the old-world distinctions of societies like Cincinnati, the Tammany Society embraced native forms and customs. The leaders had Indian titles. The head, or president, was chosen from thirteen Sachems, who were like trustees, and elected every year, and was called the Grand Sachem. In its early years, the society had a now-obsolete tradition of bestowing the honorary title of Kitchi Okemaw, or Great Grand Sachem, upon the President of the United States. Washington, John Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Jackson were each celebrated as the Great Grand Sachems of Tammany. Below the Sachems were the Sagamore, or Master of Ceremonies, a Scribe, or secretary, and a Wiskinskie, or doorkeeper. Instead of using regular calendar terms, the society divided the year into seasons and those into moons. Their notices counted from the year Columbus discovered America, the year of the Declaration of Independence, and the year they were formed. Instead of saying, “New York, July, 1800,” it would state: “Manhattan, Season of Fruits, Seventh Moon, Year of Discovery three hundred and eighth; of Independence twenty-fourth, and of the Institution the twelfth.” In its early days, the society was split into tribes, one for each of the thirteen original states; these were the Eagle, Otter, Panther, Beaver, Bear, Tortoise, Rattlesnake, Tiger, Fox, Deer, Buffalo, Raccoon, and Wolf tribes, representing New York, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, respectively. A new member of the Tammany Society could choose which of these tribes he wanted to join. Often, members would dress in Indian attire and carry papooses during their public parades. They also introduced the distinction between “long talks” and “short talks” in their speeches. Their meeting place was called the “Wigwam,” and Barden’s Tavern was chosen as their first home.

At the initiation of the Grand Sachem a song beginning, “Brothers, Our Council Fire Shines Bright, et-hoh!”[6] was sung, and at the initiation of a member another song was sung, beginning:

At the start of the Grand Sachem, a song that began, “Brothers, Our Council Fire Shines Bright, et-hoh!”[6] was sung, and when a member was initiated, another song was sung, starting:

“Sacred’s the ground where Freedom’s found,
And Virtue stamps her Name.”

The society contemplated founding a chain of Tammany societies over the country, and accordingly designated itself as Tammany Society, No. 1. A number sprang into life, but only a few—those in Philadelphia, Providence, Brooklyn and Lexington, Ky., continued for any time, and even these disappeared about the year 1818 or a few years later.

The society considered setting up a network of Tammany societies across the country, so it named itself Tammany Society, No. 1. Several others were established, but only a few—those in Philadelphia, Providence, Brooklyn, and Lexington, KY—lasted for any significant time, and even they faded away around 1818 or a few years later.

The society showed its Indian ceremonies to advantage and gained much prestige by aiding in the conciliation of the Creek Indians. After useless attempts to make a treaty with them, the Government undertook, as a last resort, in February, 1790, to influence Alexander McGillivray, their half-breed chief, to visit New York, where he might be induced to sign a treaty. To Col. Marinus Willett, a brave soldier of the Revolution, and later Mayor of New York City, the mission was intrusted. In July, 1790, Willett started North accompanied by McGillivray and twenty-eight Creek chiefs and warriors. Upon their arrival in New York, then the seat of the National Government, the members of the Tammany Society, in full Indian costume, welcomed them. One phase of the tale has it that the Creeks set up a wild whoop, at whose terrifying sound the Tammany make-believe red-faces fled in dismay. Another version tells that the Tammany Society and the military escorted the Indians to Secretary Knox’s house, introduced them to Washington and then led them to the Wigwam at Barden’s Tavern, where seductive drink was served. On August 2 the Creeks were entertained at a Tammany banquet. A treaty was signed on August 13.

The society showcased its Indian ceremonies effectively and gained significant prestige by helping to smooth relations with the Creek Indians. After unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a treaty with them, the Government decided, as a last resort, in February 1790, to persuade Alexander McGillivray, their mixed-race chief, to come to New York, where he could be convinced to sign a treaty. The mission was entrusted to Col. Marinus Willett, a courageous soldier from the Revolution and later the Mayor of New York City. In July 1790, Willett headed north with McGillivray and twenty-eight Creek chiefs and warriors. Upon arriving in New York, which was then the center of the National Government, the members of the Tammany Society, dressed in full Indian attire, greeted them. One version of the story claims that the Creeks let out a wild whoop that scared the Tammany Society members dressed up as Indians, causing them to flee in terror. Another account mentions that the Tammany Society and the military escorted the Indians to Secretary Knox’s house, introduced them to Washington, and then brought them to the Wigwam at Barden’s Tavern, where they were served enticing drinks. On August 2, the Creeks were treated to a Tammany banquet. A treaty was signed on August 13.

In June of the same year Tammany had established, in the old City Hall, a museum “for the preservation of Indian relics.” For a brief while the society devoted[7] itself with assiduity to this department, but the practical men grew tired of it. On June 25, 1795, the museum was given over to Gardiner Baker, its curator, on condition that it was to be known for all time as the Tammany Museum and that each member of the society and his family were to have entrance free. Baker dying, the museum eventually passed into the hands of a professional museum-owner.

In June of that year, Tammany set up a museum in the old City Hall "to preserve Indian relics." For a short time, the society dedicated itself to this mission, but the practical members soon lost interest. On June 25, 1795, the museum was handed over to Gardiner Baker, its curator, with the stipulation that it would always be known as the Tammany Museum and that every member and their family would have free access. After Baker passed away, the museum eventually came under the management of a professional museum owner.

Tammany’s chief functions at first seem to have been the celebration of its anniversary day, May 12; the Fourth of July and Evacuation Day. The society’s parades were events in old New York. On May 12, 1789, the day of organization, two marquees were built two miles above the city, whither the Tammany brethren went to hold their banquet. Thirteen discharges of cannon followed each toast. The first one read: “May Honor, Virtue and Patriotism ever be the distinguishing characteristics of the sons of St. Tammany.” John Pintard,[4] Tammany’s first Sagamore, wrote an account[5] of the society’s celebration of May 12, 1791. “The day,” he says,

Tammany’s main activities initially appeared to be celebrating its anniversary on May 12, Independence Day, and Evacuation Day. The society’s parades were significant events in old New York. On May 12, 1789, the day it was founded, two tents were set up two miles outside the city, where the Tammany members gathered for their banquet. Thirteen cannon shots were fired after each toast. The first toast said, “May Honor, Virtue, and Patriotism always be the defining qualities of the sons of St. Tammany.” John Pintard,[4] Tammany’s first Sagamore, wrote a description[5] of the society’s celebration on May 12, 1791. “The day,” he notes,

“was ushered in by a Federal salute from the battery and welcomed by a discharge of 13 guns from the brig Grand Sachem, lying in the stream. The society assembled at the great Wigwam, in Broad street, five hours after the rising of the sun, and was conducted from there in an elegant procession to the brick meeting house in Beekman street. Before them was borne the cap of liberty; after following seven hunters in Tammanial dress, then the great standard of the society, in the rear of which was the Grand Sachem and other officers. On either side of these were formed the members in tribes, each headed by its standard bearers and Sachem in full dress. At the brick meeting house an oration was delivered by their brother, Josiah Ogden Hoffman, to the society and to a most respectable and crowded audience. In the most brilliant and pathetic language he traced the origin of the Columbian Order and the Society of the Cincinnati. From the meeting house the procession proceeded (as before) to Campbell’s[8] grounds, where upwards of two hundred people partook of a handsome and plentiful repast. The dinner was honored by his Excellency [George Clinton] and many of the most respectable citizens.”

“was announced with a Federal salute from the battery and welcomed by a discharge of 13 guns from the brig Grand Sachem, which was anchored in the stream. The society gathered at the great Wigwam on Broad Street, five hours after sunrise, and then paraded in an elegant procession to the brick meeting house on Beekman Street. Carrying the cap of liberty in front, they followed seven hunters in Tammanial attire, with the society's great standard behind them, where the Grand Sachem and other officers marched. On either side were the members organized into tribes, each led by their standard bearers and Sachem in full dress. At the brick meeting house, their brother, Josiah Ogden Hoffman, delivered a speech to the society and a large, respectable audience. In eloquent and moving language, he recounted the origins of the Columbian Order and the Society of the Cincinnati. After the meeting house, the procession continued as before to Campbell’s[8] grounds, where over two hundred people enjoyed a generous and plentiful meal. The dinner was graced by his Excellency [George Clinton] and many of the most respected citizens.”

The toasts, that now seem so quaint, mirror the spirit of the diners. “The Grand Sachem of the Thirteen United Fires,” ran the first, “may his declining sun be precious in the sight of the Great Spirit that the mild luster of his departing beams may prove no less glorious than the effulgence of the rising or transcendent splendor of his meridian greatness.” The second: “The head men and chiefs of the Grand Council of the Thirteen United Fires—may they convince our foes not only of their courage to lift, prudence to direct and clemency to withhold the hatchet, but of their power to inflict it in their country’s cause.”

The toasts, which now seem so old-fashioned, reflect the spirit of the diners. “The Grand Sachem of the Thirteen United Fires,” began the first, “may his setting sun be cherished in the eyes of the Great Spirit so that the gentle glow of his fading light may be just as magnificent as the brightness of the rising sun or the shining glory of his peak greatness.” The second toast: “The leaders and chiefs of the Grand Council of the Thirteen United Fires—may they prove to our enemies not just their bravery to fight, wisdom to lead, and mercy to spare the hatchet, but also their ability to use it in defense of their country.”

Up to 1835, at least, toasts were an important feature in public dinners, as they were supposed to disclose the sentiments, political or otherwise, of the person or body from whom they came. In this fashion the Tammany Society announced its instant sympathy with the French Revolution in all its stages. On May 12, 1793, the sixth toast read: “Success to the Armies of France, and Wisdom, Concord and Firmness to the Convention.” “The first sentence was hardly articulated,” a newspaper[6] records, “when as one the whole company arose and gave three cheers, continued by roars of applause for several minutes; the toast was then given in whole and the applauses reiterated.”

Up until 1835, toasts were a significant part of public dinners because they were meant to express the feelings, whether political or otherwise, of the person or group who proposed them. In this way, the Tammany Society showed its immediate support for the French Revolution at all its stages. On May 12, 1793, the sixth toast stated: “Success to the Armies of France, and Wisdom, Unity, and Determination to the Convention.” “The first sentence was barely finished,” a newspaper[6] reports, “when as one the entire company stood up and cheered three times, followed by loud applause for several minutes; the toast was then fully repeated, and the applause continued."

At ten o’clock that morning, the same account relates, “the society had assembled at Tammanial Hall, in Broad street, and marched to St. Paul’s Church, where Brother Cadwallader D. Colden delivered to a crowded and brilliant audience an animated talk on the excellence of the Government and situation of the United States when contrasted with those of despotic countries.” In the procession[9] were about 400 members in civilian dress. From each hat flowed a bucktail—the symbol of Liberty—and the standard and cap of Liberty were carried in front of the line. From the church “the Tammanials went to their Hall, where some 150 of them partook of an elegant dinner.”

At ten o’clock that morning, the same account says, “the society gathered at Tammanial Hall on Broad Street and marched to St. Paul’s Church, where Brother Cadwallader D. Colden gave an engaging speech to a packed and impressive audience about the superiority of the Government and the status of the United States compared to despotic countries.” In the procession[9] were about 400 members dressed in civilian clothes. From each hat flowed a bucktail—the symbol of Liberty—and the standard and cap of Liberty were carried at the front of the line. After the church, “the Tammanials went to their Hall, where around 150 of them enjoyed an elegant dinner.”

Public feeling ran high in discussing the French Revolution, and there were many personal collisions. The Tammany Society was in the vanguard of the American sympathizers and bore the brunt of abuse. The pamphlets and newspapers were filled with anonymous threats from both sides. “An Oneida Chief” writes in the New York Journal and Patriotic Register, June 8, 1793:

Public sentiment was intense when discussing the French Revolution, leading to many personal conflicts. The Tammany Society was at the forefront of American supporters and took the most criticism. The pamphlets and newspapers were filled with anonymous threats from both sides. “An Oneida Chief” writes in the New York Journal and Patriotic Register, June 8, 1793:

“A Hint to the Whigs of New York: To hear our Brethren of France vilified (with all that low Scurrility of which their enemies the English are so well stocked) in our streets and on the wharves; nay, in our new and elegant Coffee House; but more particularly in that den of ingrates, called Belvidere Club House, where at this very moment those enemies to liberty are swallowing potent draughts to the destruction and annihilation of Liberty, Equality and the Rights of Man, is not to be borne by freemen and I am fully of opinion that if some method is not adopted to suppress such daring and presumptuous insults, a band of determined Mohawks, Oneidas and Senekas will take upon themselves that necessary duty.”

“A Hint to the Whigs of New York: It's infuriating to hear our friends from France insulted (with all the low insults that their enemies, the English, are so full of) in our streets and at the docks; even in our new and fancy Coffee House; but especially in that ungrateful place, the Belvidere Club House, where right now those enemies of liberty are drinking heavily to the destruction and annihilation of Liberty, Equality and the Rights of Man. This is unacceptable for free people, and I strongly believe that if we don't find a way to stop such bold and arrogant insults, a group of determined Mohawks, Oneidas, and Senecas will take it upon themselves to do what needs to be done.”

There is no record of the carrying out of this threat.

There’s no record of this threat being acted upon.

Despite its original composition of men of both parties, the Tammany Society drifted year by year into being the principal upholder of the doctrines of which Jefferson was the chief exponent. Toward the end of Washington’s administration political feelings developed into violent party divisions, and the Tammany Society became largely Anti-Federalist, or Republican, the Federalist members either withdrawing or being reduced to a harmless minority. It toasted the Republican leaders vociferously to show the world its sympathies and principles. On May 12, 1796, the glasses ascended to “Citizen” Thomas Jefferson, whose name was received with three cheers, and to “Citizen” Edward Livingston, for whom nine cheers were[10] given. “The people,” ran one toast, “may they ever at the risk of life and liberty support their equal rights in opposition to Ambition, Tyranny, to Sophistry and Deception, to Bribery and Corruption and to an enthusiastic fondness and implicit confidence in their fellow-fallible mortals.”

Despite being originally made up of men from both parties, the Tammany Society gradually became the main supporter of the beliefs that Jefferson strongly represented. Toward the end of Washington’s administration, political feelings grew into intense party divisions, and the Tammany Society mainly aligned with the Anti-Federalists or Republicans, with Federalist members either leaving or becoming a non-threatening minority. It loudly toasted the Republican leaders to express its sympathies and principles. On May 12, 1796, the glasses were raised to “Citizen” Thomas Jefferson, whose name received three cheers, and to “Citizen” Edward Livingston, who was honored with nine cheers. “The people,” read one toast, “may they always, even at the risk of life and liberty, defend their equal rights against Ambition, Tyranny, Sophistry and Deception, Bribery and Corruption, and against an enthusiastic love and blind faith in their fellow fallible humans.”

Tammany had become, by 1796-97, a powerful and an extremely partizan body. But it came near being snuffed out of existence in the last year of Washington’s presidency. Judah Hammond writes that when Washington, before the close of his second term,

Tammany had become, by 1796-97, a powerful and extremely partisan group. But it almost got wiped out in the last year of Washington’s presidency. Judah Hammond writes that when Washington, before the end of his second term,

“rebuked self-creative societies from an apprehension that their ultimate tendency would be hostile to the public tranquillity, the members of Tammany supposed their institution to be included in the reproof, and they almost all forsook it. The founder, William Mooney, and a few others continued steadfast. At one anniversary they were reduced so low that but three persons attended its festival.[7] From this time it became a political institution and took ground with Thomas Jefferson.”

“Criticizing self-creative societies out of fear that they would eventually threaten public peace, the members of Tammany believed they were part of this criticism, and most of them abandoned it. The founder, William Mooney, and a few others remained loyal. At one anniversary, attendance dropped so low that only three people showed up for the celebration.[7] From then on, it became a political organization and aligned itself with Thomas Jefferson.”

To such straits was driven the society which, a short time after, secured absolute control of New York City, and which has held that grasp, with but few and brief intermissions, ever since. The contrast between that sorry festival, with its trio of lonesome celebrators, and the Tammany Society of a few years afterwards presents one of the most striking pictures in American politics.

To such extremes was the society pushed that, shortly after, it gained full control of New York City, a hold it has mostly maintained since then, with only a few brief breaks. The difference between that pitiful celebration, with its trio of lonely participants, and the Tammany Society a few years later shows one of the most striking images in American politics.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Mooney was an ex-soldier, who at this time kept a small upholstery shop at 23 Nassau street. He was charged with having deserted the American Army, September 16, 1776, and with joining the British forces in New York, where for a year he wore the King’s uniform. The truth or falsity of this charge cannot be ascertained.

[1] Mooney was a former soldier who, at the time, ran a small upholstery shop on 23 Nassau Street. He was accused of deserting the American Army on September 16, 1776, and of joining the British forces in New York, where he wore the King’s uniform for a year. Whether this accusation is true or false cannot be determined.

[2] Hammond, Political History of the State of New York, Vol. I, p. 341.

[2] Hammond, Political History of the State of New York, Vol. I, p. 341.

[3] So spelled in all the earlier records. Later, the s in the penultimate syllable came to be dropped.

[3] This is how it was spelled in all the earlier records. Later on, the s in the second-to-last syllable was dropped.

[4] John Pintard was one of the founders of the New York Historical Society, the Academy of Design and other institutions. He was a very rich man at one time, but subsequently failed in business.

[4] John Pintard was one of the founders of the New York Historical Society, the Academy of Design, and other organizations. He was once a very wealthy man, but later faced business failure.

[5] Dunlap’s American Daily Register, May 16, 1791.

[5] Dunlap’s American Daily Register, May 16, 1791.

[6] New York Journal and Patriotic Register, May 15, 1793.

[6] New York Journal and Patriotic Register, May 15, 1793.

[7] This statement of Hammond probably refers to May 12, 1797.

[7] This statement from Hammond likely points to May 12, 1797.


CHAPTER II
AARON BURR IN CHARGE
1798-1802

The second period of the Tammany Society began about 1798. Relieved of its Federalist members, it became purely partizan. As yet it was not an “organization,” in the modern political sense; it did not seek the enrollment and regimentation of voters. Its nature was more that of a private political club, which sought to influence elections by speeches, pamphlets and social means. It shifted its quarters from Barden’s Tavern to the “Long Room,” a place kept by a sometime Sachem, Abraham or “Brom” Martling,[1] at the corner of Nassau and Spruce streets. This Wigwam was a forlorn, one-story wooden building attached to Martling’s Tavern, near, or partly overlapping, the spot where subsequently Tammany Hall erected its first building—recently the Sun newspaper building. No larger than a good-sized room the Wigwam was contemptuously styled by the Federalists “the Pig Pen.” In that year New York City had only 58,000 inhabitants. The Wigwam stood on the very outskirts of the city. But it formed a social rendezvous very popular with the “Bucktails” of the time. Every night men gathered there to drink, smoke and “swap” stories. Fitz-Greene Halleck has written of a later time:

The second period of the Tammany Society started around 1798. After losing its Federalist members, it became strictly partisan. At that time, it wasn’t an “organization” in the modern political sense; it didn’t aim to enroll and manage voters. Instead, it resembled a private political club that aimed to influence elections through speeches, pamphlets, and social activities. It moved from Barden’s Tavern to the “Long Room,” a place run by a former Sachem, Abraham or “Brom” Martling,[1] at the corner of Nassau and Spruce streets. This Wigwam was a shabby, one-story wooden building connected to Martling’s Tavern, near or partly overlapping the site where Tammany Hall later built its first building—now the site of the Sun newspaper building. It was about the size of a decent-sized room and was derisively called “the Pig Pen” by the Federalists. At that time, New York City had only 58,000 residents. The Wigwam was located on the very edge of the city. However, it became a favorite social spot for the “Bucktails” of the era. Every night, men would gather there to drink, smoke, and exchange stories. Fitz-Greene Halleck wrote about a later time:

“There’s a barrel of porter at Tammany Hall,
And the Bucktails are swigging it all the night long;
In the time of my boyhood ’twas pleasant to call
For a seat and cigar mid the jovial throng.”

This social custom was begun early in the life of the society, and was maintained for several decades.

This social custom started early in the society's existence and continued for several decades.

Aaron Burr was the first real leader of the Tammany Society. He was never Grand Sachem or even Sachem; it is doubtful whether he ever set foot in the Wigwam; it is known that it was never his habit to attend caucuses; but he controlled the society through his friends and protégés. The transition of Tammany from an effusive, speech-making society to an active political club was mainly through his instrumentality. Mooney[2] was a mediocre man, delighting in extravagant language and Indian ceremonials, and was merely a tool in the hands of far abler men. “Burr was our chief,”[3] said Matthew L. Davis, Burr’s friend and biographer, and several times Grand Sachem of the society.

Aaron Burr was the first true leader of the Tammany Society. He was never Grand Sachem or even Sachem; it’s unclear if he ever went to the Wigwam; and it’s a fact that he rarely attended meetings. However, he managed the society through his friends and protégés. The shift of Tammany from a talkative, speech-making group to an active political club mostly happened because of him. Mooney[2] was an average guy who loved fancy language and Indian rituals, and he was just a puppet for much more capable men. “Burr was our chief,”[3] stated Matthew L. Davis, Burr’s friend and biographer, who also served several times as Grand Sachem of the society.

Davis’s influence on the early career of Tammany was second only to that of Burr himself. He was reputed to be the originator of the time-honored modes of manufacturing public opinion, carrying primary meetings, obtaining the nomination of certain candidates, carrying a ward, a city, a county or even a State. During one period of his activity, it is related, meetings were held on different nights in every ward in New York City. The most forcible and spirited resolutions and addresses were passed and published. Not only the city, but the entire country, was aroused. It was some time before the secret was known—that at each of these meetings but three persons were present, Davis and two friends.

Davis's impact on Tammany's early career was only surpassed by Burr himself. He was known to be the pioneer of the traditional methods of shaping public opinion, organizing primary meetings, securing nominations for specific candidates, and controlling a ward, a city, a county, or even a state. During one phase of his activity, it’s said that meetings were held on different nights in every ward across New York City. The most powerful and energetic resolutions and speeches were passed and published. Not only the city but the entire country was stirred up. It took a while before the secret came out—that at each of these meetings, only three people were present: Davis and two friends.

Though Davis was credited with the authorship of these methods, it is not so certain that he did not receive his lessons[13] from Burr. Besides Davis, Burr’s chief protégés, all of whom became persons of importance in early New York, were Jacob Barker, John and Robert Swartwout, John and William P. Van Ness; Benjamin Romaine, Isaac Pierson, John P. Haff and Jacob Hayes.[4] When Burr was in disgrace William P. Van Ness, at that time the patron of the law student Martin Van Buren, wrote a long pamphlet defending him. At the time of his duel with Hamilton these men supported him. They made Tammany his machine; and it is clear that they were attached to him sincerely, for long after his trial for treason, Tammany Hall, under their influence, tried unsuccessfully to restore him to some degree of political power. Burr controlled Tammany Hall from 1797 until even after his fall. From then on to about 1835 his protégés either controlled it or were its influential men. The phrase, “the old Burr faction still active,” is met with as late as 1832, and the Burrites were a considerable factor in politics for several years thereafter. Nearly every one of the Burr leaders, as will be shown, was guilty of some act of official or private peculation.

Though Davis was credited with creating these methods, it’s not entirely certain that he didn’t learn from Burr. Besides Davis, Burr’s main protégés, all of whom became significant figures in early New York, included Jacob Barker, John and Robert Swartwout, John and William P. Van Ness, Benjamin Romaine, Isaac Pierson, John P. Haff, and Jacob Hayes.[4] When Burr was in disgrace, William P. Van Ness, who was then supporting law student Martin Van Buren, wrote a lengthy pamphlet defending him. During his duel with Hamilton, these men stood by him. They turned Tammany into his political machine, and it’s clear they were genuinely loyal to him because long after his treason trial, Tammany Hall, under their influence, unsuccessfully tried to restore him to some level of political power. Burr led Tammany Hall from 1797 even after his decline. From then until about 1835, his protégés either ran it or held significant positions within it. The term “the old Burr faction still active” was still found as late as 1832, and the Burrites were an important force in politics for several years after that. Almost all of the Burr leaders, as will be shown, were involved in some form of official or private corruption.

These were the men Burr used in changing the character of the Tammany Society. The leader and his satellites were quite content to have the Tammany rank and file parade in Indian garb and use savage ceremonies; such forms gave the people an idea of pristine simplicity which was a good enough cloak for election scheming. Audacious to a degree and working through others, Burr was exceedingly adroit. One of his most important moves was the chartering of the Manhattan Bank. Without this institution Tammany would have been quite ineffective. In those days banks had a mightier influence over politics than is now thought. New York had only one bank, and that one was violently Federalist. Its affairs were administered[14] always with a view to contributing to Federalist success. The directors loaned money to their personal and party friends with gross partiality and for questionable purposes. If a merchant dared help the opposite party or offended the directors he was taught to repent his independence by a rejection of his paper when he most needed cash.

These were the guys Burr relied on to change the Tammany Society's image. The leader and his followers were perfectly fine with having the Tammany members dress up in Indian outfits and use primitive rituals; these acts gave people a sense of untouched simplicity that effectively masked their election strategies. Bold and indirect, Burr was incredibly skilled. One of his key moves was establishing the Manhattan Bank. Without this bank, Tammany would have been pretty ineffective. Back then, banks had a much greater influence on politics than we realize now. New York had only one bank, and it was strongly Federalist. Its activities were always managed with an eye on promoting Federalist interests. The directors lent money to their friends and party allies with blatant favoritism and for dubious reasons. If a merchant dared to support the rival party or upset the directors, he quickly learned the consequences of his independence when his loans were rejected exactly when he needed cash the most.

Burr needed this means of monopoly and favoritism to make his political machine complete, as well as to amass funds. He, therefore, had introduced into the Legislature (1799) a bill, apparently for the purpose of diminishing the future possibility of yellow fever in New York City, incorporating a company, styled the Manhattan Company, to supply pure, wholesome water. Supposing the charter granted nothing more than this, the legislators passed it. They were much surprised later to hear that it contained a carefully worded clause vesting the Manhattan Company with banking powers.[5] The Manhattan Bank speedily adopted the prevailing partizan tactics.

Burr needed this way of gaining control and favoritism to strengthen his political machine and gather funds. So, he introduced a bill in the Legislature (1799) that seemed aimed at reducing the chances of yellow fever in New York City, creating a company called the Manhattan Company to provide clean, safe water. Thinking the charter allowed nothing more than this, the lawmakers approved it. They were quite surprised later to find out that it included a carefully crafted clause giving the Manhattan Company banking powers.[5] The Manhattan Bank quickly adopted the prevailing partisan tactics.

The campaign of 1800 was full of personal and party bitterness and was contested hotly. To evade the election laws disqualifying the poor, and working to the advantage of the Federalists, Tammany had recourse to artifice. Poor Republicans, being unable individually to meet the property qualification, clubbed together and bought property. On the three election days[6] Hamilton made speeches at the polls for the Federalists, and Burr directed political affairs for the Republicans. Tammany used every influence, social and political, to carry the city for Jefferson.

The 1800 campaign was filled with personal and party animosity and was fiercely contested. To get around the election laws that disqualified the poor, which favored the Federalists, Tammany Resorted to trickery. Poor Republicans, unable to meet the property requirement on their own, teamed up and purchased property together. On the three election days[6] Hamilton gave speeches at the polls for the Federalists while Burr managed political strategy for the Republicans. Tammany leveraged all kinds of social and political influence to ensure Jefferson won the city.

Assemblymen then were not elected by wards, but in bulk, the Legislature in turn selecting the Presidential[15] electors. The Republican Assembly candidates in New York City were elected[7] by a majority of one, the vote of a butcher, Thomas Winship, being the decisive ballot. The Legislature selected Republican electors. This threw the Presidential contest into the House of Representatives, insuring Jefferson’s success. Though Burr was the choice of the Tammany chiefs, Jefferson was a favored second. Tammany claimed to have brought about the result; and the claim was generally allowed.[8]

Assembly members back then weren't elected by specific districts, but as a whole, with the Legislature choosing the presidential [15] electors. In New York City, the Republican Assembly candidates were elected[7] by a majority of one, with the decisive vote coming from a butcher named Thomas Winship. The Legislature then chose Republican electors, which shifted the presidential election to the House of Representatives, ensuring Jefferson's victory. Although Burr was the preferred choice of the Tammany leaders, Jefferson was a popular second option. Tammany claimed responsibility for the outcome, and this assertion was widely accepted.[8]

The success of the Republicans in 1800 opened new possibilities to the members of the Tammany Society. Jefferson richly rewarded some of them with offices. In 1801 they advanced their sway further. The society had declared that one of its objects was the repeal of the odious election laws. For the present, however, it schemed to circumvent them. The practise of the previous year of the collective buying of property to meet the voting qualifications was continued. Under the society’s encouragement, and with money probably furnished by it, thirty-nine poor Republicans in November, 1801, bought a house and lot of ground in the Fifth Ward. Their votes turned the ward election. The thirty-nine were mainly penniless students and mechanics; among them were such men as Daniel D. Tompkins, future Governor of New York and Vice-President of the United States; Richard Riker, coming Recorder of New York City; William P. Van Ness, United States Judge to be, Teunis Wortman, William[16] A. Davis, Robert Swartwout and John L. Broome, all of whom became men of power.

The success of the Republicans in 1800 opened new opportunities for the members of the Tammany Society. Jefferson rewarded some of them with positions. In 1801, they strengthened their influence even more. The society had stated that one of its goals was to repeal the unfair election laws. For now, though, it planned to work around them. They continued the practice from the previous year of collectively buying property to meet voting qualifications. With encouragement from the society, and likely funding from it, thirty-nine poor Republicans bought a house and lot in the Fifth Ward in November 1801. Their votes swung the ward election. The thirty-nine were mainly broke students and tradespeople; among them were Daniel D. Tompkins, who would become Governor of New York and Vice-President of the United States; Richard Riker, who would be Recorder of New York City; William P. Van Ness, who would become a United States Judge; Teunis Wortman, William A. Davis, Robert Swartwout, and John L. Broome, all of whom became influential figures.

The result in the Fifth Ward, and in the Fourth Ward, where seventy Tammany votes had been secured through the joint purchase of a house and lot at 50 Dey street, gave the society a majority in the Common Council.[9] The Federalist Aldermen decided to throw out these votes, as being against the spirit of the law, and to seat their own party candidates. The Republican Mayor, Edward Livingston, who presided over the deliberations, maintained that he had a right to vote.[10] His vote made a tie. The Tammany, or Republican, men were arbitrarily seated, upon which, on December 14, 1801, eight Federalists seceded to prevent a quorum;[11] they did not return until the following March.

The outcome in the Fifth Ward and the Fourth Ward, where seventy Tammany votes were obtained through the joint purchase of a house and lot at 50 Dey Street, gave the society a majority in the Common Council.[9] The Federalist Aldermen decided to reject these votes, claiming they went against the spirit of the law, and to seat their own party candidates. The Republican Mayor, Edward Livingston, who led the discussions, argued that he had the right to vote.[10] His vote created a tie. The Tammany, or Republican, members were unfairly seated, which led to eight Federalists leaving on December 14, 1801, to avoid a quorum;[11] they did not return until the following March.

The Tammany Society members, or as they were called until 1813 or 1814, the Martling Men (from their meeting place), soon had a far more interesting task than fighting Federalists. This was the long, bitter warfare, extending over twenty-six years, which they waged against De Witt Clinton, one of the ablest politicians New York has known, and remembered by a grateful posterity as the creator of the Erie Canal.

The members of the Tammany Society, formerly known as the Martling Men until 1813 or 1814 (named after their meeting place), soon found themselves engaged in a much more captivating challenge than battling Federalists. This was the long, intense conflict, lasting twenty-six years, that they fought against De Witt Clinton, one of the most skilled politicians in New York's history, who is remembered by a thankful future as the person who created the Erie Canal.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Martling was several times elected a Sachem. Like most of the Republican politicians of the day he had a habit of settling his disputes in person. Taking offense, one day, at the remarks of one John Richard Huggins, a hair-dresser, he called at Huggins’s shop, 104 Broadway, and administered to him a sound thrashing with a rope. When he grew old Tammany took care of him by appointing him to an obscure office (Keeper of the City Hall).

[1] Martling was elected a Sachem several times. Like many Republican politicians of his time, he preferred to settle his arguments face-to-face. One day, he took offense at the comments of John Richard Huggins, a hairdresser, and went to Huggins’s shop at 104 Broadway, where he gave him a serious beating with a rope. As he got older, Tammany looked after him by appointing him to a low-profile position (Keeper of the City Hall).

[2] Mooney was a life-long admirer of Burr, but was ill-requited in his friendship. At Mooney’s death, in 1831, a heap of unpaid bills for goods charged to Burr was found.

[2] Mooney was a lifelong fan of Burr, but he didn’t get the same level of friendship in return. When Mooney passed away in 1831, a stack of unpaid bills for items charged to Burr was discovered.

[3] American Citizen, July 18, 1809.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ American Citizen, July 18, 1809.

[4] Hayes, as High Constable of the city from 1800 to 1850, was a character in old New York. He was so devoted to Burr that he named his second son for him.

[4] Hayes, who served as the High Constable of the city from 1800 to 1850, was a notable figure in old New York. He was so dedicated to Burr that he named his second son after him.

[5] Hammond, Vol. I, pp. 129-30.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Hammond, Vol. 1, pp. 129-30.

[6] Until 1840 three days were required for elections in the city and State. In the earlier period ballots were invariably written. The first one-day election held in the city was that of April 14, 1840. For the rest of the State, however, the change from three-day elections was not made until several years later.

[6] Until 1840, elections in the city and state took three days. Back then, ballots were always handwritten. The first one-day election in the city occurred on April 14, 1840. However, the rest of the state didn't switch from three-day elections until several years later.

[7] During the greater part of the first quarter of the century members of the Legislature, Governor and certain other State officers were elected in April, the Aldermen being elected in November.

[7] For most of the first quarter of the century, members of the Legislature, the Governor, and some other State officials were elected in April, while the Aldermen were elected in November.

[8] Shortly after Jefferson’s inauguration Matthew L. Davis called upon the President at Washington and talked in a boastful spirit of the immense influence New York had exerted, telling Jefferson that his elevation was brought about solely by the power and management of the Tammany Society. Jefferson listened. Then reaching out his hand and catching a large fly, he requested Davis to note the remarkable disproportion in size between one portion of the insect and its body. The hint was not lost on Davis, who, though not knowing whether Jefferson referred to New York or to him, ceased to talk on the subject.

[8] Shortly after Jefferson’s inauguration, Matthew L. Davis visited the President in Washington and proudly talked about the huge influence New York had, claiming that Jefferson's rise to power was entirely due to the Tammany Society’s efforts. Jefferson listened patiently. Then, he reached out, caught a large fly, and asked Davis to notice the striking difference in size between one part of the insect and its body. Davis understood the implication, although he wasn’t sure if Jefferson was talking about New York or him, and he stopped discussing the topic.

[9] The Common Council from 1730 to 1830 consisted of Aldermen and Assistant Aldermen, sitting as one board. The terms “Board of Aldermen” and “Common Council” are used interchangeably.

[9] The Common Council from 1730 to 1830 was made up of Aldermen and Assistant Aldermen, sitting as one board. The terms “Board of Aldermen” and “Common Council” are used in the same way.

[10] Ms. Minutes of the Common Council, Vol. 13, pp. 351-52.

[10] Ms. Minutes of the Common Council, Vol. 13, pp. 351-52.

[11] Ibid., pp. 353-56.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., pp. 353-56.


CHAPTER III
TAMMANY CLASHES WITH DE WITT CLINTON
1802-1809

The quarrel between Tammany and De Witt Clinton arose from Clinton’s charge in 1802 that Burr was a traitor to the Republican party and had conspired to defeat Jefferson. De Witt Clinton was a nephew of George Clinton. When a very young man he was Scribe of the Tammany Society. Owing to the influence of his powerful relative, backed by his own ability, he had become a United States Senator, at the promising age of thirty-three. His principal fault was his unbridled temper, which led him to speak harshly of those who displeased him. George Clinton thought himself, on account of his age and long public service, entitled to the place and honors heaped upon Burr, whom he despised as an unprincipled usurper. He was too old, however, to carry on a contest, and De Witt Clinton undertook to shatter the Burr faction for him. To oppose the Tammany Society, which embraced in itself nearly all there was of the Republican party in New York City, was no slight matter. But De Witt Clinton, with the confidence that comes of steady, rapid advancement, went about it aggressively. He had extraordinary qualities of mind and heart which raised him far above the mere politicians of his day.

The conflict between Tammany and De Witt Clinton began in 1802 when Clinton accused Burr of being a traitor to the Republican party and plotting against Jefferson. De Witt Clinton was George Clinton's nephew. As a young man, he was the Scribe of the Tammany Society. Thanks to his influential relative and his own talent, he became a United States Senator at the young age of thirty-three. His main flaw was his explosive temper, which led him to speak harshly about those who irritated him. George Clinton believed that, due to his age and long service, he deserved the position and honors given to Burr, whom he viewed as an unscrupulous usurper. However, he was too old to fight the battle himself, so De Witt Clinton took on the task of dismantling Burr's faction for him. Challenging the Tammany Society, which represented nearly all of the Republican party in New York City, was no small feat. But De Witt Clinton, armed with the confidence that comes from steady, rapid progress, tackled it with determination. He possessed remarkable qualities of mind and spirit that set him apart from the typical politicians of his time.

Such of the elective offices as were allowed the city were filled by the Tammany Republicans from 1800 to 1809. State Senators, Assemblymen and Aldermen were elective, but the Mayor, Sheriff, Recorder, Justices of the Peace of counties—in fact, nearly all civil and military[18] officers from the heads of departments and Judgeships of the Supreme Court down to even auctioneers—were appointed by a body at Albany known as the Council of Appointment, which was one of the old constitutional devices for centralizing political power. Four State Senators, chosen by the Assembly, comprised, with the Governor, this Council. Gov. Clinton, as president of this board, claimed the exclusive right of nomination, and effectually concentrated in himself all the immense power it yielded. He had De Witt Clinton transferred from the post of United States Senator to that of Mayor of New York City in 1803, and filled offices in all the counties with his relatives or partizans. The spoils system was in full force, as exemplified by the Council’s sudden and frequent changes. Though swaying New York City, Tammany could get only a few State and city offices, the Clintons holding the power elsewhere throughout the State and in the Council of Appointment. Hence in fighting the Clintons, Tammany confronted a power much superior in resources.

The elective positions available to the city were filled by the Tammany Republicans from 1800 to 1809. State Senators, Assembly members, and Aldermen were elected, but the Mayor, Sheriff, Recorder, Justices of the Peace of counties—in fact, nearly all civil and military[18] officials, from department heads to Supreme Court judges to even auctioneers—were appointed by a group in Albany known as the Council of Appointment, which was one of the old constitutional methods for centralizing political power. Four State Senators, selected by the Assembly, along with the Governor, made up this Council. Governor Clinton, as the head of this board, claimed the exclusive right to nominate, effectively concentrating all the significant power within himself. He had De Witt Clinton moved from the position of United States Senator to Mayor of New York City in 1803 and filled offices throughout the counties with his family members or supporters. The spoils system was fully operational, as demonstrated by the Council’s sudden and frequent changes. Although Tammany dominated New York City, it could only secure a few State and city offices, with the Clintons maintaining power elsewhere throughout the State and in the Council of Appointment. Therefore, in opposing the Clintons, Tammany faced a much stronger power in terms of resources.

One of the first moves of the Clintons was to get control of the Manhattan Bank. They caused John Swartwout, Burr’s associate director, to be turned out. Some words ensued, and De Witt Clinton styled Swartwout a liar, a scoundrel and a villain. Swartwout set about resenting the insult in the gentlemanly mode of the day. Clinton readily accepted a challenge, and five shots were fired, two of which hit Swartwout, who, upon being asked whether he had had enough said that he had not; but the duel was stopped by the seconds.

One of the first actions the Clintons took was to gain control of the Manhattan Bank. They got John Swartwout, Burr’s associate director, removed from his position. A few words were exchanged, and De Witt Clinton called Swartwout a liar, a scoundrel, and a villain. Swartwout decided to respond to the insult in the gentlemanly manner of the time. Clinton quickly accepted a challenge, and five shots were fired, two of which struck Swartwout. When asked if he had had enough, he replied that he had not; however, the duel was called off by the seconds.

While the Clintons were searching for a good pretext to overthrow Burr, the latter injudiciously supplied it himself when in 1804 he opposed the election of Morgan Lewis, his own party’s nominee for Governor. Burr’s action gave rise to much acrimony; and from that time he was ostracized by every part of the Republican party in New York except the chiefs of the Tammany Society, or Martling Men. He fell altogether into disgrace with the general[19] public when he shot Alexander Hamilton in a duel, July 11, 1804. Tammany, however, still clung to him. Two of Tammany’s chiefs—Nathaniel Pendleton and William P. Van Ness—accompanied Burr to the field; John Swartwout, another chief, was at Burr’s house awaiting his return. The Tammany men looked upon much of the excitement over Hamilton’s death as manufactured. But as if to yield to public opinion, the society on July 13 issued a notice to its members to join in the procession to pay the “last tribute of respect to the manes of Hamilton.”

While the Clintons were looking for a good reason to get rid of Burr, he foolishly provided one himself when in 1804 he opposed the election of Morgan Lewis, his own party’s candidate for Governor. Burr’s actions created a lot of conflict, and from that point on, he was shunned by every part of the Republican party in New York, except for the leaders of the Tammany Society, or Martling Men. He completely fell out of favor with the general public when he shot Alexander Hamilton in a duel on July 11, 1804. However, Tammany still supported him. Two of Tammany’s leaders—Nathaniel Pendleton and William P. Van Ness—went with Burr to the duel; John Swartwout, another leader, was at Burr’s house waiting for his return. The Tammany leaders viewed much of the uproar over Hamilton’s death as exaggerated. But to appease public sentiment, the society issued a notice on July 13 for its members to join in the procession to pay the “last tribute of respect to the manes of Hamilton.”

In the inflamed state of public feeling which condemned everything connected with Burr and caused his indictment in two States, the Sachems knew it would be unwise for a time to make any attempt to restore him to political power. They found their opportunity in December, 1805, when, strangely enough, De Witt Clinton, forced by the exigencies of politics, made overtures to form a union with the Burrites in order to resist the powerful Livingston family, which, with Gov. Morgan Lewis at its head, was threatening the Clinton family. The Burrites thought they would get the better of the bargain and be able to reinstate their chief.

In the heated atmosphere of public opinion that condemned everything related to Burr and led to his indictment in two states, the leaders knew it would be unwise to try to bring him back into political power for a while. They saw their chance in December 1805 when, surprisingly, De Witt Clinton, driven by political needs, reached out to team up with the Burrites to counter the strong Livingston family, led by Gov. Morgan Lewis, which was posing a threat to the Clinton family. The Burrites believed they could come out on top in this deal and manage to restore their leader.

The negotiators met secretly February 20, 1806, at Dyde’s Hotel. John Swartwout and the other Tammany chiefs insisted as conditions of the union that Burr should be recognized as a Republican; that his friends should be well cared for in the distribution of offices, and that “Burrism” should never be urged as an objection against them. The Clintons, anxious to beat down the Livingstons, were ready to agree to these terms, knowing that Burr’s prestige was utterly swept away and that any effort of his followers to thrust him forward again would be a failure. Clintonites and Burrites set to drinking hilariously as a token of good will. But their joy was premature.

The negotiators met secretly on February 20, 1806, at Dyde’s Hotel. John Swartwout and the other Tammany leaders insisted that for the union to happen, Burr must be recognized as a Republican; that his allies should be taken care of in the distribution of offices, and that “Burrism” should never be used against them. The Clintons, eager to undermine the Livingstons, were ready to accept these terms, fully aware that Burr’s influence was completely gone and that any attempt by his supporters to push him back into the spotlight would fail. Clinton supporters and Burr supporters began drinking joyfully as a sign of goodwill. But their happiness was short-lived.

When the body of the Tammany men learned of the[20] arrangement they were aroused. The Sachems drew off, and the Tammany Society continued to revile Clinton and to be reviled in return.

When the Tammany men found out about the[20] arrangement, they got really worked up. The Sachems stepped back, and the Tammany Society kept insulting Clinton while he insulted them back.

It was just before this that the Tammany Hall political organization, as apparently distinct from the Tammany Society, was created. In 1805 the society made application for, and obtained from the Legislature, the charter, which still remains in force, incorporating it as a benevolent and charitable body “for the purpose of affording relief to the indigent and distressed members of said association, their widows and orphans and others who may be proper objects of their charity.”

It was just before this that the Tammany Hall political group, clearly separate from the Tammany Society, was formed. In 1805, the society applied for and received a charter from the Legislature, which is still active today, incorporating it as a benevolent and charitable organization “to provide assistance to the poor and distressed members of the association, their widows and orphans, and others who may be deserving of their charity.”

The wording of the charter deluded only the simple. Everybody knew that the society was the center around which the Republican politics of the city revolved. It had its public and its secret aspects. “This society,” says Longworth’s American Almanac, New York Register and City Directory for 1807-1808, in a description of Tammany, “has a constitution in two parts—public and private—the public relates to all external or public matters; and the private, to the arcana and all transactions which do not meet the public eye, and on which its code of laws are founded.”

The wording of the charter only fooled the naive. Everyone knew that the society was the focal point of the city's Republican politics. It had both public and private sides. “This society,” says Longworth’s American Almanac, New York Register and City Directory for 1807-1808, in its description of Tammany, “has a constitution in two parts—public and private—the public deals with all external or public matters, while the private concerns the secrets and all transactions that don’t come to light, on which its laws are based.”

The Sachems knew that to continue appearing as a political club would be most impolitic. Year after year since 1798 the criticisms directed at the self-appointed task of providing candidates for the popular suffrage grew louder. In 1806 these murmurings extended to Tammany’s own voters. Honest Republicans began to voice their suspicions of caucuses which never met and public meetings called by nobody knew whom. The Sachems, though perfectly satisfied with the established forms which gave them such direct authority, wisely recognized the need of a change.

The Sachems realized that it would be unwise to keep acting like a political club. Year after year since 1798, the criticism aimed at their self-assigned role of providing candidates for the public vote became more intense. By 1806, these complaints began to reach Tammany's own voters. Honest Republicans started to express their doubts about caucuses that never convened and public meetings organized by unknown people. The Sachems, while perfectly content with the established systems that gave them such direct power, wisely acknowledged the need for change.

It was agreed that the Republicans should assemble in each ward to choose a ward committee of three and that these ward committees should constitute a general committee,[21] which should have the power of convening all public meetings of the party and of making preparatory arrangements for approaching elections. This was the origin of the Tammany Hall General Committee, which, consisting then of thirty members, has been expanded in present times to over five thousand members.

It was decided that the Republicans would meet in each ward to select a committee of three, and these ward committees would form a general committee,[21] which would hold the authority to organize all the party's public meetings and make plans for upcoming elections. This marked the beginning of the Tammany Hall General Committee, which started with thirty members and has grown to over five thousand members today.

At about the same time each of the ten wards began sending seven delegates to Martling’s, the seventy forming a nominating committee, which alone had the right to nominate candidates. The seventy met in open convention. At times each member would have a candidate for the Assembly, to which the city then sent eleven members. These improvements on the old method gave, naturally, an air of real democracy to the proceedings of the Tammany faction in the city and had the effect of softening public criticism. Yet behind the scenes the former leaders contrived to bring things about pretty much as they planned.

At roughly the same time, each of the ten wards started sending seven delegates to Martling’s, totaling seventy who formed a nominating committee that had the exclusive right to nominate candidates. The seventy convened openly. Occasionally, each member would have a candidate for the Assembly, to which the city then sent eleven members. These enhancements to the old method naturally gave a sense of real democracy to the Tammany faction's proceedings in the city and helped ease public criticism. However, behind the scenes, the former leaders managed to keep things largely under their control.

The action of the nominating committee was not final, however. It was a strict rule that the committee’s nominations be submitted to the wards and to a later meeting of all the Republican electors who chose to attend and who would vote their approval or disapproval. If a name were voted down, another candidate was substituted by the meeting itself. This was called the “great popular meeting,” and its design was supposed to vest fully in the Republican voters the choice of the candidates for whom they were to vote. But in those days, as has always been the case, most voters were so engrossed in their ordinary occupations that they gave little more attention to politics than to vote; and the leaders, except on special occasions, found it easy to fill the great popular meeting, as well as other meetings, with their friends and creatures, sending out runners, and often in the winter, sleighs, for the dilatory. To the general and nominating committees was added, several years later, a correspondence committee, which was empowered to call meetings of the party when necessary, the leaders having found the general committee[22] too slow and cumbersome a means through which to reach that important end.

The actions of the nominating committee weren’t final, though. There was a strict rule that the committee’s nominations had to be submitted to the wards and later to a meeting of all the Republican electors who chose to attend, where they would vote on their approval or disapproval. If a name was rejected, another candidate would be proposed by the meeting itself. This was known as the “great popular meeting,” and it was designed to give Republican voters complete control over the choice of candidates for whom they would vote. But back then, as has always been the case, most voters were so caught up in their everyday lives that they paid little more attention to politics than just voting; and the leaders, except on special occasions, found it easy to fill the great popular meeting, along with other meetings, with their friends and supporters, sending out runners and often in the winter, sleighs, for those who were slow to arrive. A few years later, a correspondence committee was added to the general and nominating committees, which was authorized to call party meetings when needed, as the leaders had found the general committee [22] too slow and unwieldy a way to achieve that important goal.

To hold public favor, the Tammany Society thought prudent to make it appear that it was animated by patriotic motives instead of the desire for offices. That the people might see how dearly above all things Tammany prized its Revolutionary traditions, the society on April 13, 1808, marched in rank to Wallabout, where it laid the corner-stone of a vault in which were to be placed the bones of 11,500 patriots who had died on board the British prison ships. On April 26, the vault being completed, the remains were laid in it. The Tammany Society, headed by Benjamin Romaine and the military; the municipal officials, Gov. Daniel D. Tompkins, members of Congress, Army and Navy officers, and many other detachments of men of lesser note participated in the ceremony.

To gain public support, the Tammany Society thought it was wise to make it seem like they were driven by patriotic motives instead of just wanting jobs. To show the people how much Tammany valued its Revolutionary traditions, the society marched to Wallabout on April 13, 1808, to lay the cornerstone of a vault for the remains of 11,500 patriots who had died on British prison ships. On April 26, once the vault was finished, the remains were placed inside. The Tammany Society, led by Benjamin Romaine along with military personnel, municipal officials, Gov. Daniel D. Tompkins, members of Congress, Army and Navy officers, and many other less notable groups took part in the ceremony.

The Federalists maintained that Tammany’s patriotic show was merely an election maneuver. Subsequent developments did not help to disprove the charge. The society proclaimed far and wide its intention of building a monument over the vault, and induced the Legislature to make a grant of land worth $1,000 for the purpose. Associations and individuals likewise contributed. The political ceremonies connected with the burial having their expected effect, Tammany forgot altogether about its project until ugly rumors, pointing to the misuse of the money collected, forced the society in 1821 to petition the Legislature for further aid in erecting the monument. On that occasion the Tammany Society was denounced bitterly. It was brought out that such was Tammany’s interest in the monument that no request was ever made for the land granted by the Legislature in 1808. The Legislature, however, granted $1,000 in cash.[1] This sum was not enough; and as Tammany did not swell the amount, though its Sachems were rich with the spoils of office, a[23] resolution was introduced in the Assembly, March 4, 1826,[2] stating that as the $1,000 appropriated February 27, 1821, had not been used for the purpose but remained in the hands of Benjamin Romaine, the society’s treasurer, it should be returned, and threatening legal proceedings in case it was not. This resolution, slightly amended, was passed on a close vote. There is, however, no available record of what became of the $1,000.

The Federalists argued that Tammany’s patriotic display was just a campaign tactic. Later events didn't help to counter this claim. The society spread the word about its plan to build a monument over the vault and got the Legislature to grant a piece of land worth $1,000 for that purpose. Various organizations and individuals also contributed. After the political ceremonies tied to the burial worked as intended, Tammany completely forgot about its project until troubling rumors about the misuse of the collected funds forced the society in 1821 to ask the Legislature for more help to build the monument. During this time, the Tammany Society faced harsh criticism. It was revealed that Tammany was so invested in the monument that no request was ever made for the land granted by the Legislature in 1808. The Legislature, however, approved $1,000 in cash.[1] This amount wasn't enough, and since Tammany didn’t add any of its own funds, despite its Sachems being wealthy from their positions, a[23] resolution was introduced in the Assembly on March 4, 1826,[2] stating that, since the $1,000 allocated on February 27, 1821, hadn’t been used for its intended purpose and remained with Benjamin Romaine, the society’s treasurer, it should be returned, with a warning of legal action if it wasn’t. This resolution, with slight amendments, passed by a narrow margin. However, there is no record available of what happened to the $1,000.

During three years, culminating in 1809, a series of disclosures regarding the corruption of Tammany officials astounded the city. Rumors grew so persistent that the Common Council was forced by public opinion to investigate. In the resultant revelations many Tammany chiefs suffered.

During three years, culminating in 1809, a series of revelations about the corruption of Tammany officials shocked the city. Rumors became so widespread that the Common Council was compelled by public opinion to conduct an investigation. As a result of these findings, many Tammany leaders faced consequences.

Benjamin Romaine, variously Sachem and Grand Sachem, was removed in 1806 from the office of City Controller for malfeasance, though the Common Council was controlled by his own party.[3] As a trustee of corporation property he had fraudulently obtained valuable land in the heart of the city, without paying for it. The affair caused a very considerable scandal. The Common Council had repeatedly passed strong resolutions calling on him to explain. Romaine must have settled in some fashion; for there is no evidence that he was prosecuted.

Benjamin Romaine, who held the titles of Sachem and Grand Sachem, was removed from his position as City Controller in 1806 due to misconduct, even though the Common Council was run by his own political party.[3] As a trustee of corporation property, he had illegally acquired valuable land in the center of the city without paying for it. This incident generated a significant scandal. The Common Council had repeatedly passed strong resolutions demanding that he provide an explanation. Romaine must have resolved the issue in some way, as there is no evidence that he faced prosecution.

On January 26, 1807, Philip I. Arcularius, Superintendent of the Almshouse, and Cornelius Warner, Superintendent of Public Repairs, were removed summarily.[4] It was shown that Warner had defrauded the city as well as the men who worked under him.[5]

On January 26, 1807, Philip I. Arcularius, Superintendent of the Almshouse, and Cornelius Warner, Superintendent of Public Repairs, were dismissed immediately.[4] It was revealed that Warner had cheated the city and the men working for him.[5]

Jonas Humbert, Inspector of Bread and sometime Sachem, was proved to have extorted a third of the fees collected by Flour Inspector Jones, under the threat of having Jones put out of office. In consequence of[24] the facts becoming known, Humbert and his associate Inspector, Christian Nestell, discreetly resigned their offices—probably to avert official investigation.[6]

Jonas Humbert, the Bread Inspector and former Sachem, was found to have taken a third of the fees collected by Flour Inspector Jones, threatening to get Jones fired if he didn't comply. As a result of[24] this information coming to light, Humbert and his colleague Inspector, Christian Nestell, quietly stepped down from their positions—likely to avoid an official investigation.[6]

Abraham Stagg, another of the dynasty of Grand Sachems, as Collector of Assessments failed, it was disclosed in 1808, to account for about $1,000.[7] Two other Assessment Collectors, Samuel L. Page (for a long time prominent in Tammany councils), and Simon Ackerman, were likewise found to be embezzlers.[8] Stagg and Page managed to make good their deficit by turning over to the city certain property, but Ackerman disappeared.

Abraham Stagg, another member of the Grand Sachem dynasty, failed as the Collector of Assessments when it was revealed in 1808 that he couldn't account for about $1,000.[7] Two other Assessment Collectors, Samuel L. Page (who had been a key figure in Tammany councils for a long time) and Simon Ackerman, were also discovered to be embezzlers.[8] Stagg and Page were able to cover their shortfall by handing over certain property to the city, but Ackerman vanished.

John Bingham, at times Sachem, and a noted politician of the day, managed, through his position as an Alderman, to wheedle the city into selling to his brother-in-law land which later he influenced the corporation to buy back at an exorbitant price. The Common Council, spurred by public opinion, demanded its reconveyance.[9] Even Bingham’s powerful friend, Matthew L. Davis, could not silence the scandal, for Davis himself had to meet a charge that while defending the Embargo at Martling’s he was caught smuggling out flour in quantities that yielded him a desirable income.

John Bingham, sometimes referred to as Sachem and a well-known politician of the time, used his position as an Alderman to convince the city to sell land to his brother-in-law, which he later influenced the city to buy back at an outrageous price. The Common Council, driven by public opinion, demanded the land be returned.[9] Even Bingham’s influential friend, Matthew L. Davis, couldn't silence the scandal, as Davis himself faced accusations of smuggling flour in large quantities for a nice profit while defending the Embargo at Martling’s.

But worse than these disclosures was that affecting the society’s founder, William Mooney. The Common Council in 1808 appointed him Superintendent of the Almshouse, at an annual recompense of $1,000 and the support of his family in the place, provided that this latter item should not amount to over $500. Mooney had a more exalted idea of how he and his family ought to live. In the summer of 1809 the city fathers appointed a committee to investigate. The outcome was surprising. Mooney had spent nearly $4,000 on himself and family in addition to his salary; he had taken from the city supplies about $1,000 worth of articles, and moreover had expended various sums for “trifles for[25] Mrs. Mooney”—a term which survived for many years in local politics. The ofttimes Grand Sachem of the Tammany Society could not explain his indulgences satisfactorily, and the Common Council relieved him of the cares of office, only one Alderman voting for his retention.[10]

But worse than these revelations was the situation involving the society’s founder, William Mooney. In 1808, the Common Council appointed him as the Superintendent of the Almshouse, with an annual salary of $1,000 and provisions for his family at the location, as long as that didn’t exceed $500. Mooney had a much grander vision of how he and his family should live. In the summer of 1809, the city officials set up a committee to investigate. The results were shocking. Mooney had spent nearly $4,000 on himself and his family, on top of his salary; he had taken around $1,000 worth of items from the city supplies, and additionally had spent various amounts on “trifles for[25] Mrs. Mooney”—a phrase that lingered in local politics for years. The often Grand Sachem of the Tammany Society could not satisfactorily explain his lavish spending, and the Common Council relieved him of his duties, with only one Alderman voting to keep him.

Most of these leaders were only momentarily incommoded, the Tammany Society continuing many of them, for years after, in positions of trust and influence. Mooney subsequently was repeatedly chosen Grand Sachem and Father of the Council; Romaine was elected Grand Sachem in 1808, again in 1813, and frequently Sachem; Matthew L. Davis was elected Grand Sachem in 1814 and reelected in 1815[11] and was a Sachem for years later; Abraham Stagg remained a leader and continued to get contracts for street paving and regulating, and neither Jonas Humbert nor John Bingham suffered a loss of influence with the Wigwam men.

Most of these leaders were only briefly inconvenienced, and the Tammany Society kept many of them in positions of trust and influence for years afterward. Mooney was repeatedly chosen Grand Sachem and Father of the Council; Romaine was elected Grand Sachem in 1808, again in 1813, and frequently served as Sachem; Matthew L. Davis was elected Grand Sachem in 1814 and reelected in 1815[11] and was a Sachem for many years afterward; Abraham Stagg remained a leader and continued to secure contracts for street paving and regulation, and neither Jonas Humbert nor John Bingham lost their influence with the Wigwam leaders.

Meanwhile the Sachems were professing the highest virtue. The society’s calls for meetings ran like this:

Meanwhile, the Sachems were claiming the highest virtue. The society’s calls for meetings went like this:

“Tammany Society, or Columbian Order—Brothers, You are requested to assemble around the council fire in the Great Wigwam, No. 1, on Saturday, the 12th inst., at 9 o’clock A. M. (wearing a bucktail in your hat), to celebrate the anniversary of the Columbian Order and recount to each other the deeds of our departed chiefs and warriors in order that it may stimulate us to imitate them in whatever is virtuous and just.”[12]

“Tammany Society, or Columbian Order—Brothers, you are invited to gather around the council fire in the Great Wigwam, No. 1, on Saturday, the 12th, at 9:00 AM (wearing a bucktail in your hat), to celebrate the anniversary of the Columbian Order and share the stories of our departed chiefs and warriors so that we may be inspired to follow their example in all that is virtuous and just.”[12]

The public, however, took another view of the matter. These scandals, and the showing of a deficit in the city’s accounts of $250,000, hurt Tammany’s prestige considerably. The Republican strength in the city at the election of April, 1809, showed a decrease of six hundred votes, the majority being only 116, while the Federalists carried[26] the State, and thus secured control of the Council of Appointment.

The public, however, saw it differently. These scandals, along with a $250,000 deficit in the city’s accounts, seriously damaged Tammany’s reputation. The Republicans' support in the city during the April 1809 election dropped by six hundred votes, leaving them with a majority of only 116, while the Federalists won[26] the State and gained control of the Council of Appointment.

The lesson was lost on the leaders. The society at this time was led by various men, of whom Teunis Wortman[13] was considered the chief power. Wortman was as enraged at the defection of these few hundred voters as his successors were at a later day at an adverse majority of tens of thousands. He caused a meeting to be held at Martling’s on May 19, and secured the appointment of a committee, with one member from each of the ten wards, instructed to inquire into the causes contributing to lessen Tammany’s usual majority. The committee was further instructed to call a general meeting of the Republican citizens of the county, on the completion of its investigation, and to report to them, that it might be known who were their friends and who their enemies. Here is to be seen the first manifestation of that systematic discipline which Tammany Hall thereafter exercised. Wortman’s plan excited both Clintonites and Federalists. The committee was called “the committee of spies,” and was regarded generally as the beginning of a system of intimidation and proscription.

The lesson didn’t register with the leaders. At this time, the society was led by several men, with Teunis Wortman[13] being seen as the main authority. Wortman was just as furious about the loss of those few hundred voters as his successors would later be about a losing majority of tens of thousands. He arranged for a meeting to take place at Martling’s on May 19, where he got a committee appointed, with one member from each of the ten wards, tasked with figuring out the reasons behind Tammany’s usual majority decreasing. The committee was also ordered to organize a general meeting for the Republican citizens of the county once their investigation was finished, so they could identify their allies and adversaries. This marked the first sign of the organized discipline that Tammany Hall would enforce later on. Wortman’s plan stirred up both Clintonites and Federalists. The committee was labeled “the committee of spies” and was widely viewed as the start of a system of intimidation and exclusion.

In the passionate acrimony of the struggle between Tammany and the Clintons, the Federalists seemed to be well-nigh forgotten. The speakers and writers of each side assailed the other with great fury. One of these was James Cheetham, a Clinton supporter and editor of the American Citizen. Goaded by his strictures, the Tammany Society on the night of February 28, 1809, expelled him from membership on the grounds that he had assailed the general Government and vilified Jefferson.

In the heated conflict between Tammany and the Clintons, the Federalists were almost completely overlooked. The speakers and writers from both sides attacked each other fiercely. One of these was James Cheetham, a Clinton supporter and editor of the American Citizen. Provoked by his criticisms, the Tammany Society expelled him from membership on the night of February 28, 1809, claiming he had attacked the federal government and insulted Jefferson.

In the American Citizen of March 1, Cheetham replied that the resolution was carried by trickery. “Tammany Society,” Cheetham continued, “was chartered by the[27] Legislature of the State for charitable purposes. Not a member of the Legislature, when it was chartered, imagined, I dare to say, that it would be thus perverted to the worst purposes of faction.” On May 1 he sent this note to the Grand Sachem:

In the American Citizen on March 1, Cheetham responded that the resolution was passed through deceit. “Tammany Society,” Cheetham went on, “was established by the [27] Legislature of the State for charitable purposes. I doubt any member of the Legislature, when it was created, thought it would be twisted to serve the worst goals of faction.” On May 1, he sent this note to the Grand Sachem:

“Sir, I decline membership in Tammany Society. Originally national and Republican, it has degenerated into a savage barbarity.”

“Sir, I refuse to join the Tammany Society. It started out as national and Republican, but it has turned into complete savagery.”

Cheetham then wrote to Grand Sachem Cowdrey for a certified copy of the proceedings, saying he wanted it to base an action which he would bring for the annulment of the charter of the Tammany Society for misuser. Cowdrey expressed regret at not being able to accommodate him. “Tammany Society,” wrote Cowdrey,

Cheetham then wrote to Grand Sachem Cowdrey asking for a certified copy of the proceedings, stating he wanted it to support a lawsuit he intended to file aimed at revoking the charter of the Tammany Society for misuse. Cowdrey expressed regret at not being able to help him. “Tammany Society,” Cowdrey wrote,

“is an institution that has done much good and may and undoubtedly will do more.… I do not think one error can or ought to cancel its long list of good actions and wrest from it its charter of incorporation, the basis of its stability and existence.”

“is an institution that has done a lot of good and may, without a doubt, do even more.… I don’t believe one mistake can or should erase its long history of good deeds or take away its charter of incorporation, which is the foundation of its stability and existence.”

The American Citizen thereupon bristled with fiercer attacks upon Tammany. “Jacobin clubs,” says “A Disciple of Washington,” in this newspaper, July 29, 1809,

The American Citizen then launched stronger attacks on Tammany. “Jacobin clubs,” states “A Disciple of Washington,” in this newspaper, July 29, 1809,

“are becoming organized to overawe, not only the electors but the elected under our government; such are the Washington and the Tammany Societies. The latter was originally instituted for harmless purposes and long remained harmless in its acts; members from all parties were admitted to it; but we have seen it become a tremendous political machine.… The Washington Jacobin Club, it is said, consists of at least two thousand rank and file, and the Tammany Jacobins to perhaps as many.… The time will come, and that speedily, when the Legislature, the Governor and the Council of Appointment shall not dare to disobey their edicts.”

“are becoming organized to intimidate, not just the voters but also those in power under our government; such are the Washington and the Tammany Societies. The latter was originally created for harmless reasons and for a long time acted in a harmless manner; members from all parties were welcome to join; but we have seen it turn into a massive political machine.… The Washington Jacobin Club reportedly has at least two thousand members, and the Tammany Jacobins might have just as many.… The time will come, and soon, when the Legislature, the Governor, and the Council of Appointment will fear to ignore their commands.”

Tammany retaliated upon Cheetham by having a bill passed by the Legislature taking away from him the position of State Printer, which paid $3,000 a year.

Tammany got back at Cheetham by getting a bill passed in the Legislature that stripped him of his job as State Printer, which paid $3,000 a year.

Tammany’s comparative weakness in the city, as shown in the recent vote, prompted Clinton to suggest a compromise and union of forces. Overtures were made by[28] his agents, and on July 13, 1809, twenty-eight of the leaders of the Clinton, Madison, Burr and Lewis factions met in a private room at Coleman’s Fair House. Matthew L. Davis told them the chiefs ought to unite; experience demonstrated that if they did they would lead the rest—meaning the voters. Tammany, he said, welcomed a union of the Republican forces so as to prevent the election of a Federalist Council of Appointment. Davis and Wortman proposed that they unite to prevent any removals from office; that the two opposition Republican clubs in turn should be destroyed and that their members should go back to the Tammany Society, which, being on the decline, must be reenforced. Or, if it should be thought advisable to put down the Tammany Society, “considering its prevailing disrepute,” then a new society should be organized in which Burrites, Lewisites, Clintonites and Madisonians were to be admitted members under the general family and brotherly name of Republican.

Tammany’s relative weakness in the city, as indicated by the recent vote, led Clinton to suggest a compromise and a unification of forces. His agents made overtures, and on July 13, 1809, twenty-eight leaders from the Clinton, Madison, Burr, and Lewis factions gathered in a private room at Coleman’s Fair House. Matthew L. Davis told them that the leaders should unite; experience showed that if they did, they would lead the rest—meaning the voters. He mentioned that Tammany was open to a union of the Republican forces to prevent the election of a Federalist Council of Appointment. Davis and Wortman suggested that they unite to prevent any removals from office; the two opposing Republican clubs should be dismantled, and their members should return to the Tammany Society, which, being in decline, needed reinforcements. Alternatively, if it was deemed best to dissolve the Tammany Society, “considering its bad reputation,” then a new society should be formed allowing Burrites, Lewisites, Clintonites, and Madisonians to join under the unifying name of Republican.

De Witt Clinton cautiously kept away from this meeting, allowing his lieutenants to do the work of outwitting Tammany. A committee of ten was appointed to consider whether a coalition of the chiefs were practicable; whether, if it were, the people would agree to it; whether the Whig (opposition Republican) clubs should be destroyed and whether the Tammany Society should be reenforced.

De Witt Clinton carefully avoided this meeting, letting his assistants handle the task of outsmarting Tammany. A committee of ten was set up to explore whether a coalition of the leaders was feasible; if so, whether the public would support it; whether the Whig (opposition Republican) clubs should be dismantled, and whether the Tammany Society should be strengthened.

The meeting came to naught. In this effort to win over the Tammany chiefs, De Witt Clinton abandoned his protégé and dependent, Cheetham, who had made himself obnoxious to them. Finding Clinton’s political and financial support withdrawn, Cheetham, out of revenge, published the proceedings of this secret meeting in the American Citizen, and, awakening public indignation, closed the bargaining. A few nights later a Tammany mob threw brickbats in the windows of Cheetham’s house. By his death, on September 19, 1810, Tammany was freed from one of its earliest and most vindictive assailants.

The meeting was a complete failure. In his attempt to win over the Tammany leaders, De Witt Clinton ditched his supporter and dependent, Cheetham, who had annoyed them. With Clinton's political and financial backing gone, Cheetham, in a fit of revenge, published the details of this secret meeting in the American Citizen, stirring up public outrage and ending any negotiations. A few nights later, a Tammany mob vandalized Cheetham's house with bricks. With his death on September 19, 1810, Tammany was rid of one of its earliest and most vengeful attackers.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Journal of the Assembly, 1821, p. 532, also p. 758.

[1] Journal of the Assembly, 1821, p. 532, also p. 758.

[2] Ibid., 1826, p. 750.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, 1826, p. 750.

[3] MS. Minutes of the Common Council, Vol. 16, pp. 239-40 and 405.

[3] MS. Minutes of the Common Council, Vol. 16, pp. 239-40 and 405.

[4] MS. Minutes of the Common Council, Vol. 16, pp. 288-89.

[4] MS. Minutes of the Common Council, Vol. 16, pp. 288-89.

[5] Ibid., p. 316.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., p. 316.

[6] Ibid., p. 50.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, p. 50.

[7] Ibid., Vol. 18, p. 194.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., Vol. 18, p. 194.

[8] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.

[9] Ibid., Vol. 20, pp. 355-56.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid., Vol. 20, pp. 355-56.

[10] Ibid., Vol. 20, p. 308. The full report on Mooney’s administration appears in Ibid., pp. 376-92.

[10] Same source., Vol. 20, p. 308. The complete report on Mooney’s administration can be found in Same source., pp. 376-92.

[11] Although the subsequent laws of the Tammany Society forbade the successive reelection of a Grand Sachem, the incumbent of the office was frequently permitted to “hold over.”

[11] Even though later laws of the Tammany Society didn’t allow a Grand Sachem to be reelected consecutively, the person in the position often got to “hold over.”

[12] Advertisement in the Columbian, May 14, 1810.

[12] Advertisement in the Columbian, May 14, 1810.

[13] Wortman had been a follower of Clinton and had been generously aided by him. He suddenly shifted to Tammany, on seeing better opportunities of advancement with that body.

[13] Wortman had been a supporter of Clinton and had received significant help from him. He suddenly switched to Tammany upon recognizing better chances for advancement with that group.


CHAPTER IV
Slow recovery from disaster
1809-1815

The Tammany men fared badly for a time. During 1809 the Council of Appointment removed numbers of them from office. In November the Federalists elected a majority of their Aldermanic ticket, and in April, 1810, they elected their Assembly ticket by the close majority of 36. Even when the Federalists were beaten the following year, it brought no good to Tammany, for a Clintonite Council of Appointment dispensed the offices. Clinton, though ousted from the Mayoralty in 1810 to make room for the Federalist Jacob Radcliff, was again made Mayor in the Spring of 1811.

The Tammany guys had a rough time for a while. In 1809, the Council of Appointment got rid of a number of them from their positions. In November, the Federalists won a majority of their Aldermanic candidates, and in April 1810, they won their Assembly candidates by a narrow margin of 36 votes. Even when the Federalists lost the next year, it didn’t benefit Tammany, as a Clinton-led Council of Appointment filled the positions. Clinton, who was removed from the Mayor's office in 1810 to allow Federalist Jacob Radcliff to take over, was re-elected as Mayor in the spring of 1811.

But before long affairs took another turn. Tammany was the only real Republican organization in the city. It stood for the national party. As men were inclined to vote more for party success than for particular local nominees, Tammany’s candidates were certain to be swept in at some time on the strength of party adherence. While the rank and file of the organization were concerned in seeing its candidates successful only inasmuch as that meant the success of democratic principles, the leaders intrigued constantly for spoils at the expense of principles. But whatever their conduct might be, they were sure of success when the next wave of Republican feeling carried the party to victory.

But before long, things took a different turn. Tammany was the only real Republican organization in the city. It represented the national party. Since people were more likely to vote for party success rather than specific local candidates, Tammany's nominees were bound to win at some point due to party loyalty. While the regular members of the organization cared about its candidates' success only because it meant the winning of democratic principles, the leaders were constantly scheming for rewards at the expense of those principles. Nevertheless, regardless of their actions, they were confident that the next surge of Republican support would lead the party to victory.

De Witt Clinton’s following was largely personal. Drawing, it was estimated, from $10,000 to $20,000 a year in salary and fees as Mayor, he lived in high style[30] and distributed bounty liberally among his supporters. His income aroused the wonder of his contemporaries. The President of the United States received $25,000 annually; the Mayor of Philadelphia, $2,000. “Posterity,” said one observer, “will read with astonishment that a Mayor of New York should make the enormous sum of $15,000 out of his office.” This was no inconsequential salary at a time when a man worth $50,000 was thought rich; when a good house could be rented for $350 a year, and $750 or $800 would meet the expenses of the average family. Many of those whom Clinton helped picked a quarrel with him later, in order to have a pretext for the repudiation of their debts, and joined Tammany.

De Witt Clinton’s following was mainly personal. Earning an estimated $10,000 to $20,000 a year in salary and fees as Mayor, he lived extravagantly[30] and generously shared resources among his supporters. His income amazed those around him. The President of the United States made $25,000 annually; the Mayor of Philadelphia, $2,000. “Future generations,” remarked one observer, “will be astonished that a Mayor of New York could earn the staggering amount of $15,000 from his position.” This was no small salary at a time when someone worth $50,000 was considered wealthy; when a decent house could be rented for $350 a year, and $750 or $800 would cover the expenses of a typical family. Many of those Clinton supported later turned against him, seeking to dispute their debts and aligning themselves with Tammany.

Tammany had the party machine, but Clinton had a powerful hold on the lower classes, especially the Irish. As United States Senator he had been foremost in having the naturalization period reduced from fourteen to five years, and he made himself popular with them in other ways. He, himself, was of Irish descent.

Tammany had the party machine, but Clinton had a strong grip on the lower classes, especially the Irish. As a United States Senator, he was a key player in reducing the naturalization period from fourteen to five years, and he gained their favor in other ways too. He was of Irish descent himself.

The Irish were bitter opponents of Tammany Hall. The prejudice against allowing “adopted citizens” to mingle in politics was deep; and Tammany claimed to be a thoroughly native body. As early as May 12, 1791, at Campbell’s Tavern, Greenwich, the Tammany Society had announced that being a national body, it consisted of Americans born, who would fill all offices; though adopted Americans were eligible to honorary posts, such as warriors and hunters. An “adopted citizen” was looked upon as an “exotic.” Religious feeling, too, was conspicuous. It was only after repeated hostile demonstrations that Tammany would consent, in 1809, for the first time to place a Catholic—Patrick McKay—upon its Assembly ticket.

The Irish were fierce rivals of Tammany Hall. The bias against letting “adopted citizens” participate in politics was strong, and Tammany presented itself as a completely native organization. As early as May 12, 1791, at Campbell’s Tavern in Greenwich, the Tammany Society declared that being a national organization, it was made up of born Americans, who would hold all offices, while adopted Americans could only hold honorary roles, like warriors and hunters. An “adopted citizen” was seen as an “outsider.” Religious sentiment was also a significant factor. It wasn’t until after numerous hostile protests that Tammany finally agreed, in 1809, to include a Catholic—Patrick McKay—on its Assembly ticket for the first time.

The accession of the Livingston family had helped the society, adding the support of a considerable faction and “respectability.” The Livingstons, intent on superseding the Clintons, seized on Tammany as a good lever.[31] Above all, it was necessary to have a full application of “respectability,” and to further that end the society put up a pretentious building—the recent Sun newspaper building. In 1802 the Tammany Society had tried by subscription to build a fine Wigwam, but was unsuccessful. The unwisdom of staying in such a place as Martling’s, which subjected them to gibes, and which was described as “the Den where the Wolves and Bears and Panthers assemble and drink down large potations of beer,” was impressed upon the Sachems who, led by Jacob Barker, the largest shipbuilder in the country at the time, raised the sum of $28,000. The new Wigwam was opened in 1811, with the peculiar Indian ceremonies. Sachem Abraham M. Valentine—the same man who, for malfeasance, was afterward (May 26, 1830) removed from the office of Police Magistrate[1]—was the grand marshal of the day.

The rise of the Livingston family had benefited the society, bringing in the support of a significant faction and adding a sense of “respectability.” The Livingstons, aiming to outdo the Clintons, saw Tammany as a useful tool. Above all, it was crucial to fully embrace “respectability,” so the society constructed an impressive building—the newly established Sun newspaper building. In 1802, the Tammany Society attempted to fundraise for a grand Wigwam but failed. The foolishness of remaining in a place like Martling’s, which exposed them to ridicule and was described as “the Den where the Wolves and Bears and Panthers gather and drink large quantities of beer,” was pointed out to the Sachems. Led by Jacob Barker, the largest shipbuilder in the country at the time, they managed to raise $28,000. The new Wigwam opened in 1811, featuring unique Indian ceremonies. Sachem Abraham M. Valentine—the same person who was later removed from the position of Police Magistrate for misconduct on May 26, 1830—served as the grand marshal for the day.[31]

From 1811 the Tammany, or Martling, men came under the general term of the Tammany Hall party or Tammany Hall; the general committee was called technically the Democratic-Republican General Committee. The Tammany Society, with its eleven hundred members, now more than ever appeared distinct from the Tammany Hall political body. Though the general committee was supplied with the use of rooms and the hall in the building, it met on different nights from the society, and to all appearances acted independently of it. But the society, in fact, was and continued to be, the secret ruler of the political organization. Its Sachems were chosen yearly from the most influential of the local Tammany political leaders.

From 1811, the Tammany or Martling men were referred to as the Tammany Hall party or Tammany Hall; the main committee was technically called the Democratic-Republican General Committee. The Tammany Society, with its eleven hundred members, seemed more separate than ever from the Tammany Hall political group. Even though the general committee had access to rooms and the hall in the building, it met on different nights from the society, and it appeared to operate independently. However, the society was actually the hidden authority of the political organization. Its Sachems were selected each year from the most influential local Tammany political leaders.

De Witt Clinton aimed to be President of the United States and schemed for his nomination by the Republican[32] Legislative caucus. Early in 1811 he sought and received from the caucus the nomination for Lieutenant-Governor. He purposed to hold both the offices of Mayor and Lieutenant-Governor, while spending as much time as he could at Albany so as to bring his direct influence to bear in person. As a State officer he could do this without loss of dignity. He would have preferred the post of State Senator, but he feared if he stood for election in New York City Tammany would defeat him. The chiefs, regarding his nomination as treachery toward Madison, immediately held a meeting and issued a notice that they ceased to consider him a member of the Republican party; that he was not only opposing Madison but was bent on establishing a pernicious family aristocracy.

De Witt Clinton wanted to be President of the United States and plotted for his nomination by the Republican[32] Legislative caucus. In early 1811, he sought and received the caucus nomination for Lieutenant-Governor. He intended to hold both the positions of Mayor and Lieutenant-Governor, while spending as much time as possible in Albany to exert his influence directly. As a State officer, he could manage this without losing credibility. He would have preferred to be a State Senator, but he was worried that if he ran for election in New York City, Tammany would defeat him. The leaders, viewing his nomination as a betrayal of Madison, quickly met and announced that they no longer considered him a member of the Republican party; that he was not only opposing Madison but also trying to create a harmful family aristocracy.

When the Clinton men tried to hold a counter meeting at the Union Hotel a few days later, the Tammany men rushed in and put them to flight.[2] Tammany was so anxious to defeat Clinton that it supported the Federalist candidate for Lieutenant-Governor, defeating the aggressive Mayor. But Clinton obtained the caucus nomination for President. His partizans voted the Federalist Assembly ticket (1812) rather than aid the Republican ticket of Tammany Hall. Assisted by the Federalists, Clinton received the electoral vote of New York State, but was overwhelmed by Madison. His course seemed precisely that with which Tammany had charged him—treason to the party to which he professed to belong. In a short time, the Wigwam succeeded in influencing nearly all the Republicans in New York City against him.

When the Clinton supporters tried to hold a counter meeting at the Union Hotel a few days later, the Tammany supporters burst in and chased them away.[2] Tammany was so determined to beat Clinton that it backed the Federalist candidate for Lieutenant-Governor, defeating the pushy Mayor. However, Clinton secured the caucus nomination for President. His supporters voted for the Federalist Assembly ticket (1812) instead of backing Tammany Hall's Republican ticket. With the help of the Federalists, Clinton won New York State's electoral vote, but ultimately lost to Madison. His actions seemed to confirm Tammany's accusations against him—betrayal of the party he claimed to represent. Soon enough, the Wigwam managed to sway almost all the Republicans in New York City against him.

One other event helped to bring back strength and prestige to Tammany Hall. This was the War of 1812, which Tammany called for and supported. On February 26, four months before war was declared, the Tammany[33] Society passed resolutions recommending immediate war with Great Britain unless she should repeal her “Orders in Council.” The members pledged themselves to support the Government “in that just and necessary war” with their “lives, fortunes and sacred honor.” The conservative element execrated Tammany, but the supporters of the war came to look upon it more favorably, and about a thousand persons, some of whom had been members before but had ceased attendance, applied for membership. Throughout the conflict Tammany Hall was the resort of the war-party. At the news of each victory the flag was hoisted to the breeze and a celebration followed. The successful military and naval men were banqueted there, while hundreds of candles illumined every window in the building. On August 31, 1814, 1150 members of the society marched to build defenses in Brooklyn; but this was not done until public pressure forced it, for by August 15 at least twenty other societies, civil and trades, had volunteered, and Tammany had to make good its pretensions.

One other event helped restore strength and prestige to Tammany Hall. This was the War of 1812, which Tammany called for and supported. On February 26, four months before war was declared, the Tammany[33] Society passed resolutions recommending immediate war with Great Britain unless she repealed her “Orders in Council.” The members pledged to support the Government “in that just and necessary war” with their “lives, fortunes, and sacred honor.” The conservative faction criticized Tammany, but the supporters of the war began to view it more favorably, and about a thousand people, some of whom had been members before but had stopped attending, applied for membership. Throughout the conflict, Tammany Hall became the gathering place for the war party. With each victory, the flag was raised, and a celebration followed. Successful military and naval leaders were honored there, while hundreds of candles lit up every window in the building. On August 31, 1814, 1,150 members of the society marched to build defenses in Brooklyn; however, this only happened after public pressure forced them to act, as by August 15 at least twenty other civil and trade societies had volunteered, and Tammany had to live up to its claims.

The leaders prospered by Madison’s favor. From one contract alone Matthew L. Davis reaped $80,000, and Nathan Sanford was credited with making his office of United States District Attorney at New York yield as high as $30,000 a year. The lesser political workers were rewarded proportionately. Having a direct and considerable interest in the success of Madison’s administration, they were indefatigable partizans. Some of the Tammany leaders proved their devotion to their country’s cause by doing service in the Quartermaster’s Department. Among these were the two Swartwouts (John and Robert), who became Generals, and Romaine, who became a Colonel.

The leaders thrived thanks to Madison’s support. From just one contract, Matthew L. Davis earned $80,000, and Nathan Sanford managed to make his position as the United States District Attorney in New York bring in as much as $30,000 a year. The lesser political workers were compensated accordingly. With a direct and significant stake in the success of Madison’s administration, they were tireless supporters. Some of the Tammany leaders showed their commitment to their country’s cause by serving in the Quartermaster’s Department. Among them were the two Swartwouts (John and Robert), who became Generals, and Romaine, who became a Colonel.

This war had the effect of causing the society to abandon its custom of marching in Indian garb.[3] In 1813 the Indians in the Northwest, incited by British agents,[34] went on the war-path, torturing and scalping, devastating settlements and killing defenseless men, women and children. Their very name became repulsive to the whites. The society seemed to be callous to this feeling, and began preparations for its annual parades, in the usual Indian costumes, with painted faces, wearing bearskins and carrying papooses. The Federalists declared that these exhibitions, at all times ridiculous and absurd, would be little short of criminal after the cruelties which were being committed by the Tammany men of the wilderness. These attacks affected the Tammany Society so much that a majority of the members, consisting mainly of the politicians and young men, held a secret meeting and abolished all imitations of the Indians, in dress and manners as well as in name, and resolved that the officers should thereafter bear plain English titles.

This war led society to give up its tradition of dressing in Indian outfits.[3] In 1813, the Indians in the Northwest, encouraged by British agents,[34] went on the offensive, torturing and scalping, destroying settlements, and killing defenseless men, women, and children. Their name became hated by the whites. The society seemed indifferent to this sentiment and began planning its annual parades, in traditional Indian costumes, with painted faces, wearing bearskins and carrying babies. The Federalists argued that these displays, always silly and ridiculous, would be practically criminal given the atrocities being committed by the Tammany men in the wilderness. These attacks impacted the Tammany Society so much that most of the members, made up mainly of politicians and young men, held a secret meeting and eliminated all references to Indians in their dress and behavior as well as in name, deciding that the officers would thereafter use plain English titles.

Mooney opposed the change.[4] He would not listen to having those picturesque and native ceremonies, which he himself had ordained, wiped out. He resigned as Grand Sachem, and many of the Sachems went with him. On May 1, 1813, Benjamin Romaine was elected Grand Sachem, and other “reformers” were chosen as Sachems. On July 4 the Tammany Society marched with reduced numbers in ordinary civilian garb. From that time the society contented itself with civilian costume until 1825, when its parades ceased.

Mooney was against the change.[4] He refused to let those beautiful and local ceremonies, which he had originally established, be erased. He stepped down as Grand Sachem, and many of the Sachems joined him. On May 1, 1813, Benjamin Romaine was elected Grand Sachem, and other “reformers” were selected as Sachems. On July 4, the Tammany Society marched with fewer members in regular civilian clothes. From then on, the society stuck to civilian attire until 1825, when its parades came to an end.

The attitude of the political parties to the war had the effect of making Tammany Hall the predominant force in the State, and of disorganizing the Federalist party beyond hope of recovery. Tammany began in 1813 to organize for the control of the State and to put down for all time De Witt Clinton, whom it denounced as having tried to paralyze the energies of Madison’s administration. Meanwhile the Federalist leaders in the city, with a singular lack of tact, were constantly offending the[35] popular feeling with their political doctrines and their haughty airs of superior citizenship. To such an extent was this carried that at times they were mobbed, as on June 29, 1814, for celebrating the return of the Bourbons to the French throne.

The way the political parties reacted to the war made Tammany Hall the main power in the State and completely disbanded the Federalist party. Tammany started organizing in 1813 to take control of the State and to permanently remove De Witt Clinton, whom they accused of trying to weaken Madison’s administration. Meanwhile, the Federalist leaders in the city, lacking any tact, kept offending the[35] public with their political beliefs and their arrogant attitude of being better citizens. This went so far that they were sometimes mobbed, like on June 29, 1814, when they celebrated the return of the Bourbons to the French throne.

The organization of Tammany Hall, begun, as has been seen, by the formation of the general, nominating and correspondence committees, in 1806 and 1808, was now further elaborated. A finance committee, whose duty it was to gather for the leaders a suitable campaign fund, was created, and this was followed by the creation of the Republican Young Men’s General Committee,[5] which was a sort of auxiliary to the general committee, having limited powers, and serving as a province for the ambitions of the young men. The Democratic-Republican General Committee was supposed to comprise only the trusted ward leaders, ripe with years and experience. About the beginning of the War of 1812, it added to its duties the issuing of long public addresses on political topics. These general committees were made self-perpetuating. At the close of every year they would issue a notice to the voters when and where to meet for the election of their successors. No sooner did the committee of one year step out than the newly elected committee instantly took its place. There were also ward or vigilance committees, which were expected to bring every Tammany-Republican voter to the polls, to see that no Federalist intimidation was attempted and to campaign for the party. The Tammany Hall organization was in a superb state by the year 1814, and in active operation ceaselessly. The Federalists, on the contrary, were scarcely organized, and the Clintonites had declined to a mere faction.

The organization of Tammany Hall, which started, as we've seen, with the creation of the general, nominating, and correspondence committees in 1806 and 1808, was now further developed. A finance committee was established to gather a proper campaign fund for the leaders, followed by the creation of the Republican Young Men’s General Committee,[5], which acted as a sort of support group for the general committee, having limited powers, and providing a space for the ambitions of young men. The Democratic-Republican General Committee was meant to consist only of trusted ward leaders, seasoned and experienced. Around the start of the War of 1812, it took on the responsibility of issuing lengthy public addresses on political issues. These general committees became self-perpetuating. At the end of each year, they would notify voters when and where to meet to elect their successors. As soon as one year’s committee stepped down, the newly elected committee would immediately take over. There were also ward or vigilance committees expected to ensure that every Tammany-Republican voter made it to the polls, to prevent any Federalist intimidation, and to campaign for the party. By 1814, the Tammany Hall organization was in excellent shape and operating continuously. In contrast, the Federalists were barely organized, and the Clintonites had dwindled to just a small faction.

The Tammany leaders, moreover, were shrewd and conciliating. About forty Federalists—disgusted, they[36] said, with their party’s opposition to the war—joined the Tammany Society. They were led by Gulian C. Verplanck, who severely assailed Clinton, much to the Wigwam’s delight. Tammany Hall not only received them with warmth, but advanced nearly all of them, such as Jacob Radcliff, Richard Hadfelt, Richard Riker and Hugh Maxwell, to the first public positions. This was about the beginning of that policy, never since abandoned, by which Tammany Hall has frequently broken up opposing parties or factions. The winning over of leaders from the other side and conferring upon them rewards in the form of profitable public office or contracts has been one of the most notable methods of Tammany’s diplomacy.

The Tammany leaders were smart and accommodating. About forty Federalists—fed up, they said, with their party’s opposition to the war—joined the Tammany Society. They were led by Gulian C. Verplanck, who harshly criticized Clinton, much to the Wigwam’s satisfaction. Tammany Hall not only welcomed them warmly but also promoted nearly all of them, like Jacob Radcliff, Richard Hadfelt, Richard Riker, and Hugh Maxwell, to top public positions. This was the start of a strategy, which has never been abandoned, by which Tammany Hall has often disrupted opposing parties or factions. Winning over leaders from the other side and rewarding them with lucrative public office or contracts has been one of Tammany’s most notable diplomatic tactics.

FOOTNOTES

[1] MS. Minutes of the Common Council, Vol. 72, p. 137. Judge Irving and an Aldermanic committee, after a searching investigation, found Valentine guilty of receiving from prisoners money for which he did not account to the city.

[1] MS. Minutes of the Common Council, Vol. 72, p. 137. Judge Irving and an Aldermanic committee, after a thorough investigation, found Valentine guilty of accepting money from prisoners that he did not report to the city.

[2] Hammond, Vol. I, p. 294.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Hammond, Vol. 1, p. 294.

[3] R. S. Guernsey, New York City During the War of 1812.

[3] R. S. Guernsey, New York City During the War of 1812.

[4] Mooney had now become opulent, being the owner of three or four houses and lots.

[4] Mooney was now wealthy, owning three or four houses and lots.

[5] The moving spirit in this committee for some years was Samuel L. Berrian, who had been indicted in August, 1811, for instigating a riot in Trinity Church, convicted and fined $100.

[5] The driving force behind this committee for several years was Samuel L. Berrian, who was charged in August 1811 for inciting a riot at Trinity Church, found guilty, and fined $100.


CHAPTER V
Tammany in Total Control.
1815-1817

By 1815 Tammany Hall obtained control of the State, and in 1816 completely regained that of the city. The Common Council and its dependent offices since 1809 had been more or less under Federalist rule, and from the beginning of the century the city had had a succession of Clintonite office-holders in those posts controlled by the Council of Appointment.

By 1815, Tammany Hall took control of the state, and by 1816, it fully regained control of the city. The Common Council and its related offices had been largely under Federalist control since 1809, and throughout the early 1800s, the city had a series of Clintonite officials in the positions managed by the Council of Appointment.

At the close of the War of 1812 the population of the city approached 100,000, and there were 13,941 voters in all. The total expenses of the municipality reached a little over a million dollars. The city had but one public school, which was maintained by public subscription. Water was supplied chiefly by the Manhattan Company, by means of bored wooden logs laid underground from the reservoir in Chambers street. No fire department was dreamed of, and every blaze had the city at its mercy. The streets were uncleaned; only two or three thoroughfares were fit for the passage of carriages, though until 1834 the law required the inhabitants to clean the streets in front of their houses. Many of those elaborate departments which we now associate with political control were then either in an embryo state or not thought of.

At the end of the War of 1812, the city's population was close to 100,000, and there were 13,941 registered voters. The total expenses of the city reached just over a million dollars. The city had only one public school, which was funded through public donations. Water was mainly supplied by the Manhattan Company, using bored wooden logs buried underground from the reservoir on Chambers Street. There was no fire department, leaving the city vulnerable to any fire. The streets were dirty; only two or three main roads were suitable for carriages, although until 1834, the law required residents to clean the streets in front of their homes. Many of the complex departments we now associate with political management were either just starting out or completely unimagined at that time.

The Aldermen were not overburdened with public anxieties. No salary was attached to the office, yet none the less, it was sought industriously. In early days it was regarded as a post of honor and filled as such, but with the[38] beginning of the century it was made a means of profit. The professional politician of the type of to-day was rare. The Aldermen had business, as a rule, upon which they depended and to which they attended in the day, holding sessions of the board sporadically at night. The only exception to this routine was when the Alderman performed some judicial office. Under the law, as soon as an Alderman entered office he became a judge of some of the most important courts, being obliged to preside with the Mayor at the trial of criminals. This system entailed upon the Aldermen the trial of offenses against laws many of which they themselves made, and it had an increasingly pernicious influence upon politics. Otherwise the sole legal perquisites and compensation of the Aldermen consisted in their power and custom of making appropriations, including those for elaborate public dinners for themselves. It was commonly known that they awarded contracts for city necessaries either to themselves or to their relatives.

The Aldermen weren’t overwhelmed by public concerns. Although there was no salary for the position, it was still actively pursued. In the early days, it was seen as an honorable role and was filled accordingly, but as the century began, it turned into a way to make money. The professional politician we see today was uncommon back then. Generally, the Aldermen had businesses they relied on and attended to during the day, holding board meetings sporadically at night. The only exception to this routine was when an Alderman was acting in a judicial capacity. By law, as soon as an Alderman took office, they became a judge in some of the most important courts, required to preside with the Mayor at criminal trials. This system put the Aldermen in charge of trying offenses against laws that many of them had created, which increasingly harmed the integrity of politics. Otherwise, the only legal benefits and compensation for the Aldermen included their ability and tradition of making appropriations, including those for lavish public dinners for themselves. It was well-known that they awarded contracts for city necessities either to themselves or to their family members.

The backward state of the city, its filthy and neglected condition and the chaotic state of public improvements and expenditures, excited little public discussion. The Common Councils were composed of men of inferior mind. It is told of one of them that hearing that the King of France had taken umbrage he ran home post haste to get his atlas and find out the location of that particular spot. In the exclusive charge of such a body New York City would have struggled along but slowly had it not been for the courage and genius of the man who at one stroke started it on a dazzling career of prosperity. This was De Witt Clinton.

The poor condition of the city, its dirty and neglected state, and the disorganized public improvements and spending barely sparked any public discussion. The Common Councils were made up of less capable individuals. There’s a story about one of them who, upon hearing that the King of France was upset, rushed home to get his atlas and figure out where that place was. With such a group in charge, New York City would have barely gotten by if it weren’t for the boldness and brilliance of the man who, in one decisive move, set it on a brilliant path to success. That man was De Witt Clinton.

No sooner did a Republican Council of Appointment step into office, early in 1815, than Tammany Hall pressed for the removal of Clinton as Mayor and announced that John Ferguson, the Grand Sachem of the Society, would have to be appointed in his place.[1] The[39] Council, at the head of which was Gov. Tompkins, wavered and delayed, Tompkins not caring to offend the friends of Clinton by the latter’s summary removal. At this the entire Tammany representation, which had gone to Albany for the purpose, grew furious and threatened that not only would they nominate no ticket the next Spring, but would see that none of their friends should accept office under the Council, did it fail to remove Clinton. This action implied the turning out of the Council of Appointment at the next election. Yielding to these menaces, the Council removed Clinton. Then by a compromise, Ferguson was made Mayor until the National Government should appoint him Naval Officer when Jacob Radcliff (Mayor 1810-1811) was to succeed him—an arrangement which was carried out.[2]

As soon as a Republican Council of Appointment took office early in 1815, Tammany Hall pushed for the removal of Clinton as Mayor and declared that John Ferguson, the Grand Sachem of the Society, needed to be appointed in his place.[1] The[39] Council, led by Gov. Tompkins, hesitated and postponed their decision, as Tompkins didn't want to upset Clinton's supporters by firing him outright. This made the entire Tammany delegation, which had come to Albany for this reason, furious. They threatened that not only would they not nominate a ticket the following Spring, but they would also make sure that none of their allies would take a position under the Council if Clinton wasn't removed. This threat suggested that the Council of Appointment would be ousted in the next election. Bowing to this pressure, the Council decided to remove Clinton. Then, through a compromise, Ferguson was appointed Mayor until the National Government appointed him as Naval Officer, at which point Jacob Radcliff (Mayor 1810-1811) would take over—an arrangement that was implemented.[2]

The Wigwam was overjoyed at having struck down Clinton, and now expected many years of supremacy. From youth Clinton’s sole occupation had been politics. He had spent his yearly salaries and was deeply in debt. His political aspirations seemed doomed. Stripped, as he appeared, of a party or even a fraction of one, the Sachems felt sure of his retirement to private life forever. In this belief they were as much animated by personal as by political enmity. Clinton had sneered at or ridiculed nearly all of them, and he spoke of them habitually in withering terms.

The Wigwam was thrilled to have defeated Clinton and now expected to enjoy many years of dominance. Since his youth, Clinton had focused solely on politics. He had spent his annual salaries and was deeply in debt. His political ambitions seemed doomed. Stripped, as he was, of any party or even a small faction, the Sachems felt certain he would retire from public life for good. In this belief, they were driven by both personal and political rivalry. Clinton had mocked or ridiculed almost all of them, often speaking of them in harsh terms.

Besides, to enlarge their power in the city they needed the Mayor’s office. The Mayor had the right to appoint a Deputy Mayor from among the Aldermen, the Deputy Mayor acting with full power in his absence. The Mayor could convene the Common Council, and he appointed and licensed marshals, porters, carriers, cartmen, carmen, cryers, scullers and scavengers, and removed them at[40] pleasure. He licensed tavern-keepers and all who sold excisable liquors by retail. The Mayor, the Deputy Mayor, Recorder and Aldermen were ex-officio Justices of the Peace, and were empowered to hold Courts of General Sessions. The Mayor, Recorder and Aldermen were also Justices of Oyer and Terminer; and the Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Recorder could preside over the Court of Common Pleas with or without the Aldermen. The gathering of all this power into its own control gave further strength to Tammany Hall.

Besides, to increase their power in the city, they needed the Mayor’s office. The Mayor had the authority to appoint a Deputy Mayor from among the Aldermen, who would act with full power in his absence. The Mayor could call meetings of the Common Council, and he appointed and licensed marshals, porters, carriers, cartmen, carmen, cryers, scullers, and scavengers, removing them at[40] his discretion. He also licensed tavern-keepers and anyone selling exciseable liquor retail. The Mayor, Deputy Mayor, Recorder, and Aldermen were ex-officio Justices of the Peace and could hold Courts of General Sessions. The Mayor, Recorder, and Aldermen were also Justices of Oyer and Terminer, and the Mayor, Deputy Mayor, and Recorder could preside over the Court of Common Pleas with or without the Aldermen. Consolidating all this power gave Tammany Hall even more strength.

But the expressions of regret at Clinton’s removal were so spontaneous and sincere that Tammany feigned participation in them and took the utmost pains to represent the removal as only a political exigency. The Common Council (which was now Federalist) passed, on March 21, 1815, a vote of thanks to Clinton for his able administration.[3] Curiously, the very Wigwam men who had made it their business to undertake the tedious travel over bad roads to Albany to effect his removal (Aldermen Smith, George Buckmaster, Mann and Burtis) voted loudest in favor of the resolution.

But the expressions of regret over Clinton’s removal were so genuine and heartfelt that Tammany pretended to share in them and worked hard to portray the removal as just a political necessity. The Common Council (which was now Federalist) passed a vote of thanks to Clinton for his effective administration on March 21, 1815.[3] Interestingly, the very men from the Wigwam who had taken it upon themselves to make the difficult journey over rough roads to Albany to secure his removal (Aldermen Smith, George Buckmaster, Mann, and Burtis) voiced the loudest support for the resolution.

Out of office, Clinton found time to agitate for the building of a navigable canal between the great western lakes and the tide waters of the Hudson. The idea of this enterprise was not original with him. It had been suggested over thirty years before, but it was he who carried it forward to success. The bigotry and animus with which it was assailed were amazing. Tammany Hall frequently passed resolutions denouncing the project as impracticable and chimerical, declaring that the canal would make a ditch fit to bury its author in. At Albany the Tammany representatives greeted the project with a burst of mockery, and placed obstacle after obstacle in its path.

Out of office, Clinton found time to push for a navigable canal between the great western lakes and the tidewaters of the Hudson. The idea for this project wasn't new; it had been proposed over thirty years earlier, but he was the one who brought it to fruition. The prejudice and hostility it faced were astounding. Tammany Hall often passed resolutions condemning the project as impractical and unrealistic, claiming the canal would create a ditch suitable for burying its creator. At Albany, the Tammany representatives responded to the project with ridicule and put one hurdle after another in its way.

In the intervals of warring upon Clinton, Tammany[41] was adroitly seizing every post of vantage in the city. The Burr men ruled its councils and directed the policy and nominations of the Republican, or, as it was getting to be more generally known, the Democratic-Republican party. Three men, in particular, were foremost as leaders—George Buckmaster, a boat builder; Roger Strong and Benjamin Prince, a druggist and physician. Teunis Wortman, one of the energetic leaders in 1807-10, was now not quite so conspicuous. What the Wigwam lacked to make its rule in the city complete was a majority in the Common Council. The committees of the Council not only had the exclusive power of expenditures, but they invariably refused an acceptable accounting.[4] The Federalists, though vanishing as a party owing to their attitude in the recent war, still managed, through local dissensions among the Republicans, to retain control of the Common Council. The Federalists, therefore, held the key to the purse. It had always been customary for the Mayor to appoint the Common Council committees from the party which happened to be dominant.

In the midst of the conflicts with Clinton, Tammany[41] was skillfully taking advantage of every opportunity in the city. The Burr faction controlled its councils and set the policies and nominations for the Republican Party, which was increasingly referred to as the Democratic-Republican Party. Three men stood out as key leaders—George Buckmaster, a boat builder; Roger Strong; and Benjamin Prince, a druggist and doctor. Teunis Wortman, one of the active leaders from 1807 to 1810, was now less prominent. What the Wigwam needed to solidify its power in the city was a majority in the Common Council. The committees of the Council not only had exclusive control over expenditures but also routinely denied adequate accounting.[4] The Federalists, although fading as a party due to their stance in the recent war, still managed to maintain control of the Common Council through local divisions among the Republicans. As a result, the Federalists held the key to the budget. Traditionally, it had been standard for the Mayor to appoint the Common Council committees from the dominant party.

Established forms meant nothing to Mayor Radcliff and to Buckmaster[5] and other Tammany Aldermen, who late in December, 1815, decided to turn out the Federalist chairmen of committees and put Tammany men in their[42] places. Radcliff imprudently printed a handbill of officers he intended appointing, copies of which he sent to his partizans. A copy fell into a Federalist’s hands. At the next meeting, before the Mayor could get a chance to act, the Federalist majority altered the rules so as to vest in future the appointment of all committees in a majority of the board. The Sachems were so enraged at Radcliff’s bungling that they declared they would have him removed from office. About a year afterward they carried out their threat.

Established systems meant nothing to Mayor Radcliff and Buckmaster[5] and other Tammany Aldermen, who in late December 1815 decided to dismiss the Federalist committee chairmen and replace them with Tammany supporters[42]. Radcliff foolishly printed a handbill listing the officers he planned to appoint and sent copies to his allies. One copy got into the hands of a Federalist. At the next meeting, before the Mayor could take action, the Federalist majority changed the rules so that in the future, the appointment of all committees would be decided by a majority of the board. The Sachems were so furious at Radcliff’s mistake that they announced they would have him removed from office. About a year later, they followed through on that threat.

In 1816 Tammany elected not only its Congress and Assembly ticket, but a Common Council, by over 1000 majority out of 9000 votes. This victory was the result of the wily policy of further disrupting the Federalist party by nominating its most popular men. Walter Bowne, a late Federalist, an enemy of Clinton and a man of standing in the community, was one of those nominated by Tammany Hall for State Senator, and the support of the wealthy was solicited by the selection of men of their own class, such as Col. Rutgers, said to be the richest man in the State.

In 1816, Tammany not only elected its Congress and Assembly candidates but also a Common Council, winning by over 1,000 votes out of 9,000. This victory came from a clever strategy to further divide the Federalist party by nominating its most popular members. Walter Bowne, a former Federalist, an opponent of Clinton, and a respected figure in the community, was one of those chosen by Tammany Hall for State Senator. The support of the wealthy was sought by selecting individuals from their own social class, like Col. Rutgers, who was said to be the richest man in the State.

Most of Tammany’s early members, certainly the leaders, were now rich and had stepped into the upper middle class; but their wealth could not quite secure them admittance to that stiff aristocracy above them, which demanded something more of a passport than the possession of money. Another body of members were the small tradesmen and the like, to whom denunciations of the aristocracy were extremely palatable. A third class, that of the mechanics and laborers, believed that Tammany Hall exclusively represented them in its onslaughts on the aristocracy. From the demands of these various interests arose the singular sight of Tammany Hall winning the support of the rich by systematically catering to them; of the middle class, which it reflected, and of the poor, in whose interests it claimed to work. The spirit of the Tammany Society was well illustrated in its odd[43] address on public affairs in 1817, wherein it lamented the spread of the foreign game of billiards among the aristocratic youth and the prevalence of vice among the lower classes. Again, in May, 1817, the Tammany majority of the Common Council, under pressure from the religious element, passed an ordinance fining every person $5 who should hunt, shoot, fish, spar or play on Sunday—a law which cut off from the poor their favorite pastimes.

Most of Tammany’s early members, especially the leaders, were now wealthy and had moved into the upper middle class; however, their money alone couldn’t get them into the rigid aristocracy above them, which required more than just wealth for acceptance. Another group of members consisted of small tradespeople who found the criticisms of the aristocracy very appealing. A third group included mechanics and laborers who believed that Tammany Hall solely represented their interests against the aristocracy. From the demands of these different groups emerged the unique situation of Tammany Hall gaining support from the wealthy by catering to them, from the middle class, which it mirrored, and from the poor, whom it claimed to serve. The essence of the Tammany Society was clearly shown in its unusual[43] statement on public affairs in 1817, where it expressed concern about the spread of the foreign game of billiards among aristocratic youth and the rise of vice among the lower classes. Then, in May 1817, the Tammany majority in the Common Council, under pressure from religious groups, passed a law that fined anyone $5 for hunting, shooting, fishing, boxing, or playing on Sundays—a law that took away the favorite pastimes of the poor.

Here, too, another of the secrets by which the organization was enabled to thrive, should be mentioned. This was the “regularity” of its nominations. Teunis Wortman, a few years before, had disclosed the real substance of the principle of “regularity” when he wrote: “The nominating power is an omnipotent one. Though it approaches us in the humble attitude of the recommendation, its influence is irresistible. Every year’s experience demonstrates that its recommendations are commands. That instead of presenting a choice it deprives us of all option.”[6] The plain meaning was that, regardless of the candidate’s character, the mass of the party would vote for him once he happened to be put forth on the “regular” ticket. Fully alive to the value of this particular power, the Tammany Hall General Committee, successively and unfailingly, would invite in its calls for all meetings “those friendly to regular nominations.” Its answer to charges of dictatorship was plain and direct. Discipline was necessary, its leaders said, to prevent aristocrats from disrupting their party by inciting a variety of nominations.

Here, too, another secret that helped the organization thrive should be mentioned. This was the “regularity” of its nominations. A few years earlier, Teunis Wortman had revealed the core of the principle of “regularity” when he wrote: “The nominating power is an all-powerful one. Even though it approaches us with the humble request of a recommendation, its influence is undeniable. Every year’s experience shows that its recommendations are commands. Instead of offering a choice, it takes away all options.”[6] The clear meaning was that, regardless of a candidate's character, the party would vote for him as long as he was on the “regular” ticket. Fully aware of the importance of this power, the Tammany Hall General Committee would consistently invite “those friendly to regular nominations” to all its meetings. Its response to accusations of dictatorship was straightforward. The leaders argued that discipline was essential to prevent aristocrats from undermining their party by provoking a range of nominations.

It was through this fertile agency that “bossism” became an easy possibility. With the voters in such a receptive state of mind it was not difficult to dictate nominations. The general committee was composed of thirty members; its meetings were secret and attended seldom by more than fourteen members. So, substantially,[44] fourteen men were acting for over five thousand Republican voters, and eight members of the fourteen composed a majority. Yet the system had all the pretense of being pure democracy; the wards were called upon at regular intervals to elect delegates; the latter chose candidates or made party rules; and the “great popular meeting” accepted or rejected nominees; it all seemed to spring directly from the people.

It was through this influential method that “bossism” became an easy reality. With voters in such an open mindset, it wasn’t hard to control nominations. The general committee had thirty members; its meetings were secret and rarely attended by more than fourteen members. So essentially,[44] fourteen men were making decisions for over five thousand Republican voters, and eight of those fourteen made up the majority. However, the system maintained the illusion of being pure democracy; the wards were regularly called to elect delegates; these delegates chose candidates or set party rules; and the “great popular meeting” accepted or rejected nominees; it all appeared to come directly from the people.

This exquisitely working machine was in full order when the organization secured a firm hold upon the city in 1816. The newly elected Common Council removed every Federalist possible and put a stanch Tammany man in his place. The Federalist Captains of Police and the heads and subordinates of many departments whose appointments and removal were vested in the Common Council were all ejected. This frequent practice of changes in the police force, solely because of political considerations, had a demoralizing effect upon the welfare of the city.

This extremely efficient machine was fully operational when the organization took control of the city in 1816. The newly elected Common Council ousted every Federalist they could and replaced them with loyal Tammany members. The Federalist Captains of Police and many leaders and staff from various departments, whose appointments and removals were managed by the Common Council, were all removed. This constant practice of changing the police force for political reasons had a negative impact on the city's well-being.

Both parties were as responsible for this state of affairs as they were for the increase in the city’s debt. To provide revenue the Aldermen repeatedly caused to be sold ground owned by the municipality in the heart of the city. This was one of their clumsy or fraudulent methods of concealing the squandering of city funds, on what no one knew. They were not ignorant that with the growth of the city the value of the land would increase vastly. It was perhaps for this very reason they sold it; for it was generally themselves or the Tammany leaders who were the buyers. One sale was of land fronting Bowling Green, among the purchasers being John Swartwout, Jacob Barker and John Sharpe. A hint as to the fraudulent ways in which the Tammany leaders became rich is furnished by a report made to the Common Council respecting land in Hamilton Square, bought from the city by Jacob Barker, John S. Hunn and others. The report[45] stated that repeated applications for the payment of principal and interest had been made without effect.[7]

Both parties were just as accountable for this situation as they were for the city’s growing debt. To generate revenue, the Aldermen repeatedly sold off land owned by the municipality in the center of the city. This was one of their clumsy or dishonest ways of hiding the waste of city funds, the purpose of which no one understood. They weren’t unaware that, as the city expanded, the value of the land would skyrocket. It’s possible they sold it for this very reason; it was usually themselves or the Tammany leaders who ended up being the buyers. One particular sale involved land facing Bowling Green, with purchasers including John Swartwout, Jacob Barker, and John Sharpe. A report submitted to the Common Council regarding land in Hamilton Square, purchased from the city by Jacob Barker, John S. Hunn, and others, gives a hint about the shady ways in which the Tammany leaders got rich. The report[45] indicated that multiple requests for the payment of principal and interest had been made without any response.[7]

By 1817 the Federalists in New York City were crushed, quite beyond hope of resurrection as a winning party. The only remaining fear was Clinton, whose political death the organization celebrated prematurely. Public opinion was one factor Tammany had not conquered.

By 1817, the Federalists in New York City were defeated, with no hope of coming back as a successful party. The only remaining worry was Clinton, whose political demise the organization celebrated too soon. Public opinion was one thing Tammany had not managed to overcome.

This inclined more and more daily to the support of Clinton. Notwithstanding all the opposition which narrow-mindedness and hatred could invent, Clinton’s grand project of the Erie Canal became popular—distinctively so throughout the State, then so greatly agricultural. On April 15, 1817, the bill pledging the State to the building of the canal became a law, the Tammany delegation and all their friends voting against it.

This leaned more and more towards supporting Clinton every day. Despite all the opposition that narrow-mindedness and hatred could come up with, Clinton’s big plan for the Erie Canal became popular—especially throughout the mostly agricultural State. On April 15, 1817, the bill committing the State to build the canal was signed into law, with the Tammany delegation and all their allies voting against it.

Gov. Tompkins becoming Vice-President, a special election to fill the gubernatorial vacancy became necessary. A new and powerful junction of Clinton’s old friends and the disunited Federalists joined in nominating him to succeed Tompkins. This was bitter news to Tammany, which made heroic efforts to defeat him, nominating as its candidate Peter B. Porter, and sending tickets with his name into every county in the State.

Gov. Tompkins becoming Vice President meant a special election was needed to fill the governor's position. A new and strong alliance of Clinton’s old supporters and the divided Federalists came together to nominate him as Tompkins' successor. This was disappointing news for Tammany, which worked hard to defeat him by nominating Peter B. Porter as their candidate and distributing tickets with his name across every county in the State.

Inopportunely for the Wigwam, the resentment of the Irish broke out against it at this time. Tammany’s long-continued refusal to give the Irish proper representation among its nominations, either in the society or for public office, irritated them greatly. On February 7, a writer in a newspaper over the signature “Connal,” averred in an open letter to Matthew L. Davis that on the evening of February 3, the Tammany Society had considered a resolution for the adoption of a new constitution, the object of which was to exclude foreigners entirely from holding office in the society. This may not have been strictly true, but the anti-foreign feeling in the organization[46] was unquestionably strong. The Irish had sought, some time before, to have the organization nominate for Congress Thomas Addis Emmett, an Irish orator and patriot and an ardent friend of Clinton. As Tammany Hall since 1802 had not only invariably excommunicated all Clintonites, but had broken up such Clinton meetings as were held, this demand was refused without discussion. The Irish grew to regard Tammany Hall as the home of bigotry; the Wigwam, in turn, was resolved not to alienate the prejudiced native support by recognizing foreigners; furthermore, the Irish were held to be Clintonites trying to get into Tammany Hall and control it.

Unfortunately for the Wigwam, the frustration of the Irish erupted against it at this time. Tammany’s long-standing refusal to give the Irish proper representation in its nominations, whether in the society or for public office, greatly irritated them. On February 7, a writer in a newspaper under the name “Connal” claimed in an open letter to Matthew L. Davis that on the evening of February 3, the Tammany Society had discussed a resolution to adopt a new constitution aimed at completely excluding foreigners from holding office in the society. This may not have been entirely accurate, but the anti-foreigner sentiment in the organization[46] was undoubtedly strong. The Irish had previously attempted to have the organization nominate Thomas Addis Emmett, an Irish speaker and patriot, and a passionate supporter of Clinton, for Congress. Since Tammany Hall had consistently excommunicated all Clinton supporters since 1802 and had disrupted any Clinton meetings that took place, this request was denied without any discussion. The Irish began to see Tammany Hall as a center of bigotry; meanwhile, the Wigwam was determined not to alienate its biased native support by recognizing foreigners. Additionally, the Irish were viewed as Clinton supporters trying to infiltrate Tammany Hall and gain control over it.

The long-smouldering enmity burst out on the night of April 24, 1817, when the general committee was in session. Two hundred Irishmen, assembled at Dooley’s Long Room, marched in rank to the Wigwam and broke into the meeting room. The intention of their leaders was to impress upon the committee the wisdom of nominating Emmett for Congress, as well as other Irish Catholics on the Tammany ticket in future, but the more fiery spirits at once started a fight. Eyes were blackened, noses and heads battered freely. The invaders broke the furniture, using it for weapons and shattering it maliciously; tore down the fixtures and shivered the windows. Reinforcements arriving, the intruders were driven out, but not before nearly all present had been bruised and beaten.[8]

The long-standing rivalry erupted on the night of April 24, 1817, while the general committee was in session. Two hundred Irishmen, gathered at Dooley’s Long Room, marched in formation to the Wigwam and broke into the meeting room. Their leaders aimed to convince the committee to nominate Emmett for Congress and to support other Irish Catholics on the Tammany ticket in the future, but the more hot-headed members immediately started a fight. Eyes were blackened, and noses and heads were battered without restraint. The invaders destroyed furniture, using it as weapons and maliciously shattering it; they tore down fixtures and smashed the windows. When reinforcements arrived, the intruders were driven out, but not before almost everyone present had been bruised and beaten.[8]

Clinton received an overwhelming majority for Governor, Porter obtaining a ridiculously small vote in both New York City and the rest of the State.[9] Thus in the feud between Tammany Hall and DeWitt Clinton, the latter, lacking a political machine and basing his contest solely on a political idea—that of internal improvements—emerged triumphant.

Clinton won a huge majority for Governor, while Porter got a laughably small number of votes in both New York City and the rest of the State.[9] In the rivalry between Tammany Hall and DeWitt Clinton, the latter, without a political machine and focusing his campaign strictly on a political idea—internal improvements—came out on top.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Hammond, Vol. I, p. 399.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Hammond, Vol. 1, p. 399.

[2] Valentine in his Manual of the Common Council of New York, for 1842-44, p. 163, states that Ferguson held on to both offices until President Monroe required him to say which office he preferred. Ferguson soon after resigned the Mayoralty. He held the other post until his death in 1832.

[2] Valentine in his Manual of the Common Council of New York, for 1842-44, p. 163, mentions that Ferguson kept both positions until President Monroe asked him to choose one. Ferguson shortly after stepped down from being Mayor. He stayed in the other role until he passed away in 1832.

[3] MS. Minutes of the Common Council, Vol. 29, p. 150.

[3] MS. Minutes of the Common Council, Vol. 29, p. 150.

[4] As late as July 28, 1829, the Common Council refused such an accounting. Charles King, a prominent citizen, memorialized the Council, through Alderman Lozier, to furnish an itemized statement of the expenditure of over half a million dollars for the previous fiscal year. By a vote of 15 to 6 the Council refused to grant the request. A public agitation on the question following, the board later rescinded its action, and supplied the statement.

[4] As recently as July 28, 1829, the Common Council denied such a request for an accounting. Charles King, a well-known citizen, petitioned the Council, through Alderman Lozier, to provide a detailed report of the spending of over half a million dollars from the previous fiscal year. The Council voted 15 to 6 to deny the request. After public outcry on the issue, the board later overturned its decision and provided the report.

[5] Buckmaster had a record. On October 9, 1815, the Common Council passed a secret resolution to sell $440,000 of United States bonds it held at 97—the stock being then under par. About $30,000 worth was disposed of at that figure, when the officials found that not a dollar’s worth more could be sold. Investigation followed. Gould Hoyt proved that Buckmaster had disclosed the secret to certain Wall street men, who, taking advantage of the city’s plight, forced the sale of the stock at 95. Buckmaster was chairman of the general committee in 1815 and at other times, and chairman of the nominating committee in 1820.

[5] Buckmaster had a record. On October 9, 1815, the Common Council passed a secret resolution to sell $440,000 of United States bonds at 97—the stock being below par at that time. About $30,000 worth was sold at that rate before the officials realized they couldn't sell any more. An investigation followed. Gould Hoyt proved that Buckmaster had leaked the secret to certain Wall Street men, who, taking advantage of the city's situation, pressured the sale of the stock at 95. Buckmaster was the chairman of the general committee in 1815 and at other times, and he was the chairman of the nominating committee in 1820.

[6] New York Public Advertiser, April 13, 1809. This journal was secretly supported for a time by the funds of the Tammany Society.

[6] New York Public Advertiser, April 13, 1809. This newspaper was secretly funded for a while by the Tammany Society.

[7] MS. Minutes of the Common Council, Vol. 18, p. 359.

[7] Manuscript. Minutes of the Common Council, Vol. 18, p. 359.

[8] The National Advocate, May 10, asserted that the Irish entered Tammany Hall, shouting “Down with the Natives!” but the assertion was denied.

[8] The National Advocate, May 10, claimed that the Irish stormed Tammany Hall, yelling “Down with the Natives!” but this claim was denied.

[9] Clinton’s vote was nearly 44,000; Porter’s not quite 1,400.

[9] Clinton received almost 44,000 votes; Porter got just under 1,400.


CHAPTER VI
CLINTON HOLDS HIS POWER
1817-1820

With Gov. Clinton at the head of the Council of Appointment, Tammany men expected the force of his vengeance. They were not disappointed. He removed many of them for no other reason than that they belonged to the organization.

With Governor Clinton leading the Council of Appointment, Tammany guys anticipated the full force of his wrath. They were not let down. He kicked many of them out for no other reason than that they were part of the organization.

Hoping to make terms with him, the Wigwam Assemblymen, early in 1818, presented to the Council of Appointment a petition praying for the removal of Mayor Radcliff and the appointment in his place of William Paulding, Jr. “Radcliff,” the paper read, “is an unfit person longer to fill that honorable and respectful office.” Clinton smiled at this ambidexterity. It was rumored that he intended to award the honor to Cadwallader D. Colden, a Federalist supporter of the War of 1812, and one of the Federalists Tammany Hall had sent to the Assembly in 1817, as a means of breaking up that party. Colden now let it be understood that he sided with Clinton.

Hoping to make a deal with him, the Wigwam Assemblymen, early in 1818, submitted a petition to the Council of Appointment asking for the removal of Mayor Radcliff and the appointment of William Paulding, Jr. in his place. “Radcliff,” the document stated, “is not a suitable person to continue in that honorable and respected office.” Clinton found this maneuver amusing. There were rumors that he planned to give the position to Cadwallader D. Colden, a Federalist supporter of the War of 1812, and one of the Federalists that Tammany Hall had sent to the Assembly in 1817 as a way to weaken that party. Colden now made it clear that he was aligned with Clinton.

The whole Tammany delegation lived in a single house at Albany and met in a large room, No. 10, in Eagle Tavern. “This system of acting as a separate body,” admitted Tammany’s own organ,[1] “was very injudicious to our city. It created suspicion and distrust among country members; it looked like a separate interest; a combination of a powerful delegation to frown down or overpower[48] the delegation of a smaller county.” Colden did not join in these nightly meetings. One day he was coaxed in to take a glass of wine. To his surprise, upon opening the door of No. 10, he found the delegation in caucus. The meeting seemed to be waiting for him before transacting business. He had scarcely taken a seat, when one of the members arose, and in a long speech protested against any member of the city delegation accepting an office, and suggested that each member should pledge himself not to do so. Colden saw at once that the resolution was directed against himself. He exclaimed energetically against the trickery, declaring that he had not asked for the office of Mayor, but would accept it if offered. The meeting broke up; Colden was appointed Mayor, and Tammany Hall from that time denounced him.

The entire Tammany delegation lived in one house in Albany and gathered in a large room, No. 10, at Eagle Tavern. “This approach of acting as a separate group,” acknowledged Tammany’s own publication,[1] “was really unwise for our city. It created suspicion and distrust among members from the countryside; it appeared as if we had a separate interest, a powerful group trying to intimidate or overpower[48] the delegation from smaller counties.” Colden did not participate in these late-night meetings. One day, he was persuaded to join for a glass of wine. To his surprise, when he opened the door to No. 10, he found the delegation in a session. The meeting seemed to be waiting for him before continuing their discussions. He had barely taken a seat when one of the members stood up and gave a long speech protesting against any member of the city delegation accepting a position, suggesting that each member should promise not to do so. Colden immediately realized that the resolution was aimed at him. He responded passionately against the deceit, stating that he hadn’t asked for the position of Mayor but would accept it if offered. The meeting broke up; Colden was appointed Mayor, and from that point, Tammany Hall denounced him.

In Albany, Clinton was vigorously pushing forward the Erie Canal project; the Tammany men were as aggressively combatting it.[2] While Clinton was thus absorbed in this great public enterprise the Wigwam was enriching its leaders in manifold ways. An instance of this was the noted Barker episode. Jacob Barker was a Sachem, a leader of great influence in the political organization, and such a power in financial and business circles that at one time he defied the United States Bank. He and Matthew L. Davis were Burr’s firmest friends to the hour of Burr’s death. Early in 1818 a bill prohibiting private banking, prepared at the instance of the incorporated banks, which sought a monopoly, passed the Senate; though as a special favor to Barker the Senate exempted from its provisions the latter’s Exchange Bank for three years. But Barker desired an indefinite lease. To create a show of public sentiment he had the hall packed with his friends and creatures on April 14, when resolutions were passed stating that the proposed bill would destroy all competition with the incorporated banks, “benefit the rich, oppress[49] the poor, extend the power of existing aristocracies, and terminate the banking transactions of an individual whose loans have been highly advantageous to many laborious and industrious mechanics and neighboring farmers.” The Legislature granted the privileges Barker asked. A few years later (1826) the sequel to this legislative favoritism appeared in the form of one of the most sensational trials witnessed in early New York.

In Albany, Clinton was actively advancing the Erie Canal project, while the Tammany guys were just as fiercely opposing it.[2] While Clinton was focused on this significant public initiative, the Wigwam was enriching its leaders in various ways. One example of this was the famous Barker episode. Jacob Barker was a Sachem, a highly influential leader within the political organization, and such a force in financial and business circles that he once stood up to the United States Bank. He and Matthew L. Davis were Burr’s staunchest allies until Burr’s death. Early in 1818, a bill banning private banking, pushed by the incorporated banks aiming for a monopoly, passed the Senate; however, as a special favor to Barker, the Senate exempted his Exchange Bank from this for three years. But Barker wanted that exemption to last indefinitely. To create an appearance of public support, he filled the hall with his friends and allies on April 14, when resolutions were passed stating that the proposed bill would eliminate all competition with the incorporated banks, “benefit the rich, oppress the poor, extend the power of existing aristocracies, and end the banking activities of an individual whose loans have been very beneficial to many hardworking mechanics and nearby farmers.” The Legislature granted Barker the privileges he requested. A few years later (1826), the fallout from this legislative favoritism manifested in one of the most sensational trials seen in early New York.

The year 1818 saw Tammany Hall in the unusual position of advocating a protective tariff. The War of 1812 having injured domestic manufacturing, the demand for such a measure was general. Party asperity had softened, and Republicans, or Democrats—as they were coming to be known—and Federalists alike favored it. The society made the best of this popular wave. It issued an address, advising moderate protective duties on foreign goods. But New York then, and until after the Civil War, was a great shipbuilding center; and the shipbuilders and owners and the importing merchants soon influenced Tammany to revert to the stanch advocacy of free trade.

The year 1818 put Tammany Hall in the surprising position of supporting a protective tariff. The War of 1812 had hurt domestic manufacturing, leading to a widespread demand for such a policy. Political tensions had eased, and both Republicans, or Democrats as they were starting to be called, and Federalists supported it. The organization took advantage of this popular sentiment. It released a statement recommending moderate protective tariffs on foreign goods. However, New York was still a major shipbuilding hub at that time and, along with shipbuilders, owners, and importing merchants, soon pressured Tammany to return to strong support for free trade.

The almost complete extinction of national party lines under Monroe caused the disappearance of violent partizan recriminations and brought municipal affairs more to public attention. From 1817 onward public bodies agitated much more forcibly and persistently than before for the correction of certain local evils. Chief among these were the high taxes. In 1817 the city tax levy was $180,000; in 1818 it rose to $250,000, “an enormous amount,” one newspaper said. Though the city received annually $200,000 in rents from houses and lots, for wharves, slips and piers, and also a considerable amount from fines, yet there was a constantly increasing deficit. The city expenses were thought to be too slight to devour the ordinary revenue. The Democratic, or Tammany, officials made attempts to explain that much of the debt was contracted under Federalist Common Councils, and[50] said that sufficient money must be provided or “the poor would starve.”

The nearly complete elimination of national party lines during Monroe’s presidency led to the end of intense partisan arguments and brought local issues into the spotlight. Starting in 1817, public organizations pushed much harder and more consistently than before for the resolution of various local problems. The most significant of these was the high taxes. In 1817, the city's tax levy was $180,000; by 1818, it had jumped to $250,000, which one newspaper called “an enormous amount.” Even though the city brought in $200,000 annually from rents on properties, wharves, slips, and piers, plus a considerable sum from fines, there was still a growing deficit. Many believed city expenses were too low to consume the usual revenue. The Democratic, or Tammany, officials attempted to clarify that much of the debt had been incurred under Federalist Common Councils, and[50] argued that enough money needed to be secured or “the poor would starve.”

At almost the identical time this plea was entered, E. C. Genet was laying before the Grand Jury a statement to this effect: that although it was known that the aggregate capital of the incorporated banks, insurance and commission companies in New York City, exclusive of one branch of the United States Bank, amounted in 1817 to about $22,000,000, in addition to the shares in those companies, yet the city and States taxes combined “on all that vast personal estate in New York City are only a paltry $97,000.”

At almost the same time this plea was submitted, E. C. Genet presented a statement to the Grand Jury saying that although it was known that the total capital of the incorporated banks, insurance companies, and commission companies in New York City, excluding one branch of the United States Bank, was about $22,000,000 in 1817, in addition to the shares in those companies, the combined city and state taxes on all that huge personal estate in New York City were just a measly $97,000.

The explanation of the blindness of the Wigwam officials to the escape of the rich from taxation is simple. The Tammany Hall of 1818 was not the Tammany Hall of 1800. In that interval the poor young men who once had to club together in order to vote had become directors in banking, insurance and various other corporations, which as members of the Legislature or as city officials they themselves had helped to form. Being such, they exerted all the influence of their political machinery to save their property from taxation. From about 1805 to 1837 Tammany Hall was ruled directly by about one-third bankers, one-third merchants and the remaining third politicians of various pursuits. The masses formed—except at rare times—the easily wielded body. The leaders safeguarded their own interests at every point, however they might profess at election times an abhorrence of the aristocracy; and the Grand Jury being of them, ignored Genet’s complaint.

The reason the Wigwam officials didn't notice the wealthy avoiding taxes is straightforward. Tammany Hall in 1818 was very different from Tammany Hall in 1800. During that time, the young poor men who used to band together just to vote had become directors in banking, insurance, and other corporations, which they had helped establish as members of the Legislature or city officials. Because of their positions, they used all the power of their political system to protect their assets from taxation. From around 1805 to 1837, Tammany Hall was directly controlled by about one-third bankers, one-third merchants, and the remaining third was made up of various politicians. The masses generally formed—except at rare moments—a group that could easily be influenced. The leaders consistently protected their own interests at every turn, even if they claimed during elections to detest the aristocracy; meanwhile, the Grand Jury, being made up of them, ignored Genet’s complaint.

A new series of revelations concerning the conduct of Tammany chieftains was made public during 1817-18. Ruggles Hubbard, a one-time Sachem and at the time Sheriff of the county, absconded from the city August 15, 1817, leaving a gap in the treasury.[3] John L. Broome,[51] another Sachem, was shortly after removed from the office of City Clerk by the Council of Appointment for having neglected to take the necessary securities from Hubbard. John P. Haff, a one-time Grand Sachem and long a power in the organization, was removed by President Monroe on November 14, 1818, from the office of Surveyor of the Port, for corruption and general unfitness.[4]

A new series of revelations about the actions of Tammany leaders was made public during 1817-18. Ruggles Hubbard, a former Sachem and the Sheriff of the county at the time, fled the city on August 15, 1817, leaving a deficit in the treasury.[3] John L. Broome,[51] another Sachem, was soon after removed from his position as City Clerk by the Council of Appointment for failing to secure the necessary guarantees from Hubbard. John P. Haff, a former Grand Sachem and a significant figure in the organization, was dismissed by President Monroe on November 14, 1818, from his role as Surveyor of the Port, due to corruption and general incompetence.[4]

But the most sensational of these exposures was that concerning the swindling of the Medical Science Lottery, by which Naphtali Judah[5] and others profited handsomely. The testimony brought out before Mayor Colden, November 10, 1818, showed that a corrupt understanding existed between Judah and one of the lottery’s managers, by which the former was enabled to have a knowledge of the state of the wheel. Not less than $100,000 was drawn on the first day, of which Judah received a large share. Further affidavits were submitted tending to show a corrupt understanding between Judah and Alderman Isaac Denniston in the drawing of the Owego Lottery, by which Denniston won $35,000. John L. Broome was also implicated in the scandal, and Teunis Wortman, while not directly concerned in it, was considered involved by the public, and suffered a complete loss of popular favor,[6] though retaining for some time a certain[52] degree of influence in the society and organization.

But the most shocking of these revelations was about the fraud in the Medical Science Lottery, which allowed Naphtali Judah[5] and others to make a huge profit. The testimony presented to Mayor Colden on November 10, 1818, revealed that there was a corrupt agreement between Judah and one of the lottery’s managers, which enabled Judah to know the status of the wheel. Over $100,000 was won on the first day, of which Judah took a significant portion. Additional affidavits were submitted suggesting a corrupt understanding between Judah and Alderman Isaac Denniston regarding the Owego Lottery, where Denniston won $35,000. John L. Broome was also implicated in the scandal, and Teunis Wortman, while not directly involved, was seen as connected by the public and completely lost their popularity,[6] although they maintained some degree of influence in society and organizations for a while.[52]

Always as popular criticism began to assert itself, Tammany would make a sudden display of patriotism, accompanied by the pronouncement of high-sounding toasts and other exalted utterances. Such it did in 1817, when the society took part in the interment of the remains of Gen. Montgomery in St. Paul’s Church. And now the Sachems prepared to entertain Andrew Jackson at a banquet, and also indirectly signify that he was their choice for President. William Mooney, again elected Grand Sachem, sent to Gen. Jackson, under date of February 15, 1819, a grandiloquent letter of invitation which, referring to the battle of New Orleans, said in part:

Always, when popular criticism started to gain traction, Tammany would suddenly showcase its patriotism, accompanied by the delivery of impressive toasts and other lofty statements. This happened in 1817, when the society participated in the burial of Gen. Montgomery at St. Paul’s Church. Now, the Sachems were preparing to host Andrew Jackson at a banquet, also subtly indicating that he was their preferred candidate for President. William Mooney, re-elected as Grand Sachem, sent Gen. Jackson a flowery letter of invitation dated February 15, 1819, which, referencing the battle of New Orleans, stated in part:

“Columbia’s voice, in peals of iron thunder, proclaimed the dread fiat of that eventful morn! Terra was drenched with human gore! The perturbed elements were hushed! Mars and Bellona retired from the ensanguined field! and godlike Hera resumed her gentle reign.… We approbate your noble deeds and greet you hero. Scourge of British insolence, Spanish perfidy and Indian cruelty—these, sir, are the sentiments of the Sons of Liberty in New York who compose the National Institution of Tammany Society No. 1 of the United States. Here, sir, we guard the patriot flame—‘preserved by concord’—its effulgence, in a blaze of glory, shall surround and accompany you to the temple of interminable fame and honor.”

“Columbia’s voice, with the sound of thunder, declared the terrifying decree of that significant morning! The land was soaked with blood! The chaotic elements were quieted! Mars and Bellona withdrew from the bloody battlefield! and the goddess Hera resumed her gentle rule.… We commend your brave actions and welcome you, hero. You are the scourge of British arrogance, Spanish betrayal, and Indian cruelty—these, sir, are the feelings of the Sons of Liberty in New York who make up the National Institution of Tammany Society No. 1 of the United States. Here, sir, we protect the flame of patriotism—‘preserved by unity’—its brilliance, in a blaze of glory, will surround and follow you to the temple of endless fame and honor.”

Jackson accepted the invitation. Cadwallader D. Colden, who had been reappointed Mayor a few days before, was asked to preside. When, on February 23, the banquet was held and Jackson was called for his toast, Colden arose, and to the consternation of the Tammany men proposed: “De Witt Clinton, the Governor of the great and patriotic State of New York.” This surprising move made it appear that Jackson favored the Clinton party. To counteract the impression, the General instantly[53] left the room, “amidst reiterated applauses,” and a dead silence ensued for three minutes. This incident, it may well be believed, did not dampen the society’s enthusiasm for Jackson; it continued to champion him ardently.

Jackson accepted the invitation. Cadwallader D. Colden, who had been reappointed Mayor just a few days earlier, was asked to preside. When the banquet took place on February 23 and Jackson was called for his toast, Colden stood up and shocked the Tammany men by proposing: “De Witt Clinton, the Governor of the great and patriotic State of New York.” This unexpected move made it seem like Jackson supported the Clinton party. To change that impression, the General quickly[53] left the room, “amidst reiterated applause,” and a dead silence followed for three minutes. This incident, it can be assumed, did not dampen the society’s enthusiasm for Jackson; they continued to support him passionately.

Colden was reappointed Mayor for the third time in February, 1820. Municipal issues were dividing the public consideration with Tammany’s renewed efforts to overthrow Clinton. The report of the Common Council Finance Committee, January 10, 1820, showed that the city would soon be $1,300,000 in debt. An attempt was made to show how the money had been spent on the new City Hall and Bellevue Hospital, but it proved nothing. Although the law expressly prohibited Aldermen from being directly or indirectly interested in any contract or job, violations were common. It was alleged that streets were sunk, raised and sunk again, to enable the contractors to make large claims against the city. To soothe public clamor, the Aldermen made a show of reducing city expenses. The salary of Colden—he being a Clintonite—was reduced $2,500, and the pay of various other city officers was cut down. The salaries of the Wigwam men were not interfered with.

Colden was reappointed Mayor for the third time in February 1820. Municipal issues were capturing public attention along with Tammany’s renewed attempts to oust Clinton. The report from the Common Council Finance Committee on January 10, 1820, revealed that the city was about to be $1,300,000 in debt. An attempt was made to show how the money had been spent on the new City Hall and Bellevue Hospital, but it didn’t prove anything. Although the law clearly prohibited Aldermen from having any direct or indirect interest in contracts or jobs, violations were common. It was claimed that streets were sunk, raised, and sunk again, allowing contractors to make large claims against the city. To calm public outcry, the Aldermen pretended to reduce city expenses. Colden’s salary—since he was a Clintonite—was cut by $2,500, and the pay of several other city officials was also lowered. The salaries of the Wigwam men were not affected.

The wholesome criticism of municipal affairs was soon obscured again by the reviving tumult of the contest between Tammany and Clinton. The Governor stood for reelection against Daniel D. Tompkins in April, 1820. Tompkins had long been the idol of the Tammany men and for a time was one of the society’s Sachems. In 1818 he had been practically charged with being a public defaulter. State Controller Archibald M’Intyre submitted to the Legislature a mass of his vouchers, public and private (for the time Tompkins was Governor), which showed a balance against him of $197,297.64. In this balance, however, was included the sum of $142,763.60 which was not allowed to Tompkins’s credit because the vouchers were insufficient. Allowing Tompkins this[54] amount, the balance against him was $54,533.44. Tompkins, on the other hand, claimed the State owed him $120,000. His partisans in the Senate in 1819 passed a bill to re-imburse him, but it was voted down in the Assembly.[7]

The healthy criticism of city affairs quickly got lost again in the renewed chaos of the fight between Tammany and Clinton. The Governor was running for reelection against Daniel D. Tompkins in April 1820. Tompkins had long been the favorite of the Tammany members and was once one of the society’s leaders. In 1818, he was practically accused of being a public defaulter. State Controller Archibald M’Intyre presented a pile of his vouchers, both public and private (for the time Tompkins served as Governor), which showed a debt against him of $197,297.64. However, this total included $142,763.60 that was not credited to Tompkins because the vouchers were inadequate. If we credit Tompkins this amount, the debt against him becomes $54,533.44. Tompkins, on his part, claimed that the State owed him $120,000. His supporters in the Senate in 1819 passed a bill to reimburse him, but it was rejected in the Assembly.[54][7]

The statements of both sides during the campaign of 1820 were filled with epithets and strings of accusations. Tammany contrasted Clinton’s alleged going over to the British with Tompkins’s patriotism in the War of 1812. Party lines were broken down, and Federalists and Tammany men acted together, as they had done the year before (1819), when their Legislative ticket won over the Clintonites by 2,500 majority. The Clintonites were tauntingly invited to visit the Wigwam, because in that “stronghold of Democracy would be found no ‘Swiss’ Federalism, no British partizans, no opponents of the late war, no bribers or bribed for bank charters, no trimming politicians, no lobby members or legislative brokers.” In Tammany Hall they would see a body of independent yeomen, of steady and unerring Republicans and men who rallied around their country in the hour of danger.[8]

The statements from both sides during the 1820 campaign were packed with insults and accusations. Tammany pointed out Clinton's supposed collaboration with the British and compared it to Tompkins's patriotism during the War of 1812. Party lines faded away, and Federalists joined forces with Tammany members, just like the previous year (1819) when their Legislative ticket defeated the Clintonites by a 2,500 majority. The Clintonites were mockingly invited to the Wigwam, where they were told they would find no “Swiss” Federalism, no British supporters, no critics of the recent war, no bribe-takers for bank charters, no opportunistic politicians, and no lobbyists or legislative brokers. In Tammany Hall, they would see a group of independent farmers, reliable Republicans, and people who stood by their country in times of crisis.[8]

While Clinton’s adherents in New York City on election day were inactive, his opponents, ever on the lookout, carried the city by 675 majority. The popularity of the Erie Canal, however, which was fast nearing completion, carried the rest of the State for Clinton.[9] “Heads up! tails down,” shouted the exuberant, successful Clintonites some days after, pointing to the disappointed, discomfited Bucktails. For Tammany had been so sure of Tompkins’s[55] election that it had procured, at considerable expense, a painting of him which was to be exhibited in the hall when the news of his election should arrive. By way of consolation the Sachems drank to this toast at their anniversary on May 12:

While Clinton's supporters in New York City were inactive on election day, his opponents, always vigilant, won the city by a margin of 675 votes. However, the growing popularity of the Erie Canal, which was nearing completion, helped Clinton secure the rest of the state.[9] “Heads up! Tails down,” shouted the enthusiastic and victorious Clinton supporters a few days later, pointing at the disappointed Bucktails. Tammany had been so confident in Tompkins's[55] election that it had spent a lot of money to commission a painting of him, which was to be displayed in the hall upon receiving the news of his victory. As a consolation, the Sachems raised a toast to this at their anniversary on May 12:

“De Witt Clinton, our lean Governor—
—— May he never get fat,
While he wears two faces under one hat.”

FOOTNOTES

[1] National Advocate, October 7, 1822. A circumstantial account of the meeting referred to on the following page appears in this issue. The paper was edited and owned by M. M. Noah, who became Grand Sachem in 1824.

[1] National Advocate, October 7, 1822. A detailed description of the meeting mentioned on the next page can be found in this issue. The paper was edited and owned by M. M. Noah, who became Grand Sachem in 1824.

[2] Hammond, Vol. I, p. 450.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Hammond, Vol. 1, p. 450.

[3] In what year Hubbard was Sachem is uncertain. His name is included in Horton’s list. He was one of the chiefs in the nominating committee from 1815 to 1817. It is worthy of note that only a short time before his flight a committee of the Common Council had examined his accounts and approved them as correct.

[3] The exact year Hubbard served as Sachem is unclear. His name appears in Horton’s list. He was one of the leaders on the nominating committee from 1815 to 1817. It's important to note that shortly before his disappearance, a committee from the Common Council reviewed his accounts and confirmed they were accurate.

[4] That Haff was removed is certain, though the author has been unable to find a record of the fact in the available papers of the Treasury Department. The Tammany organ, the National Advocate, November 19, 1818, commented as follows: “The rumors which, for several days past, have been afloat and which we treated as idle and interested, are confirmed—Captain Haff has been removed from office.” Many evidences of public gratification were shown. In one instance, eighty citizens dragged a field piece from the Arsenal to the Battery and fired a salute.

[4] It’s certain that Haff was removed, although the author couldn’t find any record of it in the available documents from the Treasury Department. The Tammany organ, the National Advocate, on November 19, 1818, stated: “The rumors that have been circulating for the past few days, which we initially dismissed as baseless and self-serving, have been confirmed—Captain Haff has been removed from office.” There were many signs of public satisfaction. In one instance, eighty citizens pulled a cannon from the Arsenal to the Battery and fired a salute.

[5] Naphthali Judah had been Sachem of the Maryland tribe in 1808, and continued for some time to be a leader in the party’s councils. He was again elected a Sachem in 1819.

[5] Naphthali Judah was the Sachem of the Maryland tribe in 1808 and remained a leader in the party's discussions for a while. He was elected as Sachem again in 1819.

[6] How deeply the people of New York were concerned in lotteries may be gathered from the fact that in 1826 there were 190 lottery offices legalized by statute in New York City. A saying obtained that “one-half the citizens got their living by affording the opportunity of gambling to the rest.” Many State institutions were in part supported from the proceeds of the lotteries. These swindles, therefore, became a matter for legislative investigation. A great number of pages of the Journal of the Assembly for 1819 are taken up with the testimony.

[6] The people of New York were really invested in lotteries, as shown by the fact that in 1826 there were 190 lottery offices legally operating in New York City. It was commonly said that “half the citizens made their living by providing the chance for others to gamble.” Many state institutions partially relied on the money generated by the lotteries. As a result, these scams became the subject of legislative inquiries. A significant portion of the Journal of the Assembly for 1819 is filled with testimonies regarding this issue.

[7] Journal of the Assembly, 1819, pp. 222-45, and Ibid., pp. 1046-53. Tompkins, now Vice President, made this race for “vindication.” It is altogether likely that this particular charge against Tompkins was made for political effect in a campaign in which each side sought to blacken the other by fierce personal attacks.

[7] Journal of the Assembly, 1819, pp. 222-45, and Ibid., pp. 1046-53. Tompkins, now the Vice President, ran for this position to clear his name. It's highly likely that this accusation against Tompkins was made for political gain during a campaign where both sides aimed to tarnish each other's reputations with intense personal attacks.

[8] National Advocate, March 29, 1820.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ National Advocate, March 29, 1820.

[9] Tammany charged that in the construction of the Erie Canal, land had been cut up in slips to make additional voters for Clinton and cited the county of Genesee, which, though polling but 750 freehold votes in 1815, gave nearly 5,000 votes in this election.

[9] Tammany claimed that the construction of the Erie Canal involved splitting up land into smaller parcels to create more voters for Clinton and pointed to Genesee County, which, despite having only 750 freehold votes in 1815, cast nearly 5,000 votes in this election.


CHAPTER VII
THE SUFFRAGE CONTEST
1820-1822

Tammany Hall now entered upon a step destined to change its composition and career, and greatly affect the political course of the State and nation.

Tammany Hall now took a step that would change its structure and direction, significantly impacting the political landscape of the State and the nation.

From its inception the society had declared among its objects the accomplishment of two special reforms—the securing of manhood suffrage and the abolition of the law for the imprisonment of debtors. No steps so far had been taken by either the organization or the society toward the promotion of these reforms; first, because the leaders were engaged too busily in the contest for office, and second, because Tammany Hall, though professing itself devoted to the welfare of the poor, was, to repeat, essentially a middle-class institution. Having property themselves, the men who controlled and influenced the organization were well satisfied with the laws under which Tammany had grown powerful and they rich; they could not see why so blissful a state of affairs should be changed for something the outcome of which was doubtful. The farmer, the independent blacksmith, the shoemaker with an apprentice or two, the grocer—these had votes, and though they looked with envy on the aristocratic class above them, yet they were not willing that the man with the spade should be placed on a political equality with themselves. In addition, most of the aristocratic rich were opposed to these reforms, and the Tammany leaders were either ambitious to enter that class or desirous of not estranging it. Lastly, the lower classes had sided with[57] Clinton generally; they regarded him as their best friend; to place the ballot unrestrictedly in their hands, Tammany Hall reckoned, would be fatuous. As to the debtors’ law, the tradesmen that thronged Tammany were only too well satisfied with a statute that allowed them to throw their debtors, no matter for how small an amount, into jail indefinitely.

From the beginning, the society aimed to achieve two main reforms: securing voting rights for all men and getting rid of the law that allowed debtors to be imprisoned. So far, neither the organization nor the society had taken any steps to promote these reforms; primarily because the leaders were too busy competing for office and because Tammany Hall, while claiming to care for the poor, was essentially a middle-class institution. The men who controlled and influenced the organization owned property and were content with the laws that enabled Tammany to become powerful and them wealthy; they saw no reason to change such a favorable situation for an uncertain outcome. The farmer, the independent blacksmith, the shoemaker with a few apprentices, and the grocer had votes, and while they envied the upper-class, they didn’t want the laborer to have equal political standing with them. Additionally, most of the wealthy aristocrats opposed these reforms, and the Tammany leaders were either aspiring to join that class or eager not to alienate it. Finally, the lower classes generally supported Clinton; they viewed him as their best ally. Tammany Hall believed that giving them unrestricted voting rights would be foolish. Regarding the debtors’ law, the tradesmen at Tammany were more than happy with a law that allowed them to imprison their debtors indefinitely, regardless of the amount owed.

Agitation for these two reforms, begun by a few radicals, gradually made headway with the public. The demand for manhood suffrage made the greater progress, until in 1820 it overshadowed all other questions. The movement took an such force and popularity that Tammany Hall was forced, for its own preservation, to join. Agreeable to instructions, the National Advocate, September 13, 1820, began to urge the extension of the right of suffrage and the abolition of those cumbersome relics of old centralizing methods, the Council of Appointment and the Council of Revision—the latter a body passing finally on all laws enacted by the Legislature. On October 7, a meeting of Democrats from all parts of the State was held in the Wigwam, Stephen Allen presiding, and the Legislature was called upon to provide for a constitutional convention for the adoption of the amendments.

Agitation for these two reforms, started by a few radicals, gradually gained traction with the public. The push for manhood suffrage made the most progress, until by 1820 it overshadowed all other issues. The movement gained such momentum and popularity that Tammany Hall had to get on board to protect itself. Following orders, the National Advocate, on September 13, 1820, began advocating for the extension of the right to vote and the elimination of those outdated remnants of old centralizing methods, the Council of Appointment and the Council of Revision—the latter being a group that had the final say on all laws passed by the Legislature. On October 7, a gathering of Democrats from across the State took place in the Wigwam, with Stephen Allen leading, and they called on the Legislature to arrange for a constitutional convention to adopt the amendments.

The aristocracy and all the powers at its command assailed the proposed reforms with passionate bitterness. “Would you admit the populace, the patron’s coachman to vote?” asked one Federalist writer. “His excellency (the Governor) cannot retain the gentry, the Judges, and the ‘manors’ in his interest without he opposes either openly or clandestinely every attempt to enlarge the elective franchise.” “We would rather be ruled by a man without an estate than by an estate without a man,” replied one reform writer. The Legislature passed a bill providing for the holding of a constitutional convention, and the Council of Revision, by the deciding vote of Clinton, promptly rejected it. Doubtless this action was due to the declared intention of the advocates[58] of the constitutional convention to abolish this body. Again an assemblage gathered at Tammany Hall (December 1) and resolved that as the “distinction of the electorial rights, the mode of appointment to office and the union of the judiciary and legislative functions were objectional and highly pernicious,” the next Legislature should pass the pending bill.

The aristocracy and its powerful allies fiercely attacked the proposed reforms with intense anger. “Are you really going to let the common people, like the coachman, vote?” asked one Federalist writer. “The Governor can’t keep the support of the gentry, the judges, and the landowners unless he fights against every move to expand voting rights, either openly or secretly.” “We would rather be ruled by a person without wealth than by wealth without a person,” responded one reform writer. The Legislature approved a bill to hold a constitutional convention, but the Council of Revision, led by Clinton’s deciding vote, quickly rejected it. This was clearly because the supporters of the convention wanted to get rid of this council. Again, a group gathered at Tammany Hall (December 1) and resolved that since the “distinction of voting rights, the method of appointing officials, and the combination of judicial and legislative functions were problematic and very harmful,” the next Legislature should pass the pending bill.

Upon this issue a Legislature overwhelmingly favorable to the extension of suffrage and other projected reforms was elected. The aristocratic party opened a still fiercer onslaught. But when the Legislature repassed the convention bill, the Council of Revision did not dare to veto it. The convention bill was promptly submitted to the people and ratified. On the news of its success the Democratic voters celebrated the event in the Wigwam, June 14, 1821.

Upon this issue, a legislature that was overwhelmingly in favor of extending voting rights and other proposed reforms was elected. The aristocratic party launched an even more aggressive attack. However, when the legislature reapproved the convention bill, the Council of Revision didn't dare to veto it. The convention bill was quickly presented to the people and ratified. Upon hearing about its success, the Democratic voters celebrated the event in the Wigwam on June 14, 1821.

Beaten so far, the Federalists tried to form a union with the reactionary element in Tammany Hall by which they could elect delegates opposed to the projected reforms. All opposition was unavailing, however; the reformers had a clear majority in the convention, and the new amendments, embodying the reforms, were submitted to the people. They were adopted in January, 1822, the city alone giving them 4608 majority.[1] When the Legislature took oath under the revised constitution on March 4, the bells of the city churches were rung; flags were flung on the shipping and public buildings; “a grand salute” was fired by a corps of artillery from the Battery; the City Hall was illuminated at night, and the municipality held a popular reception there. In Tammany Hall a[59] gala banquet was spread, one toast of which ran: “The right of suffrage—Corruption in its exercise most to be apprehended from its limitation to a few.” After that pronouncement, so edifying in view of later developments, came another as instructive: “The young and rising politician—May integrity and principle guide him—studying the public good, not popularity.”

Beaten so far, the Federalists tried to team up with the conservative faction in Tammany Hall to elect delegates who opposed the proposed reforms. However, all opposition was futile; the reformers had a clear majority in the convention, and the new amendments, which included the reforms, were put to a vote by the people. They were approved in January 1822, with the city alone showing a majority of 4,608.[1] When the Legislature took their oath under the revised constitution on March 4, the bells of the city churches rang out; flags were displayed on the ships and public buildings; “a grand salute” was fired by a group of artillery from the Battery; the City Hall was lit up at night, and the city held a public reception there. At Tammany Hall, a[59] festive banquet was laid out, with one toast saying: “The right to vote—The greatest risk of corruption comes from limiting it to just a few.” Following that declaration, which seems insightful considering later events, came another thought to ponder: “The young and aspiring politician—May integrity and principles guide him—focused on the public good, not on popularity.”

So Tammany Hall built for itself a vast political following, which soon made it practically invincible.

So Tammany Hall built a huge political following for itself, which soon made it nearly unstoppable.

FOOTNOTES

[1] A considerable increase in the number of voters was made by the suffrage reform. The last remnant of the property qualification was abolished in the State in 1826 by a vote of 104,900 to 3,901.

[1] The suffrage reform significantly increased the number of voters. The last trace of the property requirement was eliminated in the state in 1826 with a vote of 104,900 to 3,901.

The abolition of the Council of Appointment carried with it a clause vesting the Appointment of the Mayor in the Common Council. It was not until 1834 that the Mayor was elected by the people. By the Constitutional Amendments the gubernatorial term was changed to two years and the election time to November.

The elimination of the Council of Appointment included a provision that gave the Common Council the power to appoint the Mayor. It wasn't until 1834 that the Mayor was elected by the public. Through the Constitutional Amendments, the length of the governor's term was altered to two years, and the election period was moved to November.


CHAPTER VIII
STRUGGLES OF THE PRESIDENTIAL FACTIONS
1822-1825

Inevitably the greater part of the newly created voters gravitated to Tammany Hall, but they did not instantly overrun and rule it.

Inevitably, most of the newly created voters were drawn to Tammany Hall, but they didn't immediately take over and control it.

A new set of leaders came in view. Wortman and Judah had been forced from public life through the lottery exposures of 1818, and Broome had lost prestige. Hubbard had fled; Haff, Buckmaster, Strong and Prince were no longer powerful, and Jonas Humbert, who until 1820 had been a person of some authority, was now no longer in public notice. Stephen Allen and Mordecai M. Noah, with a following of some of the old Burrites, were now regarded as being at the helm.

A new group of leaders emerged. Wortman and Judah had been pushed out of public life due to the lottery scandals of 1818, and Broome had lost his reputation. Hubbard had escaped; Haff, Buckmaster, Strong, and Prince were no longer influential, and Jonas Humbert, who until 1820 had held some authority, was now out of the public eye. Stephen Allen and Mordecai M. Noah, along with some of the old Burr supporters, were seen as the ones in charge.

The pro-Tammany Council of Appointment chosen late in 1820, before the new constitutional amendments were adopted, had removed Colden and appointed Allen (Grand Sachem about this time) Mayor[1] in his place. Noah was made Sheriff, and all the other offices were filled with Wigwam men.

The pro-Tammany Council of Appointment selected late in 1820, before the new constitutional amendments were adopted, removed Colden and appointed Allen (Grand Sachem around this time) as Mayor[1] in his place. Noah was made Sheriff, and all the other positions were filled with Wigwam supporters.

The new voting element coming into the organization had to be impressed with the traditional principle of discipline. Otherwise there might be all kinds of nominations, whose effect upon the machine-made “regular” nominations of the organization would be disastrous, if not destructive. To this end the different ward committees[61] passed resolutions (April 27 and 28, 1822) declaring in nearly identical terms that the sense of a majority, fairly expressed, ought always to govern, and that no party, however actuated by principle, could be truly useful without organization. “Therefore, that the discipline of the Republican party, as established and practised for the last twenty-five years, has, by experience, been found conducive to the general good and success of the party.”[2]

The new voting component entering the organization needed to respect the traditional principle of discipline. If not, there could be all sorts of nominations that would negatively impact the pre-arranged “regular” nominations of the organization, potentially causing serious issues. To address this, the different ward committees[61] passed resolutions (April 27 and 28, 1822) stating almost the same thing: that the will of the majority, properly expressed, should always prevail, and that no party, no matter how principled, could truly be effective without organization. “Therefore, the discipline of the Republican party, as established and practiced for the last twenty-five years, has been shown by experience to benefit the general good and success of the party.”[2]

In 1822 Clinton declined to stand for reelection. Tammany Hall was considered so invincible in the city that the Clintonites and the remnant of the Federalists refused to nominate contesting candidates for Congress and the Legislature. Experience demonstrating that almost all the voters cast their ballots for the “regular” ticket without asking questions, competition for a place on that ticket, which now was equivalent to election, became sharp. When, on October 30, the nominating committee reported the name of M. M. Noah for the office of Sheriff, Benjamin Romaine moved to have that of Peter H. Wendover substituted. Two factors were at work here; one was religious prejudice against Noah, who was a Jew; the other and greater, was the struggle between the partizans of Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams and William H. Crawford to get control of Tammany Hall, as a necessary preliminary to the efforts of each for the nomination for President.[3] Romaine was an Adams supporter and could easily have nominated a ticket independent of Tammany Hall, but it would have lacked “regularity,” and hence popular support. A row ensued; and while Noah’s party rushed out of Tammany Hall claiming the “regular” nomination, the other faction, by the light of a solitary candle, passed resolutions denouncing[62] Noah and claiming that Wendover was the “regular” nominee.

In 1822, Clinton decided not to run for reelection. Tammany Hall was seen as so unbeatable in the city that the Clinton supporters and the remaining Federalists opted not to nominate competing candidates for Congress and the Legislature. Experience showed that almost all voters cast their ballots for the “regular” ticket without any questioning, making the competition for a spot on that ticket, which was now essentially equivalent to being elected, very intense. When, on October 30, the nominating committee announced M. M. Noah for the Sheriff position, Benjamin Romaine proposed substituting Peter H. Wendover instead. Two factors influenced this; one was religious bias against Noah, who was Jewish; the other, and more significant, was the battle among supporters of Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, and William H. Crawford to gain control of Tammany Hall, which was needed before each could launch their own bid for the presidency. Romaine was an Adams supporter and could have easily nominated a ticket separate from Tammany Hall, but it would lack the “regularity” that attracted popular support. A conflict broke out; while Noah’s supporters stormed out of Tammany Hall claiming the “regular” nomination, the opposing faction, illuminated by a single candle, passed resolutions condemning Noah and asserting that Wendover was the “regular” nominee.

Each of the candidates put himself before the people, declaring that a majority of the nominating committee favored him as “regular.” The leaders of the organization inclined to Noah, as one of its heads, but Wendover skillfully appealed to Anti-Semitic bigotry and gathered a large following. The Sachems dared not interfere between them, and each in consequence had a room in Tammany Hall, where his tickets were distributed and his agents made their headquarters. Noah was defeated at the polls; but his defeat did not impair his influence in Tammany Hall. He was a person of singular ability. A facile writer and effective manipulator, he maintained his hold.

Each of the candidates presented himself to the public, claiming that a majority of the nominating committee supported him as “regular.” The leaders of the organization leaned towards Noah, being one of its heads, but Wendover cleverly played on Anti-Semitic prejudices and built a large following. The Sachems didn’t dare to step in between them, so each ended up with a room in Tammany Hall, where his tickets were distributed and his agents operated from. Noah was defeated at the polls; however, his loss didn’t weaken his influence in Tammany Hall. He was a person of unique talent. A smooth writer and effective strategist, he kept his position.

“Regularity,” then, was the agency by which the leaders imposed their candidates upon the thousands of voters who, from their stores and benches, offices and farms, went to the polls to deposit a list of names prepared for them. The voters were expected only to vote; the leaders assumed the burden of determining for whom the voting should be done. An instance of the general recognition of this fact was given in 1820 when the counties of Suffolk, Queens, Kings and Dutchess voted to discontinue the practice of holding Senatorial conventions in Tammany Hall because a fair expression of the wishes of a great proportion of the Democratic-Republican electors was not obtainable there. At the same time, and for years later, complaints were frequent that the ward meetings had long since become an object of so little interest that they were nearly neglected; and that a small knot of six or eight men managed them for their own purposes.

“Regularity,” then, was the way the leaders imposed their candidates on the thousands of voters who, from their shops and benches, offices and farms, went to the polls to cast a list of names prepared for them. The voters were expected to just vote; the leaders took on the responsibility of deciding for whom the voting should happen. An example of this widespread acknowledgment occurred in 1820 when the counties of Suffolk, Queens, Kings, and Dutchess voted to stop holding Senatorial conventions at Tammany Hall because a fair expression of the wishes of a large portion of the Democratic-Republican voters couldn't be obtained there. At the same time, and for many years afterward, there were frequent complaints that the ward meetings had become so uninteresting that they were nearly ignored; and that a small group of six or eight men controlled them for their own interests.

In 1823 attempts were made by different factions to obtain the invaluable “regular” nominations. Seemingly a local election, the real point turned on whether partisans of Jackson, Adams or Crawford should be chosen. Upon this question Tammany Hall was still[63] divided. The nominating committee, however, was for Jackson. The voters were bidden to assemble in the hall at 7 o’clock on the evening of October 30 to hear that committee’s report. When they tried to enter, they found the hall occupied by the committee and its friends. This was a new departure in Tammany practices. Since the building of the hall the nominating committee had always waited in a lower room for the opening of the great popular meeting, and had then marched up stairs and reported. To head off expected hostile action by the Adams men, the committee this time started proceedings before the appointed hour. The names of its candidates were called and affirmed in haste. Gen. Robert Swartwout, a corrupt but skillful politician and an Adams supporter, proposed a substitute list of names, upon which the chairman declared that the meeting stood adjourned. A general fist-fight followed, in the excitement of which Swartwout took the chair, read off a list of names and declared it adopted. Epithets, among which “liar” and “traitor” figured most, were distributed freely. Both tickets went to the people under the claim of “regularity,” and each carried five of the ten wards.

In 1823, different groups tried to get the important “regular” nominations. Although it seemed like a local election, the main issue was whether supporters of Jackson, Adams, or Crawford should be chosen. Tammany Hall was still[63] divided on this matter. However, the nominating committee was backing Jackson. Voters were invited to gather in the hall at 7 PM on October 30 to hear the committee's report. When they arrived, they found the hall filled with the committee and their supporters. This was a new approach for Tammany. Since the hall was built, the nominating committee had always waited in a lower room for the public meeting to start before going upstairs to report. To prevent expected backlash from the Adams supporters, the committee began their session before the scheduled time. They quickly called out and confirmed the names of their candidates. Gen. Robert Swartwout, a corrupt yet skilled politician who supported Adams, proposed an alternative list of names, which led the chairman to declare the meeting adjourned. A chaotic fistfight broke out, during which Swartwout took over the chair, announced a list of names, and claimed it was adopted. Insults flew, with terms like “liar” and “traitor” being thrown around. Both ticket lists were put forth to the public, each claiming “regularity,” and each won five of the ten wards.

Though Robert Swartwout[4] was for Adams, another Swartwout (Samuel), an even shrewder politician, was Jackson’s direct representative in the task of securing the organization’s support for President. A third and less important group were the Crawford advocates. They were led by Gen. John P. Van Ness, an adroit intriguer[64] and one of the old Burr chieftains of Tammany. In 1821 Adams, then Secretary of State, ascertaining that Van Ness, as president of the Bank of the Metropolis, was indebted to that institution to the amount of $60,000 and that its affairs were in bad condition, transferred the account of the State Department to another bank. From that time Van Ness bore deep hatred against Adams, and supported Crawford, Secretary of the Treasury, for President. Crawford had deposited as a standing balance with Van Ness about the same sum Adams had withdrawn, notwithstanding the bank’s suspicious character. The Crawford men went first about the business of obtaining complete ascendency in the Tammany Society. With that end in view they tried in 1823 to elect a Grand Sachem favoring Crawford. The old Burr faction now brought forth a Presidential candidate of its own in the person of John C. Calhoun, and taking advantage of the absence of most of the society’s members, dexterously managed to elect William Todd, a partisan of Calhoun, Grand Sachem.

Though Robert Swartwout[4] supported Adams, another Swartwout (Samuel), who was an even craftier politician, represented Jackson directly in the effort to gain the organization’s backing for President. A third and less significant group was the Crawford supporters, led by Gen. John P. Van Ness, a skilled schemer and one of the old Burr leaders of Tammany. In 1821, Adams, then Secretary of State, discovered that Van Ness, as president of the Bank of the Metropolis, owed the bank $60,000 and that its finances were in poor shape, so he moved the State Department's account to another bank. From that point on, Van Ness harbored a deep hatred for Adams and backed Crawford, the Secretary of the Treasury, for President. Crawford had kept about the same amount with Van Ness as the sum Adams had withdrawn, despite the bank’s troubling reputation. The Crawford supporters first focused on gaining complete control of the Tammany Society. With that goal in mind, they attempted in 1823 to elect a Grand Sachem who supported Crawford. The old Burr faction then introduced its own Presidential candidate, John C. Calhoun, and, taking advantage of the absence of most society members, cleverly managed to elect William Todd, a Calhoun supporter, as Grand Sachem.

The popular voice for Jackson becoming daily stronger, some of the Adams leaders changed about. Perhaps having a premonition that Adams would be chosen President by the House of Representatives, the general committee of Tammany Hall, on October 3, 1823, resolved that the election of President by that branch of Congress was “an event to be deprecated,” and that the constitution ought to be so amended as to give the election directly to the people without the intervention of electors. The ward committees passed similar resolutions. This action was on a line with that of a few years before when the Wigwam, fearing the nomination of Clinton for Governor by legislative caucus, recommended that State nominations be made by a State convention of delegates. In the following April (1824) Jackson’s friends filled Tammany Hall and nominated him for President.

The support for Jackson grew stronger every day, leading some of the Adams supporters to change their stance. Sensing that Adams might be elected President by the House of Representatives, the general committee of Tammany Hall, on October 3, 1823, declared that the election of President by this part of Congress was “an event to be discouraged,” and that the Constitution should be amended to allow the election to be directly in the hands of the people, without the involvement of electors. The local ward committees passed similar resolutions. This move mirrored actions taken a few years earlier when the Wigwam, concerned about the possibility of Clinton being nominated for Governor by legislative caucus, suggested that State nominations be decided by a State convention of delegates. In the following April (1824), Jackson’s supporters filled Tammany Hall and nominated him for President.

Before the election came on, however, the organization,[65] in the full swing of power, again brought public odium upon itself. De Witt Clinton, having filled his gubernatorial term, was now serving in the modest post of a Canal Commissioner, without pay and utterly without political power. Yet Tammany carried its hatred of him so far as to cause the Legislature to remove him (April 12, 1824), despite the protests of a few of its more sagacious members.[5]

Before the election, though, the organization,[65] in its full power, once again drew public backlash. De Witt Clinton, who had completed his term as governor, was now working as a Canal Commissioner, a position that was unpaid and held no political influence. Still, Tammany's animosity toward him escalated to the point where they pressured the Legislature to remove him (April 12, 1824), despite the protests from a few of its more insightful members.[5]

Naturally, this petty act caused an immediate and strong reaction in a community endeared to Clinton by that splendid creation of his energy—the Erie Canal. No sooner did the news reach New York City than 10,000 persons held an indignation meeting in the City Hall Park and in front of Tammany Hall. Throughout the State similar meetings were held. In spite of the politicians, the cyclonic popular movement forced Clinton to be again a candidate for Governor.

Naturally, this petty act triggered an immediate and intense reaction in a community that had come to love Clinton because of his great achievement—the Erie Canal. As soon as the news reached New York City, 10,000 people gathered for an indignation meeting in City Hall Park and in front of Tammany Hall. Similar meetings took place throughout the state. Despite the politicians, the overwhelming public momentum pushed Clinton to run again for Governor.

The chiefs regretted their folly. At the same time they were subjected to public criticism in another direction. One of them, William P. Van Ness, Burr’s companion at the Hamilton duel, a Judge of the United States District Court, took it upon himself to select Tammany Hall permanently for a court-room, his object being to have the Government pay rent to the Tammany Society. His colleague, Judge Thompson, a scrupulous official, indignantly asked why the courts were not to be held in the City Hall, as usual. Judge Van Ness defiantly held court in Tammany Hall, Judge Thompson going to the City Hall. Public disgust asserting itself, an investigation was set afoot. Van Ness tried to throw the blame on his marshal. But this officer, as was conclusively shown, acted under written instructions from Van Ness in refusing to consider any other place than Tammany Hall, and he agreed to pay to the society $1,500 a year rent. The lease, which was made under the plea that no room was[66] available in the City Hall, contained a stipulation that not only should the tavern be allowed in Tammany Hall but that the court-room should be used, when required, as the meeting place of the society or of the political conventions. The citizens assembled in the wards and denounced the proceeding. The Aldermen decided to shift the responsibility which Van Ness attempted to place upon them. Their committee reported (October 24, 1824),[6] that the City Hall always had been and would be at the service of the United States Court Judges, and that a room had been set apart especially for their use. Judge Van Ness was forced to return to the City Hall to hold court.[7]

The chiefs regretted their mistake. At the same time, they faced public criticism from another angle. One of them, William P. Van Ness, Burr’s associate at the Hamilton duel and a Judge of the United States District Court, decided to permanently hold court in Tammany Hall, intending to have the government pay rent to the Tammany Society. His colleague, Judge Thompson, a principled official, angrily questioned why the courts weren’t being held in the City Hall as usual. Judge Van Ness stubbornly held court in Tammany Hall, while Judge Thompson went to the City Hall. As public outrage grew, an investigation was launched. Van Ness tried to shift the blame onto his marshal. However, it was clearly demonstrated that this officer acted on written instructions from Van Ness in insisting on Tammany Hall, agreeing to pay the society $1,500 a year in rent. The lease, which was justified by claiming no room was available in the City Hall, included a clause allowing the tavern in Tammany Hall and stipulating that the courtroom could be used, when needed, as a meeting place for the society or political conventions. Citizens gathered in the wards to denounce the situation. The Aldermen decided to reject the responsibility Van Ness tried to place on them. Their committee reported (October 24, 1824) that the City Hall had always been, and would continue to be, available for the United States Court Judges, and that a room had been specifically designated for their use. Judge Van Ness was compelled to return to the City Hall to hold court.

Tammany now had recourse to its customary devices in endeavoring to bring out its usual vote in the coming election. The general committee announced that at no period in the last twenty years had the welfare and perpetuity of the party more imperiously required a rigid adherence to ancient usages and discipline. This was meant to play on the partizan emotions of the Democrats. It was likewise a threat to punish any man of independent views who disobeyed the orders of the general committee. Such summary, veiled notifications of the general committee were seldom disregarded by those who profited or expected to profit by politics. After toasting their “squaws and papooses” on July 4 the society impressively made this toast: “May regular nominations ever prevail”—a thrust at the method of Clinton’s nomination and a warning for the future guidance of all Tammany men.

Tammany was now resorting to its usual tactics to rally its typical voters for the upcoming election. The general committee declared that never in the past twenty years had the party's welfare and survival more urgently required strict adherence to traditional practices and discipline. This was intended to appeal to the partisan feelings of the Democrats. It was also a warning to punish anyone with independent opinions who ignored the general committee's orders. Such subtle, indirect warnings from the general committee were rarely ignored by those who benefited or hoped to benefit from politics. After toasting their “squaws and papooses” on July 4, the society made this solemn toast: “May regular nominations always prevail”—a jab at the way Clinton was nominated and a caution for the future guidance of all Tammany supporters.

Tammany further attempted to counteract the impetus of the Clinton movement by touching at length upon its own patriotism in the past and by stirring up class hatreds. On the vital issues the Wigwam was silent; but in another long fulmination it recalled the “sins” and[67] “treason” of Clinton against the Democratic party. “He is haughty in his manners,” it went on, “and a friend of the aristocracy—cold and distant to all who cannot boast of wealth and family distinctions and selfish in all the ends he aims at.”

Tammany tried to push back against the Clinton movement by highlighting its own past patriotism and fueling class resentments. On the key issues, the Wigwam stayed quiet; however, in another lengthy tirade, it brought up the “sins” and “treason” of Clinton against the Democratic party. “He acts superior,” it continued, “and he is a supporter of the elite—cold and distant to those who can’t claim wealth and family privilege and selfish in all his pursuits.”

The partizans of Jackson carried the city. Presidential electors were still selected by the Legislature, and it is therefore impossible to determine Jackson’s vote. A fusion between the Clintonites and the People’s party caused the defeat of most of Tammany’s Assembly candidates, but the victors were Jackson men, and Clinton himself had declared for Old Hickory. The full Jackson strength was shown in the vote for the three Tammany candidates for Congress, who were elected.

The supporters of Jackson took over the city. Presidential electors were still chosen by the Legislature, so it’s impossible to figure out Jackson’s vote. A merger between the Clinton supporters and the People’s Party led to the defeat of most of Tammany’s Assembly candidates, but the winners were Jackson's people, and Clinton himself had backed Old Hickory. The full strength of Jackson was evident in the vote for the three Tammany candidates for Congress, who were elected.

Clinton’s victory was sweeping. The near completion of the Erie Canal, for which he had labored so zealously and which Tammany had opposed so pertinaciously, made him the idol of the people, and he was again elected Governor, carrying even New York City by 1,031 majority. That eye was blind which could not see in the opening of the canal the incalculable benefits Clinton had estimated from the first. This great work secured as a virtual gift to New York City the inland commerce of the vast empire west of the mountains, no rival being able to contend for it. The trade of the canal almost immediately increased the city’s business $60,000,000 annually, and year by year the amount grew. Along its course a hundred new and thrifty villages sprang into existence, and the State’s wealth and population went upward by leaps and bounds.

Clinton’s victory was decisive. The near completion of the Erie Canal, which he had worked on so passionately and which Tammany had fought against so stubbornly, made him a beloved figure among the people, and he was re-elected Governor, winning New York City by a margin of 1,031 votes. Anyone who couldn’t see the immense benefits of the canal, which Clinton had predicted from the start, was simply not paying attention. This major project effectively secured for New York City the inland commerce of the vast territory west of the mountains, with no competitors able to challenge it. The trade from the canal quickly boosted the city’s annual revenue by $60,000,000, and this amount continued to grow every year. Along its route, a hundred new, thriving villages emerged, leading to significant increases in the state’s wealth and population.

Compared with this illustrious achievement, a summary of the record of Clinton’s antagonists, the Tammany leaders, makes but a poor showing. Contributing to the development of democracy, for the most part, only so far as it benefited themselves; declining to take up even the question of manhood suffrage until forced to, they did little or nothing, even in the closer domain of the city, for the good of their own time or of posterity. In the[68] years when Clinton was engaged in projecting and building the canal, they were too busy wrangling over offices or cribbing at the public treasury to improve city conditions. The streets were an abomination of filth. The local authorities long refused, despite public pressure, to take steps to have the city furnished with pure water. As a result of the bad water of a private corporation and the uncleanliness of the streets, yellow fever and cholera had several times devastated the city, and in one year (1822) it was so deserted that grass grew in the streets. To make up for municipal deficits the city fathers continued selling the public land, that might have been made into parks or retained for future uses, buying it in as individuals. Between 1813 and 1819, according to the admission of the Tammany organ in the latter year, $440,347 worth of land, whose present value probably amounts to tens of millions of dollars, was thus fraudulently disposed of.[8] In a word, their records, public and private, furnish an extreme contrast to the record of Clinton, who, while a politician when need be, gave his years and his talents to the completion of a public work of the greatest utility and importance.

Compared to this remarkable achievement, a summary of Clinton’s opponents, the Tammany leaders, looks pretty weak. They supported the growth of democracy mainly when it benefited them; they only started addressing manhood suffrage when they had no choice. They did very little, even within the city, for the welfare of their time or future generations. In the[68] years when Clinton was focused on planning and constructing the canal, they were too busy fighting over jobs or misusing public funds to improve conditions in the city. The streets were shockingly dirty. The local authorities long refused, despite public demand, to ensure the city had clean water. Due to the polluted water from a private company and the filthy streets, yellow fever and cholera repeatedly struck the city, and in one year (1822) it became so deserted that grass was growing in the streets. To cover budget shortfalls, city leaders kept selling public land that could have been turned into parks or saved for future use, buying it back as individuals. Between 1813 and 1819, as stated by the Tammany newspaper in 1819, $440,347 worth of land, which is likely now worth tens of millions of dollars, was fraudulently sold off.[8] In short, their public and private records sharply contrast with Clinton's, who, while a politician when necessary, dedicated his years and skills to completing a public project of immense value and importance.

FOOTNOTES

[1] The first election for Mayor by the Common Council, under the new constitution, resulted in the choice of William Paulding, Jr., 1823-25.

[1] The first election for Mayor by the Common Council, according to the new constitution, led to the selection of William Paulding, Jr., 1823-25.

[2] Advertisements of the ward committees in the National Advocate, April 29, 1822.

[2] Ads from the ward committees in the National Advocate, April 29, 1822.

[3] It is a convincing commentary on the absolute disruption of party lines at this epoch that a contest could arise in such an organization as Tammany Hall between supporters of men of such diverse political beliefs as Andrew Jackson and John Quincy Adams.

[3] It’s a striking indication of how party lines were completely disrupted during this time that a rivalry could develop within an organization like Tammany Hall between supporters of such different political figures as Andrew Jackson and John Quincy Adams.

[4] When United States Navy Agent in 1820, Robert Swartwout became indebted to the Government in the sum of $68,000, a defalcation he could not make good. The Government took a mortgage on his property for $75,000. This and political influence saved him from prison. It was because of Adams’s efforts in his behalf that his extraordinary devotion to the sixth President was credited. Tammany Hall, considerate of human infirmity, continued him in full favor as a leader. These facts were brought out in the suit of the United States Government against Francis H. Nicholl, one of Robert Swartwout’s sureties, before Judge Van Ness in the United States District Court, April 8, 1824.

[4] In 1820, Robert Swartwout, who was an agent for the United States Navy, fell into debt with the government for $68,000, a shortfall he couldn't cover. The government placed a mortgage on his property for $75,000. This, along with political connections, helped him avoid prison. It was through Adams’s efforts on his behalf that his remarkable loyalty to the sixth President gained recognition. Tammany Hall, understanding human weakness, kept him in good standing as a leader. These details emerged in the case of the United States Government versus Francis H. Nicholl, one of Robert Swartwout’s guarantors, before Judge Van Ness in the United States District Court on April 8, 1824.

[5] Journal of the Senate, 1824, p. 409.

[5] Journal of the Senate, 1824, p. 409.

[6] MS. Minutes of the Common Council, Vol. 52, pp. 75-78.

[6] MS. Minutes of the Common Council, Vol. 52, pp. 75-78.

[7] During this agitation Jacob Barker, Judge Van Ness and M. M. Noah repeatedly presented, in the public prints, arguments in favor of using Tammany Hall as a court-room. We shall have need to refer to Barker again on another page.

[7] During this unrest, Jacob Barker, Judge Van Ness, and M. M. Noah frequently argued in the newspapers for using Tammany Hall as a courtroom. We'll need to mention Barker again on another page.

[8] For a part of this time, it should be stated, the Federalists were in power.

[8] During this period, it's important to note that the Federalists were in charge.


CHAPTER IX
THE JACKSON ELEMENT WINS
1825-1828

Factional strife had not entirely smothered the demand for improvement in the city government.[1] The arbitrary powers of the Common Council, composed, as it was, of one Board in which sat both Aldermen and Assistant Aldermen, excited general dissatisfaction. Having the power of making assessments, ordering public improvements, and disposing of the public property at will, the Aldermen made no detailed account of their expenditures. One writer advised the Aldermen to curtail some of their own extravagances: “Why not stop,” he wrote,

Factional conflicts hadn't completely extinguished the demand for improvements in the city's government.[1] The unchecked powers of the Common Council, which consisted of a single Board with both Aldermen and Assistant Aldermen, caused widespread frustration. With the authority to make assessments, mandate public improvements, and handle public property as they wished, the Aldermen provided no clear record of their spending. One writer suggested that the Aldermen should cut back on some of their own lavish spending: “Why not stop,” he wrote,

“in their career of eating the most unreasonable and costly suppers every time they meet on public business and drinking such wines as they never in the course of their lives tasted before; choice wines that cost $40 a dozen? O! but I will soon tell a tale that will make our citizens stare. I understand that our city expenses are now nearly $2,000 a day.”

“in their career of having the most extravagant and expensive dinners every time they gather for public business and drinking wines that they’ve never tasted before; select wines that cost $40 a dozen? Oh! But I will soon tell a story that will make our citizens gasp. I hear that our city expenses are now nearly $2,000 a day.”

The State constitution of 1821-22 had granted the Common Council greater powers than before in vacating and filling important offices in the city. In 1823 the city debt was rising, and though the Common Council professed to attempt retrenchment, no real effort was made, the fathers being loth to give over the voting of pretended improvements out of which they benefited as individual contractors. The agitation continuing, the Legislature,[70] in April, 1824, had passed a law to “erect” two separate chambers—a Board of Aldermen to be elected from among the freeholders for two years, and a Board of Assistants for one year, with concurrent powers. The opponents of the new branch termed it derisively the “House of Lords” and denounced its aristocratic nature. The amendment was defeated by the radicals in June, though the interest in it was slight. Over 8,000 electors failed to vote.

The state constitution of 1821-22 had given the Common Council more power than before to vacate and fill important city offices. By 1823, the city debt was increasing, and even though the Common Council claimed to be trying to cut back on spending, no real action was taken, as the leaders were reluctant to stop approving fake improvements that benefited them as individual contractors. As the unrest continued, the Legislature,[70] in April 1824, passed a law to create two separate chambers—a Board of Aldermen elected from the freeholders for two years, and a Board of Assistants for one year, both with equal powers. Opponents of the new branch mockingly called it the “House of Lords” and criticized its elitist nature. The amendment was defeated by the radicals in June, although there was little interest in it. More than 8,000 eligible voters did not cast their ballots.

Other schemes for municipal reform dissolved in talk, and by the Spring of 1825 public attention became concentrated again on the matter of Jackson’s candidacy for the office of President. Barely had John Quincy Adams been inaugurated when Tammany set about to make Jackson his successor. On May 12 Sachem Nicholas Schureman, at the anniversary celebration of the society, gave this toast: “Jackson, the Hero of New Orleans, our next President.” Again, on July 4, the principal toast was to Jackson.[2]

Other plans for city reform faded into discussion, and by Spring 1825, public interest refocused on Jackson’s run for President. John Quincy Adams had just been inaugurated when Tammany began efforts to make Jackson his successor. On May 12, during the society's anniversary celebration, Sachem Nicholas Schureman raised his glass with this toast: “Jackson, the Hero of New Orleans, our next President.” Similarly, on July 4, the main toast honored Jackson.[2]

The Jackson campaign went energetically on. But it was rudely interrupted during the following Autumn by a fresh series of revelations regarding certain Tammany chieftains. The legislative favoritism by which Jacob Barker was enabled to secure advantages for his Exchange Bank (1818)[3] now culminated in a grave public scandal. In September, 1826, Barker, Henry Eckford, another of the line of Sachems; Matthew L. Davis, lately Grand Sachem, and several other accomplices were principals in one of the most extended and sensational trials which the city had known. They stood charged with swindles aggregating several million dollars. The Grand Jury’s indictment of September 15 charged them, and also[71] Mark Spencer, William P. Rathbone, Thomas Vermilyea and others, with defrauding the Mechanics’ Fire Insurance Company of 1,000 shares of its own capital stock, 1,000 shares of United States Bank stock and $50,000; the Fulton Bank of 2,000 shares of its own capital stock and $50,000; the Tradesmen’s Bank of 2,000 shares of its own capital stock and $50,000; the Morris Canal and Banking Company of 2,000 shares of its own capital stock and $50,000; and the Life and Fire Insurance Company of 2,000 shares of its own capital stock. The indictment further charged these men with obtaining fraudulently 1,000 promissory notes for the amount of nearly $100 each, belonging to the Fulton Bank; and the same number of notes for similar sums belonging respectively to the Tradesmen’s Bank, the Morris Canal and Banking Company, and the Life and Fire Insurance Company, and with additionally obtaining by fraud the sum of $50,000, the property of Henry Barclay, George Barclay and others.[4]

The Jackson campaign continued with enthusiasm. However, it was abruptly disrupted the following autumn by new revelations about certain Tammany leaders. The legislative favoritism that allowed Jacob Barker to gain advantages for his Exchange Bank (1818)[3] led to a serious public scandal. In September 1826, Barker, Henry Eckford, another prominent leader; Matthew L. Davis, the former Grand Sachem, and several other accomplices were key players in one of the largest and most sensational trials the city had ever seen. They were accused of swindles amounting to several million dollars. The Grand Jury’s indictment on September 15 charged them, along with[71] Mark Spencer, William P. Rathbone, Thomas Vermilyea, and others, with defrauding the Mechanics’ Fire Insurance Company of 1,000 shares of its own capital stock, 1,000 shares of United States Bank stock, and $50,000; the Fulton Bank of 2,000 shares of its own capital stock and $50,000; the Tradesmen’s Bank of 2,000 shares of its own capital stock and $50,000; the Morris Canal and Banking Company of 2,000 shares of its own capital stock and $50,000; and the Life and Fire Insurance Company of 2,000 shares of its own capital stock. The indictment also accused these men of fraudulently obtaining 1,000 promissory notes for nearly $100 each, belonging to the Fulton Bank; the same number of notes for similar amounts belonging to the Tradesmen’s Bank, the Morris Canal and Banking Company, and the Life and Fire Insurance Company; and additionally obtaining by fraud the sum of $50,000, the property of Henry Barclay, George Barclay, and others.[4]

A disagreement of the jury marked the first trial; the second brought a conviction of the prisoners. Tammany Hall was unwilling to see any of its leaders go to prison. As soon as the storm of popular indignation blew over, a new trial was had for Davis, and owing to strong political influence his acquittal was the outcome. Barker was again convicted, but, thanks to the discreet use of his money, never saw a cell. He went South and lived on till over ninety years of age.[5] Eckford fled to the Orient and died in Syria. The severity of the law fell on the minor offenders, two of whom, Mowatt and Hyatt, went to prison for two years, and the Lambert brothers for one year.

A disagreement among the jury marked the first trial; the second resulted in a conviction of the prisoners. Tammany Hall was not keen on seeing any of its leaders go to prison. Once the storm of public outrage died down, a new trial was held for Davis, and due to strong political influence, he was acquitted. Barker was convicted again, but thanks to the smart use of his money, he never spent time in jail. He moved South and lived until he was over ninety years old.[5] Eckford fled to the East and died in Syria. The harshness of the law fell on the minor offenders, two of whom, Mowatt and Hyatt, went to prison for two years, and the Lambert brothers for one year.

The trial over, public interest again centered on the Presidential struggle. Alive to the necessity of winning[72] Tammany to his interest, President Adams chose most of his New York appointees from its organization, thereby creating in that body an alert clique of devoted partizans. If the leaders had been able to direct the organization absolutely, Adams might have bribed nearly all of them with offices, favors or promises, but there were other deciding factors. The first was the mass of the Democrats who favored Jackson and forced most of the leaders to his support. The second was the organizing genius of Martin Van Buren. He was a member of the Tammany Society, and in September, 1827, he visited New York to compose the discord in the general committee, which was divided equally on the question of the Presidency, although in the society itself a majority was for Jackson. The Jackson men quickly gained predominant influence. On September 27 the general committee recommended in a public address to its “fellow-citizens” that when they met in their wards, they should elect such citizens only, to represent them in their different committees, as were favorable to Jackson. The Adams men were enraged.[6] Col. James Fairlie, a veteran of the Revolution; Benjamin Romaine, Peter Sharpe, William Todd, W. H. Ireland, Abraham Stagg, Peter Stagg and John L. Lawrence, known as “the elite” of Tammany Hall, and others, denounced this action. “Was such a power of proscription and dictation ever delegated to or practised by any other general committee?” they asked in an address.

The trial wrapped up, and public interest shifted back to the presidential race. Aware of the need to win over Tammany, President Adams selected most of his New York appointees from that organization, creating a proactive group of loyal supporters within it. If the leaders had been able to control the organization completely, Adams could have won over nearly all of them with jobs, favors, or promises, but other factors were at play. The first was the large number of Democrats who supported Jackson and pressured most of the leaders to back him. The second was the organizational talent of Martin Van Buren. As a member of the Tammany Society, he visited New York in September 1827 to resolve the divisions within the general committee, which was split evenly over the presidency, even though a majority in the society favored Jackson. The Jackson supporters quickly gained the upper hand. On September 27, the general committee publicly urged its “fellow-citizens” that when they met in their wards, they should elect only those citizens to represent them in their committees who supported Jackson. The Adams supporters were furious. Col. James Fairlie, a Revolutionary War veteran; Benjamin Romaine, Peter Sharpe, William Todd, W. H. Ireland, Abraham Stagg, Peter Stagg, and John L. Lawrence, known as “the elite” of Tammany Hall, and others condemned this action. “Has such a power of exclusion and control ever been given to or exercised by any other general committee?” they questioned in a statement.

The ward primary elections on the night of October 3 were tumultuous. The Jackson men took possession of the meeting rooms, installed their own chairmen and passed resolutions, without allowing the Adams supporters a chance to be heard. Both factions then alternately[73] held meetings in Tammany Hall. So determined was the struggle to get possession of the Wigwam that the Adams men contrived to expel their opponents from it for one day, and the Jackson men had to make their nominations in the cellar called “the Coal Hole.” At a later meeting of the Adams faction, embracing a group of old Federalists, Col. Marinus Willett, a venerable Revolutionary patriot, who presided, spoke of “the danger and absurdity of confiding the destinies of the country to a mere arbitrary soldier.” The meeting passed resolutions denouncing the general committee majority and reiterating its support of Adams. The Jackson men rallied to the Wigwam in force and approved the ticket nominated in “the Coal Hole.” The nominees were for local offices and were themselves of no particular importance. The great question was whether New York City favored Jackson or Adams, and the coming election was the accepted test.

The ward primary elections on the night of October 3 were chaotic. The Jackson supporters took over the meeting rooms, appointed their own chairpeople, and passed resolutions, not giving the Adams supporters a chance to speak. Both sides then took turns holding meetings in Tammany Hall. The fight for control of the Wigwam was so intense that the Adams supporters managed to kick out their opponents for one day, forcing the Jackson supporters to make their nominations in a cellar known as “the Coal Hole.” At a later meeting of the Adams faction, which included a group of old Federalists, Col. Marinus Willett, a respected Revolutionary patriot who presided, spoke about “the danger and absurdity of giving control of the country to a mere arbitrary soldier.” The meeting passed resolutions criticizing the general committee majority and reaffirming its support for Adams. The Jackson supporters showed up in large numbers at the Wigwam and approved the ticket nominated in “the Coal Hole.” The nominees were for local offices and were not particularly significant. The real issue was whether New York City favored Jackson or Adams, and the upcoming election was seen as the true test.

The Jackson men made desperate efforts to carry the city. Now were observable the effects brought about by the suffrage changes of 1822 and 1826. The formerly disinherited class had become attached to Tammany Hall, and the organization, entirely reversing its exclusive native policy, declared for a reduction of the five-year naturalization period. From that time forth the patronage of aliens became a settled policy of Tammany. In this election these aliens exercised a powerful influence, materially aiding Jackson.

The Jackson men worked desperately to take over the city. The effects of the voting changes from 1822 and 1826 were now clear. The previously excluded group had become allied with Tammany Hall, which completely switched its exclusive native stance and called for shortening the five-year naturalization period. From that moment on, supporting immigrants became a standard policy for Tammany. In this election, these immigrants had a strong impact, significantly helping Jackson.

Cases of fraud and violence had hitherto been frequent; but nothing like the exhibition at the primaries and polls in November, 1827, had ever been known. Cart-loads of voters, many of whom had been in the country less than three years, were used as repeaters in the different wards. An instance was known of one cart-load of six men voting at six different places. Other men boasted of having voted three and four times. In an upper ward, where the foreign population had full sway, an American found it almost impossible to appear or vote at all. If he tried the[74] experiment, he was arrested immediately, his votes were taken from him and Jackson votes put in his hands. Many of the polling places had no challengers, and most of the inspectors did duty for the Jackson ticket by a display of stout hickory branches. By such means the Jackson men rolled up in the city a majority of nearly five thousand.

Cases of fraud and violence had been common; however, nothing like what happened at the primaries and polls in November 1827 had ever occurred before. Cartloads of voters, many of whom had been in the country for less than three years, were used as repeaters in different precincts. There was even a case of one cartload of six men voting at six different locations. Others bragged about voting three or four times. In one upper precinct, where the foreign population was dominant, an American found it nearly impossible to show up or vote at all. If he attempted to do so, he was immediately arrested, his votes were taken from him, and Jackson votes were handed to him instead. Many polling places had no challengers, and most of the inspectors supported the Jackson ticket by brandishing thick hickory sticks. By these means, the Jackson supporters secured a majority of nearly five thousand in the city.

Reflective citizens of both parties were alarmed and humiliated by the events of the election. The public conscience was not used to the indiscriminate stuffing of ballot boxes. To the revelations of this election can be traced the origin of the Native American party, whose cry that “political privileges should belong exclusively to the natives of the country” even now was heard.

Reflective citizens from both parties were shocked and embarrassed by what happened during the election. The public was not accustomed to the random stuffing of ballot boxes. The events of this election can be seen as the starting point for the Native American party, which continues to shout that “political privileges should belong exclusively to the natives of the country.”

Though a year before the time for choosing a President, the result of this election strongly indicated the choice of Jackson and caused great exultation and encouragement among his supporters in other cities. In the Winter of 1827, Tammany sent a delegation to visit him at New Orleans, ostensibly to present an address on the anniversary of the battle of New Orleans, but in reality, it was supposed, to confer with him on the work to be done in his behalf. By the beginning of 1828 the organization was controlled wholly by Jackson men. Not a nomination, however petty, was made of a man not known to be his partizan. The great body of Democrats approved this course on the ground that Jackson’s election was the real issue, and that local issues were subordinate for the time. When the Adams men tried to hold anti-Jackson meetings in the Wigwam, the Sachems stepped forward and exercised a long dormant power—a power which explains the real connection between the society and the organization, and which it frequently used later against hostile factions. Through pressure, the lessee of Tammany Hall sold to the society his lease. This secured, the society put in charge of the building[75] (which was fitted in part as a hotel as well as a hall) another person, instructed not to let any room to the Adams committee. The Adams men asked by what right a “charitable and benevolent society” interfered in politics. But, being excluded, they could no longer claim they represented Tammany Hall—a fatal loss to them and an important advantage to the Jackson men, who now were the only Tammany organization. The Adams committees were thus shut off from holding any meetings in the hall.

Though it was a year before the presidential election, the results of this election clearly showed Jackson was the favorite, sparking excitement and motivation among his supporters in other cities. In the winter of 1827, Tammany sent a group to meet with him in New Orleans, supposedly to deliver a speech on the anniversary of the Battle of New Orleans, but really, it was believed they were there to discuss strategies for his campaign. By early 1828, the organization was entirely under Jackson's control. Not a single nomination, no matter how small, was made for someone not known to be his supporter. The majority of Democrats backed this decision, believing that Jackson's election was the main focus and that local issues were secondary for the moment. When the Adams supporters attempted to hold anti-Jackson meetings at the Wigwam, the Sachems stepped in and exercised a long-neglected power—a power that explains the real link between the society and the organization, which they often wielded against opposing groups later on. Under pressure, the leaseholder of Tammany Hall sold his lease to the society. With this secured, the society put in charge of the building[75] (which served as both a hotel and a hall) another person, who was instructed not to rent any room to the Adams committee. The Adams supporters questioned what right a “charitable and benevolent society” had to interfere in politics. But, being sidelined, they could no longer claim they represented Tammany Hall—a critical blow to them and a significant win for the Jackson supporters, who were now the sole Tammany organization. The Adams committees were thus barred from holding any meetings in the hall.

With the Adams committees put out, the Jackson men began to quarrel among themselves for local and State nominations. The Wigwam’s inveterate foe, De Witt Clinton, was out of the way, he having died on February 11, 1828, while still Governor. As nominations continued to be looked upon as almost certainly resulting in election, there was a swarm of candidates.[7] The ambitions of few of these were gratified. The nominations were settled beforehand by a small clique, headed, it was said, by M. M. Noah.

With the Adams committees eliminated, the Jackson supporters started to argue among themselves over local and state nominations. De Witt Clinton, the longtime enemy of the Wigwam, was out of the picture; he died on February 11, 1828, while still serving as Governor. Since nominations were viewed as nearly guaranteed to lead to election, there was a flood of candidates.[7] Most of their ambitions were not fulfilled. The nominations were decided in advance by a small group, supposedly led by M. M. Noah.

Of a voting population of 25,000, Tammany Hall secured a majority of 5,831 for Jackson[8] and elected all its candidates except one. That hundreds, if not thousands, of illegal votes were counted was admitted. Boys of 19 and 20 years of age voted and were employed to electioneer for the Jackson ticket. On the other hand, raftsmen just arrived from the interior and men who had no homes were gathered in bunches and sent to swell the[76] Adams vote, though it is doubtful whether their votes were counted. For the first time in city elections money was used to influence voting.

Of a voting population of 25,000, Tammany Hall secured a majority of 5,831 for Jackson[8] and elected all its candidates except one. It was acknowledged that hundreds, if not thousands, of illegal votes were counted. Young men aged 19 and 20 voted and were hired to campaign for the Jackson ticket. Meanwhile, raftsmen who had just arrived from the interior and homeless men were gathered in groups and sent to boost the[76] Adams vote, although it’s uncertain whether their votes were actually counted. For the first time in city elections, money was used to influence voting.

The Common Council soon after removed every office-holder not of the Jackson faith. As a matter of course, Jackson rewarded his friends. He made Samuel Swartwout Collector of the Port and filled every Federal local post with his Tammany adherents.

The Common Council quickly removed any office-holder who wasn't aligned with Jackson. Naturally, Jackson rewarded his supporters. He appointed Samuel Swartwout as Collector of the Port and filled every local Federal position with his Tammany allies.

FOOTNOTES

[1] William Paulding was succeeded by Philip Hone (1825-26), who in turn was followed by Paulding (1826-29).

[1] William Paulding was replaced by Philip Hone (1825-26), who was then followed by Paulding again (1826-29).

[2] This anniversary was the first on which the society, since its formation, did not march in the streets and go to church. Each “brother,” wearing a bucktail in front of his hat, went instead to the great council chamber, where the Declaration of Independence was read by Matthew L. Davis.

[2] This anniversary was the first since the society formed that they didn’t march in the streets or go to church. Instead, each “brother,” wearing a bucktail on the front of his hat, went to the great council chamber, where Matthew L. Davis read the Declaration of Independence.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

[4] Minutes of the Oyer and Terminer, Vol. 6, pp. 3-137.

[4] Minutes of the Oyer and Terminer, Vol. 6, pp. 3-137.

[5] Barker maintained that a conspiracy had been formed against him. A pamphlet entitled, Jacob Barker’s Letters Developing the Conspiracy Formed in 1826 for His Ruin, was extensively circulated about this time or later.

[5] Barker claimed that there was a conspiracy against him. A pamphlet titled, Jacob Barker’s Letters Developing the Conspiracy Formed in 1826 for His Ruin, was widely distributed around this time or later.

[6] The action of the general committee had a sweeping national importance. “The State of New York represents the Democracy of the Union; the City of New York gives tone to the State; the General Committee govern the City.” Quoted by “A Journalist” as applying to these years in his Memoirs of James Gordon Bennett and His Times, New York, 1855.

[6] The decisions made by the general committee had a significant national impact. “The State of New York embodies the democracy of the Union; the City of New York sets the standard for the State; the General Committee oversees the City.” Quoted by “A Journalist” referring to these years in his Memoirs of James Gordon Bennett and His Times, New York, 1855.

[7] “Should the Independent electors,” wrote one of them, Aaron Sergeant, “give me a nomination (for Sheriff) (as there will be several candidates for the office) I shall succeed by a handsome majority. The Sons of Erin are my most particular friends. I rely with confidence on their support.

[7] “If the Independent electors,” wrote one of them, Aaron Sergeant, “nominate me (for Sheriff) (since there will be multiple candidates for the position), I’m confident I will win by a large majority. The Sons of Erin are my close allies. I trust their support completely.

“Knowing the office to be one worth $10,000 per annum, should I be elected, I shall give one-third of the income of this office to be divided equally to [among] the several charitable Religious Societies in the city. My claims for the office are, that I am a citizen born, and my father one of the Patriots of the Revolution for seven long years ….”

“Knowing that the position is worth $10,000 a year, if I’m elected, I will give one-third of the income from this position to be shared equally among the various charitable religious organizations in the city. My qualifications for this position are that I am a born citizen, and my father was one of the Patriots of the Revolution for seven long years ….”

[8] This was the first election in the State in which Presidential electors were voted on by the people.

[8] This was the first election in the state where the people voted for Presidential electors.


CHAPTER X
THE WORKINGMEN'S PARTY 1829-1830

In 1829 the indignation against the Tammany leaders crystallized in a “purifying” movement. Under the direction of its banker, merchant and lawyer leaders, Tammany Hall had been made a medium for either coercing or bribing the Legislature or the Common Council into passing dozens of bank charters and franchises with scarcely any provision for compensation to either State or city.[1] In 1819 the Tammany Society, in one of its pompous addresses, had recited the speculative spirit and consequent distress brought about by the multiplication of incorporated banks, and suggested that the Legislature adopt a prompt and decisive remedy tending to the abolition of those institutions. This sounded well; but at that very time, as before and after, the Sachems were lobbying at Albany for charters of banks of which they became presidents or directors. By one means or another these banks yielded fortunes to their owners; but the currency issued by them almost invariably depreciated. The laboring classes on whom this bad private money was imposed complained of suffering severely. Each year, besides, witnessed[78] an increase in the number of chartered monopolies, armed with formidable powers for long periods, or practically in perpetuity.[2] To the first gas company, in May, 1823, the Common Council had granted the exclusive right to light all the streets south of Grand street for thirty years, without returns of any kind to the city.[3] At the rate at which the city was expanding, this was a concession of immense value, and formed one of the subjects of complaint in 1829.

In 1829, the anger against the Tammany leaders came together in a "purifying" movement. Under the leadership of bankers, merchants, and lawyers, Tammany Hall had become a means for either pressuring or bribing the Legislature or the Common Council to pass numerous bank charters and franchises with hardly any compensation for the state or city.[1] In 1819, the Tammany Society, in one of its grand speeches, highlighted the speculative mindset and the resulting distress caused by the increase of incorporated banks, suggesting that the Legislature should quickly and decisively work to eliminate these institutions. This sounded good; however, at that exact time, as before and after, the Sachems were lobbying in Albany for charters for banks where they served as presidents or directors. In various ways, these banks generated wealth for their owners, but the currency they issued almost always lost value. The working-class people who had to deal with this awful private money reported that they were suffering greatly. Each year also saw a rise in the number of chartered monopolies, which gained powerful rights for extended periods or nearly forever.[2] In May 1823, the Common Council granted the first gas company the exclusive right to illuminate all the streets south of Grand Street for thirty years, with no returns to the city.[3] Given how fast the city was growing, this was a major concession and was one of the issues people complained about in 1829.

While laws were instituted to create a money aristocracy, the old debt and other laws bearing on the working classes were not changed. No attempt was made to improve a condition which allowed a dishonest contractor to put up a building or a series of buildings, collect his money and then swindle his laborers out of their wages. The local administration, moreover, continued corrupt. It was freely charged at this time that $250,000 of city money was being stolen outright every year. The city charter drafted and adopted in 1829-30 contained provisions which, it was thought, might remedy matters. It created two bodies of the Common Council—the Aldermen and Assistant Aldermen—and gave each a negative upon the propositions of the other, vesting a supreme veto power in the Mayor. It again separated the election of the Common Council from the general election. It abolished secret contracts and compelled all resolutions involving appropriations of public money or placing taxes or assessments to be advertised, and included other precautionary measures against corruption. But it opposed the public wish in still vesting the appointment of the Mayor in the Common Council.

While laws were put in place to create a wealthy elite, the old debt and other laws affecting the working class remained unchanged. No effort was made to improve a situation that allowed a dishonest contractor to build structures, collect payment, and then cheat their workers out of wages. Additionally, the local administration remained corrupt. At this time, it was commonly claimed that $250,000 of city funds were being stolen every year. The city charter drafted and adopted in 1829-30 included provisions that were thought might improve things. It established two branches of the Common Council—the Aldermen and Assistant Aldermen—giving each the power to veto the other's proposals and granting the Mayor supreme veto authority. It also separated the election of the Common Council from the general election. It eliminated secret contracts and required all resolutions involving the allocation of public funds or imposing taxes or assessments to be advertised, among other measures intended to prevent corruption. However, it went against the public's desire by still allowing the Common Council to appoint the Mayor.

To battle against the prevailing injustices the Mechanics’ or Workingmen’s party was formed. Its chief inspiration was Robert Dale Owen, son of the famous Robert Owen. “Dale” Owen, as he was familiarly[79] known, and others had recently returned to the city after an unsuccessful experiment at cooperative colonizing at New Harmony, Indiana, and a number of bright and ardent intellects gathered about him. Boldly declaring against the private and exclusive possession of the soil and against the hereditary transmission of property, the new party won over a large part of the laboring element. “Resolved,” ran its resolutions adopted at Military Hall, October 19, 1829,

To fight against the existing injustices, the Mechanics' or Workingmen's party was established. Its main inspiration was Robert Dale Owen, the son of the famous Robert Owen. "Dale" Owen, as he was commonly known, along with others, had recently returned to the city after an unsuccessful attempt at cooperative community living in New Harmony, Indiana, and many bright and passionate thinkers gathered around him. They boldly opposed private and exclusive ownership of land and the hereditary passing down of property, drawing in a significant portion of the working class. "Resolved," stated the resolutions adopted at Military Hall, October 19, 1829,

“in the opinion of this meeting, that the first appropriation of the soil of the State to private and exclusive possession was eminently and barbarously unjust. That it was substantially feudal in its character, inasmuch as those who received enormous and unequal possessions were lords and those who received little or nothing were vassals. That hereditary transmission of wealth on the one hand and poverty on the other, has brought down to the present generation all the evils of the feudal system, and that, in our opinion, is the prime source of all our calamities.”

“we believe that the initial allocation of the State's land for private and exclusive ownership was incredibly and brutally unfair. It had a fundamentally feudal nature, as those who gained large and unequal amounts of land were lords, while those who received little or nothing were vassals. The inheritance of wealth on one side and poverty on the other has passed down to the current generation all the problems of the feudal system, which we see as the main cause of our troubles.”

After declaring that the Workingmen’s party would oppose all exclusive privileges, monopolies and exemptions, the resolutions proceeded:

After stating that the Workingmen’s party would stand against all exclusive privileges, monopolies, and exemptions, the resolutions continued:

“We consider it an exclusive privilege for one portion of the community to have the means of education in colleges while another is restricted to common schools, or perhaps, by extreme poverty, even deprived of the limited education to be acquired in those establishments. Our voice, therefore, shall be raised in favor of a system of education which shall be equally open to all, as in a real republic it should be.”

“We see it as an unfair privilege for part of the community to have access to college education while another part is limited to regular schools, or in some cases, due to severe poverty, completely denied the little education those institutions offer. Therefore, we will advocate for an education system that is equally available to everyone, as it should be in a true republic.”

The banks, too, came in for a share of the denunciation. The bankers were styled “the greatest knaves, impostors and paupers of the age.” The resolutions continued:

The banks also faced their share of condemnation. The bankers were referred to as “the greatest crooks, frauds, and broke people of the era.” The resolutions continued:

“As banking is now conducted, the owners of the banks receive annually of the people of this State not less than two millions of dollars in their paper money (and it might as well be pewter money) for which there is and can be nothing provided for its redemption on demand.…”

“As banking is done today, the owners of the banks receive every year from the people of this State no less than two million dollars in their paper money (and it might as well be pewter money) for which there is and can be nothing available for its redemption on demand.…”

The Workingmen put a full ticket in the field.

The workers put together a complete slate of candidates.

Tammany Hall, dominated by some of the same men and interests denounced by the Workingmen’s party,[80] opened a campaign of abuse. Commercial and banking men outside the Wigwam joined ardently in the campaign. The new movement was declared to be a mushroom party, led by designing men, whose motives were destructive. The Evening Post, which represented the commercial element and which sided with Tammany in opposition to the new party, said that it remained for the really worthy mechanics who might have associated accidentally with that party, to separate themselves from it, now that its designs and doctrines were known. The Courier and Enquirer, partly owned and edited by Noah,[4] styled the Workingmen’s party an infidel ticket, hostile to the morals, to the institutions of society and the rights of property. The Tammany Hall, or to speak more technically, the Democratic-Republican General Committee, declaiming on the virtues of Jackson and Democracy, advised all good men, and especially all self-respecting laborers, not to vote the Workingmen’s ticket.

Tammany Hall, controlled by some of the same individuals and interests criticized by the Workingmen’s party,[80] launched a campaign of slander. Business and banking leaders outside the Wigwam eagerly joined this campaign. The new movement was labeled a transient party, led by scheming individuals whose motives were harmful. The Evening Post, representing the business community and aligning with Tammany against the new party, stated that it was up to the truly respectable mechanics who might have accidentally associated with that party to distance themselves now that its intentions and beliefs were clear. The Courier and Enquirer, partly owned and edited by Noah,[4] referred to the Workingmen’s party as an untrustworthy ticket, opposed to the morals, institutions of society, and property rights. Tammany Hall, or more formally, the Democratic-Republican General Committee, proclaiming the virtues of Jackson and Democracy, urged all good individuals, especially self-respecting workers, not to support the Workingmen’s ticket.

Nevertheless, its principles made such an impression that in November it polled over 6,000 votes, while Tammany, with its compact organization, could claim little more than 11,000 votes. It was well settled that numbers of Whig workingmen voted the new party’s ticket; and that the rich Whigs secretly worked for the success of Tammany Hall, whose ticket was almost entirely successful, though the Workingmen elected Ebenezer Ford to the Assembly.

Nevertheless, its principles made such an impression that in November it received over 6,000 votes, while Tammany, with its strong organization, could count just over 11,000 votes. It was clear that many Whig workingmen voted for the new party’s ticket, and that wealthy Whigs secretly supported the success of Tammany Hall, whose ticket was almost completely successful, although the Workingmen did manage to elect Ebenezer Ford to the Assembly.

Tammany was dismayed at the new party’s strength, and determined to destroy it by championing one of the reform measures demanded. In January, 1830, a bill for the better security of mechanics and other laborers of New York City was introduced by Silas M. Stillwell. The Tammany men immediately took it up as if it were their[81] own, urged its passage and secured the credit of its adoption, when in April, much emasculated, it became a law. It required, under penalties, the owner of a building to retain from the contractor the amount due to the mechanics employed thereon. By exploiting this performance to the utmost, Tammany succeeded in making some inroads on the Workingmen’s party. The organization leaders had recognized that it was time they did something for the laboring classes. They were fast losing caste with even independent Democrats of means, because of their subservience to the aristocracy and of the common knowledge of the illegitimate ways in which they were amassing wealth.

Tammany was upset about the new party's power and decided to undermine it by backing one of the reform measures they wanted. In January 1830, a bill aimed at better protecting mechanics and other workers in New York City was introduced by Silas M. Stillwell. The Tammany group quickly jumped on it as if it were their own, pushed for its approval, and claimed credit for its passage when it finally became law in April, albeit in a weakened form. The law required building owners to withhold from the contractor the amount owed to the workers employed on the project, under penalty. By making the most of this move, Tammany managed to make some gains with the Workingmen's party. The leaders of the organization realized they had to start doing something for the working class. They were quickly losing support even from independent Democrats with means because of their subservience to the wealthy elite and the widespread awareness of their shady methods for accumulating wealth.

One result of the Workingmen’s movement was the failure of the Wigwam to secure a majority in the Common Council. This seemed to frustrate the design to reelect, as Mayor, Walter Bowne (Grand Sachem in 1820 and 1831). Fourteen Aldermen and Assistants were opposed to Bowne, and thirteen favored him. There was but one expedient calculated to reelect him, and to this Tammany Hall resorted. Bowne, as presiding officer of the Council, held that the constitution permitted him to vote for the office of Mayor. “I will persist in this opinion even though the board decide against me,” he said. To prevent a vote being taken, seven of Bowne’s opponents withdrew on December 28, 1829. They went back on January 6, 1830, when Tammany managed to reelect Bowne by one vote. How this vote was obtained was a mystery. Fourteen members declared under oath that they had voted for Thomas R. Smith, Bowne’s opponent.[5] Charges of bribery were made, and an investigating committee was appointed on January 11; but as this committee was composed[82] of Bowne’s own partizans, it announced its inability to find proofs. Meanwhile the general committee[6] had issued a loftily worded manifesto saying that it (the committee) was established and was maintained to watch over the political interests of the Democratic-Republicans of the city and “to expose and repel the insidious and open machinations of their enemies,” that it could not discover anything wrong in the conduct of the Chief Magistrate of the city, and that it “repelled the accusations of his enemies.”

One result of the Workingmen’s movement was the failure of the Wigwam to secure a majority in the Common Council. This seemed to frustrate the plan to reelect Walter Bowne as Mayor (he was Grand Sachem in 1820 and 1831). Fourteen Aldermen and Assistants opposed Bowne, while thirteen supported him. There was only one strategy that could get him reelected, and Tammany Hall decided to go for it. Bowne, as the presiding officer of the Council, believed the constitution allowed him to vote for the office of Mayor. “I will stick to this opinion even if the board votes against me,” he said. To prevent a vote from happening, seven of Bowne’s opponents walked out on December 28, 1829. They returned on January 6, 1830, when Tammany managed to reelect Bowne by one vote. How this vote was secured was a mystery. Fourteen members swore that they had voted for Thomas R. Smith, Bowne’s opponent.[5] Accusations of bribery were made, and an investigating committee was formed on January 11; but because this committee was made up of Bowne’s own supporters, it announced that it couldn’t find any evidence. Meanwhile, the general committee[6] released a high-minded manifesto stating that it was formed to protect the political interests of the Democratic-Republicans in the city and “to expose and fight against the secret and open schemes of their enemies,” claiming it couldn’t find anything wrong in the actions of the Chief Magistrate of the city, and that it “rejected the accusations from his enemies.”

The Workingmen’s party continued its agitation, and prepared for another campaign. In the meantime the Wigwam’s agents skilfully went about fomenting divisions, with the result that three tickets, all purporting to be the genuine Workingmen’s, were put into the field in October, 1830. One was that of the “Clay Workingmen”; it was composed of a medley of admirers of Clay, the owners of stock in various great manufacturing establishments, workingmen who believed in a protective tariff, Whigs,[7] and a bunch of hack politicians who had taken up the Workingmen’s movement for selfish ends. The second was that of a fragment of the Workingmen’s party of the year before, standing resolutely for their principles and containing no suspicious politicians or monopolists. The third was that of the Agrarian party, embracing a few individuals of views too advanced even for the Workingmen’s party.

The Workingmen's party kept pushing for change and got ready for another campaign. Meanwhile, the Wigwam’s agents skillfully stirred up divisions, leading to three tickets, all claiming to be the true Workingmen’s, being launched in October 1830. One was the “Clay Workingmen” ticket; it was made up of a mix of Clay supporters, stockholders from various large manufacturing companies, workingmen who believed in a protective tariff, Whigs,[7] and some opportunistic politicians who had joined the Workingmen’s movement for their own gain. The second ticket came from a splinter group of the Workingmen’s party from the previous year, firmly standing by their principles and not including any questionable politicians or monopolists. The third was from the Agrarian party, which included a few people whose views were even too progressive for the Workingmen's party.

To the Clay Workingmen’s party[8] Tammany Hall gave little attention, since it was made up mainly of Whigs who had always, under different names, been opposed to the organization. But the genuine movement Tammany Hall covered with abuse. “Look, fellow-citizens,” said the address of the “general nominating committee,”

To the Clay Workingmen’s party[8] Tammany Hall paid little attention, since it was mostly made up of Whigs who had always, under different names, opposed the organization. However, Tammany Hall responded to the genuine movement with criticism. “Look, fellow citizens,” stated the address from the “general nominating committee,”

“upon the political horizon and mark the fatal signs prognosticating evils of a dire and fatal nature! Associations and political sects of a new and dangerous character have lately stalked into existence, menacing the welfare and good order of society. These associations … have assumed to represent two of the most useful and respectable classes of our citizens—our Workingmen and Mechanics …. Confide in them, and when they have gained their ends they will treat you with derision and scorn! Then rally round your ancient and trusty friends and remember that honest men and good citizens never assume false names nor fight under borrowed banners!”

“On the political horizon, we see warning signs predicting serious and potentially disastrous problems! New and dangerous political groups have recently emerged, threatening the safety and stability of society. These groups … claim to represent two of the most valuable and respectable classes of our citizens—our Workingmen and Mechanics …. Trust them, and once they achieve their goals, they will mock and disdain you! So, come together with your long-standing and reliable allies and remember that honest people and good citizens never use fake names or fight under false flags!”

To display its devotion to the cause of Democracy, Tammany Hall celebrated, on November 26, the revolution in France. It persuaded former President James Monroe to preside in Tammany Hall at the preliminary arrangements, and made a studied parade of its zeal. There was a procession, Samuel Swartwout acting as grand marshal. Monroe, in a feeble state of health, was brought in a stage to Washington Square, where for ten minutes he looked on. A banquet, the usual high-flown speeches, and fireworks followed.

To show its commitment to Democracy, Tammany Hall celebrated the revolution in France on November 26. It got former President James Monroe to preside over the initial arrangements at Tammany Hall and made a big deal out of its enthusiasm. There was a parade, with Samuel Swartwout serving as grand marshal. Monroe, who was in poor health, was brought in on a stage to Washington Square, where he watched for ten minutes. After that, there was a banquet, the usual grand speeches, and fireworks.

The election was favorable to Tammany. About 3,800 workingmen who had supported the independent movement the previous year, went back to Tammany, because of its advocacy of the mechanics’ lien law. The average Tammany plurality was 3,000. The real Workingmen’s ticket polled a vote of about 2,200; the Clay Workingmen’s ticket a little above 7,000, and the Agrarian, 116.

The election turned out well for Tammany. Around 3,800 working-class individuals who had backed the independent movement the year before returned to Tammany because of its support for the mechanics’ lien law. The average Tammany margin was 3,000 votes. The real Workingmen’s ticket received about 2,200 votes; the Clay Workingmen’s ticket got just over 7,000, and the Agrarian ticket received 116.

For the next few years the contest of Jackson with the United States Bank drew together the energies of all Democrats supporting him. Dropping local contests, they united to renew his power. For the time, the Workingmen’s movement ceased to exist.

For the next few years, Jackson’s battle with the United States Bank brought together the efforts of all Democrats who backed him. Putting aside local battles, they came together to restore his influence. During this period, the Workingmen’s movement faded away.

FOOTNOTES

[1] “The members [of the Legislature] themselves sometimes participated in the benefits growing out of charters created by their own votes; … if ten banks were chartered at one session, twenty must be chartered the next and thirty the next. The cormorants could never be gorged. If at one session you bought off a pack of greedy lobby agents … they returned with increased numbers and more voracious appetite.”—Hammond, Vol. II, pp. 447-48.

[1] “The members of the Legislature often benefited from the charters they created with their own votes; if ten banks were chartered in one session, there would have to be twenty in the next, and thirty in the one after that. The greedy ones could never get enough. If you managed to bribe a group of hungry lobbyists in one session, they would come back with even more people and a bigger appetite.” —Hammond, Vol. II, pp. 447-48.

Four conspicuous “charter dealers” at Albany were Sachems Samuel B. Romaine, Michael Ulshoeffer, Peter Sharpe and Abraham Stagg, all powerful organization leaders.

Four prominent "charter dealers" in Albany were Sachems Samuel B. Romaine, Michael Ulshoeffer, Peter Sharpe, and Abraham Stagg, all influential leaders of their organizations.

[2] Hammond, Vol. II, pp. 447-48.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Hammond, Vol. II, pp. 447-48.

[3] MS. Minutes of the Common Council, Vol. 48, pp. 59-60.

[3] MS. Minutes of the Common Council, Vol. 48, pp. 59-60.

[4] Noah, after falling into financial difficulties, had been ousted from the editorship of the National Advocate and had now become associated with his former political enemy, James Watson Webb, in the conduct of the Courier and Enquirer.

[4] Noah, after running into financial trouble, was removed from the editor position at the National Advocate and had now teamed up with his former political rival, James Watson Webb, to run the Courier and Enquirer.

[5] MS. Minutes of the Common Council, Vol. 70, p. 311. Shortly after this the Wigwam men removed Smith from his post of Commissioner of the Almshouse for opposing Bowne. So great was the haste to oust him, before the Aldermen went out of office, that one of the board seconded the motion for his removal before the motion was made.

[5] MS. Minutes of the Common Council, Vol. 70, p. 311. Shortly after this, the Wigwam group kicked Smith out of his position as Commissioner of the Almshouse for opposing Bowne. They were so eager to get rid of him before the Aldermen left office that one of the board members seconded the motion for his removal before it was even proposed.

[6] The general committee was now composed of thirty-six members, mainly the directors in banking and other companies. Remonstrances at this time were frequent that its important proceedings were a sealed book to the electors. Among other things it dictated to the wards not only when, but where, they should meet.

[6] The general committee now had thirty-six members, mostly directors from banks and other companies. There were many complaints at this time that its significant actions were completely unknown to the voters. Among other things, it instructed the wards not just when to meet, but also where they should gather.

[7] The term “Whig” had now come to have a definite party meaning, being used as a popular designation of the group led by John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay, officially known (1828-36) as the National Republican party. The term is first found in American politics applied to the Separatists during the Revolution. About 1808 it was taken by the anti-Burr faction of the Democratic-Republican party.

[7] The term “Whig” had now developed a specific party meaning, serving as a common label for the group led by John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay, officially known (1828-36) as the National Republican Party. The term was first used in American politics to refer to the Separatists during the Revolution. Around 1808, it was adopted by the anti-Burr faction of the Democratic-Republican Party.

[8] The men of this party, as a rule, voted the Anti-Masonic State ticket. While the Anti-Masonic party occasioned political commotion in the State, there is no evidence that it had any perceptible effect on Tammany’s career.

[8] Generally, the men in this group voted for the Anti-Masonic State ticket. Although the Anti-Masonic party caused political stir in the State, there is no proof that it noticeably impacted Tammany’s trajectory.


CHAPTER XI
Tammany and the Bank Contest
1831-1834

Tammany lost no time in announcing its intention to support the renomination of Jackson. The general committee, on March 3, 1831, unanimously passed a resolution approving of his renomination by the Democratic members of the Legislature. Seven days later the General Committee of Democratic Young Men and the ward committees acted likewise.

Tammany quickly announced its plan to support the renomination of Jackson. The general committee, on March 3, 1831, unanimously passed a resolution backing his renomination by the Democratic members of the Legislature. Seven days later, the General Committee of Democratic Young Men and the ward committees did the same.

Since the campaign of 1800 there had not been a Presidential contest in which the masses joined with such enthusiasm. Although the national election was more than 18 months distant, the excitement was intense. The late Workingmen’s party and Tammany men fraternized. The ward resolutions were full of fire, the meetings spirited. The Democratic electors of the Sixth Ward “friendly to regular nominations” resolved, on March 15:

Since the 1800 campaign, there hadn't been a presidential race where the public got so involved. Even though the national election was over 18 months away, the energy was electric. The former Workingmen’s party and Tammany members mingled. The ward resolutions were full of passion, and the meetings were lively. The Democratic electors of the Sixth Ward “friendly to regular nominations” decided on March 15:

“… That aristocracy in all its forms is odious to us as Democratic-Republicans, and that of all aristocracies an aristocracy of wealth, grinding the faces of the poor and devouring the substance of the people, is the most alarming. That we regard an incorporated association of rich men wielding the whole monied capital of the country as dangerous to our rights and liberties. That we consider the next Presidential election as substantially a contest between the people on one side and the monied aristocracy of the country on the other.”[1]

“… We, as Democratic-Republicans, find all forms of aristocracy repugnant, and among them, an aristocracy of wealth that oppresses the poor and consumes the resources of the people is the most concerning. We see a wealthy group controlling all the money in the country as a threat to our rights and freedoms. We believe the upcoming Presidential election is essentially a battle between the people and the wealthy aristocracy of the nation.”[1]

The organization’s first object was to gain a majority of the local offices in the Spring election of 1831 on the Jackson issue. The National Republican party, recently[86] organized in New York City on the same general lines as Tammany Hall, and headed by Clarkson Crolius, a former Grand Sachem, set out to crush the Jackson movement. If a defeat could be administered to it at this time, the practical effect would be great; New York would possibly influence the entire Union. To accomplish this, the National Republicans tried to divert the issue to local lines and agitated for the election of the Mayor by the people. The Tammany men joined issue at once, and in February, 1831, the Common Council committee on application, composed chiefly of Tammany men, reported adversely on a motion to suggest to the Legislature a revision of the charter. The time was declared to be inexpedient for such an innovation, one Tammany Alderman, Thomas T. Woodruff, declaring, when the matter again came up, on April 8, that the people could not be trusted with the choice of that important official. The National Republicans replied by denouncing the Common Council for its lavish expenditures of public money, its distribution of favors in the shape of “jobs” and contracts among a few retainers whose sole merits lay in their close relationship to certain managing members of the board, and for its efforts to prevent the people from having the right to elect their own Mayor.[2]

The organization’s first goal was to win a majority of local offices in the Spring election of 1831 based on the Jackson issue. The National Republican party, recently formed in New York City along similar lines as Tammany Hall and led by Clarkson Crolius, a former Grand Sachem, aimed to crush the Jackson movement. If they could defeat it now, it would have a significant impact; New York could potentially sway the entire Union. To achieve this, the National Republicans tried to shift the focus to local matters and pushed for the Mayor to be elected by the people. The Tammany supporters immediately responded, and in February 1831, the Common Council committee on applications, mostly made up of Tammany members, reported negatively on a motion to recommend a revision of the charter to the Legislature. They claimed that it wasn’t the right time for such a change, with Tammany Alderman Thomas T. Woodruff stating, when the matter was brought up again on April 8, that the people could not be trusted to choose such an important official. The National Republicans countered by criticizing the Common Council for its excessive spending of public funds, its distribution of favors in the form of “jobs” and contracts among a few supporters whose only qualifications were their close connections to certain key members of the board, and for trying to stop the people from having the right to elect their own Mayor.[2]

The opposition to Tammany was ineffectual. In the ensuing election, not less than 22 of the 28 members chosen for the new double-chamber Common Council were Tammany men, elected solely upon their pledge of allegiance to the national and State administrations. The first trial of the new charter, therefore, showed that the separation of municipal from general elections did not prevent the division of the voters on national party lines. The extent of this preliminary Jackson victory made a sensation throughout the Union and caused gloom among the United States Bank supporters.

The resistance to Tammany was ineffective. In the following election, at least 22 of the 28 members elected to the new two-chamber Common Council were Tammany supporters, chosen solely for their loyalty to the national and State administrations. Thus, the initial test of the new charter revealed that separating local elections from general ones didn’t stop voters from being divided along national party lines. The scale of this early Jackson victory created a stir across the country and brought despair to the supporters of the United States Bank.

The prestige of Tammany Hall was now overwhelming; its influence upon the Democratic party, great before, became greater. No aspirant for public favor could ignore its demands and decrees. When, on May 12, the society held an imposing celebration of the forty-second anniversary of its founding, politicians from the highest to the lowest, national and local, four hundred and over, crowded there with words of flattery. Lewis Cass, Nathaniel P. Tallmadge, the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor of the State of New York; members of the National Senate and of the House of Representatives—these and the rest were glad to avail themselves of the invitation. William Mooney was there, very old and feeble, beaming with pride at the power of the institution he had founded.[3] After the banquet, which was described in the old Indian terms, as consisting “of the game of the forest, the fish of the lakes, the fruits of the season and the waters of the great spring,” came the reading of letters. Jackson wrote: “Nothing could afford me greater gratification than to participate with your ancient and honorable society of Republicans on such an occasion,” but that press of official duties kept him away. A letter of regret, in high-flown and laudatory diction, from Secretary of State Martin Van Buren followed. James Watson Webb proposed this toast: “Martin Van Buren, the Grand Sachem of the Eagle Tribe—The Great Spirit is pleased with his faithful support of the Great Grand Sachem of the Nation and smiles graciously upon the sages and warriors of the tribe who aim to elevate their chief in 1836 to the highest station in the country.” This was greeted by nine cheers, and instantly disclosed Tammany’s choice for Jackson’s successor in 1836. The only troublous note was furnished by Duff Green, who sprang this toast upon the surprised[88] gathering: “De Witt Clinton—His friends honor his memory—his enemies dare not assail it!” By “enemies” he referred to those present; they retorted that he was an intruder, was not invited, and had not paid for his ticket.[4] Mayor Bowne was then installed as Grand Sachem in place of Stephen Allen, the former Mayor.

The prestige of Tammany Hall was now overwhelming; its influence on the Democratic Party, already strong, became even stronger. No candidate for public support could disregard its demands and decisions. On May 12, when the organization held a grand celebration for its forty-second anniversary, politicians from all levels, both national and local—over four hundred—gathered there, showering the event with compliments. Lewis Cass, Nathaniel P. Tallmadge, the Governor and Lieutenant Governor of New York; members of the National Senate and House of Representatives—all were eager to accept the invitation. William Mooney was present, very old and frail, but beaming with pride at the institution he had founded.[3] After the banquet, which was described in traditional terms as featuring “the game of the forest, the fish of the lakes, the fruits of the season, and the waters of the great spring,” letters were read. Jackson wrote: “Nothing could give me greater satisfaction than to join your ancient and respected society of Republicans on such an occasion,” although his official responsibilities kept him from attending. A letter of regret, filled with lofty praise, followed from Secretary of State Martin Van Buren. James Watson Webb offered this toast: “Martin Van Buren, the Grand Sachem of the Eagle Tribe—The Great Spirit is pleased with his loyal support of the Great Grand Sachem of the Nation and looks favorably upon the sages and warriors of the tribe who aspire to elevate their chief in 1836 to the highest position in the country.” This was met with nine cheers, quickly revealing Tammany’s choice for Jackson’s successor in 1836. The only note of controversy came from Duff Green, who surprised the gathering with this toast: “De Witt Clinton—His friends honor his memory—his enemies dare not attack it!” By “enemies,” he referred to those present; they retaliated by claiming he was an intruder, uninvited, and had not paid for his ticket.[4] Mayor Bowne was then installed as Grand Sachem in place of Stephen Allen, the former Mayor.

The Fall election of 1831 also turned upon national issues. Upon Jackson’s popularity nearly every Democratic candidate in New York city was elected by an average majority of 6,000. There were rumors of illegal voting, but no proof was submitted. The Wigwam was so overjoyed at the result that a banquet was held on November 21, presided over by Benjamin Bailey, who for a dozen years had been chairman of the general committee. He had reached his seventy-second year and could claim little political influence. But as a captain in the Revolutionary army, and as one of those confined in the Jersey prison ships, the Tammany chiefs considered him a valuable figurehead. Gen. Wool, Cols. Twiggs and Crogham and five hundred men of various importance spent the night in the Wigwam drinking to Jackson, Tammany Hall and coming victory.

The Fall election of 1831 was also influenced by national issues. Thanks to Jackson’s popularity, nearly every Democratic candidate in New York City won by an average majority of 6,000 votes. There were rumors of illegal voting, but no evidence was presented. The Wigwam was so thrilled with the outcome that they held a banquet on November 21, led by Benjamin Bailey, who had been the chairman of the general committee for twelve years. At seventy-two, he had little political influence left. However, as a captain in the Revolutionary army and one of those held captive on the Jersey prison ships, the Tammany leaders viewed him as a valuable figurehead. General Wool, Colonels Twiggs and Crogham, along with five hundred men of varying importance, spent the night at the Wigwam toasting to Jackson, Tammany Hall, and future victories.

Not only did Tammany take the initiative in supporting Jackson, but it was the first body to nominate Van Buren for Vice-President. On the news of the Senate’s rejection of Van Buren as Minister to England, an indignation meeting was held in Tammany Hall, January 30, 1832, this being the opening expression of public opinion. Van Buren was suggested for Vice-President, and the Wigwam gathering showed its satisfaction by repeated cheers.[5] Twenty-four leading Tammany men drew up a[89] letter containing their sentiments on Van Buren’s rejection, and on May 31 an outpouring in the Wigwam approved his nomination.

Not only did Tammany take the lead in backing Jackson, but it was also the first group to nominate Van Buren for Vice-President. After the Senate rejected Van Buren as Minister to England, an indignation meeting took place at Tammany Hall on January 30, 1832, marking the first public expression of opinion. Van Buren was proposed for Vice-President, and the Wigwam gathering showed their approval with loud cheers.[5] Twenty-four prominent Tammany members wrote a[89] letter outlining their views on Van Buren’s rejection, and on May 31, a gathering at the Wigwam expressed their support for his nomination.

Then followed a striking revelation, showing the venality of some of Tammany’s leaders. The United States Bank officials began bargaining for the betrayal of Jackson. The Courier and Enquirer suddenly abandoned him for the support of the bank candidates, giving as a reason the fear of the “fearful consequences of revolution, anarchy and despotism,” which assuredly would ensue if Jackson were reelected. The real reason was that Webb and Noah, as revealed by a Congressional investigation,[6] had borrowed directly and indirectly $50,000 from the United States Bank, which had now called them to time. Mayor Bowne was their sponsor to Nicholas Biddle, head of the bank. Some of the other Tammany leaders, it appeared, had been for years the bank’s retainers. Representative Churchill C. Cambreleng enjoyed a place on its pay rolls. Gulian C. Verplanck, another of the Wigwam’s representatives in Congress, had voted in its behalf, and Stephen Allen, in the State Senate, had voted for a resolution in its favor. Peter Sharpe, Ogden Edwards,[7] William H. Ireland, John Morss—all influential men in times past—now vigorously opposed Jackson, and the services of other Tammany chiefs were secured.

Then came a shocking revelation, exposing the corruption of some of Tammany’s leaders. The officials of the United States Bank began negotiating for Jackson's betrayal. The Courier and Enquirer suddenly turned against him to support the bank's candidates, claiming it was out of fear of the “terrible consequences of revolution, anarchy, and tyranny,” which would certainly follow if Jackson was reelected. The actual reason was that Webb and Noah, as uncovered by a Congressional investigation,[6] had borrowed $50,000 from the United States Bank, both directly and indirectly, and the bank was now demanding repayment. Mayor Bowne had recommended them to Nicholas Biddle, the bank's president. It appeared that some other Tammany leaders had been on the bank’s payroll for years. Representative Churchill C. Cambreleng was receiving payments from it. Gulian C. Verplanck, another representative from the Wigwam in Congress, had voted in its favor, and Stephen Allen, in the State Senate, had supported a resolution backing it. Peter Sharpe, Ogden Edwards,[7] William H. Ireland, John Morss—all once influential figures—now fiercely opposed Jackson, and the support of other Tammany chiefs was also secured.

Two influences, however, prevented the organization leaders from betraying the Democratic cause—one the common people, the other the owners of the State banks,[90] whose self-interest called for the speedy downfall of the United States Bank. Finding that they could not control the Wigwam, the Tammany agents of that bank seceded, and joined the National Republicans. The State Bank men remained in the organization and labored for Jackson, with no other idea than that their institutions would benefit in the distribution of Government funds if the United States Bank were put down. The course of the leaders remaining in Tammany smacked of double dealing. Refusing to renominate Verplanck, they put in his place Dudley Selden, who had borrowed $8,000 from the United States Bank, but who had professed to support Jackson’s veto. It looked as though certain potent influences were operating in Tammany Hall for the election of a pro-bank Congress, whoever might be chosen President.

Two influences, however, stopped the organization leaders from betraying the Democratic cause—one was the common people, and the other was the owners of the State banks,[90] whose self-interest demanded the quick collapse of the United States Bank. Realizing they couldn’t control the Wigwam, the Tammany agents of that bank left and joined the National Republicans. The State Bank people stayed in the organization and worked for Jackson, believing that their institutions would benefit from the distribution of Government funds if the United States Bank was eliminated. The actions of the leaders who stayed in Tammany seemed duplicitous. They refused to renominate Verplanck and instead nominated Dudley Selden, who had borrowed $8,000 from the United States Bank but claimed to support Jackson’s veto. It appeared that certain powerful influences were at work in Tammany Hall to elect a pro-bank Congress, regardless of who might be chosen as President.

The Tammany ward organizations, assisted by the men of the late Workingmen’s party, appointed vigilance committees to undo any mischief the leaders might attempt, and to electioneer for Jackson’s success. So enthusiastic was the Jackson feeling that many politicians of note, understanding its depth and having a care for their political futures, made haste to change front. Almost daily the people were rallied to the Wigwam by the beating of drums. A few years before, a hickory tree had been planted in front of the Wigwam; now, on October 30, a second was put there, and a barrel of beer was used to moisten its roots.

The Tammany ward organizations, with help from the former Workingmen’s party, set up vigilance committees to counteract any trouble the leaders might try to cause and to campaign for Jackson’s victory. The excitement for Jackson was so strong that many prominent politicians, recognizing its intensity and wanting to secure their own political futures, quickly switched their support. Almost every day, people were called to the Wigwam by the sound of drums. Just a few years earlier, a hickory tree had been planted in front of the Wigwam; now, on October 30, a second one was planted, and a barrel of beer was used to water its roots.

Both sides were guilty of election frauds. Votes were bought at the rate of $5 each, most of the buying being done by the National Republicans, who were supplied with abundant resources. The National Republicans, moreover, had sought to bribe certain men with the promise of offices, and on the three election days they foisted upon the voters a Jackson electoral ticket containing forty-three names, instead of the legal number, forty-two, thereby invalidating each of these ballots voted. This[91] trick, it was calculated, lost to Jackson more than a thousand votes. Of a total of 30,474 votes, Tammany carried the city by 5,620 majority. The Wigwam for many successive nights was filled with celebrating crowds. Jackson gave a conspicuously public display of his recognition of Tammany’s invaluable services, when, on the evening of June 13, 1833, he visited the society, attended by the Vice-President, Secretary Woodbury, Gov. William L. Marcy, the Mayor, and the members of the Common Council.

Both sides were involved in election fraud. Votes were purchased for $5 each, mainly by the National Republicans, who had plenty of resources. The National Republicans also tried to bribe some individuals with promises of jobs, and on the three election days, they pushed a Jackson electoral ticket with forty-three names, rather than the legal amount of forty-two, making all those ballots invalid. This [91] tactic was believed to have cost Jackson over a thousand votes. Out of a total of 30,474 votes, Tammany won the city by a margin of 5,620. The Wigwam was packed with celebrating crowds for many nights. Jackson publicly acknowledged Tammany’s critical contributions when he visited the society on the evening of June 13, 1833, accompanied by the Vice-President, Secretary Woodbury, Governor William L. Marcy, the Mayor, and members of the Common Council.

The United States Bank supporters did not surrender with Jackson’s reelection. They exerted themselves to influence Congress by means of a defeat for the anti-bank forces in New York City in the Fall election of 1833. Tammany Hall during the campaign sent out runners ordering every office-holder to his electioneering post. Vigorous meetings were held, and all the secret influences of the general committee were employed. On the other hand, merchants laid aside their ruffled shirts and broadcloth coats, put on their roundabouts and worked at the polls on the three election days for the Whig ticket. Tammany carried the city by between 2,000 and 3,000 majority. Touching this and previous elections a committee of Assistant Aldermen reported on February 10, 1834: “That frauds have been practised at the polls, the committee are convinced. At any rate, a universal and deep conviction prevails among our citizens that tricks have been resorted to for the purpose of defeating the election of one candidate and securing that of another.” It was further set forth that persons were brought up to vote who were not citizens of the United States nor qualified to vote in the State. Others voted in more than one ward. Voters also were transferred overnight from a sure to a doubtful ward.[8] No remedy followed the report.

The supporters of the United States Bank didn’t give up after Jackson’s reelection. They worked hard to sway Congress by aiming for a win against the anti-bank faction in New York City during the Fall election of 1833. Tammany Hall sent out runners during the campaign to instruct every office-holder to their electioneering locations. Energetic meetings took place, and all the secret tactics of the general committee were put into action. Meanwhile, merchants swapped their fancy shirts and coats for simpler outfits and worked at the polls on all three election days for the Whig ticket. Tammany won the city by a margin of 2,000 to 3,000 votes. Regarding this election and earlier ones, a committee of Assistant Aldermen reported on February 10, 1834: “The committee is convinced that frauds have been committed at the polls. Regardless, there is a widespread and strong belief among our citizens that tricks have been used to manipulate the election in favor of one candidate over another.” It was also stated that people were brought in to vote who were neither U.S. citizens nor eligible voters in the State. Some voted in more than one ward, and voters were also moved overnight from a secure to a questionable ward.[8] No action was taken in response to the report.

The Spring election of 1834, though local, again turned upon national issues. For the first time in the history of the city, the Mayor was to be elected by the people. The growth of public opinion had been such that the Legislature was forced, in 1833, to grant this reform.

The Spring election of 1834, while local, once again focused on national issues. For the first time in the city’s history, the Mayor would be elected by the people. Public opinion had grown so strong that the Legislature was compelled, in 1833, to implement this change.

The contending hosts were swayed, first, by the question of the United States Bank, and second, by the spoils. The merchants shut their shops and sent their whole body of clerks and laboring men to surround the polls and influence voters against Tammany Hall. The United States Bank spread abroad the cry of “panic.” If its directors could show that public opinion in the foremost city in the Union had altered so as to favor the continuation of the bank charter, then they could use that as a good basis for influencing Congress. There was no concealment of coercion of voters; the weak, the timid, the fearful were overawed by the increasing clamor of paid newspapers that the destruction of the United States Bank meant “widespread revulsion of trade and everlasting injury to the poor.” In fact, a general depression of business was produced. A row began in the “bloody ould Sixth,” by the breaking of some ballot boxes. Both parties armed with stones and bludgeons, and turned the scene into one of violence. The riot became general. A crowd, composed chiefly of Whigs, ransacked gun-shops in Broadway and made for the State arsenal at Elm and Franklin streets. Rumors of their intentions spreading, a gathering of peaceably inclined citizens arrived before them and held the arsenal until the militia hastened there and restored order.[9]

The opposing groups were influenced, first, by the issue of the United States Bank, and second, by the spoils. The merchants closed their shops and sent all their clerks and workers to surround the polls and sway voters against Tammany Hall. The United States Bank spread the alarm of “panic.” If its directors could prove that public opinion in the leading city of the nation had shifted to support the continuation of the bank charter, they could use that as a strong argument to sway Congress. There was no hiding the coercion of voters; the vulnerable, the timid, and the fearful were intimidated by the rising noise from paid newspapers claiming that destroying the United States Bank would lead to “widespread trade collapse and lasting harm to the poor.” In reality, a general business downturn was created. A disturbance started in the “bloody old Sixth” when some ballot boxes were broken. Both sides armed themselves with stones and clubs, turning the scene into chaos. The riot escalated. A crowd, mainly made up of Whigs, looted gun stores on Broadway and headed for the state arsenal at Elm and Franklin streets. As rumors of their plans spread, a group of peace-minded citizens reached it first and held the arsenal until the militia arrived and restored order.[9]

Cornelius W. Lawrence, the Tammany candidate, was declared elected by 181 votes out of a total of nearly 35,000[10] over Gulian G. Verplanck, who had gone over to the Whigs. Verplanck never ceased to contend that he[93] had been defrauded of the office. The Whigs obtained a majority in a Common Council, 17 members to the Wigwam’s 15, and joyfully said that Tammany Hall in electing the Mayor had the shadow; while they, in securing the corporation, had the substance. With the Common Council they could carry the whole patronage of the city, amounting to more than $1,000,000 a year.

Cornelius W. Lawrence, the Tammany candidate, was declared the winner by 181 votes out of nearly 35,000[10] against Gulian G. Verplanck, who had switched to the Whigs. Verplanck always claimed that he[93] had been cheated out of the position. The Whigs gained a majority in the Common Council, with 17 members compared to the Wigwam’s 15, and happily asserted that Tammany Hall, in electing the Mayor, had the appearance of victory, while they, by securing the corporation, had the real power. With control of the Common Council, they could manage the entire city patronage, which amounted to over $1,000,000 a year.

This election demonstrated clearly that the propertied classes as a whole were combined against the laborers, mechanics, farmers and producing classes generally, and that they were as much concerned over the spoils of office as was the most rabid Tammany man. As a protest against the indifference of the local leaders of both parties to the real interests of the people, and to put a stop to the granting of special privileges, the Equal Rights party now came into existence.

This election clearly showed that the wealthy classes were united against the workers, craftsmen, farmers, and the general producing classes, and that they were just as interested in the spoils of office as the most extreme Tammany supporter. As a response to the indifference of local leaders from both parties towards the genuine interests of the people, and to put an end to the granting of special privileges, the Equal Rights party was formed.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Advertisement in the New York Evening Post, March 17, 1831.

[1] Ad in the New York Evening Post, March 17, 1831.

[2] Resolutions of the Sixth Ward Anti-Tammany Republicans, March 24, 1831.

[2] Statements from the Sixth Ward Anti-Tammany Republicans, March 24, 1831.

[3] Mooney passed away the following November. Tammany passed panegyric resolutions on his character, and organized a large funeral procession which escorted his body to the grave.

[3] Mooney died the next November. Tammany held a tribute to honor his character and organized a large funeral procession to take his body to the grave.

[4] Green was an influential and intimate friend of Jackson and a member of his “Kitchen Cabinet.” He had come up from Washington to attend the banquet as one of Jackson’s personal representatives.

[4] Green was a close and influential friend of Jackson and part of his “Kitchen Cabinet.” He traveled from Washington to be at the banquet as one of Jackson’s personal representatives.

[5] The Courier and Enquirer, owned by Webb and Noah, promptly came out with this ticket in large black type upon its editorial page: For President, Andrew Jackson. For Vice-President, Martin Van Buren.

[5] The Courier and Enquirer, owned by Webb and Noah, quickly published this ticket in bold black letters on its editorial page: For President, Andrew Jackson. For Vice-President, Martin Van Buren.

[6] The First Session of the Twenty-Second Congress, Vol. IV., containing reports from Nos. 460 to 463, Washington, 1831.

[6] The First Session of the Twenty-Second Congress, Vol. IV., including reports from Nos. 460 to 463, Washington, 1831.

[7] Edwards was for many years a person of great power in the organization. In 1821, while Counsel to the Board of Aldermen, a salaried office, he was specifically charged with having mulcted the city out of $5,414 as a payment for a few hours’ service in arranging the details of a delinquent tax sale. Further charges credited him with having cleaned up more than $50,000 in five years, through various pickings connected with his office. Such, however, was his influence, that he not only escaped prosecution, but retained an unimpaired prestige in the organization.

[7] Edwards was a powerful figure in the organization for many years. In 1821, while serving as Counsel to the Board of Aldermen, a paid position, he was specifically accused of taking $5,414 from the city for just a few hours of work in organizing a tax sale for delinquent accounts. Additional accusations suggested he had siphoned off over $50,000 over five years through various unethical practices related to his role. Despite these allegations, his influence was so strong that he not only avoided prosecution but also maintained his respected status within the organization.

[8] Documents of the Board of Aldermen and Assistant Aldermen, 1834, No. 82.

[8] Documents from the Board of Aldermen and Assistant Aldermen, 1834, No. 82.

[9] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1839, No. 29.

[9] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1839, No. 29.

[10] Lawrence, 17,576; Verplanck, 17,395; blank and scattering, 18; total, 34,989.

[10] Lawrence, 17,576; Verplanck, 17,395; blank and scattered, 18; total, 34,989.


CHAPTER XII
THE EQUAL RIGHTS PARTY
1834-1837

The Equal Rights movement, which began its activity inside the Tammany organization, was virtually a moral, then a political, revival of the Workingmen’s movement. Its principles, however, were less radical, and its demands more moderate. It advocated the equal rights of every citizen in his person and property and in their management; declared unqualified and uncompromising opposition to bank notes as a circulating medium, because gold and silver were the only safe and constitutional currency, and a like opposition to all monopolies by legislation. It also announced hostility “to the dangerous and unconstitutional creation of vested rights by legislation, because these were a usurpation of the people’s sovereign rights,” and asserted that all laws or acts of incorporation passed by the Legislature could be rightfully altered or repealed by its successors. The Equal Rights movement comprised men of various classes. Moses Jacques and Levi D. Slamm were its principal leaders. To comprehend its nature, a brief review of the causes which conspired to bring it into being will be necessary.

The Equal Rights movement, which started its activities within the Tammany organization, was essentially a moral and political revival of the Workingmen’s movement. However, its principles were less radical, and its demands were more moderate. It advocated for the equal rights of every citizen regarding their person and property and their management; it declared an unwavering and firm opposition to banknotes as a form of currency, asserting that only gold and silver were safe and constitutional money, alongside a similar opposition to all monopolies created by legislation. It also expressed opposition “to the dangerous and unconstitutional creation of vested rights by legislation, as these were a usurpation of the people's sovereign rights,” and maintained that all laws or acts of incorporation passed by the Legislature could be justly altered or repealed by its successors. The Equal Rights movement included individuals from various classes. Moses Jacques and Levi D. Slamm were its main leaders. To understand its nature, a brief examination of the causes that led to its emergence will be necessary.

Up to 1831 the repeal of the law for the imprisonment of debtors had been a subject of almost constant agitation by reformers and workingmen. Under this law more than 10,000 persons, mainly unfortunate laborers, were imprisoned annually in loathsome prisons, without inquiry as to their innocence or guilt, lying there at their[95] creditors’ will, unsupplied by the city with any of the necessities of life.[1] Tammany Hall had taken no action until 1831, when its leaders gave a belated approval to a bill introduced in the Assembly, abolishing imprisonment for debts of any sum except in the cases of non-residents.[2]

Up to 1831, the repeal of the law that allowed the imprisonment of debtors had been a topic of ongoing concern for reformers and working-class people. Under this law, more than 10,000 individuals, mostly unfortunate laborers, were jailed each year in grim conditions, with no consideration of their innocence or guilt. They remained there at the mercy of their creditors, with the city providing none of life’s basic necessities.[95] Tammany Hall had not taken any action until 1831, when its leaders finally supported a bill introduced in the Assembly to eliminate imprisonment for debts of any amount, except for cases involving non-residents.[1]

This bill had become a law in that year; yet by 1833 the interest of Tammany’s chiefs in the workingman had died away to such an extent that the Assembly was allowed to pass a measure entitled “a law abolishing imprisonment for debt,” but reinstituting imprisonment on all debts under $50, thus completely nullifying the law so far as the poor were concerned.

This bill became law that year; however, by 1833, Tammany’s leaders had lost interest in the working class to the point that the Assembly was able to pass a measure called “a law abolishing imprisonment for debt,” but reinstating imprisonment for all debts under $50, effectively nullifying the law for the poor.

The measure failed to become a law; but the sharp practise shown in its wording, and in the means taken to push it through the Assembly, disgusted the Equal Rights men, and in their meetings they passed resolutions denouncing the chiefs responsible therefor. Their resolutions furthermore declared that the proceedings at Tammany Hall were a sealed book; that a few men—William Paxen Hallett, Elisha Tibbits, J. J. Roosevelt and John Y. Cebra—made up important nominations in Wall street after the bankers had decided upon the candidates and then had the nominating committee accept them.

The measure didn’t become law; however, the sharp tactics used in its wording and the push to get it through the Assembly frustrated the Equal Rights advocates. In their meetings, they passed resolutions condemning the leaders responsible for it. Their resolutions also stated that the activities at Tammany Hall were a closed book; that a small group of men—William Paxen Hallett, Elisha Tibbits, J. J. Roosevelt, and John Y. Cebra—formed the key nominations on Wall Street after the bankers had chosen the candidates and then got the nominating committee to approve them.

Popular disaffection was increased by the manner in which the Legislature and the Aldermen continued to create corporations with enormous grants. The scandals over the procurement of legislative charters, particularly bank charters, had for more than 25 years aroused a growing indignation among the people. In[96] 1805, shortly after the passage of the Merchants’ Bank charter, Peter Betts, an Assemblyman, declared in open session of the lower house, that Luke Metcalfe, a fellow-member, had sought to bribe him to vote for the measure. The price promised was 15 shares of the bank’s stock, valued at $50 each. Conflicting testimony was given on the matter, and a motion was made to expel Metcalfe; the house, however, retained him in his seat by a vote of 37 to 16.[3]

Popular dissatisfaction grew due to the way the Legislature and the Aldermen kept creating corporations with huge grants. The scandals surrounding the process of getting legislative charters, especially bank charters, had sparked increasing anger among the public for over 25 years. In[96] 1805, shortly after the Merchants’ Bank charter was passed, Assemblyman Peter Betts announced in a public session of the lower house that fellow member Luke Metcalfe tried to bribe him to vote for the measure. The bribe offered was 15 shares of the bank’s stock, worth $50 each. There were conflicting testimonies on the issue, and a motion was proposed to expel Metcalfe; however, the house voted to keep him in his seat, 37 to 16.[3]

Charges of the same kind, affecting practically every session of the Legislature, were common, though only occasionally were they made the subject of official investigation. In 1812, however, shortly after the Assembly, forced by public criticism, had passed a resolution compelling each member to pledge himself that he had neither taken nor would take, “any reward or profit, direct or indirect, for any vote on any measure,”[4] another scandal arose. The Bank of America, with very moderate assets of any sort, received a charter on a stated capitalization of $6,000,000, an enormous sum in those days. Charges of corruption were bandied about, one Assemblyman, Silas Holmes, declaring under oath that the sum of $500, “besides a handsome present,” had been offered him. A committee of the lower house listened to testimony in the case, and then, by a decisive majority, voted that the body was above suspicion.[5] But in a pronunciamento to Gov. Tompkins during the same year the same house graciously reported: “We are well aware that the number of charters for banking institutions already granted has awakened general solicitude and anxiety.”

Charges of a similar nature, impacting nearly every session of the Legislature, were common, though they were only sometimes officially investigated. In 1812, however, shortly after the Assembly, pressured by public criticism, had passed a resolution requiring each member to pledge that he had neither accepted nor would accept, “any reward or profit, direct or indirect, for any vote on any measure,”[4] another scandal occurred. The Bank of America, with very few assets, obtained a charter with a stated capitalization of $6,000,000, a huge amount at the time. Allegations of corruption circulated, with one Assemblyman, Silas Holmes, testifying under oath that he had been offered $500, “plus a generous gift.” A committee of the lower house heard testimony regarding the issue and then, by a significant majority, asserted that the body was above suspicion.[5] However, in a statement to Gov. Tompkins later that same year, the same house kindly acknowledged: “We are well aware that the number of charters for banking institutions already granted has raised general concern and anxiety.”

The Chemical Bank was a more modern instance. The report of the joint legislative committee in 1824 had shown that its promoters set apart $50,000 worth of[97] stock at par value[6] to buy the votes of members, Gen. Robert Swartwout—he who had defaulted for $68,000 in 1820—acting as one of the lobbyists and claiming $5,000 for his services.[7] Other scandals throwing strong light on legislative practises were those of the Ætna and Chatham Fire Insurance Companies. The testimony brought out in the investigation of these companies in 1826 showed that William J. Waldron (one of the line of Grand Sachems) gave $20,000 in certificates of stock to Gen. Jasper Ward, a State Senator, and $20,000 more to various other persons to get the Ætna charter through the Legislature.[8] The Chatham charter, passed in 1822, cost $20,000 in stock at par value, additional sums being paid for the passage of certain amendments in 1824.[9] Ward wrote from Albany to a friend in the city, complaining that the Jefferson Fire Insurance Company, which secured a charter at the same time (1824), had paid only 5 per cent. of what it had promised, giving notes for the remainder.[10] These were but a few examples of the general legislative corruption. The men who profited by these charters brought about, in 1830, the exemption of bank stock in the city from taxation. That nearly every Tammany leader held bank stock was proved by the testimony before an investigating committee in June, 1833, which set forth how the organizers of the newly founded Seventh Ward Bank had distributed thousands of shares among over one hundred State and city office-holders, both Tammany and Anti-Masonic. Every Tammany Senator was involved.[98] James Perkins, the principal lobbyist for the charter, swore repeatedly that $5,000 in stock at par value had been taken directly by State Senators and from $10,000 to $25,000 in stock distributed indirectly.[11] Perkins charged Thurlow Weed with accepting a $500 bribe.[12] The investigating committee reported finally that it could find no proof involving any but one of the accused.[13] As the bill for the charter had originally passed the Senate by a vote of 27 to 2,[14] and as the members of the investigating committee had been chosen from this majority, its conclusions were naturally viewed with a good deal of suspicion.

The Chemical Bank is a more modern example. The report from the joint legislative committee in 1824 revealed that its promoters set aside $50,000 worth of [97] stock at par value[6] to buy the votes of members, with Gen. Robert Swartwout—who had defaulted for $68,000 in 1820—acting as one of the lobbyists and claiming $5,000 for his services.[7] Other scandals that highlighted legislative practices included those of the Ætna and Chatham Fire Insurance Companies. The testimony from the 1826 investigation of these companies indicated that William J. Waldron (one of the Grand Sachems) gave $20,000 in stock certificates to Gen. Jasper Ward, a State Senator, and $20,000 more to various others to help the Ætna charter pass through the Legislature.[8] The Chatham charter, which was passed in 1822, cost $20,000 in stock at par value, with additional amounts being paid for the passage of certain amendments in 1824.[9] Ward wrote to a friend in the city from Albany, complaining that the Jefferson Fire Insurance Company, which secured a charter at the same time (1824), had only paid 5 percent of what it had promised, giving notes for the remainder.[10] These were just a few examples of widespread legislative corruption. The individuals who benefited from these charters helped to secure, in 1830, the exemption of bank stock in the city from taxation. Nearly every Tammany leader was found to hold bank stock, according to testimony before an investigative committee in June 1833, which detailed how the organizers of the newly established Seventh Ward Bank distributed thousands of shares among over a hundred state and city office-holders, both Tammany and Anti-Masonic. Every Tammany Senator was involved.[98] James Perkins, the main lobbyist for the charter, repeatedly stated that $5,000 in stock at par value was taken directly by State Senators and that $10,000 to $25,000 in stock was distributed indirectly.[11] Perkins accused Thurlow Weed of accepting a $500 bribe.[12] The investigating committee ultimately reported that it found no proof implicating anyone except one of the accused.[13] Since the charter's bill had originally passed the Senate with a vote of 27 to 2,[14] and the members of the investigating committee were chosen from this majority, their conclusions were naturally met with considerable skepticism.

The Equal Rights men complained that 75 per cent. of the whole of the bank notes circulating in New York City consisted of depreciated paper. The circulation of these in notes of $5 or under amounted by March, 1835, to nearly $1,500,000. One establishment alone, whose weekly payroll in 1834 amounted to $40,000, paid the greater part of this sum in depreciated notes. The wage-earner was in constant fear that any morning he might wake to hear that the bank whose notes he held had failed. Frequently the worst deceptions on the public were connived at by the officials. The Hudson Insurance Company, for instance, with a nominal capital of $200,000, was permitted to issue bonds to the amount of $800,000, upon the most fictitious resources. This was far from being an isolated instance. The law allowed a bank with only $100,000 capital to loan $250,000, thus receiving interest on more than twice the capital actually invested.[15]

The Equal Rights activists argued that 75 percent of all the banknotes in circulation in New York City were worthless paper. By March 1835, the circulation of these notes worth $5 or less had reached nearly $1,500,000. One company, which had a weekly payroll of $40,000 in 1834, paid most of this in devalued notes. Workers constantly worried that they might wake up to news that the bank issuing their notes had gone under. Often, the public was misled by officials involved in these schemes. For instance, the Hudson Insurance Company, which claimed to have a capital of $200,000, was allowed to issue bonds totaling $800,000 based on completely imaginary resources. This was not an isolated case. The law permitted a bank with only $100,000 in capital to loan out $250,000, allowing it to earn interest on more than double the actual money invested.[15]

The Council was more than ever a hotbed of venality. Numberless small “jobs” were perpetrated without public notice; but when it was proposed in October, 1831,[99] to give the Harlem Railroad Company the franchise for the perpetual and exclusive use of Fourth avenue, free of all payment to the city, Alderman George Sharp, one of the few public-spirited members, drew general attention to the matter by an energetic denunciation. After every other means had been resorted to without success to influence his vote, he was told that he would be excluded from the party by certain persons at Tammany Hall. Alderman Stevens, who declared that he had seen stock given to members of the board and to the “corps editorial” to secure their influence, was also threatened. The words of these two men proved conclusively the truth of what for a long time was common report: that the group of Tammany leaders not only controlled the party nominations but threatened public officials with their displeasure, with all which that implied—exile from public life, loss of political influence, perhaps ruin of fortune—in case they did not vote for certain measures whose “merits” were recommended to them.

The Council was increasingly a hotspot of corruption. Countless small “jobs” happened without anyone noticing; but when it was suggested in October 1831, [99] to give the Harlem Railroad Company the right to use Fourth Avenue forever and exclusively, without any payment to the city, Alderman George Sharp, one of the few civic-minded members, brought attention to the issue with a strong condemnation. After all other attempts to sway his vote failed, he was warned that certain people at Tammany Hall would make sure he was excluded from the party. Alderman Stevens, who claimed to have seen stock given to board members and the “editorial team” to gain their support, was also threatened. The statements from these two men confirmed what had long been rumored: that the Tammany leaders not only controlled party nominations but also intimidated public officials with threats of consequences, including exclusion from public life, loss of political power, and potentially financial ruin, if they didn’t vote for certain measures promoted as having “merit.”

The laborer had other grievances. For seventeen years the Council had refused to grant any additional ferries between New York City and Brooklyn. During that period the population of New York had increased 150,000 and that of Brooklyn 15,000. This growth involved a vast amount of marketing and increased the business intercourse between the two places more than fourfold. The lessees of the Fulton Ferry—the sole ferry—had made an agreement in 1811, it was alleged, with the New York City Corporation, by which the latter undertook to bind itself not to establish any additional ferries from south of Catherine street to the Village of Brooklyn for twenty-five years. The large landholders influenced the Common Council to continue this monopoly, their aim being to force the people to stay in New York, where rents were 35 per cent. higher than in any other city in the Union. The exactions of[100] the water, gas and steamboat monopolies likewise had a share in causing the formation of the Equal Rights party.

The laborer had other complaints. For seventeen years, the Council had refused to allow any more ferries between New York City and Brooklyn. During that time, New York's population grew by 150,000 and Brooklyn's by 15,000. This growth led to a huge increase in commerce and made business interactions between the two locations more than four times greater. The lessees of the Fulton Ferry—the only ferry—had allegedly made an agreement in 1811 with the New York City Corporation, where the latter promised not to start any additional ferries south of Catherine Street to the Village of Brooklyn for twenty-five years. The wealthy landowners convinced the Common Council to maintain this monopoly, aiming to force people to stay in New York, where rents were 35 percent higher than in any other city in the country. The demands from the water, gas, and steamboat monopolies also contributed to the rise of the Equal Rights party.

Besides the dispensing to favored knots of citizens of trading privileges and immunities which were withheld from the great body of the community, the laboring element believed that there was a gross inequality of taxation in the interests of the rich. Taxes rose from $550,000 in 1832 to $850,000 in 1833, but the increase fell upon the poor. The Merchants’ Bank was assessed at $6,000; the lot and building had cost that sum twenty years before, and were now worth at least twice as much. The Merchants’ Exchange was assessed at $115,000, yet it was known that the land and building had cost $800,000. Dozens of like instances were cited by the reformers and they now determined upon a concerted effort looking to better government.

Aside from giving special trading privileges and benefits to certain groups of citizens that were denied to the majority, the working class felt there was a significant unfairness in how taxes were distributed, favoring the wealthy. Taxes increased from $550,000 in 1832 to $850,000 in 1833, but the burden fell mainly on the poor. The Merchants’ Bank was valued at $6,000; the lot and building had cost that amount twenty years ago and were now worth at least double. The Merchants’ Exchange was valued at $115,000, yet it was known that the land and building had cost $800,000. Many similar cases were pointed out by the reformers, and they decided to join forces to push for better governance.

A powerful influence came to the aid of the Equal Rights men when William Cullen Bryant and William Leggett assumed the editorship of the Evening Post. This journal now advocated industrial and political reforms with singular independence and ability. It revived the original conception of the nominating committee’s functions. It urged the electors to remember that the nomination by a nominating committee was but a recommendation to the people of certain candidates whose merits and qualifications were as fair a matter of discussion as any under Heaven; and that it was for this very purpose that nominations were made so long before the great popular meeting was convened. Besides his editorial support of the movement, Leggett participated in the practical work of its organization and management. The clear thought and definite expression shown in most of the Equal Rights manifestoes and resolutions are perhaps directly due to him.

A strong influence came to support the Equal Rights movement when William Cullen Bryant and William Leggett took over as editors of the Evening Post. This newspaper now pushed for industrial and political reforms with remarkable independence and skill. It revitalized the original idea of what a nominating committee should do. It encouraged voters to keep in mind that a nomination from a nominating committee was merely a recommendation for certain candidates, whose qualifications and merits were just as open for discussion as anything else; and that this was precisely why nominations were made so far in advance of the major public meeting. In addition to his editorial backing of the movement, Leggett was actively involved in the practical organization and management of it. The clear thinking and precise wording found in most of the Equal Rights manifestos and resolutions can likely be attributed to him.

The Equal Rights faction became especially active in the Fall of 1884. Its orators raised such a stir that both[101] Tammany Hall and the Whigs suddenly developed an astonishing care for the workingmen. To conciliate them, the Tammany Nominating Committee exacted a written pledge from every one of its candidates requiring an expression of his sentiments on the monopoly question. To counteract the Wigwam, the Whigs gathered a meeting of “Whig Mechanics” at Masonic Hall, October 14, at which opposition to monopolies, especially banking monopolies, was declared. Not to be outdone, the Wigwam got together a meeting of “Democratic Mechanics,” who resolved to oppose monopolies and to restore the constitutional currency. Tammany also began to recognize, even more liberally than before, the naturalized citizens. As a consequence, it won the Fall (1834) election by over 2,300 majority, most of the Equal Rights men voting with it. One-third of its 18,000 voters were estimated at this time to be of foreign birth.

The Equal Rights group became particularly active in the fall of 1884. Their speakers created such a commotion that both [101] Tammany Hall and the Whigs suddenly showed an incredible interest in the working class. To win them over, the Tammany Nominating Committee required every candidate to submit a written statement expressing their views on the issue of monopolies. In response, the Whigs organized a meeting of “Whig Mechanics” at Masonic Hall on October 14, where they declared their opposition to monopolies, especially banking monopolies. Not to be outdone, the Wigwam held a gathering of “Democratic Mechanics,” who resolved to oppose monopolies and restore constitutional currency. Tammany also started to more generously recognize naturalized citizens. As a result, they won the fall election of 1834 by over a 2,300 majority, with most of the Equal Rights supporters voting for them. At that time, it was estimated that one-third of their 18,000 voters were foreigners.

Nearly all the Tammany Assemblymen proceeded to forget their pledges, only four of the delegation voting in the February following against the bill giving exclusive privileges to the Peaconic Company.

Nearly all the Tammany Assembly members completely forgot their promises, with only four from the delegation voting against the bill that granted exclusive privileges to the Peaconic Company the following February.

The first clash between the Equal Rights faction and the Tammany monopolists occurred at a meeting at the Wigwam on March 31, 1835. Certain that the Aldermen would never grant additional ferries, the Equal Rights men favored a measure, then pending in the Legislature, for the establishment of a State Board of Commissioners clothed with that power. Gideon Lee,[16] a Wall Street banker, called the meeting to order and nominated Preserved Fish for chairman. Many objections were uttered, and Fish retired. The radicals howled down the Tammany speakers and ran the meeting themselves, adopting resolutions prepared by Joel P. Seaver, declaring for the creation of the State board.[102] A bill for a new ferry—the present South Ferry—was passed the same year.

The first conflict between the Equal Rights group and the Tammany monopolists happened at a meeting at the Wigwam on March 31, 1835. Believing that the Aldermen would never approve more ferries, the Equal Rights supporters backed a proposal that was currently in the Legislature, which aimed to create a State Board of Commissioners with that authority. Gideon Lee,[16] a Wall Street banker, called the meeting to order and nominated Preserved Fish as chairman. There were many objections, and Fish stepped down. The radicals shouted down the Tammany speakers and took control of the meeting themselves, adopting resolutions prepared by Joel P. Seaver that called for the creation of the State board.[102] A bill for a new ferry—the current South Ferry—was passed the same year.

The Equal Rights men still hoped to gain their ends inside the organization. When Cornelius W. Lawrence[17] stood for reelection as Mayor in April, 1835, there was scarcely any opposition to him from any quarter, he receiving 17,696 votes out of a total of 20,196.

The Equal Rights men still hoped to achieve their goals within the organization. When Cornelius W. Lawrence[17] ran for reelection as Mayor in April 1835, there was hardly any opposition against him, as he received 17,696 votes out of a total of 20,196.

In the Fall of 1835, however, the Tammany Nominating Committee recommended for State offices candidates of a character most obnoxious to the Equal Rights men, and called a meeting for the evening of October 29, to ratify its nominations. Barely were the doors opened when the Equal Rights men rushed in and frustrated an attempt to place Isaac L. Varian in the chair. In the mêlée, the Bank Democrats, finding themselves unable to control the meeting, withdrew, but in doing so turned off the gas, leaving the Equal Rights men in total darkness. The trick must have been anticipated; for each man drew forth a candle and a lucifer, or “loco foco” match, and in a twinkling the hall was resplendent with dancing lights. The Equal Rights men adopted resolutions and a suitable ticket of their own.[18]

In the fall of 1835, the Tammany Nominating Committee put forward candidates for state offices that were highly disliked by the Equal Rights supporters and scheduled a meeting for the evening of October 29 to approve its nominations. As soon as the doors opened, the Equal Rights supporters rushed in and blocked an attempt to place Isaac L. Varian in charge. In the chaos, the Bank Democrats, realizing they couldn't control the meeting, left but not before turning off the gas, leaving the Equal Rights supporters in complete darkness. They must have seen that coming; each person pulled out a candle and a "loco foco" match, and in no time, the hall was filled with flickering lights. The Equal Rights supporters then passed resolutions and created their own suitable ticket.[18]

Three sets of candidates stood for election. The Native Americans, who opposed the election of foreigners to office and urged the repeal of the naturalization laws, took the place of the Whigs. In the face of this strong sentiment, Tammany Hall acted with its usual diplomacy. The general committee boasted that the regular Tammany ticket was composed of only native Americans, which was true, the naturalized citizens having been cajoled on the promise of receiving the usual[103] quota among nominations the next year. Of the nearly 23,000 votes cast at the election, Tammany Hall obtained an average majority of about 800. The Native Americans polled 9,000 votes, and the Equal Rights men, or Anti-Monopolists, over 3,500. It was estimated that 2,000 Whigs voted the Tammany ticket to defeat the Anti-Monopolists, and that about 5,500 Whig votes were divided between Tammany Hall and the Native Americans.

Three groups of candidates ran for election. The Native Americans, who opposed letting foreigners hold office and called for the repeal of naturalization laws, replaced the Whigs. In light of this strong sentiment, Tammany Hall operated with its usual cleverness. The general committee proudly claimed that the regular Tammany ticket consisted solely of native Americans, which was true, as naturalized citizens had been persuaded with the promise of receiving the usual[103] share of nominations the following year. Of the nearly 23,000 votes cast in the election, Tammany Hall secured an average majority of about 800. The Native Americans received 9,000 votes, and the Equal Rights men, or Anti-Monopolists, garnered over 3,500. It was estimated that 2,000 Whigs voted for the Tammany ticket to block the Anti-Monopolists, and that around 5,500 Whig votes were split between Tammany Hall and the Native Americans.

The news of its slight plurality was hailed with anything but pleasure at the Wigwam, where the Anti-Monopolists were denounced as political swindlers and adventurers. Instead, however, of making a show of outward fairness, the organization leaders blindly took the course most adapted to fan the flame of opposition to themselves. After the great fire of 1835, which destroyed $20,000,000 worth of property, and the extent of which was due to the refusal of the corrupt Aldermen to give the city a proper water supply, the Common Council agreed to loan $6,000,000 at 5 per cent. interest for the relief of insurance companies and banks which had suffered from the fire.[19] Nothing was said or done for the relief of the poor sufferers whom the Wigwam claimed to have under its especial protection. The Council allowed pawnbrokers 25 per cent. interest and prohibited them from loaning more than $25 on a single pledge.[20] The city institutions were in a melancholy state.[21] Most serious of all on the public mind were the disclosures concerning the Commercial Bank, from which funds were embezzled in the scheme of cornering the stock of the Harlem Railroad. As a step towards this end, Samuel Swartwout and Garrit Gilbert (a sometime Sachem) lobbied for the passage of a bill to increase the capital stock of this road, which in turn, it was thought, would increase[104] the price of all the stock—two Senators agreeing to raise objections temporarily “so as to blind the eyes of the New Yorkers.”[22]

The news of its slight edge was not welcomed with any happiness at the Wigwam, where the Anti-Monopolists were called out as political frauds and opportunists. Instead of pretending to be fair, the leaders of the organization blindly chose actions that only fueled more opposition against them. After the huge fire of 1835, which caused $20,000,000 worth of damage, largely due to the corrupt Aldermen's refusal to provide the city with proper water, the Common Council decided to loan $6,000,000 at a 5 percent interest rate to help insurance companies and banks that had been affected by the fire.[19] Nothing was said or done to assist the poor victims whom the Wigwam claimed to protect. The Council allowed pawnbrokers to charge 25 percent interest and prevented them from loaning more than $25 on a single item.[20] The city's institutions were in a sad state.[21] Most troubling for the public were the revelations about the Commercial Bank, from which funds were stolen as part of a scheme to corner the stock of the Harlem Railroad. To push this agenda, Samuel Swartwout and Garrit Gilbert (a former Sachem) advocated for a bill to increase the capital stock of this railroad, which they believed would subsequently raise the price of all the stock—two Senators agreed to hold back their objections temporarily “to mislead the New Yorkers.”[22]

The leaders made no effort to stop the granting of charters, or to curtail the monopolist privileges already granted. It was admitted generally that no legislation even remotely affecting the interests of the banks could pass without the consent of those institutions. Tradesmen also had their combinations. But combinations, legal enough when organized by capital, were declared illegal when formed by workingmen. At this time the Supreme Court of the State of New York decided that combinations to raise the wages of any class of laborers amounted to a misdemeanor, on the ground that they were injurious to trade. Later, in June, 1836, twenty tailors were found guilty of conspiracy under that decision and fined by Judge Edwards $1,150 in the aggregate for engaging in a strike for higher wages.

The leaders made no effort to stop the granting of charters or to limit the monopolistic privileges already given. It was generally accepted that no laws affecting the interests of the banks could pass without their approval. Businesspeople also formed their own groups. However, groups that were legal when created by capital were considered illegal when formed by workers. At this time, the Supreme Court of the State of New York ruled that efforts to raise wages for any group of workers were a misdemeanor because they harmed trade. Later, in June 1836, twenty tailors were found guilty of conspiracy based on that ruling and collectively fined $1,150 by Judge Edwards for going on strike for higher wages.

The mechanics prepared to hold an indignation meeting and applied for permission to use Tammany Hall. This was refused by the Sachems.[23] In defiance of the Wigwam, the meeting, a gathering of 20,000 persons, was held in the park fronting Tammany Hall. “Are workingmen,” read the address of the committee of this meeting,

The mechanics got ready to hold a protest meeting and asked for permission to use Tammany Hall. The Sachems denied this request.[23] In defiance of the Wigwam, the meeting, which attracted 20,000 people, took place in the park in front of Tammany Hall. “Are working people,” read the address from the committee of this meeting,

“free in reality when they dare not obey the first instinct of all animated beings; when our courts pronounce it criminal to exercise[105] nature’s paramount law of self-preservation? Trades unions and mechanick societies are only self-protective against the countless combinations of aristocracy; boards of bank and other chartered directories; boards of brokers; boards of trade and commerce; combinations of landlords; coal and wood dealers; monopolists and all those who grasp at everything and produce nothing. If all these combinations are suffered to exist, why are trades unions and combinations of workingmen denounced? Should they not have an equal chance in the pursuit of life, liberty and happiness? Should they not have an equal right with the other classes of society, in their person, in their property or labor, and in their management?”

“truly free when they hesitate to follow the most basic instinct of all living beings; when our courts deem it a crime to uphold[105] the fundamental law of self-preservation? Trade unions and worker societies are simply a way to protect themselves against the endless schemes of the elite; boards of banks and other licensed organizations; boards of brokers; boards of trade and commerce; groups of landlords; coal and wood suppliers; monopolists and anyone who takes everything and contributes nothing. If all these groups are allowed to exist, why are trade unions and workers’ groups criticized? Shouldn’t they have an equal opportunity to pursue life, liberty, and happiness? Shouldn’t they have the same rights as other classes in society, regarding their person, their property or labor, and their management?”

The meeting, in strong resolutions, condemned the Supreme Court decision and that of Judge Edwards.

The meeting strongly condemned the Supreme Court decision and Judge Edwards' ruling.

At this moment the peculiar Wigwam methods were being displayed in another direction to an edified public. In the first days of May, 1836, the Board of Aldermen found itself divided equally, Tammany Hall and the Whigs each having eight votes, precluding either from electing a president. The Tammany members, in the tea-room downstairs, made merry over refreshments. The Whigs could not muster a quorum, and sent word to the organization men to appear; the Wigwam men replied that they didn’t choose, and bade the Whigs come to them. Meanwhile the public business stood still. Finally the balloting was begun. On May 23, seventeen votes were found to have been cast, although there were only sixteen voting Aldermen.[24] By the end of May more than 120 ballots were had. At last, on July 1, the Tammany men persuaded Alderman Ward, a Whig, to offer a resolution electing Isaac L. Varian, a Wigwam candidate, for the first six months, which was done.

At this moment, the unusual methods of the Wigwam were being showcased in another direction for an interested public. In the early days of May 1836, the Board of Aldermen was evenly split, with Tammany Hall and the Whigs each holding eight votes, preventing either side from electing a president. The Tammany members enjoyed refreshments in the tea room downstairs. The Whigs couldn't gather enough members for a quorum and sent a request for the organization members to join; the Wigwam members responded that they preferred not to and invited the Whigs to come to them instead. Meanwhile, public business was at a standstill. Eventually, the balloting began. On May 23, seventeen votes were recorded, even though there were only sixteen voting Aldermen.[24] By the end of May, more than 120 ballots had been cast. Finally, on July 1, the Tammany members convinced Alderman Ward, a Whig, to propose a resolution to elect Isaac L. Varian, a Wigwam candidate, for the first six months, which was approved.

Taking these proceedings as a cue, the Equal Rights party, on June 6, at Military Hall, adopted a long series of resolutions stating that the aristocracy of the Democracy, or in other words, the monopolists, the paper-currency Democrats, the partizans of the “usages,” had long deceived and misguided the great body of the Democrats. Through these “usages,” the tools of the[106] banks and other incorporated and speculative interests were enabled to take advantage of the unsuspicious self-security of the people, both before and at primary meetings. By the aristocracy and through secret caucuses, candidates were chosen, proceedings were cut and dried, and committees were packed. When committees could not be packed without opposition, the resolutions further read, two sets of committeemen were usually elected, and that set whose political complexion best suited the packed majority of the general committee was always accepted without any regard to the majorities of the people. The Union did not furnish a more dangerous usurpation upon the sovereignty of the people than the fact of the Tammany Hall Nominating Committee sending recently a petition to the Legislature in favor of chartering more banks and banking paper capital and designating themselves, not as citizens, but as members of the nominating committee, notwithstanding the very nominees of such a committee had given their written pledge to oppose new banks and monopolies.

Taking these events as a signal, the Equal Rights party, on June 6, at Military Hall, adopted a lengthy series of resolutions stating that the elite of the Democracy, or in other words, the monopolists, the paper-currency Democrats, and the supporters of the “usages,” had long deceived and misled the majority of Democrats. Through these “usages,” the instruments of the[106] banks and other incorporated and speculative interests were able to exploit the unsuspecting confidence of the people, both before and during primary meetings. The elite, through secret caucuses, selected candidates, predetermined decisions, and manipulated committees. When committees couldn’t be fully controlled without pushback, the resolutions further stated, two sets of committee members were often elected, and the group whose political views most aligned with the packed majority of the general committee was always accepted, disregarding the people's majority. The Union didn't pose a more serious threat to the sovereignty of the people than the recent action of the Tammany Hall Nominating Committee submitting a petition to the Legislature in favor of chartering more banks and creating banking paper capital, identifying themselves not as citizens, but as members of the nominating committee, despite the fact that the nominees from that committee had made written commitments to oppose new banks and monopolies.

The “usages,” the Equal Rights party next resolved, so productive of secret caucuses, intrigues and abuses, furnished the avenue through which one portion of the Democracy had been corrupted, and the other portion—the great mass—led astray. The latter was taught to believe that “usages” alone made men Democrats, and that to keep Federalists and Whigs out of office was the very essence of Democracy.[25]

The "usages," the Equal Rights party then decided, which led to secret meetings, schemes, and misconduct, provided the path through which one part of the Democracy had been corrupted, while the other part—the vast majority—was misled. The latter was convinced that "usages" alone made someone a Democrat and that keeping Federalists and Whigs from holding office was the true essence of Democracy.[25]

The Equal Rights party then nominated Isaac L. Smith, of Buffalo, for Governor, and Moses L. Jacques, of New York City, for Lieutenant-Governor.

The Equal Rights party then nominated Isaac L. Smith from Buffalo for Governor, and Moses L. Jacques from New York City for Lieutenant Governor.

To draw from the strength of the new party, some of Tammany’s leaders—Samuel Swartwout, Jesse Hoyt, Stephen Allen, Saul Alley and a few others—professed to favor the repeal of the Restraining law, which[107] in effect prohibited private banking and gave the incorporated institutions a monopoly. The Anti-Monopolists were not to be deluded. On September 21 they declared that in the recent professions of the Tammany corruptionists in advocating this repeal and in favoring some other few minor democratic measures, they beheld the stale expedient of luring the bone and sinew of the country to the support of their monopoly and banking men and measures and that they had no faith in Tammany “usages,” policy or its incorrigible Sachems.

To leverage the strength of the new party, some Tammany leaders—Samuel Swartwout, Jesse Hoyt, Stephen Allen, Saul Alley, and a few others—claimed to support the repeal of the Restraining law, which[107] effectively banned private banking and gave incorporated institutions a monopoly. The Anti-Monopolists weren’t fooled. On September 21, they declared that in the recent claims of the Tammany corrupt officials advocating for this repeal and supporting a few other minor democratic measures, they saw the old tactic of trying to attract the backbone of the country to back their monopoly and banking interests and that they had no trust in Tammany's “traditions,” policies, or its unchangeable leaders.

The characters of most of the Wigwam nominations were so tainted that it seemed as if the candidates were put forward in defiance of the best public sentiment. It is not so certain that outside the Equal Rights party the voters were repelled by the current methods of buying legislation and dictating nominations. A low tone of public morals was manifested. Men were bent on money-making. He who could get rich by grace of the Legislature was thought “smart” and worthy of emulation. The successful in politics were likewise to be envied, and, if possible, imitated. A large part of the community bowed in respect to the person of wealth, no matter whence came his riches; and the bank lobbyists were the recipients of a due share of this reverence.

The characters of most of the Wigwam nominations were so compromised that it felt like the candidates were presented in defiance of the best public opinion. It's not entirely clear that outside the Equal Rights party, voters were turned off by the ongoing practices of buying legislation and controlling nominations. A low standard of public morals was evident. People were focused on making money. Those who could become wealthy through the influence of the Legislature were viewed as "smart" and worth imitating. Successful people in politics were also envied and, if possible, copied. A significant portion of the community showed respect for the wealthy, regardless of where their riches came from; and the bank lobbyists received their fair share of this admiration.

From these men the Tammany leaders selected candidates. One of the Assembly nominees was Prosper M. Wetmore, who had lobbied for the notorious State Bank charter. This bank, according to the charter, was to have $10,000,000 capital, although its organizers did not have more than a mere fraction of that sum. This was going too far, even for Albany, though upon modifying their application, the charter was granted.[26] Reuben Withers and James C. Stoneall, bank lobbyists; Benjamin Ringgold, a bank and legislative “go-between,” and Morgan L. Smith, preeminent among lobbyists, were[108] other Tammany nominees. Notwithstanding the low standards of public morals, these men were so unpopular, that when the form of submitting their names for ratification to the great popular meeting at the Wigwam on November 1, was carried out, a hostile demonstration followed. The names of Wetmore, Smith and Ringgold especially were hooted. But the leaders had groups of “whippers-in” brought in hurriedly to vote affirmatively, and the presiding officer declared all the nominees duly accepted by the people.

From these men, the Tammany leaders chose candidates. One of the Assembly nominees was Prosper M. Wetmore, who had lobbied for the infamous State Bank charter. This bank, according to the charter, was supposed to have a capital of $10,000,000, even though its organizers didn't actually have more than a tiny fraction of that amount. This was pushing it too far, even for Albany, but after they revised their application, the charter was approved. Reuben Withers and James C. Stoneall, both bank lobbyists; Benjamin Ringgold, a bank and legislative “go-between”; and Morgan L. Smith, a leading lobbyist, were other Tammany nominees. Despite the low standards of public morals, these men were so unpopular that when their names were presented for approval at the big public meeting at the Wigwam on November 1, there was a hostile outburst. The names of Wetmore, Smith, and Ringgold were especially jeered at. But the leaders quickly brought in groups of “whippers-in” to vote in favor, and the presiding officer announced that all the nominees were officially accepted by the people.

Only six of the organization’s thirteen Assembly nominees survived the popular wrath, and the nominees for nearly all the other offices were beaten, notwithstanding the expectation that the Presidential election would carry them in on the party ticket. A number of Tammany men of principle refused to vote. The Whigs, the Native Americans and some “Locofocos” joined forces. They were aided by the panic, which, breaking out shortly before election, reacted against the Democrats. The Equal Rights men as a rule voted for Van Buren. Tammany Hall and the Whigs both committed frauds. Van Buren received 1,124 majority in New York City, which in 1832 had given Jackson nearly 6,000 majority.

Only six of the organization's thirteen Assembly nominees made it through the public backlash, and the nominees for almost all the other positions lost, despite expectations that the Presidential election would bring them in on the party ticket. Several principled Tammany members chose not to vote. The Whigs, Native Americans, and some “Locofocos” teamed up. They were supported by a panic that broke out just before the election, which turned against the Democrats. Generally, the Equal Rights supporters voted for Van Buren. Both Tammany Hall and the Whigs committed acts of fraud. Van Buren won by a 1,124 vote majority in New York City, which in 1832 had given Jackson nearly a 6,000 vote majority.

Made wiser by defeat, the organization leaders realized the importance of the Equal Rights movement, and caused, as a sop, the passage, in February, 1837, of the bill repealing the Restraining act. The Common Council likewise modified the Pawnbrokers’ act by cutting down the interest to a more reasonable percentage.[27]

Made wiser by defeat, the leaders of the organization recognized the significance of the Equal Rights movement and, as a gesture of goodwill, pushed for the passage of the bill repealing the Restraining Act in February 1837. The Common Council also amended the Pawnbrokers’ Act by lowering the interest rate to a more reasonable percentage.[27]

Their providence stopped at this point, however,[28] and during the panic Winter following neither Legislature nor Common Council did anything to alleviate the miseries of the poor. On the contrary, the poor complained that the tendency more and more was to use the power of the law to make the rich richer. While the suffering[109] was greatest, Alderman Aaron Clark, a Whig, who had made his fortune from lotteries, proposed that the city spend several millions of dollars to surround its water front with a line of still-water ponds for shipping purposes, his justification for this expenditure being that the North River piers would “raise the price of every lot 25 × 100 feet west of Broadway $5,000 at a jump.”[29] “Millions to benefit landowners and shippers, but not a dollar for the unemployed hungry!” exclaimed the Anti-Monopolists. Alderman Bruen, another Whig, at a time when the fall in the value of real estate in New York City alone exceeded $50,000,000, suggested the underwriting by the city to the speculators for the sum of $5,000,000, to take in pledge the lands they had bought and to give them the bonds of the city for two-thirds their value. To the Equal Rights men there was not much difference between the Tammany Hall and the Whig leaders. Both, it was plain, sweated the people for their own private interests, although the Whigs, inheriting the Federalist idea that property was the sole test of merit, did not flaunt their undying concern for the laborer so persistently as did the Wigwam.

Their support ended here, though,[28] and during the panic of Winter following, neither the Legislature nor the Common Council did anything to help the suffering poor. Instead, the poor felt that the law was increasingly being used to make the rich richer. While the suffering[109] was at its worst, Alderman Aaron Clark, a Whig who had made his fortune from lotteries, proposed that the city spend several million dollars to create a line of calm-water ponds along its waterfront for shipping purposes. He justified this spending by claiming that the North River piers would “increase the price of every 25 × 100-foot lot west of Broadway by $5,000 instantly.”[29] “Millions to benefit landowners and shippers, but not a cent for the hungry unemployed!” shouted the Anti-Monopolists. Alderman Bruen, another Whig, suggested that at a time when real estate values in New York City had dropped by over $50,000,000, the city should support speculators with $5,000,000, taking the lands they had purchased as collateral and giving them city bonds worth two-thirds of their value. For the Equal Rights advocates, there was little to distinguish between Tammany Hall and the Whig leaders. Both clearly exploited the people for their own gain, although the Whigs, carrying on the Federalist belief that property was the ultimate measure of merit, did not emphasize their concern for laborers as persistently as the Wigwam did.

The city in 1837 was filled with the homeless and unemployed. Rent was high, and provisions were dear. Cattle speculators had possession of nearly all the stock, and a barrel of flour cost $12. On February 12 a crowd met in the City Hall Park, after which over 200 of them sped to the flour warehouse of Eli Hart & Co., on Washington street. This firm and that of S. B. Herrick & Son, it was known, held a monopoly in the scarce supply of flour and wheat. The doors of Hart’s place were battered down, and nearly 500 barrels of flour and 1,000 bushels of wheat were taken out and strewed in the street. Herrick’s place likewise was mobbed.[30] On May 10, when the banks suspended specie payments, a vast and[110] excited crowd gathered in Wall Street, and a riot was narrowly averted.[31]

The city in 1837 was filled with homeless people and the unemployed. Rent was high, and basic necessities were expensive. Cattle speculators controlled almost all the livestock, and a barrel of flour cost $12. On February 12, a crowd gathered in City Hall Park, after which over 200 of them rushed to the flour warehouse of Eli Hart & Co. on Washington Street. It was known that this firm, along with S. B. Herrick & Son, had a monopoly on the limited supply of flour and wheat. The doors of Hart’s building were smashed in, and nearly 500 barrels of flour and 1,000 bushels of wheat were taken out and scattered in the street. Herrick’s place was also mobbed.[30] On May 10, when the banks stopped issuing cash payments, a huge and[110] agitated crowd gathered on Wall Street, and a riot was narrowly avoided.[31]

The Equal Rights party could not be bought out or snuffed out. To deprive it of its best leaders Tammany Hall resorted to petty persecution. Jacques and Slamm had headed a petition to the Legislature protesting against the appointment of a certain suspicious bank investigating committee. The Wigwam men in the Legislature immediately secured the passage of a resolution for the appointment of a committee to investigate this petition, and this committee instantly haled Jacques and Slamm to appear at Albany and give testimony.[32] The purpose was plain. The Tammany men sought to have the Equal Rights leaders at Albany, which was not as accessible from the city as now, and there keep them under various pretexts while the Spring campaign for Mayor was going on. Jacques and Slamm did not appear and were adjudged guilty of contempt. When they were most needed in New York City they were arrested and arraigned before the Legislature. William Leggett also was threatened, but escaped arrest.

The Equal Rights party couldn’t be silenced or eliminated. To weaken it by removing its top leaders, Tammany Hall resorted to petty harassment. Jacques and Slamm had led a petition to the Legislature that opposed the appointment of a questionable bank investigation committee. The legislators affiliated with the Wigwam quickly pushed through a resolution to set up a committee to look into this petition, and this committee immediately summoned Jacques and Slamm to Albany to testify.[32] The intent was clear. The Tammany members wanted the Equal Rights leaders in Albany, which wasn’t as easy to reach from the city as it is today, and to keep them occupied with various excuses while the Spring campaign for Mayor was underway. Jacques and Slamm didn’t show up and were found guilty of contempt. When they were most needed in New York City, they were arrested and brought before the Legislature. William Leggett was also threatened but managed to avoid arrest.

The Equal Rights party, however, was soon to demonstrate its capacity to do harm to Tammany. The organization nominated John J. Morgan for Mayor; the Whigs named Aaron Clark, and the Equal Rights party opposed them with Jacques. The 3,911 votes Jacques received were enough to defeat Morgan, with his 12,974 votes, against Clark’s 16,140. Worst blow of all, Tammany Hall lost the Common Council. When the new body came in it removed all of the Wigwam’s office-holders that it could. The spoils in the form of annual salaries paid by the city, amounting to $468,000; the perquisites and contracts—such as that for the Croton Aqueduct, in favor of which the people had voted some years before—and other improvements, all went to the Whigs.

The Equal Rights party quickly proved it could hurt Tammany. The organization nominated John J. Morgan for Mayor; the Whigs chose Aaron Clark, and the Equal Rights party countered with Jacques. Jacques received 3,911 votes, enough to defeat Morgan, who gained 12,974 votes, while Clark received 16,140. The worst blow of all was that Tammany Hall lost the Common Council. When the new council took office, it removed all of the Wigwam’s office-holders it could. The spoils, including annual salaries paid by the city totaling $468,000, along with perks and contracts—like the one for the Croton Aqueduct, which the people had voted in favor of a few years earlier—and other improvements, all went to the Whigs.

The Tammany men, regarding the Equal Rights men responsible for this loss of power, were now disposed to treat with them and willing enough to throw over the banker-corporation element.

The Tammany guys, seeing the Equal Rights folks as the reason for their loss of power, were now inclined to negotiate with them and were ready to let go of the banker-corporation crowd.

FOOTNOTES

[1] The minutes of the Common Council covering these years show continuous records of petitions from imprisoned debtors, praying for fuel and the patching up of windows in the dead of Winter. Charitable societies were in existence to supply the jailed debtors with food.

[1] The minutes of the Common Council from these years reveal ongoing petitions from imprisoned debtors, asking for fuel and repairs to their windows during the cold winter months. There were charitable organizations in place to provide food for these jailed debtors.

[2] This singular provision, by which non-residents were liable to imprisonment for debt, while the natives of the city were exempted, was erased in 1840.

[2] This unique rule, which allowed non-residents to be imprisoned for debt while locals were exempt, was removed in 1840.

[3] Journal of the Senate and Assembly, 1805, pp. 351 and 399.

[3] Journal of the Senate and Assembly, 1805, pp. 351 and 399.

[4] Ibid., 1812, p. 134.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., 1812, p. 134.

[5] Journal of the Senate and Assembly, 1812, pp. 259-60.

[5] Journal of the Senate and Assembly, 1812, pp. 259-60.

[6] Stock given at par value meant an almost immediate rise in value to the legislator. Most stocks went upward from 10 to 15 per cent. on the passage of the charter, and in the case of the more profitable and exploitative corporations, far higher advances were scored in a short time.

[6] Shares issued at face value resulted in an almost instant increase in value for the lawmaker. Most stocks rose by 10 to 15 percent upon the charter's approval, and for the more lucrative and exploitative companies, even greater gains were realized in a short period.

[7] Journal of the Senate, 1824, pp. 498-532.

[7] Journal of the Senate, 1824, pp. 498-532.

[8] Journal of the Senate, 1826, Vol. 6, Appendix B. A considerable part of the money and stock promised the members of the Legislature for their votes was withheld owing to the expected investigation.

[8] Journal of the Senate, 1826, Vol. 6, Appendix B. A significant amount of the money and shares promised to the members of the Legislature for their votes was held back due to the anticipated investigation.

[9] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.

[10] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.

[11] Senate Documents, 1834, No. 47, and Ibid., No. 94. Walter Bowne was the bank’s president.

[11] Senate Documents, 1834, No. 47, and Ibid., No. 94. Walter Bowne was the president of the bank.

[12] Ibid., No. 94.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., No. 94.

[13] Ibid., No. 47.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., No. 47.

[14] Journal of the Senate, 1833, p. 396.

[14] Journal of the Senate, 1833, p. 396.

[15] Documents of the Senate, 1834, No. 108.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Senate Documents, 1834, No. 108.

[16] Lee was the last Mayor elected by the Common Council (1833-34).

[16] Lee was the last mayor elected by the Common Council (1833-34).

[17] Lawrence had a curious habit of strolling the streets carrying his spectacles in his hand behind his back, and ogling all the pretty girls he met, a habit which was broken later when one winsome lass tangled him in a plot, much to his financial and mental distress.

[17] Lawrence had a quirky habit of walking around with his glasses in his hand behind his back, checking out all the attractive girls he came across, a habit that changed when one charming girl got him caught up in a scheme, causing him a lot of financial and mental trouble.

[18] The next day the Equal Rights men were dubbed “Locofocos,” a name afterward applied by the Whigs to the entire Democratic party.

[18] The next day, the Equal Rights supporters were called “Locofocos,” a term later used by the Whigs to refer to the whole Democratic party.

[19] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1836, Nos. 65 and 100.

[19] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1836, Nos. 65 and 100.

[20] Ibid., 1837, No. 48.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., 1837, No. 48.

[21] Ibid., 1837, No. 32.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid., 1837, No. 32.

[22] Documents of the Senate, 1836, Vol. II, No. 94.

[22] Documents of the Senate, 1836, Vol. II, No. 94.

[23] A short time before, at an Anti-Monopolist meeting, Chairman Job Haskell had represented that the Tammany Society—the secret body, responsible to no one and enforcing its demands through the Tammany Hall political organization—was to blame for the political corruption. Resolutions were then passed setting forth that whereas the self-constituted, self-perpetuating Tammany Society had assumed a dictatorial attitude and by usages made by itself endeavored to rule the people as with a rod of iron; and, as they (the Equal Rights men) believed the people were capable of managing their own affairs without the aid of said inquisitorial society, “that we deem the Tammany Society an excrescence upon the body politic and dangerous to its rights and liberties.”

[23] A little while ago, at an Anti-Monopolist meeting, Chairman Job Haskell stated that the Tammany Society—the secret organization that answers to no one and enforces its demands through the Tammany Hall political machine—was responsible for the political corruption. Resolutions were then passed declaring that since the self-appointed, self-perpetuating Tammany Society had taken on a dictatorial attitude and tried to control the people through its own established practices, and since they (the Equal Rights men) believed the people could manage their own affairs without the help of such an intrusive society, “we consider the Tammany Society an unnecessary growth on the body politic and a threat to its rights and freedoms.”

[24] Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, Vol XI, p. 16.

[24] Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, Vol XI, p. 16.

[25] These resolutions were published officially in the New York Evening Post, June 8, 1836.

[25] These resolutions were officially published in the New York Evening Post, June 8, 1836.

[26] Cornelius W. Lawrence, the Tammany Mayor, became the bank’s first president.

[26] Cornelius W. Lawrence, the Tammany Mayor, became the bank’s first president.

[27] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1837, No. 48.

[27] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1837, No. 48.

[28] Excepting some instances of private charity by Tammany leaders.

[28] Apart from a few cases of private donations from Tammany leaders.

[29] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1836, No. 80.

[29] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1836, No. 80.

[30] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1839, No. 29.

[30] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1839, No. 29.

[31] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid.

[32] Documents of the Assembly, 1837, Nos. 198 and 327.

[32] Assembly Documents, 1837, Nos. 198 and 327.


CHAPTER XIII
TAMMANY "REFORMED"
1837-1838

One of the important changes in the composition of Tammany Hall came in 1837. The United States Bank dependents, lobbyists and supporters had left the Wigwam, as has been noted, in 1832, but the State Bank men, well satisfied with the destruction of the great rival corporation, had remained. Finding the organization no longer subservient to them they, in turn, quit Tammany during Van Buren’s administration.

One of the significant changes in the makeup of Tammany Hall occurred in 1837. The supporters, lobbyists, and dependents of the United States Bank had left the Wigwam, as previously mentioned, in 1832, but the State Bank people, pleased with the downfall of their big rival corporation, had stayed. However, when they realized the organization no longer catered to them, they also left Tammany during Van Buren’s administration.

This happened in the Fall of 1837. The Tammany General Committee, whose membership had recently been increased from thirty-six to fifty-one members, held a meeting on September 7, thirty-six members being present. Resolutions were offered upholding Van Buren’s scheme of placing the United States funds in sub-treasuries. This was a bitter dose to the State Bank men who, wanting to retain Government deposits, opposed the sub-treasury plan. The “bank conservatives” vainly tried to put off a vote on the resolutions, but being repeatedly outvoted, all but one of them left the room before the main question was put. Nineteen members remained. As seventeen formed a quorum, the question was put and the resolutions were adopted by a vote of 18 to 1. The bank men pretended that the resolutions were passed clandestinely, and they so deviously managed things that in a few days they regained control of the general committee, which at their behest refused to call a public meeting to act on the resolutions.

This took place in the fall of 1837. The Tammany General Committee, which had recently increased its membership from thirty-six to fifty-one members, held a meeting on September 7, with thirty-six members present. Resolutions were put forward supporting Van Buren’s proposal to place the United States funds in sub-treasuries. This was a tough blow to the State Bank supporters who wanted to keep Government deposits and opposed the sub-treasury plan. The "bank conservatives" unsuccessfully tried to delay a vote on the resolutions, but after being repeatedly outvoted, all but one of them left the room before the main question was addressed. Nineteen members stayed. Since seventeen formed a quorum, the question was called, and the resolutions were approved by a vote of 18 to 1. The bank supporters claimed that the resolutions were passed secretly, and they cleverly maneuvered things so that within a few days they regained control of the general committee, which then, at their request, refused to call a public meeting to address the resolutions.

But the Democratic-Republican Young Men’s Committee was saturated with Equal Rights ideas and rebelled at the policy which allowed the acts of the bankers to antagonize Democrats of principle and bring defeat to Tammany Hall. This committee met in the Wigwam on September 11 and passed a series of resolutions with which the Anti-Monopolists were as pleased as the bankers were angry. The resolution declared the public satisfaction in anticipating the separation of bank and state, and welcomed the approach of an era when legislation should not be perverted to the enrichment of a few and the depression of the many. The Young Men resolved that the crisis was sufficient reason for their committee assuming to recommend a public meeting of those who approved Van Buren’s recent message, to be held in Tammany Hall, on September 21.

But the Democratic-Republican Young Men’s Committee was filled with Equal Rights ideas and pushed back against the policy that let bankers’ actions upset principled Democrats and lead to defeats for Tammany Hall. This committee met in the Wigwam on September 11 and passed a series of resolutions that made the Anti-Monopolists happy while infuriating the bankers. The resolution expressed public satisfaction at the prospect of separating bank and state and looked forward to a time when laws wouldn’t be twisted to benefit a few while hurting the many. The Young Men decided that the crisis was enough reason for their committee to propose a public meeting for supporters of Van Buren’s recent message, to be held in Tammany Hall on September 21.

The bank men were angry that the Young Men’s committee should dare to act independently of the elder, the general committee. The latter, meeting on September 14, disapproved of the manner in which the Young Men’s meeting had been called, declined cooperation with it, and by a vote of 21 to 16 ordered the Young Men’s General Committee to withdraw the recommendation for that meeting. The Young Men ignored the order and held their meeting. Van Buren and his prospective sub-treasuries were indorsed and fiery resolutions adopted denouncing the incorporated banks.

The bankers were angry that the Young Men’s committee would dare to act independently of the elder general committee. The latter, meeting on September 14, disapproved of how the Young Men’s meeting had been organized, refused to cooperate with it, and by a vote of 21 to 16 ordered the Young Men’s General Committee to withdraw the recommendation for that meeting. The Young Men ignored the order and went ahead with their meeting. Van Buren and his potential sub-treasuries were endorsed, and passionate resolutions were passed condemning the incorporated banks.

Coming, as this denunciation did, from Tammany Hall, which had a far-reaching influence over the Union, the “bank conservatives” grew even more exasperated, for they had come to look upon the organization as almost their private property. As two-thirds of the Sachems belonged to their clique, they held a meeting in the Wigwam, on September 25, to disapprove of the sub-treasury scheme. In rushed the progressive Democrats in overwhelming force, and for an hour the place was a fighting arena. The bank men were forced to leave, and[114] the progressives organized and carried out the meeting.

Coming as this criticism did from Tammany Hall, which had a significant influence over the Union, the “bank conservatives” became even more frustrated, as they had begun to see the organization as almost their own. With two-thirds of the Sachems in their faction, they convened a meeting in the Wigwam on September 25 to oppose the sub-treasury plan. The progressive Democrats stormed in with overwhelming numbers, turning the place into a battleground for an hour. The bank representatives were forced to leave, and[114] the progressives organized and ran the meeting.

Regarding Tammany as having ceased to be the tool of the exploiting interests, the Anti-Monopolists were disposed to a union with the advanced organization party. When the Equal Rights men met at Military Hall on October 27, Col. Alexander Ming, Jr., one of the party’s organizers, said that one of the chief purposes of the Equal Rights party was to effect reform in Tammany Hall; this having been accomplished, it was the duty of every Democrat to unite on one ticket against the “high-toned Federalists, Whigs and aristocrats.” A fusion Assembly ticket was made up, composed of both Tammany and Equal Rights men, each Tammanyite subscribing in writing to the Equal Rights principles. A small contingent of the Equal Rights party, however, accused their comrades of selling out to the Wigwam, and nominated their own candidates—Job Haskell, Daniel Gorham, William E. Skidmore and others.

Regarding Tammany no longer being controlled by exploiting interests, the Anti-Monopolists were open to partnering with the advanced organization party. When the Equal Rights supporters gathered at Military Hall on October 27, Col. Alexander Ming, Jr., one of the party’s organizers, stated that a main goal of the Equal Rights party was to bring reform to Tammany Hall; once that was achieved, it was every Democrat's responsibility to unite under one ticket against the “high-toned Federalists, Whigs, and aristocrats.” A combined Assembly ticket was created, made up of both Tammany and Equal Rights members, with each Tammanyite formally agreeing to the Equal Rights principles. However, a small group from the Equal Rights party accused their peers of compromising with the Wigwam and nominated their own candidates—Job Haskell, Daniel Gorham, William E. Skidmore, and others.

The “bank conservatives” allied themselves with the Whigs. They were credited with raising an election fund of $60,000, a sum which at that time could do great execution. By raising the cries of “agrarianism” and “infidelity,” ascribing the effects of the panic of 1837 to the Democrats, coercing laborers and using illegal votes, the combined conservatives wrested nearly 3,000 majority out of a total of 33,093 votes.

The “bank conservatives” teamed up with the Whigs. They were recognized for gathering an election fund of $60,000, a significant amount at the time. By shouting slogans like “agrarianism” and “infidelity,” blaming the Democrats for the panic of 1837, pressuring workers, and using illegal votes, the united conservatives secured nearly a 3,000-vote majority out of a total of 33,093 votes.

Stimulated by this victory, the bank men attempted to regain control of Tammany and called a meeting for January 2, 1838, at 7 o’clock, in the Wigwam. The Anti-Bank Democrats then issued a call for a meeting on the same night, but one hour earlier. The Council of Sachems were mostly either “bank conservatives” themselves or sympathizers; but they feared to alienate the dominant progressives. As the best solution, they agreed that neither party should meet in the Wigwam. On January 1 they resolved that both calls were unauthorized and that neither had been sanctioned by any act of the general[115] committee. “The lease of Tammany Hall,” read their resolution, “reserves to the Council of Sachems of the Tammany Society the right to decide on all questions of doubt, arising out of the rooms being occupied by or let to a person or persons as a committee or otherwise for political purposes!” The Council sent a copy of these resolutions to Lovejoy and Howard, the lessees[1] of Tammany Hall, forbidding them to “rent, hire to, or allow either of the assemblages named on the premises.” Identical with this decree, Lovejoy and Howard issued a notice (which was published in the public prints) that their lease of Tammany Hall “contained covenants” that they would not permit any persons to assemble in the hall “whose political opinions the Council of Sachems of Tammany Society should declare not to be in accordance with the political views of the general committee of said Tammany Society,” and they (Lovejoy and Howard) therefore could not permit either meeting.[2] The conservatives then met in the City Hall Park, where they were assaulted and maltreated.[3]

Stimulated by this victory, the bank representatives tried to take back control of Tammany and called a meeting for January 2, 1838, at 7 PM in the Wigwam. The Anti-Bank Democrats then called for a meeting on the same night, but one hour earlier. Most of the Council of Sachems were either "bank conservatives" themselves or sympathizers; however, they were concerned about alienating the dominant progressives. As the best solution, they agreed that neither party should meet in the Wigwam. On January 1, they decided that both calls were unauthorized and that neither had been approved by any act of the general[115] committee. "The lease of Tammany Hall," read their resolution, "reserves to the Council of Sachems of the Tammany Society the right to decide on all questions of doubt arising from the rooms being occupied by or rented to a person or persons as a committee or otherwise for political purposes!" The Council sent a copy of these resolutions to Lovejoy and Howard, the lessees[1] of Tammany Hall, prohibiting them from "renting, hiring to, or allowing either of the gatherings mentioned on the premises." Lovejoy and Howard then issued a notice (which was published in the public prints) stating that their lease of Tammany Hall "included agreements" that they would not allow any individuals to gather in the hall "whose political opinions the Council of Sachems of Tammany Society declared were not in line with the political views of the general committee of said Tammany Society," and they (Lovejoy and Howard) therefore could not allow either meeting.[2] The conservatives then met in City Hall Park, where they were attacked and mistreated.[3]

The Anti-Bank men won over the general committee, which gave the necessary permission for their meeting in the Wigwam on January 9. The policy of Jackson and of Van Buren was upheld, and it was set forth that while the Democracy, unlike its calumniators, did not arrogate to itself “the possession of all the decency, the virtue, the morals and the wealth of the community,” it felt no more disturbed at being called “Agrarians,” “Locofocos” or[116] “Radicals” than it did at being abused in the days of Jefferson.

The Anti-Bank supporters won over the general committee, which granted the necessary permission for their meeting in the Wigwam on January 9. The policies of Jackson and Van Buren were supported, and it was stated that while the Democracy, unlike its critics, did not claim to hold “all the decency, virtue, morals, and wealth of the community,” it was no more troubled by being called “Agrarians,” “Locofocos,” or[116]“Radicals” than it was when it faced criticism in the days of Jefferson.

That foremost Equal Rights advocate, the Evening Post, now acknowledged the purification of Tammany Hall;[4] saying that the spurious Democrats who had infested the party for their own selfish purposes had either been drummed out of the ranks, had left voluntarily, or had acquiesced sullenly in the decision of the majority.

That leading advocate for Equal Rights, the Evening Post, now recognized the cleansing of Tammany Hall;[4] stating that the fake Democrats who had invaded the party for their own selfish reasons had either been kicked out, left on their own, or reluctantly accepted the majority's decision.

FOOTNOTES

[1] It will be remembered that in 1828 the Sachems had bought back a lease on the building in order to shut out the Adams men. The lease had again been let, but under restrictions which left the Sachems the power to determine what faction should be entitled to the use of the hall.

[1] It should be noted that in 1828, the Sachems had repurchased a lease on the building to exclude the Adams supporters. The lease was reissued, but with conditions that allowed the Sachems to decide which group had the right to use the hall.

[2] These details are of the greatest importance as revealing the methods by which the society asserted its absolute ascendency over the organization. They proved the absurdity of the claim that the two bodies were distinct and separate from each other.

[2] These details are extremely important as they show how the society maintained its complete control over the organization. They demonstrated the ridiculousness of the claim that the two groups were separate and independent from one another.

[3] The New Yorker (magazine), January 13, 1838. This journal was edited and published by Horace Greeley.

[3] The New Yorker (magazine), January 13, 1838. This magazine was edited and published by Horace Greeley.

[4] January 11, 1838. The credit for this temporary purification must in considerable measure be given to the Evening Post’s editors, William Cullen Bryant and William Leggett.

[4] January 11, 1838. The credit for this brief improvement must largely go to the Evening Post’s editors, William Cullen Bryant and William Leggett.


CHAPTER XIV
WHIG DEFEAT BRINGS TAMMANY BACK TO POWER
1838-1840

The course of the Whig city administration served only to strengthen Tammany and was responsible for the conviction, which later so often prevailed, that if Tammany Hall was bad the Whigs were no better, and were perhaps worse. At this time of general distress complaints were numerous that the sum of $1,300,000 was exacted from the rentpayers in a single year. In the early part of 1838 one-third of all the persons in New York City who subsisted by manual labor was substantially or wholly without employment.[1] Not less than 10,000 persons were in utter poverty and had no other means of surviving the Winter than those afforded by the charity of neighbors. The Almshouse and all charitable institutions were full to overflowing; the usual agencies of charity were exhausted or insufficient, and 10,000 sufferers were still uncared for. The great panic of 1837 had cut down the city’s trade one-half. Notwithstanding the fall of prices, the rents for tenements in New York were greater than were paid in any other city or village upon the globe.[2] So exorbitant were the demands of the landlords that the tenants found it impossible to meet them. The landowners were the backbone of the Whig party; it was not unnatural, therefore, that[118] their rapacity developed among the people at large a profound distrust of Whig men and principles.

The path taken by the Whig city administration only served to strengthen Tammany and led to a common belief that if Tammany Hall was bad, the Whigs were no better, and maybe even worse. During this time of widespread hardship, there were many complaints about the $1,300,000 collected from renters in just one year. In early 1838, about one-third of all manual laborers in New York City were essentially or completely unemployed. Not less than 10,000 people were in complete poverty and had no other means of surviving the winter than through the charity of their neighbors. The Almshouse and all charitable organizations were overflowing; the usual charitable efforts were either exhausted or insufficient, leaving 10,000 people still uncared for. The major panic of 1837 had halved the city’s trade. Despite the drop in prices, rents for apartments in New York were higher than in any other city or village in the world. The demands from landlords were so outrageous that tenants found it impossible to keep up. The landowners were the backbone of the Whig party, so it was not surprising that their greed led to a deep distrust among the general public towards Whig individuals and their principles.

The Whig officials, so far as can be discovered, took no adequate steps to relieve the widespread suffering. The Tammany ward committees, on the other hand, were active in relief work. This was another of the secrets of Tammany Hall’s usual success in holding the body of voters. The Whigs made fine speeches over champagne banquets, but kept at a distance from the poor, among whom the Wigwam workers mingled, and distributed clothing, fuel and food and often money. The leaders set the example. One of these was John M. Bloodgood,[3] who frequently went among the charitable citizens, collecting, in a large basket, cakes, pies, meat and other eatables, and distributing them among the needy.

The Whig officials, as far as we know, didn't take any significant steps to help with the widespread suffering. In contrast, the Tammany ward committees were actively involved in relief efforts. This was one of the reasons Tammany Hall usually succeeded in keeping its voters loyal. The Whigs gave impressive speeches at champagne banquets but kept their distance from the poor, while the Wigwam workers interacted with them, handing out clothing, fuel, food, and often money. The leaders led by example. One of them was John M. Bloodgood,[3] who often went among the generous citizens, collecting, in a large basket, cakes, pies, meat, and other food items, and distributing them to those in need.

In the Spring of 1838 Tammany nominated Isaac L. Varian for Mayor, and the Whigs renominated Aaron Clark. The Whigs used the panic as an example of the result of Democratic rule. Controlling the city, they employed all its machinery to win. It was reasonably certain that they did not stop at fraud. In some wards canvassing was delayed until other wards were heard from. In still other wards the Whigs refused to administer the oath to naturalized citizens. With all this they obtained a plurality of only 519 out of 39,341 votes. Had it not been for dissensions in the tumultuous Sixth Ward, Tammany would have won.

In the spring of 1838, Tammany nominated Isaac L. Varian for Mayor, and the Whigs renominated Aaron Clark. The Whigs pointed to the panic as proof of the failures of Democratic rule. With control of the city, they used all its resources to win. It was fairly clear that they didn't shy away from dishonesty. In some wards, the voting process was delayed until they got results from other wards. In other wards, the Whigs refused to administer the oath to naturalized citizens. Despite all this, they only secured a plurality of 519 out of 39,341 votes. If it hadn't been for conflicts in the chaotic Sixth Ward, Tammany would have won.

In the Fall election of 1838 the Whig frauds were enormous and indisputable. The Whigs raised large sums of money, which were handed to ward workers for the procuring of votes. About two hundred roughs were brought from Philadelphia, in different divisions, each man receiving $22. Gen. Robert Swartwout, now a Whig, at the[119] instance of such men as Moses H. Grinnell, Robert C. Wetmore and Noah Cook, former Wigwam lights, who left the Hall because the “destructionist” Anti-Monopolists captured it, arranged for the trip of these fraudulent voters. After having voted in as many wards as possible, each was to receive the additional compensation of $5. They were also to pass around spurious tickets purporting to be Democratic. The aggregate Whig vote, it was approximated, was swelled through the operations of this band by at least five to six hundred.[4] One repeater, Charles Swint, voted in sixteen wards. Such inmates of the House of Detention as could be persuaded or bullied into voting the Whig ticket were set at large. Merritt, a police officer, was seen boldly leading a crowd of them to the polls. Ex-convicts distributed Whig tickets and busily electioneered. The cabins of all the vessels along the wharves were ransacked, and every man, whether or not a citizen or resident of New York, who could be wheedled into voting a Whig ballot, was rushed to the polls and his vote was smuggled in. The Whigs were successful, their candidate for Governor, William H. Seward, receiving 20,179 votes, to 19,377 for William L. Marcy.

In the Fall election of 1838, the Whig fraud was massive and undeniable. The Whigs collected large sums of money, which they gave to local workers to buy votes. About two hundred tough guys were brought in from Philadelphia, with each man getting $22. General Robert Swartwout, now a Whig, with help from people like Moses H. Grinnell, Robert C. Wetmore, and Noah Cook—who had left the Hall because the “destructionist” Anti-Monopolists took it over—arranged for these fraudulent voters to come. After voting in as many districts as they could, each received an extra $5. They were also instructed to hand out fake tickets that looked like Democratic ones. It was estimated that the total Whig vote was boosted by this group by at least five to six hundred. One repeat voter, Charles Swint, voted in sixteen districts. Inmates from the House of Detention who could be persuaded or pressured into voting for the Whig ticket were released. Merritt, a police officer, was seen confidently leading a crowd of them to the polling places. Ex-convicts handed out Whig tickets and actively campaigned. The cabins of all the ships docked were searched, and every man—whether or not he was a citizen or resident of New York—who could be convinced to vote for the Whig candidate was rushed to the polls and his vote was hidden. The Whigs were successful, with their candidate for Governor, William H. Seward, receiving 20,179 votes compared to 19,377 for William L. Marcy.

Departing from its custom of seeking local victory on national issues, Tammany, in April, 1839, issued an address expatiating on the increase of the city expenses from a little over $1,000,000 in 1830 to above $5,000,000 in 1838. Deducting about $1,500,000 for the Croton works, there would still remain the enormous increase of $2,500,000. The city population had not trebled in that time, nor had there been any extraordinary cause for expenditure. Where had all this money gone?

Departing from its usual approach of focusing on local wins for national issues, Tammany, in April 1839, released a statement discussing the rise in city expenses from just over $1,000,000 in 1830 to more than $5,000,000 in 1838. After subtracting around $1,500,000 for the Croton works, there was still a staggering increase of $2,500,000. During this period, the city's population hadn't tripled, nor were there any extraordinary reasons for such spending. Where had all this money gone?

Tammany further pointed out that, unlike the Whigs, it had never stooped so low as to discharge the humble laborers in the public service, when it (Tammany) held[120] the Common Council. Nor had it ever been so abject as to provide them with colored tickets, as the Whigs had done, so that the laborers might be detected if they voted contrary to their masters. Tammany further charged that the Whigs in the previous election had taken the Almshouse paupers, with embossed satin voting tickets in their hands, to the polls, and were planning to do it again.

Tammany further pointed out that, unlike the Whigs, it had never sunk so low as to fire the humble workers in public service when it (Tammany) held[120] the Common Council. Nor had it ever been so degrading as to provide them with colored tickets, as the Whigs had done, so that the workers could be identified if they voted against their masters. Tammany also charged that the Whigs in the previous election had taken the Almshouse paupers, with embossed satin voting tickets in their hands, to the polls, and were planning to do it again.

Tammany made good use of this charge. But the practise was not exclusively a Whig industry. In those years both Democrats and Whigs, according to which held power, forced Almshouse paupers to vote. For a fortnight before the election the paupers were put in training. On the morning of election they were disguised with new clothing, so that the public might not see their gray uniforms. They were given tickets to vote “and tickets for grog, silver coin and also good advice as to their conduct at the polls.” Then they were carried to the polls in stages, with an officer on each step to see that none escaped. Many would return to the Almshouse drunk and with torn clothing, or after having exchanged their new garments for liquor.[5] There were usually about 300 paupers. In the Fall and Winter of 1838 a quarter of the population was relieved at the Almshouse.

Tammany took full advantage of this charge. But this practice wasn't just a Whig thing. During those years, both Democrats and Whigs, depending on who was in power, forced Almshouse paupers to vote. For two weeks before the election, the paupers were prepared for it. On election morning, they were dressed in new clothes to hide their gray uniforms from the public. They were given voting tickets, drinks, cash, and advice on how to behave at the polls. Then they were transported to the polls in groups, with an officer at each step to ensure none of them got away. Many returned to the Almshouse drunk and in torn clothes, or after trading their new outfits for alcohol.[5] There were usually around 300 paupers. In the Fall and Winter of 1838, a quarter of the population received assistance at the Almshouse.

Clark and Varian were both renominated for Mayor in the Spring of 1839. Preparations for fraud on a large scale were made by both parties. The newspapers supporting Varian admitted that Tammany thought proper to follow the Whigs’ example, and to counteract its effects, by colonizing the doubtful wards with Democratic voters. On both sides repeating was general. An Albany police officer named Coulson brought twenty-three persons, one of whom was only seventeen years old, to New York City, where they voted the Whig ticket in the different wards. For this they received $5 in advance, and $1 a day.

Clark and Varian were both nominated again for Mayor in the spring of 1839. Both parties made large-scale preparations for fraud. The newspapers backing Varian confessed that Tammany felt it necessary to imitate the Whigs’ approach and counteract its effects by sending Democratic voters into the uncertain wards. Repeating was common on both sides. An Albany police officer named Coulson brought twenty-three people, one of whom was just seventeen, to New York City, where they voted the Whig ticket in different wards. For this, they were paid $5 upfront and $1 a day.

Of the 41,113 votes Varian[6] received 21,072, and Clark[121] 20,005. The Wigwam secured a majority of 12 in the Common Council.

Of the 41,113 votes Varian[6] received 21,072, and Clark[121] got 20,005. The Wigwam held a majority of 12 in the Common Council.

Fearing that Tammany in power would use the administration machinery in elections even more than had the Whigs, the latter now made a great outcry for a registry law,[7] proclaiming it the only fraud preventive. The sudden conversion of the Whig leaders to civic purity called forth derision. But the people at large, the non-politicians, ashamed of such barefaced frauds in their city, took up the agitation. The Registry bill was introduced in the Legislature in May, 1839. It provided for the registration of voters in New York City, and made fraudulent voting a felony, with severe penalties.

Fearing that Tammany in power would exploit the administrative system in elections even more than the Whigs had, the latter raised a loud protest for a registry law,[7] claiming it was the only way to prevent fraud. The sudden shift of the Whig leaders to advocate for civic integrity was met with ridicule. However, the general public, who weren’t involved in politics, embarrassed by such blatant fraud in their city, rallied for the cause. The Registry bill was introduced in the Legislature in May 1839. It aimed to require voter registration in New York City and classified fraudulent voting as a felony, with strict penalties.

After the frauds of 1834 the Wigwam leaders had given out that they would take serious steps to obtain from the Legislature a law causing voters to be registered, but had done nothing. They now opened a campaign against the Whig bill. In the Spring of 1840 the ward committees declared against it on the pretext that it interfered with constitutional rights; that it was an insidious attempt to take from the poor man either his right of suffrage or to make the exercise of that right so inconvenient as practically to debar him from voting. The Common Council, on March 16, 1840, denounced the proposed law as inquisitorial,[122] tyrannical and disfranchising in its effect, as well as unjust, because they (the Aldermen) “know of no sin which she (New York City) has committed to make her worthy of the signal reproach now sought to be cast upon her.”[8] A few days later the Common Council on joint ballot delivered itself of a solemn protest against the constitutionality of the Registry bill, and on the night of March 24 an assemblage in the Wigwam did likewise. It was in this year that the full account of the Whig frauds of 1838 was made public. Commenting upon this, the Tammany Nominating Committee, with characteristic naïveté, said in its address: “It is with shame that we record these dark transactions and proclaim them to the people. We would, if we could, blot out their existence, for it brings disgrace on our whole country and will make the enemies of civil freedom laugh with joy.”

After the frauds of 1834, the Wigwam leaders announced that they would take serious steps to get legislation passed requiring voter registration, but they didn’t follow through. They then launched a campaign against the Whig bill. In the spring of 1840, the ward committees opposed it, claiming it violated constitutional rights and was a sneaky attempt to either take away the poor man’s right to vote or make it so inconvenient that he would practically be unable to vote. The Common Council, on March 16, 1840, condemned the proposed law as intrusive, oppressive, and disenfranchising, as well as unjust, because they (the Aldermen) “know of no sin which she (New York City) has committed to make her worthy of the signal reproach now sought to be cast upon her.”[122][8] A few days later, the Common Council recorded a formal protest against the constitutionality of the Registry bill during a joint ballot, and on the night of March 24, a gathering at the Wigwam did the same. It was in this year that the full details of the Whig frauds of 1838 were revealed. Commenting on this, the Tammany Nominating Committee, with their usual naïveté, stated in their address: “It is with shame that we report these dark transactions and share them with the public. We would, if we could, erase their existence, for it brings disgrace on our entire country and will make the enemies of civil freedom rejoice.”

The Registry bill became a law, but Tammany continued to protest against it. When, in 1841, the Legislature increased the penalties for its violation, Acting Mayor Elijah F. Purdy commented upon it severely.[9]

The Registry bill became a law, but Tammany kept protesting against it. When, in 1841, the Legislature raised the penalties for breaking it, Acting Mayor Elijah F. Purdy criticized it harshly.[9]

The able, sincere and high-minded William Leggett, the guiding spirit of the Equal Rights party, died on May 29, 1839, not quite forty years old. The Tammany Young Men’s General Committee eulogized his virtues and talents, proclaimed him amongst the purest of politicians and announced the purpose of raising a monument to his memory. Of this committee, curious to relate, the chairman was Fernando Wood and the secretary Richard B. Connolly—two men who became known for anything but devotion to the virtues they here exalted.

The talented, genuine, and principled William Leggett, the driving force behind the Equal Rights party, passed away on May 29, 1839, at just under forty years old. The Tammany Young Men’s General Committee praised his virtues and skills, declared him one of the purest politicians, and announced plans to erect a monument in his honor. Interestingly, the chairman of this committee was Fernando Wood, and the secretary was Richard B. Connolly—two individuals who became known for anything but the dedication to the virtues they celebrated here.

Leggett, some years before this, had become a radical Abolitionist. By this time the anti-slavery movement in the city and State had grown to considerable proportions, though as yet it had exercised but little influence on politics. Several riots had taken place in the streets of the[123] city, two rather serious ones happening on July 9 and 10, 1834, and June 21, 1835, and Lewis Tappan, an anti-slavery propagandist, had been mobbed. The local movement gradually acquired new adherents, and constantly increased its propaganda. At this period, however, it was more in the nature of a growing moral force.

Leggett, a few years earlier, had become a radical abolitionist. By this time, the anti-slavery movement in the city and state had gained significant traction, although it had still had very little impact on politics. Several riots had erupted in the streets of the[123] city, with two particularly serious ones occurring on July 9 and 10, 1834, and June 21, 1835, and Lewis Tappan, an anti-slavery activist, had been attacked by a mob. The local movement gradually gained new supporters and consistently expanded its outreach efforts. However, during this period, it was more of a rising moral force.

During this period another great series of disclosures regarding Tammany chieftains was made public. Samuel Swartwout, whom Jackson had made Collector of the Port shortly after coming into office in 1829, fled from the city late in 1838. He had long been a power in the organization. His name had been mentioned unpleasantly when he, with M. M. Noah and Henry Ogden,[10] contrived by means of their official positions to get $10,000 reward for the recovery of the jewels stolen from the Prince of Orange, though the recovery had been made by others. And in 1833 he had threatened, as Collector of the Port, to remove the Custom House uptown because the merchants would not lend him more than $7,000 on the strength of some worthless “Jersey meadows.” Three years later he was connected with the unsavory Harlem Railroad stock corner and the manipulation of the funds of the Commercial Bank. Early in 1838 he joined forces with the notorious politicians of the Seventh Ward Bank for the defeat of William Leggett for the Democratic nomination for Congress, securing the nomination of Isaac L. Varian in his stead. A few months later the city was astounded to learn that since 1830 he had been systematically robbing the Government, through the manipulation of Custom House receipts, and that the total of his thefts amounted to nearly $1,250,000.[11] Fleeing to Europe, he wandered[124] aimlessly about[12] for many years.[13] The community was so impressed with the size of this defalcation that a verb, “to Swartwout,” was coined, remaining in general use for many years thereafter. A defaulter was generally spoken of as having “Swartwouted.”

During this time, another major series of revelations about Tammany leaders came to light. Samuel Swartwout, whom Jackson had appointed Collector of the Port shortly after taking office in 1829, fled the city in late 1838. He had been a significant figure in the organization for a long time. His name had come up in a negative context when he, along with M. M. Noah and Henry Ogden,[10] used their official positions to obtain a $10,000 reward for the recovery of jewels stolen from the Prince of Orange, even though the recovery had actually been done by others. In 1833, he threatened, as Collector of the Port, to move the Custom House uptown because merchants wouldn’t lend him more than $7,000 based on some worthless “Jersey meadows.” Three years later, he was involved in the shady Harlem Railroad stock manipulation and the handling of funds at the Commercial Bank. Early in 1838, he allied with the infamous politicians from the Seventh Ward Bank to defeat William Leggett for the Democratic nomination for Congress, successfully securing the nomination of Isaac L. Varian instead. A few months later, the city was shocked to discover that since 1830 he had been systematically stealing from the Government by manipulating Custom House receipts, with his total thefts amounting to nearly $1,250,000.[11] He fled to Europe, wandering[124] aimlessly for many years.[12] The community was so struck by the magnitude of this embezzlement that a verb, “to Swartwout,” was created, remaining commonly used for many years afterwards. A defaulter was typically referred to as having “Swartwouted.”

A lesser figure in Tammany circles, though a person of considerable consequence, followed Swartwout in flight. This was William M. Price, at the time District Attorney for the Southern District of New York. It was discovered that he had defaulted to the Government in the sum of $75,000. Price, like so many other Tammany politicians of his time, had been mixed up with Seventh Ward Bank politics. During the latter part of his career he had been known as the personal representative in the city of President Van Buren.

A lesser player in Tammany circles, but still a person of significance, followed Swartwout in escaping. This was William M. Price, who was serving as the District Attorney for the Southern District of New York at the time. It was found out that he owed the Government $75,000. Price, like many other Tammany politicians of his era, had been involved in Seventh Ward Bank politics. In the later part of his career, he was recognized as President Van Buren's personal representative in the city.

During the following Spring, William Paxen Hallett, a member of the “Big Four” against whom the Equal Rights party had so energetically protested in 1836, was made the defendant in a civil suit involving grave fraud. As referee in a suit for damages of one John A. Manning against one Charles J. Morris, Hallett had wrongfully reported that only trifling judgments remained outstanding against Morris, and the court had accordingly given the latter a year’s time in which to make good a judgment for $3,496 rendered in favor of Manning. It appeared, however, in the proceedings before the Superior Court, May 20, 1839, that Hallett knew, or should have known, of a previous judgment against the defendant for $15,014.44 in favor of one Nathan Davis, who during the year of[125] grace seized upon all of Morris’s property, thus defrauding Manning. The testimony was so convincing that Hallett was forced to compromise the suit by paying the damages asked for. Through the influence of the organization, however, he escaped prosecution.

During the following spring, William Paxen Hallett, a member of the “Big Four” that the Equal Rights party had strongly protested against in 1836, became the defendant in a civil lawsuit involving serious fraud. As the referee in a damages case filed by John A. Manning against Charles J. Morris, Hallett incorrectly reported that only minor judgments were outstanding against Morris. As a result, the court granted Morris a year to pay a judgment of $3,496 awarded to Manning. However, in the proceedings before the Superior Court on May 20, 1839, it became clear that Hallett knew, or should have known, about a prior judgment against Morris for $15,014.44 in favor of Nathan Davis, who had seized all of Morris’s property that year, thereby defrauding Manning. The evidence was so compelling that Hallett had no choice but to settle the lawsuit by paying the damages requested. Despite this, he avoided prosecution due to the influence of the organization.

The “ring” of Police Justices had for several years been a crying scandal. Whig and Tammany magistrates were equally involved. Public clamor fixed upon John M. Bloodgood, despite his private charities, as the first victim. The Assistant Aldermen impeached him in January, 1839,[14] and submitted the case to the Court of Common Pleas, by whom he was tried.[15] Testimony was brought out tending to show that the Police Justices, by means of an understanding with policemen and jailers, extorted money from prisoners and shielded counterfeiters, thieves, street walkers and other malefactors from arrest or conviction. The charges were dismissed.[16] Stronger testimony of the same kind was brought out in May, 1840, on the trial of Police Justice Henry W. Merritt, and other testimony involved in the same way Special Justice Oliver M. Lowndes. The case, however, was dismissed.[17]

The “ring” of Police Justices had been a huge scandal for several years. Both Whig and Tammany magistrates were equally complicit. Public outrage targeted John M. Bloodgood as the first victim, despite his charitable work. The Assistant Aldermen impeached him in January 1839,[14] and the case was sent to the Court of Common Pleas for trial.[15] Evidence was presented showing that the Police Justices worked with policemen and jailers to extort money from prisoners and protect counterfeiters, thieves, prostitutes, and other criminals from being arrested or convicted. The charges were dismissed.[16] Stronger evidence of the same nature emerged in May 1840 during the trial of Police Justice Henry W. Merritt, and Special Justice Oliver M. Lowndes was also implicated. However, the case was dismissed.[17]

A strong public agitation had been waged for the reorganization of the criminal courts. The Weekly Herald of February 1, 1840, had made the statement that the farce of conducting the correctional machinery of the city involved a yearly sum of $1,360,564—this sum being the total of judges’, policemen’s and court attendants’ salaries (about $50,000), added to the blackmail exacted from offenders, and various “pickings and stealings.” The statement was an extravagant one; $700,000 would have been nearer the mark. But whatever the sum, the acquittal of the Police Justices by their fellows in judicial evil-doing indicated that the carnival was to continue. The Tammany leaders had been “out” for the two years 1837-38, and were now vigorously making hay while the sun shone, while such of their Whig contemporaries as still held office were vying with the chiefs in systematic and organized plundering.

A strong public movement had been pushed for the reorganization of the criminal courts. The Weekly Herald from February 1, 1840, stated that the ridiculous way the city's correctional system was run cost a total of $1,360,564 a year—this amount including judges’, police officers’, and court staff salaries (about $50,000), along with the bribes taken from offenders and various other forms of corruption. This claim was exaggerated; $700,000 would have been more accurate. But regardless of the amount, the acquittal of the Police Justices by their peers in corruption showed that the chaos was set to continue. The Tammany leaders had been out of power for the two years of 1837-38, and were now aggressively taking advantage of the situation, while the remaining Whig officials were competing with the chiefs in systematic and organized theft.

The Manhattan Bank scandals were made public in February, 1840. This was the bank whose charter Aaron Burr had so ingeniously secured in 1799. It had been a Tammany institution from the beginning, and Tammany politicians had ruled its policies. It was now generally regarded as the leading financial institution in the city, rivaled only by the Bank of America. It carried $600,000 of Government funds on deposit, and, of course, a large city and State fund.

The Manhattan Bank scandals came to light in February 1840. This was the bank that Aaron Burr smartly obtained a charter for in 1799. From the start, it had been tied to Tammany, with Tammany politicians controlling its policies. At this point, it was widely considered the top financial institution in the city, second only to the Bank of America. It held $600,000 of government funds on deposit and, of course, a significant amount of city and state funds.

It was now shown that for years it had loaned large sums to Tammany leaders and to family connections of its directors and officials, and that it had spent other large sums for political purposes. The total of its worthless loans and political expenditures reached the enormous sum of $1,344,266.99. Cashier Campbell P. White, tried on the technical charge of stealing several of the bank’s books, was freed through the disagreement of the jury,[18] but on a second trial, charged with assaulting Jonathan Thompson,[127] a Tammany director of the bank who had criticized his management, he was fined $250 and imprisoned for fifteen days.[19] In the midst of the excitement Colin G. Newcomb, the teller, disappeared with $50,000. That the bank weathered the storm well-nigh reaches the dimensions of a miracle. Paulding, twice a Tammany Mayor; Bowne, another Tammany ex-Mayor; and Robert H. Morris, at that time Recorder, appeared as the defendant’s witnesses in the first trial. White was an influential Wigwam chief, and in 1832 had been elected to Congress on the Tammany ticket.

It was revealed that for years it had lent large amounts to Tammany leaders and to family members of its directors and officials, and that it had also spent other significant sums for political purposes. The total of its worthless loans and political spending reached an astounding $1,344,266.99. Cashier Campbell P. White, who was tried on the technical charge of stealing several of the bank’s books, was acquitted due to a hung jury,[18] but in a second trial, facing charges of assaulting Jonathan Thompson,[127] a Tammany director of the bank who had criticized his management, he was fined $250 and sentenced to fifteen days in jail.[19] In the midst of the turmoil, Colin G. Newcomb, the teller, vanished with $50,000. That the bank survived this upheaval is almost miraculous. Paulding, who had served as Tammany Mayor twice; Bowne, another former Tammany Mayor; and Robert H. Morris, who was then Recorder, testified as witnesses for the defense in the first trial. White was a prominent leader in Tammany and had been elected to Congress on the Tammany ticket in 1832.

FOOTNOTES

[1] The New Yorker, January 20, 1838.

The New Yorker, January 20, 1838.

[2] Ibid., February 17, 1838. James Parton, in his biography of Horace Greeley, attributes the latter’s conversion and life-long devotion to Socialist principles in large part to the frightful sufferings which he witnessed in New York City, in the Winter of 1838.

[2] Ibid., February 17, 1838. James Parton, in his biography of Horace Greeley, credits Greeley’s conversion and lasting commitment to Socialist principles largely to the terrible suffering he observed in New York City during the winter of 1838.

[3] Bloodgood was the son of Abraham Bloodgood, one of the earliest Tammany politicians. The son likewise achieved considerable influence in the organization. He was for a long time a Police Justice. He will be met with again toward the end of this chapter.

[3] Bloodgood was the son of Abraham Bloodgood, one of the earliest Tammany politicians. His son also gained significant influence in the organization. He served as a Police Justice for a long time. He will be mentioned again toward the end of this chapter.

[4] Confession of Hart Marks, one of the leaders, before Justice Lowndes in the lower Police Court, November 6, 1838, and of Jonathan D. Stevenson and others in the Recorder’s Court, October 20, 1840.

[4] Confession of Hart Marks, one of the leaders, before Justice Lowndes in the lower Police Court, November 6, 1838, and of Jonathan D. Stevenson and others in the Recorder’s Court, October 20, 1840.

[5] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1844-45, XI, No. 51.

[5] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1844-45, XI, No. 51.

[6] Varian was a rugged, popular, but not over-educated man. Sir Charles Lyell, the noted British geologist, once asked him questions as to the formation of Manhattan Island. Varian said he had dug a well on his farm at Murray Hill and after going through “a stratagem of sand and a stratagem of clay they struck a stratagem of red rock.” At another time, while reading a New York newspaper at the Stanwix House in Albany, Varian remarked to Walter Bowne, then Mayor, that they had a new Street Inspector in New York City. “Indeed! who is he?” “A perfect stranger,” replied Varian; and he read from the paper: “‘Last evening the wind suddenly changed to the north, and this morning, thanks to Old Boreas, our streets are in a passable condition.’ Old Boreas,” said Varian, reflectively, “I thought I knew every Democrat in New York, but I never heard of him.”

[6] Varian was a tough, well-liked guy, but not very educated. Sir Charles Lyell, the famous British geologist, once asked him about how Manhattan Island was formed. Varian mentioned he had dug a well on his farm at Murray Hill and after going through “a layer of sand and a layer of clay, they hit a layer of red rock.” Another time, while reading a New York newspaper at the Stanwix House in Albany, Varian told Walter Bowne, who was the Mayor at the time, that there was a new Street Inspector in New York City. “Really? Who is he?” “A complete stranger,” Varian replied, and he read from the paper: “‘Last evening the wind suddenly turned to the north, and this morning, thanks to Old Boreas, our streets are in a passable condition.’ Old Boreas,” Varian said thoughtfully, “I thought I knew every Democrat in New York, but I’ve never heard of him.”

[7] In 1834 the Board of Assistant Aldermen had passed a resolution in favor of the registry of voters, and the Native American Association, early in 1838, had petitioned the Legislature similarly. The Whigs seized hold of the movement as political capital for themselves.

[7] In 1834, the Board of Assistant Aldermen approved a resolution supporting the registration of voters, and the Native American Association had asked the Legislature to do the same early in 1838. The Whigs took this opportunity to use the movement for their own political gain.

[8] Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XVIII, pp. 404-5.

[8] Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XVIII, pp. 404-5.

[9] Ibid., Vol. XX, pp. 229-30.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid., Vol. 20, pp. 229-30.

[10] Ogden was a Tammany politician of considerable importance. At the time of Swartwout’s flight he was the Cashier of the Custom House, a post which he had held for several years. He was also a director of the Seventh Ward Bank.

[10] Ogden was a significant Tammany politician. When Swartwout fled, he was the Cashier of the Custom House, a position he had held for several years. He was also a director of the Seventh Ward Bank.

[11] The exact amount was $1,222,705.69. House Executive Document, No. 13, Twenty-fifth Congress, Third Session; also House Report, No. 313.

[11] The exact amount was $1,222,705.69. House Executive Document, No. 13, Twenty-fifth Congress, Third Session; also House Report, No. 313.

[12] A pathetic tale is told of an American meeting Swartwout in Algiers, several years after this episode, and of the defaulter crying like a child over his enforced exile from the land of his birth.

[12] A sad story is shared about an American who encountered Swartwout in Algiers, several years after this incident, where the defaulter wept like a child over his forced separation from his home country.

[13] Jesse Hoyt, another Sachem, succeeded Swartwout as Collector of the Port. Hoyt was charged, about this time, with having defaulted in the sum of $30,000 in dealings with certain Wall street brokers. The Superior Court Judgment Roll for 1839-40 records two judgments against him, secured by Effingham H. Warner, one for $10,000 and one for $5,747.72. Both judgments were satisfied within a few years after his assumption of the Collectorship of the Port.

[13] Jesse Hoyt, another Sachem, took over from Swartwout as Collector of the Port. Around this time, Hoyt was accused of defaulting on $30,000 in transactions with certain Wall Street brokers. The Superior Court Judgment Roll for 1839-40 shows two judgments against him, secured by Effingham H. Warner, one for $10,000 and another for $5,747.72. Both judgments were cleared within a few years after he took on the role of Collector of the Port.

[14] See “Articles of Impeachment,” Journal and Documents of the Board of Assistant Aldermen, 1839, Vol. XIII, No. 12 and No. 25.

[14] See “Articles of Impeachment,” Journal and Documents of the Board of Assistant Aldermen, 1839, Vol. XIII, No. 12 and No. 25.

[15] Court Minutes, New York Common Pleas, record of February 19 and 20, 1839. (These records are neither paged nor indexed.) The Common Pleas of this time was popularly known as the Mayor’s Court; and the Judges were the Mayor, Recorder and certain Aldermen. The later Court of Common Pleas was not established until 1856.

[15] Court Minutes, New York Common Pleas, record of February 19 and 20, 1839. (These records are not paged or indexed.) The Common Pleas court at that time was commonly referred to as the Mayor’s Court, and the judges included the Mayor, Recorder, and certain Aldermen. The later Court of Common Pleas was not established until 1856.

[16] A curious reason for the dismissal was given in the decision of the Judges. It was that the charges had not been individually sworn to. It appeared, therefore, that the Board of Assistant Aldermen, acting in its official capacity in formulating impeachment proceedings, was not a recognizable party before the Court of Common Pleas.

[16] An interesting reason for the dismissal was provided in the Judges' decision. It was stated that the charges had not been individually sworn to. Therefore, it seemed that the Board of Assistant Aldermen, acting in its official role while initiating impeachment proceedings, was not a valid party before the Court of Common Pleas.

[17] Journal and Documents of the Board of Assistant Aldermen, 1839-40, Vol. XV, No. 71. The reason for dismissing these charges was identical with that given in the case of Bloodgood. A statement of the case is given in the report of District Attorney James R. Whiting to the Board of Aldermen during this year. See Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, 1840, Vol. XIX, pp. 135-37. The Common Pleas volume for 1840 is missing from its place in the County Court Building.

[17] Journal and Documents of the Board of Assistant Aldermen, 1839-40, Vol. XV, No. 71. The reason for dropping these charges was the same as that given in the Bloodgood case. A summary of the situation can be found in the report from District Attorney James R. Whiting to the Board of Aldermen this year. See Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, 1840, Vol. XIX, pp. 135-37. The Common Pleas volume for 1840 is missing from its spot in the County Court Building.

[18] Session Minutes, 1840.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Meeting Minutes, 1840.

[19] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.


CHAPTER XV
RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE “GANGS”
1840-1846

About the year 1840 the change in the personnel and the policy of the Wigwam became distinctly evident. After its absorption of the Equal Rights party, the organization had remained “purified” for a year or so, and then, as usual, had relapsed. But a new power and new ideas prevailed. No longer did the bankers and merchants who once held the Wigwam in their grasp, venture to meet in the secret chamber of the hall and order nominations, command policies or determine the punishment of refractory individuals. Tammany from this time forward began to be ruled from the bottom of the social stratum, instead of from the top.

About the year 1840, the changes in the makeup and policies of the Wigwam became clearly noticeable. After it absorbed the Equal Rights party, the organization stayed “purified” for about a year but then, as usual, fell back into old habits. However, new power and ideas took over. The bankers and merchants who used to control the Wigwam no longer dared to gather in the secret chamber of the hall to dictate nominations, set policies, or impose punishments on those who didn’t comply. From this point on, Tammany began to be governed from the bottom of the social hierarchy instead of the top.

Something had to be done to offset the disclosures of 1838-40. Accordingly, the policy of encouraging the foreigners, first rather mildly started in 1823, was now developed into a system. The Whigs antagonized the entrance of foreign-born citizens into politics, and the Native American party was organized expressly to bar them almost entirely from the enjoyment of political rights. The immigrant had no place to which to turn but Tammany Hall. In part to assure to itself this vote the organization opened a bureau, a modest beginning of what became a colossal department. An office was established in the Wigwam, to which specially paid agents or organization runners brought the immigrant, drilled into him the advantages of joining Tammany and furnished him with[129] the means and legal machinery needed to take out his naturalization papers. Between January 14 and April 1, 1840, 895 of these men were taken before Tammany Marine Court Judges and naturalized. Judges of other courts helped to swell the total. Nearly every one of these aliens became and remained an inveterate organization voter. Tammany took the immigrant in charge, cared for him, made him feel that he was a human being with distinct political rights, and converted him into a citizen. How sagacious this was, each year revealed. Immigration soon poured in heavily, and there came a time when the foreign vote outnumbered that of the native-born citizens.[1]

Something needed to be done to counter the revelations from 1838-40. So, the approach of encouraging foreigners, which had started out quite mildly in 1823, was now turned into a full-fledged system. The Whigs opposed the involvement of foreign-born citizens in politics, and the Native American party was formed specifically to exclude them almost completely from political rights. The immigrant had nowhere else to turn but Tammany Hall. To ensure they had this vote, the organization set up a bureau, which was the modest beginning of what became a massive department. An office was established in the Wigwam, where specially paid agents or organization representatives brought immigrants, informed them about the benefits of joining Tammany, and provided them with the means and legal resources necessary to obtain their naturalization papers. Between January 14 and April 1, 1840, 895 of these individuals were brought before Tammany Marine Court judges and became naturalized. Judges from other courts helped increase the number as well. Nearly all of these newcomers became loyal organization voters. Tammany took the immigrant under its wing, looked after them, made them feel recognized as human beings with specific political rights, and helped them become citizens. How wise this strategy was became clear with each passing year. Immigration soon surged, and a time came when the foreign vote exceeded that of native-born citizens.[129][1]

The Whigs were bewildered at this systematic gathering in of the naturalized citizens. After the election of April, 1840,[2] when Tammany reelected Varian Mayor and carried the Common Council, the Committee of Whig Young Men[3] issued a long address on the subject. After specifically charging that prisoners had been marched from their cells in the City Prison by their jailers to the polls to vote the Tammany ticket, the address declared that during the week previous to, and on election day, naturalization papers had been granted at the Marine Court on tickets from Tammany Hall, under circumstances of great abuse.

The Whigs were confused by the organized arrival of naturalized citizens. After the April 1840 election,[2] when Tammany re-elected Varian as Mayor and took control of the Common Council, the Committee of Whig Young Men[3] released a detailed statement on the matter. They specifically accused that prisoners had been taken from their cells in the City Prison by their guards to vote for the Tammany ticket. The statement also claimed that during the week leading up to and on election day, naturalization papers had been issued at the Marine Court with tickets from Tammany Hall, in a highly abusive manner.

In the campaign of 1840 the so-called best elements of the town were for General Harrison. The Wigwam men had much at stake in Van Buren’s candidature and exerted themselves to reelect him. Tammany now elaborated its naturalization bureau. A committee sat daily at the Wigwam, assisting in the naturalization process, free of charge[130] to the applicant. The allegiance of foreign-born citizens was further assured by humoring their national pride in the holding of Irish, German and French meetings in the hall, where each nationality was addressed in its own language. The more influential foreigners were rewarded with places on the Assembly or local ticket, and to the lesser workers of foreign birth were given petty jobs in the department offices, or contract work.

In the 1840 campaign, the so-called best people in town supported General Harrison. The Wigwam group had a lot at stake with Van Buren’s candidacy and worked hard to get him reelected. Tammany had now expanded its naturalization bureau. A committee met daily at the Wigwam, helping with the naturalization process at no cost[130] to the applicants. They reassured the loyalty of foreign-born citizens by appealing to their national pride through Irish, German, and French meetings in the hall, where each nationality was spoken to in their own language. The more prominent foreigners were offered positions on the Assembly or local tickets, while lesser-known immigrants were given small jobs in department offices or contract work.

The outcome was, that in the face of especially strong opposition Tammany harvested 982 plurality in the city for Van Buren, though the vote of the Western counties gave Harrison the electoral vote of the State. It was such instances as this—demonstrating its capacity of swaying New York City even if the rest of the State voted oppositely—that continued to give Tammany Hall a powerful hold on the Democratic party of the nation, notwithstanding the discredit that so often attached to Tammany men and measures.

The result was that despite facing strong opposition, Tammany secured a plurality of 982 votes in the city for Van Buren, even though Harrison got the state's electoral votes from the Western counties. It was examples like this—showing its ability to influence New York City even when the rest of the state voted differently—that kept Tammany Hall in a strong position within the national Democratic party, despite the often negative reputation associated with Tammany members and their actions.

Another example of the change in the personnel of Tammany was shown in the rise and progress of the “ward heeler” and his “gangs.” The “gangs” were not conspicuous in 1841, when the organization elected Robert H. Morris Mayor.[4] In April, 1842, when Morris was reelected,[5] the “gangs” were still modestly in the background. But in the Fall of that year they came forth in their might.

Another example of the changes in Tammany's leadership was the rise of the "ward heeler" and his "gangs." The "gangs" weren't very noticeable in 1841 when the organization elected Robert H. Morris as Mayor.[4] In April 1842, when Morris was reelected,[5] the "gangs" were still slightly in the background. But in the fall of that year, they came out in full force.

One of their leaders was “Mike” Walsh, who became a sort of example for the professional “ward heelers” that followed in his wake. Walsh had no claim at all on the ruling politicians at the Wigwam, and would have been unnoticed by them. But he was ambitious, did not lack ability of a certain kind, and had a retinue of devoted “plug-ugly” followers. He spoke with a homely eloquence,[131] which captivated the poor of his ward. The turbulent he won over with his fists. On November 1 the Tammany Nominating Committee reported to the great popular meeting. Walsh, with the express purpose of forcing his own nomination for the Assembly, went there with such a band of shouters and fighters as never before had been seen in the hall. His “shoulder-hitters”—men, as a rule, of formidable appearance—did such hearty execution and so overawed the men assembled there, that upon the question being put to a vote the general committee decided in his favor and placed his name on the regular ticket. While in the ensuing election he received not quite 3,000 votes to the nearly 20,000 cast for his opponent (the nominee first reported by the committee), he eventually was successful in his aim. Seeing how easy it was to force nominations at the Wigwam if backed by force, other men began to imitate him and get together “gangs” of their own.

One of their leaders was “Mike” Walsh, who became a role model for the professional “ward heelers” that came after him. Walsh had no connection to the ruling politicians at the Wigwam and would have gone unnoticed by them. But he was ambitious, had a certain kind of ability, and was followed by a loyal group of “plug-ugly” supporters. He spoke with a down-to-earth eloquence,[131] which appealed to the poor in his ward. He won over the unruly with his fists. On November 1, the Tammany Nominating Committee reported to the large public meeting. Walsh, intending to secure his own nomination for the Assembly, showed up with a group of loud and tough supporters like never seen before in that hall. His “shoulder-hitters”—usually intimidating-looking men—made such an impact and scared the attendees so much that when it came time to vote, the committee decided in his favor and put his name on the official ticket. Although he received just under 3,000 votes compared to nearly 20,000 for his opponent (the nominee initially reported by the committee), he ultimately achieved his goal. After seeing how easy it was to push for nominations at the Wigwam with force behind him, others began to copy him and form their own “gangs.”

This was the kind of men who, with their “gangs,” superseded the former Democratic ward committees, nearly every member of which kept a shop or earned his living in some legitimate calling. By helping one another in introducing “gangs” of repeaters from one ward to another at the primary elections, the “ward heelers” became the masters of the wards and were then graduated into leaders, whose support was sought by the most dignified and illustrious politicians.

This was the kind of men who, with their “gangs,” replaced the old Democratic ward committees, almost all of whose members ran a shop or made a living in some legitimate way. By assisting each other in bringing “gangs” of repeaters from one ward to another during the primary elections, the “ward heelers” became the dominant force in the wards and then advanced to leaders, whose backing was sought by the most respected and prominent politicians.

In fact, the city was frequently in a state of turmoil. Since 1834 there had been half a dozen riots.[6] There were constant fights between rival volunteer engine companies, to which lawless and abandoned characters attached themselves. Engines were stolen, clubs, pipes, wrenches and other weapons were used, and the affrays generally closed[132] with stabbings and broken skulls.[7] There was no police force to speak of; even Mayor Morris, whom the “gangs” called “Bob” and tapped familiarly on the shoulder, described it as “lamentably defective.”[8] One out of every twenty-one white persons in the city could not read and write.[9] From so large a population of illiterates, the “ward heelers” easily recruited great numbers of followers. Morris allowed the “gangs” full sway, and was popular accordingly. Naturally, with this encouragement, the “gangs” grew and became ever bolder.

In fact, the city was often in chaos. Since 1834, there had been about six riots.[6] There were constant brawls between rival volunteer fire departments, attracting all sorts of lawless individuals. Fire engines were stolen, and clubs, pipes, wrenches, and other weapons were used, with the clashes usually ending in stabbings and broken skulls.[132][7] There was hardly any police force; even Mayor Morris, whom the “gangs” casually called “Bob” and tapped on the shoulder, described it as “lamentably defective.”[8] One out of every twenty-one white residents in the city couldn’t read or write.[9] From such a large population of illiterates, the “ward heelers” easily gathered many followers. Morris allowed the “gangs” full freedom, which made him popular. Naturally, with this kind of support, the “gangs” grew and became increasingly bold.

General disgust at the low character of politics was felt by the independents, who rightly held both Tammany and the Whigs responsible. During the time each party held power affairs had gone from bad to worse. A joint special committee of Aldermen, appointed under public pressure, reported, in 1842, that dishonest office-holders had recently robbed the city of little short of $100,000.[10] A street cleaning contract was awarded for $64,500 a year, for five years, when other responsible persons offered to take it for not quite $25,000 a year.[11] The fraudulent selling of city land to cover up the increasing debt was continued.[12] The city office-holders sold real estate for unpaid assessments, frequently without giving notice to the owner, and bought it in themselves and so “possessed themselves of estates.”[13] Heavy and oppressive assessments for improvements never actually made were laid on the taxpayers.[14] Hundreds of thousands of dollars were expended uselessly and extravagantly.[15] Mayor Morris complained that he had no power over expenditures; that he knew nothing of legislative action on public works until[133] the warrants for payment were sent to him.[16] In violation of the charter, the Aldermen participated in all the profitable “jobs.”[17]

General disgust at the poor state of politics was shared by independents, who correctly blamed both Tammany and the Whigs. During the time each party held power, things only got worse. A special committee of Aldermen, formed due to public pressure, reported in 1842 that dishonest office-holders had recently stolen nearly $100,000 from the city.[10] A street cleaning contract was awarded for $64,500 a year for five years, while other responsible bidders offered it for just under $25,000 a year.[11] The fraudulent selling of city land to hide the growing debt continued.[12] City office-holders sold real estate for unpaid assessments, often without notifying the owner, and then bought it themselves, thereby “acquiring properties.”[13] Heavy and burdensome assessments for improvements that were never actually made were imposed on taxpayers.[14] Hundreds of thousands of dollars were wasted extravagantly.[15] Mayor Morris complained that he had no control over expenditures and was unaware of any legislative actions on public works until[133] the payment warrants were sent to him.[16] In violation of the charter, the Aldermen were involved in all the profitable “jobs.”[17]

Convicts were allowed to escape from Blackwell’s Island on condition that they voted as their keepers ordered them.[18] Prisoners whose terms had expired were kept at the public expense until election day, to get their votes. The inmates of the Almshouse and the Penitentiary were forced to manufacture articles for the use and profit of the officers of those departments. “It is a well-known fact to all who have been familiar with those establishments,” declared the Almshouse Commissioners, “that large quantities of cabinet furniture, clothing and sometimes elegant carriages, cut-glass decanters, punch-bowls, and other articles have been made at the expense of the city; and this has been carried on more or less for years.”[19] It was the custom of the officers “to expend large sums in sumptuous and costly dinners for the entertainment of partizans.” Persons confined in the City Prison were frequently swindled out of their money or effects by the officers, or by “shyster” lawyers, acting in connivance with the jailers; and to get a mere note or message delivered to friends they had to pay an exorbitant price.[20]

Convicts were allowed to escape from Blackwell’s Island as long as they voted as their guards instructed them.[18] Prisoners whose sentences had ended were kept at the public's expense until election day to secure their votes. The residents of the Almshouse and the Penitentiary were forced to make goods for the use and profit of the officials in charge of those places. “It is a well-known fact to anyone familiar with those facilities,” stated the Almshouse Commissioners, “that large quantities of furniture, clothing, and sometimes expensive carriages, cut-glass decanters, punch-bowls, and other items have been produced at the city’s expense; and this has been ongoing more or less for years.”[19] It was customary for the officers “to spend large amounts on lavish and extravagant dinners to entertain their supporters.” Individuals held in the City Prison were often tricked out of their money or belongings by the officers or by “shyster” lawyers, who colluded with the jailers; and to get a simple note or message delivered to friends, they had to pay an outrageous price.[20]

Despite the disclosures, Tammany again elected Morris, in April, 1843, by nearly 5,000 plurality, he receiving 24,395 votes to 19,516 for Robert Smith, the Whig candidate. The storm, however, was gathering, both in and out of Tammany. Inside the organization, charges were common of monstrous frauds in the primaries. Frauds against the Whigs were acceptable enough, but by Democrats against Democrats were intolerable. So pronounced was the outcry over these frauds that the Tammany General Committee, in the Fall of 1843, directed that in future[134] the ward meetings should be held on the same night and that only those whose names appeared on the poll lists should be allowed to vote.[21]

Despite the revelations, Tammany once again elected Morris in April 1843, with a margin of nearly 5,000 votes; he received 24,395 votes compared to 19,516 for Robert Smith, the Whig candidate. However, a storm was brewing, both inside and outside Tammany. Within the organization, accusations of significant fraud in the primaries were rampant. Fraud against the Whigs was considered acceptable, but fraud by Democrats against fellow Democrats was absolutely unacceptable. The uproar over these frauds was so intense that the Tammany General Committee, in the Fall of 1843, decided that in the future, the ward meetings should be held on the same night and that only those whose names appeared on the poll lists would be allowed to vote.[134][21]

Outside criticism materialized in an independent reform movement. It found a rallying point in the Native American or American Republican party, which previously had polled about 9,000 votes. It resented the intrusion of foreigners into politics, large numbers of whom had secured office. It was partially industrial in its character and following; numbers of American workingmen believed that with 100,000 immigrants[22] pouring into this country every year they would soon have to be satisfied with a shilling or twenty cents a day for their labor, instead of $1.50 they were receiving. The native element also complained of the organization of the Irish into a distinct and separate element, with a high Roman Catholic prelate at its head, in order to get part of the public school funds. The discussion of the public school question only the more accentuated hatreds, bringing to the surface the most delicate questions touching the religious feelings and prejudices of the major part of the community.

Outside criticism developed into an independent reform movement. It found a rallying point in the Native American or American Republican party, which had previously received about 9,000 votes. It was frustrated with the influx of foreigners into politics, many of whom had secured positions of power. Partially influenced by industrial interests, many American workers felt that with 100,000 immigrants[22] coming into the country each year, they would soon have to settle for a shilling or twenty cents a day for their labor, instead of the $1.50 they were earning. The native population also expressed concerns about the organization of the Irish into a distinct and separate group, led by a high-ranking Roman Catholic official, in order to access part of the public school funding. The debate over public school funding only intensified existing tensions, bringing to light sensitive issues related to the religious beliefs and biases of the majority of the community.

Tammany nominated Jonathan I. Coddington for Mayor, and placed very few naturalized citizens on its ticket. The Native American candidate was James Harper, and the Whig, Morris Franklin.

Tammany nominated Jonathan I. Coddington for Mayor and included very few naturalized citizens on its ticket. The Native American candidate was James Harper, and the Whig was Morris Franklin.

Mayor Morris called a meeting in Tammany Hall at which resolutions were passed denouncing the Common Council for its corruption and its failure to carry out reform. The advocates of the new party declared that they were not to be deceived. Their campaign was carried on with vigor. Honest men generally were roused against both Tammany and the Whigs. Religious and racial vituperation were partially cast aside and forgotten for[135] the time when the reform men took hold of the movement; not wholly so, however, for we find one of the chief native orators declaring in a campaign speech that “the American Republicans will not be found with Roman Catholics in the same ranks.” This bigotry was overlooked, inasmuch as the Native Americans promised city reform, good police, reductions in taxes, clean streets and economical expenditure of the public money. The community was pervaded by a profound sense of the corruption and inefficiency of the old parties, and ordinary political lines were forgotten.

Mayor Morris called a meeting at Tammany Hall where they passed resolutions condemning the Common Council for its corruption and failure to implement reforms. Supporters of the new party insisted they wouldn’t be fooled. Their campaign was vigorous. Honest individuals were generally mobilized against both Tammany and the Whigs. Religious and racial insults were largely set aside for the time being when the reform leaders took charge of the movement; however, this wasn’t entirely the case. One of the main native speakers declared in a campaign speech that “American Republicans will not be found alongside Roman Catholics.” This bigotry was overlooked because the Native Americans promised city reform, better police, lower taxes, clean streets, and responsible spending of public funds. The community was deeply aware of the corruption and inefficiency of the old parties, and traditional political divisions were forgotten.

Tammany made desperate efforts to carry the election. On the preceding night, convicts in batches of twenty and thirty were taken from Blackwell’s Island to New York, where they were lodged, and the next day given Democratic ballots, free lunch and in some instances were employed to electioneer.[23]

Tammany made frantic attempts to win the election. The night before, groups of twenty and thirty inmates were brought from Blackwell’s Island to New York, where they were housed, and the next day given Democratic ballots, a free meal, and in some cases were used to campaign. [23]

The Native Americans won, however, the vote standing: Harper, 24,606; Coddington, 20,726; Franklin, 5,207.

The Native Americans won, however, the vote count was: Harper, 24,606; Coddington, 20,726; Franklin, 5,207.

The new administration was a distinct disappointment. Though it had a majority in the Common Council, it accomplished few or none of the reforms its supporters had promised. The scramble for office continued as before; municipal improvements progressed slowly, and though salaries and appropriations were cut to some extent, taxes and expenditures increased. A part of this increase was doubtless justified, but the people had been promised reduction, and they refused to take into account the fiscal needs of a rapidly growing city. The administration further weakened its hold by passing and enforcing stringent “blue laws.” Not only were the unfortunate women of the streets warred upon and quiet drinking places raided, but irritating measures, such as the prohibiting of fireworks on the Fourth of July and the driving of apple women and other vendors from the streets, were taken. The result was a public reaction.

The new administration was a clear disappointment. Even though it had a majority in the Common Council, it achieved few, if any, of the reforms that its supporters had promised. The fight for office continued just like before; municipal improvements moved at a slow pace, and while salaries and budgets were cut somewhat, taxes and spending increased. Some of this increase was certainly justified, but the people had been promised a reduction, and they weren't willing to consider the financial needs of a rapidly growing city. The administration further lost support by implementing and enforcing strict “blue laws.” Not only were the unfortunate women on the streets targeted and quiet bars raided, but annoying measures, like banning fireworks on the Fourth of July and pushing street vendors, like apple sellers, off the streets, were also enforced. The outcome was a public backlash.

Mayor Harper was a quaint character, and his odd rulings when presiding in Special Sessions were the talk of the town. If a shoemaker, for instance, was arraigned before him, he would say: “Well, we want shoemakers on the island, so we’ll send you up for three months, and be smart while you last, John, be smart.” Or, in the instance of a man who claimed to be “a sort of carpenter”: “Well, we’ll send you up for two months to round your apprenticeship, and the city will take care of your lodging and board, Matthew.”

Mayor Harper was a quirky character, and his strange rulings during Special Sessions were the talk of the town. If a shoemaker, for example, was brought before him, he would say: “Well, we need shoemakers on the island, so we’ll send you up for three months, and make sure you behave, John, behave.” Or, in the case of a man who claimed to be “a kind of carpenter”: “Well, we’ll send you up for two months to finish your apprenticeship, and the city will cover your lodging and meals, Matthew.”

In the reaction that set in, many voters swung back to Tammany on the general belief that it was no worse than the other parties. This change of sentiment put the organization in good form to carry the city for James K. Polk in November, 1844. A short time before this there had come into distinction one of the most effective auxiliaries of the Wigwam. This was the Empire Club,[24] of No. 28 Park Row. Its chief was Captain Isaiah Rynders, and its membership was made up of a choice variety of picked worthies who could argue a mooted point to a finish with knuckles. Rynders had a most varied career before entering New York politics. A gambler in New Orleans, he mixed in some bowie and pistol fights there in which he was cut severely on the head and elsewhere, and his hat was perforated by a bullet. On a Mississippi steamboat he drove O’Rourke, a pugilist, out of the saloon with a red-hot poker, after O’Rourke had lost at faro and had attempted to kill the winner. These were but a few of his many diversions. In Washington he was arrested with Breedlove and Jewell on suspicion of being connected with the theft of a large sum in Treasury notes, though no proof was found against him. He was a very considerable[137] power in the Wigwam for over twenty years, frequently officiating at meetings there. Chief among the club’s other members of like proclivities were such noted fighters and “unterrified Democrats” as “Country McCleester” (McClusky), “Bill” Ford, “Manny” Kelly, John Ling, “Mike” Phillips, “Bill” Miner, “Denny” McGuire, “Ike” Austin, “Tom” McGuire, “Tom” Freeman and “Dave” Scandlin. After the nomination of Henry Clay, “Johnny” Austin—a common report of the day had it—was offered the sum of $2,000 to bring himself and five of his associates—McClusky, Kelly, Ford, Scandlin and Phillips—into the Unionist Club (a Whig organization) with the hope that they could secure success to the Whigs in the city. Offices also were promised, but the offers were refused; whether because the Wigwam held forth greater inducements is not clear.

In the reaction that followed, many voters returned to Tammany out of a general belief that it was no worse than the other parties. This shift in sentiment positioned the organization well to support James K. Polk in November 1844. Not long before this, one of the most influential groups associated with the Wigwam had emerged. This was the Empire Club,[24] located at No. 28 Park Row. Its leader was Captain Isaiah Rynders, and its members were a select group of notable individuals who could argue heated points with their fists. Rynders had a diverse background before entering New York politics. He was a gambler in New Orleans and had been involved in several knife and gun fights there, sustaining serious injuries to his head and other parts of his body, and his hat had a bullet hole in it. On a Mississippi steamboat, he chased pugilist O’Rourke out of the saloon with a hot poker after O’Rourke lost at faro and tried to kill the winner. These were just a few of his many escapades. In Washington, he was arrested alongside Breedlove and Jewell on suspicion of being involved in the theft of a large sum in Treasury notes, although no evidence was found against him. He was a significant[137] force in the Wigwam for over twenty years, often presiding over meetings there. Key among the club’s other members with similar tendencies were well-known fighters and “unafraid Democrats” like “Country McCleester” (McClusky), “Bill” Ford, “Manny” Kelly, John Ling, “Mike” Phillips, “Bill” Miner, “Denny” McGuire, “Ike” Austin, “Tom” McGuire, “Tom” Freeman, and “Dave” Scandlin. After Henry Clay’s nomination, “Johnny” Austin—a prevalent rumor of the time suggested—was offered $2,000 to bring himself and five of his associates—McClusky, Kelly, Ford, Scandlin, and Phillips—into the Unionist Club (a Whig organization) in the hope that they could help the Whigs succeed in the city. Positions were also promised, but the offers were declined; it’s unclear whether this was because the Wigwam provided better incentives.

Aided by these worthies, and by the popular indignation against the reform administration, the Wigwam men grew confident. They were now heard boasting that they intended electing their entire ticket. There being no longer fear of the Registry law (which the Wigwam had recently influenced a friendly Legislature to repeal on the ground of its discriminative application to New York City alone), fraud was open and general. The vote on its face proved this; since, while New York City could claim a legitimate vote of only 45,000, the Polk electors were credited with 28,216, and the Clay electors with 26,870 votes. For James G. Birney, the Abolition candidate, but 118 votes were polled, or at least counted.

Aided by these influential figures and the public anger towards the reform administration, the Wigwam supporters grew confident. They were now boasting that they planned to elect their entire ticket. With no longer any fear of the Registry law (which the Wigwam had recently persuaded a friendly Legislature to repeal on the basis that it unfairly targeted New York City alone), fraud became widespread and blatant. The vote totals reflected this; while New York City could claim a legitimate vote of only 45,000, the Polk electors received 28,216 votes, and the Clay electors got 26,870 votes. As for James G. Birney, the Abolition candidate, only 118 votes were cast, or at least counted.

The Tammany General Committee, on January 13, 1845, passed resolutions favoring the annexation of Texas and calling a public meeting. With a view of glorifying John Tyler—to whom they owed their positions—and at the same time of winning the good will of the incoming administration, the Custom House officers tried to anticipate the committee’s action, but were not allowed to use the hall.[138] Resolved, at any rate, to control the meeting regularly called, they crowded two thousand of their creatures, under the leadership of Rynders, into the Wigwam. The meeting was soon one of uproar, turbulence and some fighting. Rynders had his resolutions adopted “amid yells, shouts, screams, oaths, cheers, blasphemy, hisses and an uproar never before known in the pandemonium of politics.” It was the generally expressed opinion that the time had come when the proceedings of a meeting at Tammany Hall were no longer to be considered as any certain indication of the opinions of the Democratic party; that a class of men who chose to organize themselves for the purpose, by being early on the ground, acting in concert and clamoring according to certain understood signals, could carry any set of resolutions they pleased, in the very teeth of the large majority of the Democratic party.

The Tammany General Committee, on January 13, 1845, passed resolutions supporting the annexation of Texas and called for a public meeting. Aiming to praise John Tyler—who they credited for their positions—and to win favor with the new administration, the Custom House officers attempted to anticipate the committee's actions but were barred from using the hall.[138] Determined to take control of the officially called meeting, they packed two thousand of their supporters, led by Rynders, into the Wigwam. The meeting quickly devolved into chaos, turbulence, and some fighting. Rynders had his resolutions passed “amid yells, shouts, screams, curses, cheers, blasphemy, hisses, and a level of uproar never before seen in the madness of politics.” It was widely believed that the time had come when the outcomes of a meeting at Tammany Hall could no longer be seen as a reliable reflection of the Democratic party's views; that a group of individuals who organized themselves, showed up early, acted together, and shouted according to certain understood cues could pass any resolutions they wanted, regardless of the overwhelming majority of the Democratic party's opinion.

In the local campaign of 1845 Tammany acted sagaciously. It nominated William F. Havemeyer for Mayor, laying stress on the fact that he was a “native New Yorker.” The Native Americans renominated Harper, and the Whigs, Dudley Selden. The vote stood: Havemeyer, 24,183, Harper, 17,472; Selden, 7,082. Tammany secured a majority of 26 on joint ballot in the Common Council—the real power.

In the local campaign of 1845, Tammany made some wise moves. They nominated William F. Havemeyer for Mayor, emphasizing that he was a “native New Yorker.” The Native Americans renominated Harper, and the Whigs put forward Dudley Selden. The vote ended up as follows: Havemeyer with 24,183 votes, Harper with 17,472, and Selden with 7,082. Tammany achieved a majority of 26 on the joint ballot in the Common Council—the real power.

Mayor Havemeyer sincerely tried to effect reforms. In the beginning of his term he urged the fact that the Common Council united in itself nearly all the executive with all the legislative power, and declared that its main business was to collect and distribute, through the various forms of patronage, nearly a million and a half dollars a year.[25] His attacks upon the arbitrary powers and corrupt practises of the Common Council made so little impression upon that body that on May 13, the very first day of convening, the Aldermen, immediately after the reading of the Mayor’s message, removed not less than[139] seventy officials, from the heads of departments to Street Inspectors;[26] and on subsequent days the process was continued until every post was filled with a Tammany man.

Mayor Havemeyer genuinely tried to implement reforms. At the start of his term, he pointed out that the Common Council combined most of the executive and legislative power, stating that its main job was to collect and distribute, through various forms of patronage, nearly one and a half million dollars a year.[25] His criticisms of the arbitrary powers and corrupt practices of the Common Council had such little impact that on May 13, the very first day of the session, the Aldermen, right after reading the Mayor's message, removed no fewer than [139] seventy officials, from department heads to Street Inspectors;[26] and in the following days, the removals continued until every position was filled by a Tammany supporter.

But the effect upon the public mind was such that in 1846 a new charter was drafted and adopted, which deprived the Common Council of the power which it hitherto had enjoyed of appointing the heads of departments, and gave their election direct to the people.

But the impact on public opinion was so significant that in 1846 a new charter was created and approved, which took away the Common Council's power to appoint department heads, giving that authority directly to the people.

Mayor Havemeyer not being pliable enough for the Wigwam leaders, they nominated and elected, in the Spring of 1846, Andrew H. Mickle, by a vote of 21,675, the Whigs receiving 15,111, and the Native Americans 8,301.[27] Mayor Mickle was regarded as “one of the people.” He was born in a shanty in the “bloody ould Sixth,” in the attic of which a dozen pigs made their habitation. Marrying the daughter of the owner of a large tobacco house, he later became its proprietor. He improved his opportunities, business and official, so well that he died worth over a million dollars.

Mayor Havemeyer wasn't flexible enough for the Wigwam leaders, so they nominated and elected Andrew H. Mickle in the spring of 1846, with a vote tally of 21,675. The Whigs received 15,111 votes, and the Native Americans got 8,301.[27] Mayor Mickle was seen as “one of the people.” He was born in a small shack in the “bloody old Sixth,” where a dozen pigs lived in the attic. After marrying the daughter of a large tobacco house owner, he eventually became the owner himself. He took advantage of his business and official opportunities so well that he died worth over a million dollars.

FOOTNOTES

[1] The statement was made at a reform meeting in City Hall Park on April 11, 1844, that from 1841 to 1844 not less than 11,000 foreigners had been naturalized at $1 a head, though the legal fee was $5. The Judges, the speaker said on the authority of Judge Vanderpoel, signed their names to the papers without asking questions.

[1] At a reform meeting in City Hall Park on April 11, 1844, it was stated that between 1841 and 1844, at least 11,000 foreigners had been naturalized for just $1 each, even though the official fee was $5. According to the speaker, with Judge Vanderpoel’s authority, the judges signed the documents without asking any questions.

[2] This was the first election in the city occupying only one day. Before 1840 three days were used. The vote stood: Varian, 21,243; J. Phillips Phoenix (Whig), 19,622; scattering, 36; total, 40,901.

[2] This was the first election in the city that lasted just one day. Before 1840, it took three days. The vote count was: Varian, 21,243; J. Phillips Phoenix (Whig), 19,622; scattering, 36; total, 40,901.

[3] The Whigs had formed committees in imitation of the Tammany organization.

[3] The Whigs had set up committees modeled after the Tammany organization.

[4] Election of 1841: Robert H. Morris (Tammany), 18,605; J. Phillips Phoenix (Whig), 18,206; Samuel F. B. Morse, 77; scattering, 45; total, 36,93.

[4] Election of 1841: Robert H. Morris (Tammany), 18,605; J. Phillips Phoenix (Whig), 18,206; Samuel F. B. Morse, 77; other votes, 45; total, 36,933.

[5] Election of 1842; Morris, 20,633; Phoenix, 18,755; total, 39,388.

[5] Election of 1842; Morris, 20,633; Phoenix, 18,755; total, 39,388.

[6] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1839, No. 29. The Weekly Herald, February 15, 1840, stated that official documents showed, for the previous ten months, a total of nineteen riots, twenty-three murders and nearly 150 fires, the latter involving a loss of about $7,000,000.

[6] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1839, No. 29. The Weekly Herald, February 15, 1840, reported that official documents indicated that in the past ten months, there had been a total of nineteen riots, twenty-three murders, and almost 150 fires, which caused damages of around $7,000,000.

[7] See Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. VIII, No. 35, and No. 41, 1843-44, for extended accounts.

[7] See Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. VIII, No. 35, and No. 41, 1843-44, for detailed accounts.

[8] Mayor Morris’s Message, July, 1842.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Mayor Morris’s Message, July 1842.

[9] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. VIII, No. 22.

[9] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. VIII, No. 22.

[10] Ibid., 1842-43, No. 5.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., 1842-43, No. 5.

[11] Ibid., Vol. IX, No. 69.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, Vol. IX, No. 69.

[12] Ibid., Vol. X, part 1, No. 46.

[12] Same source., Vol. X, part 1, No. 46.

[13] Senate Documents, 1842, Vol. IV, No. 100.

[13] Senate Documents, 1842, Vol. IV, No. 100.

[14] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.

[15] Message of Mayor Morris, 1843.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Message from Mayor Morris, 1843.

[16] Message of Mayor Morris, 1843.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Message from Mayor Morris, 1843.

[17] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.

[18] Report of Commissioners of the Almshouse, Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XI, No. 40.

[18] Report of Commissioners of the Almshouse, Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XI, No. 40.

[19] Ibid.: 400.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid.: 400.

[20] Ibid.; see also Presentment of Grand Jury, Ibid., Vol. X, part 1, No. 53.

[20] Same source.; see also Presentment of Grand Jury, Same source., Vol. X, part 1, No. 53.

[21] About this time the general committee was enlarged. Until now the delegates had been selected from each ward. In 1843 the practise was begun of sending them from each election district.

[21] Around this time, the general committee was expanded. Up to this point, the delegates had been chosen from each ward. In 1843, the practice began of sending delegates from each election district.

[22] Sixty thousand of these entered the port of New York yearly. The total immigration rose to 154,000 in 1846 and to 427,000 in 1854.

[22] Sixty thousand of these came into the port of New York each year. The total number of immigrants increased to 154,000 in 1846 and to 427,000 in 1854.

[23] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1844-45, Vol. XI, No. 40.

[23] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1844-45, Vol. XI, No. 40.

[24] Within a few months after its organization the Empire Club had thirty-three parades and had been hired to go to Albany, Trenton, Tarrytown and other cities to help the Democracy. Whenever the Empire Club met a rival political club, a fight was sure to follow.

[24] Within a few months after it was formed, the Empire Club had thirty-three parades and was hired to go to Albany, Trenton, Tarrytown, and other cities to support the Democrats. Whenever the Empire Club faced a competing political club, a fight was bound to break out.

[25] Annual Message, 1845.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Annual Message, 1845.

[26] Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XXIX, pp. 1-55.

[26] Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XXIX, pp. 1-55.

[27] Tammany won by a minority vote both in 1845 and in 1846. That neither Tammany nor the Native Americans had enacted any competent reforms in the matter of the taxation of property was conclusively shown in an Aldermanic report of 1846. It appeared from this report that thirty million dollars’ worth of assessable property escaped taxation every year, and that no bona fide efforts were being made by the officials to remedy this state of affairs. Proceedings of the Board of Assistant Aldermen, Vol. XXIX, Document No. 24.

[27] Tammany won with less than half the votes in both 1845 and 1846. The Aldermanic report from 1846 clearly showed that neither Tammany nor the Native Americans had implemented any effective reforms regarding property taxation. According to this report, property worth thirty million dollars was not being taxed each year, and officials weren’t making any genuine efforts to fix this issue. Proceedings of the Board of Assistant Aldermen, Vol. XXIX, Document No. 24.


CHAPTER XVI
“BARNBURNERS” AND “HUNKERS”
1846-1850

Two factions had lately arisen in Tammany Hall—the “Barnburners” and the “Hunkers.” Differences in principle had at first caused the division, but it was characterized, nevertheless, by a lively race for office.

Two groups had recently emerged in Tammany Hall—the “Barnburners” and the “Hunkers.” Initially, their split was due to differences in beliefs, but it quickly turned into a fierce competition for positions.

The “Barnburners” were the radical Democrats who believed, among other things that slavery should not be extended to free territory. The nickname was occasioned by the saying of a contractor, a few years before: “These men are incendiaries; they are mad; they are like the farmer, who, to get the rats out of his granary, sets fire to his own barn.”

The “Barnburners” were the radical Democrats who believed, among other things, that slavery shouldn't be expanded into free territory. The nickname came from a contractor's remark a few years earlier: “These people are troublemakers; they’re crazy; they’re like the farmer who, to get rid of the rats in his granary, burns down his own barn.”

The “Hunkers” were the office-holding conservatives, very unwilling to have anything disturb their repose, and above all, opposed to the agitation of the slavery question. Their influence was thrown wherever possible with the slaveholding States. The term “Hunkers” arose from their characteristic of striving to keep their offices to the exclusion of everybody else—“to get all they can and keep all they can get.”[1]

The “Hunkers” were the conservative officeholders who didn't want anything to disrupt their comfort and were particularly against any discussion about slavery. They aligned their influence as much as possible with the slaveholding states. The term “Hunkers” came from their tendency to hold onto their positions to the exclusion of everyone else—“to take all they can and keep all they take.”[1]

The quarrel was as sharply defined throughout the State as in New York City. Such men as Samuel J. Tilden, C. C. Cambreleng, William F. Havemeyer and Minthorne Tompkins were the local leaders of the “Barnburners”;[141] John McKeon, Lorenzo B. Shepard,[2] a brilliant young leader who was a noted orator at the early age of 19; Edward Strahan and Emanuel B. Hart were some of the chiefs of the “Hunkers.” This factional struggle, together with the dissatisfaction given by the city administration, weakened Tammany, whose nominee, in the Spring election of 1847, J. Sherman Brownell, was defeated by the Whig candidate, William V. Brady. The vote stood: Brady, 21,310; Brownell, 19,877; Ellis G. Drake (Independent), 2,078. This was the first time in nine years that the city had been carried by the Whigs proper, though they were aided somewhat by the Native Americans.

The conflict was just as clear throughout the state as it was in New York City. Leaders like Samuel J. Tilden, C. C. Cambreleng, William F. Havemeyer, and Minthorne Tompkins were at the forefront of the “Barnburners”; John McKeon, Lorenzo B. Shepard, a talented young leader who was a skilled speaker at just 19 years old; Edward Strahan, and Emanuel B. Hart were some of the key figures of the “Hunkers.” This factional struggle, combined with public dissatisfaction with the city administration, weakened Tammany, whose candidate in the Spring election of 1847, J. Sherman Brownell, lost to the Whig candidate, William V. Brady. The vote count was: Brady, 21,310; Brownell, 19,877; Ellis G. Drake (Independent), 2,078. This marked the first time in nine years that the city was won by the Whigs, although they did receive some support from the Native Americans.

“Barnburners” and “Hunkers” laid aside their differences momentarily when President Polk visited the city in June, 1847, one of his objects being to be initiated a member of the Tammany Society. On June 26 he was waited upon at the Astor House by a deputation of the society, headed by Elijah F. Purdy. Quite worn out after a torrid day of handshaking, Polk accompanied his escorts to the large room in the Wigwam, where members of the society were usually initiated. Later, the President emerged, looking happy at having availed himself of membership in a political society which could sway Presidential choices and elections and perhaps determine his own future political fate.

“Barnburners” and “Hunkers” set aside their differences for a moment when President Polk visited the city in June 1847, one of his goals being to become a member of the Tammany Society. On June 26, he was visited at the Astor House by a delegation from the society, led by Elijah F. Purdy. After a long day of shaking hands, Polk followed his escorts to the large room in the Wigwam, where members of the society were usually initiated. Later, the President emerged, looking pleased to have joined a political organization that could influence Presidential nominations and elections, possibly affecting his own political future.

This incident past, the factions resumed their quarrel and warred so effectually that in the general election of November, 1847, the Whigs again won, by more than 3,000 votes. But Tammany, in its darkest moments, was fertile in expedients. It now arranged a great meeting for February 5, 1848, in commendation of the Mexican War. Sam Houston and General Foote made speeches,[142] and one of the Tammany orators assured the audience that though Tammany Hall “erred sometimes,” its “patriotic ardor was never cooled.” The success of this war brought thousands of voters back to the Democratic ranks in the city. Besides, “Barnburners” and “Hunkers” were tiring of defeat. Neither relished exile from office all the time. They agreed on the nomination of former Mayor Havemeyer, who personally was popular, though the Wigwam leaders had caused his administration to be discredited. Havemeyer was elected by the slender majority of 928 over the Whig candidate, Mayor Brady. The Native American party had now about gone out of existence.

After this incident, the groups resumed their argument and fought so effectively that in the general election of November 1847, the Whigs won again by more than 3,000 votes. However, Tammany, even in its darkest moments, was clever in finding solutions. It organized a large meeting on February 5, 1848, to support the Mexican War. Sam Houston and General Foote gave speeches, [142], and one of the Tammany speakers assured the audience that although Tammany Hall “made mistakes sometimes,” its “patriotic enthusiasm was never diminished.” The success of this war brought thousands of voters back to the Democratic side in the city. Additionally, both the “Barnburners” and the “Hunkers” were getting tired of losing. Neither group liked being out of office all the time. They agreed on nominating former Mayor Havemeyer, who was personally popular, despite the fact that the Wigwam leaders had tarnished his administration. Havemeyer was elected by a slim margin of 928 votes over the Whig candidate, Mayor Brady. The Native American party had nearly vanished.

But the factions soon disagreed again on national questions, and sent conflicting Tammany delegations to the national convention in Baltimore, in May, 1848. After tedious debate and much acrimony both were allowed a half vote to each delegate. When, however, it was seen that the “Barnburners” voted with some other States in support of the principle against the extension of slavery to free territory, a movement was started to reject them. The prospect of losing the all-important electoral vote of New York State was not pleasant to the convention. To avoid the arbitrary rejection of either faction the committee on credentials suggested a compromise by which it refused to open the discussion as to which faction ought to be accepted until both had pledged themselves to abide by the decision of the convention. Knowing that this would be pro-slavery, the “Barnburners” declared that “the Democracy of New York must be admitted unconditionally or not at all,” and withdrew. The “Hunkers” took the required pledge.

But the factions soon disagreed again on national issues and sent conflicting Tammany delegations to the national convention in Baltimore in May 1848. After a long debate filled with tension, both were granted a half vote for each delegate. However, when it became clear that the “Barnburners” were voting with some other states to support the principle against extending slavery into free territory, a movement was initiated to reject them. The thought of losing the crucial electoral votes from New York State was not appealing to the convention. To avoid the unfair rejection of either faction, the credentials committee proposed a compromise, stating they wouldn’t discuss which faction should be accepted until both agreed to abide by the convention’s decision. Knowing that this decision would favor pro-slavery, the “Barnburners” insisted that “the Democracy of New York must be admitted unconditionally or not at all,” and they withdrew. The “Hunkers” took the required pledge.

Arriving home, the “Barnburner” delegates issued an address saying that a faction existed among them whose object was the perpetuation and the extension of human servitude. Bold, unscrupulous and active, it wielded to a great degree the patronage of the Federal Government.[143] It addressed itself to the fears of some, to the cupidity of others. By these means it had got possession of the late national convention and had proclaimed a candidate for the Presidency—a man who obtained his nomination only as the price of the most abject subserviency to the slave power. The “Barnburners” then took steps to name candidates in opposition to Lewis Cass and Gen. W. O. Butler, the Baltimore nominees, who had been promptly approved by the “Hunker” element in the Wigwam. Calling Martin Van Buren from obscurity, they nominated him for President, anticipating the action of the Free Soil convention at Buffalo in August.

When they got home, the “Barnburner” delegates released a statement saying that there was a group among them whose goal was to maintain and expand human slavery. This group was bold, unscrupulous, and active, and it had significant backing from the Federal Government.[143] It appealed to some people's fears and played on others' greed. Through these tactics, they took control of the recent national convention and announced a presidential candidate—a person who got his nomination only by completely submitting to the influence of the slaveholders. The “Barnburners” then moved to name candidates to oppose Lewis Cass and Gen. W. O. Butler, the nominees from Baltimore, who had been quickly supported by the “Hunker” faction in the Wigwam. They brought Martin Van Buren out of obscurity and nominated him for President, anticipating the decisions of the Free Soil convention in Buffalo in August.

Throughout the slavery agitation up to the firing on Fort Sumter, the South had no firmer supporter than Tammany. In the hall Southern representatives spoke and spread broadcast their doctrines on every available occasion; however ultra those doctrines might be, the Wigwam audiences never missed applauding them enthusiastically.

Throughout the controversy over slavery leading up to the attack on Fort Sumter, the South had no stronger ally than Tammany. In the hall, Southern representatives spoke and shared their views at every opportunity; no matter how extreme those views were, the Wigwam audiences always applauded them enthusiastically.

The “Hunkers” immediately opened a series of Cass meetings. “All the South asks,” said Gen. Stevenson at one of them in Tammany Hall, on June 9, 1848, “is non-interference.” He was cheered wildly. As usual, the “regular” Democratic nominations were supported by the backbone of the Democracy in New York City—those who clung to the mere name and forms of the party as well as the active men who lived in office and luxuriated on the spoils. The “Barnburners,” otherwise now styled the Free Soilers, were quite as active as the “Hunkers,” and their defection on election day enabled Gen. Taylor to carry the city—the supposed Democratic stronghold—by 9,883 votes.

The “Hunkers” quickly started a series of meetings led by Cass. “All the South asks,” said Gen. Stevenson at one of them in Tammany Hall on June 9, 1848, “is non-interference.” The crowd went wild with applause. As usual, the official Democratic nominations were backed by the core supporters of the party in New York City—those who held onto the name and traditions of the party as well as the active members who thrived on the benefits of office. The “Barnburners,” now known as the Free Soilers, were just as engaged as the “Hunkers,” and their departure on election day allowed Gen. Taylor to win the city—the supposed Democratic stronghold—by 9,883 votes.

The dissensions in the Wigwam were as pronounced in the Spring of 1849—at least outwardly. The two factions held separate Mayoralty conventions on the same night. The “Barnburners” were naturally eager for Havemeyer, one of themselves, but he would not have[144] the honor. Hearing that the “Hunkers” were proposing Myndert Van Schaick, an extremely popular man, the “Barnburners” resolved to steal the “Hunkers’” thunder by nominating him themselves. This they accordingly did, and the bewildered public was treated to the spectacle of Van Schaick standing as the candidate of both the recriminating factions. There were not wanting those who professed to see in this action an agreement between the leaders on the matter of the local offices. The Whigs elected Caleb S. Woodhull by 4,121 plurality, and secured over two-thirds of the members of the Common Council. The Democrats of the “Old School,”—the unyielding “Hunkers”—would not vote for a candidate the Free Soilers approved of; they either did not vote at all or voted for Woodhull.

The disagreements in the Wigwam were quite obvious in the spring of 1849—at least on the surface. The two groups held separate mayoral conventions on the same night. The “Barnburners” were naturally keen on Havemeyer, one of their own, but he didn’t want the honor. Learning that the “Hunkers” were putting forth Myndert Van Schaick, a very popular figure, the “Barnburners” decided to upstage the “Hunkers” by nominating him themselves. And so they did, leaving the confused public to witness Van Schaick running as the candidate for both rival groups. Some people even claimed to see this move as a sign of an agreement between the leaders regarding local offices. The Whigs elected Caleb S. Woodhull with a plurality of 4,121 votes and secured over two-thirds of the Common Council members. The Democrats of the “Old School,”—the steadfast “Hunkers”—would not support a candidate endorsed by the Free Soilers; they either chose not to vote at all or cast their votes for Woodhull.

The “Barnburners,” practically driven out of Tammany Hall by the “Hunkers,” had been meeting elsewhere. Tiring of defeats, however, overtures for reunion were made during the Fall campaign. A fusion resulted, not only in the city but in other parts of the State, and candidates were agreed upon.[3] But no sooner had the reunion been declared than a number of irreconcilable “Hunkers” and certain other politicians—including Daniel E. Sickles, James T. Brady, “Mike” Walsh and John M. Bloodgood—formed a self-constituted “Democratic-Republican Executive Committee” to oppose the deal. On the day before election they sent out a circular denouncing the fusion, and declaring that though it promised much it was really only a means of engrafting upon Democratic time-honored principles a set of abolition[145] doctrines, “hostile to the peace and welfare of the Republic and repugnant to the sympathies and intelligence of the Democratic party.”[4]

The “Barnburners,” basically pushed out of Tammany Hall by the “Hunkers,” had been meeting in different places. However, getting tired of losing, they made moves toward a reunion during the Fall campaign. This led to a fusion, not just in the city but in other areas of the State, and candidates were agreed upon.[3] But as soon as the reunion was announced, a number of steadfast “Hunkers” and some other politicians—including Daniel E. Sickles, James T. Brady, “Mike” Walsh, and John M. Bloodgood—formed a self-appointed “Democratic-Republican Executive Committee” to fight against the deal. The day before the election, they distributed a circular denouncing the fusion, claiming that despite its promises, it was really just a way to attach abolitionist ideas to the long-standing principles of the Democratic party, which they saw as “hostile to the peace and welfare of the Republic and repugnant to the sympathies and intelligence of the Democratic party.”[4]

This circular was misleading. Neither the “Barnburners” nor the “Hunkers” had imposed any sacrifice of principle upon the other. They merely agreed for the time being to suspend their differences in order to get a controlling influence over the disbursement of municipal finances. The opinion of each voter on the slavery question was left untouched.

This circular was misleading. Neither the "Barnburners" nor the "Hunkers" had forced any sacrifice of principles on each other. They just agreed to temporarily set aside their differences to gain control over the distribution of municipal funds. Each voter's opinion on the slavery issue was left unchanged.

The election was hotly contested, for by the new State constitution the selection of minor State offices had been taken from the Governor and Legislature and given to the people.[5] Owing to this defection of a strong Tammany group the Whigs carried the city. The excitement in the Wigwam, when the result became known, was intense. Four thousand Tammany men, looking either for office or party triumph, were in a frenzy. W. D. Wallach, a politician of some note, mounted the rostrum, and under the stimulus of disappointment, held forth in a long and remarkable harangue, to which his auditors listened in comparative silence, though the same utterances at another time might have provoked a riot in the Wigwam. Men of downright dishonesty, Wallach said, had crept into the organization by the aid of bullies and loafers. These men of late years had managed to wield great power at Tammany primary elections, where, as everybody knew, matters long had been arranged “upon the assumption that by a free application of money, violence and roguery, the people could and should be controlled.” What wonder was it, he asked, that thousands of quiet and respectable Democrats had ceased to bow to the authority of regular nominations, however[146] worthy the candidates, when they found more or less of the Tammany nominating committees returned in part notoriously by violence, if not by fraud?

The election was fiercely competitive because the new state constitution transferred the selection of minor state offices from the Governor and Legislature to the people.[5] Because of a split in a strong Tammany group, the Whigs won the city. The excitement at the Wigwam when the results came in was overwhelming. Four thousand Tammany supporters, whether seeking office or a party victory, were in a frenzy. W. D. Wallach, a prominent politician, took to the stage and, fueled by disappointment, delivered a long and notable speech that his audience listened to in relative silence, although similar statements at another time might have sparked a riot in the Wigwam. Wallach claimed that dishonest individuals had infiltrated the organization with the help of bullies and slackers. These people had recently gained considerable power at Tammany primary elections, where, as everyone knew, things had long been arranged “on the understanding that through the use of money, violence, and deceit, the people could and should be controlled.” He asked what was so surprising about thousands of decent and respectable Democrats deciding to reject the authority of established nominations, no matter how qualified the candidates were, when they saw that some members of the Tammany nominating committees were often elected through violence, if not outright fraud?

The breach between the “Barnburners” and the extreme “Hunkers” was reopened and widened by this self-constituted committee’s action. It led to the formation of two bodies, each claiming to be the genuine general committee of Tammany Hall. One was led by Fernando Wood, who was suspected of being a “Hunker,” but was too much of a politician to be active against the “Barnburners.” This general committee was of a compromising disposition. In brief, it was composed mainly of what were known as political “trimmers”—men willing to make any sacrifices of principle for individual or party success. The other committee, of which Henry M. Western was the head, was composed of “Hunkers” and took up the interests of the self-formed “Democratic-Republican Executive Committee.” It was the first body in the North to call a meeting to denounce the Wilmot proviso. To all intents standing for principle, each committee sought the tremendous advantages of the possession of Tammany Hall and its political machinery. By being recognized as the “regular” general committee, its nominations would be “regular” and as such would command the votes of the great mass of Democrats. To obtain that recognition both committees realized the necessity of obtaining a majority of the Council of Sachems, which, in critical moments, had so thoroughly demonstrated its legal right to eject from the Wigwam any man or body of men it pleased.

The gap between the "Barnburners" and the extreme "Hunkers" was reopened and widened by the actions of this self-appointed committee. It led to the creation of two groups, each claiming to be the true general committee of Tammany Hall. One was led by Fernando Wood, who was suspected of being a "Hunker," but was too much of a politician to actively oppose the "Barnburners." This general committee was more about compromise. In short, it was mainly made up of what were called political "trimmers"—people willing to sacrifice principles for personal or party gain. The other committee, headed by Henry M. Western, was made up of "Hunkers" and focused on the interests of the self-formed "Democratic-Republican Executive Committee." It was the first group in the North to call a meeting to denounce the Wilmot Proviso. Each committee pretended to stand for principle, but both were after the significant advantages that came from controlling Tammany Hall and its political machinery. Being recognized as the "regular" general committee meant their nominations would be "regular" and could secure the votes of the vast majority of Democrats. To gain that recognition, both committees understood the need to obtain a majority of the Council of Sachems, which had previously shown its legal right to remove anyone from the Wigwam at its discretion during critical moments.

The opening struggle between the factions for mastery took place at the annual election of the society on April 15, 1850. Each body made desperate efforts to elect its list of Sachems. The ticket in favor of a union of the factions and of reorganizing the “Wood committee” was headed by Elijah F. Purdy, then Grand Sachem, and contained the names of Isaac V. Fowler, John A.[147] Bogert, John J. Manning and others. Former Mayor Mickle, Charles O’Conor, Francis B. Cutting and M. M. Noah led the rival ticket.

The opening battle between the groups for control happened during the annual election of the society on April 15, 1850. Each group made intense efforts to get their list of leaders elected. The slate supporting a merger of the factions and the reorganization of the “Wood committee” was led by Elijah F. Purdy, who was then Grand Sachem, and included names like Isaac V. Fowler, John A.[147] Bogert, John J. Manning, and others. The opposing ticket was led by former Mayor Mickle, Charles O’Conor, Francis B. Cutting, and M. M. Noah.

The “Hunkers” brought to the polls many men, who, though still members of the society, long since had gone over to the Whigs and had lost the habit of attending the society’s meetings. These men claimed the right to vote, and it was unquestionably theirs. In law the Tammany Society was merely a charitable and benevolent corporation. No member in good standing could be debarred from voting. With cheerful alacrity these Whig members lent their aid in distracting the Democratic party into keeping up a double organization. Office-holders and other men openly attached to the Whig party voted.[6] When it seemed that most of the Purdy ticket was elected, the two “Hunker” inspectors suddenly found three more “Hunker” tickets in the ballot box. Previously this box had been examined, emptied and exposed publicly. These three ballots, if counted, would have elected one more Sachem of the “Hunker” stripe, giving that faction six of the thirteen Sachems—one short of a majority. The two “Barnburner” inspectors refused to count them. The result of the election being disputed, Purdy promptly took possession of the books and papers of the society.

The “Hunkers” brought a lot of men to the polls who, while still part of the society, had switched to the Whigs long ago and had stopped attending the society’s meetings. These men asserted their right to vote, and they were certainly entitled to it. Legally, the Tammany Society was just a charitable and benevolent organization. No member in good standing could be prevented from voting. With eager willingness, these Whig members helped divert the Democratic party into maintaining a dual organization. Office-holders and others closely aligned with the Whig party cast their votes.[6] When it appeared that most of the Purdy ticket had been elected, the two “Hunker” inspectors suddenly discovered three additional “Hunker” tickets in the ballot box. This box had previously been checked, emptied, and displayed publicly. If counted, these three ballots would have elected one more Sachem from the “Hunker” faction, giving them six out of thirteen Sachems—just one short of a majority. The two “Barnburner” inspectors refused to tally them. With the election results in dispute, Purdy quickly seized the society’s books and papers.

As the best solution of the troubles, the Sachems, on April 26, determined to forbid both committees admittance to the Wigwam. The Sachems did not acknowledge accountability to any one for their actions, not even to the society which elected them.[7] Representing themselves as the supreme judges of which was the real Democratic General Committee or whether there was any,[8] the Sachems let it be understood that they would act as mediators. By a vote of 10 to 1,[9] they[148] “recommended”—an action equivalent to an arbitrary order—that the “Wood committee” provide for the election of delegates to a convention in Tammany Hall “to reorganize the New York City Democracy.” From the substance of the invitation sent out by the society to various conspicuous personages it was evident that, though the “Wood committee” had been favored, somehow a majority of the “Hunker,” or pro-slavery Sachems was installed.[10]

As the best way to resolve the issues, the Sachems decided on April 26 to deny both committees access to the Wigwam. The Sachems didn’t feel accountable to anyone for their actions, not even to the organization that elected them.[7] Claiming to be the ultimate judges of which was the true Democratic General Committee or if there was even one,[8] the Sachems indicated they would take on the role of mediators. In a vote of 10 to 1,[9] they[148] “recommended”—which basically meant they were issuing an arbitrary order—that the “Wood committee” set up elections for delegates to a convention at Tammany Hall “to reorganize the New York City Democracy.” The invitation sent out by the society to various notable figures made it clear that, while the “Wood committee” had been preferred, a majority of the “Hunker,” or pro-slavery, Sachems were somehow in charge.[10]

The plan of a convention was accepted by both factions. But by manipulating the primary elections for delegates Fernando Wood succeeded in filling the convention with his own creatures, allowing, for form’s sake, a sprinkling of opponents. Wood, whose aim was to get the nomination for Mayor, was the chief “trimmer,” though each side made concessions. Various equivocal resolutions touching the slavery question were adopted, and a new Tammany General Committee, comprising “Barnburners,” mild “Hunkers” and ultra-“Hunkers,” was formed.

The plan for a convention was agreed upon by both sides. However, by manipulating the primary elections for delegates, Fernando Wood managed to fill the convention with his own supporters, making sure there were just a few opponents for appearances. Wood, who aimed to secure the nomination for Mayor, was the main "trimmer," although both sides made some concessions. Several vague resolutions regarding the slavery issue were passed, and a new Tammany General Committee was created, consisting of "Barnburners," moderate "Hunkers," and ultra-"Hunkers."

The “Barnburners” and “Hunkers” then agreed upon a coalition in State and city, uniting on Horatio Seymour for Governor. Despite the diplomacy of Wood, who had arranged this pact, an explosion was narrowly averted a few weeks later. Finding themselves in a majority at a slimly attended meeting of the general committee in the latter part of September, 1850, the uncompromising “Hunkers” denounced parleying with Free Soilers, and by a vote of 16 to 11 refused to sustain Seymour. As soon as their action became known there[149] was a burst of indignation. The threat was made that if the committee did not rescind it, the Council of Sachems, most of whom, it seems, Wood had won over to his plans, would turn it out of Tammany Hall. The members of the committee hastened to meet, the ultra-“Hunkers” were routed, and the State candidates strongly indorsed.

The “Barnburners” and “Hunkers” then agreed on a coalition in the state and city, coming together to support Horatio Seymour for Governor. Despite Wood's efforts to facilitate this agreement, a crisis was barely avoided a few weeks later. As the “Hunkers” found themselves in the majority at a sparsely attended general committee meeting in late September 1850, they rejected any negotiation with the Free Soilers and voted 16 to 11 against supporting Seymour. Once their decision became known, there[149] was an outburst of outrage. It was threatened that if the committee didn't reverse its decision, the Council of Sachems, most of whom Wood had persuaded to support his plans, would expel it from Tammany Hall. The committee members quickly convened, the extreme “Hunkers” were defeated, and the state's candidates were strongly endorsed.

FOOTNOTES

[1] The Century Dictionary derives the word from the Dutch honk, post, goal or home. The transition in meaning from “goal” to “office” is easy and natural.

[1] The Century Dictionary traces the word back to the Dutch honk, which means post, goal, or home. The shift in meaning from “goal” to “office” is straightforward and makes sense.

[2] Shepard became Grand Sachem at an early age. He was one of the very few influential men achieving prominence in the society or organization against whose character, public or private, no charges were ever brought.

[2] Shepard became Grand Sachem at a young age. He was one of the rare influential men who gained prominence in the society or organization without facing any accusations, either public or private.

[3] New York Weekly Herald, November 3, 1849. James Gordon Bennett, editor and owner of this newspaper, “was a recognized member of the Tammany party.” (“Memoirs of James Gordon Bennett and His Times,” 1855, p. 80.) When Bennett first contemplated starting a newspaper, it was to the Young Men’s General Committee that he applied for funds. Though professing to be independent, the Herald nearly always supported Tammany Hall. In 1837-39, however, it had supported Aaron Clark.

[3] New York Weekly Herald, November 3, 1849. James Gordon Bennett, the editor and owner of this newspaper, “was a recognized member of the Tammany party.” (“Memoirs of James Gordon Bennett and His Times,” 1855, p. 80.) When Bennett first considered starting a newspaper, he sought funding from the Young Men’s General Committee. Although he claimed to be independent, the Herald almost always backed Tammany Hall. However, in 1837-39, it did support Aaron Clark.

[4] The committee advertised the stand it had taken in the Democratic journals of the city on November 5.

[4] The committee promoted its position in the Democratic newspapers of the city on November 5.

[5] The city charter of 1846 had likewise increased the number of elective offices in the municipality.

[5] The city charter of 1846 also expanded the number of elected positions in the city.

[6] New York Evening Post (Democratic), April 16, 1850.

[6] New York Evening Post (Democratic), April 16, 1850.

[7] New York Weekly Herald, May 4, 1850.

[7] New York Weekly Herald, May 4, 1850.

[8] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.

[9] Evening Post, May 2, 1850.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Evening Post, May 2, 1850.

[10] Seven Sachems signed the letter of invitation, which read in part: “Brothers of this society look with deep concern at the present critical state of the country and are not unmindful of the services of those who are laboring to thwart the designs of the fanatics and demagogues who are waging an unholy crusade against a union of independent sovereignties, which union has done much to advance and perpetuate the principles of American liberty throughout the world.… We have no sympathy with those who war upon the South and its institutions.”

[10] Seven Sachems signed the letter of invitation, which read in part: “Brothers of this society are deeply concerned about the current critical state of the country and recognize the efforts of those working to counter the plans of the extremists and politicians who are waging an unjust campaign against a union of independent states, a union that has greatly contributed to promoting and preserving the principles of American liberty around the globe.… We do not sympathize with those who attack the South and its institutions.”


CHAPTER XVII
Defeat and Victory
1850-1852

Under a new charter the Mayor’s term was extended to two years, and the time of election, with that of the other city officers, was changed to November. The latter change gave great satisfaction to the leaders, for it enabled them to trade votes. Trading grew to such an extent that charges became common of this or that nominee for President, Governor, State Senator and so on being “sold out” by the leaders to insure their own election.

Under a new charter, the Mayor’s term was extended to two years, and the election date for the Mayor and other city officials was moved to November. This change pleased the leaders a lot because it allowed them to exchange votes. The trade-offs became so widespread that accusations often flew around claiming that various nominees for President, Governor, State Senator, and others were being "sold out" by the leaders to secure their own positions.

The Tammany organization, too, had made a change. It had adopted the convention system of nominating. This new method was much more satisfactory to the leaders, because the election of delegates to the conventions could easily be controlled, and the risk of having prearranged nominations overruled by an influx of “gangs” into the great popular meeting was eliminated.

The Tammany organization had also made a change. It had adopted the convention system for nominations. This new method was much more satisfying to the leaders because they could easily control the election of delegates to the conventions, eliminating the risk of having prearranged nominations overridden by an influx of “gangs” into the large public meeting.

A show of opposition to the proposed program was, however, still necessary. The first general convention was held in October, 1850. Fernando Wood was the leading candidate for Mayor, and it was certain that he would be nominated. But the first ballot showed a half-dozen competitors. The second ballot, however, disclosed the real situation, and Wood was chosen by 29 votes, to 22 for John J. Cisco.

A display of opposition to the proposed program was still necessary. The first general convention took place in October 1850. Fernando Wood was the top candidate for Mayor, and it seemed certain that he would be nominated. However, the first ballot revealed six other competitors. The second ballot, though, revealed the true situation, and Wood was selected by 29 votes, compared to 22 for John J. Cisco.

Wood was a remarkable man. As a tactician and organizer he was the superior both of his distant predecessor[151] Burr and of his successors Tweed and Sweeny. He was born in Philadelphia, in June, 1812, of Quaker parents. At the age of thirteen, he was earning $2 a week as a clerk. Later, he became a cigarmaker and tobacco dealer, and still later, a grocer. As a lad he was pugnacious; in a Harrisburg bar-room he once floored with a chair a State Senator who had attacked him. But he seems to have been amenable to good advice; for once when a Quaker reprimanded him for his excessive use of tobacco with the observation, “Friend, thee smokes a good deal,” he at once threw away his cigar, and gave up the habit.

Wood was an impressive man. As a strategist and organizer, he outshined both his earlier counterpart Burr and his successors Tweed and Sweeny. He was born in Philadelphia in June 1812 to Quaker parents. At thirteen, he was making $2 a week as a clerk. Later on, he worked as a cigarmaker and tobacco dealer, and eventually, he became a grocer. As a young man, he was combative; in a Harrisburg bar, he once knocked out a State Senator with a chair after being attacked. However, he appeared to be open to good advice; when a Quaker once scolded him for smoking too much by saying, “Friend, you smoke a good deal,” he immediately tossed away his cigar and quit the habit.

Coming to New York, he engaged in several business enterprises, all the while taking a considerable interest in politics. He was elected to Congress in 1840, serving one term. Gradually he came to make politics his vocation. Political manipulation before his day was, at the best, clumsy and crude. Under his facile genius and painstaking care, it developed to the rank of an exact science. He devoted himself for years to ingratiating himself with the factors needed in carrying elections.[1] He curried favor with the petty criminals of the Five Points, the boisterous roughs of the river edge, and the swarms of immigrants, as well as with the peaceable and industrious mechanics and laborers; and he won a following even among the business men. All these he marshaled systematically in the Tammany organization. Politics was his science, and the “fixing” of primaries his specialty; in this he was perhaps without a peer.

When he moved to New York, he got involved in various business ventures while also taking a strong interest in politics. He was elected to Congress in 1840 and served one term. Over time, he made politics his career. Political maneuvering before his time was, at best, clumsy and crude. Thanks to his natural talent and hard work, it evolved into a precise science. He spent years building connections with the key players needed to win elections. He made friends with the petty criminals from the Five Points, the loud roughnecks along the river, and the waves of immigrants, as well as with the hardworking and decent mechanics and laborers; he even gained support from business people. He organized all these groups systematically within the Tammany organization. Politics was his field of expertise, and “fixing” primaries was his specialty; in this area, he was probably unmatched.

His unscrupulousness was not confined to politics. During this brief campaign he was repeatedly charged with commercial frauds as well as with bribery and dishonest practises at the primaries. A year later he was shown to have been guilty before this time of having[152] defrauded a partner of $8,000, and he escaped conviction by the merest technicality.[2]

His lack of scruples wasn't limited to politics. Throughout this brief campaign, he faced multiple accusations of commercial fraud, bribery, and dishonest practices during the primaries. A year later, it was revealed that he had previously defrauded a partner of $8,000, and he narrowly avoided conviction due to a technicality.[152][2]

Political standards in the fifties were not high. But the rowdy character of a great part of Tammany’s membership, and the personal character of many of its nominees, particularly that of Wood, proved too much to bear, even for those days, and a strong revulsion followed. Former Mayors Havemeyer and Mickle; John McKeon, a leader of note, and other prominent Democrats revolted. The election resulted in a Whig victory, Ambrose C. Kingsland securing 22,546 votes to 17,973 for Wood. A great Democratic defection was shown by the fact that Horatio Seymour carried the city by only 705 plurality.

Political standards in the fifties were pretty low. However, the rowdy nature of many members of Tammany and the personal character of several of its nominees, especially Wood, became too much to handle, even for that time, leading to a strong backlash. Former Mayors Havemeyer and Mickle, John McKeon, a notable leader, and other prominent Democrats rebelled. The election ended in a Whig victory, with Ambrose C. Kingsland getting 22,546 votes compared to Wood's 17,973. A significant Democratic shift was evident as Horatio Seymour won the city by only a 705-vote margin.

So general were the expressions of contempt for the character of the Wigwam that the Sachems resolved to invoke again the spirit of patriotism, and consequently fixed upon a revival of the old custom of Independence Day celebrations. In 1851 the ruling Council of Sachems was a mixture of compromise “Barnburners” and “Hunkers.” The committee of arrangements—Elijah F. Purdy, Daniel E. Delavan, Richard B. Connolly, Stephen C. Duryea and three others—sent invitations, filled with lofty and patriotic sentiments, to various national politicians. “Barnburners” also were invited, the conciliatory Sachems being sincerely tired of a warfare which threatened to exile them all from the sinecures of city and State offices.

The negative opinions about the Wigwam's reputation were so widespread that the Sachems decided to tap into the spirit of patriotism once more, leading them to bring back the tradition of Independence Day celebrations. In 1851, the ruling Council of Sachems was made up of a mix of compromise “Barnburners” and “Hunkers.” The planning committee—Elijah F. Purdy, Daniel E. Delavan, Richard B. Connolly, Stephen C. Duryea, and three others—sent out invitations filled with lofty and patriotic messages to various national politicians. They also invited the “Barnburners,” as the harmonizing Sachems were genuinely exhausted from a conflict that threatened to push them all out of their comfortable city and State positions.

The Society of Tammany, or Columbian Order, the[153] circular said, had originated “in a fraternity of patriots, solemnly consecrated to the independence, the popular liberty and the federal union of the country.” Tammany’s councils were “ever vigilant for the preservation of those great national treasures from the grasp alike of the treacherous and the open spoiler.” It had “enrolled in its brotherhood many of the most illustrious statesmen, patriots and heroes that had constellated the historic banners of the past and present age.… And it remained to the present hour,” the glowing lines read on, “instinct with its primitive spirit and true to the same sacred trust.”

The Society of Tammany, or Columbian Order, the[153] circular said, started “in a group of patriots, dedicated to the independence, popular liberty, and federal union of the country.” Tammany’s councils were “always on guard to protect those great national treasures from the grasp of both the deceitful and the blatant thief.” It had “welcomed into its brotherhood many of the most notable statesmen, patriots, and heroes who have adorned the historic banners of the past and present… And it continues to this day,” the inspiring words went on, “filled with its original spirit and true to the same sacred charge.”

The rhetoric delivered at the celebration was quite as pretentious and high-flown. But the phrases made no impression on the public mind. No impartial observer denied that the Wigwam’s moral prestige with the State and national party was for the time gone. Throughout the country the belief prevailed that the politicians of the metropolis deserved no respect, merit or consideration; and that they were purchasable and transferable like any stock in Wall street.

The speech given at the celebration was just as pretentious and grandiose. However, the words didn't resonate with the audience. No unbiased observer could deny that the Wigwam's moral authority with the State and national party was gone for now. Across the country, people believed that the politicians from the city were unworthy of respect, merit, or consideration; they were seen as something that could be bought and sold like any stock on Wall Street.

If before 1846 nominations were sold it was not an open transaction. Since then the practise of selling them had gradually grown, and now the bargaining was unconcealed. Upon the highest bidder the honors generally fell. Whigs and Tammany men were alike guilty. If one aspirant offered $1,000, another offered $2,000. But these sums were merely a beginning; committees would impress upon the candidate the fact that a campaign costs money; more of the “boys” would have to be “seen”; such and such a “ward heeler” needed “pacifying”; a band was a proper embellishment, with a parade to boot, and voters needed “persuading.” And at the last moment a dummy candidate would be brought forward as a man who had offered much more for the nomination. Then the bidder at $2,000 would have to pay the difference, and if the office sought was a profitable[154] one, the candidate would be a lucky man if he did not have to disgorge as much as $15,000 before securing the nomination. Some candidates were bled for as much as $20,000, and even this was a moderate sum compared to the prices which obtained a few years later.

If before 1846 nominations were sold, it wasn't an obvious transaction. Since then, the practice of selling them has gradually increased, and now the bargaining is out in the open. The honors generally go to the highest bidder. Both Whigs and Tammany men are equally at fault. If one candidate offered $1,000, another offered $2,000. But those amounts were just the starting point; committees would emphasize to the candidate that a campaign costs money; more of the "boys" would need to be "seen"; certain "ward heelers" needed "pacifying"; a band was a fitting addition, along with a parade, and voters needed "persuading." At the last minute, a fake candidate would be introduced as someone who had offered a lot more for the nomination. Then the bidder at $2,000 would have to pay the difference, and if the office they were seeking was lucrative, the candidate would be lucky if they didn't have to shell out as much as $15,000 before landing the nomination. Some candidates were drained for as much as $20,000, and even that was a reasonable amount compared to the prices that would be seen a few years later.

The primaries were attended by “gangs” more rowdy and corrupt than ever; Whig ward committees often sold over to Tammany,[3] and Whig votes, bought or traded, swelled the ballot boxes at the Wigwam primaries. Nearly every saloon was the headquarters of a “gang” whose energies and votes could be bought. In Tammany Hall an independent Democrat dared not speak unless he had previously made terms with the controlling factions, according to a relatively fixed tariff of rates. The primaries of both parties had become so scandalously corrupt as to command no respect.

The primaries were filled with “gangs” that were more unruly and corrupt than ever; Whig ward committees often collaborated with Tammany,[3] and Whig votes, whether bought or traded, inflated the ballot boxes at the Wigwam primaries. Almost every bar served as a base for a “gang” whose efforts and votes could be purchased. In Tammany Hall, an independent Democrat wouldn’t dare speak unless they had first made a deal with the powerful factions, based on a relatively set rate. The primaries for both parties had become so outrageously corrupt that they earned no respect.

The discoveries of gold in California and Australia created in all classes a feverish desire for wealth. Vessel after vessel was arriving in the harbor with millions of dollars’ worth of gold dust. Newspapers and magazines were filled with glowing accounts of how poor men became rich in a dazzlingly short period. The desire for wealth became a mania, and seized upon all callings. The effect was a still further lowering of the public tone; standards were generally lost sight of, and all means of “getting ahead” came to be considered legitimate. Politicians, trafficking in nominations and political influence, found it a most auspicious time.

The gold discoveries in California and Australia sparked a feverish desire for wealth among all classes. Ship after ship was arriving in the harbor carrying millions of dollars' worth of gold dust. Newspapers and magazines were filled with exciting stories of how poor people became rich in an incredibly short time. The craving for wealth turned into a craze, affecting every profession. This led to a further decline in public standards; values were largely forgotten, and any means of "getting ahead" became seen as acceptable. Politicians, trading in nominations and political influence, found it to be a prime opportunity.

This condition was intensified by the influx of the hordes of immigrants driven by famine and oppression from Ireland, Germany and other European countries. From over 129,000 arriving at the port of New York in 1847, the number increased to 189,000 in 1848, 220,000 in 1849, 212,000 in 1850, 289,000 in 1851 and 300,000 in 1852. Some of these sought homes in other States,[155] but a large portion remained in the city. Though many of these were thrifty and honest, numbers were ignorant and vicious, and the pauper and criminal classes of the metropolis grew larger than ever. The sharper-witted among them soon mended their poverty by making a livelihood of politics. To them political rights meant the obtaining of money or the receiving of jobs under the city, State or national government, in return for the marshaling of voters at the polls. Regarding issues they bothered little, and knew less.

This situation was worsened by the arrival of large groups of immigrants fleeing famine and oppression from Ireland, Germany, and other European countries. The number of newcomers at the port of New York soared from over 129,000 in 1847 to 189,000 in 1848, 220,000 in 1849, 212,000 in 1850, 289,000 in 1851, and 300,000 in 1852. Some of these immigrants sought homes in other states,[155] but many chose to stay in the city. While many were hardworking and honest, a significant number were uneducated and troublesome, leading to an increase in the poor and criminal populations of the city. The more cunning among them quickly escaped poverty by turning to politics for a living. For them, political rights were about making money or securing jobs in the city, state, or federal government in exchange for organizing voters at the polls. They cared little about the issues and knew even less.

The effects of the Whig and Native American denunciation of the alien vote were now seen. The naturalized citizens almost invariably sided with Tammany Hall, although there were times when, by outbidding the Wigwam, the Whigs were enabled to use them in considerable numbers.

The effects of the Whig and Native American condemnation of the foreign vote were now evident. Naturalized citizens almost always supported Tammany Hall, although there were times when the Whigs were able to rally them in significant numbers by outbidding the Wigwam.

Despite an unusual degree of public condemnation, Tammany managed, by a temporary pacification of the factions and a general use of illegal votes, to carry the city in the Fall of 1851 by nearly 2,000 majority. But it could not hold the regular Democratic strength, for Wright, the candidate for Governor, received over 3,000 majority. Frauds were notorious. In one of the polling places of the Nineteenth Ward, the Wigwam’s candidates for Alderman and Assistant Alderman were counted in after a mob invaded it and forced the Whig inspectors to flee for their lives. When the votes for the Assembly ticket were counted 532 were announced, although there were only 503 names on the poll list. This was but an instance of the widespread repeating and violence.

Despite a high level of public backlash, Tammany managed to win the city in the Fall of 1851 by almost a 2,000 vote majority, thanks to a temporary truce among the factions and a general use of illegal votes. However, it couldn’t maintain the usual Democratic support, as Wright, the candidate for Governor, won by over 3,000 votes. Fraud was rampant. At one of the polling places in the Nineteenth Ward, the Wigwam’s candidates for Alderman and Assistant Alderman were counted in after a mob took over and forced the Whig inspectors to flee for their lives. When the votes for the Assembly ticket were counted, 532 were reported, even though there were only 503 names on the poll list. This was just one example of the widespread vote rigging and violence.

With its large majority in the Common Council Tammany at first made a feint at curtailing city expenses. The taxpayers complained that the taxes were upwards of $3,500,000, for which there was little apparent benefit. The new Common Council made professions of giving a spotless administration; but before its term was over it had generally earned the expressive title of “the[156] Forty Thieves.”[4] This was the body that with lavish promises of reform replaced the Whig Common Council. William M. Tweed, an Alderman in the “Forty Thieves” Common Council, was busy in the Fall of this year indignantly defending, in speeches and public writings, the Aldermen from the numerous charges of corruption; but, as will be seen, these charges were by no means groundless.

With its large majority in the Common Council, Tammany initially pretended to cut city expenses. Taxpayers complained that taxes exceeded $3,500,000, with little visible benefit. The new Common Council claimed they would provide a clean administration; however, by the end of their term, they had earned the notorious title of “the [156] Forty Thieves.”[4] This was the group that took over from the Whig Common Council with grand promises of reform. William M. Tweed, an Alderman in the “Forty Thieves” Common Council, was busy in the Fall of this year defiantly defending the Aldermen against numerous corruption charges in speeches and public writings; but, as will be shown, these charges were far from baseless.

Since the passings of the Equal Rights party, the mechanics and laborers had taken no concerted part in politics, not even as a faction. But at this period they were far from being lethargic. The recent discoveries of gold and silver had given a quickened pulse to business, enormously increasing the number of transactions and the aggregate of profits. The workers were determined to have their share of this prosperity, and acted accordingly. Old trade-unions were rapidly strengthened and new ones formed. More pay and shorter hours of work were demanded. Between the Spring of 1850 and the Spring of 1853 nearly every trade in the city engaged in one or more strikes, with almost invariable success.

Since the demise of the Equal Rights party, the mechanics and laborers had not taken an organized role in politics, not even as a group. But during this time, they were far from inactive. The recent discoveries of gold and silver had energized the economy, significantly increasing the number of transactions and overall profits. The workers were determined to get their share of this prosperity and acted accordingly. Old trade unions were quickly strengthened, and new ones were formed. They demanded higher pay and shorter working hours. Between the spring of 1850 and the spring of 1853, almost every trade in the city went on strike at least once, almost always with success.

Having now no sincere leaders to prompt them to concerted political action, the workers oscillated listlessly between the two parties. They had lost the tremendous influence secured in the thirties, and the business element had again become dominant. Legislature and Common Council vied with each other in granting exploitative charters, and the persons who secured these, generally by bribery, were considered the leaders of public opinion. Every company demanding special privileges of the State maintained its lobby at Albany. The City Council was more easily reached, and was generally dealt with personally. Fortunes were made by plundering the city and State, and while the conduct of the agents and actual performers in this wholesale brigandage—the lobbyists,[157] Legislators and Aldermen—was looked upon somewhat doubtfully, their employers stood before the world as the representatives of virtue and respectability. The one force which might have stood as a bulwark against this system of pillage had been so completely demoralized by its political experiences that it could now only look on and let matters drift as they would.

Having no genuine leaders to inspire them to united political action, the workers drifted aimlessly between the two parties. They had lost the significant influence they had gained in the thirties, and the business sector had regained control. The legislature and City Council competed to grant exploitative charters, with those who secured these, often through bribery, seen as the leaders of public opinion. Every company seeking special privileges from the State kept its lobby in Albany. The City Council was easier to influence and was usually dealt with directly. Fortunes were made by exploiting the city and State, and while the behavior of the agents and actual participants in this widespread corruption—the lobbyists, Legislators, and Aldermen—was viewed with some skepticism, their employers presented themselves to the public as paragons of virtue and respectability. The only group that might have served as a barrier against this system of theft had been so thoroughly demoralized by its political experiences that it could only watch and allow events to unfold as they would.

In the Baltimore Democratic convention the Wigwam was represented by so boisterous a delegation that its speakers were denied a hearing. Among the delegates were Capt. Rynders, “Mike” Walsh and a number of the same kind. Cass was their favorite, and they shouted for him lustily; but on attempting to speak for him they were invariably howled down, despite the fact that Cass had a majority of the convention almost to the end of the balloting.

In the Baltimore Democratic convention, the Wigwam sent such a loud delegation that its speakers couldn’t get a chance to speak. Among the delegates were Captain Rynders, “Mike” Walsh, and several others like them. Cass was their favorite, and they cheered for him loudly; however, whenever they tried to speak on his behalf, they were always drowned out, even though Cass had a majority of the convention almost until the end of the voting.

The Wigwam, however, lost no time in indorsing the nomination of Franklin Pierce. In this ratification the “Barnburners” joined, ardently urging the election of candidates on a platform which held that Congress had no power under the Constitution “to interfere with the domestic institutions of the States”; which advocated compromise measures, the execution of the Fugitive Slave law, and which opposed all attempts to agitate the slavery question.

The Wigwam quickly supported Franklin Pierce's nomination. In this endorsement, the “Barnburners” joined in, passionately pushing for the election of candidates who believed that Congress had no constitutional authority to interfere with the domestic institutions of the States. They advocated for compromise measures, the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave law, and opposed any efforts to stir up the slavery debate.

The election of November, 1852, was not only for President and Congressmen, but for a long list of officials, city and State. Each of the Wigwam factions began playing for advantage. On July 16 a portion of the general committee met, apparently to accept an invitation to attend the funeral of Henry Clay. The “Barnburners,” finding themselves in a majority, sprang a trick upon the “Hunkers” by adopting a plan of primary elections favorable to their side. Later the general committee, in full meeting, substituted another plan, and a great hubbub followed. A “committee of conciliation,” composed of members of both factions, was appointed.[158] When it met, on August 20, the halls, lobbies and entrances of Tammany Hall were filled with a vicious assortment of persons, chiefly inimical to the general committee. “The bar-room,” wrote a chronicler, “was the scene of several encounters and knockdowns. It was only necessary for a man to express himself strongly on any point, when down he went, by the hammer-fist of one of the fighting men.” Even members of the committee, while passing in and out of the room, were intimidated. Daniel E. Sickles was threatened with personal violence, and it might have gone hard with him had he not taken the precaution of arming himself with a bowie and revolver. Members’ lives were constantly threatened; the scenes of uproar and confusion were indescribable. Mr. Sickles, for his own safety, had to jump from a window to Frankfort street, and other members were forced to retreat through secret byways.[5] It was near day-break when the factions consented to leave the Wigwam.

The election in November 1852 wasn’t just for President and Congress; it also included a long list of city and state officials. Each faction in the Wigwam started vying for an edge. On July 16, part of the general committee met, seemingly to accept an invitation to Henry Clay's funeral. The “Barnburners,” now the majority, pulled a fast one on the “Hunkers” by introducing a plan for primary elections that favored their side. Later, the full general committee replaced this plan, leading to significant chaos. A “committee of conciliation,” made up of members from both factions, was formed.[158] When they met on August 20, Tammany Hall was packed with a rowdy mix of people, mostly hostile to the general committee. “The bar-room,” a chronicler noted, “was the scene of several fights and knockdowns. A man only had to express a strong opinion for him to be taken down by one of the tough guys.” Even members of the committee were intimidated as they came and went. Daniel E. Sickles was threatened with violence, and things could have turned ugly for him if he hadn’t taken the precaution of bringing a bowie knife and revolver. Members’ lives were constantly in danger; the scenes of chaos and confusion were unimaginable. For his own safety, Mr. Sickles had to jump out a window onto Frankfort Street, and other members had to escape through secret routes.[5] It was almost dawn when the factions agreed to leave the Wigwam.

The anxiety of each was explained by the proceedings at the primaries. The faction having a majority of the inspectors secured by far the greater number of votes, and consequently the delegates who had the power of making nominations. At the primaries of August, 1852, fraud and violence occurred at nearly every voting place. In some instances one faction took possession of the polls and prevented the other from voting; in others, both factions had control by turns, and fighting was desperate. One party ran away with a ballot box and carried it off to the police station. Many ballot boxes, it was alleged, were half filled with votes before the election was opened. Wards containing less than 1,000 legal Democratic voters yielded 2,000 votes, and a ticket which not a hundred voters of the ward had seen was elected by 600 or 700 majority. Whigs, boys and paupers[159] voted; the purchasable, who flocked to either party according to the price, came out in force, and ruffianism dominated the whole.

The anxiety of everyone was due to what happened at the primaries. The group with a majority of the inspectors ended up securing far more votes and, as a result, the delegates who had the authority to make nominations. During the primaries in August 1852, there was fraud and violence at almost every voting location. In some cases, one faction took over the polls and stopped the other from voting; in other instances, both groups took turns controlling the polls, and the fighting was intense. One party ran off with a ballot box and took it to the police station. Many ballot boxes were reportedly half-filled with votes before the election even started. Wards with fewer than 1,000 legal Democratic voters recorded 2,000 votes, and a ticket that not even a hundred voters in the ward had seen was elected by a majority of 600 or 700. Whigs, young boys, and the poor voted; those who could be bought, who switched sides based on the offered price, showed up in large numbers, and thuggery took over the whole process.

The police dared not interfere. Their appointment was made by the Aldermen and Assistant Aldermen, with the nominal consent of the Mayor, exclusively on political grounds and for one year. The policeman’s livelihood depended upon the whims of those most concerned in the ward turmoils. A hard lot was the policeman’s. On the one hand, public opinion demanded that he arrest offenders. On the other, most of the Aldermen had their “gangs” of lawbreakers at the polls, and to arrest one of these might mean his dismissal.[6] But this was not all. The politics of the Common Council changed frequently; and to insure himself his position the guardian of the peace must conduct himself according to the difficult mean of aiding his own party to victory and yet of giving no offense to the politicians of the other party. Hence, whenever a political disturbance took place the policeman instantly, it was a saying, became “deaf and blind, and generally invisible.”[7]

The police didn't dare to get involved. Their jobs were assigned by the Aldermen and Assistant Aldermen, with the Mayor's nominal consent, purely on political grounds and for just one year. A policeman’s livelihood relied on the whims of those most involved in the local conflicts. It was a tough job for the policeman. On one hand, public opinion expected him to arrest offenders. On the other hand, most Aldermen had their own “gangs” of lawbreakers during elections, and arresting one of them could mean losing his job.[6] But that wasn’t all. The politics within the Common Council changed often, so to secure his position, the peacekeeper had to navigate the tricky balance of supporting his own party's victory while not upsetting the politicians from the opposing party. Because of this, whenever there was a political disturbance, it was said that the policeman would instantly become “deaf and blind, and generally invisible.”[7]

The necessity of uniting to displace the Whigs from the millions of city patronage and profit brought the factions to an understanding. Jacob A. Westervelt, a moderate “Hunker,” and a shipbuilder of wealth, who was considered the very essence of “respectability,” and a contrast to Wood, was nominated for Mayor. Tammany planned to have its candidates swept in on the Presidential current. National issues were made dominant, and the city responded by giving the Pierce[160] electors 11,159 plurality, and electing the whole organization ticket.[8] Fraud was common. No registry law was in force to hinder men from voting, as it was charged some did, as often as twenty times. On the other hand, 80,000 tickets purporting to be Democratic, intended for distribution by the Whigs, but not containing the name of a single Democrat, were seized at the post-office and carried in triumph to the Wigwam.

The need to come together to push the Whigs out of their hold on city jobs and profits led to an agreement among the factions. Jacob A. Westervelt, a moderate "Hunker," wealthy shipbuilder, seen as the epitome of "respectability," and a contrast to Wood, was nominated for Mayor. Tammany planned to ride the wave of the Presidential election. National issues took center stage, and the city reacted by giving the Pierce[160] electors a plurality of 11,159 votes, electing the entire organization ticket.[8] Corruption was widespread. There was no registration law in place to prevent individuals from voting multiple times, as it was alleged some did, as many as twenty times. Meanwhile, 80,000 tickets claiming to be Democratic, meant for distribution by the Whigs but not including the name of a single Democrat, were confiscated at the post office and triumphantly taken to the Wigwam.

Tammany once more had full control of the city.

Tammany once again had complete control of the city.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Wood’s was an attractive personality. He was a handsome man, six feet high, slender and straight, with keen blue eyes, and regular features. His manner was kindly and engaging.

[1] Wood was an appealing person. He was a good-looking man, six feet tall, slim and straight, with sharp blue eyes and well-defined features. He had a friendly and charming demeanor.

[2] Wood was charged with having obtained about $8,000 on false representations from his partner, Edward E. Marvine, in a transaction. Marvine brought suit against Wood in the Superior Court, and three referees gave a unanimous decision in the plaintiff’s favor. The Grand Jury, on November 7, 1851, indicted Wood for obtaining money under false pretenses, but he pleaded the Statute of Limitations. A friendly Recorder decided that as his offense had been committed three years previously (on November 7, 1848), the period required by the statute had been fully covered. The indictment, therefore, was quashed, and Wood escaped by one day.

[2] Wood was accused of getting around $8,000 through false claims from his partner, Edward E. Marvine, in a business deal. Marvine sued Wood in the Superior Court, and three referees unanimously ruled in favor of the plaintiff. On November 7, 1851, the Grand Jury charged Wood with obtaining money under false pretenses, but he claimed the Statute of Limitations. A sympathetic Recorder decided that since the crime had happened three years earlier (on November 7, 1848), the time required by the statute had already passed. As a result, the indictment was dismissed, and Wood got away by one day.

[3] New York Tribune, May 5, 1852. (This admission on the part of a Whig journal caused a great stir.)

[3] New York Tribune, May 5, 1852. (This acknowledgment from a Whig newspaper created quite a commotion.)

[4] There was another “Forty Thieves” Council five or six years later, which must not be confounded with the earlier and more notorious one.

[4] There was another "Forty Thieves" Council five or six years later, which shouldn't be confused with the earlier and more infamous one.

[5] The Herald, which, as usual, supported Tammany this year, described (August 24, 1852) these violences in detail.

[5] The Herald, which, as always, backed Tammany this year, detailed these acts of violence on August 24, 1852.

[6] The political lawbreaker had a final immunity from punishment in the fact that Aldermen sat as Justices in the Mayor’s Court, which tried such culprits, if ever they happened to be arrested.

[6] The political lawbreaker had a final escape from punishment in the fact that Aldermen acted as judges in the Mayor’s Court, which handled such offenders, if they were ever caught.

[7] See Report of Chief of Police Matsell, Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XXX, part 1, No. 17. The extreme turbulence of the city at this time may be judged from the fact that, despite the comparative immunity of political lawbreakers, during the eight years 1846-54, 200,083 arrests were made, an average of 25,010 a year.

[7] See Report of Chief of Police Matsell, Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XXX, part 1, No. 17. The intense chaos in the city during this period is evident from the fact that, despite the relative safety for political offenders, there were 200,083 arrests made over the eight years from 1846 to 1854, averaging about 25,010 arrests each year.

[8] The vote on Mayor stood: Westervelt, 33,251; Morgan Morgans, 23,719; Henry M. Western, 861; blank and scattering, 227; total, 58,058.

[8] The vote for Mayor was as follows: Westervelt, 33,251; Morgan Morgans, 23,719; Henry M. Western, 861; blank and scattered votes, 227; total, 58,058.


CHAPTER XVIII
“Hardshells” and “Softshells”
1852-1853

The “Barnburner”-“Hunker” factional fight was succeeded by that of the “Hardshells” and “Softshells.” How the ludicrous nicknames originated it is not possible to say. The “Softshells” were composed of a remnant of the “Barnburners”[1] and that part of the “Hunkers” who believed in a full union with the “Barnburners,” especially in the highly important matter of distributing offices. The “Hardshells” were the “Old Hunkers” who disavowed all connection with the “Barnburners,” or Free Soilers, except so far as to get their votes. This division also extended to other parts of the State, where perhaps real differences of political principle were responsible for it; but in the city the fundamental point of contention was the booty of office.

The "Barnburner"-"Hunker" factional fight was followed by the clash between the "Hardshells" and "Softshells." It’s unclear how these ridiculous nicknames came about. The "Softshells" were made up of some of the "Barnburners" and those "Hunkers" who supported full unity with the "Barnburners," especially regarding the important issue of distributing positions. The "Hardshells" were the "Old Hunkers" who completely rejected any association with the "Barnburners" or Free Soilers, except to garner their votes. This split also reached other parts of the State, where there might have been real political differences at play; however, in the city, the main point of conflict was the spoils of office.

The “Hardshells” boasted in 1852 of a majority of the Tammany General Committee which met on December 2 to choose inspectors for the ward elections of delegates to the general committee for 1853. The control of these inspectors was the keynote of the situation, for they would return such delegates as they pleased. Angered at the appointment of “Hardshell” inspectors, the “Softshells” broke in the door of the committee room, assaulted the members of the committee with chairs,[162] fractured some heads and forced the “Hards” to flee for refuge to the Astor House.[2]

The "Hardshells" proudly announced in 1852 that they had a majority on the Tammany General Committee, which met on December 2 to select inspectors for the ward elections of delegates to the general committee for 1853. Controlling these inspectors was crucial because they could determine which delegates would be elected. Furious about the appointment of "Hardshell" inspectors, the "Softshells" broke into the committee room, attacked the committee members with chairs,[162] injured several people, and forced the "Hards" to escape for safety to the Astor House.[2]

Agreeable to “usages,” the departing general committee instructed the delegates of its successor to assemble in Tammany Hall on January 13, 1853, to be installed as the general committee for the ensuing year. Until this installation, the committee of the last year remained in power. In the interval the Sachems, who, in the peculiar mix of politics, were for the most part “Softshells,” decided to take a hand in the game of getting control of the organization, and therefore called a meeting for the same night and at the same time.

Agreeing with the usual practices, the outgoing general committee told the delegates of its successor to meet at Tammany Hall on January 13, 1853, to be sworn in as the general committee for the upcoming year. Until this swearing-in, the committee from the previous year stayed in power. Meanwhile, the Sachems, who, in the unique mix of politics, were mostly "Softshells," decided to get involved in the effort to take control of the organization and called a meeting for that same night and time.

The object of the old general committee was to allow only delegates whose seats were uncontested to vote on the organization, or the contest of seats, which would return a “Hardshell” committee. The Sachems, on the contrary, favored voting by those who had the indorsement of two of the three inspectors.

The purpose of the old general committee was to let only delegates with uncontested seats vote on the organization, or the competition for seats, which would result in a “Hardshell” committee. The Sachems, on the other hand, supported voting by those who had the endorsement of two out of the three inspectors.

The “Hardshells” insisted that the Sachems had unwarrantably interfered; that this was the first time in the history of the society of any interference as to the manner of organizing the general committee; that the only power the Sachems had was to decide between contending parties for the use of the hall for political meetings, and that even then their power was doubtful.

The “Hardshells” argued that the Sachems had unjustly interfered; that this was the first time in the society's history that there had been any interference regarding how to organize the general committee; that the only authority the Sachems had was to choose between competing groups for the use of the hall for political meetings, and that even then their authority was questionable.

The Grand Sachem ordered the doors of the meeting room locked till 7:30 o’clock, at which hour both factions streamed in. Soon there were two meetings in the same room, each with a chairman, and each vociferously trying to shout down the other. Neither accomplished anything, and both adjourned, and kept adjourning from day to day, awaiting positive action by the society.

The Grand Sachem ordered the doors of the meeting room locked until 7:30. At that time, both groups poured in. Soon there were two meetings happening in the same room, each with its own chairperson, and each loudly trying to drown out the other. Neither accomplished anything, and both kept adjourning, continuing day after day, waiting for a decision from the society.

The “Softshell” section of the general committee called a meeting for January 20, but it was prohibited by the Sachems. When doubt of their authority was[163] expressed, the Sachems produced a lease executed in 1842 to Howard, the lessee of the property, by the Tammany Society, in which he agreed that he would not lease, either directly or indirectly, the hall, or any part of the building, to any other political party (or parties) whatever, calling themselves committees, whose general political principles did not appear to him or the Sachems to be in accordance with the general political principles of the Democratic-Republican General Committee of New York City, of which Elijah F. Purdy was then chairman. Howard had also agreed that

The "Softshell" section of the general committee called a meeting for January 20, but the Sachems prohibited it. When there were doubts about their authority, the Sachems showed a lease from 1842 to Howard, the lessee of the property, by the Tammany Society. In this lease, he agreed not to lease the hall or any part of the building to any other political party (or parties) that identified as committees, whose general political principles did not align with those of the Democratic-Republican General Committee of New York City, which was chaired by Elijah F. Purdy at the time. Howard had also agreed that

“if there should be at any time a doubt arising in his mind or that of his assigns, or in the mind of the Grand Sachem of the Tammany Society for the time being, in ascertaining the political character of any political party that should be desirous of obtaining admission to Tammany Hall for the purpose of holding a political meeting, then either might give notice in writing to the Father of the Council of the Tammany Society, in which event it was the duty of the Father of the Council to assemble the Grand Council, who would determine in the matter and whose decision should be final, conclusive and binding.”

“Whenever there is any doubt in his mind, or in the mind of his representatives, or in the mind of the current Grand Sachem of the Tammany Society about the political nature of any party seeking to access Tammany Hall for a political meeting, either party can submit a written notice to the Father of the Council of the Tammany Society. In that case, it’s the responsibility of the Father of the Council to gather the Grand Council, who will make a determination on the matter, and their decision will be final and binding.”

Of the thirteen Sachems, eleven were “Softshells”—a predominance due to the activity of the “Barnburners.” The “Hardshells,” without doubt, were in a majority in the Tammany Society and in Tammany Hall, but they had taken no such pains as had their opponents to elect their men. The Sachems’ meeting on January 20, professedly to decide the merits of the contest, called for the ward representatives in turn. The “Hardshells” refused to answer or to acknowledge the Sachems’ authority to interfere with the primary elections of the people. The Sachems then named by resolution the general committee they favored, thus deciding in favor of the “Softshell” committee. There was no little suppressed excitement, since the members of the Tammany Society, it was naïvely told, though allowed to be present, were not allowed to speak.

Of the thirteen Sachems, eleven were “Softshells”—a majority thanks to the efforts of the “Barnburners.” The “Hardshells” certainly had a majority in the Tammany Society and in Tammany Hall, but they hadn’t put in the effort that their rivals had to get their candidates elected. The Sachems’ meeting on January 20, supposedly to assess the contest's merits, called for the ward representatives one by one. The “Hardshells” refused to respond or recognize the Sachems’ authority to interfere with the primary elections of the people. The Sachems then named the general committee they supported by resolution, effectively backing the “Softshell” committee. There was quite a bit of suppressed excitement, as it was naively stated that while members of the Tammany Society could be present, they weren’t allowed to speak.

Alderman Thomas J. Barr, a member of the Tammany[164] Society and chairman of the “Hardshell” committee, handed to the Sachems, on behalf of his associates, an energetic protest. Summarized, it read as follows:

Alderman Thomas J. Barr, a member of the Tammany[164] Society and chair of the “Hardshell” committee, presented an assertive protest to the Sachems on behalf of his colleagues. In summary, it said the following:

“Tammany Society is a private association, incorporated for charitable purposes. There is nothing in its charter, constitution or by-laws making it a political organization in any sense of the term. The Democrats of New York City have never, in any manner or by any act, vested in the society the right to prescribe the rules for their government in matters of political organization.

“Tammany Society is a private organization established for charitable purposes. There’s nothing in its charter, constitution, or by-laws that makes it a political group in any way. The Democrats of New York City have never, in any manner or through any action, given the society the authority to set the rules for their political organization.”

“The society comprises among its members men belonging to all the different political parties of the day. The only political test of admission to membership is to be ‘a Republican in favor of the Constitution of the United States.’ It is, besides, a secret society, whose transactions are known only to its own officers and members, except so far as might be the pleasure of the Council to make the proceedings public. It can never be tolerated that a body which, in the language of its charter, was created ‘to carry into effect the benevolent purpose of affording relief to the indigent and distressed,’ and which is wholly independent of the great body of the Democracy shall be permitted to sit in judgment upon the primary organization of the Democratic-Republican party of the city of New York; and such a state of things, if its absurdity be not too great for serious consideration, would amount to a despotism of the most repugnant character and render the Democratic party of the city an object of contempt and ridicule everywhere.… Tammany Society owns a portion of the premises known as Tammany Hall, which is let to Mr. Howard and forms the plant of his hotel. This fact is all that gives to the Tammany Society any, even the least political significance.

The society includes members from all the different political parties today. The only requirement for joining is to be ‘a Republican in favor of the Constitution of the United States.’ It is also a secret society, and its activities are known only to its officers and members, unless the Council decides to make them public. It can never be accepted that a group which, according to its charter, was established ‘to carry into effect the benevolent purpose of providing relief to the needy and distressed,’ and which is completely independent of the main body of the Democracy, should have the authority to judge the primary organization of the Democratic-Republican party in New York City; and such a situation, if its absurdity isn’t too extreme for serious thought, would create a nightmare of despotism that would make the Democratic party of the city a target of ridicule everywhere.… Tammany Society owns part of the property known as Tammany Hall, which is leased to Mr. Howard and serves as the basis for his hotel. This fact is the only thing that gives the Tammany Society any political importance, even the slightest.

“The general committee derives its powers from the people, who alone can take them away. The committee in its objects, its organization and its responsibilities to a popular constituency is wholly distinct from and independent of the Tammany Society, its council or its officers, and to be efficient for any good purpose must always so remain, leaving to the Tammany Society its legitimate duty of excluding from Tammany Hall those who are hostile to the Democracy and its principles.”[3]

“The general committee gets its authority from the people, who are the only ones who can take it away. The committee, in its goals, structure, and accountability to the public, is completely separate from and independent of the Tammany Society, its council, or its officers. To be effective for any positive purpose, it must always stay that way, allowing the Tammany Society to do its rightful job of keeping out those who oppose Democracy and its principles.”[3]

In the bar-room many leaders of the excluded faction were assembled, surrounded by their fighting men. When the Sachems’ adverse decision was announced, their anger found vent in a sputter of oaths and threats, and the sum of $15,000 was subscribed on the spot for the building[165] of a rival Tammany Hall. It is almost needless to say that the rival hall was never built.

In the bar, many leaders from the excluded group had gathered, surrounded by their supporters. When the Sachems' unfavorable decision was announced, their frustration boiled over into a flurry of curses and threats, and they quickly raised $15,000 to create a competing Tammany Hall. It's almost unnecessary to mention that the rival hall was never constructed.

The Sachems later replied to the protest with the defense that their lease to Howard obliged them to act as they did. By that lease the succession of Elijah F. Purdy’s committee alone was at liberty to meet as a general committee in Tammany Hall; they (the Sachems) had not recognized Barr’s committee as such, and moreover did not admit the claim the “Hardshell” committee made of their right to hire a room separate from the majority in a building in which they had no property whatever. The Council of Sachems insisted that it had exercised the right of excluding so-called general committees before; that Tammany was a benevolent society, and that benevolent societies had the same right as others to determine who should occupy their property.

The Sachems later responded to the protest by saying that their lease to Howard required them to act this way. According to that lease, only Elijah F. Purdy’s committee had the right to meet as a general committee in Tammany Hall; they (the Sachems) did not recognize Barr’s committee as legitimate, and furthermore, they did not accept the claim made by the “Hardshell” committee about their right to rent a room separately from the majority in a building where they had no ownership at all. The Council of Sachems argued that it had previously exercised the right to exclude so-called general committees, stated that Tammany was a benevolent society, and maintained that benevolent societies had the same right as anyone else to decide who could use their property.

The “Hardshells” attempted to rout the “Softshells” at the regular meeting of the Tammany Society on February 12, but the Sachems’ action was confirmed by a vote of two hundred to less than a dozen. Each faction then strained to elect a majority of the Sachems at the annual election on April 18. Private circulars were distributed, that of the “Softshells” being signed by Isaac V. Fowler, Fernando Wood, Nelson J. Waterbury, John Cochrane and others. It breathed allegiance to the national and State administrations, the regular organization and to the Baltimore platform. The “Hardshell” circular had the signatures of Richard B. Connolly, Cornelius Bogardus, Jacob Brush and others styling themselves the “Old Line Democrats.”

The “Hardshells” tried to outvote the “Softshells” at the regular meeting of the Tammany Society on February 12, but the Sachems’ decision was supported by a vote of two hundred to under a dozen. Each group then worked hard to elect a majority of the Sachems at the annual election on April 18. Private circulars were sent out, with the “Softshells” circular signed by Isaac V. Fowler, Fernando Wood, Nelson J. Waterbury, John Cochrane, and others. It expressed support for the national and State administrations, the regular organization, and the Baltimore platform. The “Hardshell” circular had signatures from Richard B. Connolly, Cornelius Bogardus, Jacob Brush, and others who called themselves the “Old Line Democrats.”

The “Softshells” elected their ticket, and Isaac V. Fowler, afterward postmaster, was chosen Grand Sachem. This vote of a few score of private individuals decided the control of Tammany Hall and the lot of those who would share in the division of plunder for the next year.

The “Softshells” chose their candidates, and Isaac V. Fowler, who later became the postmaster, was elected Grand Sachem. This vote by a small group of private individuals determined the control of Tammany Hall and the fate of those who would benefit from the distribution of loot for the next year.

“With the exception of some few quarrels,” one friendly account had it, “which fortunately did not result[166] in any personal damage to the disputants, the affair passed off very quietly. While the votes were counted upstairs some interesting scenes were presented in the bar-room, which was crowded with anxious expectants. Language of a rather exceptional character, such as ‘political thieves,’ ‘swindlers,’ etc., was employed unsparingly, but as the majority was peaceably inclined, there were no heads fractured.”

"Aside from a few minor arguments," one friendly account reported, "which thankfully didn't lead to any personal harm for those involved, the situation went by very smoothly. While the votes were counted upstairs, some intriguing events unfolded in the barroom, which was packed with nervous onlookers. Terms of a rather unusual kind, like 'political thieves' and 'swindlers,' were used freely, but since the majority were inclined toward peace, there were no head injuries."

FOOTNOTES

[1] Many of the “Barnburners” had finally broken with the Democratic party, and were now acting independently as Free Soilers. Afterward, in great part, these independents gravitated to the new Republican party.

[1] Many of the "Barnburners" had finally left the Democratic party and were now operating independently as Free Soilers. Later on, a lot of these independents joined the new Republican party.

[2] This affair was exploited in the General Courts later. Seven rioters were arrested.

[2] This incident was leveraged in the General Courts later. Seven protesters were arrested.

[3] The statements of both sides were published officially in the New York Herald, February 10, 1853, the bare facts covering more than an entire page of solid print.

[3] Both sides' statements were officially published in the New York Herald on February 10, 1853, with the basic facts taking up more than a full page of dense print.


CHAPTER XIX
A Chapter of Revelations
1853-1854

Now came an appalling series of disclosures regarding public officials. Acting on the affidavit of James E. Coulter, a lobbyist, charging that there was a private organization[1] in the Board of Aldermen formed to receive and distribute bribes, the Grand Jury, after investigation, handed down a presentment, on February 26, 1853, together with a vast mass of testimony.

Now came a shocking series of revelations about public officials. Acting on the affidavit of James E. Coulter, a lobbyist, who claimed that there was a private organization[1] in the Board of Aldermen set up to receive and distribute bribes, the Grand Jury, after an investigation, issued a report on February 26, 1853, along with a large amount of evidence.

“It was clearly shown,” stated the presentment, “that enormous sums of money have been expended for and towards the procurement of railroad grants in the city, and that towards the decision and procurement of the Eighth Avenue Railroad grant a sum so large that would startle the most credulous was expended; but in consequence of the voluntary absence of important witnesses, the Grand Jury was left without direct testimony of the particular recipients of the different amounts.”[2]

“It was clearly shown,” said the report, “that huge amounts of money have been spent on getting railroad grants in the city, and that for the decision and acquisition of the Eighth Avenue Railroad grant, a sum so large it would shock even the most trusting was spent; however, due to the voluntary absence of key witnesses, the Grand Jury was left without direct testimony about who exactly received the different amounts.”[2]

Solomon Kipp, one of the grantees of the Eighth and Ninth Avenue Railroad franchises, admitted frequently to a member of the Grand Jury that he had expended, in 1851, upwards of $50,000 in getting them. Five grantees of the Third Avenue Railroad franchise swore that upwards of $30,000 was paid for it in 1852 in bribes to both boards.[3] Of this sum Alderman Tweed received[168] $3,000. Chief among those who bribed the Aldermen were Elijah F. Purdy (one of the line of Grand Sachems) and Myndert Van Schaick, who only a few years before had been the Tammany candidate for Mayor. A franchise for a surface railroad on Broadway, with scarcely any provision for compensation and with permission to charge a five-cent fare, was given to Jacob Sharp, over five profitable bids from responsible persons. One applicant, Thomas E. Davies, had offered to give the city one cent for every fare charged. In another application, Davies, D. H. Haight and others had offered $100,000 a year and the payment of a license fee of $1,000 on each car (the prevailing fee being $20) for a ten-years’ grant, on the agreement to charge a five-cent fare. There were two other offers equally favorable.[4] When Mayor Kingsland had vetoed the bill[5] the Aldermen had repassed it, notwithstanding an injunction forbidding them to do so.[6]

Solomon Kipp, one of the grantees of the Eighth and Ninth Avenue Railroad franchises, often told a member of the Grand Jury that he spent over $50,000 to obtain them in 1851. Five grantees of the Third Avenue Railroad franchise claimed that they paid more than $30,000 in bribes to both boards in 1852.[3] Alderman Tweed received $3,000 of that amount. Among those who bribed the Aldermen were Elijah F. Purdy (one of the Grand Sachems) and Myndert Van Schaick, who had only a few years earlier been the Tammany candidate for Mayor. Jacob Sharp was awarded a franchise for a surface railroad on Broadway, which had almost no compensation provisions and allowed a five-cent fare, despite receiving five profitable bids from reputable individuals. One applicant, Thomas E. Davies, proposed to pay the city one cent for every fare charged. In another application, Davies, D. H. Haight, and others offered $100,000 a year and $1,000 license fee for each car (the standard fee was $20) for a ten-year grant, agreeing to charge a five-cent fare. There were two other similarly advantageous offers.[4] When Mayor Kingsland vetoed the bill[5], the Aldermen reinstated it despite an injunction preventing them from doing so.[6]

Dr. William Cockroft had to pay, among other sums, $500 to Assistant Alderman Wesley Smith to get favorable action on his application for a lease of the Catherine Street Ferry. After the passage of the grant, Smith demanded $3,000 more, which Cockroft refused to pay.[7] Burtis Skidmore, a coal dealer, testified that in the Fall of 1851 James B. Taylor informed him that he had been an applicant for a ferry across the East River to Greenpoint, and that “he bribed members of the Common Council for the purpose of obtaining said grant, and that other applicants for the same ferry gave[169] a larger bribe than he did, and obtained the grant, and that all members of the Common Council whom he had bribed returned to him the money he had paid them, with the exception of Alderman Wood, who kept the money from both parties.”[8]

Dr. William Cockroft had to pay, among other amounts, $500 to Assistant Alderman Wesley Smith to get a favorable decision on his application for a lease of the Catherine Street Ferry. After the grant was approved, Smith demanded an additional $3,000, which Cockroft refused to pay.[7] Burtis Skidmore, a coal dealer, testified that in the fall of 1851, James B. Taylor told him he had applied for a ferry across the East River to Greenpoint and that he bribed members of the Common Council to secure the grant. Taylor also mentioned that other applicants for the same ferry paid a larger bribe than he did and successfully got the grant. He added that all members of the Common Council he had bribed returned the money he had given them, except for Alderman Wood, who kept the money from both sides.[8]

John Morrell swore that one of the applicants for the lease of the ferry to Williamsburg applied to some of the Aldermen and was told that it would cost about $5,000 “to get the grant through.” But a Mr. Hicks, another applicant, was so eager to “get it through” that he gave more than $20,000.[9]

John Morrell claimed that one of the people applying for the ferry lease to Williamsburg asked some of the Aldermen and was informed that it would cost around $5,000 "to get the grant approved." However, a Mr. Hicks, another applicant, was so determined to "get it approved" that he offered over $20,000.[9]

The lease of the Wall Street Ferry was similarly disposed of. Silas C. Herring testified that he with others was told he could secure it by paying a certain Alderman $5,000. Herring declined. James B. Taylor was another applicant, in 1852. He was informed that it would cost him $15,000. He offered $10,000, but on the same night “Jake” Sharp offered $20,000 and got the grant. Taylor also testified that he additionally applied for the Grand Street Ferry lease. Other parties, however, paid more bribe money and obtained it, whereat one Alderman said that “it was the damnedest fight that was ever had in the Common Council; it cost them [Taylor’s rivals] from $20,000 to $25,000.”[10]

The lease for the Wall Street Ferry was handled in a similar way. Silas C. Herring testified that he and others were informed they could secure it by paying a certain Alderman $5,000. Herring declined. James B. Taylor was another applicant in 1852. He was told it would cost him $15,000. He offered $10,000, but that same night “Jake” Sharp offered $20,000 and got the grant. Taylor also testified that he applied for the Grand Street Ferry lease. However, other parties paid more in bribes and obtained it, prompting one Alderman to say, “it was the damnedest fight that was ever had in the Common Council; it cost them [Taylor’s rivals] from $20,000 to $25,000.”[10]

The Aldermen extorted money in every possible way. In defiance of the Mayor’s veto they gave a $600,000 contract for the “Russ” street pavement, afterward found to be worthless, and which had to be replaced at additional cost. Russ had offered one Assistant Alderman $1,000 to help carry his election the next Fall if he voted favorably.[11] Exorbitant prices were paid for land on Ward’s Island, several Aldermen and officials receiving for their influence and votes bribes of $10,000, and others even larger sums.[12] The Common Council sold to Reuben Lovejoy the Gansevoort Market property for[170] $160,000 in the face of other bids of $225,000 and $300,000. Lovejoy, who, it was disclosed, was merely a dummy for James B. Taylor and others, testified “that it would cost from $40,000 to $75,000 to get this operation—the purchase of the Gansevoort property—through the city government.”[13]

The Aldermen squeezed money out of every possible source. Ignoring the Mayor’s veto, they awarded a $600,000 contract for the "Russ" street pavement, which turned out to be worthless and had to be replaced at an extra cost. Russ had offered one Assistant Alderman $1,000 to help secure his election the following Fall if he voted in his favor.[11] They paid outrageous prices for land on Ward’s Island, with several Aldermen and officials receiving bribes of $10,000 for their influence and votes, and others even larger amounts.[12] The Common Council sold the Gansevoort Market property to Reuben Lovejoy for[170] $160,000, despite other bids of $225,000 and $300,000. Lovejoy, who was revealed to be just a front for James B. Taylor and others, testified “that it would cost between $40,000 and $75,000 to push this deal—the purchase of the Gansevoort property—through the city government.”[13]

A coal merchant had to pay money for a favorable vote on his application for a lease of the Jefferson Market property, and another merchant testified to having paid one Assistant Alderman about $1,700 to get a pier lease.[14] The Aldermen demanded and received bribes not only for passing measures but for suppressing them, and even invented many “strikes,” as instanced by the case of Alderman Smith, who agreed for $250 to silence a resolution to reduce the Coroners’ fees.[15] They demanded a share of every contract made by any city official, threatening, if it were not given, to stop his supplies and have his accounts investigated.[16] If a contractor or lessee refused to meet a “request,” the Aldermen retaliated by imposing burdens upon him and reporting hostile resolutions.[17]

A coal dealer had to pay money to get a favorable vote on his application for a lease of the Jefferson Market property, and another dealer testified to paying an Assistant Alderman about $1,700 to secure a pier lease.[14] The Aldermen demanded and accepted bribes not only for passing laws but also for burying them, and even created many “strikes,” as shown by Alderman Smith, who agreed to hush up a resolution to lower the Coroners’ fees for $250.[15] They required a cut of every contract made by any city official, threatening to cut off supplies and investigate accounts if it wasn’t given.[16] If a contractor or lessee refused to comply with a “request,” the Aldermen retaliated by imposing extra burdens and presenting hostile resolutions.[17]

Applicants for the police force paid the Police Captains $40, and more to the Aldermen who appointed them. One man was reappointed Police Captain by Alderman Thomas J. Barr for $200, and another, assistant Captain for $100.[18]

Applicants for the police force paid the Police Captains $40, and more to the Aldermen who appointed them. One man was reappointed Police Captain by Alderman Thomas J. Barr for $200, and another, assistant Captain for $100.[18]

Every city department was corrupt. It was found that one hundred and sixty-three conveyances were deeded[171] to the Chief of Police, George W. Matsell, and his partner, Capt. Norris, in about a year.[19] Matsell was mentioned also as receiving money from about one hundred men who patronized the odious Madame Restell’s establishment in Greenwich street.[20] Both the police and Aldermen collected money from saloons, though the Aldermen obtained the larger share, as they had the power of granting licenses.

Every city department was corrupt. It was discovered that one hundred and sixty-three vehicles were handed over to the Chief of Police, George W. Matsell, and his partner, Capt. Norris, in about a year.[171][19] Matsell was also noted for receiving money from around one hundred men who frequented the notorious Madame Restell’s establishment on Greenwich Street.[20] Both the police and Aldermen collected money from bars, though the Aldermen got a bigger cut, as they had the authority to issue licenses.

Within three or four years William B. Reynolds received over $200,000 from the city, under a five-years’ contract for removing dead animals, offal and bones, though at the time the contract was made other persons had offered to remove them free of expense, and one had even offered to pay the city $50,000 a year for the exclusive privilege.[21] It was owing to Controller Flagg’s action that a contract to index certain city records at a cost of between $200,000 and $300,000, despite the offer of a well-known publisher to do it for $59,000, was canceled.[22] Flimsy tenement houses, causing later much fatality and disaster, were built in haste, there being no supervisory authority over their erection.[23] The lighting of the city was insufficient, thousands of oil lamps still being used, and these, according to an old custom, not being lighted on moonlit nights.[24]

In just three or four years, William B. Reynolds received over $200,000 from the city under a five-year contract to remove dead animals, waste, and bones, even though when the contract was awarded, other people had offered to do it for free, and one had even offered to pay the city $50,000 a year for exclusive rights. [21] Because of Controller Flagg’s actions, a contract to index certain city records, which would cost between $200,000 and $300,000, was canceled despite a well-known publisher's offer to do it for $59,000. [22] Poorly built tenement houses, which later led to many deaths and disasters, were constructed quickly without any oversight. [23] The city's lighting was inadequate, as thousands of oil lamps were still in use, and according to an old tradition, they weren't lit on moonlit nights. [24]

Both Tammany and Whig Aldermen and officials were implicated in these disclosures. Such was the system of city government that, though twenty-nine Aldermen were at one time under judgment of contempt of court, and a part of the same number under indictment for bribery, yet under the law they continued acting as Judges in the criminal courts. According to Judge Vanderpoel, bribery was considered a joke.

Both Tammany and Whig Aldermen and officials were involved in these revelations. The city government was structured in such a way that even though twenty-nine Aldermen were once facing contempt of court charges, and some of them were indicted for bribery, they still had the legal right to serve as Judges in the criminal courts. According to Judge Vanderpoel, bribery was treated as a joke.

A new reform movement sprang up, which quickly developed[172] into the City Reform party. The reformers proposed, as a first step, to amend the charter. The granting of leases for more than ten years was to be prohibited, and the highest bidder was to get them. A two-thirds vote was to be required to pass a bill over the Mayor’s veto. Work to be done and supplies furnished costing more than $250 were to be arranged for on contract to the lowest bidder. Any person guilty of bribery, directly or indirectly, was to be sentenced, upon conviction, to not above ten years in prison and fined not over $5,000, or both. The right to sit as Judges of the criminal courts was to be taken away from the Aldermen, as was also the power of appointing policemen. The Board of Assistant Aldermen was to be abolished, and a Board of Councilmen, consisting of sixty members, was to be instituted in its place, the collective title of the two boards to be “the Common Council.” The Aldermen were to be elected for two years (as determined in the charter of 1849) and the Councilmen for one year. An efficient auditing of accounts and claims against the city was called for, and only the more popular branch of the Common Council was to originate appropriations of money.

A new reform movement emerged, quickly turning into the City Reform party. The reformers suggested, as their first step, amending the charter. They aimed to prohibit leases longer than ten years, with the highest bidder winning them. A two-thirds vote would be needed to override the Mayor’s veto. Any work or supplies costing over $250 would need to be contracted to the lowest bidder. Anyone convicted of bribery, whether directly or indirectly, would face a prison sentence of up to ten years and a fine not exceeding $5,000, or both. The Aldermen were to lose their right to serve as Judges of the criminal courts and their power to appoint policemen. The Board of Assistant Aldermen was to be dissolved, replaced by a Board of Councilmen made up of sixty members, with both boards collectively called “the Common Council.” Aldermen would be elected for two years (as stated in the 1849 charter), while Councilmen would serve for one year. An effective auditing of accounts and claims against the city was called for, and only the more popular branch of the Common Council would be allowed to initiate money appropriations.

Tammany had grown suddenly virtuous again, and responding to the public clamor over the disclosures, had declared its devotion to pure government. At a “reform” meeting of the Young Men’s Union Club, John Cochrane, one of Wood’s lieutenants, who later announced that he would vote “for the devil incarnate if nominated by Tammany Hall,” declared: “Reform is at home in Tammany Hall. Its birthplace is Tammany Hall.” The purification movement advanced so unmistakably that Tammany approved the amendments, and the legislative bill embodying some of them was supported by the Tammany delegation in the Senate and Assembly.

Tammany suddenly became virtuous again, and in response to the public outcry over the revelations, declared its commitment to honest government. At a “reform” meeting of the Young Men’s Union Club, John Cochrane, one of Wood’s aides, who later claimed he would vote “for the devil incarnate if nominated by Tammany Hall,” stated: “Reform is at home in Tammany Hall. Its birthplace is Tammany Hall.” The push for purification progressed so clearly that Tammany approved the amendments, and the legislative bill incorporating some of them was backed by the Tammany delegation in the Senate and Assembly.

The bill passed, and upon being submitted to the people[173] of the city, in June, 1853, was adopted by the significant vote of 36,000 to 3,000.

The bill passed, and when it was presented to the people[173] of the city in June 1853, it was approved by an overwhelming vote of 36,000 to 3,000.

One of the benefits due to the City Reform party was the reorganization (1853) of the police under a separate department. The police were compelled to wear a uniform against which there had been bitter prejudice,[25] and the term of appointment was made dependent upon good behavior.

One of the benefits from the City Reform party was the reorganization (1853) of the police into a separate department. The police were required to wear a uniform, despite the strong opposition against it,[25] and their terms of appointment were based on good behavior.

Fortunately for the City Reform party, the division between the “Hardshells” and “Softshells” extending throughout the State caused the nomination of separate Democratic tickets in the Fall of 1853. There seemed less than ever any vital difference between the professed principles of the two. Under the name of “National Democrats” the “Hardshells” met in City Hall Park on September 26, and resolved:

Fortunately for the City Reform party, the split between the “Hardshells” and “Softshells” across the State led to separate Democratic tickets being nominated in the Fall of 1853. There appeared to be less distinction than ever in the stated principles of the two groups. Under the label of “National Democrats,” the “Hardshells” gathered in City Hall Park on September 26 and resolved:

“We regret that the Democracy of the city are prevented from holding this meeting in their accustomed hall.… The Democracy of the city waged in time past a successful war against a corporation which sought to control by money the political destinies of the country. We now from this time forward commence a campaign against another corporation known as the Tammany Society—a secret, self-elected and irresponsible body of men who have dared to usurp the right of determining who shall and who shall not meet in Tammany Hall.… The accidental ownership of a small equity of redemption of a small part of the ground upon which Tammany Hall stands may continue to enable the Sachems to prevent the Democracy from meeting within the hall, but we can meet in the park or in the open air or elsewhere.”

“We're sorry that the city's Democratic Party can’t hold this meeting in their usual hall.… In the past, the city’s Democrats fought successfully against a corporation that tried to control the political fate of the country with money. Now, from this point on, we are starting a campaign against another organization known as the Tammany Society—a secret, self-appointed, and unaccountable group of men who have taken it upon themselves to decide who can and cannot gather in Tammany Hall.… The unintentional ownership of a small stake in the property where Tammany Hall stands might still allow the Sachems to stop the Democrats from meeting inside, but we can gather in the park, outdoors, or anywhere else.”

The City Reform party nominated acceptable Whigs and Democrats pledged to reform, and obtained a decisive majority in the next Common Council.

The City Reform party nominated acceptable Whigs and Democrats committed to reform, and secured a decisive majority in the next Common Council.

FOOTNOTES

[1] William H. Cornell, a sometime Sachem, was, according to the affidavit of Coulter, the head of this organization.

[1] William H. Cornell, who was briefly a Sachem, was, according to Coulter's affidavit, the leader of this organization.

[2] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XXI, part 2, No. 55.

[2] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XXI, part 2, No. 55.

[3] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XXI, part 2, No. 55, pp. 1333-35, and p. 1573. See also The History of Public Franchises in New York City by Gustavus Myers in which full details are given of the briberies attending the grants of the Eighth, Ninth and Third Avenue Railroad franchises, and other franchises.

[3] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XXI, part 2, No. 55, pp. 1333-35, and p. 1573. See also The History of Public Franchises in New York City by Gustavus Myers, which provides full details about the bribery involved in granting the Eighth, Ninth, and Third Avenue Railroad franchises, along with other franchises.

[4] Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XLVIII, pp. 530-37.

[4] Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XLVIII, pp. 530-37.

[5] Ibid., p. 532.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, p. 532.

[6] For violating this injunction one Alderman—Oscar W. Sturtevant (a Whig)—was sentenced to a nominal fifteen days in prison and to pay a fine of $350, and the other offending Aldermen were merely fined. The courts afterward annulled the Sharp franchise.

[6] For breaking this order, one Alderman—Oscar W. Sturtevant (a Whig)—was given a light sentence of fifteen days in jail and fined $350, while the other Aldermen who violated the order were just fined. Later, the courts canceled the Sharp franchise.

[7] Document No. 55, p. 1219.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Document No. 55, p. 1219.

[8] Ibid. p. 1310.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source. p. 1310.

[9] Ibid. p. 1403.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source. p. 1403.

[10] Ibid. pp. 1426-28.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source. pp. 1426-28.

[11] Document No. 55, pp. 1575-76.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Document No. 55, pp. 1575-76.

[12] Ibid., p. 1282.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid., p. 1282.

[13] Ibid. p. 1445. In 1862 the Council resolved to buy back this same property for $533,437.50 and repassed the resolution over Mayor Opdyke’s veto on January 3, 1863, thus, as the Mayor pointed out, entailing a new loss to the city of over $499,000, though the property had not increased in value. Proceedings of the Board of Councilmen, Vol. LXXXVIII, pp. 723-25.

[13] Same as above. p. 1445. In 1862, the Council decided to buy back this property for $533,437.50 and passed the resolution again despite Mayor Opdyke’s veto on January 3, 1863. As the Mayor pointed out, this meant a new loss for the city of over $499,000, even though the property's value hadn't increased. Proceedings of the Board of Councilmen, Vol. LXXXVIII, pp. 723-25.

[14] Document No. 55, p. 1572.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Doc No. 55, p. 1572.

[15] Document No. 55, p. 1219.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Document No. 55, p. 1219.

[16] Ibid., pp. 1395-96.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, pp. 1395-96.

[17] Ibid., pp. 1397-98.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., pp. 1397-98.

[18] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XXII, No. 20, pp. 52-54.

[18] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XXII, No. 20, pp. 52-54.

[19] Ibid., No. 43, p. 79.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, No. 43, p. 79.

[20] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.

[21] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XX, No. 32, and Vol. XXII, No. 41.

[21] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XX, No. 32, and Vol. XXII, No. 41.

[22] Ibid., Vol. XXX, part 1, No. 16.

[22] Same source., Vol. XXX, part 1, No. 16.

[23] Ibid., Vol. XX, No. 5.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., Vol. XX, No. 5.

[24] Ibid., No. 6.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., No. 6.

[25] The general extent of this prejudice may be judged from the fact that at this time a number of suits were pending in the courts, seeking to restrain the city from enforcing an earlier order compelling uniforms to be worn.

[25] The overall scope of this bias can be assessed by the fact that, at this time, several lawsuits were in progress in the courts, aiming to prevent the city from enforcing a previous order that required uniforms to be worn.


CHAPTER XX
FERNANDO WOOD'S FIRST TERM
1854-1856

Though the City Reform party brought about some beneficial changes in the system of city government, its Common Council did not meet public expectations. The Tribune, the chief supporter of the party, admitted this (May 3, 1854), declaring that much feeling was manifested over the failure of the reformers to realize the public hopes, and attributing the failure “to the power of those representing the great political parties in the two boards to league together and sell out to each other the interests of the city as partizan or personal considerations might dictate.”

Though the City Reform party made some positive changes in city government, its Common Council didn't live up to what people expected. The Tribune, the party's main supporter, acknowledged this (May 3, 1854), stating that there was a lot of frustration over the reformers' failure to meet public hopes and blaming the failure “on the ability of those in the major political parties in both boards to come together and compromise the city's interests based on partisan or personal reasons.”

Accordingly, preparations were made to overthrow the new party. Fernando Wood now secured the “Softshell” nomination for Mayor, by packing the convention with his henchmen. The “Hardshells” held a separate convention, which ended in a row, a part nominating Wood, and the rest Augustus Schell.

Accordingly, preparations were made to take down the new party. Fernando Wood now secured the “Softshell” nomination for Mayor by filling the convention with his followers. The “Hardshells” held a separate convention, which ended in chaos, with some nominating Wood and the others nominating Augustus Schell.

Wood successfully intrigued to cause the Whigs to separate from the City Reformers; and to further divide the opposition, Tammany nominated sham reformers for the lesser city and State offices. The Whigs nominated for Mayor, John J. Herrick; the City Reformers, Wilson G. Hunt, and the Native Americans, or “Know-Nothings,” springing to life again, put forward James W. Barker. Schell, Wood’s Tammany opponent, withdrew in favor of Hunt.

Wood successfully managed to get the Whigs to break away from the City Reformers; to further split the opposition, Tammany put forward fake reformers for the minor city and State positions. The Whigs nominated John J. Herrick for Mayor; the City Reformers chose Wilson G. Hunt, and the Native Americans, or “Know-Nothings,” revived their organization and nominated James W. Barker. Schell, Wood’s Tammany rival, dropped out and supported Hunt.

The disreputable classes, believing that his success[175] meant increased prosperity to themselves, energetically supported Wood, and the liquor-dealers formally commended him. In the city at this time were about 10,000 shiftless, unprincipled persons who lived by their wits and the labor of others. The trade of a part of these was turning primary elections, packing nominating conventions, repeating and breaking up meetings. Most of these were Wood’s active allies.

The disreputable classes, thinking that his success[175] meant more prosperity for themselves, strongly backed Wood, and the liquor dealers officially praised him. At that time, there were about 10,000 aimless, unscrupulous people in the city who made a living through their wits and the work of others. Some of these were involved in manipulating primary elections, rigging nominating conventions, and disrupting meetings. Most of these individuals were Wood’s active supporters.

He needed them all on election day. With every resource strained to the utmost, he won by a close margin. He was credited with 19,993 votes; Barker with 18,553; Hunt, 15,386, and Herrick, 5,712. Tammany, therefore, succeeded, though in a minority of over 17,000 votes.

He needed all of them on election day. With every resource pushed to the limit, he won by a narrow margin. He received 19,993 votes; Barker got 18,553; Hunt received 15,386, and Herrick had 5,712. Tammany, therefore, succeeded, even though it had a minority of over 17,000 votes.

Upon assuming office, Wood surprised his followers by announcing that he would purge all offices of corruption and give good government. His messages were filled with flattering promises and lofty sentiments. At the outset he seemed disposed for good. He closed the saloons on Sunday, suppressed brothels, gambling houses and rowdyism, had the streets cleaned, and opened a complaint book. The religious part of the community for a time believed in him. He assumed personal charge of the police, and when a bill was introduced in the Legislature to strip him of this power, the foremost citizens called a mass meeting to support him.

Upon taking office, Wood surprised his supporters by announcing that he would eliminate corruption from all offices and provide good governance. His messages were filled with flattering promises and high ideals. At first, he appeared committed to doing good. He closed bars on Sundays, shut down brothels and gambling houses, and reduced rowdiness, had the streets cleaned up, and started a complaint book. The religious part of the community believed in him for a while. He took personal control of the police, and when a bill was introduced in the Legislature to take away this power, the leading citizens held a mass meeting to support him.

The troubles between the “Hardshells” and “Softshells” continued throughout the year 1855. When the latter held their county ratification meeting in the Wigwam and the name of their nominee for Street Commissioner was announced, the “Hardshells,” who had come thither with a nominee of their own, raised an uproar, whereupon “the factions on both sides went to work and pummeled each other pretty soundly and highly satisfactorily to the lookers, for at least ten minutes.”

The conflict between the “Hardshells” and “Softshells” persisted throughout 1855. When the latter held their county ratification meeting in the Wigwam and announced their candidate for Street Commissioner, the “Hardshells,” who had come with their own nominee, created a commotion. As a result, “the factions on both sides began to fight and pummel each other quite vigorously and to the satisfaction of the spectators for at least ten minutes.”

The election of 1855 was of little consequence. All eyes were now turned to the coming contest of 1856. Before the end of a year Wood had begun to reveal his[176] real nature. Many of the decent element that had for a time believed in him began to turn against him. He had also made himself unpopular with certain powerful Sachems by not giving them either a share, or a large enough share, in the spoils. His appointments were made wholly from a circle of personal friends who were more attached to him than to the Tammany organization. Knowing the folly of expecting a renomination from Tammany, as it was then constituted, he set about obtaining it by trickery.

The election of 1855 was insignificant. Everyone's focus was now on the upcoming contest of 1856. By the end of the year, Wood had started to show his[176] true colors. Many of the decent people who had supported him began to turn against him. He also became unpopular with some powerful leaders because he didn’t give them a share, or a large enough share, of the rewards. His appointments were made entirely from a circle of personal friends who were more loyal to him than to the Tammany organization. Recognizing the foolishness of expecting a renomination from Tammany as it was then, he began to scheme to get it through deceit.

Inducing Wilson Small, a Custom House officer holding a seat in the general committee, to resign, Wood had himself substituted. Then he personally assumed control of the primary election inspectors in every ward, so as to manipulate the election of convention delegates. He caused the appointment of an executive committee, which was to have the entire choice of inspectors in every instance in which the general committee failed to agree. This new committee was composed mainly of his friends, and he named himself chairman.

Inducing Wilson Small, a Custom House officer who was on the general committee, to resign, Wood replaced him. Then he took control of the primary election inspectors in every ward to influence the election of convention delegates. He arranged for the appointment of an executive committee that would have complete authority to choose inspectors whenever the general committee couldn't reach a consensus. This new committee was mostly made up of his friends, and he appointed himself as chairman.

His henchmen incited divisions in such of the wards as were not under the control of his inspectors, and the contests, upon being referred to the “executive committee,” were of course decided in Wood’s favor. Thus he appropriated a great majority of the delegates to the nominating convention.

His followers stirred up conflicts in the wards that weren’t under the watch of his inspectors, and the disputes, when sent to the "executive committee," were naturally resolved in Wood's favor. As a result, he secured a large majority of the delegates for the nominating convention.

“It is well known,” wrote Peter B. Sweeny and J. Y. Savage, secretaries of the Tammany General Committee, in a long statement denouncing Wood’s thimble-rigging “that for many years this [primary] system has been degenerating until it has become so corrupt as to be a mere machine in the hands of unprincipled men, by which they foist themselves before the people as the nominees of a party for office in defiance of public sentiment.”[1] Sweeny and Savage charged further than when the[177] primary elections took place under this patent process for cheating the people, the ballot boxes were stuffed and detachments of police were stationed at every poll to aid Wood’s agents and bully his opponents. A sickening mass of evidence of corruption was at hand, Sweeny and Savage recounted.

“It’s well known,” wrote Peter B. Sweeny and J. Y. Savage, secretaries of the Tammany General Committee, in a lengthy statement condemning Wood’s rigging tactics, “that for many years this [primary] system has been deteriorating until it has become so corrupt that it’s just a machine in the hands of dishonest people, allowing them to present themselves to the public as the party’s nominees for office, completely disregarding public opinion.”[1] Sweeny and Savage further alleged that during the[177] primary elections, which followed this obvious cheating scheme, the ballot boxes were stuffed and groups of police were stationed at every polling place to assist Wood’s agents and intimidate his opponents. Sweeny and Savage reported a disturbing amount of evidence pointing to corruption.

Wood was renominated by the city convention, and at an hour when most of his opponents on the general committee were absent, he had that body endorse his nomination by a vote of 56 to 26, nearly all of those voting being office-holders by his grace.

Wood was renominated by the city convention, and at a time when most of his opponents on the general committee were missing, he got that group to support his nomination with a vote of 56 to 26, almost all of the voters being office-holders thanks to him.

He also arranged a reconciliation between the “Hardshells” and “Softshells.” With a show of traditional Tammany custom, the “Softs” marched in Indian file to the Stuyvesant Institute, the headquarters of the “Hards,” and the reunited leaders marched back to Tammany Hall—in pairs, arm-in-arm. The “Hardshell”-“Softshell” contention thus became a thing of the past.

He also set up a reconciliation between the “Hardshells” and “Softshells.” In line with traditional Tammany custom, the “Softs” marched in a single file to the Stuyvesant Institute, the headquarters of the “Hards,” and the reunited leaders walked back to Tammany Hall—side by side, arm-in-arm. The conflict between the “Hardshells” and “Softshells” became a thing of the past.

But Wood’s personal enemies in the Wigwam were not to be appeased, and they nominated a candidate to oppose him—James S. Libby. Bitter feelings were aroused. At the Wood ratification meeting in the Wigwam, October 22, both Wood and Anti-Wood men crowded in, and then ensued another of those clashes for which Tammany Hall had become so celebrated. When John Kelly mentioned Wood’s name the Anti-Wood men raised a din and smothered the speaker’s voice. The Wood men, growing enraged, “pitched into the Anti-Woodites hot and heavy, and for a time a scene of the wildest clamor ensued. A general fight took place in front of the speaker’s stand and all round the room. Blows were given and exchanged with great spirit, and not a few faces were badly disfigured.” After a few planks had been plucked from the stand and wielded with telling effect, the Wood men won. “The great body of the Libbyites were kicked out of the room and down the stairs with a velocity proportionate to the expelling force behind.”

But Wood’s personal enemies in the Wigwam weren’t going to back down, and they nominated a candidate to run against him—James S. Libby. Tensions were high. At the Wood ratification meeting in the Wigwam on October 22, both Wood supporters and Anti-Wood men packed in, leading to another one of those chaotic confrontations for which Tammany Hall had become infamous. When John Kelly brought up Wood’s name, the Anti-Wood supporters erupted in noise, drowning out the speaker. The Wood supporters, getting furious, “went after the Anti-Woodites fiercely, and for a while, it turned into a scene of complete chaos. A full-on brawl broke out in front of the speaker’s stand and all around the room. Fights were exchanged with a lot of energy, and several faces ended up badly bruised.” After a few planks were torn from the stand and used effectively, the Wood supporters triumphed. “The majority of the Libby supporters were thrown out of the room and down the stairs with a force that matched the energy behind their expulsion.”

The City Reform party was far from being satisfied with Wood’s administration. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that by the time of his second year in office the blackness of his administration exceeded anything known before. Seasoned men fancied they knew something of corruption, extravagance and malfeasance in the City Hall, but by 1856 they better understood the growth of these under a reckless and unprincipled Mayor.

The City Reform party was definitely not happy with Wood’s administration. In fact, it’s no overstatement to say that by the time he reached his second year in office, the corruption in his administration was worse than anything seen before. Experienced people thought they knew about corruption, waste, and misconduct in City Hall, but by 1856 they had a better grasp of how these issues had expanded under a reckless and unethical Mayor.

The saloon power had grown until it controlled the politics of the city. In every groggery could be found a crowd of loafers and bruisers who could always be relied upon to pack a primary or insure or defeat the election of certain nominees. In these saloons the ward politicians held their meetings, and the keepers were ready at all times to furnish persons to parade, carrying partizan banners they could not read, or to cheer at mass meetings at the drop of a handkerchief. The saloon-keepers also furnished cheap illegal voters, ballot-box stuffers and thoroughbred “shoulder-hitters,” to intimidate peaceable citizens, or as a last resort, to smash the ballot boxes.

The power of the saloon had grown to the point where it controlled the city's politics. In every bar, you could find a crowd of slackers and tough guys who could always be counted on to pack a primary or guarantee the election or defeat of certain nominees. In these bars, the local politicians held their meetings, and the bar owners were always ready to provide people to march, carrying party banners they couldn’t read, or to cheer at mass meetings on cue. The bartenders also supplied cheap illegal voters, ballot box stuffers, and skilled enforcers to intimidate peaceful citizens, or, as a last resort, to smash the ballot boxes.

The saloon-keepers were largely above the law. A disingenuous bill, passed in 1855, ordered the saloons to be closed on Sunday, but made no provision for enforcement. They were accordingly kept open, likely enough through assurances from Wood that the owners would not be molested. Their support of the Mayor was well-nigh unanimous.

The saloon owners mostly ignored the law. A deceptive bill passed in 1855 required saloons to close on Sundays but didn’t include any rules for enforcing it. As a result, they stayed open, probably because Wood assured the owners that they wouldn’t face any trouble. Their support for the Mayor was nearly unanimous.

It was the domination of politics by this element that caused great irritation and disgust. But the opposition to Wood was hopelessly divided. It had to contend, moreover, with the adverse factor of the introduction into the campaign of national issues. The fear of the new Republican party was sure to bring out a heavy vote for Buchanan and Breckinridge, and on the strength of this wave Tammany reasonably expected to be again swept into power.

It was the control of politics by this group that caused significant annoyance and disgust. However, the opposition to Wood was completely fragmented. It also had to deal with the added challenge of national issues being brought into the campaign. The fear of the new Republican party was sure to mobilize a strong vote for Buchanan and Breckinridge, and based on this momentum, Tammany reasonably expected to regain power.

The City Reformers had greatly declined in numbers,[179] but they again came forward for the contest, nominating Judge James R. Whiting.[2] The Native American party, still maintaining its bitterness against the control of politics by foreigners, chose Isaac O. Barker, and the Whigs, Anthony J. Bleecker, making, with Wood and Libby, five Mayoralty candidates.

The City Reformers had significantly decreased in number,[179] but they stepped up again for the election, nominating Judge James R. Whiting.[2] The Native American party, still harboring resentment towards foreign influence in politics, selected Isaac O. Barker, and the Whigs nominated Anthony J. Bleecker, resulting in a total of five candidates for mayor alongside Wood and Libby.

Though backed by the dregs of the city on the one hand, Wood did not neglect to secure some “respectability” on the other. During the campaign he received a testimonial signed by some of the leading bankers and merchants, praising him and his administration and expressing the hope of his reelection. Nearly all of the signers, it was afterwards disclosed, profited by Wood’s placing of city funds or buying of city goods.

Though supported by the city's lower class on one side, Wood didn’t forget to secure some “respectability” on the other. During the campaign, he received a letter of endorsement signed by some of the top bankers and merchants, praising him and his administration while expressing hopes for his reelection. It was later revealed that nearly all the signers benefited from Wood's handling of city funds or purchasing of city goods.

Wood sought to force every man on the police force to subscribe to his election fund, one policeman, who refused to contribute, being kept on duty twenty-four hours at a stretch. From this source alone he gathered in from $8,500 to $10,000.

Wood aimed to make every officer on the police force contribute to his election fund. One cop who refused to donate ended up working twenty-four hours straight. From this alone, he collected between $8,500 and $10,000.

On election day the scum of the town shouted, repeated and bruised for Wood. Candidates were traded openly, and bribing was unconcealed.[3] The majority of the policemen were off on furlough, given by the Mayor as head of the Police Department, assisting actively for his reelection. At the polling places, so terrific was the competition for the millions of city plunder, that the Wood[180] and Anti-Wood men fought savagely. In the Sixth Ward the Wood partizans, upon being attacked, retreated for the while, and coming back, armed with brickbats, clubs, axes and pistols, set upon and routed their foes. The police meanwhile calmly looked on, until the riot was at its height, when they made a show of concern by firing fifteen or more shots, all of which fortunately went astray. The Wood partizans then broke the ballot boxes to pieces and carried off the fragments for kindling wood. In the Seventeenth Ward the Anti-Wood men destroyed some of the Wood boxes; and in the First, and most of the other wards, the day was enlivened with assaults, riots and stabbings.

On election day, the trash of the town yelled, repeated themselves, and got rough for Wood. Candidates were openly traded, and bribery was obvious.[3] Most of the policemen were on leave, granted by the Mayor, who was head of the Police Department and was actively helping with his re-election. At the polling places, the competition for the city's millions was so intense that the Wood[180] and Anti-Wood supporters clashed fiercely. In the Sixth Ward, the Wood partisans, when attacked, temporarily fell back, but then returned armed with bricks, bats, clubs, and guns, launching a fierce counter-attack and driving off their opponents. The police meanwhile just watched until the riot reached its peak, at which point they pretended to care by firing off fifteen or more shots, all of which fortunately missed. The Wood supporters then smashed the ballot boxes to pieces and took the remnants as firewood. In the Seventeenth Ward, the Anti-Wood supporters destroyed some of the Wood boxes; and in the First and most of the other wards, the day was filled with beatings, riots, and stabbings.

The count of the vote gave Wood, 34,860; Barker, 25,209; Bleecker, 9,654; Libby, 4,764, and Whiting, 3,646. The Buchanan electors carried the city with 41,913 votes; Fillmore, the American candidate, and Fremont, Republican, were allowed respectively 19,924 and 17,771 votes. Tammany Hall obtained a serviceable majority in the Common Council.

The vote count showed Wood with 34,860 votes; Barker with 25,209; Bleecker with 9,654; Libby with 4,764; and Whiting with 3,646. The Buchanan electors won the city with 41,913 votes; Fillmore, the American candidate, received 19,924 votes, and Fremont, the Republican, got 17,771 votes. Tammany Hall secured a useful majority in the Common Council.

The Republicans maintained that 10,000 fraudulent Democratic votes were cast in New York City and Brooklyn, and credited Wood with having profited by the most of those cast in this city. It was not an unreasonable contention, in view of the enormous increase over the vote of two years before.

The Republicans claimed that 10,000 fake Democratic votes were cast in New York City and Brooklyn, and they accused Wood of benefiting the most from those votes in the city. This wasn’t an unreasonable claim, considering the huge increase compared to the votes from two years earlier.

A few days after the election a meeting in Tammany Hall, called to celebrate Buchanan’s triumph, resolved that next to the success of Buchanan and Breckinridge, “the brightest and most signal achievement of the Democratic party, at this election, was the triumphant election of Fernando Wood!”

A few days after the election, a meeting at Tammany Hall, held to celebrate Buchanan’s victory, concluded that next to the success of Buchanan and Breckinridge, “the most noteworthy and significant accomplishment of the Democratic party in this election was the successful election of Fernando Wood!”

FOOTNOTES

[1] This statement was published officially in the New York newspapers, September 27, 1856.

[1] This statement was officially published in the New York newspapers on September 27, 1856.

[2] Whiting, according to the testimony of James Perkins, before the Senate Investigating Committee in 1833, had been the chief lobbyist in the task of securing the notorious Seventh Ward Bank charter in 1831. It is a striking commentary on political standards of the day that unrebutted charges of such a nature formed no bar to the advancement of a politician to such distinctions as those of Judge, District Attorney and reform candidate for Mayor.

[2] Whiting, based on James Perkins' testimony before the Senate Investigating Committee in 1833, was the key lobbyist in getting the infamous Seventh Ward Bank charter in 1831. It's a telling reflection of the political standards of that time that unchallenged accusations like this didn’t prevent a politician from rising to prominent positions such as Judge, District Attorney, and reform candidate for Mayor.

[3] Josiah Quincy related, in a lecture in Boston, that while in New York City on this election day, he saw $25 given for a single vote for a member of Congress. Upon expressing his surprise, Quincy was told that this man could afford to pay it. If reelected, it would be a money-making operation. He had received $30,000 at the last session for “getting a bill through,” and at that rate could afford to pay a good price.

[3] Josiah Quincy mentioned in a lecture in Boston that while he was in New York City on election day, he witnessed someone offering $25 for a single vote for a Congress member. When he expressed his astonishment, he was informed that this individual could afford to pay that amount. If reelected, it would turn into a profitable venture for him. He had earned $30,000 in the last session for "getting a bill passed," and at that rate, he could easily pay a high price.


CHAPTER XXI
WOOD’S SECOND ADMINISTRATION
1856-1859

Under Wood’s second administration city affairs went from bad to worse. The departments reeked with frauds. The city paid Robert W. Lowber $196,000 for a lot officially declared to be worth only $60,000 and to two-thirds of which, it was proved, Lowber had no title. Controller Flagg charged that both the Mayor and the Common Council were parties to it.[1] Fraudulent computations and illegitimate contracts were covered by false entries.[2] Amounts on the ledger were revised so as to steal considerable sums from the city outright.[3] To Bartlett Smith had been awarded a contract for grading certain streets. Before beginning work, however, the Legislature created Central Park out of that very territory.[4] Smith demanded $80,000 from the city “for trouble in arranging to do the grading”—a[182] claim the Common Council allowed, but Flagg refused to pay.

Under Wood’s second administration, city affairs just got worse. The departments were rife with fraud. The city paid Robert W. Lowber $196,000 for a lot that was officially valued at only $60,000, and it was proven that Lowber didn't even have title to two-thirds of it. Controller Flagg accused both the Mayor and the Common Council of being involved in this. [1] Fraudulent calculations and illegitimate contracts were hidden behind false entries. [2] The amounts on the ledger were changed to outright steal substantial sums from the city. [3] Bartlett Smith was given a contract to grade certain streets. However, before he started the work, the Legislature established Central Park in that same area. [4] Smith demanded $80,000 from the city “for the trouble of arranging to do the grading”—a claim the Common Council approved, but Flagg refused to pay.

It was generally charged that Wood sold the office of Street Commissioner to the notorious Charles Devlin[5] for $50,000 cash, with certain reservations as to the patronage and profits. Devlin recouped himself; for an investigation revealed that he spent half a million dollars on contracts of which he was either the real contractor or surety, and on which he made the prices 75 per cent higher than they ought to have been.[6] Of how much the city was plundered it was impossible to find out, since no reliable accounts of expenditures were kept in the Finance Department.[7] Not a few officials, relinquishing offices paying about $2,500 a year, retired loaded with riches and surrounded by friends whom they had enriched. Wood himself was now reputed to be worth $400,000.

It was widely said that Wood sold the position of Street Commissioner to the infamous Charles Devlin[5] for $50,000 in cash, with some conditions regarding the patronage and profits. Devlin made his money back; an investigation showed that he spent half a million dollars on contracts where he was either the main contractor or guarantor, and he marked up the prices by 75 percent more than they should have been.[6] It was impossible to determine how much the city was actually robbed since reliable records of expenditures were not maintained in the Finance Department.[7] Many officials, giving up jobs that paid about $2,500 a year, retired wealthy and surrounded by friends they had enriched. Wood himself was believed to be worth $400,000.

Even the Judiciary was held in general contempt. The Lowber fraud (see previous page) was promptly excused and the defendant exonerated by the courts. In November, 1855, a City Judge was tried for corruption in having entered a nolle prosequi in a certain case. The verdict was “not guilty,” with this remarkable addition: “And the jury are unanimously of opinion that in the entry of the nolle prosequi by the City Judge he has been guilty of irregularity, and it is the unanimous recommendation of the jury that Judge —— resign.” He resigned.[8] In December, 1855, during a trial for murder in the Supreme Court, counsel for the defendant exclaimed: “I know the jury have too much intelligence[183] to pay any regard to the assumptions of the Court.”[9] A man was killed at a prize fight. The Coroner, after stating the evidence at the inquest, concluded: “If the persons implicated are tried before our Court of Sessions they will have reason to congratulate themselves, as it is a difficult matter in this city to convict a person charged with any other crime than theft.”[10] In January, 1856, the seat of one of the Judges of the Supreme Court was contested by two candidates, both claiming to have been elected by popular vote. Both asserted the right to sit; in opposition to the opinions of the Judges sitting, one of the contestants took and kept his seat by pure “nerve.”[11]

Even the judiciary was generally held in contempt. The Lowber fraud (see previous page) was quickly brushed off and the defendant was cleared by the courts. In November 1855, a city judge was put on trial for corruption for having entered a nolle prosequi in a certain case. The verdict was “not guilty,” with the notable addition: “And the jury are unanimously of the opinion that in the entry of the nolle prosequi by the City Judge, he has been guilty of irregularity, and it is the unanimous recommendation of the jury that Judge —— resign.” He resigned.[8] In December 1855, during a murder trial in the Supreme Court, the defendant's lawyer exclaimed: “I know the jury have too much intelligence[183] to pay any attention to the Court's assumptions.”[9] A man was killed at a prize fight. The Coroner, after presenting the evidence at the inquest, concluded: “If the people involved are tried in our Court of Sessions, they will have reason to feel fortunate, as it is a tough task in this city to convict someone charged with any crime other than theft.”[10] In January 1856, the seat of one of the Supreme Court Judges was contested by two candidates, both claiming to have been elected by popular vote. Both claimed the right to sit; against the opinions of the judges present, one of the contenders took and maintained his seat purely by “nerve.”[11]

A new city charter, adopted in 1857, changed the date of municipal elections to the first Tuesday in December, and provided for an election for Mayor and Common Council in December, 1857. The change was aimed partly at Wood. He had probably expected severe opposition of some kind, for he had early begun planning for the continued control of the Tammany General Committee, so as to secure a renomination.

A new city charter, adopted in 1857, changed the date of municipal elections to the first Tuesday in December and set up an election for Mayor and Common Council in December 1857. The change was partly aimed at Wood. He likely anticipated some strong opposition, as he had started planning early to maintain control of the Tammany General Committee to secure a renomination.

In the primary elections, late in 1856, for delegates to this committee for 1857, a majority favorable to Wood had been elected, after violence and ballot-box stuffing in every ward. The Wood men took possession of the Wigwam and elected Wilson Small chairman. The rival party met in another place and organized a general committee. Each put forward the claim of “regularity.”

In the primary elections, late in 1856, for delegates to this committee for 1857, a majority supportive of Wood was elected, following violence and ballot-box stuffing in every ward. The Wood supporters took control of the Wigwam and elected Wilson Small as chairman. The opposing party gathered in a different location and formed a general committee. Each side claimed to be the "regular" one.

As the “usages” of the party required that the “regular” committee should have legal possession of Tammany Hall, it was necessary to determine which that committee was. Then the Sachems stepped in. Seven of them—a majority of one—were Wood’s personal enemies. By a vote of seven to five the Sachems concluded to order the election of a new general committee, which[184] was to have all known Democrats enrolled into associations.

As the party's "rules" required that the "official" committee have legal control of Tammany Hall, it was essential to figure out which committee that was. Then the Sachems intervened. Seven of them—a majority by one—were personal foes of Wood. By a vote of seven to five, the Sachems decided to call for the election of a new general committee, which[184] was to enroll all known Democrats into organizations.

“Tammany Society,” said the “seven Sachems’” report,

“Tammany Society,” said the “seven Sachems’” report,

“is the undisputed owner of Tammany Hall; and the right to control the use of that building which is inherent in its ownership has been fully secured by the lease. The Council is determined that their action shall vindicate fully the rights and powers of the venerable society of which they are officers; and also, prove a safe and efficient barrier against the tide of corruption and fraud which is sapping the power of the great party to which the society has adhered during the whole period of its existence.”

“is the clear owner of Tammany Hall; and the right to manage the use of that building, which comes with ownership, has been completely secured by the lease. The Council is determined that their actions will fully uphold the rights and powers of the respected society of which they are leaders; and also serve as a strong and effective barrier against the wave of corruption and fraud that is undermining the power of the major party that the society has supported throughout its entire existence.”

At the society’s annual election, on May 20, the Isaac V. Fowler, or “reform” ticket, had the names of some men of note—Samuel J. Tilden, Elijah F. Purdy, Peter B. Sweeny, Edward Cooper, William H. Cornell, John McKeon and Emanuel B. Hart—while Wood’s candidates were inferior hack politicians and nonentities. The “seven Sachems” had previously managed to get into the Wigwam unobserved by the Wood men, and had rapidly elected nearly sixty new members, all their own partizans, to the society.[12] These voted at the election, enabling Wood’s opponents to beat him by a majority of sixty.[13] Then the “seven Sachems” turned Wood and his men out of the Wigwam.

At the society’s annual election on May 20, the Isaac V. Fowler, or “reform” ticket, included some well-known names—Samuel J. Tilden, Elijah F. Purdy, Peter B. Sweeny, Edward Cooper, William H. Cornell, John McKeon, and Emanuel B. Hart—while Wood’s candidates were just mediocre politicians and nobody special. The “seven Sachems” had previously managed to sneak into the Wigwam without being seen by Wood’s team and quickly elected nearly sixty new members, all their supporters, to the society.[12] These members voted in the election, allowing Wood’s opponents to defeat him by a majority of sixty.[13] Then the “seven Sachems” kicked Wood and his team out of the Wigwam.

In a public address, the Wood men thereupon declared the society an irresponsible body of less than four hundred members, one-third of whom held no communication with the Democratic party, and that of its thirteen Sachems seven were “Libby bolters.” “What, then, is the issue?” asked the address. “Shall the Sachems rule[185] the people; or shall the people rule themselves? Shall the Sachems of this close corporation, to procure offices for themselves and friends, be permitted, unrebuked by the people, to exercise this omnipotent, dictatorial, supervisory power over the great Democratic party, its organization and interests, to rule out or rule in your general committees whenever it suit their caprice or selfish purposes?”

In a public speech, the Wood men declared that the society was an irresponsible group of less than four hundred members, one-third of whom had no ties to the Democratic party, and that out of its thirteen Sachems, seven were “Libby bolters.” “So, what’s the issue?” asked the speech. “Will the Sachems control the people, or will the people govern themselves? Should the Sachems of this exclusive group, aiming to secure positions for themselves and their friends, be allowed, without any backlash from the people, to wield this immense, dictatorial power over the entire Democratic party, its organization, and its interests, influencing your general committees whenever it suits their whims or selfish goals?”

The control of the police force was considered as necessary as ever to success at the election. The changes of 1853, from which much was hoped, had proved of little benefit. The force was in a chaotic state. Political and pecuniary reasons alone guided the appointment of policemen. No record of merit was kept; there was no systematic instruction of policemen in their duties except as to drill. Some Captains wore uniforms, others refused. When an applicant appointed to the force was tested for qualifications in reading, a large newspaper was given to him, and he was told to read the title. Murder abounded, and the city was full of escaped convicts.[14] One of the most important provisions of a special act of 1857 was the transfer of the police from city control to that of the State. Unwilling to surrender so effective a hold, Wood resisted the Legislature’s action. For a time there were two police departments—the Metropolitan force, under the State Commissioners, and the municipal police, under the Mayor—each contending for supremacy. One day a part of the two forces came into collision in the City Hall, and twelve men were wounded. It was found necessary to summon the militia to quell the disturbances, and Wood was arrested. Finding resistance useless, he submitted grudgingly to the new order.[15]

The police force was seen as essential as ever for success in the election. The changes made in 1853, from which a lot was expected, ended up being of little use. The force was in disarray. Appointments of policemen were based solely on political and financial motivations. There was no record of merit kept; the only training for policemen was related to drill. Some Captains wore uniforms while others refused to. When an applicant was tested for literacy, he was handed a large newspaper and asked to read the title. Crime was rampant, and the city was filled with escaped convicts.[14] One of the key provisions of a special act in 1857 was moving the police from city oversight to that of the State. Reluctant to give up such a strong hold, Wood opposed the Legislature’s decision. For a while, there were two police departments—the Metropolitan force, managed by the State Commissioners, and the municipal police, under the Mayor—each vying for control. One day, part of the two forces clashed at City Hall, resulting in twelve injuries. It became necessary to call in the militia to restore order, and Wood was arrested. Realizing resistance was futile, he reluctantly accepted the new arrangement.[15]

The police being so disorganized, the criminal classes[186] ran the town. Chief among Wood’s supporters were the “Dead Rabbits” or “Black Birds,”—a lawless “gang” who overawed certain portions of the city and who had a rival in the “Bowery Boys,” whose sole profession seems to have been to pack primaries, break ballot boxes and fight the “Dead Rabbits.” On July 4, 1857, the “Dead Rabbits,” presumably having nothing else to do, attacked a body of police in Jackson street. A band of “Bowery Boys” hurried to the front, and a pitched street battle ensued, pistols and muskets being procured from neighboring places. Barricades were thrown up in the most approved Parisian style. The result was the killing of ten and the wounding of eighty persons, some of whom were innocent bystanders. This was the most deadly of the numerous collisions of these “gangs.” As they had a powerful political influence, the police did not molest them.[16]

The police were so disorganized that the criminal classes[186] ran the town. Chief among Wood’s supporters were the “Dead Rabbits” or “Black Birds”—a lawless “gang” that intimidated certain parts of the city and had a rival known as the “Bowery Boys,” whose main activities seemed to include rigging primaries, tampering with ballot boxes, and fighting the “Dead Rabbits.” On July 4, 1857, the “Dead Rabbits,” likely with nothing better to do, attacked a group of police on Jackson Street. A crew of “Bowery Boys” rushed in, leading to an all-out street battle, with pistols and muskets gathered from nearby places. Barricades were set up in a fashion reminiscent of Paris. The outcome was ten deaths and eighty injuries, some of whom were innocent bystanders. This was the deadliest of the many clashes between these “gangs.” Since they had significant political power, the police didn’t bother them.[16]

As a member of the Metropolitan Police Commission, Mayor Wood about this time was instrumental in giving out a contract for 4,000 glass ballot boxes, at $15 apiece. It was disclosed in James Horner’s affidavit before Judge Davis, in the Supreme Court, in November of this year, that the city needed no more than 1,200 of the boxes; that Wood’s brother had secured the 4,000 boxes at a cost of less than $5 apiece and that the Mayor was to share in the $40,000 of expected profits.

As a member of the Metropolitan Police Commission, Mayor Wood was key in awarding a contract for 4,000 glass ballot boxes at $15 each. In James Horner’s affidavit before Judge Davis in the Supreme Court in November of this year, it was revealed that the city only needed about 1,200 of the boxes; that Wood’s brother had obtained the 4,000 boxes for under $5 each, and that the Mayor was set to benefit from the $40,000 in anticipated profits.

Wood neglected no means of ingratiating himself with the masses. The panic of 1857 suddenly deprived over 30,000 mechanics and laborers in the city of employment. Wood proposed the employment of the idle on public works, and the buying by the city of 50,000 barrels of flour and an equal amount of other provisions to be disposed of to the needy at cost.[17] The Common Council failed to see the value of this plan, but did appropriate a sum for public works in Central Park, the better share of[187] which went to contractors and petty politicians. To win the good will of the Roman Catholics, becoming more and more a power, the Common Council gave over to the Roman Catholic Orphan Asylum a perpetual lease of the entire plot from Fifth to Fourth avenue, Fifty-first to Fifty-second street, at a rental of $1 a year.[18]

Wood did everything he could to win over the public. The financial crisis of 1857 left over 30,000 workers in the city without jobs. Wood suggested putting the unemployed to work on public projects and having the city buy 50,000 barrels of flour and the same amount of other supplies to be sold to those in need at cost.[17] The Common Council didn’t recognize the value of this plan but did allocate some funds for public works in Central Park, most of which ended up benefiting contractors and local politicians. To gain the support of the increasingly influential Roman Catholics, the Common Council granted a perpetual lease of the entire area from Fifth to Fourth Avenue, Fifty-first to Fifty-second Street, to the Roman Catholic Orphan Asylum for a rent of $1 a year.[18]

So resourceful was Wood and so remarkable his political ingenuity that though he and his general committee were driven out by the Tammany Society, he nevertheless brought things about so that the Democratic convention in Tammany Hall, on October 15, renominated him for Mayor, by 75 votes to 12. The Tammany General Committee thereupon openly repudiated him, and the curious complication was presented of a candidate who was the Tammany “regular” nominee, yet opposed by both the society and the general committee.

Wood was incredibly resourceful and had a remarkable knack for politics. Even though he and his general committee were pushed out by the Tammany Society, he still managed to get himself renominated for Mayor at the Democratic convention in Tammany Hall on October 15, winning by 75 votes to 12. The Tammany General Committee then publicly rejected him, resulting in the unusual situation of having a candidate who was the official Tammany nominee but was opposed by both the society and the general committee.

Instantly a determined citizen’s movement to defeat him sprang up. The city taxes had nearly doubled in the three years of Wood’s administration and were now over $8,000,000, of which over $5,000,000 had already been signed away in contracts or spent in advance of collection. Yet the Common Council had recently resolved to spend the exorbitant sum of $5,000,000 on a new City Hall. The Mayor vetoed the resolution only when the most intense public opposition was manifested.

Instantly, a determined grassroots movement to take him down emerged. The city taxes had nearly doubled in the three years of Wood’s administration and were now over $8,000,000, with more than $5,000,000 already committed in contracts or spent before collection. Yet, the Common Council had just decided to spend the outrageous amount of $5,000,000 on a new City Hall. The Mayor only vetoed the resolution when the public opposition became overwhelming.

A committee of citizens, representative of the Republicans, Democrats and Native Americans, nominated Daniel F. Tiemann, a paint dealer, and a member of Tammany Hall, but who was an Alderman and as Governor of the Almshouse had made a good record.

A committee of citizens, representing Republicans, Democrats, and Native Americans, nominated Daniel F. Tiemann, a paint dealer and a member of Tammany Hall, who had been an Alderman and had created a solid record as Governor of the Almshouse.

To Wood’s support there concentrated the preponderance of the foreign born, the native rowdies and the usual mass blinded into voting for the “regular” ticket. The gamblers, brothel-keepers, immigrant runners and swindlers of every kind bought and cheated for him in the belief[188] that the reformers would drive them from the city. Wood had taken the precaution to manufacture thousands of voters. From the Wigwam, where the Wood partizans backed up their right to meet with fists, drummers-up were sent to bring in prospective citizens. Upon promising faithfully to vote the Tammany ticket, a card, valued at fifty cents, was furnished gratuitously to each. It was addressed to a Judge who owed his election to Tammany, and read:

To Wood’s support rallied most of the foreign-born, local troublemakers, and the usual crowd duped into voting for the “regular” ticket. The gamblers, brothel owners, immigrant traffickers, and all sorts of con artists bought votes and cheated for him, convinced that the reformers would push them out of the city. Wood had made sure to create thousands of voters. From the Wigwam, where Wood’s supporters defended their right to gather with their fists, they sent out “drummers” to recruit potential voters. Those who promised to vote for the Tammany ticket received a card valued at fifty cents, given to them for free. It was addressed to a Judge who owed his election to Tammany and read:

“Common Pleas:

“Common Pleas Court:”

“Please naturalize the bearer.

“Please make the bearer a citizen.”

“N. Seagrist, chairman.”[19]

"N. Seagrist, chair."[19]

From 3,000 to 4,000 voters, it was estimated, were turned out by this process.

From 3,000 to 4,000 voters were estimated to have participated in this process.

The sentiment of certain politicians may be taken from John Cochrane’s[20] remark that “he would vote for the devil incarnate if nominated by Tammany Hall.” Meanwhile they took care to make out Wood to be a much-abused man. At the ratification meeting in Tammany Hall, on November 23, long resolutions were passed, fulsomely flattering Wood and asking voters to remember that if Wood was assailed, so Jefferson, Jackson and Daniel Webster were pursued to their graves by harpies. The voters were asked not to be deceived by the abuse of the graceless, godless characters and disappointed demagogues.

The feelings of some politicians can be summed up by John Cochrane’s[20] comment that “he would vote for the devil himself if he was nominated by Tammany Hall.” At the same time, they worked to portray Wood as a victim. During the ratification meeting at Tammany Hall on November 23, lengthy resolutions were passed, overly praising Wood and urging voters to remember that if Wood was attacked, so were Jefferson, Jackson, and Daniel Webster, who were chased to their graves by critics. Voters were warned not to be misled by the insults from unscrupulous, irreligious figures and frustrated politicians.

Wood and his partizans strained every nerve for success. But it was a futile effort. The opposition won, Tiemann receiving 43,216 votes, to 40,889 for Wood. His large vote, however, showed the dangerous strength of the worst classes of the city, and boded ill for the years to come.

Wood and his supporters did everything they could to succeed. But it was a wasted effort. The opposition won, with Tiemann getting 43,216 votes, compared to 40,889 for Wood. His significant vote count, however, revealed the troubling strength of the city’s worst classes and suggested bad times ahead.

The opposition of the Tammany Society and the general committee having been responsible for his defeat, Wood made renewed efforts to regain sway over both. On their part, elated at his supposed downfall, the Anti-Wood members of the general committee decided to expel Daniel E. Sickles and C. Godfrey Gunther, two of his supporters, and met for that purpose in the Wigwam on December 9, 1857.

The conflict between the Tammany Society and the general committee led to his defeat, so Wood made new attempts to regain influence over both. Meanwhile, pleased with his expected downfall, the Anti-Wood members of the general committee decided to expel Daniel E. Sickles and C. Godfrey Gunther, two of his supporters, and gathered for this purpose in the Wigwam on December 9, 1857.

Wood’s followers thought proper to impress upon the general committee a sense of their strength. Accordingly, their fighting men were present in full force, awaiting an opportunity to mingle in the proceedings. The probability of a violent row increasing momentarily, the Metropolitan police were summoned to Tammany Hall. For a time they kept the hostiles within bounds; but the bar was well patronized, and large delegations of the “Dead Rabbits” and “shoulder-hitters” from the wards were flowing in constantly.

Wood’s supporters believed it was important to show the general committee their strength. So, their fighters showed up in full force, ready to join in the proceedings. As the chances of a violent clash increased, the Metropolitan police were called to Tammany Hall. For a while, they managed to keep the troublemakers in check, but the bar was busy, and large groups of the “Dead Rabbits” and “shoulder-hitters” from the neighborhoods kept arriving.

At 9 o’clock a desperate fight was begun in the center of the bar-room, amid intense excitement. By using their clubs unsparingly, the forty policemen succeeded in separating the combatants, though not before a young man, Cornelius Woods, had been shot in the shoulder with a slug. Unwilling to draw upon themselves the resentment of the influential ward politicians, the police made no arrests. The meeting broke up without definite action being taken in the matter of expelling the two supporters of Wood.

At 9 o’clock, a chaotic brawl broke out in the center of the bar room, creating a lot of excitement. The forty police officers managed to separate the fighters by using their clubs without holding back, but not before a young man, Cornelius Woods, was shot in the shoulder. To avoid angering the powerful local politicians, the police didn't make any arrests. The meeting ended without any concrete decision about removing the two supporters of Woods.

The first and chief point in the struggle for the control of the organization was, as usual, the control of the Tammany Society. Both factions were alive to this necessity.[190] On April 13, 1858, 150 members of the society met at the Westchester House, Bowery and Broome streets, where it was announced that 212 members were pledged to vote for Anti-Wood Sachems. Some of these members were seeking the ascendency for their own benefit, while others were not active in politics at all, but had become disgusted with Wood’s methods and men. At the election, six days later, the Anti-Wood ticket, headed by Isaac V. Fowler and Nelson J. Waterbury, won by a majority of nearly 100, 378 members voting. More than twenty members who had not been at an election of the society for twenty years or more, and a large number who had eschewed voting for ten years, hastened, some from distances, to deposit their votes. Three came from Hudson, a number from Albany, two from Washington, and one from Cincinnati.

The main issue in the fight for control of the organization was, as usual, who would control the Tammany Society. Both sides were aware of this need.[190] On April 13, 1858, 150 members of the society gathered at the Westchester House on Bowery and Broome streets, where it was announced that 212 members were committed to voting for Anti-Wood Sachems. Some of these members were looking to gain power for their own interests, while others were not involved in politics but were fed up with Wood's tactics and associates. At the election six days later, the Anti-Wood slate, led by Isaac V. Fowler and Nelson J. Waterbury, won by nearly 100 votes, with 378 members participating. More than twenty members who hadn’t voted in the society’s elections for twenty years or more, as well as many who hadn't voted in ten years, rushed to cast their ballots, traveling from distant places. Three came from Hudson, several from Albany, two from Washington, and one from Cincinnati.

The result was Wood’s forced withdrawal from the organization. He immediately started a Democratic organization opposed to Tammany and upon the same lines. It was known generally as “Mozart Hall,” from the name of the assembly room in which it met. Wood denounced Tammany, declaring that its nominees were chosen by five members of the Tammany Society, in a parlor, and ferociously expressed his determination to wage war upon the society as long as he lived until (this reservation was added) “it opened its doors.”

The outcome was that Wood had to leave the organization. He quickly set up a Democratic group that stood against Tammany and operated in a similar way. It was widely referred to as “Mozart Hall,” named after the assembly room where it held its meetings. Wood criticized Tammany, stating that its candidates were selected by just five members of the Tammany Society in a private room, and strongly expressed his commitment to fight against the society for the rest of his life until (this note was added) “it opened its doors.”

Each hall, as a matter of political business, made the most virtuous and the strongest claims of being the true Democratic organization. Each execrated the other and announced itself as the sole, valiant, sincere upholder of Democracy.

Each hall, as part of political maneuvering, asserted the most virtuous and strongest claims of being the true Democratic organization. Each condemned the other and proclaimed itself as the only, brave, and genuine defender of Democracy.

Wood’s enemies made haste to guarantee their ascendency when, on December 28, the Sachems ordered elections for the committees to be held on December 30, thus giving but one day’s notice of the event. Moreover, they forced upon all persons accepting membership in the committees, a pledge that in case of their election they would support[191] the Tammany organization and all nominations made under its authority, and disclaim allegiance to any other organization, party or clique.

Wood's opponents rushed to secure their power when, on December 28, the Sachems called for elections for the committees to take place on December 30, giving only one day's notice of the event. Additionally, they required anyone accepting membership in the committees to pledge that if they were elected, they would support[191] the Tammany organization and all nominations made under its authority, while also rejecting any loyalty to any other organization, party, or group.

The election of delegates to the various nominating conventions, in the Fall of 1858, was attended by the customary disorder. Wood’s partizans were everywhere inciting trouble. At O’Connell’s Hall, on Mulberry street, a crowd, seeing that the result was unfavorable to their side, split the ballot boxes and threw them into the street. The “Dead Rabbits,” scenting trouble, appeared hastily, and a fight ensued on Hester street, in which two of them were shot.

The election of delegates to the different nominating conventions in the fall of 1858 was marked by the usual chaos. Wood’s supporters were stirring up trouble everywhere. At O’Connell’s Hall on Mulberry Street, a crowd, seeing that the outcome wasn’t going their way, broke open the ballot boxes and tossed them into the street. The “Dead Rabbits,” sensing trouble, showed up quickly, and a fight broke out on Hester Street, where two of them were shot.

This municipal election was the first in which the Democratic voters of Irish nativity or lineage insisted on a full share of the best places on the party’s ticket. Previously they had seldom been allowed any local office above Coroner. Their dominance on the Tammany ticket again roused the “Know-Nothing” sentiment, and a combination of Native Americans, Republicans and independents resulted. The combination secured 16 of the 24 Councilmen.

This local election was the first where Democratic voters of Irish descent or heritage demanded a fair representation in the top positions on the party's ticket. In the past, they were usually only permitted to hold positions below Coroner. Their strong presence on the Tammany ticket reignited the "Know-Nothing" sentiment, leading to a coalition of Native Americans, Republicans, and independents. This coalition managed to win 16 out of the 24 Council seats.

The politicians were now confronted with a registry act, which omitted the blunder of that of 1840 in applying only to New York City. This measure became a law in 1859, despite the stubborn opposition of Tammany, some of whose leaders, Isaac V. Fowler and others, issued an address asking Democrats to arise and defeat it. Failing to defeat it, they resolved to circumvent it by means of the Board of Supervisors, which was required to appoint the registry clerks. This body was by law divided equally as to politics, the Legislature calculating that this would insure fair dealing. But by the purchase of the vote of one of the Republican Supervisors for $2,500,[21] the[192] Tammany members were enabled not only to redistrict the city to their own advantage, but to appoint trusted tools as registrars. For appearances’ sake they allowed a Republican registry clerk here and there. Of 609 registrars appointed, the Republicans secured about 75; and of the whole 609, 68 were liquor-sellers, 92 were petty office-holders, 34 were supposed gamblers, and 50 of the names were not in the city directory. The Tammany leaders held daily private caucuses, and made a list of henchmen with extreme care, in order to exclude Wood from any influence with the registry clerks. William M. Tweed, a member of the board, generally named the men, and Elijah F. Purdy boasted that Tammany demanded the appointment of none but Democrats, and that they (the Tammany Supervisors) meant to sustain their party at any and all hazards. Having the registry clerks, Tammany Hall could revel in false registry and repeating. Good citizens, dejected at the outlook, were sure of a repetition of the frauds of former years.

The politicians were now faced with a registry act that avoided the mistake of the one from 1840, which only applied to New York City. This act became law in 1859, despite strong resistance from Tammany, whose leaders, like Isaac V. Fowler and others, issued a statement urging Democrats to rally and defeat it. When they couldn’t stop it, they decided to bypass it using the Board of Supervisors, which was supposed to appoint the registry clerks. By law, this group was politically balanced to ensure fairness, but they managed to buy the vote of one of the Republican Supervisors for $2,500,[21] allowing the[192] Tammany members to not only redraw the city districts to their advantage but also to appoint loyal supporters as registrars. To make it look good, they let a Republican registry clerk in here and there. Out of 609 registrars appointed, about 75 were Republicans; and of the entire 609, 68 were liquor sellers, 92 were minor office holders, 34 were suspected gamblers, and 50 names weren’t even in the city directory. The Tammany leaders held private meetings every day and carefully created a list of loyal followers to keep Wood from gaining any influence over the registry clerks. William M. Tweed, a board member, usually named the appointees, and Elijah F. Purdy proudly claimed that Tammany insisted on appointing only Democrats, and they (the Tammany Supervisors) intended to support their party at all costs. With control over the registry clerks, Tammany Hall could indulge in falsifying registries and voting multiple times. Good citizens, disheartened by the situation, feared a repeat of past frauds.

Seeking to satisfy all parties, Mayor Tiemann failed to satisfy any. He was accused of using the official patronage for the advantage of Tammany Hall, in the hope of getting a renomination from it in 1859. He and his chief office-holders appointed to the office the most notorious fighting men and ruffians in the city. The Tammany leaders did not favor him, possibly because they thought William F. Havemeyer a man of more weight, popularity and respectability.

Seeking to please everyone, Mayor Tiemann ended up pleasing no one. He was accused of using official patronage to benefit Tammany Hall, hoping to secure a renomination from them in 1859. He and his main office holders appointed some of the most infamous tough guys and troublemakers in the city to positions. The Tammany leaders didn’t support him, likely because they viewed William F. Havemeyer as a more significant, popular, and respectable candidate.

Accordingly they nominated the latter. Wood had himself nominated by Mozart Hall, and the Republicans chose George P. Opdyke, a millionaire. In this triangular contest the Tammany men felt that the force of Havemeyer’s good record would put them in power. Singularly, however, with all its manipulation of the registry lists, and the excellent character of its nominee, Tammany lost.[193] The Irish voters sided almost solidly with Wood, and the lowest classes of the city, fearing the election of a man so distasteful to them as Havemeyer or Opdyke, used all their effectiveness for Wood, who received 29,940 votes, against 26,913 for Havemeyer, and 21,417 for Opdyke.

Accordingly, they nominated the latter. Wood had been nominated by Mozart Hall, and the Republicans chose George P. Opdyke, a millionaire. In this three-way contest, the Tammany men believed that Havemeyer’s strong record would help them gain power. Oddly enough, despite all their efforts to manipulate the voter registration lists and the strong character of their nominee, Tammany lost. The Irish voters leaned almost entirely towards Wood, and the lower classes of the city, fearing the election of someone as undesirable to them as Havemeyer or Opdyke, rallied behind Wood. He received 29,940 votes, compared to Havemeyer’s 26,913 and Opdyke’s 21,417.[193]

It was conceded that much of the worst part of Tammany’s strength had gone over to Wood. This fact was suggestive, to a degree, of Wood’s assurance, considering the declaration in his letter of acceptance of the nomination that he favored “excluding the bullies and rowdies from public employment and of dealing summarily with that class of outlaws.”

It was acknowledged that a significant portion of Tammany’s power had shifted to Wood. This hinted, to some extent, at Wood’s confidence, especially given his statement in his acceptance letter for the nomination where he expressed support for “keeping the bullies and troublemakers out of public jobs and handling that group of outlaws decisively.”

Although Tammany had nominated a good man, for the sake of sliding into power upon the strength of his reputation, its lesser candidates were generally incompetent or of bad character; half a dozen of its nominees for Councilmen were under indictment for various crimes.

Although Tammany had nominated a decent guy, to gain power based on his reputation, its other candidates were mostly unqualified or had questionable character; several of its nominees for Council members were facing charges for various crimes.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1859, No. 16. The courts decided later in favor of Lowber. As Controller Flagg refused to pay the claim on the ground of no funds being “applicable,” Lowber caused the Sheriff to sell at auction, in October, 1858, the City Hall with its equipment and paintings to satisfy a judgment of $228,000, including damages, costs and interest. Mayor Tiemann bid the City Hall in for the sum of $50,000, and turned it over to the city when reimbursed. Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1859, Vol. XXVI, No. 1.

[1] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1859, No. 16. The courts later ruled in favor of Lowber. Since Controller Flagg refused to pay the claim citing lack of “applicable” funds, Lowber had the Sheriff auction off City Hall, along with its furnishings and artwork, in October 1858 to cover a judgment of $228,000, which included damages, costs, and interest. Mayor Tiemann bid $50,000 for City Hall and transferred it to the city once he was reimbursed. Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1859, Vol. XXVI, No. 1.

[2] Ibid., Vol. XXIII, No. 42; also Ibid., Vol. XXV, No. 10.

[2] Same source., Vol. XXIII, No. 42; also Same source., Vol. XXV, No. 10.

[3] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid.

[4] The Act was passed July 21, 1853. This was one of the very few public-spirited measures of the time. Tammany, however, immediately began to utilize the measure, through contracts for the clearing and improvement of the park, to the profit of its leaders and followers.

[4] The Act was passed on July 21, 1853. This was one of the few genuinely public-spirited measures of the time. However, Tammany quickly started to take advantage of the law by securing contracts for clearing and improving the park, benefiting its leaders and supporters.

[5] Devlin was appointed by Mayor Wood to succeed Joseph S. Taylor, deceased. At the same time Daniel D. Conover was selected for the post by the Governor, who claimed the right of appointment. The Mayor used inflammatory language, a turbulent mob gathered, and the militia had to be ordered out to prevent serious violence between the partizans of each. (Assembly Documents, 1858, No. 80.) The courts later decided in favor of Devlin.

[5] Devlin was appointed by Mayor Wood to take over for the late Joseph S. Taylor. At the same time, Governor selected Daniel D. Conover for the position, asserting his right to make the appointment. The Mayor's fiery rhetoric stirred up a chaotic crowd, and the militia had to be called in to prevent any serious violence between the supporters of each candidate. (Assembly Documents, 1858, No. 80.) The courts eventually ruled in favor of Devlin.

[6] Devlin was removed from office by Mayor Tiemann in April, 1858.

[6] Devlin was ousted from his position by Mayor Tiemann in April 1858.

[7] Report of Special Common Council Committee, October 22, 1857.

[7] Report of Special Common Council Committee, October 22, 1857.

[8] Harper’s New Monthly Magazine, November, 1856.

[8] Harper’s New Monthly Magazine, November, 1856.

[9] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.

[10] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.

[12] Statement to the author by Douglas Taylor, one of the “seven Sachems.”

[12] Statement to the author by Douglas Taylor, one of the “seven Sachems.”

[13] Of this action Talcott Williams (Tammany Hall, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1898) says: “For the first time, the Tammany Society, which is only the landlord of the political body which leases its hall, exercised its singular power of deciding between rival organizations.” This, of course, is a decided error. Repeated instances of the activity of the society in this direction have been given in this work.

[13] Talcott Williams (Tammany Hall, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1898) states: “For the first time, the Tammany Society, which is just the landlord of the political entity that rents its hall, used its unique power to choose between competing groups.” This, of course, is a clear mistake. Multiple examples of the society's involvement in this area have been presented in this work.

[14] Assembly Documents, 1857, II, part 2, No. 127.

[14] Assembly Documents, 1857, II, part 2, No. 127.

[15] Assembly Documents, 1858, No. 80. The chaos produced during this dispute was extreme. Members of one force would seize and liberate prisoners taken by the other force, combats were frequent, and peaceable citizens were often unable to secure protection.

[15] Assembly Documents, 1858, No. 80. The chaos caused by this conflict was intense. Members of one group would capture and free prisoners held by the other group, fights were common, and ordinary citizens often struggled to find safety.

[16] This riot is briefly treated in Document No. 80.

[16] This riot is briefly discussed in Document No. 80.

[17] Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. LXVII, pp. 157-60.

[17] Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. 67, pp. 157-60.

[18] Ibid., Vol. LXVIII, p. 140.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, Vol. 68, p. 140.

[19] This reference to Seagrist was handed down in an Aldermanic committee’s report some years before: “… Thomas Munday, Nicholas Seagrist, Captain Norris, Mackellar and others were charged with robbing the funeral pall of Henry Clay, when his sacred person passed through this city.” Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XXII: No. 43.

[19] This mention of Seagrist was passed down in a report from an Aldermanic committee several years earlier: “… Thomas Munday, Nicholas Seagrist, Captain Norris, Mackellar, and others were accused of stealing the funeral pall of Henry Clay, while his revered body passed through this city.” Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. XXII: No. 43.

[20] Cochrane later followed Wood into Mozart Hall, but subsequently returned to Tammany Hall. He was elected to Congress, serving one term. He raised a regiment at the outbreak of the Civil War, and in June, 1862, was made a Brigadier-General. He was elected Attorney-General of the State in 1863. In 1872 he joined the Greeley movement. He held various local offices, both in 1872 and in 1883 being elected to the Presidency of the Board of Aldermen. As late as 1889 he was a Sachem. He died in 1898, in his 85th year.

[20] Cochrane later followed Wood into Mozart Hall, but then returned to Tammany Hall. He was elected to Congress, where he served one term. He raised a regiment when the Civil War broke out and was made a Brigadier-General in June 1862. He was elected Attorney-General of the State in 1863. In 1872, he joined the Greeley movement. He held various local offices and was elected President of the Board of Aldermen in both 1872 and 1883. As recently as 1889, he was a Sachem. He died in 1898 at the age of 85.

[21] Statement of William M. Tweed before a special investigating committee of the Board of Aldermen, 1877 (Document No. 8, Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. II, pp. 15-16). Isaac V. Fowler, Tweed testified, furnished the $2,500 which was paid to Peter R. Voorhis, a Republican member. Tweed further stated, that besides himself there were in the conspiracy Elijah F. Purdy, William C. Conner, Isaac Bell, Jr. (a Sachem) and John R. Briggs.

[21] Statement of William M. Tweed before a special investigating committee of the Board of Aldermen, 1877 (Document No. 8, Documents of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. II, pp. 15-16). Isaac V. Fowler, Tweed testified, provided the $2,500 that was paid to Peter R. Voorhis, a Republican member. Tweed also mentioned that in addition to himself, the conspiracy included Elijah F. Purdy, William C. Conner, Isaac Bell, Jr. (a Sachem), and John R. Briggs.


CHAPTER XXII
THE CIVIL WAR AND AFTER
1859-1867

The stirring years of the Civil War were drawing near. In this crisis, Tammany, ever pro-slavery, dealt in no equivocal phrases. On November 1, 1859, at a meeting called to order by Isaac V. Fowler, James T. Brady, acting as president, referred to John Brown’s raid as “riot, treason and murder.” Brady and others spoke dolefully of the dire consequences of a continuation of the abolition agitation and prophesied that if the “irrepressible conflict” ever came, it would result in an extermination of the black race.

The turbulent years of the Civil War were approaching. During this crisis, Tammany, always pro-slavery, made their stance very clear. On November 1, 1859, at a meeting led by Isaac V. Fowler, James T. Brady, acting as president, referred to John Brown’s raid as “riot, treason, and murder.” Brady and others spoke sadly about the terrible consequences of ongoing abolitionist movements and predicted that if the “irrepressible conflict” ever occurred, it would lead to the extermination of the black race.

But Grand Sachem Fowler was not to officiate at any more meetings. He had been living for several years at a rate far beyond his means. In one year his bill at the New York Hotel, which he made the Democratic headquarters, amounted to $25,000.[1] He had spent $50,000 toward the election of Buchanan. A social favorite, he gave frequent and lavish entertainments.[2] President Pierce had appointed him Postmaster, but the salary was only $2,500 a year, and he had long ago exhausted his private means and much of the property of his family. It was therefore a source of wonder whence his money[195] came. The problem was cleared up when, on May 10, 1860, he was removed from office, and an order was issued for his arrest under the accusation of having embezzled $155,000.[3] The filching, it appeared, had been going on since 1855.[4]

But Grand Sachem Fowler was no longer going to lead any meetings. He had been living for several years way beyond his means. One year, his bill at the New York Hotel, which he used as the Democratic headquarters, reached $25,000.[1] He had spent $50,000 on Buchanan’s election. A social favorite, he hosted frequent and extravagant parties.[2] President Pierce had appointed him Postmaster, but the salary was only $2,500 a year, and he had long since depleted his personal finances and much of his family’s property. So, it was a mystery where his money was coming from[195]. The issue became clear when, on May 10, 1860, he was removed from office, and an order was issued for his arrest on the charge of embezzling $155,000.[3] It turned out that this theft had been happening since 1855.[4]

Isaiah Rynders, then United States Marshal at New York, upon receiving orders to arrest Fowler, went to his hotel, but tarried at the bar and by his loud announcement of his errand, allowed word to be taken to Fowler, who forthwith escaped. He subsequently made his way to Mexico. His brother, John Walker Fowler, who upon recommendation of the “seven Sachems” had been appointed clerk to Surrogate Gideon J. Tucker, subsequently absconded with $31,079.65 belonging to orphans and others.[5]

Isaiah Rynders, who was the U.S. Marshal in New York, got orders to arrest Fowler. He went to Fowler's hotel but stopped at the bar and, by loudly announcing his mission, tipped off Fowler, who quickly made his escape. He later fled to Mexico. His brother, John Walker Fowler, had been appointed as a clerk to Surrogate Gideon J. Tucker based on a recommendation from the “seven Sachems.” He eventually ran away with $31,079.65 that belonged to orphans and others.[5]

In 1860 Tammany was greatly instrumental in inducing the Democrats of New York State to agree upon a fusion Douglas-Bell-Breckinridge electoral ticket. On the registration and election days the frauds practised against the Lincoln electors surpassed anything the city had known. In the Third Ward 63 fictitious names were registered in a single election district. Five hundred of the 3,500 names of the Twelfth Ward register were found to be fraudulent. In the Seventeenth Ward 935 names on the registry books were spurious, no persons representing them being discoverable at the places given as their residences. An Irish widow’s two boys, six and seven years old respectively, were registered, mother and sons, of course, knowing nothing of it—and so on ad libitum. Fictitious names, accredited to vacant lots or[196] uninhabited buildings, were voted by the thousands. The announcement of the result gave the Fusionists 62,611 votes, and Lincoln 33,311.

In 1860, Tammany played a key role in getting the Democrats of New York State to agree on a combined Douglas-Bell-Breckinridge electoral ticket. On registration and election days, the frauds committed against the Lincoln electors were the worst the city had ever seen. In the Third Ward, 63 fake names were registered in just one election district. Five hundred of the 3,500 names on the Twelfth Ward's register were found to be fraudulent. In the Seventeenth Ward, 935 names on the registry books were fake, and no one could be found living at the addresses listed. An Irish widow’s two boys, aged six and seven, were registered without their mother or them knowing about it—and it went on like that ad libitum. Fake names, assigned to vacant lots or [196] uninhabited buildings, were voted under in the thousands. The announcement of the results showed the Fusionists with 62,611 votes and Lincoln with 33,311.

At the outbreak of the war, Mozart Hall, for purposes of political display, took a prompt position in favor of maintaining the Union, although Wood, its master spirit, advocated, in a public message, the detaching of New York City from the Union and transforming it into a free city on the Hamburg plan.[6] Tammany, perforce, had to follow the lead of Mozart Hall in parading its loyalist sentiments. The society raised a regiment, which was taken to the field in June, 1861, by Grand Sachem William D. Kennedy.[7] Tammany long dwelt upon this action as a crowning proof of its patriotism.

At the start of the war, Mozart Hall quickly took a clear stance in support of keeping the Union for political reasons, even though Wood, its driving force, publicly called for New York City to separate from the Union and become a free city like Hamburg.[6] Tammany had to follow Mozart Hall's lead in showcasing its loyalty. The society formed a regiment, which was sent to the battlefield in June 1861 by Grand Sachem William D. Kennedy.[7] Tammany often highlighted this action as a prime example of its patriotism.

The real sentiments of the bulk of Tammany and of Mozart Hall were to the contrary. Both did their best to paralyze the energies of Lincoln’s administration. In a speech to his Mozart Hall followers at the Volks Garden, on November 27, 1861, Wood charged the national administration with having provoked the war, and said that they (the administration) meant to prolong it while there was a dollar to be stolen from the national Treasury or a drop of Southern blood to be shed. At the Tammany celebration of July 4, 1862, Grand Sachem Nelson J. Waterbury, though expressing loyalty to the Union, averred that it was the President’s duty “to set his foot firmly upon abolitionism and crush it to pieces, and then the soldiers would fight unembarrassed, and victory must soon sit upon the National banners.” Declarations of this kind were generally received with enthusiasm in both halls.

The real feelings of most Tammany members and those at Mozart Hall were the opposite. Both worked hard to undermine Lincoln’s administration. In a speech to his Mozart Hall supporters at the Volks Garden on November 27, 1861, Wood accused the national administration of starting the war and claimed that they intended to drag it out for as long as there was money to be taken from the national Treasury or Southern blood to be spilled. At the Tammany celebration on July 4, 1862, Grand Sachem Nelson J. Waterbury, while showing loyalty to the Union, insisted that it was the President’s responsibility “to firmly oppose abolitionism and destroy it, and then the soldiers would fight without hesitation, leading to quick victory for the National banners.” Statements like this were generally met with enthusiasm in both halls.

At times, however, under the sting of severe public[197] criticism, Tammany Hall made haste to assert its fealty to the Union cause. In September, 1861, Elijah F. Purdy, chairman of its general committee, issued a statement that “Tammany Hall had maintained an unswerving position upon this great question from the time the first gun was fired to the present hour. It has been zealously devoted to the Union, in favor of upholding it with the utmost resources of the nation, and opposed to any action calculated to embarrass the Government or to prevent all loyal men from standing together in solid column for the country.” Tammany put forth the claim that “three-fourths of the volunteer soldiers enlisted in this city and at the seat of war, are Democrats attached to Tammany Hall”; and on October 3, 1861, resolved that with a deep sense of the peril in which the Union and the Constitution were involved by the reckless war being waged for their destruction by armed traitors, it (Tammany Hall) held it to be the first and most sacred duty of every man who loved his country to support the Government.

At times, however, faced with severe public[197] criticism, Tammany Hall quickly tried to show its loyalty to the Union cause. In September 1861, Elijah F. Purdy, the chairman of its general committee, released a statement saying that “Tammany Hall has maintained a consistent stance on this important issue ever since the first gun was fired. It has been passionately committed to the Union, advocating for its support with the nation's full resources, and opposing any actions that might hinder the Government or prevent all loyal citizens from coming together for the country.” Tammany claimed that “three-fourths of the volunteer soldiers enlisted in this city and at the battlefield are Democrats affiliated with Tammany Hall”; and on October 3, 1861, it resolved that given the serious threat to the Union and the Constitution posed by the reckless war being fought by armed traitors, it was the first and most important duty of every patriotic citizen to support the Government.

The war, which so engaged and diverted the popular mind, served as a cover for the continued manipulation of primaries and conventions, and the consummation of huge schemes of public plunder. Wood himself pointed out that from 1850 to 1860 the expenses of the city government had increased from over $3,200,000 to $9,758,000, yet his tenure of office from 1860 to 1862 was characterized by even worse corruption than had flourished so signally in his previous terms. After his installation, in 1860, it was charged that he had sold the office of City Inspector to Samuel Downes, a man of wealth, for $20,000; that Downes had paid $10,000 to certain confederates of Wood, and that he had afterward been cheated out of the office. Another charge, the facts of which were related in a presentment by the Grand Jury, accused Wood of robbing the taxpayers of $420,000. The Common Council had awarded a five-years’[198] street-cleaning contract to Andrew J. Hackley, at $279,000 a year, notwithstanding the fact that one among other responsible persons had bid $84,000 a year less. Afraid to submit the contract to the ordeal of public opinion, which might give rise to injunctions, the Common Council sped it through both boards on the same night. Waiting in his office until nearly midnight for the express purpose of signing it, the Mayor hastily affixed his signature the moment it reached him. The Grand Jury found that the sum of $40,000 in bribes had been raised and paid for the passage of the contract. It was asserted that the equivalent Wood received for signing the bill was one-fourth the amount of the contract, or $69,750 a year, for five years, free of any other consideration than his signature, the other beneficiaries of the contract supplying all the money needed to protect the fraud. Spurred on by public opinion, the police—when the work was not done in compliance with the contract—had reported to the Controller, who had refused to pay the monthly bills. Then the contractors reduced the pay of their laborers from $1.25 to 95 cents a day in order to make good their payments to Wood.[8]

The war, which captured and distracted the public's attention, provided a cover for ongoing manipulation of primaries and conventions, and the completion of massive public theft schemes. Wood himself noted that from 1850 to 1860, the city government's expenses soared from over $3,200,000 to $9,758,000, yet his time in office from 1860 to 1862 was marked by even worse corruption than in his previous terms. After he took office in 1860, it was alleged that he sold the position of City Inspector to Samuel Downes, a wealthy man, for $20,000; that Downes paid $10,000 to some of Wood’s associates, and that he was later swindled out of the job. Another allegation, detailed in a Grand Jury report, accused Wood of stealing $420,000 from taxpayers. The Common Council awarded a five-year street-cleaning contract to Andrew J. Hackley for $279,000 a year, despite the fact that another qualified bidder offered $84,000 a year less. Fearing public backlash and potential legal action, the Common Council rushed the contract through both boards in one night. The Mayor waited in his office until nearly midnight, ready to sign as soon as it arrived. The Grand Jury found that $40,000 in bribes was collected and paid to push the contract through. It was claimed that Wood received one-fourth of the contract amount, or $69,750 a year for five years, simply for his signature, with the other recipients of the contract providing all the necessary funds to cover the scam. Prompted by public outcry, the police reported to the Controller when the work failed to meet contract standards, and the Controller refused to pay the monthly bills. In response, the contractors cut their workers' wages from $1.25 to 95 cents a day to ensure they could continue making payments to Wood.[8]

Hiram Ketchum, in November, 1861, publicly accused Wood of promising two men—Woodruff and Hoffman—Mozart Hall nominations for Judgeships, upon which they each paid $5,000 in checks to Wood’s account for “election expenses.” Pocketing the money, Wood then made an agreement with Tammany to unite on two other men—Monell and Barbour—for Judges, on condition that Tammany should not unite with the Republicans against him in the December Mayoralty election.

Hiram Ketchum, in November 1861, publicly accused Wood of promising two men—Woodruff and Hoffman—nominations for Judge positions at Mozart Hall in exchange for $5,000 each, which they paid to Wood’s account for “election expenses.” After pocketing the money, Wood then made a deal with Tammany to support two other candidates—Monell and Barbour—for Judge, as long as Tammany agreed not to team up with the Republicans against him in the upcoming December Mayoralty election.

S. B. Chittenden, a citizen of wealth and standing,[199] charged, in Cooper Institute, November 26, 1861, that the signature of the Street Cleaning Commissioner necessary for certain documents could be bought for $2,500, and intimated that Wood was not dissociated from the procedure.

S. B. Chittenden, a wealthy and respected citizen,[199] stated at the Cooper Institute on November 26, 1861, that the signature of the Street Cleaning Commissioner required for certain documents could be bought for $2,500, and suggested that Wood was involved in the process.

Wood had spent an enormous amount in his political schemes. He himself admitted, according to the testimony of A. W. Craven, Chief Engineer of the Croton Aqueduct Department, before a committee of Aldermen, “that his object in removing heads of departments was to get control of the departments, so that he could put in those who would cooperate with him and, also, could pay off his obligations.”[9]

Wood had invested a huge amount in his political plans. He even acknowledged, based on the testimony of A. W. Craven, Chief Engineer of the Croton Aqueduct Department, before a committee of Aldermen, "that his goal in getting rid of department heads was to take control of the departments, so he could bring in people who would work with him and also settle his debts.”[9]

It is possible to give only an outline of the “jobs” stealthily put through the Common Council. Newspaper criticism was, in a measure, silenced by appropriations of from $10,000 to $20,000 a year for “advertising,” though occasional exposures were made in spite of this. One of these related to the appropriation of $105,000 in July, 1860, for a few days’ entertainment of the Japanese Embassy in New York. Of this sum only a few thousand dollars were used for the purpose, the rest being stolen.[10]

It’s possible to provide just a brief overview of the “jobs” quietly passed by the Common Council. Newspaper criticism was somewhat muted by annual appropriations of $10,000 to $20,000 for “advertising,” although occasional scandals still surfaced despite this. One of these involved the allocation of $105,000 in July 1860 for a few days of entertainment for the Japanese Embassy in New York. Of that amount, only a few thousand dollars were actually spent for the event, with the rest going missing.[10]

Never more than now was patriotism shown to be the last refuge of scoundrels. Taking advantage of the war excitement, the most audacious designs on the city treasury were executed under color of acts of the purest patriotism. At a special meeting of the Common Council, on August 21, 1861, called ostensibly to help the families of the poor volunteers, a measure providing for[200] the appointment of twenty-two Street Opening Commissioners was hurriedly passed, upon motion of Alderman Terence Farley, against whom several untried indictments were pending. Without entering into details, it can be said that this action represented a theft of $250,000, in that the Commissioners were superfluous, and their offices were created merely to make more places for a hungry host of political workers.

Never has it been clearer that patriotism is often the last refuge of scoundrels. Exploiting the war fervor, the boldest schemes to raid the city treasury were carried out under the guise of the purest patriotism. At a special meeting of the Common Council on August 21, 1861, which was supposedly called to support the families of poor volunteers, a measure to appoint twenty-two Street Opening Commissioners was hastily pushed through, following a motion by Alderman Terence Farley, who had several unresolved indictments against him. Without getting into specifics, it's fair to say that this move amounted to a theft of $250,000, since the Commissioners were unnecessary, and their positions were created solely to provide jobs for a large number of political operatives.

If the city was a richer prize than ever to the politicians, the Legislature was no less desirable. Alien members of both branches of that body were under the complete domination of political managers. It was notorious that the Democratic and the Republican lobby lords exchanged the votes of their respective legislative vassals, so that it mattered little to either which political party had the ascendency in the Legislature. One celebrated lobbyist declared that it was cheaper to buy, than to elect, a Legislature. The passage of five franchises by the Legislature, on April 17, 1860, over Gov. Morgan’s veto, cost the projectors upwards of $250,000 in money and stock.[11]

If the city was more appealing than ever to politicians, the Legislature was equally sought after. Outsider members of both branches of that body were completely controlled by political managers. It was well-known that the Democratic and Republican lobby leaders would trade the votes of their respective legislative followers, so it hardly mattered to either party which one was in power in the Legislature. One well-known lobbyist claimed it was cheaper to buy a Legislature than to elect one. The approval of five franchises by the Legislature on April 17, 1860, despite Gov. Morgan’s veto, cost the projectors more than $250,000 in cash and stock.[11]

Apparently hostile, the leaders of Tammany and of Mozart Hall soon saw that it was to their mutual benefit to have a secret understanding as to the division of the spoils. While Mozart had supremacy for the moment, Tammany had superior advantages. It could point to a long record; its organization was perfect; it had a perpetual home, and the thousands of its disappointed ward-workers and voters who had transferred their allegiance to Mozart, in the hope of better reward, would certainly flow back in time. This changing about was an old feature of New York politics. A successful political party was always depleted by thousands of office-seekers who left its ranks because disappointed in their hopes. Most important of all, Tammany had dealt[201] the decisive blow to Mozart Hall at the Charleston convention, in 1860, and at the Syracuse convention, in September, 1861, when its delegation secured the recognition of “regularity.”

Apparently unfriendly, the leaders of Tammany and Mozart Hall quickly realized that it was in their best interest to come to a secret agreement about how to share the rewards. While Mozart was in charge for the time being, Tammany had clear advantages. It could highlight its long history; its organization was solid; it had a permanent location, and the many disappointed ward-workers and voters who had switched their support to Mozart, hoping for better rewards, would eventually come back. This shift was a common aspect of New York politics. A successful political party was always weakened by countless office seekers who left because their hopes were dashed. Most importantly, Tammany had dealt[201] a significant blow to Mozart Hall at the Charleston convention in 1860 and at the Syracuse convention in September 1861, when its delegation earned recognition for being “regular.”

Hence Mozart Hall, to avoid losing the State offices, willingly bargained with Tammany, and in the Fall of 1861 the two combined on nominees for the Legislature. They could not agree on the Mayoralty, Wood determining to stand for reelection. But true to their agreement not to ally themselves with the Republicans, the Tammany leaders nominated independently, selecting C. Godfrey Gunther. Once more a non-partizan movement sprang up to combat the forces of corruption. The People’s Union, composed of Republicans and Democrats, succeeded, despite the usual frauds, in electing George P. Opdyke, a Republican, by less than 1,000 plurality, he receiving 25,380 votes; Gunther, 24,767; and Wood 24,167. In violation of the law, returns in ten districts were held back for evident purposes of manipulation. When the figures showed Opdyke’s election, attempts were made to deprive him of his certificate on the pretense that the returns as published in the daily newspapers were inaccurate. After much counting by the Board of Aldermen, whose attempt at “counting out” Opdyke was frustrated by the vigilance of his friends, the latter was declared elected by 613 plurality.

Hence, Mozart Hall, wanting to keep the State offices, willingly negotiated with Tammany, and in the Fall of 1861, they joined forces on nominees for the Legislature. They couldn't agree on the Mayoralty, with Wood deciding to run for reelection. But staying true to their agreement not to partner with the Republicans, the Tammany leaders nominated independently, picking C. Godfrey Gunther. Once again, a non-partisan movement emerged to fight against corruption. The People’s Union, made up of Republicans and Democrats, succeeded, despite the usual frauds, in electing George P. Opdyke, a Republican, by less than 1,000 votes; he received 25,380 votes; Gunther got 24,767; and Wood received 24,167. In violation of the law, results in ten districts were withheld for obvious manipulation purposes. When the numbers showed Opdyke’s victory, there were attempts to take away his certificate, claiming that the returns published in the daily newspapers were inaccurate. After much counting by the Board of Aldermen, whose effort to "count out" Opdyke was thwarted by the vigilance of his supporters, he was declared elected by a margin of 613 votes.

Newspaper accounts described a lively time, quite in keeping with a long line of precedents, in Tammany Hall on election night. The crowd was in unpleasant humor because of Gunther’s defeat. When “Jimmy” Nesbit, a good-natured heeler of the Sixth Ward, was called upon to preside, he tried to evoke cheers for Gunther. Chafing at the lack of enthusiasm, he swore fiercely at his hearers. A shout was heard, “Three cheers for Fernando Wood,” whereupon the eminent chairman lost his equanimity and let fly a pitcher at the offender’s head. He was on the point of heaving another[202] missile, a large pewter pitcher, but a bystander caught his hand. Cries of “Tammany is not dead yet,” were heard, and then Chauncey Shaeffer regaled the crowd with the information that he got his first meal, with liquor thrown in, at Tammany Hall, sixteen years before, and he would never desert her. Shaeffer told the Tammanyites how he had gone to the White House and advised the President to let out the job of putting down the rebellion to Tammany Hall. Cries broke forth of, “You’re drunk, Shaeffer!” “You’re a disgrace to Tammany Hall.” After trying to sing “The Red, White and Blue,” Shaeffer stumbled off the platform. Isaiah Rynders then arose, and after denouncing the leaders for not being there, assured his hearers that there were many respectable gentlemen present and some d—d fools. This edifying meeting ended by “the chairman jumping from the platform and chasing a Wood man out of the room.”

Newspaper reports described a lively scene, very much in line with a long history of events, at Tammany Hall on election night. The crowd was in a bad mood because of Gunther’s loss. When “Jimmy” Nesbit, a friendly supporter from the Sixth Ward, was called to take charge, he tried to rally cheers for Gunther. Frustrated by the crowd's lack of enthusiasm, he angrily cursed at them. Someone shouted, “Three cheers for Fernando Wood,” which made the chairman lose his cool and throw a pitcher at the person who spoke. He was about to throw another big pewter pitcher, but a bystander stopped him. Shouts of “Tammany is not dead yet” echoed, and then Chauncey Shaeffer entertained the crowd by recalling how he had his first meal, with free drinks, at Tammany Hall sixteen years earlier and would never abandon it. Shaeffer told the Tammanyites how he had gone to the White House and advised the President to hand over the job of quelling the rebellion to Tammany Hall. The crowd responded with calls of, “You’re drunk, Shaeffer!” and “You’re a disgrace to Tammany Hall.” After attempting to sing “The Red, White and Blue,” Shaeffer stumbled off the platform. Isaiah Rynders then stood up, and after criticizing the leaders for their absence, reassured his audience that there were many respectable gentlemen present and some damned fools. This enlightening meeting concluded with “the chairman jumping off the platform and chasing a Wood supporter out of the room.”

Though no longer in office, Wood was still a powerful factor, since Mozart Hall, of which he was the head, could poll, or pretend to poll, 25,000 votes. Further overtures were made between him and the leaders of Tammany in 1862, with the result that an understanding was reached to divide the nominations equally. The partition was conducted amicably until the office of Surrogate was reached. Besides this there was an odd member of the Assembly not accounted for. The leaders could not agree as to how these two offices should be disposed of, and on the evening of October 2 the general committee met in the Wigwam to discuss the profound problem. Crowds were gathered inside and outside the hall, in the lobby, bar-room and on the stairs. The excitement was such that a squad of police was sent to the scene to maintain peace.

Though no longer in office, Wood was still a major player since Mozart Hall, where he was in charge, could gather, or claim to gather, 25,000 votes. In 1862, more discussions took place between him and the Tammany leaders, resulting in an agreement to split the nominations evenly. The division was handled smoothly until they reached the position of Surrogate. Additionally, there was an odd member of the Assembly that was unaccounted for. The leaders couldn’t agree on how to handle these two positions, and on the evening of October 2, the general committee gathered in the Wigwam to tackle this serious issue. Crowds were gathered inside and outside the hall, in the lobby, bar-room, and on the stairs. The excitement was so intense that a squad of police was sent to the scene to keep the peace.

Their services were needed. Heated discussions had been going on all the evening. Richard B. Connolly had his “party” on hand, eager for the fray. Francis I.[203] A. Boole mustered his retainers by the score—“fine strapping fellows, with upturned sleeves and significant red shirts that told of former battles and hard-earned laurels.” At 11 o’clock the fighting began. It had not progressed far, however, when the police charged, and wielding their clubs right and left, drove the combatants in disorder into the street. The committee was in session nearly all night, but a renewal of the scrimmage was not attempted.

Their services were needed. Heated discussions had been going on all evening. Richard B. Connolly had his “party” ready for a fight. Francis I.[203] A. Boole gathered his supporters by the dozens—“strong, impressive guys, with rolled-up sleeves and noticeable red shirts that hinted at past battles and hard-won honors.” At 11 o’clock, the fighting started. However, it didn't go far before the police charged in, swinging their clubs and forcing the fighters into the street in chaos. The committee met almost all night, but they didn’t attempt to restart the brawl.

After much haggling, the factions finally agreed. Nominations brought such great sums that the severe contention of the leaders is easily explainable. A hint of the enormous sums wrung from this source was given by Judge Maynard, when addressing a meeting of the “Representative Democracy,” in Cooper Union, on October 27, 1863. He stated that one man in Mozart Hall (doubtless referring to Fernando Wood) was the chief of all the “strikers” in New York City, and that this person made from $100,000 to $200,000 every year marketing offices.[12] Nominations and appointments went to the highest bidders, and some of the leaders held as many as thirteen different offices each. At the same meeting W. R. Ranken stated that “the manner in which these two organizations—Tammany and Mozart Hall—have packed their preliminary conventions and organizations, has been of such a character as to bring the blush of shame to every man of principle in the party. No man, were he to poll 10,000 votes, under those primary elections, could be admitted within the precincts of Tammany Hall unless he came with the indorsement of the Election Inspectors who were under the influence of the two or three men who held the reins of power there.”[13]

After a lot of negotiating, the groups finally came to an agreement. The nominations brought in such huge amounts of money that the intense rivalry between the leaders is easily understandable. Judge Maynard hinted at the vast sums collected from this source when he spoke at a “Representative Democracy” meeting at Cooper Union on October 27, 1863. He mentioned that one man in Mozart Hall (likely referring to Fernando Wood) was the leader of all the “strikers” in New York City, and this person earned between $100,000 and $200,000 each year from selling offices.[12] Nominations and positions went to the highest bidders, and some leaders held as many as thirteen different roles each. At the same meeting, W. R. Ranken remarked that “the way these two organizations—Tammany and Mozart Hall—have stacked their preliminary conventions and organizations has been such that it would make any principled person in the party feel ashamed. No one, even if they received 10,000 votes in those primary elections, could enter Tammany Hall unless they had the endorsement of the Election Inspectors who were influenced by the two or three men in charge there.”[13]

The State and Congressional elections in November showed the power of the combined halls. Seymour, for Governor, carried the city by 31,309 plurality. Among the Democratic Congressmen elected was Fernando Wood, who, evidently despairing of again filling the Mayor’s chair, had determined to employ his activities in another field.

The state and congressional elections in November demonstrated the strength of the combined efforts. Seymour, running for Governor, won the city with a plurality of 31,309. Among the Democratic Congress members elected was Fernando Wood, who, clearly giving up on becoming Mayor again, had decided to focus his efforts in a different area.

The city election for minor officers occurred in December, and the two halls again won. The apportionment of the offices, however, caused a number of clashes. One of the offices filled was that of Corporation Counsel, the nomination to which fell to the lot of Mozart Hall. Wood had promised it to John K. Hackett, subsequently Recorder, but gave it to John E. Devlin, a Sachem, supposed to be one of Wood’s bitterest opponents. By way of smoothing Hackett’s ire, Wood promised to have him appointed Corporation Attorney. This promise was also broken. Hackett went to Wood’s house and was shown into his parlor. “Mr. Wood,” said Hackett, as soon as the man who had been thrice Mayor of the metropolis of America appeared, “I called to say to you, personally, that you are a scoundrel, a rascal and a perjured villain.” Wood threatened to put him out and rang the bell. As the servant was on the point of entering, Hackett drew a revolver from his pocket and went on: “If that man comes between us, I shall blow out his brains and cut off your ears. So you may as well listen. On a certain night, in a room of the Astor House, were four persons, Mr. D., Mr. X., Mr. Y., and yourself. One of these four is a scoundrel, a rascal, a perjured villain and a hound. It is not Mr. D., nor Mr. X., nor Mr. Y. Who he is, I leave you to imagine.”

The city election for minor officials took place in December, and once again, the two halls emerged victorious. However, the allocation of positions led to several conflicts. One of the roles filled was that of Corporation Counsel, a nomination that was supposed to go to Mozart Hall. Wood had promised it to John K. Hackett, who later became Recorder, but instead gave it to John E. Devlin, a Sachem thought to be one of Wood’s fiercest opponents. To placate Hackett's anger, Wood promised to appoint him as Corporation Attorney. This promise was also broken. Hackett went to Wood’s house and was taken to his parlor. “Mr. Wood,” Hackett said, as soon as the man who had been Mayor of the biggest city in America showed up, “I came to tell you in person that you are a scoundrel, a rascal, and a lying villain.” Wood threatened to throw him out and rang the bell. As the servant was about to enter, Hackett pulled a revolver from his pocket and continued: “If that guy comes between us, I'm going to blow his brains out and cut off your ears. So you might as well listen. One night, in a room at the Astor House, there were four people: Mr. D., Mr. X., Mr. Y., and you. One of these four is a scoundrel, a rascal, a lying villain, and a coward. It’s not Mr. D., it’s not Mr. X., and it’s not Mr. Y. Who it is, I’ll leave to your imagination.”

The degraded state of politics, sinking yearly still[205] lower, caused unspeakable disgust, but the honest element of the citizenship seemed powerless. The occasional election of a reform Mayor made little difference in the situation, for either through the impotence of his position or his personal incompetency, the spoilsmen managed to prevail. The Common Council was the supreme power, and this body Tammany, or Tammany and Mozart together, generally controlled. The public money was spent as the Aldermen pleased. The Mayor’s veto became a legal fiction, for a bare majority[14] sufficed to overcome it, and this could generally be secured through deals and the trading of votes on one another’s “jobs.” The veto, in the words of a later Mayor, amounted “to nothing more than the publication of his remonstrance in corporation newspapers, to cause a few hours’ delay and excite the contempt of the members [of the Common Council] who have determined to carry their measure in spite of his remonstrance.”[15]

The state of politics was degrading, getting worse year by year[205], which caused a deep sense of disgust, but the honest citizens felt powerless. Occasionally electing a reform-minded Mayor didn't change much, as either due to the limitations of his role or his personal ineptitude, the corrupt politicians always found a way to win. The Common Council held the real power, usually under the control of Tammany, or Tammany and Mozart combined. The public funds were spent however the Aldermen wanted. The Mayor’s veto had become a mere formality, as a simple majority[14] could override it, usually achieved through deals and trading votes on each other’s “jobs.” As a later Mayor put it, the veto amounted “to nothing more than the publication of his complaints in corporate newspapers, causing a few hours’ delay and provoking the contempt of the members [of the Common Council] who had already decided to push through their agenda regardless of his objections.”[15]

Public indignation resulted in another anti-Tammany demonstration of strength in 1863. The Wigwam nominated for Mayor, Francis I. A. Boole, generally considered as nauseating a type of the politician as Tammany could bring forth. Independent Democrats and some Republicans thereupon rallied to the support of C. Godfrey Gunther, nominee of a new “reform” organization—the “McKeon Democracy.” The Republican organization, however, stood apart, nominating Orison Blunt. Gunther was elected, receiving 29,121 votes, to 22,579 for Boole, and 19,383 for Blunt. At this, as in previous elections, there were unmistakable Wigwam frauds, such as repeating and altering election returns.

Public outrage led to another anti-Tammany demonstration of power in 1863. The Wigwam nominated Francis I. A. Boole for Mayor, who was widely seen as just as unpleasant a politician as Tammany could produce. Independent Democrats and some Republicans then rallied behind C. Godfrey Gunther, the nominee of a new "reform" group—the "McKeon Democracy." However, the Republican organization chose to stand alone, nominating Orison Blunt. Gunther was elected, receiving 29,121 votes, compared to 22,579 for Boole and 19,383 for Blunt. As in past elections, there were clear instances of Wigwam fraud, including vote tampering and changing election results.

Hitherto, in Presidential conventions since Van Buren’s time, the Democratic candidates had been nominated[206] against Tammany’s resistance, the organization having had each time a candidate of its own whom it sought to force on the convention. In 1864, however, the Wigwam shrewdly anticipated the action of the Chicago convention by recommending McClellan as the Democratic nominee. On the night of McClellan’s nomination, Tammany held a ratification meeting in the City Hall Park, denounced “the imbecility of the administration of Abraham Lincoln” in the conduct of the war and “its ruinous financial policy,” and declared that it had “forfeited the confidence of the loyal States; usurped powers not granted by the Constitution; endeavored to render the executive, aided by the military, superior to the judicial and legislative branches of the Government, and assumed to destroy life and confiscate property by its unconstitutional proclamations.” Again, on November 16, at a meeting of the general committee, George H. Purser, a lobbyist and organization leader, offered a resolution, which was unanimously approved, practically declaring the war a failure.

Up until now, in presidential conventions since Van Buren’s time, Democratic candidates had been nominated[206] against Tammany’s opposition, as the organization always had its own candidate that it tried to push onto the convention. However, in 1864, the Wigwam cleverly predicted the Chicago convention's actions by suggesting McClellan as the Democratic nominee. On the night of McClellan’s nomination, Tammany held a meeting in City Hall Park to celebrate, criticizing “the incompetence of Abraham Lincoln’s administration” in managing the war and “its disastrous financial policies,” and claimed that it had “lost the trust of the loyal States; overstepped powers not granted by the Constitution; tried to make the executive, supported by the military, more powerful than the judicial and legislative branches of the Government, and attempted to take lives and seize property through its unconstitutional proclamations.” Again, on November 16, at a meeting of the general committee, George H. Purser, a lobbyist and organization leader, proposed a resolution that was unanimously approved, essentially declaring the war a failure.

In this election the Republicans took precautions to prevent repetition of the frauds of preceding years. An investigation disclosed illegal registration on a large scale. To hold the lawless in check, Gen. Benjamin F. Butler was ordered to New York. He brought 6,000 of his own troops, with artillery and a regiment of regulars, which he kept within call outside of the city until after the election, and he established a civilian system of surveillance in every election district. An unusually orderly election was the result, though fraud was not entirely suppressed, and it was charged that both sides were parties to it. McClellan received a majority in the city of 37,023, of the total vote of 110,433.

In this election, the Republicans took steps to avoid the fraud that had occurred in previous years. An investigation revealed widespread illegal registration. To keep the lawless elements in check, General Benjamin F. Butler was sent to New York. He brought 6,000 of his own troops, along with artillery and a regiment of regulars, which he kept on standby outside the city until after the election. He also set up a civilian monitoring system in every election district. The election was unusually orderly as a result, although some fraud still occurred, and it was claimed that both sides were involved. McClellan received a majority in the city of 37,023 out of a total vote of 110,433.

In 1865 Tammany again nominated Francis I. A. Boole for Mayor. Boole, as City Inspector, was the head of a department which embraced the Street Cleaning and Health Bureaus. Daniel B. Badger testified before the[207] Senate Investigating Committee of 1865 that in the previous year he had put in a written bid to clean the streets for $300,000, but when it was opened, Boole announced loudly that it was $500,000, and gave the contract elsewhere, with the consequence that it cost $800,000 to clean the streets in 1864.[16] Many witnesses swore that they paid various sums, ranging about $200 each, for positions under Boole, only to be suddenly dismissed later.[17] A surprising number of men were on Boole’s payrolls who had other business and who appeared only to draw their salaries.[18] The filthy condition of the city entailed a fearful sacrifice of life, the average deaths yearly being no less than 33 in 1,000.[19] Nearly all the 220 Health Wardens and special inspectors under Boole were illiterate and unfit. One of them testified that he thought “the term ‘hygienic’ meant the odor arising from stagnant water.”[20]

In 1865, Tammany once again nominated Francis I. A. Boole for Mayor. Boole, as City Inspector, led a department that included the Street Cleaning and Health Bureaus. Daniel B. Badger testified before the[207] Senate Investigating Committee of 1865 that the previous year he submitted a written bid to clean the streets for $300,000. However, when it was opened, Boole loudly announced it was $500,000 and awarded the contract to someone else, resulting in a cost of $800,000 to clean the streets in 1864.[16] Many witnesses claimed they paid around $200 each for jobs under Boole, only to be abruptly fired later.[17] A surprising number of people were on Boole’s payroll who had other jobs and only showed up to collect their paychecks.[18] The filthy condition of the city caused a tragic loss of life, with an average of 33 deaths per 1,000 people each year.[19] Almost all of the 220 Health Wardens and special inspectors under Boole were illiterate and unqualified. One of them testified that he thought “the term ‘hygienic’ meant the odor arising from stagnant water.”[20]

Boole, about this time, was engaged in other activities than the protection of the city’s health. In a suit brought by William Elmer against Robert Milbank in the Superior Court, in 1867, Milbank testified that he had called upon Boole to learn how he could secure the passage of an ordinance allowing the People’s Gas Light Company to lay pipes in the streets. Boole referred him to Charles E. Loew,[21] a clerk in the Common Council, and later County Clerk, and a noted Tammany figure.[208] Milbank gave Loew $20,000 cash[22] and $30,000 in stock, whereupon the Common Council passed the ordinance on the same night.

Boole, at this time, was involved in activities beyond just safeguarding the city’s health. In a lawsuit filed by William Elmer against Robert Milbank in the Superior Court in 1867, Milbank testified that he had approached Boole to find out how to get an ordinance passed that would permit the People’s Gas Light Company to install pipes in the streets. Boole directed him to Charles E. Loew,[21] a clerk in the Common Council, who later became County Clerk and was a well-known figure in Tammany. [208] Milbank handed Loew $20,000 in cash[22] and $30,000 in stock, after which the Common Council passed the ordinance that very night.

Public criticism was so caustic that Tammany withdrew Boole and nominated John T. Hoffman, a man of some popularity and considerable ability. The Mozart faction nominated John Hecker, a religious and political enthusiast of narrow views, but acceptable to the Mozart “boys” or “strikers,” because of his willingness to supply an abundance of money. Smith Ely, Jr., urged Hecker to withdraw, as his candidacy was hopeless. “Mr. Ely,” said Hecker, “you form your opinions in the ordinary way of a business man and politician, but I receive my impressions directly from on High.” The Republicans nominated Marshall O. Roberts, and the “McKeon Democracy” renominated Gunther.

Public criticism was so harsh that Tammany pulled Boole and nominated John T. Hoffman, a man who had some popularity and significant skills. The Mozart faction nominated John Hecker, a religious and political enthusiast with narrow views, but acceptable to the Mozart “boys” or “strikers” because he was willing to provide a lot of money. Smith Ely, Jr., urged Hecker to drop out, as his candidacy was hopeless. “Mr. Ely,” said Hecker, “you form your opinions like a typical businessman and politician, but I get my insights directly from above.” The Republicans nominated Marshall O. Roberts, and the “McKeon Democracy” re-nominated Gunther.

Frauds were as common as ever. It was well established that 15,000 persons who had registered could not be found at the places given as their residences. In the disreputable districts, upon which Tammany depended for a large vote, a non-Tammany speaker was in actual danger of his life. Hoffman received 32,820 votes; Roberts, 31,657; Hecker, 10,390, and Gunther, 6,758.

Frauds were as common as ever. It was well known that 15,000 people who had registered couldn’t be found at the addresses they provided. In the shady neighborhoods that Tammany relied on for a big vote, a non-Tammany speaker risked actual violence. Hoffman got 32,820 votes; Roberts, 31,657; Hecker, 10,390, and Gunther, 6,758.

There is little to say of Hoffman’s administration. Frauds and thefts of every description continued as before, though it is not possible to connect his name with any of them. His popularity grew. The Tammany Society elected him Grand Sachem, the Democratic State Committee named him for Governor in 1866,[23] and toward the end of his term as Mayor he was renominated for that office. Fernando Wood again came forth as the Mozart Hall nominee, and the Republicans selected William A. Darling. Hoffman swept everything before him[209] (December, 1867), receiving 63,061 votes, to 22,837 for Wood, and 18,483 for Darling.

There isn't much to say about Hoffman’s administration. Fraud and theft of all kinds continued as usual, although it's impossible to tie his name to any of them. His popularity increased. The Tammany Society elected him Grand Sachem, and the Democratic State Committee nominated him for Governor in 1866,[23] and toward the end of his term as Mayor, he was renominated for that position. Fernando Wood again emerged as the nominee from Mozart Hall, while the Republicans chose William A. Darling. Hoffman dominated the election[209] (December, 1867), receiving 63,061 votes compared to 22,837 for Wood and 18,483 for Darling.

The total vote was 104,481, an increase of 22,779 in two years. The reasons for this astounding augmentation were no secret to any one. Repeating was one cause, and false registration was another; in one ward alone—the Eighteenth—in this election, 1,500 fraudulent registrations were discovered. But the main cause was illegal naturalization. In the Supreme Court and the Court of Common Pleas, citizens were turned out at the rate, often, of about 1,000 a day. The State census of 1865 gave the city 51,500 native and 77,475 naturalized voters.[24] The figures were doubtless false, probably having been swelled to allow fraudulent totals at the polls to come within the limits of an officially declared total of eligible voters. Nevertheless, the figures are significant of the proportion of aliens to natives. The predominance of the former, moreover, was daily made greater through the connivance of corrupt Judges with the frauds of the politicians. The bulk of these aliens added to the hopelessness of the local situation. With their European ideas and training, and their ignorance of our political problems, they became the easy prey of the ward “bosses” and aided in imposing upon the city a reign of unexampled corruption.

The total vote was 104,481, an increase of 22,779 in two years. The reasons for this surprising increase were obvious to everyone. Repeating votes was one reason, and fake registrations were another; in just one ward—the Eighteenth—in this election, 1,500 fraudulent registrations were found. But the main reason was illegal naturalization. In the Supreme Court and the Court of Common Pleas, citizens were often removed at a rate of about 1,000 a day. The State census of 1865 reported the city had 51,500 native and 77,475 naturalized voters.[24] These numbers were likely inflated, probably to make fraudulent totals at the polls fit within the limits of an officially declared total of eligible voters. Still, the figures highlight the ratio of foreigners to natives. The dominance of the former was further increased daily with the help of corrupt judges collaborating with fraudulent politicians. The majority of these foreigners contributed to the dire local situation. With their European perspectives and lack of understanding of our political issues, they became easy targets for the ward “bosses” and helped establish a level of corruption in the city that was unprecedented.

Heretofore the Tammany organization had been held in the control of constantly changing combinations. Duumvirates, triumvirates and cliques of various numbers of men had risen, prospered and passed away. The period is now reached when the power became centralized in one man. Fernando Wood had illustrated the feasibility of the “boss” system; William M. Tweed now appeared to develop it to its highest pitch. The “boss”[210] was the natural result of the recognized political methods. Where, as in previous times, three or four or half a dozen leaders had put their wits together and dictated and sold nominations, Tweed, astute, unprincipled and thoroughly versed in the most subterranean phases of ward politics, now gathered this power exclusively in his own hands. How he and his followers used it was disclosed in the operations of the extraordinary Tweed, or Tammany “Ring.”

Until now, the Tammany organization had been controlled by a constantly changing mix of groups. Duumvirates, triumvirates, and various cliques had risen, thrived, and disappeared. Now, the power has become centralized in one person. Fernando Wood showed that the “boss” system could work; William M. Tweed came to take it to new heights. The “boss”[210] was a natural outcome of established political practices. Previously, three or four or even six leaders would collaborate to dictate and sell nominations. But Tweed, shrewd, unscrupulous, and deeply knowledgeable about the underbelly of ward politics, concentrated this power solely in his own hands. How he and his associates wielded it was revealed through the actions of the notorious Tweed, or Tammany “Ring.”

FOOTNOTES

[1] Statement to the author by Douglas Taylor, then his private secretary.

[1] Statement to the author by Douglas Taylor, who was his private secretary at the time.

[2] Fowler was an exception to the average run of the leaders who preceded him, in that he was a college graduate and moved in the best social circles. With a view of bettering the “tone” of the Wigwam, he had induced a number of rich young men to join the organization.

[2] Fowler was different from most of the leaders before him because he had a college degree and was part of the top social circles. Aiming to improve the “vibe” of the Wigwam, he had persuaded several wealthy young men to join the group.

[3] Report of Postmaster-General Holt, Senate Documents, 1st Session, 36th Congress, Vol. XI, No. 48. Also Postmaster-General Holt’s communication to James J. Roosevelt, United States District Attorney, at New York, Ibid., XIII, No. 91, p. 11.

[3] Report of Postmaster-General Holt, Senate Documents, 1st Session, 36th Congress, Vol. XI, No. 48. Also Postmaster-General Holt’s communication to James J. Roosevelt, United States District Attorney, at New York, Ibid., XIII, No. 91, p. 11.

[4] Nelson J. Waterbury, Grand Sachem (1862), was at this time, and had been for several years, Fowler’s Assistant Postmaster.

[4] Nelson J. Waterbury, Grand Sachem (1862), was at this time, and had been for several years, Fowler’s Assistant Postmaster.

[5] Statement by Mr. Tucker to the author. Confirmed by reference to report of Charles E. Wilbour to the Board of Supervisors, May 26, 1870.

[5] Statement by Mr. Tucker to the author. Verified by consulting the report of Charles E. Wilbour to the Board of Supervisors, May 26, 1870.

[6] Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. LXXXI, pp. 25-26.

[6] Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. 81, pp. 25-26.

[7] This regiment was the Forty-second New York Infantry. Kennedy died a few days after the arrival in Washington, and was succeeded by a regular army officer. The Forty-second took part in thirty-six battles and engagements. Its record stood: killed 92; wounded, 328; missing, 298.

[7] This regiment was the Forty-second New York Infantry. Kennedy passed away a few days after arriving in Washington and was replaced by a regular army officer. The Forty-second participated in thirty-six battles and engagements. Its record was: 92 killed; 328 wounded; 298 missing.

[8] Hackley, in fact, received $279,000 for only six months’ work. During the two years “for which he received full pay he has not done more than one year’s actual work in cleaning the city, as the returns in this department abundantly prove.” Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1863, part 1, No. 4.

[8] Hackley actually got $279,000 for just six months of work. In the two years he was fully paid, he did less than a year’s worth of actual work cleaning the city, as the records in this department clearly show. Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1863, part 1, No. 4.

[9] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1860-61, Vol. XXVII, No. 18.

[9] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1860-61, Vol. XXVII, No. 18.

[10] The original appropriation had been $30,000. The joint Council committee, of which Francis I. A. Boole was the head, submitted bills for alleged expenditures aggregating $125,000. Boole explained that his colleagues considered this sum excessive, and would therefore “knock off” $20,000. Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1861, No. 17.

[10] The original budget was $30,000. The joint Council committee, led by Francis I. A. Boole, submitted claims for expenditures totaling $125,000. Boole explained that his colleagues thought this amount was too high, so they would “cut” $20,000. Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1861, No. 17.

[11] For this and other instances see The History of Public Franchises in New York City, by the author.

[11] For this and other examples, see The History of Public Franchises in New York City, by the author.

[12] This speech was reprinted in the New York Herald, October 28, 1863. The Herald was known as Wood’s special organ.

[12] This speech was republished in the New York Herald, October 28, 1863. The Herald was recognized as Wood’s special publication.

[13] In a remarkable report handed down in 1862 by a select committee of the Board of Aldermen, the admission was made that the “primary elections are notoriously and proverbially the scenes of the most disgraceful fraud, chicanery and violence. They are without legal restraint or regulation, nor can such restraint or regulation be imposed upon them. Peaceable and orderly citizens, almost without exception, refuse to attend these meetings.” Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1862, Vol. XXIX, No. 7.

[13] In a remarkable report issued in 1862 by a special committee of the Board of Aldermen, it was acknowledged that the “primary elections are well-known for being the sites of the most shameful fraud, deceit, and violence. They lack any legal oversight or regulations, and no such oversight or regulations can be enforced upon them. Almost all peaceful and responsible citizens refuse to participate in these meetings.” Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1862, Vol. XXIX, No. 7.

[14] The reformers of the city had unsuccessfully sought to incorporate in the charter of 1853, a clause requiring a two-thirds vote to overcome a veto.

[14] The city's reformers had tried and failed to include a clause in the 1853 charter that would require a two-thirds vote to override a veto.

[15] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1865, part 1, No. 1.

[15] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1865, part 1, No. 1.

[16] Senate Documents, 1865, Vol. II, No. 38, pp. 75-76.

[16] Senate Documents, 1865, Vol. II, No. 38, pp. 75-76.

[17] Ibid., pp. 166-70, etc.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, pp. 166-70, etc.

[18] Ibid., pp. 252-56.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., pp. 252-56.

[19] City Inspector’s Report for 1863. The wretched condition of the city about this time caused the Legislature to establish the Metropolitan Board of Health, to have jurisdiction over the counties of New York, Kings, Westchester and Richmond and certain other territory. This board’s first report declared that the hygienic conditions of the city were disgusting and horrible; that epidemics were frequent, and that one-third of the deaths occurring in New York and Brooklyn were due to zymotic diseases. See Report of Metropolitan Board of Health, 1866, p. 133.

[19] City Inspector’s Report for 1863. The terrible state of the city around this time led the Legislature to create the Metropolitan Board of Health, which would oversee the counties of New York, Kings, Westchester, and Richmond, along with some other areas. The board’s first report stated that the sanitary conditions of the city were appalling and horrific; that epidemics were common, and that one-third of the deaths in New York and Brooklyn resulted from infectious diseases. See Report of Metropolitan Board of Health, 1866, p. 133.

[20] Senate Documents, 1865, No. 38.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Senate Documents, 1865, No. 38.

[21] Loew was several times a Sachem, holding that rank as late as 1886.

[21] Loew served as a Sachem multiple times, holding that title as recently as 1886.

[22] See Judgment Roll (1867) in the Superior Court docket and Exhibit A, forming part of the bill of particulars.

[22] See Judgment Roll (1867) in the Superior Court docket and Exhibit A, which is part of the bill of particulars.

[23] He was defeated by Reuben E. Fenton.

[23] He lost to Reuben E. Fenton.

[24] From 1847 to 1860, 2,671,745 immigrants landed at the Port of New York. Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1861, Vol. XXVIII, No. 5. In 1855 the native voters in New York City had numbered 46,173, and the aliens, 42,704.

[24] From 1847 to 1860, 2,671,745 immigrants arrived at the Port of New York. Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1861, Vol. XXVIII, No. 5. In 1855, the number of native voters in New York City was 46,173, while the number of foreign-born voters was 42,704.


CHAPTER XXIII
THE TWEED “RING”
1867-1870

The Tweed “Ring” was, in a measure, the outgrowth of the act of 1857 creating the Board of Supervisors. The Whigs, and their successors, the Republicans, had up to that year held the legislative power of the State for the greater part of ten years, during which their chief concern had been the devising of means for keeping down the Democratic majority in New York City. Their legislation was directed to the transferring of as much as they could of the government of the city to State officials, a change generally welcomed by the honest part of the citizenship, on account of the continuous misgovernment inflicted by city officials.

The Tweed “Ring” was, to some extent, the result of the 1857 law that established the Board of Supervisors. The Whigs, and later the Republicans, had held the state's legislative power for most of the past decade, and their main focus had been finding ways to diminish the Democratic majority in New York City. Their laws aimed to transfer as much city government authority as possible to state officials, a move that was generally welcomed by the honest citizens due to the ongoing mismanagement caused by city officials.

The real result of these transfers, however, was merely to make two strongholds of corruption instead of one. The Republican power in Albany and the Tammany power in New York City found it to their interests to arrange terms for the distribution of patronage and booty. Accordingly, as one means to that end, the Board of Supervisors for New York County was created. It was founded strictly as a State institution. Unlike the Boards of Supervisors of other counties, it had no power to tax. It could only ascertain and levy the taxes decreed by the State Legislature, which was required to pass yearly a special act declaring the amount necessary for the maintenance of the city government. It was to be an elective body, and each side was to have an equal quota of the twelve members. But in the first[212] board convened, this delicate balance was upset, as has been shown, by the buying of a Republican member, which in effect gave Tammany a majority.

The real outcome of these transfers, however, was just to create two strongholds of corruption instead of one. The Republican power in Albany and the Tammany power in New York City found it beneficial to work out an agreement for the distribution of patronage and spoils. To facilitate this, the Board of Supervisors for New York County was established. It was created solely as a State institution. Unlike the Boards of Supervisors in other counties, it had no authority to tax. It could only determine and collect the taxes set by the State Legislature, which was required to pass a special act each year declaring the necessary amount for the city's government. It was supposed to be an elected body, with each side having an equal share of the twelve members. However, in the first[212] meeting of the board, this delicate balance was disrupted, as previously shown, by the bribing of a Republican member, effectively giving Tammany a majority.

William M. Tweed was born in Cherry street in 1823. He spent the usual life of a New York boy. His father was a chairmaker in good circumstances and gave his children a fair education. Fascinated, as were most New York boys of the period, with the life of a volunteer fireman, he became a runner with Engine 12 before he was of age, and in 1849 he was elected foreman of another fire company. Carrying a silver-mounted trumpet, a white fire-coat over his arm and wearing an old-fashioned stiff hat, he led the ropes. So popular was young Tweed that he became a powerful factor in ward politics, and gifted with the qualities that counted most in those circles, he was not slow in utilizing his popularity. The Americus Club, for a long time Tweed’s favorite quarters, and at times the place where Tammany politics were determined, was started with him as its foremost luminary.

William M. Tweed was born on Cherry Street in 1823. He led a typical life as a boy in New York. His father was a successful chairmaker and provided his children with a decent education. Like many boys in New York at the time, he was fascinated by the life of a volunteer fireman and became a runner with Engine 12 before he turned 18. In 1849, he was elected foreman of another fire company. Carrying a silver-mounted trumpet and a white fire coat over his arm while wearing an old-fashioned stiff hat, he led the team. Young Tweed was so popular that he became a major player in local politics, and with the traits that mattered most in those circles, he quickly took advantage of his popularity. The Americus Club, which was for a long time Tweed’s favorite hangout and sometimes the place where Tammany politics were decided, started with him as its leading figure.

Though defeated for Assistant Alderman in 1850, he was elected the next year and served in the “Forty Thieves” Board. He was a delegate, in 1852, to the Congressional convention of the Fifth District, composed of two East Side wards of New York City, and Williamsburg. A deadlock ensued, through each of two candidates polling forty-four votes. Finally the Williamsburg delegates “threw over” their favorite and voted for Tweed, who as chairman of the convention, cast the deciding vote for himself, with the statement that “Tweedie never goes back on Tweedie.” He was elected, but beaten for reelection, in 1854, by the “Know-Nothings.” The latter he fought so persistently that he became known as the champion of the foreign element. He was made a Sachem of the Tammany Society because of his extreme popularity, and in 1857 he was elected to the Board of Supervisors. Selling his business[213] of chairmaking, he thereupon devoted his entire time to politics.

Though he lost the Assistant Alderman election in 1850, he won the following year and served on the “Forty Thieves” Board. In 1852, he was a delegate to the Congressional convention for the Fifth District, which included two East Side wards of New York City and Williamsburg. A deadlock occurred because both candidates received forty-four votes. Eventually, the Williamsburg delegates supported Tweed instead of their preferred candidate. As chairman of the convention, Tweed cast the deciding vote for himself, declaring, “Tweedie never goes back on Tweedie.” He was elected but lost his reelection bid in 1854 to the “Know-Nothings.” He fought against them so hard that he earned a reputation as the advocate for the foreign community. Due to his immense popularity, he became a Sachem of the Tammany Society, and in 1857, he was elected to the Board of Supervisors. After selling his chairmaking business, he focused entirely on politics.

The first “ring” was the Supervisors’ “Ring,” founded in 1859 by the Democrats in the board for the purpose of procuring the appointment of Inspectors of Election.[1] One member of the board, as already shown, was bribed by a present of $2,500 to stay away from a session when the Inspectors were appointed. Tweed was so well pleased with the success of this scheme that he was inspired to wider efforts. Aided by two men—Walter Roche and John R. Briggs—he began a systematic course of lobbying before the Board of Aldermen in support of excessive bills for supplies. He and his associates collected heavy tribute on every successful bill.

The first “ring” was the Supervisors’ “Ring,” founded in 1859 by the Democrats on the board to secure the appointment of Election Inspectors.[1] One member of the board, as previously mentioned, was bribed with $2,500 to skip a meeting when the Inspectors were appointed. Tweed was so pleased with the success of this scheme that he was inspired to expand his efforts. With the help of two men—Walter Roche and John R. Briggs—he started a systematic lobbying approach before the Board of Aldermen to push for inflated supply bills. He and his associates took a substantial cut on every successful bill.

His prestige was not visibly lessened by his defeat for Sheriff, in 1861, by James Lynch, a popular Irishman. In the same year he was elected chairman of the Tammany General Committee. This instantly made him a person of great political importance. But his grasp was yet insecure, since a hostile body of Sachems might at any time declare the general committee “irregular.” Recognizing this, he planned to dominate the society by having himself elected Grand Sachem. Holding these two positions, he reckoned that his power would be absolute. For the time, however, he thought it wise to be satisfied with the one; but eventually he succeeded Hoffman as Grand Sachem, and in his dual positions gained[214] complete control of the political situation and dictated nominations at will.

His reputation didn't noticeably decline after losing the Sheriff election in 1861 to James Lynch, a well-liked Irishman. That same year, he was elected chairman of the Tammany General Committee, which instantly made him a significant political figure. However, his grip on power was still shaky, as a rival group of Sachems could declare the general committee "irregular" at any moment. Aware of this, he set a plan in motion to take control of the society by getting himself elected Grand Sachem. He believed that holding both positions would give him absolute power. For the time being, though, he decided it was wiser to settle for just one position. Eventually, he did succeed Hoffman as Grand Sachem, and with both roles, he gained[214] complete control over the political landscape and could dictate nominations at will.

The title of “boss” he earned by his despotic action in the general committee. When a question was to be voted upon which he wished to have determined in his favor, he would neglect to call for negative votes and would decide in the affirmative, with a significantly admonishing glance at the opposing side. Soon friends and enemies alike called him “Boss” Tweed, and he did not seem to take the title harshly.

The title of “boss” he earned through his domineering behavior in the general committee. When there was a vote on an issue he wanted to go his way, he would skip asking for negative votes and would declare it passed, giving a pointed look at anyone who disagreed. Before long, both friends and foes started calling him “Boss” Tweed, and he didn’t seem to mind the nickname.

He made short shrift of his antagonists. Once, when chairman of a Tammany nominating convention, he declared the nomination of Michael Ulshoeffer, for Judge, unanimous, amid a storm of protests. On adjournment, thirty delegates remained behind to make a counter-nomination. Tweed blocked their plan by having the gas turned off.

He quickly dealt with his opponents. Once, while chairing a Tammany nominating convention, he announced the unanimous nomination of Michael Ulshoeffer for Judge, despite loud protests. After the meeting ended, thirty delegates stayed behind to propose an alternative nomination. Tweed stopped their plan by cutting off the gas.

Meanwhile he daily increased his strong personal following. Nominally Deputy Street Commissioner, to which place he was appointed in 1863, he was virtually the head of that department, and could employ, when so inclined, thousands of laborers, who could be used in manipulating ward primaries when the ward leaders showed a spirit of revolt. The Aldermen had to apply to him for jobs for their ward supporters. As a member of the Board of Supervisors at the same time, he was in a position to exercise his mandatory influence respecting the passage of resolutions dealing with expenditures and the giving out of contracts. In 1868 he added a third office to the list—that of State Senator, and was thus enabled to superintend personally the “running” of the Legislature.

Meanwhile, he was constantly growing his strong personal following. Officially Deputy Street Commissioner, a position he took on in 1863, he was essentially the leader of that department and had the power to hire thousands of workers when he wanted, who could be used to manage ward primaries whenever the ward leaders pushed back. The Aldermen had to turn to him for jobs for their supporters in the wards. At the same time, as a member of the Board of Supervisors, he could leverage his considerable influence over the approval of resolutions related to spending and awarding contracts. In 1868, he took on a third role as State Senator, allowing him to personally oversee the operations of the Legislature.

The members of the “ring”—Tweed and his subordinates, Peter B. Sweeny, Richard B. Connolly and the rest—were growing rich at a rapid rate. According to the subsequent testimony of James H. Ingersoll, it was in 1867 that the understanding was reached that[215] persons who supplied the public offices with materials would be required to increase the percentages given to the officials, and that all purveyors to the city must comply. The previous tax had been but 10 per cent., and it had been somewhat irregularly levied. A few tradesmen refused to pay the advance, but plenty there were to take their places. Ingersoll was one of these. He was told to fix his bills so as to “put up 35 per cent.,” and he obligingly complied with the command. Of the 35 per cent. collected, 25 went to Tweed and 10 to Controller Connolly.

The members of the "ring"—Tweed and his associates, Peter B. Sweeny, Richard B. Connolly, and others—were getting rich quickly. According to James H. Ingersoll's later testimony, it was in 1867 that they agreed that[215] suppliers for public offices would have to increase the percentages they gave to the officials, and all vendors to the city had to comply. The previous tax had only been 10 percent and was collected irregularly. Some vendors refused to pay the increase, but there were plenty ready to take their place. Ingersoll was one of them. He was told to adjust his bills to "include a 35 percent markup," and he willingly went along with the order. Of the 35 percent collected, 25 went to Tweed and 10 to Controller Connolly.

Tweed had become dissatisfied with the old Tammany Hall building, and a site for a new hall—the present location on Fourteenth street—was secured. The funds in hand for the building were insufficient, however, and had to be augmented by private subscription. It well illustrates the liberality with which the Tammany chieftains were supplying themselves financially, to note that when John Kelly, the Grand Sachem, at a meeting of the society announced that a loan of $250,000 would be needed, the sum of $175,000 was subscribed on the spot, fifteen members alone subscribing $10,000 each.[2] A far more astonishing incident happened in the Fall of 1867, when Peter B. Sweeny, the City Chamberlain,[3] announced his determination to give to the city treasury, for the benefit of the taxpayers, over $200,000 a year, interest money, which before that had been pocketed by the City Chamberlain.

Tweed had grown unhappy with the old Tammany Hall building, so a site for a new hall—the current location on Fourteenth Street—was secured. However, the funds available for the building were not enough and needed to be supplemented by private donations. It clearly shows how generously the Tammany leaders were lining their pockets that when John Kelly, the Grand Sachem, announced at a society meeting that a loan of $250,000 would be necessary, $175,000 was pledged right then, with fifteen members each contributing $10,000.[2] An even more remarkable incident occurred in the Fall of 1867, when Peter B. Sweeny, the City Chamberlain,[3] declared his intention to contribute over $200,000 a year to the city treasury for the benefit of taxpayers, money that had previously been kept by the City Chamberlain.

While the “ring” was plundering the city and plotting theft on a more gigantic scale, the Sachems, many of them implicated in the frauds, laid the corner-stone of the new Tammany Hall building. The ceremony was marked by the characteristic pronouncement of virtuous-sounding[216] phrases. “Brothers and friends,” rhapsodized Mayor Hoffman, “in the name of the Tammany Society, I proceed to lay the corner-stone of a new hall which will, for the next half century at least, be the headquarters of the Democracy of New York, where the great principles of civil and religious liberty, constitutional law and national unity, which form the great corner-stones of the republic, will always be advocated and maintained.…” The “braves” then marched to Irving Hall, where Tweed, Sweeny and Connolly had caused such inscriptions as these to be hung about: “Civil liberty the glory of man”; “The Democratic party—Upon its union and success depends the future of the republic. He who would seek to lower its standard of patriotism and principle, or distract its councils, is an enemy to the country.” Gazing approvingly on these inscriptions from the platform sat Tweed, Sweeny and Connolly, A. Oakey Hall and a host of Judges and office-holders of all sorts, while Andrew J. Garvey (who will reappear in these chapters) conducted the invited guests. The building of this hall—an imposing one for the day—in a central part of the city, gave to the Tweed combination an advantage of no inconsiderable significance.

While the “ring” was looting the city and scheming for bigger thefts, the Sachems, many of whom were involved in the scams, laid the cornerstone of the new Tammany Hall building. The ceremony featured the usual flow of self-righteous phrases. “Brothers and friends,” declared Mayor Hoffman, “on behalf of the Tammany Society, I’m here to lay the cornerstone of a new hall that will, for at least the next fifty years, be the headquarters of the Democracy of New York, where we will always defend and uphold the great principles of civil and religious liberty, constitutional law, and national unity, which are the foundational stones of the republic...” The “braves” then marched to Irving Hall, where Tweed, Sweeny, and Connolly had hung phrases like: “Civil liberty is the glory of man”; “The Democratic party—The success of this party is crucial for the future of the republic. Anyone who tries to undermine its standards of patriotism and principle or disrupt its leadership is an enemy of the country.” Watching approvingly over these phrases from the platform were Tweed, Sweeny, Connolly, A. Oakey Hall, and many judges and officials of all types, while Andrew J. Garvey (who will return in these chapters) greeted the invited guests. The construction of this hall—an impressive one for its time—in a central part of the city gave the Tweed group a significant advantage.

In the new Wigwam, on July 4, 1868, the Democratic national convention was held. Tammany, in fact, forced its candidate, Horatio Seymour, on the convention. The galleries were filled with seasoned Wigwam shouters, cheering vociferously for Seymour. Only persons having tickets were admitted, and these tickets were distributed by an able young Wigwam politician, who saw to it that only the right sort of persons gained entrance. Gaining its point on the nomination, Tammany magnanimously allowed the Southern men to dictate the declaration in the platform that the reconstruction acts were “unconstitutional, revolutionary and void.” There was a general suspicion that the organization, hopeless of the election of a Democratic President, had forced Seymour’s nomination[217] for the purpose of trading votes for its State and local ticket.

In the new Wigwam, on July 4, 1868, the Democratic national convention took place. Tammany basically pushed its candidate, Horatio Seymour, onto the convention. The galleries were packed with experienced Wigwam supporters, cheering loudly for Seymour. Only people with tickets were allowed in, and these tickets were handed out by a skilled young Wigwam politician, who made sure that only the right kind of people got in. After securing the nomination, Tammany generously let the Southern delegates decide the wording in the platform that the reconstruction acts were “unconstitutional, revolutionary, and void.” There was a widespread belief that the organization, feeling hopeless about electing a Democratic President, had forced Seymour’s nomination[217] to trade votes for its state and local candidates.

The State convention again named Hoffman for Governor, and preparations began for a lively campaign. Tammany addressed itself to the citizenship as the defender of the interests of the poor, and instanced the candidacy of John A. Griswold for Governor, Edwin D. Morgan for Governor, and “several other millionaires,” as a proof of the plutocratic tendencies of the Republican party. On October 19 the general committee, with Tweed in the chair, adopted an address urging the people to stand by Seymour and Blair. Continuing, it said:

The state convention once again nominated Hoffman for Governor, and preparations kicked off for an energetic campaign. Tammany reached out to citizens as the champion of the poor's interests, highlighting the candidacies of John A. Griswold for Governor, Edwin D. Morgan for Governor, and “several other millionaires” as evidence of the wealthy bias of the Republican party. On October 19, the general committee, led by Tweed, passed a statement encouraging people to support Seymour and Blair. It went on to say:

“We are united. We believe in our cause. It is the cause of constitutional liberty, of personal rights, of a fraternity of States, of an economical government, of the financial credit of the nation, of one currency for all men, rich and poor, and of the political supremacy of the white race and protection of American labor.… [Hoffman] is the friend of the poor, the sympathizer with the naturalized citizen, and the foe to municipal oppression in the form of odious excise and all other requisitional laws.… Is not the pending contest preeminently one of capital against labor, of money against popular rights, and of political power against the struggling interests of the masses?”

“We stand together. We believe in our mission. It's the mission of constitutional freedom, personal rights, a brotherhood of states, a government that’s efficient, the financial stability of the nation, a single currency for everyone, rich and poor alike, and the political dominance of the white race along with the protection of American workers.… [Hoffman] is a friend to the underprivileged, an ally of naturalized citizens, and an opponent of municipal injustice in the form of burdensome taxes and all other oppressive laws.… Isn’t the ongoing battle primarily about capital versus labor, money versus the rights of the people, and political power versus the efforts of the working class?”

Public addresses and pronunciamentos, however, formed but a small part of the Tammany program for 1868. For six weeks the naturalization mills worked with the greatest regularity in the Supreme, Common Pleas and Superior Courts, producing, it was estimated, from 25,000 to 30,000 citizens, of whom not less than 85 per cent. voted the Tammany Hall ticket. On October 30 Tweed announced to the general committee that “at 10 o’clock to-morrow the money for electioneering purposes will be distributed” and that those who came first would be served first. The chairman of the executive committee spread forth the glad tidings that there was $1,000 ready for each election district. There being 327 election districts, this made a fund of $327,000 from the general committee alone, exclusive of the sums derived in the districts themselves from the saloon-keepers and the[218] tradesmen, whose fear of inviting reprisals by Tammany officials made them “easy marks” for assessments. Tweed personally suggested to the twenty-four leaders the stuffing of ballot boxes.[4] By fraudulent naturalization, repeating, the buying and trading of votes, and intimidation, Seymour secured a total of 108,316 votes, against 47,762 for Grant. The whole vote of the city was swelled to 156,288, of which, it was conclusively demonstrated, at least 25,000 were fraudulent.[5] Tweed himself confessed, nine years later, that he thought the Inspectors of Elections “lumped” the votes and declared them without counting, in order to overcome the result in the rest of the State and give the electoral vote to Seymour.[6] To prevent the Republicans from getting the use of certain telegraph wires on election night, Tweed sent out long, useless messages, and it was even proposed to telegraph the whole Bible if necessary.[7]

Public speeches and announcements, however, were just a small part of Tammany's agenda for 1868. For six weeks, the naturalization processes operated consistently in the Supreme, Common Pleas, and Superior Courts, producing an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 new citizens, of whom at least 85 percent voted for Tammany Hall. On October 30, Tweed informed the general committee that “at 10 o’clock tomorrow the money for campaigning will be distributed” and that those who arrived first would receive their share first. The chairman of the executive committee shared the good news that there was $1,000 available for each election district. With 327 election districts, this created a total fund of $327,000 from the general committee alone, not counting the additional amounts raised in the districts themselves by saloon owners and tradespeople, whose fear of retaliation from Tammany officials made them “easy targets” for financial contributions. Tweed personally suggested to the twenty-four leaders to stuff the ballot boxes. Through fraudulent naturalization, vote buying and trading, and intimidation, Seymour managed to secure a total of 108,316 votes, compared to 47,762 for Grant. The overall city vote reached 156,288, of which it was clearly shown that at least 25,000 were fraudulent. Tweed himself admitted nine years later that he believed the Election Inspectors “lumped” the votes and declared them without proper counting, aiming to offset the results in the rest of the State and give Seymour the electoral vote. To prevent the Republicans from using certain telegraph lines on election night, Tweed sent out long, pointless messages, and it was even suggested to telegram the entire Bible if necessary.

Hoffman was swept into the Governorship on the strength of the frauds. His election left vacant the Mayor’s chair, and a special election to fill it was called for the first Tuesday of December.

Hoffman was propelled into the Governor's position due to the frauds. His election created a vacancy for the Mayor's seat, and a special election to fill it was scheduled for the first Tuesday of December.

It was all essential to the “ring” that its candidate, A. Oakey Hall, should be elected. The candidacy of Frederick A. Conkling, the Republican nominee, was not feared, but John Kelly, who controlled a considerable part of the Irish vote, was a threatening factor. Disappointed at not receiving a new post at the close of his term as Sheriff, he had led a revolt against the “ring,” and had himself nominated for Mayor at the Masonic[219] Hall “reform” convention. “Influences” were soon set at work; and suddenly, after Kelly had appeared before the nominating convention and accepted the nomination, he withdrew from the contest, on the score of ill-health.[8] Hall won, receiving 75,109 votes, to 20,835 for Conkling. The degree in which Tammany fraudulently increased the vote at the November election is indicated in the fact that at the December election, despite a repetition of frauds, the Tammany vote declined 33,000.

It was crucial for the “ring” that their candidate, A. Oakey Hall, got elected. They weren't worried about Frederick A. Conkling, the Republican nominee, but John Kelly, who had a significant hold on the Irish vote, posed a real threat. Frustrated at not getting a new position after his term as Sheriff ended, he led a revolt against the “ring” and nominated himself for Mayor at the Masonic[219] Hall “reform” convention. Soon, “influences” were mobilized, and suddenly, after Kelly appeared at the nominating convention and accepted the nomination, he withdrew from the race due to health issues.[8] Hall won, getting 75,109 votes compared to Conkling's 20,835. The extent to which Tammany fraudulently inflated the vote in the November election is highlighted by the fact that in the December election, despite similar frauds, the Tammany vote dropped by 33,000.

The “ring” nominations, being equivalent to election, yielded a large price. There was no Democratic opposition, Mozart Hall having practically passed out of existence, through Wood’s resignation of its leadership. The revenues of the various city offices were constantly rising, and a keener competition for the places arose. In 1866, before the really extensive operations of the “ring” began, it was estimated that the offices of Sheriff and County Clerk were worth $40,000 a year each. Several years later it was found that the yearly revenue of the Register amounted to between $60,000 and $70,000, partly derived from illegal fees. It was well known that one Register had received the sum of $80,000 a year.[9] The yearly aggregate of the illegal transactions in the Sheriff’s office could not be accurately ascertained; but it was a well-authenticated fact that one Sheriff, about 1870, drew from the office the sum of $150,000 the first year of his term. He was a poor man when elected; upon retiring at the end of the two-years’ term, he did not conceal the fact that he was worth $250,000, clear of all political assessments and other deductions.

The “ring” nominations, which were similar to elections, came with a hefty price tag. There was no Democratic opposition, as Mozart Hall had pretty much vanished after Wood stepped down from leadership. The revenues from various city positions were consistently increasing, leading to more intense competition for these roles. In 1866, before the extensive activities of the “ring” kicked in, it was estimated that the Sheriff and County Clerk positions were worth $40,000 each per year. A few years later, it was discovered that the yearly revenue for the Register ranged between $60,000 and $70,000, partly due to illegal fees. It was widely known that one Register was making $80,000 a year. The total amount of illegal transactions in the Sheriff’s office couldn’t be determined precisely; however, it was a verified fact that one Sheriff, around 1870, pulled $150,000 from the office in his first year. He had been a poor man when elected; when he left office after his two-year term, he openly stated that he was worth $250,000, free from political assessments and other deductions.

All nominations for city, county and, too often, State offices, and notoriously those for Judges, were dictated[220] by Tweed. He not only controlled all the local departments, but swayed every court below the Court of Appeals.[10] Judges were nominated partly with a view to the amount they could “put up,” and partly with a view to their future decisions on political questions. Fernando Wood had frankly presented the latter reason in his speech nominating Albert Cardozo, one of Tweed’s most useful puppets, for the Supreme Court.[11] At the Judiciary election of May, 1870, repeating was the order of the day, and the registry was swelled to an enormous extent. In one of the wards, about 1,100 negroes were registered; but when they went to the ballot boxes, they were amazed to learn that white repeaters had already voted upon nearly 500 of their names. Later, when a few of the negroes tried to vote, they were arrested as repeaters. The corrupt means used in selecting the Judiciary, and the hopelessness of securing just verdicts in any of the courts, prompted one writer seriously to discuss, in the pages of a standard magazine, the formation of a vigilance committee modeled upon that of San Francisco.[12]

All nominations for city, county, and often state offices, especially those for judges, were controlled by Tweed. He not only dominated all the local departments but also influenced every court below the Court of Appeals.[220][10] Judges were nominated based partly on how much they could “contribute” and partly based on how they would rule on political issues in the future. Fernando Wood openly stated this reason in his speech nominating Albert Cardozo, one of Tweed’s most reliable associates, for the Supreme Court.[11] During the Judiciary election of May 1870, repeating votes was the norm, and the registration surged significantly. In one of the wards, around 1,100 Black voters were registered, but when they showed up at the ballot boxes, they were shocked to find that white repeaters had already voted using nearly 500 of their names. Later, when a few of the Black individuals tried to cast their votes, they were arrested for being repeaters. The corrupt methods used to select the judiciary and the lack of hope for fair verdicts in any courts led one writer to seriously consider, in a well-known magazine, the creation of a vigilance committee similar to the one in San Francisco.[12]

Tweed had for some time recognized the importance of gaining a seat in the State Senate. That body could at any time create or abolish city departments or offices, or change the laws affecting them. The Tammany officials, realizing its potentialities, had already made terms with it, and the “ring,” which subsisted at first between the two factions of partizans in the Board of Supervisors, had grown into a compact “ring” between[221] the Republican majority at Albany, the Board of Supervisors and the Democratic officials of New York City. Tweed saw the necessity of being at the center of political bargaining and legislative manipulation, and accordingly had himself elected to the upper house.

Tweed had recognized for a while how important it was to secure a seat in the State Senate. That group could create or eliminate city departments or offices at any time, or change the laws that affected them. The Tammany officials, aware of its power, had already struck deals with it, and the “ring,” which had initially formed between the two factions of partisans in the Board of Supervisors, had evolved into a solid “ring” between[221] the Republican majority in Albany, the Board of Supervisors, and the Democratic officials of New York City. Tweed understood that he needed to be at the heart of political negotiations and legislative maneuvering, so he had himself elected to the upper house.

Upon taking his seat, in 1868, he at once began to procure legislation increasing his power in New York City. His first measure was the “Adjusted Claims” act, which gave the City Controller power to adjust claims then existing against the city, and to obtain money by the issue of bonds. Payments under this act were first made by the Controller in July, 1868, and were continued to January, 1869. During this time, 55 per cent. of the claims paid were divided among the members of the “ring.” In July, 1869, payments under the act were resumed, but the percentage was increased to 60 per cent., and after November, 1869, to 65 per cent.

Upon taking his seat in 1868, he immediately started pushing for legislation that would increase his power in New York City. His first initiative was the “Adjusted Claims” act, which granted the City Controller the authority to settle existing claims against the city and raise money through bond issuance. Payments under this act were first made by the Controller in July 1868 and continued until January 1869. During this period, 55 percent of the claims paid were distributed among the members of the “ring.” In July 1869, payments under the act resumed, but the percentage increased to 60 percent, and after November 1869, it went up to 65 percent.

The conspiring contractors were led by Andrew J. Garvey, Ingersoll & Co. and Keyser & Co. At first, 25 per cent. of the spoils went to Tweed, 20 to Connolly and 10 to Sweeny. When the rate was subsequently increased, others were permitted to share in the harvest, and Watson, the County Auditor; Woodward, the clerk of the Board of Supervisors, and the recognized go-betweens for the “ring” members, received 2½ per cent. Five per cent. was reserved for “expenses”—in other words, the sums necessary to bribe the requisite members of the Legislature. The division of the spoils was a matter of daily occurrence when Tweed was in town, and took place in the Supervisors’ room in the County Court House. After Watson’s warrants had been cashed, Garvey would carry Tweed’s share of the plunder to the “Boss” at the office of Street Commissioner George W. McLean. On one such visit Garvey found McLean present. In trying to hand the parcel secretly to Tweed, it fell on the floor. Tweed quickly covered[222] it with his foot, and later, with apparent carelessness, picked it up and threw it into a drawer. The too-ingenious Garvey was thereafter instructed to “do business” with Woodward.[13]

The scheming contractors were headed by Andrew J. Garvey, Ingersoll & Co., and Keyser & Co. Initially, 25 percent of the profits went to Tweed, 20 percent to Connolly, and 10 percent to Sweeney. When the share was later increased, others were allowed to join in, and Watson, the County Auditor; Woodward, the clerk of the Board of Supervisors; and the known intermediaries for the “ring” members received 2.5 percent. Five percent was set aside for “expenses”—basically the money needed to bribe the necessary members of the Legislature. The distribution of the profits happened daily when Tweed was in town, taking place in the Supervisors’ room at the County Court House. After Watson’s warrants were cashed, Garvey would take Tweed’s cut of the loot to the “Boss” at the office of Street Commissioner George W. McLean. On one such occasion, Garvey found McLean there. As he tried to discreetly hand the package to Tweed, it fell on the floor. Tweed quickly stepped on it, and later, pretending to be careless, picked it up and tossed it into a drawer. Garvey, wanting to be too clever, was then told to “do business” with Woodward.[13]

Tweed soon reached a position of general control in the State Legislature. But it cost him hundreds of thousands of dollars. Often he had to pay for what he wanted quite as heavily as did the corporations who maintained lobbies there. “It was impossible to do anything there without paying for it,” were his own words; “money had to be raised for the passing of bills.”[14] A well-known lobbyist of the time stated that for a favorable report on a certain bill before the Senate $5,000 apiece was paid to four members of the committee having it in charge. On the passage of the bill a further $5,000 apiece, with contingent expenses, was to be paid. In another instance, when but one vote was needed to pass a bill, three Republicans put their figures up to $25,000 each. One of them, it is needless to say, was secured. A band of about thirty Republicans and Democrats, shortly afterwards becoming known as the “Black Horse Cavalry,” organized themselves under the leadership of an energetic lobbyist, with a mutual pledge to vote as directed.[15] Naturally their action exercised a strong “bull” influence on the market for votes; and the sums paid by Tweed and other “promoters” grew to an enormous aggregate.

Tweed quickly gained overall control in the State Legislature. But it cost him hundreds of thousands of dollars. He often had to pay as much for what he wanted as the corporations that had lobbyists there. “It was impossible to get anything done there without paying for it,” he said; “money had to be raised for passing bills.”[14] A well-known lobbyist from that time mentioned that for a favorable report on a specific bill in the Senate, $5,000 was paid to four committee members in charge of it. When the bill passed, another $5,000 per person, along with other expenses, was due. In another case, when only one vote was needed to pass a bill, three Republicans offered $25,000 each. It goes without saying that one of them was secured. A group of about thirty Republicans and Democrats, later referred to as the “Black Horse Cavalry,” organized under an active lobbyist's leadership, pledging to vote as directed.[15] Naturally, their actions had a strong "bull" influence on the vote market, and the amounts paid by Tweed and other “promoters” skyrocketed.

Honesty among legislators was at a discount. There were some honest men in both houses who voted for several of the bills alluded to, on their merits. The lobbyists entered these men in their memoranda to their corporations as having been “fixed,” put the money in their own pockets and allowed the honest members to suffer[223] under the imputation of having been bribed. Any corporation, however extensive and comprehensive the privileges it asked, and however much oppression it sought to impose upon the people in the line of unjust grants, extortionate rates or monopoly, could convince the Legislature of the righteousness of its requests upon “producing the proper sum.”[16] The testimony before the Select Committee of the New York Senate, appointed April 10, 1868, showed that at least $500,000 was expended to get legislation legalizing fraudulent Erie Railway stock issues.

Honesty among lawmakers was rare. There were a few honest people in both houses who voted for several of the mentioned bills based on their merits. The lobbyists marked these individuals in their notes to their companies as having been “fixed,” pocketed the money, and let the honest members be suspected of bribery.[223] Any corporation, no matter how extensive the privileges it sought or how much oppression it wanted to inflict on the public through unjust grants, inflated rates, or monopolies, could persuade the Legislature of the righteousness of its demands by “producing the right amount.”[16] The testimony before the Select Committee of the New York Senate, which was appointed on April 10, 1868, revealed that at least $500,000 was spent to secure legislation that legalized fraudulent Erie Railway stock issues.

In 1869 the “ring” opened operations in the Legislature and in the municipal bodies on a greater scale than ever. Tweed began to concern himself in Erie and other railroads, and to compel different corporations to give tribute for laws passed in their interest or for providing against hostile measures. He ordered the passage of the Erie Classification bill, at the suggestion of “Jim” Fisk, Jr., and Jay Gould, who for that service made him a director of the Erie railroad.[17] At this juncture Fisk and Gould were engaged in great stock frauds and in breeding a disastrous panic, which caused widespread ruin and suffering. Tweed abetted their schemes. One of his most servile tools, Judge George G. Barnard, of the Supreme Court, did whatever Tweed directed him, especially in favor of Gould and Fisk. One biographer of Fisk wrote quite innocently: “Jay Gould and Fisk took William M. Tweed into their [Erie] board, and the State Legislature, Tammany Hall and the Erie ‘Ring’ were fused in interest and have contrived to serve each other faithfully.”[18] Once Tweed complained[224] that a friend “had gone back on him,” and when asked in return how it was that he could stand such drains on his check-book, he laughed and showed a slip of paper on which he had calculated his Erie profits for the foregoing three months; they amounted to $650,000.

In 1869, the “ring” started operating in the Legislature and local governments on a larger scale than ever before. Tweed began involving himself with Erie and other railroads, pressuring various companies to pay for laws that benefited them or to protect themselves from unfavorable measures. He pushed for the passage of the Erie Classification bill at the suggestion of “Jim” Fisk, Jr. and Jay Gould, who made him a director of the Erie railroad in exchange for that support.[17] At this time, Fisk and Gould were involved in major stock frauds and creating a devastating panic that resulted in widespread ruin and suffering. Tweed supported their schemes. One of his most submissive associates, Judge George G. Barnard from the Supreme Court, did everything Tweed instructed him, especially to benefit Gould and Fisk. One biographer of Fisk naively wrote: “Jay Gould and Fisk took William M. Tweed into their [Erie] board, and the State Legislature, Tammany Hall and the Erie ‘Ring’ were united in their interests and managed to serve each other faithfully.”[18] Once, Tweed complained that a friend “had betrayed him,” and when asked how he could handle such financial burdens, he laughed and showed a slip of paper on which he had calculated his profits from Erie over the past three months; they totaled $650,000.

During the campaign of 1869, for the election of members of the Common Council and certain State officers, a legal question arose as to whether Mayor Hall had been elected for two years or merely for the unexpired year of Hoffman’s term. Hall claimed a two-years’ term, and the best lawyers supported the claim. But to make sure of the matter, Tammany, in the late days of the campaign, instructed its members and followers to cast ballots for him, and the Police Commissioners distributed special ballot boxes for the Mayoralty vote. As no proclamation on the subject had been issued, the Republicans and other opponents of Tammany Hall had no opportunity to make nominations. Mayor Hall consequently received nearly the entire number of votes cast—65,568, out of a total of 66,619.

During the 1869 campaign for the election of members of the Common Council and some State officials, a legal issue came up about whether Mayor Hall had been elected for two years or just for the remaining year of Hoffman’s term. Hall argued for a two-year term, and leading lawyers backed his claim. To be on the safe side, Tammany instructed its members and supporters to vote for him in the final days of the campaign, and the Police Commissioners provided special ballot boxes for the Mayoral vote. Since no announcement had been made about the matter, the Republicans and other opponents of Tammany Hall couldn’t nominate anyone. As a result, Mayor Hall ended up receiving almost all the votes cast—65,568 out of a total of 66,619.

After entering the Board of Supervisors, Tweed had boasted that he would soon be among the largest real-estate owners in the city. He made good the boast. A comparatively poor man in 1864, he was reputed five years later to be worth $12,000,000. This was an exaggeration, for he was not worth anything like that sum at any one time; but he was, nevertheless, an enormously rich man. He had investments in real estate and iron mines; he was interested in every street opening and widening scheme; he had a hand in all city, and in some State, contracts, and he held directorships in many railroad and gas companies and other corporations. Connolly, who some years before had left a position as a book-keeper, at a moderate salary, to engage in politics “as a financial speculation”; Sweeny, and the rest of the “ring,” suddenly became millionaires. Many other politicians shared in the sacking of the city.

After joining the Board of Supervisors, Tweed bragged that he would soon be one of the biggest real estate owners in the city. He backed up that claim. A relatively poor man in 1864, he was said to be worth $12,000,000 just five years later. This was an exaggeration, as he was never worth that much at one time, but he was still an extremely wealthy man. He had investments in real estate and iron mines; he was involved in every street opening and widening project; he had a hand in all city contracts and some state contracts, and he held positions on the boards of many railroad, gas companies, and other corporations. Connolly, who had left a bookkeeping job for a modest salary to get into politics “as a financial risk” years before; Sweeny, and the rest of the “ring,” suddenly became millionaires. Many other politicians also benefited from the plundering of the city.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1877, part 2, No. 8, pp. 15-16. This document, embodying the full confession of Tweed before a special investigating committee, will be frequently referred to in this and the following chapter. Its value as a support to many of the statements made in the text of this work rests upon the credibility of Tweed’s word. The best opinion is that Tweed told the approximate truth. He was not a vengeful man; he was, at the time, old, and broken in power and health; he had no reason for concealment or evasion, and it is unlikely, considering his moral temperament, that he would have made false statements for the purpose of involving innocent men, or of adding to the sum of venality already proved against the guilty.

[1] Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1877, part 2, No. 8, pp. 15-16. This document, which contains Tweed's full confession before a special investigative committee, will be referenced frequently in this and the next chapter. Its value as evidence for many claims made in this work depends on the trustworthiness of Tweed's statements. The general consensus is that Tweed told a version of the truth. He was not a spiteful person; at that time, he was old and diminished in both power and health; he had no reason to hide or evade the truth, and given his moral character, it's unlikely that he would have made false claims to incriminate innocent people or to increase the proof of corruption already established against the guilty.

[2] New York Herald, September 10, 1867.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ New York Herald, September 10, 1867.

[3] “I heard that Peter B. Sweeny paid $60,000 for his confirmation as City Chamberlain by the Board of Aldermen”—Tweed’s testimony, Document No. 8, p. 105.

[3] “I heard that Peter B. Sweeny paid $60,000 to get confirmed as City Chamberlain by the Board of Aldermen”—Tweed’s testimony, Document No. 8, p. 105.

[4] Document No. 8, p. 225.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Document No. 8, p. 225.

[5] It was probably at this election that a certain amusing incident in the swearing in of the Election Inspectors occurred. No Bible being at hand, they were sworn on a copy of Ollendorf’s New Method of Learning to Read, Write and Speak French. The courts subsequently upheld the substitution of Ollendorf for the Bible, deciding that it was not such an act as would vitiate the election. Documents of the Board of Supervisors, 1870, Vol. II, No. 12.

[5] It was probably during this election that a rather funny incident occurred while swearing in the Election Inspectors. Since there was no Bible available, they were sworn in on a copy of Ollendorf’s New Method of Learning to Read, Write and Speak French. The courts later ruled that using Ollendorf instead of the Bible was acceptable, stating that it didn’t invalidate the election. Documents of the Board of Supervisors, 1870, Vol. II, No. 12.

[6] Document No. 8, pp. 133-34.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Document No. 8, pp. 133-34.

[7] Document No. 8, p. 226.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Doc No. 8, p. 226.

[8] Kelly left rather hastily for Europe, where he remained three years.

[8] Kelly left quickly for Europe, where he stayed for three years.

[9] Report of the Bar Association Committee on Extortions, March 5, 1872.

[9] Report from the Bar Association Committee on Extortions, March 5, 1872.

[10] Tilden: The Tweed Ring, J. Polhemus, 1873.

[10] Tilden: The Tweed Ring, J. Polhemus, 1873.

[11] “The Ermine in the ‘Ring,’” Putnam’s Magazine supplement (about 1869). It happened that a singular suit brought by Wood against the city came before this very Judge, when Wood obtained by his decision a judgment for $180,000 for the rent of premises owned by him, not worth, for any use of the city, over $35,000. The buildings, in great part, were so unfit for use that the city, although paying rent for them for years, established its departments elsewhere. Wood re-leased these unused offices, collecting a double rent.

[11] “The Ermine in the 'Ring,’” Putnam's Magazine supplement (around 1869). A unique lawsuit brought by Wood against the city came before this very Judge, in which Wood secured a judgment for $180,000 for the rent of his properties, which were only worth about $35,000 for any city-related use. Many of the buildings were in such poor condition that, despite paying rent for years, the city decided to relocate its departments elsewhere. Wood then re-leased these unused offices, making a profit by collecting double rent.

[12] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.

[13] Garvey’s testimony, Tweed Case, etc., Supreme Court, 1876, Vol. I: pp. 814-16.

[13] Garvey’s testimony, Tweed Case, etc., Supreme Court, 1876, Vol. I: pp. 814-16.

[14] Document No. 8, p. 29.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Document No. 8, p. 29.

[15] Document No. 8, pp. 212-13.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Document No. 8, pp. 212-13.

[16] New York Sun, February 6, 1871.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ New York Sun, February 6, 1871.

[17] Q.—“Did you ever receive any money from either Fisk or Gould to be used in bribing the Legislature?”

[17] Q.—“Did you ever get any money from Fisk or Gould to bribe the Legislature?”

A.—“I did, sir! They were of frequent occurrence. Not only did I receive money, but I find by an examination of the papers that everybody else who received money from the Erie Railroad charged it to me.” Tweed: Document No. 8, p. 149.

A.—“I did, sir! They happened all the time. Not only did I get money, but I see from looking at the papers that everyone else who got money from the Erie Railroad charged it to me.” Tweed: Document No. 8, p. 149.

[18] A Life of James Fisk, Jr., New York, 1871.

[18] A Life of James Fisk, Jr., New York, 1871.


CHAPTER XXIV
TWEED IN HIS GLORY
1870-1871

Urged by various motives, a number of Tammany leaders combined against Tweed: Some sought more plunder, others felt that their political aspirations had not been sufficiently recognized, and a number were incensed against Sweeny. They were led by Henry W. Genet, John Fox, John Morrissey, James O’Brien, “Mike” Norton and others, and called themselves the “Young Democracy.” Tweed had used these men in building his power; now, combined, they believed they could retire him. The dangerous classes joined them. Heretofore, these had stood by Tweed under a reciprocal agreement valuable to both sides. But the “Boss” had recently yielded to the public indignation over the leniency shown to an influential murderer, and had given orders to the Judges to deal more severely with flagrant criminal cases. This act constituted a virtual breaking of the compact, and the lawbreakers with one accord turned against him. There were at this time in the city, it was charged, about 30,000 professional thieves, 2,000 gambling establishments and 3,000 saloons.[1]

Urged by different motives, several Tammany leaders united against Tweed: Some wanted more money, others felt that their political ambitions weren't being recognized enough, and a few were angry with Sweeny. They were led by Henry W. Genet, John Fox, John Morrissey, James O’Brien, “Mike” Norton, and others, and called themselves the “Young Democracy.” Tweed had relied on these men to build his power; now, together, they believed they could push him out. The dangerous classes joined them. Until now, they had supported Tweed under a mutual agreement that benefited both parties. But the “Boss” had recently given in to public anger over the leniency shown towards a powerful murderer and had instructed the judges to be harsher with obvious criminal cases. This action effectively broke their agreement, and the lawbreakers all turned against him. At this time, it was claimed there were about 30,000 professional thieves, 2,000 gambling houses, and 3,000 bars in the city.[1]

The plan of the Young Democracy leaders was to induce the Legislature to pass a measure known as the Huckleberry charter, the object of which was to abolish the State commissions governing the city and to obtain a[226] relegation of their powers to the Board of Aldermen. The disclosure was made, many years later, that Richard Croker and seven other members of the Board of Aldermen had signed an agreement before a notary public, on March 20, 1870, pledging themselves to take no official action on any proposition affecting the city government without first obtaining the consent of Senator Genet and four other Young Democracy leaders.[2] These latter boasted that they would “put the charter through” if it took $200,000 to do it. To save himself, Tweed opened a half-way understanding with the Young Democracy chiefs, by which he was to join them and abandon Sweeny. Tweed even offered—though vainly—one of the most formidable young leaders $200,000 outright if he would swerve the Young Democracy to his interest.

The Young Democracy leaders aimed to convince the Legislature to pass a measure known as the Huckleberry charter, which intended to eliminate the State commissions overseeing the city and transfer their powers to the Board of Aldermen. Many years later, it was revealed that Richard Croker and seven other Board of Aldermen members had signed an agreement before a notary public on March 20, 1870, committing to take no official action on any proposal affecting the city government without first getting the approval of Senator Genet and four other Young Democracy leaders. These leaders claimed they would “push the charter through” if it required $200,000 to do so. To protect himself, Tweed struck a tentative deal with the Young Democracy leaders, agreeing to join their cause and leave Sweeny behind. Tweed even offered—though unsuccessfully—one of the most influential young leaders $200,000 outright if he would redirect the Young Democracy to support his interests.

The Young Democracy succeeded in winning over a majority of the general committee, and influenced that majority to call a meeting to be held in the Wigwam, on March 28. But the plotters had overlooked the society, whose Sachems, being either in, or subservient to, the “ring,” now exercised the oft-used expedient of shutting out of the hall such persons as happened to be obnoxious to them. When the members of the general committee appeared before Tammany Hall, on the night of March 28, they found to their surprise that the “ring” had caused to be placed a guard of 600 policemen about the building, to prevent their ingress. The gathering convened in Irving Hall, nearby, where by roll call it was found that 187 members of the committee, later increased by about a dozen—a clear majority of the whole number—were present. Fiery speeches were made, and the set purpose of dethroning and repudiating the “ring” Sachems was emphatically declared.

The Young Democracy managed to win over most of the general committee, persuading them to call a meeting at the Wigwam on March 28. However, the plotters had underestimated the society, whose Sachems, being either part of or controlled by the “ring,” deployed the common tactic of keeping out anyone they found undesirable. When the members of the general committee showed up at Tammany Hall on the night of March 28, they were surprised to find that the “ring” had put a guard of 600 policemen around the building to block their entry. The group gathered at nearby Irving Hall, where a roll call revealed that 187 committee members, later joined by about a dozen more—a clear majority—were present. Passionate speeches were delivered, and the clear intention to overthrow and reject the “ring” Sachems was strongly declared.

But the Young Democracy failed to distribute among the members of the Legislature the sum promised, and the country members, by way of revenge, voted down[227] the Huckleberry charter. Greatly encouraged by his enemies’ defeat, the “Boss” went to Albany with a vast sum of money and the draft of a new charter. This charter, supplemented by a number of amendments which Tweed subsequently caused the Legislature to pass, virtually relieved the “ring” of accountability to anybody. The State commissions were abolished, and practically the whole municipal power was placed in the hands of a Board of Special Audit, composed of himself, Connolly and Mayor Hall. No money could be drawn from the city without the permission of this board. The powers of the Board of Aldermen, moreover, were virtually abolished.[3]

But the Young Democracy failed to distribute the promised funds among the members of the Legislature, and the rural members, seeking revenge, voted down the Huckleberry charter. Feeling empowered by his enemies' defeat, the "Boss" went to Albany with a significant amount of money and a new charter draft. This charter, along with several amendments that Tweed later got the Legislature to pass, essentially freed the "ring" from being accountable to anyone. State commissions were eliminated, and nearly all municipal power was handed over to a Board of Special Audit, made up of him, Connolly, and Mayor Hall. No money could be withdrawn from the city without this board's approval. Additionally, the powers of the Board of Aldermen were essentially eliminated.[3]

The charter, which immediately became known as the “Tweed charter,” was passed on April 5. The victory cost every dollar of the sum Tweed took with him. Samuel J. Tilden testified that it was popularly supposed that about $1,000,000 was the amount used.[4] Tweed stated that he gave to one man $600,000 with which to buy votes, this being merely a part of the fund. For his services this lobbyist received a position requiring little or no work and worth from $10,000 to $15,000 a year.[5] Tweed further testified that he bought the votes of five Republican Senators for $40,000 apiece, giving one of them $200,000 in cash to distribute.[6] The vote in the two houses was practically unanimous: in the Senate, 30 to 2, and in the Assembly, 116 to 5. The state of the public conscience in New York City may be judged from the fact that the charter received the support of nearly all classes, “large numbers,” according to the Annual[228] Cyclopedia for 1871, “of the wealthiest citizens signing the petition” [for its passage].

The charter, which quickly became known as the “Tweed charter,” was passed on April 5. The victory cost every dollar of the amount Tweed took with him. Samuel J. Tilden testified that it was widely believed that around $1,000,000 was used.[4] Tweed claimed that he gave one man $600,000 to buy votes, which was just part of the overall fund. For his efforts, this lobbyist received a position that required little to no work and paid between $10,000 and $15,000 a year.[5] Tweed also testified that he bought the votes of five Republican Senators for $40,000 each, giving one of them $200,000 in cash to distribute.[6] The vote in both houses was nearly unanimous: in the Senate, it was 30 to 2, and in the Assembly, it was 116 to 5. The state of public conscience in New York City can be judged by the fact that the charter had support from almost all classes, with “large numbers,” according to the Annual[228] Cyclopedia for 1871, “of the wealthiest citizens signing the petition” [for its passage].

Tweed’s enemies were now crushed. At the election (April 18) of the Sachems of the society the opposition could poll only a paltry 23 votes, against the 242 secured by Tweed’s candidates; and even this minority was a factitious one, Tilden declaring that Tweed had arranged for it, to furnish the appearance of a contest.

Tweed’s enemies were now defeated. In the election (April 18) for the Sachems of the society, the opposition could only gather a meager 23 votes, compared to the 242 received by Tweed’s candidates; and even this small number was artificially created, with Tilden stating that Tweed had manipulated it to make it look like there was a competition.

Tweed’s organization was wonderfully effective. The society stood ready at a moment’s notice to expel from the Wigwam any person or group obnoxious to him. The general committee was now likewise subservient. In every ward he had a reliable representative—a leader, whose duty was to see that his particular district should return its expected majority. Under the leaders there were sub-leaders, ward clubs and associations, and captains of every election district. The organization covered every block in town with unceasing vigilance, acquainting itself with the politics of every voter. The moment a leader lost his popularity, or hesitated at scruples of any sort, Tweed dismissed him; only vote-getters and henchmen were wanted. So large was his personal following, that he not only caused thousands to be appointed to superfluous offices, but had a number of retainers, to whom he paid in the aggregate probably $60,000 a year, “letting them think they were being paid by the city.”[7] Opposition he had no difficulty in buying off, as in the case of one “Citizen’s Association,” whose principal men he caused to be appointed to various lucrative positions in the city government.[8]

Tweed’s organization was extremely effective. The society was always ready to kick out anyone he found annoying from the Wigwam at a moment’s notice. The main committee was also compliant. In every district, he had a dependable representative—a leader responsible for ensuring that his area delivered the expected majority. Under these leaders were sub-leaders, local clubs and associations, and captains for each election district. The organization kept a close watch over every block in town, getting to know the politics of every voter. The instant a leader lost popularity or showed any kind of hesitation, Tweed would dismiss him; he only wanted vote-getters and loyal supporters. His personal following was so large that he appointed thousands to unnecessary positions and had several aides whom he paid a total of about $60,000 a year, “making them believe they were being paid by the city.”[7] He had no trouble buying off any opposition, as seen with one “Citizen’s Association,” whose key members he arranged to have appointed to various well-paying roles in the city government.[8]

The Registry law having been virtually repealed at Tweed’s order, election frauds were made easier, and as a result of the abolition by the “Tweed charter” of the December city election, and the merging into one day’s polling of national, State and city elections, the “ring”[229] was in a position to resume the old practise of trading candidates, if all other resources failed.

The Registry law was basically thrown out at Tweed's command, making election fraud easier. Because of the “Tweed charter,” which got rid of the December city election and combined national, state, and city elections into a single polling day, the “ring”[229] was able to go back to their old habit of swapping candidates if they ran out of other options.

With the passage of the “Tweed charter” and the City and County Tax Levy bill[9] of 1870, the stealing expanded to a colossal degree. At a single sitting—on May 5, 1870—the Board of Special Audit made out an order for the payment of $6,312,500 on account in building the new County Court House. Of this sum barely a tenth part was realized by the city.[10] From the 65 per cent. levied on supplies, at the end of 1869, the rate was swelled to 85 per cent. “Jobs” significant of untold millions lurked in every possible form. Great projects of public improvements were exploited to the last dollar that could be drawn from them. A frequent practise of Tweed was to create on paper a fictitious institution, jot down three or four of his friends as officers, put a large amount for that institution in the tax levy and pocket the money. Asylums, hospitals and dispensaries that were never heard of, and never existed except on paper, were put down as beneficiaries of State and city. The thefts were concealed in the main by means of issues of stocks and bonds and the creation of a floating debt, which the Controller never let appear in his statements.

With the passing of the "Tweed charter" and the City and County Tax Levy bill[9] in 1870, the theft grew to an enormous scale. In just one meeting—on May 5, 1870—the Board of Special Audit authorized a payment of $6,312,500 for the construction of the new County Court House. Of that amount, barely a tenth was received by the city.[10] By the end of 1869, the tax on supplies was raised from 65 percent to 85 percent. “Jobs” worth countless millions were hidden in every conceivable form. Major public improvement projects were exploited for every dollar that could be extracted from them. A common tactic of Tweed was to create a fake institution on paper, write down three or four of his friends as officers, allocate a large amount for that institution in the tax levy, and pocket the money. Asylums, hospitals, and dispensaries that were never heard of and only existed on paper were listed as recipients of state and city funds. The thefts were mainly hidden through the issuance of stocks and bonds and the creation of a floating debt, which the Controller never included in his reports.

A new reform movement appeared during the Summer and Fall of 1870. Republicans, independents and disaffected Democrats combined forces and nominated Thomas A. Ledwith for Mayor. The reform ticket was apparently received with great public approval, and hopes began to be entertained of its success at the polls. Tweed, however, had already secured, by ways known[230] best to himself, assurance of Republican assistance; he had large numbers of Republican officials, Election Inspectors, and the like, in his pay, and therefore knew that he had nothing to fear. Besides this, Tammany was united and enthusiastic. Its candidates, Hall, for Mayor, and Hoffman, for Governor, had seemingly lost none of their popularity with the rank and file. A few days before the election a popular demonstration, perhaps the largest in Tammany’s history, was held in and about the Wigwam. August Belmont presided, and addresses were made by Seymour, Hoffman, Tweed and Fisk (who had now become a Democrat). All the speakers were received with boisterous enthusiasm.

A new reform movement emerged during the summer and fall of 1870. Republicans, independents, and dissatisfied Democrats joined forces to nominate Thomas A. Ledwith for Mayor. The reform ticket was met with significant public approval, and there were rising hopes for its success at the polls. However, Tweed had already secured, through means known only to him, assurance of Republican support; he had many Republican officials, election inspectors, and others on his payroll, so he felt he had nothing to worry about. In addition, Tammany was united and enthusiastic. Its candidates, Hall for Mayor and Hoffman for Governor, seemed to have lost none of their popularity with the grassroots. A few days before the election, a large rally, possibly the biggest in Tammany's history, took place at the Wigwam. August Belmont presided, and speeches were given by Seymour, Hoffman, Tweed, and Fisk (who had now become a Democrat). All the speakers were met with loud enthusiasm.

Tweed won, Hall receiving 71,037 votes, to 46,392 for Ledwith. But the indications were plain that a reaction against the “ring” had begun, for Hoffman’s vote exceeded that of Hall by 15,631, while Ledwith’s vote exceeded that of Stewart L. Woodford, the Republican candidate for Governor, by nearly 12,000.

Tweed won, Hall getting 71,037 votes compared to 46,392 for Ledwith. But it was clear that a backlash against the “ring” had started, as Hoffman’s votes surpassed Hall’s by 15,631, while Ledwith’s votes were nearly 12,000 more than those of Stewart L. Woodford, the Republican candidate for Governor.

Partly to quiet his conscience, it was suspected, and in part to make himself appear in the light of a generously impulsive man, Tweed gave, in the Winter of 1870-71, $1,000 to each of the Aldermen of the various wards to buy coal for the poor. To the needy of his native ward he gave $50,000. By these acts he succeeded in deluding the needier part of the population to the enormity of his crimes. Abstractly, these beneficiaries of his bounty knew he had not amassed his millions by honest means. But when, in the midst of a severe Winter, they were gladdened by presents of coal and provisions, they did not stop to moralize, but blessed the man who could be so good to them. Even persons beyond the range of his bounty have hailed him as a great philanthropist; and the expression, “Well, if Tweed stole, he was at least good to the poor,” is still repeated, and furnished, in its tacit exoneration, the prompting for like conduct, both thieving and giving, on the part of his successors.

Partly to ease his conscience, it was believed, and partly to show himself as a generously impulsive person, Tweed gave, in the winter of 1870-71, $1,000 to each of the Aldermen in various wards to buy coal for the needy. To the less fortunate in his hometown ward, he donated $50,000. Through these acts, he managed to deceive the poorer population about the magnitude of his crimes. On some level, those who benefited from his charity knew he hadn't made his millions honestly. But when, during a harsh winter, they received gifts of coal and food, they didn’t take time to reflect; instead, they praised the man who was so kind to them. Even people beyond those who received his charity have regarded him as a great philanthropist; and the saying, “Well, if Tweed stole, he at least helped the poor,” is still repeated, and in its unspoken approval, encouraged similar behavior—both stealing and giving—from his successors.

One of Tweed’s schemes was the Viaduct Railroad bill, which virtually allowed a company created by himself to place a railroad on or above the ground, on any city street. The Legislature passed, and Governor Hoffman signed, the bill, early in 1871. One of its provisions authorized and compelled the city to take $5,000,000 of stock;[11] another exempted the company’s property from taxes or assessments, while other bills allowed for the benefit of the railroad the widening and the grading of streets, which meant a “job” costing the city from $50,000,000 to $65,000,000.[12] Associated with Tweed and others of the “ring” as directors were some of the foremost financial and business men of the day. The complete consummation of this almost unparalleled steal was prevented only by the general exposure of Tweedism a few months later.

One of Tweed’s schemes was the Viaduct Railroad bill, which basically allowed a company he created to build a railroad on or above the ground on any city street. The Legislature passed the bill, and Governor Hoffman signed it, early in 1871. One of its provisions authorized and required the city to buy $5,000,000 worth of stock;[11] another exempted the company’s property from taxes or assessments, while other bills enabled the widening and grading of streets for the benefit of the railroad, which meant a project costing the city between $50,000,000 and $65,000,000.[12] Linked with Tweed and others in the “ring” as directors were some of the leading financial and business figures of the time. The full realization of this almost unprecedented theft was stopped only by the public exposure of Tweedism a few months later.

In the Assembly of 1871 party divisions were so even that Tweed, though holding a majority of two votes, had only the exact number (65) required by the constitution as a majority. In April “Jimmy” Irving, one of the city Assemblymen, resigned, to avoid being expelled for having assaulted Smith Weed. But Tweed was equal to the occasion, for the very next day he obtained the vote and services of Orange S. Winans, a Republican creature of the Erie Railroad Company. It was charged publicly that Tweed gave Winans $75,000 in cash, and that the Erie Railroad Company gave him a five-years’ tenure of office at $5,000 a year.[13]

In the Assembly of 1871, party divisions were so close that Tweed, despite having a majority of two votes, only had the exact number (65) needed by the constitution for a majority. In April, “Jimmy” Irving, one of the city Assembly members, resigned to avoid being expelled for assaulting Smith Weed. But Tweed was ready for this, because the very next day he got the vote and support of Orange S. Winans, a Republican linked to the Erie Railroad Company. It was publicly alleged that Tweed paid Winans $75,000 in cash, and that the Erie Railroad Company offered him a five-year position at $5,000 a year.[13]

Tweed neglected no means whatever to avert popular criticism. A committee composed of six of the leading and richest citizens—Moses Taylor, Marshall O. Roberts,[232] E. D. Brown, J. J. Astor, George K. Sistare and Edward Schell—were induced to make an examination of the Controller’s books, and hand in a most eulogistic report, commending Connolly for his honesty and faithfulness to duty. So highly useful a document naturally was used for all it was worth.[14]

Tweed did everything he could to avoid public criticism. A committee of six prominent and wealthy citizens—Moses Taylor, Marshall O. Roberts,[232] E. D. Brown, J. J. Astor, George K. Sistare, and Edward Schell—was persuaded to review the Controller’s records and produce a very flattering report, praising Connolly for his honesty and dedication to his duties. Such a valuable document was, of course, used to its full advantage.[14]

But it was in his tender providence over the newspapers that his greatest success in averting public clamor was shown. Both in Albany and in this city he showered largess upon the press. One paper at the Capital received, through his efforts, a legislative appropriation of $207,900 for one year’s printing, whereas $10,000 would have overpaid it for the service rendered.[15] The proprietor of an Albany journal which was for many years the Republican organ of the State, made it a practice to submit to Tweed’s personal censorship the most violently abusive articles. On the payment of large sums, sometimes as much as $5,000, Tweed was permitted to make such alterations as he chose.[16] Here, in the city, the owner of one subservient newspaper received $80,000 a year for “city advertising,” and to some other newspapers large subsidies were paid in the same guise. Under the head of “city contingencies,” reporters for the city newspapers, Democratic and Republican, received Christmas presents of $200 each. This particular practice had begun before Tweed’s time,[17] but in line with the expansive manner of the “ring,” the plan was elaborated by subsidizing six or eight men on nearly all[233] the city newspapers, crediting each of them with $2,000 or $2,500 a year for “services.”[18]

But it was through his careful management of the newspapers that his greatest success in quelling public outcry was evident. In both Albany and this city, he poured money into the press. One paper in the Capital received, thanks to his efforts, a legislative funding of $207,900 for one year’s printing, while $10,000 would have been more than enough for the service provided.[15] The owner of an Albany newspaper, which was for many years the Republican voice of the State, regularly submitted the most aggressively critical articles to Tweed for his personal approval. In exchange for significant payments, sometimes as much as $5,000, Tweed was allowed to make any changes he wanted.[16] Here in the city, the owner of one compliant newspaper received $80,000 a year for “city advertising,” and other newspapers received substantial subsidies under the same pretense. Under the category of “city contingencies,” reporters from both Democratic and Republican city newspapers received Christmas bonuses of $200 each. This particular practice had started before Tweed’s time,[17] but in keeping with the expansive style of the “ring,” the scheme was expanded by paying six or eight men across nearly all the city newspapers, assigning each of them $2,000 or $2,500 a year for “services.”[18]

The proprietor of the Sun, a newspaper that, from supporting the Young Democracy, veered suddenly to an enthusiastic devotion to the “Boss,” proposed, in March 1871, the erection of a statue to Tweed. The “Boss’s” adherents jumped at the idea; and an association for the purpose was formed by Edward J. Shandley, a Police Justice, and a host of other men of local note, in professional, political and social circles, among whom were not only ardent friends of Tweed, but also those who, having opposed him, sought this opportunity of ingratiating themselves into his favor. The statue was to be “in commemoration of his [Tweed’s] services to the commonwealth of New York”—so ran the circular letter.

The owner of the Sun, a newspaper that, after backing the Young Democracy, suddenly became a strong supporter of the “Boss,” proposed in March 1871 to build a statue for Tweed. The “Boss’s” followers jumped at the idea, and an organization was formed for this purpose by Edward J. Shandley, a Police Justice, along with many other locally prominent figures from professional, political, and social circles. This group included not only passionate supporters of Tweed but also those who, after opposing him, seized this chance to win his favor. The statue was intended “to commemorate his [Tweed’s] services to the commonwealth of New York”—this was stated in the circular letter.

In a few days the association had obtained nearly $8,000, some politicians giving $1,000 apiece. Other men pledged themselves to pay any amount from $1,000 to $10,000, and were on the point of making good their word when a letter from Tweed appeared, discountenancing the project. It was printed in the Sun of March 14, 1871, under the heading:

In just a few days, the association had raised nearly $8,000, with some politicians contributing $1,000 each. Others committed to donating anywhere from $1,000 to $10,000 and were about to follow through when a letter from Tweed came out, discouraging the initiative. It was published in the Sun on March 14, 1871, under the heading:

“A GREAT MAN’S MODESTY.

"A great man's humility."

“THE HON. WILLIAM M. TWEED DECLINES THE SUN’S STATUE—CHARACTERISTIC LETTER FROM THE GREAT NEW YORK PHILANTHROPIST—HE THINKS THAT VIRTUE SHOULD BE ITS OWN REWARD—THE MOST REMARKABLE LETTER EVER WRITTEN BY THE NOBLE BENEFACTOR OF THE PEOPLE.”

“THE HON. WILLIAM M. TWEED DECLINES THE SUN’S STATUE—CHARACTERISTIC LETTER FROM THE GREAT NEW YORK PHILANTHROPIST—HE THINKS THAT VIRTUE SHOULD BE ITS OWN REWARD—THE MOST REMARKABLE LETTER EVER WRITTEN BY THE NOBLE BENEFACTOR OF THE PEOPLE.”

“Statues,” wrote Tweed in part, “are not erected to living men, but to those who have ended their careers, and where no interest exists to question the partial tributes of friends.” Tweed hinted that he was not so deficient in common sense as not to know the bad effect the toleration of the scheme would have, and, ever open to suspicion, he broadly asserted that the original statue[234] proposition was made either as a joke or with an unfriendly motive.

“Statues,” wrote Tweed in part, “aren’t put up for living people, but for those who have completed their lives, and where there’s no reason to question the biased honors from friends.” Tweed suggested that he wasn’t lacking in common sense to not realize the negative impact tolerating the plan would have, and, always under suspicion, he openly claimed that the initial statue[234] idea was either made as a joke or with a hostile intent.

One of the signers of the circular has assured the author that it was a serious proposal. The attitude of the Sun confirms this. On March 15 that newspaper stated editorially that it thought “Mr. Tweed had acted hastily,” and inquired whether it was too late “to realize so worthy and so excellent an idea.” In the same issue appears an interview with Justice Shandley, who says:

One of the signers of the circular has assured the author that it was a serious proposal. The attitude of the Sun confirms this. On March 15, that newspaper stated in an editorial that it believed “Mr. Tweed had acted too quickly,” and asked whether it was too late “to bring such a worthy and excellent idea to life.” In the same issue, there is an interview with Justice Shandley, who says:

“We had contemplated eventually making a public proposition that the testimonial finally take the form of the establishment of a grand charitable institution, bearing Mr. Tweed’s honored name, and so overcome the prejudices that the statue proposition have engendered, and passing the fame of that statesman, philanthropist and patriot down to future generations. Mr. Tweed has willed otherwise, and we must submit.”

“We had thought about eventually suggesting that the testimonial take the form of a large charitable institution named after Mr. Tweed, in order to overcome the biases that the statue proposal has created, and to pass on the legacy of that statesman, philanthropist, and patriot to future generations. Mr. Tweed has decided otherwise, and we have to accept it.”

A Chicago clergyman, reading of the suggestion, publicly declared that Tweed was “more dangerous than were the ancient robber kings.” Copying this expression, the Sun urged editorially on May 13:

A Chicago pastor, upon hearing the suggestion, publicly stated that Tweed was “more dangerous than the ancient robber kings.” Echoing this sentiment, the Sun editorialized on May 13:

“Now, let the friends of Mr. Tweed combine together and answer this clergyman by erecting and endowing the Tweed Hospital in the Seventh Ward of this city. A great monument of public charity is the best response that can be made to such accusations.”

“Now, let Mr. Tweed's supporters come together and respond to this clergyman by establishing and funding the Tweed Hospital in the Seventh Ward of this city. A significant monument of public charity is the best answer that can be given to such accusations.”

Tweed aimed at a high social place. He had removed from his modest house on Henry street to a pretentious establishment on Fifth Avenue. His daughter’s wedding was among the marvels of the day; from her father’s personal and political friends she received nearly $100,000 worth of gifts. Among the wedding presents were forty complete sets of silver and fifteen diamond sets, one of which was worth $45,000. Her wedding dress cost $4,000, and the trimmings were worth $1,000.

Tweed aimed for a high social status. He had moved from his modest home on Henry Street to an extravagant place on Fifth Avenue. His daughter’s wedding was one of the highlights of the day; from her father's personal and political friends, she received almost $100,000 in gifts. Among the wedding presents were forty complete sets of silver and fifteen sets of diamonds, one of which was valued at $45,000. Her wedding dress cost $4,000, and the accessories were worth $1,000.

All of his expenditures showed a like disregard of cost. In the construction of the stables adjoining his Summer place at Greenwich, Conn., money “was absolutely[235] thrown away.” The stalls were built of the finest mahogany. All told, these stables were said to have cost $100,000.

All of his spending showed a similar indifference to cost. In building the stables next to his summer home in Greenwich, Conn., money "was completely[235] wasted." The stalls were made of the best mahogany. Overall, these stables were said to have cost $100,000.

The Americus Club was his favorite retreat, and there his satellites followed him. Scores of them were only too glad to pay the $1,000 initiation fee required, in addition to the $2,000 or so charged for sumptuously fitting the room to which each was entitled. The grandeur of their club badges well illustrated their extravagance. One style of the badges was a solid gold tiger’s[19] head in a belt of blue enamel; the tiger’s eyes were rubies, and above his head sparkled three diamonds of enormous size. Another style of badge was of solid gold with the tiger’s head in papier-maché under rock crystal. It was surrounded by diamonds set in the Americus belt. Above was a pin with a huge diamond, with two smaller diamonds on either side. This badge was estimated to be worth $2,000. A third style showed the tiger’s head in frosted gold, with diamond eyes.

The Americus Club was his favorite getaway, and there his followers gathered around him. Many of them were more than happy to pay the $1,000 initiation fee, plus the $2,000 or so required to lavishly decorate the room they were entitled to. The opulence of their club badges reflected their extravagance. One style featured a solid gold tiger’s[19] head encircled by a blue enamel belt; the tiger’s eyes were rubies, and above its head sparkled three massive diamonds. Another badge was made of solid gold with the tiger’s head in papier-maché beneath rock crystal, surrounded by diamonds set in the Americus belt. Above was a pin with a large diamond flanked by two smaller diamonds on either side. This badge was valued at $2,000. A third style displayed the tiger’s head in frosted gold, with diamond eyes.

Everywhere the prodigal dissipation of the plunder was visible. Sums of a few thousand dollars Tweed professed to hold in utter contempt. A city creditor once appealed to him to use his influence with Controller Connolly to have a bill paid. Twenty times he had asked for it, the creditor said, and could get it only by paying the 20 per cent. demanded. (This 20 per cent., it should be explained, was the sum extorted from all city creditors by the officials in the Controller’s office as their portion after the chiefs of the “ring” had taken the lion’s share.) Tweed looked at the man a moment and then wrote hastily to Connolly:

Everywhere, the wasteful spending of the stolen money was obvious. Tweed looked down on sums of a few thousand dollars. One time, a city creditor asked him to use his influence with Controller Connolly to get a bill paid. The creditor said he had asked for it twenty times and could only receive it by paying the demanded 20 percent. (This 20 percent was the amount extorted from all city creditors by the officials in the Controller’s office as their cut after the leaders of the "ring" had taken the majority.) Tweed glanced at the man for a moment and then quickly wrote to Connolly:

“Dear Dick: For God’s sake pay ——’s bill. He tells me your people ask 20 per cent. The whole d——d thing isn’t but $1,100. If you don’t pay it, I will. Thine. William M. Tweed.”

“Dear Dick: Please pay ——’s bill. He says your people are asking for 20 percent. The whole thing is only $1,100. If you don’t pay it, I will. Yours, William M. Tweed.”

The “Boss’s” note being virtually a command, the bill was paid in full.

The "Boss's" note was basically a command, so the bill was paid in full.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Statement of Rev. Dr. H. W. Billings, in Cooper Union, April 6, 1871.

[1] Statement of Rev. Dr. H. W. Billings, at Cooper Union, April 6, 1871.

[2] Testimony Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. II, pp. 1711-12.

[2] Testimony Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. II, pp. 1711-12.

[3] The amendments to the charter of 1857 had abolished the Board of Councilmen and reinstituted the Board of Aldermen and the Board of Assistant Aldermen, the two constituting the Common Council. The “Tweed charter” continued these two boards, legislating the then incumbents out of office, and ordering a new election in May. The “ring,” of course, secured a large majority in this new Council.

[3] The changes to the charter of 1857 got rid of the Board of Councilmen and brought back the Board of Aldermen and the Board of Assistant Aldermen, which together made up the Common Council. The “Tweed charter” kept these two boards, removed the current members from their positions, and called for a new election in May. The “ring,” of course, ensured they had a large majority in this new Council.

[4] The Tweed Case, etc., Supreme Court, 1876, Vol. II, p. 1212.

[4] The Tweed Case, etc., Supreme Court, 1876, Vol. II, p. 1212.

[5] Document No. 8, p. 73.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Document No. 8, p. 73.

[6] Ibid., pp. 84-92.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., pp. 84-92.

[7] Document No. 8, p. 212.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Document No. 8, p. 212.

[8] Ibid., pp. 223-25.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, pp. 223-25.

[9] For the passage of this bill Tweed paid “in the neighborhood of $50,000 or $100,000.” Document No. 8, p. 154.

[9] For the approval of this bill, Tweed paid “around $50,000 or $100,000.” Document No. 8, p. 154.

[10] While this was going on Tweed maintained the most benevolent attitude in public. At the Fourth of July celebration in the Wigwam he “called the vast assemblage to order, and with coolness, but delighting (sic) modesty, welcomed brothers and guests.” Celebration at Tammany Hall of the 94th Anniversary, etc., by the Tammany Society or Columbian Order. Published by order of the Tammany Society, 1870.

[10] While this was happening, Tweed showed a very friendly attitude in public. At the Fourth of July celebration in the Wigwam, he “called the large crowd to order and, with calmness but charming modesty, welcomed everyone—both brothers and guests.” Celebration at Tammany Hall of the 94th Anniversary, etc., by the Tammany Society or Columbian Order. Published by order of the Tammany Society, 1870.

[11] Senate Journal, 1871, pp. 482-83.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Senate Journal, 1871, pp. 482-83.

[12] See A History of Public Franchises in New York City, by Gustavus Myers.

[12] See A History of Public Franchises in New York City, by Gustavus Myers.

[13] Winans was unfortunate in his bargain, for after rendering the service agreed upon, his employers failed to keep their promises. Tweed gave him only one-tenth of the sum promised, and the Erie Railroad Company gave him no office, nor, so far as can be learned, any compensation whatever.

[13] Winans was unlucky in his deal because after completing the agreed services, his employers didn’t fulfill their promises. Tweed only paid him one-tenth of the amount promised, and the Erie Railroad Company didn’t provide him with an office or, as far as anyone knows, any compensation at all.

[14] John Foley stated to the author that the six members of this committee were intimidated into making this report under the threat that the city officials would raise enormously the assessments on their very considerable holdings of real estate.

[14] John Foley told the author that the six members of this committee were pressured into creating this report with the threat that city officials would greatly increase the assessments on their substantial real estate holdings.

[15] Document No. 8, pp. 215-18.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Document No. 8, pp. 215-18.

[16] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.

[17] It was city money which the reporters frequenting the City Hall and court buildings received. The Aldermen passed in 1869 a resolution giving them (sixteen in all) $200 apiece, for “services.” Mayor Opdyke vetoed the resolution, but it was passed over his veto. (Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, 1862, Vol. LXXXVIII, p. 708.) The grant was made yearly thereafter.

[17] The money the reporters hanging around City Hall and the courts got came from the city. In 1869, the Aldermen approved a resolution giving each of the sixteen reporters $200 for “services.” Mayor Opdyke vetoed the resolution, but the Aldermen overrode his veto. (Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, 1862, Vol. LXXXVIII, p. 708.) After that, the grant was made every year.

[18] Statement of Mr. Foley.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Mr. Foley's Statement.

[19] The tiger as the symbolic representation of Tammany Hall doubtless dates from this time. This animal was the emblem of the Americus Club, and in Mr. Nast’s cartoons it frequently appears, with the word AMERICUS on its collar. In all probability Mr. Nast was responsible for the transference of the symbol from the club to the organization. The author has been unable to find any earlier reference to the Tammany tiger.

[19] The tiger, symbolizing Tammany Hall, likely originates from this period. This creature was the emblem of the Americus Club, and it often appears in Mr. Nast’s cartoons, featuring the word AMERICUS on its collar. It’s quite possible that Mr. Nast was the one who moved the symbol from the club to the organization. The author has not found any earlier mentions of the Tammany tiger.


CHAPTER XXV
COLLAPSE AND SPREAD OF THE “RING”
1871-1872

The downfall of the “ring” was inevitable. No such stupendous series of frauds could reasonably be expected to continue, once the proper machinery for their exposure and for the awakening of the dormant public conscience was put in motion. Protests and complaints and even concerted opposition might for the time prove futile, as indeed they did; but the wind had been sown for the reaping of the whirlwind, and it could not be averted. One conspicuous instance of apparently futile criticism of the “ring” was the action of the New York City Council of Political Reform. This body, but recently organized, held a mass-meeting in Cooper Union, April 6, 1871, to consider “the alarming aspects of public affairs generally,” and to agree upon means for arousing the public to some remedial action. Speeches were made by Henry Ward Beecher, Judge George C. Barrett, William F. Havemeyer, William Walter Phelps and William M. Evarts. It was pointed out that the city debt had increased from about $36,000,000 in 1868 to over $136,000,000 at the close of 1870. But amazing as were the facts, the meeting produced no direct effect.

The downfall of the "ring" was unavoidable. No huge series of frauds could realistically be expected to last once the right tools for exposing them and awakening the dormant public conscience were set in motion. Protests, complaints, and even united opposition might have seemed pointless at the time, as they indeed did; but the seeds had been sown for a major backlash, and it couldn’t be stopped. One notable example of seemingly ineffective criticism of the "ring" was the action taken by the New York City Council of Political Reform. This newly organized group held a mass meeting at Cooper Union on April 6, 1871, to discuss "the alarming aspects of public affairs in general" and to agree on ways to motivate the public toward some necessary action. Speeches were delivered by Henry Ward Beecher, Judge George C. Barrett, William F. Havemeyer, William Walter Phelps, and William M. Evarts. They highlighted that the city’s debt had skyrocketed from about $36,000,000 in 1868 to over $136,000,000 by the end of 1870. But despite the shocking facts, the meeting had no immediate impact.

The immediate causes of the exposure were fortuitous and accidental. In December, 1870, Watson, who had become one of the chiefs in the Finance Department, was fatally injured while sleigh-riding, and died a week later. In the resultant change, Stephen C. Lyons, Jr., succeeded Watson, and Matthew J. O’Rourke succeeded Lyons as[238] County Book-Keeper. Mr. O’Rourke gradually came upon the evidence of the enormous robberies. In the meantime some of the evidence had also come into the possession of James O’Brien, one of the Young Democracy leaders. Controller Connolly was on the point of paying out the $5,000,000 called for by the Viaduct Railroad act, as well as other sums, but learning of O’Brien’s knowledge of the situation, resolved to defer the payments. In the Summer of 1871 Mr. O’Rourke presented his evidence to the New York Times.

The immediate causes of the exposure were coincidental and accidental. In December 1870, Watson, who had become one of the heads of the Finance Department, was critically injured while sleigh-riding and died a week later. Following this change, Stephen C. Lyons, Jr. took over Watson's position, and Matthew J. O’Rourke replaced Lyons as[238] County Bookkeeper. Mr. O’Rourke gradually uncovered evidence of the massive robberies. Meanwhile, some of the evidence also came into the hands of James O’Brien, a leader of the Young Democracy. Controller Connolly was about to pay out the $5,000,000 required by the Viaduct Railroad act, along with other payments, but upon learning of O’Brien’s awareness of the situation, he decided to postpone the payments. In the summer of 1871, Mr. O’Rourke presented his evidence to the New York Times.

This newspaper published the figures in detail, producing fresh disclosures day after day, and showing indisputably that the city had been plundered on a stupendous scale. In two instances alone—in the printing bills and the bills for the erection and repairing of the County Court House—the Times averred that over $10,000,000 had been illegally squandered. Tweed had bought an obscure sheet, the Transcript, and had made it the official organ for city and county advertising. He had also formed the New York Printing Company, which not only did the city printing, but claimed the custom of many persons and corporations whom he was in a position either to aid or injure. These two properties served as the highly useful media with which to extort millions from the city treasury. The Times gave the incontestible figures, disclosing that the sum of nearly $3,000,000 was squandered for county printing, stationery and advertising during the years 1869, 1870 and 1871.

This newspaper published the figures in detail, revealing new disclosures day after day, and showing clearly that the city had been plundered on a massive scale. In just two cases—in the printing bills and the bills for the construction and repair of the County Court House—the Times claimed that over $10,000,000 had been illegally wasted. Tweed had bought a little-known paper, the Transcript, and turned it into the official outlet for city and county advertising. He also established the New York Printing Company, which not only handled city printing but also claimed the business of many individuals and corporations he could either help or harm. These two entities became the very useful media through which he siphoned millions from the city treasury. The Times provided the undeniable figures, revealing that nearly $3,000,000 was wasted on county printing, stationery, and advertising during the years 1869, 1870, and 1871.

But the new County Court House, the Times demonstrated, was the chief means of directly robbing the city. All told, so far as could be learned, the sum of $3,500,000 had been spent for “repairs” in thirty-one months—enough, the Times said, to have built and furnished five new buildings such as the County Court House. Merely the furnishing, repairing and decorating of this building, it was shown, cost $7,000,000. One firm alone—Ingersoll & Co.—received, in two years, the gigantic sum of[239] $5,600,000 “for supplying the County Court House with furniture and carpets.” In brief, the County Court House, it was set forth specifically, instead of costing between $3,000,000 and $5,000,000, as the “ring” all along had led the public to believe, had actually cost over $12,000,000, the bulk of which was stolen.

But the new County Court House, the Times showed, was the main way the city was being robbed. Overall, it was reported that $3,500,000 had been spent on “repairs” in just thirty-one months—enough, according to the Times, to have built and furnished five new buildings like the County Court House. Just the furnishing, repairs, and decoration of this building were shown to cost $7,000,000. One company alone—Ingersoll & Co.—received a staggering $5,600,000 in two years “for supplying the County Court House with furniture and carpets.” In short, the County Court House, it was clearly stated, didn’t cost between $3,000,000 and $5,000,000, as the “ring” had always led the public to believe; it actually cost over $12,000,000, most of which was stolen.

The members of the “ring” affected an air of unconcern regarding the disclosures. When Tweed was questioned as to the charges, he made his famous reply: “What are you going to do about it?” He professed not to care for newspaper attacks. Yet Thomas Nast’s terribly effective cartoons pierced him to the heart. “If those picture papers would only leave me alone,” he lamented, “I wouldn’t care for all the rest. The people get used to seeing me in stripes, and by and by grow to think I ought to be in prison.” Mayor Hall put on an air of jocose indifference, occasionally replying to the charges by references to the alleged frauds in the Federal Government,[1] but oftener by wondrously facetious jests such as: “Counts at Newport are at a discount”; “shocking levity—the light-ship off Savannah has gone astray”; “these warm, yet occasionally breezy days, with charmingly cool mornings and evenings, are an indication that we are likely to have what befell Adam—an early Fall.”[2]

The members of the “ring” acted as if they were unfazed by the revelations. When Tweed was asked about the accusations, he gave his famous response: “What are you going to do about it?” He claimed to be indifferent to newspaper criticisms. However, Thomas Nast’s powerful cartoons deeply affected him. “If those picture papers would just leave me alone,” he complained, “I wouldn’t care about anything else. People are getting used to seeing me in stripes, and eventually will come to think I belong in prison.” Mayor Hall adopted a tone of playful indifference, sometimes responding to the accusations by referencing the alleged fraud in the Federal Government,[1] but more often with comically clever remarks like: “Counts at Newport are at a discount”; “shocking levity—the light-ship off Savannah has gone astray”; “these warm, yet occasionally breezy days, with beautifully cool mornings and evenings, suggest that we might experience what happened to Adam—a quick Fall.”[2]

The public, however, was at last aroused, and the impudent flippancy of Tweed, Hall and others only added to the public indignation. Though the Times was but imperfectly armed with proofs, each day’s revelations brought the citizens to a keener realization of the unprecedented enormity of the thefts, and the resolve was made by leading members of both parties in the city to unite and crush the “ring.” A call for a mass-meeting, to be held in Cooper Union, September 4, was met by a tremendous outpouring of citizens. William F. Havemeyer, the[240] former Mayor, presided, and 227 vice-presidents and 15 secretaries were chosen from among the foremost names in the community. Among the speakers were Robert B. Roosevelt and Judge Edwards Pierrepont. Now, for the first time, the public obtained a really definite idea of the magnitude of the sum stolen by the “ring” and its followers. Resolutions were reported by Joseph H. Choate, stating that the acknowledged funded and bonded debt of the city and county was upward of $113,000,000—over $63,000,000 more than it was when Mayor Hall took office—and that there was reason to believe that there were floating, contingent or pretended debts and claims against the city and county which would amount to many more millions of dollars, and which would be paid out of the city treasury unless the fiscal officers were removed and their proceedings arrested. The resolutions concluded by directing the appointment of an Executive Committee of Seventy, to overthrow the “ring,” abolish abuses, secure better laws, and by united effort, without reference to party, obtain a good government and honest officers to administer it.

The public, however, was finally stirred, and the shameless arrogance of Tweed, Hall, and others only fueled public outrage. Although the Times had limited evidence, each day's revelations heightened the citizens' awareness of the unprecedented scale of the thefts, prompting key members from both political parties in the city to come together and dismantle the "ring." A call for a mass meeting at Cooper Union on September 4 saw an incredible turnout of citizens. Former Mayor William F. Havemeyer presided, with 227 vice-presidents and 15 secretaries chosen from among the leading figures in the community. Speakers included Robert B. Roosevelt and Judge Edwards Pierrepont. For the first time, the public gained a clear understanding of the extent of the money stolen by the "ring" and its associates. Resolutions presented by Joseph H. Choate indicated that the recognized funded and bonded debt of the city and county exceeded $113,000,000—over $63,000,000 more than when Mayor Hall took office—and that there were reasons to believe there were additional floating, contingent, or dubious debts and claims against the city and county that could add many more millions, to be paid from the city treasury unless the financial officers were removed and their activities halted. The resolutions ended by calling for the formation of an Executive Committee of Seventy to dismantle the "ring," eliminate corruption, secure better laws, and work together, regardless of party affiliation, to achieve a good government and honest officials to run it.

The first move decided upon by the Committee of Seventy was to make a thorough examination of the city’s accounts. A sub-committee was on the point of doing this when, on the morning of September 11, it was reported that the Controller’s office, in the City Hall, had been broken into on the previous night and the vouchers, more than 3,500 in all, stolen. The “ring” confederates pretended that the vouchers had been abstracted from a glass case—an absurd explanation considering that after spending $400,000 for safes the city officials should have chosen such a flimsy receptacle. Later, the charred remains of these vouchers were discovered in an ash-heap in the City Hall attic.

The first action taken by the Committee of Seventy was to thoroughly review the city's accounts. A sub-committee was about to start when, on the morning of September 11, it was reported that the Controller’s office at City Hall had been broken into the night before, and over 3,500 vouchers had been stolen. The "ring" members claimed that the vouchers were taken from a glass case—an absurd explanation considering that after spending $400,000 on safes, city officials should have opted for something more secure. Later, the burned remains of these vouchers were found in a trash heap in the City Hall attic.

As if to yield to public opinion, Mayor Hall at once asked Connolly to resign as Controller. Connolly refused, on the ground that such a step without impeachment[241] and conviction on trial would be equal to a confession of guilt. Secretly, however, fearing that the other members of the “ring” intended to make a scape-goat of him, he was disposed to make terms with the Committee of Seventy to save himself. Upon the advice of Havemeyer, he appointed Andrew H. Green, Deputy Controller. With Mr. Green in that post, the Committee of Seventy could expect a tangible computation of the “ring’s” thefts. Alive to their danger, the other members of the “ring” in terror tried to force Connolly to resign, so as to end the powers he had delegated to the new Deputy Controller. Mayor Hall insisted that in making Mr. Green Acting Controller, Connolly’s action was equivalent to a resignation, and with much bluster said he would treat it as such.

As if to give in to public pressure, Mayor Hall immediately asked Connolly to resign as Controller. Connolly refused, arguing that resigning without impeachment and a trial would be like admitting guilt. Secretly, though, worried that the other members of the “ring” wanted to make him a scapegoat, he was inclined to negotiate with the Committee of Seventy to protect himself. Acting on Havemeyer’s advice, he appointed Andrew H. Green as Deputy Controller. With Mr. Green in that position, the Committee of Seventy could anticipate a clear assessment of the “ring’s” thefts. Sensing their peril, the other members of the “ring” anxiously tried to pressure Connolly into resigning to revoke the powers he had given to the new Deputy Controller. Mayor Hall claimed that by making Mr. Green Acting Controller, Connolly's action was essentially a resignation, and he boisterously stated that he would treat it that way.

In October the sub-committee made a hasty examination of such of the city accounts as were available, and were enabled to report that the debt of the city was doubling every two years; that $3,200,000 had been paid for repairs on armories and drill rooms, the actual cost of which was less than $250,000; that over $11,000,000 had been charged for outlays on the unfinished County Court House,[3] the entire cost of building which, on an honest estimate, would be less than $3,000,000; that safes, carpets, furniture, cabinet-work, painting, plumbing, gas and plastering, had cost $7,289,466, the real value of which was found to be only $624,180; that $460,000 had been paid for $48,000 worth of lumber; that the printing, advertising, stationery, etc., of the city and county had cost in two years and eight months, $7,168,212; that a large number of persons were on the payrolls of the city whose services were neither rendered nor needed; and that figures upon warrants and vouchers had been altered fraudulently and payments made repeatedly on forged endorsements.

In October, the sub-committee quickly reviewed the available city accounts and reported that the city's debt was doubling every two years. They found that $3,200,000 had been spent on repairs for armories and drill rooms, though the actual cost was less than $250,000. Over $11,000,000 had been charged for expenses related to the unfinished County Court House, the total construction cost of which, by a fair estimate, would be less than $3,000,000. Additionally, safes, carpets, furniture, cabinetry, painting, plumbing, gas work, and plastering had cost $7,289,466, but the true value was found to be only $624,180. Furthermore, $460,000 had been paid for $48,000 worth of lumber, and the printing, advertising, stationery, etc., for the city and county had totaled $7,168,212 over two years and eight months. It was also noted that a significant number of people were on the city payroll who neither performed services nor were needed, and that figures on warrants and vouchers had been fraudulently altered, resulting in repeated payments on forged endorsements.

These figures, though presenting nothing more than an outline of the immensity of corruption, gave the Committee of Seventy a foundation upon which to proceed legally. It at once obtained an injunction from Judge Barnard, restraining for the time the payment of all moneys out of the city treasury.[4] The order was modified subsequently to permit the necessary payments. The city treasury had been sacked so completely that it was found necessary to borrow nearly a million dollars from the banks to satisfy the more pressing claims.

These numbers, while only showing a glimpse of the vast corruption, provided the Committee of Seventy with a legal basis to act. They quickly got a court order from Judge Barnard to temporarily stop any payments from the city treasury.[4] The order was later adjusted to allow for essential payments. The city treasury had been emptied so thoroughly that borrowing nearly a million dollars from the banks became necessary to cover the most urgent claims.

The Committee of Seventy next presented Mayor Hall before the Grand Jury for indictment. Anticipating this, the “ring” had “packed” the Grand Jury; but such was the public outcry on this fact becoming known, that Judge Barnard was forced to dismiss the jury and order a new panel. The second jury, however, did not indict the Mayor, giving, as a reason, the lack of conclusive evidence. Later, Hall was tried, but the jury disagreed. The Committee of Seventy next procured the appointment of Charles O’Conor as assistant to the Attorney-General, and then engaged, as O’Conor’s assistants, William M. Evarts, Wheeler H. Peckham and Judge Emmott, with the express view of driving the “ring” men into prison. Through their energy, Tweed was arrested, on the affidavit of Samuel J. Tilden, on October 26, and held to bail in the sum of $1,000,000.

The Committee of Seventy then brought Mayor Hall before the Grand Jury for indictment. Anticipating this move, the "ring" had "packed" the Grand Jury; however, the public outrage that followed when this became known forced Judge Barnard to dismiss the jury and order a new one. The second jury, though, did not indict the Mayor, citing a lack of conclusive evidence. Hall was later tried, but the jury could not reach a unanimous decision. The Committee of Seventy then arranged for the appointment of Charles O’Conor as an assistant to the Attorney-General and hired William M. Evarts, Wheeler H. Peckham, and Judge Emmott as O’Conor’s assistants, specifically aiming to imprison the "ring" members. Thanks to their efforts, Tweed was arrested on October 26, based on an affidavit from Samuel J. Tilden, and was held on bail set at $1,000,000.

But Tweed was not yet crushed. In a few days—on November 7—an election for members of the Legislature, State officers, Judges of the Supreme Court, and Aldermen and Assistant Aldermen, was to be held. Most[243] of the “ring” men, in the very face of the revelations of their stupendous thefts, forgery, bribing and election frauds, came forward as candidates for renomination and election. Once elected, they reckoned upon their “vindication.” The Committee of Seventy naturally aimed at the defeat of the Tammany candidates, both for political and moral effect, and placed candidates in the field for all local, legislative and judicial offices.

But Tweed wasn't finished yet. In just a few days—on November 7—an election was set to take place for members of the Legislature, state officials, Supreme Court judges, and aldermen and assistant aldermen. Most of the "ring" members, despite the shocking revelations of their massive thefts, forgery, bribery, and election frauds, stepped up as candidates for renomination and election. Once elected, they planned on their "vindication." The Committee of Seventy naturally aimed to defeat the Tammany candidates for both political and moral reasons, putting forward candidates for all local, legislative, and judicial offices.

As Grand Sachem and chairman of the Tammany General Committee, Tweed was still “boss.” He arranged to win by his oft-used weapons of bribery and intimidation, if not by violence. The two Republican Police Commissioners were his hirelings, owing their offices to him. They could be depended upon to aid their Tammany colleagues into making the police a power for his benefit. How well, otherwise, the “ring” was fortified, was shown when the Times[5] charged that sixty-nine members of the Republican General Committee, which assumed to direct the counsels of the Republican party in the city, were stipendiaries of Tweed and Sweeny. One of them was quoted as saying, “I go up to headquarters the first of every month and get a hundred dollars, but I don’t hold no office and don’t do no work.”

As Grand Sachem and chairman of the Tammany General Committee, Tweed was still the “boss.” He planned to win using his usual tactics of bribery and intimidation, if not outright violence. The two Republican Police Commissioners were his puppets, owing their positions to him. They could be relied upon to assist their Tammany colleagues in making the police a tool for his advantage. How well, otherwise, the “ring” was fortified was revealed when the Times[5] accused sixty-nine members of the Republican General Committee, which claimed to lead the Republican party in the city, of being on Tweed and Sweeney's payroll. One of them was quoted as saying, “I go up to headquarters the first of every month and get a hundred dollars, but I don’t hold any office and don’t do any work.”

Tammany feigned to regard Tweed as a great benefactor being hounded. Tweed carried out the comedy to his best. On September 22 a “great Tweed mass-meeting” assembled in “Tweed Plaza.” Resolutions were vociferously adopted, that,

Tammany pretended to see Tweed as a great benefactor being targeted. Tweed played along with the act as best as he could. On September 22, a "huge Tweed mass meeting" gathered in "Tweed Plaza." Resolutions were loudly accepted, that,

“pleased with his past record and having faith in his future, recognizing his ability and proud of his leadership, believing in his integrity and outraged by the assaults upon it, knowing of his steadfastness and commending his courage, admiring his magnanimity and grateful for his philanthropy, the Democracy of the Fourth Senatorial District of the State of New York, constituents of the Hon. William M. Tweed, in mass-meeting assembled, place him in nomination for reelection, and pledge him their earnest, untiring and enthusiastic support.”[6]

“Pleased with his past achievements and confident about his future, recognizing his skills and proud of his leadership, believing in his integrity and appalled by the attacks on it, aware of his steadfastness and praising his bravery, admiring his generosity and thankful for his philanthropy, the Democracy of the Fourth Senatorial District of the State of New York, constituents of the Hon. William M. Tweed, gathered in a mass meeting, nominate him for reelection and pledge their committed, tireless, and enthusiastic support.”[6]

Despite the public agitation over the frauds, the Tammany nominations were of the worst possible character. Nominees for the State Senate included such “ring” men as Genet, “Mike” Norton, John J. Bradley and Walton; and for the Assembly, “Jim” Hayes, an unscrupulous tool; “Tom” Fields, reputed to be probably the most corrupt man that ever sat in the Legislature; Alexander Frear, who for years had engineered “ring” bills; and “Jimmy” Irving, who had been forced to resign his seat in the Assembly the previous Winter to avoid being expelled for a personal assault on a fellow-member. The innumerable Tammany ward clubs, all bent on securing a share of the “swag,” paraded and bellowed for these characters.

Despite the public outrage over the frauds, the Tammany nominations were of the worst possible sort. Nominees for the State Senate included notorious "ring" figures like Genet, "Mike" Norton, John J. Bradley, and Walton; and for the Assembly, there was "Jim" Hayes, a ruthless opportunist; "Tom" Fields, believed to be possibly the most corrupt person ever to serve in the Legislature; Alexander Frear, who for years had pushed through "ring" bills; and "Jimmy" Irving, who had to resign his seat in the Assembly the previous winter to avoid being expelled for assaulting a fellow member. The countless Tammany ward clubs, all aiming to grab a piece of the "swag," paraded and shouted for these individuals.

The election proved that the people had really awakened. The victory of the Committee of Seventy was sweeping. Of the anti-Tammany candidates, all of the Judges, four of the five Senators, 15 of the 21 Assemblymen, and all but two of the Aldermen were elected, and a majority of the Assistant Aldermen had given pledges for reforms.

The election showed that the people were truly awake. The Committee of Seventy won decisively. All of the anti-Tammany candidates, including all the Judges, four out of five Senators, 15 out of 21 Assemblymen, and all but two of the Aldermen, were elected, with a majority of the Assistant Aldermen promising reforms.

The one Tammany candidate for Senator elected was the “Boss” himself, and he won by over 9,000 majority. The frauds in his district were represented by careful observers as enormous. In many precincts it was unsafe to vote against him. Opposing voters were beaten and driven away from the polls, the police helping in the assaults. The reelection of Tweed, good citizens thought, was the crowning disgrace, and measures were soon taken which effectually prevented him from taking his seat.

The only Tammany candidate elected as Senator was the “Boss” himself, and he won by more than a 9,000-vote majority. The fraud in his district was reported by careful observers to be massive. In many voting places, it was risky to vote against him. Opposing voters were assaulted and driven away from the polls, with the police aiding in the attacks. Good citizens believed that Tweed’s reelection was the ultimate disgrace, and steps were quickly taken to effectively prevent him from taking his seat.

On November 20 Connolly resigned as Controller, and Andrew H. Green was appointed in his place. On November 25 Connolly was arrested and held in $1,000,000 bail. Unable to furnish it, he was committed to jail. On December 16 Tweed was indicted for felony. While being taken to the Tombs he was snatched away on a writ of habeas corpus and haled before Judge Barnard, who[245] released him on the paltry bail of $5,000. A fortnight later, forced by public opinion, Tweed resigned as Commissioner of Public Works, thus giving up his last hold on power.

On November 20, Connolly stepped down as Controller, and Andrew H. Green was appointed in his place. On November 25, Connolly was arrested and held on $1,000,000 bail. Unable to pay it, he was sent to jail. On December 16, Tweed was indicted for a felony. While being taken to the Tombs, he was taken away on a writ of habeas corpus and brought before Judge Barnard, who[245] released him on the very low bail of $5,000. Two weeks later, pressured by public opinion, Tweed resigned as Commissioner of Public Works, thereby relinquishing his last bit of power.

The careers of the “ring” men after 1871 form a striking contrast to their former splendor. Tweed ceased to be Grand Sachem. Almost every man’s hand seemed raised against him. The newspapers which had profited most by his thefts grew rabid in denouncing him and his followers, and urged the fullest punishment for them.

The careers of the “ring” men after 1871 show a striking contrast to their previous glory. Tweed stopped being Grand Sachem. It felt like almost everyone turned against him. The newspapers that had benefited most from his corruption became furious in condemning him and his supporters, demanding the harshest penalties for them.

He was tried on January 30, 1873. The jury disagreed. During the next Summer he fled to California. Voluntarily returning to New York City, against the advice of his friends, he was tried a second time, on criminal indictments, on November 19. Found guilty on three-fourths of the 120 counts, Judge Noah Davis sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment and to pay a fine of $12,000. Upon being taken to Blackwell’s Island, the Warden of the Penitentiary asked him the usual questions: “What occupation?” “Statesman!” he replied. “What religion?” “None.”

He was tried on January 30, 1873. The jury couldn’t agree. During the next summer, he escaped to California. He voluntarily returned to New York City, despite his friends' advice, and was tried a second time on criminal charges on November 19. Found guilty on three-fourths of the 120 counts, Judge Noah Davis sentenced him to twelve years in prison and a $12,000 fine. When he was taken to Blackwell's Island, the Warden of the Penitentiary asked him the usual questions: “What do you do for a living?” “Statesman!” he replied. “What’s your religion?” “None.”

After one year’s imprisonment, Tweed was released by a decision of the Court of Appeals, on January 15, 1875, on the ground that owing to a legal technicality the one year was all he was required to serve. Anticipating this decision, Tilden and his associates had secured the passage of an act by the Legislature, expressly authorizing the People to institute a civil suit such as they could not otherwise maintain. New civil suits were then brought against Tweed, and as soon as he was discharged from the Penitentiary he was rearrested and held in $3,000,000 bail.

After a year in prison, Tweed was released by a decision of the Court of Appeals on January 15, 1875, because of a legal technicality that meant he only had to serve that one year. Anticipating this outcome, Tilden and his associates had pushed through a law by the Legislature that specifically allowed the People to file a civil suit that they couldn't have filed otherwise. New civil lawsuits were then brought against Tweed, and as soon as he was let out of the Penitentiary, he was rearrested and held on $3,000,000 bail.

This bail he could not get, and he lay in prison until December 4, when, while visiting his home, in the custody of two keepers, he escaped. For two days he hid in New Jersey, and later was taken to a farm-house near the Palisades. He disguised himself by shaving his beard and[246] clipping his hair, and wearing a wig and gold spectacles. Fleeing again, he spent a while in a fisherman’s hut near the Narrows, visiting Brooklyn and assuming the name of “John Secor.” Leaving on a schooner, he landed on the coast of Florida, whence he went to Cuba in a fishing smack, landing near Santiago de Cuba. The fallen “Boss” and a companion were at once arrested as suspicious characters—the Ten Years’ War being then in progress—and Tweed was recognized. He, however, smuggled himself on board the Spanish bark Carmen, which conveyed him to Vigo, Spain. Upon the request of Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, he was arrested and turned over to the commander of the United States man-of-war Franklin, which brought him back to New York on November 23, 1876.

He couldn’t get the bail, so he stayed in prison until December 4, when, while visiting his home under the watch of two guards, he escaped. For two days, he hid in New Jersey and later was taken to a farmhouse near the Palisades. He disguised himself by shaving his beard, cutting his hair, and wearing a wig and gold glasses. Fleeing again, he spent some time in a fisherman's hut near the Narrows, visiting Brooklyn and using the name “John Secor.” Leaving on a schooner, he arrived on the coast of Florida, then went to Cuba on a fishing boat, landing near Santiago de Cuba. The fallen “Boss” and a companion were immediately arrested as suspicious characters since the Ten Years’ War was happening at the time, and Tweed was recognized. However, he managed to sneak aboard the Spanish ship Carmen, which took him to Vigo, Spain. At the request of Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, he was arrested and handed over to the commander of the United States warship Franklin, which brought him back to New York on November 23, 1876.

In one of the civil suits judgment had been given against him for over $6,000,000. Confessing to this, he was put in jail, to be kept there until he satisfied it, a requirement he said he was unable to meet. The city found no personal property upon which to levy. Tweed testified in 1877 that he held about $2,500,000 worth of real estate in 1871, and that at no time in his life was he worth more than from that amount to $3,000,000.[7] He had recklessly parted with a great deal of his money, he stated. He testified also to having lost $600,000 in two years in fitting up the Metropolitan Hotel for one of his sons,[8] and to having paid his lawyers $400,000 between 1872 and 1875. His escape from Ludlow Street Jail had cost him $60,000. It is reasonably certain that he had been blackmailed on all sides, and besides this, as has already been shown, he had been compelled to disgorge a vast share of the plunder to members of the Legislature and others. When his troubles began he transferred his real estate—and, it is supposed, his money—to his son, Richard M. Tweed.

In one of the civil lawsuits, he was found liable for over $6,000,000. Admitting to this, he was sent to jail, where he was kept until he paid it off, a requirement he claimed he couldn't fulfill. The city found no personal property to seize. Tweed testified in 1877 that he owned about $2,500,000 worth of real estate in 1871 and that at no point in his life was he worth more than that amount or up to $3,000,000.[7] He admitted to foolishly spending a lot of his money. He also testified that he lost $600,000 in two years setting up the Metropolitan Hotel for one of his sons,[8] and that he paid his lawyers $400,000 between 1872 and 1875. His escape from Ludlow Street Jail cost him $60,000. It's quite likely that he was being blackmailed from all sides, and as has already been indicated, he had to give back a significant portion of the ill-gotten gains to members of the Legislature and others. When his problems started, he transferred his real estate—and presumably his money—to his son, Richard M. Tweed.

In Ludlow Street Jail he occupied the Warden’s parlor, at a cost of $75 a week. As he lay dying, on April 12, 1878, he said to the matron’s daughter: “Mary, I have tried to do good to everybody, and if I have not, it is not my fault. I am ready to die, and I know God will receive me.” To his physician, Dr. Carnochan, he said: “Doctor, I’ve tried to do some good, if I haven’t had good luck. I am not afraid to die. I believe the guardian angels will protect me.” The matron said he never missed reading his Bible. According to S. Foster Dewey, his private secretary, Tweed’s last words were: “I have tried to right some great wrongs. I have been forbearing with those who did not deserve it. I forgive all those who have ever done evil to me, and I want all those whom I have harmed to forgive me.” Then throwing out his hand to catch that of Luke, his black attendant, he breathed his last.

In Ludlow Street Jail, he stayed in the Warden’s parlor for $75 a week. As he was dying on April 12, 1878, he said to the matron’s daughter, “Mary, I've tried to do good for everyone, and if I haven't, it's not my fault. I'm ready to die, and I know God will accept me.” To his doctor, Dr. Carnochan, he said, “Doctor, I’ve tried to do some good, even if I haven't had much luck. I’m not afraid to die. I believe my guardian angels will protect me.” The matron noted that he never missed reading his Bible. According to S. Foster Dewey, his private secretary, Tweed’s last words were, “I’ve tried to fix some major wrongs. I’ve been patient with those who didn’t deserve it. I forgive everyone who has ever wronged me, and I want everyone I’ve harmed to forgive me.” Then, reaching out his hand to grasp Luke, his black attendant, he took his last breath.

Only eight carriages followed the plain hearse carrying his remains, and the cortège attracted no attention. “If Tweed had died in 1870,” said the cynical Coroner Woltman, one of his former partizans, “Broadway would have been festooned with black, and every military and civic organization in the city would have followed him to Greenwood.”

Only eight carriages trailed behind the simple hearse carrying his body, and the funeral procession drew no attention. “If Tweed had died in 1870,” remarked the cynical Coroner Woltman, one of his former supporters, “Broadway would have been draped in black, and every military and civic group in the city would have marched behind him to Greenwood.”

Sweeny settled with the prosecutor for a few hundred thousand dollars and found a haven in Paris, until years later he reappeared in New York. He lived to an old age. The case of the People against him was settled—as the Aldermanic committee appointed in 1877 to investigate the “ring” frauds reported to the Common Council—“in a very curious and somewhat incomprehensible way.”[9] The suits were discontinued on Sweeny agreeing to pay the city the sum of $400,000 “from the estate of his deceased brother, James M. Sweeny.” What the motive was in adopting this form the committee did not know. The committee styled Sweeny “the most despicable and[248] dangerous [of the “ring”] because the best educated and most cunning of the entire gang.”[10]

Sweeny settled with the prosecutor for a few hundred thousand dollars and found refuge in Paris, until he resurfaced in New York years later. He lived to an old age. The case against him was resolved—like the Aldermanic committee that was tasked in 1877 with investigating the “ring” frauds reported to the Common Council—“in a very curious and somewhat incomprehensible way.”[9] The lawsuits were dropped after Sweeny agreed to pay the city $400,000 “from the estate of his deceased brother, James M. Sweeny.” The committee didn’t know what the motive was for this arrangement. They called Sweeny “the most despicable and[248] dangerous [of the “ring”] because he was the best educated and most cunning of the entire gang.”[10]

Connolly fled abroad with $6,000,000, and died there. Various lesser officials also fled, while a few contractors and officials who remained were tried and sent to prison, chiefly upon the testimony of Garvey, who turned State’s evidence, and then went to London. Under the name of “A. Jeffries Garvie,” he lived there until his death in 1897.

Connolly escaped overseas with $6,000,000 and died there. Several lower-ranking officials also fled, while a few contractors and officials who stayed behind were tried and imprisoned, mainly based on the testimony of Garvey, who became a whistleblower and then moved to London. Living there under the name “A. Jeffries Garvie,” he remained until his death in 1897.

Of the three Judges most involved—Barnard, Cardozo and McCunn[11]—the first and the last were impeached, while Cardozo resigned in time to save himself from impeachment.

Of the three judges most involved—Barnard, Cardozo, and McCunn[11]—the first and the last were impeached, while Cardozo resigned just in time to avoid impeachment.

The question remains: How much did the “ring” steal? Henry F. Taintor, the auditor employed in the Finance Department by Andrew H. Green to investigate the controller’s books, testified before the special Aldermanic committee, in 1877, that he had estimated the frauds to which the city and county of New York had been subjected, during the three and a half years from 1868 to 1871, at from $45,000,000 to $50,000,000.[12] The special Aldermanic committee, however, evidently thought the thefts amounted to $60,000,000; for it asked Tweed whether they did not approximate that sum, upon which he gave no definite reply. But Mr. Taintor’s estimate, as he himself admitted, was far from complete, even for the three and a half years. It is the generally accepted opinion among those who have had the best opportunity for knowing, that the sums distributed among the “ring” and its allies and dependents amounted to over $100,000,000. Matthew J. O’Rourke, who, since his disclosures, made a further remarkable study of this special period, informed the author that, from 1869 to 1871, the “ring”[249] stole about $75,000,000, and that he thought the total stealings from about 1865 to 1871, counting vast issues of fraudulent bonds, amounted to $200,000,000. Of the entire sum stolen from the city only $876,000 was recovered.

The question remains: How much did the “ring” steal? Henry F. Taintor, the auditor in the Finance Department hired by Andrew H. Green to look into the controller’s records, testified before the special Aldermanic committee in 1877 that he estimated the frauds inflicted on New York City and County from 1868 to 1871 at between $45,000,000 and $50,000,000.[12] However, the special Aldermanic committee clearly believed the thefts were closer to $60,000,000, as they asked Tweed if that figure wasn’t reasonable, to which he offered no clear response. Yet, Mr. Taintor’s estimate, as he himself acknowledged, was far from comprehensive, even for those three and a half years. It's the widely accepted view among those who have the best information that the amounts shared among the “ring” and its supporters and associates exceeded $100,000,000. Matthew J. O’Rourke, who, after his revelations, conducted further notable research on this particular period, told the author that from 1869 to 1871, the “ring” stole about $75,000,000 and that he believed the total thefts from approximately 1865 to 1871, including massive amounts of counterfeit bonds, reached $200,000,000. Of the total money stolen from the city, only $876,000 was recovered.

The next question is: Where did all this money go? We have referred to the share that remained to Tweed and Connolly, but the other members of the great “ring” and its subordinate “rings” kept their loot, a few of them returning to the city a small part by way of restitution. When Garvey died in London, his estate was valued at $600,000.

The next question is: Where did all this money go? We have talked about the share that went to Tweed and Connolly, but the other members of the large “ring” and its smaller “rings” kept their share, with a few of them returning a small portion to the city as restitution. When Garvey died in London, his estate was valued at $600,000.

FOOTNOTES

[1] New York Times, August 29, 1871.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ New York Times, August 29, 1871.

[2] Ibid., August 30, 1871.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., August 30, 1871.

[3] Later estimates put the expenditures on the Court House at $13,000,000. The generally accepted figures were over $12,000,000.

[3] Later estimates placed the spending on the Court House at $13,000,000. The commonly accepted figures were over $12,000,000.

[4] It was John Foley who procured the injunction. Mr. Foley later informed the author that upon the original injunction being obtained, the “ring” made a great clamor about the thousands of laborers who would be deprived of their wages, and ordered their hired newspaper writers so to incite the workingmen that the chief movers against the “ring” would be mobbed. In fact, were it not for public protection, grudgingly given on demand, it is doubtful whether some of the opponents of the “ring” would have survived the excitement.

[4] It was John Foley who secured the injunction. Mr. Foley later told the author that once the original injunction was obtained, the “ring” raised a huge outcry about the thousands of workers who would lose their wages, and instructed their hired journalists to incite the laborers so that the main opponents of the “ring” would be attacked. In fact, if it hadn’t been for the reluctant public protection provided on demand, it’s uncertain whether some of the “ring” opponents would have made it through the uproar.

[5] August 19, 1871.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ August 19, 1871.

[6] New York Times, November 2, 1871.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ New York Times, November 2, 1871.

[7] Document No. 8, p. 306.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Doc No. 8, p. 306.

[8] Document No. 8, p. 372.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Doc No. 8, p. 372.

[9] Document No. 8, p. 29.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Doc No. 8, p. 29.

[10] Ibid., p. 30.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, p. 30.

[11] Barnard and Cardozo were both Sachems. Mr. Foley is the author’s authority for the statement that when Barnard died, $1,000,000 in bonds and cash was found among his effects.

[11] Barnard and Cardozo were both Sachems. Mr. Foley is the source the author cites for the claim that when Barnard passed away, $1,000,000 in bonds and cash was discovered among his belongings.

[12] Document No. 8.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Doc No. 8.


CHAPTER XXVI
Tammany Rises from the Ashes
1872-1874

After the disclosures of 1871, the name of Tammany Hall became a by-word throughout the civilized world, and the enemies of corruption assured themselves that the organization was shorn of political power for a long time to come. But the wonderful instinct of self-preservation which had always characterized Tammany, joined with the remarkable sagacity which its chiefs almost invariably displayed in critical times, now conspired to keep the organization alive despite every antagonistic influence. The Tammany Society still had its charter, and while that charter remained intact, Tammany retained strong potentialities for regaining power. The reformers neglected to ask for its annulment—though it is doubtful if they could have obtained it, since the Governor, John T. Hoffman, was a creation of the Tammany organization.

After the scandals of 1871, Tammany Hall became a notorious name around the world, and those fighting against corruption believed the organization would be stripped of political power for a long time. However, Tammany's strong instinct for survival, paired with the exceptional insight its leaders usually showed in tough situations, worked together to keep the organization alive in spite of all opposition. The Tammany Society still had its charter, and as long as that charter was intact, Tammany held significant potential to regain its power. The reformers failed to ask for its annulment—though it's uncertain if they could have even achieved that, since the Governor, John T. Hoffman, was a product of the Tammany organization.

The urgent need of the Wigwam was a leader. In response to the demand, two men, John Kelly and John Morrissey, stepped to the front. Both of them were the product of local politics, and having made a science of their experience, they knew that the Tammany Hall that now lay prostrate and reviled could be raised and again made a political factor, and eventually the ruler of the city. The few men of fair character in the organization were undesirous of appearing too prominently in its councils; but despite the general odium attached to it, Kelly and Morrissey found that a large part of the thoughtless[251] mass of the Democratic voters were still willing to follow its leadership.

The Wigwam desperately needed a leader. In response, two men, John Kelly and John Morrissey, stepped up. Both were products of local politics, and having learned from their experiences, they understood that the discredited Tammany Hall could be revived and become a political force again, eventually ruling the city. The few decent individuals in the organization didn’t want to be too visible in its leadership; however, despite the widespread disdain for it, Kelly and Morrissey realized that a significant portion of the careless Democratic voters were still willing to follow its lead.[251]

Kelly had been in Europe from 1868 to late in 1871, and had not been directly implicated in the Tweed frauds. He had a strong personality, and was popular among the largest and most energetic part of the voting population—the Irish. He was called “Honest John Kelly,” and he took care to strengthen the belief implied in that name, surrounding himself at all times with a glamour of political probity. Born April 20, 1822, in New York City, of poor parents, his early life was divided between hard work and fighting, though he never appeared in the prize-ring. His trade was that of a grate-setter and mason. His early education was defective, but he later improved his natural talents by study at the parochial and evening schools.

Kelly had been in Europe from 1868 until late 1871, and he wasn't directly involved in the Tweed scandals. He had a strong personality and was well-liked among the largest and most active voting group—the Irish. He was known as “Honest John Kelly,” and he made sure to uphold the reputation suggested by that name, always surrounding himself with an aura of political integrity. Born on April 20, 1822, in New York City to poor parents, his early life was a mix of hard work and fighting, even though he never participated in boxing matches. He worked as a grate-setter and mason. His early education was lacking, but he later enhanced his natural abilities by studying at local parochial and evening schools.

The district in which he lived was the roughest in the city. Being a man of aggressive ways and popular enough to control the turbulent elements, the politicians in 1858 had him elected an Alderman, a post which he retained during 1854 and 1855. In this body he was known as a “bench-warmer”—that is, a member who kept his seat and followed the orders of his political masters without question. Giving satisfaction, he was selected to run for Congress in the district then represented by “Mike” Walsh—who was regarded in Washington as the leader of the rowdy element of New York City. Walsh ran independently, but Kelly beat him by 18 votes in a total vote of 7,593. It was generally charged then and long after that Kelly was “counted in.” Later he was reelected. During his terms in Congress, Kelly controlled most of the Federal patronage in New York City, and it was through his influence especially that Isaac V. Fowler—who, as we have mentioned, was afterward found to have embezzled over $155,000 from the Government—was reappointed Postmaster by Buchanan.

The area where he lived was the toughest in the city. As a man with a forceful personality and popular enough to manage the unruly crowd, the politicians in 1858 got him elected as an Alderman, a position he held during 1854 and 1855. In this group, he was known as a “bench-warmer”—meaning a member who stayed seated and followed the orders of his political bosses without hesitation. Satisfied with his performance, he was chosen to run for Congress in the district previously represented by “Mike” Walsh—who was seen in Washington as the leader of New York City's rowdy crowd. Walsh ran independently, but Kelly won by 18 votes out of a total of 7,593. It was widely claimed at the time, and long afterwards, that Kelly was “counted in.” He was later reelected. During his time in Congress, Kelly controlled most of the federal jobs in New York City, and it was mainly through his influence that Isaac V. Fowler—who, as mentioned, was later discovered to have embezzled over $155,000 from the government—was reappointed as Postmaster by Buchanan.

In 1863 Kelly, disgruntled at not being appointed a[252] Police Commissioner, led a portion of the Irish vote from the Wigwam over to the Germans, helping in the election of Gunther as Mayor. Having proved his influence, Tweed, in order to gain him over, gave him the nomination for Sheriff, to which office he was elected. His nomination for Mayor and his sudden withdrawal we have already related.

In 1863, Kelly, upset about not being appointed a[252] Police Commissioner, shifted part of the Irish vote from the Wigwam to the Germans, helping to elect Gunther as Mayor. After demonstrating his influence, Tweed, wanting to win him over, nominated him for Sheriff, and he was elected to that position. We have already mentioned his nomination for Mayor and his abrupt withdrawal.

At the time of his flight to Europe he was a rich man. Mayor Havemeyer charged, in 1874, as we shall see, that some, at least, of Kelly’s wealth was obtained by anything but proper methods.

At the time of his departure to Europe, he was wealthy. Mayor Havemeyer accused, in 1874, as we will see, that some, if not all, of Kelly’s fortune was acquired through questionable means.

This was the successor of Tweed as the “boss” of Tammany Hall. His coadjutor for a time, John Morrissey, was a professional prize-fighter and gambler, whose boast was that he “had never fought foul nor turned a card.”[1] When these men assumed control of the Wigwam, few persons believed it could outlive the “ring” revelations and regain power.

This was the successor to Tweed as the “boss” of Tammany Hall. His ally for a while, John Morrissey, was a professional prizefighter and gambler, who bragged that he “had never fought dirty nor cheated at cards.”[1] When these men took over the Wigwam, very few people thought it could survive the “ring” scandals and regain power.

Then occurred an extraordinary happening, though quite in keeping with Tammany shrewdness. At the society’s annual election, in April, 1872, Kelly and Augustus Schell (who had been elected Grand Sachem after Tweed was forced to resign) caused to be selected as Sachems some of the identical men who had been most conspicuous in the reform movement, such as Samuel J. Tilden, Charles O’Conor, Horatio Seymour, Sanford E. Church and August Belmont. The best proof that the non-partizan movement of 1871 was already dissolving was the readiness with which these men accepted these elections. Their acceptance may have been due to a mixed desire to make of the organization a real reform body as well as to advance their political fortunes.

Then something extraordinary happened, though it was typical of Tammany's cleverness. At the society’s annual election in April 1872, Kelly and Augustus Schell (who had been elected Grand Sachem after Tweed was forced to resign) made sure to select as Sachems some of the same men who had been most prominent in the reform movement, like Samuel J. Tilden, Charles O’Conor, Horatio Seymour, Sanford E. Church, and August Belmont. The best evidence that the non-partisan movement of 1871 was already falling apart was how easily these men accepted their elections. Their acceptance might have been driven by a mix of wanting to turn the organization into a genuine reform body and to enhance their own political prospects.

The Tammany Society now stood before the public as[253] a reform body, with the boast that all the thieves had been cast out. Next it appointed a reorganization committee to reconstruct the Tammany Hall political organization. Under its direction the general committee was enlarged to nearly five hundred members, and a new general committee, of unquestionably better quality than its predecessor, was elected. In the case of disputing district delegations, the Tammany Society’s committee decided by selecting the best men for both.[2] Out of chaos, within a few months of the “ring’s” overthrow, Kelly created a strong organization, so deftly composed as to place itself before the people as an entirely distinct set of men from the “ring” thieves—as a really Democratic body, quite as heartily in favor of good government as the most exacting reformer.

The Tammany Society now presented itself to the public as[253] a reform group, boasting that all the crooks had been removed. Next, it set up a reorganization committee to revamp the Tammany Hall political organization. Under its leadership, the general committee was expanded to nearly five hundred members, and a new general committee, undoubtedly better than the previous one, was elected. In cases of conflicting district delegations, the Tammany Society’s committee chose the best individuals for both.[2] Out of the chaos, just a few months after the “ring” was ousted, Kelly established a strong organization, skillfully crafted to present itself to the public as a completely different group from the “ring” thieves—truly a Democratic body, just as committed to good government as the most demanding reformers.

Kelly acted with great shrewdness, executive force, knowledge of men, and apparent regard for the public interests and proprieties. He affected extreme modesty, and made it appear that the delegates chose nominees by their own uninfluenced will. At the Judiciary convention in Tammany Hall, in October, 1872, he insisted that each delegate vote; in his speech he said that Tammany should have no more of the times when tickets were made up outside of conventions. Some delegates shouting for the nomination of a man of dubious character, he declared, with the air of a man exerting himself for the good of his party only, that it was time that Tammany Hall should put such a ticket in the field that no man could hold up the finger of scorn at any individual on it. He furthermore caused the appointment of a committee to cooperate in the work of reform with the Bar Association, the Committee of Seventy, the Municipal Taxpayers’ Association and the Liberal Republicans.

Kelly acted with great cunning, strong leadership, an understanding of people, and a clear concern for the public's interests and standards. He pretended to be very humble and made it look like the delegates were choosing nominees based on their own free will. At the Judiciary convention in Tammany Hall in October 1872, he insisted that each delegate cast a vote; in his speech, he said that Tammany should move away from the days when nominations were decided outside the conventions. When some delegates called for the nomination of a questionable candidate, he proclaimed, with the demeanor of someone trying to benefit his party, that it was time for Tammany Hall to present a slate of candidates that no one could criticize. He also arranged for a committee to work alongside the Bar Association, the Committee of Seventy, the Municipal Taxpayers’ Association, and the Liberal Republicans to push for reform.

At Kelly’s suggestion the Wigwam, in the Fall of 1872,[254] nominated for Mayor, Abraham R. Lawrence, a member of the Committee of Seventy and its counsel, and for Judges of the Supreme and Superior Courts, men of ability and unimpeachable name. Altogether, Tammany took on such a new guise that thousands of voters returned to its support. But the anti-Tammany movement had not yet dissipated its strength, even though it presented a divided front. One wing of this opposition was the new “reform” organization, the “Apollo Hall Democracy,” founded by James O’Brien, who now stood forth as its candidate for Mayor. The other wing, composed of the individuals and associations centering about the Committee of Seventy, nominated William F. Havemeyer.

At Kelly’s suggestion, the Wigwam, in the fall of 1872,[254] nominated Abraham R. Lawrence for Mayor. He was a member of the Committee of Seventy and its legal advisor, along with other qualified candidates for the Supreme and Superior Courts who had impeccable reputations. Overall, Tammany reinvented itself in a way that brought back thousands of voters to its support. However, the anti-Tammany movement still had some strength left, even if it was showing a split. One faction of this opposition was the new “reform” group, the “Apollo Hall Democracy,” founded by James O’Brien, who was now running for Mayor. The other faction was made up of individuals and organizations connected to the Committee of Seventy, which nominated William F. Havemeyer.

Tammany had the advantage of a Presidential year, when the obligation of “regularity” could be imposed upon a goodly share of the Democratic voters, and the further advantage of a high order of personal character in its nominees. Nevertheless, Havemeyer won, the vote standing approximately: Havemeyer, 53,806; Lawrence, 45,398; O’Brien, 31,121. The results from several election districts were missing and were never canvassed by the Board of Canvassers. For Horace Greeley, the Democratic Presidential candidate, Tammany Hall carried the city by 23,000 majority.

Tammany had the advantage of it being a Presidential year, which meant they could lean on a lot of the Democratic voters to show up regularly, plus their nominees had strong personal reputations. Still, Havemeyer won, with the vote totals being approximately: Havemeyer, 53,806; Lawrence, 45,398; O’Brien, 31,121. Some election district results were missing and were never reviewed by the Board of Canvassers. For Horace Greeley, the Democratic Presidential candidate, Tammany Hall secured the city with a 23,000 vote majority.

Mayor Havemeyer’s administration differed greatly from most of the “reform” administrations that had preceded it. Never since the year 1800 had the city revenue been distributed with such great care. The utmost regard was paid to the ordinances dealing with public health and security, and the streets were kept cleaner than ever before. The rowdy and criminal classes were deprived of the free sway they had so long enjoyed. The public school system was improved, and the standard of official character was of a higher type than had been known in many a decade. The city expenditures in 1873 were about $32,000,000, as compared[255] with $36,262,589.41 in 1871, and notwithstanding the tremendous legacy of debt left by the Tweed “ring” to be shouldered by later administrations, Mayor Havemeyer’s administration reduced the city expenses about $8,000,000 in reality, though the bare figures on their face did not show that result.

Mayor Havemeyer’s administration was very different from most of the "reform" administrations that came before it. Since 1800, the city's revenue had never been distributed with such meticulous care. There was a strong focus on the laws related to public health and safety, and the streets were cleaner than ever. The unruly and criminal elements were restricted from the unchecked freedom they had enjoyed for so long. The public school system was enhanced, and the quality of public officials was higher than it had been in many decades. In 1873, the city's spending was about $32,000,000, compared to $36,262,589.41 in 1871, and despite the huge debt inherited from the Tweed "ring," which burdened later administrations, Mayor Havemeyer’s administration effectively reduced city expenses by about $8,000,000, even though the raw numbers didn't reflect that outcome clearly.

Mayor Havemeyer complained, as so many of his predecessors had done, of the perverse interference of the Legislature in city affairs—an interference which constantly embarrassed his plans and set back the cause of reform.

Mayor Havemeyer complained, just like many of his predecessors had, about the frustrating interference of the Legislature in city matters—an interference that constantly hindered his plans and stalled the push for reform.

The Mayor was not destined to serve his full term. In September, 1874, a bitter quarrel sprang up between him on the one hand and John Kelly and John Morrissey on the other, apparently over the appointment, at Kelly’s request, of Richard Croker to be a Marshal. “When Croker’s appointment was announced,” wrote the Mayor, “I was overwhelmed with a torrent of indignation.” In a public letter addressed to Kelly, Mayor Havemeyer charged that the former, while Sheriff, had obtained $84,482 by fraudulent and illegal receipts, adding this further characterization:

The Mayor wasn't meant to complete his full term. In September 1874, a heated argument broke out between him and John Kelly and John Morrissey, seemingly over Kelly's request to appoint Richard Croker as a Marshal. "When Croker's appointment was announced," the Mayor wrote, "I was flooded with outrage." In a public letter to Kelly, Mayor Havemeyer accused him of having obtained $84,482 through fraudulent and illegal receipts while he was Sheriff, adding this further description:

“I think that you were worse than Tweed, except that he was a larger operator. The public knew that Tweed was a bold, reckless man, making no pretensions to purity. You, on the contrary, were always avowing your honesty and wrapped yourself in the mantle of piety. Men who go about with the prefix of ‘honest’ to their names are often rogues.”

“I believe you were worse than Tweed, though he was a bigger player. People recognized that Tweed was a bold, reckless man who made no claims to being pure. You, on the other hand, constantly proclaimed your honesty and cloaked yourself in the guise of piety. Those who carry the label of ‘honest’ often turn out to be dishonest.”

Kelly replied that he had acted in the Sheriff’s office as had his predecessors, and brought a libel suit against the Mayor, in the answer to which the latter embodied his charges in full. But on the day the suit was to come to trial Havemeyer fell dead of apoplexy in his office.

Kelly replied that he had done his job in the Sheriff’s office just like those before him, and he filed a libel lawsuit against the Mayor, to which the Mayor fully outlined his accusations in his response. However, on the day the trial was set to begin, Havemeyer suddenly died of a stroke in his office.

During the two years (1872-74) various forces combined to restore Tammany to the old power. The two great parties were struggling for partizan advantage for future State and national elections. This brought about[256] the old party alignment, the reform Democrats, as a rule, acting with the Wigwam, and the reform Republicans drifting to the Republican side. The disreputable classes issued forth in greater force than ever to help replace in power the Tammany that meant to them free sway. The panic of 1873, with the consequent “hard times,” turned great bodies of voters against the dominant party. The “ring” had so thoroughly looted the city that Havemeyer’s administration was forced to practise economy in the public works. The working classes either did not understand the motive of this retrenchment, or did not appreciate it. Out of the 24,500 mechanics in the city during the Winter of 1873-74, 15,000, it was estimated, were unemployed. Tammany now adroitly declared itself in favor of giving public employment to the workers. The Wigwam agents scoured the poorer districts during the campaign of 1874, giving aid to the needy, and gained their support. The agitation against a third term for President Grant; the demand for a low tariff and the denunciation of the Washington “ring,” all had their effect, while the impression which naturally might have been expected from Havemeyer’s charges against Kelly was entirely lost by the former’s slurring allusions to Kelly’s humble birth and early occupation—allusions which threw the sympathy and support of the masses strongly to Kelly and his ticket.

During the two years (1872-74), various forces came together to bring Tammany back to power. The two major parties were competing for political advantage in upcoming state and national elections. This led to the reformation of the old party alignment, with the reform Democrats generally collaborating with the Wigwam, while reform Republicans leaned toward the Republican side. The less reputable elements of society emerged in greater numbers than ever to help restore Tammany, which represented freedom for them. The panic of 1873, along with the resulting "hard times," drove many voters away from the ruling party. The "ring" had so thoroughly drained the city of its resources that Havemeyer’s administration had to cut back on public works. The working class either didn’t understand the reasons for this budget cut or didn’t appreciate it. During the winter of 1873-74, it was estimated that out of the 24,500 mechanics in the city, 15,000 were unemployed. Tammany cleverly proclaimed its support for providing public jobs to the workers. The Wigwam agents combed through the poorer neighborhoods during the 1874 campaign, offering assistance to those in need and gaining their support. The push against a third term for President Grant, the call for lower tariffs, and the condemnation of the Washington “ring” all made an impact. However, any positive impression that might have come from Havemeyer’s accusations against Kelly completely faded due to Havemeyer’s derogatory remarks about Kelly’s humble beginnings and early job—comments that actually drew sympathy and support from the masses for Kelly and his candidacy.

The astonishing consequence was that in November, 1874, Tammany Hall which, in 1871, seemed buried beneath obloquy, elected its candidate for Mayor, William H. Wickham (a diamond merchant and an anti-“ring” Democrat and a member of the Committee of Seventy) by nearly 9,000 majority over all, his vote being 70,071, against 24,226 for Oswald Ottendorfer, the Independent Democratic candidate, and 36,953 for Salem H. Wales, the Republican. At the same election, Tilden, who had also contributed to the downfall of the “ring,” received[257] the solid support of Tammany, and was elected to the Governorship.

The surprising outcome was that in November 1874, Tammany Hall, which in 1871 seemed completely discredited, elected its candidate for Mayor, William H. Wickham (a diamond merchant, an anti-"ring" Democrat, and a member of the Committee of Seventy) by a margin of nearly 9,000 votes. He received 70,071 votes, compared to 24,226 for Oswald Ottendorfer, the Independent Democratic candidate, and 36,953 for Salem H. Wales, the Republican. In the same election, Tilden, who had also helped bring down the "ring," secured the strong backing of Tammany and was elected Governor.

Tammany Hall under the surface was rapidly becoming its old self. Its candidate for Register, “Jim” Hayes, had made, it was charged, $500,000 during the Tweed régime. Fully three-fourths of the office-seekers in this election were connected with the liquor interests; and as many of these were keepers of low groggeries, they were in constant conflict with the law. Nine of the fifteen Tammany candidates for Aldermen were former creatures or beneficiaries of the “ring,” one of them being under two indictments for fraud. Yet the partizan currents at work again swept almost all of them into office.

Tammany Hall was quickly returning to its old ways. Its candidate for Register, “Jim” Hayes, was said to have made $500,000 during the Tweed era. About three-fourths of the candidates in this election were tied to the liquor industry, and many of them ran shabby bars, which put them at odds with the law. Nine out of the fifteen Tammany candidates for Aldermen were either former associates or beneficiaries of the "ring," with one facing two fraud indictments. Yet, the partisan forces at play managed to push nearly all of them into office.

Well realizing the value of appearances, Kelly lectured the new members of the Common Council,[3] telling them that “there must be no bad measures, no ‘rings,’ no getting together of a few men for the purpose of making money and controlling patronage.” Yet Kelly himself at this time absolutely controlled the strongest and probably the most corrupt political organization in the Union. He dictated State, Judicial, Congressional, Legislative and municipal nominations at will, and continued to be the absolute “boss” until his death in 1886.

Well aware of the importance of appearances, Kelly addressed the new members of the Common Council,[3] telling them that "there must be no bad practices, no 'rings,' no collusion among a few individuals to profit and control patronage." Yet, at that moment, Kelly himself completely dominated the most powerful and likely the most corrupt political organization in the country. He dictated State, Judicial, Congressional, Legislative, and municipal nominations as he pleased, and remained the undisputed "boss" until his death in 1886.

FOOTNOTES

[1] In Tweed’s confession (1877) Morrissey is mentioned as having introduced a system of repeating from Philadelphia, and also as having acted as paymaster of the fund of $65,000 distributed among the Aldermen to secure the confirmation of Sweeny as Chamberlain.

[1] In Tweed’s confession (1877), Morrissey is mentioned as having introduced a system of repeating from Philadelphia, and also as having acted as the paymaster of the $65,000 fund distributed among the Aldermen to ensure Sweeny’s confirmation as Chamberlain.

[2] The reorganization committee reached the understanding that the society should thereafter keep in the background and that it should not prominently interfere in the organization’s affairs.

[2] The reorganization committee agreed that the society should take a step back and not get involved in the organization’s affairs in a noticeable way.

[3] Amendments to the charter, passed in 1873, vested local powers in a Board of Aldermen and a Board of Assistant Aldermen—the latter to be abolished on and after January 1, 1875, and the Board of Aldermen to form thenceforth the Common Council. The Common Council was not to pass any measure over the Mayor’s veto without the vote of two-thirds of all its members. A part of the former Aldermanic powers was restored to this board by the amendments of 1873 and later years.

[3] Amendments to the charter, passed in 1873, gave local authority to a Board of Aldermen and a Board of Assistant Aldermen—the latter to be eliminated on January 1, 1875, with the Board of Aldermen becoming the Common Council from then on. The Common Council could not override the Mayor’s veto without a two-thirds vote from all its members. Some of the previous Aldermanic powers were restored to this board through the amendments of 1873 and in subsequent years.


CHAPTER XXVII
THE DICTATORSHIP OF JOHN KELLY
1874-1886

The history of the Tammany Society and of Tammany Hall during the period from 1874 onward embraces a vast and intricate web of influences, activities and consequences. To present this period in the detail proportionate to that employed in the preceding chapters would require an amount of space inconsistent with the projected volume of this work. It will, therefore, be presented in the manner of a Comprehensive Summary, in which the main movement will be outlined, and particular treatment given only to the more important features and events.

The history of the Tammany Society and Tammany Hall from 1874 onwards involves a complex mix of influences, activities, and outcomes. To cover this period in as much detail as in the previous chapters would take up too much space for this book. Therefore, it will be presented as a Complete Overview, outlining the main developments while focusing on the most significant events and features.

Toward the end of 1874 Kelly’s rule had become supreme. Under the form of “requests” he assessed every office-holder, even calling upon men receiving only $1,000 a year to pay as much as $250. To systematize these assessments, he established a regular collectorship, in charge of the society’s Wiskinskie, a city employee drawing $1,500 a year for apparent services. Abundant charges, some of which were proved, were made as to corruption in many of the city departments.

Toward the end of 1874, Kelly was in complete control. He assessed every officeholder under the guise of "requests," even asking those making just $1,000 a year to pay as much as $250. To organize these assessments, he set up a regular collectorship managed by Wiskinskie, a city employee earning $1,500 a year for what seemed to be minimal services. Many accusations of corruption were made in various city departments, some of which were substantiated.

During the next year (1875) a number of disaffected Wigwam men formed the “Irving Hall Democracy” and issued an address denouncing the Tammany General Committee as the creature of the society. The effect of this defection and of the charges of public corruption were such that in the local elections Tammany lost many of the minor offices.

During the next year (1875), several unhappy members of the Wigwam created the "Irving Hall Democracy" and released a statement condemning the Tammany General Committee as a product of the society. The impact of this split and the allegations of public corruption were significant, causing Tammany to lose many of the smaller offices in the local elections.

The friendship between Kelly and Tilden had already been broken. Kelly organized a bitter opposition to Tilden at the St. Louis National convention, in 1876, but pledged himself to support the nominations, and kept his word.

The friendship between Kelly and Tilden was already shattered. Kelly led a fierce opposition against Tilden at the St. Louis National convention in 1876, but he promised to support the nominations and stuck to his commitment.

The Presidential campaign of this year held the municipal struggle within strict party lines. The various Democratic factions united on Smith Ely, electing him Mayor by a majority of 53,517 over John A. Dix, the Republican candidate.

The presidential campaign this year kept the local contest firmly along party lines. The different Democratic groups came together to support Smith Ely, choosing him as Mayor by a margin of 53,517 votes over John A. Dix, the Republican candidate.

From December, 1876, to December, 1880, Kelly filled the position of City Controller, and was credited with reducing the city debt. Politics, however, rather than fiscal administration for the benefit of the city, continued to be his main business. One of the numerous examples of his superior sagacity in bowing to the general public sentiment was his support, in 1878, of Edward Cooper, an anti-Tammany nominee for Mayor, a man of recognized independence of character, who was elected. Tammany at this time was still largely influenced by the old Tweed conspirators, the assertion being made in 1877 that at least fifty former office-holders under Tweed were to be found in the general committee.[1]

From December 1876 to December 1880, Kelly served as City Controller and was credited with lowering the city’s debt. However, politics, rather than responsible financial management for the city's benefit, remained his primary focus. A notable example of his keen understanding of public sentiment was his support in 1878 for Edward Cooper, an anti-Tammany candidate for Mayor known for his strong character, who was elected. At that time, Tammany was still heavily influenced by the old Tweed conspirators, with claims in 1877 that at least fifty former Tweed office-holders were still on the general committee.[1]

In 1879 occurred the well-known fight of Tammany against the Democrats of the rest of the State. The Democratic State convention had assembled at Syracuse. The roll-call had barely begun when Augustus Schell, spokesman for the Tammany organization, stated that as there was every prospect that Gov. Lucius Robinson would be renominated, the delegates from New York City would withdraw, although they stood ready to support any other name. This “suggestion,” as Schell afterwards called it, was unheeded, whereupon the entire Tammany delegation retired. The delegation meeting elsewhere, Kelly, with the specific object of defeating Robinson,[260] caused himself to be nominated for Governor. The quarrel between Robinson and the Tammany chief was personal, arising from the fact that the Governor had removed Henry A. Gumbleton, a prominent Wigwam man, from the office of County Clerk. Such was the discipline to which Kelly had reduced the organization that it obeyed his word without a single protest.

In 1879, there was a famous clash between Tammany and the Democrats from the rest of the State. The Democratic State convention had gathered in Syracuse. The roll call had just started when Augustus Schell, the spokesperson for the Tammany group, announced that since it looked likely that Gov. Lucius Robinson would be renominated, the delegates from New York City would step back, even though they were willing to support anyone else. This "suggestion," as Schell later referred to it, went ignored, and the entire Tammany delegation left. The delegation met elsewhere, and Kelly, aiming specifically to defeat Robinson,[260] had himself nominated for Governor. The conflict between Robinson and the Tammany leader was personal, stemming from the Governor's decision to remove Henry A. Gumbleton, a prominent member of the Wigwam, from the County Clerk position. Such was the level of control Kelly had over the organization that it followed his orders without any objection.

He succeeded in his ulterior object. His 77,566 votes caused the defeat of Robinson, who received 375,790 votes, to 418,567 for Alonzo B. Cornell, the Republican candidate. The significant lesson furnished by Kelly’s making good his threat, was one generally heeded thereafter by State and national politicians and candidates, who declined to invite the hostility of so great a power. But for this secession, and the consequent demoralization of the Democratic party in the State, New York’s electoral vote, it is generally thought, would have gone to Gen. Hancock in 1880. Mayor Cooper refused to reappoint Kelly to the office of Controller at the expiration of his term, in December, 1880, because of his supposed agency in the defeat of Hancock.

He achieved his hidden goal. His 77,566 votes led to Robinson's defeat, who got 375,790 votes, compared to 418,567 for Alonzo B. Cornell, the Republican candidate. The important lesson from Kelly successfully following through on his threat was one that was generally taken to heart by state and national politicians and candidates afterwards, who chose not to provoke such a powerful figure. Without this split and the resulting chaos in the Democratic party in the state, it’s widely believed that New York’s electoral votes would have gone to Gen. Hancock in 1880. Mayor Cooper refused to reappoint Kelly as Controller when his term ended in December 1880, due to his perceived role in Hancock's defeat.

In 1880 the Democrats of the city were divided into the factions of Tammany Hall and Irving Hall, but laying aside differences till after the election, they agreed upon an apportionment of the local offices. The Democratic candidate for Mayor, William R. Grace, was selected by the Tammany committee from a list of names submitted by Irving Hall. Many of the members of the latter organization, however, were prejudiced against Mr. Grace because of his Roman Catholic faith, fearing that in case of his election the public school appropriations would be diverted to sectarian uses. They joined with the Republicans in support of William Dowd. The vote stood: Grace, 101,760; Dowd, 98,715.

In 1880, the Democrats in the city were split into the Tammany Hall and Irving Hall factions, but they set aside their differences until after the election and agreed on how to divide the local offices. The Tammany committee chose William R. Grace as the Democratic candidate for Mayor from a list of names submitted by Irving Hall. However, many members of Irving Hall were biased against Mr. Grace due to his Catholic faith, fearing that if he won, public school funding would be redirected to sectarian purposes. They teamed up with the Republicans to support William Dowd. The final vote was: Grace, 101,760; Dowd, 98,715.

Mayor Grace’s official power was considerably limited by the action of the Legislature, which had made the tenure of office of executives of departments longer than[261] his own—a law which in effect put the department heads in a position independent of the Mayor. In frequent messages, Mayor Grace expressed himself, as had Mayor Havemeyer, pointedly, though vainly, on the evils of legislative interference with the local government.

Mayor Grace’s official power was significantly restricted by the Legislature’s decision, which extended the terms of department heads beyond[261] his own—essentially placing those leaders in a position that was independent of the Mayor. In regular messages, Mayor Grace, much like Mayor Havemeyer before him, openly criticized, though unsuccessfully, the negative effects of legislative interference in local government.

In December, 1880, a new organization, called the “New York County Democracy,” was formed by Abram S. Hewitt and others, to oppose both Tammany Hall and Irving Hall. This body soon had a large enrolled membership, and was joined later by a number of Democrats who had unsuccessfully attempted to bring about reform in Tammany. To that end they had made an effort, at the society’s annual election in April, 1881, to elect their candidates for Sachems, when the ticket headed by Kelly won by an average majority of 50 in about 775 votes. The fact, or belief, that the result was secured through repeating and other unfair means, caused a considerable defection from Tammany.

In December 1880, a new organization called the “New York County Democracy” was formed by Abram S. Hewitt and others to challenge both Tammany Hall and Irving Hall. This group quickly gained a large membership and was later joined by several Democrats who had tried unsuccessfully to reform Tammany. To achieve this, they made an effort during the society’s annual election in April 1881 to elect their candidates for Sachems, but the ticket led by Kelly won with an average majority of 50 out of about 775 votes. The belief that this outcome was achieved through ballot stuffing and other unfair tactics led to a significant number of defections from Tammany.

In the State convention of October, 1881, the Tammany delegation was ruled out, and the County Democracy was declared “regular.” At an earlier period this adverse decision might have entailed serious, if not fatal, consequences to the Wigwam. But now that the organization was in a state of absolute discipline, ruled by one hard-headed, tireless “boss,” with each member understanding that his self-interest required his “standing by” the organization in times of trouble, as well as in times of triumph, the blow had no lasting effect.

In the state convention of October 1881, the Tammany delegation was excluded, and the County Democracy was declared “regular.” Earlier, this unfavorable ruling might have brought serious, if not deadly, consequences to the Wigwam. But now that the organization was completely disciplined, led by one determined, tireless “boss,” with every member knowing that their self-interest meant they needed to support the organization in both tough times and moments of success, the impact was negligible.

Holding the balance of power in the Legislature of 1882, the Tammany members resolved to force the “regular” Democracy to make terms with them. To that end they attended no party caucuses, and refused to support men nominated by the “regular” Democrats. At Kelly’s order they demanded, as the price of their cooperation, certain chairmanships of important committees. Not getting them, they continued for weeks their stubborn opposition. Finally the two houses were organized,[262] the Tammany men voting for the Republican candidate for clerk. Charges were freely made of a political bargain between Kelly and Gov. Cornell.

Holding the balance of power in the Legislature in 1882, the Tammany members decided to force the “regular” Democrats to negotiate with them. To achieve this, they skipped all party meetings and refused to support candidates put forward by the “regular” Democrats. Following Kelly’s orders, they demanded specific chairmanships of important committees in exchange for their cooperation. When they didn’t get what they wanted, they continued their stubborn opposition for weeks. Finally, the two houses were organized,[262] with the Tammany members voting for the Republican candidate for clerk. There were widespread accusations of a political deal between Kelly and Gov. Cornell.

There were three Democratic factions in the city in 1882—Tammany Hall, Irving Hall and the County Democracy. A movement to obtain non-partizan government caused the independent nomination of Allan Campbell for Mayor. The Republicans indorsed him, but their support was greatly weakened by their nomination of a spoils politician, John J. O’Brien, for County Clerk. The three Democratic factions agreed on Franklin Edson, who was elected by a majority of 21,417, the vote being: Edson, 97,802; Campbell, 76,385.

There were three Democratic groups in the city in 1882—Tammany Hall, Irving Hall, and the County Democracy. A drive for non-partisan governance led to the independent nomination of Allan Campbell for Mayor. The Republicans backed him, but their support was significantly undercut by their choice of a patronage politician, John J. O’Brien, for County Clerk. The three Democratic factions settled on Franklin Edson, who won with a majority of 21,417, with the vote totaling: Edson, 97,802; Campbell, 76,385.

In the Chicago national convention of 1884 the Tammany delegation bitterly opposed the nomination of Grover Cleveland, its orators virulently assailing his private and public character. Though professing afterward to support him as the Democratic candidate, the Wigwam refused to unite with other Democratic organizations in any political demonstration. The reason seems to have been Mr. Cleveland’s publicly expressed independence of Kelly and his machine. After the ensuing election, Tammany was generally charged with treachery. The Wigwam nominated a separate city and county ticket, naming Hugh J. Grant for Mayor. The County Democracy and Irving Hall agreed upon the nomination of former Mayor William R. Grace, and elected him with the rest of the fusion ticket, the vote being: Grace, 96,288; Grant, 86,361; Frederick S. Gibbs (Republican), 45,386.

In the Chicago national convention of 1884, the Tammany delegation strongly opposed the nomination of Grover Cleveland, with its speakers fiercely attacking his personal and public character. Although they later claimed to support him as the Democratic candidate, the Wigwam refused to join forces with other Democratic organizations in any political events. The reason seems to be Mr. Cleveland’s publicly stated independence from Kelly and his machine. After the subsequent election, Tammany was widely accused of betrayal. The Wigwam nominated a separate city and county ticket, selecting Hugh J. Grant for Mayor. The County Democracy and Irving Hall agreed on nominating former Mayor William R. Grace, who was elected along with the rest of the fusion ticket, with the vote totals being: Grace, 96,288; Grant, 86,361; Frederick S. Gibbs (Republican), 45,386.

In these years the control of the city offices was frequently divided among the various parties and factions. In the Board of Aldermen, as in the departments, were Tammany and County Democracy men and Republicans, so that no one faction or party completely swayed the city. Much of their former power had been restored to[263] the Aldermen by the charter amendments of 1873, by the State constitution of 1874 and various legislative acts. Reports arose from time to time that money was used to secure confirmation of appointments by the Aldermen, but the nearest approach to detail was the testimony of Patrick H. McCann before the “Fassett Committee” in 1890.

In these years, control of the city offices was often split among different parties and factions. The Board of Aldermen, like the various departments, included members from Tammany, County Democracy, and Republicans, so no single faction or party had full control over the city. Much of their previous power had been restored to[263] the Aldermen by the charter amendments of 1873, the state constitution of 1874, and various legislative acts. There were occasional reports that money was used to secure Aldermen's approval for appointments, but the closest thing to detailed evidence came from the testimony of Patrick H. McCann before the “Fassett Committee” in 1890.

Mr. McCann testified that Richard Croker, a brother-in-law, came to his store in 1884, with a bag containing $180,000, which, he said, was to be used in obtaining Aldermanic votes to secure the confirmation, in case of his appointment, of Hugh J. Grant as Public Works Commissioner, and that he (Mr. Croker) was to get ten cents a barrel on all cement used by that department.[2] Mr. McCann further testified that Mr. Croker had told him that $80,000 of this sum was furnished by Mr. Grant, and the remainder by the organization. Mr. Croker, according to the same testimony, opened negotiations through Thomas D. Adams for the purchase of two Republican Aldermen, whose votes were needed. The alleged “deal,” however, was not consummated, and the money was returned. Mr. Croker and Mr. Grant both swore that these statements were untrue.[3]

Mr. McCann testified that Richard Croker, a brother-in-law, came into his store in 1884 with a bag containing $180,000, which he said was meant to secure Aldermanic votes to confirm Hugh J. Grant as Public Works Commissioner if he was appointed. Croker mentioned that he would receive ten cents for every barrel of cement used by that department.[2] Mr. McCann also testified that Croker told him $80,000 of this amount was provided by Grant, with the rest coming from the organization. According to the same testimony, Croker started negotiations through Thomas D. Adams to buy two Republican Aldermen whose votes were necessary. However, the alleged “deal” didn’t go through, and the money was returned. Both Croker and Grant claimed these statements were false.[3]

But the extraordinary corruption of the Board of Aldermen of 1884 is a matter of public record. Twenty-one members—the exceptions among those present and voting being Aldermen Grant and O’Connor—voted to give the franchise for a surface railway on Broadway to the Broadway Surface Railroad Company.[4] The rival road, the Broadway Railroad Company, sought to bribe the Aldermen with $750,000, half cash and half bonds, but the Aldermen thought the bonds might be traced, and considered it wiser to accept the $500,000 cash offered[264] by the former,[5] each Alderman receiving $22,000.[6] Mayor Edson vetoed the resolution,[7] but it was repassed.

But the unbelievable corruption of the Board of Aldermen in 1884 is a matter of public record. Twenty-one members—the exceptions among those present and voting being Aldermen Grant and O'Connor—voted to grant the franchise for a surface railway on Broadway to the Broadway Surface Railroad Company.[4] The competing road, the Broadway Railroad Company, tried to bribe the Aldermen with $750,000, half in cash and half in bonds, but the Aldermen figured the bonds could be traced, and thought it smarter to take the $500,000 cash that was offered[264] by the former,[5] with each Alderman getting $22,000.[6] Mayor Edson vetoed the resolution,[7] but it was repassed.

Other street railway franchises were passed by the same board. Mr. McCann testified in 1890 that Mr. Grant had told him that Mr. Croker strongly advised him [Grant] not to have anything to do with “that Broadway matter,” as “they [the other Aldermen] would be caught.”[8] Mr. Grant denied having said so.[9] The fact remains that Mr. Grant was the only Tammany Alderman free of suspicion. Many of the accused Tammany city fathers were members of the organization’s executive committee, which was composed almost exclusively of leaders, and which was supposed to direct the Wigwam’s affairs.[10]

Other streetcar franchises were approved by the same board. In 1890, Mr. McCann testified that Mr. Grant told him that Mr. Croker strongly advised him [Grant] not to get involved with “that Broadway issue,” as “the other Aldermen would get caught.”[8] Mr. Grant denied saying this.[9] The fact is, Mr. Grant was the only Tammany Alderman who had no suspicion against him. Many of the accused Tammany city officials were members of the organization’s executive committee, which consisted almost entirely of leaders and was meant to oversee the Wigwam’s operations.[10]

One Alderman, Henry W. Jaehne, was sentenced to penal servitude at hard labor for the term of nine years and ten months; and another, “Honest” John O’Neill, to four years and a half, and to pay a fine of $2,000; a third, Arthur J. McQuade, was sentenced to seven years and ordered to return $5,000 of the bribe money to the city, but on July 20, 1889, at a new trial at Ballston, he was acquitted. Six other Aldermen fled to Canada, and three turned State’s evidence. Ten others were indicted, but were never brought to trial. As Col. John R. Fellows, the District Attorney who tried the cases, stated to the Fassett Committee, convictions could not then (1890) be secured, because public sentiment had changed; the storm had subsided; people had grown tired of the subject, and many former opponents of the franchise[265] had come to look upon it as a benefit.[11] But there were strong hints that political influence had saved many persons from prison.

One Alderman, Henry W. Jaehne, was sentenced to hard labor for nine years and ten months; another, “Honest” John O’Neill, received four and a half years and a $2,000 fine; a third, Arthur J. McQuade, was sentenced to seven years and ordered to return $5,000 of the bribe money to the city, but on July 20, 1889, at a retrial in Ballston, he was acquitted. Six other Aldermen fled to Canada, and three agreed to testify against their peers. Ten others were indicted but never went to trial. As Col. John R. Fellows, the District Attorney who prosecuted the cases, told the Fassett Committee, convictions could not then (1890) be secured because public opinion had shifted; the uproar had calmed down; people had lost interest in the issue, and many former opponents of the franchise[265] now viewed it as a benefit.[11] However, there were strong indications that political influence had kept many individuals out of prison.

Though the facts did not come out until the trials in 1886, public indignation and suspicion were so strong in 1884 that Kelly insisted that the Tammany Aldermen who had voted for the franchise should not be renominated.[12]

Though the facts didn't come to light until the trials in 1886, public outrage and suspicion were so intense in 1884 that Kelly insisted that the Tammany Aldermen who voted for the franchise should not be renominated.[12]

Kelly broke down with nervous and physical prostration after the Presidential campaign of 1884. Grover Cleveland’s election, which falsified his predictions, deeply disappointed him. He kept to his house, No. 34 East Sixty-ninth street, but still issued his orders to the Tammany organization. Towards the end, he could not sleep except by the use of opiates. He died on June 1, 1886.

Kelly broke down with anxiety and physical exhaustion after the presidential campaign of 1884. Grover Cleveland’s election, which contradicted his predictions, left him deeply disappointed. He stayed at his home, No. 34 East Sixty-ninth Street, but still sent out orders to the Tammany organization. By the end, he could only sleep with the help of opiates. He died on June 1, 1886.

Thus passed away the second absolute “boss” of Tammany Hall. For more than ten years 50,000 voters obeyed his commands, and it was he and not the people to whom a host of office-holders, contractors, and all who profited directly or indirectly from politics, looked as the source of their appointment, employment or emolument. On more than one occasion Kelly complained of his onerous duty of providing government for New York City. The secret of his control was the same as that of Tweed and of the previous cliques: he knew that a large part of the voting mass cared nothing for good government, but looked upon politics solely as a means of livelihood; that another large part were satisfied to vote the “regular” ticket under any and all circumstances; and, with a keen understanding of human nature, he knew how to harmonize conflicting interests, to allay personal differences, and to soothe with large promises of future rewards his disaffected followers. Profiting by Tweed’s[266] fate, he knew the value of moderation; and he earned the praise, not only of his interested followers, but also of a tolerant and easy-going class in the community, through the fact that under his rule the stealing, compared to that of the Tweed régime, was kept at a comparatively respectable minimum. It was pointed out to his credit that the fortune he left—reputed to be $500,000—was very reasonable for one who so long had held real control of a great city.

Thus passed the second absolute “boss” of Tammany Hall. For over ten years, 50,000 voters followed his commands, and it was he, not the people, that a multitude of office-holders, contractors, and all those who directly or indirectly benefited from politics looked to as the source of their appointments, jobs, or income. On more than one occasion, Kelly complained about the heavy burden of managing government for New York City. The secret of his control was the same as that of Tweed and earlier factions: he understood that a large portion of the voting population didn’t care about good governance but viewed politics solely as a way to make a living; that another significant group was content to vote for the “regular” ticket no matter the circumstances; and, with a sharp insight into human nature, he knew how to align conflicting interests, resolve personal disputes, and placate his dissatisfied supporters with big promises of future rewards. Learning from Tweed’s[266] fate, he recognized the importance of moderation; and he garnered the praise not only of his self-interested followers but also of a tolerant and laid-back segment of the community, as under his leadership, the corruption, compared to the Tweed regime, was kept at a relatively respectable minimum. It was noted as a point in his favor that the fortune he left—estimated at $500,000—was quite reasonable for someone who had held real control over a large city for so long.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Document No. 8, p. 102.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Document No. 8, p. 102.

[2] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. I, pp. 682-98.

[2] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. I, pp. 682-98.

[3] Ibid., 733, and Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1693.

[3] Same source., 733, and Same source., Vol. II, p. 1693.

[4] Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. CLXXV, pp. 237-39.

[4] Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. 175, pp. 237-39.

[5] Alderman Arthur J. McQuade’s testimony before Recorder Smythe, November 19, 1886.

[5] Alderman Arthur J. McQuade’s testimony before Recorder Smythe, November 19, 1886.

[6] Alderman Fullgraff’s additional testimony before Recorder Smythe.

[6] Alderman Fullgraff’s extra testimony before Recorder Smythe.

[7] Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. CLXXVI, pp. 777-84.

[7] Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, Vol. 176, pp. 777-84.

[8] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. I, pp. 706-7.

[8] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. I, pp. 706-7.

[9] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 752.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, Vol. I, p. 752.

[10] Ibid., p. 744.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., p. 744.

[11] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. III, pp. 2667-68.

[11] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. III, pp. 2667-68.

[12] Testimony of Hugh J. Grant, Ibid., Vol. I, p. 739.

[12] Testimony of Hugh J. Grant, Ibid., Vol. I, p. 739.


CHAPTER XXVIII
The Reign of Richard Croker
1886-1897

Upon the death of Kelly, the twenty-four leaders of the Assembly Districts, comprising the executive committee of Tammany Hall, announced individually that there would be no further “boss,” and that the organization would be ruled thenceforth by a committee of twenty-four. However, cliques immediately arose, and soon four leaders—Richard Croker, who had been a sort of deputy “boss” under Kelly; Hugh J. Grant, Thomas F. Gilroy and W. Bourke Cockran—arranged a junta for administering the organization’s affairs. By securing the support of 17 of the 24 leaders, Mr. Croker began concentrating power in his own hands, and for about fourteen years remained the absolute ‘boss’ of both society and organization.

Upon Kelly's death, the twenty-four leaders of the Assembly Districts, who made up the executive committee of Tammany Hall, announced one by one that there would be no new “boss,” and that the organization would now be run by a committee of twenty-four. However, factions quickly emerged, and soon four leaders—Richard Croker, who had served as a sort of deputy “boss” under Kelly; Hugh J. Grant, Thomas F. Gilroy, and W. Bourke Cockran—formed a junta to manage the organization’s affairs. By getting the backing of 17 out of the 24 leaders, Mr. Croker began to consolidate power in his own hands, and for about fourteen years, he remained the absolute ‘boss’ of both the society and the organization.

Mr. Croker was born near Cork, Ireland, November 24, 1843. His father was a blacksmith, who emigrated to America in 1846, and settled in a squatter’s shanty in what is now the upper portion of Central Park. From his thirteenth to his nineteenth year young Croker worked as a machinist. At a very early age he distinguished himself in the semi-social fist-fights which were a part of the life of the “gang” to which he belonged. He became, tradition has it, the leader of the “Fourth Avenue Tunnel Gang,” and fought a number of formal prize-fights, in which he came out victor.

Mr. Croker was born near Cork, Ireland, on November 24, 1843. His father was a blacksmith who moved to America in 1846 and lived in a makeshift cabin in what is now the upper part of Central Park. From the age of thirteen to nineteen, young Croker worked as a machinist. At a very young age, he made a name for himself in the semi-social fistfights that were part of the lifestyle of the “gang” he was in. According to tradition, he became the leader of the “Fourth Avenue Tunnel Gang” and participated in several formal prizefights, emerging victorious.

At the beginning of the Tweed régime, according to his testimony before the Fassett Committee, he was an attendant[268] under Judge Barnard and other Judges in the Supreme Court. Upon leaving that place, for some reason not known, he served as an engineer on a Fire Department steamer.[1] In 1868 and 1869 he was elected an Alderman. With a majority of his fellow-members, he sided with the Young Democracy against Tweed, and was accordingly, with the rest of the board, legislated out of office (April, 1870). But he must have made his peace with the “Boss” soon after, for Controller Connolly appointed him Superintendent of Market Fees and Rents. In 1873 he was elected Coroner. On election day, November 3, 1874, during a street row growing out of a political quarrel between Mr. Croker and James O’Brien, John McKenna was shot dead. Bystanders maintained that Mr. Croker fired the shot, and the Grand Jury indicted him for the crime. The trial jury, after being out for seventeen hours, failed to agree. Public opinion at the time was divided, but it is the preponderance of opinion among those who are in a position to know, that Mr. Croker did not fire the fatal shot.

At the start of the Tweed era, based on his testimony before the Fassett Committee, he worked as an aide under Judge Barnard and other judges in the Supreme Court. After leaving that role, for unknown reasons, he became an engineer on a Fire Department boat.[1] In 1868 and 1869, he was elected as an Alderman. He aligned with the Young Democracy against Tweed, and as a result, he, along with the rest of the board, was removed from office in April 1870. However, it seems he reconciled with the “Boss” shortly after, as Controller Connolly appointed him Superintendent of Market Fees and Rents. In 1873, he was elected Coroner. On election day, November 3, 1874, during a street fight stemming from a political dispute between Mr. Croker and James O’Brien, John McKenna was shot and killed. Witnesses claimed that Mr. Croker fired the shot, and the Grand Jury indicted him for the crime. The trial jury, after deliberating for seventeen hours, could not reach a consensus. Public opinion at the time was split, but most who were informed believe that Mr. Croker did not fire the deadly shot.

In 1876 he was reelected Coroner. In 1883 he ran for Alderman, with the understanding that if elected, thus establishing the fact of his constituents’ approval, Mayor Edson would appoint him a Fire Commissioner. During the canvass, a Police Captain, one of Croker’s protégés, was responsible for a brutal clubbing, the feeling over which had the effect of reducing his plurality to about 200. Mayor Edson, however, gave him the appointment, and he was reappointed by Mayor Hewitt. His alleged connection with the fund of $180,000 to be used in behalf of Hugh J. Grant, in 1884, has already been mentioned. In 1885 he caused the nomination of the latter for Sheriff. Mr. Grant, while in that office, according to Mr. McCann’s testimony, gave $25,000, in five presents of $5,000 each, to Mr. Croker’s two-year-old daughter Flossie.[2]

In 1876, he was re-elected as Coroner. In 1883, he ran for Alderman, with the understanding that if he was elected, demonstrating his constituents’ support, Mayor Edson would appoint him as a Fire Commissioner. During the campaign, a Police Captain, one of Croker’s protégés, was involved in a brutal attack, causing public backlash that reduced his lead to about 200 votes. However, Mayor Edson still appointed him, and he was later reappointed by Mayor Hewitt. His alleged connection to the $180,000 fund used to support Hugh J. Grant in 1884 has already been noted. In 1885, he facilitated the nomination of Grant for Sheriff. According to Mr. McCann’s testimony, while in that role, Mr. Grant gave $25,000, delivered in five payments of $5,000 each, to Mr. Croker’s two-year-old daughter, Flossie.[2]

Neither Mr. Croker nor Mr. Grant denied this transaction, though both declared the sum was $10,000 and not $25,000.[3] Mr. Grant furthermore declared that he gave it in consideration of Flossie being his god-child.

Neither Mr. Croker nor Mr. Grant denied this transaction, though both stated the amount was $10,000 and not $25,000.[3] Mr. Grant also mentioned that he gave it because Flossie is his godchild.

Mr. Croker showed the sagacity common to a long line of Tammany chiefs in the municipal campaign of 1886. It was a time of great excitement. The labor unions, including the Knights of Labor, had reached the highest point in organization and in solidarity of feeling ever attained by them in the history of the city. Knowing their strength, they were ripe for independent political action, and they were rendered all the more ready for it by the earnest social propaganda carried on at the time by Single-Taxers, Socialists and social reformers generally.

Mr. Croker displayed the wisdom typical of a long line of Tammany leaders during the municipal campaign of 1886. It was a time of great excitement. The labor unions, including the Knights of Labor, had reached their highest level of organization and unity in the city’s history. Aware of their strength, they were ready for independent political action, which was further fueled by the serious social movements at the time led by Single-Taxers, Socialists, and social reformers in general.

The conviction of certain members of a union for carrying on a boycott against the Thiess establishment, on Fourteenth street, proved the one impulse needed for the massing together of all the various clubs and unions into one mighty movement. The convictions were believed to be illegal, and moreover to have been fraudulently obtained—and Tammany was held responsible. Before long the nucleus of an independent political party was formed. Henry George, then at the height of his popularity, was looked upon as the logical leader, and he was asked to become the new party’s candidate for Mayor. To this request he gave an affirmative answer, contingent upon the securing of 25,000 signatures to his nominating petition.

The conviction of certain union members for boycotting the Thiess establishment on Fourteenth Street sparked the unification of various clubs and unions into a powerful movement. These convictions were thought to be unlawful and possibly obtained through fraud, with Tammany held accountable. Soon, the foundation of an independent political party was established. Henry George, who was extremely popular at the time, was seen as the obvious leader, and he was asked to be the party's candidate for Mayor. He agreed to this request, provided that 25,000 signatures were gathered for his nominating petition.

Mr. Croker saw the danger, and he took immediate steps to avert it. According to the open letter of Henry George to Abram S. Hewitt, October 17, 1897, Mr. Croker, in behalf of Tammany Hall and the County Democracy, tried to buy off George by offering him a nomination regarded as equivalent to an election.[270] George, of course, refused; the 25,000 names, or a great part of them, were secured; a nominating convention was held; George was formally nominated, and the United Labor party was launched. A spirited campaign in George’s behalf was at once begun, and was responded to by the masses with remarkable enthusiasm.

Mr. Croker recognized the danger and quickly took action to prevent it. According to Henry George's open letter to Abram S. Hewitt dated October 17, 1897, Mr. Croker, representing Tammany Hall and the County Democracy, attempted to persuade George to back down by offering him a nomination seen as practically a guaranteed win.[270] George, of course, declined the offer; about 25,000 names were gathered, or a large portion of them, a nominating convention took place, George was officially nominated, and the United Labor party was established. An energetic campaign supporting George quickly kicked off, and the public responded with incredible enthusiasm.

Mr. Croker was equal to the crisis. The agitation among the masses must be met by the nomination of a representative of the conservative interests, and a general appeal be made for the “saving of society.” Accordingly he chose as the Tammany candidate the County Democracy’s choice, Abram S. Hewitt.

Mr. Croker was ready for the challenge. The unrest among the people needed to be addressed by nominating someone who represented conservative interests, and a broad appeal had to be made to “save society.” So, he selected Abram S. Hewitt as the Tammany candidate, who was also the choice of the County Democracy.

The Republicans nominated Theodore Roosevelt. His candidacy, however, was not regarded so seriously as otherwise it might have been, for the contest narrowed down at once to a class struggle between George and Mr. Hewitt. Anarchy and every other social ill were prophesied by the conservatives as the certain results of the former’s election, and Republicans were openly urged to support the latter.

The Republicans nominated Theodore Roosevelt. However, his candidacy wasn't taken as seriously as it could have been because the race quickly became a class struggle between George and Mr. Hewitt. Conservatives predicted that the election of the former would lead to chaos and all sorts of social problems, and they openly encouraged Republicans to back the latter.

The result proved the keenness of Mr. Croker’s foresight. The vote stood: Hewitt, 90,552; George, 68,110; Roosevelt, 60,435. Yet it would be difficult to name a time in recent years, if the reiterated statements of reputable eye-witnesses are to be believed, when frauds so glaring and so tremendous in the aggregate have been employed in behalf of any candidate as were committed in behalf of Mr. Hewitt in 1886. There are few living men among the earnest band who supported George’s interests at the polls on that election day who do not believe that their candidate was grossly “counted out.”

The outcome demonstrated Mr. Croker’s sharp foresight. The vote totals were: Hewitt, 90,552; George, 68,110; Roosevelt, 60,435. However, it's hard to find a time in recent years when such blatant and extensive fraud was used in support of any candidate as it was for Mr. Hewitt in 1886, according to the repeated accounts of credible witnesses. Most of the dedicated supporters of George who voted that day believe their candidate was seriously "counted out."

Mayor Hewitt revealed an independence of character that astonished the Wigwam. Before many months he had antagonized its powerful leaders. By 1888 the United Labor party had dwindled into a faction, and there being no such compelling reason, as in 1886, for choosing a candidate outside of the organization, the[271] chiefs selected one of their own number, Hugh J. Grant. Mr. Hewitt was nominated by the County Democracy, Joel B. Erhardt by the Republicans, and James J. Coogan by the remnant of the United Labor party. The vote was as follows: Grant, 114,111; Erhardt, 73,037; Hewitt, 71,979; Coogan, 9,809. For Grover Cleveland, whom Tammany had this time supported at the nominating convention, the city gave a plurality of 55,831, out of a total vote of about 270,000.

Mayor Hewitt showed a strong sense of independence that surprised everyone at the Wigwam. Within a few months, he had clashed with its influential leaders. By 1888, the United Labor party had shrunk to a faction, and since there wasn't the same strong reason as in 1886 to choose a candidate from outside the group, the[271] leaders picked one of their own, Hugh J. Grant. Mr. Hewitt was nominated by the County Democracy, Joel B. Erhardt by the Republicans, and James J. Coogan by the remaining members of the United Labor party. The vote tallied as follows: Grant, 114,111; Erhardt, 73,037; Hewitt, 71,979; Coogan, 9,809. For Grover Cleveland, who received Tammany's support at the nominating convention, the city provided a plurality of 55,831, out of a total vote of about 270,000.

One of the Tammany men elected was James A. Flack, Grand Sachem of the society (1888-1889), who assumed the duties of Sheriff the following January. During the same year Flack surreptitiously and fraudulently obtained a divorce in order to remarry. His wife was the ostensible plaintiff, but it was shown that she knew nothing of the suit. Flack and his accomplices were indicted by the Grand Jury, whereupon he was tried and sentenced to two months in the Tombs prison, and to pay a fine of $500. The Supreme Court later affirmed the sentence. Some others implicated also went to prison. The scandal was such that Flack was removed from the Sheriff’s office, and was forced to resign as Grand Sachem of the society.

One of the Tammany men elected was James A. Flack, Grand Sachem of the society (1888-1889), who took on the role of Sheriff the following January. That same year, Flack secretly and dishonestly got a divorce so he could remarry. His wife was listed as the plaintiff, but it turned out she had no idea about the lawsuit. Flack and his accomplices were indicted by the Grand Jury, and he was tried and sentenced to two months in the Tombs prison, along with a $500 fine. The Supreme Court later upheld the sentence. Some others involved also went to prison. The scandal was so severe that Flack was removed from the Sheriff’s office and had to resign as Grand Sachem of the society.

Tammany was now in practically complete control, and carried things with a high hand. Most of the departments had again become inefficient and corrupt. On March 21, 1890, the Grand Jury handed down a presentment stating that the Sheriff’s office, which for twenty years had been a hotbed of corruption, had recently been brought into “public scandal and infamy,” through the growth of notorious abuses; that in 1889 the Sheriff’s net profits had been at least $50,000, not including certain “extra compensations that could not be ascertained.” Many other abuses, the Grand Jury further recited, were found to be connected with the management of this office, and also with the conduct of the Ludlow Street Jail.

Tammany was now practically in complete control and was running things with an iron fist. Most of the departments had once again become inefficient and corrupt. On March 21, 1890, the Grand Jury issued a report stating that the Sheriff’s office, which had been a hotspot for corruption for twenty years, had recently become a source of “public scandal and infamy” due to the rise of notorious abuses. In 1889, the Sheriff’s net profits were at least $50,000, not counting certain “extra payments that couldn’t be determined.” The Grand Jury also noted that many other abuses were found to be linked to the management of this office and to the operation of the Ludlow Street Jail.

At about the same time the State Senate Committee[272] on Cities, headed by J. Sloat Fassett, a Republican, undertook an investigation. Though subjected to the charges of lukewarmness and bargaining, this body, popularly known as the “Fassett Committee,” brought out much valuable information. Part of its testimony has already been referred to. It is impossible even to summarize the vast total embodied in the 3,650 printed pages of its report, but some of the more interesting particulars may be briefly touched upon.

At around the same time, the State Senate Committee[272] on Cities, led by J. Sloat Fassett, a Republican, started an investigation. Despite facing accusations of being uncommitted and making compromises, this group, commonly called the “Fassett Committee,” uncovered a lot of valuable information. Some of its testimony has already been mentioned. It's impossible to summarize the extensive content found in the 3,650 printed pages of its report, but a few of the more interesting details can be briefly highlighted.

Henry S. Ives and George H. Stayner testified that, while prisoners at Ludlow Street Jail, they had paid, for various favors, $10,000 to Warden James P. Keating, then and later a prominent Tammany leader, and that previously they had paid other large amounts to certain Deputy Sheriffs.[4]

Henry S. Ives and George H. Stayner testified that, while they were inmates at Ludlow Street Jail, they had paid Warden James P. Keating, a well-known Tammany leader at that time and later, a total of $10,000 for various favors. They also mentioned that they had previously given other significant sums to some Deputy Sheriffs.[4]

John F. B. Smyth testified that when Sheriff Grant had appointed him Sheriff’s auctioneer—the most valuable gift at the Sheriff’s disposal—the latter suggested his having as a partner ex-Alderman Kirk (one of the Aldermen of 1884 indicted in connection with the Broadway Surface Railroad franchise),[5] saying that the organization insisted on having “one-half of it [the loot] go to somebody else.” In less than a year the gross proceeds amounted to about $20,000. Of this, $10,000 went to various Deputy Sheriffs, one of whom was Bernard F. Martin, frequently Sachem and another noted Tammany leader.[6]

John F. B. Smyth testified that when Sheriff Grant appointed him as the Sheriff’s auctioneer—the most valuable position available—he suggested bringing on ex-Alderman Kirk as a partner (one of the Aldermen from 1884 who was indicted in connection with the Broadway Surface Railroad franchise),[5] stating that the organization required “half of it [the loot] to go to someone else.” In less than a year, the total proceeds reached about $20,000. Of that, $10,000 went to various Deputy Sheriffs, one of whom was Bernard F. Martin, who was often a Sachem and another prominent Tammany leader.[6]

A copious amount of similar testimony was brought out implicating many other Tammany leaders, and showing that the Sheriff’s known income from the office ranged[273] from $60,000 to $75,000 a year.[7] Thomas P. Taylor, a lawyer, swore that one of his clients in 1888 had had a claim of about $4,000 in the Sheriff’s hands, and that William H. Clark, a Sachem and a powerful Tammany leader, the partner of W. Bourke Cockran, and sometime Corporation Counsel, had asked him (Taylor), “what he would give to get it.” Mr. Taylor further testified that he had given nothing, and that he had secured only a few hundred dollars of the amount, after much trouble.[8] Clark denied the charge.[9]

A large amount of similar testimony was presented implicating many other Tammany leaders, showing that the Sheriff’s known income from the office ranged[273] from $60,000 to $75,000 a year.[7] Thomas P. Taylor, a lawyer, testified that one of his clients in 1888 had a claim of about $4,000 with the Sheriff, and that William H. Clark, a Sachem and a powerful Tammany leader, the partner of W. Bourke Cockran, and former Corporation Counsel, had asked him (Taylor), “what he would give to get it.” Mr. Taylor further testified that he gave nothing and only managed to secure a few hundred dollars of the amount after much trouble.[8] Clark denied the accusation.[9]

Corruption, favoritism and blackmail were charged against all the other departments controlled by Tammany, though in the Police and Excise departments, Republican and Tammany commissioners alike were shown to have winked at the abuses. Gambling houses had to pay at least $25 a week for protection,[10] and revenue was likewise derived from every place or person capable of being blackmailed. The testimony strongly pointed to the probability that as much as $10,000 had been paid to get a certain saloon license, though there was no absolute verification of the statement.

Corruption, favoritism, and blackmail were accused against all the other departments run by Tammany, although in the Police and Excise departments, both Republican and Tammany officials were shown to have ignored the abuses. Gambling establishments had to pay at least $25 a week for protection,[10] and revenue was also collected from anyone or any place that could be blackmailed. The evidence strongly suggested that as much as $10,000 had been paid to secure a specific saloon license, although there was no definitive proof of the claim.

One interesting fact officially brought out—a fact long generally known, however, and stated heretofore in this work—was that the Wiskinskie of the Tammany Society, nominally a city employee, was the official agent of the organization in collecting assessments, said to vary from 5 to 10 per cent., on the salaries of every Tammany office-holder. In fact, Mr. Croker unhesitatingly admitted before the Fassett Committee, that at that time it cost from $50,000 to $75,000 to run the organization successfully.[11] Considerable sums were likewise derived from assessments on candidates. Mr. Hewitt, it was said, contributed $12,000 in 1886, but Mr. Croker developed a very[274] poor memory when questioned about this and contributions from many Judges and other office-holders.[12]

One interesting fact that was officially revealed—a fact that had long been generally known and mentioned earlier in this work—was that the Wiskinskie of the Tammany Society, who was nominally a city employee, was the official agent of the organization responsible for collecting fees, which were said to range from 5 to 10 percent, on the salaries of every Tammany office-holder. In fact, Mr. Croker openly admitted before the Fassett Committee that at that time, it cost between $50,000 and $75,000 to run the organization successfully.[11] Considerable sums were also generated from assessments on candidates. It was reported that Mr. Hewitt contributed $12,000 in 1886, but Mr. Croker seemed to have a very[274] poor memory when questioned about this and contributions from various judges and other office-holders.[12]

The revelations, as usual, caused the formation of a citizens’ movement, and a strong combination of Republicans, Democrats and independents was formed, under the name of the “People’s Municipal League,” for the purpose of ousting Tammany. Francis M. Scott, a Democrat, was nominated for Mayor, and a vigorous campaign was waged. Tammany minimized the disclosures, and renominated Mr. Grant. A Democratic tidal wave swept the nation in the Fall of 1890, and on this wave the Tammany ticket was carried to victory, the local majority being 23,199.

The revelations, as always, led to the creation of a citizens’ movement, and a strong coalition of Republicans, Democrats, and independents was formed under the name "People’s Municipal League" to push out Tammany. Francis M. Scott, a Democrat, was nominated for Mayor, and an intense campaign was launched. Tammany downplayed the disclosures and renominated Mr. Grant. A Democratic wave swept the nation in the Fall of 1890, and on this wave, the Tammany ticket achieved victory, with a local majority of 23,199.

The effect on the society and the organization of this victory, following so closely upon the Fassett revelations, was to impress the Tammany men with an added sense of security. Accordingly, by tacit understanding, smirches made upon reputations before the Fassett Committee were to constitute no bar to political advancement, and the old condition of things in the departments was to continue. Many of those who had suffered most at the hands of the Senatorial inquisitors were elected during the next four years to places in the society and to public offices. Irving Hall and the County Democracy passed out of existence, and Tammany had full sway. Administrative corruption continued, and frauds at the polls, despite certain improvements in the ballot laws instituted in 1890, developed to a science, reaching their climax in 1893.

The impact on society and the organization from this victory, coming right after the Fassett revelations, gave the Tammany men a stronger sense of security. As a result, it was implicitly agreed that any damage done to reputations during the Fassett Committee's inquiry wouldn't prevent political careers from advancing, and the previous state of affairs in the departments would remain unchanged. Many of those who had been most affected by the Senate investigators were elected over the next four years to roles within the society and to public positions. Irving Hall and the County Democracy faded away, and Tammany took complete control. Administrative corruption persisted, and electoral frauds, even with some improvements to the ballot laws introduced in 1890, became highly sophisticated, peaking in 1893.

In 1892 Tammany fought the nomination of Mr. Cleveland for President, though it supported him after his election. Thomas F. Gilroy, Grand Sachem (1892-94) was nominated for Mayor, the Republicans presenting Edwin Einstein. A Democratic landslide marked the election, and the Tammany candidates won by practically[275] the same majority as that given to Mr. Cleveland, Mr. Gilroy receiving 173,510, and Mr. Einstein, 97,923 votes. Frauds were numerous, as usual. The opposition vote in a number of election districts was practically nothing. A certain Tammany politician, later State Senator from the lower end of town, stood in the envious wonder of his fellows for a whole year following, for having secured for the ticket all the votes but four in his election district.

In 1892, Tammany opposed the nomination of Mr. Cleveland for President, although it supported him after he was elected. Thomas F. Gilroy, Grand Sachem (1892-94), was nominated for Mayor, while the Republicans nominated Edwin Einstein. The election was a Democratic landslide, with Tammany candidates winning by almost[275] the same margin as Mr. Cleveland. Mr. Gilroy received 173,510 votes, and Mr. Einstein got 97,923. As usual, there were many fraudulent activities. The opposition's vote in several election districts was almost negligible. One Tammany politician, who later became a State Senator from the lower part of the city, was admired by his peers for a whole year afterward for securing all but four votes in his election district.

The fame of this enterprising worker aroused a determination in the breasts of others to exceed his record. During the next campaign (1893) the general indignation against the corrupt conduct of Judge Maynard, brought out a strong opposition to his elevation to the bench of the Court of Appeals. Senator Hill caused his nomination, Tammany supported him, and the word was passed around that he must be elected at all hazards. As a consequence, frauds of the gravest character were committed throughout the city. The Tammany leader of the Second Assembly District, zealous to outdo the record of the previous year, offered prizes to his election district captains for the best results. The election overturned all known records. The successful competitor brought in a poll of 369 to 0. In two other precincts no opposition votes of any kind were counted, despite the presence of Republican inspectors, and the fact that Republicans, Socialists, Populists and Prohibitionists afterward swore under oath that they had voted for their respective candidates. The vote in this assembly district, nominally 8,000, rose to nearly 13,000.

The fame of this eager worker sparked a drive in others to beat his record. During the next campaign (1893), the widespread anger over Judge Maynard's corrupt behavior led to strong opposition against his appointment to the Court of Appeals. Senator Hill pushed for his nomination, Tammany backed him, and word spread that he had to be elected at all costs. As a result, serious frauds were committed throughout the city. The Tammany leader of the Second Assembly District, eager to surpass the previous year's results, offered prizes to his election district captains for the best outcomes. The election shattered all known records. The winning candidate reported a poll of 369 to 0. In two other precincts, no opposing votes were counted at all, despite the presence of Republican inspectors, and it was later sworn under oath by Republicans, Socialists, Populists, and Prohibitionists that they had voted for their respective candidates. The vote in this assembly district, officially 8,000, shot up to nearly 13,000.

A committee from the Populist County Committee, the local branch of the National People’s party, immediately took steps to secure evidence through which to effect the punishment of the lawbreakers.[13] The evidence secured,[276] with that afterwards obtained by the Republican County Committee, the City Club, the Good Government clubs, and the Bar Association, was submitted to the Grand Jury, upon which some sixty indictments were handed down. A number of convictions were obtained, and several Tammany and assistant Tammany election officers were sent to prison. The Tammany leader of the Second Assembly District went to California immediately after the agitation began, and remained there until the affair blew over. In the election the following year the vote of this district fell to the old figures of approximately 8,000.

A committee from the Populist County Committee, the local branch of the National People’s party, quickly took steps to gather evidence to punish the lawbreakers.[13] The evidence collected,[276] along with what was later obtained by the Republican County Committee, the City Club, the Good Government clubs, and the Bar Association, was presented to the Grand Jury, resulting in around sixty indictments. Several convictions were secured, and multiple Tammany and assistant Tammany election officials were sent to prison. The Tammany leader from the Second Assembly District went to California right after the scandal started and stayed there until things settled down. In the next year's election, the vote in this district returned to the usual figures of about 8,000.

The city had again become scandalously corrupt. The bi-partizan boards, which originally had been established in the hope of applying some check to the general rascality, had merely furnished greater opportunities for deals and political bargaining. Charges of blackmail, extortion, of immunity given to crime, and most other forms of administrative venality, grew so common that again the State Senate sent (April, 1894), a committee to the city to investigate. This was the body commonly known as the “Lexow Committee,” from its chairman, Clarence Lexow. Its counsel, John W. Goff, vigorously conducted the investigation, and the result was a mass of information regarding Tammany methods of government such as the public had not known since the exposures of Tweed’s time. We can but touch upon the testimony.

The city had once again become shockingly corrupt. The bipartisan boards, which were originally set up in hopes of curbing the widespread dishonesty, had instead created more opportunities for deals and political maneuvering. Allegations of blackmail, extortion, immunity for criminals, and various other forms of government corruption became so rampant that the State Senate sent a committee to the city to investigate in April 1894. This group was commonly known as the “Lexow Committee,” named after its chairman, Clarence Lexow. Its counsel, John W. Goff, aggressively conducted the investigation, and the outcome was a wealth of information about Tammany's governing methods that the public hadn’t seen since the scandals of Tweed’s era. We can only briefly touch on the testimony.

It was shown that during each of the years 1891, 1892 and 1893, many thousands of fraudulent ballots had been cast by the active cooperation and connivance of the police; Police Captains were appointed from those members of the force who especially connived at these frauds, the appointments being made by the President of the Board of Police (who was one of the most conspicuous Wigwam leaders) at the instance of the organization. Tammany influences permeated the Police Department to such a degree that the district leaders dictated appointments, and from Captain down almost the entire force[277] joined the Tammany district associations. Forced contributions were levied upon the members for the benefit of Wigwam district organizations.

It was revealed that in each of the years 1891, 1892, and 1893, many thousands of fake ballots were cast with the active cooperation and complicity of the police. Police Captains were appointed from those members of the force who particularly turned a blind eye to these frauds, with the appointments made by the President of the Board of Police (who was one of the most prominent Wigwam leaders) at the request of the organization. Tammany's influence infiltrated the Police Department to such an extent that the district leaders decided on appointments, and from Captain down, nearly the entire force[277] became involved with the Tammany district associations. Members were forced to contribute for the benefit of Wigwam district organizations.

Capt. Creedon confessed to paying $15,000 to secure a promotion to a Captaincy, and Capt. Schmittberger, to having secured the appointment of another man as Captain, in consideration of the payment of $12,000. The average cost of obtaining an appointment as policeman was $300. The police functionaries recouped themselves in various ways. Vice and crime were protected openly. One woman who kept a number of houses of ill-repute testified that she had paid continuously for protection an aggregate of $30,000 or more. The system reached such a perfection in detail that a ratable charge was placed upon each house according to the number of inmates, the protection prices ranging from $25 to $50 monthly. Women of the streets paid patrolmen for permission to solicit, and divided proceeds. Visitors were robbed systematically, and the plunder was divided with the police. More than 600 policy shops paid at the monthly rate of $15, while pool rooms paid $300 a month. It was noted by the committee, as a remarkable fact, that when public agitation grew very strong, a private citizen, Richard Croker, secured the closing of these places practically in a single day. Every form of gambling had to pay high prices for immunity. Green goods swindlers were required to make monthly payments, to subdivide the city into districts, and additionally, in case the victim “squealed,” to give one-half of the plunder to either ward or headquarters detectives. Saloons paid $20 monthly, according “to the established custom.” The police also acted in collusion with thieves and dishonest pawnbrokers. Almost every branch of trade and commerce was forced to make monthly payments, and from every possible source tribute was wrung.

Capt. Creedon admitted to paying $15,000 to get promoted to Captain, and Capt. Schmittberger confirmed that he arranged for another man to become Captain in exchange for a payment of $12,000. The average cost to get hired as a police officer was $300. The police officers found various ways to recover their costs. Vice and crime were openly protected. One woman who ran several brothels testified that she had continuously paid a total of over $30,000 for protection. The system was so refined that each brothel was charged based on the number of residents, with protection fees ranging from $25 to $50 per month. Street women paid patrol officers for permission to solicit and shared their earnings. Visitors were systematically robbed, and the stolen money was shared with the police. More than 600 policy shops paid $15 a month, while pool halls paid $300 monthly. The committee noted that when public outcry became intense, a private citizen, Richard Croker, managed to shut down these venues practically overnight. All forms of gambling had to pay hefty fees for protection. Green goods con artists had to make monthly payments, dividing the city into districts, and if the victim reported them, they had to give half of the stolen money to either ward or precinct detectives. Saloons paid $20 monthly, according to the “established custom.” The police also colluded with thieves and dishonest pawnbrokers. Almost every business was forced to pay monthly fees, and they exacted tribute from every possible source.

The committee incorporated in its testimony the estimate of Foreman Tabor, of the Grand Jury, in March,[278] 1892, that the annual income derived from blackmailing and different sources of extortion was $7,000,000.[14] In this estimate there were probably not included the large sums paid by corporations of every kind, and all who sought the favor or feared the power of Tammany Hall.

The committee included in its testimony the estimate from Foreman Tabor of the Grand Jury in March,[278] 1892, stating that the annual income from blackmail and various forms of extortion was $7,000,000.[14] This estimate likely did not account for the large amounts paid by all kinds of corporations, as well as anyone seeking Tammany Hall's favor or fearing its power.

The two Democratic members of the Police Board at this time were James J. Martin, one of the powerful district leaders, and John C. Sheehan, who became deputy “boss” during Mr. Croker’s absence. No direct evidence was given to establish their complicity in the general extortion, but John McClave, the Republican Commissioner, resigned after a searching and pointed examination.

The two Democratic members of the Police Board at this time were James J. Martin, a prominent district leader, and John C. Sheehan, who stepped up as the deputy "boss" during Mr. Croker’s absence. No concrete evidence was presented to prove their involvement in the overall extortion, but John McClave, the Republican Commissioner, resigned after a thorough and pointed investigation.

Mr. Croker did not testify before the Lexow Committee, urgent business demanding his presence in England throughout the investigation.

Mr. Croker did not testify before the Lexow Committee because urgent business required him to be in England during the investigation.

The public was aroused as it had not been since 1871. An earnest agitation for reform, largely due to the crusade of Rev. Charles H. Parkhurst, and to the work of the City Club and the Good Government clubs, was begun. A Committee of Seventy, composed of representatives of all classes, was formed to carry on a political contest, and an enthusiastic support was given to it by the great mass of the public throughout the campaign. William L. Strong, a Republican and a prominent dry goods merchant, was nominated by the Seventy for Mayor, and the Republicans indorsed him. Tammany, after floundering about for several weeks in the vain hope of securing a candidate strong enough to stem the opposing tide, selected at first Nathan Straus, who withdrew, and then Hugh J. Grant, making its campaign largely on the ground that Mr. Grant was the only unsmirched Tammany member of the “Boodle” Board of Aldermen of 1884. The contest was bitter and determined on both sides, Tammany putting forth its utmost efforts to avert the inevitable disaster. According to a statement of John C. Sheehan, the organization[279] expended more money in this election than in any election in recent years.

The public was stirred up like it hadn't been since 1871. A serious push for reform, largely driven by Rev. Charles H. Parkhurst, along with the efforts of the City Club and Good Government clubs, began. A Committee of Seventy, made up of representatives from all walks of life, was formed to lead a political campaign, and it received enthusiastic support from a large portion of the public throughout the campaign. William L. Strong, a Republican and a well-known dry goods merchant, was nominated for Mayor by the Seventy, and the Republicans backed him. Tammany, after struggling for several weeks in a futile attempt to find a candidate strong enough to resist the opposing movement, initially chose Nathan Straus, who later withdrew, and then Hugh J. Grant, running their campaign mainly on the claim that Mr. Grant was the only untainted Tammany member of the "Boodle" Board of Aldermen from 1884. The rivalry was fierce and intense on both sides, with Tammany making every effort to avoid what seemed like an unavoidable defeat. According to John C. Sheehan, the organization[279] spent more money in this election than in any recent election.

The convictions of the previous year had served to cool the zeal of the Tammany workers for records at the polls. In consequence of this, and of further changes in the manner of balloting, New York enjoyed probably the most fairly conducted election of any since the first organized effort of Tammany men at the polls in 1800. Strong was elected by a majority of 45,187. With his election went nearly the whole of the city patronage, changes in the new constitution (1894) having greatly centralized the city’s administrative functions in the Mayor’s hands. Tammany was thus thrust out again.

The convictions from the previous year had dampened the enthusiasm of the Tammany workers for voting records. As a result of this and other changes in how voting was done, New York probably had the most fairly conducted election since Tammany’s first organized effort at the polls in 1800. Strong was elected by a majority of 45,187. With his election came nearly all of the city’s patronage, as changes in the new constitution (1894) had significantly centralized the city’s administrative functions in the Mayor’s hands. Tammany was pushed out once more.

Mayor Strong’s administration on the whole was beneficial. The city budget went up to nearly $44,000,000, but for the first time since Mayor Havemeyer’s time the streets were kept clean—a result due to the systematic energy of Col. George E. Waring, Jr. Moreover, new schools were built, new parks laid out, streets asphalted, improvements planned and carried out, while administrative corruption was almost unheard of. Not the least of the benefits of this administration was the partial reform of the Police Department, through the efforts of Police Commissioner Theodore Roosevelt, and his fellow Commissioners, Avery D. Andrews, Andrew D. Parker and Frank Moss.

Mayor Strong’s administration was generally beneficial. The city budget rose to nearly $44,000,000, but for the first time since Mayor Havemeyer’s era, the streets were kept clean—thanks to the dedicated efforts of Col. George E. Waring, Jr. Additionally, new schools were built, new parks were established, streets were paved, improvements were planned and implemented, and administrative corruption was nearly non-existent. One of the significant achievements of this administration was the partial reform of the Police Department, led by Police Commissioner Theodore Roosevelt and his fellow Commissioners, Avery D. Andrews, Andrew D. Parker, and Frank Moss.

In the mean time Richard Croker spent most of his time in England. From being a comparatively poor man, as he testified in 1890, he became suddenly rich. From April, 1889, to February, 1890, he was City Chamberlain, at a salary of $25,000 a year, but thereafter he held no public office. Within two years, however, he was able, according to common report, to buy an interest in the Belle Meade stock farm for $250,000, paying additionally $109,000 for Longstreet and other race horses. Later, he built a new house, said to cost over $200,000,[280] and lavishly spent money, and displayed the evidences of wealth in other ways.

In the meantime, Richard Croker spent most of his time in England. From being relatively poor, as he stated in 1890, he suddenly became wealthy. From April 1889 to February 1890, he served as City Chamberlain, earning a salary of $25,000 a year, but after that, he held no public office. However, within two years, he was reportedly able to buy a stake in the Belle Meade stock farm for $250,000, and he also paid an additional $109,000 for Longstreet and other racehorses. Later, he built a new house, which was said to cost over $200,000,[280] and he lavishly spent money, showcasing his wealth in various ways.

When in the city he was, for a considerable number of years, in the real estate business. He is popularly credited with having been interested in the passage and development of certain extremely valuable franchises which were obtained from the Legislature and Board of Aldermen for almost nothing. In 1892 he was reputed to dominate the Legislature, as he did the city, and the lobby disappeared. It was related at the time that all applicants for favors or for relief from hostile measures were advised “to see headquarters.”

When he was in the city, he spent many years in the real estate business. He is commonly believed to have been involved in the acquisition and development of some highly valuable franchises that were obtained from the Legislature and Board of Aldermen for almost nothing. In 1892, he was said to have a strong influence over the Legislature, just as he did over the city, and the lobby became irrelevant. At the time, it was said that anyone seeking favors or relief from negative actions was told to "check in at headquarters."

One of the franchises granted during that year was the “Huckleberry franchise,” for a street railway in the Annexed District—a grant which was worth at the time fully $2,000,000, and yet was practically given away under circumstances of great scandal.[15] When testifying before the Mazet Committee in 1899, he was asked whether he had owned, in 1892, 800 shares of the stock of this road, but declined to state.[16] Another illustration of Mr. Croker’s alleged diversified interests was furnished by a statement said to have been inspired by John C. Sheehan and published on December 23, 1900. Mr. Sheehan asserted that in 1894 he and Mr. Croker were interested in a company formed with a capital of $5,000,000 for the construction of the rapid transit tunnel. Mr. Sheehan, the statement read, forced through the Board of Aldermen a resolution approving the tunnel route which he and Mr. Croker had selected as the most feasible. The statement further set forth that Mr. Croker had $500,000 worth of this company’s stock, which came to him gratuitously, and that he and Mr. Sheehan had been also mutually interested in a proposed surety company.

One of the franchises awarded that year was the “Huckleberry franchise” for a street railway in the Annexed District—an award that was worth around $2,000,000 at the time and was practically handed out amidst significant controversy. [15] When he testified before the Mazet Committee in 1899, he was asked if he owned 800 shares of this railway’s stock in 1892 but chose not to answer. [16] Another example of Mr. Croker’s supposed varied interests was provided by a statement purportedly inspired by John C. Sheehan and published on December 23, 1900. Mr. Sheehan claimed that in 1894, he and Mr. Croker were involved in a company established with a capital of $5,000,000 for building the rapid transit tunnel. The statement said that Mr. Sheehan pushed through a resolution in the Board of Aldermen to approve the tunnel route that he and Mr. Croker had identified as the most practical. It further noted that Mr. Croker owned $500,000 worth of this company’s stock, which he received for free, and that he and Mr. Sheehan were also mutually interested in a proposed surety company.

As chairman of the finance committee of Tammany[281] Hall (a post Tweed and Kelly had held, and which carried with it the titular leadership of the organization), all the vast funds contributed for Tammany’s many campaigns passed through his hands. As he himself testified, the finance committee kept no books.[17]

As the chair of the finance committee of Tammany[281] Hall (a position previously held by Tweed and Kelly, which came with the symbolic leadership of the organization), all the significant funds donated for Tammany’s various campaigns went through his hands. As he stated, the finance committee did not keep any records.[17]

Whether Mr. Croker was at home or far abroad, his control of the Wigwam was absolute. Long since, he had inaugurated the system of “turning down” any man that disobeyed orders.

Whether Mr. Croker was at home or far away, his control of the Wigwam was total. Long ago, he had started the practice of "turning down" any man who disobeyed orders.

At the time of Mr. Bryan’s nomination, in 1896, Mr. Croker was in England. His three years’ racing experience there cost him, it was reported, between $600,000 and $700,000. He remained abroad, leaving the organization, as we have mentioned, in charge of John C. Sheehan as a kind of vicegerent. Mr. Sheehan’s public record in Buffalo had been severely criticized, and many organization men had protested against his being put in charge. This protest, however, was generally understood at the time to be founded not so much on the matter of Mr. Sheehan’s record as on that of his being an interloper from another section of the State. Tammany that year ignored the national Democratic platform. Though ratifying Mr. Bryan’s nomination, a general apathy prevailed at the Wigwam throughout the campaign, and the more radical Democrats repeatedly charged the leaders with treachery to the ticket. The result of this apathy and of other influences was that Mr. McKinley carried the city by over 20,000 plurality.

At the time of Mr. Bryan's nomination in 1896, Mr. Croker was in England. His three years of racing experience there reportedly cost him between $600,000 and $700,000. He stayed abroad, leaving the organization, as mentioned, under the leadership of John C. Sheehan as a sort of deputy. Mr. Sheehan's public record in Buffalo had faced serious criticism, and many organization members protested against him taking charge. However, this protest was generally seen at the time as being less about Mr. Sheehan's record and more about him being an outsider from another part of the State. That year, Tammany disregarded the national Democratic platform. While they endorsed Mr. Bryan's nomination, there was a general sense of indifference at the Wigwam throughout the campaign, and the more radical Democrats repeatedly accused the leaders of betraying the ticket. The outcome of this indifference and other factors was that Mr. McKinley won the city by over a 20,000 plurality.

Mr. Croker finally returned home in September, 1897, shortly before the meeting of the Democratic city convention. It was commonly believed that Mr. Sheehan, the deputy “boss,” had made preparations to assume the “boss-ship” himself, but Mr. Sheehan emphatically[282] denied this. Whatever the circumstances were Mr. Croker promptly deprived the former of power, and later succeeded in practically excluding him from the organization.

Mr. Croker finally got back home in September 1897, just before the Democratic city convention met. People generally thought that Mr. Sheehan, the deputy "boss," was getting ready to take over the "boss" position himself, but Mr. Sheehan strongly denied this. Regardless of the situation, Mr. Croker quickly stripped him of power and later managed to nearly kick him out of the organization.

The “Boss’s” supreme control of city politics was illustrated by the nomination for Mayor of Greater New York of Robert C. Van Wyck, who was in no sense the organization’s candidate, but represented merely Mr. Croker’s choice and dictation. The Citizens’ Union nominated Seth Low, who probably would have been elected had the Republicans indorsed him. But the latter nominated Benjamin F. Tracy, thus dividing the opposition, which was still further disintegrated by the action of the Jeffersonian Democrats in nominating Henry George, and later Henry George, Jr., upon the noted economist dying in the heat of the campaign. The canvass was carried on with the greatest vigor, for under the Greater New York charter all the territory now embraced in the city limits was to vote for one Mayor, with a four-years’ term, and almost dictatorial power in the matter of appointments and removals. In his statement, heretofore referred to, Mr. Sheehan asserted that during this campaign he personally collected and turned over to John McQuade,[18] the treasurer of Tammany Hall, the sum of $260,000, irrespective of contributions collected by others, and that at the end of the canvass Mr. McQuade had $50,000 in the treasury.[19]

The “Boss’s” total control over city politics was shown by the nomination of Robert C. Van Wyck for Mayor of Greater New York. He wasn't the organization’s real candidate; he was just Mr. Croker’s choice. The Citizens’ Union put forward Seth Low, who likely would have won if the Republicans had backed him. Instead, they nominated Benjamin F. Tracy, splitting the opposition even further, especially after the Jeffersonian Democrats nominated Henry George, and later Henry George, Jr., when the well-known economist passed away during the heated campaign. The campaign was held with great energy, as under the Greater New York charter, everyone within the city limits was allowed to vote for one Mayor, who would serve a four-year term and have almost dictatorial power over appointments and removals. In his earlier statement, Mr. Sheehan claimed that during this campaign, he personally collected and handed over to John McQuade,[18] the treasurer of Tammany Hall, a total of $260,000, not including contributions collected by others, and that by the end of the campaign, Mr. McQuade had $50,000 in the treasury.[19]

The vote stood: Van Wyck, 253,997; Low, 151,540; Tracy, 101,863; George, 21,693; scattering, 17,464. The Wigwam was beside itself with joy; the victory[283] meant absolute control of the greater city’s annual budget of over $90,000,000, not to speak of the tens of millions more derived from rents, fees, fines, interest, assessments for street improvements, bond sales and premiums, and from those vast and varied sources of contract juggling, selling of legislative “goods,” and all the other avenues, too numerous to enumerate, of which Tammany from early times has availed itself. It also meant the control of an army of employees, now estimated at 60,000. The disreputable classes vociferously celebrated the occasion, assured that the town was once more to be “wide open.”

The vote was as follows: Van Wyck, 253,997; Low, 151,540; Tracy, 101,863; George, 21,693; scattering, 17,464. The Wigwam was ecstatic; this victory[283] meant complete control over the larger city's annual budget of over $90,000,000, not to mention the tens of millions more coming from rents, fees, fines, interest, assessments for street improvements, bond sales and premiums, and various sources of contract manipulation, selling legislative “goods,” and countless other avenues that Tammany has exploited since early times. It also signified control over a workforce estimated at 60,000 employees. The disreputable classes loudly celebrated, confident that the city was once again going to be “wide open.”

FOOTNOTES

[1] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. II, pp. 1708-12.

[1] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. II, pp. 1708-12.

[2] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. I, pp. 707-8.

[2] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. I, pp. 707-8.

[3] Ibid., pp. 745-50, and Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1701.

[3] Same source., pp. 745-50, and Same source., Vol. II, p. 1701.

[4] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. I, pp. 235-52, and Ibid., p. 300.

[4] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. I, pp. 235-52, and Ibid., p. 300.

[5] Kirk had been dropped from the Council of Sachems in 1886 owing to the disclosures.

[5] Kirk was removed from the Council of Sachems in 1886 because of the revelations.

[6] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. I, pp. 282-87. Bernard, or “Barney,” Martin and two others had been indicted on the ground of having been bribed, but the indictments were dismissed in March, 1890, on a technicality which allowed the defendants to fall back upon the Statute of Limitations.

[6] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. I, pp. 282-87. Bernard, or “Barney,” Martin and two others were charged with being bribed, but the charges were dropped in March 1890 due to a technicality that let the defendants use the Statute of Limitations as a defense.

[7] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. I, p. 344.

[7] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. I, p. 344.

[8] Ibid., pp. 502-11.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, pp. 502-11.

[9] Ibid., p. 513.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, p. 513.

[10] Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1244.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., Vol. II, p. 1244.

[11] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, Vol. II, p. 1756.

[11] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, Vol. II, p. 1756.

[12] Ibid., pp. 1757-62.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, pp. 1757-62.

[13] The credit for instituting this prosecution has been variously, and sometimes impudently, claimed. There is no doubt, however, that not only the first, but the most important evidence, was furnished by this committee, whose practical head was William A. Ellis, of the Second Assembly District.

[13] The credit for starting this prosecution has been claimed in various ways, sometimes quite arrogantly. However, it's clear that both the initial and most significant evidence came from this committee, which was practically led by William A. Ellis of the Second Assembly District.

[14] Investigation of the Police Department, etc., 1894, Vol. V, p. 5734.

[14] Investigation of the Police Department, etc., 1894, Vol. V, p. 5734.

[15] See A History of Public Franchises in New York City, by the author.

[15] See A History of Public Franchises in New York City, by the author.

[16] Stenographic minutes, p. 699.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Steno minutes, p. 699.

[17] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. II, p. 1755. Mr. Sheehan in the statement cited stated that when, in 1894, Mr. Croker sent an order to the district leaders requiring that district assessments amounting to $35,000 should be paid before March 1, the payments were promptly made.

[17] Testimony, Senate Committee on Cities, 1890, Vol. II, p. 1755. Mr. Sheehan stated in his testimony that when, in 1894, Mr. Croker issued an order to the district leaders demanding that district assessments totaling $35,000 be paid by March 1, the payments were made promptly.

[18] Mr. McQuade was associated with Tweed, as a commissioner, in the building of the Harlem Court House. The testimony brought out in the case of Henry A. Smalley vs. The Mayor, etc., before Judge Donohue, in the Supreme Court, January 28, 1878, showed that the value of all the material used in the building was $66,386, but that the Finance Department had paid out for this material $268,580.

[18] Mr. McQuade was involved with Tweed as a commissioner in the construction of the Harlem Courthouse. The evidence presented in the case of Henry A. Smalley vs. The Mayor, etc., before Judge Donohue in the Supreme Court on January 28, 1878, revealed that the total value of all the materials used in the construction was $66,386, while the Finance Department had disbursed $268,580 for these materials.

[19] Early in 1898 Tammany Hall, with considerable display, disposed of most of this fund, by giving $20,000 for the poor of the city and a like sum for the Cuban cause.

[19] Early in 1898, Tammany Hall, making a big show of it, used most of this fund to donate $20,000 to help the poor in the city and another $20,000 for the Cuban cause.


CHAPTER XXIX
THE DICTATORSHIP OF RICHARD CROKER (Concluded)
1897-1901

Now that Tammany was reinstalled in almost absolute power, Mr. Croker set about choosing the important city officials to be appointed by the Mayor. He frankly admitted before the Mazet Committee, in 1899, that practically all of them were selected by him or his immediate associates. Requiring a routine assistant in the work of “bossing,” Mr. Croker selected John F. Carroll, who thereupon resigned the office of Clerk of the Court of General Sessions, which yielded, it was estimated, about $12,000 a year, to take a post with no apparent salary. Mr. Croker then returned to horse-racing in England.

Now that Tammany was back in almost complete control, Mr. Croker set about picking the key city officials to be appointed by the Mayor. He openly admitted in front of the Mazet Committee in 1899 that nearly all of them were chosen by him or his close associates. Needing a routine assistant for the work of “bossing,” Mr. Croker picked John F. Carroll, who then resigned from his position as Clerk of the Court of General Sessions, which was estimated to bring in about $12,000 a year, to take a job with no clear salary. Mr. Croker then returned to horse racing in England.

The public pronouncements of the organization continued to voice the old-time characteristic pretensions of that body’s frugality, honesty and submission to the popular will. In October, 1898, the county convention in the Wigwam passed resolutions commending “the wise, honest and economical” Tammany administration of Greater New York, and denouncing the “corruption, extravagance and waste of the infamous mismanagement” by the previous reform administration. Yet at this very moment the Bar Association was protesting against Mr. Croker’s refusal to renominate Judge Joseph F. Daly,[1][285] on the ground of his refusing to hand over the patronage of his court. The convention itself, despite its fine words, acted merely as the register of the will of one man, with scarcely the formality of a contest; and the public had again become agitated over the certainty of grave scandals in the public service.

The public statements from the organization continued to express the long-held claims of its frugality, honesty, and dedication to the people's wishes. In October 1898, the county convention in the Wigwam passed resolutions praising the "wise, honest, and economical" Tammany administration of Greater New York, while condemning the "corruption, extravagance, and waste of the infamous mismanagement" under the previous reform administration. Yet at the same time, the Bar Association was protesting Mr. Croker’s refusal to re-nominate Judge Joseph F. Daly,[1][285] claiming it was due to Daly's refusal to hand over the patronage of his court. The convention itself, despite its lofty rhetoric, acted merely as a rubber stamp for the will of one man, with hardly any semblance of competition; and the public had once again become restless over the certainty of serious scandals in public service.

Tammany’s election fund this year was generally reputed to be in the neighborhood of $100,000. As much as $500 was spent in each of several hotly contested election districts. Tammany won, but by a margin less than had been expected and, in fact, arranged for. The State Superintendent of Elections, John McCullough, in his annual report (January, 1899) to Gov. Roosevelt, gave good grounds for believing that Tammany had been deprived of a large support on which it had counted. Of 13,104 persons registered from specified lodging houses in certain strong Tammany districts, only 4,034 voted. It was evident that colonization frauds on a large scale had been attempted, and had been frustrated only by the vigilance of Superintendent McCullough.

Tammany’s election fund this year was generally believed to be around $100,000. Up to $500 was spent in each of several highly competitive election districts. Tammany won, but by a smaller margin than expected and actually planned for. The State Superintendent of Elections, John McCullough, in his annual report (January 1899) to Gov. Roosevelt, provided solid evidence that Tammany had lost a significant amount of support it had relied on. Out of 13,104 people registered from specific lodging houses in certain strong Tammany districts, only 4,034 actually voted. It was clear that large-scale colonization frauds had been attempted and were only thwarted by the diligence of Superintendent McCullough.

The state of administrative affairs in the city grew worse and worse, nearly approximating that of 1893-94. The Legislature again determined to investigate, and accordingly sent to the city the special committee of the Assembly, popularly known as the “Mazet Committee.” This body’s prestige suffered from the charge that its investigation was unduly partizan. Moreover, it was generally felt by the public that its work was inefficiently carried on. Nevertheless, it produced a considerable array of facts showing the existence of gross maladministration.

The situation with city administration continued to deteriorate, almost resembling the issues of 1893-94. The Legislature decided to look into it again, so they sent a special committee from the Assembly, commonly referred to as the “Mazet Committee.” This committee's reputation was damaged by claims that its investigation was too biased. Additionally, many members of the public believed that its efforts were being handled poorly. Still, it managed to uncover a significant amount of evidence indicating serious mismanagement.

It was disclosed that every member of the Tammany Society or of the organization’s executive committee, held office, or was a favored contractor. Over $700,000 of city orders went to favored contractors without bidding. Various city departments were “characterized by unparalleled ignorance and unfairness.” The payrolls in some of the most important departments had increased[286] $1,500,000 between July 1, 1898, and September 1, 1899, and the employees had increased over 1,000, excluding policemen, firemen and teachers. The testimony proved the increasing inefficiency and demoralization of the Police and Fire Departments. It further proved the existence of a ramified system of corruption similar to that revealed by the Lexow Committee.

It was revealed that every member of the Tammany Society or the organization’s executive committee held a position or was a favored contractor. Over $700,000 in city contracts were awarded to favored contractors without going through a bidding process. Different city departments were marked by extreme ignorance and unfairness. The payrolls in some of the most crucial departments rose by $1,500,000 between July 1, 1898, and September 1, 1899, with an increase of over 1,000 employees, not counting policemen, firemen, and teachers. The evidence showed a rise in inefficiency and demoralization within the Police and Fire Departments. It also demonstrated the presence of a widespread system of corruption similar to what the Lexow Committee had uncovered.[286]

The disclosures attracting the greatest public attention were those relating to the Ice Trust, the Ramapo project, and Mr. Croker’s relations to the city government. On April 14 the committee exposed a conspiracy between the Ice Trust and the Dock and other departments of the city government, to create and maintain a monopoly of New York’s ice supply. Six days after the exposure, Mayor Van Wyck, as he subsequently admitted in his testimony before Judge Gaynor, acquired 5,000 shares, worth $500,000, of the Ice Trust stock, alleging that he paid $57,000 in cash for them; but although urged to substantiate his statement, did not produce proof that he actually paid anything. It was shown conclusively before the committee that the arrangement between the Ice Trust and the city officials was such as to compel the people to pay 60 cents a hundred pounds, and that the trust had stopped the sale of five-cent pieces of ice, practically cutting off the supply of the very poor. Many other Tammany officials were equally involved. Proceedings were begun some time after, looking to an official investigation of the Ice Trust’s affairs, and charges against Mayor Van Wyck were filed with Gov. Roosevelt. The latter were finally dismissed by the Governor in November, 1900.

The disclosures that captured the most public attention were related to the Ice Trust, the Ramapo project, and Mr. Croker’s connections to the city government. On April 14, the committee revealed a conspiracy between the Ice Trust and the Dock and other city departments to create and maintain a monopoly on New York’s ice supply. Six days after this revelation, Mayor Van Wyck, as he later admitted in his testimony before Judge Gaynor, acquired 5,000 shares of Ice Trust stock worth $500,000, claiming he paid $57,000 in cash for them; however, despite being urged to prove his statements, he did not provide any evidence that he actually paid anything. The committee conclusively demonstrated that the arrangement between the Ice Trust and city officials forced people to pay 60 cents for every hundred pounds of ice, and that the trust had stopped selling five-cent pieces of ice, effectively cutting off the supply for the very poor. Many other Tammany officials were similarly involved. After a while, proceedings began for an official investigation into the Ice Trust’s operations, and charges against Mayor Van Wyck were filed with Governor Roosevelt. These were ultimately dismissed by the Governor in November 1900.

In August, the committee uncovered the Ramapo scheme. The Ramapo Water Company, with assets “of at least the value of $5,000,” sought to foist upon the city a contract calling for payment from the city treasury of an enormous amount in annual installments of about $5,110,000, in return for at least 200,000,000 gallons of water a day, at $70 per million gallons. This was[287] proved to be an attempt toward a most gigantic swindle. Had not Controller Coler exposed and frustrated the scheme, the Tammany members of the Board of Public Improvements would have rushed the contract to passage.

In August, the committee discovered the Ramapo scheme. The Ramapo Water Company, with assets valued at “at least $5,000,” tried to push a contract onto the city that would require the city treasury to pay a staggering $5,110,000 annually for at least 200,000,000 gallons of water a day, costing $70 per million gallons. This was[287]proven to be an attempt at a massive scam. If Controller Coler hadn't exposed and stopped the scheme, the Tammany members of the Board of Public Improvements would have rushed the contract through.

Mr. Croker’s testimony threw a flood of light upon his political views and standards as well as his powers and emoluments as “boss.” He acknowledged that he had a powerful influence over the Tammany legislators at Albany, whose actions he advised, and that he exercised the same influence upon local officials. He readily conceded that he was the most powerful man he knew of.[2] “We try to have a pretty effective organization,” he said; “that is what we are there for.”[3]

Mr. Croker’s testimony provided a lot of insight into his political beliefs and standards, as well as his powers and benefits as the "boss." He admitted that he had a strong influence over the Tammany legislators in Albany, whose actions he advised, and that he exerted the same influence over local officials. He readily acknowledged that he was the most powerful person he knew.[2] “We strive to have a pretty effective organization,” he said; “that’s what we’re there for.”[3]

Mr. Croker also admitted that judicial candidates were assessed in their districts.[4] In fact, some of the Judges themselves named the respective sums to the committee. Judge Pryor testified that he had been asked for $10,000 for his nomination for a vacant half-term in the Supreme Court.[5] Other judicial candidates, it was understood, paid from $10,000 to $25,000 for nominations.[6] Mr. Croker maintained that the organization was entitled to all the judicial, executive, administrative—in brief, all offices—because “that is what the people voted our ticket for.”[7] Mr. Croker refused to answer many questions tending to show that he profited by a silent partnership in many companies which benefited directly or indirectly by his power. “The man who is virtual ruler of the city,” said Frank Moss and Francis E. Laimbeer, counsel to the committee, in their report, “can insure peace and advantage and business to any concern that takes him and his friends in, and can secure capital here or abroad to float any enterprise, when he guarantees that the city officials will not interfere with it.” Mr. Croker was asked[288] many other questions touching this subject, but gave little information. He declined to answer the question whether $140,000 of the stock of the Auto-Truck Company had been given to him without the payment of a dollar; it was his “private affair.”[8]

Mr. Croker also acknowledged that judicial candidates were evaluated in their districts.[4] In fact, some of the Judges themselves mentioned the amounts to the committee. Judge Pryor testified that he had been asked for $10,000 for his nomination for a vacant half-term in the Supreme Court.[5] Other judicial candidates reportedly paid between $10,000 and $25,000 for nominations.[6] Mr. Croker insisted that the organization had the right to all judicial, executive, administrative—in short, all offices—because “that is what the people voted our ticket for.”[7] Mr. Croker chose not to answer many questions suggesting that he benefited from a silent partnership in various companies that directly or indirectly gained from his influence. “The man who is virtually the ruler of the city,” said Frank Moss and Francis E. Laimbeer, counsel to the committee, in their report, “can guarantee peace and benefits to any business that accepts him and his friends, and can secure funding here or abroad to support any venture, as long as he assures that city officials won’t interfere with it.” Mr. Croker was asked[288] several other questions on this topic but provided little information. He refused to answer whether $140,000 worth of stock in the Auto-Truck Company had been given to him without any payment; it was his “private affair.”[8]

“We are giving the people pure organization government,” he said. He referred to the thoroughness of discipline in the Wigwam, and stated that the only way to succeed was to keep the whip in hand over his henchmen. It took “a lot of time,” and he “had to work very hard at it.” Tammany was built up, he said, not only upon the political principles it held, but upon the way its members sustained one another in business. “We want the whole business, if we can get it”; “to the party belong the spoils”; “we win, and we expect every one to stand by us”; “I am working for my pocket all the time,” were some of Mr. Croker’s answers, most of them told in anything but grammatical English.

“We're providing the people with a well-organized government,” he said. He talked about the strict discipline in the Wigwam and mentioned that the only way to succeed was to keep his henchmen in check. It took “a lot of time,” and he “had to work really hard at it.” Tammany was built up, he said, not just on the political principles it stood for but also on how its members supported each other in business. “We want the whole deal, if we can get it”; “to the party belong the spoils”; “we win, and we expect everyone to back us”; “I’m always working for my own benefit,” were some of Mr. Croker’s responses, most of which were delivered in anything but proper English.

The general opinion obtained that the committee’s work would have been far more effective and free from charges of partizan bias if Thomas C. Platt, the Republican “boss,” had been summoned concerning his alleged political connection with the great corporations and financial interests, as Mr. Croker had been.

The general opinion was that the committee’s work would have been much more effective and less accused of partisanship if Thomas C. Platt, the Republican "boss," had been called to discuss his supposed political ties with major corporations and financial interests, just like Mr. Croker had been.

Apparently the disclosures made no deep impression on the city administration, for matters went along pretty much as before. On March 9, 1900, the New York Times published a detailed statement, which it later reiterated, that the sum of $3,095,000 a year was being paid by the gambling-house keepers of the city to the “gambling-house commission,” which, it said, was composed of two State Senators, a representative of the poolroom proprietors, and the head of one of the city departments. This commission, the account stated, received and passed upon applications, established the tariff to be paid by the[289] applicants, and supervised the collections. Later, in the same month, the Grand Jury handed down a presentment arraigning the city officials for the sway enjoyed by the criminal and vicious classes.[9]

Apparently, the revelations didn’t make a significant impact on the city administration, as things continued much as they had before. On March 9, 1900, the New York Times published a detailed statement, which they later repeated, noting that the gambling-house operators in the city were paying $3,095,000 a year to the “gambling-house commission.” This commission was said to consist of two State Senators, a representative from the poolroom owners, and the head of one of the city departments. The report stated that this commission handled applications, set the fees to be paid by the applicants, and oversaw the collections. Later that same month, the Grand Jury issued a report criticizing city officials for the influence held by the criminal and immoral elements. [9]

Neither the Grand Jury’s presentment nor the Times’s detailed statements had the slightest effect on the conduct of the city administration. In November, however, a marked change occurred. For several years certain reform societies and ecclesiastical bodies, particularly the Episcopal Church, had sought to mitigate the open flaunting of immorality in the tenement houses of a particular police district on the East Side. The attempts had been resisted, not only by those living upon the proceeds of this immorality, but by the police themselves; and two ministers who had complained to certain police officials had been grossly insulted.

Neither the Grand Jury’s report nor the Times’s detailed statements impacted how the city administration acted at all. However, in November, a significant change took place. For several years, certain reform groups and religious organizations, especially the Episcopal Church, had been trying to address the blatant immorality in the tenement houses of a specific police district on the East Side. Their efforts were met with resistance not only from those profiting from this immorality but also from the police themselves; two ministers who had voiced their concerns to some police officials were treated very rudely.

Immediately after the Presidential election, Bishop Henry C. Potter, of the Episcopal Church, in a stinging letter of complaint, brought the matter to the attention of Mayor Van Wyck. It was the psychologic moment for such an action, and it produced immediate results. Mr. Croker paused in his preparations for his usual trip to England long enough to give orders to put down the immorality complained of, and he appointed a committee of five to carry his mandate into effect, or at least to make some satisfactory show of doing so. He went further than this, for his orders included a general ukase to the lawbreakers of the city to “go slow,” or in other words, to observe, until further advices from headquarters, a certain degree of moderation in their infractions of law and their outrages upon decency.

Immediately after the presidential election, Bishop Henry C. Potter of the Episcopal Church sent a sharp letter of complaint to Mayor Van Wyck, bringing the issue to his attention. It was the perfect time for such a move, and it led to quick results. Mr. Croker paused his plans for his usual trip to England just long enough to order a crackdown on the immorality that had been raised, appointing a committee of five to implement his orders or at least show some effort in doing so. He went even further, as his instructions included a broad directive to the lawbreakers in the city to “take it easy,” in other words, to maintain a certain level of restraint in their violations of the law and their offenses against decency until they received further instructions from headquarters.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Tweed testified in 1877 that Joseph F. Daly, with two others, constituted the sole membership of the “Citizens’ Association” of 1870, and that he had placated the three men by giving them offices, Mr. Daly securing a Judgeship of the Court of Common Pleas.

[1] Tweed testified in 1877 that Joseph F. Daly, along with two others, made up the entire membership of the “Citizens’ Association” of 1870, and that he had satisfied the three men by appointing them to positions, with Mr. Daly obtaining a judgeship in the Court of Common Pleas.

[2] Stenographic minutes, p. 451.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Transcribed notes, p. 451.

[3] Ibid., p. 465.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., p. 465.

[4] Ibid., p. 6806.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid., p. 6806.

[5] Ibid., p. 523.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., p. 523.

[6] Ibid., pp. 6891, etc.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., pp. 6891, etc.

[7] Ibid., p. 464.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., p. 464.

[8] Stenographic minutes, p. 683.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Transcribed minutes, p. 683.

[9] On December 22, 1900, Gov. Roosevelt removed Asa Bird Gardiner, the Tammany District Attorney, who was popularly credited with having originated the phrase, “To hell with reform,” for having encouraged the turbulent element to open resistance of the law at the election. Eugene A. Philbin, an independent Democrat, was appointed his successor. The latter promptly demanded the resignations of many of Mr. Gardiner’s assistants. Before his election Gardiner had long been chairman of the Tammany Hall Legal Committee.

[9] On December 22, 1900, Governor Roosevelt removed Asa Bird Gardiner, the Tammany District Attorney, who was widely believed to have coined the phrase, “To hell with reform,” for encouraging the unruly group to openly defy the law during the election. Eugene A. Philbin, an independent Democrat, was appointed as his replacement. Philbin immediately requested the resignations of many of Gardiner’s assistants. Before his election, Gardiner had been the long-time chairman of the Tammany Hall Legal Committee.


CHAPTER XXX
TAMMANY UNDER REMOTE LEADERSHIP
1901-1902

In the municipal campaign of 1901 the anti-Tammany forces combined upon the nomination of Seth Low, a Republican, for Mayor, and upon the nominations of various other candidates for city offices. Tammany’s candidate for Mayor was Edward M. Shepard. Both Mr. Low and Mr. Shepard were acclaimed by their respective supporters as men of standing, prestige and public character. Mr. Low was a man of wealth who had become president of Columbia University. Mr. Shepard was a lawyer of note, although some critics pointed out that his practise was that of a corporation attorney, serving the great vested interests. It may be remarked that Mr. Shepard was a son of the brilliant Lorenzo B. Shepard, who, as stated in Chapter XVI of this work, became a leader of Tammany Hall at so early an age and was chosen Grand Sachem of the Tammany Society.

In the municipal campaign of 1901, the anti-Tammany forces came together to nominate Seth Low, a Republican, for Mayor, along with various other candidates for city offices. Tammany’s candidate for Mayor was Edward M. Shepard. Both Mr. Low and Mr. Shepard were hailed by their supporters as respected individuals with strong reputations and public integrity. Mr. Low was a wealthy man who had become president of Columbia University. Mr. Shepard was a well-known lawyer, although some critics noted that he primarily practiced as a corporate attorney, representing major vested interests. It’s worth mentioning that Mr. Shepard was the son of the remarkable Lorenzo B. Shepard, who, as discussed in Chapter XVI of this work, became a leader of Tammany Hall at a young age and was elected Grand Sachem of the Tammany Society.

The scandals of Mayor Van Wyck’s administration were conspicuous issues of the campaign of 1901. But there were two particularly noteworthy features pressed by the reformers in their indictment of Tammany. One of these issues, which made so deep an impression upon the public mind, especially in the densely populous East Side of New York City, was the flagrant immorality under which young girls of the tenderest age were often decoyed into lives of shame. The question thus presented was neither that of the “suppression of vice” nor that of how people could be made virtuous by mandate of law. The question, as[291] put to voters, was whether a system under which a corrupt, money-making combination of vicious lawbreakers with police and other officials should be allowed to continue in abhorrent traffic.

The scandals during Mayor Van Wyck’s administration were major issues in the 1901 campaign. However, there were two particularly significant aspects highlighted by the reformers in their criticism of Tammany. One of these issues, which left a strong impression on the public, especially in the crowded East Side of New York City, was the shocking immorality where young girls of the youngest age were often lured into lives of shame. The question raised wasn’t about the “suppression of vice” or how people could be made virtuous through laws. The question posed to voters was whether a system that allowed a corrupt, profit-driven alliance of lawbreakers with police and other officials should be permitted to continue in its deplorable activities.

A widely-circulated pamphlet published by the City Club for the Women’s Municipal League presented a series of facts as attested by court records, the statements of City Magistrates, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children and others, and as reported by the Committee of Fifteen, composed of reformers, probing into the question. The pamphlet declared that the facts justified the conclusion that the business of ruining young girls and forcing them into a life of shame, for the money there was in it for the dealers, had recently grown to considerable proportions; that its existence was known to the police; that the police made little or no effort to stop it; that the police, or those for whom they acted, probably derived profit from the traffic; and that a reasonably active and efficient Police Department could stop the traffic of a deliberate merchandizing of the virtue of women, usually young girls. Details were given of numerous cases which had been passed upon in the courts, and a long description of the traffic was included from a statement made on October 21, 1901, by District Attorney Eugene A. Philbin of New York County.[1]

A widely-distributed pamphlet published by the City Club for the Women’s Municipal League presented a series of facts based on court records, statements from City Magistrates, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, and others, as well as reports from the Committee of Fifteen, a group of reformers investigating the issue. The pamphlet stated that the facts supported the conclusion that the business of exploiting young girls and pushing them into a life of shame, for the profit it generated for dealers, had recently grown significantly; that its existence was known to the police; that the police made little to no effort to stop it; that the police, or those they represented, likely benefited financially from the trade; and that a reasonably proactive and effective Police Department could put an end to the trafficking of women's virtue, particularly young girls. It included detailed accounts of numerous cases reviewed in the courts and featured a lengthy description of the trafficking based on a statement made on October 21, 1901, by District Attorney Eugene A. Philbin of New York County.[1]

Justice William Travers Jerome, of the Court of Special Sessions, had already made a similar statement. He was quoted in the New York Times, of June 27, 1901, as saying:

Justice William Travers Jerome, of the Court of Special Sessions, had already made a similar statement. He was quoted in the New York Times, on June 27, 1901, as saying:

“People are simply ignorant of conditions on the East Side [of New York City]. If those conditions existed in some other communities there would be a Vigilance Committee speedily organized, and somebody would get lynched. The continued greed and extortion of the Police Captains who charge five hundred dollars for a disorderly resort to open in their precinct, and then collect fifty to a hundred [dollars] per month, has, however, made even vice unprofitable.[292] Details, I know, are revolting and not nice to read, but yet the people ought to know about them. Just yesterday I sentenced to six months in the penitentiary the keepers of one of the most depraved houses of the East Side. I firmly believe that they were merely the agents of the man who owns not one but many of such places. He is well known as a politician in a certain notorious district.

“People are just unaware of the situation on the East Side [of New York City]. If those conditions were happening in other neighborhoods, there would quickly be a Vigilance Committee formed, and someone would be lynched. The ongoing greed and extortion from the Police Captains, who charge five hundred dollars for a disorderly establishment to open in their precinct and then collect fifty to a hundred dollars each month, has even made vice unprofitable.[292] I know the details are disturbing and not pleasant to read, but people need to be informed about them. Just yesterday, I sentenced the operators of one of the most corrupt places on the East Side to six months in prison. I strongly believe they were just acting on behalf of the man who owns not just one but many of these establishments. He is well-known as a politician in a certain infamous area.”

“That house is but one of hundreds within a radius of one mile of this building [the Criminal Court House] where criminals are sometimes brought to justice. I will stake my reputation that there are scores within less than that distance from here in which there are an average of ten or twelve children from thirteen to eighteen years old.”[2]

“That house is just one of hundreds within a mile of this building [the Criminal Court House] where criminals are occasionally held accountable. I would bet my reputation that there are plenty within that distance from here that have an average of ten or twelve kids aged between thirteen and eighteen.”[2]

Nominated for District Attorney of New York County by the anti-Tammany forces, Mr. Jerome’s speeches on these existing conditions made a keen impression and excited the deepest feeling, especially among the people of the East Side. Intricate questions of taxation and arrays of figures proving an exorbitant budget and the waste of public funds could not make the same appeal to their indignation as the portrayal of conditions menacing their home life and polluting their environment. The facts thus spread forth caused the most intense resentment against Tammany.

Nominated for District Attorney of New York County by the anti-Tammany forces, Mr. Jerome’s speeches about the current situation made a strong impact and stirred deep emotions, especially among the residents of the East Side. Complex issues of taxation and long lists of figures showing an excessive budget and mismanagement of public funds didn’t trigger the same anger as the depiction of conditions threatening their home life and damaging their surroundings. The facts presented generated significant resentment toward Tammany.

In reply Tammany Hall sought to represent that the traffic thus described was largely mythical—and that at all events it was greatly exaggerated. It was no fiction, however, nor was police connivance and corruption a fiction, either. So far as the open flaunting of vicious conditions was concerned, Tammany Hall had itself been forced to recognize them; as a concession to public opinion Mr. Croker had, in November, 1900, appointed an Anti-Vice Committee with orders to investigate vice conditions and “clean up” the “Red Light” district. To impart a tone of good faith to the work of this committee, he had appointed Lewis Nixon, a naval academy graduate and a ship builder, its chairman. It was generally understood that this committee had been created as a clever campaign move to offset in the public mind the growing indignation[293] against Tammany, many of the leaders of which, it was notorious, had profited richly from the system of police “protection” of vice.

In response, Tammany Hall tried to claim that the described activities were largely imaginary—and, at the very least, greatly exaggerated. However, it wasn’t fiction, nor was the police collusion and corruption. When it came to the blatant display of immoral conditions, Tammany Hall had to acknowledge them; as a concession to public sentiment, Mr. Croker appointed an Anti-Vice Committee in November 1900 to investigate vice conditions and “clean up” the “Red Light” district. To lend credibility to this committee’s work, he chose Lewis Nixon, a naval academy graduate and shipbuilder, as its chairman. It was widely believed that this committee was established as a strategic campaign move to counter the rising public outrage against Tammany, many of whose leaders had notoriously benefited from the police's “protection” of vice.

In respect to the “white slave” traffic, however, it must be said, in justice to Tammany, that the factors attributed were not the only ones responsible, and such a traffic was far from being confined to New York City; it went on in other cities under Republican and Reform as well as Democratic rule. This was conclusively shown later by the necessity of the passage of a law passed by Congress aimed at the traffic (a law subsequently diverted somewhat from its original purpose), and by official investigations and court proceedings. The large number of prosecutions in the Federal courts under that law showed the widespread character of the traffic.

Regarding the “white slave” trade, it’s important to note, in fairness to Tammany, that the factors blamed were not the only ones at fault, and this trade was far from limited to New York City; it also took place in other cities under Republican, Reform, and Democratic leadership. This was clearly demonstrated later by the need for Congress to pass a law targeting the trade (a law that was later somewhat altered from its original intent), along with official investigations and court cases. The high number of prosecutions in the Federal courts under that law highlighted the widespread nature of the trade.

Another important issue of the municipal campaign of 1901 was the scandal growing out of the charges that William C. Whitney, Thomas F. Ryan, W. L. Elkins, P. A. B. Widener, Thomas Dolan and associates had looted the stockholders of the Metropolitan Street Railway Company of New York City of tens of millions of dollars. Whitney and Ryan were credited with being among the chief financial powers long controlling “Boss” Croker; and by means of his control of Tammany Hall, and in turn New York City, securing franchises, privileges and rights of enormous value. This control was often equally true of the New York State legislature; subsequent developments, in fact, revealed that in years when the Legislature was dominantly Republican and therefore could not be ordered by Mr. Croker, both Republican and Democratic legislators were corrupted by the Metropolitan Street Railway Company, or by agents acting for it.

Another key issue in the municipal campaign of 1901 was the scandal surrounding allegations that William C. Whitney, Thomas F. Ryan, W. L. Elkins, P. A. B. Widener, Thomas Dolan, and their associates had swindled the stockholders of the Metropolitan Street Railway Company in New York City out of tens of millions of dollars. Whitney and Ryan were known as two of the main financial figures who had long been backing “Boss” Croker; and through his control of Tammany Hall, and thus New York City, they secured franchises, privileges, and rights of immense value. This control also applied to the New York State legislature; later developments showed that in years when the legislature was primarily Republican and could not be directed by Mr. Croker, both Republican and Democratic legislators were bribed by the Metropolitan Street Railway Company or by agents representing it.

According to Mr. W. N. Amory,[3] who was thoroughly familiar with the affairs of the Metropolitan Street Railway[294] Company, and who exposed its looting, Mr. Jerome knew, in 1901, “that the conduct of Metropolitan affairs was corrupt. We had on numerous occasions discussed that point.”

According to Mr. W. N. Amory,[3] who was well-acquainted with the operations of the Metropolitan Street Railway[294] Company and revealed its exploitation, Mr. Jerome was aware, in 1901, “that the management of Metropolitan affairs was corrupt. We had discussed this point multiple times.”

Mr. Jerome made profuse public promises that if he were elected District Attorney he would press investigation. “Let me tell you,” he said at the conclusion of a speech on October 26, 1901, “that if I am elected I shall make it my business to follow the trail of wrongdoing and corruption not only when they lead into tenement houses, but I shall follow them even if they lead into the office of the Metropolitan Street Railway Company.” Mr. Jerome added: “No one knows better than I do that when I am attacking the Metropolitan Street Railway Company, I am arraying myself against the most dangerous, the most vindictive and the most powerful influences at work in this community.”[4]

Mr. Jerome made a lot of public promises that if he was elected District Attorney, he would pursue investigations. “Let me tell you,” he said at the end of a speech on October 26, 1901, “that if I’m elected, I will make it my mission to track down wrongdoing and corruption, not just in tenement houses but even if it leads right into the office of the Metropolitan Street Railway Company.” Mr. Jerome added: “No one knows better than I do that when I go after the Metropolitan Street Railway Company, I’m taking on the most dangerous, the most vengeful, and the most powerful forces in this community.”[4]

Mr. Jerome’s denunciations and promises aroused great enthusiasm and large expectations; they had much effect in contributing to the result of the campaign, for it was popularly realized that while Tammany leaders accumulated their millions of dollars, yet back of these leaders, and secretly operating through them, were magnates of great financial power with their tens or hundreds of millions of dollars acquired largely by means of financial and industrial power conferred by legislation, permissory or statute, of various kinds. The electorate well knew that comparatively small grafters were numerous, but now it had the promise that the large spoliators, hitherto immune, would be exposed and prosecuted, if possible.

Mr. Jerome's criticisms and promises sparked a lot of excitement and raised high hopes; they significantly influenced the outcome of the campaign, as people widely understood that while Tammany leaders were amassing millions, there were powerful tycoons operating behind the scenes, using these leaders to advance their interests. These magnates had tens or even hundreds of millions, mostly obtained through financial and industrial advantages granted by various laws. The voters knew there were plenty of smaller crooks out there, but now they were promised that the bigger criminals, who had been untouchable before, would be exposed and held accountable, if possible.

The result of the election was that Mr. Low was elected Mayor by a plurality of 31,636. Nearly all of the other anti-Tammany candidates for the large offices were also elected, although Tammany’s candidate for the Borough of the Bronx—Louis F. Haffen—was successful.[295] The total vote stood: Low, 296,813; Shepard, 265,177. For other political parties, a small vote was cast: Benjamin Hanford, candidate for Mayor of the Social Democratic party, received 9,834 votes; Keinard, Socialist Labor candidate for Mayor, polled 6,213 votes, and Manierre, Prohibition candidate for Mayor, 1,264 votes.

The election results showed that Mr. Low was elected Mayor with a plurality of 31,636 votes. Almost all of the other anti-Tammany candidates for major offices were also elected, although Tammany’s candidate for the Bronx—Louis F. Haffen—was successful.[295] The total votes were: Low, 296,813; Shepard, 265,177. For other political parties, the vote totals were low: Benjamin Hanford, the Social Democratic party's candidate for Mayor, got 9,834 votes; Keinard, the Socialist Labor candidate for Mayor, received 6,213 votes; and Manierre, the Prohibition candidate for Mayor, had 1,264 votes.

That of a total vote of 561,990 votes cast for the two chief opposing candidates, Tammany and its allied organizations should have polled 265,177 votes, showed Tammany Hall’s enormous strength, even in the face of a combination of opponents, with all the strength of definite issues obviously putting Tammany on the defensive.

That of a total vote of 561,990 cast for the two main opposing candidates, Tammany and its allied organizations should have received 265,177 votes, demonstrated Tammany Hall’s significant power, even against a coalition of opponents, with all the backing of clear issues clearly putting Tammany on the defensive.

Realizing that the attacks upon him personally as the “boss” of Tammany Hall and of the city had been successful in a political sense, Mr. Croker wisely concluded, immediately after this defeat, to obscure himself and give an appearance of retiring from active participation in the affairs of Tammany Hall. Conscious, too, of the public discredit attaching to Tammany methods and Tammany leaders, he saw that the time had come to inject some show of an element of respectability and reform into Tammany Hall. He now underwent the formalities of an “abdication.”

Realizing that the attacks against him as the "boss" of Tammany Hall and the city had been politically effective, Mr. Croker wisely decided, right after this defeat, to step back and create the impression that he was retiring from active involvement in Tammany Hall's activities. Aware as well of the public disgrace associated with Tammany's methods and leaders, he understood that it was time to bring in an element of respectability and reform to Tammany Hall. He now went through the formalities of an "abdication."

On January 13, 1902, the astonishing news was made public that he had selected Lewis Nixon as his successor as the leader of Tammany Hall. Mr. Nixon, at this time, was forty-one years old; hailing from Leesburg, Virginia, he had been graduated from the United States Naval Academy, and had become a naval constructor, later owning his own naval ship plant at Elizabeth, New Jersey. He was also connected with a number of private corporations. In 1898 he had been appointed by Mayor Van Wyck to the office of President of the East River Bridge Commission, and in 1900-1901 had acted, as we have seen, as Chairman of Mr. Croker’s Anti-Vice Committee.

On January 13, 1902, it was announced that he had chosen Lewis Nixon as his successor as the leader of Tammany Hall. Mr. Nixon, at this time, was forty-one years old; originally from Leesburg, Virginia, he graduated from the United States Naval Academy and became a naval constructor, eventually owning his own shipyard in Elizabeth, New Jersey. He was also involved with several private companies. In 1898, he was appointed by Mayor Van Wyck as President of the East River Bridge Commission, and in 1900-1901, he served as Chairman of Mr. Croker’s Anti-Vice Committee, as we have seen.

When the educated Mr. Nixon assumed what he styled[296] the leadership of Tammany Hall, not only seasoned politicians of all grades but also the sophisticated smiled skeptically. Tammany district leaders maintained in public an air of profound gravity and obedient acquiescence which caused general amusement. And when Mr. Nixon solemnly discussed his plans for the improvement of Tammany Hall, he was popularly regarded as an innocent. Even when Mr. Croker, as an apparent token of good faith, made Mr. Nixon chairman of the Tammany Finance Committee, few considered his appointment seriously; he was generally dubbed “the phantom leader.” Having attended to Mr. Nixon’s installation, Mr. Croker sailed abroad to his estate at Wantage; to all nominal appearances he had severed himself from Tammany politics.

When the educated Mr. Nixon took what he called[296] the lead at Tammany Hall, not just experienced politicians but also the savvy folks looked on with skepticism. Tammany district leaders put on a show of deep seriousness and obedient agreement that everyone found amusing. And when Mr. Nixon earnestly talked about his plans to improve Tammany Hall, people mostly saw him as naive. Even when Mr. Croker, as a sign of good faith, made Mr. Nixon the chair of the Tammany Finance Committee, hardly anyone took his appointment seriously; he was commonly referred to as “the phantom leader.” After attending Mr. Nixon’s installation, Mr. Croker went off to his estate in Wantage; by all outward appearances, he had cut ties with Tammany politics.

This comedy lasted but a few months. On May 14, 1902, Mr. Nixon sent his resignation as leader to the Tammany Hall Executive Committee. He accompanied his resignation with a speech in which he declared that since he had become chairman of the Tammany Hall Finance Committee, he had found himself so hampered by a “kitchen cabinet” headed by Andrew Freedman (Mr. Croker’s business partner) and by the continued interference of the absent Mr. Croker, that he could no longer lead Tammany Hall and retain his self-respect in the circumstances.

This comedy lasted only a few months. On May 14, 1902, Mr. Nixon sent his resignation as leader to the Tammany Hall Executive Committee. He included a speech with his resignation in which he stated that since he had become chair of the Tammany Hall Finance Committee, he had found himself so restricted by a “kitchen cabinet” led by Andrew Freedman (Mr. Croker’s business partner) and by the ongoing interference of the absent Mr. Croker, that he could no longer lead Tammany Hall and keep his self-respect under the circumstances.

“Every important act of mine,” Mr. Nixon announced, “has been cabled to England before it became effective. Mr. Freedman and his party interfered with me at every turn, and at last sought to dictate to me whom I ought to place on the Board of Sachems.

“Every important action of mine,” Mr. Nixon announced, “has been sent to England via cable before it took effect. Mr. Freedman and his group got in my way at every turn, and eventually tried to tell me who I should appoint to the Board of Sachems."

“Then a cablegram came from Wantage [Mr. Croker’s estate] direct to me to place certain men on the Board of Sachems, and when I rebelled I found that at every turn I would be opposed by this coterie of interferers.

“Then a cablegram arrived from Wantage [Mr. Croker’s estate] directly to me instructing me to appoint certain individuals to the Board of Sachems, and when I resisted, I realized that I was met with opposition at every turn by this group of meddlesome individuals.”

“I found that nearly all my important acts had to be viséd before they became effective. Many of the district[297] leaders would accept my orders, but before carrying them out, they would get advice from Mr. Croker.”[5]

“I discovered that almost all my significant actions needed to be approved before they could take effect. Many of the district leaders would accept my commands, but before executing them, they would seek advice from Mr. Croker.”[5]

With this announcement Mr. Nixon vanished from the scene of Tammany politics.

With this announcement, Mr. Nixon disappeared from the world of Tammany politics.

As a matter of fact, certain Tammany district leaders were already planning to bring about a change of actual leadership.

As a matter of fact, some Tammany district leaders were already planning to change the actual leadership.

On May 22, 1902, the Executive Committee of Tammany Hall took steps which tended to sever the relation that Mr. Croker retained with the organization. It voted to recommend the abolition of the Sub-Committee on Finance which had always been presided over by the various “bosses” of Tammany Hall, thus eliminating from the chairmanship of that committee Andrew Freedman, who was the representative and mouthpiece of the absentee Mr. Croker.

On May 22, 1902, the Executive Committee of Tammany Hall took actions that aimed to cut the ties Mr. Croker had with the organization. They voted to suggest getting rid of the Sub-Committee on Finance, which had always been led by the different "bosses" of Tammany Hall, thereby removing Andrew Freedman from the chairmanship of that committee. Freedman had been the representative and spokesperson for the absent Mr. Croker.

At the same time the Executive Committee chose a triumvirate of leaders to guide the organization. The regency of three thus selected were Charles F. Murphy, Daniel F. McMahon and Louis F. Haffen. All three, of course, were Tammany district leaders. Mr. Murphy’s career is described hereafter. Mr. McMahon was chairman of Tammany’s Executive Committee and head of the contracting firm of Naughton & Company. It was this company that made a fortune from the contract for changing the motive power of the Third Avenue Railway, regarding which there was so much scandal. With nothing more than powerful political “pull,” this concern obtained large contracts. It was charged by John C. Sheehan that Richard Croker secured 50 per cent. of the profits of this company, and that he pocketed $1,500,000 from this source; this assertion, however, depended merely upon Mr. Sheehan’s word; it was not established in any official investigation. The third member of the triumvirate,[298] Mr. Haffen, was now president of the Borough of the Bronx.

At the same time, the Executive Committee chose a trio of leaders to guide the organization. The three selected were Charles F. Murphy, Daniel F. McMahon, and Louis F. Haffen. All three were, of course, Tammany district leaders. Mr. Murphy’s career is described later. Mr. McMahon was chairman of Tammany’s Executive Committee and head of the contracting firm Naughton & Company. This company made a fortune from the contract to change the motive power of the Third Avenue Railway, which was surrounded by scandal. With nothing more than powerful political influence, this company secured large contracts. John C. Sheehan claimed that Richard Croker received 50 percent of the profits from this company and that he pocketed $1,500,000 from it; however, this claim relied solely on Mr. Sheehan’s word and was not proven in any official investigation. The third member of the trio, [298] Mr. Haffen, was now the president of the Bronx.

But this triumvirate did not last long. On September 19, 1902, it was effaced, and Charles F. Murphy became the boss of Tammany. This action was taken at a meeting of the Executive Committee. At this meeting former Chief of Police Devery, holding that he had been elected at the primaries, tried to have himself recognized as a district leader, but his claims were speedily disposed of and he was shut out. Mr. Haffen handed in this resolution:

But this trio didn't last long. On September 19, 1902, it was dissolved, and Charles F. Murphy became the leader of Tammany. This decision was made at a meeting of the Executive Committee. During this meeting, former Chief of Police Devery, believing he had been elected in the primaries, tried to get himself recognized as a district leader, but his claims were quickly dismissed, and he was excluded. Mr. Haffen submitted this resolution:

“Whereas, the experiment of the Committee of Three having proved the desirability of individual responsibility in leadership,

“Whereas the experiment of the Committee of Three has shown the importance of individual responsibility in leadership,

“Resolved, That the powers and duties heretofore exercised and performed by the Committee of Three be hereafter exercised and performed by Charles F. Murphy.”

“Resolved, That the powers and duties previously held and carried out by the Committee of Three will now be held and carried out by Charles F. Murphy.”

Nine Tammany district leaders, headed by John F. Carroll, who evidently aimed at power himself, opposed the resolution, but twenty-seven other district leaders voted it through. One of the leaders immediately sent a cablegram to Mr. Croker announcing the result. Now that Mr. Murphy was chosen leader, he also became the treasurer of Tammany Hall.

Nine Tammany district leaders, led by John F. Carroll, who clearly had his own ambitions for power, opposed the resolution, but twenty-seven other district leaders pushed it through. One of the leaders quickly sent a cable to Mr. Croker announcing the outcome. Now that Mr. Murphy was selected as leader, he also took on the role of treasurer of Tammany Hall.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Facts for New York Parents, etc., Published for the Women’s Municipal League by the City Club of New York, October, 1901.

Please provide the text you would like me to modernize. Facts for New York Parents, etc., Published for the Women’s Municipal League by the City Club of New York, October, 1901.

[2] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid.

[3] From 1895 to 1900 Mr. Amory was connected in an official capacity with the Third Avenue Railway Company.

[3] From 1895 to 1900, Mr. Amory held an official position with the Third Avenue Railway Company.

[4] Report of speech in the New York Herald, October 27, 1901.

[4] Report of speech in the New York Herald, October 27, 1901.

[5] This speech was published in the New York Sun and other newspapers on the following day.

[5] This speech was published in the New York Sun and other newspapers the next day.


CHAPTER XXXI
CHARLES F. MURPHY’S RULE
1902-1903

Charles Francis Murphy, supreme leader of the Tammany organization from 1902 to this present writing, was born in New York City on June 20, 1858. He was a son of Dennis Murphy, an Irishman whose eight children all were born in the same district in New York City, and all of whom obtained the rudiments at least of a public school education. Dennis Murphy, it may be here said, lived to the remarkably hale age of eighty-eight years, dying in 1902.

Charles Francis Murphy, the top leader of the Tammany organization from 1902 to now, was born in New York City on June 20, 1858. He was the son of Dennis Murphy, an Irishman, and all eight of his children were born in the same neighborhood in New York City, with all of them receiving at least a basic public school education. It's worth noting that Dennis Murphy lived a remarkably healthy life until he was eighty-eight years old, passing away in 1902.

As a youth, “Charlie” Murphy worked in an East Side shipyard, by no means a genteel schooling for a boy, although affording a forceful kind of experience of much value in his later career. Having to fight his way among rough youths, he developed both physical prowess and a sort of domineering ascendency which gave him marked leadership qualities among the virile youths overrunning what was then a district noted for its gangs. It was a section of the city filled with vacant lots and was long called the “Gas House District”; here it was that the notorious “Gas House Gang” achieved local reputation.

As a young man, “Charlie” Murphy worked in a shipyard on the East Side, definitely not a refined environment for a boy, but it provided him with valuable life experience that would help him later in his career. Having to stand up to tough peers, he developed physical strength and a dominating presence that made him a natural leader among the strong young men who filled what was then a gang-infested area. This part of the city was full of empty lots and was known for a long time as the “Gas House District,” where the infamous “Gas House Gang” gained local fame.

Tradition has it that when a very young man “Charlie” Murphy organized the Sylvan Social Club, a species of Tammany Hall juvenile auxiliary, composed of boys and youths ranging from fifteen to twenty years of age of whom he became the recognized leader. Later, through political influence, he obtained a job as driver on a cross-town[300] horse car line. In his later career his enemies invidiously related how jobs of that kind were much coveted at the time because of the fact that as there were no bell punches or car fare registers, the conductors could easily help themselves to a proportion of the fares and divide with the drivers. True, this practise was prevalent, but the implication thus cast upon Mr. Murphy has been simply a gratuitous one, lacking even the elements of proof; it can therefore be dismissed from consideration.

Tradition has it that when a young man named “Charlie” Murphy started the Sylvan Social Club, a kind of juvenile branch of Tammany Hall for boys aged fifteen to twenty, he quickly became their recognized leader. Later, using his political connections, he landed a job as a driver on a cross-town horse car line. In his later career, his enemies maliciously claimed that jobs like that were highly sought after because, since there were no bell punches or fare registers, conductors could easily take a cut of the fares and share it with the drivers. While this practice was common, the suggestion that Mr. Murphy participated in it lacks any actual evidence and can be disregarded.

He was a manly youth noted for his filial care, a solicitous son, turning in most of his earnings to his mother; he was, in fact, the main support of the family. At the same time he put by enough money—said to have been $500—to establish himself in the saloon business.

He was a strong young man known for his caring nature, a devoted son who gave most of his earnings to his mother; he was, in fact, the primary provider for the family. Meanwhile, he saved enough money—rumored to be $500—to start his own bar.

In 1879 he became owner of a diminutive saloon on Nineteenth street, east of Avenue A. Four years later, he opened another saloon, larger and better equipped than the first, at the corner of Twenty-third street and Avenue A. He was already a pushful, resourceful Tammany worker in his district, in which he was a district captain. Of the underground methods and diversified influences of district politics he had a good knowledge, and no less so the application of campaign funds in the most effective ways for producing votes. Shortly before 1886, Mr. Murphy opened another saloon, this time at Nineteenth street and First avenue. Subsequently he opened still another saloon at Twentieth street and Second avenue, which was the headquarters of the Anawanda Club, the Tammany district organization. Selling out the original saloon in which he had started business, he now opened a saloon at the northwest corner of First avenue and Twenty-third street. By 1890 he was the owner of four prosperous saloons. It was said of him that he never tolerated a woman in his saloons, although all of his saloons were situated in a district where the admission of women was a commonplace.

In 1879, he bought a tiny bar on Nineteenth Street, east of Avenue A. Four years later, he opened a larger and better-equipped bar at the corner of Twenty-third Street and Avenue A. He was already an ambitious and resourceful Tammany worker in his district, where he served as a district captain. He had a solid understanding of the underground methods and various influences of district politics, as well as how to use campaign funds effectively to get votes. Shortly before 1886, Mr. Murphy opened another bar, this time at Nineteenth Street and First Avenue. Later, he opened another bar at Twentieth Street and Second Avenue, which became the headquarters of the Anawanda Club, the Tammany district organization. After selling the original bar where he started, he opened a bar at the northwest corner of First Avenue and Twenty-third Street. By 1890, he owned four successful bars. People said he never allowed women in his bars, even though all his bars were located in an area where admitting women was common.

In 1892, at the age of thirty-two years, he was chosen Tammany leader of the “Gas-House” district. He was popular with the generality of people there; however reserved was his talk, he was always credited with being generous with his cash; no poor person was turned away empty-handed. It was narrated of him that during the blizzard of 1888 the Tammany General Committee, at his prompting, voted $4,000 for the relief of the poor, and that a large part of it came from Mr. Murphy’s own pocket. Of the $4,000, the sum of $1,500 was given to the Rev. Dr. Rainsford’s mission for distribution. Such personal acts of human warmth (irrespective of motive) counted more with masses of voters than tons of formal polemics on civic virtue, nor did the recipients care as to what source the funds came from. Even Dr. Rainsford was so impressed that he was moved to say from the pulpit of St. George’s Church that if all the Tammany leaders were like the leader of the Eighteenth Assembly District (Mr. Murphy), Tammany would be an admirable organization.

In 1892, at the age of thirty-two, he was elected Tammany leader of the “Gas-House” district. He was well-liked by most of the people there; even though he was a bit reserved in conversation, he was known for being generous with his money; no poor person was ever sent away empty-handed. It was said that during the blizzard of 1888, at his urging, the Tammany General Committee voted to allocate $4,000 for the relief of the needy, and a significant portion of that came from Mr. Murphy’s own funds. Out of the $4,000, $1,500 was given to Rev. Dr. Rainsford’s mission for distribution. These personal acts of kindness (regardless of the motivation) resonated more with large groups of voters than endless debates on civic virtue, and the recipients didn’t care where the funds originated. Even Dr. Rainsford was so touched that he expressed from the pulpit of St. George’s Church that if all Tammany leaders were like the leader of the Eighteenth Assembly District (Mr. Murphy), Tammany would be a fantastic organization.

As a district leader, Mr. Murphy carried on politics and saloons systematically as a combined business. One of his brothers had long been on the police force; another brother was an Alderman; still another brother became an Alderman and Councilman.

As a district leader, Mr. Murphy handled politics and bars as a combined business. One of his brothers had been on the police force for a long time; another brother was an Alderman; and yet another brother became both an Alderman and a Councilman.

When Mr. Van Wyck was elected Mayor, Charles F. Murphy was appointed a Dock Commissioner. Report had it that when he went into the Dock Board Mr. Murphy “was worth” perhaps $400,000, accumulated in the saloon business and politics in eighteen years. He had long been known as “Silent Charlie.” Within a few years after his appointment as Dock Commissioner, his fortune, it was said, reached at least $1,000,000. When he became Dock Commissioner, Mr. Murphy nominally assigned his four saloons to a brother and three old friends.

When Mr. Van Wyck was elected Mayor, Charles F. Murphy was named a Dock Commissioner. Rumor had it that when he joined the Dock Board, Mr. Murphy "was worth" around $400,000, earned from the bar business and politics over eighteen years. He had been known for a long time as "Silent Charlie." Within a few years of becoming Dock Commissioner, his wealth was said to have grown to at least $1,000,000. When he took the role, Mr. Murphy officially transferred ownership of his four bars to a brother and three longtime friends.

Before leaving the office of Dock Commissioner, John J. Murphy (Charles F. Murphy’s brother), James E.[302] Gaffney and Richard J. Crouch (one of Charles F. Murphy’s political district lieutenants) had incorporated the New York Contracting and Trucking Company. Gaffney was an Alderman. These three men were credited with holding only five shares each of the hundred shares of the company; just who held the remaining eighty-five shares has never been definitely explained. When quizzed later by a legislative committee, Charles F. Murphy denied that he had any ownership or financial interest in the New York Contracting and Trucking Company, and no records could be found proving that he did have any interest.

Before leaving the Dock Commissioner's office, John J. Murphy (brother of Charles F. Murphy), James E.[302] Gaffney, and Richard J. Crouch (one of Charles F. Murphy’s political district aides) started the New York Contracting and Trucking Company. Gaffney was an Alderman. These three men were said to own only five shares each out of the hundred shares of the company; the identity of the holders of the remaining eighty-five shares has never been clearly established. When questioned later by a legislative committee, Charles F. Murphy denied having any ownership or financial interest in the New York Contracting and Trucking Company, and no records were found to prove he had any interest.

One of the transactions of this company was as follows: In July, 1901, the company leased a dock at West Ninety-sixth Street, and it leased another dock at East Seventy-ninth Street, paying the city a total rent of $4,800 a year for the two properties. It would appear from a report subsequently made by Commissioner of Accounts William Hepburn Russell to Mayor Low that the average profit from the two dock properties was $200 a day, making a rate of 5,000 per cent. on the investment. This particular transaction of the New York Contracting and Trucking Company, lucrative as it was, nevertheless was modest compared to the company’s subsequent transactions which we shall duly describe.

One of the transactions of this company was as follows: In July 1901, the company leased a dock at West 96th Street and another dock at East 79th Street, paying the city a total rent of $4,800 a year for both properties. A report later made by Commissioner of Accounts William Hepburn Russell to Mayor Low indicated that the average profit from the two dock properties was $200 a day, resulting in a return of 5,000 percent on the investment. Although this particular transaction of the New York Contracting and Trucking Company was quite profitable, it was still modest compared to the company's later transactions, which we will describe in due course.

Certainly by the year 1902, Mr. Murphy showed the most visible evidences of some sizable degree of wealth; he acquired a suburban estate at Good Ground, Long Island, owning, too, in time, among other possessions denoting wealth, a string of automobiles.

Certainly by 1902, Mr. Murphy displayed clear signs of considerable wealth; he bought a suburban property at Good Ground, Long Island, and eventually owned, among other possessions that signified wealth, a collection of cars.

This millionaire leader of Tammany Hall was by no means an unpleasant man to meet. He had a certain diffidence and he was not a good talker; his old habit of attentively listening was too strongly fixed. Physically strong, his deep voice and direct, concise manner when he did speak were impressive and always concentrated on the business at hand. He had none of the[303] ordinary vices; he drank liquor occasionally, it was true, but his drinks were sparse and the times far separated. In smoking he did not indulge, neither did he swear, nor gamble at cards, although he was not a stranger to stock market speculations. A communicant of the Epiphany Roman Catholic Church, he attended mass every Sunday, and gave liberal donations to the church. Unlike Mr. Croker, Mr. Murphy never cared to make the Democratic Club his headquarters; every night, when a district leader, Mr. Murphy could be found, from 7:30 to 10 o’clock, leaning against a lamp post at the northwest corner of Twentieth Street and Second Avenue. Everybody in the district knew that he would be there, accessible to anybody who wanted to talk to him. Such were the career and characteristics of the new leader of Tammany Hall—a dictator in fact, yet preserving all of the tokens of democratic accessibility.

This millionaire leader of Tammany Hall was definitely not an unpleasant person to meet. He had a certain shyness, and he wasn't a great conversationalist; his long-standing habit of listening intently was ingrained in him. He was physically strong, and when he did speak, his deep voice and straightforward, concise style were impressive and always focused on the task at hand. He had none of the[303]usual vices; he did drink liquor occasionally, but his drinks were few and far between. He didn't smoke, swear, or gamble at cards, although he did dabble in stock market speculations. As a member of the Epiphany Roman Catholic Church, he attended mass every Sunday and made generous donations to the church. Unlike Mr. Croker, Mr. Murphy never chose to make the Democratic Club his base; every night, when serving as a district leader, Mr. Murphy could be found from 7:30 to 10 p.m. leaning against a lamppost at the northwest corner of Twentieth Street and Second Avenue. Everyone in the district knew he would be there, open to anyone who wanted to talk. Such were the career and traits of the new leader of Tammany Hall—a dictator in practice but still upholding the marks of democratic accessibility.

Mayor Low’s administration failed to make an impression calculated to influence a majority of voters to reelect him. Quite true, most of his appointees to head the various departments were men of character, administrative capacity and sincerity of purpose—radically different types, indeed, from the Tammany district leaders who were usually appointed to those offices under Tammany administrations.

Mayor Low's administration didn't make a strong enough impression to sway most voters into reelecting him. It's true that many of his appointees who led various departments were people of integrity, skill, and genuine intentions—completely different from the Tammany district leaders typically appointed to those positions during Tammany administrations.

But in appointing Colonel John N. Partridge as commissioner of police, Mayor Low chose a weak and inefficient man. The demoralized condition of the police administration under Tammany had long been the special target of the reformers’ attacks, and people had expected a wholesome overhauling of that department under Mayor Low. Colonel Partridge’s administration, however, was so disappointing that the City Club was moved to demand his resignation. It criticized Commissioner Partridge for taking no adequate measures to break up the alliance between the police and crime, or to get a proper understanding of the underlying conditions in the police department,[304] and further criticized him for surrounding himself at headquarters with notoriously corrupt officers, one of whom, in fact, was made his principal uniformed adviser.

But when Mayor Low appointed Colonel John N. Partridge as police commissioner, he chose a weak and ineffective person. The troubled state of the police administration under Tammany had long been a main target for reformers, and people expected a significant overhaul of that department under Mayor Low. However, Colonel Partridge’s leadership was so disappointing that the City Club called for his resignation. They criticized Commissioner Partridge for failing to take effective steps to break the connection between the police and crime or to properly grasp the underlying issues within the police department,[304] and they further criticized him for surrounding himself at headquarters with notoriously corrupt officers, one of whom became his main uniformed advisor.

The City Club’s criticism did not charge that Partridge was personally corrupt, but that he was weak and gullible and was ignorant of real conditions. “Commissioner Partridge and his deputies adopted the idea of ruling the police force according to military ideas. The word of a superior officer was accepted absolutely as against that of a subordinate. In a force where the superior officers had, for the most part, secured their promotions by bribery; where the superior officers were the beneficiaries of blackmailing; and where the honest men, as a rule, remained subordinates—the attempt to instil a spirit of respect among the men for their superiors excited only ridicule, and added to the prevalent demoralization.…”[1]

The City Club’s criticism didn’t claim that Partridge was personally corrupt, but rather that he was weak, naive, and unaware of the actual situation. “Commissioner Partridge and his deputies embraced the idea of managing the police force like a military operation. The word of a superior officer was taken as final over that of a subordinate. In a force where most superior officers had climbed the ranks through bribery; where the higher-ups were benefiting from blackmail; and where honest individuals usually stayed in subordinate positions—the effort to cultivate respect for superiors among the officers only led to mockery and worsened the existing demoralization.…”[1]

True as such a general statement was, it has been equally true, as experience has shown, that various other reform police commissioners have vainly tried “to break the system”; temporary figures, commissioners come and go, but “The System” has remained more or less intact. Even General Francis V. Greene, appointed by Mayor Low January 1, 1903, to succeed Colonel Partridge (who resigned the day before the trustees of the City Club’s demand for his resignation was handed in), found this to be a fact, notwithstanding his earnest, conscientious efforts to correct conditions in the police department.

True as that general statement was, experience has shown that various reform police commissioners have unsuccessfully tried to “break the system”; temporary figures, commissioners come and go, but “The System” has remained pretty much the same. Even General Francis V. Greene, who was appointed by Mayor Low on January 1, 1903, to replace Colonel Partridge (who resigned the day before the City Club trustees submitted their request for his resignation), found this to be the case, despite his sincere, dedicated efforts to improve the conditions in the police department.

The vote of the body of the police force themselves showed, in 1902, their complete dissatisfaction with conditions. At least 75 per cent. of the police force voted for Low in 1901; a year later fully 90 per cent. voted for Bird S. Coler, Tammany’s candidate for Governor.[2]

The vote from the police force itself in 1902 clearly showed their total dissatisfaction with the conditions. At least 75 percent of the police force voted for Low in 1901; a year later, a full 90 percent voted for Bird S. Coler, Tammany’s candidate for Governor.[2]

This was only one of many indications of a forthcoming Tammany victory. Even some reformers criticized Mayor Low as at all times ready to denounce the Tammany leader from whom he could expect nothing, while refraining from saying anything against Senator Thomas C. Platt, the Republican “boss” who represented and headed a political machine element not materially different from that of Tammany. Mayor Low, it was also critically pointed out, was not of a type to hold the goodwill of a large body of the proletarian voters; his views, manner and leanings were of an aristocratic order; and in a city where class distinctions were so notoriously and effectively exploited by Tammany Hall, nothing could be more destructive to the endurance of an administration than the popular belief that its head, however honest personally, embodied the interests and smug views of the people of wealth—that he was, in the expressive phrase of politics, “a silk-stocking.” Various acts of Mayor Low’s were cited against him and deepened this impression in the popular mind.[3] Mayor Low’s supporters pointed out energetically that he had reduced the city’s debt by $7,000,000; that he had reformed the system of tax collection; that he had secured for the city adequate payments for public franchise grants; that he had defeated corrupt “jobs”; that he had reformed the public school system—that in every way he had been a thorough reform Mayor. These representations, the election result showed, were in vain.

This was just one of many signs of an impending Tammany victory. Even some reformers criticized Mayor Low for always being quick to condemn the Tammany leader from whom he anticipated nothing, while avoiding criticism of Senator Thomas C. Platt, the Republican "boss" who led a political machine that was not significantly different from Tammany's. Critics also noted that Mayor Low was not the type to win over a large segment of working-class voters; his views, demeanor, and inclinations were quite aristocratic. In a city where class divisions were so well-manipulated by Tammany Hall, nothing could be more damaging to the longevity of an administration than the widespread belief that its leader, no matter how personally honest, represented the interests and privileged perspectives of wealthy individuals—that he was, as the political phrase goes, "a silk-stocking." Various actions taken by Mayor Low were highlighted against him, further solidifying this perception among the public. Mayor Low’s supporters passionately pointed out that he had reduced the city’s debt by $7,000,000; that he had reformed the tax collection system; that he had secured fair payments for public franchise grants; that he had fought against corrupt dealings; and that he had improved the public school system—claiming that he had been a thorough reform Mayor. These assertions, as the election results revealed, were ultimately futile.

With conditions favorable to its return to power, Tammany Hall took measures to make its ticket in the municipal campaign of 1903 headed by a candidate whose name stood for prestige and respectability.

With favorable conditions for regaining power, Tammany Hall took steps to make its slate in the 1903 municipal campaign led by a candidate whose name symbolized prestige and respectability.

Tammany’s candidate for Mayor was George B. McClellan, whose father of the same name, after serving as Commanding General in the Union Army during part of[306] the Civil War, had been the Democratic candidate for President of the United States in 1864. A political protégé of Charles F. Murphy, George B. McClellan had seen service in Congress and had been selected by Mr. Murphy as Tammany’s candidate for Mayor a considerable time before the campaign opened. Jealousy antagonistic to Tammany’s domination and assertion of supreme power, the Brooklyn Democratic organization, then under control of “Boss” Hugh McLaughlin, opposed McClellan’s nomination, but Mr. Murphy carried his point.

Tammany’s candidate for Mayor was George B. McClellan, whose father, also named George B. McClellan, had served as the Commanding General in the Union Army during part of[306] the Civil War and had been the Democratic candidate for President in 1864. A political protégé of Charles F. Murphy, George B. McClellan had served in Congress and had been chosen by Mr. Murphy as Tammany’s candidate for Mayor long before the campaign kicked off. Jealous of Tammany’s control and dominance, the Brooklyn Democratic organization, which was then led by “Boss” Hugh McLaughlin, opposed McClellan’s nomination, but Mr. Murphy got his way.

To the amazement and chagrin of the Republicans and Fusionists, Tammany Hall then consummated a bold and astute political stroke by appropriating two of the three principal nominees of its opponents’ ticket, and nominating them as Tammany candidates. These two men were Edward M. Grout and Charles V. Fornes, respectively occupying the offices of Controller and President of the Board of Aldermen under Mayor Low’s administration. With Mayor Low they had been renominated. Thus did Tammany shrewdly weaken the other side and present itself as having two chief candidates of the same identity and capacity as those of the reformers. Mayor Low and his supporters did not accept this unhumorous situation complacently; they indignantly forced Grout and Fornes off their ticket. But the effect sought by Tammany had been produced.

To the shock and frustration of the Republicans and Fusionists, Tammany Hall made a clever political move by taking two out of three main nominees from their opponents' ticket and nominating them as Tammany candidates. These two men were Edward M. Grout and Charles V. Fornes, who were the Controller and President of the Board of Aldermen under Mayor Low’s administration. They had been renominated alongside Mayor Low. This strategy allowed Tammany to cleverly weaken the opposition while presenting itself with two key candidates who were just as capable and similar to those of the reformers. Mayor Low and his supporters did not accept this situation lightly; they angrily removed Grout and Fornes from their ticket. However, the effect Tammany wanted to achieve had already taken place.

Mr. McClellan was elected Mayor by a plurality of 62,696. The vote resulted: McClellan, 314,782; Low, 252,086. Furman, candidate for Mayor of the Social Democratic party, received 16,596 votes; Hunter, the Socialist Labor party’s candidate for Mayor, 5,205 votes. For the Prohibition ticket 869 votes were cast. In this election Tammany also elected its candidates, including Grout and Fornes, to all of the other important city offices, except the Presidency of the Borough of Richmond. The results of the election practically gave Tammany Hall full control of the city.

Mr. McClellan was elected Mayor with a plurality of 62,696 votes. The vote count was as follows: McClellan, 314,782; Low, 252,086. Furman, the Social Democratic party's candidate for Mayor, received 16,596 votes; Hunter, the Socialist Labor party’s candidate for Mayor, got 5,205 votes. The Prohibition ticket received 869 votes. In this election, Tammany also elected its candidates, including Grout and Fornes, to all of the other important city offices, except the Presidency of the Borough of Richmond. The results of the election effectively gave Tammany Hall complete control of the city.

FOOTNOTES

[1] The Police Department of the City of New York—A Statement of Facts, published by the City Club of New York, October, 1903, pp. 52-55, etc.

[1] The Police Department of the City of New York—A Statement of Facts, published by the City Club of New York, October 1903, pp. 52-55, etc.

[2] Ibid., p. 58.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., p. 58.

[3] See a long letter from a leading reformer published in the New York Herald, April 12, 1903.

[3] Check out a lengthy letter from a prominent reformer that was published in the New York Herald on April 12, 1903.


CHAPTER XXXII
THE INFLUENCE OF BRIBERY AND "HONEST GRAFT"
1903-1905

Graft of all kinds was rampant, as later official investigation showed, in Tammany-controlled departments, but in the public mind the question of this form of graft was vastly overshadowed by the revelations of the New York legislative committee investigating the great life insurance companies.

Graft of all kinds was widespread, as later official investigations revealed, in Tammany-controlled departments, but in the public's mind, the issue of this type of graft was greatly overshadowed by the findings of the New York legislative committee investigating the major life insurance companies.

The disclosures showed that Republican legislators as well as Democratic were bought; that enormous corruption funds had been contributed to both political parties, and that one political machine was no better than the other.

The revelations indicated that both Republican and Democratic lawmakers had been compromised; that massive sums of corruption money had been funneled to both political parties, and that one political machine was just as corrupt as the other.

Bribery expenditures, the committee reported, were classified on the various insurance companies’ books as “legal expenses.” The committee described the amounts as extraordinarily large. In the year 1904 alone, the Mutual Life Insurance Company thus disbursed $364,254.95; the Equitable Life Assurance Society, $172,698.42, and the New York Life Insurance Company, $204,019.25.[1]

Bribery expenses, the committee reported, were listed in the records of various insurance companies as “legal expenses.” The committee described these amounts as extremely large. In the year 1904 alone, the Mutual Life Insurance Company spent $364,254.95; the Equitable Life Assurance Society, $172,698.42, and the New York Life Insurance Company, $204,019.25.[1]

Andrew C. Fields, long engaged by the Mutual Life Insurance Company to manipulate legislation at Albany, lived there in a sumptuously furnished house jocosely styled the “House of Mirth.” The expenditures were charged to “legal expenses.” The Mutual thus expended more than $2,000,000 in “legal expenses” from 1898 to[308] 1904.[2] And from 1895 to 1904, the total payments made by the New York Life Insurance Company to Andrew Hamilton, its chief lobbyist at Albany, amounted to $1,312,197.16, all of which sum was soberly entered as “legal expenses.”[3] A present of nearly $50,000 was contributed in 1894 by the New York Life Insurance Company to the campaign fund of the Republican National Committee, and similar amounts in 1896 and 1900 to the same recipient.[4] All of the large insurance companies regularly contributed funds not only for national political campaigns, but for those in the States; the Equitable, for example, gave $50,000 in 1904 to the Republican National Committee, and had also, for many years, been giving $30,000 annually to the New York State Republican Committee.[5] The legislative investigating committee found it impossible to trace all of the directions of this continuous great corruption. “Enormous sums,” the committee stated, “have been expended in a surreptitious manner.”

Andrew C. Fields, who had long been hired by the Mutual Life Insurance Company to influence legislation in Albany, lived in a lavishly decorated house humorously called the “House of Mirth.” The costs were billed as “legal expenses.” The Mutual spent over $2,000,000 on “legal expenses” from 1898 to[308] 1904.[2] And from 1895 to 1904, the total payments made by the New York Life Insurance Company to Andrew Hamilton, its main lobbyist in Albany, reached $1,312,197.16, all of which was recorded as “legal expenses.”[3] In 1894, the New York Life Insurance Company contributed nearly $50,000 to the campaign fund of the Republican National Committee, with similar contributions made in 1896 and 1900 to the same group.[4] All major insurance companies regularly donated money not only for national political campaigns but also for state ones; for instance, the Equitable donated $50,000 in 1904 to the Republican National Committee and had also been giving $30,000 annually to the New York State Republican Committee for many years.[5] The legislative investigating committee found it difficult to trace the flow of this ongoing substantial corruption. “Enormous sums,” the committee said, “have been spent in a covert manner.”

Under the pressure of public opinion, District Attorney Jerome finally caused the Grand Jury to proceed against a few of the figureheads involved; the great magnates who had profited so enormously from the huge frauds, were, so events proved, left untouched. Although it had been clearly proved by the testimony that the frauds and corruptions consummated were gigantic, not a single one of those of great wealth implicated was ever sent to jail or even incommoded by the formality of a trial.

Under the pressure of public opinion, District Attorney Jerome finally pushed the Grand Jury to take action against a few of the key players involved; the major moguls who had made huge profits from the massive frauds were, as it turned out, left unscathed. Despite the clear evidence provided by witnesses that the fraud and corruption were monumental, not one of the wealthy individuals implicated was ever sent to jail or even faced the formality of a trial.

In the face of such disclosures, the opponents of Tammany could not well point to Tammany corruption as an exclusive product. It was a time, too, when what was termed “muckraking” was almost at its height; magazines and newspapers, were filled with articles exposing in detail the corruptions and colossal manipulations and spoliation done by great corporations and other vested[309] interests, and the close connection between these and the “bosses” and machines of both old political parties. Public attention was concentrated more upon these nationwide scandals than upon local graft—petty, indeed, in some respects, compared to the great extortions of trusts and other industrial, transportation and financial corporations.

In light of these revelations, Tammany's opponents couldn't really claim that Tammany's corrupt practices were unique. It was also a time when what was called "muckraking" was peaking; magazines and newspapers were packed with articles detailing the corrupt dealings and massive manipulations carried out by large corporations and other powerful interests, as well as the close ties between these entities and the "bosses" and machines of both older political parties. The public's focus was more on these national scandals than on local corruption—small-time, in some ways, compared to the major extortions from trusts and other industrial, transportation, and financial corporations.

These factors had their influence in developing in New York City a powerful movement called the Municipal Ownership League, later passing under the name of the Independence League. The head of this organization was William R. Hearst. He had inherited a large fortune from his father, United States Senator George Hearst. The estate comprised a San Francisco newspaper; and William R. Hearst had come to New York, where he now had a morning and an evening newspaper. Of a sensational order, yet written in popular style, these newspapers had an extensive circulation, and their agitational matter were in reality the mainstay of his movement. Two of the local objectives of this agitation were the scandalous overcrowding of the street car system and the methods by which the subway system in New York City, built by the city’s credit, had been turned over to the profit of private interests. At the same time, no means was neglected to awaken popular resentment against the “plunderbund” fattening on the people, and to arouse indignation against the bossism of Tammany Hall. Day after day effective articles, editorials and cartoons were published; written in a simple style, understandable by the crudest intelligence, they produced a great effect among the voters. Nothing quite like this original kind of political journalism had ever been known in New York City.

These factors contributed to the rise of a powerful movement in New York City known as the Municipal Ownership League, which later became the Independence League. The leader of this organization was William R. Hearst. He had inherited a substantial fortune from his father, United States Senator George Hearst. The estate included a San Francisco newspaper, and William R. Hearst had moved to New York, where he now owned both a morning and an evening newspaper. These sensational newspapers, written in a popular style, had a large circulation, and their provocative content was actually the backbone of his movement. Two key local issues that this agitation focused on were the shocking overcrowding of the streetcar system and the ways in which the subway system in New York City, built with the city’s funds, had been handed over to private interests for profit. At the same time, no effort was spared to stir public anger against the “plunderbund” benefiting at the people’s expense and to spark outrage against the bossism of Tammany Hall. Day after day, impactful articles, editorials, and cartoons were published; written in a straightforward style that anyone could understand, they had a significant impact on voters. Nothing like this groundbreaking form of political journalism had ever been seen in New York City.

The operations of the New York Contracting and Trucking Company, in particular, supplied facts which were used effectually by newspapers and civic organizations to show the new methods by which Tammany leaders were gathering in millions from contracts. This company,[310] as we have seen, was headed by John J. Murphy, brother of the Tammany Hall chief, and by Alderman James E. Gaffney.

The activities of the New York Contracting and Trucking Company provided concrete evidence that newspapers and community groups used effectively to expose how Tammany leaders were raking in millions from contracts. This company,[310] as we've noted, was led by John J. Murphy, the brother of the Tammany Hall leader, and Alderman James E. Gaffney.

Its transactions revealed the great difference between Tweed’s methods and those of the later leaders of Tammany Hall. Under the Tweed régime tens of millions of dollars were stolen outright. The lesson of the overthrow of the Tweed “ring” was not lost on his successors. Mr. Croker refused to countenance such outworn, discarded and dangerous methods of theft. They had resulted disastrously to Tammany in Tweed’s day. In place of direct thieving methods of getting rich, indirect methods, surrounded with secrecy and every possible precaution against detection, were developed. Some Tammany district leaders became opulent on blackmail and extortion, the circuitous route of which it was most difficult to trace (in a legal sense) to its final destination. As for Mr. Croker himself, the question was frequently put to him, “Where did you get it?”[6] He could reply that his operations in amassing his wealth were entirely legitimate; “inside” real estate speculations, connections with trust companies and other corporations and stock transactions. Knowing him to be the source of much legislation and administrative favors worth tens, if not hundreds, of millions of dollars to corporations, his opponents were by no means wholly satisfied with such an explanation, but whatever their suspicions they could never prove that he had personally profited from selling legislation. Essentially, however, Mr. Croker never posed as a business man; he was a politician.

Its transactions showed a significant contrast between Tweed’s methods and those of later Tammany Hall leaders. During the Tweed era, tens of millions of dollars were stolen outright. The downfall of the Tweed “ring” taught his successors a valuable lesson. Mr. Croker rejected those outdated, discarded, and risky methods of theft. They had caused serious problems for Tammany during Tweed’s time. Instead of direct stealing to get rich, more indirect methods were developed, cloaked in secrecy and with every possible precaution to avoid detection. Some Tammany district leaders became wealthy through blackmail and extortion, which were difficult to trace (legally) to their final outcomes. As for Mr. Croker, he was often asked, “Where did you get it?”[6] He could claim that his wealth was entirely earned through legitimate means: “inside” real estate deals, connections with trust companies and other corporations, and stock trades. While he was known to be the source of much legislation and administrative favors worth tens, if not hundreds, of millions of dollars to corporations, his opponents were not entirely satisfied with such an explanation. Despite their suspicions, they could never prove that he personally profited from selling legislation. Ultimately, however, Mr. Croker never presented himself as a businessman; he was a politician.

But by the period when Charles F. Murphy became “chief,” the “business-man” type of leader had evolved. Under this plan—a plan that afforded the most plausible opportunities for explaining the sudden acquisition of wealth—Tammany men became open or secret partners[311] in contracting firms, using the pressure of political power to have large contracts awarded to their concerns. It was not necessary for these leaders to know anything of contracting; they could be ignorant of every detail; their one aim was to get the contracts; the actual skilled work could be done by hired professional men. No law penalized such methods, respectable in every appearance. At the same time, inasmuch as speculating in the stock market was legitimate in law, fortunes could be made in acting upon advance information of legislative or other official means concerning certain corporations.

But by the time Charles F. Murphy became the "chief," the "businessman" type of leader had emerged. This plan—one that provided the best chance to explain the sudden influx of wealth—allowed Tammany men to become open or secret partners[311] in contracting firms, using their political influence to secure large contracts for their companies. It wasn't necessary for these leaders to know anything about contracting; they could be completely uninformed about the details. Their sole goal was to obtain the contracts; the actual skilled work could be handled by hired professionals. There was no law against such practices, which seemed respectable on the surface. At the same time, since speculating in the stock market was legally acceptable, fortunes could be made by acting on insider information regarding legislative or other official actions related to certain corporations.

The first large contract obtained by the New York Contracting and Trucking Company was a $2,000,000 contract for excavating the site for the new Pennsylvania Railroad Station in New York City.

The first major contract secured by the New York Contracting and Trucking Company was a $2,000,000 deal for digging the site for the new Pennsylvania Railroad Station in New York City.

For a long time, notwithstanding reiterated protests from the press and public organizations, the Board of Aldermen, controlled by Tammany, had obstinately refused to vote for the franchise giving the Pennsylvania Railroad power to use streets for its tunnel approaches and terminal in Manhattan, New York City. Reports were circulated that the sum of $300,000 had been demanded by the Aldermen, and that until that sum was produced they would not vote for the franchise. It was noted that it was “Big Jim” Gaffney, “outside man” for the New York Contracting and Trucking Company and Alderman from Leader Charles F. Murphy’s district, who, together with “Little Tim” Sullivan, Tammany leader in the Board of Aldermen, took a leading part in persuading the Aldermen to hold out against giving the franchise for the Pennsylvania tunnel. The newspapers unanimously described the Aldermanic action as a “hold-up.” Likewise, it was also noted that when from some mysterious quarter orders reached Tammany Aldermen to vote for the franchise, it was Alderman Gaffney who took the lead in rallying the Aldermen to vote it through.

For a long time, despite repeated protests from the press and public organizations, the Board of Aldermen, controlled by Tammany, stubbornly refused to vote for the franchise that would allow the Pennsylvania Railroad to use streets for its tunnel entrances and terminal in Manhattan, New York City. Reports circulated that the Aldermen had demanded a bribe of $300,000, and that they wouldn’t vote for the franchise until that amount was paid. It was noted that “Big Jim” Gaffney, the "outside man" for the New York Contracting and Trucking Company and Alderman from Leader Charles F. Murphy’s district, along with “Little Tim” Sullivan, Tammany leader in the Board of Aldermen, played a key role in persuading the Aldermen to resist granting the franchise for the Pennsylvania tunnel. The newspapers unanimously referred to the Aldermanic action as a “hold-up.” Similarly, it was noted that when mysterious orders came for the Tammany Aldermen to vote for the franchise, it was Alderman Gaffney who led the charge to get the Aldermen to approve it.

This sudden change of front after a protracted “hold-up,”[312] puzzled the public exceedingly, and sinister imputations were made. Not until months later did the public begin to see illumination; it was then announced that although the New York Contracting and Trucking Company had not been the lowest bidder (its bid, according to report, was $400,000 more than that of a competitor), nevertheless it had been awarded the $2,000,000 contract for digging the Pennsylvania Railroad site.

This sudden shift after a long “hold-up,”[312] left the public really confused, and some dark speculations arose. It wasn’t until months later that the public started to understand what happened; it was announced that even though the New York Contracting and Trucking Company wasn't the lowest bidder (its bid was reportedly $400,000 higher than a competitor's), it still received the $2,000,000 contract for excavating the Pennsylvania Railroad site.

In the case of the awarding of a contract covering several million dollars in February, 1905, to the New York Contracting and Trucking Company for the six-track local improvement of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, the circumstances were much the same.

In February 1905, a contract worth several million dollars was awarded to the New York Contracting and Trucking Company for the six-track local improvement of the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad, and the situation was very similar.

A franchise had been asked for a project called the New York, Westchester and Boston Railroad Company. At the same time, another company calling itself the New York and Port Chester Railroad Company, made a similar application and opposed the other company. Both companies, as subsequent developments showed, were in fact owned by the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad; the opposition of one to the other was evidently for mere effect.

A franchise was requested for a project called the New York, Westchester, and Boston Railroad Company. At the same time, another company named the New York and Port Chester Railroad Company submitted a similar application and opposed the other company. Both companies, as later developments revealed, were actually owned by the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad; the conflict between them was clearly just for show.

For three years the Board of Aldermen refused to give the franchises, either one of which would give the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad its own independent entrance into New York City. Somehow and from somewhere the announcement was now made that unless the Board of Aldermen acted, a law would be passed by the Legislature stripping it of all power of granting franchises. This threat was executed; the Legislature passed an act vesting franchise-granting power in the Board of Estimate and Apportionment. It may here be parenthetically noted that with the great powers increasingly vested in it the Board of Estimate became the most compact and powerful instrument of government that had ever been developed in the government of New York City.

For three years, the Board of Aldermen held back on granting the franchises, either of which would allow the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad to have its own direct access into New York City. Suddenly, it was announced that if the Board of Aldermen did not take action, the Legislature would pass a law that would take away their power to grant franchises. This warning was put into action; the Legislature enacted a law that transferred the power to grant franchises to the Board of Estimate and Apportionment. It's worth noting that as more power was consolidated within it, the Board of Estimate became the most efficient and powerful governing body ever created in New York City's government.

This body is composed of eight officials. Of these, three officials,—the Mayor, the Controller and the President of the Board of Aldermen,—have, by reason of a greater vested plurality of votes, the dominance of power. The other five members are the Borough Presidents.

This group consists of eight officials. Out of these, three officials—the Mayor, the Controller, and the President of the Board of Aldermen—hold significant power due to having more votes. The other five members are the Borough Presidents.

The first point passed upon by this Board was the question of whether or not the New York, Westchester and Boston Railroad Company was or was not a defunct corporation. On March 30, 1904, Corporation Council Delany (elected by Tammany Hall) reported to the Board of Estimate and Apportionment that the Board had no jurisdiction to examine the legal capacity or incapacity of the company.[7]

The first point addressed by this Board was whether the New York, Westchester and Boston Railroad Company was a defunct corporation. On March 30, 1904, Corporation Counsel Delany (elected by Tammany Hall) informed the Board of Estimate and Apportionment that the Board had no authority to investigate the company's legal status or lack thereof.[7]

On June 24, 1904, the company received its franchise. The company was really an adjunct of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, and its franchise gave it the right to operate more than sixteen miles of four-track line within New York City; the company secured practically all the available routes for entrance and exit to and from New York City by way of the Bronx. It was the $6,000,000 contract for constructing this railroad improvement that the New York Contracting and Trucking Company secured.

On June 24, 1904, the company got its franchise. The company was basically an extension of the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad, and its franchise allowed it to operate over sixteen miles of four-track line in New York City. The company acquired nearly all the routes available for entering and exiting New York City through the Bronx. It was the $6,000,000 contract for building this railroad improvement that the New York Contracting and Trucking Company obtained.

The declaration was made that no other contractor had ventured to compete for this work; and the explanation was offered in some quarters that inasmuch as a large part of the work was located inside the city limits and as an unfriendly city administration might do much to hamper the carrying out of the contract, the New York, New Haven and Hartford officials, with a cautious eye to the railroad’s interests, were willing to award the contract to the Tammany firm and pay higher prices. Mr. Gaffney asserted that politics had nothing to do with the obtaining of the contract and that his company “had[314] bid with other contractors and won out,” but politicians did not take this statement seriously. In February, 1907, the New York Contracting and Trucking Company surrendered its contract for a consideration of $500,000 to another company, the Holbrook, Cabot & Daly Company, which had previously done much of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad’s construction work. It was not until seven years later that the fact, originally suspected, as to why the contract had been given without competition to the Gaffney-Murphy company, was authoritatively stated. On May 20, 1914, Charles S. Mellen, long president of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, testified before the Interstate Commerce Commission that the contract had been turned over to that Tammany concern “to avoid friction with the city,” meaning that by giving the contract to the Tammany company, city officials would attempt no “hold-up,” such as placing obstacles in the way of carrying the construction work through.

The announcement was made that no other contractor had tried to compete for this work; and some suggested that since a significant part of the project was within the city limits, an unfriendly city administration might hinder the execution of the contract. To protect the railroad’s interests, officials from the New York, New Haven and Hartford decided to award the contract to the Tammany firm and accept higher prices. Mr. Gaffney claimed that politics played no role in winning the contract and that his company “had[314] bid with other contractors and won,” but politicians did not take him seriously. In February 1907, the New York Contracting and Trucking Company gave up its contract for $500,000 to the Holbrook, Cabot & Daly Company, which had previously handled much of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad’s construction work. It wasn’t until seven years later that the reason why the contract was awarded without competition to the Gaffney-Murphy company was officially revealed. On May 20, 1914, Charles S. Mellen, who had been president of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad for a long time, testified before the Interstate Commerce Commission that the contract was given to that Tammany firm “to avoid friction with the city,” meaning that by selecting the Tammany company, city officials would not try to “hold up” the project by creating obstacles to its progress.

Further disclosures strongly indicated that during the time when the Westchester franchise was acquired by the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, certain powers in Tammany Hall “had to be taken care of,” and that they benefited financially.

Further disclosures strongly indicated that when the Westchester franchise was acquired by the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, certain influential people in Tammany Hall “had to be taken care of,” and that they received financial benefits.

After being looted of large sums in financial jugglery, the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad had been thrown on the verge of insolvency. It was revealed in 1918 that a certain $12,000,000 of New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad money put into the Westchester project had mysteriously vanished in unexplained directions. The Interstate Commerce Commission, in 1914, conducted an investigation to find out specifically, if possible, what became of those missing millions.

After losing a significant amount of money through financial tricks, the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad was on the brink of bankruptcy. In 1918, it was discovered that $12,000,000 of the railroad's funds, which had been invested in the Westchester project, had mysteriously disappeared without explanation. The Interstate Commerce Commission launched an investigation in 1914 to try to determine what happened to those missing millions.

On April 24, 1914, Oakley Thorne, a New York banker, who had been the agent of J. P. Morgan & Company in handling the $12,000,000 for the purpose of secretly purchasing the Westchester and the Portchester franchises[315] for the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, gave certain testimony before the Interstate Commerce Commission. He averred that he had burned the books containing the particulars as to how he had spent at least $8,000,000; he explained that he therefore could not give names, amounts and dates. A letter written by Mr. Thorne in October, 1906, to C. S. Mellen, president of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, was produced. In this letter Thorne wrote that “there are people in Fourteenth Street who are very strongly in favor of Westchester and others in favor of Portchester,” and suggested that “both sides will have to be taken care of.” Asked what the reference to “Fourteenth Street” meant, Thorne replied, “Why, I believe, Tammany Hall.” Mr. Thorne testified that he could not possibly remember the names of any individuals in “Fourteenth Street” who “had to be taken care of,” but he admitted that he knew that “Big Tim” Sullivan was “friendly” to the Westchester “enterprise” and owned stock in it; at the time this testimony was given Sullivan was dead.

On April 24, 1914, Oakley Thorne, a banker from New York who was the agent for J. P. Morgan & Company in managing the $12,000,000 for secretly buying the Westchester and Portchester franchises[315] for the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, testified before the Interstate Commerce Commission. He stated that he had destroyed the records detailing how he spent at least $8,000,000, which meant he couldn’t provide names, amounts, and dates. A letter from Thorne dated October 1906, addressed to C. S. Mellen, president of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, was presented. In the letter, Thorne mentioned that “there are people in Fourteenth Street who are very strongly in favor of Westchester and others in favor of Portchester,” and suggested that “both sides will have to be taken care of.” When asked what he meant by “Fourteenth Street,” Thorne responded, “I believe, Tammany Hall.” He testified that he couldn't remember the names of any individuals from “Fourteenth Street” who “had to be taken care of,” but he acknowledged that “Big Tim” Sullivan was “friendly” to the Westchester “enterprise” and owned stock in it; at the time of this testimony, Sullivan was deceased.

Mr. Thorne asserted that he could not recall definite particulars, but he could vaguely remember that there were persons in “Fourteenth Street” who had, at the time, been “interested in the Westchester City and Contract Company, the New York Development Company and other concerns that subsequently formed a part of the Westchester combination turned over to the New Haven [the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company] through Morgan & Company.” Certain “persons in Fourteenth Street,” Mr. Thorne further testified, had to be bought off because of their “nuisance value,” but precisely what was the nature of that “nuisance value” was not explained. In the disposition of the many millions of dollars placed in his hands, Mr. Thorne was not required to make any accounting or give any vouchers.

Mr. Thorne claimed he couldn't remember specific details, but he vaguely recalled that there were people on "Fourteenth Street" who had, at the time, been "interested in the Westchester City and Contract Company, the New York Development Company, and other businesses that later became part of the Westchester merger handed over to New Haven [the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company] through Morgan & Company." Some "people on Fourteenth Street," Mr. Thorne further testified, had to be compensated because of their "nuisance value," but he didn't clarify what that "nuisance value" was. In handling the many millions of dollars he was given, Mr. Thorne was not required to provide any accounting or receipts.

Further details of later developments were given in the testimony of Charles S. Mellen, president of the New York,[316] New Haven and Hartford Railroad during the years when the above franchises were acquired.

Further details of later developments were provided in the testimony of Charles S. Mellen, president of the New York,[316] New Haven and Hartford Railroad during the years when the above franchises were acquired.

On May 14, 1914, Mr. Mellen testified, at a hearing before the Interstate Commerce Commission, that the directors of that railroad set aside a fund of $1,200,000, the value of 8,000 shares of New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad stock, which sum was distributed among “people of influence” in the politics of New York City for the procuring of certain much-desired changes in the charter of the New York, Westchester and Boston Railroad Company. Mr. Mellen further testified that Inspector Thomas F. Byrnes, who, for many years, had been head of the New York Police Department (and who was deceased at the time of this hearing) had acted as the go-between in this transaction; that Byrnes agreed to obtain thirteen different modifications or “amendments” to the New York, Westchester and Boston Railroad charter from New York city’s officials; and that to bring about these results stock, or its equivalent in cash, to the sum of $1,200,000, was given to Byrnes for distribution among Tammany politicians whose identity Mr. Mellen declared that he did not know. Mr. Mellen’s testimony revealed that some of these persons accepted stock made out in the names of dummies, but that the majority demanded and received cash for their “services.” All but $50,000 of the $1,200,000 was distributed.

On May 14, 1914, Mr. Mellen testified at a hearing before the Interstate Commerce Commission that the railroad's directors allocated a fund of $1,200,000, the worth of 8,000 shares of New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad stock. This amount was distributed among “people of influence” in New York City's politics to secure certain desired changes in the charter of the New York, Westchester and Boston Railroad Company. Mr. Mellen also testified that Inspector Thomas F. Byrnes, who had been head of the New York Police Department for many years (and who had passed away by the time of this hearing), served as the middleman in this arrangement; that Byrnes agreed to secure thirteen different modifications or “amendments” to the New York, Westchester and Boston Railroad charter from the city's officials; and that to achieve these outcomes, stock or its cash equivalent totaling $1,200,000 was given to Byrnes for distribution among Tammany politicians, whose identities Mr. Mellen claimed he did not know. Mr. Mellen's testimony indicated that some of these individuals accepted stock made out in the names of fronts, but the majority requested and received cash for their “services.” All but $50,000 of the $1,200,000 was distributed.

The records of the Board of Estimate in 1908 and 1909 bear out Mr. Mellen’s testimony; they show that nearly every request for alterations of the charter or extensions of time made by the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad was granted. The Board of Estimate during the years in question consisted of Mayor McClellan; Controller Herman A. Metz; Patrick F. McGowan, President of the Board of Aldermen; John F. Ahearn, President of the Borough of Manhattan; Bird S. Coler, President of the Borough of Brooklyn; Louis F. Haffen, President of the Borough of the Bronx; Lawrence Gresser,[317] President of the Borough of Queens, and George Cromwell, President of the Borough of Richmond.[8]

The records of the Board of Estimate from 1908 and 1909 confirm Mr. Mellen’s testimony; they show that almost every request for changes to the charter or extensions of time made by the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad was approved. The Board of Estimate during those years included Mayor McClellan, Controller Herman A. Metz, Patrick F. McGowan, President of the Board of Aldermen, John F. Ahearn, President of the Borough of Manhattan, Bird S. Coler, President of the Borough of Brooklyn, Louis F. Haffen, President of the Borough of the Bronx, Lawrence Gresser,[317] President of the Borough of Queens, and George Cromwell, President of the Borough of Richmond.[8]

Continuing his testimony, Mr. Mellen stated, on May 20, 1914, that upon further recollection he found that the amount distributed to politicians in connection with securing the Westchester franchise and alterations to the charter, really totaled $1,500,000 or $1,600,000. Much of this amount was presented in the form of due bills sent in by Tammany politicians by means of messengers; Mr. Mellen personally handed over cash for the due bills, but the names of the recipients he said he could not remember. “Do you know,” Mr. Mellen was asked, “what all this Westchester and Portchester stock was doing in Tammany Hall?” “I know,” he replied, “what it was doing to me when I took it on. It was costing me lots of money.” “Do you know how all this stock reached Tammany Hall?” “I have not the slightest idea. I could suppose a lot of things, but I do not know anything about it.”

Continuing his testimony, Mr. Mellen stated on May 20, 1914, that upon further reflection, he realized that the total amount given to politicians to secure the Westchester franchise and changes to the charter was actually $1,500,000 or $1,600,000. A lot of this money was presented as due bills sent by Tammany politicians through messengers; Mr. Mellen personally paid cash for the due bills, but he said he couldn’t remember the names of the recipients. “Do you know,” Mr. Mellen was asked, “what all this Westchester and Portchester stock was doing in Tammany Hall?” “I know,” he replied, “what it was doing to me when I took it on. It was costing me a lot of money.” “Do you know how all this stock got to Tammany Hall?” “I have no idea. I could guess a lot of things, but I don’t know anything about it.”

Submitting, on July 11, 1914, the results of its investigation to the United States Senate, the Interstate Commerce Commission reported that the facts as to the New York, Westchester and Boston Railway transaction constituted “a story of the profligate waste of corporate funds.” The fullest details are set forth in that report of the magnitude of the corruption used. Commenting upon Mr. Mellen’s testimony, the report declared: “The testimony is somewhat occult, but the character of the transaction is no less certain. This money was used for corrupt purposes, and the improper expenditures covered[318] up by the transfer to the New Haven [New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company] of these worthless securities.… It seems very strange that Mr. Mellen was not able to identify with any particularity any one with whom he had these transactions except the late Thomas F. Byrnes. No comment is necessary to make clear to the mind the corrupt and unlawful nature of this transaction, and it would seem that the amount illegally expended could be recovered from Mr. Mellen and the directors who authorized it.…”[9]

Submitting, on July 11, 1914, the results of its investigation to the United States Senate, the Interstate Commerce Commission reported that the facts regarding the New York, Westchester and Boston Railway transaction amounted to “a story of the reckless waste of corporate funds.” The full details are provided in that report about the extent of the corruption involved. Commenting on Mr. Mellen’s testimony, the report stated: “The testimony is somewhat unclear, but the nature of the transaction is unmistakable. This money was used for corrupt purposes, and the improper spending was concealed by transferring these worthless securities to the New Haven [New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company].… It seems very odd that Mr. Mellen couldn’t specifically identify anyone with whom he had these transactions except the late Thomas F. Byrnes. No further comment is needed to highlight the corrupt and illegal nature of this transaction, and it seems that the amount spent unlawfully could be recovered from Mr. Mellen and the directors who approved it.”[318][9]

There is now pending (1917) a suit in the United States District Court brought by the stockholders against the former directors of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company and against the company for the return of $165,000,000 alleged to have been lost to the treasury of that railroad in various ways.

There is now a pending lawsuit (1917) in the United States District Court filed by the stockholders against the former directors of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, as well as against the company itself, seeking the return of $165,000,000 that is claimed to have been lost from the railroad's treasury in various ways.

To return, however, to the operations of the New York Contracting and Trucking Company: Another contract secured by that concern was a contract from the Consolidated Gas Company for grading the site for the Astoria gas plant; the franchise for the Astoria “Gas Grab” had been supported by Tammany.

To go back to the activities of the New York Contracting and Trucking Company: Another contract they obtained was from the Consolidated Gas Company for grading the site for the Astoria gas plant; the franchise for the Astoria "Gas Grab" had the backing of Tammany.

By 1905 it was estimated that the New York Contracting and Trucking Company or its offshoots had received contracts aggregating $15,000,000—all contracts from corporations and interests benefiting from the city government or depending upon favors from it. Yet two years previously this very company was a nonentity as far as securing large contracts were concerned, and none of its heads had any experience in the contracting business. Now in a certain well-understood field, it was virtually free from competition.

By 1905, it was estimated that the New York Contracting and Trucking Company, along with its subsidiaries, had received contracts totaling $15,000,000—all from corporations and interests that benefited from or relied on the city government. Just two years earlier, this very company was insignificant when it came to landing large contracts, and none of its leaders had any experience in the contracting business. Now, in a specific well-defined area, it faced almost no competition.

None could now fail to note the great transition from[319] the Tweed period when Tammany leaders used only the vulgar and criminal methods of stealing money out of the city treasury. Under Murphy’s leadership the obvious methods used were those of “honest graft”—the making of millions from contracts with public service corporations, and this was represented as legitimate business. Fully six Tammany district leaders were members of or “interested” in large contracting firms, although the heads of these, often of a nominal character, were not known as Tammany leaders. These concerns employed a total of many thousands of men, all of whom were expected to be useful at the primaries and elections.

None could now fail to notice the significant shift from[319] the Tweed era when Tammany leaders relied solely on crude and criminal tactics to take money from the city treasury. Under Murphy’s leadership, the clear methods employed were those of “honest graft”—making millions through contracts with public service companies, which was presented as legitimate business. Fully six Tammany district leaders were members of or “invested” in large contracting firms, even though the heads of these firms, often just figureheads, weren’t recognized as Tammany leaders. These businesses employed thousands of men, all of whom were expected to be helpful during primaries and elections.

At this time there was discernible the beginnings of a growing feeling that reform officials, while prosecuting gamblers and comparatively petty offenders of all stripes, somehow were singularly ineffective in bringing about the prosecution of corporation magnates charged with looting on a large scale. This feeling had not crystallized as yet, but it was felt in some quarters.

At this time, there was a noticeable growing belief that reform officials, while going after gamblers and minor offenders of all kinds, were unusually ineffective in prosecuting corporate leaders accused of large-scale theft. This feeling hadn’t fully formed yet, but it was present in some circles.

Some of District Attorney Jerome’s former supporters were impressed by the fact that despite his campaign promises, he had not caused the indictment or other prosecution of the men who had looted the Metropolitan Street Railway Company. James W. Osborne, a noted attorney, had declared in open court in 1903, that the “insiders” had, by means of duplicating of construction accounts, manipulation and in other ways, stolen $30,000,000. Mr. Amory declared and specified that an additional $60,000,000 had, by various processes of devious manipulation, gone to enrich the “insiders”—a total of $90,000,000.

Some of District Attorney Jerome’s former supporters were struck by the fact that, despite his campaign promises, he had not initiated the indictment or prosecution of the individuals who had looted the Metropolitan Street Railway Company. James W. Osborne, a well-known attorney, had publicly stated in court in 1903 that the “insiders” had, through duplicating construction accounts, manipulation, and other methods, stolen $30 million. Mr. Amory claimed that an additional $60 million had been acquired by various deceptive practices, benefiting the “insiders”—adding up to a total of $90 million.

On April 25, 1903, Mr. Osborne gave out this statement: “We have produced evidence before Magistrate Barlow which shows a crime has been committed, and now it is up to the District Attorney to say whether he will avail himself of that evidence and proceed against those who have committed the crime. We have charged in open[320] court that $30,000,000 has been stolen, and that [statement] never has been disproved by the Metropolitan Company or its counsel. I told Mr. Nicoll, counsel for Mr. Vreeland [president of the Metropolitan Street Railway Company] openly he would not be able to disprove my charges.”

On April 25, 1903, Mr. Osborne made the following statement: “We have presented evidence to Magistrate Barlow that shows a crime has been committed, and now it’s up to the District Attorney to decide whether he will use that evidence and take action against those who are guilty. We have publicly charged in court that $30,000,000 has been stolen, and that claim has never been disproven by the Metropolitan Company or its lawyers. I told Mr. Nicoll, the lawyer for Mr. Vreeland [president of the Metropolitan Street Railway Company], directly that he would not be able to disprove my charges.”

Mr. Amory openly declared that Mr. Jerome’s investigation of the matter in 1903 was not undertaken in good faith. “It was,” he wrote, “a deliberate whitewash. I have documentary evidence to prove it.” Mr. Amory charged that of the twenty-seven distinct written charges filed with Mr. Jerome against the Metropolitan management, Mr. Jerome’s accountant reported on only seven, and these latter were of minor importance, involving chiefly technicalities of accounts and not serious crimes. Yet Mr. Jerome, was Mr. Amory’s indignant comment, represented that the accountant’s report was “very clear and full and takes up every charge” and that Mr. Jerome had reported that “the specific charges so far as they involve criminal wrong-doing are entirely without foundation.”[10]

Mr. Amory openly stated that Mr. Jerome's investigation of the matter in 1903 was not done in good faith. “It was,” he wrote, “a complete cover-up. I have documentary evidence to prove it.” Mr. Amory accused that of the twenty-seven distinct charges submitted to Mr. Jerome against the Metropolitan management, Mr. Jerome's accountant only looked into seven, and those were minor issues, mainly involving technicalities in accounts rather than serious crimes. Yet, Mr. Jerome, as Mr. Amory indignantly pointed out, claimed that the accountant's report was “very clear and comprehensive and addresses every charge” and that Mr. Jerome had stated that “the specific charges regarding any criminal wrong-doing are completely unfounded.”[10]

While thus declaring that he could find nothing on which to base prosecution of the Metropolitan Street Railway Company magnates, District Attorney Jerome showed by other acts, it was complained, that petty criminals would be prosecuted to the limit of the law. He was charged with discriminating between rich and powerful business offenders, on the one side, and on the other, poor and relatively uninfluential violators of the law.

While stating that he couldn't find anything to support prosecuting the powerful executives of the Metropolitan Street Railway Company, District Attorney Jerome demonstrated through other actions, it was claimed, that small-time criminals would be pursued to the fullest extent of the law. He was accused of favoring wealthy and influential business offenders while going after poor and relatively powerless lawbreakers.

On one occasion Mr. Jerome appeared before labor unions, delivered homilies on the virtues, and warned them that he would make short shrift of labor grafters. This lecture had reference to the case of Sam Parks, a labor leader, charged with grafting on employers and receiving money for prompting or “calling off” strikes. District[321] Attorney Jerome waited for no elaborate formal investigation; he immediately started the machinery of his office against Parks and caused him to be convicted. Already a dying consumptive, Parks was sentenced to prison, where he died shortly after. But no action, it was pointed out, was taken against powerful construction companies that had bribed Parks and other labor leaders to declare strikes on buildings for which competitors had the contracts.[11] Another much-discussed incident was the result of a collision of railroad trains in the Park Avenue tunnel—a collision maiming and killing many persons. The obsolete and dangerous condition of this tunnel had long been known. It was commented that District Attorney Jerome did not make the slightest move against the railroad directors; he hurriedly caused the indictment and arrest of Wisker, a railroad engineer, as the sole culprit and proceeded with despatch to his trial. The jury, however, refused to convict the engineer.

On one occasion, Mr. Jerome spoke in front of labor unions, preached about the importance of honesty, and warned them that he wouldn't tolerate corrupt practices in labor. This speech was about Sam Parks, a labor leader, who was accused of taking bribes from employers and getting paid to instigate or “call off” strikes. District Attorney Jerome didn’t wait for a detailed investigation; he quickly set his office in motion against Parks and got him convicted. Already suffering from terminal illness, Parks was sentenced to prison, where he died shortly after. However, it was noted that no action was taken against the powerful construction companies that had bribed Parks and other labor leaders to initiate strikes against competitors’ contracts.[321] Another widely discussed incident involved a collision of railroad trains in the Park Avenue tunnel, which injured and killed many people. The outdated and hazardous state of this tunnel had been well-known for a long time. It was pointed out that District Attorney Jerome didn’t take any action against the railroad directors; instead, he quickly pushed for the indictment and arrest of Wisker, a railroad engineer, as the only responsible party and rushed him to trial. However, the jury ultimately refused to convict the engineer.

Considering that Mr. Jerome was a leading reformer, such contrasts were gradually calculated to make the very mention of reform odious to the observing of the working people. The complaint was generally heard that the big grafters were safe and immune, while petty offenders were dealt with rigorously. Nevertheless, a large number of voters, influenced by a stream of praise from the press, still believed in Mr. Jerome’s promises and motives, and his action in 1905 in not securing a renomination from political bosses but procuring it independently by means of a petition circulated among electors, strengthened the old belief that he was sincere and was independent of political and other domination. Much was made[322] of the fact of his independent renomination. The Republicans withdrew their candidate for District Attorney and nominated Mr. Jerome, and the press in general enthusiastically supported him. He was reelected. It was not until some years later when the full effects of his administration could be popularly realized in perspective, that Jerome fell into general disfavor with the voters.

Considering that Mr. Jerome was a prominent reformer, such contrasts were gradually designed to make even the idea of reform unappealing to the attentive working class. It was frequently said that the major offenders were untouched while minor ones faced harsh penalties. However, many voters, swayed by a wave of praise from the media, continued to trust Mr. Jerome’s promises and intentions. His decision in 1905 to secure his renomination not through political bosses but by gathering a petition from voters further reinforced the belief that he was genuine and not controlled by political influences. A lot was made[322] of his independent renomination. The Republicans dropped their candidate for District Attorney and chose Mr. Jerome instead, and the media generally rallied behind him. He was reelected. It wasn't until several years later, when people could finally see the overall impact of his administration, that Jerome lost favor with the voters.

As an instance of the methods of contractors under the Tammany régime during this time, it is only necessary to mention the facts, later disclosed in an investigation by John Purroy Mitchel, Commissioner of Accounts, as to how in 1904 defective hose was sold to the Fire Department. The Windsor Fire Appliance Company (of which the president and chief stockholder was Michael F. Loughman, later appointed Deputy Commissioner of Water Supply) sold 25,000 feet of hose to New York City for $23,410.25. Although this hose did not answer the specifications of the contract, it was accepted. The consequence was that it burst many times at fires, some of them serious. The same was true of equally worthless hose supplied by other contractors.

As an example of the methods used by contractors during the Tammany era, it’s enough to mention the findings later revealed in an investigation by John Purroy Mitchel, Commissioner of Accounts, about how defective hoses were sold to the Fire Department in 1904. The Windsor Fire Appliance Company, whose president and main shareholder was Michael F. Loughman (who was later appointed Deputy Commissioner of Water Supply), sold 25,000 feet of hose to New York City for $23,410.25. Even though this hose didn’t meet the contract specifications, it was accepted. As a result, it burst multiple times during fires, some of which were serious. The same issue occurred with other low-quality hoses provided by different contractors.

The municipal election in 1905 was a triangular contest. Tammany Hall did not fear the Republican ticket headed by William M. Ivins for Mayor. But it did have intense uneasiness over the possibility of Mr. Hearst triumphing; his movement was too plainly making inroads among large numbers of voters that ordinarily would have voted the Tammany ticket. Tammany was particularly bent upon winning inasmuch as by the provisions of the revised charter the term of the incoming Mayor and other officials had been changed to a four-year incumbency. Hearst was the Municipal Ownership League’s candidate for Mayor, and Tammany renominated Mayor McClellan. So effective were Hearst’s onslaughts on “Boss” Murphy and the elements represented by him that during the campaign Mayor McClellan repeatedly made promises that[323] he would thereafter pursue an independent course, should he be reelected.

The municipal election in 1905 was a three-way contest. Tammany Hall wasn't worried about the Republican ticket led by William M. Ivins for Mayor. However, they were very anxious about the chance of Mr. Hearst winning; his campaign was clearly gaining traction with many voters who usually would have supported Tammany. Tammany was especially determined to win since the revised charter had changed the term for the new Mayor and other officials to four years. Hearst was the candidate for Mayor from the Municipal Ownership League, while Tammany renominated Mayor McClellan. Hearst’s attacks on “Boss” Murphy and his supporters were so effective that during the campaign, Mayor McClellan repeatedly promised that[323] if reelected, he would pursue an independent course.

Mr. Hearst’s vote returns came in so heavily after the polls were closed that it looked as though he were certainly elected. That very night there was a strange interruption, lasting about an hour, in the public giving-out of the returns. Then as the returns were resumed, it appeared that although the vote between McClellan and Hearst was extremely close, McClellan had a little the better of it. The next day it was announced that Mayor McClellan was reelected by a close margin. Mr. Hearst and his followers declared that manifest fraud had been committed, and took steps to have a recount. Meantime while this process was dragging along, Mayor McClellan was widely criticized for his action in immediately claiming his reelection, opposing a recount, and not showing faith in the legitimacy of his claims by waiting with dignity until there had been a careful official recount.

Mr. Hearst's vote returns piled in so fast after the polls closed that it seemed like he was definitely going to win. That same night, there was a strange pause in the public announcement of the returns that lasted about an hour. When the updates continued, it turned out that even though the vote between McClellan and Hearst was extremely close, McClellan had a slight edge. The next day, it was announced that Mayor McClellan had been reelected by a narrow margin. Mr. Hearst and his supporters claimed that clear fraud had taken place and started pushing for a recount. Meanwhile, while this process dragged on, Mayor McClellan faced heavy criticism for immediately claiming his reelection, opposing a recount, and not showing confidence in the legitimacy of his victory by waiting with dignity for a thorough official recount.

The final official recount gave this result: McClellan, 228,407 votes Hearst, 224,929 votes; Ivins, 137,184 votes. It may be added here that in the very next year—in 1906—Hearst accepted a Tammany indorsement when he ran for Governor, but he was defeated by Charles E. Hughes, who, as counsel for the Legislative Insurance Committee, had achieved wide popularity for his exposure of the insurance company iniquities.

The final official recount showed these results: McClellan, 228,407 votes; Hearst, 224,929 votes; Ivins, 137,184 votes. It's worth noting that the following year—in 1906—Hearst accepted a Tammany endorsement when he ran for Governor, but he lost to Charles E. Hughes, who had gained significant popularity for his work as counsel for the Legislative Insurance Committee, where he exposed the wrongdoing of insurance companies.

With the reelection of Mr. McClellan, Tammany Hall confidently looked forward to four more years of unquestioned control of the immense budget and enormous opportunities embodied in the rule of New York City.

With Mr. McClellan's reelection, Tammany Hall confidently anticipated four more years of unchallenged control over the massive budget and significant opportunities that come with governing New York City.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Report of the New York Legislative Insurance Committee, 1906, Vol. X, p. 16.

[1] Report of the New York Legislative Insurance Committee, 1906, Vol. X, p. 16.

[2] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.

[3] Ibid., p. 50.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., p. 50.

[4] Ibid., pp. 62 and 398.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., pp. 62 and 398.

[5] Ibid., p. 10.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, p. 10.

[6] Mr. Croker, in 1900, had admitted his liability to an English tax on a yearly income of $100,000.

[6] Mr. Croker, in 1900, acknowledged that he was liable for an English tax on a yearly income of $100,000.

[7] The company had filed articles of incorporation in 1872, but was charged with being an abortive corporation in that it had never completed the necessary formalities required by law.

[7] The company filed its articles of incorporation in 1872, but was accused of being a failed corporation because it never fulfilled the legal requirements.

[8] As we shall see later, the political composition of the Board of Estimate was at this time considerably mixed; during his second term Mayor McClellan was fighting Mr. Murphy, leader of Tammany Hall, and had the backing of Senator McCarren and of McCarren’s lieutenant, Controller Metz. Mr. McGowan, president of the Board of Aldermen, was supposed to be a Tammany man, but was not on good terms with the “Organization” and was credited with being aligned with McClellan and Metz.

[8] As we will see later, the political makeup of the Board of Estimate was quite mixed at this time; during his second term, Mayor McClellan was up against Mr. Murphy, the leader of Tammany Hall, and had support from Senator McCarren and McCarren’s right-hand man, Controller Metz. Mr. McGowan, the president of the Board of Aldermen, was thought to be a Tammany supporter, but he wasn't on good terms with the "Organization" and was believed to be aligned with McClellan and Metz.

[9] Interstate Commerce Commission Report No. 6569, In re Financial Transactions of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Co., July 11, 1914, pp. 35, 38, etc. The above are but a few extracts from this comprehensive report.

[9] Interstate Commerce Commission Report No. 6569, In re Financial Transactions of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Co., July 11, 1914, pp. 35, 38, etc. The above are just a few excerpts from this detailed report.

[10] The Truth About Metropolitan, by W. N. Amory, pp. 60-64.

[10] The Truth About Metropolitan, by W. N. Amory, pp. 60-64.

[11] In an effective article in McClure’s Magazine, Mr. Ray Stannard Baker showed how one of these big companies bribed walking delegates to declare strikes on buildings being put up by rival contractors in order that it—the briber—might be able to get a reputation for building within contract time, and thus exclude competitors from getting further contracts.

[11] In a compelling article in McClure’s Magazine, Mr. Ray Stannard Baker revealed how one of these large companies paid off walking delegates to call strikes on construction sites run by competitor contractors so that the company paying them could build a reputation for finishing projects on time, effectively keeping competitors from securing more contracts.


CHAPTER XXXIII
Tammany's Control Under Leader Murphy
1906-1909

When Mayor McClellan, in the campaign of 1905 promised an independent administration, Tammany leaders did not take his words seriously; they considered his promises mere campaign vapor. In this estimate they were mistaken. Mayor McClellan broke relations with Charles F. Murphy in January, 1906, and announced that he would keep every promise made by him “on the stump.” His appointment of anti-Murphy men to office had a nettling effect on the leader of Tammany Hall, against whom he began a systematic campaign. Results, still more serious to Tammany leaders, were forthcoming.

When Mayor McClellan, during the 1905 campaign, promised an independent administration, the Tammany leaders didn't take him seriously; they thought his promises were just empty talk for the campaign. They were wrong in that assessment. In January 1906, Mayor McClellan severed ties with Charles F. Murphy and stated that he would fulfill every promise he made while campaigning. His decision to appoint anti-Murphy individuals to positions of power irritated the leader of Tammany Hall, and he began a targeted campaign against him. The outcomes were even more serious for the Tammany leaders.

The President of the Borough of Manhattan was John A. Ahearn, a noted Tammany district leader. He had been a State Senator from 1889 to 1902, and had been elected president of the Borough of Manhattan in 1903, and reelected in 1905 for a term of four years. It may be explained that the presidency of a borough was a powerful office, having direct appointive and supervisory power over six departments with expenditures of many millions of dollars annually.[1]

The President of the Borough of Manhattan was John A. Ahearn, a well-known Tammany district leader. He served as a State Senator from 1889 to 1902 and was elected president of the Borough of Manhattan in 1903, later being reelected in 1905 for a four-year term. It's worth noting that the presidency of a borough was a significant position, with direct appointive and supervisory authority over six departments that had annual budgets in the millions.[1]

Charges of misconduct were brought against Mr. Ahearn, in 1906, by the Bureau of City Betterment (later called the Bureau of Municipal Research). When Mr. Ahearn requested an investigation by the Commissioners of Accounts, Mayor McClellan accommodated his desire. The report of these commissioners, handed in to the Mayor, July 16, 1907, severely arraigned Ahearn’s administration, and after specifying particulars, the report denounced “the inefficiency, neglect, waste and corruption disclosed in the course of this inquiry.”[2]

Charges of misconduct were filed against Mr. Ahearn in 1906 by the Bureau of City Betterment (which later became the Bureau of Municipal Research). When Mr. Ahearn asked for an investigation by the Commissioners of Accounts, Mayor McClellan agreed to his request. The report from these commissioners, submitted to the Mayor on July 16, 1907, harshly criticized Ahearn’s administration and, after detailing specific issues, condemned “the inefficiency, neglect, waste and corruption revealed during this inquiry.”[2]

The investigation showed that in the three years that Mr. Ahearn had occupied the office of borough president, he had control of an expenditure totaling $21,994,477. Of this amount it was shown that $1,608,762 was spent in the purchase of supplies without public tender being asked, as required by law. It was proved that many of the payrolls (amounting to an aggregate of $5,942,187) were padded with the names of men who never did a day’s work for the department. Even in the expenditures made under contract—expenditures totaling $14,447,473 in the three years—it was proved that little effort was made to compel contractors to observe their obligations. Fully a third of the total expenditure—the third amounting to $5,400,000—was lost to the city, it was asserted, by the manner in which the department was administered. There were still further losses to the city; and although, also, there was plenty of money at Mr. Ahearn’s disposal for the repairs of street pavements, that work, it was held, was considerably neglected. The evidence in the commissioners’ investigation and the evidence presented by the City Club in subsequent hearings ordered by Governor[326] Hughes showed that supply contractors often made profits ranging from 100 to 200 per cent. (and in at least one case 300 to 500 per cent.) more than the regular prices prevailing in the open market.

The investigation revealed that during the three years Mr. Ahearn served as borough president, he controlled spending of $21,994,477. It was found that $1,608,762 was spent on supplies without conducting public bids, as legally required. Evidence showed that many payrolls, totaling $5,942,187, included the names of individuals who never worked a single day for the department. Even in the contract expenditures—totaling $14,447,473 over three years—there was little effort to ensure that contractors followed through on their commitments. It was claimed that about a third of the total expenses—amounting to $5,400,000—was lost to the city due to the way the department was run. There were further losses to the city, and although Mr. Ahearn had ample funds for street pavement repairs, that work was significantly overlooked. Evidence from the commissioners' investigation and from the City Club during subsequent hearings ordered by Governor[326] Hughes indicated that supply contractors often marked up their profits by 100 to 200 percent (and in at least one case, 300 to 500 percent) above regular market prices.

Among other disclosures the testimony revealed that $144,500 had been paid out for asphalt “fire burns,” which in reality were not “fire burns” at all; they were defects that the asphalt companies were obliged to repair without charge. The favorite contractors were such Tammany district leaders as Bartholomew Dunn, Thomas J. Dunn and others.

Among other revelations, the testimony showed that $144,500 had been paid for asphalt "fire burns," which were actually not "fire burns" at all; they were defects that the asphalt companies were required to fix for free. The preferred contractors included Tammany district leaders like Bartholomew Dunn, Thomas J. Dunn, and others.

On December 9, 1907, Governor Hughes removed Mr. Ahearn from office. In his notice of ejection, Governor Hughes said that justice to Mr. Ahearn required that attention should be called to the fact that “it is not shown, and it has not been claimed, that he has converted public money or property to his own use, or has personally profited in an unlawful manner by his official conduct.” But Governor Hughes said that he did find that the charges of maladministration, remissness and grave abuses existing under Ahearn’s administration had been proved. Mr. Ahearn was, in reality, a victim of the Tammany system. A few days later, the Manhattan Aldermen reelected him—a move that was contested by taking the case to the Court of Appeals, which in November, 1909, sustained his removal and disapproved of his reelection. Meanwhile, he had continued in office.

On December 9, 1907, Governor Hughes removed Mr. Ahearn from office. In his notice of removal, Governor Hughes stated that fairness to Mr. Ahearn required highlighting the fact that "it hasn't been shown, and it hasn't been claimed, that he has misappropriated public money or property for his own benefit, or has unlawfully profited from his official actions." However, Governor Hughes did find that the accusations of mismanagement, negligence, and serious abuses during Ahearn's administration were proven. Mr. Ahearn was, in fact, a victim of the Tammany system. A few days later, the Manhattan Aldermen reelected him—a decision that was challenged in the Court of Appeals, which in November 1909 upheld his removal and disapproved of his reelection. Meanwhile, he continued to serve in office.

Another conspicuous Tammany leader removed from office was Louis F. Haffen, president of the Borough of the Bronx. He had held that office since January 1, 1898, and had been last reelected in 1905. Mr. Haffen was, as we have seen, one of the regency of three controlling Tammany Hall immediately previous to Charles F. Murphy’s assumption of sole leadership. He was a Sachem of the Tammany Society.

Another noticeable Tammany leader who was removed from office was Louis F. Haffen, president of the Borough of the Bronx. He had held that position since January 1, 1898, and had been last reelected in 1905. Mr. Haffen was, as we have seen, one of the three leaders in control of Tammany Hall just before Charles F. Murphy took over as the sole leader. He was a Sachem of the Tammany Society.

In November, 1908, twenty-two charges were presented to Governor Hughes by John Purroy Mitchel and Ernest[327] Gallagher, Commissioners of Accounts of New York City, at the instance of Mayor McClellan.[3] The City Club and the Citizens’ Union jointly filed charges against Mr. Haffen and prosecuted them. Governor Hughes, basing his findings and action on the report of Wallace Macfarlane, his Commissioner who heard the evidence, found that the following charges had been established:

In November 1908, John Purroy Mitchel and Ernest Gallagher, the Commissioners of Accounts for New York City, presented twenty-two charges to Governor Hughes at the request of Mayor McClellan.[3] The City Club and the Citizens’ Union collaborated to file and pursue charges against Mr. Haffen. Governor Hughes, relying on the findings of Wallace Macfarlane, the Commissioner who reviewed the evidence, determined that the following charges were proven:

That Mr. Haffen had greatly abused his discretionary power in failing to enforce more stringently the time clauses of contracts for public improvements, and that the time statements in his certificates to the Finance Department were in many cases untrue; that the public funds were wasted by loading the payrolls of his department with a large number of superfluous employees; that there was political jobbery in the building of the Bronx Borough Court House; the appointed architect was essentially a politician without professional qualifications who had hired others to do the architectural work. The granite contract for this building was awarded to the Buck’s Harbor Granite Company, represented in New York by a Bronx Tammany district leader.

Mr. Haffen seriously misused his discretionary power by not enforcing the time clauses of public improvement contracts more strictly, and many of the time statements in his certificates to the Finance Department were false. Public funds were wasted by adding a large number of unnecessary employees to his department's payrolls. There was political corruption involved in the construction of the Bronx Borough Court House; the appointed architect was basically a politician with no professional qualifications who hired others to handle the architectural work. The granite contract for this building went to the Buck’s Harbor Granite Company, which was represented in New York by a Bronx Tammany district leader.

Among an array of further charges against Mr. Haffen that were found true was the charge that he was financially interested in the Sound View Land and Improvement Company, “and that his official action in connection with the Clason’s Point Road was induced by his desire to increase the value of his own and his associates’ holdings in this company, which had acquired a tract of forty-one acres with a frontage of 2,500 feet on the proposed road, with a view to that improvement.”

Among several additional charges against Mr. Haffen that were proven true was the allegation that he had a financial interest in the Sound View Land and Improvement Company, “and that his official actions related to Clason’s Point Road were motivated by his desire to increase the value of his and his associates’ investments in this company, which had acquired a 41-acre parcel with a 2,500-foot frontage on the proposed road, aimed at that improvement.”

Another charge established against Mr. Haffen was that[328] as borough president and chairman of the local board of Morrisania, Mr. Haffen had recommended the acquisition by New York City of certain property at Hunt’s Point on the East River Shore, for use as a public bathing place. This property, Governor Hughes declared, was utterly unsuitable for the purpose because of its proximity to a trunk sewer.

Another accusation against Mr. Haffen was that[328] as borough president and chair of the local board of Morrisania, he had suggested that New York City buy some property at Hunt’s Point on the East River for use as a public swimming area. Governor Hughes stated that this property was completely inappropriate for that purpose due to its closeness to a main sewer.

Governor Hughes set forth that the Hunt’s Point transaction was “a highly discreditable affair. This shore property was about five acres in extent, and the assessed valuation was about $4,300. During the condemnation proceedings the attorney for the company which owned it purchased it from his client for about $86,000.[4] It was then transferred to another company, and was acquired by the city at a cost of about $247,000, the value fixed by the condemnation commissioners.” Thus the award for the Hunt’s Point property was fifty-eight times the assessed value, and many times the actual value.

Governor Hughes stated that the Hunt's Point deal was "a highly discreditable affair." This property on the shore covered about five acres and was assessed at around $4,300. During the condemnation process, the attorney representing the company that owned it bought it from his client for about $86,000.[4] It was then sold to another company and eventually obtained by the city for about $247,000, as determined by the condemnation commissioners. Therefore, the compensation for the Hunt’s Point property was fifty-eight times its assessed value and significantly more than its actual worth.

Other charges against Mr. Haffen were sustained. Overtime charges on contracts had been liquidated arbitrarily; on one occasion $70,000 was improperly remitted to “Bart” Dunn who previously had contributed $1,000 to the Haffen campaign fund.[5] Payments were made to contractors on absolutely false statements certified from[329] Mr. Haffen’s office. Extravagance in the Bureau of Public Buildings and Offices resulted in an estimated waste of $175,000 of an available $292,000 in six years of Mr. Haffen’s administration.[6] Contract juggling was common. Worn-out Belgian blocks were sold by the borough to contractors and then repurchased by the city as new. In cases where contractors were friends of Mr. Haffen, contract specifications were so drawn as to exclude competitors. Streets were laid in irregular routes so as to aid land development schemes in which Tammany men held control. Highway contract specifications were deliberately violated by the contractors. The labors of the maintenance force in the Bureau of Highways were wasted to such an extent that the investigators estimated a loss of 50 per cent. in efficiency, or $1,600,000 in money, within six years.[7] A similar waste of $300,000 was attributed to the Bureau of Sewers in the same period.

Other charges against Mr. Haffen were upheld. Overtime charges on contracts were settled randomly; at one point, $70,000 was wrongly paid to “Bart” Dunn, who had previously donated $1,000 to the Haffen campaign fund.[5] Payments were made to contractors based on completely false statements certified from[329] Mr. Haffen’s office. Overspending in the Bureau of Public Buildings and Offices led to an estimated waste of $175,000 from an available $292,000 during Mr. Haffen’s six years in office.[6] Contract manipulation was common. Worn Belgian blocks were sold by the borough to contractors and then bought back by the city as if they were new. In cases where contractors were friends of Mr. Haffen, contract specifications were designed to exclude competitors. Streets were laid out irregularly to support land development plans controlled by Tammany affiliates. Highway contract specifications were intentionally broken by the contractors. The maintenance workforce in the Bureau of Highways was so inefficient that investigators estimated a loss of 50 percent, totaling $1,600,000 over six years.[7] A similar waste of $300,000 was attributed to the Bureau of Sewers during the same time frame.

Borough President Haffen was ousted by Governor Hughes on August 29, 1909. When removed from office, Haffen complained, “This is a fine reward for twenty-six and a half years of honest, faithful and efficient service to the people.…”

Borough President Haffen was removed by Governor Hughes on August 29, 1909. After being ousted, Haffen said, “This is a great way to reward twenty-six and a half years of honest, loyal, and effective service to the people…”

Another high city official who went out of office during this time was Joseph Bermel, president of the Borough of Queens. He hastily resigned while under charges.

Another high-ranking city official who left office during this time was Joseph Bermel, president of the Borough of Queens. He quickly stepped down while facing accusations.

Mr. Bermel was not, strictly speaking, a Tammany man; he was an auxiliary satrap. His removal from office had been asked for by Attorney-General Jackson and Deputy Attorney-General Nathan Viadiver, of New York State, at the conclusion of an inquiry into Bermel’s office.

Mr. Bermel wasn’t, to be precise, a Tammany man; he was a supporting leader. Attorney-General Jackson and Deputy Attorney-General Nathan Viadiver from New York State requested his removal from office after an investigation into Bermel’s office.

Bermel was charged by the Attorney General and by the Queen’s Borough Property Owners’ Association with various acts. He was accused of conspiring with others[330] to defraud New York City in the purchase or sale of land to New York City; he was charged with accepting money from persons interested in the sale of such lands, and was further charged with selling and using his influence in the land purchases in question. He was accused of failing to aid the Grand Jury in its investigations into these transactions, and was further charged with blocking the procedure of that body with his influence and money in refusing to testify in certain matters, and in other cases testifying falsely and removing his books from the Grand Jury’s jurisdiction. Another charge was that he swore falsely concerning his bank deposits, which evidence he sought to corroborate by the testimony of a witness who presented apparent confirmation in the shape of a written paper, which paper upon investigation was proved to be a false and fraudulent document.

Bermel was accused by the Attorney General and the Queen’s Borough Property Owners’ Association of several offenses. He was alleged to have conspired with others[330] to defraud New York City in the buying or selling of land; he was charged with taking money from individuals involved in the sale of that land, and he was also charged with using his influence in these land transactions. He was said to have not cooperated with the Grand Jury during its investigations into these deals and was further accused of using his influence and money to obstruct the Grand Jury’s work by refusing to testify in certain cases, and in other instances, providing false testimony and removing his records from the Grand Jury’s reach. Another accusation was that he lied about his bank deposits, attempting to support his claims with a witness who provided what seemed like confirming evidence in the form of a document, which upon investigation turned out to be false and fraudulent.

Still further, Mr. Bermel was charged with receiving money for granting special privileges to contractors; with neglecting pavements and permitting material of a lower grade than specified to be used in contract work; with purchasing supplies for public buildings at exorbitant prices and with allowing the same high prices to be charged for repairs to public buildings. Additional charges were that he appointed incompetent subordinates and permitted persons who did no work to draw salaries. Close upon the announcement from Albany that Governor Hughes had appointed Samuel H. Ordway as Commissioner to take testimony, Bermel on April 29, 1908, resigned from office.[8]

Still further, Mr. Bermel was accused of accepting money in exchange for giving contractors special favors; of neglecting sidewalks and allowing materials of a lower quality than specified to be used in contract work; of buying supplies for public buildings at outrageous prices and allowing those same high prices to be charged for repairs to public buildings. Additional accusations included appointing unqualified people and allowing those who didn’t do any work to collect salaries. Shortly after the announcement from Albany that Governor Hughes had appointed Samuel H. Ordway as Commissioner to gather testimony, Bermel resigned from his position on April 29, 1908.[8]

The Aldermen on April 30, 1908, elected Lawrence Gresser to fill Mr. Bermel’s unexpired term as President of the Borough of Queens, and on November 2, 1909, Mr. Gresser was elected by the people to that office for the[331] four ensuing years. In 1911 charges were preferred by citizens of Queens County against Gresser. A number of these charges were sustained by Samuel H. Ordway, the Commissioner appointed by the Governor to take testimony and report. Commissioner Ordway, however, explained in his report made June 16, 1911: “Of those [charges] that are sustained, none, in my opinion, establishes corruption or dishonesty on the part of Mr. Gresser. I believe that he is an honest man and would not be a party to any corrupt acts either for his own benefit or that of his associates. But I am of the opinion that he has been inefficient and incompetent, and has been neglectful of his duty to protect the city and the Borough of Queens against fraud and corruption on the part of his subordinates.”[9] After an argument made by Robert S. Binkerd, Secretary of the City Club, asking for Mr. Gresser’s removal, Governor Dix removed Gresser from office.

On April 30, 1908, the Aldermen elected Lawrence Gresser to complete Mr. Bermel’s unexpired term as President of the Borough of Queens. Then, on November 2, 1909, the people elected Mr. Gresser to that position for the[331] next four years. In 1911, residents of Queens County brought charges against Gresser. Some of these charges were upheld by Samuel H. Ordway, the Commissioner appointed by the Governor to gather evidence and report. However, Commissioner Ordway clarified in his report on June 16, 1911: “Of those [charges] that are upheld, none, in my view, prove corruption or dishonesty on Mr. Gresser's part. I believe he is an honest man and would not engage in any corrupt actions for his own gain or that of his associates. However, I do believe he has been inefficient and incompetent, and has neglected his duty to protect the city and the Borough of Queens from fraud and corruption committed by his subordinates.”[9] Following an argument presented by Robert S. Binkerd, Secretary of the City Club, for Mr. Gresser’s removal, Governor Dix removed Gresser from office.

But Tammany men were not the only officials against whom charges were brought. It had long been a subject of increasing general comment that District Attorney Jerome, much noted as such a leading reformer, who had been so conspicuously active in sending petty offenders to prison, had failed to bring about the conviction of any high insurance officials and had not brought about the indictment of a single traction system manipulator.

But Tammany men weren't the only officials facing accusations. It had long been a topic of growing concern that District Attorney Jerome, known as a key reformer who had been very active in sending minor offenders to prison, had not managed to convict any high-ranking insurance officials and hadn't indicted a single person involved in managing the traction systems.

On September 8, 1907, a voluminous petition was sent by various New York business men and other citizens to Governor Hughes. This petition recited in detail the specific transactions thus complained of, made a scathing criticism of District Attorney Jerome for having failed to prosecute those responsible, and demanded that the Attorney General of New York State be forthwith directed to bring prosecution.

On September 8, 1907, a lengthy petition was sent by several New York businessmen and other citizens to Governor Hughes. This petition outlined in detail the specific issues they were complaining about, harshly criticized District Attorney Jerome for not prosecuting those responsible, and called for the Attorney General of New York State to immediately start legal action.

Evidence submitted, on December 1, 1907, to the Grand Jury in General Sessions showed that Thomas F. Ryan and associates had bought in 1902 from Anthony N. Brady for $250,000 the franchise of a company called the Wall and Cortland Street Ferries Railroad Company, a corporation having a dormant franchise for a road that had never been built.[10] They had then sold this franchise to a dummy corporation, called the Metropolitan Securities Company, for $965,607.19. Part of this sum went to the syndicate’s brokers; the precise amount of funds divided among Ryan, Widener, Dolan and the estates of William C. Whitney and William L. Elkins was $692,292.82.[11] The surviving members of this group subsequently settled the transaction by making restitution of this sum soon after the facts had been made public and after charges had been made against Jerome. On the very day that Mr. Ryan and associates had bought the non-existent Wall and Cortlandt Street Ferries Railroad, they had also bought, for $1,600,000, the People’s Traction Company, owning a paper road never built, and the New York, Westchester and Connecticut Traction Company, a small railway, which a short time previously had been sold in bankruptcy proceedings for $15,000.[12] It was charged that in this transaction also, there was another grand division of funds.

Evidence submitted on December 1, 1907, to the Grand Jury in General Sessions showed that Thomas F. Ryan and his associates had purchased in 1902 from Anthony N. Brady for $250,000 the franchise of a company called the Wall and Cortland Street Ferries Railroad Company, a corporation with a dormant franchise for a road that had never been built.[10] They then sold this franchise to a shell company called the Metropolitan Securities Company for $965,607.19. Part of this amount went to the syndicate’s brokers; the exact sum divided among Ryan, Widener, Dolan, and the estates of William C. Whitney and William L. Elkins was $692,292.82.[11] The remaining members of this group later settled the transaction by paying back this amount soon after the details became public and charges were leveled against Jerome. On the very day that Mr. Ryan and his associates purchased the nonexistent Wall and Cortlandt Street Ferries Railroad, they also bought, for $1,600,000, the People’s Traction Company, which owned a paper road that had never been constructed, and the New York, Westchester, and Connecticut Traction Company, a small railway that had recently been sold in bankruptcy proceedings for $15,000.[12] It was alleged that in this transaction as well, there was another major division of funds.

These particular transactions, however, were in reality insignificant compared to the disappearance of $16,000,000 from the treasury of the Third avenue Railway,[13][333] and vaster total transactions charged, aggregating, as we have previously noted, about $90,000,000. The fact was brought out in the investigation by the Public Service Commission that all the books of the Metropolitan Street Railway Company in which its affairs from 1891 onward to 1902 were recorded, had been sold to a purchaser who promised to destroy them.[14] Street car lines bought for a few hundred thousand dollars were, it was charged, capitalized at ten or twenty times that sum, and then followed a process by which vast amounts were charged in duplication of construction accounts.

These transactions, however, were actually minor compared to the loss of $16,000,000 from the treasury of the Third Avenue Railway,[13][333] and the much larger total transactions charged, which we previously noted was around $90,000,000. The Public Service Commission's investigation revealed that all the records of the Metropolitan Street Railway Company covering its activities from 1891 to 1902 had been sold to someone who promised to destroy them.[14] Streetcar lines that were purchased for a few hundred thousand dollars were allegedly valued at ten or twenty times that amount, followed by a scheme where large sums were charged for duplicated construction accounts.

Lemuel Ely Quigg (who for six years had been a member of Congress) admitted that in the four years preceding 1907 he had received $217,000 from the Metropolitan Street Railway Company.[15] This was charged to a construction fund, part of which was another sum of $798,000 paid to different persons whose names were concealed. Further facts in a legislative investigation in 1910 (to which we shall hereafter refer) supplied certain other missing links.

Lemuel Ely Quigg, who had served as a member of Congress for six years, acknowledged that in the four years leading up to 1907, he received $217,000 from the Metropolitan Street Railway Company.[15] This amount was allocated to a construction fund, which included an additional $798,000 paid to various individuals whose identities were kept secret. Further details uncovered during a legislative investigation in 1910 (which we will mention later) provided some other missing pieces.

No criminal proceedings, however, were brought against Mr. Ryan. In a statement published on May 26, 1909, Col. Amory averred that when a Grand Jury was called in 1907 to investigate the acts of Ryan and associates of the Metropolitan Street Railway Company, the foreman of the Grand Jury was a director in Mr. Ryan’s[334] Equitable Life Assurance Society. Col. Amory also made the accusation that in April, 1903, Daniel Mason, Mr. Jerome’s former law partner, and William H. Page, Jr., another of the Metropolitan’s lawyers, had attempted to bribe him (Amory) while a State’s witness, with $200,000, to withdraw the charges that Amory had filed with Jerome against the Metropolitan Street Railway Company. On January 27, 1908, Judge Rosalsky, in the Court of General Sessions, severely arraigned District Attorney Jerome, declaring that Jerome had so conducted the examination of Thomas F. Ryan before the Grand Jury as probably to invalidate any indictments which that body might have found against Ryan. Paul D. Cravath, Governor Hughes’s former law partner, was now Ryan’s astute attorney.

No criminal charges were brought against Mr. Ryan. In a statement released on May 26, 1909, Col. Amory claimed that when a Grand Jury was convened in 1907 to investigate the actions of Ryan and his associates from the Metropolitan Street Railway Company, the foreman of that Grand Jury was a director in Mr. Ryan’s Equitable Life Assurance Society. Col. Amory also accused that in April 1903, Daniel Mason, Mr. Jerome’s former law partner, and William H. Page, Jr., another lawyer for the Metropolitan, tried to bribe him (Amory) while he was a State witness, offering $200,000 to drop the charges Amory had filed with Jerome against the Metropolitan Street Railway Company. On January 27, 1908, Judge Rosalsky, in the Court of General Sessions, harshly criticized District Attorney Jerome, stating that Jerome had managed the examination of Thomas F. Ryan before the Grand Jury in a way that could potentially invalidate any indictments the jury might have found against Ryan. Paul D. Cravath, former law partner of Governor Hughes, was now Ryan’s sharp attorney.

Governor Hughes appointed a Commissioner to hear the evidence upon which the charges against Mr. Jerome were made. Jerome admitted that when Ryan, Brady and Vreeland were before the Grand Jury he had put leading questions to them. Further he testified that he had not asked the Grand Jury to indict Ryan in the matter of the Wall Street and Cortlandt Street Ferries Railway transactions. Interrogated as to a certain contribution made to his campaign fund by Samuel Untermeyer, counsel for Mr. Hyde of the Equitable Life Assurance Society, Mr. Jerome denied that any ulterior purpose was behind it. Mr. Ryan admitted on the witness stand that he (Ryan) had contributed heavily to the national fund of the Democratic party in 1900.

Governor Hughes appointed a Commissioner to review the evidence regarding the charges against Mr. Jerome. Jerome acknowledged that he had asked leading questions when Ryan, Brady, and Vreeland were before the Grand Jury. He also testified that he did not ask the Grand Jury to indict Ryan concerning the transactions involving the Wall Street and Cortlandt Street Ferries Railway. When questioned about a contribution to his campaign fund from Samuel Untermeyer, who represented Mr. Hyde of the Equitable Life Assurance Society, Mr. Jerome denied that there was any hidden agenda behind it. Mr. Ryan admitted while on the witness stand that he had made significant contributions to the national fund of the Democratic Party in 1900.

The Commissioner’s report exonerated Jerome, and Governor Hughes dismissed the charges, saying, “Nothing has been presented which furnishes any just ground for impeaching the good faith of the District Attorney in connection with any of the transactions set forth, nor has anything been shown which would justify his removal from office.” The outcome was severely criticized by some of the very newspapers which had once enthusiastically supported[335] Mr. Jerome. Col. Amory wrote that there were other bribes than money bribes, and that he did not believe Mr. Jerome capable of doing a corrupt act for money.[16] Whatever the fundamental facts, the consequences were clear: great sums of money had undeniably vanished, a group of magnates had become additionally enriched, the street railway system was wrecked and thrown into bankruptcy, the statute of limitations had meanwhile been interposed, and nobody had been prosecuted.

The Commissioner's report cleared Jerome, and Governor Hughes dropped the charges, stating, “Nothing has been shown that provides any reasonable basis to question the honesty of the District Attorney regarding any of the actions described, nor has anything been provided that would warrant his removal from office.” The result faced heavy criticism from some of the very newspapers that had previously backed Mr. Jerome enthusiastically. Col. Amory commented that there are other types of bribes beyond just monetary ones, and he didn't believe Mr. Jerome would commit a corrupt act for money. Whatever the core facts, the outcomes were evident: large amounts of money had definitely disappeared, a group of wealthy individuals had become even richer, the street railway system was ruined and went bankrupt, the statute of limitations had been applied, and no one had been prosecuted.

These were the essential facts, and they were facts that, after all explanations, could not be evaded. Mr. Jerome himself was forced to recognize them in his own defense; in his public speeches he took great pains to assure his hearers that acts might be wrong and yet not criminal, but it was an explanation not favorably received in general. The great change in public opinion was forcibly shown, when, at a meeting in Cooper Union, on May 26, 1909, Mr. Jerome was badly heckled and asked the most pointed questions as to why he had not prosecuted the traction magnates.

These were the key facts, and they were facts that, despite all the explanations, couldn't be ignored. Mr. Jerome himself had to acknowledge them in his own defense; in his public speeches, he made a big effort to reassure his audience that certain actions could be wrong but not necessarily criminal, but this explanation was generally not well-received. The significant shift in public opinion was clearly demonstrated when, at a meeting in Cooper Union on May 26, 1909, Mr. Jerome faced intense heckling and was asked tough questions about why he hadn't prosecuted the transportation tycoons.

The city finances during these years were in a bewilderingly deplorable state. On December 31, 1907, the total amount remaining uncollected from the tax levies covering the years 1899 to 1907, inclusive, was $90,545,000. In addition, a sum of $12,289,000 remained uncollected from the tax levies prior to the year 1899.[17] Notwithstanding these actual enormous deficiencies, the amounts placed in the tax levies, from the years 1899 to 1905 inclusive, to provide for possible deficiencies in tax collections, was only $11,719,000. During that very period the amounts in discounts, remissions and cancelations amounted to $12,477,000, which was more than $758,000[336] in excess of the amount placed in the tax levies to provide for deficiencies in collections. “In other words,” reported a Select Legislative Committee, “the amounts placed in the tax levies during those years to provide for deficiencies in collections, did not even equal the discounts, cancelations and remissions, and made no provision whatever for failure or inability to collect taxes levied.”[18]

The city's finances during these years were in a shockingly terrible state. On December 31, 1907, the total amount still uncollected from the tax levies from 1899 to 1907 was $90,545,000. Additionally, there was $12,289,000 that remained uncollected from tax levies before 1899.[17] Despite these huge shortfalls, the amounts included in the tax levies from 1899 to 1905 to account for potential collection shortfalls was only $11,719,000. During that same period, the amounts for discounts, remissions, and cancellations totaled $12,477,000, which was over $758,000[336] more than the amount set aside in the tax levies to cover collection shortfalls. “In other words,” reported a Select Legislative Committee, “the amounts included in the tax levies during those years to address collection shortfalls did not even match the discounts, cancellations, and remissions, and made no provision whatsoever for the failure or inability to collect the levied taxes.”[18]

By October 31, 1908, uncollected taxes due the city (including $9,324,000 personal taxes for years previous to 1898, which had been written off as uncollectable), amounted to $84,506,000. Despite the fact that this huge sum had not been collected, the city officials spent the greater part of it as though it had been collected; of the $84,506,000 uncollected, the sum of $76,266,000 had, by October 31, 1908, been expended by the city in appropriations included in budgets which, in reality, ought to have been defrayed by these uncollected taxes.[19]

By October 31, 1908, the unpaid taxes owed to the city (which included $9,324,000 in personal taxes from years before 1898 that had been deemed uncollectible) totaled $84,506,000. Even though this massive amount hadn't been collected, the city officials spent most of it as if it had been received; out of the $84,506,000 in uncollected taxes, $76,266,000 had been spent by the city on allocations included in budgets that, in reality, should have been covered by these uncollected taxes.[19]

Basing their action on these uncollected taxes, the city officials had issued, from time to time, large amounts in revenue bonds with which to get money to pay the appropriations in the yearly budgets. On October 31, 1908, there was outstanding against these arrears of taxes $40,606,000 of revenue bonds. This left a balance of $35,660,000 which had been expended by the city for current expenses, but which had neither been collected nor procured by revenue bonds.[20] The Select Legislative Committee commented upon the fact that although the evidence proved conclusively that not more than 65 per cent. of personal taxes were collectable, yet the city budget had nearly equaled the entire levy in each year.[21] Furthermore, the sum of $24,521,000 in special franchise taxes had not been collected by December 31, 1907.

Basing their actions on these unpaid taxes, the city officials occasionally issued large amounts of revenue bonds to raise funds for the annual budget appropriations. On October 31, 1908, there were $40,606,000 in revenue bonds outstanding against these tax arrears. This left a balance of $35,660,000 that the city had spent on current expenses, which had not been collected or covered by revenue bonds.[20] The Select Legislative Committee noted that even though the evidence clearly showed that no more than 65 percent of personal taxes could be collected, the city budget almost matched the total tax levy each year.[21] Additionally, by December 31, 1907, $24,521,000 in special franchise taxes had not been collected.

The sources of a certain $33,000,000 which had been spent by the city puzzled the Select Legislative Committee.[337] Just how this money was obtained the Committee was not able to ascertain.

The sources of a certain $33,000,000 that the city spent confused the Select Legislative Committee.[337] The Committee couldn’t figure out how this money was acquired.

But, the Committee added, it was shown that the assessment account for local improvements was depleted to the amount of $1,900,000. There should have been a sum of $600,000 comprising trust funds, various bequests, intestate estates, etc., but it could not be found. Also, there should have been in the city treasury $3,800,000 more as a special account including deposits made with the city against contractors’ liability for restoring and repaving streets and the unliquidated balance of the Brooklyn fund. But this $3,800,000 “did not exist.” The accounts of the various boroughs revealed a shortage of $1,500,000; excise funds were short $5,100,000; the account of unexpended proceeds of the bond account disclosed a shortage of $7,200,000, and the account of that part of the unexpended bond accounts which had not been allotted was short $8,250,000.[22] making “The Controller’s office,” the Select Legislative Committee reported, “was unable within any reasonable time to determine from what funds the remaining $4,000,000 had been taken, up the total shortage of $33,000,000. But the net result is certain, that for the payment of running expenses over a long period of years, the City has taken the total amount of $29,000,000 from specific funds set apart for other purposes, shifting the resulting deficits from one fund to another as occasion required.”[23]

But the Committee noted that the assessment for local improvements was depleted by $1,900,000. There should have been $600,000 from trust funds, various bequests, intestate estates, and so on, but that couldn't be found. Additionally, there should have been another $3,800,000 in the city treasury as a special account, which included deposits made with the city for contractors' liability in restoring and repaving streets and the unliquidated balance of the Brooklyn fund. However, this $3,800,000 "did not exist." The accounts from the different boroughs showed a shortage of $1,500,000; excise funds were short by $5,100,000; the account of unspent proceeds from the bond account revealed a shortage of $7,200,000, and the part of the unspent bond accounts that hadn't been allocated was short by $8,250,000.[22] making “The Controller’s office,” the Select Legislative Committee reported, “was unable to determine within a reasonable timeframe from which funds the remaining $4,000,000 had been taken, contributing to the total shortage of $33,000,000. However, the clear outcome is that the City has used a total of $29,000,000 from specific funds meant for other purposes to cover running expenses over many years, transferring the resulting deficits from one fund to another as needed.”[23]

Large issues of corporate stock were also made for other than permanent improvements.[24]

Large corporate stock issues were also created for reasons other than long-term improvements.[24]

The city budget appropriations had grown enormously. In 1898 the amount was $70,175,896. By 1909 it had mounted to $156,545,148, an increase of more than $86,000,000, or approximately 123 per cent. Yet the increase in population had been only about 39.4 per cent.[25]

The city budget allocations had increased significantly. In 1898, the amount was $70,175,896. By 1909, it had risen to $156,545,148, an increase of over $86,000,000, or about 123 percent. Meanwhile, the population had only grown by around 39.4 percent.[25]

Vast sums were squandered in the purchasing of city supplies and in a multitude of other ways. Condemnation proceedings were a source of great scandal. There was the Catskill reservoir and aqueduct to supply New York with water, the estimated cost of which undertaking was $162,000,000. “Rings” of politicians bought land which they sold to the city at high prices. For the one item of advertising “public notices” of condemnation proceedings, the cost already had approximated $800,000.[26] In three years the fees paid to certain Catskill reservoir and aqueduct commissioners appointed to condemn land, aggregated $169,490, and this amount did not include the fees of commissioners who had not yet reported.[27] During the same period the fees paid to commissioners in New York City street and park opening proceedings totalled more than $384,000, while fees paid in other condemnation proceedings (exclusive of the Dock Department) aggregated more than $300,000.[28]

Huge amounts of money were wasted on buying city supplies and in many other ways. The condemnation proceedings caused a major scandal. There was the Catskill reservoir and aqueduct to provide water for New York, which was estimated to cost $162,000,000. Groups of politicians bought land and sold it to the city for high prices. Just for the advertising of “public notices” for condemnation proceedings, the cost had already come to about $800,000.[26] In three years, the fees paid to certain commissioners for the Catskill reservoir and aqueduct who were tasked with condemning land added up to $169,490, and this figure didn’t even include the fees for commissioners who hadn’t reported yet.[27] During the same time, the fees given to commissioners for opening streets and parks in New York City exceeded $384,000, while fees for other condemnation proceedings (not including the Dock Department) totaled over $300,000.[28]

Large as these sums were, they were but a fraction of the total amounts pocketed by all of the beneficiaries.

Large as these amounts were, they were just a small part of the total that all the beneficiaries received.

The city payroll was padded with an extraordinarily large number of superfluous employees. In a separate memorandum to the Legislative Committee report, Mr. William M. Bennet, a member of that committee, quoted Controller Metz’s statement in 1909 that from 25 to 50 per cent. of New York City’s payroll, then totalling $80,000,000 a year, was “useless.”[29] At this time (in 1909) New York City’s actual debt reached $800,000,000.[30] In many directions “Organization” men were faring richly. Even though Mayor McClellan was fighting Leader Murphy, Tammany held sway in many administrative and court departments, not included in the Mayor’s jurisdiction, and he had certain reasons for placating some Tammany district leaders.

The city's payroll was bloated with a huge number of unnecessary employees. In a separate memo to the Legislative Committee report, Mr. William M. Bennet, a member of that committee, quoted Controller Metz’s statement from 1909 that between 25 to 50 percent of New York City’s payroll, which was then $80,000,000 a year, was “useless.”[29] At that time (in 1909), New York City’s actual debt had reached $800,000,000.[30] In many areas, “Organization” men were doing very well. Even though Mayor McClellan was in conflict with Leader Murphy, Tammany still had a strong influence in various administrative and court departments that were outside the Mayor’s control, and he had specific reasons to appease some Tammany district leaders.

After declaring his independence of “Boss” Murphy, Mayor McClellan, supported by Senator McCarren, of Brooklyn, had begun a contest—futile enough, as it turned out—to get control of Tammany Hall. According to a magazine article[31] written by General Theodore A. Bingham, Police Commissioner during Mayor McClellan’s second administration, Mayor McClellan “knew full well that the most effective weapon was the power and patronage at his disposal, by virtue of his office. When he tried to use the police I objected.” Dismissed by Mayor McClellan from the office of Police Commissioner, Mr. Bingham soon after set forth his experiences in the published article in question.

After declaring his independence from "Boss" Murphy, Mayor McClellan, backed by Senator McCarren from Brooklyn, started a contest—ultimately a pointless one—to take control of Tammany Hall. According to a magazine article[31] written by General Theodore A. Bingham, who was Police Commissioner during Mayor McClellan’s second term, Mayor McClellan “knew very well that the most effective weapon was the power and patronage at his disposal because of his office. When he attempted to use the police, I objected.” After being dismissed by Mayor McClellan from the role of Police Commissioner, Mr. Bingham soon outlined his experiences in the published article in question.

“In all election contests,” wrote General Bingham further,

“In all election contests,” wrote General Bingham further,

“whether it be a primary election, a municipal election, or a State or a National election, the police are a factor. The district leader who can control the majority of the uniformed men on duty in his bailiwick is not apt to have much trouble in fighting off rival candidates. He has a most influential body of men working for him 365 days in the year.

“Whether it’s a primary election, a local election, or a state or national election, the police play a role. The district leader who can manage most of the uniformed officers on duty in his area is unlikely to face much trouble from opposing candidates. He has a very influential group of people supporting him 365 days a year."

“The baneful influence of the ordinary Tammany district leader in a single precinct station house is far-reaching. When he can do favors, or persuade the men that he can do them, his influence is something beyond belief. Some leaders have had more authority in some police stations than the executive head of the department. They have been looked upon as the men from whom to take orders. They have often visited the station not only to give bail for unlucky constituents, but to give orders to the captains and lieutenants.

“The harmful influence of the typical Tammany district leader in a single precinct station is extensive. When he can do favors, or convince the men that he can, his influence is unbelievable. Some leaders have held more power in certain police stations than the head of the department. They have often been seen as the go-to people for orders. They frequently visit the station not just to post bail for unfortunate constituents, but also to give directives to the captains and lieutenants.”

“Policemen as a whole are the most gullible persons in the entire City Government when it comes to the question of the power of the political ‘boss.’ This is not surprising. Experience has taught them that if they displease the local powers they are apt to be transferred to a distant precinct. Therefore, they fear to take a chance. The wily leader takes advantage of this weakness. He uses his power at every opportunity, and when he meets with opposition he is prompt with his threats. Suppose, in the course of time, the offending policeman is shifted as a matter of routine. Then the leader struts about telling this offender’s fellow officers that he, the leader, had the man transferred.” And if a policeman showed independence, Mr. Bingham asserted, a word from the leader to the superior[340] officers caused “complaints to be made, extra hours of duty, unpleasant details and the like, until the man’s life is made miserable.”

“Overall, cops are the most naive people in the whole City Government when it comes to the power of the political 'boss.' This isn't surprising. They've learned from experience that if they upset the local powers, they risk being moved to a far-off precinct. So, they don't want to take any chances. The crafty leader exploits this weakness. He uses his power whenever he can, and when he faces resistance, he's quick to threaten. If, over time, the troublesome cop gets moved as part of the usual process, the leader boasts to this cop's fellow officers that he was the one who got him transferred.” And if a cop acted independently, Mr. Bingham said, a word from the leader to the higher-ups would lead to “complaints being filed, extra hours of duty, unpleasant assignments, and so on, until the guy's life becomes unbearable.”

General Bingham declared that he had labored to stamp out these abuses, but unavailingly. “So bad did this political influence become in some precincts in Manhattan after Mayor McClellan began his contests at the primaries for the leadership of Tammany Hall, that I had to make radical changes in the personnel of those districts.”

General Bingham stated that he had worked hard to eliminate these abuses, but without success. “The political influence became so corrupt in certain areas of Manhattan after Mayor McClellan started his battles in the primaries for control of Tammany Hall, that I had to make significant changes in the staff of those districts.”

It was absurdly easy for Mr. Murphy and his Tammany machine leaders to squelch Mayor McClellan’s plans for leadership. No auspicious time was it, however, to nominate a “regular Organization man” for Mayor; respectability had to be invoked and a hack politician obviously would not serve the purpose. Besides, there was resistance from Senator McCarren’s Brooklyn organization against the nomination of a distinctively Tammany “Organization” creature.

It was ridiculously easy for Mr. Murphy and his Tammany machine leaders to shut down Mayor McClellan’s plans for leadership. However, it wasn't the right time to nominate a typical “Organization man” for Mayor; they needed to emphasize respectability, and a typical hack politician wouldn’t fit the bill. Plus, there was pushback from Senator McCarren’s Brooklyn organization against nominating a clearly Tammany “Organization” candidate.

The candidate of Tammany Hall and its allies was William J. Gaynor. A Brooklyn lawyer, he had signalized his early career by causing John Y. McKane, then Democratic “boss” of Coney Island, to be convicted and imprisoned for ballot box frauds and for defying a court injunction. Elected to the State Supreme Court, Gaynor was a member of that body when nominated for Mayor; and by his constant exposures of the tyrannies and abuses committed by the police force he had become widely and favorably known as a man opposed to “The System.” Thus, Tammany could depict its candidate as a genuine and proved reformer. But apart from these representations, Gaynor was, in fact, a man of intellect, force and independence of character, deep understanding of public questions and of progressive, even advanced, views. A far different type he was from the usual run of ignorant grafting politicians.

The candidate backed by Tammany Hall and its supporters was William J. Gaynor. A lawyer from Brooklyn, he made a name for himself early on by getting John Y. McKane, the Democratic "boss" of Coney Island, convicted and imprisoned for ballot box fraud and for ignoring a court order. After being elected to the State Supreme Court, Gaynor was on that court when he was nominated for Mayor; through his continuous exposure of police misconduct and abuse of power, he became well-known and respected as someone who opposed "The System." As a result, Tammany was able to portray him as a legitimate and proven reformer. But beyond these portrayals, Gaynor was actually a man of intellect, strength, and independent character, with a deep understanding of public issues and progressive, even advanced, views. He was a far cry from the typical corrupt politicians.

By his strong denunciations of the looting done by surface-railway manipulators and by his emphatic declarations in favor of the building by the city itself of further[341] subways, Gaynor won a large following. He seemed uncommonly sincere when he caustically arraigned the combination of railway promoters and financiers who, he said, were busy at the “old game” of seeking to enrich themselves manifold more by getting additional traction franchises. “My friends,” he asserted in a speech in Tammany Hall, on October 19, 1909, “we are going to build the subways. We do not intend that a single subway or a franchise for it shall be passed over to any of these men.” He made other pronouncements to the same effect.

By strongly condemning the looting by surface-railway operators and clearly stating his support for the city to build more[341] subways, Gaynor gained substantial support. He appeared genuinely sincere when he sharply criticized the group of railway promoters and financiers who were, as he claimed, engaged in the “old game” of trying to make themselves even richer by obtaining extra traction franchises. “My friends,” he declared in a speech at Tammany Hall on October 19, 1909, “we are going to build the subways. We do not intend for any single subway or franchise for it to be handed over to any of these men.” He made other statements expressing the same sentiment.

The pushful, insistent Mr. Hearst was still backed by a political organization, now passing under the name of the Civic Alliance, but his course in accepting Mr. Murphy’s and Tammany’s support during his candidacy for Governor after having bitterly assailed them in previous campaigns when he was an independent candidate, had effectually alienated many of his former followers. By reason of the influence of his newspapers, he still, however, had considerable strength. He was the nominee of the Civic Alliance for Mayor. The Republican and Fusion candidate was Otto Bannard, a banker. Edward F. Cassidy was the Socialist Party’s candidate. One of the issues put forward by the Fusion campaigners was the continuing abominations of the “white slave” traffic, operated, it was asserted, with the connivance of the police.

The pushy, determined Mr. Hearst was still supported by a political group now called the Civic Alliance, but his decision to accept support from Mr. Murphy and Tammany during his run for Governor—after he had strongly criticized them in earlier campaigns when he was running as an independent—had effectively alienated many of his former supporters. However, due to the power of his newspapers, he still held significant influence. He was the Civic Alliance’s nominee for Mayor. The Republican and Fusion candidate was Otto Bannard, a banker. Edward F. Cassidy was the candidate for the Socialist Party. One of the issues raised by the Fusion campaigners was the ongoing horrors of the “white slave” trade, which, they claimed, was being allowed to happen with the police’s involvement.

Gaynor was elected. The vote resulted: Gaynor, 250,378; Bannard, 177,304; Hearst, 154,187; Cassidy, 11,768; Hunter (Socialist Labor) 1,256; Manierre (Prohibition) 866. Although, however, Gaynor won, yet by the election of many of the Fusion candidates (to the offices of Controller, President of the Board of Aldermen and presidents of boroughs) Tammany lost control of nearly all of the borough presidencies, and in turn of many of the departments and of the powerful Board of Estimate. In this Board Tammany now had only three votes.

Gaynor was elected. The vote tally was: Gaynor, 250,378; Bannard, 177,304; Hearst, 154,187; Cassidy, 11,768; Hunter (Socialist Labor) 1,256; Manierre (Prohibition) 866. Even though Gaynor won, the election of many Fusion candidates to positions like Controller, President of the Board of Aldermen, and borough presidents meant that Tammany lost control of almost all the borough presidencies, along with many departments and the powerful Board of Estimate. In this Board, Tammany now had only three votes.

FOOTNOTES

[1] When Ahearn was elected president of the Borough of Manhattan, it was “Boss” Murphy, with the “advice and consent” of the Tammany Executive Committee, who really chose his appointees to head the Department of Public Work, the Bureau of Highways, the Bureau of Sewers, the Bureau of Buildings, etc. Of course, Tammany district leaders were appointed; they were really responsible to the Tammany Executive Committee.

I'm sorry, but I don't see any text to modernize. Please provide the short piece of text you'd like me to work on. When Ahearn became president of the Borough of Manhattan, it was “Boss” Murphy, with the approval of the Tammany Executive Committee, who actually decided on his appointees to lead the Department of Public Work, the Bureau of Highways, the Bureau of Sewers, the Bureau of Buildings, and so on. Naturally, Tammany district leaders were appointed; they were essentially accountable to the Tammany Executive Committee.

[2] See A Report on a Special Examination of the Accounts and Methods of the Office of the President of the Borough of Manhattan, Directed by Hon. George B. McClellan, Mayor, Commissioners of Accounts of the City of New York, July 16, 1907. This report gives the full findings of the Commissioners of Accounts. The full testimony is embodied in Vols. I to III of Testimony, Ahearn Investigation, 1907, Commissioners of Accounts.

[2] See A Report on a Special Examination of the Accounts and Methods of the Office of the President of the Borough of Manhattan, Directed by Hon. George B. McClellan, Mayor, Commissioners of Accounts of the City of New York, July 16, 1907. This report includes the complete findings of the Commissioners of Accounts. The full testimony is included in Vols. I to III of Testimony, Ahearn Investigation, 1907, Commissioners of Accounts.

[3] See A Report on a Special Examination of the Accounts and Methods of the President of the Borough of the Bronx, etc., Commissioners of Accounts of New York City, June 16, 1908. The complete testimony in the Haffen Investigation is set forth in Vols. I to IV, Testimony, Borough of the Bronx Investigation, 1908, Commissioners of Accounts. See also Memorandum submitted to Governor Hughes, by the Commissioners of Accounts, 1909.

[3] See A Report on a Special Examination of the Accounts and Methods of the President of the Borough of the Bronx, etc., Commissioners of Accounts of New York City, June 16, 1908. The complete testimony in the Haffen Investigation is outlined in Vols. I to IV, Testimony, Borough of the Bronx Investigation, 1908, Commissioners of Accounts. Also, refer to the Memorandum submitted to Governor Hughes by the Commissioners of Accounts, 1909.

[4] The attorney here referred to was Joseph A. Flannery. Upon charges preferred by the Bar Association, and after a three years’ investigation, he was disbarred, May 17, 1912, by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. He was found guilty on five of the six charges brought against him, one of which charges dealt with the notorious Hunt’s Point land “job.” It was on record that Flannery personally profited to the sum of $300,000 from various transactions of land sold to the city at fictitious valuations. On June 11, 1914, W. D. Guthrie, representing the New York Bar Association, reiterated the charges when he argued before the Court of Appeals at Albany for the confirmation of Mr. Flannery’s disbarment. Flannery’s attorney declared that nobody was misled or labored under a misapprehension as a result of his client’s actions; that the company for which Flannery was attorney knew as much about the transaction as did Flannery. On October 24, 1914, the Court of Appeals sanctioned Flannery’s disbarment.

[4] The attorney mentioned here was Joseph A. Flannery. Following charges brought by the Bar Association and a three-year investigation, he was disbarred on May 17, 1912, by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. He was found guilty on five out of six charges against him, one of which related to the infamous Hunt’s Point land “deal.” It was documented that Flannery personally gained $300,000 from various land sales to the city at inflated prices. On June 11, 1914, W. D. Guthrie, representing the New York Bar Association, reaffirmed the charges while presenting arguments before the Court of Appeals in Albany for confirming Mr. Flannery’s disbarment. Flannery’s attorney claimed that no one was misled or confused by his client’s actions; the company Flannery represented was just as informed about the transaction as he was. On October 24, 1914, the Court of Appeals approved Flannery’s disbarment.

[5] Summary of Findings, A Report on a Special Examination of the Office of the President of the Borough of the Bronx, etc. Commissioners of Accounts, June 16, 1908, p. 1.

[5] Summary of Findings, A Report on a Special Examination of the Office of the President of the Borough of the Bronx, etc. Commissioners of Accounts, June 16, 1908, p. 1.

[6] Ibid., p. 3.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid., p. 3.

[7] Ibid., p. 3.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same as above., p. 3.

[8] He had been elected Borough President of Queens in 1905, after a fight upon “Joe” Cassidy, long Democratic “boss” of Queens, in which campaign Bermel ran as an “Independent Democrat” and had violently denounced “Cassidyism and public graft.”

[8] He was elected Borough President of Queens in 1905, after a battle against “Joe” Cassidy, the long-time Democratic “boss” of Queens. In this campaign, Bermel ran as an “Independent Democrat” and strongly criticized “Cassidyism and public graft.”

[9] In the Matter of Charges Preferred against Lawrence Gresser, President of the Borough of Queens, City of New York, Report of Commissioner Samuel H. Ordway, 1911, p. 91.

[9] Regarding the Charges Against Lawrence Gresser, President of the Borough of Queens, City of New York, Report by Commissioner Samuel H. Ordway, 1911, p. 91.

[10] In a signed statement in the New York Evening Call, February 27, 1909, Col. Amory declared that when this matter was originally exposed in the hearing before the Public Service Commission, the full facts were not brought out; that one of the ten original owners had recently informed him (Amory) that the price paid by Ryan and Brady was in reality only $25,000.

[10] In a signed statement in the New York Evening Call, February 27, 1909, Col. Amory stated that when this issue was first revealed during the hearing before the Public Service Commission, not all the facts were disclosed; one of the ten original owners recently told him (Amory) that the actual price paid by Ryan and Brady was only $25,000.

[11] See Investigation of the Interborough Metropolitan Company, etc., 1907, Public Service Commission, First District, Vol. IV, pp. 1613-1618, etc.

[11] See Investigation of the Interborough Metropolitan Company, etc., 1907, Public Service Commission, First District, Vol. IV, pp. 1613-1618, etc.

[12] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.

[13] After this company had been forced into bankruptcy in 1908, the above sum was the estimate as stated by Receiver Whitridge. See also Col. Amory’s remarks, June 29, 1910, Third Avenue Company—Plan of Reorganization, Public Service Commission, First District, Stenographic Minutes, p. 2417.

[13] After this company went bankrupt in 1908, the amount mentioned above was the estimate given by Receiver Whitridge. Also, see Col. Amory’s comments from June 29, 1910, Third Avenue Company—Plan of Reorganization, Public Service Commission, First District, Stenographic Minutes, p. 2417.

[14] Investigation of Interborough Metropolitan Company, etc., 1907, Public Service Commission, First District, Vol. II, pp. 774-775. D. C. Moorehead, Secretary and Treasurer of the Metropolitan Street Railway Company, further testified that District Attorney Jerome had investigated these books in 1903, and that they were disposed of in 1905 for $117 or so; they were sold, Mr. Moorehead testified, “because of lack of store room.” No litigation, he said, was in progress at the time they were sold.

[14] Investigation of Interborough Metropolitan Company, etc., 1907, Public Service Commission, First District, Vol. II, pp. 774-775. D. C. Moorehead, Secretary and Treasurer of the Metropolitan Street Railway Company, further testified that District Attorney Jerome looked into these records in 1903, and that they were sold off in 1905 for about $117; they were sold, Mr. Moorehead said, “because there wasn't enough storage space.” No legal action, he added, was happening when they were sold.

[15] Investigation of Interborough Metropolitan Company, etc., 1907, Vol. III, p. 1395, etc.

[15] Investigation of Interborough Metropolitan Company, etc., 1907, Vol. III, p. 1395, etc.

[16] Truth About Metropolitan, p. 2.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Truth About Metropolitan, p. 2.

[17] Report of the Joint Committee of the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York, Appointed to Investigate the Finances of the State of New York. March 1, 1909, p. 10.

[17] Report of the Joint Committee of the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York, Appointed to Investigate the Finances of the State of New York. March 1, 1909, p. 10.

[18] Ibid., p. 11.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, p. 11.

[19] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.

[20] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.

[21] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source.

[22] Ibid., p. 13.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., p. 13.

[23] Ibid., p. 13.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., p. 13.

[24] Ibid., p. 14-15.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, p. 14-15.

[25] Ibid., p. 16.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, p. 16.

[26] Ibid., p. 26.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source., p. 26.

[27] Ibid., p. 28.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, p. 28.

[28] Ibid.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid.

[29] Ibid., p. 115.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, p. 115.

[30] Ibid. pp. 112-113.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid. pp. 112-113.

[31] Why I Was Removed, by Theodore A. Bingham, Van Norden’s Magazine, September, 1909.

[31] Why I Was Removed, by Theodore A. Bingham, Van Norden’s Magazine, September, 1909.


CHAPTER XXXIV
ANOTHER ERA OF LEGISLATIVE CORRUPTION
1910-1911

It was only a few months after this election that the investigations of William H. Hotchkiss, State Superintendent of Insurance, followed by that of a New York Legislative committee into the matter of legislative graft, revealed the extensive and variegated corruption of both political parties.

It was just a few months after this election that the investigations by William H. Hotchkiss, the State Superintendent of Insurance, along with a New York Legislative committee looking into legislative corruption, uncovered the widespread and diverse corruption in both political parties.

An examination by Mr. Hotchkiss, in October, 1909, of the affairs of the Phœnix Insurance Company of Brooklyn had brought to light a mass of correspondence apparently disclosing an intimate connection between the president of that company and legislative measures, introduced from 1900 to 1910, affecting fire insurance companies. The materials thus unearthed caused Superintendent Hotchkiss to order a full examination of the books and records of other fire insurance companies, which examination was begun in January, 1910.

An investigation by Mr. Hotchkiss in October 1909 into the affairs of the Phœnix Insurance Company of Brooklyn uncovered a significant amount of correspondence that seemingly revealed a close connection between the president of that company and legislative measures introduced from 1900 to 1910 that impacted fire insurance companies. The findings prompted Superintendent Hotchkiss to order a comprehensive review of the books and records of other fire insurance companies, which started in January 1910.

On January 18, 1910, the New York Evening Post published certain facts the purport of which tended to show that State Senator Jotham P. Allds, when Republican leader of the Assembly, in 1901, had been bribed to assist in killing certain legislation to which bridge construction companies objected. The Senate was forced to investigate, and Allds hastily resigned, but the Senate on March 29, 1910, sustained the charge of bribery by a vote of 40 to 9.

On January 18, 1910, the New York Evening Post published information that indicated State Senator Jotham P. Allds, when he was the Republican leader of the Assembly in 1901, had taken a bribe to help block certain legislation that bridge construction companies opposed. The Senate had to conduct an investigation, and Allds quickly resigned, but on March 29, 1910, the Senate confirmed the bribery accusation with a vote of 40 to 9.

It was well understood that this virtuous action was “a sacrifice” and an ostentatious sop to public opinion;[343] many more legislators than he were implicated in charges of corruption. Meanwhile, Mr. Hotchkiss was persisting in his investigation. In the course of Mr. Hotchkiss’ inquiry, on March 22, 1910, testimony developed the fact that for twenty years or more, “firebug” funds had been raised by insurance companies and lavishly distributed among legislators at Albany and that those companies had employed one William H. Buckley to act as “watcher” on “strike bills” introduced in the Legislature at Albany. Buckley admitted that at a time after only three years’ admission to the bar, he had received $27,000 from insurance companies for representing them during the sessions of the Legislature.

It was widely recognized that this virtuous action was “a sacrifice” and a flashy gesture to please public opinion;[343] many more lawmakers than him were involved in corruption charges. Meanwhile, Mr. Hotchkiss continued his investigation. During Mr. Hotchkiss’s inquiry, on March 22, 1910, it was revealed that for over twenty years, “firebug” funds had been collected by insurance companies and generously distributed among legislators in Albany, and that those companies had hired one William H. Buckley to act as a “watcher” on “strike bills” introduced in the Albany Legislature. Buckley confessed that just three years after being admitted to the bar, he had received $27,000 from insurance companies for representing them during legislative sessions.

One of the bills introduced in the Legislature was a measure fathered by Senator Thomas F. Grady, a noted Tammany leader, celebrated as the chief orator of the Tammany organization. This bill, called a re-insurance act, was introduced and passed under such circumstances that Vice-President Correa of the Home Insurance Company referred to it in a contemporary letter as “bought legislation.” Mr. Correa also stated in that letter, which was in evidence, that only three re-insured fire insurance companies supported the bill, which gave those three companies a distinct advantage over 209 direct insurance companies doing business in New York State. The bill dealt with the carrying of a reserve where part of a fire risk was re-insured. Senator Grady declared, in a public interview, that this bill was introduced to protect policy holders by compelling the re-insurance company, when a part of a policy was farmed out by the company of the first instance, to keep an adequate reserve against the policy thus taken, but all of the insurance officers examined by Mr. Hotchkiss admitted either wholly or in part, that Grady’s interview did not represent a correct conception of what his bill actually provided.[1]

One of the bills introduced in the Legislature was a measure initiated by Senator Thomas F. Grady, a well-known Tammany leader, celebrated as the main speaker of the Tammany organization. This bill, known as a re-insurance act, was introduced and passed in such a way that Vice-President Correa of the Home Insurance Company referred to it in a recent letter as “bought legislation.” Mr. Correa also mentioned in that letter, which was presented as evidence, that only three re-insured fire insurance companies supported the bill, giving those three companies a significant edge over 209 direct insurance companies operating in New York State. The bill concerned the maintenance of a reserve when part of a fire risk was re-insured. Senator Grady stated in a public interview that this bill was introduced to protect policyholders by requiring the re-insurance company, when part of a policy was outsourced by the initial company, to maintain an adequate reserve against the policy involved. However, all the insurance officials examined by Mr. Hotchkiss admitted in whole or in part that Grady’s interview did not accurately reflect what his bill actually entailed.[1]

Another conspicuous Tammany leader implicated in the disclosures before Superintendent Hotchkiss was Senator “Big Tim” Sullivan. He had long been one of the really powerful leaders of Tammany Hall, and held direct sovereignty over the teeming East Side below Fourteenth Street.

Another prominent Tammany leader involved in the revelations before Superintendent Hotchkiss was Senator “Big Tim” Sullivan. He had long been one of the key power players of Tammany Hall and had direct control over the bustling East Side below Fourteenth Street.

Beginning life as a bartender, “Big Tim” Sullivan had been given the nickname “Dry Dollar” Sullivan, because of his habit of carefully wiping the bar before placing change on it. His career in the Assembly and Senate was notorious for the number of bad bills promoted or supported by him. His power in manipulating primaries and swaying elections on the East Side south of Fourteenth Street was recognized as that of a master hand; he knew how to make the “gangs” his obedient servants; not a secret of colonizing voters and carrying elections was unknown to him and his clan; at the same time he was called “the friend of the poor” because of his yearly practise of giving the wastrels of the Bowery and vicinity Thanksgiving and Christmas dinners and presents. By his proved and consistent ability to sway politics in the great and thickly-populated East Side, he had to be recognized as an independent Tammany power; no one could become “boss” of Tammany Hall without his support. His power in Tammany was exceeded only by Mr. Murphy’s. In fact, he was one of the actual rulers, not only of Tammany Hall, but of New York City.

Beginning his career as a bartender, “Big Tim” Sullivan earned the nickname “Dry Dollar” Sullivan because he had a habit of meticulously wiping the bar before putting down any change. His time in the Assembly and Senate was infamous for the many bad bills he promoted or backed. He had a talent for manipulating primaries and swaying elections on the East Side south of Fourteenth Street, where he was recognized as a master strategist; he knew how to make the “gangs” his loyal followers. No secret of organizing voters and winning elections was unknown to him and his group. Despite this, he was called “the friend of the poor” for his annual practice of providing Thanksgiving and Christmas dinners and gifts to the down-and-outs of the Bowery and nearby areas. Through his proven and consistent ability to influence politics in the densely populated East Side, he had to be acknowledged as an independent power within Tammany; no one could rise to be the “boss” of Tammany Hall without his backing. His influence in Tammany was only surpassed by Mr. Murphy. In fact, he was one of the actual leaders, not just of Tammany Hall, but of New York City.

George F. Seward, president of the Fidelity and Casualty Company, testified on March 21, 1910, before Superintendent Hotchkiss, that a man representing himself[345] to be an agent of Senator “Big Tim” Sullivan, in 1891 or 1892, offered, in return for a $10,000 bribe, to have a bill inimical to that company’s interests killed. Mr. Seward, in response, dictated this telegram to Sullivan: “Mr. Seward says you can go to hell.” In reply to a question as to whether this happened when the Republican party or the Democratic party was in power, Mr. Seward replied, “So far as either party is concerned, I don’t think it would make very much difference, and I really do not recall.” Both parties, Mr. Seward said, were represented in the “Black Horse Cavalry” at Albany. In a public interview Sullivan denounced Mr. Seward’s charge as a lie. Recalled as a witness, on March 22, 1910, Seward adhered to the story he had told. It may be remarked here that when Sullivan died in 1913, he left a considerable fortune, originally estimated at two millions of dollars; his friends represented that he had made it from a chain of showhouses in which he was interested; but the inventory showed that he owned large quantities of stock in mining companies, realty companies and other concerns. Many of these shares, however, were listed by the executors of his estate as valueless. The definite value of Sullivan’s estate was placed at $1,021,277.33.

George F. Seward, president of the Fidelity and Casualty Company, testified on March 21, 1910, before Superintendent Hotchkiss, that a man claiming to be an agent for Senator “Big Tim” Sullivan, in 1891 or 1892, offered to kill a bill harmful to the company's interests in exchange for a $10,000 bribe. In response, Mr. Seward sent this telegram to Sullivan: “Mr. Seward says you can go to hell.” When asked whether this occurred during Republican or Democratic control, Mr. Seward replied, “I don’t think it would make much difference, and I really don’t remember.” He stated that both parties were represented in the “Black Horse Cavalry” at Albany. In a public interview, Sullivan called Mr. Seward’s accusation a lie. Recalled as a witness on March 22, 1910, Seward stood by his original story. It’s worth noting that when Sullivan died in 1913, he left behind a significant fortune, initially estimated at two million dollars; his friends claimed he earned it from a chain of theaters he was involved with, but the inventory revealed he held large amounts of stock in mining companies, real estate companies, and other ventures. Many of these shares were, however, marked as worthless by the executors of his estate. The final valuation of Sullivan’s estate was set at $1,021,277.33.

On March 24, 1910, certain definite facts were brought out showing how Buckley, lobbyist at Albany for the fire insurance companies, had succeeded in killing, in 1903, various proposed enactments which those companies did not want enacted.

On March 24, 1910, some clear facts came to light revealing how Buckley, a lobbyist in Albany for the fire insurance companies, managed to block several proposed laws in 1903 that those companies didn’t want passed.

Correspondence produced showed that Buckley had written to George P. Sheldon, president of the Phœnix Insurance Company, that “it was not difficult to tie the matter [insurance bills] up in the committee,” and later correspondence held out the assurance that the matter “had been arranged.” According to the testimony, Justice Edward E. McCall of the New York State Supreme Court had indorsed a $35,000 check from Sheldon to Buckley. On March 29, 1910, Darwin P. Kingsley, president[346] of the New York Life Insurance Company, testified that Buckley had offered to buy him the votes of six members of the New York State Senate for a certain amount, and that when he (Kingsley) declined to pay, a certain insurance measure which Kingsley had favored was withdrawn.

Correspondence revealed that Buckley had written to George P. Sheldon, president of the Phœnix Insurance Company, stating that “it wasn’t hard to manage the issue [insurance bills] within the committee,” and later communications suggested that the issue “had been settled.” Testimony indicated that Justice Edward E. McCall of the New York State Supreme Court had approved a $35,000 check from Sheldon to Buckley. On March 29, 1910, Darwin P. Kingsley, president[346] of the New York Life Insurance Company, testified that Buckley had offered to purchase the votes of six members of the New York State Senate for a specific amount, and that when he (Kingsley) refused to pay, a particular insurance bill that Kingsley had supported was withdrawn.

These are but a few of the specific details brought out in the hearings before Mr. Hotchkiss; it appeared that at least ten prominent Republican legislators who had ruled important Senate and Assembly Committees for years had speculative accounts in the brokerage firm of Ellingwood & Cunningham of New York City, in which firm G. Tracy Rogers, keeper of the traction “Yellow Dog” fund during that period, was a special partner.

These are just a few of the specific details revealed in the hearings overseen by Mr. Hotchkiss; it became clear that at least ten prominent Republican lawmakers who had led key Senate and Assembly Committees for years had investment accounts with the brokerage firm of Ellingwood & Cunningham in New York City, where G. Tracy Rogers, the manager of the traction “Yellow Dog” fund during that time, was a special partner.

On April 8, 1910, State Superintendent of Insurance Hotchkiss made a full report to Governor Hughes of the investigation that he had made. Mr. Hotchkiss reported that the aggregate of disbursements by fire insurance companies in connection with legislation affecting those companies, from 1901 to 1909, probably exceeded $150,000.

On April 8, 1910, State Superintendent of Insurance Hotchkiss submitted a complete report to Governor Hughes on his investigation. Mr. Hotchkiss reported that the total expenditures by fire insurance companies related to legislation affecting them, from 1901 to 1909, likely surpassed $150,000.

“The moneys so paid,” Mr. Hotchkiss reported, “were disbursed for traveling expenses of individuals and delegations; annual and special retainers of regular counsels; so-called retainers of legislative lawyers; contributions to political committees; gifts or payments to men of political prominence and influence, and entertaining legislators and others, at times in a somewhat lavish manner.”

“The money that was paid,” Mr. Hotchkiss reported, “was used for travel expenses for individuals and groups; annual and special fees for regular lawyers; so-called fees for legislative lawyers; donations to political committees; gifts or payments to influential political figures, and entertaining legislators and others, sometimes in a somewhat extravagant way.”

Mr. Hotchkiss further set forth in his report that the log rolling of “strike” bills in and out of committees was a regular business, that the books of the stock brokerage house of Ellingwood & Cunningham, New York City, “warrant a strong suspicion that such books, to an extent at least, had been a clearing house for financial transactions connected with legislation during the period mentioned,” and that G. Tracy Rogers, a special partner in the firm and long president of the Street Railways Association of the State of New York, seemed up to the time of[347] the failure of that firm “to have been the legislative representative at Albany of the traction interests.” Mr. Hotchkiss reported that: “Certain of the accounts in these ledgers show a close connection between G. Tracy Rogers and the Metropolitan traction interests in New York City. The character of the securities dealt in [by legislators] frequently recalls legislation urged or retarded at about the same time.” Mr. Hotchkiss urged further inquiry, and in a special message to the Legislature, on April 11, 1910, Governor Hughes called on that body to follow, by means of a general investigation, the trails of legislative corruption laid bare by the Allds bribery trial and the investigation conducted by Superintendent Hotchkiss.

Mr. Hotchkiss further detailed in his report that the log rolling of “strike” bills in and out of committees was a regular part of business, and that the records of the stock brokerage firm Ellingwood & Cunningham in New York City “raise strong suspicions that these records, at least to some extent, served as a clearing house for financial transactions linked to legislation during the stated period.” He noted that G. Tracy Rogers, a special partner in the firm and long-time president of the Street Railways Association of the State of New York, appeared to have been the legislative representative for the traction interests at Albany until the failure of that firm. Mr. Hotchkiss reported that, “Certain accounts in these ledgers reveal a close connection between G. Tracy Rogers and the Metropolitan traction interests in New York City. The nature of the securities involved [by legislators] often mirrors legislation that was encouraged or delayed around the same time.” Mr. Hotchkiss called for further investigation, and in a special address to the Legislature on April 11, 1910, Governor Hughes urged that body to initiate a general investigation to follow the paths of legislative corruption exposed by the Allds bribery trial and the inquiry carried out by Superintendent Hotchkiss.

In the face of the exposures already made and the insistent demands for further investigation, the legislative committee appointed for the purpose could not evade pressing the inquiry.

In light of the disclosures already made and the ongoing demands for more investigation, the legislative committee assigned for this purpose could not avoid pushing the inquiry forward.

The testimony on September 15, 1910, showed that during a single month in the summer of 1903, the sum of $40,000 was sent by an agent of the New York City street railway interests to the firm of Ellingwood & Cunningham, and that no vouchers or receipts were asked or given to account for the distribution of the money. At previous hearings, the fact had been established that this brokerage house was the firm which served as a “clearing-house” for the money supplied to members of the Legislature by G. Tracy Rogers. At the hearing on September 16, 1910, the evidence showed that Senator Louis F. Goodsell and Assemblyman Louis Bedell, prominent Republican leaders in the Legislature, had received large amounts of money from the Metropolitan Street Railway Company and G. Tracy Rogers from 1900 to 1904; Goodsell had received $24,800, and Bedell $21,750. Goodsell admitted that he had “bought” stock without putting up any margin.

The testimony on September 15, 1910, revealed that during a single month in the summer of 1903, an agent of the New York City street railway interests sent $40,000 to the firm of Ellingwood & Cunningham, and no vouchers or receipts were requested or provided to account for how the money was distributed. Previous hearings had already established that this brokerage firm acted as a “clearing-house” for the funds given to members of the Legislature by G. Tracy Rogers. At the hearing on September 16, 1910, the evidence indicated that Senator Louis F. Goodsell and Assemblyman Louis Bedell, key Republican leaders in the Legislature, had received significant sums of money from the Metropolitan Street Railway Company and G. Tracy Rogers between 1900 and 1904; Goodsell received $24,800, and Bedell received $21,750. Goodsell acknowledged that he had “bought” stock without putting up any margin.

At the same hearing, H. H. Vreeland, president of the[348] Metropolitan Street Railway Company, testified that the Metropolitan Street Railway Company contributed campaign funds, and that it did so to practically every one that ran for office; he remembered $20,000 or $25,000 given to the Republican organization and $17,000 or $18,000 to the Democratic organization; this was in about the year 1902 or 1903. Another method of subsidizing politicians individually, Mr. Vreeland testified, was by carrying stocks on the books of various brokerage houses for them; these individual stock transactions ran from $20,000 to more than $30,000.

At the same hearing, H. H. Vreeland, president of the[348] Metropolitan Street Railway Company, testified that the company donated to campaign funds and did so for almost everyone who ran for office; he recalled giving $20,000 or $25,000 to the Republican party and $17,000 or $18,000 to the Democratic party; this was around 1902 or 1903. Another way of supporting politicians individually, Mr. Vreeland testified, was by holding stocks on the books of various brokerage firms for them; these individual stock transactions ranged from $20,000 to over $30,000.

Much further testimony was brought out showing the enormous and continuous subsidizing of both old political parties and politicians by corporations wanting certain legislation enacted or smothered. On September 21, 1910, Mr. Vreeland admitted that the Metropolitan Street Railway Company had, prior to 1903, paid out fully $250,000 in “taking up” stocks that legislators and other politicians had been carrying with brokerage houses and which they desired converted into cash; this was one of the indirect methods of influencing political or legislative action in the interest of the company. G. Tracy Rogers testified that he had disbursed $82,475 in three years, and that most of it went to members of the railroad committees of the New York Legislature. In these hearings the names of a number of conspicuous legislators and the amounts received by them were brought out in the testimony.

Much more evidence emerged showing the huge and ongoing financial support of both major political parties and politicians by corporations looking to get certain laws passed or shut down. On September 21, 1910, Mr. Vreeland admitted that the Metropolitan Street Railway Company had, before 1903, paid out around $250,000 in “buying up” stocks that legislators and other politicians held with brokerage firms and wanted converted into cash; this was one of the indirect ways to sway political or legislative decisions in favor of the company. G. Tracy Rogers testified that he had distributed $82,475 over three years, with most of it going to members of the railroad committees of the New York Legislature. During these hearings, the names of several prominent legislators and the amounts they received were revealed in the testimony.

Testimony, also under oath, on October 19, 1910, purported to show that a legislative corruption fund of $500,000 was raised at a meeting in Delmonico’s to defeat anti-race track gambling legislation at Albany in 1908; that Charles H. Hyde,[2] Chamberlain of New York[349] City under Mayor Gaynor, attended this meeting, and that State Senator Frank Gardner went to Albany with Hyde because Hyde did not know the ways of legislators and how to approach them “properly.”

Testimony, also under oath, on October 19, 1910, claimed that a fund of $500,000 for legislative corruption was raised at a meeting at Delmonico’s to block anti-race track gambling legislation in Albany in 1908; that Charles H. Hyde,[2] the Chamberlain of New York[349] City under Mayor Gaynor, was present at this meeting, and that State Senator Frank Gardner went to Albany with Hyde because Hyde wasn’t familiar with how legislators operated and how to approach them “properly.”

Hyde’s father-in-law was William A. Engeman, owner of the Brighton Beach race track; according to the testimony, Hyde made a subscription for Engeman (who had failed to pay), and later put in a bill for personal expenses covering the amount. The testimony further represented that there was a dispute as to who was to handle the bribery funds, and that $125,000 was given to James E. Gaffney “to take care of three or four members of the Legislature—Tammany men.” According further to the testimony, Senator Thomas F. Grady, Democratic leader at Albany and close friend and spokesman of “Boss” Murphy, received only $4,000 of the bribery fund. Two Republican State Senators wanted $25,000 each. The testimony also involved Senator Patrick H. McCarren. Senator McCarren was the Democratic “boss” of Brooklyn; he was an ally of Tammany Hall (for the Democratic organization in Brooklyn retained its autonomy separate from that of Tammany Hall, yet allied with it), and he was the legislative agent of various financial interests and trusts.

Hyde's father-in-law was William A. Engeman, the owner of the Brighton Beach racetrack. According to the testimony, Hyde made a subscription for Engeman (who hadn't paid), and later submitted a bill for personal expenses covering that amount. The testimony also indicated that there was a disagreement about who would manage the bribery funds, and that $125,000 was given to James E. Gaffney "to take care of three or four members of the Legislature—Tammany men." Further testimony stated that Senator Thomas F. Grady, the Democratic leader in Albany and a close friend and spokesperson for "Boss" Murphy, received only $4,000 from the bribery fund. Two Republican State Senators were looking for $25,000 each. The testimony also involved Senator Patrick H. McCarren. Senator McCarren was the Democratic "boss" of Brooklyn; he was an ally of Tammany Hall (since the Democratic organization in Brooklyn maintained its own autonomy while still being aligned with Tammany Hall), and he acted as the legislative agent for various financial interests and trusts.

It appeared, according to the testimony, that Senator McCarren was angry that the handling of the race track fund was entrusted to others; he objected “to a strange man going up there, expecting to get away with such a proposition,” but later he was placated and lent his aid against the bill. When urging Senator Foelker, a Brooklyn Republican, to vote against the bill, McCarren was represented as saying to Foelker: “You need not fear the indignation of your constituents. If you are afraid of possible reelection or have any doubts about election time, I think I can fix it up for you so you can name your own opponent at the coming election.” This was the substance of the testimony of Assistant District Attorney[350] Robert Elder, of Brooklyn, who narrated the facts revealed to him by former State Senator Frank Gardner, under indictment charged with attempting to bribe Foelker. (Here the fact should be noted that when Gardner was tried on this charge he was acquitted on February 23, 1911.) Mr. Foelker himself testified that he was offered $45,000 and then $50,000 to vote against the bill, which offer he refused; the vote on the bill was extremely close, and a single vote meant its passage or defeat.

It seems, based on the testimony, that Senator McCarren was upset that the management of the race track fund was handed over to others; he objected to "a stranger going up there, thinking he could pull off such a scheme," but later he calmed down and supported the opposition against the bill. While urging Senator Foelker, a Republican from Brooklyn, to vote against the bill, McCarren reportedly said to Foelker: "You don’t have to worry about your constituents being upset. If you’re concerned about re-election or have any doubts as election time approaches, I believe I can arrange it for you so you can choose your own opponent in the upcoming election." This was the gist of the testimony from Assistant District Attorney[350] Robert Elder from Brooklyn, who shared the details revealed to him by former State Senator Frank Gardner, who was under indictment for allegedly trying to bribe Foelker. (It should be noted that Gardner was acquitted of this charge on February 23, 1911.) Mr. Foelker himself testified that he was offered $45,000 and then $50,000 to vote against the bill, which he declined; the vote on the bill was extremely close, and a single vote determined whether it would pass or fail.

At further hearings of the Legislative “Graft Hunt” Committee, Senator Eugene M. Travis, of Brooklyn, testified that an ineffectual effort had been made, at a time when the foes of the measure needed only one or two votes, to bribe him with $100,000 to vote against the bill prohibiting horse racing in New York State. Senator Travis specified three other Senators whom they attempted to bribe. August Belmont testified that the $500,000 fund was “mythical and absurd.” It was reported that representations made at the hearing on November 30, 1910, were to the effect that one jockey club alone had expended $33,000 while the anti-race track gambling legislation was pending, and that information from reliable sources tended to show that each of the other seven racing associations had expended a similar sum, or perhaps more. Further information, it was given out, was to the effect that each of ninety-three bookmakers had subscribed $3,000 each. The total of the above stated contributions would have amounted to $543,000—supposing the fund to have been a fact.

At additional hearings of the Legislative “Graft Hunt” Committee, Senator Eugene M. Travis from Brooklyn testified that there was a failed attempt to bribe him with $100,000 to vote against the bill banning horse racing in New York State, at a time when the opponents of the measure only needed one or two votes. Senator Travis pointed out three other Senators who were also targeted for bribery. August Belmont stated that the $500,000 fund was “mythical and absurd.” It was reported that claims made during the hearing on November 30, 1910, indicated that one jockey club alone had spent $33,000 while the anti-race track gambling legislation was under consideration, and credible sources suggested that each of the other seven racing associations had spent a similar amount, if not more. Additionally, it was revealed that each of ninety-three bookmakers had contributed $3,000 each. The total of these contributions would have added up to $543,000—if the fund had actually existed.

Whatever were the basic facts, pro and con, as to the alleged $500,000 fund for the defeat of the anti-race-track bill, the record shows that it was defeated on April 8, 1908, by a-vote of 25 to 25, and that among those voting against it were such Tammany Senators as Grady, Frawley, McManus, Sullivan and other Tammany men and Democrats,—in all seventeen Democrats and eight[351] Republicans. A new State Senator having been elected in a special election in one district, the bill prohibiting gambling at race tracks was subsequently passed.

Whatever the basic facts were, for and against, regarding the alleged $500,000 fund intended to defeat the anti-race-track bill, the records show that it was defeated on April 8, 1908, by a vote of 25 to 25. Among those voting against it were Tammany Senators like Grady, Frawley, McManus, Sullivan, and other Tammany members and Democrats—totaling seventeen Democrats and eight[351] Republicans. After a new State Senator was elected in a special election in one district, the bill prohibiting gambling at race tracks was ultimately passed.

Nearly all of those involved made vehement denials. Senator McCarren had died on October 23, 1909—a year before these hearings. Although cooperating with “Boss” Murphy in elections, there was nevertheless considerable animosity between the two, arising, it was generally believed, from a suspicion that Mr. Murphy, inflated by his personal victory in electing McClellan in 1903, was attempting to extend his political territory to Brooklyn. Senator McCarren had openly protested against this “encroachment” and had threatened trouble if it were pushed. It was this jealously vigilant attitude on the part of the bosses of the other boroughs which prevented Tammany Hall from extending its regular organization outside the former city limits.

Almost everyone involved made strong denials. Senator McCarren passed away on October 23, 1909—a year before these hearings. While he worked with “Boss” Murphy during elections, there was still a lot of animosity between them, believed to stem from a suspicion that Mr. Murphy, boosted by his personal success in helping elect McClellan in 1903, was trying to expand his political influence into Brooklyn. Senator McCarren had openly complained about this “encroachment” and had threatened trouble if it continued. It was this watchful attitude from the bosses in other boroughs that kept Tammany Hall from extending its regular organization beyond the old city limits.

McCarren himself was a “sporting man” and reputed to be a “thoroughbred” at that. He had his own elaborate racing stable, and it was said of him that he once uncomplainingly lost $30,000 on a bet, although the decision of the racing judges was open to question. In 1908 the failure of the brokerage firm of Ennis & Stoppani revealed the fact that McCarren was “carrying” $250,000 worth of stock, for which he had paid nothing, and which resulted in a loss to him of about $107,000. No demand had been made by the brokers upon McCarren for margins; in view of this fact he could not have been compelled to pay losses; it was said of him, however, that he gave a check to the receiver and took the stock. He was a “heavy operator” in real estate and in the stock market, and had personal relations with H. H. Rogers, Anthony N. Brady, William C. Whitney, J. Pierpont Morgan, W. K. Vanderbilt, August Belmont and other Wall Street magnates, of whose interests he was a recognized pusher in the Legislature.

McCarren was considered a "sporting man" and was known to be a "thoroughbred." He had his own impressive racing stable, and it was rumored that he once calmly lost $30,000 on a bet, even though the racing judges' decision was questionable. In 1908, when the brokerage firm Ennis & Stoppani failed, it was revealed that McCarren was "carrying" $250,000 worth of stock, which he had paid nothing for, resulting in a loss of about $107,000. The brokers had not demanded any margins from McCarren; because of this, he couldn't have been forced to pay the losses. However, it was said that he wrote a check to the receiver and took the stock. He was a "heavy operator" in both real estate and the stock market and had personal connections with H. H. Rogers, Anthony N. Brady, William C. Whitney, J. Pierpont Morgan, W. K. Vanderbilt, August Belmont, and other Wall Street titans, with whom he was a recognized supporter in the Legislature.

To return, however, to the hearings of the Legislative[352] “Graft Hunt” Committee: facts brought out showed that the beet sugar interests had also debauched the Legislature and that State Senator John Raines, a leading Republican, received $9,000 in two years for pushing bounty bills to aid beet sugar interests. These facts were admitted by Henry F. Zimmerlin, former vice-president and Albany lobbyist of the Lyons Beet Sugar Refining Company.

To go back to the hearings of the Legislative[352] “Graft Hunt” Committee: the information revealed that the beet sugar industry had also corrupted the Legislature and that State Senator John Raines, a prominent Republican, received $9,000 over two years for promoting bounty bills that supported beet sugar interests. These facts were confirmed by Henry F. Zimmerlin, former vice-president and Albany lobbyist of the Lyons Beet Sugar Refining Company.

The full testimony tended to show that insurance companies, traction companies, construction companies and other interests paid large sums to defeat legislation that they did not want enacted, or were blackmailed into paying other large sums to have “strike bills” suppressed. But the report of the Legislative Investigating Committee, made on February 1, 1911, was harmless as far as specific findings of corruption were concerned. As to the charges of traction and race track corruption, the Committee reported that no definite and substantial charge, verified by knowledge, had been filed with it, and that “in consequence it finds nothing definite in regard to the traction and race track charges that it examined.”[3] There were one or two indictments, but no one, either bribers or bribed, had to go prison, although in charges made in a detached subsequent case, one solitary State Senator, Stilwell, was convicted of bribery charges and sentenced to prison; he was a comparatively obscure politician.

The full testimony showed that insurance companies, transit companies, construction companies, and other interests paid large amounts to stop legislation they didn’t want or were coerced into paying large sums to suppress “strike bills.” However, the report from the Legislative Investigating Committee, issued on February 1, 1911, revealed no significant findings of corruption. Regarding the allegations of corruption in transit and race tracks, the Committee stated that no concrete and substantial charges had been submitted to it, and therefore it found nothing definitive concerning the transit and race track allegations it looked into. [3] There were a couple of indictments, but neither the bribers nor those bribed went to prison, although in charges brought in a later case, one lone State Senator, Stilwell, was convicted of bribery and sentenced to prison; he was a relatively unknown politician.

Inasmuch as the Legislature for years had been dominantly Republican, these disclosures had a much more injurious political effect upon the Republican organization than upon Tammany, and they were of weight in[353] bringing about the election of a Democratic Governor in the person of John A. Dix, in 1910. This was the first Democratic Governor of New York State elected in many years; the result was the enlargement of Tammany’s sway, and more offices and further fields of power and profit for “the Organization.”

Since the Legislature had been mostly Republican for years, these revelations had a much bigger negative impact on the Republican party than on Tammany. They played a significant role in[353] electing John A. Dix as a Democratic Governor in 1910. This was the first time in many years that a Democratic Governor was elected in New York State; the outcome was an increase in Tammany's influence, leading to more positions and greater opportunities for power and profit for “the Organization.”

At the same time, a Legislature, the majority of which were Tammany men and Democrats, was elected. The election of a United States Senator coming up, the chief aspirant pushed for the place was William F. Sheehan, an attorney for the traction magnate, Thomas F. Ryan. Mr. Murphy had his headquarters in Albany directing the contest; he was said to have given his promise to Mr. Sheehan, but when he saw that Sheehan could not be elected, he tried to bring about the election of Daniel F. Cohalan, his personal attorney and adviser, as United States Senator. A few years previously, Cohalan was an obscure lawyer, but as the friend and adviser of “Boss” Murphy, his practise had grown to large and lucrative proportions; it was a practise principally dealing with matters concerning municipal affairs. In 1908 Mr. Murphy had caused Mr. Cohalan to be chosen Grand Sachem of the Tammany Society.

At the same time, a Legislature, mostly made up of Tammany members and Democrats, was elected. With the election of a United States Senator approaching, the main candidate for the position was William F. Sheehan, an attorney for the transit magnate, Thomas F. Ryan. Mr. Murphy was running his campaign from Albany, overseeing the contest; it was said that he promised Mr. Sheehan his support, but when it became clear that Sheehan couldn't win, he shifted his efforts to get Daniel F. Cohalan, his personal attorney and adviser, elected as United States Senator. A few years earlier, Cohalan had been an unknown lawyer, but as Murphy's friend and adviser, his practice had grown significantly and became very profitable, mainly focusing on municipal affairs. In 1908, Mr. Murphy had helped Mr. Cohalan become Grand Sachem of the Tammany Society.

But Mr. Murphy found that it was not possible to put Cohalan in the United States Senate. Certain “insurgent” Democratic legislators elected from various parts of the State, wanted neither Sheehan, Ryan’s attorney, nor Cohalan, Murphy’s attorney. Finally Justice James A. O’Gorman (who years previously had been elected to the New York State Supreme Court by Tammany) was compromised upon as the candidate for United States Senator and elected.

But Mr. Murphy realized that it just wasn’t possible to get Cohalan into the United States Senate. Some “insurgent” Democratic lawmakers from different areas of the State didn't want either Sheehan, who was Ryan’s lawyer, or Cohalan, who was Murphy’s lawyer. In the end, Justice James A. O’Gorman (who had been elected to the New York State Supreme Court by Tammany years earlier) was agreed upon as the candidate for United States Senator and was elected.

Then Mr. Murphy decided to make Mr. Cohalan Justice O’Gorman’s successor on the Supreme Court Bench.

Then Mr. Murphy decided to appoint Mr. Cohalan as Justice O’Gorman’s successor on the Supreme Court.

According to published report, the appointment of Mr. Cohalan as a Justice of the Supreme Court by Governor Dix was the result of “a deal” between Dix and Murphy.[354] Governor Dix wanted the appointment of George C. Van Tuyl, as State Commissioner of Banks, confirmed. The nomination of Van Tuyl was referred to the Senate Finance Committee, of which Senator Frawley, a Tammany district leader, was chairman. A report was prepared recommending that the nomination of Van Tuyl be confirmed, but this report was held up week after week, and the statement was common in the political slang current at Albany that no action could be taken in presenting the report “until the Governor comes across with Cohalan.” At last, on May 18, 1911, Senator Frawley suddenly presented the report, moved its confirmation, and the Senate acquiesced. Sixteen minutes later a message appeared from Governor Dix announcing the appointment of Daniel F. Cohalan to succeed James A. O’Gorman as Justice of the Supreme Court for the remainder of O’Gorman’s unexpired term.

According to a published report, Governor Dix's appointment of Mr. Cohalan as a Justice of the Supreme Court was the result of “a deal” between Dix and Murphy.[354] Governor Dix wanted the State Senate to confirm George C. Van Tuyl as State Commissioner of Banks. Van Tuyl’s nomination was sent to the Senate Finance Committee, which was chaired by Senator Frawley, a Tammany district leader. A report recommending Van Tuyl’s confirmation was prepared, but it was held up week after week. It became common political lingo in Albany that the report couldn’t move forward “until the Governor comes across with Cohalan.” Finally, on May 18, 1911, Senator Frawley unexpectedly presented the report, moved for its confirmation, and the Senate agreed. Sixteen minutes later, Governor Dix sent a message announcing the appointment of Daniel F. Cohalan to replace James A. O’Gorman as Justice of the Supreme Court for the rest of O’Gorman’s unexpired term.

The session of 1911 was the first time in nineteen years that the Democratic party had control of the Legislature, and Tammany Hall was in control of the Democratic organization in the State. It was at this session that a strong effort was made to enact the Tammany-Gaynor “Ripper” Charter, the provisions of which aroused much scandal. The majority of the Board of Estimate in New York City were at this time Independent Democrats. The proposed charter would have arbitrarily deprived them of many of their most important functions of office. Its aim was to impair the powers of the Board of Estimate in many destructive ways, and to centralize power in the hands of the Mayor. It would have given the Mayor complete domination of the development of transportation facilities in New York City. Such effective opposition was raised that it was defeated by the votes of Independent Democrats in the Assembly. At this session it was, too, that an attempt was made to pass the Sullivan Inferior Criminal Courts “Ripper” bill which, by making city magistrates elective instead of appointive,[355] would have restored the old pernicious, demoralizing system of local political influence. These were but two of a list of other proposed Tammany measures.

The 1911 session was the first time in nineteen years that the Democratic Party controlled the Legislature, with Tammany Hall leading the Democratic organization in the state. During this session, there was a strong push to pass the Tammany-Gaynor "Ripper" Charter, which caused quite a scandal. At that time, the majority of the Board of Estimate in New York City were Independent Democrats. The proposed charter would have unfairly taken away many of their key functions. Its goal was to weaken the Board of Estimate's powers in several harmful ways and to concentrate power in the Mayor’s hands. It would have allowed the Mayor to completely control the development of transportation facilities in New York City. There was such strong opposition that it was defeated by the votes of Independent Democrats in the Assembly. This session also saw an attempt to pass the Sullivan Inferior Criminal Courts “Ripper” bill, which aimed to make city magistrates elected instead of appointed, thereby bringing back the old corrupt system of local political influence. These were just two among several other proposed Tammany measures.

Mr. Murphy’s habits as leader at this time were in singular contrast with those of years previously when, as a district leader, he had made his hailing place by a lamp post. He now used a luxurious suite of rooms at Delmonico’s fashionable restaurant, at Fifth avenue and Forty-fourth street, where, during campaign contests, he held his secret consultations. Here those whom the “Boss” desired to see on terms of great privacy were summoned, nor were they admitted, it was reported, before they had been first scrutinized and received by Mr. Murphy’s factotum, “Phil” Donohue, the treasurer of Tammany Hall, who took his stand in an anteroom. During the campaign of 1911, when County and Assembly candidates were to be elected, Mr. Murphy was to be found almost daily at Delmonico’s, and, according to published report, Justice Cohalan was there with him frequently. It was at this election that Mr. Cohalan was elected Justice of the Supreme Court for a period of fourteen years.

Mr. Murphy’s leadership style at this time was completely different from how he had been in the past when, as a district leader, he would meet by a lamppost. He now occupied a luxurious suite of rooms at Delmonico’s, a trendy restaurant on Fifth Avenue and Forty-fourth Street, where he held secret meetings during campaign seasons. Those whom the “Boss” wanted to meet privately were summoned, and they reportedly weren’t allowed in until they had first been screened and vetted by Mr. Murphy’s assistant, “Phil” Donohue, the treasurer of Tammany Hall, who stood guard in the anteroom. During the 1911 campaign, when candidates for County and Assembly were being elected, Mr. Murphy could be found almost daily at Delmonico’s, and according to reports, Justice Cohalan was often there with him. It was during this election that Mr. Cohalan was elected as Justice of the Supreme Court for a term of fourteen years.

Veteran politicians who had learned the wisdom of combining the pocketing of millions with the art of simple appearances, shook their heads ominously at what they considered “Boss” Murphy’s tactlessness in vaunting his power, surrounded by ostentation and grandiose luxury.

Veteran politicians who had figured out how to mix making millions with the skill of humble appearances shook their heads sadly at what they saw as "Boss" Murphy's lack of tact in boasting about his power while surrounded by showy displays and excessive luxury.

FOOTNOTES

[1] An indication of Senator Grady’s large sources of income had come to public notice in 1907 when the District Attorney’s force raided the poolroom “clearing house” at 112 Fulton street, New York City. Canceled checks and other records found there revealed that a mysterious person designated variously in the syndicate’s account books as “Tommy,” “T. G.,” “T. Grady,” and “Sen.,” had “raked off” more than $43,000 on the poolroom business in the first two years of the syndicate’s existence and had continued to profit from that source up to the very time of the raid. No doubt, however, Grady had his losses, too.

[1] In 1907, Senator Grady’s significant sources of income came to light when the District Attorney's team raided the poolroom “clearing house” at 112 Fulton Street, New York City. Canceled checks and other documents found there revealed that a mysterious person listed in the syndicate’s account books as “Tommy,” “T. G.,” “T. Grady,” and “Sen.,” had skimmed off more than $43,000 from the poolroom business in the first two years of the syndicate’s operation and continued to earn from that source right up until the raid. However, it’s likely that Grady experienced some losses as well.

[2] Hyde, on November 29, 1912, was convicted in court on a charge of accepting a bribe, as a public officer, in consideration for depositing public money in certain banks. He was sentenced to two years in State’s prison. But the verdict was later reversed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, and he was released from all criminal charges.

[2] Hyde was found guilty in court on November 29, 1912, for taking a bribe as a public official in exchange for putting public funds in certain banks. He received a two-year prison sentence. However, the decision was later overturned by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, and he was cleared of all criminal charges.

[3] The Committee commented: “The investigation shows clearly the extreme difficulty of securing exact information which will disclose the methods by which powerful financial interests seek to control legislative action in matters coming before legislative bodies.

[3] The Committee stated: “The investigation clearly reveals the significant challenge of obtaining precise information that would reveal how powerful financial interests attempt to influence legislative decisions on issues presented to legislative bodies.

“The crime of bribery is one of the most difficult of all crimes to uncover. All the resources of ingenuity are used to conceal it, and only in exceedingly rare instances are either of the parties to the crime willing to come forward and disclose the facts.”

“The crime of bribery is one of the hardest crimes to uncover. People use all sorts of clever tactics to hide it, and it's extremely rare for either party involved in the crime to step forward and reveal the details.”


CHAPTER XXXV
“CHIEF” MURPHY’S LEADERSHIP—MORE DETAILS
1912-1913

Mayor Gaynor was by no means pliable to Tammany purposes; he both asserted and exercised his independence of “Chief” Murphy. But although great powers were centralized in his office, there were nevertheless numbers of Tammany men in the various departments, bureaus and courts. Of the 85,000 regular employees of New York City in 1912 (including 10,118 policemen and 4,346 firemen), many were Tammany men, the larger number of them occupying subordinate positions. The entire city payroll at this time aggregated about $89,000,000—an average outlay of $7,500,000 a month for salaries and wages alone. The city budget for 1913 was $190,411,000.

Mayor Gaynor was definitely not flexible when it came to Tammany's interests; he not only claimed but also exercised his independence from “Chief” Murphy. However, even though significant powers were concentrated in his office, there were still many Tammany supporters in the various departments, bureaus, and courts. Of the 85,000 regular employees of New York City in 1912 (including 10,118 police officers and 4,346 firefighters), many were affiliated with Tammany, most of them in lower-ranking positions. At that time, the total city payroll was around $89,000,000—an average monthly expenditure of $7,500,000 just for salaries and wages. The city budget for 1913 was $190,411,000.

Despite the appointment of successive Police Commissioners—there had been eight within eleven years—to remedy matters in the Police Department, the state of affairs in that department was still a fruitful cause of scandal. This continuing scandal was brought to a vivid climax by a murder the deliberate audacity of which horrified and aroused the people of the city.

Despite the appointment of several Police Commissioners—there had been eight in eleven years—to fix issues in the Police Department, the situation in that department was still a major source of scandal. This ongoing scandal reached a shocking peak with a murder so brazen that it horrified and stirred the people of the city.

On April 15, 1912, Police Lieutenant Charles Becker went, at the head of his “raiding squad,” to the gambling house of Herman Rosenthal on West Forty-fifth street. On July 11, 1912, Rosenthal went to the West Side Police Court to protest against the “oppression” of the police in stationing a uniformed man constantly on duty in his house. Shortly thereafter, Rosenthal made an affidavit,[357] which was published in the New York World on July 14, 1912, swearing that Police Lieutenant Becker had been his partner in the operation of the gambling house and had made the raid for certain personal purposes hereafter explained.

On April 15, 1912, Police Lieutenant Charles Becker led his “raiding squad” to Herman Rosenthal's gambling house on West Forty-fifth Street. On July 11, 1912, Rosenthal went to the West Side Police Court to complain about the “oppression” he felt from the police, who had stationed a uniformed officer on duty in his house at all times. Soon after, Rosenthal filed an affidavit,[357] which was published in the New York World on July 14, 1912, claiming that Police Lieutenant Becker was his partner in running the gambling house and that the raid was conducted for personal reasons that he would explain later.

If at this time a Tammany district attorney had been in office, the results might not have been fatal to Rosenthal. But the district attorney, Charles S. Whitman, was an official noted for his excellent record. It was well realized that when he agreed to listen to Rosenthal’s charges against Becker, he could not be “reached” by any “influence” or intimidated by any threat. The alternative on the part of somebody vitally interested was to slay Rosenthal on the principle that “dead men tell no tales,” and thus prevent important disclosures being made to the district attorney.

If a Tammany district attorney had been in office at that time, the outcome might not have been so deadly for Rosenthal. But the district attorney, Charles S. Whitman, had a solid reputation for his excellent record. It was clear that when he agreed to listen to Rosenthal’s accusations against Becker, he couldn’t be swayed by any “influence” or scared by any threats. The alternative for someone with a significant interest was to kill Rosenthal under the idea that “dead men tell no tales,” thus stopping any important information from getting to the district attorney.

At 2 o’clock on the morning of July 16, 1912, Rosenthal was summoned out from the doorway of the Hotel Metropole at Broadway and Forty-third street, and shot to death by four “gunmen” from within an automobile, which immediately after the shooting sped away with the murderers.

At 2 a.m. on July 16, 1912, Rosenthal was called out from the entrance of the Hotel Metropole at Broadway and 43rd Street and was shot to death by four "gunmen" in a car, which quickly drove off with the killers right after the shooting.

Arrests of suspects quickly followed. By July 29, 1912, District Attorney Whitman held four men, all of whom had become informers. These four were “Bald Jack” Rose, “Bridgie” Webber, Harry Vallon, and Sam Schepps—two of whom, Rose and Vallon, had voluntarily surrendered. On statements made by Rose and Vallon, the Grand Jury returned an indictment against Becker charging murder in the first degree. A few days later, Becker was re-indicted, and indictments were handed in against the four “gunmen”—Louis Rosenberg, alias “Lefty Louie,” 23 years old; Harry Horowitz, alias “Gyp the Blood,” 26 years old; Jacob Seidenshner, alias “Whitey Lewis,” 26 years old, and Frank Cirofici, alias “Dago Frank,” 29 years old. These “gunmen” were variously arrested at different places.

Arrests of suspects happened quickly. By July 29, 1912, District Attorney Whitman had four men in custody, all of whom had turned informers. These four were “Bald Jack” Rose, “Bridgie” Webber, Harry Vallon, and Sam Schepps—two of them, Rose and Vallon, had voluntarily surrendered. Based on statements from Rose and Vallon, the Grand Jury returned an indictment against Becker, charging him with first-degree murder. A few days later, Becker was re-indicted, and indictments were issued against the four “gunmen”—Louis Rosenberg, aka “Lefty Louie,” 23 years old; Harry Horowitz, aka “Gyp the Blood,” 26 years old; Jacob Seidenshner, aka “Whitey Lewis,” 26 years old; and Frank Cirofici, aka “Dago Frank,” 29 years old. These “gunmen” were arrested at various locations.

Stirred by this brutal murder, a mass meeting of citizens was held at Cooper Union on August 14, 1912. Resolutions were adopted part of which approved a proposal for an appropriation by the city of $25,000 for an investigation into police conditions and a thorough inquiry into the causes and possible remedies of systems of blackmail and graft. A Citizens’ Committee was appointed by this mass meeting to report on these conditions.

Stirred by this brutal murder, a large meeting of citizens was held at Cooper Union on August 14, 1912. Resolutions were adopted, part of which approved a proposal for the city to allocate $25,000 for an investigation into police conditions and a thorough inquiry into the causes and possible solutions to systems of blackmail and corruption. A Citizens’ Committee was established by this mass meeting to report on these conditions.

Of the police force this committee reported on February 26, 1913, that:

Of the police force, this committee reported on February 26, 1913, that:

“The corruption is so ingrained that the man of ordinary decent character entering the force and not possessed of extraordinary moral fiber may easily succumb. About him are the evidences of graft and the enjoyment of irregular incomes substantially increasing the patrolman’s salary. Inadequate condemnation is shown by his associates in the force for such practises; on the contrary, there is much indirect pressure which induces him to break his oath of office; the families of grafting policemen live better than his own, and the urgencies of his family and of his own social needs tempt him to thrive as do his corrupt associates. Such a system makes for too many of the police an organized school of crime. The improvement of recent years—and there is some—is not great enough to satisfy an aroused public.

“The corruption is so deep-rooted that an ordinary person with decent character joining the force, lacking exceptional moral strength, can easily give in. All around him are signs of corruption and the enjoyment of illegal incomes that significantly boost a patrolman's salary. His colleagues in the force often show inadequate condemnation for such practices; instead, there's a lot of indirect pressure that pushes him to break his oath. The families of corrupt officers live better than his own, and the pressures from his family and social needs tempt him to do the same as his corrupt colleagues. This system creates an organized school of crime for too many police officers. Although there has been some improvement in recent years, it’s not enough to satisfy an awakened public.”

“But not resting with this general knowledge of the existence of such matters, this Committee has made an intensive examination of the conditions in a number of police precincts. We know that the connection between members of the police force and crime or commercialized vice is continuous, profitable and so much a matter of course that explicit bargains do not have to be made; naturally this “honor among thieves” is occasionally violated, as is customary among thieves, both the keeping and the breaking of faith being determined by these policemen for their own profit.

“But not satisfied with just this general knowledge of these issues, this Committee has conducted a thorough investigation of the conditions in several police precincts. We understand that the relationship between police officers and crime or illegal activities is ongoing, lucrative, and so routine that explicit agreements aren’t necessary; of course, this “honor among thieves” is sometimes broken, as is common among criminals, with both loyalty and betrayal being decided by these officers for their own gain.”

“Well knowing this police ‘system,’ grand juries will not on police testimony indict violators of the law, lest they [the grand juries] be lending themselves to police persecution of a selected criminal who had refused tribute, and so be helping the police ‘system.’ For the same reason petit juries will acquit, and judges will discharge, and crime increases and goes unpunished, while honest policemen are discredited and discouraged.

“Well aware of how the police 'system' works, grand juries will not indict lawbreakers based on police testimony, as they don’t want to contribute to police harassment of a chosen criminal who has resisted paying off the police, thereby supporting the police 'system.' For the same reason, petit juries will acquit, and judges will dismiss cases, leading to more crime that goes unpunished, while honest police officers are discredited and discouraged."

“Evil thus breeds new maggots of evil. The sums collected by the police excite the greed of certain politicians; they demand their shares, and in their turn they protect the criminal breaches of the law and the police in corruption. The presence of ‘politics’ brings strength and complexity to the ‘system’ and makes it[359] harder to break up. The city, we believe, is convinced that it is time for more radical efforts at improvement.”[1]

“Evil breeds new forms of evil. The money collected by the police fuels the greed of certain politicians; they demand their cut and, in turn, protect the illegal actions of both criminals and corrupt police. The involvement of 'politics' strengthens and complicates the 'system,' making it[359] harder to dismantle. The city, we believe, is ready for more drastic efforts at improvement.”[1]

A Committee of the Board of Aldermen, appointed to inquire into matters connected with the Police Department, held eighty public sessions, took 4,800 pages of testimony and records, handed in certain conclusions, and made recommendations for further laws. “We have received shocking evidence of a widespread corrupt alliance between the police and gamblers and disorderly house keepers,” this committee reported in part.[2] During the same time, District Attorney Whitman was vigorously prosecuting public offenders. In a single year four police inspectors were convicted of conspiracy and were also under indictment for bribery, one police captain was convicted of extortion, one lieutenant was convicted of extortion, one patrolman of perjury, and two patrolmen were convicted of extortion. In addition, there were various indictments of patrolmen for extortion. Of the convicted, the captain and one patrolman confessed; an attorney and a citizen indicted for bribery in connection with police matters, also confessed.

A Committee of the Board of Aldermen, assigned to look into issues related to the Police Department, held eighty public sessions, collected 4,800 pages of testimony and records, submitted certain findings, and made recommendations for new laws. “We have received shocking evidence of a widespread corrupt alliance between the police and gamblers and owners of illegal establishments,” the committee reported in part.[2] Meanwhile, District Attorney Whitman was actively prosecuting public offenders. In just one year, four police inspectors were convicted of conspiracy and were also under indictment for bribery, one police captain was convicted of extortion, one lieutenant was convicted of extortion, one patrolman was convicted of perjury, and two patrolmen were convicted of extortion. Additionally, there were various indictments against patrolmen for extortion. Among those convicted, the captain and one patrolman confessed; an attorney and a citizen indicted for bribery related to police matters also confessed.

To return to the trials for the murder of Rosenthal: At Becker’s trial Rose testified that his connection with Becker had begun in 1911, after a “raid” on a gambling house kept by him (Rose) on Second Avenue; that the levying of tribute on “unraided” gamblers was systematized; that Rosenthal was brought under this system of “protection”; that Rosenthal and Becker had become partners; and that Rosenthal in March, 1912, had refused to “give up” $500 for the defense of Becker’s press agent who was charged with the killing of a negro in a “raid” on a crap game. According further to Rose’s testimony, this refusal brought on strained relations between[360] Becker and Rosenthal; and that after the “raid” on Rosenthal’s gambling house, on April 15, 1912, when Rosenthal threatened “to squeal,” Becker began to plan for the “fixing” of Rosenthal. In June, 1912—so Rose testified—when “Big Jack” Zelig, an East Side gang leader, was in the City Prison, the plan was determined upon of negotiating with him that, in exchange for his release, some of his “gunmen” should “attend to” Rosenthal. The four “gunmen” arrested, Rose swore, were the tools that committed the murder, and he (Rose) had acted as Becker’s agent in arranging matters with them. The testimony further showed that on the afternoon after the murder, the quartet of “gunmen” had received $1,000 as payment, after which they quit the city.

To go back to the trials for Rosenthal's murder: At Becker’s trial, Rose testified that his connection with Becker started in 1911, after a “raid” on a gambling house he ran on Second Avenue; that there was a system for collecting tribute from “unraided” gamblers; that Rosenthal fell under this system of “protection”; that Rosenthal and Becker became partners; and that in March 1912, Rosenthal had refused to “give up” $500 for the defense of Becker’s press agent who was charged with killing a Black man during a “raid” on a crap game. According to Rose’s testimony, this refusal caused tension between Becker and Rosenthal; and after the “raid” on Rosenthal’s gambling house on April 15, 1912, when Rosenthal threatened to “squeal,” Becker started planning to “fix” Rosenthal. In June 1912—so Rose testified—when “Big Jack” Zelig, an East Side gang leader, was in City Prison, they planned to negotiate with him so that in exchange for his release, some of his “gunmen” would “take care of” Rosenthal. The four “gunmen” who were arrested, Rose swore, were the ones who committed the murder, and he (Rose) had acted as Becker’s agent in coordinating with them. The testimony also revealed that the afternoon after the murder, the group of “gunmen” had received $1,000 as payment, after which they left the city.

On the testimony of Rose and others, Becker was convicted on October 24, 1913; the conviction of the four young “gunmen” soon followed. All five were sentenced to death. By a decision of the Court of Appeals, on February 24, 1914, Becker was allowed a new trial upon the ground that by reason of hostile rulings his trial had not been fair, but the conviction of the four “gunmen” was affirmed. They were electrocuted at Sing Sing prison on April 13, 1914. Subsequently, after a second trial, Becker was again convicted, and was duly electrocuted.

On the testimony of Rose and others, Becker was found guilty on October 24, 1913; the convictions of the four young “gunmen” followed shortly after. All five received death sentences. On February 24, 1914, the Court of Appeals decided that Becker should get a new trial because his previous trial had not been fair due to biased rulings, but the convictions of the four “gunmen” were upheld. They were executed in the electric chair at Sing Sing prison on April 13, 1914. Later, after a second trial, Becker was convicted again and was executed as well.

Another source of quick-ripening trouble to Tammany Hall, turning large numbers of voters against its chief, Mr. Murphy, and against the whole system of the “Organization,” was the summary manner in which it impeached and disposed of Governor William Sulzer.

Another cause of rapid trouble for Tammany Hall, driving many voters away from its leader, Mr. Murphy, and against the entire “Organization” system, was the abrupt way it impeached and dealt with Governor William Sulzer.

Mr. Sulzer had been a member of Tammany Hall for twenty-five years, and had always been pushed into office by Tammany Hall since the time when, as a young man, he had been one of Mr. Croker’s protégés. Elected to the New York State Assembly, he had been made its Speaker at a youthful age. Later he had been repeatedly sent to Congress by Tammany Hall nominations, and it was primarily a Tammany backing that caused his nomination[361] and election as Governor, in 1912. Tammany believed that it had every reason to feel sure that as Governor Mr. Sulzer would continue pliable and docile to the “Organization’s” orders and interests.

Mr. Sulzer had been a member of Tammany Hall for twenty-five years and had always been pushed into office by Tammany since he was a young man and one of Mr. Croker’s protégés. He was elected to the New York State Assembly and became its Speaker at a young age. Later, Tammany Hall nominated him multiple times for Congress, and it was mainly their support that led to his nomination[361] and election as Governor in 1912. Tammany felt confident that as Governor, Mr. Sulzer would remain compliant and obedient to the Organization’s directives and interests.

“Boss” Murphy, however, was soon disillusioned when Governor Sulzer declined dictation.

“Boss” Murphy, however, quickly became disillusioned when Governor Sulzer rejected his orders.

According to Mr. Sulzer’s detailed story,[3] he (Sulzer), immediately prior to going into office as Governor, spent an afternoon with Mr. Murphy at his request in his private room at Delmonico’s.

According to Mr. Sulzer’s detailed story,[3] he (Sulzer), right before taking office as Governor, spent an afternoon with Mr. Murphy in his private room at Delmonico's at his request.

“His attitude,” Mr. Sulzer related, “was very friendly and confidential. He said he was my friend; that he knew of my financial condition and wanted to help me out. As he went on, I was amazed at his knowledge of my intimate personal affairs. To my astonishment, he informed me that he knew I was heavily in debt. Then he offered me enough money to pay my debts and have enough left to take things easy while Governor. He said that this was really a party matter and that the money he would give me was party money … and that nobody would know anything about it; that I could pay what I owed and go to Albany feeling easy financially. He then asked me how much I needed, to whom I owed it, and other personal questions.

“His attitude,” Mr. Sulzer said, “was very friendly and trustworthy. He told me he was my friend; that he was aware of my financial situation and wanted to help me out. As he continued, I was shocked by how much he knew about my personal life. To my surprise, he mentioned that he knew I was in deep debt. Then he offered me enough cash to clear my debts and still have some left over to relax while being Governor. He claimed this was actually a party issue and that the money he would provide was party funds … and that nobody would find out about it; that I could settle my debts and head to Albany feeling financially secure. He then asked me how much I needed, who I owed it to, and other personal questions.

“As I did not want to be tied hard and fast as Governor in advance, I declined Mr. Murphy’s offer, saying that I was paying off my debts gradually; that my creditors were friends and would not press me; that I was economical, that I would try to get along on my salary as Governor.” Mr. Sulzer asserted that Mr. Murphy repeated the offer, and that when he (Sulzer) again refused, Mr. Murphy said, “If you need money at any time, let me know, and you can have what you want. We cleaned up a lot of money on your campaign. I can afford to let you have what you want and never miss it.”

“As I didn't want to be permanently tied down as Governor, I turned down Mr. Murphy's offer, explaining that I was gradually paying off my debts; that my creditors were friends and wouldn’t pressure me; that I was being frugal and intended to make do with my salary as Governor.” Mr. Sulzer stated that Mr. Murphy repeated the offer, and when he (Sulzer) refused again, Mr. Murphy said, “If you ever need money, just let me know, and you can have whatever you want. We made a lot of money from your campaign. I can easily let you have what you need without it affecting me.”

Then, according further to Mr. Sulzer’s story, Mr. Murphy wanted Governor Sulzer to meet him at the hotel in Albany where Murphy was staying; Sulzer did not go. Subsequently, on the night of February 2, 1913, they met at Justice Edward E. McCall’s house in New York City, where Murphy urged the appointment of his friend, John Galvin, to succeed Mr. Willcox as a member of the Public Service Commission in New York City. The Public Service Commission is a body invested with enormous authority in the matter of granting of public franchises and other comprehensive powers; it had been under anti-Tammany control, and it was a body the domination of which was pressingly sought by Tammany; there were vast subway franchises to be awarded, and the powers of that body could be used with almost autocratic effect in certain ways over the entire range of recognized public service corporations. Governor Sulzer would not appoint Galvin, but finally compromised upon the selection of Justice Edward E. McCall as Chairman of the Public Service Commission.

Then, according to Mr. Sulzer’s story, Mr. Murphy wanted Governor Sulzer to meet him at the hotel in Albany where Murphy was staying; Sulzer did not go. Later, on the night of February 2, 1913, they met at Justice Edward E. McCall’s house in New York City, where Murphy pushed for the appointment of his friend, John Galvin, to replace Mr. Willcox as a member of the Public Service Commission in New York City. The Public Service Commission is a group with significant authority over granting public franchises and other extensive powers; it had been under anti-Tammany control, and Tammany was eager to dominate it; there were huge subway franchises to be awarded, and the powers of that group could be used almost autocratically over the entire range of recognized public service corporations. Governor Sulzer would not appoint Galvin but eventually settled on selecting Justice Edward E. McCall as Chairman of the Public Service Commission.

“At this meeting and subsequently,” Mr. Sulzer declared, “Mr. Murphy demanded from me pledges regarding legislation and especially concerning appointments to the Public Service Commission, the Health Department, the Labor Department, the State Hospital Commission, the Department of State Prisons and the Department of Highways.” Murphy insisted that various Tammany men whom he named should be appointed to those offices. Mr. Murphy, however, favored the retention in office of C. Gordon Reel, State Superintendent of Highways, saying that he was “a good man.” “Mr. Murphy added,” Mr. Sulzer’s statement continued, “that if I wished a new State Superintendent of Highways, ‘Jim’ Gaffney was the best all-around man for the job.”

“At this meeting and afterwards,” Mr. Sulzer stated, “Mr. Murphy asked me for commitments regarding legislation, particularly about appointments to the Public Service Commission, the Health Department, the Labor Department, the State Hospital Commission, the Department of State Prisons, and the Department of Highways.” Murphy insisted that several Tammany men he mentioned should be appointed to those positions. However, Mr. Murphy supported keeping C. Gordon Reel, the State Superintendent of Highways, in his role, saying he was “a good man.” “Mr. Murphy added,” Mr. Sulzer’s statement continued, “that if I wanted a new State Superintendent of Highways, ‘Jim’ Gaffney was the best all-around man for the job.”

“When I took office as Governor of the State last January,” Mr. Sulzer declared in a signed published statement,

“When I took office as Governor of the State last January,” Mr. Sulzer declared in a signed published statement,

“on the very first day my attention was abruptly called to the fact that during the year just ended there had been spent in the State $34,000,000 WITHOUT A SINGLE AUDIT.

“On the very first day, I was suddenly made aware that during the past year, $34,000,000 had been spent in the State WITHOUT A SINGLE AUDIT.

“On the second day that I was in office a messenger presented to me bills amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars, pointing out to me where I was to sign my name. If I had attached my signature to those bills they would have been immediately paid, and yet the messenger thought that he was telling me nothing unusual when he said that other Governors had signed bills that way, and that one Governor had left a rubber stamp outside his office with the messenger, so that he would not be bothered.

“On the second day I was in office, a messenger brought me bills totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars, indicating where I needed to sign. If I had signed those bills, they would have been paid right away, and yet the messenger acted like it was no big deal when he mentioned that other Governors had signed bills this way, and that one Governor even left a rubber stamp outside his office for the messenger, so he wouldn’t be disturbed.”

“‘Leave those bills there,’ I said, ‘and I’ll look into them. The rubber stamp period is over.’”

“‘Leave those bills there,’ I said, ‘and I’ll check them out. The rubber stamp era is over.’”

After Mr. Sulzer had become Governor he learned, as his statement read, that the State Architect had expended more than $4,300,000 in the previous year; that this was done practically on the certificate of that official, and that there had been no proper audit; the vouchers had been carried to the trustees of public buildings, composed of the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor and Speaker of the Assembly by a clerk and approved by the use of a regular office stamp. Governor Sulzer also learned, he said, that the appropriation for 1912 had been exceeded by nearly half a million dollars, and that there was no proper supervision. Governor Sulzer appointed John A. Hennessy as Commissioner to investigate reports of graft in these and other departments. At the same time, he appointed George W. Blake as Commissioner to inquire into prison management.

After Mr. Sulzer became Governor, he found out, as his statement indicated, that the State Architect had spent over $4,300,000 in the previous year; this was done mainly based on that official's certification, and there hadn't been a proper audit; the vouchers were sent to the trustees of public buildings, made up of the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, and Speaker of the Assembly by a clerk and were approved with a regular office stamp. Governor Sulzer also discovered that the budget for 1912 had been exceeded by nearly half a million dollars, and that there was no proper oversight. Governor Sulzer appointed John A. Hennessy as Commissioner to investigate allegations of corruption in these and other departments. At the same time, he appointed George W. Blake as Commissioner to look into prison management.

Mr. Hennessy’s report disclosed the most widespread graft. In construction work on public buildings, large bills had been submitted for inferior material; the payrolls on the electrical and other contracts had been padded; regular State employees had been displaced as inspectors and timekeepers by political henchmen from Tammany District Leader James J. Hagan’s district in Manhattan, from which the State Architect, his secretary, and the foreman on the general work came. At Governor Sulzer’s request, Mr. Hennessy asked the State Architect for his resignation, but Senator Frawley, another Tammany[364] district leader, intervened with a protest to Governor Sulzer against any interference with the work on the State Capitol or other State buildings.

Mr. Hennessy’s report revealed a major corruption scandal. In construction projects for public buildings, inflated invoices had been submitted for substandard materials; the payrolls for electrical and other contracts had been exaggerated; regular State employees had been replaced as inspectors and timekeepers by political allies from Tammany District Leader James J. Hagan’s area in Manhattan, where the State Architect, his secretary, and the foreman for the general work originated. At Governor Sulzer’s request, Mr. Hennessy asked the State Architect to resign, but Senator Frawley, another Tammany district leader, stepped in with a protest to Governor Sulzer against any interference with the work on the State Capitol or other State buildings.

“I sent for Hennessy,” Mr. Sulzer’s narrative went on, “who in my presence related to Senator Frawley the main facts in the case, but Frawley still persisted that nothing should be done with the State Architect’s office, at least until there had been further consideration of the case. I told Hennessy to return to the State Architect (Mr. Hoofer) and insist upon his resignation. What happened between these two men I can only tell from Hennessy’s recital to me. Hoofer told him that he (Hoofer) was not a free agent, that he had no control over his deputies, that he had no control over his secretary, nor did he have any control over the men who checked up the work. He (Hoofer) said they were all appointed through Tammany Hall.… Hoofer said he wanted to consult somebody in New York. While I held the ’phone, I told Hennessy to ask Hoofer the name of the man, and Hennessy responded that Hoofer wanted an opportunity to see Charles F. Murphy and explain certain things.”

“I called Hennessy,” Mr. Sulzer continued, “who explained the main facts of the case to Senator Frawley in my presence, but Frawley insisted that nothing should happen with the State Architect’s office, at least until the case was reviewed further. I told Hennessy to go back to the State Architect (Mr. Hoofer) and demand his resignation. What transpired between those two, I can only share from Hennessy’s account. Hoofer told him that he wasn’t a free agent, that he had no control over his deputies, his secretary, or the employees who checked the work. He said they were all appointed through Tammany Hall.… Hoofer expressed a desire to consult someone in New York. While I was on the phone, I instructed Hennessy to ask Hoofer who that person was, and Hennessy relayed that Hoofer wanted a chance to meet Charles F. Murphy and explain some things.”

Governor Sulzer allowed a few days’ delay. Shortly before the time limit that Governor Sulzer had set for Hoofer’s resignation, “John H. Delaney came to me,” Mr. Sulzer’s story went on, “and said that he had been talking to ‘the Chief’ over the ’phone, and that Murphy wanted Hoofer’s resignation to go over until such time as he could discuss the case with me.” A little later “Senator Wagner, Senator Frawley and John H. Delaney came into the Executive Chamber and informed me that Murphy was insistent that nothing should be done in the case of Hoofer during that week, and it was a subject that would have to be discussed with the organization.” Upon Governor Sulzer’s demand that he resign or be immediately removed, Mr. Hoofer wrote his resignation.

Governor Sulzer allowed for a brief delay. Just before the deadline he set for Hoofer’s resignation, “John H. Delaney came to me,” Mr. Sulzer continued, “and mentioned that he had been on the phone with ‘the Chief,’ and that Murphy wanted Hoofer’s resignation to be postponed until he could discuss the matter with me.” A little later, “Senator Wagner, Senator Frawley, and John H. Delaney came into the Executive Chamber and informed me that Murphy was adamant that nothing should be done regarding Hoofer that week, and that it was a topic that needed to be discussed with the organization.” After Governor Sulzer insisted that he resign or be removed immediately, Mr. Hoofer wrote his resignation.

The next official removed by Governor Sulzer was C. Gordon Reel, State Superintendent of Highways, following Commissioner Hennessy’s investigation and the disclosures of extensive graft in highway contracts in a large number of counties. The amount of this graft has been variously estimated at from $5,000,000 to $9,000,000. That the system of plundering the State in the building of roads was no fiction was shown later in the large number of indictments (followed by many convictions) handed down against politico-contractors and State employes in New York State.

The next official removed by Governor Sulzer was C. Gordon Reel, the State Superintendent of Highways, after Commissioner Hennessy’s investigation revealed extensive corruption in highway contracts across many counties. The amount of this corruption has been estimated to be between $5,000,000 and $9,000,000. The reality of the system of looting the State during road construction became evident later with the numerous indictments (which led to many convictions) issued against political contractors and State employees in New York State.

In the most important of the indictments found by the Suffolk County Grand Jury on January 22, 1914, the Grand Jury charged “grand larceny” and “conspiracy” in the construction of a so-called “cementitious Hudson River gravel road” the specifications of which designated a material absolutely controlled by Henry Steers, of the contracting firm of Bradley, Gaffney & Steers, commonly known as “the Tammany Trust.”

In the most significant of the indictments issued by the Suffolk County Grand Jury on January 22, 1914, the Grand Jury accused of "grand larceny" and "conspiracy" related to the construction of a so-called "cement-based Hudson River gravel road," which specified a material that was completely controlled by Henry Steers from the contracting firm Bradley, Gaffney & Steers, often referred to as "the Tammany Trust."

During an investigation conducted by James W. Osborne, in behalf of New York State, the testimony, on February 17, 1914, indicated that State Superintendent of Highways Reel ordered the use of a patented road for roadways and caused the specifications to be changed so as to favor the Gaffney-Bradley-Steers Company which controlled this particular patented pavement. And when Mr. Sulzer testified, on February 29, 1914, before the Assembly “Graft Hunt” Investigating Committee, he said that an average of 30 per cent. of the money paid for those State roads (which had been investigated by Mr. Hennessy) went into the contract, and that 70 per cent. went into the pockets of politicians and contractors. Mr. Sulzer asserted that about $9,000,000 had been stolen in 1912.

During an investigation led by James W. Osborne on behalf of New York State, testimony on February 17, 1914, revealed that State Superintendent of Highways Reel had directed the use of a patented road for highways and altered the specifications to benefit the Gaffney-Bradley-Steers Company, which owned this specific patented pavement. When Mr. Sulzer testified on February 29, 1914, before the Assembly “Graft Hunt” Investigating Committee, he stated that roughly 30 percent of the money allocated for those State roads (which had been examined by Mr. Hennessy) went to the contract, while 70 percent ended up in the hands of politicians and contractors. Mr. Sulzer claimed that around $9,000,000 was stolen in 1912.

According to Mr. Sulzer, Mr. Reel’s appointment as State Commissioner of Highways had been Mr. Murphy’s “personal selection.” When Governor Sulzer’s attitude[366] indicated Reel’s removal, Mr. Murphy (so Sulzer stated) pressed forward the appointment of “Jim” Gaffney to succeed Reel. “Mr. Murphy demanded the appointment of Gaffney, and still later a prominent New Yorker came to me in the Executive Mansion bringing the message from Mr. Murphy that it was ‘Gaffney or war.’ I declined to appoint Gaffney.

According to Mr. Sulzer, Mr. Reel’s appointment as State Commissioner of Highways was Mr. Murphy’s “personal choice.” When Governor Sulzer’s stance suggested Reel’s removal, Mr. Murphy (as Sulzer mentioned) pushed for the appointment of “Jim” Gaffney to replace Reel. “Mr. Murphy insisted on Gaffney’s appointment, and later, a well-known New Yorker visited me at the Executive Mansion with a message from Mr. Murphy saying it was ‘Gaffney or war.’ I refused to appoint Gaffney.[366]

“This is the Gaffney who, only a few months afterwards, on September 4, 1913, in undisputed testimony before the Supreme Court of New York, was shown to have demanded and received $30,000 in money (refusing to take a check) from one of the aqueduct contractors, nominally for ‘advice.’ This is the man who Mr. Murphy demanded should be put in a position where he would superintend and control the spending of sixty-five millions of the money of the State in road contracts.”

“This is the Gaffney who, just a few months later, on September 4, 1913, in clear evidence before the Supreme Court of New York, was found to have asked for and accepted $30,000 in cash (refusing to take a check) from one of the aqueduct contractors, supposedly for ‘advice.’ This is the man whom Mr. Murphy insisted should be placed in a position to oversee and manage the spending of sixty-five million dollars of State funds on road contracts.”

Mr. Sulzer here referred to the testimony of Harry B. Hanger, aqueduct contractor, who swore that he paid Mr. Gaffney $30,000 for “expert advice on the labor situation” on one contract, and $10,000 for the same services on another contract. Mr. Gaffney later—on March 20, 1914—himself testified before the Special Grand Jury in New York City as to this transaction.

Mr. Sulzer mentioned the testimony of Harry B. Hanger, an aqueduct contractor, who stated that he paid Mr. Gaffney $30,000 for "expert advice on the labor situation" for one contract, and $10,000 for the same services for another contract. Mr. Gaffney later testified himself before the Special Grand Jury in New York City regarding this transaction on March 20, 1914.

It was the same Mr. Gaffney, too, whose name was involved in the award of Contract No. 22 for the Catskill Aqueduct. This contract was awarded on March 19, 1909, over two lower bidders to Patterson & Company, a firm of no great capital or experience. James W. Patterson, Jr., head of that firm, subsequently testified before the Grand Jury, in 1914, to his making arrangements to pay 5 per cent. of the contract price ($824,942.50) as a “contribution to Tammany Hall.” John M. Murphy, a Bronx contractor, testified that, as agent for James E. Gaffney, he had arranged to sell the contract, and had received from Mr. Gaffney 10 per cent., or $4,125, as his share of a certain $41,250, after threatening[367] “to kick over the whole deal” if Gaffney did not give the proper “honorarium.”

It was the same Mr. Gaffney whose name was linked to the awarding of Contract No. 22 for the Catskill Aqueduct. This contract was given on March 19, 1909, to Patterson & Company, a firm with limited capital and experience, bypassing two lower bidders. James W. Patterson, Jr., the head of that firm, later testified before the Grand Jury in 1914 about arranging to pay 5 percent of the contract price ($824,942.50) as a “contribution to Tammany Hall.” John M. Murphy, a contractor from the Bronx, testified that he acted on behalf of James E. Gaffney to sell the contract and received 10 percent, or $4,125, as his portion of a specific $41,250 payment, after threatening “to kick over the whole deal” if Gaffney didn’t provide the appropriate “honorarium.”

It appeared from the testimony that $41,250 in bills had been deposited in escrow to be handed over by James G. Shaw, the “stakeholder,” to a some one designated as Gaffney, on the day after the award of Aqueduct Contract No. 22. Questioned as to whom this $41,250 was given, Mr. Shaw could not remember, which forgetfulness made the fastening of legal proof impossible. The special Grand Jury investigating this matter reported, however, in a presentment to Justice Vernon M. Davis, in the Supreme Court, New York City, on April 21, 1914, that the Grand Jurors were morally satisfied that a crime had been committed in the sale of Contract No. 22 to Patterson & Company, and that this contract could not have been sold and delivered, as it was, in the name of James E. Gaffney, “without the collusion of a member of the Board (of Water Supply) itself.” Inasmuch as five years had passed since the transaction, the Statute of Limitations intervened to bar criminal prosecution.

It was revealed through the testimony that $41,250 in bills had been placed in escrow to be handed over by James G. Shaw, the “stakeholder,” to someone identified as Gaffney, the day after the award of Aqueduct Contract No. 22. When asked about who received the $41,250, Mr. Shaw couldn’t recall, and this forgetfulness made it impossible to secure legal proof. However, the special Grand Jury looking into this matter reported to Justice Vernon M. Davis in the Supreme Court, New York City, on April 21, 1914, that the Grand Jurors were morally convinced that a crime had occurred in the sale of Contract No. 22 to Patterson & Company, and that this contract could not have been sold and delivered, as it was, in the name of James E. Gaffney, “without the collusion of a member of the Board (of Water Supply) itself.” Since five years had passed since the transaction, the Statute of Limitations came into play to prevent criminal prosecution.

In an inquiry later conducted by District Attorney Whitman, James C. Stewart swore that one “Gaffney” asked him for a contribution of five per cent. upon $3,000,000 worth of canal work that he (Stewart) was seeking. Stewart refused to make the arrangement; his bid was much the lowest, but he did not then get the contract. Precisely what “Gaffney” it was who proposed the handing over of this $150,000, Stewart averred that he could not tell; he had never seen him previously. When, on January 30, 1914, District Attorney Whitman brought Stewart and James E. Gaffney face to face, Stewart said that he could not identify Mr. Gaffney as the man who demanded the $150,000.

In an investigation later carried out by District Attorney Whitman, James C. Stewart stated that someone named “Gaffney” asked him for a five percent kickback on $3,000,000 worth of canal work that he (Stewart) was pursuing. Stewart declined to make the deal; his bid was significantly lower, but he still did not win the contract. When asked which “Gaffney” proposed the payment of $150,000, Stewart claimed he couldn't identify him; he had never encountered him before. On January 30, 1914, when District Attorney Whitman brought Stewart and James E. Gaffney together, Stewart said he could not recognize Mr. Gaffney as the person who requested the $150,000.

During the course of this same inquiry Mr. Sulzer testified, on January 21, 1914, that on learning that Stewart was to be denied the contracts, he telegraphed on December[368] 18, 1912, to the Canal Board asking it to defer action until he could consult with its members. Whereupon John H. Delaney came to him and excitedly said, “My God, Congressman, what have you done? It angered the Chief more than anything else I have ever known. The Chief is wild.” The “Chief,” otherwise Charles F. Murphy, demanded an interview with the Governor-elect at once.

During this same investigation, Mr. Sulzer testified on January 21, 1914, that upon finding out Stewart was going to be denied the contracts, he sent a telegram to the Canal Board on December[368] 18, 1912, asking them to hold off on making a decision until he could speak with its members. Then John H. Delaney approached him, visibly upset, and said, “My God, Congressman, what have you done? It made the Chief angrier than anything I've ever seen. The Chief is furious.” The “Chief,” who is Charles F. Murphy, immediately requested a meeting with the Governor-elect.

In this interview, which was held at Delmonico’s, Mr. Sulzer quoted Mr. Murphy as saying to him, “Why did you send that telegram to the Canal Board? You have no right to butt in on things that don’t concern you. I’m attending to that matter, and I want you to keep your hands off. If you are going to begin this way, I can see now where you will end as Governor. You do what you are told hereafter, and don’t take any action on matters that don’t concern you without conferring with me.” When Mr. Sulzer said he was going to be Governor, Mr. Murphy (so Sulzer testified) replied: “So that is the way you understand it? Well, if you go along that line, I can see where you will end up damned quick. You are going to be Governor? Like hell you are!”

In this interview, which took place at Delmonico’s, Mr. Sulzer quoted Mr. Murphy saying to him, “Why did you send that telegram to the Canal Board? You have no right to interfere in things that don’t concern you. I’m handling that matter, and I want you to stay out of it. If you’re going to start like this, I can already see how you'll end up as Governor. From now on, do as you’re told, and don’t take any action on things that don’t involve you without checking with me first.” When Mr. Sulzer mentioned he was going to be Governor, Mr. Murphy (as Sulzer testified) responded: “So that’s how you see it? Well, if you keep going down this path, I can see where you’ll be very quickly. You’re going to be Governor? No way!”

Mr. Sulzer further testified at this hearing that on the evening of March 3, 1913, at a luncheon in Washington, he told Senator O’Gorman that Mr. Murphy was putting the “screws” on him and bringing to bear all the influence he could to have James E. Gaffney appointed Commissioner of Highways, and that Senator O’Gorman had said: “Governor, if you appoint Jim Gaffney Commissioner of Highways it will be a disgrace to the State of New York and it will ruin your political career as the Governor. Don’t you know that Gaffney is Murphy’s chief bagman? Don’t you know he is the man Murphy sends out to hold up the contractors? Don’t you know he is the man that held up my client, James G. Stewart, for over a hundred thousand dollars, and he would have got away with it if Stewart had not come to me, and if[369] I had not gone to Murphy and read the Riot Act, telling him that I would not stand for that kind of politics; that he had to stop Gaffney, and that if he didn’t stop Gaffney, so far as my client was concerned, I would expose him.”

Mr. Sulzer further testified at this hearing that on the evening of March 3, 1913, at a lunch in Washington, he told Senator O’Gorman that Mr. Murphy was putting the pressure on him and using all the influence he could to get James E. Gaffney appointed Commissioner of Highways. Senator O’Gorman responded, “Governor, if you appoint Jim Gaffney Commissioner of Highways it will be a disgrace to the State of New York and it will ruin your political career as Governor. Don’t you know that Gaffney is Murphy’s main guy? Don’t you know he’s the one Murphy sends out to shake down the contractors? Don’t you know he’s the one who extorted over a hundred thousand dollars from my client, James G. Stewart, and he would have gotten away with it if Stewart hadn’t come to me, and if [369] I hadn’t gone to Murphy and made it clear that I wouldn’t stand for that kind of politics; that he had to stop Gaffney, and that if he didn’t stop Gaffney, as far as my client was concerned, I would expose him.”

Subsequently Mr. Sulzer met Mr. Murphy several times, and was importuned (so he testified) to appoint Mr. Gaffney. When Sulzer replied that it was impossible, Mr. Murphy announced, “Well, it’s Gaffney or war.” Mr. Sulzer’s testimony went on: “At this conversation, one of the things Mr. Murphy said to me was, ‘If you don’t do this, I will wreck your administration.’ It was not the first time he had threatened me, and I answered, ‘I am the Governor, and I am going to be the Governor.’ He said, ‘You may be the Governor, but I have got the Legislature, and the Legislature controls the Governor, and if you don’t do what I tell you to do, I will throw you out of office.’” After Governor Sulzer had removed Reel, Mr. Murphy was still pressing Gaffney’s appointment.

Later, Mr. Sulzer met with Mr. Murphy several times and was pressured (as he testified) to appoint Mr. Gaffney. When Sulzer said it was impossible, Mr. Murphy declared, “Well, it’s Gaffney or war.” Mr. Sulzer continued, “During this conversation, one of the things Mr. Murphy said to me was, ‘If you don’t do this, I will ruin your administration.’ It wasn’t the first time he had threatened me, and I replied, ‘I am the Governor, and I am going to stay the Governor.’ He said, ‘You might be the Governor, but I control the Legislature, and the Legislature controls the Governor, and if you don’t do what I say, I will oust you from office.’” After Governor Sulzer removed Reel, Mr. Murphy continued to push for Gaffney’s appointment.

Of the inquiries into graft carried on by George W. Blake and John W. Hennessy, Mr. Sulzer testified: “Their reports staggered me, and believe me, it takes something to stagger me. There was graft, graft everywhere, nor any man to stop it.” Mr. Sulzer testified that Mr. Murphy had sought to hamper the graft exposure by causing to be cut off—for the first time in the State’s history, he said—the Governor’s contingent fund, and he described how it became necessary to raise money by private subscription to enable the graft inquiry to be carried on.

Of the investigations into corruption conducted by George W. Blake and John W. Hennessy, Mr. Sulzer said: “Their reports shocked me, and trust me, it takes a lot to shock me. There was corruption everywhere, and no one to stop it.” Mr. Sulzer testified that Mr. Murphy tried to hinder the investigation into corruption by cutting off—for the first time in the State’s history, he said—the Governor’s discretionary fund, and he explained how it became necessary to raise money through private donations to continue the corruption inquiry.

“I have been in office now for six months,” wrote Mr. Sulzer in a signed article later, “and in that time I have learned enough to be able to say without fear of contradiction that in the past three years $50,000,000 of the people’s money has been wasted or stolen.”

“I have been in office now for six months,” wrote Mr. Sulzer in a signed article later, “and during that time I have learned enough to confidently say that over the past three years, $50,000,000 of the people's money has been wasted or stolen.”

In a talk, on March 18, 1913, with Mr. Murphy over[370] appointments to the Supreme Court of New York State, the Tammany chief—so Mr. Sulzer related—“threatened me with public disgrace unless I agreed to his program on legislative matters and appointments. It was at this conference, too, that he talked about the things he ‘had on me,’ and said that I had better listen to him and not to his enemies up the State; that if I did what he told me I would have things easy and no trouble, and that if I didn’t do what he wanted me to, I would have all the trouble I wanted.…

In a conversation on March 18, 1913, with Mr. Murphy about[370] appointments to the Supreme Court of New York State, the Tammany chief—according to Mr. Sulzer—“threatened me with public disgrace unless I went along with his agenda on legislative issues and appointments. It was during this meeting that he also mentioned the things he ‘had on me,’ and said that I should pay attention to him instead of listening to his opponents upstate; that if I followed his instructions, I would have it easy and face no trouble, but if I didn’t do what he wanted, I would have all the trouble I could handle.…

“He was very insulting. Then I asked him what he could do to destroy me. And he said: ‘Never mind; you will find out in good time. Stand by the organization and you will be all right. If you go against the organization, I will make your administration the laughing stock of the State.’ It was at this time that he asked me to call off George Blake, the commissioner who was investigating the prisons.… I told him that Blake was an efficient man and that I was going to let him go on with his work, and he said, ‘If you do you will be sorry for it. Mark what I am telling you now!’

“He was really insulting. Then I asked him what he could do to ruin me. He replied, ‘Never mind; you’ll find out soon enough. Stick with the organization, and you’ll be fine. If you go against the organization, I’ll make your administration the laughingstock of the State.’ It was around this time that he asked me to stop George Blake, the commissioner who was looking into the prisons.… I told him that Blake was good at his job and that I was going to let him continue with his work, and he said, ‘If you do, you’ll regret it. Remember what I’m telling you now!’”

“I told him what I had heard about the vileness of things in the Sing Sing and Auburn prisons. I said: ‘We certainly ought not to stand for them. I want to get at the facts, and if there is anything wrong, stop it; if there is any graft, eliminate it.’ Mr. Murphy told me that he didn’t want anything done in connection with Sing Sing prison by Blake or any other man; that the warden there, Mr. Kennedy, was a friend of his and a good man, and he wanted him left alone. This, remember, was the warden whom I afterward removed from his place on charges and who was since indicted by the Westchester grand jury.” It may be noted here that later there were a number of prosecutions in prison graft cases. The graft in the prisons reached a total of many millions of dollars in the one item alone of the substitution of[371] bad food for the good food paid for by the State. Extensive grafting was found in other respects.

“I told him what I had heard about the awful things happening in Sing Sing and Auburn prisons. I said: ‘We definitely shouldn’t accept that. I want to get to the truth, and if there’s something wrong, fix it; if there’s any corruption, get rid of it.’ Mr. Murphy told me he didn’t want anyone, including Blake, interfering with Sing Sing prison; that the warden there, Mr. Kennedy, was his friend and a good man, and he wanted him left alone. Just so you know, this was the same warden I later removed from his position on charges and who was subsequently indicted by the Westchester grand jury.” It’s worth mentioning that later there were several prosecutions in prison corruption cases. The corruption in the prisons amounted to millions of dollars just from substituting[371]bad food for the good food that the State paid for. There was also widespread corruption found in other areas.

Mr. Sulzer added that one of the agents through whom Mr. Murphy most frequently communicated with him was Justice Edward E. McCall. “Judge McCall usually spoke of Mr. Murphy as ‘the Chief,’ and would say to me that ‘the Chief’ wished such and such a thing done, or demanded that I follow such and such a course of action. Every Tammany member of either house who approached me from day to day used the same language, saying that ‘the Chief’ demanded this or demanded that, or that ‘the Chief’ had telephoned to put through such a piece of legislation, or kill some other piece of legislation.”

Mr. Sulzer added that one of the agents Mr. Murphy communicated with most often was Justice Edward E. McCall. “Judge McCall typically referred to Mr. Murphy as ‘the Chief’ and would tell me that ‘the Chief’ wanted this or that done, or insisted that I take a certain course of action. Every Tammany member from either house who contacted me daily used the same wording, saying that ‘the Chief’ demanded this or that, or that ‘the Chief’ had called to push through a particular piece of legislation, or to block another one.”

Meanwhile, on March 10, 1913, reports of trouble between Governor Sulzer and Mr. Murphy had become public; when on this date Sulzer removed C. Gordon Reel as State Superintendent of Highways, it was reported in the newspapers that Murphy had asked Governor Sulzer to name James E. Gaffney, his partner in the contracting business, as Reel’s successor. On the next day, Mr. Murphy hotly denied that he had asked Gaffney’s appointment. From day to day further reports of estrangement were published. In a speech before the Democratic editors of the State, on March 25, Sulzer asserted: “No man, no party, no organization can make me a rubber stamp. I am the Governor. Let no man doubt that.”

Meanwhile, on March 10, 1913, news of the conflict between Governor Sulzer and Mr. Murphy went public; on this date, Sulzer removed C. Gordon Reel as State Superintendent of Highways. Newspapers reported that Murphy had urged Governor Sulzer to appoint James E. Gaffney, his business partner in contracting, as Reel’s replacement. The following day, Mr. Murphy strongly denied having requested Gaffney's appointment. Each day brought more reports of their growing rift. In a speech to the Democratic editors of the State on March 25, Sulzer declared: “No man, no party, no organization can make me a rubber stamp. I am the Governor. Let no man doubt that.”

It appeared that Mr. Murphy had the idea that Sulzer was at heart a Progressive; it may be explained that the Progressive party had polled a large vote and was recognized as a powerful political factor.

It seemed that Mr. Murphy thought Sulzer was fundamentally a Progressive; this might be clarified by noting that the Progressive party had received a significant number of votes and was seen as an influential political force.

It was on the night of April 13, 1913, that Governor Sulzer, according to his interview published later in the New York Evening Mail, held his final interview with Mr. Murphy. “I asked him,” Mr. Sulzer said, “not to interfere[372] with the trial of Stilwell in the Senate. I said, ‘What are you going to do about him?’ ‘Stand by him, of course,’ replied Mr. Murphy. ‘Stilwell will be acquitted. It will only be a three-day wonder. How do you expect a Senator to live on $1,500 a year? That is only chicken feed.’ … Before we parted that night, I warned Mr. Murphy that he would wreck the party and accomplish his own destruction if he persisted in shielding grafters and violating platform pledges. His angry retort was that I was an ingrate, and that he would disgrace and destroy me.”

It was on the night of April 13, 1913, when Governor Sulzer, in an interview he later gave to the New York Evening Mail, had his final conversation with Mr. Murphy. “I asked him,” Mr. Sulzer said, “not to interfere[372] with the trial of Stilwell in the Senate. I said, ‘What are you going to do about him?’ ‘Stand by him, of course,’ replied Mr. Murphy. ‘Stilwell will be acquitted. It’ll only be a three-day sensation. How do you expect a Senator to live on $1,500 a year? That’s just pocket change.’ … Before we left that night, I warned Mr. Murphy that he would ruin the party and bring about his own downfall if he kept protecting crooks and breaking campaign promises. His angry response was that I was ungrateful, and that he would disgrace and destroy me.”

In fact, as Mr. Murphy predicted, Senator Stephen J. Stilwell was voted not guilty of official misconduct, by a vote of 28 to 21 in the Senate, after an investigation by the judiciary committee of charges of bribery made against him by George H. Kendall, president of the New York Bank Note Company. But subsequently Stilwell was indicted in New York County, convicted of bribery upon substantially the same evidence as that upon which a majority of his colleagues in the State Senate had acquitted him, and he was sentenced to a two-year term in prison.

In fact, as Mr. Murphy predicted, Senator Stephen J. Stilwell was found not guilty of official misconduct by a vote of 28 to 21 in the Senate, after an investigation by the judiciary committee into bribery charges made against him by George H. Kendall, president of the New York Bank Note Company. However, Stilwell was later indicted in New York County, convicted of bribery based on almost the same evidence that led a majority of his colleagues in the State Senate to acquit him, and he was sentenced to two years in prison.

Replying later to Mr. Sulzer’s charges, Mr. Murphy definitely denied that he had ever recommended the appointment of James E. Gaffney as Highways Commissioner; that he ever mentioned Gaffney’s name to Governor Sulzer for any office; he emphatically denied that he ever made the threats that Sulzer attributed to him or that he ever sent for Mr. Sulzer to come and see him. Mr. Murphy asserted that he never saw Sulzer alone after he became Governor “because I knew he’d do just what he has done—perjure himself.”

Replying later to Mr. Sulzer’s accusations, Mr. Murphy clearly denied that he had ever suggested appointing James E. Gaffney as Highways Commissioner; that he ever brought up Gaffney’s name to Governor Sulzer for any position; he strongly denied that he ever made the threats Sulzer claimed he did or that he ever called for Mr. Sulzer to come and meet him. Mr. Murphy stated that he never saw Sulzer alone after he became Governor “because I knew he’d do exactly what he has done—lie under oath.”

In April, 1913, Governor Sulzer pushed his Direct Primary Bill, and Tammany members of the Legislature decided in retaliation to defeat all bills favored by him and to “hold up” all of his appointments. On April 24, 1913, Tammany legislators were stirred to anger by his[373] veto of a direct primary bill that they had concocted; a few days later they overwhelmingly voted down his direct primary bill. More retaliation followed on both sides.

In April 1913, Governor Sulzer promoted his Direct Primary Bill, and Tammany members of the Legislature decided to retaliate by blocking all bills he supported and delaying all of his appointments. On April 24, 1913, Tammany legislators were outraged by his[373] veto of a direct primary bill they had created; a few days later, they voted overwhelmingly against his direct primary bill. More retaliatory actions took place on both sides.

It was during this time—in May, 1913—that the New York World published specific charges that in return for a promise made two years previously to get a lucrative post for J. A. Connolly, a personal friend, Justice Cohalan, Murphy’s legal and political adviser, had taken a note from Connolly for $4,000. This promise, it was charged, had not been kept. There were, it was also charged, back of this note a series of transactions in the years 1904 to 1906 between Connolly and Cohalan involving the payment of various sums amounting to $3,940.55; Connolly claimed that Cohalan had demanded and obtained from him 55 per cent. of the net profits on all city work that was given to Connolly’s firm by means of Cohalan’s influence. Connolly further claimed that the payments to Cohalan were calculated on this basis, and that their friendship ceased when Cohalan demanded $1,500 more than Connolly reckoned was due him. Threatened with an action at law, Cohalan surrendered the $4,000 note to Connolly’s attorney.

It was during this time—in May 1913—that the New York World published specific allegations that, in exchange for a promise made two years earlier to secure a high-paying job for J. A. Connolly, a close friend, Justice Cohalan, who was Murphy’s legal and political adviser, had accepted a $4,000 note from Connolly. It was claimed that this promise had not been fulfilled. Additionally, it was alleged that there were a series of transactions between Connolly and Cohalan from 1904 to 1906 involving various payments totaling $3,940.55; Connolly claimed that Cohalan had demanded and received 55 percent of the net profits from all city work awarded to Connolly’s firm due to Cohalan's influence. Connolly further asserted that the payments to Cohalan were based on this arrangement, and their friendship ended when Cohalan demanded $1,500 more than Connolly believed was owed. Faced with a potential lawsuit, Cohalan returned the $4,000 note to Connolly’s attorney.

These charges were investigated by the Grievance Committee of the Bar Association; the report of that committee confirmed every charge made. Refusing to recognize the jurisdiction of the Bar Association, Justice Cohalan requested Governor Sulzer to have the charges passed upon by the Legislature; this Governor Sulzer did in a special message embodying the report of the Grievance Committee of the Bar Association. The Legislature ordered a trial before the Joint Judiciary Committee. Justice Cohalan admitted on the witness stand that he had made a great mistake in his dealings with Connolly, and that the money he had paid to Connolly was blackmail given in the hope of hushing up the affair for the good of his party. William D. Guthrie, representing the Bar Association, reviewed the case in detail, and demanded[374] Justice Cohalan’s removal. The Joint Judiciary Committee’s report recommended that the case against Justice Cohalan be dismissed, which report was upheld by a majority vote of the Legislature. Opponents of Tammany pointed out that this was a characteristic action from a Legislature dominated by Tammany influences.

These allegations were looked into by the Grievance Committee of the Bar Association; their report confirmed each charge made. Justice Cohalan, refusing to acknowledge the Bar Association's authority, asked Governor Sulzer to have the Legislature review the charges; Governor Sulzer did this in a special message that included the Grievance Committee's report. The Legislature called for a trial before the Joint Judiciary Committee. On the witness stand, Justice Cohalan admitted that he had made a significant mistake in his interactions with Connolly and acknowledged that the money he gave to Connolly was blackmail intended to cover up the situation for the benefit of his party. William D. Guthrie, representing the Bar Association, detailed the case and demanded[374] Justice Cohalan’s removal. The Joint Judiciary Committee’s report suggested that the case against Justice Cohalan be dismissed, which was supported by a majority vote in the Legislature. Critics of Tammany noted that this was typical behavior from a Legislature influenced by Tammany.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Report of the Citizens’ Committee Appointed at the Cooper Union Meeting, August 12, 1912, pp. 6-7.

[1] Report of the Citizens’ Committee Appointed at the Cooper Union Meeting, August 12, 1912, pp. 6-7.

[2] Preliminary Legislative Report of Special Committee of Board of Aldermen, p. 6.

[2] Preliminary Legislative Report of Special Committee of Board of Aldermen, p. 6.

[3] An extended interview published in the New York Evening Mail, October 20 and 21, 1913.

[3] A lengthy interview released in the New York Evening Mail, October 20 and 21, 1913.


CHAPTER XXXVI
GOVERNOR SULZER’S IMPEACHMENT AND TAMMANY’S DEFEAT
1913-1914

The campaign of retaliation against Governor Sulzer soon came to a climax.

The retaliation campaign against Governor Sulzer quickly reached its peak.

On July 15, 1913, a committee called the Frawley Committee (headed by Senator Frawley) was appointed to inquire into Governor Sulzer’s receipts and expenditures of campaign funds. After taking testimony, that committee submitted its report with the finding that, following his campaign for Governor, Mr. Sulzer had omitted declaring in his campaign statement $19,000 of contributions to his campaign fund and had purchased, for his personal account, stocks with part of the moneys thus received.

On July 15, 1913, a group known as the Frawley Committee, led by Senator Frawley, was formed to investigate Governor Sulzer’s handling of his campaign funds. After gathering testimonies, the committee presented its report, revealing that after his campaign for Governor, Mr. Sulzer failed to declare $19,000 in contributions in his campaign statement and had used some of that money to buy stocks for his personal account.

The evidence, according to the committee’s report, showed that a total of $109,016 in cash or stock had been in Mr. Sulzer’s possession, and that this sum came from campaign contributions. Mr. Sulzer had used both cash and checks to purchase stocks; and as far as could be brought out by the records and testimony, his Wall Street transactions with three brokerage firms covered a total of $72,428.28, dating from January 1, 1912. It appeared that the greater part of these payments were made after he became a candidate for Governor and was elected to that office. Mr. Murphy and other Tammany leaders pointed out that while these very transactions had been going on, Mr. Sulzer had in his public speeches pretended that he was a poor man.

The evidence from the committee’s report showed that Mr. Sulzer had a total of $109,016 in cash or stock, which came from campaign contributions. He used both cash and checks to buy stocks, and according to the records and testimony, his Wall Street transactions with three brokerage firms amounted to $72,428.28, starting from January 1, 1912. Most of these payments appeared to have been made after he became a candidate for Governor and was elected to that position. Mr. Murphy and other Tammany leaders noted that during these transactions, Mr. Sulzer had publicly claimed to be a poor man.

Mr. Sulzer’s own version was that if he had made a mistake in signing his campaign statement it was due to haste and carelessness and not to intent to deceive. “But,” he added,

Mr. Sulzer’s own version was that if he had made a mistake in signing his campaign statement, it was because of impatience and neglect, not a desire to mislead. “But,” he added,

“this is not the only explanation of the failure to itemize certain moneys which were received in the campaign. Some of the moneys were not for campaign purposes at all, but were loans. They were given to me by friends who knew I was heavily in debt, and who loaned me the money to pay my debts or to use as I saw fit. These friends wanted nothing, and in case of my election I knew there was nothing they would ask me to do, or that I could do for them. Politics had nothing to do with the matter.

“this isn't the only reason for not detailing certain funds received during the campaign. Some of the money wasn't for campaign purposes at all; it was loans. Friends who knew I was in a lot of debt lent me the money to help pay my debts or to use as I wanted. These friends wanted nothing in return, and if I got elected, I knew there was nothing they would ask of me or that I could do for them. Politics had nothing to do with it.”

“All the moneys given to me, or sent to me for the campaign, were turned over to the committee, to which reference has been made, or were subsequently given to Mr. Murphy. Whether the latter turned these moneys over to the State Committee or not I cannot say, but an investigation of the report filed by that committee negatives the assumption.”

“All the money given to me or sent to me for the campaign was handed over to the committee I mentioned, or was later given to Mr. Murphy. I can’t say whether he passed that money on to the State Committee or not, but looking into the report filed by that committee suggests otherwise.”

On August 13, 1913, the Assembly, by a vote of 79 to 45, impeached Governor Sulzer on eight articles. Trial by the High Court for the Trial of Impeachments, consisting of the State Senate and the Judges of the Court of Appeals, followed.

On August 13, 1913, the Assembly voted 79 to 45 to impeach Governor Sulzer on eight counts. This was followed by a trial in the High Court for the Trial of Impeachments, which included the State Senate and the Judges of the Court of Appeals.

Governor Sulzer vigorously fought back, and public opinion was greatly aroused over his charges that the affair was simply a case of the Tammany “Organization” summarily disciplining him for refusing to be its tool. He was convicted on three of the eight articles of impeachment: (1) that he had filed with the Secretary of State a false sworn statement of his campaign receipts and expenditures; (2) perjury in swearing to the truth of the campaign accounting; (3) committing a misdemeanor in suppressing evidence and preventing or seeking to prevent witnesses from appearing before the legislative committee. On October 17, 1913, Governor Sulzer was removed from office by a vote of 43 to 12 by the High Court for the Trial of Impeachments.

Governor Sulzer fought back fiercely, and public opinion became highly charged over his claims that the situation was simply Tammany's way of punishing him for refusing to be their puppet. He was found guilty on three out of eight impeachment charges: (1) that he had submitted a false sworn statement of his campaign donations and spending to the Secretary of State; (2) perjury for claiming that the campaign finances were accurate; (3) committing a misdemeanor for hiding evidence and trying to stop witnesses from appearing before the legislative committee. On October 17, 1913, Governor Sulzer was removed from office with a vote of 43 to 12 by the High Court for the Trial of Impeachments.

It should be noted that Chief Justice Edgar M. Cullen, of the Court of Appeals, who presided at the trial, voted[377] to acquit Mr. Sulzer on every one of the articles. “Never before the present case,” said Chief Justice Cullen, “has it been attempted to impeach a public officer for acts committed when he was not an officer of the State.…” Chief Justice Cullen held that Mr. Sulzer had committed no offense in failing to state the amounts and sources of his campaign contributions, and that there was no evidence of any deceit or fraud.

It should be noted that Chief Justice Edgar M. Cullen, of the Court of Appeals, who presided over the trial, voted[377] to acquit Mr. Sulzer on all charges. “Never before this case,” said Chief Justice Cullen, “has it been attempted to impeach a public official for actions taken when he wasn't in office.…” Chief Justice Cullen determined that Mr. Sulzer had not committed any wrongdoing by failing to disclose the amounts and sources of his campaign contributions, and there was no evidence of any deceit or fraud.

Governor Sulzer’s supporters set forth the following as the main actual reasons why proceedings for his removal were pushed:

Governor Sulzer’s supporters presented the following as the main reasons why the efforts to remove him were initiated:

First: Mr. Sulzer’s persistent efforts to secure the enactment of the Full Crew legislation to conserve human life on the railroads.

First: Mr. Sulzer’s ongoing efforts to pass the Full Crew legislation to protect human life on the railroads.

Second: Mr. Sulzer’s success in securing the enactment of the laws that he recommended to compel honest dealings on the New York Stock Exchange.

Second: Mr. Sulzer’s success in getting the laws he suggested passed to ensure honest trading on the New York Stock Exchange.

Third: Mr. Sulzer’s refusal to approve the McKee Public Schools Bills which would have given control of public schools to a religious denomination.

Third: Mr. Sulzer’s refusal to approve the McKee Public Schools Bills, which would have handed control of public schools over to a religious denomination.

Fourth: Mr. Sulzer’s successful efforts in causing the repeal of the notorious charter of the Long Sault Development Company, by which the State of New York received back its greatest water power and the most valuable of its natural resources.

Fourth: Mr. Sulzer’s successful efforts in getting the repeal of the infamous charter of the Long Sault Development Company, which allowed the State of New York to reclaim its biggest water power and its most valuable natural resources.

Fifth: Mr. Sulzer’s defiance of the bosses-big and little—and his fight for honest and genuine direct primaries.

Fifth: Mr. Sulzer’s defiance of the bosses—big and small—and his fight for fair and authentic direct primaries.

Sixth: Mr. Sulzer’s determined refusal to be a proxy Governor or “a rubber stamp.”

Sixth: Mr. Sulzer’s firm refusal to be a proxy Governor or “a rubber stamp.”

Seventh: Mr. Sulzer’s absolute refusal to follow “boss” dictation regarding legislation and appointments, and his blunt refusal to call off Blake and Hennessy, and stop the investigations which were being made, under his direction, to uncover fraud and expose graft in the State Departments.

Seventh: Mr. Sulzer’s complete refusal to follow “boss” orders about legislation and appointments, along with his straightforward refusal to call off Blake and Hennessy and halt the investigations he was overseeing to uncover fraud and expose corruption in the State Departments.

Eighth: Mr. Sulzer’s moral courage, in the performance[378] of public duty, wherein he insisted on the trial and punishment of Senator Stilwell for extortion.

Eighth: Mr. Sulzer’s moral courage, in performing[378] his public duty, where he insisted on the trial and punishment of Senator Stilwell for extortion.

Ninth: Mr. Sulzer’s determination to set in motion the machinery of the law, in various counties of the State, to indict the grafters and bring them to justice.

Ninth: Mr. Sulzer’s commitment to activate the legal system in different counties of the State to charge the corrupt individuals and bring them to justice.

There could be no questioning that the proceedings against Sulzer had an effect upon the public mind the reverse of that expected by “Boss” Murphy and his advisers.

There was no doubt that the actions taken against Sulzer impacted public opinion in a way that was completely opposite to what “Boss” Murphy and his advisors anticipated.

The attempt of Tammany Hall’s leaders to pose in this case as the conservers of political virtue met with a sardonic reception and quickly reacted upon them in unmistakable terms. Public opinion in general made no attempt to mitigate Mr. Sulzer’s acts, but, with a keen perception of the fundamental facts, it saw that the real reason why Governor Sulzer was so brutally punished was not because of those acts but because he had finally broken away from Tammany dictation and had sought to be somewhat of an independent Governor. Every intelligent person knew that this was his crime in the view of the Tammany organization, and, according to Tammany standards, the worst crime that could be committed. That an organization which had been steeped in corruption and graft should so ostentatiously pretend to be the exposer and punisher of infractions in an official who had defied its power, excited mockery, resentment and indignation. Public sympathy turned toward the deposed Governor, and he was nominated for the Assembly by the Progressives in an East Side district.

The leaders of Tammany Hall trying to present themselves as champions of political integrity were met with cynicism and quickly faced clear backlash. Overall, public opinion didn’t try to excuse Mr. Sulzer’s actions, but it understood the core reason behind the harsh punishment he received: it wasn’t really about what he did, but rather that he had finally broken free from Tammany’s control and tried to be a more independent Governor. Everyone with a decent understanding knew this was considered his main offense by the Tammany organization and, according to their standards, the worst crime possible. It was absurd for a group so entrenched in corruption and bribery to so blatantly act as if they were the ones exposing and punishing violations from an official who had stood up to their authority, which stirred mockery, anger, and outrage. Public support shifted toward the ousted Governor, leading to him being nominated for the Assembly by the Progressives in an East Side district.

As we have seen, one of the chief issues upon which Gaynor had made his Mayoralty campaign in 1909 was for municipally built and operated subways.

As we have seen, one of the main issues that Gaynor focused on during his Mayoral campaign in 1909 was the need for subways that were built and operated by the city.

After becoming Mayor, he underwent a decided change of mind. The subway rights were awarded to the Interborough Rapid Transit Company and the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company. The Final Report of the Joint Legislative Committee appointed to investigate the Public[379] Service Commissions severely criticizes the policy and the terms under which the contracts were made by the Public Service Commission and the Board of Estimate. On the other hand, defenders of the Board of Estimate’s action point out that the reasons why that Board changed from city to company subways were that by the cooperation of the companies, the city had the benefit of $150,000,000 more in funds than would have been the case without that cooperation; that the new subway lines instead of being independent, disconnected routes, unrelated to existing transportation lines, would be built in appropriate extenso of subway facilities already in operation; and that by this arrangement not only would the service be harmonized and improved but the payment of double fares would be done away with and an aggregate of vast sums thus saved to the traveling public. The circular routes by which the city’s transportation problems will be more effectively and constructively solved were adopted despite Gaynor’s favoring the Interborough Rapid Transit Company’s perpendicular routes plan.

After becoming Mayor, he changed his mind significantly. The subway rights were granted to the Interborough Rapid Transit Company and the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company. The Final Report of the Joint Legislative Committee, which was set up to investigate the Public[379] Service Commissions, strongly criticizes the policy and the conditions under which the contracts were made by the Public Service Commission and the Board of Estimate. On the other hand, supporters of the Board of Estimate's decision argue that the reason the Board switched from city-operated to company-operated subways was due to the collaboration with the companies, which brought in $150,000,000 more in funds than would have been available otherwise; that the new subway lines would not be isolated, disconnected routes but would expand on the existing subway infrastructure; and that this arrangement would not only harmonize and improve service but also eliminate double fares, saving the traveling public a significant amount of money. The circular routes designed to more effectively solve the city's transportation issues were approved despite Gaynor's preference for the Interborough Rapid Transit Company’s vertical routes plan.

One feature of the testimony later before the Joint Legislative Committee especially attracting public attention was the imputation that in the contract for the third-tracking of the Interborough Rapid Transit Company’s elevated railroads, a fund of $2,000,000 was surreptitiously provided in the form of a commission to John F. Stevens. Formerly Mr. Stevens had been associated in the construction of the Panama Canal with Mr. Shonts who now was president of the Interborough Rapid Transit Company. This company, in the third-tracking work, wanted exemption from supervision by the Public Service Commission. According to a memorandum preserved by George W. Young, an Interborough director, this contract with Mr. Stevens was entered into (so, it was asserted, Mr. Shonts told Mr. Lane, another director), because “in connection with the securing of the contract which had been closed between the City of[380] Greater New York and the Interborough, Mr. Shonts had found it necessary to make certain commitments and incur certain obligations, and that it was by means of the Stevens contract that he expected to meet and pay these commitments and obligations.”[1]

One notable aspect of the testimony later given to the Joint Legislative Committee that caught public interest was the allegation that in the contract for the third-tracking of the Interborough Rapid Transit Company’s elevated railroads, a hidden fund of $2,000,000 was secretly allocated as a commission to John F. Stevens. Previously, Mr. Stevens had worked on the construction of the Panama Canal alongside Mr. Shonts, who was now the president of the Interborough Rapid Transit Company. This company sought exemption from oversight by the Public Service Commission for the third-tracking project. According to a memo kept by George W. Young, an Interborough director, this contract with Mr. Stevens was established (as it was claimed that Mr. Shonts informed Mr. Lane, another director) because “in relation to securing the contract that had been finalized between the City of[380] Greater New York and the Interborough, Mr. Shonts had found it necessary to make certain commitments and take on certain obligations, and that it was through the Stevens contract that he expected to fulfill and satisfy these commitments and obligations.”[1]

The Joint Legislative Committee thus comments on the testimony: “It is perfectly clear that Mr. Shonts did tell Mr. Lane something about commitments and obligations in respect to this strange proposition; it is equally clear that he was not under any business commitment or honorable obligation to Mr. Stevens. He made a request of the Public Service [Commission] Chairman for an exception from the general contract, relieving third tracking from official supervision, and had told the reason for it in his desire to give the contract to Mr. Stevens. He did obtain exemption from supervision, and that applied to the contractor to whom finally the contract was awarded.”[2]

The Joint Legislative Committee comments on the testimony: “It’s clear that Mr. Shonts did tell Mr. Lane something about commitments and obligations related to this unusual proposal; it’s also clear that he didn’t have any business commitment or honorable obligation to Mr. Stevens. He asked the Public Service [Commission] Chairman for an exception from the general contract, allowing third tracking to be free from official supervision, and explained that he wanted to give the contract to Mr. Stevens. He did get the exemption from supervision, and that applied to the contractor who was ultimately awarded the contract.”[2]

The chairman of the Public Service Commission here referred to was Edward E. McCall. Whatever may be the shadowy implications conveyed in this report, no statement is made that any corruption was used, nor is any proof presented that any official was improperly influenced. The salient fact was that McCall, in an era when corporation activities were more and more rigorously scrutinized by official bodies, should have reverted to by-gone standards and graciously allowed a removal of that very supervision which it was expected the Public Service Commission would insist upon exercising.

The chairman of the Public Service Commission mentioned here was Edward E. McCall. Regardless of the unclear implications in this report, there’s no claim that any corruption took place, nor is there any evidence that any official was improperly swayed. The important point is that McCall, in a time when corporate actions were increasingly examined by official agencies, should have returned to outdated standards and willingly accepted a reduction of the very oversight that the Public Service Commission was expected to enforce.

Tammany Hall’s nominee in the municipal campaign of 1913 was this same Edward E. McCall.

Tammany Hall's candidate in the 1913 city election was the same Edward E. McCall.

When an attorney, Mr. McCall had been connected with certain operations of the New York Life Insurance Company, of which corporation his brother, John A. McCall,[381] was president. It appeared from the testimony before the Legislative Insurance Investigating Committee, in 1905, that Edward E. McCall had given notes, totalling about $10,000, to “Andy” Hamilton, the chief legislative lobbyist at Albany of that company and distributor of the “Yellow Dog Fund.”

When he was a lawyer, Mr. McCall was involved in some operations of the New York Life Insurance Company, where his brother, John A. McCall,[381] served as president. Testimony before the Legislative Insurance Investigating Committee in 1905 revealed that Edward E. McCall had provided notes amounting to around $10,000 to “Andy” Hamilton, the chief lobbyist for that company in Albany and the person responsible for distributing the “Yellow Dog Fund.”

Precisely why Edward E. McCall should have given those notes was not explained. Hamilton received great sums in all for legislative purposes; in the transferring of some of the sums Edward E. McCall figured. Both Edward E. McCall and “Andy” Hamilton received “excessive remuneration” from the New York Life Insurance Company, apparently for legal services in a certain case, which sums, according to the report of Charles E. Hughes, there was no adequate reason for paying. At the same time that these sums were paid to them, both Edward E. McCall and Hamilton were under a regular retainer as attorneys by the New York Life Insurance Company, each of them receiving $10,000 a year.

The exact reason why Edward E. McCall gave those notes was not clarified. Hamilton received large amounts for legislative purposes; in the process of transferring some of those amounts, Edward E. McCall was involved. Both Edward E. McCall and “Andy” Hamilton received “excessive payment” from the New York Life Insurance Company, seemingly for legal services in a particular case, which, according to Charles E. Hughes' report, lacked sufficient justification for those payments. At the same time these payments were made to them, both Edward E. McCall and Hamilton were regularly retained as attorneys by the New York Life Insurance Company, each earning $10,000 a year.

Mr. McCall was put upon the Supreme Court Bench in 1902, by Tammany backing, and remained there until his appointment, in 1913, by Governor Sulzer as Chairman of the Public Service Commission, First District.

Mr. McCall was appointed to the Supreme Court Bench in 1902 with Tammany's support and stayed there until 1913, when Governor Sulzer appointed him as Chairman of the Public Service Commission for the First District.

The greatest exertions were made by Tammany to sway the electorate so as to swing the election in its favor. Tammany realized that the Sulzer episode would be an important issue, but it did not anticipate that the summary removal of Governor Sulzer, with all the attendant circumstances, would make so unpleasant an impression, driving large numbers of voters to the other side. Tammany thought that it had put Sulzer on the defensive; it did not quite foresee the effect of revelations which, before the campaign was over, placed Tammany seriously on the defensive and its leaders under the necessity of making explanations.

Tammany put in a huge effort to influence the voters and turn the election in its favor. They knew the Sulzer situation would be a crucial topic, but they didn't expect that the abrupt removal of Governor Sulzer, along with everything that came with it, would leave such a negative impact, pushing many voters to the opposing side. Tammany believed it had put Sulzer on the back foot; however, it didn't fully anticipate the impact of news that, by the end of the campaign, placed Tammany in a difficult position, forcing its leaders to make explanations.

Moreover, in selecting its candidates and developing[382] its campaign tactics Tammany did not appreciate the very much altered attitude of a large section of the public toward municipal politics. There had arisen in New York City an increased public demand for proved administrative capacity. The old days of public toleration of choosing politicians for “good fellowship” or subservient qualities had about gone. The emphasis was now placed by Tammany’s opponents upon the fact that cities should be not merely governed, but well governed, by men of vision, ability and integrity.

Moreover, when choosing its candidates and developing[382] its campaign strategies, Tammany didn't recognize that a significant portion of the public had changed its views on local politics. In New York City, there was a growing demand for proven leadership and administrative skills. The old days when people accepted politicians based on "good fellowship" or loyalty were mostly over. Tammany’s opponents now emphasized that cities should not just be governed, but should be led effectively by individuals with vision, skill, and integrity.

The candidate for Mayor of the Republicans and Fusionists was John Purroy Mitchel, a young Independent Democrat, who was credited with having made a notable record as Commissioner of Accounts. Later he had been President of the Board of Aldermen, and then Collector of the Port of New York. Nominated with him were William A. Prendergast, for Comptroller, and George McAneny for President of the Board of Aldermen; all were eulogized by their supporters with having served the city with constructive ability and marked efficiency, and with having opposed and exposed Tammany graft and extravagance.

The Republican and Fusionist candidate for Mayor was John Purroy Mitchel, a young Independent Democrat known for his impressive record as Commissioner of Accounts. He later served as President of the Board of Aldermen and then as Collector of the Port of New York. Alongside him were William A. Prendergast for Comptroller and George McAneny for President of the Board of Aldermen; all were praised by their supporters for serving the city with skill and efficiency, as well as for opposing and revealing Tammany's corruption and wastefulness.

The Socialist Party’s candidate for Mayor was Charles Edward Russell, a writer of note and a man of high personal character.

The Socialist Party's candidate for Mayor was Charles Edward Russell, a well-known writer and a person of strong personal integrity.

Full of bitterness was this campaign. Perhaps the most effective speakers against Tammany Hall were John A. Hennessy and former Governor Sulzer. Mr. Hennessy in a public speech on October 23, 1913, specifically charged that he held a note for $35,000 that had been signed by a Justice of the Supreme Court who had been Mr. Murphy’s alternative candidate for Mayor. “I do not say that the $35,000 was ever paid to anybody. I don’t suspect him of any vices that would induce him to borrow $35,000.… If he has had to pay $35,000 or more for his [Supreme Court] nomination, why he simply followed a tradition in the organization to which he belonged.”

This campaign was full of bitterness. Probably the most effective speakers against Tammany Hall were John A. Hennessy and former Governor Sulzer. In a public speech on October 23, 1913, Mr. Hennessy specifically accused that he held a note for $35,000 signed by a Supreme Court Justice who had been Mr. Murphy’s backup candidate for Mayor. “I’m not saying that the $35,000 was ever paid to anyone. I don’t think he has any vices that would make him borrow $35,000.… If he had to pay $35,000 or more for his [Supreme Court] nomination, then he was just following a tradition in the organization he was part of.”

Mr. Hennessy charged Mr. McCall with not answering[383] the question of where he got his campaign money, and asked Mr. McCall whether, in 1902 (when McCall was a candidate for the Supreme Court nomination) he, McCall, had not met George W. Plunkett, a Tammany district leader—the originator of the term “honest graft”—in a room in the Hoffman House, and whether Anthony N. Brady was not in another room at the same time. “I want to ask Judge McCall,” Mr. Hennessy continued, “whether his sponsor, Charlie Murphy, had not seen Anthony Brady in respect to McCall’s nomination in the Hoffman House, and I want to ask Judge McCall if the gentleman who brought him and Plunkett together to discuss that nomination, did not have something to do with Murphy and Mr. Brady in respect of that nomination.” Mr. Hennessy charged that one man that Mr. McCall paid was Plunkett, but he (Hennessy) did not know whether he paid Murphy, or whether he paid the amount to somebody who paid Murphy; he (Hennessy) did not undertake to assert that.

Mr. Hennessy accused Mr. McCall of not answering[383] the question of where he got his campaign funds, and asked Mr. McCall whether, in 1902 (when McCall was running for the Supreme Court nomination), he had met George W. Plunkett, a Tammany district leader known for coining the term “honest graft,” in a room at the Hoffman House, and whether Anthony N. Brady was in another room at the same time. “I want to ask Judge McCall,” Mr. Hennessy continued, “if his sponsor, Charlie Murphy, had met with Anthony Brady regarding McCall’s nomination at the Hoffman House, and I want to ask Judge McCall if the person who introduced him to Plunkett to discuss that nomination wasn’t connected to Murphy and Mr. Brady regarding that nomination.” Mr. Hennessy claimed that one person Mr. McCall paid was Plunkett, but he (Hennessy) did not know if he paid Murphy directly, or if he paid someone else who then paid Murphy; he (Hennessy) did not claim to know.

The Anthony N. Brady here mentioned was a traction magnate, who, beginning as a clerk in Albany, had by means of legislative manipulation giving richly valuable railway and other franchises, accumulated an estate of $90,000,000.

The Anthony N. Brady mentioned here was a transportation tycoon who started as a clerk in Albany. Through savvy legislative maneuvering that secured him highly valuable railway and other franchises, he built a fortune of $90,000,000.

In several speeches Mr. Hennessy pointedly asserted that James Stewart, a contractor, had paid $25,000 to a former friend of Charles F. Murphy, and inquired whether J. Sergeant Cram (a prominent Tammany light) had not received $5,000, and Norman E. Mack another $5,000.

In several speeches, Mr. Hennessy clearly stated that James Stewart, a contractor, had given $25,000 to a former friend of Charles F. Murphy. He also asked whether J. Sergeant Cram (a well-known Tammany figure) had received $5,000, and if Norman E. Mack had received another $5,000.

At a public meeting on October 25, 1913, Mr. Sulzer declared that he had sent to Charles F. Murphy $10,000 that Allan Ryan (Thomas F. Ryan’s son), had contributed to his campaign fund, and that Mr. Murphy had never accounted for it.

At a public meeting on October 25, 1913, Mr. Sulzer stated that he had sent $10,000 to Charles F. Murphy, which Allan Ryan (the son of Thomas F. Ryan) had contributed to his campaign fund, and that Mr. Murphy had never explained its use.

Mr. Sulzer named John H. Delaney (later State Commissioner of the Department of Efficiency and Economy),[384] as the messenger who had carried the $10,000 in bills to Mr. Murphy. This money, Mr. Sulzer asserted, had originally been handed to him (Sulzer) in his New York office by Mr. McGlone, Allan Ryan’s secretary, and that he (Sulzer) gave the $10,000 to Delaney, who took it uptown and gave it to Murphy. “Late that afternoon,” Mr. Sulzer continued, “I saw Mr. Murphy at Delmonico’s. During our conversation, I said, ‘Did John give you the ten from Ryan?’ Mr. Murphy replied: ‘Yes, that’s all right, but it’s only a drop in the bucket. You’ll have to do better than that.’ So far as I know,” Mr. Sulzer continued, “and I am pretty well advised, Mr. Murphy never accounted for that $10,000, any more than he accounted for the Brady $25,000 which I refused and which he accepted from Judge Beardsley [Brady’s legal representative]. At all events, I think Mr. Murphy should tell the voters what he did with the money.” Mr. Sulzer declared that he (Sulzer) was still in debt, and that “I am a poorer man to-day than I was when I became a candidate for Governor.” No one acquainted with Sulzer’s career could doubt that had he been essentially corrupt, he could have become a millionaire from huckstering of legislation when he was Speaker of the Assembly; there was no bribing him, however, with money; he was, in fact, a poor man.

Mr. Sulzer named John H. Delaney (who later became the State Commissioner of the Department of Efficiency and Economy),[384] as the messenger who delivered the $10,000 in cash to Mr. Murphy. Sulzer claimed that this money was originally given to him in his New York office by Mr. McGlone, Allan Ryan’s secretary, and that he handed the $10,000 over to Delaney, who then took it uptown and gave it to Murphy. “Later that afternoon,” Sulzer continued, “I saw Mr. Murphy at Delmonico’s. During our conversation, I asked, ‘Did John give you the ten from Ryan?’ Mr. Murphy replied, ‘Yes, that’s fine, but it’s just a drop in the bucket. You’ll have to do better than that.’ As far as I know,” Sulzer added, “and I’m quite informed on the matter, Mr. Murphy never accounted for that $10,000, just like he never accounted for the $25,000 from Brady that I turned down but he accepted from Judge Beardsley [Brady’s legal representative]. In any case, I believe Mr. Murphy should explain to the voters what he did with the money.” Sulzer stated that he was still in debt and said, “I’m poorer today than I was when I ran for Governor.” Anyone familiar with Sulzer’s career would agree that if he had been corrupt, he could have easily made millions by trading legislation when he was Speaker of the Assembly; however, he was not bribable with money; in fact, he was a poor man.

Mr. Sulzer then declared that Thomas F. Ryan was “Boss” Murphy’s master.

Mr. Sulzer then stated that Thomas F. Ryan was "Boss" Murphy's superior.

This, in fact, was the very point made by the Socialists: that the political “bosses” were only the tools of the great financial and industrial magnates; and that where the political “bosses” gathered in their millions, the magnates accumulated their tens or hundreds of millions of dollars as their individual fortunes. Why, queried the Socialists, concentrate attention on the instruments? Why not, said they, attack the power of the whole social, political and industrial system of which the political “boss” was merely one expression? This system, according[385] to the Socialist party, was the capitalist system for the overthrow of which they declared and agitated. They pointed out that behind Mr. Murphy and Tammany Hall, as well as behind the Republican organization where it was in power, were traction, railroad, telephone, electric lighting, industrial and other financial interests all selfishly utilizing the power embodied in political “bosses” for their own ends and aggrandizement, and that these were the real powers that could make and unmake political “bosses.”

This was exactly the point the Socialists were making: that the political "bosses" were just tools of the wealthy financial and industrial tycoons; and where the political "bosses" gathered in their millions, the tycoons amassed their tens or hundreds of millions of dollars as individual fortunes. Why focus on the instruments, the Socialists asked? Why not, they suggested, challenge the entire power of the social, political, and industrial system of which the political "boss" was just one aspect? According to the Socialist party, this system was the capitalist system, which they aimed to overthrow and protested against. They highlighted that behind Mr. Murphy and Tammany Hall, as well as behind the Republican organization when it was in control, were interests like transportation, railroads, telecommunications, electric lighting, and other financial interests, all self-serving and exploiting the power embodied in political "bosses" for their own benefit and expansion, and that these were the real powers that could create and destroy political "bosses."

Gaffney, Cram and Plunkett had all denied allegations aimed at them; Murphy and McCall had remained silent. But on October 26, 1913, McCall and Murphy both issued statements. Mr. McCall denied the charge that he had paid $35,000 for the nomination for the Supreme Court in 1902. Mr. Murphy made public an affidavit in which he (Murphy) denied that McCall had ever paid him anything at any time, and branding the charge as false. On the next day Mr. Murphy gave out a long statement making a sweeping denial of Mr. Sulzer’s statements; he asserted that he had received the $25,000 from Anthony N. Brady, but that he had returned the money the next day; he also denied that he had ever received $10,000 from Ryan.

Gaffney, Cram, and Plunkett all rejected the allegations against them; Murphy and McCall stayed silent. But on October 26, 1913, both McCall and Murphy released statements. Mr. McCall denied the accusation that he had paid $35,000 for the Supreme Court nomination in 1902. Mr. Murphy shared an affidavit in which he (Murphy) denied that McCall had ever paid him anything at any time, calling the allegation false. The next day, Mr. Murphy gave a lengthy statement completely denying Mr. Sulzer’s claims; he stated that he had received $25,000 from Anthony N. Brady but had returned the money the following day; he also denied ever receiving $10,000 from Ryan.

Mr. Hennessy returned to the attack. On the same day he charged that a seat in the United States Senate (to succeed Senator Root) had been offered to Sulzer if he would yield to Mr. Murphy, and that it was Mr. McCall who acted as the intermediary.

Mr. Hennessy came back to the fight. On the same day, he claimed that a Senate seat in the United States (to succeed Senator Root) had been offered to Sulzer if he would give in to Mr. Murphy, and that it was Mr. McCall who served as the go-between.

In a public speech on the following day, October 28, 1913, Mr. Hennessy demanded the tracing of Mr. Brady’s $25,000, and suggested that it might be well to examine the executors of Brady’s estate and find out whether Brady had deposited $25,000 two days after Judge Beardsley had handed that money to Mr. Murphy. “I knew Mr. Brady very well,” Mr. Hennessy went on. “I have known Mr. Brady since he was selling groceries in Albany[386] twenty-five or twenty-six years ago, … and I know that he never carried around $25,000 in bills every day in his pocket; so if he got this $25,000 in bills from Mr. Murphy, he undoubtedly deposited it somewhere.” Mr. Hennessy chided Mr. Murphy with having been told by his district leaders to answer him, after he (Murphy) had declared that he would not notice the charges, and said that Mr. Murphy was “shoving it off on a dead man.”

In a public speech the next day, October 28, 1913, Mr. Hennessy called for the tracing of Mr. Brady’s $25,000 and suggested it would be wise to look into the executors of Brady’s estate to see if Brady had deposited the $25,000 two days after Judge Beardsley handed that money to Mr. Murphy. “I knew Mr. Brady very well,” Mr. Hennessy continued. “I have known Mr. Brady since he was selling groceries in Albany twenty-five or twenty-six years ago, … and I know that he never carried around $25,000 in cash every day in his pocket; so if he received this $25,000 in cash from Mr. Murphy, he definitely deposited it somewhere.” Mr. Hennessy criticized Mr. Murphy for being told by his district leaders to respond to him after Murphy had stated he wouldn’t address the charges and said that Mr. Murphy was “passing the blame onto a dead man.”

When, on October 29, 1913, former Judge Beardsley, counsel for the Brady estate, issued a statement asserting that the $25,000 was returned to Brady, Mr. Hennessy in a public speech demanded proof and charged that an alibi was being proved over the body of a dead man. Mr. Hennessy made the charge that in the campaign of 1910 Mr. Murphy had collected fully $150,000 for which he had not accounted in the statement filed with the Secretary of State. “Most of this money,” Mr. Hennessy declared, “came from contractors who were clubbed into giving it.”

When, on October 29, 1913, former Judge Beardsley, the lawyer for the Brady estate, made a statement claiming that the $25,000 was returned to Brady, Mr. Hennessy, during a public speech, called for proof and accused them of fabricating an alibi over the body of a dead man. Mr. Hennessy alleged that in the 1910 campaign, Mr. Murphy had collected around $150,000 that he hadn't accounted for in the report submitted to the Secretary of State. “Most of this money,” Mr. Hennessy stated, “came from contractors who were pressured into giving it.”

So this exciting campaign drew to a close amid sensational charges, counter charges, denials and reiterations.

So this thrilling campaign came to an end amid sensational accusations, rebuttals, denials, and repeated statements.

Over in Queen’s Borough, the Democratic “boss” of that section, “Joe” Cassidy, was in serious difficulties; he had long, with some intermissions, ruled that part of the city; and although he was not a Tammany man, nor did Tammany rule Queens, in the strict sense of the meaning, yet he was an ally of Tammany and had always “consulted” Mr. Murphy.

Over in Queen’s Borough, the Democratic leader of that area, “Joe” Cassidy, was in big trouble; he had long been in charge of that part of the city, with some breaks; and even though he wasn’t part of Tammany Hall, nor did Tammany control Queens in the strict sense, he was an ally of Tammany and had always “consulted” Mr. Murphy.

Local “Boss” Cassidy and one of his lieutenants were under indictment for conspiring in selling a nomination in 1911, to the Supreme Court Bench to William Willett, Jr., and Willett was indicted for being a party to the conspiracy. During his trial later, Cassidy admitted that he was “boss,” but asserted his honesty. Questioned as to why he did not deposit a certain sum in bank, he replied, “I was used to carrying money in my pocket. I was[387] lonesome without a roll in my pocket.” It may be said here that Willett was convicted, and likewise were Cassidy and one of his lieutenants by a jury on February 2, 1914; Cassidy and Willett were each sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of not less than a year in prison and a fine of $1,000, and Cassidy’s lieutenant “go-between,” Louis T. Walter, received a sentence of three months and a fine of $1,000. After serving a year in prison Cassidy was released and later (January 19, 1917) was restored to citizenship by Governor Whitman.

Local "Boss" Cassidy and one of his lieutenants were indicted for conspiring to sell a nomination to the Supreme Court Bench to William Willett, Jr. in 1911, and Willett was indicted for being involved in the conspiracy. During his trial later, Cassidy admitted he was the "boss," but claimed he was honest. When asked why he didn't deposit a certain amount in the bank, he replied, "I was used to carrying money in my pocket. I was lonesome without a roll in my pocket." It should be noted that Willett was convicted, along with Cassidy and one of his lieutenants, by a jury on February 2, 1914. Cassidy and Willett each received an indeterminate sentence of not less than a year in prison and a fine of $1,000, while Cassidy's lieutenant "go-between," Louis T. Walter, was sentenced to three months and a fine of $1,000. After serving a year in prison, Cassidy was released and later (January 19, 1917) was restored to citizenship by Governor Whitman.

Intelligent people contemplated with wonderment the antiquated tactics that Tammany Hall was blindly following. Although the discussion of pressing economic problems was vitally concerning great masses of people, Tammany Hall seemed unaware of their existence. The rapid development of the trusts, the concentration of capitalist power and wealth, the tense unrest among different classes of people, were reflected in various political and industrial movements, but in Tammany Hall no attention was given to them. Oblivious to the great industrial changes and popular agitations and thought, Tammany still adhered to its old semi-feudalistic methods of “carrying its vote”; it concerned itself only with matters of offices, jobs, contracts and interested legislation; it depended upon immense campaign funds and the personal following of its leaders in marshaling the army of voters all of whom by jobs or other such self interest sought to perpetuate its power.

Intelligent people looked on in amazement at the outdated tactics that Tammany Hall was blindly sticking to. Even though discussions about urgent economic issues were critically important to many people, Tammany Hall seemed completely unaware of them. The rapid rise of trusts, the concentration of capitalist power and wealth, and the growing unrest among different social classes were evident in various political and industrial movements, but Tammany Hall ignored them entirely. Completely out of touch with significant industrial changes and public unrest, Tammany continued to rely on its old semi-feudal methods of "getting its vote"; it was only focused on issues of offices, jobs, contracts, and self-serving legislation; it relied on huge campaign funds and the personal loyalty of its leaders to rally the army of voters, all of whom sought to maintain its power through jobs or other forms of self-interest.

New York City had also grown too vast for the Tammany district leaders to control as they did in the decades when it was smaller and compact. Great numbers of people had moved from Manhattan to other boroughs; and this constant process of migration had much weakened the power of Tammany organization leaders in keeping in touch with the voters. The Jewish vote had grown to enormous proportions, and so had the Italian, but the[388] Jewish vote was generally a vote racially independent of Tammany and not particularly sympathetic to the character, racial and religious, of its leaders.

New York City had become too large for the Tammany district leaders to oversee like they did back when the city was smaller and more compact. A lot of people had moved from Manhattan to other boroughs, and this ongoing migration significantly weakened the power of Tammany leaders in connecting with the voters. The Jewish vote had ballooned, as had the Italian vote, but the [388] Jewish vote was mostly racially independent of Tammany and not particularly sympathetic to the backgrounds—racial and religious—of its leaders.

Tammany Hall was overwhelmingly defeated. Mr. Mitchel’s plurality was 124,262. The vote resulted: Mitchel, 358,181; McCall, 233,919; Russell, 32,057. All of the anti-Tammany candidates for city offices were elected by varying pluralities. Mr. Sulzer was triumphantly elected to the Assembly. However, Tammany men could glean some slight consolation in this hour of disaster; Lieutenant Governor Martin Glynn, who had succeeded Sulzer as Governor, could be generally depended upon to appoint some Tammany men to various appointive offices; when his list of appointments was handed down they were not altogether disappointed. Tammany was especially jubilant in getting control of the Public Service Commission, not to mention a firmer hold in various State departments.

Tammany Hall was decisively defeated. Mr. Mitchel’s plurality was 124,262. The vote tallied as follows: Mitchel, 358,181; McCall, 233,919; Russell, 32,057. All the anti-Tammany candidates for city offices won by different pluralities. Mr. Sulzer was proudly elected to the Assembly. However, Tammany members found a bit of consolation in this moment of defeat; Lieutenant Governor Martin Glynn, who took over from Sulzer as Governor, could generally be relied on to appoint some Tammany members to various appointed positions; when his list of appointments was released, they were not completely let down. Tammany was especially thrilled to gain control of the Public Service Commission, not to mention strengthening their presence in various State departments.

The results of the municipal election cut Tammany off from city, county and national patronage; in such an extremity Mr. Murphy had little to offer famishing followers except soothing words which counted for nothing where practical results were demanded.

The results of the municipal election severed Tammany’s connection to city, county, and national patronage; in this critical situation, Mr. Murphy had little to give his starving followers except reassuring words that meant nothing when real results were expected.

The mutterings against Mr. Murphy in certain quarters grew to open rebellion; no longer was he fulsomely praised as a sagacious political strategist; he was now derisively called a stupid blunderer for his successive actions and particularly for his campaign of reprisal against Sulzer—a campaign producing so inflaming an effect against Tammany.

The whispers against Mr. Murphy in some circles turned into outright rebellion; he was no longer lavishly praised as a wise political strategist; instead, he was mockingly labeled a clueless fool for his repeated mistakes and especially for his retaliatory campaign against Sulzer—a campaign that sparked intense backlash against Tammany.

A resolution introduced in the Democratic Club, on February 2, 1914, demanded that he retire from “all participation in the party’s affairs,” to which Mr. Murphy defiantly replied in an interview, “I am the leader of Tammany Hall. You can add that I am going to remain the leader of Tammany Hall no matter what some others might think they have to say about it.” Believing that at[389] least thirty-two of the thirty-four Tammany district leaders would vote to continue him in power, “Boss” Murphy made this announcement with apparent confidence. Indeed, it was reported that the Executive Committee of Tammany Hall had voted to retain his leadership.

A resolution introduced at the Democratic Club on February 2, 1914, called for him to step back from “all participation in the party’s affairs.” Mr. Murphy responded defiantly in an interview, saying, “I am the leader of Tammany Hall. You can also say that I’m going to stay the leader of Tammany Hall, no matter what some others might think.” Believing that at least thirty-two of the thirty-four Tammany district leaders would vote to keep him in power, “Boss” Murphy announced this with clear confidence. Reports indicated that the Executive Committee of Tammany Hall had voted to keep him in leadership.

A few days later some extracts from a letter written by Richard Croker to John Fox were made public. “Murphy was a big handicap to McCall,” Mr. Croker wrote. “The Hall will never win under Murphy’s management. I hope some good man will get in and drive all them grafters contractors out.” On March 10, 1914, at a meeting of the Democratic Club, Charles F. Murphy, James E. Gaffney, Thomas F. Foley, George W. Plunkett and Thomas Darlington were rudely read out of that club on the nominal ground of non-payment of dues, whereupon Thomas F. Smith, Secretary of Tammany Hall, styled that action “a joke” and declared that “the club has cut no figure locally since 1896.”

A few days later, some excerpts from a letter written by Richard Croker to John Fox were made public. “Murphy was a big liability for McCall,” Mr. Croker wrote. “The Hall will never succeed under Murphy’s leadership. I hope someone good steps in and drives all those shady contractors out.” On March 10, 1914, at a meeting of the Democratic Club, Charles F. Murphy, James E. Gaffney, Thomas F. Foley, George W. Plunkett, and Thomas Darlington were abruptly kicked out of the club on the pretext of unpaid dues. In response, Thomas F. Smith, Secretary of Tammany Hall, called that action “a joke” and stated that “the club hasn't mattered locally since 1896.”

Mr. Murphy remained “the Chief” of Tammany Hall.

Mr. Murphy remained "the Chief" of Tammany Hall.

The various official inquiries into the system of graft in State contracts conducted by Special Commissioner James W. Osborne and other officials continued after the election. In January, 1914, Bart Dunn, an associate Tammany leader of the Eighteenth Assembly District and a close friend of Charles F. Murphy, was convicted of conspiracy in highways construction graft, and sentenced to ten months in the penitentiary and to pay a fine of $500; he took an appeal and was let out on bail. Subsequently, however, he was compelled to serve six months in prison.

The various official investigations into the corruption in state contracts, led by Special Commissioner James W. Osborne and other officials, continued after the election. In January 1914, Bart Dunn, an associate Tammany leader from the Eighteenth Assembly District and a close friend of Charles F. Murphy, was convicted of conspiracy related to construction graft and sentenced to ten months in prison along with a $500 fine; he appealed and was released on bail. However, he eventually had to serve six months in prison.

On February 15, 1914, after he had been summoned to testify again in an investigation by District Attorney Whitman, State Treasurer John J. Kennedy committed suicide. As State Treasurer, Kennedy was ex-officio a member of the State Canal Board which had control of contracts now under investigation; his son was, in conjunction with others, one of whom was under indictment,[390] in the business of bonding contractors on canal and other State work. It was believed that worry arising from the forthcoming examination as to his son’s transactions, was the cause of Kennedy’s suicide.

On February 15, 1914, after being called to testify again in an investigation by District Attorney Whitman, State Treasurer John J. Kennedy took his own life. As State Treasurer, Kennedy was automatically a member of the State Canal Board, which oversaw contracts currently under investigation; his son was involved, along with others, one of whom was facing indictment,[390] in the business of bonding contractors for canal and other state projects. It was thought that anxiety over the upcoming inquiry regarding his son’s dealings led to Kennedy’s suicide.

At a hearing conducted by the District Attorney’s office, in New York City, on February 26, 1914, Mr. Sulzer again related, this time in testimony, the story of the $25,000 campaign contribution by Anthony N. Brady and that of $10,000 by Allan Ryan, both of which contributions were made in 1912. “Once,” Mr. Sulzer testified, “in a talk with Murphy, he told me that Ryan had given a check for $25,000 in 1912. Murphy said that he would report that, but not the $10,000. He said he would find a dummy for that. He also found dummies for Brady’s $25,000.” Mr. Sulzer explained that a certain $25,000 that Mr. Murphy had returned to Brady was not the $25,000 that Brady had contributed to the campaign of 1912. Brady, so Mr. Sulzer testified, had sued Murphy for $40,000 and Murphy had settled the suit for $25,000; the records would disclose this suit, Mr. Sulzer said.

At a hearing held by the District Attorney’s office in New York City on February 26, 1914, Mr. Sulzer again recounted, this time as testimony, the story of the $25,000 campaign contribution from Anthony N. Brady and the $10,000 from Allan Ryan, both made in 1912. “Once,” Mr. Sulzer testified, “in a conversation with Murphy, he told me that Ryan had written a check for $25,000 in 1912. Murphy said he would report that, but not the $10,000. He mentioned he would find someone to cover that up. He also found people to cover up Brady’s $25,000.” Mr. Sulzer explained that a particular $25,000 Mr. Murphy had returned to Brady was not the same $25,000 that Brady had contributed to the 1912 campaign. Brady, according to Mr. Sulzer’s testimony, had sued Murphy for $40,000, and Murphy had settled the lawsuit for $25,000; the records would show this lawsuit, Mr. Sulzer stated.

Thus far some of the smaller grafters have been convicted and sentenced to jail, but the really powerful politicians involved have not suffered. After two months’ consideration of the charges of graft and official misconduct brought against C. Gordon Reel, State Engineer John A. Bensel, Duncan W. Peck, State Superintendent of Public Works—the three officials forming the highways Commission under the régime of which, it was charged, the large grafting had been going on—the Albany County Grand Jury, on April 28, 1914, reported that no indictments had been found against any of these men, nor against Charles A. Foley, Deputy Superintendent of Highways. According to facts disclosed by Mr. Osborne’s investigation, many of the 318 repair contracts let by Foley and passed by Reel, Bensel and Peck, were awarded only after contractors had contributed to the[391] Democratic campaign fund. Numerous of the roads covered by these contracts were so badly constructed that they went to pieces within a year; and the State, so Mr. Osborne charged, thereby lost hundreds of thousands of dollars.

So far, some of the smaller crooks have been convicted and sent to jail, but the really powerful politicians involved have faced no consequences. After two months of reviewing the charges of bribery and official misconduct against C. Gordon Reel, State Engineer John A. Bensel, Duncan W. Peck, State Superintendent of Public Works—the three officials who made up the highways Commission during the time when the major corruption was alleged to occur—the Albany County Grand Jury reported on April 28, 1914, that no indictments had been issued against any of these men, nor against Charles A. Foley, Deputy Superintendent of Highways. Based on the information revealed by Mr. Osborne’s investigation, many of the 318 repair contracts awarded by Foley and approved by Reel, Bensel, and Peck were granted only after contractors had contributed to the [391] Democratic campaign fund. Many of the roads covered by these contracts were so poorly built that they fell apart within a year; and, according to Mr. Osborne, the State ended up losing hundreds of thousands of dollars because of this.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Final Report of the Joint Legislative Committee Appointed to Investigate the Public Service Commissions, March, 1917, p. 67.

[1] Final Report of the Joint Legislative Committee Appointed to Investigate the Public Service Commissions, March, 1917, p. 67.

[2] Ibid., p. 68.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid., p. 68.


CHAPTER XXXVII
Tammany's Current Status
1914-1917

Upon the removal of Governor Sulzer from office, Martin Glynn, as has already been noted, had become Governor of New York State. A Democrat, he consequently appointed men of the party to which he belonged to various offices. Tammany and its auxiliaries now had control of the Public Service Commission, First District.

Upon the removal of Governor Sulzer from office, Martin Glynn, as noted earlier, became Governor of New York State. A Democrat, he appointed members of his party to various positions. Tammany and its allies now controlled the Public Service Commission, First District.

But this control was abruptly ended by the effect of the disclosures made in the testimony before the (Thompson) Joint Legislative Committee probing into the affairs of the Public Service Commissions. Mr. Glynn was succeeded as Governor by Charles S. Whitman who had done such notable service as District Attorney of New York County. During 1915 the Joint Legislative Committee held many hearings at which much testimony of an upheaving nature was given.

But this control abruptly stopped due to the revelations made during the testimony before the (Thompson) Joint Legislative Committee investigating the Public Service Commissions. Mr. Glynn was replaced as Governor by Charles S. Whitman, who had previously served effectively as the District Attorney of New York County. In 1915, the Joint Legislative Committee held many hearings where a significant amount of shocking testimony was presented.

One result of this inquiry was a series of grave charges against Edward E. McCall, Chairman of the Public Service Commission, First District, and, as we have seen, recent candidate of Tammany Hall for Mayor. Accompanied, by a request for Mr. McCall’s removal from office, these charges were made to Governor Whitman by the Joint Legislative Committee on December 12, 1915, and were supplemented by a bill of particulars, specifying twenty charges, formally filed ten days later.

One result of this investigation was a number of serious allegations against Edward E. McCall, Chairman of the Public Service Commission, First District, and, as we’ve seen, a recent candidate for Mayor backed by Tammany Hall. Along with a request for Mr. McCall’s removal from office, these allegations were presented to Governor Whitman by the Joint Legislative Committee on December 12, 1915, and were followed by a detailed document listing twenty charges, officially filed ten days later.

The charges declared that Mr. McCall’s acceptance of his appointment to the Public Service Commission was in[393] violation of law; that he was at the time the owner of stock in a corporation subject to the Public Service Commission’s supervision; that thereafter he attempted to transfer this stock to his wife “which attempt was a mere subterfuge and a clumsy effort to evade the statute”; and that as Chairman of the Public Service Commission he participated in the consideration of matters affecting the value of this stock.

The charges stated that Mr. McCall’s acceptance of his position on the Public Service Commission violated the law; he was the owner of stock in a company that fell under the Commission’s supervision at that time. Furthermore, he tried to transfer this stock to his wife, which was seen as a mere trick and a poor attempt to evade the law. As Chairman of the Public Service Commission, he also took part in discussions that affected the value of this stock.

Further, the charges accused Mr. McCall of accepting a retainer for legal services from a corporation, the chief owner of the stock of which was commonly reputed to be a controlling factor in the management of the Interborough Rapid Transit Company; and that in another case he accepted a retainer in an action then pending in the Supreme Court “in which action the engineers in the employ of the Public Service Commission will be necessary as material witnesses.” Other charges specified that he favored the public service corporations to the detriment of public interests. The sixteenth charge particularized that in the matter of the third tracking of the elevated railroads in Manhattan he failed to reserve the power of supervision to the Commission “and that as a result of such failure the lessee of the Manhattan Railway Company [the Interborough] has entered into extravagant and improvident contracts under which its stockholders and the people of the City of New York have suffered and will suffer large losses”. The seventeenth charge arraigned McCall for having authorized the construction of connecting lines by the Interborough Rapid Transit Company “at an extravagant and exorbitant price and without competition to the disadvantage of the city of New York and its inhabitants.” The eighteenth charge set forth that in the execution of the dual subway contracts “he permitted the inclusion of a provision under which the New York Municipal Railway Corporation will be permitted unwarrantedly to deduct from the earnings of that company, before the division of the net earnings[394] between the company and the city can be accomplished, a sum aggregating more than $10,000,000.” In brief, the charges declared that McCall showed misconduct in office, favoritism, neglect of duty, and inefficiency.

Further, the charges alleged that Mr. McCall accepted a retainer for legal services from a corporation, the main owner of which was widely believed to be a key player in the management of the Interborough Rapid Transit Company; and that in another case he accepted a retainer in an ongoing action in the Supreme Court “in which case the engineers working for the Public Service Commission will be needed as key witnesses.” Other charges claimed that he favored the public service corporations over the public’s interests. The sixteenth charge detailed that regarding the third tracking of the elevated railroads in Manhattan, he failed to maintain the Commission's supervisory power “and that as a result of that failure, the lessee of the Manhattan Railway Company [the Interborough] has entered into extravagant and reckless contracts that have caused and will cause significant losses for its shareholders and the people of New York City.” The seventeenth charge accused McCall of authorizing the construction of connecting lines by the Interborough Rapid Transit Company “at an excessive and unreasonable price and without competition, disadvantaging New York City and its residents.” The eighteenth charge noted that in carrying out the dual subway contracts “he allowed a provision that enables the New York Municipal Railway Corporation to unjustly deduct from that company’s earnings, before any distribution of the net earnings[394] between the company and the city, an amount exceeding $10,000,000.” In summary, the charges stated that McCall exhibited misconduct in office, favoritism, neglect of duty, and inefficiency.

After consideration of the charges, Governor Whitman, on December 6, 1915, removed Mr. McCall from office as the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, First District. The particular charge substantiated was that McCall violated that section of the Public Service Commissions law forbidding a Commissioner to hold stock in a corporation subject to the Commission’s supervision.

After reviewing the charges, Governor Whitman, on December 6, 1915, dismissed Mr. McCall from his position as Chairman of the Public Service Commission for the First District. The specific charge proven was that McCall violated the part of the Public Service Commission law that prohibits a Commissioner from owning stock in a corporation under the Commission’s oversight.

McCall, however, was not the only Public Service Commissioner involved in the revelations before the Joint Legislative Committee. At a session on December 16, 1915, Sidney G. Johnson, vice-president of the General Railway Signal Company, testified that Robert Colgate Wood, another Public Service Commissioner, demanded $5,000 from the Union Switch and Signal Company for using his influence as Commissioner to give that company a subway signal system contract. The offer, it was testified, was refused. On January 25, 1916, the Grand Jury in New York County indicted Mr. Wood for the alleged solicitation of a bribe. Meanwhile, on December 27, 1915, George V. S. Williams, another Public Service Commissioner, resigned from office on the plea that for some time he had been contemplating this step, and now that he was no longer “under fire” he could retire in justice to himself.

McCall, however, wasn’t the only Public Service Commissioner involved in the revelations before the Joint Legislative Committee. At a session on December 16, 1915, Sidney G. Johnson, vice-president of the General Railway Signal Company, testified that Robert Colgate Wood, another Public Service Commissioner, demanded $5,000 from the Union Switch and Signal Company in exchange for using his influence as Commissioner to secure that company a subway signal system contract. The offer, it was testified, was turned down. On January 25, 1916, the Grand Jury in New York County indicted Mr. Wood for allegedly soliciting a bribe. Meanwhile, on December 27, 1915, George V. S. Williams, another Public Service Commissioner, resigned from his position, stating that he had been considering this step for some time, and now that he was no longer “under fire,” he could step down fairly.

Serious as these developments were, they did not have the damaging effect upon Tammany that might ordinarily be supposed. Except in certain offices here and there Tammany was out of power, and therefore, not being prominently on the defensive, could not be effectively assailed. Moreover, in view of the results of a recently tried libel suit, it was anything but a propitious time for Tammany’s Republican opponents to make capital from such incidents.

Serious as these developments were, they didn’t have the negative impact on Tammany that one might expect. Except for a few positions here and there, Tammany was out of power, and since they weren’t on the defensive, they couldn't be effectively attacked. Additionally, following the outcome of a recently concluded libel suit, it was definitely not a good time for Tammany’s Republican opponents to exploit these incidents for political gain.

This libel action, which conspicuously held public attention, was one brought by William Barnes, Jr., Republican State leader, against Theodore Roosevelt. In a published article, Colonel Roosevelt had practically charged that there was a corrupt alliance between Mr. Barnes and Charles F. Murphy, the Tammany leader, and that Mr. Barnes had worked through a corrupt alliance between crooked business and crooked politics. The article did not charge personal corruption in the sense of bribery, but emphasized the nature of the political methods used. The trial of this action resulted, on May 22, 1915, in the jury finding a verdict in favor of Roosevelt.

This libel case, which attracted a lot of public attention, was brought by William Barnes, Jr., a Republican State leader, against Theodore Roosevelt. In a published article, Colonel Roosevelt essentially accused Mr. Barnes of being in a corrupt partnership with Charles F. Murphy, the Tammany leader, and suggested that Mr. Barnes had been involved in a corrupt relationship between dishonest business practices and corrupt politics. The article didn't accuse anyone of personal corruption in terms of bribery but highlighted the type of political tactics used. The trial of this case concluded on May 22, 1915, with the jury delivering a verdict in favor of Roosevelt.

The proceedings of this trial directed general notice much more to the workings of the Republican machine system than to Tammany methods. To the initiated it had long been known that the Republican machine, as the power usually controlling the Legislature, was the preferred instrument through which the powerful financial, industrial, utility, commercial and other corporations operated to get the legislation that they wanted. This fact was now confirmed and disseminated by the outcome of the libel suit. Long, too, had it been suspected that between the apparently hostile political machines there often existed secret understandings or alliances cloaked over by pretended political warfare which was merely mock opposition intended for credulous public consumption. The court proceedings and the verdict showed that the stating of this fact was not a libel.

The trial proceedings drew more attention to how the Republican machine operated than to Tammany's tactics. Those in the know had long understood that the Republican machine, usually in control of the Legislature, was the main tool used by powerful financial, industrial, utility, commercial, and other corporations to push through the legislation they wanted. This was confirmed and brought to light by the outcome of the libel suit. It had also been suspected for a while that there were secret deals or alliances between the seemingly rival political machines, disguised as political battles that were really just for show, meant to deceive the gullible public. The court proceedings and the verdict revealed that stating this was not libel.

The effect upon public opinion of this libel action was far more injurious to the Republican State organization than to Tammany, a reaction naturally to be expected in judging an organization which had so long found campaign material in strong virtuous denunciations of “Tammany corruption.” At the same time public disfavor of the Republican organization was increased by the bad record of the Republican Legislature in 1915—a record[396] that in many respects was worse than that of a Tammany Legislature. These influences were to Tammany’s advantage. Always rushing to excesses when in prosperity, Tammany in times of adversity moderated its action by observing prudence and deferring to public proprieties. Its chief candidates in the 1915 election were men of accredited good character and reputed ability. These conditions, together with the fact that the Republicans and the Progressives did not unite in opposition to Tammany, helped to bring a measure of success to Tammany. For the first time in more than fifteen years Tammany managed to elect a District Attorney in the County of New York in the person of Judge Edward Swann, and it elected Alfred E. Smith to the office of Sheriff.

The impact of this libel lawsuit on public opinion was much more damaging to the Republican State organization than to Tammany, which was to be expected since the Republicans had long campaigned against “Tammany corruption” with strong moral outrage. At the same time, public dislike for the Republican organization grew due to the poor performance of the Republican Legislature in 1915—a record[396] that, in many ways, was worse than that of a Tammany Legislature. These factors worked in Tammany’s favor. While Tammany often went overboard during good times, they showed restraint by being cautious and adhering to public expectations during tough times. Their main candidates in the 1915 election were well-respected individuals with good reputations. These circumstances, along with the fact that the Republicans and Progressives did not join forces against Tammany, contributed to Tammany's success. For the first time in over fifteen years, Tammany succeeded in electing a District Attorney in the County of New York, Judge Edward Swann, and they also elected Alfred E. Smith as Sheriff.

From the beginning of 1916 Tammany was thus in full control of the criminal machinery of the law in New York County. District Attorney Swann showed such energy in the sustained prosecution of the infamous “white slavers,” that the formulating of charges against him came as a surprise to many citizens who had formed a good estimate of his activities in office. These charges, made by Judge James A. Delahanty of the Court of General Sessions, on December 30, 1916, alleged misconduct in office in the matter of certain assault cases resulting from the garment trades strike of 1914.

From the beginning of 1916, Tammany had complete control over the criminal justice system in New York County. District Attorney Swann was so active in relentlessly prosecuting the notorious “white slavers” that the accusations against him took many citizens by surprise, as they had a positive view of his work in office. These accusations, made by Judge James A. Delahanty of the Court of General Sessions on December 30, 1916, claimed misconduct in office regarding certain assault cases that stemmed from the garment trades strike of 1914.

In the list of charges forwarded to Governor Whitman Judge Delahanty accused District Attorney Swann of having deliberately presented a false recommendation to a Judge of General Sessions on the strength of which he obtained the discharge on bail of more than a score of defendants indicted in March, 1914, on various charges of assault, riots, and injuries to property occurring during the course of labor disputes on the East Side. Judge Delahanty further charged that District Attorney Swann even sought to have the indictments against these men dismissed, although seven of them had offered to plead guilty. Judge Delahanty had been an Assistant District[397] Attorney when Mr. Whitman was District Attorney, and hence could claim an intimate familiarity with the details of those very cases. Among the characters concerned in the clothing trades strike were such notorious gangsters as “Dopey Benny” Fein, “Waxy” Gordon, “Jew” Murphy and others such widely known for their activities in the section east of the Bowery.

In the charges sent to Governor Whitman, Judge Delahanty accused District Attorney Swann of intentionally submitting a false recommendation to a Judge of General Sessions. This led to the bail release of over twenty defendants who were indicted in March 1914 for various offenses related to assault, riots, and property damage during labor disputes on the East Side. Judge Delahanty further claimed that District Attorney Swann even tried to get the indictments against these men dropped, even though seven of them had offered to plead guilty. Judge Delahanty had been an Assistant District[397] Attorney when Mr. Whitman served as District Attorney, so he was very familiar with the details of those cases. Among those involved in the clothing trades strike were notorious gangsters like “Dopey Benny” Fein, “Waxy” Gordon, “Jew” Murphy, and others who were well-known for their activities in the area east of the Bowery.

Assistant District Attorney Lucian S. Breckinridge who had had charge of the preparation of many of these cases for trial, had resigned on March 28, 1916, on the ground that District Attorney Swann’s action in the cases was “a travesty on justice, and an outrage to decency,” and that he (Mr. Breckinridge) did not purpose to acquiesce in that action either actively or by silence. In his letter of resignation Mr. Breckinridge asserted that the investigation of the strike “disclosed a tale of wrong and outrage, and a use of gangsters and thugs in labor troubles unparalleled in the history of this country.” On the other hand, Morris Hillquit, chief counsel for the labor unions involved, asserted in an interview that “the indictments were based on evidence furnished by a combination of notorious lawbreakers, who were known as such to the prosecuting officials.” Mr. Hillquit denounced their story as “a most clumsy concoction, bearing evidence of deliberate fabrication.”

Assistant District Attorney Lucian S. Breckinridge, who had been responsible for preparing many of these cases for trial, resigned on March 28, 1916, stating that District Attorney Swann’s handling of the cases was “a mockery of justice and a violation of decency,” and that he (Mr. Breckinridge) would not stand by either actively or passively. In his resignation letter, Mr. Breckinridge claimed that the investigation into the strike “revealed a story of injustice and abuse, as well as the use of gangsters and thugs in labor disputes like nothing seen in this country’s history.” On the other side, Morris Hillquit, the lead attorney for the labor unions involved, said in an interview that “the indictments were based on evidence provided by a group of notorious criminals, who were recognized as such by the prosecution.” Mr. Hillquit condemned their narrative as “a poorly crafted fabrication, clearly showing signs of deliberate deception.”

After the filing of the charges against him, District Attorney Swann declared that the charges were actuated by politics. He made a bitter personal attack upon Mr. Breckenridge, and retaliated later by causing Mr. Breckinridge to be indicted upon the allegation that he had received a bribe from manufacturers. On January 14, 1917, the City Club presented charges to Governor Whitman and asked for District Attorney Swann’s removal from office. The first charge included Judge Delahanty’s statements, and declared that District Attorney Swann’s efforts to procure the dismissal of indictments against labor union men charged with assault constituted an attempt[398] to perpetrate a fraud on the Court of General Sessions, and that its object was to pay a Tammany election debt to East Side labor unionists. The second charge asserted that by various means Mr. Swann had sought to coerce and intimidate Mr. Breckinridge, who was a valuable witness into any inquiry into the charges against the District Attorney.

After the charges were filed against him, District Attorney Swann claimed that they were politically motivated. He launched a harsh personal attack on Mr. Breckenridge and later responded by getting Mr. Breckenridge indicted on accusations of accepting a bribe from manufacturers. On January 14, 1917, the City Club presented charges to Governor Whitman and requested the removal of District Attorney Swann from his position. The first charge included statements from Judge Delahanty and claimed that District Attorney Swann's attempts to get the indictments dismissed against labor union members accused of assault were an attempt[398] to mislead the Court of General Sessions, with the aim of settling a Tammany election debt to East Side labor unionists. The second charge alleged that Mr. Swann had used various tactics to coerce and intimidate Mr. Breckenridge, who was an important witness in any investigation into the allegations against the District Attorney.

At this writing (March, 1917), it is not possible to give the outcome of these charges; the determination of them and the decision are still to be forthcoming from Governor Whitman when sufficient time shall have been allowed for adequate inquiry.

At this point (March 1917), it's not possible to provide the outcome of these charges; the resolution and the decision are still pending from Governor Whitman, once enough time has been given for a thorough investigation.

By the end of 1916 the municipal administration headed by Mayor John Purroy Mitchel had been in power for three years with another year to serve. Usually in past times after a fusion administration had been in office for a year or two its unwise repressive acts only the more strengthened Tammany, which always put forth the boast that it was the real democratic bulwark against aristocratic property rule and that it was the genuine representative of the masses. On this claim it generally had succeeded in elections for nearly two decades, returning a majority of from 75,000 to 100,000 for the Democratic candidates, especially in State and National elections. In the 1916 election Tammany was able to give Wilson a plurality of only about 40,000 over Hughes. To accept the results of any one particular election would be unsafe. Nevertheless, it would seem to be the case that as compared with its past Tammany is in a moribund condition; its only large hold, the decline of which is relieved by but an occasional victory, is in Manhattan Borough. The population of Manhattan is not growing nearly as rapidly as some of the other boroughs which at the same time show an increasing anti-Tammany or Republican tendency.

By the end of 1916, the city administration led by Mayor John Purroy Mitchel had been in power for three years with another year to go. In the past, after a fusion administration had been in office for a year or two, its unwise repressive actions only seemed to strengthen Tammany, which always claimed to be the true democratic barrier against aristocratic property control and the real representative of the masses. Based on this claim, it had generally succeeded in elections for nearly twenty years, winning a majority of about 75,000 to 100,000 votes for Democratic candidates, especially in State and National elections. In the 1916 election, Tammany was able to give Wilson a lead of only about 40,000 over Hughes. Relying on the results of any single election would be risky. However, it appears that compared to its past, Tammany is in a weakened state; its only stronghold, which is declining and occasionally wins a victory, is in Manhattan Borough. The population of Manhattan is not growing nearly as fast as some of the other boroughs, which are simultaneously showing a rising anti-Tammany or Republican trend.

While Tammany has been clinging to outworn tactics and aims out of keeping with the rising standards of the[399] times, the anti-Tammany farces have learned much from the experiences of previous movements. Likewise they have proved responsive to the broadening currents of the age. Whatever their minor mistakes they have not regarded New York City as an object of low political tyranny and brutal spoliation. They have, in the main, applied constructive ability to administration, and have evinced a keen sense not merely of the cleanly appearance and well-ordered functions of the great city but of its architectural and other aesthetic values as well, as shown by several measures recently adopted. This is a very different condition from that prevailing during the times when the city’s affairs were dictated by ignorant politicians whose sole aim was to enrich themselves quickly and satisfy the predatory desires of their followers.

While Tammany has been holding on to outdated tactics and goals that don’t align with the rising standards of the[399] times, the anti-Tammany efforts have learned a lot from past movements. They have also adapted to the changing trends of the era. Despite their minor mistakes, they have not seen New York City as a target for low political oppression and brutal exploitation. For the most part, they have focused on effective administration and shown a strong appreciation not only for the clean appearance and well-organized functions of the great city but also for its architectural and other aesthetic values, as demonstrated by several recently adopted measures. This is a very different situation compared to when the city’s affairs were controlled by ignorant politicians whose only goal was to enrich themselves quickly and fulfill the greedy desires of their followers.

The anti-Tammany forces have learned, too, that repression only nullifies in the popular mind the good effects of other accomplishments. In the last few years New York City officials have allowed absolute freedom of speech and freedom of assemblage on the public streets, designating certain places for the purpose, and qualifying this liberty only by the salutary proviso that the speakers be held responsible for any unlawful utterances. An instructively different attitude, this, from that in days not so long gone by when assemblages of citizens were forbidden to use streets and were mauled and clubbed by the police, and when they were prohibited from holding discussions in public buildings.

The anti-Tammany groups have also realized that repression just undermines the positive impact of other achievements in the public's mind. In recent years, New York City officials have allowed complete freedom of speech and assembly on the streets, designating specific areas for these purposes and only adding the reasonable condition that speakers are accountable for any unlawful statements. This shows a significantly different mindset compared to not too long ago when citizens were banned from using the streets for gatherings, were beaten and clubbed by the police, and were restricted from having discussions in public buildings.

Judged by the performances of many exploiting administrations that have ruled and robbed New York City, Mayor Mitchel’s administration has been one of wholesome tendencies and accomplishments. Its opponents have bitterly attacked some of its policies, but however of a debatable nature these may have been or are, the antagonists of this administration have not been able to assail it on the score of endorsed graft and incompetence as has been the case with so many other city administrations.[400] It is not contended that evils have entirely disappeared, but at any rate the base, ignoble practices and the repellant incompetence characteristic of past “boss” rule have been much supplanted by improved methods, expert judgment, technical experience, a higher tone, and good spirit.

Considering the actions of many corrupt administrations that have controlled and exploited New York City, Mayor Mitchel’s administration stands out for its positive direction and achievements. His opponents have harshly criticized some of his policies, but no matter how contentious these may be, his critics have not been able to attack him for accepted corruption and incompetence like so many other city administrations have faced. [400] It's not claimed that all problems have disappeared, but the corrupt practices and shocking incompetence typical of past "boss" rule have largely been replaced by better methods, expert judgment, technical skills, a higher standard, and a positive spirit.

The police department, so long the special canker, has been placed on a different basis. A recent report of the Bureau of Social Hygiene, which has closely investigated that department, does not claim that graft has been entirely eliminated but it points out that “tremendous gains have been made.” The “vice ring,” it reports, has been broken up; the gambling evil has been greatly reduced; organized graft is no longer the sinister and secure system that it was. “Collusion between exploiters of vice and officials in the Police Department has ceased. Petty grafting still occurs. The man on the beat may take a small bribe to overlook a breach of the law, but protection can no longer be purchased.” The Committee of Fourteen gives credit for this transformation largely to the “clean-up” movement started by Police Commissioner Cropsey under Mayor Gaynor, and continued and elaborated by Police Commissioner Arthur Woods under Mayor Mitchel’s administration. Some survivals of old standards still remain, particularly in the selection of policemen too much for physical capacity and not enough for technical intelligence as applied to detective work. From these continuing old standards serious incapacity has often resulted in the unearthing of crimes.

The police department, once a major problem, has been restructured. A recent report from the Bureau of Social Hygiene, which has thoroughly examined that department, doesn’t claim that corruption has been completely eliminated, but it does highlight that “tremendous gains have been made.” The report states that the “vice ring” has been dismantled, gambling issues have significantly decreased, and organized corruption is no longer the powerful and secure system it used to be. “Collusion between vice exploiters and officials in the Police Department has ended. Minor corruption still happens. Officers on the beat might accept a small bribe to ignore a law violation, but protection can no longer be bought.” The Committee of Fourteen attributes much of this change to the “clean-up” movement initiated by Police Commissioner Cropsey under Mayor Gaynor, and further developed by Police Commissioner Arthur Woods during Mayor Mitchel’s time. Some remnants of old practices still exist, especially in the recruitment of police officers focusing too much on physical strength and not enough on the investigative skills needed for detective work. These outdated criteria have often led to serious failures in solving crimes.

Had New York City a homogeneous population the movement for a general elevation of civic standards would have proceeded faster. But New York City’s conglomerate population with its polyglot diversities has naturally presented great difficulties in the solid formation of a unity of understanding and purposes. Nevertheless the progress has been very considerable. In spreading its educational measures for the conservation of health, the[401] Health Department of New York City for example, has obviously encountered serious obstacles, in dealing with a heterogeneous and in many quarters a congested population. Yet by intelligent perseverance it has succeeded so well that in 1916, notwithstanding an infantile paralysis epidemic, the death rate was only 13.82 per 1000—the lowest death rate in New York City’s history. The notable improvements brought about by these and other departments attest ever-increasing proficiency. Where formerly the traditional conception of politics in New York City was one cynically regarding office as a legitimate means of spoils, graft, corruption and corporation pillaging, new traditions have been gradually substituted. The old influences may here and there persist, but they are no longer accepted by masses of voters as a fixed creed. The stage has been passed when the open venality of politics can be successfully flaunted; it is now the subtle influences often seeking surreptitiously to use government for their own invidious ends that require the watching.

If New York City had a more uniform population, the push for overall improvement in civic standards would have progressed more quickly. However, the city's diverse and mixed population has created significant challenges in forming a unified understanding and common goals. Despite this, there has been notable progress. For example, the Health Department of New York City has faced serious challenges while implementing educational initiatives to protect public health, especially among its diverse and often crowded communities. Yet through smart perseverance, they achieved such success that in 1916, despite an outbreak of polio, the death rate was only 13.82 per 1,000—the lowest in the city's history. The significant improvements made by various departments demonstrate a growing level of competence. Where the typical view of politics in New York City used to see public office as a means for corruption, graft, and exploitation, new values have slowly taken their place. While old influences might still exist in some areas, they are no longer seen as a given by many voters. The time has passed when the blatant corruption of politics can be openly displayed; now it's the subtle influences that often try to manipulate government for their own selfish purposes that we need to keep an eye on.

The supporters of Mayor Mitchel’s administration hold that by eradicating partisan politics it has been able to concentrate its whole attention upon the one duty of providing efficient government for the city. They point out, that contrary to the careless methods of some former administrations, the Mitchel administration has, by prudent supervision of finances reduced the budget annually by several million dollars, and yet has made notable extensions in service. They further call attention to the fact that the Mitchel administration has put a stop to the ruinous practice of mortgaging the credit of the city for generations in advance. For the first time, they also tell, New York City has protested against the old arbitrary practice of making enormous State appropriations for objects in which New York City had no share; that as result of this protest the State has already made partial restitution; and that the program of city relief in this direction should eventually mean an annual reduction of[402] $12,000,000 in New York City’s tax burdens. The Mitchel administration forces emphasize the great increase in the collections from taxes, assessments, water rates, docks, ferries, subway and miscellaneous revenue. These are some of the financial improvements enumerated.

The supporters of Mayor Mitchel’s administration believe that by eliminating partisan politics, it has been able to focus entirely on its main responsibility of providing effective government for the city. They point out that, unlike the careless approaches of some past administrations, the Mitchel administration has prudently managed finances, cutting the budget by several million dollars each year while still expanding services. They also highlight that the Mitchel administration has stopped the damaging practice of mortgaging the city’s credit for future generations. For the first time, they say, New York City has opposed the old arbitrary practice of making huge State appropriations for projects that did not benefit the city; as a result of this protest, the State has already started to make partial restitution, and the city relief program in this area could eventually lead to an annual reduction of [402] $12,000,000 in New York City’s tax burdens. The supporters of the Mitchel administration stress the significant increase in collections from taxes, assessments, water rates, docks, ferries, subways, and other revenue. These are some of the financial improvements listed.

In the line of departmental progress Mayor Mitchel’s administration is credited with a large list of reforms and innovations: The transformed morale of the Police Department; the efficiency of the Fire Department in greatly curtailing the number of fires while at the same time that department has cost $200,000 less a year than formerly; the humanizing of the activities of the Charities Department and of the correctional system; the progressive work of the Health, Education and other departments; the enterprise of the Dock Department in adding seven miles of wharfage and vast areas of dock space to New York harbor’s piers. This is but the merest synopsis of the abundant details set forth showing what Mayor Mitchel’s administration has done.

In terms of departmental progress, Mayor Mitchel’s administration is recognized for a long list of reforms and innovations: the improved morale of the Police Department; the Fire Department's effectiveness in significantly reducing the number of fires while also costing $200,000 less per year than before; the more compassionate approach of the Charities Department and the correctional system; the proactive work of the Health, Education, and other departments; and the efforts of the Dock Department in adding seven miles of wharf space and large areas of dock space to New York harbor's piers. This is just a brief overview of the many details that illustrate what Mayor Mitchel’s administration has accomplished.

So attractive is this record that the description may possibly seem open to the suspicion of being one-sided, if not effusive. Recalling how often New York City has suffered from flagrant maladministration, the skeptic may be tempted to regard these attributed deeds as being too good to be true. Besides, campaign documents are to be scrutinized not so much for their assertions as for their omissions.

This record is so appealing that the description might come off as biased, if not overly enthusiastic. Considering how often New York City has dealt with blatant mismanagement, a skeptic might think these claimed accomplishments are too good to be true. Furthermore, campaign documents should be examined more for what they leave out than for what they say.

It is true that the great bulk of the accomplishments of Mayor Mitchel’s administration may be justly claimed by his supporters as genuine services which are bound to become fixed standards any overthrow of which will not be easily tolerated by the educated public. These Administration annalists, however, have not separated the reforms essentially enduring from those which by their nature are merely experimental, as, for example, certain educational policies. But experiments have their distinct[403] value; better that they should be tried than inertia should prevail.

It’s true that the majority of the achievements of Mayor Mitchel’s administration can rightfully be claimed by his supporters as real services that will likely become established standards, and any attempt to overturn them won’t be easily accepted by the educated public. However, these chroniclers of the Administration have not distinguished between reforms that are fundamentally lasting and those that are, by their nature, merely experimental, like certain educational policies. But experiments have their own distinct[403] value; it’s better to try them than to let things stagnate.

One of the few specific charges brought against Mayor Mitchel’s administration is the assertion that a coterie of real estate speculators has profited unduly by the sale of park sites and other real estate to the city and State during recent years. In reply the supporters of Mayor Mitchel’s administration say that the acquisition of these properties was indispensable to great public improvements planned; that whatever payments have been made have been paid by the regularly determined award of the courts; and that there is not the slightest evidence of collusion on the part of city officials.

One of the few specific accusations against Mayor Mitchel’s administration is the claim that a group of real estate investors has unreasonably profited from selling park land and other properties to the city and state in recent years. In response, supporters of Mayor Mitchel’s administration argue that acquiring these properties was essential for the significant public improvements that were planned; that any payments made were based on the standard court-awarded amounts; and that there is no evidence whatsoever of collusion among city officials.

Thus far the opponents of Mayor Mitchel’s administration have devoted much of their energy to attempts at personal onslaughts. This line of action has called forth the comment that it is because of the very absence of administrative scandals that the administration’s adversaries resort to vague personal attacks. From these opponents has come the persistent innuendo that because of Mayor Mitchel’s occasional social associations with rich and powerful personages, his official activities must necessarily be influenced by that contact. It is aptly pointed out that the hypocrisy and demagogery of such an aspersion may be properly estimated when it is recalled that the elements mainly concerned in spreading it have been the identical organized forces that year after year were the tools of designing men and corporations that by the adroit use of corrupt politics vested in themselves huge corporate privileges and powers and enormous wealth.

So far, the opponents of Mayor Mitchel’s administration have spent a lot of their energy trying to attack him personally. This approach has led to the observation that it’s precisely because there are no real administrative scandals that the administration’s critics fall back on vague personal jabs. These opponents continue to imply that because Mayor Mitchel sometimes socializes with wealthy and influential people, his official work must be swayed by those connections. It’s important to note the hypocrisy and demagoguery of such claims when considering that the groups mainly pushing this narrative are the same organized forces that, year after year, have been manipulated by scheming individuals and corporations who, through clever corrupt politics, have secured massive corporate privileges, power, and wealth for themselves.

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